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THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

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BY

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INTRODUCTION

THIS is not a history of the Russian Revolution. It is a study of the consequences of a political event in the country where it took place and also on the contemporary world. The heroic period of the Revolution, from 1917 until the end of the war of foreign intervention and the civil war, has been covered by a large number of books, good, bad and indifferent. I have resisted the temptation of dramatising history, and to add one more book to the poetic political literature that passes as history. In that art, Trotzky cannot be beaten. His book on the Russian Revolution is a master-piece of imaginative literature; but as a work of history, it is of doubtful value. Without the personal element, it could be on par with Carlyle's French Revolution. To eliminate passion from the writing of history, however, still remains a controversial possibility. I have only made an effort to explore it. It is for the reader to judge to what extent I have succeeded.

As a matter of fact, this book has not been written according to a preconceived plan. It is written over a period of ten years, as a record of my reactions to contemporary events in the process of unfolding. The events themselves had to be chronicled; to that extent, this is a history of the Russian Revolution—of the period it covers, the period in which the Revolution unfolded its constructive possibilities, while also revealing the contradiction between its theoretical presuppositions and pragmatic compulsion.

My point of departure was acceptance, critical to a degree, of the Marxist point of view that, having taken place as of historical necessity, the process of the unfolding of the Revolution was predetermined. That view, which is the basic feature of the presuppositions of the architects

and engineers of the Russian Revolution, was put to the test of experience, which after all is the material of history. To analyse the experience of a particular period objectively, instead of interpreting it from this or that point of view, is the scientific method of writing history. Even then, no historian can be taken on his word, if he claims to be entirely free from subjectivism. My analysis of the experience of roughly two decades, covered by this record, under the banner of the Russian Revolution, is subjective only to the extent that any item of scientific knowledge is necessarily so. Knowledge presupposes the existence of the knower, and no knower ever begins an investigation with a really open mind, which means, an empty mind, a mental vacuum, if it means anything. The test of objectivity is the readiness to change one's opinion when subsequent experience challenges its validity.

I hold that my attempt to record history in the process of making stands that test. This is not history written from a personal or any theoretical point of view. At the same time, I do not make the absurd claim of having started with an open mind. I had a distinct theoretical predisposition and corresponding expectations of the Revolution. Concretely, I began the study of what I believed to be the constructive phase of the Revolution as a Marxist; and it was also as a Marxist that I was driven to the conclusion that, pragmatically, the Revolution was not conforming with its *a priori* theoretical pattern.

The essence of Marxism is that ideas are moulded by experience. Marxism is not the horoscope of humanity; it is a method of studying history. It does not permit of scholastic historicism, interpreting history by distorting or ignoring facts. If consciousness is determined by the physical existence, then a really Marxist study of history should not be theoretically hide-bound. Empiricism is nowhere more valid than in the study of history. That is not the case when one undertakes to study or to write a

history of the past. Then, historians who want to be distinguished from the facile manufacturers of legends must rely upon logical deductions from available materials, having first subjected them to a searching criticism guided by rational judgment of truth and error or positive falsehood. In studying contemporary history, actual experience must be the sole guide, unless one wishes to be a court chronicler. Experience again has to be objectively analysed, the sequence of facts understood in their logical significance, not by interpreting them from a fixed point of view. Any fact is not to be judged by its supposed purpose or imaginary cause, but by its logical implication. Then, the significance of some facts is so very self-evident that only theoretical sophistication or deliberate falsification can weave them into a legend and call it the glorious achievement of revolution.

The first section of this book was written ten years ago, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, as essays on its positive outcome during the preceding period. It was then published as the first edition of this book, with the sub-title "A Review and Perspective", which indicated the scope and purpose of the essays. That original review of the initial period of the Revolution, which was far from being detailed, has not been amplified in this enlarged edition. My purpose was mainly to visualise the future of the Revolution in the light of its development until that time. Therefore, I did not go into the historical background and the immediate causes of the Revolution; nor did I depict the dramatic events of the "Ten Days That Shook the World", nor again the epic of the civil war. Having had a modest role in that drama, I could with difficulty resist the temptation of adding to the romantic literature called the history of revolutions. However, for my purpose, it was enough to recollect certain significant facts indicating tendencies which were to assert themselves eventually to determine the course of the Revolution in its constructive phase.

On the twentieth anniversary, it was sufficiently clear that the Revolution had not flowed in the channel marked out for it theoretically by Marxist historicism. From the very beginning, it was not a proletarian revolution of the Marxist conception. Let alone Marx, who had laid down his *theory of the proletarian revolution* half a century before *1917, the Russian Revolution did not fit into the ex*pectations even of Lenin, its sponsor, organiser and leader. As a matter of fact, it was Lenin who directed the revolution in a channel unforeseen in its theoretical presuppositions. Yet, Lenin died prematurely, the most dogmatic defender of Marxist orthodoxy. There could be no doubt about his sincerity and honesty of purpose. Sincerity and firmness of conviction are of the essence of fanaticism. Lenin was the greatest fanatic of our time, perhaps of all time, since the Prophet of Arabia. Leninism is a remarkable doctrine—theoretically orthodox to the extremest degree of dogmatism, practically realistic in the sense of unscrupulous opportunism. Lenin was an indifferent philosopher; but he philosophised in order to rationalise his masterful opportunism. Plagiarising Goethe, he used to say: "Theory is gray, but evergreen is the tree of life." If Lenin was a poor philosopher, his sense of the poetic was certainly not very striking. The poetico-philosophical dictum was meant to justify his practice in crass contradiction of the theory he so dogmatically defended. Whatever philosophy of life Lenin professed, found concrete expression in his revolutionary opportunism—the end justifies the means—which eventually brought about the moral degeneration of the international communist movement.

Lenin's realism, as yet very far from opportunist tactics, switched the revolution in an unforessen channel when in 1920 he liquidated War Communism and introduced the so-called New Economic Policy. The word "new" was of crucial importance. It marked a departure from Marxist orthodoxy, which could not be practised without liquidating the revolution. Nobody will ever be

able to say with certainty if Lenin wanted power for the sake of it. But he admittedly did attach supreme importance to power. Having captured power fortuitously (until April 1917, Lenin did not believe that the Bolsheviks could capture power), he was determined to hold on to it at all cost, firmly believing that, in possession of power, he could *shape things into the a priori pattern of Marxism.* The cost, in the first place, was theoretical orthodoxy which since then became the lady-love of the knight-errant Trotzky. Fanatical champion of permanent revolution, he disapproved of the New Economic Policy as a dangerous deviation from the road to Socialism. He was right; only, the goal of Socialism has, since those days of confidence and optimism, turned out to be either an unrealisable utopia or the prosaic reality of State Capitalism. Lenin, however, firmly believed in Socialism; he only chose a long detour as soon as he saw that the tempting shortcut to the goal was risky, and might even turn out to be a blind-alley. To call the practice during the years immediately after the capture of power "War Communism" was like giving the dog a bad name to justify beating it. No other practice is visualised in the Marxist scheme of building the socialist society on the ruins of Capitalism. The New Economic Policy was a definite departure from Marxist orthodoxy.

A review of the earlier phase of the Revolution led me to that conclusion, and the perspective of its future development appeared to me accordingly. But I did not believe that the Revolution was betrayed—not even by Stalin. I only realised that the road to world revolution and Socialism could not be built theoretically, but that it had to be paved with the materials available and under the supervision of the experience of the engineers engaged in the task and of the architects of the new order. A critical and realistic review of the past opened up an optimistic perspective; the revolution could not be fitted into the *a priori* theoretical pattern; it must break new

grounds; it would experience difficulties, but unfold possibilities never dreamt of in the simplified philosophy of Marxist Horatios. I believed that Stalin worked out the implications of Lenin's realism, and that the Soviet planned economy, though essentially based also on the "exploitation of labour", was paving the road to Socialism in as much as it fortified the base of the world proletarian revolution. The Russian Revolution had changed its course; still, it remained a revolution. That was the optimistic note of the first edition of his book, which nevertheless was a critical review of the history of the first two decades of the Revolution.

The rest of the book, which is the major part of this second edition, records history in the process of making, and I hold that that is the best method of writing reliable history. With this method, the historian deals with first-hand material. If he resists the temptation of dramatising events, even when they are dramatic, he can trace their logical sequence irrespective of motives which might have brought them about. I adopted that method in studying the development of the Russian Revolution during the last ten years. My purpose was not to interpret from a definite point of view. I did not pretend to approach the problems of contemporary history with a blank mind. I had my predispositions, theoretical convictions, fond expectations, and—illusions. But I had also the desire to submit them to the test of experience. I held on to my opinion, cherished my illusions, to the bitter end, but had the objectivity to change my opinion, forsake illusions, not without grief when experience left no option.

The second section of the book covers a period which, heralded by the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany, began with the swift-moving succession of crises in 1939. Until then, the Russian Revolution, despite the world significance of its professed ideology, had been a localised occurrence, although the area affected was con-

siderable. In the early 'thirties, thanks to the initial success of planned economy, which enabled Russia to regain her share of the world trade, she came out of diplomatic isolation. Consequently, the repercussion of whatever happened in Russia began to make itself felt abroad. The impact of the Revolution reached the neighbouring countries of Europe as well as Asia, no longer only in the form of Communist propaganda, but directly, through political and economic relations. The outcaste of the 'twenties attained the status of a Great Power. Since then, the further history of the Russian Revolution became interwoven with the history of the contemporary world. By the end of the 'thirties, the political horizon of Europe was darkened by the shadow of the war which had determined the internal development of Russia, ever since in the middle of the 'twenties the Revolution entered its constructive phase. That turning point in its history coincided with the capture by Stalin of the supreme leadership. Stalin visualised the ultimate triumph of the Revolution in an eventual military victory of Russia.

Therefore, an analysis of the international relation of forces in Europe became necessary to have a realistic view of the future of the Russian Revolution. On the other hand, the Napoleonic tendency of the latter determined the development of events in Europe. In the most critical period of contemporary history, from autumn 1939 to summer 1941, when Europe offered the opportunity for the Russian Revolution to advance according to the Stalinist strategy of Red Napoleonism, Russia acted in such a manner as to isolate itself once again completely from the civilised world. Her curious attitude provided plausible justification for confounding Communism with Fascism.

I tried to see through the veil of the mystery of Russian diplomacy and explained it as manoeuvreing to capture strategic positions before striking. I still believed in the possibility of the Revolution spreading to Europe,

according to Stalin's plan, and Revolutionary Russia capturing the moral leadership of the continent as its deliverer from Fascism. Of course, in that case, she must share the actual political leadership with others, more qualified for the role, as Lenin had visualised. But Stalin's Napoleonism, like Bonaparte's in the period of the French Revolution, turned out to be also a generator of the lust for power, notwithstanding its objectively liberating and revolutionary significance.

In the period of the French Revolution, Napoleon's Empire was a transitory phenomenon, but the impact of the revolution imparted through that medium was abiding. Stalin's strategy of spreading the revolution of our time, might have had a greater success if it remembered the lesson of history and was guided by Lenin's wisdom. Reaching Europe, the revolution was bound to democratise itself in order to be abiding in a new cultural atmosphere. In that historically determined perspective of the revolution triumphant, the Russians saw a danger for their supremacy. A masterful revolutionary strategy, on the point of successful culmination, degenerated into a struggle for the domination of Europe. The Russians moved farther and farther in the direction of unscrupulous power-politics, the more opportunities they missed during the post-war years owing to the fading of their revolutionary vision. It became clear that the Russian Revolution had exhausted its possibilities to influence directly the reconstruction and regeneration of Europe. That process is traced in the latter sections of the book, which record my reaction to the movement of events. The tortuous and often incredibly stupid and short-sighted policy of the Russians could no longer be explained on the assumption of a realistic revolutionary strategy.

But even now I do not share the opinion that the revolution has been betrayed by Stalin personally or by the Stalinist regime. It was not a betrayal, but a mis-

carriage. The miscarriage of the Russian Revolution is due to the fallacies of Marxist historicism. Experience exposed those fallacies. It will never be known whether Lenin consciously realised the inadequacies of the Marxist theory of revolution. In any case, already early in its history, he did switch the revolution in a different channel. Until after the war, when the Russians missed rapidly recurring opportunities to adjust the revolution to the new context of its expansion and further development, I believed that Stalin was astutely reacting to reality, disregarded in the theoretical system of Marx, and deliberately bringing about a metamorphosis of the Revolution. Speaking at the Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1926, when practically all the veterans of the Revolution—Trotzky, Kamenev, Zinoviev—were opposing his policy as deviation from Marxism and betrayal of the proletarian revolution, Stalin declared that, on the authority of Marx, intelligent Marxists should see the necessity of revising their theoretical presuppositions in the light of experience. Until two years ago, I believed that Stalin's revolutionary strategy—military, diplomatic, political and economic—was determined by the idea he proclaimed twenty years ago. Why, how and when he abandoned that sound position, and his legendary realism degenerated into the opportunism of power-politics, are very interesting questions.

In the latter part of the book, I have briefly offered replies to the questions. Apart from more fundamental reasons, such as the fallacies of original Marxism, its dogmatisation by the epigons, the utopian nature of the ideal of Communism, the dangerous implication of the abstract concept of communal interest, Leninist glorification of power, the miscarriage of the Russian Revolution could be traced to one single mistake on the part of Stalin. It was to have waited too long at the most critical time owing to wrong calculations; the failure to strike to prevent the fall of France. The magnitude of that fatal blunder escap-

ed my understanding at that time. Very largely thanks to that grave mistake, Russia might have been overrun by the German invaders. During that gravest crisis of its history, since the darkest days of the civil war, the rulers of Russia lost their nerves. Panic-stricken, they invoked the tradition of legendary mediaeval heroes and patriotic warriors. That was a concession to nationalist chauvinism, which during the war practically eclipsed the romantic spirit of the proletarian revolution, and since then has made a mere formality of the Communist profession of Revolutionary Russia. One cannot escape the obvious lesson to be learned from that experience. In practice, Communism is not nearly as attractive as the ideal depicted in theory and imagination; therefore, it cannot command the spontaneous loyalty even of the toiling masses. The miscarriage of the Russian Revolution is due to the reason that, under the Red Flag of Communism, it cannot become a world revolution.

Even before Russia was drawn in the Second World War, an analysis of the then international relation of forces and its dynamics led me to the conclusion that the post-war world would be polarised as between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The anticipated process has taken place, but it has not divided the world into the camps of revolution and counter-revolution. Why it has been so, is explained in the last section of the book. The threatening clash between the two giants competing for world domination would not be the grand finale of a period of wars and revolutions. That impending catastrophe of the international power-politics culminating in another was may be avoided by the leadership of the revolution of our time passing out of the hands of the Russians. In the concluding chapter, that heartening possibility has been examined. The result is an epitaph of the Russian Revolution, though hopeful for Europe. The period of revolution opened in 1917 will be closed successfully by European Democracy refusing to be dragged into another war. The leaders of

the Soviet Union and their communist cohortes throughout the world have failed to march abreast of the new forces and new ideas which, growing out of the life-and-death struggle against triumphant Fascism, are now reacting positively to the present crisis of modern culture and civilisation.

The purpose of this book was to judge the validity of the theoretical presuppositions of the Russian Revolution, which was expected to open up a new chapter to human history. Therefore, I followed the movement of international events taking place under its impact, and which in their turn determined the course of the Revolution. A detailed examination of the conditions at the home of the Revolution was not within the purview of this study. Yet, their implications had to be appraised in so far as they influenced the foreign policy of the State founded by the Revolution. On the whole, this book records the result of a study of the history of the contemporary world, and indicates the perspective of the future of civilised mankind opened up by it.

In an article written early in 1938, I tried to explain the strange practice of the Revolution devouring her own children, repeating itself in our time. I also wrote a critical appreciation of the dramatic personality of Trotzky after the tragic end of his chequered career—meteoric rise and equally spectacular fall. The Moscow trials and the fall of Trotzky were the most tragic episodes of the Russian Revolution. They puzzled the whole world, including the friends of the Revolution. Therefore, those articles are reproduced as appendices, because they could not be fitted into the text of the book without breaking the continuity of this study.

A pen picture of the personality of Stalin should have been also included in the book. I wanted to do that, but could not do it for various reasons. To that extent, this study of the Russian Revolution is incomplete. Because,

since Stalin captured the leadership of the Communist Party of Russia, the history of the Revolution coincided with his biography. Therefore, in a way, a picture of Stalin's remarkable personality is interwoven in the texture of the canvas of this book. The entire strategy of the Revolution, with its masterfulness as well as serious defects, its initial success and ultimate debacle, described in this book, bears the *imprimatur* of the personality of Stalin—the most powerful personality of our time, and who as such could make or mar history. Undoubtedly, he wanted, and still wants, to make history. The Red Army was his creation, and but for that powerful instrument, Europe and Asia might be to-day groaning under the iron heels of Hitler. In so far as the destruction of the mechanised hordes of the modern Attila gave civilisation a chance of survival, the Russian Revolution has triumphed. Stalin has made history. But history must go ahead. The Russian Revolution has failed to keep pace with it. Stalin is ageing, though rather prematurely. History will not stop at the nearing end of his career. It will survive one of its great makers, and also the revolution of our time.

M. N. Roy

SECTION ONE

A REVIEW AND PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION

TWENTY years ago,[1] the world experienced the most important event of modern history. It was the Russian Revolution. The event was the most important of our time because it opened up a new chapter of human history. Lately, doubt regarding the historical significance of the Russian Revolution has been gaining ground even among its ardent supporters and admirers. It was hailed from one side, and feared from the other, as the death-knell of Capitalism and the first triumph of the revolutionary forces striving for the establishment of Socialism.

The development in Russia during the last ten years (1927-37) bewildered many, discouraged some revolutionary enthusiasts and aroused hopes in the capitalist world. Twenty years later, very few people outside that country, however loyal supporters of the Revolution they may be, can claim to have a clear understanding of what is happening there. The recent arrests, trials and severe punishments of a large number of men and women, occupying high positions in administrative, industrial and political organisations of the country, have naturally added to the bewilderment. Staunch and tried supporters of the new experiment have been compelled to become critics, in many cases very bitter.

Taking all the conceivable necessities into consideration, one finds it difficult to explain why practically all the old leaders of the revolution should be eliminated, either politically or physically. It is very difficult to believe that they turned traitors to the revolution,[2] to the initial success of which they made their contributions, having had

[1] The first edition of this book was published in 1937 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Revolution.

[2] See Appendix A, Section I.

devoted their entire life in preparations for that success. On the other hand, it is equally difficult to believe that in a country swept by revolutionary idealism, power has been captured by a small group of people given to sadistic morbidity. The structure of the Russian Communist Party, its ideals and disinterested action in pursuance of its theory, should rule out a personal dictatorship or a bureaucratic regime.

As regards the crucial question whether the Russian Revolution has failed or succeeded *as a Socialist Revolution*, it is much too early to offer a definite answer in one way or the other. The arguments advanced in support of either contention have more or less force. But a conclusive judgment pronounced to-day in favour of either side is bound to be premature and prejudiced.

The historical significance and positive achievements of the Russian Revolution are to be estimated not by its immediate results. Because these, great as they are, do not necessarily preclude a line of development away from the goal of Socialism. It is not suggested that there is the least desire on the part of the leaders of the Revolution to strike out such a course. Personally, I reject emphatically the contention that the present leaders of the Russian Communist Party have quietly discarded the ideals they still publicly profess, or that, on its twentieth anniversary, the Soviet Union is in no way distinct from any other National State. There are many things apparently contradictory to full-fledged Socialism or unadulterated internationalism. All these regrettable things may not be altogether necessary. Some of them may be avoidable. But it is not a matter of detail. The crucial question is: Under the given conditions, internal as well as external, is it possible to follow any other policy?

No criticism, however dispassionate or sympathetic may be the motive, however firm may be the revolutionary conviction of the people advancing it, can claim relevancy unless the critics are able to suggest an alternative course

of action. Impractical criticism is no better than uncritical conformity.

Historically, it would be much too premature to pass the adverse judgment even if all the evidences in support of it were relevant and reliable. Granted that the economic structure and industrial organisation of the Soviet Union are not strictly according to the principles of Socialism, it does not necessarily follow that the revolution has disowned its original ideals. On the other hand, it is simply absurd to assert that the responsibility for the failure of the working class in other European countries to make a revolution belongs to those who captured the leadership of the Russian Communist Party after the death of Lenin and the downfall of Trotzky. Neither the slow progress towards genuine socialist economy, nor the retarded triumph of revolution in other countries is due to any subjective factor. The one as well as the other is historically determined, the former being the inevitable consequence of the latter.

This does not imply endorsement of the Trotzkyist theory of permanent revolution and the associated doctrine that Socialism cannot be built in one country. The contradiction of Trotzky's position is obvious. Of course, a country in the midst of a capitalist world cannot have a full-fledged socialist economy. But what is the working class in power in that country to do when revolution does not take place in other countries? Strict adherence to Trotzky's theory would demand of the working class in the revolutionary country to lay down the power rather than to carry on the work of economic reconstruction which must necessarily be contaminated to some extent by the surrounding capitalist conditions. This has necessarily taken place in the Soviet Union. But only revolutionary romanticists would have advocated the different course, which logically would have been to lay down the power.

The policy followed by the Russian Communist Party under the leadership of Stalin is eminently realistic; and

realism is the fundamental principle of Marxist philosophy. The proletariat with the aid of the peasantry captured power in Russia. The expectation that revolution would take place in other countries was not fulfilled. The joint effort of the capitalist world to defeat the Russian Revolution fortunately did not succeed. What was the leadership of the revolution to do in that situation? For a Marxist, the answer should be obvious: Carry on doing what can be done under the given conditions, while waiting for the revolution to take place in other countries, and doing whatever possible to hasten the process.

But a Marxist must bear still another consideration in mind. External aid may be useful, but unless the internal conditions of a country are favourable for the victory of the revolution, it can be of very little avail. A dispassionate view of things must bring us to the undesirable conclusion that the revolutionary movement did not succeed in other European countries because conditions necessary for the purpose were more or less absent there. By this it is not meant that Capitalism had not played out its progressive role; that the working class had not been driven to a position where it must bid for the capture of power with the object of reorganising society on the basis of a new mode of production. All the conditions of capitalist decay and disorganisation were more or less there. But the decisive factor in a revolutionary situation is the breakdown of the established state; that is the essential condition for the victory of the revolution. This condition has been absent in all the leading European countries except for a short period immediately after the war, and that also only in the Central European countries.

In the face of the danger of revolution, even the intensely nationalistic bourgeois states develop an international solidarity on the basis of class interest. So, the temporary breakdown of the capitalist State in Austria and Germany was quickly repaired with the help of those very powers which had contributed to the breakdown. The

result was the defeat of the working class in Germany. Once the perspective of an immediate revolution in any of the leading West-European countries disappeared, the development in Russia was predetermined. There is no use quarreling with history. Man makes history, but can do so only with the material available.

Already in 1921, the perspective of future development was sufficiently clear to Lenin. The New Economic Policy was not only a new policy for Russia. It was a new orientation for the entire international revolutionary movement. The policy of United Front was dictated by a long perspective of revolutionary development. Nor was the policy purely "economic" for Russia herself. For her, too, it was a new *political* policy. It is realised by very few even to-day that the policy inaugurated by the sagacity of Lenin implied quietly setting aside the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. From that time on, the social foundation of the revolutionary State was continually broadened to embrace classes which can be involved in a process of economic reconstruction such as, given the necessary political guarantee, would develop eventually into Socialism, but was not socialistic by itself. Only non-critical conformists can make the obviously absurd assertion that even to-day a socialist society has been established in the Soviet Union. We need not be ashamed of making that admission. Because, it does not mean that the Russian Revolution has miscarried itself. It has been as successful as it is possible to be under the given world conditions; and the success until now has been so great that it can be characterised as the most brilliant monument to the creative genius of man, in the realm of material progress.

A revolution is not made in a day. Society experiences not isolated instances of revolution, but entire periods of revolution. And the periods usually embrace centuries. It took the bourgeoisie more than two-hundred years to liquidate feudal social relations, and subvert the autocratic

State. Even the French Revolution, which represented the culminating point of the process, was not fully successful before nearly hundred years had passed after feudalism had been destroyed and monarchy overthrown by the Jacobins.

The historical significance of the Russian Revolution is that it opens the period of proletarian revolution. Only twenty years have passed. Is it not obviously premature to pass a conclusive judgment? Apparent setbacks, or even reaction, do not necessarily imply the defeat of a revolution which stands on the order of the day. The rise of Napoleon was *apparently* a victory of reaction. But at the same time, Napoleonism was the child of the revolution in asmuch as it destroyed feudalism in a number of leading European countries—a historically necessary task which could not be accomplished by the native social forces. So, what if the proletarian revolution of our day is going to have its Napoleonism? It may be a necessary stage.

Marx said that, with all its internal contradictions, decay and disintegration, Capitalism could carry on indefinitely unless the proletariat overthrew it. The proletariat is an international force. Therefore, it is not prescribed that the working class of one particular country must accomplish the revolutionary task in that country. It is quite conceivable that the process will take place on a really international scale, not according to the schematic idea of a simultaneous world revolution, but the proletariat victorious in one country, and having acquired sufficient strength in consequence of that victory, carrying the revolution to other countries where difficulties of the local conditions may prevent the native working class performing the task by itself. Indeed, that appears to be the perspective of the present international situation. And all the developments in Russia, the apparently nationalistic policy of the Soviet State, become comprehensible if we try to approach it from the point of view of this perspective of the present European situation.

It is contended by the opponents of Socialism that the Russian Revolution has revealed the fallacy of the Marxian reading of history. By analysing the development of the capitalist mode of production, Marx came to the conclusion that Socialism would be the logical consequence of that development. He further prophesied that Socialism would be established upon the overthrow of the decayed capitalist system by the proletariat. From the perspective of history it follows that the revolution should take place first in the most developed capitalist countries. According to the Marxist doctrine, the conditions for the success of the revolution are riper in those countries. With these arguments, the opponents of Socialism maintain that the Marxian theory regarding the internal mechanism of the capitalist mode of production is all wrong, and, consequently, the establishment of Socialism is not an historical necessity. Contrary to the prediction of Marx, the revolution took place in a country in a very backward stage of capitalist development, which fact proves, it is maintained, that revolutions are not inherent in the process of social progress, but are brought about forcibly by malicious or misguided minorities.

The experience of the Russian Revolution supplies arguments to another set of people who, while professing Marxism, have the tendency of relapsing into the utopian notion of Socialism combatted by Marx himself. These people seem to believe that Socialism can be established anywhere or at any time, if the working class, whatever may be its relative strength, can only manage to capture State power. These Marxists do not realise that their romantic idea of revolution corroborates the position taken up by the opponents of Marxism. On the one hand, it is identical with the contention of bourgeois economists that Socialism is not an historical necessity, but an ideal of naive humanitarians, or a mischievous plan hatched out of fanatical class hatred. On the other hand, the romantic interpretation of the success of the Russian Revolution falls

in line with the anarcho-syndicalist theory that a revolution is brought about by the determined action of an organised minority.

The history of the Russian Revolution bears out neither the contention of the bourgeois critics of Marxism, nor the revisionism of its uncritical admirers. As regards the former, the fault is not of the Marxian reading of history, but with their reading of Marxism. The Marxian outlook of history precludes predeterminism or any mechanical process of development. While forecasting the most probable line of development, it does not rule out unforeseen events, which may be pregnant of tremendous possibilities, taking place in consequence of more or less accidental combinations of circumstances. The Russian Revolution was such an event. It does not disprove the determinist laws of history discovered by Marx, any more than the formation of the solar system can be regarded as a negation of physical causality.

Moreover, Marx never pretended to cast the horoscope of humanity. He did not make any prophecy about the actual happening of the revolution. He simply said that it was bound to happen in the future as it had happened repeatedly in the past. All the arguments of the bourgeois critics of the Marxian conception of history become irrelevant as soon as the Russian Revolution is regarded in its correct historical significance. Strictly speaking, the Russian Revolution is not a proletarian revolution, not of the kind which, according to Marx, should begin in the most highly developed capitalist countries. The Russian Revolution was a belated bourgeois revolution. While opening up the era of proletarian revolution, it was the last event of the period of bourgeois revolution.

As a matter of fact, if we take the whole world into account, that period has not yet definitely come to a close. In many countries, the bourgeois revolution is still to take place. For a time, the leaders of the Russian Revolution lost the Marxian historical perspective, and forgot that

history develops unequally. Lately, they seem to have regained the historical sense; and curiously enough, for this welcome reversion to realism, they are accused of having deviated from Marxism. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of Russia, the revolutionary working class throughout the world is to-day fighting with the significant slogan "Defence of Democracy". In Spain, the Communist Party is leading the working class in a revolutionary struggle for democratic freedom. Spain is in the throes of a democratic revolution. In China, the slogans of the proletarian revolution have been set aside so that the working class may take its rightful place in the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary system.

Since the Russian Revolution, historically, and to a very large extent actually, was not a proletarian revolution, it does not in any way disprove the correctness of the Marxian perspective of history. But this defence of Marxism shocks the orthodoxy of the romantic Marxists who believe that the success of the Russian Revolution has proved the anti-Marxist notion that a revolution can be made to order. The lessons drawn from the experience of the Russian Revolution should enable us to develop Marxism on the basis of the principles laid down by its founder. The lesson is that revolutions cannot be classified strictly into a limited number of categories. One revolution may have the bourgeois as well as the proletarian character; and this is bound to happen when it takes place in a transition period of history. The Russian Revolution is of this mixed type. We cannot mechanically put a label on it. If that is done, we are sure to have a distorted view of things and fail to appreciate its achievements correctly.

Another lesson of the Russian Revolution is that the social character of the revolutionary State is not theoretically predetermined. Experience has shown that denial of formal parliamentary democracy need not necessarily be expressed through the dictatorship of the proletariat; that a new type of a revolutionary State, unforeseen in the

Marxian theory, may arise under certain circumstances. In other words, the experience of the Russian Revolution has demonstrated that, in the circumstances in which it took place, the State created by it was a dictatorship in so far as it rejected formal parliamentary democracy, but, on the other hand, it was not the dictatorship of the proletariat in the strict theoretical sense, because it had a broader social foundation. These lessons are perfectly compatible with the Marxian theory of State, the fundamental principle of which is that the social character of the State is determined by the class composition of the forces involved in the revolution.

Still another lesson is that, under certain circumstances, the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a necessary condition for the establishment of Socialism. This, perhaps, is the most far-reaching lesson to be derived from the experience of the Russian Revolution. Only on the strength of this lesson is it possible to reject the contention that the Russian Revolution has disproved the Marxian theory of history. Because, what is implicit in Marxian theory is that proletarian dictatorship can be established as the transition to Socialism only in the most advanced capitalist countries. Marx did not say that, in the twentieth century, revolutions could take place only in the highly developed capitalist countries. Therefore, the revolution taking place in Russia before England or Germany, was no more excluded from the Marxian perspective of history than a revolution taking place in China or in India. The Russian Revolution belongs to a different period of history. It would be erroneous to regard it as in priority in the scheme of revolutions belonging to a different period. What happened in 1917 was not a proletarian revolution taking place in an industrially backward country, instead of where it should have taken place according to the Marxian perspective of history. It was a bourgeois-democratic revolution taking place in a country which, though sufficiently advanced in the process of capitalist develop-

ment, had not yet passed through the bourgeois revolution. Being historically a bourgeois-democratic revolution, it could take place before proletarian revolutions in other countries. Of course, Marxism does not say that the proletarian revolution could not have taken place in industrially advanced countries before the Russian Revolution. We are living in a period of transition in which revolutions of different character, belonging to two different periods of history, are bound to overlap.

The thesis that the State created by the Russian Revolution was not a proletarian dictatorship, even when it claimed that character, will be established in a following chapter. Preparatory to that, it is necessary to state facts which disclose the real nature of the Revolution.

What is known as the February Revolution was a bourgeois revolution of the classical type. The movement causing the downfall of the monarchy was led by the Constitutional Democrats, the party of the big bourgeoisie. Before long, the leadership of the revolution passed on to the petit-bourgeoisie; that means, the social character of the revolution still remained bourgeois. When the working class occupied the centre of the stage, even then the character was not changed except on the surface. It appeared on the scene and captured the leadership of the revolution with the slogan "Peace, Land and Bread". The slogan represented neither the sentiment nor the demands of any particular class. It represented the sentiment and the demands of the entire people with the exception of the feudal aristocracy and military adherents of the overthrown monarchy.

Thus, when the working class captured the leadership of the revolution, it did so without in any way transforming its social character and historical role. As a matter of fact, until July even the Bolsheviks, including Lenin himself, did not conceive of the possibility of the revolution developing as it subsequently did. The demand for the Constituent Assembly was not a mere propagandist slogan.

Even the Bolsheviks were striving for the establishment of the broadest form of parliamentary democracy. The counter-revolutionary *coup* of the Cossack General Kornilov was warded off by the proletariat under the leadership of the Bolsheviks in defence of democracy.

The Bolsheviks conceived the idea of capturing power only when the genius of Lenin perceived that the decisive condition for the possible success in that effort was maturing. The State apparatus was breaking down; the army was disintegrating, having suffered severe defeats on the front. The failure of the petit-bourgeois government of Kerenski to introduce any agrarian reform had accentuated the discontent of the peasantry. So, the perspective was that, while there would be practically no resistance to the proletariat bidding to capture State power, it could count on the support of the peasantry. "Bread" was the demand of the urban toilers; "peace" and "land" were the demands of the peasantry. And it was with these slogans that the revolution became victorious. "Land to the peasant" is not the programme of the proletarian revolution. The Great French Revolution fought for this programme. The fact that in Russia the revolution with an identical programme came under the leadership of the working class did not change its social character. It was an accident of history.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL BASIS OF THE SOVIET STATE

ALTHOUGH the Bolsheviks began bidding for power with the slogan "Bread, Land and Peace", the factor that united the majority of the people in a revolutionary upheaval was the desire to put an end to the war which had meant wholesale death and destruction, unmitigated by the satisfaction of victory. Defeat after defeat had not only demoralised the army, which constituted the mainstay of the Tzarist State; they had greatly impaired the prestige of the monarchy and the classes allied with it. The defeats on the front were due not so much to the strength of the enemy as to bad organisation and corruption at home. In hundreds of thousands, peasants and workers were sent to the fronts to defend the fatherland against foreign invasion; but they were not properly equipped for the purpose. The discontent against the corrupt Court which paralysed national defence, and the inefficiency of those entrusted with the organisation of supply, were first felt by the officers of the lower ranks. Consequently, there was demoralisation in the army; and discipline began to disappear. The discontent spread to the ranks.

At that psychological moment, the news of the Tzar's abdication reached the fronts. The soldiers, recruited mostly from the peasantry, had been taught to identify the State with the Tzar. The passing of the Tzar, therefore, meant to them the end of all government. While coming to fight for the fatherland, they had left behind what little belonged to themselves. In the absence of any government, who was to protect that? So, they were eager to go home to look after their families and whatever little they possessed. The downfall of the Tzar deprived the war of all meaning. They had been sent to fight for the Tzar.

He was gone. So, the war must also end. On the other hand, the idea that with the Tzar the government had also disappeared freed the soldiers from the fear of authority which alone maintains discipline imposed from above. Consequently, there began mass desertions. The demand for peace, put forward by the Bolsheviks, was the concrete expression of the prevailing sentiment and, therefore, hastened the process of the disintegration of the army and breakdown of the State.

As a matter of fact, Lenin conceived the idea of capturing power only when the news of the disruptive development at the fronts began to reach the rear. The Kerensky Government was swept away not so much by an organised revolutionary action on the part of the proletariat as by the insubordination of the army. The downfall of Kerensky was due to his effort to disregard the popular demand for peace. It is not correct to say that his efforts to continue the war were inspired by the motive of checking revolutionary developments at home. He acted as a petit-bourgeois patriot, eager to organise resistance against foreign invasion. He was not a conscious counter-revolutionary. The German armies were sweeping in and were sure to occupy the major part of Russia, if there was no military resistance. A misguided patriot, he acted as an instrument of the Entente Powers who wanted to check the German conquest of Russia.

But whatever might be his purpose or the pretext for acting as he did, Kerensky undertook to do the impossible. He wanted to continue the war when the army was clamouring for peace. And he failed to do what might have enabled him to succeed in his undertaking. Under the pressure of the reactionary upper classes, who had placed him in power, he went back on the programme of his own party to give land to the peasants. Had he done that, the peasants might possibly be persuaded to go back to the front, no longer to fight for the Tzar, but for the defence of their new possession. Kerensky's Napoleonism

proved to be an abortion, because the revolutionary foundation on which French Napoleonism flourished was not laid in Russia. The Jacobins had given land to the peasants; in return, these supplied Napoleon with soldiers. In Russia, Jacobinism rose only after the downfall of Kerensky, which was brought about, like the downfall of the monarchy, by military defeat and disintegration of the army.

When Kerensky, in power, foolishly went back on the fundamental clause of the programme of his party, the Bolsheviks came forward with the slogan "Land to the Peasants". So they began the struggle for the capture of power rather as the revolutionary vanguard of the peasantry than of the proletariat; and they succeeded only when they had secured the support of the peasant masses. The signal for insurrection was given by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party only after it had captured a majority in the Congress of Peasant's Soviets. And that strategic position was captured not under the banner of Socialism, not as a conquest of the proletarian revolution, but by insisting on the fulfilment of the bourgeois revolution, namely, abolition of feudalism, not in favour of the collective ownership of land, but for giving the land to the cultivator.

Kerensky's effort to counter the general demand for peace had transformed mass desertion into a rebellion against authority. The slogan "Land to the Peasants" strengthened the desire for peace. The soldiers were eager to return home not only to defend the little they had left, but to take possession of more. Moved by a powerful new incentive, they were ready to break down any authority which would send them back to the front.

Originally, they wanted to flee towards home, throwing away their guns, as unnecessary encumbrances, and to ensure disguise. In the new situation, they decided to take the guns along—first to fight their way through, and then to defend their new possession back home more effectively.

Thus, out of the disintegration of the army, brought about by the breakdown of the decayed and corrupt monarchist State, there arose an unexpected revolutionary force, which helped the Bolsheviks to defend their position of power in Petrograd and Moscow, in the meantime captured by the proletariat, the former with the aid of mutineer marines. The capture of the capital cities was mainly due to the fact that they were without any organised authority, and there was no counter-revolutionary force to put up an effective resistance.

This does not in any way minimise the revolutionary determination of the Bolsheviks and the great heroism of the workers who captured power. But in view of the hisorical facts, we must come to the conclusion that the triumph of the Bolsheviks was due mainly to extraordinarily favourable objective conditions. Indeed, according to a correct understanding of Marxist revolutionary strategy, so cleverly practised by Lenin, insurrection can be successful only under such a favourable combination of objective circumstances. The Bolsheviks organised the insurrection; but they did not undertake the task before they were satisfied that it could possibly be accomplished in the given relation of forces. The main point to be borne in mind is that they did not undertake the task relying solely on the proletariat. Before it appeared certain that power captured in the capital cities could be maintained, thanks to the possibility of a considerable number of soldiers coming over to the side of the revolutionary peasantry, inspired with the prospect of owning the land they cultivated, the Bolsheviks did not give the signal for insurrection which placed the working class in power in Petrograd and Moscow.

The Soviets constituted the basic units of the revolutionary State; they were councils of workers', peasants' and soldiers' deputies. In an overwhelmingly agricultural country like Russia, the proletariat, except in the industrial centres, could not possibly have majorities in the Soviets.

The soldiers were mostly peasants. Consequently, outside the industrial districts, the Soviets were bound to be dominated by the peasantry, and as such could not be very dependable instruments for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the earlier stages of the revolution, efforts were made to prevent peasant predominance of the Soviets, on the one hand, by enfranchising only the poorer strata of the peasantry, and, on the other hand, by allotting a larger quota of delegates to the workers. But in the villages, even those precautions could not guarantee proletarian majorities in the Soviets. There was simply no proletariat in the village. So, taking the country as a whole, the revolutionary State could not be called a proletarian dictatorship in the strict sense of the term. As a matter of fact, it was called the Workers' and Peasant' Republic.

Proletarian dictatorship was established in industrial centres, particularly in Petrograd and Moscow. But it was rested upon the support of the peasantry, given through the Soviets throughout the country. The social structure of the country determined the nature of the revolutionary State. In so far as the initiative for capturing power was taken by the party of the proletariat, the central State organisation assumed the character of a dictatorship of that class. Traditionally accustomed to accept the authority of the government established in Petrograd and Moscow, the peasantry throughout the country recognised the new government in Moscow as the central authority. That looked like the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat throughout the country.

But the proletarian dictatorship, visualised in the Marxist theory of State as a transitional feature in the process of development of the revolution, is not a relation between the working class and the peasantry. The victorious proletariat exercises dictatorial power in relation to the bourgeoisie which, overthrown from political power and deprived of economic privileges, are sure to carry on subversive activities against the new State. The Soviets

set up by the Russian Revolution in rural areas were rather organs of the revolutionary peasantry engaged in the task of beating down the vanquished forces of feudalism than dictatorship of the proletariat. As a matter of fact, the peasantry, whose revolutionary action guaranteed the success of the revolution, were not at all concerned with the class character of the State established in the capital cities, nor were they sympathetic to the socialist programme of the Bolshevik Party.

It was an alliance of two classes fighting on two different fronts, with two different revolutionary ideals belonging to two periods of history. The forces fighting for the ideal of Socialism were limited to a small part of the country, while in the rest of the country the revolution was predominantly of bourgeois-democratic character. And it was the victory on that wide front on which the peasantry was fighting for the programme of bourgeois-democratic revolution that secured the triumph of the revolution as a whole. Organised and led by the Bolshevik Party, the civil war was fought and won by the peasants, and the peasants fought to defend the land that revolution had given to them. They were fighting against the Tzarist Generals whose victory would mean the return of the landlords. Therefore, the battles fought on the front, where the fate of the revolution was decided, were battles between the revolutionary peasantry and feudalism.

The Soviet State, established on the basis of such a class relation in the revolutionary struggle, could not be a proletarian dictatorship. It was established by a revolutionary alliance of the workers and peasants, and therefore could not be the dictatorship of one class. The leadership of the Communist Party was not the dictatorship of the proletariat. The party was leading two classes in the revolutionary struggle. Through it, the working class acted as the driving force of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. But the class primarily involved in the revolution was the peasantry, after the bourgeoisie had declined

to play their revolutionary role. This being the relation of classes underlying the revolutionary alliance, the Soviet State, while retaining formally the title of proletarian dictatorship, virtually represented the establishment of a new type of democracy in which political power was actually exercised by the great majority of the population.

CHAPTER III

DEFEAT OF THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE

JUST as the breakdown of the established State and the consequent disorganisation of all its branches enabled the Bolshevik Party to capture power, just so, a similarly favourable combination of external factors made it possible for them to retain it. The news of events in Russia terrified the Allied Powers. They had welcomed the downfall of Tzarism, hoping that the new bourgeois government would be able to conduct the war more efficiently. But when the revolution swept away the bourgeois government, hope was replaced by fear and anxiety.

After the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk, the Soviet Government was regarded as an enemy of the Allied Powers, and to engineer its overthrow became a part of the plan "for making the world safe for democracy". But the problem was how to do that. The Russian counter-revolutionaries were unable to accomplish the task. They required external aid which, under the given international circumstances, could not be made available to them. All the resources of the Allied Powers had to be concentrated on the Western front to check the last desperate German offensive, which was undertaken with troops released by the suspension of large-scale operations in the East. Germany was the only external force which could come immediately and effectively to the aid of the Russian counter-revolutionaries. But the menace of German intervention was partially checked by the sagacity of Lenin, who had the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk concluded in the face of the opposition of many other Bolshevik leaders.

That brilliant strategic move served three far-reaching revolutionary purposes. In the first place, the general demand of the Russian peasantry for peace was fulfilled. The new government thereby won the confidence of the

peasant masses which, since then, became the bulwark of the revolution. Released from the military service at the front, hundreds of thousands of trained soldiers were scattered throughout the country, to bear arms for the defence of the revolution. In the second place, her expansionist ambition at least partially satisfied by territorial concessions made in the Treaty, Germany relaxed the offensive in the East, thus giving the new government in Russia the breathing space for entrenching itself. The third purpose served was to keep the Allied Powers busy with checking the German offensive in the West and thus to make it impossible for them to intervene actively in Russian affairs in favour of the counter-revolution. The cumulative effect was that, until the middle of 1919, the Soviet Government did not have to face any greater resistance than that of the native forces of counter-revolution, which were disorganised and demoralised. The farther extremities of the defunct empire remained under the control of counter-revolutionary armies helped with supplies from abroad and reinforced by foreign expeditionary forces. But the revolutionary government had time enough to entrench itself in the heart of the country, and thus there was created an impregnable base from where the forces of revolution could operate advantageously and beat back the hordes of international counter-revolution.

The Bolsheviks captured power with the expectation of revolution breaking out in Western Europe, particularly in Germany. In the beginning, that expectation appeared to be on the point of being fulfilled. The next year saw the downfall of the German monarchy. The Austrian Empire disintegrated in consequence of severe military defeats. There was a revolution in Hungary. But in none of these countries the situation was quite favourable for the triumph of the revolution. In Germany, the revolution failed to go beyond the establishment of a parliamentary democratic State. Upon the downfall of the monarchy, the bourgeoisie with the aid of the army could

take possession of the State machinery and prevent its complete breakdown as in Russia. The Treaty of Brest-Litowsk had given time to the revolutionary Soviet Government to organise and entrench itself for beating down counter-revolutionary resistance. In Germany, the termination of war meant an accession of strength for counter-revolution, which was reinforced by the army released from service at the fronts.

As a matter of fact, the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk, which was so very helpful for the triumph of revolution in Russia, proved to be harmful for the revolution in Germany. But that was only a secondary and contributory cause. The main cause for the defeat of the revolution in Germany was the existence of a powerful bourgeoisie which, thanks to the co-operation of the Social-Democratic Party, and the conservativeness of a fairly well-to-do class of peasant proprietors, could reorganise the partially dislocated State machinery and set it going ruthlessly against the revolution. In other words, the main cause for the defeat of the revolution was the fact that the peasantry was not involved in a subversive movement and the great bulk of the working class was not prepared to go beyond the establishment of a parliamentary democratic State. The Social-Democratic Party could not have "betrayed" the revolution if the majority of the organised workers following its leadership were determined to go ahead. They rejected proletarian dictatorship in favour of parliamentary democracy. That is a lesson of history which revolutionaries should not forget.

Objective conditions for the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, as visualised by Marx as a contingency of the transition period, existed in Germany more acutely than in any other country. Nor can we attribute the failure to the absence of a revolutionary party of the working class. The left wing of the Social-Democratic Party, which during the revolutionary crisis operated as the Spartakists, was no less revolutionary than the Russian

Bolsheviks. There was no Lenin in Germany; but Marxists do not believe that history is made by great men. Then, who knows that Rosa Luxemburg would not have played the role if the stage was set in Germany as it was in Russia?

In Hungary the revolution collapsed not only because of the absence of a competent leadership. That defect was undoubtedly there. But the real cause of the defeat of the Hungarian revolution was foreign military intervention. The other cause was the hostility of the peasantry. In Bavaria also, the revolution was killed by the peasantry. And the French army of occupation in the Palatinate was the standing menace. If necessary, it would have marched in to overthrow the revolutionary government just as the Rumanian army did in the case of Hungary.

Thus, owing to the absence of the favourable internal and external conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to capture and retain power in Russia, their expectation of the revolution breaking out successfully in other countries was not fulfilled. In that deplorable international situation, the Russian Soviet Government naturally appeared as the vanguard of the international revolutionary movement. Nevertheless, its social character and revolutionary functions, as far as Russia itself was concerned, had to be adjusted to the conditions of the country. In spite of the fact that it succeeded under the leadership of a working class party, the Russian Revolution is not to be regarded strictly as the first act of the drama of proletarian world revolution. Nor was the Russian proletariat, when it captured power, qualified to be the leader of the proletarian world revolution. Lenin himself knew it and did not make a secret of it. He always said that, as soon as the revolution was successful in a West-European country, Russia would recede to the background. The delay of the proletarian revolution in countries where it should have taken place earlier could not change the social character of the Russian Revolution. On the other hand, it is precisely owing to the failure of the proletariat to capture power in

more advanced industrial countries, that the Russian Revolution opened up a new perspective of the establishment of Socialism, not expressly indicated by Marx.

The new perspective opened up already in 1920, when the New Economic Policy was introduced. It meant surrender of the *dictatorship* of the proletariat, while the *leadership* of the working class party remained. As a matter of fact, the virtual surrender of the dictatorship enabled the working class party to establish its leadership over the peasant masses without whose support the revolution could not be successful. The New Economic Policy was to sacrifice the immediate interests of the proletariat, so that substantial concessions could be made to the peasantry as well as to the petty traders. The New Economic Policy implied that the socialist mode of production could not be introduced before the country had been industrialised on a large scale, for which purpose the capitalist mode of production had to be restored.

It was not a retreat. That was the only possible line of *advance* under the given conditions of the country. We can profitably remember Lenin's memorable speech introducing the new policy in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. Addressing those who were afraid that the dictatorship of the proletariat would be weakened by the new policy, he said: "We want dictatorship of the proletariat. But where is the proletariat? Ours is an industrially backward country. The proletariat was always very small numerically. Most of it have been killed, either in the war or in the revolution. And in the latter case, the most advanced elements have been the victims. So, if we want to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, let us begin by creating the proletariat. And for that purpose we shall have to adopt any policy that will hasten the industrialisation of our country. The policy advocated by me will serve that purpose." This is not a verbatim quotation. But that is the substance and the spirit of the memorable speech.

That turning point in the development of the Russian Revolution was reached not only under the pressure of internal conditions, but also in consequence of the international situation. Given the conditions of the country, the Russian Revolution could not *by itself* develop as a *pure* proletarian revolution. When Lenin said that upon the capture of power by the proletariat in more advanced capitalist countries the Russian Revolution would recede to the background, he meant that in that case Russia would become a secondary factor in the world socialist economy. In the situation where she actually found herself, it was necessary to strike out an independent line of development. She had to create the conditions which would enable her to establish Socialism without the aid of the victorious proletariat in more advanced capitalist countries—even when Socialism was not established in those countries. The object of the New Economic Policy was to create those conditions. The expectation of the proletariat capturing power in the more advanced capitalist countries having receded farther, the Russian Revolution must fall back on its own resources.

But that was not done before the final effort was made to help the proletariat in West-European countries to capture power and thus shift the responsibility of leading the Socialist Revolution on others objectively more qualified for the rôle. Germany was the country where objective conditions for the success of revolution still appeared to be favourable. Military defeat had accentuated the economic crisis. The conditions of the working class were growing worse. Even the peasantry were feeling the pinch. But the army had not joined the revolution. Why not fill up that gap from outside? In Russia, the revolution had already created an army which could be placed at the disposal of the German working class. On the other hand, the Allied Powers had begun to intervene actively in Russia. In the earlier part of 1920, the military position of the Soviet Government appeared to be very precarious.

In that situation, it became necessary to make a desperate effort to promote revolution in Western Europe. But the defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw brought that initial chapter of the Russian Revolution definitely to a close. The perspective of world revolution disappeared for the time being. The Russian Revolution was left alone to look for itself.

The immediate task was to win the civil war. That could not be done by direct military operations. The counter-revolutionary armies, closing in upon the centre of the country from all sides, were very well equipped and liberally supplied by international Capitalism. Frontal attack would be disastrous. The Red Army was very badly equipped. Morale alone cannot win battles. Soldiers were not only without boots and coats, but many of them had no guns, and all of them very little to eat. The only effective strategy in that situation was guerilla operation, and for that purpose active support of the peasantry was essential. Peace and land had won the support of the peasantry. But in the meantime, much of it had been alienated by "War Communism". The New Economic Policy gave the peasants full right of ownership of the product of the land they cultivated. They were no longer obliged to deliver their crop to the common stock. They were given the right to sell their produce in the open market and thus derive greater benefit from increased produce. The new policy regained the confidence of the peasantry and consequently contributed to the organisation of effective resistance to foreign military intervention. Once again the peasantry proved to be the decisive factor. It was with their aid that the proletariat had captured power; and it was again the peasantry which won the civil war.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

DICTATED by the disappearance of the perspective of immediate revolution in the industrially advanced countries of Europe, the New Economic Policy of the Soviet Government provoked differences of opinion inside the ranks of the Communist Party about the immediate tasks of the revolution and the perspective of its development. Those who had believed that the victory of the revolution under the leadership of a working class party would mean the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the direct beginning of the construction of Socialism, regarded the new policy as a deviation from the programme of the party. They opposed the policy of making concessions to the petit-bourgeoisie (rural as well as urban) and of prospective compromise with the capitalist mode of production. Lenin's answer to them was: "Whoever expects a 'pure' social revolution will never live to see it. Such a person pays lip service to revolution without understanding what revolution is." Lenin, obviously, meant a pure socialist revolution. In no revolution, the parties involved are arrayed strictly according to an immutable scheme of class distinction. In industrially backward countries particularly, the line of differentiation is bound to be zigzag and shifting.

In his famous book on "Left Wing Communism", which he condemned as an "infantile sickness", Lenin indicated the perspective of the revolutionary development in Russia as well as abroad. He wrote: "We in Russia have been convinced by long and bloody experience of the truth that revolutionary tactics cannot be built up on revolutionary words alone. Tactics must be based on a sober and strictly objective estimation of all the class forces in a given State (in neighbouring States and in all States, that

is, on a world scale) as well as on an evaluation of the experience of revolutionary movements." Lenin was not deviating from Marxism in the least. He demonstrated extraordinary realism, and thus won the distinction of the greatest revolutionary leader of our time. He could act as he did because of his clear understanding of the Marxian analysis of class relations in a revolutionary crisis, which alone enables one to follow a really Marxian revolutionary tactics.

The first programme of proletarian revolution had been adopted by the German Social-Democratic Party. According to the Programme of Gotha, "the liberation of labour must be the work of the working class, opposed to which all other classes form merely a homogeneous reactionary mass." Criticising that mechanical view of class relations, Marx wrote that it was a mistake to regard the middle class—artisans, small industrialists, peasants, etc., —"as a homogeneous reactionary mass." Lenin saw that in the given situation in Russia it was indispensable for the working class to secure the co-operation of the non-proletarian masses in order to secure the victory of the revolution. And what he proposed was not an opportunist alliance. The new policy was based on the recognition that, under the given situation, the urban as well as rural middle classes were integral parts of the social basis of the revolution. Therefore, he ridiculed the "left-wingers" for their insistence on "pure" social revolution.

The Russian Revolution was not a pure proletarian revolution. The State established by it, even in the beginning, was not the dictatorship of the proletariat in the strictest sense of the term. After the introduction of the New Economic Policy, its social foundation was broadened progressively. The social foundation of the State was a revolutionary alliance of the workers and the petit-bourgeoisie (including the peasantry) against the feudal aristocracy and big capitalists. One of the fundamental lessons of the Russian Revolution is that the establishment of

proletarian dictatorship is not an indispensable condition for the construction of Socialism.

Lenin carried the party with him. But he died before the entire party had been fully convinced of the correctness of his strategy. Trotzky appeared as the leader of the dissenters. As a matter of fact, even when Lenin was alive, Trotzky had remained sceptical about the new line. But Lenin's leadership was supreme. Trotzky's theory of permanent revolution rejected the realistic view of class relations formulated by Marx already in 1875. The theory advocated by Trotzky even before the Russian Revolution, in opposition to Lenin and the Bolsheviks, regarded the peasantry as the reserve force of counter-revolution. Of course, Trotzky also differentiated the semi-proletarian landless peasantry from the upper strata of their class. But that was a mechanical approach to the problem. It was a wrong approach as well. The peasantry was regarded as the enemy. It should be destroyed, only by instalments. This apparently revolutionary theory became extremely dangerous for the revolution in a country where the revolution, even under the leadership of the proletariat, could not undertake socialist construction without the co-operation of the peasantry.

The fundamental purpose of the New Economic Policy was to industrialise the country so that, on the one hand, the working class could grow numerically and, on the other hand, preconditions for establishment of Socialism be created. The capital necessary for the purpose could be had only from the surplus produce of the premier industry, which was agriculture. Russia was not yet in a position to manufacture machinery required for the programme of rapid industrialisation. It had to be imported. The problem was of payment. International trade bills are seldom paid in cash. In those days, the Soviet Government was not at all in a position to pay its bills in cash. The urgently needed means of production could be imported from abroad only by stimulating exports; and in those

days, Russia could export only the produce of agriculture and allied industries. So, a relentless warfare against the peasantry, according to the theory of permanent revolution, was incompatible with the purpose of creating conditions for the establishment of Socialism in Russia.

The poor and landless peasantry constituted the majority of the class. But they controlled only a small fraction of agricultural production. Import could be stimulated only by persuading the upper strata of the peasantry to increase their production. And that could be done only by conceding to them the right of ownership of the produce of the land held by them. In other words, private trade in the produce of the primary industry of the country had to be allowed so that the revolutionary State could be socially reinforced, and modern industries quickly built under its control, as an integral part of socialist construction.

The economic concessions made to the peasantry *as a whole,* not for making an opportunist alliance, but as a token of the recognition of their revolutionary significance in the given situation, inevitably had a political counterpart. Larger and larger numbers of peasants were enfranchised. The kulaks, that is, the rich peasants, still remained formally deprived of the franchise, but economic freedom enabled them to exercise considerable influence over the local Soviets. While the State kept strict vigilance over their activities and all pronounced counter-revolutionary tendencies were suppressed, the general policy was to make the rich peasants, occupying the strategic sector of the agricultural industry, feel that they were not molested under the new regime. The influence of the Bolshevik Party was extended to the villages by admitting an increasing number of peasants into its fold, which theoretically should be the monopoly of the proletariat. The process went so far as to drive some old Bolshevik leaders into the opposition and make common cause with Trotzky, whom they had combatted previously.

The defeat of Trotzky did not put an end to the conflict of opinion inside the Bolshevik Party. After Trotzky, Zinoviev and Kamenev appeared as the leaders of new opposition against the "transformation of the Bolshevik Party into a peasants' party". The new opposition was also bound to be defeated, because it disapproved of the logical consequences of the New Economic Policy, which had been accepted by the party as a whole. If the party was really being transformed into a peasants' party, the process simply reflected the necessary shifting of class relations in the course of the development of the revolution. Therefore, the process could not be checked, unless the New Economic Policy was discarded. And that would mean disruption of the revolutionary alliance of classes which constituted the social foundation of the Soviet State.

The world has been puzzled by the fact that, in course of time, one old Bolshevik leader after another came out in opposition to the policy of the party ever since Stalin succeeded Lenin as its leader. The elimination of the "Old Guard" from the leadership of the party was ascribed to Stalin's love for power and bureaucratic control of the party machinery. The real reason for these facts, however, was the exigencies of the revolution. The opposition of old leaders was due to their failure to understand the nature of the revolution. They expected "a pure social revolution", and therefore were doomed never to see it, as Lenin had predicted. Blind loyalty to an ideal made them unable to find the path that alone led to the ideal. Under the given conditions of the country, the proletariat alone could not undertake the task of constructing Socialism. The effort to establish a pure dictatorship of the proletariat was bound to fail. Lenin had written that "Socialism cannot be victorious unless it introduces complete democracy" (*Socialist Revolution and the Right of Self-Determination*). In those days, the task of the revolution was to create preconditions for socialist construction. Producing classes other than the proletariat

were interested in the accomplishment of that task. Therefore, even if hostile to Socialism, under the given situation, they were revolutionary factors in so far as the accomplishment of that task was concerned. They had to be given their rightful place in the political regime and the scheme of economic reconstruction.

The Five Years' Plan and the brilliant success of its execution have commanded the admiration of the world—even from those who are not friendly to the political regime in Russia. Strictly speaking, the accomplishment of the Five Years' Plan was only a preparation for the establishment of Socialism; nevertheless it can be regarded as an integral part of the process of socialist construction. But the successful introduction of planned economy was possible only after the country had been sufficiently industrialised in consequence of the execution of the New Economic Policy. Prosperity of the peasantry, constituting the bulk of the population, was the primary condition for a quick development of industry and a rapid exchange of commodities, resulting in the accumulation of capital necessary for the production of the means of production. The New Economic Policy, stimulating agricultural production, brought about two very salutary consequences. Firstly, expansion of export enabled the Soviet Government to re-equip the battered industrial plants by importing new machinery; and that increased the production of manufactured commodities demanded by the peasantry in exchange of their produce. Secondly, expansion of agricultural produce brought down the price of food stuff; that enabled State-owned industries to carry on with lower wages without causing much hardship for the workers. The result was larger accumulation of capital which quickened the process of industrialisation.

The years of 1925 to 1928 were the period of remarkable economic improvement and consequently of political stability. General economic improvement meant increased production of national wealth, which constituted the

foundation of planned economy. Thus, the New Economic Policy, while representing the recognition of the fact that the Russian Revolution was not a pure Socialist Revolution, did not, on the other hand, mean betrayal of the interest of the working class or rejection of Communism in favour of Capitalism.

The years-long controversy over the nature of Soviet economy was largely academic. The question was not of theory, but of actual experience. Owing to peculiar national and international conditions, a new type of economy developed in the Soviet Union, which could not be fitted into any preconceived theoretical pattern. It was neither capitalist nor socialist. It contained elements of Capitalism, while it was a process of socialist construction. The question to be answered was not whether Soviet economy was capitalist or socialist; the question was whether under the given conditions the revolution could immediately create any other form of economy than it did create. Those who regarded the economic development in the Soviet Union after the Communist Party came under Stalin's leadership as degeneration into Capitalism, supported their point of view with the purely theoretical assertion that Socialism could not be built in one country. The argument was altogether irrelevant. And the attitude of those advancing the argument was defeatist.

The working class in alliance with the peasantry captured power in one country. The revolution did not spread to other countries. In that situation, Socialism could not be established in Russia. What was the revolutionary government to do? What should be the economic policy of the party of the proletariat? Theory would not help. The coat had to be cut according to the cloth available. The policy must be determined by the regard for the realities of the situation. What could be done, was the only thing to do. Since Socialism could not be established and the classes in power were not interested in Capitalism, a new type of economy was bound to develop.

The line of social development is not theoretically predetermined. Marxism gives us a perspective of history, but it does not make a rigid scheme for the future. It does not exclude unforeseen developments. The Russian experience helps us to grasp the true relation between theory and practice.

A dogmatic adherence to the theoretically correct dictum that Socialism cannot be built in one country would compel the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to act as no sane group of people could act. It should lay down power and go back to emigration where it could preserve the pristine purity of its theories. Meanwhile, counter-revolution would triumph in Russia. This is no caricature. It would be the logical conclusion of the argument advanced by "Marxist" critics of Soviet economy like Trotzky and his followers.

Former opponents of Trotzky, like Zinoviev, Kamenev and others, who had rejected the theory of permanent revolution, also failed to have due regard for the class relations which constituted the background, and contributed to the triumph, of the Russian Revolution. Therefore, they were eliminated from the leadership of the party, in which they had occupied prominent places before and after the revolution. The point of their argument was that, since Socialism could not be built in one country, the economic policy of the Soviet Union was a deviation towards Capitalism. Granted that the danger of the deviation was there, could that be avoided if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remained under the leadership of Trotzky and Zinoviev, instead of preferring that of Stalin? The opposition, while demanding the rejection of the policy, did not offer an alternative.

Another implication of its argument was that more attention should be devoted to the task of promoting revolution in other countries than to the task of the economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union. That was simply

vulgarisation of internationalism, done with demagogic purposes.

For one thing, the Communist International was there to look after that task. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union all along supported the activities of the C. I. Therefore, the charge that, under the leadership of Stalin, the Communist Party of Russia paid only lip service to the cause of world revolution, was utterly unfounded. Revolution cannot be brought about only by propaganda and agitation. If revolution in other countries depended only on the wish of the Communist Party of Russia, it could be easily brought about. Because, there was no reason for the C. P. S. U. not to have that wish. On the contrary, revolution in other countries would be so very welcome even for the "nationalist" purposes of the Soviet Union that it should be only too willing to promote it by all means at its disposal. The cautious and compromising character of Soviet diplomacy was criticised and even condemned as dictated rather by "nationalist" interest than by considerations of the international proletarian solidarity. That charge was equally baseless, being made by those who did not understand that one could not always do what should be done, but only do what could be done under the given situation.

Secondly, there might be more than one way of promoting the world revolution. It could not be expected to proceed strictly according to a predetermined plan or theoretical scheme. Already in 1921, the chances of a successful revolution in the near future in the countries of Western Europe had disappeared. The internal development of the Soviet Union was bound to be determined by that fact. It was idle to quarrel with history. And it was worse to quarrel with those who believed that Marxists could perform the miracle of making history to order. With the perspective of an immediate revolution in other countries disappearing, the only sensible and practical policy for the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the

Soviet Union was firstly to create the preconditions for the eventual establishment of Socialism and, secondly, to defend its existence, for which purpose it was necessary to avoid international complications which might involve it prematurely into a war with the capitalist world.

The preconditions for the establishment of Socialism are created by the capitalist mode of production. But the capitalist mode of production is not inseparably connected with capitalist economy, the main purpose of which is to make the largest possible profit, which necessarily means the greatest exploitation of the working class. The fundamental feature of the capitalist mode of production is that capital (which in Marxist language means factories, machines, industrial plants, etc.) replaces land as the main means of production. It is evident that the introduction of such a mode of production does not necessarily require the exploitation of the working class by another class. Private ownership of the means of production is not a necessary condition for the introduction of the capitalist mode of production. The mode of production called "capitalist" (because it was originally invented for the purpose of making profit) serves the purpose of the exploitation of labour only when the means of production are privately owned. With the elimination of private ownership of the means of production, the "capitalist" mode of production can become the foundation of a type of economy which creates the preconditions for Socialism, indeed, becomes an integral part of the process of socialist construction, while formally retaining certain features of Capitalism.

In the Soviet Union, the private ownership of the means of production had been abolished. Thus, the fundamental condition for the establishment of Socialism was there. But on the other hand, production itself was not yet for use, but mainly for exchange. So, in that sense, elements of Capitalism were also there. Not only was the process of production conducted according to the

so-called capitalist mode (which, in the last analysis, is only the application of technology to industry); the capitalist *method* also was still in force. Surplus value was still produced; and production of surplus value was not possible unless the direct producer was deprived of, or voluntarily surrendered, a part of the value produced by him. Rapid accumulation of capital, in consequence of larger and larger surplus value produced, thanks to the application of the most up-to-date technological skill, had hitherto been the motive force of Soviet economy. It derived its formally non-socialist character not from the adoption of the capitalist mode of production, but from the continuance of the capitalist method of production. This, however, was no danger. It did not deprive Soviet economy of the other character of being an integral part of socialist construction. The distinction between "building Socialism" and "building for Socialism" was sophistic. It should neither be exaggerated nor minimised. By building for Socialism, Soviet economy was building Socialism. On the other hand, it was not yet socialistic altogether.

The abolition of private property in the means of production is a decisive guarantee against the formation of new classes. Socialism does not propose to reduce mankind to one level. Even in socialist society, there will be strata determined by physical, educational and intellectual inequalities. Socialism is equalitarian only in asmuch as it will create equality of opportunities for all. There will be strata. But they will not be differentiated by rigid lines. There will be a constant flux also.

For these considerations, one need not be alarmed by "inequalities" in the Soviet Union. They were not signs of any reaction. Those belonging to the highly paid group could not crystallise into a class of neo-capitalists even if they wanted to. They had the fullest liberty to enjoy personal comforts and achieve cultural advance thanks to their handsome income. But they were precluded, not by any formal law, but by the very nature of the established

system of economy, from any economic aggrandisement. There was no incentive for accumulating their income into such large wealth as could acquire illegal political power or become the means of exploiting labour. Wealth alone cannot be the instrument of exploitation. For that purpose it must be converted into capital and, as a means of production, capital could not be privately owned in the Soviet Union. Under this situation, the incentive to accumulate wealth was bound to disappear. A classless society was in the process of formation. In the Soviet Union, human nature was changing. A country could not advance that far without coming very near to Socialism. The Soviet Union was advancing towards Socialism. Only it was following a path not previously foreseen. Hence the controversy and confusion about the nature of Soviet economy.

On the other hand, there was a deplorable lack of frankness on the part of some defenders and apologists of Soviet economy. Why this reluctance to call a spade a spade? Why insist on maintaining that you are travelling the conventional, theoretically predetermined path while experience has enabled you to find a new road? In order to defend the whole-hogging attitude regarding the socialist character of Soviet economy, a neo-Marxist doctrine was invented. It distinguished Communism from Socialism. According to these neo-Marxist theoreticians, the Soviet economy (of the thirties) was socialist, which was a transition to Communism. But Marxism knows no distinction between Socialism and Communism. If there was Socialism in the Soviet Union, then there was Communism also. And if there was no Communism, then Socialism was not established. There was no shame in admitting it. Conscious, purposeful, building *for* Socialism was *to build* Socialism. That process had gone far enough. The transition was from an intermediary type of economy to fullfledged Socialism. *Propagandist* interpretation of the situation only created confusion.

CHAPTER V

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION

THE foreign policy of the Soviet Union was also determined by the disappearance of the probability of a successful revolution abroad in the immediate future. The probability disappeared already in 1920, when the final effort to utilise the post-war revolutionary crisis failed. But the possibility still remained, particularly in Germany.

On the other hand, the nationalist movements in the non-European subject countries were pregnant with great revolutionary possibilities. Any serious development in those parts of the world might have a considerable repercussion on the march of events in Europe. But before long, from that direction also no decisive development could be expected. The nationalist movement in Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan, having attained a certain measure of success with the help of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia, stopped short of the final struggle against Imperialism and even preferred some agreement with it to the revolutionary alliance with the Soviet Union. In India, the movement revealed signs of immaturity which precluded such serious revolutionary developments as might menace Imperialism. Only in China the perspective was brighter. Therefore, everything possible was done there to help the Chinese people to make the long overdue democratic revolution which, if successful, would have had an international repercussion. But there also the revolution suffered an unexpected defeat just when it appeared to be very near success.

The early diplomacy of the Soviet State did not leave out of account the revolutionary possibilities in Germany. The acute crisis of the post-war years had passed. But conditions in Germany were still far from being normalised. The Versailles Treaty was there to ruin Germany economic-

ally and thus drive her towards revolution as the only way out of the intolerable situation. In those days, the main object of Soviet diplomacy was to encourage Germany and other defeated countries to form an alliance with the Workers' and Peasants' Republic against the victorious Entente Powers planning to stabilise the system of imperialist domination of the world through the instrumentality of the League of Nations. The first step towards the attainment of that object was the Treaty of Rapallo. In conseqence of that treaty, the economic blockade of the Workers' and Peasants' Republic was broken. Economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union could then be undertaken with machinery purchased in Germany. Moreover, German expert advice was also secured for the creation of a modern army which was necessary for the defence of the Soviet Union. The prospect of making profit out of the Russian trade kept the German bourgeoisie away from the temptation of seeking financial aid from the ex-enemy countries for rehabilitating industries. In short, Soviet diplomacy, while sincerely supporting the German people against Entente Imperialism, prevented such a foreign policy on the part of the German Government as would have led to the liquidation of the revolutionary crisis in Germany. In other words, the object of the Soviet diplomacy was to exploit the revolutionary possibilities of the disturbed conditions of Germany in the years after the war.

In 1923, the situation in Germany became acute once again, opening up the perspective of a possible revolutionary development. But unfortunately, the working class was again defeated. Moreover, the German ruling classes realised that a rapproachment with the ex-enemies was the only guarantee against the danger of revolution at home. The Allied Powers met them more than halfway, politically as well as financially. American capital streamed in to help the German bourgeoisie to overcome the financial chaos created by the efforts to enforce the Treaty of Versailles by military intervention. British diplomacy, led

by Austen Chamberlain, welcomed Germany into the League of Nations and persuaded her to abandon the "Russian orientation". In order to combat the danger of revolution which, breaking out in the unsettled conditions of Germany, might easily spread to other countries, the Treaty of Versailles was revised. The Locarno Pact heralded the formation of a formidable anti-Soviet alliance. Considerable concessions were made to Germany for winning her over for the holy alliance of the twentieth century.

A new task was set to Soviet diplomacy. It was to prevent the formation of that alliance, which would eventually mean military attack upon the Workers' and Peasants' Republic. The method adopted by the Soviet diplomacy was to promote rivalry between the parties concerned in the would-be alliance. The world economic crisis made the task comparatively easy. The Soviet Government made a trade-agreement with England. Germany was threatened with the loss of the profitable Russian market. Imperialist rivalries, the scramble for foreign markets, thus provoked, militated against the projected anti-Soviet alliance. The offer of huge concessions for exploiting the rich natural resources of the Soviet Union induced powerful financial groups in the imperialist countries to oppose the plan of the anti-Soviet alliance. But nothing more abiding than a mere breathing space was gained.

Finally, it was realised that the policy of the Soviet Government, internal as well as foreign, could no longer be framed on the basis of the expectation of revolution abroad. The expectation still remained. The revolution was bound to take place sooner or later in other countries. But it could no longer be expected to take place in the near future. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union must carry on.

It had to face two problems. One of internal reconstruction, and the other of defence against foreign enemies. The solution of the former problem was necessarily compli-

cated by the latter. Defence of the first Workers' and Peasants' Government undoubtedly was the primary task. The solution of the problem of internal reconstruction depended on the very existence of the Soviet Republic. And the struggle for existence necessitated the creation of a strong army, so strong as could, if and when necessary, defeat the forces of international reaction single-handed. Meanwhile, every effort should be made to avoid any premature military conflict of first magnitude. The Workers' and Peasants' Republic should not allow itself to be provoked into a war before it was fully prepared for it.

That exigency of the situation determined Soviet diplomacy. The "nationalism" of the Soviet Government was nothing more damaging and discreditable than the concern to steer clear of the dangerous waters of premature military conflicts. Neither Marxism nor loyalty to the cause of proletarian revolution could have patience for the doctrinaire internationalism which found fault with the "nationalist" pre-occupations of Soviet diplomacy. Following any other course, the Soviet Government could not promote the cause of world revolution, simply because the forces making for it were defeated in other countries. What it could possibly do was to get involved in a premature conflict which might mean the end of the first Workers' and Peasants' Republic. The Soviet Government did not give up internationalism. It simply refused to be romantic. The existence of the Workers' and Peasants' Republic had not only laid down the foundation of a socialist society; by itself it was the greatest incentive for the world revolution; eventually it might be the decisive force to bring it about.

The necessity of creating a powerful modern mechanised army very largely determined the process of industrial development in the Soviet Union. Much of the undeniable economic hardships, so much advertised by the enemies of Socialism as evidence for the failure of the Russian experi-

ment, resulted from that necessity. Emphasis had to be laid on the production of the means of production even for the purpose of laying down a stable foundation of socialist economy. For the exigencies of defence, that had to be done all the more. The development of heavy industries was an indispensable condition for the creation and efficient operation of a modern mechanised army. Consequently, in the first Five Years Plan, so much place was given to the production of the means of production that only a small portion of the recurringly accumulated capital could be devoted to the production of the articles of consumption. Hardships were caused not only by scarcity of necessary commodities; the urban population, including the industrial workers, had to live on rationed food, because the peasants would not sell their produce unless supplied with manufactured articles. That was a period of heroism unparalleled in history. Only planned economy could perform the miracle of laying a solid foundation for greater industrial development and incidentally of creating the most powerful and best equipped army in the world within the space of five years. Was the process of the erection of that magnificent monument of revolutionary energy and human creativeness to be disturbed by petty considerations of satisfying superficial observers and prejudiced critics, who were more concerned with their pet pre-occupations than with the fundamental task of the revolution?

The successful tackling of the problems of defence and internal reconstruction enabled the Soviet Union to cope with the extremely difficult international situation in which it found itself upon the victory of Fascism in Germany. Until then, the German Government had been more or less friendly. The alliance visualised in the Rapallo Treaty had indeed not materialised. But, on the other hand, the Chamberlain plan of anti-Soviet block had also miscarried. Germany simply could not do without the Russian market. America could give her huge loans; France and Britain could make her concessions as regards the Versailles

Treaty. But none of them would willingly allow Germany to regain her place in the world market. The rationalisation of industries carried on with borrowed American capital increased the German need for foreign markets. The only available outlet was the Soviet Union, which, on its part, was always prepared to buy and make the payments regularly. Thus, while giving up the "Russian orientation" politically, the German Government found it profitable to maintain friendly economic relations with the Soviet Union. There was a bond even between the armies of the two countries. Although the German bourgeoisie was eager for a closer rapproachment with the French because of the interlocking interests in the mining and metal industries on the borderland of the two countries, the spirit of revenge persisted in the military circles; and the military retained considerable power in the German Republic. So, the plan of a Russo-German alliance against France was not altogether given up. That constituted the bond between the armies of the two countries. Even that policy of retaining secret relations with the German army was adopted in pursuance of the revolutionary purpose of preventing complete political stabilisation of Europe on the basis of an understanding between the two groups of former enemies. The purpose was revolutionary from two points of view. On the one hand, remaining in an unstable political condition, Europe could be thrown into an acute revolutionary crisis by any accidental event; on the other hand, mutual disagreement would prevent the imperialist powers from carrying out the plan of a joint attack upon the Soviet Union.

On Hitler's advent to power, Germany became openly hostile to the Soviet Union. The previous diplomatic relations could no longer be maintained. The new German Government was not only eager to enter into an anti-Soviet alliance, but aspired to assume its leadership. It approached Britain with the proposal for an aggressive war against the "danger of Bolshevism". England had always

been mortally afraid of that danger. But in her traditional way, she had been looking for somebody who would draw for her the chestnuts out of the fire. Hitler offered her the services of Germany. The problem of defence became very acute for the Soviet Union. It had acquired considerable strength, but was not yet in the position to meet the world single-handed at both the extremities of its vast territories. Japan would readily join Germany and England. Once again, the skill of revolutionary diplomacy was put to a severe test. Provoked from all sides, the Soviet Government had to act with patience, foresight, self-confidence and discretion. Soviet diplomacy had to accomplish two extremely difficult tasks: to avoid military conflicts without appearing to be weak or afraid, and to secure the alliance of some first-rate capitalist Power.

It was obvious where the new ally was to be sought. Although the war-mongering of Fascist Germany was primarily directed against the Soviet Union, France, naturally, was very much perturbed by the developments across the Rhine. She had reason not to rely upon the ceremonious *entente cordiale* with Britain. On the other hand, the relations with Italy were very strained. The Franco-Soviet alliance was the obvious counter-move against the victory of Fascism in Germany. The skill of Soviet diplomacy in bringing about that alliance, cutting across the old generally favoured plan of an anti-Soviet block, was not fully appreciated even by all the leaders of the international revolutionary working class movement. As a matter of fact, not a few of them found fault with that astute move, criticising it as rank opportunism dictated by the growing "nationalist" tendency on the part of the present leaders of the Russian Revolution. If concern for the existence of the Soviet Union was nationalism, that was certainly not a matter of shame.

In the new alliance, the Workers' and Peasants' Republic found a temporary guarantee against the danger of an attack from Germany. On the other hand, the cause

of international revolution was furthered by creating a powerful check against the spread of the fascist counter-revolution. But for the new alliance, one or the other of the following developments would have most probably taken place: Either the Soviet Union would have been involved in a war on two fronts, with practically all the imperialist Powers arrayed against it; or France would have been overrun by Fascism. Either eventuality would be disastrous for the cause of the international proletariat. A military defeat of the Soviet Government would put off the Socialist World Revolution for a time dreadful to contemplate; on the other hand, if France went fascist, the triumph of counter-revolution in Europe would be complete. Both these disastrous eventualities were headed off by the skill of Soviet diplomacy, which came in for so much bitter criticism even from Socialists and Communists.

After the victory of Fascism in Germany, only romanticists could still have any illusion about serious revolutionary developments in Europe of international consequence. Counter-revolution was triumphant. Any revolutionary offensive was altogether out of the question. The task of the moment was to resist the triumphant march of counter-revolution; and since the working class even in Germany could not do that alone, it was necessary to make alliances on the national scale, as it had been done so profitably on the international scale. But the necessary alliance could not be made on the terms of the working class. That sort of alliance could not last long, even if other classes could be duped into it. In order to be abiding, the alliance must be made as a historical necessity, serving the common purpose.

The defence of democracy menaced by Fascism could be the only platform for such a defensive alliance. The historical mission of the proletariat is to establish a form of democracy broader and more genuine than that obtain-

ing in the parliamentary State. But when that earlier achievement of human progress was in the danger of being destroyed by counter-revolution, then the defence of parliamentary democracy became the paramount task of the proletariat. Socialism and workers' democracy were to be built on the foundation of industrial progress and relative political freedom laid in consequence of the victory of the bourgeois revolution. If counter-revolution was allowed to destroy that foundation, the perspective before the world would be rather of a relapse into mediæval barbarism than of Socialism and greatest human freedom. Therefore, the defensive fight against triumphant counter-revolution was the task of the moment. Everything done for that purpose was a revolutionary act, and therefore fully justified.

The revolution, begun in 1917, did not develop rapidly enough to satisfy the expectations of the easily discouraged enthusiasts. Twenty years after, the perspective appeared even less bright than ever. But that, by no means, proved that the period of revolution was closed. The forces of the revolution suffered defeats in many countries; but in Russia they consolidated themselves not only in the form of unprecedented human achievements, but also as a formidable power to guarantee the success of the revolution throughout the world.

More than fifty years lapsed between the French Revolution and the establishment of democracy in the other countries of Europe. The intervening period was marked by exchange of victories between revolution and counter-revolution. The world is making the same experience in the period of proletarian revolution. The delay in the development of revolution in other European countries had its repercussions on the situation in France. At its home, the revolution could not retain its original drastic character. Jacobinism was liquidated, to be followed by Napoleonism,

which, representing a reaction in France, operated as a powerful revolutionary factor for the rest of Europe.

History never repeats itself exactly. In our time, the proletarian revolution has not suffered any setback comparable to that suffered by the bourgeois revolution in France. On the twentieth anniversary, it appeared that the proletarian revolution might still have its period of Napoleonism —of an entirely different nature. Napoleon did not carry the banner of bourgeois revolution consciously. He was simply an instrument, and an unwilling instrument at that. Proletarian Napoleonism, should it ever become a historical fact, would be a consciously revolutionary force.

What were the possibilities?[1] The correct perspective must be found in a rigorously realistic analysis of the situation. History will not conform itself to our desire. The perspective, therefore, should not be coloured by desire. The very regrettable, but most outstanding fact is that in every important European country the working class has suffered such a severe defeat as precludes the possibility of any effective offensive action in the near future.

In England, the disparity between the objective and subjective conditions for revolution still remains very great. Indeed, the still lingering reformist illusions of the British working class reflects the immaturity of the objective conditions for revolution. Super-profit made in the colonies and income from foreign investments still enable the British bourgeoisie to tide over the economic crisis at home. Therefore, the perspective in England is rather of demoralisation than of revolution. In the past, great Empires met that fate. In the case of England, history may repeat itself in that sense. Of course, there always remains the chance of revolution in other countries having decisive repercussions in England.

[1] This was an analysis of the international situation in 1937.

In France, the proletariat is not yet beaten, nor does it lack revolutionary spirit. There, both the objective and subjective conditions for revolution are maturing. But any attempt on the part of the French working class, under the given conditions of the world, is most likely to be defeated by the joint forces of international reaction. The revolution has become a really international affair. It is no longer international only symbolically. Any action on the part of the working class of any single country must be determined by the relation of forces on the international plane.

If France were left alone, then there might be no obstacle to the revolution becoming victorious. But she will not be left alone. That is the decisive consideration. And nobody with any sense of responsibility and understanding of the existing relation of international forces can ignore it. The Spanish experience is there to teach the lesson. And it goes without saying that the intervention of the foreign forces of reaction will be much more prompt and on a larger scale in France than it has been in Spain. Therefore, before deciding in favour of a revolutionary offensive in the only single country where that is at all possible (in the late thirties), it is wiser to look for a possible international support to counter-balance the international aid to counter-revolution. From where can that possibly come? Hitler has almost appeared on the Pyrenees. While France is surrounded by the iron ring of international Fascism, ready to pounce upon her in the case of revolution, the working class in Germany as well as in Italy lies prostrate after severe defeats and years of brutal repression. Intervention by those countries could be prevented or even checked only by effective revolutionary action on the part of the working class there. And to be effective, that action must not fall short of threatening the overthrow of the fascist regime and the capture of political power. The realities in those countries permit no optimism regarding such an action.

There is a tendency to welcome war as the opportunity for revolutionary action. That is a fatalist tendency which should not be allowed to influence the tactics and strategy of the revolutionary movement. Since a war on a large scale is likely to open the floodgates of revolution, it is but natural for the capitalist States to try their best for putting off that fateful day. Consequently, to pin hopes on the "inevitability" of war is to believe that revolution will take place with the aid and connivance of its enemies. Then, what is the guarantee for the revolution succeeding in case of war? As a matter of fact, the nature of future wars is indicated by the Spanish experience. In any case it is a dangerous illusion to pin hopes on war. The days are gone when a national war could be converted into a civil war. Because, there are no national wars. On the other hand, civil war is being waged on an international scale. Any war will mean civil war on a gigantic scale—offensive of the counter-revolution against the forces of international revolution.

Under the given conditions of the world, revolutionary offensive in any country must depend on the indispensable external help only from one source. And that is the Soviet Union. The situation is not likely to change in the near future. The victory of Fascism in Spain definitely closes a period of possible revolutionary offensive of any decisive importance. That victory is not yet complete. But, on the other hand, there is no use hoping against hope. The revolution can still win only on one condition: abandonment of the treacherous policy of non-intervention, so that the Republican Government can receive substantial aid from sympathisers abroad. Even in that case, it will have to depend mostly on France. Britain may not like the Italian conquest of Spain. But she will certainly not give any active help to the potentially revolutionary government. The Soviet Union is handicapped by geographical distance, and the long route of maritime supply can be easily controlled by Germany and Italy.

So, the success of revolution in Spain is ultimately conditional upon a revolution in France. There is already a powerful fascist movement in that country, aided and abetted by the ruling classes. While not only the working class but also the petit-bourgeois democratic masses are sympathetic towards the Spanish Republicans, and even the government is similarly disposed to some extent, the army cannot be depended upon when support to the Spanish Republicans will certainly involve France in a war with the Fascist Powers. So, the attitude of the army becomes the decisive factor. And the armies again are no longer the instruments of the respective National States; they are so many units of international counter-revolution. Of course, armies are still recruited from the lower strata of the population. The common soldier still remains a potential ally of the revolution. But he is no longer the whole of the army. The modern mechanised army has very largely become immune to the revolutionary susceptibility of the common soldier.

In that situation of the late thirties, proletarian Napoleonism ceases to be a matter of mere speculation, and appears as a decidedly possible, even necessary, feature of the perspective of revolutionary development. The success of revolution is not guaranteed even in the country where the native forces are not yet beaten and are sufficiently powerful, unless external aid is provided for. And that can come only from the Soviet Union.

It will be no easier for the Soviet Union to help a revolutionary government in France than it has been in Spain. In either case, the decisive aid could be given only at the risk of a war in which all the international forces of reaction would most probably be allied on the side of Germany and Italy. Those who accuse the Soviet Union for the failure to come to the aid of the revolution in Spain more effectively, do not stop to think whether the risk could be taken without seriously prejudicing the cause of

revolution, instead of promoting it. The risk could be taken either on the assumption that the war would coincide with serious revolutionary upheavals in the Fascist countries, or on the certainty of the Soviet Union possessing the power to face and vanquish the united forces of international counter-revolution. The assumption can be made rather by way of speculation than on the basis of an unbiassed analysis of the relation of forces. Until recently, the Soviet Union was not prepared to run the risk. Even in the late thirties it cannot be done light-heartedly.

The defeat in a large-scale war might not only endanger the very existence of the Soviet Union; it is sure to crush the forces of revolution in the victorious Fascist countries. This consideration has influenced Soviet foreign policy for ten years and determined the tactics of the Communist International. The time has not yet come to change the course. Defeat has compelled the working class to be on the defensive. It would be irresponsible for the Communist International to lead the proletariat in Spain or France, for example, in any all-round offensive action, when the guarantee for the success of that venture is not fully available. In the situation, the People's Front policy was adopted as the strategy of retreat and defence against Fascism. It does not mean betrayal of the proletarian revolution. Nor does it imply abandonment of the ideal of Socialism. To protect the proletariat from the danger of destruction in premature conflicts is a revolutionary duty.

While preserving the forces of revolution in other countries, the base of revolution must be made invincible. That is the primary consideration. That necessity can be fully realised only in the light of the perspective of proletarian Napoleonism.

On repeated occasions, the Soviet Union has proved its loyalty to the cause of peace. Its socialist economy is free from the contradictions which breed expansionist

greed and lead to aggressive wars. No serious bourgeois statesman believes in the "red menace". On the contrary it is fully believed even by its enemies that the Soviet Union will never go to war except in self-defence. But the exigency of self-preservation requires a far-sighted policy. It is an equally well known fact that a number of powerful States are preparing an offensive war against the Soviet Union. The projected war is a part of international civil war. Having beaten down the forces of revolution in their own countries, the Fascist governments wish to destroy the base of the proletarian world revolution. So threatened, it would be stupid for the Soviet Union to wait indefinitely with patience until the enemy breaks in. It is a typical case where to attack is the best defence. But if the Soviet Union ever takes the initiative in precipitating a war, it will not be a war for the aggrandisement of national interests. It will be an episode in the international civil war which is already raging fiercely. Red Napoleonism may appear as the signal for an offensive on the part of the forces of international revolution, when they have sufficiently recovered from their past defeats.

Triumphant counter-revolution in a number of European countries must be defeated before the forces of revolution in those countries could reassert themselves effectively. How that will be done is the question. It is possible that counter-revolutionary States will weaken themselves in a mutual military conflict. But that possibility is not to be counted upon as the perspective of revolutionary development. As against that possibility, it is to-day almost certain that the next war will include attack against the Soviet Union either by the joint forces of Fascism or by any one of the Fascist States. International civil war, so aggravated, may end in the overthrow of the counter-revolutionary States and the consequent success of revolution in other European countries, only if the Soviet Union will be powerful enough to carry the war into the home of the attacking States.

Under the given world conditions, and the relation of forces on the national as well as international plane, no other perspective of a triumphant revolution can appear to be more plausible. Therefore, to avoid the possible military defeat of the Soviet Union in a prematurely precipitated military conflict is the fundamental consideration of the strategy of the international revolutionary movement. At the same time, the military power of the Soviet Union must be increased at all costs. The army of the Soviet Union may still have to appear as the military vanguard of the world revolution.

The unity of purpose on the part of the leadership of the Soviet Union as well as of the Communist International is of supreme importance. Any disturbance of that unity is likely to be the cause of weakness. There are those who fail to realise the supreme need of the moment. The world is still in the midst of a civil war, the severest battles of which are yet to be fought. Revolutionary ruthlessness still remains a necessary weapon. It is a disagreeable weapon, but cannot yet be discarded without endangering the revolution itself. It is from this point of view that the arrests and trials in the Soviet Union can be justified. The task immediately before the Soviet Union is not only to defend itself, but, in order to defend itself, to come to the aid of the revolutionary forces in other countries, and that will mean military operations on a gigantic scale, not dreamt of even by the boldest militarist. The last and decisive battles of international civil war shall have to be fought on the ground of the enemies of the revolution and with their own instruments.

APPENDICES TO SECTION ONE

APPENDIX A

THE MOSCOW TRIALS[1]

REVOLUTION eats her own children. That is a popular saying which acquired great plausibility from the tragic experiences of the French Revolution. Is the tragic drama being re-enacted in our time? Is the Russian Revolution devouring her own children? Progressive forces throughout the world are bound to be disturbed by the fact that, even when the Revolution appears to have accomplished its destructive tasks and well advanced on the road of reconstruction, such acts should be committed as may be necessary only when it is still in danger. The French Revolution gave birth to Napoleonism because Terror did not stop as soon as it had accomplished the unpleasant task of exterminating the defenders of the old regime. The moment it laid its hand on Danton, it began to weaken the forces of democracy and thus help the creation of an atmosphere favourable for the rise of Napoleon who was to restore monarchy. All the leaders of the revolution, great and small, followed Danton to the guillotine, accused of being enemies of the revolution. A similar process of extermination has been going on in Russia ever since the fall of Trotzky in 1927.

In the beginning, the extermination was not physical, but political. One after another, old leaders were removed from positions of authority and even expelled from the party. It is conceivable that it was a necessary process. Those who had played prominent, even decisive parts in the periods of preparation and destruction, might not all prove equally competent when confronted with the problems of reconstruction. If they did not, they must make

[1] Written in May, 1937, and included in the first edition.

room for a new set of leaders. The Revolution is greater than individual revolutionaries, however great these may be. It is but natural that in different stages of its own development the revolution should throw up new leaders to reinforce the old cadre. But in the course of time, the character of the process changed. Conceivably necessary political elimination went to the extent of physical extermination. Was it necessary?

The recent trials and conviction of a large number of old leaders appear to give an affirmative answer to this question. They were accused of having conspired against the revolution. They pleaded guilty to the charge. The whole affair had the appearance of a melodrama. It delighted the capitalist world which hopefully exclaimed: Look, the Revolution is devouring her own children once again. Others, who pretend to be neutral between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution, expressed disgust at what they believed to be an unnecessary act of cruelty. Revolutionaries throughout the world were puzzled and are earnestly looking for some convincing explanation.

Dogmatic assertion about the guilt of the accused does not carry conviction. Sweeping justification begs the question. Uncritical apology is but a token of blind faith and intellectual slavery. It is necessary to probe deep into the conditions which compel the commission of acts alleged to have been committed by the accused.

The necessity for these trials is found in the fact that opposition elements inside the Communist Party were becoming instrumental for an eventual overthrow of the established order. This fact is established not only by the confessions of the accused themselves. These could be discredited as made under pressure, through the spontaneity, comprehensiveness and vigour of those statements leave little room for such doubt. However, the fact is established by other evidence which is entirely voluntary. In his latest

book, *The Revolution Betrayed,* Trotzky openly advocates violent overthrow of the present Russian State which he considers to be an instrument of counter-revolution. It is but natural for those who share this view to do whatever is possible under the given conditions for the realisation of their cherished ideal. They did. Thus, the confession of Radek and others is corroborated by the fact of their opinion about the nature of the present Soviet Government. If they believed that it did not incorporate the ideal for which they had worked throughout their life, they should be morally justified in their efforts for destroying it. Why did they then take up the penitent attitude during the trials? The answer to this most intriguing question is found in a critical analysis of the background of the trials.

When former leaders of the party believed that the party was going in the wrong way, their anxiety naturally was to regain their influence which, in their opinion, could alone save the revolution. But open opposition to the new leadership led immediately to expulsion from the party. It was not possible to influence the party from outside. The way back to the party was found in hypocrisy. Having gained re-admission into the party by false declarations, the old leaders were compelled to adopt clandestine methods for the propagation of the views they had openly abandoned. So, the root of the evil is to be found in the internal condition of the party. Former leaders of the party were denied the possibility of expressing their views, and were forced to adopt underhand methods of activity which brought them in contact with real enemies of the revolution. It is absurd to hold that men, who had devoted their whole life to the cause of revolution, should sell themselves willingly to the Fascists. But conscious motive is not the point at issue. Presumably, they acted according to their revolutionary conviction. In doing so, however, they became inspirers of counter-revolutionary activities, and as such deserved their tragic end. When the dangerous implications of their activities became clear to them in the

light of facts placed before them after arrest, they were not slow to admit their guilt, though they had not committed it consciously. Their attitude during the trial was a tragic token of their sincerity, of their undying devotion to the cause of revolution. It was an interesting psychological phenomenon also. But, for the moment, we are not concerned with that aspect of the matter.

The deplorable conditions, under which tried and devoted revolutionaries were forced to become instruments of counter-revolution, are created by the suppression of all criticism of the leadership, of the expression even of any doubt about the correctness of the official policy. They are created in the stifling atmosphere characterised by utter absence of free discussion of problems that are constantly rising out of the experience of reconstruction. Clandestine activity on the part of dissenting elements is bound to take place in the absence of democracy in the administration of the party. The trial and stern administration of revolutionary justice have deprived the enemies of social liberation of some very convenient means for achieving their nefarious purpose. But the source of danger still remains, and it is a very fruitful source. In the given unhealthy atmosphere of party life, opposition elements are bound to degenerate and be demoralised. No party can ever be entirely free from opposition. Absolute unanimity is a sign of intellectual stagnation or hypocritical conformism. Freedom of criticism is the only guarantee against dissenters and non-conformists lending themselves willingly or unwillingly to the service of the common enemy.

APPENDIX B

A CRITICAL APPRECIATION OF LEON TROTZKY[1]

"A TREMENDOUS imperiousness and a kind of inability or unwillingness to be at all caressing and attentive to people, and absence of that charm which always surrounded Lenin, condemn Trotzky to a certain loneliness. Even some of his personal friends afterwards became his sworn enemies. For work in political groups, Trotzky seemed little fitted: but in the ocean of historic events, where such personal features lose their importance, only his favourable side came to the front..... As to Trotzky's inner structure, as a leader, he was, on the small scale of party organisation, inapt and unskilful. He was impeded there by the extreme definiteness of the outlines of his personality. Trotzky is imperative. Only in his relation with Lenin after their union, he showed always a touching and tender yieldingness..... Lenin never looks at himself, never glances in the mirror of history, never even thinks of what posterity will say of him—simply does his work.....In distinction from him, Trotzky often looks at himself, Trotzky treasures his historic role, and would undoubtedly be ready to make any personal sacrifice, not by any means excluding the sacrifice of his life, in order to remain in the memory of mankind with the halo of a genuinely revolutionary leader." Lunacharsky, *Revolutionary Silhouettes.*

The above picture drawn in 1923, while Trotzky was at the height of power and glory, will remain a correct estimation of his character and personality, as long as he will be remembered in history. The picture was drawn not only in the hey-day of Trotzky's fame, but it was done by an admirer. Therefore, the defects pointed out therein could be attributed neither to malice nor to wilful mis-

[1] Written at the end of 1940, soon after Trotzky's assassination.

representation. Trotzky was a great man, and was very eager that he should be recognised as such. In that eagerness, he only accentuated the faults from which all great men, conscious of their greatness, usually suffer. Those defects, so very pronounced even when he was performing great deeds, later on made a tragedy of his eventful career.

I met him first in the summer of 1920—just before the Red Army suffered the historic defeat on the outskirts of Warsaw. My first impression was similar to that one receives while watching a skilful actor playing a thrilling role on a grandly set stage. The Second World Congress of the newly-founded Communist International had just closed its session in Moscow, which was then almost a beleaguered city. Yet, half-starved and dilapidated Moscow was already then throbbing as the heart of the world revolution, and everyone present there felt the throb. Only a few months ago, the other great metropolis of the revolutionary Republic, Petrograd, had been freed from the menace of occupation by the White Guards of General Denikin, backed up by the powerful German Army, still intact, along the Baltic.

Civil war was still being waged fiercely not only in Siberia, but all along the lower course of the Volga. The counter-revolutionary army of Admiral Koltchak, backed up by the Japanese and American interventionists, had penetrated into the heart of European Russia. The Czechoslovak Legion, financed from America and armed by the Allies, was still crossing the Russian continent, dealing death and destruction on the way. Finally, yet another counter-revolutionary army, commanded by General Wrangel, had landed at the Black Sea ports and was advancing northwards. The ring of counter-revolution was thus closing around Moscow practically from all directions. It must be broken through. It was decided to strike through Poland. The Red Army was to carry the banner of revolution to defeated Germany, where the

workers had already risen in revolt, but could not succeed in the face of fierce repression.

From the front, Trotzky telegraphed to the Second World Congress of the Communist International asking the leading delegates to send messages of encouragement to the Army of the Revolution on the march. He also invited a delegation to visit the front. I was a member of that delegation. At the headquarters of the Western Front, we were received by the Commander-in-Chief. The Army, inspired with the ideal of liberating the world from all forms of oppression and exploitation, as it was then, defied all description. Any military expert would have refused to recognise it as an army. There were no drill sergeants to teach the soldiers to keep their brass buttons shining and boots polished. The buttons were mostly missing and boots scarce enough. Even all the soldiers did not have guns. Yet, there was no doubt on the part of anybody that the Army of the Revolution was going to be victorious. That confidence was the most powerful weapon in the possession of that strange army. And it was Trotzky who was making superhuman efforts to keep the Army equipped with that weapon. He looked like a man walking in his dream. He was making history. And he was anxious that the history should be written with no mistake about his place in it.

A parade was held for the reception of the international delegates. That was the first time I heard Trotzky deliver a speech. He spoke in Russian. I hardly understood any Russian then. Nevertheless, I remained spellbound for more than an hour while he spoke. In my school days, I had listened to the oratory of the old type Congress leaders in India. During my subsequent travels, I had occasion to hear others reputed as orators. But Trotzky's feat reminded me of the legend of Demosthenes I had read in school books—an immovable statue, pouring forth a cataract of words which electrified the whole

atmosphere simply by their sound. Later on, I came to appreciate that Trotzky's oratory was equally rich in content. His greatest performance as an orator was at the Third World Congress of the Communist International. For making a report on the world economic situation, he spoke in German nearly for three hours; immediately afterwards, he delivered the same speech almost verbatim in two other languages—French and then Russian. Trotzky will go down in history as the greatest orator, certainly of our time, and perhaps as second to none of all ages.

