Strategies and games : theory and practice
Material type:
- 9780262041690
- 330.015193 DUT
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Gandhi Smriti Library | 330.015193 DUT (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 133820 |
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330.01 REY Operating rules in organizations : macroeconomic and microeconomic analysis | 330.0112 ELL Ahead of the curve: a commonsense guide to forecasting business and market cycles | 330.0151 WHI Do the math! on growth, greed, and strategic thinking | 330.015193 DUT Strategies and games : theory and practice | 330.015195 ANG Mostly harmless econometrics : an empiricist's companion | 330.015195 DOU 3rd ed. Introduction to econometrics | 330.015195 GUI 7th ed. Guide to economic indicators : making sense of economic |
Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate aswell as business school students. This text is the first to provideboth a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety ofreal-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business,political science, and the law.
Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.
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