PELICAN BOOKS

A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE

EPILOGUE (1895-1905)

BY

ELIE HALÉVY

BOOK I : IMPERIALISM

NOTE

This volume consists of BOOK I (IMPERIALISM) from the original edition of the Epilogue (1895–1905). The first volume of the original edition has already been completed in three volumes of the Pelican Series. The remainder of the work will follow in due course.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

A complete list of all Penguin and Pelican Books will be found at the end of this volume. If you are not already on our mailing list and would like to know when new books are added, please send in your name and address on a postcard. Suggestions for new additions are welcomed.

PELICAN BOOKS

A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE

EPILOGUE VOL. I

1895-1905

BY

ELIE HALÉVY

BOOK I : IMPERIALISM

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY
E. I. WATKIN



PUBLISHED BY
PENGUIN BOOKS LIMITED
HARMONDSWORTH MIDDLESEX ENGLAND

First published in English 1926
Published in Pelican Books 1939

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
HAZELL, WATSON & VINEY, LTD., LONDON AND AYLESBURY

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

THE Translator wishes to point out that the present volume embodies certain modifications and amplifications made by the Author in consequence of additional information made public since the French original appeared—particularly the publication of *British Documents*.

He also desires to thank Monsieur Halévy for reading the proofs and suggesting many valuable improvements, also Mr. D. A. Barker for proof reading and suggestions.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

WHEN, twenty years ago, I undertook the task of writing a general history of the English People during the nineteenth century I did not find it easy to decide where I should end my narrative. At Queen Victoria's death? But her death which occurred in the middle of the Boer war was in no sense a turning point in English history. With the conclusion of the Boer war in June 1902? But the peace of Vereeniging was at least the apparent victory of Chamberlain's imperialism, and could such a victory be considered the natural conclusion of a century which had given England a Robert Peel and a Gladstone, a Cobden and a Herbert Spencer? Or ought I perhaps to conclude with the election of 1906 and treat the downfall of the party which had linked its fortunes with those of an aggressive imperialism, and the revival of Liberalism or rather the advent of a new and more democratic Liberalism, as marking for Great Britain the real end of the nineteenth century? The years passed, the centenary of Waterloo was approaching and my indecision had not been dispelled, when the commencement of a great European war, in many respects comparable to that which had stained with blood the opening of the century seemed to provide the natural conclusion of my work. But more than ten years have passed since then, and I have come to another decision. I will conclude my narrative about the year 1895, that is to say, about the time when Gladstone disappeared from political life. Neither Chamberlain with his exploitation of the warlike passions of the democracy, nor Lloyd George, author of the budget of 1909, the Insurance Act of 1911 and the programme of land reform of 1912, were men of the Victorian age. The period between 1895 and 1914 does not belong to the British nineteenth century, as I understand it. It is at most the epilogue of that century, as it is the prologue of the century which opened with those four years of tremendous upheaval, both military and social.

Must I therefore abandon the idea of writing the history

of those nineteen years? I could not face without regret the prospect of leaving unused the mass of material I had accumulated when preparing the lectures which for almost thirty years I have given at the *Ecole libre des sciences politiques*. Or must I postpone writing it until I had completed my history of the nineteenth century? Life is too short for plans so remote to be safely formed. So I decided to write immediately the history of this epilogue of the nineteenth century in two volumes, of which the present is the first. I will return later to the Victorian age.

I will not, however, deny that the treatment of this period presents special difficulties to an historian like myself who has in a sense specialised in the history of the nineteenth century. Having approached the study of that epoch with a determination to treat it in a spirit of critical sympathy, and convinced that it was the culmination, or to speak less dogmatically, one of the culminations of British culture, it is difficult for me not to regard the subsequent period as, by comparison with its predecessor, a period of "decadence." But decadence is a dangerous word. It can only be applied without qualification to a period marked by a general decay of culture and a general decline of prosperity. But we find nothing of the sort in Great Britain during the years which I am studying. The country was becoming more civilised every day. Am I then prepared to maintain the paradox that "civilisation" and "decadence" are synonymous, and that England was suffering from over-civilisation? I must explain the special sense in which the term "decadence" is applicable to the period whose history I am about to relate.

On the one hand, whatever the improvements made in her national institutions, England felt an increasingly powerful conviction that her vitality was less than that of certain other nations, and that if she was progressing, her rate of progress was less rapid than theirs, that is to say, if not absolutely, at least relatively to her rivals, she was declining. It was this loss of confidence which explains the far-reaching change in her foreign policy which took place towards the end of the nineteenth century. The British Government, no longer certain that the country was sufficiently powerful to stand by herself, abandoned the

policy of " isolation," and sought external support in some system of alliances. I shall tell the story of the deliberate rapprochement with the United States of America, also of the advances made towards Germany and their ignominious failure, and I shall then describe the advances made to the enemies of Germany. I shall recount the developments which imperceptibly conducted Europe along the fatal path, hidden from so many contemporary observers, which led to the great war of 1914. In relating this history I shall make England the centre of my perspective, but I shall adopt a method possibly somewhat different from that often adopted. I shall not plead against or in favour of any government. In 1914 the aims respectively pursued by the different governments and which each regarded as legitimate proved incompatible with the maintenance of peace. Moreover the aims of the German government proved irreconciliable with the aims pursued by all the great nations, and in that sense Germany " deserved " the alliance which was formed against her. But I do not intend to discuss in its usual form the question of the " moral " responsibilty for the war. I hope the day has already gone by for the literature of war propaganda, and equally for that propaganda against war, which is itself a form of war propaganda.

We also witness the decline, if not of England herself, at least of the ideal which she had pursued for an entire century and which she had come to regard as the secret of her greatness.

The decline of that individualist form of Christianity in which Protestantism essentially consists, and a revival of Catholicism, or more generally, of the Catholic forms of Christianity. I shall mark the limits of that revival. I shall inquire whether it was not accompanied by a phenomenon of far deeper significance, a decline of the Christian faith, and should not be regarded as in certain respects its " euthanasia." But I shall not on that account deny its reality, but shall relate its progress in the objective spirit of the historian, leaving to the reader to decide how far the progress of this Catholic movement should be considered a phenomenon of senescence, fostered by the panic which dare not face the difficulties of inquiry and the

dangers of doubt, by moral weariness and intellectual timidity.

The simultaneous decline of economic individualism. The growth of Socialism. I shall relate that growth as an historian, not as a propagandist, and shall present it as a movement of the working class rather than the diffusion of a creed. I shall study with all the sympathy it deserves this effort of a class to achieve its emancipation. But my sympathy will be accompanied by a certain scepticism. The British workmen found fault with the employers for their lack of initiative, attachment to routine and slowness in adopting technical improvements, as compared with the employers in countries which were truly progressive, and on these grounds sought to get rid of them. But the employers returned against the working class the charges they brought. They denounced the routine of the Trade Unions and the obstacles systematically erected by the Unions to hamper the expansion of British industry. The impartial observer will be disposed to conclude that both classes had formed an unconscious alliance against that appetite for work, that zeal for production by which British industry had conquered the markets of the world. An irrational appetite? A blind zeal? Possibly. But on the other hand this prudent philosophy is perhaps the philosophy of the aged. Reserving our judgment on this point we will be content to show that, in spite of all claims to the contrary, the spirit which inspires what we may term in the most general sense Socialism is opposed to the spirit of production.

Both Neo-Catholicism and Socialism are phenomena common to the entire western world. But we must not forget the extent to which England differs from the rest of Europe. Too many people conclude from the progress which Socialism has made in England that a "social revolution" is imminent, similar to those which have taken place on the Continent. They forget that Socialism in Great Britain, confining its aims to the satisfaction of purely economic demands, and adapting itself to the traditional forms of party government, has assumed the constitutional and moderate form of "Labour." Too many Catholics cherish the hope that the day is at hand when

the majority of Englishmen will once more accept the authority of the Pope. They forget not only that popular Protestantism presents an obstacle to the spread of Catholicism in England which will certainly not be overcome, but also that the characteristic form taken by Neo-Catholicism in England is the insular compromise known as "Anglo-Catholicism." Though the historian is compelled by the nature of his work to emphasise the changing aspects in the life of a people, he fails in his task if he does not also call attention to the permanent foundation which underlies these superficial changes. To-day as in the past everything in England is instinctive groping, mutual tolerance and compromise, the effects of that moral and religious constitution whose factors we have analysed elsewhere. That constitution persists in its main lines unchanged and is still the source of those admirable political manners, abused, but all the while secretly envied, by those who, on the Continent, whether they belong to the parties of the right or of the left, profess the creed of violence.

ELIE HALÉVY.

August, 1926.

My thanks are due to M. Emile Bourgeois, Sir Valentine Chirol, and Messrs. Graham Wallas, Cloudesley Brereton and G. P. Gooch who on particular points have kindly given me the benefit of their learning and personal experience; also to M. Paul Vaucher and Mr. C. M. Everett for the most valuable assistance which they rendered in acceding to my request to read through my book in proof and make suggestions, and finally to Baron de Meyendorff who kindly placed at my disposal the correspondence of Baron de Staal, Russian ambassador in London during the closing years of the nineteenth century.

BOOK I

IMPERIALISM

CHAPTER I

CHAMBERLAIN AND LORD SALISBURY

IMPERIALISM. THE NEW GOVERNMENT. TWO YEARS OF DISILLUSIONMENT. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. A UNION OF THE TEUTONIC RACES. THE GREAT DESIGN

IMPERIALISM

The General Election of 1895. *Its significance*

IN June 1895 the Liberal Cabinet which for the past three years had dragged out a precarious existence took the opportunity afforded by a defeat in the Commons on a clause in the army estimates to resign and thus transfer to the Opposition the responsibility of making a new appeal to the country. The Cabinet, formed a few days later by Lord Salisbury, was not, like the government produced by the Conservative victory of 1886, a Conservative Cabinet enjoying the support from outside of the group of recalcitrant liberals led by Chamberlain which had refused to accept Gladstone's programme of Irish Home Rule. It was a coalition government in which these rebels, now in the strict sense deserters to the opposite camp, took their seats with the representatives of traditional Conservatism. The formation of the Cabinet was followed speedily by dissolution, and the General Election which began on July 12 and finished on August 10 proved a brilliant victory for the Conservative party, or, to use the term current since 1886, the Unionists, that is to say the party which wished to maintain the Parliamentary union between Great Britain and Ire-

land. The Election of 1892 had returned to the House of Commons 274 Liberals and 81 Irish Nationalists as against 269 Unionists and 46 Liberal Unionists. The Government therefore had a majority of 40, if supported by all the Irish Nationalists, and a series of unfavourable by-elections had since reduced that majority by almost half. The election of 1895 returned to Parliament 340 Unionists and 71 Liberal Unionists as against 177 Liberals and 82 Irish Nationalists. That is to say there was a Unionist majority of 152; 411 members supported Lord Salisbury's government against a Liberal and Irish Opposition of 259. The Liberals did their best to minimise the significance of the returns. The alliance between the Conservative and Liberal Unionists, between Lord Salisbury and Chamberlain was, they argued, artificial and precarious. And if that alliance had for the nonce won a victory at the polls, it was because the temperance legislation of the late government had alarmed the brewing interest, and the bill which had passed the Commons to disestablish the Church in Wales was a direct attack upon the Anglican Church. The great brewers, they explained, had placed immense sums of money at the disposition of the Conservative agents, and in every constituency the Anglican clergymen had worked hard in the same cause. And after all the Conservative victory assumed very different proportions when account was taken not of the seats won but the votes cast for either party. Out of a total electorate of six million three hundred thousand, less than four million eight hundred thousand had polled, and of those 4,800,000 voters, 2,412,000 had voted for the Unionists, 2,380,000 for the Liberals and their Irish allies. That

is to say the Unionist majority amounted to little more than 31,000 votes. There could be no doubt that within the next five or six years the Unionists, now placed in office, would have lost the allegiance of thirty thousand voters.

But these arguments and figures produced little impression on public opinion. It was generally felt—and the writer bases this assertion not on the evidence of documents which he had consulted but on his personal reminiscences—that the election of 1895 marked a turning point in the moral and political history of the British people.

In the first place, even if we take the most favourable view of the situation from the liberal standpoint, it appeared certain—they would have admitted it themselves—that the Liberals would never again see those glorious days when for close on half a century they might have fairly claimed to be the regular government of the nation. In those days Freedom—intellectual freedom, civil freedom, freedom of production and trade, freedom of nationalities, had been the magic formula which was expected to solve in the immediate future every political and social problem. In those days the Conservative party had been excluded from office because its very title branded it as the foe of liberty. If it had occasionally succeeded in forming a Cabinet, and on one occasion in 1841 had even gained an election, those successes were only temporary accidents, and the political balance was speedily redressed in favour of the Liberals. Unfortunately since the Reform Bills of 1867 and 1884 which, without actually introducing universal suffrage, had given the country an extremely democratic constitu-

tion, new problems had arisen for which the disciples of Cobden and the supporters of Gladstone had either no solutions, or solutions to which the electorate was not prepared to accord an unreserved assent. The two parties had held office in turn, and the utmost which the Liberals could hope after each defeat was, as everyone agreed, a new swing of the electoral pendulum which would restore them to power with the certainty of being turned out at no distant interval. But there was a wide-spread disposition to regard their defeat in the summer of 1895 in a more serious light and to believe that for the renovated Conservative party it might well prove the beginning of an epoch of continuous rule comparable to the rule of the Liberals throughout the middle of the century.

It was all very well for the Liberals to denounce the coalition between the traditional Conservatives and the deserters from Gladstone's party. In reality, although the Liberal Unionists had decided to maintain an electoral organisation distinct from the Conservative, at Westminster the two groups formed a single party receiving one whip, and the Liberal Unionists expelled from the great National Liberal Federation were admitted without opposition to all the Conservative clubs in London and the provinces. Both groups obviously formed a homogeneous party. This could not be said of the new Opposition. In the first place the Opposition contained the Irish Nationalists on whom for the last three years the Liberals had depended for their majority in the House but who for that very reason had enormously contributed to their unpopularity. For in England the Nationalists were at once hated for their unpatriotic language and despised for their intes-

tine squabbles. They were divided into two or three warring factions which attacked each other unsparingly. Wales, where moreover the Conservatives had just begun to make a little headway, was beginning to cause similar anxieties though to a far slighter degree. For the example of Irish Nationalism had called a Welsh nationalism into being, and the Welsh Radicals formed at Westminster a distinct group which demanded a modicum of Home Rule for the Principality. It was indeed to satisfy their wishes that the Liberal Cabinet had reluctantly placed upon its programme the Welsh Disestablishment which had just contributed to its defeat. And in Scotland, where the Conservatives had won almost half the seats, and in England itself, where the Conservative majority was overwhelming, the Liberal party was obviously suffering from a deep-seated internal disintegration.

The End of the Old Liberalism

The definite retirement of the aged Gladstone in 1894 at the venerable age of eighty-five possessed, as everyone agreed, a deep significance. He had realised —possibly too late—that times had changed. Two reasons had decided the step; his second Irish Home Rule Bill had been thrown out by the Lords with the obvious approval of the entire country, and his colleagues had demanded an extensive programme of naval construction that contradicted the principles which throughout his political career had inspired his finance and his political aims. His retirement left the leaders of his party a prey to disunion. On one side were those who remained faithful to his tradition, con-

vinced opponents of expenditure and war, of bureaucracy and state socialism. On the other were the younger men who vied with the Conservatives in their zeal for the consolidation of the Empire and who at the same time, as though with the deliberate intention to appear, in contrast with the old-fashioned Gladstonians, progressive, displayed leanings towards a collectivism, of an indefinite and very moderate character it is true. The destinies of the old Liberal party were therefore in the hands of leaders at issue among themselves and the disagreement among the leaders was reflected in the party as a whole by a double crisis affecting respectively its organisation and its voting strength. In the first place the party machine was passing through a crisis. Not only in the boroughs but also in the counties, the local organisation of the party had gradually come under the exclusive, or almost exclusive, control of artisans and labourers. The workmen who came forward as Liberal electioneering agents or candidates were the secretaries of the great trade unions whose membership grew every year. It might have been expected that the unions would have worked for the return to Parliament of representatives of their own class and have formed a labour party to take the place of the Liberals. But although within the last twenty years a certain number of working men had been returned to Parliament, they were a tiny and unpretentious group, content, indeed almost proud, to be merged in the organisation of Gladstonian Liberalism. And on the whole the trade unions displayed no anxiety to grasp political power. They preferred to employ their money for other than electoral purposes, to extend their organisations for

mutual assistance, and to accumulate the funds necessary to finance a strike. Politically they remained loyal to the aristocratic traditions of the country, and sought above their own ranks in the governing classes the only candidates they considered worthy to represent their interests in the government of the nation. Their search was seldom successful. Among the great landowners and leading manufacturers there were only a few who, more from family tradition than personal inclination, remained faithful to the Liberal creed. Even among the gentry, manufacturers, bankers and traders of the middle class an uninterrupted stream of defections thinned the party ranks. The party was obliged to be content with second rate candidates, cranks, and men inspired by personal ambitions, political adventurers greedy of spoils and honours. But it was a costly business to stand as a Liberal candidate in an English constituency. For as the number of wealthy Liberals decreased, the heavier became the demands made by the local electorate upon the purse of the few who remained. If in the August of 1895 the Liberal agents had been asked what in their opinion was the immediate cause of their defeat, they would all have replied without the least hesitation that it was lack of funds and lack of candidates. The Liberals had indeed surrendered to the Conservatives without a contest no less than 124 seats as against the ten in which a Liberal was returned unopposed.[1]

If the organisation of the party was passing through a crisis, its position as regards numbers was no less

[1] *Ann. Reg.*, 1895, p. 153. Cf. the *Fortnightly Review*, June, 1898 (Vol. lxiii. pp. 910 sqq.): An unsigned article entitled "The Present State of the Liberal Party."

critical. The electors were abandoning a party unable to offer either sufficiently respectable candidates or a definite programme. The lack of programme was indeed the direct result of the dissension which prevailed among the party leaders. A programme of social reform had, it is true, been adopted, state regulation of the conditions of labour in factories, compensation for accidents to workmen in the course of their employment, restriction of the hours of work in mines—which seemed calculated to satisfy an electorate in which labour was the predominant element. But it was public knowledge that a considerable section of the leaders had only accepted these portions of the Liberal programme with extreme reluctance. And moreover, no one could fail to notice that the proposals for social reform put forward by many Liberal candidates were for practical purposes indistinguishable from those presented by a considerable number of Unionists loyal to the tradition of Beaconsfield or friends of Chamberlain. And finally it was clear that certain of the proposed reforms, in the first place the restriction of the miners' day, would be opposed by a section of the working class, which at this date had not yet been widely affected by the socialist propaganda. Should the Liberals then return to their old programme of uncompromising hostility to war and militarism, colonial expansion and armaments? No decided opposition to a policy of that kind was anywhere discernible among the electorate. For militarism was hardly felt by the masses of a nation which knew nothing of conscription, and the British budget was so arranged that the burden of expenditure on the army and navy did not fall on the

working class. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, an entire section of the Liberal leaders, the followers of Lord Rosebery, were imperialists, and during the three years of Liberal government the foreign office had pursued an imperialist policy. But if a policy of imperialism must in any case be adopted, the imperialism of Lord Salisbury and Chamberlain was preferable. It was perfectly frank, and was not compromised by an alliance either with the supporters of peace at any price or, and this was the decisive factor, with the partisans of Irish Home Rule, the would-be disrupters of the United Kingdom.

The Dream of a "Greater Britain"

The jingoism which at the close of the nineteenth century prevailed in the large towns, must be understood as a phenomenon of transition. The great mass of electors were disgusted with middle-class Liberalism. They had not yet discovered socialism. But at this period no one appears to have clearly perceived that the Conservative victory was essentially a passing phase. Alike at home and abroad everyone expected that many decades must elapse before a popular party would arise rejuvenated from the ruins of the old Liberalism. For the moment it was the Tory party which boasted its rejuvenation and claimed to be in the strictest sense a popular party. It was no longer an obscure country party whose opposition to the claims of the large towns was unheeded by the nation at large. Not only in the counties but in the boroughs also the Tories and their Liberal Unionist allies had won an overwhelming victory. Lancashire, the home

of Cobden and John Bright, only a few years before the centre of the free trade and Liberal propaganda, returned 48 Unionists as against only 7 Liberals and an Irish Nationalist who represented an Irish division of Liverpool. In London 54 Conservatives were returned for 8 members of the new Opposition. In the music halls bellicose sentiments received as much applause from the pit and gallery as from the stalls and dress circle. And it was the Conservative party which, at the very time when both in London and the provinces it was extending its control over the press, created a new type of newspaper to meet the needs of a public more extensive and less educated than that which journalism had hitherto addressed. On May 4, 1896 the young Alfred Charles William Harmsworth —the future Lord Northcliffe—brought out the first number of the *Daily Mail*, a paper of reduced size and costing only a halfpenny.[1] The new paper contained no feature which resembled the carefully accurate information and well-informed argument which for over a century had been the glory of British journalism. There were illustrations: serial stories: political articles of extreme brevity and preceded by large headlines which dispensed a hurried reader from the perusal of the text. And there was an abundant

[1] Two morning papers were indeed already published in London at a halfpenny—*The Morning* and *The Morning Leader* (the latter a Radical organ)—but they were not very successful. There were also two halfpenny evening papers—*The Star* (since 1888) and *The Evening News*, which Alfred Harmsworth had purchased in August, 1894, to prepare the ground in London for the Conservative candidates at the election which was felt to be imminent. In 1897 the Radical *Morning Herald*, and in 1900 the *Daily Express* followed. But it is from the brilliant success of the *Daily Mail* that we must date the real beginnings of the halfpenny press (Kennedy Jones, *Fleet Street and Downing Street*, 1919, pp. 117 sqq.).

supply of sensational news items to tickle the popular palate, crimes, catastrophes, royal marriages and funerals, sport, naval and military reviews and wars.[1] Harmsworth's venture was immediately rewarded by an unprecedented success. At the end of the first three months the *Daily Mail* had reached a circulation of over 200,000 copies, at the end of three years the circulation had almost reached 550,000. The handful of democrats who protested against the exploitation of warlike feelings presented the aspect of a select group of aristocrats, distinguished, but powerless. When the Liberals had taken office fifteen years before, their policy had been a reaction against Lord Beaconsfield's imperialism. They had evacuated Afghanistan and the Transvaal, and had abandoned Gordon at Khartoum to a death which they refused to avenge. They had gone further and attempted to break up the Empire by granting the Irish Home Rule. Now the imperialists, once more masters of Parliament and public opinion, reacted in their turn against these pacific tendencies. They called upon the British to forget party quarrels and combine in a firm front against the Irishman and the foreigner. And their appeal was not addressed to the mother country alone, but to Britons in every part of the Empire. They wished to consolidate the Empire by establishing a federal bond between the Mother Country and her

[1] "What sells a newspaper? is a question asked me. The first answer is 'War.' . . . War apart, a State Funeral sells more papers than anything else. The public takes a livelier interest in funerals than in weddings. . . . Next to a State Funeral comes a First-class Murder. . . . After a First-class Murder, any big public pageant or ceremony will swell a paper's sales." (Kennedy Jones, *Fleet Street and Downing Street*, 1919, p. 200). Kennedy Jones was one of the original editors of the *Daily Mail*.