Fortunately, the loudspeaker was invented only after the world had enjoyed Trotzky's oratory. The Red Square of Moscow can accommodate half a million people on the occasion of packed meetings addressed by great leaders of the Revolution. Until 1928, there was no loudspeaker. It was no fun to address meetings there. Speakers had to be carefully selected. But it was Trotzky alone who could make himself heard by everybody in a packed meeting on the Red Square.

His marvellous power of speaking made of him an invaluable asset for the Revolution during the critical days of the civil war. That was also his contribution in the months preceding the insurrection, when agitation was the decisive form of revolutionary activity. Even as the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, Trotzky made his mark not as a military genius or a skilful strategist, but as the inspirer. The Red Army was not the creation of any single individual. It was the creation of the Revolution. Trotzky's military counsellor was the French Captain Sadoul. He was a Staff Officer, who had been a member of the Allied Mission sent to Russia in 1917 to reorganise the Army under the Provisional Government after the fall of the Tzar.

During his stay in Petrograd, he was disgusted with the intrigues against the efforts for setting up a really democratic regime on the ruins of Tzarism. That disgust

brought him in touch with the revolutionaries, and when the Allied Mission left upon the Bolsheviks seizing power, Captain Sadoul stayed behind. For that act, he was court-marshalled in France for "desertion" and sentenced to death in contumacy. In the earlier years of the civil war, he acted as Trotzky's *de facto* Chief-of-Staff. He told me that in those days Trotzky had absolutely no knowledge of military technicalities and would not know what to do with military affairs, if he had actually to manage them. Let it be said that Sadoul was a great admirer of Trotzky and did not part company with him until, upon the death of Lenin, Trotzky came into conflict with the party.

Trotzky seldom commanded the Army in actual military operations. His function was to dash from one front to the other and appear, as if with an uncanny instinct, on the weakest spot to inspire the wavering detachments with a vision, and instil in them a new courage and new determination. That was certainly not a mean contribution. But proper credit is not given to the other heroes of the civil war if, on the merit of his unquestionable services, Trotzky is allowed to eclipse all others, and acclaimed as the creator and leader of the Red Army—the organiser of the victory of the Revolution. The names of Bluecher, Frunze, Budjenny and Stalin are written prominently in the history of the civil war. The part played by those men may not have been so much advertised, perhaps because they were not so very dramatic. Nonetheless, they were heroic parts and, taken together, they were of more decisive importance for the victory of the Revolution than the dramatic feats of Trotzky.

A matchless orator and a skilful agitator, Trotzky was equally brilliant as a writer. Previously, his writings were mostly journalistic and won for him the distinction of the "prince of pamphleteers." During the closing years of his life, he matured as a writer, and perhaps will be remembered longer for his literary talent than for other

temporary accomplishments. Politically, all through his chequered career, Trotzky was unstable and erratic. As a Marxist theoretician, he had always been wrong, and it was due to the wrong notions developed out of the vanity of his younger years, that he came to grief later on, when he would not abandon his wrong ideas even after they had been proved to be so by experience.

Occurring in the dramatic period of a great revolution, Trotzky's positive achievements have become well known. But it is not so well known that more than once he advocated actions which, if allowed, would have left no history of the Russian Revolution to be written by Trotzky. He rendered great services to the Revolution. But he was capable of rendering even greater disservice. On two occasions, he was prevented from doing so by the influence of Lenin, only to whose genial leadership the angular personality of Trotzky could be subordinated. On the last occasion, it was a conflict with the entire party. His will crossed, this time not by a more powerful, but less obtrusive personality, Trotzky revolted and consequently started on the declining plane of his career.

Generally, Trotzky's role in the Revolution is regarded only as second to that of Lenin. There are some who would not concede the first place even to Lenin. Having known both the men rather intimately for a long enough time, I came to the conclusion that there was no comparison. They lived on entirely different planes. Therefore no clash was possible. The one was a thoroughgoing subjectivist, looking upon the world as a stage set for himself to enact a great drama. The other was primarily a philosopher, having a detached, objective view of the world, considering himself a part of it. Egoism and unshaken courage of conviction were respectively their outstanding characteristics. There can be no comparison, unless these two characteristics are confounded as the

different expressions of the immeasurable mystic factor called personality.

The soul of Lenin's personality, if I may use one of those delightfully vague terms, expressed itself in his creation—the Bolshevik Party. Trotzky was neither a co-creator nor a part of the creation. That fact alone is the evidence of the fundamental difference in the temperament and the outlook of the two men. One was anxious to play the towering individual with a mission. The other was the simple man of the mass—the *Massenmensch*, as the Germans call it. Lenin believed in his power to build—to create something great. But he knew that he must create out of material which was not within himself. In other words, the unfolding of his creative genius was dependent upon numerous other factors, which were independent of himself. That was Lenin's greatness. In that sense, Trotzky can hardly be called a great man. It is not a mere accident that Trotzky did perform great deeds, and actually rose up to the stature of a great man, only during the short period that he came under the influence of Lenin, and allowed his subjectivism to be guided by the sober wisdom of the objective philosopher. As soon as the vicissitudes of life deprived him of that mooring, he drifted into the uncharted ocean of his egoism, only to be ship-wrecked to the sincere grief of all who could really appreciate his great merits.

Now, let those general observations be borne out by a few facts. At least thrice, Trotzky might have acted as the grave-digger of the Russian Revolution, if he was allowed to have his way. He was vehemently opposed to the newly established and almost tottering Soviet Government signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty dictated by triumphant German militarism. His appeal to the working class of the world in reply to the arrogance of the German General who threw the draft treaty on the table and marked the dotted line with his sword, was certainly thrilling. But a

thrilling appeal could not save the Revolution in that critical moment. The world was thrilled, but failed to respond in the desired manner. Nevertheless, Trotzky would not take the hint. He was completely submerged in his vision of the world revolution, sure to be conjured up by his dramatic appeal.

In the last analysis, it was subjectivism, which often makes small men appear great, and great men sometimes go astray. It was dishonourable, a shame for revolutionaries, those fighting for the great ideal of the liberation of the world, to be dictated by German militarism. The prestige of some individuals wanting to play memorable roles in a great drama must be defended, no matter what happened to the Revolution. Of course, Trotzky did not think like that. He was simply carried away by emotion. But the keen, far-sight and cold calculations of Lenin were there to prevent the Revolution being ship-wrecked on the hidden rocks of sub-conscious egoism.

It was only on that occasion, when on the point of committing a great disservice to the Revolution, that Trotzky appeared almost to overwhelm Lenin. He carried the majority of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party with him in the opposition to signing the "dishonourable treaty." But Lenin stood like a rock. He would not allow the catastrophe to happen. He settled the controversy by declaring on the Radio that the Soviet Government was going to sign the treaty.

In that connection, there is a very highly interesting anecdote—told by Radek. When Lenin was going to make the decisive declaration, the latter remonstrated with him saying how could he disregard the opinion of the majority. In honest surprise, Lenin turned around and asked: "Majority? But the Russian people want peace." Radek protested: "How do you know that?" Lenin replied that the majority of the Russian people had already "voted for peace." "How?" "With their feet. Don't you

see that the soldiers are running away from the front? And whom do the soldiers represent? The peasantry, which constitutes the majority of the Russian people." That was Lenin. And that one single incident shows what was the difference between Lenin and Trotzky. That "dictatorial" act of Lenin was condemned by romantic revolutionaries throughout the world as surrender to German militarism (Lenin was even suspected of acting as a German agent), as betraying the Baltic peoples who were left to the tender mercies of the German invaders. But before long, it was realised that the signature of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty saved the Russian Revolution. Most of the territories conceded under duress were recovered before long. And eventually, the Baltic peoples have also regained their freedom within the Soviet Union without making any great sacrifice.

The next occasion was Trotzky's opposition to the New Economic Policy advocated by Lenin. Then also, as in his subsequent opposition to the policy of the party under the leadership of Stalin, Trotzky would rather put the Revolution in the cold-storage, so to say, than permit it to deviate the least from his predetermined theoretical scheme. Already then, he was back to his doctrine of the Permanent Revolution, a doctrine which has been the evil genius of his whole life. But again, on that occasion, Trotzky did not realise the implication of his position. If he did, he would certainly not have taken it up. His reasoning was very simple: the peasantry is wedded to the desire to own private property; any concession to it will mean the rebirth of Capitalism; that could not be allowed without prejudicing the proletarian character of the Revolution. The logic is plausible. Only it did not quite fit in with the logic of the situation in which the Revolution had to develop. If concessions were not made to the peasantry, racked and ruined by four years of war and three years of civil war, they would have provided a fertile field for the

counter-revolution to thrive. The theoretical purity of the Revolution could be preserved only at the cost of the Revolution itself. Lenin was still there, and once again Trotzky was not allowed to render a disservice to the Revolution, which would have more than counter-balanced all his services.

The so-called Stalinist policy, vehemently opposed by Trotzky, was only the continuation of the New Economic Policy inaugurated by Lenin. That was not a deviation from Marxism, but the practical application of Marxism to the concrete realities of the given situation. The bone of contention, again, was the appreciation of the place of the peasantry in the scheme of the development of the Revolution in an industrially backward country. According to Trotzky's doctrine of the Permanent Revolution, the peasantry is the devil of the drama. Whatever may be the merit of the theory, it obviously could not be applied to a country populated mostly by the devils. To exterminate the majority of the population is certainly not the proper way of making a revolution successful.

The objectivity of this criticism is testified by the fact that all along, ever since his opposition to the New Economic Policy, I was inclined to take up Trotzky's point of view. That only proves that Trotzky's personal magnetism and emotional appeal found response rather in the romanticism of the immature than in the hard-headed practical revolutionary. Trotzky had no personal charm for me. I had the privilege of knowing Lenin rather from close quarters. That gave me a glimpse of real greatness. Appearances could not deceive me. Moreover, the first impression was not very favourable. I think, off the stage, actors are rather incongruous. Life itself is a serious drama. It need not be artificially dramatised. Nevertheless, with all my strong dislike for Trotzky's personal characteristics, I also made the mistake of considering his attitude more revolutionary. But being an ordinary

person, not encumbered with the obsession of a great mission to perform, I could learn, and gradually attain the maturity of intelligence necessary for discriminating unostentatious solidity from imposing flares. So imperceptible was my political differentiation from Trotzky, that he was shocked at my "defection." That was in the historic session of the Executive Committee of the Communist International towards the end of 1927, when Trotzky was removed from its membership.

It was an all-night gruelling session, and winter nights in Moscow are very long. Though now firmly convinced that Trotzky's point of view was wrong, yet I was disgusted with the mechanical method of the representatives of one party after another going to the platform to denounce Trotzky in a vituperative language. He was sitting there, still fighting like a lion interrupting every speech with sharp repartees which non-plussed most of the speakers. Evidently, he was the minority of one. Perhaps he still entertained the hope of my supporting him. Indeed, I might have. Because I was sorry for him. I wanted to make a gesture of protest against pigmies tilting toy lances at the lion at bay. I was still not free from subjectivism. Trotzky was wrong. But the giant should not be humiliated by marionettes. Finally, I decided to speak, in order to let the doomed man have the last chance to vindicate his position, if it could be at all vindicated. I was the last to speak before the vote was taken. The dawn was breaking. All were tired out and sleepy. Trotzky looked fierce, but desperate.

The issue was the possibility of building Socialism in one country. Trotzky maintained that it could not be done, and quoted lengthily from Marx and Lenin in support of his point of view. His thesis was that, so long as the world remained capitalist, the Soviet economy was bound to degenerate into Capitalism; and he accused Stalin's policy as heading towards that degeneration.

My speech was only a question put to Trotzky: Agreed that it is not possible to build Socialism in the Soviet Union in the midst of a capitalist world; then, there are two alternatives—either we should go on doing whatever is possible by way of advancing towards the ultimate goal of Socialism, pending the success of revolution in other countries; or we should lay down power in the Soviet Union and go back to emigration to wait for the time when there will be a revolution simultaneously throughout the world. I asked whether Trotzky would choose the latter alternative. He shouted "No". Then I would vote for his expulsion, because he had been advocating a policy either without understanding its implications, or without meaning to putting it into practice, if he had the opportunity to do so. Trotzky looked crest fallen. All through the night, he had heckled every speaker with challenging questions. He kept quiet while I spoke, and hung his head in answer to my question. The historic vote was cast against him —unanimously. The Revolution went over the head of one of its most brilliant products.

It is instructive that practically all the older leaders, who had shined as agitators during the Revolution and the civil war, joined Trotzky in his last fight against the party. Trotzky was one of a whole type of revolutionaries whose days were gone. They were qualified for accomplishing tasks during the destructive phase of the Revolution. As soon as those tasks were accomplished, and the Revolution was confronted with new and often unexpected problems, in its constructive phrase the older leaders became back numbers. Only subjectivism did not allow them to be reconciled to the new situation. Having played their part creditably, they should have sat back comfortably, basking in their well-deserved glory, to watch the drama unfold and new actors occupy the centre of the stage.

Of course, there was no objection or obstruction to any one of them, or to all of them, to have grown up to

the new problems and continue as the leaders of the Revolution even in its second phase. But practically all of them failed to do that, and Trotzky was the most outstanding failure. Unable to fit himself into the scheme of post-revolutionary construction, he persuaded himself to believe that the destructive phase of the Revolution must be re-enacted so that the centre of the stage could be reserved for Trotzky for all the time. That belief, bred out of egoism, was objectively counter-revolutionary.

Trotzky's crusader's zeal for a second revolution in Russia and the plan to organise the Fourth International as the instrument for that revolution of his dream, implied a morbid desire to destroy what he had helped to be created. I do not believe that he was at all happy while he passed his last years in those objectively counter-revolutionary activities, egged on not so much by any theoretical convictions as by a bitter hatred for the man who had done him the great service of having prevented him from doing the greatest disservice to the Revolution. Had Trotzky had his way, and Stalin been removed from the leadership of the party, most probably there would be no Soviet Republic to-day. Therefore, Trotzky goes down in history as one of the most outstanding personalities of our time, with his place there secured by the help of the man who has come to be known as his arch-enemy.

SECTION TWO

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

CHAPTER VI

WHITHER EUROPE?

THE choice is not between Democracy and Fascism. They have never been the only alternatives. Democracy, as conventionally understood, is dead. The birth of Fascism twenty years ago sounded the death-knell of Democracy. As a matter of fact, the ugly child of Fascism, to grow up into the bloody monster of to-day, was conceived in the womb of parliamentary Democracy, and carefully, though covertly, nurtured on her lap. The creator of parliamentary Democracy was also the promoter of Fascism, in a later period of history. Fascism was created to replace parliamentary Democracy when this no longer served the purpose of the creator. The creator was Capitalism. Democracy and Fascism are two forms of the capitalist State. They are suitable respectively for the periods of normal development and of decay. That being the case, it is an erroneous idea that Fascism and Democracy stand in the relation of thesis and anti-thesis. This erroneous idea generally clouds the perspective of the possible development of the present events on the European scene. It must be discarded in order to understand where Europe is going and where the rest of the world is likely to follow her.

When a particular social system exhausts all its potentialities to promote the welfare of humanity, forces for its disruption germinate and grow within its own structure. Gradual and painless transition from one state of development to another is unknown in history. In every turning point of history, the present is marked by a clash between the future and the past.

The social order heralded by the rise of modern trade, industry and science about three hundred years ago, and eventually established by the great revolutions of the seven-

teenth and eighteenth centuries, has exhausted all its potentialities. It did mark a period of phenomenal progress in all the departments of human existence. Parliamentary Democracy was the political achievement of the period. The establishment of the parliamentary democratic State created legal conditions necessary for an unrestricted expansion of trade and industry. The expansion took place on the basis of the private ownership of the new mechanical means of production. Protection of private property was the fundamental principle of the jurisprudence of the period. The laws of the parliamentary democratic State also guaranteed personal freedom. But that was, on the one hand, freedom to exploit and, on the other hand, the freedom to sell labour power in a competitive market. A continuously increasing productivity of labour was the lever of all progress during that period. It was brought about by the application of science to the process of production. The result was a tremendous development of technology, by virtue of which the productivity of labour became practically unlimited, not only in theory, but to a large extent actually as well. Eventually, the process reached its end. The forces of progress, developed within the established social order, to serve its own needs, could no longer have the freedom of growth within its framework. The established social order must be replaced by a new one with greater freedom, if the agencies of further progress and greater human welfare were to assert their liberating and beneficial influence to the fullest extent. The world entered an epoch of revolution. Human history reached a turning point where it was bound to be marked by a fierce clash between the vested interests and general welfare.

The great achievements of the passing period, on the one hand, put a certain section of society in possession of tremendous power, wielded through the ownership of the means of production and the control of the monstrous machinery of the modern State; and, on the other hand, a

good deal of legal freedom and civil liberty inevitably accrued to the rest of society in addition to a limited economic improvement, intellectual development and cultural elevation. The political and legal super-structure of the established social order came in conflict with its economic foundation. Parliamentary Democracy became antagonistic to the interests of Capitalism. The creator could naturally not allow his creation to be bigger than, and injurious to, himself. For the interest of Capitalism, parliamentary Democracy therefore must go. Fascism was forged as the weapon.

Democracy can develop as the antithesis of Fascism only by outgrowing the limitations of Capitalism and by finding for itself a broader economic foundation. But many among those who to-day pretend to defend Democracy against Fascism are also opposed to the liberation of Democracy from its economic limitations. Therefore, theirs has been a fight for a lost cause.

So long as contemporary society remains based upon the exhausted economic system of Capitalism or any other antiquated system, it must adopt the political institution of Fascism in some form or other. Fascism is the politics of decayed Capitalism. Its economic content is controlled capitalist production. Therefore, Fascism is the fate of Europe; and to-day the rest of the world must go the way of Europe. Is there, then, no other alternative than the perspective of a relapse into barbarism opened up by the staggering triumph of Fascism in Europe to-day? There is. But the alternative is not parliamentary Democracy; it is revolution, as the transition to the establishment of a new social order representing a higher stage of human development. The choice before Europe to-day is between revolution and degeneration, which is bound to follow upon the imminent triumph of Fascism.

The recent march of events in Europe must have greatly puzzled all thinking people. Has the Hitler regime

really transformed the Germans into a race of supermen? Otherwise, how is it possible for the Nazis to overrun practically the whole of Europe, sweeping before them powerful armies of one country after another within less than a year? If one rejects the belief that Hitler is possessed of a miraculous or super-human power of creating a race of supermen in a few years, the present European tragedy must have some other explanation.

The singular triumph of Fascism is due to the fact that it represents the interest of capitalist Europe as a whole. It is a condition for the decayed capitalist social order to overcome its own contradictions and survive the crisis brought about by them. The so-called democratic Powers have proved to be no match for the military might of Fascism because they themselves were also heading towards Fascism. One does not fight the agency of one's own salvation. If England and France, for example, are to survive as capitalist States, Fascism must triumph there also. It is immaterial whether it comes in the form of Hitler's hordes or grows internally as it has actually been doing already for some time. No importance need be attached to the imprisonment of a Sir Oswald Mosley. The most significant fact is the establishment of a veritable totalitarian regime in two and a half hours, on the formation of the Churchill Cabinet. In France, the process goes on even more visibly. The present Government excluded the Fascist sympathiser Daladier, but included the outspoken Fascist Ibarnegaray. Could that possibly happen if the French Government was really anti-fascist and fighting for Democracy? The nationalist prejudice is still there to oppose a foreign invasion. But the opposition, at the same time, is paralysed by fascist sentiment and sympathy, which have been remarkably growing in the upper social strata not only in France, but in all the other so-called democratic countries which appear to be arrayed against Hitler's hordes.

If that was not the case, the present European drama would be differently enacted. The French Army, after all, is not so weak as to be swept like a broken reed by the avalanche of Nazi invasion. The triumphal march of Fascism would not be possible unless it corresponded with a desire, may be sub-conscious, on the part of its apparent victims. There is a community of interests underlying this tragedy. Only that makes it possible. The famous "Fifth Columnists" are not all smuggled from outside. They are also of native growth.

This interpretation of recent events may appear to be far-fetched and even incredible. But it ceases to be so if one remembers the diplomatic history of Europe ever since the Locarno Pact of 1924. The Nazi Party was the creation of German Capitalism at bay. Previously, Fascism had triumphed in Italy also in a similar way. Terrified by the revolutionary upheaval immediately upon the conclusion of the last war, the weak and corrupt Italian bourgeoisie handed power over to Mussolini for his services in beating down the forces of revolution with his bands of armed gangsters, drugged with the spirit of jingoist nationalism and the spurious tradition of the glory of ancient Rome. Only the other day, the columns of the London *Times* as well as the *Statesman* of Calcutta were placed at the disposal of Dr. Fritz Thyssen for telling the story of his helping Hitler in every possible way to organise a movement with the declared object of overthrowing the Republic. Dr. Thyssen did that not as an individual, but as the doyen of German industrial magnates.

But Fascism could entrench itself neither in Italy nor in Germany if it had not been welcomed as the bulwark of international Capitalism, and as such patronised and secretly aided by the so-called democratic Powers. In a way, the present situation in Europe is the Nemesis of Anglo-French diplomacy ever since 1924. The Nazi military machine, which is devastating Europe to-day, was not

created in a day. Nor could it be done secretly. Leaving aside the controversial question (still largely veiled in mystery) of actual financial help from the City of London and co-operation of the French armament manufacturers, it cannot be denied by anybody that the danger of Fascism could be nipped in the bud if the so-called democratic Powers really wanted to do so. Instead of doing that, they actually abetted the successive acts of aggression on the part of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. One may be charitable to Mr. Chamberlain and grant him the credit of a sincere desire for maintaining peace; but he cannot be spared condemnation as the most incredibly stupid statesman. But it was neither Mr. Chamberlain nor any other individual politician who determined and directed the fateful and fatal policy. The determining factor was the anxiety for the defence of the capitalist system as a whole against the danger of revolution. Fascism had proved to be an effective instrument for that defence. Nothing should be done to weaken or discredit it. That was the guiding principle of the diplomacy of the so-called democratic Powers, which has landed Europe in its present predicament.

Fascism, therefore, is the fate of Europe trying to escape liberation through the historically necessary revolutionary change. Hitler is triumphant as the natural leader of capitalist Europe, if that conventional term can be used for the sake of convenience. In a way, events are taking place almost according to a plan. The plan is to consolidate the forces of counter-revolution for defending decayed Capitalism against the rising tide of revolution. Only in the matter of leadership the plan may be miscarried. But that, after all, is a matter of detail. The establishment of Fascism over the whole of capitalist Europe was implied in the plan. The so-called democratic Powers desired to dominate a nazified Europe, still retaining their parliamentary facade. But in asmuch as they welcomed Fascism as indispensable for the defence of the decayed system of

Capitalism, they could not possibly prevent, or even desire to prevent, its triumph all over Europe.

The imminent nazification of Europe will not be regarded as a calamity by the ruling classes even of defeated England and France. The defenders of parliamentary Democracy will not mourn its disappearance. That is in the order of things to-day. As a matter of fact, peace in Europe is nearer to-day than ever during the last twenty years. Nazi Germany will have no quarrel with a Fascist France and an England moving in the same direction. The process of nazification in these countries has been going on for some time. The military defeat will only hasten its consummation. There, of course, will be some territorial readjustment and some shift in the balance of power. On the whole, the outcome will be "Gleichschaltung" of the different capitalist States embattled for the last struggle against revolution. The modern civilisation of Europe, built up during the last four hundred years, may survive the crisis and blossom forth into a higher civilisation, or it may succumb, leaving its home reduced to a state of barbarism by triumphant Fascism.

The latter dismal perspective would have thrown us into a state of despair had not a sufficiently bright ray of hope been coming from the beacon of a new world which is being built in a sixth part of the globe. This is no poetry. Fascism and the U.S.S.R. have both resulted from the process of the dissolution of the capitalist social order. The one tries to destroy all the achievement of modern civilisation and suppress all the forces of progress and freedom which represent the positive outcome of the period of social development on the basis of Capitalism: The other incorporates all these positive outcomes and, therefore, affords us a glimpse into a brighter future of humanity. This is not poetry, because Soviet intervention alone may still change the course of events in Europe and consequently spare the masses of the European population the bloody ordeal of

triumphant Fascism. Indeed, Soviet co-operation would have been all along available. The fact that it was not only not welcomed, but actually spurned, is yet another proof that there was really no serious desire to arrest the triumphant march of Fascism. The projected Anglo-Franco-Soviet anti-aggression pact would have surely saved Poland and incidentally prevented the present European conflagration. But that was not to be, because Fascism seems to be the fate of capitalist Europe in the throes of death.

Europe will either be saved by the effort of the forces of revolution encouraged by a timely Soviet intervention, or she will be reduced to barbarism in consequence of the imminent fascist victory. Fascism is the illicit love of parliamentary Democracy. Passion persuaded her to allow the paramour to enter her house and ravage her. She is not sorry, not at all. Why, then, should we shed tears over this ruination of her own desire? From her own point of view, she is being saved. As observers from a distance, we can only hope that the better fate, equally possible, will be still available for European humanity, and the present tragedy will pass away as a horrible nightmare.

* * *

Notwithstanding all stout optimism on the part of the valiant defenders of the lost cause, Europe, for the moment, seems to be heading rapidly towards a relapse into barbarism. France has fallen—not to foreign invaders, but a tragic victim of internal reaction. Various reports about the causes of the French collapse are appearing in the press. They are causing surprise and indignation. For the intelligent observer of the march of events, during the last ten years and more, these reports, however, are no news. All along, those causes have been known to be in operation. Only they were ignored, wilfully. Those who drew attention to them were either ridiculed as alarmists, or suspected of being accomplices to the "Bolshevik con-

spiracy" against the saviour of the Western civilisation. Hitler claimed, and was accorded by many, that distinction. The short-sightedness, stupidity and greed of her own rulers have, step by step, brought Europe to her present plight. The Frankenstein has not been conjured up in a day. It is the creation of the desire to save a decayed system—a desire expressed through the European diplomacy ever since 1924, when the fateful pact was signed at Locarno.

On his return from France, after the conclusion of the armistice, Geoffrey Cox wrote in the *Daily Herald* of London: "I do not know of one single French Fascist leader or Nazi sympathiser being arrested during the war. No serious measures were taken to check the activities in France of secret agents of the enemy. Those who have all along supported Hitlerism and were noted in the police records for receiving money from Nazi Germany in peace time, remained free in Paris even after the war broke out. The Cagoulards (French Royalist Fascist party) conspired against the French democracy at the time of the Popular Front Government. Immediately upon the declaration of war, all imprisoned members were released and sent to their respective regiments. Instead of arresting the secret enemies, the French military police were all along busy in persecuting the Communists."

Now, this sounds like a sensational revelation. But all these things were known for years to those who were really alert against the growing menace of Fascism. However, even now, the real nature of the danger should be fully appreciated, and those who sincerely wish to combat it must have the courage to strike at the roots of the evil which may destroy European civilisation.

One must ponder seriously over what has happened in Europe during the last couple of years. No less than seven countries, in addition to France, have come under the iron heels of triumphant Fascism. Previous to that,

Spain was thrown to the wolf. The history of the Spanish tragedy is still to be written, though its causes are already known sufficiently. But for the connivance of Anglo-French diplomacy, the youngest Republic of Europe could not be ravaged by the fascist barbarians. At that time, France was warned by her well-wishers. They pointed out the danger of Hitler appearing on the Pyrenees, thanks to the stupid policy carried on even by the Popular Front Government under the dictation of the real rulers of France. The prophecy has come true. Events connected with the surrender of France now show that the French ruling class, particularly important military chiefs, were all along closely connected with the reactionary party in the Spanish Civil War. It is not an accident that to-day Franco appears as the connecting link between the German Nazis and the French reactionary clique around Marshal Petain.

An outburst of jingoist nationalism, Fascism, nevertheless, is an international phenomenon. It operates on an international scale; it has created an international organisation. No single country in Europe to-day, with the sole exception of the Soviet Union, is free from the tentacles of this octopus. Everywhere the famous "Fifth Column" is preparing the ground for the triumph of Fascism. The enemy is not knocking at the door. He is in our midst everywhere. That is the real position. If the defenders of the heritage of humanity and the promoters of progress want to fight the enemy effectively, they must first know who are the friends. Serious mistakes on this score have been the main contributing cause to the European tragedy.

After Spain, went Czechoslovakia. She was a creation of the Treaty of Versailles which, in its turn, was an instrument forged for the security of France. Yet it was again France who abandoned Czechoslovakia to the fascist aggressor. That could not happen if the rulers of France were really afraid of German vengeance. One does not allow the power of a dreaded enemy to grow when that could be

prevented. France could have prevented the destruction of Czechoslovakia. At that time, the fullest co-operation of the Soviet Union was guaranteed by Treaty. Germany could not possibly fight on two fronts. Caught in the powerful vice of the French and the Soviet armies, the Hitler regime in Germany could have been destroyed, and Czechoslovakia saved incidentally. But that was not to be. The Munich Pact implied the repudiation of the Franco-Soviet alliance. The other side of the picture logically was a secret understanding between Nazi Germany and the reactionary rulers of France.

A national humiliation has always been the prelude to the rise of Fascism. France had to make that experience in order that the recrudescence of the forces of mediaeval barbarism could be possible in the classical land of rationalism and revolution. Her own rulers have for these years been preparing her humiliation. They did make an effort to establish in France a fascist regime of native growth. But the experience of February 6, 1934, discouraged them. France is not Germany, where the bourgeois democratic revolution had never been consummated. The traditions of the Great Revolution which gave birth to modern Europe cannot be easily overwhelmed in France. But those traditions could not prevent the decay of Capitalism, which necessitates the rise of Fascism. So, Fascism was as much necessary for defending the interests of the French ruling class as were the traditions of the revolution precious for the masses of the French population. Just as, in a previous epoch, the threatened feudal monarchist regime in France invited foreign intervention to save itself, just so are the rulers of present France delivering France to the German Nazis so that their sectional interest may be guaranteed. On the previous occasion, the conspiracy failed. This time it has succeeded. That is the tragedy of Europe.

It is not a fantasy. The Petain-Weygand-Flandin-Laval clique opposed the defence of Paris on the ground

that, in that case, Paris would be the scene of a "Red Revolution". In 1870, the Paris Commune was still the shadow of a revolution cast ahead. To-day, it would be something entirely different. The spectre of the revolution, which alone could save the situation, drove the short-sighted defenders of democracy to submission, and the conspirators succeeded in bringing about the national humiliation of France as the prelude for her Fascisation.

The spectre of a revolution, which must take place if the achievements of modern civilisation are to be preserved as the foundation for a greater civilisation, has been driving Europe towards Fascism ever since 1924. In 1923, Germany was on the verge of a revolution. American capital flowed in to save the situation. But that was only a stop-gap measure. For heading off the danger, more drastic measures had to be taken. The Versailles Treaty had to be scrapped, so that the German ruling class might again grow powerful enough to tide over the severe economic crisis and beat down the forces of revolution. The conspiracy, which has ultimately resulted in the humiliation of France and threatens to lead farther to the Fascisation of entire Europe, began with the conclusion of the Locarno Pact in 1924. It was then that the Frankenstein was conceived.

A story of that conspiracy hatched in the seclusion of a Swiss pleasure resort will reveal the sinister background of the present European tragedy. The Locarno Pact made very far-reaching concessions not to Germany as a whole, but to the German ruling classes, so that they could hold their own against the danger of revolution. Those concessions laid the foundation of the Nazi regime, established eventually. Having made some efforts to stabilise the economic life of Germany on the basis of normal capitalist reconstruction, the German ruling class realised the necessity of forging a new instrument suitable to the conditions in which they had to operate. The new instrument was the

National-Socialist movement. The doyen of post-war German economy, Dr. Fritz Thyssen, has now himself admitted his enormous contribution to the creation and growth of Fascism in Germany. The admission is superfluous and belated. The story has been more or less known to all the observers of international events.

The concessions made by the Locarno Treaty included: (a) evacuation of German territories, occupied by the Allied Armies, many years earlier than provided in the Versailles Treaty; (b) withdrawal of the Allied Control Commission, which was to supervise the disarming of Germany and demilitarisation of the left bank of the Rhine. Those concessions contributed immensely to the rise of a new German militarism. So very substantial were the economic and military concessions made by the Locarno Pact, that Germany willingly agreed to ratify the territorial clauses of the Versailles Treaty. Austen Chamberlain was a Francophile, bitterly hostile to Germany. Yet, he persuaded France to make concessions which sanctioned the remilitarisation of Germany. Briand might have been motivated with an ill-conceived liberalism. But the net result of the "Locarno spirit" was to destroy the security of France.

An English lawyer, J. H. Morgan, K. C., who had been attached to the Allied Control Commission, exposed the serious implications of the Locarno Pact in a series of articles contributed to the *Daily Telegraph* in April 1936. He wrote: "Both these Covenants (evacuation and withdrawal) were duly carried out by the Governments of England and France. Few indeed are they in this country who have any conception of the length to which the British and French Governments went in performing these Covenants and indeed much more than was covenanted. It was not merely that the Control Commission was ordered to withdraw on the faith of pledges by the German Government that Germany's continuing defaults in the matter would be cured. The work of demilitarising the Rhineland was also

abandoned." The same competent writer also testifies that even previously the Allied Control Commission had connived with German rearmament by leaving intact strategic structures in the zone on the "German representation as to the commercial utility of belligerent things. Even on the bank of the Rhine, permanent works of mobilisation were left intact by the evacuating Allied Army out of deference to the spirit of Locarno."

The same witness further informs that it had been known for years that the German Security Police in the occupied territories were camouflaged *Reichswehr*. "But in this case also, the British and French Governments agreed in 1927 to the maintenance of those formations in the Rhineland." Between 1920 and 1926, under the very nose of the Allied Control Commission, the cadre of the old German army had been kept intact under the command of General von Seeckt. After the conclusion of the Locarno Pact, the British and French Governments tacitly waived their objection to the existence of that "shadow army", which went on preparing the way for the introduction of general conscription under the Hitler regime. "The Pact of Locarno, so far from arresting the process of rearming, actually facilitated it."

In view of this background of the present European situation, the "surrender" of France assumes an entirely different meaning. For one thing, it has not been brought about by a combination of fortuitous circumstances; it was predetermined. Secondly, it is not a surrender, but the only escape for the French ruling class having stakes in a decayed social system. And they are not alone in that precarious position. They are all marching in a dismal procession towards the relapse into barbarism, some taking the lead, others following. A more enlightened section may be terrified by the spectre of the Nemesis. But they also are bound to go the fateful way, willingly or under compulsion, if they fail to have the courage to travel the only alternative

way which is the way of bourgeois democracy giving place to a new system of greater freedom and general prosperity.

Unfortunately, that courage is still lacking. Therefore, the perspective of the European scene is dark indeed. No use pinning hope on America. The Fascist sympathy of the rulers of the Transatlantic Democracy is an open secret. Henry Ford has refused to supply England. The entire Republican Party shares his sentiments. The presidential election may not turn out the present administration. But in order to win, President Roosevelt must give in to the predominantly isolationist tendency, which means nothing less than leaving Europe to the mercy of triumphant Fascism.

Can England, then, fight alone? Are the resources of her colonies so very great? Will they be available in the critical moment? These are questions which must perturb the defenders of human freedom and human progress. The scales can be turned only by the intervention of the U.S.S.R. But that help cannot be expected for the preservation of a decayed system which has given birth to the monster of Fascism. The fight against Fascism, in order to be successful, must be inspired with the determination to destroy its root. Modern civilisation must outgrow the limits of decayed Capitalism and discredited parliamentary Democracy, in order to survive the fierce attack of Fascism.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHOICE

THE *finale* of the European tragedy is being enacted in the quiet health resort of Vichy. Of course, the place has not been deliberately chosen. Yet, it happens to be symbolic. All the super-annuated and incurably sick rich of the world go to Vichy with the forlorn hope of regaining youth and health by putting themselves through the ordeal of drinking distasteful water and wallowing in sulphurous mud. The French Republic is being subjected to that tortuous treatment. The Petain Government of traitors and capitulators has convened both the Houses of the French Parliament to meet as the National Assembly for revising the Constitution of the Republic. The details of the projected revision are not yet known. From the scanty news available, it is however clear that the revision will amount to the destruction of the Republic and the establishment of a fascist dictatorship.

The tragic implication of this event is to be measured by the recollection of the historical fact that, in the beginning of the last century, France occupied in Europe the same position as occupied by Nazi Germany to-day. Only, then her role was entirely different. She was engaged in the glorious mission of carrying the message of freedom to the European countries still groaning under the autocracy of a decayed feudalism. Nazi Germany, on the contrary, is the bearer of the standard of a victorious counter-revolution. She is not avenging the defeat in the first world war or the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles. The feudal Germany, which suffered crushing defeats at Jena and Austerlitz, is resurrected under the bloody banner of National-Socialism. She is taking revenge by trying to wipe out the achievements of the great French Revolution,

which heralded the advent of victorious Democracy. Will she succeed? The future of Europe depends on the answer to this fateful question. Meanwhile, the death dance goes on.

The fascisation of France is not the result of a military defeat. On the contrary, the military defeat was a part of the process of her fascisation. And the defeat itself was stage-managed. The whole truth about the apparent miracle of the mechanised forces of the modern Attila breaking through the Weygand Line and sweeping the North of France to occupy Paris in two weeks without any resistance, is still to be told. One fact, however, did not miss the scrutiny of careful observers. There was practically no fighting. After Weygand was called to replace Gamelin as the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, things went worse instead of improving. The latter might have blundered, and it seems that he has buried his shame in a voluntary death. But Weygand's strategy was evidently sinister. If he has any military genius, it appears to shine only when he is engaged in fighting, or preparing a fight, against the Soviet Union. He won his military reputation not by defending France, but by helping the Polish dictator Pilsudski beat the young and badly equipped Red Army back from Warsaw in 1920. Recently, his military talent was employed in the task of creating in the Near East a powerful base of operation against the Soviet Union. The spirit with which he was working there has been revealed by the Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in Syria, who declared himself ready to fall in line with the policy of the Petain Government, and would have acted as the advance-guard of possible fascist thrust towards the East, if his ambitions were not checked by a threat from the Turkish Government, presumably with encouragement from Moscow. That being the history of the man who was called upon to lead the French Army in the fateful days, his appearance on the scene sealed the fate of France.

Weygand's strategy was continuous retreat, until the German Army practically surrounded Paris, and then to deliver that classical home of Democracy and Revolution to the foreign invader. Only, the core of the tragedy is that the invaders were not foreign, in asmuch as their mission coincided with the interest of the French ruling class, represented by Weygand and his kind. That makes the tragedy all the more tragic. It is all the more tragic because it is a tragedy not only of France, but of entire Europe. The fascisation of France is only a part in the process of the fascisation of entire Europe. The sinister forces which have caused the downfall of France are in operation everywhere, even in those countries which are still arrayed against victorious Fascism. Unless and until it is realised that the extermination of those forces is the condition for the triumph of Democracy against Fascism, Europe will be fighting losing battles, finally to follow Germany towards the relapse into barbarism.

Some information about the "battle of France", however, is beginning to leak out. It shows that there was no battle, but only a conspiracy for the destruction of Democracy in France. The other day, speaking at a meeting in London, Professor Saurat, Director of the Institut Français, gave out the information that in the whole battle of France only 6000 soldiers were killed. But prisoners taken by the Germans were no less than 600,000. That is a very significant fact. It may or may not be very accurate. But it does give a picture of the situation. Any serious resistance to the invasion by a modern mechanised army would have certainly cost many more lives. Evidently, there was little of such resistance. On the other hand, the large number of prisoners taken tells an entirely different story. Indeed, two alternative inferences can be made therefrom: either French soldiers simply did not want to fight; or the strategy of Weygand was to allow the doubtful units to be encircled by the swift moving mechanised

advance-guard of the invading army. In the earlier period of the campaign, numerous changes in the Command of the French Army were reported. Presumably, there were officers who wanted to put up a resistance. Either they were removed from their positions, or the units commanded by them were allowed to be captured.

There are still other facts proving that the fascisation of France is not an accidental event. Indeed, there are no accidents in history any more than in nature. It is not an accident even in the sense of not being premeditated or anticipated. An event occurring unexpectedly is called an accident. The fascisation of France is not such an event. Being a process rather than an event, it may embrace particular events which were not anticipated exactly in the form and in the way they did occur. Even the daily press and current political literature bear testimony to the fact that the process of fascisation has been going on for some time, and its scope was not limited to any one country. On the occasion of severing diplomatic relations with Britain, the Foreign Minister of the Petain Government declared: "French foreign policy for many years has been dictated by a desire to do nothing which could dissociate us from the foreign policy of Great Britain. The policy of sanctions which separated us from Italy was solely due to this anxiety. The same is true of our policy with regard to Central Europe and Germany. The negotiations which terminated in the Munich Agreement were personally conducted by Mr. Chamberlain. We entered the war in the wake of Britain, who declared war first."

Without exonerating the Petain Government in any way, it must however be admitted that there is absolutely no exaggeration in this particular declaration. But, on the other hand, the rulers of France cannot shake off the entire responsibility for the fateful diplomacy which has landed Europe in her present plight. But the point for the moment is that, according to this declaration, a certain section of

the French ruling class was all along opposed to an anti-fascist foreign policy. Under its influence, successive French Governments, apparently of varying political complexion, allowed themselves to be dictated by the British foreign policy, which was certainly not anti-fascist. Presumably, the impression that the present Foreign Minister wishes to convey is that, had the section of the French ruling class, represented by the Petain Government, been allowed to pursue a foreign policy independently, the fascisation of France as well as of the rest of Europe (including England) might have taken place painlessly, without the hitch of the present unnecessary armed conflict.

It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the policy of appeasement was an invitation for the invader. He has been welcomed in France, and who can say that the same reception does not await him in the rest of Europe? The culmination of a process, fascisation of France, therefore, must be read as the writing on the wall. No use raising alarm about the invader knocking at the door, while those eager to throw open the door retain freedom of action and continue occupying positions of power.

Turning to the *finale* enacted at Vichy, one finds familiar features associated with the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany. The burning of the Reichstag was the signal for the overthrow of the German Republic. In France, the conflagration has taken place on a much larger scale. There, Democracy has not been destroyed symbolically. It has been done through the shameful act of the surrender of Paris. Von Papen's "Cabinet of Monocles" prepared the scene for Hitler's rise to power. The clique of French militarists around the octogenerian Petain performed the same function in France.

The rump Reichstag of Germany met in the Opera House of Berlin to applaud Hitler pronouncing his oration at the funeral of the Weimar Republic. Nearly half the house was either in jail or in exile. The body meeting at

Vichy as the French National Assembly is equally defective. It is meeting in the Casino, the historic Palais Bourbon having fallen under the shadow of the Swastika. The Communists, Socialists and the Radical Socialists together constitute the majority of the French Chamber of Deputies. It is not known what exactly has happened to all of them. But there is enough information to the effect that most of them are absent, the Communists in jail and the others in exile. So, the "National Assembly" will represent not France, but the "two hundred families" of France, whose interest requires the fascisation of the classical land of modern Democracy, and who have promoted the process in that direction.

The decision to call the rump National Assembly for giving France a Fascist Constitution was taken by the Ministers, and communicated by Laval (not a member of the Cabinet) to some fifty Senators who endorsed it. Laval and Flandin are the political spokesmen of the real rulers of France. So, in reality, the Petain Government is not acting under the dictation of foreign invaders, but according to the wishes of the French ruling class. The fascisation of France takes place immediately under the impact of foreign invasion, but is brought about by the exigencies of maintaining the domination of the native forces of reaction.

Any detailed comment on the new French Constitution must be deferred until the document is published. From the advance news, it can be expected to be of the classical fascist pattern. The corporate State will replace the democratic Republic. The Government will demand the help of the Parliament "to reform the whole structure of French administration including its very institutions". The structure of a democratic State, definitely set up after nearly a hundred years of revolutions and counter-revolutions, will at last be pulled down. The occupation of Paris by the Prussian Army in 1870 was followed by the rise of the Third Republic. More than seventy years of struggle preceded

that. The Third Republic existed hardly that long. Now it is to be no more. This time also, the immediate cause is the occupation not only of Paris, but practically of the whole of France by the German Army. But the effect is so very different.

The traditions established by one of the greatest revolutions of history cannot be so very easily effaced. There is a difference between France and Germany. Yet in France also, Fascism is trying to find its social foundation; it is trying to exploit the economic bankruptcy and disillusionment of the urban middle class. With that purpose, it will pander to their vanity. "Work and intelligence must take the pride of place over favouritism and plutocracy." This is a familiar cry which has misled millions in Germany and Italy. It is an open secret that the politicians standing behind the Petain Government are creatures of the plutocracy—the "two-hundred families" of France. It is also declared that the defeat of France calls for a bold measure. This bold measure will be taken precisely by those bold soldiers who were the engineers of the defeat.

Such is the way of Fascism, and Fascism does not represent the perversity of any particular nation or race. It is the politics of capitalism in decay. Capitalism is in decay throughout the world. Wherever attempts will be made to keep alive this dying system, Fascism must come. It has come to France. It has come there as a determined process. The same fate will overtake the rest of Europe if the causes of the process are not eradicated. Will the professed defenders of Democracy have the necessary courage? Will they learn from the tragedy of France?

* * *

For the moment, Europe appears to be lost. The fascisation of France completes the dreadful picture. With the solitary exception of Sweden, the whole of the European Peninsula has been brought under the iron heels of triumphant Fascism. This solitary exception is a lesson. But

for the proximity of the Soviet Union, Sweden would have suffered the fate of Norway. That lesson must be learnt by those who earnestly wish to fight Fascism. Sweden was no less penetrated by the Nazi Fifth Column than other unfortunate countries which were undone by that curse. She had her Quislings and Petains, ready to throw open the gates to the welcome invader. Yet, she escaped the common fate, because the Nazi hordes were warned off by the Soviet Union. At the other end of Europe, the internal regime of the Balkan countries has been essentially fascist already for some time. The German invaders would have been welcome there also. The Western Powers could not prevent the Nazis grabbing those countries any more effectively than in the case of Poland. But there also, the proximity of the Soviet Union operated as the check upon Nazi expansionism. These facts should be borne in mind while trying to find an answer to the question how to fight Fascism.

The defence of England cannot be identified with the fight against Fascism. The object of that fight is to liberate Europe from the fascist grip: to rescue modern civilisation from the imminent danger of destruction. England may or may not be invaded by the Nazis. She may or may not succeed in resisting that invasion. The decisive fact, however, is that, with the domination of practically the whole of Europe, Fascism has become tremendously powerful. It will drive Europe back to barbarism, even if the British Isles can escape that fate. But can England alone stand, if the whole of Europe goes? The task, therefore, is greater than the defence of England. The fight against Fascism, in order to be successful, must be an offensive on a gigantic scale. Where are the forces available for the purpose?

Mobilising the resources of her Empire, and reinforced by the help from America, England can be fairly confident of warding off an invasion if the Nazis will undertake the misadventure. But she is certainly not in a position to be, single-handed, on the offensive against triumphant Fascism.

American help, as a commercial proposition, will be available for the defence of England. But it is doubtful whether that help will be available for the purpose of carrying the war to the home of Fascism. Whatever illusion there might have been on that score, has been dispelled by President Roosevelt's address to the Congress, in which he categorically declared that America would never participate in any war in Europe. That being the relation of forces, the prospect of liberating Europe from the grip of Fascism does not seem to be very bright. The defence of England, letting Europe sink into mediæval barbarism, is not an ideal which can inspire the fighters for freedom and the champions of progress throughout the world.

All the optimistic talk about the ultimate victory over Fascism seems to be based on the hope that a protracted war will result in an exhaustion of the enemy. That hope was legitimate as long as the forces of Fascism were confined to one or two countries. But it has disappeared since the Nazis have been allowed to overcome the disadvantage of the limited resources of Germany. To-day it is no longer a war with Germany. In asmuch as all the resources of the whole of Europe are now completely at the disposal of the Nazis, in a way, it is a war against Europe. As the rulers of Europe, the Nazis to-day are in a position to carry on the war almost indefinitely. Blockade would no longer harm them. The British Navy, even with the doubtful co-operation of the American fleet, can do no more than blockade Europe. But blockade can no longer be of any great strategic importance. The Fascists are no longer afraid of it. With the entire western coast of Europe, from the North Cape to Gibraltar, under their control, the possibility of landing any considerable Anglo-American expeditionary force must be excluded. Europe, thus, seems to be doomed. There must be some other line of attack if the fight against Fascism is to end in a victory.

The plan of carrying on the fight against Fascism from

the British and French colonies, even if England falls, is not to be taken seriously. The experience in connection with France has already proved the impossibility of that plan. The French colonial administrators and commanders of the colonial armies have all turned out to be rather unreliable allies. Fascist sympathy is natural for the mentality of the colonial administrators. Even if it was otherwise, far off colonies could not be of any serious military value for a war which must be waged in Europe. The colonies could only be the source of supplies; but there must be a front in Europe to be supplied. So long as that front does not exist, the colonies are useless in any real fight against Fascism. The England of Pitt could defeat France in America. But to-day Germany cannot be fought either in Africa or in Asia. She has made herself the master of Europe. If she is to be defeated, she must be met there. How is that possible? That is the fundamental problem of the fight against Fascism. Those who fail to grasp this problem, or try to evade it, are not serious when they talk of the fight against Fascism. Or they talk glibly without realising the seriousness of what they are talking about.

The talk of fighting Fascism from the colonies, if necessary, has a different significance. The world is to be divided into three federations, so to say. As against the Fascist Federation of Europe, the French and English colonies are to be consolidated into one politico-economic unit. Eventually, that might develop into the Anglo-American federation. On the other hand, there is the Union of the Soviet Republics. However fantastic the plan of colonial consolidation may appear, it does not seem to be without powerful protagonists. It was in pursuance of this plan that the British proposal was made to the French Government on the eve of the latter's capitulation. If the plan ever materialises, it will mean abandoning Europe to the mercies of Fascism; it will mean betrayal of the European civilisation. If the European civilisation cannot be saved in its original

home, it certainly cannot be successfully transplanted on exotic soils, and thrive there as a civilisation. The plan of the anti-fascist Powers to withdraw to their colonies will mean capitulation before Fascism, acceptance of defeat at the hand of triumphant Fascism, and therefore connivance with the destruction of European civilisation by fascist barbarism. Certainly, that cannot be the ideal for the earnest fighters against Fascism.

The fairly long history of colonial administration gives lie to the pretension that Imperialism carries to the backward people the message of modern civilisation. What have lately come to be known as the characteristic features of Fascism, have all along been associated with colonial administration, political as well as economic. On the other hand, the inability to distinguish Imperialism from modern civilisation has characterised the nationalist movements in the colonies with an animus against the latter, which again is a characteristic feature of Fascism. The atmosphere in the colonial countries is in every way favourable for the establishment of a fascist regime which may superficially differ from the classical type of Europe. So, the fantastic plan of continuing the fight against Fascism from the colonies, if ever acted upon, will lead to the creation of a rival fascist federation. There will be a fight between Europe caught in the process of a new decline and decay, and an army of non-European slaves, driven by European emigrants in alliance with the native upper classes.

The Anti-Fascism of the colonial nationalist movements is only skin-deep. It is known that, in a number of countries, situated nearer to Europe, the nationalist movements were greatly influenced by fascist propaganda. But propaganda from outside is a secondary factor. Fascism is inherent in nationalism, which is an anachronism in these days when the operation of all social forces necessarily transgresses national boundaries. Fascism being the acutest outburst of nationalism, it is logically inherent in every

nationalist movement. Suspend the operation of the Defence of India Act, and you will be surprised to find out how much of Fascism there is in this country. If the British are to make India, for example, their new home, they will have to cultivate the friendship of those sections of the native population which are naturally inclined towards Fascism, and whose representatives until recently used to idealise the "great achievements" of Germany and Italy under Hitler and Mussolini, extolling the latter as liberators of those nations. Thus, looked at from every point of view, the colonies cannot be the base for continuing any real fight against Fascism.

Moreover, to run away from Europe, leaving her to a dire fate, will be a strange demonstration of the determination to liberate her from the grip of Fascism. To run away with your money-bag, is poor heroism. This escapist policy may serve the purpose of squaring the conscience of those who have committed the crime of delivering Europe to Hitler. Laval and Samuel Hoare delivered Abyssinia to Mussolini. Since then, the former has performed a greater feat. He has delivered France to Fascism. That transaction took place through the intermediary of General Franco. Even to-day Samuel Hoare happens to be the British Ambassador at the Court of that General. The danger of his emulating the greatest feat of his friend is not imaginary. To neglect it, cannot be reconciled with a serious determination to fight Fascism. And the patrons of Sir Samuel Hoare in England are still trying to dictate British policy. Beset with all these dangers, England single-handed can never fight Fascism.

Neither a defensive warfare nor the escapist plan of shifting to the colonies, will do. To begin with, there must be a thorough house-cleaning. Then, the gravity of the problem of the fight against Fascism must be fully grasped. The Frankenstein must be bearded in his own den. Fascism must be fought and defeated on the battle-fields of Europe.

Who can do that? The attention must naturally be attracted by the other federation, which has been responsible for whatever effective resistance has until now been put up against Fascism. But a co-operation with that power presupposes a change of heart. It cannot be induced to draw other people's chestnuts out of the fire. There must be an honesty of purpose on the part of those who profess to fight Fascism.

It is easy to see how the situation in Europe can be immediately changed by some action on the part of the Soviet Union. It is equally easy to see how that action cannot be taken by any other Power. The Soviet Union alone is in a position to begin an offensive against Fascist Europe.

The position of vantage, occupied to-day by Nazi Germany with the aid and connivance of the democratic Powers, can be easily wrested by the Soviet Union, provided that there will be some guarantee against the utilisation of that occasion for a peace among the capitalist Powers, fascist and non-fascist, on the cry of Bolshevik menace. So long as politicians of the Chamberlain school retain their position in the higher circles of British politics, that guarantee will not be there. Consquently, there will be no effective fight against Fascism.

As soon as the Red Army will move into the Balkans and also towards the East-European countries handed over to Hitler by Mr. Chamberlain's appeasement policy, the military situation in Europe will change. Germany cannot afford to lose her control of those valuable sources of supply. The Nazi military machine will have to be employed for defending them. The Soviet Union must be assured of the fullest support of England at that crucial moment. Japan must be prevented from doing any mischief in that opportunity. That task should be allotted to America. The British Navy should hold Italy in check.

All these things can be done only by those who are reconciled to the perspective that, rescued from the grip of Fascism, Europe cannot still remain the happy hunting-ground of decayed Capitalism. The end of an era has divided the world in two camps. There is no third alternative. In this fateful moment, one must take side. The outcome of the fight against Fascism will depend on the choice between the breakdown of the European civilisation and the rise of a higher civilisation upon the defeat of Fascism. This choice has not yet been made. Therefore, the fate of Europe hangs in the balance.

Not only the fate of Europe, but possibly of the whole world, hangs in the balance. Which side will the balance be tipped? Lately, it has become a fashion to talk of the "new order". None of the numerous prophets has, however, told us clearly what will be the nature of the "kingdom to come". This is no time to dream beautiful dreams or to indulge in loose talk. The fateful choice must be made. It is not between the devil and the deep sea. It is between retrogression and progress: indeed, between life and death. Should modern civilisation live and blossom forth into a still better civilisation; or should all the splendid achievements of human genius be sacrificed on the altar of cowardice and greed?

The phenomenal triumph of Fascism seems to have acted as the shock-cure for at least some of the victims of the disease of optimism and complacency. It has quickened thought which may grasp the gravity of the problem confronting humanity, and even go to the extent of offering some solution. It has dawned on some that the world cannot continue as it is. It has entered one of the successive periods of its history when far-reaching changes must take place. In other words, a revolution is on the order of the day. Those who regard that historical necessity as a dreadful spectre, and try to run away from fate, can travel only

one way—that of counter-revolution, which is triumphant Fascism.

Once revolution is recognised as a historical necessity, it loses its terror and secures adherence even from the most unexpected quarters. In these days of enlightenment, when practically all educated people have learned to study history as a science, the recognition should not be difficult. There have been revolutions in the past. They have regularly punctuated the entire history of mankind. All scientific students of history know to-day that they were not outbursts of irrationalism, or brought about by the "forces of evil" conspiring against the divine dispensation of injustice and inequity. Revolutions are mutations in the process of social evolution. Sudden changes—from the quantitative to the qualitative—are not limited only to the evolution of lower organisms. Moreover, they are not really sudden changes. Mutation also is a determined event. It is the culmination of a gradual process. All the mysteries of organic evolution have been solved by the discovery of mutation. Society is a conglomeration of higher organisms. It is also subject to the deterministic laws of biology. And history is only a part of the social science. Therefore, it should not be difficult for the educated, those who are educated to the extent of being free souls, capable of placing the general welfare of mankind above the greed of sectional interests, to regard revolution as a determined social event, the occurrence of which can be obstructed or delayed only at the cost of human progress. No use our claiming the distinction of civilised beings if we are not capable of taking that view of things. If modern civilisation has not yet produced a sufficiently large number of such free souls, it will not be worth saving as against the depradation of triumphant Fascism.

The thought provoked by the shock of the European tragedy, particularly the fall of France, however, still lacks the courage of grasping the problem in its fullest dimensions.

Even those who are laboriously coming to the realisation that the world must go forward if relapse into barbarism is to be avoided, are not yet able to visualise the way ahead. When the tormented world cries aloud for a radical revaluation of values and for a thorough overhauling of its social structure, they can suggest only tinkering here and there. When the civilised world must take boldly a long leap forward, they counsel a discrete retreat into the dilapidated trenches of nineteenth century Liberalism.

Sometimes, it is necessary to take a step backward in order to take the plunge with all the more vigour. If the modern world is to draw inspiration from its own tradition, so as to come victorious out of the present life and death struggle, it should look beyond the pig-headed and chicken-hearted Liberalism of the nineteenth century to the magnificent and really inspiring achievements of the century of the Great Bourgeois Revolution. Those achievements are in grave danger to-day. The fascisation of France, hundred and fifty years after the Great Revolution, is not an event to be passed over with a few conventional tears. This violence upon human progress must be avenged by a re-enactment of the Great French Revolution as a prelude to an even greater revolution, to carry through which is the privilege of our time.

The new world will not be the creation of a modern God. If it is to rise, it will rise as the handicraft of man. Therefore, the creator must know what he is going to create. But the prophets prefer to mystify us, because then it will be possible to mislead the believers. No faith, please. There must be a vision, an intelligent vision.

Mr. Chamberlain also used to talk about a new world order. He said he was creating it with his policy of appeasement. The result of that policy is the tragedy of Europe. So, there we have a taste of the mysterious new world order. The insane fear of Communism, the stupid anxiety to prevent revolutionary changes which are bound to take

place, drives one to the camp of Fascism. With those handicaps, no "democratic" Power can possibly fare any better than France, in the face of the fascist onslaught. It should be remembered that Hitler became the protégé, if not actually the darling, of the European *status quo-ers* as the superman who had saved Germany from Red Revolution and thereby guaranteed entire Europe against the menace of Bolshevism. If the *status quo* has become untenable, it must go. That is simple commonsense. Fascism is the new weapon for the maintenance of the unstable *status quo*. Therefore, it has adherents and allies in every country. They are the forces of Petainism, which is not the curse of France, but is an international phenomenon. Those incipient, insidious forces must be stamped out ruthlessly before the fate of France overtakes Britain also. Vested interest is entrenched in the *status quo*. The two must go together. That means a revolution, which is nothing more dreadful than the passing of an untenable *status quo*. Is it so very difficult to understand this simple proposition?

The relation of forces is clear enough. To-day the democratic world admits, though reluctantly, that Nazi aggressiveness has so far received a check only from the Soviet Union. As against that, we have the history of Europe ever since 1924, during which period the growing forces of Fascism were aided and abetted in every possible way, nationally and internationally, by the "defenders of democracy". Turning to recent history, we have the testimony of the Deputy Leader of the House of Commons and of another member of the British Government. The latter declared in the Parliament the other day: "There is no evidence in Norway, Holland, France or Belgium that any part of the working class acted as Fifth Columnists. The latter came from higher up." Major Attlee declared on the same occasion: "The Nazis were able to persuade some

well-to-do people that they were the saviours of society against a revolution."

An approximately similar relation of forces obtains in Britain. The composition of the majority in the present House of Commons does not correspond to the resolution or the needs of the country. The resolution, as announced by the Prime Minister the other day, is to carry on the war indefinitely until victory. It is to-day an open secret that the Prime Minister does not have the full support of the Conservative Party, which still follows Chamberlain. He is dependent for his position on the rows of some very wealthy men who sit behind him in the House of Commons. They could turn him out of office; he is far from being free and must trim his sail to suit those who still look to others than himself for their guidance before the vote. That is a very alarming relation of forces.

It is not in vain that the Nazis are counting upon the fall of Churchill. In the British Ambassador at the Court of General Franco, they have a reliable liaison with the very wealthy men who can turn out any Prime Minister whenever they choose. In this situation, on whom should a British Government, determined to fight Fascism, depend? The fight against Fascism evidently must begin at home. Otherwise, the danger of Petainism of the British brand may be a reality in England before long. Those incipient British Lavals and Flandins must be removed from their positions of power and privilege, if England is to escape the fate of France. But they have too much at stake to eliminate themselves voluntarily. They can count upon the mass of *status quo-ers,* whose souls are assailed by doubts about their petty interests. In this dangerous situation, honest and determined defenders of Democracy must act with the reckless courage of those who, hundred and fifty years ago, made Democracy triumph in France. Churchill, or whoever it may be, must have the courage to emulate Robespierre, Danton and Marat, if he wishes to defend

Democracy against traitors and conspirators. The achievements of modern civilisation are to be rescued from the ruins of the capitalist Democracy. Otherwise, how are you going to convert those very wealthy and proportionately powerful men to your faith of a new world order?

It is admitted that the only dependable factor in the fight against Fascism is the working class. If Democracy is to be saved only by the devotion and idealism of the working class, she must cease to be the fashionable dame who adorned luxurious parlours during the last hundred years and more. She must democratise herself. Otherwise, she cannot possibly escape being ravaged by the ruffians who alone can to-day protect the money bags of her old-time admirers.

There is no half-way house between Fascism and Socialism. The whole socio-political system reared upon the foundation of Capitalism has decayed beyond repair. The whole structure must be rebuilt from the bottom up. That is the need of the time. Beyond is the picture of the new world order which has been inspiring the millions with no stake in the established order, and who therefore will shed not a single tear at the burial of a dead system. Those who are still anxious to galvanise that dead system by some imaginary palliatives, are attempting the impossible, only to be landed in the camp of Fascism by virtue of that anxiety.

But the tragedy of Europe may yet provoke bold thinking. The caravan of history will go on. It may be arrested for a while by bandits and brigands. But there is no other choice than between the breakdown of an entire civilisation and a revolution—one of those great events which occur from time to time for rescuing the world from severe crises.

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According to a *Reuter* message from New York, the American explanation "for Hitler's delay in attempting to

invade Britain is his preference for a negotiated peace rather than a struggle to the death." It is also reported that, according to American informed opinion, "three features of the British plan for victory are blockade, revolution and eventual participation of the United States."

The three act play promises to be entertaining. But the roles are still to be allotted. There will be no difficulty about the players in the first and the third act, although to be coherent, the construction of the drama has obviously to be recast. If the present European drama is not to end as a dreadful tragedy, a revolution must be conceived as its *finale*. Whether the American information of the British plan of victory is correct or not, the end of Fascism is conditional upon a revolution. But it has not been given its proper place in the British plan. The expectation appears to be that the German people will be starved by blockade, so that ultimately, in despair, they will rise against the Nazis; a revolution will overthrow the Hitler regime; and then, with the aid of the United States, the *status quo ante bellum* will be re-established in Europe. If anybody is really thinking on those lines, he is simply living in the fool's paradise.

It has been already shown that Europe can be saved from the danger of a relapse into mediæval barbarism only by a war of offensive. England can continue only a defensive war, assuming that the machinations of the still powerful "appeasement" party will be frustrated. With the control of the resources of practically the whole of Europe, the Fascists can defy maritime blockade indefinitely. Moreover, whatever injury can be afflicted by a rigorous blockade will be the share of the victims of fascist terror in Germany as well as the other occupied countries. Hunger and privation do not guarantee the success of a revolution, which to-day must face the most formidable machine of organised violence. Therefore, the decisive role of revolution in the European drama has to be allotted to the

U.S.S.R. It has been cast by history. In addition to its other achievements, the U.S.S.R. has become the instrument for what was considered to be an impossibility until now, namely, bloodless revolution. During less than a year, the revolution has taken place in West Ukraine and White Russia, in the Baltic countries, parts of Finland, Bessarabia and North Bukovina, without shedding a drop of blood, figuratively speaking. It may happen similarly in other countries before long. The revolution in Germany and in the other European countries, tyrannised and betrayed by Fascism, will be brought about by the instrumentality of the U.S.S.R.

The wistfully expected American intervention cannot be fitted into the scheme of a serious and effective fight against Fascism. In our time, America has intervened in European affairs twice. Once during the last war, and then in 1924 to save German Capitalism breaking down under the stupid operation of the Versailles Treaty. Neither to-day nor in the near future, America can again intervene as on the occasion of the last war. There is no place for an American expeditionary force to land in Europe. Even supplies from America cannot be of decisive importance, or even really necessary, so long as England remains compelled only to conduct a defensive war. America may participate in the blockade, but blockade itself being of dubious strategic value, participation in it will be of equally negligible importance. How, then, can American intervention be given the conclusive place in the reported British plan of war against Fascism?

The repetition of American intervention in 1924 cannot be desired by those who really want the destruction of Fascism. It should be remembered that American intervention enabled the German ruling class to beat down the forces of revolution, and thereby opened the way for the rise of Fascism. If American intervention is expected to play that role again in Europe, it should be opposed by all

the sincere advocates of freedom and Democracy, instead of being welcomed as an agency of liberation.

The pattern of the expected American intervention is outlined in a *Reuter* despatch from New York: "Washington will declare the whole continent (of Europe) out of bounds for American shipping; Russia is to be kept busy elsewhere, so that she will be unable to supply Germany." The first part of this plan of American intervention may be easily accomplished, although it will do little harm to the Fascists. The second part is positively sinister. In order to prevent an imaginary supply to Germany, Russia must be engaged in a war of self-defence. The second part of the American plan has no other meaning. The Finnish experience is to be repeated, maybe in some other, more advantageous, place. Whether the plan will work out or not, is a different question. The significant fact is that such an action is contemplated as a part of the plan of a war supposed to be conducted for defending liberty and Democracy against Fascism.

It still remains to be seen if the first part of the American plan of intervention will ever be put into effect. Meanwhile, there is a leakage in the blockade, thanks to the American desire to supply Germany with the most vital necessity for mechanised warfare, namely, petroleum. The information comes from the British Government that America has exported to Spain a very large amount of this valuable commodity this year; the amount is much more than could be possibly consumed in Spain. And there can be little doubt as to which quarter the Fascist Government of Spain must be passing on the surplus petroleum. On the other hand, there is absolutely no evidence to show that any Russian petroleum has been of late delivered to Germany. Therefore, it is not even a case of the pot calling the kettle black. Yet, America proposes to make some trouble for the U.S.S.R., which alone until now has successfully crossed the path of Fascism. There should be no

difficulty for all genuine fighters against Fascism to see from which quarter Europe can expect the help to liberate herself from the grip of Fascism.

While doing absolutely nothing by way of helping Europe fight Fascism, except selling munitions as a good business proposition, the United States of America have already committed clear acts of hostility against the Soviet Union. In the last analysis, those acts of hostility condone fascist aggression, as against the Soviet Union, at any rate. The United States Government has refused to sever diplomatic relations with the Fascist Government of France. But it did not delay a day in protesting against the decision of the Baltic countries to incorporate themselves in the Soviet Union. The diplomatic representatives of the reactionary pro-fascist governments of the Baltic States, now abolished by constitutionally expressed verdicts of the people, will remain in Washington enjoying the recognition of the American Government. That is not only an act of hostility, but an intervention in the internal affairs of the Baltic countries, in support of the reactionary ruling class who, for their selfish interests, allowed their countries to be turned into colonies of Nazi Germany. American intervention in the internal affairs of those far off countries goes even farther. It goes to the extent of a financial blockade, which amounts to sheer robbery.

In view of the proverbial American hatred for the Soviet Union, these acts of hostility are not surprising, although they clearly indicate where American sympathy really lies, and therefore should dispel all illusion about American intervention in the fight against Fascism. But what is surprising is identical action also on the part of the British Government, which has declared its intention to "freeze" the credit of the Baltic countries. Most probably, this anti-Soviet gesture is made to please America. But it is time for the British Government to realise that the problematical American help is as good as useless in an

offensive war against Fascism, which must be waged if the "plan of British victory" is ever to be executed.

The choice for the forces of Democracy and freedom in Europe is clear enough. The liberator will not come across the Atlantic. The choice is between a bold advance beyond the limit set by the interests of Capitalism, and that means a revolution; and a relapse into barbarism under the iron heels of Fascism. In the former course, the European forces of Democracy and freedom can count upon the help from only one source, namely, the Soviet Union. In the other way, they will be pushed not only by the iron-rod of Fascism, but also by the mistakes and mischievousness of those pretending to fight for Democracy.

Except for desultory air-raids, the war is practically at a standstill. Backdoor negotiations are going on for an early peace. In this sense, American intervention is actually taking place. No peace offer from Hitler might have as yet been received by the British Government. But there is enough indication to the effect that feelers are being sent through different channels. It is also known that powerful men in England are in favour of peace. Therefore, exchange of views must be going on. It is reported from Washington that a definite peace offer has been made through the King of Sweden. The reported terms are highly significant: Britain should keep out of Europe; Germany should get back her African colonies as well as Belgian Congo; in return, the Fascists would guarantee the existence of the British Empire, to the extent of helping its protection against the "Yellow Peril". The corollary to such a settlement of the European dispute through the good offices of Uncle Sam would naturally be the recognition of his supremacy in the New World. Indeed, he is not waiting for the recognition. The outcome of the Pan-American Conference at Havana means a definite establishment of American protectorate over the Western Hemisphere.

Thus, the perspective of the world situation, to be

created upon an early termination of the European conflict, thanks to the good offices of the American Government, will be the division of the world into three spheres of influence. The home of modern culture and civilisation is to be thrown to the wolf to keep him away from other flesh-pots; there will be a federation of the black and brown peoples under the protection of a Nazified England; and the New World will be the exclusive property of the "white-born" American. The "Yellow Peril" will have to be dealt with, and the three may form a united front for the purpose. Hitler is reported to have already made that offer. The real devil of the drama is the giant standing astride two continents, occupying more than one sixth of the globe. The plan of settling the fate of the world without taking that factor into consideration, and with a thinly veiled hostility towards it, is not only dangerous, but palpably stupid.

While all these practical and impractical, sinister and stupid, schemes are being hatched, for the division of the world, prostrate Europe hangs on the verge of an even greater catastrophe. Reports are coming about famine conditions in practically all the countries under fascist domination. The situation threatens to be so desperate that the Petain Government is reported to be on the point of issuing an appeal to the Christian charitableness of America. It is also reported that Uncle Sam is going to be very stern this time, because even ordinary food stuff, meant for hungry mouths, will amount to aiding Hitler. So, pending the secret negotiations and desultory air-raids, the masses of the European population will be abandoned to starvation. The shadow of the Middle-Ages, with their starvation, disease, misery and degradation, is veritably cast athwart the whole of Europe. Whether the war will continue, or there will be an early peace, in either case the European humanity seems to be doomed to that dreadful fate. A continued war will only mean more tightened blockade, all the adverse effects of which will fall on the masses of non-

combatants. An early peace is possible only on the basis of the recognition of the fascist domination of Europe. That again bodes untold suffering and brutalisation of the European masses.

An offensive war against triumphant Fascism alone can save Europe from that gloomy future. And such a war cannot be waged except with the fullest co-operation of the U.S.S.R. Indeed, no other power on earth can even begin such a war. The U.S.A. must be completely left out of the immediate future of Europe.

But this hope also seems to be shattered by the latest pronouncement of the head of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government has declared its intention to remain neutral. It has also informed the world that the Soviet-German Pact still remains. How, then, can Europe look up to the U.S.S.R. as the source of its only hope?

The situation is not as bad as all that. Soviet neutrality does not mean anything worse than the most natural and legitimate desire not to draw chestnuts out of the fire for the benefit of other none too friendly parties. The anxiety for an honest understanding and close co-operation with the U.S.S.R. has been growing in influential British circles. That is very welcome. But the opposing tendency seems still to be very strong and is raising the illusion of American intervention to distract the attention of the British Democracy from the undesirable alliance with the U.S.S.R. Consequently, no serious step has been taken by the British Government to come to an understanding with the Power whose active co-operation is indispensable to excute "the plan of victory".

On the other hand, simultaneously with his peace overtures to England, Hitler has been paying serious attention to the situation in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. The Nazis have been smarting after the defeats they suffered in the East ever since the conclusion of the Soviet-German

non-aggression pact. They have been warned off the coveted granary of the Ukraine. The road to the Black Sea through Poland and Roumania has been closed to them. They had to yield their strategic position in the Baltic. They had to leave Sweden alone for the fear of a clash with the U.S.S.R. Finally, their years of long intrigues in the Balkans are being set to naught by the rapid spread of the Russian influence. The collapse of France and the palpable inability of England to help are persuading the Balkan countries to look upon the U.S.S.R. for protection against fascist aggression. In other words, Soviet neutrality has immensely strengthened the factor which will play the decisive role in the historic struggle against Fascism, namely, revolution.

The short-sightedness and pusillanimity of the leaders of English Democracy may leave European humanity to sink in the twilight of the Middle-Ages. But the positive outcome of European culture and modern civilisation has found a new home. There, it will be preserved and further developed, to be given back to a reborn Europe, sooner or later. Therefore, for the sake of the future of humanity, the only safe harbour of human heritage must be protected against avowed enemies. They may be for the time being divided among themselves. But unless the forces of Democracy and progress can successfully assert themselves in England, before it is too late, they will again make up, to join hands in the holy war against the common enemy—the saviour of modern civilisation.

Just as the Christian crusaders of the Middle-Ages fought the Arab custodians of the Greek culture, and thus helped the spiritual subjugation and social stagnation of Europe for nearly a thousand years, just so will be also the effect of the anti-red crusade of our time. But like the crusades of the past, this crusade will also fail to arrest indefinitely the march of progress and civilisation. While Europe was drugged to brutalisation on the lap of the

Mother Church, the treasures of the ancient Greek culture were rescued from the ruins of the Roman Empire by the infidel Arabs. They guarded those treasures zealously, to be inherited by a reborn Europe. History may repeat itself. Only, the experience in our time may be very much different from that of the past, and the dark age may be proportionately shorter. But meanwhile, the fire must be kept burning. That is the motive behind Soviet neutrality.

Molotov's speech need not discourage the fighters for Democracy. It should only give the British Government some food for thought. As a matter of fact, it looks like a deliberate provocation. It is a challenge to make the choice between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. While the attitude of the British Government remains indecisive, the Soviet Union cannot afford to get involved in a war with Germany. The situation in the Balkans may develop that way, before long. Hitler's delay in attacking England and his anxiety for a settlement are very largely determined by the situation in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. If, on the conclusion of peace in the West, the Nazi hordes will turn eastwards, to avenge the defeats of the last year, nobody will raise a finger. The U.S.S.R. must have a definite guarantee against that danger before it can abandon its present policy of keeping Hitler at an arm's length. The British Government must lay all its cards on the table, if it desires active co-operation of the U.S.S.R., without which Europe cannot be liberated from the deadly grip of Fascism.

Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. can wait patiently, fortifying its position all the time and extending the sway of the revolution, steadily and surely, in every possible direction. It has a clear conscience. None else can save European civilisation. If others will not co-operate, the U.S.S.R. must adjust itself to the situation, and work patiently and tread warily, with eyes fixed confidently on a distant future.

CHAPTER VIII

REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMACY

THERE are different ways of looking at a thing. A thing appears differently to persons looking at it from different points of view. Soviet foreign policy also can be examined from different points of view, and everybody will form his opinion about it according to his point of view. If a number of people looking at the same thing from diverse points of view begin to argue about it, there is bound to be disagreement, which may be impossible to compose. In order to discuss a subject logically and fruitfully, it is necessary to start from some agreed point of departure. Disagreement, however, is not sufficient ground for condemnation. In order to condemn something it is not enough to say that I disagree with it. The world is full of differences; if simple difference was to be the justification for condemnation, then we should be compelled to condemn each other practically on every question. If you wish to criticise me, the most convincing, sensible and effective method of doing so will be to expose the inconsistency of my action, to show that I am behaving in a way which does not conform with my professions and principles.

According to certain critics, the foreign policy of the Soviet Government has ceased to be in any way different from that of the Imperialist States, and therefore the Soviet Union no longer deserves the sympathy, support or admiration of the freedom-loving world. If it can be proved that the diplomatic or any other activity of the Soviet Government contradicts the principles with which the Soviet Republic was founded, certainly, the criticism will be just and convincing. But for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Soviet Government has deviated from those principles, one must begin with a statement of the

fundamental principles of the Soviet State. If it is found that its present activities do not correspond with those principles, then we may, and should, condemn the Soviet Government as no longer deserving the sympathy and support of the lovers of freedom. But if it is found that its activities do not contradict its professed principles, then all criticism becomes irrelevant; it becomes a case of simple disagreement, which may have no other foundation than pure prejudice.

The critics of the Soviet Government judge its activities by certain standards without caring to ascertain whether those standards are applicable to the Soviet Union. Certain conventional standards of what is called international morality are applied. Divorced from historical and realistic contexts, those standards are mere abstractions. In the beginning, one must judge if measures applicable to the behaviour of other governments can also be applied to the actions of the Soviet Government. It is neither a matter of favouritism nor of blind faith. It is necessary to realise that there are different standards of values. If my values cannot be measured by your standards, that does not prove that my values are worthless. It only proves that your conception of values is different from mine. We have not attained the stage when all ethical principles could be uniform. There is no such intellectual or moral uniformity. There is diversity; there are differences. If we start from the preconceived, selfish, or interested point of view that whatever is distasteful to me is wrong, and whatever I like is good, then our judgement will neither be sober nor reliable nor convincing. It will lead only to condemning each other. That is not the way of measuring and judging things.

The critics of Soviet foreign policy have invented the new term "Red Imperialism", which is being used almost *ad nauseam*. It is maintained that the Soviet Union has become an Imperialist State, the only difference being that

its Imperialism is red, while the Imperialism of other States is of different complexion.

The term "red" has a distinct connotation. It stands for revolution. The object of the revolutionary movement of our time is to destroy Imperialism. Therefore, the newly coined and much used phrase "Red Imperialism" is obviously a contradiction in terms.

For a serious analysis of any phenomenon, it is not enough to deal with vague generalities. It is very simple to ascertain whether the Soviet State is or can ever be an Imperialist State.

The activities of a State in any field—economic, diplomatic, military are determined not by the supposed perversities, predilections or prejudices of individuals or groups of individuals who happen to be at the head of the State. The activities of any State are determined by its social character and its internal necessities. It is due to internal necessities, the exigencies of its very existence, that a State launches upon the career of territorial expansion and becomes what is known as an Imperialist State.

Modern Imperialism, again, has to be distinguished from the earlier impulses for building vast empires. In our time, an empire is not the same thing as the Roman Empire or the Empire of the Moghuls. All students of history and politics should know that there is no similarity between those Empires and the British Empire, for example. The terms Empire and Emperor are not inseparable. Modern Imperialism does not necessarily include territorial expansion. One of the biggest imperialist Powers of our days, the United States of America, has to a great extent avoided territorial expansion. The essence of modern Imperialism is economic and financial expansion, which does not necessarily require military conquest of foreign territories. That expansion again does not take place according to the will or whims of a dictator. When a country attains the stage of economic development where further

development is not possible within its boundaries, it feels the necessity for encroaching upon the freedom of other peoples. That again depends on the social character of its national economy. A high stage of capitalist economy, that is, production for profit, not for use, impels a country to establish its domination on other, either through military conquest or financial operations.

The foundation of modern Imperialism is export of capital. Capital is exported when in any particular country more of it accumulates than can be profitably reinvested at home. Capital migrates not necessarily in the form of money or gold shipped from one country to another, but through various other mediums, such as surplus export, banking operations, loans, etc. Modern Imperialism thus is the outcome of Capitalism. Only highly developed capitalist countries can adopt an imperialist policy.

The Soviet economy is not capitalist. There has been some controversy on this question. It is maintained by some that Soviet economy has reverted to Capitalism. That is a matter of socialist theory and the science of economics. It has been treated in a previous section of this book. Only a few words need be added to show that Soviet economy cannot create internal conditions which give the impetus to imperialist expansion. The cardinal feature of Soviet economy is the absence of private property in the means of production (factories, mines, land, etc.). That is the foundation of Socialism. In the absence of private property in the means of production, the character of production changes. It ceases to be for exchange, for making profit. It is for use. It is true that even in the socialist economic system capital accumulates. For otherwise there would be no further development of the means of production, and no more expansion of national economy. But, then, capital is only congealed labour, not a means of exploitation; together with other means ot production, it is no longer privately owned. Its production, in that case,

serves as a lever of economic expansion; but it is no longer reinvested for producing profit. That is the position in the Soviet Union.

Surplus value is created in the entire productive machinery of the Soviet Union. The production over and above what is necessary for the subsistence and reproduction of the people, however, does not create surplus *capital*. It can all be absorbed in the productive apparatus of national economy. In the capitalist system, such a process cannot be allowed because it gradually reduces the margin of profit to the vanishing point. With the elimination of private ownership of the means of production, the profit-motive also disappears. So, surplus production does not mean accumulation of capital, which must be exported because reinvestment at home would not yield sufficient profit. A country with socialist economy is never required to export capital. Therefore, the Soviet Union does not possess the fundamental feature of an Imperialist State. It is entirely mistaken and miseading to say that the Soviet Union is also becoming an Imperialist State.

The more popular interpretation of Imperialism is that it is the result of simple greed for territorial expansion or the lust for the glory of military conquest. That is a wrong view. Even the great Empires of the past were not the product of wanton desires of individuals or predatory notions. They were also caused by necessity. Chenghis Khan with his hordes would not have swept the entire Asian continent, unless the homeland of the Mongols were barren and too poor to provide food and other necessities for a growing population. Those mediæval invaders were compelled to launch upon their predatory adventure by the necessities of physical existence. All the invasions and conquests of past history could be traced to the internal conditions of the conquering nations. No Empire was ever built by the whim or ambition of a conqueror.

Is there any necessity for Russia to expand? There is

no pressure of population. The population is very large. But the Soviet Union embraces one-sixth of the globe. Even if the population increased tenfold, there would still be no overcrowding. It will be equally difficult to prove that any other cause for expansion is operating in the Soviet Union. Therefore, it cannot be an Imperialist State either in the modern sense or in the mediæval sense. There is no need for it to acquire new territories; nor has it surplus capital seeking profitable investment abroad.

How, then, can we explain the Soviet invasion of Poland and then of Finland? These events again should not be taken out of the context of the history of the relation of the Soviet Union with the rest of the world. The diplomatic history of the last decade or so bears testimony to the fact that the Soviet Union has been the most decisive factor for preserving the peace of the world. Ever since the conclusion of the civil war which followed the Russian Revolution, Soviet diplomacy has striven only for one objective, namely, to live peacefully and develop itself economically and construct its internal life. Again and again, the Soviet Union avoided armed conflicts, even at the cost of what is called prestige. Its persistent policy for preserving peace was interpreted as weakness and indifference to the cause of revolution in other countries. The Soviet Government was accused of having betrayed the ideal of world revolution and degenerated into a nationalist state concerned only with its own selfish interests, disregarding the international obligations of a Socialist State. It was alleged that the Soviet Government did not want to risk a war because it was anxious to safeguard its national interests.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union was determined by its very existence. At its very birth, it had to defend itself against the entire world, which was terrified by the spectre of the revolution spreading to other countries. Once the Soviet Union came victorious out of that first trial

of strength, its primary concern naturally was to strengthen itself so as to be able to face the attack of the capitalist world, bound to come sooner or later. Knowing that time was working for the Soviet Union, the capitalist world always tried to provoke it into a premature conflict, to avoid which was the guiding principle of Soviet foreign policy all along.

To-day, the Soviet Union is stronger than ever. Nevertheless, it is not yet in a position to risk a war in which the entire capitalist world may be against it. It could not have any doubt about the attitude of the capitalist world in case of any plausible pretext for a concerted campaign against it. An act of aggression against any one of the neighbouring countries would provide the capitalist world with that pretext. The Soviet Government would be composed of lunatics and adventurers if it disregarded that danger. Nevertheless, in the case of Poland and later on of Finland, the Soviet Government had to depart from its policy of avoiding doing anything which might involve it into a premature conflict with the rest of the world. There must have been some reason for that departure. Unless that reason is discovered, the Soviet foreign policy is bound to be misunderstood.

Let us now take the concrete case of Finland. What would the Soviet Republic gain by conquering it? What is there in Finland which the Soviet Union does not possess? How will the Soviet Union be benefited by conquering Finland? The economic value of Finland should be known to all students of economic geography, now that it has been figuring in the headlines of the daily press throughout the world. Half of Finland is situated in the barren Arctic region, without any economic value; the other half consists mainly of lakes and swamps. Although sufficiently large, the country is very thinly populated, having hardly more than three million inhabitants.

Politically, Finland is a creation of the Russian Revo-

lution. Together with the other Baltic States, Finland was a part of the Tzarist Empire. The Russian Revolution recognised the right of self-determination of subject peoples. Finland as well as the Baltic countries chose to secede from the Workers' and Peasants' Republic. They took that unwise step on instigation of the Imperialist Powers allied against the revolution. That was an unwise step because none of those newly created States could have a sound economic basis; and they were therefore bound to gravitate under the domination of this or that Imperialist Power. It was not conducive to the welfare of the toiling masses of those countries to forego partnership in the rising Workers' and Peasants' Republic, and prefer nominal political freedom which delivered them to the exploitation by the native upper classes under the protection of foreign Imperialism.

However, Russia did not object. Perhaps, at that time, it could not prevent the secession. But it was not exactly like the fox calling the grapes sour. The fact is that the Soviet Government was the first to recognise the right of self-determination of subject peoples to the extent of secession. Before long, Russia grew strong enough to re-annex the seceded States, if she wanted. The international situation was also favourable. Her relation with the German Republic was friendly. Even if that was not so, Germany was not in a position to go to war for saving the Baltic States. Nor would it be possible for the Western capitalist Powers to render effective help to the Baltic States in case of their being attacked by their powerful neighbour. Finland was still very weak, unsettled and not fortified. France and England were much too far away to do anything for its defence. Yet, there was no aggression from the side of the Soviet Union. There was sufficient reason for the Soviet Government to take action against those States, which practically were outposts of anti-Soviet propaganda and intrigues. But the recognition of the right of self-determination was not a hypocritical act on the part of the Soviet

Government. It was a fundamental principle of the revolution which gave birth to the Soviet Union. Since Finland as well as the Soviet Republic are the creation of the self-same revolution, one must prove that the Soviet Government has deviated from the principles of its birth in order to allege that it is engaged in the lawless and shameful act of destroying what it originally created.

It has already been shown that there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union is in any way interested to conquer Finland or the Baltic States or any other country. But, one might ask, is it not a fact that the Soviet army has attacked Finland? It appears to be so. No fact, however, should be taken on its face value. This particular event must have been caused by some other reason, because there is no reason for the Soviet Union to conquer Finland, nor is there any reason to believe that the Soviet Government has undertaken a costly military operation just for fun or for the sheer perversity of destroying the independence of a small nation. What is the fact really? It is frivolous to say that the Soviet Government began military operation against Finland simply for the morbid pleasure of destroying the freedom of a democratic State or for giving a demonstration of Bolshevik blood-thirstiness. Historical events cannot be explained with such frivolous and obviously prejudiced assertions. The military operations in Finland must have been caused by some other reason than the assumed wantonness on the part of the Soviet Government, or the satanic will of a Stalin. It is the business of political observers to discover that cause, and then pass judgment.

The Soviet Government having no reason to launch upon a costly and undesirable venture, its military action against Finland must have been forced by some external factor. An analysis of the situation will show that the Soviet Government was compelled to act in the apparently outrageous manner. At the end of 1939 the world was

full of righteous indignation also about the Soviet invasion of Poland. Stalin was condemned as Hitler's "partner in crime". The "rape of Poland" by the Bolshevik barbarians shocked the credulous world. The Soviet Government was characterised as the "Bolshevik brigand" and what not. The cry of "Red Imperialism" horrified liberal conscience. It is now well known that Soviet intervention in Poland was due to the natural anxiety to keep the Nazi hordes at an arm's length. The cases of Soviet aggression in Poland and Finland will be exposed in the next chapter.

The act of Soviet diplomacy which scandalised the world almost without any exception was to make a pact with Nazi Germany. That appeared to be an utterly inexplicable, unjustifiable and inexcusable act. Was it not a callous compliance with fascist aggression? Outraged by the scandal, the world denounced Stalin as Hitler's blood-brother; the Soviet-German Pact was characterised as an alliance between Fascism and Communism, which exposed the essential similarity between the two. Hitler invaded Poland only a few days after the conclusion of the pact, which was therefore described as the signal for the Second World War. Events moved so very fast thereafter for a few weeks as to daze the world. There were very few who could distinguish facts from fiction, detect the true cause of events, and soberly judge the motives of the different parties involved in the great upheaval. But a calm scrutiny of contemporary history became possible, at any rate, for those few who wanted to do so, as soon as the swift moves and counter-moves following upon Hitler's gambit led to the "phoney" stage of the war. To discerning eyes, capable of penetrating behind the thick fog of uncontrolled emotions, which still hung heavy on horrified Europe, events appeared in their proper perspective. So seen realistically and appraised dispassionately, the events leading up to the

dramatic conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact threw a new, less lurid, light on that act of Soviet diplomacy.

In March 1939, Hitler annexed Czechoslovakia. Thereupon, a British diplomatic note was sent to Moscow enquiring if the Soviet Government was prepared to join other democratic Powers guaranteeing against a German attack on Roumania. A reply from Moscow reached London on the same day. It proposed concrete steps to be taken against fascist aggression. The Soviet proposal was that Britain, France and Russia should pledge themselves to act together simultaneously and with all means to prevent any further fascist aggression, direct or indirect, against the territory or independence of any other European country. The Russians further proposed that military consultations should be started at once, so that Hitler's already known plan to seize Danzig could be headed off. The Moscow negotiations on these straight-forward proposals dragged on for four months. Meanwhile, Britain and France signed the Munich Pact, which not only recognised the Nazi annexation of Czechoslovakia as an accomplished fact, but, by implication, if not explicitly, delivered the whole of Eastern Europe to the tender mercies of Hitler. By signing the Munich Pact, France repudiated the obligations incurred by her alliance with the Soviet Union.

But September was approaching; a year ago, Hitler had announced that by then something formidable would happen. It was evident from Nazi manœuvres and propaganda drives that Danzig was the next objective. It was natural for the Russians to be alarmed. At that juncture, the Moscow negotiations broke down on the practical issue of military steps to be taken for helping Poland in case of the imminent German attack. The British and French delegates to the Moscow military talks asked if Russia was prepared to render the help. Voroshilov gave an unambiguous reply: The Soviet Government would give Poland whatever military assistance she required, as

and when desired, provided that on the first sign of the German army moving against Poland, Soviet forces would be allowed to enter into the eastern provinces of the country. The Polish Government opposed the Soviet offer; they would never allow the Russian army to set foot on Polish soil. Their attitude might have been motivated by traditional distrust. But how could the Russians undertake the responsibility of defending Poland against German attack if they were not allowed to take the field—to meet the invader? Perhaps the Russians had an ulterior motive. But in the given situation, Poland had no way out. She must choose between Communist Russia and Nazi Germany. It was evident that the Polish army was no match for Hitler's military machine; nor could any substantial help reach Poland from Britain and France. By rejecting the Soviet offer, Poland, for all practical purposes, chose the latter alternative. Russia was consequently confronted with the danger of the victorious German army appearing on her frontier almost in no time. What would any government do in that critical moment? Any act then was bound to be motivated by the instinct of self-preservation.

Soviet diplomacy had been "machiavellian" in the sense of having anticipated the crisis, and prepared for it. The pact between the two sworn enemies could not possibly have been signed all on a sudden, one fine morning. It is foolish on the part of the Russians to deny that they had taken up negotiations with the Germans, perhaps on the latter's initiative, when the Moscow talks with Britain and France were still going on. Such naive plea of innocence does not convince anybody; it only creates suspicion about the motive of what was a forced move. The alternative for the Russians would have been to court a war with the Fascist Axis. Presumably, they were not yet prepared to take the risk. Whether the little time gained by an undeniably opportunist, though forced, diplomatic move really served their supposed purpose, enabled them to improve their

strategic position substantially, was a question which could not be judged correctly at that time. Facts of the situation were not known. The point is that, if self-defence is a basic responsibility of a State, then the Soviet Government did nothing more reprehensible in making the pact with Nazi Germany than to discharge that responsibility. By the given standards of political practice of governments, the Soviet diplomacy could not be judged very harshly for its most scandalous act. Internationally isolated, the Russians simply made a dishonest deal with the avowed enemy, with the hope, perhaps a false hope, of putting off the evil day.

Subsequently, when the storm of emotional controversy subsided, more balanced opinion about the Russians concluding a non-aggression pact with their enemy was expressed from different quarters, and the consideration which compelled them to make that opportunist move was duly appreciated by those undeniably competent to do so. The conservative *Daily Telegraph* of London, no apologist of Communist Russia, for example, wrote: "Russia is alarmed at the rapidity of the German advance and the threat it offers to Russia's western frontier. The new Russo-German non-aggression pact is worth no more than Hitler's agreement with Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Stalin cannot watch the German steamroller crushing over prostrate Poland without the uneasy suspicion that the driver may forget to stop. Stalin can have no doubt that what Hitler covets most in Europe is the granary of the Ukraine. The presence of a powerful Russian army on his eastern frontier will immobilise a large part of Hitler's forces at a time when they are needed in the West." The Military Correspondent of the London *Times* wrote that, from the strategic point of view, the Russian proposal could not be rejected if Poland was to be given guarantee against German invasion.

At the end of July 1940, while addressing the Supreme Soviet on the state of Russia's foreign relations, Molotov

made certain observations which again scandalised the world. Referring to the non-aggression pact with Germany, the Soviet Foreign Commissar said that developments since the pact was concluded had not reduced its strength; on the contrary, they had emphasised its importance and proved the need of its continuation. As regards the effect of the pact, Molotov was certainly right. By the time he spoke, it was a well-known fact that the effect had been to check Nazi aggression eastwards. Nor was he far from being right in anticipating similar results from a continuation of the pact. Subsequent events in the Balkans warranted his optimism.

The significance of the pact was, according to Molotov, that leading circles in Germany recognised "the role and weight of the Soviet in European affairs". Given that significant recognition, the Nazis could not act in defiance of the Soviet will, while they had done that in the case of all other Powers. The immediate object of the Soviet foreign policy was to prevent the conclusion of peace on the background of a nazified Europe. That was also clear from Molotov's speech. The Russian leaders knew that Hitler was anxious to make peace with England "on desirable terms". The Soviet-German non-aggression pact prevented the Nazis from attaining that "principal objective". Thus, Soviet foreign policy offered the only guarantee against the fascisation of the whole of Europe, including England. The Nazis were to be pushed on in their adventure until they exhausted themselves. Having failed to form an anti-fascist front with the Western Powers, Russia fell back upon that indirect, but effective, method of bringing about the ultimate destruction of Fascism.

The underlying motive of Soviet foreign policy was clearly discernible in the concluding passages of Molotov's speech: "The Soviet must show keen vigilance with regard to its exterior security and the strengthening of all its interior and exterior positions. We must keep our entire people in

a state of mobilisation, ready to face danger of military aggression, so that no hazards and no manœuvres of our exterior enemies could take us unawares. If we all remember this, we shall achieve new, and even more glorious successes for the Soviet." The external danger to the Soviet Union was mainly represented by Nazi Germany. With the domination of the whole of Europe, the Fascists were sure to turn upon the base of revolution, as soon as they had settled with England in one way or the other. Therefore, there could not be any mistake in the Soviet policy towards Nazi Germany and its allies. Moreover, the policy no longer represented a defensive attitude. It envisaged "more glorious successes for the Soviet". That Red Napoleonism offered Europe the only salvation could no longer be doubted by the more far-seeing, more intelligent and more realistic observers. The sooner its historical necessity was recognised, the better. Only that recognition could save Europe from the calamity of a complete breakdown of the modern civilisation.

While the more advanced countries of Western Europe were overrun by the fascist hordes, the weaker and less advanced countries bordering on the Soviet Union escaped that fate. And the world now knows fully well who has protected them. Having dislodged the Germans from their entrenched positions in the Baltic, and definitely freed the people of that region from the fascist menace, Soviet foreign policy was directed towards the Balkans with the self-same object. The Nazis knew it, and made desperate efforts to resist the growth of Soviet influence and the advance of revolution in that direction. The control and economic exploitation of the countries from Poland down to the Bosphorus were essential for Germany to win the war ultimately. The decisive battles of the war, therefore, must eventually be fought in those parts of Europe. Germany could not possibly fight on two fronts. Her military leaders were very anxious to avoid the mistake

which caused the downfall of the Kaiser regime. Therefore, before the engagement on the western front was over, one way or the other, the Nazis were reluctant to precipitate matters on the other front. But at the same time, if they had to choose, the Nazis would fight rather on the East than on the West.

Soviet foreign policy was based *inter alia* on the following considerations: (a) Germany was determined to control South-Eastern Europe as her only available source of petroleum, food and other raw materials; (b) with that purpose, she wanted to bring that area under her political domination; (c) once the Balkan problem was so settled, the German position in Europe would be practically invincible and, having gained the ultimate victory on the West, she would turn upon the Soviet Union, the very existence of which was a challenge to the fascist scheme of world domination. It is quite natural that the immediate concern of Soviet foreign policy in the given situation should be to prevent such developments as would certainly place the Soviet Union in the position of being confronted with the forces of triumphant Fascism, before the preconditions for victory in that final struggle were created.

The "realism and firmness" of the policy of neutrality enabled the Soviet Union to frustrate the Nazi scheme of Balkan domination. Otherwise, the "battle of England" might have been suspended in favour of battles all along the eastern front. The Soviet Union naturally did not want such a showdown while any number of battles could be won bloodlessly, and in consequence an invincible position attained before the final battle had to be fought.

None with any understanding of the currents and cross-currents of the international situation could have made any mistake regarding the real relation between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The *Times* Diplomatic Correspondent wrote: "Russia is still anxious to show the world that she is on good terms with the aggressive

nations. Probably, Germany will keep them good for some time yet. It is generally thought that Molotov's hint about the developments between Germany and Russia may presage a new arrangement of territory of a sharper definition of interests between the two." That soon happened, and the result was not favourable for Germany. The German protectorate of Roumania was compelled to concede to the Bulgarian demand backed up by the Soviet Union, and before long Hungary had to disgorge Transsylvania.

The Turkish reaction to Molotov's speech, as reported by *Reuter,* was even more outspoken. "Molotov's speech is regarded by observers as an indication that the Soviet at present is marking time, while increasing her own defensive preparations under the cover of co-operation with Germany. The impression is growing in Turkey that Molotov's speech leaves the door wide open for further improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations, if it is desired. The lip service paid by Molotov to the agreement with Germany does not affect in the slightest the essential fact that Russia cannot allow Germany to progress eastwards."

Nor did the Nazis have any illusion about the real implication of the Soviet foreign policy. If they put up with it for such a long time, that was because they were helpless. Nevertheless, they were alarmed by the increase of Soviet power and influence in the Balkans. German nervousness greatly increased after the Soviet power was completely established in the Baltic to the extent that even Finland could no longer be relied upon as a possible base of anti-Soviet operations. The Russians were powerfully established on the Ruthenian border. Thus, they were in a position to seize an opportunity to throw her divisions across the southern plane of Hungary to Yugoslavia. In that position, the Nazis could no longer think of invading Britain and thus provide Russia exactly the opportunity she was ready for.

Evidently, for the Nazis it was not all quiet on the

eastern front. Soviet "neutrality", however "real and firm", was a poor consolation for them. They knew what was coming, and did their best to prevent it. Already in the middle of July, the Berlin press emphasised the need "to build up a strong, compact bulwark in South-Eastern Europe."

Thanks to the misunderstood and maligned Soviet foreign policy, all the positions on the long eastern front were fully prepared for the offensive war which alone could free Europe from the domination of triumphant Fascism. But an intimate knowledge of the dangerous under-currents of the international situation, and bitter experience did not allow the Soviet leaders to be unmindful of the danger of a sudden change on the western front. If the western front was held with firmness, for a sufficiently long time, the Nazis would have been compelled to fight on two fronts earlier than they dared, and the war might have ended in the deliverance of Europe correspondingly sooner. But the western front crumbled. After the fall of France, Britain's heroic resistance lost strategic significance. During the year between the fall of France and the attack on the Soviet Union, the war was a manœuvre for positions all along the several thousand miles of the eastern front.

