THE AWAKENING OF ASIA

By the Same Author

ENGLAND FOR ALL

THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF SOCIALISM

THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM

THE BANKRUPTCY OF INDIA

COMMERCIAL CRISES OF THE XIXth CENTURY

THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

A COMMUNE FOR LONDON

RECORD OF AN ADVENTUROUS LIFE

FURTHER REMINISCENCES

CLEMENCEAU: THE MAN AND HIS TIME

The Awakening of Asia

By

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TO MY WIFE

ROSALIND TRAVERS

PREFACE

THIS book has been held up by the Censor for more than two years. From my own standpoint, this has turned out to be an advantage, so far as its prospect of usefulness goes. Now, more than ever before, Europeans and Americans are prepared to consider the relations of the white races to Asiatics as demanding very careful study. That Japan should be fully represented at the Peace Conference, as one of the Great Powers of the world, and that China and India, with their joint population of some 700,000,000 people, should claim the right to make themselves heard at the same gathering of the nations, are events which cannot be overlooked. Asia, indeed, seems destined to play a still greater part in the future than she has played in the past. It is important, therefore, for the English-speaking peoples, to whom I primarily address myself, that they should recognise this at once. Self-determination and justice for all races cannot be confined to Europe or America.

When first I began my serious studies of the influence of the white man on the Far East, I was of the opinion that this influence had been almost wholly beneficial. The fact that close relations of my own had been connected with Eastern affairs for several generations naturally strengthened me in this view.

Preface

It was only by degrees that I was forced to the conviction that European interference, European trade interests, European religious propaganda, European administration and European domination had been almost wholly harmful. Such reforms, that is to say, as we had introduced in the early days of our intercourse with the great civilised peoples of Asia counted for little or nothing in comparison with the mischief we have wrought.

This is still a most unpopular idea of what the white man has achieved in the vast continent from which, in days gone by, Europe has learnt so much.

H. M. HYNDMAN.

13, *Well Walk, Hampstead,*
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THE AWAKENING OF ASIA

CHAPTER I

ASIA AND EUROPE IN THE PAST

THE purely arbitrary border-line, which is supposed to separate the continent of Europe from the continent of Asia, at times leads to the misapprehension that there is really such a break in territorial continuity. There is, of course, no recognised division between the two continents, either in the matter of geography or of race. The vast land areas distinguished by the names of Europe and Asia blend imperceptibly into one another: it is practically impossible to say where the one ends and the other begins.

Similarly with the numerous and widely-differing inhabitants. The dominant races of Europe are nearly all of Asiatic descent, deriving their blood from more or less recent waves of invasion and colonisation from the East. The Aryans of Great Britain and the Aryans of India, for example, much as they differ to-day, came originally from the same stock. This is but one instance of remote Asiatic origin. Europe, in fact, is a great conterminous Colony of Asia, which, in the course of thousands of years, has set up for itself. If Europe were deprived of all her peoples of ancient Asiatic origin, by some inconceivable process of unnatural selection, the greater part of Western civilisation would disappear.

We are indebted, however, for far more than our racial descent to our Eastern progenitors of the remote past. Leave their descendants where they are to day, but withdraw from them the basic discoveries and inventions which we owe to Asia, and the entire fabric of our existing social arrangements would collapse. Cotton, silk, porcelain, the mariner's compass, gunpowder, algebra, geometry and astronomy, as well as much of our architecture and agriculture, with many of our fruits and flowers, came first into our daily lives from that continent. Every one of the great religions of the world, to say nothing of its philosophy, was *vouchsafed to humanity from east of the Mediterranean Sea.* Our own Asiatic religion, Christianity, is overlaid with so much of Greek metaphysic and Pagan ceremonial that the unlearned are apt to think of it as a purely European creed. Our most ardent and self-sacrificing missionaries of Christianity are often so little versed in the history of their own faith that they altogether fail to accommodate its tenets to the conceptions of the Asiatic peoples whom they strive to convert. The great efforts made from Europe to persuade Asiatics to embrace the creed accepted and adopted by the West have generally proved abortive, because the methods used to propagate this religion are entirely unsuited to the social conditions of the people among whom it has been preached.

For in spite of the lack of definite frontier, or clear racial distinctions, it is certain that the long severance of the two continents in thought, custom and social arrangements has so ordered matters that Asia has perhaps never been deeply affected by Europe in thought, custom or religion for any considerable length of time.

We are inclined nowadays to take more account of the European invasion of Asia than of the Asian invasion

of Europe. Yet the influence of the East upon the West and the far less powerful influence of the West upon the East have been going on for many, many centuries. The successive waves of invasion and counter-invasion from Europe to Asia and from Asia to Europe are not easy to record accurately and intelligibly. Some of the Asiatic attacks upon Europe were no better than mere temporary raids giving no permanent results, and the same may be said of the greater portion of the European advances upon Asia. At some periods both attacks were going on simultaneously, and the direct military influence of Asia upon Europe has been much more recent and more powerful than we generally recognise. Even in the Great War, while tens of thousands of Asiatic Turks were fighting on the side of Germany, Japan threw in her lot with the Allies and has been fighting on their side against Germans in the East, while large forces from India have been engaged with the enemy in the West. But, in any survey of the mutual aggressions from the one side or other, there is nothing in the European attempts upon Asia, until the period from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, which can be compared for vigour, continuity and effect to the pressure exerted for a far longer period by Asiatics upon Europe.

1. Taking the European advances into Asia first, and dealing with them only, in order of date, there have been within historic times four great European invasions of Asia. The first was the wonderful campaign of Alexander of Macedon and his Greek armies. His forces marched unbeaten to the Indus and defeated Porus on the borders of Hindustan. As a military feat the whole expedition was a marvellous success. But, great as were his victories in the field and far-reaching his projects for founding an Eastern Empire, the fact remains that Alexander's exploits and those of his

lieutenants produced no permanent effect whatever upon the important countries over which they and their immediate descendants ruled. There is nothing to show, either in arms or in arts, in philosophy or in religion, that the Asiatics, who were compelled to submit for the time being, adopted Greek methods or absorbed Greek ideas. It was conquest without colonisation : victory without continuous influence. The wave of invasion receded and matters went on below the surface much as they did before.

2. Even the Roman mastery of a large portion of Asia scarcely influenced Eastern thought or Eastern customs at all. Yet this second great European invasion lasted for many centuries, and was maintained, alike when Rome was at the height of her power, and when her magnificent system of civil and military organisation was slowly tottering to its fall. Those long, long years of peaceful and successful rule failed to impress European conceptions, or European methods, upon the mass of the subject population, or even upon the educated classes as a whole. They remained essentially Asiatic, in all important respects, below the surface. The Pax Romana passed away and the Asiatics of centuries before became Asiatics again for centuries after. This was so, first and foremost and all through, from the days when the Parthians on the frontier routed Crassus and his army, to the period when the Byzantine Emperors were vainly struggling against the Arabs and the Turks.

> The East bowed low before the blast
> In patient deep disdain ;
> She heard the legions thunder past,
> Then plunged in thought again.

The great legacy of administration, laws and jurisprudence which Rome bequeathed to Europe proved of little virtue or permanence in Asia. The splendid

roads, harbours, water-conduits and other public works, of which the ruins still bear witness to the genius and foresight of her Emperors and engineers, conduced to great material prosperity, as the wealth and luxury of the principal cities testified. But the whole elaborate system left the psychology, habits and beliefs of the people untouched. The Asiatic mind remained impervious to European thought. Asiatic customs, Asiatic tribal and family relations, Asiatic religions long survived Greek and Latin teaching and Greek and Latin cults. Nay, in all these departments of human activity, as in some others, Asia, even under Roman supremacy, had a continuous and peaceful influence upon her conquerors, at a period when all hope of shaking off the Roman yoke had been practically abandoned. In Rome itself and in other great cities of the Western Empire, Asiatic philosophy and Asiatic superstitions made way long before the Asiatic religion of Christianity spread its network from Palestine over the European provinces. At Constantinople imitations of Asiatic forms and ceremonies pervaded the whole Imperial Court.

3. Where the powerful organisation and efficiency of the Roman Empire had failed after hundreds of years of successful domination to produce a permanent effect, it was little likely that other disorderly and spasmodic efforts from the West would prevail. There seems, indeed, in spite of the continuity of territory and ancient community of race already referred to, an inscrutable difference between the whole conception of life and thought, customs and ideals which pervade Asia and that which is rooted in Europe. Except in rare instances of remarkable men, gifted with the highest powers of sympathy and imagination, it is doubtful whether the inhabitants of the two continents have ever understood one another.

The motley hosts who went forth under the banners of the Crusaders formed the third important invasion of Asia by Europe. Whatever may have been the hopes and intentions of the more capable statesmen and warriors of Europe we can now see that they were doomed to disappointment, even if the attacks upon "the infidel" had been far better organised and disciplined than in fact they were. At first, at any rate, the Crusades were nothing more than spasmodic religious raids, bred of hysteria and inspired by fanaticism. Later they may have had some conscious, or unconscious, economic motive; and unquestionably racial antagonism developed as a result of the long series of encounters with the Moslem armies. These freebooters of Christianity and marauders of feudalism, however, were as little animated by any great scheme of polity as were their opponents. Here and there the leaders carved out short-lived kingdoms for themselves and their followers, chiefly at the expense of the decadent Christian Empire of the East, whose outposts in Asia Minor and Palestine they went forth to defend.

But the Crusades, taken together, were no more than a fierce religious and warlike offensive against Mahound, with the hope of happiness hereafter and loot here, in the long-drawn defensive struggle against the steadily-advancing flood of Asiatic aggression. They made no lasting impression whatever upon "the East." The Holy City of Christianity, Jerusalem, remained for centuries afterwards and continued till yesterday in the custody of those rival monotheists, the followers of Mohammed. Thus the third assault of Europe upon Asia produced even less effect than its two predecessors.

On the other hand, the permanent influence of Asiatic attacks upon and settlements in Europe may still be easily discerned. Even in Vienna, which for many a century was the bulwark of the West against

Asiatic incursions, people say to-day: "Cross the Wien and you find yourself in Asia." The Western limit of certain flora of the Asiatic steppes is drawn at a little hill on the outskirts of the Austrian capital.

4. The fourth European invasion of Asia has taken place in modern times. It is a much wider, more continuous and far more formidable assault than any of its predecessors. This great movement is still in progress, and we are by no means as yet in a position to judge of its final effect. French, English and Russians, following upon the early religious and commercial efforts of the Portuguese and Dutch, have carried on for three centuries a steady pressure of, firstly religious propaganda, then mercantile persuasion, and lastly armed conquest at the expense of the inhabitants. The result is that Europeans have now seized and dominate more than half of the area and little less than half of the population of the great Eastern Continent, with its adjacent islands. I shall try later on to estimate the real significance and possible consequences of this the last great counter-stroke against the Asiatics. The fact that the country we speak of as Russia in Europe, which suffered most in old times from the inroads of barbarous hordes from Central Asia, to-day holds sway over the territories whence these tribes swept in succession to the West on their missions of massacre, is a strange instance of historic revenge for the horrors of the past.

Let us now turn back to the successive Asiatic invasions of Europe, so far as they are known to history. By the great inroads of the Huns in the fourth and fifth centuries Asia first penetrated in organised force into Central and Southern Europe. There were no armies then available capable of resisting their advance. From the first, these barbarians, in spite of their love for destruction and rapine, showed a disposition to settle

in the territories they conquered. Attila himself established permanent camps in more than one country, and the Magyars of Hungary to-day owe their descent for the most part to the savage tribes who terrorised the decadent Roman Empire from Constantinople to Rome. These Asiatic Colonies, carved out of Roman Europe in its process of disintegration, tempted other Finno-Tatar tribes to follow their example. Successive waves of Avars, of the same great stock as the Huns, came over in the sixth century and grew formidable not only to the Romans but to the Goths, who had been engaged in appropriating their share of the Empire, now fair booty for courageous invaders. But the Avars, after their complete defeat by another combination of Asiatic tribes, disappeared as a separate horde and were probably absorbed into the armies of their conquerors. They left no permanent mark on the map of Europe, though at one period they dominated, under their own name, the whole great district from the Don to the middle Danube, coming into contact with the armies of Charlemagne on their frontier.

From the fourth to the end of the seventh century Asiatic invasions went on almost without cessation, and it is matter of wonder that the Byzantine Empire, with all its dexterity, and fitful military prowess under great generals, was able to survive these attacks. At the end of the seventh century the ancestors of the present Bulgars, who formed part of one of the raids, settled in the region now occupied by their descendants. About the same time Finn-Ugrian tribes overran North-Western Russia and settled in Finland, perhaps dispossessing a Caucasian race. Thus, by the beginning of the ninth century, three Mongolian races, the Finns, the Huns and the Bulgars, numerically unimportant, but ethnologically valuable, had taken firm root in Europe.

But by far the most dangerous and continuous Asian assault upon European countries and their independence came with the rise of Mohammedanism. After three hundred years of almost perpetual suffering at the hands of uncivilised tribes, whose numbers appeared incalculable, the Byzantine Empire might have anticipated an ebb in the tide of Asiatic aggression, when the invaders from Persia were driven back. This was not to be. The success of the warlike creed of the great Arabian prophet led to another series of conquests and colonisations, which more than once threatened to subdue, or depopulate, the entire West. Yet Europe was now settling down to the establishment of a new system, and the organised armies which it developed were formidable enough to have made head against Moslem attack, had there been any community of aim among the European populations. As it was, the danger of overwhelming Asiatic success became very great. Time after time Christian chivalry of the finest quality, supported by men of courage and vigour fighting for their homes, were routed by monotheistic sons of the desert, or ruthless savages from the great steppes, who brought into the field a still fiercer fanaticism than that of the Catholics.

Even to-day, with all the details of his early life and subsequent career laid bare by men of our own race, who have studied the whole extraordinary story of the noble Arabian, it is no easy matter to comprehend the character, or to account for the marvellous success of Mohammed in the early part of the seventh century. Never claiming divine powers at any period of his mission, without a single miracle to his name, this very human prophet of God made his first converts in his own family, was able, after almost hopeless failure, to obtain control in his own aristocratic *gens,* and had such remarkable personal influence over all with whom

he was brought into contact that, neither when a poverty-stricken and hunted fugitive, nor at the height of his prosperity, did he ever have to complain of treachery from those who had once embraced his faith. His confidence in himself, and in his inspiration from on high, was even greater when he was suffering under disappointment and defeat than when he was able to dictate his own terms to his conquered enemies. Mohammed died as he had lived, surrounded by his early followers, friends and votaries: his death as devoid of mystery as his life of disguise.

What followed upon his decease was in a sense as miraculous as the original triumph of his creed among his own kith and kin. For centuries before the coming of Mohammed, the Prophet of Allah, the Arabs had been the poor, proud, cruel, hard-living and hard-fighting men of the desert and its oases that they are to-day. If economic causes and desire for material domination had been their main incentives to war and conquest there was as much reason for their outbreak, and apparently many better chances of their success, before than after the advent of Mohammed.

Unlike their successors, the Mongols and Turks, who butchered their defeated enemies wholesale, the early followers of Mohammed spared the lives of all who accepted the new faith—a much more reasonable policy. Even now it is very difficult to explain how the Arabs achieved their remarkable conquests. At the time of Mohammed's rise to fame and power they numbered, all told, barely 3,000,000 families. Thus they comprised no more than 15,000,000 persons, including women and children, and taking account of the entire population of the trading cities and seaports on the coast, as well as of the inhabitants of the fruitful oases. The population of the countries they invaded was not only far greater than this, but, in the first instance, much better

organised for resistance than the Arabs were for attack. Yet they rose so far above their historic record in border warfare that they were able to defeat in fair fight the armies of Constantinople, which a few years before, under the command of the Emperor Heraclius himself, had utterly routed the Persians. Whatever may have been the actual causes of the Arab success, the results were amazing. The Caliphs who succeeded Mohammed were so well served by their generals and their troops, in spite of all internecine differences, that, within a century of the Hegira in A.D. 622, Europe was successfully attacked by the Arabs from the West as well as from the East. It was indeed a marvellous procession of victory.

Beginning with the conquest of Asia Minor and proceeding almost without a check to Egypt, which the Mohammedans have held and controlled till the present century, the victorious Arabs swept along the African shores of the Mediterranean, and mastered them so completely that they used them as a base to attack Spain; and Spain was not only conquered but colonised even more thoroughly than their other territories. In southern Spain, indeed, the Saracens proved that they had learned much from their defeated enemies, by introducing arts, science and medicine, which had fallen into disuse and even into contempt in Western Europe. The immediate descendants of the very same rough, ignorant soldiers, who had inflicted an irreparable loss upon humanity by burning what remained of the great library of Alexandria, were so changed in character that as the Moors of Spain they became celebrated alike for their civilisation and their learning. They were superior in every respect to the Europeans around them, and their capital, Cordoba, was long the most enlightened, best governed and most tolerant city in Europe. The ruins of their splendid architecture,

decoration and irrigation works are the admiration of the West to-day.

The advance of the Saracens into France also was no chance raid. It was another deliberate attempt to conquer and dominate beyond the Pyrenees. But for a local rising of the subdued tribes in Africa, it is more than possible that the battle of Tours might have failed to head back the advance of the Asiatic armies. Even as it was, the victory of Charles Martel over the Emir Abdorrahman seemed by no means conclusive at the time; since the Saracen armies pushed still farther forward into France in the following year. Nevertheless, the date of A.D. 722, the centenary of the flight of Mohammed from Mecca, may be taken as the time when the Arab conquerors had exhausted the full vigour of their attack on that side. But, within their own borders in Spain, the Asiatic invaders remained for generations a capable and cultured folk, who preserved for Europe in their writings not a little Greek knowledge and culture.

From A.D. 722 onwards for a thousand years Asia was steadily pressing upon Europe. With short intervals of repose, these invasions constitute one long record of rapine and slaughter. Tartars, Mongols, Turks spread death and desolation all round them for century after century. Russia, the Balkan Provinces, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Italy, Sicily, even the south of Ireland, all suffered from their incursions by land and by sea. The terror of them spread from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, and even countries far remote from their ravages felt unsafe from their attacks. Some of the devastated areas were occupied and colonised: more were again and again subjected to murder, rapine and desolation out of sheer love of bloodshed and horror. Robbery and greed of gain seem to have been secondary impulses. In the majority of cases even religious fervour played little part. The successive

inroads were carried out by savage hordes, nominally Mohammedans, who treated the great Empires of India and China with the same ferocious barbarity that they inflicted upon Eastern Europe, and were really inspired by no creed more elevated than that of the North-American Indians.

The total numbers of these victorious assailants seem to have been small in comparison with the campaigns they undertook and the populations they crushed. As the wounded of their armies had little chance of recovery, owing to lack of medical aid, their constant victories seem the more surprising. So revolting is the whole long story of such human beasts of prey that we are apt to overlook the astonishing prowess they displayed in their long career of destruction.

Yet a careful survey of events may show that in Batu (A.D. 1235) the Mongols produced a general who was quite equal to Alexander, Hannibal, Marlborough or Napoleon, alike in the scope of his enterprises, the difficulties he surmounted and the success he achieved. The son of one of Genghis Khan's captains, he was sent out to conquer everything within the reach of his arms by that stupendous marauder's immediate successor. And he did it in the course of a few short years. Nothing arrested his conquering career. He swept right away from Central Asia to the very heart of Germany, with an army which, though large for those days, was certainly insufficient to account for the victories he won over a succession of brave enemies, who knew that defeat meant for them torture and death. He and his men made light of distance, and paid no attention either to climate or seasons of the year. There were no winter quarters for them. Natural obstacles, which, both before and since, have arrested the operations of great armies, equipped with all the appliances of modern science, were speedily overcome by this extraordinary

commander. He made no more account of the descendants of the Scourge of God, who had long settled in Hungary, than he did of the Teutonic Knights who came to their rescue. Wholesale butchery befell them both.

Tradition recounts that Batu used cannon and gunpowder, and that he had highly-skilled Chinese engineers in his train, during this series of campaigns. Whether that was so or not, it is indisputable that he and his forces were so uniformly successful, and won victories on such a vast scale against opponents who might claim superior training, education and discipline, that the Tartars seemed more formidable foes of the growing European civilisation than were the Arabs five hundred years before, or the Turks at the same time and two and three hundred years later. Batu and his invincible Mongols constituted, in fact, only one important incident in that long succession of ferocious Tartar assaults which threw back the development of Eastern Europe for generations, if not for centuries. Batu's wonderful strategy and tactics have not received as much attention from historians or students of military affairs as might have been expected. This is probably because he was an Asiatic barbarian, and played no obvious part in Western European affairs. Unlike his remote kinsmen, Kublai Khan in China and Baber in India, he did not combine statesmanship with military powers of the first order, and bequeathed no organised empire to his descendants. Batu indeed was not nearly so successful in this respect as the Saracens of Spain, or the Turks of Adrianople and Constantinople. Yet that an Asiatic commander, not possessed of overwhelming numbers, should have carried all before him in Eastern Europe during the thirteenth century is worth consideration in this twentieth century, when, within twenty years, another Asiatic power, of much the same race and of

very recent growth, defeated one of the great military Empires of the West.

For many generations after Batu and his Mongols were gathered to their fathers and fellow-butchers, the Tartar tribes who succeeded them carried on the like depredations. In 1382 the cities of the Ukraine and Northern Russia were sacked and burned by them one after the other. In 1389 another rush forward occurred under the great Timour the Tartar. In 1558 again Moscow, Kiev and other towns were given over to fire and sword, while every sort of cruelty and horror was inflicted upon their ruined inhabitants. The invaders still seemed to have no idea of using the subjugated population to produce wealth for themselves. Massacre and torture for the sake of massacre and torture seemed sufficient incentive for them. And these oncoming tidal waves of human conquest and desolation had all the appearance of irresistible natural phenomena. If the marauders lacked great captains in the later raids, smaller leaders readily filled their place, and the hordes themselves made up by their persistence and daring for their lack of ability. Even so late as 1650, a great Tartar irruption laid waste Eastern Europe. If the remembrance of such events, which went far to destroy an entire civilisation among the Ruthenians and Little Russians, has faded in the West, which suffered only from the Tartar terror at a distance, this is not so in Eastern Europe, where the constant presence of the Turks to the South has served to remind the inhabitants of what their forefathers underwent at the hands of still more ferocious enemies than these.

The success of the Turks, though much slower, was far more enduring in its results than that of their cousins the Tartars and Mongols in the North. Though their first serious European campaign only began in 1341, they were soon firmly settled at Adrianople, and

"the crowning mercy" of Kossovo for the Moslem, which the descendants of the unfortunate Serbs were of late sadly recalling, was fought in 1389. Then the Slavs were remorselessly crushed, and remained for centuries under Turkish rule, while their country was subject to Turkish colonisation. We English may talk of the high qualities which the Turks as soldiers unquestionably possess, but we have never undergone their rule. Turks and goats together, say Eastern Europeans, will reduce the richest country to ruin. However this may be, their domination of Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine and Egypt helped to divert the route of European commerce, as their conquest of the African littoral threatened to give them permanent control of the Mediterranean.

After the capture of Constantinople in 1453 Asiatics in Europe became for centuries a dreaded factor in European politics. With the Turk in Sicily and a conquering army within a few days' march of Rome, while Greece was completely overwhelmed and Austria and Hungary successfully invaded, the liberties of the West seemed once more imperilled by Asiatic greed and ferocity. Yet even the near approach of danger and ruin failed to convince European States of the necessity for combination against their common enemy.

Though the battle of Lepanto in 1571 is generally spoken of as marking the decay of the Turkish power, it was more than a century later when the Poles, under John Sobieski, coming to rescue the Austrian armies, defeated the Turks in their second siege of Vienna, and put a limit to their career of conquest on land. This was in 1681, barely eight generations ago. The peace of Karlovitz, in 1700, marks the end of the Turkish offensive in Europe.

Not until 1830 was the den of Turkish pirates at Algiers destroyed by Lord Exmouth. Twenty-four years

later still, England and France, both of whom had previously entered into very close relations with the Ottoman Porte, were in direct alliance with her against Christian Russia, thus bringing the Turks to the European Council table.

These latter events are, however, only incidents in wars which Europe originated and carried on. In giving a summary of the attacks on Europe by purely Asiatic forces, I wish to remind those who may consider the renewal of such assaults impossible, under modern conditions, what a very serious part Asia played for many centuries in European affairs.

CHAPTER II

THE PORTUGUESE PIONEERS

At the very same period when Tartars and Turks were thus achieving the conquest and domination of a large part of Europe, the European nations themselves were beginning to force their commerce and their religion on the peoples of the Far East. Since the success of the later waves of Mongolian invasion in Asia Minor the old trade routes to India and China had been blocked to European merchants. It has been ingeniously suggested that the monopoly of such commerce, which consequently fell into the hands of the Mohammedan invaders, partly furnished the means whereby their armies were financed in their attacks upon Europe. That the interchange of goods between East and West was very largely conducted for centuries by Arabs and other Mohammedan peoples is undoubted. The discovery by Bartholomew Diaz of the new route round the Cape of Good Hope threatened from the first to deprive the Moslem communities, from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea, of the great commercial advantages they had previously enjoyed.

This was at once recognised by the Portuguese discoverers themselves, who rejoiced at the double blow they might thus strike at the Moors, the terror of whose arms was quite a recent memory in Portugal as well as in Spain. Christian fanaticism and commercial greed for gain went hand in hand on their Eastern expeditions. These Portuguese adventurers were the pioneers of European trade and settlement in India. Their early

methods of dealing with peoples more civilised and more moral than themselves formed a pattern upon which their successors in the same field too often modelled their conduct. One of their first points of attack was the city of Calicut, on the Malabar Coast of India.

The following accounts of this place, before and after the arrival of the Portuguese, give some idea of the Asiatic society which these bigoted barbarians of Europe regarded simply as a fine opportunity for proselytism and plunder. The first description is by a Shiah Mohammedan, the other by a Catholic European :

"The town is inhabited by infidels [Hindoos] and situated on a hostile shore. It contains a number of Mohammedans who are constant residents, who have built two mosques and meet every Friday to offer up prayer. . . . . Security and justice are so firmly established in this city that the most wealthy merchants bring thither from maritime countries considerable cargoes, which they unload and unhesitatingly send to the markets and bazaars, without thinking in the meantime of checking the accounts or keeping watch over the goods. The officers of the custom-house take upon themselves the charge of looking after the merchandise, over which they keep watch night and day. When a sale is effected they make on them a charge of one-fortieth part; if they are not sold they make no charge on them whatsoever. . . . In Calicut every ship, whatever place it may come from, or wheresoever it may be bound, when it puts into this port is treated like other vessels, and has no trouble of any kind to put up with."

Yet this traveller was not favourable to Calicut, and was shown no courtesy by its chief, the Samuri, who was ruler of the whole district.

The European says : "There is no place in all India where contentment is more universal than at Calicut,

both on account of the fertility and beauty of the country and of intercourse with men of all religions who live there in the free exercise of their own religion. . . . It is the busiest and most full of all traffic and commerce in the whole of India; it has merchants from all parts of the world and of all nations and religions, by reason of the liberty and security accorded to them there; for the King permits the exercise of every kind of religion . . . Justice is well administered and awarded to all gratuitously."

An Italian traveller bears similar testimony to the condition of the place in 1505, the Mohammedan having been there sixty-three years before. So that the admirable administration of this portion of the country was continuous.

The Portuguese, who were quite ignorant of the language, religion, habits and customs of the people with whom they came to trade, burst in upon the civilised folk inhabiting the Malabar Coast like a set of Barbary pirates or Tartar marauders. They were guilty from the outset of the most hideous and wanton cruelty. Vasco da Gama in particular resorted to tortures, butcheries and atrocities on peaceful non-combatants worthy of the Germans in the late war. Special outrages were committed at the same port of Calicut, because the Samuri refused to turn all Mohammedans out of his territory. In 1502, the infamous Pope Alexander VI. (Borgia), who had published a Bull according the East and West Indies to Spain and Portugal, confirmed the claim of King Emanuel to the title of "Lord of the conquest, navigation and commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia and Persia."

It was under this Christian rescript that the Portuguese acted. And they carried out their programme with the utmost religious and commercial zeal. By their activity and predatory genius, the two ablest

governors or viceroys of the Portuguese King, Almeida and Albuquerque, seized and made a fine capital of Goa. But they and their successors were worthy followers of da Gama in cold-blooded cruelty and rapine. Eyes torn out, women's noses cut off, harmless fishermen hanged wholesale, such were the charms of civilisation which Europe transmitted to Asia by Albuquerque the Great and other Portuguese leaders. Religion only added theological ferocity to the fury of the mercantile instinct. Hindus and Mohammedans alike found no respect for their souls nor any mercy for their bodies, if they ran counter to the ideas of the bigoted priests who only desired for them eternal salvation. Piracy became the rule on the sea, religious persecution the law of the colony, robbery and bribery the recognised concomitants of administration all round. Things went from bad to worse. Albuquerque was a poisoner of the Samuri: the priests were the poisoners of prisoners.

St. Francis Xavier landed in India on his great mission to the heathen of the Eastern world in 1542. He was on friendly terms with some of the Portuguese leaders and closely connected with them. Writing to a Jesuit friend in 1545, he strongly adjured him on no account to allow any of his friends to be sent to India to look after the finances and affairs of the king. However honest and trustworthy they might be, the whole atmosphere of the Portuguese settlements was such that they would be exposed to the most terrible moral dangers: "There is a power here, which I may call irresistible, to thrust men headlong into the abyss, where besides the seductions of gain and the easy opportunities of plunder, their appetites for greed will be sharpened by having tasted it, and there will be a whole torrent of low examples and evil customs to overwhelm them and sweep them away. Robbery is so public and so common that it hurts no one's character, and is hardly counted

a fault; people scarcely hesitate to think that what is done with impunity it cannot be bad to do. Everywhere, and at all times, it is rapine, hoarding and robbery. No one thinks of making restitution of what he has once taken. The devices by which men plunder, the various pretexts under which it is done, who can count? I never cease wondering at the number of new inflections which, in addition to all the usual forms, have been added in this lingo of avarice to the conjugation of that ill-omened verb 'to rob.'" From all which it might appear that Xavier himself would have done better to direct his missionary enterprise to the conversion of Europeans, rather than go further afield to spread his own creed among Asiatics whose morality and general conduct were infinitely higher than theirs.

As the Portuguese Empire began, so it went on. Here and there an upright as well as an able man, such as Botelho, became Governor, and did what he could to remedy an almost unendurable state of things. But, like Albuquerque in his great enterprises, Botelho was not supported from home in his endeavours to establish common honesty and decent behaviour among Portuguese officials and merchants. On the contrary, he was thwarted in every possible way by the king and his Court, and returned to die in poverty. It is possible that had Portugal remained independent of Spain a better system might have been introduced, and, with this reorganisation, some permanence secured for the scattered Portuguese "Empire." As it was, no such reform was made, and the Portuguese in India failed to extend their power inland. When the Dutch and English competition began in earnest they were unable to meet it successfully, and the whole piratical adventure faded into insignificance, leaving only the ruins of Goa to recall opportunities missed and ill-gotten

wealth accumulated in the early days of Europe's modern invasion of Asia.

One characteristic of these earlier inroads of Christian Europe upon the Far East is worth remembering at the present time. In the sixteenth, seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth century there was none of that arrogant confidence in the superiority of the white race over all races of a different colour, which later became so marked a feature in the attitude of Europe towards the Eastern peoples. Far from it. The behaviour of European merchants and missionaries to the great and even to the smaller rulers of India, China and Japan was deferential, and in many cases even servile. These monarchs, viceroys and chieftains compared favourably with their own royal personages, alike in culture, wealth, power and magnificence, as the most important European envoys were ready to admit. All the travellers and adventurers of the early days of commerce and piracy enlarge upon the splendour of the countries they were making ready to exploit. Not until the latter half of the nineteenth century did Europeans, and more particularly the English, convince themselves that our goods, our methods, our administration, our philosophy, our religion, our teachers were so immeasurably superior to those of the benighted heathen whom it was part of the white man's burden to bring into the fold of Western civilisation.

CHAPTER III

CHINA IN THE PAST

ALTHOUGH no accurate census has ever been taken of China, the generally accepted estimate is that there are fully 350,000,000 people in the Chinese Empire as now delimited. This appears to be correct, even after taking account of the annexations of Chinese territory by France in Cochin China and Tonquin, by Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia, and by Japan in Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa. Such an enormous population has never before been gathered together under one rule in the history of the world, and its numbers are believed to be steadily increasing. Though the inhabitants of many of the Provinces cannot understand one another's speech, the written language is the same all over the Empire. As the communications between the most populous districts are being rapidly improved and general education is spreading, it is quite probable that, within fifty years from the present date, there will be as little difference between the districts of Northern and Southern, or Eastern and Western China as there is between the talk of ordinary Yorkshiremen and that of the agricultural labourers of Devonshire and Somersetshire.

The Chinese, though devoted to their local autonomy, as members of this or that province, have a clear conception of the unity of their race. They have fully recognised for centuries, and even for thousands of years, that they all belong to the same great Empire. Their " Brotherhood of the Four Seas " is a very ancient

formula of their national aspirations. Though no more than ideal to-day, it is still cherished almost unconsciously in the hearts and minds of the people. This ideal, therefore, may quite conceivably be realised, as the patriotism of common race and common nationality is aroused, either by pressure from without or by the manifest need of reorganisation on a large scale within.

There are two questions which necessarily arise, as the history of China and the Chinese is briefly surveyed and brought down to our own day. How is it that this huge Empire, with its multitudes of vigorous, civilised, intelligent and educated men—for practically all Chinamen can read, write and cast accounts—how is it that so important a country should have fallen so often a victim to the barbarous hordes from the North and West? China has never decayed as an administrative unit in the same way that the Roman Empire or other great Empires have declined. The Chinese have remained under the same domestic rule for thousands of years. Through all the wars and anarchical revolts their system of government has gone on practically as it is to-day.

The conquerors were conquerors and remained the rulers at the top, but the administrators remained administrators century after century beneath them, as if no change had been made. Nothing like this has been seen in all human history. Even the ablest of Tartar Emperors could do no more than continue the methods of civil organisation which were there when his dynasty began and remained when his dynasty ended. Even the last Manchu rulers felt compelled to accept Chinese for at least three-fourths of the most important administrative posts throughout the Empire. They, like their predecessors, were themselves captured by Chinese civilisation and found themselves powerless in the face of passive civil resistance.

That so stubborn and well-organised a people, capable under vigorous leadership of amazing efforts, should have failed time after time to make head against their enemies was due to the fact that they were too civilised for their epoch in every sense. So completely moralised, also, were they by the teachings of Confucius and his predecessors that they abhorred war—even in self-defence. Save on very rare occasions, they regarded peaceful production and distribution for themselves and the community at large as the chief object in life. Everything else was secondary to this. The various grades of society were all superior to the soldier. The man who made the trade of arms his profession was regarded by them as a Pariah; and, as a nation, they had no conception, during the greater part of their history, of the need of a public force for public defence. The Great Wall was built to shut out for ever all possible assaults, and the troops required for its defence rarely came in touch with the mass of the population. Thus the soldier held no place in this calm, easy-going, essentially industrious and industrial community. Their own latent power they little understood and rarely used.

The Chinese, in short, were Pacifists of Pacifists, unready and unwilling to make the preparations necessary to defend themselves even against the most unprovoked attacks. They were easily overcome and mastered, therefore, time after time, by tribes whose sole vocation was plunder and slaughter. The Chinese, that is to say, not only accepted religions, the foundation of whose creed was peace and fraternity among all mankind, but, unfortunately for themselves, they acted up to their tenets for generations. This was their ordinary rule of life. The records of China thus convey one long warning against national disarmament and contempt for military training, so long as there exist within striking distance of the highly-moralised peace-worshipping

country other peoples who have not yet attained to this elevated standard of human conduct. Lack of military training, then, merely invites attack. It has been calculated that China has suffered from no fewer than twenty-three of these inroads and conquests by barbarians from the North and North-West, owing to her persistent refusal to organise her people for armed resistance.

