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Economics of the public choice

By: Material type: TextTextPublication details: "Cheltenham, U.K."; Edward Elgar; 1996Description: 252 pISBN:
  • 9781852785147
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 302.13 MCN
Summary: In The Economics of Public Choice, Patrick McNutt evaluates a range of public choice concepts including rent-seeking, voting and voter behaviour, the growth of government and bureaucracy. This authoritative text offers a refreshing insight into traditional public choice territory, using diagrammatic exposition coupled with perceptive commentary. Each chapter develops its arguments from first principles to a comprehensive review of the main issues. Evidence on the growth of government is analysed and rent-seeking is presented with an emphasis on property rights. Niskanen’s theory of bureaucracy is reexamined against the background of the bureau-shaping models. In his approach to the economic theory of clubs, the author examines possible non-economic factors at play in the optimal provision of a public good. A final chapter on democracy reexamines the Downsian question: why bother to vote? This refreshing and critical evaluation of the traditional concepts of public choice analysis judiciously balances micro and macro issues, ensuring that it will be welcomed by students, academic and professional economists and policymakers.
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Books Books Gandhi Smriti Library 302.13 MCN (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 80770
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In The Economics of Public Choice, Patrick McNutt evaluates a range of public choice concepts including rent-seeking, voting and voter behaviour, the growth of government and bureaucracy.
This authoritative text offers a refreshing insight into traditional public choice territory, using diagrammatic exposition coupled with perceptive commentary. Each chapter develops its arguments from first principles to a comprehensive review of the main issues.

Evidence on the growth of government is analysed and rent-seeking is presented with an emphasis on property rights. Niskanen’s theory of bureaucracy is reexamined against the background of the bureau-shaping models. In his approach to the economic theory of clubs, the author examines possible non-economic factors at play in the optimal provision of a public good. A final chapter on democracy reexamines the Downsian question: why bother to vote?

This refreshing and critical evaluation of the traditional concepts of public choice analysis judiciously balances micro and macro issues, ensuring that it will be welcomed by students, academic and professional economists and policymakers.

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