Constitutional reform and effective government

As the United States prepares to celebrate the bicenten nial of its Constitution, many experienced statesmen and thoughtful scholars are raising questions about the adequacy for contemporary times of the institutional structure created by that grand document. The division of policymaking authority among three centers of power the presidency, the Senate, and the House provides a safeguard against hasty and ill-considered action, as the framers intended. But that division can also lead to debilitating conflict that renders the government incapable of dealing with critical problems in a timely and decisive manner. Those who believe that the govern ment is too prone to stalemate and deadlock have suggested a broad range of institutional changes designed to encourage a greater degree of harmony between the executive and legislative branches.

In this book, James L. Sundquist reviews the framers' rationale in creating the country's unique constitutional structure and then ana lyzes various proposals for altering that structure or the relationships among its institutional elements. He identifies three problems as fundamental. First, the electoral system commonly leads to divided control of the executive and legislative branches between the two major parties, making policy conflict and deadlock all but inevitable. Second, the short interval of only two years between national elections tends to preoccupy presidents and legislators alike with the always imminent next election, and to limit to only a few months every four years the "window of opportunity" for dealing with pressing matters free from electoral distraction. Third, the absence of a workable mechanism for replacing a government that has palpably failed, for any of a wide range of possible reasons, permits what may be a dangerously long wait until the next regularly scheduled election. In his analysis, the author emphasizes feasible remedial measures to alleviate or resolve these problems.