At intervals, however, this compact of pacifism has been broken through, when, under the leadership of exceptionally capable men of their own race, they have risen against and overthrown a specially obnoxious barbarian Emperor. The last successful national upheaval of this kind (before the expulsion of the Manchus and establishment of the Chinese Republic) was the revolt against the Tartar Imperial domination, founded by Kublai Khan, the conqueror who endeavoured to follow up his victories on the mainland by his ill-fated expedition for the subjugation of Japan. This Mongol dynasty was short-lived. It lasted only from A.D. 1280 to A.D. 1368. At the latter date, a famous Buddhist monk, abandoning the pacifism of his creed, and subordinating his fanatic ecstasies and anchorite abnegation to his patriotism, raised and drilled a powerful army of native Chinese, swept aside the successor of the great Kublai, and founded the celebrated Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted for nearly three hundred years, from 1368 to 1643. Then, the kingdom of peace having once more been instituted, the Manchu Tartars came down upon the fold and held the throne of China from 1643 to 1911.

The general theory that, when nations and Empires reach a certain stage of growth they lose their initiative, decay and fall into the rear of more vigorous peoples, is no explanation of such a long period of arrested development as that to be observed in China. It is difficult to assign any precise date to the commencement of this period of intellectual apathy, though it appears to

have begun in a noticeable shape towards the close of the Ming dynasty. Possibly the competitive system, which became more and more a mere barren memorising of the Chinese classics, stunted the minds of the learned section of the community. Conceivably, the faculty of initiative, which is essentially individual, may have been blighted by some unknown physiologic or psychologic cause. However that may be—and such guesswork leads no whither—invention, discovery, the adoption of ideas and improvements from other countries all seemed gradually to stop from the period indicated onwards.

The great, masterful, brilliant race, which had set the pace for mankind in almost all directions, ceased to move forward, and was content to remain within the limits of intellectual accomplishment and scientific and industrial achievement it had already reached in the preceding epoch. This lapse from the general vigour and continuous advance in intelligence, which had enabled the Chinese to surpass their neighbours in civilisation, was not due to the earlier or later Tartar invasions, and could be detected long before opium had become a curse to the country. No step forward is apparent for centuries, among these people who gave Europe, as is believed, the art of printing, gunpowder, the mariner's compass, as well as many improvements in engineering, besides the ceramic and other arts.

Yet individually the Chinese give no sign either of physical deterioration or of mental decay. In North and South alike they apparently retain the fine qualities which secured for them their marked pre-eminence, and enabled them, many hundreds of years ago, to pervade the whole of the Eastern seas with their commerce, to establish a flourishing Colony in distant Africa, to civilise and educate Japan, to dominate Nepal and Burmah, and greatly to influence even Eastern Bengal. Such widespread supremacy was based upon knowledge

and adventurous energy more than upon force. Having no stereotyped caste system to split up their social life, and separate it into almost impermeable stratifications, nor any hereditary nobility to check democratic initiative or cripple popular administration, it is clear that they were not cramped by worn-out institutions which prevented them from following the bent of their natural capacity. The extreme complexity of their language, a possible hindrance, was no greater in the period of intellectual immobility than it had been for centuries before, or than it is to-day. Though also, as hinted above, the purely literary form of their competitive examinations may be little calculated to secure the best men for administrative posts, or to encourage the study of science, yet, even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so much of the old organisation and old knowledge remained, that, though there was then no perceptible advance, there was at least no retrograde movement. Marked ability was still displayed in astronomy, geometry and practical engineering. The machinery for progress was all to hand. Only the impetus was lacking.

There has been, also, speaking generally, no set-back in Chinese morals, apart from the dreadful opium-smoking disease forced upon the country by Europeans. The Chinese ethic is quite sound as an exposition of the best side of their entire social system. Nowhere is the influence of the family greater or more beneficial. Confucianism, the most widespread of Chinese religions, is a noble ethical creed, which dominates daily action, even in regions where other religious forms are popular and are accepted by the masses. There is no people throughout the East so much respected and admired by those, whether Asiatics or Europeans, who have close knowledge of them and continuous dealings with them as the Chinese. Industrious, straightforward, cheerful, persistent, loyal, honourable and courteous—these are the

terms commonly used by men of our own race who have lived among them and have taken pains to study their character.

That the Chinese are quite capable of holding their own with Europeans in almost any sort of employment is one of the difficulties of the near future. Chinese merchants and bankers have little to learn from European experts in the same line of business. The great industrial Hooeys require no teaching even from the most efficient of our trade unions. All this being true, the marvel is still unexplained how this gifted people should have remained at the same stage of development for centuries, until they are now being forced forward by external pressure.

But the movement has begun. The latent capacities still exist. The conservatism of this country of small properties and ancient usages has been shaken to its foundations. The China of the past is rapidly fading, and the Chinese of the present are taking up the line of their own historic achievements and will play a great, possibly the greatest, part in the future of humanity.

CHAPTER IV

CHRISTIANITY IN THE FAR EAST

THE claim of the Nestorian Christians to have "established" Christianity in China in the seventh century is based upon the discovery of a monument at Singau-Fu purporting to record their work from A.D. 636 to A.D. 781. Their propaganda is stated by Gibbon to have gone on as late as the thirteenth century. Though direct evidence of this missionary effort is hard to discover, and appears to have eluded the famous travellers in China who came later on the scene, the genuineness of the monument is not necessarily doubtful; nor does there seem to be any special reason why the Jesuits of the seventeenth century should have forged such a statement in stone. Assuming, however, that Gibbon and his commentators, who accept the authenticity of the record, are correct, it is strange, if the new creed made any great impression in the capital, or in the provinces, there should be no trace of this in the Chinese annals of the period. There is nothing impossible, or even improbable, in the partial success of a Nestorian mission to the Far East. But it is further stated that the Christian creed made so much progress that it was regarded as dangerous, and was crushed out so completely that nothing of it was left but this monument. The story, therefore, if true, is only another strong piece of evidence against the value of the zealous and self-sacrificing attempts of European missionaries to convert the Chinese.

This vast, strange and seemingly immutable Empire

of China was for many centuries practically unknown to the West. Occasional travellers found their way there and, like Marco Polo, brought back astonishing accounts of Chinese civilisation to their own people; but it was not until after the known world had been divided between the two great Catholic powers, by papal decree, that the European missionaries found their way to China and gained a footing there. They made their first converts in 1584.

The history of Jesuit propaganda in China and Japan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries shows the influence of Europe upon Asia in a much more important light than does the commercial progress which was being made at the same time. At one moment it even appeared as if the Jesuits would soon control, if not guide, the Chinese Empire, so great was their influence not only over the Emperor Kuang-Hi himself at Peking, but in many of the provinces. The Chinese were not then bitter against foreigners—they went so far as to appoint the father of Marco Polo a Viceroy—nor opposed to the Christian religion; and the Chinese authorities under instruction of the Court were disposed to help, rather than to hinder, the propaganda of the new creed.

The Jesuits, with their statesmanlike astuteness, were careful not to run counter to the feelings of the people. They used their skill in medicine, and their knowledge of astronomy and mathematics, to aid the literary class in extending their sphere of attainment, and cured the people of obstinate ailments without shocking their prejudices. By adopting the Chinese dress and making themselves proficient as far as possible in speaking and writing the Chinese language they did their utmost to remove any objections to themselves as mere "foreign barbarians," deficient alike in culture and manners. More important still, they kept the Chris-

tianity which they taught to a great extent on the plane of the ancient Chinese religions. They took good care not to attack the teachings of Confucius, whose ethical religion was accepted by countless millions not wholly emancipated from less material or more superstitious creeds. Above all, they never interfered with the close family relations and ancient rites of ancestor-worship, which, in various forms, constitute the basis of Chinese social and religious life.

Owing to this prudence, circumspection and regard for the feelings of the people they were surprisingly successful. Probably they would have continued to be so, but for the appearance on the scene of more bigoted and far less tolerant professors of their faith. Franciscans and Dominicans came into the field and denounced all such attempts to inculcate Christianity "along the line of least resistance" as a criminal compromise with the Evil One. The Chinese converts must accept the whole of the somewhat complicated doctrines of the Church of Rome, and entirely eschew the religious sentiments which, as they did not prevent them from embracing Christianity itself, the more far-seeing Jesuits permitted their flock to retain.

Moreover, the new-comers, not content with this ill-judged and untimely intolerance, allowed it to appear that religious control might easily extend to civil dominance, and took no heed to disguise their personal and sectarian differences from the Chinese officials and public. Thereupon, the Chinese all became suspicious. The Pope unwisely supported the stricter sect of propagandists and, although this mistake was remedied by his successor, the mischief, from the Catholic point of view, had been done. The Jesuit fathers, who had obtained all but supreme influence in China, were flouted, the many Christians they had converted were maltreated, and a systematic persecution began. Thus the

great success achieved by early missionaries in the seventeenth century was completely obliterated in the eighteenth, and the propaganda has never recovered from the antagonism thus aroused. This change of attitude on the part of the Chinese was not due to religious rancour; though of course priests of a rival creed took advantage of popular ill-feeling against the foreigners who undermined and weakened their own cult. It arose from the conviction that, in one way or another, the Catholic missionaries were aiming at the overthrow of ancient Chinese civil as well as religious institutions. And this was true. As will be seen, the same causes produced even more serious effects, about the same time, in Japan.

It is greatly to the credit of the Jesuits that they were still able to recognise and to record the high character of the great nation with whom they had so unfortunately come into conflict. The following sketch of the Chinese character and conduct by French Jesuit fathers in China was written after the tide of prosecution had begun to flow furiously against their co-religionists. No modern friend of China has given a more appreciative account of this fine people:

"The Chinese, generally speaking, have very charming manners. If their character lacks the attractive vivacity which we ourselves appreciate because it is almost innate in us, it is likewise far removed from the sudden anger and violence with which many Europeans may be taxed.

"Education is excellent in China: it is based on filial piety, respect for the aged, and minutiæ of ceremonial, possibly trifling in themselves, but nevertheless necessary, or at least useful, in maintaining order, peace and confidence. A man can only rise by study and work; there are schools in all the towns where the young are taught at the expense of the Government, and undergo

stiff examinations before being promoted to the three grades of literature which give the right to official employment and honours.

"There is no hereditary nobility, and the children of a famous father must distinguish themselves or fall into obscurity.

"Jurisprudence, ethics, Chinese characters are the sciences chiefly taught in the Chinese schools, and the doctrine of Confucius, the celebrated philosopher who lived about 500 years before Christ, is the basis of all studies.

"The political administration of China rests solely upon the mutual duties of fathers and children. The Emperor is the father and mother of the Empire. A Viceroy is the father of the province where he rules, as a Mandarin is the father of the town he governs.

"This constitution of government is so natural, so mild in China, the peoples are so accustomed to it, that they cannot imagine a better.

"They obey out of respect, they order with consideration, and when firmness is needed it is that of a father, not of a tyrant. There are, nevertheless, some sad exceptions, and kings and peoples have sometimes experienced that it is very difficult never to abuse absolute power.

"All the tribunals are so subordinated that it is almost impossible that prejudice, position, or corruption influence the judgments, as every civil or criminal case is submitted to the decision of one or several superior Courts.

"When it is a question of condemning a man to death, no precaution seems excessive to the Chinese. The fiat of the Emperor himself is needed for the humblest of the people as for the greatest lord, and no judge can put a citizen to death except in case of sedition and revolt.

"Nothing contributes more to the tranquillity which this vast Empire enjoys than the police to be seen in the towns. It is precise, vigilant, severe, and the Mandarins are responsible, under penalty of losing their position, for the least disorder which takes place in their department.

"In spite of so much wisdom, precaution and paternal care, the Chinese people are like other people everywhere. Errors and even crimes are committed; but they are perhaps more uncommon, they are not tolerated, and vice does not thus flaunt itself boldly, especially in the interior of the Empire, for on the coasts and in the frontier towns commerce with strangers has changed the character of the Chinese and the purity of their morals.

"This nation also must not be judged by what strangers tell us, who have only seen it superficially and who only know its outside.

"Agriculture is held in great honour in China; trade flourishes there, and astronomy as well as geometry are assiduously cultivated. They are bound to have knowledge of these principles in order to excavate and complete the immense canals which traverse the various provinces and serve to protect them against inundations as well as to facilitate the communications which are necessary in such a vast Empire."

But these favourable views of the Chinese did not prevent the Jesuits from denouncing the sale and maltreatment of children, which was then too common, nor from criticising vigorously other objectionable features of Chinese social life. The following passage shows also that the worthy fathers—for in China they were worthy, as well as self-sacrificing and wonderfully courageous—were not devoid of very bitter prejudices in favour of their own faith. Thus: "Bonzes are here in very great numbers. Nowhere in the world has the

Devil better imitated the holy ceremonies with which the Lord is worshipped in the true Church. The priests of Satan have long robes which fall to their feet, with very large sleeves that precisely resemble those of some European clergy. They live together in their pagodas, as in convents, go forth to beg in the streets, get up in the night to worship their idols, and sing many songs in a manner which closely resembles our psalmody." It would be interesting to read the comments of a learned Buddhist on this amusing passage.

Though Christianity was never numerically strong in China it is beyond question that at one time, owing to the extraordinary partiality for its votaries shown by the Emperor Kuang-Hi, the Catholic religion exercised great and beneficial influence, and might have taken root permanently as one of the recognised creeds of the Empire. Weakened by injudicious intolerance, Christianity was then crushed by cruel persecution. It has never recovered. Catholic and Protestant missionaries have carried on their propaganda unceasingly, in the face of great difficulties and dangers. But the results of their efforts have been very trifling. They have indeed so far only helped to bring about those organised and unorganised risings against foreigners which are tending to combine all China in a demand for the final exclusion of these religious zealots.

China at the date of the arrival and subsequent success of the Jesuits was a vast Empire organised by peace for peace. Japan at the same time was controlled by a caste which, supreme in the various tribes, was organised by war for war. The contrast between the two countries was very marked. China even then had probably more than 300,000,000 inhabitants and was governed by a set of literati who owed their civil positions to their success in purely academic examinations. Japan, with a tenth of this population, was

nominally ruled by the Mikado but really by a succession of Mayors of the Palace with the name of Shogun. These Shoguns themselves, however, were then no more than the heads of the great feudal nobles, the Daimyos, who were supreme in their several provinces. The fighting retainers of these provincial magnates were probably as brave and devoted a set of warriors as ever took the field, enjoyed the luxury of individual combat, or committed suicide, in accordance with ancestral custom, in order to avenge upon their own persons the death of a great chief, or the real or imaginary wrongs from which they themselves had suffered.

The people of old Japan have been described by many writers. Owing their civilisation entirely to the Chinese, they developed a domestic life and art of their own which in some respects surpassed the teaching of their instructors. The picturesque charm and pleasing manners of the inhabitants delighted all visitors in those days from which modern Japan is now so distant, far more remote than the actual four hundred years. The ancient religion of the country, Shintoism, a highly developed form of ancestor-worship, had been overlaid to a great extent by Buddhism, imported from China, and, despite its widespread influence, regarded with distrust and dislike by the ablest of the Shoguns, on account of its interference in political affairs. The only foreign nations except the Chinese who then carried on commerce with the Japanese were the Dutch and Portuguese. The first Jesuit missionaries, who began their work in 1550, were Portuguese.

This religious invasion from Europe was much more successful in Japan than was the simultaneous movement in China. The introduction of Christianity into Japan by the Portuguese missionaries was in fact the very greatest danger which has ever threatened that country. At first, the reigning Shoguns, like the

Emperor of China, favoured Christianity, partly in this case as an antidote to dominant Buddhism. Many of the great Daimyos were converted. Their Samurai followed their lead and appeared with a banner bearing the Cross as their emblem. By the year 1581, within a generation, that is to say, Christianity had grown popular and was spreading throughout the islands. There were then two hundred churches in Japan, and in 1585 a Japanese religious embassy was sent to Rome.

As they gained strength in certain provinces, under the leadership of the Jesuits, who were forced by competition beyond their usual politic action, the Christians became furiously intolerant. All the worst features of religious rancour were manifested. Thousands of Buddhist temples were burnt down, Buddhist priests were slaughtered wholesale, and ancient works of art were destroyed to an enormous extent. The Jesuits as well as the Franciscans and Dominicans praised these outbreaks as evidence of the highest religious zeal. Thereupon followed the natural reaction against the new faith.

This reaction began, as Christianity had spread, locally in the provinces. The central authority, not then so powerful as it became later, acted at first with extreme leniency in regard to the teachers of Christianity and their votaries. From that point of view the Jesuits and even the Dominicans had little to complain of. They were given full liberty to propagate their religious doctrines, so long as those doctrines, when accepted by the nobles and the people, carried with them no menace to the existing society. Even the earlier outrages by the Christians were condoned. They were warned to keep within limits in their action, but their preaching was unfettered. Japanese tolerance was, in fact, at this period remarkable.

The success which accompanied the Jesuit missions

is surprising. For Christianity was "essentially opposed to all the beliefs and traditions upon which Japanese society was founded." Owing to the caution and policy of the originators of the mission, this was not observed at the beginning of their work. Those who accepted the doctrines did not show hostility to the old creed and old observances, which were essentially collective in their essence. Christianity, on the other hand, is a religion of the individual, with what appears to all who regard human society as an organised whole, something of an Anarchist taint. Sooner or later, therefore, the spread of the Christian religion meant not only the weakening of other religions but the sapping of State authority itself. Ancient Rome was tolerant of all creeds and gave the most various deities from all parts of the world welcome in the Imperial City. It was only when the Christians showed, as individuals, a disposition to revolt against the Roman State that Trajan, the most tolerant and magnanimous of Emperors, permitted them to be persecuted. It was not their worship but their theories of civil life he objected to. Those theories and their accompanying actions struck at the roots of human society, as Trajan and his friends understood it. So in Japan. From the point of view of highly enlightened and capable Japanese rulers and statesmen, Christianity struck not only at Buddhism and Shintoism, but at all ancient customs and all ancient laws. To the Japanese State it was a cruel and subversive creed which would wreck the old ideas of devotion to ancestors, loyalty to the district, tribe and superior, filial piety and family duty. For this was substituted sheer anarchy under the foreign leadership and foreign domination of the Pope and his agents.

Yet, had it not been for the rashness of the Dominicans and the destructive intolerance of the

converts, egged on by these religious zealots, the Catholic propaganda might easily have got so far as to render any attempt at suppression futile. But the furious zeal of the newly arrived monks and the outrages which they planned and fomented rendered their position wholly untenable. Christianity by itself was acceptable to a growing minority: Christianity wedded to fanatical revolt could hope for no mercy from the people at large. Civil and religious liberty in every sense is the end and aim of every progressive community. But that stage had not then been reached in Japan. Persecution is immoral and reactionary, whether used against Catholics or Socialists. Yet the adherents of any faith who set to work to burn and slay and destroy, in the name of their supernatural or material deity, can scarcely complain if the same weapons are turned against themselves.

The Japanese at length felt that the Christians constituted a desperate danger to the whole State, of which the reorganisation and partial centralisation under the Shoguns had only just begun. Clemency and consideration produced no effect. The Jesuits and their brother priests paid little or no attention to remonstrance, or mild measures of repression. At last the foreigners and their followers joined battle in earnest with the Japanese authority as represented by the Shogun. In 1606 an Edict was promulgated forbidding all further Christian propaganda and declaring that all converts must abandon Christianity. It was a strong measure and one inevitably bound to be followed up by vigorous action, unless Japan was to undergo a Christian revolution, for which the country, as a whole, was quite unprepared.

Unfortunately, the monastic orders who were in control paid no attention to this enactment. They thought they were already strong enough to resist

successfully the central power. The fathers deceived themselves. But their preparations and the support they had received from the Christian Daimyos and their warlike followers showed clearly that the Shogun and his Council had by no means underrated the peril they had to face. The renewed propaganda of the Catholics brought into Japan not peace but a sword with a vengeance. From religious antagonism the struggle developed into ferocious civil war, in which bigotry and patriotism strove furiously for mastery. As the rebellion spread and the real issues at stake became plain, the more powerful of the Daimyos withdrew their support from the Christian armies. But the struggle went desperately on. By degrees, from 1617 onwards, the fighting became more and more barbarous, the most horrible tortures being inflicted upon the foreign priests and their converts. The great Shogun Iyeyasu and his son and successor were finally victorious, after twenty years of continuous fighting. The war ended in the siege and capture of the great sea-fortress Hara, where tens of thousands of the insurgents—who had appealed for foreign help from without—were put to the sword by a powerful Government army. This occurred in 1638. It was regarded as a terrible lesson by victors and vanquished alike. Thenceforward Christianity has had no hold on Japan.

So serious, however, had been the effort of the Christians to obtain civil and religious control, and so costly to the country was their suppression, that Japan then cut itself off definitely from European intercourse. Only the Dutch were allowed even to trade under very stringent conditions. All European ships, except the Dutch, entering Japanese ports were destroyed, and Japanese who left Japan could not return. Thus, within a hundred years, Europeans and their religion, after amazing success, were completely crushed and excluded

from the country. For more than two centuries this policy of exclusion was maintained.

Lafcadio Hearn explains the early success of Christianity on these grounds: First, because at the beginning of their propaganda the Jesuits did not attack ancestor-worship. Secondly, because the Catholic ceremonial was so like the Buddhist rites in every way—as we have already seen by the admission of the Jesuits themselves in China. Thirdly, the pressure brought to bear on the Christianised Daimyos, who were anxious to obtain European arms by commerce with the Portuguese. Whether this was so or not, and much as Christians naturally regret the manner in which Japan relieved herself from the menace to her institutions that the spread of this religion inevitably involved, we cannot deny that the proceedings of the Catholic missionaries in China and Japan were, at first unintentionally, but afterwards in both cases intentionally, directed towards establishing foreign influence and foreign control over the two most civilised nations of the Far East. It was a systematic invasion of great and ancient countries of a most subtle character, which, but for the lack of discretion shown by some of the fathers, might have led to disruption and national ruin.

Asia is the land of long memories. These attempts to obtain civil domination through religious propaganda have never been forgotten either in China or in Japan.

Though the Portuguese established a powerful Empire, with its capital at Goa, under the religious control of the Catholic Church, Christianity has never at any period achieved anything in India approaching to the success which it temporarily attained farther East. From the days of Francis Xavier until now, Christianity has made no way in Hindustan: although for more than a hundred and fifty years a Christian nation has been the most powerful, and for nearly a hundred years

the dominant, influence in that great country. We need not here consider why the Christian religion has so completely failed to make head against Brahminism and Mohammedanism. The strange combination of trade, piracy, intrigue and conquest which gained for England her Indian Empire is a most important factor in the successful pressure upon the Far East and will be dealt with fully later on.

CHAPTER V

OPIUM IN CHINA

THERE is not much to praise in the rule of the Manchu Tartars in China. They obtained domination over a people far superior to themselves through causes already mentioned; and the best that can be said of them as administrators is that they did not do so much harm to their conquered subjects as might have been expected, until within the past generation at any rate. And in view of the endless denunciation which they now receive from their lately-emancipated critics, it is fair to recall that, from the first and all through, they set their faces against the pernicious habit of opium-smoking, tried their utmost to stop it, and issued Imperial Edict after Imperial Edict to suppress it altogether. The earliest Edict against the opium habit was promulgated in China nearly two hundred years ago. This was by the Emperor Yung Chang, in 1729. Up to that date, so far as is known, only two hundred chests a year had been used in China, although opium had been a monopoly of the Mogul Government for more than a century. But, from the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards, the trade steadily increased, in spite of the opposition of the Peking Government and of the Chinese themselves. This increase was almost entirely due to European, and especially to English, trade.

It is still the fashion to speak of European influence as beneficial to Asia. How far it has been so up to the present time the most enthusiastic believer in "The White Man's Burden" would find it exceedingly

difficult to show. Certainly, nothing whatever has been done in China which can be regarded as the slightest makeweight against the hideous mischief brought upon the people of that great Empire by the opium traffic. The sole object of this nefarious trade was to make money. It was well known to its purveyors that opium-smoking was a curse to China in every possible way. The vice destroyed by degrees both body and mind. In whole districts, where the people were devoted to opium-smoking, the adult male population slowly became incapable of any active exertion and gradually descended from crapulous debauchery into blank despair. That made no difference to English merchants, English capitalists, English politicians or English statesmen. Huge profits could be realised by comparatively small outlay. Poverty-stricken Indian finance could be helped by an opium monopoly. So opium was "good business."

The lucky adventurers who had made millions out of the degradation of the Chinese exercised great political influence on their return home. And no attention whatever was paid to the unceasing protests of the Chinese Government; the vigorous agitation of English philanthropists, in which the Quakers played a leading part, was disregarded; the universal testimony of doctors and other independent witnesses as to the crime which was being committed against the physical and mental well-being of the Chinese was thrust aside; even the statements of leading English officials on the spot were pooh-poohed. There is no portion of English commercial history more shameful to our country or more degrading to the character of its traders and statesmen than the plain unvarnished record of the Opium Trade with China. England forced more than one war upon the unfortunate and wholly unprepared Chinese, solely in the interest of the vendors of this

pernicious drug. England seized Chinese territory in order to afford harbour to her smugglers, who landed increasing cargoes of opium in China in defiance of the Chinese Government.

England by her inhuman policy literally forced the Chinese Government to permit the growing of opium in China itself, in order to obtain some control over this illegal traffic. I believe no Englishman can read a plain account of what was done without understanding why foreigners denounce his country as a nation which, while claiming high morality, never allows any consideration of human wellbeing to interfere with its greed for gain. Happily, this miserable opium trade is now being suppressed. But England bargained hard for its maintenance to the last. And Asiatics, who have a good memory in such matters, are not likely to forget in our day the conduct of the English Government in this important affair.

In 1773 the East India Company themselves took up and encouraged the opium trade which had previously been carried on by private merchants and individual adventurers. The Company pursued much the same course with the opium traffic that they did in regard to extension of their territory in India. Their published documents and correspondence denounced the use of the drug—whose baneful qualities, when habitually used for smoking, were well understood—except for medicinal purposes. The directors also declared their opposition to any illicit commerce, carried on in defiance of the enactments of the Chinese Government. On the surface, nothing could have been more straightforward and honourable than their conduct. They even went so far as to put the Company's servants under stringent regulations, which forbade them to partake in the traffic, except by licence, under pain of instant dismissal. Yet the trade went on steadily increasing, no longer by

hundreds but by many thousands of chests a year, with corresponding profits to the Company and their agents.

The restrictions which the directors piously imposed out of "compassion for mankind" were continually relaxed out of regard for their own dividends. That is the simple truth. They even extended the cultivation of ouium in India more widely, to the great injury of the native farmers, in order to meet the rapidly growing demand from China. All the evidence, quoted from official reports by Mr. Samuel Rowntree and others, goes to show that the trade was so nefariously conducted that its thoroughly piratical and infamous character was universally recognised. The vessels used were furnished with large guns as well as other offensive weapons of all kinds, and direct smuggling from them was conducted by fast boats manned by sailors who themselves were armed to the teeth. So matters went on for more than half a century.

Although the Imperial Government of China never ceased to denounce this importation as ruinous to China, and again and again passed Edict after Edict against the smuggling of opium, "which poisons the Empire," the local Chinese authorities and the combination of Chinese merchants known as the Hong were always ready to assist in a business which brought to the former a steady income in bribes and gave the latter enormous profits. The sales of opium had risen to 17,000 chests in 1835, from the trifling amount of 200 chests in 1729. And this although, throughout, the successive Emperors were bitterly hostile to the importation, as well as to home cultivation of the poppy. The whole trade was, in fact, conducted as a piratical smuggling war, whose managers resorted to every conceivable infamy in order to expand the shameful business. Fighting and slaughter were common whenever honest Chinese officials attempted to resist the

smugglers. These bandits gained in boldness by impunity, and their confidence that after 1835 they had the British Government at their back encouraged them still more.

So fatal was the traffic to China, so outrageous the infringement of that Empire's rights, that the principal English officer on the spot went as far as he could in his despatches to persuade his Government to come to some definite decision on the subject. This was the more necessary since the Chinese Government, in the face of such treatment, had naturally become incensed and threatened reprisals. Nor could it be disputed that the Court of Peking was quite within its rights in taking the strongest steps to suppress a shameful trade, which had been declared illegal by a succession of Imperial Edicts, the validity and propriety of which were admitted by the representatives of the foreigners themselves. The latter even asked that, in view of the abominable nature of the entire commerce, the brutal and ruthless manner in which it was carried on, and the increasingly desperate character of the men engaged in the smuggling, means should be provided for exercising control over British subjects who were responsible for all this illegality. This was not done.

Lord Palmerston on the 15th of June, 1838, wrote as follows to Captain Elliot, the British Agent on the spot, who was at this time constantly appealing for support from home: "With respect to the smuggling trade in opium, which forms the subject of your despatches of 18th November and 19th November and 7th December, 1837, I have to state that his Majesty's Government cannot interfere for the purpose of enabling British subjects to violate the laws of the country in which they trade. Any loss, therefore, which such persons may suffer in consequence of the more effectual execution of the Chinese law on this subject, must be borne by the

parties who have brought that loss on themselves by their own acts.

"With respect to the plan proposed by you in your despatch of 18th November for sending a special commission to Chusan to endeavour to effect some arrangement with the Chinese Government about the opium trade, H.M. Government do not see their way to justify them in adopting it at the present moment."

This despatch was delivered to Captain Elliot two years too late, and was then never published in China! It shows clearly the view taken of the traffic by Lord Palmerston at that time.

In spite of this plain speaking, the supposed interests of Indian Finance and the profits of English merchants drove matters steadily from bad to worse. No wonder the Chinese Government resorted at last to strong measures. Such outrages by foreigners would have forced any European State to declare war long before. Commissioner Lin, however, who was specially empowered to put an end to the trade, sent a fine address on behalf of his countrymen to be forwarded to Queen Victoria. This was in 1839. Once more the Chinese Minister pointed out, in dignified language, the terrible effect of the opium traffic on the Chinese, and appealed to England, on the grounds of common humanity, to combine with the Chinese Government in stopping the whole trade. The appeal was useless.

Again, after admitting that the traffic was shameful, and even agreeing that a vast amount of opium should be surrendered and the trade put an end to, incidental troubles arose which were used by Great Britain to justify warlike measures. In 1840 began a series of attacks, bombardments, sacks of cities and massacres of the Chinese, commencing at Chusan and spreading to other ports, which have never been surpassed in infamous ferocity by any race of savages in the world.

They were spoken of freely by Englishmen of high position as "wanton atrocities."

There was no excuse whatever for what was done. The cause of conflict was bad enough: the vengeance wrought on the unoffending Chinese population remains a permanent stigma on our English character. Against the conduct of the "Western barbarians" the behaviour of Commissioner Lin stands out as that of a true patriot and man of the highest honour. He was undoubtedly very zealous in his efforts to save his countrymen from being poisoned for the profit of unscrupulous foreigners; and he passed beyond the limits of mere prudence in resisting the wholly illegal demands of a set of piratical adventurers, armed with weapons which the Chinese were powerless to resist. It is also unfortunately true that some of the Chinese officials themselves, by their acceptance of heavy bribes from the smugglers, and afterwards by the cultivation of opium in the Provinces with the countenance of the local Mandarins, played directly into the hands of the foreigners against the welfare of their own countrymen. But, when every allowance is made and all possible pleas are urged on behalf of English policy, the fact remains that war was forced upon China in support of a commerce which is now universally admitted by English Governments, as well as by all individual Englishmen, to have been an accursed trade from every point of view.

The result of the war was a foregone conclusion. It was not a war, indeed, but a succession of butcheries and massacres, in which British sailors and soldiers ran little risk and covered themselves with infamy. They fought for the right to poison the Chinese people, in defiance of the prohibition of the importation by the Chinese Government; all solely in the interests of the opium-smuggling profiteers. Thus and thus only the Treaty of Nankin of 1842 was secured. Commissioner

Lin was sacrificed to the aggressors. The island of Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain. The Chinese paid heavy indemnities and defrayed all debts and expenses.

The illegality of the traffic was acknowledged on the English side after this war of butchery, as it had been before. Nevertheless, the opium trade steadily grew. Hong Kong became a fortified place of protection for smugglers under the British flag. Every effort was at once made to "legalise" the importation. Lord Palmerston, whose previous despatch is partly given above, actually instructed British agents to "endeavour to make some arrangements with the Chinese Government for the admission of opium into China as an article of lawful commerce"! The Chinese Emperor, in reply to the suggestion that he should accede to this, and place a heavy duty on the import of opium, said at this time in a public manifesto: "I cannot prevent the introduction of the poison: gain-seeking and corrupt men will for profit and sensuality defeat my wishes; but nothing will induce me to derive revenue from the vice and misery of my people." It was and remains a noble reply. The hypocrisy of preaching a high Christian morality to the Chinese, while thus outraging all decency and humanity, by way of trade in poison, is obvious.

From 1842 onwards the traffic went on even more completely in defiance of right and justice than it did before. Hong Kong was organised openly as an enemy stronghold, where English and Chinese smugglers, and pirates and desperadoes of every description, found protection under the British flag. Continuous warfare ensued, to all intents and purposes of the kind which used to be waged by the Dey of Algiers along the coasts of the Mediterranean. The "foreign devils" necessarily became more and more hated. They deserved the animosity felt for them. They were attacked by the

mob in some instances. Even where no lives were lost terrible reprisals were resorted to by the English authorities. Not content also with maintaining the right of smuggling under arms for British adventurers and their own vessels, the local officials at Hong Kong actually went so far as to grant licences, still under the British flag, to lorchas, very smart coasting craft used for smuggling opium, armed and manned by Chinese pirates, who defied their own Government, again under the British flag. Such action was dead against all international law, and manifestly a direct infringement of Chinese Imperial rights within Chinese waters.

The case of the lorcha *Arrow,* which led to the Second Opium War, was only one of numerous similar cases that escaped notice. The *Arrow,* whether sailing under unexpired British licence or not, was undoubtedly a piratical vessel engaged in smuggling and piratical warfare. But when the Chinese, knowing well that she was manned by pirates who indulged in plundering and murder as well as in smuggling, seized the boat and arrested the crew, apologies were demanded by Sir John Bowring. When these were not forthcoming, bombardment and butchery shortly after began, and the Chinese Commissioner on the spot, his house having been thoroughly shelled by the British, called upon the people to "exterminate the barbarians!"

Who can blame him? But the war of 1856-7 followed, which ended, of course, in the defeat of the Chinese. Even then the special British Envoy, when peace was proclaimed to the advantage of Great Britain, made no pretence that the opium-smuggling was other than ruinous to the people of China who indulged in the drug. Lord Elgin, in fact, recognised the iniquity of the whole thing. But the old policy still prevailed. The talk was of philanthropy : the practice was plunder.

And finally, in 1858, the opium trade was "legalised," the Chinese Government put a duty on the drug, and the Chinese, by importations from India and the cultivation of the poppy at home, were thenceforth deliberately, but now legally, poisoned. Once more justice must be done to the Manchu Emperors. With all their faults, on this one subject they never really changed their opinion: compelled though they were by the English campaigns to acquiesce in the poisoning of their subjects.

For nearly fifty years, from 1858 to 1906, this horrible trade went on without cessation. If a majority against it were obtained in the House of Commons and the Indian Government was called upon by Parliamentary Resolution to restrict the cultivation and gradually to suppress the sale of the drug, no attention was paid to the behests of the Imperial Assembly. When a number of decent Englishmen, horrified at the effects produced by this pernicious trade, kept up a vigorous agitation, in order to convince their countrymen of the crimes that were, decade after decade, being committed in the Far East in their name, and under their flag, these wholly unprejudiced people were officially sneered at and denounced as sour fanatics, opposed to legitimate commerce and conspiring to wreck the finances of India.

To such an extent did the opium-smoking plague spread that, just before the Chinese Government finally resolved to put it down throughout China, at all hazards, it was declared on official authority that not fewer than one-fourth of the people of the Empire were poisoning themselves with this drug. Opium-smoking, as already said, is universally recognised as ruinous to the intellect and morals of those who become addicted to it. It is almost impossible for anyone to begin to indulge in the habit and then to break it off. In this respect it is even more dangerous than the disease of alcoholism, or the

injection of morphia. The Chinese themselves, as has been seen, have no doubt whatever about the fatal effects of opium-smoking upon the welfare of the Empire. Much as they disliked their Tartar rulers, on this point all the best men in China agreed with the Edicts of their Emperors prohibiting the importation and use of opium for smoking.

