Politics of administrative alienation in India's rural development programs

The literature on development administration contains a standing contradiction because, in the quest for state-stimulated economic development, the existence of a well-developed, active and committed civil service is generally considered essential for inducing rapid change. Yet reports from the field repeatedly mention extensive disaffection, passivity, and corruption among administrators. Development administrators themselves often blame these negative characteristics on the incidence of political interference and claim that political factors impede the effective implementation of development programs. Far from impeding development progress, however, political-administrative conflict may contribute to economic growth, and a degree of administrative alienation may be salutary evidence that adequate political leverage is being applied to development programs.
This study of India's major rural development programs focusses on the agricultural, cooperative, and banking schemes which in the 1960s were collectively charged with increasing the production of cereal grains. It investigates relations among political and administrative elites within the context of rural India by clarifying mutual images and outlooks of politicians and administrators in Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, the two Indian states having the longest experience with Panchayati Raj. The mutual expectations and behavior of these actors in both agriculturally growing and stagnating areas indicate how administrative resources may be most efficaciously managed in an economy of planned change.