From Khyber to Oxus

Anglo-Afghan relations in the nineteenth century have been the subject of much discussion. Generals posted on the frontier, administrators in the solitude of Simla and latter-day historians have written profusely on the theme. Some have extolled the 'noble savage' in the Pathans; others have romanticised the might of the British Raj; and still others have busied themselves in following the intricacies of Kabul politics. Such studies have, however, been essentially mono-dimensional, concerning themselves primarily with the relations between the Indian government and the Amirs of Kabul. Little attention, if any, has been paid to the Central Asian and European aspects of the Afghan question.

The present study, dealing with the crucial period from 1869 to 1880, seeks to correct the perspective and aims at an original presentation of the Afghan problem. The British in India, as elsewhere, had their legends, myths and heroes. But behind these lay the concrete realities of trade and diplomacy. If an expanding market for British goods was the goal, Afghanistan by virtue of its striking location on the map provided an ideal entrepot. If the object was to launch offensives in Central Asia, the co-operation of the Afghans was indispensable. Russia was both commercial competitor and political enemy, though it was not as great a threat as it was made out to be. Thus the Afghan question involved three distinct relationships those between Kabul and Calcutta, between St. Petersburg and St. James', and between London and Calcutta. The Afghan commitments of the Indian government were not always consistent with the exigencies of European politics, while the interpretation of British interests in Central Asia could vary sharply from London to Calcutta. The tensions of these relationships make an interesting study. Afghan reactions to European expansion add a further dimension to the problem but any assessment of them must be restricted by the limited extent of evidence available. Likewise, it would require access to Soviet archives to make a definitive appraisal of Russian motives and interests.