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MARĀTHĀ HISTORY

RE-EXAMINED

{1295-1707}

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"The real student of mankind treats no standpoint as absolutely right or absolutely wrong."

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P R E F A C E

Why I have attempted this re-examination of Marāṭhā History I have explained in the Introduction. *How* is, no doubt, a matter for the Reader to judge. The subject is both vast and bristling with controversies. I claim no infallibility for either my conclusions or my authorities. I am open to correction.

I am indebted to Rev. Irineu Lobo, S.J., for the citations from Professor Pissurlencar's *Portuguese e Maratas*, as well as for his genial visits during the arduous moments of my writing; to Professor R. V. Oturkar, M.A., for his robust criticism which was helpful even when I was incorrigible ; and to my colleague Mr. K. G. Nitsure, M.A., who has materially shared my labours throughout—and more particularly in the preparation of the Bibliography and the Index.

To the venerable Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai, B.A., I owe much inspiration and help with books and discussions, especially on the pre-Śivāji period.

Great as my obligations are to all these and several other friends who patiently criticised portions of my MS., I own the fullest responsibility for all my views and especially my errors of commission and omission.

Poona, October 1944.

S. R. S.

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INTRODUCTION

No apology is needed to introduce a re-examination of Marāṭhā history which, it will be admitted, has been long overdue. I wish, however, that the task had been attempted by some one more competent or better qualified than myself to undertake it. "The Mahrattas were once a mighty nation", wrote Edward Scott Waring in 1810; "how they rose and how they fell may surely challenge enquiry." Nearly twenty years before Waring's *History of the Mahrattas* appeared the subject had attracted the attention of a German professor of Halle University who published his now little known *Geschichte der Maratten*, as early as 1791, for the edification of his European contemporaries. The writer himself admitted that he could not vouch for the authenticity of the earlier parts of his fantastic work, but that he had compiled it from such accounts as were available to him in the several European languages. It comprised 288 octavo pages and also contained a map prepared by Forster in 1786. The book closes with 'the peace with England of 17th May, 1782.' The author never visited India and the work has little value to-day except as a rare specimen of the first European account of the Marāṭhās full of quaint errors.

The next in point of interest is the better known work of Edward Scott Waring, published in London in 1810. The author was for seven years attached to the English embassy at Poona and had greater opportunities of gaining information upon many points than usually fall to the lot of other persons. "I state this," he records in his Preface, "to excuse the presumption of my undertaking, aware that I expose myself to the charge of having trifled with my time, and of having lost opportunities not to be recovered." Modestly conscious of his limitations, "yet, without arrogance," he adds, "I may assume the merit of having been the first to present the reader

with a connected history of the Mahrattas, derived from original sources, and sources till lately not known to have existed. I am aware that some portions of Mahratta history are before the Public; none, however, derived from their own annals, and consequently neither so copious nor so authentic". He particularly assumes merit 'of having considered his subject most fully, and of having spared no pains to procure every possible record that could add greater interest to his work, or justify the favourable opinion of his friends'. His appraisal of the comparative merits and demerits of the Persian and Marāṭhī source materials is worthy of special attention.

Regarding the former, he writes, "None, so far as I can judge, can be more fallacious, or can less requite the diligence of patient investigation. Ferishta, who composed a general history of India, as well as a particular history of the Deccan, is almost the only historian who merits the praise of impartiality and accuracy. He died before the era of Mahratta independence, and his mantle has not fallen upon any of his brethren. The Mooslims, of course, view with animosity and anguish, the progress the Mahrattas have made in the conquest of their fairest provinces; and which of late years must have been aggravated by the bondage of their king, the unfortunate representative of the house of Timoor. From such persons little that was favourable to the Mahratta character could be expected. The facts they give are garbled and perverted, while the slightest circumstance against them is seized upon, and extended to an immeasurable length. Their style is also a subject of just reprehension. Their forced and unnatural images, their swelling cadences and modulated phraseology, are as disgusting to a discriminating taste, as they must be inimical to historical truth. For in a history composed in verse, something will be sacrificed to measure, and much to rhythm. Although the Persian histories be not written in verse, yet they partake of all its faults. They abound in quaint similes and forced antithesis, while the redundancy of their epithets distract and bewilder attention. If this judgment to the Persian scholar seem harsh, I refer him to the history

of the late Nizam of the Deccan, or, if he object, to the undisputed master of this prurient style, the celebrated Abul Fazil."

One may not quite fall in with this criticism in toto, but it is certainly a welcome corrective to the exaggerated importance that is attached by some latter day scholars to the sanctity of the Persian authorities. Apart from the linguistic features, the Muslim accounts may not be considered more reliable or authentic simply because they contradict the native sources. There is much truth in Waring's warning that from such persons little that was favourable to the Marāṭhā character could be expected: 'The facts they give are garbled and perverted, while the slightest circumstance against them is seized upon, and extended to an immeasurable length'.

On the contrary, "Not so the Mahratta histories", states Waring. "Their historians (some will deny them the name) write in a plain, simple and unaffected style, content to relate passing events in apposite terms, without seeking turgid imagery or inflated phraseology. Excepting in the letter addressed to the Peshwa, by the great Mulhar Rao Holkar, no attempt is made to make the worse appear the better reason. Victory and defeat are briefly related; if they pass over the latter too hastily, they do not dwell upon the former with unnecessary minuteness. They do not endeavour to bias or mislead the judgment, but are certainly deficient in chronology and in historical reflections. Whether I have done justice to their works I am at a loss to determine, aware of my own incompetency, and not ignorant of the deficiency of my materials." The frankness and modesty of Waring are worthy of emulation, though we may not accept all his conclusions.

The premier historian of the Marāṭhās in English, though not on that account unchallengeable, has been and still is, James Cunningham Grant Duff. He was captain of the Native Infantry of Bombay and Political Agent at Satara (1806-22). The first edition of his well-known *History of the Mahrattas* was published in London in 1826 (in 3 vols.). In its latest form (1921) it has been resurrected in two volumes edited by

S. M. Edwardes with an interesting 'Memoir of the Author and a learned Introduction.

"The want of a complete history of the rise, progress, and decline of our immediate predecessors in conquest, the Mahrattas," writes Grant Duff, "has been long felt by all persons conversant with the affairs of India; in so much, that it is very generally acknowledged, we cannot fully understand the means by which our own vast empire in that quarter was acquired, until this desideratum be supplied."

Aware of the difficulties and shortcomings of the indefatigable Orme and the pioneer Scott Waring, Grant Duff honestly strove ('working twelve and fourteen hours daily without intermission... subject to very serious headaches, which at last became very agonising, returning every fifth day, and lasting from six to sixteen hours at a time, requiring me to work with wet cloths girt about my head') to make good their deficiencies, with what result modern scholars best know.

"Circumstances placed me", he says in his Preface to the first volume of the original edition, "in situations which at once removed many of the obstacles which those gentlemen (Orme and Waring) encountered, and threw materials within my reach which had been previously inaccessible." Nevertheless, he confesses his initial lack of education and heavy pre-occupations with civil and military duties, "ill-calculated for preparing us for the task of historians". But it must be admitted that Grant Duff, by his indefatigable labours provided for all his successors a solid bedrock and starting point in the writing of a history of the Marāṭhā people.

He has no doubt provoked much criticism—not undeservedly—; but his very shortcomings and errors provided hot incentives to further efforts by the natives in re-writing their own history more correctly. To be fair to Grant Duff his critics would do well to remember his frank attitude expressed in these unmistakable words: "There being differences of opinion as to whether the writer of history should draw his own conclusions, or leave the reader reflect for himself, I may expect censure or approbation according to the taste of parties.

I have never spared my sentiments when it became my duty to offer them ; but I have certainly rather endeavoured to supply facts than to obtrude my own commentaries ; and though I am well aware that, to gain confidence with the one half of the world, one has only to assume it, I trust that I shall not have the less credit with the other for frankly acknowledging a distrust in myself."

Besides, he has also stated : " in such a work many errors must exist ; of these, I can only say, I shall feel obliged to any person who, after due consideration and inquiry, will have the goodness, publicly or privately, to point them out ". No one can deny that this has been too well done by readers of Grant Duff for over a century since. ' Your difficulty, and yet what none but you could accomplish,' wrote Montstuart Elphinstone to him, ' was to get at facts and to combine them with judgment so as to make a consistent and rational history out of a mass of gossiping *Bukkurs* and gasconading *Tawarcekhs*.' He also suggested : ' I think, however, you should have introduced more of the manners of the Mahrattas as they now stand, and it may be a question whether that does not come more naturally when you reach the present period ; but, on the whole I think that, as you are writing for Europe, you should make people acquainted with your actors before you begin your play '. Grant Duff appears to have acted on this hint somewhat in his ' Preliminary observations respecting the Geography, Chief Features, Climate, People, Religion, Learning, Early History, and Institutions of the Mahratta Country ' ; and these have been supplemented and improved upon by his latest editor in his Introduction. Whether or not Grant Duff's *History of the Mahrattas* ' takes its place in the very first rank of historical compositions ', it has been considered important enough to be translated into Marāṭhī, quoted and criticised during a whole century. Though some of his details and conclusions have been criticised and corrected, the work as a whole is yet to be superseded effectively, despite the researches and writings of generations of scholars.

Mahadev Govind Ranade's *Rise of the Maratha Power*,

published three quarters of a century later, in 1901, not only marked the next milestone in Marāṭhā historiography, but also emphasised a new approach and outlook regarding the subject. It clearly indicated that no foreigner, however diligent or honest, could correctly gauge or interpret the true character or significance of historical movements. Grant Duff had no doubt sensed the importance of 'a very extraordinary power, the history of which was only known in a very superficial manner', but he could not adequately understand or assess its spirit as Ranade could. From this point of view, even Indian scholars of great reputation hailing from other parts of India and drawing their inspirations from tainted sources have sadly missed the real import and correct significance of the rise of the Marāṭhā power. There cannot indeed be any true insight without sympathy. Ranade may not have been right in all his conclusions, but his main contribution consisted in emphasising an approach and view-point. The rise of the Marāṭhā power, he pointed out, 'was not a mere accident due to any chance combination, but a genuine effort on the part of a Hindu nationality to assert its independence'; and that 'the success it achieved was due to a general upheaval, social, religious, and political of all classes of the population'. There are many, he writes, 'who think that there can be no particular moral significance in the story of the rise and fall of a freebooting Power, which thrived by plunder and adventure, and succeeded only because it was the most cunning and adventurous among all those who helped to dismember the great Moghul Empire after the death of Aurangzeb. This is a very common feeling with the readers, who derive their knowledge of these events solely from the works of English historians. Even Mr. Grant Duff has given his support to the view that "the turbulent predatory spirit of the Hindus of Mahārāshtra, though smothered for a time, had its latent embers stirred by the contentions of their Mahomedan Conquerors, till, like the parched grass kindled amid the forests of the Sahyādri mountains, they burst forth in spreading flame, and men afar off wondered at the conflagration". If this view of the historian

be correct, it may fairly be urged that there is nothing in the narrative which can be described as having a moral significance useful for all time. The sequel of this narrative will, however, it is hoped, furnish grounds which will lead the historical student of Modern India to the conclusion that such a view is inconsistent with facts, and that the mistake is of a sort which renders the whole story unintelligible'. Without repeating all his arguments, I feel no hesitation in expressing my complete agreement with his main contention that "Freebooters and adventurers never succeed in building up empires which last for generations and permanently alter the political map of a great Continent." One cannot help regretting that Ranade's contemplated "second volume" of which manuscript notes were nearly ready should have for ever remained unpublished. Nevertheless, his *General Introduction to Shahu Chhatrapati and the Peshwas' Diaries* is a very valuable sequel indicating the sound principles of his treatment.

A History of the Maratha People by C. A. Kincaid and D. B. Parasnis, first published in three volumes (1918, 1922, and 1925), has since been brought out in a single volume (1931). The work, despite the linking together of the two names, bears unmistakable testimony to Mr. Kincaid's individual authorship, though Parasnis must have supplied him the materials. This is the meaning of the acknowledgment: "For twelve years we had been closely associated in the creation of this work". Mr. Kincaid, it must be frankly stated, is a story-writer—not a historian. His second chapter on 'The Pandharpur Movement, 1271-1640', is typical of his method; he hardly misses an opportunity to intersperse his narrative with childish anecdotes which needlessly undermine the standard of the book as a serious study of Marāṭhā History. Denis Kincaid's *The Grand Rebel*, which is admittedly 'An Impression of Shivaji, Founder of the Maratha Empire' (1937) is, within its scope and purpose, a much better representation in a fascinating style of his important theme. His brilliant sketch of Śivājī—"the founder of the Maratha state whose memory inspired the rise of modern Hindu Nationalism,

a man for whom a majority of Hindus entertain much the same sentiment as the Germans for Frederick the Second and the Italians for Garibaldi, and whom the Marathas adore as more than human"—is at once more artistic in its sense of proportion as well as sense of history. His picture of the Marāṭhās presented in his 'Prologue', conveys a truer and more sympathetic impression of the people than is contained in more learned treatises lacking the poetic insight of Dennis Kincaid. As he has neatly put it in his 'Preface': 'Most English people have heard of the Moguls as almost the traditional pre-British rulers of India. They then find it puzzling that the earlier heroes of Anglo-Indian biography apparently *never oppose any Moguls but are constantly in difficulties with the Marathas...* Such of their chiefs who were so unfortunate as to oppose Anglo-Indian celebrities are generally reprobated as rebels; their names, which Victorian writers made earnest but incorrect attempts to spell, provide an easy target for such sprightly historians of to-day as Mr. Guedella, who are entertained by the un-English sound of them. But as at school one's curiosity was often piqued less by the inevitable Romans than by their unsuccessful opponents, many people must have vaguely wondered about these Marathas; the rise of whose power was exactly contemporaneous with the appearance of the English in India; who destroyed the Mogul Empire and disputed with both English and French for the mastery of a sub-continent; who once more opposed the English in the Mutiny, providing in Nana Sahib the cleverest and in the Princess of Jhansi the best and bravest, of the revolutionary leaders; and from whom have sprung rulers of such deserved repute as Princess Ahalyabai of Indore and the present (1937) Gaekwar of Baroda, and dynasties as devoted to the Empire as Gwalior and Kolhapur'.

No other history of the Marāṭhās, as a whole, has since been published in English. The *Riyāsat*, in Marāṭhī, by Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai, stands in a class by itself. It is a mine of information and a monument to the patient industry, painstaking scholarship, and patriotic zeal of the septuagena-

rian historian of Mahārāṣṭra who is still an unbeaten living encyclopædia of historical information with a particular flair for dates, documents and details. This is not the place to assess his vast and varied work as an historian ; but his appreciation by his life-long collaborator and friend, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, may be quoted without being inapposite : “ Eternal vigilance in self-criticism has been the saving salt of his writings. Tireless striving after accuracy, passion for going down to the root of things, cool balance of judgment and unfailing common-sense in interpretation have marked his historical works”. It has been his long cherished desire to present his *Riyāsat* in an English garb. Until that desire is fulfilled, English readers should remain content with his *Main Currents of Maratha History* which is a reprint of his lectures delivered at the Patna University in 1926. The following extract from his introductory remarks is worthy of special attention :—

‘ A vast amount of fresh historical material has been published in Maharashtra during the last quarter of a century, of which the outside public of India who do not know the Marathi language, are more or less ignorant. It is impossible to make all this material available to readers in English, and unless it reaches non-Marathi readers, it cannot excite corresponding research in other languages. With this object in view, I thought of taking a rapid glance over the whole course of Maratha history, touching those salient points which have been recently established in Maharashtra on this new evidence, and those others which are still to some extent debatable, indefinite, or vague. I shall therefore speak on the aims and objects of Maratha policy, explaining what it has achieved and what it has failed to achieve, what good or evil it did to India, and what place it can claim in the history of India as a whole, interpreting, in fact, to the non-Maratha world, the meaning of this documentary evidence, and the results it leads one to, as regards the past achievements of the Marathas. At the same time, I have a great desire to bring about a co-ordination of effort throughout the country between Maharashtra and the other parts of India in this important subject of national

interest.... I think without such an interchange and such a supplementing from all quarters, our individual efforts in Maharashtra will for ever remain isolated and incomplete. Our past is a common property which we all have to share equally.'

This puts in a nutshell the *raison d'être* of the present effort also. It attempts to do more elaborately and systematically what Ranade and Sardesai have already outlined from the point of view of the natives of Mahārāṣṭra. Apart from a popular book in Hindi (G. D. Tamaskar's *Marāṭhonkā Uthān aur Patan* -1930) I have not come across any recent attempt to present Marāṭhā history in a language that might appeal to a wider circle of readers outside Mahārāṣṭra as well. Much research has been carried on ceaselessly, in and outside this province, bringing to light new facts as well as fresh stand-points. The work of synthesising and interpretation has not merely not kept pace with this march of research, but has altogether lagged behind. Very learned treatises, such as Sarkar's *Shivaji and His Times* and Surendranath Sen's *Administrative System of the Marathas and Military System of the Marathas* have been published ; but no attempt has been made to re-examine Marāṭhā history as a whole, in the light of all the new materials and literature.

The task no doubt appears to be too staggering for any single individual to attempt. The materials are so vast, varied and scattered, the languages in which they are found are so many and difficult, and the controversies over details and situations so frequent and baffling, that these have effectively scared away scholars far better equipped and qualified than I can ever claim to be. But time and tide waits for no man, and with the ceaseless accumulation of materials the task is bound to grow more bewildering as the years roll on. It is more than a century since Grant Duff wrote, and nearly a quarter century since Kincaid's book first appeared ; yet, none has come forward to fill the gap.

If I have ventured to meet this need, it is out of no false sense of the lightness of the task that I have done so. I am

fully conscious of the greatness of my subject. However, having at least partially, succeeded in fulfilling such a want in the matter of Mughal History, for a fairly large body of readers, I felt tempted to try to meet this greater *desideratum*, as well. But readers will easily, I hope, note the difference in the treatment and style of presentation of my former and present themes. Considering the nature and scope of Marāṭhā history, as well as my purpose here, I have tried to be artistic without being unscientific, sympathetic without being uncritical, and simple without being unhistorical. I have looked at the pattern as a whole without inspecting the details of the parts too closely, except where they seemed to be of vital importance. While emphasising the perspectives, I hope, I have not been blind to the prosaic details so as to pervert the picture.

The bibliography at the end will indicate the extent of my indebtedness. Friends, too numerous to be mentioned without being invidious, have helped and encouraged me in this endeavour ; but the responsibility for all that I have put in final form here is entirely my own, though I have thankfully considered their criticism and respected their differing points of view. This volume is part of my contemplated work, and closes with the death of Aurangzeb. I have relegated the notes and references to the end which I expect will be found convenient by most of my readers. The Appendices have been added to amplify the text and notes where I considered they were called for. For the rest the work must speak for itself

CHAPTER ONE

THE BACKGROUND

‘The people of that country had never heard of the Mussulmans; the Mahrāṭṭā land had never been punished by their armies; no Mussulman king or prince had penetrated so far. Deogiri was exceedingly rich in gold and silver, jewels and pearls, and other valuables.’—BARANI.

The central fact which provoked the Marāṭhā movement during the seventeenth century of the Christian era was the challenge of Muslim domination. That menace had its portentous beginning in Sind and Multān nine centuries earlier, but its enduring consequences were not realised until long afterwards. Islām was a revolutionary force, and its advent in North India was opposed tooth and nail by the Rājapūts for several centuries. Heroic as their resistance was it nevertheless ultimately proved ineffective. The Muslim advance was delayed but not prevented. Was history to repeat itself in South India? Let us follow rather than anticipate the historical process.

Saturday, 26 February, 1295 A.D. (19 *Rabī ‘-u’l-ākh̄har*, 695 H.)¹ was indeed a fateful day for the Deccan and South India. On that date ‘Alā-u’-d-Dīn Khaljī started from Karā on his historic expedition to Devgiri. The enormous treasure that he got on that occasion, and the ease with which he could gather it, were to him a revelation of the state of things in the South. Firishta reckons it at 600 *maunds* of pearls, 2 *maunds* of diamonds, rubies, emeralds and sapphires, 1,000 *maunds* of silver, 4,000 pieces of silk, besides other precious commodities ‘to which reason forbids us to give credit.’² In addition to this plunder the cession of Elichpūr and its dependencies was also demanded, that the conqueror might leave a garrison there for the collection of revenues to be remitted to him at Karā-Māñikpūr. ‘Alā-u’-d-Dīn determined by this dar-

ing adventure the shape of things to come in the Deccan for several centuries.

Khaljī imperialism was sustained on the gold got from the Deccan and South India,—from Devgiri, Warangal, Dvārasamudra, and Ma'bar. 'Alā-u'd-Dīn made his successful bid for the throne of Delhi being emboldened by the enormous loot he had secured from the Yādava capital. Having murdered his uncle, Sultān Jalāl-u'd-Dīn, and usurped his authority, he was devoured by a zeal for conquest. Ambitious of emulating the example of Alexander the Great, he found additional incentives in religious fanaticism and the greed for gold. In the South he had discovered an El Dorado too tempting to be ignored even in the face of the Mughal raids nearer home. Like Maḥmūd of Ghazna, he covered his lust for lucre with a fervour for his Faith. It was exceedingly worthwhile despoiling the infidels and desecrating their idol-temples in the name of Islām. If, in addition to this, a Kamal Devī or a Deval Devī could also be secured for the royal *harem*, the Ghāzi would consider that a heavenly reward. With all this, 'Alā-u'd-Dīn was a shrewd and practical man. He did not seek to kill the goose that laid the golden egg. During the Warangal expedition he instructed his slave-general, Nā'ib Malik Kāfūr, 'If the Rāi consented to surrender his treasure and jewels, elephants and horses, and also to send treasure and elephants in the following year, the Nā'ib was to accept these terms and not press the Rāi too hard. He was to come to an arrangement and retire without pushing matters too far, lest Rāi Ladar Deo (Pratāparudra Dev II of Warangal) should get the better of him. If he could not do this, he was, for the sake of his own name and fame, to bring the Rāi to Delhi.'³

The Khaljīs ruled over North India from 13 June 1290, when Jalāl-u'd-Dīn ascended the throne at Delhi, to 8 September 1320, when Ghiyās-u'd-Dīn Tughlaq Shāh was proclaimed Sultān by the army. This was a short but revolutionary régime. The Khaljīs inaugurated a military dictatorship of which 'Alā-u'd-Dīn was the best exponent. "The need for security, internal as well as external, was the dominant note of his policy."

He found in South India a rich quarry to support his military rule. Four expeditions were accordingly sent across the Vin-dhyas under his Nā'ib or Deputy, the famous Malik Kāfūr who was a *hazār dīnārī* slave,—a low-caste Hindu purchased in Gujarāt.

In 1306-7 he led an expedition to Devgiri (2nd since 'Alā-u'd-Dīn's) on the ostensible ground that Rāmdev Rāo had failed to pay the promised tribute for three years. The next raid was against Pratāparudra of Warangal in 1309. His third was a campaign into Mysore (Dvārasamūdra) and Ma'bar in 1310—11. In 1312 Malik Kāfūr once again felt it necessary to invade Devgiri in order to punish Rāmdev's son and successor Śankardev. The last Khaljī expedition to the Yādava capital was provoked by the rebellion of Harpāldev, the last ruler of that dynasty, in 1318. This was under Qutb-u'd-Dīn Mubārak Shāh and Malik Khusrau, another Hindu slave of low-caste to act as a Muslim general. This favourite of the depraved Sultān, however, after a victorious expedition into Warangal and Madura, 'hatched the egg of ambition in his brain' and usurped the throne of Delhi by murdering his master Mubārak Shāh.

To understand the easy triumphs of the Muslims during this quarter century (1295—1320) it is necessary for us to study more closely the conditions obtaining in the Deccan and South India at that time. The seven expeditions of the Khaljīs into the South were not unlike the seventeen raids of Mahmūd Ghazna in the North (1000—27): their aims, character, and results were almost identical. Both the Ghaznavid and the Khaljī adventurers were actuated by predatory motives reinforced with religious fanaticism; both were alike tempted by the opulence and political impotence of the infidels. The military advantage in both cases lay with the Muslim aggressors; the revolutionary consequences too were not dissimilar in the two instances. Politically, a portion of the invaded territories nearest to their own kingdoms was annexed by both to serve as a stepping-stone for further encroachments. The Hindus of the South, however, seemed to have learnt nothing from the

misfortunes of their co-religionists in the North. Equally rich, equally divided and short-sighted, their frantic and fitful resistance was foredoomed to failure. The immediate result of the Khaljī incursions was tragic.

The principal kingdoms to bear the brunt of the Muslim attacks in the South were those of Devgiri of the Yādavas, Warāṅgal of the Kākatiyas, Dvārasamudra of the Hoysalas, and Ma'bar (Madura) of the Pāṇḍyas. Among these we are concerned here mostly with the Yādavas ; the rest will be noticed only incidentally.

The Yādava dominions constituted the Mahārāṣṭra of those times. Of their extent and exact boundaries it is not possible to speak accurately. Epigraphic evidence on such matters is not always reliable. The Yādava rulers, like all their contemporaries, claimed victories and conquests with scant regard for truth.⁴ A recent writer, however, has computed that 'During the palmy days of Singhaṇa, the greatest king of the dynasty, the Sēuṇa (Yādava) authority extended over the whole of Western Deccan, comprising Mahārāṣṭra, Northern Konkan, including the districts of North Kanara, Belgāum, Bijāpūr, Dhārwar, Bellāry, and portions of the south-western Telugu country.'⁵ But, for our purposes, the character of this kingdom is of greater importance than its extent or boundaries. Despite the pompous titles assumed by the Yādava monarchs, such as *Pratāpa-chakravartin*, *Samastabhuvanāśraya*, *Samrāt*, and *Śrī Pṛthvī-vallabha*, they proved themselves unworthy of the *Suvarṇagaruḍa-dhvaja* (golden eagle emblem) which they vainly flaunted. Whatever their earlier traditions or achievements in a purely Hindu world, the last three of the glorious Yādavas failed ingloriously in the face of the *Mlechhas*. 'Alā-u'd-Dīn could reduce Rāmdev Rāo to submission in the course of twenty-five days. This amazing and ignominious surrender needs the closest scrutiny. It will reveal that there was nothing in it to support the traditional sentiment regarding the Yādava.⁶

From contemporary Muslim and other (local) sources we are able to reconstruct a fairly reliable picture of the situation. From Amīr Khusrau we learn that 'Alā-u'd-Dīn started from

Karā-Māṇikpūr on 19 *Rabi-'u'l-ākhar* 695 H., and returned to that place 'after taking immense booty from Rāmdeo' on 28 *Rajab* the same year.⁷ According to Wassāf, 'He appointed spies to ascertain when the Rāi's army was engaged in warfare, and then he advanced and *took the country without the means which other kings think necessary for conquest. The prudent Rāi in order to save his life gave his daughter in marriage to the Sultān and made over to him his treasures and jewels.*'⁸ Barani, who followed soon after, states : 'When 'Alā-u'd-Dīn went to Bhailsān (Bhilsā) he heard much of the wealth and elephants of Deogīr. He inquired about the approaches to that place, and resolved upon marching thither from Karā with a large force (3—4,000 horse and 2,000 infantry) but without informing the Sultān 'Alā-u'd-Dīn marched to Elichpūr, and thence to Ghāṭi-lājaurā When 'Alā-u'd-Dīn arrived at Ghāṭi-lājaurā, *the army of Rām-deo under the command of his son had gone to a distance. The people of that country had never heard of the Mussulmans* ; the Mahrattā land had never been punished by their armies ; no Mussulman king or prince had penetrated so far. Deogīr was exceedingly rich in gold and silver, jewels and pearls, and other valuables. When Rām-deo heard of the approach of the Muḥammadans, he collected what forces he could, and sent them under one of his *rāṇās* to Ghāṭi-lājaurā. They were defeated and dispersed by 'Alā-u'd-Dīn who then entered Deogīr. On the first day he took 30 elephants and some thousand horses. Rām-deo came in and made his submission. 'Alā-u'd-Dīn carried off an unprecedented amount of booty.'⁹ 'Iṣāmy alleges that when Rāmdev was warned by Kānhā (governor of Lājaurā) that the Turks were invading his dominions, the heedless monarch dismissed him with ridicule. But the valiant *rāṇā* hastened to the frontier where, with the assistance of two women-warriors, he attempted to stem the tide of invasion. 'The two brave Hindu women who were like tigresses on the battle-field attacked the Turkish army fiercely, thereby exciting the admiration of their foes. Nevertheless the Turks defeated the Hindus and put most of them to death. During the battle, Kānhā and the two women

were taken prisoner though they fought ever so well.¹⁰ Ibn-i-Baṭūṭa says that Rām-deo 'submitted and surrendered the city (Kaṭaka or Deogīr) without fighting, making valuable presents to his conqueror.'¹¹

Firishta, though writing very much later, is supposed to have made use of earlier works which have not survived since. Substantially agreeing with the accounts cited above, he gives further details. He states that 'Alā-u'd-Dīn 'enlisted many chiefs of distinction who had formerly been dependants of the Balban family.'¹² Secondly, he says that 'Alā-u'd-Dīn's army was composed of '8,000 chosen horse.' The first place of any consequence reached by him was Elichpūr where, having stopped for a while to refresh his troops, he moved by forced marches to Deogīr, '*the lower town of which was not entirely fortified, the outer wall being then incomplete.*' Rām-deo, with his son Śankar-deo, was 'absent in a distant part of his dominions.' But, as soon as he heard of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn's advance, he hastened home and tried to intercept the enemy with a numerous army. For this purpose he threw himself in between 'Alā-u'd-Dīn and the city and 'opposed him with great gallantry, but was eventually defeated with severe loss.'¹³ Firishta has supplemented and, in part, modified this statement by reference to the *Mulhiqāt* and the *Ṭabaqāt-i-Naṣirī* thus : 'On reaching Devgiri 'Alā-u'd-Dīn found the Rājā himself in the city, but his wife and eldest son were at worship at a temple at some distance. On the approach of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn, Rām-deo was in the greatest consternation. Having, however, collected 3 or 4,000 citizens and domestics, he opposed the Mahomedans at a distance of two *kos* (4 miles) from the city but, being defeated, retired into the fort which had at that time no ditch.'¹⁴ In his great hurry, Rāmdev had improvised an army of riff-raffs and domestics to defend his capital city ; so too did his men put into the fort salt bags which had been received from the Konkan, mistaking them for grain. The garrison consequently was soon starved into submission. So helpless did the Yādava feel in the grip of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn, that he tried to dissuade his more spirited son Śankardev (who had meanwhile rushed to the city with a large

force) from attacking the aggressor, declaring that the Muslims were 'an enterprising and warlike race, with whom peace was better than war.' The young prince, however, would not be convinced of this until he had tried conclusions with the Turk on the bloody field of battle. This made Rāmdev Rāo apologise to the conqueror in abject and pitiable terms : 'It must be known to you,' he said to 'Alā-u'd-Dīn, 'that I had no hand in the late quarrel. If my son, owing to the folly and petulance of youth, has broken the conditions between us, that event ought not to render me responsible for his rashness.'

'Alā-u'd-Dīn had so effectively surrounded the place that the inhabitants had no opportunity to escape, which enabled him to levy large sums on the merchants by way of contributions. He had also captured 40 elephants, and several thousand horses belonging to Rāmdev in the town. Little wonder that Firishṭa triumphantly observes : 'We may here justly remark that in the long volumes of history there is scarcely anything to be compared with this exploit, whether we regard the resolution in forming the plan, the boldness of its execution, or the great good fortune which attended its accomplishment.'¹⁵ We learn from 'Iṣāmy that Garṣhāsp (i.e. 'Alā-u'd-Dīn) was greatly pleased with Rāmdev ; he summoned him to his camp, and treated him with much consideration. He gave back to Rāmdev his royal umbrella together with his kingdom, and presented him with two powerful elephants. They then vowed to each other that they would act as father and son ; whereupon, Garṣhāsp who had attained his object returned to Karā.'¹⁶

If the Muslim accounts are to be trusted, the conduct of Rāmdev Rāo deserved condign punishment. His son Śankardev and his son-in-law Harpāldev, as we shall presently see, behaved more manfully as well as patriotically. But before proceeding to describe their martyrdom we should hold a closer inquest over the ignominious capitulation of the most inglorious of the Yādavas. Dnāneśvara's dedicatory lines eulogising Rāmdev have misled some writers about the character of his reign.¹⁷

● In the first place, there was little harmony within the royal family. Devgiri was a house divided against itself. On the

death of Kṛṣṇa (1260 A.D.), father of Rāmdev, his brother Mahādev appears to have usurped authority taking advantage of the minority of Rāmdev. When the latter came of age, he had to secure his legitimate patrimony by means of a palace-revolution.¹⁸ References in contemporary works, like Chakra-dhara's *Līlācharita* and Bhāskara's *Śiśupālavadha*, indicate that 'Rāmdev ascended the throne; Āmaṇa (Mahādev's son) was overthrown; and Devgiri underwent a revolution.'¹⁹ (1271). Likewise, Hemādri who was *karaṇādhīpa*²⁰ under Mahādev (whose son Āmaṇa, it is alleged, was cruelly executed by Rāmdev, along with several of his supporters) was too orthodox a protagonist of the conservative order to be on good terms with his new master. Besides being the murderer of his late patron's son, Rāmdev's religious inclinations were too friendly towards the heterodox (if not heretical) sect of the Mahānubhāvas. Hemādri's critics allege that he invited the Muslims to Devgiri, while his defenders charge the Mahānubhāvas with being in league with the *Mlechhas*.²¹ Whether the Muslims came of their own accord or in response to an invitation, the result was the same. It is clear that they must have found the internal situation very inviting indeed. Besides the antipathy between the king and his chief minister, sectarianism was rampant within the State: Sanātānīs vs. Mahānubhāvas, Lingāyats vs. Jainas, etc. Some consider the Mahānubhāvas more anti-Jaina than anti-Sanātānī.²² This only adds one more edge to the anti-so-many dissensions. The militant sect of the Vīra-Śaivas (Lingāyats) was born at Kalyāṇi (the Kalachuri capital) in the Deccan only a century before. It was one of the most violent movements ever started against both Brāhmanism and Jainism.²³ The Muslim invaders were too ready to exploit these differences. They seem to have exempted the Mahānubhāva monks (who wore sable clothes like the Muslim *faqīrs*) from paying the *jiziya*, thereby lending a dismal colour to orthodox suspicions about their complicity with the invaders.²⁴

One trait, however, was common to all the sects of the Hindus, namely, their antipathy towards all the rest. Besides this suicidal exclusivism, the moral or psychological effect of

their total teaching was devitalising. The fourfold way to *Mokṣa* (viz. *Dhāna*, *Karma*, *Bhakti* and *Vairāgya*) inculcated by them only stressed in different terms the means of escaping life. This was the very antithesis of the positive activism of the invading Muslims. To make matters worse, the leadership of Mahārāṣṭra then was in the extremely incompetent hands of Rāmdev Rāo, who, despite his pedantic titles (*Gurjara-kuñjara-dāna-kanṭirava* ; *Teliṅgatuṅga-tarūnmūlanamattadantāvala*; *Mālavapradīpa-śamana-malayānila*, etc), as Rājwāḍé has observed, was an unmilitary king.²⁵ According to the Paṭhan copperplate inscription, Rāmdev granted three villages to 57 Brāhmins on condition that (among other indications of good behaviour) *they should use no weapons* !²⁶ This stipulation, indeed, was superfluous for a people for whom Hemādri had already prescribed an engrossing round of rituals in his *Chaturvarga-Chintāmaṇi*. Its *Vrata*-, *Dāna*-, *Tirtha*-, *Mokṣa*- and *Prāyaścitta-Khaṇḍas* left little room for trifling duties like the defence of the State. *Karma* was not as yet the *action* of the *Gītā*, but only one class of ritual.²⁷

Marco Polo who sojourned through the land between 1288-93, speaks of the people of Ma'bar as 'going to battle with lances and shields, but without clothing, and are a despicable *unwarlike race*.'²⁸ They do not kill cattle, he further observes, nor any kind of animals for food ; but when desirous of eating the flesh of sheep or other beasts, or birds, 'they procure the Saracens, who are not under the influence of the same laws and customs, to perform the office.' But under better leadership, even such a non-violent people were made to give a better account of themselves by other rulers, as we shall notice later. But Rāmdev Rāo of Devgiri possessed little grit and found his own sons quarrelling among themselves.²⁹ A revolt of Mālūgi, one of his feudatories, is referred to by Rudra Kavi in his *Rāṣṭraudha-varṇa Mahākāvya*, wherein Rāmdev was taken prisoner, but released by the intervention of Hemādri.³⁰ Marco Polo also refers to Ṭhānā (?) as 'a great kingdom with a language of its own, and a king of its own, *tributary to nobody*.'³¹ The sovereignty of the Yādavas over the Konkan

appears to have been challenged about this time. According to the poet, above referred to, Mālugi's grand-father obtained Tal-Konkan from the Yādava king as his marriage portion, and this territory was extended by the next two rulers of the Mayūragiri Bāgula family.³² After 1322 the land definitely passed out of the hands of the Hindus into those of the 'Saracens' who conquered it by force of arms, says Odoricus, and 'are now subject to the emperor of Delhi.'³³

Ali this came about because of the initial ineptitude of Rāmdev Rāo. Instead of strengthening the defences of his realm he appears to have indulged in futile puerilities. At the moment of the Muslim attack his capital was in a sad state of negligence : the fort was without a moat, the city without an army, and there were not even provisions for the besieged garrison.³⁴ Even after the shock of the first surprise was over, Rāmdev Rāo did no better. If 'Iṣāmy is to be believed, 'Rāmdev Rāo, who remained loyal to 'Alā-u'd-Dīn, sent a secret messenger to Delhi to inform him that a rebellion headed by Sangama (Śankara?) had broken out at Devgiri against the Sultān. He was himself held a prisoner in his palace by Bhil-lama (Sangama?) and his followers; and he requested the Sultān to send a competent person with an army to put down the rebels and restore the imperial authority.'³⁵ Malik Kāfūr appeared before Devgiri, may be in response to this call, on 24 March 1307 (19 *Ramazān* 706 H). 'Rāmdev and his family who were spared by the special command of the Sultān were made prisoner' and sent to Delhi along with enormous booty.³⁶ According to Firishta, Malik Kāfūr 'having first subdued a great part of the country of the Mahrāṭṭās, which he distributed among his officers, proceeded to the siege of Deogiri, since known by the name Daulatābād. Rām-deo being in no condition to oppose the Mahomedan troops, left his son Śanker-deo in the fort, and *advanced with presents to meet the conqueror* in order to obtain peace.'

Going to Delhi as a prisoner of war, along with 'rich presents and 17 elephants to pay his respects', Rāmdev was '*received with great marks of favour and distinction.*' He had

'royal dignities conferred upon him ; the title of *Rāi-Rāyān* was granted to him, and he was not only restored to his government, but other districts were added to his dominions, for all of which he did homage and paid tribute to the King of Delhi.' The district of Nausāri was given to him and a *lākh* of *tankas* for expenses of his journey home. Rāmdev continued to pay his annual tribute regularly. Barani also tells us how Rāmdev paid obsequious attentions to Malik Kāfūr, 'as dutiful as any *raiyat* of Delhi,' while he was on his way to Warangal in 1309.

'On approaching Devgīr, Rāi-Rāyān Rāmdeo came forth to meet the army with respectful offerings to the Sultān and presents to the generals. While the army was marching through the territories of Deogīr, Rāmdeo attended every day at headquarters. So long as it remained encamped in the suburbs of the city, he showed every mark of loyalty and to the best of his ability supplied Nā'ib Kāfūr and his officers with fodder, and the army with *matériel*. Every day he and his officers went out to the camp rendering every assistance. He made the *bazār* people of Deogīr attend the army and gave them strict orders to supply the wants of the soldiers at cheap rates. The army remained in the suburbs of Deogīr for some days resting from its fatigues. When it marched, Rāmdeo sent men forward to all the villages on the route, as far as the borders of Warangal, with orders for the collection of fodder and provisions for the army, and giving notice that if a bit of rope was lost they would have to answer for it. *He was as dutiful as any raiyat of Delhi.* He sent on all stragglers to rejoin the army, and *he added to it a force of Mahrāṭṭās, both horse and foot.* He himself accompanied the march several stages and then took leave and returned. *All wise and experienced men noticed and applauded his devotion and attention.*'³⁷

Rāmdev had fallen never to rise again. Deogiri was made the base of operations against all the southern Hindu kingdoms. Like a drowning person the Yādava monarch was dragging all his possible saviours into the lethal element. For a third time the victorious Malik was at Devgiri on 3 February 1311 (13 *Ramazān* 710 H.) ; this time to march against Ma'bar and

Dvārasamudra. As before, the Rāi-Rāyān placed all the resources of his State at the disposal of the Nā'ib. During this dark period of Hindu history, Mahārāṣṭra provided the sinews of war to the Muslim conquerors for the enslavement of the rest of India instead of fighting valiantly 'for the ashes of her fathers and the temples of her gods.' The days of redemption were far off.

In the estimation of Khusrau, the *matériel* provided by Rāmdeo 'was beyond all computation' and included hard and soft goods of wool and leather, brass and iron.³⁸

We may not doubt that the King of Devgiri on this occasion was Rāmdev, though Barani and Firishta erroneously state that he was dead.³⁹ 'Iṣāmy and Khusrau correctly indicate the existence of Rāmdev, Rāo who died only a little after the return of Malik Kāfūr from his southern campaign. Rāmdev's inveterate hostility towards the Hoysala Ballāla III is well known. It is therefore not surprising that he issued orders to Parśurām Daḷavāi (whose estates lay on the border) to guide the Muslim army into Dvārasamudra.⁴⁰ Śankardev's hatred of the invaders was too deep-seated to permit him to stoop to such sycophancy. His opposition to 'Alā-u'd-Dīn had been made clear on the very first occasion despite his father's cowardice. He had ever since continued to be rebellious. In fact, his intransigence had called for repeated punitive expeditions on the part of the Khaljī Sultān. When Rāmdev died, therefore, Śankardev once again rose in revolt.

'News reached Delhi,' writes 'Iṣāmy, 'sometime after Malik Kāfūr's return from Ma'bar, that Rāmdeo died and Bhil-lama (Śankardev) revolted. The Sultān sent Malik Nā'ib to suppress the rebellion.'⁴¹ According to Firishta : 'Alā-u'd-Dīn consented to Malik Kāfūr's proposal, who accordingly proceeded, the fourth time, to the Deccan in the year 712 H. (1312). He seized the Rājā of Deogīr and inhumanly put him to death. He then laid waste the countries of Kanara, from Dābhol to Chaul, and as far as Rāichūr and Mūdgal. He afterwards took up his residence at Deogīr and, realising the tribute from the princes of Telingāna and Karnāṭak, despatched the whole to

Delhi.⁴² 'Iṣāmy's description of the settlement of the country appears, on the face of it, exaggerated : 'Malik Kāfūr,' he says, 'after taking possession of the kingdom treated the people with kindness and moderation. As soon as he entered Deogiri, he assured the people of safety ; nobody was slain, and none imprisoned. He despatched letters to all parts of the kingdom declaring general amnesty. These measures restored tranquillity to the mind of the people, and they felt that they had nothing to fear from their new Muslim masters Malik Nā'ib knew that the prosperity of the State depended on agriculture. So he summoned the cultivators to his presence, spoke to them kindly, and granted them leases. The farmers being convinced that they had a ruler who was interested in promoting their welfare, devoted themselves to their lands vigorously and extracted greater yield from the soil than ever before.'⁴³

This is, obviously, too idealised a picture even to appear plausible. The known policy of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn towards his infidel subjects should make us sceptical about such beneficence. 'Iṣāmy qualifies his statement by saying : 'Though he showed kindness to people who submitted to his authority, he *put down rebels with a stern hand.*' If there were loyalists like Rāmdev Rāo at Devgiri, there were men too like Kānhā and Śankardev, and even women 'who fought like tigresses on the field of battle.' It could not therefore have been 'roses, roses all the way.' The peace and prosperity were not for those who opposed ; for, towards such, the conqueror was naturally stern. Besides, Malik Kāfūr was in the Deccan for too short a period to see the fruits of his benevolence. 'He pulled down temples and built mosques in their places,' the same 'Iṣāmy writes. 'He erected in obedience to the commands of the Sultān a great mosque at Deogiri and named it after him. He strove to establish Islām in the land of the Mahrāṭṭās and, under his rule, Deogiri became a great Muslim centre in the Deccan.'⁴⁴ The good that men do is oft interred with their bones, the evil lives long after them !

Neither Malik Kāfūr, nor his master 'Alā-u'd-Dīn, survived long enough to reap the harvest of their sowing in the Deccan. Both died a miserable death at Delhi with whose particulars we

are little concerned here. Before the cycle of palace-revolutions was completed at the capital, an epidemic of revolts broke out all over the Khaljī dominions. 'At this time,' writes Firishta, 'the flames of universal insurrection, which had long been smothered, began to burst forth and were first apparent in Gujarāt Meanwhile, the Rājputs of Chitor threw the Maḥomedan officers over the walls and asserted their independence, while Harpāldev, the son-in-law of Rāmdev, stirred up the Deccan to arms, and expelled a number of the Maḥomedan garrisons.'⁴⁵

These rebellions had started even before 'Alā-u'd-Dīn's breath was stilled in his body. The dying Sultān, it is said, bit his own flesh out of frenzy when he got news of these disorders. But his agony was cut short by his *hazār-dīnārī* slave and Nā'ib of the empire, it is alleged, by poison. Malik Kāfūr, having usurped the throne, was himself murdered soon after. It was, therefore, left to Mubārak Shāh who succeeded, to quell the revolts. In the second year of his reign, the new Sultān marched into the Deccan to chastise Harpāldev, 'who by the assistance of the other princes of the Deccan had recovered the country of the Marāṭhās A detachment was sent in pursuit which brought back Harpāldev prisoner. He was flayed alive, decapitated, and his head fixed above the gate of his own capital. The King then ordered a chain of posts to be established as far as Dvārasamudra, and built a mosque in Devgīr which still remains. He appointed Malik Beg Luky, one of his father's slaves, to command in the Deccan.' (Firishta)⁴⁶.

We learn from 'Iṣāmy and Amīr Khusrau that, owing to the troubles at Delhi, 'Ain-u'l-Mulk and other officers were recalled post haste 'with all the Muslim inhabitants resident in Devgīr.'⁴⁷ The opportunity thus created was promptly seized by Harpāldev and his coadjutors. But the result was catastrophic. Marāṭhā independence, as it then appeared, was extinguished for ever. The historic family of the Yādavas, on whom lay the responsibility of stemming the tide of Muslim advance into South India, was tragically overwhelmed. A few more details

of the *dénouement* which are available might be noted for their pathetic interest.

‘Iṣāmy simply says that Harpāldev was ‘despatched to hell.’ According to Amīr Khusrau, Mubārak Shāh ‘received the submission of all the *Rāis* and *Rāṇās* of those parts, except Raghu, the deputy and minister of the late Rāi Rāmdeo. Raghu, on learning of the approach of the King, fled to the hills in open rebellion, Khusrau Khān was detached with a powerful army to repel him, and a royal tent accompanied in order to do honour to the expedition. One of his officers named Qutlugh, the chief huntsman, seized some of Raghu’s adherents from whom it was ascertained that he had nearly 10,000 Hindu cavalry under him. Khusrau Khān attacked him in a defile and completely routed him. The Hindus who had pretended to independence were either slain, captured or put to flight. Raghu himself was most severely wounded; his body was covered with blood, his lips emitted no breath. He entered some cave in a ravine which even a snake could scarcely penetrate....

‘When Khusrau Khān was returning to the King, after the defeat of Raghu, he received intelligence on the road that Rāṇā Harpāl had rebelled and taken up a position in the hills at the head of a powerful army. The Khān went in pursuit of him and was vigorously attacked two or three times by the rebel who in the end, being desperately wounded, was taken captive and his army put to flight. He was brought, bound hand and foot, before the King who gave orders that he should be put to death. When his way had been taken towards hell by the sword, the King gave his body to the other hellites that this great infidel and little Satan might become one of the chief ornaments of their kingdom. The hellites who had accompanied him out of regard, and had fought by his side, also afforded food to the flames of the infernal regions. *Those hellites did not desire that he should be burnt by himself alone, so they accompanied him into the flames, and hell was satisfied by that sacrifice.*’⁴⁸

Barani's account is somewhat different : ' In the year 718 H. (1318), ' he writes, ' the Sultān marched with his *maliks* and *amirs* at the head of an army against Deogīr which, upon the death of Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr, had thrown off its subjection and had been taken possession of by Harpāldeo and Rāmdeo (?) ... On arriving at Deogīr, Harpāldeo and other Hindus who had joined him were unable to withstand the army of Islām, and they and all the *muqaddams* dispersed, so that the Sultān recovered the fort without fighting and spilling of blood. The Sultān then sent some officers in pursuit of Harpāldeo who was the leader of the rebels, and had excited the revolt. He was captured and the Sultān ordered him to be flayed and his skin to be hung over the gate of Deogīr. The rains came on and the Sultān remained with the army for a time at Deogīr. All the *Mahrāṭṭās* were once more brought into subjection. The Sultān selected as governor of Deogīr Malik Yak Lākhi, an old slave of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn, who for many years was Nā'ib of the *barīds* (spies); and he appointed feudatories, rulers and revenue-collectors over the territories of the *Mahrāṭṭās*.'⁴⁹

In all the above accounts, what is of greater significance for us is not the fate of Harpāldev as that of Mahārāṣṭra. The consequences were far-reaching as well as disastrous, both to the people of Mahārāṣṭra and the Southern peninsula generally. The latter were able to rally their forces more quickly and build up a rampart sooner than the Hindus of the Deccan. But the fortunes of the two were closely knit together as the sequel will show.

After the execution of Harpāl, Mubārak's general Malik Khusrau had marched into Telingāna and Ma'bar to complete the work begun by Malik Kāfūr. But he too like his prototype was soon called to Delhi under very similar circumstances, and partook of the same fate. When, ultimately, the Khaljī rule was overthrown by the Tughlaqs at Delhi, the new Sultān, Ghiyās-u'd-Dīn, despatched his son Ulugh Khān (Md. Tughlaq) on the southern campaign. History again repeated itself. The ambitious prince in his turn hastened back to the capital to murder his old father, and occupied his throne. Only

two things in the history of Muḥammad Tughlaq are strictly relevant to our theme : (1) his change of capital to Devgiri, and (2) the various rebellions of his reign in so far as they had anything to do with the Deccan.

Muḥammad's conquest of Telingāna, Ma'bar, Kampili and Dvārasamudra extended the dominions of the Sultān beyond the range of efficient control from Delhi. Hence, the idea of establishing a more central capital at Devgiri was a wise and expedient one. We are little concerned with its romantic details here.⁵⁰ But, abortive as the plan proved, its net gain to the Muslims was that Devgiri permanently improved as a centre of Muslim power. Daulatābād has ever since remained a proud Muslim possession. Its continued occupation by the Khaljis, Tughlaqs, Bahmanis, and the Nizāmshāhī, Qutbshāhī, and the present rulers of Hyderābād, is an instructive commentary on the nature of the loss sustained by the Marāṭhās as a result of the Yādava failure to withstand the first Muslim invasion. A stitch in time would have saved more than nine. That the Marāṭha failure was due to a fatal lack of leadership is amply demonstrated by the subsequent happenings. The Muslims of the Deccan, though they were an exotic minority, with better leadership and greater grit, could successfully challenge the overlordship of Delhi and overthrow its domination for several centuries. Had the Yādavas acquitted themselves better, the history of South India might have been different.

Shāikh Mubārak witnessed the fortifications of Daulatābād in progress between 1327 and 1329.⁵¹ The tombs of Muslim celebrities like Amīr Ḥasan (a comrade of Amīr Khusrau), Shāikh Burhān-u'd-Dīn Gharīb (a disciple of Shāikh Nizām u'd-Dīn Auliya), and Qāzī Sharaf-u'd-Dīn, added to the attraction of the place as a centre of pilgrimage. The consequent increase of the Muslim population in the Deccan, Firishta notes, became a source of alarm to the Hindus.⁵² Ibn-i-Baṭūṭa who visited Daulatābād during 1334-42 has many interesting observations to make about the contemporary scene.

From Ujjain, writes he, 'we went to Daulatābād, a large and illustrious city which rivals the capital, Delhi, in impor-

tance and in the vastness of its lay-out. It is divided into three parts : One is Daulatābād properly so called, reserved for the residence of the Sultān and his troops ; the second part is called Katakah (Skt. camp); and the third is the citadel, unequalled for its strength and called Davaiquir (Devgīr). At Daulatābād resides the great Khān, Qutlū Khān, preceptor to the Sultān. He is the commandant of the city and represents the Sultān there, as well as in the lands of Sāghar, Tiling and other dependencies. The territory of these provinces extends over three months' march and is well populated. It is entirely under the authority of Qutlū Khān and his lieutenants. . . . It was to the fortress of Devgīr that Nasīr-u'd-Dīn (son of Malik Mal) and Qāzī Jalāl-u'd-Dīn fled for refuge when they were defeated by the Sultān.

'The inhabitants of the territory of Daulatābād belong to the tribe of Mahrāṭhās to whose women God has granted a peculiar beauty, especially in their noses and eye-brows. They possess talents not found in other women in the art of pleasing men The idolaters of Daulatābād are devoted to commerce and their principal trade consists in pearls ; their wealth is enormous, and they are called *Sāha* (Skt. *Sārthavāha*) ; the singular of the word is *Sāh* ---and they resemble the *Akārims* of Egypt.

'There are in Daulatābād, vines and pomegranates which yield two harvests in a year. By its population, and the extent of its territory, and the number of very large cities in it, *this province is very important for the revenues derived from it*. It was told that a certain Hindu took a lease of the contributions from the province for seventeen crores . . .

'In Daulatābād there is a *bazār* for singers and singing girls. This *bazār*, called Tarabābād (abode of rejoicing), is among the largest and most beautiful in existence. . . . In it are mosques for prayer where the priests recite the *tarāwīḥ* during the month of *Ramazān*. One of the Hindu rulers, whenever he passed through this place, used to alight in the pavilion and the singing girls sang in his presence. One of the Muḥammadan Sultāns also did likewise.'

Ibn-i-Baṭūṭa proceeded from here 'to the small town of Nazarbār inhabited by Marāṭhās well skilled in the mechanical arts.' Their physicians, astrologers, and nobles, he says, 'are called Brāhmins and Kṣatriyas. Their food consists of rice, vegetables, and oil of sesami, for *they dislike giving pain to animals or slaughtering them*. They wash themselves before eating, as we do at home to get rid of a pollution. They do not marry among their relatives at least up to the seventh remove; neither do they drink wine. For this in their eyes is the greatest of sins. It is so in all India, even among the Muslims; any one among them that drinks wine is punished with 80 stripes and imprisoned for three months in a dungeon which is opened only during meal-time.

'From Nazarbār we went to Sāghar, a large city on a considerable river (Tāpti—Gibb.) of the same name. On the banks of this river, we see water-wheels, and orchards where grow mangoes, bananas, and sugar-cane. *The inhabitants of this city are peaceable, religious and upright men, and all their acts are worthy of approbation*. There are orchards with hermitages meant for travellers... The population of Sāghar is very large. Strangers go there for the company of the people, and because the town is exempt from taxes and duties.'⁵³

Mahārāṣṭra was so much demoralised by the Khaljī conquest that it submitted as a matter of course to the yoke of the Tughlaqs. If there were frequent revolts in the Deccan, as elsewhere, during this period, they were not by the Marāṭhās. The first of these was by Malik Yak Lākhī before the accession of Muḥammad Tughlaq. There were not less than twenty-one rebellions in the reign of this erratic monarch. Of these only five were connected with the Deccan. Their account is relevant and instructive if only because the Marāṭhās never could make capital out of them, but allowed the Muslims to perpetuate their hold over the Deccan ultimately by the establishment of a local kingdom of their own, viz. the Bahmanī. That this ineptitude or political impotency was not shared by all the Hindus of the South was demonstrated by the foundation of the virile Vijayanagar kingdom, south of the Tungabhadra river.

The most disconcerting insurrection for Muḥammad Tughlaq was that of Bahā-u'd-Dīn Garshāsp in 1327. It did not originate in the Deccan, but, according to Firishta, the first battle of the war against him was fought near Devgiri.⁵⁴ The Sultān came from Delhi to Daulatābād in pursuit of the rebel and directed his military operations from there. Garshāsp escaped, first to Sāgar and thence to Kampili whose Hindu rājā gave him shelter. Reinforcements sent from Devgiri brought about the defeat of the rebel as well as his supporters. Though Garshāsp was the King's cousin,⁵⁵ he was according to Ibn-i-Baṭūṭa flayed alive and his flesh cooked with rice was served to his family.⁵⁶ The rājā of Kampili died, chivalrously fighting for his protégé. His stuffed head was carried to the Court as a trophy, while his sons and important officers of state were taken prisoner.⁵⁷ Firishta says that Muḥammad thought of shifting his capital to Devgiri after this rebellion. Accordingly he called it Daulatābād, 'raised several fine buildings within it and excavated a deep ditch round the fort which he repaired and beautified. On the top of the hill whereon the citadel stood, he formed new reservoirs for water and made a beautiful garden.'⁵⁸

Then the Sultān marched to Konḍāṇa (Sinhagaḍ) where 'Nāg-nāk, a Kōḷi chieftain, opposed him with great bravery, but was forced to take refuge within his walls. As the place was built on the summit of a steep mountain, inaccessible but by one narrow pass cut through the rock, the King had no hopes of reducing it but by famine. He accordingly caused it to be closely blockaded, and at the same time made some attacks on the works in which *he was repulsed with heavy loss*. The garrison distressed for provisions, and having no hopes of the King's retreat, at length evacuated the fort at the expiration of eight months, after which the King returned to Daulatābād.'⁵⁹

The next trouble arose in Ma'bar but its repercussions were felt in Mahārāṣṭra. When Muḥammad Tughlaq heard of the revolt of Sayyid Jalāl-u'd-Dīn, he proceeded to Daulatābād (1335) and *'laid a heavy contribution on that city and the neighbouring provinces which created an insurrection; but his*

numerous army soon reduced the insurgents to their former state of slavery."⁶⁰ He did not, however, meet with the same success in the Ma'bar expedition. At Warangal, 'a pestilence broke out in his camp to which a great part of his army fell victim. He had on this occasion nearly lost his life, and was induced to leave one of his officers, Malik Nā'ib 'Imād-u'l-Mulk, to command the army, and to return himself to Daulatābād.' On his way thither, he suffered from a tooth-ache wherefore he got his aching tooth extracted and ceremoniously buried at Beer (Bīd) 'and caused a magnificent tomb to be reared over it, which still remains a monument of his vanity and folly.' At Mungi-Paiṭhaṇ he conferred the title of Naṣrat Khān upon Shihab-u'd-Dīn Multānī and made him governor of Bīdar and its dependencies which yielded an annual revenue of a *crore* of rupees. He, at the same time, appointed Qutluḡ Khān, who was the Sultān's tutor in early life, to the government of Daulatābād and the country of Mahārāṣṭra.⁶¹ In 1338-39 (740 H.) Naṣrat Khān misappropriated the royal revenues and rebelled. Qutluḡ suppressed the revolt and sent Naṣrat as a prisoner to Delhi.⁶² Soon after, followed the insurrection of 'Alī Shāh who killed the Hindu officer of Gulbarga and seized the government treasury.⁶³ He was an 'Amīr Judīda' or Mughal recently converted to Islām and sent to the Deccan for revenue collection. 'Finding no legitimate authority in the country, he summoned together his Mughal brethren, raised an army, and occupied Gulbarga and Bīdar on his own account.'⁶⁴ This rebellion was also put down by Qutluḡ Khān with the help of the Mālwa army.

The eighteenth revolt against Muḥammad Tughlaq was that of 'Ain-u'l-Mulk. It was occasioned by the transfer of that officer to Daulatābād (1340). Qutluḡ Khān was recalled to Delhi on a charge of misgovernment and abuse of authority. But, as a matter of fact, he appears to have been a popular and pious governor. According to 'Iṣāmy, when the 'pious Khān' left for Delhi, 'even the walls cried out (or echoed the people's wails) that all that was good was now departing from the Deccan.'⁶⁵ The remedy, however, proved worse than the

disease. 'So extremely ill did this arrangement turn out that the people, disgusted at the removal of Qutluḡ Khān and the want of capacity displayed by the new administration, rebelled in all quarters and the country was devastated and depopulated in consequence. To make up the deficiency of the revenue, as well as to gratify their own avarice, the Deccan officers plundered and oppressed the inhabitants.'⁶⁶

In the history of the fateful forty-five years (1295-1340) traced by us so far, the one distressfully disappointing feature has been the absence, in Mahārāṣṭra, of the will to resist, barring a few noble exceptions like Kānhā and the two valiant women, Śankardeo and Harpāldeo, Raghu and Nāg-Nāk the spirited Kōḷi chief of Kōṇḍāṇa. The people of Mahārāṣṭra were conquered, oppressed and humiliated, but they meekly submitted like dumb-driven cattle. A sixteenth century Marāṭhī work embodying earlier traditions dolorously records : 'There are too many Yavanas (Muslims) in the country ; the people are without patriotism ; arms have been discarded ; they have taken to agriculture ; some have sought service ; several people have died ; many have lost their sense of duty.'⁶⁷ Sporadic instances of courage are indeed available, but only in support of the Muslim rebels. Thus we learn that a rājā of Ṭhāṇā (? Badahra or Burabrah) afforded shelter to Malik Hoshang, but the latter subsequently recanted. 'The rājās of the Deccan,' writes Firishta, 'suffering under the tyranny of Delhi, rejoiced at the revolt of the Muslims in which some joined, while others, more circumspect, only privately encouraged it and assisted the rebels with money and supplies.'⁶⁸ Only once do we come across a local chieftain called Kandhra (at Gulbarga) who, in mad desperation, put to death a number of Muslims, a month or two after the accession of Naṣir-u'd-Dīn, the first independent Muslim King of Daulatābād. He too being defeated, put himself in communication with the Delhi officers but was driven away by Zafar Khān.⁶⁹

The sovereignty of the Sultāns of Delhi over the Deccan was overthrown, not by the Hindus, but by the Muslim officers themselves. Muḥammad Tughlaq had sent an army to suppress

the wide-spread revolt of the 'Amīr Judīda' of Rāichūr, Mūdgal, Gulbarga, Bīdar, Bījāpūr, Gunjoti, Rāibāg, Gilghuri, Hukeri, and Berār (Firishta). 'On arriving on the Deccan frontier, at Manukpoonj pass, fearing the King had a design on their lives, they entered into a confederacy and with one accord fell upon the guards.' The insurgents got the better of the Delhi army, besieged Daulatābād, killed many of the King's officers, and appropriated the treasury. Finally, they proclaimed one among themselves, 'Ismā'il, King of the Deccan with the title of Naṣīr-ud-Dīn. Muḥammad Tughlaq did not live to suppress this revolt. He was hunted out by the rebels much like Aurangzeb by the Marāṭhās of a later generation. While he was pursuing other rebels in Gujarāt, the Sultān got news of the defeat and death of the royalist general 'Imād-u'l-Mulk. The imperial army was driven into Mālwā. Thus began the independence movement in the Deccan; but it was independence of the Muslims not of the Marāṭhās.

On Friday 24 *Rabī'u'l-ākhar* 748 H. (12 August 1347) the crown was placed on the head of Zafar *Khān*, and a black canopy (the colour assumed by the Abbāsīd *khalīfas*) was raised above the throne. The *khutba* was read and coins were struck in the name of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn Ḥasan Shāh Bahmanī. He made Gulbarga his capital, and called it Ḥasanābād. 'Having assumed charge of his government, Ḥasan Shāh neglected none of his duties and his dominions daily increased; so that in a short time (writes Firishta) the territory from the river Bhīmā to the vicinity of the fort of Adoni, and from the port of Chaul to the city of Bīdar, was brought under his authority.⁷⁰

This kingdom of Gulbarga (Bahmanī) was not the only Muslim State to arise out of the ruins of the *Khalji*-Tughlaq dominions in the South. Sayyid Jalāl-u'd-Dīn Aḥsan Shāh, governor of Ma'bar, likewise 'rebelled, usurped power, killed the lieutenants and agents of the sovereign, and struck coins of gold and silver in his own name,' writes Ibn-i-Baṭūṭa.⁷¹ (1334-35). This Sultanate, however, proved ephemeral, as it was extinguished by Vīra Kampana (c. 1378) which event has been celebrated by his queen Gangā Devī in her charming epic en-

titled *Madurā Vijayam* or *Kaṃṇarāya-Charitam*, an historical poem of rare merit.⁷² Kaṃṇa was the son of one of the founders of the great Vijayanagar power. Referring to this last event, namely, the establishment of the Vijayanagar kingdom, Firishṭa observes : ' The confederate Hindus seized the country occupied by the Muslims in the Dakhin and expelled them, so that within a few months, Muḥammad Tughlaq had no possessions in that quarter except Daulatābād.'⁷³

The rise of this great Hindu power in South India is a very important and fascinating theme with whose foundation alone we are here concerned. Its influence upon Marāṭhā history will be appropriately dealt with in a later chapter. Arising out of very similar conditions as those which obtained in the Deccan, Vijayanagar grew into a mighty defender of Hindu civilisation for two centuries and a quarter (1336-1565). Its genesis provides an instructive contrast to the depressing story of the Hindus further north, during the same period. Warangal, Kāmpili and Dvārasamudra had been equally overrun by the Muslim invaders ; but their reactions were quite different from those witnessed by us in the Deccan.

Two pieces of evidence should suffice to illustrate the results of Muslim aggression in the Āndhra and Karnāṭak countries : An epigraph in the former region records : ' After the death of Pratāparudra, the earth was engulfed in the ocean of darkness of the Turuṣka rule. *Adharma*, which had been kept under control up to that time by that virtuous monarch, flourished under them unchecked, as the existing conditions were favourable for its growth. The cruel wretches subjected the rich people to torture for the sake of their wealth ; many of their victims died of terror at the sight of their vicious countenances. The Brāhmins were compelled to abandon their religious practices ; the images of the gods were overthrown and smashed to pieces ; the learned were deprived of the *agrahāras* which had been in the possession of their families from time immemorial ; and the agriculturists were despoiled of the fruits of their labour, and their families were impoverished and ruined. None dared to lay claim to anything, whether it was a

piece of property or one's own wife. To those despicable wretches wine was the ordinary drink, beef the staple food, and slaying the Brāhmin the favourite pastime. The land of Telinga, left without a protector, suffered destruction from the Mussulmans like a forest subjected to a devastating wild fire.⁷⁴ In very similar language Gangā Devī writes : ' In the *agrahāras* (of the temples) where the smoke issuing from the sacrificial fires was largely visible, and where the chant of the *Vedas* was always audible, we have now the offensive smelling smoke from roasted flesh, of the Muslims ; and the harsh voice of these ruffians is alone heard there.'⁷⁵

Two inscriptions (one of 1341 and another of 1376) speak of Sangama, father of the founders of Vijayanagar, as having been born in fulfilment of a divine promise to deliver the country from the hands of the *Mlechhas*.⁷⁶ A later epigraph (of 1652) says that Vijayanagar was founded 'for the protection of gods, cows and Brāhmans.'⁷⁷ Making due allowance for the idiom of poetry in the above notices, we can yet perceive the historical facts imbedded in them. To follow their political reactions we have only to score the pages of Barani and Firishta.

'A revolt of the Hindus broke out in Arangal (Warangal),' writes Barani. 'Kanya Nāyak had developed strength in the country. Malik Maqbūl, the Nā'ib Wazīr, fled to Delhi and reached there in safety. The Hindus captured Arangal which was entirely lost. At this time, one of the relations of Kanya Nāyak (Harihara ?) whom the Sultān had sent to govern Kampili, apostatised from Islām, and broke into rebellion. The land of Kampili was lost and fell into the hands of the Hindus, and Deogīr and Gujarāt alone remained in the possession of the Sultān.'⁷⁸ Firishta adds a few more circumstantial details : 'About this time,' says he, 'Krishna Nāyak, son of Ladar Deo (i.e. Pratāparudra-deva), who lived in the vicinity of Warangal, went to Belāl Deo (Vīra Ballāla III of Dvārasamudra), the powerful King of Carnātic, and told him that the Muḥammadans had entered *Telingāna and Carnātic* and had made up their minds to exterminate the Hindus. He suggested that

something should be done to avert the crisis. Belāl Deo called a meeting of his ministers, and, after a good deal of deliberations, decided that, leaving his provinces in the rear, he should advance to the route of the armies of Islām, and deliver Ma'bar, Dvārasamudra and Kampili from Muslim control, and place them in the charge of Krishna Nāyak. In accordance with this plan, Belāl Deo founded in the mountainous region near the frontier of his kingdom, in a well fortified place, a city which he named. . . . Bijānagar. Numerous horse and foot soldiers were sent under Krishna Nāyak, and Warangal was captured. The governor 'Imād-u'l-Mulk fled to Daulatābād. Belāl Deo and Krishna Nāyak both combined their forces and delivered Ma'bar and Dvārasamudra, which had been for years in the past tributaries of the ruler of Carnātic, from Muslim control. On all sides the flames of war and rebellion were kindled, and of the distant provinces nothing remained in the possession of the Sultān except Gujarāt and Deogīr.⁷⁹ (1336). Even this last stronghold, as we have already noticed, was lost to Delhi in 1347. South India thus stood divided into two groups : the Bahmanī kingdom in the Deccan, and the Vijayanagar kingdom to the south of the Tungabhadra river. The struggle between the two and their respective successors constitutes the long prelude to the glorious war of independence which the Marāṭhās of the 17th and 18th centuries carried on, and as a result of which they came very near to being the sovereign masters of the whole of India. But, for that consummation, the Marāṭhās had to undergo a prolonged period of probation, which must engage us in the next three chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TUTELAGE

"Thus was the ground prepared partly by nature, partly by the ancient history of the country, partly by the religious revival, but chiefly by the long discipline in arms which the country had undergone under Maḥomedan rule for three hundred years."—M. G. RĀNAḌÉ.¹

The Bahmanī kingdom, of whose foundation we have spoken in the preceding chapter, endured for nearly 180 years (1347-1526). But its effective existence came to an end with the murder of Maḥmūd Gāwān in 1481. With him, wrote Meadows Taylor, "departed all the cohesion and power of the Bahmanī kingdom."² Out of its dominions were carved out (i) the 'Imādshāhī of Berār in 1484; (ii) the 'Ādilshāhī of Bījāpūr in 1489; (iii) the Nizāmshāhī of Aḥmadnagar in 1490; (iv) the Quṭbshāhī of Golkonḍa in 1518; and (v) the Barīdshāhī of Bīdar in 1526. What place did the Marāṭhās fill in the history of these kingdoms? Rānaḍé has observed that their entire administration was permeated with Marāṭhā personnel.³ Grant Duff has written: "It (the Bahmanī kingdom) was aided by the native princes of the Deccan, and from several circumstances in the conduct of war, particularly the desultory plan adopted by the insurgents (who founded the kingdom), which always requires the aid of the native inhabitants of any country, *there is strong presumption of their having contributed more to its success than the Mussulman historian was aware of, or, perhaps was willing to allow.*"⁴

Rānaḍé has also pointed out that the foreign mercenaries (Turks, Persians, Abyssinians and Mughals) employed by the Deccan Sultāns proved more troublesome than useful, and that gradually reliance came to be placed chiefly upon the country *Bāngīrs* and *Śīlédār* troops. "This training in arms brought education, power, and wealth with it, and in the sixteenth

century we meet with Ghādgés and Ghorpaḍés, Jādhavs and Nimbālkars, Morés and Śindés, Daflés and Mānés, as generals in charge of ten or twenty thousand horses, and in enjoyment of proportionate *jahāgīrs*.⁵⁵ It is our purpose, in this chapter, to assess the nature of this tutelage of the Marāṭhās under their Muslim masters during the two and a half centuries which preceded the rise of Shāhji Bhoslé, father of the great Śivāji. This is by no means an easy task, and we should particularly guard ourselves against hasty generalisations, both as regards the character of Muslim rule and policy in the Deccan, as well as the nature of the Hindu reactions and response. The fact that some of the Sultāns were originally Hindus or married Hindu wives has led some writers to believe that "These influences exerted a power which made it impossible for Maḥomedan powers to retain their bigotry and fanatic cruelty in the Deccan, and (that) although there were irruptions of violence now and then, on the whole great toleration was shown towards their Hindu subjects by these Maḥomedan kings, and gradually both civil and military power came into Hindu hands."⁵⁶ Closer examination will, however reveal that the causes of the considerable employment of Hindus in the civil and military services of the Sultāns lay outside their policy of religious toleration which has been exaggerated by Rānaḍé and some others beyond what is warranted by the facts of the situation. Indeed, consanguinity had little to do with the so-called liberal policy of the Maḥomedan kings of the Deccan.

In the first place, the subjugation of the Hindus by the Muslims was never completed in western Mahārāṣṭra and Konkan. The latter was not conquered till the middle of the fifteenth century; and the Ghātmāthā of the Māvaḷs were never subdued in the sense in which the Deś was. The reasons for this will become clear as we proceed. Secondly, the Muslim conquerors of the Deccan were considerably weakened by their isolation, being cut off from the stream of perennial replenishment like their coreligionists in North India. They further undermined their own strength by perpetual quarrels

among the Deccani and Foreign parties. The murder of Gāwān was an indicator of this suicidal hatred and factiousness. Opportunities were thus amply provided for the enterprising and pushful Marāṭhās, alike by the paucity of the Muslims in the Deccan and their disunity. But there was no uniformity of conditions all over the country, nor in the same tract of land under different rulers. We should therefore make a careful survey of the various parts of the Deccan and Mahārāṣṭra under its several dynasties during the three centuries that preceded the advent of Śivājī, namely, 1347-1630.

We have already noted that, under Ḥasan Shāh, the founder, the Bahmanī kingdom stretched from Daulatābād, in the north, to Adoni in the south, and from Chaul, in the west, to Bīdar in the east, according to Firishta. The same writer tells us that 'Alā-u'd-Dīn (Iḥasan Shāh) divided his kingdom into four *aṭrāf* or provinces viz. (i) Aḥsanābād-Gulbarga (the Kṛṣṇā-Tungabhadra Doāb up to Dābol); (ii) Daulatābād (including Junnar, Chaul and Paithān); (iii) Berār (including Māhūr); and (iv) Bīdar (including Qandhār, Indūr, Kaulās, and parts of Telingāṇa).⁷ With minor variations this administrative arrangement continued down to the days of Maḥmūd Gāwān who made substantial alterations in it. By that time the kingdom had grown in extent and covered, not only the table-land of the Deccan up to the Ghāts, a portion of Telingāṇa and the Rāichūr Doāb, but also the Konkan down to Goa (in the west) and the whole of Āndhra (in the east and south). Besides, Khāndesh was a protectorate in the North. Gāwān reduced this unwieldy Empire to order by dividing it into provinces of moderate size, each under a *Sarlashkar*. Berār was cut into two parts: Gāwil and Māhūr; Daulatābād and Junnar divisions extended up to Daman, Bassein, Goa, and Belgāum; Bījāpūr, up to the Horā river including Rāichūr and Mūdgal; Aḥsanābād-Gulbarga, from Sāgar to Naldūrg with Sholāpūr; and Telingāṇa included Rājāmundry and Warangal. 'Apart from nearly halving the old provincial areas, the Khwāja removed certain tracts from

the jurisdiction of each of the new governors, bringing them directly under the control of the king himself as the *Khāṣa-i-Sultānī* or Royal Domain, thus putting a strong royal check on the power of the *Ṭarafdār* in his own province.⁸ This was a wise precaution reminding us of the reforms of William the Conqueror in England and of Kleisthenes in ancient Athens.

For greater efficiency, Gāwān also reorganised the army and the revenue system. He made it a rule that there should be no more than one fortress under the direct command of each *Ṭarafdār*. *Qile'dārs* of all other strongholds were to be appointed and controlled directly by the central Government. The obligations of the *jāgīrdārs* and *maṣabddārs* were more strictly defined in terms of definite contingents to be maintained by them, for which they were paid. A *maṣabddār* was to receive one *lākh* of *hons* (later raised to 1½ *lākhs*) annually for every 500 men under arms. Where *jāgīrs* were granted in lieu of cash payment, compensation was allowed to cover the collection charges; but if the stipulated number of men was not maintained, a proportionate amount was deducted (or had to be reimbursed). A systematic land-survey was also carried out, fixing the boundaries of villages and towns and regulating the revenue assessments.⁹

The Muslim population being comparatively small, the working of these reforms, as well as the normal administration, necessitated increasing dependence on the Hindu personnel. Under the *Khaljīs* and *Tughlaqs*, there were frequent withdrawals of the Muslim officers from the Deccan to meet the exigencies in the North. Twice at least we have noticed that the repatriation was on a large scale: i. When Malik Kāfūr recalled 'Ain-u'l-Mulk 'with all the Muslim inhabitants resident in the city (of Daulatābād)'; ii. When Muḥammad Tughlaq relinquished his second capital. Incidents of this nature encouraged insurrections on the part of even the Muslim officers. With the establishment of the Bahmanī kingdom, contact with the North was almost completely cut off. Only such Muslims as elected to settle in the South permanently

alone remained. Occasionally a fortune-hunter came from outside. The number of converts, though growing, was not very large. Despite the strength of their polygamous *harems* and fecundity, the rulers found it necessary to augment their numbers by inviting foreign immigrants. But the remedy soon proved worse than the disease. The local Muslims hated the New-comers and gave rise to constant civil strife resulting not infrequently in murderous orgies. 'While the Delhi aristocracy and its early representatives in the South', writes Professor Sherwāni, 'were mostly of Central Asian Turki stock or of Afghan heritage, the New-comers of the South came mostly from the coasts round the Persian Gulf or from further North, as far as the strip of territory on the south of the Caspian Sea, being mostly Syeds from Najaf, Karbalā, and Medīna, and Persians from Sistān, Khurāsān or Gilān.'¹⁰ The conflict between the Northerners—with their Habshī (Abyssinian) subordinates (who had settled down earlier in the Deccan)—and the New-comers from Irāq and Irān, led to precipitate the downfall of the Bahmanīs.

The importance of the Hindus becomes quite obvious in the light of the above conditions. The attitude of the Hindus towards the *Mlecchas* is illustrated by Firishta's observations on the forced marriages effected by the conquerors (e.g. between the daughter of Dev Rāi of Vijayanagar and Firūz Shāh Bahmanī). 'Though the Rāis of the Carnātic had never before given their daughters in marriage to any persons but those of their own caste', he writes, 'and *deemed it degrading to intermarry with strangers*, yet Dev Rāi, out of necessity, complied.'¹¹ We have no reason to expect the Hindus of the Deccan to have been less conservative or orthodox.

From the beginning, Hindus must have been largely employed in the civil administration. With the lapse of time, they came to be recruited also in the armies in increasing numbers. We have no statistical records to enable us to determine the proportion of Hindus in the Deccani forces employed in the so-called '*jihād*' against the 'infidels' of Vijayanagar, but

we cannot regard these medieval wars as wars of religion. Equal ferocity and destructive zeal were exhibited by all the belligerents whether the fighting was among co-religionists or against the followers of another religion. The recorded instances of slaughter and demolition of sacred places are, therefore, to be looked upon more as 'acts of war' than 'facts of fanaticism'. The Hindu rulers of Vijayanagar soon learnt to enlist Muslim mercenaries in their armies even as the Sultāns of the Deccan had enrolled Hindus.

The policy of the Bahmanī rulers towards their infidel subjects may be best expressed in the words of Maḥmūd Gāwān (used by him in another context). According to him 'the principles of justice and the causes of domination and subjection' were that 'those who of their own free will and without any compulsion acted according to the principles of the *Qur'ān* and the *Ḥadīs*, wore the turban of freedom, while those who put a cap of pride on their heads with the hand of denial fell from the steed of authority'. Again, 'Some rose from the stage of subjection to elevated pedestals of high office and others, through good fortune, sat on royal thrones'.¹² In clearer terms we might state that 'submission to Islām was for the Hindus the highroad to promotion, while defection from it or opposition was the surest way to fall from the steed of authority'. This is amply borne out by the doings of the Sultāns.

'Alā-u'd-Dīn Ḥasan, the just Bahmanī king, conquered territories belonging to the Muslims no less than the Hindus. But the *Burhān-i-Ma'āthir* declares, that Ḥasan Kangu ordered his generals to devastate and plunder the country of the infidels soon after his assumption of royal authority.¹³ The writer also adds that Ḥasan '*did much towards propagating the true Faith.*' Firishta describes his successor, as well, as '*a champion of the true religion*'. The greatest of the Bahmanī Sultāns, namely Fīrūz Shāh, who usurped the throne on 14 February 1397, was, according to the *Burhān-i-ma'āthir*, 'a good, just, and generous king, who supported himself by copying the

Qu'irān, and the ladies of his *harem* used to support themselves by embroidering garments and selling them'. Among his eclectic tastes were hard drinking, a passionate fondness for music, and addiction to a seraglio with an assortment of women drawn from several nationalities.¹⁴ In his war against Vijayanagar, he left 'the roads littered with the bodies of the slaughtered Hindus,' though he agreed to release his Brāhman prisoners of war on payment of ten *lākhs* of *hons*. The Hindus when they won a victory over him, in 1419, mercilessly butchered their enemies, desecrated their *mosques* and ravaged their country. In the graphic words of Firishta, 'The Hindus made a general massacre of the Mussulmans, and erected a platform with their heads on the field of battle. They followed the Sultān into his own country, which they wasted with fire and sword, took many places, broke down many *mosques* and holy places, slaughtered the people without mercy; by their actions seeming to discharge the treasured malice and resentment of ages'.¹⁵

Under the next Bahmanī King, Aḥmad Shāh, the capital was shifted from Gulbarga to Bīdar. Dr. Ishwari Prasād has characterised this ruler as a ferocious bigot and a cruel tryant. But the Muslim chronicler says that 'his disposition was adorned with the ornament of clemency and temperance, and with the jewel of abstinence and devotion'.¹⁶ Our particular interest in his reign is confined to his doings in the Konkan.

Western Mahārāṣṭra was the real cradle of native independence. Even under the Yādavas, we have observed how, according to Marco Polo, the ruler of Ṭhānā owned no master above him. Another such instance is that of the chief of Bāglān who successfully defied Rāmdev Rāo. Ibn-i-Baṭūṭa has noticed that there was a Muslim principality at Honāvar and Goa. 'There are two towns in the interior', he writes, 'one an ancient construction of the infidels, and the other built by the Mussulmans when they first conquered the island (of Sandabur or Goa). In the latter there is a great cathedral *mosque* comparable to the *mosques* of *Baghdād* : it was founded by Ḥasan,

father of the Sultān Jamāl-u'd-Dīn Muḥammad of Hanāur'.¹⁷ This place was later annexed by Vijayanagar, and the Muslim dominion was rendered precarious and unreal over the west coast. Marco Polo alludes to the rich trade of the Konkan in finely dressed leather, cotton goods, gold and silver, though the sea was infested with pirates. Bahmanī boats occasionally put out to sea from Dābol and Chaul to bring commodities to the Kingdom from diverse maritime centres.¹⁸

In 1403, Khalaf Ḥasan Baṣrī (Malik-u't-Tujjār) was ordered, by Sultān Aḥmad Shāh Bahmanī I, to subdue the coast. But the territory round Māhim was disputed by the Sultān of Gujarāt. Conflict was, however, averted by the intervention of some holy men on either side.¹⁹ In 1436, the Hindu *rājā* of Sonekhair was defeated, and he agreed to give his daughter in marriage to 'Alā-u'd-Dīn II.²⁰ Eleven years later, Malik-u't-Tujjār was again dispatched to the Konkan (1347). But the Muslims this time suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Hindus. There was division and suspicion of treason in the invader's camp. They retired to Chākan where the Deccani faction 'entertained the foreign Muslims with the *sherbat* of destruction and the sword of tyranny ; so that about 1,200 Sayyids of pure lineage and nearly 1,000 other foreigners (from 7 to 18 years of age) were put to the sword'.²¹ Firishta's account of the Hindu resistance to Bahmanī is worthy of being noticed in full because of the light it throws upon the condition of the country and the spirit of the people. In it are to be found the seeds of the future Marāṭhā revolt which was to spread out triumphantly in ever-widening circles.