Chapter IX

RED NAPOLEONISM

The events during a whole period of history are determined by the development of the great revolution which is the outstanding feature of that epoch. It is hardly a hundred years since the last echoes of the Great French Revolution sunk into the silence of the European horizon. For no less than half a century, the whole of Europe was directly influenced by the events which took place in France in the last decade of the eighteenth century. The repercussion of those events even went beyond the boundaries of Europe. Itself the final outburst of forces generating throughout Western Europe over a long period, the French Revolution set the tone to the subsequent political and social development of the civilised world. Nevertheless, even to-day, there are historians and political philosophers who wonder whether the French Revolution was successful; or was it not just a bloody episode which only disturbed peaceful evolution for a time? The fact, however, is that it was a success—not limited to France alone. It convulsed the whole of Europe. Even the countries which mainly contributed to the fierce struggle for arresting the spread of its influence, eventually were benefitted by it. To-day, no historian worth the distinction would deny that the constitutional development in England during the nineteenth century was directly influenced by the French Revolution. In 1848, Germany and the surrounding countries of Central Europe almost followed France in the path of the Great Revolution. Even far off Russia, the stronghold of black reaction, during the nineteenth century, was not immune from the influence. The Decembrist Revolt of 1824-25 was the result of the introduction of democratic ideas which

had contaminated the officers of the Tzarist army during the Napoleonic war.

The underestimation of the great sweep of the French Revolution results from a wrong notion about the role that Napoleon played in the European drama. It is generally believed that he represented the negation of the ideals of the Great Revolution. While deprecating the glorification of Napoleon done by others, the scientific historian, nevertheless, discards that wrong notion. Whatever may have been the ambitious intention of the individual, Napoleonism was the child of the French Revolution. It was the instrument created by the Revolution for overwhelming its opponents. The army which dealt staggering blows to the structure of feudal Europe under the command of Napoleon had been created by the genius of the Jacobin Generals defending the young Republic, when it was beleaguered by the international forces of reaction. Indeed, the military might of Napoleonism was a direct creation of the Revolution. Napoleon's army was not a mercenary band. It had a solid social basis. It was recruited from the French peasantry, who had benefitted the most from the Revolution. For defending the land given to them by the Revolution, the peasants of France created the powerful instrument not only to keep the feudal lords away from France, but also to beat down foreign Powers trying to restore the ancient regime even in the home of the Revolution. It was a misfortune of Europe that the Napoleonic phase of the French Revolution could be only partially successful. Feudal Europe would have completely disappeared, had Napoleonism been not defeated by the organised forces of international reaction. Fascism is the bastard of the outraged bourgeois revolution. It is not an accident that eventually Germany became the home of this monster. That unfortunate country must atone for the sin of having been instrumental in arresting the victorious march of

Napoleonism, and missing the necessary experience of the bourgeois revolution.

* * *

Our age is dominated by the Russian Revolution, which opened up a new epoch of revolutions. In the beginning, it appeared to be a veritable spectre. Just as in the case of the French Revolution, there was an international alliance also against this great revolution of our time. After the stormy events of the years immediately following it, the revolution did not spread as rapidly as the French Revolution. The conditions of the epoch necessarily delayed its Napoleonic phase.

In our time, a powerful army cannot be created as easily as in the time of Napoleon. To-day, soldiers alone, however much inspired they may be with great ideals, cannot make an army irresistible. A modern revolutionary army must have a solid industrial and technological base in addition to the social basis. It takes time to create the former, particularly in a backward country like Russia. On the other hand, the forces opposed to revolution in our time are immensely better equipped and organised. Their sense of international solidarity is also much more developed. Therefore, the expansionist phase of the revolution of our time was preceded by a long period, during which its base had to be consolidated and its striking power developed to match the opponents'.

But it was bound to develop its Napoleonism. Its historic mission could not be accomplished without that appropriate and necessary instrument. As a matter of fact, the military factor is even more important in the scheme of the revolution of our time, although there grows also the possibility of its being the agency for bloodless revolutions. But it must be there. How its influence will be brought to bear upon the situation, is determined by the operation of other factors. Taking place in the atmosphere of a higher civilisation, revolution itself may have more civilised forms.

Reviewing the history and perspective of the Russian Revolution on its twentieth anniversary, I indicated this line of development. Although an intimate knowledge of the under-currents of the European situation should enable one to anticipate events occurred since then, at that time the view about the nature of future developments was very largely theoretical. But theory itself is not sucked out of one's thumb. It is a deduction from experience, and based on the analysis of the given situation. Even then, it must be empirically verified, before it can stand as a theory. Red Napoleonism to-day stands as a verified theory.

The idea of Red Napoleonism was criticised even from the most unexpected quarters, when it was first suggested. But hardly two years passed, and the world was piously horrified by the rise of "Red Imperialism". The liberal admirers of the Russian Revolution were, of course, shocked, surprised and pained. But even avowed Communists were at a loss to explain the new phenomenon. Those who had fed themselves on the childish text-book notions of the world revolution naturally could not anticipate such a development. Had they known that Napoleonism was a necessary stage of every revolution, they would not be required to give a shamefaced justification of the Soviet foreign policy. What was condemned as "Red Imperialism" was the appearance of Red Napoleonism—the characteristic feature of the politics of our time. Having consolidated its base, the revolution was on the march. "Red Imperialism" was the bad name given to the dog which had to be beaten.

Having anticipated the development which was inevitable if the revolution was to succeed, I had no difficulty in explaining the puzzling turns of the Soviet foreign policy. Those who are scared out of their wits by the dreadful spectre of the revolution on the march, at that time ridiculed the "far-fetched ideas of the unpaid agent of Stalin". But they had to live and learn. Of course, some never

learn. They still hug their prejudices when the world passes by and the drama of the revolution of our time unfolds its fascinating scenes.

Before long, the European scene shifted. Baulked in the East by Soviet diplomacy, the Nazis were compelled to do what they did not want to do. They were compelled to precipitate a real war with the Western Powers. That adventure might have been fatal for them. But the forces of Fascism were discovered to be more mature than expected by the greatest optimist amongst themselves. The unexpectedly swift triumph of the Nazi hordes, culminating in the betrayal of France, compelled European democracy in distress to turn towards the Soviet Union for help. The more intelligent and less reactionary people began to understand the real implication of the Soviet foreign policy, hitherto condemned as "Red Imperialism". They came to realise that the Soviet Union alone had put a decisive check to Nazi aggressiveness. If the latter could not be checked in the West, that was due to the stupid anti-Soviet policy of the Western Powers. Had not the negotiations for the formation of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet anti-fascist bloc been broken off for the fear of the Red Army appearing in Central Europe, the Nazi hordes would not have overrun France. Had France not betrayed her alliance with the Soviet Union, so that unfortunate Czechoslovakia might be an offering for the Nazi War God, she might have escaped the humiliation. Trying to escape the fate which must overtake her as of historical necessity, Europe was possessed by a veritable misfortune which almost ruined her. The fate was to experience the expansionist phase of the revolution of our time. It could be escaped only by inviting ruination.

On the 16th of September 1939, the Polish State created twenty years ago by the Versailles Treaty ceased to exist. Together with its army commanded by swaggering officers, it collapsed within two weeks since the Nazi war machine

had crossed the frontier. On the 17th of September, hardly a month after Stalin had celebrated his "blood-brotherhood" with Hitler, one hundred divisions of the Red Army began marching westwards on a five-hundred miles long front, at the speed of forty miles a day. The tidal wave was stopped along the "Curzon Line" which, according to the Allied Supreme Council of the First World War, was to have been the eastern border of the new Polish State created by the Versailles Treaty. Pampered Polish jingoes took advantage of Revolutionary Russia's preoccupation with civil war and pushed their frontier far eastwards so as to establish their rule over eleven million Ukrainians and White-Russians. The oppression of the national minorities inside Poland was one of the international scandals of the twenties. After the defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw in 1920, the Soviet Government had no other alternative than to be reconciled to the *status quo*. It wanted to live in peace with the Polish neighbour.

The disappearance of the Polish State created an entirely new situation. Before the Red Army crossed the Polish border, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Molotov, declared that Russia could "no longer watch developments inactively, the rapid advance of the Germans having created a new situation in Eastern Europe." The immediate motive of the movement of the Red Army,as announced by Molotov, was to protect the Ukrainian and White-Russian population. The Polish State, which had oppressed those national minorities, having collapsed, the protection was meant to be against the advancing Nazis. The Red Army marched in a veritable no-man's land. It was not an aggression against Polish sovereignty, which was no longer there.

Until the very last moment, the Soviet Government did not inform its new "ally" that the Red Army would march westwards. That fact, proved that a partition of Poland was not provided in the Soviet-German Pact, as was generally assumed at that time. Presumably, the

Russians, even after the conclusion of the pact, did not know how far the Nazis would go eastwards. They had mobilised a powerful army on the Polish frontier, to meet the eventuality of the new "ally" coming too close. On the 16th of September, a German bombing plane was shot down in Soviet Ukraine. That little incident must have been taken by the Russians as the danger signal, and they acted. The advancing Red Army met no resistance from the Poles; but the strategic points throughout Eastern Poland were bombed by German planes to impede the advance of the Russians, which could not be stopped. If the Nazis chose to exchange greetings instead of gun fire on meeting the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk, that was not their free choice. In any case, the Red Army having taken up positions along a line across Poland down to the Hungarian border, the Nazis were kept away from the Galician oil fields, and their way to Roumania was blocked. That is why, in a letter to the *Times*, Bernard Shaw made the cryptic remark: "The news from Russia was good news for Britain". At the same time, the officially informed *Reuter's* Diplomatic Correspondent reported: "The Russians will try to occupy the (Galician) oil fields. Germany, threatened by France and Britain, is in no position to object. The German press is disconcerted by Russia's general mobilisation and hasty advance along the Roumanian frontier to cut off that portion of the Balkans from the Germans. Hitler will do his utmost to avoid a common frontier with Russia. He has obviously abandoned at least openly his former pretensions to the Ukraine." It was demonstrated by one single act of the Russians that only the Red Army could check Hitler's aggression towards the East. The Balkans were also safeguarded against Hitler's designs by his "blood-brother" Stalin. That was, indeed, a strange alliance between Fascism and Communism!

In the new situation, Germany was compelled to concede whatever Russia demanded in Eastern and South-

Eastern Europe. The London *Times* Correspondent reported from Belgrade: "The public is now noticeably relieved that Russia has moved across Germany's path to the Black Sea." *Reuter's* Diplomatic Correspondent added: "The Nazis are believed to be particularly nervous of the revival of Pan-Slavism throughout the Balkans under Communist direction." A Russian mission was cordially received at Belgrade, where German and Italian agents had until then been busily intriguing. The Turkish Foreign Minister was on the way to Moscow. By one stroke, the Russians halted Hitler's advance at the cost of the independence of small nations. It was a drastic step, rather a master-stroke. But there was no bloodshed, no cruelty, no treachery, no change of fronts. It was primarily a move for self-defence, which incidentally benefitted all but the Fascist Powers, even if it was too late to save Poland; and that was not Russia's fault.

But was it really an attack on Poland? The world has been regaled with tons of lyrics about Polish democracy and the Polish zeal for freedom. The fact, however, is that the Poland of the inter-war period was not a National State, nor was it a democracy. More than fifty per cent. of its population were non-Poles—Ukrainians, White-Russians, Jews. The treatment that those and other national minorities received in the Polish State was a standing scandal of European politics for twenty years. Poland was created with the object of mutilating the old Austrian Empire, and for raising a powerful barrier against the danger of Bolshevism. Ever since the creation of the Polish State, there was a strong nationalist movement among the non-Polish population. The object of the movement was to break away from Poland and unite with the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine and White-Russia within the Soviet Union. The desire was very natural because, ethnologically and historically, the Ukrainians and White-Russians should be united in homogeneous

national States. The Soviet Government, with all its sympathy for the oppressed peoples, scrupulously avoided doing anything that might be interpreted as an act of hostility against Poland. That was part of the policy to avoid an armed conflict in which the entire capitalist world was sure to be allied against the Soviet Union.

When the German Army marched into Poland and was nearing the Soviet borders, and in view of the not altogether unfounded apprehension that, in the case of Germany attacking the Soviet Union, she would not only receive the moral but also material support from the Western Powers, the obvious thing for the Soviet Government to do was to head off that danger by taking necessary military steps. It was not an aggression.

When Germany invaded Poland, England and France at last formally declared war on her; but they did nothing practical and effective. They could have done, if they wanted. Even without Russian aid, Poland might have been saved if the French and British armies acted quickly and attacked Germany from the West, on a large scale. When the bulk of the German army was engaged in Poland, it would have been easy for the French and the English to break through the western frontier of Germany and deliver such a blow to Hitlerism as might have caused its early downfall. But that is exactly what the Western Powers did not want. Because, the consequence of the downfall of Hitlerism would be resurgence of the suppressed forces of revolution in Germany. The declaration of war against Germany was only a face-saving device. Once that was done, England and France sat tight, without doing anything to endanger the Nazi regime seriously. Meanwhile, the Red Army frustrated all Nazi plans for expansion eastwards, and protected the Balkan countries against the danger of German aggression. The road to the north-east was also blocked. Nazi influence in the Baltic was destroyed. For

the first time in their riotous career, the Nazis received a definite setback.

On September 29th, *Reuter* reported: "Activities in Moscow seem to show that Nazi-Soviet collaboration is not so whole-hearted as it seemed at first glance. The treaty does not provide for automatic assistance for Germany, if the war continues, but merely for consultation. Russia expects the war to culminate in a revolution in Germany. The question then is whether Russia will deem it best to see Germany collapse quickly or will prolong the agony with a view to making the crash worse when it comes." Speaking in the Parliament on October 2nd, the British Prime Minister said: "The Russo-German agreement has changed the position of Poland, but it by no means follows that the arrangement will ensure ultimate advantage of Germany." In a broadcast speech a day earlier, Churchill had made a more outspoken and significant statement of British attitude towards Russia after she moved into Poland:

"What is the second event of this first month (of the war)? It is of course the assertion of power of Russia. We could have wished that the Russian armies be standing on their present line as friends and allies of Poland, instead of as invaders. But that Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate, an eastern frontier has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare to assail. When Herr Ribbentrop was summoned to Moscow last week, it was to learn the fact, and to accept the fact, that Nazi designs upon the Baltic States and the Ukraine must come to a dead stop. It cannot be in accordance with the interest and safety of Russia that Nazi Germany should plant itself upon the shores of the Black Sea or that it should overrun the Baltic States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of south-eastern Europe. Here these interests of Russia fall into the same channel as the interests

of Britain and France. Through the fog of confusion and uncertainty, we may discern quite plainly the community of interests which exists between England, France and Russia, to prevent the Nazis carrying the flames of war into the Balkans and Turkey. I will proclaim to-night my conviction that the second great fact of the first month of the war is that Hitler and all that Hitler stands for have been and are being warned off the south and south-east of Europe."

About the same time, authoritative non-official British opinion was expressed by Barridale Keith in a letter to the *Manchester Guardian*. He wrote: "We must not shut our eyes to essential facts which afford much justification for Russian action. We cold-shouldered in September, 1938 the efforts of Russia to protect Czechoslovakia; we rejected the Russian proposal of March 18th, after Prague, for a conference of the Powers interested; we refused the proposals of Russia for assurance to her against aggression through the Baltic States; and we did not induce Poland to consent to ask her aid or to agree to admit Russian forces to her territory in case of attack. In these circumstances, was Russia to allow Germany to become unquestioned mistress of Poland? It would have been most unwise of her to remain quiescent, and we should not hesitate to welcome her continued neutrality in the struggle."

Apart from strategic considerations of international significance, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland had an immediate liberating effect for the local population. The Red Army marched in with the slogan "Five Acres and a Cow" for each toiling peasant. By the end of October, that is, within six weeks, the break-up of big landed estates was complete. A total of 1,790,000 acres of land was distributed to 178,000 peasant families. Land was given also to 33,000 agricultural workers. Holdings of 175,000 poor peasants were increased. Thousands of heads of cattle, horses, goats and pigs were distributed to

the poor peasants. Reporting about "the changes in East Poland, where Stalin is master", the correspondent of the London *Times* wrote:

"Contrary to general belief, there are as yet no Workers' and Peasants' Soviets in the occupied territory. The administration is being carried on by provisional local committees. The agrarian revolution in Soviet Poland has had the force of a stupendous movement."

The western frontier of the Soviet Union stretches well over a thousand miles from the Arctic to the Black Sea. The Baltic States and Finland, though creations of the Russian Revolution, had become the base of anti-Soviet activities. The Soviet Government had always endeavoured to come to some understanding with those States, so that they might not be utilised as the base of an eventual attack upon the Soviet Union. Under instigation from the imperialist Powers, particularly Germany, they had resisted. But once Germany was put in a tight corner by the action of the Soviet Government, the Baltic States took up a more reasonable attitude and signed non-aggression pacts with their more powerful neighbour. There was much noise about Russia bullying those countries to allow her to encroach upon their sovereignty. The fact, however, was that, with the aid of the Soviet Government, they threw off the yoke of reactionary German colonisers—the so-called Baltic barons, known all over Europe as the worst reactionaries. Even after their secession from the defunct Tzarist Empire, the Baltic countries and Finland did not become really free. The German Eastern Army, operating against Russia during the first world war, refused to return to Germany upon the conclusion of peace. They settled down in the Baltic States as the real rulers of those countries. The Governments of those countries came to be dominated by reactionary German monarchists. Militarily and politically, the Baltic States and Finland practically

became German colonies. Financially, they came under the domination of England.

Having occupied eastern Poland and blocked Hitler's advance towards the Black Sea and the Balkans, preliminary to his playing the twentieth century Alexander the Great, the Russians told their "ally" off the Baltic also. They concluded treaties of mutual assistance with Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia. Backed up by their powerful neighbour, those countries, for the first time dared assert their sovereignty. The German colonisers, who had been virtual rulers of the Eastern Baltic coast for generations, were compelled to evacuate, leaving all their property behind. No compensation was paid. The extensive estates of the German Baltic barons were broken up and distributed to the peasants. It was under Soviet pressure that Hitler withdrew from the Baltic countries the Nazi advance-guard which had entrenched themselves firmly there.

The Baltic barons claimed descent from the mediæval Teutonic Knights, and even in the twentieth century represented mediævalism. Germany, particularly under the Nazis, was very proud of her Baltic colonies. The Baltic barons sided with the Tzarist regime to suppress the repeated revolts of the local population. Consequently, there was a heritage of race hatred. When the Tzarist regime in Russia was overthrown by the revolution, the Baltic provinces of Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia declared themselves independent, and Republican Governments were established there. The Soviet Government recognised the Baltic Republics. Though the latter remained outside the Federation of Soviet Republics, the repercussion of the revolution was felt in the Baltic provinces also. But the revolution was defeated by the German Baltic Army, which refused to return home after the defeat in 1918. Nevertheless, the new Baltic Republican Governments dispossessed the German landlords. Virtual rulers of the country for generations, and with private armies at their

command, the latter resisted the law. In 1924, the Latvian Government paid handsome compensations to the dispossessed landlords, who thus gained the control of the industries of the country. Though they became capitalists almost overnight, the German colonisers called themselves barons, proud of their mediæval ancestry and mediæval outlook. At the end of 1939, only a couple of months after the Soviet-German Pact had been signed, the Baltic barons were compelled to evacuate their "Colony" and return home, probably to join Hitler's "storm troops" or go to the Labour Camps.

Describing the veritable social revolution in the Baltic States, the *Times* Correspondent at Riga wrote: "The hurried exodus of the Germans from the Baltic States at the behest of Soviet Russia must have evoked unpleasant thoughts in the minds of many in the Reich, brought up to boast of the German colonisation of the Eastern Baltic. The present transfer of the descendants of centuries old German colonists may be interpreted in two ways: either Hitler expects the Baltic States to be absorbed by Russia, or the former (Baltic States), unwilling to face two dangers at once, are themselves taking the chance of ridding themselves, with Soviet help, of dangerous nests of Nazis."

There remained Finland, which was a more dangerous spot than the Baltic States. The latter were not easily accessible to the Western Powers except through Germany. The non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, therefore, isolated them from distant "protectors". Having realised that, they abandoned their traditional anti-Soviet attitude and agreed to live in peace and amity with the powerful neighbour. But Finland is differently situated. Its line of communication with the western imperialist Powers was not disturbed by the change of German policy. It was accessible to the distant anti-Soviet forces through Sweden, Norway and directly through the ice-free port of Petsamo. Therefore, Finland stubbornly

refused to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union even after the other Baltic States had done so. The unreasonable attitude on the part of the Finish Government naturally caused suspicions. Other facts, well known to the Soviet Government, provided the background to that asprehension.

Finland is a poor, sparsely populated country. Yet, during the last years, it had spend lavishly on tremendous fortifications and creating an army supplied with the most up-to-date arms. Against whom was Finland making those preparations? There was no reason to suspect any aggressive motive on the part of the Soviet Government, which alone could invade Finland. That being the case, the disproportionately large military preparations in Finland could not be for defensive purposes, but for some other motive. Owing to its favourable strategic position, Finland was lavishly equipped for serving the purpose of eventual military operations against the Soviet Union. In view of the fact that, in a critical moment, the Baltic States could be isolated from Western Europe, the place of honour was conceded to Finland. Therefore, Finland stubbornly resisted when Soviet diplomacy wanted to prevent her from being used as a base of operation against Russia. With the knowledge that it could receive the help no longer available to the Baltic States, the Finnish Government refused to come to terms with the Soviet Union, and consequently forced the precipitation of an armed conflict which might develop into an international attack upon Russia.

It was maintained that the proposal of the Soviet Government, if accepted, would amount to a violation of Finnish sovereignty. What Russia wanted was a strip of Arctic land around the port of Petsamo without any economic value, and the lease of some barren islands along the coast of the Gulf of Finland. If there was any encroachment upon Finland's freedom, that was only her freedom

to be an instrument in the hands of anti-Soviet Powers. The Soviet Government could not possibly allow that freedom. If any freedom was involved in the conflict between the Finnish Government and the Soviet Union, it is only that freedom—the freedom of the Finnish Government to sell Finland for a counter-revolutionary purpose.

The German General Ludendorff said that "Finland is the lock to Russia. Give me the key to Finland, and I will open the door to Russia." Was it not natural for the Soviet Government to see that the key did not fall into the hands of its enemies? Was it not natural for it to demand that the key should remain in its own hand? The Soviet Government did not make any greater demand on Finland. Why did Finland resist? The answer is obvious. It wanted to deliver the key to the enemies of the Soviet Union. In that situation, there was no other course left to the Soviet Government. It had to bang and bolt the door, by force, when all persuasion failed.

In addition to the cession of the port of Petsamo and a narrow strip of Arctic territory around it, the Soviet Government wanted about 400 square kilometres of Finnish territory in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad, in return for nearly twenty times as much territories to the north of Lake Ladoga. Moreover, the Soviet Government wanted a thirty years' lease of the peninsula of Hango in the Gulf of Finland. The leased territory was to be used for a naval base. A number of other smaller islands in the Gulf of Finland were also to be ceded to the Soviet Union. Finally, the Soviet Government demanded demilitarisation of the Aaland Islands. A glance at the map makes it clear that the territorial adjustments proposed were of the greatest strategic importance for the defence of the Soviet Union, whereas they would make no difference for Finland, provided that the latter did not want those territories to be used for the purpose of hostile activities against the Soviet Union.

The importance of Petsamo and the Arctic territory around it has already been mentioned. It was from that very key position that the first attack upon the Revolution was made. That ice-free port on the Arctic coast was the base of operation for the international forces of intervention in 1920. The Finns having failed to close that door against future attack on Russia, the latter did not want that danger spot to remain any longer. The innumerable small islands along the southern coast of Finland could be a lurking ground for hostile submarines in the case of a war against the Soviet Union. A submarine base there would successfully bottle up the entire Soviet Navy in its base at Kronstadt. Finally, the Aaland Islands command the exit from the Gulf of Finland. When in 1920 the island came in the possession of Finland, it was demilitarised by a Convention of the League of Nations. In 1939, Finland decided to refortify it. The Soviet Government opposed the move. The Finnish Government, however, went ahead with the work of fortification, disregarding a resolution of the League of Nations; and the latter failed to intervene.

That was the beginning of the conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland. The refortification of the Aaland Islands by Finland with the brazen connivance of the Western Powers was regarded by the Soviet Government as the signal for open preparations for an eventual attack upon the Soviet Union. The stubborn refusal of the Finnish Government to settle the conflict peacefully on the above terms compelled the Soviet Government to undertake the unpleasant task of clearing out the danger spot, to uproot a dangerous thorn in its side.

The Soviet-Finnish negotiation was itself a curious affair. Finland was an independent country, heroically defending its freedom against a powerful aggression. But during the negotiations, it became evident that the Finnish Government was not acting independently. A Finnish delegation went to Moscow. The Soviet Government made

some proposals. Instead of carrying on negotiations on the spot, the Finnish delegation went back to Helsinki for further instructions. The distance between Moscow and Helsinki is not very great. There is telegraphic and telephonic communication. A courier could go, and return with answer within twenty-four hours. Yet, the Finnish delegation returned to Helsinki no less than half a dozen times for fresh instructions. And every time it had to wait there for several days. No doubt that the instructions came not from the Finnish Government, but from some distant quarters. In course of the negotiations, the anxiety of the Soviet Government for a peaceful settlement eliminated practically all the points of disagreement, and it was generally expected that the Finnish delegation would return from its last visit to Helsinki with the instruction to sign the pact. But on its arrival in Helsinki, it found that the Government had changed, and the new Government did not approve of the tentative agreement.

The new Government was headed by one Mr. Ryti, who had to be introduced to the world by the London *Times* as a "familiar figure in the City of London", and the holder of a British title—K.C.V.O. Evidently, it was under foreign pressure that the Finnish Government refused to come to an agreement with the Soviet Union, and consequently drove the Finnish people in an insane armed conflict with the powerful neighbour, who did not want to harm them in any way.

The Red Army attacked Finland early in December 1939. It was really a token gesture. The country as a whole was not touched. The Red Army moved into the bleak Arctic region, heading for the port of Petsamo which was evacuated by the Finnish garrison. In the region occupied by the Russians, a parallel Finnish Government was set up, headed by the veteran communist leader Kuusinen who, since the defeat of the revolution of 1919 in his country, had been living in the Soviet Union. The

new Government had the support of all the left-wing parties, which were opposed to the military dictatorship of General Mannerheim. It proclaimed its object to be to establish a Democratic Republic of Finland. The Russians immediately concluded a mutual assistance pact with the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Finland, which declared war upon "the tyrants and war-mongers of Helsinki". The terms of the treaty were as follows: In return for 3,970 square kilometres of Finnish territory in the northern vicinity of Leningrad, 70,000 square kilometres of Russian territory further to the North were ceded to Finland; Russia was to pay the other party 120 million Finnish marks; Finland ceded a narrow strip of the Murmansk coast as far as Petsamo; the tip of the Peninsula of Hango at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, together with a few barren islands in the adjacent waters, were leased to the Soviet Government for thirty years, and the latter was entitled to establish there a naval base. The Soviet Government undertook to supply arms and munitions to the "People's Government of Finland". Evidently, the perspective was not of a war between Russia and Finland, but a civil war in the latter country.

The international background of the conflict between Russia and Finland, however, determined the course of events, which led up to the regrettable armed clash between the two countries. A few days before the events in Finland began moving towards war, the conservative *Evening Standard* of London wrote: "If Russia goes to war with Finland, what will happen? Britain will be probably moved to give assistance to that Northern Democracy, which has a closer kinship to us than Poland ever had. But Germany may also assist the Finns, not because they are democrats, but because an independent Finland is a strategic necessity for Germany. So, we may find this paradox emerging—Britain and Germany co-operating to hold Finland up, and at the same time fighting to bring one

another down." The dangerous cross-currents of the international situation could not be more clearly exposed. The "Northern Democracy", which Britain was to bolster up as against Communist Russia, even at the risk of helping Germany in the midst of a war with her, had been a military dictatorship for nearly two decades. And what was the particular kinship? Reporting the movement of Russian troops towards Petsamo, a newspaper despatch from Stockholm revealed "that the nickel mines where British capital is invested have been destroyed by the Finns (withdrawing from Petsamo) in order to prevent exploitation by the Russians." That revelation explained why and how the political dark horse, Mr. Ryti, suddenly became the head of the Finnish Government, which refused to endorse the agreement negotiated by a delegation sent by a previous government.

Not only Britain, but Nazi Germany also was very much concerned with the fate of the "Northern Democracy" of General Mannerheim. But she also was helpless. On December 8th, *Reuter* sent the following despatch from London: "Germany made strong secret representations to Moscow before the Red Army marched into Finland. Stalin refused to reply. This rebuff has caused a renewed wave of consternation in Berlin. High Nazi circles are beginning to realise that Germany has to pay for Soviet support. With this gnawing fear, responsible German military circles are gazing into the future where Germany will be fighting for her life, after having been encircled even in the North by a Russia which, after all, remains Germany's mortal enemy, and which will drop Germany the moment she has obtained everything that Germany can give, should Germany show the slightest inclination to check the further advance of Bolshevism."

A Danish correspondent in Berlin wrote: "Never has official friendship between Russia and Germany been so unpopular as now. Many young Germans would gladly

volunteer to fight for Finland." The famous French journalist, Pertinax, internationally reputed as a keen observer of foreign affairs, observed: "It will be the most disquietening feature if the Soviet were to bring about a revolution in Finland; for the upheaval would not then be confined to its geographical limits." The Finnish interlude exposed the war as an international civil war; should the danger of revolution be acute, the democratic Powers would join up with Nazi Germany to fight it. The significance of the Russian move in Finland was admitted even by the severest critics of "Red Imperialism". For instance, the liberal British journalist, Vernon Bartlett, in a fiercely anti-Russian article, wrote: "It is true that, after Finland, the severest sufferer is likely to be Germany herself. The only possible enemy against whom Russia is taking this ruthless precaution, is Germany; no other Power would be in a position to launch an attack on Leningrad through Finland. Either Finland will be quickly overrun, in which case Stalin will be able to complete his control over the Eastern Baltic, while Hitler is still wondering what to do on the Western front; or the Finnish campaign will swallow resources which might otherwise have come Germany's way." So, the Russian move in Finland was an attack upon Nazi Germany. Why were the democratic Powers, at war with her, so very nervous, then? To defend Finland at that juncture meant to help Nazi Germany.

The issue of the armed conflict between Russia and Finland was not the latter's independent existence; it was control of the ice-free port of Petsamo. The Dorpat Treaty of 1920, dictated by the German Baltic barons, compelled the young and weak Soviet Government to cede Rybachi Peninsula, the hinterland of the port of Petsamo, to Finland. General Mannerheim, who had been the ruler of Finland since the defeat of the revolution in 1919, was one of the German colonisers of the Baltic. So, the Soviet demand for the control of the Rybachi Peninsula was not an

aggression; it was a demand for the revision of a dictated treaty. Why were the rulers of Finland prepared to risk everything to resist the legitimate demand for a strip of Arctic territory?

Having attained the status of "the most powerful State on the Baltic", the Soviet Union had secured its western frontiers. The ice-free port of Petsamo under the control of a hostile government remained the only chink in the Russian armour. As Vernon Bartlett pointed out, no other Power than Germany could attack Leningrad, directly, but they could through Petsamo. The Soviet Government wanted to remove that remaining weak spot in its system of defence. The "attack" on Finland was a defensive measure on the part of the Russians. It might not be "morally" justifiable; strategically, it was; and the world was in the midst of a war.

Ever since the Baltic barons rescued their Finnish colony from the ruins of the Russian Empire, Germany had been keenly interested with the strategical importance of that country; and the importance obviously was as a base of future operations against Communist Russia. Already in 1919, one of the Prussian militarists, von der Goltz, went to Finland to help the organisation of a counter-revolutionary army under the command of his kinsman, General Mannerheim. Until the Soviet-German Pact was signed, Germany had considered Finland to be within her sphere of influence. Hitler could not prevent the Russian move for the capture of Petsamo; but he maintained diplomatic relations with the Helsinki Government, which was denounced by the Russians as "tyrants and war-mongers". And Mannerheim's army remained a detachment of Hitler's Wehrmacht. Even after the Russians had sent troops to occupy a part of Finland, their "ally" kept on helping their enemies in every possible manner. Reuter's Diplomatic Correspondent reported: "It is authoritatively learnt in London that many rifles were lately sent to Fin-

land from Germany. They were first sent to a northern port and from there to Helsinki." Italian planes were also used to transport war materials to Finland. According to another *Reuter* message, Finland was allowed to purchase military planes in Britain. At the same time, Finland received military supplies from all the countries under Nazi control. Finland was to be the battle-ground of the international civil war. At that juncture, the *Reuter's* News Agency made a sensational revelation about the root cause of the Russian attack on Finland. It reported that during the Moscow negotiations, before Hitler attacked Poland, the Soviet Government had "insisted that Britain and France should induce the Baltic countries and Finland to grant naval bases on the inlands of Oesel, Dago and Aaland, but the Allies refused." That was a strange attitude for the Western Powers to take. Had the Moscow Conference succeeded, Russia would be involved in a war with Germany for the defence of Poland. To enable her to control the Baltic Sea in that eventuality, was obviously in the interest of the Powers allied against Nazi Germany. Their strange attitude naturally caused suspicion in Russia, and could not but contribute to the breakdown of the Moscow negotiations, and eventually to the sensational diplomatic and military moves on the part of the Soviet Government.

However, Red Napoleonism was on the march, and for the time being none could stop it. Germany alone was in a position to make a direct attempt, but she did not dare. That was the immediate consequence of the Soviet-German Pact. Referring to the German uneasiness caused by Soviet activities in the Baltic and Finland, the Zurich Correspondent of *Le Journal* of Paris observed: "It is clear that Moscow's desire will prevail, for the day Germany attempted to oppose Red expansion plans, she will sign her death-warrant." Nevertheless, Nazi Germany and the Western Powers egged on General Mannerheim to provoke a full-blast Russian attack on Finland. His army

was well equipped, and Southern Finland, particularly the part facing Leningrad, was heavily fortified. The Mannerheim Line, built to keep the Russians at bay, was believed to be the strongest fortification in Europe, even stronger than the Maginot Line. The Helsinki Government was provided with a full war chest also. On December 5th, the Finnish Parliament voted for a long-term loan of 700 million marks and a short-term loan of a thousand million marks. How could a country with a three million population raise the huge sum? Evidently, the loans were to be subscribed in other countries. "Poor little Finland" was recklessly driven to her doom by her rulers, allies, friends and patrons.

Having egged Finland on to an armed conflict with the Soviet Union, her patrons were committed to stand by her. But, on the one hand, Germany did not dare oppose the Russians; and, on the other, the democratic Powers were not in a position to do more than send arms and give financial help surreptitiously; and it would be awkward for them to do more even if they could. So, they fell back upon the discredited machinery of the League of Nations to launch a moral offensive against the Soviet Union. On a motion of the far-off South-American countries, the Soviet Union was expelled from the musty parlours of the old lady of Geneva. It was a fishy affair. All the countries bordering on the Soviet Union, and therefore directly menaced, refused to be dragged into the whirlpool of international power-politics: the three Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Switzerland and China abstained from voting. Belgium and Holland opposed the application of economic sanctions against the offender. Europe buzzed with the rumour that the token gesture of the League of Nations would be the signal for another peace offensive by Germany. *Reuter* revealed that Hitler would make his peace proposals on the occasion of the meeting of the League of Nations. According to an inspired report published in

Le Journal of Paris, Hitler's proposals would be: Reconstruction of Czechoslovakia without the Sudetenland; restoration of a Polish State covering the limited territory inhabited by Poles; Danzig and the Corridor to be ceded to Germany; Ruthenia and Galicia to be constituted as buffer States; and the Western Democratic Powers were to join Nazi Germany to resist the Bolshevisation of Europe.

Unfortunately for the projected anti-Bolshevik crusade, the Soviet Union was completely exonerated by a White Paper published by the Finnish Government on the day before the League of Nations meeting. It was revealed in that document that the Soviet Government had offered to the Finnish Government of Helsinki exactly the substantial concessions subsequently made to the People's Government headed by Communist Kuusinen. Moscow, in addition, waived the opposition to the fortification of the Aaland Islands by Finland, provided that no other Power got any footing there. The Russians also suggested that the fortifications in the Karelian Isthmus should be demolished from both sides, and the non-aggression pact between Finland and Russia be further strengthened, each of the parties pledging itself not to join in any hostile alliance against the other. The Finnish Government agreed to all these terms; the negotiations broke down on the Russian demand for a thirty years' lease of the Hango Peninsula, which Soviet strategists considered to be vital for the defence of Leningrad, although they were prepared to reduce the number of troops to be stationed there. The Finnish insistence on preventing preparations for an effective defence of Leningrad, just when Europe was buzzing with the rumour about the imminent formation of the Twentieth Century Holy Alliance, could not but put Red Napoleonism on the spur. The festering sore of Mannerheim's Finland must be cleaned; "the tyrants and war-mongers of Helsinki" must no longer be allowed to continue their nefarious activity against the safety of the Soviet Union.

On December 12th, *Reuter's* Correspondent reported from Helsinki: "Russia is concentrating a million and half men opposite the Finnish frontier. War materials are moving up in an endless stream. Huge reserves are believed now to be in position at a series of points from Leningrad northwards." That was rather fantastic; such huge concentration of force was hardly necessary for reducing "brave little Finland". It was either meant to be a mere demonstration of power to break the morale of the Mannerheim clique; or the Russians were preparing to encounter in Finland a more formidable enemy. How the Russian mind was working in that critical moment, was not unknown abroad. The Diplomatic Correspondent of the *Sunday Despatch* of London wrote: "In Finland, Russia's objectives are the seizure of all strategic points that will give her complete mastery of the Baltic; the joining of Finland's Karelian province and her own Karelian province in an autonomous Finnish-Soviet Republic. Stalin's great fear is that eventually Britain, France, Germany and Italy will combine against Russia. It is this fear which won him over from his earlier determination to achieve his objects in Finland solely by means of diplomatic pressure. Von Ribbentrop's main idea in concluding the treaty with Russia was to blackmail the Allies by inducing them to accept the Nazi peace offer under the threat of the increasing Russian danger."

Experience showed that the Russians were not oversuspicious. They had to encounter and break in Finland the outpost of a powerful international coalition. As a matter of fact, Soviet strategists had underestimated the strength of the resistance Russian forces would meet in Finland. The initial stage of the Finnish campaign, excluding the walk-over in the Far North, was not very creditable for Red Napoleonism.

How was it possible for Finland to put up such a resistance? Modern warfare is a very costly affair. It is

known that the Finish army was very well equipped with most up-to-date implements of warfare. Every bit of Finland along the Soviet frontier was heavily fortified. Even France almost went bankrupt for building the Maginot Line. How could Finland afford the luxury of the Mannerheim Line? With a three million population, and very poor natural resources, she could not possibly find all the money for this luxury. The money must have come from somewhere else. During the protracted negotiations, war materials were flowing into Finland from all quarters. On the other hand, the Soviet Government did not want to inflict any injury on the Finnish people. It did not plan serious military operations. It expected that before long the Finnish Government would realise its stupidity and come to an honourable settlement.

It seems that the Soviet Government had underestimated the maturity of the plan to use Finland as the field of battles between revolution and international counter-revolution. In the earlier stages of the war, inadequately equipped detachments of the Red Army were confronted with the most up-to-date machines of warfare. Consequently, initial gains could not be kept up. Even then, the Red Army did not want to begin serious operations, reluctant to inflict injuries on the Finnish people, which would be unavoidable in that case. But Finland was not fighting for her own freedom. She was fighting other people's battles. Confronted with the forces of international counter-revolution on the battlefields of Finland, the Soviet Government was ultimately compelled to bring its entire military might to bear upon the situation. The prolongation of the war only proved that the Soviet Union was not fighting Finland, but the combined forces of world capitalism, which had been conspiring for years to bring about the conflict. However, once the Russian strategists took a serious view of the situation, the prestige of Red Napoleonism was quickly restored. To reduce the strongest line of fortifications by a

frontal attack was the boldest and the most magnificent military feat of the entire war. The Finnish war finished, the scene shifted to the southern sector of the thousand miles front stretching from the Arctic to the Black Sea.

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As soon as the Red Army blocked the German advance towards south-eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union secured its position in the North through the mutual assistance treaties with the Baltic States, the capitalist Powers began a brisk diplomatic intrigue in the Balkans and the Near East, in order to prevent the ascendancy of Soviet influence in those countries. They scored the first success by compelling Turkey to break off her old friendly relation with the Soviet Union. Mussolini was given a free hand in the Balkans to pursue his long-cherished scheme of expanding the Neo-Roman Empire. The Soviet Union was still vulnerable on its southern flank. As soon as troubles began to brew in that quarter, the Soviet Government was alarmed and had to complete the security of the western frontier so as to be able to face the danger from the South with all its might. Finland was the only danger spot on the western front. It had to be neutralised. The little window in the Arctic must be closed.

Immediately after the fall of France, the perspective of the development of the conflict was clear. On the one hand, it was clear that the Nazi invasion of England would not materialise. It was hard to believe that the German strategists ever seriously contemplated the plan. Obviously, it was such an impossibility. Experience soon dispelled the fear about the potentialities of the Luftwaffe. On the other hand, it was also clear that England could do nothing to dislodge the Fascists from the domination of the whole of the European continent. So, the perspective was of a deadlock, which could not be broken soon by maritime blockade. The decisive battles of the war had to be fought on the front where the Fascists could be attacked. Simple

facts of geography allowed no room for any doubt about the scene of those battles, and that again determined who was to play the leading rôle. The decisive battles of the war had to be fought in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

At the Brenner meeting of the fascist dictators, it was decided to shift the scene. Soon after the Axis Tripartite Pact was announced, Japanese correspondents in Berlin reported an official German declaration to the following effect: "Germany's military and diplomatic position has been so strengthened by the new pact with Japan that there is no longer any necessity for having the plan of invading England." Reporting the news, *Reuter's* Diplomatic Correspondent commented: "But there are other implications in the German statement. If Germany's hand is strengthened, it is obviously not against Britain. The menace could only come from Russia. The next few days will help to clarify the position whether Germany, by virtue of increased strength, is to threaten Russia or woo her."

Events moved rapidly since then. There could be no doubt that the Nazis were back to their mutton. The basic plan of their expansionism was the invasion and conquest of at least a large part of the Soviet Union. They were back to that plan.

The day after the change of plan was announced from Berlin, *Reuter* received from Bucharest reports of "mass concentration of Soviet troops along the rivers Bug and San, which form the demarcation line between Germany and Russia in Poland". Similar concentration also took place "along the border of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, where strong mechanised forces are being camouflaged in the forests. Numerous transports of Soviet motorised troops are being concentrated along the German-Russian frontier".

The Fascists retorted by convening the Balkan Conference at Vienna, from which the "Soviet ally" was excluded.

The occupation of Roumania was decided there, presumably in pursuance of a larger plan of military operations in the Near East. Promptly, the Soviet Government made *démarches* in Berlin to the effect that it would not approve of the nazification of the Balkans. The diplomatic *démarche* was backed up by imposing military demonstrations. In a few days, Soviet and German troops stood facing each other along the river Pruth, the border-line between nazified Roumania and the Soviet Union. *Reuter* reported that the Nazi invaders of Roumania "are said to be speaking openly of being stationed there to prevent any further Russian advance". Soviet authorities, on the other hand, admitted the presence of twenty divisions massed beyond the Roumanian border. It was further reported that Soviet units had penetrated southwards as far as the central arm of the Danubian Delta. Following some incidents between German and Soviet units near Galatz, the Russians reinforced their river fleet. Soviet troops definitely established themselves at the mouth of the Danube.

Commenting on the presence of German troops in Roumania, the Turkish newspaper *Yeni Sabah* wrote: "Russia would not allow the Dardanelles to pass into other hands." So, whatever might be the immediate objective of the Fascist Powers, the Soviet Union was involved in the first place; in the immediate future, the conflict was bound to be between the Fascists and the Soviets.

The development was predetermined by the Axis Tripartite Pact. The *Daily Telegraph* of London, for example, wrote: "The only Power against whom the pact is conceivably directed is Russia. Russia is given notice that she is excluded from the leadership in the new order now arising in Europe and Asia. The new pact is just as much a threat to Russia as the original Anti-Comintern Pact itself."

The Nazi press invited the Soviet Government to enter into a military alliance with Germany. The invitation was

a threat. The Russians were told that either they were with the Fascist Powers or against them; they had to make up their mind and be prepared for the consequences if they decided against the will of the Great Dictator. The development in the Balkans leading up to the dramatic situation of the Red Army and Hitler's war machine actually marshalled in battle-array, followed the Nazi threat to the Russians, given in the form of an invitation for an alliance.

Nor was it an empty threat. *Reuter* reported from New York that an American journalist, recently returned from Europe, had written: "It is generally taken for granted in the Nazi circles that Germany will invade Russia in 1941. Responsible Nazi officials declare, in off-the-record, but scarcely secret conversations, that the Soviet Union will either deliver the Ukraine and Baku oil regions and the former Baltic States, or Germany will seize them. High German officials believe that war between Germany and Russia is inevitable." America was then neutral, and American visitors to Germany were taken into confidence by the Nazis.

The major part of the year 1940 was taken up by intensive war preparations in the Soviet Union. The Red Army had to recover from the jolt it had undoubtedly received during the Finnish campaign. Under Timoshenko, the Red Army was reorganised and reinforced. The news could not be altogether kept a secret. The Germans had to keep an army of a three-quarter million men to guard their eastern frontier—against their "ally". Simultaneously, devious diplomatic moves were made with the object of manœuvring for positions on the chess-board of international power-politics. Molotov's Berlin visit at the end of the year caused lively speculations. But the underlying purpose of Soviet diplomacy was being grasped by an increasing number of observers. Just before Molotov visited Berlin, the diplomatic correspondent of the London *Observer,* for instance, wrote: "Both Balkan and Far-

Eastern developments (conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact) have had the effect of renewed speculation about the possibility of Russia's being drawn into the war. Apart from the normal consideration that no government wants to be involved in war, if it can help it, there is the additional motive in Russia's case that universal Communism is still one of her chief objectives. In Moscow's view, the war between Germany and Britain in Europe, and if possible between Japan and America in the Far East, are the means best calculated to serve Russia's ambition of launching general Communism by first undermining the capitalist countries, provided always that Russia herself remains intact by contriving not to be involved in either war."

In view of the cryptic pronouncements made by Russian leaders on the anniversary of the revolution, Berlin could not be very hopeful about Molotov's coming visit. The President of the Supreme Soviet, Kalinin, reaffirmed the anxiety of his government to keep Russia out of the armed conflict, but at the same time characterised the war as "practically a world war" and declared that Russia could "not be an indifferent by-stander". The Defence Commissar warned the audience with the following unambiguous words: "The intense international situation is pregnant with various surprises, and we must show utmost vigilance, and always remember that we keep our entire people in a state of mobilisation and preparedness in the face of danger and military attack, so that no accident and no trick of our foreign enemies could catch us unawares."

Before spring 1941, Hitler could have no more hope of attaining the ambition of seizing the granary of the Ukraine. The Russians had completely outmanoeuvred him, diplomatically as well as militarily. Events in the Balkans did not move more favourably for the Fascist Powers than in Eastern Europe. Dr. Tilea, Roumanian Minister in London

until his country joined the Nazi camp, described the events there as a definitive victory for Russia. He revealed that Hitler's plan was to overrun the Ukraine, and having dealt a stunning blow to the Russians, throw the entire weight of his war machine to the West. The time-table of the planned operation was fixed to the day. The Roumanian army under General Antonescu was to invade Russia from the South. All that well-laid, ambitious and perfidious plan was frustrated by the Red Army moving swiftly down to the Danube Delta.

Baulked in the north, the Nazi war machine struck southwards and occupied Bulgaria early in April, 1941. Moscow promptly reacted by publicly disapproving of Bulgaria surrendering voluntarily. The Russian statement was welcomed in Turkey, where it was interpreted as Soviet determination to bar Germany's advance to the Straits. Alarmed by the German occupation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia responded to the Russian diplomatic *démarche* and signed a pact of non-aggression and mutual assistance. It was reported in the British and American press that, during the first week of April, Hitler held a series of secret talks with Balkan politicians, and unfolded before them his plan of conquering the Soviet Union. The military position at the moment was that about ninety German divisions and a hundred and thirty Russian divisions stood face to face along the line from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The opinion throughout the world was that the protest against the occupation of Bulgaria and the non-aggression pact with Yugoslavia were the most decisive anti-German gestures on the part of Russia since the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact.

By the middle of April, Russia signed the neutrality pact with the Eastern pole of the Fascist Axis. A few days later, the Tokyo correspondent of the London *Times* reported: "Russian troops are moving to the West on the Trans-Siberian Railway. The general impression is

that Russia's Far-Eastern troops are being moved to the German frontier, where a strong Russian line-up already stretches from the White Sea to the Black Sea, and where the Germans are hurrying on with the completion of the East Wall, corresponding to the West Wall of the Siegfried Line".

In the spring of 1941, strategically, Germany had no other alternative than to make a frontal attack on the Soviet "ally". The attempt to reduce the fortress of Britain could not be resumed, because the bulk of the German army was pinned down on the long eastern front, and stretched out through the Balkans. Even after the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula, Germany dared not move directly towards Asia, because the flank of the army attacking the Straits would be open to the Russians stationed in the Danube Delta. Russia had been preparing for this situation. The day of reckoning had come. But how very mature was the crisis was not yet quite realised by all. Even the London *Times*, for instance, wrote: "There is no doubt that Stalin is a realist, who understands fully that foreign policy can be based only on effective power which, in the contemporary world, means highly organised and developed industrial capacity. Stalin, who has been for twenty years a close and tolerably cynical observer of the international scene, is unlikely to put much faith in pacts—at least those that now unite his country with his western and eastern neighbours. His policy will be to build up Soviet industrial strength and, therefore, military strength, and he hopes that no neighbouring Power will be driven either by ambition or despair to impose on him any disagreeable interruption of the process."

That was within just three weeks before Germany attacked Russia. Events were moving fast. Russia had rejected Hitler's insolent demand for greater help, including co-domination of the Ukraine and a share in Soviet industries. Wanting to make a final test of Russia's position

and intention, Hitler informed Moscow that he was going to announce the formal assumption of Germany's leadership of Europe. He received a clear rebuff: Russia categorically refused to admit any German claim to the leadership of Europe. So, there had never been an alliance between Communism and Fascism. Both were bidding for the leadership of Europe; a clash between the two was inevitable. Events during the previous decade had been heading towards that show-down.

Chapter X

THE CLIMAX

In the early hours of June 22nd, Germany attacked Russia without going through the formality of declaring war. After the Nazi hordes had attacked the Red Army in Poland, Hitler made a proclamation in which some interesting facts were revealed. Referring to the Soviet-German Pact, Hitler said: "I sent von Ribbentrop to Moscow, because I thought that he could come to an understanding with Russia." So, Russia had not double-crossed Britain and France by secretly negotiating a pact with Germany when the Moscow talks of 1939 were going on. The initiative was taken by Germany. Russia only availed of the opportunity to secure her self-defence when there was no hope of an agreement with the democratic Powers. Hitler further informed the world: "In the autumn of 1939 and the spring of 1940, Russia tried to bring not only Finland, but also the Baltic States under her yoke. This could only have been directed against Germany." That much about "Red Imperialism", and Stalin's blood-brotherhood with the Nazi dictator. About more recent events, Hitler said: "Russia has broken the Soviet-German non-aggression pact by organising a putsch in Yugoslavia and promising to send arms, planes and ammunitions to the Serbs through Salonika." In the peroration, the basic issues were joined: "Bolshevism is opposed to National-Socialism, and is its deadly enemy. Bolshevist Moscow desires to stab National-Socialist Germany in the back, while she is engaged in a struggle for existence. Germany has no intention of remaining inactive in the face of this great threat to her eastern frontier. The German forces, therefore, oppose this menace with all the might at their disposal."

In a Note delivered to the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, simultaneously with the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the following revelations were made: "When in the summer of 1939 the Reichs Government approached the Soviet Government, they were aware of the fact that it would be no easy matter to reach an understanding with a State ruled by a party which, as a section of the Communist International, was striving to bring about world revolution." The German Note then referred to a secret document which proved that the Russians had concluded the treaty with the Reich as "a mere technical manoeuvre". The document was found in the Soviet Legation in Belgrade. It contained the following passage: "The U.S.S.R. will not react until the opportune moment occurs. The Axis Powers have further dissipated their forces, and the U.S.S.R. will consequently strike a sudden blow against Germany."

* * *

In an article with the caption "The Riddle Solves Itself", I wrote on June 29th, 1941:

"The real nature of the present international conflict is at last laid bare. There is no room for any doubt about it. It was evident all along. Only those looking for a plausible justification of their indefensible attitude, and others blinded by a die-hard prejudice, could not or would not see it. This is neither an imperialist war nor a war between nations. It is the type of conflict which marks a turning point of history. It is the paroxysm of death of a doomed social order and, at the same time, the birth-pang of a new. Therefore, essentially, it is the life and death struggle between the forces respectively representing the two. Others not belonging definitely to this or that camp may be caught in the vortex. That is inevitable in a titanic struggle on which the future of mankind depends. As the struggle develops, the line of demarcation becomes sharper; the relation of forces shifts; and the perspective becomes clearer. The process may be zigzag. There may be periods

of uncertainty. But history, not being a medley of events precipitated by madmen or engineered by clever diplomats, takes its course, guided by its own inexorable logic. The last world war ushered in one of the recurring periods of wars and revolutions, which necessarily take place on the background of an international class struggle.

"The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union was, therefore, not unexpected by those who could read history in this sense. As a matter of fact, if the present war was not to be a senseless drama of wholesale death and destruction, this latest development was inevitable. It might have taken place earlier or later. But it was bound to be. As a matter of fact, the war against Fascism has at last begun. Until now it was only a prelude. The vast sweep of the prelude only indicates the grimness and the ferocity of the main drama which is still to be enacted. Until now, it was manoeuvring for positions, shifting of forces and searching of hearts.

"The outcome of the conflict, reaching its climax, however, is not certain. It still remains to be seen how others will behave. The experience of the past occasions misgiving in that respect. It is doubtful whether all involved in this struggle have even now come to realise its full implications, and will have the courage to reconcile with the inevitable.

"But for the conflicting cross-currents and dangerous undercurrents of the contemporary international situation, the curse of Fascism might have been exterminated without allowing it to inflict misery and misfortune on a number of European nations. Now that the malicious reading of the Soviet foreign policy during the last two years has been repudiated by the march of events, it can be asserted, with greater force than ever, that, until the very eve of this war, England and France were opposed to an alliance with the Soviet Union, while the latter was eager to form a combination of the democratic Powers to check fascist

aggression. That unfortunate attitude on the part of the Western Powers compelled the Soviet Union, for the sheer consideration of self-defence, to adopt a policy of diplomatic manoeuvring in order to prepare itself for meeting the blow which has at last fallen.

"Knowing fully well that the Soviet Union represented one of the forces primarily involved in this struggle, and therefore the Nazi war machine would turn against it sooner or later, its leaders were compelled to take certain steps as strategic exigencies. The Soviet actions in Poland, Finland, the Baltic States and finally in Bukovina, were clearly directed against the Nazis. Hitler has blurted that out in his declaration of war on the Soviet Union. Yet, the Soviet Union was bitterly denounced for those acts against Nazi aggression, even by those who were actually engaged in this grim struggle against Fascism.

"Why did not the Soviet Union, then, openly enter the struggle any earlier? The most propitious moment would have been when the Nazi military machine was sweeping westwards, particularly when the fall of France was imminent. Later on, the Soviet armies could have moved to check the fascist conquest of the Balkans. Now it can be asserted without any serious contradiction that the Soviet Government would have taken the arena against international Fascism on either of those two occasions, had it not been in grave doubt about the attitude of the Powers who had previously rejected its offer of an anti-fascist alliance. It was a simple strategic consideration not to risk a single-handed war with the formidable military machine of Fascism, except when actually attacked. That moment had at last come, and the Soviet Union did not hesitate in the least to take up its position in the front ranks of this international struggle against Fascism.

"Even when the Nazis were openly preparing for the attack on their enemy Number One, there was doubt about the possible attitude of the Soviet Government. That was

possible only because of the failure to understand the real nature of this war. Fascism rose with the declared intention of destroying Bolshevism, which is nothing more terrifying than the necessary outcome of the great achievements of modern civilisation which Fascism wishes to annihilate. There are many who are sincerely anxious to safeguard those achievements against the menace of their destruction by Fascism; yet, they may not take kindly to what passes under this outlandish name of Bolshevism; they may even be hostile to Bolshevism, going to the extent of putting it on a par with Fascism.

"But the Bolshevik leaders of the Soviet Union cannot possibly be so foolish as to allow the branch to be hacked down which sooner or later is bound to bear the fruit of the system they represent. Therefore, they are as much vitally interested in the defence of the achievements of modern civilisation, as such, as all other sincere democrats. That being the case, the struggle for the destruction of Fascism is primarily their struggle, directly as well as indirectly. Two socio-political systems representing two successive stages of modern civilisation must be defended together against the enemy of both. That is the basis for an anti-fascist democratic alliance. And a foremost place in that alliance was reserved for the Soviet Union from the very beginning. Prejudices and other petty considerations prevented for a time the consummation of that alliance, which is indispensable for guaranteeing the future of mankind. But at last it has been concluded, though not through the efforts of diplomats. It has been consummated thanks to the inexorable logic of events.

"For nearly two years, a heavy gloom hung over the horizon of the world. The future appeared very dark, indeed. But dispassionate observers of events, who could study history as a science, did not give up hope, although often times they had to hope against hope. They wondered with a feeling of acute pain whether the prejudice against

a natural ally would die so hard as to go to the extent of courting defeat.

"The whole atmosphere has been suddenly cleared by the firing of guns on the front where the decisive battles against Fascism were bound to be fought. The news of military operations are still to come. The first thrust of the formidable Nazi military machine, prepared so elaborately, may be too fierce to resist. But, for the first time, the totalitarian war machine of the Nazis will come up against a whole people in arms. It will have to throw itself against a line which is as thick as one sixth of the globe. The steel and concrete structure of a Maginot Line might crumble, or it might be circumvented and the thrust driven into the heart of a civilian population not at all prepared for a total war. But a line as thick as the nation itself can neither be pierced nor circumvented.

"Under the impact of dramatic developments, a veritable miracle has happened. Shells are falling off the eyes of statesmen. Lingering doubts and suspicions seem to have disappeared overnight. The British Prime Minister's broadcast speech* sounds as if it was inspired. For all practical purposes, it amounts to a ceremonious declaration of an Anglo-Soviet alliance in the fight against Fascism. And an alliance so spontaneously formed is sure to be firmer, deeper and more abiding than a diplomatic formality.

"After nearly two years of troubles and tribulations, the world holds out a promise of surviving this severe crisis. The brutality and recklessness of triumphant Fascism have cemented the bond which binds all those who, irrespective of the country they belong to, share the ideals cherished by modern mankind. The Fascists want to destroy those ideals. They must be fought everywhere, on all fronts, wherever they are found, open or disguised, if those ideals are to be kept burning, to be attained by all.

* See Appendix D

That is the object with which a grand anti-fascist democratic alliance is being formed under the terrific pressure of storm and stress which almost overwhelmed the world."

* * *

Having put up some resistance in Poland, the Red Army reeled under the terrific blow of the Nazi war machine. Soviet Russia was in for the most excruciating but heroic period of her history. The spirit with which she faced the situation, and which ultimately brought her out of it, was breathed in Stalin's speech* delivered about a month after Germany attacked. It was a solemn declaration, which echoed throughout the civilised world, which welcomed revolutionary Russia taking her place at the forefront of the democratic forces fighting desperately against triumphant barbarism.

* See Appendix E

SECTION THREE

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

CHAPTER XI

THE DISSOLUTION

THE news of the dissolution of the Communist International must have caused surprise throughout the world. It has come unexpectedly, yet not quite as a bolt from the blue. It has been neither an arbitrary act on the part of the Russians, nor an opportunist move of Soviet diplomacy, though one of its by-products may, indeed, be a better diplomatic relation between the Soviet Government and its allies in this war.

The Communist International had been a nightmare for the ruling classes of the world ever since its foundation twenty-five years ago. Even to-day, the United Nations are not quite free from the influence of die-hard reactionaries and stupid conservatives. For the sake of its immense military advantage, they put up with an alliance with the Soviet Union. But they do not want it to be anything more than a temporary make-shift, and would utilise the relation between the Soviet Government and the Communist International as the excuse for breaking up the alliance as soon as the exigencies of this war were over. As a matter of fact, of late they have been complimenting the Russians for abandoning the cause of world revolution and recovering their traditional patriotic spirit. The dissolution of the Communist International will be welcomed by them as the conclusive evidence for the triumph of reaction in the Soviet Union, qualifying it for respectable company. Indeed, it is reported that some American public men have congratulated the Soviet Government for "the step in the right direction". It is certainly a step in the right direction. But the standards of right and wrong are still different.

It would be a matter of satisfaction if the dissolution of the Communist International incidentally contributed to

an improvement of diplomatic relations inside the camp of the United Nations. But the Russians have taken this step without any opportunist motive. That is clear from the resolution to dissolve the organisation. The full text is not yet available. But sufficient indication of the object is to be found in the following passage of the cable report. "The proposal to disband is based on the fact that world conditions have greatly altered since the Comintern was founded, and that this form of international working class organisation no longer corresponds to world conditions, specially in view of the state of affairs created by the present war." The resolution contains a strong appeal to all the Communist Parties in other countries "to concentrate all their forces for the fullest support of, and active participation in, the *war of freedom of the peoples and* States of the anti-Hitlerite coalition in order to smash as quickly as possible the deadly enemy of workers—German Fascism and its allies and vassals".

The words italicised (by me) in the above quotation indicate the change in world conditions, in consequence of which the old form of international working class organisation has become out of place. It is a regrettable fact that even when this war started, and for some time afterwards, the Communist Parties in other countries than the Soviet Union, * obsessed with their mechanical ideas about past, present and future, failed to realise that freedom of the peoples and States of the anti-Hitlerite coalition was the condition for the attainment of the greater freedom visualised in the programme of the Communist International. They failed to see that the freedom of the peoples and the States of the anti-Hitlerite coalition would smash the deadly enemy of the workers and thus pave the way for the freedom of the working class. They forgot one of the lessons of history taught by Karl Marx, namely, that a class frees itself by freeing the entire society of the time.

* Now I must admit that the exception was not warranted by fact and therefore not justified.

The change in the world conditions which warranted the dissolution of the Communist International was brought about by the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany. Fascism had appeared on the scene as the avowed enemy, not only of the working class, but of modern political institutions and cultural values. More than a decade earlier, it had come to power in Italy. But not until the Nazis captured power in Germany did Fascism become an imminent menace for the whole world. Until then, Fascism was regarded, except by a few penetrating observers, as enemy only of the working class, and therefore to be fought only by the working class. A centralised world organisation was to co-ordinate and guide the activities of the working class in different countries in pursuance of that historic task. The Communist International was that world organisation.

But before long, it became evident (it was evident to the more discerning observers from the very philosophy of Fascism)* that Fascism proposed to subvert the whole structure of modern civilised society, which enabled the more advanced sections of humanity to strive successfully for greater human freedom. There was a new polarisation of world forces. The working class was no longer alone in the fight which it had undertaken more than a century ago. It should be emphasised that historically the object of the fight was not to liberate the working class alone, but to liberate the entire society from bondages which prevented its further progress. This historical object of the working class movement may not have been clear in the mind of the great bulk of its members. But it was there, serving as its motive force.

Triumphant Fascism forced a new alignment of forces, an alliance of all desirous of defending modern civilisation. The working class belonged to that alliance. But it could not immediately take up its position in the new constellation

* In 1934, while in prison, I wrote *The Philosophy of Fascism* published in 1937.

of forces fighting for freedom, because the new alliance embraced many social elements and political organisations which had previously been regarded as antagonistic to the liberation of the working class. Therefore, even after the world conditions had undergone a far-reaching change, the Communist International continued in existence.

But the Soviet Government promptly appreciated the new world situation, characterised by a new polarisation of forces and adapted itself to it. The first step in that direction was to join the League of Nations, which had previously been condemned as an alliance of imperialist Powers for the destruction of the Soviet Union and for world domination. The next step was the persistent effort of the Soviet Government for non-aggression pacts which were to lay the foundation for an anti-Fascist alliance. The newly orientated Soviet foreign policy eventually resulted in the formation of the Franco-Soviet alliance which, linked up with the alliances of both these Powers with Czechoslovakia, represented a long advance towards the formation of an anti-Fascist bloc. The appeasement policy of the British Government under Chamberlain delayed the consummation of that object. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government was undaunted in its efforts, and had not the Moscow negotiations in 1939 failed, it would have entered into an alliance even with the Chamberlain Government.

The People's Front movement, inaugurated by the Communist Parties in 1934, at the instance of the Russians, was in accord with the new orientation of Soviet foreign policy. Fundamentally, that was a deviation from the original position of the Communist International; therefore, if the new movement developed as it promised to, it could not be accommodated within the structure of the International organisation founded after the Russian Revolution. By sponsoring the new movement, the Communist International substituted dictatorship of the proletariat by a democratic alliance as the means to the attainment of its ulti-

mate goal. Of course, this fundamental shifting of position was not noticed by the Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union. It is doubtful whether all the Russian leaders themselves realised the implication of the movement they encouraged. However, the People's Front movement was a definite step towards the eventual dissolution of the Communist International—not only its organisational disbandment, but a revision of its political programme and theoretical presuppositions.

But history refuses to be fitted into any scheme devised even by the cleverest of the leaders of men. The Spanish episode proved to be a serious snag, and upset all the calculations of the Russians regarding the possibilities of the People's Front movement. Had the movement succeeded in France, as it had a very good chance to, the whole history of Europe might have changed. But to prevent a break in their sustained effort for bringing about an anti-fascist alliance, the Soviet Government, while fully supporting the People's Front Republican Government of Spain, could not successfully oppose the non-intervention policy of the British Government, which succeeded in compelling the People's Front Government in France to fall in line. The result was the People's Front movement ending in a debacle. But seen from a historical perspective, it was only a temporary break in the process of realignment of forces in accordance with changed world conditions.

That was a process which ultimately was bound to dissolve the Communist International *formally*. As a matter of fact, the spiritual dissolution of the organisation coincided with that process, when Stalin declared that Communism was not a commodity for export. That historic declaration was evidently not a repudiation of Communism. It meant that the Soviet Government did not propose to introduce Communism in other countries. Those who entertained the ideal of Communism as a historical necessity need not have the ambition of imposing it

on other countries. If Communism is a necessary stage of social evolution, every country will reach the stage in due course of time. The progress towards that stage is bound to be uneven, determined by the conditions of each country, the conditions in any particular country being determined by the world conditions.

But the continued existence of the Communist International appeared to contradict the declaration of Stalin, which could be realised by any sensible Communist in any country. It *appeared* to contradict because formally the Communist International was not a part of the Soviet Government and much less identical with it. But that was only the formal relation. In reality, the Communist International was so very intimately linked up with the Soviet Government that it was very difficult to dissociate the latter from any act or idea of the former.

The Communist International proclaimed itself to be the General Staff of the army of world revolution. Nominally, the army was stationed throughout the world, each of the sixty odd Communist Parties being the commanding cadres of the respective local detachments of the army of world revolution. But the fact remained that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a member of the Communist International and was therefore committed by all its pronouncements and responsible for all its actions. Moreover, it occupied such a dominating position in the International that without its approval the latter could make no pronouncement nor undertake any action. On the other hand, the Soviet Government was controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its new foreign policy was sanctioned by the Communist Party. Therefore, for a time, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was pursuing a course which could be characterised as double-dealing.

That was a damaging result of the contradictions of

the existence of the Communist International even after the change in world conditions had rendered it superfluous. Indeed, the position was still worse. According to its constitution, the activities of each party affiliated to it are planned and guided collectively by the International as a whole. Formally, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union could not claim exemption from the rule. Therefore, the entire Communist International was committed by the new orientation of the Soviet foreign policy which, in its turn, prepared the ground for the dissolution of the Communist International. Such a self-contradictory situation could not continue indefinitely. But it is very difficult to abolish an established institution.

It would have been easier if the Communist Parties in other parts of the world, at least in the leading countries, were as keenly alive to the changing conditions as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But intellectual subservience was the curse of practically all the Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union. That misfortune again was, to a large extent, historically determined. The Communist International was a creation of the Russians. By virtue of the fact that it was the only Communist Party in power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was naturally recognised as the leader of the International, and consequently dominated it in every respect. All the other parties accepted the authority of the Russians, to the point of intellectual subservience. The Russians could not be entirely absolved of all responsibility in this connection. But they did not deliberately try to check the intellectual growth of other parties. The spirit of hero worship and the atmosphere of the Catholic Church, which came to prevail in the Communist International, caused intellectual atrophy and political helplessness on the part of the Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Communist International dragged along its self-contradictory and superflous existence under the momentum

of its inability to think for itself. Ultimately, the Russians had to bell the cat.

But even now, they have acted very correctly. The resolution to dissolve the Communist International is recommendatory. It has been submitted for the approval of all the affiliated parties. The latter have the right to reject the proposal. But it would be too much to expect of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to abide by such a possible, though completely improbable, decision. Even then, there will be nothing to prevent other Communist Parties to maintain their world organisation. That is not at all likely to happen. Already several Communist leaders in other countries have rushed to endorse the resolution without even waiting to read the full text of it. That shows to what a depth of moral degradation this once proud organisation has fallen, and that again shows how very necessary was its dissolution.

One colourful chapter of the history of revolution of our time is closed. How will the next chapter begin?

History is not divided into water-tight compartments. Its chapters overlap. We have been living through such a period of transition, which can be regarded as having been closed by the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union. The new chapter began with an event which would have been entirely incredible even a few days earlier. It was Churchill's speech on the day after the Soviet Union was attacked. Even that incredible event was not altogether unexpected. It was determined by the fall of Chamberlain and the subsequent development of British foreign policy. Stalin's speech shortly afterwards clearly indicated how the new chapter was going to be written. Finally came the Anglo-Soviet alliance as the most outstanding landmark of contemporary history. The far-reaching implication of the fact that the alliance was concluded for twenty years was not appreciated by many. It has not been fully appreciated as yet. Men at the helm of affairs of leading countries do

not commit their respective governments for such a long time in these eventful days, when something entirely unexpected may happen to-morrow, unless they are working with a long term plan. At least in the case of Stalin, that was so. The dissolution of the Communist International proves that.

The chapter of the contemporary history of revolution, closed with the dissolution of the Communist International, did not begin with its foundation. Originally, the Communist International was called the Third International. Two other Internationals had preceded it. The history of all the three Internationals composes the history of revolution of our time. The chapter just closed had opened with the formation of the International Association of Workers by Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and their associates in 1866. The theoretical foundation of the new organisation was laid down by the memorable *Communist Manifesto* issued about fifteen years earlier.

The rise of National States had been the outstanding feature of the history of Europe during the preceding century. The revolutionary struggle leading up to the establishment of National States was led by the rising capitalist class, called the bourgeoisie, because of their association with urban areas. It had the support of the urban workers as well as of the peasantry. The revolution developed under the banner of democratic freedom. But the National States established by it became instruments in the hands of the capitalist middleclass with or without the support of the upper classes.

By a searching analysis of the mode of capitalist production, Karl Marx showed that all new values were created by labour; that production of surplus value was the basis of capitalist economy. Capitalist economy, though developing within national boundaries protected by the respective National States, was however a universal system. It was guided by laws which operated everywhere. Con-

sequently, industrial workers in all the capitalist countries were subjected to an identical system of exploitation. Their ultimate liberation was conditional upon the replacement of that system by a system of social justice. The system being universal, the struggle against it must take place on an international scale. Even the immediate demands of the industrial workers as regards wages and conditions of labour could not be enforced successfully in one country. If wages remained low in one country and the workers there laboured under worse conditions, the capitalists in another country would not redress the grievances of their workers in that respect on the plea that greater cost of production would make them unable to compete in the world market. If the conditions of workers were depressed in one country, workers of all other countries would be adversely affected on the same plea.

Having pointed out the identity of the interest of the working class throughout the world, Karl Marx gave the famous slogan "Workers of the World—Unite!" which became the motto of the international labour movement.

Patriotism was a product of the Great French Revolution. But after the establishment of National States, the sentiment was exploited by vested interests for entrenching themselves and aggrandising themselves at the cost of the toiling masses. The latter were to sacrifice so that the nations might prosper and be great. Patriotism lost its charm for the workers and, indeed, became an instrument for their social slavery. Karl Marx showed that capitalism expropriated the producing masses. How could they be the owners of their respective countries? Therefore, Marx declared that the working class had no country. Nationalism would make the working class of one country fight the working class of another, while the interests of the working class, immediate as well as remote, required united efforts against the universal system of exploitation. That analysis of the situation, as it was in the middle of the nineteenth

century, led the pioneers of the labour movement towards the ideal of internationalism. The International Association of Workers, subsequently known as the First International, was founded in consequence.

The *Communist Manifesto* not only laid down the theoretical foundation of the International Association of Workers, but also outlined its programme of action. The immediate object of the International was to secure progressive improvement of the conditions of the working class through collective action. The ultimate object was to replace capitalist society, based on private ownership of the means of production, by a freer social organisation in which they would be collectively owned. Even before the time of Karl Marx, workers had been called to revolt against Capitalism and establish a communist society. Property had been characterised by philosophers as theft, and Capitalism castigated as sinful. But the ideal of common ownership and communist society remained a utopia—no more within practical realisation than the Christian Millennium.

Karl Marx showed that Communism was not a utopia; that property was not theft, but a lever of social progress in a certain stage of history; and that Capitalism was a necessary stage of social evolution. From that analysis he concluded that, just as private ownership had replaced tribal Communism, and Capitalism had replaced earlier economic systems, just so was it bound to be replaced eventually by a higher form of social organisation. He further showed that the capitalist mode of production with the aid of modern machine would gradually undermine private ownership and, without any social necessity, the latter could exist only as an obstacle to further economic development. Machine production socialises labour; the corollary to that should be common ownership of the means of production—of the tools with which labour is performed.

Communism ceased to be a utopia. It was conceived as a necessary stage of social evolution.

Although Capitalism, being a stage of social evolution, was bound to disappear in course of time, National States controlled by the capitalist class could maintain it almost indefinitely even after it had exhausted all its progressive possibilities. The mode of production is the lever of social evolution; but political power could promote or retard progress. Therefore, Karl Marx came to the conclusion that the capture of political power by the working class was the condition for the final disappearance of the decayed capitalist society and the establishment of Communism. The State being the instrument in the hands of the class controlling the economic life of a nation, it must be overthrown before the life could be reorganised. The State further is the organ of power; therefore it could not be overthrown without violence. This analysis led to the conclusion that sooner or later the working class, striving for a better social order, must rise up in insurrection against the established State, overthrow it and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat to overwhelm all resistance and ultimately to create the communist social order.

The International Association of Workers was to inspire the working class of the world with those ideals and lead them step by step through the outlined programme of action. Before long, there was an insurrection, which established the Paris Commune in 1870. The experience was very short. Its defeat was explained by the fact that the Commune was not a proletarian dictatorship. The real reason of the failure perhaps was that already then the relation of forces had so changed as to make insurrection not a very practical proposition. Less than a hundred years ago, the Parisian people, armed with picks and axes, could overwhelm and overthrow the corrupt and decayed monarchy. But in 1870, the insurgents had to face the

formidable Prussian Army, which was very much different from the armed forces of the effete Bourbons.

Insurrection as well as dictatorship were traditions of the French Revolution, and of other revolutions of still earlier periods. The revolution which broke out towards the end of the eighteenth century continued throughout the earlier half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the tradition was very much alive. The *Communist Manifesto* was composed in the midst of an insurrectionary atmosphere—when in 1848 several European capitals were scenes of insurrection. They all failed. But it was too early to draw the lesson of the failure. It was ascribed to weakness and treachery. But in 1870, there was neither weakness nor treachery among the Communards of Paris. Still, the insurrection did not succeed, and the Commune was drowned in a sea of blood. The relation of forces had changed, at least it was changing. Nevertheless, it was too early to detect the process. Therefore, revolutionaries stood by the traditions of the Great French Revolution and inscribed insurrection and dictatorship on their banner.

The very achievement of the French Revolution, however, rendered action according to its tradition very difficult, if not impossible. The newly arisen National States were economically much more stable, politically much better organised and militarily immensely stronger than the decayed feudal order and mediaeval monarchy which they had replaced. They could not be easily overthrown by popular upheavals. That was proved by the experience of revolutionary movements during the period between the Great French Revolution and the Paris Commune.

The First International was disrupted by the consequences of the fall of the Paris Commune. The bitter experience of a whole century of defeats sobered down the spirit of the working class. There was yet another cause for the tendency which since then gained ascendancy in the labour movement. Partial political freedom and civic

rights, established in a number of modern European States during the very period when the revolutionary movement experienced a series of defeats, afforded the working class the opportunity to defend and promote their immediate interests with less spectacular methods. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, there was a steady improvement in the conditions of the working class, particularly in Great Britain. Consequently, the ideas with which the International Association of Workers had been established, began to lose their appeal to the bulk of workers, and the Second International was born in that atmosphere of optimism.

Dictatorship was indeed an ill-conceived idea. It is particularly out of place in the Marxian scheme of historical development. With the development of Capitalism, the majority of a nation becomes proletarianised. The object of revolution is to restore the dispossessed to their own. Political power has indeed been given the decisive importance. But when political power is captured by the proletariat, it comes in the possession of the majority and consequently the ideal of democracy is realised. Assuming that capture of power was still to be an act of violence,—overthrow of the established State by an insurrection—its result would be not dictatorship, but establishment of democracy. For these reasons, it was inadvisable to have been carried away by the idea of dictatorship. As a matter of fact, originally, Marx and his associates did not do so. The necessity of dictatorship was pressed subsequently in order to combat the simplification of the problem of the transformation of the State from an instrument in the hands of the possessing classes into a bulwark of freedom for the people as a whole.

But the faith in parliamentary democracy, which characterised the Second International, was equally misplaced. That was proved by subsequent history, when working class parties commanding majorities in parliaments, or at least constituting sufficiently large minorities, failed

to influence fundamentally the policy of the State. A middle course had to be found. But it was as yet too early. It could be opened later on only by radical changes in the relation of forces, changes which have now warranted the dissolution of the Communist International.

Revolution remained a necessity. Class relations must change. Ultimately, society should cease to be divided into exploiting and exploited classes. A radical change in the political organisation of society, that is the State, was a condition for the fulfilment of all those necessities. If the State could not be overthrown, what was the other alternative? The opponents of the idea of dictatorship failed to realise the decisive importance of the State. They could not distinguish between the State and the Government. As it was theoretically possible for the working class, wherever and whenever it constituted the majority of the population, to form the government under the parliamentary system, it was maintained that power was within the reach of the working class. There was nothing more to do than to take it. The fallacy of this view was exposed by experience and later on by the forcibe abolition of parliamentary democracy on the advent of Fascism. That experience revived the idea of dictatorship, and the Communist International was established after the last world war with the original programme of the International Association of Workers. The Second International with its faith in parliamentary democracy had come to grief on the outbreak of the last war. But the history of the intervening quarter of a century could not simply be effaced. It was bound to influence subsequent developments.

The failure of parliamentary democracy to develop gradually into Socialism, and its eventual suppression in a number of European countries by Fascism, naturally placed the ideas of violent overthrow of the capitalist State and dictatorship of the proletariat again on the order of the day.

But at the same time, the rise of Fascism revealed the inadequacies of parliamentary democracy and compelled a realignment of forces on the international plane, which created conditions for a possible transformation of the State peacefully.

The last great war broke up the Second International and dispelled its parliamentary illusions. It also created conditions for the success of the revolution in Russia. The Communist International, originally called the Third International, was one of the immediate outcomes of the Russian Revolution. Immediately preceding events determined the outlook of the Communist International, which appeared as the uncompromising standard-bearer of the tradition of the First International. The latter was inspired by the traditions of the Great French Revolution. The Third International proposed to carry the banner of the revolution, successful in Russia, to the rest of the world. Naively, it believed that revolution must travel the same way everywhere, that the scenes of Leningrad and Moscow in 1917 should be re-enacted to the minutest detail, including the very stage-setting, in Berlin, Paris and London.

When the parties of the Second International called upon the workers in their respective countries to participate in the last war, as a war of national defence, Lenin denounced the war as an imperialist war and gave the slogan that it should be transformed into a civil war. The Russian Revolution triumphed with that slogan. The Communist International inherited that tradition. Ultimately, it approached the situation created by the present anti-fascist war with the old slogan of Lenin. It failed to see how the slogan was entirely inapplicable to this war. Between the two wars, two new factors had appeared on the scene, namely, a Socialist State embracing one sixth of the globe, and Fascism which had subjugated the whole of Europe. Consequently, this war broke out on the background of an entirely different relation of forces. The old slogan of

Lenin was not applicable to it simply because this war is a civil war. There is nothing to be transformed. And the revolutionary character of this war was determined by events which had taken place during the period between the two wars. Since the world is involved in a civil war which, if waged resolutely, will bring about the necessary transformation of the State, the programme of the Communist International had become unsuitable to the situation. Therefore, its dissolution was a necessity.

Chapter XII

HISTORY AND TRADITION

Did not the experience of the Russian Revolution prove that insurrection and dictatorship of the proletariat are indispensable conditions for the attainment of the goal of Communism? That goal still remains to be attained in other parts of the world. Did not, then, the Communist International still have a historical rôle to play?

The Russian Revolution is a fluke of history. It does not fit into the Marxist scheme of revolution. According to that scheme, a revolution in our time becomes necessary when Capitalism undermines the institution of private property by socialising production and thus lays down the foundation of the socialist society. Those conditions for a necessary social transformation mature only in the most advanced capitalist countries. Before the revolution, they were practically absent in Russia. The revolution there succeeded, thanks to a fortuitous combination of circumstances. Nevertheless, once it did succeed, it became the most decisive event of our time. Only, it did not set the pattern of subsequent events. It influenced the course of history indirectly.

That is the case with all great revolutions. None of them is ever repeated after the original model. That was so after the French Revolution. It opened up a whole period of revolutions lasting for nearly a century. But the Parisian scene of the last decade of the eighteenth century was never enacted anywhere. The Communist International disregarded that lesson of history. It proposed to organise revolutions in all the other countries of the world after the model of the Russian Revolution. The impracticability of that plan became evident very soon. Yet, it was many years before the plan was abandoned—before the actual dissolution of the Communist International. In

so far as the Russians were concerned, the plan was practically abandoned as far back as 1926. Already then, Stalin at least had come to the conclusion that revolution on the Russian model was not possible in the countries of Western Europe. That was not a theoretical conclusion, but wisdom gained from experience. The Communist International should have been disbanded at that time.

No great revolution sets the pattern of subsequent events. But in each case, the respective ideals are attained gradually over a whole period, even in countries not experiencing any revolutionary upheaval. The French Revolution was opposed by all the Powers of Europe. Prussia led the opposition militarily. But the greatest opposition to the ideals of the French Revolution came from Britain, although the ideals had previously been conceived in that country. Later on, the ideals of the French Revolution triumphed more nearly in Britain than in any other European country. Similarly, in the case of the Russian Revolution, its opponents have at last become allies and admirers of the Soviet Union. That does not mean that they are going to imitate the Russians. They still remain opposed to the idea of Communism. But what is there in a name? When the achievements of the Soviet Union win the admiration of the world, they are bound to influence the course of coming history. Britain's relation to the Russian Revolution may be a repetition of her relation with the French Revolution.

The Russian Revolution could take place on the model of the Great French Revolution even after nearly a hundred and fifty years, because of the peculiarities of the situation in which it took place. For one thing, Russia had not experienced the process of modernisation which had taken place in other European countries since the French Revolution. The economic organisation of the country remained very backward and unstable. The State was corrupt and inefficient. There was indeed a large army equipped with

modern weapons. But it was not free from the corruption and inefficiency of the State, being itself a part of the State. Secondly, during the war, the economic life of the country was further disorganised. Then, defeat completely disorganised the army and demoralised the State. On the whole, the conditions thus were very much analogous to those at the time of the Great Franch Revolution when an armed insurrection could succeed.

But even then no success would be guaranteed to the Russian Revolution if the factor which operated against subsequent revolutionary upheavals in other countries could be in operation against it also. That factor was the armed force of the victorious Powers. When the Russian State collapsed and the revolutionaries seized power, the external opponents of the revolution were busy elsewhere. They could not intervene promptly as they did in the case of subsequent revolutionary outbreaks in other countries. The only threat came from the German Eastern Armies, and they were almost on the point of overwhelming the revolution and overrunning the whole of European Russia. But that danger to the Russian Revolution was headed off by the defeat of the Germans on the Western front. Because the capitalist Powers were engaged in a war against each other, the grand alliance against the Russian Revolution could not be formed as promptly as in the case of the French Revolution. That gave the revolution some time to consolidate itself—politically, if not militarily and economically. Even when the grand alliance was eventually formed, it was not very solid, being rent with mutual suspicion and rivalry among its members. Therefore, the war of intervention was waged indirectly. In short, insurrection succeeded in Russia because it did not have to contend with an organised modern army. That was an accident. Revolutionary outbreaks in other countries inspired by the Russian experience, did not have the advantage, and all failed.

A theory was constructed out of the Russian experience. Collapse of the established State in consequence of a military defeat is the condition for a successful revolution; therefore, in the case of a war, revolutionaries should try to bring about the military defeat of their countries. The theory came to be known as revolutionary defeatism. As a matter of fact, Lenin had developed that theory even before the Russian Revolution. The revolution was believed to have corroborated the theory. Apparently that was the case. But the success of the revolution was due to many other contributory causes, which were not properly appreciated. Consequently, the theory became rather a dogma than a lesson learned from experience. The Communist International tried to act according to the dogmatic theory of revolutionary defeatism when this war broke out. That was the greatest blunder it ever committed. The blunder landed it almost in the camp of its avowed enemy. It became more evident than ever how dangerous it was to maintain an organisation committed to antiquated ideals and an impracticable programme, even after its existence had become superfluous.

A year after the Russian Revolution, it became clear that the collapse of a State upon military defeat did not guarantee the success of revolution. In autumn 1918, the German Army suffered defeat, and the monarchist State collapsed. There was a revolutionary outbreak throughout the country. Even soldiers and sailors joined the revolution, here and there. But the insurrection did not succeed. The Communists ascribed the failure to the treachery of the Social Democratic Party. It is true that the latter, as a party, did not join the insurrection. But it would have failed even if they had joined. Because defeat on the front had not completely disintegrated the German Army which, on the whole, remained loyal to the ruling class. The latter, in its turn, was not corrupt and inefficient like the Russian ruling class. Then, had the revolution in Germany

developed and come nearer to success, it would certainly have had to contend with the victorious Allied armies standing guard on the western frontier. It was under that threat, in addition to the unimpaired power of resistance of the native ruling class, with its armed forces still largely intact, that the German Revolution preferred the peaceful line of development, and succeeded to a large extent. The alternative course most probably would have meant its bloody suppression and a triumph of reaction, perhaps to the extent of a restoration of the monarchy under the protection of the victorious *entente* armies.

The revolution in Finland was not guaranteed success by the collapse of Tzarism and the decomposition of the Russian army. It was suppressed by an invading German army. The Hungarian Revolution also met a similar fate. The Austrian Empire had disappeared. But the Roumanian army marched in to overthrow the Soviet Republic of Hungary.

All those experiences corroborate the theoretical judgment that the success of the Russian Revolution was due to a fortuitous combination of circumstances. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as a proof that insurrection is an indispensable condition for the necessary revolutionary change, even in our time. Later on, similar experience was made again in Germany in 1923, in Austria and in Spain.

Now about dictatorship. The Soviet State founded by the Russian Revolution was not a proletarian dictatorship. In the beginning, it was a dictatorship, in so far as it functioned as the organ of power for overwhelming all resistance to the revolution and waging the civil war and the war of intervention. While fighting for its very existence and in the midst of a war, every government assumes dictatorial powers. But constitutionally, even in the very beginning, the Soviet State had a very broad democratic basis, and it was certainly democratic as compared with

the Tzarist State it had replaced. The Soviet, from the very beginning, was a Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. These three sections of society in contemporary Russia together constituted an overwhelming majority of the people. How far effective power was exercised by those sections of the population may be a matter of doubt. But does the people exercise effective power in the parliamentary democratic State? However, as soon as normal conditions were established, the broader democratic character of the Soviet State became evident to all unprejudiced observers. It certainly made for more effective democratic practice.

The point, however, is that the Russian Revolution did not establish a proletarian dictatorship. It simply could not. Because the proletariat was such a small minority that it would be a fantastic dream on its part to assume dictatorial power. Lenin knew that long before the revolution. Therefore, he attached very great importance to the peasantry. The Bolsheviks gave the call for insurrection with the slogan "All power to the Soviets" only when the All-Russian Peasants' Soviet came over to them. So, the revolution broke out as a democratic revolution. Had any effort been made to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, the revolution would have been destroyed by the peasantry. The success of the Russian Revolution and the consequent advance towards the goal of Communism was guaranteed by the democratic composition of the Soviet, and not by the imaginary dictatorship of the proletariat.

Towards the end of 1920, it became evident that the history of revolution of our time was not to be written as expected upon the foundation of the Communist International a year ago. The defeat of insurrections in Germany and Hungary had previously given the same indication. But why should not the banner of revolution be carried from one country to another? Napoleon did that after

the French Revolution. The Red Army was to do that in our time. Its defeat at Warsaw in summer 1920 was yet another lesson of history. But that also was taken as a temporary setback. Europe, particularly Germany, still remained in the grip of a severe economic crisis and unsettled political conditions. They were very favourable for revolution; indeed, they made revolution urgently necessary. The Communist International was to organise the army of the impending revolution, which would rise and capture power and establish a proletarian dictatorship in the near future.

Finally, by 1924, there could be no doubt about the impossibility of revolutionary practice according to the programme of the Communist International, framed under entirely different world conditions. The perennial economic crisis and unsettled political conditions led up to another revolutionary outbreak in Germany in 1923. By that time, the Communist Party had become a very powerful factor of the situation. It commanded the support of a very large section of the working class. The Soviet Government, through the instrumentality of the Communist International, had helped the German revolutionaries in every possible way. The Red Army was to march in to their aid as soon as they would deal the first blow. But it never came to that. The German army was on the march even before the insurrection had broken out. Any action on the part of the Red Army in that critical moment would have meant a war with Germany, who could count on the backing of the entire capitalist world. Action according to the implications of the programme of the Communist International would have thus buried the very prospect of revolution instead of promoting it.

That experience made a revision of the theoretical presuppositions and political programme of the Communist International necessary. As a matter of fact, a step was taken in that direction. The Communist International

issued the slogan of United Front. But there were mental reservations. The United Front of the working class was to be organised under the leadership of the Communist Parties. It was not said so expressly. But it could not be otherwise so long as the Communist Parties remained committed to the programme of armed insurrection and dictatorship of the proletariat. Those two ideas constituted the difference between the Second International and the Communist International. Even after the latter was organised, the majority of the workers in the European countries, through their respective trade-unions, remained attached to the Second International. So long as the Communist International remained committed to the distinctive features of its programme, it was only logical to infer that a united front of the entire working class was necessary for the execution of its programme. One step in the right direction was soon followed by several in the opposite direction and the united front policy was replaced by the foundation of the Red International of Labour Unions.

But the Soviet Government, now under the leadership of Stalin, did not fail to learn the lessons of history. The Communist International was virtually dissolved even if it continued in formal existence. Taking note of the fact that there was little possibility of revolutions taking place in other European countries on the Russian model, the Soviet Government would no longer run after the chimera, but turn its entire attention to the problem of reconstruction at home. The defeat of Trotzky was the landmark in the new orientation of the Soviet Government. The ideal of Communism was not abandoned. On the contrary, the Russians set about the task of realising the ideal where they had the fullest freedom to do so. If the ideal could be achieved in one country, it was bound to influence the course of events in others. Stalin heralded the dissolution of the Communist International when he declared that

Communism was not a commodity for export. That was the return to the original scientific position of Marxism. The Messianic spirit of the Communist International had been a deviation from that position. The new orientation of the Soviet Government, determined by the experience gained in a number of countries, indicated the new path of revolution. It no longer lay necessarily through insurrection and proletarian dictatorship. The Russian Revolution was to influence the course of history in our time indirectly, just as the Great French Revolution did in its time.

However, the Communist International continued in the traditional way. Notwithstanding the new orientation of the Soviet Government, the Russians still remained its leaders. But they were too preoccupied with the gigantic task of building Socialism in one sixth of the globe to guide properly the general staff of the world revolution in which they no longer believed. Moreover, they could not be altogether free from obsessions which constituted the theoretical outfit and political programme of the Communist International.

Ultimately, those obsessions blinded them, at least in the beginning, to the revolutionary possibilities of this war. In the beginning, they also condemned this war as an imperialist war, and appear to have believed that they could really keep out of it. But for the tradition of the Communist International, the Russian leaders might have detected earlier the change of conditions brought about by this war, and acted accordingly. As it is, perhaps they committed a blunder by staying out of the war until they were attacked. The greater blunder committed by Hitler has spared the world the possible disastrous consequences of the blunder which resulted from the history and tradition of the Communist International.

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Repeated experience having proved that the tradition

of the Communist International was no longer valid, that its programme and plan of action, modelled after events of another epoch, were no longer practicable, its existence after 1924 was not only superfluous, but actually did more harm than help the attainments of its ideals. Many intelligent Marxists and loyal Communists detected the turning point in the history of revolution of our time and advocated a reorientation, which might have prevented the painful experiences and tragic events which resulted from the mechanical application of the antiquated policy of the Communist International. But they did not succeed. Reason was overwhelmed by conformist fanaticism; dogmatism would listen to no argument. During the period between 1925 and 1929, the internal life of the Communist International was subjected to a regime of terror. The hope of proletarian dictatorship exercising revolutionary terror throughout the world having not been fulfilled according to the fond expectations of unthinking optimists, it came to be practised at home. The tallest heads were the first to fall. The Communist International was purged of all intelligence and independent thinking in the name of discipline. Unquestioning acceptance of whatever the Russians said came to be the criterion of communist loyalty. The pioneers, those who with Lenin had laid the foundation of the Communist International, and its leading foundation members were first removed from the leadership of the important national sections, to be altogether expelled eventually. They were replaced either by youthful enthusiasts or by sycophants. The result was serious weakening, not only moral, but also organisational.

Already at that time, it was anticipated by the more farsighted among the Communists themselves that the International was doomed to be overwhelmed by the crisis unless the entire world situation should change in consequence of a revolution in a leading country in the near

future. The crisis essentially was a crisis of leadership. * Had there been a really Marxist leadership, capable of adjusting its theories and adapting its practice to changed world conditions, the Communist International would not have committed the series of fatal blunders during the years from 1925 to 1929, which seriously weakened the revolutionary movement.

The crisis coincided with the beginning of the post-revolutionary construction of the Soviet Union which, in its turn, precipitated a crisis in the Russian Communist Party. The elimination of a number of the more known leaders of the revolution was the result of the latter crisis. Those leaders of the Russian Revolution who had lived in exile were naturally more known to the world. But the very fact that, for the better part of their life, they were compelled to live outside Russia kept them more or less ignorant of the peculiarities of the Russian situation. Lenin was the only exception, he being a man of universal intelligence. But the same misfortune enabled them to feel the spirit of internationalism even to the extent of unrealistic fanaticism. They were the founders of the Communist International. Trotzky was the personification of their spirit. Under the leadership of Lenin's genius, they all made valuable contributions to the success of the revolution so long as it was only destructive. But they thought in terms of world revolution. They firmly believed that, once the revolution broke out in one country, it must spread like wild-fire to others. So, when a fortuitous combination of circumstances enabled them to capture power in Russia, they regarded that success only as a step towards world revolution, which was to take place according to a preconceived pattern. The power captured in Russia was to be utilised for bringing about revolution in other countries where conditions were more favourable for the realisation of the programme of the Communist International.

* This idea was developed by me in a series of articles called "The Crisis of the Communist International" published in Berlin 1929.

Everything went well as long as the expectation lasted. But by 1924, it became clear that the revolutionary wave had subsided in Western Europe, and it was bound to be followed by a more or less long period of depression. That perspective presented the Russian leaders with a new problem. It was the problem of post-revolutionary reconstruction: to build Socialism in one country, in the midst of a capitalist world. Was that possible? The leaders of the revolution, whose names had been associated with that of Lenin, all believed that it was not. That confronted them with an even more difficult question: If post-revolutionary reconstruction was not possible except after world revolution, if Socialism could not be built in one country, what was the Soviet Government to do? Was the Russian Communist Party then to lay down power and go underground or retire into exile, waiting for the time when a revolutionary wave would sweep the whole world simultaneously?

I put this question to Trotzky in 1927 in a meeting of the Excutive of the Communist International. That meeting resolved to remove him from the Executive. When that question, exposing the absurd implication of his challenge to the possibility of building Socialism in one country, was put to him, Trotzky's only reply was to keep quiet. He was not a man to be easily silenced. His intelligence was extraordinary, and his debating power was simply unrivalled. But he had taken up an untenable position. And that was the case with the other once famous leaders, such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, etc., who had simply not thought of the problems of post-revolutionary reconstruction. Therefore, when the Soviet Government had to tackle the problem irrespective of whether the theoretical possibility of its solution was visualised by orthodox Marxists, the older leaders had simply to make room for unknown men, who eventually proved to be better and greater.

But the talent of the latter also was one-sided. They were either old revolutionaries who had always remained in the country and were therefore in close touch with Russian reality, or they were men produced by the revolution. Stalin belonged to the first group, and the now wellknown "Stalin's young men" were the flower of the latter. But all of them were unacquainted with, or inadequately informed about, the situation in other countries. They had not lived in the hectic atmosphere of great expectations about the coming world revolution breathed by the older leaders who spent their lives in exile; they had not participated in the innumerable conferences of the Second International where the Russian exiles led by Lenin fanatically defended the traditions of the French Revolution against the revisionism of the Social Democratic Marxists. They had fought for the revolution in Russia. They had waged the civil war to its bitter end. In the beginning, they also had shared the hope of revolution breaking out in other countries. But when that hope disappeared, they thought that the wisest thing to do in the given situation was to reconstruct the economic organisation in one sixth of the globe. Whether that was possible or not, was for them not a matter of theory, but of practice. The epic experience of the civil war had given them the feeling that there was nothing really impossible. That was the spirit of Stalin, breathed into the Russian Communist Party. During the French Revolution, Robespierre sent Danton to the guillotine; in Russia, Dantonism triumphed.

When the leadership of the Russian Communist Party passed on to those men, who were primarily concerned with the problems of socialist reconstruction in one country, they also became the leaders of the Communist International. That change in the leadership of the Communist International immediately produced two results. First-rank Russian leaders could no longer personally guide the Commmunist International, and whenever they did give

any direction, it was often wrong because of their defective understanding of the situation in other countries. The older leaders had visualised Russian problems from the point of view of the situation in the Western European countries. The new leaders projected Russian problems into other countries. That unrealistic approach had a very adverse effect, particularly on the organisational structure of the Communist International; and its organisational structure, cast on the model of the Russian Communist Party, contributed to its isolation from the masses in other countries. The structure of the Russian Communist Party was determined by the problems of post-revolutionary reconstruction. It was palpably absurd to cast the Communist Parties in other countries on that model, because they had to deal with entirely different problems.

The crisis of the Communist International, a crisis to which it ultimately succumbed, resulted from its internal contradiction, which itself was historically determined. The contradiction was that the organisation as a whole tried to live simultaneously in two periods of history—pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary. The Russian Communist Party constituting its leadership lived in the post-revolutionary period, whereas the rest of the organisation lived in the pre-revolutionary period. Nevertheless, the entire organisation was to function as a homogeneous body, with a uniform organisational structure, a centralised policy and according to resolutions equally binding for all.

That was an impossible situation. But it could not be changed because in that case there would be no International. The contradiction could be eliminated by the Russian Party getting out of the International. In that case, the International would die in no time. Because, after it had outlived its historical rôle, the Communist International existed exclusively on the authority of the Russian Communist Party and the Soviet Government.

Ultimately, it had to break down under its own internal contradiction, which was incurable. That is a vindication of the Marxist law of history, notwithstanding blundering orthodoxy.

After the Russian Communist Party survived its crisis, first class men disappeared from the actual leadership of the Communist International. Engaged in the super-human task of building Socialism in a backward country devastated by civil war, the Russian Communist Party could not spare any man of talent for leading the Communist International. Indifferent materials were delegated for that purpose. But they carried the authority of the Russian Bolsheviks, and on that authority not only commanded unquestioning conformity, but claimed infallibility. That was a decisive check of intellectual growth on the part of other parties. Any disagreement with the Russians was a deviation; as that could not be avoided by men of intelligence and independence, with all their devotion to the cause and concern for organisational solidarity, they came under the axe of mechanical discipline. By 1928, the leadership of the Communist International thus came to be composed exclusively of indifferent Russians and their nominees from other parties. Such a leadership was bound to be incompetent, and commit the fatal blunders which marked the subsequent history of the Communist International.

The whole tragic story cannot be narrated in this obituary note. The history of the Communist International is still to be written. That contribution to contemporary history may now be made by qualified and fully informed persons whose tongue was hitherto tied by the sense of loyalty to the organisation to which they spiritually belonged even after the formal relation was severed. The silence was also caused by the desire not to cause the Russians any embarrassment or inconvenience. Any criticism would

serve the purpose of anti-communist and anti-Soviet propaganda.

