Rules, games and common pool resources (Record no. 176960)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02492nam a2200217Ia 4500
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20220516203655.0
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020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9780472065462
082 ## - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 333.7 OST
100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Ostrom, Elinor
245 #0 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Rules, games and common pool resources
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Michigan
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Michigan University Press
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Date of publication, distribution, etc. 2006
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 369 p.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. While the tragedy of the commons is real, there are many instances where institutions develop to protect against overexploitation. In this important work, the authors explore empirically, theoretically, and experimentally the nature of such institutions and the way they come about.<br/><br/>Forests, irrigation systems, fisheries, groundwater basins, grazing lands, and the air we breathe are all examples of common-pool resources (CPRs). Because no one has property rights or control over such a resource, users of CPRs are frequently assumed to be caught in an inescapable dilemma ― overexploitation of the resource, or what is commonly known as "the tragedy of the commons." Many well-documented examples of overexploitation exist. The users of commonly held resources have, however, in many instances overcome incentives to destroy the resources and have developed long-enduring institutions that enabled them to utilize these resources more effectively. Understanding the conditions under which users of CPRs successfully develop and maintain effective institutions is critical to facilitating improved resource policies.<br/><br/>Using the analytic tools of game theory and institutional analysis and an empirical foundation based on controlled laboratory experiments and field data, this book explores endogenous institutional development. Specifically, this research focuses on three questions. In CPR dilemmas, to what degree are the predictions about behavior and outcomes derived from noncooperative game theory supported by empirical evidence? Where behavior and outcomes are substantially different from the predicted, are there behavioral regularities that can be drawn upon in the development of improved theories? What types of institutional and physical variables affect the likelihood of successful resolution of CPR dilemmas? This is a work of important relevance to all studying environmental issues from a wide variety of disciplinary perspectives.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element Public goods
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Gardner, Roy (ed.)
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Walker, James (ed.)
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Books
Source of classification or shelving scheme Dewey Decimal Classification
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Total checkouts Full call number Barcode Date last seen Price effective from Koha item type
  Not Missing Not Damaged   Gandhi Smriti Library Gandhi Smriti Library   2020-02-08   333.7 OST 158251 2020-02-08 2020-02-08 Books

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