'At this time', writes the historian, 'Meamun Oolla Deccany formed a plan for reducing to subjection all the fortresses along the sea-coast. To effect this, the King deputed Mullik-oot-Toojar with 7000 Deccany infantry and 3000 Arabian cavalry, besides his own division, to the west. Mullik-oot-Toojar, fixing upon Chākan as his seat of government, secured the fort near the city of Joonere, from whence he sent

detachments at different times into Concan, and reduced several *rājās* to subjection. At length he moved to that country in person, and laid siege to a fort the *rājā* of which was named Shirka, whom he speedily obliged to surrender and to deliver himself and family into his hands.

‘Mullik-oot-Toojar insisted that Shirka should embrace the faith of Islām or be put to death ; upon which the subtle infidel, with much assumed humility, represented that there existed between him and Shunkur Ray who owned the country round Khelna (Viśālgāḍ) a family jealousy and that should he enter into the pale of Islām, and his rival remain secure in the full possession of power, he would, on the general’s retreat, taunt him with ignominy on account of his change of religion, and excite his own family and subjects to revolt ; so that he should lose the countries his ancestors had held for ages. Rājā Shirka added, however, that if M. would reduce his rival Shunkur Ray of Khelna and give his country either to himself or one of his officers, which might be effected with little difficulty, he would then pronounce the creed of the true faith, enroll among the servants of the King, and remit annually a tribute to the treasury, as well as assist in reducing those *rājās* who might fail hereafter in their duty and allegiance.

‘M. replied that he heard the road to the Ray’s country was woody, and full of difficult passes. To which Shirka answered that, while there was a guide with the army so faithful and capable as himself, not a single soul should receive injury. Accordingly, M. relying on the promises of the Rājā in the year 858, began his expedition against Khelna, but was deserted in the outset by the Deccany and Abyssinian officers and troops who declined entering the woods. Rājā Shirka, agreeably to his promise, during the first two days conducted the army along a broad road, so that the general praised his zeal and fidelity ; but on the third day he led them by paths so intricate that the male tiger, from apprehension, might change his sex ; and through passes more fortuitous than the curly locks of the fair, more difficult to escape from than the

mazes of love. Demons even might start at the precipices and caverns in those wilds, and ghosts might be panic-struck at the awful view of the mountains. Here the sun never enlivened with his splendour the valleys ; nor had providence designed that it should penetrate their depths. The very grass was tough and sharp as the pangs of serpents, and the air fetid as the breath of dragons. Death dwelt in the waters and poison impregnated the breeze. After winding, weary and alarmed, through these dreadful labyrinths, the army entered a darker forest a passage through which was difficult even to the winds of heaven. It was bounded on three sides by mountains whose heads towered above the clouds, and on the other side was an inlet of the sea so that there was no path by which to advance, nor road for retreat but by which they had entered.

'M. at this crisis fell ill of a bloody flux so that he could not attend to the regularity of the line of march or give orders for the disposition of his troops who, being excessively fatigued, about nightfall flung themselves to rest wherever they could find room, for there was no spot which admitted of two tents being pitched near each other. While the troops were thus scattered in disorder, Shirka, their treacherous guide, left them and communicated to Shunkur Ray that he had lured the game into his toils. The Ray, with a great force conducted by Shirka, about midnight attacked the Mussulmans from all quarters, who unsuspecting of surprise were buried in the sleep produced by excessive exertions. In this helpless state, nearly 7000 soldiers of the faithful were put to death like sheep, with knives and daggers ; the wind blowing violently, the rustling of the trees prevented the troops from hearing the cries of their fellow-sufferers. Among these was Mullik-oot-Toojar who fell with 500 noble Syuds of Medina, Kurbulla and Nujuf, as also some Deccany and Abyssinian officers, together with about 2000 of their adherents who had remained with their general. Before daylight, the Ray having completed his bloody work retired with his people from the forest'.²²

The struggle for Marāṭhā independence begun by the

Širkés, in the manner described above, was not taken up by other Marāṭhās immediately. For the time being it ended as a heroic episode. But in western Mahārāṣṭra and Konkan there were many hard nuts to crack, and ultimately the Muslim powers were baffled by the intrepid Māvalés of these regions. It took a couple of centuries before the land could produce a Śivājī. Meanwhile the Muslims had their complete innings and the Marāṭhās had to serve out their full tutelage.

During the satanic rule of Humāyūn (1458-61) not only the Hindus, but even his Muslim subjects got disgusted. He was a sadist and constant shedder of human blood, fit to rank with the Hindu Harṣa of Kāshmir or Caligula and Nero of Rome. When he died, the poet Naṣīr composed this fitting chronogram :

Humāyūn Shāh has passed away from the world.

God Almighty, what a blessing was the death of
Humāyūn !

On the date of his death the world was full of delight.

So "Delight of the World" gives the date of his death. Two minors—Aḥmad III and Muḥammad III—sat on the throne in three years (1461-63) under the regency of the Dowager-queen, Makhḍūmah-i-Jahān. The enemies of the Bahmanīs took full advantage of the situation and invaded their territories. The worst of them was Maḥmūd Khaljī of Mālwa who advanced as far as Bīdar and ravaged the country all around the capital. The houses of the nobles as well as of the common people were plundered and destroyed. But the queen-regent was a valiant lady. She drove away the invader with the help of the King of Gujarāt, and also won great popularity for herself by releasing all the prisoners capriciously imprisoned by her son Nizām-u'd-Dīn Aḥmad. Khwāja Jahān Maḥmūd Gāwān was her coadjutor and successor to power in the Bahmanī Kingdom.

Despite his undoubted greatness in other ways, Maḥmūd, like most of his contemporaries, was an uncompromising bigot.

So far as the Hindu subjects were concerned, therefore, the efficiency of his administration only resulted in making Muslim tyranny more efficiently tyrannical. He was also an imperialist. He 'increased the Bahmanī dominions to an extent never reached before'. One of the tasks to which he addressed himself was to rehabilitate the prestige of the Sultāns shattered in western Mahārāṣṭra by the disastrous Khelṇā expedition of Malik-u't-Tujjār.

The Marāṭhā rājās of Khelṇa and Sangameśvar, emboldened by their recent triumph, had continued their rebellious activities. They particularly meddled with the sea-trade making common cause with the pirates of the west coast. The Rāya of Sangameśvar alone, according to Gāwān, sent 130 ships to rob the Mecca pilgrims annually, and 'many thousands of Muslims were sacrificed at the altar of the greed of these people'.²³ He therefore organised a grand campaign in order to permanently subjugate the southern and western parts of the country. It was to be a three-pronged thrust : i. towards Bāgalkot and Hubli under the Sultān in person ; ii. towards Belgaum under Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh ; and iii. in the Konkan under Gāwān himself. Though ultimately all of them were successful, the last one proved the most hazardous.²⁴

It is to be remembered that in 1436 Sultān 'Alā-u'd-Dīn had sent Dilāwar Khān with an army 'to reduce the tract of country along the sea-shore called Concan inhabited by a hardy race of men' (Firishta) ; that Dilāwar succeeded in reducing the rājās of 'Raيرة and Sonkehr' to submission ; and further that the Khān 'secured the beautiful daughter of the latter rājā for the King.' Though the officer was suspected of having 'received bribes from the rājās of Concan and had not done his utmost to reduce their fortresses', 'Alā-u'd-Dīn was 'charmed with the rājā's daughter, who was without equal in beauty, disposition and knowledge of music.'²⁵ However, no effective results followed, and the rājās continued to harass travellers, both on land and sea, and 'constructed the strongest defences imaginable'. The merchants were afraid of taking

their wares out, and there was a big drop in the commerce of the Kingdom.²⁶

Early in 1469 (874 H.) Maḥmūd Gāwān marched to Kolhāpūr and made that his H.Q.²⁷ during his campaign against the recalcitrant infidels of the west country. He summoned to his assistance troops from Junnar, Chākaṇ, Kolhār, Dābhol, Chaul, Wāi and Māṇ.²⁸ 'Shunkur Ray of Khelna constantly maintained a fleet of 300 vessels,' writes Firishta, 'and interrupted the traffic of the Maḥomedans. Upon the report of Khwāja M. Gāwān's approach, the infidels contracted defensive alliances with each other, and assembled in great numbers at the head of the passes; but M. Gāwān by degrees forced all their positions. Finding his cavalry useless in the mountainous country, he sent back the horse he had brought from the capital, and contented himself with the troops under Asud Khan Geelany, with the Joonere division, and his own dependents under Khoosh Kuddum, with the troops from Kolhar and Dabul. With this army he made his way by means of fire and the axe through the woods. He lay five months before the fort of Khelna without reducing it; and the rains setting in, compelled him to relinquish the siege. Committing the passes to the protection of 10,000 infantry inured to the climate, and on whom he could depend, he ascended the mountains and constructed thatched huts to pass the wet season in the district of Kolhāpūr, where he captured the fort of Rāmгур. After the rainy season, he again descended the passes, and by stratagems and gifts of money, obtained possession of the fortress of Khelna, which had never till then been in the hands of the Mussulmans.'²⁹

Gāwān returned to the capital only after an arduous campaign lasting three years. So great a strain had this put upon him that Firishta says: 'M. Gāwān retiring to his chamber, disrobed himself of his splendid dress, threw himself on the ground, and wept plenteously; after which he came out, put on the habit of a *dervish*, and calling together all the most deserving holy and learned men, and Syuds of Ahmudābād,

Bīdur, distributed among them most of his money, jewels, and other wealth, reserving only his elephants, horses, and library ; saying, " Praise be to God, I have escaped temptation, and am now free from dangers." '30

After Gāwān came the deluge. The Bahmanī empire split up into the pentarchy of 'Imādshāhī, 'Ādilshāhī, Nizāmshāhī. Qutbshāhī, and Barīdshāhī. There were in all fourteen rulers who reigned during 180 years. Avoiding the extremes of both eulogy and deprecation such as that of Meadows Taylor and Vincent Smith, and also bearing in mind the general standards of that age,³¹ it is still difficult to feel enthusiastic over the total performance of the Bahmanī Kings. Confining our attention to their Hindu subjects whose condition alone is relevant to our theme, it is futile to deny that they were shabbily treated, though they might have shared a moiety of the good things of life during the fitful periods of prosperity as residuary legatees.

Athanasius Nikitin, a Russian merchant, sojourned in the Kingdom from 1470-74. His impartial observations are worthy of attention : ' The land is overstocked with people ', he writes ; ' but those in the country are very miserable, while the nobles are extremely opulent and delight in luxury.'³² It is not difficult to distinguish between the opulent classes and the indigent masses ; the former were mostly composed of the ruling Muslim nobles, and the latter largely comprised the conquered Hindu subjects. The wealth of the rich was derived from the peaceful toils of the peasants, and the spoils of war, supplemented by the profits of such trade as then existed. But war was the most paying industry, especially when it was the enemies' countries that were more frequently devastated. Under the Bahmanī Sultāns most of the fighting was done on foreign soil. While, therefore, the 'overstocked' population supplied the man-power for the armies, those who survived the slaughter, or rather their masters, were enriched beyond the dreams of avarice. How this wealth was expended might be gathered from the following description by Nikitin.

He found the Khorassanian 'Boyar' Melik Tuchar, merchant prince, keeping an army of 2,00,000 men; Melik Khān, 1,00,000; Kharat Khān, 20,000; and many other Khāns keeping an army of 10,000 men. The Sultān went out with 3,00,000 men of his own. 'They are wont to be carried on their silver beds (*pālīs*), preceded by some twenty chargers caparisoned in gold, and followed by 300 men on horse-back, and by 500 on foot, and by horn-men, 10 torchbearers and 10 musicians. The Sultān goes out hunting, with his mother and his lady, and a train of 10,000 men on horseback, 50,000 on foot; 200 elephants adorned in gilded armour, and in front 100 horsemen, 100 dancers, and 300 common horses in golden clothing; 100 monkeys, and 100 concubines, all foreign.'³³

It has ever been the lot of conquered peoples to support the burdens of such gilded prosperity. But what galled the 'infidels' most was not the shocking contrast between the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor, but the religious intolerance of their fanatical rulers. Consequently, the first spontaneous reactions of the oppressed masses were neither in the political nor in the economic field, but in the religious. We shall deal with these consequences in a later chapter. Here we must complete the story of Muslim rule under the minor dynasties which arose out of the ruins of the Bahmanī Kingdom.

Of the five kingdoms referred to before, the 'Imādshāhī was absorbed by Aḥmadnagar in 1574, and the Barīdshāhī by Bijāpūr in 1609. Thus the Nizāmshāhī of Aḥmadnagar, the 'Adilshāhī of Bijāpūr, and the Qutbshāhī of Golkonda alone played rôles of any consequence in the seventeenth century. Of these three, the first was extinguished in 1636, the second in 1686, and the last in 1687. The Nizāmshāhī existed for 146 years, the 'Adilshāhī for 197 years, and the Qutbshāhī for 169 years. Together they ruled over most of Mahārāṣṭra, a part of Āndhra and a portion of Karnāṭak. Besides these there was the Fārūqī kingdom of Khāndesh (1388-1601) in the Tāptī valley with its key fortress of Asīrgarh and its

capital city of Burhānpūr which became the Mughal base of operations in the Deccan during the seventeenth century. But, from the point of view of Marāṭhā history, the Nizāmshāhī and the 'Ādilshāhī must engage most of our immediate attention.

The founder of the Nizāmshāhī was Malik Aḥmad Bahri, son of Nizām-u'l-Mulk who led the Deccani Muslims against the foreigners in the quarrels which culminated in the assassination of Maḥmūd Gāwān (1481). Within a decade of this event three new kingdoms came into existence in quick succession : the 'Imādshāhī in 1484, the 'Ādilshāhī in 1489, and the Nizāmshāhī in 1490.³¹ The Qutbshāhī followed in 1518, and the Barīdshāhī in 1526. Malik Aḥmad was governor of Junnar when he rebelled against his Bahmanī sovereign. His position was considerably strengthened by his capture of Daulatābād in 1499. His successor, Burhān Nizāmshāh, ruled for forty-five years (1508-53) playing an important part in the Deccan politics. In 1550 he allied himself with the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar against his co-religionist 'Ādilshāhī. Eight years later a reversal of alliances was brought about by the Bijāpūr ruler who invaded the Nizāmshāhī territory along with the Vijayanagar forces. This proved a fateful invasion. The Hindus under Rāma Rāya of Vijayanagar enacted such barbarities in the Aḥmadnagar kingdom that they provoked savage repercussions. Indeed, to cut a long story short, these brutalities drove the Muslim powers to form a strong confederacy, under the leadership of Bijāpūr, for the destruction of Vijayanagar.

In December 1564 the confederates met at Tālikoṭa (25 miles n. of the Kṛṣṇā river), now in Bijāpūr District. On Tuesday, 23 January 1565 (20 *Jum.* ii. 972 H.)³² battle was joined with the Vijayanagar army in the village of Bāyāpūr or Bhogāpūr (better known as Rakkastangaḍi). The result is too well known to need dilation. That historic battle ranks with Tarāin (1192), Khānuā (1527), Haldīghaṭ (1576), and Pānipat (1761), in the annals of Hindu India. Each one of

these engagements proved a sanguinary triumph for Muslim arms with far-reaching consequences.

Husain Nizāmshāh of Aḥmadnagar and 'Āli 'Ādilshāh of Bijāpūr, commanded, respectively, the centre and the right wing of the Muslim army. The left wing was led by Ibrāhīm Qutbshāh of Golkonḍa. The conquerors shared the dominions, though not the traditions, of the defeated Vijayanagar kingdom. The great Hindu empire of the South which had lasted for more than two centuries, as V. A. Smith has observed, was finally ended, and the supremacy of Islām in the Deccan was assured.³⁶

Aḥmadnagar continued to flourish for sixty years more (1565-1626), especially under the vigorous leadership of Chānd Bibī and Malik 'Ambar. Husain Nizāmshāh was succeeded by Murtazā (1565-86). During the new régime Berār was annexed to the Nizāmshāhī territories (1574); but little else worthy of notice took place. On the other hand, the period following was marked by faction-fights, futile wars, and weak successors on the throne. Consequently, Aḥmadnagar fell a prey to ambitious aggressors from the North and the South. Chānd Bibī and Malik 'Ambar, no doubt, heroically struggled against the external enemies and pulled up the State from within to the level of a precarious prosperity; but they were soon overwhelmed by the external enemies. Partners in great victories have seldom continued to live in amity: Aḥmadnagar and Bijāpūr were no exceptions. Their quarrels encouraged the Mughal emperors to push forward their imperial designs in the Deccan, thereby endangering the liberty of all. Burhānpūr and Aḥmadnagar were occupied by the imperialists in 1600; Asīrgarh was taken by them in 1601. Malik 'Ambar continued to fight valiantly against them for another quarter of a century. But neither his courage nor patriotism nor resourcefulness availed anything (as we shall witness in the next chapter), in the face of Bijāpūr and the Mughals. To anticipate that history a little, the fall of the Nizāmshāhī was precipitated by the unholy alliance between the 'Ādilshāh and

the Mughal Emperor. The terms of the compact between them might be quoted here without comment ; for they speak for themselves.

i The 'Ādilshāh was to acknowledge the overlordship of the Mughal Emperor and promise to obey his orders in future.

ii The pretensions of Nizāmshāhī were to be noted and all its territories to be divided between the Emperor and the King of Bijāpūr.

iii The latter was to retain all his ancestral dominions with the following additions :—From the Aḥmadnagar kingdom in the west, the Sholāpūr and Wāngi *Mahals*, between the Bhīmā and the Sīnā rivers, including the forts of Sholāpūr and Parendā ; in the N.E., the *parganas* of Bhalki and Chidgupa, and that portion of the Konkan which belonged to the Nizāmshāh, including Poona and Chākan districts.

These acquisitions comprised 59 *parganas* and yielded a revenue of 20 *lākhs* of *hons* or nearly 80 *lākhs* of rupees. The rest of the Nizāmshāhī territory was to be annexed to the Mughal Empire "beyond question or doubt."³⁷ The *parganas* specified above and the hinterland between the Mughal and Bijāpūr dominions constituted the heart of Mahārāṣṭra. This was the cradle of a historic movement that was presently to arise and shake the foundations of Muslim dominions alike in the Deccan and the North.

Bahmanī history repeated itself in the 'Ādilshāhī no less than in the Nizāmshāhī. The 'Ādilshāhī kingdom of Bijāpūr, founded in 1489, by Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh, ran its uneven course until its extinction at the hands of Aurangzeb in 1686. Its greatest achievement in the cause of Islāmic rule was the overthrow of Vijayanagar in 1565 followed by the annexation of its provinces in the South thereafter. Firishta has described Yūsuf as 'a wise prince, intimately acquainted with human nature,' handsome, eloquent, well read, and a skilled musician. 'Although he mingled pleasure with business, yet he never allowed the former to interfere with the latter. He always warned his ministers to act with justice and integrity, and in

his own person showed them an example of attention to those virtues. He invited to his court many learned men and valiant officers from Persia, Turkistan, and Rūm ; also several eminent artists who lived happily under the shadow of his bounty. In his reign the citadel of Bījāpūr was built of stone.'³⁸

An illuminating incident is also narrated by Firishta : 'When Yoosoof Adil Khān first established his independence, he heard that one Mookund Row Marhatta and his brother, who had both been officers under the Bahmuny government, had with a number of peasants fled and taken up a strong position among the hills with the determination of opposing his authority : he accordingly marched against them at the head of 2,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry : they were defeated and their families fell into the hands of the King. Among these was the sister of Mookund Row, whom Yoosoof afterwards espoused, and gave her the title of Booboojee Khanum. By this lady he had three daughters and one son, Ismael, who succeeded to the throne. Of the three daughters, Muryum, the eldest, married Burhan Nizam Shah Bheiry of Ahmud-nuggur : Khoodeija, the second, married Ala-ood-Deen Imad-ool-Moolk, King of Gavul and Berar : and Beeby Musseety, the third, married Ahmud Shah Bahmuny at Goolburga, as has been related.'³⁹

This story is interesting as revealing Yūsuf's intimacy with the Hindus. Vincent Smith says that he freely admitted Hindus to offices of trust ; the Marāṭhī language was ordinarily used for purposes of accounts and business.⁴⁰ Marriage with a Hindu woman captured in war may not, however, be construed as anything more than attraction towards a member of the opposite sex rather than of the opposing sect. Yet, it is well to remember that the lady became the mother of one Muslim ruler and the mother-in-law of three others. It is also significant to observe that the unidentified Mukund Rāo, together with his unnamed brother, was carrying forward the tradition of the Śīrkés, fighting valiantly with the help of a 'peasant' army and taking advantage of the mountainous

character of their country. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at that the Muslim rulers found it expedient to tame these turbulent Marāṭhās under the yoke of civil and military service. "It must always be remembered," writes Gribble, "that the Mahomedan conquests, not only in the Deccan but also throughout India, were the conquests of a foreign army of the forts and strongholds. The country itself was left untouched, and the fort once taken, it was either razed like Vijayanagar, or a garrison being left there, the army marched on. The Hindoo ryots were left to till their fields as before, and the only difference to them was that they paid their land-tax to a Mahomedan instead of a Hindoo landlord. The artisans and merchants still plied their crafts as formerly; it was only the members of the royal families who retreated before the conquerors. A large number of the landed proprietors were also allowed to remain, with authority to collect the revenue, on condition, however, that they paid a fixed rent to the Government. Over each small district was placed a Mahomedan governor who was supported by a small body of troops with which he kept order. There was no occupation of the country by the Mahomedans and no settlement of the conquerors in the rural parts. The Hindoo population remained a nation as separate and as apart as it had been when they were ruled by their own countrymen. Their customs and their religious rites remained the same. When the wave of war swept over their villages, then temples and shrines were desecrated, in those places which had not been visited by the foreign army, the old structures still remained and, during times of peace, they were not molested. Some of these Hindoo Zamindars proved faithful servants and brought with them their own retainers to serve in the Mahomedan armies. In this way the constitution of the Mahomedan armies of the Deccan underwent a gradual change. Whether it was owing to constant feud between the foreign and the Deccanee Mahomedans, or whether foreigners found greater attractions in the armies of the great Delhi Emperors, cannot now be said, but

it seems certain that there was no longer the same quantity of volunteer adventurers from foreign parts from whom to recruit the Deccan armies. It therefore became the custom to recruit the ranks largely from among the Hindoo warlike tribes—the Beydars, Mahrattas and Rajputs. The chief commands were bestowed upon Mahomedans, and there were also special regiments composed exclusively of Mahomedans amongst whom were also Arabs and Abyssinians. The armies, however, were very largely made up of Hindoos, and not only did this cause a change in their system of warfare, but it led eventually to a weakening of the army itself.”

The Marāṭhās or Bārgīs, he goes on to point out, especially distinguished themselves as irregular cavalry and were largely employed in the hilly country ending in the Western Ghāṭs. “Mahomedans at no period seem to have had any partiality for hills and jungles. When they received a jaghir (or estate) they preferred that it should be in the plains, if possible, not far from the capital. Even then, they seldom resided in their country seats, except occasionally for hunting or purposes of sport. They preferred the vicinity of the Courts with all their intrigues and luxury. They therefore left the wilder portions of the Deccan in the hands of these Hindoo chieftains, stipulating only that each Zamindar should bring a certain number of retainers into the field. *In this way there gradually grew up a hardy race of mountaineers, always the best stuff for soldiers, who, brought up in their own faith and traditions, were yet taught the art of war by their conquerors, and only awaited a time of danger and of weakness to raise the standard of revolt, and assert their own independence. This was, in fact, the origin of the Mahratta nation*, and the Sultans of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar may be said to have educated and brought into existence the nation which, before long, was to take, not only their places, but very nearly to acquire the sovereignty of India.”⁴¹

It is difficult to improve upon this description of the conditions in which the Marāṭhās found their great opportunities.

All over Mahārāṣṭra today there are families in whose veins runs the blood of their ancestors who exploited this situation to their fullest advantage. Most of them have preserved traditions, partly oral and partly written, which when sifted and verified would provide rich material for their grand national *saga*. These sources of Marāṭhā history ought not to be contemptuously dismissed as worthless fabrications or "gossiping *Bakhats* and gasconading *Tawārikhs*." For our present period they constitute an invaluable source. Even where some of the details might appear to be of doubtful authenticity, the tradition as a whole is borne out by the test of cross-references and mutual corroborations. They are, besides, so interwoven with place-names, institutions and practices which have continued in after ages, that little doubt might be cast upon their essential veracity. Minus a few mythical touches and interpolations calculated to foster family pride, they provide a wealth of valuable information which remains to be fully utilised. They certainly give us a full picture in tone and colour of the formative period of Marāṭhā history, which must not be ignored or neglected.

Under the Deccan Sultāns, the country was divided into *Tarafs* or *Sarkārs*, subdivided into *parganas* or *prānts*, which in their turn were made up of units, the smallest of which was a village. The revenue was farmed out in small portions and collected mostly through Hindu agents. There were 'Āmils or government officers to regulate the police work and decide civil suits. These last were generally referred to the *Panchāyats*. Over the 'Āmils was a *Muqāsādār* or 'Amaldār (who was not always a Mahomedan); and above the latter a *Sūbā* : "He did not reside constantly in the districts, and took no share in the revenue management, although deeds and formal writings of importance were made out in his name."⁴²

The military organisation was feudal in character. The hill-forts were generally garrisoned by the Marāṭhās under the *Deśmukhs* and *Jāgirdārs*. A few places of great importance were reserved by the King, by whom the *qile'dārs* and gover-

nors were appointed. Rank depended upon the number of retainers and horses maintained for which a *jāgīr* was generally assigned. Grant Duff observes, 'the quota of troops so furnished was very small in proportion to the size of the jāgheer. Phultun Desh, for which in the time of the Mahratta Peishwas 350 horse were required, only furnished 50 to the Beejapoor government, at a very late period of that dynasty ; but the Mahratta chiefs could procure horse at a short notice, and they were entertained or discharged at pleasure : a great convenience to a wasteful Court and an improvident government. The allegiance of the Hindoo *sardārs* was secured by the conferment of titles like Nāik, Rāja, and Rāo, which invariably carried with it the means of supporting the new rank. Often the Mahrattas proved recalcitrant and even dangerous ; but they were seldom united. They fought with rancour wherever individual disputes or hereditary feuds existed ; and that spirit of rivalry, which was fomented by the Kings of the Bahmanne dynasty, was one means of keeping the Mahrattas poised against each other in the dynasties which succeeded them.'⁴³

Rānaḍé has pointed out that Brāhman *Deśpāṇḍés* and Marāṭhā *Deśmukhs* or *Desāis* were in charge of district collections, and the names of Dādopant, Narso Kālē, and Yesu Paṇḍit were distinguished for the great reforms they introduced in the Bijāpūr revenue administration. Brāhman ambassadors were employed by the Aḥmadnagar kings at the Courts of Gujarāt and Mālwa ; and Kamalsén, a Brāhman *Peśvā* held great power under the first Burhānshāh. Yesu Paṇḍit was *Mustaphā* in the Bijāpūr kingdom at the same time.⁴⁴

One of the earliest Marāṭhā families to carve out a place for themselves was that of the Nimbāḷkars of Phalṭan. Its scions still rule over their historic principality. Their family traditions stretch back to the days of Muḥammad Tughlaq, and recount the distinguished part played by the Nimbāḷkars under successive dynasties.⁴⁵ One Nimba Rāj appears to have obtained the title of Nāik from M. Tughlaq together with a

jāgīr worth three and a half *lākhs*. His son, Waṇanga-bhūpāl, distinguished himself under the Bahmanis, and he married Jaivantābāi, daughter of Kāmraj Ghāṭgē, who was a great *mansabdār*. Under the 'Ādilshāhī, a Nimbālkar was made *Sardeśmukh* of Phaltan, according to Grant-Duff, before the middle of the seventeenth century, "as appears by original *sunuds* of that date." He also adds, that Wungojee Naik, better known by the title of Jugpāl, who lived in the early part of that century "was notorious for his restless and predatory habits."¹⁶ A sister of this Jugpāl was the grandmother of Śivājī the Great (i.e. wife of Mālojī Bhoslé).

Shāhjī, father of Śivājī, got a good footing because of his relations with the Nimbālkar on the one side (in the 'Ādilshāhī) and with the Jādhavs on the other (in the Nizāmshāhī). The *jāgīrs* of these important Marāṭhā families, stretching athwart the country, and occupying contiguous lands, formed an *imperium in imperio* on account of the *de facto* power they wielded.

Another such family was that of the Morés who were 'originally Nāiks in the Carnātic.' One of them had risen to be a commander of 12,000 infantry. Yūsuf 'Adil Shāh employed him in the reduction of the wild tract between the Nīrā and Wāraṇā rivers. In this enterprise Moré was successful, and he dispossessed the Śīrkés and their allies, the Guzars, the Mohités, the Mahādiks, etc. For this great service the title of Chandra Rāo was conferred upon Moré. His son Yaśvant Rāo, likewise, distinguished himself in a battle against Burhān Nizāmshāh, near Parenda, and captured his green flag. He was consequently allowed to use that trophy as his standard, and succeeded his father, as Rājā of Jāvli. 'Their posterity used the same tract of country for seven generations, and by their mild and useful administration that inhospitable region became extremely populous.'¹⁷

The Ghāṭgés of Khatāv Deś were separated from the Nimbālkar by the Mahādev Hills. They were *Deśmukhs* of Māṇ under Bahmanī rule; but the title of *Sardeśmukh* was

conferred upon Nāgojī Rāo Ghātḡé by Ibrāhīm 'Ādilshāh in 1626, together with the honorific *Jujār Rāo*. The Mānés were *Deśmukhs* of Mhasvaḍ in Māñ tālukā (51 miles e. of Sātārā). They too were distinguished *Śilédārs* under Bijāpūr government, 'but nearly as notorious for their revengeful character as the Śirkés.'⁴⁸ The Daflés of Jath (Bijāpūr District) were hereditary *Pāṭils* of Daflāpūr; and the Sāvants of Wāḍi (near Goa) were *Deśmukhs* who got the title of Bahādur from the 'Ādilshāh for service against the Portuguese. "It is remarkable of their territory," writes Grant-Duff, "that the ancient appellation of the family is preserved in our modern maps. They were distinguished as commanders of infantry, a service best adopted to the country which they inhabited."⁴⁹

The Sāvants were Bhoslés like the *Deśmukhs* of Mudhol and Kāpsī, near the Wāraṇā and Ghaṭaprabhā rivers respectively. All these Marāṭhās traced their origin from North Indian Kṣatriyas or Rājput̥s: the Nimbāḷkars were Pawārs or Paramārs, and the Daflés Chauhāṇs; the Jādhavs of Sindkhed were Yādavs, and the Bhoslés Sisodiyās. The story of the migration of junior members of the Kṣatriya ruling families of the North runs in the family traditions of several chieftains of the Deccan and the South. According to Rudrakavi's *Rāṣṭraudha-Vamśa Mahākāvya* (1596 A.D.) the founder of the Bāgul principality of Mayūrgiri (Nāsik District) belonged to the Rāṭhoḍ family, and originally came from Kanauj. Minus its poetic and mythological touches, several of the historical facts mentioned by the poet are corroborated by other evidence. A few incidents are worthy of notice here.

Bāglān (country of the Bāguls) came under Muslim domination after the fall of the Yādavas of Devgiri. The *Tārīkh-i-Firūzshāhī* states that (c. 1340) the mountains of Sālhér and Mulhér were held by a chief named Māndev (a mistake for Nānadev of the Bāgul family). The Mayūrgiri kingdom appears to have been founded at the commencement of the fourteenth century.⁵⁰ But it was compelled into submission successively by the Muslim rulers of Bīdar, Khāndesh

and Gujarāt. In 1429, during the Bahmanī-Gurjarāt war, the Bāgul territory was over-run and devastated by Aḥmad Shāh I (Bahmanī). Seventy years later we find that the Bāguls were tributaries to Aḥmadnagar. Next, in 1539, Bahādur Shāh of Gujarāt subjugated them. Finally, when Akbar conquered Khāndesh (1599), they had to submit to the Mughals.

The *Ā'in-i-Akbarī* refers to the Rāṭhoḍ chief of the mountainous region between Surat and Nandurbar, who commanded 8,000 horse and 5,000 infantry. He owned seven forts, two of which (Shālher and Mulher) were places of unusual strength. Owing to its abundance of grain, fodder and water, Bāglān was able to resist Akbar during a prolonged siege of seven years. 'As the passes were most strongly fortified, and so narrow that not more than two men could march abreast, Akbar was in the end obliged to compound with the chief, giving him Nizāmpūr, Daita, and Badūr, with several other villages. In return Pratāpshāh agreed to take care of merchants passing through his territory, to send presents to the Emperor, and to leave one of his sons as a pledge at Burhānpūr.'¹¹ Jahāngīr in his *Memoirs* writes: 'He (i.e. Pratāpshāh) had about 1,500 horse in his pay, and in time of need could bring into the field 3,000 horse ... The aforesaid Rājā does not drop the thread of caution and prudence in dealing with the rulers of Gujarāt, the Deccan, and Khāndesh. He has never gone himself to see any of them, and if any of them has wished to stretch out his hand to possess his kingdom, he has remained undisturbed through the support of the others. After the province of Gujarāt, the Deccan and Khāndesh came into possession of the late king (Akbar). Bharjiv (Pratāpshāh) came to Burhānpūr and had the honour of kissing his feet; and, after being enrolled among his servants, was raised to the *manṣab* of 3,000.'¹²

The Bhoslés were destined to play by far the most important rôle in shaping the history of the future. Like the founder of the Bāgul dynasty, the Sisodiyā ancestor of Śivājī appears to have come into the Deccan about the time the Bahmanī

kingdom was established. According to the documents in the possession of the Bhoslé (Ghorpaḍé) rulers of Mudhol, two brothers, Sajjan Sinh and Kṣem Sinh,—sons of Ajay Sinh, son of Lakṣmaṇ Sinh of Chitor (kinsman of Ratna Sinh, the husband of the famous Padmini of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn Khaljī's adventure of 1303)—being disinherited by their father, came into the Deccan as soldiers of fortune. Sajjan and his son Dilīp were granted a *jāgīr* by 'Alā-u'd-Dīn Ḥasanshāh Bahmanī in recognition of their gallant services, at Mirat near Daulatābād. The *farmān* relating to this (dated November 1352), still preserved at Mudol, reads : 'Being pleased with the valiant deeds displayed on the battle-field by Rāṇā Dilīp Sinh, *Sardār-i-Khāskhel*, the son of Sajjan Sinh and grandson of Ajay Sinh, ten villages in Mirat (Ṭaraf Devgarh) are granted to him for the maintenance of his family. So, in accordance with his wishes, they should be given over to him. *Ramazān*, 753 H.'⁵³

Firishta says that 'Suddoo' (Sidojī, son of Dilīp) was awarded the title of 'Meer Nobat' for his great exploits. His son Bhairojī or Bhīmjī obtained Mudhol, along with 84 adjoining villages, in 800 H. (1398), from Fīrūz Shāh Bahmanī. In the *farmān* Sidojī is referred to as Ṭhānedār of Sāgar who 'sacrificed himself in the thick of the fight.' Bhairojī who 'fought shoulder to shoulder with his father against our enemies, and showed great courage and ability, attracted our royal attention as deserving of favours. So in recognition of these qualities. . . Mudhol and the adjoining 84 villages (Ṭaraf Rāibāg) have been granted as a mark of royal favour to Bhairavsinhji. So he should take possession of this *jāgīr* and enjoy it from generation to generation and render diligent and loyal service in the cause of our Empire. 25 *Rabī-u'l-ākhar*, 800 H.' (15 January 1398).⁵⁴

Another document speaks of the services of Ugrasen 'in the battle against the Rājā of Vijayanagar'; and adds, 'In the same manner, from the beginning of this Kingdom, the ancestors of his family have faithfully sacrificed their lives in the service of our Sovereignty. Hence, the cherishing and sustaining of

this family is incumbent on us'. This *farmān* (dated 8 *Shawwāl*, 827 H. or 3 September 1424) links up the Mudhol and Mirat *jāgīrs* (with Pāthri) 'given from old days'...to continue in the possession of Ugrasen, 'so that he may serve us with satisfaction.'⁵⁵ To these territories the *pargana* of Wāi was added, in 1454, by 'Alā-u'd-Dīn II for service during the campaign against the Sirkés of Kheḷna.

Śubhakarṣṇa, a younger son of this Ugrasen, together with his paternal uncle, Pratāp Sinh, left Mudhol on account of a family dispute, and settled on the Mirat *jāgīr*, about 1460. Thenceforward the two sections of the Bhoslés developed along divergent lines. Muḥammad Shāh Bahmanī's *farmān* (of 7 *Jumādī-u'l-Awwal*, 876 or 22 October 1471) explains the circumstances in which the Mudhol family acquired its more popular name of Ghorpaḍé; in it the final capture of Kheḷna is attributed to Kṛṣṇa Sinh and Bhīm Sinh of this family.⁵⁶ Successive *farmāns* of the 'Ādilshāhs bear witness to the continued loyalty of the Ghorpaḍés to their Muslim masters. But the northern branch of the Bhoslés, descended from Śubhakarṣṇa, though serving under the Nizāmshāhī rulers, struck out for greater independence. Shāhjī and Śivājī belonged to the Mirat branch. In this line were born Mālojī and his brother Viṭhojī. They were originally *Pāṭils* of Verūl (Ellora near Daulatābād), under Lukhjī Jādhav Rāo, who was *Deśmukh* of Śindkhed (Nizāmshāhī). Mālojī married Umābāi, a sister of Vangojī Nāik Nimbālkar of Phaltan. Their son, Shāhjī was married to Jijābāi, daughter of Lukhjī Jādhav Rāo. She became the mother of the famous Śivājī. When Mālojī died fighting at the battle of Indāpūr, in 1606, he left behind him as family *jāgīr*, Ellora, Dheradi, Kannrad, several villages in the Jafrābād, Daulatābād and Aḥmadābād (Nizāmshāhī) districts, besides the management of the Poona estate.⁵⁷ He had already acquired the status of a *manṣabdār* of 5000 horse before the historic marriage of Shāhjī and Jijābāi. The exploits of Shāhjī will be dealt with in the next chapter. But the ground had been already prepared for him in the manner described by us above.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PIONEERS

'We Rājapūts have served from old till now under several kings ; we have never before served nor shall we do so in future under dishonour and displeasure. We shall not further put up with unfair treatment. Shāhji to 'Āli 'Ādil Shāh.'

During the seventeenth century, when the Mughal Empire was in the plenitude of its power and prosperity, the Southern States were in a crumbling condition. Already a century had elapsed since the dissolution of the Bahmanī Kingdom, and Vijayanagar was more a memory than a political entity to reckon with. While the Nizāmshāhī was tottering to its fall, Golkonḍa and Bijāpūr were emitting a last fitful glow before their extinction. Both the Deccan and the peninsula further south, therefore, offered a tempting field to adventurous spirits whether they were of local or foreign origin. Our concern in this chapter is to trace the doings of some of these adventurers who ultimately proved themselves the creators of a new order.

At the outset, it is helpful to bear in mind that the century opened with the death of Akbar (1605), in North India, and closed with the death of Aurangzeb (1707) in the Deccan. These two titans, each ruling for half-a-century, enclosed between their reigns an epoch of grandeur and power such as had rarely been witnessed in India since the days of the imperial Mauryas and Guptas. The best period of Muslim rule in the Deccan was certainly over ; and further south, the vanishing shadow of Vijayanagar brooded over a congeries of warring chieftains, rather than States, who had up till recently been its subordinates or feudatories. Golkonḍa and Bijāpūr were like two lizards trying to lick in these political ephemera, while the imperial cat was already at their back about to swallow them. The Marāṭhās stepped in at this juncture, and by a combina-

tion of the 'mountain-rats' performed the miracle of saving themselves from the feline danger. Shāhjī Bhoslé, father of Śivājī, occupies a position of great promise among the pioneers of the Marāṭhā movement for the liberation of their country from the domination of Islāmic powers.

Personality has ever played a prominent part in politics ; and though our chief aim is historical rather than biographical, we have necessarily to note a few landmarks in the careers of the early makers of Marāṭhā history. Shāhjī was born on 15 March 1594 and married Jijābāi, daughter of Lukhji Jādhav Rāo, in 1605. His second marriage took place about 1625, with Tukābāi Mohitē at Bijāpūr.² These details are of importance on account of their political consequences. Śivājī was born of the former wife and Vyankojī of the latter. Both became founders of States whose history we are to trace in later chapters. Besides, the two marriages led to family feuds which were not without significance in shaping important events. One of the immediate results of the dispute which arose between the Bhoslés and the Jādhavs was that Lukhji went over to the Mughal camp,³ while Shāhjī remained in the Nizāmshāhī to be one of its last defenders.

It is not to be supposed, however, that Shāhjī's service was disinterested ; for he too was a fortune-hunter and changed sides as exigencies dictated. But his *bona fides* may not be questioned, relatively speaking. While his father-in-law went away in a huff and petulant pique, Shāhjī proved a more loyal supporter of the kingdom though not of every prince who sat on the Nizāmshāhī throne. The circumstances were such that no absolute consistency of conduct could be expected from anybody. Shāhjī was one among several soldiers of fortune. We should judge his actions in terms of the situations as they arose rather than by any absolute standards ; more with a view to understand and elucidate than to praise or condemn. He could rise above many of his contemporaries, but not above his age. That transcendence was reserved for his gifted son Śivājī.

The Nizāmshāhī kingdom, founded by Malik Aḥmad Baharī in 1490, was practically extinguished in 1633 when Husain Nizām Shāh III was captured by the Mughals and sent a prisoner to Gwalior fort, after the fall of Daulatābād.⁴ But a puppet prince was put up by Shāhji, and lived as a fugitive, until the king-maker was compelled to surrender him at Māhuli three years later.⁵ The commencement of the public career of Shāhji covers the momentous period of the last four decades of the ill-fated Nizāmshāhī State. His name first finds prominent mention among the Marāṭhā officers who fought against the combined forces of the Mughals and the 'Adilshāhī at Bhātvaḍi in defence of the Nizāmshāhī kingdom, under its great leader Malik 'Ambar (Oct. 1624).⁶ His father-in-law, Lukhji Jādhav Rāo, was in the opposite camp on this historic occasion. To appreciate its correct significance we must survey the situation in the Deccan from the commencement of the century.

Akbar had begun his policy of aggression into the Deccan in 1593.⁷ The lack of harmony among the Muslim Sultāns of the South, as well as their factious nobles, helped the Mughals in their imperial designs. Great heroism and patriotism were displayed in resisting their advance by Chānd Bibī and Malik 'Ambar, but they proved of little avail in the end.⁸ Akbar occupied Burhānpūr on 31 March 1600. Prince Dāniyāl and Khān-i-khānān captured Aḥmadnagar fort on 19 August the same year; while Asīrgarh came into Mughal possession on 17 January 1601.⁹ It is related that Akbar then proclaimed himself Emperor of the Deccan. He also tried to establish a permanent link with the Muslim rulers of the South by securing an 'Adilshāhī princess for his son Dāniyāl. But the Prince died within a few months after his reluctant bride had joined him in 1604. Details of this incident are narrated by Firishta who personally escorted the unwilling princess to Paithān. The enforced marriage and its fatal result may be considered prophetic of the future consequences of the imperial 'courting of the Deccan bride.' Aurangzeb was to be the last Mughal

Emperor to suffer from the fatal consequences of the forced political 'match-making.' For that imperial conqueror was also brought to his lethal bed in the Deccan, and the 'bride' survived to undo his Empire.

Like the captive 'Ādilshāhī princess the States of the Deccan were long struggling to escape from the imperial Mughal clutch. But Aḥmadnagar, Bijāpūr and Golkonḍa were successively over-powered. The pity of it, however, was that while the first was being attacked, the others co-operated with the aggressor instead of joining in common defence against the common danger. Consequently, the removal of the Nizāmshāhī (1636) brought the Mughal menace to the very gates of Golkonḍa and Bijāpūr. The imperial share-out of the Nizāmshāhī territories, which we envisaged in the preceding chapter,¹⁰ proved but a deadly bait; though for the time-being the jealous neighbours of the extinguished kingdom gloated over their temporary gains. The heroic Chānd Bibī died a martyr in this struggle, and the brave Abyssinian soldier-statesman, Malik 'Ambar, valiantly, though in vain, tried to defend his master's dominion during a full quarter-century. "It is my design," he declared to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shāh, "to fight the Mughal troops so long as life remains in my body. It may be that through Your Majesty's ever increasing fortune, I shall expel the Mughals from the Deccan."¹¹ Ibrāhīm, however, proved unworthy of this noble trust and confidence. Ultimately he joined the Northern aggressor for the common ruination of all the Deccan States. The battle of Bhātvaḍi (Oct. 1624) was a shining episode in the gallant defence of the Aḥmadnagar kingdom by Malik 'Ambar.¹² It was a striking military triumph, won against the combined forces of Bijāpūr and the Mughals but barren of political results. The 'brave captain,' as Petro della Valle calls him, died (in 1626), like Chānd Bibī, extorting admiration even from his enemies. In the words of the *Iqbāl-nāma-i-Jahāngīrī*: 'In warfare, in command, in sound judgment, and in administration, he had no rival or equal. He well understood the predatory (kazzāki) warfare, which in the

language of the Dakhni is called *Bārgi-giri*. He kept down the turbulent spirits of that country, and maintained his exalted position to the end of his life, and closed his career in honour. History records no other instance of an Abyssinian slave arriving at such eminence.'¹³

From the point of view of Marāṭhā history, the greatest service that Malik 'Ambar rendered was the employment and training he afforded to the Marāṭhās. He used them with such deadly effect that his enemies 'passed their days without repose and nights without sleep.' Prominent among the Marāṭhas who fought on his side at Bhātvaḍi, as we have stated before, were Shāhjī Bhoslé, Viṭhalrāj and his son Khelojī Bhoslé, Mudhojī Nimbālkar of Phaltan, Hambīr Rāo Chuhān and Nāgojī Rāo Ghāṭgē. On the opposite side were Lukhjī Jādhav Rāo, Udā Rām, and Viśvanāth (in the Mughal camp), and Dhunḍirāj Brāhmaṇ, Ghāṭé and several others (in the Bijāpūrī army).¹⁴ The observations of Dr. Beni Prasād, in this connexion, are worthy of citation : "The Marathas entered the service and the courts of the Deccan monarchs. In the beginning of the seventeenth century they constituted a powerful factor at the Nizāmshāhī court of Ahmadnagar. The light Maratha horse formed valuable auxiliaries to the Deccan forces. Malik 'Ambar fully realised their value against the Mughals . . . From this point of view, the chief importance of the Deccan campaigns of the Mughals lies in the opportunities of military training and political power which they afforded to the Marathas. Malik 'Ambar as a great master of the art of guerilla warfare, as Shivaji himself, stands at the head of the builders of the Maratha nationality. His primary object was to serve the interest of his own master, but unconsciously he nourished into strength a power which more than revenged the injuries of the south on the northern power."¹⁵

Though Shāhjī was temporarily alienated, either by the hauteur of Malik 'Ambar¹⁶ or his lack of adequate recognition of the ambitious Marāṭhā's services after Bhātvaḍi, and found welcome at Bijāpūr (between 1624-26), he was called

back to the Nizāmshāhī when the able Abyssinian was no more. Shāhjī was of sufficient importance at that time for his services to be coveted by Bijāpūr. Malik 'Ambar had killed Mullā Muḥammad Lāri, the Bijāpūrī general, after Bhātvaḍī, and followed up his victory by raiding the 'Ādilshāhī territories. The defection of Shāhjī from 'Ambar, therefore, was a welcome relief to Bijāpūr. The Marāṭhā captain was made *Sar Lashkar* by Ibrāhīm Shāh and Karyāt Talbīḍ, and Panhālā were conferred upon his relations the Mohitēs.¹⁷ The exploits of Shāhjī during this period, such as his defeat of Mudhojī Phalṭaṅkar, are described in the *Śiva-Bhārat*.¹⁸ Though all its details may not be accepted as true, the serviceableness of Shāhjī to his new master might not be gainsaid. But the jealousy of the older 'Ādilshāhī servants and the opportunity created by the death of Malik 'Ambar (14 May 1626) brought Shāhjī back into the Nizāmshāhī. It is also not unlikely that Murtazā II invited him, for the *jāgirs* of Poona and Sūpā which Shāhjī had secured on his leaving Bijāpūr were reconfirmed by the Nizām Shāh in May 1628.¹⁹ The circumstances were certainly all very tempting and favourable for a person of Shāhjī's calibre and ambitions.

The death of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shāh, on 12 September 1627, might have precipitated his action. Fath Khān (Malik 'Ambar's son) had, indeed, succeeded to his father's official position, but his character was not equal to his status as we shall presently see. The Emperor Jahāngīr also died, on 29 October 1627, leaving behind him a situation full of turmoil creating opportunities for the enemies of the Empire. Ever since the murder of prince Khusrau (22 Feb. 1621)²⁰ by order of Khurram (Shāh Jahān) at Burhānpūr, troubles had been brewing thick within the Mughal dominions. Shāh Khurram himself rebelled in 1623 and sought shelter in the Deccan.²¹ The imperial family itself was torn with dissensions: Nūr Jahān wanting her son-in-law Shāhriyār to succeed her husband to the throne; her brother Āṣaf Khān supporting the claims of his son-in-law, Khurram; and prince Pārvez backed up by the

powerful noble Mahābat Khān. The last named actually rebelled and took the royal couple captive a little before Jahāngīr's death in 1626.²² Finally, Dāwar Baksh (the hapless son of the tragic Khusrau) was made a scape-goat to pave the way for Shāh Jahān who ascended the imperial throne through crime and bloodshed.²³ The new reign also opened ominously with the revolt of Khān Jahān Lodī, who following his master's precedent took refuge in the Deccan (1627-31).²⁴

Such was the atmosphere within the Mughal Empire when Shāhjī returned to the Nizāmshāhī kingdom. Things were not more settled at home. While Khān Jahān was seeking support from Murtazā Nizāmshāh (1629-30), Fath Khān was imprisoned by the machinations of Hamīd Khān, a vile and unscrupulous fellow who rose to power through vice and corruption.²⁵ In the face of the pursuing Mughal forces, a temporary alliance had been formed between Bijāpūr and Aḥmadnagar in support of the rebel Khān Jahān who promised restoration of the Deccan territories conquered by the Mughals.²⁶ Being in league with the Lodī, even Lukhjī Jādhav Rāo had returned to the Nizāmshāhī. Bijāpūr was so well fortified, and the allies acted in such unison, that the imperial army under Āsaf Khān had to return, not by *imposing* but *accepting* terms from the Deccanis.²⁷ But the wickedness of Hamīd Khān soon changed the face of the situation. The ascendancy of Mustafā Khān and his pro-Mughal party in Bijāpūr (1627-48)²⁸ was also not calculated to help in the continuation of the united front against the imperialists. Shāh Jahān, on the other hand, was wild with his father-in-law over his failure at Bijāpūr and was determined on more vigorous action. At such a moment the folly of Hamīd Khān brought about a shocking crime in the Nizāmshāhī in the shape of the murder of Lukhjī Jādhav Rāo and several members of his family (25 July 1629).²⁹ Suspicion of treason might have instigated this tragedy in that atmosphere of intrigue and disloyalty. But whatsoever the reason, it certainly served to alienate from Murtazā even the recently restored Shāhjī Bhoslé. Along with some other frightened and dis-

affected servants of the Nizāmshāhī, Shāhji felt it expedient to join the Mughals. The Mughal chronicler, Abdul Ḥamīd Lāhaurī, writes :

‘ At this time, Shāhuji Bhoslé, son-in-law of Jadū Rāi, the Hindu commander of Nizām Shāh’s army, came in and joined Azam Khān (the Mughal commander). After the murder of Jadū Rāi, . . . Shāhuji broke off his connexion with Nizām Shāh, and retiring to the districts of Pūna and Chākan, he wrote to Azam Khān proposing to make his submission upon receiving a promise of protection. Azam Khān wrote to court and received orders to accept the proposal. Shāhuji then came and joined him with 2000 horse. He received a *khil’at*, a *manṣab* of 5000, and a gift of two *lacs* of rupees, and other presents. His brother Minājī (Mānājī ?) received a robe and a *manṣab* of 3000 personal and 1500 horse. Samājī (Sambhājī), son of Shāhuji, also received a robe and a *manṣab* of 2000 personal and 1000 horse. Several of their relations and dependants also obtained gifts and marks of distinction.’ (Nov. 1630).³⁰

Wisdom dawned on Murtazā too late ; and when he tried to mend matters, the remedy proved fatal to himself. Disgusted with the domination of Ḥamīd Khān, he brought out Fath Khān from the prison and put him in power. But the restored minister, either out of revenge or mistaking this for a confession of weakness, imprisoned Murtazā and wrote to the Mughal governor Āṣaf Khān that he had done so because of the Nizāmshāh’s evil character and enmity towards the Emperor, ‘ for which act he expected some mark of favour.’ In answer he was asked to prove his loyalty and goodfaith by ridding the world of such a wicked being. Fath Khān on receipt of this hint ‘ secretly made away with Nizām Shāh but gave out that he had died a natural death.’³¹ (Feb. 1632). Then he placed the deceased King’s son Husain (III) on the throne, and having reported the news to the Imperial Court was called upon to submit to the Emperor. Fath Khān thereupon had the *khulba* read in the name of Shāh Jahān, and Daulatābād was surrendered to the Mughals along with other rich tribute. Having thus secured

the submission of Shāhjī in 1630 and of Fath Khān in 1632, Shāh Jahān returned to Āgrā (which he had left on 3 Dec. 1629) on 6 March 1632.³²

The withdrawal of the Emperor from the South was dictated by two considerations : the death of the queen Mumtāz, at Burhānpūr (7 June 1631), and the outbreak of a devastating famine in the Deccan at the same time. Concerning the latter calamity Abdul Ḥamīd writes : 'During the past year no rain had fallen in the territories of the Bālāghāt, and the drought had been especially severe about Daulatābād. In the present year also there had been a deficiency in the bordering countries and a total want in the Deccan and Gujarāt. The inhabitants of the two countries were reduced to the direst extremity : Life was offered for a loaf, but none would buy ; rank was to be sold for a cake, but none cared for it ; the ever bounteous hand was now stretched out to beg for food ; and the feet which had always trodden the way of contentment walked about only in search of sustenance. For a long time dog's flesh was sold for goat's flesh, and the pounded bones of the dead were mixed with flour and sold. When this was discovered the sellers were brought to justice. Destitution at length reached such a pitch that men began to devour each other and the flesh of a son was preferred to his love. The numbers of the dying caused obstructions on the roads, and every man whose dire sufferings did not terminate in death, who retained the power to move, wandered off to the towns and villages of other countries. Those lands which had been famous for their fertility and plenty now retained no trace of productiveness.'³³

Within a few months of Shāh Jahān's return to Āgrā, Shāhjī quitted the Mughal camp (June 1632). The ostensible ground for his desertion was his dissatisfaction at the redistribution of rewards once granted to him. On his joining the Mughals, he had been allowed to occupy the districts of Junnar, Sangamnér and Byzāpūr as his estates. A little later, he was asked to stay at Nāsik which was the *jāgīr* of another Mughal officer, Khwāja Abul Ḥasan. Finally, when Fath Khān sur-

rendered Daulatābād to the Emperor, some of the places previously assigned to Shāhjī were taken away from him and given to Fath Khān (May 1632). Shāhjī therefore returned to the Nizāmshāhī within a month of this, and seized the districts of Nāsik, Trimbak, Sangamesvar, Junnar as well as parts of Northern Konkan.³¹ Then followed a tussle between the Mughal forces and the Deccan States which once more came together for the recovery of their lost possessions. The absence of Shāh Jahān was an encouraging factor, and Khān-i-khānān Mahābat Khān had retired to Burhānpūr leaving Daulatābād in the charge of Khān Daurān Nasir Khān. At Bijāpūr Muṣṭafā Khān was undoubtedly favourable to the Mughals, as also Fath Khān in the Nizāmshāhī. But there was a powerful anti-Mughal group in the 'Ādilshāhī led by Khawāṣ Khān and Randaulā Khān. They had also an intrepid Hindu general in their camp, namely, Murār Jagdev, who was friendly towards Shāhjī. It was this combination that the imperialists were called upon to face at this time.³² The position was somewhat as follows :

In the extreme east of the Nizāmshāhī territories was Sholāpūr which was in the keeping of Sidi Raihan. In the west were Shāhjī at Pemgaḍ and Śrīnivās Rāo at Junnar. Sidi Sābā Saif Khān in Tal-Konkan and Sidi Sābā 'Ambar at Rājāpūrī (Janjirā) were practically independent. Bijāpūr claimed suzerainty over the Māvaḷs and along the Nīrā river. But, owing to the unsettled conditions, and the see-sawing of authority, every petty chieftain and *qīle'dār* was obliged to submit to the most powerful. Expediency rather than consistency and loyalty had become the rule of action for most people. The attitude of the waverers might be illustrated by the conduct of Sidi Saif Khān. While Shāhjī was rallying the forces of the country in collaboration with Bijāpūr, he called upon the Sidi to join him. But that recalcitrant captain marched away to Bijāpūr pretending to submit directly to the 'Ādil Shāh. Shāhjī then attacked him and dealt a severe blow from which he was rescued by the friendly intercession of Murār Jagdev. At Bijāpūr the Sidi was awarded a *jāgīr* worth two *lākhs*,³³

thereby showing that there was no perfect harmony between the allies, or the party opposed to Khawāṣ Khān was mobilising its strength to overthrow its rivals.

Meanwhile, Shāhji, with the support of Murār Jagdev, got crowned at Pemgaḍ another petty princeling belonging to the Nizāmshāh's family (September 1632)³⁷ in order to impart legality to his actions. By then he had made himself master of Junnar, Jivdhan, Sundā, Bhorgaḍ, Parasgaḍ, Māhuli, Kohaj, etc. with a personal following of 12,000 troops.³⁸ The way he set about consolidating his authority may be indicated by his treatment of Śrīnivās Rāo of Junnar. The unwary chieftain was captured along with his castle under the ruse of proposing a marriage between Shāhji's eldest son Sambhāji and Śrīnivās Rāo's daughter.³⁹ Coercion and stratagem were considered a part of the game while playing for higher stakes. Murār Jagdev was acting similarly on behalf of the 'Ādil Shāh. Āqā Rizā was commandant of the important border fortress of Parendā, originally under the Nizām Shāh. Owing to his dislike of Fath Khān, he had recently transferred his allegiance to the Mughals. Murār Jagdev now won him over by bribery (28 July 1632).⁴⁰ More instructive still are the instances of Jalnā and Daulatābād. Maḥmūd Khān was keeper of the former stronghold under Fath Khān. Both Shāhji and the Mughal general Khān Zamān made a bid for his surrender; but the latter having offered the larger prize, Jalnā submitted to the imperial officer. (7 October 1632).⁴¹ Maḥmūd Khān was rewarded with a *manṣab* of 4000 *zāt* and 4000 *svār*.

Fath Khān was himself in charge of Daulatābād wherein he had been reinstated. Though he was nominally subject to the Mughals, actually he was ready to side with the strongest party. While carrying on negotiations with Mahābat Khān at Burhānpūr, he was won over by the more immediate offers of help made by Shāhji and Randaulā Khān. The latter paid him 3,00,000 *pagodas* cash, supplied him with provisions and fodder, and promised to leave him in independent possession of Daulatābād. 'That ill-starred foolish fellow,' writes the dis-

appointed Mughal chronicler, 'allured by these promises, broke former engagements (with the Mughals), and entered into an alliance with them.'

Mahābat Khān could not brook this. In January 1633 he sent his son, Khān Zamān, in advance to punish Faṭḥ Khān, and himself followed in March next. When the Khān-i-khānān joined his son in the attack on Daulatābād and stormed the fortress with shot and shell, writes Lāhaurī, Faṭḥ Khān 'woke up from his sleep of heedlessness and security. He saw that Daulatābād could not resist the Imperial arms and the vigour of the Imperial commander. To save the honour of his own and Nizām Shāh's women, he sent his eldest son Abdu-r Rasul to Khān-i-khānān (laying the blame of his conduct on Shāhuji and the 'Ādil-Khānis) ... On the 19th *Zi-l hijja*, Faṭḥ Khān came out of the fort and delivered it up.' (17 June 1633). He was rewarded with a *khil'at* and grant of two *lākhs* of rupees (annual), his property was restored to him, and he was admitted into Mughal service. The puppet prince Husain Nizām Shāh III was sent a prisoner to Gwalior, and his property was confiscated.¹² (21 Sept. 1633).

Shāhji had once declared, that the loss of Daulatābād, which was but one out of the eighty-four fortresses in the Nizāmshāhī, was no cause for despair. In July 1633 he gathered round himself, at Bhīmgad, an army of seven to eight thousand and seized the country from Poona and Chākan to Balāghāt and the environs of Junnar, Aḥmadnagar, Sangamnér, Trimbak and Nāsik. The Mughals tried to tackle him by offer of terms through his cousin Māloji Bhoslé, but he felt himself strong enough to reject their offers.¹³ The imperialists met with like failure against Murār Jagdev at Parendā. Prince Shūjā was sent for the capture of that stronghold (24 Feb. 1634); but it defied him. Azam Khān had attempted it three years earlier (March 1631), but with no better result. On both the occasions the valour of Murār Jagdev baffled the Mughals. With the approach of rains, and lack of provisions, Shūjā withdrew in May 1634. These failures broke the heart

of Khān-i-khānān who died on 26 October that same year, with the task of subjugating the Deccan still unaccomplished.⁴⁴

To retrieve the Imperial position, Khān Daurān was sent as viceroy in January 1635. He chased Shāhjī out of the environs of Daulatābād where he was collecting revenue at Rām-dūd. Shāhjī escaped to Junnar *via* Śevgāon and Amarpūr across the Mohri Ghāt, losing 8000 oxen laden with grain, arms, and rockets, along with 3000 followers who were taken prisoner. The *Śiva Bhārat* states that he was still master of the territories enclosed between the rivers Godāvarī, Pravarā, Nirā and Bhūmā, besides the Māvaḷ and Konkaṇ.⁴⁵ What strengthened him further was his alliance with Bījāpūr. To tackle this situation Shāh Jahān himself moved into the Deccan, arriving at Daulatābād on 21 February 1636.

The time was certainly opportune for him. Muṣṭafā Khān and Khawāṣ Khān were at logger-heads in Bījāpūr. The former had been sent to prison by the latter (in 1633); but the situation soon recoiled on Khawāṣ. The instrument of the reaction was Randaulā Khān who had fallen out with Murār Jagdev and Khawāṣ Khān. Finding himself in danger Khawāṣ appealed for Mughal help, but was murdered along with Murār Jagdev, before the Mughals could come to their rescue (1635).⁴⁶ The ascendancy of Randaulā Khān, however, did not affect the alliance with Shāhjī. Therefore Shāh Jahān decided to act with caution.

The imperial army was divided into three parts, each being led respectively by Khān Daurān, Khān Zamān, and Shā'ista Khān. The first was sent towards Kandhār and Nāndéd (in the border between Golkonḍa and Bījāpūr territories), with instructions to ravage the country and besiege the forts of Udgīr and Āvsé. The second division, under Khān Zamān, was directed towards Aḥmadnagar to capture or devastate Shāhjī's possessions from Chāmargonḍa and Asṭī to the Konkaṇ. The third was to conquer Junnar, Sangamnér, Nāsik and Trimbak. Finding that Bījāpūr was not shaken by these manœuvres, Shāh Jahān finally ordered the devastation of the 'Ādilshāhī terri-

stories as well. These tactics, perhaps reinforced by intrigues through the pro-Mughal Muṣṭafā Khān, succeeded in detaching Bijāpūr from Shāhji. On 6 May 1636 a treaty between the Emperor and 'Ādil Shāh was signed, followed by another, in June, with Golkonda.¹⁷ The purpose of these engagements was to isolate Shāhji : after defining the share-out of the Nizāmshāhī territories (as indicated in the preceding chapter), it was particularly stipulated that the 'Ādil Shāh should give no quarter to the rebel Shāhji until he submitted to the Emperor and surrendered Junnar and the other Nizāmshāhī forts to the imperialists, and agreed to take up service under Bijāpūr. Failing such surrender on the part of Shāhji, 'Ādilshāhī forces were to co-operate with the imperial generals in the reduction of the Marāṭhā rebel.¹⁸

Thus deserted and betrayed by Bijāpūr, Shāhji became a fugitive hunted from fort to fort, until at last he was forced to submit under the combined pressure of the confederate armies. The *Śiva Bhārat* names the following among Shāhji's supporters in this grave extremity : his only friends in need : namely, Ghāṭgé, Kāṭé, Gāikwād, Kank, Thomré, Chauhān, Mohité, Mahādik, Kharāṭé, Pāṇḍharé, Wāgh, Ghorpadé, etc.—all Marāṭhās.¹⁹ His own family was at Junnar with his eldest son Sambhāji among its defenders. But they were all pursued and driven over the Ghāṭs into the Konkan. It was the rainy season, and the Mughal force under Khān Zamān was for a time held up by the floods in the Mūlā, Mūthā and Indrāyaṇī rivers, between Poona and Lohgaḍ. Shāhji wavered for a while between Māhuli and Muranjan forts before making a final stand. He even sought assistance and shelter at the hands of the Portuguese. But, in the face of the 'Ādilshāhī and Mughal pursuers, they dared not take any risks. 'The Council unanimously agreed,' frankly states the Portuguese record, 'that, concerning Shāhji, who was pursued by two such powerful enemies as the Mughals and 'Ādil Shāh, with whom we are at peace and on friendly terms, *it was not convenient to favour and help openly*, nor give him shelter in the fortress of Chaul, but, in case he

were to go to Dandā (Rājāpūrī) or wherever he should think best, that way he could be helped with all precaution.⁵⁰

Finally driven to bay, Shāhji decided to take shelter within Māhulī which had been lately surrendered to him by its Marāṭhā commandant Mambājī Bhoslé. There he was closely invested and forced to submit : 'He was told that if he wished to save his life he should come to terms with 'Ādil Khān ; for such was the Emperor's command. He was also advised to be quick in doing so, if he wished to escape from the swords of the besiegers. So he was compelled into submission to 'Ādil Khān, and besought that a treaty might be made with him. After the arrival of the treaty, he made some absurd inadmissible demands,' writes the imperial historian, 'and withdrew from the agreement he had made. But the siege was pressed on and the final attack drew near, when Sāhu came out of the fort and met Randaulā half way down the hill, and surrendered himself with the young Nizām. He agreed to enter the service of 'Ādil Khān, and to surrender the forts of Junnar, Trimbak, Tringalwārī, Haris, Jund, and Harsira, which were delivered over to Khān Zamān ... Randaulā, under the orders of 'Ādil Khān, placed the young Nizām in the hands of Khān Zamān, and then went to Bījāpūr accompanied by Sāhu.'⁵¹ (November 1636). Here ended the first phase of Shāhji's restless career. It synchronised almost exactly with the Nizāmshāhī's struggle for existence (1594-1636). With the extinction of that Kingdom and Shāhji's entry into the 'Ādilshāhī service, we turn from the Deccan proper to peninsular India ; from the fortunes of a growing Empire in the North to the misfortunes of a languishing Empire in the South.

The period which followed the treaty between the Mughal Emperor and the Deccan Sultāns afforded the latter a respite on their northern frontiers which they fully utilised for extending their dominions southwards. Golkonda and Bījāpūr were, like the now extinguished Nizāmshāhī, inheritors of the Bahmani traditions. The renewal of the war with what remained of the once glorious Vijayanagar Empire, was therefore quite tradi-

tional for them. Besides there were alluring prospects in the South from whose territories and treasures the Sultāns could compensate themselves for losses sustained by them at the hands of the Mughals. To these temptations were added the inviting dissensions of the scions and vassals of Vijayanagar (viz. the Nāyaks of Ikkeri, Mysore, Ginjī, Tanjore, Madura, etc.) who by their suicidal antagonisms undid all the good work of the great Rāyas. As the Jesuit Antoine de Proenza significantly observed, in 1659 : "The old kings of this country appear, by their jealousies and imprudent actions, to invite the conquest of entire India by the Muslims."⁵² The *Muḥammad-nāma* (official chronicle of the Kings of Bijāpūr) plainly declares : 'As the Karnāṭak and Malnāḍ had not been conquered before by any Muslim king of the Deccan, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shāh thought of bringing them under his sway *in order to strengthen and glorify the Islāmic religion in the dominion of the Hindus* :'⁵³ and 'to win for himself the titles of *Mujāhid* and *Ghāzi*,' adds the *Basātīn-u's-Salātīn*.⁵⁴

The objectives being thus settled, geography and their relative strength and status determined the respective shares in the spoils of victory between Bijāpūr and Golkonḍa. Tentatively it was agreed upon that Golkonḍa was to extend along the East coast below the Kṛṣṇā delta, and Bijāpūr to conquer Western Karnāṭak, Malnāḍ, and the Mysore plateau. The forces of the two inevitably met in the Eastern Carnāṭic near Ginjī, and thereafter the division depended upon *force majeure*. Machiavellian *real politik* really decided the fate of small and great principalities where grab as grab can was the only guiding principle, and neither 'border nor breed' was respected.

The century which followed the disaster of Rakkastangaḍi (1565) was one of disintegration for the Vijayanagar dominions. From our point of view it closes with the death of Shāhjī in 1664. Venkaṭapati II and Śrī Ranga III were the last two rulers of the Araviḍu dynasty who struggled heroically to preserve their great inheritance (1630-64).⁵⁵ But the Nāyaks and polygārs, their nominal vassals, saw to it that they did

not succeed. The petty chiefs of Ikkeri, Mysore, Ginjī, Madura and Tanjore, who were originally officers of Vijayanagar, had gradually become its feudatories, and then independent rulers. Now they acted as enemies, rebels and traitors. A Dutch record of the time speaks of 'the Tijmerage (Timma Rājā), commander of the King of Carnatica, who had revolted against the King and arrested him, and except a few fortresses had conquered the whole country.'⁵⁶ Though ultimately all of them went the way of traitors, for the time being, these short-sighted and selfish rebels played havoc with the remnants of the Vijayanagar empire. Our interest lies chiefly in the work of Shāhjī and the Marāṭhās who came into this disturbed atmosphere as agents and auxiliaries of the Bījāpūr King, but remained in the South to found a dominion of their own.

Shāhjī served under Muḥammad 'Ādil Shāh (1636-56) and 'Āli 'Ādil Shāh (1656-64). The Bījāpūr kingdom survived him only twenty-two years ; for it was absorbed in the Mughal Empire in 1686. The principal generals who led the southern campaigns were Raudaulā Khān (1636-43), Muṣṭafā Khān (1643-48), and Khān Muḥammad (1648-57). Shāhjī was associated with all of them practically throughout, and rose to be latterly one of the most important Bījāpūr generals. He was appointed governor at Bangalore and entrusted with the work of consolidation and extension of the 'Ādilshāhī authority. Occasionally he was misunderstood or misrepresented by his Muslim colleagues, and suffered arrest or imprisonment more than once. But every time he vindicated himself successfully, and died in harness as a loyal servant of the 'Ādil Shāh in 1664. The self-respecting and independent tone of his letter to 'Āli 'Ādil Shāh (excerpt cited at the head of this chapter) is indicative of his strength and importance in 1657. His southern activities certainly proved more fruitful for Marāṭhā history than his earlier adventures in the Nizāmshāhī.

Shāhjī's antecedents at the commencement of his enforced 'Ādilshāhī service must be borne in mind in order to be able to assess his position correctly. Though defeated in war, it is

not to be forgotten that he had been lately ally of his present master. Secondly, though deprived of his other Nizāmshāhī possessions, his *jāgīrs* in Poona and Supā were left to him. These formed the nucleus round which his gifted son Śivājī developed his power and empire. We shall speak of these developments in later chapters, but here it must be remembered that the activities of both father and son were to have important repercussions on each other.

Between 1637 and 1640 three expeditions were sent into the Malnād area of Mysore. They were led by Randaulā Khān and Shāhjī who were old friends. The first was against Ikkeri and Basavapaṭṭaṇa, which were ruled respectively by Virabhadra and Kengé Hanuma. The *Muḥammad-nāma* relates : 'Keng Nāyak, the Rājā of Basavapaṭṭaṇa, who had an ill-will against Virabhadra, through the deplorable propensity of taking revenge, informed Rustum-i-Zamān (Randaulā Khān), "I will help you in conquering the whole country, but you should first invade Ikkeri. I will show you a path by which you can reach Ikkeri quickly, and Virabhadra will not catch scent of your coming. You will gain an easy victory over him if you will give me one *lākh* of *hons* as my reward and commend me to your king." Rustum-i-Zamān agreed to this.'⁵⁷ The result of this treachery was that Ikkeri was conquered (1637) and Virabhadra was compelled to cede half of his territory and pay a tribute of 18 *lākhs* of *hons*. Virabhadra then shifted his capital to Bidnūr.⁵⁸ Two years later a punitive expedition was led against the Nāyak for not having paid the stipulated tribute. "Ikkeri might have been annexed," writes Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, "but was saved by the intervention of Shāhjī, and agreed to be a vassal kingdom under Bījāpūr."⁵⁹ An inscription of 1641 speaks of Virabhadra as having 'given protection to the southern kings who were alarmed by the great army of the Pātushāh.'⁶⁰

The next expedition was against Kastūri Ranga of Sirā and Kempé Gauḍā of Bangalore (1638). The former division was led by Afzal Khān and the latter by Randaulā Khān and

Shāhjī. Following the morality of Pizarro at Maxico (against Atahualpa) and anticipating his own fate at Pratāpgaḍ, Afzal Khān murdered the chief of Sirā during a feigned interview, and captured his stronghold.⁶¹ The chief of Tāḍpatri saved himself by cleverly diverting the Muslim army to Bangalore. The latter place was conquered by Randaulā and Shāhjī and made the headquarters of the Bijāpūr authority under Shāhjī. Śrīrangapaṭṭaṇa was next attacked (1639). But according to a contemporary Kannaḍa work (*Kaṇṭhīrava Naraśarājēndra Vijaya* by Govinda Vaidya, composed in 1648) the Muslims, were defeated and driven out.⁶² The *Muḥammad-nāma*, however, claims that the Rājā, after a month's resistance, saved his kingdom by paying a tribute of five *lākhs* of *hons*.⁶³ The *Śiva Bhārat* attributes the victory to Shāhjī's valour which it says was applauded by Rustum-i-Zamān (Randaulā Khān). It also adds that the Nāyaks of Kāveripaṭṭaṇa and Madura also submitted during this campaign.⁶⁴

The third expedition was provoked by the revolt of Kengé Hanuma who appears to have engineered a general rising of the Hindu *rājās* in 1639. He had gathered together an army of 70,000 men to defend his capital city of Basavapaṭṭaṇa. But his bitter enemy Vīrabhadra of Bidnūr saw in this an opportunity for revenge and joined the Bijāpūr forces. The defenders made heroic resistance, but Basavapaṭṭaṇa was conquered. Kengé Nāyak was obliged to pay 40 *lākhs* of *hons*. Shāhjī, from all accounts, is said to have played a prominent part in this campaign.⁶⁵ Minor raids were directed towards Belūr, Tumkūr, and Chiknāikana Haḷḷi, the last of which alone yielded 20,000 *hons*; another 80,000 were got from Baḷḷāpūr. An abortive understanding with Śrī Ranga Rāyal was attempted, but it proved of little consequence. Rustum-i-Zamān carried away all the movable treasures from Kolihal (Kunigal, 40 m. w. of Bangalore) and left the empty fortress to Śrī Ranga, 'as agreed to before.'⁶⁶

The revolt of Śivappa Nāyak, successor of Vīrabhadra of Bidnūr, in 1643, opened the next stage of the conquest. Khān-i-

khānān Muzafer-u'd-Dīn was dispatched to suppress the rebellion. His success in this earned for him the title of Khān Muḥammad Muḥammadshāhī. He effected the further conquests of Nandiyāl and eight other strongholds, during the year following, in the Karnool District. (1644-45).⁶⁷ The major campaign, however, was entrusted to Nawāb Khān Bābā Muṣṭafā Khān in 1646.

Marching *via* Gadag and Laxmeśvar (June 1646) Muṣṭafā Khān was joined by Asad Khān and Shāhjī (3 Oct.) at Honhalli—12 m. w. of Basavapaṭṭaṇa. Other chiefs came in at Sakkarépaṭṭaṇ (Kaḍūr District) among whom were Śivappa Nāyak of Bidnūr, Doḍḍa Nāyak of Harpanhalli, Kengé Nāyak's brother, the Desāis of Laxmeśvar and Koppal, as well as Marāṭhās like Ābājī Rāo Ghāṭgē and Bālājī Haibat Rāo. At Śivaganga even envoys from the Nāyaks of Ginji, Madura, and Tanjore came to meet the invaders : indeed a portentous symptom of the prevailing chaos. Śrī Ranga Rāyal, the nominal suzerain of these rebellious Nāyaks, attempted to coerce them with an army of 12,000 horse and 3,00,000 men, but found it an impossible task. An English Factory record notes : " This country is at present full of wars and troubles for the King [Śrī Ranga], and three of his Nagues [Nāyaks] are at variance, and the King of Vizapore's army is come into this country on the one side, and the King of Golkonda on the other, both against this King."⁶⁸

Finding resistance impossible, Śrī Ranga tried diplomacy. He sent his Brahman agent Venkayya Somājī to induce the Bijāpūr general to spare his country. But the Khān refused to be diverted by ' the deceitful words of the Rāyal's envoy.' However, Shāhjī persuaded Muṣṭafā Khān to send his representative Mullāh Aḥmad to the Rāyal at Vellore to discuss terms with him personally. But the Rāyal, unfortunately, appeared to have decided upon resistance. Shāhjī's well meant intercession, therefore, created misgivings in the mind of Muṣṭafā Khān. Nevertheless, the general acted tactfully under the circumstances. Marching on Vellore, he placed Shāhjī on the right wing of

his army, at the same time keeping Asad Khān's division behind him as a safeguard against possible treachery. But Shāhjī acquitted himself well and did not betray the trust placed in him. Vellore was captured after heavy fighting; 5,800 of Śrī Ranga's troops lay dead on the field. The Rāyal was thus forced to submit paying an indemnity of 50 *lākhs* of *hons* and 150 elephants (April 1647).⁶⁹ Muṣṭafā Khān returned in triumph to Bijāpūr, effecting some minor conquests on his way back. Muḥammad 'Ādil Shāh showed his appreciation of the great victory by proceeding as far as the river Kṛṣṇā to receive the victorious general. The *Muḥammad-nāma* records the result in characteristic words: 'As the King thought of spreading and strengthening the true faith, he brought Rām Rāj (Śrī Ranga?) and all other *rājās* of the south under subjection, and the strong temples which the *kāfirs* had erected in every fort were completely demolished. The whole country was conquered in three years and the citadel of dualism and idol-worship was given such a rude shock that the knots of the sacred-thread wearers (of Śc̣t-band Rāmeśvar) were snapped.'⁷⁰

Despite the religious fervour reflected in the Muslim chronicler's remarks, the campaign was not a mere fanatical raid. To garner its political fruits the Hindu Shāhjī was as much depended upon as the Muslim Asad Khān. A *farmān* issued on 11 January 1648 (a day after Muṣṭafā Khān was again dispatched to the South) bespeaks of the confidence placed by Muḥammad Shāh in the Marāṭhā general. It enjoins on Yaśvant Rāo Wadvé equal obedience to the commands of the Nawāb Khān Bābā (i.e. Muṣṭafā Khān) and Shāhjī who is referred to in endearing terms such as '*Mahārāj Farzand* Shāhjī Bhoslé.' He is asked, 'being in agreement with the Mahārāj,' to practise loyalty to Government.⁷¹

This last campaign under Muṣṭafā was due to an invitation from Tirumala Nāyak of Madura who had quarrelled with the Nāyaks of Ginjī and Tanjore.⁷² The combined forces of Tirumala and Muṣṭafā invested the fort of Ginjī, but the siege was protracted on account of the severe famine which was raging

all around. Suddenly, in the midst of these prolonged operations, Shāhjī was arrested by Muṣṭafā. According to the *Basātin-u's Salātin*, 'Some incidents happened which became the cause of disunion and disaffection between Shāhjī and Muṣṭafā Khān.'⁷³ Further details of the incident are thus stated in the *Muḥammad-nāma* : 'When the siege of Ginjī was protracted, and fighting continued long, the cunning Shāhjī, who changed sides like the dice of a gambler, sent an agent to Nawāb Muṣṭafā Khān begging leave to go to his own country and give repose to his troops. The Nawāb replied that to retire then would be tantamount to desertion. Then Shāhjī remonstrated that grain was too dear in the camp, and his soldiers could no longer bear the privation and strain of the siege. He added that he was retiring to his country without waiting for further orders. The Nawāb being convinced that Shāhjī meant mischief, and might show fight, had him arrested (on 25 July 1648) with such extreme cleverness and circumspection that no part of his property was plundered, but the whole was confiscated to Government.'⁷⁴

The *Basātin-ū's-Salātin* also states that Bājī Ghorpaḍé, Yaśvant Rāo Wadvé, and Asad Khān were employed in apprehending Shāhjī. He was surprised in his bed in the early hours of the morning, but his personal contingent of 3000 Marāṭhā horse offered resistance and had to be dispersed. On hearing of this, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shāh dispatched Afzal Khān 'to bring Shāhjī away ; and an eunuch to attach his property.'⁷⁵

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has attributed this arrest of Shāhjī definitely to his "disloyal intrigues."⁷⁶ In support of this view he has cited a letter from Abdullah Qutb Shāh to Hājī Nasira (his agent at Bījāpūr) which alleges that on 23 December 1647 Shāhjī Bhoslé had petitioned him 'begging to be taken under his protection', adding that 'then and repeatedly before this' he had 'rejected Shāhjī's prayers and told him to serve 'Ādil Shāh loyally.' Continuing, Sir Jadunath has accused Shāhjī of "coquetting with both the Rāyal and Qutb Shāh," and states that "the latter sovereign divulged the fact to 'Ādil Shāh."

The Venkayya Somājī incident is also alluded to by him as further supporting his allegation of treason on the part of Shāhjī.⁷⁷ A careful examination of the entire evidence, however, points to a very different conclusion.