There are good reasons for mistrust of Christian missionary efforts in Asia, and especially in China. But the missionaries of all Christian creeds in China, whose opinion was taken by the Royal Commission appointed, strongly condemned the use of opium for smoking, by an overwhelming majority. Doctors who have watched on the spot the growth of the disease (it is no less) are strongly of the same opinion. Yet the Royal Commission was so prejudiced in favour of this shameful trade that its members combined to burke all unfavourable testimony and blamed the Chinese for any mischief which had been caused! Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Committees are generally appointed either in order to support the Government of the day on some foregone conclusion, or to whitewash prominent politicians who have been accused on evidence of a serious offence, or, lastly, to postpone indefinitely any action which might be opposed to the interests of the upper classes. But never was a Royal Commission so disgracefully prostituted to perpetuate infamy as this Royal Commission on Opium.

It is needless to pursue the exposure of English malpractices in this matter further. Outside of those who were directly or indirectly interested in the traffic, from the pecuniary point of view, it is impossible to obtain any evidence in its favour. There is not a single Chinese book or pamphlet to be found in its defence; and in risings against foreigners, whether due to religious animosity towards missionaries or to

suspected political interference, the denunciation of the Opium traffic supported by the "Foreign Devils" has nearly always made its appearance. Whenever Englishmen of character and position have presumed to place England on a higher level of conduct and morality than China, her action in forcing opium upon the Chinese for pecuniary gain has been brought up as conclusive evidence against them. I myself well remember highly-educated Chinamen I have met out of China, citing this same policy, and the great ignorance and brutality of many Englishmen they had encountered, as conclusive proof of the immense superiority of their own countrymen to foreigners.

Happily, by degrees, it was brought home even to the English Government, and through them to the Indian Government, that the opium trade was not only an outrage upon China and upon civilisation generally, but that the growth of the poppy in India was not beneficial to Indian finance in the long run. Moreover, when competition for the general trade of China became keener, owing to the appearance on the Chinese market of the United States, Germany, Japan and other Powers, we discovered that the feeling of the Chinese people against the English, owing to the attitude of English merchants on the opium question, might seriously prejudice the whole commerce with China—of which we had one-half. Simultaneously, the long, costly and high-minded propaganda of the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Traffic, as well as the scathing criticism directed against it in Parliament, had its effect upon the public mind and stirred up sudden indignation against it.

For once, therefore, money-getting and morals were not wholly at variance. The Chinese Government, consequently, was emboldened to push its views more vigorously than ever. What was going on in China

rendered strenuous action inevitable. The health of a large portion of the people was being rotted out of them and ruin stared this great country in the face. It was clear also that England could not in the twentieth century carry her detestable policy of force in favour of profitable poison-selling to a successful issue, as she did in 1842 and 1856-8. China might easily have found both an Asiatic and a European Ally to enable her to make head against a continuance of the nefarious proceedings of Great Britain. Surrender on the question was practically inevitable. On September 20, 1906, an Edict was promulgated decreeing the final suppression of opium cultivation and opium-smoking throughout the Chinese Empire within ten years. The restrictions were drastic in themselves, but, in practice, they were enforced even more rigidly than the law demanded. Although the Manchu Dynasty was even then tottering to its fall, it is clear, by the wholesale abandonment of the cultivation of the poppy, as observed by English travellers, that the entire population was in favour of the adoption of the policy for which Chinese Emperors and statesmen had so long and so vainly striven against English opposition. The Edict declared that :

1. The cultivation of the poppy in China must be restricted annually by one-tenth of the existing area.

2. All persons using opium were to be registered.

3. All shops selling opium were to be gradually closed ; and all places where opium was smoked were to discontinue the practice within six months.

4. Anti-Opium Societies were to be officially encouraged and medicines were to be distributed to cure the opium-smoking habit.

5. All officials were requested to set an example to the people, and all officials under sixty were required to abandon opium-smoking within six months or to withdraw from the service of the State.

Thus, after nearly one hundred years of strenuous endeavour to prevent the development and to check the spread of the opium plague, introduced and maintained by British arms and influence, from 1729 onwards, the Government of China was at last able to secure supremacy in this matter within the boundaries of the Empire. In 1907 the British Government offered a reduction of the cultivation of opium in British India by one-tenth of the area devoted to poppy-growing in each year. It may be taken for granted, therefore, that this odious traffic is now finally suppressed.

CHAPTER VI

THE BOXER RISING AND THE REFORMING EMPEROR

In Western Europe the general impression is that the great Chinese revolts, culminating in the Boxer Rising of 1899-1900, were unjustifiably directed against harmless foreigners, mostly missionaries, who were doing that which they were fully entitled to do by treaty, and were teaching doctrines and spreading knowledge which could only benefit the Chinese themselves. It is very difficult to record the long succession of attacks upon apparently well-meaning folk who were causing no injury, in such wise as to be intelligible to Europeans, without feeling exasperation at these apparently brutal and ruthless crimes. There is no excuse, we lightly say, from the point of view of common humanity, for these abominable actions.

Nor does it relieve the Chinese from the odium they incur to point out that in Europe itself the horrors of St. Bartholomew, of the Massacre of the Albigenses, of the Peasant War in Germany, of the sack of Rome by the Constable de Bourbon, of the Russian pogroms on the Jews, or, quite recently, of the German armies in Belgium, France and Serbia, are quite as bad as, if not worse than, anything which has occurred in China. But such examples do show that in the matter of ferocity the West is not much in advance of the East, when antagonisms of religion, class, or race, are involved. And the Chinese are naturally peaceful and conciliatory to a much greater extent than even civilised Europeans. The Catholic missionaries have borne their testimony

as to what the Chinese were over the whole of the interior of that great Empire two centuries ago. Here is the evidence of an American Protestant missionary at the time of the great Boxer Rising, 1899-1900 :

"They have the loftiest moral code which the human mind, unaided by divine revelation, has ever produced. and its crystalline precepts have been the rich inheritance of every successive present from every successive past. The certainty that this is the best system of human thought as regards the relations of man to man is as much a part of the thinking of every educated Chinese as his vertebræ are part of his skeleton; and the same may be said of the uneducated Chinese, when the word feeling is substituted for thinking. The scholar feels because he thinks, the peasant feels without thinking; but their feeling is in the same direction, and not infrequently of a like intensity when the roots of their natures are reached. . . . The Copernican system of astronomy . . . is not more firmly accepted in Western lands than are the tenets of Confucianism as a whole and in details, intellectually and psychologically appropriated by the Chinese as on a par with a law of nature."

And this moral teaching of Confucius which is thus accepted as the last word in ethics enters into every family and underlies every creed. It is impossible to escape from it. "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you" was the basis of Chinese morality many centuries before Christianity was heard of. The Chinese have "an instinctive and hereditary aversion from war." As already pointed out, they contemn military action and regard soldiers as men of a low grade of humanity. No great Chinese general has ever dreamed of a vast campaign of conquest, and though the powerful Mongol Emperor, Kublai Khan, vainly attempted the invasion of Japan, that venture has never

been renewed, nor has any effort been made to use the huge Chinese population to dominate the rest of Asia on land.

How then has it come about that these peaceful, high-minded moral folk have shown such a furious hatred of foreigners, not once or twice but repeatedly, during the past fifty years—a hatred culminating in the Boxer upheaval, which was supported, if not actually started, by the reactionary Empress Dowager and her officials? The truth is that the adoption of foreign ideas, nay, the very presence of foreigners, forcing their opinions and methods upon the Chinese, signifies the break-up of the ancient civilisation, if any considerable success is attained by such means. No half-measures of resistance are of any avail.

One of the shrewdest English observers who ever passed many years in the Far East gave it as his sober judgment that white men were fatal to Asiatics; that the good they could do was practically nothing; that the evil they wrought was incalculable; and that no Eastern State, if it considered the well-being of its people, would allow of the settlement of white men in its midst. Once there, it was impossible to deal with them effectively otherwise than by complete destruction. And to this rule there could be no exception. Sooner or later the white man must be crushed, if wholesale calamities were to be averted.

At the time of the Boxer outbreak I conversed on this subject with a well-known Frenchman, then President of the Banque Russo-Chinoise in Paris. He had lived continuously in China for twenty years, could read, write and speak Chinese well, had visited all parts of the Empire with the consent and help of the Government, and was intimately acquainted with Chinese public and domestic life. He had personally the highest regard for the Chinese as a people, and his interests

were, of course, bound up with the development and trade of China. I asked him what he thought of the position. He expressed the opinion that the Boxer movement could not be successful at that time, but added that he doubted whether in twenty years any Europeans would remain in China. They are not suited to the country, said he. This applies to white men of every nationality and every creed.

The missionaries by their constant presence and persistent propaganda brought home to the Chinese and Japanese and forced daily upon their attention the fact that there was a foreign body that had inserted itself into their social life which they could neither absorb nor expel, and were therefore compelled to exterminate. With far less reason a somewhat similar feeling manifested itself against industrial immigrants from Asia into America and Australia, although in their case no religious or political propaganda was attempted.

Nor should it be forgotten that, apart altogether from the aversion which we consider mere prejudice against missionaries, there are other than religious grounds for Chinese resistance to the growth of foreign trade. The mere spread of commercial civilisation means, in many cases, the entire dislocation of the ancient society and the temporary ruin, or quite possibly the complete starvation, of whole sections of the working-people.

Thus the immense and profitable importations of cotton cloth, so remunerative to Manchester, threaten China with the same fate that befell the unfortunate spinners and weavers of India, as a consequence of foreigner-enforced Free Trade. As matters stood, quite a large proportion of the Chinese workers gained their livelihood, no very good one at the best, by spinning yarn and weaving cotton cloth. Large districts also grew cotton for this purpose. Suddenly, then, poor folk find their scanty means of subsistence swept away

from them by the appearance on the market of cheap foreign goods, which act like a great natural agent of destruction, so far as they are concerned. The foreigner who is denouncing and sapping their religion is also by some malefic influence depriving them of their chance to work. The foreigner, always the foreigner!

So, in another direction, with the railways. Here labour is demanded for construction, and this may have its advantages for a certain class. But, on more than one railroad built by foreign capital, under foreign control, the management of the Chinese coolies by foreign overseers, very imperfectly acquainted with the language, has been abominably bad. Their only idea has been to push the business through as rapidly as possible, and the well-being or the feelings of Chinese navvies were the last things considered. The foreigner once more!

Then, when the railways are built and running, the advantages to certain classes of the population may be considerable, but the economic gains to other sections are by no means so apparent. In fact, the displacements occasioned, and the drain of produce brought about for export purposes, greatly interfere with all the old arrangements, and do so to the detriment of the people who can least afford, as they can least understand, or adapt themselves to, such wholesale transformations. The discontent may be the discontent of ignorance, but that does not improve matters for the discontented. All is put down to the foreigner, who has introduced this new system of transport, which the local people were opposed to from the first. Still the blighting influence of the foreigner!

Obviously, these improvements must come sooner or later. To oppose to them a stolid resistance must be futile. But when we consider the meaning of such an upheaval as that of 1899-1900 and denounce it as a revolt

of barbarians against the beneficent civilisation of the West, it is well to bear in mind, at the same time, that many causes have combined to bring about the ugly result. Moreover, it is quite within the bounds of possibility that, unless great care is taken to accommodate the new methods to that steady conservatism which has distinguished the fine Chinese race for hundreds and even thousands of years, the Republic itself may yet have to face a tremendous wave of reaction.

It is this possibility which makes the story of the Boxer rising worth careful study. The movement was due to the concentration of all the feelings of irritation touched upon above. The Emperor Huang-Hsu, therefore, seems worthy of more consideration and respect than he has yet received, as a wide-minded man of the best intentions, who failed because he took little or no account of the forces over against him, and because, with the rashness of a convinced enthusiast, he forgot that what is permissible to an agitator, who is eager to ensure the success of his principles, becomes dangerous in a potentate who issues orders that must be obeyed. The Chinese Emperor saw that his forces had been completely defeated on land and sea in 1894-5 by an island power with little more than one-tenth of the population of his own vast Empire, because the Japanese had adopted European methods. He also knew that but for the intervention of the European nations, Japan would have displaced him from the throne, and might either have established a dynasty of its own, or assumed a protectorate over all China. That would have been the natural result of such a victory as Japan had won. The ancient usages therefore were worn out.

The country which first recognised this truth had taken the lead in Asia, and would keep it, unless China awakened, in like manner, to the hard facts of the time. Convinced of the truth of this, the Emperor took counsel

with Kang Yu Wei, an official who had made a special study of the changes in Japan, and, being satisfied of the soundness of his ideas of reconstruction, proceeded at once to put them into practical form, regardless of the opposition of the Tsung-li Yamen, the leading Council of the Empire, and of several of China's leading statesmen.

The reforming Emperor, Huang-Hsu, went ahead much too fast, even if he had made sure of the position behind him by familiar Asiatic methods. His succession of Edicts were admirable in themselves, from the Western point of view, and tended to bring Chinese education and Chinese organisation abreast of the most advanced European nations, in imitation of the policy adopted by Japan. But these Imperial Edicts were promulgated too soon, followed too rapidly one after another, and failed to take account of the fact that Japan, though she owed her civilisation to China, was, at the time of her great transformation, in a totally different stage of her development.

The Emperor of China has no such universally-accepted God-like authority as the Mikado, nor are the literati, even if all were favourable to the Emperor's projects, either so powerful or so patriotic as the Samurai of Japan. Yet the Edicts prior to the Boxer troubles were undoubtedly calculated to revolutionise China completely and still more rapidly than Japan had been transformed. The defeat of the Chinese forces by the despised Islanders in 1894-5 had convinced the ablest Chinese leaders that a reform of the Empire on somewhat similar lines, civil and military, was inevitable, if China was to avoid foreign conquest or domestic disintegration. Even Li Hung Chang, whose capacity and character were much overrated in the West, saw that, and so did Yuan-Shi-Kai and others. But the Emperor's plans of reform, if put into effect

in the manner he ably and courageously, yet most undiplomatically, intended they should be, would have produced forcible resistance, even had the Empress Dowager, the Boxers and Russia been non-existent.

Every department of the Empire was to be reorganised immediately, all on Western lines, and with the advice and assistance of the detested foreigners in person and on the spot, who were everywhere regarded by the people with suspicion and hatred. The removal of old officials in order to make sure that the programme of the Emperor should be effectively put into practice by sympathetic new-comers; the constant reminders to Viceroys and others from the Emperor himself that the changes upon which he had set his heart were not being pushed ahead with sufficient zeal and loyalty; the impulse from above simultaneously firing with enthusiasm the young men who, educated in Europe, America and Japan, saw all their ideals on the high road to realisation; the jubilation of the various sects of missionaries who felt so sure that the "new learning" must give them exceptional opportunities for the preaching of their creeds that they actually used old Chinese temples for Christian churches, and were very careless about old graveyards; the vigorous construction of railways with no concern for the prejudices or interests of the mass of the people—all these coming at once were enough to stir a much less conservative race than the Chinese to furious resistance.

We know how difficult it is to introduce thoroughgoing reforms, even when they have been recognised as beneficial, into the government of any democratic European State. Not only have Parliament and the people to be convinced, but the greatest obstacle of all, the bureaucratic spirit of official opposition, has to be overcome. England has been tinkering with National Education for eight-and-forty years, and the denomina-

tional bugbear has not been overcome even yet. In China the change of the entire educational system, such as the Emperor proposed and tried to force upon the people, touched every portion of the learning of which the literati were so proud. Practical teaching, largely by foreigners, of positive knowledge and science was to follow, and in great part to replace, the endless study of the Chinese classics. This came by sudden enactment which all must obey.

New Universities, New Schools of Agriculture, New Armies, New Laws, New Postal Services, and so on, in every direction, and all at once. It was a magnificent conception: its effects are being felt, realised, and gradually put in practice, at the present time. But it is none the less amazing that any man, or any set of men, could imagine that all the ideas and methods of age-old China could thus be swept into the rubbish-heap in a few months—for the Edicts or decrees came hot-foot one on the top of the other—without creating serious internal disturbance. The chorus of praise which arose from the foreigners, as well as from the Chinese who had learnt from them, only made opposition more certain and more bitter. Many who know China well believe that, had the Emperor and his advisers been more judicious, and taken pains to rally to their side organised forces of the people; had they kept the army and its commanders in close touch with the Court, and had they brought the new proposals gradually before the governing class and the people, success might have been achieved. It was all a question of time and opportunity.

In such a matter it is impossible to reason from Europe or America to Asia. In these continents we assume progress in every country as a matter of course. It may be slower or faster, here or there, but progress is going on all the time and in nearly every direction.

Changes come from within, they are not, as a rule, enforced from without. Thus Revolution is worked up to gradually by the necessity of accommodating the political, legal and social forms to the stage of economic development which has been reached. Such a revolution may be peaceable or forcible, according as the dominant class is capable and farsighted, or selfish and tyrannical —according as the subject class is courageous and mentally active, or cowardly and apathetic.

But no definite rule can be laid down, nor can the precise period of transformation be foreseen and predicted. In some cases the economic growth precedes the transformation of the general constitution of society : in others the political forms actually anticipate the economic development. For example, the French Republican institutions are two or three generations ahead of the material position in France ; while in Great Britain the political changes lag far behind the economic status. Where education is exceptionally good, also, as in Scandinavia, Finland, and Switzerland, the general ideas of the working population are so far advanced that they can in some degree anticipate, supervise and guide the movement up to the next stage of industrial growth, or even hasten on the change towards the desired social end.

Hence, in any period, the possibility of a revolution, in the interest of the next class to be emancipated, depends upon two essentials in civilised and progressive countries. First that, in the main, the economic, which means the productive and distributive, development has reached the point where the change is not only desirable but practically inevitable ; secondly, that the class itself, whose emancipation is attaining the period of realisation, comprehends as a whole what is going on around it. If the material conditions are behind the mental conceptions of the actual position, forcible revolution

may arise from the natural desire of the people to hurry forward the transformation in their own interest. Should the material conditions, on the other hand, be considerably in advance of the intelligent appreciation of the masses, then an anarchical upheaval is scarcely to be avoided, unless the dominant minority exhibit exceptional sagacity.

Whether the revolution itself in any country is violent or pacific—which makes very little difference in the long annals of human progress—its real object is to give legal and popular sanction to results already partially or wholly achieved. Mere force alone cannot greatly accelerate the advance; but, used against the people with persistence and ruthlessness, it may considerably help reaction. Moreover, any attempt to impose upon a population a beneficial system, for whose acceptance they are unprepared, may, even in Europe, bring about a terrible reactionary set-back. This we may discern in "the White Terror" in France, after the Revolution had lost its first fervour, and in a less formidable shape in Austria under the well-meaning but doctrinaire progressist, Joseph II.

The Chinese Emperor's Proclamation in favour of progress was, nevertheless, a remarkable document. It sharply criticised the shortcomings of China in every direction, and declared that ancient institutions afforded no solution of the difficulties with which the Empire was surrounded on every side. Changes must be made, and made at once. And the Emperor risked his crown and his life upon the success of his new policy. It was magnificent, but it was not statesmanship. When, however, the Republicans, who have again obtained control of the Empire after the revolution and Yuan-Shi-Kai's attempted usurpation, indulge in unmeasured abuse of the Manchu Emperor and Court, unprejudiced students of events may recognise that the famous Edicts

and Proclamations of Huang-Hsu, though they failed to achieve the objects he had in view, wrecked his own career and had their share in producing the Boxer rising, none the less spread important truths throughout the Chinese Empire and prepared the way for the era of progress upon which China, we may hope, if left to herself, has now entered. Huang's services should be remembered when his mistakes have long been forgotten.

There is now no doubt whatever that the Boxer Rising of 1899-1900 was fostered and helped by the Dowager Empress from the Imperial Palace, with the support of the other reactionary members of the Imperial Family and important Ministers. It scarcely admits of question also that Tsarist Russia, being well aware of what was going on, neither took any measures to mitigate the growing ferment by exercising her preponderating influence in Peking, nor advised the other European Powers of the dangers of a general reactionary upheaval. It is clear that the remarkable success achieved by the organisation of the Clenched Fist—a title which may have suggested the Kaiser Wilhelm's threat of his Mailed Fist!—was not foreseen by Europeans generally; for the Legations at Peking were left almost wholly unprotected, and the attack upon them, even when a great part of China was in ferment, took the Ambassadors themselves by surprise. As a body, they regarded the Chinese, after their defeat by Japan, as an inferior people, who could be divided up among the great Powers (not excluding, now, Japan) at any time advisable.

In Peking itself, as in the Treaty Ports, Europeans had a town to themselves. They not only claimed the right to dwell in the capital, but they resented even being overlooked by the native population, did not allow any of their people who might commit offences to be

dealt with under Chinese law, and in fact created an *imperium in imperio,* as independent of Chinese authority as if the territory upon which they had encamped were entirely their own. And all this time, in addition to other matters of irritation and grievance, the opium traffic was still being forced upon the people, in defiance of the wishes of the Government, by those same foreigners who made themselves so detestable in religious and other ways.

Let us imagine similar proceedings going on in any European country or colony, or in the United States of America. Is it not certain that the whole population would take the first opportunity of rising as one man in order to eject the intruders? Is it not also beyond dispute that, under such circumstances, terrible outrages would be committed upon the defenceless foreigners in the interior, when the mob—meaning the majority of the population—escaped from the control of the local authorities, or believed that many of those officials sympathised with the rioters?

Too much importance has been attached to the assaults upon missionaries, as if the religious propaganda carried on by these missionaries of Christianity and forerunners of foreign trade were almost the sole ground for the great revolt. No doubt, the murder of the Catholic missionaries in Shantung, and the outrageous demands made in consequence by the Germans for territorial and other concessions, were the sparks which fired the conflagration in that particular region. The Boxer leaders and the Government which the Empress Dowager set on foot, after the suppression of the unfortunate Huang-Hsu and his advisers, naturally took advantage of any such anti-Christian outbreak to push ahead their own policy. But that policy, as it found expression in the Boxer movement, was a *national* policy, organised, not as a provincial outbreak, like

most Chinese revolts, but as a national effort at final emancipation from foreign influence and foreign control, secular as well as religious.

Down with the foreigners! China for the Chinese! Those were the universal cries of the well-organised groups which showed almost from the first that they had one common object. If the ideas of men like Yuan-Shi-Kai with regard to the formation of an effective army had been rapidly carried out and the Boxer chiefs had been induced to make common cause with such an army when created, then the reformist designs of the Emperor and the anti-foreign views of the Boxers might possibly have harmonised. By playing then upon the mutual jealousies of the Foreign Powers a gradual reconstruction of China, in defiance of external influence, might have resulted.

But as matters stood this was impossible. The Emperor was too revolutionary, the Empress Dowager was too reactionary, for either of them to achieve permanent success. All the European and American and Japanese interests were assailed at the same time. Even Russia was compelled to make common cause with the rest. So after the Legations at Peking, with those who had taken shelter in the rapidly-improvised defences, were saved from destruction by an international combination of armies, the revolt was suppressed and the whole agitation died down.

It must be admitted that the conduct of the Allies during their advance and the looting which they permitted in Peking and its neighbourhood were wholly unworthy of the troops of civilised nations. Nothing done by the Germans in their attacks upon Belgium and France was worse than the savagery of the Allied forces in their campaign against the Boxers in China. Their ravaging, sacking, plundering, burning, as well as their treatment of women, fully justified all the

charges brought against the whites as barbarians. Undoubtedly the behaviour of the Boxers had been abominable and their cruelty and treachery were inexcusable. The cold-blooded murder of the German Envoy, Baron von Ketteler, was contrary to all international law and opposed to the common rules of humanity, which none know better than the Chinese. But this was no reason for the maltreatment of the agricultural population, or for the looting of the Imperial Palace. It was a recrudescence of the brutality and ruffianism displayed by the English in their opium wars, and did much to shake the confidence in English and American justice which had slowly grown up. The demand for heavy indemnities and the seizure of important blocks of territory by England, Russia, Japan and even Germany, made matters still worse. Only the United States, by returning its share of the indemnity for lives sacrificed and property destroyed, showed something of the higher spirit of civilisation and humanity.

CHAPTER VII

THE BOXER RISING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

THE behaviour of the Allies after the suppression of the Boxers was not of a kind to render European relations with the Chinese people any more friendly than they were before. Far from it. China during the advance upon Peking and in the settlement arrived at was treated as a conquered country and her territory was appropriated right and left, apart from the exaction of a huge indemnity. Russia laid hands upon Manchuria as her sphere of influence. Japan demanded preponderance in Korea and sowed the seeds of trouble in other directions. Germany seized upon Tsing-Tau and the province of Kiau Chau, without a title of justification. England, not to be behindhand in the race of dishonour, grabbed the port of Wei-Hai-Wei, which has not been and never will be of any use to her. The United States alone acted with unexpected moderation and refused to have part or lot either in the indemnity or in the annexation of territory.

Such proceedings, taken as a whole, were little likely to produce a favourable effect upon China. In fact, the policy of revenge adopted by the European Powers went far to strengthen, especially in the provinces so outrageously ravaged by the Allied armies, that desperate hatred of foreign interference, which was at the bottom of the entire Boxer troubles. Nor was the prospect of the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, judged from the European point of view, any brighter than it had been before. Yet all the while the new ideas

set forth in the revolutionary Edicts of the Emperor Huang-Hsu were making way with a rapidity destined to surprise even those who were best acquainted with China and the Chinese. It is strange that the most enlightened and progressive of modern Manchus, who suffered personally for his own foresight and capacity, should have done more to hasten the downfall of his own Imperial family than had any of his reactionary predecessors.

Though the Manchu Emperors at Peking, to whom were accorded divine attributes, could appoint, remove, reward or behead Viceroys and Mandarins at their pleasure, and held military domination over the provinces ruled by these Imperial subordinates, nevertheless the administration of the provinces was in the main local and was not much interfered with from above. There was no complete centralisation under the Government of Peking. The provinces were also strongly attached to their independence. Even under the most despotic of the Manchus, China was therefore rather an Imperial Federation of Provinces than a militarist Empire. Below the Manchu sovereignty the old Chinese customs, religions and methods of administration steadily held their ground. Moreover, in at least one of the Southern Provinces the traditions of the ancient Ming dynasty survived; and an organisation directed towards the removal of the Manchus and the destruction of their entire rule had been maintained with Chinese persistence, in spite of several futile attempts at insurrection, for 250 years.

The same unprogressive but by no means unintelligent conservatism, based upon the unit of the family, peasant proprietorship with small cultivation, the universal Confucian ethic, the religious devotion to ancestry and social duty to the community prevailed everywhere. It is also generally true that so long as

foreigners refrained from interfering with Chinese habits and customs, they were received with kindness and courtesy throughout the Empire by the Chinese themselves. Travellers who were mere passers-by were more likely to suffer from childish but not ill-natured curiosity than from hostile demonstrations, unless they designedly or inadvertently offended native usages, or ran counter to local prejudice. There is abundant testimony to this, before animosity grew up, roused by foreign settlers who, with the best of motives, gave the impression that they wished to dominate Chinese opinion.

Besides, although the Boxer uprising is spoken of as if all China participated in this great anti-foreign and reactionary attack, the truth is that only the Northern Provinces, where the Manchu influence was paramount, took an active part in the movement. It is indeed not too much to say that though the people held anti-foreign views the really intelligent Chinese leaders were against the whole agitation. Throughout the great Southern and Western Provinces, whence the reconstruction came, the more capable Chinese were coming slowly to the conclusion that crucial changes were inevitable; and one of the ablest of Chinese statesmen, then Ambassador to Great Britain, expressed his hope, in a public interview, that this cataclysm in the affairs of his country would lead to great improvements: "I hope that financial, educational and judicial reforms will be introduced after this crisis is over, and I would even say, as a representative of my country as well as of my Government, that I hope the Powers will insist upon reforms." Thus spoke Lo Feng Lu. A very remarkable utterance from a Chinaman holding such an important official position, and one which would have cost him very dear had the reactionary party been permanently successful.

Even in the perturbed Northern Provinces, where the Boxers had achieved temporary success, certain of the Viceroys, both Chinese and Manchu, were far-sighted enough to declare against the insurrectionists, to protect foreigners from attack, and to give the Allies no excuse for extending their campaign of revenge against the people. Thus Yuan-Shi-Kai risked everything by pursuing this policy in Shantung, though his Chinese subordinates of the same race as himself were many of them bitterly opposed to him. Had he not had at his disposal large bodies of troops, trained according to European methods, upon whom he could rely, his success in keeping his province in order would have been more than doubtful. As it was, no foreigner was killed in Shantung, and the Allied troops did not molest that province. Similarly, the Manchu, Tuan Fang, who was then temporary Governor of Shensi, intervened directly to protect the foreigners and sent them, when their lives seemed likely to be endangered, under strong escort to places of safety. This he and Yuan-Shi-Kai did, although the whole power of the Empress Dowager and the Palace was, as they knew, friendly to the Society which had organised these outbreaks; and it is strong evidence that public spirit and patriotic resistance to popular clamour were by no means unknown qualities among the Mandarins who have been so indiscriminately abused in the West.

Their conduct, and that of others who ran similar risks in order to defend foreigners with whom they could have no racial or religious sympathy, contrasts very favourably with the conduct of the Allied officials, civil and military, who actually ordered fine old temples to be burnt to the ground merely because the revolutionists had used them as storehouses and barracks. On an impartial survey of the insurrection and its suppression, it seems that the Boxers and the Allies

stood on much the same low plane in the matter of humanity and civilisation; but that the Chinese authorities frequently displayed characteristics far superior to both sets of barbarians under most trying circumstances. The devastation of whole districts by the armies of the Allies, the looting, raping, plundering, burning of Peking, the frightful barbarity of the Russians in the butcheries of Bladovestchenk, and the brutality and greed of the Germans at Kiau-Chau will ever remain as another black mark against European civilisation in the Far East.

Not until the great war between Japan and Russia in 1904-5 did China as a whole begin to understand that the day for rejecting the practical effects of European knowledge and education was past. The time indeed had come for China either to learn in the new school, or to submit to partition by European Powers, perhaps even to domination by the hated and despised Japanese. Barely ten years had passed ere the ideas which the genius of the Emperor Huang-Hsu had failed to impress upon his people were commonly accepted. In the meantime, the work of education and organisation throughout the Southern Provinces, with which the name of the much-persecuted Sun Yat Sen is most closely associated in Europe, had gone on rapidly, in spite of all the efforts of the Court of Peking and its emissaries to suppress the propaganda and destroy its chief.

Sun Yat Sen and his followers had recognised for many years that thoroughgoing changes were essential to save China from dissolution or foreign conquest. Inspired by a high conception of what China might do, they steadily prepared the conservative mind of the people to accept the necessary transformation. They also took advantage of the increasing numbers of Chinese students who had gone to Europe, America and Japan in order to acquire Western learning, to

imbue them with aspirations of returning to their country as helpers in the revolution and reorganisation, when the state of affairs justified a vigorous attack upon the Manchus and the establishment of a new government.

Circumstances greatly helped reformers and revolutionists of every school. Russia had for many a long year appeared to the Chinese as the most formidable of all the European Powers, and the one which best understood how to make her influence felt. She was always at hand, her conquests in Asia had been continuous and apparently carried out on a systematic plan. By degrees she had pressed forward from the west and north, until a great railway partly running through Chinese territory had been constructed from the Russian Empire in Europe to the Russian Empire on the Pacific Ocean. Russia had never favoured Christian proselytism within Chinese boundaries. The Greek Church, with all its ardour for conversion, had been held back by Russian statesmen from any dangerous ventures in favour of spreading that form of Christianity in the Flowery Land. There was no friction with them, therefore, from inconsiderate and bootless religious zeal, nor had the Russians taken any part in the nefarious opium traffic which had procured for the English such an infamous name. Cruel and ferocious the Muscovites had often shown themselves to be. But they understood Asiatics and Asiatic ways, many of the Russian officials being Asiatics themselves.

So far as the Chinese could see, Russia had been invariably successful, had met with no check in her great advance across Asia, had taken the lead in preventing Japan from exacting from their country the full terms to which she considered herself entitled after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and was then much the strongest nation in the Far East. Russia, too, at the close of the Chinese war with Japan, had herself

proposed a close understanding with China and had concluded a preliminary agreement with her. Chinese statesmen felt, therefore, that, however dangerous Russia might be to them in the future and by reason of her recent annexations in the present, that great nation could be relied upon to withstand the progress of Japan on the mainland and the final appropriation of Korea by these impudent but too successful Japanese islanders, as they seemed from the Chinese point of view.

What followed appeared little short of a miracle to Chinese Ministers, who, awakening from their torpor and foolish over-confidence of the previous decade, thought that they now understood how powerless the East was in comparison with the West. The first shock to Chinese complacency was given when in 1904 the two belligerents, Japan and Russia, made common cause in paying not the slightest attention to the integrity of Chinese territory. China was a neutral in the conflict. She took no part whatever in the struggle. Yet Russia and Japan, finding it convenient to fight their fight out on Chinese ground, calmly did so in their own way and at their own convenience.

Poor, harmless, unmilitary China could only look on powerless while her own provinces were ravaged by the contending armies, while her cities were occupied, defended, attacked, besieged, regardless of her protests, and the sacred tombs of the Manchu Emperors were violated by the presence and misbehaviour of Russian and Japanese troops. This humiliation was bitterly resented. But nothing could be done. The defenceless, like the absent, are always in the wrong. This was bad enough. The victory of neither combatant could benefit China; but, of the two conflicting nations, the Chinese were naturally more favourable to the Russians than to their late conquerors. Moreover, they thought Russia was sure to win. The result, as all the world knows,

was quite the contrary. Japan beat Russia. Asia defeated Europe. Then at once it was borne in upon the Chinese more forcibly than ever that Japan, by adopting European methods of warfare and organisation, had assumed the leadership of the Far East. The Battle of Mukden and the Treaty of Peace signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, entirely changed the whole face of world-policy for East and West alike. They had also completely transformed Chinese policy.

It was inevitable that Chinese Emperors and Chinese statesmen should at last yield to the unerring logic of facts. What had been far-seeing but unrealisable statesmanship on the part of a monarch ahead of his time became now political necessity, even for men of moderate ability. This is not to say that the chief advisers of the Manchu Emperor, from 1905 to 1908, were of inferior capacity. Prince Chun, Yuan-Shi-Kai, Chan Chih Tung and others were far above the average of intelligence. But with the lesson of the Boxer rising and the shameful looting of Peking behind them, and the startling victory of the Japanese over the Russians on Chinese territory right in front of them, two facts were thrust upon China which not even the most stupid could overlook. An Eastern race adopting European methods of warfare must inevitably defeat another Eastern race which persisted in following the old ways. An Eastern race adopting Western methods of warfare can even defeat Europeans at their own game. This last was the great moral for China of the Russo-Japanese War.

Therefore, it positively rained Edicts in favour of European ideas and the new learning of the West. The revolution which provoked reaction was followed by reforms which engendered revolution. A new spirit arose among the people as well as among the Chinese literati and men of business. Thenceforward, progress was almost as rapid, though not so systematically

organised, as that which had taken place earlier in Japan. The immense difference in area and population, the far greater conservatism of the inhabitants, the lack of any military caste to direct the reorganisation of the army, the antagonism between the Chinese and their Manchu rulers, were much more formidable obstacles to speedy change than the insurrection of some of the old feudal chiefs against the revived rule of the Mikado.

But what was done was nevertheless most surprising and encouraging for the future. In 1905 a Commission was set on foot to examine into the administrative systems of foreign countries. Representative government, a revolution in itself, was to be carefully investigated. On September 1, 1906, an Edict was issued with the Manchu Emperor's sanction, decreeing the establishment of a Parliamentary form of government at a date not fixed. In November of the same year an Edict went forth to reorganise the offices of the central administration. A year later, November, 1907, it was decided that a single Imperial Assembly, not a double chamber of House of Lords and House of Commons, was required. In 1907, also, an Advisory Council was established. On August 27, 1908, an Edict announced the convocation of a Parliament nine years later, and on December 3rd the Edict was confirmed. In this year the Dowager Empress, who had so resolutely and ruthlessly fought the elaborate scheme of progress in reform, died. With her death and the consequent cessation of her influence events moved faster still. October, 1909, saw classes settled for the formation of a Senate or Imperial Council. One year more, and the National Assembly held its first meeting. This meant the opening of a new era for the political and social life of the most populous and ancient Empire in the world.