The first blunder was theoretical, and the Russians contributed to it very largely owing to their inadequate acquaintance with the situation abroad. It was the failure to appreciate fully the consequence of the defeat of the German Revolution in 1923. The defeat might not have been conclusive if American Imperialism had not intervened. But the crisis of 1923, which almost helped revolution to triumph in Germany, convinced the victorious *entente* Powers that, unless the German bourgeoisie were put back on their feet, Western Europe could not be freed from the menace of Bolshevism. American capital poured into Germany, and the economic crisis in that country was overcome by a large-scale reconstruction and rationalisation of industries. The Locarno Pact politically restored Germany to the status of a Great Power. But the Communist International still hugged the hope of world revolution, and its theoreticians interpreted the end of the German crisis as only a partial and temporary stabilisation. The Social Democratic leaders did not accept that palpably erroneous view. Therefore, the entire propaganda of the Communist International was directed against the Social Democratic Party, which was accused of creating illusions for the working class with the object of sabotaging the revolution just around the corner. The fact, however, was that the great bulk of the German industrial workers followed the Social Democratic Party; consequently, the fierce attack upon the latter only isolated the Communist Party from the working class. In 1923, its membership had risen above 300,000; and some of the most powerful trade unions were under its control. In 1925, thanks to the new policy, the membership fell below 50,000; and, driven out of all the large trade unions, the handful of Communists organised the Red International of Labour Unions.

During these fateful years, the Russian Party was absorbed with the struggle between old and new leaders. As pioneers and founders of the International, the old leaders had counted on the support of the parties outside of Russia in their struggle against Stalin, whom they accused of a desire to liquidate the revolution. In order to disarm his opponents, and isolate them in the International also, Stalin did not discourage the revolutionary illusion, although already in 1925 he had lost faith in the possibility of revolution in Western Europe on the classical model.

The second grave mistake was underestimation of the danger of Fascism. Although Mussolini's Black Shirts had captured power in Italy years ago, and Fascism had spread in a number of smaller European countries, it became a general menace in 1928 when the National-Socialist Party suddenly became a rapidly rising factor in German politics. It was the consequence of the restoration of German Capitalism with American help, the historical importance of which the Communist International had failed to appreciate. Therefore, when the subsided wave of revolution was eventually followed by a rising tide of counter-revolution, the Communist International ridiculed those who sounded the alarm with the complacent slogan that "Germany is not Italy". But Hitler marched in the proverbial seven-league boots, and before long Communist theoreticians appreciated Fascism as a necessary stage of revolutionary development and expounded the "theory of catastrophe": the democratic illusion of the masses stood on the way to revolution; the Weimar Republic kept up that illusion; let the Fascists smash the Weimar Republic and free the masses from the democratic illusion; and then the Communists would step in to make the revolution.

That fantastic theory, of course, presented the Social Democratic Party again as the devil of the drama; Social Democracy was a greater enemy of revolution than Fascism. That was not a mere fantasy. The theory was put into

practice when, on the eve of Hitler's advent to power, the Communist Party actually made a united front with the Fascists as against the Social Democrats, on the occasion of the great Berlin transport workers' strike in 1932. When the history of the Communist International comes to be written, it will have to pronounce the harsh verdict that the Communist International helped Fascism to capture power in Germany.

Previous to that, an equally serious mistake had been committed in China. Even after the revolution had been defeated for not taking the initiative in the opportune moment, the call was issued for a general armed uprising, which culminated in the short-lived Canton Commune. That adventurist experiment cost millions of lives still to be counted. That extremely costly experiment ultimately compelled the Communist Party of China to fall back on the policy of co-operating with general democratic development, a course which it should have taken to recover from the unwarranted defeat of 1927.

The resolutions of the Communist International regarding India since 1928 were the height of stupidity. Very inadequately informed about the conditions in the colonial countries, Lenin had attributed an important revolutionary role to the nationalist movements in those countries. He regarded the bourgeoisie in the colonial countries as a revolutionary class. Other founder-members of the International had questioned his views. Nevertheless, there was general agreement on the policy that the movement for the liberation of the colonial countries was to be supported, particularly by the working class of the respective imperialist countries.

Lenin expressed his views in 1920. During the following years, the situation in the colonial countries, particularly in India, changed greatly. By 1928, there could not be any illusion about the revolutionary role of the nationalist bourgeoisie. The fact of their seeking a compromise with

Imperialism could not be disputed. But a Marxist should discover the cause of that fact. The cause was gradual disappearance of the monopoly of imperialist finance and the consequent "decolonisation" of India. The benefit of the process all went to Indian Capitalism. The Communist International refused to accept this perfectly Marxist view of the changed situation. The Sixth World Congress in 1928 condemned the expounders of the theory of decolonisation as apologists of Imperialism. Blissfully ignoring the fundamental doctrine of Marxism, that every economic system decays and develops internal contradictions, the theoreticians of the Communist International regarded Imperialism as something immutable and imperishable. They maintained that the Indian bourgeoisie was brutally suppressed by Imperialism. Yet, the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International passed a long resolution about India in which the Indian people were warned against the nationalist bourgeoisie betraying them, and the Communist Party was directed to develop the Indian Revolution with the slogan of Soviet Republic and dictatorship of the proletariat!

Acting on that stupid self-contradictory resolution, the infantile Communist Party of India denounced the National Congress as an organ of counter-revolution just when, as a loose mass movement, it might have been brought under a progressive democratic leadership. The idea of Constituent Assembly was also denounced as counter-revolutionary, because how could Communists demand a Constituent Assembly after the Russians had disbanded one in Leningrad twenty years ago! Such was the intellectual degeneration caused by the desire to imitate the Russians in every single detail.

The Seventh World Congress in 1935 reversed the whole policy on the strength of a report of an English Communist who had spent several years in an Indian jail. The revolutionary role of the Indian nationalist bourgeoisie

was again discovered, and the Communist International recommended the grossly non-Marxist policy of creating the "National Front".

For India, the Communist International was an unmitigated evil. Its Indian section has done more harm to the cause of the Indian Revolution than any other single factor. Composed of a handful of half-baked youngsters, it could not do so if the authority of the Communist International and of the Soviet Government standing behind it did not enable them to make an appeal to the romanticism of the middle-class youth. The liquidation of the Communist International can be expected to free the progressive elements from a fascination which prevented them to appraise the realities of the Indian situation. The disappearance of the Communist International will strengthen the position of a realistic revolutionary leadership of this country.

CHAPTER XIII

INTERNAL CRISIS

ULTIMATELY, the Communist International was disrupted by its internal contradiction. The final disruption began with the conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact. The contradiction was between the post-revolutionary tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the pre-revolutionary problems which confronted the rest of the International. The existence of the Soviet Union was the precondition for the accomplishment of the task of post-revolutionary socialist construction. Therefore, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union guiding the policy of the Soviet Government was deeply concerned with diplomatic and military considerations.

In critical periods of history, diplomacy can serve the purpose of defence. The years immediately preceding this war were such a period. In the beginning, Soviet diplomacy persistently tried to form an anti-fascist alliance which, in addition to protecting world democracy, would guarantee its own defence against the dreaded attack by Nazi Germany. When those efforts ultimately failed, the preparations for the defence of the Soviet Union were not quite complete. The Soviet leaders had anticipated that dangerous position. In view of the recently concluded Anti-Comintern Pact, it was also to be anticipated that Japan would attack the Soviet Union from the east simultaneously with the Nazi aggression from the west. As a matter of fact, the Soviet leaders believed that the task of building Socialism in one country was bound to be eventually followed by the greater task of defending the Socialist Soviet Union against a concerted attack of the entire capitalist world. The Munich Pact and the subsequent breakdown of the Moscow negotiations were regarded by them as the

signal for the apprehended attack. They might be able to fight Nazi Germany alone. But they were naturally reluctant to risk a war with the entire capitalist world so soon. In that critical situation, they fell back on the weapon of diplomacy, and concluded the non-aggression pact with Germany.

It was a matter of simple commonsense that the Soviet-German Non-aggression Pact was not meant to initiate the policy of fraternisation between Communism and Fascism throughout the world. As a matter of fact, the pact not only warded off the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, but effectively checked fascist aggression towards the east. It not only broke the Anti-Comintern Pact, at least for the time being, but also prevented the greater danger of the spiritual fascisation of the democratic Powers as prepared by Chamberlain's appeasement policy, which had just culminated in the Munich Pact.

But the Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union interpreted the Soviet-German Pact in an entirely different way—as an alliance between Communism and Fascism against British Imperialism. Habituated to follow the Russians slavishly, they believed that the policy of the Russian Communist Party must be practised by all the other sections of the Communist International. The simple fact that these latter were living in an entirely different period of history and had therefore a different set of problems to solve, was clean forgotten.

In a few days, the war broke out and the spiritual confusion of the Communist International was complete. Having for nearly twenty years stood at the forefront of the struggle against the danger of rising Fascism, all on a sudden the Communists become fanatical advocates of peace with Hitler. They continued that insane policy even when the fascist hordes overran one country after another, and the working class of entire Europe came under the iron heels of Fascism. The death warrant of the Com-

munist International was signed by its own hand when the Communist Parties forgot that Fascism was the instrument created with the purpose of defending the decayed capitalist order against the coming revolution. The verdict of history is that, upon the outbreak of this war, the Communist International betrayed the cause of revolution. The more charitable verdict would be that the Communist International was the first casualty of this war, against which it had warned the world for years. No useful purpose would be served by letting the stinking carcass lie about. The sooner it was cleared away, the better.

The mechanical somersault of the Communist Parties after the Soviet Union was attacked by the Nazis proved their spiritual degeneration more conclusively, instead of rehabilitating them. It proved that the Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union were mere marionettes. An international organisation composed of such bodies could not serve any useful purpose. The Russian Revolution had created in one country conditions for building up Socialism. There the Communist Party has a rôle to perform. But in the rest of the world, events did not develop according to the expectations aroused by the Russian Revolution. In those countries, the Communist Parties were to organise the revolution on the Russian model. As the events did not shape as desired, and they are less likely to do so in future than in the past, there is nothing for the Communist Parties to do. Only the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains as the creator and the creation of the Russian Revolution. The Communist International proved to be an abortion of the Russian Revolution. Therefore, it could not be fitted into the scheme of the positive outcome of the latter. As a matter of fact, for a long time it stood on the way of the Russian Revolution influencing the world as it could do under the conditions of the world of our time. Its disappearance, therefore, will only help

the world to advance towards the goal which has been set before it by the Russian Revolution.

The internal contradiction which brought the Communist International to grief prevented a homogeneous theoretical development on the basis of the teachings of Marx and Lenin. Theories degenerate into dead dogmas, if they are not adjusted to new experience and revised accordingly from time to time. After the Russian Revolution, Marxian theory had to be adjusted to two different sets of experience. On the one hand, there were the experiences gained from a revolutionary struggle, from civil war and from the subsequent process of reconstruction. On the other hand, there was the experience of a series of defeated revolutions, of triumphant reaction and of a new alignment of forces consequent upon the rise of Fascism.

The Russians developed Marxian theories with the aid of their experience. They were naturally so very engrossed with their own experience that they could not correctly appraise the value of events in other parts of the world. Consequently, their theoretical contribution was one-sided. It covered the problem of post-revolutionary reconstruction, and more particularly, economic problems. The more fundamental aspects of Marxian theory were still regarded by them as immutable dogmas. Those aspects could be tested only by the experience gained in other countries where history did not fit into what is believed to be the Marxist scheme.

As a matter of fact, there is no such thing as a Marxist scheme of history. Marx did not cast the horoscope of mankind. He formulated certain fundamental principles and outlined some laws of social evolution. But his philosophical conclusions were deduced from a scientific knowledge nearly a hundred years old, and his political doctrines were determined by world conditions which have radically changed since his time. The Russians, since the

revolution, have been living in a world of their own creation. But the Communists in other countries had to adjust themselves to conditions created by others. Therefore, they were in a better position to test the theoretical presuppositions of Marxism by the experiences of our time. It was for them to develop the more fundamental aspects of Marxism which the Russians, living in a world of their own, could simply accept as dogmas. Because, these did not affect their practice, as regards which they had the fullest freedom.

Theoretical constructions are always made before the revolution. The philosophical principles and political doctrines which influenced and guided European life in the nineteenth century, had been formulated over a period of more than hundred years before the French Revolution. Similarly, Lenin and other Russians made valuable contributions to Marxism while they were preparing for the revolution. Once they captured power, they were engrossed with practical matters. The time came for them to rebuild the world instead of building up theories. Lenin left his book, *State and Revolution*, incomplete, because the time came for revolutionary deeds instead of elaborating revolutionary theories.

The honourable task of laying down the theoretical foundation for revolutionary practice in the changed conditions of the world of our time fell to the Communists outside the Soviet Union. But the Communist International made it impossible for them to accomplish that task. It did not equip them for the purpose. To imitate and obey the Russians came to be the criterion of Marxist orthodoxy. All Communists owe allegiance to the home of Socialism. But from that it does not follow that loyalty to the Russians makes one necessarily a Communist. Yet, the Communist International set up that standard and consequently obstructed the intellectual development of its adherents.

This negative achievement of the Communist Inter-

national had its repercussions on the Russians themselves. Recognised by Communists throughout the world as the final authority on all philosophical and scientific matters, they themselves experienced spiritual stultification. In the given situation, that was inevitable. They reacted marvellously to the problems of post-revolutionary reconstruction. But their approach to the political and economic problems of other countries was still determined by old ideas, which had been invalidated by changed conditions of the world, the belated recognition of which ultimately caused the dissolution of the Communist International. That wrong approach on their part was also inevitable. Because, they did not directly experience the problems in other countries, and therefore did not have the incentive to thought which would indicate the correct approach under the given conditions. They could make the experience indirectly, through the Communists on the spot. But the latter behaved as projected egos of the Russians. They lived in the midst of changed conditions as men in the moon, thinking in terms of an imaginary world to come, or a world long past. In this respect, the Communist International failed the Russians also. It did not keep them in touch with the changing conditions of the world. That spiritual isolation was more dangerous than the political isolation of the Soviet Union brought about by the conspiracy of the capitalist world. The consequence of that evil was that, in a critical period, the Soviet leaders themselves were misguided by the obsessions of the Communist International instead of guiding the other Communist Parties on the right way.

It was a vicious circle. The predominating position of the Russians in the Communist International was fully deserved and historically determined. But that fact, in its turn, prevented the intellectual growth of the revolutionary movement, which was historically necessary to supplement the practical achievements of the Russians.

Finally, the spiritual stultification of the Communist Parties made of the Communist International a still-born child. As the Russians could not possibly abdicate their position in the Communist International without knocking the very basis off the latter, internal contradiction was bound to disrupt it ultimately.

The theoretical weakness of the Russian leaders, who after all were the leaders of the Communist International, was determined by the combination of circumstances described above. The weakness expressed itself in the failure to appraise the relation between the objective and subjective factors of history. By declaring that man is the maker of his destiny, Marx appeared to have attached greater importance to the subjective factor. The reaction to the fatalist theory of gradualism also laid emphasis on the subjective factor. Consequently, in course of time, orthodox Marxists became converts to the doctrine that the history of the world is the biography of great men. The history of the world of our time was determined by the evil genius of a few imperialist statesmen conspiring to destroy the Soviet Union; that was the simplified approach to all the problems of contemporary history. It was forgotten by the orthodox Marxists that this simplified approach negativated the fundamental principle of the entire theoretical system of Marx. The principle is that thought is determined by the conditions of physical existence. So, after all, the objective factor is the predominating. Future events are to be anticipated in the light of a searching analysis of the anatomy and physiology of the world as it is; the motives of men at the helm of affairs, their goodness or badness, are a secondary factor.

The bitter experience of their relation with the capitalist world made the Russian leaders deviate from this essential principle of Marxism. That was quite natural. After all, they are human beings. But bitterness and anger against the treachery of individual statesmen or imperialist govern-

ments should not have broken them asunder from theoretical moorings. Yet, exactly that almost happened to them in the earlier period of the war. The pact with Germany was a necessary diplomatic device, grossly misunderstood at that time. But subsequent events have justified it. Once the pact was concluded, it had to be scrupulously observed, if the expected advantage was not to be forfeited. That must have prevented the Communist International to instruct the Communist Parties in other countries how to behave.

But all those considerations do not justify certain passages of Molotov's speech made after his return from Berlin. That was not an ordinary propagandist performance. On that occasion, a dispassionate analysis of the given relation of forces could have been made, and that might have served as guidance, at least for the intelligent Communists in other countries. On that occasion, Molotov characterised this war as "the second imperialist war", and that light-hearted, and theoretically wrong, pronouncement of his drove the Communist International almost into the arms of Fascism. Flying in the face of the known facts of recent history, Molotov held British Imperialism responsible for the war and thus, by implication, exonerated Fascism. Theoretically, that was a crass contradiction of the correct communist view, previously expressed emphatically, that Fascism meant war.

Only a wrong theoretical approach could characterise this war as an imperialist war. An imperialist war, strictly speaking, is an inter-imperialist war; that is, a struggle between two Imperialist Powers for world domination. To call this war an imperialist war, therefore, was to identify Fascism with Imperialism. Such a view is entirely un-Marxist. Imperialism and Fascism both have for their common denominator—Capitalism. But they mark two distinctive stages of Capitalism. Modern Imperialism results from capitalist prosperity; whereas Capitalism creates

Fascism as the weapon for its last defence, only when it can no longer provide the foundation for Imperialism. Therefore, Fascism is not identical with Imperialism. Economically it restricts capitalist production; politically it abolishes the liberties of parliamentary democracy; culturally it stands for mediaevalism as against modern civilisation. As such Fascism gathered under its banner all the reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces, known with different names previously. Therefore, on the rise of Fascism, there was a new polarisation of forces throughout the world. The new world conditions, which eventually compelled the dissolution of the Communist International, were created by the rise of Fascism. The Russian leaders made the mistake of not recognising that fact early enough.

Notwithstanding all the stupidities of the Communist International and theoretical mistakes on their part, the Russian leaders could not possibly have any illusion about the intents and purposes of Fascism. Fully knowing that a fierce clash with that avowed enemy was inevitable, they only wanted to have time to make adequate preparations. As a matter of fact, I have always been of the opinion that the Russians wanted to attack first. But subjectivism, born of the traditions of the Communist International, persuaded them to wait too long. The ultimate outcome of the Russian Revolution, which opened a new era of history, was bound to place the Soviet Union at the forefront of the world of our time. This war provided the Soviet Government with the opportunity to place itself at the head of a world democratic alliance. It could have done so in spite of the machinations which culminated in the Munich Pact. The outbreak of the war changed the whole situation. There was the opportunity for the Soviet Union again to take the initiative, and that time the last word would be with the peoples of England and France. When at last Hitler set his war machine moving and began to overrun one country after another, ultimately threatening

France and Britain, the field was clear for the Soviet Government to take the lead. The bulk of the Nazi army was moving towards the West. Just at that moment, a powerful Red Army—about a hundred divisions—was standing within a striking distance of Berlin. If the Soviet Government had struck at that moment, its isolation, brought about by fifteen years' conspiracy, would have ended immediately, and it would have been hailed by world democracy as the leader in the anti-fascist war.

Most probably, the step was not taken for military considerations. Preparations were not yet quite complete. But France was at stake. It was the choice between the entire French Army and the vast industrial resources of France, on the one hand, and the possibility of creating a few more divisions of the Red Army. Evidently, even from the purely military point of view, the risk was worth taking. Politically, the Franco-Soviet Pact would have been forthwith restored in a much stronger form. Russian action would have strengthened the hand of the progressive elements in the political and military circles of France. Fifth Columnists, capitulators and traitors would have been isolated. From the very beginning of the war, Hitler would have been placed in the position which he has been always so very anxious to avoid: he would have been compelled to fight on two fronts. The result of that mistake on the part of the Russians was complete isolation, the end of which Stalin welcomed in his speech upon the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union.

That almost fatal blunder on the part of the Russians in that most critical period of contemporary history was due, in the last analysis, to the antiquated theoretical presuppositions of the Communist International. As long as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remained a member of the Communist International, it could not be immune from its theoretical weakness and obsolete traditions. Once the mistake was committed, it might have had

its full consequences. But there history stepped in to correct man's mistake. Marxism was vindicated. Having cast for the Soviet Union the honourable rôle of leading world democracy in the struggle against reaction fighting its last battles, history could not allow itself to be deceived by human frailty.

What the Russians themselves had always anticipated, happened just when perhaps they believed that it might not happen at all. Most probably, they believed that, having overrun Europe, Hitler's war machine would turn eastwards and destroy the British Empire. Suppose events did take that course, what would be Hitler's new objective? He would turn towards his avowed enemy. Only, in the meantime, he would be so enormously strengthened that with all the preparations it would be almost impossible for the Soviet Union to resist the onslaught. It is simply dreadful to think that subjectivism and miscalculation on the part of the Russians drove the world to the brink of such a dangerous precipice. But the mistake on the part of the Russians was interpreted by Hitler as a sign of weakness, and he decided to strike in good time. A miscalculation on the part of counter-revolution cancelled the mistake committed in the camp of revolution. The scale of events was tipped, and the world was saved. The salvation has now been celebrated by the dissolution of the Communist International, the antiquated theoretical presuppositions of which persuaded the Russians to go so far in a dangerous direction.

Chapter XIV

A NEW CHAPTER OF REVOLUTION

The dissolution of the Communist International does not mean abandonment of the ideal of Communism, which has been set before civilised mankind by history itself. Indeed, it is not an ideal in the sense of something desirable. It is a state of social organisation which mankind is bound to reach, in course of its endless progress. Being a probable landmark in the history of mankind, the ideal of Communism cannot disappear, even if all the professed Communists turned their back on it or gave it up as unattainable.

The spirit of internationalism remains. The dissolution of the Communist International is not a vindication of Nationalism. As a matter of fact, Communist Internationalism is not an antithesis of Nationalism. The Communist International, from its very beginning, stood for national freedom of all peoples. But at the same time Marxists do not regard any state of social or political organisation as final. History, being a record of continuous progress, knows no finality. Therefore, Nationalism is only a stage of social progress, as transitory as any other stage.

The spirit of internationalism is to be distinguished from any particular plan of international action. The Communist International was organised with such a plan. But it was not a plan of international action, as a matter of principle. It was a plan of a particular kind of international action, to be carried out not by mankind as a whole, but by a certain class of people in every country. The impossibility of such an action, under the given conditions of the world of our time, having been demonstrated by the experience of two decades, the plan

has been abandoned. Evidently, that does not prove any defect in the idea of internationalism. On the contrary, the dissolution of the Communist International has been brought about by the realisation that internationalism must be practised on a higher plane, embracing the entire mankind.

This is not a belated wisdom—a shamefaced rectification of a wrong idea. Practice of internationalism on a higher plane was not possible previously. The perspective of the Communist International, therefore, was necessarily limited by the conditions and possibilities of the time. The latter having changed, the perspective has correspondingly broadened. The historically necessary struggle for the liberation of mankind, an ideal to be realised through the reorganisation of society on a higher level, can now have the advantage of a larger adherence than could be imagined before. The programme and the organisation of the Communist International excluded this possibility. Therefore, its continued existence would have retarded progress towards its own goal, doing harm, to the spirit of internationalism.

The ideal remains. Only the method of attaining it must be changed. That is the significance of the dissolution of the Communist International. Changed world conditions compel a corresponding change in the method of attaining the goal. More concretely speaking, revolution —that is to say, a reorganisation of society—still remains a necessity. The necessity is felt more keenly to-day than ever before, and by an increasingly large section of society. The feeling of its necessity by a larger section of society not only increases the chances of its success, but opens up new ways before it. The end is a historically necessary reorganisation of society. It is immaterial how that end is attained. Previously, there appeared to be no other way than the traditional methods of revolution. The changed world conditions have opened up new ways.

The resistance will be much less in the future. The camp of counter-revolution is disintegrating. Decay and decomposition reduce its power of resistance. Past revolutions were associated with violence not because revolutions are inherently violent, but because of the fierceness of resistance to them. In the absence of fierce and fanatical resistance, the impending revolution will cease to have violent forms and terrifying appearances.

It is becoming evident to all thinking men that capitalist economy has exhausted all its progressive possibilities, having created conditions for a better social order; that its restoration is not compatible with ideals of democratic freedom and peaceful progress. It is also being realised by persons not blinded by greediness and preconceived ideas that, if this war could possibly end in the restoration of the *status quo,* the peace would be only an armed truce, to be soon disturbed by a still more catastrophic war. Moreover, the conditions of the post-war world will preclude the normal practice of Capitalism. Reconstruction of the world on the basis of capitalist production will make the introduction of fascist practices inevitable. These latter practices were introduced in Germany and other countries not due to any innate perversity on their part. After it had exhausted all its social usefulness, Capitalism could be maintained only by those practices. Therefore, this war has confronted the entire world with the choice between Fascism and Socialism. Democracy will survive this war only by becoming Social Democracy. And that is only a less frightening name for Communism.

Even before this war, and particularly during the period of recurring crises between the two great wars, the necessity for a radical reorganisation of society was felt by all thinking and progressive minded people. The Marxist criticism of Capitalism and the prediction that eventually the latter must be replaced by a system of

economy based on common ownership, were gaining ground among people not directly interested in the established order of society. But they were doubtful about the practicability of socialist economy. The prejudice that the profit motive is the condition for all enterprise and initiative confused thought and paralysed action.

Eventually, one sixth of the world became the scene of socialist reconstruction. The unprecedented experiment was watched with suspicion, doubt and interest. Again, prejudice prevented a correct appreciation. Nevertheless, news about the socialist reconstruction in the Soviet Union spread throughout the world, influencing economic thought and dispelling lingering doubts about the possibility of shifting the entire economic system of a country from the basis of private property to that of common ownership. Finally, came this war and presented the Soviet Union with the opportunity to stand what can be called the crucial test of a gigantic social experiment. The achievement of socialist economy can now be measured by the traditional standards. Communism could not only perform military miracles, but, as Lord Beaverbrook declared, it produced the greatest Generals of our time. Coming from one of the most successful capitalists of our time, that candid confession was of decisive historical importance. There could no longer be any doubt about the practicability of Socialism. The recognition of the triumph of Socialism is the outcome of this war. And it is going to be the significance of the victory over Fascism.

But there still remained another obstacle. It was fear. The Communist International was a spectre. Nearly a hundred years ago, Karl Marx wrote: "Communism stalks over Europe like a spectre." Then, Capitalism was a rising system which appeared to be full of endless possibilities, and consequently occasioned great expectations. Anything that challenged Capitalism was regarded as an evil—a threat to civilisation. Since then, things

have changed. Having exhausted all its progressive possibilities, Capitalism, in the form of Fascism, became the enemy of modern civilisation. It ceased to be regarded as something sacrosanct. Everybody admitted that there was something wrong with the established order, and the necessity of reform was generally felt. Marxists knew that the crisis was coming, that the revolution would take place of necessity. Communism is the positive outcome of Capitalism. Why should it appear as something fearful and thus delay its own general acceptance? So long as revolution was a thing of the future, it had to be heralded, and its necessity proved. But once it is there, why not let it take its own course? Let it be, instead of talking about it and thus striking terror in the heart of people who are willy-nilly involved in the process of revolution. The dissolution of the Communist International is an act of revolutionary realism, to remove the last obstacle to the triumph of revolution. This bold step could be taken, and properly appreciated, only by revolutionary realists who have discovered the new ways of revolution.

Revolutionaries do not believe in the possibility of persuading the opponent with arguments. Particularly, Marxists cannot have that belief. Men's ideas are determined by the conditions of their physical existence which include social relations. Therefore, arguments cannot change ideas. The change can be brought about only by a change in the conditions of existence. In other words, arguments advanced by individuals may not carry conviction; but the arguments of history cannot be disregarded. Because, the sanction behind the arguments of history has changed social conditions which include the relation of forces on the national as well as on the international scale.

Fascism is a product of Capitalism. It is an instrument created for the defence of the decayed capitalist society. Therefore, it was only natural for the capitalist Powers, notwithstanding the democratic form of their

governments, to aid and abet the rise of Fascism. From the capitalist point of view, this war should not have taken place. It should have been avoided at all cost. No effort was spared to do so. But the logic of history overwhelmed subjective efforts to arrest the necessary march of events. It was a veritable case of man proposing and God disposing; only, it was not the God with a long beard sitting in the Seventh Heaven; it was the irresistible impact of the objective forces of history. The outbreak of this war, defying all the frantic efforts from both sides, finally proved the necessity of revolution. Everything necessary may not be inevitable. But in this case, it was inevitable to a very high degree of probability. Otherwise, this war might have been avoided.

Whatever may be the immediate outcome of this war, a military defeat of the Axis Powers will mean a severe disruption and disorganisation of the forces of counter-revolution marshalled in such a formidable array. Fascism as a social tendency may not be immediately destroyed. That will depend on the nature of the military outcome of this war. Military defeat, however, will deprive Fascism of political powers, and consequently emasculate it to a very large degree. Eventual destruction of Fascism will mean destruction of the instrument created to defend the decayed capitalist system. Marx's prophecy is being fulfilled before our very eyes: Capitalism is digging its own grave. Capitalist governments having undertaken the task of destroying the last citadel of Capitalism, the necessity of maintaining a separate international organisation as the General Staff of the world revolution disappears.

This highly interesting and entirely unexpected process is taking place without the forces involved in it being conscious of its implications. Most probably, they are still confident that nothing of the kind will happen. But the predispositions and desires of men occupying positions of great power have once been overwhelmed by the

objective forces of history. There will be much greater chance of that happening once again when this war has set free still more powerful forces. In this situation, co-operation is bound to promote the cause of revolution and accelerate progress. Particularism will only breed suspicion and divide the forces which should pull together to take advantage of the most favourable fortuitous combination of circumstances. That consideration has led to the dissolution of the Communist International.

But we need not entertain illusions. It will not be an easy sailing. There will be ups and downs in the process. It may be long or short. But one thing is certain: For its own defence, democracy must become Social Democracy. And that, after all, is how Marx called Communism. Therefore, it is not a wishful statement to say that the dissolution of the Communist International does not mean turning away from the goal of Communism. On the contrary, an instrument suitable for a method of action which could not embrace all the progressive forces, becomes antiquated when, owing to the tremendous accession of strength, the revolution is within the reach of its goal.

Revolutions take place of necessity, because periodical reorganisation of society is in the nature of human progress. A revolution may take place through the instrumentality of a certain class of people. But it takes place for general welfare. Otherwise, it would not be a historical necessity. Modern civilisation being the high-water mark of human progress until now, it creates greater possibilities of further progress than ever before. Consequently, the need for social changes opening up new channels of progress is felt in the modern civilised society by a much larger section of people than in the earlier periods of history. When the forces of revolution swell to the extent of becoming the majority, the resistance to the impending social change becomes correspondingly weaker, and the ways of the revolution change accordingly. When it takes place by

consent, it loses its terror. Consent, however, is not always given willingly. But it may result from the pressure of circumstances which cannot possibly be controlled. The world is under such a pressure to-day. Therefore, new ways of revolution are opening up.

These unexpected possibilities cannot be visualised except in the light of a proper appreciation of the historical value of Marxism. The greatest injustice done to Marxism by its orthodox exponents is to characterise it as the ideology of a particular class. Marx himself disowned, as it were in anticipation, such a narrow interpretation of his teachings. He said that a class became revolutionary when its interests coincided with the interests of the entire society. It is also a fundamental principle of Marxism that the ideology of a particular class is determined by its position in society. Therefore, the proletariat could not be the leader of modern society if its ideology was not the philosophy of the future of mankind.

Backward people may not always know what is good for them. Therefore, in the past, revolutions were carried through by progressive minorities. The civilised man, owing to higher education, and more developed intelligence, is not only more conscious of his interest, but is able to take an enlightened view about it. As soon as a revolution becomes necessary in modern times, the necessity is felt by more and more people, until the majority joins the army of progress. The process is accelerated under the pressure of unforeseen circumstances. We are experiencing such a juncture of history.

Just as many avowed enemies of Communism are to-day helping mankind to advance towards that goal, just so more men are to-day moving in the direction indicated by Marxism than can be imagined by the casual observer. Marxism has already become the philosophy of the progressive mankind. The world can be reconstructed as a home of freedom and culture only along the lines indicated

by Marxism. Therefore, Communism has come to its own. It has become the future of mankind, its heritage.

In this situation, an exclusive organisation of the Communists is no longer necessary, and being unnecessary, it has ceased to exist.

SECTION FOUR

WAR AND REVOLUTION

Chapter XV

THE MARCH OF REVOLUTION

Penetrating observers of the international situation can no longer have any doubt about the political outcome of the war. In the midst of the gigantic clash of arms which is nearing its end, and as a consequence thereof, conditions have been maturing for a social reconstruction of the countries directly involved in this war. Few can any longer entertain the dream of returning to the pre-1939 world, and equally few need be afraid of such a reaction.

This war broke out as an international civil war, and as such was pregnant with the possibility of triumph either of revolution or of counter-revolution. In the beginning, it appeared that counter-revolution as represented by the Axis Powers was going to have a walk-over. Those were the darkest days of modern history. That dangerously critical period was followed by the initial victories of the United Nations' arms. During that second phase of the war, reactionary tendencies gained ground and tried to prejudice the political reconstruction of post-war Europe with the specious plea of military expediency. Had those reactionary efforts succeeded, the international civil war would have ended in a triumph of counter-revolution even after the military defeat of the Axis Powers. The failure of the policy of backing up shady and discredited men like Darlan, Giraud, Badoglio, and their kind in Germany, Austria and Hungary, in due time proved that the pre-war socio-political structure of Europe had crumbled under the terrific clash of arms and its far-reaching consequences; it could not be resurrected. The international civil war entered the third phase opening up the perspective of an eventual triumph of revolution.

Whatever may happen to Germany during the years

immediately after the conclusion of the conflict between the regular armies, the political picture of the rest of post-war Europe can now be seen, at least in broad outlines. Nowhere can the defenders of the old regimes raise their heads again. After the Soviet Union survived the first terrific onslaught of the Nazi war machine, a more or less radical socio-political reconstruction of the Eastern European countries—from the Baltic to the Black Sea and perhaps also down to the Mediterranean—was a foregone conclusion. All those countries had been overrun by the Axis Powers. The Red Army alone could liberate them. Under the given circumstances, the process of their liberation could not possibly stop at the expulsion of the fascist invaders; it was bound to go beyond, in the direction of the establishment of democratic freedom and social liberation of the masses. In every one of those countries, the fascist invaders had found allies in the reactionary upper classes of the native society. The fascist invasion, therefore, had the significance of the triumph of counter-revolution in the civil war which was waged for years in those countries. The expulsion of the Axis armies from those countries for that reason meant defeat of the counter-revolution. Thereafter, the reactionary upper classes of the native society, whether they had actually welcomed the Nazi invaders or put up a semblance of resistance because some other reactionary group was favoured with the patronage of the invaders, could not possibly regain power.

In those countries of Europe, the Red Army was destined to play the part played by Napoleon's army after the French Revolution. The Soviet Government had repeatedly declared that it would not seek to change the social *status quo* of the countries liberated by the Red Army. There is no reason to doubt the honesty of the declaration. But on the other hand, it would be fantastic to expect the Red Army to allow the feudal landlords to restore their

rule. In order to do so, they must suppress the people economically as well as politically. Having driven out the fascist invaders, the army of liberation could not possibly be indifferent to the fate of the liberated peoples. Moreover, the pre-war social and political *status quo* in those countries had been undermined by the Fascist invaders and completely disrupted by total mobilisation for military purposes on both the sides. The *status quo* at the time of liberation, therefore, was very different from the pre-war conditions. The Soviet Government had pledged itself not to interfere with the new *status quo*. Why should it interfere with the march of revolution?

In our time, military force is the most decisive factor in the process of revolution. The days are long past when a people in revolt could overwhelm the army of the established State and capture power. This great change in the relation between the forces of revolution and counter-revolution has been brought about by the mechanisation of the army and the organisation of the modern State. A part of the army going over to the side of the revolution in the critical moment, therefore, does not at present materially change the relation of forces. The possible defection does not affect the mechanised and armoured units requiring highly developed technical skill and a complicated system of supply. And the core of a modern army is composed of the mechanised and armoured units. Defection of some auxiliary detachments such as infantry does not, therefore, seriously impair the strength of the army. An improvised revolutionary army cannot solve the problem of supply. The problem becomes almost insoluble if some mechanised or armoured units come over to the side of revolution. Those units can be supplied only from a highly industrialised base. An insurgent army can never have the benefit of such a base.

During this war, irregular forces have substantially contributed to the defeat of the enemy only when they

were operating as integral parts of the regular army. As such, they had the advantage of being supplied from organised industrial bases. That was the case with the guerillas operating behind the Germans on the Soviet front. Tito's partisans were regularly supplied from Italy, and later on from the advanced bases of the Red Army. The Maquis and other armed resistance organisations in France, which contributed so much to the expulsion of the German invaders, could do so only after the Anglo-American armies landed in France. Only thereafter could the irregular French army have the benefit of regular supply from an industrial base.

The problem of the forces of revolution having the advantage of arms, has been solved during this war. The underground resistance movements in a number of countries have created the army of the revolution. The social basis of the resistance movements determines the political purpose and social ideal of the army created by it. In pre-war Europe, everywhere, even in the most advanced democratic countries, the army was controlled by the upper classes. Therefore, in any critical moment, it was bound to be an instrument of counter-revolution. That factor constituted the insuperable obstacle in the way of revolution during the period between the two wars. This war has removed that obstacle. An army of the people has grown not only in all the countries of Eastern Europe, but also in other countries.

Among the latter, France occupies the most conspicuous position. On the background of the underground resistance movement, a new French army is rising rapidly. It is an army of the people not only in the composition of its ranks. It is commanded by new men, all young, having no connection with the old military caste and the "two hundred families" who, together conspired against French Democracy and handed her over to the Nazi invaders with the hope that the latter would help them to establish a

dictatorship. Indeed, there is a striking similarity between the new French army and the improvised army of the French Revolution, which sprang almost out of nothing to defend the Republic against monarchist Europe.

There have been complaints from French quarters that the new French army is not receiving adequate supplies from the Anglo-American allies. Most probably, it is a matter of unavoidable delay rather than of deliberate refusal. In any case, after the remarkable feats of the re-born French army, re-born as a people's army, of breaking through the Belfort gap and reaching the strongly fortified city of Strasbourg in one spurt, it will receive adequate supply for strategic considerations, if not for political reasons. Once again the war will contribute to the creation of a people's army.

To appreciate the far-reaching significance of the rise of a new French army, one should recollect what happened in Algiers not even two years earlier. Even after Darlan's sudden death, Giraud was backed up by the Allied North-African Headquarters, because more than one hundred Generals of the old French Army gathered around him. De Gaulle, on the other hand, was supported by the resistance movement inside France, which laid down the foundation of the new French army. Those super-annuated Generals of Giraud, Generals without an army, represented the spirit of the old order. They are no more. Their disappearance from French politics affords a glimpse into the future of France.

Together with the old military caste, the "two hundred families" which ruled the Republic are also in the process of disappearance. The Fourth Republic heralded by De Gaulle a year ago at Algiers is rising out of the ruins of the Third Republic. The die-hard desire to restore in Europe the *status quo ante bellum* induced the British and American Governments to withhold from De Gaulle's Government the recognition as the Provisional Government

of France. After the liberation of Paris and in the absence of any other personality or group seriously bidding for the leadership of the French Democracy, the recognition could no longer be delayed. But the Committee of National Liberation, backed up by the Consultative Assembly, did not wait for the diplomatic recognition. Immediately on arrival in Paris, it began functioning as the *de facto* government, and there was no other factor to challenge its authority.

The first measures taken by the *de facto* government are very significant. They indicate the nature of the rising Fourth Republic. It is going to be a Social Republic, if not quite a Socialist Republic. The revolutionary measures taken by the *de facto* government in the field of industry and finance are facilitated by the consequences of the German invasion. The proprietorship of industrial and financial concerns very largely passed on to the Germans during the period of occupation. Expropriation as far as the German invaders were concerned could not legitimately be objected to. And if industry and finance are to be partially expropriated, the rest still held by Frenchmen cannot logically be exempted.

Notwithstanding its unmistakable social complexion, the Committee of Liberation has at last been recognised by Britain and America as the Provisional Government of France. Evidently, London and Washington have reconciled themselves to the inevitable. Once France was liberated from the Nazi invaders, she could not be prevented from travelling the way of revolution. It was a choice between Fascism and Democracy which, in post-war Europe, must become Social Democracy. The choice was not to be influenced by subjective predilections. It was forced by the march of events. Once the dice were cast, the consequences could not be avoided. If Europe was to be liberated from the Nazi invaders, their allies and collaborators could not be protected in any country.

These developments in France may generalise for the whole of Europe the conditions which are maturing in the countries directly bordering on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government may abstain from doing anything by way of changing the internal regime of any country; the Red Army may not emulate Napoleon's army by setting up puppet Governments in all the countries under its occupation. But neither of them can withhold the spiritual protection to the forces of revolution throughout Europe. The liberation they offer to the European peoples is liberation from all the enemies of freedom and progress. Therefore, the centre of gravity of post-war Europe has shifted to Moscow. The future of Europe must be visualised in the perspective of the relation of the various European countries with the Soviet Union. The medium of that relation will no longer be the Communist International. The revolution no longer marches under the banner of Communism, although Communism may still remain the goal ahead.

The revolutionary potentialities of the international situation created by this war are indicated by the fact that a growing volume of powerful opinion in Britain has reconciled itself to the view that the U.S.S.R. is bound to be the dominating power of continental Europe. The forces of revolution, no longer to be identified with any particular class, but embracing all those who want to build up a new social structure on the basis of the positive achievements of modern civilisation, are no longer orphans, so to say. Now they will have the protection of the greatest military power of our time, a military power which has won recognition as such, as well as unreserved admiration, not measured by old standards, but for having made the decisive contribution to the liberation of Europe by delivering smashing blows to the Axis war machine.

The betrayal by the French ruling class of the Franco-Soviet alliance not only delivered Czechoslovakia

to the Nazi invaders, but heralded this war. There is now good prospect that this war will revive the Franco-Soviet alliance on a more solid basis. De Gaulle's visit to Moscow indicates that direction. This time it is not going to be a mere diplomatic deal for an opportunist purpose. The rising Fourth Republic of France will naturally seek the patronage and support of the Soviet Republic, and the latter has already demonstrated its readiness to respond to the appeal. It should be remembered that Moscow was the first to extend recognition to the Committee of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of France. That was more than a year ago, when the Committee was composed of some exiles still at Algiers. That friendly gesture of the Soviet Government must have influenced subsequent developments in France.

The march of revolution in Europe may possibly be retarded by the old policy of balance of power. Efforts have been made, and are still being made, to create a bloc of West-European countries, which would be outside the orbit of influence radiating from Moscow. Germany can no longer serve the purpose. At least for a number of years, she will not exist as a political factor, and the Red Army will have a large share in the military occupation of Germany. Therefore, France alone could be the pivot of a possible West-European bloc outside the radius of Soviet influence. Now there is little doubt about the way France is travelling. The last hypothetical rampart against revolution is crumbling before it was built. Without France, Spain can be of little use. Therefore, Sir Samuel Hoare's so many years' labour of love is written off by Churchill as lost. Protection has been withdrawn from Franco. The immediate result of that diplomatic gesture is a resurgence of the Republican movement. After all, the tragic heroism and sacrifice of the Spanish Republicans might not have been in vain. That might be recorded in history as one of the innumerable preludes to the drama of revolution which is unfolding even before our eyes.

The situation in Italy still remains rather obscure and is in a flux. But it seems that even old Bonomi will follow Badoglio into the oblivion. It is not yet certain who will follow him, and what sort of government Italy is going to have. But the defenders of the old order are singularly out of the picture. Nor has the plan of Amgot been very successful. The Vatican may still try to operate as the crystallising point of the disintegrated and demoralised forces of reaction. But one can be very doubtful about the success of its efforts. The crystallisation of the democratic and progressive political forces, on the other hand, will most probably be delayed until after the conclusion of the military campaign. But by that time, the spiritual influence of Moscow will reach the Eastern coast of the Adriatic, and the north of the Alps. The possible counter-influence might have come from France and Spain. But the former of these countries at least also having joined the march of revolution, the future of Italy appears to be also predetermined.

Even little Belgium is not altogether unaffected by the time spirit. Who could ever conceive of the Communists being included in the government of that country? The Communist Party there has always been a negligible factor. They may have taken a disproportionately large part in the underground resistance movement. That only shows how this war promoted revolution. The inclusion of two Communists in the government, because of their part in a form of activity which was considered high treason in pre-war Europe, irrespective of its object, is only a recognition of the importance of the forces of revolution in post-war Europe.

The present Belgian Government, however, does not seem to be entirely free from the pre-war traditions. Two men holding key positions in it are suspects as collaborationists. The suspicion is so strong and widespread that after the recent Cabinet crisis the Prime Minister found it

necessary to make a statement publicly explaining the conduct of his colleagues at the time of the German invasion. The explanation, though plausible, is not quite convincing. Three Ministers, the two Communists and one representing the underground resistance movement, have left the Ministry. The Commander of the Allied Army intervened to help the Catholic Premier tide over the crisis. Perhaps the dissident Ministers representing the forces of revolution overstated their case. Impractical and impatient leadership has often prejudiced the case of revolution. But it can be too strong to be prejudiced. It is so now—throughout Europe.

The Belgian Ministry has saved its prestige. But even in that, it has succeeded by agreeing to abide by the verdict of the Parliament. In any case, Belgium is too small a country to influence the general trend of development in Europe. Moreover, it is just behind the front where some of the decisive battles of the war are being fought. Therefore, the freedom of political conflict may still for some time be jeopardised by military exigency. Eventually, events in France will determine political developments in Belgium. Only as a partner of a West-European alliance could Belgium, and also Holland, strike out an independent (of France) line of politico-economic policy counting on British protection. And without France, no West-European alliance would be of any importance. It would not be worthwhile for Britain to risk a possible estrangement of relations with the U.S.S.R. by sponsoring and patronising such an ineffectual Western alliance. The rising Fourth Republic compels France to gravitate towards Moscow, accelerating the march of revolution.

The British Government has not been very slow in reading the writing on the wall. The choice between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. was placed before Britain as soon as this war broke out. It was a difficult choice—not only for the British Government and the British ruling class,

but also for British Democracy. Therefore, it took time to make the choice. But at last the choice seems to have been made. As far as the British ruling class and the present British Government are concerned, it may not be a choice of free will. For the British Democracy, it is a deliberate choice, the choice being between revolution in Europe and another world war in the near future.

The conservative average Briton with his faith in gradualism may shy at the idea of something out of the ordinary happening. But there cannot be the least doubt about his recoiling before the very possibility of another war. He can never forget the *blitz* of 1940, and the war as a whole has not been for him a picnic. Britain no less than the U.S.S.R. has experienced the privations of a total mobilisation, and in the case of the former, privations have been more intense than in the case of the U.S.S.R. having the advantage of a larger population and greater natural resources.

The horror of war and the resulting anxiety to avoid another war, are helping British Democracy to realise that only a revolution in Europe can head off the dreaded catastrophe. The alternative is resurrection of Fascism, and history has demonstrated that Fascism means war. In order to blast the social foundation of Fascism, laid by Capitalism which has exhausted all its progressive possibilities, Democracy must outgrow the limitations of the economic relations of capitalist society and become Social-Democracy. The process of that historically necessary transformation or transmutation of Democracy is revolution. It does not matter how the process takes place. The essence of revolution is expansion of freedom, and freedom is the scope for creative human activity in all departments of social life.

For the British ruling class, it is a choice between vassalage to the U.S.A. and an honourable alliance with the U.S.S.R. Britain alone cannot arrest the march of

revolution in Europe; any attempt with that purpose is fraught with the danger of an eventual war with the U.S.S.R. Apart from the British people's horror for that eventuality—indeed, for any war—a Europe, marching peacefully towards Socialism, will not be antagonistic even to a capitalist Britain. The whole of the European continent in the process of reconstruction on the broad basis of Social Democracy will provide British trade with an easily accessible market. The U.S.S.R. will not be a competitor in the field of trade. Therefore, a capitalist Britain would lose nothing by conceding to the U.S.S.R. the political suzerainty of post-war Europe. That is the basis for an Anglo-Soviet alliance which inevitably will help the march of revolution in Europe.

The ill-hidden disagreement between Britain and the U.S.A. about post-war economic policy indicates the choice of the former. The U.S.A. is an advocate of post-war reconstruction of the world on the basis of private enterprise. Britain, on the contrary, prefers State control, which means limitation of private ownership of industries. The American point of view implies a commitment to restore the old regime in Europe. The present British Government, though largely controlled by the capitalist ruling class, would not commit itself to such a policy which would inevitably lead to a war with the U.S.S.R.

Any reconstruction of the world on the basis of capitalist economy will be under American leadership. Britain will not be in a position to challenge American domination of the world. All her foreign investments have been wiped out during this war. Now she is an imperialist Power only in name and by tradition. On the other hand, the U.S.A. has become the leading creditor Power. Indeed, there is none to compete. Britain cannot possibly regain her position lost during the war. Therefore, in a capitalist world, she must necessarily be a satellite of the U.S.A. The proud Empire would not accept that humiliating

position of vassalage. The only alternative is an alliance with the U.S.S.R. Thanks to Stalin's realism, that alliance would guarantee the existence of the Empire, transformed into a Commonwealth, in return for British connivance with the march of revolution in Europe. The price is easily paid: not only is the Empire saved as a tradition, but the humiliation of vassalage to the Trans-Atlantic upstart is also avoided, and the European market is won in the bargain. A whole continent in the process of social-democratic reconstruction, which implies a rising standard of living of the masses, offers an ever-expanding market. The Red Army, assisted by the newly rising people's armies throughout liberated Europe, will establish the peaceful conditions necessary for the exchange of commodities.

Under the pressure of circumstances, imperialist Britain also is thus gravitating towards the U.S.S.R. By doing so, she is shedding Imperialism. Dispassionate students of history, future as well as past, saw that British Imperialism could not survive this war. If the U.S.S.R. guaranteeing territorial integrity of the British Empire is a condition for the march of revolution in Europe, then the post-war British Empire should be appreciated as an instrument of revolution. In that case, Empire would be a misnomer. The British Empire is in the melting pot.

The British Empire, guaranteed by the U.S.S.R. to prevent Britain becoming a vassal of the U.S.A. and consequently an agency of counter-revolution in Europe, may influence the outcome of the international civil war still to be waged on the Asiatic front. If Britain gravitates towards the other pole of the post-war world, she will be compelled by the domineering major partner to appease Fascism in India. In that case, India will be "free" to be the harbour of the forces of counter-revolution beaten in Europe. Industries built on the basis of private ownership, reinforced by American finance and protected by a

dictatorial National Government according to the Bombay Plan, will make India the base of a future war against the U.S.S.R.

The international civil war will not end with the conclusion of the present military conflict. The now almost certain triumph of revolution in Europe will be a landmark of this historical period of war and revolution. But the civil war will still have to be waged throughout the rest of the world. The struggle for the freedom of India will take place in the context of the international civil war. The future of India, therefore, is to be visualised in the perspective of the march of revolution in Europe.

The triumph of revolution in Europe may eventually precipitate another war, which will coincide with the final stage of the international civil war of our time. That war will most probably be waged on the front dividing Europe and Asia, the latter becoming the base of operation of the forces of counter-revolution. Having failed to march towards freedom during this war, India may have to wait for the next opportunity. But the march of revolution in Europe may afford the forces of revolution in India a chance to assert themselves. In that case, Asia may not be the base of the forces of counter-revolution, and another war on the Euro-Asian front may be avoided.

Chapter XVI

CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON

The war is over—militarily. The Axis Powers are defeated. Japan also cannot hold out much longer. But peace does not seem to be yet within reach. It cannot be, until the international civil war, which constituted the social background of the worldwide clash of arms, is also concluded with a victory for the democratic and progressive forces.

The military victory of the United Nations does not preclude continuation of the fight for freedom and democracy on the political front, which may now appear not only as between the Powers allied against the Fascist Axis, but also inside the countries militarily liberated. As a matter of fact, in proportion as the military defeat of the Axis Powers became certain, political issues and social conflicts, submerged previously by the overriding necessity of united action on the battle-fronts, made themselves felt. Even then, again and again, they had to be pushed to the background so that they might not prejudice unity of military action.

Now that the foremost goal of crushing the military might of the Axis Powers has been attained, the clash of political ideas and social ideals can no longer be avoided. Indeed, any effort to do so would deprive this military victory, won at an incalculable cost, of its progressive, liberating, historical significance. Such a tragic abortion of history is simply unthinkable.

The victory over the Axis Powers has not been won only by the wisdom and courage of the great leaders of the United Nations, nor by the military genius of their strategists, nor again by the talent of those who directed the gigantic machinery of production and total mobilisation

of resources. This greatest military victory of all ages has been won by the heroic determination of entire peoples to make the most supreme sacrifice to defend the ideals of freedom and progress cherished by modern humanity. This has been a veritable people's war—fought and won by the people. The dramatic end of Mussolini's career is symbolic. It is also appropriate that Hitler should meet his fate in Berlin besieged and reduced by the Red Army. The main culprits have received their retribution directly from the mighty arm of the people untrammelled by conventional notions of administering justice and unrestrained by false sentiments.

The last world war ushered in a period of wars and revolutions. The sharpening conflict of ideologies characterises such recurring periods of creative upheavals in human history. The clashing ideologies do not hang in the air. They represent antagonistic social forces. A conflict of social forces underlies the clash of ideas and ideals. The conflict during this period of wars and revolutions was between Socialism and Capitalism. The former is not the ideology of any particular class. It is an ideal for the entire humanity, in asmuch as it proposes reorganisation of society. Nor is it an utopia. The pattern of a new social organisation it presents grows out of the dissolution of the *status quo*. Embodying all the positive achievements of the passing order, it will be a stage in the continuous process of human evolution.

If Capitalism could still operate as a lever of social progress, the challenge of Socialism would provoke no reaction. For nearly half a century, until the last world war, the conflict remained confined more or less to the realm of ideas. Occasionally, it did break out in sporadic revolts against the established social and political relations. So long as Capitalism had not exhausted all its progressive social possibilities, it could owe allegiance to the political and cultural ideals of modern civilisation. The precarious

balance between progress and reaction, held for several decades, was finally disturbed by the consequences of the last war. Capitalism could retain its hold on society by repudiating all the social doctrines, political institutions and cultural values which were associated with it when it operated as a progressive and liberating force. Fascism became the ideology of Capitalism.

To combat the forces striving for a reorganisation of society on the basis of the sum total of the cultural achievements of man during the preceding period of history, is the proclaimed object of Fascism. The ideological conflict characterising the contemporary civilised society became irreconcilable. The last world war precipitated revolutions, and open civil war broke out in the wake of revolutions. That process of a violent readjustment of the relations of modern civilised society culminated in this war. Its military phase is concluding. The more fundamental issues, however, are still to be joined. The hostilities on all the fronts—political, social and cultural—will not cease so long as the conflict of ideas and ideals continues. Outbreaks of that conflict are taking place frequently even when the common victory over the Axis Powers is celebrated.

The nature of the conflict has to be understood before it can be composed. It is not a conflict between Democracy and Fascism, if Democracy is still to be defined in terms of the capitalist social relations. The architects of peace must realise that Capitalism can no longer exist without degenerating into Fascism, and Fascism breeds war. Any attempt to reconstruct the world, torn and tormented by the war, on the basis of capitalist social relations, will lead to another war, and this time the duration between the two wars will be shorter than between the last two. Indeed, the danger immediately besetting the world to-day is of the clash of arms just nearing its end leading directly to another war clearly on the lines of the conflict of ideas

and ideals. The danger is greater and more imminent than is generally imagined. It can be possibly headed off by forbearance on the part of the Soviet Union and wisdom on the part of Britain. Exhaustion resulting from the supreme effort of four years will most probably compel the Soviet leaders to make a virtue of necessity. They will patiently resist all provocation, hoping that the progressive forces will assert themselves, particularly in Britain, and turn the tide in the direction of a genuinely democratic post-war reconstruction.

A restatement of the concept of Democracy is the prerequisite for peace. That condition has been created by military exigencies which allowed and helped the rise of popular forces in the European countries. They cannot be cramped into the framework of formal Democracy, which does not necessarily establish Social Democracy, and keeps the masses practically deprived of effective power. They rose, and performed incredible feats of heroism, inspired by ideas and in pursuance of ideals which cannot be reconciled with a restoration of the *status quo*. Militant *demos* in action has put a new content in the concept of Democracy. Fascism all but killed Democracy practically throughout Europe; Democracy will survive that death-blow by becoming Social Democracy. The pre-war ideological conflict between Capitalism and Socialism will become a conflict between a conventional attachment to formal Democracy and the necessity for bold democratic practice.

Like the pre-war conflict between Capitalism and Socialism, the post-war clash of ideas and ideals also takes place in all the civilised countries, dividing each of them into two camps. Until the incipient or die-hard forces of Fascism capitulate unconditionally on that front of the international civil war, there will be no peace in the world. On the foundation of decayed Capitalism and discredited formal Democracy, no organisation of world

security can be abiding. At best, it will be an armed truce internationally, and extremely unstable politico-economic relations inside national boundaries. On the basis of capitalist production, be it guided by private enterprise or planned and regulated by the State, the economy of the war-devastated world cannot be rehabilitated except as preparation for another war. But the very idea of another war is frightful. Hence the anxiety for the organisation of security.

All eyes are for the moment fixed on the San Francisco Conference. The untimely death of President Roosevelt cast an ominous shadow on that gathering. Its very beginning has been marred with events which are bound to cause grave misgivings about the future. The callous disregard for the earnest pleading of the Soviet delegate, even when the Red Army was hoisting the flag of victory on the headquarters of world Fascism, is ominous. It looks like a demonstration against the forces of revolution which made the victory possible, and which alone can be relied upon to make Democracy triumph over the die-hard tendencies of reaction. Was it necessary to humiliate publicly the representative of the Power to which the civilised world owes its salvation from the dreadful consequences of a possible Axis victory? And that for the doubtful purpose of patronising a country which sympathised with, and helped the Axis Powers, until yesterday. The American-inspired anti-Soviet demonstration at the very beginning of the San Francisco Conference looks like an attempt to belittle the part played by the Soviet Union in the war. This first attempt to lower the prestige of the Soviet Union may be as ominous for the future as if it were the first shot in a new war, even when the last of this one is still reverberating all the way around the world. Perhaps it was only an outburst of jealousy.

No unprejudiced student of the war would deny that victory has been won by the joint efforts of the United

Nations, primarily of the Big Three. The heroic stand of Britain against the furore of the Nazi blitz under Churchill's dramatic leadership will go down in history as a veritable epic. Had Britain fallen, it is very doubtful whether the Soviet Union could have resisted the entire might of the German war machine. On the other hand, with the British Isles under German occupation, the American colossus would not be able to find a footing in Europe, assuming that in such an eventuality he would have at all cared for the fate of Europe. Thus, in the earlier part of the war, Britain stood there as the valiant sentinel of liberty. Later on, the place of honour was occupied by the Soviet Union.

While it is true that the war could not be won except with the joint efforts of the three Great Powers, no strategist would deny that the Soviet Union was the decisive factor. The Nazi defeat at Stalingrad and their failure to break through the Caucasus turned the tide of the war. Had the German war machine broken through the Caucasian barrier, the whole of Asia would have gone. On the one hand, defence of India, caught between the two ends of the Axis, would have been impossible. On the other hand, the British arms in the Middle East and Egypt would be taken from the rear by the German-Japanese forces effecting a junction through the Persian Gulf. Turkey would go over to the Axis, and the fascist invaders would be welcomed in all the Asiatic countries. Britain's heroism would then have been of no avail.

Having saved the world from that imminent calamity, the Soviet Union occupied a place of honour in the high councils of the United Nations. The subsequent achievements of the Red Army raised Soviet prestige very high, and it was generally believed that the Soviet Union would play the decisive role also in post-war reconstruction. Churchill's visit to the Soviet capital and the Moscow and Teheran Conferences confirmed the belief. But, at the same time,

the nearer the victory on the battle-front, the more frequent became rumours of disagreement on political issues. All the disagreements could be traced to the old conflict of political ideas and social ideals. Should the pattern of post-war reconstruction be made to fit into the threadbare structure of worn-out capitalist relations, or should the liberated European peoples be allowed, if not helped, to build up a really new order on the foundation of greater freedom and broader Democracy? Most probably, the question does not present itself so clearly in the mind of any Anglo-American statesman. None would suggest restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*. But undoubtedly, there are predispositions and ideological prejudices which influence judgement and attitude. The result is not only the disagreement on a series of individual issues, such as on the Polish Provisional Government, but an atmosphere of general suspicion, if not actual distrust.

Despite under-currents of discord, the determination of the three Great Powers to co-operate in establishing peace, as in winning the war, reached the high-water mark at the Teheran Conference. It decided that liberated Europe would be divided into zones under the vigilance of individual Powers. According to that agreement, Eastern Europe, including a large part of Germany, would be the Soviet zone of influence. There, Democracy would certainly become Social Democracy. Consequently, before long Soviet influence would radiate beyond the specified zone. That perspective seems to have frightened the conservative elements in Britain, and particularly in America. President Roosevelt went to the Yalta Conference to press for the plan of a joint control of liberated Europe, superseding the Teheran plan of zones of influence. Stalin agreed, either to prevent a rupture, or believing that the old conflict of ideas and ideals has been consumed in the conflagration of the war. Now the Russians are accused of deviating from the spirit of Yalta.

It is reported that soon after the Yalta Conference the Soviet Government proposed to return to the Teheran plan. The stubborn refusal of London and Washington to recognise the Provisional Government of Poland unless discredited emigré politicians of doubtful record were included, naturally made the Russians suspicious about the implications of the plan of joint control. If Britain sides with America, as she has been doing notwithstanding Churchill's generous appreciation of the Soviet anxiety for security, Moscow could not expect to make its view prevail in a controversy concerning any country beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. Subsequent events could not but feed Soviet distrust and apprehension. The latest of such events is the Anglo-American refusal to recognise the Austrian Provisional Government. To dispute Karl Renner's competence to head a Provisional Government in Austria is surprising. London and Washington have been for years sponsoring emigré governments and now wish to foist them on the respective countries. Why should they be so finnicky about "Moscow-sponsored" governments in countries liberated by the Red Army? Benes and Renner have a greater reputation as democrats than the emigre politicians and discredited crowned heads enjoying the patronage of Washington and London. As regards the men and women composing the Polish Provisional Government, they may not be internationally known; but their competence to reconstruct their country according to the proclaimed principles of the United Nations can be judged by their record of action. Agrarian reform is the crying need of Poland, as of any other East European country. Ever since 1920, successive Polish Governments failed to introduce the reforms needed for the welfare of the bulk of the people. The Provisional Government has immediately applied itself to that basic problem of Poland's national life. The people of liberated Europe will no longer put up with the fraud of pious professions; governments will be judged by their practice. To refuse recognition to a

government practising democracy is interfering with the free expression of the sovereign will of the people of that particular country.

Perhaps the Russians are rather morbidly suspicious. They have a bitter memory. However, they could easily agree to a reconstitution of the Polish Provisional Government with the inclusion of some nominees of London and Washington. But it is not a question of concession in details. It is a question of principle, and a precedent would be established. That apprehension has been corroborated by the refusal to recognise the Provisional Government of Austria. Is it not only natural for the Russians to feel that at Teheran the Anglo-American allies conceded to their viewpoint because the war was still to be fought; victory being won now, they wish to have the lion's share of it? Given this feeling, they are sure to insist upon a return to the Teheran plan and, if opposed, will most probably take unilateral actions which will supply munitions to the reactionaries in Britain and America, to whom this war has been only an ordinary episode of history.

Commander Stephan King-Hall's newsletter, which specialises in relations with Russia, makes the following very significant revelation: "In Britain, the Russians have been so very much more praised than criticised in pubilc that they may be under either of two illusions as to the attitude of the people of Britain towards them. If they know nothing of the extent to which they are criticised in private, they may imagine that the British people approve almost everything the Russians do. On the other hand, if they are aware of the criticism and contrast it with public praise, they may conclude that it is essentially sinister and hostile."

Undoubtedly, knowledge of the hidden feeling of hostility makes the Russians suspicious. Only, they also know that the feeling is not shared by the British people. It is confined to those few who would ignore the spirit

of the age. The true relationship between the two countries found expression in a large section of the British press which strongly disapproved of Argentine's inclusion in the San Francisco Conference and supported the Soviet point of view. There was yet another significant event at the San Francisco Conference.

In pursuance of a resolution of the World Trade-Union Conference, Sir Walter Citrine went to San Francisco to press for labour representation. Molotov moved that a representative of the British Trade-Union Congress be admitted as a delegate to the Conference. Subsequently, Citrine publicly attacked the British delegation for not supporting Molotov's motion, which therefore fell through.

There will be a general election in Britain soon. It is almost certain that the Labour Party will capture many more seats in the Parliament, if not an actual majority. The results of recent by-elections are straws indicating how the political wind in Britain is blowing. Reconstruction of the British Government after the coming general election will considerably alter the relation of forces in all inter-allied conferences. The conflict of ideas and ideals as between Britain and the Soviet Union will be less operative, if not disappear altogether. The British Labour Party and the Trade-Union Congress were severe critics of the Communist dogma of proletarian dictatorship. The Russians have quietly abandoned that bone of contention, and become ardent advocates of democracy, knowing fully well that formal Democracy cannot survive Fascism, which grew out of its discredit. They have learned that the alternative to the ineffective formal Democracy is not dictatorship, but a restatement of the concept of Democracy, attaching more importance to practice than to mere professions.

A change of government in Britain will make the Anglo-Soviet alliance more effectively operative. The United States, then, will have no instrument to exert pressure in-

directly. British Labour will have little interest in the restoration of Capitalism and the establishment of governments controlled by reactionary upper classes in Europe. Under the new relation of forces amongst the leading victorious Powers, the United States will not be able to take up a domineering position without running the risk of a rupture, which may directly lead to dreadful consequences.

It is very unlikely that, having won the war, the popular forces will step back. Unless there will be some bungling somewhere, a people's war will end in a people's peace. If the peoples are given freedom to express and assert their will, no European country will tolerate a government controlled by people associated spiritually with the pre-war world. Liberated Democracy is on the march.

Look at the result of the municipal elections in France. Nearly fifty per cent. of the seats have been captured by the Communists and Socialists, the former having the larger share. Together with the resistance groups, also actuated by advanced democratic ideas, they will constitute nearly a three-fourth majority. On the other hand, the old capitalist parties have practically disappeared. The conservative groups together have captured hardly ten per cent. of the seats. General De Gaulle is going to reconstruct his government, taking in more Communists. The result of the election to the Parliament will be on the same pattern.

Recent events in Northern Italy also show that there too Democracy is on the march. A number of big cities were captured by partisans mostly led by the Communists before the Allied armed forces reached them. Military emergency having disappeared, Italy should now be allowed to return to normal political life. The result of a free election there is also a foregone conclusion. Left-wing parties will sweep the polls, and give the country a government committed to the new concept of Democracy.

The whole of Europe, including Britain, in so far as the vast bulk of the people is concerned, has become a "zone of Soviet influence". There, the future belongs to triumphant Democracy, in its new connotation. Any attempt to counteract "Soviet influence", by a joint control of liberated Europe, can only have the object of resisting the process of painless revolution, which promises to be the positive outcome of the anti-fascist war. This diplomacy results from the still lingering conflict of ideas and ideals. The resurgent European Democracy would not obey the orders of Generals after the last shot in the war has been fired. In any possible clash, as heralded by recent events in a number of countries, the Soviet Union will naturally take the side of resurgent Democracy. In the context of joint control, that would bring the Soviet Union in conflict with the other Allies, and given the desire on the part of the latter (eventually, it will be only America), any such conflict may have serious consequences. Indeed, the final phase of the international civil war may flare up in another clash of arms. Anxious to avoid the painful possibility, the Soviet leaders wish to have freedom of action in a specified zone where Democracy can be helped to transcend the limits of empty formality and lay the foundation of a really free society. The plan of joint control would deprive them of freedom of action even in the countries liberated by the Red Army. The non-recognition of the Polish and Austrian Provisional Governments corroborates this apprehension.

Although British diplomacy is still playing an ambiguous role, the polarisation of social forces, not only in Europe, but throughout the world, is taking place around the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. respectively. I anticipated this process even before these two rivals for the leadership of the post-war world formally entered the military conflict. Since then, the perspective of the relation of forces in the post-war world has become clearer, even in course of the

military struggle conducted with joint efforts. In the post-war world, forces will not polarise in alliances of antagonistic Powers. The process will cut across national boundaries. That was essentially the case even in this war; but as the consequence thereof, it has become quite evident now. There are no pro-American or pro-Soviet countries. In every country, social forces are divided by the conflict of ideas and ideals represented respectively by the two rivals for the leadership of the post-war world. The die-hard anti-democratic forces orientate towards the U.S.A. because that is the only country in the contemporary world where the dominating position of Capitalism has not yet been seriously challenged. The U.S.A. alone will emerge out of this war with the wherewithal to attempt a capitalist reconstruction of Europe. It rendered that dubious service after the last war also; the result was the rise of Fascism. This time, a similar attempt will more surely have a similarly dreadful consequence. But the war against the Axis Powers, and the operation of the Axis Powers themselves, have destroyed the very possibility of succeeding even as the last time. With the exception of Germany, the democratic forces throughout Europe have been steeled in the fire of the fight against Fascism. They will defend their liberty. And the Soviet Union is now there to back them up. Any attempt to arrest the revolutionary and liberating consequences of the war unfolding themselves peacefully will precipitate another armed clash which will be a naked international civil war.

Nevertheless, the desire of the U.S.A. to instal crypto-fascist regimes in post-war Europe has been hardly concealed ever since the American armed forces crossed the Atlantic. Overriding military considerations compelled the British Government to tow the line, often reluctantly. Fearing that after the military defeat of the Axis Powers British Democracy will assert its independence and the

Anglo-Soviet alliance become the backbone of post-war Europe, American Imperialism wanted to establish its military domination over Europe during the war. Ever since a sizeable American army landed in France, the Nazis, in their turn, have skilfully played into the hands of American Imperialism. While putting up a stubborn resistance to the British forces in the North, the Nazis withdrew from the rest of France, allowing the American armies practically a walk-over. The same thing happened on the Rhine and subsequently inside Germany. Once the Nazis realised that the war was lost, they wanted the Americans to occupy Germany. While Marshal Montgomery's army had to fight every yard of the ground through the Netherlands and then in Northern Germany, the American army encountered practically no opposition until they cut all the way across the country and reached the frontier of Czechoslovakia, where they could stand on the way of the Red Army marching northwards from Vienna. They were also within the reach of Berlin, which would have fallen to them like Paris, if they marched on it. But that would presumably be contrary to the agreed plan of co-ordinated operation of the United Nations. To the disappointment of the German High Command and the Nazis, the Americans had to leave Berlin to the Red Army, desist from penetrating into Czechoslovakia, which was within the Soviet operational zone, and swing southwards. There the Nazis had made elaborate preparations for putting up the last-ditch resistance. It was reported by well-informed military observers that near about one hundred divisions had been concentrated for the defence of Hitler's retreat. Yet, the whole thing crumbled like a house of cards before the American army. Town after town surrendered without any resistance. There was no popular uprising like in Northern Italy to disorganise and demoralise the German army.

Before Berlin fell to the Red Army, and Montgomery

was still meeting fierce resistance in the North, the rest of Germany was occupied by the Americans. They even wanted the French to get out of Stuttgart after the latter had captured it. That cannot be all written to the credit of the weight of American armour and fire power. The Russians are known to have thrown the largest mass of men and metal in the battle of Berlin. And Zhukov and Koniev do not compare unfavourably with Patton and Bradley as Field Commanders. Evidently, the Germans threw in all their remaining forces against the Russian and Montgomery's armies, and allowed the Americans to occupy the larger part of their country and to reach points where they could be on the way of the Red Army, or the latter would have to risk a clash with the Allies.

Curiously enough, all the German war lords except Hitler himself, happened to be in those parts of the country which were overrun by the Americans. They surrendered evidently with relief. That is hardly an accident. Hitler's ace diplomat, von Papen, was comfortably seated at the breakfast table, even when the Americans were in the neighbourhood, waiting to be taken prisoner. In Italy also, when captured by the partisans, Mussolini's Marshal Graziani demanded that he should be taken to the Americans.

The Americans not only want to keep the Red Army away from the heart of Europe. Previously, they squeezed the British also. When the American Ninth Army reached the Elbe at a short distance from Berlin, British press correspondents at the front in their reports raised the question if British troops fighting their way through Northern Germany would be allowed to go to the German capital. The question was raised with reference to the fact that until now not a British soldier, except on leave, has been seen in Paris. It seems that the Americans wanted to reach Berlin first and establish themselves in control

there. And British front line correspondents, who had seen how little resistance the Americans were meeting, believed that they would reach Berlin before the Red Army, and keep the British as well as the Russians out. Previously, the Americans did not like the British even to occupy Brussels. There was a very tense situation for a time. On the Franco-Belgian frontier, the advancing British Army found its way to Brussels blocked by American troops.

The behaviour of the Nazis and the German Army towards the Americans naturally make the impression that they regard the latter as the only guarantee against the dreaded danger of "Bolshevism", by which they mean resurgent Democracy. The Americans, on their part, have not done anything to remove this impression. On the contrary, their eagerness to be everywhere before everybody else gives birth to the suspicion that they have a post-war plan of their own. Joint control, under such circumstances, will inevitably lead to clashes, unless the Russians would be prepared to concede hegemony to the Americans.

There should be no serious objection to that, if there really was a unity of purpose. It is a fact that America is the only great Power among the United Nations which possesses the wherewithal to attempt capitalist reconstruction of Europe, and possessing the wherewithal, she naturally wishes to make the attempt. Anti-Soviet sentiments have been expressed in the American press even during the war. In view of these facts, the reactionary elements not only in Germany, but throughout Europe, naturally hope that powerful America would help them survive the defeat. On the other hand, the democratic and progressive forces look upon the Soviet Union as their champion. The British efforts to prevent this polarisation of forces, which might precipitate another war, have so far been ineffective. If they succeeded, Britain would

have to play second fiddle to America. But the changed relation of forces in the political life of Britain, a change which has taken place under the pressure of total mobilisation, will compel her to take the side of resurgent Democracy. The Anglo-Soviet alliance will prove to be stronger than the Anglo-American alliance.

This relation of forces will constitute the background of the struggle for the freedom of Europe. The struggle will continue even after the unconditional surrender of the Nazis. Himmler's offer of surrender only to the Anglo-American allies was rejected; but the inclusion of the Soviet Union is a mere formality. Nazi Germany, which speaks for all the forces of reaction throughout Europe, has not surrendered unconditionally. The Nazis will continue their struggle against "Bolshevism", that is, the Soviet Union and European Democracy, and they hope to enlist the sympathy and support of the Anglo-American allies in this holy crusade. The hope is unfounded as far as Britain is concerned. There, Democracy is coming to its own. The hope is not unfounded as regards America, which has never made any secret of a widespread anti-Soviet sentiment.

The new German Foreign Minister appointed after Hitler's death, in a radio broadcast to the German nation, declared: "With us all European people are threatened with starvation and the Bolshevist terror, and are awaiting a new order which would bring real and durable peace to this Continent. As more and more of the German East, which should be a larder to the hungry people of Europe, falls into the hands of the Bolsheviks, famine is bound to overtake Europe quickly. The Bolshevist is going to thrive on this starvation and need. Bolshevised Europe will be the first step on the road to world revolution. The achievement of that goal or a third world war are the inescapable alternatives. We too believe that a world order should be established which would prevent further

war and eliminate in time the cause of such war. But we cannot create such order by making a wolf into a sheep. Humanity longs for the solution of burning social questions which exist in every country; such a solution cannot be found in Bolshevism. It must be based on a just social order which respects the liberty and dignity of the individual. We sincerely believe that we can make a contribution to such a solution."

It sounds like the Satan quoting scriptures. But that is a call for an ideological war. Since antagonistic forces still remain, the war must be fought out before a lasting peace could be established. The head of the post-Hitler Nazi Government, Doenitz, backed up his Foreign Minister with the following dramatic declaration:

"In the North, West and South, single armies have laid down arms after an honourable struggle. Because the struggle against the Western Powers has become senseless. The only purpose for which we still have to fight is to save as many Germans as possible from Bolshevisation and enslavement. That is your most sacred task, which you will have to carry out and will carry out in the spirit of our dead Fuehrer."

That was on May 4th, two days before Doenitz ordered the entire German Army to lay down arms unconditionally. It would be naive to believe that the ideological war, declared so passionately only two days before, could end with the conclusion of the military conflict. The forces of reaction will try to survive the military defeat by conspiring to build up a world ideological front against "the danger of Bolshevism", that is, the establishment of a genuinely democratic society, on the ruins of Hitler's "new order".

The perspective of the post-war world will be determined by America and Britain taking sides in the last stages of the international civil war. Whether the process

will be peaceful and painless, or violent and bloody, depends on the spearhead of world reaction.

The veteran American journalist, I. F. Stone, whose political stories from Washington have made history, writes in a New York paper:

"The strongest, if not the most dominant, tendency of the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference is regarded as aimed at the organisation of an anti-Soviet bloc. One finds that the main question in the minds of many State, War and Navy Department officials and too many members of the American delegation is the balance of forces between America and Russia—the implied assumption being that a war between them is inevitable."

CHAPTER XVII

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE

THE report published at the close of the Potsdam Conference over the signatures of the "Big Three" presents an outline of the map of post-war Europe—not only the geographical map, but also the immensely more important political and social map. As such, the report of the Potsdam Conference is a document of much greater historical significance than the San Francisco Charter. While the latter, though apparently more ambitious, is full of vague generalities and pious principles, the former deals realistically with concrete problems. As a matter of fact, a satisfactory territorial redistribution and political and social reorganisation of Europe are the conditions *sine qua non* of any effective world security scheme. The latter can be implemented only upon the foundation of the former. Hence the supreme importance of the Potsdam report, which holds out the promise that the foundation of a world security organisation may be solidly laid by the foresight and statesmanship of the heads of the three leading Powers.

Most probably, this historic document has a touch of tragedy about it. Did Churchill contribute much to its formulation? How far was he responsible for the new Anglo-American policy as incorporated in the Potsdam report? If he had much to do in that respect, then Britain's war leader struck a courageous blow for the conquest of peace just on the eve of his dramatic fall. That is certainly an irony of history.

Such a long, comprehensive but concise document could not be prepared in the last three or four days of the conference, when Churchill was no longer one of the Big Three. That must have been substantially done before

the conference adjourned. It seems that in the Potsdam Conference Churchill tried to redeem himself in the eyes of Stalin. His reactionary outbursts during the election campaign could not but rekindle Stalin's old suspicions. That would not create a psychological atmosphere congenial for a settlement of a host of thorny questions.

The most pleasantly surprising feature of the Potsdam report is its remarkable freedom from the "Truman touch". According to inspired press reports, the new American President was going to Potsdam with very definite ideas about post-war Europe, and those ideas were such as could not be reassuring for the Russians. Events since the German surrender had caused in Moscow grave misgivings about the possible consequence of a joint occupation of Germany. Therefore, the Russians preferred return to the Teheran formula of dividing Germany into zones occupied separately. It was reported that at Potsdam Truman would press for joint control, and oppose "dismemberment" of Germany. Moreover, he had just replaced Morgenthau in the Treasury Department. That meant rejection of the so-called Morgenthau Plan for the "industrial disarmament" of Germany—a plan which closely approximated the Soviet point of view. Generally, soon after assuming office, by an accident, Truman began to make appointments which clearly indicated his intention to liquidate Roosevelt's New Deal. Prominent New Dealers, who had all along constituted the inner circle of the Roosevelt administration, were summarily sacked. In view of all these significant facts, it was generally believed that at Potsdam Truman would put his foot down. Churchill's reactionary rhetorics during the election campaign encouraged the American Tories. As their spokesman, the new President was confident of getting the British Prime Minister's support for his diplomacy to outmanœuvre an isolated Stalin, and save "liberated" Europe for a neo-fascist or crypto-fascist enslavement.

The Potsdam report shows that Truman's diplomatic gambit did not work. Presumably, Churchill did not come up to his expectations. Stalin could not have made the Soviet point of view prevail against the opposition of the other two. Or, was the report written after the new British delegation came to Postdam? In that case, Attlee and Bevin made their first appearance on the international scene holding out a great hope for post-war Europe.

Of course, the Potsdam decisions do not deliver Europe to the Russians. The latter never wanted that. On the contrary, they have all along been extremely accommodating. For instance, what was the justification for the British and the Americans occupying two-thirds of Berlin after the Red Army had captured the city? The same question may be asked about Vienna. The Russians did not want to share in others' victory. They did not claim the right to share the occupation of other German cities captured by the Anglo-American armies.

At last, the legitimate claim of the Russians has been admitted, and a realistic view has been taken about the administration of occupied Germany. The basic claim is that they should occupy the parts of Germany liberated by the Red Army. This formally legitimate claim has been morally reinforced by the actual administration of the Soviet-occupied zone. There, democratic elements are helped to reorganise themselves and participate in the administration of public affairs. In the Soviet-occupied zone, the German people, though still subject to the rigour of a military emergency, are having the first taste of liberation.

As against that, how is the situation in other zones? According to a report in the *New Statesman and Nation* of London, in the middle of June the situation in Western Germany was as follows:

"He (the military occupation officer) must not fraternise with the non-Nazi burgermeister whom he has cajoled

into accepting an unwelcome responsibility; nor must he show any friendliness to the anti-Nazi group which seized power in the town before the arrival of our troops and handed it over intact . . . Here, all anti-Nazis were regarded as suspects and a notorious landlord was made burgermeister."

The London *Economist* gives the following picture of the American-occupied Bavaria:

"A certain pro-Catholic bias in the American Military Government has given political Catholicism in Bavaria a decisive start. Cardinal Faulhaber's influence was decisive in shaping the new Bavarian administration. In the Rathaus, a prominent right-wing Catholic acts as Oberburgermeister, another right-wing Catholic and former chairman of the Bayerische Volkspartei, which ruled the province before the Nazis, has always preferred to sit down with the devil rather than with the Social-Democrats. The Military Government has made it more than sufficiently clear that there must be no politics in Germany, and that the ban on political activities applies to all anti-Nazi groups without distinction. . . . The politically mature Western Powers apparently do not dare risk a revival of German politics. Yet, the resulting vacuum favours none so much as the Nazis."

The Potsdam Conference puts an end to all these vagaries and none too reassuring developments. Though divided in separately occupied zones during the indefinite period of occupation, Germany will be administered in future by a uniform policy. It is admitted that surrender of the German army and disappearance of Hitler's Government do not end the war against Fascism. The victory on the military front must be consolidated by continuing the war on the political, economic and cultural front. And that will also be a total war, waged ruthlessly until complete destruction of the enemy.

The Potsdam report thus can be welcomed as the

charter of freedom for the German people, and also for the other peoples of Europe.

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The breakdown of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in London is naturally again causing a good deal of anxiety about the future of Europe. It is said that adversity brought strange bed-fellows, who are now falling apart. On the other hand, it is asked: Why cannot a socialist government of Britain agree with the Russian Communists on the problems of peace, while Churchill pulled on so well with Stalin to wage war against the Axis Powers?

Military emergency pushed political issues to the background. Yet, these were the real issues involved, and therefore had to be joined before the anti-fascist war could be definitely over—with a decisive victory for the forces of democracy, liberty and progress. There was ample reason to fear that, when the underlying political issues were to be ultimately joined, serious disagreement between the Soviet point of view and that of Britain and America would not only make the problems of peace baffling, but might indeed precipitate another war. Churchill's reactionary outbursts during the election campaign only aggravated the fear. The victory of the Labour Party, therefore, was reassuring about the future of Anglo-Soviet relations. With a socialist government in Britain, the Anglo-Soviet alliance should survive the vicissitudes of a fluid situation, and become the sheet-anchor for war-torn Europe, secure in peace and democratic freedom.

All the problems of peace can be reduced to one single question: Will Europe, tormented and tyrannised by Fascism, be reconstructed on the basis of Capitalism or Socialism? This question of all questions of our time can be stated in different terms: Can Europe go back to the pre-fascist days, or can Democracy survive the nearly successful onslaught of Fascism without transcending the narrow

limits of formal parliamentarism and becoming Social-Democracy? The answer to this historic question was pronounced by history herself. The failure of parliamentary Democracy to cope with the chaotic conditions of the inter-war period gave birth to Fascism. Therefore, the issue which ultimately precipitated this war was not Fascism versus parliamentary Democracy; it was Fascism versus Socialism; because, a radical reconstruction of the decayed capitalist society was the condition for the survival of Democracy in its fullest implication.

The solution of the problems of peace was therefore conditional upon the nations united in the war against the Axis Powers undergoing a process of social revolution under the pressure of emergency. And, in the last analysis, it was Britain and America which would count. It was all along evident that America would try to restore in Europe the capitalist *status quo ante bellum*. It was equally evident that the Soviet Union would pull in the opposite direction. Britain was to hold the balance, if war-torn Europe was to have a period of respite. Therefore, the relation of forces in Britain was of supreme importance for the future of Europe. It would tip the scale one way or the other. A capitalist Britain would most probably (enlightened self-interest might persuade her to think differently) support the American plan of European reconstruction. In that case, a conflict with the Soviet point of view would be inevitable, and instead of peace, a new war would be casting its ominous shadow across Europe.

Taking place at this juncture of contemporary history, the victory of the British Labour Party was of supreme importance. It tipped the balance of the relation of international forces on the side of a socialist reconstruction of Europe, and thus guaranteed to the European peoples not only a genuinely democratic freedom, but also durable peace. A socialist government of Britain would not be

interested in the restoration of the capitalist *status quo* in Europe. Its view would have a greater affinity to that of the Soviet Union, even if there were disagreements about methods and procedures of attaining the common goal of Socialism. Under a socialist government, British foreign policy, particularly in relation to Europe, would revolve around the axis of the Anglo-Soviet alliance, which would consequently be the bulwark of freedom and peace in Europe.

This hope about the future of Europe seems to be shattered by the failure of the Foreign Ministers' Conference. The failure is reported to be due to disagreements between the Soviet Union on the one side, and Britain and America on the other. Will the Anglo-Soviet alliance survive this crisis? Will the Labour Government fail to implement a treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union concluded by the previous government headed by Tory Churchill? These anxious questions are arising in the minds of many, even if they are not yet asked openly. But these questions presuppose yet another question: Will a Socialist Britain, or a Britain on the way to Socialism, follow the lead of capitalist America? Can she possibly do so?

In the London conference, the British Foreign Secretary sided with the American representative as against the Soviet delegate. Was it a deliberate choice of a policy dictated by emergency? Time alone will provide convincing reply to this anxious question. Meanwhile, one or two facts may be noted. The Anglo-American financial negotiation is not yet concluded; the outcome may make or mar the future of the British Labour Government. Powerful American financial capitalist circles, holding a whip-hand, frankly did not take kindly to the advent of a Labour Government in Britain. These facts permit the supposition that the pressure of circumstances must be influencing the initial moves of the British Labour Government.

As a matter of fact, in the London conference, differences arose chiefly between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Minor members of the United Nations started the agitation against the procedure laid down at the Potsdam Conference regarding the negotiation of the peace treaties. The Australian Foreign Minister called the Potsdam procedure "vague and unworkable". The American Secretary of State promptly backed up the point of view of the small nations and proposed modification of the Potsdam procedure. The modified procedure, apparently harmless, would place the Soviet delegate in a minority in every case of disagreement; because, the small nations would naturally vote with their generous patron, the United States of America.

In the beginning, Molotov seems to have acted like a trusting soul and agreed to the modification proposed by Byrnes. The far-reaching modification was formulated cleverly so as to make it appear innocuous. According to the Potsdam procedure for drafting treaties with ex-enemy countries, "the Council will be composed of members representing those States which were signatories to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned." There is nothing vague and unworkable in this procedure. The Potsdam procedure further stipulated that treaties of peace should be drawn up "with a view to submission to the United Nations". The American proposal at the London conference was "to hold a general conference to settle the peace of Europe."

On the face of it, the modification was quite harmless; indeed, it was unnecessary, and exactly therefore it was bound to cause suspicion. Why make an unnecessary change? The underlying motive was not to modify, but to scrap the entire Potsdam agreement, which had accepted Soviet supremacy over Eastern Europe.

Molotov was taken unawares. But Moscow did not fail to detect the motive and put him on his guard. Only

when he pointed out that acceptance of the American proposal amounted to a departure from the Potsdam agreement did Bevin throw his hat in the ring. He wanted Molotov to stand by the previous resolution of the conference on the ground that otherwise the conference would make no headway. As far as the British delegate was concerned, it was clearly a matter of principle. By a clever manoeuvre, they had ensured the support of the small nations in case of a division. The British delegation had to choose between siding with the Soviet representative as against the rest, or to be with the latter, for the time being. Evidently, Bevin acted under the pressure of circumstances.

If, on the contrary, it was a deliberate choice, the logical sequel of British foreign policy inaugurated thereby would be eventual scrapping of the Anglo-Soviet alliance. Because, there is no reason to expect that the Soviet Government would forego the position in Eastern Europe conceded to it by the Potsdam agreement. On the other hand, the American principle, introduced in the London conference, is meant to scrap the Potsdam agreement, which was signed by President Truman in order to secure Soviet co-operation in the war against Japan. That necessity being no longer there, the Americans may feel that they have paid a price without getting anything in return. But an agreement signed by the heads of the three Great Powers is an agreement, and the Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe is not quite a gift of the Americans. Therefore, Moscow is not at all likely to yield. The diplomatic deadlock created by the London conference will continue indefinitely. If the British Government was reconciled to that gloomy perspective, the Anglo-Soviet alliance should be regarded as a dead letter.

Bevin's speech in the Parliament creates an entirely different impression. Of course, he defended his attitude in the Foreign Ministers' Conference, though not very convincingly. There would be no occasion for asking some

members of the Council to walk out, if the Potsdam procedure was not altered. It is very difficult to see any reasonableness in the insistence upon China to participate in the drafting of the treaty with Roumania or Hungary, or even France, for that matter. The fact is that, if the world is to have any security, that would not happen in consequence of some high-sounding resolution to be called "International Bill of Rights", as the Americans grandeloquently suggest; the responsibility for guaranteeing security to the world will fall on those Powers who can discharge it. It is palpably absurd to maintain that the U.S.S.R. and, say, Afghanistan, for example, or the U.S.A. and Peru, should have equal say in all discussions about the future of the world. The small nations should not be made the facade of power politics.

However, the direction of the foreign policy of the British Labour Government is clearly indicated in the conclusion of Bevin's speech: "Return to normal and happy conditions in Europe, to which peace treaties must be the first step, is what the world is waiting for. The temporary breakdown will, I hope, lead to further discussion of these matters on the basis of what is best for permanent peace. For the future, I say with confidence that, given time and if we all continue to apply patience and understanding of each other's difficulties, we shall overcome the present divergences and any other which may reveal themselves. For our part, we shall certainly work in the same spirit of co-operation in which the countries united to pursue the war against our enemies."

The argument with which Bevin discouraged the demand for an immediate debate on his report is equally significant. He said: "I think the situation is delicate at the moment, and if the debate is delayed for a little it may be that the strings may be remended and national and international interests better served."

Finally, we have the letters exchanged between Bevin

and Molotov at the conclusion of the conference. If they were mere conventionalities, the British Foreign Secretary would hardly take the trouble of reading them in the Parliament.

The American attitude, on the other hand, opens up an entirely different perspective. It was outlined in a broadcast speech by John Foster Dulles, who was the Special Adviser to the Secretary of State in the London conference. Having declared that the U.S.A. would never negotiate treaties of peace with Roumania and other East-European countries unless they measured up to the American standard of democracy, that is to say, return to the capitalist *status quo ante bellum,* Dulles turned the table on the Soviet Union. Flying in the face of facts, he declared that the Soviet delegate "insisted on a change of procedure". Then he proceeded to make the following significant statement:

"The change was demanded as a means of indicating Soviet displeasure with the course the negotiations were taking, and as a means of finding out whether the United States was really determined to hold to the basic principles I have described. They did not find out that the United States was willing to sacrifice its principles and its historic friendship with China and France. It was inevitable that time should come when the Soviet Union would want to test us out. It was a good thing that it happened, and that it is now behind us. Disagreement on post-war settlement will lead to different nations carrying out their will in particular areas. That is not necessarily a permanent disaster. It will tend to divide the world into blocs and spheres of influence."

As against this thinly veiled bellicose attitude, which regards a conflict with the Soviet Union to be inevitable, the perspective of British foreign policy as stated by Bevin is definitely conciliatory and optimistic. For the moment, the problem of peace in Europe, however, does appear

to be baffling. But the breakdown of the London conference takes us back to the Potsdam agreement. Any departure from that agreed blueprint of the future of Europe will necessarily mean scrapping of the Anglo-Soviet alliance. Though there is enough cause for anxiety, there is hardly any reason to assume that the foreign policy of the Labour Government is moving to that disastrous direction.

Chapter XVIII

THE FAR-EASTERN INTERLUDE

Japan surrendered two days after the Soviet Union had declared war against her and after she had experienced the second visitation of the deadly atomic bomb.

Only three weeks ago, when, during the fateful Potsdam Conference, Japan was called upon to capitulate, her militarist rulers at first pretended to ignore the warning and then, with a gesture of power, declared their determination to fight on. At that time, very few, even on the side of the United Nations, could anticipate what was coming. The dramatic collapse of Japan is very unexpected. Until a few days ago, American Commanders, while expressing confidence that Japan was sure to be defeated, warned against undue optimism. The general belief was that it was going to be a long-drawn war of attrition. The events during the last few days must have suddenly snapped the morale even of the militarist rulers of Japan who, by tradition, are desperados and temperamentally predisposed rather to suicidal acts than to shameful capitulation. The feudal notion of valour is still the national characteristic of Japan. The nerve-shattering effect of the atomic bombs seems to have overwhelmed the structure of national psychology—the emotional outfit of a nation, reared on the basis of a hoary tradition. It is indeed the passing of an old world—almost overnight.

The Japanese capitulation is the most dramatic event of the war, itself the most deadly drama of the entire human history. The war marks the end of an era. The revolution sweeping over Europe may now reach Asia also. The old world is crumbling everywhere. The capitulation of Japan means the collapse of its last remaining rampart. The war, this tremendously revolutionary

event, has shaken up the entire old world—from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

Though it ended so suddenly, the war in Asia has been much longer than the war in Europe. It began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria fifteen years ago, and it ended as soon as the Red Army marched into Manchuria, where the hard inner core of the Japanese army was based and the industrial nerve-centre of Japan's military power was located. That coincidence appears to be an irony of history.

But a mechanised army of half a million men, provided with an up-to-date industrial base, would scarcely throw off the sponge without a fight, unless some factor other than the fifty divisions of the Red Army was simultaneously in operation. The atomic bomb seems to have rendered all strategic calculations out of date overnight. It evidently broke the moral backbone of Japanese resistance.

The fifteen years of war in Asia are over all on a sudden. What will happen now? A civil war in China was going on simultaneously with the Sino-Japanese war. Will the civil war be also concluded now? Has any recent development on the civil war front influenced the course of the other war in Asia? In other words, what is the diplomatic and social background of the sudden collapse of Japan? These questions cannot be answered to-day. But events following the dramatic surrender of Japan will have to be carefully scanned for answer to these questions. Because, the future of Asia will be determined by those answers.

The atomic bomb most probably has hastened the climax of the drama of Japan's defeat. But its connection with the Potsdam Conference is now evident. And the war against Japan was discussed at Potsdam in the context of the future of the relation of international forces in the Far East. The future of China is of greater importance

in that context than the future of defeated Japan. Chiang Kai-shek's China in the camp of the United Nations has been one of the anomalies, indeed absurdities, of the war. Adversity might bring strange bed-fellows. But will the victory of Chiang Kai-shek's China mean triumph of the cause of the United Nations on the Asiatic front? Japan was going to be defeated, but what about the future of China? How should the civil war be concluded there? If the victory of the United Nations on the Asiatic front was to be celebrated in Chunking, then the war would have been fought in vain. Victory of Chiang Kai-shek's China would mean Fascism in Asia surviving the defeat of Japan.

The future of the Far East could not have been discussed so very frankly at Potsdam. In diplomatic conferences, one does not speak frankly. They usually talk through their top hats, if not actually with the tongue in the cheek. But it is now publicly known that Soviet participation in the war against Japan was the most important point on the agenda of the Potsdam Conference. On August 9th, the day after the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, the American Associated Press correspondent flashed the news from Washington "that the final agreement upon Russian entry into the war with Japan was the primary object of President Harry Truman's trip to Potsdam for the epoch-making Big Three Conference."

Now, therefore, it can be reasonably inferred that the Potsdam ultimatum to Japan followed Stalin's agreement to satisfy the American President's object. On the other hand, Stalin's agreement must have resulted from the satisfaction he obtained from his previous talks with T. V. Soong about the Chunking Government's future policy. Indeed, Soong could not give Stalin entire satisfaction without consulting his colleagues at home. He had to go to Chungking for the purpose. Stalin's agreement at Potsdam to join the war against Japan presumably was

conditional upon the result of Soong's consultation at Chungking. Therefore, the Soviet Union could not be a party to the Potsdam ultimatum to Japan.

Stalin and Soong returned to Moscow almost simultaneously, and the Soviet declaration of war followed. From this sequence of events it is clear that before delivering the death-blow to the Asiatic pole of the Fascist Axis, the Soviet Union made it sure that Japan's defeat would not mean victory of Fascism in China.

On the day of the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, the United Press of America reported from Washington: "Russia's entry into the war against Japan has changed the entire outlook for that struggle, and may result in surrender by the Japanese within a short time. The effect of the Russian move, according to competent experts, will be not only military, but also political and economic. It is conceded here that Russia now must be given a leading rôle in the post-war reorganisation of Asia, and there is fear in some quarters that Russia may insist on the formation of pro-Soviet governments in some countries of Asia, as they did in Eastern Europe."

Such developments in the Far East would be the inevitable consequence of Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Anticipating that, while criticising the Soviet Government for not participating in the war against Japan even after Germany's defeat, an influential school of American opinion did not want Moscow actually to do so. Why, then, was President Truman so very anxious to get the Soviet Union in? His object, it is reported, was to shortem the duration of the war in Asia. In other words, without the Red Army, Japan also could not be defeated easily. The atomic bomb was ready for use before Truman left for Potsdam. If that new weapon could do the job, it was not necessary to make concessions to the Soviet point of view about the reorganisation of Europe.

For solving this conundrum, it should be recollected that only very recently, when the atomic bomb must have been ready for use, authoritative American Commanders on the Pacific front deprecated the expectation of an early end of the war against Japan. General MacArthur wanted another year. Even after the first devastating assault with the new weapon, Admiral Mountbatten declared that it would be unwise to count exclusively on it for the final defeat of Japan. None would belittle the deadly power of the new weapon; but because of its extreme destructive power, its use must be limited. The object of the war against Japan was neither to slaughter the entire people, nor to blow up the islands. Therefore, the use of the atomic bomb must necessarily be limited by the purpose of shattering the morale of the enemy. His actual capitulation would have to be attained through other military operations. And strategists must have realised from the very beginning of the war that Japan would have to be beaten on the Asiatic mainland. Therefore, it was almost a foregone conclusion that the Red Army would have to contribute also to the victory on the Pacific front of the war.

Americans interested in China as a market and field of capital investment would prefer to defeat Japan without the help of the Red Army, which would earn for Moscow a say in the political reorganisation of the Far East. They relied instead upon Chiang Kai-shek's China, which proved not only an ineffective, but an unreliable ally. To drive Japan out of the Pacific islands, the Malaya Peninsula and eventually from South China, was within the realm of practical possibility. Her home islands could also be devastated by bombardments. But it would take years to dislodge her from North China, unless the Red Army took a hand. Such a long drawn-out war in a distant country requires the traditional crusader's zeal; it can be waged only in pursuance of a cause. But

such a war is hardly a good business proposition. Therefore, American businessmen, who dictate the policy of the Washington Government, were anxious to end the war soon and charged President Truman to enlist the cooperation of the Red Army. That is another case of adversity bringing strange bed-fellows.

Stalin naturally would not send the Red Army to make the Far East safe for American Imperialism or to drive the Japs out of China, so that the latter could welcome the American gallant. When Soong first came to Moscow to canvass Soviet participation in the war against Japan, he must have been told one or two things about the conditions on which the Red Army would come in. Stalin is too hard-headed a realist to make an issue of the Chinese Communists. He must have, however, demanded democratisation of China and a close Soviet-Chinese alliance. But perfectly fair conditions could not be complied with unless Kuomintang Fascism was ended, and Chiang Kai-shek's Chungking clique removed from dictatorial power.

So, Soviet participation in the war against Japan was to coincide with a silent revolution in China. This parallel development was predetermined by the fact that the Japanese war coincided with a civil war in China. It would have been a tragedy if the two powerful poles of the post-war world had openly taken sides in the civil war in China. By agreeing to participate in the war against Japan, Stalin's wisdom avoided that tragedy. Meanwhile, Japan capitulated as soon as a powerful offensive by the Red Army threatened the security of her strategic position in Manchuria.

The war is over. But the mopping-up operations on the Asiatic front will take a long time. The Red Army will certainly participate in that operation in China, and that will mean a good deal of house-cleaning for the latter. Soviet participation in the war thus guarantees against the danger of Fascism in Asia surviving the defeat of Japan.

The defeat of Japan may not restore peace in the Far East. China has been in a state of civil war ever since 1927. The civil war gave the Japanese aggressors the opportunity to establish themselves in the Northern Provinces and the coast line of the country. Until 1937, the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek attached greater importance to the suppression of the democratic forces and the Communist Party than to resistance against the Japanese invaders. A civil war waged for the defence of vested interests was considered to be more patriotic than the war for the defence of Chinese territory and national honour.