We have already noticed how the misgivings about Shāhjī's loyalty, caused by his misplaced sympathy towards Śrī Ranga Rāyal's agent, were proved baseless by his conduct at Vellore in November 1646. If he had started "coquetting" with the Qutb Shāh between November 1646 and 23 December 1647 (the date of the alleged appeal to Qutb Shāh) and had "repeatedly" done so during these thirteen months, the 'Ādil Shāh, after being informed about it by Qutb Shāh, could not have issued the *farmān*, on 11 January 1648, to Yaśvant Rāo Wadvé asking him to act in obedience to *Mahārāj Farzand* Shāhjī Bhoslé. The allegation of disloyalty before 11 January 1648, therefore, stands disproved.

During the short period of six months and two weeks (11 January to 25 July 1648) preceding Shāhjī's arrest, there was all round dissatisfaction owing to the lack of provisions and the strain of the prolonged operations. *Khairiyat Khān* and *Sidi Raihan* were as dissatisfied as Shāhjī. The hardships referred to by Shāhjī were therefore real and not only a pretext. The *Muḥammad-nāma* itself complains that even the Qutb Shāh (whose forces were defeated by Śrī Ranga Rāyal) formed a secret understanding with the infidel and sent Mīr Jumla, his general, to assist in the defence of Ginjī.⁷⁸ But Mīr Jumla arrived too late and was defeated by the Bījāpūr general Bājī Ghorpaḍé. Sir Jadunath himself states that Abdullah Qutb Shāh wrote "whimpering to Shāh Jahān that 'Ādil Shāh had broken his promise and was forcibly taking away Qutb Shāh's portion."⁷⁹ In these circumstances we are inclined to be sceptical about the allegation against Shāhjī. Qutb Shāh who was himself intriguing against 'Ādil Shāh could not have "divulged" the repeated advances of Shāhjī if they had been true.

Muṣṭafā Khān died under the strain on 9 November 1648. The siege of Ginjī was concluded victoriously by his successor

Khān Muḥammad on 28 December the same year. Shāhjī was all the time (25 July to 28 December 1648) detained at Ginjī. Had he been guilty of treason, he would have been post haste dispatched to Bījāpūr, especially as Afzal Khān had been specially deputed for the purpose. The prisoner was, however, actually taken to the capital along with the treasures—'property beyond calculation and 39 elephants for the King', which looks incredible had Shāhjī been really guilty of the offence for which he is supposed to have been arrested. The party led by Afzal Khān (which included Shāhjī) was received by the 'Ādil Shāh 'in the Kalyāṇ Maḥal which had been decorated for the *Nauroz* festivities.⁸⁰

The treatment of Shāhjī at Bījāpūr and the terms of his release go to confirm our belief that his arrest was not due to treason. He was kept in ordinary confinement under Aḥmad Khān, *sar-i-sar-i-naubat*, and told that 'he would be pardoned and restored to his former honours if he surrendered to the King the forts of Konḍāna, Bangalore, and Kandarpi.'⁸¹ Aḥmad Khān, by the King's order, conveyed Shāhjī to his own house and imparted to him 'the happy news of the royal favour and did his utmost to compose his mind. Shāhjī decided to obey and wrote to his two sons ... to deliver the forts to the Sultān's officers immediately. They obeyed promptly. Thus all the numerous misdeeds of Shāhjī were washed away by the stream of royal mercy. 'The Sultān summoned Shāhjī to his presence, *gave him the robe of a minister, and settled his former lands on him again.*'⁸² Had Shāhjī been really guilty of treason, he would have been beheaded like Khawās Khān or torn to pieces like Murār Jagdev in 1635. That he should have been so honorably acquitted in the face of bitter enemies at the Court, who were thirsting for Shāhjī's blood, speaks volumes for his integrity as well as importance.

'The nobles and gentry of the city,' says the *Muḥammad-nāma*, 'were astonished at the graciousness of the King and began to say : "Shāhjī Rājā deserves to be put to death, and not to be kept under guard." ... Some councillors did not at

all like that Shāhjī should be set free, because that faithless man . . . would play the fox again. Many others held the view that to liberate this traitor and ruined wretch would be like treading on the tail of a snake. . . . No wise man would rest his head on a hornet's nest as on a pillow.⁸³ Obviously Muḥammad Shāh was no fool to invest such a man with 'the robe of a minister.'

Between the arrest and release of Shāhjī only less than ten months had elapsed (25 July 1648 to 16 May 1649). Of these over five months had been spent at Ginjī without trial. The journey from Ginjī to Bījāpūr must have occupied at least a month. Finally, after about three months detention, perhaps as a state prisoner, he was sent back to the South with no stigma of a traitor attaching to him. Nevertheless, this experience appears to have brought about a metamorphosis in the mind of this loyal servant of Bījāpūr. Though an earlier *farmān* of 'Ādil Shāh, dated 1 August 1644, speaks of Shāhjī as a 'reprobate' in connexion with the activities of Dādājī Konḍdev,⁸⁴ nothing of an incriminating character had evidently been established against him personally. Kānhojī Jedhé had been sent against Dādājī on that occasion; but later he must have joined Shāhjī. For, the following interesting entry, dated 16 May 1649, is found in the *Jedhé Śakāvalī* :—

'Shāhjī was released in return for Konḍāṇa. At that time, Kānhojī Jedhé and Dādājī Kṛṣṇa Lohkaré *were also released*. They met the Mahārāj who said to them : You have been put to the hardships of captivity on account of me. As to our future : The King of Bījāpūr ordered me to lead an expedition into Karnāṭak to which I replied, 'How can I do it with my income from only twelve villages?' Thereupon the King promised to confer on me the provinces of Bangalore yielding five *lākhs* of *hons*. I have undertaken this enterprise on these terms.

'Your *watan* is in *Māvaḷ*, and my son Śivbā occupies Khedébārē and Poona. You should help him with your troops; and, since you are influential in those parts, you should see that all the *Māvaḷ* Deśmukhs submit to him and obey him.

Thus you should 'all assert your strength, and should any Mughal or 'Ādilshāhī army march against you, you should fight them in full faithfulness to Śivbā.'⁸⁵

This record explicitly conveys to us Shāhjī's attitude towards Śivājī and his activities. We shall have occasion, at a later stage, to consider this more appropriately. But it in no way contradicts what we have already said about the conduct and character of Shāhjī. While being not less loyal than most other Bijāpūr officers, his private interests demanded the most jealous safeguarding. The tone of his letter to 'Āli 'Ādil Shāh, dated 1657, referred to before, clearly indicates this very natural desire. Government officers of Shāhjī's standing in medieval times were feudal vassals. Their *jāgīrs* and personal estates were not under the direct jurisdiction of the King who was merely their suzerain. It was the desire of every big officer to increase his *jāgīrs*, and Shāhjī was no exception. While he personally tried to augment his southern estates through loyal service, he could not but wink at the activities of his gifted and assertive son. His unjustifiable arrest must have brought home to him rather piquantly the precariousness of his position. It was a lucky circumstance that Śivājī was carving out an independent position for himself. While it was incumbent on him to continue in the service of Bijāpūr, as well as expedient, it was neither paternal nor human for him to take any other attitude towards his recalcitrant son. Shāhjī was, therefore, obliged under the circumstances to maintain as good a face with the 'Ādil Shāh as he possibly could, without in any way jeopardising or hampering the good work that Śivājī was doing. If at all, he would help and encourage without compromising his position and interests in the South. This was the obvious degree of his 'reprobation', in the eyes of the 'Ādil Shāh, which could not be established as 'treason.' Besides, Shāhjī was too important an officer in Karnāṭak, almost indispensable, to be executed or antagonised. Affairs in the 'Ādilshāhī were fast running to a crisis after the death of Muṣṭafā Khān. Muḥammad Shāh's protracted illness (1646-56) culminating in 'his

death, and the slur of illegitimacy cast over his successor 'Āli 'Ādil Shāh, constituted a period of great trepidation which was rendered worse by the chronic factiousness of the nobles. The murder of Khān Muḥammad, the successor of Muṣṭafā Khān and victor of Ginji, on 11 November 1657, was an event as symptomatic, if not portentous, as the assassination of Maḥmūd Gāwān in the last days of the Bahmanī kingdom.⁸⁶

Aurangzeb's last vicerealty of the Deccan (1652-57) was also another source of great danger to the Deccan States. His operations against Golkonḍa were no doubt frustrated by the over-riding policy of Shāh Jahān (April 1656), but he had succeeded in winning over the experienced and powerful general Mīr Jumla. Sir William Foster writes : " In September 1654 the English factors reported a fresh development in the unstable politics of the Coast. The king of Golkonḍa, Abdullah Qutb Shāh, had long been jealous of the power wielded by his servant Mīr Jumla, and an open breach had now occurred between them. The latter was suspected of an intention of making himself an independent sovereign of the territory he had conquered in the Carnatic ; but he was well aware of the difficulty of standing alone, and after making overtures to the King of Bijāpūr, he finally succumbed to the intrigues of Aurangzeb, who as viceroy of the Deccan was eagerly watching for an opportunity to interfere Towards the end of 1655—an act provoked by the haughty behaviour of his son—precipitated the crisis, and drove Mīr Jumla into the arms of Aurangzeb, with disastrous results to the Golkonḍa kingdom."⁸⁷ Much the same was to happen to the 'Ādilshāhī.

Aurangzeb attacked Bijāpūr in 1657. Though Shāh Jahān again interfered, the 'Ādil Shāh had to surrender Bīdar, Kalyāṇi and Pareṇḍā besides paying a tribute of one *crore* of rupees.⁸⁸ The Mughal war of succession, occasioned by Shāh Jahān's illness, provided a short though welcome respite to Bijāpūr and Golkonḍa (1657-65). When the campaign was resumed, it ended in the extinction of the only two Muslim Sultanates of the South (1686-87) still remaining.

That Shāhjī had remained loyal to the 'Ādil Shāh even after his arrest and release is indicated by a Portuguese letter dated 11 April 1654. It states that 'The persons acceptable to the King Idalxa and according to his belief loyal to him are Fatecan, Xagi (i.e. Shāhjī) and Malique Acute.'⁸⁹ But the game of independence was being played by all around him, great and small. He was no longer under the tutelage of a superior Muslim officer, and could more and more act on his own initiative; perhaps also in his own interest as well as anybody else. As a matter of fact Muslim power in the South was palpably dwindling. Like the tail of a serpent whose head has been caught inextricably in a trap, the 'Ādilshāhī and Qutbshāhī authority over Karnāṭak was doomed to spasmodic withdrawal. But there was no one in the peninsula strong enough to take its place. Kanṭhīrava Narasarāja Wodeyar of Mysore and Tirumala Nāyak of Madura, who had made themselves independent as well as powerful, died in 1658.⁹⁰ Śrī Ranga Rāyal was struggling tragically to recover his lost inheritance, but all his efforts proved in vain. "Here is nothing but taking and retaking of places with parties of both sides in all places," observes a contemporary European witness. The lack of unity among the native rulers is well indicated by the Jesuit records from Madura: "Tirumala Nāyak (while he was still alive) instead of co-operating in the re-establishment of the affairs of Narasinga (i.e. Śrī Ranga), who alone could save the country, recommended negotiations with the Muḥammadans, opened to them again the passage through the Ghāṭs, and urged them to declare war against the King of Mysore whom he should have sought for help. (The King of) Bisnagar, betrayed a second time by his vassal, succumbed to the contest, and was obliged to seek refuge on the confines of his kingdom in the forests where he led a miserable life . . . a prince made unhappy by the folly of his vassals, whom his personal qualities rendered worthy of a better fate."⁹¹

The same writer notes how the Muslims profited from such a state of things: "Kanakan (Khān-i-khānān) did not

wish to leave the country without levying ransom on Tanjore and Madura. He raised large contributions and returned to Bījāpūr full of riches." Further, "The Muslims have already been for several months in possession of this beautiful and fertile country ; no one knows now what their ulterior designs are ; whether they will establish themselves there or will content themselves with collecting the riches they can find there." ⁹²

One feels tempted to quote copiously from the contemporary Jesuit accounts which are one of our very important sources of information. Father Proenza writes in 1659 : " Muthu Virappa Nāyak, Tirumala's successor, appeared to rectify the mistakes of his father and throw off the yoke of the Muḥammadans. Resolved to refuse the annual tribute which they had imposed, he began to make preparations for a vigorous resistance, and furnished with soldiers and munitions the fortress of Trichinopoly which was the key to his dominions on the northern side. The King of Tanjore, instead of imitating his example and co-operating with him, sent his ambassadors to Idal Khān, while he wasted time in negotiations, the enemy's army crossed the mountains and appeared before Trichinopoly with a preparation which revealed its scheme to conquer all the country. Observing the warlike preparation of the Nāyak, it moved towards the east, pretending to devastate the surrounding country ; then, at a time when one least expected it, it fell on Tanjore on 19 March 1659. This town, situated in the midst of a fertile plain, was not inferior to the strong citadels of Europe." ⁹³

This expedition was led by Shāhjī. The final conquest of Tanjore was effected by his son Vyankojī in 1675. Vyankojī or Ekojī, as he is more familiarly called in the southern and foreign records, was born of Shāhjī's second wife Tukābāi Mohité. Thus were the foundations of the Marāṭhā kingdom of Tanjore laid. But of this we shall see more later. Shāhjī's eldest son by his first wife Jijābāi, Sambhāji (full brother of Śivāji), appears to have died fighting at Kanakgiri about 1655. ⁹⁴

The annals of South India during the last phase of Shāhjī's life are very chaotic. Apart from the quarrels between the local

rulers, the Muslim invaders themselves had fallen out with each other. As early as 14 January 1652, the English factors observed : " Wars being commenced between the Moors of Golkandah and Vizapore, who having shared this afflicted kingdom, are now bandying against each other, while the poor Gentue, hoping their destruction, watches opportunity to break of his present miserable yoke."⁹⁵ About ten years later (1660-62) we learn that " The Gentue is powerful about the Tanjore country, and if hee overcomes the Balle Gaun (Bahlol Khān) the Vizapore's servant, 'tis thought hee 'il meete with little or no opposition in all these parts."⁹⁶

The above impressions relate to the activities of Chokkanātha, son of Muttu Virappa, who brought about a temporary coalition by force of arms between Madura, Tanjore and Ginjī. In 1662, Linganna, the rebellious Madura general, joined Shāhjī and besieged Trichinopoly. But Chokkanātha compelled them to seek refuge first in Tanjore and then in Ginjī. Linganna, too, was before long reclaimed by the coalition and employed against Shāhjī. The shrewd Proenza remarks, " It appears certain that, if then the three Nāyaks had joined Śrī Ranga with all the troops they could gather, they would easily have succeeded in chasing the common enemy, and depriving him of the advantage he had taken of their disunion and reciprocal betrayal. But Providence which wanted to punish them left them to this spirit of folly which precipitated the ruin of those princes and their dominions."⁹⁷

The nature of the unspeakable ruin brought about by the chronic warfare is described in the Jesuit letters : Pestilence followed in the wake of war. " The Muslims were the first victims of pestilence, having been themselves the cause of it. Their horses and men perished of famine in such large numbers that the corpses could not be buried or burnt, but were flung in the midst of the field, which imprudent act bred diseases and increased the mortality."⁹⁸ The inhumanity of man was worse. " But nothing can equal the cruelties which the Muhammadans employ," writes an eye-witness. " Expression fails me to re-

count the atrocities which I have seen with my eyes ; and if I were to describe them truth would be incredible. To the present horror are added the fears of what is to happen ; for it is announced that Idal Khān sends a strong army to raise contributions, which the Nāyaks had promised, by force."⁹⁹

As an instance of such devastating raids we might cite 'Vana Mian's behaviour when he was baffled by the defence of Trichinopoly fort : "The besiegers broke out on the country, devastated the harvest, burnt the villages, and captured the inhabitants to be made slaves. It is impossible to describe the scenes of horror which then enveloped this unhappy country. The Indian nobility, thinking it infamy to fall into the hands of these despicable beings, did not fear to seek refuge in death, less frightful in their eyes than such a dishonour. A large number, after slaying their women and children, plunged the sword into their own bodies and fell on their corpses. Entire populations were seen resorting to this tragic death. In other villages the inhabitants gathered together in several houses to which they set fire and perished in their flames."¹⁰⁰

War is nothing if it is not barbarous. Consequently, it would be unfair to suggest that the Muslim advance was ever like this. Much depended upon the character of the commanders. Another Jesuit letter from Trichinopoly (1662) states : "The Muslims under the command of Shāhjī and Moula, generals of 'Ādil Shāh, have occupied the realms of Ginjī and Tanjore for the last two years, and seem to fix their domination there. *The people have submitted to the yoke of a conqueror from whom they get less cruelty and more justice than from their own sovereigns.*"¹⁰¹ This certainly shows that Shāhjī as a general must have acted more humanely and justly than most of his contemporaries. A conqueror indeed reveals his truest character in the moment of his victory. Shāhjī by his conduct on this occasion earned the goodwill of the conquered who had suffered from the worst horrors of war at the hands of others. He thereby paved the way for his successors, the Marāṭhā rulers of Tanjore, who created a condominium in the South along-

side of Śivāji's *Svarājya* in the Deccan, whose history, however, we shall not anticipate here. It will follow in due course.

Before concluding this chapter it is necessary to note a few more incidents in Shāhji's career which provide a commentary upon his character as a pioneer in the great political adventure of the Marāṭhās. His rôle was not that of a conscious builder ; but he did serve in carrying forward the cause of which his great son Śivāji was the best protagonist. Shāhji did not have Śivāji's vision or sense of mission ; his was the humbler but most necessary task of preparing the ground,— not by precept but by example, by daring and doing. In this sense he was the most successful among the pioneers of Marāṭhā freedom and prestige. While not being free himself, he made possible the freedom of his people who were fashioned into a nation by the genius of his son. Kānhā and the two brave women who ' fought like tigresses on the battle-field ' when ' Alā-u'd-Dīn Khaljī first invaded the Deccan, sowed the seeds of heroic resistance. That seed was fostered by the blood of Śankar-dev and Harpāl-dev who preferred to be broken rather than bend before the aggressors. The Koḷi Nāg-nāk of Konḍāṇa and the Śirkés of Khelna revealed the mettle of which the true Marāṭhās were made ; they also demonstrated the strength of the mountain fastnesses and their strategic importance. The innumerable Marāṭhas who sought service under the Bahmanī Sultāns were, through their very servitude, gathering very valuable experience in arms and in administration that was to constitute the richest asset of later generations. Lakhji Jādhav Rāo and others of his stamp sold their services as mercenaries. The Ghorpadés by their consistent loyalty continued through generations, redeemed their unpatriotic character by their moral courage and personal dignity. It was left to Shāhji Bhoslé of all the men of his race and generation to play the more ambitious part of a king-maker and fight for the defence and maintenance of an independent kingdom (the Nizāmshāhī) in the face of the Mughals and the ' Adilshāhī. If he failed in this, he failed honourably. If he was consequently obliged to accept service

under his recent enemy, he served with a sense of realism, courage, dignity, and self-respect. This is nowhere better illustrated than in his letter to 'Āli 'Ādil Shāh II (d. 6 July 1657).

In that letter Shāhjī asked for a just reward for his recent services at Kanakgiri, Anegondi, Kundgol and Tamgaṇḍ. 'Knowing that the prestige and dignity of Your Majesty could not be assured without keeping the frontier tribes in awe, I have enrolled 1500 more men in my army. These cannot be maintained without an addition to my *jāgīrs*.' He suggests an addition being made adjacent to *Karyāt* Aklūj or *Tapé* Tembhūrni, or Bhūtagrām and Peḍné; or else, in Pātshāhbād or the Vaḍeru District. He protests against his lands in Musalkal District and *Karyāt* Karvé being given away to Trimbakjī (Shāhjī's cousin) without due compensation. He warns, 'If Your Majesty should thus tamper with my concerns, on the advice of worthless fellows, I must remind Your Majesty that we Rājput̃s have served from old till now under several kings; we have never before served nor shall we do so in future under dishonour and displeasure. We shall not further put up with unfair treatment. I have patiently endured these indignities, during the past eighteen months, with the hope that I shall continue to receive from Your Majesty the treatment and favours I got from Your worthy father. To avoid embarrassing Your Majesty I have waited so long restraining my feelings. If Your Majesty will have my services in future, I claim that my status should be maintained as heretofore. Else, . . . I shall retire to some sacred place there to serve the Almighty and pray for Your Majesty.'¹⁰²

Eighteen months later, on 10th December 1659, we read in a letter from Revington (written from Kolhāpūr): One months tyme more will, wee believe, put an end to his ('Ādil Shāh's) trouble; for Sevagy's father Shawjee, that lies to the southward, is expected within eight dayes with his army consisting of 17,000 men, and they intend for Vizapore, the King and Queen's residence, whose strength consists onely in men and they are above 10,000 soldyers; so that in all probability

the kingdom will be lost."¹⁰³ We do not know the exact context of this threatened attack of Shāhjī on Bijāpūr. It might have been due to his failure to get satisfaction from the 'Ādil Shāh even after his repeated protests. We learn from the Dutch Dagh Register (16 May, 1661) that "The Neyks of Madura and Tanjouwer and the commander Sahagie, Antosie Pantele, and Lingamaneyk have met to consider an offensive defensive contract which is a serious thing to us. And therefore the Governor has excused the intended visit of Masulepatnam settlement." The alliance, however, appears to have soon melted away; for the record continues: "But afterwards the Governor was informed that the contract mentioned above had been cancelled, and the Neyks have secretly conferred to attack Sahagie."¹⁰⁴

This incident explains why Shāhjī again came to be arrested in 1663 by the 'Ādil Shāh. The circumstances leading to it are thus related by a Dutch record of 11 April 1663: Bahlol Khān, the Bijāpūrī general, came to terms with the Nāyak of Tanjore who promised to pay him 300,000 *pardaux*; and the general proceeded against the fortresses of Ārni and Bangalore to subdue "the rebel Sahagie."¹⁰⁵ But Shāhjī won over Bahlol Khān. Confirmation of this rebellion of Shāhjī is to be had in an English letter of 20 July 1663 (from Goa) wherein it is reported: "This Jassud (spy) swears before he came out of Banckpore [where 'Ādil Shāh was] he saw irons put on Bussall Ckan and Shagee, but taken off the latter in two dayes: who is now with the king without any command."¹⁰⁶

It would be interesting to know in detail the history of this insurrection on the part of one who had been throughout loyal to the 'Ādil Shāh. It is significant that Shāhjī was soon restored to favour and sent back to the South, while Bahlol Khān was imprisoned and put to death.¹⁰⁷ Was Shāhjī influenced by the Hindu confederates of the South, alliance with whom in May 1661 had proved abortive? Or was he being drawn into the vortex of Śivājī's powerful movement for the liberation of the country from the domination of the Muslim

rulers? But his resumption of, or acquiescence in, the 'Ādil-shāhī service culminating in his accidental death near Basava-paṭṭaṇa, on 23 January 1664, while on a campaign to subdue the recalcitrant chieftains in that region, affords no clue to the inner workings of his mind. He died where he had first begun his earliest expedition under Randaulā Khān in 1637—in the Shimogā District of Mysore. He must have been about seventy years of age then (1594-1664); but what a period, looked at from the point of view of happenings nearer Shāhji's home-estates of Poona and Supā ! But he too served in his own way, with all his limitations, the cause of Marāṭhā dominion in South India. At his death his conquests included Anegondi, Basavapaṭṭaṇa, Kanakgiri, Bangalore, Kolār, Ārni, Ginjī, Tegenapaṭam (Cuddalore) and Porto Novo, besides his personal estates scattered about in the Deccan and Karnāṭak.¹⁰⁸ They constituted the scaffolding on which his two sons—Śivājī in the Deccan and Ekojī in the South—were to erect their con-
dominion for the greater glory of the Mārāṭhā people. To un-
derstand the true inspirations of that national effort we should go deeper than the political and military history of the times.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INSPIRATION

‘The unclean Yavanas have become kings ; sins are being committed everywhere ; hence, there hath been Divine Manifestation to blot out the evils of Kali. Nāmā says, The people, having found the Yavanas unendurable, are singing the praises of God : for, these are ever the means of redemption.’—NĀMA-DEV.¹

Hindu reactions to the Muslim domination, we have said earlier, were more cultural and religious than political. From the time of Jaipāl and Ānandapāl to the days of Prthvirāj, Sangrāmasinh and Rāṇā Pratāp in North India, and the fall of the Yādavas of Devgiri, the Kākatīyas of Warangal, the Hoysaḷas of Dvārasamudra, and the Pāṇḍyas of Madura, kingdom after kingdom had been overthrown by the invading Muslims, and *Dar-u'l-Harb* sought to be converted into *Dar-u'l-Islām*.² In all appearance, this revolution was political and brought about by military means. But the critical historian cannot miss two important characteristics : (a) that the conquerors were not content with mere loot or political subjugation ; (b) the vanquished Hindus sooner submitted to the political yoke of the Muslims than to their religious interference. The outer *jihād*, dramatically proclaimed and destructively carried out, was nothing compared with the insidious and constant war that was waged by the protagonists of Islām against the devotees of Hinduism. With noble exceptions like Zain-ul-Abideen's in Kashmir, Husain Shāh's in Bengal, and Akbar's at Agra, the Muslim toleration of Hindu institutions and culture had been casual, fitful and precarious. It did not depend, as has been supposed by some, on the Hindu parentage of a Muslim in power or his marriage with Hindu women. Malik Kāfūr, Malik Khusrau, Khān-i-Jahān Maqbūl (to mention only a few instances) were not less fanatical than the true-born Muslims who came from

outside India, like Maḥmūd Ghazna or Maḥmūd Gāwān. Wedlock with Hindu women, employment of Hindus in the army and administration, and even the adoption of the local language in official documents (in the lower reaches of red-tape) did not at all affect the fundamental attitude of the Muslim rulers towards their infidel subjects. *Jiziya* continued to be levied, temples desecrated, and 'infidels' persecuted in innumerable petty ways, after centuries of the conquerors' domicile in India. Yet, the Hindus could no more avoid seeking service under their hateful masters, than the Muslims could carry on without the infidels' co-operation. But though they were militarily conquered and politically subjugated, the Hindus would not allow themselves to be religiously converted or culturally submerged. By a fundamental law of human nature, the greater the repression, the stronger and more rebellious became the reactions. Hindu civilisation has survived because of this inexorable law. Defeated on the battle-fields and deposed from the seats of government, it asserted itself with irrepressible vigour in the hearts and homes of the Hindus. Rājasthān, Vijayanagar and Mahārāṣṭra have repeatedly demonstrated the truth of this thesis.

The three centuries which elapsed between the first invasion of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn Khaljī (1295) and the birth of Shāhājī (1594), constituted a prolonged period of probation for the people of Mahārāṣṭra, during which they suffered agonies of soul and body, but deliverance could not come until Śivājī began his great movement in the seventeenth century. Shāhājī died in 1664, exactly one hundred years after the destruction of the great Hindu empire of Vijayanagar on the battle-field of Rakastangaḍi (1565). The inner history of the heart of Mahārāṣṭra during this epoch is more meaningful than the outer shell of tutelage which we have described so far. The secret of the amazing success which Śivājī met with in his single generation is unintelligible except in the light of the forces that were at work, far from the courts of kings and their sanguinary activities. Those that have been blind to this vitalising factor have sadly missed the full significance of the pre-Śivājī period of Marāṭhā history.

To the undiscerning and unimaginative rationalist of to-day, to whom all religion is superstition, the medieval mind must for ever remain a sealed book. But Faith, transcending reason, formed the normal texture of the psychology of men and women then, in India and elsewhere. Belief in the supernormal and spiritual forces was for them as obvious as the rising and the setting sun. To dismiss their beliefs as mere superstitions is, therefore, to throw away the only key which can disclose to us the motive springs of their actions. Whether the power that inspired the makers of Marāṭhā history sprang from Tuḷajā Bhavānī or from Khandōbā of Jejūrī is not a matter for scientific inquest ; it is a 'fact' to be admitted as a potent instrument which shaped the life and conduct of the people living in those times. Bhavānī and Khandōbā were as great realities to the Marāṭhās of the seventeenth century as the goddess Athena and the Oracle of Delphi were to the Greeks of ancient times. The 'fact' for the historian is not that, according to him, miracles did take place, but that *the people sincerely believed that they did happen* ; so much did they accept them as realities that their beliefs led them to heroic endeavours. In this sense, Śivājī was no more a pretender than Joan of Arc : some people did feel that inspiration ; others did accept it for a fact ; and all *acted in that faith*. The task of the historian is to gauge and assess the extent and results of these potent forces.

Intellectually and spiritually, there was a new age dawning in Mahārāṣṭra when outwardly she was being conquered and subjugated by the armies of Islām. This awakening had a social and political side to it, apart from the spiritual and intellectual. In a word, *Mahārāṣṭra-Dharma* was at the root of Marāṭhā *Svarājya* as it was conceived of and politically translated by Śivājī. Its genesis is to be traced back to the protagonists of what is popularly called the Paṇḍharpūr movement. It was mystical and devotional to begin with, but before long bore a rich harvest in fields other than the merely religious. It had an esoteric as well as a popular side, a philosophical no less than practical aspect. We are here concerned only with its pragmatic consequences.

Dnāneśvar who died soon after the first invasion of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn Khaljī, and lived under the patronage of Rāmdev Rāo at Devgiri, might be considered the progenitor of this great movement.³ "The beginning of the mystical line," according to the authors of *Mysticism in Mahārāṣṭra*, "was effectively made in Mahārāṣṭra by Dnānadev Anā while a continuous tradition goes on from Dnāneśvar to Nāmadev, and from Nāmadev to Ekanāth, and from Ekanāth to Tukārām, Rāmdas like Heracleitus stands somewhat apart in his spiritual isolation." Further, they have observed : "If we reclassify these great Mystics of Mahārāṣṭra according to the different types of mysticism, they fall into the following groups : Dnāneśvar is the type of an intellectual mystic ; Nāmadev heralds the democratic age ; Ekanāth synthesises the claims of worldly and spiritual life ; Tukārām's mysticism is most personal ; while Rāmdās is the type of an active saint."⁴ Whatever be the school or category to which these saints belonged, the total effect of their combined teachings was the propagation of *Mahārāṣṭra Dharma* which had very far-reaching political results.

It is significant that Dnāneśvar chose to interpret the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, and to do it in the language of the people,—Marāṭhī. Whatever else Dnāneśvar may stand for, he rendered a great service to the cause of Marāṭhā freedom by this double choice. In this respect, he stands with Gautama Buddha, John Wycliffe and Martin Luther. From a purely linguistic point of view, he did for Marāṭhī what Chaucer did for English : a 'well of the vernacular pure and undefiled.' He brought philosophy and religion from the heights of the Himālāyas, as it were, to the hearths and homes of Mahārāṣṭra. This democratic service was indeed both timely and fruitful.

The state of Mahārāṣṭra when Dnāneśvar appeared was a shade worse than Europe when Luther preached and protested. Theological and metaphysical obscurantism had been carried to excess without reference to the morals of the people. The situation has been well described by Rājwāḍé : "In the latter half of the thirteenth century, under the Yādavas, the

Marāṭhās were too very engrossed with the good things of life, though they clothed them in the garb of religion. Their most honoured gospel was the *Chaturvarga Chintāmaṇi* of Hemādri, in which the *Śrutis*, *Smṛtis* and *Purāṇas* were pedantically paraded as authorities for feeding Brāhmaṇs with prescribed feasts in propitiation of particular deities for every day in the year. From Hemādri's *Vratakhanda* it would appear that no less than 2000 ceremonies were to be performed in the course of 365 days ! For him, indeed, there was no distinction between feasting and religion. There is not to be found in any other language, in any other part of the globe, a work of that character making a fetish of such things."⁵ The consequence was that the people became ignorant, superstitious and effeminate ; and the foreigners took full advantage of their incapacity to resist. Elsewhere we have noticed the sectarianism that was rampant : in the midst of great learning there was a tragic lack of wisdom. Besides, the language of religion had long been the sacred Sanskrit, of which the masses as well as classes were ignorant : a microscopic minority of erudite paṇḍits enjoying the monopoly of exploiting the superstitious beliefs of the people. The obvious remedy for such evils was to break through this monopoly by spreading enlightenment of the purest sort through the medium of Marāṭhī. Mukundarāj and the Mahānubhāvas had attempted this before Dnāneśvar, but the Bastille had not fallen. The cult of the Mahānubhāvas was too heretical to be popular on a wide scale ; and the metaphysics and mysticism of Mukundarāj were too esoteric to be understood or assimilated by the many."⁶ Two of his tenets certainly militated against the needs of the situation, namely, his conviction that "a mystic should never reveal his inner secret lest the people might deride it," and that contemplation on the *Paramāṃṛta* "turns back the devotee from the world and enables him to see the vision of his Self."⁷ Dnāneśvar, on the other hand, rightly adopted the popular exposition of a popular text as the instrument of his instruction. Not that the *Dnāneśvarī* (or *Bhāvārtha-dīpikā*) is less traditionally philosophical ;⁸ but in it the genius of the commentator has translated the deepest

truths in such an idiom and wealth of homely illustration, that his work has remained unrivalled as a classic of popular enlightenment. So far-reaching was its influence that the barber Senā sang of the great service rendered by Dnāneśvar in revealing the surest path to salvation, and overflowing with a sense of obligation declared : ' Large-hearted is his benevolence, like that of father and mother ; how can I, poor soul, express the unrequitable. He has indeed shown the true path, and imparted life to the inert.'⁹ To this day, the pilgrims to Paṇḍhārpūr and Dehū sing as they move along : '*Dnānadev-Tukārām ! Dnānobā-Tukārām !*'

Dnānadev wrote his *Amṛtānubhava* or ' Immortal Experience ' for the few ; *Bhāvārthadīpikā*, or ' Light on the Essential Meaning (of the Gītā),' for the many ; and *Abhangs*, or devotional songs, for all. The second of these, popularly known as the *Dnāneśvarī*, very properly conveyed the message of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, a message of hope, of action, of courage and duty - to the bewildered people of Mahārāṣṭra in the days of their undoing at the hands of the invading Muslims. The *Gītā* has been commented upon by men of genius in every age, stressing one or another aspect of its comprehensive philosophy to suit the needs of their time and generation. But any attempt to read into the *Dnāneśvarī* anything less than its universal meaning might appear too arbitrary and unwarrantable. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the work breathes a contemporary and local atmosphere, even while it envisages a wider and timeless truth. For illustration, we might cite Dnāneśvar's description of *Daivī* and *Āsurī Sampatti*. It is not in the language of Śrī Kṛṣṇa or Vyāsa, but in that of a Deccani writer of the medieval times. Without seeking in it the historical accuracy of a *Domesday Survey*, we might, without exaggeration still look for local colour in its terms and illustrations. The shortcomings of Rāmdev Rāo's contemporaries could not have been absent from the mind of Dnāneśvar when he wrote his great commentary.

The intellectual atmosphere of his time is well reflected, for instance, in the thirteenth chapter, verses 653-842. He

speaks of a villager worshipping god after god, going to a *Guru* and learning some *mantra* from him, placing an image of his choice in a corner of his house, but going on a pilgrimage to temple after temple, Forgetting the god at home, he worships another : the spirits of the dead ancestors, with the same devotion as his God on *Ekādaśī* and serpents on *Nāgapanchamī*, *Durgā* on the fourth of the dark fortnight ; then *Navachandī* on another occasion and *Bhairava* on Sundays, the *linga* on Mondays, etc. He worships perpetually without being silent even for a moment, at various shrines ; 'like a courtesan attracting man after man at the entrance to the town,' the devotee who thus runs after different gods, he says, is 'ignorance incarnate.' He knows the theory of *karma*, has learnt the *Purāṇas* by rote, is a great astrologer and can predict future events, knows the science of architecture and the art of cooking ; has mastered the magic of the *Atharva-veda*, his knowledge of sexual science is boundless, has studied the *Bhārata*, attained proficiency in the *Āgamas* ; in ethics, medicine, poetics and dramaturgy there is none equal to him ; he can discuss the *Smṛtis*, is well versed in the *Nighaṇṭu*, and very profound in logic. 'He knows all these sciences, but is stark blind in the Science of Self-knowledge The plumage of a peacock is covered all over with eyes ; but there is no vision.'

As a corrective, Dnāneśvar's prescription is significant : Fearlessness, Purity, Steadfastness, Sacrifice, are the virtues he inculcates in the order of their importance. Sacrifice means dutifully offering to God whatsoever is best. Who can deny that, had the generation of Dnāneśvar and Rāmdev Rāo possessed these qualities, the fate of Mahārāṣṭra might have been different. The context of the *Gītā*, the sermon of Śrī Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna, and its fulfilment in action,—all pointed to the same moral : *Dharma*. Dnāneśvar swept away much nonsense, stimulated clear thinking, and, more than anything else, filled the people with a purer faith and hope in redemption : 'Where the Moon is, there is moon-light ; where fire exists, there is burning power ; where Kṛṣṇa is, there is victory.'¹⁰ Confidence in Him is the beginning of *Bhakti* : 'He punishes the wicked

and destroys all sin ; when Prahlād uttered His name, God ran to his rescue ; His name is indeed the best and holiest of all things : it came to the succour of Dhruva, of Ajāmila, of Gajendra, of Vālmiki. Mountains of sin are destroyed in an instant by the name of God. There is neither season nor prescribed time for its utterance. The devotees of God feed themselves with the nectar of His Name.'¹¹

Such was the line of attack that Dnāneśvar adopted in order to purify, simplify, and popularise religion. That this renovated Faith proclaimed a revolt against the traditional ideas and practices will become more and more apparent as we proceed. 'We have discovered the secret : let us propagate the *Bhāgavata-Dharma* ; what use are pilgrimages while the mind still remains full of evil ?'¹² asks Nāmadev who ushered in the *Democracy of Devotion*.

Nāmadev was a tailor, and Dnānadev the son of an out-caste Brāhmaṇ. Others soon followed from all ranks and classes of people. As Rānadé has pointed out, there were about fifty saints and prophets during this age : some of whom were women, a few converts from Islām, nearly half of them Brāhmans, while in the remaining half there were Marāṭhās, Kuṇbīs, Mahārs, goldsmiths, tailors, gardeners, potters, maid-servants and repentant prostitutes. According to him Dnāneśvar's influence was greater than that of any other saint except Tukārām.¹³ Nāmadev was Dnāneśvar's contemporary but outlived him by over fifty years (d. 1350). Others associated with them were Nivr̥tti, Sopān and Muktābāi,—the two brothers and a sister respectively of Dnānadev. To this cycle also belonged Gorā the potter, Sāvata the gardener, Narahari the goldsmith, Chokā the *Mahār*, Janābāi the maidservant, Senā the barber, Kānhopātrā the prostitute. Senā and Kānhopātrā alone were separated from Nāmadev by about a century (c. 1448-68) ; all the rest were contemporaries.¹⁴ Together they constituted a fraternity of religious persons whose outlook and teachings are well reflected in the songs (*abhangs*) of Nāmadev. "He developed the *sampradāya* of Paṇḍharī as no other single saint ever did."¹⁵

Dnānadev and Nāmādev represented, respectively, the intellectual and the emotional aspects of the revival. The spirit of the teachings of both alike was to penetrate to the essence through the externals : 'A stone god and his mock devotee cannot satisfy each other. Such gods have been broken to pieces by the Turks, or have been flung into water,' says Nāma, 'and yet they do not cry.'¹⁶ Is it not amazing, he asks, that people should discard the animate and worship the inanimate ? 'They pluck a living *Tulasī* plant to worship a dead stone ; . . . they kill a living ram to perform the Soma sacrifice ; they paint a stone with red-lead, and women and children fall prostrate before it . . . People worship a serpent made of clay, but take up cudgels to kill a living one. -All these are vain,' declares Nāma : 'the only pursuit of value is to utter the Name of God.'¹⁷

In the propagation of moral ideals, illustrated with Paurāṇic examples, and the homely imagery used by them for popular enlightenment, we find the simple technique and high character of the teachings of these saints. 'Contact with other women,' says Nāma, 'is the sure cause of ruin : that way was Rāvaṇa destroyed and Bhaṣmāsura reduced to ashes ; that way the Moon became consumptive and Indra's body became punctured with a thousand holes.'¹⁸

It is equally interesting to note that, according to Nāmādev, the following combinations are hard to meet with : 'Gold and fragrance ; diamond and softness ; a *Yogin with purity* ; a *rich man with compassion* ; a *tiger with mercy* ; a *hearer who is attentive* ; a *preacher who knows* ; and a *Kṣatriya who is brave*.'¹⁹ What a bold commentary upon contemporary conditions !

Then we find him describing a saint as a 'spiritual washerman' who uses the 'soap of illumination' ; 'he washes on the slab of tranquillity, purifies the river of knowledge, and takes away the spots of sin.'²⁰ There is only one favour he would ask of God : 'that we should always feel Him in our heart, utter His name only with our tongue, see Him alone with our eyes. Our hands should worship Him only, our heads be placed

at His feet alone, and our ears hear only His praise. He should show Himself on our right, our left, before us and behind, as well as at the close of our lives. We should ask of God no other favour except this.²¹ The emotional effect of such ecstatic 'madness' upon the devoted masses cannot be imagined but felt in the company of the God-intoxicated.

"The value and significance of this movement," observes Mr. Macnicol,—a foreigner nurtured in another creed and culture—"lie in its affirmation of the claims of the human heart and in the moral and religious consequences that follow from that affirmation. These are the elements in it that gave it its power and enabled it to make an appeal so far-reaching and so profound. It was, if we may say so, a splendid effort of the Hindu soul to break the bondage under which it had lain so long. It at last stirred in its long sleep, and turned its drowsy eyes towards the dawn." It is also to be noted that Mr. Macnicol opines: "They have no language but a cry," and their poems are "primarily religious and only secondarily and accidentally works of art."²²

The religious capital of Mahārāṣṭra was, and still remains, Paṇḍharpūr :

*'On Bhīmā's banks all gladness is
In Paṇḍharī the Abode of Bliss.'*

This is the refrain of many a song that is re-echoed by the choirs of singers that journey with eager expectation, year by year, to this Deccan village to look upon the face of the God, writes the Christian Missionary: "There is little outwardly to distinguish the worship at this shrine from that of a hundred others throughout the land. The image is rudely fashioned and has no grace of form. The worship is that which is commonly performed in any Hindu temple. What gives it distinctive character is the special song services, the *kīrtans* and *bhajans*, that are conducted for the instruction of pilgrims, and *in which their deep religious emotion finds its fullest utterance*. Great numbers of pilgrims sit for hours at Paṇḍharpūr and the other village centres of the cult (like Dehu and Ālandī), listening to the

exhortations of some famous preacher or *Haridās* (lit. slave of God) who bases his discourse upon verses from such poet-saints as Jñānadev or Eknāth or Tukāram. With the teaching is skilfully combined the singing of a choir. *These kīrtans have a profound emotional effect upon the multitudes gathered in eager expectation at the holy place.* The songs of the old saints awaken, and in some degree satisfy, the deep desires of their hearts. So also groups will gather for what are called *bhajans*, when there is no preaching, but they continue often for hours, singing those songs of longing and ecstasy.²³ These foreign impressions, gathered from a modern setting, might serve to acquaint the reader with an echo (though necessarily faint) of the original thrills experienced by a people more attuned and sensitive to that kind of appeal than our present generation which is far removed from such devotional experiences.

How the spirit of the Bhakti movement permeated the masses and coloured their psychology may be gathered from the language used by some of the saints. We have already cited some *abhangs* of Nāmadev. The gardener Sāvata says, 'Garlic, Onion and Chilli are my God : the water-bag, the rope, and the well are all enveloped by Him ... Well was it that I was born in a low caste ; and well is it also that I have not attained greatness. Had I been born a Brāhman, my life would have been a mere round of rituals. Placed as I am, I have no ablutions to make, nor *Sandhyā* to perform. Born in a low caste, I can only beg for Thy compassion.'²⁴ Narahati, the goldsmith, makes his body the melting crucible of his soul, and pours the molten gold of God into the matrix of the three *guṇas*. Hammer in hand he breaks to pieces anger and passion ; and with the scissors of discrimination, cuts out the gold-leaf of the Name of God. With the balance of illumination he weighs God's Name. Bearing a sack of gold he crosses to the other side of the stream (of *Samsāra*).²⁵ Likewise, Chokhā the untouchable saint says : ' The worshippers at the temple beat me for no fault of mine : they abuse me and charge me with having polluted God. I am indeed a dog at Thy door ; send me not away to another.' Chokhā is convinced that the real Paṇḍharī is his

own body ; that his soul is the image of Viṭṭhala therein ; and tranquillity plays the rôle of Rukmiṇī. 'Contemplating God in this wise I cling to the feet of God.' Chokhā may be untouchable, he argues, 'but my heart is not untouchable : just as the sugarcane might be crooked, but the juice is not crooked.' He earnestly prays that if God should give him a son, he should be a saint ; if a daughter, she shall be like Mīrābāī or Muktābāī. 'If it should not please God to do any of these things, it is much better that He denies any offspring to Chokhā.'²⁶

Turning to the barber Senā, we find him holding the mirror of discrimination, and using the pincers of dispassion : 'We apply the water of tranquillity to the head, and pull out the hair of egotism ; we take away the nails of passion, and are a support to all the castes.'²⁷ Kanhopātrā, the fallen woman, cries : 'I am verily an outcaste : I do not know the rules of conduct : I only know how to approach Thee, in submission. Thou callest thyself the saviour of the fallen : Why dost Thou not then uplift me ? I have once declared myself Thine : if others should claim me now, whose then would be the fault ? If a jackal were to take away the food of a lion, who shall be blamed ?'²⁸ These appeals rose from the heart of Mahārāṣṭra trodden under the heels of the Mlecchas for several generations. The outcome was that, for five centuries, Mahārāṣṭra became the abode of "that noblest and truest of democracies, the Democracy of the *Bhaktas*."²⁹

From the middle of the fifteenth century, we come across another cluster of saints : Bhānudās, Janārdhanswāmī, and Ekanāth. Their predecessors had carried ecstatic devotion to excess. It was time, therefore, to put a curb on extreme emotionalism. The balance between other-worldliness and the duties and obligations of this mundane life was held even by these three. We cannot say that they consciously argued like this ; but their teachings as well as conduct indicate such harmonisation.

Bhānudās was born at Paiṭhan on the Godāvārī, about 1448.* He is supposed to have brought back the image of Viṭṭhala from Hampi (Vijayanagar) whither it had been re-

moved for safety from Muslim hands. His disciple was Janārdhanswāmī, the master of Ekanāth. Janārdhan was *qile'dār* of Daulatābād till his death in 1575. He devoted himself to the service of God even while he was performing his worldly duties. He was a model for Ekanāth in his combination of the worldly and spiritual life. He was respected alike by the Hindus and the Muslims. "Every Thursday which was sacred to the God of Janārdhan Swāmī was proclaimed a holiday at Devagaḍ by the order of the Mahomedan king." His *samādhi* still exists inside a cave at Daulatābād. Ekanāth lived with him for nearly six years. On one occasion he is said to have impersonated Janārdhan and fought in defence of the fortress. Ekanāth, all through his lifetime (1533-99), was noted for his industry and regularity. His patience and his equanimity were proverbial. His behaviour with a Muslim who spat on him every time he returned from his bath in the river, his redemption of a prostitute, his kindly treatment of an untouchable boy, and several other instances of his saintly behaviour revealed his practical spirituality.

Ekanāth wrote works like *Bhāvārtha Ramāyaṇ* and edited the text of the *Dnāneśvari*. But his reputation chiefly rests on his great commentary on the eleventh chapter of the *Bhāgavata*, the bible of *Bhāgavata Dharma*. From the point of view of style the work of Ekanāth is reckoned superior to that of Dnāneśvar. His vindication of Marāṭhī as an adequate vehicle of thought is familiar to most students of that language. If Sanskrit is to be regarded as the speech of the Gods, he declaims, is Prākṛit to be considered the language of thieves? Let alone these errors of vanity, he declares, both are equally sacred when used for praising God. God is no partisan of one speech or another : 'My Marāṭhī', he proudly proclaims, 'is an excellent vehicle and is rich freighted with the fruits of divine thought.'³⁰ His *Bhāgavata*, indeed, amply illustrates the potentialities of that language. It covers every conceivable subject connected with Vedāntic philosophy, with religion, with morality, etc. In the words of the late Rev. J. E. Abbott : "Did he believe in knowledge as a way of salvation? Yes, but it must be

without hypocrisy. Did he believe in *Bhakti* as a way of salvation? Yes, but it must mean true love of God, and sincere. Did he believe the Brāhman held the first place in the social system? Yes, but a Brāhman without true devotion to God would go to hell, and a Śūdra with true devotion would be found in Heaven. Did he believe in Caste? Yes, but his firm conviction that God was in all men, Brāhman or Śūdra and even Mleccha, made him, if the traditional stories of him can be believed, disregard the rules of Caste when the needs of humanity demanded it."³¹

While the Ekanāthī *Bhāgavata* is replete with current social and religious philosophy, the same Christian critic observes, it is not a book for teaching those doctrines. "It is rather the thought of sincerity, absence of hypocrisy, true love of God and man, moral ideas of truth and honesty, purity of life, sacredness of marriage, condemnation of immorality, selfishness, avarice, drunkenness, and other forms of vice, in all phases of life, that runs through the book and gives it its distinction . . . The work is too large, the subjects too varied, for any detailed analysis here. But it is in Marāṭhī literature a unique book and worthy of study for its presentation of moral ideals, as they appealed to that great religious teacher to whom *the trueness of the inner spirit was more than any outer form.*"³²

After Ekanāth we come to Tukārām and Rāmdās, both of whom were contemporaries of Śivājī. The outlooks of these great makers of the Marāṭhā mind and spirit were even more closely knit together, perhaps, than those of Mazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi in the creation of modern Italy. We might almost say that Śivājī carved out by his sword an independent State in the Deccan in order to safeguard the spiritual culture summed up in Tukārām, with the sagacity of Rāmdās. Tukārām is still the most popular saint of Mahārāṣṭra. He is the summit and culmination of a long line of *Bhaktas*. In him the stream of devotion has swollen into a flood. His emotion is overpowering, his philosophy is reassuring, and his vehicle is the daily speech of the masses. "Of all the Marāṭhā *bhaktas*," writes Mr.

Macnicol, "the greatest in the popular estimation, certainly the widest in the extent of his influence is Tukārām The popularity of his verses has continued undiminished until today, and they are so widely known among all classes of Marāṭhās that many of them have almost come to have the vogue and authority of proverbs. They are more familiar throughout Mahārāṣṭra than are (or were) in Scotland 'the psalms of David or the songs of Burns.' Not only are they prized by the most illiterate worshipper of Viṭhobā as the '*Veda*' of their sect, but they furnish a large portion of the psalmody of the reforming Prārthanā Samāj, while some of the greatest of modern Indians, such as M. G. Rānaḍé and Sir R. G. Bhaṇḍārkar, have found in them, perhaps more than in the ancient scriptures, nourishment for their own religious life."³³

For all this, Tukā, as Mahīpatī says, was not a learned man. He never went to school. His father taught him the little that he knew. He did not know Sanskrit. "He must have found great difficulty in understanding the works of Dnānadev and Ekanāth, in their antique Marāṭhī forms, when he retired with his books to his mountain retreat, to read and study them," observes Abbott. "His caste as Śūdra (*Vāṇi*) was comparatively low, and no inspiration came to him from that source, nor from the Brāhmins of his acquaintance, to whom he was accustomed to bow as Hindu social laws demanded. Tukā's growth was like the growth of a tree, from seed to full stature, on some retired spot, unassisted except by the laws of his own being. Forced at first by hard necessity, he was a petty grocer in a little village, successful because of his natural ability and honesty; but his heart was not in his business. He wanted God in his soul, and all earthly things, money and property, he counted as filth. Naturally, he failed in business, and then came a period of readjustment to his now complete indifference to earthly things, and the unsympathetic attitude of his sharp-tongued wife and scorning neighbours."³⁴ Despite these troubles, Mahīpatī describes him as 'helping the sick, carrying the burdens of the weary, giving water to the thirsty, food to the hungry, going on errands for the lame. Even animals came in,

for his kind thought. He watched for such as needed water or food. Even in this he met with no sympathy from his wife, and little from his neighbours. Tukā had to walk alone. His teacher was no other than the spirit within him.³⁵

Frequently as we have quoted the admiring Mr. Abbott already, the following appreciation by him of Tukārām's consummation as a Bhakta is both correct and irresistible : In the latter half of his life, 'God is his all-in-all. God was his food and his drink. The world was nothing to him, God was his centre. His poetic inspiration came to him unexpectedly, but once in its grasp he thought and spoke only in *abhangs*. No one taught him the art of poetry. His words flowed out of a heart full of love of God and goodwill to men.'³⁶

The saint himself proclaims : 'I know nothing, and what I am uttering are not my words, O ye saints. Be not angry with me, for God Pāṇḍuranga speaks through me. He has filled every nook and corner in me. How else can an ignorant person like me declare what transcends even the *Vedas*? I only know how to sing the name of God ; by the power of my *Guru*, God is bearing all my burdens.'³⁷ 'Pāṇḍuranga is my father and Rakhumāi my mother. I am therefore of pure lineage from both my parents. I need no longer be poor in spirit or a pigmy in power. I shall no longer be wicked or unfortunate. God will ever come to my succour.'³⁸ 'Who can deprive the son of the treasures of his father? I sit on the lap of God and there remain fearless and contented.'³⁹ 'By the power of my faith God has made me a free master, says Tukā.'⁴⁰ 'I distribute the harvest of God : all castes may come and partake of this bounty to their satisfaction.'⁴¹ He declares his mission to be to promote religion and to destroy atheism. I take pointed words and fling them like arrows. I have no consideration of great and small.'⁴² 'Through various lives have I been doing this duty, to relieve the oppressed from the sorrows of existence. I shall sing the praises of God and gather together His saints. *I shall evoke tears even from stones. I shall sing the holy name of God and shall dance and clap my hands with joy. I shall plant my feet on the brow of death.* I shall imprison my pas-

sions and make myself the lord of the senses.'⁴³ 'Pebbles will shine only so long as the diamond is not brought out. Torches will shine only so long as the sun has not risen. People will talk of other saints so long as they have not met Tukā.'⁴⁴ 'I have come to illuminate the path and distinguish between the true and the false Before me no tinsel can stand.'⁴⁵ 'I have girded up my loins and have discovered for you the path across the ocean of life. *Come hither, come hither ; come great and small ; men and women. Take no thought and have no anxiety : I shall carry you all to the other shore. I bear with me the certitude of God to carry you over in God's name.*'⁴⁶

Few could resist this call. For the masses, indeed, the voice of Tukā was the voice of God. It reverberated throughout Mahārāṣṭra and its echoes rolled from soul to soul. The message was not a political one, but only religious. Yet the people, once filled with that fervour, could never remain apathetic. Tukārām was undoubtedly a mystic, but the people were not mystical. Their mighty enthusiasm for religion could be easily directed into pragmatic channels. Rāmdās was as much the instrument of this transformation as Śivājī. He converted the *Vārkarī* into the *Dhārkarī sampradāya*, as Rājwāḍé puts it : the *sahiṣṇu* psychology was revolutionised into the *jaiṣṇu*. The *God of this virile cult is not the static Viṭhobā of Paṇḍharpūr, but the dynamic Māruti of Rāmdās* : Hanumān is our supporter ; Śrī Raghunāth is the God we worship. While our *Guru* is the powerful Śrī Rām, what room is there for penury ? When Raghunandan is our best benefactor, why should we go to others ? Hence are we the slaves of Śrī Rām ; our faith is firmly set on Him. Let the heavens fall, but we shall not think of any other.'⁴⁷

It is to be remembered that Hanumān is the Hercules of Hindu mythology. His labours cleared the Augean Stables for Śrī Rāmachandra the creator of *Rāma-rājya* : the ideal *Svarājya* of the Hindus. In terms of Marāṭhā history, we might describe Śivājī as a combination of Hanumān and Śrī Rāmachandra in the eyes of the masses. The emotional mysticism of Tukārām and the intellectual pragmatism of Rāmdās must have been of

considerable assistance to Śivājī in building up his great movement. He was certainly not writing on a blank page of History. The entire galaxy of saints had as much to do with the creation of a new Marāṭhā society as Śivājī. The psychological and moral foundations had been well laid before Śivājī's military and political genius laid the coping stone. Marāṭhā *Svarājya* of the seventeenth century was not the work of a single man howsoever gifted. It was a mansion built by several hands directed by several brains. It was the natural product and culmination of the historical process which we have described in its various aspects in the present and earlier chapters.

It is futile to speculate on the exact share of each worker in this complex historical field. To attempt such an analysis is like trying to determine what proportion of soil and sunlight, wind and rain, have gone into the making of a huge banyan tree. The vital elements of historical evolution are incapable of accurate measurement and arithmetical apportionment. It is therefore vain to distribute the dividends among all the partners in the great business of nation-building. Both Śivājī and Rāmdās were creators as well as participators in the new life that was surging through Mahārāṣṭra during the seventeenth century. That they were contemporaries working for a common cause is undeniable. The diary of their personal meetings and contacts is only of secondary importance.

The controversy regarding the personal contacts between Śivājī and Rāmdās is thus clinched by Rānaḍé and Belvalkar : The earliest date assigned to their first meeting is 1649 ; the last is 1672. "It is highly probable," they say, "that the earlier date is the more correct one ; but we shall await some new discoveries for the final decision in the matter."¹⁸ The letter attributed to Śivājī and dated in the fifth year of *Rājyā-bhīṣeka* is an illuminating document. In substance it reads as follows :—

'Obeisance to my noble Teacher (Rāmdās), the father of all, the abode of bliss. Śivājī who is merely as dust on his Master's feet, places his head on the feet of his Master, and submits : I was greatly obliged to have been favoured by your

supreme instruction, and to have been told that my religious duty consists in conquest, in the establishment of *Dharma*, in the service of God and the Brāhmins, in the amelioration of my subjects, and in their protection and succour. I have been advised that herein is spiritual satisfaction for me. You were also pleased to declare that whatever I should earnestly desire would be fulfilled. Consequently, through your grace, have I accomplished the destruction of the Turks and built at great expense fastnesses for the protection and perpetuation of my kingdom. Whatever kingdom I have acquired I have placed at your feet and dedicated myself to your service. I desired to enjoy your close company, for which I built the temple at Chāphal and arranged for its upkeep and worship, etc. . . Then when I again desired to make over 121 villages to the temple at Chāphal, and also intended to grant eleven *viṭas* of land to every place of worship, you said that all this could be done in due course. Consequently, I have assigned the following lands for the service of God . . . I promise to make available, at the time of the annual festival, all the corn from these lands.—Dated *Rajyābhīṣeka śaka* 5 ; Aśvin Śuddha 10 (-- *Śaka* 1600 or 1678 A.D.).¹⁹

Competent critics have considered 'activism' the most characteristic feature of the teachings of Rāmdās. "Rāmdās, more than any other saint of Mahārāṣṭra, called people's minds to the performance of Duty, while the heart was to be set on God No wonder that with this teaching he helped the formation of the Marāṭhā kingdom, as no other saint had done before."²⁰ His *Dāsa Bodha* is supposed to contain the political testament of Rāmdās. Particularly does he declare therein : 'The *Mlecchas* have long been rampant in the country and it is necessary to be very vigilant . . . The goddess Tuḷajā Bhavānī is indeed benignly interested but it is necessary to be circumspect in action.'²¹ Addressing the goddess at Pratāpgaḍ, Rāmdās implores, 'I ask only one thing of Thee, my Mother : Promote the cause of the King in our very lifetime. I have heard of Thy exploits in the past ; but show Thy power today.'²² •His vision of the Kingdom of Bliss, wherein 'the wicked cease from

troubling and the weary are at rest', is described in his *Ānanda-vana Bhuvana* : ' A great calamity has overtaken the *Mlecchas* ; God has become the Protector of the virtuous ; all evil-doers have come to an end. Hindusthān has grown strong ; haters of God have been slain ; the power of the *Mlecchas* has vanished. The Mother has blessed Śivājī and destroyed the sinners. I see the Goddess in the company of the king, intent on devouring the wicked. She protected Her devotees of old ; She is protecting them today - in the Kingdom of Bliss.'⁵³

To prepare for this consummation, Rāmdās preached in the living present : ' Places of pilgrimage have been destroyed ; homes of the Brāhmans have been desecrated ; the whole earth is agitated ; *Dharma* is gone. Therefore, Marāṭhās should be mobilised ; *Mahārāṣṭra Dharma* should be propagated. The people should be rallied and filled with a singleness of purpose ; sparing no effort, we should crash upon the *Mlecchas*.'⁵⁴ Torn from their context these exhortations might sound fanatical. But from what we have recorded in the preceding pages the religious revival had reached a stage where it was bound to become militant. Even the patient and forbearing Ekanāth wrote : ' Wicked kings began to rule, and they exploited their subjects like thieves. Themselves worse than Śūdras, they converted people of all castes. Such being the condition (most sinful and sacrilegious) Brāhmans gave up studying the scriptures ; they became drunkards, served the ignominious, and fed themselves like dogs . . . on the leavings from the Turks' table.'⁵⁵ Rāmdās, to be fair to him, also recommended moderation : ' Extremes should be always avoided ; one should act according to situations. The wise should never be fanatical Times change ; rigid rules do not always help ; in politics theoretical consistency is misleading.'⁵⁶

The saints taught by example as well as by precept. On the whole, their total influence was in the direction of evoking great fervour for religion, yet restraining that zeal by a moderation which has always characterised Hindu social behaviour. The revivalism was creative and constructive, not violent and destructive. " The impulse was felt," as Rāṇaḍé has observed,

"in art, in religion, in the growth of vernacular literature, in communal freedom of life, in the increase of self-reliance and toleration."⁵⁷ In spirit, this renaissance was also fed from another source, namely, Vijayanagar. Particularly was that great kingdom (destroyed just a century before the death of Shāhji, as we have seen) the repository of the best traditions of Hindu rule and culture. Particularly, in the matter of religious toleration, no less than as a shining example of what Hindu organisation could achieve, the Marāthās had an inspiring model in the "never-to-be forgotten Empire" of the South.

The specific channels through which this inspiration worked must remain a controversial subject. On the religious side we have the significant tradition of the removal of the image of Viṭṭhala (to save it from Muslim desecration) to Vijayanagar, and its restoration to Paṇḍharpūr by Bhānudās (d. 1513). The Marāthī poet Mahīpati has described this historic incident in his *Bhakta-vijaya* (composed, 1762) which evidently records a well-established tradition. It is to be remembered that the initial consecration of Viṭhobā at Paṇḍharī is attributed to Puṇḍalika—a saint equally respected by the people of Mahārāṣṭra and Karnāṭak. The service rendered by a Karnāṭak king through the protection and restoration of Viṭṭhala, the most popular god of Mahārāṣṭra, was bound to make a deep and abiding impression upon a people who were now passionately devoted to the Paṇḍharpūr cult. In the verses of Mahīpati we witness the sentiments of the Marāthās regarding their favourite god: While Viṭhobā was away from Paṇḍharī, 'the city was like a body without life, or a river without water. The city was oppressed with fears. It was like an army without a king, like constellations without the moon, or as a virtuous devoted wife deprived of her husband (unprotected among men). So with Hari gone to Vijayanagar, the whole of Paṇḍharī seemed desolate. Dejected, the saints and *mahants* sat down by the Eagle-platform. "Whose praises shall we now sing?" they asked among themselves. The *Life of the World* has deserted us. The promise given to Puṇḍalik (to stick to Paṇḍharī) has been broken.'⁵⁸

The rejoicing at the return of Viṭhobā was commensurate with the sorrow at his absence. 'And now the assembled crowd of men and women praised Bhānudās saying that it was through him that the *Lord of Heaven* had come back to Paṇḍharī. Some distributed sweetmeats throughout the city. Others gave feasts of daintily cooked food to Brāhmins. Thus all the dwellers of that sacred city rejoiced in their hearts. Just as when the son of Raghu came back to Ayodhyā, after enduring fourteen years of exile, the people of the city rejoiced, so did the people of Paṇḍharī also rejoice. As when a mountain becomes dry in the time of drought, and then a cloud pours abundant rain upon it, so did the people of Paṇḍharī feel relieved. It was like the joy of the clouds as they saw the ocean issuing from Agastī ; it was like the beauty of vegetation when Spring appears : so was the return of the *Protector of the Helpless* to Paṇḍharī. All the inhabitants became happy : It was as when life returns to the body and all the senses are quickened and begin to perform their functions. So it happened to all the people of Paṇḍharī.'⁵⁹

This event beautifully symbolises the return of life to the dead limbs of Hindu society. Out of the very ashes of Vijayanagar a spark was conveyed to Mahārāṣṭra which added to the illumination created by the saints. The protection of Viṭhala was the protection of Hindu *Dharma* and civilisation, as it was lived and understood by those generations. His restoration therefore was the restoration of *Dharma* which brought about a great and enthusiastic revival. Vijayanagar had stood like a rock against the waves of Islāmic advance for over two centuries. While protecting all that Hindu civilisation meant, and fighting valiantly against the forces of Muslim aggression, Vijayanagar had throughout continued to be tolerant towards the Muslims individually. This tradition was not extinguished at Tālikoṭa or Rakkastangaḍi, but transmitted to Mahārāṣṭra through innumerable channels.

Professor T. S. Shejwalkar has discussed some of these in his article on "What Śivājī and the Marāṭhā State owed to Vijayanagara" (in the *Vijayanagara Sexcentenary Commemo-*

ration Volume).⁶⁰ He has pointed out therein how the author of *Mahārāṣṭra Mahodayāchā Pūrvāraṅga* (lit. Dawn of the Great Awakening of Mahārāṣṭra), dealing with the period 1300-1600 A.D., unavoidably found himself writing a history of Vijayanagar. The family *bakhars* of the Brāhman Sardesāis of Sangameśvar, he says, show how they were supported by the Vijayanagar kings, and thinks that their title of *Nāyak* must have been derived from Vijayanagar. "The cultural influence of Vijayanagara," according to him, "is found mentioned in a curious manner: When after the terrible Durgādevī famine, at the end of the 14th century, the whole of Mahārāṣṭra was depopulated for thirty years, a certain Brahmin, Dādo Nara-sinh by name, of *Atharva Veda* and *Bhūlanjana Gotra*, came from Vijayanagara to Karād, and, with the permission of the Pādshāh of Bedar, helped in the reconstruction and repopulation of the land."⁶¹ Prof. Shejwalkar is also of the opinion that Śivājī, who was at Bangalore as a boy until 1642, must have imbibed at his father's court some of the surviving traditions of Vijayanagar, as evidenced by the *Śiva Bhārat* and *Rūdḥā-Mādhava-Vilāsa Champu*.⁶² "We can take it almost for certain," he states, "that Śivājī's mind had become full of tales of Vijayanagara, of the exploits of its heroes, and the cultural work of its learned men like Vidyāranya. The fame of 'Rāma Rāja Kānaḍā' and the historic battle of 'Rākshas-tagdi' had spread far and wide in Mahārāṣṭra as we can judge by the existence of Marāṭhī *Bakhars* on the subject and the casual mention of his name elsewhere ... Subjectively speaking, it seems clear to us that Śivājī's ideal was formed in the shadow of Vijayanagara."⁶³ Finally, he concludes, "Because Śivājī wished to stand forth as a successor of Vijayanagara, he selected as his imperial coin the gold *hona* in imitation of Vijayanagara, and did not copy the *rupee* of the Mughals though it was becoming the current coin of India as a whole then. For the same reason he continued the practice of donating villages and cash from the treasury to learned Brahmins and to shrines of Hindu deities on the Madras coast. A number of the grant papers have been published in Marāṭhī from the Peshwa State-

records by Pārasnīs and Māvji. His grant, indited on silver-plate, to Tirumalarāya and Rāmarāya, the two sons of Śrī Ranga Rāyulu, the last nominal emperor of Vijayanagara, who died a fugitive in the west country (probably Bednūr), though in its present form spurious, still appears to be, as remarked by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, correct in substance from the sentiments expressed therein."⁶¹

Before we close this chapter, it is necessary to explain the work of Shāhjī in Karnāṭak which has been characterised by one writer as "all along unfriendly though he was a Hindu." Mr. D. B. Diskalkar has observed, "He was no doubt the greatest Hindu general in those days whose help could have saved Vijayanagara for some more years If Shāhjī had left the cause of Bijapur and had taken up that of Vijayanagara the history of the Karnāṭaka could have taken a different turn. The foundation of the Marāṭhā power in the south which he laid by his Bijapur service could as well have been laid by the Vijayanagara service."⁶²

It indeed seems a pity that the historical process does not consult future wisdom. Our regrets that things might have been different from what they were actually reveal our sentiments instead of elucidating History.

'The old order changeth, yielding place to new,
And God fulfils himself in many ways.'

The collapse of the Vijayanagar empire clearly showed its military weakness. It had not enough political stamina to resuscitate itself. The unhealthy state of things during the last century of its shadowy existence (1565-1664) revealed the incapacity of the South to sustain Hindu civilisation. It was an epoch of self-seeking adventurers. In that *milieu* 'to scrap the sorry scheme of things' and reshape it to a new pattern was not the work of individual men but of Destiny. Shāhjī was as much an instrument in the hands of that 'Divinity which shapes our ends' as Śivājī. The emergence of a New Order necessarily involves the destruction of the old. Not all who participate in the processes of History act as conscious agents.

Most men are like mere pebbles in the stream of life ; but some stand out as boulders and even shape the currents of history. Shāhjī was a builder unaware of the magnitude of his own contributions towards the rise of the Marāṭhā power. He succeeded because Bījāpūr was behind him ; otherwise he might have died like Tirumala or Śrī Ranga. Vijayanagar could not be resurrected. If Hindu civilisation was to survive, a new *avatār* was needed. He appeared in the person of Śivājī.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE GRAND STRATEGIST

" Report hath made him an airy body and adds wings, or else it were impossible hee could bee at soe many places as hee is said to bee at all at one time. Hee is very nimble and active imposing strange labour upon himself that hee may endure hardship, and alsoe exercises his chieftest men that hee flies to and fro with incredible dexterity. — *English Factory Record*, 1664.¹

The life and doings of Śivājī have been minutely and critically studied by scholars in and outside Mahārāṣṭra for more than a century since Grant Duff wrote his *History of the Mahrattas*. Still we are no nearer a correct understanding of the various details of his crowded career today than were his earliest historians or biographers. "It is impossible to come to any universal agreement," writes Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "on questions like,—Where did Shivaji spend the years 1637 and 1638, at Puna or Bijapur? Was it Dadaji Kond-dev or Shivaji who subjugated the Mavals? When did Dadaji die? What was the first Bijapuri fort taken by Shivaji and in what year? In what year or years did he establish his own authority over those forts of his father which had not been at first placed under him? What were the order and dates of his acquisition of the 40 forts of which he was admittedly in possession in 1659?"² This questionnaire might be expanded almost without limit, according to the objectives held in view by the researcher. For the biographer of Śivājī such minutiae may be of insatiable interest. But, for our purpose, the character and outlook of Śivājī are of greater importance and significance than even the details of his horoscope or the ethnology of his lineage.³ In the light of the place we have given to individuals in the preceding chapters, we should concentrate more on the historical than biographical aspects of even this greatest of the makers of Marāṭhā nationhood. Except on matters which are of value in the under-

standing of the historical process, therefore, we have relegated details to the notes and appendices at the end of this volume. It is to be admitted, however, that though Śivājī could be considered in one sense as a product of his age, the dynamics of his great personality in their turn moulded and reshaped the destiny of the people and country. So powerful was this factor that most writers have attributed, it seems to us, rather too much to his individual genius. Without seeking to under-rate this vital and almost decisive element, we should emphasise that Śivājī did not inherit a clean slate and he did not work in a vacuum. He had to rub out and rewrite much, but he had also to adjust his sails to the contemporary winds. Though he was a master-craftsman endowed with extraordinary talents, his tools were mostly old and his co-adjutors were not a negligible factor. The resultant of the total historical process provided him a congenial atmosphere which enabled his genius to bear abundant fruit. The soil indeed had been prepared and watered by the pioneers and saints. Śivājī did the final ploughing and seed-throwing. The farmer was a creature of the soil, the seed was indigenous ; and so were the bullocks and the plough. Finally, the harvest is never the product of any single person's labour : so also was the Marāṭhā creation.

That Śivājī's success was due to his qualities of leadership is quite obvious. The absence of those qualities in the Yādavas, as well as the apathy of the people of Mahārāṣṭra in those days, had made for the collapse of Hindu power then. Now there was leadership of extraordinary vision combined with equal capacity for initiative and organisation ; now the people were awakened and ready to respond ; and all the opportunities that time, place, and circumstances could afford were available also. The result, however, did not depend upon these merely : there were, too, formidable odds to be reckoned with. When 'Alā-u'd-Dīn started his aggressions the whole peninsula, though politically split up, was Hindu. Now there were the Muslim kingdoms of Aḥmadnagar, Bijāpūr and Golkonḍa. The first of these was indeed dissolved while Śivājī was still a boy of six years,⁴ but its place had been taken by the more powerful and

dangerous Mughal empire. To emerge successfully out of this situation required courage as well as dexterity. Śivājī had not the inherited resources of a long established kingdom like that of the Yādavas. Like Sher Shāh Sūr he had to build them up out of a mere *jāgīr*. Bricks and mortar and even artisans alone, however, cannot build a magnificent and enduring structure ; it requires the genius of an architect to achieve amazing results. Marble was available for long ages before the Tāj Mahal was created ; and the huge rock out of which the temple of Kailās was hewn existed before this marvel was accomplished. Śivājī was a titanic creator in the realm of politics and nation-building. He had the vision of Mazzini, the dash of Garibaldi, the diplomacy of Cavour, and the patriotism, perseverance, and intrepidity of William of Orange. He did for Mahārāṣṭra what Frederick the Great achieved for Germany or Alexander the Great for Macedonia. In India, later, Ranjit Singh, the Lion of the Punjab, affords a striking parallel. Still, in several respects Śivājī stands alone and unique.

It has been observed that, in ancient Greece, the history of the rise and fall of Thebes was no more than the biography of Epaminondas. Some have regarded the rise of the Marāṭhū State as almost a similar phenomenon ; but historical analogies are superficial, lame, and misleading. Śivājī's achievement was greater, richer, and more enduring. We propose to deal with it in this and the following three chapters.

To begin with, the amazing success that Śivājī won in the course of his relatively short span of life, cannot be explained satisfactorily except in terms of his military talents. His political ideal could not have been accomplished without his military genius. He had to create and equip the armies with which he had to fight ; he had to fix for them a goal, fire them with a zeal, and lead them from victory to victory so as to galvanize a whole people with a sense of national triumph. Progressively, as we shall witness, this was not purely a military achievement. Diplomatic skill, political manœuvring, and creative statesmanship had all to be brought into focus for the total result. Otherwise Śivājī would have remained a mere war-lord, a futile and

ainless adventurer. He has been spoken of as a 'Grand Rebel,' but this is too negative and incomplete an epithet to describe him adequately. He was a strategist—a Grand Strategist—by which he accomplished his positive ends. These aims he summed up in the noble word '*Svarājya*' which was to be enjoyed under the protecting authority of the '*Chhatrapati*.' This was the legacy he wished to leave to posterity : his own progeny and his people. But this grand strategy was empirically evolved and rested on his patrimony, his early training, and opportunities. It grew with his life and developed with his experience. What follows, therefore, must inevitably constitute a historical-biography or an account of how Śivājī made history for his country with the help of his people, during the seventeenth century.

There is no unanimity among scholars about the exact date of his birth. Sir Jadunath Sarkar has accepted 10 April 1627 on the authority of Chitnis whose account was written as late as c. 1810 A.D.: '19 February 1630 is the date recorded in the Jedhé *Śakāvali*, a work of undoubtedly earlier origin.'⁶ We have already stated that Śivājī was born of Shāhjī and Jijābāi both of whom traced their lineage from ancient royal families.⁷ The place of his birth was Śivneri, a fortress which still contains monuments commemorating that event.⁸ The circumstances attending his nativity, infancy and early life are worthy of recapitulation for the light they throw upon his psychology. His father led an extremely unsettled and hunted life. His mother too was much exposed to the dangers and vicissitudes of her husband's fortunes. There were narrow escapes and thrilling episodes in the fugitive family. When Śivājī was still in the embryo, his mother had been shocked by the cold blooded butchery of her father, two brothers and a nephew in the Nizām-shāhī (25 July 1629). In 1633 Jijābāi had very nearly been captured by Mhaldar Khān the *qile'dār* of Trimbak.⁹ In 1636 Shāhjī was besieged together with his family in the fortress of Māhuli, and might well have been either slaughtered or imprisoned for life. Thereafter the little boy and his long-suffering mother, except for short intervals perhaps, lived mostly

on the Poona *jāgīr*, while Shāhjī was in the Karnāṭak along with his eldest son Sambhājī, and his second wife Tukābāī Mohitē.¹⁰ The death of Sambhājī in action at Kanakgiri (c. 1655)¹¹ left Jijābāī alone with Śivājī to engross her affections. She thus lived for the most part with her gifted son to guide and inspire him in all the trying moments of his life. She died in 1674 a few days after Śivājī's coronation at Rāigaḍ. She was his real and living Bhavānī.

It is more difficult to assess the direct influence of Shāhjī upon Śivājī. But from what little we know, we cannot agree with those who have imagined that he neglected his first family at Poona. The ground on which this opinion has been based is too fictitious to be convincing.¹² On the contrary, we have evidence to believe that there was no alienation in sentiment or purpose between Shāhjī at Bangalore and Jijābāī and Śivājī in Poona. According to Sabhāsad, they were living together at Bangalore until Śivājī was twelve years of age.¹³ Then, even if we should skip over the highly dramatised accounts of Śivājī's early visit to Bijāpūr, as given in the *Śiva Digvijaya* and Chitnis *Bakhars*,¹⁴ there are more sober references in them which may not be doubted. For instance, the loyal father in Bijāpūr service is reported to have written to his adventurous son remonstrating against his disloyal conduct (towards the 'Ādil Shāh) in terms which sound quite plausible and natural : "I have to stay at the Court ; you are my son, and yet you are plundering treasures and capturing forts without pausing to think that it will compromise me. (Its only result will be) the Bādshāh's displeasure and the loss of all we have. What I have earned is for you. You should maintain and gradually increase it. It is your duty to keep secure what my service has procured for me in my old age."¹⁵ Despite the political divergence in outlook at that stage, revealed by this letter, the family affection of Shāhjī towards Śivājī is too transparent to be questioned. Likewise, Jijābāī is stated to have advised Śivājī : "What property your father has, he has earned for you. Do what may secure future good. That will please your father ; do not entertain any doubt about it."¹⁶ We would only add to this that,

when Shāhjī was imprisoned in 1648-49, Śivājī gave up Konḍāṇā as that was one of the conditions of his liberation. He also appears to have carried on negotiations with prince Murād to secure the same purpose.¹⁷ The Jedhé entry on Shāhjī's release, quoted earlier, also throws unmistakable light on the degree of Shāhjī's interest in his son's security and progress.¹⁸ The alleged apathy between father and son, therefore, finds little support in the evidence at our disposal. If anything, as years passed, they understood each other better, and perhaps also appreciated each other's achievements in their respective spheres. Ultimately, the work of both, following seemingly divergent lines, proved equally fruitful in the creation of an independent Marāṭhā dominion.

In the purely political sphere, the most direct instrument of Śivājī's instruction in the formative years of his life, was Dādājī Konḍ-dev. He was Shāhjī's Brāhman steward on the Poona *jāgīr*, and became Śivājī's tutor and mentor from 1642-47. Sabhāsad speaks of him as "the intelligent and shrewd Dādājī Konḍ-dev," and according to Chitnis : "Śivājī Mahārāj lived in the province of Puṇa and was educated by Dādājī Pant. He was taught the arts of wrestling and throwing missiles."¹⁹ From all accounts, Dādājī appears to have been a very conscientious and capable administrator. On coming to Puṇa he took possession of the 12 Māvals, says Sabhāsad. "The Māval Deśmukhs were seized and taken in hand ; the refractory among them were put to death. Then, in course of time, Dādājī died."²⁰ Śivājī thereafter managed his own affairs. The nature of the relations and activities of the Bhoslés and their steward is revealed by a letter of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shāh to Kānhojī Jedhé, dated 1 Aug. 1644. As Shāhjī Bhoslé, it states, has become a rebel and Dādājī, his supreme agent, is campaigning in the region of Konḍāṇā, Khandojī and Bājī Khopdé have been deputed to suppress him, along with "our grand ministers." Kānhojī Jedhé too is asked to co-operate with the 'Ādilshāhī officers in return for which he is promised elevation. It closes with the remark, "know this to be urgent."²¹ We shall see later on how the Jedhés, far from acting as the

agents of the 'Ādil Shāh in suppressing the rebellious activities of the Bhoslés, joined with them in the work of Marāṭhā independence. From this point of view it is significant to remember that Kānhojī Nāyak Jedhé and his *kārbhārī* Dādājī Kṛṣṇa Lohokaré were imprisoned in 1648 and released in 1649 along with Shāhjī.²²

Other coadjutors of Śivājī in these early years will come in for notice in due course. But the names of Yesājī Kank, Bājī Pasalkar, and Tānājī Mālūsaré appear prominently among them. Could this band of young dare-devils have conceived of the noble ideals which Śivājī formulated explicitly in his maturer years? Despite the precocious sentiments put into the mouth of the young hero by the *Bakhar* writers, we would rather not anticipate his idealism. At this stage, to begin with, they were a group of fiery young men, ambitious to achieve something, tugging at the leash, straining to go forward, bursting into adventures for their own sake, and inebriated with success. But increasingly, gathering experience, under the gifted leadership of Śivājī they found their opportunities ever widening. The sober and consummate guidance of Dādājī Konḍ-dev (until 1647) and the patriotic and powerful inspiration of Jijābāi gave direction and meaning to their juvenile escapades.