Colonies, and to extend it by foreign conquest. This might seem a sufficient explanation of an aggressive policy which, practised with a brutal ostentation, would in a short time arouse the hostility of the entire world. If, however, we examine the new imperialism more closely, we shall discover that, if the British were aggressive, it was because they believed themselves threatened. A peaceful nation the English had undoubtedly been in the period around 1860, possibly more peaceful than any nation in the entire course of history. But these peaceable dispositions masked a profound disdain. Sure of her command of the seas and proud of her vast wealth, England scornfully abandoned the continent to its dissensions. Unfortunately the situation not only on the continent, where peace had prevailed for twenty-five years, but throughout the world, had radically altered during the last half century to the disadvantage of Britain.

In 1851, if France was poorer, her population still exceeded that of Great Britain; 35,700,000 Frenchmen as against only 27,000,000 British. But the population of the United States was only 23,000,000, Germany did not exist as a State, and the influence of Russia, whose population was not exactly known, was shortly to be weakened on the Bosphorus and in Asia by the Crimean war. Twenty years later on the morrow of the Franco-German war the population of Great Britain exceeded 31,800,000 and was thus on the way to overtake the French figure of 36,500,000. But the population of the newly created German Empire in the very first year of its existence was nearly 41,000,000 and the population of the United States, 38,600,000, also exceeded that of Great Britain. At

the end of another twenty years, in 1891, the populations of Great Britain and France were almost equal, each slightly above 38,000,000, and the former would soon exceed the latter. But on the other hand Britain was left far behind by Germany with a population of 50,000,000, and by the United States with a population of 63,000,000. And the population of Russia was estimated at 100,000,000. Britain was and knew herself to be threatened by "empires." How could she recover the advantage? She must pursue the programme already laid down by Lord Beaconsfield and assert her position, not as a nation like her rivals, but as an empire. No doubt the population of Great Britain barely exceeded 38,000,000. But there were nearly 2,000,000 British subjects in Cape Colony and Natal, over 600,000 in New Zealand, over 3,000,000 in Australia, and 5,000,000 in Canada. Add to these figures the Indian subjects of Great Britain, almost 300,000,000 and a further 46,000,000 in the remaining territories under some form of British rule or influence. The total amounted to 381,000,000,000. What other State could hope to rival such a figure? Moreover, the number of British subjects was on the increase, and optimists could entertain the hope that within two generations, if not one, the population of the self-governing colonies alone would be four times its present figure and would equal the population of the Mother Country.[1] The area of the Empire was also

[1] "The British Empire must stand and fall together, and in twenty years' time the larger part of Britain will be outside of Great Britain." (Speech by the Canadian, G. E. Foster; *Report . . . on the Colonial Conference at Ottawa with the Proceedings of the Conference*, 1894, p. 203). "At the present rate of increase the inhabitants of Australia at or before the close of the next century will number about 190,000,000, and constitute no incon-

on the increase: in September 1896 a statesman calculated that in twelve years 2,600,000 square miles had been added to the Empire, that is to say twenty-four times the area of Great Britain.[1] In 1895 the area of the British Empire was 11,335,000 square miles.[2] A few more annexations and it would amount to a quarter of the entire land surface of the globe.

Imperialism as a Commercial Speculation

This was the object which the convinced imperialists deliberately pursued, to extend indefinitely the area of the Empire until it became impossible for any rival nation to entertain the hope of equalling its magnitude. But when they spoke of extending the Empire they had in view not only, as the foregoing considerations might lead the reader to suppose, an increase of

siderable part of the population of the world." (David A. Wells, *Recent Economic Changes and Their Effect on the Production and Distribution of Wealth and the Well-being of Society*, 1890, p. 454).

[1] Lord Rosebery. Edinburgh speech, Oct. 9, 1896: . . . "The British Empire is in truth, as Napoleon III said quite falsely of his empire—the British Empire is peace. It means peace and it needs peace." He immediately added: "For the last twenty years, still more during the last twelve, you have been laying your hands, with almost frantic eagerness, on every tract of territory adjacent to your own or desirable in any point of view which you thought desirable to take."

[2] In this total Egypt is not included. Cf. Sir Robert Giffen, *The Relative Growth of the Component Parts of the Empire.* Read at a Meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute, February, 1899: "The increase in area and population in this Empire, excluding Egypt and the Sudan, amounts since 1871 to 2,854,000 square miles of the area, or more than one-fourth of the whole, and to 125,000,000 of population, which is also more than one-fourth of the whole. The increase of the ruling race included in this population amounts to about 12,500,000, or about one-fourth of the number in 1897; and the increase in the subject races is 112,000,000, or nearly one-third the numbers in 1897. The increase in the subject races is largely, but by no means exclusively, due to annexation" (*Economic Inquiries and Studies*, vol. ii. p. 223).

area and population but also, perhaps most of all, the increase of the national wealth, the improvement of the economic position. For, if some years previously a vague feeling of pessimism and anxiety had prevailed in England, it was because a number of symptoms, decrease of exports and unemployment, had led the English to ask themselves whether their country had not entered upon an era of industrial stagnation, possibly of actual decline.

The British could still contemplate with pride the vast size of their mercantile marine, whose tonnage equalled that of all the foreign powers together.[1] But what of the goods carried by these innumerable vessels? The value of British exports for the year preceding the return of the Conservatives to power in 1895, was not so far in excess of American, French or German exports as in former years.[2] Comfort might

[1] Dr. V. Juraschek (*Uebersichten der Weitwirtschaft*) credits Great Britain with the ownership of 42·7 per cent. of tonnage of the world, and, taking steam tonnage as equivalent in carrying power to three times as much sailing tonnage, with just over 50 per cent. of the carrying power of the world (A. W. Flux, "British Trade and German Competition": *Economical Journal*, vol. vii. pp. 43–4).

[2] Export statistics for 1894: United Kingdom £216,000,000, United States £181,100,000, Germany £148,100,000, France £123,100,000. In 1892 American exports had reached the figure of £211,600,000, as against the £227,000,000 of British exports. (See the Tables and Diagrams in: *Memoranda, Statistical Tables, and Charts prepared in the Board of Trade with reference to various matters bearing on British and Foreign Trade and Industrial Conditions*, 1903, pp. 5 sqq.) It should be added that if the British imagination was disagreeably impressed by the increase of American exports, the latter did not, speaking generally, compete with British industries. On the contrary they provided British manufacture with the cheap bread and cheap cotton which it required. (*Foreign Trade. Statistical Tables relating to the Progress of the Foreign Trade of the United Kingdom and of other Countries in recent years, with report to the Board of Trade thereon*, 1894, p. 4.) But the United States were also exporting, in greater numbers every year, manufactured articles. Out of her

be derived from the consideration that, if the national production were to be fairly estimated on the basis of these figures, they must not be taken simply, but the value of the exports must be divided by the number of the population. It would then be seen that Great Britain still far outstripped her competitors. The value of British exports per head of the population was more than double the value of American.[1] But even estimated by this standard it must be admitted that the value of British exports had during the past twenty-five years steadily declined. The United States and Germany on the other hand showed a steady increase, and it seemed possible to predict with an almost mathematical certainty the day when Great Britain would be overtaken by these two nations. French competition did not inspire the same anxiety; like the population, the value of French exports remained almost stationary. Russian competition gave less grounds for uneasiness. Nevertheless Russia and France were extending their colonial empire in Asia and Africa and every area occupied by a foreign power was immediately closed to British imports by a cus-

total exports in 1880 about 10 per cent. were manufactures and about 90 per cent. food and raw materials; in 1899 about 29 per cent. were manufactures, and about 71 per cent. food and raw materials. These percentages say something; and the absolute figures say more. The value of her manufactures exported in 1880 was £17,165,000, in 1899 £75,798,000; of food and raw materials in 1880 £154,490,000, in 1899 £185,329,000. (Sir Vincent H. P. Caillard *Imperial Fiscal Reform*, 1903, pp. 19–20.)

[1] For the period 1895–1899, £5 19*s.* 5*d.* per head for Great Britain, £2 18*s.* 4*d.* for the United States. Twenty-five years earlier (1870–4) the figures had been £7 7*s.* 3*d.* for Great Britain, £2 9*s.* 2*d.* United States. France remained stationary: £3 15*s.* 0*d.* for the first five-year period, £3 14*s.* 8*d.* for the second. The German figure rose from £2 16*s.* 7*d.* to £3 7*s.* 9*d.* (*Memorandum on the Comparative Statistics of Population, Industry and Commerce of the United Kingdom and some Leading Countries*, 1902, p. 11.)

toms barrier. The dissatisfaction inspired by the unfavourable economic situation had without doubt contributed to the Conservative victory at the polls. How did the Conservatives propose to remedy ills for which the Liberal policy had no cure? Their prescription was imperialism, the opening of new markets to British exports by the annexation of new colonies.

However, if Britain had lost her former confidence that she would always remain the greatest exporter of goods, she enjoyed a unique position, which moreover improved every year, among the nations of the world as the exporter of capital. At the date with which our history opens an economist estimated that the amount of British capital invested abroad, or in the colonies, had risen from £144,000,000 in 1842, to £600,000,000 in 1877, £875,000,000 in 1882, and £1,698,000,000 in 1893, and represented 15% of the entire capital of the nation.[1] A few years later the Treasury estimated that the income from foreign investments subject to income tax had risen between 1884 and 1900 from £33,829,124 to £60,266,886.[2] To this we must add the interest, not easy to distinguish, earned abroad or in the colonies by British companies, insurance companies, for example, or building societies. Statisticians who took into account every pos-

[1] Michael G. Mulhall. *The Dictionary of Statistics*, 4th ed., 1899. Capital.

[2] C. K. Hobson, *The Export of Capital*, 1914, pp. 200–1. The same writer (p. 207) gives the following statistics showing the export of capital at three different dates, separated by intervals of ten years:—

	Capital Invested in the United Kingdom	Capital Invested Abroad	Total
1885 ..	£ 8,735,000,000	£1,302,000,000	£10,037,000,000
1895 ..	9,063,000,000	1,600,000,000	10,663,000,000
1905 ..	11,009,000,000	2,025,000,000	13,036,000,000

sible source estimated the total annual interest from foreign investments at about £100,000,000.[1]

Britain could well afford to import far more than she exported. Since she was receiving at the same time the interest of capital invested abroad, the balance of commerce remained favourable and the country grew wealthier. But several disquieting factors detracted from the comfort to be derived from this consideration. The great banking houses which controlled in London the investment of British capital were slipping out of British hands. Since the disappearance in 1890 of the celebrated firm of Baring, they all bore German, German-Jewish or American names.[2] What use would they make of the sums entrusted to them by British capitalists? It was no matter for indifference if this capital was absorbed without return in some remote Argentine, as had actually happened during the previous decade, or went to nourish the new-born industries of rival nations, Germany, for example, or the United States. Ought it not rather to be employed in developing the resources of the Empire, the Indian cotton mills, the large-scale agriculture of

[1] Sir Robert Giffen, *The Excess of Imports* (*Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, March, 1899; vol. lxii. p. 81).

[2] "In the City of London to-day there is not a single English firm among what may be called the *haute finance*. If a large financial operation has to be concluded we first go to Messrs. Rothschild, then to Messrs. Raphael, both German Jews; then to Messrs. S. S. Morgan & Co., an American house; after that, probably, to Messrs. Speyer or Messrs. Seligmann or Messrs. Stern, also German Jews, then perhaps to Messrs. Hambro, a Danish firm; then to houses like Messrs. Frühling & Goschen, and so on, all foreign houses and mostly Jews; but there is no strictly English name among them since the unlimited Barings ceased to exist in 1890; and the period during which the Barings' business was best managed was while it was under the direction of Mr. Joshua Bates, an American." (J. W. Cross, *British Trade in* 1898. *A Warning Note. Nineteenth Century*, May, 1899, p. 854.)

Australia, the gold and diamond mines of South Africa and the Canadian foundries? The imperialists wished to guide British capital into the latter channels while at the same time making an outlet in the same direction for the surplus population of the country.[1] In this way the capital of Great Britain would foster the development of lands which should be regarded as England overseas, Greater Britain. By contact with her young colonies the old country would renew her youth.

In those distant days when England was at war with the armies of revolutionary and imperial France it was the fashion in Paris to declaim against the nation of shopkeepers, the insular Carthage which presumed to oppose the modern Rome. In reality the nation of shopkeepers at that period returned only a handful of business men to Parliament: it was represented and ruled by an aristocracy whose ample revenues derived from the rental of their estates raised them to a position of supremacy over the representatives of business. When therefore that aristocracy fostered on every sea the development of British commerce, its position as the defender of the national interests was the stronger, because it was impossible to suspect the ministers of defending their private interests or even the immediate interest of their class. What changes a century had brought! Business men of every description—manufacturers and merchants, directors of companies, mine owners, brewers, bankers—made up 250 members of

[1] Between 1845 and 1870 4,000,000 British subjects emigrated from the United Kingdom to the United States, between 1870 and 1890, 3,000,000. Between 1879 and 1899 only 1,250,000 Englishmen emigrated to the colonies. (Alleyne Ireland, *Tropical Civilisation*, pp. 14, 15, 16.)

the House of Commons returned in 1895,[1] and the remaining members, barristers, officers and gentlemen of leisure were bound to the business world by ties

[1] To be exact, according to my calculations, 244 out of 670 members. But even this figure does not convey an adequate notion of the political power wielded by business men in each of the countries which together composed the United Kingdom. If we take into consideration England alone and also leave out of account the representatives of Universities, the Scottish, Welsh (Monmouthshire being here reckoned with Wales of which it may fairly be regarded as a part) and Irish members, we find that out of 456 members 189 were business men. Among the 70 Scottish members were 26 business men. Of the 34 seats for Wales and Monmouthshire 9 were held by business men. Of 101 Irish members 20 were business men. Moreover, the exact position occupied by these 20 members demands examination. Hotel-keepers, drapers, corn-chandlers, they were presumably petty tradesmen, parish-pump politicians. Ireland differed entirely from England both in social organisation and intellectual atmosphere. The following classification by parties as well as by districts affords further information of interest. England (exclusive of Monmouthshire): Liberals 30 business men out of 65 members in the counties, in the boroughs 19 out of 42, in London 2 out of 7. Conservatives. In the counties 35 out of 141, in the boroughs 33 out of 99, in London 22 out of 50. Liberal Unionists. In the Counties 3 out of 5, in the boroughs 4 out of 16. Wales (and Monmouthshire): Liberals. In the counties 5 out of 20, in the boroughs 3 out of 6. Conservatives. Of the 2 county and 5 borough members returned none were business men. Liberal Unionists 1 (the only representative of the party in Wales). We notice the large proportion of business men among the Liberal Unionists, which reveals the true character of the revolt. In England the proportion of business men is even greater among the Liberals than among the Conservatives, still in the country districts the party of the landed gentry. But this does not apply to London where almost half the Unionist members were business men. If we examine these figures from a slightly different point of view we discover that the Unionist Party was the party of the bankers (among the Liberal members there was not a single banker), of the brewers and wine and spirit merchants (far better represented on the Conservative than on the Liberal benches), whereas manufacturers are proportionately more numerous on the Liberal side of the House, merchants and mine owners in an actual majority. After the election of 1900 the proportion of business men of every description appears to have increased, if we can trust the statistics of the *Constitutional Year Book* for 1896, p. 125, and for 1902, p. 136 (statistics, however, which for the Parliament of 1895 give slightly different figures from those at which I have arrived by my own calculations. In 1900 there were 139 business men on the Unionist side of the House, as against 101 in 1895 and 94 on the Liberal as against 76 in 1895).

almost as close. The gentry in particular, still well represented on the Conservative benches, could not dream of living on the rents of their estates. The fall in the price of all food stuffs had hastened the decay of British agriculture, and now landowners visited the country only to spend the money they had made in the cities. How did they make it? The enormous growth of limited liability companies enabled the old ruling class to maintain on the whole its position in a country thoroughly industrialised. It was estimated that since the statute of 1862, which had placed their legal position beyond dispute, joint stock companies had issued shares representing a capital value of £1,500,000,000, an amount, it was calculated, double the capital invested in French and German companies together.[1] And this calculation took no account of the capital of the colonial and Indian companies. Every member of Parliament was identified to some extent by his annual dividends with the interests of the great financiers by whom all these companies had been floated, and the latter did their best to tighten the bond by offering members of Parliament a place on the boards of directors which managed their companies and even by appointing them Chairmen of the board.[2] What could look better on a prospectus than the name of a Peer, or the head of some great family? When in 1896 the Chinese Li-Hung-Chang visited Europe, and in every country was welcomed with open arms in the hope of valuable commissions, the Duke

[1] *Quart Rev.*, April, 1900. Art. vi., *The Reform of Company Law* (vol. cxci. p. 374).

[2] After the election of 1900 270 members of the House of Commons sat on boards of directors, of whom 164 were Unionists, 22 Liberal Unionists, 76 Liberals and 8 Irish Nationalists (*Constitutional Year Book*, 1902, p. 136).

of Devonshire did not deem it disrespectful to his guest to receive him at the great foundry where he was Chairman of the Board of Directors. The Duke of Fife, whose marriage had made him a member of the royal family, was a Director of the Chartered Company, founded to exploit the gold mines of the Northern Transvaal and Cape Colony, which played such an important part in the national policy. An even closer relative to the Queen, the Duke of Connaught, was considered by public opinion to have been compromised by the disgraceful failure in 1903 of the London and Globe Society which cast a shadow over the death-bed of Lord Dufferin, a former viceroy of India.

The scandal was the culmination of a series of scandals which during the previous decade had from time to time filled the columns of the newspapers. In 1893 there was the colossal fraud of the Liberator Building Society; in 1894 the failure of the New Zealand Loan Company which had compelled the resignation from the Cabinet of the minister Mundella; and in 1898 the bankruptcy of the financier Hooley who had made an enormous fortune by floating industrial and trading companies. To attract shareholders Hooley had needed titled directors; he was proved to have bought for a cash payment the names of several noblemen. The unbridled speculation on the Transvaal gold mines constituted another scandal on account of its too obvious influence on British colonial policy. This undisguised determination of policy by financial interests [1] might have been

[1] *The Economist*, August 12, 1899: "It is undeniable that during the session just ended there has been an atmosphere of money in the lobby and precincts of the House of Commons scarcely

expected to excite public disapproval, and provoke an organised campaign of protest in the press and heckling in the House. There was nothing of the sort. Both parties agreed not to exploit a particular scandal against its opponent, and their silent pact was obviously approved by the general public. The effect upon the public mind produced by the protests of a Stead or an Arnold White cannot be compared with the huge popularity enjoyed in very different times by such a pamphleteer as William Cobbett. In the course of the century public life has obviously become increasingly impervious to the appeal of the agitator, as political institutions became more democratic. No one desired to invest party strife with that embittered and passionate quality which it possessed in contemporary France, and no one considered that the riotous scenes provoked in Paris some two or three years earlier by the Panama scandal were likely to raise the tone of French public life. Moreover, when all has been said, and the imperialist trend of public opinion which placed the Conservatives in office has been considered in its most exclusively commercial aspect, justice demands that we should regard it from another aspect, equally real. Not for a single moment could the imperialism of the government programme have awakened the enthusiasm of the masses, if it had been nothing more than a manifestation of commercial

known before. All manner of interests have gathered there, as they gather in Washington and in the various State Legislatures in America. More attempts to influence the votes of members have been made than has been known before, or, at any rate, than members can recollect since the days of railway-construction. Incidents connected with the Telephone Bill, the Petroleum Bill and the Clerical Rates Bill point to a closer connection between finance and legislation than is desirable or safe."

greed, and had not contained a very considerable element of idealism. This aggressive and martial ideal now demands brief analysis.

Imperialism as an Ideal

One thing at least is beyond dispute. At the very time when we are witnessing what might appear at first sight nothing more than the expression of a purely commercial policy, we also witness in the realm of ideas the decline of the " morality of self-interest " or " utilitarianism " which many had been disposed to regard as the philosophy of British Liberalism at the epoch of its supremacy. The great missionary of Free Trade, Richard Cobden had professed the ethics of self-interest, and Herbert Spencer had embodied this ethical and political creed in a vast system of sociology based on the principle of an identity, or at least a progressive identification, during the historical period through which humanity is actually passing, of individual self-interest with the interest of society. But it was precisely the historic inevitability of this identification which in Herbert Spencer's native country was being questioned more and more widely thirty or forty years after his popularity had reached its zenith. The English neo-Hegelians, influenced by German metaphysics, refused to regard society as a mere collection of individuals. Far from it being true that society existed in virtue of individuals and for their sake, individuals existed only in virtue of society and for the sake of society, that is to say in so far as society was the embodiment of ideal ends—science, art, religion,

whose pursuit alone gave value to the individual. Society, in Hegel's terminology, the State, depository of all the moral traditions of the nation, the real State, closed to all interference from without, and admitting no social unit superior to itself, a veritable earthly God: this was the philosophy which in 1899 found powerful expression in a book by Professor Bosanquet, which soon took its place as a classic.[1] Moreover, the English neo-Darwinians drew from the doctrine of evolution very different conclusions from those drawn by Herbert Spencer. In a book whose success testified to the degree in which it reflected the temper of the period [2] Benjamin Kidd, a self-educated writer,

[1] Bernard Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, 1899—See especially p. 320. "The Nation-State . . . is recognised as absolute power over the individual, and as his representative and champion in the affairs of the world outside." See further on the question 'whether State action is to be judged by the same moral tests as private action,' pp. 322 sqq., especially p. 323: "The State, as such, certainly cannot be guilty of personal immorality." P. 324: "Promises and treaties . . . are acts which embody public ends. And here the State on its side is bound to maintain good faith; but still its agent is likely to go wrong if he mixes up the obligations of the State with his private honour. The question for him, if he has to keep or break a public undertaking, is —to what is the State substantially bound, not to what extent would he be bound, if he had made the promise or engagement in question in his private capacity." Also p. 326: "A public act which inflicts loss, such as war, confiscation, the repudiation of a debt, is wholly different from murder or theft. It is not the act of a private person. It is not a violation of law. . . . It is the act of a supreme power, which has ultimate responsibility for protecting the form of life of which it is the guardian, and which is not itself protected by any scheme of functions or relations, such as prescribes a course for the reconciliation of rights and secures its effectiveness." See further on the France of the Dreyfus case the note on p. 321: "The dangers besetting the French Republic to-day (December, 1898) are, in essence, tests applied to the strength of a national idea. If the idea cannot maintain itself, we must reluctantly suppose that it ought not—that the common life has not the necessary depth."

[2] Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution*, 1894. In four years the book went into 19 editions.—"The Divine mission and special

developed the thesis that the quality which gave superiority to a species or race and ensured its victory over its rivals, was not reason, a critical and destructive faculty, but faith, the willingness to subordinate immediate to remote interests, the interest of the individual to the interest of society. Reason only becomes useful to the race when it has been brought into the service of faith. It was not to their intellectual but to their religious and moral superiority that the Teutonic races, the English and Germans, owed the ascendancy which they had achieved over the Latin races, victims of their intelligence and individualism, for example Renaissance Italy and Revolutionary France.

