Fact and theory in economics: the testament of an institutionalist

INSTITUTIONAL economics has meant different things to different men. Veblen and Commons, for example, saw the world through glasses of similar coloration but different re solving powers, as the initial essay in the present collection brings out. Mitchell's view of the world and that of J. M. Clark, to mention two men whose names appear frequently in t the following pages, emphasized still other aspects. Yet all these men shared a sense of the shortcomings of traditional economics and a belief in the applicability of natural science methods to social science problems. Probably no member of the group that proudly accepted the institutional label has represented more fully the varied directions of interest, or expounded more systematically the common philosophy, than Morris Copeland.
The essays presented here have been selected from a much larger total with a view to demonstrating the meaning of the institutionalist approach in concept and practice. Taken all together, the essays in the first group, "Objectivity in Eco nomics," outline the institutionalist philosophy and catalogue its main criticisms of neoclassical economics. The two groups that follow reflect the institutionalist emphasis on the need for precision in economic statistics and procedures of verification ("Toward Better Measurement and Testing') and for a continuing refinement of the tools of economic analysis ("Social Accounting Concepts"), though each is only a sampling of what might have been included. A group of theoretical essays brings to a conclusion this expression of belief in the need for a blend of economic fact and theory that has given this volume its title.