History proceeds from the concrete to the abstract, from particulars to the general, and palpable human facts are the incentive which goad men to idealistic actions. The atmosphere indeed must have been rife with stories of the misdoings of the Muslims : the declared policy of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shāh (as stated in the *Muḥammad-Nāma*) was "to strengthen and glorify the Islamic religion in the dominion of the Hindus."²³ The technique of the execution of this policy was well-known : the desecration of Hindu places of worship and the conversion of the Hindus. Though Hindus served under the Muslims, the price they had to pay was often too heavy. The massacre of the Jādhavas (Lukhājī and his sons and nephew), the murder of Kheḷojī Bhoslé and the conversion of Bajājī Nimbālkar were instances²⁴ to provoke reprisals even as family vendetta. Numerous other such provocations must have been felt by Hindus all

over the 'Adilshāhī dominions. Rāmdās preached his philosophy of 'direct action' in such a society. No wonder that inflammable material, such as the Śivājī group provided, caught immediate fire. Like the Carbonari and the young men of Italy under the fiery inspiration of Mazzini, the spirited youths of the Māvaḷs formed a revolutionary body—ready for any sacrifice. It is to be remembered that Śivājī was 18-19 years of age when his father Shāhjī was imprisoned, then released. Think of its effect upon Jijābāi, upon Śivājī and upon the Jedhēs and Lohokarēs. Earlier, too, had suppressive measures been taken against Dādājī Konḍ-dev for insurrectionary activities in the region of Konḍāṇā. Śivājī and his band of young followers—whether they were Kṣatriyas or Marāṭhās—were not tame cultivators but gallant fighters. They captured forts, looted government treasures, and may be even destroyed a mosque.²⁵ They belonged to a people of whom Yuan Chwang had remarked : 'They are proud, spirited, and warlike, grateful for favours, and revengeful for wrongs, self-sacrificing towards suppliants in distress, and sanguinary to death with any who treated them insultingly.'²⁶

Opportunities were provided by the very situation, geographical constitution, and the administrative looseness of the regions which nursed these people in an atmosphere of freedom. Politically speaking, it is helpful to note (i) that the Nizāmshāhī was dissolved in 1636 ; (ii) that this was preceded and followed by unavoidable anarchy, particularly in the tracts now covered by the Poona, Thāṇa, Kolābā and Nāsik districts ; (iii) that the 'Adil Shāh's forces were pre-occupied with the Karnāṭak campaigns thereafter ; and (iv) that Shāhjī's Poona *jāgīr* (comprising the land enclosed between the Ghod river in the north, the Nīrā in the south, and the Bhīmā in the east, stretching over the Ghāṭs and the Māvaḷs into the Konkan in the west), though nominally a fief under Bījāpūr, was virtually independent. Apart from the general laxity of feudal administration, the last ten years of Muḥammad 'Adil Shāh's reign were marked by his prolonged illness (1646-56) and court intrigues of a deadly nature. " The hill forts under all the Mahomedan

governments," writes Grant Duff, "were generally much neglected."²⁷ Some of the more important strongholds were no doubt garrisoned by the State, but in times of need (like the Karnāṭak campaigns) the best troops were removed. Ordinarily, most of the forts were entrusted to the *mokṣadārs*, the *amildārs*, the *jāgīrdārs* or the *deśmukhs* of the districts wherein they were situated. "There was no hill-fort in Shahjee's Jagheer committed to the care of Dadajee Konedee. The strong fort of Kondanah had a Mahomedan Killidar; and Poorundhur was under charge of a Brahmin appointed by Morar Punt. Shahjee's family were on terms of intimacy with both the Killidars, particularly Neelkunt Rao of Poorundhur, who was originally under the Nizam Shahee government and had adhered to Shahjee."²⁸

What with constant war-activities and famine (such as the terrible one which devastated the Deccan in (1630-31) and the chaos which followed in their wake, the land had become a prey to robbers and wild beasts. The *Tārīkh-i-Śivājī* cites the instance of a revenue officer under Ahmadnagar, named Moro Tāndev, who 'raised a tumult and seized the neighbourhood of Puna,' during this period. The whole region up to Wāi and Śirwāḷ was devastated and unsafe.²⁹ It was in the reduction of this state of things that Dādājī Konḍ-dev rendered the greatest service. His strong and efficient administration cleared the Augean Stables for Śivājī, as well as set a constructive model for him. The Māvaḷ country, as Sarkar has well observed, was the cradle of Śivājī's power and the Māvaḷ people formed the backbone of his army. The prevailing system of administration left a free hand to the local chiefs and officers. The *Deśmukh* was no more than the king's local agent for the collection of revenue through the village *Pāḷils*. They were granted, in return for this service, some commission and rent-free lands. The king was interested in nothing beyond receiving the stipulated revenue. The actual administrative work was done by Brāhman stewards or *kārbhārīs*, like Dādājī Konḍ-dev, assisted by a Kāyastha Prabhu staff. The Marāṭhā *Deśmukhs* and *Jāgīrdārs* had enough leisure to play the rôle of petty *rājās* indulging in hunting and martial exercises. The mass of

the people were Kuṇbī farmers or Koḷī fishermen who provided excellent material for the army or the feudal militia. It is said of Guru Govind Singh that he fashioned hawks out of sparrows and lions out of foxes. Śivājī likewise converted the Māvaḷ yeomanry into ironsides for the achievement of Marāṭhā freedom and the creation of a Marāṭhā State.

The people but reflect the character of their land. No elaborate natural or geographical description is called for here. But the most impressive features cannot be missed by any observer of these homelands of the Marāṭhās : the main Sahyādri range forming the backbone of the country, with the Deccan plateau or Deś in the east, and the Konkaṇ coastal strip in the west. The arid plains above and the alluvial plains below the Ghāṭs are nothing peculiar, except that they provided free access to raids from the hardy mountaineers who lived in the middle.

The soil in the Konkaṇ is productive and the rainfall even heavy at places. The coast is broken with inlets and creeks which afford havens for country-craft to encourage some sea-borne trade. Ports like Bassein, Bombay, Chaul, Dābul, Ratnāgiri, Rājāpūr, Vingurla, Goa, and Kārwar, attracted even foreign shipping. The tussle for their possession soon brought into existence a chain of coastal fortresses like Janjira, Suvarṇadurg, Vijayadurg, Sindhudurg, etc. The part played by these in Marāṭhā history will appear in due course. The Konkaṇ became the bone of contention between the Muslims, the Marāṭhās and the European powers.

The Māvaḷ country comprises the habitable portions of the mountain region, with its terraced hills and hollows, where even today one sees hamlets nestling in the beautiful valleys as he descends from the Ghāṭs. The soil yields to hard labour a scanty subsistence which does not keep the Māvaḷ peasantry out of want. Higher up, the steep hill-sides are covered with thick forests inhabited by wild beasts and mountain tribes. The climate and the surroundings both impart to the denizens of the valleys and Ghāṭ-māthā (summit) a sturdiness, vigour and simplicity of living which have constituted the greatest military assets of Mahārāṣṭra. This was the habitat of the 'moun-

tain rats' that became the greatest source of danger to the Muslim powers which had hitherto enjoyed such 'plain'—sailing over the vast stretches of the Deccan Trap.

The strength of the Marāṭhās lay in their forts and mountains. The Koli Nāg Nāk and the Śirkēs of Khelna had demonstrated it in the time of Muḥammad Tughlaq and the Bahmanīs. So also had the valiant Mukund Rāo taken advantage of the hills and defied Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh with the help of his peasant army. Śivājī was but following in their wake, and making large-scale application of their solitary experiments. As the author of the *Ādnāpatra* has strikingly put it : "*Durga* is the very essence of the State ; *Gaḍ* and *Kōḷ* constitute the kingdom ; they are its foundation ; its treasure. They are the strength of the army ; and the prosperity of the realm."³⁰ Not only the Kingdom, but the entire culture of Maharāṣṭra in those times, observes Prof. S. N. Banhatti, was fort-centred and hill-based. Hence, Śivājī and Rāmdās, he says, laid the foundations of Marāṭhā *Svarājya* seeking support from the mountains.³¹

The twelve Māvals³² which Dādājī Kond-dev is said to have taken possession of when he returned with the boy Śivājī from Bangalore (c. 1642), formed the nucleus round which the Marāṭhā enterprise commenced. Śivājī was a strategist and, like Sher Shāh, never scrupled about the means where the ends were considered of vital importance. We shall discuss this issue independently elsewhere. But we would caution the reader here against exaggerating its implications or applying it unfairly to all his actions and in all the stages of his career. Śivājī was not a saint like Rāmdās or Tukārām. He was not acting in a purely spiritual or moral sphere. Political and military actions are to be judged in history, in the first instance, by canons other than purely ethical. Reserving ethical judgment, therefore, for ultimate evaluation at the end, we shall examine each instance of his public conduct as history discloses it to our vision. Suspending the moral verdict we must concentrate, for the time being, on the historicity of the details. When the authenticity of each fact is ascertained and established beyond doubt, or the evidence is verified, the verdict may not be shirked. To start

with, therefore, Śivājī for us is neither saint nor sinner, but just human : impelled by human motives to achieve human ends in a human world,—we must also add, of the seventeenth century.

Since our purpose is not to give an exhaustive biography of Śivājī, we can find space here only for the most typical and decisive illustrations. The earliest instance of what we might describe as his pragmatic conduct, or stratagem, was his capture of the treasures belonging to his uncle, Sambhājī Mohitē, in *Sūpa mahal* (1649).³⁰ Sabhāsad's account of this incident lacks details.³¹ But Dr. Bālkrishna finds in it the young ruler's determination to set an example of firm rule to all his subordinates by thus sternly dealing with his own uncle.³² The point, however, is not the motive of the action but its method. The method lay in concealing the real motive. Sambhājī was the brother of Tukābāī Mohitē, the second wife of Shāhjī. He held charge of Sūpa directly from his brother-in-law and was not inclined to submit to young Śivājī. The latter therefore circumvented him by a stratagem. Pretending to visit him on account of *Śimgā* he caught hold of his estate.

Next, at Purandar (c. 1650), Śivājī's interference was invited by a dispute between Nīlkanth Nāyak (the keeper of the fort) and his two younger brothers.³³ Śivājī made use of the opportunity to imprison all the three and occupied the fort in force with his Māvāles. The fort belonged to Bijāpūr ; now he made it his own.

These two instances show that Śivājī was bent upon making himself master over all his surroundings. Sher Shāh had used similar methods at Chunar and Rohtas,³⁴ and even the great Akbar had not scrupled to capture Asīrgarh finally through bribery.³⁵ Chākāṇ, Torṇa, and Rājgaḍ came into Śivājī's possession through voluntary submission or persuasion or force. The last named place was further strengthened and used by Śivājī as his capital until it was superseded by the more famous Rājgaḍ. Konḍānā was secured by bribing Siddi 'Ambar, its Bijāpūrī commandant.³⁶ It is difficult to date these acquisitions accurately ; but their importance lies more in the total and

increasing power they brought to Śivājī than in the sequence of their annexation. Indāpūr and Bārāmāti on the eastern side of his *jāgīr* appear to have peacefully submitted to Śivājī. Obviously his power was becoming irresistible for the smaller fry by about 1649. He had begun to alarm the 'Ādil Shāh's government, which accounts for its insistence on the surrender of Konḍāṇā as the price of his father's freedom. That he did not yield without a struggle is indicated by circumstantial evidence. There appears to have been some fighting between Śivājī's men and the Bijāpūr forces in the vicinity of Purandar.¹⁰

From these minor incidents, we must now turn to the major events of his life. The circumstances attending his capture of Jāvli from the Morēs (January 1656) and his killing of the great Bijāpūrī general Afzal Khān (November 1659) are among the most controversial topics connected with Śivājī's earlier triumphs. Both are of critical importance in forming our judgment about him, and call for the most careful examination.

The Morēs of Jāvli were vassals of the 'Ādil Shāhs for eight generations. Their first ancestor to occupy that place had rendered great service to Bijāpūr in establishing its hold upon that wild tract. In recognition of this his name, Chandra Rāo, was proudly borne by every successor to the Jāvli fief. But the direct line of succession having failed in the eighth generation, the last chieftain Kṛṣṇa Rāo, happened to be adopted. He was a boy of sixteen summers and had been in occupation of the *gāḍī* for three years when Śivājī conquered Jāvli. It is alleged that Śivājī got into possession of this valuable piece of territory by means of a pre-meditated and cold-blooded murder which was the outcome of "organised treachery."¹¹

There is little doubt that Śivājī was a pragmatic idealist. He was extremely ambitious and determined to secure his ends without making bones about the means. Jāvli was rich, strategically important, and lay athwart the path of his expansion. As we have already noted, Śivājī did have recourse to a stratagem at Sūpa and bribery at Konḍāṇā. But these facts alone cannot justify pre-judging his conduct at Jāvli. In our humble

opinion, the available evidence is inadequate to establish that the acquisition of Jāvḷi was brought about by "organised treachery."

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has discussed this incident in his *Shivaji and His Times*. But his categorical indictment is based upon evidence which leaves us unconvinced. Brushing aside the *Śiva-Bhārat* and the *Jedhé Śakāvali*, as unhelpful, he seems to have relied mainly on Sabhāsad and *Tārīkh-i-Śivāji*.¹² The complete authenticity in all details of this last named work, in its available form (in Persian), is yet to be convincingly established. The only contemporary authority, explicitly cited by Sarkār is Sabhāsad. However, after having quoted from his (Sabh. 10) and certified that "There is no reason to disbelieve such an authority in a matter like this," he summarises his conclusions, drawn "from a consideration of all the materials," thus:

"The then Chandra Rao, named Krishnaji and eighth in succession from the founder, was a boy of sixteen and all his business was conducted by his kinsman, Hanumant Rao Moré, who was his *diwan*. Raghunath Ballal Kordé, under Shivaji's orders, visited Hanumant with a pretended offer of marriage between his master and the late Chandra Rao's daughter, and treacherously slew him at a private meeting. [Sarkar, *ibid*, p. 65, speaks of "Shambhuji Kavji" as "the murderer of H. More."] He escaped unscathed and quickly brought Shivaji to the scene with a vast army. Jāvḷi was captured after six hours' fighting, and several members of the Moré family were taken prisoner. But Chandra Rao was either absent from the place or fled away before its fall. He took refuge in Raigarh. Shiva invested it and gained possession of it by negotiations. The two boys, Krishnaji Chandra Rao Moré and his younger brother Baji Rao Moré, were carried away by Shivaji to Puna and there the elder one was beheaded."¹³

None of these details "critically discussed" and finally concatenated by Sarkar as "the most probable reconstruction" of the Jāvḷi affair, tallies with Sabhāsad's account given by him earlier. There Raghunāth Ballāl Kordé was commissioned "to kill" *Chandra Rao*; actually he finds that *Hanumant Rao* was

slain, and *Chandra Rao* took refuge in Raigarh. According to Sabhāsad, Raghunāth "stabbed Chandra Rao and his brother Surya Rao," and "the assassins promptly rushed out of the gate, cut their way through the alarmed and confused guards, beat back the small and hurriedly gathered band of pursuers and gained a chosen place of hiding in the forest." According to Sabhāsad, again, it was Hanumant Rao who held out in a neighbouring village, after Chandra Rao and Surya Rao were stabbed. Then there were pretended negotiations and Hanumant Rao was stabbed by *Sambhāji Kāvji*,⁴⁴ and not by Raghunāth Korḍé. The discrepancies have not been explained by Sir Jadunath. If Sabhāsad was really 'such an authority there is no reason to disbelieve in a matter like this,' we find no reason either why his details should be tampered with or his authoritative account contradicted finally.

For one thing, Sarkar has not strictly adhered to Sabhāsad's text in his citations : (i) "learning that Chandra Rao usually lived in a careless unguarded manner" is contrary to Sabhāsad's description of Jāvli as a place well guarded by ten to twelve thousand troops (असे जबरदस्त गड कोठ दहाबारा हजार लष्कर हाशम समेत राज्य करीत असत.)⁴⁵ The "small and hurriedly gathered band of pursuers," therefore, does not sound plausible. (ii) There is nothing in Sabhāsad's text which corresponds to —"and gained a chosen place of hiding in the forest." Secondly, the name of the younger brother given by Sabhāsad is Sūryāji Rāo and not Bāji Rāo. Both of them were stabbed and presumably killed (खासाच पडलियावरी)⁴⁶ according to Sabhāsad ; but Chandra Rāo was absent and came to terms with Śivāji later at Raigarh, according to Sarkar. Finally, the two brothers were taken to Poona where Chandra Rāo alone (says Sarkar) was beheaded : though according to his other authority *Tārīkh-i-Śivāji*, "Shivaji sent Raghunath Ballal to *Chandra Rao* to ask for the hand of his fair daughter. On reaching the place, Raghunath first went to the diwan Hanumant Rao and stabbed him to death at the interview. He returned by a night-march to Shivaji (at Purandar), who was highly delighted and by quick marches arrived before Javli with a vast army and took it after

six hours of fighting. The *sardars* Baji and Krishna Rao, aged 14 and 16 years respectively, were brought prisoners to Puna and there beheaded. The women and children were set free."⁴⁷

Here again, it is obvious that Chandra Rāo who was only 16 years of age could not have had a daughter whom Śivājī might even pretend to ask in marriage. Besides, "the late Chandra Rao's daughter" spoken of by Sir Jadunath finds no place in any of the authorities cited by him. Though T. S. states that both the brothers were beheaded, Bājī is found alive by Sarkar, by other evidence,⁴⁸ and therefore could not have been beheaded by Śivājī at Poona. His attempt at the repudiation of the alleged correspondence of Chandra Rāo with the 'Adilshāhī government for recovering his heritage ("which would be a quite natural and legitimate desire") is too naïve, inasmuch as he himself admits that Bājī escaped (on 28th August, according to the *Shivapur Daftar Yādi*), assumed the hereditary title of Chandra Rāo, and in March 1665 joined Jai Singh for war against Śivājī; Ambājī Govind Rāo Moré was also with him.⁴⁹

In the light of the above examination of Sir Jadunath Sarkar's version of the Jāvli incident we should look for something more plausible. That Śivājī captured Jāvli after six hours fighting, and that Chandra Rāo submitted at Raigarh after negotiations, are two important facts admitted by Sarkar, after considering all the evidence. The contemporary Jedhē *Śakāvali* records: "Śivājī goes and captures Jāvli, after taking with himself and fighting with the help of, the contingents of Kānhojī Jedhē Deśmukh, and Bāndal, and Silimkar, and the Deśmukhs of Māval."⁵⁰

Further details are supplied by the Jedhē *Karīna* which states: "In course of time when an expedition against Jāvli was planned, Kānhojī Nāyak and the Deśmukhs were summoned together with their contingents and sent against the Morés of Jāvli who had been already routed by Kānhojī and who had fled from Jāvli. Later, however, Hanumant Rāo Moré renewed the insurrection in the Jor valley against whom Śivājī sent Raghunāth Ballāl *Sabnis* with a body of troops from Poona.

Raghunāth Ballāl killed Hanumant Rāo and took possession of Jor.

“Soon after, Śivājī himself went against Jāvli with the troops of the Deśmukhs and captured it on 31 December 1655. When Chandra Rāo lost Jāvli he took shelter at Rāirī (i.e. Rāigaḍ) where Śivājī besieged him. The besieging party was composed of the contingents of Kānhoji and other Deśmukhs among whom was one Haibat Rāo Silimkar Deśmukh of Gunjan Māvaḷ. He mediated for Chandra Rāo with Śivājī and brought about a meeting between them. Negotiations took place and Rāirī was captured in the *Durmukhi* year 1578 ś. For these services, Haibat Rāo Silimkar was given a fresh seal of Deśmukhi in his jurisdiction of Gunjan Māvaḷ and Śivājī composed his domestic quarrel by effecting a partition.”⁵¹

An elaborate and interesting account of the Jāvli incident is also available in the Moré *Bakhar* which was first published by D. B. Pārasnī in his *Itihāsa Samgraha* (June 1909). According to it, Kṛṣṇājī Bājī ruled at Jāvli for three years when Śivājī demanded submission from him. The proud Moré, however, was not to be easily cowed down. ‘Then there came to be great enmity between Chandra Rāo and Śivājī Mahārāj. Śivājī Mahārāj sent Sūrya Rāo Kākdé and 2000 infantry against Jāvli. Descending from the Nisni Ghāt of Mahābaleśvar, ... they laid siege to Jāvli. The approaches of Jāvli were difficult ; there were dense clusters of bamboos. There the fighting went on for a month. At the end of the month Kṛṣṇājī Bājī Moré Rājé left Jāvli and went with his men to Rāigaḍ ... Śivājī Mahārāj advanced against it. Chandra Rāo held out at Rāigaḍ for three months. Then peace was made.’⁵² Then follow illuminating details of the scene of meeting. Śivājī intended to restore Jāvli to Chandra Rāo if he agreed to be submissive and loyal. ‘Taking Kṛṣṇājī with him, he came to Chākaṇ. Kṛṣṇājī wrote secretly to Vyankājī Rājé Ghorpaḍé of Mudhol, a *maṇṣabdār* of Bijāpūr : You are a *maṇṣabdār* of the Pādshāh. We too are esteemed rājās under the Pādshāhī ... You and we are relatives. Śivājī Rājé Bhoslé is self-styled king. He has made such trouble for the Pādshāh. So, by hook or crook, in

any way that you think suitable, secure our release from here and take us to Mudhol. After we have joined you, we shall then exert ourselves to the utmost . . . These letters were discovered by the messengers of Śivājī Mahārāj . . . He read them, and saw there was treachery. Then he said to Kṛṣṇājī : You and I met at Rāigaḍ. You gave me your word of honour that you would not be unfriendly to me. Still, you sent treasonable letters to Vyankājī Ghorpaḍé. It is clear from this that you Morés are faithless people.—Thus accusing him, Śivājī Mahārāj had him beheaded at Chākaṇ. From that time the rule of the Morés disappeared from Jāvli.⁵³

The charge of treason has not therefore, issued from "some modern theorists" as Sarkar alleges, but is at least as old and authentic as the above record. The conduct ascribed to Bāji Moré by Sarkar is also in keeping with that. Śivājī's first interference with the Morés appears to have been in connexion with the succession disputes after the death of Daulat Rāo, the last of the Chandra Rāos in direct lineal descent. Kṛṣṇājī Bāji Rājé was adopted from the Śivthar family.⁵⁴ Appeals from rival claimants invited interference from outside. Afzal Khān, the *sūbadār* of Wāi, deputed Kānhoji Jedhé to settle the affairs of Jāvli, but he proved to be in league with Śivājī.⁵⁵ Hanumant Rāo, having taken possession of Jor (or Johar) Khoré, must have invited punishment upon himself. Similarly, Sabhāsad speaks of another Bābjī Rāū as a *ṛāj* or rebel whom Śivājī, after the fall of Jāvli, imprisoned and blinded.⁵⁶ Many a border dispute between the Morés and Śivājī which embittered their relations is also on record.⁵⁷ There is every reason to believe that Kṛṣṇājī owed his position to Śivājī. The *Tārīkh-i-Śivājī* refers to him as *sardār*, not *rājā*.⁵⁸ Hence Śivājī's demand from him to renounce the title of *Rājé* as recorded in the Moré *Bakhar*.⁵⁹ These antecedents explain Śivājī's conquest of Jāvli in 1656.

The Morés being loyal to and dependent on Bijāpūr, were obviously a thorn in the side of Śivājī. He would not tolerate them unless they showed loyal submission to him. Failing this he felt it necessary to remove them from his path of expansion.

Hence Sabhāsad's statement : चंद्रराव मोरे यास मारल्या विरहित राज्य साधत नाही. त्यास तुम्हा वांचून हें कर्म कोणास न होय. तुम्ही त्यांजकडे हेजबीस जाणे. — "The kingdom cannot achieve (its objectives) unless Chandra Rāo Moré is *beaten* (subdued). None can accomplish this better than you. You should go to him for *negotiations*."⁶⁰ He (Raghunāth Ballāl *Sabnis*) was sent as *hejib* or envoy with an escort of 100-125 armed men. It would have been a suicidal venture for such a small party to proceed on a murderous errand to a stronghold well defended by 10-12 thousand troops. If, despite this, the emissary attacked any of the Morés single-handed in the course of the interview, his rashness cannot be construed as an act of pre-meditated murder treacherously planned and instigated by Śivājī. Henry II, in our opinion, was more guilty of the murder of Becket than Śivājī in the alleged crime at Jāvḷi. Yet, it was Hanumant Rāo that was killed, and not Chandra Rāo. The verb *mār* has been used by Sabhāsad on the same page in the sense of "raid" in the sentences : "जुन्नर शहर मारिले; मग अमदानगर मारिलें; मोंगलाजी मोंठें युद्ध केलें." "Junnar city was raided; Aḥmadnagar was raided; a great battle was fought with the Mughals."⁶¹ मार does not therefore necessarily mean only "kill." Moreover, we do not find the name of Raghunāth Ballāl Kordé (who was merely an envoy) among those who were rewarded for distinguished action during the Jāvḷi campaign. Had he accomplished the important "murder" upon which he had been deliberately set by Śivājī, as alleged, we should have expected him to be highly rewarded like Bīr Singh Bundela by Jahāngīr for the assassination of Abul Faḍl.

According to Sabhāsad, Moro Trimbak Pinglé was rewarded with the *Peśvāship*; that office was formerly held by Śāmrāo Nīlkanth Rozekar. Nīlo Sōndev was made *Sūrnīs* and Gangāji Mangāji became *Vāknīs*. Bālabhaṭ and Govindbhaṭ (sons of the celebrated Prabhākaraḥ) continued to be *Upādhyes*. Netāji Pālkar was created *Sarnobat* of 7000 horse and 3000 *silédārs*; and Yesājī Kank that of 10,000 *Māva* infantry. "Thus the kingdom was strengthened."⁶² Evidently, Raghu-

nāth Ballāl Korḍé must have continued to be *Sabnis* or paymaster ; Bālkrṣṇa Dikṣit *Mujumdār* or Accountant-General, and Sonājī Pant *Dabīr* or Secretary. They had been appointed by Shāhājī as men of tried ability, as early as 1639. To them Śivājī had added Tukojī Chor Marāṭhā, as *Sarnobat*, and Nārayan Pant as divisional Paymaster.⁶³

The acquisition of Jāvli brought great accession of strength to Śivājī. Its hoarded treasures augmented his resources in money ; and its very position gave him immense strategic advantages. He followed up this success by the subjugation of the Survés and Śirkés of Śrngārpūr. Now perched on the Sahyādrī, at a point (4000 ft. above sea-level) where no less than eight passes cross the range into the Konkan, through countless gorges and narrow foot-tracks, he erected the historic stronghold of Pratāpgaḍ and installed therein his inspiring goddess Bhavānī. He had also secured Rāiggaḍ which was ultimately to be his capital, and where his coronation as *Chhatrapati* was celebrated in 1674. Immediately his greatest gain was that the recruiting ground of his famous Māva troops was enlarged. His Kingdom now comprised, besides Jāvli and its fortresses, Sūpa, Bārāmāti and Indāpūr in the S. E. ; Purandar, Rājgaḍ, Konḍlānā and Torṇa in the S. ; and Tikoṇa, Lohgaḍ and Rājmāchi in the N. W.,—overlooking the Konkan coast from the crest of the Sahyādrī Range.⁶⁴

It will be obvious from the above position that the Konkan would be the most natural field of expansion for Śivājī's kingdom. There, however, Śivājī had to reckon with Bijāpūr, the Mughals, the Siddis, and the Europeans (Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English). Though the Mughals were to prove, finally for Śivājī, the most formidable enemy (Aurangzeb was Viceroy of the Deccan from 1636-44 and 1652-57), his immediate concern was with Bijāpūr and the Siddis as its subordinates. The Europeans were, by their situation and interests, always sitting on the fence. Aurangzeb was cleverly egging on Bijāpūr to tackle Śivājī who was fast growing into a menace for the Muslim powers. The message he left for 'Ādil Shāh when he hurriedly left for the North to contest the throne speaks

for itself : " Expel Śivā who has sneaked into the possession of some of the forts of the land," it said : " If you wish to entertain his services, give him *jāgīrs* in the Karnāṭak far from the imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them."⁶⁵ Śivājī had extended his activities as far as Junnar and Aḥmadnagar (of which we shall speak later), and Aurangzeb had also instructed his officers to carry on reprisals devastating and plundering without pity. Poona and Chākāṇ were to be utterly ruined, its people enslaved or killed, and those who had abetted Śivā's depredations in the imperial territories to be slain without mercy.

The state of Bijāpūr at this time was pitiable. Muḥammad 'Ādil Shāh had died on 4 Nov. 1656. Aurangzeb had compelled his successor to cede Bīdar, Kalyāni and Parenda together with the payment of an indemnity of one *crore* of rupees. Internally, the murder of *Khān-i-Khānān Khān* Muḥammad (11 Nov. 1657) indicated that all was not well at Bijāpūr. The very able officer Mulla Muḥammad had been called away from Kalyān, and Śivājī found his opportunity there. Aurangzeb was playing a double game : while advising the 'Ādil Shāh to protect his country 'as the son of a dog was waiting for his opportunity,' he kept 'the path of correspondence with Śivā open.' Finally, on 25 January 1658, he wrote to Śivājī : " Though your offences do not deserve pardon, I forgive you as you have repented. You propose that, if you are granted all the villages belonging to your home together with the forts and territory of Konkaṇ, after the imperialists have seized the old Nizāmshāhī territory now in the hands of the 'Ādil Shāh,--You will send Sona Paṇḍit as your envoy to my Court, and a contingent of 500 horse under one of your officers to serve under me, and you will protect the imperial frontiers. You are called upon to send Sonajī and your prayers will be granted."⁶⁶ When Śivājī invaded the Konkaṇ, therefore, he appeared to have done so with imperial connivance if not imperial authority ; though, as a matter of fact, he had seized Kalyān and Bhivandī on 24 Oct. 1657.

⁶⁵ In the *Hemalambi* year *śaka* 1579,' the Jedhé *Karīnā*

states, 'an expedition was undertaken against the Portuguese at Kalyāṇ and Bhivandī. Dādājī Bāpūjī (a cousin of Śāmrāj Pant *Peśvé*) was put in charge of it. Dādājī Kṛṣṇa and his brother Sakhojī (the *Kārbhārīs* of Kānhojī Nāyak) were specially called with their strong Māvaḷ contingents. Dādājī Kṛṣṇa was put in charge of Kalyāṇ and Sakhojī in charge of Bhivandī. They captured Kalyāṇ and Bhivandī, plundered the Portuguese possessions, and established a post at Āseri. The Portuguese agreed to pay a *khandī* and a quarter of gold every year. Śivājī fortified the creek at Durgadi. This was a grand achievement, as it brought in plenty of money and provisions.' The account concludes with the observations that Sakhojī was killed in the operations, but the whole territory was captured; that Ābājī Mahādev was placed in charge of the conquered territory; that the vast collection of iron weapons, rockets, etc. captured were distributed over several forts; and that Śivājī founded Śivapaṭṭaṇ at the foot of Rājgaḍ as well as strengthened the defence of Prabhalgaḍ (east of Panvel).⁶⁷ He also made Kalyāṇ a naval base and built dockyards.⁶⁸

On 8 January 1658 he seized Māhuli. 'His progress into the Kolābā district appears to have been assisted by local chiefs who were eager to throw off the Muslim yoke.'⁶⁹ A number of other fortresses were either acquired or built: Sūrgaḍ, Birwaḍi, Tuḷa, Ghosālgaḍ, Sudhāgaḍ, etc. Both the Siddis of Janjira and the Portuguese were alarmed by these activities, and Bijāpūr determined to stop the aggressions. The result was the campaign of Afzal Khān who started in September 1659 despite the rainy season, only to meet with his tragic end at Pratāpgaḍ on 10 Nov. 1659. This brings us to a discussion of another great controversy on the conduct and motives of Śivājī. Historically, it is important because the overthrow of Afzal Khān was for Śivājī and the Marāṭhās really a triumph over Bijāpūr or the 'Ādilshāhī.

The account of this epic incident given in the Jedhé *Karīmā* appears to us to be the most plausible. According to it Afzal Khān ordered all the Māvaḷ Deśmukhs to join him at once, with all their troops. Kedārjī and Khandojī Khopḍé were among

the first to obey his summons. But Kānhojī Jedhé informed Śivājī of what was happening. Since the narrative of the *Karīnā* is too long, we would recommend the reader to peruse it either in the Marāṭhī text or in the *Shivaji Souvenir* translation. We shall merely recount it here very briefly in part. The oaths exchanged between Kānhojī and Śivājī on this historic and critical occasion are very illuminating.

‘Kānhojī Nāyak informed Śivājī of these happenings in a personal letter, to which he received a reply that Kānhojī should get all the people to swear an oath of loyalty, or that he should please himself by going over to the *Khān*. In this situation, Kānhojī Nāyak, with his five sons, went and saw Śivājī at Sivapaṭṭaṇ and addressed him thus, in a private interview : “ Your father had obtained an oath from me and sent me in your service. I am prepared to remain true to it. I am at your service, with my five sons and all my men, and will fight unto death for you. If we die, who is going to enjoy the *watan* ? I cannot prove false to my oath.” Thereupon Śivājī said : “ If so, you should solemnly swear the renunciation of your *watan*.” Kānhojī took some water into his hands and poured it down in confirmation. . . . Then Śivājī and Kānhojī ate milk and rice together, put their hands on *bel-bhandār*, and exchanged solemn oaths : Śivājī saying, “ We and our descendants shall never fail to look after you and your descendants ; when I am victorious I shall reward you justly.” Then Kānhojī conveyed the message to all the Deśmukhs declaring : “ The *Khān* is treacherous. When his object is accomplished, he will ruin us all. This Marāṭhā kingdom is our own. We should stand by Śivājī and protect it with our contingents and courage.” They repeated the oaths and Śivājī got together an army of the Māvales.’

Then the visit of the *Khān* was negotiated and arranged at Pratāpgaḍ, through Pantājī Gopināth. Kānhojī and the other Deśmukhs were stationed at Jāvli ; Bāndal was posted at Daré, and Haibatṛāo Bālājī Silimkar at Boche-gholi Pass. At a private conference Śivājī told Kānhojī : “ I have full confidence in you, but I am not equally sure about the others. You know how treacherous the *Khān* is. If I succeed at the meeting, three

guns will be fired from the fort, on which you should all attack the Khān's forces at Pār. If I am captured by the Khān, you should block his path at Wardhani and prevent his forces joining him." Śivājī again got Kānhojī to swear loyalty. Kānhojī once more promised to execute his orders fully.

'A grand structure was erected at the foot of Pratāpgad where Afzal Khān came to visit Śivājī, in the month of *Kārtika* of the *Vikārī* year *śaka* 1581, seated in a palanquin, and accompanied by his envoy and escort. Śivājī had already selected his men and assigned to them various duties. During the meeting, Afzal Khān caught hold of Śivājī's neck under his arm, when Śivājī (forearmed as he was with *wāgnakhas*) cut open his entrails. On getting his neck released Śivājī took out his sword. The Khān's men put him into the palanquin and began to run. His envoy and some attendants attacked and wounded Pantājī Gopīnāth. Instantly, however, Jivā Mahala, Bājī Sarjē Rāo, and a few others, counter-attacked them, pulled down the Khān from his palanquin and Śivājī severed his head. The guns were at once fired from the fort; Kānhojī and the Deśmukhs attacked the Bījāpurī forces at Pār and captured their elephants, horses and materials. The Khopdēs fled with fifty of their followers along the bank of the Koyna. Thus was the victory won by Śivājī.'⁷⁰

The whole affair has been well discussed from various points of view and sources by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in his *Shivaji and His Times*. We find no reason to disagree with either his evidence or his conclusions. "The weight of recorded evidence, as well as the probabilities of the case," he writes, "support the view that Afzal Khān struck the first blow and Shivaji only committed what Burke calls, 'a preventive murder.' It was, as I wrote in the *Modern Review* in 1907, 'a case of diamond cut diamond.'"⁷¹

The situation should be humanly visualised. Śivājī was by now fighting, not for his own personal advancement, but for the liberation of his people and country from the yoke of the Muslims. He had succeeded hitherto in extending his power and influence without facing a big army or fighting a pitched battle.

May be, as Aurangzeb put it, he had "sneaked into" possession of several forts and lands. Now he was confronted with an experienced general, an army comprising at least 10,000 cavalry and artillery, etc. The Bijāpūr government had set its whole machinery of administration to mobilise even the Māvaḷ Deś-mukhs against Śivājī. Afzal Khān had started with a bravado and fanfaronade that were calculated to demoralise and unnerve the Marāṭhās. He had boasted : "What is Śivājī ! I shall bring him alive a prisoner, without even once alighting from my horse."⁷² If the traditional accounts are to be trusted, he had started with a devastating campaign laying his impious hands on Tuljā Bhavānī. Even the English had come to know that the Dowager Queen of Bijāpūr, "because she knew with that strength (10,000 horse) he (Afzal Khān) was not able to resist Śivājī, counselled him to *pretend friendship with his enemy, which he did*."⁷³ Under these circumstances, Śivājī acted with alacrity and judgment.

Afzal Khān seemed equally anxious, in spite of his bluster, to capture Śivājī if he could without fighting a battle. He therefore proposed parleying through his envoy Kṛṣṇājī Bhāskar. But Śivājī caught scent of the Khān's real intentions, "whether through intelligence or suspicion it's not known," write the English. He took counsel with his mother, Jijābāi ; he had a vision, or the goddess Bhavānī appeared to encourage and bless him, in a dream. He also "kept his powder dry", made sagacious dispositions of his troops reinforced with the divisions of Netājī Pālkar and Moro Trimbak Pinglé,⁷⁴ and determined to face the consequences with coolness, caution and courage. The result was a triumph of superior strategy : the tragedy of Malik-u't-Tujjar and his ill-fated army, in the Bahmanī adventure against the Śirkés, repeated itself. It was a national crisis for the Marāṭhās ; and, as with the Spanish Armada in the English Channel, in 1588, God seemed to have breathed his squall and scattered the enemy's forces. The ambushed Marāṭhā armies fell upon the Bijāpūr cavalry, and the carnage was terrible. Only those who begged for quarter "holding grass between their teeth" were spared. 3,000 men

were killed, according to reports received by the English at Rājāpūr a few days later.⁷⁵ Even elephants and camels were hacked to pieces ; 4,000 horses, 1,200 camels, 65 elephants, treasures worth more than 10 *lākhs* of rupees, besides artillery, waggons, ammunition, etc. were captured by the Marāṭhās.⁷⁶ Needless to add, it brought glory to Śivājī and humiliation to Bijāpūr.

Smarting under this blow, the Bijāpūr government despatched another army under Fazl Khān, son of Afzal Khān, who had escaped from the holocaust. Śivājī was besieged at Panhālā by 15,000 'Ādilshāhī troops, while the Marāṭhā garrison numbered no more than 5—6,000. It was an unequal struggle ; yet Śivājī escaped through superior strategy. Dividing his forces, he left for Viśālgad (27 miles to the West) with half his army on 13 July 1660, leaving Panhālā in the charge of the gallant Pratāp Rāo Gujar. He was hotly pursued, but the heroism of Bājī Prabhu, Deśpāndē of Hirdas Māva---Leonidas of Marāṭha history---enabled Śivājī to escape by holding up the pursuers at Pavankhind.

'Death clamoured, and tall figures strew'd the ground Like trees in a cyclone.'

Seven hundred brave Marāṭhās laid down their lives in this 'Thermopylae' for the safety of their King. Panhālā was lost (22 Sept. 1660), but the Saviour of the Marāṭhās was saved.⁷⁷ Next came the struggle with the Mughal empire.

It has been observed before that, towards the close of Aurangzeb's last viceroyalty in the Deccan, the Marāṭhās had already begun their incursions into the imperial territory. Bijāpūr had narrowly escaped from the designs of Aurangzeb, at least for the time being, and was inclined to wink at Śivājī's raids beyond the 'Ādilshāhī dominions. Aḥmadnagar and Junnar were despoiled by the Marāṭhās. From the latter place alone Śivājī obtained 3,00,000 *hons*, 200 horses, and much jewellery and clothing.⁷⁸ However, not until Aurangzeb was firmly seated on his ill-gotten throne, could he take effective steps for the security of the Deccan which he had hurriedly

forsaken in 1657. In July 1659 he despatched his uncle Shā'ista Khān as its Viceroy.

While Śivājī was besieged at Panhālā, the new Mughal Viceroy opened a 'second front' against the Marāṭhās by attacking Chākaṇ (18 miles to the North of Poona). This place was of strategic value on the route from Aḥmadnagar into the Konkaṇ. It was valiantly defended by the old Marāṭhā veteran Firangjī Narsala. He held out tenaciously for two months, and extorted admiration even from Shā'ista Khān. When he was forced to capitulate he refused to be enticed away from his allegiance to Śivājī and was allowed to rejoin his master.⁷⁹

On 3 February 1661 Śivājī surprised Kar Talb Khān, the Mughal officer who had been commissioned by Shā'ista Khān to recapture Kalyāṇ. While the Khān was descending from the Bhor Ghāṭ with his heavy artillery and baggage, Śivājī pounced upon him and, cutting off alike his retreat and advance, forced him to buy his escape with a ransom. He followed up this initiative by a cyclonic campaign in the Konkaṇ. Posting Netājī Pālkar to take care of his rear, Śivājī overran the 'Ādilshāhī coastal districts from Dandā-Rājāpurī to Kharepatan. His movements were so rapid that no opposition was offered anywhere. Pilājī Nilkanth and Tānājī Malūsarē distinguished themselves during this campaign. Śivājī secured his fresh gains in the Konkaṇ by building new strongholds like Mandangad and Pālgarh, recalling the fugitives, and encouraging the agriculturists and traders with generous subsidies. Though the Mughals reconquered Kalyāṇ and dominated Northern Konkaṇ (1661-63), Śivājī retained his hold over Ratnāgiri and the S. E. corner of the Kolābā District. Then came the great *coup* at Poona in the night of 5 April 1663 : a blow, as Sarkar has described it, whose cleverness of design, neatness of execution and completeness of success created in the Mughal Court and camp as much terror about Śivājī's prowess, as his *coup* against Afzal Khān had done among the Bijāpurīs.⁸⁰

Shā'ista Khān had occupied Poona since 9 May 1660. But the celebrated adventure of Śivājī, whose romantic details are

familiar to every schoolboy, appears to have taken place—not in the Lāl Mahal itself—but in the camp. Both Sabhāsad and Abbé Carré speak of the “camp” rather than of a house or palace. Philip Gyfford’s letter of 12 April 1663 (from Rājā-pūr to Sūrāt) gives us the best contemporary report of the incident.⁸¹

‘Rājuī Pandit,’ it states, ‘is returned, and present upon his arrival he desired me to write to Your Worship . . . Yesterday arrived a letter from the Rājāh, written by himself, to Rājuī, giving him an account how that he himself, with 400 choice men, went to Shā’ista Khān’s camp ; there, upon some pretence (which he did not insert in his letter) he got into his tent to *salām*, and presently slew all the watch, killed Shā’ista Khān’s eldest son, his son-in-law, twelve of his chief women, forty great persons attending their general ; wounded Shā’ista Khān with his own hand (and thought to death, but since hears he lives), wounded six more of his wives, two more of his sons ; and after all this, returns but losing six men and forty wounded ; 10,000 horse under Rājāh Jaswant Singh standing still and never offered to pursue him ; so that it is generally believed it was done with his consent, though Śivājī tells his men, his *Paramēśvara* bid him do it.’

The consequences of such master strokes of strategy might very well be imagined. The catastrophe earned for Shā’ista Khān a penal transfer to Bengal which a chronicler has described as ‘hell crammed with good things.’ Śivājī was fast acquiring a reputation for working miracles : ‘Report hath made him an airy body, and added wings ; or else it were impossible he could be at so many places, as he is said to be at, all at one time. . . . They ascribe to him to perform more than a Herculean labour that he is become the talk of all conditions of people.’⁸² . . . Śivājī reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to all the kings and princes round about, daily increasing in strength. . . . He is very nimble and active, imposing strange labour upon himself that he may endure hardship, and also exercises his chiefest men that he flies to and fro with incredible dexterity.’⁸³

One important element in Śivājī's strategy was that he allowed no breathing time to his enemies and acted with incredible swiftness. Soon after his Poona adventure he descended into the Konkan and struck a blow at those who were friendly towards Bijāpūr. The Sāvant of Kudal was the chief victim of this campaign. Though a Bhosla, like Śivājī, Lakham Sāvant had been acting contrary to the interests of the Marāṭhās and, consequently, Śivājī thought it necessary to occupy his territory. The Dutch Register for 14 Nov. 1663 states :--" At last, on the 23rd May, the great rebel Siwasi, originator of all these internal troubles, has come down to the province of Candael with his army comprising of 4,000 horsemen and 10,000 footmen, which created a great fear and panic among the inhabitants of Vingurla. The Dessy (Desāi) Zokhamsant (Lakṣman Sāvant), well known from former letters, sent a Brahmin to the Company's camp with the information of Siwasi's arrival, and with the request that our men, the governor and all the merchants of Vingurla, would come to the place where he stayed at the moment called Wāri, leaving the camp (or lodging) under the care of only 2 or 3 Dutchmen. The Resident, considering this a treacherous scheme to murder him, declined this offer ; and indeed, afterwards our men heard that the said Lokhamsant intended to attack our residence, against which attack they prepared."⁸¹ Another entry in the Dagh Register reads : " Tidings came to Golkonda that our lodgings at Vingurla had been partially destroyed by Siwasi and that the inhabitants have fled."⁸²

This was a blow intended more against Bijāpūr than against the European settlements. It was portentous of the more dramatic blow on Surat that was soon to follow. Alarmed by these activities, the Dowager Queen of Bijāpūr complained to Shāhjī of his son's depredations : " Although you are a servant of this Government, you have committed treachery by sending your son Śivājī to Poona and upsetting the authority of the Bādshāh there. He has captured some forts belonging to the Bādshāh, conquered and plundered several districts and provinces, overthrown one or two principalities, and killed some chiefs submissive to the Bādshāh. Now keep your son under

proper control or your *jāgīr* will be confiscated." Shāhji replied : " Although Śivāji is my son, he has fled from me. He is no longer under my control. I am a faithful dependant of the Bādshāh. Though Śivāji is my son, His Majesty may attack him or deal with him in any way he likes ; I shall not interfere."⁸⁶ A similar attempt was also made to tackle Śivāji through the Portuguese at Goa and the Desais of Kudal.⁸⁷ Meanwhile Śivāji suddenly turned north and ' blitzed ' Surat in the first week of January 1664.

On 5 January he was at Gandēvi 28 miles south of Surat. The next day (Wednesday 6 Jan. 1664) at 11 a.m. he was within bowshot of the Burhanpur Gate of the emporium. Escalot writes : " Thuss farr, deare Browne, I had wrote on Tuesday the fifth January about ten in the morning, when on a sudden a strong alarme was brought to our house from the towne with news that Seva-Gee Raya . . . was coming downe with an army of an uncertain number upon Surat to pillage the city, which news strooke no small consternation into the minds of a weake and effeminate people, in soe much that on all hands there was nothing to be scene but people flying for their lives and lamenting the loss of their estates ; the richer sort, whose stock of money was large enough to purchase that favour at the hands of the Governor of the Castle, made that their sanctuary and abandoned their dwellings to a merciless foe, wich they might well enough have defended with rest of the towne had they had the heartes of men."⁸⁸ But panic is paralysing, and as Carré observed, the courage of the inhabitants of Surat ' did not serve as ramparts.' In fact, the biggest port on this side of India belonging to the Mughal was ' unfortified by art or nature.'⁸⁹ The Moors, through the unworthy covetousness of the governor of the town, ' had nobody to head them, nor none unto whome to joyne themselves, and so fled away for company ' whereas if there had been 500 men trayned and in readiness, as by order of the king there ever should, whose pay the governor puts into his own pocket, the number to defend the city would have amounted to some thousands. This was the condition of the citty at the tyme of its invasion."⁹⁰

"Wednesday the 6th January, about eleven in the morning," says the contemporary eye-witness, "Sevagee arrived neere a great garden without the towne, about a quarter of a mile, and whilst he was busied in pitching his tents, sent his horsemen into the outward streets of the towne to fire the houses, soe that in less than halfe an houer wee might behold from the tops of our house two great pillars of smoke, the certaine signes of a great dissolution, and soe they continued burning that day and night, Thursday, Friday and Saturday : still new fires raised, and every day neerer and neerer approaching our quarter of the towne. That the terror was great, I know you will easly believe, and upon his first beginning of his firing, the remainder of the people fled as thicke as possible, soe that on Thursday the streets were almost empty, wich at other tymes are exceeding thick with people, and we the English in our house, possessed of a Seraw or place of reception for strangers, were left by the governor and his people to make what shift we could to secure ourselves from the enemys : this might the English and Duch have done, leaving the towne and going over the river to Swalley to our shipps, which were then riding in Swalley hole, but it was thought more like Englishmen to make ourselves ready to defend our lives and goods to the uttermost than by a flight to leave money, goods, house, to merciless people, and were confirmed in a resolution that the Duch alsoe did the same, though there was no possibility of relieving one another, the Duch house being on the either side of towne almost an English mile asunder

"Things being thus reasonably well prepared, newes is brought to us that Mr. Anthony Smith, a servant of the companies, one whoe hath been chiefe in several factoryes was taken prisoner by Sevagees souldiers as he came ashore neere the Duch house, and was coming to the English, hee obtaines leave some few houers after to send a note to the president, wherein hee acquaints him with his condition, that hee being brought before Sevagee hee was asked what hee was and such like questions, and at last by *Sevagee told that he was not come to doe any personal hurte to the English or other merchants, but only*

to revenge him selfe of Oram Zeb (the Great Mogol), because he had invaded his country, had killed some of his relations, and that hee would only have the English and Duch give him some treasure and hee would not medle with their houses, else hee would doe them all mischiefe possible."

Though Mr. Smith was kept in duress until Friday afternoon, he was later released and sent back to the English as a messenger with a demand for three *lakhs* of rupees. But President Oxenden decided to face all consequences and detained him. Luckily, Śivājī, having obtained sufficient booty otherwise, left Surat on Sunday morning : "about 10 o'clocke as they tell us hee went his way."⁹¹

Among the houses 'fired' by Śivājī were those of 'Hogee Said Beg' and 'Verge Voras' the two merchant princes of the Empire. "On Friday after hee had ransaked and dug up Vergo Voras house, he fiered it and a great vast number more towards the Duch house, a fier so great as turned the night into day : as before the smoke in the day tyme had almost turned day into night ; rising soe thicke as it darkened the sun like a great cloud." The fires, however, were not all started by the Marāṭhās. We learn from Carré that 'when the governor of the castle opened artillery fire upon the town, he shot at random ; and if it was to a certain extent fraught with dangers in regard to Sevagy's soldiers, it rendered the destruction of the people of Surat most certain.'⁹²

The real character of Śivājī as a conqueror is revealed by his conduct under extreme provocation. It is in great contrast to Nādir Shāh's at Delhi under similar temptation. During the *five* fatal hours (from 9 A.M. to 2 P.M.) on the terrible Sunday, 11 March 1739, there was greater slaughter and destruction at the imperial Mughal capital than during the *five days'* occupation of Surat by Śivājī. The random killing of a few of his followers by some ruffians in the streets of Delhi, according to Ānandrām Mukhlis, provoked the Persian into reprisals such as the capital had not witnessed during the 348 years since Hazrat Sahib-Kiran Amir Timur ordered the inhabitants to be massacred. The loss in lives and treasure was indeed incalculable.

Neither age nor sex was respected by the furies let loose upon the city ; the miscreants in some cases appeared to have escaped leaving the innocent to be victimised. Several men and women were driven to insanity and suicide in their desperation. The streets and houses were glutted with corpses, and soon the stench of these threatened to choke the living. The *debris* could be cleared and cleansed only by means of fire. "By degrees the violence of the flames subsided, but the bloodshed, the devastation, and the ruin of families were irreparable. For a long time the streets remained strewn with corpses, as the walks of a garden with dead leaves and flowers. The town was reduced to ashes, and had the appearance of a plain consumed with fire. All the regal jewels and property and the contents of the treasury were seized by the Persian conqueror in the citadel. He thus became possessed of treasure to the extent of 60 *lacs* of rupees, and several thousand *ashrafs* ; plate of gold to the value of one *crore* of rupees, and the jewels many of which were unrivalled in beauty by any in the world, were valued at about 50 *crores*. The peacock throne alone, constructed at great pains in the reign of Shāh Jahān, had cost one *crore* of rupees. Elephants, horses, and precious stuffs, whatever pleased the conqueror's eyes, more indeed than can be enumerated, became his spoil. In short, the accumulated wealth of 348 years changed masters in a moment."

Śivājī behaved with remarkable restraint while an attempt on his life was actually made in Surat at the instigation of the chicken-hearted governor. The assassin struck the blow and Śivājī rolled in a pool of blood, but when he recovered he did not give way to wild vengeance like the Irani invader. The English observer writes : "The fellow haveing made his thrust at Sevagee with all his might, did not stop but ran his bloody stump against Sevagees breast, and with such force that both Sevagee and hee fell together, the blood being seen upon Sevagee, the noise ran through the camp that hee was killed, and the crye went, 'kill the prisoners,' whereupon some were miserably hacked ; but Sevagee haveing quitted himselfe, and hee that stood by haveing cloven the fellows skull, *command was given*

to stay the execution, and to bring the prisoners before him, wick was immediately done ; and Sevagee, according as it came in his minde, caused them to cutt of this mans head, that mans right hand, both the hands of a third." All together about four heads and 24 hands were cut off. Then it came to be Mr. Smith's turn (being caught as one of the suspected): "and his right hand being commanded to be cutt of, hee cryed out in Indostani to Sevagee, rather to cutt of his head, *unto which end his hatt was taken of, but Sevagee stopped execution, and soe praised be God, hee escaped !*"⁹⁴

Thevenot, who passed through Surat two years afterwards (10 Jan. 1666 to Feb. 1667), further noted with satisfaction : "All the rest of the town was plundered except the monastery of the Capuchins. *When the plunderers were in front of their Convent they passed by, and they had orders from their chief to do likewise, because on the eve of the very first day, Father Ambrose, who was their Superior, moved with pity for the Christians inhabiting Sourat, went to see this Raja to speak to them in their favour, and to beg him at least to do no violence to their persons. Sivagy had respect for him. He took him under his protection and granted him what he wanted for the Christians.*"⁹⁵ Cosme da Guarda categorically confirms : "Men, women and children ran naked without knowing where and to whom. *But no one was in the peril of his life, for it was the strict order of Sevagy that, unless resistance was offered, no one should be killed ; and as none resisted none perished.*"⁹⁶

Śivājī, according to Carré, then left Surat as easily as he had entered it, "having found in one single city all the wealth of the East and securing such war-funds as would not fail him for a long time."⁹⁷ Thevenot's estimate of the wealth secured by Śivājī was "in jewels, gold and silver, to the value of above thirty French millions."⁹⁸ According to the English President, they took away "in gold, pearle, pretious stones and other rich goods, to the value of money hundred thousand pounds."⁹⁹ Bernier reckoned that Śivājī returned "laden with gold and silver to the amount of several millions, with pearls, silken stuffs, fine clothes and a variety of other costly merchandise."¹⁰⁰

Finally, Valentyn states : " Everything of beauty existing in Surat was that day reduced to ashes Two or three Banian merchants lost several millions, and the total loss was estimated at 30 millions . . . He (Śivājī) and his followers appropriated only the most valuable spoils and *distributed the less valuable things*, which could only hamper their retreat, *among the poor, whereby many acquired much more than what they had lost through fire and pillage* (Śivājī) departed at the first gleam of daylight, *delighted to have plucked such a fine feather from Aurangzeb's tail.*"¹⁰¹

Valentyn has hit the nail admirably on the head. No conquest or annexation was intended by Śivājī. He only wanted to singe the Emperor's beard as the English " sea-dogs " Drake and Hawkins had done at Cadiz. He also wanted the " war-funds " as Carré noted. All other things were only incidental to the raid. Few other conquerors in history have displayed the restraint and humanity shown by Śivājī during his attack on Surat.

The defences of the greatest port of the Empire had been sadly neglected. According to Cosme da Guarda " some confused news of his (Śivājī's) intention reached Surrate but caused a great laughter, as hundred and eighty thousand cavalry were encamped in the very territories of which Sevagy had become master." But when Śivājī actually appeared on the scene, Ināyet Khān, the governor, shut himself up " like a woman " inside the fort, and when his men fired out of sheer desperation, " more damage was done to the town than the enemy." ¹⁰² Prince Muazzam who had succeeded Shā'ista Khān as viceroy in the Deccan, was regaling himself at Aḥmadnagar, ' caring only for pleasure and hunting.' Jaswant Singh tried to save himself from obloquy (on account of his alleged delinquency during the Shā'ista Khān incident) by besieging Konḍānā. He was at it from November 1663 to 28 May 1664, but was obliged to retire for the monsoon to Aurangābād, worse off than what he had been at the start. But Śivājī was quite a different type of general to wait upon the vagaries of weather. Despite the inclemency of the season, he suddenly swooped down upon Aḥmad-

nagar while the imperialists were still expecting him to be chewing the cud from Surat !

When Aurangzeb awakened to the realities of the situation, he did two things : (1) to set Surat on the road to recovery, and (2) to open a grand offensive against the 'grand rebel' Śivājī. The two measures were not altogether unconnected. Surat was an important source of revenue to the Mughal Empire. Śivājī's raid had dealt a blow at once to the treasury and the *prestige* of the Empire. The sinews of war came from the coffers of the 'Banians', both Christian and heathen. "As the advantage the great Mogal derived from Surrate was enormous," writes Guarda, "and the governor had informed him (Aurangzeb) that all was lost and the merchants were arranging for a change of place on account of the scant security of Surrate, he resolved to remedy everything by sending an army that would totally destroy Sevagy and detain the merchants. He ordered that they should be excused duties for three years, during which period nothing should be paid for import or export. This appeased and relieved all, for it was a very great favour in view of the large capital employed by those Gentios in trade. The wealth of those people is so great that when the Great Mogal sent for a loan of four millions to Baneane Doracandas Vorase, he answered that His Majesty should name the coin and the sum would immediately be paid in it *What is still more surprising is that the major part of the Baneane's capital was invested at Surate and this offer was made four years after the sack of Sevagy.* So much had already been accumulated, and considerable had been the profit of those three years when no tax was paid." ¹⁰⁴

We find confirmation of the above in a letter dated 4 August 1664, written by the Dutch Governor-General to the Directors of their East India Company : "King Orangech has ordered the town of Surat to be surrounded by a stone wall," it says, "and has granted a year's exemption of tolls and duties to the merchants, the Company and the English being also included. This exemption was to begin from March 16th 1663, and we calculate that the Company will then gain a sum of

f 50,000 (£4,200), so that this catastrophe has brought us profit!"¹⁰⁴

On 3 October 1670 Śivājī repeated his exploit at Surat. Property worth about 132 *lakhs* was looted and Surat remained in continual dread of the Marāṭhās. As Sir J. Sarkar has observed, the real loss of Surat was not in the booty carried away by the Marāṭhās: "The trade of this, the richest port of India, was practically destroyed Business was effectively scared away from Surat, and inland producers hesitated to send their goods to this the greatest emporium of Western India."¹⁰⁵

To turn from Surat to the grand offensive against Śivājī: Despatches arrived from Prince Muazzam, writes *Khawāfi Khān*, 'to the effect that Shivaji was growing more and more audacious, and every day was attacking and plundering the imperial territories and caravans. He had seized the ports of Jiwal and Pabal and others near Surat, and attacked the pilgrims bound for Mecca. He had built several forts along the sea-shore and entirely disrupted maritime intercourse. He had also struck copper coins (*sikka-i-pul*) and *hons* in the fort of Rajgad. Maharaja Jaswant Singh had endeavoured to suppress him, but without avail.'¹⁰⁶ Hence, Rājā Jai Singh and Dilir *Khān* were sent to join the armies already fighting against Śivājī.

Jai Singh's career, as Sarkar has said, 'had been one of undiminished brilliancy from the day when he, an orphan of twelve [now he was 60], received his first appointment in the Mughal army (1617). Since then he had fought under the imperial banner in every part of the empire, from Balkh in Central Asia to Bijapur in the Deccan, from Qandahar in the west to Mungir in the east In diplomacy he had attained to a success surpassing even his victories in the field. Wherever there was a difficult or delicate work to be done, the Emperor had only to turn to Jai Singh. A man of infinite tact and patience, an adept in the ceremonious courtesy of the Muslims, a master of Turki and Persian, besides Urdu and the Rajput dialect, he was an ideal leader of the composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajputs and Hindustanis that followed the cre-

scent-banner of the sovereign of Delhi His foresight and political cunning, his smoothness of tongue and cool calculating policy, were in striking contrast with the impulsive generosity, reckless daring, blunt straightforwardness and impolitic chivalry which we are apt to associate with the Rajput character.¹⁰⁷

Jai Singh's coadjutor, Dilir Khān, was also a veteran soldier. His real name was Jalāl Khān Daud-zai. He had served under Prince Suleman Shikoh during the war of Succession, and with Mīr Jumla in the Assam campaign. He was the founder of Shāhjahānābād in Rohilkhand. He was to win further laurels in the present war against Śivājī.

Faced with such generals and such forces as they led, Śivājī and the Marāṭhās had their mettle put to the hardest test yet encountered by them. Jai Singh organised a whirlwind campaign in order to encompass the Marāṭhās from all sides. Casting his net far and wide, the 'Ādil Shāh, the petty rājās and zamīndārs, the Siddis, and even the Europeans, were all enlisted as supporters. Corruption was set a-foot on its nefarious work in the very camp of the Marāṭhās. Purandar, where Śivājī resided, was made the heart and centre of this colossal campaign. When Jai Singh arrived there, writes Cosme da Guarda, 'even Sevagy could not help being frightened. For, besides the 400,000 cavalry, the number of men and animals that followed these armies could neither be credited or ascertained. There went with it 500 elephants, 3 million camels, 10 million oxen of burden, men of useless service and merchants without number.

'The first thing that Sevagy did was to tempt this general in the same way as he had done the other. He sent him a very large and very valuable present desiring his friendship. The Raya refused both and ordered to inform Sevagy that he had not come to receive presents but to subdue him; and for his own good, he asked him to yield and avoid many deaths, or he would make him yield by force. This resolution perturbed Sevagy.'

The siege of Purandar was proceeded with. 'The Raya had brought with him a large number of heavy artillery of such a calibre that each cannon was drawn by forty yokes of oxen ; but they were of no use for bombarding a fortress of this kind ; for it was not a handiwork of man, but of the author of Nature, and it also had foundations so laid and fortified that they laughed at the balls, wind, and even the thunderbolts. The plain at the top, where the men communed with the stars, was more than half-a-league in breadth, provided with food for many years, and the most copious water that after regaling men was precipitated through the hill to fertilise the plants with which it was covered.'¹⁰⁸ The highest point of this fort is 4,564 ft. above sea-level, and more than 2,500 ft. above the plain at its foot. It is really a double fort—Purandar and Vajragad or Rudramāl. It was by the seizure of this latter citadel (in 1665), as later on the English were to do in 1817, that Jai Singh made it impossible for the Marāṭhās to retain Purandar.

It was during the defence of this strategic stronghold that Murār Bājī, like Bājī Deśpānde and Tānājī Mālūsarē, laid down his life heroically. Dīlir Khān sat down before the fortress like Yama with a grim determination to capture it at any cost. Greatly admiring the gallant resistance of Bājī he offered to spare his life if he should submit and accept high appointment in the imperial service. But the valiant Marāṭhā spurned the temptation and continued the fight courageously. A shot from Dīlir, however, soon brought down the dauntless and incorruptible Bājī. Still the garrison, with the courage worthy of the mother of Brasidas, as Sarkar puts it, continued the struggle undismayed by the fall of their leader, saying : 'What though one man Murār Bājī is killed ? We are as brave as he and we shall fight with equal courage !'¹⁰⁹ That this was not a vain boast is borne out by Khawāfi Khān's testimony to 'the surprises of the enemy, their gallant successes, attacks on dark nights, blocking of roads and difficult passes, and burning of jungles,' etc. which made the task of the Mughals very arduous.¹¹⁰ But, with all that the Marāṭhās could do, it was an

unequal struggle. The resources of the Mughals were vastly superior.

Jai Singh's flying columns were everywhere. His army dispositions were those of a consummate general. He had opened his campaign from Poona on 14 March 1665. The vanguard of the imperialists, with heavy artillery under Dilir Khān, was in the vicinity of Purandar on the 30th. Vajragad (Rudramāl) was forced to capitulate on 14 April. On the 25th following a choice division led by renowned captains was ordered to devastate the surrounding regions. The area covered by Rājgad, Simhagaḍ and Rohida was to be utterly desolated without a vestige of cultivation or habitation. Likewise, the villages enclosed between the forts Lohgād, Visāpūr, Tikoṇa and Tangai were also devastated ; much of Bālāghāt and Pain-ghāt was harried. In the neighbourhood of Rohida alone, 50 villages were destroyed towards the end of April. Another month passed and Purandar itself seemed irrevocably doomed. The casualties among the garrison were alarming. The realist in Śivājī anticipated the inevitable. To prolong resistance under such circumstances was to invite annihilation or worse dishonour and captivity for the Marāṭhā families sheltered within the fort. He therefore opened negotiations with Jai Singh, on 20 May 1665, through his Pandit Rāo Raghunāth Ballāl. But Jai Singh insisted on a personal interview with Śivājī. This was at last brought about at 9 A.M. on 11 June 1665. Khawāfi Khān has recorded the proceedings as follows :—

‘When Sivaji entered, the Raja (Jai Singh) rose and seated him near himself. Sivaji then, with a thousand signs of shame, clasped his hands and said : “ I have come as a guilty slave to seek forgiveness, and it is for you either to pardon or to kill me at your pleasure. I will make over my great forts, with the country of Konkan, to the Emperor's officers, and I will send you my son to enter the imperial service. As for myself, I hope that after the interval of one year, when I have paid my respects to the Emperor, I may be allowed, like other servants of the State who exercise authority in their own provinces, to live with my wife and family in a small fort or two.

Whenever and wherever my services are required, I will on receiving orders, discharge my duty loyally.'

The Rājā cheered him up and sent him to Dīlir Khān. 'After direction had been given for the cessation of the siege, 7,000 persons, men, women and children, came out of the fort. All that they could not carry away became the property of Government, and the fort was taken possession of by the forces. Dīlir Khān presented Sivaji with a sword, etc. He then took him back to the Rājā who presented him with a robe and renewed his assurances of safety and honourable treatment. Sivaji with ready tact bound on the sword in an instant and promised to render faithful service. When the question about the time Sivaji was to remain under parole and of his return home came under consideration, Rājā Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor asking forgiveness for Sivaji and the grant of a robe to him and awaited instructions

'A mace-bearer arrived with the *firman* and a robe and Sivaji was overjoyed at receiving forgiveness and honour. A decision then arose about the forts, and then it was finally settled that out of the 35 forts which he possessed, the keys of 23¹¹¹ should be given up with their revenues amounting to 10 *lacs* of *hons* or 40 *lacs* of *rupees*. Twelve small forts with moderate revenues were to remain in the possession of Sivaji's people. Sambha, his son, a boy of eight years old, in whose name a *mansab* of 5,000 had been granted, at Rājā Jai Singh's suggestion, was to proceed to Court with the Rājā attended by a suitable retinue. Sivaji himself with his family was to remain in the hills and was to endeavour to restore the prosperity of his ravaged country. Whenever he was summoned on imperial service he was to attend.'¹¹²

On his being allowed to depart, he received a robe, horse, etc. In addition, Śivājī further undertook, 'If lands yielding 4 *lākhs* of *hons* a year in the lowlands of Konkan (Painghāt) and 5 *lākhs* of *hons* a year in the uplands (Bālāghāt Bijāpurī) are granted to me by the Emperor, and I am assured by an imperial *firman* that the possession of these lands will be confirmed in me after the expected Mughal conquest of Bijāpur,

then I agree to pay to the Emperor 40 *lākhs* of *hons* in thirteen yearly instalments.' ¹¹³

Since these lands were to be wrested by Śivājī from Bijāpūr, Jai Singh thought he had cleverly thrown a bone of contention between the two enemies of the Mughals in the Decan, viz. the 'Ādil Shāh and the Marāṭhās. Proud of this achievement, he wrote to the Emperor : ' This policy will result in a threefold gain, - 1st we get 40 *lakhs* of *hons* or 2 *krors* of rupees ; 2nd Śivājī will be alienated from Bijāpūr ; 3rd the imperial army will be relieved from the arduous task of campaigning in these two broken and jungly regions, as Śivājī will himself undertake the task of expelling the Bijāpūrī garrisons from them.' In return Śivājī also agreed to join the Mughals in the invasion of Bijāpūr with 2,000 cavalry and 7,000 infantry under his own command. " Now that 'Ādil Shāh and Qutb Shāh have united in mischief," Jai Singh wrote to Aurangzeb, " it is necessary to win Śivājī's heart by all means and send him to North India to have audience with your Majesty." ¹¹⁴

The reason for such a settlement may not be entirely attributed to Jai Singh's magnanimity. Khwāfī Khān's references to the embarrassment caused by the guerilla tactics of the Marāṭhās and Dilir Khān's apprehensions expressed to Jai Singh seem also to indicate that the Mughal generals considered discretion the better part of valour. " I will not say anything more now," Dilir said, " this campaign will end by ruining both you and me." ¹¹⁵

Śivājī was prevailed upon by ' a thousand devices ' to undertake a visit to Āgrā, which he reluctantly accepted. He reached Āgrā on 11 May 1666 and was received by Kumār Rām Singh, son of Jai Singh Kachwah. Aurangzeb gave him audience the very next day ; but treated him with such calculated insult that Śivājī was terribly upset. Kumār Rām Singh was obliged to give an undertaking to the Emperor that ' if Śivājī escapes or does any mischief, the Kumār will take the responsibility.' Śivājī was consequently very anxious that Rām Singh did not come into trouble on account of himself if possible. His enemies were persuading Aurangzeb ' either to kill

Siva or to confine him in a fortress or to throw him into prison.' But Rām Singh having come to know of this, protested to Muḥmad Amin Khān; "It has been decided by His Majesty to kill Śivājī; but he has come here under a guarantee of personal safety. So it is proper that the Emperor should kill me first, and then only, after I am dead, do with Śivājī what he likes." Nevertheless, Śivājī was ordered to be transferred to the custody of Radandāz Khān, a reckless favourite of Aurangzeb, evidently to facilitate the nefarious design. Śivājī then tried to get out of Aurangzeb's clutches through diplomatic negotiations; but he was firmly told that he must not visit anybody, 'not even go to the Kumār's house.' Subsequently, Śivājī was placed under the direct surveillance of the Kotwāl, Fulad Khān. Thus freed from his moral responsibility towards Rām Singh, Śivājī effected his dramatic escape from Āgrā, after having tried various other stunts, during the night of 17 August 1666. A letter of 18th August states, "This morning Śivājī was found to have fled away from Āgrā."¹¹⁶

All these details are now confirmed by the fresh evidence recently brought to light by Sir Jadunath Sarkar. "We must therefore now discard as pure fiction," he writes, "all the stories told by Khafi Khan and others about Shivaji's romantic adventures during his flight through Allahabad, Benares and Gaya, and even Jagannath Puri, according to a Maratha fabulist."¹¹⁷ Sarkar now holds that Śivājī must have returned to Rājgaḍ on 12 Sept. 1666, by a more direct route than hitherto believed. His revised opinion rests upon a few statements in the Persian *Akhbarats* and the Dingal letters now published by him. An *Akhbarat* dated Delhi 15 Nov. 1666 appears to state that the Emperor had learnt from a news-letter from Aurangābād that 'a son has been born in the house of the wretch Siva, and that he himself is ailing.' Further, a Dingal letter of Ballu Sah to *diwān Kalyāndās*, dated Delhi 19 Nov. 1666, is said to refer to 'public rumours now confirmed by news-letters reaching the Emperor' that Śivājī after having slipped out of Āgrā 'at midnight' reached his fort in 25 days; and that 'his son who accompanied him had

died on the way ! Again, the same purveyors of news reported the birth of another son to Śivājī at Rājgaḍ, adding that 'for many days Śivājī lay ill' . . . 'thus has the *waqia-navis* written.' From these references Sir Jadunath concludes that Śivājī must have reached Rājgaḍ on 12 September, and that the imperial spies must have probably got the news in the middle of October following : "the rigid time limit of 25 days," he states, "by a rather bow-shaped route, bars out all these (earlier described) anecdotes as impossible."¹¹⁸

The date, hitherto accepted by Sarkar, of Śivājī's reaching home was 20 Nov. 1666. As a variant he has cited the *Shivapur Yādi* mentioning 10 December, in his *Shivaji and His Times* (chronology at the end). The Jedhé *Śakāvali* and *Karīna*, which correctly record *Śrāvaṇ Kṛṣṇa 12 Prabhava* 1588 *Śaka* (17 Aug. 1666) as the date of Śivājī's escape from Āgrā "in a basket," also state that Śivājī returned to Rājgaḍ with Sambhājī on *Mārgaśīrṣa Śukla 5* of the same year (20 Nov. 1666). These local records indicating the later arrival of Śivājī in Mahārāṣṭra appear to us more reliable than the more distant Persian and Dingal news-letters. The allusion to Sambhājī's death on the way must serve to put us on our guard. Besides, the letter of Jai Singh dated 15 Nov. 1666, quoted by Sarkar in his *Shivaji and His Times*, whose authenticity we have no reason to doubt, militates against his latest view : "There is no trace or news of the fugitive Shiva," complains Jai Singh. "My days are passing in distraction and anxiety. I have sent trusty spies to get news of Shiva."¹¹⁹ What a relief the *Akhbarats* and Dingal letters might have brought to Jai Singh had their writers taken him into their confidence !

CHAPTER SIX

THE CHHATRAPATI

नायं राजा मनुष्योस्ति किंतु साक्षाच्छिवः स्वयं ।
तथापि भक्तिपाशेन बन्धश्छत्रपतेरहं ॥

NISCHALAPURI.

The seven years that elapsed between Śivājī's return from Āgrā and his coronation as *chhatrapati* at Rāigaḍ (5 June 1674) were the most momentous years of his life. From a constructive and creative point of view they constituted the most fruitful in the history of the Marāṭhās. The arrangements that Śivājī made for the upkeep of his possessions (such as were left to him by the treaty of Purandar), during his absence at Āgrā, have rightly been characterised by Sarkar as "a master piece of forethought and organisation."² They revealed that Śivājī was as great a statesman as he was a strategist. For all his thrilling adventures the future of Mahārāṣṭra might have been as sterile as that of Macedonia after the death of Alexander, but for the solid foundations which Śivājī well and truly laid for the greater glory of his race, during the short interval separating his return home from Āgrā (20 Nov. 1666) and his second raid of Surat (17 Oct. 1670). The *Rājyābhiṣeka* which took place on Friday 12 *Jyeṣṭha śukla* of the *Śaka* year Ānanda (5 June 1674) was but the grand culmination of a career which evoked admiration and wonder even from his enemies.

On his part Śivājī had scrupulously fulfilled all the terms of his treaty with Aurangzeb. Not only did he hand over to the Mughals all the forts demanded by them in the agreement, but also actively joined them in the Bijāpūr campaign (20 Nov. 1665) with 9,000 Marāṭhā troops. In recognition of this assistance Aurangzeb sent him a letter of praise, a robe of honour and a jewelled dagger.³ In the discharge of his obligation Śivājī had even to fight against his own half-brother Vyan-

kojī who was a loyal supporter of Bijāpūr.⁴ Though Netāji Pālkar wavered for a while and went over to the enemy, he was soon persuaded to return and was rewarded with Rs. 38,000 cash, a *manṣab* of 5,000 and a *jāgīr* in 'the settled and lucrative old territory of the empire.'⁵ Finally, Śivāji yielded to Jai Singh's importunities and went to Āgrā, with what result we have already noticed. Not only Aurangzeb, who was his life-long and inveterate enemy, but even Jai Singh at one moment, under the chagrin of personal disappointment and discomfiture, yielded to the temptation of seeking to end Śivāji's life ignominiously despite the plighted troth of a Rājput for the safety of his person.⁶ Nevertheless Śivāji had borne himself with courage and dignity in the most trying circumstances and escaped from 'the jaws of death' by dint of his own resourcefulness. The veteran Jai Singh was borne down by anxiety, humiliation and misrepresentations at Court, and died at Burhāmpūr (on 2 July 1667), cursing like Cardinal Wolsey the base ingratitude of kings. His place in the Deccan was taken by the easy-going Muazzam whose unseemly and suicidal quarrels with the capable but insubordinate Dilir Khān afforded golden opportunities to Śivāji to recover his lost dominion. Aurangzeb's preoccupation with the suppression of the Yusufzai rebellion at Peshāwar (March 1667) compelled him to acquiesce in a truce with the Marāṭhās negotiated by the nerveless Muazzam and Jaswant Singh. A letter of Prince Muazzam dated 6 March 1668, informed Śivāji that the Emperor had conferred on him the title of *Rājāh* and that his other demands were under consideration.⁷ Sambhāji was restored to his *manṣabdārī* of 5,000 and was sent to Aurangābād as Śivāji's representative along with the devoted Pratāp Rāo Gujar and Nirāji Rāoji. According to the Jedhé *Śakāvalī*, Śivāji himself went to Aurangābād where he interviewed Jaswant Singh on *Kārtik kṛṣṇa* 13 Monday of the Śaka year *Plavanga* 1589 : "Next day he left Aurangābād on horseback for Rājgaḍh."⁸ This truce lasted till *Pauṣ, Saumya* 1591 Śaka (i.e. from 4 Nov. 1667 to Dec. 1669), when Pratāp Rāo and Ānand Rāo returned to Rājgaḍh along with Sambhāji.⁹

Śivāji was not hibernating during the interval of peace,

though the English factors at Kārwar wrote to Surat (16 Sept. 1668): "The country all about at present is in great tranquillity"; and on 9 March 1669, "Our feare of Sevagy this yeare is pretty well over, hee not using to stirr soe late in the yeare Sevagy is at Rajahgur, and very quiett, as alsoe is all the country round about us," etc.¹⁰ The details of his constructive work of organisation of the State he was building we shall consider in our final chapter. At the time of his departure for Āgrā, Sabhāsad tells us, Śivājī had entrusted Rājgaḍ and the other forts to the charge of his mother, Moro Pant *Peśvā*, Nilo Pant *Majumdār*, and Netājī Palkar *Samobat*. When he returned from the North, 'Mātuśrī and the *kārkūns* and the soldiers in the army and the people in the forts and the militia were all pleased and held festivities. Preparations were then made for the recovery of the 27 forts ceded to the Mughals. Śivājī said to Moro Pant *Peśvā*, Nilo Pant *Majumdār* and Anṇājī *sūrnīs*: "You should capture these forts by diplomacy and exertion"; and the Rājē said personally to the Māvales: "Capture ye the forts." Thereupon there was a *Hazārī* of the Māvales — Tānājī Mālusarē by name — who made the offer: "I shall take the fort of Konḍāṇa."¹¹ This incident may be taken as marking the end of the truce with the Mughals, and the beginning of Śivājī's fresh offensive. According to the Jedhé *Sakāvalī* Konḍāṇa—thereafter called Simhagaḍ—was captured on Friday *Māgh kṛṣṇa* 9 (4 Feb. 1670). Though Sabhāsad assigns no date for this event, he mentions it as the first episode since Śivājī's return. Much as Simhagaḍ stands out physically silhouetted against the southern sky of Poona to-day, Tānājī's heroic exploit has indelibly impressed itself on the racial memory of the Marāṭhās as an achievement of the first magnitude; and well it might, for it was here that the Kolī Nāg Nāk had first opened the Marāṭhā resistance to the Muslim advance under Muḥammad Tughlaq. The *powāḍā* or ballad of Tānājī by Tulsidās is familiar to every Marāṭhā to this day. Our hearts throb as the Śāhirs sing:

"And ye Marāṭhās brave! give ear,
Tānājī's exploits crowd to hear.

Where from your whole dominion wide
 Shall such another be supplied ?
 O'er seven and twenty castles high
 His sword did wave victoriously,
 The iron-years are backward roll'd,
 His fame restores the age of gold ;
 Whene'er this song ye sing and hear,
 Sins are forgiven, and heaven is near !¹²

'In this manner,' simply writes Sabhāsad, 'was Konḍāṇa captured first. Then Moro Pant *Peśvā* and Nilo Pant and Annājī Pant and the Māvāḷes, with similar distinction took twenty-six forts in four months. The Rājā went on governing his kingdom, recapturing what forts had been ceded by the treaty.'¹³ According to the *Sakāvalī*, Purandar was recaptured by Nilo Pant *Majumdār* on Tuesday *Phūlgūn Kṛṣṇa* 12 (8 March 1670) ; Mughal territory was invaded and Junnar besieged by Śivājī in *Bhādrapad*, *Sādhārṇ* 1592 *Śaka* (August 1670) ; Surat was looted for the second time on *Kārtik Śukla* 1 (4 Oct. 1670) ; and on 14 of the same month (17 Oct.) on his way back from Surat, he fought with Dāud Khān near Dindori. In *Jyēṣṭha*, *Virodhikṛt* 1593 *Śaka* (June 1671) Sāhlér was besieged by Bahādur Khān and Dilir Khān, but they raised the siege in October the same year and retired to Aurangābād. Prince Muazzam left for Delhi in *Māgh* (Feb. 1682), evidently to report the gravity of the situation to the Emperor.

The circumstances leading to these hostile activities on the part of Śivājī need to be looked into more closely. Aurangzeb, ever suspicious by nature, feared collusion between his son Muazzam and the Marāṭhās. Consequently, he ordered the arrest of the Marāṭhā agents of Śivājī at Aurangābād (Pratāp Rāo and Nirājī Pant). But like the five members of Parliament attempted to be apprehended by Charles I of England, these Marāṭhā sardārs slipped out with their troops before action was taken against them. To make matters worse, Aurangzeb, in sore straits for money, also ordered the seizure of Śivājī's estates in Berār, ostensibly in lieu of the *lākh* of

rupees advanced by Jai Singh for Śivājī's expenses *en route* to Āgrā. "The rupture, inevitable in any case," writes Sarkar, "was precipitated by financial causes. Retrenchment of expenditure had now become a pressing necessity to Aurangzib, and he ordered the Mughal army in the Deccan to be greatly reduced."¹⁴ On 11 December 1669 the Emperor received intimation of four Marāṭhā captains of Śivājī's *birādari* having deserted from the imperial camp. On 26 January 1670 Aurangzeb ordered Dilir Khān to hasten to Aurangābād and Dāud Khān to run to the assistance of Prince Muazzam.¹⁵

Though Śivājī was never lacking in incentives to act briskly and vigorously against the Mughals, further zeal was imparted to his arms by Aurangzeb's fanatical actions at this time. "The archrebel Sevagee," observes an English contemporary, "is againe engaged in armes against Orangshah, who out of blind zeale for reformation hath demolished many of the Gentiles temples, and forceth many to turn Musslemins."¹⁶ The Jedhé *Śakāvali* also records that in *Bhādrapad* or August 1669 Aurangzeb started religious persecution at Kāśī and broke temples. The breach with the Mughals, according to Sarkar, occurred early in January or a fortnight earlier, though he says "There is no evidence for holding that Shivaji broke the peace with Aurangzib as a protest against the latter's general order for temple destruction (9 April 1669), though the two events are placed immediately after one another in an English factory letter (Foster xiii. 256) and *Jedhe*."¹⁷ It cannot, however, be asserted that Aurangzeb's religious persecutions had no repercussions in Mahārāṣṭra.