Thus, in less than six years, still under Manchu domination, the whole basis of Chinese rule had been

changed and any return to the old state of things had been rendered impossible. Further progress was in fact decreed by events. This had been foreseen and prepared for in the purely Chinese movement in each of the great provinces, where Electoral Assemblies had been already established in 1909. Happily, also, the Chinese statesmen and generals and agitators, who organised this rapid transformation, were wise enough to recognise that popular demands for revolution must in such stirring times be backed up by disciplined forces which could be relied upon to support the new government. The Manchus had no chance of success against the Chinese levies trained on the European plan. So in 1911 the Tartar dynasty, which had been masters of China for nearly three hundred years, was got rid of much more easily than could have been expected, and with an amount of bloodshed far inferior to that which has attended infinitely less important developments in European countries.

"China for the Chinese," the cry which had been raised by the Boxers, the aspiration which found voice on the death of the Empress Dowager, became now the rallying cry of progressive China all over the Empire. Once more—for the twenty-second time, it is said—the Tartar invaders had been deposed and their supporters were being sent back to colonise the uncultivated lands of the north. All this was done with the sympathy and good will of the Western Powers and Japan. The shameful policy of the partition of China which had found favour in Europe for years before and was thinly disguised by the declaration of "spheres of influence" for this or that commercial brigand from the West, aided by the still more formidable brigand close at hand, met with a check which it is to be hoped will develop into permanent and effective resistance. A consolidated China of the Chinese, with a sufficient army, an adequate

navy, and continuous development of her internal resources, would speedily exercise a proportionate influence on the politics of the Pacific. But, to ensure safety from the predatory nations by which she is encompassed, the Republic must finally abandon her policy of unpreparedness and non-resistance to attack. By self-defence alone can this magnificent country, with its splendid resources in men and material, be secured against attempts at domination from without—attempts more dangerous to her independence than any by which she has been previously threatened.

When first the possibility of the ejection of the Manchus and the establishment of a self-governing China developed into a practical policy, many European sympathisers thought that a revival of the Ming dynasty of the South might be desirable, if the direct descendants of that Chinese Imperial family could be found. Those descendants were known, but none of them was at all qualified for the position of Emperor. Nevertheless, the view was so strongly held that only an Emperor ruling from Peking could hold the newly-emancipated China together that it was some time before the idea of a Chinese Republic, steadfastly advocated from the first by Sun Yat Sen and his associates, found general favour. Republics had not been so generally successful elsewhere that they could be regarded as a form of government suited to a highly conservative Eastern nation which had lived under successive Imperial dynasties for thousands of years. A Republic of a democratic kind presupposes a democracy, and democracy, in the Western sense, is unknown in the East. The entire absence of hereditary nobility had never involved as its consequence democratic control in any shape. Competitive examinations for official positions, even where they were conducted without any suspicion of bribery or favouritism, or dominant influence or substitution,

were entirely different from popular nomination or election. That China therefore should adopt Republican institutions, of which there was at the time only one established example in Europe on a large scale, appeared almost inconceivable to old residents at the Treaty Ports or at Peking.

Nevertheless the influence of Sun Yat Sen and his school prevailed, and Sun Yat Sen might himself have been the first President. But he gave way to Yuan-Shi-Kai, the able and fearless Viceroy of Shantung in the Boxer days, who had armed and trained an efficient Chinese force. The unfortunate results of this appointment to the Republic and Yuan himself were seen later. For Yuan-Shi-Kai, while a genuine Chinaman, a reformer, and a protector of foreigners, was still of the old school of Mandarins, though strongly indoctrinated with the new military ideas. He was arbitrary, tyrannical and self-indulgent, and, as he gained increased power, his conception of his position as President differed little from that which a reactionary Manchu would have held under similar circumstances.

But meanwhile—before as well as immediately after the actual revolution and overthrow of the Manchus—the whole Chinese system had been modified in the most surprising way. Change of social habits, abandonment of ancient customs, uprooting of old-world ceremonies, application to educational purposes of religious buildings long devoted to various kinds of worship, are all infinitely more difficult to bring about than alterations in political forms or the removal of an obnoxious dynasty. In these matters, however, China, when once she began to move, progressed with even greater celerity than Japan a generation before. Thus the unpractical old rules in regard to education, even less suited to modern ideas than the antiquated devotion to Greek and Roman literature which still prevails in English

public schools and universities, were entirely relaxed from one end of China to the other. The pressing necessity for acquiring Western knowledge, while not giving up the inculcation of the noble truths of Confucian morality, was imposed from above and readily accepted below. In September, 1905, an Edict was promulgated which did away with the old method of examinations from 1906 onwards. The new system established was essentially modern in every way. Thousands of temples were now used as schoolrooms, while the people, who would formerly have resented such use as an outrage, made little or no objection. In spite of the large numbers of Chinese who had gone for instruction to Europe and America and the many thousands who had resorted to Japan for the same purpose, the great difficulty was to find enough Chinese teachers to meet the demand for the thorough inculcation of the new ideas.

The extreme Chinese deference to authority, which had hindered the advance of knowledge and fostered a prejudiced conservatism for ages before, told strongly in the other direction now that the rulers of the country were convinced that it was unsafe to stand upon the old ways and issued mandates for a complete change to the new. This same Confucian law of implicit obedience to paternal injunctions from above rendered the adoption of the system recommended from on high far easier than would have been possible with a people less subservient to family rule and official domination. When the crystallised moulds of educational instruction were even partially broken anything became possible in the China of the present and near future. A highly intelligent race was all at once relieved from the intellectual bondage of centuries and entered again upon that upward and onward career towards the knowledge and control over nature which had once enabled China to

lead the civilised world, and may not impossibly do so again. For the Chinese of old were above all originators and men of initiative. The Japanese, the Koreans, the Malayans and others did but follow in the footsteps of the great Chinese discoverers and inventors, who had boldly and vigorously blazed the trail for them through the vast forests and dense undergrowth of human ignorance. Europe itself owes much of its knowledge to the patient work of the Chinese of long ago, whose descendants we, the whites of to-day, have too often despised.

The fresh start was, as already said, accompanied by a new view of military training. The soldier, formerly contemned as a non-worker in spite of his skill in arms, has become all at once an important person, like his rival in those countries where peace was not counted the essential thing. If universities for peaceful study are being formed all over the Empire, military academies with the latest curriculum for scientific slaughter have likewise been established in hot haste. Imitating in this respect the worst and most unhealthy methods of the West, barracks filled with soldiers are making their appearance in many of the great cities. The superstitious grotesquerie of Manchu warfare which had its full share even in the war against Japan and constituted a noticeable weapon in the arsenal of the Boxers has disappeared for ever. The grimaces and yells, the hideous masks and bows and arrows of the recent past have given place to systematic European drill, and the men are armed with the best of European weapons. "Arsenals are to be seen at every great centre; cannon and all the munitions of war are being made within the empire. This is not the case at one town merely, or at two, but at every capital. . . . The whole empire seems to be arming, not in extraordinary haste but with thoroughness, with doggedness and with resources with which no

European nation can compare." These observations of an unprejudiced American traveller may be somewhat exaggerated. China cannot pretend at present to stand as a military power on the same plane as Japan or England or America. But the possibilities of the future under her own development, or under Japanese leadership, cannot be contemplated without serious reflection, or even apprehension.

How long have Europeans laughed at the idiotic complacency with which Chinese women crippled themselves for life by compressing their feet into a formless mass, while overlooking the foolish and harmful fashion once adopted by elegant Western women in constricting their own waists? But it had become a fashion consecrated by the use of centuries and rendered more difficult to overcome by the habitual confinement of Chinese women of good station. As hard, apparently, therefore, to uproot within a few years as to induce the Jews to part with their holy rite of circumcision.

The women themselves were devoted to their own customary lameness. They regarded as barbarians those of their own sex in Western China itself who refused thus to disqualify themselves for some of the most important duties of life. Never would they unbind their own feet or permit their female children to stalk along like men in the open street. Yet between 1905 and 1911, even before the revolution, that is to say, in province after province this ancient practice of binding the feet came to an end. Bound feet were becoming the exception. Girls who never went out now troop to school in some districts. They are beginning to read and even to think for themselves. The elaborate painting of the face which was the rule is also fading out. In their sexual arrangements some liberty is being secured, so that girls may refuse husbands chosen for them, if necessary. The unbinding of the feet is

symptomatic of release in other directions. The emancipation of woman is in many districts more than keeping pace with the emancipation of the men. The repression was much greater: the freedom gained is relatively more complete.

Similarly with the queue. That was a symbol of Manchu supremacy enforced by the Tartar conquerors and Emperors. But, in the course of generations, the subjugated Chinamen had become accustomed to and proud of this method of wearing their "back hair." Even in distant colonies under the British flag, where they were perfectly free, had they wished, to cut off this long appendage, so dear to our own sailors of old, the Chinese immigrants never dispensed with their queues. Their presence was as familiar to them and as little irksome as their use of chopsticks. Yet, in this case, also, revolt prevailed over custom and fashion. With the disappearance of the Manchus and the inauguration of the Republic, the wearing of pigtails gradually became less general and has now been given up almost everywhere. Recognised as due to Manchu usurpation, it was discarded as an evidence of the victory of China herself over the Tartar invaders, and something which belittled them in the eyes of the new commercial foreigners who were pressing in upon her from the sea.

Thus Europeans and Americans have in every direction to deal with a new and an awakened China. Education, social customs, military organisation, economic advance, racial isolation are all in process of fundamental transformation. Yet, though, as will be seen, they are adopting Western material improvements and methods of development on a scale and over an extent of country which amazes the most sanguine, all admit that they will never welcome Europeans who settle among them. Like the Japanese, they will make use of foreign knowledge as far as may be convenient,

but only upon their own terms. They see very clearly that, however much Europeans may be in advance of the Chinese in material growth, in other respects the Western Barbarians of the Opium Wars and the Peking plunderings are Western Barbarians still. They on their side continue to regard the Chinese as an inferior people, and treat them, wherever they can or dare, as inferior people to-day.

An aristocratic English clergyman, now a bishop, went to China, filled with that consummate assurance which so endears the Anglo-Saxon to cultivated Celestials, whose ancestors were a great and civilised people while his forbears were prowling amid the forests of Northern Europe half-clad. He went—think of it—in order to convince the inhabitants of that country not only that cannon and rifles are more effective weapons than bows and arrows, and railways and motor-cars preferable to palanquins, but that he himself could teach them a far higher Asiatic religion than any they had yet embraced.

The simple fact, observe, that Christianity has been taught in China for more than three hundred years to very little purpose, by men who had made themselves masters of the language, had adapted themselves to the usages of the people, and by their tact, scientific acquirements and capacity for administration once nearly obtained control of the entire Empire, does not in the least dash our self-constituted apostle's sublime self-confidence. He knows not a word of Chinese himself, and has little experience in the country, yet by his persistence he forces some of the most important of the official class to "argue" with him on abstruse points of his own difficult and elaborate creed. Imagine a Chinese bonze getting the Viceroy of India, the Viceroy of Ireland and the ablest "literati" from the British Universities to devote hours on end to the discussion of

Confucianism and Laotseism, interrupted only by an admirable luncheon provided by the Archbishop of Canterbury's exquisite cook! What sort of reception would the Chinese devotee really encounter? It is not pleasant to think of. Yet this is what befell the reverend gentleman in infidel China, and here is his account of his treatment by his entertainers :

"The courtesy of the Chinese officials, the charm of their manner, the mixture of dignity and good-nature which is such a characteristic of their behaviour makes controversy with them delightful. I do not think anyone who has known them can be but greatly attracted by their courtesy and kindness. All Chinese are courteous, but the Chinese literati, perhaps naturally, greatly excel their fellow-countrymen in this charming characteristic." The kindly arrogance of all this, superimposed on a vehement argument in favour of establishing an English Christian University in China, never occurs to this amiable traveller. Yet in other directions he is able to discern and comment upon the disagreeable qualities of his own countrymen with some perspicacity and judgment. Thus he is really a little shocked when he discovers that in Shanghai—a great Chinese city, by the way—foreigners have so completely obtained control of the public gardens that a notice is put up on their behalf : "No Chinese shall be admitted except servants in attendance on foreigners." Cultivated Chinese officials of the type with whom the English ecclesiastic had held his controversy, as well as highly educated Chinese merchants and scholars, are all excluded! Moreover, so entirely are foreigners masters of the municipality that there is not a single Chinese representative on the City Council. China for the Chinese indeed!

The incongruity of this sort of conduct seems to have struck an American observer even more forcibly. He

is looking on at another great Chinese city with its European settlement, and he thus invites his readers to look with him: "Contrast the forts, foreign forts, on the wall, the hostages given to foreigners, who not only claim to dwell in the Manchu city, but oblige part of the wall to be prohibited to Chinese, lest the foreign settlement be overlooked! Imagine a section of Washington taken possession of by Moroccans and Tripolitans, with Turks and Arabs and Persians settling alongside, Oriental soldiers garrisoning it, free-born Americans bidden keep away lest the European susceptibilities be hurt! Would America tolerate that long, after her new army was in working order? Look down yonder. At the foot of the wall is a squad of cadets from the naval academy practising bugle calls. Who are those yellow faces in Western dress? Soldiers with modern weapons. And who are these in naval uniform? Police of a new type." That is the sort of vision, following upon all that has gone before, which must arouse serious reflection in the most superficial mind.

So one would imagine, at least. Yet only a few years have passed since a highly intelligent Englishman, who is accepted as an authority on all Eastern questions, wrote as if China must always be talked down to by Europeans. It seemed to him that if Europeans grew favourable to China after continual residence in the country, it must be due to some injurious influence which the Chinese exert over those who come habitually in contact with them! There again is still the note of Chinese inferiority. For this reason, no matter what view the Chinese themselves may take, they are to be permanently dictated to in their own country by the foreigners on the spot. Missionaries, for example, have been, directly or indirectly, the cause of much of the trouble which has arisen against the white settlers outside the Treaty Ports. It is quite possible indeed

that one of the most potent causes of the Boxer rising was the incredibly foolish Edict, issued at the same time with other important but premature decrees, which declared that Catholic bishops should receive the same honours and be accorded the same ceremonies as Chinese officials of the highest rank. This was due to continuous and threatening pressure exerted by the French authorities at Peking and their clerical friends at home. Nothing could be more calculated to arouse bad feeling. Yet the tone of the English writer cited above, whose views on India are vehemently reactionary, is scarcely less objectionable than the French demand for exceptional recognition of the ecclesiastical envoys of the Pope. "The missionaries have a right to go to China and to China they will continue to go, however undesirable their presence there may be considered." That is the opinion of Sir Valentine Chirol. And he goes farther. Missionaries are the pioneers of commerce and foreign influence. "Missionary work in China is not only a proselytising but also a humanising agency, and every missionary establishment is a centre from which civilising influences radiate over the whole area of its operations."

But that is just what patriotic and farseeing Chinamen understand perfectly well from their own point of view. They understand, that is to say, precisely what "civilising influences"—white man's "kultur"—mean in the East; that, however fine a creed Christianity may be in itself, it is unsuited to China under existing conditions and is liable, by the zeal of its apostles, to rouse exactly those misunderstandings and stir up those animosities which it is most desirable to avoid. Europeans as a whole, but particularly the English and Americans, are especially strong on the dignity and freedom of the individual as an individual. He stands out as something by

himself, having rights and duties apart from his family, and independent even of the community. His future salvation after death depends upon himself, and his relations to his ancestors have long since been obliterated or merged in a general respect for the past. The Chinese have no such ideas as these, they regard them as improper and immoral, and wish to have nothing to do with them as guiding their conduct through life or in death. The only success achieved by Christianity in China has been gained by throwing overboard some of the most cherished tenets of the faith which is now dominant in Europe, and by recognising ancestor worship, the supremacy of the family and unshakable duty to the community as the essentials of civilised existence. Here, once more, is it probable that, since China is becoming aware of her own strength and is rising out of the stagnation of ages, she will extend welcome and ensure protection to ecclesiastical agitators who, sincere as they may be, introduce all the elements of internal conflict?

The removal of the Manchu dynasty and the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911 was a revolution which only gave sanction to results already achieved and, by constituting a free Federation of the Provinces, prepared the way for further progress. The leaders of this almost peaceful transformation were in favour of moving the capital from Peking to the South. This policy was favoured by the Republicans for many reasons. Not only was Peking the Tartar capital, whence the Chinese themselves had been ruled by foreign barbarians for many generations, but it was too far from the centre of the country and had lost much of its political and national importance owing to the wholesale annexations and leasings of territory by Russia and Japan during the past twenty years. It was found, nevertheless, that the change, however

desirable, could not then be made. Yuan-Shi-Kai, who at first received the support of all the European Powers and was not opposed by Japan, held control of the land forces. His appointment as President of the Republic practically settled the question that Peking should remain the capital and centre of administrative authority so long as he held the office of President.

It soon appeared that this masterful personage was almost the worst republican who could have been chosen for the post. Trading upon the ignorance of resident Europeans of the great changes which were taking place all round them; securing the financial help of the Great Powers to the extent of many millions sterling, in spite of the protest of the Republican Assembly; surrounding himself as soon as he could with some of the most despicable Chinese agents of the old régime and holding control of his army by strong martial law, Yuan-Shi-Kai constituted himself a dictator of the type of Porfirio Diaz in Mexico or Enver Pasha in Turkey. He was more corrupt and more brutal even than these wretches. And he was favoured, like them, by foreign financiers. They wanted railways, loans, mining concessions and so on. Yuan-Shi-Kai, like his first patron, Li Hung Chang, wanted money and power and the means of extravagance and debauchery. These he could obtain by the aid of his foreign patrons.

It was a sad personal deterioration, and the leaders of the republican party, Hwang Hsiu and Sun Yat Sen, both real patriots, the one a soldier and the other a statesman and a philosopher, made a great mistake when they gave way to Yuan at the beginning of his mischievous Presidential career. A reign of terror began. All the old machinery of delation, torture and execution, which had been set in motion by the Dowager Empress, was furbished up afresh and put to full use by Yuan. His opponents were forced to flee the country

to save their lives. Hwang and Sun Yat Sen took refuge in Japan, while Yuan pursued his course for a time unchecked. The foreigners in China still backed Yuan alike locally and in the Press at home. Despotic rule was necessary, they averred, for the benefit of the Chinese themselves.

Happily for the Republic and for the future of China, Yuan, not contented with the substance of despotic power, yearned for its shadow as well. He wished to establish a new dynasty at Peking, of which he and his son should become the first and second Emperors. That was too much for the new spirit of the Chinese. Revolt followed upon revolt, province after province seceded from Yuan's Presidency. Opposition sprang up from every quarter. This resistance was an even more remarkable evidence of the growth of sound public opinion among these hundreds of millions of people than the expulsion of the Manchus. Though Yuan drew back from his attempt to ascend the Imperial throne, his failure was complete and his death probably came at a fortunate time for himself.

Notwithstanding the outbreaks in various localities and the disposition of some of the provinces to maintain an independence scarcely compatible with the federative policy of the Republic, the founders of the new Government, and in particular its chief guiding spirit, Sun Yat Sen, are confident that this form of political organisation is best suited to the character and disposition of their countrymen and will succeed. Unquestionably, if the Republic can be maintained, with sufficient military and moral backing to ensure freedom from external interference, this will be best for China herself and for those who have the closest relations with her. That Sun Yat Sen and many of his friends know Europe and America well and that leading military and naval commanders share their opinions as to the policy

to be adopted, gives great hope for the future. The danger of the success of further European designs of partition is reduced, first by the development of China herself, next by the weakening of the Western Powers engaged in the Great War, and then by the certainty that any attempt at interference by force or threat of force would at once bring in Japan on the side of China.

The ambitions of this last formidable nation are the worst danger that threatens China's independence, and Chinese statesmen must already be only too well aware of this. The World War has strengthened Japan's position as regards all other Powers to an extent that is not as yet fully comprehended in Europe. Confidence in Japan's loyalty and pacific intentions is, in my opinion, entirely misplaced. Japan is the Germany of the East, and China is only the first nation to experience how much she has learnt from her European prototype in statecraft and strategy. This will be seen more clearly when I treat of the general policy of Japan before and during the war. Those European statesmen and publicists, therefore, who were foolish enough to aid and abet Yuan-Shi-Kai in his nefarious plottings against the Chinese Republic, and thus weakened the Republic's capacity to resist pressure from without, are largely responsible for the following demands categorically made by Japan upon China after the capture of Tsing-tau and the occupation of Kiau-Chau. Germany was very soon and very easily disposed of in the Far East, and a small English brigade from India took part in the assault upon the German fortress. But no sooner was Japan in possession than China found that the important port and district which had been "leased" to the Empire at a distance was now exclusively at the disposal of the still more dangerous Empire close by, whatever promises the latter might have previously

made. Directly Japan knew that the European nations were involved in so huge and lasting a war that it gave her a free hand in the East, and the moment she found that the United States neither would nor could check her, she made the following amazing demands upon China:

Jan. 18, 1915.

"The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly relations and good neighbourhood existing between the two nations, agree to the following articles:—

I.

"Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.

"Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the Province of Shantung and along its coast, no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pretext.

"Article 3. The Chinese Government consents to Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kaio-chou-Tsinanfu Railway.

"Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself as soon as possible certain important cities and ports in the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports. What places shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate agreement.

II.

"The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the

special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles:—

"Article 1. The two Contracting Powers mutually agree that the term of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term of the lease of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung Mukden Railway shall be extended to cover a period of 99 years.

"Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

"Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

"Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Japanese subjects the right of opening mines in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly.

"Article 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Government's consent shall be first obtained before action is taken:—

(*a*) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a third Power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia.

(*b*) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia.

"Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chinese Government employs political, financial or military advisers in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government shall be first consulted.

"Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control and management of the Kisiu-Changchun Railway shall be handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this agreement.

III.

"The Japanese and Chinese Governments seeing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Company have close relations with each other at present, and desiring that the common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the following articles:—

"Article 1. The two contracting parties mutually agree that when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations, and they further agree that, without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of whatsoever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Company to dispose freely of the same.

"Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Company, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Company; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any undertaking which it is apprehended may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of the said Company shall first be obtained.

IV.

"The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of China, agree to the following special article:—

"The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China.

V.

"Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

"Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

"Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police which caused no little misunder-

standing, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese police service.

"Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent. or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government) or that there shall be established in China a jointly-worked Sino-Japanese arsenal. Japanese experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

"Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chao-Chow.

"Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien Japan shall be first consulted.

"Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in China."

These terms carry their own meaning on the face of them. If accepted in full they involved the subjugation of China to Japan in every respect. China thereafter could move neither hand nor foot within her own borders or in relation to foreign nations without Japan's consent. That possible domination which the European Powers had foreseen and prevented in 1895 would have been quietly accomplished in 1915, twenty years later. Some who know the Far East well hinted at the time that this extraordinary move was made, not with the expectation that it would be successful at the moment, but as a notice to the world at large that "Asia for the Asiatics" had developed into something more than a cry. Also, it was a method of declaring that Japan's

interests in the new Republic were greater than those of all the rest of the nations put together. The matter, as will be seen later, passed almost unnoticed in Europe, and was carefully kept out of sight by the Government of Japan's chief Ally in the West—England.

These terms have never been formally accepted by China, but Japan has acted for the last three years almost as if they had been ratified. Further, by the Treaties of May, 1915, between China and Japan, the latter Power obtained all the advantages the Germans formerly possessed in the Province of Shantung; and no territory or island within this Province "will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any pretext." The whole of Kiau-Chau Bay is to be opened as a Commercial Port, and Japan has the right to a concession under her exclusive jurisdiction. In regard to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, their railways, jurisdiction, etc., as well as Port Arthur and Dalny and the mining areas, Japan gained practically all she asked for.

The only one of the Powers whose remonstrance on the subject has been published, and that almost as if it were an unimportant matter, was the United States, whose despatch, sent both to China and Japan, in May, 1915, ran as follows:

"In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which have taken place or which are now pending between the Government of China and the Government of Japan and the agreements which have been reached and the results thereof, the Government of the United States has the honour to notify the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of

China or the international policy commonly known as the Open Door policy."

Whether eventually this will have an effect upon Japanese policy remains to be seen. So far the position between China and Japan in relation to the original demands remains as stated. And, indeed, the situation is still more serious than it is described to be above. Japan, beyond all question, has been using her position as the Ally of the Western Powers and the United States to obtain final control not merely of the province of Shantung, which the capture of Tsing-tau and the demand for the Tsing-tau—Tsinan railway puts entirely at her mercy, but to place the whole of China under Japanese domination. This policy of interpenetration of the vast territory of the Chinese Republic is being carried out by an admixture of financial, diplomatic and military aggression—there is no other description of Japan's proceedings which will meet the case. The demands of January 18th, 1915, are being forced upon China in far more stringent shape than those which at first were presented by Japan to the European Powers as the real text. Thus the heavy loans at fully 8 per cent. interest forced upon the President of the Republic, and the stipulations by which they were accompanied in regard to railways, transport, general trade and munitions, are quite on the lines laid down by German banks before the war, when loans were granted for the purpose of gaining industrial and commercial supremacy in any country.

But there is scarcely any need for these loans which, from the economic standpoint, Japan is really in no condition to make. Her diplomatic demands, if supported by military occupation of Chinese territory, are quite sufficient to give Japan the absolute mastery of the hundreds of millions of people and all the vast resources of the Flowery Land which she has coveted

ever since 1894-5. "China for the Japanese" is the policy now being pursued with a relentless persistence which all the forces of the Allies may be unable to check, unless they at once collectively call a halt to the Government of Japan and follow up protest and remonstrance by vigorous action.

The Chinese know well what is being prepared for them. They are quite well aware that while the Allies have been defeating the Germany of Europe, China is being sacrificed to the possible Germany of Asia. We are told in a Japanese official organ that "the solution of China's problem is of great importance to Japan and has little to do with Great Britain." That is plain speaking, certainly, in regard to a Power with which a Treaty is in existence formally guaranteeing equal rights in China. The "true" solution is propounded by the writer when he advocates, over and above compliance with the twenty-one demands: the abolition of the Republican form of government; Japanese administrators to the number of several thousands in all the important posts, exercising complete control over China's diplomatic administration and military affairs; Japanese schools throughout China; a Treaty to be concluded embracing all these points.

The effect of Japanese policy, when carried through to completion, will be nothing short of the absorption of the whole of China into the sphere of Japanese influence. Even the advance of the Japanese troops into Siberia is already being made use of in order to strengthen the claims of Japan to permanent control of the entire Eastern portion of that great province.

A further brief summary of what is being achieved by this systematic invasion of China on the same lines that were followed in regard to Korea may open the eyes of Great Britain, the United States and France, the three European Powers now most closely interested

—Russia being incapable of definite action for some time to come—to the very serious danger that may shortly confront Europe in the Far East. Of course, if China were welcoming Japanese control and Japanese rule as beneficial to the Chinese themselves Europeans could only accept that position, though it is in direct contravention of all existing Treaties. But, notoriously, this is not the case. The Chinese distrust and dislike the Japanese and have not the slightest desire to see Japan handling their vast population, in order to extend still farther the ambitious plans of the most important Japanese statesmen.

Here is what is being aimed at and will be obtained, unless European Powers come to the aid of China. First, the highly important Province of Shantung, so situated that, with the command of its ports and its existing railway connections in Japanese hands, it becomes a permanent menacing threat to the independence of Northern China. In place of Germany, with her military and naval bases thousands of miles away, China will have now to face an Asiatic Power with its military and naval bases close at hand; with an army already in occupation of very important strategical posts, and with a knowledge of Chinese conditions and Chinese politics which no European country can hope to rival.

But this is only a beginning. The whole of South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, magnificent recruiting grounds for the Japanese army, with fine resources of their own, would become, to all intents and purposes, integral portions of the Japanese Empire on the mainland. Then the Valley of the Yang-tse-Kiang, with its enormous mineral wealth, and incalculable possibilities of economic and social development, would pass exclusively into the hands of the Japanese. The position thus acquired could not but strengthen enormously the

whole Japanese plan of commercial, industrial and administrative control. For, once in occupation of this great region, Japan would be able to cut China in two and foment systematically the differences between Southern and Northern China, already existing, until she could come in as the "saviour" of both from internecine anarchy.

China, by herself, moreover, will be deprived of all possible chance of resistance. Japan takes care of that. Modern war is a function of industry. The industries of peace must at once be transformed into industries for war. Where this is not possible munitions must be brought in from without. Russia is a crucial example of the truth of that. China, if let alone, would, almost certainly, in view of dangers ahead, set to work to establish important war industries of her own. This, in fact, is what she has already begun to do. But this policy on the part of China, if pushed farther, might endanger Japan's coming supremacy. Therefore, it is to be enacted, under these claims from the Island Empire, that Japan shall have sole control over all the munitions of war that China may need.

Then there is the provision and control of police over large districts of China. This is of great importance, in order to maintain peace and provide prosperity for vast populations. So these police are to be not Chinese but Japanese. Obviously, such police would be entitled to bear arms, for the purpose of defending themselves and other people: a peaceful army of permanent occupation in fact.

On the top of all these Japanese reforms conducted in Chinese interest with forced Chinese consent is to be imposed the most tremendous bureaucracy of which the world has yet heard. The thousands of Japanese administrators, already claimed as essential, would pervade and dominate every department of

China. Her whole Government would be Japanese. Her political, her financial, her military affairs would be wholly and solely carried on by imported foreigners from Japan, who would leave to the Chinese no such local rights to manage their own business as even the Manchu dynasties conceded. Consequently, China, within a generation or so, would become thoroughly Japanese. And, of course, nobody would have the slightest right to interfere, any more than they have in Korea at the present time. Asia for the Asiatics. China for the Japanese. A doctrine of exclusion of all foreigners except the Japanese is part of this vast scheme which the exigencies of the Great War have hidden from Western Europe. It is impossible, in my opinion, to exaggerate the importance of what is steadily going on. We are talking of peace, permanent peace, of a League of Nations, of the universal brotherhood of man. And all the time a poor but well-peopled, well-trained, well-disciplined and most ambitious Empire at the other side of the world has prepared a plan of annexation for a huge contiguous Republic with some 400,000,000 of inhabitants which, under her guidance, will at no distant date become by far the most powerful State in the world.

This may be inevitable, though I do not think it is. But if Great Britain, the United States and France allow China to be placed under Japanese rule, as Korea is already, then, in my opinion, the prospects for peace in the not remote future will scarcely have been improved by the defeat of Germany.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA FOR THE CHINESE

WHEN European writers and speakers treat of China and her development they almost invariably do so from a purely selfish point of view. They are eager to "open up" China in order to sell their goods at a profit; they are anxious to spread their religion in order to extend the influence of their own ideas. Chinese statesmen and the Chinese people may be quite right, nevertheless, in declaring that both foreign trades and foreign religions shall only be introduced into their own territory under such restrictions as they may see fit to impose. The history of the opium traffic, the seizure of large portions of their country by the foreign traders, and the rush for concessions to be held and managed by strangers from without have taught the Chinese a lesson.

So far as Europe is concerned, while intercourse with foreigners is growing and their help in certain directions is not refused, the determination that China shall be mistress in her own country, which was strongly expressed under the Manchus, is certainly not weakening under the Republic. In considering, therefore, the remarkable and rapid economic changes which are now taking place in that Empire it is well to bear in mind that they do not in any way interfere with the demand of "China for the Chinese." Nor should we overlook the fact that, much as the Chinese dislike the Japanese and resent the success which they have achieved and the manner in which, by war and diplomacy, they have

secured large portions of Chinese territory, yet Asiatics have a capacity for understanding and acting with Asiatics that Europeans can never fathom. The Chinese have no desire whatever to come under Japanese rule—far from it. They have seen what that means in Korea, where tyranny and cruelty of the most atrocious character have been practised in the name of civilisation, order and humanity. The methods of suppression used in Formosa towards the Chinese settled in that island have been no better; though the conditions in this case rendered harsh action possibly more excusable. But, in spite of all this, were it to come to a choice between European partition and Japanese ascendency, there is little doubt which would have the preference.

Meanwhile China is adopting Western improvements to such an extent that a vast economic and social revolution is being brought about, similar to that which has taken place in Japan, though on different lines. The great European War has compelled the Chinese to rely upon themselves for certain of their internal developments which foreigners had formerly carried out for them. The Great War has, in fact, extended its influence to China even in industrial affairs. But just as Japan, while at first using European methods, contrived to turn them eventually into means for ousting the foreigner; so the Chinese, who, at first, were far more under the control of white men than their rivals of the Island Empire, are now proceeding in the same direction. Complete emancipation is their object. The Chinese would rather slacken progress than purchase increased rapidity of development by submission to European or American capitalists.

Since the Boxer rising the construction of railways, instead of being hampered, has been favoured by the

principal central and local authorities. This came about although the revolution against the Manchus was partly fostered by denunciation of the nationalisation, or centralisation, of railways then being attempted. The people also are steadily losing their prejudices against railways, as the injury done to local industries and transport agencies is, they find, compensated in other directions. In spite of costly financing and the bad conduct of the foreign managers in some instances, the 5,000 miles of railways built and running in China have achieved a greater financial success than has ever been attained in any country. According to the latest statistics, the profits upon the Peking and Mukden Railway, *after deducting 5 per cent. upon the capital embarked,* amounted to upwards of 18½ per cent. for the year 1913. The year before the net earnings on a similar basis were 19½ per cent. on the total capital.

A yet more remarkable instance of success from the first is the section of the railway from Peking to Sinyuan, a distance of 400 miles. The section, Peking-Kalgan, already built, consists of 125 miles, much of it through exceptionally difficult country. It was constructed and financed entirely by the Chinese themselves; and, even on this portion, without any of the through traffic which will hereafter be secured, it earns already 20 per cent. upon the capital employed. Similar satisfactory results are being obtained on the Peking-Hankow railway. In fact, everywhere in China the railways are a great financial success. No wonder, therefore, that the Chinese, apart from their desire to exclude foreigners as far as possible from railway management, should be anxious to obtain complete control for themselves. This they have done as far as they can. But the prices they have had to pay, to recover possession of the lines granted by concession

to outsiders, have, of course, immensely reduced the average of interest obtainable by the purchasers.

That the policy of acquisition is fully justified is clearly shown by the fact that, even during the revolution and the period of unsettlement which followed under the Republic, such surprising results were obtained. Moreover, amid all the turmoil, the Chinese railway employees worked steadily on, without any regard to the political disturbance, though the railways themselves were largely used for the transport of the troops necessary to secure the victory of the Republicans over the Manchus. And the construction of the designed railways proceeded almost as if the most crucial revolution in the history of the Empire were not going on at all. The recent war, having completely shut off the supply of foreign capital and skilled foreign aid, on the concessions granted to outsiders, has forced the Chinese to carry out their improvements themselves, and they are constructing railways in more than one district by Chinese engineers, Chinese managers and Chinese labour exclusively. The lack of capital from abroad slackens the rate of progress but does not stop it altogether. Thus the Chinese will now be able, while making use of foreign capital when needed, to impose restrictions which, at the beginning of their railway construction policy, were difficult, if not impossible, to enforce.

Another example of what can be done by native effort is the San Ming Railway in one of the districts south-west of Canton. Here a line has been projected, carried out and a township built quite in accordance with the most modern European ideas of local development. The railway starts from Kung Yik Fou, which occupied a site covered only by rice-fields when the surveyors selected it as the ground for the erection of a township. Within two years this new terminus was

laid out with straight, well-lit asphalted streets. Buildings of solid construction were erected, with shops, offices, etc., as well as a large hotel. A big commercial centre is growing, connected by the railway with the sea and opening up the delta of the river. The whole was planned, built and financed by the Chinese themselves. Similar changes are being brought about in many directions, and factories, ironworks, etc., are being established and managed successfully entirely by Chinese.

One notable point about the Chinese railways is the extraordinary financial success they have achieved, in spite of the fact that the ordinary roads throughout the Empire are some of the worst in the world. The vastly improved postal system seems to have had little effect so far in creating and keeping up good public highways. Now in Great Britain and most European countries fairly good roads had been gradually made between the main cities and towns long prior to the construction of the railways. These were introduced because the highroads for horse vehicles were found to be quite insufficient to meet the demands of increasing traffic, and canals, though much cheaper for freight than either common roads or railways, were exceedingly slow for transit and were never adequately developed.

