Game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation

By:

Ray, Debraj

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: New York; Oxford University; 2007Description: 321pISBN:

9780199207954

Subject(s):

Economics

DDC classification:

338.9 RAY

Summary: This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Call number	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
Books	Gandhi Smriti Library	338.9 RAY (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Available		133156

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This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.

The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and
extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?

Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

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