In a *firmān* issued to Abdul Ḥasan, dated 28 February 1659, Aurangzeb wisely directed: "Our royal command is that you should direct that in future no person shall in unlawful ways interfere with or disturb the Brahmans and other Hindus resident in those places."¹⁸ But later, on 20 November 1665, he reversed this policy and declared: "In Ahmadābād and other *parganahs* of Gujarāt in the days before my accession temples were destroyed by my order. They have been repaired and idol-worship has been resumed. Carry out the former

order." The *Maasir-i Alamgiri* enthusiastically appreciative of this bigotry observes : 'On the 17th *Zi-l Kada* 1079 H. (18 April 1669) it reached the ear of His Majesty, the Protector of the Faith, that in the provinces of Thatta, Multan and Benares, but especially in the latter, foolish Brahmans were in the habit of expounding frivolous books in their schools, and that students and learners, Musulmans as well as Hindus, went there, even from long distances, led by a desire to become acquainted with the wicked sciences they taught. The Director of the Faith, consequently, issued *orders to all the governors of provinces to destroy with a willing hand the schools and temples of the infidels ; and they were strictly enjoined to put an entire stop to the teaching and practising of idolatrous forms of worship*. On the 15th *Rabi'u-l ākhar* it was reported to his religious Majesty that, in obedience to orders, the government officers had destroyed the temple of Bishnāth at Benares. . . . In the month of *Ramazān* 1080 H. (Dec. 1669), in the 13th year of the reign, *this justice-loving monarch, the constant enemy of tyrants, commanded the destruction of the Hindu temples of Mathura* known by the name of Dehra Kesu Rai, and soon that stronghold of falsehood was levelled with the ground. On the same spot was laid, at great expense, the foundation of a great mosque. The den of inequity was thus destroyed. . . . 33 *lacs* were expended on this work. Glory be to God who has given us the faith of Islam that, in the reign of the destroyer of false gods, an undertaking so difficult of accomplishment has been brought to a successful termination This vigorous support given to the true faith was a severe blow to the arrogance of the *Rajas*. . . . The richly jewelled idols taken from the pagan temples were transferred to Agra and there placed beneath the steps leading to the Nawab Begum Sahib's mosque, in order that they might ever be pressed under foot by the true believers. Mathura changed its name into Islāmābād.'¹⁹

Aurangzeb's frenzy continued for several years. Cart loads of idols were taken also from Jodhpur to the capital to be trodden upon by the faithful. The *Jaziya* was reimposed,

Hindu fairs and festivals were prohibited. Hindus were forbidden to wear arms and fine dresses, and to ride well-bred horses, elephants, and to go in palanquins. 'According to the law $2\frac{1}{2}$ p.c. should be taken from Musalmans and 5 p.c. from Hindus (customs duty).'²⁰ In 1671 it was ordered that all rent-collectors in crown-lands ought to be Muslims. Provincial governors were also called upon to dismiss their Hindu head clerks and accountants and to replace them by the true believers. The dismissed employers sought service under Śivājī, in some cases at least.²¹ In North India this policy antagonised the Rājputs and drove the Jāts, Satnāmis and Sikhs into open revolt. In Mahārāṣṭra one iconoclastic officer found his task too strenuous: 'The hatch-men of the government,' he complained, 'in the course of my marching do not get sufficient strength and power to destroy and raze the temples of the infidels that meet the eye on the way.' Hence Aurangzeb ordered: 'You should appoint an orthodox Inspector (*darogha*) who may afterwards destroy them at leisure and dig up their foundations.'²² Ironically, however, this *darogha* happened to be the Marāṭhā, and he dug up the foundations of Aurangzeb's Empire!

Addressing the imperial officers, Śivājī wrote in effect: 'For the last three years ye have been under orders from Aurangzeb to seize my country and forts. Ye are reminded that even the steed of unimaginable exertion is too weak to gallop over this hard country, and that its conquest is difficult. My home is unlike the forts of Kaylāni and Bīdar, and is not situated on a spacious plain. It has lofty mountain ranges, 200 leagues in length and 40 leagues in depth: everywhere there are *nālās* difficult to ford; and sixty forts of rare strength have been built,—some on the sea-coast. Afzal Khān came against me on behalf of the 'Ādil Shāh and perished.... Why do not you report to the Emperor what has happened, so that the same fate may not overtake you? Amir-ul umara Shā'ista Khān was sent against these sky-kissing ranges and abysmal valleys. He laboured hard for three long years and bluffed to the Emperor that I was going to be subdued in the shortest

time. But at last, as all false men deserve, he encountered a terrible disaster and went away in disgrace. *It is my duty to guard my land :*

The wise should beware of this river of blood,
No man can ford, in safety, its terrible flood.¹²³

This was not a vain and empty boast. Its force was brought home to the Mughals during the campaigns of 1670 and the succeeding years. On 4 February 1670 Konḍāṇa (Simhagaḍ) was captured by the heroic sacrifice of Tānājī. On 8 March Purandar was retaken by Nilo Pant. A few days later, the *qilā'dār* of Chāndod was held up in his fort and the town was plundered yielding Rs. 40,000, an elephant and twelve horses. At Kalyāṇ-Bhiwandi, Uzbek Khān (thānedār) was killed and the place captured. Ludi Khān the *fauzdār* of Konkan was beaten and put to flight (March 1670). The *faujdār* of Nānded deserted his post in a panic. Though there were temporary setbacks at Pārnér, Junnar and Māhuli, the position was soon retrieved. By the end of April 1670 the Marāṭhās had plundered 51 villages in the vicinity of Aḥmadnagar, Junnar and Parenda. Lohgaḍ was captured in May, and Hindola, Karnālā and Rohida in June. On 16 June Māhuli was recaptured after slaying its new commandant, Alāwardi Beg, and 200 of the garrison.

All this time, Prince Muazzam and Dilir Khān were engaged in an unseemly quarrel, almost amounting to civil war. Aurangzeb deputed Iftikhar Khān in March 1670 to compose their differences ; but 'he played the Jack on both sides' and added fuel to the fire. Muazzam complained of Dilir's defiant conduct, and the plunder of imperial villages by his Paṭhān troops. "The latter charge was borne out by the reports of the news-writers." The Khān was actually chased across the Tāpti by Muazzam and Jaswant Singh "with all the available Mughal troops, calling upon Śivājī to come to their aid !"¹²⁴

The weakness of the imperial position, betrayed by the above incidents, might have been apparent even to observers

less acute than Śivājī. To the astute Marāṭhā leader it offered too tempting an opportunity for aggressive action. Surat once more attracted his attention. A letter of 10 July 1670 observes : " The notable progress of Sevagy in his conquest of Mauly, etc., now in the blustering time of raines, makes his name yet more terrible to Surrat. Insomuch that the Governor is allarummed from Brampore, Orangabaud, Mooler and other places, to expect and prepare for an assault, so that this town is under no small feare."⁴⁵

The English had put up a brave show in 1664, but their valiant President, Sir George Oxenden, had died on 14 July 1669. Again they were called upon to prepare themselves " for the preservation of the honour and repute of the English nation and security of the Hon'ble Companys house at Surratt.... Wherefore it was propounded Debated and Concluded to send order to the Deputy Governor &ca at Bombay that they spare us... 35 or 40 White Portugall souldiers who have been trayned up & are actually in service so that the charge will be but little & that onely for Dyett (duty) the time they are in Surratt."⁴⁶

Śivājī actually appeared in Surat for the second time on 3 October 1670 : " whereupon the President and Councill resolved to send the Hon'ble Companys treasures which is on shoare, some on board the *Berkely Castle*, the rest on board the *Loyal Oxenden*." On the third day (5 October), Śivājī suddenly left Surat, though no Mughal army was near. An official inquiry ascertained, says Sarkar, " that Shivaji had carried off 66 *lakhs* of Rupces' worth of booty from Surat, - viz., cash, pearls, and other articles worth 53 *lakhs* from the city itself, and 13 *lakhs* worth from Nawal Sahu and Hari Sahu and a village near Surat."⁴⁷

According to Abbe Carré, " Partly in different wars he (Śivājī) had waged, and partly in the Court, he had exhausted his treasures. This is what made him to resolve to plunder Surat for a second time."⁴⁸ He also states : " As the purpose of Sevagy was only to make fun of the Great Mogol, he did not exert himself further ; and did no harm to the people."

The French, the Dutch and the English were given "a timely notice to display their standards on the top of their terraces that they may be saved thereby from the fury of the soldiers." The English lost one soldier, the French 'two black servants', and the Dutch none : "We could only oppose to Sivasî's hordes 35 men in all, but they did not molest us."²⁹

The English President, Gerald Aungier writes : "The King (Aurangzeb) being sensible of the great danger his chiefe port was in, ordered downe Bahadur Cann, the viceroy of Ahmadabad, with 3,000 horse, to protect Surratt, whose arrivall eased us of the present feare, but cost us, the French and Dutch and all the Merchants, deare for our protection in presents to him (the viceroy) which is a civil kind of plunder demanded by these great Umbrawes as a tribute due to them; wee at first intended him a small acknowledgment of 2 or 300 rupees worth in some European rarities, but the Merchants of the Towne having presented him high, and the Dutch Commandore, contrary to his private promise to Gerald Aungier, made him a Piscash of 4,000 rupees, we were forced for peace sake to please him with a present to the value of rupees 1,700 in imitation of the Indians that worship the Devill that he (the viceroy) doe them hurt, for indeed we expect little good from him, but the French gallantly exceeded all compare, for their chief Directeur the Here Caron made him a present to the value of Rups. 10,000 in horses, rich tapestry, brass guns &c., which made no small noyse in Towne, and caused different censures, some commanding his generosity, others with reason taxing his ill husbandry.

"The 3rd October Sevagy's army approached the walls and, after a slight assault, the Defendants fled under the shelter of the castle Gunns, and they possesst themselves of the whole Towne, some few houses excepted (English, French, Dutch, Persian and Turkish) which stood on their defence. . . .

"The enemy having taken the Tartar Seray could from thence more safely ply their shot at our house, for which they prepared themselves, but finding our menn resolute on their

defence, they held up their hands desiring a Parley. . . . The Captain tould Mr. Master, the Rajah or Sevagy was much enraged that wee had killed soe many of his menn and was resolved on revenge. . . .but Mr. Master stood in so resolute a posture that the Captain, not willing to hazard his men's lives, sent some person to him, demanding a present, though to noe great vallue.

"Mr. Master thought it not imprudence to secure our goods, together with soe many mens lives at soe reasonable a rate, and therefore by advise of those with him, being a Merchant of Rajapore, fell into discourse with him touching our leaving that Factory, asking the reason why wee did not send our people to trade there as formerly.

"Mr. Master answered that it was Sevagy's fault and not ours, for he had plundered the company's house, imprisoned their servants, and whereas since that time he had given satisfaction to serverall persons whom he had robbed, yet he had not taken care to satisfy the English the losse they had susteyned ; to which he answered that *Sevagy did much desire our return to Rajapore and would doe very much to give us satisfaction.*

"This gratefull discourse being over, the Present was sent by two of our servants who were conveyed to Sevagy's tent without the Towne ; he sent for them and *received them with the Piscash in a very kind manner, telling them that the English and he were good friends, and putting his hand into their hands, he told them that he would doe the English no wrong,* and that this giving his hand was better than any cowl to oblige them thereunto.

"Before your servants were returned to your house, Sevagy had called his Army out of the Towne, to the wonder of all men, in regard no enemy was neare, nor the noyse of any army to oppose him ; but he had gott plunder enough and thought it prudence to secure himself, and that when he marched away he sent a letter to the Officers and chiefe Merchants, the substance whereof was that, if they did not pay him 12 *lakhs* of

rupees yearly Tribute, he would return the next yeare and burne downe the remayning parte of the Towne."

The account closes with a few observations which indicate how lightly the English came off out of this second sack of Surat. They made representations to the Emperor "soe that wee have a just right to demand the whole losse from the King and have taken such an effectual course by sending our remonstrances to the Court and improving our interests with the Shawbunder, cozzy and Merchants whome wee have protected in this danger, that *"wee trust in God you will be no losers by it in the end."*"

The most important outcome of the raids on Surat was that the constant alarms they created for years "putt all trade into disorder". There was renewed panic in February and October 1672, in September 1673, October 1674, and December 1679. Śivāji disorganised the imperial trade with the minimum effort and maximum gain to himself. When Muazzam heard of this disaster, he despatched Dāud Khān post-haste from Burhānpūr, to intercept the Marāṭhās returning from Surat. Śivāji had by then entered Bāglāna and plundered the environs of Mulhēr fort. The pursuing Mughals met the Marāṭhās at Vanī Dindori (15 miles n. of Nāsik; 28 miles s. w. of Chāndod) on the Ghāṭs. The result was "a severe action" as Sabhāsad has called it.¹ For two *prahars* the battle raged. The Marāṭhās fought *ne plus ultra*, and killed 3,000 of the enemy, took 3 to 4,000 horses, and two *razārs* (officers). It was a resounding triumph for the Marāṭhās. Pratāp Rāo (*Sarnobat*), Vyankoji Datto and Ānand Rāo distinguished themselves in this action (17 Oct. 1670).

Encouraged by these successes and enriched with the booty secured, Śivāji launched a major campaign in Bāglāna, Khāndesh and Berār. His forces numbered about 20,000. Capturing the forts of Ahivant, Mārkaṇḍ, Rāvla and Jāvla (in Bāglāna), he rapidly advanced to the vicinity of Burhānpūr (Khāndesh) and plundered Bahādurpur (2 miles from Burhānpūr). But his most striking exploit was, however, the sack of Karanja (Berār) where he secured booty worth one

crore of rupees in gold, silver and finery. Many prominent and prosperous men were taken captive at Karanja and Nandūbar, and held to ransom or *chauth*—perhaps the first instance of its collection in Mughlāi.

The next exploit of Śivājī was the investment of Sālher (c. 5 January 1671). Like Humāyūn at Chanderi, Śivājī personally scaled the fortress with a rope-ladder while 20,000 of his troops, horse and foot, surrounded the stronghold. Fatullah Khān, the commandant of the fort, fell fighting. But in other places the Mughal officers were regaling themselves with song and dance : there were daily entertainments in the houses of the grandees (including Mahābat Khān who was specially deputed by the Emperor to tackle Śivājī). There were no less than 400 dancing girls specially imported from the North for the delectation of the *umara*.³² When reinforcements came, or more vigorous officers like Bahādur Khān and Dilir Khān were despatched in order to jinger up the resistance, they indulged in fitful and frenzied massacres, as at Poona where all above the age of nine were slaughtered in one raid in December 1671.³³

The imperialists tried to recapture Sālher (January-February 1672) with disastrous consequences. 'A great battle took place,' writes Sabhāsad. 'For 4 *prahars* of the day the fighting lasted. Mughals, Pathāns, Rājpūts and Rohilas fought with artillery-swivels carried on elephants and camels. As the battle raged, such dust arose that for a distance of 3 *koses* square, friend could not be distinguished from foe. Elephants were killed ; 10,000 men on the two sides fell dead. Countless horses, camels and elephants as well. There was a deluge of blood.... The horses captured alive alone numbered 6,000. One hundred elephants were also taken, and 6,000 camels. Goods, treasures, gold and jewels, clothes and carpets beyond calculation came into the Rājā's hands. 22 *wazīrs* of note were taken prisoner. Ikhlās Khān and Bahlol Khān themselves were captured. In this manner was the whole *sūbāh* destroyed.'

Sabhāsad gives the names of a dozen Marāṭhā *sardārs* who distinguished themselves in this battle and adds, 'Simi-

larly did Māvaḷé soldiers and *sardārs* toil hard. The commanders, Moro Pant *Peśvā* and Pratāp Rāo *Sarnobat*, both distinguished themselves by personal acts of valour ; so also did Sūrya Rāo Kānkaḷé (a *pāñch-hazārī*) who was struck down by a canon-ball. . . . Other heroes of note also fell. Victory was won after such fighting.'¹ The news was flashed to the Rājé and the canon boomed and sugar was distributed. Gold wrist-lets were put on the arms of the *jāsūds* who brought the news. Immense wealth was given to Pratāp Rāo *Sarnobat*, Moro Pant *Peśvā*, Ānand Rāo and Vyankojī Pant, in reward. The other officers and *Māvaḷés* were also similarly rewarded. 'Bah-loī Khān and the Nawāb and *wazīrs* who had been taken prisoner were dismissed with horses and robes.' Dilir Khān, who was four marches away from Sālhēr at that moment, fled. With pardonable pride, Sabhāsad observes : 'The Bādshāh at Delhi felt much distressed at the bad news. For three days he did not come out into the Hall of Public Audience. So sad was he that he said : "It seems God has taken away the Bādshāhī from the Musulmans and conferred it on Śivāji."²

The English records also confirm the victory in which the Marāṭhās "forced the two generals, who with their armies had entered into Sevagy's country, to *retreat with shame and loss*."³ But the Persian records are silent on this.

On 5 June 1672 a large Marāṭhā force under Moro Trimbak Pingle captured Jauhār (100 miles from Surat towards Nāsik) from its Kōḷī chieftain Vikramshāh, and carried away treasure worth 17 *lākhs* of rupees. Rāmnagar. (Dharam-pūr) was likewise taken in July, and its rājā, Somshāh, forced to seek refuge under the Portuguese at Daman. The annexation of these two important places brought the Marāṭhās within 60 miles south of Surat which was perpetually placed on tenter hooks.

An English record of 26 October 1672 states : "This day news being brought to Surat of a great army of Sevagee being come as near as Rāmnagar and that 4 of the King's *Umbraus* with 4 Regiments of horse had deserted the King's service and revolted to Sevagee, the town took the allarme and the shrōffs

to whom we had sold the Company's treasure, who had weighed a considerable part of it, and paid in about 30,000 rupees on the accounts, refused to carry it out of the house." 37

The principal of the *umarā* referred to in the above statement were Jādhav Rāo Deccani (a great-grand-son of Lukh-jī) and Siddi Halāl, both of whom, being defeated in the Nāsik district, joined Śivājī between July and October 1672. Then Śivājī made a peremptory demand for *chaut* from Surat : "*as your Emperor has forced me to keep an army for the defence of my people and country, that army must be paid by his subjects.*" The governor of Surat made this a pretext for taxing his Hindu subjects and pocketed their contribution ! 38

While Surat was trembling under these tribulations, Śivājī suddenly turned towards Berār and Telingāna. This raid was no part of his major campaign, but only intended to create diversions with a nuisance value. Perhaps it was also his intention to reconnoitre and test the enemy's forces. Certainly it served to keep the Mughals guessing as to his plans and strategy. If Śivājī met with a reverse here and there, during such desultory action, he also came by some random booty.

To meet the situation created by the Marāṭhā raids during 1673, Bahādur Khān, the new viceroy and c-in-c. of the Mughal forces in the Deccan, set up his H.Q. at Pedgāum on the Bhīmā (8 miles south of Chāmār gundā). Śivājī therefore marched into Bījāpūr territory where the death of Āli 'Ādil Shāh II (24 Nov. 1672) created tempting opportunities. Āli's successor, Sikandar, was a boy of four summers. Khawās Khān, the Abyssinian, had assumed dictatorial authority as Regent, and thereby evoked the jealousy of other officers. The resulting tussle for power created confusion in the 'Ādilshāhī kingdom and made it vulnerable to Marāṭhā attacks. On 6 March 1673 two of Śivājī's captains, Konḍājī Farzand and Anṇājī Pant marched against Panhāla. Under cover of night, like Tānājī at Simhagaḍ, Konḍājī scaled the steeper side of the fortress and surprised its garrison. The incident has been vividly described by Jayarām Pindē in his *Parnāla-parvata grahaṇākhyānam*. In view of Śivājī's earlier

discomfiture at that place and its colourful antecedents, this victory added a new feather to his cap. It was followed up by the capture of Parli on 1 April and of Sātārā on 27 July. Pratāp Rāo drove away Bahlol Khān (Bijāpūrī general) after a desperate struggle at Umrāni (36 miles from Bijāpūr city), in the middle of April 1673. The doughty Pathān, however, returned to the fray and kept the Marāthās engaged, with better results, from June-August. But both Bijāpūr and Golkonda soon realised the expediency of making it up with Śivājī, in the face of the common enemy, viz., the Mughal.

"It is confirmed to us from Choule and other parts," write the English factors in October 1673, "that overtures of peace are closely prosecuted betwixt the King of Vizapore and Sevagee who hath a considerable army ready of horse and foote and thitherto maintaines his frontiers against the Mogull and Bullole Choune, and 'tis generally concluded that the Kings of Bijapore and Golcondah do covertly furnish him with men and money, and that he also covertly fees the Generall and Commanders of the Mogulls Army which hath qualified their heat against him, soe 'tis thought that noe great action will be performed between them this yeare, yet the preparation Sewagee makes causeth us to believe that either he expects to be assaulted or designs to make some notable attempt in the King's country." Another letter (Gerald Aungier's) dated 16 September, 1673 says: "Sevagee bears himself up manfully against all his enemies . . . and though it is probable that the Mogulls Army may fall into his country this yeare, and Ballol Chaune on the other side, yet neither of them can stay long for provisions, and his flying army will constantly keep them in allarme; nor is it either their design to destroy Sevagee totally, for the *Umaras* maintain a politic war to their own profit at the King's charge, and never intend to prosecute it violently so as to end it."⁴⁰

One of the unfortunate happenings connected with this phase of Śivājī's war in Bijāpūr territory was the loss of Pratāp Rāo Gujar, in February 1674. Śivājī had taunted him for having let go Bahlol Khān at Umrāni in April last. "Go with your

army," he said, "and win a decisive victory. Otherwise never show your face to me again!" The valiant but sensitive general literally carried out this mandate. On 24 February 1674 at Nesari, 'in the narrow gorge between two hills,' he charged like the Light Brigade at Balaklava and rushed 'into the jaws of death' followed only by six faithful horsemen. The gallant seven drowned themselves in a river of blood: 'There was not to reason why; there was not to make reply; there was but to do and die, though some one had blundered!' But the disaster was retrieved by Ānand Rāo, his lieutenant, by a daring attack on Sampgāum in Kanara (20 miles from Bankāpūr), in March following. He captured treasures worth 150,000 *hons*, 500 horses, 2 elephants and much other booty. Bahlol Khān and Khizr Khān, with 2,000 horse and many foot-soldiers, tried in vain to intercept him. On 8 April Śivājī held a grand review of his troops at Chiplūn and appointed Hamsājī Mohitē as *Sarnobat* in place of the deceased hero Pratāp Rāo Gujar. "Finding him a very intelligent, brave, patient and cautious soldier," writes Sabhāsad, "Śivājī conferred on him the title of Hambir Rāo. Bounties were lavishly distributed among the soldiers."¹¹

Late in January 1674 Dilir Khān had tried to assail Śivājī in the Konkan, but as the English noted, "received a rout by Shivaji and lost 1,000 of his Pathans." Śivājī too lost 5 or 600 men.

By now it was evident that this son of a Bijāpūrī noble (Shāhājī Bhoslé) though described by his enemies as a marauder and free-booter, had virtually become a King except in name. Even the title of *Rājā* had been secured by him diplomatically from the Mughal Emperor than whom there was no greater sovereign in India. To set the *imprimatur* of legality over all he did, and also to win the prestige of a crowned monarch, Śivājī had only to ceremonially translate his *de facto* power into *de jure* sovereignty; and this coping stone he decided to lay over the edifice of his great achievements up to 1674. Rāigad was the capital he chose for the impressive ceremonial as well as to be the seat of his government thereafter.

It was centrally situated in the heart of his territories. Nearly equidistant from Poona, Bombay and Sātārā, it had a political and military, no less than commercial value, all its own. Detached from the Sahyādri, but elevated above the Konkan, Rāigaḍ is removed from, yet served by the sea on account of its nearness to Mahāḍ which had considerable trade importance in those days. Strategically, it was protected from direct attacks by Bījāpūr as well as the Mughals; but from its position in the Māvaḷ country and nearness to the sea, Śivājī could ideally direct all his military and maritime operations. From a religious point of view, the place was twice blessed by the shrine of Paraśurām at Chiplūn and that of Bhavānī at Pratāpgaḍ. Khwāfi Khān has the following interesting observations to make about Rāigaḍ.

‘When Sivaji had satisfied himself of the security of Rajgarh, his old retreat, and of the dependant territory, he turned his thoughts towards finding some other more inaccessible hill as a place for his abode. After diligent search he fixed upon the hill of Rahiri, *a very high and strong place*. The ascent of this place was three *kos*, and it was situated 24 *kos* from the sea; but an inlet of the sea was about seven *kos* from the foot of the hill. The road to Surat passed near the place and that port was ten or twelve stages distant by land. Rajgarh was four or five stages off. The hills are very lofty and difficult of ascent. Rain falls there for about five months in the year. The place was a dependency of the Kokan belonging to Nizam-ul-Mulk. Having fixed on the spot, he set about building his fort. When the gates and bastions and walls were complete and secure, he removed thither from Rajgarh and made it his regular residence. After the guns were mounted and the place made safe, he closed all the roads around, leaving one leading to his fortress. One day he called an assembly and having placed a bag of gold and a gold bracelet worth a hundred *pagodas* before the people, he ordered proclamation to be made that this would be given to any one who would ascend to the fort and plant a flag, by any other than the appointed road, without the aid of ladder or rope. A *Dher* came for-

ward and said that, with the permission of the Raja, he would mount to the top of the hill, plant the flag and return. He ascended the hill, fixed the flag, quickly came down again, and made his obeisance. Sivaji ordered that the purse of money and the gold bracelet should be given to him, and that he should be set at liberty; and he gave direction for closing the way by which the *Dher* had ascended.¹²

Douglas calls it the Gibraltar of the East, and of all hill-forts of the Bombay Presidency the most interesting. Grose found it 'the most completely impregnable place in the universe!' Śivājī 'like the Eagle of the hills,' says another, 'with his penetrating eyes could from this eyrie descry his prey in all directions, but no one could approach the Lion's Den.'¹³

On this hill-citadel Śivājī got himself crowned on Friday 5 June 1674 (*Jyēṣṭha Śuddha* 12 of the *Śaka* year 1596, *Ānanda*). He thereby appeased the conscience of the formalists, soothed the sentiments of the superstitious, and made a striking impression on the minds of the masses. It was an act of supreme sagacity and far-seeing statesmanship. It drew around Śivājī—now *Chhatrapati*—all the varied and scattered elements of the Marāṭhā State and provided a focus for their loyalties. Śivājī had reached the apogee of his greatness and grandeur, and all the gold he had garnered was lavishly expended in the gorgeous ceremonial. "Fifty thousand Brāhmans learned in the *Vedas*", writes Sabhāsad, "had assembled. Besides them had gathered many *Taponidhis* and holy men, *Sanyāsīs*, guests, *Māmbhāvs*, *Jaṭhādharis*, *Jogis*, and *Jangams* of various denominations. For four months they were given unhusked corn and sweets; when dismissed, money, ornaments and clothes in abundance were presented to every one according to merit. To Gāgā Bhat, the chief priest, was given immense wealth. The total expenditure amounted to one *kror* and forty-two *lākhs* of *hons*. To every one of the eight *Pradhāns* was given a reward of one *lākh* of *hons* and a gift of one elephant, one horse, and robes besides that. In this manner was the Rājē installed on the throne. In this age of *Mlechha* Bādshāh's rule all over the world, only this Marāṭhā Bādshāh became *Chhatrapati*.

'This affair that came to pass was one of no little importance.'⁷ Sabhāsad also observes that Gāgā Bhat opined that as Śivājī had subdued four Bādshāhis and possessed 75,000 cavalry, infantry, forts and strongholds but no throne, the Marāṭhā Rājā should also be crowned *Chhatrapati*.¹¹

Among the visitors to *Rāigaḍ* at the time of the *Rājyā-bhīṣeka* or coronation ceremonials were the representatives of the English East India Company, --Henry Oxenden, Geo : Robinson and Tho : Michell. They reached 'Rairy' when the Rājā was away at Pratāpgaḍ to worship at 'the shrine of Bowany, a pagod of great esteeme with him,' and were received by the 'Procurator Neragy Pundit . . . whose reception was very kind.' They discussed many matters and were assured 'that *the Rajah would after his coronation act more like a prince by takeing care of his subjects and endeavouring the advancements of commerce and trade in his Dominions which he could not attend before being in perpetuall warrs with the King of Vizapore and the Great Mogull.*'¹⁵

On 22 May 1674, 'We received order to assend up the hill into the Castle : the Rajah having enordered us a house there, which we did, leaving Puncharra about 3 of the clock in the afternoon, we arrived at the top of that strong mountain about sunset, which is fortified by nature more than art being of very different access and but one avenue to it, which is guarded by two narrow gates and fortified with a strong high wall and bastions thereto, all the other part of the mountaine is a direct precipice so that its impregnable except the Treachery of some in it betrayes it. On the Mountaine are many strong buildings of the Rajah court and houses for others, Ministers of State, to the number of about 300, it is in lengths about 2 1/2 miles and in breadth about 1/2 a mile, but no pleasant trees nor any sort of graine grows there on ; our house was about a mile from the Rajah's pallace into which we retired with no little content.'¹⁶

The next day they were granted audience by Śivājī 'though busily employed with many other weighty affaires as his coronation, marriage, etc.' '*The Rajah assured us that we*

might now trade securely in all his Dominions without the least apprehension of evill from him, for that the Peace was concluded.' On the 29th the Rajah was 'according to the Hindoo Custome, weighed in Gold and poised about 1600 Pagodas, which money together with one hundred thousand more, is to be distributed after his coronation into the Bramings who in great numbers are flockt hither from all the adjacent countreys.'

After the coronation, the Englishmen saw Śivājī on the 6th, about 7 or 8 of the clock, and the Rajah was seated on a magnificent throne, and all his nobles waiting on him in very rich attire. He presently enordered our coming nearer even to the Throne where being rested we were desired to retire which we did not so soon but that I tooke notice on each side of the throne there hung according to the (Mores manner) on heads of gilded Lances many emblimes of Government and Dominion, as on the right hand were two great fishes heads of Gould with every large teeth, on the left hand several horses tiales, a paire of Gould Scales on a very rich Lances head equally poysed an emblem of Justice, and as we returned at the Pallace gate there was standing two small ellephants on each side and two faire horses with Gould bridles and furniture, which made us admire which way they brought them up the hill, the passage being so difficult and hazardous.⁴⁷

Dr. Fryer, another Englishman who was then at Bombay, narrates an interesting anecdote illustrative of Śivājī's hospitality towards his European guests. 'It is typical of his toleration, especially as the occasion was that of a sacred ritual when a vast concourse of orthodox Brāhmans had gathered together at Rāigaḍ. "I will only add one Passage," writes Fryer, 'during the stay of our Ambassador at Rairee : The Diet of this sort of People admits not of great Variety of Cost, their delightfulest Food being only Cutchery, a sort of Pulse and Rice mixed together, and boiled in Butter, with which they grow fat. But such Victuals could not be long pleasing to our Merchants who had been used to feed on good Flesh : It was therefore signified to the Rajah. That Meat should be

provided for them ; and to that end a Butcher that served those few *Moors that were there*, that were able to go to the charge of Meat, was ordered to supply them with what Goat they should expend (nothing else here being to be gotten for them) which he did accordingly with the consumption of half a goat a Day, which he found very profitable for him, and thereupon was taken with a curiosity to visit his new customers ; to whom, when he came, it was told them, The honest Butcher had made an Adventure up the Hill, though very old, to have the sight of his good Masters who had taken off of his hands more flesh in that time they had been there, than he had sold in some years before ; so rare a thing it is to eat Flesh among them ; for the Gentiles eat none, and the Moors and Portugals eat it well stew'd, bak'd, or made into Pottage ; no Nation eating it roasted so commonly as we do ; And in this point I doubt we err in these Hot countries, where our spirits being always upon the Flight, are not so intent on the business of concoction ; so that those things that are easiest digested and that create the least trouble to the Stomach, we find by Experience to agree best here.' ⁴⁸

The Dutch account of the coronation⁴⁹ refers to Śhivāji's abandonment of 'his present caste of Bhonsla' and taking 'the caste of Kettery' (*Kṣatriya*). 'Taking into consideration that *Suasy could not be crowned unless he first became a Kettery*, and that he had promised not to act or rule tyrannically and badly as before, on 8th of June last, *they granted him the caste of Kettery . . . but he also demanded to be taught the Brahman rule*. This, however, they refused, but *one of the chief of them complied*.'

This is rare testimony from an unexpected quarter, to the most heated controversy that must have raged among orthodox circles as to matters of rectitude and propriety. Though the Bhoslés claimed descent from the Sisodia Rājputs of Mewār, Śhivāji's eligibility to the ritual to which the twice-born (*divijas*) alone were entitled, had to be established to the satisfaction of Benares *Pundits*. The hall-mark of that status was undoubtedly the performance of the *Upanayana* ceremony which

Śivājī had obviously not undergone.⁵⁰ Even the marriages in the Bhoslé family had been performed in accordance with the *Paurāṇic* and not the *Vedic* ritual. Śivājī aspired to be not merely the secular head of the State, but *Rājā* and *Chhatrapati* in the Hindu tradition : to be supreme leader of the orthodox communities and sovereign protector of *Dharma*. For this, any status less than that of a *Kṣatriya* would be inadequate. Hence the Dutch allusion to his admission into the 'Kettery caste.' Whether by reference to authentic horoscopes or genealogies, it is significant to note that the Dutch also refer to compliance⁵¹ by one of the chief of the Brāhmins (evidently Gāgā Bhat).

It speaks volumes for Śivājī's statesmanship to have conceived of all the implications of an *Abhiṣikta Rājā* and the significance of the unique title of *Chhatrapati*. No Hindu or Indian Prince, or for that matter, any ruler whatsoever had borne the significant name of *Chhatrapati* symbolising the 'protective umbrella' instead of the truculent bird of prey, the Eagle of the Caesars (or Kaisers), or the Lion or 'king of beasts', or the Dragon of the Celestial Emperors, or even the *suvarṇa Garuḍa-dhwaja* of the ancient Yādava rulers of Mahārāṣṭra. Once this noble ideal was conceived of, outward conformity to orthodox prescriptions, investiture of the sacred-thread, ritualistic re-marriage with his own wedded wife, accession to the throne, and even repetition of the *Rājyābhiṣeka* according to *Tāntric* rites, after the Vedic ceremonials had been once duly performed,—were all of secondary value⁵². Śivājī, having secured the substance, went through the magic shadow-show of ceremonials according to this cult and the other creed with a rare sense of humour.

A very good illustration of the manner in which the *Chhatrapati* discharged his trust as leader and Protector of Hindu *Dharma* and civilisation is to be found in an interesting document which, if it is authentic, might be considered as the *Magna Carta* of Marāṭhā *Śvarājya*. It is dated 28 January 1677, and recounts the circumstances of Śivājī's coronation in accordance with ascertained sacred laws for the protection of

all Hindu religious and social traditions. It promises to render the most speedy and impartial justice to all who should invoke Śivāji's dispensation following established traditions, scriptures and public opinion ; and calls upon people of all communities to act with one accord and cooperate with the Government in defeating the *yavanas* coming from the North. This done, it concludes, the rulers and subjects will be alike blessed by God³⁴. It reveals the spirit of Śivāji's administration. It shows that he was not a mere empire-builder adding territory to territory. It proves that Śivāji was a man with a mission who drew his inspirations from history, from the classics, from the society and culture around him, from Rāmdās and the saints of Mahārāṣṭra, and more, and constantly, from his mother Jijābāi as an embodiment of all these. She had nursed his body and spirit, and lived just long enough to witness his coronation. Then she said her *nunc dimittis*.

"Suasy's mother," declares a Dutch letter, "having come to be present at her son's coronation, although about 80 years old, died 12 days after, leaving to her son about 25 *lakhs* of *pagodas*,—some say more."³⁵ What "more," indeed, the poor, calculating, foreign traders could hardly assess : It was the spirit revealed in Śivāji's *Dharma Rājya* ! Jijā Bāi seemed to declare :

Now lettest thou thy servant depart, O Lord,
 According to thy word, in peace ;
 For mine eyes have seen thy salvation,
 Which thou hast prepared before the face of
 all peoples ;
 A light for revelation to the Gentiles,
 And the glory of thy people !

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PATRIMONY

प्रतिपच्चंद्ररेखेव वर्धिष्णुर्विश्ववंदिता ।

शाहमूनो : शिवस्यैषा मुद्रा भद्राय राजते ॥

ROYAL SEAL OF ŚIVĀJĪ

‘Dynamic like the new-born moon, adored by the universe, this Seal of Śiva (son of Shāhājī) is the beacon of stable prosperity.’ The choice of this inscription for his Royal Seal by Śivājī is no less significant than his assumption of the title *Chhatrapati*. ‘Vikramāditya’ was quite in the Hindu tradition ; but *Chhatrapati* was more characteristic of Śivājī’s idealism. He was not out for martial glory or imperial aggrandisement, but only anxious to protect Hindu *Dharma* and Society. ‘Love of country is patriotism ; love of more country is imperialism.’ Śivājī’s patriotism was not geographical but ethical : his imperialism was protective, not acquisitive or destructive. He was not a *Marāṭhā nationalist*, if by this is implied anything parasitical. His cause was the cause of Hindu civilisation and not merely the freedom of Mahārāṣṭra. Those who have concentrated on his acts of war and temporary objectives have missed the meaning of his *Mission*. The true heart of Śivājī *the man* is revealed more by his submission to Rāmdās and Tukārām, and the adoration of his mother, than by his slaying of Afzal Khān or the sack of Surat. जननी जन्म भूमिश्च स्वर्गादपि गरीयसी ‘Mother and the Motherland are more adorable than Heaven.’ Śivājī loved the culture of his land (*Hindu-rāṣṭra*) as much as his mother. His mission was to fight for ‘the ashes of his ancestors and the temples of his gods.’

Though destiny had separated Śivājī from his father, their hearts were throbbing in unison. This was amply demonstrated by their community of action. Śivājī exerted

himself not merely for the release of his father from imprisonment, but also for the permanent release of his patrimony from the harassing domination of *Mlecchas*. Shāhjī, as we have noticed, had grown under other circumstances, and his lot had been cast under masters whom his eldest surviving son heartily hated. Particularly had his mind undergone a metamorphosis since his malicious arrest and imprisonment. His release was more due to his own worth than to the capricious magnanimity of his masters. Shāhjī had made himself indispensable to the 'Ādilshāhī; he was the prop of the Karnāṭak dominion. His message to Kānhojī Jedhé, Āli 'Ādil Shāh's mandate to the same captain, Shāhjī's reply to the Dowager Queen of Bijāpūr when she complained about Śivājī's activities, Shāhjī's second arrest and immediate release thereafter, all bear testimony to our reading of the situation. Shāhjī as a Pioneer was working, though perhaps less consciously and deliberately than Śivājī, yet as importantly, for the common cause of Hindu-rāṣṭra. To secure his patrimony in Karnāṭak, therefore, was as necessary for Śivājī as his independence in the homelands. As soon as he had firmly established himself as sovereign over Mahārāṣṭra, consequently, Śivājī turned his attention to Karnāṭak. For Karnāṭak was not a mere piece of territory but a heritage. It was more valuable to Śivājī, as the new champion of Hindu freedom and civilisation, than was the connexion of the attenuated Holy Roman Empire of Austria for Napoleon Bonaparte. Marāṭhā *Svarājya* was the continuation of Vijayanagar *Sāmrajya*.

In dealing with Śivājī's campaign in the Karnāṭak during 1677-78, which is the subject of the present chapter, it is necessary to be clear about its antecedents, as well as, its perspective. Its military details are only of secondary interest. In the first place, it is to be remembered that Śivājī was following in the wake of his father Shāhjī and his half-brother Vyankojī. Both Shāhjī and Vyankojī were officers in 'Ādilshāhī service. The former, when he died in 1664, had left behind him a large number of scattered *jāgīrs* and estates out of which Bangalore was initially the most important; because that was for the

most part Shāhji's head-quarters. Śivāji's elder brother, Sambhājī, had died at Kanakgiri about nine years before his father. Śivāji himself had left Bangalore while he was still a boy of twelve years. Choosing an independent career for himself he had carved out a kingdom of which he was now sovereign master. Vyankoji, his younger half-brother,¹ had also built up for himself a principality at Tanjore (1675), but as a dependency of Bijāpūr². Śivāji needed no augmenting of either his resources or prestige by wanting a share in his patrimony ; and Tanjore evidently had been no part of it. But he certainly did want in the South a foothold by which he could overthrow for ever the power of the Muslims. Had Vyankoji been like minded, his task might have been easier. But unfortunately it was otherwise. Already, as a loyal officer under Bijāpūr, he had fought against Śivāji during the latter's abortive alliance with the Mughals. Obviously, for Śivāji the most natural thing to do, under the circumstances, was to ask for a share in Shāhji's property which Vyankoji had been enjoying undivided since 1664. He had no designs against his brother, but only wanted a political lever in the Karnāṭak. Since this could not be had for the asking, conflict was inevitable. The logic of the situation demanded action.

The first thing Śivāji attempted was negotiation. "For 13 years you have enjoyed the undivided patrimony," he wrote to Vyankoji. "I waited in patience. Then . . . in many ways I demanded my share. But you would not even entertain the thought of yielding it. Then it became necessary to take harsh measures. *It was not befitting my position and reputation to seize your person . . .* It is not good to promote internal discord ; by so doing, of old, the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas came to grief. I again told you, through Sāmji Nāik, Konheri Pant and Śivāji Śankar : Let us make a division and take our respective shares and live with good-will towards each other. But you, like Duryodhana, intended evil and determined not to come to any agreement, but to fight."

• This letter was actually written when the hostilities had started and Śivāji's forces had made considerable gains. But

its recapitulation of the peaceful negotiations is authentic and reveals the mind of Śivājī no less than that of his brother. "Now, some places I have already taken," it continues; "others which are still in your hands, viz. Ārni, Bangalore, Kolār, Hoskote, and other minor places, and Tanjore should be handed over to our men; and of the cash, jewellery, elephants and horses, half should be given to me as my share. You will be wise to make such accommodation with me. If you do so with a clear mind, I shall give you a *jāgīr* of 3 *lākhs* of *hons* in the district of Panhālā, this side of the Tungabhadra, to be held under me. Or, if you do not like to hold a *jāgīr* under me, I shall procure for you a *jāgīr* of 3 *lākhs* from Qutb Shāh. Both alternatives I have suggested to you. One of them you should consider and accept. Do not leave it to be decided by obstinacy. There is no reason why we should quarrel between ourselves and come to grief."

The attitude of Vyankoji reflected in the above letter is also confirmed by foreign contemporary accounts. Martin, for example, observes: "Sivagy had some claim against Ecugy (Ekojī, i.e. Vyankojī), his brother by his father, with respect to his succession to the deceased. Ecugy had in his possession one third of the land of Gingy which their common parent Sagimagro (Shāhjī Mahārāj) held on his part. There were also his personal property and valuable effects. Sivagy demanded his share of these goods. He had written several times to Ecugy to come and meet him, and that they would settle the matter between them; the latter recoiled at last after having taken, according to his idea, all possible securities from his brother, by some oaths customary among them, but which were not inviolable to those who cared more for their interest than their religion. Ecugy crossed the river Coleroon and came to see Sivagy. The first conversations gave evidence of amity and tenderness only; then it came to the negotiation, when Ecugy discovered that his brother would not let him go unless he had satisfied him about his claims. He also used his cunning, and while he offered friendly words he sought some means of withdrawing himself from such a bad strait. He

succeeded therein one night. He had a *cattamaron* kept ready for him on the banks of the Couleron under pretext of necessity, for he was watched. He approached the banks of the river, threw himself into the *Cattamaron* and crossed to the other side which was his country and where he had some troops. On receipt of the information given to Sivagy, he caused Ecugy's men who were in his camp to be arrested; among them was one Jagarnatpendit, a Bramen who commanded the troops of his brother, a man of courage and ability. The brothers did not meet again since; however, Sivagy took possession of a part of the lands of Gingy which belonged to Ecugy, but it would have cost him more if he had remained in the camp." 1

In the two accounts cited above, which substantially corroborate each other, we have a clear picture of the situation *vis-a-vis* the two brothers. To understand how the meeting of Śivājī and Vyankoji on the Coleroon (July 1677) came about, we must follow the earlier movements of Śivājī.

Having convinced himself of the necessity of the Karnāṭak campaign, Śivājī set about it in a manner which will illustrate his strategy and statesmanship. He no longer moved like an adventurer as before. He carefully surveyed the situation both in the Deccan and in the Karnāṭak, matured his plans, chose his own time for action, and proceeded with it right royally.

The Muslim powers of the Deccan were disunited and weak. The Mughals had designs against both, which Aurangzeb realised by the end of that decade (1677-87). The 'Ādilshāhī and the Qutbshāhī were extinguished respectively in 1686 and 1687. They were on their last legs when Śivājī was planning his Karnāṭak campaign. Once they had acted together in the business of subjugating the South. Then Bijāpūr was the senior partner; but now she had fallen on evil days. The Afghan and Abyssinian parties paralysed the kingdom by their quarrels. The leader of the former group, Bahlol Khān, seized all authority in the name of the boy-prince Sikandar (11 Nov. 1675) and murdered the old Regent, Khawāsh Khān

(18 January 1676). Khhizr Khhān, the right hand man of Bahlol, met with a similar fate, soon after ; and the Mughals, taking advantage of this civil strife, opened a campaign against that helpless kingdom (31 May 1676).

It was on such a broken reed that Vyankoḷī was foolishly relying when Śivāḷī demanded his share of their patrimony. Instead of directly dealing with the situation and settling the matter in his own judgment, the pusillanimous Vyankoḷī referred it to his suzerain master, the king of Bijāpūr. "I call myself a Bādshāhī officer," he plaintively wrote, "and enjoy this property in accordance with the Bādshāhī orders. My elder brother demands a share of the patrimony, and I have answered that the property is in lieu of service. Why should I give him any share?" The reply of the Bādshāh is illuminating. "We have learnt the purport of your letter. Shāhḷī Rājē served us faithfully, and the *sanad* was granted to him and his descendants. Śivāḷī now demands his share. Although a traitor, he is a Government servant, and we are quite able to demand explanation of him. *Why do you create family squabbles and bring trouble to the Government?*" If we write that you should not give him his share he will create disturbances in our territories, and that is not good. His father was our servant, and he will enjoy the ancestral property and serve us. Although an enemy, *if he demands his rights as a servant in a friendly manner, you should certainly surrender them. He is the senior owner of your patrimony.*"⁵ Despite these accents of justice one cannot miss the more than lurking sense of embarrassment. Śivāḷī too was well aware of this. The astute Raghunāth Nārāyaṇ Hanmantē, who had acute differences with Vyankoḷī on matters of State and had but recently left Tanjore, had passed through Bijāpūr and joined Śivāḷī.⁶ The result was a master-stroke of diplomacy. Śivāḷī bribed the Mughal viceroy, Bahādur Khhān into inaction, through 'the highly intelligent' Nirāḷī Rāoḷī, and made alliance with Qutb Shāh. The reason is naively stated by Sabhāsad thus :

'The Rājē entertained in his heart the desire of conquering the Karnāṭak from the Tungabhadra valley to the Kāverī.

It would cause delay if only the army was sent for the conquest. So the Rājé decided to go in person. . . . For accompanying him to Karnāṭak, the Rājé selected from the Royal cavalry (*pāgā*) regiments 25,000 horsemen, and he took with him the *Sarkār-kūn* Raghunāth Nārāyaṇ and Janārdhan Nārāyaṇ (Hanmanté) who had local knowledge of Karnāṭak. . . . *The Rājé thought that the cash accumulated in the treasury should not be spent for that campaign. The money should be procured from new sources and the conquest should be effected through such means. Seeing that there was abundance of wealth in the Bādshāhi of Bhāgānagar, he decided to exploit it through friendly means.*'⁷

Through Pralhād Nirājī he negotiated with Mādaṇṇa and Akaṇṇa—'the virtual sovereigns and real masters of the whole Bādshāhi'. The outcome was the happy concurrence of the Qutb Shāh in the projected campaign. But, as during the earlier Bijāpūr-Golkonda campaign, so too on the present occasion, Qutb Shāh was only a junior partner.

Śivājī started from Rājgaḍ in January 1677 for Hyderābād. His troops numbered about 50,000.⁸ They were unusually well appointed for the occasion, and were under very strict orders to behave themselves exceedingly well in the Qutbshāhi dominions. Śivājī himself acted with the best diplomatic *finesse* and condescension. So the Marāṭhās were received by the Qutb Shāh with the utmost cordiality. The exemplary conduct of the guests during their entire sojourn indicated their rigorous discipline under Śivājī. The rough Māvalé soldiers, who were ferocious on the battlefields, gave a surprisingly good account of themselves under the civil restraints imposed upon them by their sovereign leader on this occasion. There was a unique display of grandeur on both sides; but the personal equation between Śivājī and Abul Ḥasan seemed to be somewhat like that between Nādir Shāh and Muḥammad Shāh at Delhi in 1739. The host in each case heaved a sigh of relief as the fearful guest quitted his dominions, after having dictated terms which the host could ill-afford to refuse. It was all through *veni, vidi, vici* for the Marāṭhā Caesar.

The terms of the 'secret treaty' have been thus summarised by Sarkar : "The Sultan was to pay Shivaji a subsidy of 3,000 *hun* a day, or four and a half *lāks* of Rupees a month, and send 5,000 men (consisting of 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot) in charge of one of his generals (*sar-i-lashkar*), Mirza Muhammad Amin, to co-operate in the conquest of the Karntak. A train of artillery with material was also supplied by Qutb Shah, and probably a large sum of money as advance payment of the promised subsidy. In return for this aid, Shivaji promised his ally such parts of his conquests in the Karnatak as had not belonged to his father Shahji. The defensive alliance against the Mughals was strengthened anew with solemn oaths taken by Shivaji in the presence of Qutb Shah, while the latter promised to pay his annual tribute of one *lakh* of *hun* regularly and to keep a Maratha ambassador at his court."

Sivājī tried further to strengthen himself by calling upon important 'Ādilshāhī *sardārs* like Māloji Ghorpadé to join him, forgetting old family scores, in the name of Marāṭhā, or rather Deccani, freedom from the domination of the foreign Paṭhāns. In a letter of unique historical interest he points out that the 'Ādil Shāh has fallen on bad days and the young Pādshāh has become a mere puppet in the hands of Bahlol Khān and his Paṭhān partisans. They will destroy the families of the Deccani nobles one after another, he warns : they will not allow any one to live. 'Considering this, we from the beginning had maintained good relations with the Qutb Shāh. The Qutb Shāh has agreed to the terms proposed by me and Mādaṇṇa Pant. Whatever I proposed, he agreed to. Such duties and responsibilities were entrusted to us that our Pādshāhī should be made to flourish in the highest degree. *The Paṭhāns should be destroyed and steps should be taken to keep the Pādshāhī of the Deccan in the hands of the Deccanis.*

'After an agreement was reached on both sides, we also thought that *all true Marāṭhās* should be taken into the *confederacy* and introduced to the Qutb Shāh. Considering the good of the Marāṭhās, I have driven out of my mind all the enmity of our elders. You should be free from suspicion. Bearing in

mind the good of the Marāṭhās, who are people of importance, and speaking in several ways to the Qutb Shāh, we have requested the King to send you a *firmān*.' Finally, Śivājī appeals to the sentiments of the Ghorpaḍés, asks Mālojī to disabuse himself of all false considerations of loyalty to the 'Ādilshāhī of 'two generations,' and points to the usurpation of power by the Paṭhāns at Bijāpūr at all costs.' 'You Marāṭhas,' he says 'are our kith and kin ; and we should all join together and destroy the Paṭhāns at all costs.' In return, *jāgīrs* worth double their 'Ādilshāhī estates are offered in the dominions of the Qutb Shāh.¹⁰

Before we proceed further with the narrative of Śivājī's movements in the Karnāṭak, it will be helpful to survey the conditions obtaining there at the time of this campaign. The hold of the 'Ādilshāhī government in these regions was only nominal. Such of the officers and commandants of forts as still held their appointments from Bijāpūr, with the singular exception of Vyankojī Bhoslé, were noted for neither their efficiency nor allegiance to superior authority. In fact, there was none at Bijāpūr at that time to command unified loyalty. Hence the administration in the South was completely disorganised. Conditions since the death of Shāhjī (1664) had become worse instead of better. The land had been continuously ravaged by the armies of Bijāpur, the Nāyaks, and robbers, so much so that foreign observers (in 1676) remarked : "This long series of wars has been followed by a general famine which ravages especially in the environs of Madura and Marava. Everywhere only devastation and solitude and death are seen ; a part of the inhabitants have succumbed to starvation ; others have left their country to seek relief elsewhere. Day by day, Ekojī, on the one hand, and the King of Mysore, on the other, will absorb the last *débris* of this kingdom, once so flourishing. *The conquest of it will be very easy, for the people will regard the enemy, whoever he may be, as their true saviour.*"¹¹

Another account, dated 16 November 1676, describing Negapatam states : "There was much consternation and the

countries were continually being looted on account of differences and intestine wars between the Madurese, Tansiouwer, Theuver and Visiapore rulers. . . . In the meantime, the prospects of trade and agriculture were absolutely ruined by all these troubles, and for many years these countries would not be flourishing again, especially because now the Visiapore commander-in-chief Mamoedachan and Cherechan Lody of Sinsier had also started a war against each other."¹²

It was into such a distracted and devastated land that Śivājī and his Marāṭhā troops burst about May 1677. The Golkonda army, comprising no more than 5,000 horse and foot, could have counted for no more than camp-followers with the vastly superior forces of Śivājī. Hence, the alliance was merely nominal from the very beginning; but with it Śivājī could appear to be acting not only in his own interest. Yet, as the campaign advanced, it was more than apparent that the Marāṭhās would appropriate all.

Leaving Golkonda in March, they were near Madras in the first week of May. The historic fortress of Ginjī was taken by the middle of the month. Vellore was reached about the 23rd. It was held by Abdullah Khān Habshī. Being well fortified and provisioned Vellore took over fourteen months to capture (23 May 1677 to 21 August 1678). But Śivājī marched on, leaving the siege operations to Narahari Rudra *Sabnis*, with 2,000 horse and 5,000 Māvalé infantry. A great battle was fought at Tiruvadi on 26 June and the Bijāpur army under Sher Khān Lodī was put to flight. The Khān was pursued, discovered lurking in a forest, and finally forced to surrender on 5 July. From 6 July to 2 August 1677 Śivājī was encamped at Tirumalvadi on the Coleroon negotiating with his brother Vyankojī. But his peaceful efforts had no better result than those of Humāyūn with Kāmran. Consequently Śivājī was obliged to fight.

Martin's account of the meeting between the two brothers has already been cited. An entry in the Dutch Dagh-Register, dated 2 Oct. 1677, states: 'Siwagie is now with his army in the country of Mysoer, not far from the capitals of the princes

of Madure and Tansjour, from which places he threatens the whole of Visiapour. People are of opinion that he will now make himself Master (of the country), for the Golconda authorities on the whole will not do other than what he wants but try to satisfy him only with pretty words. He had already a quarrel with his brother Egosia Rajia (the present ruler of the Province of Tansjour) over the estates left by their father Sahasy, so that he took possession of those lands for himself.¹³

The conduct of Vyankoji since he broke off the negotiations of Šivāji is reflected in several letters of the time. While Šivāji's forces were engaged in the sieges of Ārni and Velloré, states an English report, 'Eccogee is leagueing with the Natives of Madure and Maysore and other woodmen, and likely to find Sevagee work enough.'¹⁴ Likewise, Andre Friere, the Jesuit missionary at Madura also writes : 'Ekoji profiting by this diversion to re-establish his affairs gathers his soldiers, crosses the river, and enters the territory of Gingi. Santogi comes to give him battle at head of an army superior in number and commanded by clever and intrepid captains.... But Ekoji's men with great fury fell on the enemy like lions, broke their ranks, and spread carnage everywhere and turned the victory to their side. But all on a sudden, art and stratagem snatched away the victory from blind courage.... After a bloody combat of several hours, they are broken and they leave the battle-field and the honour of victory to Santogi, whose losses are, nevertheless, much more considerable than those of the conquered.'¹⁵

We have confirmation of this information in Martin's account : 'A great battle was fought,' he writes, 'on the 26th of this month (November, 1677) between the armies of Sivagy and Ecugy. *It was the latter who commenced it. The melee* was severe for the people of these parts : many were killed and wounded ; among those were some men of importance. The two parties retreated and the loss was almost equal.'¹⁶ Further details of this Pyrrhic victory are contained in a Madras report dated 29 Nov. 1677. It states that 'Sevagees Lieutenant and brother Santogee left in Chengy and neigh-

bouring conquest was few days since engaged by the forces of their brother Eccogee from Tangiour, being 4,000 horse and 10,000 foot, his being 6,000 horse and 6,000 foot. The battle held from morning till night, in which Santogee was worsted and fled 3 quarters of one of those leagues, being pursued $\frac{3}{4}$ of a league. When being returned to their severall camps, Santogee, consulting with his captains what the importance and shame would be, resolved to dress and saddle their horses again, and so immediately rode away by other wayes, and in the dead of the night surprised them fast at rest after soe hard labour ; their horses unsaddled, and made a great slaughter of them, taking nigh 1000 horse in that manner, the 3 chiefe commanders, the tents and all their baggage, and 100 horse more taken by woodmen which fell to share the plunder ; and the rest fled over the river Coalladon (Coleroon) for Tangiour ; by which meanes Sevagee seemes to have gained a quiett possession for the present ; Maduray Nayguc refusing to meddle on either part.'¹⁷ That the conduct of the Madura Nāyak was more pusillanimous than neutral is indicated by a Jesuit commentary : 'While the two armies were fighting, the Nayak of Madura came with his troops against Ekoji. . . . (but) he did not know how to take advantage of it. . . . he wasted his time there. . . . (and finally) the cowardly and imprudent Nayak lost his time and money and went to the citadel of Trichinopoly to hide himself in disgrace.'¹⁸ The Nāyak was not a friend of Śivājī, but he was certainly an enemy of Ekoji. This is clear from the Jesuit records. 'As I have told you in my last letter,' says one, 'the Nayak of Madura was preparing for a war with Ekoji, the old captain of Idal Khan, now an independent master of Tanjore and a part of Gingi. Meanwhile it was reported that Sabaji (Śivājī), the elder brother of Ekoji, in revolt against his sovereign for some time, had seized several provinces of Bisnagar (Vijayanagar) and advanced at the head of a strong army. This news appeared incredible ; how to believe that Sabaji could traverse a distance of several hundreds of leagues through (the country of) the warlike people of the Dekhan and Golconda to carry war

into our country? While the probability of this rumour was argued about, Sabaji solved the question by falling like a thunderbolt on the citadel of Ginge, which he took at the first assault. He owed this easy success to the division which prevailed, and to the numerous communications which he had carefully conducted with the Muhammadans.¹⁹

In July 1677 an envoy from Madura had waited upon Śivājī : 'Here came an Higyb from the Nague of Madure : to whom His Highness Sevagee Raja spoke that his master bore a signe of being worth 900 lacks, whereof he should give him for the present 100 lacks for his expenses, to which the said Higyb answered that part of his masters country the Nague of Misur had taken, and part Yckagee, wherefore he was not able to give anything at present, and that if he would restore him back the said country, he will give seaven lacks. These are the news at present here. The Nague of Madure has sent all his family away to Madure from Chertanapelle (Trichanapallee) where they were before, and while the river of Colorun remains full they feare nothing ; but afterwards God knows what will be done.'²⁰

Though no Marāthā army of Śivājī invaded Madura, that unfortunate country could hardly escape the horrors of devastation by other agencies. From a Jesuit letter (1678) we learn : 'To make matters worse, the whole country has been devastated by a kind of deluge : in the provinces of Satyamangalam, Trichinopoly, Tanjore and Gingi, the inundations have carried away whole villages with their inhabitants. This scourge of divine anger was soon followed by famine, pestilence, and at last brigandage which infests all the kingdom. The capital, once so flourishing, is no longer recognizable ; its palaces, once so rich and majestic, are deserted and begin to fall into ruins ; Madura resembles a town much less than a den of robbers.'²¹

To return to Ekojī, an English record, dated 9 April 1678, notes : 'By intelligence from the parts of Chengee we understand, that by Sevagees order to his Generall, his Brother Santogee, and to his Braminies and Chief Officers, *they have con-*

*cluded a firme peace with Eccogee, his Brother, and delivered back to Eccogee a good part of the country worth 2 lacks of Pardoes per Annum; which Sevagee had taken from him and Eccogee in lieu thereof had paid 3 lacks of Pardoes in ready money, and upon the confirmation of this agreement, Santogee had been feasted and nobly presented by Eccogee in his castle at Tanjoor, and after having received the third quarter of 6 Lack of Pardoes, which the Madura Naigue promised to pay Sevagee, of which there now remains but 1½ Lack behind to be paid. Santogee with his Army returned to Chengee Castle, great part of which is very strongly rebuilt since Sevagee took it, and there is great store of Graine and all things necessary for a long siege allready laid in, and he has a good stock of many allsoe beforehand besides the Rent of the country he has taken, dayly coming.'*²²

It is interesting to find corroboration of this from the Dutch sources: 'The two last letters dated Nagapatam the 11th and 15th May,' states the Dagb Register, 'mention that the wandering robber Sewagie has at last made an alliance with his brother Egosie Ragia and the Madurese. *The said Egosie Ragia would keep in his possession the rich country of Tansjour* and Suwagie would have to abandon it for three lacs of pardaux and he would then go to Veloure, for which he had already left with the whole of his army.' Finally, '*The Ruler Egosie Ragia is now-a-days in peaceful possession of the countries of Tansjour, more by the prestige of his brother Sewagie Ragia than by his own strength...* This was the reason why the Neyek of Madura did not draw sword against him.'

²³

Vyankojī was brave and, as his battle with Santojī showed, possessed great martial qualities. He had stepped into the shoes of Shāhjī as the leading Bijāpūrī general in the Karnāṭak and made a mark by his conquest of Tanjore in 1675. Not only could he act with vigour, as occasion demanded, but also rule the conquered lands wisely and efficiently. As ruler of Tanjore "he sought to make himself beloved by the inhabitants. The justice and wisdom of his government began to close the wounds of the preceding reign," writes a Jesuit

observer, "and to develop the natural resources of the country. By repairing the canals and tanks, he has given fertility to the vast fields which had been left unutilised for many years, and the last crop has surpassed all that was seen before."²¹ This is valuable testimony coming as it does from a foreigner and contemporary. What he lacked was the vision of Śivājī. He could not even appreciate the mission of his great brother. But the magnanimity and statesmanship of the *Chhatrapati* showed themselves, as ever before, in the hour of triumph. This is revealed by his treatment of Vyankoji in all stages of their conflict, as well as by the terms of the treaty between them. According to Sabhāsad, Śivājī declared, "Vyankoji Rājé is my younger brother. He has acted like a child. But still he is my brother; protect him. Do not ruin his kingdom."²² So he commanded his generals. The terms of his treaty with Vyankoji are thus stated in the *Śiva Digvijaya Bakhar* ²³

1. The wicked, the thieves, drunkards, and haters of Hindus, etc., should not be allowed to stay within the kingdom. In case they are suffered to remain, they should be compelled to give security, and a strict watch must be kept over them, that they might do no harm.

2. The *Mahal* of fort Ārni, conferred on Yādo Bhāskar by the late Mahārājā (Shāhjī), should not be disturbed. He has eight sons who might render proper service.

3. We have a *sanad* for *jāgīrs* from Bijāpūr. Some of our estates were brought under their jurisdiction by treaty when we came from Daulatābād. Many *pāligārs* were also brought under our jurisdiction. There might be some excess or deficiency of revenues in our joint-holdings. We have to serve the Bijāpūr Government with a contingent of 5,000 horse. *But in the treaty concluded between us it has been settled that we shall not be called upon to serve in person, but only render military assistance whenever necessary.* This was settled when our father was still alive. *Hence, you shall not have to serve the Bijāpūr government personally.* In case of your

failure, I shall exact from you the money required for military assistance.

4. The *Pātilkī*, *Deśmukhī* and *Nādgauḍa watans* in the Deccan, viz., Hingarj Beraḍi and Deulgāum, are our ancestral property. You will have nothing to do with them. I shall continue to manage them.

5. If people from my provinces go to yours, and your people come into mine, they should be amicably induced to return to their original provinces.

6. The *pargana* of Bengrūl yields today --with the neighbouring stations of Baskoṭ and Silekoṭ--a revenue of two *lākhs Barai*. If they are brought under our administration, they might yield five *lākhs*. These I had conferred on *Chi*. *Saubhāgyavati* Dīpā Bāi, for *Choli-bāngdi*. These should be continued in the female line. The *mahals* should be managed by you, but their revenue should be enjoyed by her on whom it might be conferred by *Sau*. Dīpā Bāi.

7. A *Mahal* yielding seven *lākhs* of *hons* out of my conquests near Gingi, I have granted as hereditary *inām* to *Chi*. *Rājeśri* Vyankāji Rājé for *dūdḥ-bhāt*. I shall send the *sanads* according to the list of *mahals* sent by you.

8. I have written to *Chi*. Bahirji Rājé. He will deliver to you what *mahals* you want. He is a faithful ancestral servant. A hereditary *inām* of villages yielding one *lakh Barai* in the province of Tanjore is conferred on you. *Sanads* will be sent when you name the villages.

9. If thieves from your province come into mine, I shall deliver them to you on demand ; and if traitors from my provinces go to yours, you should do the same.

10. You should continue the monthly allowance granted for the Mahārājā's (Shāhjī's) *samādhi*, including the band, horses, elephants, and *kārkūns* that should be maintained there. Do not allow any slackness in this respect.

11. The privileges, etc., of the relations of the Royal family and the titled nobility should be preserved, and their status and order of precedence should be respected. No heavy duties should be assigned to them.

12. The officers and commanders should be consulted on important matters. Only loyal and competent officers should be appointed to positions of trust. Promotions should be given strictly according to merit. Conflicts among State officials must be discouraged by all possible means.

13. The private suite of Rājā Vyankoji should consist of good, loyal and upright servants who should give sureties for their good behaviour. All should be treated equally ; there should be no favourites.

14. Agents and Envoys should be maintained in all the neighbouring Courts, whether friendly or hostile. Arrangements should be made for secret and prompt intelligence about changes.

15. Both *pāgā* and *śilédār* cavalry divisions should be properly organised. Horses and men should be always in readiness. *Śilédār* forces should be converted into *pāgā* as far as possible. Artillery and cavalry should both be ready in case of invasion.

16. Disputes among high and low concerning boundary rights, contracts, treaties, etc. should be discouraged. The poor and needy should be succoured in difficulties, and saved from the oppression of the rich and powerful.

17. Religious grants from the State, benefactions to temples and holy places, should be continued. On no account should they be violated.

18. Suits relating to debtors and creditors, partitions and successions, inheritances, etc. should be decided by specially constituted *Panchāyats*. The administration of Civil Justice should be conducted in the best interests of the people, without corruption or bribery. The State should consider itself the special guardian of the poor in matters of justice.

19. Protection once offered, mere might has never been resorted to in the history of our family. This tradition should be maintained in the future also.

Obviously, this is not only a treaty—as treaties go—but also, the *Political Testament* of Śivājī intended for the guidance of Vyankoji in his southern charge.

The defeat of Vyankojī (16 Nov. 1677) had been at the hands of Santojī Bhoslé and Hambīr Rāo Mohité who were provoked into action by Vyankojī himself. Śivājī had been obliged to leave the Karnāṭak earlier in November 1677 to defend his kingdom from the Mughals in the North. The siege of Vellore was at that time still dragging on ; it was successfully terminated on 21 August 1678. Śivājī, nevertheless, took Bangalore, Kolār, Serā etc., in the Mysore plateau, during his march northward. Bankāpūr, Koppal, Gadag and Laxmeśvar, in western Karnāṭak, were also likewise occupied more or less easily. Remarkable resistance was, however, offered by Malla Nāikini at Bhilavdi and she could not be subdued until 28 February 1678. Śivājī left part of his forces behind to complete his unfinished tasks, and himself reached Panhālā on 4 April. He was back in Rāigaḍ before June 1678, —18 months after he had left for Golkonḍa.

An English report, dated 16 January 1678, said : ' With a success as Caesar's in Spain, he came, saw, and overcame, and reported so vast a treasure in gold, diamonds, emeralds, rubies and wrought coral, that have strengthened his arms with very able sinews to prosecute his further victorious designs.'²⁷ Sabhāsad estimates the territory annexed by Śivājī in the Karnāṭak as yielding an annual revenue of 20 *lākhs* of *hons*, and including a hundred forts, taken or built by Śivājī.²⁸ Another English record states that ' Śivājī by his deputies has a full and quiet possession of all these countries about those two castles of Jinji and Vellore, which are worth 22 *lākhs* of *pardoes* (or 550 thousand pounds sterling) per annum, in which he has a considerable force of men and horse, 72 strong hills and 14 forts (in the plain),—being 60 leagues long and 40 broad.'²⁹

In the light of the above, Sir Jadunath Sarkar does not appear to be correct in his estimation of Śivājī's Karnāṭak campaign. In the 1st edition of his *Shivaji and His Times*, he held the view that " It is incredible that a born strategist like Shivaji could have really intended to annex permanently a territory on the Madras coast, which was separated from his

own dominions by two powerful and potentially hostile States like Bijapur and Golconda, and more than 700 miles distant from his capital. *His aim was merely to squeeze the country of its accumulated wealth and return home with the booty.* The partition of his father's heritage was only a plea adopted to give a show of legality to this campaign of plunder."³⁰ Though he has omitted this statement from the latest edition of his work, the latter part of the aim of Śivājī as understood by Sarkar, still finds elaborate argument. According to him, Śivājī wanted to replenish his treasury which was depleted by the extravagance of his coronation and military expenditure. "All other avenues having been exhausted, he turned to Karnāṭak,—"*this real land of gold.*" It seems to us, however, that Sarkar's description of this *El Dorado* is both unreal and anachronistic. Karnāṭak might have been both historically and potentially rich : in the time of "Samudra Gupta and the Western Chalukyas, Malik Kafur and Mir Jumla." It might have had at the end of the 17th century "still enough wealth left in it to tempt the cupidity of Aurangzib."³¹ But what is strictly relevant to our context is whether Karnāṭak was a land flowing with milk and honey *at the moment* when Śivājī contemplated and actually carried out his invasion. The contemporary European descriptions tell a different story, as we have already witnessed. He himself states : "It is very doubtful whether Shivaji would, of himself, have cared to assert his right to his father's Karnatak territory. *He certainly did not need it.* As he rightly said on his death-bed, 'I received [from my father] the Puna territory worth only 40,000 *hun*, but I have won a kingdom yielding one *crore* of *hun*' (Sahasad 104)."³² Further, he also observes : "Over the Karnatak plains thus conquered, he at first placed Shantaji, a natural son of Shahji, as viceroy with Jinji for his head-quarters, assisted by Raghunath Narayan Hanumanté as diplomatic adviser and auditor (*majmuadar*) and Hambir Rao as commander of the army of occupation. The table-land of Mysore was placed under Rango Narayan as viceroy, but subject to the higher jurisdiction of Jinji."³³ Lastly, he states that

when the Marāṭhā army under Hambir Rao was withdrawn, Raghunāth Pant organised in Karnāṭak a "local force" of 10,000 horse (both *pāgā* and *śilédār*) "for the defence of the new province."³¹ In the face of these admissions we cannot accept Sarkar's categorical assertion: "But *gold*, and *not land*, was his (Śivājī's) *chief object*."³⁵

Śivājī improved the fortifications of the country he conquered, appointed officers for its administration, left definite instructions as to the policies to be followed, and made every effort to conciliate the people and foster their trade and industry. His dealings with the Dutch, the French and the English during this campaign are illustrative of his attitude. On 31st July 1677 the Chief of the Dutch factory at Tegenapatam (Cuddalore) waited upon Śivājī, at Tundumgurti, with rich presents—silks, spices, Maldiv cocoanuts, sword blades, etc. Śivājī was pleased with the gifts and sent the Dutchman away with a robe of honour. On 2 October the same year the Dutch noted: '*in all these matters the said Siwasi conducted himself in a very polite and friendly manner toward the Company as also our residents in Golconda. Later he promised to our representative in Tegenapatam to promote the trade of our Company in all possible ways which is also shown by the grant of same couls.*'³⁶

In June 1677, according to the French Governor of Pondicherry (Francois Martin), their Brāhman envoy had no less than three interviews with Śivājī: '*Sevagy assured our envoy that we might stay in complete security at Pandichery without taking the side of either party; that if we offered the least insult to his people there would be no quarter for us or for those of our people who were in the factory at Rajapour, that he would send an avaldar in a few days to govern Pondichery and that we might have to live with him in the same manner as we had done with the officers of Chircam.*'³⁷

From the English records we obtain several interesting details: On 9 May 1677, for instance, they noted: '*Sevagee (or be it his Soun) being entertained in the King of Golcongas service, and now upon his march to fall upon Chengy with an*

army of 20 Mille horse and 40 Mille foot, the van whereof (being about 5 Mille Horse) already past Tripatty and Calastry 9 and 8 leagues Gentu from hence, and this night expected at Cangiawaram (anchivaram) about 4 leagues Gentu hence, a distance which it is very usuall for his Horse to march in a nights time.' ³⁸ Śhivājī repeatedly asks for supplies of 'Maldivo cokanutts, cordiale stones and some other precious roots,' *assuring us of his friendship and offering the price for them.*' The English complied with his request and 'for the service of the Honourable Company' sent 'unto him by our Camp Bramany Ramana with a civill letter as in the Golconda Register, not requiring the money but making a present of them, *his power encreasing and he exercising so much authority in the King of Golcondas country*, that he sends all about to receive the Kings rents by his own people, and punishing the Avaldars and great men of the country at his pleasure.'³⁹ Sir William Langhorne, writing in a very 'civil' tone to Śhivājī, declared : 'Wee entreat you accept of the affectionate respects wherewith wee make present of them to your Highness ; and as the settlements which our Hon'ble Employers have already in your dominions obliges us to *wish you all desirable prosperity, so the great honour your noble achievements acquires you from all men who shall attaine to a right understanding of them, not only wins our reasons but our inclinations also, and wee do so highly prize the opportunitys* of doing you such services as fall within the narrow compass of a strangers power that wee account it as an instance of your kindness that you are pleased to import your mind, which wee receive with all the resentments of a passion that must ever be pressing ourselves.'⁴⁰—My Lord, your Highnesses most humble, most obedient servant, W. L.' How, despite these gushing civilities, the English really comported with Śhivājī, will be noticed in the next chapter. Meanwhile, President Langhorne of Fort St. George, again wrote on 17 February 1678 : 'We are now to acquaint you that Sevagee, grown great and famous by his many conquests and pillageings of the Moghulls and Visapour countrys, is at length come hither with an army of 16 in 20 M. (16 to 20 thousand) horse and

severall thousand of foot, raised and raising among the woods, *being unfortunately called in by the King of Golconda* or Madanna to help them to take Chengy, Vealour and Pamangoda (Pelgonda), the remainder of the sea part of the Cornatt country as farr as Porto Novo, out of the Visiapours hands, with title of Generalissimo, by which means he has gotten in a manner the possession of this country, the said King having no force to oppose him. *We have twice presented him with some rarities* of counter poysons, etc., by him desired, to the value of pagodas 112 Ind. *in order the begetting a fair correspondence with him* now at first, if possible, grounding it upon the introduction of those settlements you have already in his country's at Rajapore and Carwar, the former whereof was very well taken. Of the latter we have yet no news from our Brmany who attends his motion, but more particularly upon the King of Golcondas Meirza Mahmud Omin and our loving friend, who has some 1000 horse and 4000 foot along with him.'¹¹

The entire situation in the Karnāṭak changed with the entry of Śhivājī therein. Shāhji's scattered *jāgīrs* and the principality of Tanjore were now linked up with Śivājī's dominions. They attained a new significance in the history of the peninsula and became part of the new order that was emerging out of the chaos of the dark age which had intervened between the fall of Vijayanagar and the rise of the Marāṭhā power. Vyankojī had conserved his patrimony from Shāhji, but Śivājī consolidated it and gave it a new orientation. The *Chhatrapati* was no mere Jason in search of the golden fleece, but the conservator of the greater and larger Patrimony of Hindu civilisation. "The transactions of Sivaji in the Carnatic," writes Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, "and his dealings with his half-brother Venkaji (or Ekoji) seem capable of an interpretation, once it is realized that Sivaji may have cherished the ambition to stand before his great enemy, the Moghul, as the acknowledged representative of the empire of Vijayanagar recently become extinct. The existence of the grant of Sivaji to the two sons of Sriranga, though the document is not quite above

suspicion, and the issue of the coinage of which one specimen at any rate, on the model of Vijayanagar, has been recently discovered, are indications in support of what some of the Marhatta documents do record in respect of this particular idea of Sivaji. Shahji had acquired as his *jaghir* in the Carnatic territory, which could favourably compare with that of any other South Indian viceroy under Hindu rule. After the acquisition of Tanjore, Venkaji was actually in occupation of the territory of the Nayaks of Tanjore and of Gingi with a considerable portion of Mysore in addition. Madura was already decrepit and must have seemed to Sivaji capable of being brought under his imperial protection. Ikkeri was probably inclined to support him against Mysore. Mysore was perhaps the one State that was likely to prove troublesome. If Sivaji cherished such an idea, it cannot have been regarded impracticable in 1677, and all his efforts to bring his brother to reason need not necessarily have been the result of greed. All the details of the transaction taken together seem to indicate a clearly higher motive, and that may well have been *the ambition to stand before Aurangzib as the acknowledged successor of the emperors of Vijayanagar.*¹²

This opinion, though speculative in character, deserves special attention as coming from the Doyen of South Indian scholars who has devoted his life-time to the study of Vijayanagar history. Even though Śivājī's grant to the two sons of Śrīranga, according to him, may not be 'quite above suspicion,' his main thesis is not thereby affected. If the grant should prove spurious, in its available form, its fabrication itself will serve to indicate that the scions of the last imperial family of Vijayanagar considered Śivājī great enough to receive such a compliment. The Marāṭhā *Chhatrapati* must have appeared to them as the only protector of their honour and patrimony. This in itself constitutes the best commentary on what Śivājī attempted to do for Hindu India through his Karnāṭak conquests.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SEA FRONT

‘ All the way, as he goes along, he gives his *qaul* (assurance) promising them that neither he nor his soldiers shall in the least do any wrong to anybody that takes his *qaul*, which promise he hitherto hath kept.’— Gyfford to Surat (24 May 1663).¹

Few Indian rulers have bestowed as much attention on the sea as Śivājī did. Situated as his new and growing State was, its western fringe was of the utmost importance, and could not be neglected for long. Though there was no major enemy as yet on the coast, its potentialities for good and evil were great as well as vital. With the keen vision and foresight that he possessed, the activities of the Siddis as well as the Europeans (Portuguese, Dutch, French and English) were shrewdly noted by him. Despite its importance and value, neither Bijāpūr nor the Mughals had bestowed on the Konkan the attention it deserved. They marked the earth with ruin, but their control stopped with the shore. As Musliim rulers, they were indeed anxious to protect the pilgrim traffic to Mecca; but otherwise, their interest was confined to importing Arab horses and maintaining a few private ships for personal profit. Their governments as such maintained no fleets worth speaking, either for commerce or for defence, though Surat, Cambay, Broach, Bombay, Vingurla, Goa, Karwar, etc. attracted the maritime foreigners.² Śivājī appreciated the advantages better and decided to ‘harness the sea.’

His first task was to eradicate the Siddis, who were not only like ‘mice in the house,’ a nuisance, but also a plague. They were nominally under Bijāpūr, but actually their own masters. They pretended to pay homage to the ‘Ādil Shāh or the Mughal Emperor as it suited their convenience; but the sovereign was more dependent than the vassal so far as *de facto* power

on the coast was concerned. Janjirā was their stronghold and the Gibraltar of the Muslims³. For Śivājī it was a thorn in the side of his kingdom, a menace to his western defences, and a source of perpetual irritation. His determination to subjugate or oust the Siddis from their position of vantage is reflected in Oxenden's report of his negotiations at Rāigaḍ.

'I took (according to your Honours order),' he wrote to his superiors, 'occasion to discourse with him (i.e. Nirājī Pandit) concerning the concluding of a peace betwixt the Rajah (Śivājī) and the Siddy of Danda Rajapore urging those arguments enordered in my instructions and likewise those communicated me in private by his Honour, but all were not prevalent enough to persuade him, it was not his Masters interest to prosecute that siege (of Janjirā) so near a conclusion, for the Rajah without doubt will have Danda either this raines or next monsoon, intending to make an assault on it speedily after his coronation, to which effect he hath enordered his best souldiers to get themselves in readyness, and hath already sent 15 pieces ordinance more to strengthen and renew the battery. He hath offered the Siddy, upon delivery of the castle, what Monsup (Mansab or rank) he shall desire, upon refusall whereof he must expect the miserys that attend warr and so severe an enemy as Sevagee Rajah who, Naragee Punditt reports, vallues not the assistance the Mogulls fleete gives him nor the damage it will do his country in the future.' ⁴

The struggle for supremacy in the Konkan, however, must not be considered as a mere duel between Śivājī and the Siddis. It was part of Śivājī's programme to wrest his land from the domination of the foreigners.⁵ It was equally necessary for him to subjugate the Hindu chiefs and rājās who had either remained vassals to Bijāpūr or asserted their feudal independence. In the larger interest of his cause he could not leave their precarious position to be exploited by either Bijāpūr, the Siddis, or the Europeans. The Mughal Emperor was equally anxious to frustrate his ambitions—as much in the Konkan as on the main land. The Marāṭhā struggle on the Sea Front therefore had many facets.

We have witnessed Śivājī's relations with Lakham Sāvant of Kuḍal, in an earlier chapter, as also his expeditions on the west coast.⁶ Since his occupation of Kalyāṇ—Bhiwandī in October 1657, he had also taken Daṇḍā in November 1659 and Rājāpūr in March 1661. These activities were a source of embarrassment alike to the Bijāpūr authorities and the European traders. A Portuguese letter dated 16 August 1659 observes : ' The son of Captain Xagi (Shāhji) who has left King Idalxa ('Ādil Shāh), has taken over the lands near Bassein and Chaul, is getting very powerful and forces us to be careful as he has built a navy in Bhiwandī, Kalyan and Panvel, ports in the district of Bassein. We have ordered our Captain not to allow him to put the vessels to sea, in order to embarrass his going out.'⁷ Another English record, five years later, states : ' Deccan and all the south coasts are all embroiled in civil wars, King against King and country against country, and Sivaji reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to all the Kings and princes round about, daily increasing in strength.'⁸ Ten more years elapsed and John Fryer observed that 'Seva Gi is reckoned also as a diseased Limb of Duccan, impostumated and swoln too big for the Body ; in some respects benefiting, in others discommoding it ; beneficial by opposing the Mogul's entry into the Kingdom ; but prejudicial in being his own Paymaster, rewarding himself most unconscionably ; all Conchon the Sea-Coasts, 250 Leagues, that is, from Balsore Hills to the River Gangole (Gangavaly) ; where neither is he limited in his extravagant Desires, expecting only opportunity to gain further. Inland he hath not much, the Goat (the western Ghat range) seeming to be a Natural Line of Circumvallation to the Up Country, where it is Campaign, though below Hilly ; so that ascend to it' by Mountains piled on one another, over which Seva Gi hath total Dominion, the Deccanees not striving to retake anything, for all he heth blocked up their Ports, which may prejudice them for the future ; an irreparable Damage (Arab Steeds being the Life of their Cavalry) ; they having only Porto Novo beyond Tutticaree left them free.'⁹ SA

These European notices of Śivājī's activities and growing importance on the Konkan and Kanara coasts cover the period of about twenty years from his conquest of Kalyāṇ (1557) to his great Kārnāṭak campaign in 1677-78. During these two decades, it is to be recollected, Śivājī had achieved many momentous things outside the Konkan: He had overthrown Afzal Khān and Shā'ista Khān, he had raided Surat, fought with the Mughals under Jai Singh and Diler Khān, accepted their terms at Purandar, gone to Āgrā and miraculously effected his escape therefrom, raided Surat again, defeated Mughal officers at Dindori, got himself crowned at Rāigaḍ, and triumphantly marched through Golkonda and Bijāpūrī Karnāṭak. This was a record more impressive than that of Raghu as described by Kālidāsa in his *Raghuvamśa*, more glorious than that of Samudragupta. He had baffled the Mughal Emperor and humbled Bijāpūr. Now it appeared that he had only to round off the conquests by the consolidation of the Konkan coast. This is the significance of Śivājī's doings on the west coast.