Eventually, there was a split in the nationalist camp, and one of the factions openly accepted the patronage of Japan. Thereupon, the other faction led by Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to take up a half-hearted resistance to the foreign invader. The Communists, on the other hand, became fanatical converts to the doubtful doctrine of a united national front, and declared their determination to wage the patriotic war against Japan under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

To talk of a patriotic war in the midst of the bloodiest civil war of modern history, and particularly when a good half of the patriots were allied with the foreign invader, was one of the many vagaries of the communist political practice in China. However, one nationalist faction being compelled to fight Japan, Chiang Kai-shek could not altogether reject the communist peace offer. Consequently, open hostilities in the civil war were suspended, and there was a period of armed truce. The united national front for waging a patriotic war under Chiang's leadership, however, was no more stable or abiding than that.

The extremely precarious balance of power could not last long. It was frequently upset actually by overt acts, even when the Communists passionately preached unity in the patriotic war, and the nationalists would not yield to

the "enemies of the nation" (they had so branded the Communists) in patriotic fervour. The honeymoon of united front was over while Japan was still far from defeat.

Several leftist foreign journalists representing powerful press organs in Britain and America had fostered the myth of a united front in China and boosted Chiang Kai-shek as the hero of the patriotic war against Japan. They suddenly felt it necessary to remove the lid from the cauldron of Cathay, in which the vicious brew of a civil war had been furiously boiling all the time, for years. Their scathing criticism of the nationalist regime attracted the attention of the world. There is reason to believe that the debunking of Chungking by leftist press correspondents heralded a change in communist policy. The honeymoon of a united national front in the patriotic war was yet another bitter experience.

The civil war was a stubborn fact which simply could not be eliminated by Communists becoming passionate patriots. In the Soviet Union, Communism can be patriotic for the very simple reason that there the people have a *patria*, the country belongs to them. In other countries, where the *patria* is the property of a minority, and the majority is entirely dispossessed, it is absurd to preach patriotism to the people. The Communists have still to learn that the Russians cannot be imitated everywhere, under all circumstances.

For the last year or so, the civil war in China was not always restricted even by a precarious armed truce. It was waged openly on the political front. The Communists suddenly discovered fascist ambitions in Chiang Kai-shek, having for several years lionised him as the leader of the patriotic war. The latter, on his part, accused the Communists of disloyalty and disrupting national unity.

Such being the situation, it is quite possible that on the disappearance of the Japanese invader, who forced a semblance of national unity, the smouldering fire of the

civil war will again break out in flames. Indeed, any other development will be extremely surprising, although it will certainly be a pleasant surprise. The experience of China will answer one of the outstanding questions facing the post-war world, namely, can democratic freedom be reconciled with Nationalism? The civil war in China has not been, and will not be, a struggle between Communism and Nationalism. It is a tussle between Nationalism and Democracy, between reaction and progress, between vested interests and the urge for a social reconstruction needed for promoting the welfare of the people as a whole.

Had Nationalism been democratic, the Communists could not capture the leadership of the masses. Having learned from bitter experience, the Communists in China to-day are Communists only in name. In reality, they stand for democratic freedom and have established it wherever they had the power to do so. As champions of Democracy in practice as well as in theory, they have been proclaimed enemies of the nation. Nationalism thus proposes to wage war against Democracy. How can a civil war be avoided in such a situation, unless the United Nations will have the good sense of turning out the strange bed-fellow and back up the Chinese Democracy?

For the moment, there does not seem to be any agreement amongst the United Nations about the future of China. Perhaps, the collapse of Japan came too soon and suddenly, even before discussions for an agreement could be undertaken. But that is only a superficial view, which isolates military considerations from political issues. As a matter of fact, the pattern of post-war political developments in China was drawn in the Potsdam Conference, where the American President pressed Stalin to join the war against Japan actively, and Stalin agreed. Indeed, this happened still earlier. In his first speech as the leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, Churchill gave out the interesting information that already at Yalta

Stalin had promised to declare war against Japan three months after the collapse of Germany. Churchill pointed out that Stalin kept his promise to a day.

The Red Army's appearance on the Far Eastern war front is sure to have one of two possible consequences; either it will conclude the civil war in China with the victory of Democracy, or the civil war in China will divide the United Nations. But the conflict will be between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Under a Labour Government, Britain will most probably take the side of Democracy.

The dreaded conflict cast ahead its ominous shadow as soon as Japan collapsed. Acting on the Emperor's order, the Commander of the Japanese Army in North-West China surrendered, and, as a matter of course, the surrender was to be accepted by General Chu Teh, the Commander of the Communist Eighteenth Army, which had for years been fighting the invaders in that part of the country. But while ordering "officers and men in various war zones to intensify their war efforts and actively push forward without the slightest relaxation", Chiang ordered the Communist Eighteenth Army "to remain at their posts and wait for further instruction". Presently, the instruction was issued. It was announced from Chungking that none but Chiang Kai-shek's representative was entitled to accept on behalf of China the surrender of Japan.

Chu Teh challenged Chiang Kai-shek's order; pointing out this discrepancy between the orders issued simultaneously, he alleged that Chiang's order to the Eighteenth Army amounted to a prohibition for the Communists to capture arms from the defeated enemy. In a memorandum to the British, American and Soviet Ambassadors at Chungking, Chu Teh contended that troops under Communist Command had engaged sixty-nine per cent of the Japanese army in China; and on that ground, he insisted that the Communists should have a due share in the

acceptance of the Japanese surrender. The Communist Commander also reserved the right to dispute any arrangements, pacts or treaties made without his consent.

In that extremely tense atmosphere, Chiang Kai-shek invited the head of the Communist Government at Yenan, Mao Tse-tung, to come to Chungking immediately to discuss the situation. That it was an order in the characteristically polite Chinese form of an invitation became evident presently, when, commenting on the invitation, the Press Chief of the Chungking Government said: "I expect that the Communists will carry out Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's order in connection with the surrender of Japan. Whoever ignores the Generalissimo's order, becomes the common enemy of the people." That is unmistakably the voice of nationalist totalitarianism, which has no regard for Democracy, and demands obedience to one leader.

The precarious truce thus has definitely ended and civil war has again broken out in all its stark nakedness. Mao Tse-tung has, of course, refused to walk into Chiang's parlour. Only international intervention can stop the civil war. Hopes are raised by the Soviet-Chinese pact signed in Moscow. Meanwhile, there are ugly features in the Chinese situation. The Commanders of the American Army in the Far East seem to be fully backing up Chiang Kai-shek's totalitarian claim. Commenting on the aggravated conflict between Chungking and the Communists, the Commander of the American forces in China, General Wedemeyer, said: "It is not our business to be involved in Chinese domestic affairs. We won't start shooting unless they shoot us." That is rather ominous. Who would start shooting the Americans in China? It is reminiscent of the armed intervention of the good old days. Neutrality in a civil war always means backing the wrong side. Having declared neutrality, in the same press conference the American army chief backed up Chiang's totalitarian claim

as against the communist demand for a share in the acceptance of Japan's surrender. He said: "Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's representatives have been appointed to receive surrender in different areas of China." The Supreme Commander of the Far Eastern front, General MacArthur, also issued similar orders.

This attitude only encourages Chiang Kai-shek to resume his old crusade against the Communists and, on the pretext of fighting the "Bolshevik menace", suppress the forces of Democracy. On the other hand, it is very doubtful whether he will be in a position to make his order prevail in the North, where the Communist Army occupies extensive territories and commands the confidence of the people.

The purpose of Chiang Kai-shek's crassly discriminating order to the Communist Army was obviously to prevent it growing stronger by taking possession of the arms laid down by the Japs. According to reports from different sources, the Communists are not taking chances. They seem to be making hay while the sun shines. Their plan presumably is to occupy the entire territory to the North of the Lunghai Railway, including Peiping and perhaps the great port of Tientsin also. It is difficult to see how Chiang Kai-shek could check the Communists, unless a restraining hand from Moscow pulls the strings, and Moscow should have hardly any reason to do so. The only warrant would be the new treaty with the Chungking Government.

It is reported that, according to the treaty, the Chungking Government will be reconstructed as a coalition government, the Communists having a fair representation. Such a change of government may head off the civil war. But pending that possible happy turn of events, both sides will surely try to occupy positions of vantage so as to drive the hardest possible bargain. Then, the possibility of the Communists occupying the entire northern half

of the country, the Red Army standing nearby, may win a powerful international ally for the Nationalists. Such a polarisation of forces, nationally as well as internationally, will only aggravate the danger of civil war in China, and she may even be the field where the last battles of the international civil war will be fought.

Perhaps this perspective hastened the surrender of Japan, who may still be saved as an outpost of reaction in the Far East. But Stalin's realism may still save the situation. He would not force the issue. A genuine democratisation of the Chungking Government will satisfy him for the time being.

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After the excruciating experience of the last six years, culminating in the use of atomic bombs, the possibility of another war is really dreadful. One should not even talk light-heartedly about it. But on the other hand, it is no use blinking at disagreeable facts, playing the ostrich game. To overlook or disregard the fundamental social, political and ideological issues underlying the armed conflict, on the pretext of military emergency, was not only a short-sighted but positively dangerous practice. The clash of arms over, the war is now waged on political fronts which cut across the ex-belligerent nations and liberated countries. It is idle to talk of peace while the forces of progress and reaction, of Democracy and power-politics, are clashing almost everywhere. Before peace becomes a reality, the fundamental social, ideological and political issues of our age must be honestly faced and equitably settled. Neither cant nor opportunism would take the war-torn world out of the danger of a threatened chaos towards the coveted goal of peace, order and security.

For the moment, anxious eyes are focussed on the Far-Eastern scene, though the situation in Europe is not at all reassuring. The advent of a Labour Government in Britain may hasten the outburst of hostilities in the

international civil war. The shrewdness of the new British Foreign Secretary does not seem to have succeeded in warding off the danger. Pending the development of the conflict between aggressive American Capitalism and Britain on the road to Socialism, the international relations in the Far East may reach an acute crisis. China has moved nearer to a renewed outbreak of civil war on a much larger scale than ever before. And the dreadful drama unfolds, as it were, with the grim fatality of the Greek tragedy, on a background of international relations which are hardly pacific in intent and purpose.

None is deliberately preparing for another war, while one is still to end. But there are powerful elements whose ambition casts doubt on the possibility of peace, even when they may be talking about it. Indeed, until the civilised world is united in ideas and ideals, it will not be free from the danger of war. Realistic statesmen may deprecate ideological wars. But they may not always be able to prevent political conflicts which result from divergent outlooks on the future of the world. In a civilised world, wars are bound to be fewer and far between. But in the last analysis, they are equally bound to be ideological wars. Civilised nations do not go to war for settling disputes over territories. Such disputes can be composed more and more through negotiations—through the peaceful means of an adequate international machinery. But it is only natural for each great Power to wish that the future of the entire world should be shaped after its own image. It might not be a desire to dominate the world; but it is a matter of faith and idealism.

The post-war world is undergoing a rapid process of polarisation. The moving force is an ideological conflict which, in its turn, results from divergence of opinions about the possibility of freedom, peace and security. One opinion is that no freedom and progress is possible in the absence of private enterprise, which presupposes a social

order built on the basis of private ownership of the means of production; the other opinion holds that the ideal of Democracy and peace cannot be attained within the framework of the capitalist society and, therefore, the world must be reconstructed on the basis of Socialism. Every country is now divided within itself on this fundamental issue of our age, and the two conflicting tendencies find their respective champions in the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

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The crisis in the Far East has been aggravating in the context of this process of international polarisation. There, the delicate diplomatic balance is in greater danger of being upset on the issue of the civil war in China, because there the opposite poles are too close together, physically. As a matter of fact, there is sufficient ground for the view that Japan's unexpectedly early surrender is intimately connected with this process of polarisation.

American expansionists, who openly declare that the "U.S. zone of defence" should extend to the Chinese coast, did not want Soviet participation in the war against Japan. They feared that contribution to the defeat of Japan and liberation of China would win for the Soviet Union a dominating position in the Far East, challenging the doctrine that America's defence zone should extend thousands of miles beyond her frontiers across the Pacific. However, Soviet participation in the war against Japan was a foregone conclusion. Otherwise, who would drive the Japs out of their strongly entrenched positions in Manchuria and North China? Chiang Kai-shek's ramshackle army, demoralised by corruption, could not be expected to tackle the task. So, the result of Soviet non-intervention in the war against Japan would necessarily be eventual conquest of those regions by a powerful American army. Moscow could not foresee such a situation with equanimity. Just as in Europe, so in the East also,

the Soviet Government is naturally anxious to have friendly neighbours. A Kuomintang China would hardly fulfil that expectation. An American army serving the purpose of a powerful buffer, nationalist China would certainly try to assert its authority in Outer Mongolia and far-off Sinkiang.

Foreseeing all these unpleasant possibilities, the Soviet Union was bound to move in the East as soon as the war against Germany was over. On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that Soviet participation in the war against Japan was somewhat hastened by the Potsdam ultimatum. That was a dubious document. The terms for Japan's "unconditional surrender" were very much different from those made in the case of Germany. Indeed, Japan was offered an opportunity to escape defeat. Now, critics complain against "semi-peace" or a "strange peace" in the Pacific. But previously, they missed the point of the Potsdam ultimatum, which predetermined such an anomalous situation.

In the beginning, Japan disregarded the ultimatum, because her defeat was not so very imminent. At that time, an opportunity to escape defeat was not an irresistibly tempting proposition. Japanese militarists have always been daring gamblers. But presently the situation changed. On the one hand, atomic bombs rendered the defence of Japan's home islands untenable, and on the other, Soviet attack seriously prejudiced the Japanese plan of withdrawing on the continent and continuing resistance based on Manchuria. Now, defeat being certain, the opportunity to escape it was seized.

The most dangerous feature of the Potsdam ultimatum was that it left the powerful Japanese army in Manchuria, which had all along been like a dagger directed against the U.S.S.R., in an ambiguous position. Who was to disarm it? Who was to assume control of the war industries of Manchuria? These questions were not clearly

raised and answered in the Potsdam ultimatum. The Soviet declaration of war against Japan automatically answered the question. The powerful Kwangtung army —the hard core of Japan's military power—could not have the advantage offered by the Potsdam ultimatum, and escape defeat. And the occupation of Manchuria by the Red Army guarantees that Japan will be industrially disarmed to a considerable extent.

But significantly, this favourable turn in the military situation in the Far East has provoked anti-Soviet outbursts in America and in certain sections of the British press. While dilatory tactics on the part of Japan gave the Red Army time to advance swiftly in Manchuria, the *Associated Press* reported from Washington on August 17th:

"The question asked here is: Are the Russians going deeper into Manchuria, in order to make the most of their opportunity against the Japanese; or is it the beginning of an occupation to restore the privileges lost by the Russians in the first Russo-Japanese war? It is also speculated that the Soviet might hope to push far enough South to join up with the Chinese Communist forces in North China."

On the same day, the New York *American* wrote: "We must face the fact that Russia is taking Manchuria and Korea at practically no cost and with every likelihood of gaining full possession of their large and modern industrial plants which were built by the Japanese."

Reporting "signs of growing rivalry between Moscow and Washington over China", the Diplomatic Correspondent of the London *Sunday Despatch* wrote two days latter:

"Russia wants Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia united in a Mongolian People's Republic in close relationship with Moscow, a similar plan for Korea, and either the same for Manchuria or a lease grant to Russia of special interests."

The "Asiatic and Russian expert" of the *Daily Mail*, George Moorhead, wrote on August 20th:

"I believe that Russian armies, regardless of surrender formalities, will march at least to the Liao-Tung Peninsula and join with the Chinese Reds, while Yenan forces will drive on until they are stopped by General Chiang or until Anglo-American occupation forces land."

Let us look at the other side of the picture. According to a *United Press* message from Washington, "there is a wide-spread and increasing fear in the American liberal and leftist circles that the Allies will not impose a sufficiently hard peace on Japan, and that the Nipponese will rapidly recover from the defeat and again threaten the peace of the world. The fear appears to be based largely on these possibilities: Firstly, the apparent intention of the Allies to maintain the present system of the Japanese Government, centring around the Emperor who, as the head of the Church and the State, will perpetuate the basic system which makes military dictatorship possible; and secondly, the apparent intention of the Allies to permit Japan to retain her light industries and again build up limited overseas markets which will result in the perpetuation of the Japanese system of great industrial groups such as Mitsui and Mitsubisi, which will tend to support a future military effort to gain physical control of the regions of the world where the vital raw materials are produced."

According to another report by the same agency, "the Chinese are of the opinion that the conditions under which the Japanese have surrendered provide the nucleus for a new world-wide conflict, since the Japanese feel that they are in no way truly defeated." The report adds: "The Russians are understood to have agreed to the Chinese retention of Manchuria due to a desire to avoid committing a breach of the Cairo agreement and thus incurring the displeasure of the Anglo-American Powers. The Chinese have agreed to a Soviet sphere of influence in Korea which

the Russians are known to have been seeking in order to offset anticipated United States influence in that area through possession of bases in the Ryukus island."

Looking at this situation, one cannot but wonder whether the stage is being set for peace or war. There will be Japan, which has escaped defeat except in Manchuria, and Kuomintang China, fully backed up by the U.S.A. Both these spearheads against the land of Socialism will be strongly buttressed by the American defence zone guarded by a big Navy with numerous advance bases covering the whole of the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator.

The Soviet move in the face of this none-too-reassuring perspective is obvious. Not only will Manchuria be occupied by the Red Army, so long as the Far Eastern situation remains in a flux; Moscow will see to it that Northern China, down to the Yellow River or the Lunghai Railway, has a government friendly to the Soviet Union.

The Chinese-Soviet Pact indicates that Moscow would go a long way to avoid a clash in the Far East. The peace in that part of the world, therefore, for the moment, depends very largely on the attitude of nationalist China. If encouraged by the U.S.A. it would insist upon its totalitarian claim, China would be plunged into a civil war, which might openly merge into the international civil war.

The Russians have gone more than half-way in order to head off the danger of a civil war in China, which might prejudice all the plans of restoring peace in the Far East. The Sino-Soviet Treaty is a diplomatic instrument of supreme importance, and it could not be concluded if the Russians stood on prestige instead of making great concessions. Nevertheless, the treaty has greatly enhanced the prestige of the Russians, having demonstrated once again the sincerity of the Soviet Government's desire to live in peace in a peaceful world.

A powerful section of the American press has been alleging that Soviet policy in the Far East was motivated by expansionist and aggressive designs, and this malicious anti-Soviet propaganda found an echo also in the British reactionary circles. The Russians were suspected of a design to fish in troubled waters; they would grab the whole of Manchuria, and through the instrumentality of the Communists set up a puppet government in Northern China.

There was nothing to prevent them, if the Russians really intended to do so. Even the spectre of a civil war in China would not be effectively deterrent. Because, nothing short of an active foreign intervention on a large scale could prevent Communist armies from occupying the whole country to the North of the Yellow River, provided that they were sure of Russian backing. In that eventuality, America would most probably intervene in favour of Chungking.

Two days before the Sino-Soviet Treaty was published, when its broad outlines were already generally known, the London *Economist* wrote: "Politically, nothing has happened to undermine American support for Chungking." In the same article, it was noted that the American attitude against Communists had stiffened everywhere.

But it is very doubtful if, in the given situation, America could actively take sides in the Chinese civil war. The Chungking Government would of course be liberally supplied with money and war materials. The immediate international repercussion of the civil war in China, however, would be a greater tension inside the camp of the United Nations. The Soviet policy evidently is motivated by the anxiety to avoid further taxing of the relations already so very strained under the pressure of the difficult situation in the Balkan countries.

Moscow was in a position to occupy Manchuria for an indefinite period on the plausible ground of security against

future aggression. In view of the palpably soft treatment of Japan, it would be quite natural for the Soviet Government to take up such an attitude of distrust. Provocation for doing so was not lacking. Fearing that the Red Army would march into Korea, on August 28th Tokyo Radio broadcast a message which was evidently an invitation to the American forces to forestal the Russians. Sounding the alarm, "that partial liberation of the country by the Red Army has caused a rising among Koreans", the Tokyo Radio declared: "Local Japanese authorities eagerly await the early arrival of Allied forces and urgently desire that thy will take into consideration the actual conditions on the spot before proceeding with the dismemberment of Japanese forces."

A *Reuter* message reporting the Tokyo broadcast interpretes it as follows: "It will fall to the Red Army to receive the Japanese surrender throughout Korea, and the fact that the broadcast was delivered in English is interpreted as a round-about attempt to induce Britain to press Soviet authorities to ease local surrender conditions." At the same time, while the Allied forces were still to land in Japan proper, a message from General MacArthur's headquarters announced that American forces were going to land in Korea. There was a rumour that the Japanese had requested General MacArthur that they should not be disarmed in Korea. The Soviet commentator on foreign affairs, Hoffman, refers to this rumour as an "insolent attempt which will of course be rejected".

Moscow could also extend its political influence to the whole of North China by promoting the establisment there of a friendly government. But the Soviet leaders preferred a long-term policy to the short-sightedness of securing immediate advantages. Foregoing the temptation of immediate advantage and expansion of direct political influence, they have gained morally. From that position of great prestige, the Soviet Government will be able to

influence and guide the development of the situation in the Far East. China may reach the goal of democratic freedom without having to go through the ordeal of a renewed civil war.

The international relations in that part of the world will have to be adjusted to the new perspective of a peaceful development. Thus, Soviet diplomacy may not only eliminate the danger of a new civil war in China; it may also secure peace in the Pacific. The entire credit must go to Soviet diplomacy, because but for the readiness of Moscow to go more than half-way, there would be no Sino-Soviet Treaty. It was not necessary for Moscow to make disproportionate concessions to China; and American policy, particularly in connection with the sudden conclusion of the war against Japan, was full of provocation for Moscow, providing ample reason for distrust and apprehension.

Of course, the success of Soviet statesmanship will depend on the response from China. The treaty has been formally ratified in Chungking. But that is not enough. In the treaty, Russia has pledged herself not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. But the treaty will be a dead letter or a scrap of paper unless the internal life of China is democratised. Should nationalist China still continue under the anti-communist political influence of America, she would only try to utilise the treaty as a sanction for her totalitarian claims. That would evidently be contrary to the spirit of the treaty, and Moscow could hardly be expected to fall in line. Thus, in the last analysis, peace in the Far East still remains conditional upon the internal developments in China and the part America will play in that connection.

Commenting on the conference between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist leaders, Hoffman writes in the Moscow paper *Red Star*: "The future development of China and the maintenance of interal peace depends

on the co-operation of these two parties. China is at the turning point of her history, and the situation demands quick rallying of all forces of the Chinese people for post-war reconstruction and a democratic Constitution of the country."

Meanwhile, the reactionary elements who have been prejudicing public opinion against the Soviet Union in Britain as well as America, have been disarmed. The veteran British journalist, J. L. Garvin, writes in the conservative *Daily Telegraph*: "No nation wants another world war less than Russia. Russia wants to make assurance doubly sure by making and keeping her frontiers as impregnable as any frontier can hope to be in the atomic bomb age. At the same time, she desires that every State on her borders or near them shall be friendly or at least not positively hostile to her distinctive system."

American appreciation of Soviet diplomacy is equally unreserved, being a frank admission that all suspicion about Moscow's designs in the Far East are unfounded. The *Associated Press* correspondent in Washington writes: "Diplomatic officials consider it (the Sino-Soviet Treaty) one of the most important and peace-aiding pacts to come out of the chaos of the war. To American leaders, it means that the widely expressed fears of a civil war in China and of Soviet land-grabs in North-East Asia and of a Moscow campaign to dominate Asia politically, now appear, on the face of the treaty, to be without foundation. Diplomats profess to see Russian willingness to work with the other Big Powers to an extent which some had feared would not be possible so soon after the war."

The dreaded and suspected Russians having laid their cards on the table, one may now reasonably ask what have the Americans up their sleeves. Will there be a reciprocity of international relations in the Far East? Only the blind optimist can answer this fateful question confidently in the affirmative. It is becoming more evident every day

that American policy in the Far East is to leave the Japanese military power and industrial potential sufficiently intact so that, under American patronage, a politically democratised Japan, though with the position of the Emperor unimparied, could be not only a serviceable buffer, but a spearhead against the Soviet Union. The advance posts of the American Eastern zone of defence extending beyond the Pacific were to be located in a nationalist China imbibed with suspicion and hostility against the Soviet Union. The Russians could not be indifferent to that perspective of developments in the Far East. The war in Europe over, Soviet diplomacy turned its attention to the East with the object of gaining security on that side. How that object was to be attained, depended on the attitude of nationalist China.

* * *

Since 1922, the Soviet Union had been the staunchest supporter of China's nationalist aspirations. With Russian help, Chiang Kai-shek created his army, which waged a bloody war against the Chinese people for ten years. The tragic experience of that civil war taught the Russians that even after the nationalist bourgeoisie had betrayed the revolution in China, it could not develop under the banner of Communism. The lesson of that experience persuaded the Communists to abandon their old romantic ideals, and become the champions of truly democratic freedom.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty is fully consistent with that perspective of the new way to freedom in China. A democratic China would be a reliable ally of the Soviet Union and guarantee its security in the East. The object of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, as far as Soviet diplomacy is concerned, is to detach China from reactionary outside influences, so that her internal life may be generally democratised. The Soviet Government has pledged itself not to interfere in the internal affairs of China; but only the political simpleton would believe that Moscow would render

military and economic assistance to a reactionary Chinese Government. The Russians would be fools if they repeated the bitter experience of 1925-26. The treaty, if faithfully implemented by the Chinese, is bound to serve the purpose of a powerful lever to revolutionise the internal life of China, and only a democratic China could escape the shameful position of an American vassal.

When Soong first visited Moscow before the Potsdam Conference, the Russians most probably offered him the choice between a democratic China loyally allied with the Soviet Union, and vassalage to America under the nationalist banner of anti-Communism. It must have also been broadly hinted to him that, should nationalist China make the latter choice, the overriding consideration of security would compel the Russians to take certain military and political steps which could not be prevented either by Chunking or by its American patrons.

While Stalin went to Potsdam, Soong returned home to consult his colleagues, and particularly Chiang Kai-shek. Knowing fully well that, whatever was told to Soong at Moscow, would reach the Americans (Soong came to Moscow from Washington), Stalin must have directly acquainted President Truman with the substance of the Moscow talks.

It may remain a secret of history, to be unravelled by future historians, how far Stalin's report of his talks with Soong precipitated the Potsdam ultimatum to Japan. For the moment, it can be hypothetically stated that the Anglo-American ultimatum to Japan and the latter's unexpectedly early surrender were the results of the Moscow talks, which led to the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.

Soviet diplomacy scuttled the American plan of practically establishing a protectorate over nationalist China. The sweeping concessions offered by the Soviet Government enormously strengthened the hands of the progressive

elements in China. Any open opposition to them would isolate Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary nationalist clique. So, the very process of the negotiations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty influenced the relation of forces in the political life of China. The conclusion of the treaty represented a triumph of the progressive and democratic forces.

Apprehending that far-sighted Soviet diplomacy might lead the whole of China out of the orbit of American influence, Washington naturally wanted to have a second string to its bow. With that purpose, Japan was given the opportunity to escape defeat and destruction so that she could replace China as the spearhead of the Pacific zone of American defence.

After the initial pleasant surprise, the unexpectedly early end of the war in the East caused widespread misgivings. Before long, it became evident that Japan had been offered an opportunity to escape defeat, and she had seized it. American liberal opinion criticising the policy of a soft peace in the Pacific has already been quoted. The Australian Government has also disapproved of the policy. The British press talked of the "strange peace" in the Pacific. Now here is an authoritative opinion; in an article entitled "We are to soft with these Japs", General Gordon Finlayson writes:

"To those whose memories are not too short, there is something sinister—almost alarming—in the way events between the Allies and the Japanese have developed since Japan's surrender. Her armies for the most part are still intact. Many even have not been contacted, and so are undefeated. Almost half their strength is in Japan already, and can claim that no enemy could land there until permitted to do so by the Emperor. Reports say that the Japanese show no sign of a feeling of defeat. Why should they? Their faces have been saved, and that saves their spirit."

The Potsdam ultimatum heralded this policy of soft peace in the Pacific. If the world was too slow to anticipate what was coming, the hard-boiled Russians made no mistake. They reacted swiftly. War was declared against Japan and the Red Army swooped down on Manchuria—the nerve-centre of Japan's military power. Japan proper may be kept up as a buffer under American patronage; but she will have no teeth to bite. The Russian military move, defeating America's second gambit in the game of power politics in the Far East, has been capped by the feat of Soviet diplomacy represented by the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.

Indeed, the swift military action in Manchuria must have been the irresistible sanction of Soviet diplomacy. The Chungking Government was confronted with the choice between an honourable alliance and a civil war. If it was foolhardy enough to make the latter choice, its enemies would have all the advantages offered to it. It did make the right choice, and that indicated a triumph of the progressive and democratic forces as against the reactionary clique which dominated the politics of nationalist China until now.

Soviet expectations about the repercussions of the treaty are indicated in an article in the Red Army paper, *Red Star* which, having urged China to unite her democratic forces and advised her to abandon reactionary tendencies, writes: "In this way, the great Chinese nation will receive the sympathy and support of democratic elements of the world, including the Soviet Union". Then the paper goes on to warn China "to be on her guard against any resurgence of Japanese power, for history shows that a defeated enemy, under favourable conditions, may rise again and resume his malicious ends". That is a clear hint about the direction from which the Soviet Government anticipates danger.

The immediate political result of the treaty, on the

national scale, might be liquidation of the so-called Communist Government of the north-western border regions. That would not be a setback, but a great impetus for the democratisation of China. The ferment of the Chinese revolution will now have the freedom to operate throughout the country and influence developments far and wide. Let it be noted that the revolution is still on the order of the day; only, it has found a new way.

The Communists may not be given equal representation on the Central Government. But the Communist Party will be a party in the State on a footing of equality with any other party, including the Kuomintang. If it functions as the leader of Chinese Democracy, which will mean its being communist only in name, it will grow in influence and entrench itself throughout the country as firmly as it did in a restricted area. Thus, Soviet diplomacy has not only contributed to peace in the Far East, and saved China, from the ordeal of a civil war, but has placed her on the road to democratic freedom.

* * *

Transformation of the Pacific into an armed American lake promised to be the result of the "strange peace" in the Far East. One may well wonder why this formidable plan of a far-flung "U.S. zone of defence"—defence against whom? Who will in the near future threaten the security of America across the Pacific?

In view of the curious application of the policy of unconditional surrender in the case of Japan, one cannot believe that all these war-like preparations are meant to be a guarantee against future aggression by the latter. Fear of that danger would have dictated a policy as rigorous as in the case of Germany. As a matter of fact, the curious feature of the situation in the Far East is that Japan was given the opportunity to escape a sure defeat, and she is being handled with velvet gloves, though

with a show of severity. Evidently, the policy is not to treat Japan as Germany is being treated.

If American war-like preparations in the Pacific were meant for defence against future Japanese aggression, the dreaded enemy would hardly be treated like that. Outright destruction of Japan's military power, including industrial disarmament, would have given America all the security in the Pacific, sparing her the enormous expenditure for building up and maintaining a far-flung zone of defence.

It might be an exaggeration to say that the peace in the Far East is overcast by the shadow of war clouds. The stark fact of the situation, nevertheless, is that the avoidance of a civil war in China, thanks to Soviet diplomacy, has not essentially eased the tension of the international situation in the Far East. Otherwise, there would be no occasion for America to launch upon a grandiose programme of war-like preparations to celebrate the peace in the Pacific. And if Japan is not the potential enemy, then the preparations can hardly have any defensive purpose.

The remaining Far Eastern Power is the Soviet Union. China's inclusion in the Big Five is rather a matter of courtesy. Nor can the colossus of the new world fear an attack by Australia. But is there any conceivable ground to suspect any such intention on the part of the Soviet Union? Even the most alarmist anti-Soviet propaganda would not make that palpably absurd charge. America's war-like preparations, therefore, cannot be altogether defensive.

The necessity of Columbia ruling the waves of the Pacific evidently results from the perspective of America having to wage war on the Asiatic mainland. Only for such a war, and only if it is to be waged against a first-class Power, is it necessary for America to acquire complete control of the Northern Pacific so as to transform it into

an armed lake studded with a series of powerful naval bases, and patrolled by a formidable navy? It is evidently preparation for a war with the Soviet Union.

But what is the *casus belli*? China might have been the bone of contention. Soviet diplomacy has made a clear commitment in that respect. By signing a treaty for thirty years, the Soviet Government has pledged itself not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. If America also pursued the policy of hands-off China, there would be no cause for friction with the Soviet Union, and war clouds will disappear from the Far Eastern horizon.

One may not suspect that America has aggressive designs in the Far East. But one cannot deny that she is determined to keep that part of the world out of the influence of any other Power; and in the future, it is again the Soviet Union which will come in the picture. The Sino-Soviet Treaty is bound to have a tremendous moral influence on the internal development of China, and that development will prevent China from becoming the happy hunting ground of surplus American capital. There will be a struggle for the soul of China, so to say, and the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. will be the contending parties, representing two conflicting views about the future of the world.

A danger of the two poles of the post-war world clashing on the issue of China's future thus does not disappear with the spectre of civil war in China, exorcised by Soviet diplomacy. The curious policy of soft peace with Japan is to be explained in the context of that danger. It is an integral part of the grandiose war-like preparations of America in the Pacific.

It took weeks before a token Allied forces landed in Japan, and the American Commander went to Tokyo to accept the latter's formal surrender. But an American Army was despatched without any delay to seize the southern half of Korea, while Japan was still to be

occupied. Could not Korea be left to the Red Army? The Soviet Government has also subscribed to the Cairo agreement that independence should be restored to the Koreans.

It seems that American policy is more suspicious about the Soviet ally than about the defeated enemy. It is of greater importance for the peace in the Pacific to check any possible spread of the dreaded Soviet influence than to disarm Japan. No wonder that this policy has been characterised as "the strange peace in the Pacific".

The Allied policy towards defeated Japan dictated by America, whose claim to the suzerainty of the Far East seems to be taken for granted, is not only causing misgivings, but provoking frank criticism in sober British journals like *The Times* and the *News Chronicle*. Observing that all the pronouncements of the Japanese leaders have one dominant theme—Japan has been defeated because she was not strong enough to accomplish the task undertaken—the London *Times* writes:

"International aggression is out of fashion, at least for the moment; therefore, the Japanese repudiated it as outmoded. Popular government through democratic institutions has emerged triumphant from the world war: therefore, the Japanese will hold new elections, and allow non-official candidates to present themselves. For international security, all these mean little. She did the same after the war of 1914-18, but as soon as division arose among the victors, she decided that she had been wrong to regard democracy as the system destined to rule in the future. Is there any guarantee that her latest conversion will be any more lasting? The answer to this question depends less upon Japan herself than upon the policy followed by the Allies. It is doubtful if this process will be aided by the decision of the Allies to establish no military administration in Japan, but to use the country's own governmental organisation as their instrument; for, the oligar-

chical system remains intact. It will be a long time before the Japanese people can shake themselves free from their dangerous myth of racial superiority."

The liberal *News Chronicle* is even more outspoken: "The Emperor's speech is a direct incitement to the Japanese to begin to recreate forthwith circumstances in terms of which they are able to disrupt the world peace. That Hirohito should have been allowed to address his subjects in such terms will create profound misgivings everywhere. Once again, the Allies are not quick enough on the uptake when it comes to translating a military victory into political terms. Darlan, Badoglio and Doenitz—each was allowed to have his say. Now we have Hirohito exhorting his people to make manifest their innate glory."

In addition to the Emperor's speech ordering the Japanese people to lay down arms, there have been many other significant pronouncements by high-placed persons, which have not attracted sufficient attention. For example, after the surrender, a group of foreign journalists went on a tour of Hiroshima. Speaking to them, the Commander of Japan's greatest naval base, Admiral Kanazawa, declared: "It is all over. Now we can play tennis together. The Japanese people went into the war on orders and stopped fighting on orders. The reason for the latter order is something I do not understand, it was a matter of high policy."

The new Foreign Minister of defeated Japan told pressmen in Tokyo on September 7th: "The Allies will not establish a military government in Japan, but will make requests to the Japanese Government which will then be fully met. The Allies have come to recognise Japan's good faith in the enforcement of the Potsdam Declaration. Out-and-out wartime industries must of course be stopped. But negotiations are going on for speedy reconversion to peace-time industries."

Just when defeated Japan is treated with all the con-

sideration, being granted fullest opportunities to recover from the token defeat soon enough, the plan to transform the Pacific into an armed American lake is announced by President Truman himself. Unless Columbia would rule the waves of the Pacific, with some purpose other than keeping Japan in check, the treatment of defeated Japan seems to be sheer madness. How else can one characterise a policy which lets the wild beast at bay off, and simultaneously proposes to take costly precautions against its future depradations? The American ruling class has certainly not gone mad? Or is there a method in the apparent madness?

The real purpose is revealed by the despatch with which American forces were landed in Korea. The Russians would not be unduly suspicious to regard that as a belligerent act. Their occupation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles could not be objected to without throwing down the veil altogether.

The recent report of the House of Representatives Naval Affairs Committee recommended "complete American strategic domination of the Pacific, including retention after the war of the U.S. bases on the island possessions of other Allies." The President now has approved of the plan and has declared that "by negotiation and all other means, America will retain a whole series of naval bases in the Pacific, and Yokohama will be included in the list."

The report of the House of Representatives Naval Affairs Committee, which recommended the grandiose plan of war-like preparations, also gives a broad hint about its purpose. It urges "a comprehensive economic and psychological policy throughout the Pacific islands, where the population should be indoctrinated to the American way of life as soon as possible without infringing upon their customs and institutions."

In plain language, that is colonisation of islands which

presumably are to serve as the spring-board for the jump at a bigger prize. The most significant point is "indoctrination in the American way of life". Is it not clear enough that the ground is prepared for an ideological war in the Far East? If Americanisation beyond the borders of God's Own Country is a legitimate mission, why raise the bogey of the Bolshevisation of China, while nothing more hair-raising than a democratic revolution is on the order of the day? Yet, on that issue of democratisation of China, the Far East may be the scene of another world war.

Chapter XIX

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

It is hoped that Stalin's speech on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution will offer a constructive leadership to post-war Europe. Since the failure of the first Foreign Ministers' Conference, international relations have been alarmingly deteriorating. In the Far East also, the dramatic conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty does not seem to have produced the expected result. That was an instance of constructive leadership offered by the Russians. If it failed to influence the situation in one part of the world, could it be more successful in another? Time alone will answer this fateful question. Meanwhile, the Soviet leader's pronouncement on November 7th is anxiously awaited. If he does not stand on prestige, the diplomatic deadlock can be easily broken. In that happy eventuality, the Anglo-Soviet alliance will survive the crisis, to become the sheet-anchor of post-war Europe. Otherwise, the future of that tortured and tormented continent will be dark indeed.

The responsibility of saving and cementing the historic alliance rests, in the first place, with the Russians. They have much greater freedom of action than the other partner. The Soviet Union is the most formidable military Power of the world. And before long, the economic foundation of that power, very much shaken by the ravages of the war, will be consolidated. The strong can afford to be liberal.

For Churchill, an alliance with Communist Russia might have been a matter of emergency—an act of bold and masterful opportunism. Had he survived the war as the national leader of Britain, the strange bed-fellow brought by adversity might have been quietly shown the door, if not demonstratively kicked out.

Any such cynical view about a major accident of history became irrelevant when British Democracy put a socialist government in office. The British Labour Party has always been critical of the so-called "Communist methods". As a whole, it may not accept the dogmas of orthodox Marxism. But it pursues the object of replacing Capitalism by Socialism. Its ideas about the means to the end may be "unrealistic"; the method it proposes to follow may not be effective. For the moment, that is a matter of theoretical controversy, which will be settled by experience. But there is absolutely no reason to doubt that the British Labour Party sincerely stands for Socialism; and that fact commits the Labour Government to a foreign policy which cannot conflict with the Anglo-Soviet alliance. Perhaps, concluded as an opportunistic emergency measure by Churchill's War Cabinet, it will unfold its great constructive possibilities when implemented by a Labour Government.

Bevin's first speech outlining the Labour Government's foreign policy did not satisfy impatient leftists inside as well as outside Parliament. His report of the Foreign Ministers' Conference was even more disappointing. There were features in both the speeches which could be reasonably criticised. But no helpful critique could miss the guiding principle of Labour's foreign policy indicated in the first speech: Economic problems should be given preference in any scheme of post-war settlement and reconstruction. The Labour Government's approach to those problems will be socialist. The Labour Government could not easily carry through its programme of a socialist reconstruction of British economy, if European reconstruction took place on the basis of the capitalist *status quo*. Therefore, ultimately, its foreign policy is bound to harmonise with that of the Soviet Union and can be most effectively executed through the instrumentality of the Anglo-Soviet alliance.

The other principle of the doubtfully liberal foreign policy inherited by the Labour Government, namely, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, need not necessarily stultify the progressive (therefore, genuinely liberal) desire to promote the process of democratisation of the economic life of the European peoples liberated from the iron rule of Fascism. If it is legitimate to withhold diplomatic recognition of newly established governments on the ground that they do not conform with certain standards of political Democracy, it should be equally legitimate to do so in order to compel compliance with the requirements of a democratic reorganisation of national economy.

In the contemporary world, complete autonomy in economic matters is even less possible than absolute political independence of nations. Therefore, compliance with mutually beneficial economic practices can be more easily obtained; even diplomatic pressure may not be necessary. The idea of economic sanctions for compelling good behaviour in international relations was incorporated in the League of Nations Covenant—the apotheosis of classical Liberalism.

Briefly speaking, there is no reason why the British Labour Government, consistent with its declared object, should not promote the process of a socialist reconstruction of Europe. A similar development being desirable also from the point of view of the Soviet Union, the advent of a Labour Government in Britain guarantees the continuation of the Anglo-Soviet alliance. A war-time partnership necessarily becomes the pivot of the foreign policy of the new government and the axis of post-war Europe. One of the most fateful accidents of contemporary history may prove itself to be an irresistible expression of the logic of the operation of the forces of social progress.

But, for the moment, history appears to be stultifying herself; actual events seem to be belying expectations. As a matter of fact, on the face of it, inter-Allied relations

have never been so strained since the war-time Anglo-Soviet partnership was formed. While America appears to be trying to prevent further deterioration, the British Labour Government seems to be pulling in the contrary direction. It has even gone to the extent of protesting against certain American diplomatic moves in Eastern Europe, which are evidently meant to be conciliatory for the Soviet Union. Is Bevin going to undo what Churchill did, and might have done? Superficial observers of recent events are bound to be troubled or pleased, according to their respective inclination, by this question.

The situation is complicated. It should not be allowed to drift any longer. It must be tackled by a masterful hand. Therefore, so much importance is attached to Stalin's speech on November 7th.

Those who fear that strong personalities like Bevin and Stalin will clash, do not see the dynamics of history. Bevin is handicapped by the difficult position of the country whose foreign relations must be adjusted to those difficulties. Stalin should be a big enough man to appreciate Bevin's difficulties, sympathise with him and extend a helping hand. He cannot allow the Labour Government to fail, and its success will depend a good deal on how it handles the problem of European reconstruction.

Losing Soviet co-operation, for one reason or another, the British Labour Government will be compelled to be a reluctant party to the American policy of restoring the capitalist *status quo* in Europe on the plausible pretext of non-intervention, which means, veiled intervention in favour of the forces of reaction. For its own safety, the Soviet Union cannot be indifferent to such a possible development. Capitalist restoration will mean revival of Fascism. Because, if in the inter-war period Capitalism could not hold its own without promoting political dictatorship, it will be able to do so even less after it has been irreparably undermined by the anti-fascist war and Fascism itself.

This dangerous reaction can be prevented only by a joint Anglo-Soviet policy of promoting socialist reconstruction of Europe. Failure to adopt that policy, which is essential for the success of the Labour Government even at home, will discredit it seriously, prejudicing its chance of return to office for a second time. And failure of the Labour Government will mean triumph of reaction in Britain, and in our time reaction must necessarily take the form of Fascism.

In its own interest, as well as for the sake of a progressive reconstruction of Europe, the Soviet Union must do everything to head off such an ominous possibility in Britain. It must help the British Labour Government to be successful. Stalin certainly cannot share the naive belief of his romantic followers that failure and discredit of the Labour Government will be the signal for a revolution in Britain. That did not happen in Germany, and one must learn from the bitter experience. Therefore, Stalin is expected to propose a formula for breaking the diplomatic deadlock, and for continued Anglo-Soviet co-operation. It is a test for his statesmanship.

There is a conflict of the concepts of Democracy. In order to safeguard Anglo-Soviet co-operation as against the American policy of restoring the capitalist *status quo*, the Russians must make some concessions to the British notion of Democracy. In other words, unless they are prepared to risk another war, which they will have to wage on two fronts, the Russians must set aside the orthodox communist doctrine of dictatorship. Indeed, they must realise that it is not possible for them to operate in Europe through the instrumentality of the Communist Parties, and yet to save the Anglo-Soviet alliance as the stable foundation of the super-structure of post-war Europe. The practice of backing up the Communist Parties in the Eastern European countries, at all cost, will have to be abandoned. Experience has proved this practice to be not

quite suitable for the social conditions of those backward countries.

Proletarian dictatorship in the transition period may be a theoretically tenable proposition; but it cannot obviously be practised in overwhelmingly agrarian countries. The pragmatic proof offered by the experience of Russia herself cannot be taken as the final argument. An article of faith has no place in political practice, which must be determined by the given conditions.

The decisive question is whether establishment of democratic freedom, not limited by a restoration of the capitalist *status quo*, in the liberated countries of Eastern Europe, indispensably requires a political regime which can make no room for more than one party. The situation will not be improved by squibbling in this respect. It can be stated more crassly, so as to obviate futile controversy on points of fact. Can the parliamentary practice of liberal Democracy, historically associated with Capitalism, be reconciled with the purpose of establishing a higher form of Democracy? In still other words, is not coalition government the more appropriate political regime for the transition period?

The experience of post-war Europe, including the countries directly under Soviet control, answers this crucial question of our time in the affirmative. Some restricted freedom is granted to other parties, even in those countries, simply because the Communist Parties there have a very narrow social base. That being the case, it would be so much easier to help the establishment of genuine coalition governments, backed up by broad People's Fronts. Stalin will have to sanction that practice to vindicate his reputation of an iron-willed realist, and lift the ominous thunder-cloud which is darkening the future of Europe.

The Soviet Government, if not orthodox Communism, has been steadily moving towards this view. Practically in all the countries in the Soviet zone, provisional govern-

ments are based on coalitions of several parties. Everywhere, of course, the Communists, with the backing of the Red Army, hold the whip-hand, so to say. Though nominally coalitions, the provisional governments are therefore covert dictatorships. Nevertheless, the fact that the Russians, who are the real masters of the situation, find it necessary to dispute the allegation that the provisional governments are trying to establish one-party political regimes, is significant.

The fact indicates that they are getting reconciled to the idea of coalition governments. They are coming closer to the western conception of democratic Socialism, which, because it is Socialism, must essentially differ from formal parliamentarism, in so far as this latter functions as the bulwark of the capitalist *status quo*.

Post-war development in France as well as in Britain opens up the perspective of parliaments outgrowing the control of the upper classes. Nor is there much ground for the apprehension that in either of those countries the old State machinery will defy the will of the people expressed through the truly democratised parliaments, or sabotage socialist measures.

The State machinery is manned by the middle class, which has voted for the Socialist Parties in both the countries. The breakdown of capitalist economy and consequent disintegration of the bourgeois society are bringing about a new relation of classes. Capitalist economy no longer offers any future to the middle class in the framework of the bourgeois social order. The middle class, therefore, joins the army of Socialism.

If a majority votes for Socialism, or for a radical reconstruction of the feudal-agrarian social order in the East European countries, there is no need for a revolutionary dictatorship. Social reconstruction can take place under a truly democratic government, even in the formal sense.

Of course, the structure of the democratic State in countries without the tradition of formal parliamentarism need not be cast on the model of the latter. It has obvious defects, the most glaring being that, for all practical purposes, effective political power is withheld from the masses. That is why parliamentary Democracy could function as the bulwark of the capitalist *status quo*, until this latter was rendered completely untenable. In the newly democratised countries, Democracy can be real from the very beginning.

The central fact of the present European situation is that the *status quo ante bellum* has been almost irreparably undermined by the war. It would be a great misfortune if the immense progressive possibilities of this fact were not allowed to unfold themselves by a pedantic dispute between democratic Socialism and dictatorial Communism. It is incredible that the Anglo-Soviet alliance should be wrecked by such a pedantic dispute. In the conditions of Europe, the dispute is totally out of place. To-day, Socialism and Democracy are not mutually exclusive concepts. Democracy can realise itself only in a socialist society; on the other hand, negation of Democracy is not a prerequisite for the establishment of Socialism.

* * *

Stalin did not make the expected speech on the anniversary of the Revolution. For the first time in many years, he was not present at the public celebration. This fact has naturally set afloat a spate of rumours. Was he prevented from speaking? The characteristic Russian secretiveness, often altogether unnecessary, is bound to cause such wild speculation.

On the very day, it was announced by the Moscow Radio that he was going to speak. The announcement naturally created the impression that he had returned to the capital from his holiday. At the time when he was to

speak, the world was on tip-toe. But his voice was not heard on the air. What happened?

Two alternative answers suggest themselves: He suddenly fell ill; or at the eleventh hour he decided not to speak—voluntarily or under compulsion. The suggestion that he might have been prevented from speaking must be ruled out. There is absolutely no reason to believe that his authority has declined in the least. Nor could he be very ill, since earlier in the day he was alright; otherwise, it would not have been announced that he was going to speak.

The more sinister speculation—that he may be dead—is entirely unfounded, because only two weeks ago the American Ambassador in Moscow had visited him at a Black Sea health resort with President Truman's memorandum. He found Stalin in perfect health.

Therefore, while something unexpected happening cannot be altogether ruled out, the mystery of Stalin not making his speech can be traced to a morbid sense of dramatics. The outside world cannot imagine what purpose would be served by creating all this mystery. If, indeed, the purpose is not to conceal the most unfortunate event of Stalin's death, then it may cause unfounded panic, and the morale of the Soviet people may snap just when they are required to measure up to tremendous tasks for repairing the ravages of the war. Although in the given atmosphere of mystery, misgivings cannot be avoided, I am inclined to believe that Stalin changed his mind at the last moment, and his speech was delivered by Molotov at the Moscow Soviet. This may appear to be a rather far-fetched assumption. But for the moment, we can only leave it at that. The mystery will be unravelled before long.

Whatever may be the reason, the fact is that the speech which was expected to throw some light on the future of Europe was not made. Nevertheless, the perspective is

not so very dark as a week ago. During this weak, several other speeches and pronouncements have been made. They are quite reassuring, and they are not *ad hoc*. They were made on the background of a private exchange of views which began with President Truman's letter to Stalin and the latter's "favourable reply".

Even previous to that, President Truman had made yet another diplomatic move calculated to end the deadlock created by the failure of the Foreign Ministers' Conference. The latter ended negatively because of disagreement about the future of the Balkan and East-European countries bordering on the Soviet Union. America and Britain refused to recognise the governments of Roumania and Hungary, for example, until they measured up to the standard of parliamentary Democracy. The Russians, on the other hand, maintained that provisional governments of all those countries enjoyed the support of all sections of the people except the reactionaries who had collaborated with the Axis Powers, and that the provisional governments were arranging for free and fair elections, after which constitutionally democratic regimes would be established.

The issues were not so clearly joined at the Foreign Ministers' Conference. There, the deadlock happened apparently on a procedural question. But had there been no disagreement on fundamentals, the question of procedure would not have presented an insurmountable difficulty. The underlying issues became evident soon after the break-up of the conference, when the American State Department announced that all the former Axis satellite States were the joint concern and responsibility of the Big Three, and that the conclusion of any long-term economic agreement should be jointly done by the Big Three.

That announcement was a double-edged sword. While clearly disputing Russia's right to enter into agreements with the States bordering on her western frontier

without Britain and America also being party to any such agreement, the announcement made concessions to the Soviet point of view regarding the issue on which apparently the Foreign Ministers' Conference could not agree. It was tacitly admitted that France and China need not participate in discussions which did not concern them directly. That had been stipulated in the Potsdam declaration, and in the London Conference Molotov refused to agree to any revision of it.

Disregarding the express meaning of the American announcement, which was not friendly towards it, Moscow nevertheless responded quickly. An official spokesman welcomed the American desire to participate in the economic reconstruction of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and suggested that, for that purpose, the American Government should cultivate closer relation with the established governments of those countries. That was a broad hint—America should recognise the provisional governments of those countries as legally constituted governments, as the condition for being a party to any economic agreements with them.

Washington was not slow to take the hint. President Truman sent a liberal newspaper owner, Mark Ethridge, as his special envoy to investigate the situation on the spot and report. The appointment aroused keen interest, and the general opinion was that the mission was a mere formality which would make it easier for the American Government to extend diplomatic recognition to the governments of the Balkan and Eastern European countries, until then regarded as "Soviet puppets".

An early easing of the tense situation became possible by the Russians at the same time realising that in those predominantly agrarian countries governments dominated, even covertly, by Communists could not have a sufficiently broad democratic support, and therefore could be maintained only with the backing of the Red Army. The point

was clinched by the Budapest municipal election, in which the Agrarian Democratic Smallholders Party inflicted a heavy defeat on the combined Socialists and Communists. Marshall Voroshilov's recommendation that the election should take place on the basis of a single list, including candidates of the three parties, was not accepted by the Agrarian Democrats. They defied the wish of the all-powerful Commander of the Red Army, and yet won the election. That was a pointer which Moscow could not possibly ignore. Since then, Soviet policy has been to allow greater freedom to non-communist parties. That was an approximation of the Anglo-Saxon idea of democratic practice.

It is not yet publicly known what sort of a report Ethridge made. Presumably, it was less biassed than that of the Service diplomats, who are known to sympathise with the old regime, and are distrustful of any innovation. All the disagreements and difficulties can be reduced to a conflict of the concepts of Democracy. Is Democracy possible except in the form of parliamentarism as known in the Anglo-Saxon countries and Western Europe?

Presumably, having received from Ethridge a report that in the Soviet-occupied parts of Europe things were not so bad as depicted by biassed observers, President Truman decided to take the bull by the horn. It had been suggested from different quarters that the Big Three should meet in order to end the deadlock created by the failure of the Foreign Ministers' Conference. But who was to take the initiative? Would Stalin care to come to a conference? The intrepid unconventionalism of Churchill was no longer available, simply to fly to Moscow and talk it over with Stalin. Moreover, the American Government wanted to capture the leadership, most probably with a sinister motive—to undermine the Anglo-Soviet alliance. Bevin and Molotov had quarrelled. Why not please Stalin

with a liberal gesture, and insinuate that Imperialist Britain is the devil of the piece?

After some preliminary exchange of views, to assure that there would be no rebuff, President Truman addressed a letter to Stalin. The American Ambassador in Moscow went where the latter was taking his holiday, to deliver the epistle personally, and returned with an answer which President Truman found to be "favourable". The content of that historic correspondence still remains a secret. It is also not known whether London was consulted by President Truman. In any case, Bevin did not protest. Evidently, he also wanted the ice to be broken. Unfortunately, he did not take the initiative, and the result of that failure might have prejudiced the future of Europe, if Anglo-Soviet co-operation was not an indispensable necessity for a democratic reconstruction of that devastated continent. Europe cannot be reconstructed on any other basis.

The contents of the Truman-Stalin correspondence remained publicly unknown. But soon thereafter, the American Secretary of State made a public declaration which could be regarded as its consequence. On October 31st, he made a public statement of American foreign policy, which included the following declaration:

"We have sympathised with the efforts of the Soviet Union to draw into closer and more friendly association with her Central and Eastern European neighbours. We are fully aware of her special security interests in those countries, and we have recognised those interests in the arrangements made for the occupation and control of former enemy States. We can appreciate the determination of the people of the Soviet Union that never again will they tolerate pursuit of policies in those countries deliberately directed against the Soviet Union's security and way of life, and America will never join any groups in those countries in hostile intrigue against the Soviet Union."

That was a full retreat from the position taken up

at the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Soon thereafter, President Truman made a more comprehensive statement of the foreign policy of his administration. Though he made no special reference to the relation with Russia, the policy in that respect proclaimed a few days ago by the Secretary of State could very well fit into the general scheme outlined by the President. The situation was showing signs of improvement in the beginning of the month.

It remained for the other two parties to speak out. Thereafter, the atmosphere might be congenial for convening a Big Three meeting or for the Foreign Ministers' Conference to resume where it had broken off. Since the American announcement was presumably a sequel to the Truman-Stalin correspondence, it was anticipated that the Soviet leader would reply in his speech on November 7th. At the same time, the Truman announcement gave the British Government the occasion for a parliamentary debate on foreign policy on the eve of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington.

Indeed, knowing neither the content nor the outcome of the Truman-Stalin correspondence, progressive opinion in Britain pressed for the Labour Government taking initiative to end the diplomatic deadlock. Attlee's decision to have a personal talk with President Truman must have been made at least partially under that pressure. The object of the proposed visit could not be limited to a discussion of the atom bomb secret. Any meeting of the heads of two governments, under the given circumstances, was bound to cover the whole ground of international relations. The problems, particularly those of the Anglo-American-Soviet relations, were so interconnected that no single one could be discussed and solved without touching all of them. As soon as Attlee's visit was announced, a well informed press correspondent wrote from Washington: "While control of the atomic bomb is the motivating purpose of the meeting, the President and the Prime Minis-

ter will examine the whole range of outstanding Anglo-American issues and their bearing upon world peace and European treaties . . . . London sat quietly on the side-line while Washington proudly fondled the new bomb. And the more Washington did so, the more Moscow bristled over a score of points at issue in various Allied gatherings, and the more the appearance developed of America and Russia as prime rivals in the post-war world."

In Britain, powerful voices were raised urging the Labour Government to straighten out the relation with the Soviet Union. For instance, Zilliacus, a Labour M.P., who had been associated with the League of Nations for twenty years, wrote: "We Labour Members were returned by voters who, among other things, expected us to drop the Tory policy of hostility to the Soviet Union, and to get together with that country; but this has not yet happened."

The veteran journalist, A. J. Cummings, wrote in the *News Chronicle*: "Why we expect the Russians to trust us and abandon their territorial defences after withholding from them even in war time the achievement of the atom bomb, and while we are still debating the peril of passing on knowledge freely to the Soviet Government with which we have a Twenty Years alliance? What is the use of asking the Russians to trust us if we have not got the courage to trust them? In an atom age, Britain will be one of the most vulnerable countries of the world. It will be a pretty poor outlook for the British people if we remain at daggers drawn with the greatest military Power in Europe."

Finally, on November 6th, the voice from Moscow was heard. It was not Stalin's voice. That was a disappointment. But it was a reassuring voice, and the fact that it was Molotov who spoke was all the more welcome. Addressing the Moscow Soviet, on the eve of the anniver-

sary of the Revolution, in the place of Stalin, Molotov declared:

"The failure of the Five Foreign Ministers' Conference was not fatal. Such differences of opinion had occurred before during the war. But there is still much to be done to implement the decisions taken at Yalta. The strength of the Anglo-American-Soviet coalition is now being tested in peace. It could not, however, be expected that the Soviet people would treat like friends all of those who were their former enemies in the Axis camp. . . . Following the defeat of the Axis, a number of fascist and semi-fascist countries in Europe had turned democratic. They must not be interfered with. On the contrary, they must be helped."

The last passage is highly significant. It clearly indicates Soviet readiness to make concessions to the Anglo-Saxon notion of democratic practice in the political reconstruction of the Balkan and East-European countries. That was a generous gesture in response to Byrnes' declaration that America had no intention to back up any anti-Soviet bloc.

Bevin spoke in the Parliament before the full text of Molotov's speech could have reached him. Therefore, he spoke more on the Truman declaration; and that was proper, because the parliamentary debate on foreign policy was held in that connection. Nevertheless, the British Foreign Secretary also made some significant remarks about the future of Anglo-Soviet relations. He said:

"There is a conflict of principle that only time, understanding and conciliation can reconcile. You get a frightful nightmare of insecurity arising at every turn. On the other hand, you have the principle of co-operation as the goal. Great difficulties arise largely because of the terrific struggle of the last six years as to whether or not you can entirely obliterate what are called spheres of influence and power-politics. But the next moment you

seem to be searching and striving for other ideals. So, I would ask the House not to be too impatient in this transitional period. I appeal to the Great Powers on behalf of the British Government—and we are ready to do it—to put their cards on the table—face upwards. We will take no step, we will do nothing nor allow any of our agents or diplomats to do anything, to stir up hatred or to provoke a situation detrimental to Russia in Eastern countries."

Unfortunately, Bevin's tone was not altogether free of bitterness. The Soviet press has not been very kind in its criticism of the Labour Government's foreign policy. The Communists have still to get over their morbid distrust for the British Labour leaders, and discard the habit of questioning the motives of the latter. Men like Bevin, on their part, could be less subjective while discussing large international issues. However, Churchill seized the occasion to prove that the Anglo-Soviet alliance was not an emergency measure—an opportunist move on his part. Opening the debate, he said:

"It is the absolute desire of this House that those feelings of comradeship which have developed between the British and Russian peoples should not only be preserved but repeatedly expanded. I would say how glad we are to know that Generalissimo Stalin is still strongly holding the helm and steering his tremendous ship. I cannot feel anything but most lively admiration for this truly great man, father of his country, ruler of his country's destinies in times of peace, and its victorious defender in times of war. Even if we should develop a strong difference on many aspects of policy with the Soviet Government, no state of mind must be allowed to occur in this country which ruptures or withers those great associations between our two peoples which were our glory and our safety in the late frightful convulsion. I feel it necessary to pay this tribute to Soviet Russia; with all her tragic load of

suffering, all her losses and devastations, all her enduring qualities, any idea of Britain deliberately pursuing an anti-Russian policy or making elaborate combinations to the detriment of Russia, is utterly opposed to British thought and conscience."

While Stalin's absence from the historic scene at Moscow is causing anxiety, Molotov's speech is welcomed in Britain with a sigh of relief. The *Times*, for instance, describes the speech as "statesmanlike" and writes: "There is nothing either in the tone or tenor of it to suggest that an agreement was out of reach. In the minds of most members (of Parliament), the dominant issue in international affairs to-day is not so much the relation between Britain and the United States, but relations between those two countries and the Soviet Union. The Anglo-Soviet alliance is one of the legacies of this war and whose necessity has been demonstrated by it."

Even before the debate, Lord Beaverbrook's *Daily Express* made a sensation by appearing one day with a two-line editorial. It was: "Try to understand Russia."

SECTION FIVE

LOST OPPORTUNITIES

Chapter XX

DURING THE WAR

Descartes expounded a mechanistic view of the Universe after making the pious observation that, of course, the world was created by God, but it would be interesting to imagine how it could have come to be all by itself. Similarly, while proposing to show how the history of the contemporary world might have been different, I also make the following concession to the determinist view, which does not distinguish itself from fatalism: Of course, all historical events are determined; yet it would be interesting to see how they could be differently determined. After all, it was the propounder of historical determinism who said "man makes history". If history makes room for heroes, for men who are not mere marionettes, but who make history, Stalin is certainly one of them. He was, and still is, in a position to shape the future of the world. For the moment, the future does not appear to be very bright. Could he not have acted differently?

This question cannot simply be dismissed as speculative, unless we are prepared to say that ours is the best possible world; and that historical determinism is only another name for Providential Will, as Shaw once remarked. Those who believe that man makes history must logically admit that alternative lines of development are possible in any given situation. It is idle to complain against a state of affairs unless one can show how it could be different.

I don't believe that ours is the best possible world, or that something better is going to come out of it automatically; nor do I believe that the uninspiring present and the dreadful future were inevitable. An objective historian must reject the fatalist doctrine of inevitability. The hero

of our time, he who was in a position to make history, could have done a better job. To answer the question why he failed, is the duty of the objective, dispassionate, students of history. In discharge of that duty, I propose to show how the hero could have acted differently, and created a better world. The answer to the question why he did not, will be implicit in the delineation of the alternative possibility.

The German attack on Russia in June 1941 marked a turning point not only in the course of the war, but also of the history of our time. The war itself, as it broke out nearly two years earlier, was an accident. Even the closest observers of events could not predict the almost certain flare-up beginning that way. Indeed, it was contrary to all expectations. But the German attack on Russia was predetermined, as much as any historical event is predetermined, and therefore could be predicted by scientific students of history. Had not Hitler made that mistake, the war most probably would have ended differently. To attack Russia, when he did, was a mistake on the part of Hitler. It was not a treacherous act, as Stalin thoughtlessly characterised it. If Stalin ever expected Hitler to be loyal to any pact with the Soviet Union, he was either a fool or something worse. It would never be known whether Stalin really believed that Nazi Germany and Communist Russia could make a common cause against Imperialist Britain. What he did believe, most probably, was that, on account of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Hitler would delay the attack on Russia, giving the latter some more time to prepare for the eventuality. By not acting according to Stalin's expectation, Hitler committed a blunder; and that was a fortunate event for the Soviet Union as well as for the rest of the world. Of course, it was a matter of touch and go. For a time, the future of the world hang in the balance.

The German attack on the Soviet Union was the most critical moment of contemporary history. Either the Soviet Union would be destroyed and the whole of Europe subjected to triumphant Fascism; or the defeat of Hitler in consequence of his mistake would open up a new era of modern history, with Communist Russia as the leader of Europe. The latter development would be the fitting sequel to the Russian Revolution. After the defeat of Fascism, liberated Europe would not return to the *status quo ante bellum*. Fascism had grown out of the decay of the capitalist social order. The unsettled conditions of the inter-war period had made the inadequacies of parliamentary democracy palpable. It was evident to all thinking minds and progressive spirits that democracy could be saved and consolidated only by a radical reorganisation of the economic life of the modern European society. The Russian experiment had demonstrated that the necessary reorganisation was possible; that there was a practical alternative to decayed capitalism. The war conclusively proved the success of the collectivist Soviet economy. But for the robustness of the new economic relations and the soundness of the industrial organisation built on the new collectivist basis, the amazing achievements of the Red Army would be inconceivable. Even a die-hard capitalist like Lord Beaverbrook testified that Communism in Russia had produced the most powerful army and the greatest of generals of our time.

There could be little doubt that the post-war reconstruction of Europe would be on the pattern so successfully established in the Soviet Union. Russian leadership of liberated Europe, therefore, appeared to be a foregone conclusion. The anti-fascist war promised to be the greatest revolutionary event of history. Its result was to be the whole of Europe flying the banner of revolution, which had attained initial victory in Russia thirty years ago. The Nazi war machine having failed to destroy the Soviet

Union, a heartening perspective was opened up before Europe. The history of the world was on the point of turning a new chapter of great promise and incalculable possibilities.

Nevertheless, after the capitulation of Germany, the Soviet Union has been rapidly losing the position of vantage it had gained during the war. Until the war ended, its moral prestige was sky-high. A year after the war ended, the Soviet Union was almost as isolated as it had been after the conclusion of the pact with Nazi Germany. The heartening perspective of Europe, liberated from Fascism, marching towards genuine democratic freedom under the leadership of revolutionary Russia is clouded by grave misgivings. Europe is split up into two parts. The Russians are frankly apprehensive of the formation of an anti-Soviet Western Bloc. They could not prevent it, even though the Communist Party became a major factor in France, and the other two leading parties in that pivotal country of the prospective Western Bloc are undoubtedly democratic and not unfriendly disposed towards the Soviet Union. In Britain also, the Russians are fast forfeiting the vast store of good will built up during the war. That unfortunate fact is evidenced by the critical, even hostile, attitude publicly taken up by journalists who have for years been ardently pro-Soviet.

There is plenty of evidence to the effect that the Russians have not succeeded in making themselves welcome even in the countries occupied by the Red Army. In some of those countries, Communists have not fared well in the elections, indicating that the Russian leadership has not been spontaneously accepted even in the eastern half of Europe which is now the Soviet zone. Peace seems to be as far as ever, and another war may indeed be nearer.

Already in 1942 it could be foreseen that the post-war world would be polarised as between the U.S.A. and the

U.S.S.R. But in that process of differentiation between the defenders of the dying and the renascent worlds, the whole of Europe, liberated from Fascism, was naturally to gravitate towards the pole represented by the U.S.S.R. In 1946, a year after the defeat of the Fascist Powers, not only is Europe divided, but they actually talk of a war between Washington and Moscow for the domination of that tortured and tormented continent. Soviet diplomacy seems to be entirely indifferent to that possible danger. Indeed, its object evidently is to secure strategic control of the half of Europe to the east of a line drawn from Stettin to Trieste. That policy represents an admission of failure to assume the leadership of post-war Europe. And a division of Europe, mainly out of strategic considerations, would surely prepare the ground for another war.

Given sufficient time, the Russians may be able to consolidate their position in the eastern half of Europe so as to emerge victorious out of the next war. But will they be given the time? And what will be the consequence of another large-scale war? The only consolation is that neither side will deliberately precipitate another war. But the situation is getting more and more tense every day. In such an atmosphere, any thoughtless act may cause the flare-up. Provocations are coming from both sides. Another war, which by no stretch of imagination or wishful thinking could be ruled out, will mean complete ruin of Europe and collapse of modern civilisation. The Soviet Union itself will not escape the catastrophe, as it once did, fortunately, five years ago.

The war potential of America remains intact, while the economic resources of the Soviet Union are too exhausted, and its industrial organisation much too strained to stand the impact of another large-scale military operation in the near future. Moreover, the Soviet Union will be completely isolated; the buffer States of Eastern Europe and the Balkans will be weak as well as undepend-

able allies. In contrast, the U.S.A. will in no time be able to revive the defeated Fascist armies of Europe. With Franco's Spain as the bridgehead, an uninterrupted flow of war materials will come from the transatlantic arsenals to equip European reaction in a crusade against the U.S.S.R. And it will be a war on two fronts. In addition to China, nationalist India will be a willing base of operation against Russia.

If an international war could be avoided at least for the time being, Russian policy might provoke civil war in some of the countries of Western Europe, France and Italy, for instance, where the sufficiently powerful Communist Parties are sure to strive for the establishment of political regimes which will be ready to accept Russian leadership. Neither in France nor in Italy, not to mention other countries of Western Europe, are the Communist Parties likely to succeed peacefully. The democratic middle-classes there are losing confidence in Communism and are rallying round progressive Christian parties which are committed to far-reaching social reconstruction consistent with the traditions of the countries. Communist attempts to capture power by other means will surely precipitate civil war and will open the floodgates of the next world conflagration to consume modern civilisation. The perspective thus is gloomy indeed.

The Russians have missed the almost sure chance of becoming the leader of post-war Europe. Having missed the chance, they are pursuing a policy which may be disastrous for the world, including themselves. How did this happen? Could not the Russians act differently, and at least help the post-war Europe of liberated democracy shape its destiny, avoiding the danger of another war?

History almost predetermined that, liberated from Fascism, Europe would turn its back on the ruins of capitalism and march towards a new era of greater freedom and higher civilisation under Russian leadership. But the

Russians failed to rise up to the occasion. They would not stoop to conquer. They could not adjust their behaviour to the new atmosphere in which they were to operate after the collapse of the fascist military might. They disregarded the fact that the peoples of Western Europe have a tradition of democracy, which was the issue of the war as far as they were concerned. They failed to realise that, to triumph in Western Europe the revolution must reconcile itself with that tradition, which itself was the legacy of an earlier revolution. They would not trust anyone but their henchmen, who call themselves Communists, who had discredited themselves by their behaviour in the earlier stages of the war, and who are advocates of the idea of dictatorship, so very repugnant to the democratic tradition of Western Europe. The greatest mistake of the Russians was their failure to imagine that the revolution which actually held Europe in its grip could have different patterns, and might even open up the vista of a future not according to their preconceived notions.

Man not only makes history, but can mar it also. It seems that the Russians are playing that negative role. I defended practically every act of theirs during the last fateful decade. They committed several mistakes, but thanks to their position of vantage they could rectify the mistakes and make history instead of marring it. A review of events will show that they could have acted differently in several crucial moments.

The Soviet-German Pact of 1939 was a forced move. It might have encouraged Hitler to precipitate the war in a manner he had not intended. But the persistent policy of the Western Powers to appease him at all cost did not leave the Soviet Union any other alternative than to seek security in an obviously opportunist and precarious pact with Nazi Germany.

I was one of the very few, not only in this country but throughout the world, who on that ground justified the apparently unprincipled action of the Soviet Government. Nevertheless, in consequence thereof, the Soviet Union was morally isolated. It forfeited the sympathy of many erstwhile supporters, and friends who remained loyal found it extremely difficult to explain the conduct. As a matter of fact, the blind followers, namely, the Communists in other countries, actually believed that the Soviet Union had entered into an alliance with Fascism. They thus corroborated the avowed enemies of the Soviet Union, who characterised the Soviet-German Pact as the marriage of Fascism and Communism, which, in their opinion, were two sides of the same medal. Apart from the moral isolation of the Soviet Union, the pact threw the international Communist movement in a state of hopeless confusion.

Interpreting the forced move erroneously, the Communist Parties actually operated as the fifth column of the Axis Powers, and consequently discredited themselves irreparably. There is reason to believe that they acted in that shameful manner on orders from Moscow. It was not necessary for the Russians to have gone that far. Therefore, it can be suspected that they did not conclude the pact with Nazi Germany altogether as an emergency measure.* It was a part of their great blunder of misjudging the war as an imperialist war, of appreciating Fascism as a lesser evil compared to Imperialism.† Much too

* *See note at the end of the Chapter* (P. 360).

† "In reply to my incidental question, he commented on the Anglo-Soviet negotiations to the effect that, under the present circumstances, the result desired by England could hardly be achieved." (From a German Foreign Office memorandum dated May 17th, about a conversation between the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires Astakhov and Schnurre.)

In a report to Berlin, the German Ambassador in Moscow wrote on May 20th, 1940:

"There is no reason for apprehension concerning Cripps' mission, since there is no reason to doubt the loyal attitude of the Soviet Union towards us and since the unchanged direction of Soviet policy towards England precludes damage to Germany or vital German interests. There

belatedly, Stalin himself admitted the mistake when, months after the war was over, he declared that it had been an anti-fascist war from the very beginning. In any case, that mistake on the part of the Russians, whether it was of omission or commission, apart from other consequences, demoralised and discredited the international Communist movement. In the very beginning of the war, I said that Communism was its first major casualty. The Russians endorsed that view by liquidating the Communist International two years later.

If the Soviet-German Pact was a forced move on the part of the Russians, they could have availed of the first opportunity to regain the ground lost in consequence thereof. The opportunity came when the Germans attacked France. Instead of seizing the occasion for attacking Germany, thereby putting an end to their moral isolation, and appearing on the stage as the saviour of Europe, the Russians callously watched the fall of France.* Objective students of history cannot exonerate them entirely of the responsibility for that tragedy which, but for Hitler's subsequent mistake, might have been a boomerang for the Russians themselves. Whether that was a deliberate policy or a miscalculation, nobody will ever know for

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are no indications of any kind here for the belief that the latest German successes caused alarm or fear of Germany in the Soviet Government."

"He (Stalin) did not see any danger of the hegemony of any one country in Europe and still less any danger that Europe might be engulfed by Germany. Stalin observed the policy of Germany, and knew several leading German statesmen well. He had not discovered any desire on their part to engulf European countries. Stalin was not of the opinion that German military successes menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations with Germany. These relations were not based on transient circumstances, but on the basic national interests of both countries." (From a memorandum given by Molotov, on the instruction of Stalin, to the German Ambassador in Moscow about Stalin's conversation with Cripps.)

* On May 7th, 1940, Ribbentrop directed the German Ambassador in Moscow to inform Molotov that the Nazi army was moving towards France through Belgium and Holland. The Ambassador replied on May 10th:

"I called on Molotov; instruction carried out. Molotov appreciated the news and added that he understood that Germany had to protect herself against Anglo-French attack. He had no doubt of our success."

certain, unless Stalin will write a truthful autobiography. I prefer to take the charitable view and regard it as a mistake, and therefore maintain that the Russians could have just as well acted differently, turning the tide of the war and influencing history so as to head off the present dangerously critical position.

The Russians passively watching, and perhaps indirectly helping, the Germans overrun France, cannot be justified by any political consideration. It would be grotesque to argue that the Russians were bound by the moral obligation of the pact with Nazi Germany. That argument would rule out the only justification for Communists entering into a pact with the Fascists, namely, that it was an emergency measure for self-defence. The Russians would severely condemn themselves at the bar of history if they ever argued that, by signing the pact with Nazi Germany, they had morally bound themselves to connive with all the subsequent acts of fascist aggression.*

Only strategic considerations could have persuaded the Russians to let Nazi Germany have a free hand to overrun the whole of Western Europe and threaten invasion of Britain. That was a miscalculation, amounting to incredible stupidity. By that mistake, the Soviet Union exposed itself to the gravest danger. Only a greater mistake on the part of Hitler saved it from the catastrophe.

The strategic consideration hypothetically was to gain time for completing the preparations for the inevitable showdown. Fascism had grown as reaction to the danger of proletarian revolution. The avowed purpose of National-

* Reporting that he had informed Molotov that Germany was invading Denmark and Norway, Schulenburg wrote to Ribbentrop on April 17th, 1940:

"Instruction carried out with Molotov to-day at 10-30 A.M. European time. Molotov declared that the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced upon Germany. The English had certainly gone much too far; they had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations. In conclusion, Molotov said literally: 'We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures.'"

Socialism was to save European civilisation from the canker of Marxism eating into its vitals. Hitler came to power with the sole objective of destroying the Soviet Union and expanding German power to the East. The Russians had not failed to take notice of that menace, and had been preparing to meet it eventually. The industrial development of the Soviet Union had been planned primarily with the object of equipping and supplying a powerful army. The preparation had been going on for nearly ten years. If by 1940 the Red Army and the Soviet industrial organisation were not yet up to the mark, a few months more would make little difference. If the Russians did not believe in the possibility of an abiding alliance between Fascism and Communism, they should have had no illusion about the movement of the Nazi war machine after it had destroyed the French Army. It would certainly turn eastwards to settle accounts with its natural enemy.

The strategic consideration, therefore, was also against Soviet neutrality when Germany attacked France. That was the moment for the Red Army to strike, and compel Germany to fight on two fronts. Later on, the Russians clamoured for a second front against Germany. But they would not open one when it was for them to do so, and by doing so they could shorten the war perhaps by several years and reduce the destruction and suffering of Europe proportionately. The risk was negligible. During the one year's time, gained by the questionable policy of neutrality in the international civil war, the Red Army was perhaps reinforced by a few more divisions and some additional tanks, guns and planes. As against that, the whole army of France was at stake. Therefore, the risk of throwing the Red Army in action a year earlier was worth taking. An attack from the east would have prevented Hitler from throwing his entire might against France. Not only the French Army might have thus escaped destruction; a timely attack would have proved to be effective defence of the Soviet Union itself. Partially engaged by the French

Army, saved thanks to timely Soviet action, the Nazi war machine could not subsequently throw its whole weight against the Soviet Union. Consequently, it could not penetrate so far into the Soviet territory, and the Russian people would have been spared much of the devastation and suffering.

Moreover, it is a doubtful strategy to wait until attacked. To attack, when the bulk of the Nazi Army was moving westwards, would have been a superior strategy. Neutrality, indeed, tied the hands of the Russians even as regards preparations for the eventual showdown. They could not freely move troops and supplies near enough to the frontiers without provoking suspicion of the strange bed-fellow. Because of that handicap, resulting from neutrality, the Red Army could not stop the initial German offensive penetrating deep into Soviet territory.

So, the policy of neutrality, which morally isolated the Soviet Union, produced a negative result strategically also. On the other hand, had the Red Army been thrown into action, at a negligible risk, to prevent the fall of France, not only the entire course of the war might have been different; the Soviet Union would have recovered the ground lost politically and morally in consequence of having concluded the pact with Germany; the world would have been convinced that it was a forced move—an emergency measure for self-defence. The prestige of the Soviet Union would have risen sky-high overnight. Appearing as saviours, at the zero hour, the Russians would have been hailed as leaders of Europe. The Franco-Soviet alliance, partially nullified at Munich, would have been reaffirmed in action. Out of gratitude for the Russians, the French people would not tolerate a government favouring any other foreign relation.

Yet another consideration might have conceivably determined Russian policy. It was the apprehension that the French Government would capitulate and the French

Army not fight in any case. That was an unfounded suspicion. The fact is that, whatever might have been the personal predilection of some military leaders, the French Army as a whole was simply outmanoeuvered, and the government did not throw off its hands before the Germans actually appeared at the gates of Paris. Russian intervention would certainly have changed the relation of forces on the fields of Netherlands and France. The British Expeditionary Force was also there. Consequently, the German Army would have met greater resistance. The French Government would have had time to arrest political demoralisation, and reinforce itself. Finally, it must not be forgotten that Petain himself had all along been the staunchest supporter of an alliance with Russia. The Russians rushing to the help of France in that crucial moment might have encouraged the veteran Marshal to act differently, and the French Army would have rallied round its doyen.

However, what the Russians apprehended did happen eventually. The entire might of the Nazi war machine was thrown against them. It would have made no difference if that occurred a little earlier. When it did happen, the apprehension of the Russians that they would be left to fight all alone was exposed to be groundless. By then, France had been eliminated. But Britain acted as the Russians would have never believed. They let down France; yet imperialist Britain behaved differently. The mistakes of the Russians, which have robbed them of the proud privilege of leading post-war European democracy, can all be traced to their ideological bigotry—to ignore all human values and believe selfishness to be the sole motive of action.

As a matter of fact, continued neutrality was more risky for the Russians themselves. But for Hitler's foolish haste in attacking the Soviet Union, Stalin's cleverness might have been its undoing, and incidentally the whole

of Asia as well as Europe come under the domination of the Axis Powers. The failure of the Red Army to strike at the opportune moment when the bulk of his forces was overrunning Western Europe, encouraged Hitler to attack the Soviet Union, believing that it was too weak to resist. There was an alternative strategy for him. Failing to invade Britain, the Axis war machine could be turned to the opposite direction, to break through the Balkans and Turkey, and to strike at Britain through the backdoor, so to say. The consequence of that move, which Hitler was free to make, thanks to Russian neutrality, would have been complete encirclement of the Soviet Union, the European Fascist Powers joining up with the Asiatic partner of the Axis alliance.

The long line of communication was no consideration against that alternative strategy on the part of the Axis Powers. Firstly, the distance would be not much greater than that to the Caucasus through White Russia and the Ukraine. Secondly, while in the latter case every mile had to be protected against a tenacious enemy, in the former, it would pass through friendly territories. The Axis armies would have found allies in the Asiatic peoples. Coming on the pretence of liberators from the British yoke, they would have established their domination in the whole of Asia with the cooperation of their beguiled victims.

Then, the Soviet Union could be assailed from all sides. It would be completely isolated geographically. The Anglo-American help, which enabled it to stem the tide of Nazi invasion, would in that case not be available. Hitler's mistake or impatience, whatever it might have been, alone saved the Soviet Union from that catastrophic consequence of the policy of neutrality. It could be avoided by the Red Army attacking Germany to help France at a very negligible risk, and with the certainty of rehabilitating the moral prestige of the Soviet Union and capturing the leadership of European democracy.

Post-war Europe accepting Soviet leadership presupposed a Napoleonic period of the Russian Revolution. Stalin's entire policy ever since 1925, when he captured the leadership in Russia, was determined by that perspective. He set about the task of building an army which would not only be able to defend the Soviet Union against any attack, but in due course of time carry to Europe the flag of revolution—just as Napoleon's army did after the French Revolution. To wait for the enemy to attack was certainly not Napoleonic strategy. In the summer of 1940, when Hitler had sent the major part of his army to the West, about one hundred divisions of the Red Army were deployed along a line running through the middle of Poland. Berlin was within a striking distance; so also were the nerve-centres of Germany in the south-west. The non-aggression pact had convinced the Nazis that the Red Army was too weak to attack. Therefore, the eastern front of Germany most probably was not so very heavily guarded. In any case, if the Red Army attacked in the summer of 1940, the war would be waged on the German soil, and the Russian people spared the ordeal of an invasion. The mistaken policy of continued neutrality was the first setback to Red Napoleonism which would have made Russia the leader of post-war Europe.

Having missed the first chance to capture the leadership of Europe, the Russians eventually committed yet another mistake, which ruled out the possibility of Red Napoleonism. It was the apparently desperate cry for a second front against Germany. For a time, the Russians might have been unnerved. But it is very doubtful if Stalin lost confidence for a moment. In the midst of the clamour for a second front, one could not miss the confident declaration—"We shall beat the enemy on our own strength". Stalin had let the first opportunity pass because he believed that another year for giving the final touches

to his military preparations would ensure the success of Red Napoleonism.

The cry for a second front had an entirely different purpose. It was to create in the mind of the European peoples suspicion about the earnestness of the Anglo-American allies to fight Fascism, so that they would look upon the Russians as their saviours. The demand for the second front could, therefore, be appreciated only as the political strategy of Red Napoleonism. But it defeated its own purpose; it was the second great mistake of the Russians. And Stalin personally should be held responsible.

None but the blind Soviet partisans in other countries could be convinced that Britain, particularly, was not serious about fighting the Axis Powers, and would let Russia go down even if she could help. There were so many facts to the contrary. Firstly, the way the British Government reacted to the German attack on Russia; secondly, the twenty years' alliance with Russia, concluded on the initiative of the British Government; and thirdly, the prompt supply of war materials, which partially compensated for the loss of Soviet industrial centres and thus substantially helped the Red Army survive the initial impact of invasion. But it was not all a matter of good will. The Red Army was actually fighting Britain's battles. If Russia was defeated, even to the extent of the German army breaking through the Caucasus, the whole of Asia would be at the mercy of the Axis Powers. India would go, and the British Empire in the East be a thing of the past. Indeed, the battle for India was fought at the foot of the Caucasus. Britain was bound to do everything in her power to prevent the Germans win that fateful battle.

To demand for the opening of a second front, which would serve more than a diversionary purpose, was evidently incompatible with the perspective of Red Napoleonism. The Machiavellian motive of the demand was not generally understood. In the mind of the average

European, it created the belief that not only the liberation of Europe, but the very existence of the Soviet Union itself, depended upon Britain and America. The mistaken, or much too clever, policy of discrediting Britain and America served the contrary purpose. The Russians forfeited the right of the leadership of post-war Europe, which was to be established by the liberating role of Red Napoleonism, and actually conceded that privilege to the Anglo-American allies, whom they wanted to discredit.

That was a tragedy of error. For, as a matter of fact, the Nazi war machine was smashed by the Red Army. The strategic value of the second front was negligible. The Red Army could have broken into Germany before long, if even after the second front was opened, the bulk of the German Armies did not remain on the eastern front. It was therefore that the Americans could sweep through France. They met practically no resistance, even on the Rhine. The second front did not render the Red Army's three-pronged march to the heart of Germany any easier. Every inch of the war was tenaciously fought by the maximum might of the German army. The Germans let the American invaders walk across the country right up to the Czech frontier in order to concentrate all their forces to hold Zhukov's army at the eastern approaches of Berlin.

These and many other facts prove that the Red Army alone could have reduced Hitler's fortress of Europe, helped by the Anglo-American air force pulverising German industrial centres, and supplies pouring into Russia in increasing quantities. The correct policy for the Russians, consistent with the perspective of Red Napoleonism, of carrying revolution to Europe, would have, therefore, been to press for more and more of that help. In that case, having smashed the hardest core of German military might on the road to Berlin, the Red Army need not stop there, but could sweep ahead right up to the Rhine. That would have been the consummation of Red Napoleonism.

The second front, notwithstanding its negligible strategic significance, deprived the Red Army of the credit of having smashed the German war machine single-handed, aided by auxiliary Anglo-American operations, and liberated Europe from the fascist yoke. And having made the impression that the second front was essential for the liberation of Europe, the Russians cannot legitimately dispute the claim of Britain and America to have a hand in its reconstruction. The Russians have foolishly forefeited their claim to the sole leadership of post-war Europe. They have missed the bus. Stalin's policy of Red Napoleonism, which should have been the historical sequel to the Russian Revolution, has miscarried. He was cast for the role of one of the greatest heroes of history. He has played the rôle badly—until now.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XX, SEE P. 350:

* The suspicion is fully borne out by secret diplomatic documents found in the German Foreign Office after the fall of Berlin. They show that negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact was initiated by the Russians in April 1939.

"Russian policy had always moved in a straight line. Ideological differences of opinion had hardly influenced the Russian-Italian relationship, and they did not have to prove a stumbling block with regard to Germany either... Soviet Russia had not exploited the present friction between Germany and the Western Democracies against us, nor did she desire to do so. There exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing. And from normal, the relations might become better and better. With this remark, to which the Russian had led the conversation, Herr Merekalov ended the interview. He intends to go to Moscow in the next few days for a visit." (Summary of a statement made by the Soviet Ambassador Merekalov in an interview with the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office, Weizsaecker, as recorded in a memorandum dated April 17th, 1939.)

The overture was repeated on May 17th by Astakhov, who was Charge d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, when Ambassador Merekalov was away in Moscow.

"Astakhov stated in detail that there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and Soviet Russia, and that therefore there was no reason for any enmity between the two countries. During this conversation, he also again mentioned the Treaty of Rapallo." (From a German Foreign Office memorandum signed by Karl Schnurre, Head of the Eastern European Section of the Commercial Policy Division.)

Germany was unwilling to go beyond a commercial treaty. The Russians pressed for a political understanding also on the German Ambassador in Moscow. He received on May 21st the following instruction from Berlin: "We must now sit tight and wait to see if the Russians will speak more openly." On May 22nd, the German Ambassador reported his interview with Molotov:

"The resumption of our economic negotiations does not satisfy him as a political gesture, and he apparently wants to obtain from us more extensive proposals of a political nature. We must be extremely cautious in this field as long as it is not certain that possible proposals from our side will not be used by the Kremlin only to exert pressure on England and France."

On May 27th, the German Ambassador in Moscow received the following reply from Weizsaecker:

"We are of the opinion here that the English-Russian combination certainly will not be easy to prevent. The possibility of success is considered here to be quite limited, so that one must wait whether a very open statement in Moscow, instead of being beneficial, might not rather be harmful, and perhaps produce a peal of Tartar laughter."

"Our Ambassador in Moscow had a talk with Herr Molotov about the resumption of German-Soviet commercial negotiations and on this occasion Herr Molotov made them subject to the clarification of political relations between Germany and Soviet Russia. . . . . If they should have the desire to have a political conversation with us, I personally can imagine this as entirely possible. I would consider as a condition that the aggressive promotion of the idea of world revolution no longer be an element in the present Soviet foreign policy. If this condition is met, as certain signs might indicate, I could imagine that such a conversation would lead to useful results in the direction of a progressive normalisation of German-Soviet Russian relations." (Foreign Office memorandum dated May 29th, apparently prepared by Ribbentrop for Hitler's consideration.)

In a letter to the German Ambassador in Moscow, dated August 3rd, Ribbentrop wrote:

"Last evening, I received the Russian Chargé. I alluded to the trade agreement discussions, and designated such a trade agreement as a good step on the way towards a normalisation of German-Russian relationship, if this was desired. I considered that, in so far as the desire existed on the Russian side, a remodelling of our relations was possible. . . . . I continued that our policy was a direct and long-range one; we were in no hurry. We were favourably disposed towards Moscow; it was therefore a question of what direction the rulers there wanted to take. If Moscow took a negative attitude, we would know where we stood and how to act. If the reverse was the case, there was no problem from the Baltic to the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us. I said that there was room for the two of us on the Baltic, and that Russian interests by no means needed to clash with ours there. . . . . We were making no fuss about it; the choice lay with Moscow. If they were interested there in our ideas, Herr Molotov could shortly pick up the thread again with Count Schulenburg."

On August 14th, Ribbentrop requested the German Ambassador in Moscow to call upon Molotov and deliver to him a communication which began with the following declaration:

"The ideological contradictions between National-Socialist Germany and the Soviet Union were in the past years the sole reason why Germany and the U. S. S. R. stood opposed to each other in two separate and hostile camps. The developments of the recent period seem to show that different world outlooks do not prohibit a reasonable relationship between the two States, and the restoration of co-operation of a new and friendly type. The period of opposition in foreign policy can be brought to an end once and for all, and the way lies open for a new sort of future for both countries."

On August 19th, Molotov handed to the German Ambassador a draft of the proposed non-aggression pact.

Chapter XXI

IN PEACE CONFERENCES

The advent of Labour to power in Britain gave the Russians a chance to rectify the mistake which had deprived them of the leadership of post-war Europe to be captured by Red Napoleonism. In any case, Soviet leadership of Europe could not make Moscow the capital of the continent. That was clear to Lenin, even when the world revolution was believed to be on the order of the day. He said that, as soon as the revolution triumphed in any European country (Germany was believed to be on the verge of revolution at that time), the centre of political gravity would shift there, and Russia occupy a secondary position. The proletarian revolution would naturally unfold its characteristic features in the most advanced industrial countries. The peculiar patterns of the Russian Revolution could not be transplanted there. Nevertheless, the era of the proletarian revolution having been opened up by the Russian Revolution, it would always have a symbolic importance in history, and the Russians enjoy the honour of revolutionary pioneers.

The revolutionary rôle of a successful Red Napoleonism was to be played out with the military defeat of Fascism. Napoleon ploughed up feudal Europe, and the forces of social and political progress were released consequently. Revolutionary outbreaks took place eventually in other countries. But nowhere the pattern of the French Revolution was repeated. As a matter of fact, there was a retreat in France itself. Similarly, liberated from the fascist yoke, European democracy should be left free to assert itself in its own way according to the political and cultural traditions of Europe. Russian leadership, even in the form of successful Red Napoleonism, could not go any

further. If it tried to, it would become an instrument of reaction, just as Napoleon also was. Trying to set up dictatorial regimes under communist puppets in the countries of Eastern Europe, occupied by the Red Army, the Russians may be acting as Napoleon did after he had played out his revolutionary rôle.

The historically possible Russian leadership of post-war Europe was to be symbolic, just as in the case of the French Revolution. It would express itself in liberated Europe refusing to return to the *status quo ante bellum* and, looking beyond Capitalism, moving towards Socialism. The opposition to that symbolic Russian leadership could be expected only from the U.S.A. At the worst, Britain was a doubtful factor. But on Labour coming to power, her position changed. She could no longer be regarded as an opponent of the symbolic Russian leadership of Europe. She became an ally. The Anglo-Soviet alliance could then outgrow the limitations of a war-time emergency measure, to become the backbone of post-war Europe. As the peculiar patterns of the Russian Revolution are not compatible with the democratic tradition of Western Europe, the historically determined symbolic Russian leadership could be more effective on the basis of the Anglo-Soviet alliance. The Russians could still lead European democracy towards Socialism, if they had the wisdom to share the privilege with Britain, now on the road to Socialism under the Labour Government.

They did not react with intelligence and far-sightedness to the favourable situation created by the rise of the Labour Government in Britain. Instead of welcoming the British Labour Government as an ally in the historic task of helping the reconstruction of Europe on a new foundation, the Russians feared it as a challenge to their desire to dominate Europe, and acted with the perverse belief that to discredit it was their revolutionary duty. Blinded by the prejudice that all but their henchmen, who call

themselves Communists, are enemies and counter-revolutionaries, they refused to see that the British Labour Government had to function under great handicaps, just as they also had to, once in their country.

Instead of extending a helping hand to the ally still in a difficult position, they denounced the Labour Government as reactionary, engaged in anti-Soviet conspiracies in the tradition of British Imperialism. That was an incredibly foolish policy, because to have helped the Labour Government be successful in Britain, would obviously have guaranteed democratic reconstruction of Europe tending towards Socialism.

It will take some time for the revolutionary consequences of the anti-fascist war to unfold themselves. The pace of history cannot be forced. The tempo is also determined. By trying to force the pace, the Russians are creating international discord and fomenting national civil war, both of which factors threaten to precipitate another world war, which would be ruinous for all, including themselves. They could, and still can, act differently, promoting human progress, and themselves occupying a place of honour and importance in that process.

As Marxists, the Russian leaders should know that British Imperialism is a thing of the past; that it cannot possibly survive the economic consequences of the war. The imperialist tradition may die hard; but the economic foundation of British Imperialism has been blasted. Practically all British foreign investments have been written off to meet the expenses of the war. Britain today is heavily indebted to other countries. All the available capital is required for rebuilding her industries, almost completely worn out under the pressure of speeded up war production. After paying for the import of food and essential raw materials, her export will leave no surplus for investment abroad. In such a financial position, a country cannot be an imperialist Power.

On the other hand, her peculiar economic position does not permit Britain to move rapidly towards Socialism. Her very existence depends on export trade, and she could not expand it without a big loan from America. The Wall Street bankers could not be expected to finance the socialist reconstruction of British industries. That difficulty was bound to determine the tempo of the revolutionary transformation of Britain. Even a Communist Government could not possibly get around it. Proletarian dictatorship would be of no avail. Supposing that there would be little or no internal resistance, import of food and raw materials would be interrupted. Socialised industries would be closed down for want of raw materials; there would be a severe scarcity of food, and the workers have no money to buy it. In short, starvation would put an end to a dramatic revolution on the Russian model.

Apart from the democratic tradition, the gradualism of British Socialism is objectively determined. The possibility of replacing Capitalism by a collectivist economy constitutionally, is unavoidable. The Labour Party has been placed in power not only by the working class, but by a majority of the British people as a whole. If the Labour Government acts foolishly, disregarding the difficulties inherent in the peculiar position of the country, it may be turned out of office in the next election. But its violent overthrow by the opponents of Socialism is simply inconceivable. Democratic Socialism thus is a practical possibility. Therefore, Marx foresaw it. It will be a long process, but there is no alternative.

Instead of arbitrarily disputing the *bona fides* of the British Labour Party, as the Russians do, they should take an objective view of the situation and realise that the Labour Government is compelled to act cautiously in a very difficult situation. The Russians were in a position to be helpful to it in a variety of ways, and thus accelerate the tempo of the revolution in Britain. In this case, the

omission to do so was not a mistake on their part. They seem to have forgotten their Marxism. Otherwise, they could not regard post-war Britain even under a Labour Government as an imperialist Power, and determine their relation with her accordingly. Had they not abandoned the Marxian internationalist view, and relapsed into nationalist power-politics, the Russians could have taken the British Labour Government into confidence, and together planned the reconstruction of Europe so as to enable Britain to overcome some of her economic difficulties. The cooperation could easily extend to the Mediterranean countries and the Near and Middle East. The vast area of the Eurasian continent might be integrated into one economic unit, in various stages of socialist reconstruction. Europe would then not be divided up into eastern and western blocs, and peace, after these six years of devastating war, would not be farther than another war.

The post-war Soviet diplomacy of holding up the settlement of any major issue of international relations cannot be understood except on the assumption that the Russians want to precipitate another war, believing that in consequence thereof the old world will be completely dissolved and a thoroughly devastated and largely depopulated Europe will be a happy hunting-ground for the intolerant architects of a communist new order. They seem also to believe that, so long as Europe remains in unsettled conditions, they have the greatest chance of expanding their influence, working on the emotions of distressed, starved and desperate peoples by holding out the hope of a heaven on earth.

The famous iron curtain does not permit one to judge to what extent the promise has been fulfilled in the Soviet-occupied countries of Eastern Europe. Whatever may be the truth, just the contrary impression is gaining ground abroad. Why hide good things? The obviously sensible policy would be to throw them open for all to see, and

to set an example for the rest of the world. Presumably, not in a position to regain the moral leadership of Western Europe on the strength of the achievements in the Soviet-occupied territories, the Russians are getting ready for another war. In pursuance of that policy, they want to prevent the reconstruction of the rest of Europe under the rival Anglo-American leadership, while consolidating their position in the eastern half of the continent.

The Russians are not really practising vandalism or any other large-scale crimes in the countries occupied by them. They do not make a secret of the fact of having their own ideas of freedom and social justice. Nor have they as yet discarded the doctrine that revolutionary dictatorship is an indispensable condition for any radical social transformation. So, if there is any secret in the Russian-occupied countries, it is presumably of military nature; advance bases are most probably being prepared there for future operations of the Red Army.

Such a plan of action might be fitted into the perspective of Red Napoleonism, although that perspective could no longer have a revolutionary significance. However, if that is the perspective of the Russian policy, and otherwise it cannot be sympathetically explained, they are committing the grave strategic mistake of temporising. The time is working against them. They are fast losing the store of good will in other countries. Their failure to put a new meaning in the Anglo-Soviet alliance, to transform it into a powerful instrument for the democratic reconstruction of Europe, has already split up the continent into two camps. To maintain their position in their respective countries, the Communist Parties have become the most rabid protagonists of Nationalism. Therefore, they can no longer effectively oppose the formation of a western bloc for the defence of national traditions. In the competition for leadership with the Christian Progressive parties, rapidly rallying the democratic forces under their banner, the

Communist Parties may sink still deeper in the bog of nationalist degeneration. In Italy, Togliatti has already dissociated the Communist Party from Marxism. There is no reason to doubt that the Communist Parties are operating as so many spearheads of Russian foreign policy—of a belated Red Napoleonism.

When, drunk with martial glory, Napoleon did not know where to stop, he ceased to be the liberator and became the terror of Europe. National Communism would be a poor fifth column, if the Russians forfeited the sympathy and good will of the European democracy. As a matter of fact, the chance of the Russians regaining the leadership of post-war Europe is being seriously prejudiced by the behaviour of the Communist Parties. After the experience of National-Socialism, liberated European democracy is not very likely to be fascinated by the lures of National-Communism. As the standard-bearer of international Communism, the Red Army will not be welcomed as the liberator of Western Europe.

