Making regulatory policy / edited by Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas

Few scholars have applied modern behavioral and organization theory to study the regulatory agencies, and fewer still have integrated this approach with frameworks drawn from adminis trative law and analysis. This multidisciplinary collection combines detailed case studies with theoretical discussions drawing upon legal con cepts, organizational analysis, and behavioral theory.

In part 1, Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas provide a theoretical overview of regula tory policymaking by contrasting two basic perspectives on the administrative decision process: bounded rationality and social construc tion. Paul Rock (Sociology, London School of Economics) demonstrates the complexity of policymaking processes and the difficulties of disentangling lines of influence and even chronologies of events. Peter K. Manning (Sociology, Michigan State University) explores the relevance of conceptions of risk, hazard, or catastrophe to emergent policy, using the occa sion of the near-disaster in 1979 at Three Mile

Island in Pennsylvania for illustrative purposes. In part 2, Barry Boyer (Law and Social Policy, SUNY-Buffalo) analyzes the relationship between legal procedures for policymaking and the various constituency groups concerned with the Federal Trade Commission. Robert L. Rabin (Law, Stanford) analyzes the role of political climate in shaping regulatory policy in the Envi ronmental Protection Agency. Errol Meidinger (Law and Social Policy, SUNY-Buffalo) bases his examination of the influence of professional ideol ogy within the EPA on a market mechanisms philosophy.

Part 3 is concerned with issues of regulatory policy formation that are basic to administrative law and procedure. Colin S. Diver (Law, Univer sity of Pennsylvania) discusses the capacity of agency policymakers to design rules rationally, in view of the perceived level of rule violation. Daniel J. Gifford (Law, University of Minnesota) emphasizes the importance of understanding how the nature of regulatory cases can influence policy governing the delegation of discretion.

In the concluding essay, the editors focus on the central issue of discretion in administrative decision making and the implications of the bounded rationality and social construction frameworks for the design of rules in regulation policy.