His two raids on Surat revealed to him the weakness of the Emperor in that region. His conquest of Kalyāṇ and the Karnāṭak equally well demonstrated the helplessness of the 'Ādil-shāhī government. Bijāpūr authority had long been dwindling everywhere in its dominions. That the western region was no exception to this growing paralysis was soon evident to Śivājī. The Siddis on the one side and the Marāṭhās on the other, while being inimical towards each other, proved equally fatal to Bijāpūr authority. The Desāis of Kudal and the minor rājās of Sundā and Bidnūr were lesser fry who by their own quarrels and ambitions made matters worse for their overlord the 'Ādil Shāh. Śivājī was as ready to fish in these troubled waters as anybody else on the coast. Tempted by these opportunities he raided the Kanara coast as far south as Basrūr⁹ and as much into the interior as Bidnūr,¹⁰ Sundā¹¹ and Hubli.¹² This inevitably brought him into clash with various rivals and enemies whose varying results we are to assess in this chapter.

Many details relating to this phase of Marāṭhā history

are subjects of controversy, but we shall illustrate the situation with a few salient examples.

Śivājī raided Basrūr early in 1665. It was then a port belonging to the rājā of Bidnūr who was a vassal of Bijāpūr. While returning north along the coast after this expedition, Khawāṣ Khān, the Bijāpūrī general, encountered him and attempted to block his path. Earlier Śivājī had occupied Dandā-Rājāpūr and Kharepatan; he had destroyed Vingurlā and built the stronghold of Sindhudurg.¹³ At the approach of the Marāṭhā "all the Muhammadan governors as far as Sanquelim and Bicholin were fled," says an English record.¹⁴ Alarmed by these happenings the Bijāpūr authorities tried to mobilise their forces. The governor of Phonda, the Desāi of Kudal, and Khawāṣ Khān were among those ordered to rally. Śivājī kept his gains none the less. Khawāṣ Khān was defeated and put to flight over the Ghāṭs. Bājī Ghorpaḍé who was on his way to join the Khān, together with a division of 1,500 horse, was cut down in this connexion and Mudhol was destroyed in a punitive raid¹⁵.

'At Kudal in the Konkan lived a rebel named Lakham Sāvant Desai with 12,000 *haṣam*,' writes Sabhāsad. 'Kudal was under the 'Ādilshāhī. He sent word to Bijāpūr that, assembling an army of horse, foot and militia, he was going to march against Śivājī to recover Konkan. To this effect he sent a verbal message. Thereupon, from Bijāpūr, Khawāṣ Khān, c-in-c., a great warrior, came to Kudal with 10,000 horsemen. Lakham Sāvant joined him with 12,000 *haṣam* and went on reconquering Konkan. In the meantime, the Rājé got the information, and selecting the army and militia, marched straight on them. Bājī Ghorpaḍé, who was coming from Bijāpūr with 1,500 horsemen to help Khawāṣ Khān, descended from the Ghāṭs and halted. Thereupon the Rājé sent an army against him and by a surprise attack utterly destroyed Bājī Ghorpaḍé with his personal troops and 1,200 horses were captured. A great battle was fought. Learning this news, Khawāṣ Khān was struck with terror and fled over the Ghāṭs and went straight to Bijāpūr.'¹⁶ The Jedhé *Śakāvalī* gives *Kār-*

tika, krodhin, 1586 Śaka (10 October--7 Nov. 1664) as the date of this event. Sarjé Rão Jedhé is said to have fought valiantly in the action.

The defeat of the Desāi at the hands of Śivājī is attributed by the Dutch to the want of powder and the absence of *Kha-wās Khān* :¹⁷. 'After Chaveschan had courageously beaten Sivasi on a plain with a small army consisting of 2000 horsemen and as many foot soldiers, Sivasi again rallied his army, divided it into three or four squadrons, and marched against that Lord in a very good order. A sharp fire of rockets was first opened on both sides [Śivājī met with stiff resistance at first]. Still, after a good deal of skirmishing and firing of muskets, he caused them (Lakham Sāvānt's men) to waver. *The main causes of this defeat were the want of powder and the absence of Lord Chaveschan.*'¹⁸

The treaty of Purander (12 June 1665) allowed the Marāthās a free hand in Bijāpūrī Konkan, while Śivājī was an active ally of the Mughals in their campaign against the 'Ādil Shāh. The death of the Bijāpūrī general Bahlol *Khān*,¹⁹ in July 1665, was a great blow to that unfortunate kingdom. The English factory letter from Kārwār to Surat dated 29 Aug. 1665 verily notes, "The affairs of the royal drunkard at Bijapur passed from bad to worse."²⁰ The absence of Śivājī from the Deccan during his visit to Āgrā and his policy of peace for some time thereafter provided a short respite. But troubles again gathered, especially after the death of Ali 'Ādil Shāh on 24th Nov. 1672. We have vivid glimpses of these in the contemporary English records.

On 17 February 1673 Kārwār wrote to Surat : 'We have been in double feare here, what with the Dutch on the one side and the Rajah of Cannarah and Sundas forces on the other ; but wee hope in God now shall suddenly heare of a peace which may secure us from the one, and the arrivall of some forces from Vizapore here wee hope will secure us from the other. The Rajah of Connarahs forces hath taken Mirjee Castle and are retired back to their owne country againe, and the Rajah of Sundas forces now lye in seize of Anchola Castle

.... Muzaffer Ckaun, the Lord of this Country, is likewise sent out of Vizapore against the Rajah of Caunarah to chastise both the Rajahs for invading his towns (At the same time internal trouble had arisen within Bednur owing to a quarrel between the Pepper Queen and her quandom favourite Timmann.) Tymmana and the Rauna of Cannara hath ben at warrs for this three monthes, he being the chiefe man in that country and of a very mean parentage did insult too much over all people, but more especially the Bramins, which they could not brooke, so that this warr was begunn by their instigation.' ²¹

Śivājī was too ready to exploit such a situation and we read in a letter of 31 October 1673 : 'Wee suppose Sevagees Army will not trouble your parts for some tyme, for wee have certaine intelligence that himselfe in person with his army of 15,000 men is gone to Sunda, a Castle near Goa, to take it from the Vizapore King, and alsoc to attempt the conquest of the Carnatick Country, where they are fallen into Civill warr amongst themselves, and the late Rajah's wife hath called in Sevagee to her assistance and promised him a great treasure.' ²²

We do not know what exactly transpired at Bidnūr, but according to Chitnis, the Rānī agreed to pay an annual tribute and to admit a Marāṭhā Resident at her Court.²³ Though Sarkar holds that Bidnūr "did not really become a Maratha protectorate," ²⁴ we have clear testimony to the contrary in an English letter dated 24 Aug. 1676 which unequivocally declares : 'Sevagee by his Power and *Sovereignty in those parts* may bring the Sunda Rajah to a good accomdation with us, obliging to lett our goods passe without molestation in the future' ²⁵ The Dutch were obliged to place their factories in Kanara (Chandāvar, Vingurlā, etc.) under the command of their General of Malabār "on account of the disturbances caused by Sivaji's inroads." ²⁶ Not only the coastal places but also the uplands had their trade upset. Hubli was raided in 1664-5 as well as in May 1673. After the latter loot by Pratāp Rāo, the English remonstrated : 'As for his last act Hubely you may tell him we have a better opinion of

him than to think it was done by his order.' ²⁷ He answered, "I never gave any orders to disturb the English in any way of their factories, but have ever had a good liking or opinion of them." He also warned them as a friend : 'that we trade so little as we can into Deccan, because he is determined to make a sharp war there as soon as the rains are over.' ²⁸ We shall discuss Śivājī's relations with the English more fully later. Meanwhile we should recount his activities in the Konkan leading to his conflict with the Siddis and the Portuguese. Bijāpūr was too much paralysed by internal squabbles. The overthrow of Khawās Khān and his supporters in November 1675 was but a symptom. ²⁹

On 8 April 1675 Śivājī commenced his siege of Phonḍa in Kudal territory. Though its governor, Muḥammad Khān had provisions to last him for four months, and the garrison was secretly helped by the Portuguese from Goa, the fort capitulated in less than four weeks (6 May). Muḥammad Khān saved himself and some of his men by promising to assist Śivājī in the acquisition of the neighbouring districts. ³⁰ In a short time Ankola, Śiveśvar, Kārwār and Kadra, came into Śivājī's hands. By 25 May, the whole of Bijāpūrī Kanara, down to the Gangāvātī river, was conquered. A Kārwār letter declares, 'Sevagee hath made a thorough conquest of the country hereabouts. . . . He is master of all as far as Anchola,' ³¹ Another from Rājāpūr, dated 31 May, states : 'Sevagee Rajah hath now taken all belonging to the King of Veasapore in Cunkron' ³² (Konkan). But the major operations of Śivājī were directed against the Siddi stronghold of Janjirā. Epic in its interest, nevertheless, this Trojan adventure of the Marāṭhās miscarried. Despite his prolonged and pertinacious efforts Śivājī was destined to die without accomplishing this his greatest ambition on the sea front.

"We cannot but admire," writes Dr. Bal Krishna, "the spirited and determined defiance exhibited by the Siddis in the long struggle which lasted for about a quarter of a century. . . . It is indeed strange that the one who had swallowed a large part of the Bijapur Kingdom, who had made the Gol-

konda King his tributary, and who had shaken the foundations of the Mogul Empire, should have been baffled in capturing the castle of Janjira after so many heroic efforts. All his brilliant victories seem to be eclipsed by this signal failure of his life. The causes of this life-long disappointment are to be traced to his inferior navy and artillery. His light vessels could never break through the cordon of big battleships placed all round the castle, nor stand the heavy fire of more than 300 cannon with which the towers and bastions of Janjira bristled." ³³ It is well also to note that C. V. Vaidya, an enthusiastic panegyrist of Śivājī, equally generously observes that the Siddi of Janjirā "must be given the credit of obstinately maintaining his position and his small State against the continuous effort of Shivaji to subdue or destroy him." ³⁴

We have already noted that Janjirā was of great importance to Śivājī as well as the Muslims. Opposite that island-fortress were Dandā and Rājāpūr both of which Śivājī had occupied between 1659-61. Janjirā was only half-a-mile out across the sea. The Marāṭhās, with their position of vantage on the coast, could cut off the Siddis' communications with Bijāpūr, but the latter would retaliate by ravaging the Konkan. Raghunāth Ballāl Korḍé, says Sabhāsad, ³⁵ had wrested the coast from the Siddis, but after his death, the conduct of the Habshis underwent a change. Then the Rājé sent the celebrated Vyankojī Datto, who devastated and annexed the land of the Siddis. He came after inspiring such terror that the Siddis opened negotiations for peace. But the Rājé did not accept the terms but remained in the Siddi's country and strengthened himself by the erection of new forts at various places. The Siddis had to obtain provisions from other lands in order to subsist. 'On that account the Rājé fitted out ships in the sea.' He also fortified some submarine rocks and built strongholds in the sea : 'Uniting ships with forts, the Rājé saddled the sea.' ³⁶

Building *ghurabs*, *tarandes*, *tarus*, *galvats*, *śibaās* and *pagars*, he appointed two *Sūbādārs* (a Muslim *Daryā Sārang* and a *Bhaṇḍārī Māi Nāyak*), constituting a *sūbā* of 200 ships :

In this manner was the navy equipped.' The Rājé's ships then began to plunder the cities and forts belonging to the Mughals and the Firangis. They fought at various places and obtained grains and other provisions: 'In this manner 700 ships were out in the sea.'³⁷ Not all of these ships were intended to fight the Habshis, the Firangis, or the pirates. Some of them sailed as far as Mocha in western Arabia, loading them at Jaitapūr (2 miles up the Rājāpūr river) "with goods of considerable value." On 12 March 1665, the English factors noted that from each of the 8 or 9 'most considerable ports in the Deccan' seized by Śivājī, there 'set out 2 or 3 or more trading vessels yearly to Persia, Basra, Mocha, etc.' Later, in April 1669, they observed several of his rice-boats being destroyed by a storm, off Kārwar,—“one of the ships being very richly laden.”³⁸

In the same year, Śivājī renewed his attack on Janjirā with great vigour but failed. In 1671 the Siddis even recovered Dandā fort by the bold *coup* of their captain Qāsim. Śivājī tried to secure English assistance, but the Surat authorities advised their factors “*not to positively promise him the grenades, mortar pieces, and ammunition he desires, nor to absolutely deny him, in regard we do not think it convenient to help him against Dunda, which place, if it were in his possession, would prove a great annoyance to Bombay.*”³⁹

Aurangzeb, on the contrary, sent a fleet of 36 vessels, great and small, (towards the close of 1672) from Surat to help the Siddi. These ships perpetrated great havoc in the Marāṭhā ports of Dābol, Kelshi, etc., and destroyed above 500 of their vessels. The French supplied some ammunition to Śivājī in August following,⁴⁰ while the Dutch proffered 22 ships if Śivājī would help them conquer Bombay from the English. Śivājī, however, declined the assistance on the terms demanded by the Dutch.⁴¹

The Mughal fleet returned in May 1673 and continued its work of destruction until October. But in March 1674 there was a swing in favour of Śivājī, though in the naval battle of Satavli the admirals of both sides (Siddi Sambal and Daulat

Khān) were wounded. The Siddis lost 100 men against 44 of the Marāṭhās. The Siddis then retreated to Hariśvar, 21 miles south of Janjirā. Śivājī followed up this victory by reducing the whole of South Konkan from Rājpur to Bārdēs. During the next two years (1675-77) he was engaged in delivering his final assault on Janjirā itself.

In August 1676, 10,000 reinforcements were sent under Moro Pant *Pésvā*; but the heroic effort was frustrated in December. Desultory attacks on either side continued to the very end of Śivājī's life, but the conquest of Janjirā remained an unfulfilled aspiration. All that the Marāṭhās could do was to occupy Khanderi (Kennery) island, 30 miles N. of Janjirā and 11 ms. S. of Bombay, as a consolation prize and hold it against the combined attacks of the Siddis and the English.

The part played by the Europeans—particularly the Portuguese and the English—in this struggle for supremacy in the Konkan needs closer examination. The French were as yet timid and the Dutch ineffective despite their hatred of both the English and the Portuguese. It is not to be forgotten that their very position and interests made the Europeans play a double game. Duplicity was the very breath of their nostrils, and diplomatic negotiations were intended to cut both ways if possible. Protestations of friendship for political or commercial reasons, therefore, under such circumstances, lacked even the passing emotional honesty of lovers' pledges.

Antonio de Mello de Castro, the new Portuguese Viceroy, took office on 16 December 1662. Śivājī was then already at war with Shā'istā Khān. On 26 April 1663 de Castro wrote to Śivājī: "I send to the North a nobleman of such authority and experience that he can arrange with your Highness all that is practicable and convenient to both of us. *However, it will be with great secrecy, because in this consist the good results which I desire for Your Highness, not only on account of your brave acts but also for the good friendship which the Portuguese will find in Your Highness And I hope that from the present struggle Your Highness will come out victorious and*

that from the fame of your victories the terror in your antagonists will increase.' ⁴² Following this, on 5 May 1663, he ordered his Captain General of the North Dom Alvaro de Ataide) "not to allow any foodstuffs or provender to go to the people of the Mughal Emperor." It would be expedient, he said, "to prevent *with all dissimulation* that any kind of provision should go to the camp of the Mughal in order that for want of it he would leave this neighbourhood, and thus Shivaji would have a chance of being able to accomplish his intentions of injuring the enemy who, *as he is so powerful, would be better far away and not such a close neighbour.*' ⁴³

This, however, did not prevent de Castro from writing to Rājā Jai Singh, on 31 March 1665, "*It pleases me very much to have so near such a good neighbour.* Between our King, my Lord, and the King Sultan Aurangzib exists peace and friendship which has lasted for several years *From these lands was never given help or favour to Shivaji I hereby send orders to the North that they should not give Shivaji any kind of favour nor admit any of his people into our lands, and the same will be done from this side.*" ⁴⁴ Only eighteen days later, the same de Castro again advised his Chief Captain of the North (Ignacio Sarmiento de Carvalho), "The affairs of the Mughals which give so much anxiety . . . are, however, worthy of great consideration, and thus *it is meet we deal with them with great prudence, so that we neither give them occasion to break with us, nor should we show them that we doubt them ; and, because all their complaint is born of their imagination that we show favour to Shivaji, you should order that nothing should be done from which they could have this suspicion.* However, if *without this risk* you could *secretly* give any aid with munitions and foodstuffs to Shivaji *you should do it for money ;* because it is not desirable that if he is driven from his lands, the Mughal should remain the lord of them. *But this should be done with such great caution that never should he be able to guess, much less verify it.*" Further, "To Shivaji you will write how much better it is for him and for us that his retreat, in case it should be necessary to do so, should not

be Chaul, but rather to Goa, *where he would be more safe, and we would not have to break with the Mughal*; and in this way we would be able to be intermediary in any conference when fortune changes the state of things. *Also emphasise that he would obtain the greatest safety in this island of Goa, which he could not have in Chaul*, and thus he should be persuaded that it is best for him, and we should save ourselves as far as possible for us to do so."⁴⁵

On the top of all this, de Castro felt obliged, in August 1665, to direct his Vicar of Bassein (Fr. Dãoi ma Vicira) to wait upon Rājā Jai Singh and *to congratulate him on his victory over Śivājī* saying: "*I took from him all the transport ships which the Mahratta Shivaji had carried off on the pretence he was coming to my land, thus preventing that he should provision the fortresses so that he could resist for a long time*; as the success of this movement has shown, because *for lack of provisions they gave themselves up to him.*"⁴⁶

In 1669, the Portuguese actively helped the Siddi against Śivājī. On 27 May 1669, learning that the position of Dandā was precarious, they considered: "This matter is of vital importance (and decided) that it is not convenient to the State to have such a powerful enemy in the neighbourhood. It appeared well to us to order you to assist the fortress of Danda with some soldiers, powder, and shot necessary for the defence. *This can be done under the pretence that he (the Siddi) being our vassal we are bound to help him or under any other pretext which you might think more fit.*"⁴⁷ On 21 August, again, the same Portuguese official (Acting Governor) gave strict orders that the Siddi should be succoured by all means against the attack of Śivājī.⁴⁸

Finding that his efforts were thus being frustrated by the Firangis, Śivājī sent his *vakīl*, Viṭhal Pandit, to Goa. Consequently a treaty was signed between the Marāṭhās and the Portuguese, on 20 February, 1670, on the even basis of reciprocity. Clause 2 stated: "They should not give refuge nor provisions of any kind to the Habshi of Danda, and the Portuguese should send orders to this effect to all their ports." This

was agreed to. It was also accepted 'that there shall exist a strong friendship between both the parties, by sea and land, and should anything be done without reason, a report should be made by Raja Shivaji to the Governor of India, and in the same manner by the said Governor to the Raja Shivaji, and *without obtaining satisfaction in this way this peace and friendship should not be broken.*'⁴⁹ Strangely, while these negotiations were going on in Goa, on 16 January 1670, a letter to Lisbon declared: "Shivaji Raje has made himself master of the Konkan and levies taxes by ways which the inhabitants take ill and therefore abandon their lands. *He makes a very undesirable neighbour.* He is not firm in his promise, and *he is to be dreaded more when he pretends to be your friend*: He lives on theft and cunning; this is the fellow who entered Bardez in 1667; *at present we have to defend our lands with great caution.*"⁵⁰

Under the plea that the Marāṭhās had seized a Portuguese vessel at Daman and taken it to Dābhol, in November 1670, despite the treaty engagements, the Portuguese retaliated by capturing 12 ships belonging to Śivājī and took them to Bassein. However, the Portuguese Captain of Chaul (Louis Alvares Pereira de Lacesda) sheltered refugees from Śivājī's territories while they were harried by Aurangzeb's men towards the close of 1672. "Shivaji and his secretary and *subedar*," says the Captain, "wrote to me thanking me for the favour done to those people, to whom I replied that I did nothing but keep the terms of the peace between Shivaji and the State and that no other motive moved me." Reporting all that then transpired between him and the Marāṭhā envoy, the writer concludes: "The said physician informed me that Shivaji wanted to make himself a vassal of His Highness, for he had learnt that others had done the same, and on finding the Portuguese disposed to protect him, he would send one to Goa to treat about this with your Excellency."⁵¹

Flattered by this, the Viceroy, Louis de Mendonca Furtado, sent a copy of this report to His Majesty the King of Portugal, on 19 January, 1673. But in reply he was told: "Having

seen what you have written in your letter of 19th February 1673, by which you informed us of the condition to which you have reduced Shivaji without waging war, about his being forced to offer to the Captain of Chaul the Government of Chaul and to be the vassal of the State, I think it advisable to tell you to be careful regarding the designs of Shivaji. You should treat with him with all caution and diligence necessary for the safety of this State without neglect, attending also to the insolence with which he treats friends and enemies alike without keeping faith with any one." ⁵²

The reversal of the Portuguese policy towards Śivājī became evident at the siege of Phonda on 8 April 1675. About the middle of the month, when they realised that the besieged needed help, they secretly sent ten boat-loads of provisions along with some men. But when these were intercepted by the Marāṭhās the Portuguese disavowed them. ⁵³ It is not quite correct therefore to assert, as Sarkar has done, that the Portuguese "remained strictly neutral during his (Śivājī's) wars with the Mughals and Bijapur." ⁵⁴ The fact is that the Portuguese, at this time, were a decadent power in India "anxious only to hold their own, and timidly averting an armed encounter with every other State by employing friendly appeal, patient endurance, and diplomatic evasion." ⁵⁵

Among the external causes of the Portuguese decline were the rivalry of the Dutch and the English. ⁵⁶ These two latter powers were constantly at war among themselves and both invoked Śivājī's assistance against each other. An English letter speaking of their Dutch rivals says, "Their envy is so great towards us that to take out one of our eyes, they will lose both their own." ⁵⁷ The jealous and envious Portuguese, declares another, "have endeavoured all that lay in their power to obstruct our settlement; the (Mughal) Governor of Surat hath not been wanting alsoe to use his policy to undermine us; and Siddy Sambole with his Fleete hath been no small impediment. The Dutch with their powerful fleete designed to have swallowed us up, but blessed be God who hath hitherto preserved us and rendered all their evill designes advantageous (to us);

Sevagee onely hath proved, and that for his own interest sake, *our fairest friend and noblest enemy.*"⁵⁸ It is important to note that this is the dictum of Gerald Aungier, English Governor of Bombay. Yet, sadly, the English factors—particularly in the Bombay settlement—proved anything but friendly towards Śivāji. Elsewhere also they were deeply suspicious of his designs despite outer civilities. For example, at Madras, "Sevagee Rajia, having sent the Agent a letter of 22nd September last (1677) by two of his spys, desiring us to supply him with Ingeniers, *to which was returned him a civil excuse*, it being wholly unfit for us to meddle in it, there being many dangers consequent thereon, as well of encreasing his power, as of rendering both Golconda and the Mogull our enemys, all these parts being spread with his Spys and himself and army now come nearer this way, within two dayes march of this place." All available "Ingeniers" were employed "*to prevent any design of so evill a neighbour as Sevagee.*"⁵⁹

On the West Coast there was less of civility and more of hostility. The English had their factories at Bombay, Rājāpūr and Kārwar; and in the interior at Hubli, Athni, Dharangaon, etc. At Surat they had their Head-quarters. Their interests were primarily commercial, though exigencies of time and situation obliged them to handle fire-arms and ammunition. "*In general we must needs say,*" declared their Directors in London, "*that peace and not warr is the Element in which Trade thrives and flourishes and 'tis not the interest of a Company of Merchants to launch into those great charges which unavoidably attend it, especially where the opposition is considerable and the event very hazardous.*"⁶⁰ Rājāpūr, however, proved this a mere pious intention.

In January 1660 Śivāji's captain Dorājī raided the port. Though the English had no business to take sides in the action, they openly assisted the Muslims. The Marāṭhās infuriated by their interference, caught hold of their broker Bālājī at Jaitapūr. In order to secure his release they sent Mr. Philip Gyffard into the Marāṭhā camp; but he too was taken prisoner. Consequently, on 13 February, Mr. Revington wrote to Śivāji,

offering to assist him in the conquest of Dandā-Rājāpūr, should he be pleased to release the two prisoners. Orders were actually issued to set Bālājī and Gyffard at liberty, but some suspicious activity on the part of the latter led to Gyffard's removal to another place of security. On 23 February Revington, taking the law into his own hands, way-laid the party, 10 miles away from Rājāpūr, and romantically rescued the prisoner. Obviously he got the information from Gyffard himself. It is evident, therefore, that the immediate release of Gyffard was not effected because of his unlawful conduct, and not being, as it was alleged, "kept by a rogue Brahman in Kharepatan castle out of the lucre and expectation of a bribe."⁶¹

The second Marāṭhā attack on Rājāpūr took place in March 1661. This time too, as Sarkar has said, "the English were clearly in the wrong."⁶² While Śivājī was besieged in Panhālā by Siddhi Jauhar, from 2 March to 22 September 1660, the English supplied some ammunition to the besiegers for "tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English's." Śivājī's second raid on Rājāpūr factory was intended to punish the English for their egregious conduct. On this occasion he carried away, besides much valuable booty, Messrs. Henry Revington, Richard and Randolph Taylor, and Philip Gyffard as prisoners. Before they were removed from Rājāpūr, Śivājī offered to release them if they would agree to help him in the capture of Rājāpūr. He also promised to give them a good salt-port besides. It be recalled that Revington had himself offered these terms an year earlier. But now the arrogant prisoners declined to discourse about it, until they should be actually set at liberty. When a ransom was demanded, they declared that they had lost everything in the sack of their factory. Then they tried to negotiate once more proposing conditions leaving "a hole to creep out of their obligation." When this failed to deceive Śivājī, they threatened to invoke Imperial assistance through their Surat authorities. Finally, chafing under their loss of liberty, the 'disconsolate prisoners' petulantly complained of the apathy of their com-

patriots—the President and Council at Surat. The result was the following well-merited rebuke :—“ How you came to be in prison you know very well. It was not for defending the Company's goods, 'twas for going to the siege of Panhala and tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English's. None but what is rehearsed is the cause of your imprisonment.”⁶²

Exasperated by this embarrassing situation the prisoners attempted to escape from gaol, but were apprehended and kept in closer confinement at Rāigaḍ. Failing in all their stratagems and designs, the English at last appealed to Shā'istā Khān the Mughal viceroy in the Deccan. Unfortunately, however, as we have already witnessed, the Khān himself came to grief (5 April 1663) at the hands of Śivāji. On 3 February, the same year, the Council had commissioned *H. M. S. Covertite* to seize Śivāji's richly freighted ships bound for Mocha. But only two days afterwards the prisoners were released, after nearly two years, with an assurance that the English would receive protection in future. It is amusing to note the fulminations of the Surat Council immediately after this unexpected relief : They declared that they had ‘desisted from calling that perfidious rebel Sevagee to an account because they had neither conveniency of force or time.’ They were still determined, none the less, upon avenging the wrong done to their ‘loving brethren’ as well as the loss inflicted upon their Masters' property at Rājāpūr, though they sadly realised, “as yet we are altogether incapable for want of shipping and men necessary for such an enterprise : Wherefore patience !”⁶³

Then followed Śivāji's two raids on Surat in 1664 and 1670. We have already described them and discussed their consequences. In 1674 the English sought the opportunity of Śivāji's coronation at Rāigaḍ to make it up with him. Oxinden's embassy was deemed a great success by all the English factors in India. On 10 July 1674 the Bombay Council noted with satisfaction, “Mr. Henry Oxenden returned from Sevagy with whom a *firm peace* is settled and articles signed between the Honble. Company and him.”⁶⁴ The report was communi-

cated to Surat as well as Madras. The latter expressed warm appreciation of '*that eminent service you have done your Honble. employers in settling soe faire a correspondence with Sevagee and soe reasonable overtures for advantages both in traffique and neighbourhood*, now that the establishment of his conquests renders him no less concerned for the encouragement of trade than he was formerly for plunder.'⁶⁵ London too was likewise informed of this settlement in their letter, dated 20 August 1674, enclosing and commending Oxenden's fuller report.

The preamble to the treaty read : " Articles of peace, union and friendship between the noble prince Sevagee Rajah and the Hon. English East India Company : 1. That from this day forward, there be a true, firm and inviolable peace and amity between the noble prince Sevajee Rajah and the Hon. E. E. I. Co., their successors and assignees, and between the lands, countries, subjects and inhabitants of both parties of what degree and quality soever.

" 2. That all acts of enmity, hostility and discord, shall cease and be abolished, and that both parties shall abstain and forbear from all plunderings, depredations and injuries whatsoever, public and private, in all places both by sea and land.

" 3. That the said Sevagee Rajah and his subjects and all ether inhabitants in his Dominions, shall use and treat the English kindly and with respect and honour due to them as friends and confederates, so that they may freely pass by land and water into the countrys, cities and towns belonging to Sevagee Rajah, and there continue so long as they please, and buy provisions and likewise trade and traffick in goods and commodities of all sorts, paying the usual duties, and be obedient to the civil Government of the respective places, the same kindness to be reciprocally interchanged to the subjects of Sevagee Rajah on the island of Bombay." ⁶⁶

Peace is never the outcome of compacts and agreement. Where there is no harmony of interests there cannot be lasting amity. Like the treaty between the Portuguese and Śivāji, this one also was not calculated to last long. The hollowness

of the protestations of 'firm friendship' was soon exposed when, in November 1674, Śivājī requested the Hon'ble. Company's Bombay office to supply him fifty guns. The English had been importing guns for sale and Bombay advised Surat, "It will certainly be very good for the Company to ease their large dead-stock here by the sale of some of the guns and especially the two great brass gunns which lye heavy upon us."⁶⁷ But the President and Council, having duly debated, judged it impolitic and inexpedient to part with them : "they are of such use and service by the command they have into the sea, besides the repute they give to the place, that *although they are a charge, yet wee should blush to thinke that either Sevagee or any othars should be master of them.*"⁶⁸ Surat therefore ordered : "Though Sevagee should profer you ready money for your two brass gunns, yet we would not have you part with them without a positive order from us ; *for it is a matter of great consequence and we know not how far he may be trusted.*"⁶⁹

The guns remained unsold in Bombay until 21 January 1678, certainly, when Swally Marine reported to the Company : "The great brass gunns are remayning at the fort (Bombay), *no person appearing to buy them.* Indeed Sevagee would be our chapman for them and many more things, but for mony or expectation of payment his great debt to your Honours may witness what small punctuallity may be expected from him. *If any buyer presents, (we) shall dispose of them.*"⁷⁰ On the face of it, this was not a correct report. They were not willing to sell the guns to Śivājī in spite of his "extraordinary kinde letter . . . together with a present of 5 loads of ordinary stuffs and a confirmation of the order for the President of the mony according to agreement at Rajapore and other priviledges which he hath granted to the English in his country."⁷¹

On 1 January 1675, Marāṭhā troops, while campaigning in Mughal territory, raided Dharangaon (near Burhānpūr in Khāndesh). Considerable damage was done to the English factory there, and property worth Rs. 10,000 was looted. The English factors protested that they were at peace with Śivājī,

but the Marāṭhā troops paid no heed. Representations were then made to Śivājī, but he too did not admit their claims to compensation. Losses in enemy territory were obviously not contemplated in the Rāigaḍ undertaking. Even Bombay observed : “Sevagee and wee in these parts keep a faire understarding and good correspondence and we question not but it will continue ; *however* we shall make a full demand of the Companys and factors loss there of him and *procure for the future if possible we can*, Coles (Kauls) for the English factors and Brokers *in all places where our investments are made* that none of his forces at any time molest them.”⁷²

It is noteworthy to observe that Śivājī acceded to these requests and granted *Kauls* for future security, though at first he considered the English demands “very unreasonable.” Absurd accounts were given by Samuel Austin in his letters to Surat ; but the Surat authorities in their communication to London stated : “Satisfaction could not be procured, *Sevagee declaring that he was not lyable to make good any losse wee sustained in his enemyes country against whome he prosecuted a just war* ; he blamed the Generall of his Army much for violence done us : and to the end wee should not be subject to such injuries hereafter, he gave us his coles or passports for that place and also for many other factoryes.”⁷³ Austin, however, was not appeased and persisted in asking for his personal losses.

Rājāpūr and Kārwär, too, had suffered much on account of constant war in their vicinity. Messrs. Child and Oxenden were specially deputed, as experienced men, to set matters right in those two places. They obtained from Śivājī “effectuall orders to his Ministers together with his Cole or passe for their future security.”⁷⁴ Nevertheless the English factories continued to suffer as there was no peace in the land and not all of Śivājī's officers were equally sympathetic. We find, in May 1676, Surat warning Rājāpūr “to be very circumspect and cautious in your dealings and contracts with Sevagee's ministers, for wee experience them to be more subtle and perfidious every day than other.”⁷⁵ Not only Śivājī's men but other

local chieftains proved equally a source of trouble. And to make matters worse, the weavers and other workmen entrusted with money ran away, as at Hubli.

Hubli was 'a great inroad town and a mart of very considerable trade.' English records speak of the town as "that mark of our Carwarr factors where we sell and buy most of the goods that post affords us."⁷⁶ The Marāthās first looted it in 1664-5, but little damage was done to the English factory.⁷⁷ However, in 1673, the English lost much and, failing to get satisfaction from Śivājī, threatened to take some "smart course to revenge the wrongs."⁷⁸ Śivājī, as we have noticed before, explained that the action was unauthorised, professed friendship towards the English and advised them 'that we trade so little we can into the Decan because he is determined to make a sharp war there so soon as the rains are over.' The demand for compensation was unsubstantiated: "However he desires to see the particulars of our loss, which we could not show him having not received it from you."⁷⁹ All the same the English were getting impatient and planning some "smart course."⁸⁰ Not only Hubli and Rājāpūr, but also Athni and Kārwar had suffered. "Though we conceive the Rajah himself doth not desire to breake friendship with us, but would grant us what is reasonable, yett his officers have so little regard to his orders that they are not to be trusted."⁸¹

At first (14 June 1676) they thought of improving matters by replacing their native agents Nārāin Shenvi at Rāigaḍ by an Englishman: "And wee are of opinion, had you sent an Englishman at first and expostulated the matter a little roughly with him; or had sent Girder, for whome they have a far greater respect than your Naran Sunay, they would sooner have complied with you than now they are like to doe."⁸² But on 29 September 1676 they commissioned Captain Robert Fisher to threaten the coastal shipping unless the English were better treated: 'for as wee doe noe injury nor offer any injustice or affront to any nation whatsoever, soe wee are resolved to suffer none from any, but to vindicate the Company's right and honour in the manner wee cann.'⁸³

"Wee had once great hopes that Sevajees country would have proved advantageous to the Hon'ble. Companys trade," they mournfully declared, "and did believe he would have been soe wise and understand his own interest soe farr as to have kept a faire and just correspondence with us, but wee now find (17 Oct. 1676) that soe long as that pirate and universall robber lives, that hath noe regard to friend nor foe, God nor man, there can be noe security in any trade in his country ; wherefore wee have determined to dissolve the factory of Rajpore soe soon as wee can call in our debts Wee have not consigned them any goods this yeare nor shall wee, till wee can bring Sevagee to a better understanding with us. The same intention wee have for Carwarr if it continues long under his jurisdiction, and wee would have you alsoe withdraw all trade and correspondence out of his country Were it not for our factors and the Company's estate yet remaining at Rajpore wee would take a more smart course with him and doe ourselves justice on the first vessels wee could meet with all belonging to his ports ; but for this wee must take some more convenient opportunity." ⁸⁴

Nevertheless, the Surat authorities climbed down only a week later (25 Oct. 1676) when business considerations cooled their temper. They wrote to Bombay : "Revoking all former orders touching Brawts (Varrants or Bhatty), wee doe require you to receive the Hon'ble. Companys debts due from Sevajee in plate, *on as cheap terms as you can best agree.*" ⁸⁵ But no consistent policy was arrived at. The factors at Rājāpūr, Kārwar and Hubli, however, were instructed to get in as much as their outstanding debts as possible "before the coming downe of our Europe shippes, and what goods you have made provision of to be in readiness with yourselves ;" ⁸⁶ also "we would have you deale plainly with Annagee Punditt, and press him home, either let him make us complete satisfaction or let him know the factory shall be withdrawne ; and that you may be ready, we would have you soe dispose affairs that upon order you may without faile embark with what belongs to be Hon'ble. Companys." ⁸⁷

That the English could not get away so easily was revealed to them when Mr. Everage escaped from Rājāpūr : "The Soobedarr sent to us for the key of our warehouse . . . the which we refused to doe. [Then he took account of the stores and] sealed up the door with the Rajah seale,"⁸⁸ Meanwhile hostilities had started between the English and the Marāṭhās over "the unhappy business of Hendry Kendry."

We have before alluded to Śivājī's capture and occupation of the island of Khanderi (Kennery) near Bombay. Underi (Hendry) is only 12,00 yards from the mainland. Together these two islets constituted the "Hendry Kendry" of, perhaps, the most melodramatic episode in Anglo-Marāṭhā history.

Śivājī had attempted to fortify Khanderi in 1672, but failed. Owing to the combined opposition of the Mughals, the Siddis and the English, he was obliged to withdraw. The *Śiva-Digvijaya Bakhar* says : 'Doulat Khān and Māi Nāik Bhandārī proceeded at the head of their squadrons to fortify the island of Khanderi. They were going to build a fort, but the English ships came from Bombay, saw the extent of the projected fortifications and wrote to Yākut Khān at Janjirā. The Habshis . . . laid siege to Khanderi, with the cooperation of the English, and demanded that no building should be constructed on their frontier. The forces were not strong enough to fight the enemies ; so the Bhandārī concluded a treaty, came away amicably and informed the Mahārājā of what had happened.'⁸⁹

Śivājī took up this project more seriously in August 1679. The English once again protested saying that they had "allways supposed (Hendry Kendry) to belong to us." But the real reason was that they perceived it "little policy to suffer so potent and voracious a Prince to possess himself of soe considerable a post without disputing his title thereunto. His designs cannot be otherwise then to have check on the whole trade of this (Bombay) Island and adjacent parts, keeping there allwayes a flett of small brigantines to cruse up and downe. . . . If he is suffered to build, it will be hard disputing with him hereafter, *but at present wee suppose standing on our*

tearmes and owning it as ours, with a seeming resolution to obstruct him, may make him desist.”⁹⁰

This claim had never before been put forth in 1672 or 1674. Clause 18 of the Rāigaḍ treaty as drafted by the English themselves read : ‘That the English, and other inhabitants upon the Island Bombay, shall have free liberty to fetch firewood from the adjacent islands opposite to the main, without any obstruction from Seavage’s people, or *any custom to be demanded or paid for the same*, to whom strict prohibition to be given to prevent misunderstandings.’⁹¹ It is clear from this that the claim of Hendry Kendry as ‘allwayes supposed to belong unto us’ was only a pretext and after-thought. Besides, when the Siddi occupied Hendry, as a counterpoise to Śivāji’s occupation of Kendry, on 9 January 1680, the English—far from objecting—actually encouraged and assisted him. They simply wrote to London : “The Syddy Admirall of the King of India’s fleete hath taken and fortified another little Island.”⁹² Indeed, the Siddi proved more obnoxious than the Marāṭhā : His success “soe puft up the Syddy that he now presumes to give laws in all that Bay (solely your Honrs.’ Royalty) requiring all vessells from your Island to take his passes, otherwise will seize on them ; besides his men coming in great numbers ashore are so insolent and abusive that your Deputie Governour and Councill write us (Surat) that they are not able to bear it, and that if it be not suddenly remedied, some dangerous consequences will ensue.”⁹³

The reason why the English put up with the Siddi is thus frankly stated : “Our intention was to have complained to this Governor thereof ; but he is soe exasperated at making a peace with Seavage that he not only encourages but abets the Syddy in these abuses, which your affaires here will not suffer us at present otherwise to remedy ; therefore it will highly concern your Honrs. speedily to take some effectual course for redress of these growing evils (with divers others in your affaires here,—too many now to be repeated), otherwise you will suddenly lose your Island and all your Northern trade”⁹⁴

Despite the combined and most determined hostility of the

English and the Siddis, however, the Marāṭhās continued to occupy Khanderi and went on with the work of fortifying it. Successive attempts of the English, from 3 September 1679 to 28 January 1680, to frustrate their efforts were most valiantly withstood by them. Neither naval brow-beating nor diplomatic blandishments deflected them from their firm resolve to hold the island at all costs. The foolhardy attempt of Lieut. Thorpe, on 19 September, to effect a forced landing ended in a tragedy : Thorpe himself got killed and his *shibar* was captured. A blockade was organised from 20 September to 9 October, but proved equally futile. The naval engagements between the contemptible 'mosquito craft' of the Marāṭhās and the better equipped ships of 'the Queen of the Ocean'⁹⁵ during a whole month (18 Oct. - 18 Nov.) brought no better result. On 31 October Śivājī threatened a counter-blockade of Bombay. But on 5 November the English squadron (comprising the HUNTER, the FORTUNE, 2 *machuās*, and 5 *shibars*) drove the Marāṭhā fleet into Nagoṭhna creek where it was bottled up until 10 November. Then the Siddis joined the English and carried on a relentless war against the Marāṭhās, by land and sea. They occupied Underi (Hendry) island, as a counterpoise to Khanderi, and soon made themselves an irksome nuisance to their English allies who made peace with Śivājī.⁹⁶

This sorry episode was communicated to London in the following terms : "After exceeding trouble and difficulty wherein Mr. Child, your new Deputy Governour, hath used great paines and industry, a peace is concluded with Sevagee : wherein 1. (we) have been forced to permitt his possession of the Island in the mouth of your port of Bombay, finding wee were not able with our present strength to force him from it ; 2. what vessells taken from us, he is to make satisfaction for, and on which account wee have allready received 100 Candy of beetlenuts ; 3. likewise, what men he tooke in them to returne back, which is performed ; 4. liberty for your factors at Carwarr and Rajapore to come away at their owne conveniencys ; and 5. to cleare his former account."⁹⁷

No better commentary could be offered on the incident

than the remarks of the Court of Directors of the East India Company (London) : "Now we come to treat of the business of Bombay, which by the hostilities lately entered into with Sevagee about Hendry Kendry, renews and aggravates our further charge and trouble when we hoped we had arrived to an undisturbed and prosperous posture of affaires, and that the Island Revenues would have quite eased us of further expenses and have yielded somewhat of retribution for those excessive charges we have laid out upon it. But we are sorry to find it otherwise upon this unhappy quarrel we are fallen into, though upon what grounds began by Sevagee we know not ; but however it be, the conduct of our men by Lieutenant Thorpe was very unhappy, who either through drunkenness or great unadvisedness ran himself into the loss of his life and his party into that mischief which befell them, so that foolishly if not madly they fell into blood before you used the medium of accommodation for peace, and the endeavouring it afterwards when Sevagee had obtained and maintained his post and could not be removed from it, we doubt will either be to noe purpose or noe wayes to our honour or advantage."⁹⁸ So it turned out in the end. As Dr. Fryer observed : " Amidst these Wars, and rumours of Wars, we quietly laid down our Arms and leave Seva Gi and Syddy alone to contend for our stony piece of Ground on Henry Kenry ; how much to our Honour or Reproach may be gathered from the language we have daily cast in our Teeth : ' Why Vaunts your Nation ? What Victories have you achieved ? What has your Sword done ? Who ever felt your power ? What do you possess ? We see the Dutch outdo you ; the Portugalls have behaved themselves like Men ; every one runs you down ; you can scarce keep Bombain, which you got (as we know) not by your Valour, but compact ; And will you pretend to be Men of War or cope with our Princes ? It's fitter for you to live on Merchandise and submit to us.' "⁹⁹

CHAPTER NINE

THE CRISIS

‘ This Kingdom was invaded by a powerful enemy in the person of Aurangzeb. He used all his valour and resources, in wealth and materials, for the destruction and conquest of this Kingdom. But all his efforts proved futile, by the grace of God.’ —*Ādnā-patra*.

The true test of a living organism is its capacity to survive a crisis. The Marāṭhā State created by Śivājī, in the course of less than three decades, proved its vitality during the thirty years that followed his death on 4 April 1680. Indeed, if the Darwinian test of survival is to be applied to the Mughal Empire and the Marāṭhā Kingdom, both of which were struggling for existence—not by the tame principle of ‘live and let live’, but by the militant method of exterminating the rival—the Marāṭhās proved their fitness to survive by the eternal and immutable law of evolution. While the grandiose structure of the Mughal imperial system was visibly tottering to its fall, the young and vigorous Marāṭhā power was advancing in a crescendo of staggering success. In the words of their most vigilant critic, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, “The Marathas were no longer a tribe of banditti or local rebels, but the one dominating factor of Deccan politics, and an enemy all-pervasive throughout the Indian peninsula, elusive as the wind, the ally and rallying point of all the enemies of the Delhi empire and all disturbers of public peace and regular administration throughout the Deccan and even in Malwa, Gondwana and Bundelkhand.” This is a very correct estimate of the Marāṭhā *body politic* at the death of Śivājī, as will be amply borne out by any impartial examination, howsoever searching, of the happenings from 1680 to 1707 and after.

Aurangzeb was the most inveterate enemy of not merely the ‘execrable wretch Siva’, but also of the Marāṭhā power

which survived him. With bitter chagrin Aurangzeb declared : ' My armies were employed against him (Śivājī) ' for nineteen years, but nevertheless, his State has always been increasing '. The English factors verily observed : ' He is so inveterate against the Raja (Sambhājī) that he hath thrown off his *pagri* and sworn never to put it on again till he hath either killed, taken or routed him out of his country.'² But, by a strange irony of Fate, despite the destruction of Sambhājī, the rout of Rājārām, and the capture of Shāhū, it was Aurangzeb's empire and that of the Marāṭhās that was undermined by his ceaseless war of over forty years.

Mahārāṣṭra had met with her first crisis when she fell before the Khaljis and the Tughlaqs in the fourteenth century. Until the rise of Śivājī her emergence as an independent political entity could not have been even predicted. So long as Śivājī was alive, the only crisis she had to face was when he was virtually a captive at Āgrā with dire possibilities. Of course earlier, anything might have happened at his fateful meeting with Afzal Khān. But Śivājī appeared to have a charmed life. Indeed, ' Sevagy hath dyed so often,' wrote the English in May 1680, ' that some begin to thinke him immortal ' !³ The real crises, however, came with perturbing persistence when Śivājī was dead. They were due partly to internal and partly to external causes. The former arose out of the exigencies to which the medieval monarchy was everywhere exposed, viz., the dual curse of succession disputes and the incalculable element of the personal character of the successor to sovereign authority. To look no farther than the thirty years following Śivājī's death (1680-1710), Mahārāṣṭra was confronted with crises arising out of these two factors at least four times : 1. During the succession dispute between the supporters of Sambhājī and Rājārām (1680-81) ; 2. in 1689, when Sambhājī fell and Rājārām had to seek refuge in Ginji ; 3. in 1700, when Rājārām died leaving two sons (Śivājī and Sambhājī) by two different wives ; and 4. in 1707, when Shāhū was released by the astute imperialists in order to confound the Marāṭhās who were already in the toils of a civil war.

The external causes of what we might describe as the 'SUPER-CRISIS' consisted of a combination of enemies, great and small, who surrounded the Marāṭhās on all sides : 1. The Mughals ; 2. Bijāpūr until its extinction in 1386 ; 3. The Sīddis of Janjirā ; and 4. the Portuguese—to mention only those powers with whom the nascent Marāṭhā State had actually to wage war. Among these the Mughals alone were the most formidable ; the rest being mere auxiliaries. We shall consider the latter before the former : the minor before the major.

The Ādilshāhī had long been a-dying as we have witnessed in the preceding chapters. The succession of the boy Sikandar had indeed been the beginning of the end. The squabbles among the Afghāns and the Deccanīs had become chronic in the absence of a strong and dominating Sultān. The State appeared to have been marked by an adverse Fate, and misfortunes entered every gate. Gone were the days when by a Muslim *entente* the great and glorious Vijayanagar Empire was overthrown under Ādilshāhī leadership. Gone too were the days when, in alliance with the weaker Qutbshāhī of Golkonda, Muslim dominion was spread over the Karnāṭak regions. Gone even were the days when, in cooperation with the Mughals, Bijāpūr could obstruct—though not prevent or frustrate—the growth of the Marāṭhā power. The 'Ādil Shāh could not even create an effective local diversion in the Deccan while Śivājī was away in Karnāṭak (1677-78) with the larger portion of his army. Nay, 'Jamshid Khan, since the death of the Nawab (Bahlol Khan, on 23 Dec. 1677) found himself incapable of longer holding out (and) agrees with Shivaji to deliver up (the fort of Bijapur and the person of Sikandar Ādil Shah) to him for 6,00,000 *pagodas*' (Feb. 1678). The resourcefulness of Siddi Masūd, however, saved Bijāpūr for the time being.⁴

The acquisition of Koppal, in March 1679, had put 'the gate of the South' (Sabhāsad) into the hands of the Marāṭhās. Gadag had been conquered even earlier. Marāṭhā dominion now extended over the Tungabhadra river into the Bellāry and Chitaldurg districts. The local chieftains of

Kanakgiri, Harpanhalli, Rāidurg, etc., having been subdued. that country was formed into a regular province under Janārdan Pant Hanumanté. So weak was Bijāpūr all this time that, finally, even Masūd had to acquiesce in Śivājī's Karnāṭak conquests in return for help received from him when Bijāpūr was besieged by Dilir Khān (Aug. to Nov. 1679). But for Śivājī's timely and effective assistance, Bijāpūr might have fallen then, instead of seven years afterwards. The 'rebel' Śivājī thus proved a truer saviour of the 'Ādilshāhī than its imperial ally from the North.⁵

Śivājī was certainly not in love with either Bijāpūr or Golkondā; but he had clearly foreseen that the Mughals would prove more dangerous. As it transpired, the conquest of Bijāpūr and Golkondā by Aurangzeb (1686-7) brought the Mughals into closer proximity to the Marāṭhās. The Muslim kingdoms could no longer be played off against one another. On the contrary Aurangzeb's prestige as their conqueror was considerably increased in the South. His resources as well as strategic advantages were also augmented. As successor to the 'Ādil Shāh and the Qutb Shāh he could now legitimately claim hegemony over the Karnāṭak.

Śivājī's failure in taming the Siddi had fateful repercussions on the West Coast. It hardened the masters of Janjirā, on the one side, and emboldened the Portuguese, on the other. This was for Sambhājī a baffling inheritance. He could not be expected to succeed where his father had definitely failed. Yet the irascible son of Śivājī was desperately determined to suppress the Siddi. So another heroic attempt was made to reduce Janjirā (1680-82) before the Bhoṣṭé could feel convinced that his control must stop with the shore.

Though the Siddis were much disturbed by the quantities of shot and shell incessantly fired into their island-fortress by the Marāṭhās, they stuck to the rock like the iguana. 'Sambhājī is resolved,' wrote the English on 19 January 1682, 'not to raise the siege so long as he hath a rag to his back.'⁶ He had drafted an army of 50,000 men, under Dādājī Deśpāṇḍé, to build a causeway across the channel, 800 yards wide and 30

yards deep, to reach the island. 20,000 troops with a vast train of artillery were also despatched to bombard Janjirā. When sheer force failed, stratagem was tried, but with equally futile results. A desperate attempt to effect a landing by sea had ill-success, for not above 500 escaped (out of 4,000), the rest being all killed by the Siddi and his men.' :

The attitude of the English and the Portuguese towards Sambhājī was more helpful to the Siddi than to the Marāṭhās. When Sambhājī invoked their assistance, the President and Council at Surat instructed Bombay : "you must use all contrivances to keep fair with them ; as we would by no means quarrel with Sambhaji Rajah, so upon no account can we with prudence fall out with the Siddi at present, it being a very unfit time." As a matter of fact they were "more afraid of the Mughal's displeasure than Sambhaji's (and) ordered the admittance of the Siddhi's fleet (in Bombay waters)."⁸

This kind of complicity enraged Sambhājī against both the English and the Siddis, but he had not the power to punish them. His fleet was twice beaten by the Siddis—i. in August 1681 at Underi, and ii. in October the same year at Bombay.⁹ In the latter action Siddi Misri, the Muslim Captain of the Marāṭhā fleet, was mortally wounded and died in Bombay. An attempt to punish the English by setting the Arabs against them ended in a disaster to the latter.¹⁰ Before this trouble was over, Sambhājī had to face the Portuguese, and the Siddis consolidated their position.

After Sambhājī's death (1689), Siddi Khairiyat Khān captured several of the Marāṭhā strongholds in the Konkan, like Talé, Ghosālé, Rāigad, etc. Between 1696 and 1706 Siddi Qāsim ruled over Janjirā as his brother Khairiyat's successor, under the title of Yāqut Khān. He fortified and garrisoned all the places conquered by his predecessor, as well as looted and devastated the Marāṭhā districts in the neighbourhood.¹¹ All this was winked at or encouraged by Aurangzeb. Siddi Yāqut died in 1706. But the Marāṭhās, being engrossed in their life and death struggle against the Mughals, could hardly

attend to the Siddi. Not until a Śivājī of the Seas arose in Kānhojī Āngre could anything be done with their rivals.

Turning to the Portuguese, we might characterise Marāṭhā relations with them at the close of Śivājī's life as 'peaceful but not friendly.' Under Sambhājī the position deteriorated. Prof. Pissurlencar has deplored the imprudence of Sambhājī in this result and tried to show how friendly the Portuguese always were towards the Marāṭhās.¹² But we have seen enough of their dealings, in the last chapter, to accept this criticism. With the Siddis still on his hands, Sambhājī could ill-afford to antagonise either the English or the Portuguese. Pissurlencar has himself admitted that, to begin with, Sambhājī had begun well with the Portuguese.¹³ Without overlooking the faults of Sambhājī, it is equally necessary to examine the conduct (1682-84) of the new Portuguese Viceroy, Francisco de Tavora Conde de Alvor.¹⁴

Aurangzeb was very anxious to win over the Portuguese to his side in order to open a second front against the Marāṭhās from the sea-side. Manucci was at that time in Goa. "When Aurangzeb's letter reached the Viceroy," he writes, "he had me sent for to translate it into Portuguese. On hearing the proposals I gave him advice as to what he should do. For this war could not be of any benefit to the Portuguese, seeing that the Mughal would never be content to leave the Portuguese to themselves after he had destroyed Sambhājī. In spite of this the Viceroy engaged in the war against that prince, and thereby all but lost Goa."¹⁵

Conde de Alvor, rather than Sambhājī, it appears to us, was responsible for the breach of friendship between the Portuguese and the Marāṭhās. Sambhājī wanted to fortify Anjdiv, an island to the south of Kārwār, as a naval base (like Khanderi) to counterpoise Janjirā; but the Portuguese forestalled him by planting their flag there in April 1682. When Sambhājī protested against this as an unfriendly act, the Viceroy simply declared that he was his own master in his own territories.¹⁶ To make matters worse, he wrote to his Captain of the North (Don Manoel Lobo de Silveira) and the gover-

nors of Chaul, Bassein and Daman, asking them to allow free passage to the Mughal troops marching against Sambhājī.¹⁷ These were intolerable acts of unfriendliness in the eyes of Sambhājī. The make-believe of a congratulatory letter (28 July 1682) over the birth of Shāhū, written by de Alvor,¹⁸ could ill-conceal the real attitude of the Portuguese Viceroy. Sambhājī, in his sober moments, was too realistic a man to be deceived by such political gestures. He, therefore, made up his mind that it was necessary to foil Aurangzeb's designs by the conquest of Goa. War thus became inevitable.

Shāh Maḥomed, Mughal envoy carrying Aurangzeb's letter to the Viceroy (dated June 1682), was in Goa on 20 January 1683. He left the place in April following.¹⁹ But hostilities between the Portuguese and the Marāṭhās had already begun. In December 1682 Mughal vessels carrying provisions to Ranmast Khān, who was ravaging Marāṭhā territory near Kalyāṇ, had been allowed by the Portuguese to pass through Thāṇā. Sambhājī started his reprisals on 5 April 1683,—surprising patience considering his irascible temper! He looted and destroyed Tārāpūr and other towns from Bassein to Daman. The Portuguese retaliated by capturing Marāṭhā vessels and imprisoning (16 May) their ambassador (Essajī Gambhir Rāo?) in Goa.²⁰ The major actions of this war were fought at Chaul, Phondā (Fondem) and Estovao near Goa.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has tripped at many points connected with this struggle, both as regards dates and places. His account is both inaccurate and misleading.²¹ The Portuguese case does not at all bear extenuation or defence as Sarkar has attempted to do. Conde de Alvor *never* "planned to make a diversion" for the Marāṭhā: he only fell a victim to Sambhājī's ruse. Sambhājī, as Manucci has unequivocally stated, sent to the Viceroy tutored spies who told him that in the fortress of Phondā there were great treasures. "His object was to get the Viceroy to leave Goa with a large force for the conquest of that fortress. Then he meant to cut off the Portu-

guesse retreat and prevent their return, in this way making himself master of Goa."²²

Manucci learnt of this design through the French at Rājāpūr. The warning was conveyed to the Portuguese Viceroy : "I told His Excellency, but he would not heed my words. He issued forth with eight hundred white soldiers and eight thousand Canarese. He crossed with them to the other side of the river and began his campaign. With him went five pieces of heavy artillery."²³ Far from being unopposed, as Sarkar has said, the Viceroy had a very hot reception at the hands of the Marāṭhās : "They attacked with great fury the Viceroy's army, and gave him as much to do as he could manage. His best troops were killed, and, if he had not used wooden obstructions with which to impede the onset of the cavalry he would never have been able to get back to Goa, nor could he have made any defence. The rainy weather impeded the discharge of his matchlocks ; thus, coming on still closer, a trooper among the Rajputs²⁴ dealt His Excellency a sword blow on the ribs. Retreating slowly, he reached the river-bank with great difficulty, and once more entered Goa. *He recognised, although too late, that he had been misled.*"²⁵

This disastrous and disgraceful rout has been characterised by Sarkar as a retirement "bravely and skilfully conducted by the Viceroy in person"²⁶ All the field-pieces and ammunition are declared to have been brought away, and "the Portuguese had only a small skirmish which cost about 100 men on each side." Yet Manucci, who was in Goa at the time, noted that "great grief was caused in the city from the fruitless loss of so many lives."²⁷ Well might this have been so mourned over, for the Portuguese as well as their native troops "threw down their muskets and fled . . . but in vain, for the blacks rode over them, trampling most of our men. All our men fled in utter disorder, each one trying to save himself. . . . Nearly a whole company of seamen were killed, the dead and wounded amounting to two hundred."²⁸

The Marāṭhās next seized the island of Santo Estêvão (Juã, 2 ms. N. E. of Goa). There was great consternation

in Goa, and on the following day (15 Nov. 1683) the Viceroy, "against the judgement of Dom Rodrigo da Costa, wished to reoccupy the place.... He selected some 150 soldiers, shouting in a loud voice that any one who meant should follow him. He went as far as the castle walls and marched round them, during which Sambhājī's troops slew a great many. Some reinforcements arrived, and by good luck the Viceroy and Dom Rodrigo were able to reach their boats and take to flight, otherwise they would certainly have been killed like the rest Sambhājī's soldiers retained the island and were very near to Goa. They gave so much trouble to the city that *the Viceroy resolved to send an embassy to that prince to see if he could obtain a peace*, and I was obliged to go a second time to Sambhājī But the fighting still went on with great energy. *Well was it for the Portuguese that Sambhājī never knew exactly how few men there were in the island. If he had known, he could have carried out his scheme* (of occupying Goa) *in its entirety.*"²⁹

The old tragedy was once more enacted : The Viceroy was himself wounded by a bullet in the arm ; more than 150 men were killed ; the rest either fled or got stuck in the mud never to escape alive. The Marāṭhās left the island on 16 November 1683,³⁰ but continued to ravage the country round about. Sambhājī quitted Goa in December.

In the northern theatre of war, too, the fight was inconclusive. The siege of Chaul (Aug. 1683) cost the Marāṭhās dear. On 22 December they occupied the island of Karinja (10 ms. S. E. of Bombay). It was however, retaken by the Portuguese in September. The two parties continued to 'snarl and snap at each other' for some time afterwards.³¹

Early in 1684 a truce was patched up between the Portuguese Viceroy and Sambhājī by which, among other things, it was settled that 'when Sambhājī on his part will have given over in the north all lands and fortresses, with all the artillery and arms which he had taken from us, and returned all the prisoners, then the same kind of restitution will be made to him

of all his men who are now in our hands, and the *gāo candil*(?) of Bassein will be paid and the *chouts* of Daman, Sambhājī Rājē being obliged to defend those territories as he has promised.' ³² However on 24 January 1686 we find the Portuguese reporting to Lisbon that 'As Sambhājī did not keep the terms of peace it became necessary to continue the war with him.' ³³

Whatsoever the cause of continued or fresh hostilities, the Portuguese secretly incited the Desāis of Concao (Konkan) to rebel against Sambhājī. Consequently, Khem Sāvant, with Portuguese assistance, roamed over places belonging to the Marāṭhās, burning and robbing, north of Goa. (Feb. 1685). The Dalvis of Phondā did the same to the south of Goa, always finding safe refuge in Portuguese territory. The Portuguese treaty with these chieftains (8 Feb. 1685) makes interesting reading. It was signed by 'Rama Dalvy Bounsullo and Deva Saunto Bounsullo, servants of Quema Saunto Sardesai of Curallo, and two others.' Its terms were : That they should capture the lands from Banda to Ancolla, and, dividing them into three parts, they should give two to the Portuguese ; that the one who takes the lands from Cuddale to Chaul would be helped by a Portuguese fleet, to cow down opposition all along the coast, with their own crew, arms and ammunition, in return for which they were to receive a third of the lands, etc., taken. Besides the fleet, they would be supplied with gunpowder and bullets, 'as much as could be spared,' without paying in kind or money. The Viceroy also undertook to write to the King Mogor asking him to take the chiefs into his service, and to this end he would send his own men to accompany them to the Mogor. Finally, if they came out victorious, the Portuguese would grant them the same liberty as they enjoyed under the Moors and under Sambhājī, to live in those territories according to their rites, having their own temples and other things ; but they should not make peace with Sambhājī, as the Portuguese too would not; nor do harm to the factories of the English, the French and the Dutch in Sambhājī's territories. The Portuguese agreed to lend them money

on these terms and on their giving hostages, but *only to the extent they could, and after starting the war.*³⁴

The stipulation against harming the English and other Europeans, in the above treaty, throws an instructive side-light on the attitude of the foreigners. Despite their mutual rivalries and national antipathies (which often resulted in armed antagonisms), *per contra* the heathen natives, they felt like safeguarding their European and Christian interests. The *Italian* Manucci obtains secret information about Sambhājī's military movements from the *French* at Rājāpūr, and warns the *Portuguese*, as we have before noticed. The Portuguese stipulation regarding the English is all the more interesting in the light of the English attitude about them. On 30 Nov. 1683 Sir John Child wrote to Sir Josia Child: "Bombay labours under abundance of troubles from the Siddi and *our very naughty neighbours the Portuguese*. They have lately forbid all provisions going to our island and afford it all the injury they can. They are at war now with Sambhaji Raja."³⁵ Again, on 7 April 1684, we find the Company's Directors asking Surat to vindicate the honour of their nation against *the insolence of the Portuguese* as well as the Moors: But "in the face of impending struggle peradventure it may be prudent to temporise with the Moghul and Sambhaji until we have righted ourselves with other two and until you have made Bombay so formidable that the appearance of it may fright the Moghul's government and Sambhaji Raja."³⁶

Bombay was to be made 'as strong as money and art could make it.' Sir John Child, President of Surat Council, was styled 'Captain General and Admiral of all forces by sea and land in the Northern parts of India, from Cape Comorin to the Gulf of Persia.' In October 1685 Surat was informed that the Directors had decided upon firm action both against 'the Moors and the impudence of the interlopers', for which it was necessary to 'enter into a close confederacy and friendship with Sambhaji Raja and *maintain always a strict friendship with him.*'³⁷ In 1687 Child moved to Bombay, together with his Council, from Surat and made it the seat of the Company's

Government. Sambhājī was losing against the Mughals, but the English felt that Bombay was safer than Surat.³⁸

However, the negotiations with Sambhājī proved fruitless as he was not in a position to assist the English, nor were the English anxious to help Sambhājī.³⁹ After the final catastrophe of Sambhājī, we find Child writing to the Directors in England on 12 Dec. 1689 : "At present there is no certain news where Raja Ram is ; but on this part of India he does not appear, nor any force of his in the field to withstand the Moghul and his forces. Rairee . . . and most of his strongholds are fallen into the Moghul's hands. . . . All the country about us that was the Raja's is the Moghul's now ; there only stands out for the Raja near us the little island Kenery, . . . and another castle on the mainland called Padangarh to the southward of Chaul. . . . They have been with us for assistance and would feign borrow money, etc. We have given them all good words, may be, and keep them engaged what we can for the present, but in all appearance they will not hold out long, and should we trust them, they will certainly deceive us."⁴⁰

The sad state of Mahārāṣṭra alluded to in the above reference constituted the Major crisis of her history since the death of Śivājī in 1680. The last days of that great monarch had indeed been clouded by anxieties such as Akbar had felt on his death-bed. Sambhājī's character and conduct were somewhat analogous to Selim's in several respects : Both were inheritors of a glory and responsibilities which their characters could ill-sustain ; both were in revolt against their fathers who were forced to keep them under duress on account of grave misdemeanour ; both alike were a prey to overpowering passions which neutralised virtues that might otherwise have enabled them to improve upon their heritage ; both were looked upon by their fathers with grave apprehensions about the wisdom of their succession ; both had junior rivals whose eligibility was considered more suitable ; both allowed authority to slip out of their own hands into those of their favourites, though of very different characters and consequently with very different results. There is no comparison between the noble

Nūr Jahān and the criminal Kavi Kalaś or Kaluśā ; the former proved the saviour of Jahāngīr, while the latter was the ruiner of Sambhājī. Both, however, possessed accomplishments through which they could master their masters and hold them in a *vice*. The only redeeming feature of the two reigns was that there were very able State-officials who served their sovereigns out of regard for their great predecessors and a deep sense of personal responsibility. The tragedy of Sambhājī is without a parallel in history : a tragedy of high spirits self-poisoned, of courage without character and scholarship without sagacity, unfortunately fortunate to have been the son and successor of Śivājī, whose incontinence and fitful cruelties eclipsed an otherwise loveable personality.¹¹

What perturbed Śivājī more than any moral blemish of Sambhājī was his defection to the Mughal camp on 13 December 1678. That unfilial, unpatriotic, indiscreet delinquency seemed to jeopardise all the great and good work that Śivājī had done during nearly half-a-century of his strenuous life. Was all that he had so arduously achieved to be undone by his own son? But the destinies of Mahārāṣṭra were not to miscarry even under such a misfortune. Still, it terribly upset the anxious father. Sambhājī had not merely deserted to the enemy but also attacked Bhūpālgaḍ which was in the keeping of the veteran Firangjī Narsalā (the valiant hero of Chākan). Overwhelmed by conflicting sentiments (human though unsoldierly) the old warrior behaved like Tardi Beg Khān at Delhi on the eve of Akbar's entry into India, and met with the same fate. His error of judgment in yielding the fortress to the rebellious son of his master earned for him the extreme penalty of a delinquent soldier.

Sambhājī, however, returned to his father in December next (1679) and was kept in confinement in Panhālā. Śivājī died at Rāigaḍ on 4 April 1680. Plans to supersede Sambhājī only provoked him, when he regained freedom and authority, into acts of insensate cruelty. Soyarā Bāi (Rājārām's mother) was inhumanly put to death, Annājī Datto and several other important officers of State were barbarously executed, and the

Śirkés were equally ruthlessly exterminated.⁴³ Rājārām, Sambhājī's step-brother, hardly ten years of age, had been raised to the throne as a puppet only to be thrown into prison for no fault of his own.

The accession of Sambhājī, on 20 July 1680, in the midst of the turmoil which followed the death of Śivājī, seemed to afford Aurangzeb the opportunity of his life. The flight of Prince Akbar (Aurangzeb's rebellious son) into Mahārāṣṭra, on 1 June 1681, lured him into the Deccan which was destined to be his grave. Things had not been moving satisfactorily there for quite a long time. Shāh 'Ālam had been replaced by Khān-i-Jahān Bahādūr Khān as viceroy in May 1680. The old general laid siege to Ahivant in July 1680, but the defenders made good resistance. As soon as the rains ceased, Sambhājī opened his campaign in Khāndesh. Burhānpūr and Dharampūr were sacked in January 1681. No resistance was offered, much harm was done, and the people threatened 'civil disobedience' if better protection was not afforded them by the imperial officers.⁴⁴ So the Emperor hastened South and arrived at Aurangābād on 22 March 1682.

'As soon as the peace negotiations with the Rānā (of Mewār) were completed,' writes Manucci, 'Aurangzeb left Ajmer, early in September of the year 1681. His object was now a war with Sambhājī, all unmindful of his fate—namely, that this departure was for ever, that there would be no return for him either to Āgrā or to Delhi; for it is now (in 1700) nineteen years that he has been in camp without effecting anything against that rebellious people, the Mahrattahs. God only knows what will come to pass in the end! For the reports continually brought in to me are that he is in a very bad way, closely pressed by the aforesaid Mahrattahs. Thus until this day he has not been able to accomplish the enterprise he intended (as he said) to finish in two years. He marched carrying with him three sons, Shāh 'Ālam, A'zam Tārā, and Kām Bakhsh, also his grandsons. He had with him much treasure, which came to an end so thoroughly during this war that he was compelled to open the treasure-houses of Akbar, Nūr

Jahān, Jahāngīr, and Shāh Jahān. Besides this, finding himself with very little cash, owing to the immense expenditure forced upon him, and because the revenue-payers did not pay with the usual promptitude, he was obliged at Aurangābād to melt down all his household silver ware. In addition to all this, he wanted to empty the great store-houses filled with goods left by deceased persons or with property collected in Akbar's, Jahāngīr's and Shāh Jahān's time from the men, great and small, who had been servants of the State. But afterwards he ordered these store-houses not to be opened, for he rightly feared that, he being absent, the officials would embezzle more than half.⁴⁵

While a Mughal fleet was cruising along the Konkan coast in order to intercept Prince Akbar, to prey upon Marāṭhā vessels, and to divert Sambhāji's attention generally, a Mughal army of 14,000 horse, under Hasan 'Ali Khān, descended upon Kalyān from Junnar, burning and destroying villages *en route*. Prince Azam and Dīlir Khān were sent towards Aḥmednagar, while another division was despatched to Nāsik, under Shihab-u'd-Dīn Khān and Dalpat Rāi. But the siege of Rāmsej (7 ms. N. of Nāsik), despite reinforcements sent under Khān-i-Jahān himself, very soon revealed to Aurangzeb the might and resourcefulness of the Marāṭhās. "If we may believe Khafi Khan who was present at the siege," writes Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "the fort had no iron cannon, but the garrison hollowed out trunks of trees and fired leather missiles from them 'which did the work of ten pieces of artillery.'"⁴⁶

Aurangzeb's spirit was roused by this incident and he decided upon extensive operations. Meanwhile the siege of Rāmsej dragged on and Khān-i-Jahān had to withdraw petulantly burning down the wooden tower constructed by him at great cost. 'The exultant Marathas crowded over the walls, beating their drums for joy and taunting the retreating Mughals in the foulest language.'⁴⁷ Likewise the imperialists felt obliged to decamp from Kalyān destroying its fortifications. Sambhāji attacked them from the rear, killing many and capturing a large number of horses. "Thus we see," observes Sarkar, "that for

more than a year after his arrival at Aurangabad, from November 1681 to April 1683, the Emperor accomplished nothing notable in spite of his immense resources."⁴⁸ The Surat factors wrote on 3 April 1682 that Aurangzeb 'hath with him a great army with which he sits still and attempts nothing, being under great jealousy and fears, thinks himself hardly secure'. He was 'continually wavering' being 'extraordinarily peevish and uneasy'. To avoid the Emperor's wrath, it was suspected, Dilir Khān poisoned himself.⁴⁹

In the Konkan, Shāh 'Ālam had crossed the Rāmghāṭ pass (26 ms. W. of Belgāum and 30 ms. N. E. of Goa) and entered Sāvāntvādī. Hasan 'Alī Khān guarded his lines of communication over the Ghāṭs with 5,000 men. It was on account of this move that Sambhājī had withdrawn suddenly from Goa after Estevao (Dec. 1683). Yet, Shāh 'Ālam demanded from the Portuguese a large fee for having rescued them from Sambhājī! When they demurred, he plotted to seize Goa by treachery and ravaged the surrounding country when he was balked of his prey. This, says Sarkar, was "the worst mistake the Prince could have committed, because ultimately it meant the annihilation of his army through famine."⁵⁰

The historic disaster of the worse than Zenophon retreat (more like Napoleon's from Moscow) of Shāh 'Ālam's army has been graphically described by Manucci who was an eye witness. They were retreating over the Rāmghāṭ pass "a league and a half of ascent. Here Sambhājī might have killed the whole of us, for it was a place difficult to climb, with narrow paths passing through jungle and thorny scrub. . But he did not choose to attempt it, and they said he was acting in collusion with Shāh 'Ālam. But what Sambhājī did not do by attacking us, God carried out by the pestilence which raged in the army with such violence that in seven days of its prevalence everyone died who was attacked—that is about one-third of the army. Of this disease there died every day five hundred men ; nor was the mortality confined to men only—it extended to horses, elephants and camels. This made the air pestilential, and it being a confined route, supplies also failed, and this was

like encountering another enemy. For although, as I said, wheat was abundant, from this time there were no animals to carry it. Thus the soldiers had more than enough to undergo. Many of those whose horses died had no money to buy others, nor was there anyone in the camp ready to sell. They were thus forced to march on foot, and many died of the great heat and thirst they underwent.'⁵¹ The miserable remnants of Shāh 'Ālam's army reached Aḥmednagar on 18 May 1684, having accomplished nothing beyond burning and plundering a portion of the Konkan. "He hath taken no stronghold," observed the English, "but ruins the country, lays all waste, and burns all towns he comes near."⁵²

Aurangzeb then concentrated on the conquest of Bijāpūr and Golkonḍa which he accomplished in 1686 and 1687 respectively.⁵³ Sambhājī sent some succour to the beleaguered cities but could do little more. Aurangzeb also accused the Qutb Shāh of having sent a *lākh* of *pagodas* to 'the wicked Sambha.' When the two Sultanates were destroyed and their armies disbanded, Sambhājī found employment for most of them. "God made use of this very expedient of Aurangzeb," writes Manucci, "to counteract his projects. In disbanding the soldiers of those other kingdoms, he imagined he was making his future enterprises a certainty. But Sambhājī was thereby only rendered the more powerful ; for although he had no sufficient resources to entertain so many men, he welcomed all who resorted to him, and in place of pay allowed them to plunder wherever they pleased."⁵⁴ All the same, flushed with his recent triumphs over Bijāpūr and Golkonḍa, Aurangzeb vowed that he would not return to the North 'until he had seen Sambhājī's bleeding head weltering at his feet.'⁵⁵

One of the windfalls of the Mughal offensive at a very critical stage was the death of Hambīr Rāo Mohitē, Śivājī's great generalissimo (Dec. 1687). The Mughal general Sarja Khān indeed met with at Wāi 'the fate that had befallen Afzal Khan,'⁵⁶ but it was a pyrrhic victory for the Marāṭhās. Hambīr Rāo drew the enemy into a death-trap in the Mahā-bales'var Hills—as the Śirkés had done with Malik-u't-Tujjār

—and slaughtered them. “The warworn cavalry leader,” writes Kincaid, “added to skilful generalship an intimate knowledge of the Deccan and Konkan hills. On the battle-field the sound of the veteran’s voice was worth fifty squadrons. In the council chamber he alone ventured to beard the infamous Kalasha or recall to his master a fitting sense of his exalted duties. Had Hambirrao lived, it is possible that with his hold firmly established on Jinji and with the resources of much of southern India at his command, Sambhaji would have repelled the Mughal offensive. But on Hambirrao Mohite’s death Kalasha became all powerful and Sambhaji became more and more a slave to profligacy and intemperance; and the effects of the King’s vice and sloth were soon visible in the disasters of his armies.”⁵⁷

The sins of omission and commission were indeed beginning to bear fruit for Sambhājī. When Bālājī Āvjī, his son Āvjī Ballāl and brother Śāmājī were trampled under the feet of elephants, Yesu Bāi, Sambhājī’s queen, is stated (by Chitnis) to have declared to her erring husband: “You have not acted properly in killing Bālājī Prabhu; he was a venerable and trustworthy servant. Śivājī used to confide his secrets to him and say—‘Chitnis is the very life of the kingdom and myself.’ On oath he had pledged that office to Bālājī and his family. You have killed and alienated so many; the few remaining also you have treated so unfairly. What will become of our kingdom?”⁵⁸ Rāmdās had likewise admonished the Prince advising him to avoid excesses and to act always in the memory of his noble father.⁵⁹ Raghunāth Pant Hanumantē (whom Sambhājī had displaced by his brother-in-law Hirji Mahādik, as viceroy of the Karnāṭak) equally candidly asked: “Why is the kingdom shrinking daily? Why is the Siddi still unsubdued? Why are Brahmans being beheaded instead of being imprisoned? Why are the enemies sought to be won over instead of executed? Why is the administration in Kalusha’s hands instead of the King’s?”⁶⁰ The one and only answer was that Sambhājī had gone too far down the primrose path to be redeemed.

Writers have blamed Kavi Kalās for this. Khawāfi Khān, describes Sambhājī's boon companion as a 'filthy dog.' He also observes that 'Unlike his father, (Sambhājī was addicted to wine, and fond of the society of handsome women, and gave himself up to the pleasure. . . pleasures which bring so many men of might to their ruin.'⁶¹ Both Sambhājī and Kabjī were 'entirely unaware of the approach of the Falcon of Destiny,' as they were regaling themselves with the gifts of Bacchus and Venus, at Sangamesvar (22 ms. N. E. of Ratnā-giri) on the Ghāṭs. This was none other than Muqarrab Khān,⁶² Aurangzeb's emissary, who with 3,000 picked men came from Kolhāpūr 'with the speed of lightning' and pounced upon his prey on 1 February 1689. Two weeks later the unfortunate prisoners were presented to the Emperor in his camp at Bahādurgad. A verdict of death was pronounced by the doctors of law for having 'slain, captured, and dishonoured Muslims, and plundered the cities of Islām.' The captives then became legitimate targets of humiliation, ridicule and torture (at which the Inquisitors of Europe might have blushed) at the hands of the true believers. Finally, on 11 March 1689, the infidels were put through a most barbarous execution at Korégām on the Bhīmā (12 ms. N. E. of Poona). The place was renamed Fatehābād.⁶³

Martin alleges that 'some of the leading Brahmans', disgusted with Sambhājī's misconduct, conceived 'the design of destroying him.' They informed some imperial officers and got troops placed in ambush 'at a place which was convenient for their purpose'. Then luring Sambhājī into 'the diversion of hunting, caused him to be led into the trap where the Mughals enveloped him. His head was by order of the Emperor carried to various provinces and publicly exposed in many cities.'⁶⁴

"It has been said," writes Manucci, "that custom becomes nature; and a man accustomed to any vice cannot, even when he would, free himself from the tendency that by repeated acts he has contracted. Thus was it with Sambhājī. Habituated to interfering with other men's wives, now when it had become necessary to act the hero, he could not rid himself of his per-

verse inclinations. This was the cause of his losing liberty and life. Kab Kalish availed himself of this evil propensity to deliver him into the hands of Aurangzeb." The traitor was the first to be punished, "so that he might be unable to state that this great treason had been plotted at Aurangzeb's instigation." Then Sambhājī was painfully paraded on a camel with the cap and bells of a clown, and when the humiliating and painful perambulation was completed, Aurangzeb "ordered his side to be cloven open with an axe and his heart to be extracted." The body was thrown to the dogs.⁶⁵

Vain hatred ! Mahārāṣṭra could not be crushed that way. The murder of Sambhājī sent a thrill of horror through every Marāṭhā heart and made his hair stand on end. The reaction revealed that every such hair was also turned into a spike ; for Aurangzeb had unwittingly sown the dragon's teeth. "It seemed as if the death of Sambhājī," Manucci observes, "was bound to secure Aurangzeb's lordship over all the lands of Hindustan down to the sea. But the commanders of valorous Shivājī, father of this unfortunate man, were by this time practised in fighting the Mughals, and expert in the way of dealing with those foreigners who deserted from his side. They determined to continue the campaign and uphold the cause of Rām Rājā, younger brother of the deceased. Therefore they took him out of the prison and made him their prince. . . . Thus in 1689 the war recommenced with great fury. It was not enough for Aurangzeb to have made himself master of Bijāpūr and of Gulkandah ; he must needs oppress a little prince who yet was strong enough to compel so potent a king to remain away from his kingdom (i.e. Hindustān) and dwell in camp merely to prevent the loss of his previous conquests.'"⁶⁶

The period of eighteen years, from 1689 to 1707, was one of utmost trial for the Marāṭhās. Their race had produced not only a Śivājī, but also a Sambhājī. How could the future of such a people be confidently predicted ? Rājārām was still in his teens and was not a man of genius ; certainly not a leader of the qualities of his father, nor had he the drive or flare of Sambhājī. Shāhū, son of Sambhājī, was a lad of seven

summers. Leadership that the situation demanded was not to be found within the royal family. This was indeed the crest of the crisis, but the nation produced other men of drive and decision, of courage and character, of brawn as well as brain. That is why, despite the resources and determination of Aurangzeb, the country was saved. As men of faith, indeed, as the *Amātya* put it, "all his efforts proved futile *by the grace of God*." Yet is it equally true that Providence was acting through men like the *Amātya* himself : 'This object, just as it was conceived in the mind of His Majesty, was carried out on account of God's extreme kindness and your efforts.'⁶⁷

The saviours of the legacy of Śivājī and the heritage of Mahārāṣṭra at this time—to name only the most prominent—were 1. Rāmachandrapant Bāvdēkār *Amātya*, 2. Śankrājī Nārāyaṇ, 3. Paraśurām Trimbak, 4. Santājī Ghorpaḍé, 5. Dhanājī Jādhav, 6. Khaṇḍo Ballāl *Chīṭnis*, and 7. Pralhād Nirājī. They were the seven sages (*saptaṛṣi*), the BRAIN TRUST of Mahārāṣṭra whose courage, wisdom, resourcefulness, perseverance, patriotism, presence of mind, loyalty, selflessness and devotion to duty saved Mahārāṣṭra. But it is not to be forgotten at the same time that these great qualities were 'in the widest commonalty spread', without which little could have been achieved by leadership alone. The innumerable heroes and heroines of Mahārāṣṭra in those dark days of sore strain—despite the blacksheep among them bore themselves up with courage and patience. It was their 'blood, sweat, tears and toil' not less than the statesmanship of the *Amātya* and the valiant generalship of Dhanājī and Santājī that made history for Mahārāṣṭra. While 'His Majesty'—Rājārām—supplied the sentimental and traditional tie, the wisdom and valour of these Pillars of State overcame all obstacles '*by the grace of God*.' Faith, indeed, is life-giving. This Faith, which moves mountains, was the 'cumulative index' of the work done in Mahārāṣṭra by saints like Dnānésvar, Eknāth, Tukārām and Rāmdās, as well as by all the Pioneers—as political sappers and miners—which preceded the great nation-builder Śivājī.