While the apprehension of another war might have forced the Russians to commit a series of political mistakes, strategically also, they have not acted with foresight. To detach Britain from the U.S.A. would obviously be the overriding strategic consideration. Even a capitalist Britain could be so detached by working on her pride and showing her how in alliance with the Soviet Union she could avoid the inglorious fate of being a vassal of the U.S.A. A free hand in the East, and supremacy of the Mediterranean conceded to Britain in return for cooperation in the democratic reconstruction of Europe, which under the given circumstances would unavoidably accept the symbolic Soviet leadership, would be a good enough bargain. It would have promoted the world revolution by transforming the whole of the European continent into its base. On the other hand, even with a free hand in the East, Britain could not possibly regain her position as an imperialist

Power. The anti-fascist war had placed her on the road to Socialism. There was no retracing the steps. She could not for long remain even an ordinary capitalist country except as a vassal of the U.S.A. The Soviet foreign policy may still drive her that way.

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The policy of supporting colonial nationalism indiscriminately is reactionary, from the Marxist point of view; it is politically opportunist, and strategically may prove suicidal for the Soviet Union. It only serves the purpose of embarrassing Britain. British Imperialism is doomed by history. The choice for the countries which constitute the British Empire is either to become independent national States or to remain voluntarily associated with a Britain on the road to Socialism. Choosing the former course, they will provide a new home to Capitalism when it is decaying in other parts of the world. Scared by the spectre of Socialism, capital will fly from Britain to find a refuge in the new home. National independence of the colonial countries, on the basis of capitalist economy, will, therefore, actually offer protection to derelict Imperialism. In any case, they will add to the difficulties of a socialist government in Britain. Their autarchist economy will mean loss of market for British industries, when the maintenance of the foreign trade is an essential condition for the socialist reconstruction of Britain. Socialist Britain could sell her goods in the former colonial countries only by lowering the standard of living of her workers.

On the other hand, independence on the basis of Capitalism will not improve the economic condition of the masses of the former colonial countries. In order to compete with older industrial countries in the home market, and to capture markets abroad, the industries of those countries will have to rely on cheap labour and cheap raw materials. That will mean low wages for industrial labour and reduced income for the primary producers. New

industries in the former colonial countries will have to be not only protected by high tariff walls, but heavily subsidised also. Protection will force prices up, and the home market, circumscribed by the low standard of living of the masses, will absorb still less goods. The capitalist industries of the new national States, therefore, will fall back on the typical methods of fascist economy—armament production and subsidised export trade. They will be the storm centres of the next world war. "Fascism means war" is an empirical truth. Former colonies becoming independent national-capitalist States will inevitably move towards Fascism. That is the perspective of the Russian policy of supporting colonial nationalism indiscriminately.

Remaining voluntarily associated with Britain on the road to Socialism, the former colonial countries will necessarily travel also on that road; getting the chance of avoiding Capitalism, they will escape the fate of becoming the new home of Fascism. The Russian experience itself has demonstrated that an imperial structure can be maintained as an economic unit, and transformed into a socialist commonwealth. Yet, the Russians are ardent advocates of the pseudo-Marxist doctrine that colonial countries should become independent national States, and patronise nationalist movements led by the bourgeoisie and other, more reactionary, elements.

This policy might have been justified as a lever to disintegrate the British or any other Empire. Now it is fighting a bogey. It is even worse. It is backing the wrong horse, and may be digging one's own grave. Because, apart from other considerations, the theoretically fallacious and politically opportunistic policy of patronising colonial nationalism is strategically bound to be a boomerang for the Russians.

It is now evident that nationalist China has definitely gravitated to the American pole. In the next world war, she will provide a formidable base of operation against the

U.S.S.R. Even now the Russians are complaining that the Americans are precipitating a civil war in China. And what is the purpose of doing so except as a pretext and prelude for an eventual attack on the Soviet Union?

Nationalist India is also bound to gravitate in the same direction. Breaking away from Britain, she will not look towards the Soviet Union out of gratitude for all its misplaced patronage. For economic considerations, she will also become an ally of America, if not a vassal. Capital goods and finance for building in India heavy industries geared up for armament production will come only from the country which will eventually need her as a base of operation against the U.S.S.R. Yet, the Russians plump for a National Government of the Indian bourgeoisie with an undisguised fascist orientation, while denouncing the British Labour Government as imperialist.

Could not the Russian Communists and their henchmen throughout the world champion the cause of the freedom of the colonial peoples in a more sensible manner? Instead of patronising pro-fascist nationalist parties, they could support parties demanding people's freedom. They could advocate socialisation of the economic life of former colonial countries so that the latter might not become a new home for Fascism. Such a truly Marxist approach to the colonial question would provide the Russians with a new basis of cooperation with the British Labour Government.

The position in China can no longer be recovered. Any serious effort to do so will precipitate a war with the U.S.A. immediately. The Russians evidently do not want to take the risk. Therefore, they went to the extent of signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty at the cost of the Chinese Communists. Even that bold diplomatic move did not succeed. With the consent of nationalist China, America is on the offensive. The Russians must be on the defensive

and protect their eastern flank as best as they can against an eventual attack.

Strategic considerations should persuade the Russians to adopt such a foreign policy as might prevent the development of a similarly ominous situation also in India. A closer Anglo-Soviet alliance suggests itself as the wisest policy. That alliance would at the same time be the instrument for promoting the freedom of the Indian people. The Labour Government could be persuaded to realise that it would be better for Britain as well as for India if the latter was launched on the path of a radical economic reconstruction, rather than be handed over to a National Government of the reactionary upper classes. The democratic duty of a Labour Government in Britain is not to help the rise of Indian Fascism on the pseudo-constitutionalist ground of self-determination, but to establish people's freedom in India and put the Indian people on the road to Socialism. The Russians did that in former Czarist colonies. Why should they not advise and press a socialist government in Britain also to do the same? In short, one need not be very imaginative to see how close Anglo-Soviet co-operation could transform the former colonial countries into a free and prosperous periphery of a socialist Europe.

Barring the Russians behaving very rashly, Europe is not very likely to be the scene of another war. The Russians, therefore, need not be nervous about the attitude of this or that European Government. Even the Western Bloc will never be anti-Soviet. Despite all provocation, Britain also will not go to war against the Soviet Union. Apart from other considerations, she simply cannot afford another war. Notwithstanding all the cross-currents of the European situation, the world will be polarised as between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. But in case of a war, the Americans will not be able to use any part of Europe as a dependable base. The next war will therefore be fought in the East, which still harbours Fascism, defeated

in Europe. China and India are the key points. The one is already in American possession. The struggle for the control of India, therefore, is of the most decisive strategic importance. It is a struggle between America and Britain, between Fascism and democratic Socialism. The future of the Soviet Union depends on which side the Russians will tip the scale. For the moment, they appear to be bent on tipping it on the wrong side, to their own danger.

There was a time when Stalin evidently calculated Soviet foreign policy in terms of a bargain with capitalist Britain.* The Yalta agreement about the landing of British troops in Greece represented recognition of British supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was no need for that concession except to consolidate the Anglo-Soviet alliance as the pivot of post-war Russian policy. From Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the Red Army could simply walk into Greece and take possession. The British could not prevent it; but apprehending that the Russians wanted to drive them out of the Near East, they might join the U.S.A. in an anti-Soviet crusade. Stalin was anxious to head off such an alignment of international forces. The Huguenot king of Navarre once said that Paris was worth a Mass. Stalin believed that Greece could be sacrificed in order to retain the friendship of Britain. Subsequent Soviet foreign policy, however, has gone to the opposite direction.

* Such a bargain extremely favourable to the Soviet Union was proposed as early as the summer of 1940, when the Churchill Government sent Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador to Moscow. The British proposals made through Cripps included:

"The British Government was of the opinion that unification and leadership of the Balkan countries for the purpose of maintaining the *status quo* was rightly the task of the Soviet Union. Under the present circumstances, this important mission could be carried out only by the Soviet Union.

"The British Government knew that the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with the régime in the Straits and in the Black Sea. Cripps was of the opinion that the interests of the Soviet Government in the Straits must be safeguarded." (From a memorandum given by Molotov, on Stalin's instruction, to the German Ambassador in Moscow.)

The possibility of promoting world revolution in co-operation with Britain became immensely greater when Labour came to power. If it was still a matter of bargain, the Russians could have greater confidence in the good faith of Bevin than of Churchill, provided that the purpose of the bargain was to promote the cause of Socialism, albeit not on the Russian model. But strangely enough, the Soviet attitude towards Britain changed abruptly as soon as the Labour Government came to office. To alienate Britain, pending the polarisation of the world as between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., would manifestly be the worst political strategy on the part of the latter. Yet ever since Labour came to power in Britain, that grave blunder of political strategy has been the most outstanding feature of Russian foreign policy.

The strange, almost suicidal, attitude of the Russians has been a puzzle for all who believed that post-war Europe would accept the symbolic Soviet leadership, and that its revolutionary reconstruction would take place on the basis of the Anglo-Soviet alliance bound to be reinforced by the advent of the Labour Government. The Russians are singularly ignorant of other peoples' psychology; their henchmen usually misinform them also about the situation abroad. A doctrinaire conception of Marxism, though not hesitating to abandon it in practice, and the oriental deification of power, make the Russians incapable of appreciating the political significance of cultural traditions, and blind them to the innumerable variables in the equations of historical determinism. Nevertheless, they would be incredibly stupid to believe that, by discrediting the Labour Government, they might accelerate the tempo of revolution in Britain. They would be living in a fool's paradise if they regarded the Labour Government as the Kerenski period of the revolution in Britain, which would presently develop on the classical Russian model under the leadership of imitation Lenins.

Yet, their policy cannot be otherwise explained. Therefore it is so very deplorable. Nobody in his senses can think of the British Communists capturing power through an armed insurrection. I have already shown what would be the fate of the revolution in Britain even if its happening in that way is hypothetically admitted. If communist propoganda succeeds in discrediting it in the eyes of the British working class, and Soviet diplomacy prevents it from establishing peace in Europe, the British Labour Government will not be overthrown by a *coup d'état,* to be replaced by proletarian dictatorship. In the next election, British democracy may withdraw its confidence in the Labour Party and place the opponents of Socialism in office again. Since British economy, undermined by the anti-fascist war, cannot be rehabilitated on the basis of normal *laisser faire* Capitalism, Britain, in that case, would most probably move towards Fascism, and the dreadful possibility of an Anglo-American anti-Soviet bloc would be an actuality. The stage would be set for another world war. Meanwhile, Russian foreign policy will have also alienated the West-European countries, which will provide a solid base for military operations to be conducted with the plausible object of defending European democracy against the aggressiveness of the Asiatic totalitarianism of Russian National-Communism. Will history repeat itself by producing the Grand Alliance against Red Napoleonism?

Russia could prevent that dreadful eventuality, dreadful because another such war may mean the end of modern civilisation, if her leaders remembered Lenin's realistic view that expansion of the revolution would shift the centre of political gravity to Western Europe. Stalin has realised, though rather late, that it was an anti-fascist war from the very beginning. He should not have any inhibition against learning yet another lesson from history—that it was a revolutionary war, because the defeat of the Axis Powers meant smashing of the spearhead of world reaction.

Post-war Europe is in the throes of a revolution. The old order is irreparably undermined. Left to itself, European democracy will come to its own, and the revolution brought about by unprecedented means is bound to have peculiar features.

The disappearance of the old bourgeois parties proves loss of faith in the possibility of a restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*. On the other hand, the dramatic rise of new democratic parties out of the background of the resistance movements, indicates that the revolutionary forces will not rally under the banner of Communism. Not only one advanced European country, but the whole of the continent having come in the throes of revolution, Russia must now yield leadership to others, as Lenin anticipated. The historically determined shift of leadership will also be symbolic. The Russians are not required to withdraw from Western Europe. They are only required to realise that the cultural and political traditions of Western Europe are bound to set the pattern of the revolution there, and it will have its own leadership.

If it was not a deceptive manoeuver, the liquidation of the Communist International meant the Russians foregoing the leadership of the coming European revolution, according to Lenin's testament, so to say. The logical sequel to that step, again assuming that it was an honest move, would be to direct the Communist Parties to dissolve themselves. Because their very existence proves that the Russians have not learned from Lenin, and are still trying to impose their leadership on the whole of Europe.

This struggle for leadership naturally creates conflicts and confusions in the ranks of resurgent democracy. That unfortunate situation affords the defeated forces of reaction chances to manœuvre for positions, and possibly regain a lease of life. The twenty-five years' untiring effort of the Communists to discredit the old Labour and Social-Democratic Parties represented the Russians struggling for the

leadership of the European working class. It has been an unsuccessful struggle, because it disregarded historical determinism. But it succeeded in dividing the working class, preventing the growth of a powerful democratic movement, and consequently helping Fascism capture power.

The Russians could yield the leadership of the European revolution to those historically better equipped for that rôle, according to Lenin's prognostication, by ordering the dissolution of the Communist Parties. It is an open secret that they are backed up by the Russians in every conceivable manner. Without that patronage, and disowned publicly by the Russians, the Communist Parties will be compelled to abandon the vain effort of making revolution everywhere on the Russian model. They will have no other alternative than to merge themselves with the older working class parties. With their tolerant ideology and faith in democratic methods, the latter will then assume the undisputed leadership of the revolution. So long as Europe will march towards Socialism, it matters little if she prefers a way different from the Russian, and if it will be a longer way, in order to be less painful. The new era opened by the Russian Revolution will unfold itself in any case.

Noted for his realism, Stalin should even now have the wisdom to stoop to conquer, to yield local leadership so that history may celebrate the triumph of the symbolic Russian leadership of the revolution whose success has been guaranteed by the anti-fascist war.

CHAPTER XXII

AT HOME

THE foreign policy of a country is necessarily determined to a very large extent by its internal structural and functional conditions. An objective judgment as regards these in the Soviet Union is impossible in the absence of the requisite data. Whatever information is available is partisan, being either propagandist or adversely prejudiced. Therefore, for a hypothetical judgment sympathetic observers of the experiment must largely depend on circumstantial evidence.

A sympathetic interpretation of the Russian foreign policy has for its point of departure the assumption that the Soviet Union is a socialist State or at least engaged in the great historic task of rebuilding society as a co-operative commonwealth on the basis of equitable, if not equalitarian, economic relations. The assumption is warranted by the fact that a party committed to the programme of establishing Socialism captured power and directed the life of the country for nearly a whole generation. During that time, private property in the means of production, distribution and exchange was abolished, and the economic life of the country was shifted on to the basis of social or common ownership.

After the period of civil war and the following years of the New Economic Policy, the entire economy of the country, structural as well as functional, was planned presumably to adjust production to the original social purpose of satisfying the requirements of the community as a whole. When the first Five Years Plan was introduced, Stalin himself testified that the object of Soviet economy was to lay the foundation of a socialist reconstruction, if not actually to establish Socialism.

Those who believed that Socialism was the panacea for all the evils of the modern world, naturally maintained that the Soviet Union was doing a liberating mission by building Socialism in one-sixth of the globe. It was therefore regarded as the base of world revolution. Anything done for its defence and consolidation safeguarded the future of mankind, and was therefore justifiable. With that conviction of a firm believer in the socialist utopia, I interpreted every move of the Soviet foreign policy, even after the conclusion of the pact with Nazi Germany, which caused misgivings about its purpose and consequences.

But at the same time, the foreign policy of a socialist State or of a country in the process of socialist reconstruction can be theoretically anticipated. Therefore I interpreted the apparently aggressive moves of the Soviet Government in the beginning of the war as preparatory to the Napoleonic stage of the Russian Revolution—Red Napoleonism. The post-war Soviet foreign policy, however, cannot be so explained. It can hardly be distinguished from the traditional diplomacy of National States engaged in power-politics, manœuvering for a predominating position in the international set-up.

The Soviet State and the Communist International were the twin creations of the Russian Revolution. The theoretical subordination of the former to the latter through the intermediary of the Communist Party which held power in the Soviet Union, guaranteed its social and political character. On the other hand, the Communist International was to be the instrument of the foreign policy of a Socialist State, namely, to promote the proletarian world revolution. Stalin was honest when he said that Communism was not a commodity for export—from the Soviet Union. What he meant was that the proletarian revolution would be promoted in other countries by the Communist International. The dissolution of the latter, therefore, indicated a new orientation of Soviet foreign policy. Its

object was no longer to promote the proletarian world revolution through the instrumentality of the Communist International, but to extend the domination of the Soviet State to other countries. Holding on to the assumption that the Soviet Union is a Socialist State, Socialists should not be unduly alarmed by the new orientation of the Russian foreign policy. At the same time, it is quite natural for them to wonder if it can be the foreign policy of a Socialist State. If logically that is doubtful, then it is permissible to test the validity of the assumption that the Soviet Union is a Socialist State.

Having regard for the controversial nature of most of the available data regarding the actual conditions of the political, economic and cultural life in the Soviet Union, I shall test the assumption theoretically, and also in the light of indisputable and indisputed facts. In theoritical judgment, I shall apply the orthodox Marxist standards.

Withering away of the State is a condition for the establishment of Socialism. In other words, in a classless society, there is no place for the State, which, in the Marxist view, is an instrument of class domination, an engine of coercion. Nobody would claim that politically the Soviet Union has come anywhere near that stage. It may be contended that the introduction of the Stalin Constitution is a long step in that direction, because it divests the Soviet State of the dictatorial character.

Granted that the Soviet State has been democratised; but it still exists, and has become a more complex machinery, instead of showing any signs of fading out of existence. Theoretically, proletarian dictatorship being the State of the transition period, it was bound to disappear in course of time. The transition period could not last for ever. Having theoretically, if not only ostensibly, ceased to be a dictatorship, the Soviet State has logically outgrown its transitory nature. It has come to stay. This argument about a point of fact leads to one of two possible

conclusions: Either a classless society has not been established in the Soviet Union; or the Marxist-Leninist theory of State has been repudiated by experience.

In the former case, it cannot be simply taken for granted that the economic life in the Soviet Union has been fully democratised. Indeed, economic equality is ruled out by the Soviet theoreticians as an utopia. Therefore, again according to the orthodox Marxian theory, there cannot be political freedom while economic inequality still continues and will continue indefinitely. And, as the ideological super-structure of the established relations of admitted and justified economic inequality and inadequate political freedom, Soviet culture must necessarily (according to Marxism) be an apology for the *status quo*.

This disappointing development in the Soviet Union may be most plausibly ascribed to objective causes. It can be argued that it could not be otherwise under the given circumstances, and the argument will have the sanction of Marxism. But that will be relying on a broken reed, worshipping in the temple of a fallen god. Because, the belying of the great expectations, if it has indeed been objectively determined, disproves the validity of certain Marxist theoretical presuppositions. Therefore, the authority of Marxism alone is not enough to carry the conviction that the conditions in the Soviet Union could not be different from what they are. That being the case, it is permissible to imagine how things could be different, and to enquire if the rulers of Russia since Lenin died, and perhaps including himself, did not commit mistakes or act contrary to professions.

The fact that the Soviet State does not show any sign of withering away is explained by differentiating Socialism from Communism. It is argued that in the communist society there will be no room for the State; in the Soviet Union only Socialism has been established as the condition for the eventual attainment of the utopia of Communism.

Marx, however, did not distinguish between Socialism and Communism; and he vehemently combatted anarchism. Now his Russian disciples conceive Communism as a far-off utopia, identifying it with anarchism. They indulge in this sophistry, disregarding the teachings of the master, because the facts of the present situation cannot be otherwise explained.

What, then, is the Socialism which is claimed to have been established in the Soviet Union? The means of production are no longer privately owned; consequently, private individuals or business corporations do not make profit by exploiting labour. But "exploitation of labour" itself has not ceased. The producer does not get the full value of his labour. If he did, industries could not expand, as they have been doing in the Soviet Union. The vast sums allotted year after year in the State budget for investment in industries and agriculture represent unpaid labour. According to Marx, production of surplus value over and above what is expended for purchasing labour power, is the specific feature of Capitalism. By that token, the abolition of private ownership has not put an end to the capitalist mode of production in the "Socialist Fatherland". Private Capitalism has been replaced by State Capitalism, which is euphemistically equated with Socialism, and as this "Socialism" is very much different from the real thing, Communism has been relegated to the distant fairy land of Utopia.

But as against that faith, there is a fact confronting us: The State is not withering away, but becoming a permanent institution. The functioning of the economic life of the Soviet Union requires an elaborate administrative machinery which is provided by the newly constituted government. Hostile critics say that the Soviet economy has created a new ruling class—the managerial bureaucracy. Whatever may be the force of the criticism, it is a fact that the new Soviet Government set up under the Stalin

Constitution is composed of more than fifty ministers, each in charge of a sector of the planned nationalised economy. Bureaucratisation of the economic life of the country is an indisputable fact. Democratic control through the trade unions and factory committees has completely disappeared.

Higher wages and special emoluments as incentive for greater productive efforts, such as the Stakhanovite system belie the expectation raised to the dignity of a theoretical axiom that under Socialism "productive labour will become a pleasure instead of a burden." (*Anti-Duehring*). The practice rather corroborates the view that acquisitiveness is a human instinct, and a justification of the profit motive is supplied by that view. It is an implication of Marxism that human nature is not immutable; it changes. A new generation has grown up under the Soviet system; yet, human nature does not seem to have changed. One generation may be too short a time. But it is long enough to produce a new tendency. That even is absent.

One cannot, therefore, escape the conclusion that planning of national economy does not necessarily establish Socialism. In the Soviet Union, there is planned economy, but it is State capitalism, and there is a tendency to stabilise this position. It is no longer a period of transition. "Socialism" has been established, although admittedly it is not Communism, which will never be attained because the revolution has passed the transition period; it has reached the goal. But has it, really?

It will be helpful to refresh our memory of what Marx wrote about the goal:

"In Communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity, but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing to-day and another to-morrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming

hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic." (*German Ideology*).

Since it was the description of the Communist society, it may be regarded still as a distant ideal. But are the conditions of life in the Soviet Union moving towards that direction? Even the blatant propagandist or the unblushing apologist would hesitate to answer this question in the affirmative. On the contrary, tendencies in operation, and justified theoretically, exclude the possibility of any movement in the direction of social and cultural freedom visualised by Marx as the specific features of Communism.

We may seek consolation in the belief that the present is only the transitory stage towards full-fledged Communism.

Could it be otherwise? Theoretically, no. Because the conditions in Russia were not ripe for a proletarian revolution. However, the revolution did take place, and thanks to a fortuitous combination of circumstances, the Communist Party captured power. It would have been criminal for it not to do so on the ground that historically the honour was reserved for the bourgeoisie. That was one of the instances showing how man makes history. If there is room for heroes in history, Lenin was one, like Stalin after him. It would be quixotic on the part of the Communist Party to lay down power when it was realised that an industrially backward country could not reach Socialism directly. But at the same time, it was a mistake to make false pretensions.

The pattern of social reconstruction possible after the Russian Revolution was indicated by the New Economic Policy, which followed the abortive attempt to establish Communism. Thanks to that policy conceived by the genius of Lenin, the young Soviet Republic survived the civil war. It tended towards the creation of peasant proprietorship. The transfer of the ownership of land, the main means of production in an agrarian country, from a

parasitic class to the actual cultivator, would be a great social revolution. At the same time, the novel institution of the Soviets guaranteed that the revolution would go beyond the limits of formal parliamentary democracy. To build up the novel form of State, based upon organised democracy, to realise the maximum degree of economic reconstruction possible under the given circumstances, was the task set by history to the Communist Party of Russia. Accomplishment of that task, resulting from a realistic appreciation of, and approach to, the problems of the situation, would have set in motion a process of social evolution not foreseen by Marxism and contrary to some of its theoretical presuppositions. The result would be a non-capitalist economic development which would fall short of Socialism. Stalin had the perspicacity of seeing the possibility of such an unforeseen development in the case of China, if the nationalist movement there headed towards a social revolution. But wisdom failed him at home, where the struggle for leadership forced his hand. That was a misfortune, which queered the pitch of the movement of events in the Soviet Union.

The New Economic Policy was a concession to the peasantry. Therefore, Trotzky, as the most consistent advocate of Marxist dogmatism, opposed it. By combatting Trotzky's exaggerated romanticism, Stalin won his reputation as a realist. Proletarian revolution on the *a priori* Marxist pattern was not possible in agrarian Russia, although the Communist Party had captured power. The preconditions of Socialism had to be created before the ideal could be attained. Any attempt to socialise economic backwardness would be reactionary. Economic development was conditional upon increased production, and a proportionately larger social surplus. Agriculture was the largest sector of Russian national economy at that time. Therefore, a substantial increase of national income could result only from larger agricultural production. Under the

given circumstances, that result could be obtained by making the peasantry feel that it would pay them to produce more.

The New Economic Policy was calculated to give the peasantry the necessary incentive to increase agricultural production. But that could not be the policy of the proletarian revolution. Trotzky's theory of permanent revolution called for a war against the peasantry. Stalin was condemned as the champion of the *kulaks*—peasant proprietors. When he captured the leadership of the Communist Party in 1926, Zinoviev, Kamenev and their supporters went over to Trotzky and accused Stalin of the intention of transforming the party of the proletariat into a peasants' party. Stalin, however, stood his ground and promised to lead the Soviet Union on the line of development indicated by the New Economic Policy.

The present internal conditions of the Soviet Union, which determine a dangerous foreign policy, resulted from a deviation from the correct position at home, as the defender of which Stalin captured leadership. Why did he go off the rail?

* * *

Democratisation of the Soviet State would necessarily be the political consequence of the new Economic Policy. The recognition of the vital position of the peasantry in the structure of national economy should be soon followed by their enfranchisement, as it actually did happen, though partially. Given the economically strategic position of the peasantry, the process of the broadening of the social base of the Soviet State in that manner could not be arrested. The Soviets in the rural areas would in consequence cease to be organs of proletarian dictatorship, as they were theoretically meant to be, and become People's Committees representing the overwhelming majority of the population. In an agrarian country, rural Soviets would constitute by far the larger sector of the social base of the new revolu-

tionary State. The urban Soviets, with a different class composition, would be reduced to a subsidiary position.

In that situation, proletarian dictatorship would be untenable. The Communist Party was naturally apprehensive of that perspective of a situation created by the given relation of classes. The perspective was of a conflict between a necessarily democratised State representing an overwhelming majority of the people, and the party of the proletariat representing only a small minority. An intelligent Marxist conviction should have persuaded the Communist Party to be reconciled to that perspective of revolutionary development, possible under the given circumstances. Its revolutionary consciousness should have been determined by the social environments which set the pattern of the possible revolution.

Unfortunately, Lenin died just when the revolution was overtaken by the crisis. The experience of the initial stage of the revolution had convinced him that actual events could not be fitted into an *a priori* theoretical pattern. Lenin was the most dogmatic Marxist; but he was also a genius capable of learning quickly from experience. As a shrewd revolutionary strategist, he had recognised the decisive importance of the peasantry in an industrially backward country like Russia. A fact of historical significance, which should have set the pattern of post-revolutionary social reconstruction, is ignored by the orthodox chroniclers of the Russian Revolution: Lenin did not call for the insurrection with the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" until the Bolsheviks captured a majority in the All-Russian Congress of Peasants Soviets.

Once the Bolsheviks captured power, even Lenin was swept off his feet by the unexpected success, and appeared to believe that, having captured power by a fluke, a small minority could reconstruct the economy of a vast country according to its preconceived notions, disregarding the sentiments of the ninety per cent majority. But he soon

recovered his balance and ordered a retreat which saved the revolution. The New Economic Policy represented the realisation that economic reconstruction along lines laid down in the programme of the Communist Party was not possible under the conditions of a backward country like Russia. It contained the quintessence of the programme of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; but the Soviet State, even if it could not be the organ of proletarian dictatorship, guaranteed that the democratic revolution would not place the bourgeoisie in power. Having failed to lead the democratic revolution, the bourgeoisie could play no rôle in the post-revolutionary scene. A new form of democracy, a State based on organised democracy (the Soviets), was on the order of the day. But it would not be consistent with the preconceived idea of proletarian dictatorship. Therefore, the Communist Party deviated from the realistic path of Lenin soon after his death.

To do him justice, it must be said that Stalin inherited Lenin's realism, and wanted to canalise the revolution in the democratic direction, following the trail blazed by the New Economic Policy. But the anxiety to retain the leadership of the party, the lure of power, forced him to move in the opposite direction. Having eliminated Trotzky as an effective rival for leadership, Stalin stepped in his theoretical as well as political shoes. He broke away from the Leninist tradition, scrapped the New Economic Policy, and launched upon forcible collectivisation of agriculture, which amounted to a war upon the peasantry as demanded by the purist dogmatism of Trotzky. By 1928, Stalin appeared to be quite firmly seated in the saddle of leadership. It was not necessary for him to make concessions to the Trotzkist point of view after the elimination of Trotzky himself. He must have been compelled to do so by forces operating under the surface.

Although partial enfranchisement of the peasantry in pursuance of the New Economic Policy had begun the

democratisation of the Soviet State, effective power still remained vested in the Communist Party committed theoretically to the dogma of proletarian dictatorship. From the strategic position of General Secretaryship of the party, Stalin could manipulate the party machinery to support him against Trotzky. But he could not expect to retain that support if he wanted the party to forego the claim to monopolist power and actually transfer all power to the Soviets. Proletarian dictatorship had become a Frankenstein, and Stalin had to sacrifice democracy and his own realism to placate that exacting demigod, in order to retain his position. Perhaps it was sheer lust of power on his part. But I for one would not exclude it that he acted as he did with the hope, and even conviction, of guiding events in the right direction as long as he remained at the helm of affairs.

Before proceeding to enquire if Stalin could be charged of any error of commission as well as of omission, it will be useful to examine further the possible political consequences of the New Economic Policy. I have already considered them hypothetically, and maintained that they should be preferable for larger considerations. They can also be considered pragmatically.

After a bitter experience of ten years, the Communist Party of China abandoned the ambition of operating as the instrument of a minority dictatorship, and reconciled itself to the fate of becoming a People's Party, and as such undertake the task of establishing a new type of democracy more real and effective than parliamentarism. Proletarian dictatorship may be a plausible proposition for countries where the industrial workers constitute the majority of the people. In that case, dictatorship is a misnomer, because a government controlled by the working class in those countries will have the support of the majority, and therefore be a democratic government. In economically backward countries, proletarian dictatorship will be nega-

tion of democracy, which is certainly not the right road to the genuine democracy of a co-operative commonwealth. But the hollowness and inadequacies of parliamentary democracy having been exposed in practice, it can no longer be a revolutionary ideal. The rise of a new type of democracy is on the order of the day. The political consequence of the New Economic Policy, introduced by Lenin after the abortive effort to establish Communism, promised to evolve the new type of democracy. The promise was not fulfilled in Russia. But the Chinese experience has demonstrated that the Communist Party could, for all practical purposes, become a party of the people, and yet remain the leader of a social revolution. That would have been the case in Russia, had the New Economic Policy been pursued to its logical consequence. The Soviet State would have been a new type of democratic State instead of being a class dictatorship, *nominally*. As a matter of fact, it was never a proletarian dictatorship; it has all along been the dictatorship of the Communist Party. Becoming the party of the people by implementing the New Economic Policy, which corresponded with the interests of the majority, the Communist Party, like the Soviet State, could have a genuine democratic sanction for building a new social order. If it is justifiable for the Communist Party of China to abandon the orthodox Communist programme, including proletarian dictatorship and collectivisation of agriculture, the Russian Communist Party also could have legitimately pursued the path indicated by Lenin towards a new type of democracy, and thus offered a leadership to the entire world. In that case, the history of our time might have been entirely different, and Stalin could be a more successful hero.

Forced collectivisation of agriculture, as against the virtual recognition of peasant proprietorship implied in the New Economic Policy, emphasised the dictatorial character of the Soviet State. Because, it was a measure disliked by

the majority of the people. If collectivisation of agriculture was indispensably necessary for the economic development of the country, it could be done differently, in a less painful manner. Large farms worked with machines could be organised to set examples. They would not displace individual peasants, as there was plenty of uncultivated land. Co-operative farming of pooled individual holdings could be encouraged by the offer of the Government hiring out tractors and mechanical harvesters at cheap rates. In any case, individual producers would not be able to compete with large-scale farms. The process of eliminating wasteful small individual farming would be slow; but there was no reason to hurry.

Preferring that painless, but slow process, the Soviet State would entrench itself in a voluntary support of the majority of the people. It would shed its dictatorial character. The transition from dictatorship to genuine democracy would cease to be a plausible theoretical postulate, and become an actuality. A country undergoing a social revolution under the guidance of a democratic State with the consent of the people, would have no reason to fear attacks from outside. On the other hand, example being better than precept, it would promote similar revolutions in other countries more effectively. In any case, popular sympathy for the Soviet Union developing in a painless and democratic way would be so very strong as to rule out the danger of its being attacked by this or that reactionary Power. Free from the fear of external aggression, the Soviet State would not find it necessary to gear up its entire apparatus of production to the exigencies of defence. Production would be increased to serve the social purpose of meeting the normal requirements of the country. More consumers' goods would be produced; the standard of living would rise more rapidly; the reason for emergency production removed, the entire economic life would be normalised and democratised. In the absence of the danger

of war, there would be no justification for the limitation of civil liberties. Increasing political freedom would result from the normalisation of the economic life. An atmosphere congenial for the growth of a new culture would be created.

Why did not the Soviet Union travel that path of painless, albeit slow social reconstruction, of economic prosperity, political freedom and peace? The answer to this question is to be sought in the struggle for the leadership of the Communist Party after the death of Lenin. That was another instance of man making history; only in this case, history was marred by man—by his miscalculations and ambition.

The New Economic Policy had a bearing also upon the international position of the Soviet State. Lenin and his associates believed that by capturing power in Russia they were giving the signal for revolution in other countries of Europe. They did not believe that they could retain power in Russia unless the revolution spread in other countries, particularly in Germany. Immediate events appeared to come up to their expectations. The revolution, however, was defeated in Hungary and in Germany also. That was a great disappointment. But in the meantime, a revolutionary army had risen out of the civil war in Russia. It should go to the aid of the revolution in Germany. The defeat of the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw in 1920 put an end to what was to be the Napoleonic phase of the Russian Revolution. That experience most probably contributed as much to the New Economic Policy as did the failure of the attempt to establish Communism upon the capture of power by the party of the proletariat. The New Economic Policy implied that, having failed to function as the spearhead of the world revolution, the newly established Soviet State should try

to consolidate itself so that it could continue to exist relying on its own strength.

But few leaders of the Russian Revolution shared Lenin's extra-ordinary self-confidence. They still pinned their hope on world revolution, and did not believe that the Soviet State could in the meantime do anything more than somehow hold on. Nor did Lenin think it would be wise to disillusion them. While introducing the New Economic Policy, with the object of striking out a new path for the Soviet State, he also fostered his followers' faith in the world revolution, hoping that the fanaticism of the faithful could be harnessed for internal consolidation.

Stalin, perhaps, was the only front rank leader who understood Lenin's strategy and shared his self-confidence. But after the untimely death of Lenin, he began the struggle for the leadership of the party, with the disadvantage of being associated with empty-headed agitators like Zinoviev, who believed that they were holding a beleaguered fortress, to be soon relieved by the world revolution. That mentality was shared by the entire leading cadre of the party who had grown up mostly in European exile as fanatical believers in the Marxist prophesy of world revolution. Trotzky was their natural leader. To fight his influence successfully, Stalin for a time after Lenin's death, shared the leadership of the party with Zinoviev and Kamenev, who were fanatical prophets of world revolution. As Stalin was eager to turn the energy of the party to the task of internal consolidation by implementing the New Economic Policy, the opportunist alliance could not last long. Zinoviev went over to Trotzky to oppose Stalin's attempt "to betray the proletarian revolution—to transform the Bolshevik Party into a petit-bourgeois peasants' party."

In the meantime, the burning hope of world revolution had experienced yet another cold blast. In 1923, revolution was defeated for the second time in Germany. The

significance of the defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw might not have been grasped by Stalin as fully as by Lenin; but he did not fail to draw a lesson from the defeat of the second German revolution. He lost faith in the world revolution, if he ever had any. But the party still held on to the faith as the greatest revolutionary virtue. Stalin could not trifle with the guiding emotion of the leading cadre of the party, when his position and policy were being challenged by a combination of the old prophets of the revolutionary faith. But he outmanoeuvered them by opening before the inner circle of the party a new road to world revolution. By themselves, even countries like Germany had failed to make the revolution; there is no sense in hoping against hope; let us build up a formidable army which, in the fulness of time, will carry the banner of revolution to Western Europe. That was a fascinating perspective. As the prophet of Red Napoleonism, Stalin finally broke the opposition of the old guard and captured the leadership of the party. The new international perspective, at the same time, set the pattern of the internal development of the Soviet State.

The requirements of the creation of a powerful army clouded the perspective of the democratisation of the Soviet State opened up by the New Economic Policy. Since then, all internal developments—political, economic, emotional—tended towards militarisation of the Soviet State. To begin with, heavy industries would have to be built up rapidly to lay down the foundation of a military State. As by far the larger part of national income (surplus produce) had to be invested for that purpose, the production of consumers' goods was drastically cut down. In return for the produce of agriculture, the peasants could not be supplied with manufactured articles they needed. A slump in agricultural prices and production would affect the largest lump of national income, slowing down the building of heavy industries. That was a vicious circle, which could

be broken only by abandoning the New Economic Policy—by deviating from the path of the democratisation of the Soviet State.

The alternatives were: reversal to the system of confiscation or forcible seizure of agricultural products and collectivisation of agriculture under State control. The former system had failed in the earlier years of the revolution; nevertheless, it was tried once again for a time. The result was an alarming fall of agricultural production and widespread discontent of the peasantry. Collectivisation checked the fall of production, but could not remove the discontent of the peasantry.

The political consequence of a lopsided industrialisation and forcible collectivisation of agriculture was tightening of the dictatorship. General scarcity of consumers' goods and high prices caused discontent also among the urban working class. Emphasis on the idea of proletarian dictatorship served as an analgetic balm, if not actually as a dope. They were the rulers of the Soviet State; they were building a new world; therefore the workers must put up with hardships and make sacrifices for the happiness of future generations. Sacrifices were all the more necessary for the defence of the Workers' Republic against the attack by the capitalist world.

During the period of the two Five Years Plans, the Soviet State thus had to be necessarily dictatorial. But it became less of a proletarian dictatorship than ever before. Planned economy laid the industrial base for a powerful army; but it did not establish Socialism. Yet, the fiction was kept up; and it only served the purpose of replacing the fanatical faith in world revolution by a new type of patriotism—to labour and sacrifice for the "Socialist Fatherland". The militarised Soviet State necessarily became a National State. Whatever might have been the purpose with which it was created (and there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the original purpose), the logic

of internal development of the Soviet Union transformed the nature of the Red Army. Instead of operating as the spearhead of world revolution, it became the instrument to make the world feel the power of the Soviet Union. Post-war Soviet foreign policy is the reflex of that internal movement away from democracy, not towards Socialism through proletarian dictatorship, but towards neo-nationalism.

This tendency, which, officially promoted, strongly manifested itself during the war, proves that human nature has not very much changed in the Socialist Fatherland. The emphasis was on the "fatherland", the adjective being only an euphemism. The legendary greatness of Russia—of the Tzars—had to be invoked in order to create enthusiasm for the defence of the Socialist Fatherland. That was an admission that the Soviet State has not created a new culture, although two generations have grown up since it was established. The Tzarist General, Souvarov, who conquered Poland, is celebrated by the Soviet State as the greatest national hero. The heroes of the revolution and the civil war are given subsidiary places, if not altogether superceded by the legendary figures of mediaeval Russia. The Order of Souvarov is the highest distinction given by the Soviet State—higher than the Order of Lenin! Nationalist revivalism has become so rampant that recently the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (*The Bolshevik*) found it necessary to call a halt. But it is more easily said than done. Popular sentiment would irresistibly flow in the traditional channels, unless they were canalised in a new direction.

When the revolution broke out nearly thirty years ago, ordinary soldiers and workers pounced upon military officers and tore away their gorgeous epaulettes, which were regarded as the insignia of a tyrannical régime. So violent and widespread was the symbolic outburst of popular passion that officers themselves threw away their

epaulettes of which they were so proud. Now even more gorgeous epaulettes have returned to adorn the officers of the Red Army. The gallaxy of the Marshals of the Soviet Union carry swords decorated with twenty-eight rubies and diamonds and emeralds. Even Stalin was afraid that the Red Army, very largely his own creation, might not be sufficiently respectful, unless he made himself a Marshal on formally assuming the supreme command. Later on, he had to promote himself to the rank of Generalissimo, evidently to show that he stood above his Marshals.

Stalin dropping the long coat and cap of the ordinary Red Army man, the simplicity which made him loved, to don the Marshal's regalia—there is a tragedy in that picture. How awkward he looked in that ridiculous outfit, sitting between Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran! The tragedy could be imagined by comparing that picture of an institutionalised Stalin with the picture of his old self, still in the long coat and cap, looking at Churchill with the familiar cynical smile and twinkle in the eye, when Churchill first visited Moscow. Even then, Stalin was still the Man of Destiny of our time; I, at any rate, like to hold on to that belief, or was it an illusion? At Teheran, it was a new Stalin—personification of the Tzarist tradition, dressed up in the nationalism of the Socialist Fatherland. He appeared to be somewhat uncomfortable in the new rôle. But history, after all, got the better of him.

This change in the personality of its leader reflects what has really happened in the internal life of the Soviet Union. Both have been overwhelmed by the logic of history. Man can make history, if he keeps it in mind that his creative power is limited by the material available for creation. If the Soviet State was reared upon the foundation of organised democracy as the bulwark of a slow but painless reorganisation of the economic life of the country, the Russian Revolution might have blazed a new trail of social evolution. It would not conform with some theoretical

presuppositions of Marxism. But Socialism has not been established in any case; and the experience has belied theoretical expectations. However may the present economic, political and cultural conditions in the Soviet Union be described, they have created an explosive situation. Therefore, post-war Soviet foreign policy is fraught with the danger of war, which will not promote revolution. Deviating from the practical way of democratic development, the Soviet State headed towards the present dangerous position —dangerous for itself as well as for the entire civilised world.

SECTION SIX

THE END OF AN ERA

Chapter XXIII

A BALANCE SHEET

It is a century since the Communist Manifesto was published to herald the proletarian world revolution which would establish Socialism on the ruins of the bourgeois capitalist order. The prophets of the coming revolution believed to have proved its inevitability by pointing out the contradictions of the capitalist economy which were bound to precipitate recurring crises; the cycle of economic crises was to culminate in a political crisis, which would shake the already economically undermined structure of the capitalist State; in that confidently anticipated revolutionary situation, the working class was to rise in revolt, overthrow the bourgeoisie from power and establish proletarian dictatorship as the political institution of the period of transition to Socialism. Nearly a hundred years have passed since the optimistic prophesy was made; but history has not moved accordingly, and to-day there is less ground than ever to expect it to do so.

Irrespective of whatever might be in the womb of history, the authors of the Communist Manifesto were unduly alarmist when they invoked the spectre of Communism to stalk over Europe, striking terror in the heart of the bourgeoisie. As a matter of fact, more than half a century passed before the imaginary spectre became a reality. Only in 1917, it actually cast its shadow athwart Europe, and the ruling classes all over the world were terrified by the danger of Communism. The Russian Revolution was hailed as ushering in the era of proletarian revolution heralded by the Communist Manifesto one hundred years ago. Taking place in an atmosphere of general unsettlement and uncertainty, the dramatic events in Russia were expected by some, and feared by others,

to be contagious. The former regarded them as the signal for the world revolution. For several years, the situation continued to be tense. Revolutionary upheavals did take place in Germany and some other minor European countries. The Communist International was founded as the instrument for organising and leading the impending world revolution.

The optimism was not shared by the old Social-Democratic parties, which commanded large working-class following in a number of European countries, although they also believed in the Marxist prognosis of history. Therefore, Communist Parties, in the beginning necessarily small and uninfluential, had to be organised in other countries at the instance and under the leadership of the Russians. In one or two countries, particularly in Germany, which, owing to the military defeat, was caught in a severe economic and political crisis, the young Communist Party rapidly grew in number. But nowhere could the Russian events of 1917 be repeated successfully. After the first act, the drama of the world revolution did not move rapidly. Having provoked counter-revolutionary resistance, it slowed down. A new spectre began to stalk over Europe. Already in 1922, Fascism came to power in Italy. Since 1925, it cast its ominous shadow all over Europe. Counter-revolution moved swiftly from triumph to triumph, in one country after another, until Hitler came to occupy the centre of the stage in Germany. Revolution had to fall back on its base in Russia, leaving outposts and advance-guards in the various countries of the world under the domination of triumphant counter-revolution.

So, even in the fulness of time, when the period of proletarian revolution did begin more than half a century after the publication of the optimistic Communist Manifesto, the drama of history did not unfold as the prophets of the world revolution had foretold. Firstly, it broke out in the most unexpected place—in agrarian Russia, instead

of one of the most advanced industrial countries, where Socialism was to have germinated in the womb of the decaying capitalist order. Secondly, the revolution, even if it was historically necessary, did not prove to be inevitable. Thirdly, the bourgeois social order turned out to possess means of defending itself which could not be foreseen and calculated at the time the Communist Manifesto heralded the proletarian world revolution as historically predetermined and therefore inevitable. Finally, the most disconcerting experience was that, without any organisation and notwithstanding imperialist competition, the bourgeoisie showed a greater sense of international solidarity than the proletariat.

The main factor which stopped the revolution spreading to other countries, to become a world-wide movement, was the military power of the modern States. It was absent in the middle of the nineteenth century. Therefore, naturally, it did not enter into the Marxist calculation of the relation of forces in the anticipated revolutionary crisis. Due to that miscalculation, the scheme of world revolution went askew even when it did appear to be imminent. It was a miscalculation; the prophets of the proletarian world revolution believed that it would be on the pattern of the bourgeois revolution which had started in France. They should not have missed the fact that the bourgeois revolution spread from France to other countries of Europe through the instrumentality of Napoleon's army; even then the military factor was decisive. At that time, it was on the side of the revolution. The French Revolution created a new type of army, which made Napoleonic strategy possible. The misfortune of the proletarian revolution was that, when it was expected to take place, the bourgeois States could acquire such a formidable military power as enabled them to survive the greatest economic and political crises by beating down the forces of revolution. Therefore, the concrete result of the Russian Revolution was the rise

and triumph of Fascism in Europe. That was hardly a happy beginning of the era of the proletarian revolution.

Although the Communist International, backed up by the new Russian régime, carried on the propaganda for the world revolution, for all practical purposes the perspective of the Russian Revolution had to be adapted to the realities of the world situation. It could not be the prelude to the world revolution, which did not take place, and there appeared to be little chance of its happening within a measurable future. The new régime in Russia could not live indefinitely from hand to mouth, only with great expectations. History did not move according to the text-book of professional revolutionaries. What were they to do?

The repercussion of the fact that history refused to fit into an *a priori* pattern was a crisis in the Communist Party of Russia, and consequently in the Communist International. The powerful personality and genius of Lenin held the party together during the initial stage of the crisis. Soon after his untimely death, dissensions broke out, first in the struggle for leadership, and then in a theoretical controversy about the future of the revolution in Russia. In that controversy, Stalin maintained that it was possible to build Socialism in one country, pending the coming of the world revolution which he doubted in the heart of hearts. As against that practical and statesmanlike view of the perspective of the revolution, Trotzky defended Marxist orthodoxy. He maintained, on the authority of the prophets and their scriptures, that Socialism was conditional upon the proletarian world revolution. He condemned Stalin's doctrine of Socialism in one country as a tendency towards restoration of Capitalism. With all the brilliance of a superb propagandist, and the burning passion of an artist, Trotzky would not see the logical consequence of his revolutionary intolerance and theoretical dogmatism. If Socialism could not be built in one country except in

the context of a successful proletarian world revolution, and the latter was not just round the corner to give the helping hand, what was the Communist Party of Russia to do except to lay down power in order to escape the charge of reviving Capitalism? Because of the logical absurdity of Trotzky's position, Stalin carried the day, and the Russian Revolution struck out a line of development independent of Marxist orthodoxy.

The pattern of the initial development of the Soviet Union was set by the triumph of Stalinism over stereotyped Marxism. Echoing Goethe, Lenin, while inaugurating the New Economic Policy, a departure from the *a priori* Marxist scheme, had declared: "Theory is gray, but evergreen is the tree of life." Stalin acted accordingly, and with astonishing boldness revised Marxism in practice as warranted by experience. By doing so, he proved himself to be a greater Marxist than his dogmatic opponents; because, experience is the basis of Marxism, which knows no final truth. Nevertheless, he himself fell victim to the circumstances.

The belief that the Russian Revolution was the signal for the proletarian world revolution had been drilled into the mental make-up of the members of the Russian Communist Party. In order to carry through his realistic policy, Stalin had to retain their confidence that he also shared the utopian belief. Even when striking out a different path in practice, Stalin had to smile benevolently on his followers who were theoretically defending Marxist orthodoxy. That was intellectual dishonesty on the part of the Stalinist leadership which, therefore, blocked intellectual development on the basis of actual experience. In a sense, Stalinism was Marxism in practice under circumstances not foreseen by the prophets of Socialism. At the same time, it was a negation of Marxism, because it did not allow consciousness to be determined by being. Having rescued the revolution from the fascinating snare of

Trotzkyist orthodoxy, Stalin, in order to entrench himself in power, patronised and encouraged intellectual dishonesty.

The doctrine of Socialism in one country, notwithstanding its historical emergency and practical justification, was bound to encourage nationalism. It was all the more certain to do so when the chance of proletarian revolution in other countries did not appear to be bright. But it would be a new type of nationalism, not necessarily bringing in its train a capitalist revival as Trotzky apprehended. Personally, Stalin had all along been the prophet of the new type of nationalism, which has ultimately culminated in a Pan-Slavist revival, though under the red flag.

It was during the war that "proletarian patriotism" practically eclipsed international Socialism in the Soviet Union. But several years previous to that, Stalin had expounded a new doctrine which was the corollary to Socialism in one country. He characterised the post-five-years-plan social organisation and culture of the Soviet Union as "national in form but socialist in content". In the Communist Manifesto, the prophets of the proletarian revolution had declared that the working class had no country. It was an irony of history that the State created by the first proletarian revolution came to be called the "Socialist Fatherland"; later on, the adjective also was dropped, and it became the "Soviet Fatherland". Before long, the "Internationale" ceased to be the anthem of the first proletarian Republic. It was replaced by a full-blooded national anthem invoking Slav traditions and glorifying Russian heroes of the past.

By the time the second world war broke out, promising a new period of revolutionary crises, Russia had, for all practical purposes, become a national State. It was indeed not marching back towards capitalism; but on the other hand, its "socialist content", necessarily influenced by the nationalist form, was tending towards Socialism—the classless and stateless society of the Communist Manifesto. The

first successful proletarian revolution had nearly run itself in the sand, abandoned almost all its original ideals, when the world entered into the present epoch of war and revolutions. The rulers of Russia believed that they could peacefully go on building their national-in-form, socialist-in-content new order, even when the rest of the civilised world went up in flames thanks to fascist incendiarism. It was hoped that the shock of that great tragedy would jolt them out of their complacency and nationalist isolation. The fall of France in 1940 dashed that lingering hope. Historians must, therefore, come to the conclusion that the fall of France closed the epoch of the Russian Revolution. By not rushing to the aid of European democracy in distress, attacked by foreign Fascism and betrayed by native collaborators, Russia forfeited the leadership of the world in the new epoch of wars and revolutions, an honour which should be hers for having had ushered in what was believed to be the age of the proletarian world revolution.

The earlier years of the anti-fascist war, particularly the fall of France, closed the era of proletarian world revolution heralded by the Communist Manifesto a century ago. Because, that crisis offered Russia the last chance to establish in the whole of Europe the long anticipated proletarian dictatorship, and she missed the chance. In Russia itself the revolution underwent a metamorphosis. Its leadership had never been proletarian; in course of time, it became less so. Proletarian dictatorship was still proclaimed as a matter of theoretical formality, rather of courtesy. However, the war presented the opportunity to accomplish, through the instrumentality of the Red Army, what could not be done politically. That was the occasion for the Russian Revolution to enter its Napoleonic phase—to spread beyond the national frontiers and become an international movement.

As far as I knew, Stalin had been preparing for the moment, thinking in terms of "Red Napoleonism". But

the opportunity was missed. The logic of the internal development of the Soviet Union towards nationalism, even though with a "socialist content", proved to be too much for a man's will to control. Otherwise, the history of that crucial period could not be rationally explained. At last, the opportunity came for the Russian Revolution to develop into the long anticipated proletarian world revolution; but it was not seized. The plausible case for Russian neutrality during the earlier part of the anti-fascist war could be argued from a nationalist point of view; and even then it was a short-sighted policy and bad strategy, unless the antagonism between Russian Communism and German Fascism had really disappeared. From the point of view of proletarian world revolution and international Socialism, it was utterly indefensible. Stalinist Russia had gone far away from Lenin's revolutionary idealism, that the proletariat of any single country should be sacrificed, if necessary, for promoting the cause of world revolution.

With due deference for the wishful thinking (utopianism) of the founders of "scientific Socialism", it must be admitted by all the sober fighters for an equitable and equalitarian new order, that the inability of the proletariat to seize the leadership of the civilised world was predetermined. It is a Marxian theory that a particular class assumes the leadership of society when its own interests happen to be identical with the welfare of the entire community. There is a good deal of truth in it. But the truth is vulgarised by conceiving social or human interest as exclusively or predominantly economic. Materialist philosophy has been discredited by those who identify it with economic determinism. The leadership of the great struggle for building a cosmopolitan humanist commonwealth on the basis of the great technological, material and intellectual achievements of modern civilisation, belongs to those who can fully appreciate the cultural values of those achieve-

ments. By its very social position, the proletariat as a class, even in the most advanced countries, cannot be expected to do that. Since the rise of Fascism, all the basic concepts of modern civilisation were at stake. To save them, as the inspiration for a higher civilisation, is the common concern of contemporary society. The economic interests of the proletariat must be protected and promoted. But it must also be realised that they are not identical with the interests of modern civilised society. The Marxian theory of leadership does not qualify the proletariat to play that role of honour in the modern world. Therefore, the Russians failed to seize the opportunity presented by the anti-fascist war, and their failure burst the bubble of the proletariat leading the modern world out of its present crisis.

This logical judgement is empirically corroborated. Look at the attitude of the Communist Parties in the earlier period of the war, when triumphant Fascism was overrunning Europe. It was so distressing that already then I wrote that Communism was the first major casualty of this war. The Communists actually functioned as Hitler's collaborators. Just when Hitler's hordes were marching on Paris, the leader of the French Communist party speaking over the German radio exhorted French soldiers to desert the army. The British Communist Party demanded peace—advocating Chamberlain's policy of appeasing the Axis Powers, even after British democracy had repudiated it. The Communist Parties, claiming to be the class-conscious vanguard of the world proletariat, played that damaging and discrediting role and demonstrated a callous disregard for the cultural values and basic concepts of modern civilisation, simply because Russia, loyal to her pact with Nazi Germany, remained neutral in the fateful struggle until she was herself attacked.

Most probably, without the intervention of the Red Army Hitler could not be defeated. But impartial histo-

rians cannot forget that it was a forced participation. If Hitler had the good sense of leaving them alone, the Russians, on their own testimony, might never have entered the war against the Axis Powers. However, on the other hand, without the help of the Western democratic Powers, Russia might have been overrun by Hitler's hordes. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt were interested in saving the Russian economic system. But they were dead-set on defeating Hitler, because he stood for mediaeval barbarism as against modern civilisation. So, as a matter of fact, it was not the interest of the world proletariat, as represented by the Communist International, which was identical with the fate of the modern world in the most critical moment of its history. The rôle was filled in by the much maligned western democracy, because of its loyalty to human and cultural values.

When the war was forced upon Russia, she defended herself under the banner of patriotism. The propaganda for world revolution and Communism had worn thin. The history of Tzarist Russia was searched for examples to inspire heroic deeds. The war opened before Russia two alternative roads to the future: Red Napoleonism, to carry revolution to the rest of Europe; and nationalist atavism, notwithstanding the supposed socialist content. Her communist rulers chose the latter course, and put an end to the period of revolution.

The Soviet Union has emerged from the war as a national State, not only in form, but very largely in content also. Her planned economy may or may not be socialistic. But her cultural life, whatever of it is there, is so very saturated with neo-nationalism that even Stalin's personal appeal for the revival of Marxist ideology seems to have made little impression. Recently, the theoretical organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party—*The Bolshevik*—sounded the alarm against the wave of nationalist deviation which was sweeping the entire Socialist

Republic of the proletariat which is supposed to have no fatherland. But the Frankenstein created by the Communist Party under Stalin's leadership cannot now be laid. The salvo against nationalism having misfired, the big guns of the antiquated Marxist orthodoxy were turned upon another tendency born out of the experience of the war. It is the so-called "western influence" which might still bring revolutionary Russia abreast with the post-war world. The purity of proletarian ideology is now defended by the official onslaught against writers and artists who "show admiration for the bourgeois culture of the western countries".

Another official organ of high-level propaganda—*Cultural Life*—came out with a complete programme of developing "Communist consciousness in the Soviet people". Bitterly complaining that "Marxist-Leninist theory is not being studied by the Communists", the journal enjoined: "No one must give way to war-weariness, either mental or physical; there must be no escapism —from our Soviet realities". The programme for cultivating communist consciousness denounced "alien bourgeois ideologies, and any hankering for petit-bourgeois western culture".

This campaign, which may be meant to be a propaganda offensive against neo-nationalism, was inaugurated by Zhdanov, one of Stalin's trusted lieutenants. He is believed to be Malenkov's rival for Stalin's successorship. During the war, when Stalin was engrossed with military matters, Malenkov, a comparatively young and unknown man, virtually replaced him as the General Secretary of the party, and from that position of authority promoted neo-nationalism, of course with Stalin's connivance. During the war, Zhdanov also was taken up with military duties. He is one of Stalin's old guard, who fought and won the theoretical war against Trotzky. His return to the political field as the leader of the campaign for ideological purity is

interpreted as a manoeuvre to remove Malenkov from his strategic position. But the latter may have taken a leaf out of the master's book, and entrenched himself firmly behind the all-powerful party bureaucracy, as Stalin did quietly before he declared war upon Trotzky. It is not a struggle for supremacy between the party and the army, as superficial observers seem to believe. It is a conflict between Communism and Nationalism; in other words, between communist internationalism and national Socialism.

The party bureaucracy, supported by the army, seems to have become the champion of the latter. The utopia of world revolution has been replaced by Pan-Slavism revived under the red flag. The new slogan is "From the Pacific to the Oder and the Adriatic". Stalin is reported to have depicted the new perspective as follows: "A planned economy in Russia and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe will enable us to heal our wounds much quicker and less painfully than we could do otherwise. If the capitalist world leaves us in peace and allows us to go on planning and building for twenty or thirty years in the vast area from the Pacific to the Oder and the Adriatic, we shall eventually reach such a high standard of living that, without wars or bloody revolutions, the rest of the world will follow our communist example".

That is something new—entirely different from the classical scheme of world revolution, and also the crypto-nationalist doctrine of Socialism in one country. If Stalin's new plan succeeds, the world may have an example. But whatever may happen after twenty or thirty years, immediately, the new Russian policy is nationalist expansionism, which is more likely to lead to a war unless the rest of the world will do more than leave the Russians in peace. Perhaps, Russia will win that war, provided the conflict can be localised in some places of her choice—the Balkans or the Middle-East. But that will not be a revolutionary war. It will be a war for Russian expansionism. The

history of revolution will not be directly concerned with it.

Where does Stalin stand in this swift-moving drama? If he is really inspiring the campaign against neo-nationalism, once in his life he is fighting a losing battle; he is trying to kill the Frankenstein created by himself. One can only speculate; but the speculation reminds me of what I wrote in 1930, when the political guillotine of the Russian Revolution was swiftly disposing of Stalin's opponents, who took up an attitude reminiscent of Dantonism: We have captured power, accomplished the first stages of the revolution, now let us go slow and enjoy ourselves. Comparing Stalin with Robespierre, I wondered if he would not have his St. Just also. I don't know what is there in the minds of the Red Marshals. I am inclined to think that Malenkov may fill in the rôle, if it will come to that. The reason of the suspicion is very solid: Whoever controls the machinery of the all-powerful party bureaucracy, will be able to pay even Stalin himself in his own coin. And his present perspective, as per the above quotation, is Dantonist.

But, in any case, nothing dramatic is likely to happen. After all, Stalin is nearing seventy, and the war, the responsibility of having placed Russia in that perilous position, has heavily told upon his iron constitution. He may die or retire with decorum. But has he already lost his grip on the reins of power which he still holds formally? There are facts which suggest an answer in the affirmative.

* * *

The first Foreign Ministers' Conference in London almost broke up. Bevin had replaced Churchill, and Roosevelt was dead. Stalin alone of the Big Three was still alive. All eyes naturally turned upon him for the leadership to take the United Nations out of the crisis. But nobody knew where he was resting to recover from the strain of the war years. It was reported that he was ill.

However, he returned to Moscow on the eve of the anniversary of the revolution, which took place shortly after the unsuccessful Foreign Ministers' Conference in London. The anxious world expected a reassuring pronouncement from him on that day. But he did not speak; Molotov deputised him. That was unprecedented—Stalin present in Moscow on the anniversary of the revolution, and someone else making the official pronouncement. There was something wrong. Was he still ill? No; then he would not have returned. Was he no longer the supreme boss? Again, one could only speculate.

Some months later, a sensational story appeared in the American press: During the three months he was reported to have been ill or resting, he was virtually a prisoner! It was further reported that he wanted to continue even after the war the policy of co-operation with the Western democratic Powers. The neo-nationalists, who had seized the reins of power during the war, felt that the longer post-war Europe could be kept in an unsettled condition, the greater would be the opportunity for Pan-Slavist expansionism. For the first time since he came to the helm of affairs in Russia, Stalin could not make his view prevail. He was set aside with all respect and ceremony, when the post-war Soviet foreign policy was announced to the world by Molotov at the London Conference. Thereafter, Stalin could not publicly repudiate the policy unless he was prepared, and had the power, to cashier his Foreign Minister and remove the neo-nationalists fom their strategic positions. It seems that he did not dare make that attempt, and risk a downfall towards the end of a grand career.

Thereafter he made several public pronouncements which were promptly repudiated by Soviet delegates at international conferences. Moreover, the pronouncements themselves were self-contradictory. When international relations were extremely strained, and the Soviet Foreign

Minister, Molotov was accusing Britain and America of war-like intentions, and Moscow Radio was warning the world against war-mongers, Stalin broke his silence to grant an interview to the British journalist Alexander Werth at the end of September 1946. It was an important as well as a sensational pronouncement. The Russian leader categorically declared: "A real danger of a new war does not yet exist." Perhaps the sting might have been in the word "yet". But on the same occasion, he made other statements which were positively reassuring. He was very optimistic about the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Britain, and added that, "far from decreasing, the possibility was increasing." Stalin's pronouncement naturally created the impression that there was a new hopeful turn in Russian foreign policy. But Molotov went on in his old way. After a month, Stalin himself reverted to the talk of war danger, while denouncing Churchill as the greatest war-monger. Then again, in an Order of the Day issued on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, he made the following declaration: "The absence of any threat of war should not engender equanimity. Our nation has, as to war years, a profound understanding and interest, and the State knows its duty to the fatherland, and has used all its energy towards strengthening its country's might. Constant military preparedness of the Soviet Army and Navy is the price of safety for our motherland and durable peace throughout the world."

Apart from contradicting the statement made only a few weeks earlier about war danger, the Soviet leader's declaration made on the anniversary of the proletarian revolution fully endorsed neo-nationalism. He concluded by an appeal for a "study of the lessons of the great patriotic war" for future guidance. Perhaps, having recovered from his illness—or was it temporary internment? —whatever might have been the case, Stalin did make a last attempt to regain control and arrest the dangerous

drift towards nationalist expansionism. Whether it is a drift or a deliberate design, he did not succeed in his attempt.

With a single-minded purpose, he had created the Red Army. It was to act as the instrument of world revolution when the time came. But in the process, the dictatorial State, a powerful army and the requisite industrial organisation generated forces and created tendencies antagonistic to the original purpose. For winning the war, those very forces and tendencies were encouraged to the extent of becoming predominating. What was meant to be a revolutionary war of liberation, became a "patriotic war".

History declined to follow the course marked out by the Communist Manifesto. The failure of the proletariat to assume the leadership of society in advanced European countries compelled the revolution in Russia to abandon the long-cherished ideals; instead of moving towards the Communist Utopia, it ended in establishing a National State—with a new type of economy; but that distinction, in its turn, proved that planned economy was not necessarily liberating and equalitarian; that, on the contrary, it may continue the exploitation of labour on the plausible pretext of satisfying the abstract and imaginary collective ego. The transition from Communism to Nationalism was easy and imperceptible because the latter also makes a fetish of the deceptive concept of collectivity, which completely ignores its own constituent units.

The Russian Revolution was hailed as the signal for the world revolution heralded by the Communist Manifesto. Its failure to have that hypothetical historic significance must necessarily modify the idea of proletarian revolution. The close of the epoch of the Russian Revolution means the end of the dream of the proletarian revolution. The Communist Parties still exist, even as predominating factors, in some countries. But they have attained that

status thanks to their nationalist degeneration. At the opening of the newly elected French National Assembly, the veteran Communist, Marcel Cachin, spoke in a tone reminiscent of Poincaré, whom the Communists themselves gave the nickname *"La Guerre"* (Poincaré means war). There was a time when the Communists held that Nationalism led to war. Now, a century after the publication of the Communist Manifesto, Communism has completely discredited itself, and the spectre of proletarian revolution has been exorcised by the history of the Russian Revolution.

The experience of the anti-fascist war and its aftermath has given birth to new ideas and new ideals to move civilised humanity towards a really new order. The leadership of that movement does not belong to any class, but to men and women who embody the totality of the heritage of human history and cherish the moral and cultural values created by human genius ever since the dawn of civilisation, the very values which inspired the prophets of Socialism to issue the Communist Manifesto.

Chapter XXIV

AMERICAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

At the conclusion of the military phase of the second world war, the Russian colossus stood astride Europe. Morally, her position was equally strong. The leadership of liberated Europe was in the hollow of her hand. Nothing short of a war could dislodge her from that position, and there was no power to risk that adventure.

In Britain, Churchill had already been replaced by the Labour Government. Even if he remained in power to relapse into his pathological Communist-phobia, he could not possibly drag Britain in an anti-Soviet war. Apart from the decisive question of Britain's ability to wage another first-class war, Russia enjoyed a tremendous goodwill in that country. The U.S.A. was the only power materially in a position to wage a war for dislodging Russia from her dominating position in Europe. The bulk of the American people, for various reasons, could be stampeded into an anti-communist crusade.

Such was the international relation of forces at the conclusion of the second world war. America was the second country to have survived the war as a Great Power. Actually, she had grown stronger, economically as well as militarily. Naturally, she aspired for world domination, and, to satisfy that ambition, would have to cross swords with the only other Great Power, namely, Russia.

Everybody knew that it was a very costly victory for Russia. The Red Army only stopped short of appearing on the Rhine. A large part of Europe to the east of a line from Stettin to Trieste, bulging considerably westwards in Central Germany, was actually occupied by it. But that formidable military power, at the end of the war, stood on a severely shaken economic base. The inter-

national outcaste of yesterday had emerged out of its isolation as a world power, but it was a top-heavy structure. Nevertheless, the U.S.A. would not dare provoke an immediate show-down, although the field-commanders of the American Army in Europe might have been inclined that way, as it could be inferred from their frantic dash across Germany, right up to the Czech border, not to mention the outskirts of Berlin. It may be presumed that the first direct contact with the Red Army, flushed with great victories, dampened their enthusiasm. Later on, observers sent to sound the situation, such as the ex-President Herbert Hoover, were reported to have returned with the opinion that the Red Army could not be beaten; in the picturesque American language, it would make mincemeat of any adversary.

There can be no doubt about it that the post-war Soviet foreign policy was determined by the feeling that none could challenge Russia's position, and therefore she would have her way further to consolidate her position, militarily and politically, if not morally. Therefore, the guiding principle of Russian foreign policy was to delay the conclusion of peace. Unsettled conditions would promote the prospect of revolution, encouraged by the presence of the victorious Red Army. Consequently, Russian influence would spread westwards, until the whole of Europe was included in the Soviet system.

Indeed, flushed with the feeling of power, the Russian leaders were inclined to gamble with their store of goodwill abroad. But they played a game of bluff. They could not have been ignorant of the essential weakness of their apparently formidable military position. No modern strategist would lay overmuch stock on an army deployed over extensive foreign territories, when its industrial base was nearly shattered. The Soviet foreign policy of bluff and bluster counted upon the fact that the only Power potentially capable of calling the bluff, namely, the U.S.A.,

was for the moment actually under a disadvantage. The American army in Europe was not nearly big enough to cross swords with the colossus standing astride half of Europe; and the doughboys were eager to go back home. Even if America decided to send a new expeditionary or punitive force to Europe, she would be confronted with great technical difficulties. Except Franco's Spain, there was no bridgehead for landing a large army and the necessary supplies.

In that situation, American strategists were guided by the Clausewitz dictum, and fell back upon diplomacy. Peace conferences, where Molotov stammered thunders against the whilom allies, and Vishinsky, of the Moscow Trials fame, vituperated, only served the purpose of temporising. While the Russians talked peace belligerently, and the Americans tried to be benevolent, with the suave diplomatic smile, the rivals feverishly manœuvred for positions in different parts of the world, all along the would-be battle-fronts. The Russians, new in the field of high diplomacy, were taken in by American simulation. Believing that Uncle Sam was withdrawing from the old world, true to his deceptive tradition of isolationism, the Russians turned to their *bête noire*, British Imperialism, disregarding the fact that in the meanwhile a Labour Government had come to power in Britain. However, they could not be so very incredibly foolish as to miss that the most outstanding fact of the post-war world was the disappearance of Britain as an imperialist Power. Their propagandists might be still obsessed with an old complex. But economic experts and military espionage should have enlightened the policy-makers of the Kremlin.

As a matter of fact, British Imperialism and the shadow of Churchill were only convenient bogeys to serve the purpose of the post-war Soviet foreign policy, which was to embarrass the British Labour Government. It was a dear old quarrel—Communists finding fault with any and

every thing done by Socialists in or out of office. But the familiar theoretical motivation of the quarrel would be too far-fetched in this case.

Merciless exposure of socialist policy was supposed to be necessary for quickening the revolutionary consciousness and will of the working class. The pattern of the revolution having been once for all set in Russia in 1917, socialist governments everywhere should be compared with the Kerenski régime, and treated as such: they should be exposed as counter-revolutionary, and finally overthrown. But it would be grotesque if any Russian leader ever really believed that in Britain Harry Pollit could play Lenin, even if Bevin could be properly tarred and feathered as the arch-social-fascist conspiring with British Kornilovs.

The Soviet foreign policy of embarrassing the British Labour Government had a more realistic purpose. It was to prevent the possibility of socialist Britain providing an alternative leadership to liberated Europe. Had not the Russians missed their chance of becoming the leader of a democratic Europe, they need not be anxious about the rivalry of the British Labour Government. As it was, they felt that, notwithstanding their dominating political and military position, morally, Europe was slipping through their fingers, so to say. An alternative leadership would accelerate the process. Hence the necessity of painting the British Labour Government in the blackest possible colours.

When world attention was focussed on the Anglo-Soviet conflict in Greece and Persia, America quietly moved up her pawns on the chess-board of power politics. Having decided to soft-pedal in Europe, she had selected China for skirmishing. The Sino-Soviet Pact had shown that Russia was not prepared for a show-down in the Far East, where America was technically in a stronger position. Therefore, the U.S.A. selected China as the ground where first to

challenge Russia, and risk a show-down if the adversary would take up the gauntlet.

The Chief of the Staff of the American Army, General Marshall, himself went to direct operations in the Far-Eastern theatre. Owing to the essential unsoundness of her apparently dominating military position, Russia was outmanœuvered. The civil war, reopened on a grand scale by Chiang Kai-shek with forty divisions trained by American strategists and equipped with up-to-date armaments supplied from America, went against the Communists from the very beginning. Their headquarters were captured and their army was split up into groups scattered over a vast territory. Evidently, the Russians could not help their protégés anything like the Americans did theirs. In the first encounter, the Russians suffered a reverse.

At the same time, perhaps under American instigation, the British Labour Government called the Soviet bluff in Persia. The tension over the Azherbeidjan separatist movement almost reached the breaking point, Russia appearing to be scoring heavily. She was not only dictating terms at Teheran; the communist-sponsored Tudeh Party extended its operations to the oil fields of Southern Persia. Suddenly, the pro-Russian Persian Prime Minister went over to the counter-offensive on the issue of the election in Azherbeidjan. The blustering Tudeh Party collapsed like a house of cards, and the dreaded Soviet influence, supposed to be creeping towards the Persian Gulf, vanished in thin air.

Twice a show-down was threatened, once in China and then in the Middle-East. Both the times, Russia receded, not for any pacific intention, but obviously because she was not prepared to risk a war. America was not slow to make the inference and decided to open the counter-offensive before Russia had more time to reinforce the economic and industrial foundation of her military power.

The American decision to launch the counter-offensive

was determined by yet another fact. By the end of 1946, news leaked out indicating that the Russian Government was experiencing innumerable difficulties in tackling the problems of post-war economic reconstruction. Apart from the reports of foreign visitors, an official economic survey published early in 1947 disclosed that the post-war crisis of Soviet economy was very grave; that the difficulties of the conversion of national economy from war to peace were great. There was considerable slackness both in industry and agriculture. Consequently, economic rehabilitation of the war-devastated territories was being delayed, rendering a reasonably early return even to a moderate prosperity highly problematical. The survey included a report on food production which revealed that agriculture was badly in need of tractors and other mechanical implements. They were not available because, again according to the official report, the 1946 plan of industrial production had not been carried out. The post-war Five Years Plan provided for the manufacture of 250,000 tractors—mainly in the giant plants of Kharkov and Stalingrad, both destroyed during the war. By the beginning of 1947, they were still not fully reconstructed. In 1946, they had produced only a few thousand tractors; not much more than 30,000 were expected in course of the current year. Consequently, agricultural production could not be stepped up.

The giant collective farms were in a crisis. During the war, the grim achievement of collectivising agriculture had been considerably undone, even in areas far away from the German occupied territories and the front lines. Discipline had slackened and bureaucratic control relaxed. Many peasants took advantage of the emergency and quietly reverted to private farming on lands carved out of collective farms. The emergency precluded any stern measures to arrest the retrograde process. As a matter of fact, to keep the politically backward section of the peasantry satisfied, in many places managers of collective farms

themselves sold land to individual peasants and gave certificates releasing them from the obligation of work on collective farms. In his report to the Supreme Soviet, the Minister of Agriculture mentioned that during the war about eleven million acres of land had been seized by peasants who had reverted to private individual agriculture.

Attempts to undo the war-time laxity only created discontent among the peasantry. The flame was fanned by the return of demobilised soldiers, who had for the first time in life seen conditions in other countries. The atmosphere was certainly not favourable for restoration of agricultural production on the pre-war basis. Consequently, the problem of food supply was bound to remain baffling for an indefinite period of time. The situation was aggravated by a severe draught in 1946, when extensive tracts in the wheat producing Ukraine and White Russia still lay waste.

The position of manufacturing industries as also of mining and transport, according to the official survey, was equally alarming. Apart from the heavy fall in the supply of tractors and other agricultural machinery, general industrial production was much lower than the planned level. Shortage of coal-output was the basic problem. The Donetz mines, flooded during the war, were still largely under water. The production of coal in the Siberian fields was also lagging far behind the plan. To remedy the situation, a retrograde measure was introduced. The Supreme Soviet amended the Constitution by restoring the eight hours day instead of seven hours.

Railway transport was in a chaos. Roads turned into ravines during the war were still very largely unusable. On top of that, cases of inefficient management, general slackness and corruption were disclosed by Ministers who, in their turn, were castigated during the session of the Supreme Soviet. Evidently, the economic crisis was finding a political expression also.

While manoeuvering in Europe diplomatically, hitting out successfully in the Far East, and carefully watching events inside Russia, the U.S.A. was quietly acquiring monopoly control of the Middle-Eastern oil fields. American air bases established in those parts during the war were not dismantled. On the contrary, when the veil of war-time secrecy was lifted, the world was staggered by the news of well equipped oil towns and a series of the world's largest aerodromes being built by Americans in Saudi Arabia right up to the Persian Gulf.

Finally, in February 1947, it was announced that an agreement had been concluded between British and American oil companies, which was interpreted as the U.S.A. underwriting British interests in the Middle East. The economic implication of the biggest oil deal of post-war history was the establishment of American monopoly on the supply of petroleum from the Middle-Eastern fields. It was of great commercial as well as strategic importance. In the near future, the entire American petroleum supply would be required for home consumption, and in consequence America lose control of the world oil market. The monopoly of supply from the Middle East removed that danger, opening at the same time new avenues for the export of American capital to be invested for acquiring a controlling share of the Middle-Eastern oil companies. Strategically, American Imperialism would find powerful bases very near to the southern flank of Russia, and the American Navy be guaranteed fuel supply in the anticipated eventuality of a war in those parts of the world.

Another consequence of the Anglo-British oil deal was to block the possibility of Russia acquiring a footing in the North-Persian fields. Russia had been pressing for concessions to counteract the danger of the American Sinclair Oil Company holding concession rights near her border. It was rather difficult for the Persian Government to disregard the Russian demand. They had been temporising

for several years. It was tacitly understood that, after the Anglo-American agreement, the Sinclair Oil Company would waive their concession right, enabling the Persian Government to resist the Russian demand on the ground that the Majlis had prohibited any further concession to foreigners.

So, by the beginning of 1947, the stage was set for America to appear on the southern flank of Russia, until then considered to be a British zone of influence. The decline of British Imperialism created a power-vacuum for the U.S.A. to fill in. The token gesture was the appearance of American battle-ships in the Eastern Mediterranean and their cruising up to the Sea of Marmora, the very gate of the Soviet citadel. The touchy Soviet Government had to take that none too friendly gesture without any protest. One more reason to convince America that the time had come to go over openly to the offensive. She might have gone slow still for some time, although the former army chief, Marshall, replacing Byrnes at the State Department, clearly indicated which way the wind was blowing. However, America's hand was forced by a further deterioration of Britain's economic and financial position. She was ready, and welcomed the opportunity, to appear on the scene formally as Britain's successor to the responsibility of the paramount World Power.

In summer 1947, Admiral Richard Connolly, Commander of the American fleet in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea, visited Turkey and Persia. The purpose of the visit, as freely commented in the press, was to demonstrate that the Truman doctrine would be backed up by military power, if necessary. Admiral Connolly's report was to help the formation of the new orientation of the American global strategy, which now regarded Greece and Turkey and the Middle East oil-fields as of vital importance. There was no longer any doubt that the American attitude to Greece and Turkey virtually

amounted to a military alliance, and that America would not allow the Middle East to be incorporated in the Soviet sphere of influence. Admiral Connolly's visit also meant that the Dardanelles were included in the American system of defence, and therefore America would resist by force any threat to that point of vital strategical importance.

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Ever since, towards the end of the Second World War, it was decided, with Stalin's consent, to retain a British Army in Greece, financially bankrupt Britain had to spend about 25 million pounds a year for discharging that commitment. Stalin could not be very anxious to have British Imperialism utilise Greece as a bulwark to keep Russia away from the Mediterranean. That was a move against American penetration of the Middle East, which was bound to undermine Britain's imperial power, as well as challenge Soviet influence. On the point of being driven out of Egypt, and precariously holding its position in Palestine, tottering British Imperialism, not yet reconciled to its fate, wanted to have a new footing in the Eastern Mediterranean. Stalin, still thinking of post-war European reconstruction on the basis of the Anglo-Soviet alliance, also wanted to keep America at an arm's length. Therefore he consented to a British Army staying in Greece.

The Labour Government inherited the commitment in Greece together with other doubtful legacies of decayed Imperialism. Meanwhile, Soviet foreign policy had changed, mainly because of the advent of a Labour Government in Britain. Precisely the Greek question became one of the subjects of Russian attack upon the British Labour Government. The cue was taken up by the leftists in the Labour Party, whom Bevin characterised as "crypto-communists". To insist upon discharging Churchill's Greek commitment, even after Stalin conveniently forgot his responsibility in that connection, was one of the cardinal mistakes of the Labour Government. But there is reason

to believe that it was not Bevin's die-hard imperialist preoccupation, but American diplomatic pressure which was responsible for the misadventure. The Red Army was marking time on the northern border, to march in as soon as the British forces pulled out of Greece. With the Russians planted on the Mediterranean, and most probably also in occupation of the Dardanelles, the American position in Arabia would be strategically weakened. Therefore, the Americans did not want British troops to leave Greece before they were ready to step in, fully prepared for the consequence, namely, a possible war with Russia.

The British token army in Greece, of course, could not resist if the Russians decided to walk in. But the latter evidently did not want to precipitate an armed conflict even with down and out British Imperialism, knowing that powerful America would immediately come in. Otherwise, they would have had no scruple against giving their *bête noire* the *coup de grace.*

On the other hand, the British Labour Government could not order the token army out of Greece without American consent, while the fateful loan negotiations were still going on. But ultimately, the financial burden became unbearable; and perhaps the British Labour Government felt that it was no longer necessary to continue doing police duty in that part of the world, which had passed into the orbit of American Imperialism. In any case, Britain finally decided to pull out of Greece. The notice to that effect was given to the American Government personally by Bevin, when he went across the Atlantic for the Security Council meeting early in 1947.

By the end of February, the British Ambassador at Washington informed the American Government that for his country's financial position the coal crisis had been like the last straw to break the camel's back; therefore, Britain had no option; she must end the commitment undertaken upon the liberation of Greece in October 1944. The British

Ambassador gave further details of his country's economic plight. The balance of international payments was heavily against her, the income from overseas investments having practically disappeared. British export trade could be maintained only by selling in countries with cheap money, and purchasing raw materials from those with hard currencies. The result was a rapid exhaustion of Britain's dollar credit, including the American loan. In other words, British Imperialism was a thing of the past, and therefore Britain could no longer take an active part in international power politics. If America was anxious to keep Russia within the limits of her sphere of influence, actually occupied by the Red Army, she should come forward to shoulder the heavy responsibility directly.

Until then, American journalists and politicians out of office had been attributing all the evils of the world to British Imperialism. All on a sudden, America was alarmed by the reality of the "dissolution of the British Empire", and by its "passing from the scene of history". The New York *Times*, for instance, was staggered "to see suddenly projected before our imagination the picture of a world without British power, without the balance-wheel of British moderation, without the weight of Britain in the democratic scale."

Bitterly referring to the sudden awakening in America, the London *Economist* (March 22, 1947) wrote: "It was curious how many people, who previously had seen small merit in British Imperialism, were heard to speak of the departed with delicate regret.....Pax Britannica is over. Who then shall be the keeper of the peace?"

The American reply to the British note was readiness to help Greece financially, provided that the British Army would remain there. The motive was to have Britain committed to a partisan attitude in the eventuality of a war between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. But this time, the Labour Government had to act under pressure at home.

Inside the Labour Party, the criticism of the thankless Greek policy had grown too pronounced to be ignored. In the face of the heavy shortage of labour at home, keeping thousands of men under arms in Greece could not be justified. Soon after his return from America, Bevin assured a secret meeting of the Labour Party that no British soldier would remain in Greece after the end of March, 1947.

America could no longer delay action. Withdrawal of the British Army would be followed by collapse of the Greek Government; the Communist-led guerillas would capture power; and the Red Banner with hammer and sickle would be planted on the shore of the Mediterranean. The repercussion would be felt throughout the Middle East. Turkey would be isolated, and might capitulate to Russian pressure. What, then, would happen to the house Uncle Sam had built in Arabia? The motive which compelled the American Government to go over to the counter-offensive was revealed in course of the debate in the Congress on the proposed loan to Greece and Turkey. One member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Chester Murrow, known to be connected with the petroleum trade, said: "Any failure on the part of the Congress to approve President Truman's programme for aid to Greece and Turkey will imperil American oil interests in the Middle East. In the event of future trouble, the almost illimitable supply of oil in Arabia will be of paramount importance to our national defence. To protect our national interest and guarantee our security, we must not allow the Middle East to be overrun by a Power whose actions clearly indicate an unfaltering determination to dominate the world."

Three years ago, a commission appointed by the American Government under one Dr. De Goyler (presumably of the Dutch Royal Shell pedigree) had reported: "The centre of gravity of world oil production is shifting from the Caribbean Gulf area to the Middle East—to the Persian Gulf area—and is likely to continue to shift until

it is firmly established in that area. The Middle-East countries possess proved or semi-proved reserves on a scale comparable with those of the U.S.A., and the scope for new discovery is very much greater." Addressing the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, the British oil magnate, Sir William Fraser, gave some significant facts which bore out the optimistic report of the De Goyler Commission. "Two fields in Persia have already produced one hundred million tons each. The production of the Kirkuk field (in Iraq) has approached the fifty million ton mark. Next to the great Texas fields, the Persian fields have the distinction of being the largest oil producing centre of the world. The natural production advantages of the oil fields of the Persian Gulf area have in the past been to a large extent upset by certain physical drawbacks. The long tanker haul to European markets, involving a circuit of Arabia and a passage through the Suez Canal, has been a substantial handicap. The geographical disadvantages still remain, but may be much reduced when the projected large-diameter trunk pipelines from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean are eventually in position."

From the American point of view—strategic as well as commercial—the necessity of defending Turkey as against Russia was obvious. If Turkey resisted Russian pressure, she could not, without outside help, withstand attack from two sides—by Bulgaria, Roumania and Yugoslavia from the West and the Russians themselves from the North-East. Delaying action until then, to stop the Russians, America would have to wage a war when the adversary had captured decisive strategic advantages. America felt the need of defending her frontiers, meaning the frontiers of the capitalist world, against communist aggression, thousands of miles away, in Greece.

In an article explaining why Turkey needed American help, the *Spectator* (March 21, 1947) of London wrote:

"Turkey needs help to-day because she stands in the way of Soviet Russian expansion throughout the Middle East. Already communist propaganda and money are trying to corrupt the neighbouring Syrians, and it is known that Soviet agents are inciting the Kurds, age-old enemies of the Turks, to form a Soviet-sponsored Kurdish Republic. Quietly, Moscow has been weaving a net around stubborn and independent Turkey, and this is the reason why every Turk to-day welcomes Mr. Truman's blunt declaration of help."

It was not a sudden decision on the part of America to rush to the help of Greece and Turkey. Serious thought must have been given to the strategic problem of controlling the Eastern Mediterranean before the American Government under-wrote the plan of constructing pipelines to bring oil from the Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf fields to Levantine ports. To back up solidly the key-country, and the strongest one, of the region, namely Turkey, must have appeared obvious to the American strategists. But they did not stop there. The question of establishing bases on the southern littoral of the Mediterranean had also been raised. It was anticipated in diplomatic circles that, in the Four Powers Conference on the future of the Italian North-African colonies, to be held within a year after the conclusion of the peace treaty, the U.S.A. would demand trusteeship of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. The excellent harbour possibilities on the Tripoli coast must have attracted the attention of American naval strategists. During the war, America constructed an extensive airfield at Asmara in the Italian colony of Eritrea. It was not dismantled. Finally, there was a rumour that President Truman had personally written to King Fuad of Egypt inviting him to join the anti-communist bloc. In other words, in the Nile Valley also, America was to step into the shoes of British Imperialism. All these news were entirely consistent with the American policy of controlling the Eastern

Mediterranean, a policy determined by the vested interests in Saudi Arabia and the recent deal about the Middle-Eastern oil resources. The presence of a big American fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean became a permanent phenomenon from the middle of 1947. The corollary was establishment of bases. Hence the plan for America annexing former Italian colonies in North Africa, on the pretext of trusteeship. Russia had claimed similar footing in the same territory. She was opposed by Bevin on the ground that Britain had promised independence to the Italian colonies. But how would Britain resist the American demand for trusteeship?

The dramatic development of American foreign policy took place just on the eve of the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Moscow, where the future of Germany was to be discussed. According to the already familiar pattern of American diplomacy *à la* Clausewitz, the new Secretary of State, General Marshall, was going to the Soviet capital to play the laughing third while Bevin and Molotov would be indulging in open diplomacy, that is, free exchange of accusations and abuses. But there came one more disquietening news for America: For some time, Bevin and Stalin, who by then had resumed control of affairs in Moscow, had been exchanging letters about the future of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty; it leaked out that during his stay in the Russian capital, the British Foreign Secretary would take up personal negotiations with the Soviet chief.

During the latter half of 1946, some significant changes had taken place inside the Russian Communist Party and the Soviet Government. Stalin appeared to have resumed control, and succeeded in checking the nationalist degeneration of Soviet foreign policy, which was drifting dangerously towards possible armed conflicts. The changes were formally made public on the occasion of the nomination of candidates for election to the Supreme Soviet. The list published in the first days of 1947 was, of course, headed

by Stalin; next to him were Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov and Beria—all old confidants of the chief. It appeared that Malenkov, who had almost usurped the powerful position of the General Secretary of the party during Stalin's illness, had been outmanœuvered. Evidently to weaken his group, which had the support of the army, Marshal Rokossovsky was awarded the Order of Lenin, rather late in the day, and the degraded Marshal Zhukov's portrait appeared in the streets with that of the Generalissimo.

On his return to Moscow, Stalin had granted interviews to British and American journalists, and to the Secretary of the British Labour Party. His tone was conciliatory, which was hopefully interpreted as heralding a change in Soviet foreign policy. The statement, repeated several times, that there could be more than one way to Socialism, was indeed very significant. Stalin made the significant declaration just when the conference of Foreign Ministers was meeting at New York. Undoubtedly, Molotov took the hint and made some concessions at the end of the conference. Later on, Vishinsky attributed the success of the New York conference to Stalin's realistic leadership. Was he thinking of salvaging the Anglo-Soviet Treaty as the basis of European reconstruction? One more event appeared to encourage the optimistic view. It was announced that in January an international conference of Socialist Parties of the countries in the Soviet zone would be held at Budapest. The plan could not be conceived without Russian consent. That news was interpreted as a gesture of reconciliation with the viewpoint of the British Labour Party.

Yet one more straw indicated which way the wind was blowing. Stalin announced that the Soviet army abroad would in the near future be reduced from sixty to forty divisions, and that by the middle of 1947 no more than twenty divisions would remain outside the Soviet Union.

At the same time, it was hinted that the entire Red Army would be reduced to its peace time strength of 1,500,000 men.

In the context of those facts, indicating a possible reorientation of Soviet foreign policy, the British decision to pull out of Greece naturally appeared ominous to the Americans. Was not the Labour Government responding to the Russian gesture of reconciliation? It was no longer possible to carry on war through diplomacy. America decided to go over to the offensive, no longer under the white banner of peace, but with the flying colours of open hostility. General Marshall's brief for the Moscow Conference had to be rewritten. The new theme was provided by the President's announcement that the U.S.A. must immediately take over British commitments in Greece and grant a big loan not only to that country, but also to Turkey, to be followed by others. The anti-communist crusade, prepared systematically on a grand scale behind the façade of a series of abortive peace conferences, was at last declared with all fanfares and solemnity. America took to the war path, of course, not for any aggressive design, nor self-interest, but to protect the countries bordering on the Soviet Union and the Russian-occupied zone against the threat of communist totalitarianism!

Commenting on General Marshall's appointment as the head of the State Department and his mission to Moscow, the Washington Correspondent of the New York *Times*, generally considered to be the best informed journalist in the American capital, wrote: "He has not gone to Moscow to plead for the writing of the German and Austrian peace treaties. He has not even gone to Moscow primarily to make peace with Germany, but to emphasise the cost of not making peace with the United States." The prevailing view was that, while seeking to gain Russian co-operation in an acceptable peace settlement, General

Marshall was equipped with an alternative plan regarding the future of Germany. The plan included resisting Soviet expansionism elsewhere; and General Marshall was fully prepared to make it quite clear to Stalin that that was the American plan. Commenting on the news, the London *Spectator* of March 21, 1947, wrote: "The United States will surrender no more vital positions in return for Soviet pledges. The Americans may be alarmed, but they are not frightened. It is good news that he (General Marshall) is listened to respectfully in Moscow. Whether he wins an acceptable peace there, or is forced to pursue his alternative policy, he appears as a strong new figure on the American political horizon. And the American horizon has become the world horizon."

The President having asked the Congress to sanction 400 million dollars to help Greece and Turkey, the State Department produced before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee "secret documents" to motivate the belligerent policy. The documents proved, to the satisfaction of those who were anxious to be satisfied, that Russia had been waging a war of nerves against Turkey, and intended to establish a communist régime in Greece. The evidence of those documents, which were there ready to be produced in the psychological moment, persuaded the U.S.A. to recognise that the maintenance of Greek independence and territorial integrity was of supreme importance to the security and independence of the whole of the Near and Middle East, which was of vital importance to American security.

The far-reaching implication of the U.S.A. stepping into the power vacuum created by the collapse of British Imperialism was frankly unfolded by the Acting Secretary of State, Acheson, before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. He said:

"Failure to maintain democratic governments in key countries like Greece and Turkey will echo throughout a

vast area as far east as China; India, Burma, China, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iraq and Iran are the countries which will be affected. India is going through a most difficult period. She has very serious internal problems. These will be seriously affected by a general breakdown of democratic governments in those areas. It will be necessary to invest American funds in Korea also. The U.S.A. would react to cases similar to those of Greece and Turkey, should they occur."

A comprehensive and dreadful picture of what was coming. Only, informed world opinion was asked to tax its imagination heavily when the American Secretary of State talked of "democratic governments" in the countries he proposed to protect against Russian totalitarianism.

In a speech delivered at Texas five days before his solemn address to the joint session of the Congress, the President had revealed the real motive of his new policy. Grandiloquently, he proclaimed: "We are the giant of the economic world. Whether we like it or not, the future pattern of economic relations depends on us. We can lead the nations into economic peace, or we can plunge them into economic war." In the latter speech, the President talked of supporting "free peoples who are resisting attempted mobilisation by armed minorities or outside pressure", and recommended action which, as the London *Economist* of March 22, 1947, ironically pointed out, contrasted "sharply with the series of steps taken against German totalitarianism in the later 'thirties. Before World War II, there was neutrality, quarantine, boxes and bales —first on a cash-and-carry basis, then on lease-lend, but not men. Until after Pearl Harbour, not men. The present proposal is for funds, commodities and personnel—both civilian and military—rightaway."

The presidential rhetoric—"this is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious"—drew such

comments as "if we fail, this aid to Greece is the lease-lend of World War III."

However, within a comparatively short time, American diplomacy and dollars had completely turned the table on the adversary, who only a year ago appeared to have everything in his own way—from the Pacific to the Atlantic. All along, the Soviet Government had counted upon the support of the Asiatic peoples, whose cause the Communists championed, indiscriminately and dogmatically, even at the cost of prejudicing the relation with Socialist Britain. Now the oppressed peoples of Asia, set free or on the road to freedom by the decay of British Imperialism, have all been taken under protection by America. In the coming war against Russia, the Asiatic countries from Korea to Turkey will be transformed into bases of the American army; the liberated colonial peoples may provide cannon fodder also. A grim tragedy and irony of fate!

The U.S.A. took the offensive full of confidence that Russia would not dare take up the challenge. In addition to other signs of weakness, behind the façade of imposing military might and blustering diplomacy, there were the recent conciliatory gestures towards Britain, which were interpreted by American observers as further evidence of Russia's weakness. According to well informed foreign journalists at Washington, the basic assumption of the aggressive policy inaugurated by the enunciation of the so-called Truman doctrine was that war danger did not result from American policy, but from the conditions which provoked it; the belief in high quarters in the American capital was that war was less imminent when the U.S.A. decided to step in the power vacuum than previously—indeed, it was less probable. That was a very significant view. The rulers of America seemed to believe that a belligerent gesture would be enough to check Russian ambition. This view was officially expressed a few weeks later by Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate

Foreign Affairs Committee. He declared: "The risk of war is less if the U.S.A. now, at a moment when the United Nations are unable to cope with the problem with a friendly firmness, indicates to Russia the deadline beyond which the U.S.A. will not permit her to go." Curiously enough, this frankly belligerent declaration was authoritatively made when the Foreign Ministers were talking peace at Moscow.

Liberal and independent sympathisers of Russia, whose goodwill was her greatest asset since she entered the war against international Fascism and contributed so much to its defeat, interpreted American policy as follows: The U.S.A. was not demanding that Russia should abandon Communism; nor that she should stop preaching Communism; nor again that the rest of the world should not choose Communism as against Capitalism if they so desired. The U.S.A. only demanded that Communism should not be imposed on other countries by force. The policy implied that the American Government would help all countries which wanted to resist such imposition. It was wise that the intention of the American Government was made clear.

In other words, the American counter-offensive was interpreted even by neutral observers as a measure calculated to prevent war. History would show if the interpretation was correct. For the moment, it could not be imagined how Russia would react. One thing, however, was certain: She was not in a position to risk a war in which she would be encircled by hostile neighbours all along her Asiatic frontiers. American calculations were all well founded.

Soon after the American loan to Greece and Turkey had been announced, Persia applied for a similar help, American experts having approved of the plan for which the money was needed. Turkey enthusiastically welcomed America taking up the responsibility of helping nations threatened by totalitarianism. The Turkish Prime Minister

was quite outspoken. Referring to radio broadcasts from Moscow, which kept on reminding the Turkish people that in all wars with Russia they had almost always been defeated, the Turkish Premier said: "There is one great Power to-day who had designs on our territory. Logically, that Power should not go to the extent of starting a war. However, leaders of irresponsible totalitarian States may take decisions according to their whims or their nervous conditions. Therefore, we might wake up one morning to find ourselves involved in war."

In the beginning of 1947, Soviet Russia thus stood completely isolated from the Asiatic peoples. Her position in Europe was no more secure. The expansionist phase of the Russian Revolution was going to be very short. The revolution had run its course. Having missed the chance of becoming the leader of democratic Europe, Soviet Russia ultimately stood confronted with only two alternatives: to withdraw modestly within the limitations of a National State, and to plunge the world in another war, severely prejudicing not only the future of modern civilisation, but her own future also.

There was a possible way out of the dilemma—an honest understanding with the British Labour Government by abandoning the vain ambition of planting the discredited red flag on the Atlantic in the near future. Personal talks between Stalin and Bevin were reported to have been cordial. But in the Foreign Ministers' Conference, Molotov pursued a diplomacy which was obviously meant to keep Europe still in a chaotic condition, believing that time was on the side of Russia. Behind the scene, Russian diplomacy made frantic efforts for transforming the Anglo-Soviet Treaty into an offensive and defensive alliance, obviously with reference to a war with America. It would be stark madness for Britain to enter into such an alliance. Powerful America was sure to retaliate financially, and Britain could not possibly survive the resulting crisis.

If before the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Moscow Russia had lost her influence practically in all the Asiatic countries, afterwards, her position in Europe also deteriorated. With American aid, the Greek Government mounted an all-out offensive against the Communists. They did not stand the trial any more successfully than their comrades-in-arms in China or Persia. Serious dissension broke out in the ranks of the Greek Communist Party. American battle-ships cruising the Eastern Mediterranean evidently discouraged the Red Army to march in the power-vacuum. There were other reasons for that remarkable inactivity.

While expounding the new policy to the Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, the Acting Secretary of State hinted that European countries in the Russian zone might be helped as Greece and Turkey. To illustrate his meaning, he referred to the American protest against events in Hungary. "We think an attempt is being made to force on the Hungarian people a form of government which they have repudiated." There was an almost instantaneous response to the sinister American gesture. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia applied for UNRRA help. If the solicited help was allowed to come, that would be the thin end of a wedge driven into the vitals of the Russian power structure.

The Russians were not slow to see the danger. At the end of April 1947, Marshal Tito, addressing the Parliament on his Five Years Plan of national economy, sounded the warning: "We cannot be dependent on capitalist countries. There are some reactionaries who would try to sabotage it (the plan), and who dream of the kind of aid now being given to Greece and Turkey, and hope for a change of authority in Yugoslavia."

If the developments in Hungary foreshadowed Russian reaction to the new situation, they would be playing into the hands of America. In Hungary, the occupation authorities had cynically abandoned the pretence of abiding by the results of a democratic election, which went

against the Communists. The new policy was to help the Communist minority to overthrow the Small-Holders Party, which had won the election. Such a policy would alienate the majority of the people not only in Hungary, but in other East-European countries. From their base in Greece, the Americans would encourage the discontented elements, and actively help them to revolt against the Russian occupation authorities. The latter would be in a delicate position. The choice would be between the risk of a war with America, having the support of the majority of the native populations, or to allow power to slip out of their hand.

The situation in Austria was equally awkward for the Russians. They did not like the Social-Democratic government there, and had been manoeuvering for some time to replace it by another fully subservient to their will. Now they were afraid that the Truman doctrine might be applied also to Austria, which would then be a wedge between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The Russians could not possibly abandon Austria; because, that would mean severance of their line of communication, essential for their strategic position in Eastern Europe. The Red Army in Europe is based on the line of communication from Poland to Roumania, through Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary. Austria thus is a pivotal position, which the Russians could not abandon. Therefore, they obstructed at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference the plan of a peace treaty with that country, which had been practically annexed by them, and they did not want any change in the *status quo*.