In China this has not been the case at all. Roads were practically non-existent. And, though China has some of the finest canals in the world, built in the old days, they have not been extended for generations. Railways, therefore, were introduced into this densely-peopled country almost under similar conditions to those prevailing in new territories. Ordinary roads have to be constructed to lead up to the railroads, and as this is done and the railways themselves are extended to connect all the main centres of trade, it seems impossible to over-estimate the traffic which will grow

up for the purpose of internal supply, without considering foreign trade at all. Natural as it may be that foreigners of all nationalities and all races should be eager to take advantage of the openings afforded for commerce with this vast population, they will soon learn that China has within herself such immense resources of all kinds, and extends over such widely different climates, that at need she could easily supply all her wants and find all her own markets, without reference to any other nation whatever.

Thus, at the present time, the Chinese are so short of fuel that hot water is a great luxury. Unlike the Japanese, the poorer classes in China can hardly ever get hot baths, though when these are readily obtainable, as at Singapore and other places to which the Chinese emigrate, they take to them naturally enough. But when the enormous coal supply is opened up, here is a vast market at hand for internal heating of all kind. The railways, the new industries, Chinese vessels on the sea and along the canals, will create an enormous demand for all this coal. And the province of Shansi alone has been estimated by first-rate authorities to contain enough workable coal to last, taking account of any conceivable increase in its use, for upwards of 1,000 years. The huge national coal supply, of which this one province is only part, will shortly be developed and connected with the great cities and most populous districts by railway, and thenceforward we may expect to see China enter upon yet another remarkable phase in its great history.

It is not likely that the Chinese will take up speedily the co-operative phase of industry. The economic circumstances and social environment have not yet reached the stage where this is possible. In all probability a considerable period of competition must come, as in Japan and Europe, before such a transformation

can be brought about. During this period the Chinese will be themselves most formidable competitors on the markets of the world. More formidable even than the Japanese if they work independently. Most formidable of all if they work in combination with those islanders—which is by no means unlikely.

For the Chinese in their own country, as abroad, are the most persistent and indefatigable toilers the world has ever seen. Like the English, they are content to be wage-slaves, so long as they get what they consider to be good pay. They are ready to work long hours in factories at rates of wages which the European labourer of similar capacity would scoff at. By universal admission, in all grades of employment, they are proving themselves little, if at all, inferior to their white compeers. My own opinion, from what I have seen of them outside China, is that, so long as they are decently treated and bargains made with them are strictly fulfilled, they are capable, trustworthy and thoroughly well-behaved. Yet the Chinese who emigrate to America, Australia, etc., are quite the lower grade of the general Chinese population.

The effect of the war upon China's foreign policy has been much greater than was at first anticipated. Though Japan, acting strictly in accordance with her understandings and treaties with Great Britain, declared herself at once on the side of the Allies against Germany, and rendered them excellent service in the Pacific and by the provision of munitions, there seemed every probability that the Republic of China would be able to maintain a strict neutrality, tempered only by Japanese high-handed diplomacy. The Germans did all they could to ensure the continuance of China's neutrality and to render it as benevolent as possible towards themselves. They relied for success, not only upon the great influence which their agents had obtained

by timely loans to the reactionary section of the new Republicans, but also upon an elaborate propaganda conducted in their favour throughout the Provinces, at an expense relatively almost comparable to the huge sums spent for the like purpose by Count Bernstorff in the United States.

But it seemed impossible for Germany, under her Imperial Dynasty, to act with good faith, or even ordinary prudence, towards neutrals with whom it was her interest as well as her apparent wish to ingratiate herself. Consequently, after the most earnest efforts, attended by some success, to persuade the Chinese that the rebellious tribes on the frontier of the French possessions were armed and supported by the French Republic, the Germans, by their piratical policy at sea, destroyed at a blow everything they had done to impress the Chinese Government with their vast power and unfailing success. Though the President himself, like his predecessor, was disinclined to take an active part in the war, the popular sentiment was too strong for him, and he was compelled by Parliament to break off diplomatic relations with the Central Powers, to declare war upon them, and to follow up this policy by strong action against German citizens and German property in China.

Thus China, the oldest and most populous Empire in the world, just converted into a modern political Republic, took its stand with its rival and recent enemy, Japan, side by side with the European Allies and the United States of America in the world-wide war. It may be that this step on the part of China will be regarded in time to come as by no means the least important event in the history of the stupendous conflict which has devastated Europe. East and West, China, Japan and India, by Germany's mad tactics of outrage and piracy, were brought into alliance not only with

Europe but with America. It was Sun Yat Sen, the Washington of China, the man to whom more than any other the Chinese Republic owes its foundation in the first instance as well as its consolidation after Yuan-Shi-Kai's harmful policy and death, who sent congratulations on behalf of 350,000,000 of educated and peaceful Asiatics, to the Republic of the United States when the President of America was also forced into war. The fact that in this way all the greatest civilised nations on the globe, outside the Central Powers, have become entitled to a share in the common settlement of affairs, gives great hope that any economic and social antagonisms which may arise will be harmonised and a collision averted between the white races and the growing forces of Asia.

At the present time the United Kingdom possesses one-half of the total foreign trade with China. Nearly all the discussion in our Press turns on the problem of how the English are to retain this overwhelming superiority in the face of German, American and Japanese competition. Germany is for the time being out of the fray, but only for the time being. America is greatly troubled by the "closing of the open door" through Japan's action during the war. Japan herself is using her military and naval strength, as well as her superior capacity, for interpenetration of China, due to her knowledge of the Chinese language and easy adaptability to Chinese habits and customs, to steal a march upon all the white men, Allies and enemies alike, intending to obtain an ultimate monopoly of Chinese external commerce. It is capitalist antagonism of the most acute character, in which, to all appearance, Japan will eventually come out the winner, so far as her European competitors are concerned. Her "spheres of influence," as already seen, have immensely extended since August, 1914: her commercial progress more than

keeps pace with her military, naval and diplomatic success. But even more difficult to cope with in years to come will be Chinese internal production. The cotton trade, in particular, is one in which China may easily suffice for herself. Nor, to judge by what is taking place already, need she fear that in the manufacture of iron and steel she must long be dependent upon foreign supplies. In fact, the competition which is most to be feared in the Chinese trade is that from China herself, and no long time may elapse before Lancashire has to ponder this truth very seriously. Whether the decay and ruin of the factory industry in Lancashire and Yorkshire would really be disadvantageous to Great Britain as a whole is another matter.

The Japanese Premier and Count Ushida have recently laid stress upon the renewed strength of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and have declared that Japan has no desire whatever for territorial expansion. They do not disguise, however, that they wish to obtain commercial domination, in certain directions, even should they return Shantung and Tsing-Tau to China. That the Chinese do not feel very safe, in spite of these assurances, is certain. It is unreasonable to expect that they should. The demands made by Japan in 1915 have still not been withdrawn, nor, so far as at present appears, does the Peace Conference intend to meddle in this matter. Meanwhile, China is divided into two conflicting sections. These two parties of the North and South are meeting in conference, and it is hoped by patriotic Chinese that some satisfactory arrangement for common action will be come to; the rather that Japan is accused of fomenting the discord in her own interest. Until an understanding is arrived at, the talk of the nominal President at Peking with European interviewers goes for little or nothing.

Much as we may admire the ability and statecraft by

which Japan has acquired her eminent position in the Far East, it is well to have no illusions as to her fundamental policy. Japan is a warlike, China is a peaceful, power. Japan, even now, is a very poor country. China is rich, and possesses incalculable resources for the creation of wealth. Japan regards China as her treasure-house of raw materials for her industries, as they exist at present; the market for her industries as they may be in the near future; and the ideal country in which she can exercise her great powers of organisation and development later on. China feels confident that, if given fair play, she can open up, connect by road and railway, administer and co-ordinate her own vast and wealthy territories for herself. But she is at present in no position to resist the claims of Japan to exercise exceptional authority, and to obtain unprecedented privileges within the borders of China, unless she has support from without. In view of what has happened since 1895, China may well be excused for not accepting verbal engagements as binding, should there be—as there undoubtedly is—very strong reason on Japan's side for breaking them.

Whatever may be said, therefore, as to the value of the Anglo-Japanese Treaties, which, unless renewed, come to an end in 1921, it is obviously not to the interest of China herself, of Great Britain, or of the United States, to say nothing of France and other European Powers, that Japan should carry on a similar policy towards China to that which she has so successfully completed in regard to Korea. China is greatly alarmed at Japanese ambition and her astute methods of "peaceful penetration," supported always by powerful forces on land and on sea. China under the complete control of Japan would be as great a danger as the German mastery of Central and Eastern Europe to permanent peace, League of Nations or no League of Nations.

CHAPTER IX

THE GROWTH OF JAPAN

THE development of Japan in the course of the past forty years has been something altogether unprecedented in human history. Even Europeans who witnessed, close at hand, the changes that were taking place, by no means fully appreciated what was going on under their own eyes. The transformation from feudalism to modern capitalism, which has not been achieved in the most advanced European countries within a period of four hundred years, was accomplished in Japan in a tenth part of that time. From first to last the whole story has been most dramatic. A people described, not fifty years ago, by one of the shrewdest of our ambassadors as "highly intelligent children," became, between 1870 and 1910, one of the great Powers of the world : fighting, negotiating, treaty-making, manufacturing, trading on at least equal terms with European nations, from whom in that short space of time they had learnt all the essentials of modern military and industrial life.

That this is only a beginning all now understand and not a few fear. The more so that this rapid rise in strength, as the ablest Japanese writers point out, has, strictly speaking, been accomplished by no revolution. There have been great risings, desperate civil wars, extraordinary class displacements, a complete overthrow of "Mayors of the Palace," more influential than any of the vice-kings who held sway in France. Yet the same royal family of divine descent, whose members have sat as Mikado in direct succession on the

Imperial throne for unnumbered centuries, holds unchallenged rule to-day. The removal of the monarch has apparently never been thought of. His godlike supremacy remains the most permanent, unchangeable feature in all the varied movements of Japanese growth. His sacred autocracy, carefully concealed by political and parliamentary forms, remains, and is likely to remain, as fully accepted in practice by the sceptical Japanese scholar, who returns from his European studies versed in all the science and culture of the West, as by the least educated coolie who pulls along a rickshaw.

The concentration of Japanese patriotism on the supreme ruler, and the worship of ancestry and ancestors, as if ever present at all times in the life and death of the organisers and defenders of the country, give to the Japanese not only in military but in civil affairs an ardour of personal service, where the interests of the nation are involved, which is quite unequalled in any modern State. Not even Germany, with its organised cult of Kaiser, State and Fatherland right or wrong, showed such devotion to the ideal of national success and pre-eminence as Japan. And apparently the full development of the great faculties which underlay the old Japanese civilisation has by no means yet been reached. Every step taken forward is carefully utilised in order to ensure with safety the next advance. If the desired end can be achieved peacefully, so much the better; but the preparations for war, should peace negotiations fail, are never relaxed. If, therefore, China with her vast resources and immense population of industrious, educated, peace-loving toilers may in the future become the leading nation of the whole world, it cannot be disputed that for many years to come Japan will remain the leading nation of the Far East.

So complete a library of books on the history of Japan has been compiled by Japanese, European and American writers of late years that it is possible to survey the progress of the country in the past and its position in the present from almost every point of view. The Japanese themselves reckon their modern annals from the visit of Commodore Perry's American squadron in 1853. At that date they had been shut out from foreign intercourse, foreign settlement and foreign trade for a period of fully two hundred years. This policy of exclusion was due to the outrageous attempts of the Jesuits and other Catholic orders to obtain political domination in the Island Empire. Only the Chinese, and the Dutch to a very limited extent, were exceptions to this complete boycott of outsiders.

Thus for seven entire generations Japan had sufficed for herself and had developed her social system independent of any external influence whatsoever. Since, during this period, her people had been on the whole prosperous and had greatly increased in numbers; since, also, the great Togowara family, which held the real government of the country under the atrophied supremacy of the Mikado, had produced a series of able men to act as vice-kings over the great feudal nobility; since, likewise, the fate of India and the ruthless attacks of Europeans upon China were not unknown to Japanese rulers and learned men—it is not surprising that when Commodore Perry demanded, more than sixty years ago, that the country should be opened to American intercourse, he met with a cool reception and a plain "No." The civil wars occasioned by Christian intrigues and politico-religious enterprise, when hundreds of splendid old temples were burnt down and thousands of Japanese were killed and wounded on both sides, had left too deep a mark on Japan to be forgotten. Fear of a renewal of such imported troubles

from another side naturally influenced the Japanese in their attitude toward the white new-comers from the United States, whom they, of course, associated with Europeans.

But the American envoy was shrewd as well as firm and dexterous. On his second visit in the following year his prospects of success were much greater. In the meantime, the whole question had been carefully discussed by the Japanese, and her leading men had come to the conclusion that Japan could not permanently seclude herself from the outside world. The only thing to be done was to keep such fateful intercourse within the narrowest possible limits. It was clear that the American Commodore and envoy did not intend to put up with a refusal. He had the means for enforcing his demands at his disposal. Therefore the cautious but clever people with whom he was dealing arranged in a friendly manner a question which might otherwise have been decided by force of arms. Japan in 1854 was again opened to some extent to foreign trade and settlement. America was acting not only for herself but for all civilised countries. Not even yet, perhaps, do we fully appreciate the meaning of this step. A completely new element was then introduced into the politics of the Far East and of the world at large.

I was talking many years ago to my friend the well-known American geographer and engineer, the late Colonel Church, about the possible action of Japan and China, when they understood their own strength, and had adopted and applied the methods of Western Europe to military and industrial development, in the islands and on the mainland. In the course of our conversation he said: "When I was encamped on the head waters of the Amazon, travelling down from Bolivia in 1869, I saw a queer, clumsy animal busily

licking up the ants which were working round the base of a big ant-heap. The ants inside paid no attention to the fate of their fellows. This went on for some time, and the depredator was doing exceedingly well. Suddenly it occurred to him that, although there were so many ants outside, there must be a great many more within. So he made full use of his forepaws and broke down the heap. Within two hours his bones were whitening in the sun.

"And that will finally be the fate of the white races if they try to break up the human ant-heap of the swarming East."

Little did the Americans imagine, when they broke in upon reluctant Japan, that they might be providing China and all Asia, and its hundreds of millions of people, with precisely that warlike leadership they need in any difficulties which may arise between the East and West in the near future. The two hundred years of seclusion had created among a large section of the people of Japan a spirit of warlike fellowship, of personal sacrifice and individual devotion unprecedented in our knowledge of the East. With these qualities were combined a capacity for accepting new ideas, imitating foreign inventions and institutions, and adapting the latest appliances to their own needs which, likewise, had never before been seen in Asia. Nothing of this was known either to Europeans or to the Japanese themselves when that first step which counts was taken by the United States in Japan. Since then the carapace of the ant-heap has been fractured in earnest.

In 1856, with the consent of the Shogun and the acquiescence of the great Daimyos, the first American Consul was allowed to establish his Consulate at Shimoda and a commercial treaty was signed. Other commercial treaties were shortly afterwards concluded with England, France, Russia and other countries.

There was still a very strong opposition to this course in Japan. But resistance to the Shogun Government and its feudal supporters was relentlessly put down for the time being, and the treaties were confirmed and enforced by authority.

Thus, following up the lead given by America, European nations were not slow to push their trade in the opening afforded. As usual, foreigners thought that if they were not welcome to the Japanese they ought to be, and, assuming all those airs of superiority, and displaying the congenial rudeness so specially offensive to courteous and polite people such as the Japanese, they quickly stirred up a bitter feeling against themselves. This brought about a confused massacre of Europeans at the Treaty Ports already opened, within six years of the inauguration of the new policy. Such methods of exhibiting racial dislike are, of course, not in accordance with the comity of nations. Civilised countries make little allowance for these sudden ebullitions of dislike, accompanied by disorderly homicide, at the expense of their own people, no matter how much provocation may have been given—always provided that, as was then the case with Japan, the offending nationality is much the weaker party. Where strength is displayed on the other side a less stringent diplomacy is generally used.

The cause of the outbreak, on this occasion, was the high-handed action of Russia in reference to the island of Saghalien, which by right belonged to Japan. Therefore the Japanese Government appealed for help to Great Britain and other foreign powers against Russia. This in turn gave rise to a furious agitation amounting almost to a civil war between the two native sections: those who favoured such invitations to the objectionable foreigner and those who regarded this action by the Japanese Government as derogatory to

the nation. From an attack upon their countrymen who desired foreign aid and were ready to extend foreign privileges, the disturbance spread to an assault by the reactionary or patriotic mob on the foreigners themselves. Many of these were killed or injured. Their respective Governments demanded immediate apology and compensation from the Shogun and his administration, who still constituted the *de facto* Government of Japan. The Japanese authorities were unable or unwilling to meet the demands of the foreign Powers, on account of outrages committed by a set of people, who were, in fact, in revolt against the policy which the Shogun himself had initiated and carried out. They not unreasonably disclaimed responsibility for acts directed quite as much against themselves as against the foreigners who, incidentally, suffered severely. The Powers, however, possibly with equal justice, claimed that a Government capable of making Treaties in the name of the nation could not evade its obligations, if subjects of the countries involved were killed or wounded, while acting within the strict limits of their Treaty rights.

In the end controversy ceased and bombardment by European vessels began. Japan was bombarded at Kagoshima in 1862, and then by Great Britain, the United States and France, at Shimonoseki in 1863, and, having no means of making effective reply, was forced to give way. Foreign troops were landed, and Japan, which had been immune from hostile invasion since the complete failure of the expedition dispatched against her by the great Chinese Emperor known to us as Kublai Khan, was threatened under conditions where resistance was hopeless. It was a terrible lesson. Its full meaning was not lost either upon the reformers or the reactionaries of Japan. The Japanese, however skilful and courageous they might be in the use of their own native weapons, saw that they could have no chance

whatever of holding their own, still less of defeating Europeans, on land or on sea, until they themselves possessed European means of offence and destruction. What China only began to see in 1895 and 1900 the leaders of Japan grasped more than thirty years earlier.

Such was the second great step in the advance of this almost unknown Asiatic country to its now recognised position in the East. Astute as were the statesmen who took an active part in the removal of the Shogun in 1868, and the restoration of the almost powerless Emperor to the long-forgotten active domination, which, in theory, still belonged to the Mikado, we cannot believe that they had any idea of the results which would follow from this remarkable political resurrection.

Nevertheless, we can now discern that they took the only possible course by which their country could deal adequately with the new policy, and safely introduce the period of reorganisation and adaptation rendered essential by European intervention. Thus they so modified Japanese internal arrangements that one of the greatest political, social and military transformations the world has ever seen was carried through with comparatively little civil warfare. It was practically impossible to make this wholesale change without any open antagonism or violent strife. The marvel is that all resistance to the new order of things should have been so promptly suppressed, and suppressed, too, by national troops, who had none of the traditional aptitude and cultivated chivalry of the rebel Samurai to whom they were opposed. Even more remarkable was the behaviour of the Daimyos, or great feudal dignitaries and these Samurai themselves, in voluntarily giving up their ancient privileges and pensions in order to ensure the success of the constitutional régime under the quasi-autocracy of the Mikado. That a dominant

caste should thus peacefully surrender its ancestral position, for the benefit of a system of government which its members could scarcely appreciate, is an example of patriotic self-sacrifice previously unknown.

What was in effect a revolution in Japan—the surrender of the Shogunate by the last of the Shoguns and the downfall of the feudal system—is referred to by the Japanese themselves as a "Restoration" of Imperial Powers which had fallen into desuetude in the course of hundreds of years. During these long centuries the Mikado had always been nominally the supreme authority, and the Shoguns themselves claimed to derive their own delegated power from him and not from any hereditary succession of their own. Owing partly to the action of Sir Henry Parkes, the British Ambassador at the time of the confirmation of the Treaties with foreign countries, the representative of the long line of Mikados, with all his afflatus of divine origin, was literally dug up from seclusion and endowed with fresh Imperial vigour. On April 11th, 1868, this policy was definitely carried out with even less difficulty than attended the displacement of James II. by William III. and his Hanoverian successors in Great Britain. Though for a short time there was vigorous fighting, no Pretenders arose thereafter to challenge the right and position of the Mikado.

By the oath taken by the late Emperor Mutsuhito in 1868 he, as represented by Prince Ito, undertook to educate the people for their duties as members of a constitutional country. This was done systematically from above as well as by continuous instruction, steadily improving in scope and effectiveness, below. The ablest Japanese politicians and students were sent to Europe and the United States, in order to investigate thoroughly the forms, and give their reports upon the advantages, of the different constitutional systems

accepted in the various States. The whole inquiry was conducted with Aristotelian exactitude, under far more difficult circumstances than those which confronted the great Greek philosopher. There was no attempt at sudden introduction of any cut-and-dried scheme or doctrinaire conception of constitutional government. What after careful consideration could be most advantageously adapted to Japanese manners and customs and thoughts and ideas was taken: the remainder was left. It was a sort of political eclecticism such as had never been attempted in practice before. And, as a learned and experienced Japanese writer has ably put it, the result was that political parties arose before any public Assembly was established. These political parties rendered a Parliament necessary to give expression to the views of the people of whom they were composed. This was directly contrary to what occurred in England, the Mother of Parliaments, where the House of Commons, or Assembly of Burgesses, existed for a long time before political parties in any modern sense arose.

But the Japanese democracy and its political system are very different from any European institution, just as the Japanese "Constitutional Monarchy" is a totally distinct conception of kingship from any that has ever been seen in Europe. The Japanese are Asiatics, and in politics, as in policy, Asiatics they remain. The forms resemble ours: the spirit which underlies them is in nowise the same, nor even similar. However, from this memorable date onwards, the pledge of the late Emperor has throughout been faithfully observed. Great as have been the difficulties and numerous the abuses, internal and external, which Japan has had to face, that undertaking to "educate the people to the requirements of a Constitutional State" has been steadily pursued.

Public opinion is a plant of very slow growth, and, even in the most advanced European nations, its influence is far less powerful than is commonly supposed. There are many ways in which, even where it exists and may advantageously exert itself, public opinion can be deceived or twisted hither and thither by an unscrupulous Government. We have had plenty of examples of that in Europe. But in Japan on really important matters it cannot even yet be said that the people take an intelligent and effective interest in their own affairs; though, as will be seen later, the advanced parties, and in particular the Socialists, have done their utmost to stir up the people to constitutional agitation, in the interests of genuine social and political reform, and recent events point to the achievement of some success in this respect.

In 1871 the feudal system was entirely abrogated, and that cleared the ground for those changes in the local and central administration which brought them into closer relationship with similar institutions in Europe. But ten years passed—a long time with Japan's rate of development—before definite steps were taken to set on foot representative government in anything like the European sense of the term. Eight years more went by before the new Constitution took shape in formal law. In the course of these twenty years from 1868 to 1889 a strong and formidable bureaucracy had grown up on the ruins of the old feudal arrangements. On more than one occasion, notably in relation to Korea in 1873, and upon some suspicious land sales by the Government at a later date, there were popular risings and the demand of political factions for greater freedom of discussion led to serious outbreaks which were severely suppressed.

With the formal promulgation of the Constitution in 1889, followed by the creation of a Second House

and a peerage, Japan entered finally upon her remarkable experiment of the adaptation of Western political institutions to an Asiatic foundation. Its success in general affairs cannot be disputed. But, so far as regards her external policy, and her extraordinary growth of military, naval and commercial strength, those are probably right who say that the constitutional democracy has little real significance; that Japan remains for the present a highly organised and efficient bureaucracy, with a ruler deified by the common people, and a State so consolidated that political manœuvres will never be allowed to interfere with the realisation of national ambitions at home or abroad.

The Constitution, however, as formally proclaimed and now maintained, leaves plenty of openings for democratic development, as the people become accustomed to exercising their political power.

The second object of the Emperor, according to Prince Ito, from 1868 onwards, was "to fortify the nation with the best results and resources of modern civilisation, in order to secure for the country prosperity, strength and culture and the consequent recognised status of membership upon an equal footing in the family of the most powerful and civilised nations of the world." This is as definite a policy as it was possible to enter upon; but it does not appear in the Constitutional Oath itself, and the generalities of the oath certainly do not express these great aspirations so clearly. Probably they grew up as the means for gratifying them were secured.

The progress of Japan has generally followed the lines thus indicated by Prince Ito. But the change has been wrought by extension from military and naval reorganisation to industrial and commercial development. From the first, the old warlike spirit was

cultivated and scientifically used for the purposes of the new era. In her army and navy Japan quietly and persistently adopted all those improvements in discipline, training, material appliances and highly-trained medical and surgical skill which Europe could teach her. Circumstances being as they were, there was no internal opposition to elaborate preparations carried on during many years apparently for provision against foreign attack. The European bombardments were quite sufficient ground for making thoroughly ready to meet any similar attacks in the future. Thus, from 1873 onwards, when universal military service was ordained, Japan, almost unknown even to European observers on the spot, became a formidable adversary on land and on sea. The details of the manner in which her power was built up are of much less interest than the fact that she completely succeeded in the course of twenty years in carrying out all at which her statesmen aimed. When she was ready the results achieved were startling.

Throughout this most important preparatory period, constitutional government was worked up to and eventually established. But in the sixteen years between the establishment of universal military service and the adoption of representative forms of legislation and administration, a conception of national duty, accompanied by a knowledge of growing national strength, had been carefully inculcated among the people and the whole country was inspired, by degrees, with the new warlike enthusiasm, adapted to modern conditions, but based upon the expansion of the old ideals. Several minor issues were raised by action from without, and the success of Japan in obtaining recognition of her international position fortified Japanese statesmen in the line of policy which they were pursuing. Public discussion and the growth of

a newspaper press, backed up by political parties, so far as such parties could then be formed and express collective opinions, tended in the same direction—the consolidation of strong national feeling and a determination to assert the national dignity.

General as well as special education went hand in hand with this wide national policy. Japanese rulers pursued efficiency with all the zeal of the Germans, and without showing at home that coarse militarist brutality which has rendered German discipline a byword in Europe for scientific ruffianism. True, in Korea, Formosa, and on the march to Peking, Japanese soldiers and administrators showed that they were not at all in advance of other militarists, Asiatic or European, in their ruthless dealings with those who stood in their way, civilians or soldiers. But in Japan itself, apparently, the officers behaved with decency towards their own troops, alike in peace as in war; while the great care taken of the soldiers themselves, in all matters relating to their health and well-being, were a lesson to the white men from whom they had originally learnt.

Meanwhile, manufacture and trade and shipping were fostered with the same assiduity as other departments of the national life. Internal development, as will be seen later, kept pace with military training and civilian organisation. No pains were spared to bring Japan in all respects up to the level of those nations which, almost unknown to herself, and wholly disregarded by them, she was beginning to consider as her rivals in the struggle for prosperity, wealth and political influence. Industrial growth followed upon instead of preceding preparation for war. The two hundred years and more of complete seclusion thus formed an introduction to a sudden plunge into the full stream of world polity and world commerce.

"Japan shall make herself" might well have been the motto which the old-new Japan had borrowed from Italy. There was no attempt at secrecy. Far from it. Japan persistently asserted herself, alike before and after the promulgation of the Constitution by the Emperor in 1889. From the first, her people regarded those international arrangements forced upon her by the European Powers, which hindered her complete control over her own affairs and established foreign Courts and accorded foreign privileges in her own territory, as evidence of national inferiority and marks of national degradation.

Japanese statesmen never ceased to press for the fullest recognition of the entirely independent position of Japan, by the revision, or indeed revocation, of all the treaties obtained from her. Count Okuma and Count Aoki, as successive Foreign Ministers, following upon the efforts of Count Inouye with the Powers in 1886, unceasingly demanded that Japan should have entire control over foreigners in the country, should remove foreign judges from Japanese tribunals, should recover her full right to enact her own tariffs and should exclude foreigners from her coasting trade. In short, they demanded that Japan should have precisely the same standing in all international matters as England, France, the United States or Russia. But it was no easy matter to bring this to proper and honourable settlement. Some of the counter-demands made by the foreign Powers now seem quite outrageous.

Those were the days when all Asiatics were regarded as human beings on a much lower plane than Europeans —a sort of half-way creation between the high-minded Caucasian and the fetish-worshipping Hottentot. That an upstart little Empire like Japan should claim equality with great and ancient civilised nations was

a matter not for serious negotiation but for ridicule and contempt. Japan, like China, had been "opened" by bombardment for the benefit not of the Japanese but of Europeans, and it was preposterous that all legitimate advantages gained by force of arms should be given up, merely because the Japanese Government had created a sort of spurious patriotism among the people, who resented the really philanthropic designs of white men from without!

This is really no exaggeration of the tone of the European official negotiators from 1880 onwards, as may be seen from the records on both sides of what took place. The foreign residents in Japan, indeed, took up a position which could only have been justified if Japan had been on the high road to become a conquered country, or at least a subordinate nation under European guarantee and guidance. In spite of the transformation which Japan had already undergone, notwithstanding the extraordinary series of events which had led up to the existing situation, these Asiatic people were still, according to this idea, where they had been fifty years before. Even the Chinese despised the little Japs and put them on much the same level as the barbarous tribes on the Western frontier of their Empire.

Fortunately, after several years of petty diplomatic trafficking, which more than once nearly led to war, Great Britain, and then the other Powers, gave way practically to all Japanese claims. Japan, without resort to arms but by sheer force of reason and good diplomacy, recovered all the control over her own affairs of which she had been deprived.

This relief of Japan from unreasonable foreign intervention was first acknowledged to be just and formulated as a Treaty, by Great Britain, on July 16, 1894—only twenty-five years ago—and other Powers

followed on the same lines. It is noteworthy that in the very same month (on July 25th) the war with China about Korea began. This war with China was the event which partially, but only partially, revealed to Europe the strength of the new Empire that had come to the front in the Far East.

CHAPTER X

JAPAN TRIES HER STRENGTH

THE relations of Japan with Korea extend over many, many centuries, beginning even with the mythical traditions of prehistoric time. Japan was civilised from China through Korea, and it is to Korea that she admittedly owes her most important domestic industries as well as her art. The Japanese themselves recognise fully their indebtedness to the Koreans in these respects; and almost sacred records of the gratitude of the nation to their Chinese and Korean teachers are to be found frequently in Japan to-day. Their influence pervaded the whole of Japanese thought, literature and general development. This did not prevent Japan from completely conquering the country in the third century of the Christian era, and she remained mistress of Korea for several hundred years. Later, all hold upon the mainland was given up, and Japan withdrew to her own territory. But the geographical situation of Korea in relation to Japan is such that, unless the rulers of that nation were friendly and the Japanese could rely upon the support of the Korean Court, difficulties were certain to arise, so soon as the policy of Japan brought her into close contact with the outside world.

Previously, considerable numbers of Chinese and Koreans had settled in Japan and had become recognised members of the community without any friction. This is used as evidence by the Japanese to show that they have no prejudice against the civilised people of the mainland, to whom in days gone by they had owed

so much. But they could not forget that, centuries before, the great invasion of Japan by China in the thirteenth century, which would probably have succeeded but for the intervention of a hurricane, had been organised from Korea. If, therefore, Korea in modern times, under Chinese influence, turned against Japan, or if Russia, now steadily approaching from the West and North, gained the upper hand in the Kingdom of Chusen, then that populous peninsula might become a serious danger to the Island Empire. And Japan, five-and-twenty years ago, was not nearly so confident of her own strength as she naturally is to-day.

Japan thought she could afford to run no risks, should Korea fall under hostile control, native or foreign. Though the Koreans had paid tribute to Japan for several generations, this did not necessarily give the Japanese any hold upon Korea itself; and the Japanese acknowledged it themselves, when, in their first Treaty, they recognised Korea as an independent sovereign State and sent later an Embassy to the Korean capital. Unfortunately, in 1894, a series of outrages were committed by the Koreans in their capital, with the support of their own Government, and at last with the countenance and aid of Chinese troops, under the command of the late President of the Chinese Republic, Yuan-Shi-Kai. This wound up by an attack upon the Japanese Legation at Seoul, which was burnt down. However, war was then averted by the self-restraint of the Japanese Government, which contented itself with very moderate terms.

Thereafter, the struggle between China, Russia and Japan for the dominant position in Korea took an acute shape. At first the Chinese had every advantage, and were not only favoured by the Koreans but had virtual control of the Korean Court and Government. A rule of mismanagement and corruption on the part of the

Korean officials was followed by conspiracies and risings. These led to the intervention in the internal affairs of Korea of all three powers, China, Russia and Japan, with a view to a reorganisation of the whole administration. Both China and Russia strongly objected to the presence of Japanese troops in Korea, though this was justified by the Treaty of Tientsin, when the Chinese Government itself sent troops there. An attempt to arrange joint action with China was refused, and the sinking of a Chinese transport by a Japanese war vessel brought about the war between China and Japan in 1894-95.

This war was the most important event that had occurred in the history of Asia since the Manchu conquest of the Chinese Empire. At the commencement, as already remarked, nearly all the Europeans who were best acquainted with affairs in the Far East anticipated the easy victory of the huge Chinese Monarchy over pretentious little Japan. The Japanese were still contemned, not only by the Chinese themselves but by the Russians and other European nations. Even Great Britain, which had so recently signed a Treaty very favourable to Japanese claims, seems to have been ignorant of the inevitable result of the conflict, between a comparatively small but active, progressive and warlike nation, possessed of the latest modern weapons, and huge, unwieldy, belated China, with no effective forces on land or on sea.

To the amazement of the whole Eastern world, Japan was completely victorious from the first and all through. The Chinese Government had entirely overrated its strength : the European Powers were completely taken by surprise. If she had been left alone there can be little doubt that Japan would, then and there, have entered upon a policy of domination which in a few years would have placed the whole Chinese Empire at

her control. That, according to Asiatic ideas, must be the natural result of such obvious superiority as Japan had displayed in a short but decisive campaign. But the actual terms of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Shimonoseki on April 14, 1895, were far from containing any demand for supremacy. Japan obviously felt already that jealous lookers-on would not tolerate a step which could render the Island Empire one of the greatest Powers in the world. The original Treaty, therefore, was moderate enough :

1. Recognition of the full and complete independence of Korea by China.

2. Cession of the Liaotung Peninsula (Port Arthur, etc.), and the adjacent waters, to Japan.

3. Cession of Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan.

4. Payment to Japan of an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels.

5. Opening up of Shashih, Chunking, Suchow and Hangchow to trade.

6. Opening of the Yangtse-Kiang to navigation.

These terms, however, and the surprising outcome of the war itself at once convinced Russian statesmen that they had now a rival for influence and acquisition of territory in the Far East that might prove infinitely more powerful than peaceful, apathetic China, who would put up with almost any pressure from European nations. Russia, therefore, with the support of France and Germany, demanded that the Liaotung Peninsula, the only really important concession claimed by Japan from China, should be given up. The ground for this demand expressly was that the Japanese possession of the Liaotung Peninsula, owing to its geographical position, would be a constant menace to Peking and render illusory the independence of Korea. It cannot be denied that these contentions were entirely justifiable. But this did not make the surrender any more

palatable to Japan, who only gave way to the obvious assertion of superior force which, at that time, she had no means of effectively resisting.

What followed in Korea showed the view the Japanese really took of their position in regard to that kingdom. They acted as if they were masters there: ably when Count Inouye was their Minister; foolishly and provocatively when General Miura took his place. Owing to the proceedings of the latter and the resentment occasioned in Seoul and Korea generally, Russia came to the front and obtained almost complete control. The hopeless weakness of China disclosed by this war, and afterwards the confusion caused by the Boxer rising, encouraged the European Powers to enter upon a general campaign of peaceful encroachment, the result of which was that Japan found herself face to face with the possibility of the dismemberment of China by territorial annexations, and creation of "spheres of influence" all over the Empire, the sole interest of the European Powers. Maps, in fact, were published in the years between 1895 and 1904 which coolly appropriated to this or that Western nation vast districts which they were to exploit and develop much as they pleased. Japanese policy seemed entirely frustrated. "Asia for the Asiatics" became a mere dream.

Nor did the active part which the admirably equipped and officered army of Japan took in the relief of Peking mend matters much from her point of view. For now Russia obtained the right from China to carry her Siberian railway through Manchuria, secured a definite lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, which she had compelled Japan to give up, practically obtained possession of the rich territory of Manchuria, and was daily increasing her control over Korea. Germany, France and Great Britain had likewise taken what they wanted, or thought they might want.