Rājārām does not appear to have undergone a formal coronation. In his letter to the *Pant Sachiv* Śankrājī (25 Aug. 1697) he says : 'God will bring back Shāhū surely in course of time ; he is the true master of the kingdom. All that I am doing is for his sake only. Ultimately all people have to look up to him : it is God's will.'⁶⁸ Yet the proclamation of Rājārām as King proved a wise step. For on 19 October 1689, when Rāigaḍ was captured by Zulfiqār Khān, Shāhū and other members of the royal family were taken prisoners. Rājārām by his escape to Pratāpgaḍ (5 April), thence to Panhālā, and finally to Ginjī, which he reached on 15th Nov. 1689, had saved the monarchy. The 'flight' was as cleverly planned and as romantically executed as Śivājī's escape from Āgrā.⁶⁹ It was part of the strategy which the Marāṭhā alone had the genius to carry out.

Rājārām remained in Ginjī for eight long years, until November 1697. The Mughals besieged that historic stronghold from September 1690 to 8 January 1698, though they were not seriously at it all that time. Still the presence of Rājārām there, most of the period, served to tie up vast forces and supplies in the South, which the imperialists could ill spare from Mahārāṣṭra proper. Had Aurangzeb been able to concentrate all his attention and resources on his central target during this vital stage of his war, the result might have been fatal to the Marāṭhā cause. Nor was Ginjī captured finally along with Rājārām : the bird had flown before the nest was taken.

Fort St. George had noted on 14 Nov. 1689 : Rājārām's 'designe of comeing hither being reported to divert the Mugull's army from thence and joine with severall Gentue Naigues and raise a considerable army to retake the Gulcondah and Vizapore Kingdoms, wch. there is great probability of, both places being at present very weakly guarded.'⁷⁰ It is interesting to note that the *Ādnāpatra* also states : 'After achieving so much success by favour of God, Rājārām divulged his inmost object of conquering the country occupied by the Yavanaṣ, of destroying the Yavana conspiracy, and of beating down the

Yavana predominance which had taken root in the East, West and South, by sending large armies.’⁷¹

There is confirmation of these objectives as well in the correspondence of the Marāṭhā generals and officers. A letter of 22 March 1690, written by Khandō Ballāl *Chitnis* speaks of the rallying of the Poligārs of the South in these terms : ‘The news here is : Since Rājārām reached Karnāṭak 40,000 cavalry and 1,25,000 foot-soldiers have joined him ; more are coming. The hereditary Poligārs of that province have all come over to him. It has become an impressive rally.’⁷²

Aurangzeb, all this time, was hovering between Bijāpur and Brahmāpuri (Islāmpūr). Up to 1699 he tried out all his best generals in both the principal theatres of war, namely, Karnāṭak and Mahārāṣṭra. Thereafter (1699-1705), disgusted with their quarrels, corruptions, inefficiency, disloyalty, dishonesty and defeats,—particularly in Mahārāṣṭra—the Emperor desperately decided to direct the operations in person. The result of this despairing adventure was that the imperial octagenarian suffered a physical break-down and felt constrained to retire to Aḥmednagar, on 20 January 1706, where he died a year later. “One by one the old, able and independent officers and courtiers of his earlier years,” writes Sarkar, “had passed away, and he was now surrounded only by timid sychophants and upstart nobles of his own creation, who could never venture to contradict him in his errors nor give him honest counsel. The mutual jealousies of his generals—Nusrat Jang against Firuz Jang, Shujaet Khan against Md. Murad, Tarbiyat Khan against Fathullah Khan,—ruined his affairs completely as the French cause in the Peninsular War was ruined by the jealousies of Napoleon’s marshals.”⁷³

When Rājārām reached Ginjī he set up a Court there with all the paraphernalia of Marāṭhā government. As noticed above, he also rallied all the local forces around himself. In January 1690, even the Mughal feudatories and officers (newly brought under them) like Yāchappa Nāik, ‘Ismā’il and Md. Sādiq, rebelled against Aurangzeb and joined Rājārām. In April, the imperialists from Madras to Kunimedu were hope-

lessly outnumbered and defeated, and forced to flee to the European settlements on the coast. The situation was slightly improved when Zulfiqār Khān, the Mughal C.-in-C. arrived at Conjivaram in August and began the siege of Ginjī the next month. For a time even Rājārām retired from Ginjī; but he soon returned in February following. Zulfiqār was baffled by the mocking fortress while the Marāṭhās, recovering from their first shock, began to harass him incessantly. By April the deceptive superiority of the Mughals melted away and the Marāṭhās played havoc with their camp and supplies.⁷⁴ Aurangzeb sent heavy reinforcements on 16 December 1691 under Zulfiqār's father Asad Khān (Imperial *Wazīr*) and Prince Kām Bakhsh. Yet nothing was achieved and the Mughal officers preyed upon the *zamīndārs* of the surrounding country. 'The rains fell with excessive severity. Grain was dear. The soldiers, having to spend days and nights together in the trenches, suffered great hardship; the entire tract looked like one lake.' To make matters worse, men of the garrison of Ginjī sallied out and slaughtered the drenched Mughal soldiers. Bad as the Mughal position was during the rainy season, says Sarkar, it became absolutely untenable in the winter.⁷⁵

Early in December 1692, 30,000 Marāṭhā cavalry arrived, led by renowned generals like Santāji Ghorpaḍé and Dhanāji Jādhav. Their first success was the capture of the Mughal *faujdār* of Conjivaram, Ali Mardān Khān, along with 1500 horse and six elephants. All the property and equipment of the Mughals was plundered. The Khān was, however, released for a ransom of one *lākh* of *hons*. Several nobles and imperial officers fled for refuge to Madras where they were succoured by the English.⁷⁶ The victorious Marāṭhās established their authority over Conjivaram and the Kadapa district.

At Ginjī the besiegers were themselves besieged. So completely were they encircled that all communications with their base-camp were cut off. Aurangzeb's favourite son, Kām Bakhsh, himself opened secret negotiations with Rājārām. But he was arrested for his treason by the other generals and tumultuous scenes were enacted. 'The audacity of the infidels

exceeded all bounds and death stared the Muslims in the face.⁷⁷ A desperate attempt was made by the imperialists to extricate themselves from the death-trap, but their ammunition was soon finished. However, timely reinforcements coming under Sarfarāz Khān and the heroism of Dalpat Rāi Bundela, saved the Mughals with the skin of their teeth. They were then allowed to withdraw (23 January 1693) to Wandiwash, but not until the *Wazīr* Asad Khān himself had made overtures to Rājārām to secure a pitiable truce.⁷⁸

The siege of Ginjī was not renewed in earnest until November 1697. During the interlude between January 1693 and November 1697 the Mughals diverted themselves over the rest of Karnāṭak. They won over Yāchappa Nāik and 'Ismā'il Maka, subdued fortresses in the S. Arcot district, invaded Tanjore and exacted tribute from Ekojī's son Shāhjī II. Towards the close of 1694 they turned to Ginjī, but only to deceive the Emperor. Bhimsen writes: 'If he (Zulfiqār) had wished it he could have captured the fort on the very day he reached Jinji. But it is the practice of generals to prolong operations (for their own profit and ease).' Manucci too observes: 'The project did not suit Zulfiqār Khān's views. Success in it would have ended the war, and with it his own power.' Consequently, the offer of Yāchappa Nāik to take the fort within a short time was not merely turned down, but he was barbarously executed as a traitor.⁷⁹ Sarfarāz Khān left the camp in utter disgust in April 1695, without even asking for Zulfiqār's permission. Vellore was invested in October, but it held out for many years, and was not taken until 14 August 1702. Meanwhile, the arrival of Santājī and Dhanājī created such panic that many took fright and prepared to decamp sending their families to Madras.⁸⁰ Zulfiqār himself took shelter in Arcot (1696). The soldiers were kept in arrears of pay. He even threatened to levy blackmail from the English at Madras, as no money came from the Emperor.⁸¹ The siege of Ginjī was resumed only when Santājī had been murdered by the agents of Dhanājī (June 1697) and Rājārām had left for Viśālgad. "To preserve appearances," writes Wilkes, "it was

necessary to report frequent attacks and repulses. On the other side Dāud Khān (Panni), second in command of the Mughal army, drank largely of the best European liquors, and when full of the god would perpetually volunteer the extirpation of the infidels. Zulfiqār necessarily assented to these enterprises, but always gave secret intelligence to the enemy of the time and place of attack ; and the troops of Dāud Khān were often repulsed with slaughter."⁸²

Zulfiqār and his coadjutors in the Karnāṭak may not be singled out for such comment. Elsewhere in the Mughal army things were no better. In May 1690, when Rustam Khān was captured by the joint action of Rāmchandra Pant, Śankrājī, Santājī and Dhanājī, near Sātārā, the tide appeared to be turning against Aurangzeb for the first time.⁸³ It was a signal triumph for the Marāṭhās. 1500 Mughals fell on the field and the Khān's family too was captured, together with 4,000 horses, 8 elephants, and the entire baggage of Rustam's camp. After sixteen days the Mughal general purchased his freedom for one *lākh* of *rupees*. The Marāṭhās then captured in quick succession the fortresses of Pratāpgaḍ, Rohida, Rājgaḍ and Tornā in the course of the same year. Paraśurām Pant took Panhālā in 1692, but the Mughals, under Prince Muizuddin could not wrest it from him even after a close investment from 1692-94. Then Prince Bidar Bakht tried his skill at it until 1696, followed by Fīrūz Jang ; but all in vain. From 1693-95 the Marāṭhās, particularly under Santājī Ghorpaḍé and Amṛt-rāo Nimbālkar, were actively harassing the Mughals while their generals were quarrelling among themselves. The period closed with the defeat and death of two first-rate imperial generals,—Qāsim Khān and Himmat Khān.⁸⁴

The former general had been sent against Santājī in November 1695. Finding that local *zamīndārs* like Barmappā Nāik had made common cause with the Marāṭhās, 'a very choice corps' was despatched to assist Qāim Khān, under Khanazād Khān and Murād Khān. But Santājī proved himself more than equal to this picked military talent of the Mughals. He entrapped the enemy in the citadel of Dōḍḍeri.

in the Chitaldurg district of Mysore. There the rump of the beaten army had gathered for refuge, and such was their panic that the very officers⁸⁵ (Khān azād Khān, Sāf Shikand and Md. Murād) scrambled into safety before their men. The rank and file were left in the lurch to starve and die, for provisions were scarce. The transport animals are said to have eaten the thatch of neighbouring cottages : 'They even chewed one another's tails mistaking them for straw!' The officers, once they sneaked into the safety of the stronghold, shamelessly declared "How gallantly have we brought ourselves here!"⁸⁵ Qāsim Khān drugged himself to death out of despair. The rest purchased their freedom at great cost. The terms of the capitulation were strictly observed by the Marāṭhās, but not by the Mughals. With a rare sense of chivalry Santājī supplied bread and water to the famished and woe-begone imperialists and nursed them back into life. "On the third day Khanazad Khan started for the Court with a Maratha escort."⁸⁶

Within two months of this triumph, on 20 January 1696, Santājī scored another great victory over Himmat Khān, at Basavapaṭṭaṇ. Here the general sent for the rescue of Qāsim Khān was killed in action, and his troops were caught in the citadel as at Doḍḍeri. Finally, Hamid-u'd-dīn Khān followed with an army of 12,000 and retrieved the situation. "That is how a soldier fights!"⁸⁹ declared Aurangzeb, praising Hamid. Bīdar Bakht was sent to punish the rebellious *zamīndārs* of Mysore, while Santājī was away at Ginjī (end of January 1696).

Passing over the desultory fighting which continued in several places, and the murder of Santājī Ghorpaḍé in June 1697 (which we shall comment upon later), we must here refer to an abortive peace offer made in September 1698. It is not unlikely that Rājārām, who lacked the iron will of his father and brother in relation to the Mughals, and depressed over the tragic loss of the great general Santājī, might have desired a respite. But soon better counsels prevailed and a more vigorous policy was adopted. Early in 1699 Rājārām made a tour of inspection over Konkan visiting all the forts. In June

he returned to Sātārā which he contemplated making his capital. In September he planned an extensive campaign into Khāndesh and Berār. In October he was actually out on what unfortunately proved his last expedition. Broken in health he returned to Simhagaḍ within a few months and died there on 2 March 1700.⁸⁸ He was but thirty years of age then. 'At that time,' writes Chitnis, 'he called together the *Amātya* and other ministers and declared: "Ever since the time of the Great King (Śivājī) you have been exerting yourselves in the cause of the Kingdom. My end is near. Hereafter you should all join together and continue the work as at present. You should not slacken your efforts to secure the return of Shāhū, when I am no more. You will win if you concentrate on that objective,—you know it well. What more shall I add?" So saying, he commended Ramchandra Pant and the rest to one another. Commanding all to act in obedience to the great *Amātya*, with a prayerful heart, he went to his eternal rest.'⁸⁹

This illuminating record clearly reflects the soul of the dying Prince: conscious of his own limitations, he sincerely desired the return of Shāhū; while appreciative of the devotion of his ministers, he was apprehensive of the divisions among them. The blood-feud between Dhanājī and Santājī, with its tragic result, was a portentous warning. Personally too weak in mind and body to give a vigorous lead to his compatriots, he undoubtedly showed the greatest sagacity in entrusting tasks which were obviously beyond his own capacity to hands that were more capable and brains that were more resourceful like those of the *Amātya* and his coadjutors. By his last act of commendation, leaving the kingdom in the safe hands of Rāmchandra Pant *Amātya Hukmatpanah*, Rājārām redeemed at one stroke all his faults of omission and commission. Historians have failed to appreciate the character of this amiable Prince. He might have been weak, but he was shrewd, sincere, patriotic, well-meaning and inclined to be magnanimous. His death undoubtedly deepened the crisis of his country, though his survivors had both the courage and power to tide over it.

To follow the summary of the situation given by Chitnis : 'Here Paraśurām Pant, Śankrājī Pant, and *Hukmat-panah* recovered the forts of Panhālā, Sātārā, etc. Konkan had been assigned by Sambhājī to Sidojī Gujar, and Kānhojī Āngré was under him. Considering Sidojī wise, brave, and virile, he was taken to Ginjī ; and Āngré was placed in charge of Suvarṇa-durg. With great vigilance he guarded that province and its strongholds When Rājārām returned, he was made *Sarkhel* on account of his meritorious services. Rāmchandra Pant, by his great valour, had protected the kingdom during Rājārām's absence ; therefore he was invested with all authority, and he continued to guide the destinies of the State.'⁹⁰ Śankrājī who was *Sachiv* until 1690 was given the title of Rājādnā, and put in charge of the territory covered by Rāigaḍ. The *Amātya*, personally looked after the region between Karhād and Gokarna. The army was commanded by Rāmchandra Pant and Śankrājī with Santājī and Dhanājī under them. Paraśurām Pant, the captor of Panhālā, also conquered the lands and forts between Miraj and Rāngṇa. He earned the titles of *Sūbā-lashkar* and *Samśer-jang*, and in course of time became *Pratinidhi* and *Amātya*. He combined in himself the civil qualities of Rāmchandra Pant and the military qualities of Śankrājī, and earned the utmost confidence of Tārābāi after the death of Rājārām. Pralhād Nirājī and Khandō Ballāl were equally serviceable to Rājārām while he was at Ginjī.

Santājī Ghorpaḍé belonged to the Kāpsī branch of the Bhoslā family. He was pre-eminently a soldier, but too impetuous, almost ungovernable and imperious. This character brought him into conflict with Dhanājī Jādhav, which soon appeared to revive the ancient family feud of Bhoslā vs. Jādhav. Had Rājārām the tact or force of personality, he might have composed their differences ; but he seemed to favour Dhanājī. Consequently the quarrel culminated in the cowardly crime of murdering Santājī while he was bathing in a sequestered stream in a corner of the country.⁹¹ Dhanājī had already superseded Santājī as *Senāpatī*. He had served with distinction under Pratāp Rāo Gujar and fought at Umrāṇi and Ne-

sari. He came to be honoured as Jaising Rāo for his victories against the Mughals. Certainly he was a great general, though he lacked the fire and flash of his murdered rival.

We need not follow Aurangzeb in his tale of woe in all detail. The *dénouement* of his life was an unspeakable tragedy. During the last eight years (1699-1707), like a petty miser counting and recounting his coins, the senile Emperor was obsessed with taking and retaking forts. "The rest of his life is a repetition of the same sickening tale," says Sarkar : "a hill-fort captured by him after a vast expenditure of time, men and money, the fort recovered by the Marathas from the weak Mughal garrison after a few months and its siege begun again by the Mughals a year or two later ! His soldiers and camp-followers suffered unspeakable hardships in marching over flooded rivers, muddy roads, and broken hilly tracks ; porters disappeared ; transport beasts died of hunger and overwork ; scarcity of grain was ever present in his camp. His officers wearied of this labour of Sisyphus ; but Aurangzib would burst into wrath at any suggestion of return to Northern India and taunted the unlucky counsellor with cowardice and love of ease Therefore, the Emperor must conduct every operation in person, or nothing would be done." ⁹²

Leaving Brahmapuri (Islāmpūr), which he had occupied continuously from 1695-99, Aurangzeb took Vasantgaḍ in November 1699 ; Sātārā occupied him from Dec. 1699—April 1700 ; Pārli, April—June 1700 ; Panhālā and Pavangaḍ, March—May 1701 ; Vardhan, Nandgīr, Chandan-Vandan, June—Oct. ; Viśālgāḍ, Dec.—June 1702 ; Simhagaḍ, Dec.—April 1703 ; Rājgaḍ, Dec.—Feb. 1704 ; Torṇā, Feb.—March ; and Wāgingerā, Feb.—April 1705. Halting at Khawāṣpūr (1700), Khaṭāw (1701), Bahādurgāḍ (1702), Poona (1703), Khed (1704), and Devapūr (1705), during the rains each year, destiny overtook the aged Emperor at last in October 1705. Breaking up his camp at Devapūr on the 23rd of that month he set out for the North in a *pālki*. He reached his ' journey's end ' at Ahmednagar on the morning of Friday, 20 February 1707. Indeed, as he used to say,

'In a twinkle, in a minute, in a breath,
The condition of the world changeth.'⁹³

The Marāṭhās pursued him like Yama to the very verge of earthly existence. Like the rats of Bishop Hatto, helter skelter they poured in, at all times and places. When Aurangzeb commenced his fatal retreat, some fifty to sixty thousand Marāṭhās pursued him, cutting off his supplies and stragglers, and even threatening to break into his very camp. The Emperor left annihilation and anarchy behind him. 'Many maṇṣabdārs in the Deccan,' writes Bhīmsen, 'starving and impoverished, have gone over to the Marāṭhās.'⁹⁴ In April or May 1706 a vast Marāṭhā force appeared within four miles of the imperial entourage. Khān-i-Alam was despatched to drive them away, but he was hopelessly overwhelmed. Strong reinforcements, however, kept the Marāṭhās at arm's length, but not out of harm's way, after severe fighting.

In Gujarāt, Dhanājī Jādhav sacked Baroda in March 1706. Nazrat 'Ali, the imperial *faujdār* was taken prisoner, and the other Mughal officers fled to Broach. Similar raids were carried into the outskirts of Aḥmednagar in May. In the South, the Marāṭhās captured Penukonḍa, 'the key of both the Karnāṭaks,' and attacked Sirā. A hit-and-run campaign was kept up incessantly by the Marāṭhās, allowing no respite to the Mughals.⁹⁵

To sum up, from the campaign of Rājārām, 'As before, the Maratha army was formed into three divisions. Dhanaji Jadhav, in addition to his supreme command, led one division. Parashuram Trimbak led the second and Shankar Narayan the third. Early in 1699 Rajaram took the field with the combined divisions, amounting at least to sixty thousand men; and as the army advanced northwards, it was joined by brigades under Parsoji Bhosle, the founder of the Bhosle house of Nagpur, Haibatrao Nimbalkar, Nemaji Sindia, and Atole. This mighty force moved towards the Godavari valley. The Mughul garrisons who tried to resist were overwhelmed. Dhanaji Jadhav defeated one large body of imperial troops near

Pandharpur. Shankar Narayan cleared another contingent under Sarza Khan out of the Puna district. Entering the valley of the Godavari, Rajaram publicly proclaimed his right to levy from it the *chauth* and the *sardeshmukhi* From those villages that could not pay, bonds were taken. From the Godavari valley Rajaram reached into Khandesh and Berar. This time he came not as a mere raider; and to convince the inhabitants that he would give them protection, and exercise sovereignty, he divided the country into military districts and left in them strong detachments under distinguished generals. Khanderao Dabhade took command in Baglan and northern Nasik. Parsoji Bhosle was made governor of Berar, Nemaaji Sindia governor of Khandesh, and Haibatrao Nimbalkar governor of the valley of the Godavari. Rajaram himself led a large body of cavalry to plunder the rich city of Jalna, some miles south-east of Aurangabad. After the departure of the regent (i.e. Rajaram), Nemaaji Sindia won an important success near Nandarbar, a large town some eighty miles east of Surat.'⁹⁶ It was while returning from Jalna that Rājārām had died at Sinhagad in March 1700. The domestic quarrels which ensued and the civil war with Shāhū after his return from the imperial camp in 1707, will be dealt with in the next volume. This indeed created another major crisis in the history of the Marāṭhās, but the manner in which they met it might be briefly characterised in the words of Khwāfi Khān, the Mughal historian :

'When Ram Raja (Rājārām) died, leaving only widows and infants, men thought that the power of the Marathas over the Dakhin was at an end. But Tara Bai, the elder wife (of Rājārām), made her son of three years old successor to his father, and took the reigns of government into her own hands. She took vigorous measures for ravaging the Imperial territory, and sent armies to plunder the six *subas* of the Dakhin as far as Sironj, Mandisor, and the *suba* of Malwa. She won the hearts of her officers, and for all the struggles and schemes, the campaigns and sieges of Aurangzeb up to the end of his reign, the power of the Marathas increased day by day. By

hard fighting, by the expenditure of the vast treasures accumulated by Shah Jahan, and by the sacrifice of many thousands of men, he had penetrated into their wretched country, had subdued their lofty forts, and had driven them from house and home; still the daring of the Marathas increased, and they penetrated into the old territories of the Imperial throne, plundering and destroying wherever they went. In imitation of the Emperor, who with his armies and enterprising *amirs* was staying in those distant mountains, the commanders of Tara Bai cast the anchor of permanence wherever they penetrated, and having appointed *kamaishdars* (revenue collectors) they passed the years and months to their satisfaction with their wives and children, tents and elephants. Their daring went beyond all bounds. They divided all the *paraganas* (districts) among themselves, and following the practice of the Imperial rule they appointed their *subadars* (governors), *kamaishdars* (revenue officers) and *rahdars* (toll-collectors) They attacked and destroyed the country as far as the borders of Ahmedabad and the districts of Malwa, and spread their devastations through the provinces of the Dakhin to the environs of Ujjain. They fell upon and plundered large caravans within ten or twelve *kos* of the Imperial camp, and even had the hardihood to attack the royal treasure It would be a troublesome and useless task,' concludes Khwāfī Khān, 'to commit to writing all their misdeeds: but it must suffice to record some few of the events which occurred in those days of sieges *which, after all, had no effect in suppressing the daring of the Marathas.*'⁹⁷

Aurangzeb, at one moment, according to Bhīmsen, had attempted appeasement, but it proved too late and futile: 'As the *Marāṭhās* had not been vanquished, and the entire Deccan had come into their possession like a deliciously cooked pudding, why should they ~~make~~ peace? The envoys of the Prince returned in disappointment and Rājā Shāhū was again placed under surveillance in the *gulāl bār.*'⁹⁸

CHAPTER TEN

THE ACHIEVEMENT

आहे तितुं जतन करावें । पुढें आणि मिळवावें ।
महाराष्ट्रराज्य करावें । जिकडे तिकडे ॥

RĀMDĀS

‘Whatsoever there is should be conserved ; more should be acquired ; the Mahā-rāṣṭra kingdom should be extended, in all directions.’ The objectives of the Marāṭhās could not have been put more clearly than in these words of Swāmī Rāmdās. We have in the preceding nine chapters examined the history of the Marāṭhās from the advent of Islāmic power in the Deccan to the death of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (1295-1707). During these four hundred odd years we have witnessed the rise of a new force which was to shape the destiny of India for a little over another hundred years. The eighteenth century was a great turning point in the history of modern India. It saw the catastrophe of the Mughal Empire, the climax of the Marāṭhā power, the fall of the French and the rise of the British dominion in our country. The British really conquered India neither from the French nor from the Mughals, but from the Marāṭhās. The ultimate failure of the last named in building up a free and prosperous Hindusthān has prejudiced critics to such a degree that their rôle in Indian history has been greatly misjudged. Indeed, nothing succeeds like success, and historians are almost invariably partial towards the successful. However, truth demands an unbiased assessment. While the Marāṭhās cannot escape from the just verdict of historians that they sadly missed a golden opportunity to create in the whole of India a *Mahā-Rāṣṭra* or ‘Great Dominion’, we should not be blind to their great achievements. There is, undoubtedly, a tide in the affairs of men, and the Marāṭhās were no exception. They were not merely unfortu-

nate ; but they also blundered. They had their own faults and shortcomings. Yet, to judge a people in their total effort finally we should examine their entire history. We would therefore reserve this task for a later volume. At the present stage of our enquiry, we can do no better than tentatively focus the reader's attention on what the Marāṭhās achieved during the four centuries which elapsed between the invasion of 'Alā-u'd-Dīn Khaljī and the death of Aurangzeb. It will be admitted that this was by all tests an honest record and a proud achievement.

To begin with, we have witnessed how, for lack of leadership, during the earlier centuries of the Muslim advance into the Deccan, Mahārāṣṭra was not merely over-run by the Yavana hordes but also all but totally overwhelmed. Without trying to recount in detail the nature of this calamity, we might roundly characterise the reaction in the words of Sewell, who wrote about Vijayanagar : 'Everything seemed to be leading up to one inevitable end—the ruin and devastation of the Hindu provinces, the annihilation of their old royal houses, the destruction of their religion, their temples, their cities. All that the dwellers in the South held most dear seemed tottering to its fall. But suddenly, about the year 1344 A.D., there was a check to this foreign invasion—a stop—a halt—then a solid wall of opposition ; and for 250 years South India was saved The success of the early kings was phenomenal.'²

Despite this success of the Vijayanagar kings history was to repeat itself. Rakkastangadi, in 1565, appeared to have undone all the good work of the Rāyās. When the sun of the glories of Vijayanagar set with the red glow of destruction in that fateful year, the dark sky of the Hindus of the peninsula was studded only with innumerable orbs of a lesser magnitude. The Nāyaks and Poligārs, indeed, shed a baleful halo which boded no good to anybody in the South. Śrī Ranga verily struggled heroically to renovate the vanished empire, but he was doomed to fail in that anarchical age. His people had lost the inspiration, and he lacked the genius and personality to ride the storm. Like the heroes of Rājasthān in North

India, after an epoch of glorious resistance to the foreign invaders, South India as well appeared to have succumbed to a spell of exhaustion. But thanks to the character of the Marāṭhās, Hindu civilisation was again saved.

The rise of the Marāṭhā power has hardly a parallel in the history of India. Neither the Rājapūts nor the Sikhs, with all their noble qualities, could ever rise to the great eminence reached by the Marāṭhās. Even the achievements of Vijayanagar were confined to the south of the Tungabhadra, though its inspiration watered the roots of Marāṭhā freedom. The uniqueness of the Marāṭhā movement lay in its national character.³ It was not the creation of any single individual ; but it was born out of the sufferings of a great people,—a people with a number of virtues which gave rise to and sustained the Marāṭhā effort to build up an independent state. The hidden sources of its strength were not in the armories which fashioned the crude weapons of the rough Marāṭhā soldiers, but lay in the character of the people and their country. How far the geography of Mahārāṣṭra fashioned the history and fortunes of its people is too large a question to be discussed here. But we are inclined to emphasise the human more than the natural (i.e. geographical and physical) elements in the moulding of Marāṭhā history. Race and environments, —soil, climate, and the rivers, mountains and valleys—did indeed play a very important rôle ; but we are more interested in knowing what the Marāṭhās, so circumstanced, did in order to improve their lot. From this point of view, even the much discussed ethnology of the people of Mahārāṣṭra, and the Kṣatriya lineage of the Bhoslés and other ruling families are of secondary and purely scholastic interest.⁴ The total achievement was the resultant of all these factors, no doubt ; but it was the moral character and political genius of the people of Mahārāṣṭra that brought about the result which alone concerns us here. If race and physical environments alone decided the character of a people's history, we can hardly account for the rise and fall of nations and states. Even this philosophical question need not divert us from our historical or factual

survey. The Marāṭhās of our study were confronted with a very natural and human problem : namely, the problem of survival. They were threatened with cultural and political extinction ; but they showed guts, moral fibre, and political tenacity. By virtue of these they survived, achieved their freedom, and, what is of greater historical importance, also made creative contributions to the heritage of the Hindus. To note these is our main business in this chapter.

The collapse of the Hindus before the armies of the Khaljīs and the Tughlaqs revealed the hollowness of the Yādava dominion. In the matter of defence of the realm—the most fundamental duty of every government—the rulers of Mahārāṣṭra had miserably failed. The people had to pay for this delinquency by over three centuries of political subjection to the conquerors. But the inherent character of the Marāṭhās—their will and courage never to submit or yield, their pertinacity—ultimately brought them victory and freedom. This was a plant of slow growth, but its roots were deep down in the soil of Mahārāṣṭra. The nation was alive though fallen for a long while. Its character is to be judged, not by its fall, but by its revival. Dead wood does not revive ; a corpse does not rise from its grave. The Marāṭhā revival showed that the heart of Mahārāṣṭra was quite sound even while its limbs were paralysed. More than anything else, its faith had not been shaken by the Muslim arms or its vision dimmed by defeat on the battle-fields. Through 'blood, sweat, tears and toil' the soul of Mahārāṣṭra worked its way to triumph.

If the preceding chapters have shown anything, it is that the triumph of the Marāṭhās was the triumph of a *people*, a *nation*, rather than that of a few men of genius. The rôle of the leaders is, no doubt, of very great importance ; but no leader can succeed without a following worthy of his leadership. Marāṭhā history has revealed that the people were not merely worthy of their leaders, but that they showed their mettle even in the absence of them. Leadership means organisation : there was the absence of it under Rāmdev Rāo, and

the triumph of it under Śivājī. But a people once awakened, and awakened properly, can never be put down. This is the meaning of the struggle which ensued after the death of Śivājī and its culmination in the dynamic freedom of Mahārāṣṭra.

It is significant that, when 'Alā-u'd-Dīn Khaljī invaded the country, it was Kānhā, a provincial governor, and two women who fought against the aggressor while the king himself was listless and apathetic. Śankardev and Harpāldev, again, indicated the difference between the elder and the younger generations. Janārdan Swāmī, Ekanāth and Rāmdās bore testimony to the essentially pragmatic outlook of the people of Mahārāṣṭra. As we have explained in an earlier chapter, even pure saints like Dnānadev, Nāmadev, and Tukārām—may be non-politically—poured life into the atrophied limbs of Mahārāṣṭra and filled them with a fresh outlook and energy. A people must have faith before they can fight for it. They must have something precious to preserve to make it worthwhile dying for it. The value of the work of the saints, therefore, lay in making the people conscious of the treasures of the great heritage of the Hindus. How successful and widespread this leaven was, was indicated by the message being propagated by not merely a potter like Gorā, a tailor like Nāmadev, a gardener like Sāvtā, and a goldsmith like Nara-hari, but also by a maid servant like Janā Bāi, a prostitute like Kānhopātrā, a mahār like Chokhā, and a barber like Senā. To avoid being misunderstood, it is necessary to emphasise that their mission was *spiritual, not political*; but Rāmdās showed the bearing of the one upon the other. If Tukārām was like St. Francis of Assisi, Rāmdās was like St. Dominic, Peter the Hermit and Ignatius Loyola. Śivājī was Mazzini, Cavour and Garibaldi rolled into one: the Marāṭhā *resorgimento* was a compound of many elements and forces too complex and numerous to be simply analysed in terms of 'proteins and carbohydrates or vitamins a, b, c, etc.' of nation-hood.

Next to the rôle of the saints that of the active resisters of aggression like Kānhā, Śankardev and Harpāldev, Mukund

Rão, Nāg Nāk (of Koṇḍānā), Śankar Rão (of Sangameśwar) and the Śirkés (of Kheḷna) ought to find honourable mention. They were followed by a numerous body of adventurers and soldiers, *bārgīrs* and *śilédārs*, *kārkūns* and *kamāvisdārs*, *rahdārs* and *jāsūds*, *sardārs* and *maṇṣabdārs*,—men of all conditions and ranks who, through the very channels of submission and service, gathered experience and merits that were to constitute the bedrock of self-government. The *Desāis* and *Sardesāis* the *Deśmukhs* and *Sardeśmukhs*, and even the *Kulkarṇis* and *Pātils* were to be the pillars of the new State. At first as rebels, then as mercenaries; later as adventurers and careerists,—these people of Mahārāṣṭra—Brāhmans, Kṣatriyas, Marāṭhās, Kuṇbis, Kolis and even Rāmoṣīs—were, like pebbles in a running brook, being shaped into a mighty force by the stream of history. To begin with, most of them were unconscious agents, but progressively evolving into conscious pioneers of a new order in Mahārāṣṭra. The historical process was transforming men of the type of Shāhji into those of the character of Śivāji. Peasants were being moulded into Tānāji's and Bāji's, and women were becoming inspirers like Jijā Bāi and Tārā Bāi. Baser metal was occasionally found mixed with the gold, but the balance was on the whole favourable to Mahārāṣṭra. Meticulous scholars have laboured to pick out the black-sheep from the white, and to show that "among the Marāṭhās not much union was seen." The evidence cited, however, is too poor to be convincing.⁵ Despite the defections pointed out (of some Jādhavs, Morés, Khopadés and Pisāls, etc.) it was the patriotic Marāṭhās that triumphed against the better equipped imperialists. As the Amātya proudly declared: 'This kingdom was invaded by a powerful enemy in the person of Aurangzeb. He used all his valour and all his resources in wealth and other things for the destruction and conquest of this kingdom. But all his efforts proved futile by the grace of God!'

In the following pages, therefore, we shall be citing evidence, or samples, of the total Marāṭhā achievement rather than illustrations of individual genius or accomplishments. It

cannot be too often emphasised that, as we have stated before, the creations of Śivājī were also the achievements of the race ; because Śivājī himself was a creature of Mahārāṣṭra. He was undoubtedly a man of superb genius, but not less a Marāṭhā on that account. He was the embodiment of the spirit of his age and country and gave direction and shape to a power that had already come into existence. Śivājī was great because he understood his people—their needs, aspirations and character—thoroughly. He was great because he had the larger vision and capacity to exploit the situation fully for the ever lasting glory of Mahārāṣṭra. Marāṭhā *Svarājya* which was the combined product of all these forces—individual and national—bore distinct marks of the Marāṭhā genius.

The title of *Chhatrapati* itself, as pointed out before, was unique. So was also the form and character of the administration which Śivājī brought into existence. Far from being a mere imitation of what prevailed in the neighbouring Muslim States and the Mughal Empire, the Marāṭhā creation was an improvement as much in matters of detail as of policy; as much in the civil government as in the military organisation. These have been very well described and discussed at length by other writers, and it is not necessary, in our scope, to repeat all that has been said by them.⁶ But a few outstanding features might be usefully stressed here.

In the first stage of their recovery the Marāṭhās, as we have noted, gathered valuable experience as mere mercenaries and servants. Then came the stage of revolt. Śivājī in his earlier days was leader and organiser of this. But revolt is essentially negative, though to be successful and fruitful—as the Marāṭhā movement was—it must be inspired by positive ideals. Śivājī was a man of action and a statesman. His ideals were therefore embodied in his actions. We need recall only a few illustrations here to characterise them.

The first illustration of his manner and spirit was his interview with Kānhojī Jedhé and the exchange of oaths which took place between them on the eve of the encounter with Afzal Khān. The whole account of the incident, reproduced

earlier,⁷ bears authentic testimony to the spirit of dedication to patriotic service and sacrifice that manifested itself in the awakened Maharāṣṭra of those days. The second example is that of Śivājī's letter to Mālojī Ghorpaḍé.⁸ There was a bitter feud between the two branches of the Bhoslé family. But Śivājī appealed to the need for unity and tried to bring about a combination of all the Deccani interests—Hindu as well as Muḥammadan—against the foreigners. 'The Paṭhāns should be destroyed and steps should be taken to keep the Pādshāhī of the Deccan in the hands of the Deccanis.' The third instance is that of Śivājī's treatment of his brother Vyankojī. His warning to him in the classic terms of the *Mahābhārata* is at once an illustration of his intentions and outlook. The advice finally embodied in the Treaty between the two brothers⁹ is a political document of rare value. It clearly enunciates the principles on which Śivājī based his administration: they were principles calculated to make the civil and military organisations efficient as well as just. Lastly, we would refer here to the great charter of civil rights guaranteed by Śivājī in his proclamation of 28 January 1677 (quoted *in extenso* in the Appendix). That his State was broadbased upon the goodwill and welfare of all his people, including his Muslim subjects, has been amply testified to by impartial observers.¹⁰ There was not another ruler like Śivājī in this respect, perhaps, with the singular exception of Akbar.

The beginnings of his system have been outlined for us in the account given of it by Sabhāsad. Though it appears to be somewhat scrappy and unsystematic, it is none the less authentic and happens to be the earliest connected account available of Śivājī's embryo State organisation. We make therefore no excuse in reproducing it *in extenso*.

"The Rājé," writes Sabhāsad,¹¹ "appointed officers and framed the following regulations for the management of the forts that had been captured." In every fort there were to be a *havāldār*, a *sabnis*, and a *sarnobat*,—all three of equal status. They were to conjointly carry on the administration.

There was to be a store of grain and war *materiel* in the fort to be looked after by a *kārkhānīs*. The accounts of income and expenditure were also to be maintained by him. In larger and more important forts, there were to be five to seven *Taṭ sarnobats* who were to divide the ramparts among themselves and keep vigilance over their respective areas. Of every 10 men to be stationed in a garrison, one was to be a *nāik*; the other nine to be *pāiks*. "Men of good families should in this manner be recruited." Of the forces, the musketeers (*bandukhī*), the spearmen (*atēkarī*), the archers (*tirandāj*), and the light-armed men (*āḷ-hatyārī*), were to be personally selected by the Rājé himself to make sure that each man was "brave and shrewd." The *havāldār* and *sarnobat* were to be Marāṭhās of good family, whose integrity was to be assured by some *hujrāt* or officer of the royal staff. A Brāhman was similarly chosen to be *sabnīs*, and a Prabhu to be *Kārkhānīs*. "In this manner each officer appointed should be different (in caste) from the others." The fort was not to be left in the charge of a *havāldār* alone: "No single individual could surrender the fort to any rebel or miscreant. In this manner was the administration of the fort carefully and newly organised."

Similarly, *pāgās* were organised in the army. The *śilédārs* were placed under the jurisdiction of a *pāgā*. "To none was left independence to rebel." Marāṭhā troopers with horses were called *bārgīrs*; 25 *bārgīrs* were under a *havāldār*; a division of 5 *havāldārs* (with the *bārgīrs* under them) formed a *jumlā*, which was to be under a *jumlādār*. The salary of a *jumlādār* was fixed at 500 *hons*, with a palanquin. His *Majumdār* was paid 100 to 125 *hons*. For every 25 horses there was to be a farrier (*nālbānd*) and a water-carrier (*ṣakhālji*). Ten *jumlādārs* were placed under a *Hāzārī* whose salary was 1,000 *hons*, with a *majumdār*, a Marāṭhā *kārbhūri*, and a Kāyastha Prabhu *janvīs* attached. 500 *hons* were allotted for these latter. Salary and palanquin were given to each individual according to his rank. Accounts of income and expenditure were to be made out in the presence of all the four. Five

hāzārīs were to be under a *Pāñch hāzārī*, whose salary was to be 2,000 *hons* (with a *Majumdār*, a *kārbhārī* and a *jamnīs* attached). Over five such officers was the *Sarnobat* or commander-in-chief. The *silédārs* also being similarly organised, were equally under the *Sarnobat*. The higher grade officers (*hazārī*, *pāñch hazārī* and *Sarnobat*) were further served by *vaknavises* (news-writers), *harkaris* (couriers and spies), and *jāsūds* (messengers) appointed by the *Sarnobat*. "Bahirji Jādhav, a very shrewd man, was appointed *Nāik* of the *jās-ids* under the *Sarnobat*. This man was selected after great scrutiny."

The army regulations were conceived carefully and enforced strictly. The armies were to come into cantonments in the home territories during the rainy season. Grains, fodder, medicines, thatched houses for men and stables for horses were to be provided. They were to march out after *Dasarā*. At the time of their departure an inventory was to be prepared of all things belonging to every person (high and low). While out campaigning in the foreign territories (*mulukhghiri*), the troops were expected to subsist on their spoils. There were to be no women, female slaves or dancing-girls, in the army. He who was found keeping them was to be beheaded. "In enemy territories, women and children should not be captured. Cows should not be taken. Bullocks should be requisitioned for transport purposes only. Brāhmans should not be molested. Where contributions are laid, no Brahman should be taken as a surety. None should commit adultery."

For eight months during each year the army was to be out campaigning in foreign territories. On its way back, in the month of *Vaiśākh*, it was to undergo a thorough search at the frontier. Whatever a trooper carried in excess of his pay was to be calculated, deducted or recovered from his salary, by comparison with the initial inventory. Articles of very great value were to be sent to the royal treasury. If any one was found hiding anything, the *sardār* (searching officer) was to punish him. After they returned to barracks the *sardārs* were to account for everything to the Rājé. "There all accounts

should be explained and the things should be delivered to His Majesty." An account of the expenditure incurred by the army was also to be submitted. If any surplus was due to the contingents "it should be asked for *in cash* from His Majesty." Then they were to return to the barracks.

Saranjāms were granted to those who had worked hard during the late campaign. If any one had been guilty of violating the rules or of *cowardice*, an enquiry was to be instituted and "the truth to be ascertained by the consensus of many," and the offender dismissed. Investigations were not to be delayed. The army was then to rest for four months, until next *Dasarā*, when it would march out again according to the orders of the Rājé. "Such were the rules of the army."

Similarly, among the Māvaļés, there was to be a *Nāik* for every ten men; and a *havāldār* over every five *Nāiks* (or 50 men). Over two or three *Nāiks* was a *jumlādār*; and a *hazārī* over ten *jumlās*. The *jumlādār* was paid 100 *hons* per annum; with a *sabnīs* who was paid 40 *hons*. The salary of a *hazārī* was 500 *hons*; that of his *sabnīs*, 100-125 *hons*. Over seven *hazārīs* was a *Sarnobat*. Yesājī Kank was the first to be appointed to this command. "Everybody was to abide by his orders."

To the *Sarnobats*, the *Majumdārs*, the *Kārkūns*, and the men on the personal staff of the Rājé, salary was paid by assignments on the land revenue. The lands cultivated by them were taxed like those of the ordinary *rayats*, and the dues credited as part of their salaries. The balance was paid by *varāt* or orders to pay on the *Huzūr* (Central Govt.) or on the District treasuries. "In this manner were their accounts punctually settled." *Mokāsā mahals* or villages with absolute rights were on no account to be granted to the men on military service. Every payment was to be made by *varāt* or in cash. None but the *Kārkūns* had any jurisdiction over the lands. All payments to the army and the fort-establishments were made by them. "If *mokāsās* were granted, the *rayats* would grow unruly and wax strong; and the collection regulations would no longer be obeyed. "If the *rayats* grew powerful, there would

be disturbances in various places. Those who were granted *mokāsās* would join with the *zamīndārs* and rebel. Therefore, *mokāsās* should not be assigned to anybody."

Kārkūns were also to be appointed for investigating into the conquered provinces. Intelligent and experienced men were to be appointed as *daftardārs* in the *Majumdār's* office in each *mahal* and *sūbā* to keep accounts and draft papers. Then, as matters progressed, intelligent and careful *havāldārs* were to be picked out and the *sūbās* conferred on them. The *māmlā* of each *mahal* was to be given to a clever *Majumdār* of the *sūbā*, "skilled in writing and conversant with accounts." One who had not served as a *kamāvisdār* or one who could not write was not to be put in charge of a district or province. "Such a man should be sent back on being told either to serve under the *Bādsāhi* (!) or to enlist as a *śilédār* with his own horse."

Of the *kārkūns* employed in the provinces, the *havāldār*, according to the size of his *mahal*, was to be paid from 4 or 5 to 300 *hons*; the *Majumdār*, from 3, 4, 5, 50 or 75 *hons*. Over two *mahals* yielding a *lākh*, $1\frac{1}{2}$ *lakh*, and $\frac{3}{4}$ *lakh* of *hons* (approximately) were to be a *Sūbādār* and a *kārkūn*. To them was to be assigned a salary of 400 *hons* per man. The *Majumdār* appointed to the *sūbā* got a salary of 100—125 *hons*. The *sūbādār* was expected to maintain a *palanquin* for which he received an allowance of 400 *hons*. The *majumdār* received a sunshade (*ābdāgiri*) allowance. . . All officers with a salary of 100 *hons*, while out on expedition, were required to maintain a sunshade. In the home dominions, a *sūbā* was placed in charge of a tract yielding one *lakh* of *rupees*. To the unsettled tracts on the frontiers, a force of infantry, cavalry, and militia, "as strong as each place might require," was sent with the *kārkūn* in charge of *mulukhgi*.

Likewise all lands in the provinces were surveyed, including forest areas. The measurements were fixed as follows :— The length of a measuring rod was five cubits and five *muṭhis*. A cubit was fourteen *taisus* (तसु) The length of the rod was to be 80 *taisus*. 20 *kāthīs* (rods) square made one *bhiga*; and 120 *bhigas* made one *chāvar*. The area of every village was

ascertained according to these standards. An estimate was made of the produce (grain) of each *bhiga*, and after dividing it into five shares, three were given to the *rayats*; two were taken by government. New *rayats* were given cattle and seeds. Money grants were also made, to be recovered in two to four years, according to the means of the *rayat*. The *kārākūn* collected in kind, according to the assessment in each village, at the time of the harvest. In the provinces, the *rayats* were not to be under the jurisdiction of the *zamīndārs*, the *Deśmukhs* and the *Deśāis*. "If they attempted to plunder the *rayats*, by assuming authority, it does not lie in their power." Studying the defects and evils obtaining in the Bādśāhī provinces, the *rājā* demolished the strongholds of the *Mirās-dārs* in the conquered parts of the *Deś*. Where there were important forts, he garrisoned them with his own men, and nothing was left in the hands of the *Mirās-dārs*. "This done, he prohibited all that the *Mirās-dārs* used to levy at their sweet will, by *Ināmi* right or revenue farming, and fixed the assessments in cash and grains; for the *zamīndārs*, as well as the *Deśmukhs*, the *Deś-kulkarnīs*, the *Pātils*, and the *Kārākūns*, their rights and perquisites were defined according to the yield of the village." The *zamīndārs* were forbidden to build castles with bastions.

Finally, grants were made to all the temples in the country, for the proper maintenance of lights (दिवाबत्ती) offerings (नैवेद्य) and other services (अभिषेक). Even the state-allowances to the shrines of the Muhammadan *pīrs* and mosques were continued, according to the importance of each place. Suitable allowances were also granted to pious and learned Brāhmins to enable them to carry on their sacred duties. The *kārākūns* were to convey to them annually the allowances and perquisites granted. "In this manner," writes Sabhāsad, "the *Rājā* ruled his kingdom, continuing his enquiries about the forts and the strongholds, the army and the militia, the provinces and the personal staff."

The system founded by Śivājī not merely worked well under the guidance and supervision of his personal genius but also survived the tests of time and circumstances. The crises which followed the death of Śivājī in succession, and the vicis-

situdes of fortune which his nascent State and people experienced during the thirty years which preceded the rise of the Peśvas, proved the wisdom of his arrangements. Though a very large part of the credit for this achievement belongs to the system which Śivājī brought into existence, we cannot, however, emphasise too often the role of the Marāṭhā people at large. Without their grit and sagacity Marāṭhā *Svarājya* might have crumbled into dust under the determined attacks of Aurangzeb. There is no other instance in Indian history where the people withstood organised might on such a wide scale and over such a length of time successfully. The sustained Marāṭhā resistance, practically over the whole of the southern peninsula, is a unique and admirable achievement. Except by an assessment of the totality of the forces involved, the rise of the Marāṭhā nation into all-Indian importance cannot be adequately explained. Śivājī was the brain of this mighty movement; its heart was represented by the saints of Mahārāṣṭra; and its limbs, which translated ideas and emotions into facts of history, were spread out all over the country.

Apart from the details of the Marāṭhā civil and military organisation which it is not our intention to describe here, the quintessence of their political genius is contained in what is known as the *Ādnāpatra* ascribed to the great *Amātya* Rāmachandrapant Bāvḍekar. Nominally it was issued by Sambhājī of Kolhāpūr on 21 November 1716, but in reality composed by Rāmachandrapant who served under Śivājī, Sambhājī, Rājārām, and Sambhājī II.¹² In effect it therefore embodies the collective experience of four generations of Marāṭhā rulers in the most momentous period of their history (1672-1716).

Born in 1650, Rāmachandrapant became *Amātya* in succession to his father (Nilkanth) in 1672, and rose to the position of *Hukumat Panha* under Rājārām (1689-1700). We have already estimated his character and services to the Marāṭhā State, in the last chapter. In the words of Professor S. V. Puntambekar, "His *Rājanīti* is one of the greatest literary legacies relating to the War of Maratha Independence and the principles of state policy which the great Śivājī laid down."¹³

Even in the literature of State-craft in India as a whole, it holds a place of unique interest and importance. It is not an academic book like *Sukranīti* or the *Artha Śāstra*, but a condensed record of the actual and tested political wisdom of the Marāṭhā race. It breathes in every sentence the atmosphere in which it was conceived and reflects the empiricism of a most practical people. A summary of its main principles ought to form an important part of any survey of the early achievements of the Marāṭhās.

The first two sections of the *Ādnāpatra* deal with the troubles of the Kingdom during the War of Independence. The remaining seven are of importance because they deal respectively with the General Principles of State Policy and Organisation, Administrative and Ministerial Policy and Organisation, Commercial Policy, Policy towards *Watandārs*, Policy regarding Hereditary *Vṛttis* and *Ināms*, Policy about Forts, and Naval Policy.¹⁴

Summing up the great work of Sivāji, the *Ādnāpatra* says : ' In this manner he subdued every enemy in the way in which he should be conquered, and created and acquired a Kingdom free from thorns (enemies) and extending from Salheri-Ahivant to Chanji and the banks of the Kaveri ; and he also acquired hundreds of hill-forts as well as sea-forts, several great places, forty thousand state cavalry and sixty to seventy thousand *siledars*, two lakhs of foot soldiers, innumerable treasures, similarly the best jewellery and all kinds of articles. He regenerated the Marathas of the ninety-six noble families. Having ascended the throne he held the royal umbrella and called himself *Chhatrapati*. He rescued the *Dharma*, established Gods and Brāhmans in their due places and maintained the six-fold duties of sacrifice, . . . according to the division of the (four) *varṇas*. He destroyed the existence of thieves and other criminals in the kingdom. He created a new type of administration for his territories, forts and armies, and conducted the government without hindrance and brought it under one system of co-ordination and control. *He created wholly a new order of things.*'¹⁵

The preamble closes with the observation : ' In order that

princes of long life, ornaments to the kingdom, should be well-versed in political affairs and that other governors and officers in various parts of the country should protect the State by conducting themselves according to principles of good government, His Majesty (Sambhājī II) has prepared this treatise in accordance with the *Śāstras*. Remembering it well you should see that princes are educated according to its principles. Likewise the kingdom should be protected by making all the people do their duties in consonance with it and according to the functions allotted to them.¹⁶

The King being the highest functionary of the State, the *Ādnāpatra* looks upon him as divinely appointed. If the people have no protector, who could make for them one common law, they would quarrel and fight with one another and be destroyed; this should not happen. All the people should be free from trouble and should follow the path of *Dharma*. 'Out of compassion for the people God in his full favour has granted us this kingdom.'¹⁷

The sections dealing with the duties of kings, no doubt, read like counsels of perfection. But it is well to remember that the Marāṭhās, far from being bandits, worshipped high and noble ideals. 'Kings who lived in the past,' according to the *Ādnāpatra*, 'succeeded in this world and acquired the next with the help of *Dharma*.' It therefore enjoins on the King: 'believing with a firm faith in the practice of *Dharma*, the worship of God, the acquisition of the favour of saintly persons, the attainment of the welfare of all, the prosperity of the dynasty and the kingdom should be uninterrupted and regulated... Holding universal compassion towards the blind, the crippled, the diseased, the helpless and those without any means of subsistence, he should arrange for their means of livelihood so long as they live.'¹⁸

Appreciating the value and importance of servants, the treatise lays down: 'By taking work from those according to the functions allotted to them and by treating all with equal regard by virtue of his authority, he should keep them contented and look after them so that none of them would feel

any want about their maintenance. Everything should be done which would keep them ready and pleased in his service. If any doubt is felt at some time or other about their conduct, an immediate inquiry should be made in accordance with justice. . . . They should be paid well so that they should not find it necessary to look to others for their maintenance. . . . From amongst them every one should be promoted and encouraged according to the measure or importance of his work. . . . In this way, after appreciating the merit of every one according to the efforts made by him, he should be duly rewarded. Otherwise, if he be given less, the fault of want of appreciation would fall to his credit ; and, if he be given more, carelessness would be attributed to him ; but when he knows the real nature of work, both these faults would not occur.'¹⁹

The sense of proportion and seriousness of outlook about affairs of State is reflected in the instructions regarding entertainments, and the patronage of poets, bards and jesters : ' The chief function of the King is the effective supervision of State affairs. There should be no break in this.' Poets and bards should be entertained at the Court. ' But hearing only self-praise is a very great fault. For this purpose one should not get wholly absorbed in their company by neglecting State affairs.' They should not be invited at the time of conducting State business. ' Kings should not at all indulge in the habit of making jokes. Friends are after all servants.' Too great familiarity would breed contempt, slacken discipline and undermine dignity.

The duty and wisdom of consultation is thus appropriately inculcated : The King should first think independently of any work to be done ; then he should consult experts in the business. ' Whatever leads to the success of the work undertaken should be done by accepting the best possible advice given. If he insists on his own plan, his servants would not at all speak out the merits and defects of the work proposed. Hence the intelligence and initiative of servants does not get full scope for development, but rather they get atrophied and the work gets spoilt. Similarly, if he regards the glory achieved as satisfac-

tory, then he does not feel inclined for further exertion. As a result the enemy would find the occasion for an invasion and the kingdom would suffer. This should not be allowed to happen. *While protecting what is already acquired, new achievements should always be attempted; and this should continuously remain the aim of the King.*'²⁰ It is interesting to note the identity of Rāmdās's words inscribed over this chapter with the last italicised sentence above.

Intensely practical as the Marāṭhās were they recognised that 'Finance is the life of the State. In times of need if there is money all the perils are averted. Therefore with this aim in view the State treasury should be filled.' The advice regarding payment for work is equally shrewd and salutary: 'Servants should be paid well and without any reluctance. If any special work is done by them or if they are burdened with a family they should be given something (in addition) by way of gifts. But any more salary than what is attached to an office should not be paid for any special work done in the same office. The reason is that if any one's salary is increased, other servants of the same rank ask for an additional salary, and if not paid they get discontented. If any one's salary is increased owing to his influence, the salaries of all others who are of the same rank will have to be increased, because they are similar to one another. Then the whole organisation will break down ... For this reason salary should be paid according to rules, and rewards should be given according to special work done. But where the salary is fixed, no change should at all be made.'²¹

If so much care and thought were bestowed on the rewards and remunerations of servants greater care and caution were also necessary in their selection and appointment. The principles and tests recommended for employment in the royal troops might be taken as typical of the standards aimed at in the entire administration for all practical purposes. 'Those persons should be employed in the body of royal troops,' states the Edict, 'who are very brave, powerful, select, thoroughly obedient, and the very mention of whose name will extort ad-

miration in the army and the country, and who on occasion will inspire terror. Those who are capricious, arrogant, unrestrained, childish, vicious, defaming, vilifying and have acted treacherously towards their previous master should not at all be kept in the body of royal troops. For on the strength and assurance of the royal army one can remain free from anxiety about all matters. At times life has to be hazarded; other soldiers have to be kept within bounds. If this method of organisation is kept up, all these things are attainable; otherwise not.'

But the writer is realistic enough to note that men of good character are not easily available at any time. 'Therefore while touring round in the country, in the army and in the small and big forts, the King should have an eye for proper men, and associating with him, in addition to his ministers, the best men wherever available, showing kindness to them and finding their worth, he should employ them in his body of royal troops.' If a man commits any wrong deserving of punishment, he should be immediately punished. 'There should be no weakness shown out of any consideration. If discipline is at all absent in the King's own troops, then how can it be expected to prevail outside?'

Further, the Edict adds: 'If any new servant is to be engaged, full enquiry should be made about his family, place of residence, relations and first service; and if he is not found fraudulent, profligate, or a spy on behalf of others, murderous, drunkard, dissolute, very old, incapable of any work, he should be kept if found very brave. But no servant should be engaged without taking a surety for him. If he runs away after committing robbery, murder and other lawless acts, then the surety must be held responsible for the offender's conduct. This matter should not be neglected. Then the servant remains attentive (to his work) and does not go out of control, and the allotted work is done rightly.'²²

Then follow detailed instructions as to the behaviour of kings and the education of princes, with a special emphasis on tolerance. 'As the root of a tree makes the tree grow strong

in a well-watered place, so the King, who is the root of the kingdom and is endowed with virtues, causes the growth of the kingdom. The reason is that the ideal Hindu King is God himself who is the teacher of the whole world and is the distributor of weal and woe to all. If the King is endowed with virtues, then the welfare of the greatest number is possible ; if he is possessed of vices, the misery of the most is the result. Therefore it is said that the King is the maker of the Age.'²³

The essential functions of the King are thus succinctly stated : ' In the kingdom the organisation of royal troops, of small and large forts, of cavalry and infantry, the removal of the afflictions of the people, the protection of the people, the inquiry into the prevalence of *Dharma* and *adharma*, timely charity, regular distributions of fixed salaries, timely taxation of the people, and the storing of acquired things, a regular inquiry into the State income and expenditure, a resolve to do works great and small according to their importance after knowing their past and with an eye to their future, the meting out of punishment after considering the justice and injustice of a thing, and then determining its penalty according to the *Sāstras*, the organisation of means for removing the calamities of foreign invasion, receipt of news by appointing spies in all countries, the proper consideration of the duty of alliance, war and neutrality towards another State upon any particular occasion, and the determination of action according to it, the protection of the existing kingdom and the acquisition of new territory, the proper observation of the rules relating to female apartments and others, an increase of respect towards respectable men and the control of low-minded persons, the gaining of the favour of gods and good Brāhmins devoted to the gods, and the destruction of irreligious tendencies, the spreading of the duties of religion, the acquisition of merit for the eternal world, and doing such other duties,—these are certainly the functions of a King.'²⁴

These ideals do not indicate that the Marāṭhā kingdom was a predatory State. No civilised State could have better ideals. But to carry them out it was realised that good and

capable ministers were as necessary as the King himself. Ministers are therefore described as the pillars of the kingdom. 'A minister is one who spreads the King's power; he is a restraint on the sea of injustice born of the King's intoxication; he is like the goad of an elephant. Nay, a minister is the repose of the King in this world, because of his administration of State affairs, and the light for the next world on account of his protection of religion. Kings have no other relations or things higher than ministers; of all the servants, ministers should have the highest respect. Kings should appoint ministers possessed of good qualities, realising fully that ministers alone are the King's true arms, that ministers alone are his relatives. The whole burden of the State should be placed on them.' Yet the King is advised not to leave too much in the hands of the ministers; he should himself be active and vigilant. Two points are particularly noteworthy in these instructions: (a) that it is very improper to entrust the whole burden of the State and the authority to punish, in all territories, to one man; (b) that the generals of the army should be made dependent on the minister. 'In this way, if at times a general quarrels with a minister, there will be no difficulty about punishment; nay, in all kinds of work one will be a check on the other. On this account, one feeling afraid of the other, carries out regularly the laws laid down.'²⁰

Nowhere else was the practical wisdom of Marāṭhā policy shown better than in the matter of the hereditary *watandārs*, *māmdārs* and the *vṛtti* holders. They are described as small but independent chiefs of territories and sharers in the kingdom. 'They are not inclined to live on whatever *watan* they possess, or to always act loyally towards the King who is the lord of the whole country and to abstain from committing wrongs against any one. All the time they want to acquire new possessions bit by bit, and to become strong; and after becoming strong their ambition is to seize forcibly from some, and to create enmities and depredations against others. Knowing that royal punishment will fall on them, they first take refuge with others, fortify their places with their help, rob the travellers, loot the terri-

tories and fight desperately, not caring even for their lives. When a foreign invasion comes they make peace with the invader, with a desire to gain or keep a *watan*, meet personally the enemy, allow the enemy to enter the kingdom by divulging secrets of both sides, and then becoming harmful to the kingdom get to be difficult of control. For this reason the control of these people has to be very carefully devised.'

The directions given for the liquidation of this feudal anarchy are a masterpiece of political sagacity. 'Because these faults are found in them,' the Edict says, 'it would be a great injustice that they should be hated and that their *watans* should be discontinued; and on special occasions it would be a cause of calamity. If, on the contrary, that is not done and these people are given freedom of movement, their natural (wild) spirit would immediately find play. Therefore both of these extreme attitudes cannot be useful in the interest of State policy. They have to be kept positively between conciliation and punishment. Their existing *watans* should be continued, but their power over the people should be done away with. They should not be allowed to have any privileges or *watan* rights without a State charter. Whatever has come down to them from the past should not be allowed to increase nor to become less even by a little, and they should be made to obey the orders of the authorities of the territory. A group of kinsmen or agents should not be allowed to remain jointly on the *watan*. After making inquiries, their kinsmen and agents should each be kept in distant provinces along with their families by giving them work according to their abilities. They should not be allowed to get absorbed in their *watans*. *Watandārs* should not be allowed to build even strong houses and castles. If by chance there is found anyone overbearing and unrestrained, he should be praised and sent to do that work which is difficult of achievement. In it if he succeeds or is ruined, both the events would be in the King's interest. If he is saved he should be given even more difficult work. *Watandārs* should not be allowed to quarrel among themselves. They should be well flattered. But there are established usages for their behaviour and they should not

be allowed to transgress even a little. If they are infringed, immediate punishment should be inflicted. Looking to the position of *watandārs* and establishing, every year or two, proper relations with them, the King should weaken them by taking a tribute and other things from them. When a *watandār* who has not infringed the duties of his station is near him, the King should speak about him to other servants that he is virtuous, honest and attached to him, and similarly those words which would give encouragement to him. If among the *watandārs* there are honest persons, it is difficult to get other servants of their type. Firstly, if a *watandār* be a reliable person, and if in addition be honest, he is a veritable flower of gold which has smell. Therefore such *watandārs* should be gathered together with great care; favours should be bestowed on them, respect should be shown to them, royal service should be entrusted to them; nay, they should be reserved to do important work.²⁶

The same is said about the holders of *ṛtti*s and *Ināms*: 'If they are found fit, they should be told to do higher service, but should not be given a new *ṛtti*, for the reason that if a *ṛtti* be given out of public revenue, then the revenue would get less hereditarily by so much. Decrease of revenue leads to the decay of the kingdom, and to the loss of the wealth of the kingdom Similarly, it is a great injustice to give lands as *ināms* to servants or *ṛtti*-holders for the purpose of achieving a task. A King if he be an enemy of his kingdom should be generous in granting lands. The King is called the Protector of the land for the sake of preserving the land; but if the land be given away, over what would he rule? whose protector will he be? Even if a village or piece of land be given for every special service rendered, . . . then it would so happen that, in course of time, the whole kingdom would be granted away. . . . Therefore a King who wishes to rule a kingdom, to increase it and to acquire fame, as one who is skilled in politics, should not at all get infatuated and grant land to the extent of even a barley corn. To say that servants who have rendered service which is useful from generation to generation should be given something which would continue hereditarily

is not proper. For, when he becomes a servant and accepts salary, then it is his duty to do his master's work by great exertion and daring,—putting his heart and soul into it. However, if one has done very meritorious service, which could not have been done by others, then he should be given a higher service with a *walan* or salary attached to it, so that there will be no infliction on the people nor any decrease in the public revenue.²⁷

During the seventeenth century forts were of the utmost value to the struggle for freedom in Mahārāṣṭra. Hence a whole chapter of considerable length has been devoted to this subject in the *Ādnāpatra*.²⁸ 'The essence of the whole kingdom,' it declares, 'is forts.' If there are no forts, during a foreign invasion, the open country becomes supportless and is easily desolated, and the people are routed and broken up. If the whole country is thus devastated, what else remains of the kingdom? Śivājī built this kingdom on the strength of forts. He also built forts along the sea-shore. With great exertion places suitable for forts should be captured in any new country which is to be conquered. The condition of a country without forts is like a land protected only by passing clouds. 'Therefore those who want to create a kingdom should maintain forts in an efficient condition, realising that forts and strongholds alone mean the kingdom, the treasury, the strength of the army, the prosperity of the kingdom, our places of residence and resting places, nay, our very security of life'.

The last two sections of the chapter on forts are devoted to the building, equipment, garrisoning, and administration of these vital points. Considering their importance and value, it is pointed out, their upkeep and organisation ought not to be neglected even in the slightest degree. 'On that account the life of the fort is the *Havāldār*; so is the chief *sarnobat*. They must be chosen by the King himself, and must not be engaged on the recommendation or flattery of some one'. They should be selected for their valour, self-respect, industry, honesty, wakefulness and appreciation of the fort as the dearest

treasure entrusted to them by their master. 'Similarly, the *Sabnīs* and the *Kārkhānīs*, who are the promoters of the laws laid down by the King, and are the judges of all good and bad actions, and who are also high authorities like the *Havāldārs* and *Sarnobats*, should act like them by making all act in the same way.' *Taṭ-sarnobats*, *Bārgirs*, *Nāik-wādī*, *Rāj-pūts*, etc. should also be chosen with similar care. 'Persons who are appointed for service in the forts should not be retained if they are addicted to intoxicating drugs or are unsteady, capricious, murderous and perfidious. Those who are to be appointed should be entertained only on assurance of their good character. Even then a *Havāldār* is to be transferred after three years ; a *Sarnobat* after four years ; a *Sabnīs* and *Kārkhānīs* after five years'.

It is recognised that it is difficult to get reliable men to work in the forts. Yet, all kinds of precautions are recommended. If the workers are close relatives they should not be kept within the same fort. *Deśmukhs*, *Deśpāndes*, *Pāṭils*, *Kulkarnīs*, *Chaugulēs* and other hereditary *Watandārs* who occupy the territory round about a fort should not be given service in the forts near it. They should be employed five or ten villages away from their *watans*'. If this precaution is not followed they might either prove idle or betray to the enemy. If they are found guilty of any offence, they should be immediately punished without waiting for the termination of their term of office. Even if there should be the slightest suspicion of betrayal, the officer concerned should be at once removed even before the investigation starts. When he has come into the royal presence, he should be judged justly, and if the charge is proved against him he should be immediately beheaded, without showing any mercy. The punishment should be proclaimed by beat of drums as a deterrent. If, after proper and just investigation his innocence is established, he should be conciliated and care taken to see that no stigma attaches to him. He should not, however, be sent back to the same post.

The instructions in this behalf are clear, just, humane

and cautious. The rule against employment of relatives in the same place is explained in a manner that appeals to common sense : ' If they commit any offence one feels constrained in punishing them. If proper punishment is not given, others find excuse to petition on their own behalf ; and thus influence leads to the increase of influence, and the established laws are broken. This very thing is the cause of the ruin of a kingdom. For this purpose the breach of laws should not at all be allowed. The chief means for the protection of the kingdom are the forts.'

Equally detailed and interesting instructions are given about the choice of sites, materials, classes and modes of construction. Despite the length of the passage one feels tempted to reproduce it as a whole because of its importance. Besides, it is reflective of the practical character of the Marāṭhā people who have such a genius for details : Forts should be built on sites carefully chosen in every part of the country, it says. There should not be any point, in the neighbouring hills, higher than the fort. If there is one, it should be brought under the control of the fort by reducing it with mines. If this were not possible such points should be occupied and strengthened. ' The building of the fort should not be undertaken only to meet a temporary need. Ramparts, towers, approaches by sap and mine, watches, outer walls, should be built wherever necessary. Those places which are vulnerable should be made difficult by every effort with the help of mines, and the weakness of the fort should be reduced by the erection of strong edifices. Gates should be constructed in such a way that they should escape bombardment from below, and they should have towers in front which would control egress and ingress. To have one gate to the fort is a great drawback. Therefore, according to the needs of the fort, one, two, or three gates and similarly small secret passages should be provided. Out of these only those that are always required for normal use should be kept open, and other doors and inlets should be built up. . . .

' There are several classes of forts which can be built on

every mountain. If there is a plain in front of the gate or below the walls of the fort, a deep moat should be dug and a second wall built mounted with guns to prevent the enemy approaching the moat. The approaches to the fort should not be easy of access. Besides this, secret paths should be maintained for escape in times of emergency. There should always be outposts round forts. There should be patrolling by sentinels of the environs of the fort. There should not at all be a strongly built house near below the fort, or a stone enclosure round any house.

‘Likewise the water-supply must be assured. If there is no water, and if it becomes necessary to fortify the place, then by breaking the rock, reservoirs and tanks should be constructed if there is a spring. One reservoir alone should not be depended upon. For during fighting it might get dried up. Therefore for storing water two or three reservoirs ought to be constructed. Water from them should not be ordinarily spent. The water in the fort should be specially protected. . . .

‘Within the fort, excepting the royal residence, no well-built house should be constructed. The walls of the royal residence should be built of bricks thickly plastered with *chunam*. No cracks in the house should be allowed to remain where rats, scorpions, insects and ants would find a place. The compound should be thinly planted with *nirgudī* and other trees. The officer in charge of the fort (*Gaḍkari*) should not keep the house unoccupied because it is the royal residence. . . . No rubbish should be allowed to fall on the roads, in the market place, or near the walls of the fort. By burning such rubbish, and by putting the burnt ashes in the backyard, vegetables should be made to grow in every house. In order that all granaries and storehouses of military provisions in the fort should be free from troubles of fire, rats, insects, ants, white-ants, the floor should be paved with stones and *chunam*. Tanks (cisterns) should be made on cliffs of forts in places where there is black rock having no cracks. If there is even a small crack, it should be seen that, by applying *chunam*, no leakage takes place. . . .

‘ The powder magazine should not be near the house. . . . Rockets, grenades and other explosives should be kept in the middle portion of the house. They should not be allowed to get damp. After every eight or fifteen days the *Havāldār* should visit it, and taking out powder, rockets, grenades and other explosives and drying them, seal them again after storing them. Guards should always be kept to protect the powder magazine. . . .

‘ On all the vulnerable places in the fort, big and small guns, *charkyas* and other machines suitable for those places and also for higher places should be mounted on platforms on every bastion and rampart wall at suitable intervals. The *charaks* and big guns should be kept on gun-carriages after testing the weight of the guns and by giving them strong iron-rings as supports. . . . tools for repairing the touch-holes of guns and other things necessary for gun-firing should always be kept ready near the guns. . . . Grenades and rockets should be kept ready at every watch. The officer in charge who says that there is no enemy in the country and that when he comes he would get ready by bringing things from the storehouses, is foolish and idle. Such an one should not be entrusted with the work. He should act according to orders blindly and be alert even if there is no occasion ; then when the real occasion comes there will be no danger. . . .

‘ In the rainy season, guns and doors should be besmeared with oil and wax, and by filling the touch-holes of guns with wax and by putting front-covers on guns sufficient for covering their mouths, they should be protected from being spoiled. All kinds of trees should be planted in the fort. In time of need all of them would serve as wood. In every fort Brāhman, astrologers, *vaidiks*, the learned, and physicians who are versed in mineral and herbal medicines, surgeons, exorcists, wound-dressers, blacksmiths, carpenters, stone-cutters, cobblers, etc. should be engaged in sufficient numbers. When there is no special work for them they should not be allowed to remain idle. They should be asked to do other work. In every fort salary, treasury, military provisions, and other kinds

of articles necessary for forts should be collected and stored. While remembering that forts would not at all be useful in the absence of these arrangements, the administration of the forts should be carried on as detailed above.'

The navy was considered an independent limb of the State.²⁹ 'Just as the King's success on land depends on the strength of his cavalry, so the mastery of the sea belongs to him who possesses a navy. Therefore a navy ought to be built Whatever naval force is created should be fully and well equipped with brave and efficient fighters, guns, matchlocks, ammunition, grenades and other materials of naval use.' Then follow instructions about organisation.

'Every unit should contain five *gurabs* and fifteen *galbats*. Over all of them must be a *sar-subhā*. All should obey him. For the expenses of the navy the revenue of a particular territory should be apportioned. *Commerce will be ruined if the expenses are defrayed out of the income derived from ports, and merchants will be troubled.* Harbours should be well protected ; otherwise, in cases of need articles of necessity cannot be brought from abroad. There would also be a loss of customs duties and other income. ... Trade should be increased. *Kolis and merchants should not be troubled. If any one gives them trouble, it should be warded off. Foreign ships without permits should be subjected to inspection. By taking them under control, by using conciliation and intimidation, without touching any of their goods, and by giving them an assurance of safety, they should be brought to the port. In many ways naval and territorial authorities should conciliate and encourage them to freely sell and purchase what they desire, after taking from something by way of customs duties. If there is a great merchant he should be treated with special hospitality at government expense. An effort should be made to see that the foreign merchant feels assured in every way and attracted to enter into commercial relations with the kingdom. Hostile ships should be brought into port without any damage and the King should be informed about them.'*

Skipping over the instructions regarding naval fights and tactics, we might refer to the rules for sheltering the ships. 'The navy should be sheltered every year in a different port which has a fort facing the sea.... Then also the whole fleet should not be kept in one place, but distributed in various places. In the night patrolling, both by land and sea, should be done round about the fleet.... With royal permission useful parts of teak and other trees which are in the forests of the kingdom should be cut and collected. Besides this, whatever is necessary should be purchased and brought from foreign territories... Even when a tree is very old and not of much use, it should be cut only with the consent of its owner and after paying for it. Force should not at all be used.'

Lastly, we might consider the commercial policy as laid down in the *Ādunāpatra*.³⁰⁰ Merchants are described therein as the ornaments and glory of the kingdom. They are the cause of its prosperity. They bring goods from other lands, and lend money in times of need. There is a great advantage in the protection of merchants. For this reason the respect due to merchants should be maintained. On no account should strong action be taken against them, nor should they be disrespected. By making them establish shops and factories in market towns, trade should be fostered, in elephants, horses, rich silks, and cloths of wool etc., jewels, arms and all other kinds of goods. In the capital market great merchants should be induced to come and settle. They should be kept pleased with presents and gifts on special occasions. If they do not find the place favourable, they should be kept satisfied where they are, and by showing them kindness their agents should be brought and kept by giving them suitable places for their shops. Similarly, by sending an assurance of safety to sea-faring merchants at various ports, they should be given the freedom of intercourse in trade'.

Very shrewd precautions about the Europeans are sounded. 'These hat-wearers (*टोपीकर*) are ambitious of increasing their territories and establishing their religion. Moreover this race of people is obstinate. Where a place has fallen into their

hands they will not give it up even at the cost of their lives. Their intercourse should therefore be restricted to the extent only of their coming and going for purposes of trade. They should strictly be given no places to settle in. They should not at all be allowed to visit sea-forts. If some place has sometimes to be given for a factory, it should not be at the mouth of an inlet or on the sea-shore ; they would establish new forts at those ports with the help of their navy to protect them. Their strength lies in their navy, guns and ammunition. As a consequence so much territory would be lost to the kingdom. Therefore, if any place is at all to be given to them, it should be in the midst of two or four great towns, eight to sixteen miles distant from the sea,—just as the French were given lands at Rājāpūr. The place must be such as to be low-lying and within the range of control of the neighbouring town, so as to avoid troubling the town. Thus by fixing their place of habitation, factories might be permitted to be built. They should not be allowed to erect strong and permanent houses. If they live in this way by accepting the above conditions, it is well ; if not, there is no need of them. It is enough if they occasionally come and go, and do not trouble us ; nor need we trouble them.

The character of the Marāṭhā achievement during the seventeenth century becomes clear from the above cited evidence. It was both a cultural and a political triumph. Its roots were in the moral character of the people. A down-trodden and long-suffering race had reasserted itself with vigour and liberated the land and culture from the throttling grip of the foreigners. In doing this they had also shaken the Mughal Empire to its foundations ; they had made themselves the actual masters of their own homelands and the potential masters of the whole of India. They had created a new State and a New Order superior to any that had hitherto existed in Hindu India. Their idealism was noble and their organisation sound : It was spontaneous, healthy, liberal, practical, and was the natural expression of the genius of Mahārāṣṭra. —in short, the concrete manifestation of *Mahārāṣṭra-Dhārma*.

An ampler examination of all its phases and features must form the subject of an independent volume. It has evoked the admiration as well as criticism of scholars of repute in and outside Mahārāṣṭra. We might appropriately conclude this brief survey—based on objective and contemporary evidence—with the following observations of Sir Jadunath Sarkar who might never be accused of any uncritical admiration of the Marāṭhās : Though he speaks in terms of Śivājī the individual, we have no hesitation in extending the application of his remarks to Śivājī's contemporaries whose contributions were not less important or less worthy of appreciation. Those who outlived him carried on his great work to its natural and grand culmination. The blunders of his successors should not blind us in the appreciation of the net achievements that stand indubitably to the credit of his people, especially during the seventeenth century.

Speaking of Śivājī, Sarkar writes : " But the indispensable bases of a sovereign State he did lay down, and the fact would have been established beyond question if his life had not been cut short only six years after his coronation. He gave to his own dominions in Mahārāṣṭra peace and order, at least for a time. Now, order is the beginning of all good things, as disorder is the enemy of civilisation, progress and popular happiness." Then he proceeds to point out that order is only a means to an end : the next duty of the State is to throw careers open to talents and to educate the people 'by creating and expanding through State effort the various fields for the exercise of their ability and energy economic, administrative, diplomatic, military, financial and even mechanical' : all this was done by Śivājī. The third feature was freedom in the exercise of religion : ' though himself a pious Hindu he gave his State bounty to Muslim saints and Hindu sadhus without distinction, and respected the *Quran* no less than his own Scriptures '. Śivājī's political ideals were such that we can almost accept them even today without any change. He aimed at giving his people peace, universal toleration, equal opportunities for all castes and creeds, a bene-

ficent, active and pure system of administration, a navy for promoting trade, and a trained militia for guarding the homeland. Above all, he sought for national development through action, and not by lonely meditation. . . . Every worthy man, -not only the natives of Maharashtra, but also recruits from other parts of India, -who came to Shivaji, was sure of being given some task which would call forth his inner capacity and pave the way for his own rise to distinction, while serving the interests of the State. The activities of Shivaji's government spread in many directions and this enabled his people to aspire to a happy and varied development, such as all modern civilised States aim at."³¹

This, in brief, was the nature of the Marāṭhā achievement.

EPILOGUE

If historical studies have any value and purpose it is to reveal the past with a view to instruct the present. This depends upon the discovery of the truth about the bygone times and its significance to the living generation. But it is obvious that 'the whole truth and nothing but the truth' is beyond recapturing and exact assessment. Nonetheless, we need not be cynical like jesting Pilate or consider that 'history is fiction agreed upon'. The best historical research, pursued with academic honesty, therefore, can recover only a partial view of the 'dead' past. Inevitably this is bound to be not merely *partial* in the sense of being incomplete or fragmentary, but also 'partial' as meaning *biased*. It is hardly to be expected that any writer, however much he might protest to the contrary, will be altogether free from preferences or prejudices. These inherent traits of the human mind are further coloured by the nature of the sources depended upon. In the case of the Marāṭhās, without necessarily being credulous about the native versions as absolutely correct, one has got to be very guarded in accepting the foreign evidence as more reliable or critical merely because it is contrary. Difficult as the task of the historian is, he has, in the last resort, to depend upon his own judgment and discretion. I claim to have done

no better in the full consciousness of the above considerations. I have consequently been less categorical or dogmatic in the presentation of my conclusions. I am aware that, in the final analysis, they must stand the dual tests of logic and authenticity of evidence.

Facts are the bricks of which the edifice of History is built. But the architecture is the work of the historian. This accounts for the difference in the presentation of the substance of history by different writers. In the reconstruction and interpretation of periods and movements in history the attitude and approach of the historian are not a negligible factor. To Grant Duff the rise of the Marāṭhā power appeared to be as fortuitous as a forest fire in the Saihyādrī mountains. Sir Jadunath Sarkar has found in it no more than the manifestation of the genius of supermen : "The cohesion of the peoples in the Maratha State," he says, "was not organic but artificial, accidental, and therefore precarious. It was solely dependent on the ruler's extraordinary personality and disappeared when the country ceased to produce supermen" (*Shivaji*, pp. 485-86). But to Rāṇadé belongs the credit of having pointed out the larger and deeper significance of Marāṭhā history which he tracked to its very roots. This is not to deny that there were accidental as well as personal elements in the shaping of the destiny of the Marāṭhā people. While these exist in all histories, it cannot also be gainsaid that there have been movements like the Renaissance in Europe which may not be explained purely in terms of accidents and personalities. The Marāṭhā *resorgimento* was one such complex historical phenomenon which, because of its uniqueness in Indian history, has not been correctly understood. There have been religious movements in India, as well as creations of political states, like Buddhism and the Maurya empire ; but the combination of the two in the rise of the Marāṭhā nationality was more integral and powerful than any that transpired before. Yet it was not a political movement intended for the propagation of Hindu religion ; rather was it an upsurge of a virile people in defence of their

own way of living : the Marāṭhās called it *Svarājya* and *Mahārāṣṭra Dharma*. Its best and greatest exponents were Śivājī and Rāmdās. Whatever the degree of their mutual acquaintance or intimacy, they were together the true protagonists of all that the Marāṭhā movement stood for.

It is absurd to characterise the Marāṭhā adventure as an attempt to establish a communal empire. Once the safety and integrity of *Mahārāṣṭra Dharma* was secured, it ceased to be merely or even mainly religious. It tended to become more and more political, but the original impulse indubitably came from religion. The equality of opportunity afforded to men of merit drawn from all castes and grades of society, including the Muslims, demonstrated the broad basis on which the Marāṭhā State in its pristine form was founded. Its later deterioration ought not to prejudice our judgment about its original character, which alone concerns us here.

A recent writer has attempted to make out a case for the economic interpretation of Marāṭhā history.* He has tried to show that Śivājī was the leader of the down-trodden peasants of Mahārāṣṭra against the dominating landlord class. In this 'class-war' it was a matter of historical accident that the majority of the exploited class happened to be Hindus. There were Hindu *Deśmukhs* and *watandārs* who were as much opposed to Śivājī as the Muslim rulers themselves. It was a war of the exploited against the exploiters. However, even he does not deny that there were other factors also at work in the *milieu* : he only wants to emphasise that the economic incentive was an equally potent force which served to drive the masses into effective action. While there is room for special interpretations, the nearest approximation to historical truth must necessarily be the total view based upon such sociological data as might be available. This difficult task must be reserved for a special volume.