The *Manchester Guardian's* Special Correspondent at Moscow, Alexander Werth, who was believed to be in the confidence of the Kremlin, reported: "In the last few days of the conference, it became particularly clear that Austria had become a major issue, both as connected with Germany and as part of the wider conflict of interest. Mr. Marshall viewed that the United States cannot allow

Austria to become a Russian satellite, even if she wanted to. The Russians, for their part, were worried lest Austria should become the object of the Truman policy."

The Russian demand for the transfer to them of all German assets in Austria would mean that such a large sector of the national economy of that country would be placed beyond her control as would render her chance of surviving as an independent self-supporting country very problematical. She would, indeed, be a Russian puppet.

The Russian policy in Germany promoted neither the cause of revolution nor of a democratic reconstruction. The demand for political unification of the country, as the precondition for economic rehabilitation, only served the purpose of helping the resurgence of Nationalism. In the earlier days of the war, Russian intention, as declared by Stalin himself, was to disrupt Germany politically as well as economically, so as not to leave her the opportunity to become once again a menace to the Soviet Union. That intention coincided with the American Morgenthau Plan of agrarianizing Germany; whether that could be done, was another matter. Later on, while appealing to German patriotism through the League of German Officers, Stalin himself declared that Germany could not be disrupted, that the idea of doing so was fantastic. Since then, Russian policy was determined by the latter doctrine. The Russian plan of a political reconstruction of Germany as submitted to the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Moscow was to build up a strong centralised State. The U.S.A. and Britain opposed the Soviet plan on the ground that a centralised Germany could easily be the home for resurrected Fascism. The Russians have not yet proved that it would not be so. It is doubtful if the centralised Germany of their desire would be a Communist Germany. It would certainly be a nationalist Germany with the spirit of revenge.

This suicidal policy is reminiscent of the Russian support to the agitation against the Versailles Treaty, which gave birth to Fascism. A nationalist Germany, even under communist leadership or hegemony, and a France also of the same pattern, would be doubtful allies of Russia, if she still remained champion of a world communist revolution. Things in Europe are evidently heading towards an anti-climax, and Russian diplomatic ineptitude is driving them to that direction. There is no doubt that De Gaulle's return to politics fits into the scheme of American counter-offensive.

The failure of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference has exposed the impossibility of any agreement about Germany's future. A division of that country between East and West appears to be a foregone conclusion. In that case, Britain will be driven back in the American camp. Even to-day, with the prospect of De Gaulle returning to power in France, morally encouraged and materially helped from across the Atlantic, British diplomacy must be very circumspect. Therefore, the negotiations for a revision of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty have failed to produce any positive result. Britain may not sponsor a Western Bloc; but if such a grouping of West-European countries happened under American instigation and patronage, as a part of the counter-offensive, Britain could not possibly stay out of it without risking complete isolation. And a Western Bloc under American patronage would, indeed, be anti-Russian. Because, neither the Socialists nor even Christian Democrats are likely to occupy any position of influence under the régime. By fighting the German Social-Democrats with the absurd allegation that they are neo-nationalists, that Schumacher is groomed by the British Labour Government for the rôle of a new Hitler, the Russians themselves are promoting a fascist resurgence in Germany. Delay in ending the present political and economic chaos, and the *de facto* division of the country

will give rise to a bitter nationalist feeling. The Russians hope to divert that sentiment against the Western Powers. It is evident how suicidal that policy is bound to be. Yet, the Russians tenaciously hang on to the belief that, the longer Central Europe remains in a state of chaos and misery, the brighter will be the prospects of revolution. Their hope of revolution is only promoting counter-revolution, which may eventually be their own Nemesis.

In the context of this international relation of forces, the American counter-offensive is an ominous event. It was very skilfully planned and carefully executed, step by step, until the climax was reached. The perspective is of either Russia quietly accepting defeat, to take up a place in the new *status quo* of international power politics, yielding world domination to America; or of a third world war, the consequences of which are simply dreadful to imagine. The latter eventuality may reasonably be ruled out. Russia has been completely outmanoeuvered; the Napoleonic phase of her revolution has been sterile. American counter-offensive closes the period of the Russian Revolution. The world is heading towards a period of precarious equilibrium, which may give the forces of democracy and progress an opportunity to assert themselves, and, perhaps, blaze a new trail into the darkness of the future.

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In a broadcast speech on his return to America after the Moscow Conference, General Marshall gave out a significant piece of news, which might be the only remaining hope, though a forlorn hope. He disclosed that Stalin had told him that it was possible that no great success would be achieved at this session, but he thought that compromises were possible on all main questions, including the political structure of Germany; it was necessary to have patience and not to become pessimistic.

It remains to be seen if Stalin's famous realism will prevail in Russian foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Ameri-

can offensive will develop. That is evident from the same broadcast speech of Marshall. He declared: "Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking, while doctors deliberate. So, I believe, that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion. New issues arise daily. Whatever action is possible to meet these pressing problems, must be taken without delay."

And what are the issues? They were stated by a member of the American delegation to the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference—John Foster Dulles. He is notorious for his anti-Soviet views. It is significant that he was included in the delegation. In a press conference, Dulles said: "The United States delegation hammered out specific policies which, in the long run, should accomplish more than an agreement, which inevitably would have involved much compromise. The people of Europe are more interested in convictions than in compromises. One important by-product of the conference has been the increased unity between the British, French and ourselves." The general impression created in Moscow by this statement, according to Alexander Werth, was "the confirmation of certain American ideas that an ideological war is in full swing, and that there is little hope for the future."

Dulles' view was corroborated by subsequent news. Immediately on his return home, General Marshall reported his experience at Moscow to the President and Congressional leaders. He is said to have stressed that, for the first time since the end of the war, the U.S.A. had held a consistent and inflexible position in negotiations with the Soviet Union, and that so far as the Moscow Conference was concerned, the issues between the two countries had been outlined and made crystal clear.

The U.S.A. is not at all perturbed by the failure of the Moscow Conference. On the contrary, the American Government seems to be pleased to have made it evident that it is impossible for the Western Powers to agree with

Russia. Having done that, the U.S.A. intends to exert a sustained visible influence in Europe and the Mediterranean, and Moscow must either resist this growing influence or accomodate itself to it.

Without food from the Soviet-occupied regions, Germany cannot be rehabilitated economically. That is the trump card held by the Russians. They want to use it as the bargaining counter. But they can be outwitted by supplying the rest of Germany with food from abroad. America is in a position to do so. Now the policy of the Western Powers will certainly be to raise the level of industry in their zones to a point where Western Germany can buy its food and raw materials from abroad with the surplus of industrial production. The consequence of the stalemate at Moscow will thus be more freedom for industrial development in Western Germany. Simultaneously, steps for political and administrative unification will also have to be taken.

On the other hand, the Russians will rest their foreign policy on the calculation that, by opposing the American proposal for a Four-Power Treaty, they will keep Germany and the rest of Central Europe in unsettled conditions, troubled waters to fish in. They are speculating. Treaty or no Treaty, the U.S.A. has no intention of leaving Europe, which eventually will have to choose. The choice will involve another war, for which the U.S.A. is preparing. For the moment, the odds are all against the Russians.

Chapter XXV

RUSSIAN TACTICS

The strategy of the revolution was planned by Stalin in the middle 'twenties when, using the party machinery as his instrument, he captured supreme power in the Soviet Union. Experience had convinced him that without Russian military intervention revolution could not succeed in any European country. Therefore, he launched upon the policy of building a formidable army to carry revolution beyond the borders of Russia—to all directions. Red Napoleonism became the strategy of the revolution. The policy was cast on the French model. It evidently transcended the pure Marxian perspective of revolution taking place inevitably—of historical necessity. Marxist historicism is naive; revolutionary development did not fit into the *a priori* scheme. Stalin's innovation, therefore, was called for, if the programme of world revolution was ever to be realised, instead of remaining an always receding ideal. But Stalin also made a mistake; he read history wrongly.

Napoleon's army carried the banner of revolution all over Europe, right up to the walls of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, by the time the whole of Europe felt the impact of the French Revolution, the revolution itself had become very much different from what it was originally. Nearing final victory, the revolution outgrows or discards its natal outbursts, aspirations and forms. When revolution comes of age, so to say, it sobers down. Its positive achievements may even appear to be contradictory to the originally proclaimed objects and cherished ideals. It so happened with the French Revolution; and it is bound to happen also with the Russian Revolution.

When Stalin realised that revolution had to be carried

to Europe by the Russian Army, he should have remembered the political consequences of Napoleon's military victory. He should have learned from history that, carried to Europe by the Red Army, the revolution would look very much different. He failed to do so. Because of that grave mistake, Stalin missed so many opportunities to bring his master plan of revolutionary strategy to a successful culmination. It is still more tragic for himself; because his strategy may still succeed. Indeed, Europe is in the throes of a revolution; but it does not fit into the *a priori* scheme of the Russians. Therefore, they foolishly disown what is very largely their creation. Having lost the opportunity of being hailed as the hero of our time, the liberator of Europe, leader of a really successful world revolution, Stalin may become, like Napoleon, the proclaimed enemy of freedom. He is allowing events to drive him to that undeserved and unenviable position. That will, indeed, be the greatest tragedy of history.

The strategy of Red Napoleonism having failed, from their point of view, the Russians must fall back upon tactical manœuvres to gain time and consolidate positions already held. Immediately after the Moscow Conference, Stalin granted an interview to Harold Stassen, who then aspired for the Republican Party candidature for the American Presidential election of 1948. On that occasion the Soviet leader declared that it was possible for the Russian Communist economy and American free enterprise to exist side by side and co-operate. That unexpected declaration indicated how the Russians planned to meet the American counter-offensive. Their strategy still stands. A formidable military power is the sanction of the Russian policy. But they have their Marxist faith also. The tactics of temporising, adopted after the period of Red Napoleonism ended without the desired spectacular success, is based on the fatalism of Marxist economic doctrine: the wartime prosperity of America is bound to be followed by a

slump; that crisis at home would compel the American Government to abandon the grandiose scheme of financing an international anti-communist crusade, and even pull out of Europe altogether. Indeed, the Russians believed that the Americans were bluffing; in view of the coming financial crash, they could not possibly be serious about the offer of huge loans to all and sundry. Therefore, in the much publicised interview granted to Stassen, the Russian leader so persistently pressed the question about the coming slump in America. Not sharing the Marxist fatalism, Stassen ridiculed the idea; but Stalin thought the American was simply trying to conceal the Achilles' heel of the giant.

American prosperity inflated by war production would, of course, be followed by a period of slack business, unless the flow of export trade could be diverted into a different channel. That is the underlying motive of the American plan to grant loans to foreign countries and also to finance European reconstruction. The anti-communist crusade is a business proposition. Therefore, unless the Russians could persuade needy countries to eschew the American loan or financial assistance in some other form, it is idle for them to base their strategy of revolution on the expectation of the coming slump in America. On the one hand, they are not in a position to give the required financial assistance; and, on the other, their policy drives one European country after another to look for help in the other direction. Thus, Russian tactical moves are bound to help America avoid the slump, the Marxist belief in the inevitability of which is the trump the Russians imagine they are holding.

With this pathetic belief, the Russians want to temporise until the Nemesis of Capitalism overtakes America. Meanwhile, the policy is to strengthen their position, politically as well as militarily, in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. As regards the rest of the continent, the policy is to see that political insecurity in some countries and

chaos in Germany, and economic insecurity everywhere, continue, so that, when the situation will be aggravated by the American slump, the time to strike will come. Communist Parties will capture power, through parliamentary majorities in some countries, and through insurrection, in others. The Red Army will march across the Stettin-Trieste line, and with one sweep revolution will reach the Atlantic coast.

Sabotage of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in May 1947 to discuss the Austrian and German peace treaties, was a part of this plan. If to keep Germany in a state of chaos and insecurity was not the Russian object, it is difficult to imagine what induced them to take up the negative attitude which caused the failure of the conference. While rejecting the American plan of a forty-years Four-Power treaty to keep Germany disarmed, and other proposals for immediate political and economic settlement, the Russians offered no practical alternative. Molotov, indeed, produced a plan for the political unification of Germany. But in the absence of any agreed plan of economic reconstruction, it was idle to plan political unification. With their Marxist theory of economic determinism, the Russians should have known that.

All these facts and considerations lead to the conclusion that the Russians did not want the Moscow Conference to succeed. To prepare the ground for the revolution to come in the wake of the confidently expected American slump, the political and economic life of Europe, severely shaken by the war, should be further dislocated and demoralised. Germany, particularly, must remain in a state of chaos; because, breakdown of the capitalist order is the condition for revolution.

A very significant remark of Stalin, in course of his private talk with General Marshall after the breakdown of the Moscow Conference, indicated how the Russian mind was working. Having suggested that even after the

failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on the future of Germany, compromise was possible on all main questions in that connection, Stalin remarked that the abortive conference was "only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces."

After six years of total war, the world has got accustomed to speak in military terms. But Stalin's remark was not a mere fashion of speech. The sabotage of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference was a tactical move in the context of the revised plan of revolutionary strategy. That became clear immediately after the conference.

The divergence of opinion about the future of Germany might be almost irreconcilable. But the problem of the Austrian treaty was not so very baffling. Except for the north-eastern corner, wedged in between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Austria does not belong to the Russian zone of occupation. On the conclusion of the peace treaty, the Allied Military Council which now rules the country for all practical purposes, must be dissolved and the American troops withdrawn. That new situation would be advantageous for the Russians. Established in all the surrounding countries, they should be able to exercise a greater influence on Austria than America, Britain or even France. Why did then Molotov block the Austrian treaty also? According to the Potsdam agreement, all the signatories are categorically committed to restore Austrian independence at the earliest. It was military considerations which determined Russian diplomacy as regards Austria.

Peace treaties with the former satellites of Nazi Germany having been concluded, the Russian Army of occupation should leave Hungary as soon as that country ratified the treaty. Even under the patronage of the Red Army, the Commander of which is the virtual ruler of the country, the Communists heavily lost the election in Hungary. Nevertheless, thanks to the patronage of the

all-powerful Commandantura of the Russian army of occupation, the Communists managed to acquire a dominating position in the government set up after the election. But they would not be able to maintain that position when the Red Army left. With the almost certain disappearance of the artificially foisted communist control of Hungary, the Russian power structure in Eastern Europe would be seriously undermined. The advance base of the Red Army along a line from the Baltic to the Adriatic would be broken. The Russians could not be indifferent to that strategic danger. They must remain in Hungary even after the ratification of the peace treaty. So long as the peace treaty with Austria was not concluded, they could have the pretext to maintain military formations in Hungary for guarding the line of supply for the Russian troops in Austria. Therefore, the Austrian treaty should be held up.

But that game could not be continued indefinitely. The Potsdam agreement stands; the Russians themselves do not want to scrap it formally. Therefore, the Allied military regime of Austria must come to an end without much further delay. The way out of the dilemma was to pull down the democratic façade in Hungary, and to instal in that country an out-and-out communist dictatorship. In that case, Hungary would, for all practical purposes, be an integral part of the Soviet Union, a reliable corner-stone of the Russian power structure in Eastern Europe and a firm pivot of the advance base of the Red Army. In other words, the Russians decided to make a little managed revolution in Hungary, preparatory to the formal military evacuation of that country according to the peace treaty.

The election held in November 1945 was a great surprise for the Communists. The country had just been liberated by the Russians. With the Red Army in complete control, the Communists were confident of winning the

election and establishing their dictatorship constitutionally. But the Hungarian electorate did not express gratitude for the liberators by voting for their protégés. The so-called Small-Holders' Party swept the polls. It was returned with an absolute majority in the Parliament. The Communists polled only eighteen per cent of votes. It was evident that a communist regime under the circumstances would be a minority dictatorship. But election or no election, the Russian Commander was the supreme ruler of the country. No government could be formed and last for a day without his approval. Presumably, under that condition, the leader of the Small-Holders' Party, Nagy, formed a coalition government. The Communists were given a disproportionately large representation, their leader, Rakosi, becoming the Vice-Premier, and the Home Ministry going also to one of them. Having been constrained to do what could not be avoided, except by forcibly installing a minority dictatorship, the Russians instigated the Hungarian Communists to do everything, overt and covert, for undermining the parliamentary position of the Small-Holders' Party.

The intrigue culminated in the dramatic arrest, in February 1947, of the General Secretary of the Party, Bela Kovacs, on the charge of plotting to overthrow the Republic. The government of the Republic, headed by the leader of the Small-Holders' Party, naturally did not believe the charge, and the Hungarian police refused to arrest Kovacs. Thereupon, he was seized by the Russian Military Police on the altered charge of conspiring against the security of the Soviet forces of occupation. The circumstances left no doubt that the order for the arrest of the General Secretary of the Prime Minister's party originated at the Russian Commandantura. The whole affair was very clumsy. Kovacs' party was by far the largest in the State. Constitutionally, it could have complete control of the government, to the exclusion of the Communists.

The whole party stood by Kovacs, as evidenced by the government refusing to arrest him. So, the allegation was that the Small-Holders' Party was conspiring to overthrow the government which it could constitutionally control completely. Why should it want to overthrow the Republic, the President as well as the Prime Minister of which were its members? Granted that the party was an instrument of rank reaction, and would prefer a dictatorial regime to a parliamentary government, would it not be fantastic for it to believe that the ambition could be realised under the very nose of the all-powerful Russian Commander, so very anxious to protect the Republic?

The stage for a managed revolution in Hungary thus having been set, the curtain went up immediately after the abortive Moscow Conference. The crisis was precipitated by the Russian demand for transfer of the 55 million pounds worth German assets in Hungary. Neither the armistice nor the peace treaty with Hungary entitled Russia to this demand. German assets in Hungary could not be treated similarly as those in Austria, because, according to the terms of the armistice, Hungary had been paying reparations to Russia out of her own resources. The Hungarian Government claimed that the German assets should be counted as partial compensation for the enormous damage done by the Germans, particularly, when they retreated in the winter of 1944-45. The majority of the Hungarian Government, therefore, refused to comply with the unexpected Russian demand. As the dispute could not be settled on the spot, the Hungarian Finance Minister was summoned to Moscow.

Although the crisis broke out in the open only after the Moscow Conference, the Russian demand had been privately presented early in May, when the Hungarian Minister of Trade had also been summoned to Moscow, presumably as a counter-move to the possibility of Hungary asking for an American loan after the favour was done

to Greece and Turkey. The purpose of the move was to tie Hungarian economy still more closely to the Russian. The Hungarian Government might offer the German assets as security for a loan from America. If such a possible deal was made, America would penetrate Hungarian economy to the detriment of Russian interests; and political influence would certainly follow economic penetration. To get hold of the German assets in Hungary was, therefore, a matter of life and death for the Russian control of that strategically pivotal country. The Hungarian crisis was the first encounter of some magnitude following upon the "skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces" at the Moscow Conference.

That initial encounter in the next bout of power politics was very well calculated. It was meant to have far-reaching economic, political and military significance. While both the Hungarian Ministers were still in Moscow, presumably resisting the Russian demand for immediate transfer of the German assets, on May 28th, the Commander of the Soviet occupation forces presented a note to the Hungarian Government in reply to the latter's three months' old request that Kovacs should be handed over to the Hungarian civil authorities to be tried, if there was any legitimate charge against him. The note was reminiscent of the famous Moscow trials. It dramatically disclosed that, while in Russian custody, Kovacs had made a confession, according to which many leading members of his party, including several Ministers, were implicated in the alleged plot to overthrow the Hungarian Republic. Evidently, the note was a signal for mass arrests. In course of the following days, many important members of the majority party were taken in custody by the Russian Military Police. At the same time, there was a mass flight of deputies and other public men out of the country.

The most dramatic event was the resignation of the Prime Minister, from Switzerland, where he had gone a

few days before for a holiday. It was very curious for the head of the government to go on holiday outside the country in the midst of a crisis precipitated by the Russian demand, and while two of his colleagues were mysteriously detained in Moscow. There was still another fact which threw a veil of mystery on Nagy's going out of the country at that critical moment for no serious reason.

The Russian demand was supplemented by the demand of the native Communists for nationalisation of the Hungarian banks, which held the German assets. That ancillary demand was also opposed by the Small-Holders' majority in the Cabinet. While matters of such vital importance were on the order of the day, it was indeed curious for the head of the government to go abroad for a holiday. The inducement for the strange behaviour could be easily surmised. Nagy must have somehow discovered what was brewing, and wanted to escape arrest. The Prime Minister going on a short holiday could not be prevented. Indeed, the engineers of the crisis wanted him to be out of the way. It would be too big a scandal to arrest a Prime Minister, who held office as the leader of the majority party, on the charge of plotting against his own regime. During his absence, the Communist Vice-Premier, Rakosi, became the head of the government. Nagy evidently hoped that the Russians would not force the issue to the extent of a virtual *coup d'état*. He believed that in a few days time the storm might blow over, and wanted to be out of harm's length during that period. Before leaving, he had a talk with Rakosi, who promised that no decision on the question of the nationalisation of the banks would be taken during Nagy's absence.

As soon as Nagy left the country, communist newspapers denounced him as one of the plotters against the Republic. His complicity with the alleged plot was said to have been proved by Kovacs' confession. Rakosi telephoned Nagy to return immediately. He refused and

tendered his resignation. There was hardly any alternative for him. He would return not as the Prime Minister, but a prisoner of the Russian Military Police.

Upon the dramatic resignation of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet also resigned. In the midst of that shake-up, while there was no Prime Minister, two Ministers were still away in Moscow, and some under arrest or in hiding, the non-existing Cabinet held a meeting presided over by Rakosi, and issued an order establishing State control over thirteen banks. It also decided to hold a new election in September. The real job thus done, the formality of constituting a new Cabinet followed. The decision to hold new elections was of considerable political significance. There was no constitutional call for the decision. It implied a *coup d'état*. The party which had won the last election was severely weakned by the arrest of many leading members, and the flight of others to escape the same fate. Whatever remained of it, was thoroughly demoralised and became subservient to the real rulers of the country. The *de facto* communist dictatorship, thus installed by the Russian Army of occupation, will have a constitutional sanction from the victory in a managed election under the reign of terror of the Russian Military Police.

On June 22nd, the new Hungarian Government issued a White Paper which contained yet another confession of Kapocs, Private Secretary to the ex-Prime Minister Nagy. Kapocs was arrested in his office when Nagy's dramatic resignation was announced. According to his statement, said to be recorded on June 13th, the ex-Prime Minister's policy was to secure the ratification of the peace treaty at an early date, so as to hasten the withdrawal of the Russian occupation forces. In the meantime, he would placate the Communists and their allies. Nagy's internal policy, also according to the confession of his Secretary, was to form a bloc of middle-class parties, including the Peasants Party and also those Social-Democrats who were not subservient

to the Communists. The White Paper further disclosed that Nagy, with the above foreign and home policy, wanted to transform Hungary into a political and economic base of American imperialism in South-East Europe, and that in return he had obtained the promise of a large American loan.

Shorn of the frills, the story could well have a substance of truth, which would fit into the recently proclaimed Truman doctrine. Nagy's subsequent public pronouncements and his going to the U.S.A. from Switzerland also seem to corroborate the story. It was quite natural for the Russians to be alarmed by such a story, and to be on their guard. But the way they went at it was sure to defeat their end. In any case, the *coup d'état* in Hungary could not certainly be glorified as an act in promotion of the world revolution; it was rather an act of aggression, practical annexation of a foreign country.

The rump parliament, meeting after the Cabinet crisis, was called upon to endorse the irregular executive order regarding the State control of banks. The strength of the Small-Holders' Party had by that time been considerably depleted. The new government could easily carry the original order through the rump parliament. Nevertheless, the parliament was asked to nationalise only two banks which, between themselves, owned about half of all the industries of the country. The parliament resolved that the nationalisation would take effect from August 1st, on which day the three years' plan of economic reconstruction, cast on the Soviet model, would also be put in force. One of the remaining Small-Holders' Party deputies vehemently opposed the plan as impractical, on the ground that, without foreign financial help, it could not be carried out. At the same time, he declared that Nagy had yielded 98 per cent to communist pressure, and the new government wanted to go the whole length. Through the nationalisation of the two main banks, not only the way was

cleared for the transfer of the German assets to Russia, but Hungary's entire economic life was subordinated to the Soviet economic system. With a government completely under communist control, and her national economy tied up to meet Russian requirements, Hungary would certainly not ask for the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces. In the last analysis, the purpose of the *coup d'etat* in Hungary was to secure that country as a sector of the advance base of the Red Army preparing to meet the American counter-offensive.

But it is extremely doubtful if such tactics would succeed in keeping American influence away. On the contrary, it is more likely to add to the insecurity of the Russian advance military base in South-Eastern Europe. A quarter of a century after the Russian Revolution, and most probably owing to the experience of that period, Communism had no popular appeal in the countries bordering on the Soviet Union. In such a situation, the Russians should have encouraged democratic movements in those countries, instead of forcing on them nominal communist dictatorships. Nominal, because most of the Communists in those countries are anything but Communists. To free those countries from feudal mediaevalism and other reactionary forces, would be really promoting a revolution. Modernisation of economic life is the first step towards their political progress and cultural uplift. They being financially not self-sufficient, and Russia unable to help, the temptation to look towards America for help is irresistible. It is sheer dogmatism to condemn that natural tendency as reactionary. The alternative is incorporation in the regimented system of Soviet economy, which has not a very bright record to show. It is a choice between private Capitalism and State Capitalism. Pragmatically, the latter has not proved to be an economic system preferable from the democratic point of view. With all its admitted faults, the former is associated with a minimum measure of politi-

cal and intellectual freedom. Instead of forcing the choice on them, the countries under Russian occupation could be allowed to have financial aid wherever it could be had, and modernise their economic life under democratic political regimes. That policy would win for the Russians the friendship of her neighbours, and because of the close proximity, their economy would surely be influenced by the positive and progressive aspects of the Soviet system. That is the only way in which the Russian Revolution could influence contemporary history.

But the Russians chose an entirely different way, which might promise revolution at the risk of another war; and precisely therefore it is a very dangerous path.

The situation in Hungary is the picture of the revolution which the Russians propose to carry to the rest of Europe at the point of the bayonet. In the beginning of June, as consequence of the terror against the Small-Holders' Party, there were 15,000 to 20,000 political prisoners. Not only was the landed aristocracy, which ruled the country and collaborated with the German Nazis, ruined, and rightly enough; the middle class also was distrusted and persecuted, although a party representing that class commanded, according to the election of 1945, the confidence of the people. Hungary is an agrarian country, and peasants do not like Communism. The Communist Party of Hungary, like in all the countries under Soviet domination, is a questionable assortment of people —down-and-out aristocrats, army officers purchasing Russian patronage at the cost of their conviction, and recruits from former fascist organisations. Nationalist degeneration of Communism has made it acceptable to aristocratic army officers and fascists who are not political adventurers. The President of the National Bank of Hungary, Imre Oltvany for example, was the leader of the pro-communist and pro-Russian "left" wing of the Small-Holders' Party, and was tipped as the successor of Nagy in the premiership.

Significantly enough, the National Bank was not nationalised. It is clear that the *coup d'état* in Hungary was a move in the game of Russian power-politics, having nothing to do with any revolution.

To tighten the grip similarly on all the countries of South-Eastern Europe, was the Russian tactics to meet the counter-offensive. The earlier policy was more realistic, and therefore commensurate with the plan of promoting revolution. When the Red Army entered those countries, following the retreating Germans, the Soviet authorities had disowned any intention of forcibly changing their *status quo*. Accordingly, instead of proletarian dictatorship, everywhere coalition governments were established under the protection of the Red Army. Counter-revolutionary parties and reactionary social elements who had collaborated with the German invaders, either fled with them or were removed from positions of power. The post-war coalition governments, therefore, were really democratic. But confronted with the problem of economic reconstruction, in every country they felt the need of foreign financial aid. Russia was not in a position to help. If the democratic governments in the countries occupied by the Red Army were allowed the minimum measure of independence, they would naturally look to America for loans. Some of them actually did. Russia was unnecessarily alarmed, and decided to replace the democratic regimes by open communist dictatorships, so that the economic life of all those countries could be subordinated to her strategic plan.

The Yugoslav government adopted a five-years plan which, cast on the Soviet pattern, gave priority to heavy industries, while the people were starved for the most indispensable consumers' goods. Road-building was a prominent part of the plan. The Balkans are notorious for bad roads. But the roads to be built according to the plan were all towards the Greek frontier. They were to

serve the strategic purpose of Russia. The peasants badly needed roads for the transport of their products to the towns. The leader of the Peasants Party was arrested for criticising the five years plan as wasteful. The national economy of Albania was tied up with the Yugoslav five years plan. Neglecting the food requirements of her people, Albania was to concentrate on commercial crops such as flax, which were to be exchanged with grain from Yugoslavia. In order to have an exportable surplus, the Yugoslav peasantry were compelled to surrender to the State a fixed quota of agricultural produce, irrespective of their own requirements. The system was analogous to War Communism, which had such a disastrous consequence in Russia during the earlier years of the revolution.

Bulgaria and Roumania are experiencing famine conditions, because the Russian army of occupation is living on the land. Consequently, there is a widespread peasant discontent breaking out in open revolts here and there. The least opposition to the government in both the countries is suppressed by laws restricting the freedom of press and speech and also by mass arrests. Under Tito, Yugoslavia has had an out-and-out communist government ever since the country was liberated by the Red Army. The Bulgarian government is based on the so-called Fatherland Front, a coalition of five parties, although the Prime Minister is the Communist Dimitrov of Reichstag Fire Trial fame. The non-communist partners of the government coalition have never been free agents. They cooperated with the Communists under duress. All along they were subjected to all sorts of limitations of movement and political activity. Hundreds of Republican officers, who had participated in the war-time resistance movement, were arrested. Finally, in the beginning of June 1947, simultaneously with the *coup d'état* in Hungary, pretenses were thrown to the winds, and open terror was let loose against all non-Communists.

The leader of the parliamentary opposition, Nikola Petkov, was arrested and twenty-three deputies were deprived of their seats in the parliament for having secretly expressed their loyalty to Petkov. As prominent leader of the resistance movement, one of the founders of the Fatherland Front, he is very popular throughout the country.

In Roumania, more than 400 arrests were made since the beginning of June in the same year. Among the arrested persons were the Vice-President, General Secretary and two other leaders of the Peasants Party, who were trying to go abroad. The charge against them was to have plotted to overthrow the communist-dominated régime. The wave of terror reached the high-water mark in the arrest of the 78 years old leader of the Peasants Party, Dr. Maniu.

These developments clearly indicate the Russian resolve to tighten the grip on South-East Europe by establishing out-and-out communist dictatorships in all the countries. Politically, this is an adventurous policy, the countries being overwhelmingly agrarian. Economically, the policy is suicidal. The motive, therefore, is strategic. The spearhead of the policy was an intensification of guerilla activities in Northern Greece, where a communist government has been established. Before the Americans took over from the British, Greece might be incorporated in the Russian defence system. Wishing to avoid a military clash in the near future, the Russians did not go so far immediately. Their immediate objective was to prevent the almost certain possibility of the Truman doctrine finding a response in the financially bankrupt countries of South-East Europe. That object also may not be attained, owing to Russia's inability to finance the urgently needed economic rehabilitation of the countries under her occupation. But the tactics is to temporise. The Russian leaders believe that the imminent slump would soon eliminate the lure of American financial aid, and the helpless countries

of South-East Europe would be reconciled to the not very promising fate of being incorporated in the system of Soviet economy.

In Europe, outside the Russian zone, the revolutionary tactics is being determined also by the confident hope of the coming American slump. The tactics is to prepare for the seizure of power in the countries where Communist Parties are sufficiently strong to make that attempt with a reasonable chance of success. Therefore, in France and Italy, the Communists have left the coalition governments. The plan is to create a standing political crisis and dislocate economic life by fomenting industrial strife. In France, the Communists stand a good chance of carrying through the plan. They being the largest party, their opposition renders the parliamentary position of any government extremely insecure. At any moment, they could overthrow the government by voting jointly with right-wing parties; and they would have no scruple in practising this "revolutionary opportunism". The Communists acted like that in the last days of the Weimar Republic, when they made united front with the Nazis against the Social-Democratic government. That policy ended in a disaster. But the Communists have not learned the lesson. They are engaged in the class war, and believe that everything is fair in love and war. Controlling the Trade-Union Federation, the Communists are in a position to aggravate the economic difficulties of France. A revolutionary crisis in France, precipitated on the occasion of the expected American slump, would be a signal for the Communists in Italy also to strike. If in the meantime Germany could be kept in a state of political uncertainty and economic insecurity, the whole of Europe might soon be swept by a mighty wave of revolution.

The Americans, on the other hand, are not in a position to step up their counter-offensive. To do that, they must precipitate an early armed conflict. Anti-Russian

sentiment is being whipped up in America. Molotov's inept and blustering diplomacy has created ten times more anti-Communists in less than two years than the Pope's propaganda during the last thirty years. Thanks to their own cussedness, the Russians have squandered the vast store of good will in Britain also. Influential Americans are itching for a showdown before it is too late. The U. S. Chief of Staff, Eisenhauer, for example, has asked his country to be ready for a war within a year. One holding his position would hardly indulge in idle alarmism. The declaration of the so-called Truman doctrine, as the London *Economist* pointed out, was "flamboyant and provocative". Anglo-American press correspondents returned from the Moscow Conference with the optimistic opinion that Russia was too weak to risk a war within the next ten years. Anti-Communist crusaders are naturally impatient. They are all for taking time by the forelock, to be through with the menace, once for all. This view was expressed vehemently by the American delegate to the U.N.O. Security Council during the discussion of the report of the Balkan Commission. Opposing the French plea for a compromise, he warned against an explosion (meaning Russian invasion) that might happen any day, and pressed the American demand for an international patrol on both sides of the border between Greece and her neighbours—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. The action demanded by America would require a fair size army, part of which should encroach upon the territories of countries opposed to such an international intervention. The fat would be in the fire, to set off a large-scale conflagration.

Whether American policy as a whole is heading towards such an eventuality or not, one thing is certain: Notwithstanding the favourable emotional atmosphere, even a formally democratic regime, provided that it is not prepared to throw off the formality, has to labour under

many disadvantages when it comes to declaring a war. The issues involved must be discussed publicly, and public opinion in America, on the whole, cannot even now be mobilised in favour of a large-scale war. For these considerations, the makers of America's high policy soon realised that the Truman declaration, in so far as it implied an offensive against Russia, was somewhat premature.

Chapter XXVI

THE LAST CHANCE

The Marshall Plan is a tactical retreat. The new American Secretary of State came back from the Moscow Conference with the impression that Russian policy was not to precipitate a conflict, but to temporise with the object of preparing for an eventual trial of strength. There could be two alternative counter-policies: to force a showdown the Russians wanted to delay, and to take such measures as would eliminate factors which were operating to the advantage of the Russians and which they naturally wanted to exploit. Geographical considerations alone should rule out the first alternative. Marshall's military eye could not miss the fact that the political lay-out of post-war Europe placed the Russians in a strategically advantageous position. Nearly three-fourths of the continent, barring the Iberian Peninsula, were actually occupied by the Red Army. Outside their zone of occupation, the Russians had powerful advance guards in France and Italy. In the middle, Germany was an extremely uncertain factor. Given this situation, in the case of a war, American forces in Europe would have to be based on precarious bridge-heads. The strategist in Marshall made no mistake in judging the situation. He favoured the latter alternative as the more effective counter-move to the Russian tactics of temporising while preparing for a showdown.

The Russians planned to keep Europe in a state of economic disorganisation, so that Communist Parties could fish in troubled waters. The most fitting counter-move would be to help the economic recovery of Europe. In his famous Harvard speech, the American Secretary of State offered that help, not to this or that country, but to all. By implication, even Russia herself was not exclud-

ed, not to mention her satellites. No string was attached to the offer as in the case of the Truman doctrine, which was to grant loans to countries fighting communist totalitarianism. Apparently, it was not painless dollar imperialism. Europe was asked to draw up her own plan of reconstruction. "Any country that is willing to assist in the task of (general) recovery will find full co-operation." But "the programme should be a joint one—agreed to by a number of, if not all, European countries." It was not a large-scale charity; it was a bold business venture and a shrewd political strategy. But from the point of view of the European countries, struggling for economic recovery, it was a generous offer, apparently with no ulterior motive. Therefore, it was enthusiastically welcomed practically throughout Europe, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even some Balkan countries.

The announcement of the Marshall Plan created a new international situation. America decided to step back, so that Britain, with the co-operation of France, might assume the leadership of Europe. On the part of America, it was neither a relapse into isolationism, nor an act of self-abnegation. It was a realistic business calculation, which nevertheless could have a very beneficial effect for the future of Europe. The possibility of a business slump cannot be altogether ruled out. It will result from the world dollar shortage. The present employment level and general prosperity cannot be maintained in America unless her export trade expands. But it is bound to shrink if Europe cannot soon recover her purchasing capacity. For the moment, owing to the ravages of war, most European countries can export very little. So, they must pay in cash for whatever they purchase in America. In other words, they require dollars not only for paying for immediate purchases in America, but for rehabilitating their industries so that before long they could produce for export and build up dollar credits. The Truman doctrine was to keep

up the export trade by selling mainly war materials to countries which were to be granted loans to pay for the destructive commodities. That policy, apart from willy-nilly preparing for war, was essentially imperialist. Since loans for buying war materials could not be recovered soon, they necessarily presupposed American control of the political and economic life of the debtor countries. Moreover, from the business point of view, the Truman doctrine was short-sighted. The artificially created market for war materials was bound to be saturated before long, unless a series of wars or a world war was visualised. On second thought, even the most jingoist American businessman, therefore, must have frowned on the Truman doctrine.

The Marshall Plan, which was to supplant the bellicose Truman doctrine, was as bold as the war-time Lease-Lend. It involved an outlay of six billion dollars, not as a loan to the distressed European countries, but a grant-in-aid. The vast sum must be spent if the dollar deficits of the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Western Germany and other smaller countries were to be counter-balanced. Unless the dollar requirements of Europe or their equivalent in goods were provided, wheat, coal and other American surplus products could not be sold there. Such a large-scale stoppage of export would endanger American prosperity, and also cause economic, social and political chaos in Europe. Therefore, experts argued that the health of American economy was dependent on the recovery of Europe. As the estimated sum of six billion dollars was not meant to be a loan to Europe, it must come from taxation and savings in America. Otherwise, the Marshall Plan was bound to have inflatory consequences. But the large sum represented not more than three per cent of America's gross national production. It was a good business to spend that much to put America's best customers on their feet. To finance European economic recovery was such a sound business proposition that the aspirant for Presidency,

Harold Stassen, who toured Europe extensively, recommended that as much as ten per cent of America's gross production could be written off for the purpose. While announcing his plan of European recovery, Marshall stressed that it was not directed against any country or economic doctrine, but against hunger, poverty and chaos in Europe. The plan, no doubt, had a utilitarian as well as an idealistic significance. The American Government realised that to help European economic recovery and democratic resurgence, was the most effective measure against the dreaded spread of Communism.

A crucial question, however, had to be faced, if the risky venture implied in the Truman doctrine was to be avoided in favour of a safer business proposition. The question was: Can the desired economic recovery of Europe take place on the basis of orthodox Capitalism? Should it be made conditional upon a restoration of an economic system which lay in ruins throughout post-war Europe? The question involved a political question: Should Europe be the scene of a life-and-death struggle between the American system (unbridled private enterprise) and the Soviet system (call it Communism or State Capitalism)? It was no longer a theoretical question. After the first world war, America tried to restore capitalist economy in Germany. The Dawes Plan and the Young Plan defeated the object. They helped the rise of Fascism, which was as contradictory to the American doctrine of free enterprise as Soviet planned economy. After the second world war, a similar effort would have even a lesser chance of success. In no European country there are many advocates of return to the pre-war economic system. Old political parties committed to a restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* have disappeared. The non-working class parties, which to-day compete with the Communists, also stand for economic reforms amounting to a large measure

of Socialism. Old-fashioned private enterprise is discredited in the old world.

The Marshall Plan evidently took notice of this most outstanding feature of the post-war European situation. Whatever might be the economic system of post-war Europe, it would provide a market for American export, once order was restored there. The prevailing state of economic disintegration, uncertainty and chaos was bound to be exploited by the Russians in the name of revolution and Communism. Therefore, for the purpose of combatting the communist menace, checking Russian expansionism, and also for the sake of American business interests, order must be restored in Europe. Let that object be attained at all cost; let Europe recover on the basis of a mixed economic system, like that introduced in Britain by the Labour Government. If America could trade and have large-scale financial transactions with a Britain on the road to Socialism of a sort, she should be able to do so also with Europe moving in the same direction. But this realistic policy, which at the same time was the shrewdest counterblast to Russian Communism, could not be successful unless America disowned all intention to interfere with the internal affairs of the European countries. There was a good deal of distrust and fear of dollar imperialism. The leadership of Europe thus automatically reverted to Britain who, under the Labour Government, could command the confidence of all the democratic parties of Europe.

At the same time, the Marshall Plan unwittingly, whatever might be its ulterior motive, presented the Russians also with the last opportunity to regain the leadership of democratic Europe, provided that they would have the good sense of sharing it with Britain. The plan implied that Russia also could get the benefit of American financial assistance, if she honestly participated in a joint effort for European recovery and reconstruction, instead of pinning her hope on the belief that political chaos, economic uncer-

tainty, poverty, starvation, misery and general degradation would drive Europe towards revolution. The Russians hesitated, full of suspicion and fear, while the British Labour Government seized the initiative, but earnestly sought Russian co-operation. Once again, Russian leadership turned out to be lacking in self-confidence, foresight, imagination and broad vision.

The British Labour Government acted promptly, and France joined in. Together they invited Russia to a conference for devising the ways and means of European economic reconstruction on the basis of the Marshall Plan. The Russians were taken by surprise. They could not possibly decline the invitation without isolating themselves completely. Having failed to take the initiative, they were compelled to make a forced move. Molotov agreed to attend the Paris Conference. But the object with which he went was clear to the critical observer from the very beginning. In his reply to the Anglo-French invitation, the Soviet Foreign Minister alleged that, by demanding a joint programme of European economic reconstruction, the Marshall Plan implied a menace to the sovereignty of the European States, and suggested that each country should have the right to state its requirements and receive the offered American financial assistance accordingly. He also hinted that the assistance should be in proportion to the loss and destruction suffered during the war. Should that principle be accepted, the Russians would present an enormous bill which, however justified, could not be expected to be entertained by America. The alleged dishonesty of the Marshall Plan would thus be exposed, and the shrewd American move in the game of international power-politics successfully countered. So, Molotov went to Paris with the object of sabotaging yet another international conference and with the illusion that, by doing so, he would win European democratic opinion for the Russian point of view. The illusion was based on the possibility of Russian diplo-

macy exploiting German distrust for the French and resentment against Britain. In the Paris Conference, Molotov, with his characteristic bad taste, actually branded Bevin and Bidault as agents of dollar imperialism, "liveried lackeys of Wall Street."

The story of the Paris Conference hardly needs recapitulation in detail. After the initial exchange of views, Bidault proposed that the conference of three Foreign Ministers should calculate the requirements of Europe as a whole, and prepare an over-all plan of reconstruction with the offered American financial assistance. Bevin supported the proposal. Molotov opposed on the ground that such a plan would mean interference with the internal affairs of sovereign national States.

There was an opportunity for building up a democratic commonwealth of Europe on the basis of a planned economy, which would put an end to such ruinous practices as competitive production, dumping, customs barriers and fluctuating national currencies. The representative of Communist Russia stood up as the champion of keeping Europe divided in mutually suspicious and antagonistic national States, many of which were economically unstable because of insufficient natural resources, low productive capacity and disproportionate military expenditure. Europe is a natural economic unit. With co-operation instead of competition, it could be developed for common well-being and prosperity. The production of steel, for example, requires coal from the Ruhr Valley and iron from Lorraine. Nature has placed these two deposits side by side. Yet, they belong to two nations, and on that issue three great wars have been waged in our time. Every sensible person now feels that this absurdity must end. Only communist cussedness stands on the way.

The Russians suspected that the plan would restore Capitalism in Europe. But could they prevent that by staying away? Their co-operation was solicited. They

could influence the plan by participating in its preparation and execution. It goes without saying that America could not be expected to finance socialisation of Europe. But under the joint leadership of France, where the Communist Party was the largest party, of Britain under a Labour Government, and Communist Russia, Europe could not possibly become a colony of dollar imperialism. The Russians are not only distrustful of others; they have little confidence in themselves. Therefore they lost the last opportunity, and helped the creation of the Western Bloc which had been haunting them like a nightmare since the conclusion of the war. The failure of the Paris Conference, Russian refusal to co-operate in the creation of a democratic commonwealth of Europe, divided the continent into two parts. Though a product of communist obstructionist bungling, the Western Bloc originally was not meant to be an anti-Soviet coalition. The Marshall Plan may, indeed, be a blessing in disguise. It may help at least a part of Europe to recover from economic uncertainty and political chaos, which encouraged communist adventurism and consequently made for the catastrophe of another war.

The Russians forced the division of Europe because geographically they have won the lion's share. They intended to reinforce their power-structure on that basis. In addition, they have their faith in Marxist fatalism—the American slump is coming, nothing can prevent it; and they also count upon the Communist Parties, which have penetrated deep into the Western Bloc and are expected to make endless trouble, if not actually seize power. With all that, disillusionment may be in store for the Russian strategists of revolution. They are building their power-structure on a bed of shifting sand. But there is no going back for them. In the last analysis, it is the military might of Russia herself which will count. Therefore, while trying to consolidate the advance line and push it farther wherever possible, and penetrating behind the

enemy's line through the Communist Parties in Western Europe, the Russian strategists are not neglecting the home base.

Having learned a bitter lesson from the war with Germany, Russia is building up vast industrial centres deep into her extensive territories. Even Moscow is being relegated to a secondary place in the industrial structure and strategic plan of Russia. In short, the nerve-centre of the Soviet industrial structure is being shifted beyond the Urals. In 1936, one third of the coal consumed in Russia came from the Siberian fields as against only one-tenth before the revolution. The plan is to raise the quota to half by 1950. A similar shift is taking place in steel production. In 1940, only twelve per cent of the entire output came from Siberia. In 1950, it should rise to forty per cent. New oil fields are being explored in Central Asia. Even light industries are also transplanted to safe distances. There should be no intolerable shortage of consumers goods during the next war.*

Is Russia then preparing for a defensive war?† Apparently, she is still counting upon a revolutionary up-

* In the beginning of August 1947, the usually well informed and sober correspondent of the *Sunday Times* (London) reported: "A great military and industrial bastion is being built on Soviet Russia's south-eastern border. Outstanding priority in the Five Years Plan is given to the densely wooded expanse between Lake Baikal and the Pacific. Thirty-sixth in population of the States, cities and provinces of the Soviet Republic, the Siberian Republic of Khabarovsk Krai, to the north of Manchuria, will receive the fourth-largest share of the budget. Five great centres of industries are developing along this stretch of the Trans-Siberian Railway; four more in the forests to the north. Iron ore is abundant and the area is rich in coal, though only 15 of some 200 seams are so far tapped. Workers from the west have swollen the population from its pre-war million and a quarter to little short of two million. The area is dependent for its food on Manchuria, on which the communist grip appears to be daily tightening."

† "It would seem that the great bulk of the real fighting army of the Soviet Union is not standing ready in Europe, but retraining and re-equipping at home. When it will be ready for action, is anybody's guess, but almost certainly not until the finish of the first post-war Plan at the end of 1950." (Edward Crankshaw in the *Observer*, London).

Whatever may be the number of divisions actually on war footing, the size of the Russian army is to be measured by her population. Military service being obligatory, every year the numerical strength of the mobilis-

heaval in Central and Western Europe in the near future. But that is an idle, if not a positively risky speculation. Stalin's realism may not be altogether blind to the dark side of the picture. Consequently, while staking heavily in a daring gamble, Russian strategists may just as well be preparing for the worst—the emergency of having to fight a hostile world with their back to the wall. If the Russian political leaders were not really living in a fool's paradise, they could not be very confident of the Communists riding to power on the crest of a deliberately created political chaos and callously engineered economic misery resulting from industrial dislocation in France and Italy. In both the countries, the Communists attained their present position by professing most fervent patriotism, which opportunist politics won for them, to a very large measure, the support of the urban lower middle class and the peasantry, these latter non-proletarian social elements having lost confidence in the old political parties. Communist patriotism is already wearing thin in both the

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able man power increases by about 2 million men trained in the use of arms. The budget figures are also misleading. The Soviet budget includes the entire capital investment in national economy. Therefore, the 17 p.c. allotted to military expenditure amount to much more than the actual sum represented by a higher percentage in the budgets of other countries.

For these reasons, the Soviet army is the largest standing army. But only forty divisions are stationed in the occupied countries of Europe, and the army of occupation may be still reduced in the near future. The entire Russian army is undergoing a radical reorganisation, retraining and regrouping under self-sufficient autonomous local commands. The professional Marshals have been politically emasculated; but the army has not been weakened by their total elimination. As professional soldiers, they are holding important positions in the scheme of the reorganisation of the army—Zhukov, on the Black Sea coast; Bagramian, at Tiflis, guarding the oil fields of Grozny and Baku; Malinovski, somewhere in Siberia; and Rokossovski, at Minsk. The whereabouts of others are a closely guarded secret. These are not mere garrison commands. Each is a complete army with its industrial base, capable of operating independently of a central command and co-operation with other units. The Soviet armed forces are being thus regrouped into a number of complete armies in anticipation of an attack from the air, possibly with atom bombs, which may disrupt all means of communication, rendering all centralised direction and supply utterly impossible. All the self-contained armies with their respective industrial bases are situated far away from the European frontier, except the one in White Russia, which evidently is meant to bear the entire brunt of the first assault.

During the war, professional soldiers like Zhukov, Malinovski,

countries. Once Europe is divided into two hostile camps, the Communists in the Western countries will find it more and more difficult to be patriotic and pro-Russian at the same time. However optimistic a view one may take, neither in France nor in Italy the Communists stand any chance if they attempt to capture power through insurrection in the near future. And should no stable government be possible owing to their going out of the coalitions, they must have a trial of strength in another election. It is very doubtful if they will retain the non-proletarian democratic sanction with which they plan to make a proletarian revolution. The most significant fact is that the Communist Parties in the democratic countries grew in strength and

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Rokossovski and Koniev, outshined the party Marshals, such as Voroshilov and Budenny. "Firmly entrenched in popular esteem, and apparently also in the Soviet political hierarchy, the Marshals proceeded to create a post-war army according to their own predominantly professional military concepts. The crux of this concept was a complete divorce of the armed forces from the Communist Party, and autonomy in both technical and political matters, which no other organ of the Soviet State enjoys. The structure of the armed forces was to be established along conventional military lines, with emphasis on land warfare. There appeared no place for political or revolutionary considerations in this concept. A triumph of these concepts was bound to create a static army, similar to the professional standing armies of the West, whose non-political character is constantly emphasised. This clashed with the dynamic concept of Bolshevism, in which the army is one of the several political instruments of revolution, the terms war and revolution being alternately used to describe the same thing" (Ellsworth L. Raymond, formerly Chief of the U. S. Army's Russian Economic Section, in the *United Nations World, March,* 1948).

The role of the army was completely redefined after the behind-the-scene controversy was brusquely concluded by Stalin's famous letter (published in the theoretical organ of the Communist Party, *The Bolshevik*) about the place of Clausewitz in Soviet strategic theory. Stalin declared: "It has now become ridiculous to accept the teachings of Clausewitz." The new Soviet military doctrine was elaborated by Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov in the two volume book *The Brain of the Army*. It became the manual of the Soviet armed forces. The new doctrine goes beyond Clausewitz, who held that war was a continuation of politics by other means. The fundamental tenet of the new Soviet military doctrine as enunciated by Shaposhnikov is: "War is both the highest form and the most important weapon of politics."

In the new theory, "war assumes a total and permanent character. Every act of the State and its individual parts represents a tactical move to implement the strategic concept. The whole nation is engaged in a permanent and total effort, maintaining its military might merely as a deterrent or an implement of persuasion or to be used only as a last resort. In the light of this development, it may be stated categorically

importance by pretending loyalty to democratic principles, and to that extent abandoning Communism. If the conversion was intelligent and honest, they could not only maintain their position, but improve it. That is the road to revolution in our time, which cannot be travelled under the tattered and discredited banner of Communism. On the one hand, pretences and opportunism could not deceive an intelligent democracy for a long time; and, on the other hand, any attempt to seize power by force in countries beyond an easy striking distance from the advance base of the Red Army would only help counter-revolution.

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In November 1947, President Truman convened the Congress in a special session to discuss the European Recovery Plan of General Marshall. It was evident that the next year's presidential election would not be too much of a pre-occupation for America. European recovery was too urgent to be neglected even for a year; indeed, it was intimately linked up with America's domestic problems. The President took the extraordinary step of convening a special session of the Congress only after having ascertained that the Marshall Plan had the support of the leaders of both the parties. In Washington, there was an atmosphere of quiet confidence. The Russian colossus had allowed itself to be outmanœuvered in the struggle for the leadership of Europe. America, with the aid of Britain

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that the Soviet Union does not want a shooting war now, in ten years, or at any time in the future. The outbreak of a shooting war would constitute evidence of her complete political failure. While her political forces are engaged in the waging of an admittedly aggressive struggle, Russia's military forces are trained along largely defensive lines." (*Ibid.*)

The Soviet strategists seem to envisage the next war beginning with a mass air attack which may cause economic paralysis of the regions attacked. Nevertheless, they do not expect the first phase of the war to be decisive. They anticipate a protracted period of attrition like during the last war, only on a vastly greater scale. During that second phase, the enemy will be exhausted, territorial vastness of the Soviet Union enabling the Russian armies to escape defeat and destruction, until the opportune time will come for mounting an all-out counter-offensive leading to victory. Evidently, Soviet strategists are thinking in terms of the last war. Therefore, like the French General Staff in 1940, they may be perfectly prepared for the last war when the next war will come.

and France, had regained the initiative. Negotiation for the merger of the American, British and French zones in Germany was almost complete. Molotov's stubbornness and Vishinski's vituperations in the coming Foreign Ministers' Conference to meet in London no longer caused much worry. The American Plan of European economic recovery had opened up a vista of hope before the distressed peoples of that devastated continent. All were eager to co-operate and get going. Even the countries in Eastern Europe would fall in line, if they dared defy Russia. Russia alone took up the position of opposing the common effort for restoring Europe to health and strength. Her isolation was complete, morally, if not yet politically.

Chapter XXVII

FROM COMMUNISM TO NATIONALISM

For the obvious considerations indicated in the preceding chapter, it is very unlikely that the Russians should want their advance-guard in West Europe to launch upon any risky adventure. The role allotted to them is to keep the pot boiling, so that the restoration of political equilibrium and economic recovery is indefinitely held up. Germany will be the worst victim of this policy, and the Russians believe that out of the depth of misery the German people will rise in revolt to welcome communist dictatorship as the only possible saviour. The next objective of the Russian revolutionary strategy is still Germany, not France nor even Italy. Hence the stubborn resistance to any advance towards a peace treaty with that long-tortured and tormented country. Pursuing this insane policy, the Russians are going to the extent of promoting the resurrection of national chauvinism. The rejection of the American proposal of a Four Power Treaty to keep Germany disarmed for forty years does not imply anything else. So, the long awaited German revolution, if it happens under Russian inspiration, will not mark an advance of world proletarian revolution, but a reinforcement of the power structure of the Russian National State, provided that resurrected German nationalism will not be the means to defeat the end of the Russians.

Immediately, the Marshall Plan worked out under Anglo-French leadership may frustrate the Russian revolutionary tactics. Economic recovery will steal the fire out of the communist gun in France, other Western countries, and ultimately in Germany. Therefore, the Russians are so dead against the plan, and in their madness, born out of the lust for power, have gone to the extent of splitting up

Europe in two hostile camps, aggravating the danger of another world war. If Fascism meant war, as it did, Russian Communism, which has metamorphosed itself into another form of aggressive nationalism, is also driving the world to the same direction. The Russians, of course, do not want to precipitate a war. But they are pursuing a provocative diplomacy, which may any day set off a conflagration, with the belief that no government in the civilised world wants a war, none can afford the sinister luxury of one, and even the U.S.A., the only exception, cannot swiftly plunge into an armed conflict, thanks to the much maligned democratic system. Therefore, the Russians will not be able to block the recovery of Western Europe; and that process is going to mean a revolution. That is how the Marshall Plan may be a blessing in disguise, and why the Russians have lost their opportunity, thanks to the foolishness of non-co-operating with it.

The impact of this revolution coming from the West will be felt in the whole of Germany; it will reach the outer bastion of the Russian power structure. And there is enough reason to believe that they will also crumble in course of time. The reign of terror in the countries occupied by the Red Army may in a critical moment redound against the Russians. As a counterblast to the Marshall Plan, they have announced the Molotov programme for the economic reconstruction of the Eastern Block. The programme may be very plausible. But who will provide the wherewithal to finance it? Propaganda will no longer do. Already there are signs indicating which way the wind is blowing.

In several countries under Russian occupation, democratic and progressive opinion welcomed the Marshall Plan and favoured co-operation. In the beginning, the situation was not only embarrassing, but positively alarming for the Russians. Britain enthusiastically endorsed the Marshall Plan, just when a trade agreement had been con-

cluded between the British and the Polish Governments. Addressing the Budget Session of the Diet, the Polish Prime Minister, Cyrankiewicz, belonging to the curious breed of crypto-Communists, raised by Russian diplomacy, feelingly referred to his friendly talk with the "social-fascist" Bevin, and expressed great satisfaction at the progress towards the restoration of normal relations with imperialist Britain. He declared that the trade agreement and the supplementary financial arrangements had prepared the ground for further co-operation between the two countries. On that very day came the invitation signed by Bevin to the Paris Conference. It was extremely difficult for the Polish Government to reject the invitation outright as an imperialist trap. It was committed to co-operation with Britain, not only as a matter of principle, but in actual practice. Nevertheless, the Polish Government could not do anything without consulting Moscow. Meanwhile, it was freely commented in official circles of Warsaw that under certain conditions Poland should join in an international discussion of the Marshall Plan. The tone of the press, which could not speak without official approbation, showed eagerness for obtaining financial assistance, and therefore favoured participation in the Paris Conference.

Czechoslovakia took up a similar attitude. Before the Paris Conference met, Czech as well as Polish diplomatic representatives in Paris had clearly hinted in informal talks that their countries were extremely anxious to co-operate with the plan of European reconstruction, provided that they could do so without risking a breach with Russia, which they could not afford. Before Molotov put his foot down, even Tito's communist Yugoslavia had evinced lively interest in the Marshall Plan. Hungary had been tempted by the Truman offer. So, there could be no doubt about her attitude to the Marshall Plan, had she not in the meantime been subjected to the purge.

The general readiness of the East-European and

Balkan countries to accept the Anglo-French invitation to the Paris Conference did not imply any hostility to Russia. It only expressed their common anxiety for finding a way out of serious difficulties, no promise for an early solution of which was forthcoming from their close relation with the powerful liberator. All of them had been plundered by Nazi Germany and then devastated by the war. They badly needed foreign financial assistance for economic recovery. Following the Russian example, on communist inspiration, they had prepared ambitious plans of large-scale industrialisation to be executed within two to five years. But none had nearly enough money to finance the building of the new order. And failure to execute the plan would surely tell upon the prestige and stability of the established regimes. Some raw materials might be expected from Russia; but much more than that was necessary, particularly, capital goods—machinery, locomotives, rolling stock for railways, and other essential commodities of the kind which could for a long time come only from the West. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary had traditionally traded with the West. Resumption of that trade was highly desirable for their economic recovery. Therefore, they had enough reason not to throw away the chance of getting the help offered by the Marshall Plan. Up to the war, about 75 per cent of the export of these agricultural countries went to Germany. They must now find an alternative market. Herself still mainly an agricultural country, Russia could not replace Germany for a long time to come. Britain is a more promising customer of the agricultural product of South-Eastern Europe. And those countries were also interested in an early recovery of Germany. The Marshall Plan promised to promote their economic interest; their attitude was accordingly determined.

But Russia's is the commanding voice in those parts of Europe. The Czech Government alone had maintained

a certain measure of independence. Therefore, it actually accepted the invitation to the Paris Conference. Thereupon, the heavy hand of Moscow came down upon Prague. The Communist Prime Minister Gottwald, accompanied by the Foreign Minister (the son of old Masaryk) proceeded to Moscow, obviously on summons, to discuss the issue. They returned home to announce that, as all other Slav States had refused to attend the Paris Conference, Czech participation would be regarded by the Soviet Government as an unfriendly act. It was disclosed by nosy press correspondents that the Czech Government acted under the Russian threat of denouncing the alliance between the two countries. The press report was subsequently corroborated by the Socialist Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Peter Zenkl who, speaking at a public meeting, declared that it would be contrary to the country's interests to have economic relations only with nations who were Czechoslovakia's political allies; he advocated that Czechoslovakia's economic relations must be broad-based. That was a broad enough hint. But the speaker did not stop at that. He went on to disclose that, but for the Russian threat to denounce the Czech-Soviet Pact, his Government would not have withdrawn the acceptance of the invitation to the Paris Conference. It is highly significant that several other Czech Socialist leaders spoke in the same strain. This fact was interpreted as the opening shot in a campaign against the doctrine of a Slav system of economy as advocated by the Communists. The Catholic Slovacs are naturally opposed to Pan-Slavism, even if it flies the Red Flag in the place of the Tzarist Eagle. Consequently, one cannot brush aside the rumour that, even after Gottwald returned from Moscow with the mandate, a large majority of his Cabinet was against changing the decision to attend the Paris Conference, whatever might be the political consequences. Only the Social-Democratic Ministers supported the Communists, presumably to avoid a crisis, which might take a serious turn. The final decision

made under Russian pressure, however, was very unpopular.

The Polish Government stayed away, equally under pressure from Moscow, regretfully and with reluctance. All the parties represented on the coalition government, particularly the Socialists, were strongly in favour of participating in the Paris Conference. It was reported that the Cabinet was definitely split on the issue. The Communists carried the day with the threat of Russian action, which could not be altogether headed off by submission. A number of Socialist leaders were arrested soon afterwards.

The Hungarian attitude was predetermined by the *coup d'etat* in the beginning of June. Nevertheless, the voice of dissent against the Russian-dictated negative policy was not altogether silent. Criticising the communist contention that Hungary could not join any anti-Soviet bloc, the organ of the Socialist Party wrote that the Socialists were determined to do everything in their power to prevent the division of Europe into two hostile blocs.

Evidently, all is not quiet on the eastern front. Germany, of course, was not invited to the Paris Conference. Therefore, the situation in the eastern part of that country occupied by Russia could not be judged by the reaction to that event. But there are other indications to prove that the revolution carried there by the Red Army has not taken roots. Indeed, there also the situation is alarming, for the Russians. Otherwise, it would not be necessary for Beria, known to be Stalin's right-hand man, to visit Eastern Germany in order to advise the Russian military authorities how to popularise Communism. The Socialist Unity Party, sponsored and patronised by the Russians, is practically a State within the State in Eastern Germany. On the ground that all genuine Socialists have joined the Unity Party, the Social-Democratic Party is not allowed to exist legally in the Soviet zone. In the last election of the States Diets, the camouflaged Communist Party was

opposed by the Liberals and Christian Democrats. They had to labour under great handicaps, because the Socialist Unity Party was fully backed up by the military authorities. Nevertheless, it failed to secure a majority in any one of the five States. Three-party coalition governments had to be formed. Nevertheless, all tht five Ministries of the Interior went to the Communists and four of the Premierships. Yet, Communism could not be made popular in a highly industrial country. On the contrary, opposition to the Socialist Unity Party has become more and more widespread and of late penetrated the working class also. The purpose of Beria's visit was to help the German Communists combat the popular opposition. Indoctrination of the youth is the most effective method to achieve the end. Therefore, in addition to the Ministries of Interior, the Communists control the Departments of Education in all the five States in the Russian zone. It is highly significant that more than half the school teachers appointed by the communist-controlled Ministries of Education are former members of the Nazi Party. Now they are members of the Socialist Unity Party; otherwise, they could not be entrusted with the mission of indoctrinating the youth. It is no wonder that the German working class should oppose the brand of Communism which commended itself to former Nazis.*

Nationalist degeneration of Communism is the common feature of the political life of those parts of Europe

* Early in 1948, a declaration signed by Marshal Sokolovski, Russian Military Governor of Germany, announced the end of de-Nazification with the following argument: "Among former members of the Nazi Party, there are patriotically minded people who are ready and willing to co-operate with the democratic forces of society in working for unity and democratic development of Germany."

Shortly thereafter, it was reported that the Russians would sanction the appearance of a new party in their zone. The new party would be called the "National-Democratic Party". It would be the rallying ground for "small Nazis", and resurrect the old Nazi slogans against "western monopoly capitalism" and "colonisation of Germany". Positively, it would demand unification of Germany under a strong centralised government. Significantly enough, the odious (for the Nazis) adjective 'democratic' would be dropped.

which to-day fly the Red Flag of proletarian world revolution under the protection of the Russian Army. Evidently, the revolution is defeating its own end; opportunist means adopted as revolutionary tactics were bound to corrupt the end also. This inglorious fate has overtaken the Russian Revolution because, thanks to a fallacious theory and incompetent, short-sighted, leadership, it failed to march abreast of time and seize the opportunities offered by epoch-making events, which occurred very largely under the impact of the Russian Revolution.

This sad perspective of the most promising current of contemporary history thus flowing into the backwaters of reaction results from the Russian tactics to meet the American counter-offensive. Now the roles will change as between the two aspirants for world domination. America can now temporise, believing, with more reason than Russia, that time is working in her favour. In view of the fact that it is not all quiet on the eastern front, Russia may be left alone with her lion's share of the geography of Europe. The recovery of the rest of the continent on the basis of the Marshall Plan, implemented under Anglo-French leadership, will have a demoralising and disintegrating repercussion in the countries over which the Red Flag of revolution flies. To shut that danger out, the iron curtain is clamped down right across the whole of Europe. But the pressing economic difficulties facing the peoples of the Russian-occupied countries can be removed neither by terror nor by indoctrination. It all depends on the state of Soviet economy. If nothing positive can be done, the hungry masses cannot indefinitely be fed on promises and propaganda. So far, the liberators have robbed the countries which have been revolutionised. Can they give something in return in the near future? That is very doubtful. Soviet industrial organisation still remains on war footing. Consumers' goods are in short supply. There will be nothing to spare for the newly revolutionised

countries, which must experience the ruinous practice of War Communism.

But can one be sure that a better fate awaits Western Europe in the near future? Perhaps not. Not only the Russian Communists, but the British Socialists also have lost their opportunities during the last several years. They have no vision. They pursue a hand-to-mouth policy. But experience seems to have at last taught them a lesson. They have taken the initiative; perhaps they have been stampeded by circumstances. But there is no going back from the position taken up, and the beginning is encouraging. The Paris Conference of nations who are prepared to operate jointly on the basis of the Marshall Plan has been the first international gathering of the post-war period to act with despatch and end with a considerable measure of success. That unprecedented event seems to have taken the Americans by surprise. There may be some procrastination on the other side of the Atlantic. In view of the presidential election in 1948, American foreign policy may be subordinated to affairs at home. But precisely for that reason, the British Labour Government will have the opportunity to assume the leadership of democratic Europe. Once the latter came together, determined to work in common interest, American help might be a secondary factor. In any case, America cannot simply be indifferent to developments in Europe, particularly when her own prosperity depends upon European recovery. But the initiative must remain with Europeans, if the danger of dollar imperialism is to be headed off.

Commenting rather tartly on the failure of America to react quickly to the resolution of the Paris Conference, the London *Economist* wrote: "This move to get Western Europe together in an economic and political sense depends vitally on whole-hearted and intelligent British interest and leadership." The voice finds an echo across the Channel, and consequently the way to European recovery under a

new leadership opens up. On the conclusion of the Paris Conference, the press organ of the Popular Republican Party, *L' Aube,* wrote: "The understanding between Socialist Bevin and Christian Democrat Bidault has an outstanding value to which none can be blind. The forces of salvation lay in the union of Socialism and Christian Democracy Either Europe will be made by the union of these two forces, or she will not be made at all."

The vision is refreshing, although it might be depicted in different terms, according to the predilection either of the writer or of the artist. The point, however, is that European recovery is conditional upon a break with the tradition of conventionalism in economic and political practice as well as thought. In its time, the French Revolution compelled Europe to take that step, which was its positive outcome. Similarly, in our time, the resurgence of Democracy, inspired by a new Humanism, will mark the triumph of the Russian Revolution. If that happens, the Western Bloc will be the home of the successful revolution of our time.

In contrast, what is the picture of the countries which have come directly under the sway of the Russian Revolution running into the backwaters of nationalist reaction? Communist totalitarianism has broken the spell of Utopia. The message is no longer of proletarian internationalism, but of Pan-Slavism, not of Communism, but of nationalist chauvinism. The Communist International has been substituted by an international of nationalists. It is a contradiction in terms—not only in theory; it has been proved to be so pragmatically. Hitler's European new order was to be such an incongruous structure. It went up in the flames of a war, proving that Fascism meant war. Fascism is only the most rabid form of nationalism. Communist nationalism is also most rabid. Therefore, it is also heading towards a war. That is the negative consequence of the Russian Revolution. Therefore, its positive outcome can

be felt and consolidated only outside the radius of its direct reach.

During the last quarter of a century, nationalism was preached in the backward countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans with the fanaticism of a religious dogma. Glorification of the legendary past was the theme not only of the text-books of history taught in schools. Literature and the periodical press also contributed to the popularisation of those fictitious glories. That atmosphere was naturally very congenial for the spread of the racial doctrines of Fascism. With the advent of that new cult, the nationalist hysteria in South-Eastern Europe was immensely aggravated. When, after the expulsion of the German invaders, these countries came under the domination of Communist Russia, they should have outgrown the antiquated cult of nationalism. The Marxists had all along been the most consistent critics of nationalism. They preached that the proletariat had no fatherland. Accordingly, Austrian Socialist leaders, like Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, advocated a programme of co-operation of the Danubian nations.

After the Russian Revolution, under Lenin's leadership, Communism took nationalism under its protecting wings. Stalin subsequently developed the idea, and was hailed as the prophet of a neo-nationalism. During the war, Pan-Slavism became the most prominent feature of Russian propaganda. The war which was to herald the world proletarian revolution was christened "The Patriotic War". It was forgotten that the purpose of this long anticipated war was to give the Red Army the opportunity to carry the banner of revolution to Europe. It was glorified as a war for the defence of the fatherland, though euphemistically still called "Socialist" or simply Soviet. To the countries of South-Eastern Europe, liberated from German Nazi domination, the victorious Red Army did not bring the message of international Communism, but the plan

of a confederation of the Slav nationalities under Russian leadership. Communist Russia replaced Nazi Germany as the patron of the nationalism of the backward peoples of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. While the Communist International was dissolved, Pan-Slav Congresses were held in Moscow during the war. The Communists played prominent parts in those Congresses. But the Pan-Slav Congress held in Belgrade in 1946, still on the initiative of the Communists and under the protection of the Red Army, had nothing of Communism. Racial slogans replaced class slogans. Instead of proclaiming the international proletariat as the creator and leader of the future, speaker after speaker preached the familiar slavophil doctrine that the Slav nations were morally superior to those of the West corrupted by the capitalist civilisation. They declared that Russia, not as the home of the first proletarian revolution, but as the leader of the specially gifted Slav race, was destined to save and regenerate the world. *

Even as revolutionary opportunism, the pandering to the nationalist vanity and chauvinism was a dangerous game. Parties opposed to Communism and Russia are

* The six-hundredth anniversary of the Charles University of Prague was celebrated a month after the communist *coup d'état*. Modelled after the classical University of Paris, the centre of learning and rationalist thought throughout the Middle-Ages, the University of Prague for centuries radiated the cosmopolitan spirit of the European culture. John Huss did not breathe any racial or nationalist spirit; he was a Bohemian by birth, but a disciple of John Wycliffe. The cosmopolitan tradition of the Prague University, which for centuries commemorated the heresy of Huss, ends with the triumph of Communism. Racial nationalism takes its place. On the eve of the anniversary, the Communist Minister of Education, Professor Zdenek Nejedly, declared that " the celebration will be Slavonic in character ".

On the same occasion, a conference of the Union of Czech Youth took place in Prague. In a message to the conference, the Communist Prime Minister said: " Together with the Soviet Union and the other Slav countries, there are 250 million of us. We are in the foreground of world history and progress as the builders of a new, higher and more humane social order. If ever our nation has re-approached its most glorious Hussite period, it is surely now." The complete absence of any reference to the role of the working class in the projected building of the new order under communist leadership is remarkable. Then, it is a gross falsification of history to seek in the cosmopolitan tradition of John Huss a sanction for communist nationalism.

more experienced in it. Previously, the leadership of nationalism, ideological as well as organisational, had come from the upper classes. It is difficult for governments relying upon the patronage of the Russian army of occupation to outbid the opposition in nationalist fanaticism and patriotic intolerance. If the latter are denounced as the agents of some far-off capitalist Power, the Communists and governments controlled by them are open to the same charge on more tangible grounds, because of their being subservient to Soviet power politics. * The nationalist degeneration of Communism is actually promoting a revival of Fascism.

At the same time, the contradictions of a nationalist international began to make themselves felt even before the incongruous organisation took any shape. The first instance was the dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia over Teschen; the second was the Czech-Hungarian conflict about the treatment of minorities; the third is the traditional enmity between the South-Slavs and Greece.

* Explaining the cause of the communist *coup d'état* in his country, Ivo Duchacek, who was chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czech Parliament, and escaped after that event, writes: "The dissolution of the Comintern a few years ago had everywhere united communist resistance with the national resistance during the invasions, and had brought the Communists within the national communities; it was to that that the rapid growth of the Communist Parties had been largely due, both in Eastern and in Western Europe. But two years after the war, the semi-independence which those parties had gained in each country had had results which Stalin himself had not perhaps foreseen. It had greatly increased their strength, but at the same time it had rendered them more accessible to the contagion of bourgeois chauvinism." (*Manchester Guardian*, March 11, 1948).

Nationalist degeneration threw the Communist Party of Roumania also in a severe crisis. Having captured for their "Front of People's Democracy" 405 out of 415 seats, with the now famous method of allowing the electorate the liberty to vote only for one list of candidates; the Communists declared that a proposal for the incorporation of Roumania into the Soviet Union would come up before the new Parliament in summer 1948. A section of the Communist Party represented by Patrascanu, who was the leader of the party during the war, and Minister of Justice in the post-war coalition government, seems to have taken seriously the propagandist insistence upon national sovereignty. It is reported that the redoubtable Madame Pauker (communist Foreign Minister) also sympathised with the "nationalist group". They opposed accession to the Soviet Union. Consequently, Patrascanu was dismissed from his post and arrested. His followers must have been treated in the same manner.

This last clash of nationalities threatens to precipitate a war in which Russia will be involved.

Nationalism, promoted and patronised by the Russians, has turned out to be a veritable Frankenstein. The leadership of resurrected nationalism is slipping out of the hands of the Communists. It is providing a popular platform to the reactionary elements opposed to communist-controlled regimes. The latter are compelled to rely more and more on terror, as evidenced by mass arrests and purges during the recent year. The result of this forced move is further alienation of popular sympathy. In such an atmosphere of distrust and political uncertainty, no economic reconstruction is possible. On the other hand, because of the doubtful privilege of being hitched on to Soviet planned economy, the backward agrarian countries of South-Eastern Europe are compelled to share the rigour of that system, which is subordinated to strategic considerations. So, under the Red Flag of revolution, those countries are experiencing retrogression in every sphere of existence. Economically, the position is hopeless; politically, it is highly explosive. Hence the Russian anxiety to isolate those countries from the rest of Europe, particularly, when the latter may soon be on the road to recovery.

Greece still remains the only weak spot in the outer bastions of the Russian power structure. The Russians, therefore, are determined to close it, and the Americans are equally resolved to hold the bridgehead. This struggle for power might still set off a conflagration which will in no time envelop the whole of Europe. If that dire eventuality can be avoided, then, though divided, Europe will have a breathing time. Economic reconstruction on the basis of the Marshall Plan will necessarily mitigate the absurdity of unlimited national sovereignty. A resurgent democracy, eschewing nationalism on the one hand, and freed from the spell of the collectivist utopia, on the other, will undertake the building of a new order of political

freedom, economic equality and social justice. At the same time, the home of the proletarian revolution, rechristened as the "Socialist Fatherland", with its outer bastions, will forego freedom, to march backwards under the tattered banner of the antiquated cult of nationalism, though fraudulently dyed red.

The experience of the Russian Revolution has exposed the fallacies of Marxism as a theoretical system and the non-liberating implications of Communism in practice. In order to be a turning point in the history of civilisation, the revolution of our time, therefore, will triumph not where it has created a new *status quo* of terror and voluntary slavery, spiritual regimentation and moral degradation; it will succeed as a resurgent democracy, passionately holding on to the ideal of freedom, undertaking the task of building a new order under the banner of a New Humanism.

Chapter XXVIII

REVOLUTION OR WAR?

The Russian refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan of European recovery split the continent into two camps. The ostensible reason for that negative attitude was concern for the national sovereignty of countries which, for their very physical existence, required the aid offered by America. The terms of the offer made it clear that there was no string attached to the aid. Nobody believed that it was selfless humanitarianism. Evidently and admittedly, it was a well calculated business proposition—a long-term investment. Expressly it was not a loan. Therefore, the offered financial aid could not possibly be an instrument for establishing America's political domination on the countries receiving it. They were to agree amongst themselves without any American intervention, about the ways and means of executing the plan of recovery. That most probably would mean some mutual compromise on the issue of national sovereignty in the sense of mitigating the extravagances of economic nationalism, which had done so much harm in the past. Thanks to that compromise, needed for the economic recovery of all, the war-torn continent would at last make a move in the desirable direction of a European Commonwealth.

It was curious for the Communists to be opposed to that welcome perspective on the lame excuse of championing national sovereignty. It was a lame excuse because, in the East-European countries under their occupation, the Russians did not act according to the principle which was their ostensible reason to oppose the plan of European recovery. It is an open secret that Poland and Czechoslovakia were coerced to stay away from the Paris Conference. In Hungary, a government returned in the previ-

ous election by an absolute majority had to be overthrown by a communist *coup d'état* with the patronage of the Red Army, because of the lure of the Truman doctrine. Even Roumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were not quite immune from the contagion; there also the screws of the Russian-protected communist dictatorship had to be tightened by suppressing whatever terrorised opposition was allowed to keep up a democratic show.

As against such a Soviet bloc formed to resist American Imperialism, sixteen nations of Western Europe voluntarily participated in the Paris Conference, and without any of them surrendering national sovereignty, agreed to act jointly for common recovery on the basis of the Marshall Plan. The division of Europe was an accomplished fact. But Germany still blurred the line of demarcation—politically as well as geographically. The Foreign Ministers' Conference met in London to settle the future of that unfortunate country. Molotov came there with a plan which, if accepted, would mean incorporation of Germany into the Soviet bloc. But in consequence thereof, the Red Flag of Communism, granted that it was still the emblem of the proletarian world revolution, would not fly along the Rhine. It would mean resurrection of German nationalism under Soviet patronage. A National-Communist Germany would rise out of the ruins of National-Socialism, as the spearhead of Russian expansionism. The Russian demand was: establishment of a centralised government for a united Germany, and withdrawal from Germany of all foreign forces. That appeared to be a very liberal attitude in contrast to the attitude of the other victorious Powers, who were accused by the Russians of a design to dismember Germany. Firstly, the Russian allegation was baseless. The British also stood for a united Germany, but preferred a federal structure to a highly centralised State, such as in no time would nullify the policy of demilitarisation.

There was disagreement amongst the Western Powers. France was inclined towards the breaking up of Germany into several weak States. Having regard for the fact that France had all along been the first prey of German aggressiveness and militarism, one could understand her point of view. But she could be persuaded to accept the plan of a united Germany, if the Russians agreed with the British proposal of a federal structure which, guaranteeing against the resurrection of Germany as an aggressive military Power, would allay the natural anxiety and fear on the part of France. As the only effective rival of Russia for the domination of Europe, America most probably wanted to consolidate the western half of Germany, politically and economically, under one central administration, having realised that the eastern and central parts occupied by the Red Army could not be detached from the Soviet bloc. But the American policy could be frustrated, if the Russians, British and French agreed on the plan of a united Germany with a federal structure, which would also have the support of German democratic opinion.

The constitution of a centralised German State as proposed by Molotov was virtually cast on the Hitlerian model. Germany did not become a formidable military power until she was united by Bismarck under Prussian domination. The Weimar Constitution restored the pre-Bismarckian federal structure—to be again destroyed by Hitler, who improved upon Bismarck by completely abolishing local autonomy. The Russians advocated a highly centralised State on that model. The plan would naturally appeal to German nationalism, which could therefore be expected to join the Eastern Bloc out of gratitude for the Russian patron. This pandering to the spiteful nationalism of a defeated people was extremely dangerous; the Russian policy was at least foolish, if it was not worse. The Russian plan to sway Germany by an appeal to nationalism had

been deliberately laid and matured steadily over a period of several years.

When military hostilities ceased, there were about two and a half million German prisoners of war in Russia. Few of them have returned to Germany. Not many could be absorbed in the Soviet zone, which had to accommodate the large influx of German emigres from Poland and Czechoslovakia. Some most probably are employed as labourers in the Soviet Union. But not a substantial number could be so absorbed without displacing Russians, causing large-scale unemployment. It is reported from various sources that the bulk of the German prisoners of war in Russia have been organised into a sizeable army of many divisions under two of Hitler's Marshals taken prisoners at Stalingrad—von Paulus and von Seydlitz. Presumably, the commanding cadre of the resurrected German army was provided by the League of German Officers formed in Moscow towards the end of the war. This practice of the Russians is reminiscent of the Prussian General von Seeckt keeping intact the officers corps of the Kaiser's army defeated in the first world war, with the aid and connivance of the Allied military mission. Subsequently, Hitler's Wehrmacht was built on that foundation.

The ghost-army of von Paulus and von Seydlitz must have sworn allegiance to Russia, if not conversion to Communism. Consequently, the Russians believe that, even as the resurrected Wehrmacht of German nationalism, it will be an instrument of their power-politics. The belief is further reinforced by the fact that a good deal of communist propaganda must have been done among the ordinary German soldiers. But Communism has of late been so much mixed up with nationalism that it is very doubtful whether, back home, the resurrected German army would still remain loyal to the new love, the exotic cause of National-Communism, or be carried away by the intoxicating idea of a Germany rising out of the ashes

with the might to avenge herself. In that case, the protégé of to-day may not in future remain even a grateful ally, but remember that the Red Army humiliated the German Wehrmacht.

There is another side to the background of the plausible Russian attitude towards Germany. It is to absorb the storm-troops of Hitler in the ranks of the army of the Proletarian World Revolution. In the Soviet zone of Germany, former Nazis, including many who held important positions in the Hitler regime, win exoneration simply by joining the Communist Party; and as members of the party patronised by the occupying Power, they occupy important positions in the new regime also. The Russian practice of creating this curious political amalgam naturally wins over the sympathy of former Nazis in the rest of Germany. There they may not be openly enrolled in the Communist Party, but will constitute a numerous and experienced fifth column in the enemy camp. This remarkable process again is reminiscent of a process in the reverse direction.

When Hitler came to power, there was vast defection from the ranks of the German Communist Party; hundreds and thousands went over to the Nazi Party, and millions of communist voters transferred their allegiance to the new regime. Berlin alone used to cast more than a million votes for the Communists. Therefore, right up to the eve of the Nazi victory, the Communists used to exclaim, not without justification, "Berlin remains Red". In 1932, ninety-eight per cent of the entire electorate voted for Hitler! Lack of principle, opportunism and cowardice seem to be common traits of the armies and camp-followers both of revolution and counter-revolution. Therefore they can be thrown into the curious political amalgam brewing under the Red Flag.

In the context of this policy—of resurrecting a large German army and rallying the demoralised Nazis under

the banner of Communism—it is easy to see the motive of the apparently very laudable Russian proposal that all foreign armies should be withdrawn from Germany upon the establishment of a centralised government. The ghost-army marking time somewhere behind the "iron curtain" will march in to fill the power-vacuum. With the votes of former Nazis and all others responding to the appeal of nationalism, the Communist Party, as the instrument of the Russian policy, will be returned by a majority. Power will be captured constitutionally. Thereafter, events will follow on a familiar pattern, and the whole of Germany incorporated in the Soviet bloc—to be its powerful spear-head. There is, however, a flaw in this beautiful dream and sinister strategy of revolution: the spearhead may be the boomerang. The fact that the Red Flag is no longer the emblem of revolution is the only guarantee against the danger for the Russians.

Tracing in its report published in autumn 1947 this ominous development of Russian expansionist policy, the "International Committee for the Study of the European Question" observed: "Conscious of the fact that the Germans remain profoundly nationalistic as in the past, the Soviet Government seems determined from now on to appeal above all to the nationalist feelings of Germany... The Soviet authorities have succeeded in rendering their zone of occupation dependent on Russia, both politically and economically; this zone can in fact be used now as a bulwark against, or as a spring-board towards, the West." The possibility of the report being malicious anti-Soviet propaganda was excluded by the fact that Edouard Herriot was among its signatories. For many years, Herriot was the most outstanding of the non-communist friends and supporters of the Soviet Union.

While the Russian policy of indefinitely blocking the peace treaty with Germany, unless it was according to the Molotov proposals, compelled the Western Powers to

act independently, the latter were vociferously denounced for splitting Germany. The non-communist parties which accepted the Anglo-American proposal of setting up a central administration for Western Germany were accused by the communist press of treachery to the German nation; their leaders were branded as Quislings—"traitors to the Fatherland". The press organ of the Russian Military Administration in Germany denounced all non-communist party leaders as "reactionaries, representatives of German Imperialism and militarism"! Taking the cue from the Russians, the central press organ of the Communist-controlled Socialist Unity Party fulminated: "The struggle for the maintenance of German unity can be won only after the sharpest reckoning with these Quislings." At the same time, the culmination of Soviet policy was forecast by Colonel Nazorov of the Russian Military Administration of Germany, who early in January 1948 declared that "in foreseeable time there will be only one occupying Power in Berlin". Since the Western Powers have no intention of packing up so that a Russian-sponsored Central Government for the whole of Germany may be set up in Berlin, Nazorov's declaration is a notice for the Western Powers to quit. As they are not likely to do so, it is a declaration of war.

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The successful Paris Conference of sixteen nations agreeing to work the Marshall Plan of European recovery forced the hand of the Soviet Government to abandon the tactics of temporising with the hope that an early economic crisis would compel America to leave Europe to its fate and to the mercy of Russia. The newly orientated Russian policy struck out in two directions: revival of the Communist International, and consolidation of the communist dictatorship in all the countries of the Soviet zone. While the purpose of the latter was to provide a reliable base for an offensive move in Germany, the former was

to direct operations inside the camp of the enemy, to disrupt and disorganise it. Russia hit out also in another direction.

In order to avoid a clash with America in the Far East, Russia had not allowed the Chinese Communist Party to precipitate a large-scale civil war immediately upon the surrender of Japan. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1946 amounted to a betrayal of the Chinese Communists by their Russian patrons. Taking advantage of the Russian anxiety to go slow in China, Chiang Kai-shek went over to the offensive against the Communists who were driven out of their stronghold in Yenan. They withdrew into Manchuria, where military supplies from Siberia could more easily reach them whenever they would again be ordered to move forward. The order came in the autumn of 1947, when Russia, reacting to the Marshall Plan of European recovery, decided to strike out in all directions. The Communist offensive in Manchuria, which has been steadily driving Chiang Kai-shek's armies out of one strategic position after another, is a Russian second front against America. The whole of Manchuria and the northern half of Korea may be soon incorporated in the vast Eurasian territory ruled from Moscow. But that again will not mean march of the Proletarian World Revolution, but a fatal plunge into another world war. America will fight Russia in the Far East to the last Chinese. Heavily engaged there, Russia will be stopped in Europe. American strategy is also to open a second front against Russia in the Far East. While the American Congress is still delaying actual financial aid to Europe, there is no delay in the case of China. In addition to all manner of assistance (financial credit, war materials, experts for training a modern army, etc.) given to Chiang Kai-shek's government in the past, a proposal to help nationalist China with another 600 million dollars is being rushed through the Congress.

Urging the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee to expedite the matter, General Chennault, who came to Washington for the purpose, said: "China's enormous population could furnish almost unlimited man power for military operations, if properly trained, equipped and supplied... When these facts are given proper weight as strategical factors in any future war, it is not difficult to understand why Russia would not voluntarily launch an offensive in Europe so long as China remains uncommunised. Nor should it be hard to understand why a third world war is improbable if China remains our friend and ally. Siberia, east of Lake Baikal, could be isolated from the remainder of Russia by air attacks launched from Chinese airfields. Bombers operating from Chinese airfields in West China are within a much closer range of Russian industrial areas. Failure to provide adequate aid to China at this time will constitute the greatest failure of American foreign policy in all our history, and will inevitably set the stage for World War III." General Chennault knows his China well, and speaks from personal experience. He commanded the "American Volunteer Air Force" in China in the earlier years of the war and then retired from the army to be the head of a commercial airline in the Far East. A few days later, the Secretary of State announced: "American property in the Pacific estimated at 500 million dollars will be transferred to China by the end of June." The property is surplus war material. Evidently, America means business in China. Russia may be allowed to seize the whole of Manchuria through the intermediary of the Chinese Communists. That will not be a great loss, because Manchuria has been virtually under Russian occupation since the collapse of Japan. But any further advance southwards will meet stronger resistance. The Russo-American struggle for power will aggravate the civil war in China, causing incalculable loss of life and endless misery for the Chinese people.

However, no diversion in the Far East can compel America to withdraw from Europe, and thus frustrate the Marshall Plan of recovery. The issue must be joined in Europe. Any aggressive move in Germany, to be successful, must be synchronised by similar actions in Italy and France. But the hands of the Communist Parties in those key countries were tied by their participation in coalition governments, a policy adopted on Russian advice. The revival of the Communist International marked a definite break with that wise and realistic policy, which, if pursued with skill, perseverance and farsightedness, might have enabled Russia to take a large share in the leadership of the post-war democratic Europe; and consequently, the Napoleonic stage of the Russian Revolution would have opened up an era of greater political freedom and social progress, instead of creating a highly inflammable international situation fraught with the danger of yet another world war.

The dissolution of the Communist International in 1943 raised the hope that the Russian Revolution might lead up to a process of peaceful social reconstruction and widening of the frontiers of freedom. The experience of a whole generation having demonstrated that revolution on the Russian model could not succeed in our time, in any European country, and that any attempt to disregard the lesson of contemporary history was more likely to play in the hands of reaction by precipitating a war, it was hoped that the Communists would see the wisdom of giving up the sterile road to insurrection and strike out a new way to revolution, which held out the promise of attracting many others who were also striving for the ideal of an equalitarian economic order and social justice. Stalin personally is known to have advocated continued co-operation with the Western Democracies even after the defeat of Germany; and co-operation presupposed appreciation of their point of view and readiness to make concessions

to it. In an interview with the Secretary of the British Labour Party as late as summer 1947, he admitted that there might be more than one road to Socialism, and revolution need not necessarily take place everywhere on the Russian model. It is also an open secret that there was a struggle inside the Russian Communist Party on the issue of the attitude towards the Western Democracies. The aggressive point of view, dressed up as uncompromising adherence to the doctrine of revolutionary capture of power, seemed to have gained the upper hand during Stalin's absence due to illness. On his return, he had to give up his position unless he was prepared to surrender the leadership of the party. It seems that he stooped to conquer; only, in reality, it was a surrender not to the advocates of world revolution, but of Russian expansionism. The Red Army had tasted blood and captured the soul of the party, which had been militarised through and through during the war; Communism itself had degenerated into nationalism. In course of the war and after it, Communism became a camouflage for Pan-Slavism.

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The repercussion of the Truman doctrine and of the more tempting Marshall Plan of European recovery even in the countries of the Balkans and Eastern Europe alarmed the Russians. The position of the Russians even in those countries occupied by the Red Army was not quite secure. The foundation of the power-structure must be consolidated. None but the Communists could be relied upon in an emergency. One cannot go halfway. If co-operation with all democratic forces was honestly meant, then there was no reason why the practice should be confined only to Eastern Europe. The negative attitude towards the Marshall Plan meant that the Russians would not practise the policy of co-operation with the democratic forces of Western Europe. The dishonesty of the democratic profession was exposed. The non-communist parties in the

countries occupied by the Red Army realised that they had been duped. There was no sense for the Russians to continue the camouflage of co-operating with them. They were emasculated by the arrest, imprisonment or execution of their leaders, a few of whom found safety in timely flight from their countries. Governments still nominally coalitions came under complete communist domination, became thinly veiled dictatorships. The ruthless process culminated in the revival of the Communist International.

In September 1947, delegates of the Communist Parties of nine European countries including Russia met in a secret conference at Warsaw, and resolved to set up an international bureau to co-ordinate and guide their activities. There would be nothing very remarkable if the countries concerned were Russia and her satellites. The governments of those countries all acted anyhow according to a common policy dictated by Russia. The significant fact was the presence of French and Italian delegates at the Warsaw Conference. Their presence was explained in a statement issued after the conference. The document called upon all Communist Parties to take up "the banner of defence of their national independence and the sovereignty of their countries in the struggle against the current economic and political plundering by the imperialist anti-democratic bloc led by the U.S.A." So, the Warsaw Conference, and the International Communist Bureau set up by it, marked the opening of an offensive against the Marshall Plan of European recovery. According to communist theory, continued chaos, economic disorganisation and political instability are the preconditions for revolution; any attempt to help the recovery of Europe, therefore, was reactionary, and as such, must be opposed by the advocates of revolution. But the Communist Parties of the Balkan and Eastern European countries could not do anything to frustrate the Marshall Plan, because, under Russian pressure, they had excluded themselves from its

purview. The revolutionary duty must be discharged by the French and Italian Communists. Their delegates were invited to Warsaw to take orders.

The resolution of the conference strongly criticised the "weaknesses" of the Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union. The rebuke, though general ostensibly, was meant for the French and Italian Communists. They were told by the Russian delegate Zhdanov that they were intimidated to make futile concessions to Imperialism, because they underestimated their own strength and overestimated that of the enemy. As the most uncompromising champions of the nationalist interest of their respective countries, they were compelled to pursue policies which could not be reconciled and consolidated. The Italian Communists, for example, opposed the demands of Tito's Yugoslavia as regards Trieste. When the French Communist theoretician, Duclos, criticised the attitude of the Italian Communist Party, the leader of the latter, Togliatti, snubbed him with the remark that he was pretending to be the Secretary of the Communist International, forgetting that it had been dissolved. This confusion of communist politics was the doing of the Russians. They had directed the Communists to act as the champions of nationalism.

To become effective spearheads of the revolutionary struggle against European recovery, the Communists in the two pivotal countries, France and Italy, must act in unison; their activities must be co-ordinated and guided from an international centre. In 1943, the Communist International was dissolved on the ground that the Communist Parties of the different countries had attained majority, and therefore no longer required the helping hand of Russia through the medium of an international organisation. Four years later, their immaturity, their failure to act correctly without guidance, provided the reason for the revival of the Communist International! As a matter of fact, it was an emergency measure. The

Communist Parties of France and Italy were ordered to go back on the policy of co-operating with the democratic forces, and get out of the coalition governments to regain freedom of action. They must engineer mass strikes and demonstrations with the object of dislocating the economic life and creating a political chaos in their respective countries, so that there could be no stable governments to co-operate in the plan of European recovery with the aid of America. Without France and Italy, the plan was bound to fail; the distress and despair of the peoples of Western Europe would aggravate; and conditions would be ripe for the Communists to capture power.

That was communist strategy in France in the autumn of 1947. But it proved to be a fiasco. The general strike which was to pull down the coalition governments (without the Communists) headed by Socialist Ramadier, and most probably meant to be the signal for an armed insurrection, had to be called off because the majority of the workers refused to leap in the dark at the behest of the Communists. The latter not only controlled the trade-unions, but had at their disposal large secret dumps of arms and ammunitions. Yet they failed in the attempt to seize power by the classical revolutionary method. They beat a strategic retreat before it was too late. Had they acted more rashly, as their confrères in Germany had done in 1930, they would have almost certainly afforded De Gaulle the opportunity for which he was marking time. Seventeen years ago, the Communists had done a similar service to Hitler. Acclaimed as the saviour of France, De Gaulle would have stepped in the political vacuum created by the fall of the Ramadier Government, and communist resistance would have led to a civil war which, under the given international situation, would precipitate another world war. The Red Army was still too far away to move in promptly. Instead of revolution, counter-revolution would have triumphed in France. All these obvious considerations must have per-

suaded the Communists to hold back, of course, waiting for the next chance. That was nevertheless a severe blow to their prestige.

In Italy also, about the same time, the Communists made a similar effort, and there did go to the extent of throwing armed workers' batallions in action in the streets of Rome and some other industrial cities. The result was equally negative. Since then, in both the countries, the tide appeared to turn against the Communists. Thereupon, the Russians revised their strategy of revolution. The attempt of a frontal attack by the advance-guard in France and Italy having failed, they decided to fall back upon the base, preparatory to mounting a fresh offensive against a more vulnerable sector of the enemy's line. The preparation was to be consolidation of the base, politically as well as militarily.

The Red Army was marking time to the east of the line from Stettin to Trieste, running through Berlin and the industrial centres of Central Germany. Militarily, the advance line was quite secure. It was reinforced by Marshal Tito's army which commanded the east coast of the Adriatic, ready to pounce upon Italy whenever the signal was given. Political security of the base, as preparatory to a resumption of the Napoleonic strategy of the revolution, required a clear break with the previous policy of the Communists co-operating with non-communist parties in the Balkan and East-European countries where they were still not sufficiently strong. During two years of Russian occupation, owing to the fact that, though in minority, thanks to the patronage of the occupying power, they could capture all the strategic positions in the State machinery, Communists acquired a disproportionately large share of power. Consequently, they could not only suppress all opposition, but also terrorise their "allies" to submission. Nominal coalition governments were transformed into virtual communist dictatorships. Having

thus entrenched themselves in power, communist minorities went over to the offensive in the summer of 1947. President Truman's declaration that America would help Greece, Turkey and other countries to resist communist aggression, provided a plausible pretext. The blow struck Hungary and Bulgaria almost simultaneously. The story of the communist coup in the former country has been told in a previous chapter. Equally outrageous events in Bulgaria did not attract so much attention of the outside world because, headed by Dimitrov, the "Fatherland Front" government there was a virtual communist dictatorship. There was not much of democracy to be suppressed, nor an elected majority to be driven out of office by perfidious manœuvres and illegal, unscrupulous and violent acts. In Bulgaria, the liquidation of the "conspirators against the Fatherland", therefore, was not so spectacular.

The opposition leader Nikola Petkov was suddenly arrested on June 5th in the parliament building. Within a week, all his twenty-three followers were deprived of their seats in the parliament. Petkov was subsequently executed. As a prominent leader of the war-time resistance movement, he was very popular throughout the country. The Agrarian Party, led by him, joined the Fatherland Front when it was formed in 1944. Petkov was one of the five founder-members of the Executive Committee of the new organisation, and became the Deputy Prime Minister. Soon serious differences arose between his party and the Communists. In August 1946, Petkov with his Agrarian colleagues resigned from the coalition government. In the election of November 1946, the Communists captured sixty per cent of the seats in the parliament. The election was far from being free. That was the opinion of all foreign journalists on the spot. Here are some of the facts which supported the opinion.

The Communists applied terror tactics not only against the opposition, but also against their allies in the Fatherland

Front. The Social-Democratic Party was not allowed to carry on any election campaign in the countryside, and Bulgaria is an overwhelmingly agrarian country. Kimon Georgiev, who was the Prime Minister at that time, was the leader of the Republican Party, until then the most influential and best organised party. It was the most persecuted. Practically all the members of its Executive Committee were debarred from standing for election to the parliament. Their candidature was rejected by the communist-controlled local committees of the Fatherland Front. Those who were fortunate enough to pass that initial test, were prevented by the communist militia even to visit their constituencies. General Velchev, who was War Minister before the election, also belonged to the Republican Party. He was supported by a large majority of the officers' corps. The Republican officers commanded the Bulgarian army against the Germans in Yugoslavia and Hungary. During the election campaign, more than two-hundred senior Republican officers were arrested, including General Stanchev, Commander-in-Chief of the First Army, and his Chief of Staff, General Gurchev. All the arrested officers were known for their participation in the resistance movement during the German occupation. General Stanchev, for example, led the guerillas and the insurgent army who captured Sofia from the Germans. Moreover, all the arrested officers had received high Soviet military decorations for having helped the advance of the Red Army in the Balkans. General Velchev resigned to protest against the arbitrary arrest of his supporters. The retaliation was dismissal of practically all the non-communist officers of the army.

In summer 1947, communist dictatorship in Roumania was also tightened by mass arrests. Even in Yugoslavia, where communist rule was firmly established, the feeble opposition was destroyed by the arrest of its leader, Yovanovitch, and other prominent figures.

