Soviet Union and the third world; Economic bind

This book describes how the Soviet Union's economic performance, capabilities, and the associated Marxist theory have become the Achilles' heel of Moscow's relations with the Third World. Such was not the situation at the outset of Khrushchev's offensive. In 1955, the USSR challenged the West to economic competition in the former colonies, confident that it alone offered them the correct combination of guidance and aid. Twenty-five years later that confidence appears shaken, for it has become evident that Soviet economic capacity does not match Soviet political aspirations. Moreover, many Soviets recognize that their Marxist theories have failed to keep up with the rapid developments in science and technology affecting international economic relations. Khrushchev's initial assurance and uncompromisingly competitive aims have given way to moderation and a fumbling for new means and rationales in the vastly more complicated world.

This study is an examination of Soviet scholarly works and polemics, as well as of official statements and statistics. It deals with the conceptual framework in which economic a range of perceptions and relationships operate; it is neither an economic analysis nor a compendium of factual data.