Finally, whatsoever the forces at work—and they were various ; and whosoever the personalities—and they were

* Lalji Pendse धर्म की क्रांति

numerous—participating in the historical process ; the total achievement—the building up of a rich, dynamic and creative new order out of an inert, spineless and chaotic mass of scattered ignorant supine peoples—a metamorphosis, the like of which had never been witnessed in India before, certainly merits the closest, dispassionate and respectful study at the hands of historians. Nothing more and nothing less has been attempted here.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Ch. I THE BACKGROUND

1. Briggs, *Firishta*, Vol. I, p. 304 gives A.H. 693 (1294 A.D.). The date given in the text is according to Amīr Khusrāu *Khazā 'm-ul-Futūh*, J. I. H. VIII, p. 238; E. D. III, p. 69. The latter being contemporary is obviously more reliable.

2. *Firishta*, I, p. 310.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 371; Ishwari Prasad, *Hist. of Med. Ind.*, pp. 228-29 (1940 ed.).

4. Cf. Fleet, *Kanarese Dynasties*, p. 74; Eliot MS. Collections, II, pp. 513-30; P. S. & O. C. Inscriptions, Nos. 125, 112 and 202-205; J. R. A. S. (O. S.), II, pp. 388 ff. and V, pp. 178 & 183; I. A., X, p. 101.

5. Venkataramanayya, *The Early Muslim Expansion in South India*, p. 1.

6. Sardesai, *Main Currents of Maratha History*, pp. 5-6.

7. E. D. III, p. 69.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-50.

10. *Futūh-us-Salāfin*, pp. 223-25; Venkataramanayya, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

11. E. D. III, p. 598.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 304-10.

13. *Ibid.*

14. 'The ditch of Dowlatabad, the scarp of which is, in many places, 100 feet, excavated out of the solid rock, is now one of the most remarkable objects of curiosity in the Deccan; but according to the author quoted, it must be a modern work, and executed subsequently to the first invasion of the Deccan by the Mahomedans.' Briggs, I, p. 306 n.

15. *Firishta*, I, p. 311.

16. Venkataramanayya, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.

17. Cf. *Dnānēśvara Darśan*, I, p. 95.

तेथ युदुवंश विलास । जो सकळकळानिवास ।

न्यायार्ते पोषी क्षितीश । श्रीरामचंद्र ।

●18-19. Bhandarkar, *Collected Works*, III, p. 161; I. A. XIV (Paithan Grant), p. 317; *Śiśupāla-radha* by Bhāskara Kaviśvara

and *Lilācarita* of Cakradhara. In the last named work occurs the reference : रामदेवो रावो राज्यी बैसला । आमणदेवो खाली उत्तरीला । देवगिरी पालटली । (725) ; K. A. Pādhyé, *Life of Hemādri*, pp. 130-131.

20. Thānā copper-plate inscription of Ś. 1194 cited by Pādhyé, *Life of Hemādri*, p. 248.

21-22. V. B. Kolté, *Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa Borikar*, pp. 151-52, 203-205.

23. S. R. Sharma, *Jainism and Karnatak Culture*, pp. 34-38.

24. S. D. Pendsé, *Mahārāṣṭrācā Sāmskṛtika Itihāsa*, pp. 100-101, 135-36 ; B. A. Saletore, 'Delhi Sultans as Patrons of Jainas' in *K. H. R.* IV, 1-2 (Jan. to July 1937) ; *Med. Jainism*, p. 371.

25. Pādhyé, *op. cit.*, p. 143 ; *Gaz. of Bombay Presidency*, I, ii, pp. 246-48 ; Rājwāḍé, *Mahikāvati Bakhar*, pp. 42-43.

26. *Gaz. of Bombay Presidency*, I, ii, p. 248.

27. Cf. Rānādé, *Mysticism in Mahārāṣṭra*, p. 20.

28. Marsden and Wright, *The Travels of Marco Polo*, ch. XX, p. 389.

29. 'शंकर आपणा रावो भणवी । ते बलाळा न रुचे जीवी ॥

असंसितु घातु प्रसवी । पाडन वचे ॥ जाणोनि दंद संधु ।

दोघा केला विभाग ' states

Bhāskara Kaviśvar in his *Śiśupāla-vadha*—a contemporary work (c. 1308 A.D.).

30. Gackwad's Oriental Series, No. 5, p. xv.

31. Yule, *Marco Polo*, II, pp. 230, 302 ; Da Cunha, *Chaul and Bassein*, pp. 14 and 131.

32. Gackwad's Oriental Series, No. 5, pp. xv-xvi.

33. Yule's *Cathay*, I—cited in *Gaz. of Bom. Presidency*, I, ii, p. 5. Early Muslim settlers in the Konkan are also referred to in *ibid.*, p. 7.

34. According to Firishṭa domestic servants and other riff-raff elements were hurriedly mobilised for the defence, at the eleventh hour. Bags of salt were mistaken for bags of grain ; the discovery was made very late while the garrison was without other provisions. Cf. W. H. Wathen, 'Ten Ancient Inscriptions' in the *J. R. A. S.* (O. S.), II, p. 389.

35. *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭin*, p. 274 ; Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, pp.

26-29. Cf. *Khusrāu*, *Khazā 'in-ul-Futūḥ*, *J. I. H.*, VIII, p. 374.

36. *Khusrāu*, *op. cit.*, p. 374 ; *Firishṭa*, I, p. 369.

37. E. D., III, pp. 201-02.

38. *Khazā 'in-ul-Futūḥ*, *J. I. H.* IX, pp. 53-4 ; E. D. III, p. 87.

39. *Barani*, E. D. III, p. 203 ; *Firishṭa*, I, p. 373.

40. E. D. III, pp. 87-88 ; Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
41. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 325-26.
42. Briggs, I, pp. 378-79.
- 43-44. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 326-27 ; Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
45. *Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*, Eng. tr. i, p. 194 ; Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, p. 78, n. 5 ; Briggs, I, p. 381.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 388-89.
47. *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, pp. 340-41.
48. *Nuh Sipihr*, E. D. III, Appendix, pp. 557-58, 564.
49. E. D. III, pp. 214-15.
50. For a fuller discussion on the subject see Mahdi Husain, *The Rise and Fall of Md. bin Tughluq*, pp. 108-24.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 124 ; Briggs, I, p. 427.
53. Nilkanta Sastri, *Foreign Notices of S. India*, pp. 226-28.
54. Mahdi Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-45 ; Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-33.
55. Firishhta calls him nephew ; Briggs I, p. 418.
56. Nilkanta Sastri, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-17.
57. Briggs, I, pp. 418-19 ; Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-43.
58. Briggs I, pp. 419-20 ; Mahdi Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-45 ; cf. Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, p. 116, n. 29.
59. Briggs I, p. 420 ; *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, p. 418.
60. The date of this revolt (712 H. 1341 A.D.) is wrongly given by Firishhta ; Briggs I, p. 423. Cf. Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-96.
61. Briggs I, pp. 423-24.
62. Mahdi Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
64. Briggs I, p. 429 ; H. K. Sherwani, *Mahmūd Gawān*, 61-3.
65. Mahdi Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-67 ; *Futūh-us-Salātīn*, 480 ; cf. *Jour. of the Aligarh Hist. Res. Soc.*, p. 17.
66. Briggs I, pp. 430-33.
67. *Mahikāvaticī Bakhar* by Bhagawān Nanda Dutta (c. 1578 A.D.) which embodies earlier traditions.
68. Briggs II, pp. 286-87 ; E. D. III, p. 619 ; Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-98 and n. 14.
69. *Jour. of the Aligarh Hist. Res. Soc.*, I, pp. 24-26.
70. Briggs II, pp. 290-91 ; *ibid.*, I, pp. 437-41 ; II, pp. 284-92.
71. E. D. III, p. 618 ; Nilkanta Sastri, *op. cit.*, p. 219.
72. Ed. by Harihara and Srinivasa Sastri, with an Introduc-

tion by T. A. Gopinath Rao (Trivandram, 1916), cf. R. S. Aiyar, *Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 3-4.

73. Cf. Baranī, p. 484 ; Ishwari Prasad, *Qaraunah Turks*, pp. 200-202 ; Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, pp. 169 ff.

74. *Bhārati*, XIX, p. 311, cited by Venkataramanyya, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-67.

75. *Madura Vijayam* ; see note 72 above.

76. E. C. VIII, sb. 375, pp. 65-66. *Ibid.* IV, yd. 46, p. 58 ; Introd. p. 23.

77. *Ibid.* VI, sg. 11.

78-79. See note 73 above.

Ch. II - THE TUTELAGE

1. Ranade, *Rise of The Maratha Power*, p. 38.
2. Quoted by V. A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India*, p. 281 (1923 ed.).
3. Ranade, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-58.
4. Grant Duff, *A Hist. of the Mahrattas*, I, p. 45 (Rev. ed 1921).
5. Ranade, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
7. H. K. Sherwani, *Mahmūd Gāwān*, p. 48.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-59.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 159-61.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63 and n. 50 ; cf. Denison Ross, *Arabic Hist. of Gujarat*, Introd. pp. xxxi-xxxii.
11. Briggs II, p. 385.
12. Sherwani, *op. cit.*, p. 190.
13. *I. A.* XXVIII, 1899, pp. 144-45.
14. Ishwari Prasad, *Med. India*, pp. 375-76.
15. Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 65.
16. Ishwari Prasad, *Med. India*, p. 382.
17. Nilkanta Sastri, *Foreign Notices*, p. 232.
18. Briggs II, p. 368 ; Sherwani, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
19. Ishwari Prasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-82 ; Sherwani, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.
20. Ishwari Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 383.
21. *I. A.* XXVIII, 1899, pp. 239-40 ; cf. *Firishta*, Briggs II, pp. 436-46 ; Sherwani, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-71.
22. Briggs II, pp. 436-40.
23. Sherwani, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-33 ; *Indian Hist. Congress Proceedings*, 1935, pp. 31-41.

25. Briggs II, p. 424.
26. *Riadhul-Inṣā*, 79 and 83.
27. *Burhan-ul-Ma'sir*, 86 ; Briggs II, pp. 483-84.
28. *Riadhul-Inṣā*, 61.
29. *Firishṭa* II, pp. 483-84.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 486.
31. Meadows Taylor, *Hist. of India*, p. 186 (New ed.) ; V. A. Smith, *O. H. I.*, pp. 282-84.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 283.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Cf. *O. H. I.*, p. 286 ; Ishwari Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 405.
35. *O. H. I.*, p. 294.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
37. Kincaid and Parasnis, *A Hist. of the Maratha People*, p. 443 (1931 ed.).
38. *O. H. I.*, p. 292.
39. Briggs III, p. 31.
40. *O. H. I.*, p. 292.
41. Gribble, *A Hist. of the Deccan*, I, pp. 205-7.
- 42-43. Cf. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 64-68.
44. *Rise of the Maratha Power*, p. 33.
45. D. B. Pārasnīs, *Marāṭhē Sardār*, pp. 28-39.
46. *A Hist. of the Marathas* I, p. 69.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.
50. C. D. Dalal, *Rashtraudhavanśakāvyā*, Intro., p. xvii.
- 51-52. *Ibid.*, pp. xviii-xix ; cf. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, I, pp. 50-53.
53. Balkrishna, *Shiraji the Great*, I, i., p. 39.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-47.
57. *Patra Sāra Samgraha*, Nos. 26-29, 36, 92; Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

Ch. III THE PIONEERS

1. आमा अकार्तुकाचे बोले करुनु आपले जागिरीत नाहक गैरहिसाबी पादशाह खलेल करविताती, तरी आपण रजपूत लोक अजी तलग पेशजीहि दोषा चौ पादशाहीत खिदमत केली, अमा गैरहिसाबी जाजती सोसुनु कमड्जतीन व गैरमेहरबानीन पेशजीही खिदमत केली नाही व पुढंही न करं—

- Shāhji to 'Alī 'Adil Shāh, 6 July 1657.

2. Cf. D. V. Apte, *Śiva Caritra Nibandhāvali*, I, pp. 15-16.

3. L. Jādhav, along with Bābājī Kāyath, Udā Rām, Adam Khān and Yākut Khān, appears to have gone over to the Mughals c. 1616 : *Iqbal-nāma*, pp. 84-5 ; *Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*, R. B. I, pp. 312-13. The final desertion is referred to in *Śiva Bhārat*, ch. iv, sl. 1-3 ; *Iqbal-nāma*, p. 187 ; *Tuzuk-i-Jahāngīrī*, R. B. II, p. 218. See Grant Duff, I, p. 78 ; Balkrishna, I, i., pp. 62-3.
4. V. A. Smith, *Akbar*, pp. 276-77 and 282.
5. E. D. VII, pp. 51-61 ; cf. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, p. 16.
6. Chowdhuri, *Malik Ambar*, pp. 118-22 ; *Śiva Bhārat*, ch. iv, sl. 10, 65.
7. V. A. Smith, *Akbar*, pp. 248-9, 266.
8. Gribble, *A History of the Deccan*, I, ch. xix, pp. 211-41 ; *Ibid.*, ch. xxi, pp. 251-62 ; and J. N. Chowdhuri, *Malik Ambar*.
9. Smith, *Akbar*, pp. 276-77, 282, 313-16. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, pp. 34-6.
10. Ch. Two, pp. 43-44 above.
11. Chowdhuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-3.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-18 for events leading up to the battle of Brātvaḍi.
13. E. D. VI, pp. 428-9. For a fuller appreciation of M. Ambar Chowdhuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-71.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 118-22 ; *Śiva Bhārat*, ch. iv, 10, 65. Cf. n. 10 a, Chowdhuri, p. 119 ; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 35 for the part played by Shāhji.
15. *Jahangīr*, pp. 256-59.
16. Chowdhuri, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-47.
17. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, I, i. pp. 68-9.
18. Ch. v, 18.
19. Cf. *Ibid.*, vi, 8 ; P. S. S., 262, 274, 275 ; Balkrishna, I i., p. 76.
20. Beni Prasad, *Jahangīr*, pp. 330-33 ; Saksena, *Shahjahan*, pp. 34-5.
21. Beni Prasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-68, 383-86 ; Saksena, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-8. Cf. Surat letter of 29 Nov. 1626—o.c. 1241—Surat to the Company.
22. Beni Prasad, *op. cit.*, ch. xx, pp. 387-411 ; E. D. VI, pp. 420-28.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Saksena, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-79.
25. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, pp. 37-38, 55.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
27. Saksena, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-159.
28. Mustafa Khān was the son-in-law of Mulla M. Lari who had been cruelly done to death by Malik Ambar after the battle of

Bhātvaḍi. He was a deadly enemy of the Nizāmshāhi. *Śiva Caritra Nibandhāvalī* I, p. 23.

29. Balkrishna, I, i., pp. 76-7 (n. 1), p. 80. Y. K. Deshpande in *Hist. Rec. Com. Report*, 1942 (Mysore), p. 233. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, pp. 38-9.

30. Cf. *Ibid.*, 39-40; Balkrishna, I, i., pp. 80-3; E. D. VII, pp. 7-22.

31. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42. The error in Sarkar's calculation of "two months" (July 1631-Feb. 1632) is obvious.

32. Sharma, *Mughal Empire*, pp. 460-66; Saksena, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-79.

33. E. D. VII, p. 24.

34. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 40, 42-3, 45-6.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-7.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

37. *Jedhē Sakāvalī* gives *Bhādrapad* 1554 Ś. as the date of this coronation at 'Pengiri.' Cf. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 46; E. D. VII, p. 51.

38. Balkrishna, I, i., p. 84.

39. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-8.

40. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-5; Smith, *Akbar*, pp. 276-77 and 282.

43. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-6.

44. Saksena, *Shahjahan*, pp. 159-63.

45. Cf. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

47. For details of the campaign read Saksena, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-47; Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, I, pp. 55-48 (the terms of the treaty are given on pp. 38-40).

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-48.

49. *Śiva Bhārat*, ix, 5-7.

50. Pissurlencar in *Sardesai Com. Vol.*, pp. 45-6.

51. E. D. VII, pp. 51-61.

52. R. S. Aiyar, *Hist. of the Nayaks of Madure*, Appendix A: *La Mission du Madure*, iii, 42 (Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, p. 7.).

53. Verma, *Muhammad Nāma*, p. 24.

54. *B. S.*, p. 317.

55. R. S. Aiyar, *op. cit.*, Introd., pp. 18-28; S. K. Aiyangar, *Baroda Lectures*, pp. 2-24.

56. *Dagh Register* (1631-34) pp. 145, 241, 364; Cf. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, I, i., p. 109 n.

57. Balkrishna, I, i., pp. 110-13. Verma, *Muhammad Nāma*, p. 23. Cf. S. K. Aiyangar, *Baroda Lectures*, p. 44.

58. Verma, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-6. Keladi was the capital up to 1560.

Ikkeri up to 1639 ; Bidnūr thereafter. Read, *Vij. Com. Vol.*, pp. 255-69. Cf. Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*, p. 220 n., Rice, *Mysore and Coorg*, p. 158 ; Balkrishna, I, i. pp. 105-8, ii. p. 95.

60. E. C. VII, Sh. 2.

61. Balkrishna, I, i., p. 111.

62. B. A. Saletore, 'Kannada Sources' in *Sardesai Com. Vol.* (1938).

63. Verma, *M. N.*, pp. 27-8.

64. *Śiva Bhārat*, ix, 37-39.

65. Cf. Verma, *M. N.*, pp. 28-30.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31 ; S. K. Aiyangar, Baroda Lectures, pp. 47-8.

67. Verma, *M. N.*, pp. 33-40.

68. E. F. (1646-50), pp. 25-6 ; Cf. S. K. Aiyangar, Baroda Lectures, pp. 47-8.

69. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, pp. 17-19.

70. Verma, *Muhammad Nāma*, pp. 36-7.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-9. *Śiva Bhārat*, xii, 18-47. Cf. Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, *op. cit.*, p. 50. The date (1646) given by the last as well as his reference to 'Yeshopant Bharve' are obviously erroneous.

72. For a fuller account of the part played by Tirumala read R. S. Aiyar, *Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 110-49, and Jesuit records in *ibid.*, pp. 264-69. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

73 and 74. Verma, *M. N.*, p. 52 ; R. S. Aiyar, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-66 ; Sarkar, *op. cit.*

75. Verma, *M. N.*, pp. 52-3. Cf. *S. B.* xii for others associated with the arrest.

76. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-3 ; *Shivaji*, pp. 35-38 ; *Modern Review* XLVI, p. 12. Cf. Diskalkar, *Vijayanagar Com. Vol.*, pp. 120, 122-23.

77. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, p. 23.

78. Verma, *M. N.*, p. 60.

79. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

80. *Basatin-e-Sālātīn*, pp. 327-29. Verma, *M. N.*, pp. 52-3. The fall of Ginji is thus described by the Jesuits : 'The fortress, protected by its advantageous position, was besides defended by good fortifications, furnished with a strong artillery and by a numerous army provisioned for a considerable time ; it could accordingly defy all the efforts of the besiegers. But soon disagreements and divisions sprang up among these men (the besieged) so diversified in nationality and manners. A revolt broke out ; in the midst of the general confusion, the gates of the citadel were thrown open to the enemy who rushed into it and delivered the town, the richest in all these countries, to pillage. The booty was immense, consisting of silver, gold, pearls, and precious stones of inestimable value.' R. S. Aiyar, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

81. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 24 ; Verma, M. N., pp. 55-6.
84. Sarkar, I. H. Q. VII, pp. 362-64. "The present *firmān* is of great importance as throwing contemporary light on the activities of Dādājī Konḍ-dev and giving the exact dates of the Marāṭhā acquisition of Konḍāna (Simhagarh) and Shāhji's rupture with Bijāpūr." *ibid.*, p. 363.
85. *Shivaji Souvenir*, pp. 6-7. The date of Shāhji's release given therein is 15 *Jyēṣṭha*, 1571 *Virodhi* - 16 May 1649. For a full discussion of the causes of Shāhji's arrest and release also read Balkrishna, *Shivaji* I, i., pp. 127-35.
86. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, p. 56.
87. *E. F.* (1650-55) p. xxxiv.
88. Sharma, *Mughal Empire*, pp. 472-73.
89. Pissurlencar, *Shivaji*, p. 33.
- 90-91. R. S. Aiyar, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-67.
92. Cited by S. K. Aiyangar, *Baroda Lectures*, p. 57.
93. R. S. Aiyar, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-70.
94. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
95. *E. F.* (1651-54), p. 111. Jan. 27, 1652.
96. *Ibid.* (1661-64), p. 174.
97. R. S. Aiyar, *op. cit.*, p. 267. Also read *ibid.* pp. 150-161 and 269-77.
98. Cf. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, p. 30. R. S. Aiyar, *op. cit.*, p. 272.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 272 ; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
102. *Shivaji Souvenir*.
103. *E. F.* (1655-59), pp. 249-51. Revington to Co. d. 10 Dec. 1659 ; Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
104. *Dagh Register*, 1661, p. 126 (16 May 1661).
105. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 156 ; also pp. 151-52.
106. *E. F.* (1661-64) p. 242 ; Balkrishna, I, ii., p. 95.
107. *Śiva Caritra Sāhitya*, IV, p. 21.
108. Balkrishna, I, i., p. 157 ; S. K. Aiyangar, *Baroda Lectures*, p. 57.

Ch. IV- THE INSPIRATION

1. राजे अथ यवन झाले । ठायीं ठायीं दोष घडले ।
मग इहीं अवतार घेतले । कलिदोष हरावया ॥
नामा म्हणे पुढें हे जन । यवन संसर्गें कटीण ।
होतां गाती हरीचे गुण । ते उद्धरती सर्वथा ॥

2. 'Abode of Infidelity' to be converted into 'Abode of Islām.'
3. Belvalkar and Rāṇaḍé, *Mysticism in Mahārāshtra*, p. 31.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.
5. Rājwāḍé, *Itihāsāchi Sādkhané*, vol. VIII, p. 46.
6. The Mahānubhavic conceits are like the conceits of the early Elizabethan writers, and we may say that Jñānadeva stands to the Mahānubhavas just in the same relation in which Shakespeare stood to the early Elizabethans." B. & R., *op. cit.*, p. 27.
7. *Paramāṃṛta* XIV, 18 and 25.
8. B. & R., *op. cit.*, pp. 52 ff.
9. श्री ज्ञानराजे केला उपकार । मागं हा निघारं दाखविला ।
उदार तुम्ही संत । मायबाप कृपावंत । केवढा केला उपकार ।
काय वानूं मी पामर ॥ जड जीवा उद्धार केला ।
मार्ग सुपंथ दाविला । सेना म्हणे उतराई ।
होतां न दिसे कांहीं ॥
10. B. & R., *op. cit.*, p. 138.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
12. आम्हां सांपडलें वर्म । करूं भागवत धर्म ॥
काय करुनि तीर्थाटनें । मन भरलें अवगुणें ॥
13. See Macnicol, *Psalms of the Marāṭhā Saints*, pp. 12-13.
14. B. & R., *op. cit.*, pp. 183-191.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Abhanga* 94.
17. *Abhanga* 95.
18. *Abhanga*, 102.
19. *Abhanga* 106.
20. *Abhanga* 115.
21. *Abhanga* 140.
22. *Psalms of the Marāṭhā Saints*, Introd. 22, 26.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
24. *Abhangas* 1-2.
25. *Abhanga* 5.
26. *Abhanga* 5.
27. *Abhanga* 11.
28. *Abhanga* 3.
29. W. B. Patwardhan quoted by B. & R., *op. cit.*, p. 209.
30. संस्कृत वाणी देवें केली । प्राकृत तरी चोरांपामुनी झाली ।
असोत या अभिमान भुली । त्रथा बोली काय काज ॥

आतां संस्कृता अथवा प्राकृता । भाषा झाली जे हरिकथा ।
 ते पावनहि तत्त्वतां । सत्य सर्वथा मानली ॥
 देवासि नाहीं वाचाभिमान । संस्कृत प्राकृत तथा समान,
 ज्या वाणी झालें ब्रह्मकथन । त्या भाषा श्रीकृष्ण संतोष ॥
 माझी मराठी भाषा चोखडी । परब्रह्मी फळली गाढी ॥

31. *Eknath*, pp. 255-58. Cf. B. & R., *op. cit.*, pp. 256-57.
32. *Abbot*, *ibid.*
33. *Psalms of the Marāthā Saints*, pp. 18-19.
34. *Tukārām*, pp. x-xi.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Abhanga* 1188.
38. *Abhanga* 1091.
39. *Abhanga* 859.
40. *Abhanga* 2386.
41. *Abhanga* 3946.
42. *Abhanga* 1445.
43. *Abhanga* 1585.
44. *Abhanga* 2012.
45. *Abhanga* 176.
46. *Abhanga* 221.

47. साह्य आम्हासी हनुमंत । आराध्य दैवत श्रीरघुनाथ ॥
 गुरु श्रीराम समर्थ । काय उणे दासासी ॥
 दाता एक रघुनंदन । वरकड लंडी देईल कोण ॥
 तें सोडोनि आम्ही जन । कोणांप्रति मागावें ॥
 म्हणोनि आम्ही रामदास । राम चरणीं आमचा विश्वास ॥
 कोसळोनि पडो रे आकाश । आणिकाची वाम न पाहूं ॥

48. B. & R., *op. cit.*, pp. 363-69
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 368-69.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 422.

51. म्लेंच्छ दुर्जन उदंड । बहुतां दिवसांचें
 मांजलें बंड । या कारणे अखंड । सावधान अमावें ॥

Dāsabodh XVIII, 12.

बरें ईश्वर आहे साभिमानी । विशेष तुळजा भवानी ।
 परंतु विचार पाहोनी । कार्य करणें ॥ *Ibid.*, 9.

- 52. *Anandavāna-bhuvana*, 27-43.
53. *Ibid.*,

54. तीर्थक्षेत्रे मोडिलीं । ब्राह्मण स्थानें अष्ट झालीं ।
 सकळ पृथ्वी आंदोळली । धर्म गेला ॥
 मराठा तितुका मेळवावा । आपुला महाराष्ट्र धर्म
 वाढवावा ॥ बहुतलोक मेळवावे । एक विचारें
 भरावें । कष्टें करून घसरावें । म्लेंच्छांवरी ॥
55. तेव्हां नीच ते राजे होती । प्रजा नागविती चोर प्रय ॥ ७६ ॥
 शूद्राह्मनि अति कनिष्ठ । ते राजे होती परमश्रेष्ठ ।
 वर्णावर्ण करिती अष्ट । अति पापिष्ठ अधर्मी ।
 अपराधावीण वितंड । भले त्यांसी करिती दंड ।
 मार्गस्थां करिती कोंड । करिती उदंड सर्वापहरण ॥
 स्वमुखें ब्राह्मण न करिती अध्ययन । होती
 अष्ट जाण मद्यपी ते । नीचांचें सेवन करिती ।
 घोरोघरीं । श्वानाचियेपरी पोडभरिती ॥
 दावलमलकाची पूजिती गदा ।
 वर्षातून फकीर होती एकदां । मग डोला होतां
 थंडा । खाती मलिदा हिंदु तुर्काचें खरकटें ॥
 (गां. पं. २५७८, ३८९२).

Read S. D. Pandse, *Mahārāṣṭrācā Sāṁskṛtika Itihāsa*, p. 160.

56. अति सर्वत्र वर्जावें । प्रसंग पाहोन चालावें । हटनिग्रहीं
 न पडावें । विवेकी पुरुषें ॥ ७ ॥ समया सारिखा
 समय येईना । नेम सहसा चालेना । नेम धरितां
 राजकारणा । अंतर पडे ॥ ६ ॥ *Dāsabodh* XVIII, 6.

57. *Rise of the Marāṭhā Power*, pp. 10-11,
 58. *Bhakta Vijaya*, 140.
 59. *Ibid.*, 239-245.
 60-64. Pp. 125 ff.
 65. *Vij. Com. Vol.*, pp. 122-23.

Ch. V THE GRAND STRATEGIST

1. *F. R. Surat* Vol. 86, p. 102 of 26 June 1664.
2. *Shivaji and His Times*, p. 20 n. Cf. D. V. Apte, *Śivājīcī Vasatī-sthānēn* in *Vividha Dnāna Vistāra*, Sept. 1937.
3. Read p. 118 and relevant notes below. For a brief statement read Har Bilas Sardā, *Śivājī a Sisodia Rajput: a copy of*

Śivāji's horoscope is also given therein. Dr. Balkrishna discusses the ancestry of Śivāji in ch. ii of his *Shivaji the Great*, I, i., pp. 35-56.

4. The date of Śivāji's birth assumed by me as correct is the new one, viz. 19 Feb. 1630.

5-6. For the controversy on the old and new dates of Śivāji's birth (6th April 1627 and 19 Feb. 1630) read D. V. Apte in *Śiva Chavitra Pradīpa*; V. S. Vākaskar in *Sahai ichāra* (Tercentenary special no. ed. by C. V. Vaidya and D. N. Apte), pp. 187-293; and G.D. Tamaskar's series of articles in the *Educational Review* of Madras June 1936-April 1938. Cf. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 22. D. V. Apte and M. R. Paranjpe, *Birth Date of Shivaji* (Poona, 1927). *Shivaji Souvenir*, pp. 95-110 (Marāṭhī section).

7. See note 3 above.

8. For an account of Śivaneri read C. G. Gogate, महाराष्ट्र देशां-नील किङ्ग, I, pp. 64-71; *Bom. Gaz.* (Poona), XVIII, iii., pp. 153-63.

9. Grant Duff, *Hist. of the Mahiattas* I, p. 87.

10. According to Chitnis the marriage of Shāhji with Tukābāi took place one year after the birth of Śivāji, i.e. in ś. 1550 (Sānēs ed. 1924, p. 27). Cf. Tanjore Inscription, p. 6; Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-7.

11. Balkrishna, *Shivaji*, I, i. p. 144.

12-16. Sarkar writes "It is a fair inference from the known facts that by the year 1630 or thereabout Jijā Bai lost her husband's love, *probably with the loss of her youth*, and Shahji forsook her and her little son Shivaji and took a *younger and more beautiful wife*, Tuka Bāi Mohitē, on whom and whose son Vyankoji he henceforth lavished his society and all his gains. (*Shivaji*, p. 23 Italics mine.) Shāhji was round about 50 yrs. of age in 1630 (See Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 58). Presumably Jijā Bāi could not have been older than her husband. According to the 91 *Kalmi Bakhar* she was two years younger (Vākaskar's ed. Baroda 1950, pp. 6-7). Considering the hard life led by Jijā Bāi along with her husband and all the known details of her vigorous living, Sarkar's inference regarding her "loss of youth" appears curious. Tukā Bāi might indeed have been younger, but *ergo* "more beautiful" seems to be Sarkar's own embellishment. Śivāji and his mother were at Bangalore until the boy was 12 years of age according to Sabhāsad. If he had been neglected by his father, as alleged, he need not have moved his little finger for the release of his father. The entire relations sketched by me in the text constitute a refutation of Sarkar's misreading of Shāhji's attitude towards Jijā Bāi and Śivāji. Cf. Sen, *Śiva Chhatrapati* pp. 164, 174-75; Sardesai, *Marāṭhī Riyāsāt*, I, p. 82; and *Śiva Bhārat* IX, 60.

17. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 37. Randulla Khān who died in 1643 could not have been the cause of Shāhji's release in 1649 ! See P. S. S. 488 and Kincaid, I, p. 143.

18. Read pp. 79-80 *ante*.

19. Sabhāsad, pp. 3 and 164. Cf. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, 97 and 102. The traditional view of Dādāji, recorded by Grant Duff, the editor (S. M. Edwards) notes, may have to be modified in the light of further research.

20. Sabhāsad, p. 4. The 12 Māvajs referred to by Sabhāsad were i. Rohidkhor, ii. Velvand, iii. Muse, iv. Muṭhe, v. Jor, vi. Kanaḍ, vii. Sivthar, viii. Murum, ix. Pauḍ, x. Gunjan, xi. Bhor, and xii. Pavan. Sen, *Śiva Chhatrapati* pp. 3-4 ; cf. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 24-30.

21. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, pp. 85-6.

22. See note 18 above.

23. Verma, M. N., pp. 36-7 ; Cf. *Basātin-e-Sālātin*, pp. 328-29 'The country which had nothing but idol-worship and infidelity for centuries was illumined with the light of Islām through the endeavours and good-wishes of the King ... Mosques were erected in the cities which were full of temples and preachers and criers were appointed in order to propagate Islām.'

24. See p. 61 and note 29 Ch. III above for the murder of the Jādhavas. Kheloji Bhonslé is referred to by Sarkar as Sivaji's grand uncle, *Shivaji*, p. 31. For an account of Bajāji Nimbalkar, see *Shivaji Souvenir*, Marathi section, pp. 165-86.

25. *Śiva Bhārat*, xviii, 52-54 ; V. S. Bendrey, *Daṇḍanīti*, p. 63.

26. Watters' *Yuan Chwang*, ii, p. 239.

27. *Hist. of the Mar.* I, p. 103.

28. *Ibid.*

29. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 25-6.

30-31. For the importance of the part played by geography in the rise of the Marāṭhā power read *Śivaji Nibandhāvali*, pp. 330-33. The *Adnā-patra* states :

संपूर्ण राज्याचें सार तें दुर्ग । गड कोट हेंच राज्य, गड कोट म्हणजे राज्याचें मूळ, गड कोट म्हणजे खजीना, गड कोट म्हणजे सैन्याचें बल, गड कोट म्हणजे राज्यलक्ष्मी....॥

See S. N. Banhatti's article in *Rāmdās and Rāmdāsi*, Vol. 50, pp. 375 ff ; also read *Shivaji Souvenir*, pp. 48-94 (Marāṭhī section).

32. See note 20 above.

33-35. Sambhāji Mohitē was a brother of Tukā Bāi the second wife of Shāhji. Balkrishna, *Shivaji*, I, ii., pp. 25-6.

36. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

37. Sharma, *Mughal Empire*, pp. 90-93 ; 138.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 285-86. Cf. Smith, *Akbar*, p. 287.
 39. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-5.
 40. *Siva Bhārat*, Chs. XII-XV ; Rawlinson, *Source Bk. of Man. Hist.*, pp. 13-19. Cf. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-8.
 41. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
 42. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.
 43. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
 44-46. The relevant passage in Sabhāsad is reproduced in full here for reference :

‘ कोंकणांत चंदरराव मोरे म्हणून राज्य करीत होते. व गृंगारपुरां सुर्वे राज्य करीत होते. असे जबरदस्त गड कोठ दहा बारा हजार लष्कर, हाशम समेत राज्य करीत असत. त्यांजकडे रघुनाथ बळाळ सबनीस बोलावून पाठविले. विचारकरितां, “ चंदरराव मोरे यास मारल्या विरहित राज्य सांभत नाहीं. त्यास तुम्हांवांचून हें कर्म कोणास न होय. तुम्हीं त्यांजकडे हेजबीस जाणें, ” ऐसें सांगितलें. बराबर निवडक धारकरी शें सवाशें माणूस निवडून दिलें. ते स्वार होऊन जावली नजीक जाऊन पुढें चंदररायास सांगून पाठविलें कीं, “ आपण राजियाकडून आलों आहों. कित्येक बोलणें तहरह कर्तव्य आहे ” असें सांगून पाठविलें. उपरि त्यांनीं त्यांस आपणांजवळ बोलावून भेट घेतली. कित्येक बाह्यात्कारी बोलणें जालें. विराड दिलें तेथें जाऊन राहिले. दुसरे दिवशीं मागती गेले. एकांतीं भेट घेतली. बोलणें जहालें. प्रसंग पाहून चंदरराव व सूर्याजीराव दोघांभावांस कटारीचे वार चालविले. जमातीशीं निघून चालिले. पाठीवर लाग जहाला त्यास मारून निघोन चालिले. खांसाच पडलियावरी लोक काय चालून येतात ? असें कर्म करून परतोन, राजियाकडे भेटीस आले. तेच खांसा राजा चालोन जाऊन जावली सर केली. मावळे लोकांस कौल देऊन संचणी केली. प्रतापगड म्हणवून नवाच बसविला. हणमंतराव म्हणवून चंदररायाचा भाऊ चतुर्बंट म्हणून जागा जावलीचा होता, तेथें बळ धरून राहिला. यास मारिल्याविना जावलीचें शैल्य तुटत नाहीं. असें जाणून संभाजी कावजी म्हणून महालदार राजियाचा होता त्यास हणमंतराव याजकडे राज्यकारणास पाठवून, सोईरिकीचें नातें लावून, एकांतीं बोलीचालीस जाऊन, संभाजी कावजी यांनं हणमंतरायास कटारीचे वार चालवून जिवें मारिलें. जावली काबीज केली.

47. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 43. Cf. Rawlinson, *Source Bk.*, pp. 54-5.
 48-49. *Ibid.*, p. 44. Cf. 91 *Kalmi Bakhar*, para. 29. B. B. Misra “The Incident of Javli” in the *Journ. of Ind. Hist.* (April 1936), pp. 54-70 ; S. N. Sen, *Sardesai Com. Vol.*, pp. 197-201 ; C.V. Vaidya, *Shivaji*, pp. 64-71 ; and Balkrishna, *op. cit.* pp. 31-39.

50. *Shivaji Souvenir*, p. 7. This finds remarkable confirmation in contemporary letters: *P. S. S.* 553, 557 (June-July 1649).

51. *Shivaji Souvenir*, p. 52.

52-53. Rawlinson, *Source Bk.*, pp. 55-57.

54. Rawlinson, *Source Bk.*, p. 56; Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 32; *Śiva Bhārat*, xviii, 8-9.

55-57. *P. S. S.* 557, 615, 627. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 33. Misra, *J. I. H.*, April 1936, pp. 64-7. The rebellion of Hanmant Rao is referred to by Subhāsad and the *Jedhe Karinā*, as well as, in *P. S. S.* 561 and 567.

58-59. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 43. Cf. Misra, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65; Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

60-62. Texts cited (Sen and Sānē).

63. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

64. *Ibid.*, 45-47.

65-66. *Ibid.*, 51-54. Cf. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 60; *P. S. S.* 739.

67-68. *Shivaji Souvenir*, pp. 52-3; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 56; Pis-surlencar, *Shivaji*, p. 4.

69. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 56. Māhuli referred to here (my friend Prof. Oturkar points out to me) is in the Thāga Dist., not that in Sātārā Dist.

70. *Shivaji Souvenir*, pp. 53-6.

71. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

72. Sabhāsad; Sen, *Śiva Chhatrapati*, p. 9.

73. *E. F. R. V.* i, p. 3; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

75-76. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 68. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-58.

77. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-77, particularly n. on p. 77. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54, p. 58.

78. Pārasnis MS. letter no. 5; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 49. Sabhāsad; Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

79. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 81.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

81. *F. R. Surat* Vol. 103; *E. F.* vol. 1661-64, p. 236. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 80 ff. For career of *Shā'ista Khān*, *ibid.*, p. 76.

82-83. *F. R. Surat*, 86; to Karwar and to Co.

84. *D. R.* pp. 543-45; Balkrishna *op. cit.*, p. 92.

85. *D. R.*, p. 455 (20 July 1663).

86. Sabhāsad; Sen, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

87. For Bijāpūr diplomacy and the desperate efforts to tackle Śivājī through the Desāis of Sāwantwādi and the Portuguese read Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-7.

88. Thomas Browne, Vol. I, pp. 426-37 ; Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-11.
- 89-90. *Ibid.*, pp. 230-31 ; also pp. 210-11.
91. *Ibid.*, pp. 213-21.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 232.
93. E. D. VII, pp. 88-89 ; Sharma, *Mughal Empire*, pp. 792-93.
94. *Br. Museum Sloane MSS.* No. 1861, I. A., Dec. 1921. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 220.
95. *Ibid.*, pp. 226-27 ; Thevenot, III, ch. xvii.
96. Sen, *Foreign Bibliographies of Shivaji*, pp. 73-6.
97. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 232.
- 98-100. J. C. De, *Indian Culture*, VI-VII, articles on the Surat raids.
101. Sen, *Foreign Biographies*, pp. 360-62.
102. *Ibid.*, pp. 73 ff ; cf. other foreign accounts in Balkrishna, *Shivaji*, I, ii, pp. 190 ff.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.
104. The Dutch losses amounted to t. 20,000 (£1,700). *Ibid.*, pp. 371-72. It is obvious that the compensation granted was not uniform in all cases.
105. *Shivaji*, pp. 178-79.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
107. *Ibid.*, pp. 106-07.
108. Sen, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-84 ; 40, 49.
109. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
110. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-22.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
- 112-113. E. D. VII, pp. 272-75.
- 114-115. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 143.
116. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-47.
- 117-118. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31.
119. *Shivaji and His Times*, p. 158.

Ch. VI—THE CHHATRAPATI

1. The crown quotation is from Nischalapuri who was a Tāntric who brought about a second coronation ceremony of Sivaji in accordance with his cult, after the Vedic rites had already been performed. His work entitled *Śrī Śiva-rājyābhiśeka-kalpataru* has been edited by D. V. Apte (*B. I. S. M. Quarterly*, Vol. X, 1 March-June 1929). See V. S. Benārey, *Dandaniti*, p. 66 and p. 34, n. 57.
2. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 141.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31 ; *House of Shivaji*, pp. 124-27.
4. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 134.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
7. *Pārasnis* MS. letter No. 11.
- 8-9. *Shiraji Souvenir*, p. 16.
10. *E. F.*, Surat vol. 105 ; 1668-69, p. 269.
11. Sen, *Śiva Chhatrapati*, pp. 72-73.
12. Acworth, *Ballads of the Marathas*, p. 55.
13. Sen, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
14. *Shiraji*, p. 166.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
16. *E. F.* 1668-69, pp. 256-57. 23 Jan. 1670. Cf. Sharma, *Mughal Empire*, pp. 523-59 for Aurangzeb's religious policy.
17. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, 166-67.
18. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, III, pp. 319-20.
19. *E. D.* VII, pp. 183-85.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 293 ; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 318, 323.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
22. Sharma, *Mughal Empire*, p. 526.
23. Sarkar, *House of Shiraji*, pp. 98-100.
24. Sarkar, *Shiraji*, pp. 170-73. Cf. Manucci, II, pp. 162-67 ; *F. R.*, Surat, vol. 105 pt. ii (fl. 20-21), Bombay, 5 Sept. 1670.
25. *F. R.*, Bombay, vol. 19, p. 27 (Surat to Bombay).
26. *Consultations*, Surat, 16 Mar. 1670, and Swally Marine, 2 Oct. 1670.
27. Sarkar, *Shiraji*, p. 178.
28. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, I, ii, p. 328.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 328-31.
30. *O. C.* 3515, 20 Nov. 1670.
31. Sabhāsad, 65. Cf. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-82.
- 32-33. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
- 34-36. Sabhāsad, 75-76. English records confirm this victory, though the Persian records are silent about it *O. C.* 3633, Surat to Co., 6 April 1672.
37. Surat, vol. 3, fl. 25 Surat Cons., 26 Oct. 1672.
38. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-94.
- Bombay to Surat, Oct. 1673 ; Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-
F. R., Surat, 106.
41. Sabhāsad, 79 ; Jedhe *Śakārālī* gives the date.
42. *E. D.* VII, p. 288.
43. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.
44. Sabhāsad ; Sen, *Śiva Chhatrapati*, pp. 113-18.
45. Sen, *Foreign Biographies*, pp. 456-61.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 461-62 *O. C.* vol. 35, No. 3965.

47. *Foreign Biographies*, pp. 467-68.

48. *Travels in India*, pp. 263-64.

49. *Dutch Records*, XXXIV, No. 841, 13 Oct. 1674.

50-52. *Ibid.* The controversy regarding the ritualistic details of the coronation are of secondary interest. The political importance of the ceremony has been brought out in the text. [P. 181, l. 21—For *dhwa* read *dhwa*.]

53. स्वास्त श्रीराज्याभिषेक शके ३ नल नाम संवत्सरे माघ शुध ५ क्षेत्रीय कुला-
चंतस श्री राजा शिवाजी छत्रपती स्वामी याणी समस्त ब्राम्हण वेदपाठी व ग्रहस्थान
व क्षेत्रीय मंडळी तथा प्रभुग्रहस्थान व वैश्यजाती व शूद्रादि लोकान तथा जमेदार व
वतनदार व रयेत वगैरे सर्व जाती हिंदु महाराष्ट्रान तथा महालानि व देश व तालुके
व प्रांतानिहाय वगैरे यांस आज्ञा केली ऐसिजे. हिंदु जातींत आनादि परंपरागत
धर्मशास्त्रप्रमाणे धर्म चालत आले असता अलीकडे कांहीं दिवसांत येवनी आमल
जाहल्यामुळे कांहीं जातींतील लोकास बलात्कारे धरून भ्रष्ट केले व कितेक जागींची
दैवते जवरीने छिन्नभिन्न केली. हिंदु जातीत हाहाकार जाहाला. गाय ब्राम्हणसह
धर्म उत्छद्द होण्याचा समय प्राप्त जाहाला. त्याजवरून श्री ईश्वरीकृपेने आमचे हाते
श्री सांबाजीने यवन वगैरे दुष्टास शासन करऊन पराभवाते गेले व राहिले ते शत्रू
पादाक्रांत होतील. परंतु लिहिण्याचें कारण की या सरकारात राज्याभिषेक समई
क्षेत्रक्षेत्रादि क्षेत्रस्थ ब्राम्हण बहुत ग्रंथ अनादि सर्व जमा करून धर्मस्थापना जाहाली
त्यास श्रीकासी क्षेत्रस्थ ब्राम्हणांत कांहीं तट पडून हाली ग्रंथ पाहाता भटजीकडून
तफावत जाहली आहे ठरले त्याजवरून हल्ली पुन्हा शास्त्रीपंडित व मुदसदी व
कारकून यास आज्ञा होऊन ज्ञाति विवेक व स्कंद पुराणांतरगत श्याद्रीखंड अदी
महान ग्रंथी निरणय सर्व ज्ञातिविसी जाहले आहेत ते वगैरे सर्व ग्रंथानुमते व जसे
ज्याचे धर्म अनादि चालत आले त्याप्रमाणे निरवेध चालावे अगर ज्या ज्या ज्ञातीस
वेदकर्माचा अधिकार असून येवनी जाहल्यामुळे आथवा ब्राम्हणांनी कांहीं द्वेषबुद्धीने
शास्त्रानुरूप कर्मे न चालवितां मलीन जाहली असतील ती त्या ज्ञातीचें मंडळीनी
पुरी पाहून ज्याची त्याची नीट वहिवाट आचरणे. ज्या ज्ञातीत जशी परंपरा चालत
आली त्या प्रो चालवावी. जो कोणी द्वेषबुद्धीने द्रव्ये लोभास्तव ब्राम्हण शास्त्रविरहित
नवीन तंटे करून खेलेल करील येविसी त्या ज्ञातीवाले यांनी सरकारात अर्ज
करावा. म्हणजे शास्त्राचे समते व रूढीपरंपरा व ग्रंथ पाहून निरंतर निरमल्लखरणे
धर्मस्थापना कोणाचा उजुर न धरीता परनिष्ठ जेव्हांच तेव्हांच त्वरीत बदाबस्त
होईल. हली यवन उत्तर देशीहून येत आहे. तरी सर्व ज्ञातीने एक दिल राहून कस्त
मेहनत करून सेवा करून शत्रू पराभवाते न्यावा यात कल्याण तुमचें सरकारचें

ईश्वर कवील, जाणेजे. " (K. S. Thackeray, *Grāmanyaṇacā Sādyanta Iti-hāsa*, 154-55, Bombay, 1919.)

51. See note 49 above.

Ch. VII THE PATRIMONY

1. Vyankoji was the son of Tukā Bāi Mohitē the second wife of Shāhji. Śivāji born of Jijā Bāi was elder in years as well as by the seniority of his mother as the first wife of Shāhji.

2. Until the subjugation of Karnāṭak by Śivāji in 1677 Vyankoji, not only technically, but also by personal choice and inclination preferred his subordination to Bijāpūr. Read text p. 188 *ante*.

3. Rawlinson, *Source Bk. of Mar. Hist.*, pp. 129-31; Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 284-86.

4. Sen, *Foreign Biographies*, pp. 302-04.

5. Sen, *Śiva Chhatrapati*, pp. 231-32.

6. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 285-86.

7. Sen, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-20.

8. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 294-95.

10. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-84.

11. See R. S. Aiyar, *Nayaks of Madura*, p. 280; *La Mission du*

12. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-28.

13. *Dagh Register*, v, 319-2 Oct. 1677.

14. *Ft. St. George*, vol. 18, p. 42 (24 Aug. 1677).

15. *La Mission du Madure*, iii, p. 271.

16. Sen, *Foreign Biographies*, p. 317.

17. *F. R. Surat* vol. 107, pt. ii, fl. 24.

18. *La Mission du Madure* iii, p. 271.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 281-82.

20. *Ft. St. George Records*, vol. 27, pp. 17-18 (16 July 1677).

21. *La Mission du Madure*, iii, p. 273.

22. *Ft. St. George, Diary and Consultation Bk.* (1678-79) p. 67.

23. *Dagh Register*, 28 Aug. ; 1678, p. 458 ; 10 Nov. 1678, p. 642.

24. *La Mission du Madure*, iii, p. 249.

25. Sen, *Śiva Chhatrapati*, p. 129.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 232-36 ; Cf. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-289.

27. H. Gary's *Report to the Co.* dated Bombay 16 Jan. 1678 - o. c. 4314.

28. Sabhāsad, 90.

29. English *Diary and Consultations* (1678-79), pp. 105-06. Cf. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 308-9.

30. *Shivaji*, pp. 366-67 n. (1919 ed.)

31. Sarkar, *Shivaji* (1929 ed.), p. 280.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 286-87.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 311-12 and 312 n.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 308-9.
36. *Dagh Register*, 2 Oct. 1677, p. 319.
37. Cited by Sen, *Śivāji Nibandhāvali*, I (Eng. Section), pp. 58-9.
38. *Fl. St. George Records*, 1672-78, pp. 112-13.
39. *Ibid.*, 18 June 1677, p. 115.
40. [This ref. no. is erroneously printed in the text as '30.] *Ibid.*, Vol. 27, p. 28. 19 June 1677.
41. O. C. 4266 ; Sen, *Foreign Biographies*, pp. 472-74.
42. R. S. Aiyar, *Nayaks of Madura*, pp. 176-77 ed. note by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar. Cf. *B. I. S. M. Quart.*, 1937, No. 68, pp. 136-44.

Ch. VIII THE SEA FRONT

1. Sabhāśad (65-66) also states that Śivāji 'protected and properly maintained those who accepted his Kaul.'

2. E.g. read my *Mughal Empire*, pp. 410-418, 604-618 and 853-859 depicting the relations with the Europeans.

3. Janjira island is 45 miles s. of Bombay. $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the e. on the mainland are Danda and Rājāpuri on opposite sides of the Rājāpuri creek. These three places were of very great commercial and strategic value, as will be clear from their history dealt with in the text. Read B. K. Bhonsle, *Janjira Samsthāncā Itihās* for a fuller account ; E. D. VII, p. 256.

4. F. R., Surat vol. 88, *Letters and Memorial*, Rairy, 21 May 1674.

5. The Siddis being Abyssinians were as much foreigners as the Portuguese, French, Dutch and the English. Their attitude towards Śivāji was more persistently hostile.

6. P. 143 *ante*.

7. Pis-surlencar, *Shivaji*, p. 4.

8. Surat, vol. 86 Surat to Co., 26 Nov. 1664.

8A. Fryer, *Travels* II, p. 66.

9. Read Shejwalkar's art. on the Basrur expedition in the *Bulletin of the Deccan College Post-graduate Research Institute*, vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 135-144.

10-11. See text pp. 211-12 *ante*.

12. Hubli was sacked in 1664-5 and 1673. F. R. Surat vol. 86, p. 102-26 June 1664, Surat to Carwar speaks of 'that mart of our Carwar factors where we sell and buy most of the goods that post

affords us'; Hubli, a great inroad town and a mart of very considerable trade.' *Ibid.* vol. 87, p. 54, 1 Nov. 1673; *O.C.* No. 3779 of 31 May 1673. Also *E. F. India* 1665-67, pp. 75-76; Surat vol. 104, p. 212 of 6 Jan. 1665; and *F. R. Surat*, vol. 106, pp. 145-6 of 2 Sept. 1673; *ibid.*, fl. 109-110 of 14 May 1673; *O. C.* vol. 34 No. 3786 of 17 May 1673.

13 Cf. *Dagh Register*, Bl. 445, 7 Feb. 1676.

14. *F. R. Surat*, 103; Gyffard to Surat, 24 May 1663 and 22 June 1663

15. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 235. We cannot say how far Śivājī was provoked into this "massacre of the Ghorpadés" by the memory of Bāji's rôle in the arrest of Shāhji in 1648. Cf. *Sabhāsad* p. 54 (Sāné's ed.).

It is important to note that this passage mentions neither the Mudhol "massacre" nor the "popular tradition" about the motive of revenge (for Bāji's rôle in the arrest of Shāhji in 1648). The only other authority cited for this embellishment is the *Jedhé Sokāvali*. The entry therein, however, simply reads:

शके १५८६ क्रोध संवत्सरे : कार्तिक मासी येदिल शाहाची व राजेश्री स्वामीचा बिषाड होऊन नि खावासखान कुडाळास आले. राजेश्री स्वामी शेनेसहवर्तमान जाऊन घोरपडे मारिले खावासखानासी युद्ध केलें तो पळोन घाटावरी गेला समागमे सज्याराऊ जेथे होते त्याणी युध्याची शर्त केली. (*Siva-caritra-Pradīpa*, p. 23).

It means: 'Śaka 1586 *Krodha Samvatsara*, in the month of *Kārtika*, 'Ādilshāhī and Rāje Śrī Swāmi having fallen out, and Khawās Khān having come to Kudal, Rāje Śrī Swāmi, with his army, went and struck down Ghorpadé, fought with Khawās Khān, and he fled over the Ghats. Sarjé Rāo Jedhé who was in that action, fought valiantly.'

The distinguished part played by Sarjé Rāo Jedhé in this engagement having attracted the special attention of the chronicler, this entry in the *Śakāvali* acquires a particular authenticity. The month *Kārtika* of the *Krodha* year (śaka 1586) corresponds to 10th Oct. – 7th Nov. 1664 (Ephemeris). The destruction of the Ghorpadés took place while Khawās Khān was in Kudal; and his fight with Śivājī and flight over the Ghāts followed after the Ghorpade incident. These happenings are recounted in this sequence in an undated letter (c. 1664) supposed to have been written by Śivājī, and opening with the terms of address: वडिलांचे शेवेसी. These words mean: 'In the service of the Parent' (either father or mother), and it has been argued, that this letter must have been written by Śivājī to his mother, since Shāhji had died on 23rd January 1664. The letter recounts incidents that took place at the end of that year, but quotes

the purport of a letter received to which it was presumably a reply. The translation of this letter given in the *Shivaji Souvenir* (pp. 145-46) is not idiomatic. It opens with—'At the service of *Father*';... and the recounted wording is rendered as 'You are aware of the critical situation in which *I found myself* a few years ago in the Bijapur Darbar....' (referring to Śāhji's imprisonment in 1648). Stricter adherence to the conventions of the language and society would warrant its being put only in indirect speech : विज्यापुरास येणें घडलें 'the visit to Bijapur came about.' No one who is familiar with the charming indirectness in which a Hindu wife refers to her husband or his actions will miss the correct import of this expression. Hence it does *not* mean "what *happened to me*," as crudely implied by the English translation in the *Souvenir*. There is therefore nothing to preclude, *if the letter is genuine*, its having been addressed to Jijābāi. Cf. Balkrishna, I, ii, pp. 539-40; C. V. Vaidya, *Shivaji*, pp. 164-70. But C. V. Vaidya has strenuously argued for the greater plausibility of its being addressed to Shāhji, and has consequently found it necessary to antedate the events referred to therein, rejecting the date recorded by the *Śakāvali*. No one has questioned the authenticity of the letter. Though it may not be possible to fix its address or date beyond dispute, its contents serve to confirm the two important *facts* recorded in the *Śakāvali*. The destruction of Mudhol and its motive are also referred to therein. We are further informed that Mudhol *jagir* was annexed by Śivāji :

पुन्हा आपलेसे करून मुघोळ पंचमहाल आपला करून स्थापिले.

Ali Adilshāh, however, regranted Bāji's *jāgirs* to his son Māloji, in perpetuity, in view of his father's "martyrdom" in the service of his *Sarkār*. It is important to note that, in the royal *firman*, there is not even an allusion to any barbarity committed by Śivāji : "And a *dispute and fight* also took place *between the supreme* (and) *most holy Sarkār and Shivāji Rājāh Bhonslê*; in the fight your father having displayed gallantry and heroism and self-sacrifice, and having (thus proved himself) useful in every respect to the most holy Sarkār, died like a martyr." Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, I, i. *Firman* dated 20th Oct. 1670 (end of the vol.).

The "*massacre of the Ghorpades*" finds no support anywhere. Śivāji's letter says "बाजी मारिले व कितेक खासे लोक पडले." Bāji was killed and many of his own men (troops) fell. A Dutch record as well speaks in very similar terms : "The victory gained by the rebel in taking Captain Gorpora by surprise was far from what Chaveschan expected, as that person was certainly one of the most excellent commanders. He got so severely wounded that he soon died and lost 200 men besides all the cash ... Gorpora's men who escaped though

no more than 300 horsemen, made it so hot for Sivasi near Carra-patam and Waim above the Ballagatta, that the same is said to have hastened the breaking up of his camp from here." Dagh-Register ; Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, II, ii. p. 533. In a very frank letter addressed to Māloji, in 1677, Śivāji writes : " From time to time enmity began to grow between your and our families. In several contests you killed our persons and we yours. As a prominent instance, our people killed, in the contest, your father Bāji Ghorpade. Mutual enmity continued in this way." He then invites Māloji's co-operation in what he explains as their common interest, namely, to see that Deccan is in the hands of the Deccanees. *Ibid.* II, i. pp. 282-83.

16. Sabhāsad, 69.

17-18. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, I, ii., p. 527.

19-20. *F. R.*, Karwar to Surat, 29 Aug. 1665.

We should point out here Sir Jadunath Sarkar's confusing reference to Bahlol Khān in the context of the suppositious victory of Khawās Khān over Śivāji. He gives a common Index reference (p. 234) to both Khawā Khān and Bahlol Khān. The latter name, however, does not appear on that page, though in the ft. n. that of Md. *Ikhlas Khān* does. But this was a brother of Khawās, and his second defeat and expulsion from S. Konkan (Nov. 1665) are referred to therein. Who then was *Bahlol*? In the third edition of his *Shivaji and His Times*, this Bijapuri general is stated to have died in June or July 1665, (P. 240 and Index.) But, like a cat with nine lives he reappears, time and again later and wins victories over the Marāṭhās in several encounters. On or about 15th April 1673 Bahlol Khān is supposed to have been allowed to withdraw at Umrani " probably for a bribe." (*Shivaji*, p. 201). In June, the same year, he " held Kolhapur and defeated the Marathas in several encounters, forcing all their roving bands to leave the Karwar country. He also talked of invading South Konkan and recovering Rajapur and other towns next autumn. In August he is still spoken of as ' pressing hard upon Shivaji, who supplicates for peace, being fearful of his own condition.' But soon afterwards Bahlol Khān, his irreconcilable enemy, fell ill at Miraj and Shivaji's help was solicited by the Bijapur and Golkonda Governments to defend them from a threatened Mughal invasion under Bahadur Khan (September)." (*Ibid.*, pp. 246-47). The difference in identity (though obvious) between the Bahlol Khān who died in 1665 and his latter namesake is nowhere explicitly indicated. Secondly, it passes our comprehension to see how Śivāji who ' supplicated for peace being fearful of his own condition ' in August could, in September have been ' solicited by Bijapur and Golkonda Governments to defend them from a threatened Mughal invasion.' The illness of Bahlol Khān could not certainly have tilted

the balance so miraculously. The same Bahlol Khān (we presume) was defeated by Ānand Rāo, at Bankāpūr, in the following March (1674), when, after a desperate battle, he and Khizr Khān were "put to flight with the loss of a brother of Khizr Khan." They had an army of '2000 cavalry and many foot-soldiers.' "Ānand Rāo robbed the entire Bijapuri army, captured 500 horses, 2 elephants, and much other prize." (*Ibid.*, p. 204). We do not know why these categorical statements, as to the places and personalities, in the text should be neutralised in the footnote by references which leave the reader utterly bewildered. Sabhāsad's account, quoted verbatim, relates to Hambīr Rāo's defeat of Husain Khān Miana, which Sarkar has himself located at Yelburga and dated January 1679. (*Ibid.*, p. 320.) A comparison of the two ft. notes (pp. 204 and 320) would show that Sarkar does not accept Sabhāsad's concatenation of the place of action and the generals named. The reference therefore, with all its wealth of details, is more confusing than helpful. Bahlol is as distinct from Husain Khān, as Ānand Rāo is different from Hambīr Rāo. The two actions were equally distinct from one another, though both of them were decisive victories for the Marāṭhās. They took place at two different times, though the place might have been very near each other. We do not see why, if other particulars given by Jedhé are to be accepted as true, (Nāgoji Rāo Jedhé was killed in action on that occasion and his wife Godubai (of the Ghorpaḍé family) died sati. Because of this close family interest the Jedhēs could have made no mistake about the place. According to their *Karīna*, Sīvāji commiserated with Nāgoji's mother Tuljābāi and assigned to her one *scr* of gold yearly, there should be any emendation of *Yelgedla* into *Yelburga*. 'Yelagi' (20 m. s. of Belgaum) sounds nearer to *Yelgedla* than 'Yelburga' (30 m. n.-e. of Gadag). *Sampgaon* of Sabhāsad is 19 m. s. e. of Belgaum, while *Yelagi* is 20 miles south of Belgaum. This accounts for the genesis of Sabhāsad's error in confusing the two incidents. But the modern reader need make no mistake about them.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar has, in his recent work (*House of Shivaji*, Calcutta, 1940), independently elucidated the Bahlol Khān mystery of his *Shivaji and His Times*; though in this new work there is no indication whatsoever of the fresh information being an emendation of the earlier, perhaps unconscious, confusion. We now learn from him that Bahlol Khān I, who was a contemporary of Shahjī, had two sons both of whom inherited the title, as B.K. II and B.K. III. On the death of the latter (B.K. III) in July 1665, his son, Abdul Karim, was created Bahlol Khān IV. At this, Abdul Md., son of B.K. II, took umbrage and went over to the Mughals (Nov. 1665) who conferred upon him (c. 1669) the title of *Ikhlas Khān*. But Sarkar

cautions us against confusing this title in the Mughal peerage with the same title borne by other Bijāpūri nobles. This Ikhlās Khān was wounded by Śivāji in the battle of Dindori on 17th Oct. 1670, and again wounded and captured by Pratāp Rāo at Salher in Feb. 1672. It is not clear, even now, how the Ikhlās Khān, brother of Khawās Khān, defeated and put to flight by Śivāji in 1665 could be confused with the Bahlol Khān of Index reference (p. 234). However, it is well to bear in mind that Bahlol Khān III died in July 1665; and that the B.K. of all later incidents was the IV of that name, who was the Bijāpūri *Wazir* from 1675-77. It was he who usurped all authority as the new Regent of the infant Sikandar 'Adilshāh on 11 Nov. 1675, and also before that, "being certain of heavy loss, and even utter repulse," at the hands of Śivāji, wisely withdrew after having proceeded to the succour of Phonda in May 1675. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 250.

To complete the Bahlol epic, we might also add that the corpulent Husain Khān Miana captured at Koppal by the Marāṭhās (January 1677) was a 'fellow-clansman' though 'no near relative' of Bahlol Khān III (died July 1665). He escaped to the Mughals in 1683, was made a 5-*hazāri* by Aurangzeb with the pompous title of *Fath Jang Khān* (*House of Shivaji*, pp. 62-3) but was again captured by Marāṭhās and honourably lodged, by Sambhāji, at Rāigad where he died.

21. *F. R.*, Surat vol. 106 (2nd set), Carwar, (17 Feb. 1673), p. 100; *ibid.*, vol. 88, pt. ii, vol. 37, Carwar, 14 April, 1675. *Śivāji Nibandhāvali*, pp. 523-24.

22. *O. C.* 3881, 31 Oct. 1673.
Chitnis, 70.
Shivaji, pp. 252-53.

25. *S. F. Outward L. B.* No. 2 Surat to Karwar, pp. 181-83.

26. *Dagh Register*, Bl. 445, 7 Feb. 1676.

27-28. *O. C.* vol. 34, No. 3786, 17 May 1673; *Orme Mss.* vol. 114 Section 2, p. 87 21 June 1673.

29. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, Ch. 42; *House of Shivaji*, p. 58.

30. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 250-53.

31. *F. R.* Surat vol. 88. 58 Karwar.

32. *Ibid.*, Vols. 62-3 Rajapore.
Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, II, i, p. 373.

C. V. Vaidya, *Shivaji*, p. 330.

35-37. Sen, *Śiva Chhatrapati*, pp. 89-95.

38. *F. R.* Surat, vol. 2, 86, 105; Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 260. Sarkar's estimate of the total strength of Śivāji's fleet is erroneous. "The Maratha chronicles," he states (*ib.* p. 258), speak of Shivaji's fleet as consisting at its best of four hundred vessels of various sizes and

classes." *Ib.*, p. 267 he has himself referred to the destruction of above 500 of Śivājī's vessels by Aurangzeb's fleet. Sabhāsād speaks of 700 vessels.

39. *F. R. Surat*, 82.
40. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 266-68.
41. *O. C.* 3760 cited by Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 267-68.
42. *Indian Hist. Rec. Com. Proceedings*, vol. IX, p. 110.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-13.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.
- 47-48. *Shivaji Souvenir*, pp. 124-26.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
50. Pissurlencar, *Shivaji*, p. 34.
- 51-52. *Shivaji Souvenir*, pp. 130-33.
53. Pissurlencar, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-9; Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 250.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 363-65.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
56. Heras, *The Decay of Portuguese Power in India*, pp. 35-6.
57. *Letters Received by the E. I. Co.*, III, p. xxvi.
58. *O. C.* 1115, *B. P. Unav.*, vol. VI, p. 152. Bombay 28 Sept 1675.
59. *F. R.*, Ft. St. George, vol. I, p. 17. 3 Oct. 1677.
60. *B. P. Unav.* VIII, p. 62. London to Surat, L. B. 6, 502-15 Mar. 1681.
61. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 344.
62. *Ibid.* [This no. has been erroneously repeated in the text (p. 223). The reference for this is *F. R. Surat*, vol. 85. 10 Mar. 1662.]
63. *F. R. Surat*, 103 (6 Feb. 1663) and 2 (9 Oct. 1663).
- 64-65. *Ibid.*, vol. 88, p. 227.
66. *F. R. Bombay*, vol. I, pp. 30-31; Orme, vol. 114, p. 185.
67. *F. R. Surat*, vol. 107 (Fol. 6), 9 Nov. 1674.
68. *Ibid.*, vol. 88 (Fol. 244), 13 Nov. 1674.
69. *Ibid.*, vol. 89 (Fol. 90), 5 Dec. 1676.
70. *Ibid.*, (Fol. 30).
71. *Ibid.*, vol. 107 (Fol. 6), 9 Nov. 1674.
72. *Ibid.*, (Fol. 60), Bombay, 6 Feb. 1675.
73. *O. C.* vol. 36, No. 4175. 2 Feb. 1676; Forrest, *H. S. I. Swally Marine to Co.*, p. 81.
74. *S. F. Letter Book* No. 2., p. 33. 17 Jan. (out) 1676.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 120—Surat to Rajapore.
- 76. *F. R.*, Surat, vol. 86, p. 102; Surat to Karwar, 26 June 1664

77. *E. F. India*, 1665-67, pp. 75-6; Surat, vol. 104, p. 212-6 Jan. 1665.
78. *F. R.*, Surat, vol. 106, pp. 145-46- 2 Sept. 1673.
79. *Orme Mss.* vol. 114, sec. 2, p. 87- 21 June 1673.
80. *F. R.* Surat, vol. 106, Fols. 109-110 -14 May 1673; vol. 3 (3rd set), p. 22 - 19 July 1673.
81. *S. F. Outward Letter Book* No. 2., pp. 123-24, Surat to Rajapore, 13 May, 1676.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 140; Surat to Bombay 14 June 1676.
83. *O. C.* vol. 37, No. 1225; *S. F. Outward L. B.* No. 2, pp. 181-83 Surat to Karwar, 24 Aug. 1676.
84. *F. R.*, Surat, vol. 89 (Fols. 69-70) - Swally Marine, 17 Oct. 1676.
85. *S. F. Outward L. B.* No. 2, p. 237; *F. B.* Surat, vol. 89, p. 72.
86. *F. R.*, Surat vol. 89 (Fol. 112), Surat to Rajapore, 12 July 1678.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 67, Surat to Rajapore, 25 Feb. 1678.
88. *Ibid.*, Surat vol. 108, (Fol. 52). Rajapore, 28 Feb: 1679-80.
89. Forrest, *Home Series*, p. 66; *F. R.*, Surat, vol. 106, pp. 94, 114.
90. *F. R.* Bombay vol. 8, p. 28.
91. *Ibid.*, vol. 6, pp. 124-28.
- 92-94. *O. C.*, 4699.
- 95-96. Cf. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 270-76.
97. *B. P. Unav.* VIII, pp. 29-30; *O. C.* Vol. 10, No. 1699, 8 April 1680.
98. *L. B.* vol. 6, 302; London 15 Mar. 1681.
99. John Fryer, *East India*, vol III, pp. 163-65.

Ch. IX THE CRISIS

1. *C. H. I.*, IV, p. 290.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 281-82 Cf. Kincaid and Parasnis, *A Hist of the Mar. People*, p. 144 (1931 ed.).
3. *F. R.*, Bombay vol. 19, p. 6 (2nd set), 7 May 1680.
4. *Ibid.*, vol. 107; Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 317-18.
5. Sarkar, *A Short Hist. of Aur.*, pp. 241-67. Cf. Kincaid and P., *op. cit.*, pp. 104-108.
6. *F. R.*, Surat, 108 - Bombay to Surat, 19 Jan. 1682.
7. B. K. Bonsle, *Janjira*, pp. 46-54; K. and P., *op. cit.*, p. 21; *F. R.* Surat, 108; Carwar, 30 July 1682.
8. Orme, 112; *F. R.* Surat, 90; to Sir John Child, 8 May 1682.
9. *Ibid.*, 107; K. & P., *op. cit.*, p. 122.

10. *F. R.*, Surat, 91, Surat to Co., 10 April 1683. Siddi Misri was the son of S. Sambul who had joined Sivaji in 1677—Bhonsle, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-3, 51.

11. For a list of the 22 forts owned by the Siddis at this time, see *ibid.*, p. 58.

12. *Portuguese e Marathas II, Sambhaji*, pp. 68-73.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4 ; e.g. letter of 5 May 1680.

14. He arrived in Goa on 11 Sept. 1681 and left India on 15 Dec. 1686.—Danvers, ii, 361, 370.

15. Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, ii, p. 261 ; Pissurlencar, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14 ; reported to Portugal in a letter dated 24 Jan. 1683.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-20.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

21. Sarkar, *A Short Hist. of Aur.* p. 297. See note 31 below.

22-23. *Storia*, ii, pp. 262-63. See n. 3 on Ponda ; Orme dates the incident in Sept. 1683 (*ib.*, n. 2.) Cf. Sarkar, *A Short Hist. of Aur.*, p. 297 : "The Viceroy planned to make a diversion by laying siege to Phonda... he arrived (on 22nd Oct.) in the vicinity of Phonda and opened fire on that fort immediately." In his *Aur.*, IV, pp. 273-74 he has stated : "On 27th Oct. he set out from the town ... and arrived in the vicinity of Ponda without opposition, on 1st Nov. ... opened fire immediately." Note the discrepancies in dates as well as place names : "Ponda," he points out (*Aur.* IV, p. 273 n.) is 10 miles s. s. e. of Goa town ; it must not be confused with "Phonda" in the extreme s. of Ratnagiri Dist.

According to his *Short Hist.* (p. 297) "Next day they (Portuguese began to retreat and on 1st Nov. reached Durbata where they were to embark for Goa." In *Aur.* IV, pp. 274-75 the date given by him is "11th Nov."

If the viceroy 'set out' on the '27th Oct.' he could not have 'arrived' on the "22nd Oct."

24. Sambhaji's auxiliaries brought by Prince Akbar.

25. *Storia*, ii, p. 263.

26. *Hist. of Aur.* IV, p. 275.

27. *Storia*, ii, p. 263.

28. Sarkar, *A Short Hist. of Aur.*, pp. 297-298.

29. *Storia*, ii, pp. 268-71.

30. Cf. Kincaid & P., *op. cit.*, p. 124 ; the date of the capture of St. Estavao is given as 25 Nov. 1683.

31. Pissurlencar, *Sambhaji*, pp. 65-67. The details of this incident are very confusing. Sarkar in his *Short Hist.* p. 297 says that Sambhaji's Pe-hwa laid siege to Chaul with an army of 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry on 31st July. In his larger work (*Aur.*, IV, p. 271) he has stated that Moro Trimbak Pingle laid siege to Chaul on 10th August. According to Kincaid and P. (p. 123) it was in June 1683. Grant Duff (p. 242) also gives the same date. Sardesai in his earlier (1915) ed. of the *Riyāsat* had vaguely referred to the siege of Chaul as having taken place during the monsoon of 1683 (p. 570); now, on the basis of the *Jedhe Śakāvali*, he gives 10th June 1683, adding that 8th Aug. (night) as the probable time of the final assault. (*Ibid.* 3 उग्र प्रकृति संभाजी, pp. 46-47 1935 ed.). For the opening of Sambhaji's campaign, Sarkar gives 15th April 1683 in *Aur.*, IV, p. 270 and 5th April 1683 in his *Short Hist. of Aur.*, p. 297.

32. Pissurlencar, *Sambhaji*, pp. 56-7; letter of Conde de Alvor to the General of the North, dated 4 Feb. 1684.

33-34. Pissurlencar, *A Liga dos Portuguese com o Bounsulo Contra Sambhaji*.

35. *O. C.* 5005.

36. *Letter Bk.* vol. 7 dated 7 April 1681; also *F. R.* Surat, 90 d. 8 May 1682 reflecting the same attitude.

37. *L. B.* vol. 8; London to Surat, 28 Oct. 1685.

38. *O. C.* 5641 of 21 Dec. 1687.

39. W. S. Desai in *Ind. Hist. Cong., Proceedings*, p. 605 (Allahabad, 1938).

40. *O. C.* 5691 of 12 Dec. 1689.

41-43. Chitnis, (Sane's ed. 1930), pp. 3, 7, 15. Formal coronation of Sambhaji, 16 Jan. 1681. Cf. Character of Sambhaji in Sardesai, उग्र प्रकृति संभाजी; and of Jahāngir in my *Mughal Empire*. *Ibid.* p. 206 for the Tardi Beg incident. Cf. Kincaid & P. pp. 106-07. [Ref. No. 42 has been omitted in the text through oversight.]

44. Sarkar, *Aur.* IV, pp. 244-46.

45. *Storia*, ii, p. 255.

46. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-58.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 259 and n.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 261; earlier Sarkar (p. 256) has stated that Aur arrived at Aurangabad on 22 Mar. 1682 not Nov. 1681 as here. Surat to Co. 10 April 1683.

49. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-64.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 291. For Portuguese negotiations through Manucci see *Storia*, ii, pp. 277-79.

51-52. *Ibid.*, p. 287 and n.

53. Sharma, *Mughal Empire*, pp. 553-65.

54. *Storia*, ii, p. 309.
55. Orme, p. 201 ; Kincaid & P., p. 144.
56. *Ibid.*, Sarja Khān was originally in Bijāpūr service.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-45.
58. Chitnis, *Sambhaji*, 7.
59. *Ibid.*, 3 ; ' कांहीं उग्र स्थिती सोडावी । कांहीं सौम्यता धरावी ।'
' शिवराजाचें कैसें बोलणें । शिवराजाचें कैसें चालणें । शिवराजाची सलगीं देणें,
कैसी असे ।
60. Kincaid & P., p. 140. ' On 25 Dec. 1683 Sambhaji returned to Raigad ; there he gave full authority to Kavi Kalash '. *Jedhé Sakāvali*.
61. E. D. VII, p. 338.
62. Originally Shaikh Nizām, who deserted Golkonda during its siege (28 May 1687) and was created 6 *hazāri* by Aurangzeb with his new title and a cash reward of one *lakh* of rupees, etc.
63. Sarkar, *Aur.* IV, pp. 398-404. Cf. Chitnis, 20 and *Jedhé Sakāvali* speak of Tulāpūr ; Sardesai identifies the place with Vaḍu. *Sambhaji*, 99 (new ed.).
64. Martin's *Memoirs*, ii, 454 ; Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, p. 204.
- 65-66. *Storia*, II, pp. 310-12.
67. *Ādnāpatra*.
68. चिरंजीव शाहू कालेंकरून तरी श्री देशीं आणाल.....शाहू सर्व राज्यास अधिकारी, आम्ही करतो तें तरी त्याचेसाठींच आहे. प्रसंगास सर्व लोकांस त्याजकडेच पाहणें आहे. हें कारण ईश्वरेंच नेमिलें आहे.
Sardesai, *Rājārām*, p. 41 (new. ed.) *Rājwādē*, vol. XV, p. 296.
Rājārām was only मंचकारूढ but not 'crowned' like Sambhaji. Cf. Sarkar, *Aur.* IV, p. 404.
69. *Rājārāma-caritam* by Keshav Pandit, ed. by V. S. Bendrey (Poona 1931). Cf. Sarkar gives the date as 1st Nov. *Aur.* V, p. 25. Sardesai, *Rājārām*, gives 15 Nov.
- 70-71. *J. I. Hist.*, Vol. VII (1928) p. 92.
72. Sardesai, *Rājārām*, p. 49 ; *Rājwādē*, vol. 15, Nos. 347-348.
73. Sarkar, *Aur.* V, p. 14. For fuller details, *ibid.*, pp. 1-254 ; Sardesai, *Rājārām*, pp. 164 ff. (1936 ed.).
74. Chitnis, *Rājārām*, 34.
75. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
- 77-78. *Ibid.*, p. 84 ; *M. A.*, 357.
79. Manucci, *Storia*, iii, pp. 271-72.
- 80. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-4.

82. Mysore, i, p. 133 ; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, V, p. 106. Ginji capitulated finally on 8 Jan. 1698.

83-86. Sarkar, *Aur.* V, p. 118 ; E. D. VII, pp. 356-57. *Khawāfi Khān* estimates the Mughal losses at 50-60 *lācs* of rupees.

87. [Marked '89' in the text (p. 259) by mistake.] Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

88. Kincaid (p. 176) gives 5th March (*Falgun Vadya* 9, *Saké* 1621. Ac. to the *Ephemeris*, this should be 15th (Wednesday). Chitnis gives अष्टमीसह नवमी 2nd March ; Sarkar makes it 3rd March in *Jedhē Sakāvali*. For details of Rājārām's last campaign read Sarkar, *Aur.* V, pp. 132-35 ; Kincaid, pp. 170-76.

89-90. *Chitnis*, 54, 63.

91. Dhanāji was a Jādhav, being a grandson of Santāji Jādhav (a brother of Jijābāi).

92. See Sarkar, *Aur.* V, pp. 14-15 for Aurangzeb's campaigns, Nov. 1699 - Oct. 1705.

93-94. *Ibid.*, pp. 236-40.

95. *Ibid.*, pp. 254-55.

96. Kincaid & P., *op. cit.*, pp. 172-73.

97. E. D. VII, pp. 373-75.

98. Sarkar, *Short Hist. of Aur.*, p. 358.

Ch. X THE ACHIEVEMENT

1. *Dās Bodh*.

2. *A Forgotten Empire*, Introd. pp. 5 and 7.

3. This is to be understood in a relative, not absolute, sense. No other people in India have displayed the peculiar traits of nationhood, good as well as bad, as the Marāṭhās during the period of their ascendancy.

4. Read Grant Duff's *Hist. of the Marathas*, Introd. by S. M. Edwardes (1921 ed. O. U. P.) ; and C. V. Vaidya's 'Are the Bhonsles Kshatriyas?' in the *Shivaji Souvenir* (Dhawale, Bombay, 1927).

5. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, V, pp. 207-13.

6. S. N. Sen, *Administrative System of the Marathas ; Military System of the Marathas*. Balkrishna, *Shivaji the Great*, Pt. IV.

7. *Ante* 136-37.

8. *Ante* p. 190.

9. *Ante* pp. 197-99.

10. Read Balkrishna, *Shivaji the Great*, Pt. IV, ch. x. Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*, p. 381 and *House of Shivaji*, pp. 80-82.

11. Sen, *Shiva Chhatrapati*, pp. 29-39.

12. *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. VIII, pt. 1, pp. 81-82.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-103.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-5.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 208-211.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 214-16.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 217-18.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 219-29.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 229-33.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-14.
31. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, pp. 79 and 82.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

An exhaustive Bibliography is a *desideratum* for the writing of scientific history in modern times. It is obvious, therefore, that Marāṭhā History cannot be properly studied except with the help of an adequate guide to the sources and literature on the subject. An attempt has been made in the Introduction to acquaint the reader with the general works hitherto available, particularly in English, to the students of Marāṭhā History. It is the purpose of this note to briefly indicate the wealth of materials that must be consulted by those who would like to form their own independent judgment on the topics discussed in the body of this work. Attention is confined here to the period covered in the text—'Alā-u'd-dīn's invasion of the Deccan to the death of Aurangzeb only. For obvious reasons no reference is made to unpublished materials. The more ambitious student will find additional aids in the references and bibliographies cited by writers like Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Dr. Surendranath Sen, Mr. S. M. Edwardes, Dr. Bal Krishna Kincaid, and others. Apart from the mere lists of authors and works given by them, it is helpful to go through the critical comments made by some of them.

To mention only a few specific instances we might refer the reader to Sir Jadunath Sarkar's *Shivaji and His Times*, pp. 407-18 (3rd ed. 1929) and his lectures on 'Sources of Maratha History' delivered in Bombay in 1941 (*Journal of the University of Bombay*, Vol. X, Part I, pp. 1-22). Dr. S. N. Sen's Introduction to his *Administrative System of the Marathas* (2nd ed., 1925), *Foreign Biographies of Shivaji* and his *Śiva Chhatrapati*, pp. 251-59 (1920); and Dr. Bal Krishna's *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, Part I, Introduction, pp. 17-34 (1932). The *Historical Miscellany*, Serial No. 31 (B. I. S. M., Poona, 1928) also contains an article on 'A Brief Survey of Portuguese Sources of Marāṭhā History', by Dr. S. N. Sen. Extracts from the unpublished Dutch records in the Hague Colonial Archives are also to be found in the *Śivāji Nibandhāvalī* I, Eng. sec. pp. 61-88. (Śiva Charitra Kāryalaya, Poona, 1930).

For the sake of brevity, and to avoid needless repetition, I have thought it superfluous to include here materials referred to in the above works, as well as in my NOTES. A very valuable bibliography of published works in Marāṭhī, up to 1943, is now available to the readers in Mr. S. G. Dātē's excellent compilation, *Marāṭhī Grantha Sūchi* Vol. I, pp. 958-96 (Poona, 1944). A thorough-going bibliography in all languages must take more time to compile than I can command, and more paper than War controls permit. Out of the materials I have gathered I subjoin a few gleanings which might be of some use to the more painstaking readers.

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