Russia then abandoned any pretence of acting in common with the other Powers, or in the general interest, so far as Manchuria was concerned; although she had been a party to the arrangement between all the European countries, and at that time Great Britain and Germany were acting under agreement in the East to safeguard the integrity of China. Thus Russia was the nation which had gained most substantially, first by Japan's victory over China and next by the Boxer risings. She took advantage of the increasing weakness of China and the incapacity of Japan to resist her policy.

In consequence, Japan found herself deprived of all direct influence in Korea, and saw Manchuria and the Liaotung Peninsula entirely in Russian hands. This was a dangerous position for the rising Island Empire. Precisely those perils which Japanese statesmen had long foreseen, and tried to avert, now confronted their country in the most menacing shape. Russia, the European Power which then appeared the most formidable and ambitious in the world, held certain geographical territories and strategical ports which, when Japan seemed likely to hold them, had been declared perilous to Korea and even to Chinese independence.

Under these circumstances the Island Empire was forced to take into consideration her whole future policy in the East. The alternative which presented itself to her statesmen was to make terms at once with Russia—a policy advocated by perhaps the ablest man in Japan—or to enter upon a Treaty with Great Britain, who at this period was in full blast of antagonism to St. Petersburg, though by no means devoid of resentment towards Germany for the attitude taken by the Kaiser in regard to the Boer War. After a good deal of hesitation between the two European Powers, the

arguments of Count Hayashi prevailed, and Japan entered upon her fateful Convention with England of 1902 which, renewed and confirmed in 1905 and again in 1911, secured to Japan the opportunity for expanding and consolidating her strength. This convention has already produced results which were certainly not anticipated by the English Foreign Office when the agreement was entered upon, nor by the House of Lords when its members rose and applauded its confirmation, upon Lord Lansdowne's entering that Assembly in 1905.

No immediate results followed, beyond France's declaration that she stood by Russia, in the East as in the West. But the significance of the virtual Treaty of Alliance between England and Japan—leaving aside altogether the latest clause which engaged Japan to safeguard British interests in India—was unmistakable. It was something more than an acknowledgment of Japan's equality with a great European nation, whose ancient domination over an empire in Asia placed her ahead of all her rivals. It was a manifest strengthening of Japan against Russia, in return for Asiatic support to a European Empire, whose Colonists excluded Japanese entirely from their shores.

There is no need to recite the incidents which led up to the war between Japan and Russia. Enough to recall the well-known facts that the representatives of the Tsar in Eastern Asia, greatly underrating the force of their Asiatic opponent, and egged on by greed of gain from territories claimed by their Government, in defiance of the Japanese, deliberately provoked the war of 1904. They felt confident that, in spite of all the disadvantages of carrying on a campaign at such a great distance from their base, and with only one railway line of supply over many thousands of miles, they would win with ease. The French were of the

same opinion. Even men in high position, who ought to have been well informed, had no doubt whatever as to the result. To hint in Paris at the probability of a Japanese victory on the day when the Japanese crossed the Yalu, was taken as, in diplomatic language, "an unfriendly act." All Europe was misled even more completely than in the case of China. Russia never won a battle on land or on sea. Her over-confidence, incapacity, lack of adequate preparation and corruption gave the Japanese the victory.

They themselves believe, or affect to believe, that they were deprived of the full reward of their amazing success by the intervention of the United States and the forced Treaty of Portsmouth. Others, with no prejudice in favour of Russia, hold the opinion that, had the war continued, the Russians, who fought even better in the battle of Mukden than they did in their previous desperate and unfortunate engagements, would have won in the end. The discussion of such possibilities of the past is futile. Beyond the fact that Japan bears a grudge against America for having brought about peace at that juncture, the really important feature of the whole business is that Japan, then and there, took her place definitely as one of the great military and naval Powers of the world, established herself firmly as the leader of Asia against Europe, and virtually obtained all, and much more than all, of which she had been deprived by Russia's intervention, after she had crushed the Chinese, ten years earlier.

Though the truth has not even yet been fully recognised, either in Europe or America, and England and her Colonies in particular have shut their eyes to obvious facts, Japan thenceforth stood forward as the champion of Asia against Europe. The centuries of European depredations in Asia had at last met with resistance so well organised and so successful that the new Asiatic

Power at once leaped into the front rank. Who can wonder that with this triumph fresh in their minds, the Japanese should take further steps in the same direction? It is one of the most trenchant pieces of practical irony in modern politics that Great Britain, with her huge Indian Empire, should have felt compelled, by the exigencies of European affairs, to aid Japan in securing a free hand in the East.

"The mere fact that England has adopted this attitude shows that she is in dire need and she wants to use us to bear some of her burdens." Such was the late Count Inouye's opinion in December, 1901. How the Japanese negotiators must have laughed in their sleeves, therefore, when Lord Lansdowne argued that, in return for British protection of Japanese interests in Korea, a Japanese undertaking to safeguard British interests in the Valley of the Yang-tse was insufficient! Japan must consequently agree as well to protect India for England! Joseph Chamberlain supported Lord Lansdowne in that amazing contention. And this was before Japan had beaten Russia! No wonder, I say, that after her remarkable campaign, "the manifest destiny" of the Island Empire shone out clear and bright before the cool, determined men who absolutely control Japan's foreign policy.

Since then Japan has been working more assiduously then ever, in war and in peace, for the supremacy of the Far East—for the leadership of Asia. What, prior to the wars with China and Russia, had been an almost unconscious sense of possibility, a dim, disembodied aspiration towards a nebulous hegemony, became a definite object to be striven for persistently against all European nations, friends or enemies, who were likely to challenge Japanese policy. The "Open Door" in China, to which so much importance was attached by the Western Powers, was really accepted by Japan only

as a form of words to cover a very different aim. There is no need to impute bad faith or turpitude to Japan on this account. She had never disguised from Europe, from the time when China's weakness was disclosed in 1894, and Japan was forced to cancel her demands in 1895, that she regarded her position in China as the basic preoccupation of her entire foreign policy. From the time of her victory over Russia, however, circumstances combined to give her statesmen one opportunity after another of strengthening her international influence. They were not slow to take advantage of these openings. They proved neither more nor less unscrupulous than their European compeers.

The Treaty of Portsmouth must ever be considered as a fresh and notable starting-point in the history of the relations between Europe and Asia. It recorded, for all time and in an unmistakable shape, the victory of an almost unknown and remote Asiatic nation over an Empire which for generations had been regarded as a danger to Europe, which had defeated and crushed an invasion headed by the greatest general of modern times, and, in spite of temporary halts, was marching forward, without haste and without rest, to dominant influence on the Pacific Ocean, combined with eventual control over Constantinople, Asia Minor and the Persian Gulf. So threatening to the world and to the ambitions of other Powers did the might of the Muscovite Empire appear before the Japanese War, that Germany, having obtained her foothold at Tsing Tau seven years earlier, rejoiced at the Treaties between England and Japan as constituting a balance to the strength of her formidable rival for places in the sun.

But the Treaty of Portsmouth was only the commencement of a series of Treaties, Agreements, Extensions and Confirmations. By these Conventions Japan, while pledging herself time after time, and

in the most formal manner, to respect the integrity and independence of China, nevertheless contrived to engineer herself into a political and strategical situation that enabled her to use her various allies without being used by them. Thus in less than two years after that Peace between Russia and Japan, which secured to the latter freedom from interference in Korea, a hold on the Liaotung Peninsula and equal rights with all the European nations in China, the whole of the relations between the Powers were completely transformed.

Three months of 1907 witnessed the signature of the Franco-Japanese Agreement in Paris; the Russo-Japanese understanding in St. Petersburg; and the Anglo-Russian Convention likewise in St. Petersburg. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty remained as it had been confirmed in 1905. It was an era of accommodation all round. France took the lead with Japan in 1906, and a Japanese loan of £12,000,000 was issued in Paris on the virtual basis of an understanding between Russia and her late enemy. There was a general combination of the parties most closely interested. The policy of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire met with general acceptance, the United States joining in with the other three Powers, England, Russia and Japan, under the Agreement (Root-Takaliyu) of November, 1908.

No wonder that there were fêtes and rejoicings in Tokio. Japan could well afford to borrow European capital by tens of millions sterling and use it to build up her internal prosperity, while waiting for the next opportunity to assert herself. No wonder, also, that Germany, taking no part in these various agreements, resented the success which, for the time being at any rate, attended them. The Kaiser suddenly descried the Yellow Peril writ large across the whole map of the Far East, and was not slow to proclaim his views

to the world in 1908, the same year that the American Treaty with Japan was signed. This speech was followed up by a long series of German intrigues in China against Japanese influence, which had now virtually the silent support of the growing strength of the Triple Entente between England, France and Russia. These intrigues only served to fortify that combination so far as policy in the Far East was concerned. Nor did the endeavours of Germany to create differences between England and Japan have any greater success. Japan indeed, with the consent, or at any rate without the active interference, of the Triple Entente, definitely annexed Korea in 1910—an extremely important step which attracted far less attention than it ought to have done both in England and America. The independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, to which Japan had pledged herself to the European Powers and the United States, was thus completely nullified and the "Open Door" was virtually closed in regard to Korea.

That kingdom became thenceforth an integral part of the growing Japanese Empire, subject to its domination in every respect, and vastly increasing its power, in war as in peace.

With the practical control of the Liaotung Peninsula Japan thus assumed a position on the mainland which threatened the independence of all Northern China, unless the Chinese themselves should follow in the wake of the Islanders, throw aside their peaceful policy and imitate their rival by arming and training themselves efficiently on land and on sea according to the best European models. The appropriation of Korea showed more sharply than ever the real objects of Japanese statesmanship and gave clear indication of the lines along which it would move to attain them. Moreover, the tyranny and cruelty which accompanied

the establishment of Japanese rule in Seoul and all over Korea proved conclusively that, courteous and persuasive as she might be in her intercourse with Western countries, Japan was, and would remain, thoroughly Asiatic in her way of dealing with any overt resistance to her authority or even moderate criticism of her policy.

Unfortunately, the behaviour of European troops in India, China, Tonquin, Siberia and elsewhere in Asia has been of such a character that Japan has an easy retort at hand should she be reproached with excessive barbarity. For good or for ill, Korea was to the Japanese a conquered country, and the mild Koreans had to accommodate themselves as best they might to the efficient administration of the descendants of the people whom their ancestors had rescued from barbarism centuries before. The methods of subjugation employed were on the same level as those practised by the Japanese contingent in the advance to the relief of Peking during the Boxer siege and in Formosa after that island was conceded to Japan by China in 1895. Such an increase of population as Japan derived from these annexations greatly added to her power both of offence and defence, while the calm indifference with which her European friends, Germany excepted, viewed these changes could not but encourage her to make further progress on similar lines.

One great advantage arose, nevertheless, from the vast array of agreements between the Allied Powers (as they have since become) and the Government of Tokio. When the revolution occurred in China in 1911 —what time the Agadir question had brought Europe to the very brink of war—all the nations most directly interested in China's trade and solicitous about China's development, followed scrupulously, in accordance with their conventions, the policy of "hands off." They all,

in fact, accepted the successful anti-Manchu revolt and acknowledged the Republic, whose leaders were shortly afterwards compelled to take refuge in Japan. When, however, the first President of the Republic, Yuan-Shi-Kai, after having secured loans from Europe, attempted to establish himself as Emperor after the Great War had begun, and even sent his son as Envoy to Berlin—then Japan put her veto on this arbitrary step and forced the would-be usurper to abandon his project.

With the Great War Japan made her appearance as the Ally of the Triple Entente in their resistance to the Central European Powers. And she, who in 1911 had concluded Treaties of Commerce with her Allies on absolutely equal terms, now took up a position which prominently gave her the lead in Asiatic affairs—a lead which she will retain until China herself fully wakes up to the facts of national existence. On August 15, 1914, Japan demanded from Germany the immediate surrender of Kiau Chau. Declaration of war followed, and German warships were sunk. Tsing Tau was attacked and taken, with some 1,200 Anglo-Indian troops helping. The whole province of Shantung was at Japan's mercy, "to be returned to China after the war." The Caroline and Marshall Islands were likewise occupied. Japan also gained advantages in Manchuria, regardless of Chinese objections, having previously joined with her Allies in the Pact of London to the effect that there should be no separate peace.

As her portion of the Allied defence against Germany, the Japanese fleet has controlled the Pacific Ocean, and thus aided the Australian Colonies in giving support to England and the Entente generally. All this, while part of the general campaign, has served greatly to strengthen her own position. The better feeling with Russia which followed carried her still

farther: first by the supply to Russia of large quantities of munitions which she did not require herself, and for which Great Britain paid, through her Muscovite Ally; and next by a Treaty with Russia, of which the only details known are that the two Powers mutually guarantee one another's territories in the East. Russia thus definitely and finally secured to Japan all and more than all for which the great Muscovite Empire had made war in 1904-5, and, besides, practically gave Japan a "free hand" in China. Thus of the non-Asiatic nations who had agreed with Japan to maintain the "Open Door" for all countries in the Chinese Empire, the United States alone was left unhampered, to oppose any plans that Japanese statesmen might have formed for the further extension of the fixed policy of their country. This was the fact, and the United States realised it.

Japan had made all necessary preparations to meet any difficulties that might arise. She had established several thousand Japanese labourers within striking distance of the Panama Canal, she had made careful surveys of convenient landing-places in Mexico, notably at Tobolobampo, she had entered into relations with the Mexican leaders, she had drafted preliminary agreements with Ecuador, touching a naval station in the Galapagos Islands, and she had so placed herself in regard to the Philippines that the United States would find it impossible to keep control of those islands against her, permeated as they were with Japanese agents.

Her position was also greatly strengthened by her occupation of the Marshall Islands, while the numbers of Japanese employed in the Sandwich Islands—all trained men—made it extremely difficult for the United States to hold that strategically important group, in the event of war, even if there were no movement

simultaneously among the Japanese in California. It has, at any rate, been made quite clear to the more observant of American publicists and strategists that, should any serious trouble arise with Japan, they could not rely upon the Panama Canal. Either from neutral causes or from enemy attack that waterway might be interrupted at any moment. This meant that the American Naval Base would be not 3,000 or 4,000 but 14,000 miles distant from the main theatre of hostilities. Therefore, though the American fleet was much more powerful numerically than the Japanese fleet, this superiority might not be brought into play soon enough to deal effectively with the Japanese vessels before all that Japan wished to achieve for the time being had been effected.

Meanwhile, Japan has the lead in the Far East and seems likely to keep it. The majority of Englishmen, and even the majority of Americans, who are still more closely concerned than Japan's Ally England with the policy of this powerful and ambitious State, have but a superficial idea of the possible spread of its influence in the near future. Yet this is not for want of warning. Americans in particular have been told by their own countrymen, military officers as well as civilians, who have specially studied the subject, about the sort of antagonism which may lie ahead. Germans, too, who regarded the problem of the Far East and the Pacific Ocean from a totally different point of view, went into the matter with their customary thoroughness before the war, and expressed virtually the same opinion. They believe that Japan is preparing, with the same relentless efficiency which she displayed in making ready for her campaigns against China and Russia, to deal with the United States when time and opportunity offer.

Americans themselves freely admit that the still

rising Power of Asia has ample grounds for serious ill-feeling against the Great Republic. Breaches of international law and national pledges have been committed by the United States Government time after time. The 150,000 Japanese—mostly trained soldiers, by the way—who have taken the place of the Chinese on the Pacific Slope are regarded with the same hostility as their forerunners from the mainland of Asia. A massacre of the Japanese immigrants, before they could organise and defend themselves, was not long ago considered possible. Since then the Japanese Government has itself checked the emigration of its subjects to America, and a settlement has been temporarily arrived at.

But, if we are to judge these able and far-seeing people and their statesmen by what we ourselves should do in a similar case, it seems very unlikely that they will submit permanently to such a badge of inferiority as this arrangement implies, especially since the Californians make no secret of their contempt and dislike for their unwelcome guests. Moreover, not only racial, but commercial, antagonisms are at work. It is well known that the great American manufacturing Trusts have need of the outlet offered by the markets of China, where Japanese influence and Japanese cheapness are already gaining ground in rivalry with them. There is a little Socialism in Japan and more in America; but its votaries will not be numerous or powerful enough in either country to stave off a capitalist war, sooner or later, unless other circumstances render them great assistance. The policy of the Japanese in Mexico and the South American States also threatens American capitalist interests.

Recent events have greatly changed the situation. The United States having been driven, by the German policy of unlimited outrage and piracy on the high seas,

into making common cause with the Allies of the Entente against the Central Powers, has found herself obliged to constitute an effective army and to strengthen her navy. This is a complete alteration of the general attitude of the great American Republic which cannot fail eventually to have its influence in the Pacific. Japan is no longer face to face with a Power of enormous wealth and resources, addicted to peace at any price, and unprepared to encounter organised and efficient attack. Moreover, the U.S.A. is now practically in alliance not only with Great Britain (hitherto a "suspect" country on the American side of the Atlantic), France and Russia, but also with Japan herself. Europe has been "bled white" by the war: America has not. Though, therefore, the policy of Japan can scarcely change its ultimate intention, there will be a greater obstacle in the path of its immediate realisation. The antagonism of interests remains, but Japan is not the only Power which has gained strength by the war. The United States has so far done the same.

We need not, however, take General Homer Lea's pessimistic pre-war view about Japan's possible attack upon California in order to understand that, if Japan means to have her own way *in China,* it will be exceedingly difficult for the United States to prevent her, as matters stand to-day in Europe. What may come after the war no one can say. Even the League of Nations would find it no easy matter to withstand the claim of "Asia for the Asiatics" championed by Japan. Japan's demands upon China of January 18th, 1915, followed by the surrender of the Chinese Republic on points which entirely destroy the figment of the territorial integrity of China and close the open door of more than one great province, show that the whole question of her policy on the Pacific Ocean hangs upon

her relations to that vast country. Japan will no more allow the United States to interfere with her policy in that respect than she permitted Russia to do so.

Japanese emigration and the relation of Japanese settlers to the American Government and the American States are small matters compared with the leadership of the Asiatic peoples to which Japan aspires and has partially attained. Since the Great War has vastly improved not only her political but her financial position, and since the comparatively moderate Count Okuma has been succeeded first by the militarist Terauchi as Prime Minister, and then by a democratic party Government, it is still possible that we shall hear of more demands against the independence of China. In that case, although Sun Yat Sen has thought it safe to return to Shanghai, the death of Huang-Hsu, who had the confidence of the new Chinese soldiery, is a very serious loss to the great peaceful Federation of Provinces which calls itself the Chinese Republic. These are the days when the kingdoms of peace suffer violence and the violent take them by storm. The tale of the West may soon be told again in the East.

It is natural and, in my judgment, praiseworthy, that Japan should resent, and endeavour to render impossible for ever, the sort of treatment which we Europeans have dealt out to China and other parts of Asia for centuries. England, Russia, France, Germany, Holland, Portugal, Spain, have all had a hand in this infamous business. It could scarcely be surprising, therefore, if Asia should strive to avenge upon Europe some of the horrors of the past, as she gains strength and puts the methods of civilised warfare at the disposal of fully three-fifths of the human race.

That is a growing danger which our descendants may have to face. But that Japan should use the present terrible state of affairs in Europe to impose upon the

unwilling population of China—possessing even by the admission of the highest Japanese statesmen qualities superior to their own—is a policy which ought to be resisted as soon as possible, if the Chinese themselves desire help against this aggression. The Japanese are not popular in Asia, and their unpopularity has undoubtedly increased during the past four years. On the other hand, whatever their differences may be, Asiatics understand one another at bottom far better than they understand, or trust, or like, Europeans, or Americans. This the United States is beginning to comprehend. It may be as well for other nationalities of the West to consider the whole situation from this point of view.

Particularly is this the case with Great Britain. Not only does she still hold the leading position in trade with China, but, on the whole, Englishmen get on better with the Chinese than do any other Europeans. So long as competitive commerce exists, therefore, and political influence helps the nation which does this large business, the appearance on the scene of an active competitor close at hand, well versed in the Chinese language and Chinese ways, is of the utmost importance. Japanese traders take more pains, are content with smaller profits and are ready to deal, on a smaller scale, with inferior products to those which English merchants are disposed to handle. They do not gain ground rapidly because they have a lower standard of commercial morality than that to which the Chinese producers and traders have been accustomed, and certain very doubtful transactions in the purchase of Chinese currency did them harm during the war, when everything was in their favour.

But, in spite of everything, Japanese merchants and traffickers will probably make great way in China in the near future. Even keen personal dislike and

contempt for sharp practice can scarcely head back permanently the commercial advance of those who, in addition to the advantages of language and race, possess superior adaptability, greater assiduity, are content with smaller profits, and, above all, sell cheap goods. Now that Japan has added to all this persistent and threatening political pressure upon the Chinese Government the acquisition of "spheres of influence" and vast stretches of territory which close the open door to all trade but her own, obviously it will be no easy matter for Europeans to keep up their commerce with China on the present scale. England, the close Ally of Japan, begins to feel her rivalry, in spite of all Treaty obligations, as much as the United States, which can scarcely be considered a very friendly Power, though circumstances have made the American Republic practically an Ally of the Island Empire. The battle of industrial and trading competition will go steadily on in war as in peace, in peace as in war.

CHAPTER XI

THE MISTRESS OF ASIA

In the early part of 1916, owing to the adverse criticism of Japanese policy in China, not only by English residents but by a portion of the English Press, the *Japan Times* obtained and published the considered opinions of all the leading Japanese statesmen, bankers, financiers and journalists as to the Anglo-Japanese Treaties of Alliance. They practically did not differ about the great value of these to Japan. The abrogation of them, by either side, was unanimously regarded as almost inconceivable and highly injurious. Some modifications might be made growing out of changed conditions, but the basis of the Treaties must remain untouched. The general agreement is remarkable:

Thus, Count Okuma, then Prime Minister, while insisting upon the necessity for all the Allies to "stick together" in order to defeat Germany, goes on to say: "I assert positively, without any fear of successful contradiction, that Japan is loyal to her Alliance, friendly to Great Britain and faithful to all her undertakings. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is just as strong to-day as ever it was. Japan benefits by the Alliance, and so does Great Britain."

Count Terauchi, the successor of Count Okuma as Premier, was for some years Viceroy and Governor-General of Korea, and is generally regarded in Europe as the leader of the militarist, annexationist and anti-Chinese section of Japanese politics. It is claimed for him that, since 1910, he has been a most successful

administrator on the mainland and that, owing to his stern but honest rule, Korea, which he found in poverty and squalor, is now prosperous and contented. He gives it as his view that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been of great mutual benefit, as has been amply demonstrated, and adds: "I most firmly believe that the relations between Japan and Great Britain are too amicable and stand on too firm a footing to be shaken."

Baron Kato, who has been four times Foreign Minister as well as Ambassador in London, and is now the leader of the most influential party in the House of Representatives, goes more into detail and is even more positive on the same side. On January 1st, 1915, before the amazing demands made by Japan upon China on the 18th of the same month, he set forth his position at length in an important Japanese journal: "It matters not who takes the reins of government in this country or what Cabinet is in power, our attitude towards England and the Alliance will remain the same. . . . It is the rock on which our foreign policies stand. All other ententes or agreements are merely supplementary to this main plank in our national platform. No ministerial change can alter this position or this policy. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance stands for the peace of the Far East. If any man thinks this Alliance was conceived or entered into simply because it might be useful in times of war, he is mistaken. In its relation to the situation in China, for instance, the Alliance is one of peaceful guardianship, safeguarding China's integrity and the principle of equal opportunity"—equal opportunity in Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula and Fukien!—"which are as essential in conserving the interests of Japan as those of Great Britain. So long as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stands, no power can break the integrity of China or really threaten the principle of equal opportunity"—

Again—"The Anglo-Japanese Alliance has vastly increased the prestige of Japan. . . . But the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is beneficial to Great Britain also. During the present war, Great Britain has been able to withdraw her ships from the Far East; whereas, if the Alliance had not been active and actively carried out by Japan, a considerable portion of the British fleet must have been sent to these waters."

Baron Takahashi, the leader of the Opposition in the House of Peers and a statesman of great experience in finance, who was extremely distrustful of the administrations in which Count Okuma and afterwards Count Terauchi were Prime Ministers, nevertheless is of the same opinion as his political adversaries on this particular matter. Thus: "The leading men of this country—the men of all classes, occupations or political leanings—are in sympathy with Great Britain and the Allies. A consensus of the well-balanced opinion of the Empire will show the whole people to be in perfect accord with upholding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This is true in political, social, educational and economic circles. There is, in fact, no real division of opinion."

Baron Shibusawa, the greatest financier of Japan, a man seventy-six years of age, who, capable Americans say, got the better of them all round when on a visit to the United States, joins in the general chorus of approbation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This is as important an adhesion to the policy as any of the preceding, and Baron Shibusawa is supported by most influential bankers and commercial men.

On the other hand, while agreeing also as to the value of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he recognises that there is some ground for the objection that Great Britain is getting the best of the bargain. Such a man as the eminent journalist, Mr. Matsuyama, denounces

the attitude of the British in the Far East. These people, he avers, especially the residents in China, show a tendency to dislike the Japanese. This is undoubtedly true of the dwellers in Peking and Shanghai, and it would be advisable if they could cultivate a little more of Asiatic courtesy and calmness. The day has gone by when either Japanese or Chinese can be treated with arrogance or disrespect. And, as Mr. Matsuyama truly remarks, Englishmen generally, and English merchants in the East in particular, were preserved from the great dangers which they would certainly have encountered had Japan been even a neutral in the war. But this editor winds up by asserting that "the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is absolutely necessary for both Great Britain and Japan. After the war Germany may attempt to regain her influence in the Orient with renewed vigour, and may attempt to wreak vengeance, especially on Japan. . . . The Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be the basis of all diplomacy in the Far East."

Baron Megata puts the crux of the whole matter most clearly and forcibly, while admitting that the English Alliance is of the greatest service to Japan and ought to be maintained in order to preserve peace in the Far East. But one primordial consideration weighs with Japan and must never be overlooked by Great Britain. Here it is: "Japan is the next-door neighbour of China, and Japan is the most deeply concerned in the maintenance of peace in the Orient. Therefore, because of this propinquity,* geographically and economically, Japan must be prompt to assert her opinion, exert her influence and insist upon her rights in China, in order to prevent waste by conflagration, breaches of the peace and illegal procedure. . . . So long as this is done and clearly understood, so long

* This same word is used by Mr. Lansing in his recent Note to Count Ishii.

as rights of position and sincerity of purpose are recognised by the people of the two nations, all will go well and there will be nothing to stay or to hinder the working of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, or the progress of good understanding between the two peoples."

Surely that is plain enough and throws a startling light upon all the previous expressions of good will. Let the reader note these passages from the mouth of Japanese of the first standing in every department, and take them in conjunction with the demands upon China by Japan already recorded. It is useless to disguise the truth. Japan is aiming at domination in China and relies upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to help her to attain this great end.

The integrity of Chinese territory and the "Open Door" which constitute the basis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance may be given up by Great Britain for some temporary and dishonourable advantage in the Far East. But, however much we may respect and admire Japan, however anxious we may be to believe in her desire to act in accordance with her pledges, we must look at the position as it really is. The Japanese claim a controlling voice in the future of China, with her enormous population and her vast potential wealth. They are on the high road to secure it, regardless of Great Britain or any other nation. What this may mean to the world at large can be judged by those who read the recent history of Japan. All other details of world-policy may ere long seem trifling in comparison with this. The suicide of the white race may leave the planet open to the supremacy of the yellow.

We have been accustomed, for an entire generation, to read and hear of the charm, the taste, the simplicity, the courtesy, the cleanliness, the self-sacrifice, the cheerfulness, the intelligence of the Japanese. Their

courage, their devotion, their high conception of individual, family and patriotic duty have also been most picturesquely put before us in the present as well as in the past. The delightful style and poetic imagination of Lafcadio Hearn and other pleasing writers have thrown a glamour over the whole Archipelago. No Asiatics have ever been brought so close to us by Europeans of genius and by their own admirably organised system of publicity and propaganda in the national interest. There is, in fact, a fascination about the Island Empire which has obscured for us until lately the appreciation of the serious side of Japanese character and policy. Now we tend possibly to exaggerate the influence and power of the great rival to European trade and European polity in the Far East. But our late ally Russia, on the one hand, and our enemy Germany, on the other, both show clearly, the one by a Treaty virtually acknowledging the dominant position of Japan, the other by continuous efforts to come to terms with Japan in some way (despite the contemptuous attitude of Japanese statesmen), that they now fully recognise the change that has taken place. Great Britain, France and the United States ought not, therefore, to be less clear-sighted in the matter.

CHAPTER XII

INDUSTRIAL JAPAN

FROM the earliest days when Japan began to reorganise the superstructure of her society so that she might hold her own against European dictation on land and on sea, she set to work also to reconstitute the whole industry of the country on similar lines so far as they were suited to Asiatic customs and laws. The progress of Japan has been from military and naval development to the improvements in agriculture and manufacture necessary to maintain great fighting forces. Japan to-day has an army and a navy at least twice as strong as they were at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. The general opinion of those best qualified to judge is that she will not be contented until they are at least twice their present strength and that her navy in its various departments may be able to hold its own against any force that the United States at a critical moment could bring round Cape Horn into Japanese waters.

Now, Japan is still a poor country compared with such nations as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, or the United States. Even the Empire of Russia before the war was considerably richer than Japan. How, then, is the Island Empire, even with its present population of some 70,000,000, including nowadays Korea, Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula, to pay interest on its large foreign loans and bear at the same time the weight of these heavy armaments? This question was faced by Japanese statesmen at a very early period in the record of the new development.

They saw at once that it was useless to enter upon such an ambitious policy as that which opened out before them, especially after their successful war with China, unless they adapted all possible modern improvements in agriculture, manufacture, transport, railways, shipping, finance and mining. The education of the people must also accompany this activity. Thus alone could Japan hope to continue on the upward path which her leaders had traced for her. Nothing was omitted which could lead to the attainment of her object.

Mistakes were made in some directions, of course; but never in any European country, not even in Germany, was the complete programme of the industrial and social transformation of a nation carried out so systematically as in Japan. Here, as in the army and navy, European ideas were used and adapted, but European influence was never at any moment allowed to dominate. There were those who hoped, the writer among them, that the Japanese, who had examined and criticised the advantages and defects of modern European society, would have done their utmost to avoid the terrible mischief caused to any working population by the introduction of unrestrained capitalism, the great factory industries and the consequent bitter competition for a mere subsistence wage by men, women and children. Little or no attempt has been made in this direction. The results, as will be seen later, are deplorable. Japanese industrial Imperialism, like happy-go-lucky commercialism in Great Britain, has been a curse to the people.

But the economic change from national poverty to comparative national affluence is being brought about none the less. The natural skill of the people, their power of adaptation and their personal industry, when combined with the most improved machinery and a low

rate of wages, are rendering them very formidable competitors in the world market, while there has been none of that fatal neglect of agriculture, whose full effect England must now experience. It is, in fact, sad to put the clearly-thought-out methodical advance of Japan in her combination of home defence and warlike strength, with unceasing internal development, beside the floundering incapacity displayed by England during the present generation. The contrast is humiliating to anyone who takes the trouble to investigate the facts.

Agriculture is, and always has been, by far the most important industry of Japan, and the growth of manufactures and commerce has not induced the Government to neglect this, the foundation of all sound national prosperity. They have recognised, as a recent writer has stated, that "it is no exaggeration to say that upon agriculture and agriculturists depends the existence of the Empire." The small cultivators, whose average holdings are not larger than those of the Chinese peasantry, constitute the healthiest and most vigorous class in the Empire: the men who did the best of the fighting against China and Russia and are the backbone of the Japanese armies to-day. The land itself is not fertile, and the climate is not specially favourable for tillage. Consequently, rural life is hard and the standard of subsistence low. Home industry of all kinds is brought in to increase the product of the family and relieve them from actual hardship. The more fortunate, who are engaged in the silk and weaving industries, owning at the same time their plots of land, are the best off, and stand in much the same position as the cultivators and weavers of the eighteenth century in the north of England, or the small vignerons of southern France. Those of the agricultural population who have to pay rent to landlords, or till the land for large

proprietors, are worse off. The tendency also of the rural population to drift into the cities, in search of high wages and relief from excessive and ungrateful toil, is growing in Japan as elsewhere.

Including the output of all departments of home industry of every kind, the total annual value of the products of agriculture is put at an average of £156,000,000 a year from a population of upwards of 30,000,000 engaged in work upon the soil, or less than £5 per head gross, exclusive of taxation or cost of manures. These make a deduction from this total of nearly 15s. per head. Reckoned in money, therefore, the total income of a family of five persons of the agricultural class dependent upon the soil does not exceed £20 a year, in return for the exhausting labour of man, woman and children. This is large, no doubt, in comparison with the return obtained by the pauper ryots of British India, but it is a poor remuneration, even when compared with the ill-paid and badly-housed agricultural labourers of southern England.

Only seventeen per cent. of the total area of Japan is cultivated, and the character of the remainder displays little probability of any great extension. As the population is increasing so fast that it can scarcely be absorbed in the cities, the question of emigration will probably become more pressing as years go on. This must be considered in all discussion of Japan's foreign policy, and its solution will become more important should she combine with China in a demand for a free outlet for her surplus labourers to unoccupied or sparsely-peopled territories. For obviously, if a family of five on the average receives no more than eight shillings a week, reckoned in our currency, though the small freeholders may get more for their labour, the occupiers, who pay to the landowner nearly a half of their gross produce, and the labourer for wages, who

has no property, must receive less; and it is from these classes that the emigrants to California and other territories are chiefly drawn.

Nevertheless, the efforts of the Japanese Government and the intelligence and industry of the people, accompanied by a reduction of agricultural taxation, are producing remarkable results. The most recent statistics available show that although the extent of cultivated land has not very greatly increased, the average yield per acre has improved steadily in the past twenty years, and there is every reason to believe that this upward tendency will still continue, though not at the same rate. What may be achieved by direct and capable State intervention is shown in the case of tobacco, where by careful attention and selection a smaller cultivated area and lessened production brings in a higher return owing to improved quality. A Government Commission is constantly engaged in introducing advantageous methods of culture and substituting animals and machinery for direct human labour wherever this is found profitable.

But important as agriculture is and must ever remain for Japan—if her statesmen retain their capacity of correctly judging the national interests—she relies upon her advance in the great modern industries for the means to hold permanently the position which she has gained by her wars and her diplomacy. She has not, however, advanced in this respect as much as she required, or as her leaders hoped. It is easy to understand the enormous difficulty of introducing into an agricultural country, almost at a blow as it were, and without any thorough preparation or training, the complete paraphernalia of modern industry and manufacture. The wonder is not that Japan has failed in the course of a generation to rival fully the great industrial countries, which had so long a

start of her on the markets of the world, but that she has been able to achieve so much within so short a period.

Had she not assumed the necessity for a policy of aggression and expansion on the mainland and the constant endeavour to secure a dominant position in China, Japan would already have established her domestic concerns and foreign trade upon a thoroughly sound basis. In less than thirty years her exports and imports have increased more than fifteen-fold; she has freed her hands from the trammels of commercial conventions with foreign nations and can impose such protective duties as she pleases; she has ceased to be dependent upon external sources for warships and munitions; she has built up and is extending an important mercantile marine; and just at the time when her financial circumstances had become rather strained, the great world war, which means something not far short of ruin to her Allies, enabled Japan, after the fall of Tsing-Tau and the destruction of German sea power in the East, to supply Russia, at the cost of England, with quantities of munitions at a large profit to herself.

Japanese impatience at the rate of progress seems due rather to the excitability of a new-born nation than to that cool, unbiassed judgment of events to which we have been accustomed in Japan's foreign and Colonial policy. This last remarkable turn of industrial and financial events in favour of Japan shows itself in an unmistakable manner in the recent statistics of her exports and imports.

Thus agriculture, mining, manufacture advancing; commerce steadily growing; population increasing, apart from the 17,000,000 added in 1910 by the annexation of Korea to the inhabitants of Japan proper; and now the economic advantage due to the

Great War: all together give Japan the position at home which enables her to take a bold line abroad.