Possibly, however, in such a connection, men of letters are more significant than professional philosophers. They address a wider circle of readers, and are therefore more representative of their period. What then was the tendency which prevailed in English literature at this time when the great Victorian epoch must be regarded as already past, even before the death of the Queen by whose name it would be known to the historian? English literature had indeed felt the influence of the pessimistic French realism. But the im-

duties of a nation, the right of Success and Force, such formulas irritate the reader who comes to them for the first time. But when we discover how naturally these ideas have . . . taken root and grown into the permanent structure of men's minds, until their truth has become an unconscious presupposition, and realised the ardent conviction with which everyone here regards them as binding the conscience with a religious sanction, we must admit that we have to do with a genuine moral code." (André Chevrillon, *Etudes Anglaises,* 1901, p. 332.) For other contemporary French witnesses see E. Boutmy, *Essai d'une psychologie politique de peuple Anglais,* 1901—also J. Bardoux, *Essai d'une psychologie de l'Angleterre contemporaine, Les crises belliqueuses,* 1906, and in P. Mantoux: *A travers l'Angleterre contemporaine,* 1909, the essay entitled, *Du Jingoisme et de la guerre Sud-Africaine,* originally written in 1902.

porter of this foreign " manner," George Moore, would only become a great artist when he had shaken off its influence. And the far more British realism of Thomas Hardy as yet worked only below the surface; it was not until later that he would be recognised as the forerunner of an entire generation of revolutionary realists. Need we mention here those tragic young writers—the eldest in 1895 was not forty years old and only one of the group was destined to outlive the age of fifty—who had been fascinated by the literature and philosophy of the French " decadents," Oscar Wilde, Aubrey Beardsley, the editors of the *Yellow Book*? They were only a coterie of eccentrics proud of their isolation, and the thunderbolt launched in 1895 by Puritan morality when Wilde was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for homosexual vice broke up the confraternity. Very different from these were the authors read by the general public who must be regarded as the authentic interpreters of the prevalent attitude.

That fascinating writer Robert Louis Stevenson, who had settled in an island of the Pacific to die in voluntary exile, was amusing children and delighting adults by his stories of adventure and heroism in the South Seas. Joseph Conrad, a smaller artist despite his loftier pretensions, a naturalised alien of Polish extraction who had served for many years in the British merchant service, was beginning to make a name by his novels which almost invariably told the story at once sublime, sordid and pathetic of the white man in the Tropics at grips with the hostility of nature and the aborigines. The unfortunate Henley on a bed of sickness and pain dreamed of battles, glory and

conquest, and, if his poems were too " select "—both in quality and quantity—to reach the masses, this was by no means the case with the works of another writer, the literary mouthpiece of the period. Young Rudyard Kipling, the son of an artist who was curator of an Indian museum, had begun his literary career by imitations of the French novel, and had dreamed of becoming an English, or Anglo-Colonial, Maupassant. But soon, as he celebrated the melancholy of the British Tommy on garrison in Asia and hymned the greatness of an empire washed by " seven seas," he became by universal consent the unofficial poet laureate of British imperialism. And now he wrote—for children, was it, or for adults?—his *Jungle Books*. He set his hero, the little Mowgli, in the world of beasts, and the beasts taught Mowgli the law of the jungle which maintains the balance of species at the cost of a never ending struggle, a truceless war. Must this struggle, this war, be condemned as evil? Not when it is the law of the world. The spirit of conquest and aggrandisement must not be confused with the spirit of hatred, greed and delight in doing mischief for its own sake; it is the courage ready to hazard all risks which gives the victory to the better man. A species of Darwinian philosophy expressed in a mythical form was the basis of a moral code, chaste, brutal, heroic and childlike.

We now see the exponents of imperialism under an entirely different aspect. Far from appealing to the self-interest of their audience, they call upon them to sacrifice their private interests, even their very lives, in pursuit of a lofty national ideal. Can we in a few words define more precisely the nature of this ideal,

as it was understood by the British imperialists at the close of the nineteenth century? It was in the first place the consolidation, if possible, the federal union of the British of the United Kingdom with the British in Canada, South Africa and the Pacific, of one democracy with its fellows. In many respects this ideal was Liberal, almost Republican, humanitarian, and its pursuit had nothing ignoble. In the second place it was the forcible annexation of a large portion of the globe neither inhabited nor habitable by white men. But experience had apparently proved—and on this point about the year 1900 few Liberals disagreed with the Imperialists [1]—that tropical conditions did not admit

[1] In a little book published in 1900 under the title *Liberalism and the Empire* and written in collaboration with F. W. Hirst and J. L. Hammond, Gilbert Murray devoted a chapter to the study of the exploitation of inferior races in ancient and modern times. After describing the abuses, and indeed the atrocities, which have accompanied the system and the evil effects which it has invariably produced, he nevertheless concludes: "The coloured races whose land we invade cannot remain free men. The white man who lives among them, do what we will to control him from Westminster—and those who wish to control are a small and perhaps a diminishing party—will either force the coloured men to serve him or else sweep them from his path. Let us help him, in order that we may control him" (p. 155). For a study of the problem from the strictly economic standpoint of trade, see Benjamin Kidd, *The Control of the Tropics,* 1898, and for an account of the system of native labour, the more fundamental work by Alleyne Ireland, *Tropical Colonization. An Introduction to the Study of the Subject,* 1899, especially Chapters Four—The Earlier Aspects of the Labour Problem in the Tropics—Five—The Indentured Labour System—and Six—Solution of Labour Problems by the Dutch.—See further, L. C. A. Knowles, *The Economic Development of the British Overseas Empire,* 1924, Book Two. *The British Tropics,* also the extensive and useful compilation published in 1903 by the American Government under the title, *Colonial Administration,* 1800–1900 (*House Documents,* vol. xli. No. 15, pts. 7–9. *Commerce and Finance,* Jan.–Mar., 1903. 57th Congress, 2nd Session, 1902–3). The works of Howard Hensman, *A History of Rhodesia Compiled from Official Sources,* 1900 (a defence), and H. C. Thomson, *Rhodesia and Its Government,* 1898 (a criticism) contain interesting observations on the treatment of the natives in a particular colony.

of the spontaneous development of great independent civilisations of the European type. Where England did not install herself by annexation, other European nations would occupy the empty place. To stand aside was not, as the Gladstonians maintained, to refuse from moral scruples to share the spoils, it was a cowardly refusal to fulfil to the utmost of the national ability the noble mission of the European races to civilise the world, to refuse to bear what Rudyard Kipling called the White Man's Burden.

THE NEW GOVERNMENT

TWO YEARS OF DISILLUSIONMENT

The New Cabinet. Chamberlain, Lord Salisbury, Arthur Balfour

Such was the current of public opinion which had borne the new cabinet into office. Lord Salisbury, Premier and Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, First Lord of the Treasury, and leader of the Commons, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, the celebrated Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, Goschen, a deserter from the Liberals who already in Lord Salisbury's first ministry had acquitted himself brilliantly at the Exchequer, First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Lansdowne at the War Office and the Duke of Devonshire, President of the Privy Council, these were the outstanding members of a huge cabinet of twenty-seven which bore every appearance of a strong government. Should the critic find fault

with its composition as too aristocratic:—there were eight peers of whom three were the heads of great families? The objection would betray ignorance of the times. The peerage had never enjoyed a more solid popularity. It was significant that a very large number of municipal bodies had lately made a custom of choosing as their honorary president the bearer of some great name.[1] Was it a matter for uneasiness that the Cabinet contained too many statesmen of the first rank? Among the members of the Cabinet, the *Spectator* pointed to four, possibly five, ministers fitted to become prime ministers,[2] and it was beyond dispute that the Cabinet contained two eminent statesmen, differing so profoundly from each other in origin, character and temperament that friction seemed inevitable, the one regarded by public opinion and regarding himself as the great man of the Cabinet, the other its official head: Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury.

Joseph Chamberlain's age in 1895 was almost sixty. Thirty years had gone by since as a young Radical manufacturer in Birmingham he had led the campaign which finally resulted in the great statute of 1870 establishing primary education, the imperfect realisation of Chamberlain's democratic and secular ideal. It was twenty years since he had launched that other campaign of reaction against Lord Beaconsfield's im-

[1] See the striking list of these aristocratic chairmen in an interesting article in the *Quarterly Review*, vol. clxxxiv. pp. 270 sqq. Art xii., *The Citizenship of the British Nobility*.

[2] *Spectator*, June 29, 1895: The four statesmen were the Duke of Devonshire, Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain and Edward Goschen—to whom the article added Lord Lansdowne, less familiar indeed to the public, but in the opinion of the *Spectator*: "one of those Anglo-Irishmen who can rule by a sort of instinct."

perialism which returned Gladstone to power at the election of 1880. President of the Board of Trade in the Cabinet which Gladstone had formed on taking office, the recognised leader of the Radical section of the Liberal party, and famous for the democratic methods, at times even verging on Socialism, by which he had conducted the local government of Birmingham, he had outraged Conservative sentiment by his violent diatribes against the aristocracy and the plutocrats. He was only waiting for Gladstone to retire to become the official " leader " of an ultra-democratic Liberal party. But Gladstone refused to grow old, and in 1885 disconcerted the nation by his sudden conversion to the programme of Irish Home Rule. Chamberlain thereupon broke with his chief and took with him a group of malcontents.

Was it chimerical to entertain the hope of a reconciliation between this group of seceders and the old Gladstonian party? As the years passed and Gladstone clung to office it became increasingly plain that the rupture was incurable. Chamberlain was sent to Washington by Lord Salisbury to settle certain matters at issue between the United States and Canada. He there learnt to interest himself in colonial questions and, without abandoning all his democratic opinions, became a missionary of British imperialism. It was not surprising. The British Empire, at least under one of its aspects, was a free confederation of democracies, already at the end of the nineteenth century far more democratic than the Mother Country, and Chamberlain himself,[1] a self-made man of the middle class, a

[1] Human memory is short and in 1895 it was widely forgotten how intense, fifteen years earlier, had been Chamberlain's opposi-

former screw manufacturer, had far more in common with politicians like Seddon of New Zealand and Reid of Australia than with the Duke of Devonshire and the Marquis of Salisbury. No one was astonished that when offered the choice between the War Office which would involve an enormous task of administrative reform and the Colonial Office he chose the latter. At a period when Colonial questions had assumed such importance, and Colonial conflicts between the Powers were becoming so frequent and so serious, the day might well come when the Colonial Office would be the real Foreign Office. Now, if there was ever a man born to enlarge the scope of his commission, that man was Chamberlain, whose ambition was the more insatiable, because it had been so long unsatisfied and who had reached the age of sixty when at last he found himself in a position to play the part in his country's history of which he felt himself capable. Everyone in England or on the Continent knew that pallid face, those pursed lips, that faultless frock-coat, that orchid in his buttonhole, and that eloquence at once cold and vehement which infuriated his opponent. By nature a firebrand, his words and actions alike kindled a conflagration.

It was only to be expected that Lord Salisbury, who combined the functions of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, should feel uneasy at the entrance of this outsider into his Cabinet. What points of contact could exist between an uneducated manufacturer who

tion to imperialism. See *Standard*, July 1, 1895. "There are Radicals who scarce seem to be patriots. But no one will affirm that Mr. Chamberlain was not, at every period of his career, a thorough-going Englishman, and an ardent champion of the Imperial idea."

had never been at Oxford or Cambridge, and was not even a member of the Church of England, and the head of such an old family as the Cecils, on which the personality of the present Marquis had conferred a high repute for culture and traditional piety? Destined from youth, by his birth as much as by his tastes and capacity, to fill the highest offices of State, at a period when he still occupied a subordinate position, he had offered a stubborn resistance to the democratic, and later to the imperialist, projects of Disraeli. Between 1886 and 1892 as Prime Minister in an administration, which was perhaps one of the best England had ever known, he had contrived to extend the Empire without the bloodshed and expense of military enterprises, by friendly compacts with foreign Powers, and at the same time by a series of internal reforms had satisfied the demands of Chamberlain and his followers. But Chamberlain was then an external ally with whom it was the easier to treat because his position in the House was more difficult. Relations between the two statesmen were likely to be far more difficult now, when they disputed within the same Cabinet the control of British foreign policy. The difference of age indeed was not very great. But the one was all impatience to cover in the few remaining years of active life the ground he had failed to traverse during a career as slow as it had been lengthy. The other, the elder by five years, when he returned in 1895 to the Foreign Office may possibly have entertained sweeping ambitions. But he was very quick to realise their futility and thought only of a peaceful close to a career long since crowned with success. He was ailing and obliged to nurse his health by wintering every year in

the south of France. He was a lover of solitude, never so happy as when he could pass long hours in the chemical laboratory which he had installed at Hatfield. From a philosophic nonchalance rather than from deliberate haughtiness, he kept his colleagues at a distance: the story went round that he did not even know by sight one of his colleagues in the Cabinet. His language was brutally outspoken and he had a reputation for disconcerting sallies. But these sallies did not indicate the violent temper of a man of action, they were merely the cynical frankness of a sage, and moreover, of a sage now far advanced in years. One day a Chinese statesman laid before him a project of intervention in northern China. Lord Salisbury refused to entertain it, the risks were too great. "I understand," replied the Chinaman, "we govern, you and I, two Empires on the decline." Lord Salisbury loved to repeat this story as a good joke. And after all the Chinaman was possibly right. He was right, if he simply meant that Lord Salisbury with the weariness of old age felt that his country was old like himself and equally in need of rest.

These two statesmen were indeed strange yokefellows! "There had been," said a speaker of the Opposition, "conjunctions in our history which needed a great War Minister and there had been conjunctions which needed a great Peace Minister. Chatham was a War Minister. Walpole was a Peace Minister. But what they never wanted was a Minister half Chatham and half Walpole." [1] The difficult task of maintaining communications between the Chatham and the Walpole of the Cabinet fell to Lord Salisbury's nephew, the

[1] John Morley's Speech at Leeds, June 8, 1898.

leader of the Commons. Arthur Balfour, declared a political opponent, is " one of the rare men who make public life tolerable and even respectable." [1] He was a metaphysician who refused to take seriously the claim of the outer world to reality. And if he regarded the world as an enigma, the world paid him back in his own coin. It was indeed to the enigmatic aspect of his personality that he owed so much of his power to impress and charm. Was he never to be anything more than the youthful sceptic and æsthete who, fifteen years before, had first attracted notice by the publication of his *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, and who lolling carelessly beside Lord Randolph Churchill in the House of Commons amused himself by turning into ridicule the leaders of both the historic parties? Or had he revealed his true nature when in 1886 Lord Salisbury gave him a seat in the Cabinet as Irish Secretary and for the next six years, an autocrat without misgivings, he had bullied the Irish for their own good? The return of the Conservatives to office in 1895 revealed him in yet another guise, ripened by experience. A second philosophical essay *The Foundations of Belief* discovered a profound traditionalist behind the sceptic's mask, and explained how a sincere attachment to the faith in which he had been brought up by his mother, the charming Lady Blanche Balfour, was the firm foundation on which his imperturbability and irony reposed. Indolent he always remained and throughout an entire session seemed to take pleasure in annoying his fellow Conservatives, and even his opponents by the spectacle of his nonchalance. Then

[1] Sir William Harcourt to John Morley, about the end of December, 1898. A. G. Gardiner, *The Life of Sir William Harcourt*, vol. ii. p. 478.

all of a sudden he would shake off his lethargy and meet the attacks of the Opposition or defend some important and complicated measure with an untiring energy and a sovereign command of dialectic. In defending the indefensible, reconciling the irreconciliable and in removing by his skill in verbal manœuvres the bad effect produced by some intemperate outburst of his redoubtable colleague, he knew no rival. The Opposition contrasted him with Chamberlain to his advantage and liked him. The old Tories to whom Chamberlain's methods were often distasteful, and who would never have consented to serve under his orders, were willing to work with him under the leadership of Arthur Balfour, a man who was never put out by anything and disposed to derive amusement from everything. Was such a sorry affair as the world worth taking tragically? Balfour was now a finished Parliamentary leader, indeed the model Parliamentary leader, the darling and spoilt child of Parliament, as Chamberlain was its *enfant terrible,* and if his popularity was less obvious than Chamberlain's, it was perhaps more firmly established with a nation which has so to speak the Parliamentary system in its blood.

The South African Question. Cecil Rhodes and the Jameson Raid

The new government had hardly been in office six months when a sensational event revealed to the world the methods which Chamberlain's imperialism would pursue. There had lived for years in South Africa one of the great men of the Empire, the most typical repre-

sentative of that imperialism whose outlines we have sketched, with its characteristic blend of commercialism and idealism.[1] Still quite a young man, Cecil Rhodes, the fourth son of a clergyman, had settled in South Africa for his health. There he had amassed a very large fortune, he was the King of Kimberley, the diamond City. Moreover, unlike the business men of his entourage, he nourished lofty ambitions and used his wealth in the spirit of Napoleon. He was the Prime Minister of Cape Colony. He was chairman of the great chartered company which as far north as the Zambesi developed the territory called after his name, Rhodesia. He was planning to construct a railway which would serve Rhodesia and when complete would traverse Africa as far as Cairo and seal the hegemony of Great Britain over the entire continent. He looked further still and dreamed of binding the Empire together by a federal constitution. His imperialism was coloured by a vague Liberalism. In Cape Colony he governed with the entire goodwill of those Dutch colonists who had originally brought European civilisation to South Africa, and it was by reconciling the two races that he sought to secure British rule. In England he subscribed to the funds of the Liberal party.[2] Formerly a friend of Parnell's, he contributed to his party funds and one of his intimate friends was a member of

[1] For his career see among a host of authorities Vindex, *Cecil Rhodes, His Political Life, Speeches,* 1881–1900, 1900, an interesting collection of documents (letters, speeches), and especially Basil Williams' excellent book, *Cecil Rhodes,* 1921.

[2] This subscription was at first kept secret and the circumstances connected with it made a sensation when they became public. See *Spectator,* August 3, 10, 17, October 12, 1901, also the correction (which was not a disclaimer) in the *Daily Chronicle,* August 19, 24, October 12, 1901.

the group.[1] There was room for the Irish nation in his scheme of imperial federation. A bachelor and a woman-hater, he belonged entirely to his work, and was never weary of tinkering at his strange will, the testament of a dreamer, which bequeathed his entire fortune to found a species of knighthood, which should spread his ideal throughout the Anglo-Saxon world and assure to the English-speaking people the dominion of the world.[2]

But an obstacle stood in the way of his schemes of immediate annexation. In the very middle of British South Africa were two Boer republics, that is to say republics inhabited by Dutch colonists. Annexed under Lord Beaconsfield's government, they had reconquered their independence when Gladstone was in office. Five years earlier gold had been discovered in the more northerly of these two republics, the Transvaal, and a British population had grown up around the Johannesburg mines, more numerous and more dis-

[1] For the relations between Cecil Rhodes and Parnell see R. Barry O'Brien, *The Life of Charles Stewart Parnell*, 1846–91, 1898, vol. ii. pp. 184 sqq.—also Vindex *Cecil Rhodes*, appendix iv. The correspondence between Mr. Rhodes and Parnell, on the gift of £10,000 to the Irish Party, pp. 839 sqq.

[2] For the history of the will and the successive forms which it assumed between 1877 and 1899, see *The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes* with elucidatory notes, to which are added some chapters describing the Political and Religious Ideas of the Testator edited by W. T. Stead, 1902. See especially p. 59: "After recalling how the Roman Church utilises enthusiasm, he suggests the formation of a kind of seculiar Church for the extension of the British Empire." For the curious mixture of mysticism and Darwinism which constituted Cecil Rhodes' "religion," see pp. 85 sqq. See also (p. 64) his letter to Stead of August 13–Sept. 3, 1891: "Please remember the key of my Idea discussed with you is a Society copied from the Jesuits as to organisation." The object of this society was to be the establishment of world peace by the union of Great Britain and the United States." The only thing feasible to carry this idea out is a secret society gradually absorbing the wealth of the world to be devoted to such an object."

contented every year. Financiers, engineers, traders, labourers and barristers the Uitlanders chafed against their treatment as a floating mob of aliens without political rights. The Transvaal Boers on the other hand had elected as their President the aged Kruger, an uncompromising foe of British influence. It was certain that he would never grant the Uitlanders the rights they demanded. Nor would he allow the Transvaal to be incorporated into a federation dominated by the British. To overcome this opposition Cecil Rhodes plotted a stroke of armed violence.

The directors of the chartered company delegated to Rhodes by formal deed the full powers which by their charter of incorporation they had received and were under an obligation to employ. That is to say Cecil Rhodes was invested with nothing short of a dictatorship within the company's territory.

At this juncture the Colonial Secretary transferred to the Company the extensive territory of Bechuanaland, hitherto a Protectorate, which on the west [1] bordered the Transvaal Republic, and the bodies of police already established in the country were ordered to assemble at Mafeking, where an agent of Cecil Rhodes,

[1] Bechuanaland comprised two parts, a crown colony whose annexation to Cape Colony had been practically completed when Chamberlain became secretary, and a protectorate whose future annexation had been promised without however any particular date being fixed. In this decison the partisans of annexation were embarrassed by the opposition of three native chiefs who complained that their rights had been violated and whose cause was espoused with considerable warmth by philanthropists in London. (See Rev. Edwin Lloyd, *Three great African Chiefs, Khama, Sebele and Bathong*, 1895.) The difficulty delayed Chamberlain, but not for long. For he took office during the closing days of June and the annexation was effected on November 6. (*Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa.* Together with the proceedings of the Commmittee and *Minutes of Evidence*, 1897, pp. 336–8.)

Dr. Jameson, would form out of their number the nucleous of a new police force, which would henceforward be in the service of the Company. Thus Jameson found himself in command of a small army on the Transvaal border.

Meanwhile, Rhodes was engineering a rebellion at Johannesburg. He and his friend Beit, a German by birth who had made a fortune out of the gold mines, spent together £260,000 on organising the plot. They were convinced that the rebellion would be immediately successful and would not even involve bloodshed. What they feared was that the victors of the Johannesburg rebellion would be attacked by the Boers from the country districts. Then the moment would arrive when Jameson and his band could profitably intervene. Rhodes would persuade the home government to sanction the *fait accompli* and declare, if not as in 1877 the annexation of the entire Transvaal, at least the establishment of a system of local self-government for Johannesburg and the Rand.

But the plot was bungled. In the first place the malcontents in Johannesburg wasted valuable time. Many among them were Germans who took alarm at the suggestion of joining a distinctively British movement. They denounced the plot to Berlin, and Berlin made diplomatic representations in London. Then Jameson lost patience and acted too soon. On December 27, 1895, without waiting for a summons he invaded the territory of the Republic at the head of some four or five hundred men. This rash move lost everything.

