Humanist Marxism and wittgensteinian social philosophy

Wittgensteinian philosophy is usually presented as being primarily concerned with problems in logic and language, contributing to the linguistic revolution within post-war analytic philosophy. However, his rejection of empirical realism cannot be confined to a purely conceptual level but entails the suggestion that philosophical problems can be resolved by human practice. Although Wittgenstein, unlike Marx, was primarily concerned with logical problems and used an ahistorical method, he none the less shares with humanist Marxism a culturalist approach which is essential to our understanding of social change. Drawing on recent work in the Marxian and Wittgensteinian traditions, Susan Easton makes a comparison of the two modes of thought by reference to a number of dichotomies in social theory: essence and appearance, facts and values, individual and totality, nature and

convention and materialism and idealism. The book has two principal aims: first, to establish Wittgenstein as a thinker whose project is compatible with Marxism and to situate it within continental rather than Anglo-Saxon philosophy: secondly to employ Wittgensteinian ideas and techniques in analysing and defending the assumptions underpinning humanist

Marxism. While links between Wittgenstein and social science have been noted in recent years, this work ties Wittgenstein's philosophy to a more specific form of Marxism. It will be of particular interest to students of Marx and Wittgenstein, social philosophy and social theory.