Nor can we fail to see that the Government is pursuing with the 53,000,000 of Japanese and 17,000,000 of Koreans, forming the solid combination of 70,000,000, a home policy which, from the capitalist point of view, is calculated to strengthen her still further. It is lamentable, for instance, to compare what Japan is doing in the matter of education and scientific training of her children and young people with what we English are doing in India. In Great Britain itself, English school training is in many respects behind Japanese; and the criminal neglect and inefficiency of English elementary schooling during the last four years has increased this inferiority. There are no fewer than 7,000,000 children in the elementary schools of Japan and 500,000 youths in the special and technical schools. The helping hand of Government is extended throughout, and students are encouraged and aided in their endeavour to improve their efficiency by foreign travel and investigation. So excellent, likewise, are the Japanese educational establishments and Universities that thousands of Chinese are now going to Japan in order to acquire that modern knowledge from the West which the Chinese themselves recognise is indispensable to the development of their country, but which they are unable to furnish at home. Japan is providing not merely military and naval but intellectual leadership for the hundreds of millions of the vast Empire by whose inhabitants she is nevertheless disliked and despised.

When, also, we speak of Japan as mainly an agricultural country, this, though true in itself, gives an inadequate conception of the great strength of the urban population, which is increasing in Japan as in other civilised countries. Apart from Tokio with its

2,000,000 inhabitants, and Osaka with 1,400,000, there are five other cities which have together a population of 2,000,000, and there are in all sixty-six towns with a population of over 30,000 each. Moreover, the greater part of the larger cities and towns are massed together in comparison with the total area of the Japanese islands. Railways now connect the main industrial and agricultural centres, supplementing the admirable water communications by sea and canal.

This concentration of industrialism and improvement in transport combine to make Japan a centre of material influence which can scarcely fail to increase her pressure upon China in time to come. A glance at the map shows how this long procession of islands from Saghalien to Formosa, lying like a series of wharves along the coast of Eastern Asia, with its outposts and inlets at Korea, on the Liaotung Peninsula, at Kiau Chau, and now at Fukien, gives Japan an enormous commercial as well as a strategical advantage in the competitive war of the near future as compared with her rivals in Europe or in America. Never in history was so remarkably favourable a geographical situation in the hands of one nation, controlled by men capable of taking full advantage of it and looking to the future of Asia as in some sort the heritage of the Japanese race.

When we consider the question of labour, of wages, or the domination of capital, of physical endurance under the new industrial conditions, the outlook for Japan is not so favourable for permanent success. Unless, in this department as in others, the Japanese are ready to deal with and remedy the defects of a ruthless system of material and personal exploitation, they may find the ground break under them later.

The old Japan is being destroyed by capitalism, and it is still doubtful whether Japanese labourers and

artisans are so well suited to face the pressure of the intermediate period as the more physically powerful as well as more stolid Chinese. The extremely pacific, long-suffering and persistent nature of the Chinese tells in their favour. As competitors in agriculture on the mainland and in hard manual work of all kinds it is said that the Japanese have already proved unable to hold their own against Chinese or even Koreans. So likewise in factories. Employers can get more effective and more continuous work out of Chinese than out of Japanese. Since women almost entirely take the place of men in Japanese textile industries, Japan may have the advantage for the time being, but in the long run such toil as is now enforced upon Japanese women must certainly deteriorate their progeny, as it has in Great Britain and the United States. The factory system as a whole has not been pushed so far as it has been in Europe, and the awful horrors of Lancashire and Yorkshire in the first half of the nineteenth century have not yet been reproduced to their full extent in Japan.

But when we read of "factories buzzing night and day; thousands of young girls still contracting to live for three years in a 'compound,' like so many peas in a pod, and to work in the mills for twelve hours per day one week and twelve hours per night the next"; when we bear in mind that these female wage-slaves coming mostly from the country districts, the daughters of small agriculturists, receive as wages from fourpence to sevenpence a day for twelve hours of exhausting toil; when we further consider that in all trades, though wages are rising, the cost of mere subsistence is increasing still more—when we sum all this up, we can see that Japan, by plunging headlong into unrestrained competitive capitalism, is running social risks against which the sad experience of our own and

other countries might well have warned her. Nothing more horrifies foreigners who visit Japan or touch at Japanese ports than to see women with children strapped on their backs, coaling the great steamers as they come in. This is fairly typical of what was going on until the introduction of none too stringent Japanese Factory Acts in 1911.

In fact, the old personal and kindly relations between masters and workers, which formed a portion of the ancient days of Japan, and lasted up to the great change, are disappearing. It is as if the British Middle Age feudalism and guild system, with all its restrictions and castes and regulations and grades, had been plunged at a stroke into the purely competitive, *laissez-faire*, pecuniary capitalism of the nineteenth century. Even in England, we have not yet understood that children are the most important portion of any community; though this truth is well known to, and acted upon, by many savage tribes. In Japan children's vitality is sapped, their intelligence stunted, and their morality imperilled by endless factory work. The lessons of Europe have not been learned. There is reason, however, to hope that much more vigorous steps will be taken as the sane and sensible part of the nation wakes up to the truth, and the workers gain influence as a class.

In the meantime, Japan may be said to form the classical example of fulfilment of the prediction that wherever capitalism, with its attendant competition, great factory industry, production for profit and wage-slavery gains ground, there Socialism will assuredly follow. There are countries such as Finland, France and Italy, where although the great industries have not by any means reached their full development, yet Socialism, owing to various causes, has made rapid progress. In Japan the rise of capitalism has been accompanied

at once by a development of Socialism. Of course, therefore, we find the Japanese capitalists, with their attendant professors, hard at work to prove that there is not, and ought not to be, any antagonism between capital and labour. For them there is no class war. The labourers, they say, who sell their power to labour as a class to the capitalists as a class, are directly interested in seeing their employers get rich. These employers, it is true, become wealthy by taking all the wealth the labourers create over and above the bare subsistence wages paid. But the more surplus value they obtain by this process the more labourers they are able to employ. Consequently, labourers should do their utmost to increase the productiveness of labour in order that additional realised capital should be at the disposal of the great organisers of industry. Such harmony is in profiteering souls!

The workers of Japan seem to have unconsciously revolted against this new religion of the slave-drivers modernised, before Socialism gained any hold. Huge masses of men, scarcely even organised in their trades, recognised indistinctly that their interests were one as against their masters. So formidable did the expression of this general opinion, in the form of public meetings and demonstrations, threaten to be, that at the very commencement they were suppressed by the police. The old story in regard to any attempt by the people to emancipate themselves and use machinery for the common good. Socialism gave a scientific, historic basis to the working-class unrest.

But this advance did not come at once. The efforts of Tokichi Tariu and Shimosu Inagaki in the early 'eighties failed to obtain any support, although trade unionism had already made considerable progress, notably among the railway servants. Whatever work may have been done privately, no definite association

was formed until 1889 for the express purpose of investigating Social-Democratic teaching. This was called the Society for the Study of Socialism. The names of the principal founders were the two Socialists given above, with Isoh Abé, Sen Katayama, Sakuma and Miyaké. "At their regular meetings they gave in turn lectures on such eminent Socialists as St. Simon, Fourier, Proudhon, Marx, etc., and on the principles laid down by them. This Association lasted for two years, and during that time some of the members advocated Socialism and others were opposed to it. But at the end of 1900 the Association decided to take up active work, and consequently it was deemed essential that it should consist of Socialist members only: the non-Socialist members thereupon withdrew, and the title was changed to The Socialistic Society."

Early in 1901 the Japanese Social-Democratic Party was formed. It was immediately dissolved by the Government. Here is the programme issued by the leaders:

1. To extend the principle of Universal Brotherhood.
2. To enforce disarmament for the sake of Universal Peace.
3. To abolish the existing system of class distinctions.
4. To establish public ownership in land and capital.
5. To establish public ownership in means of communication, such as railways and ships.
6. To equalise distribution of wealth.
7. To equalise the distribution of political rights.
8. To make the State bear the expense of free education for the people.

This is manifestly as complete a revolutionary series of proposals as has ever been set forth in any civilised

country. In some respects it is simpler and more intelligible than most of the programmes of the same kind that I have seen in other languages. No wonder that the Japanese Government, at that time wholly devoted to capitalism and its concomitant economic and social oppression of the mass of the people, refused to allow fair play to the Social Democrats. Even their immediate practical proposals leading up to the realisation of these great ideals were regarded as harmful to the Government. Katayama and others were ordered by the police to dissolve the party, and all attempt to revive it under another name was at once suppressed.

Thus deprived of any opportunity for open propaganda, the Social Democrats were compelled to devote themselves to economic education only. Before and during the Russian War the Japanese Social Democrats joined with those whom we may call Socialistic Radicals in an agitation against the whole policy of the Government. This led to further persecution.

Nevertheless, they made progress, and by degrees the pretence of fear of a dangerous secret society brought with it the form of repression to which Socialists of all countries are accustomed. Imprisonment, suppression of newspapers and then official prosecutions, condemnations and hangings soon followed. Japanese statesmen, in fact, showed themselves as ruthless against active reformers and revolutionaries at home as they had been by their own admission against the unfortunate Manchurians, Chinese and Koreans abroad. Consequently many Japanese Social Democrats were compelled to flee the country and take refuge in Europe and America. Thus was seen the strange contrast that while Japan was granting asylum to Chinese revolutionary leaders such as Sun Yat Sen, Huang-Hsu and their friends, Japanese Social Democrats were imprisoned and executed and others were compelled to fly for their

lives. Nevertheless, Socialism in Japan is making way steadily. There is already a large literature on the subject.

The controversies which have been carried on so vigorously in Europe and America have been renewed in Japan. There are already two well-defined sections: the State Socialists, who answer to the Fabian Society, with its bureaucratic ideals, and the revolutionary Socialists or Social Democrats, proceeding on the same lines as the French and English parties bearing the same name. By common consent persecution has failed to prevent the propaganda of ideas. The martyrs of Social Democracy have not sacrificed their lives or their liberties in vain. Professor Abé, himself a Socialist, writing of Socialism in Count Okuma's exhaustive work on Japan, winds up his survey in these words: "Socialistic ideas have been widely diffused throughout the Empire in the past few years, and an increasing number of scholars and statesmen now devote themselves to its study, while a great many students take an interest in the subject. It would be a great mistake to judge of the influence of Socialism from the yet small number of professed Socialists only. The Socialistic spirit is afloat everywhere." This passage appears in what is virtually an official publication, edited by the able statesman who till recently was Prime Minister. Its presence there goes far to prove that the Japanese, notwithstanding the abominable persecution referred to, and the supremacy for the time being of aggressive militarism, have some reason for claiming to be a wide-minded people.

Progress is going on below all the time. Though public opinion is not so far developed in Japan as her champions, native and foreign, contend it is, we cannot doubt that the national intelligence which has so rapidly developed Socialists of great capacity and high

scientific idealism, will ere long manifest itself in an endeavour to prepare for the coming forms of social life, which must sooner or later displace the mushroom growth of capitalism. The antagonism between this capitalism and the wagedom below is increasing. The opposition of socialised industrialism to aggressive imperialism must likewise gain strength. Those same problems which Europe and America have to face and solve, or else go under in the struggle of classes, must likewise be handled in Japan. Capitalists will then be called upon to make sacrifices to enlightened patriotism like those made by the majority of the Daimyos and Samurai fifty years ago. It may be that they, and with them the nation at large, will rise to this high conception of national progress, national well-being and national dignity.

Already there are evidences of rapidly approaching changes in this direction. The present Government of Japan is the first definitely party administration which has ever held control of the country and its Empire. The Cabinet itself is composed of men whose social standing in their youth and early manhood would have been enough to exclude them from office a very few years, not to say months, ago. Two of the members have actually risen to their present position from the ranks of what may be fairly described as the proletariat, having begun their career in the lowest class of producers and distributors. Moreover, the great rice riots a year or so ago, which took the Japanese Government more than a fortnight to suppress, were not only violent expressions of popular exasperation at shortage of necessary food accompanied by very high prices, but were evidences of a growing determination of the mass of the Japanese workers to secure more direct influence upon the management of national affairs and the social order.

Hence we can discern that democratic progress has begun and that Japan, like the Western nations, has to face, in the near future, important changes, accelerated in their development by circumstances arising out of the Great War. Such inevitable antagonisms cannot be suitably dealt with and put an end to by mere force. This Japanese statesmen of the new school at home, and their able diplomatists abroad, clearly see. They are now carefully studying how to avert from their own country such anarchical outbursts as have devastated Russia and are threatening Germany. This is no easy task, and the possibility of success depends upon prompt and capable economic and social action. The Japanese themselves are hopeful of a peaceful solution. Having learnt much from Europe, the leading power of Asia may, by her peaceful internal reorganisation, teach Europe in turn. But this can scarcely be harmonised with imperialist ambitions and militarist lust of conquest. In short, Japan, as a world-power and as the champion of Asia for the Asiatics, has a glorious future before her, if she refuses to sacrifice the greatness of her people at home to the illusory glory of domination abroad.

CHAPTER XIII

ASIATIC EMIGRATION

It was by emigration and colonisation that the Chinese brought themselves directly into contact with European civilisation in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The emigrants showed remarkable capacity for adapting themselves to circumstances and for competing with white men in almost every department of industry. Great alarm was felt at their coming, even in comparatively small numbers, to California and the Australian Colonies. This was a very different matter from the infamous kidnapping of Chinese coolies which had long gone on at the Portuguese port of Macao,—whence thousands of unfortunate Chinese were shipped off to slavery and death in the guano mines of the Cincha Islands—or from the more ordered indentured labour imported into Tahiti and the Sandwich Islands. Though many of the Chinamen were brought to the Pacific slope and Australia by the great Chinese Emigration Companies under contract, a much larger proportion landed as practically free men, and set to work on the gold diggings, in laundry work, as domestic servants and helps, as railway navvies, as skilled artificers and as gardeners.

They were, as a rule, successful. Their intelligence, persistence, good-humour and thrift rendered them formidable rivals to the whites; while their comparatively cheap standard of life, and the long hours which they were ready to work, enabled them to undersell European labour to an extent which, however advan-

tageous it might be to the capitalists who employed them, was by no means satisfactory to the white artisans and labourers whom they deprived of their jobs. As at this time English, Americans and other foreigners were demanding free entrance into China and the enjoyment of exceptional rights when landed, the objections to Chinese immigration into very thinly populated territories seemed quite contrary to fair dealing. But that made no difference. A vehement agitation was set on foot against the Asiatics alike in Australia and in America.

The arguments generally used in favour of their exclusion avoided at first, at any rate in Australia, the question of their economic competition with the white labourers. The opposition was based on ethical and sanitary grounds. Objectors put the case thus: "Chinamen did not bring their wives with them. They were a vicious, degraded set who corrupted the white community. They formed a town of their own in the midst of the white cities and carried out their own laws and maintained their own customs, regardless of the population around them. In order to keep a proper control over them and prevent them from committing Asiatic crimes a special police was needed, which entailed additional expense upon the rest of the community. They were great gamblers, who would stake their own lives and freedom and lose them to their compatriots rather than not play at all, thus engendering a sort of chattel slavery. They were addicted to opium-smoking and spread this detestable and most harmful vice among the whites. Having no women of their own, they set to work, deliberately and improperly, to pervert and cajole white girls and women to act as their mistresses, or even to become their wives. They lived wretched, unwholesome lives packed close in ill-ventilated dens which became a source of danger and a

breeding ground for loathsome diseases for the Colony in which they settled. All the money they earned by their industry, and saved by their excessive thrift, was not used for the benefit of the people among whom they dwelt, but was sent off to China to their relatives in that country, or to lie in Chinese banks until their own return. The goods imported for their use, and nearly the whole of the trade which their presence engendered, passed solely through the hands of Chinese merchants, and, except for the payment of freight, did not advantage the white dealers in any way. Thus, during the whole of their existence outside the Flowery Land, Chinese immigrants of every grade were in no sense Colonists, nor did they become genuine citizens. Even when they died in the country they went to, they took good care that their bodies should not fertilise the soil they had lived upon and cultivated : their corpses were conveyed back to China in order that their dust might mingle with the earth sanctified by the ashes of their ancestors of long ago."

It was a formidable indictment, some counts of which were founded on legitimate grievances. But, taken as a whole, the Chinese were quiet, hard-working people who were exceedingly useful in developing sparsely-peopled territories, who also performed duties, especially in the direction of small farming and the cultivation of vegetables, which were entirely neglected by the white settlers. The real objection to their presence was that already stated.

The white workers found that these intelligent Asiatics, who seemed to live only to toil and accumulate savings, could undersell them in the labour market and might bring down the rate of wages below any reasonable standard of European subsistence. These vigorous Celestials with their broad hats, strange attire and curious habits of working and walking, threatened, in

short, the well-being of their white competitors, or so they thought. Hence, as cargo after cargo of them landed in San Francisco, or Melbourne, and were housed in miserable tenements, where they slept packed head and tail like sardines in a tin, breathing an atmosphere so thick and fetid that many a curious visitor who peeped in upon them at night soon suffered physical upset for his pains—as cargo after cargo of these robust Chinese came over, the numbers of the new arrivals were grossly exaggerated and a very bitter feeling was aroused among the populace.

Visions of millions of these objectionable but nevertheless educated and civilised interlopers taking charge of Australia, or the Pacific Slope of America, were conjured up before the eyes of the white Colonists, and it was pointed out to them, by men of ability and literary power, that millions more would scarcely be missed from the vast storehouse of 400,000,000 people whence they came. The Chinese problem was a burning racial question in theory, and a riotous mob question in practice. The Yellow Danger became as formidable a peril in social affairs as Yellow Jack in common physiology. China Town in San Francisco, Little Bourke Street in Melbourne, were held up as specimens of an old and degraded civilisation, imported from Asia, to corrupt and embrute the high refinement of the mining camps and free-meal saloons where the European held sway.

I saw this Chinese immigration close at hand when it occasioned most alarm, both in the United States and in Australia. As I have personally always liked the Chinese whom I have met, whether belonging to the coolie or to the merchant and trader class, and have found them, so far as my experience of employing them went, a straightforward, trustworthy and capable folk, my view on the matter of Chinese immigration and

Chinese competition is certainly not prejudiced against this great Asiatic people. I have, in fact, much admiration for them, and I have never ceased to wonder at the cool, matter-of-fact way in which they adapted themselves, without in any way giving up their nationality, or changing their own dress or customs, to the very different civilisation into the midst of which they had plumped themselves down.

I have seen them at work in Australia on gold-fields wholly abandoned by white diggers but which they continued by endless toil to work at a profit. I have witnessed their admirable assiduity in supplying mining camps and even considerable towns and cities with excellent vegetables, that, but for their market-gardening, would have been destitute of any food of the kind. I have observed their excellent service as laundrymen, domestic servants and cooks when there were no whites at hand who would devote themselves to these avocations; and thus, having watched all this going on, I cannot shut my eyes to the truth that, in what are called new countries, the Chinese are exceedingly useful and worthy people. To denounce their method of life when we leave our own disgusting piggeries of slums unremedied in London and Glasgow, New York and Chicago, appeared to me the height of hypocrisy. No cities in Europe or America could turn out skilled and unskilled artisans and workmen by the thousand, educated, capable, industrious and self-respecting, as the coast cities of China did in the 'sixties and 'seventies of the last century. Their activity and daring were as remarkable as their persistence.

A barque put into Nandi Bay, in what was then a remote part of Fiji, in 1869. The few whites who were then settled in the neighbourhood went quickly to the shore to find out who the new-comers were and what was their object in coming. The barque was bound for

the principal settlement, Levuka, and was out of its course. In the first boat to touch land was a Chinaman, whose pidgin English was just intelligible. I asked him what he was doing in the vessel, for he had no appearance of a seaman about him. It struck me the moment I had put the question that he might just as well have inquired the same thing of me—for how I had got where I then was I scarcely knew. However, his answer was that some 3,000 of his countrymen were "out of their time," as indentured labourers in Tahiti, and he had come out in this vessel to see if there was any opening for them in the Fiji Islands. I met "John" again later, in Sydney. He saw there was nothing to be done in the Fijis for his coolies and was then casting about for a passage back to Tahiti in another craft.

A few months after this, I went up from Auckland, New Zealand, to the Sandwich Islands. That group was then full of Chinese, and I seem to remember that I got more than one excellent dinner cooked by a Chinaman at Honolulu on my way to San Francisco. There again the Chinese question loomed large, and Bret Harte, whom I called upon and got to know, had just written his famous ironical stanzas about the Heathen Chinee. China Town, afterwards so largely used in novels and sketches of Californian life and adventure, was then by no means so extensive, or possessed of such remarkable underground and above-ground residences, as in years to come. But it was an extraordinary Asiatic quarter for an Occidental city even then—a bit of China growing up, with its theatres, opium-dens, restaurants and bitter factions, in the heart of San Francisco. It was obvious that the inhabitants had "come to stay" until, having made enough money to satisfy them, they returned to China and were replaced by others of their countrymen.

Under the conditions then existing, the Chinese, I felt sure, would soon pervade the whole of California and possibly spread farther inland. That was the general opinion, though here, as in Australia, the immigration had only just begun. From San Francisco across the continent by rail was my next journey. There were the Chinese again. The Central Pacific Railroad had only just been completed and linked up with the other sections of the great transcontinental line. At one of the highest stations, in the heart of the Rocky Mountains, a large number of Chinese railway navvies were collected on the platform. Before the train left, the letters from China which had come in by the last mail steamer were being distributed to them—letters and postcards. There stood the Chinamen reading their communications from home, written in a language unknown to the Americans and other travellers who stood around, as if they had lived for years in the country.

I have recalled these personal incidents because I feel confident that sooner or later, if the existing competitive, capitalist, wage-paying social system continues, this matter of Chinese immigration and Chinese competition will become again a very serious question indeed, in the United States of America and in the English Colonies. There are already some 9,000,000 of Chinese out of China; and in the Malay Straits Settlement and elsewhere they do very well under the British flag. But an emigration of 9,000,000 must be, of course, a mere bagatelle to China. The really important fact is that, ere long, as white men feared nearly fifty years ago, further millions may insist upon trying their fortunes again in countries already partially peopled, not by Malays or other Asiatics, but by men of European race.

Now, I have satisfied myself that, should this be

so, the white workers cannot hold their own permanently against Chinese competition in the labour market. The lower standard of life, the greater persistence, the superior education of the Chinese will beat them, and will continue to beat them—always to the advantage of the capitalists. That was the reason why, in 1879, the further importation of Chinamen into the United States, and shortly after into Australia, was forbidden by law, and heavy penalties were enacted against its infringement. The exclusion remains legally in force to-day.

It was a very strong measure. Moreover, it was a measure which was directed not only against the Chinese but, so far as Australia was concerned, against other Asiatics. Even Indians, who form a portion of the recognised population of the British Empire, were prevented from landing on the great Southern Continent, unless they paid a fine, or entrance money, to the amount of one hundred pounds sterling. And this Act was so stringent and so universally applicable that, several years ago, a special law had to be passed through the Australian Assemblies enabling the famous cricketer, Ranjitsinhgi, now the Jam of Ramnuggar, to land and play for England against Australia, in the test cricket matches, without reducing his funds to that extent in favour of his hospitable entertainers.

Here, therefore, we had a direct and bitter economic and social antagonism between European settlers and Asiatics as represented chiefly by the Chinese, in the sparsely-peopled continents of North America and Australia, which resulted in the declaration of a virtual war of exclusion against the older race. In South America, parts of the West Indies, the Dutch Colonies and elsewhere, the feeling was not so strong and the action was not so decisive.

But now the whole question has been raised afresh

by emigrants from the rising Power of the Far East, and the antagonism has assumed a phase which may easily give rise to very great difficulties in the near future, though for the time being a truce—it is no more than a truce—has been arranged. In this new development the Japanese have taken the place of the Chinese.

The Chinese had, perforce, submitted, without more than a mild protest, to the laws against the admission of their countrymen into America and Australia. They were a great people whose civilisation, based upon much of what we call modern scientific knowledge, was in full growth before even Egypt had attained a dominant position and probably many hundreds of years before the Greeks had enlightened the Mediterranean. But they were in no position to fight. So they allowed Europeans to settle in their own quarters in the great Chinese seaports, to hold for themselves an important portion of Peking; while they gave way entirely upon the right of the Chinese to earn their living in territory occupied by the white race.

But times were changing in the East, and Japanese emigration came about under very different circumstances. The exclusion law of 1879 did not directly apply to them. So they rapidly took the place of the Chinese in the Sandwich Islands, a few years later, and began to occupy the same position in California. By this time, however, Japan, by her adoption of European methods of warfare and her marvellous success in her campaigns, first against China and then against Russia, had secured her place as a civilised power, capable of treating on equal terms with the most important European nations. Japan had been the Ally of England since 1902, had entered upon the closest possible relations with Russia, and was generally regarded as the rising force in Far Eastern politics.

When, therefore, her countrymen were brutally

attacked in California, when their shops and places of business were destroyed and their lives placed in jeopardy—when, in short, the old methods used against the Chinese to intimidate them and to compel the United States Government to exclude them were put in force against the Japanese—a very different situation arose. The Japanese had a perfect right to settle in California and elsewhere in America. Their presence was protected by Treaty, and the various objections formulated against the Chinese did not apply to these clean, quiet, capable Asiatics. They had, therefore, every ground to complain of the treatment of their emigrants and, what was much more important, they had the means of defending them, if necessary, by force. Moreover, they claimed, as civilised, educated men and women, that their children should have the same rights in the schools as the children of American citizens.

Here the race prejudice, which plays a very much greater part in social and political America than is generally known in Europe, comes in very strongly indeed. This was the second great motive of the hostility to the Chinese: the economic competition in the wages market being the first. Both reasons applied to the Japanese and quite as forcibly. The Japanese were formidable in the labour market, were even in some respects perhaps more objectionable than the Chinese. They were equally members of an alien race: in fact, a Chinaman and a Japanese, both now without pigtails, when dressed in European garb, can scarcely be distinguished by white men's eyes from one another. The Japanese, however, did bring their women with them, and to all appearance intended to take root in the country, which the Chinese, being in the main birds of passage, were not likely to do.

The school question for Japanese children brought

the whole matter to a crisis. It was a crucial point. It was one upon which the Japanese Government could and can scarcely give way permanently, without admitting the inferiority of their people to Americans —and this they are not at all disposed to concede. Consequently, the feeling between the two countries became increasingly bitter. The Japanese were quite within their rights, alike in protesting against the ill-treatment of their countrymen, against the law preventing the ownership of land by Japanese, against the exclusion of Japanese children from the American free schools, and against the refusal of the United States to receive any more Japanese immigrants. But the Government of Washington, pressed by the agitation of the whole of the States of the Pacific Slope, was unable to agree to the Japanese demands, however right they may have felt them to be.

It was at this time that I received a letter from my friend Dr. Sen Katayama, the leader of the Socialist Party in Japan. Katayama had been forced to leave his country and to settle in California, owing to the relentless persecution, followed by numerous condemnations to death and long imprisonment, set on foot against Socialists in Japan by the Japanese authorities. Katayama is well known to the Socialists of Europe. He was present at the great International Socialist Congress of Amsterdam, which was held in the middle of the Russo-Japanese War. One of the most dramatic incidents of that Congress, which did not lack for stirring episodes, was when Katayama, as delegate and leader of the Japanese Social Democrats, and Plechanoff, holding the same position in respect to the Russian Social Democrats, came forward on the platform and shook hands amid vehement applause. The whole of the hundreds of delegates present rose in their places and cheered. It was a striking scene.

Socialists at that time still believed in the international fraternity of the workers—an illusion which, in 1914, was so completely destroyed for the time being by the action of the German Social Democrats in heartily supporting the ruthless militarist aggression of their Junker caste.

Here is Katayama's letter :

"3903 SACRAMENTO ST.,
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., U.S.A.
Dec. 12, 1914.

"DR.* H. HYNDMAN.

"DEAR SIR,—It is very, very sad thing that your prediction became now fulfilled in Europe. But to you, dear Dr., an honour of your farsighted judgment must be bestowed by the world! Those who ridiculed or buffeted at your wise prediction are fighting on both sides and are given their principles of international socialism up to the misguided patriotism, and apparently reasonable pretext for national defence!

"I left now some three months ago Japan for this country and now I am working among the Japanese in the Pacific coasts. Japan does as you know still persecute socialists and does not permit them to agitate for the cause of socialism, nay more the Japanese authorities do not allow us to work for the laboring class interest even in the line of pure and simple trades unionism. I am really driven out of my country because of socialism, financially it was impossible for me to get living in Japan, even then if I could devote my life for the interest of the working classes I would suffered every privation and poverty but I could do nothing, I was too well known to the authorities to work in disguise, I was utterly hopeless for the rest of my life in Japan, so I decided to leave my country, first I intended to be at Vienna Socialist Congress but it was impossible as you know it, so I could come here for my own and my family's sake.

"Now dear Doctor there are some one hundred and sixty

* I regret to say I am not a Doctor of any branch of learning or science.—H. M. H.

thousand Japanese in the U.S.A. They are mostly workers unskilled or farm laborers. With exception of Hawaii the Japanese are all living amidst of anti-Jap. movement which has been ever growing and ever far reaching in the U.S.A. The anti-Japanese movement has been headed by influential men of two political parties such as ex-Pres. Roosevelt, Hearst and Johnson, together with Gompers and Berger. The mass of the Americans are ignorant of the real situation. They judge the matter by the newspapers and world's map, a tiny little map compared with the America—and they think it is nonsense to think of America going to war with Japan. This ignoring the situation by the mass of American workers is very dangerous and liable to cause the war between Japan and the U.S.A. As you know Japanese workers are not organised and easily misled by the Jingo party. But the problem is still more pressing for nearly two hundred thousand Japanese are to-day in American soil, and they are almost all persecuted by the white people simply because they are of yellow color skin. Since the European war began the Japanese in America became stricken with fear and anxiety for they read from day to day about persecuting or shooting down the peaceful and non-fighting population by both sides, especially by Germans. It is only nationality that cause even such a hatred and enmity resulting in brutal persecution and butchering innocent women and children there. The Japanese in America fear and dread, I think not unreasonably, of the possible war between Japan and America and their consequent lot that might be far more horrible than those of Germans in French soil or English in Germany at the present time, for they are entirely different race from the people in this country.

"Now it is not a question which side shall win in the coming conflict, if such a conflict came to be true, no. Whichever side may get the final victory in the supposed conflict, that would be not much consequence actually to the laboring classes of both countries; they shall suffer equally in the war just as they are suffering in Europe to-day.

"It is too complicated to deal with the relation between two countries in question, but I am trying to find out some ways

to avert the future conflict of two nations and moreover, I am endeavouring to find out what shall be the best attitude that the Japanese in America should assume under such a condition. You might think it best way for both if the Japanese shall leave the U.S.A. and get their home. Now no Jap. immigrant comes nowadays from Japan under the gentlemen's agreement, and it is not easy matter for all the Japanese of two hundred thousands shall leave their abodes in America. Many of them are now ten, twenty and even thirty years in this country.

"Dear Dr. Will you kindly tell me what shall I advice my own countrymen workers here that will be the best on the situation? Anti-Japanese movement now in the U.S.A. is not against those Japanese who might come here after. It is anti-Japanese who are already here, yes, they are here, coming under then the most favorable circumstances, many of them come here and to Hawaii because they were called for by the true Americans namely the sugar planters and railroad kings! And they are now persecuted socially and financially and losing one after another the privileges that they have enjoyed equally in the past with Americans or those other nationaliti s!

"I am intending to publish a little paper for the interest of the Japanese in America so I wish you write me an advice to the Japanese in America as to their future what is the best.

"I remain yours

"SEN KATAYAMA."

I do not think there is any doubt whatever that when he wrote, his alarm was genuine and entirely warranted. The Japanese had been abominably treated by the Americans of California and the Pacific Slope generally. The Colonists of British Columbia had joined in the outcry, notwithstanding the succession of Treaties 1902, 1905, and 1911, between the mother country and Japan. There was, therefore, quite a possibility that in the event of war between the United States and the Island Empire something of the kind anticipated by Katayama might have taken place. On the other hand, the

Japanese, though scattered, were not defenceless, and a great number of them were trained soldiers. Happily, the Japanese Government, with that cool, far-seeing policy which so far has always distinguished its great Council of Foreign Affairs, decided not to push matters to an extremity. They even withdrew their just claims and undertook to restrict Japanese emigration to the United States as far as possible. But they did not do so because they were unable to press their rights by force of arms, but because, presumably, they did not feel that this was the time, not perhaps the special question, on which they wished to assert themselves to that extent.

It is well, however, for the sake of the United States and the British Colonies, that the full truth about the Japanese as Colonists should be thoroughly understood. The matter should be examined and considered wholly without prejudice. Whatever may be the drawbacks, from the point of view of competition on a lower standard of life, these obstacles are speedily overcome. To begin with, Miss Brown's statements about them, that "The Japanese are peaceable, law-abiding, tirelessly industrious, home-seeking, moral, temperate, grateful and generous. They require no policing, there are no disturbances; no woman has ever been molested," are confirmed by the special Commission appointed by the United States Government. But they are also well educated, quick to learn English, and ambitious. This latter quality in particular the Americans dislike. The Japanese think themselves quite as good as the Californians, and they do not trouble to disguise their opinion.

Professor Millis, Professor of Political Economy in the University of Kansas, after twelve years of investigation, speaks of them in the very highest terms in every respect. They compare, he says, favourably "in

the matter of schooling and literacy with immigrants from Europe and are vastly superior to Chinese and Mexicans." Their cleanliness is remarkable: drunkenness and opium-smoking are almost unknown. He also entirely agrees with the good opinion expressed of them in other respects. In everything except colour, creed and race they are most desirable members of the community. Moreover, they are extremely anxious to get out of the wage-earning class, where their competition, undoubtedly, is difficult for white labourers to meet. Most of the immigrants into California are agriculturists. Directly they are able to do so they take up land. Such admirable cultivators are they that they can pay their way and thrive upon land under such heavy rents as were never before known. Where possible they purchase land and settle down to a comfortable, and in every manner respectable, family life. The children, when they go to the common schools, differ little from the rest of the scholars, except that they are more adaptable and much more courteous than the American children.

In fact, from every point of view the Japanese in the West of America are reputed to be an admirable people. Yet laws have been passed not only preventing them from acquiring land by purchase but they are not even allowed to lease land for more than three years. There can be no dispute about the truth of the contention that they have been and are badly treated by the American Government simply and solely because they are Japanese and because what they might do in the way of competition is greatly feared. They inherit the prejudice against the Chinese of thirty-five and forty years ago, a prejudice which was then possibly justifiable. But the Japanese, unlike the Chinese, settle in the country permanently, if they are allowed to do so; they till the land they take up admirably; their wives

work with them on their holdings, and their children grow up to be as industrious, as capable, as self-respecting and even better educated than themselves. They are beginning to demand full rights of nationalisation as American citizens. There seems no reason whatever why these rights should not be conceded. There is nothing but race and religious antagonism against it, provided always that, by a reasonable and friendly arrangement with the Japanese themselves, the numbers of the immigrants be limited within given periods. This, it appears, the Japanese Government is willing to concede.

But the same position has arisen with regard to British Columbia and Australia. It cannot be dealt with, in my opinion, by permanent exclusion, if Japan insists upon her rights as a civilised power.

Those who imagine, therefore, that the whole question of Asiatic emigration to North America and Australia has been more than temporarily settled are, in my judgment, deceiving themselves altogether. It is possible, of course, that the internal development of Japan, and behind her of China, may afford a full outlet for the ill-paid labour of the industrious millions in Japan and the tens of millions of China. But this does not seem in the least likely for many a long year to come. When, consequently, the vast populations of Eastern Asia move in earnest towards a peaceful colonisation of the European settlements bordering on the Pacific Ocean, and when they do this with the support and under the leadership of the Governments of Japan and China, it is difficult to see how their demand for free access to such sparsely-peopled territories as Southern California, British Columbia and Western Australia can be effectively resisted.

Nor, when they have once landed, is it easy to understand how they are to be prevented from com-

peting vigorously with white labour. It is as certain as anything can be that Socialism, or the general organisation of industry upon the basis of co-operation instead of competition, will not make head fast enough to handle this economic and social problem before it is forced upon the world on a vast scale. The tendency even of European nations to resort to Chinese labour at a pinch has been shown during the war by the French, as well as the British, and this tendency may increase in time to come. Meanwhile, I regard the fact beyond dispute that, under capitalism, competitive wagedom and production for profit, the European and American workers cannot hold their own against the Mongolian toilers.