To what extent was Chamberlain informed of the plot by Cecil Rhodes' agents in London? How far was he guilty, though not a formal accomplice, of con-

niving at the scheme? Must we conclude that he deliberately refused to be told plans of whose nature he was well aware? [1] In any case it is unthinkable that a

[1] This conclusion is certainly suggested by Dr. Rutherfoord Harris's account of his interview with Chamberlain in London on August 1, 1895: "I referred to the unrest at Johannesburg and added a guarded allusion to the desirability of there being a police force near the border. Mr. Chamberlain at once demurred to the turn the conversation had taken," also Mr. Chamberlain's own version a little later of the same interview: . . . "It was in the course of this conversation that he (Dr. Harris) made the remark, the exact words of which I could not possibly pledge my memory to at this distance of time, but it was to the effect 'I could tell you something in confidence,' or 'I could give you some confidential information': I stopped him at once. I said 'I do not want to hear any confidential information; I am here in an official capacity, I can only hear information of which I can make official use." (*Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa;* together with the *Proceedings of the Committee and Minutes of Evidence,* 1897, pp. 337, 339.) It is amazing that these two documents which in my opinion demonstrate Chamberlain's connivance are understood by many Englishmen—and not only by Chamberlain's political sympathisers—as acquitting him of all responsibility. Must we go still further—and speak not merely of connivance but of actual complicity? Chamberlain's obstinate refusal in 1897 to permit the production of certain documents, the untruthful evidence given by Miss Flora Shaw and the extraordinary excuses trumped up to clear Edward Fairfield leave very little doubt on the point. See for the text of the Hawksley documents, William T. Stead, *Joseph Chamberlain, Conspirator or Statesman? An Examination of the Evidence as to his Complicity in the Jameson conspiracy, together with the newly published letters of the Hawkesley dossier,* 2nd Ed. 1900. The additional documents published by *l'Independence Belge* on January 6, 1900, under the title *Les Dessous d'une Guerre. Chamberlain et Jameson,* are however all later than the raid and when read after twenty-five years' interval do not seem to warrant the sensation caused by their original publication. Edmund Garrett and E. J. Edwards, two journalists at the Cape, in a work fully documented, and most carefully weighed, entitled *The Story of an African Crisis: Being the Truth about the Jameson Raid and the Johannesburg Revolt* of 1896: *Told with the Assistance of the Leading Actors of the Drama,* 1897, admit that the project of collecting the Bechuanaland police on the Transvaal border for the purpose of assisting the Uitlanders was already known to the Liberal Cabinet in 1894, and C. Ian Colvin (*The Life of Jameson,* vol. ii. pp. 166 sqq.) hints that this was the explanation of the surprising weakness displayed by the representatives of the Liberal Opposition on the Committee of Enquiry in 1897.

statesman of such acute intelligence should have begun his ministerial career as an unsuspecting dupe. But when, instead of a revolt breaking out spontaneously on Boer territory, as Rhodes had planned, a military raid was attempted, that is to say a hostile invasion of the Transvaal by British troops without a preliminary declaration of war, he had no option, in spite of Rhodes' telegrams imploring a few days' delay, but to yield to the demands of the German government [1] and disavow Jameson. Kruger meanwhile entertained the Johannesburg malcontents with insincere negotiations, until the Boers hastily summoned to the field surrounded Jameson's troop at Krugerdorp and compelled it to surrender.

The abortive attempt provoked keen indignation throughout Europe. The German Emperor sent President Kruger a telegram of congratulation. On the other hand British feeling was dangerously excited, and to satisfy the public the Government despatched two regiments to Africa and mobilised a flying squadron. To understand the universal hostility of Continental opinion, the Emperor William's interference and the British nervousness, we must understand the relations which obtained between Great Britain and the powers about the date when the Unionists took office.

British Isolation. Germany Rejects British Advances

Europe was divided between two rival groups of powers—the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and

[1] For these demands see *Second Report of South African Committee* . . . Appendix, p. 459. Translation of Documents presented in the Reichstag, Feb, 12, 1896, also: *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette,* 1871–1914. Vol. xi. pp. 15 sqq.

Italy, the Dual Alliance of Russia and France. But if in its inception the Franco-Russian Alliance was aimed at Germany, it had possessed from the outset another aspect, hostility towards Great Britain. For the Russian Government was steadily losing interest in the Balkans where its victories of 1878 had brought only a series of disappointments, and cherished ambitious designs of Asiatic conquest both in Persia and Afghanistan, and in China. In these regions, therefore, Russian imperialism clashed with British. Nothing could be further from the thoughts of the statesmen who followed each other in the government of France than to provoke a war with Germany, even if they could obtain a guarantee of Russian intervention. They also were occupied with the execution of an ambitious scheme of colonial expansion in China and Indo-China and above all in Africa, which at every turn brought them into conflict with the British policy of annexation. Hence the British government inevitably drew closer to the Triple Alliance which opposed France and Russia. The rapprochement had already begun between 1886 and 1892 when Lord Salisbury was at the foreign office. Not only was there an avowed friendship, almost an understanding, between the British and German governments, but a formal agreement whose object was confined to the maintenance of the status quo in the Mediterranean and which, though not termed an alliance, was in effect an alliance against France, had been secretly concluded between England, Austria and Italy. The same policy had been followed by Lord Rosebery both as Foreign Secretary and later as Prime Minister in the Liberal Cabinet. And, indeed, there existed many ties of a sentimental nature

which were calculated to facilitate a political rapprochement between England and Germany. The British royal family was closely related to several of the ruling houses of Germany, and to the Prussian in particular. Young Englishmen in large numbers went to finish their education at German universities, to return imbued with respect for their professors, and friendship for their fellow students. There was no rivalry at sea. As yet Germany had no navy. Between the two armies there was nothing but the memory of victories won in common against France, during the Seven Years' War, in 1814 and in 1815, and every year in both countries certain regiments celebrated the anniversary of Waterloo. But, to the advances made by Great Britain the German government had failed to respond. Not only did the Franco-Russian alliance, as it became anti-British, cease to alarm Germany, but the Emperor William and the officials of the Wilhelmstrasse, encouraged by the excellent relations which had prevailed between the courts of Berlin and Petersburg since the accession of Nicholas II, were beginning to entertain the project of a general alliance of the Continental powers against England under the leadership of Germany. During the last two or three centuries every great military power had been seduced in turn by this ambitious dream. Spain first, then France, and now it was the turn of Germany. In Russia an entire party was pledged to this policy; and, if once it was accepted by Russia, French anglophobia had become of late so acute that in spite of bitter memories still recent the adhesion of France did not appear beyond the bounds of hope. The Emperor William believed that his project was on the eve of being realised when,

in 1895, after the Japanese rout of the Chinese army and the cession to Japan of the Liao-Tung peninsula by the treaty of Shimonoseki, the united intervention of the German, Russian and French governments compelled Japan to abandon her conquest. England found herself alone in support of Japan against this Triple Alliance of the Far East, as it was called in Germany. Might not this new Triple Alliance find further spheres of action in other parts of the globe and even in European waters?

Such was the unfavourable diplomatic situation bequeathed in the summer of 1895 by the Liberal Cabinet to its Unionist successor. It is likely enough that Lord Salisbury was inclined to lay the blame upon Lord Rosebery. Throughout his former ministry the relations between England and Germany had been excellent. Why should they not be so again? The situation in the Near East seemed to him an opportunity to bring about a reconciliation. The Turkish authorities had suppressed a rebellion of the Armenians in Asia Minor by a general massacre. The British consuls had denounced the atrocities which had marked the suppression of the revolt; the Christianity and humanitarianism of the British public had been deeply shocked, and the convention of 1878 had invested Great Britain with a species of moral protectorate in regard to the Armenians. Lord Salisbury had never been a friend of the Turk and his indignation was perhaps fanned by the reports of Turkish atrocity put before him by his two sons Lord Robert and Lord Hugh Cecil, both devout Anglicans of the High Church party. He was persuaded that the hour of dissolution had at last struck for the Ottoman empire shaken by this latest

crisis. The crowning achievement of his last ministry had been the peaceful partition of Africa. Why should not Turkey be divided among the Powers, with the prospect perhaps of a future partition of China? The wisest procedure was to make a bid for German support. Italy, which was endeavouring to establish a colony on the coast of the Red Sea, saw her efforts thwarted by the formidable opposition of King Menelik of Abyssinia, who was openly supported by France and Russia. Might it not be possible to compensate Italy from the pickings of the Turkish empire, for example in Albania? And since Italy was the ally both of Germany and of England, she provided a common ground on which both powers might meet. Conversations were begun between the Foreign Office and the German Embassy in London. They were continued between Lord Salisbury and the Emperor William in person when on August 5 the Emperor attended the Cowes regatta.

But the Kaiser proved decidedly adverse to Lord Salisbury's proposals. He regarded himself as officially pledged to protect the integrity of the Turkish empire. Moreover, in his defence of the Ottoman empire he had the entire support of the Russian government, for Russia had too many Armenian subjects to be willing to establish an independent Greater Armenia at its very gates. France accepted the Russian standpoint. There was thus formed at Constantinople against the threatened British intervention a Triple Alliance of Germany, Russia and France, a Triple Alliance of the Near East, a replica of that Triple Alliance of the Far East which was thwarting British policy in the Yellow Sea. The interview at Cowes far from restoring good relations between the two govern-

ments made them far worse than before. The Emperor William left England at variance with the British Court, and four years would pass before he repeated his visit. He had also quarrelled with Lord Salisbury leaving him thoroughly disabused of ambitious foreign policies and in particular of the policy of an understanding with Germany.[1]

This diplomatic embroglio, long kept secret, explains the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger. Though his action took the public by surprise, it could not have surprised the Cabinet after what had passed at Cowes in August. It was evident that the Emperor William was pursuing, with his ministers' full approval, a policy of persistent hostility to British imperialism. At Pekin first and later at Constantinople he had formed an alliance of the powers to oppose it. He now attempted to do the same in South Africa. In January on the very morrow of the Jameson raid he sounded the French and Russian governments as to the possibility of a joint intervention to protect the independence of the Transvaal. But the Radical government then in office in France declined the suggestion. Was it because the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was still too recent a memory? Or was it because the Radical com-

[1] For the details of these abortive negotiations see Hermann Freiherr von Eckardstein, *Lebenserrinerungen und politische Denkwurdigkeiten*, vol. i. (1919), pp. 221 sqq., vol. ii. p. 284, vol. iii. (1921), pp. 121 sqq. There are numerous inaccuracies in Baron von Eckardstein's account: nevertheless he must receive the credit of having been the first to reveal this important episode. For further details see Sir Valentine Chirol, *Ex-Kaiser and England. A New Chapter of Diplomacy* (*Times*, Sept. 11 and 13, 1902), in its turn completed and corrected by *Die Grosse Politik*, chap. lx. (vol. x. pp. 1 sqq). Despite its importance the incident is not mentioned either in vol. iii. of the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, 1923, or in the *History of Modern Europe*, 1878–1919, by G. P. Gooch, 1923.

plexion of this Cabinet rendered the ministers less amenable to Russian influence than their predecessors? Or did they shrink from a direct challenge to the British sea power? Against the British navy German support, even had they thought of asking for it, would have been worthless. For at this date the German navy did not count.[1]

British Foreign Policy (1896–1897)

The defeat sustained by German diplomacy at Paris in January 1896, although less public, was no less damaging to the latter than the failure of the Jameson raid to British imperialism. In consequence the policy of both governments during the months which followed became extremely confused. The Emperor William attempted a diplomatic rapprochement with England by a step for which the colonial difficulties of Italy again provided the occasion, though this time the overtures were made by Germany, not by Great Britain. The Italian army after a sanguinary defeat had just been driven back upon the coast of the Red Sea. There was now no question, as in the previous July, of offering her territorial compensation in the Mediterranean.

[1] If vessels of every description are taken into account, already in 1895 Germany with 201 enjoyed a superiority, if not over France (439) or Italy (224) at least over Russia (189). But this was due to the large number of her torpedo boats (114 to 85 British). If, however, we take into account only first-class ironclads (vessels with a minimum speed of 11 knots, a minimum tonnage of 6,000 and less than 12 years old in 1894) Germany possessed only 5 as against 8 Italian, 17 Russian, 21 French and 29 British. Or again, if we consider only first-class cruisers (15 knots, 5,000 tons and above, together with a few old ironclads) Germany possessed only one to 5 Italian, 7 Russian, 6 French and 29 British.

But might not England ease the position of the Italian army in Africa by effecting a diversion? Over ten years had passed since after Gordon's death she had refused to proceed with the invasion of the Egyptian Sudan, either in her own name, or, as the representative of the Khedive. Why not resume the project then abandoned and despatch an expedition to Khartoum on the rear of the Italian army? [1] The British Cabinet jumped at the suggestion. The victory would recover the prestige lost by Jameson's humiliating defeat. The expedition, arranged in haste, proved an arduous task; thirty per cent of the officers perished. But it was successful. Sir Herbert Kitchener, who left Wady Halfa about the end of April, defeated the enemy on June 7 at Ferkeh and on September 19 at Hafir. On September 23 Dongola was occupied. The first stage had been covered on the road to Khartoum.

The expedition was regarded by the entire world as a reply to French designs upon Abyssinia and the Upper Nile. It is not easy to understand why the step was taken at the very moment when Lord Salisbury, aware for the past six months of the disposition of the German government, was doing his utmost to improve British relations with France and was concluding an agreement about Siam whose provisions were censured by Lord Rosebery as inspired by an excessive anxiety to placate the French.[2] Indeed before embarking on the Sudanese expedition Lord Salisbury, who perhaps had yielded reluctantly to the Italian and German sug-

[1] Prince Hohenlohe to Count von Hatzfeldt, March 4, 1896 (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xi. p. 235).

[2] H. of L., Feb. 11, 1896 (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th Ser., vol. xxxvii. pp. 35–6).

gestions and the views of his colleagues,[1] attempted to obtain the approval of France. The British army, he had proposed, should only advance beyond Dongola, if an agreement had been previously reached with the French government. But although the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the famous scientist Berthelot, received Lord Salisbury's overtures favourably, he found himself opposed by the majority of his colleagues and by the Russian embassy. He resigned. The expedition was despatched in spite of French opposition, and since the hostility of France and Russia made it impossible to finance the expedition from the reserve of the Egyptian Debt, the Khedive opened a loan which, being entirely subscribed in England, strengthened the British hold upon Egypt.[2]

The Foreign Office, however, did not lose heart but continued to do its utmost to improve relations with France. It felt that in pursuing this policy it was sup-

[1] M. de Staal to Prince Lobanov, March 20, April 11, 1896: "Lord Salisbury hotly defended his point of view though admitting a certain measure of truth in my argument so far as Italy was concerned. He spoke with particular warmth when he argued that military necessity had compelled the decision of the Cabinet. He was perhaps inspired by the zeal of the convert, if the story is true that he was one of the last to be won over to the suggestion of an expedition in the Soudan . . ." (*Archives of the Russian Embassy in London*). He had written to the same correspondent a fortnight before (March 4–16, 1896): "Her (Britain's) interests will always make her seek a good understanding with Italy. She will do her best to assist that Power in her present difficulties. But it is doubtful whether she will so readily return to her former orientation towards the Triple Alliance.... In my opinion British sympathies are rather with Russia and France than the Central Powers.... M. de Courcel who, in a very short time, has achieved an important position here, is of opinion that the solution of the many Colonial questions outstanding between the two countries cannot fail to improve the relations between their respective governments, and it is for this that he is working, in his opinion, with marked success."

[2] *Die Grosse Politik*. Vol. xi. pp. 158 sqq.

ported by public feeling, just then acutely inflamed against the Emperor William and his people, and further exasperated by the disclosures of German policy published in October 1896 by the Bismarckian press. The negotiations already engaged between the two governments for the demarcation of their respective boundaries in the Niger zone were pushed on with the sincere intention of bringing them to a successful issue, and although they broke down, at least an agreement about Tunis was concluded on September 18, 1897, which enabled France in return for certain concessions to revoke the commercial treaty that the British had made with the Bey of Tunis before the French occupation. We may conjecture that Lord Salisbury hoped by these demonstrations of friendship to obtain French support for his Armenian policy. For at the close of 1895 the Sultan, encouraged by the inaction of the Powers, had given the signal for massacres which on the lowest estimate made 80,000 victims in a single year. The massacres stirred public opinion in England. There was an outbreak of indignation on humanitarian grounds, led by the Churches. Patriotic sentiment also played its part. What a disgraceful spectacle of weakness Britain was displaying in the Levant! *Punch* and Gladstone united to deplore the fate of the unhappy Armenians. Never had a more unanimous movement of public opinion pushed the government to energetic intervention. But what could be done against the solid combination of Germany and Russia which France, now governed by a Cabinet of moderates, supported more firmly than ever? Lord Rosebery, the official leader of the Liberal Opposition, refused to associate himself with the agitation on behalf

of the Armenians. "Against the policy of solitary interference in the affairs of the East I am prepared to fight tooth and nail. . . . I am convinced that there was a fixed and resolute agreement on the part of the Great Powers of Europe, all of them, or nearly all of them, to resist by force any single-handed intervention by England in the affairs of the East. . . . Isolated action by Great Britain means a European war." [1] And when the old Gladstonians found fault with his timid language he gave up his leadership of the party which remained without a recognized head.

Then the disturbances in Crete, complicated as they were by Greek intervention, distracted attention from the conditions in Armenia, and, although the attitude of the Russian government was more favourable to the Cretan rebels than it had been to the Armenian, the Sultan, relying on German and Austrian support, declared war on Greece in April 1897. In Greek territory his army inflicted a crushing defeat on the Greek army, and the war ended in September with a victorious peace imposed by Turkey. This Turkish victory was a final humiliation for the British Foreign Office.

Such in the Levant were the more than unsatisfactory fruits of British policy. Sir Herbert Kitchener's march to Dongola—already a year old—had done nothing to nullify at the other end of Africa the bad effects of the Jameson raid. And finally each of the three Powers which had formed in 1895 the Triple Alliance of the Far East was attempting to secure the highest possible return for the assistance then given to China. Railway construction was beginning in China

[1] Edinburgh Speech, Oct. 9, 1896.

and many politicians in London urged that England should take her share in it. Among them was Lord Charles Beresford, a member of one of the most important families of the Anglo-Irish nobility whose chequered career included the command of a naval squadron, active participation in the work of the House of Commons, and a journey through China in the rôle of a diplomatic commercial traveller on behalf of British manufacturers and merchants.[1] But, if by a treaty concluded with China on June 5, 1897, the British secured privileges to the South of the Yang-Tse-Kiang, in the north the concessions were obtained by Russia, financed by French capital and served by Belgian engineers; Russia also concluded an agreement with Japan for the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in Corea, and at the same time the report was current that a secret treaty had been signed by which Russia was empowered to extend the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria and received the lease of a Chinese port, Kiao-Chau or Port-Arthur. In reality, it was Germany which in November first effected a military occupation of the Shan-Tung peninsula and took over the port of Kiao-Chau on a 99 years' lease. The Russian government replied to this step by despatching in December a squadron to Port Arthur. The control which England had so long been accustomed to exercise over the whole of China was a thing of the past.

[1] For the Chinese question at this period see the Hon. George N. Curzon (Lord Curzon), *Problems of the Far East*, 1894. (Sir) Valentine Chirol, *The Far Eastern Question*, 1896, Lord Charles Beresford, *The Break-up of China, With an account of its present Commerce-Currency, Waterways, Armies, Railways, Politics and Future Prospects*, 1899; also the American publication by P. S. Reinsch, *World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century as influenced by the Oriental Situation*, 1900.

The Year 1897. *The Queen's Diamond Jubilee. Public Uneasiness*

How could this series of mistakes and failures be retrieved? When Jameson and five of his lieutenants, surrendered by the Transvaal government to the British authorities, had been tried in the London courts and sentenced to several months' imprisonment a Parliamentary Committee was appointed to probe the conspiracy to the bottom. It reported in July 1897. The members of the committee, both Conservatives and Liberals, were unanimous. Only an insignificant minority of two, a Radical and an Irishman, dissented from the report. The conduct of Cecil Rhodes and several of his accomplices was censured, but no punishment was suggested, not even the removal of Rhodes' name from the list of Privy Councillors. The Colonial Secretary was acquitted of all knowledge of the plot, but no steps had been taken to procure the documents which alone could have decisively proved whether or no his ignorance was genuine. It was only with considerable difficulty that the Radical opponents of imperialism secured the appointment of a special sitting for the discussion of the Report by the House. And when on July 26 the matter was put to the vote their motion only obtained 77 votes as against 304 in favour of the government, and the sitting concluded with a speech by Chamberlain which was not so much a defence of his own conduct as a panegyric of Cecil Rhodes, the rebel and patriot. Was his intention when he spoke in these terms merely to satisfy public opinion which for the past eighteen months had regarded Rhodes as a hero and a martyr? Or was it rather to

signify his intention, now the path had been cleared, to revive at the first opportunity his aggressive policy in South Africa after its temporary check?

The Committee reported immediately after the splendid Jubilee Celebrations with which Great Britain kept the sixtieth anniversary of the Queen's accession. Once more, as at the former Jubilee in 1887, the ministers of the self-governing colonies met in conference in London. They discussed, though with the utmost caution, what steps could be taken towards a federal union of the Empire. But the festival was itself a manifesto. No longer, as in 1887, was it simply an act of almost religious homage paid to the person of the aged Queen, it was an act of homage to the Empire. In the long procession which started from Buckingham Palace, visited the centre of the City, crossed London Bridge and regaled the slums of Southwark with the spectacle, figured the premiers of the great self-governing colonies, the vassal princes of India, the governors of crown colonies, representatives of every military or naval force in the Empire, mounted infantry from Australia, Canada and the Cape, Sepoys, and specimens of a hundred different races in their native costumes. From this point of view the Jubilee was a gesture of defiance flung by England to the nations of the world. Possibly she was isolated, her isolation, as Sir Wilfrid Laurier expressed it in a phrase which caught on immediately, was "splendid."[1] The

[1] The phrase seems to have been first used by a Member of the Canadian Parliament, G. E. Foster, when in their Lower House he spoke on January 16, 1896, of: "These troublesome days when the great Mother Empire stands splendidly isolated in Europe." Three weeks later Sir Wilfred Laurier gave it currency: "Whether splendidly isolated or dangerously isolated, I will not now debate; but for my part I think splendidly isolated, because this isolation

world might hate Britain. Britain by herself was a world.

If, however, the Jubilee celebrations were a "splendid" answer to the German emperor's unsuccessful attempt eighteen months before to unite the Continent in an active league against England, the German occupation of Shan-Tung was a reply to the Jubilee which England was obliged in her turn to leave unanswered. Public opinion was still uneasy, even at the moment when the British were seeking to persuade the world, perhaps to persuade themselves, of their imperturbable self-confidence, and it was symptomatic of the state of public feeling that Rudyard Kipling's Jubilee poem was a solemn meditation on the mortality of empires.

> Far-called, our navies melt away,
> On dune and headland sinks the fire;
> Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
> Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
> Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
> Lest we forget—lest we forget.