Of the eight countries in the Soviet zone, only two, Czechoslovakia and Finland, had up to the summer of 1947 remained democratic, though there also the Communists occupied important positions in coalition governments. Czechoslovakia particularly was frankly anxious to retain her traditional relation with Western Europe, while honestly admitting the necessity of a close alliance with Russia. Consequently, she was regarded as the only bridge over the widening gulf between the Communist dominated East and the democratic West of Europe. With 118 seats in a parliament of 306, the Communists held the key post of the Prime Minister and several other important positions in the coalition Cabinet, including the Ministry of the Interior. Nevertheless, the sober guidance of President Benes, ably reinforced by Jan Masaryk, kept the balance, and the political life of the country appeared to run smoothly until the conflict of ideas and ideals broke out in the open in June 1947.

Together with Poland, Czechoslovakia accepted the invitation to the Paris Conference on the Marshall Plan. The Russians put their foot down, and the Czechoslovak Government was coerced to stay away from the Conference. Even after the Communist Prime Minister returned from Moscow with the order, there was a violent disagreement inside the Cabinet. But for the anxiety of the Social-Democratic Ministers to prevent a break-down of the coalition and the consequent political crisis, by a majority vote the Cabinet would have disregarded the Russian wish, and stood by the original decision to attend the Paris Conference. A crisis was avoided, and the Russians had their way. But the controversy and the humiliation of the non-communist Ministers did not remain a secret. Suppressed indignation at the Communist high-handedness broke out in public throughout the country. Socialist, liberal and Catholic party leaders publicly spoke against the doctrine of a rounded up Slav Bloc, and maintained the

importance of the western orientation. In the non-communist press, there was growing criticism of the Communist Party, though not of Russia. Public activities of the non-Communist parties, mass meetings and demonstrations attracted larger and larger crowds. The opposition to the Communist policy was the most pronounced, naturally, in the countryside. All those facts indicated that the Communists were losing ground in spite of their control of the trade-unions and also the open secret that they had hidden stores of arms. In view of the coming election in spring of the next year, the Russians could not be unmindful of the development. Czechoslovakia undoubtedly was the only chink in their armour. It must be closed up to complete the consolidation of the advance base of the Red Army. The ruthless process of clamping Communist dictatorships on the countries occupied by Russia culminated in the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia early in February 1948.

The first shot of the campaign, however, was fired as early as July of the previous year, when in a public speech the Communist Prime Minister denounced "the Fascist elements in Slovakia". That sudden outburst, obviously provoked by the spreading discontent against the Communists, was regarded by close observers as heralding events on the Hungarian pattern. The tenseness of the situation aggravated owing to hitches in the negotiations of the trade treaty with Russia.

Non-co-operation with the Marshall Plan of European recovery was bound to be economically disadvantageous for Czechoslovakia. In 1947, the bulk of the country's foreign trade was with the U.S.A. and Britain. Russia occupied the sixth place in her export list and sixteenth in the import list. Interruption of that trade relation would mean financial difficulty for Czechoslovakia, who, in future, would have to rely almost entirely on native resources for reconstruction. The experience of two years,

since the country's inclusion in the Slav Bloc, had proved that the members of the Bloc, including Russia, could neither supply all the raw material required by Czechoslovakia nor absorb her export of manufactured goods. When Russia demanded non-participation in the Marshall Plan Conference, the Czechoslovak Government must have pointed out these difficulties. Russia offered a long-term trade treaty which would enable Czechoslovakia to overcome economic difficulties apprehended as consequence of non-participation in the plan for European recovery. But the terms stipulated by the Czechoslovak delegation were not acceptable to the Russians. The negotiations dragged on for months causing misgivings and discontent in Czechoslovakia. By the end of the year, she received practically none of the goods originally offered by Russia. As for example, of the promised 200,000 tons each of wheat and fodder not more than 10,000 tons actually came before the end of the year, and that also from Hungary. The feeling that Communist policy was doing them harm naturally spread in Czechoslovakia. The Communists, also naturally, were alarmed by the almost certainty of a serious setback in the coming election, if the situation was allowed to deteriorate from their point of view.

Czechoslovakia, indeed, was the weakest spot in the advance base of the Red Army. Jutting out as a salient into the heart of Germany, its strategical importance was great. To secure it, therefore, was a vital part of the revised strategy of revolution—or the Third World War.

The Government of Czechoslovakia was a coalition of four parties. The economic and financial difficulties created by the Communist policy prescribed from Moscow and the resulting wide-spread discontent and the terroristic methods of the Communist Minister of Interior to suppress it caused growing divergence of opinion inside the Cabinet. The crisis brewing under the surface ever since Czecho-

slovakia was coerced to isolate herself from the western democratic world, broke out in the open when, at the end of February 1948, all the Ministers (except the Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk) belonging to the two non-Marxist parties, resigned.* In the beginning, President Benes

* The Cabinet crisis was apparently due to a disagreement on the question of nationalisation. Ministers belonging to Dr. Benes' party, together with other non-Marxist members of the Cabinet, opposed the Communist demand for the nationalisation of all wholesale business and of all private enterprise employing more than 50 workers. The *Manchester Guardian* correspondent at Prague reported : " The right wing opposed these measures and seems to have gained a considerable amount of support in the country. The membership of the Democrats and the Conservatives increased rapidly in the last few months in Bohemia, Moravia as well as Slovakia ; the publication and sale of anti-Communist literature mounted noticeably; and the disappointment which many Czechs felt for their non-participation in the Marshall Plan was voiced more and more openly in the atmosphere of relative freedom which Czechoslovakia still enjoyed. The circumstances were undoubtedly most opportune for the non-communist parties to press for early elections. Accordingly, in order to force the issue, the two right-wing parties rejected the nationalisation policy and requested the Communist Prime Minister Gottwald to submit the draft of a Constitution. The Communists' reply was to proceed, in spite of the lack of Government agreement, with their plans. The crisis came into the open when at a Cabinet meeting on February 17th the Democrats asked the Communist Minister of the Interior to explain the transfer of certain anti-communist police officials from the Czech capital. Nosek dismissed these transfers as routine measures, and in turn went on to charge the right-wing parties with collaboration with Britain and America and with General Anders. Asked for evidence and an open trial, the Communists proposed an adjournment of the Cabinet until February 20th. Without waiting, however, for that day, Communist headquarters immediately sent out secret instructions to all its members to prepare for the taking over of factories and to get ready for a general strike on February 21st. The instructions included an assurance that the Communists had the fullest support of Russia. On the same day, armed workers began to guard most factories in Prague and tension began to rise in the town as the Communists announced that they would not give way on nationalisation. It was in these circumstances that the last meeting of the Coalition Government took place on February 20th. By that time, the choice before the non-Communist members was to bow before the Communist show of strength or to resign in the hope of forcing a general election. They chose the latter, a last desperate gamble. Benes must have been aware of the inevitable consequences, if he had accepted their resignations. He left Prague without a division."

In course of time, more details about the background of the Czech crisis came to the notice of the outside world. Ivo Duchacek, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak Parliament, who escaped from his country after the Communist *coup d' état*, in an article in the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: " The crisis did not reach its peak until February, 1948, but it began in July, 1947, on the day when the American suggestion, which later became known as the Marshall Plan, was unanimously accepted by a government that regarded itself as free. Just then, moreover, President Benes had sent a personal letter to Mr. Stalin expressing his country's desire to renew a political and military

declined to accept their resignation and earnestly advised the Communist Prime Minister to maintain the National Front, so that a broad-based democratic government could be possible. But the Prime Minister forced the issue by appointing new Ministers to fill up the vacancies and pressing the President to give his approval to the reorganised Cabinet. Evidently, the President gave in under duress.* Because, when the Communist Prime Minister called upon the President to present his new Cabinet, heavily armed police squads, reinforced by the Communist militia carrying brand-new weapons of all kinds, paraded the streets of Prague. Thereafter, the President no longer appeared in public except at the funeral of Jan Masaryk, who had

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alliance with France. It was a bold step! A government delegation made up of Mr. Gottwald, Prime Minister, Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister, and Prokop Drtina, Minister of Justice, went to Moscow to discuss economic relations between Russia and Czechoslovakia, also the Franco-Czech treaty. They were icily received. Stalin and Molotov were driven to explain personally to the Czechoslovaks that it was incumbent on them to pay less attention to American credits, Egyptian cotton and Swedish iron ore than to Slav solidarity in the face of the danger of American Imperialism. Stalin himself said plainly to Jan Masaryk that the Prague Government's first decision was incompatible with the Russo-Czech alliance, and demanded, by a veritable ultimatum, that the Prague Government should rescind its decision before 4 p.m. on that very day. It did not escape Stalin and Molotov that the Czechoslovak Communists themselves, under the pressure of their non-Communist colleagues, and specially under the weight of the realities of their country's economic life, would have been glad to benefit by the Marshall Plan, if they had been free agents. The Czechs, the only true Russophils among all the peoples of Central Europe, had suddenly appeared to the Kremlin to be contaminated by bourgeois nationalism. It had become clearly necessary to set the Communist house in order in Europe. That is why, on September 28th, 1947, the Cominform was set up. And Czechoslovakia, where the Communist Party had shown itself to be so corrupted by purely national interest, was the first to be hauled before Communism's international tribunal."

* In the direction issued by the Communist headquarters, it was mentioned that the actions proposed therein had the full support of Russia. Two days before the direction was issued, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Zorin, had reached Prague. On February 18th, he had an interview with President Benes to discuss the political situation. Gottwald and Masaryk were present at the interview. According to the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Prague, "Zorin is reported to have advised Benes to agree to Gottwald's demands in the interests of Czechoslovakia, and to have threatened the President with the occupation of his country by the Red Army in case of any disturbance." After the interview, President Benes left Prague, to return on February 23rd and find the capital practically controlled by Communist armed guards. "The following day, in order to avoid bloodshed, and with it the probable occupation

committed suicide some days later.* The Ministry of Information gave out the news that Dr. Benes was ill, having complete rest at his country residence on medical advice. But the patient somehow managed to let the world know that he was not ill. His silence, therefore, was imposed. Even on such a solemn occasion as Masaryk's funeral, he did not say a word, undoubtedly because he could not speak out his heart.

Not only was the central government purged under a threat of violence; Communist Action Committees sprang up overnight throughout the countryside to supersede the local authorities. The Central Action Committee, with headquarters in Prague, functioned as the Shadow Cabinet or the super-government. The policy of the new regime was outlined in a statement issued by it on February 28th: "It is absolutely necessary to purge the political parties of the enemies of popular democracy. Only those party organs which have been approved by Action Committees can carry on political activities. All public life will be concentrated in the National Front. The decisions of the organs of the National Front will be binding on all, including the political parties."

The Communists justified their "bloodless" revolution with the following argument: The country had been committed to a socialist programme; but the two non-

of Czech territory by the Red Army, Benes accepted the resignation of the twelve Ministers and agreed to the formation of a new government under Gottwald." (*Manchester Guardian*).

* In an interview granted to an English visitor, the day before his alleged suicide, Jan Masaryk "did not give the impression of a desperate man." His one wish expressed on that occasion was to "attend some conference in London soon". Presumably, he was looking out for an opportunity to get out of the country. According to the English visitor, Masaryk was a virtual prisoner during the last days of his life. He was suddenly removed to the Czerninski Palace which had never been his residence before. There he was given an entirely new staff and was not allowed to see any visitor alone. According to all reliable reports, it appears that he put up with all the indignity with the sole object of making a bold declaration in the Parliament to meet a few days later. That was the only remaining chance for him to speak out. In that situation, others would be more anxious to send him out of this world than he himself.

Marxist parties in the coalition were stubbornly and systematically obstructing the policy of the government; as the last resort, they took to actual plotting with the object of overthrowing the established regime. The policy of the new regime, framed on the basis of this unsubstantiated premise, logically led to the suppression of all non-Communist parties except small groups and few individuals who either succumbed to terrorism or to the selfish desire of being on the winning side. In the beginning, Masaryk appeared to belong to this category of weak and selfish men. The world was puzzled. But careful observers did not fail to notice a highly significant incident which occurred immediately after the change of government. Masaryk's deputy in the Foreign Office was a Communist who has since succeeded him. He availed of the first opportunity to tell the world that the purpose of the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia was to consolidate the Eastern Bloc. In a message to the French Communist daily *Humanité* he announced: "We have the intention within the next few weeks of completing our system of alliances by signing treaties, particularly with Bulgaria and Roumania." Masaryk lost no time to disown the policy proclaimed by his Deputy. In an interview to the correspondent of another Parisian journal *L'Ordre*, he declared: "Czechoslovakia is, and remains, a Democratic State which wishes lasting peace. We do not wish Europe to be divided in two camps." Presumably, Masaryk hoped that the Communists would not push things so far, and therefore took up the attitude of wait and watch. His eventual suicide was symbolic: alliance with the incorrigible addicts to an amoral, unscrupulous, ruthless, attitude to life dooms the defenders of the values of modern civilisation to disillusionment, despair and self-destruction.

Masaryk's tragic end naturally had no influence on his ruthless allies. The "bloodless" revolution marched on, backed up by the brandishing of mailed fists, organised

terrorism and systematic suppression of all liberty. The entire legal system of the land was radically changed by executive orders; electoral laws particularly had to be thoroughly revised to ensure a Communist victory in the coming election. "People's Tribunals" sprang up to supersede the legally constituted courts. Armed communist militia was the sanction of the new organs of justice. All and sundry denounced by the all-powerful Action Committees as "reactionaries and enemies of the people", were hauled up before the "People's Tribunals", no longer to be tried, but to be summarily dealt with. Who cares for justice when prosecutors and judges belong to the same camp?

Within less than a month, all the non-communist political parties were rendered totally incapable of participating in the coming election effectively, even if they were formally allowed to do so. Their leaders were deprived of their parliamentary immunity on the charge of "conspiracy" and "treason". Socialists, Democrats, Social-Democrats, were all treated alike.*

How the "bloodless" revolution was carried through and the perspective it opened up, were quite frankly described by a member of the new government, Zdenek Fierlinger, a Social-Democrat who was Prime Minister before the Communist Gottwald took over charge, and Minister of Industries in the new Cabinet. In an interview to the correspondent of the London *Daily Herald,* granted a few days after the *coup d'état,* Fierlinger, answering a

* The election took place in May 1948. The electorate was to vote for or against one single list of candidates, nominated by the National Front dominated by the Communists, who had captured complete control of the State machinery. A few non-Communists were included in the list. But the Communist-dominated government made it clear through their election propaganda that not to vote for the single list of candidates or even to abstain from voting, would be regarded as " unpatriotic ", and punishable as hostility to the established régime. It was a typical Hitler election ; about 90 p. c. of the electorate voted (under compulsion) for the single list. Yet, the number of blank ballot papers reached the million mark, and equally as many did not vote.

number of pointed questions, said: "No political pressure was put on the non-Marxist parties, but, of course, they had to recognise the lesson of mass demonstrations. The opposition could not go against the current. In a sense, parliamentary democracy will continue, but, of course, we shall have to see that no liberalistic ideas can interfere with our planning a new system. We shall try to leave the press as free as possible, but there must be certain control. We cannot afford the full freedom of press. We are now at war—a war to maintain peace and build Socialism. Although we want peace, we are prepared to fight if attacked; but we shall have no fifth column here. We need a Social-Democratic Party for those who dislike Communist discipline and interpret Marxism differently. But, of course, it must collaborate very closely with the Communists. The elections may be postponed. I do not know whether an opposition party will be allowed; at present all parties are united in the National Front, and there is no opposition."

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The clamping of Communist dictatorship on Czechoslovakia was a provocation for the democratic world. Previously, when similar events had taken place in other countries of Eastern Europe, the Western Powers either remained silent or made mild protests singly. In the case of Czechoslovakia, something unprecedented happened. Within forty-eight hours, America, Britain and France issued a joint communiqué declaring that the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia "places in jeopardy the very existence of the principles of liberty to which all democratic nations are attached." The latest Communist move was regarded as the signal for a general offensive. The object was Germany. Once the heart of Europe was captured, the rest would follow without much difficulty. With the Czechoslovak hinterland secured, the Russian Army in Saxony could make a swift move to cut off

Berlin from Western Germany. The Western Powers, in that eventuality, might not be able to stop the Russian mechanised steam-roller. But the Russians would not gain much from that risky adventure, risky because it was as likely as not to precipitate a war. And with the whole of Western Germany, including the industrial Ruhr Valley of great strategic importance, still under their control, the Western Powers could not be easily defeated.

The Russian offensive, opened with the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia, is more likely to develop as an encircling movement. Austria can be easily absorbed in the Soviet zone. No American resistance need be apprehended there. The Bavarian outpost of the American Army in Europe is too far away from the Atlantic coast. The problem of transport and supply would be difficult of solution. A successful Russian move in Austria will have a strong repercussion in Italy, greatly enhancing the chances of the Communist Party in the election to be held in April 1948. If the Communists won the election in Italy, the tidal wave might sweep France also. Then Germany would be isolated, and the time come for the Red Army to march towards the Rhine.

But it cannot simply be taken for granted that the Red Flag, whether still as the emblem of international Communism or of Russian expansionism, will be easily planted on the Rhine, *en route* to the Atlantic coast. The Americans will not give up Europe without a fight. And even if the Russians did reach the Rhine without meeting much resistance, their reaching that far would result in a war. In Italy, the Communists may win the election and establish themselves in power with the help of Marshal Tito's army swiftly crossing the Adriatic, before the Americans can make any counter-move. If that happened, the spectre of Communism would most probably drive France into the embrace of De Gaulle. A Fascist France, reinforced by Franco's Spain, would provide America with

a sufficiently broad and deep base of large-scale military operations in Europe.

The Americans are frankly alarmed by the ominous march of events in Europe. They also are feverishly preparing for a war which may break out before the year is over. They have all along been preparing for the eventuality. But for obvious reasons, they were reluctant to precipitate the show-down. Firstly, notwithstanding the rising anti-Red and anti-Soviet hysteria, systematically whipped up in the U.S.A., not many Americans would voluntarily go over to Europe to fight the anti-Communist crusade. Secondly, it takes time to gear up the slow-moving wheels of a Democratic State to the requirements of a large-scale mechanised war. Thirdly, a people not habituated to regimentation demands a good deal of persuasion and inciting propaganda to subject themselves to the total mobilisation necessary for such a war. In contrast, the U.S.S.R. has a large, well-equipped army actually in the field, marking time for the marching order. According to the latest reports, it is six times as large as the American Army, only a fraction of which is still in Europe. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. is not handicapped by the formalities of a slow-moving democratic machinery. The given relation of forces being so very favourable to them, it is only natural for Russians to fall for the temptation of taking advantage of it by precipitating the final clash of arms, which they believe to be inevitable. Otherwise, Russian foreign policy since summer of 1947 cannot be explained. It is no longer a strategy of revolution, but is deteriorating into provocation for a war.

* * *

Finland is the second country in the Soviet zone of influence where a measure of democratic freedom was spared, out of consideration for the susceptibilities of the Scandinavian countries. It was a diplomatic object—to keep them away from the Western Bloc, to which camp they naturally belong owing to their democratic tradition.

But in the eventuality of a war of the kind towards which the world seems to be moving, as it were by fate, Russia cannot risk the possibility of the Scandinavian Peninsula becoming a base of enemy operation. The grim possibility could be headed off if the Russian Army was in a position to anticipate the adversary in the seizure of the Peninsula. Complete absorption of Finland in the Soviet political and military system, therefore, was an integral part of the new Russian strategy of revolution. But there, development has not been so swift and spectacular. The weapon used is diplomatic cunning. Stalin addressed a letter to the President of the Finnish Republic, proposing a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. It was an invitation into the proverbial bear's embrace. But Finland, situated as she is, had no option.

Negotiations began and went on for some time, the Finns presumably resisting complete absorption. A draft on the basis of a tentative agreement has been prepared. The final conference for the conclusion of the treaty is to take place in Moscow at the end of March 1948. Meanwhile, it has leaked out that the Russians want a military pact. All the parties, except the Communists and their "fellow-travellers", are up against such a pact. Given such a strong opposition, the treaty may not be ratified by the parliament, in which the Communists do not command a majority. The perspective, therefore, is a *coup d'état* to ensure the conclusion of the pact. A pretty clear idea of the proposed pact can be gathered from the press report about President Paasiviki's last instruction to the delegation leaving for Moscow. He advised them to beware of far-reaching terms on the model of the Russo-Hungarian treaty. Presumably, in his original letter to the Finnish President, Stalin suggested a treaty on that model. He further instructed the delegation to stipulate that the military clauses of the pact must not be in operation before a war actually broke out. Finally, it should also

be specified that Finnish territory would be defended by the armed forces of Finland, unless she explicitly asked for Russian help. Paasiviki is a pro-Russian of long standing. He is frankly suspicious about the motive of the proposed pact of friendship. It can therefore be reasonably presumed that the Russians contemplate virtual military occupation of Finland, and they will have what they want, by hook or crook.* But meanwhile, they are driving the Scandinavian countries definitely in the Western camp. The Prime Ministers of the three countries met in a conference to define their attitude towards the Soviet pressure on Finland, and the Western Union Pact. They declared their determination to combat forcible spread of Communism.

Italy, at the one end, and Finland, at the other, are the immediate objectives of the Russians. Therefore, in his conscription address to the Congress, President Truman mentioned both these countries, situated so far apart, as likely to provide America with a *casus belli.*

The apprehension of a new aggressive move on the part of Russia has given impetus to parallel counter-developments: one frankly bellicose, and the other may still, even at this eleventh hour, offer Europe the leadership of a Third Force to save the distressed and desperate continent from a war precipitated by the rivalry between two giants lusting for more power.

The Communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia, whatever may be the consequences of the Russian offensive

* Protracted negotiations ended in the conclusion of a treaty which was not quite to the liking of the Russians. The world was watchful, and the Finns dared put up resistance to a degree. Subsequently, the Russians tried to make up by promoting a Communist *coup d' état* on the Czech model. But they were forestalled. President Paasiviki dismissed the Communist Minister of the Interior who was engineering an armed uprising against the Government. His reinstatement was demanded under the threat of a general strike. Finally, a compromise was reached; another member of the Communist Party was appointed in the place of the dismissed Minister of the Interior. But the plan of the Communists capturing power was frustrated, for the time being, at any rate.

opened therewith, was undoubtedly playing into the hands of the American "war-mongers" denounced from Moscow *ad nauseum*. The events in Prague were interpreted as the signal for a war, even in the soberest quarters. Speaking on the "Conditions of Peace" at the Yale Law School, a philosopher and jurist, F. S. C. Northorp, for example, said: "There is danger of war within the next few weeks since Russia hopes to grab the world before November first." The former Secretary of State, James Byrnes, addressing at the same time another academic institution, sounded the alarm that "the U.S.A. may have to meet an international crisis only four or five weeks from now." He therefore called for "action against Russia instead of letters of protest". In a joint meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed forces, described as the most important military conference since the end of the war, the Secretary of War said: "I am worried and sick at the imminent threat of war." The temper of the country was described by an influential New York daily as follows: "Since 1946, all planning has been on a long term basis, assuming that war was ten to fifteen years off. Now the military is thinking in terms of immediate mobilisation. April 18th, the date of the Italian election, presents a possible D-Day to them." Another well-informed journalist reported: "It is now definitely clear here in Washington that it will mean shooting if Russia makes another move, no matter whether with political or military means, whether in Italy, Austria or Iran." In that tense situation, the President convened a joint session of the Congress to hear him make a statement on foreign policy. As generally anticipated, he called for conscription on the following ground: "We cannot meet our international responsibilities unless we maintain our armed forces." Then he proceeded to add: "It is of vital importance that we keep our occupation forces in Germany until peace is secured in Europe." The declaration was compared with that of President Roosevelt after the fall of France in 1940, when

he proclaimed a state of national emergency and called for a total mobilisation.

Two days later, speaking in the University of California, all the way across the continent, the Secretary of State, General Marshall, was even more explicit than his Chief. He went to the extent of indicating the storm-centre—the point where the apprehended conflagration might break out, and gave a broad hint about the nature of the initial counter-move on the part of America. Having warned Italy that a Communist victory in the coming election would cut her off from American economic aid, Marshall proceeded to justify the contemplated American retaliation: "Every European nation under Communist influence has been prevented from participation in in the European Recovery Programme. Some have been deprived of the right to participate clearly against their wishes. Since the association is entirely voluntary, the people of any nation have a right to change their mind and in effect withdraw from it. If they chose to vote into power a government in which the dominant political force would be a party whose hostility to this programme has been frequently, publicly and emphatically proclaimed, this could only be considered as evidence of the desire of that country to disassociate itself from the programme."

The Communists coming to power constitutionally would not be a legitimate *casus belli*. But the Americans would not be so outmanœuvered. They would pay the Russians in their own coin. The latter coerced Czechoslovakia and Poland to non-co-operate with the Marshall Plan of European recovery. Now America would influence the election in Italy by threatening economic blockade. More than one can play the same game; sauce for the gander is sauce also for the goose. As the American threat of economic retaliation may frustrate the Russian plan of capturing Italy constitutionally, they are offering baits to counteract the threat. Anticipating that the Communists

would seize power there before long, the Russians had all along backed up the claim that Italy should have the trusteeship of her former African colonies. One should think that colonial ambitions would damage the revolutionary reputation of the Communists. Nevertheless, the Communist Party of Italy has been conducting the election campaign with the slogan that, with powerful Russian support, it alone can regain for Italy her lost colonies. On the eve of the election, the Russians had offered yet another inducement for the Italian people to vote for the Communist Party. According to the term of the peace treaty, a share of the Italian fleet was allotted to Russia. The latter would forego her share. But the Italian people can be easily reminded that a similar act of generosity was committed by both Britain and America long before the Russians.

There is a keen competition for influencing the result of the Italian election. On March 20th, U.S.A., Britain and France sent a note to Russia and Italy proposing that the "Free Territory of Trieste" be returned to Italy. That was obviously a move to counteract any possible effect of the Russian bait to Italy. The French Foreign Minister Bidault dramatically made the news about Trieste public at Turin, where he had gone to sign the Franco-Italian Customs Union Pact. He said: "I am able to bring to the Italian people some good news and hope. Trieste is a great Italian city. The French Government has decided that this Free Territory regime is unworkable, and it is necessary to find another solution. It cannot be other than pure and simple return of Trieste to Italy." He concluded by expressing the hope that Russia would approve of the proposal. That was an unkind cut. There had been a fierce struggle between Italy and Yugoslavia for the possession of Trieste. Even the Communists of both the countries came to a clash on that issue. Yugoslavia was ruled by Tito; thanks to their nationalist degeneration, the

Communists in the other country had to back up the Italian claim as against that of their comrades across the frontier.

The joint American, British and French note conveying the proposal of returning Trieste to Italy recollects the old story: "Disposition of the (free) territory was one of the most bitterly fought issues in the Italian peace treaty. Both Yugoslavia and Italy claimed the area. The Western Powers contended that such facts as historic and ethnical associations made it properly an Italian area. But the Yugoslavs argued similarly that it should belong to them, and Yugoslavia had the support of Russia. In the end, the compromise solution of a free territory was agreed upon. The only change it had to make was for the Western Powers and Russia to compose their major differences and agree on such a relatively minor issue as the selection of a Governor." Pending the selection of a neutral Governor, the territory was divided into two zones, the northern occupied by American and British troops, and the southern by the Yugoslavs. The note then proceeded to motivate the new proposal. "Discussions in the Security Council have already shown that agreement on the selection of a Governor is impossible, and they have received abundant evidence to show that the Yugoslav zone has been virtually incorporated in Yugoslavia. . . . Failing any East-West agreement, Trieste, or the southern anchor of the dividing line between the Communist-controlled lands and the western nations of Europe, has no future except as a pawn to be constantly fought over."

The Russians as well as the Italian Communists were placed in a very embarrassing position. The former could not agree to abandon the southern anchor of their front across Europe. The latter, on the other hand, could not oppose the return of Trieste to Italy without enraging nationalist sentiment and thus heavily prejudicing their chances in the coming election. But Russian strategic

considerations must be of overriding importance in the Communist world; non-Russian Communists must fall in line. Placed in an extremely embarrassing position, the Italian Communists tried to evade the issue. Their leader, Togliatti, denounced the proposal as "a vulgar attempt to drag Italy into an atmosphere of war". That amounted to a rejection of the proposal, and the non-Communist Italian press interpreted the Communist attitude as such. Its reaction was summarised in headlines like "Whether we get Trieste back or not, depends on the Soviet Union", "It is Stalin's turn to speak". After a couple of days' silence, the Russians made explicit what was implicit in Togliatti's statement. The Moscow Radio commented that the proposal "is intended to revise the peace treaty with Italy behind the back of the Soviet Union. The declaration is by no means motivated by concern for the Italian people, as its originators try to make out." The line of the Italian Communist Party's election propaganda was thus indicated: not to oppose outright the proposal for the return of Trieste, but to condemn it as a conspiracy against Italy. That dope, however, is not very likely to be swallowed except by the Communists and their dupes.

The Western Powers have made still other moves to influence the result of the coming Italian elections: the former Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland will be placed under Italian trusteeship, and Greece will forego her reparation claims on Italy. The anxiety on both sides to influence the Italian election proves that the dreaded conflagration may break out there.

If the result of the Italian election went against their anticipation, would the Russians hold back? If they did, the danger of war would not be so very imminent. But now that the fat is in the fire, they are not very likely to lose time, and allow the Americans to steal a march in Italy. In the eventuality of the Communists winning the election, the armed hostility may not break out immediately.

There will be no legitimate pretext for the Americans to intervene militarily. So, the dreaded third world war would break out in the near future only on the initiative of the Russians, if they tried to seize power in Italy, directly or indirectly, the native Communists having failed to do so constitutionally. If their revised strategy of an encircling movement preparatory to a frontal attack in Germany fails, then the European Recovery Plan may have a chance, and revolution of the Communist dream get a set-back. To avoid that possible set-back, the Russians may precipitate the catastrophe of a total war.

* * *

While naturally provoking American bellicosity, the Russian aggressiveness has quickened a parallel process of development in the opposite direction—towards the possibility of a peaceful reconstruction of Europe, which will open up a new perspective of hope before civilised mankind. It is the formation of the Western Union. Though the beginning of this reassuring development was marked by the sixteen nations' conference about the Marshall Plan, under the terrifying impact of the fast-moving events in Eastern Europe, it outgrew the original limited purpose and tended towards the definite emergence of a Third Force in the field of international politics.

The idea of a European Union is old. It has many adherents, growing in number. The movement got a set-back when Churchill, with his characteristic impetuosity, offered himself for its leadership. Under his leadership, the movement was bound to be suspect. On the other hand, the United Nations Organisation does not promise to be a greater success than the League of Nations. During the latter years of the war, the hope gained ground that the Anglo-Soviet alliance might provide the foundation of a democratic commonwealth of Europe, which would be erected as the monument of the final triumph of the

Russian Revolution. But it was the Russians who dashed that hope. That is the tragedy of contemporary history.

Having gambled away the proud position of being acclaimed as the liberator of Europe, owing to their short-sightedness which resulted from an ill-conceived and fallacious philosophy of revolution, they deliberately went ahead with a plan of dividing Europe into two parts, the one under their control, to be used eventually as the base of operation for seizing the other also by force. In the background of the sharpening conflict between the two giants for the domination of Europe, there developed tendencies of local cohesion and co-operation. The small countries of Western Europe—Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg,—all equally devastated by German invasion—quietly entered into a pact for economic co-operation; as the result of that wise policy, they quickly recovered from the injuries of the war, and prospered. Britain and France concluded an alliance, the historical significance of which was symbolically indicated by the fact of its being signed at Dunkirk. Finally, successive Four Power Conferences having failed to agree about the future of Germany and, in the meantime, the eastern parts occupied by the Red Army having been practically integrated in the Russian system of economy, Britain and America decided to merge their zones of occupation into one political and economic unit. Only France still stood aloof, insisting upon the internationalisation of the Ruhr Valley—the industrial nerve-centre of Germany. She also maintained that German contribution to her economic recovery should have the priority over any plan of German reconstruction. The plan of America financially helping European recovery presupposed a pooling of the resources of the European nations themselves. On that basis, the requirement of Europe as a whole was to be estimated. Reconciliation of the French point of view about the future of Germany,

therefore, was an essential condition for putting the Marshall Plan in practice.

To suspect the British Labour Government of anti-Soviet designs was the most unfortunate feature of post-war Russian foreign policy. The congenital anti-Communist animus of a Churchill might have led to Britain joining America, as a mere satellite, in an alliance against Russia. But it is a fact that the Labour Government all along resisted being driven to that direction under American pressure. They could not go against the sentiment of the voters who placed them in power. Not only labour, but the salaried middle class and liberal intelligentsia also were decidedly in favour of a close co-operation with Communist Russia. The pro-Soviet sentiment penetrated the upper classes also. The prestige and moral status of the U.S.S.R. were so very high in Britain during the closing years of the war and afterwards, as would make it impossible for any government to pursue a deliberate anti-Russian policy. It is the greatest tragedy of contemporary history that the Russians failed to appreciate the value of that sentiment, and callously squandered the large store of goodwill in Britain. It was not a mistake on their part; it was a policy determined by the belief, grown in the atmosphere of dictatorship, that public opinion can be disregarded with impunity. However, irrespective of public opinion, the Labour Government has a conviction of its own, which is also disbelieved by the Communists, who claim to be the only sea-green incorruptible champions of social justice. Although they were compelled by circumstances to be very careful not to offend American susceptibilities, the British Labour Government always endeavoured to pursue an independent foreign policy, particularly in the case of their relation with Russia. Whatever might have been Churchill's motive of advocating a Western Bloc, Bevin wanted the same thing with the object of making European Democracy independent of American

ambitions for world domination. He was eager for Anglo-Soviet understanding and co-operation, which would render the attainment of the object easier. And, it seems, he believed that a union of the Western Democracies would facilitate the desired rapprochement with the refractory Russians.

Even recently, when all hope for attaining the desired object seemed to be lost, Bevin repeatedly avoided doing what might annoy the Russians, at least in one of the cases risking American displeasure. The American Government released for publication documents alleged to have been exchanged between Germany and Russia since the conclusion of the non-aggression pact of 1939. The British Foreign Office not only refused to be a party to the publication, but actually disapproved of its circulation in Britain. The second instance was the cold reception given to Mikolajczyk when he returned to Britain to escape arrest in Poland. The reluctance of the Foreign Office to take some energetic step to secure permission of the Soviet Government for the Russian women to leave the country to join their British hunbands, is another instance. In this matter, public opinion in Britain ran very high.

Apart from the entirely uncalled for hostile attitude of the Russians, there were other factors which stood in the way of the Bevin Plan of a Western Union as a possible means for securing Russian co-operation in a democratic reconstruction of Europe independent of American interference. The most stubborn factor was the suspicion of Holland and Belgium. It was clear to all that the projected Western Union, to be an effective economic unit, must eventually include Germany; it was also clear that a Germany recovered from the revages of war would acquire an increasingly important position in the new set-up. Holland and Belgium, just as France, dreaded the perspective, and considered Bevin's plan of a Western Union not only unrealistic, but hypocritical.

The first sixteen nations' conference in Paris was followed up by negotiations to eliminate the discordant factor of French claims. The preliminary negotiations culminated in a Three Powers conference, which met in London early in March 1948, when the ominous events in Czechoslovakia were casting ahead their shadow athwart the whole of Europe. The success of the conference was to some degree assured by the realisation that the imminent danger of a war could be headed off only by quick action to set Western Germany on its feet, economically, and by a concerted effort for a general recovery on the basis of mutual aid. Actually, the success was greater than hoped by the most optimistic. On the one hand, Britain and America accepted the French point of view about the Ruhr; and, on the other hand, France agreed to the plan of uniting the whole of Germany outside the Russian zone under a Central Government with a federal constitution. Another agreement of still greater importance was that the Marshall Plan would be applied also to Western Germany. The concession made by France was to allow German participation in the international control of the Ruhr and to put off the question of security. The general opinion was that the London Conference had removed the biggest obstacle on the way to the formation of the Western Union. Holland and Belgium followed France.

The sixteen West-European nations agreeing to co-operate in the Recovery Plan met again in Paris on March 15th. Bevin and Bidault reported the result of the Three Powers' consultation in London. Significantly, Marshall was not present. The responsibility for putting his plan in practice had been taken over jointly by the European nations who required the help. Submitting for the approval of the conference the proposal for the creation of an organisation to handle American aid, Bevin said: "If Europe is now receiving aid to help her over the next stage of rehabilitation, she is justified in accepting that aid, because

of the price she has paid, and because of her concentrated efforts to preserve both justice and liberty for the future. I hope and believe that, when the nations become independent of aid, they would not break apart again, but their co-operation would go on." The birth of the Western Union only two days later was thus heralded. Bevin added: "I invite not only this great conference, but the peoples of Europe to join in this great effort to triumph over economic difficulties and so to secure firmly the human rights which all should enjoy." In concluding the speech, he declared: "I feel more hopeful now than at any time during or since the war." Bidault reported the agreement that Germany must have its place in the plan of aid and programme of recovery. While doing so, he said: "Justice and commonsense alike demand that the resources of this industrious and persevering country should be associated with the effort of reconstruction we have undertaken." Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, said that Europe economically reorganised under the plan would be "one of the most independent units of the world. The new European organisation should guarantee to the working masses a standard of living not marked by strong contrasts and the opportunity of work whenever it was possible for them to work."

On March 17th, 1948, the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg met at Brussels to sign the fifty years Western Union Treaty, which was described by Bevin as "not an end, but just a beginning". In the preamble of the treaty, the signatories declared their resolution—

"To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

"To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the rule of law and

constitutional traditions, all of which are their common heritage;

"To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

"To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis of European economic recovery;

"To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security, and in resisting a policy of aggression;

"To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

"They accordingly desire to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence."

Addressing the special joint session of the Congress, just when the Western Union Treaty was being signed, President Truman referred to the event and declared: "This action has great significance, for this agreement was not imposed by the decree of a more powerful neighbour. It was the free choice of independent governments, representing the will of their peoples. Its significance goes far beyond the actual terms of the agreement itself. It is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for the protection and preservation of its civilisation. The development deserves our full support. I am confident that the U.S.A. will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to do so."

The Russian reaction to this development has, of course, been perverse and petulant. It is denounced as an Anglo-American conspiracy for the enslavement of Europe. Whatever they may say, a machinery having been created on the basis of an agreement of all concerned, the plan of European recovery will be put into effect without any further delay. Amelioration of the conditions of life in Western Germany and economic stabilisation of France and Italy will destroy the hope of the Russians that starvation, destitution and despair will drive Germany to embrace Communism as the only possible salvation. On the other hand, the mutually agreed plan of recovery rules out the possibility of a restoration of the economic *status quo ante bellum*. The Americans may desire that; but the parties controlling the governments who have concluded the Western Union Treaty are all committed to a programme of a more or less radical social reconstruction. All of them are, indeed, socialist; but Socialism can no longer claim the monopoly of the ideals of political liberty, economic equality and social justice. These are not the ideals of any particular class; they are human ideals. Therefore, a party of the working class is not the only instrument for their attainment.

It is not an accident that Socialist Parties, which would not break away from the humanist tradition of all libertarian movements, would not discard democratic practice in favour of dictatorship, would not repudiate moral values and dismiss the concept of individual freedom as a vain abstraction, are attracting all the educated, cultured, disinterested, idealistic members of society, while the culturally backward toiling masses are responding to the Communist appeal to the base human instincts. Revolution is no longer the concern of a minority. If it is a historical necessity, the bulk of society must participate in it. The second world war placed such a revolution on the order of the day. The honourable role of leading it, in co-

operation with others, was within the reach of the Russians. They missed their chance, but the caravan of history must go on. The Russians are determined to interfere with the peaceful process, because post-war development did not conform with their wish. Consequently, instead of leading a revolution, they are driving Europe towards the catastrophe of another war.

It is no excuse to say that America also is doing the same; the world was not expecting America to lead a revolution. Had the Russians not insisted upon Europe accepting their idea of revolution and, instead, co-operated with the great democratic and socialist parties of Western Europe, including Germany, the civilised world would not be in the present perilous position. If the Western democracies to-day must rely on American economic aid and perhaps military protection also, the inexorable will of the Russians to impose Communist totalitarianism upon the whole of Europe has driven them to that predicament. The fact, however, is that American help and protection, whatever may be their ulterior motive, do not in the least degree curtail the rights and liberties of the beneficiaries, while the alternative offered by the Russians through the intermediary of the various Communist Parties means destruction of all that and more.

The Western democracies are not prepared to pay such a high price for a Utopia which, when reached, turns out to be something entirely different from the figment of imagination—something unattractive, indeed positively repulsive for people traditionally accustomed to appreciate the democratic ways of life with the cherished moral and cultural values. If the tradition of democratic freedom and of a cultured and moral attitude even to the toughest problems of life can be kept intact in the midst of economic distress, the hope of civilised mankind surviving the greatest crisis of history will remain burning.

The Western Union, even as a modest start in the

right direction, holds out that hope; it is the silver lining in the mass of dark clouds hanging heavily on the horizon. If it succeeds in keeping Western Europe out of the mad scramble for power, which in that case will most probably reduce other parts of the world to rack and ruin, the positive outcome of the Russian Revolution will survive the fearful catastrophe of a war, which may be precipitated by the Russians themselves in the near future.

Chapter XXIX

THE TIDE TURNS

The battle of Italy was lost—by the Russians. The parliamentary election in that country was one of Stalin's "brushes and skirmishes" in a large-scale manœuvre of the international communist forces taking up positions prepatory to yet another global war which, according to Marxian teleology, is inevitable. The world still remains under the ominous shadow of the danger of war. But it has gained a respite which may enable the "Third Force" to grow up as a strong buffer between the two giants moving headlong towards a clash. Indeed, the result of the Italian election places the Third Force as a decisive factor on the map of Europe. Now Italy will mean an accession of strength for the latter. The Scandinavian countries will most probably follow Italy. For obvious strategical reasons, Sweden was reluctant to offend the Russian colossus, and Sweden determines the foreign policy of the Scandinavian group.

Their strategic plan of a grand offensive having received a setback in Italy, the Russians are not likely to make any aggressive move elsewhere, at least in the near future. The recently concluded Russo-Finnish Pact of friendship and mutual defence is not entirely satisfactory for the Russians. The Red Army will not have the right to march through Finland without the latter's consent, and the consent will not be given unless Finland is actually attacked. As there is no likelihood of such an imaginary happening in the near future, Sweden need not fear a sudden attack by Russia. Relieved of that nightmare, Sweden may now take the lead to ally the Scandinavian countries openly and formally with the Western Democracies. Having experienced that neutrality provided them no security,

Norway and Denmark, at any rate, may be expected to move closer to the Western Union. In consequence, Europe will be clearly divided. But that also will be a formal consummation of what is already happening actually. The division, however, will be so even, as to postpone the calamity of an immediate war. Then, consolidation of the Western Union and some measures for the economic rehabilitation of Central and Western Europe may usher in a period of peaceful reconstruction and orderly progress.

Yet another factor will give a respite to Europe. For the rest of 1948, America will be absorbed with the presidential election. The Democratic Administration, being threatened with an almost certain defeat, will naturally concentrate its entire attention on the affairs at home with the hope of saving itself. Two Democratic Presidents, Wilson and Roosevelt, secured re-election with the slogan "He kept us out of the war". That slogan will still have a powerful appeal for the average American citizen. Having taken energetic, often to the extent of being belligerent, steps to check the rival for world domination, the American Government can now speak a language of peace, and President Truman campaign for his re-election with the catching slogan "He kept us out of the war", as his predecessors did respectively on the eve of joining the last two world wars. He is in a position to argue that the aid for European recovery, sponsored by his Administration, will not only check the spread of Communism, but has frustrated the Russian plan of pushing westwards which, if not resisted by other means, would have compelled America to take to arms. So he has kept America out of the war. And to add to the probability of winning the election with the good old slogan of his predecessors, President Truman and his Administration will be very careful to avoid provocative actions in the international field. That will considerably ease the tension, and there may be less local "incidents", like those happen-

ing of late in Berlin and Vienna, any one of which might set off the spark. The war of nerves, or the cold war, suspended for a time, even an armed truce, will allow some time to the Third Force to grow up internally and the Western Union to get going.

But it all depends on the Russians. How will they react to the situation? Will they be sobered by the defeat in Italy, or be provoked to more rash and reckless actions? The Communists still remain a powerful factor in Italy. It is reported that they possess secret dumps of arms. They are a well organised, determined minority. They can be easily reinforced, in many ways, across the Adriatic. They may attempt an insurrection, if the signal will come from the Russians—through the Cominform. The possibility of such a move cannot be altogether ruled out. Russian strategy would not give up Italy without a desperate resistance. Many years ago, before the second world war, great importance was attached to Italy in the Russian strategy. Therefore, before the opportunity of concluding a pact with Nazi Germany came, the Soviet Government had established close trade relations with Fascist Italy. That was the thin end of the wedge.

After the war, control of Italy became of still greater importance from the Russian point of view. So long as the Mediterranean remained open for American shipping, and Turkey resisted the Russian desire for the control of the entrance to the Black Sea, a wall of buffer States, north to south across Europe, would not make Russia's position strategically secure. American penetration of the Near East and the alienation of the Muslim countries have greatly reduced the strategic importance of a possible Russian control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. With the Mediterranean free for the American Navy, the Near East can be a solid base of operation against Russia. That indeed is a basic principle of American strategy. It is

therefore no accident that such determined efforts were made from either side to influence the election in Italy.

In consequence of the defeat of the Communists, Russia loses the chance of gaining control of Italy in the near future, unless she would risk the desperate step of an insurrection. But the strategists of revolution should by now have learned, from the bitter experience of many years, that that is a forlorn hope. However well organised, numerous and armed they may be, the Communists by themselves will not be able to capture power in Italy through an insurrection. The defeat in the election has dealt a severe blow to their prestige. The sweeping victory of the Christian Democrats indicates that the lower middle class and peasantry are alienated from the Communist Party. In such a situation, it would be a capital political blunder to call for an insurrection which is bound to end in a blood bath, unless Tito's army marching in is a part of the plan. And that would surely precipitate a war. Notwithstanding the preoccupation at home, the American Government will intervene. Tito's army may occupy the north in the meantime. But the south and Sicily are more important strategically. Established there, the Americans will keep the Mediterranean free and attack Russia from the Near Eastern base. For these considerations, the Russians are not likely to gamble. They have no other alternative than to swallow the defeat in Italy, and turn their ingenuity in some other direction.

The centre of gravity may shift to the Far East. It seems that the Russians have been preparing for a large-scale offensive in China.* Whatever may happen there, the position in Europe must be stabilised. What are the

* While the attention of the anxious world was focussed upon the movement of ominous events in Europe, China relapsed into the stage of a large-scale civil war, which had been temporarily headed off by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1946. Russian strategy seems to be to open a second front against America in the Far East. Having withdrawn themselves from weak positions, the armed forces of Chinese Commun-

Russians most likely to do for the purpose? For the sake of prestige, they may make an offensive move where success is almost certain. That will be Austria, which can be easily absorbed in the Soviet zone. The Americans cannot do much there, and they are not likely to precipitate war on a relatively minor issue. With Italy in the Western Bloc, control of Austria would not give Russia any concrete advantage. Now, the Anglo-American-French proposal for the return of Trieste to Italy will be executed. Yugoslavia with Russian support will object, but unsuccessfully, unless Tito will be prepared to size the port by force. That again will be a clear *casus belli*, and the final word will have to come from Moscow. It will not come, because Stalin would hardly risk a war when the initiative has been captured by the enemy.

What is the perspective of immediate development in Italy? Does the defeat of the Communists mean a triumph of reaction? The relation of political forces in any particular country, or internationally, is no longer so simple. The terms "left" and "right" have lost their traditional meaning. Much is said about the Church supporting the Christian Democrats. That is no secret. The Catholic Church waged its crusade against Communism, and naturally supported the party which appeared to be the most likely to turn the tide in the elections. If the Communists failed to secure the same discrediting support, that was not their fault. Moscow has been hobnobbing with the

ism fell back upon the secure base in Manchuria where, in addition to local resources, they could be easily supplied by their Russian patrons. Thereafter, they have been on an all-round offensive, and have pushed the Nationalist Army practically out of the whole of Northern China. America is naturally alarmed by the development in the Far East, and is pouring in help for the Kuomintang régime. But the latter is so very corrupt to the core, and consequently demoralised, that the Communists may not be stopped unless America intervenes directly—from the advanced base deliberately prepared in Japan by General MacArthur. So, the very welcome respite in Europe may coincide with a war in the Far East, and any armed conflict between the two giants contending for world domination is bound to be global. The Russians may still lose the battle of Europe in China—the Napoleonism of the Russian Revolution meet its Waterloo somewhere on the far-off Pacific coast.

Vatican, particularly through Poland. And finally, there is the unforgettable fact, that without the all-out support of the Communists, the Lateran Pact could not be incorporated in the Constitution of the Italian Republic.

The Lateran Pact was signed in 1929 by Mussolini and Pope XI, for regulating the relations between the Vatican and the Fascist Corporative State, which thereby accepted Catholicism as the official religion. It contained such declarations as: "Italy considers the basis and apex of public schooling to be the teaching of Christian doctrine according to the forms derived from Catholic tradition." It deprived priests guilty of apostasy, or even simply rebuked (by the Church) on that account, of the right to teach in schools or do "any work in which they are in immediate contact with the public." Not only is such a reactionary document incorporated in the Constitution; it is further provided therein that, unless the Vatican so desires, the Constitution cannot be amended in this respect.

The particular clause (No. 7) of the draft constitution was supported by all the right-wing parties. The Socialists, then united under Nenni, and the Republicans opposed it. The Communists held the balance, and they tipped it on the side of reaction. At the last moment, Togliatti dramatically declared that his party would vote for the clause, because they did not want national unity to be disrupted by religious dissension! Lenin had said that religion was opium for the people; his successors (Togliatti could not speak without the sanction of the high-priests of Moscow) allowed the Catholic Church to continue drugging the Italian people, of course with the hope that the latter might support the Communists out of gratitude for having given them the freedom to be drugged. For some time, Communist opportunism appeared to be fruitful; the Catholic peasant masses of Sicily and Southern Italy came under the demagogic sway of the Communists. Now opportunism has turned out to be a boomerang. It left the

backward Italian masses under the spiritual protection of the clergy, and the clergy advised the faithful flock to vote against Communism. The Communists, therefore, must thank their own stupidity and scant respect for principle for their defeat, instead of abusing others.

Another argument to explain away the Communist defeat ought to be mentioned: foreign help to the Christian Democrats. Again, it is no secret. It has been officially admitted in Washington that several million dollars were spent to help the cause of democracy in Italy. If the Communists of one country are entitled to help their brothers in all other countries, why should not adherents of another ideology do the same?

In Italy it was a fight with gloves off. The issue was not national; it was international. The future of Europe and of the whole world was involved. The battle of Italy was fought as the prelude to a deliberately prepared clash of arms between two giants aspiring for world domination. The Russians lost the battle. But it is not an American victory. The right-wing parties have been eliminated. The Christian Democrats are in absolute majority in both the Houses of Parliament. With the support of the anti-clerical Republicans and the Socialists led by Saragat, their position will be unassailable. In such a secure parliamentary position, a government can pursue an independent policy. The basic principles of the programme of the Christian Democratic Party are agrarian reform and redistribution of wealth. The Communists did not make any bigger promises, and there is no reason to assume that they were more honest than the Christian Democrats.

Looking at the situation from all points of view, an impartial observer can expect an orderly democratic development in Italy. The Third Force will be in a much stronger position there than in France, where the present government has to humour the parties to the Right. Then, if a Communist victory would have had repercussions in

France, their defeat can also be expected to have the contrary effect. The perspective thus is of the tide turning, giving European democracy the much needed respite.

There is hope. The danger of war recedes. The revolution advocated by the Communists is conditional on war. The laying of that discredited and dreaded spectre of revolution should enable the Western Union to take up the leadership of the constructive revolution for which Europe is ripe, and all but a few are anxiously waiting for the chance to contribute to the triumph of that revolution.

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On May 11th, 1948 it was disclosed in Moscow that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. had agreed to have a bilateral discussion of their differences with the object of reaching a settlement. The Soviet Foreign Ministry released for publication correspondence exchanged between Molotov and the American Ambassador in Moscow. The world was pleasantly surprised by that unexpected development. In a letter addressed to the Soviet Foreign Minister on May 4th, the American Ambassador had described the relation between the two countries "as a source of disappointment to the American people and Government", and declared that "as for the U.S.A., the door always remains open for discussion and settlement of our differences". Molotov's prompt response was encouraging; in reply to the letter of the American Ambassador, he had written: "The Soviet Government adopts a positive attitude to the wishes of the U. S. Government to improve relations, and is in agreement with the proposal to begin in this connection a discussion and settlement of the differences existing between us."

The relief and the hope of an early relaxation of the international tension, however, were very shortlived. Within twelve hours since Moscow gave the pleasant surprise, an icy douche from Washington dampened the enthusiasm and dashed the hopes of the world. The

State Department let it be known that the Russian reply did not justify a meeting in the near future, and that there must be further overtures from Moscow before any meeting could take place. Indeed, Washington denied that the American Ambassador in Moscow had made a concrete proposal of a meeting. He had only "made it clear to the Russians that we are available at any time. On the other hand, we are not prepared to meet the Russians on a basis of glittering generalities, but only frank and specific matters."

On the same day, President Truman personally corroborated the statement of the State Department spokesman. He said that the American desire for "decent and reasonable relations with Russia represented no new departure in American foreign policy. Ambassador Smith was directed to seek an interview with M. Molotov in order to set forth as clearly as could be expressed the policies and purposes of the United States with regard to the Soviet Union, in view of the character of current propaganda statements."

The defeat in Italy was followed by a diplomatic defeat of the Russians. The purpose of the American diplomatic move evidently was to sound how Moscow intended to react to the international situation created by the result of the election in Italy. The anticipated development did not take place in Austria, except some pinpricks in Vienna. In Berlin also, the Russians stopped short of precipitating an armed conflict upon the Western Powers having declared that they meant to stay there. In the case of Finland too, they preferred to go slow. All those facts indicated that the Russians would suspend their plan of an offensive all along the line. Or were they only feigning?

The Americans wanted to make sure, and recast their policy accordingly. Ambassador Smith's Note to Molotov was not exactly an olive branch. It was, indeed, a pro-

vocative document. Yet, the Russians welcomed it as an invitation to a bilateral conference for amicable settlement of outstanding differences. Of course, Molotov's reply was full of equally provocative counter-charges. Almost certainly, the Russians did not believe in the *bona fide* of the American gesture, and would have gone to yet another international conference to utilise it as a forum for propaganda. Most probably, they were actuated by yet another motive—to isolate Britain, their *bête noire*. A bilateral agreement with America would serve that purpose. However, irrespective of their motive, the eagerness to settle the differences amicably was interpreted at Washington as a sign of weakness on the part of the Russians. They were outplayed in the game of bluff.

Having ascertained, thanks to Molotov's maladroit diplomacy, that after the defeat in Italy the Russians would make no further move, in the near future, to take Western Europe by storm, the Americans were convinced that the Truman-Marshall policy of containing Communism had succeeded. The Russians withdrawing behind their outer bastions, presumably to consolidate their power in that vast expanse of the earth's surface from the Pacific to the Adriatic, Western Europe gets a respite, and the Americans can be preoccupied with the Presidential election without much anxiety about their international position. So, for the time being, the danger of war seems to have receded.

The net result of the crisis which, during the first half of the year 1948, drove Europe to the brink of the precipice of a catastrophe, is complete isolation of Russia and her satellites from the rest of Europe. It is not a mere political estrangement. Communism, under Russian leadership, is turning its back on the tradition of modern culture, which originally was its source of inspiration. If the Russians succeeded in their Napoleonism, they might have experienced what happened to the Romans after they had conquered the ancient world of Greek learning

and culture. In that case, the Russian Revolution would have been recorded in history as an episode in the continuous process of human progress.

The defeat of Red Napoleonism, mostly due to its own miscalculations, kept the revolution away from the world of modern culture and precluded its ideas and ideals being revaluated in an atmosphere of spiritual freedom. The experience of having been hailed as the liberators of Europe and then of being dreaded, instead of being loved, when they came nearer, naturally embittered the Russians. Flushed with the delirium of victory, they did not stop to think if their message of deliverance was up to the expectation of Europe, ready for a revolution; nor did it occur to them that their conduct might be disappointing for those who had admired them from a distance. The ideologists of their new order explained the disconcerting experience by the theory that Western culture was antagonistic to the blessings offered by the Russian Revolution.

It is a suicidal theory. The historical justification of the revolution was that the capitalist order set limits to social and cultural progress; therefore, it must be overthrown and replaced by a more liberating new order. The purpose of revolution being to promote human progress, the humanist and democratic traditions of the European culture could not be antagonistic to it.

Stalin's double mistake of letting Russians see Europe and Europe see the Russians, was not the subject of a popular joke. It was of a great significance, and could have had far-reaching consequences. Liberal thought and democratic ideals were first introduced in Russia after the Napoleonic war by officers who had been in Europe for a number of years. The Red Army going out to Europe and staying there for years, was bound to have a similar repercussion on the internal life of Russia. But the rulers of the Communist new order of Russia were frightened by the first signs of the tendency of the revolu-

tion to widen its cultural horizon in consequence of its coming in contact with the European democratic ways of life.

Frantic measures were taken to stop the process, which might have converted the Russian Revolution into a general European revolution. Russian soldiers, privates as well as officers, were prohibited from mixing socially with the people of the occupied countries. Offenders were severely punished for breach of discipline. The penalties included mass transfer to the rear—to be detained indefinitely in segregation camps on the Russian frontier, to be "re-educated" so as to shake off the "corrupting influence" of Western culture. But ideas cannot be quarantined. A large number of Russians having seen a new world abroad, their experience told upon the cultural life at home. While Europe was resisting the imposition of the Communist new order, the traditions of Western culture captivated sensitive Russians at home, just as captive Greece had once upon a time made captives of her Roman conquerors. Confronted with that danger of Europeanisation, Russian Communists began a crusade against the "corrupting influence of the bourgeois civilisation", which found expression in "post-war laxity and easy-going ways". Democratic ideas and the vision of a good life should not be allowed to weaken the rigour of cultural regimentation. In the literature of the proletarian new order, there was no place for humanist dreams. Music, poetry and drama should be free from all abstraction and individualist emotionalism; they must depict "the socialist reality" and glorify "the new hero of our time—the hero of industry, the Soviet worker."

The significance of the crazy campaign was that the Communist new order should be proud of the capitalist heritage of the enslavement of man through technology and mass production; but the humanist tradition, liberal ideas, democratic ways of life, and moral values of the

modern civilisation, should be condemned as "corrupting bourgeois prejudices". For thus disowning the sum total of the positive achievements of the old order, the entire cultural heritage of Europe, as antagonistic to its purpose, the Communist revolution forfeits its historical significance, and is itself disowned by Europe.

POSTSCRIPT

POSTSCRIPT

DURING the latter half of 1948, events moved faster than the printing press. They must, however, be left out of the purview of this study. Otherwise, its publication will be indefinitely delayed. Any review of contemporary history is bound to be incomplete. This postscript is added only to mention the more significant facts indicating the general tendency of developments.

The Russian-sponsored cult of Communist Nationalism or National-Communism is so very self-contradictory that it was bound to create problems baffling even for the dialectic skill of Marxist scholasticism, in practice. Ever since the termination of the second world war, the Russians have been grappling with these problems throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The frontiers of the Socialist Fatherland were pushed westwards almost to the middle of Europe, on the background of a struggle between international Communism and Slav nationalism developing throughout those parts of the world.

In the spring news leaked out that Patrascanu, the leader of the Roumanian Communist Party, had been expelled from the party and placed under arrest for the "nationalist deviation"—of opposing the project of Roumania's incorporation in the Soviet Union. Patrascanu was not only the leader of the party in power; he was also the Minister of Justice, that is, head of the police. His expulsion and arrest showed that the Russians were the real rulers of the country. It was further reported that a number of other leading members of the Roumanian Communist Party belonged to the "nationalist group" and were similarly dealt with. They must have taken seriously the lesson of national sovereignty taught by the Russian Communists. But they did not learn the neo-Marxist dialectics, that Communist Nationalism must consummate

itself in the oneness of the Socialist Fatherland. The fundamental dogma of this modern scholasticism is the identity of theory and practice. The dogma is backed up by power; given power, any theory can be practised, and the most absurd theory justified pragmatically.

While Roumania was causing anxiety to the Russian patrons of Communist Nationalism, a more serious development took place in Yugoslavia. Evidently, it was to deal with that new crisis that the Cominform met, and the fact that it met not at its headquarters at Belgrade indicated the measure of the gravity of the crisis. Its resolution excommunicating Marshal Tito and expelling the entire Communist Party of Yugoslavia is staggering. Next to Stalin, Tito was for years the most outstanding personality of the Communist world. He had his days in Russia; but he was not a hero made by the Russians. He gained fame and rose to power mostly by his own merits.

On June 19th, the Cominform issued a communique calling upon the Yugoslav Communist Party to change its policy and leaders, particularly Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovitch. It may be noted that Kardelj stands next to Tito in the political life of the country, being the Vice-Premier; Djilas is the Secretary of the Communist Party; and Rankovitch is also a man of equal importance. Not only were these top leaders picked out for grave accusations; the entire Central Committee of the Communist Party was accused of having "placed itself and the whole of party out of the family of brotherly Communist Parties, outside the United Communist Front, and therefore outside the ranks of the Cominform." It was nothing less serious than a *coup d'état;* it was a call, indeed, an order for the overthrow of the entire political leadership of the country.

The gravamen of the charge against the leaders of the Communist régime in Yugoslavia is that they had "silently accepted the bourgeois nationalist theory that

capitalist States represent a lesser danger to Yugoslavia's independence than the Soviet Union. . . The anti-Soviet conception was suited only to nationalism." Tito and his followers "attempted to revise Marxism and Leninism, which taught the necessity of the hegemony of the Communist Party." There are long subsidiary charges which do not deserve serious consideration, being of the order of the pot calling the kettle black; for example, "there is dictatorship inside the Yugoslav Communist Party", which suppressed democracy, etc.

The Communist régime in Yugoslavia has deviated towards Nationalism, and tried to defend national sovereignty (glorified by neo-Marxism and championed by the Russian Communists) at the cost of loyality to the Socialist Fatherland, that is to say, has not been sufficiently subservient to the super-communist overlords from Russia. According to the communiqué of the Cominform, "Soviet specialists had been put under a special régime and supervised by the Yugoslav Security Police". Similar methods are said to have been applied also to the representative of the Soviet Communist Party and to a number of official Russian representatives. "This wrong policy of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Party was revealed by the Soviet Communist Party", and the "Cominform agreed". So, in reality it is not a rift in the Communist camp, but a conflict between Russian overlordship and nationalist "deviation" of the Communist régime in Yugoslavia.

The concrete instance of the "wrong policy" for which Tito's régime is accused of disloyalty to the Socialist Fatherland and Communist Brotherhood is the Five Year Plan of economic reconstruction, characterised in the anathema as "ambitious and unrealistic". Most probably, the Yugoslavian plan is such as cannot be fitted into the scheme of Soviet economy. In that case, it is quite conceivable that Tito, believing, not without justification, that he is entitled to a degree of independent action, would

explore other possibilities for the reconstruction of his country. It is equally conceivable how any such attempt would almost inevitably compel Yugoslavia to transgress the rigid limits of the autarchic system of the Soviet Eastern Bloc. Ever since this very natural tendency was encouraged by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the Russians began condemning "bourgeois nationalism" and replaced coalition governments by out and out Communist dictatorships in one country after another. But the ghost of nationalism, invoked with an opportunist purpose, cannot be exorcised; it behaves like Banquo's head. Eventually it broke out, in the most objectionable manner, it seems, under the oldest Communist dictatorship outside Russia. A veritable boomerang for the Russians. How would they parry?

Under ordinary circumstances, the anathema would send the accursed into political wilderness. It is long since the Russians have devised very effective methods of eliminating the leaders of any Communist Party who showed signs of independence, even if they commanded the support of their respective parties. It is the same as in the case of the Catholic Church. The anathema is pronounced against selected sinners: the unthinking faithful flock in no time deserts the accursed; the abstraction of international leadership and discipline triumphs. In the present case of Yugoslavia, the branded sinners are in power; if Tito can retain the confidence of the army, which is largely his creation, he may not have to play Barbarossa; his may be a successful revolt against the national-communist Church. That will mean a major defeat for the Russians in the international game of power-politics—a defeat perhaps of greater significance than that recently suffered in Italy. Tito's excommunication is therefore not a matter of Communist domestic quarrels; it is of international importance and may have far-reaching consequences. Not only in Italy, but also in France the Communists would

find themselves in a very awkward position in consequence of the excommunication of Tito. One of his crimes is to have made concessions to peasant proprietors. Now the Communist Party in France is committed exactly to that concession. The Yugoslav affair will surely make it very difficult for the Communists in Italy to persuade the peasants to believe in their promises.

And finally, what about the claim that the Communists are the tallest partriots and stoutest defenders of national independence. Communism has gained considerable ground in France and Italy as the most uncompromising champion of national interest and the purest of patriots. How will they keep up that pretension when the tallest of the poppies may be laid low for not subordinating the interest of his country to that of the Socialist Fatherland? The scholastic distinction between bourgeois nationalism and proletarian patriotism cannot carry any conviction outside the ranks of the faithful. The Yugoslav crisis reveals the artificiality of the international politico-economic system based upon the self-contradictory cult of National-Communism. It may survive this particular crisis. Tito may go the way of Trotzky. But eventually, the choice for the "People's Democracies" of the Soviet Zone will be between complete absorption in Greater Russia or war of national independence against the Moscovite conquerors.

Pan-Slavism, like any other expansionist chauvinistic nationalism, is a double-edged sword. Hitching its wagon to that fickle star, Communism launched upon a dangerous adventure in the Balkans. The revolt of Tito was almost a foregone conclusion. The Yugoslav leader is very largely a self-made man; as regards outside help, he got more from Churchill than from Stalin. Therefore, it is natural for him to give expression to the ambition of Balkan (South-Slav) Nationalism. But the plan of an autonomous Balkan Federation was first sponsored by Dimitrov, a leader of international Communism made in Moscow. That

is a very significant fact. The unstable amalgam of National-Communism was bound to break up, particularly in that part of the world where Nationalism is the strongest passion of political life. Dimitrov did not want to wait until Tito took the initiative in the struggle to subordinate Communism to Nationalism. But the Russians had not liberated the Balkans to let it become an independent nationalist politico-economic unit. All the countries liberated by the Red Army, even if the liberation took place under the banner of Nationalism, albeit dyed red, were eventually to be incorporated in the Socialist Fatherland. Therefore, the idea of a Balkan Federation, though championed by a leader of international Communism, was discountenanced in Moscow. The unstability of the curious amalgam of National-Communism was exposed.

Tito is more qualified for, as well as entitled to, the leadership of the projected Balkan Federation, which would be more nationalistic than communist. (From the democratic point of view, there is little to choose between the two perspectives, both of totalitarianism and dictatorship.) But it seems that, relying upon the possibility of entrenching himself in an independent position, Tito desired to take time, which would work in his favour. Thanks to the fact that he had built up the nucleus of an army, loyal to himself, and also to the goegraphical position of his country, Tito could maintain a degree of independence of the Russian liberators. Post-war Yugoslavia is rather a buffer than a Russian satellite; and as a buffer it may go one way or the other. This uncertainty inherent in the status of a buffer State is increased, to the prejudice of Russia, by the fact that, while Nationalism is ingrained, Communism is a thin veneer and itself has promoted the nationalist aspirations. For all these considerations, Tito was in no hurry, preferring to bide his time.

Dimitrov's ambition forced Tito's hand. It was surprising that the former should advocate something

repugnant to his patrons. But the dictator of Bulgaria is famous for his brawn, not brain. Having been pampered by the Russians, he believed that they would not grudge him his ambition to be the overlord of the Balkans, particularly when he never dreamt of ever going against them. Nor did the Russians fear that their creature would ever dare go against them; but they were realistic enough to detect the rumbling of Nationalism. Naturally desiring to nip the danger of the boomerang in the bud, the Russians not only rebuked Dimitrov publicly for his indiscretion, but decided to go ahead immediately with the plan of incorporating the Balkans in the Socialist Fatherland. Tito could wait no longer. He sponsored the counter-plan of a Balkan Federation; having disapproved of it previously, the Russians regarded it as a move against their position in the Balkans. They had watched with anxiety Tito's endeavour to maintain a degree of independence.

In the Yugoslav plan of economic reconstruction, top priority was given, on the insistence of Russian experts, to building roads towards the Greek frontier. The economic interest of the country was to be subordinated to the strategic considerations of Russia. Opposition to the plan was condemned and suppressed as "bourgeois nationalist deviation". Not wishing to risk a premature clash, Tito sang the Russian tune, but hastened to rectify his apparent affront to the nationalist sentiment by promulgating an agrarian programme which pacified the peasantry, the mass basis of Nationalism. The concession to peasant proprietorship figures prominently in the charge-sheet against Tito; the allegations of his having tried to weaken the position of the Russians in Yugoslavia are deduced from that main charge. But because Yugoslavia was virtually a buffer State, more nationalist than communist, the Russians also had to go slow until Dimitrov's maladroit ambition precipitated the situation.

It is significant that a programme adopted by the

Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party gave prominence to the plan of a Balkan Federation, giving the signal for the nationalist revolt against Communist internationalism, which has now come to be the fraudulent label for Russian expansionism. It is still more significant that such a tendentious programme was published together with Tito's statement in reply to the Cominform communiqué anathemising him. That was a gesture of deliberate defiance, with the object of rallying Nationalism against Communism. And the fact that in this conflict the cause of Nationalism is championed by a veteran Communist, who still pledges loyalty to the professed faith, only shows to what depth of confusion and degeneration has Communism been degraded by the stupidity and power-lust of the Russians.

The defeat in Italy frustrated the Russian strategy of a grand encircling movement preparatory to a thrust westwards from Berlin and the newly secured salient of Czechoslovakia. The fond hope of Communism coming to power constitutionally in Italy and France having disappeared in consequence of the experience in those two countries, the Russians immediately fell back upon their earlier plan of a frontal attack, which would almost certainly precipitate an international armed clash. Nothing could possibly stop the Red Army reaching the Rhine. The war, however, was not at all likely to be won with the first successful stroke. That would only be the beginning of a protracted struggle, and the greater potentials of America might tell in the long run. Only that consideration seems to have stayed the hands of the Russians, who are admittedly determined to conquer the whole of Europe for Communism.

Nevertheless, since the spring they have been pursuing an extremely provocative policy in Berlin. The immediate object of the policy obviously is to drive the Western Powers out of the German capital. The latter, on their

part, have made it clear that they would not give in without resistance. So, the events in Berlin represent a drift towards an international armed conflict, and the Russians appeared to be determined to force the issue whereas the others, conscious of the weakness of their position, were anxious to avoid it. In the beginning, it appeared that the Russians made a demonstration of power in Berlin in order to influence the election in Italy; vascillating elements were expected to take the stronger side. If that was the purpose, then the Russians should have altered their attitude in Berlin after the Italian election. But they acted in the contrary manner; their actions became even more provocative, sharpening the conflict to a point where it could no longer be regarded as a game of bluff. The Western Allies would not leave Berlin, and the Russians are determined to drive them out. There is no other explanation for their policy, which evidently is to set up in Berlin, cleared of the Western Powers, a Government which will claim authority in the whole of Germany.

Having failed to attain that object without precipitating an armed clash, which the Russians evidently did not dare as yet, they have finally abandoned even the formal co-operation with the Western Powers by setting up their own military administration of the eastern parts of Berlin. It seems that the Russians are, for the time being at any rate, reconciled to the *status quo* of a divided Europe. They must set their house in order. Tito's Yugoslavia remains a thorn in their side.

While trying to stabilise the *status quo* in Europe, the Russians have turned their attention towards Asia, which seems to hold out promises for a swifter march of the revolution. Spectacular achievements in China have more than compensated for the setbacks suffered by Communism in Europe. If the Communists overrun China (and at the moment it appears that nothing can stop them),

the tidal wave of revolution may sweep over the whole of South-East Asia. But it will not be a revolution; a large part of the globe will be plunged into a ruinous civil war and chaos. The countries of South-East Asia as well as China have already had a foretaste of that grim possibility.

APPENDICES

Appendix C

TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following agreement:

Article One.—Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.

Article Two.—Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.

Article Three.—The Government of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

Article Four.—Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

Article Five.—Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

ARTICLE SIX.—The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.

ARTICLE SEVEN.—The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich
Signed: v. RIBBENTROP

With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.
Signed: V. MOLOTOV

SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

On the occasion of the signature of the Non-aggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversation the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognised by each party.

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrange-

ment of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. S. R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded, can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event, both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to South-eastern Europe, attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.

4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government	Plenipotentiary of the
of the German Reich	Government of the U. S.S.R.
Signed: v. RIBBENTROP	Signed: V. MOLOTOV

APPENDIX D

CHURCHILL'S BROADCAST ADDRESS ON THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA, JUNE 22, 1941.

"We have reached one of the climacterics of the war. At four o'clock this morning, Hitler attacked and invaded Russia. All his usual formalities of perfidy were observed with scrupulous technique. A non-aggression treaty had been solemnly signed and was in force between the two countries. No complaint had been made by Germany of its non-fulfilment. Under its cloak of false confidence, the German armies drew up in immense strength along a line which stretches from the White Sea to the Black Sea; and their air fleets and armoured divisions slowly and methodically took their stations. Then suddenly, without declaration of war, without even an ultimatum, German bombs rained down from the air upon the Russian cities, the German troops violated the frontiers; and an hour later, the German Ambassador, who till the night before was lavishing his assurances of friendship, almost of alliance, upon the Russians, called upon the Russian Foreign Minister to tell him that a state of war existed between Germany and Russia.

"Thus was repeated on a far larger scale the same kind of outrage against every form of signed compact and international faith which we have witnessed in Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium, and which Hitler's accomplice and jackal Mussolini so faithfully imitated in the case of Greece.

"All this was no surprise to me. In fact, I gave clear and precise warning to Stalin of what was coming. I gave him warning as I have given warning to others before. I can only hope that this warning did not fall unheeded. All we know at present is that the Russian people are de-

fending their native soil and that their leaders have called upon them to resist to the utmost.

" Hitler is a monster of wickedness, insatiable in his lust for blood and plunder. Not content with having all Europe under his heel, or else terrorised into various forms of abject submission, he must now carry his work of butchery and desolation among the vast multitudes of Russia and of Asia. The terrible military machine, which we and the rest of the civilised world so foolishly, so supinely, so insensately allowed the Nazi gangsters to build up year by year from almost nothing, cannot stand idle lest it rust or fall to pieces. It must be in continual motion, grinding up human lives and trampling down the homes and the rights of hundreds of millions of men. Moreover, it must be fed, not only with flesh, but with oil.

" So, now this blood-thirsty guttersnipe must launch his mechanised armies upon new fields of slaughter, pillage and devastation. Poor as are the Russian peasants, workmen and soldiers, he must steal from them their daily bread; he must devour their harvests; he must rob them of the oil which drives their ploughs; and thus produce a famine without example in human history. And even the carnage and ruin which his victory, should he gain it—he has not gained it yet—will bring upon the Russian people, will itself be only a stepping-stone to the attempt to plunge the four or five hundred millions who live in China, and the three hundred and fifty millions who live in India, into that bottomless pit of human degradation over which the diabolic emblem of the Swastika flaunts itself. It is not too much to say here, this summer evening, that the lives and happiness of a thousand million additional people are now menaced with brutal Nazi violence. That is enough to make us hold our breath. But presently, I shall show you something else that lies behind, and something that touches very nearly the life of Britain and of the United States.

"The Nazi regime is indistinguishable from the worst features of Communism. It is devoid of all theme and principle except appetite and racial domination. It excels all forms of human wickedness in the efficiency of its cruelty and ferocious aggression. No one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it. But all this fades away before the spectacle which it now unfolding. The past with its crimes, its follies and its tragedies, flashes away. I see the Russian soldiers standing on the threshold of their native land, guarding the fields which their fathers have tilled from time immemorial. I see them guarding their homes where mothers and wives pray—ah yes, for there are times when all pray—for the safety of their loved ones, the return of the bread-winner, of their champion, of their protector. I see the ten thousand villages of Russia, where the means of existence were wrung so hardly from the soil, but where there are still primordial human joys, where maidens laugh and children play. I see advancing upon all this in hideous onslaught, the Nazi war machine, with its clanking, heel-clocking, dandified Prussian officers, its crafty expert agents fresh from the cowing and tying-down of a dozen countries. I see also the dull, drilled, docile, brutish masses of the Hun soldiers plodding on like a swarm of crawling locusts. I see the German bombers and fighters in the sky, still smarting from many a British whipping, delighted to find what they believe is an easier and a safer prey.

"Behind all this glare, behind all this storm, I see that small group of villainous men who plan, organise and launch this cataract of horrors upon mankind. And then my mind goes back across the years to the days when the Russian armies were our allies against the same deadly foe; when they fought with so much valour and constancy, and helped to gain a victory from all share

in which, alas, they were—through no fault of ours—utterly cut off. I have lived through all this, and you will pardon me if I express my feelings and the stir of old memories.

"But now I have to declare the decision of His Majesty's Government—and I feel sure it is a decision in which the great Dominions will, in due course, concur—for we must speak out now at once, without a day's delay. I have to make the declaration, but can you doubt what our policy will be? We have but one aim and one single, irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi régime. From this nothing will turn us—nothing. We will never parley, we will never negotiate with Hitler or any of his gang. We shall fight him by land, we shall fight him by sea, we shall fight him in the air, until with God's help we have rid the earth of his shadow and liberated its peoples from his yoke. Any man or State who fights on against Nazidom will have our aid. Any man or State who marches with Hitler is our foe. This applies not only to organised States, but to all representatives of that vile race of Quislings who make themselves the tools and agents of the Nazi regime against their fellow-countrymen and the lands of their birth. They—these Quislings—like the Nazi leaders themselves, if not disposed of by their fellow-countrymen, which would save trouble, will be delivered by us on the morrow of victory to the justice of the Allied tribunals. That is our policy and that is our declaration. It follows, therefore, that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people. We shall appeal to all our friends and allies in every part of the world to take the same course and pursue it, as we shall, faithfully and steadfastly to the end.

"We have offered the Government of Soviet Russia any technical or economic assistance which is in our power, and which is likely to be of service to them. We shall bomb Germany by day as well as by night in ever-increas-

ing measure, casting upon them month by month a heavier discharge of bombs, and making the German people taste and gulp each month a sharper dose of the miseries they have showered upon mankind. From now forward the main expansion of our Air Force proceeds with gathering speed. In another six months, the weight of the help we are receiving from the United States in war materials of all kinds and especially in heavy bombers, will begin to tell.

"This is no class war, but a war in which the whole British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations is engaged without distinction of race, creed or party. It is not for me to speak of the action of the United States, but this I will say: if Hitler imagines that his attack on Soviet Russia will cause the slightest division of aims or slackening of effort in the great Democracies who are resolved upon his doom, he is woefully mistaken. On the contrary, we shall be fortified and encouraged in our efforts to rescue mankind from his tyranny. We shall be strengthened and not weakened in determination and in resources.

"This is no time to moralise on the follies of countries and Governments which have allowed themselves to be struck down one by one, when by united action they could have saved themselves and saved the world from this catastrophe. But when I spoke a few minutes ago of Hitler's blood-lust and the hateful appetites which have impelled or lured him on his Russian adventure, I said there was one deeper motive behind his outrage. He wishes to destroy the Russian power because he hopes that, if he succeeds in this, he will be able to bring back the main strength of his army and air force from the East and hurl it upon this Island, which he knows he must conquer or suffer the penalty of his crimes. His invasion of Russia is no more than a prelude to an attempted invasion of the British Isles. He hopes, no doubt, that all this may be accomplished before the winter comes, and that he can overwhelm Great Britain before the fleet and air power of

the United States may intervene. He hopes that he may once again repeat, upon a greater scale than ever before, that process of destroying his enemies one by one, by which he has so long thrived and prospered, and that then the scene will be clear for the final act, without which all his conquests would be in vain—namely, the subjugation of the Western Hemisphere to his will and to his system.

"The Russian danger is therefore our danger, and the danger of the United States, just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free men and free peoples in every quarter of the globe. Let us learn the lessons already taught by such cruel experience. Let us redouble our exertions, and strike with united strength while life and power remain."

Appendix E

STALIN'S SPEECH SOON AFTER THE GERMAN ATTACK

"Comrades, Citizens, Brothers and Sisters, Fighters of our Army and Navy! I am addressing myself to you in the grave moment of the attack of Hitler's Germany on our country. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, despite the fact that the best divisions of the enemy and the best units of his air-force have already been beaten and have found their graves on the battle-field, the enemy continues to push forwards and throw new forces to the front. Hitler's armies have succeeded in seizing Lithuania, the greater part of Latvia, the Western part of White Russia and part of the Western Ukraine.

"A serious danger is threatening our country. How could it happen that our glorious Red Army had to surrender a number of towns to the Fascist invaders? As a belligerent country, Germany was fully mobilised, and 170 divisions had been moved to the frontier, standing in readiness, awaiting the signal for the offensive, whereas our troops had still to be mobilised and moved to the frontiers. If part of our territory has been occupied by Fascist troops, this is due chiefly to the fact that the war began under conditions which were not advantageous for our army. We did not want to do anything which might be the pretext for an attack on our frontiers.

"History shows that there are no invincible armies. Napoleon's army was considered invincible, but it was defeated. The German army during the first imperialist war also considered itself invincible, but was defeated. The same must happen to Hitler's Fascist army. This army *has not heretofore met any serious resistance; but having* invaded our territory, it has met a serious resistance. As

a result of this resistance, the best divisions of the Fascist army have been beaten. This means that it will be defeated just as the armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm II were defeated.

"Fascist Germany has suddenly perfidiously violated the non-aggression pact between her and the U.S.S.R. without regard for the fact that she would be considered by the whole world as the aggressor. One might ask: How could the U.S.S.R. conclude a non-aggression pact with such felons and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was it not a mistake? Of course not. A pact of non-aggression is a pact of peace between two countries. It was such a pact that Germany offered us in 1939. Could the U.S.S.R. reject such an aggreement with a neighbouring State, even if at the head of that State stood such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop?

"What did we gain by concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany? We assured our country peace for eighteen months and the opportunity to get our forces ready for the eventuality of Germany attacking us despite the pact.

"What did Germany gain and lose by felonously tearing up the pact and committing aggression against the U.S.S.R.? The Fascists have secured a certain short-term military advantage, but have lost politically, being condemned by the whole world as blood-thirsty aggressors. This short-lived military advantage will be only an episode, whereas the enormous political advantage for us is a serious and lasting factor which will be the basis of decisive military successes of the Red Army.

"All the best men in Europe, America and Asia and finally all the best men in Germany brand the action of the German Fascists as perfidious, and sympathise with the Soviet peoples, approve their course of action, and see that our cause is just, and that the enemy must be crushed, and we must win.

"Our troops are fighting heroically against an enemy abundantly supplied with tanks and aeroplanes. Overcoming numerous difficulties, they are fighting with self-denial for every inch of the Soviet land. The main force of the Red Army, provided with thousands of tanks and aircrafts, are just entering into action. Our resistance to the enemy increases. The entire Soviet people is rising in defence of their country.

"It is necessary that we should understand the gravity of the danger which threatens our country. We must avoid complacency cultivated during the years of peaceful construction. The enemy is crafty and merciless. He wants to conquer our land; he wants to seize our magnificent industries built by the Soviet workers and which belong to them; he wants to steal the grain raised by the workers in our collective farms; he wants to rob our petrol pumped by Soviet workers; he wants to deprive the Soviet peoples of their freedom and economic prosperity. He wants to restore Tzarism and bring back the princes and landlords. He wants to destroy the national culture and the national States of the free peoples of the Soviet Union, of the Ukrainians, of the Georgians, of the Armenians, Usbeks, Tartars. He wants to Germanise them and to transform them into the slaves of German princes and barons. He wants to drive the Soviet land into the darkness of barbarism. It is, therefore, a question of life and death for the Soviet peoples and the Soviet State. It is a question whether the people shall be free or shall be enslaved. All citizens should cease to be complacent, and the entire Soviet people must be on war-footing.

"They should have no mercy for the enemy, nor should there be any place in our ranks for grumblers, cowards and panicmongers. Lenin used to say that the basic quality of the Soviet people should be heroism and fearlessness. The Red Army and the Soviet people are endowed with those Bolshevist virtues. We must subordi-

nate everything to the interests of the front and the task of crushing the enemy. The peoples of the Soviet Union must rise to defend their rights and their land against the enemy.

"The war against Fascist Germany is not to be regarded as an ordinary war. It is not a war between two armies. It is a war of the whole Soviet people against the Fascist rulers of Germany. The object of this war against the Fascist invaders is not only to defend the U.S.S.R., but also to help the liberation of all the peoples of Europe groaning under the Fascist yoke, including the German people. In this war of liberation, we are not alone. In this great war, we shall have faithful allies in the peoples of Europe and America, and the people of Germany, oppressed and tyrannised by the Fascist ruling clique. Our war for the freedom of our country is merged in the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for the defence of democratic freedom. It is a united front of the peoples who stand for freedom against the threat of enslavement by Hitler's Fascist army, for culture and progress against barbarism. That is the meaning of the historic speech of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, who promised all support to the Soviet Union, and of the declaration of the Government of the United States confirming their readiness to give us assistance, which cannot but fill the heart of the Soviet people with gratitude.

"Comrades! Our forces are united. The arrogant enemy will soon realise this. The Red Army represents workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia, rising to fight the invaders. Let the millions of our working people rise like one man, in every village, in every collective farm, in every workshop. The workers of Moscow and Leningrad have already begun energetically to create such people's militias for supporting the Red Army. Every nation which is threatened with invasion must create such a people's army.

"The army and navy and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet soil and fight to the last drop of their blood to defend their towns and villages. We must organise assistance to the Red Army in all fields, direct all our efforts towards increasing its ranks as well as ensuring that it is supplied with all that is necessary. We must organise speedy transportation of troops, food stuffs and munitions. We must work out a scheme of local defence for the protection of central power stations, telephone and telegraphic centres. There shall be a ruthless campaign against all disorganisers in the rear, panic-mongers and spies, saboteurs and enemy parachutists. We must remember that the enemy is crafty, experienced in deceit and propagation of false rumours. All who hinder the task of defence will be immediately brought before the military tribunals, regardless of their rank.

"In the event of a retreat of the Red Army, all railway stock shall be brought away; not a single locomotive or coach shall be left to the enemy; nor a pound of grain, nor a gallon of petrol. Farmers should take away all their cattle and place their corn in the care of the State to be transported to the rear. Everything that cannot be removed must be destroyed. In the areas occupied by the enemy, guerilla detachments must be created as well as groups of saboteurs entrusted with the task of fighting the enemy everywhere through guerilla warfare, by blowing up bridges and roads, by wrecking telephone and telegraphic communications and setting fire to forests, godowns and trains. It is necessary to create unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices in the invaded areas. This is not a war between two armies, but a great struggle of the whole Soviet people against the invading Fascist army. Every man, every woman, every child must take part in this struggle.

"I appeal to the whole Soviet people to organise themselves around the party of Lenin and the Soviet Government, to support with the greatest sacrifice the Red Army and Navy, in order to annihilate the enemy; for our victory and for the liberation of the peoples subjugated by Fascism. Comrades, forward to victory!"

Appendix F

ANGLO-SOVIET TREATY

PREAMBLE

The King of Great Britain and the President of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. have decided to conclude a treaty of alliance in the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe, and of collaboration and mutual assistance thereafter between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Article One.—In virtue of the alliance established between the United Kingdom and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the high contracting parties mutually undertake to afford one another military and other assistance and support of all kinds in the war against Germany and all those States which are associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article Two.—The high contracting parties undertake not to enter into any negotiations with the Hitlerite Government or any other Government in Germany that does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions and not to negotiate or conclude, except by mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty with Germany or any other State associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Article Three.—(1) The high contracting parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period; (2) pending the adoption of such proposals, they will, after the termination of hostilities, take all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany or any of the States associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

ARTICLE FOUR.—Should one of the high contracting parties during the post-war period become involved in hostilities with Germany or any of the States mentioned in article three (2) in consequence of an attack by that State against that party, the other high contracting party will at once give to the contracting party so involved in hostilities all military and other support and assistance in his power.

This Article shall remain in force until the high contracting parties by mutual agreement shall recognise that it is superseded by the adoption of proposals contemplated in Article Three (1). In default of adoption of such proposals, it shall remain in force for a period of twenty years and thereafter until terminated by either of the high contracting parties as provided in Article Eight.

ARTICLE FIVE.—The high contracting parties, having regard to interests of the security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organisation of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects and will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

ARTICLE SIX.—The high contracting parties agree to render one another all possible economic assistance after the war.

ARTICLE SEVEN.—Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other high contracting party.

ARTICLE EIGHT.—The present treaty is subject to ratification in the shortest possible time and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Moscow as soon as possible. It comes into force immediately on the exchange

of the instruments of ratification and shall thereupon replace the agreement between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom signed at Moscow on July 12, 1941.

Articles One and Two of the present treaty shall remain in force until the re-establishment of peace between the high contracting parties and Germany and the Powers associated with her in acts of aggression in Europe.

Articles Three to Seven of the present treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years. Thereafter, unless twelve month's notice has been given by either party to terminate the treaty at the end of the said period of twenty years, it shall continue in force until twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall have given notice to the other in writing of his intention to terminate it.

London, May 26, 1942. SIGNED BY ANTHONY EDEN
V. MOLOTOV.

Appendix G

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS' CONFERENCE AT MOSCOW

The following is the full text of a communique issued from London regarding the decisions taken at the Three Powers' Conference in Moscow:

"A conference of the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, Mr. Cordell Hull, of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, and of the Soviet Union, M. Molotov, took place at Moscow from October 19 to October 30, 1943. There were twelve meetings.

"The agenda included all questions submitted for discussion by the three Governments. Some of the questions called for final decisions and these were taken. On other questions, after discussion decisions on principle were taken. These questions were referred for detailed consideration to commissions specially set up for the purpose or reserved for treatment through diplomatic channels. Other questions again were disposed of by exchange of views.

"The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have been in close co-operation in all matters concerning the common war effort. But this is the first time that the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments have been able to meet together in a conference. In the first place, there were frank and exhaustive discussions of measures to be taken to shorten the war against Germany and her satellites in Europe. Advantage was taken of the presence of military advisers representing the respective Chiefs of Staff in order to discuss definite military operations with regard to which decisions have been taken, and which are already being prepared in order to create a basis for the closest military co-operation in future between the three countries.

"The Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that the three Governments are in complete agreement that the allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influence and emanations shall be utterly destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish government and other institutions based upon democratic principles. The Foreign Secretaries of the United States and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their governments from the inception of the invasion of the Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

"The Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

"(1) It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

"(2) Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of press and of public meetings shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-fascist political groups.

"(3) All institutions and organisations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.

"(4) All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from institutions and organisations of a public character.

"(5) All political prisoners of the Fascist régime shall be released and accorded full amnesty.

"(6) Democratic Organs of Local Government shall be created.

"(7) Fascist Chiefs and army Generals, known or

suspected to be war criminals, shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

"In making this declaration, the three Foreign Secretaries recognise that so long as active military operations continue in Italy, the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs-of Staff. The three Governments, who are parties to this declaration, will at the request of any one of them consult on this matter. It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of Government.

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States have agreed that Austria, the first country to fall a victim to Nazi aggression, shall be liberated from German domination. They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany's penetration of March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see re-established a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighbouring States which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security, which is the only basis for lasting peace. Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

"The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres, and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and from which they

are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing, and all peoples of territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of Government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers, and that in their desperation the recoiling Hitler Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by the monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union, which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on the French and Italian territory.

"Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the interest of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: At the time of the granting of any armistice to any Government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or have taken consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free Governments which will be erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible details from all these countries, having regard specially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy. Thus, the Germans who took part in wholesale shootings of Polish officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in the territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who

have hitherto not imbued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to the accusers in order that justice may be done. The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of German criminals whose offences have no particular geographical location and who will be punished by a joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.

"Second only to the importance of hastening the end of the war was the recognition by the three Governments that it was essential in their own national interests and in the interests of all the peace-loving nations to continue the present close collaboration and co-operation in the conduct of the war into the period following the end of hostilities, and that only in this way could peace be maintained and the political, economic and social welfare of their peoples fully promoted.

"The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China, united in their determination in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations to continue hostilities against these Axis Powers with which they respectively are at war until such Powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender; conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the people allied to them from the menace of aggression; recognising the necessity of ensuring rapid and orderly transit from the war to the peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, jointly declare:

"(1) That their united action pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies will be continued for the organisation and maintenance of the peace and security;

"(2) That those of them at war with the common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy;

"(3) That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed on the enemy;

"(4) That they recognise the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States and open to membership by all such States, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security;

"(5) That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with each other and with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the comity of nations;

"(6) That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces in the territories of other States except for purposes envisaged in this declaration after joint consultation; and

"(7) That they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period."

Appendix H

THE YALTA STATEMENT

"We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied Powers for the final defeat of the common enemy.

"The Military Staffs of the three Allied Powers have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer co-ordination of the military effort of the three Allied Powers. The fullest information has been inter-changed. The timing, scope and co-ordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north and south, have been fully agreed and planned in detail. Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three Staffs attained at this conference will result in shortening the war. The meetings of the three Staffs will be continued in future whenever the need arises.

"Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue hopeless resistance.

"We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany is accomplished.

"Under agreed plans, forces of the three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany; co-ordinated administration and control has been provided for under

the plan through a Central Control Commission consisting of the supreme commanders of the three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three Powers, if she should so desire, to take a zone of occupation and to participate as the fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four Governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

"It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces, break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment, eliminate or control all German industries that could be used for military production; bring all the war criminals to justice and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organisations and institutions; remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public offices and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.

"It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for the Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations.

"We have considered the question of damage caused by Germany to the Allied nations in this war and recognise it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for the damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question

of extent and methods for compensating the damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

"We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our Allies of a general international organisation to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential both to prevent aggression and remove political, economic and social causes of war through close and continuous collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

"The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not reached there. The present conference has been able to resolve the difficulty. We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the U. S. A. on April 25th, 1945, to prepare a Charter of such an organisation along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

"The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. As soon as consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

"We have drawn up and subscribed to a declaration on liberated Europe. This declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles."

February, 1945

(Sd.) Winston Churchill
(Sd.) Franklin D. Roosevelt
(Sd.) J. V. Stalin

Declaration of Joint Policy

The Premier of the U.S.S.R., the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples of Europe liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the people of former Axis satellite States to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. The establishment of order in Europe and rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.

This is the principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by aggressor nations and to foster conditions in which liberated peoples may exercise these rights. The three Governments will jointly assist people in any European liberated State or a former Axis Satellite State in Europe where, in their judgment, conditions require:

Firstly, to establish conditions of peace; secondly, to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; thirdly, to form an interim government broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and fourthly, to facilitate wherever necessary holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult other United

Nations and the provisional authority of other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to themselves are under consideration. When in the opinion of the three Governments conditions in any European liberated State or any former Axis Satellite State in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on measures necessary to discharge joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration, we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter and our pledge in the declaration with other peace-loving nations of a world order dedicated to law, peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind. In issuing this declaration, the three Powers express the hope that the provisional government of the French Republic may be associated with themselves in the procedure suggested.

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our difference about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirmed our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussion, we have agreed on conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major Powers.

The agreement reached is as follows: A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland.

The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr are authorised as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with the view to a reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to holding free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections, all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have a right to take part and put forward candidates. When the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Governments consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digression from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and the west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course for the extent of these accessions and that final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

Yugoslavia: We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that

agreement. We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed, it should declare that: firstly, the Anti Fascist Assembly of National Liberation should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as the temporary Parliament; and secondly, legislative Acts passed by the Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly. There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

Meetings of Foreign Secretaries: Throughout the conference, besides daily meetings of the heads of Governments and Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries and their Advisers have also been held daily. These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the conference agreed that a permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will therefore meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London after the United Nations Conference on world organisation.

Unity for peace as for war: Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to the peoples of the world. Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realised—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford an assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and

want." It is considered that victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organisation will provide the greatest opportunity to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

Appendix I

THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT

On July 17th, 1945, the President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together with Mr. Clement R. Attlee, met in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. They were accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes, Mr. V. M. Molotov and Mr. Anthony Eden, the Chiefs of Staff and other advisers.

There were nine meetings between July 17th and July 25th. The conference was then interrupted for two days while the results of the British general election were being declared.

On July 28th, Mr. Attlee returned to the conference as Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. Four days of further discussion took place. During the course of the conference, there were regular meetings of the heads of the three Governments accompanied by the Foreign Secretaries and also of the Foreign Secretaries alone. Committees appointed by the Foreign Secretaries for preliminary consideration of questions before the conference also met daily.

The meetings of the conference were held at the Cecilienhof, near Potsdam. The conference ended on August 2, 1945.

Important decisions and agreements were reached. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the conference.

President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave the conference, which has strengthened the ties between the three Governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding, with renewed confidence that their Governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will insure the creation of a just and enduring peace.

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

The conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the five principal Powers to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the Governments participating in the Council.

The text of the agreement for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers is as follows:

1. There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

2. (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking deputy duly authorised to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1, 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

3. (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy,

Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilised for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany, when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks, the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purpose of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Ialy. Other members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the member governments.

4. (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases, it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the States chiefly interested in seeking solution of the particular problem.

In accordance with the decision of the conference, the three Governments have each addressed an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council.

The establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text will be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodic consultation among the Foreign

Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

The conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal task by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the co-ordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly, it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

III. GERMANY

The Allied Armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom, in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed.

Agreement has been reached at this conference on the political and economic principles of a co-ordinated Allied policy towards defeated Germany during the period of Allied control.

The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea Declaration on Germany. German militarism and *Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten* her neighbours or the peace of the world.

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that

the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world.

The text of the agreement is as follows:

The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period

A. Political Principles:

1. In accordance with the agreement on control machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instruction from their respective Governments, by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as it is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council will be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the S. S., S. A., S. D., and Gestapo, with all their organisations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organisations and all other military and quasi-

military organisations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganisation of German militarism and Nazism.

(b) All arms, ammunitions and implements of war and all specialised facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms and ammunitions and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organisations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to insure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful co-operation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler régime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed or political opinion, shall be abolished. No such discrimination, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organisations and

institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganised in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralisation of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) Local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) All democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussions shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) Representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and State (land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) For the time being, no Central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. Economic Priciples:

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunitions and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peace-time needs to meet the objectives stated in paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on reparations and approved by the governments concerned, or if not removed, shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralised for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organising the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation, Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end, common policies shall be established in regard to:

(a) Mining and industrial production and allocations;

(b) Agriculture, forestry and fishing;

(c) Wages, prices and rationing;

(d) Import and export programmes for Germany as a whole;

(e) Currency and banking, central taxation and customs;

(f) Reparation and removal of industrial war potential;

(g) Transportation and communications.

In applying these policies, account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy, but only to the extent necessary:

(a) To carry out programmes of industrial disarmament and demilitarisation, of reparations and of approved exports and imports;

(b) To assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany, and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries, excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.);

(c) To insure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports;

(d) To control German industry and all economic and

financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of achieving the other objectives named herein;

(e) To control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, etc., connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls, established by the Control Council, a German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measure shall be promptly taken:

(a) To effect essential repair of transport;

(b) To enlarge coal production;

(c) To maximise agricultural output; and

(d) To effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany, the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the reparations agreement.

IV. Reparations from Germany

In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached:

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the western zones and from appropriate German external assets;

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the western zones:

(a) Fifteen per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) Ten per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the western zones to be trans-

ferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removal of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the western zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed instalments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment not necessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the zone commander in the zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the western zones of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America renounce their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the eastern zone of occupation in

Germany as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Roumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

V. Disposal of the German Navy and Merchant Marine

The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the three Governments in due course.

VI. City of Koenigsberg and the adjacent area

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that, pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east-north of Braunsberg-Goldap to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the city of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VII. War Criminals

The three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943, have no particular geographical localisation.

The three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring those criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before September first.

VIII. Austria

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the City of Vienna.

IX. Poland

The Conference considered questions relating to the Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary of Poland.

On the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, they defined their attitude in the following statement:

A. We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in

accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, recognised by the three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government, as the recognised government of the Polish State, in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and the merchant marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government, in accordance with the decision of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of Poland:

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference, the three heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the conference and have fully presented their views. The three heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovakia frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this Conference, and including the area of the former Free City of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purpose should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

X Conclusion of Peace Treaties and Admission to the United Nations Organisation

The Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe.

The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland,

Hungary and Roumania should be terminated by the conclusion of peace treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part, the three Governments have included the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the New Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a peace treaty with a recognised and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing peace treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Roumania.

The conclusion of peace treaties with recognised democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations.

The three Governments agree to examine, each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organisation, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

1. Membership of the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above.

The three Governments feel bound, however, to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close associations with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

XI. Territorial Trusteeships

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government concerning trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation.

After an exchange of views on this question, it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XII. Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary

The three Governments took note that the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three Governments agree that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries and accepting as a basis the agreed proposals.

XIII. Orderly Transfer of German Populations

The Conference reached the following agreement on the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary:

The three Governments having considered the question in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from

Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions, pending the examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIV. Military Talks

During the Conference, there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest.

August 2, 1945

Approved: J. V. Stalin
Harry S. Truman
C. R. Attlee

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