The subject of emigration and immigration was brought up more than once at International Socialist Congresses, and special Commissions, on which I served myself, were appointed to deal with the question. But the ignorance of the matter displayed by the majority of the members of the Commissions was so great, and their disinclination to look facts in the face, which in any way conflicted with their universal humanitarian theories, was so strong, that the Reports presented were practically valueless. No attempt was really made to treat the serious complications involved. European workers in short are not, as yet, competent to handle the whole of this immigration problem, and American and Australasian workers are, for the most part, bitterly prejudiced.

Emigration from India, being directly controlled by the Indian Government, does not present the same features, or create the same difficulties, that have arisen and will almost inevitably arise again in connection with the outflow from China and Japan. But the economic antagonism to the Aryan Hindoos is as strong on the part of the whites as their objection to the

Mongol Asiatics. This has been manifested of late years by the legislation against them in Australia, already mentioned, and more recently in South Africa and British Columbia. They are hated not only as workers who compete with white labourers, but as small traders who outbid and undersell European traffickers. Their claim to British citizenship has not protected them from most unjust and shameful treatment by their fellow-subjects of the British Empire. This cannot go on safely. As Asia begins to assert herself and to take her rightful place in the world, India, like other portions of that great continent, will demand that her people should cease to be treated as inferior beings, when brought into contact with those whose interests they have helped to defend on the battlefields of Europe.

There can be little doubt that in the near future this whole matter of race competition in the industrial sphere, outside Asia itself, will be forced upon the consideration of the British Empire and the United States in particular. The sooner, therefore, the subject is discussed without prejudice and some reasonable decision reached, the better. Japan and China, together or separately, are very different Powers from what they were in 1879, or even, relatively speaking, in 1911.

It is of the utmost importance also that England and America and the white races generally should form a serious judgment upon the course they intend to pursue towards China and the Chinese. England and America, especially, are allowing matters to drift after a fashion that can scarcely fail to be dangerous. While both are crying aloud for the "open door" and proclaiming the necessity for Chinese independence, neither the British Empire nor the United States is taking any definite steps to secure either the one or the other. At the same time, the British Empire, by the action of its

Colonies in Australia and British Columbia, and the United States by its surrender to the agitation in California, are putting themselves completely in the wrong by their policy of excluding the civilised Mongolians from their respective countries. Especially is this policy untenable when both powers are demanding the fullest rights of entry and settlement in China itself against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. In my opinion it will be impossible in the near future to keep the yellow races permanently out of British and American territory, should they continue to wish to immigrate and settle there. But it is most important that, if this is really the case, the two nations most directly concerned in the attempted solution of this difficult problem of Asiatic emigration and immigration should hold close conference on the question. To drift is to move towards war, as we have seen recently in European affairs.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BRITISH IN INDIA

THE invasion of India from the West, in modern times, began in earnest by way of trade and commerce. There was no preconceived intention of conquering that vast territory by any of the Europeans who first landed and made settlements on its shores, except perhaps for a short time by the Portuguese. Nor, as already said in passing, has there ever been a successful propaganda of Christianity in Hindustan, such as menaced the well-being of China and Japan. At the beginning of the rivalry of the two principal nations of Europe for influence over the Indian Courts and Kingdoms, the French were the statesmen and administrators, the English were the merchants and traders. Such men as Dupleix and Bussy took a wider view of Indian affairs, and better understood what would be to the advantage of the Indians themselves, than the English of the same period. Indians, also, were first trained to war on European principles and formed into armies of Sepoys by men of the Perron, de Boigne and Raymond type.* Yet England succeeded in establishing her rule where France failed; because her adventurers, as they gained power, were supported from home, which the French were not; because the English fleets eventually obtained control of the Eastern as well as the Western seas; and because, at the critical moment, the present masters of Hindustan made better use of the trained Indian

* Colonel Hyndman disarmed Raymond's force at the Nizam's Court in 1802.

levies and played upon the differences between the Indian Courts with greater astuteness than their opponents.

Nevertheless, the conquest of India, mainly by Indian troops, led by Englishmen, was achieved, as it were, by accident. There was no organised effort whatever. The conquistadores of South America and Mexico were born again in a new shape, and equally destitute of scruple, throughout the settlements granted as trading centres by the Rajahs and Nawabs of India. The East India Company was not in the least desirous of annexing and governing large and populous districts. On the contrary, the Directors were never weary of impressing upon their representatives in India the permanent necessity for keeping their direct possessions within the narrowest possible limits. Above all, they should avoid war with their neighbours. Hostilities of any kind were wholly outside the scope of money-getting commercial enterprise and injurious to business.

The sole aim and object of these advocates of profitable peace and lucrative persuasion was to secure the means for distributing enormous dividends on the shares of their company. Aggression must be avoided, but adequate profits and commercial returns must be made. But the agents on the spot took the most effective means at their disposal to satisfy the pecuniary demands of their chiefs in London, and paid little attention to their prohibition of remunerative rapine. Thus was seen the marvellous spectacle of clerks and supercargoes developing into great generals and administrators of the first rank and winning an Empire against fearful odds. This unexampled fashion of conducting the business of a mere trading company, taking possession of a civilised Empire as a detail of business, and waging great wars in order to pay huge dividends to shareholders thousands of miles away, is

quite exceptional on such a scale in all human history. Nothing like it had ever before been seen in the East: nothing like it will probably ever occur again.

From the first began that steady withdrawal of wealth from India to England which, in one form or another, has gone on ever since. Throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century, the wealthy English Nabob, denounced by Pitt, who had returned to his own country, after shaking the pagoda-tree to some purpose in his own interest, was the familiar type of the rich man of yesterday. There are the records of the East India Company to bear witness to the conduct of the fortune-hunters of that halcyon period of plunder. India was the El Dorado of the unscrupulous and cruel commercial adventurer. The legitimate proceedings of the great company, chartered by Queen Elizabeth and successfully carried on up to our own time, were bad enough. There is no doubt about that. It was no rose-water management which paid such stupendous dividends and drove the stock of the lucky shareholders to such an enormous premium. But the illegitimate business of the East was infinitely worse in every respect. Even the lowest commercial morality cannot justify the robbery and rascality which pervaded many departments of English administration in India from the time of Clive's rise to power until the first Governor-Generalship of Lord Cornwallis. The praises of many of the successful freebooters have been chanted for 160 years with national pride and exultation: the effect of their depredations upon the luckless Indians who suffered from their extortions, though denounced at the time by Englishmen of the highest character and reputation, has since been overlooked and is now almost forgotten.

It is unnecessary in any case to enlarge upon the crimes of the men who plundered in this way a great

and ancient civilisation. Whether Warren Hastings could or could not have avoided the transactions stigmatised by Burke, but disregarded by the Indians themselves in consideration of his other qualities; whether Clive and smaller men were entitled to be "amazed at their own moderation" in the loot which they appropriated, are matters of comparatively small importance. The guilt or innocence of individuals counts for little in such a system of wholesale robbery as afflicted the provinces under immediate English control, and especially Bengal and Oude, in the generation between 1757, the date of the battle of Plassey, and 1786, when attempts at reform began.

What the total amount of wealth may have been which was abstracted from India and transported to England, without any valuable return, at the end of the eighteenth century will probably never be known. It must have been quite enormous, transcending indeed the drain from America to Europe which followed upon the discoveries of Columbus and his successors. The wealth thus abstracted from India and used in the form of productive capital in English industries, especially the coal, iron and cotton industries, enabled Great Britain to obtain the lead in manufacture and commerce which gave her the control of markets in the century which followed. And the Indians themselves, who provided the means for the attainment of this commercial supremacy, suffered a second time, and even more horribly than they did from direct expropriation, by the economic consequences of their original losses.

In the seventeenth and during a great part of the eighteenth century the importation of Indian calicoes into England was prohibited, on the ground that their competition would have crushed the rising home industry in similar goods. At the end of the eighteenth century, however, owing to the accumulation of riches,

chiefly from Hindustan, England had become possessed of a virtual monopoly of new machinery, run by steam power, which enabled her to undersell the whole world in textile goods of every description. English hand-loom weavers and spinners suffered seriously from the competition of the machine-made products at their own door; but their miseries were child's-play in comparison with the horrors inflicted upon the weavers of India at the same time. No protective tariff was allowed to safeguard them. Unchecked competition, free trade in English goods in English territory, was a commercial religion.

As a consequence, these unlucky producers of Indian fabrics saw their means of livelihood swept away from them, by a process which they could neither understand nor withstand. Tens upon tens of thousands of them perished of starvation; for there was no place for them in the Indian society of that day, apart from the one which they occupied. The foreign government made not the slightest attempt to regulate this fatal free-trade competition, and the effects of the English connection in this respect have been wholly harmful to the peoples of India. The fatal results of economic causes are carefully disregarded. Successful wars and continental annexations quite eclipse in interest the sad fate of the miserable Indian weavers who perished silently on the field of commercial war.

Later on, it was generally recognised, by those who probed into the matter, that—to use the statement of an exceedingly able and vehement champion of British rule—"The earlier members of the Indian Service, civil and military, must be pronounced to be the most corrupt body of officials that ever brought disgrace upon a civilised government." Effective steps were taken to check this objectionable form of the exploitation of India by England and to regularise the

methods by which the dominant power in Hindustan remunerated itself from Indian resources for the services rendered to the subjugated territories.

The improved system of administration was set on foot in 1789 and, after having incidentally conquered the Mahrattas—the Native States which rose to great prominence on the decay of the Mongol authority—the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, finally established English administration in India in much the same shape that it exists to-day. Honesty was fostered, if not assured, by payments to the Europeans employed of such high salaries that the temptation to accept bribes, or to indulge in illegal appropriation, became less and less inducive, in proportion to the risk of removal and punishment. Whether the form of government thus created was suited to the character of the people, whether it was not too expensive for the well-being of the inhabitants, whether foreigners were capable of sufficiently sympathising with and understanding the social system into which they had burglariously forced an entry, or whether the European ideas, laws and economic conceptions imposed upon the population were not likely to prove injurious—these were points which the new Government never stopped to consider.

For 132 years, from 1786 to 1919, the official class of foreign administrators have done their utmost, alike in India and in England, in Parliament, on the platform and in the Press, to convince the world that British rule has conferred immense benefit on its subjects, and that the inhabitants of Hindustan are quite incapable of governing themselves. This has never been the view of the mass of Indians themselves, ignorant, peaceful and submissive as the great majority of the cultivators may be, who constitute more than four-fifths of the entire population. And there are the great "protected"

Indian States, with nearly 70,000,000 of people, to prove still that Indian administration of India is by no means the hopeless business that Englishmen as a rule believe it to be.

During the whole of the period referred to above (1757-1857) conquest by force of arms and annexation by that means, or by chicane, pressed steadily forward. Some of the military operations, always carried on in the main by Indian troops, exhibited great skill and courage on the part of the European leaders; though such a disaster as that of Ferozeshah showed that Indian soldiers under Indian generals had not degenerated from the earlier days. But the most remarkable fact, brought out by those of the English administrators who were in closest touch with their subjects, and had taken the closest pains to study and comprehend their aspirations, was that the worst rule of Indians by their own people was preferred to the best management by foreigners.

For example, the famous Sir William Sleeman, of the old East India Company, was a man so thoroughly versed in Indian languages and customs, and so completely at home in Indian dress and manners, that he succeeded in doing that which even the great Akbar, at the height of his power, was unable to achieve. He was able, that is to say, to put down that extraordinary semi-religious sect of stranglers, the Thugs, whose members had been the horror of all Indian travellers for hundreds of years. The capacity for disguise, the astounding coolness and courage displayed by Sleeman in the course of this triumph of detective enterprise and repression of crime have never been excelled, if ever equalled. It was a truly *marvellous* feat, possible only to a man who had the most thorough knowledge of Indian dialects and provincial peculiarities, with a keen imagination as well, which gave him the power of reading into the minds of those with whom he was

brought into contact, under circumstances that might have cost him his life at any moment. But, in addition to this astounding performance, Sleeman was one of the ablest and best of the East India Company's Civil Servants and Administrators. Naturally, too, he was loyal to his own countrymen.

Yet what does he tell us of a specific instance with which he was familiarly acquainted? Native rule in the great province of Oude was in every way abominable. It is doubtful whether in time of peace any worse tyranny was ever seen in any part of Hindustan. Robbery, torture, the most fiendish barbarities of every kind, were inflicted daily upon the wretched inhabitants. If ever interposition by a neighbouring State, under peaceful and law-abiding foreign control, could appear not only justifiable but inevitable, this was such a case. Interposition and annexation, therefore, actually took place. What followed? Though all this anarchy and misgovernment was suppressed, and life and property were made secure, under English law and justice, the people were bitterly opposed to the change, which seemed to foreign eyes to be so much for the better. Amid all these previous horrors, so shocking to Europeans of the nineteenth century, Indian habits, Indian customs and Indian laws were in the main upheld. The land-tax was roughly and not unreasonably assessed and levied, the rapacity of native money-lenders was checked, the existing legal methods were simple and generally understood.

To give Sir William Sleeman's own words: "There were neither accumulating arrears of land revenue nor ruinous back debts to weigh down the proprietors; there were no unsatisfied decrees of Court to drive debtors to hopeless despair; they came back from their court of bankruptcy, the jungle forest, free from encumbrance; the bread-tax was fixed with some regard

to the coming harvest; arrears were remitted when the impossibility of payment within the year was clearly demonstrated. . . . There could be no black despair in those days of changeful misrule." Never was there a more crushing exposure of the idea that honesty of administration and peace within the borders of a subject country really justifies foreign domination. "The people," so this master of Indian affairs openly declared, "the people generally, or at least the greater part of them, would prefer to reside in Oude . . . than in our own districts, under the evils they are exposed to from the uncertainty of our laws, the multiplicity and formality of our courts, the pride and negligence of those who preside over them, and the corruption and insolence of those who must be employed to prosecute or defend a cause in them and to enforce the fulfilment of a decree when passed. . . . I am persuaded that if it were put to the vote among the people of Oude, ninety-nine in a hundred would rather remain as they are, without any feeling of security in life or property, than have our system introduced in its present complicated state."

This was in 1856, the year before the great Mutiny. Two generations have passed since then, and the system is more complicated than ever. No fewer than twenty-five thousand new laws were put on the statute-book in the first ten years of this twentieth century alone!

Annexation, therefore, to the British Empire in India has *never* been welcomed by the people annexed. Yet the direct government of Englishmen, who did not interfere with Indian habits but did their best to ensure honest and prompt judgment in case of difference, and used their authority to restrict economic hardship and to secure fair play, has often been immensely popular. Such men are never forgotten by the inhabitants of the provinces over which they have once exercised their

benign sway. Whole districts would turn out to welcome them; men, women and children would cover them with flowers and chant their praises, when they returned after the lapse of many years. This sort of one-man rule called, of course, for thorough knowledge of the country and the language, as well as for long and continuous residence among the people themselves. But such instances of individual success before narrow-minded bureaucracy gained control were not rare under the "Kumpani Bahadur." The servants of the Government who were given appointments went to India very young, found themselves at the early age of seventeen or eighteen thrown among a strange population, and often entrusted with powers which rendered it imperative that they should become thoroughly acquainted with those over whom they were placed. It is creditable to our race that, after the early days of rapine and rascality, so many were successful under such trying circumstances.

Moreover, the East India Company itself, though it kept up a European and a powerful Indian Army, was not lavish in its expenditure; nor, in spite of all drawbacks, and the general objection to the new methods gradually gaining ground, was it regarded with hatred by its subjects. The drain of produce without return from India to England was trifling in the Company days compared with what it afterwards became. Some of the most capable of those who rose to high appointments remembered what India had been and might be again. A few saw that European domination could only be temporary, and, so far as was possible, endeavoured to prepare their countrymen for the withdrawal which they knew, sooner or later, was inevitable. But the general opinion, both in India and in England, was that the Indians, split up into many races and peoples, with at least four antagonistic

religions, professed by millions of people, and with the caste system which shut out whole sections of the inhabitants from close contact with one another, were quite incapable of common action against the foreigners, however much they might dislike their rule. The great past of Hindustan was already being forgotten in any estimate of the future of the Empire. Already it was taken for granted that Europeanisation was the one thing needful to make of India a greater Empire than ever, and thus to increase the power and wealth of England.

Yet, many hundreds of years before, the nations of India had been a collection of wealthy and highly-civilised peoples, possessed of a great language, with an elaborate code of laws and social regulations, with exquisite artistic taste in architecture and decoration, having beautiful manufactures of all kinds, and endowed with religious ideas and philosophic and scientific conceptions which have greatly influenced the development of the most progressive races of the West. One of the noblest individual moralists who ever lived, Sakya Houni, was a Hindu; the Code of Menu, of the ninth century, before the Christian Era, is still as essential a study for the jurist as the Laws of the Twelve Tables or the Institutes of Justinian; Akbar the Mohammedan was the greatest monarch who ever ruled the East; while, even in later times, nations over whom the English held supremacy have proved that there are among them no unworthy descendants of the authors of the Vedas of the Mahabarata and Ramayana, of the architecture of the Taj Mahal and Beejapore, of Toder Mull and Nana Furnava of Baber, Hyder Ali and Runjeet Singh. Nevertheless, nine-tenths of what has been written about India in English is so expressed that we are led to believe that stable civilised government only began with the European Raj,

and that nothing short of wholesale Europeanisation can save Hindustan from permanent anarchy.

It is now recognised that the revolt which goes by the name of the Indian Mutiny was in reality a national rising against the growing extension of European domination. The native troops of the East India Company were roused against their officers by misrepresentations calculated to outrage the dearest feelings, or prejudices, of soldiers of all creeds and castes. But the scope of the upheaval went far beyond the army itself. A considerable part of India was directly hostile to English rule, so far as the more intelligent and well-to-do classes were concerned. The plans of the leaders were well laid; the discontent upon which they could reckon was widespread; the recent refusal of the ancient right of adoption, by the Government, and seizure of the territories of Indian Chieftains on that ground had alarmed all the Princes; the date of the attack had been well chosen, being a hundred years after the manifest superiority of the white man in arms had been first admitted; and the secret of the conspiracy was, on the whole, well kept. Yet the insurrection failed.

This arose from several causes. The original Mutiny at Meerut began before it was intended, and before the general outbreak which was to follow, or to occur simultaneously, was ready. The agricultural population over the greater part of India did not sympathise sufficiently with the revolt to oppose actively, or even passively, the operations of the Government troops; the vast number of camp-followers required to enable an army to move under European leadership never fell short for want of recruits. The insurgents developed no really capable leader, nor anyone of first-rate initiative, with the exception of Tantia Topee and that famous princess the Ranee of Jhansi, who were not

sufficiently supported. On the other hand, the English soldiers and officers exhibited wonderful vigour, courage and endurance; while individual civilian officials of the Government, who had been long in the country and were known and trusted by the Indians under their control, kept whole districts quiet, which would otherwise have joined the insurgents.

But, above all, the English Government owed its successful suppression of the outbreak to the fact that the Sikhs, the great people who had most recently been defeated by the foreign rulers, took sides with their conquerors and rendered invaluable assistance, which ensured victory to the Europeans. The rising was therefore put down, and all Hindustan came under the direct or indirect control of the British Crown. Thereupon the periodical survey, which was necessary before the East India Company could obtain the renewal of its Charter, was done away with, and one more reasonable security for justice was abrogated.

India, with its 315,000,000 of inhabitants, has for just sixty years been under the management of the most extraordinary and fortuitous system of foreign domination known in the history of man. The rulers come in succession from without, educated, until their appointment at the age of more than twenty-one, in accordance with methods as remote from, and as irreconcilable with, Asiatic ideas as it is possible for them to be. Alike in their work and in their pleasure, they keep as far aloof from the people they govern as possible. Very rarely do they marry Indians: still more rarely do they settle permanently in the country. The head of the Government, who himself is brought out fresh from Europe, and is entirely ignorant of India, does not remain in office for more than five years. His subordinates return "home" frequently for their holidays and go back to England permanently, to live

on a considerable pension, after their term of service is completed.

The longer this reign of well-meaning but unsympathetic carpet-baggers continues the less intimate do their general relations with the Indian people become. The colour and race prejudice, which existed not at all, or to a very small extent, at the beginning of English dominance, now becomes stronger and stronger every year. In India itself men of ancient lineage, beside which the descent of the oldest European aristocracy is a mushroom growth, are considered in the Presidency Towns, as well as on the railways, unfit to associate on equal terms with white young bureaucrats just arrived in the country. And these "competition-wallahs," owing their position too often to desk-work, though clever enough in their own way, lack nowadays that indescribable quality of the Sahib or "gentleman" which is nowhere so instinctively recognised as in Asia.

The consequences of all this will appear later. In view of these simple facts it is astounding that the English administration should be so successful as it has been and even now is. But still more wonderful does it seem that another and more formidable upheaval should not have come already. The complete disarmament of the population and the careful efforts made to perpetuate, and even to intensify, the old obstacles to common action between the various sections of the population have, however, done much to keep things as they are.

I will quote an English writer who knew India well and cannot be accused of being in the least degree hostile to his own countrymen, who, on the contrary, throughout his career looked at most questions from an English point of view: "Not only is there no white race in India, not only is there no white Colony, but there is

no white man who purposes to remain. . . . No ruler stays there to help, to criticise or educate his successor. No white soldier founds a family. No white man who makes a fortune builds a house or buys an estate for his descendants. The very planter, the very engine-driver, the very foreman of works, departs before he is sixty, leaving no child, no house, no trace of himself behind. No white man takes root in India, and the number even of sojourners is among those masses imperceptible."

And on what is this alien supremacy based? Upon fifteen hundred foreign administrators isolated among the hundreds of millions of Indians—*rari nantes in gurgito vasto*—not one of whom, with the best intentions in the world, and enjoying a far closer intimacy with his subjects than a modern Civil Servant would claim, can exercise any lasting influence on the people committed to his charge. These are the district officers, the real rulers of India, upon whom the true responsibilities of government fall. Each of them is in his way a Governor, and these are *some* of his duties: He is—

Collector of the Land Revenue.

Registrar of the landed property in the District.

Judge between landlord and tenant.

Ministerial officer of the Courts of Justice.

Treasurer and Accountant of the District.

Ex-officio President of the local rates Committee.

Referee for all questions of compensation for lands taken up for public purposes.

Agent for the Government in all local suits to which it is a party.

Referee in local Public Works.

Magistrate, Police Magistrate and Criminal Judge.

Head of the Police.

Ex-officio President of Municipalities.*

* Sir William Hunter first gave this list.

It is utterly impossible that all these multifarious duties, with the endless reports that have to be written and the questions with superiors which have to be discussed, can be performed satisfactorily. Many of the ablest of the Civil Servants themselves admit that this is so. But they can suggest no remedy which would not involve the removal of the existing European domination. Constant transfers from district to district and frequent furloughs to Europe make things worse. Here again is a criticism by an English official in India, when the situation was by no means so acute as it is to-day. This official himself was brought into contact with Indians much more familiarly than most of his countrymen, his family also had been connected with India for more than a century, and furnished two or three Directors to the East India Company:

"It is in general sadly true that Englishmen in India live totally estranged from the people among whom they are sojourning. This estrangement is *partly* unavoidable, being the result of national customs, language, and caste. But, on the whole, there is no doubt, I think, that it might in great part be removed if Englishmen would make up their minds (but how can they be ordered to do so?) to assume a less contemptuous attitude. Some natives in some respects *are* (it must be admitted) contemptible; but not all, or nearly all. We may say that, while there is fault on both sides, the greater fault is on our side, because we have not performed a duty—clearly laid upon us by the nature of our position in India—of striving to understand the natives. The English contempt proceeds in the main from English ignorance, and English ignorance is accompanied, as so often happens, by English bluster. Those who have known the natives well have generally liked them, even loved them, and their love has been returned with a remarkable wealth of unselfish affection.

That natives are worth the effort of knowing, no humane person can doubt; but because with the difference of language and habits it *does* take some effort to know them, most Englishmen keep aloof. This tendency to aloofness is greater than it used to be, and is, I fear, increasing. This is a great misfortune. Some think that the increased tendency comes from an increase of Europeans of a lower social order than those who formerly came to India. It may be so; if so it can only be regarded and deplored as a new (but necessary) order of things. Certain it is the natives consider the Sahib is not what he used to be—certain, too, that English rule is not popular.

"This is the great social calamity attending our Raj in India. For it is not easy to dictate a remedy. Nothing can be effected by preaching or exhortation. The examples of Englishmen placed in high office may do, and have done, something to foster goodwill between the different races; but the respect due to high office necessarily involves some formality, and forbids the expression of cordial sentiments. On the whole, nothing tangible can be achieved till the ordinary Englishman begins by treating the ordinary native as worthy to be known, and treats him, when found worthy, as an equal and a friend. But that happy day has not come yet. The army of the 'damned nigger' Philistines is strong."

There can be no doubt that the war has tended to increase the general disaffection in India, nor that this disaffection will grow still further unless the British Government makes up its mind to grant Indians all that their leaders now demand, and prepares the way for still greater concessions in the near future. The people of England do not understand this. The Anglo-Indian authorities, as well as the Government at home, still think they can safely side-track or cajole the whole

movement. That is what the Indians themselves sadly anticipate, and they know it must inevitably lead to very great trouble. This Englishmen cannot believe, because they pay attention only to the much-advertised loyalty of the great Indian Princes and the quiet maintained by the people themselves during the period of hostilities. But the Princes, as matters stand, could not do otherwise; and they expect, besides, full recognition and reward from the rulers of Hindustan. The nations and peoples themselves are all unarmed and incapable of an organised rising, but they too demand fair treatment from a country which has been fighting, so it declares, for the freedom and rights of nationalities.

As to the Indian Princes, the important Conference held for five days between these magnates and the English Viceroy at Delhi in 1916 must open the eyes of all except those who will not see. Hindoo rulers of every grade and sect attended, side by side with Mohammedan chieftains. These notables chose as their representative and spokesman, when demanding different and better conditions, the Hindu Gaikwar of Baroda. Now, the Gaikwar of Baroda is not only the leader of the advanced party among the higher section of the Hindoos, but, when the King-Emperor George V himself held his great Imperial Durbar at Delhi, it was generally considered throughout India that he deliberately failed in courtesy to the European monarch. This was apologised for and explained away at the time. But the impression remains, and Asiatics are quite subtle enough to overlook the apology and rejoice at the offence. And it was the Gaikwar of Baroda who was put forward to champion the cause of his fellow-Princes and himself to Lord Chelmsford! This one fact, and the solid front maintained by the native rulers, far more than outweighs all the loans and offers of services made by them for the war. Yet the

Independent Princes of India and their 70,000,000 subjects are the one section of India who may be regarded as gaining advantages from British rule and British peace.

As to the people, the war will influence them too. Their men were fighting side by side with Europeans in Europe, on equal terms but for very inferior rates of pay. They understand that, if they understand nothing else. When they get back to India and return to their villages, they will do much to destroy the illusion that white troops must always, and under all circumstances, be superior to coloured men. Moreover, the sense of injustice and bad faith under which they suffer will be communicated to all their kinsfolk. However anxious the upper and trading classes of Great Britain may be to keep peace and contentment in Hindustan, they must surely see that unfair treatment of this sort is likely to spread downright hostility to British rule among that very section of the population with whom they ought to ingratiate themselves. On matters of this personal nature Hindoo and Moslem, Sikh, Pathan, Hyderabadi and Mahratta will all be of one mind, even if their particular section has not been serving on the foreign battlefields.

Then the war was extremely costly to India. Not only has she rendered the dominant foreign Power help in every other way, but, poverty-stricken as she is, India has been compelled to lend Great Britain a huge sum. In order to pay interest upon this amount, the Government of India has imposed import duties upon manufactured cotton goods. This was absolutely necessary if the interest was to be paid, and the "Home Government" in London sanctioned the duties. Thereupon the cotton manufacturers of Lancashire raised a great and exceeding bitter cry and began a serious agitation. "Lancashire," as an eminent Indian, long

and, said to me, "has always been a
of India." No doubt this enmity is not
it is all in the way of business. But the
India of the Cobdenite *laissez-faire* policy
and is ruinous. It first partly arrested Indian
manufacture, by heavy protective duties against
them; then, when capital drained from India by sheer
robbery had built up Lancashire cotton factories, the
Indian weavers were ruined by free trade. Lastly,
now, this policy is maintained, in spite of its cruelty
to rising native industry and to the over-taxed ryot
who is threatened with an increase of the salt-tax.
True, the Lancashire demand has been refused for the
moment, but India is in a perilous state. The original
forced loan was shameful and is so considered by
Indians. The taxes to pay interest upon it constitute
an excessive impost. But Lancashire would enforce
the worst form of tax on the ryot rather than be hurt
even to a small extent.

Meanwhile, India is still shut out from the possibility of receiving any education for the people. We Englishmen deplore their ignorance. This is how we enlighten them: Out of the total Revenue raised in British India—that is to say, India directly under British rule—we spend only one penny per head on education and only 1·9 per cent. of the population go to school. The improvement during the last ten years has been almost nominal. Yet even in Russia, a very poor and backward country, the expenditure on education is 7½d. per head, and the children at school number between 4 per cent. and 5 per cent. of the whole population. These facts do not come home to the agricultural classes of India, which form the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants directly. But they are learning now from others how grossly they are being defrauded of the instruction to which they have

a right. What makes the neglect of British rule in this respect the more disgraceful are the facts that in the Native State of Baroda, in 1910, more than 8·6 of the total population was at school as against 1·9 in British Territory, while now it is stated that 100 per cent. of the boys of school age in Baroda are receiving instruction, as against 21·5 per cent. in British India, and 81·6 per cent. of girls against about 4 per cent. Yet the Anglo-Indian Government of Hindustan claims to be a civilised and highly progressive administration. The Indians are fast learning that it is really very reactionary indeed, when compared even with some of the rulers of their own race.

Whether the great upheaval in Russia will affect India as a whole it is too soon yet to say. That educated Indians are greatly encouraged by this important change, by them so little expected, is already certain; and the establishment of the Chinese Republic has likewise inspired the abler among them to aim at similar development.

Over and above the Europeans immediately concerned in administration, there are many more occupied directly or indirectly in other branches of Government affairs. But in all India there are no more than 200,000 Europeans and Eurasians altogether. These are, for the most part, entirely outside the official class.

The British Empire in India really consists, therefore, of the bureaucrats spoken of and 75,000 English troops, of whom 50,000 at the outside can be reckoned as fit for active service at any given moment. The native Indian army, which is some three times as numerous, could scarcely be relied upon as trustworthy at any period of serious internal trouble. This is generally admitted, and Indians and other nationalities without the borders of Hindustan are well aware of its truth. Moreover, a peaceful upset of the entire

artificial English system is quite possible at any moment, seeing that, as has been truly said by an Imperialist Englishman, "Indians themselves have only to refuse to work for Europeans, and the whole white Empire would be brought to an end within a month." Certain it is that if the agricultural population, hitherto so quiescent (with the exception of a few local outbreaks against usurers and excessive water-tax), were to become even passively hostile, British rule would soon be a thing of the past.

CHAPTER XV

THE UNSOUNDNESS OF BRITISH INDIAN FINANCE

THE agricultural population of India is the most poverty-stricken mass of human beings in the whole world. It constitutes four-fifths of the whole of the inhabitants of Hindustan. Now it so happens that forty years ago I had a very vigorous controversy about the conditions of this vast body of agriculturists which, in spite of much-lauded "progress" in other directions, has been getting poorer and poorer ever since. In the course of that widely-read discussion, one of my chief opponents was an Indian Judge of the highest standing, who had resided for far the greater part of his adult life in India. He generally devoted his vacations to travelling all over the country, mostly at a foot's pace, and he gave the following account of these ryots of India in the course of a long and vigorous article directed against my contentions as to the poverty of British India:

"The dense population, amounting in its more fertile parts to six and seven hundred per square mile, is almost exclusively occupied in agricultural pursuits. But the land of India has been farmed from time immemorial by men entirely without capital. A farmer in this country has little chance of success unless he can supply a capital of £10 to £20 an acre. If English farms were cultivated by men as deficient in capital as the Indian ryots, they would all be thrown upon the parish in a year or two. The founder of a Hindu village may, by the aid of his brethren and friends,

have strength enough to break up the jungle, dig a well and, with a few rupees in his pocket, he may purchase seed for the few acres he can bring under the plough. If a favourable harvest ensue, he has a large surplus, out of which he pays the *jamma* or rent to Government. But, on the first failure of the periodical rains, his withered crops disappear; he has no capital wherewith to meet the Government demand, to obtain food for his family and stock, or to purchase seed for the coming year. To meet all these wants he must have recourse to the village moneylender [whence, by the way, did he get his capital?]—who has always formed as indispensable a member of a Hindu agricultural community as the ploughman himself.

"Every Englishman in office in India has great powers, and every Englishman—as the late Lord Lytton once observed to me—is in heart a reformer. His native energy will not enable him to sit still with his hands before him. He must be improving something. The tendency of the English official in India is to over-reform, to introduce what he may deem improvements, but which turn out egregious failures, and this, be it observed, amongst the most conservative people of the world. Some of the most carefully devised schemes for native improvement have culminated in native deterioration.

"Every ardent administrator desires improvements in his own department; roads, railways, canals, irrigation, improved courts of justice, more efficient police, all find earnest advocates in the higher places of government. But improved administration is always costly, and requires additional taxation. I fear those in authority too often forget that the wisest rulers of a despotic Government have always abstained from laying fresh burdens on the people. It is, in fact, the chief merit of such a Government that the taxes are

ordinarily light, and are such as are familiarised by old usage. New taxes, imposed without the will or any appeal to the judgment of the people, create the most dangerous kind of disaffection. But if this is true generally, it is especially true in India, where the population is extremely poor, and where hitherto the financier has not been enabled to make the rich contribute their due quota to the revenue of the country."

These admissions by a Member of the Council of India seem to me conclusive alike as to the poverty of the great mass of Indians and the complete unsuitability of European administration to cope with it.

The true test of the prosperity and good government of any country is not the average income of the whole population, in which the revenues of the millionaires, great landowners and heads of industrial or transport companies balance the wages received by the artisans, small cultivators or agricultural labourers, but the real well-being of the whole of the producing class. Now this in India is steadily deteriorating decade by decade and year by year. Mr. William Digby's book with the misleading, ironical title, "Prosperous British India," which I implored him not to use, was published in 1901. It contains the most terrific indictment of British rule in Hindustan that has ever been penned. The facts and statistics contained in its 650 pages are drawn almost entirely from official reports, documents and calculations. The whole constitutes a social, economic and political investigation of surpassing interest and value. One categorical statement alone is enough to condemn the entire British system :

In the year 1850, seven years before the Mutiny, the estimated income of British India was twopence per head per day.

In the year 1882—a generation later—the officially-

estimated income was three-halfpence per head per day.

In the year 1900 an analysis of all sources of income gives less than three-farthings per head per day.

What the real impoverishment of the Indian ryots or agriculturists of British India actually must be, when the income of all the well-to-do population in the cities and districts of Anglo-India is deducted, can scarcely be imagined by the inhabitants of the poorest European State.

Can we wonder that a sense of deadly dullness, depression and ruin weighs on that portion of Hindustan where Europeanisation is supreme? It is not poverty alone that occasions this sad state of things. Everything tends in the same direction. Native Indian arts are disappearing, education is neglected, there is no life or pleasure available, no outlet for energy, no hope of change, no variety of occupation. An American traveller, in a recent book full of unmeasured glorification of Europeans and European rule, has described the vivacity, colour and magnificence of the Court of Udaipur in all its ancient splendour, side by side with ancient indifference, ancient abhorrence of what is new, ancient love of ancient customs and ancient devotion to a sacrosanct ruler possessed of a pedigree directly traceable for thousands of years. And then he cannot restrain himself from comparing this un-Europeanised relic of the past, still holy to scores of millions of Hindoos, with the squalid monotony and unending sadness which pervade British India.

It may be that, as the majority of Englishmen and European visitors believe, India can never emancipate herself, without external aid, from her present position of subjugation. Whether it is consonant with the claims of England to be the champion of justice and freedom in other directions that she should keep what might be

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