No one could charge the government with injuring the material prosperity of the nation: for the past two years there had been a brisk recovery of trade by which the Treasury and Industry alike profited. Nor could they be charged with neglect of imperial defence: the big naval programme which Goschen laid before Par-

of England comes from her superiority" (House of Assembly, Feb. 5, 1896). Three weeks after this the British First Lord of the Admiralty, Goschen, naturalised the phrase in England: "We have stood alone in that which is called isolation—our splendid isolation, as one of our Colonial friends was good enough to call it" (*Speech at Lewes*, Feb. 26, 1896).

liament in 1896 had received the almost unanimous approval of both parties. And if, on the other hand, the internal policy of the Cabinet, too exclusively favourable to agriculture and the Anglican Church, had aroused discontent in a few urban constituencies, Radical politicians deceived their audiences or themselves when they predicted for the next election a reversal of the verdict given in 1895. For the Opposition continued to be weakened by deep internal dissensions. When imperialists like Lord Rosebery or Sir Edward Grey criticised the conciliatory spirit which Lord Salisbury displayed toward the French colonial movement, the Gladstonian section of the party, still powerful in the National Liberal Federation and among the party leaders in the Commons, refused to follow them. They praised persistently and pointedly Lord Salisbury's policy of moderation, apparently delighted to embarrass by their praise, even more than Chamberlain, the man who a year ago had been their official chief and who perhaps entertained hopes of recovering that position. Both parties alike were suffering from anæmia. Never had the debates been so completely subject to the strict ruling of the Speaker, never had they been so lifeless, and never had the public taken so little interest in the proceedings at Westminster. It was evident that the Unionist coalition had failed to give the national pride the satisfaction which had been expected and which no other party could give. Just then an event took place, if not in England, at least in an English-speaking country which with a dramatic suddenness awoke British imperialism to new life.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR. THE GREAT DESIGN, A UNION OF THE TEUTONIC PEOPLES

The War in Cuba and British Public Opinion

The large island of Cuba had been since 1895 in revolt against Spain, and the rebels were receiving from the American continent not only encouragement, but money and arms. In 1896 they were recognised as belligerents by the government of the United States which in 1897 made representations on their behalf at Madrid. On February 15, 1898, the *Maine*, an American man-of-war, was sunk by an explosion in the harbour of Havana. The preposterous tale was immediately circulated in the United States and confirmed by an official despatch that the Spaniards had deliberately destroyed the *Maine*. At once a formidable wave of patriotic enthusiasm swept the country; humanitarian zeal on behalf of the oppressed Cubans, lust of conquest, desire to avenge a slight upon the national honour were blent in one powerful movement of public feeling which President Mackinley was unable to resist. On April 20 war was declared, on July 3 the entire Spanish fleet was wiped out off Santiago and on August 2 Spain asked for the peace, concluded on December 10, which abolished the last vestiges of her colonial empire. It was an important date in the history of imperialism throughout the world. America had reacted to the stimulus of European example, abandoned the peaceful isolation which Washington had laid down as the fundamental principle of her foreign policy, and become in her turn a conqueror. And,

unlike the European empires up to the present, she had aggrandised herself at the expense of a European and a Christian nation. She had acquired a colonial empire by expelling the Spaniard.

How was her action regarded by British public opinion? Three years before, at the very moment when the Unionists took office, American imperialism had clashed with British. A frontier dispute had arisen between British Guiana and the Republic of Venezuela. President Cleveland had intervened and, taking his stand on the doctrine laid down in 1823 by President Monroe which denied the right of foreign powers to interfere in the affairs of the New World, had offered his arbitration. When Lord Salisbury in disdainful terms refused to entertain the offer, Cleveland, on December 17, 1895, invited Congress to appoint a commission to inquire into the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute. When the commission had reported, it would, he maintained, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means at its disposal, as a deliberate attack on their rights and interests, the occupation by Great Britain of territory adjudged after due inquiry to Venezuela. On the appointment of the commission the British Cabinet retreated and accepted the arbitration which in November it had rejected on principle.

No doubt the threat of war between the two great English-speaking nations had at the time occasioned lively protests on both sides of the Atlantic. British holders of American bonds sold out. There was a panic in Wall Street, and financial circles both in England and America realised how close was the community of interests between the two countries. Nor was it merely a community of interests; there was also

a community of sentiment. The leaders of thought,[1] the clergy of every Protestant denomination indignantly denounced the suggestion of a fratricidal war. It must also be admitted that, as a consequence of these demonstrations, the government of the United States finally carried out the arbitration in such a fashion as to spare to some extent British susceptibilities. Nevertheless, the entire episode added another to the long list of defeats suffered by the Unionist Cabinet. And the American politicians completed the humiliation of Great Britain and baffled the attempts at rapprochement made by the two governments. When a treaty of universal arbitration had been signed by the Secretary of State, Olney, and the British Ambassador Sir Julian Pauncefote, the Senate after long debates refused to ratify. After all this it is not surprising that at the beginning of 1898 the Unionist press as a whole was frankly hostile to the American point of view, and favourable to Spain. Nor is it surprising that Sir Julian Pauncefote, who had been humiliated in 1895 by the arrogant attitude of America and a second time in 1897 by the rejection of his arbitration treaty, attempted at the beginning of April to revive the project

[1] It is curious to compare the language of the American philosopher William James about the Venezuela affair with his language two years later during the Spanish-American War. Then he expressed indignation: "Cleveland, in my opinion, by his explicit allusion to war, has committed the biggest political crime I have ever seen here" (Letter to F. W. H. Myers, Jan. 1, 1896. *The Letters of William James*, vol. ii. p. 31). In 1898 his tone is utterly different and while lamenting that: "at the least temptation all the old military passions rise and sweep everything before them," he writes: "The European nations of the Continent cannot believe that our pretence of humanity and our disclaiming of all ideas of conquest is sincere. It has been *absolutely* sincere! The self-conscious feeling of our people has been entirely based on a sense of philanthropic duty, without which not a step would have been taken." (*Letter* to François Pillon, June 15, 1898—*Ibid.* p. 74.)

of arbitration, to be proposed this time to the United States by the joint intervention of all the European powers.[1] Certain Tories, descendants of the seventeenth-century Cavaliers, had always cherished a traditional affection for the Catholic and Latin nations. And surely the natural sympathies of Lord Salisbury and Arthur Balfour were with the Spanish crown rather than with the business men of Chicago?

But the attitude of the Radical press was very different. The intellectual circles and the religious organisations which constituted the backbone of the party shared to the full the American outlook and feelings. How could they do otherwise than champion the United States against Spain, even if, from the standpoint of international law, Spain was in the right? From March onwards the *Speaker*, the *Daily News* and the *Daily Chronicle* were demanding the conclusion of an Anglo-Saxon alliance,[2] and the nonconformist bodies expressed their wish that every effort should be made to bring the two peoples together.[3] No doubt the outbreak of Jingoism in the United States was a source of embarrassment to those Liberals who were

[1] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. pp. 23–4, 28, 29. It must be added that when the story of this proposal leaked out in the early part of 1902, it was categorically denied by Lord Cranborne, a son of Lord Salisbury and under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (H. of C. Feb. 11, 1902; *Parl. Deb.* 4th Ser. vol. cii. p. 992). The German evidence seems, however, decisive. In fact the German documents prove, if their evidence is reliable, that Sir Julian Pauncefote's attitude was the attitude of all the leading Conservative organs in London until the middle of April. The Cuban War is not mentioned in Vol. i. of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 1898–1914.

[2] *Daily News*, March 16, 1898. *Daily Chronicle*, March 18, April 15, 1898. *Speaker*, March 19, 1898.

[3] See the telegram of sympathy despatched on April 27 to President Mackinley by the Spring Meeting of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland (*Daily Chronicle*, April 28, 1898).

professed opponents of militarism. They escaped the difficulty by the reflection that this was a war of liberation, undertaken to free the Cubans from the Spanish yoke, or again, that since American civilisation was of a commercial and peaceful type, the defeat of Spanish militarism was actually the victory of peace. And if the editors of the *Manchester Guardian* experienced a certain difficulty in solving the problem, it was otherwise with the *Daily Chronicle,* at that time the most popular of the important London dailies. The reader is given the impression that the entire Anglo-Saxon world was at war with Spain, and that the Englishman was almost guilty of treason who refused to take part, mentally, if not as a soldier, in a war which was nothing less than a crusade waged against a barbarous and corrupt foe.

It was not long before it became evident that the Liberal attitude on this question corresponded better than the Tory with the interests of the nation. What was it that occasioned such uneasiness to the British? The spectacle of a virtual combination of the great powers of Europe against their country. Now, in every Continental capital from Petersburg to Berlin and Paris the same combination was, it appeared, being formed against the United States. Was England to condone all the injuries she had received and unite with the European governments in the defence of Spain? Should she not rather espouse the cause of the United States and as her ally take up the gauntlet which the old world seemed desirous of throwing down, not to the United States alone but to the entire English-speaking world? Before the end of April, the Conservative press had altered its standpoint and, with the single

exception of the eccentric *Saturday Review,* had taken the side of the United States. It was a turning point in the foreign policy of Great Britain. The British press, like the British government, has never departed from the attitude, now definitely adopted, of deliberately courting the friendship of the American government and people.

Further Advances to Germany

It is not easy to say with certainty how far the Unionist press yielded to the spontaneous pressure of public opinion, or how far the government dictated the policy of the party organs. It is, however, worth remark that throughout the whole of April Lord Salisbury was convalescing after influenza in the South of France and that in consequence Chamberlain's influence in the Cabinet lacked the usual makeweight. Chamberlain was entirely devoid of the prejudice against the Yankee usual among the Tories. For he was a newcomer, a man of the Colonial or American stamp. The sentiments which led the Radical press to espouse the American cause were native to the society into which he had been born, and in which he had made his political apprenticeship. The Radical Jingoism of the *Daily Chronicle* was his own. Was the agreement at this juncture between himself and the great Radical daily a mere coincidence? Or is there reason to suspect a secret understanding? I would call attention to a significant fact. On March 8 the *Daily Chronicle* was demanding not only an understanding with America, but an understanding, even a

military alliance, with Germany. On the 14th it repeated the demand and on the 18th united both suggestions in the single grandiose project of a Triple Alliance. " The world is coming to be ruled by great forces or combinations of forces. The huge Russian empire and the vast strength of the French Republic—that is one union. All German-speaking people will be under one flag before the next century is very old." At the very time when the *Daily Chronicle* was elaborating this ambitious scheme, Chamberlain was working hard to realise it by secret negotiations with the diplomatic representatives of Germany, negotiations whose details have long been kept secret but whose results were soon apparent.

In the course of the winter the suggestion had often been mooted that it might be possible to break the underground league of the Powers against Great Britain which seemed on the way to become universal, by special negotiations with one or other of the Powers. Many symptoms pointed to a weakening of the alliance between Russia and Germany in the Far East now that the time had come for the allies to divide the spoils of their common victory. In October Russia had watched with an unfavourable eye the German occupation of Shan-Tung, and in December Germany had been chagrined by the Russian counter move, the military occupation of Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung peninsula. Under these circumstances was it impracticable to enter into negotiations with Russia and arrive at a partition of spheres of influence between the two nations, both in China and in Turkey, by which Northern China would be definitely abandoned to Russia? Negotiations were, in fact, carried on be-

tween London and Petersburg until the end of March,[1] on the very eve of the Russian occupation of Port Arthur. Or was the alternative policy, an understanding with Germany, impossible? In January Sir Herbert Kitchener resumed his advance up the Nile and began his conquest of the Sudan. Every day witnessed a further step on that route from Cairo to the Cape which was now the deeply cherished ideal of the Chamberlain school of imperialism. It was common knowledge that the French colonials had replied to the scheme with an ambitious counter project. In the summer of 1896 Captain Marchand had left the Congo with a commission to forestall the British on the Upper Nile and bar their advance by setting up a cordon of French posts between Brazzaville and Djibouti. That is to say a conflict between France and Great Britain was imminent. Moreover, the relations between the British and the Boers in South Africa were becoming strained. The problem of the legal status of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal was still unsolved. There also, any day, matters might reach a crisis. Surely prudence suggested that in view of the difficulties likely to arise at any moment in North or in South Africa steps should be taken to prevent further demonstrations of hostility by the Emperor William, such as had embarrassed the British government towards the end

[1] See *British Documents*, vol. i. pp. 5 sqq., in particular the Marquis of Salisbury to Sir N. O'Connor, Jan. 25, 1898. See also the apprehensions expressed by Graf von Hatzfeldt in a letter of March 25: "The conviction prevails in the City that the situation as regards China is at present very critical and that at the meeting of the Cabinet to-day important decisions will be taken. It is believed in many quarters that the Cabinet will attempt to reach an understanding with Russia, disarm her enmity and prevent her from actively supporting the French demands" (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv. p. 196).

of 1895, and, by timely concessions to the German colonial movement, secure in advance the diplomatic isolation of France and the South African republics. Ever since November 1897 Lord Salisbury's language in his weekly conversations with the German ambassador had assumed a conciliatory tone which his interlocutor regarded as significant, and there can be no doubt that it was with the backing of both governments that a group of English and German financiers, having first secured the rejection of a rival offer from Russia, advanced China in February the amount of her war indemnity to Japan.[1] But when Lord Salisbury expressed his desire for an understanding between the two countries he had been careful to explain that he did not mean an understanding directed against any third party. In Parliament he continued to speak the language of peace, protested against the current belief that it was a duty to grab whatever Britain could lay her hands upon, stand up to the entire world and turn every dispute into a *casus belli*, and lamented the discredit which had overtaken the Cobdenism of his youth.[2] On the other hand no indications at the beginning of 1898 pointed to Chamberlain as the man who would give a new orientation to British foreign policy. The German ambassador looked to Lord Salisbury, not to Chamberlain, to improve the relations between the two countries. At the end of December Chamberlain told the Russian ambassador " that the only sound policy for Great Britain was an understanding with Russia and consequently with France." [3] For Eng-

[1] Graf von Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office, Nov. 20, 1897 (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiii. p. 43).
[2] *H. of L.*, Feb. 8, 1898 (*Parl. Deb.* 4th Ser. vol. liii. p. 45).
[3] M. de Staal to Count Mouravieff (Dec. 10–22, 1897). Cf. M. de

land was involved in colonial disputes with Germany, as with other countries, and a settlement was no easier to reach. His high-handed methods made Chamberlain intensely unpopular at Berlin.[1] That was the Chamberlain touch. He mistook it for strength. But he was also, and for the same reason, addicted to rapid and sensational decisions. The Russian occupation of Port Arthur produced an outburst of anti-Russian feeling in England which rendered a diplomatic understanding between the two countries impossible. Under these circumstances Chamberlain espoused the policy of an understanding with Germany. At once he went further than Lord Salisbury was prepared to go, indeed he would very soon alarm his chief. It was his deliberate design to give the understanding a more thea-

Staal to Prince Lobanov (Feb. 7–19, 1896): "Many indications combine to show that British public opinion is taking a direction favourable to our country. The other day at a social function I met Mr. Chamberlain, the leading statesman of the moment. He took me aside and spoke very warmly in that sense." A little later, when Chamberlain in a violent speech had thrown down the gage to Russia (see below p. 89), Lord Salisbury could apologise to the Russian ambassador for the incident and add: "That his astonishment when he read the speech was the greater because in the Cabinet Mr. Chamberlain had consistently pleaded for an understanding with Russia." M. de Staal confirms Lord Salisbury's evidence on this point. (M. de Staal to Count Mouravieff, May 13–25, 1898)—*Archives of the Russian Embassy in London.*

[1] Graf von Hatzfeldt to Prince von Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1897: "When I seek to discover the motives of the unreasonable demands of the English and the obstinacy with which they adhere to them, I am led to the conclusion that Mr. Chamberlain's personal ambition is primarily responsible, *possibly also his lack of sympathy with Germany.*" (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv. p. 108.) And on December 18, when Lord Salisbury had explained to the ambassador that the Cabinet could not with safety attempt to influence public opinion too strongly in favour of Germany, the Emperor wrote against the passage of his report in which Von Hatzfeldt repeated the Premier's words: "*Das ist von einem Cabinett mit Chamberlain darinnen nicht zu befürchten*—A Cabinet of which Chamberlain is a member need have no fear on that score." (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiii. p. 47.)

trical setting and consequently a less pacific character than it had possessed in Lord Salisbury's intention.

It would seem that the discussions which he proceeded to initiate were undertaken on his personal responsibility without previous consultation with the Premier. The agents were, on the German side, a certain Baron von Eckardstein, a former secretary to the embassy who in consequence of his marriage to a wealthy London heiress, daughter of the well-known furnisher, Sir John Blundell Maple, had left the diplomatic service and lived in London as a private gentleman of means; on the English side, Lord Rothschild, a member of the group of Liberal Unionists whose nominal head was the Duke of Devonshire but which was actually led by Chamberlain. The Duke of Devonshire had married a German wife, as Eckardstein an Englishwoman, and Devonshire House played an important part in the negotiations. The discussions apparently began about the end of February but no active steps were taken until Lord Salisbury fell ill, ceased to attend the meetings of the Cabinet, and finally, on March 15, left for a month's holiday in the south of France. Chamberlain was now for practical purposes Prime Minister, and his authority was enhanced by the violent protest of certain English newspapers [1] against the

[1] *Times*, March 28, 31. *Morning Post*, same dates. Cf. *Fortnightly Review*, April 1 (vol. lxiii. pp. 513 sqq.), the article entitled *Where Lord Salisbury has Failed*. By *Diplomaticus*. (The writer however at the conclusion of his article declared that it was not his intention to demand Lord Salisbury's resignation of the Foreign Office.) See also H. of C. March 30: Sir Charles Dilke's motion condemning the union in a single hand of the Foreign Office and the duties of a Prime Minister (*Parl. Deb.* 4th Ser., vol. lv. p. 1360). The *Daily Chronicle* supported the motion, but, very characteristically, the official organ of the Radical Party, the *Daily News* (March 31), warmly espoused the defence of Lord Salisbury.

virtual resignation at such a critical moment of the statesman who, in spite of his advanced age, attempted to combine the duties of a Prime Minister with those of a Foreign Secretary.[1] Throughout the entire month, both inside and outside the House, the language employed by certain ministers was calculated to prepare public opinion for grave eventualities.[2] Finally Chamberlain arranged for March 26 a dinner at Lord Rothschild's at which Balfour and himself were to meet the German ambassador. Balfour would seem to have been afraid of committing himself too deeply to Chamberlain's schemes; he pleaded an engagement for the 26th and on the 25th called on the ambassador. At the interview he was content to express in general terms the opinion that an understanding between England and Germany, in China and elsewhere, seemed to him practicable in the interest of both countries. But on the following day Chamberlain had a conversation with the ambassador in which he frankly admitted that England

[1] Was it really his inactivity which the Press blamed and not rather the active resistance which, even when invalided abroad, he opposed to his colleagues' imperialism? See (Sir) W. S. Blunt's account in his diary of a conversation with George Wyndham on March 24: "George . . . walks home most nights with Arthur Balfour from the House, and hears a good deal of what is going on. He tells me Lord Salisbury does not intend resigning, and though he has made over the Foreign Office temporarily to Balfour, he still keeps interfering with affairs there not altogether to Arthur's pleasure." (*My Diaries*, 1888–1914, vol. I. p. 357.)

[2] See the speech delivered on March 2, at Bradford, by Lord Selborne, Under-Secretary for the Colonies: "He thought that the majority of his countrymen would agree that the one trite rule of conduct in the real interests of the country was peace, but not peace at any price. It was the responsibility of the elector to make up his mind as to the exact point at which the price became too much." Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had already spoken in bellicose terms on January 17, at Swansea, and on January 19, at Bristol. Lord Salisbury's pacific utterance in the House of Lords on February 8 was a reply to these speeches of his colleague.

could not remain any longer isolated, and proposed on the spot that the Triple Alliance should be transformed into a Quadruple Alliance of which England should be a member.[1]

The Emperor William respected a proposal, almost naïve in its suddenness. But it was no slight matter for congratulation that at the very time when his personal policy was at last victorious at Berlin, and the Reichstag, by passing the first law of naval construction, had recognised the necessity of equipping Germany with a fleet worthy of a first-class power, he had won abroad a diplomatic success, almost equally important. England, which only two years before he had so seriously insulted, was now invoking his assistance. He did not altogether reject the British advances and many signs warned the public that a new era in foreign policy was about to open. When on March 27 Russia signed the public treaty with China which guaranteed her possession of Port Arthur, Britain replied by occupying Wei-Hai-Wei with the entire approval of the Berlin government, and when on April 5 he justified the step in the House of Commons Balfour was at pains to lay stress on the common interests in China of England and Germany which must be jointly defended against Russia. On April 8 Sir Herbert Kitchener as he advanced victoriously on Khartoum received a public letter of congratulation from the German emperor. As though in

[1] The first account of Anglo-German negotiations to be made public appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* of April 15, 19, 26 and September 3, 7, 10 and 11, 1912. It does not seem to have made much impression on the public. The story was retold in Baron von Eckardstein's book, *Lebenserrinerungen und Politische Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1919 (see especially vol. i. pp. 291 sqq.)—*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv. pp. 191 sqq. corrects in certain details and completes on many points but on the whole confirms in its essentials Eckardstein's account.

obedience to an official command [1] the British press desisted from the attacks, common since 1896, on Germany and even on the Emperor's person. This was the position when during the first half of May two speeches delivered, one by Lord Salisbury three days after his return from the Continent, the other by Chamberlain, carried public excitement to the highest pitch.

The Panteutonic Programme

Addressing the Primrose League on May 4 Lord Salisbury, after a few remarks on current questions of home politics, enlarged on the foreign situation. Events in Northern China served as a pretext for inviting his audience to consider the condition of the world as a whole. There were " living " nations. There were also " dying " nations. It was " inevitable " that the former should expand at the cost of the latter. And that expansion could only be effected by war. Not that the Prime Minister was eager for war, far from it. The entire speech was a mournful jeremiad rather than a call to arms. In a somewhat ambiguous sentence Lord Salisbury urged the British people not to squander the

[1] Prince von Radolin to Prince von Hohenlohe, Aug. 2, 1898: " Even in England where the Press is completely free, a hint from headquarters has sufficed to recall, at least all the respectable newspapers, to a correct attitude." (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiii. p. 186.) The Emperor William to the Emperor Nicholas, May 30, 1898: ... " In the beginning of April the attacks on my country and person, till then showered on us by the British Press and people, suddenly fell off.... This rather astonished us at home and we were at a loss for an explanation. In a private enquiry I found out that H.M. the Queen herself, through a friend of hers, had sent word to the British Papers that she wished this ignoble and false game to cease. This is the land of the 'free Press.'" (The Kaiser's letters to the Tsar, pp. 52–3)—On Chamberlain's relations with the Press see Kennedy Jones, *Fleet Street and Downing Street*, 1917, p. 95.

resources of the Empire before the day arrived when the fate of the world would be settled, on " matters which, if at the moment they appeared serious, would be dwarfed to insignificance in the perspective of the future." While claiming for England her share of the spoils, he explained that his country would bear no grudge against other nations, if they extended their dominion over regions " where the British grasp was unable to reach." He pleaded on behalf of a policy of isolation, and warned the country of the dangers of " a policy of prestige." Very different in tone was the speech which Chamberlain delivered at Birmingham and which had the appearance of a deliberate reply to his chief. From beginning to end his speech breathed war. He began by denouncing " the mysteries and the reticences " of the traditional diplomacy. He claimed for a democratic government like the British the right to take the nation into its confidence and conduct its foreign policy in public under the eyes of the world. He then declared himself unable to be content, as Lord Salisbury appeared to be, with the policy of isolation to which England had proudly adhered ever since the Crimean War. So long as other countries were isolated that policy was defensible, but now, when the Continental nations were grouped in powerful alliances, England must find friends. War was no doubt a horrible thing, but " even war itself would be cheaply purchased, if, in a great and noble cause, the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an Anglo-Saxon alliance." He proceeded to attack Russia, which in his Primrose League speech Lord Salisbury had been careful to spare. He denounced the treacherous intrigues by which Russia had con-

trived to obtain possession of Port Arthur and Talienwan. That treachery might indeed have been foreseen: "who sups with the devil must have a long spoon." But war with Russia was out of the question except in concert with an allied power. Once more he condemned the policy of isolation and refused to "reject the idea of an Alliance with those Powers whose interests most nearly approximate to our own." The concluding portion of the speech in which everyone saw an advance to Germany was ill received on the other side of the North Sea. On the other hand the suggestion of a possible "Anglo-American alliance" was welcomed in the United States, and flags were hoisted at New York on the Queen's birthday, as in London on Independence Day. For the Americans, who were at war with Spain, were delighted to find, in England at least, sympathy with their cause, and even entertained the pleasing hope that they might yet win German sympathy through the good offices of Great Britain. When the American ambassador in Germany was invited to speak at Leipzig on July 4, he refused to begin his speech until a German flag had been added to the American and British flags which adorned the hall, and made his discourse a panegyric of Germany "the second Mother-country" of the United States.[1] Thus the two speeches, in which both speakers, one minister in a tone of anxiety, the other in accents of delight, seemed to agree in declaring war imminent, quite naturally kept the public for several days in a state of alarm. When the tension subsided it was evident that the Colonial Secretary had the nation be-

[1] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. p. 54n . . . *Autobiography of A. D. White*, vol. ii. pp. 168 sqq.

hind him. The imperialist policy which since 1895 had been the unavowed policy of the Cabinet had received from Chamberlain an expression calculated to strike the imagination of the country, indeed of the entire world.

Six days after the Birmingham speech the aged Gladstone died at the age of eighty-six. The country with one consent paid his memory the tribute she is wont to pay without distinction of party to great statesmen who have had the privilege to serve her. Nevertheless, his disappearance from the scene at this particular moment may be regarded as symbolic. His funeral, so soon after Chamberlain's war cry, seemed the funeral of the political tradition which bore his name. The old Liberal orthodoxy was dead.

The struggle between Liberalism and despotism, industrialism and militarism, during which in any country the British Liberals were prepared to champion the former against the latter by naval support or active intervention, was a thing of the past. What meaning was there now in the opposition when the youthful and growing German nation was the perfect embodiment both of industrialism and of militarism? There were progressive nations, and stagnating or decadent nations, " living " nations and " dying " nations. Which were the progressive and living nations? Pre-eminently the United States and Germany. But were not these two nations united with England by deep-rooted affinities? In the first place by community of religion. All three countries were predominantly Protestant. Nevertheless, the advocates of an understanding between them did not stress their common Protestantism. And if, on occasion they brought it forward, it was not as a matter

of theological truth but in so far as Protestantism in contrast with Latin Catholicism could be presented as the form of Christianity best adapted to the "Saxon," "Germanic" or "Teutonic" temperament. For the question of race had become the keystone of the current sociological systems. The progress of civilisation had brought the European nations into contact with peoples at once less civilised than themselves and very different in racial character. The inevitable result was to establish a very close association between the two concepts of "civilisation" and "race." But were there not among the Europeans themselves racial distinctions, less marked no doubt, but real nevertheless, and differing only in degree from the distinction between the black races and the white, the white and the yellow races? And in particular was there not a "Teutonic" race which throughout the North West of Europe presented Christian civilisation in its most consummate form and, overflowing its European boundaries, had created beyond the seas, on the one hand the British Empire, on the other, the United States of America? How powerless the rest of the world must prove in face of an alliance between the three great representatives of a race manifestly designated by its innate qualities to assume the empire of the globe? [1]

The Slavonic race was flooding Asia. Should Eng-

[1] For an even more definite formulation of Chamberlain's system see his speech at Wakefield, Dec. 8, 1898. If his allusions to Russia are more restrained, he adopts a hectoring tone towards France. "As a moment's reflection will show that there is no part of the globe in which British and German interests conflict in any serious way, I think we may hope that in the future the two nations—the greatest naval nation in the world and the greatest military nation —may come more frequently together, and our joint influence may be used on behalf of peace and unrestricted trade, in which case it will certainly be more potent than would be the influence of either Power taken alone." He also advocated a tightening of the

land inaugurate her new policy by erecting in the East a dyke to stem the rising tide? But at the close of the nineteenth century Russia was far from being regarded as a "dying nation," and very few at that time took seriously the revolutionaries who proclaimed the imminent collapse of the Czarist system. On the contrary public opinion was inclined to regard the Russian advance in Asia as something inevitable, irresistible as a force of nature. It was in another direction that the Anglo-Saxon race must take, had indeed already taken, the initiative. Spain, humbled by the United States, had apparently exhausted all her old vitality and power of expansion. Little Portugal stagnated, forgotten by the world, though still in possession of an extensive colonial empire. Italy, having achieved her unity, was attempting to raise herself to the position of a great

bonds which united England and her colonies and a rapprochement with the United States. "If we are assured of the friendship of the Anglo-Saxon race, whether they abide under the Stars and Stripes or under the Union Jack, there is no other combination that can make us afraid." A few passages taken from writers of widely different provenance will prove the extent to which the British imagination was possessed by the idea of a panteutonic alliance. Annie Besant, *Ancient Ideals in Modern Life*, 1901, pp. 8–9: "There is dawning now on the vision of the earth a vast Teutonic world-empire, formed by the English and their Colonies, with their huge offshoot, the United States, bound in close alliance. Their world-empire will be the next to dominate humanity." *The Life of Hugh Price Hughes*, by his daughter, 1905, pp. 291–2. "His attitude to Germany was that of unloving admiration, but he thought that the Emperor and Mr. Chamberlain were the two cleverest men in Europe.... The German people did not take his fancy, but England must increasingly ally herself with them.... Germany, like England, had accepted the Reformation, and stood for the future and for progress. France, on the contrary, had not done so, and was declining daily and in that he loved that country he incessantly belaboured her"; pp. 552–3 (during the Boer War): "When his opponents said, 'You, an advocate of peace, and a member of the Peace Society, uphold this iniquity?' he thought: 'Yes, indeed, and a vaster Peace Society than you wot of, my dear brother. Our Society ranges the earth, and sends men to their deaths so that thousands unborn may have some chance of enjoy-

power. But her attempts appeared a series of blunders, almost ridiculous: Crispi's megalomania had resulted in the fiasco of Adowa. France cherished the memory of a great past, still by no means remote, but, if the prospect of a military dictatorship was a constant source of anxiety, the inglorious government which for the past quarter of a century had managed to avert the danger was an object of contempt. The Reactionaries in alliance with the Revolutionaries had exploited the Panama scandal against the Parliament. And now the Dreyfus affair was beginning. Would a combination of the Republicans and the Revolutionaries take their revenge and utilise this new scandal to the detriment of the Army? Or, as the majority of Englishmen expected, would the unstable and scandalous political conditions enable a soldier of low calibre to establish

ing what you and I do.' This Peace Society, moreover, was distinctly Teutonic in character and friendly to the Teutonic peoples, because they had accepted the principles of the Reformation." The Rev. Hugh Price Hughes, a distinguished Wesleyan, was an imperialist. And the language of the Congregationlist minister R. Horton, whose imperialism was less pronounced, if not pro-German, is at any rate anti-Latin. See *The Awe of the New Century*, 1900, p. 51: "The signs do not point to unity of that kind" (Catholic unity), "the despotic kind. Popes and Cæsars and Czars are merely survivals where the life of the new age is not yet felt. They have nothing to do with the everlasting Gospel; they have no point of contact with Christ. They are in the circle of ideas which made the Roman Empire, the Latin Races, the Latin religion." Sometimes panteutonism assumed a Liberal aspect. See Bernard Holland, *Imperium et Libertas, A Study in History and Politics*, 1901, pp. 8–9: "In France... the Revolution and Napoleonic régime... did but put the last touches to the work of Louis XI, Richelieu and Louis XIV. But in countries inhabited by races of the Teutonic breed—Germans, English, Swiss, Dutch—centralisation has never been so complete, and liberties of all kinds, individual, municipal and provincial have been better maintained throughout history against the central power. In these countries the principle of division of power which was at the bottom of the mediæval social order, now asserts itself with better chance of success, because we are enlightened by the teaching of history, or experience."

a precarious dictatorship? The colonial undertakings of France seemed disproportionate to her stationary population, and subordinate position in the markets of the world. Unpleasant rumours were current to the effect that the hastily organised expedition to Madagascar had been on the verge of a disaster. This was evidently the quarter where the Teutonic attack must be delivered. No doubt the turn of the Slavonic barbarian would come sooner or later, but the decadent Latin races must be the immediate victims.

The anti-Latin Policy. Portugal. Spain. France and the Niger Basin

Portugal was the first to suffer from the Anglo-German understanding. About the beginning of June the report spread that Portugal was raising a loan in London on the security of the customs of her South African Colonies. Great Britain, no doubt, expected to secure in this indirect fashion a control over Delagoa Bay, sufficient to prevent the Transvaal Republic obtaining supplies by that route should there be a recrudescence of the conflict between President Kruger and the British government. The German government at once protested, pleaded previous engagements between the Portuguese government and itself and demanded a share in the bargain. The plea was allowed and negotiations began. It was with Lord Salisbury that Graf von Hatzfeldt had to deal at first, and the discussions dragged on for over two months. But on August 9 the Prime Minister took a holiday of several weeks and left Balfour in temporary charge of the Foreign Office. No doubt Balfour had as little taste as his

uncle the Premier for Chamberlain's spectacular foreign policy, but his dislike did not blind him to the fact that an understanding between England and Germany might serve the immediate interest of his country. Two agreements were signed in London on August 30. Though the first was not explicitly declared secret, the text was not published. In the accepted phraseology the two governments agreed to guarantee " the integrity and independence of Portugal." If Portugal were in need of money, England and Germany would jointly advance the necessary loan. The colonial customs of Portugal would be pledged to both creditors. In case of non-payment England would be entitled to the customs levied in that part of Mozambique which lay to the south of the Zambesi and throughout central Angola, Germany to the customs levied in Mozambique, to the north of the Zambesi and in the north and south of Angola. The second agreement, which was strictly secret, provided that if " unfortunately " it should prove impossible to preserve the integrity of the Portuguese Empire, both the contracting powers should have entire liberty of action in the respective customs areas defined by the first convention. In short, Portugal, a European nation, and, moreover, an ally of Great Britain, was treated as the European powers were accustomed to treat Turkey, Persia or China. As a first step, her colonies were divided into two spheres of influence, British and German respectively, and provision was made for their eventual partition between the two powers.[1]

[1] The territorial arrangements made by the two conventions are rather more complicated, and include important dispositions relating to the Portuguese colony of Timor in the Pacific. See for the full history of the negotiations, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv. pp.

These negotiations concerning the Portuguese colonies were kept secret, as also were those begun in August by the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, for the conclusion of a convention [1] which would practically have amounted to the establishment of a military protectorate or quasi-protectorate of England over Spain. Spain was to promise not to erect fortifications within a radius of seven miles round Gibraltar. She was also to promise her help to England in the event of war, and England would make herself responsible for the military and naval defence not only of the bay of Algeciras, but also of the Balearic and Canary islands. But who was the enemy whose influence England was fighting in the Peninsula, and against whom she wanted to make sure of the help—voluntary or otherwise—of Spain? It was with another Latin nation, with France, that the

257 sqq.; *British Documents,* vol. I. pp. 44 sqq. One point, however, after both publications, remains obscure, and that is the exact part played by Chamberlain. It would seem that, afraid of giving offence at the Cape, and even in Australia, by too extensive concessions, he chose to remain in the background and leave to Lord Salisbury and Balfour the invidious task of arranging the deal. Reference is made to the Anglo-German agreement of 1898 in Baron von Eckardstein's *Lebenserrinerungen,* vol. ii. pp. 205–6. When the negotiations for a Portuguese loan finally broke down, the agreement of August 1898 was rendered inoperative, and it was even arguable that it had lapsed. When the conflict between Great Britain and the South African Republic became acute, and an unfriendly Portugal which permitted the free importation of arms into the Transvaal might have proved very awkward, Lord Salisbury seized the opportunity to conclude a treaty of friendship with Portugal, which had the air of a protest against the bargaining of the previous year (*British Documents,* vol. i. pp. 88 sqq.).

[1] The draft of this Convention, which was never signed, was confidentially shown by the Spanish Government to the Russian Ambassador at Madrid, who later on communicated it to his French colleague. It has apparently left no trace in the Archives of the Foreign Office, but is referred to in the most explicit terms in a telegram from Sir H. D. Wolff to the Marquis of Salisbury, March 10, 1899 (*British Documents,* vol. ii. p. 255).

tension had become more acute for several months previously; and there was nothing secret about the relations between the two countries.

The matter at issue was the settlement of the frontier between the French possessions in Western Africa and the British Colonies of the Gold Coast and Nigeria. When in 1897 Lord Salisbury reopened negotiations with this object he no doubt hoped to reach without much delay a friendly solution, such as had just been achieved in Siam and Tunisia. But the affair dragged on interminably. In February, the report became current that French officers had occupied certain of the disputed areas with the object of presenting England with a *fait accompli.* In consequence of an alarmist speech by Chamberlain in the Commons and a representation by Sir Edward Monson to the Quay D'Orsay the French minister for Foreign Affairs Hanotaux denied, or at least disavowed, the expedition.[1] In May Chamberlain's warlike speech was at once interpreted —although the name of France had not been pronounced—as aimed immediately at France. On May 19, four days after the Birmingham speech, a meeting of the Cabinet was held, a stormy meeting, if report be true. Chamberlain, it was rumoured, had demanded that the negotiations with France should be brought to a conclusion by the threat of an ultimatum. Faced by the opposition of his colleagues, he had actually tendered his resignation. And he had finally prevailed. One thing at any rate is certain, that from this moment the negotiations progressed rapidly and on June 14 the agreement was signed.

[1] For the entire incident see the debate between Chamberlain, John Dillon and Labouchere, H. of C., February 24, 1898 (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th Ser., vol. lxiii. pp. 1605 sqq.

Must we regard it as a humiliation for France? If France renounced her claim to Bussa and the entire navigable waters of the Niger, she secured in compensation the use of two ports on the Niger for the free transit of her goods. And if she abandoned the entire Sokoto, she kept Nikki in the Borgo region. Moreover, the frontier of the Gold Coast was rectified to her advantage. It is possible, therefore, to see in the agreement a compromise satisfactory to both countries, and in this instance also to detect the moderating influence of Lord Salisbury. The fact remains that the British Cabinet believed—and not without foundation [1]—that it had been the intention of the French foreign office to protract the discussion, unite the question of the Niger with the question of the Upper Nile and, by thus postponing the settlement of the former until the latter had reached a critical stage, secure that all the questions outstanding in Africa between the two governments, including the Egyptian, should be the object of a general agreement, which would, they

[1] "The aim of the British Representatives was, it may be truly said, to reduce within the narrowest limits the object of the negotiations, to confine them to the discussion of particular cases, and the demarcation of local boundaries. The French Government, which never lost sight of its wider aim, attempted to give them a more general scope, and sought to include the whole of Africa. This was the crucial issue which revealed the fundamental divergence of standpoint between the two parties. We believed that our object might be attained if only we could contrive to embrace in the same agreement, not only the right bank of the Niger, but its left bank, Lake Chad and the territories which extended as far as the Nile valley (Gabriel Hanotaux, *Fachode*, p. 118)." It is difficult to understand how after this admission M. Hanotaux can present the agreement as a victory for his policy—the *Yellow Book* published in 1899 by the French Foreign Office under the title *Documents diplomatiques, Correspondance et Documents relatifs à la Convention franco-anglaise du* 14 *Juin*, 1898. 1890–1898 contains no documents later than January 20, 1898, and therefore concludes at a date before the relations between the two governments had become strained.

hoped, be more favourable to France. The speedy conclusion of the agreement was therefore in itself a diplomatic success for Great Britain. The settlement of the Niger question left the question of the Upper Nile where it was before.

Fashoda

While the British government was hastening the settlement of the Niger frontier Sir Herbert Kitchener continued his advance on the Upper Nile. On September 2 he was before Omdurman, and his twenty-three thousand men found themselves faced by the Khalifa's army of fifty thousand. That evening the victory was won. It was a massacre rather than a battle. On the Anglo-Egyptian side fifty were killed and three hundred wounded. Of the Dervishes thirty thousand were killed and only four thousand wounded. Kitchener had, it would seem, given the order that no prisoners were to be taken. The same evening the Sirdar's troops entered Omdurman and the ruins of Khartoum. The Mahdi's corpse was taken from its coffin, his head, severed from the trunk, was sent as a present to a nephew of General Gordon, and the officers of the expeditionary force made souvenirs of his nails.[1] These were the orgies with which imperialism avenged Gordon's death.

Had Marchand outstripped the Anglo-Egyptian army on the Upper Nile and established himself above Khartoum? That was the question. On September 19 Sir Herbert Kitchener continued his

[1] H. of C., June 5, 1899. John Morley's speech (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, vol. lxxii. pp. 337 sqq.).

march up stream, met Commandant Marchand at Fashoda and, ignoring his presence, annexed the country in the name of the British and Egyptian governments. A serious conflict had begun between France and England. The British government pointed out that in 1895 Sir Edward Grey, Under Secretary at the Foreign Office under the Liberal government, had warned the French government that any interference in the Valley of the Upper Nile would be regarded by Great Britain as an unfriendly act.[1] The French government replied that Lord Kimberley, then Foreign Secretary, had repudiated his subordinate's speech by his subsequent declarations. The British government further claimed to represent the Egyptian government and maintained that, since the Sudan was the lawful possession of Egypt, Marchand had no status at Fashoda. The French government replied that in the equatorial regions, and in one instance, even on the Nile, the British government had recognised the rights of Belgium. Why then should not France assert her rights in those regions? Who, moreover, had conferred on England the mandate to represent Egypt? The Khedive? Or his suzerain the Sultan? The French government even went so far as to deny the existence, in the strict sense, of a Marchand mission, and proposed to wait for his official report before discussing the question. But the legal arguments were only preliminary fencing in the duel between Paris and London. It was obvious that between Kitchener and Marchand force was the sole arbiter. It was equally obvious that force was on the side of Kitchener.

[1] H. of C., March 28, 1895 (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, vol. xxxii. pp. 405–6).

Marchand and the handful of Sudanese under his command were cut off from all communication with the outside world by Kitchener's army of twenty thousand. Was France prepared to redress the balance by risking a naval war? What could the French fleet do against the British? And after all who in France wanted war?

The Dreyfus case was still dragging on and the situation was becoming more critical. As the scandal proceeded, it undermined the influence of the nationalist and colonial party. Delcassé had replaced Hanotaux at the Quai d'Orsay immediately after the conclusion of the Niger agreement, and had lost no time in showing his desire to restore friendly relations between France and England which in the opinion of many had been compromised by the fault of his predecessor. He declared his readiness to evacuate Fashoda. He asked only that the evacuation should be effected under conditions which would as far as possible spare the honour of France. He proposed that simultaneously with Marchand's retirement negotiations should be begun to provide the African possessions of France with an outlet on the Upper Nile. Lord Salisbury, it seems, was not unfavourable to the proposal. He did not reject it in principle and replied that he should refer it to the Cabinet.[1]

[1] Baron de Courcel to M. Delcassé, Oct. 5, 1898 (*Documents diplomatiques. Affaires du Haut-Nil et du Bahr-el-Ghazel*, 1897, 8, p. 20). The same to the same, Oct. 12, 1898 (*Ibid.*, pp. 25–6). To remove the bad effect produced in England by the publication of the *Yellow Book*, the Foreign Office immediately published a *White Book* giving an account of the same interviews. But on the point with which we are concerned the *White Book* does not, we believe, contradict, on this point, M. de Courcel's two reports. (The Marquess of Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, Oct. 12, 1898: *Egypt No.* 3 (1898). *Further Correspondence respecting the Valley of the Upper Nile*, pp. 8–9.)

But he found himself powerless. Since May, not he but Chamberlain had been the real Foreign Secretary, and Chamberlain's programme was to reconquer for England the prestige which in the eyes of the public had been jeopardised in every quarter of the globe by Lord Salisbury's weakness, his "squeezability." In the Far East no action could be taken against Russia without the active support of Germany which up to the present had not been forthcoming. But in Africa England enjoyed a free hand and could avenge at the cost of France the defeats she had been obliged to suffer in China. To secure the unconditional recall of the Marchand mission was now the slogan of the entire press, practically without exception. Only one or two Radical organs, such as *The Daily News* and the *Manchester Guardian,* attempted to oppose the current of public opinion. And even their protest was made, so to speak, only for the sake of principle: the outburst of anti-semitism in Paris had done much to estrange Liberal sympathy from France. Lord Rosebery left his retirement, and on October 12 delivered a warlike speech in which he blamed the Unionist government for having adopted during the past three years a policy of conciliation towards France. On the following day, Asquith spoke in the same sense. Even in the Liberal camp the imperialists had gained the ascendancy.

Throughout the second half of October the situation seemed to become graver every day. England ostentatiously armed. A powerful reserve squadron was stationed in the Channel, and it was said that the Admiralty had forbidden the dockyards to undertake any repairs likely to require more than twenty-four hours

to complete. After a Cabinet meeting held in London on October 27 both countries were prepared for the issue of a British ultimatum. The same day the first Lord of the Admiralty, Goschen, declined to preside at a dinner which had been arranged in his honour at Sheffield on the ground that under the present circumstances it was impossible for him to leave the Admiralty.

On November 3 the French government gave way, and the dispute was settled by the recall of Marchand. And the settlement was complete when on March 21, 1899 an agreement was concluded which left the Wadai to France but reserved to Great Britain the Nile Valley and the region of Darfur. For the first time since 1895 a Colonial dispute between Britain and France had been settled neither by a victory for the latter nor by a compromise; France had capitulated unconditionally.

The Year 1899. *The Hague Conference. Mahan's Doctrine*

There is good evidence that in the Foreign Office Lord Salisbury continued to oppose Chamberlain's influence. Possibly he was encouraged in his resistance by the fact that, even during the year 1898, on the whole so favourable to his rival, he had succeeded in settling the difficult question of Crete in agreement with France and Russia and in opposition to Germany and Austria. And on several occasions during the following year he was able to win substantial successes. He concluded an agreement with Russia which laid down two distinct spheres of influence for the construction of

Chinese railways by the contracting powers. It was an apology to Russia for Chamberlain's insults of the previous spring. When further colonial negotiations were opened with Germany circumstances enabled Lord Salisbury to delay their conclusion. For Cecil Rhodes, when he visited Berlin and made his peace with the German government,[1] had promised, that if Germany would assist the accomplishment of his great transafrican scheme, she should receive substantial concessions in the Samoan Islands. But the Colonial Office refused his urgent requests: the Australians did not favour an extension of German territory in their neighbourhood. By April it was evident that the Anglo-German negotiations for the partition of the Samoan Islands had broken down. And towards France there was no doubt that Lord Salisbury's personal dispositions were as friendly as ever. Perhaps on this point he could count on royal support. It was rumoured that the aged Queen Victoria, who had persisted in wintering as usual in the south of France, had obtained from Lord Salisbury a promise to spare her the horrors of a war during the few years she might still hope to live.

At the distance of a quarter of a century it is easy to notice these minor matters which combine to show how artificial after all was the imposing system constructed in 1898 by the British imperialists. But at the time, if they interested the embassies of Europe, they passed

[1] Two years later he added a codicil to his will providing for the foundation of fifteen scholarships of £250 at Oxford, to be held by German students chosen by the Emperor. For, he added, "a good understanding between England, Germany and the United States of America will secure the peace of the world, and educational relations form the strongest tie."

almost unnoticed by the general public. Relations with France continued to be strained. Between the press of both countries there was open war. The French press would not forgive England Fashoda, British journalists made the most of the opportunity for indignant comment furnished by the Dreyfus scandals. Moreover, it was in vain that Paul Cambon, who had just succeeded the Baron de Courcel at the embassy in London, continuing his predecessor's policy, proposed a general settlement of all the questions outstanding between the two countries, not only in Africa, but in Madagascar, Newfoundland, Siam, Shanghai and the New Hebrides. However friendly his personal dispositions, Lord Salisbury always refused, and in January and March the questions, first of Madagascar, then of the port of Muscat in the Persian Gulf occasioned further diplomatic conflicts between the two governments. For in the intention of the French ambassador a general settlement meant the re-opening of the Egyptian question, which the British government was determined to exclude from discussion. And, further, it would inevitably be a compromise reached by mutual concessions. That, however, was no longer desired in London. The British wished to raise in turn all the questions in dispute and settle each unfavourably to France. Without war? Yes, if France gave way all along the line. But if at last she decided to stand firm, was another " Cuban War " such an alarming prospect? Within two months the American navy had wiped out the Spanish. Would it take the British navy very much longer to destroy the French? [1] There

[1] We may call attention to certain imaginary forecasts published about this time which throw light on the attitude of the public. *National Review*, vol. xxxi. pp. 502 sqq., June 1898: J. N. Hamp-

was no doubt a party in London in favour of war. And it was not confined to Unionists, but included members of the Liberal Opposition. In December Sir William Harcourt, leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons, resigned. A few days later John Morley, a loyal defender of Gladstonian principles, broke off all political relations with the official leaders of the Liberal party. Like Lord Salisbury among the Conservatives, Harcourt and Morley had been swamped by the rising flood of imperialism. Their isolation must have been brought home to them when they read the speech delivered to his constituents by the Socialist, John Burns: "Recent events had taught them the

son, *Great Britain, against France and Russia.* "It is a picture of the next war which except for England's loss of Egypt was to be confined to the white nations. All the belligerents would be exhausted and the sole result of the war would be the aggrandisement of Germany against whom we could no longer count upon the support of Russia and France. It is possible that the United States might come to our assistance, but we cannot at all depend upon her doing so. Our best hope lies in this, that in the course of history no Power has ever attained military and maritime supremacy at the same time, a fact which is specially illustrated by the careers of Louis XIV and of Napoleon. Assuming that it is beyond the capacity of any Power to achieve the two objects at once, we may conclude that Germany, being at the present moment undoubtedly the first military Power in Europe would, if she now tried to gain possession of maritime supremacy also, be preparing her own downfall." In short the writer, while fearing the results, foresees a war between England and the Dual Alliance. *How the Jubilee Fleet escaped Destruction; and the Battle of Ushant : or two Episodes in the Career of a Naval Officer,* by P. L. Stevenson, 1899 (2nd Ed.). (The letter prefaced to the 2nd Ed. is dated January, 1903.) It is a brief account of a war waged by England against a combination of Russia, Germany and France, with no ally except Italy. The result is an overwhelming victory. The battle of the Ushant Islands fought on December 1, 1902, is a second Trafalgar, more glorious than the first. B***, *The New Battle of Dorking,* 1900, describes the invasion of England by a French Army. To prevent the danger the author demands the entire reorganisation of the British Army so as to make it possible to invade France and dictate peace in Paris.

duties and responsibilities of empire and shown that the dream of peace in which the Manchester school indulged was based on delusion. . . . The Latin and other races were beginning to see that the world-wide supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race was imminent, if it had not already arrived." [1]

Suddenly a curious incident occurred, likely it seemed to bring to a temporary halt the advance, not only of British imperialism, but of imperialism throughout the world. On May 18, on the initiative of the Emperor of Russia, the Peace Conference opened at the Hague.[2]

On August 24, 1898, the Czar Nicholas, taking by surprise every foreign government including the French, had issued a public document proposing that an international conference should be summoned to consult upon the best methods of securing to all nations " the advantages of a genuine and lasting peace " and " to fix a limit to the continually increasing growth of armaments." The delegates accredited by the various nations, civil, military and naval, entered upon the conference, for the most part sceptical, and in a very bad humour. Vice-admiral Sir John Fisher communicated in private to the German naval delegate his views which were those of the British Admiralty. " The sole principle he admitted was that might is right and he had made it quite clear to Goschen that in the event of war he should regard any agreements that might be concluded at The Hague as null and void, if they were opposed in any way to the political and military in-

[1] Speech at Battersea, November 13, 1898.

[2] For the Hague Conference see *Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White*, 1908. Part v. chapters xlv.-xlix. (vol. ii. pp. 250 sqq.), also *Die Grosse Politik . . . Kapital C.* (vol xv. pp. 139 sqq.).

terests of his country." [1] But on the other hand the Czar's appeal had roused from their torpor the pacifists throughout Europe. "The Conference," Count Münster reported to Berlin, "has brought here the political riffraff of the entire world, journalists of the worst type such as Stead, baptized Jews like Bloch, and female peace fanatics like Madame de Suttner, who yesterday again entertained the Russian delegation at a large banquet, Madame Salenko, etc. All this rabble (actively supported by the young Turks, the Armenians and the Socialists into the bargain) are working in the open under the ægis of Russia." [2] But in the existing situation this "rabble" was able to exercise a species of moral influence on the governments of the West.[3]

[1] Report of Captain Siegel (of the German merchant service), one of the technical advisers appointed by the German government. June 28, 1899 (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. p. 230). In a conversation with the American delegate, the American ambassador, Andrew White, he expressed himself in less bellicose terms, but his remarks were equally characteristic: "To my regret I found him using the same argument as regards the sea that Count Münster had made regarding the land. He said that the navy of Great Britain was and would remain in a state of complete preparation for war; that a vast deal depended on prompt action by the navy and that the truce afforded by arbitration proceedings would give other Powers time, which they would otherwise not have, to put themselves into complete readiness. He seemed uncertain whether it was best for Great Britain, under these circumstances, to support a thorough-going plan of arbitration, but on the whole seemed inclined to try it to some extent. Clearly what Great Britain wants is a permanent system of arbitration with the United States; but she does not care much, I think, for such a provision as regards other Powers." (Andrew White, *Autobiography*, vol. ii. 267–8.) For the truculent speeches with which it amused him to frighten the professional diplomatists at the Hague, see W. T. Stead, "*Admiral Fisher*" (*Review of Reviews*, February 1910; vol. li. pp. 117–18), also Lord Fisher's own *Records*, p. 55.

[2] Count Münster to Graf von Bülow, June 26, 1899 (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. p. 313).

[3] Andrew Dickson White, *Autobiography*, vol. ii. p. 285 (under the date of June 2, 1899): "The shoals of telegrams, reports of proceedings of societies, hortatory letters, crankish proposals and peace pamphlets from America continue"—*Ibid.*, June 14. "In

Moreover, since none of the delegates wished to inflict a snub on the Russian government, all united to prevent the failure which no doubt the vast majority of delegates secretly desired.

Limitation of armaments was rejected by a vote, unanimous except for the Russian delegates. But the British delegate, Sir Julian Pauncefote, was successful in introducing a scheme of organised arbitration. We have already seen how often during the past four years he had come into contact with the idea in Washington. It is true that owing to the action of the German government a proposal for compulsory arbitration was rejected, and it was decided that only those international disputes should be submitted to arbitration which did not concern the honour or vital interests of the parties. In fact it often happened during the course of the discussions that Germany found herself isolated, or on the verge of isolation, against a combination of all the great powers of Europe. But Germany had no desire to break with Russia, and the French delegates, Léon Bourgeois and d'Estournelles de Constant, found the formulas of agreement of which everyone was in search. A permanent Court of Arbitration was set up at The Hague whose constitution, procedure and powers were laid down in detail by a convention signed on July 29.

the course of our breakfast, Baron d'Estournelles made a statement which, I think, impressed every person present. It was that, as he was leaving Paris, Jaurès the famous Socialist, whom he knows well, said to him: Go on; do all you can at the Hague, but you will labour in vain; you can accomplish nothing there, your schemes will fail, and we shall triumph! or words to that effect. So clear an indication as this of the effect which a failure of the conference to produce a good scheme of arbitration will have in promoting the designs of the great international Socialist and Anarchist combinations cannot fail to impress every thinking man." (Cf. pp. 304, 307, 312.)

Where are we to look for the origin of this demonstration? Are we to believe that it was suggested to Petersburg by the desire to put an end to the competition in armaments with neighbouring nations which Russia was already beginning to find a crushing burden on her resources? It is certain that Count Witte had about this time become convinced that neither the financial nor the political system of Russia was sufficiently firm to support the burden of a war or even of an aggressive foreign policy. Or did the imperial project dissimulate a hostile intention towards England, and was the ulterior purpose to enable the great Powers by the reduction of their land armaments to concentrate their efforts on the construction of battleships and conspire to shake off the naval despotism of Great Britain? There is no doubt that the dream of a great Continental alliance against England haunted the imagination of many Russians, and it was the misfortune of the Chamberlain imperialism that any active campaign for peace must in 1899 necessarily wear the semblance of an engine directed against Britain. But we must also admit that it was no mere historical accident that the founder of the Hague Court of Arbitration was the grandson of the emancipator of the serfs and the great-grandson of the author of the Holy Alliance, and that Slavonic mysticism played a part, indeed a large part, in the Emperor's decision. It was rumoured that he had been influenced by Ivan Bloch's great book on war.[1] The work has been prevented by its very size from attaining a wide circulation, but the movement of ideas which followed the Hague Confer-

[1] I. Bloch. *The War of the Future, in its Technical, Economic and Political Aspects* (Russian Original, 6 vols., 1898).

ence made known at least its existence and title, and it has since inspired a host of writers more readable, also more superficial, than Bloch. The journalist Stead immediately published an abridged translation for the use of the British public.[1] Disciple and literary executor of Cecil Rhodes, his imagination, Utopian though it was, had not crossed hitherto the frontiers of the Pax Britannica. Now he became the apostle of peace between men of all nations and all races. The " pacifist " [2] movement was born in 1899.

Its birth therefore coincided with the date when British, or more correctly Anglo-Saxon, imperialism, for it was common to Chamberlain and Roosevelt, burst upon the world. Nor is the coincidence surprising. Pacifism took shape and grew, as the friends of peace saw the danger of a world war drawing nearer. The dread of it had lain heavy on Europe ever since the last upheaval had ended in 1815, but as that upheaval had been of a revolutionary as well as a war-like character, overthrowing churches and thrones, the fear of revolution had long prevailed with the rulers of Europe to prefer peaceful solutions to indulgence of the lust of conquest. After forty years of peace a new era of wars had opened; but it was by a succession of short wars over limited areas, not by a general war,

[1] *Is War now Impossible? Being an Abridgement of The War of the Future in its Technical and Political Relations,* by Ivan Bloch. With a prefatory conversation with the author by W. T. Stead.

[2] The term, of course, is an anachronism at this date. My friend Th. Ruyssen informs me that it was coined by the Frenchman Emile Arnaud, President of the International League of Peace and Liberty, who used it for the first time at the Glasgow Peace Congress of 1901. Severely criticised at first for its incorrect formation, it does not appear to have become current in France till about 1905, and in England still later. (At first the English insisted on the term " pacificist.")

that the map of Europe had been re-arranged between 1850 and 1870. After the latter date Colonial expeditions, the exploitation of Africa and Asia had provided the appetite of the Great Powers for conquest with sufficient satisfaction outside Europe. But now the globe was becoming too small for their greed, and the Spanish-American War threatened to prove the prelude to that world war whose menace had for many a long year been almost forgotten. What world war? The war whose programme Chamberlain had laid down in May 1898.

Chamberlain had found an accredited interpreter of his policy in the American writer named Mahan, a naval captain and professor at the Naval War College of his country. Mahan's utterances were invested with a double authority. To naval men he was a learned historian, to historians a man with personal experience of naval matters. His thesis, which he was never weary of reiterating, was that political supremacy belonged to the nation, and to that nation alone, which could keep the command of the seas. Naturally his message was addressed in the first place to his compatriots. He wished to persuade them to form a navy proportionate to their economic power and thus gain the hegemony of the world. But the examples which he adduced to enforce his thesis were taken most often from the history of British achievement [1] and it was in no jealous spirit that he told its story. For he did not conceive

[1] *The Influence of Sea-power upon History*, 1660–1783. 1890—*The Influence of Sea-power upon the French Revolution and Empire*, 1783–1812. 1892—*The Life of Nelson. The Embodiment of the Sea-power of Great Britain*, 1897. For his biography see Charles Carlisle Taylor, *The Life of Admiral Mahan, Naval Philosopher*, 1920.

the American hegemony as won at the cost of the British. He desired not an exclusively American, but an Anglo-Saxon hegemony, and it was for the two fleets, the British and the American, united that he claimed the command of the seas.[1] Was it surprising that his books were extremely popular in Great Britain? His thesis was that of Lord Rosebery and Chamberlain; it was the racial imperialism which had taken possession of the two great English-speaking nations on the occasion of the Cuban war.

In a work entitled *The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies* Mahan drew a picture of the imminent and inevitable war. The combatants were, it could not be otherwise, the two great races which would shortly dispute, had indeed disputed already, the government of Asia, the Anglo-Saxons and the Slavs. Against Russia the Anglo-Saxons were assisted by the alliance of Germany and Japan, and the four allied fleets were supreme at sea. They would also enjoy the support of the German and Japanese armies which would attack Russia, respectively on her western and eastern fronts. France remained the ally of Russia and in the Mediterranean the combined Russian-French fleets might occasion some difficulty to their Anglo-American foes. But the latter could count on the alliance of Italy, also on the moral instability of the French, more Celtic perhaps than Latin.

[1] *The Interest of America in Sea-power, Present and Future*, 1897. See especially in this volume the study entitled *Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion*, which first appeared in July, 1894—in the *North-American Review*, where it made one of a series of articles commissioned by Andrew Carnegie to promote a rapprochement between the two nations—*Lessons of the War with Spain and other Articles*, 1899.

War was inevitable, the victory of the Anglo-Saxons was equally inevitable.[1]

But at the very moment when, in 1900, *The Problem of Asia* was published, British imperialism was taking another direction.

[1] Admiral Mahan died December 1, 1914.

CHAPTER II

THE BOER WAR

THE WAR. THE OPPOSITION AND THE WAR. PRO-BOERS AND LIBERAL IMPERIALISTS. ENGLAND AND EUROPE. THE GERMAN PROBLEM

THE WAR

The Situation in South Africa after the Jameson Raid

IF, in the spring of 1899, the tension between Great Britain and France became less acute and the British government adopted the conciliatory methods of the Foreign Office in preference to the aggressive methods of the Colonial Office, it was because Chamberlain's attention was turned elsewhere. The moment, he thought, had arrived to settle the South African question which had been left pending for the last three years.

With feverish haste President Kruger was arming the Transvaal Republic. No objection could be raised, for the Jameson Raid had placed his government in a position of legitimate defence and by one of the ironies of history had provided him with the necessary funds to defray the cost. He had arrested the principal leaders of the plot, organised at Johannesburg in concert with Rhodes, and had allowed them to be sentenced to death by the tribunals. But he had then commuted the death penalty into the payment of enormous fines, and the money thus obtained was applied, together with other revenues, to the purchase of artillery, Maxim guns, rifles and ammunition. Two large armoured forts were erected near Johannesburg, and their guns were kept permanently trained on the mass of suspected Uit-

landers. And besides these public preparations, it was rumoured that Kruger was making many others in secret, and that in a never ceasing stream cannons, rifles and ammunition were pouring into the country through Delagoa Bay—more rifles, it was confidently reported, than would suffice to arm the entire population of the Republic. No doubt preparations were being made to distribute the surplus wholesale to the malcontents in Cape Colony who were only awaiting the signal to throw off British rule. Moreover, Kruger's government was rapidly becoming a naked dictatorship, and every Boer, whatever his position, judge, politician or private citizen, who dared to contest his absolute rule was promptly ruined. Kruger made the serious mistake of neglecting to conciliate those among the Johannesburg capitalists who cared more for wealth than for political independence, and were still prepared to come to a friendly understanding with his government. A commission of inquiry appointed by himself, and composed exclusively of Boers, had admitted in 1897 that the protests made by the Chamber of Mines against the reckless exploitation of the gold diggers by the dynamite monopoly and the Dutch Railway Company were fully justified. But he either ignored these grievances entirely or granted only the most trifling redress. It was clear that the exploitation was his deliberate policy. His object was not to develop the mining industry, but simply to draw from it a revenue sufficient to hold down by armed force the foreign diggers on the Rand.

The President was faced at Cape Town by a formidable adversary. He was not Cecil Rhodes. Since the Jameson Raid Rhodes had been on the shelf. He was

no longer Prime Minister at the Cape, which was henceforward governed by the intransigents of that Afrikander Bond in concert with which he had ruled so long. Between the Bond and Rhodes there was now a complete rupture, and Rhodes was now exclusively occupied in the far north with the development of Rhodesia. But since February 1897, the young Sir Alfred Milner had been Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner for South Africa. As an undergraduate at Balliol the new governor had won a brilliant reputation for intellectual ability, and on leaving Oxford had completed his education at the German universities. Under-secretary of finance in the Egyptian administration, on his return to England he had published the results achieved by the years of British occupation in Egypt in a book which very soon became a standard authority. When the government decided to send him to the Cape, he was in London as Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue. Since he was regarded as one of the most distinguished representatives of the new imperialist school, his choice, a year after the Jameson fiasco, was highly significant. The aged and infirm Lord Rosmead, whom he succeeded, had made himself unpopular with the British population in South Africa by his scrupulous adherence to constitutional procedure—his weakness his critics called it. They were satisfied when they learned the name of his successor. It was obvious that Sir Alfred Milner had not been sent out to the Cape to play the part of a vice-regal puppet, or to be the long-suffering diplomat in his relations with President Kruger. He was sent to speak the language of a master, to govern effectively, and to assert British supremacy.

During the first months of his governorship he was quietly making himself master of a host of questions, political and social, with which hitherto he had been wholly unacquainted, and the self-respect of the Afrikanders was flattered when he learned the Taal, the debased Dutch which was the local idiom. It would indeed have been imprudent to display his colours within a few months after the Raid, when in London the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry was engaged in clearing up an episode so damaging to British credit. But only a year after his arrival, in a public speech delivered in March 1898, he spoke a language novel in the mouth of a governor of the Cape. After explaining that the British government wished to avoid even the appearance of interfering in the domestic affairs of the Transvaal, he suddenly, without, it would seem, feeling the least awkwardness in the contradiction, made an attack upon the policy of Kruger. He denounced and blamed for the tension which prevailed in South Africa what he termed " the unprogressiveness—he would not say the retrogressiveness of the Government of the Transvaal." That government was mistaken in fearing danger from without. The evil from which it was suffering must be sought within its own borders. The date of this speech is not without significance. It was delivered at the very time when Chamberlain, shaking off Lord Salisbury's yoke, attempted to make himself for all practical purposes Foreign Secretary and to bestow at last on the foreign policy of the Unionist Administration that firmness it should and would have possessed for the past two years, had Lord Salisbury been less aged, less peace-loving and less fearful of failure.

The following winter, the native " boys " employed in the Rand mines complained of ill-treatment at the hands of the Transvaal police. The diplomatic representative of the British government at Pretoria received their complaints, which were by no means novel, and transmitted them to the Cape. Sir Alfred Milner was then on holiday in London; and the commanding officer of the British forces in South Africa, Sir William Butler, who was acting governor, refused to take notice of the matter. Then an English resident at Johannesburg who had killed a man in a brawl was himself killed by the policeman who was engaged in arresting him. The incident, in itself insignificant, provoked an explosion of resentment among the Uitlanders. A petition asking for the protection of the British Queen was sent to the Cape. Sir William Butler refused to transmit it. A second petition was then drawn up, signed by over twenty-two thousand British subjects, placed in the hands of the British representative at Pretoria, despatched by him to the Cape, and transmitted to London by Sir Alfred Milner who had returned from England. It reached the Colonial Office on April 14. Once more the date is significant. Three weeks earlier the question of the Upper Nile had been settled. The moment had come to settle—at as little cost it was hoped—the Transvaal question. Both well out of the way, the great undertaking of the Cape to Cairo railway could be begun from both ends.[1]

[1] For the preliminaries of the Boer War, the negotiations at Bloemfontein and Pretoria, see J. P. Fitzpatrick, *The Transvaal from Within. A Private Record of Public Affairs,* 1899. (The author represents the imperialist standpoint. He was an accomplice in the Jameson Raid. The latter portion of the book, p. 285 onwards, deals with the period 1895–99.) Edward T. Cook, *Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War,* 1901 (Liberal imperialist). Though

We are loath to relate in detail the legal debate between the two governments which began towards the close of spring and continued until autumn, so unimportant does it appear in the perspective of the past. Were the arguments bandied between the parties the sincere expression of their intimate convictions? The British maintained, and no doubt believed, that the majority of the Transvaal population was now composed of foreigners. The Boers denied it: the Future would prove them right. But they recognised that, as the mining industry developed, the day might well come, and in a not distant future, when the British contention, if untrue at present, would be realised by the force of circumstances. President Kruger contemplated with alarm the sudden destruction of his entire policy which would be entailed by the wholesale admission of the Uitlanders to citizen rights. The Transvaal would no longer be the citadel of all those Dutchmen in the Orange Free State and in Cape Colony who looked to him as their leader and who cherished the design of shaking off the British yoke and founding in South Africa a vast Dutch-speaking republic which should extend from the Cape to the Zambesi. Sir Alfred Milner, on the other hand, when he supported the claims, to a certain extent legitimate, of the Uitlanders, was no doubt eager to alter suddenly in favour of England the existing balance of power in South

the book was written in support of the British contention, the attitude of the Government is often criticised, by a journalist who, though an imperialist, belonged to the Liberal Opposition. It is also a work of painstaking research; see at the end of the book pp. 376–8, the list of official publications dealing with the origin of the war. *Sir William Butler, An Autobiography by Lieut.-Gen. the Right Hon.* Edited by his daughter, Eileen Butler. Sir William Butler was Commander-in-chief of the British Army in South Africa. His opposition to Milner's policy lost him the post.

Africa. He wished the Transvaal to furnish a political base for the British colonists at the Cape against the Dutch majority which was organised in the Afrikander Bond and threatened in the near future to endanger the prospects of British imperialism in Cape Colony itself. Steyn, President of the Orange Free State, declared in 1898 the formation of a United States of South Africa impracticable, because the two Boer republics would demand a Republican constitution for the Union, the British colonists its incorporation in the Empire. If by impracticable he meant impracticable by peaceful methods, he was right. The conflict which now opened in South Africa was not a conflict of interests. Between conflicting interests a compromise is always attainable. It was the conflict of two nationalities, two faiths, two passions, two absolutes. Between absolutes force is the sole arbiter.

Neither the High Commissioner, however, nor the Boer President could enunciate their respective positions in these frank terms. Both were obliged to put forward legal arguments. And, unfortunately for England, President Kruger's legal position was unassailable.

Sir Alfred Milner declared himself the defender of the rights of the British residents in the Transvaal and in adopting this attitude he did not exceed his province as a diplomatist. But instead of losing time in a series of protests, renewed from day to day, against denials of justice indefinitely repeated, he adopted a more daring procedure. He called upon the Transvaal government to change the political status of the Uitlanders and, by admitting them to full citizenship, enable them to defend their rights themselves on a

footing of equality with the original Burghers. In his own striking phraseology he demanded that the British subjects in Johannesburg should, to safeguard their rights, be permitted to be British subjects no longer. The demand was a glaring interference in the internal affairs of the Republic. By what right did he interfere? In virtue, he alleged, of the suzerainty which Britain claimed over the Transvaal. The claim was not new; eighteen months before, in the course of a protracted diplomatic correspondence, Chamberlain had upheld it against the repudiation of the Boer government. To what legal document could its upholders appeal? To the preamble of the Convention of 1881 by which England renounced her annexation of the Transvaal? It was certainly true that the word suzerainty was used in that document. But the Boer governments had protested and secured its omission from the Convention of 1884. In place of an extremely vague and general declaration of British suzerainty they had obtained the substitution of a definite clause, reserving to Great Britain a right of control over the relations between the government of the Transvaal and foreign powers.[1] With that one definite reservation the Transvaal could therefore claim to have possessed since 1884 the status of an independent sovereign state. To evade the force of this argument the Colonial Office now argued that the purpose of the Convention of 1884 had not been to

[1] With the exception of the Orange Free State—with which President Kruger had concluded in 1897 an offensive and defensive alliance. Chamberlain had already appealed to the Convention of 1884 against certain legislation passed by the Transvaal Volksraad, but he had invoked definite clauses of the Convention (E. T. Cook, *Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War*, pp. 79 sqq.), and until the present crisis the general question of suzerainty had not been raised.

annul, but merely to complete the Convention of 1881, that the relations between England and the Transvaal Republic were determined not by the former only, but by both conjointly, and that if by the latter, President Kruger's foreign policy was made subject to British control, England in virtue of the former was still suzerain in the widest possible extension of the term. The contention could not be maintained, but to escape from a sheer impasse England was obliged to maintain it.

The Negotiations at Bloemfontein and Pretoria

On May 31 Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger met at Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State. President Steyn had arranged the interview, which had Chamberlain's approval. Sir Alfred Milner, urged by Kruger to state his case, first proposed that the complete franchise should be conferred on everyone who had resided in the Transvaal for five years and possessed a pecuniary qualification to be fixed later, and further that a number of new constituencies should be created on the Rand, so that the Uitlanders who were concentrated in that district might receive their just share of representation. Kruger replied by a counter proposal. Naturalisation would be granted after two years' residence, the franchise at the expiration of five more years, that is to say after a residence of seven years, instead of the five proposed by Milner. Moreover, the measure would be but partially retrospective. It was only after considerable discussion that Kruger consented to the creation of three new constituencies on the Rand. Finally Kruger's scheme con-

tained a number of very strict conditions which would render naturalisation and the subsequent franchise more difficult to obtain. In principle these conditions were fully justified—it was impossible to enfranchise without strict safeguards a heterogeneous cosmopolitan and floating population—" Monte Carlo superimposed upon Sodom and Gomorrah," [1] men who too often had come out to draw high salaries and earn large profits, to return home, as soon as their fortunes had been made. But on the other hand it cannot be denied that Kruger, an adept at intrigue, might very well have manipulated the details of his scheme so as to render the concession of the franchise nugatory. On this point therefore there was matter for discussion between the two negotiators. Sir Alfred Milner, however, refused to allow the discussion even to begin. He demanded that his proposal, not Kruger's alternative, should be taken as the basis of negotiation. Kruger's proposal contained a number of very important concessions to the British point of view. But Milner was determined to make it clear from the outset that he was not treating with Kruger as with an equal, but had come to dictate to a vassal the terms on which friendly relations might continue. Kruger refused to yield. On June 6 the negotiations were broken off.

Kruger then took a bold step. He announced his intention to bring before the Volksraad the counter-proposal which Sir Alfred Milner had refused even to discuss and make it the basis of a law to amend the franchise. It was in vain that Chamberlain protested

[1] " It is Monte Carlo superimposed upon Sodom and Gomorrah," a well-known Cape politician had recently described it to me (*Sir William Butler, An Autobiography by Lieut.-Gen. the Right Hon.*, 2nd Ed., 1913, p. 415).

from London, asked for a copy of the proposed law and expressed his desire that the Transvaal Government should not proceed with the bill before receiving the observations of the British government. On July 23 the franchise bill was passed at Pretoria by the Volksraad. The British government were placed in a difficult position. How could they reply to the passage of a Boer law which, taken as a whole, constituted a very considerable concession to the Uitlanders' demands by breaking off diplomatic relations with President Kruger? Much against the grain they re-opened negotiations with the object of improving the new law by means of an inquiry to be conducted jointly by both governments. This time the conversations were held at Pretoria between the British representative and the Secretary of State, Reitz. The former requested that the law should be revised on the basis of the proposals formulated by Sir Alfred Milner at Bloemfontein. The request, however, was a mere form. The real object of the discussions was to agree on the best procedure to adopt for the amicable revision of the law of July.

It was Kruger who on August 14, after the discussions had proceeded for two days, disconcerted the British representative by suddenly acceding to the request made by the British government. He accepted the principle of five years' residence which Sir Alfred Milner had put forward at Bloemfontein. He further declared his readiness to set up eight new constituencies on the Rand. Moreover, the new citizens should enjoy precisely the same rights as the original citizens, might even take part in the election of the President. But in return he asked that this interference of the

British government in the domestic affairs of the Transvaal should be expressly declared to be final, that the British government should renounce its claim to suzerainty as far as the internal administration was concerned, and finally, that a system of arbitration should be set up to settle all future disputes between the two governments.

The proposal for arbitration had been already made by Kruger at Bloemfontein. He thought no doubt that it would be difficult for the British government to reject it at a time when the Hague Conference was in session, and moreover it was the British delegate who had proposed that the Conference should devote its efforts to the organisation of a regular procedure of international arbitration. But Sir Alfred Milner, like the thorough-going imperialist he was, had refused to entertain the proposal. Arbitration, according to him, was out of the question, even between two friendly States on an equal footing, if the question to be submitted to arbitration was the treatment of the subjects of one State by the government of the other. Sir Alfred Milner had, however, conceded that once the question actually pending had been settled by a formal agreement between the governments of London and Pretoria, the interpretation of its articles, should any question arise as to their meaning, should be submitted to a regular and automatic procedure of arbitration provided only that the tribunal should contain no foreign element. In August Kruger accepted this demand of Sir Alfred Milner. He merely asked that not only Englishmen, citizens of the British colonies, and citizens of the Transvaal should be eligible to seats on the proposed arbitration tribunal, but also citizens

of the Orange Free State. It was an important concession for it amounted to a partial incorporation of the South African Republic in the British Empire.

What was the British government's reply to these advances? It was in the first instance a speech delivered by Chamberlain on August 26 to his sympathisers at Birmingham. He accused President Kruger of " procrastinating in his replies," of " dribbling out reforms like water from a squeezed sponge." The proposals which Sir Alfred Milner had made at Bloemfontein had been moderate, so moderate indeed that many people charged them with weakness. " We cannot ask less, and we cannot take less. The issues of peace and war are in the hands of President Kruger and of his admirers. . . . Will he speak the necessary words? The sands are running down the glass. The situation is too fraught with danger, it is too strained for any indefinite postponement. The knot must be loosened . . . or else we shall have to find some other ways of untying it." The speech was a significant preface to the note which the British government despatched on the following day to the government of the Transvaal. The British government insisted that no preliminary conditions, such as the Boer government persisted in requiring, should be attached to the grant of the franchise, since they were likely to nullify the concessions granted by the proposed reform, refused to give any undertaking to abstain in future from interference in the affairs of the Republic and concluded by pointing out that the franchise was not the only question which concerned the Uitlanders and demanding for the first time that all questions which affected their

status should be settled at the same time as the franchise.

Thus it was, that every concession made by Kruger provoked a further demand from the British government; and the British government thereby proclaimed to the entire world that in their view the Transvaal was a sponge which they intended to squeeze to the last drop. President Kruger was faced with the alternative of refusal or unconditional surrender. He chose the former and withdrew the proposals which he had made in August. Would the British government reply by the immediate issue of an ultimatum? There can be little doubt that an ultimatum was proposed by Chamberlain at the Cabinet meeting held in London on September 8. But Lord Salisbury's conciliatory influence can be detected in the note despatched to Pretoria the same day, which was couched in polite language, once more asked the Transvaal government not to withdraw its proposals and was content with reserving the right to take more energetic measures in the event of refusal. It is true that the note raised a further question. Britain asked that the representatives of the Rand in the Pretoria Parliament should have the right to speak English as well as Dutch. Nothing could be more just. In the Parliament of Cape Town the Dutch had the right to use their own language. Kruger would have been well advised if he had accepted the demand or, at least, had left it to the decision of the Volksraad to be elected under the new franchise. Instead he returned a blunt refusal and let it be clearly seen that he opposed to British intransigence an equal intransigence of his own. It would serve no useful purpose to follow in detail the subsequent exchange of notes between the

two governments. Everyone now knew that war was inevitable. On October 9 President Kruger issued an ultimatum which was equivalent to a declaration of war. And the declaration of war by the Transvaal Republic was followed by a similar declaration on the part of the Orange Free State. Hostilities had, therefore, begun between the British Empire and the entire white population of South Africa, not yet subject to the British government. By a strange irony the first war to follow the adoption by Great Britain of the methods of Chamberlain's "new diplomacy" was waged against a small people of Teutonic race, indeed of a far purer Teutonic stock than the English. The proclamation in which the Secretary of State, Reitz, called to arms, not only the Burghers of the Transvaal but the Afrikanders generally, was couched in the style of William the Silent: "As once Spain at the height of her power with her bloodthirsty Duke of Alva and her invincible armies was compelled to drink the bitter chalice of defeat, so to-day the same God shall deliver our enemies into our hands." [1]

[1] October 11. See the full text in the *Blue Book* entitled *Further Correspondence Relating to Affairs in South Africa*, 1900, p. 139. This community of race did in fact disturb many British imperialists, even when they were endeavouring to incorporate the Boers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State in the British Empire. See Lord Wolseley to Sir Gordon Sprigg, Prime Minister at the Cape, April, 1896: "When ... I hear of the Boers arming and building forts and blustering and knowing how little it would all be worth, if we took the matter up seriously, I feel sorry for England and sorry for a race very kindred with our own and possessing some of our best characteristics. I grieve to think that two peoples that ought to live together in peace and unity are being set against one another." (Sir F. Maurice and Sir George Arthur. *The Life of Lord Wolseley*, 1924, p. 314.) See further A. Conan Doyle, *The Great Boer War*, chap. iv. (1st Ed. p. 79): "It was pitiable that it should come to this. These people were as near akin to us as any race which is not our own. They were of the same Frisian stock which peopled our own shores. In habit of mind, in religion,

I was in London. I remember seeing the troops on their way to the front marching through the streets amidst the cheers of the crowd. I remember a few days later watching in the halls of clubs and in hotels the tape unroll its tidings of defeat. I can still see the old gentleman—obviously a retired army officer of superior rank—who threw himself on me, while I was reading the news, to ask in anxious tones "Have they joined hands?" And in the porch of the old War Office in Pall Mall I remember the little group whose composition was continually renewed, standing in front of the official list of dead and wounded. One evening when I was there it divided to let a carriage pass, at the back of which we caught a glimpse of Arthur Balfour wearing a look of profound dejection; he was coming, like everyone else, in search of news.

Military Unpreparedness of England. Lord Lansdowne and Lord Wolseley

The military preparations for the war had not been made.[1] At first sight the omission must appear sur-

in respect for law, they were as ourselves. Brave, too, they were, and hospitable, with those sporting instincts which are dear to the Anglo-Celtic race. There were no people in the world who had more qualities which we might admire, and not the least of them that love of independence which it is our proudest boast that we have encouraged in others as well as exercised ourselves." Even Chamberlain, when hostilities began, declared his conviction: "That one great Teutonic people cannot hold another Teutonic people in subjection.... Does anybody imagine, whatever may be the result of the war... that we shall refuse as an ultimate settlement that equality of rights to the Dutch of the Transvaal which the Dutch in the Transvaal have denied to us?" (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, vol. lxxvii. p. 656.)

[1] For the military policy of England before the war see the debates which took place in the House of Lords at the beginning of

prising when we remember that the immediate cause of the fall of the Liberal Cabinet in June 1895 had been the mismanagement which prevailed at the War Office. And in fact when the new government took office they gave reason to believe that they intended to adopt strong measures in this department. The Liberals had just compelled the Commander-in-chief, the Duke of Cambridge, the Queen's first cousin, to resign, and now that the Unionists had succeeded them in office, the Queen hoped that another Royal Prince, for example his brother, the Duke of Connaught, might be his successor. But Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne were firm and insisted on the appointment of Lord Wolseley, an experienced soldier who was regarded in the army as the leader of the reformers.[1] Unfortunately, he did little to realise the general expectation.

He effected the purchase of Salisbury Plain as a permanent ground for manœuvres. He reorganised the procedure of mobilisation, and, three years after his appointment, boasted that he could mobilise two army corps in less time than the Admiralty would require to provide the necessary ships for their transport. But he did nothing whatever to reform the organisation of the army. The system of linked battalions, introduced

1901, between Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for War, and Lord Wolseley, the retired Commander-in-chief (H. of L., March 4, 15, 1901, *Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, vol. xc. pp. 317 sqq., vol. xci. pp. 6 sqq. *Report of H.M. Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Military Preparations and other Matters concerned with the War in South Africa*, 1903. *The Times History of the War in South Africa*, 1899–1902, vol. i. (by L. S. Amery). See also the extremely interesting *Life of Lord Wolseley*, by Sir Frederick Maurice and Sir George Compton Archibald Arthur, 1924.

[1] Maurice and Arthur, *The Life of Lord Wolseley*, pp. 274 sqq.: The Liberals had wished to appoint General Sir Redvers Buller over his head.

thirty years earlier by the Secretary for War, Cardwell, was retained. Each regiment was composed of two battalions, one stationed abroad, the other in barracks in London where it served as a depôt for the other. The entire army consisted of 124,000 men serving abroad (of which 73,000 were in India, 51,000 in the Colonies and in Egypt) and 125,000 in the home battalions. To these 125,000 we must add 90,000 in the Reserve, 130,000 militia men, 265,000 volunteers and 12,000 in the Yeomanry (mounted volunteers). Together they composed a total of some 625,000 men in the United Kingdom. These 600,000 were not divided permanently and in time of peace into army corps. The army corps were temporary formations which existed only during war and were improvised as circumstances required. No steps were taken to improve the organisation and quality of the reserves; no doubt Lord Wolseley shared the prejudice against them, entertained by every member of the regular army. As for the regulars, the terms of enlistment were so unattractive that there was a scarcity of recruits (especially when employment was plentiful), and it had been found necessary to create a new category of service, called special enlistments, for men of inferior physique and health who could be brought up to the necessary standard by training in barracks after enlistment. In 1899 it was estimated that the " specials " in some cases comprised over half the strength of the home battalions. In a case of emergency the recruits were despatched to the front, almost immediately after they had been called up. The " specials " remained at home and became the real reserve to be sent out to the front, as they became fit for service. Four years after his

appointment the Commander-in-chief was only in a position to mobilise in a fortnight two army corps and two brigades of cavalry, that is to say only 85,000 troops, by no means all of the best quality.

Why had Lord Wolseley, of whom so much had been expected, not accomplished more? Was he too old when he was appointed? Or was it, perhaps, that at the very time when in 1895 he became Commander-in-chief, his powers had been strangely restricted by the introduction of a new system of army administration? The Commander-in-chief was henceforward only a high military official having the right of access to the Secretary for War on a footing of equality with a number of other officials whose functions he had formerly controlled. He was moreover placed, not only in a position of strict subordination to the War Office, but also under the control of a Council of Defence over which the Prime Minister presided and which was composed entirely of civilians. These changes the Liberal Cabinet had been preparing to make in the summer of 1895, that the proposals of an important commission of inquiry might be carried out [1] and the Conservative Government had decided—whether willingly or not—to conform to its recommendations.[2] What was the result of the new system? The Commander-in-chief, Lord Wolseley and his defenders complained, was

[1] *Preliminary and further Reports of the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Civil and Professional Administration of the Naval and Military Departments and the Relations of those Departments to each other and to the Treasury*, 1890. The Commission is usually known from the name of its Chairman as the Hartington Commission.

[2] Lord Lansdowne to Lord Salisbury, August, 1895. "We must try to follow, or seem to follow, the main recommendations of the Hartington Commission." (*The Life of Lord Wolseley*, by Major-General Sir F. Maurice and Sir George Arthur, p. 274.)

paralysed by the inertia of government departments whose torpor was never disturbed by a breath of public opinion in a country which took only naval questions seriously and in which the Army Estimates were passed every year by an almost empty House, whereas the debate on the Naval Estimates was among the outstanding features of the Session.

But if Lord Wolseley's complaints had been justified, the four years from 1895 to 1899 should have witnessed a continual series of disputes, between the Commander-in-chief, pressing for reforms, and the War Office, refusing to make them. In fact, so far as the reform of the army as a whole is concerned, there is no evidence of a single dispute, nor have Lord Wolseley's papers disclosed any of those plans of military reorganisation which a few years later would engage public attention. As regards the reinforcement of the British Army in South Africa, it is no doubt true that Lord Wolseley with Chamberlain's support had persistently pressed the government ever since the Jameson Raid to send out more troops. He was, however, faced by the opposition of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Secretary for War. Twice only did he obtain any satisfaction, at the beginning of 1896, when war with Germany was threatened, and again at the end of 1898, when a war with France seemed imminent. And, even so, his success had amounted to very little. In the summer of 1895 there were 2,100 British troops at the Cape and 2,800 in Natal—in all 3,900 men and 6 field guns. Two years later there were 3,800 troops at the Cape, 4,300 in Natal, in all 8,100 with 24 field guns. And at the end of another two years, when the Bloemfontein negotiations began, there were no more than

4,500 troops at the Cape, and 5,800 in Natal: a total force of 10,300. And the field guns were still only 24.[1]

When the negotiations inaugurated a new phase in British relations with the Boers, Lord Wolseley renewed his demand for adequate military preparations. At the beginning of July he proposed the immediate mobilisation in England of an army corps and a cavalry division. The mobilised troops would be kept in readiness to depart for the front in case of need, and even if they were never required, the mobilisation would in itself be a demonstration which must strengthen the position of the British negotiators at Bloemfontein. At the same time he proposed the immediate despatch to South Africa of an additional force of 10,000. But in the Cabinet he was opposed, not only by the party in favour of conciliation, but even by the majority, led by Chamberlain. Everybody expected to triumph at Bloemfontein without the cost of a war. Paris had capitulated in 1898, why should not Pretoria do the same in 1899? Only two thousand troops were sent to Natal, and it was not until September that with feverish haste the steps were taken which the imminence of war rendered necessary. But when this is admitted in exculpation of Lord Wolseley, and he has been given full credit for his perception that the attitude adopted by the British government must lead to war, it is impossible to claim that the measures he advised would have been sufficient to overcome the resistance of the Boers. Moreover, there was no plan of campaign. On this point the neglect of the Com-

[1] *Report of H.M. Commissioners*, 1903, pp. 18 sqq. Maurice and Arthur, *The Life of Wolseley*, pp. 315 sqq. See especially pp. 327 sqq., *Précis of Letters and Minutes from the Commander-in-Chief to the Secretary of State.*

mander-in-chief was only equalled by the neglect of the War Office, and Lord Lansdowne was for once in entire agreement with Lord Wolseley when, called upon later by a commission of inquiry to account for the omission, he refused to admit that the general in supreme command of an expeditionary force ought as a matter of course to be "furnished with full and precise instructions."[1] Later, the advocates of the British government appealed to this absence of preparation as a proof that Britain had not wished to go to war: Kruger, they argued, who was prepared for war, had deliberately taken England unawares by his ultimatum. The truth of the matter was that the British, misinformed by Cecil Rhodes and his followers, and misled by a long succession of colonial expeditions in which their opponents had been hordes of savages without discipline or courage, had miscalculated not the numbers, but the morale and the military capacity of the Boers. Both government and nation expected either unconditional acceptance of the British terms or, at the worst, a rapid march of the British army, barely retarded by a few easily won skirmishes, to Johannesburg and Pretoria. It was quite possible that everything would be over before Christmas. They had not long to wait for a rude awakening.

The Conduct of the War. From the Initial Defeats to the Capture of Pretoria

Sir George White was in command of the British army in Natal,[2] a force of some twelve thousand men

[1] *Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa*, 1904 (vol. ii. p. 514).

[2] For the history of the military operations see in the first place

stationed in the acute angle of British territory thrust between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. He marched boldly towards the northern frontier. But hard pressed on either flank, he was soon driven back after a series of hard fights, one of which amounted to a minor disaster, on the town of Ladysmith. It was not long before he was surrounded in Ladysmith, and cut off from all communication by rail or telegraph with the capital of Natal. The Boers, advancing unchecked, reached by November 10 the town of Colenso and the Tugela river. The entire district of Ladysmith was then formally annexed to the Orange Free State and the Boers, crossing the Tugela, began to spread out in small bands in the direction of the capital of Natal, the seaport of Durban. In the west the Boers invaded Bechuanaland, proclaimed its annexation to the Transvaal and besieged Colonel Baden-Powell in Mafeking. They surrounded Kimberley, the metro-

the *Times History of the War in South Africa*, 1899–1902, 7 vols., 1900–1907, an excellent work. (General Editor, L. S. Amery.) Vol. i. (which deals the preliminaries of the war), vol. ii. and vol. iii. are by L. S. Amery, vol. iv. by Basil Williams, and vol. v. by Erskine Childers. Vol. vi. deals with administrative problems which followed the restoration of peace. Vol. vii. Index and Appendices. See also *History of the War in South Africa*, 1899–1902, compiled by direction of His Majesty's Government by Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice with the assistance of a staff of officers, 43 vols., 1906–10. (Vol. iii. is anonymous, vol. iv. by Captain Maurice Harold Grant.) A. Conan Doyle's *The Great Boer War* is a popular work contemporary with the events it records (the first edition appeared before the conclusion of the war). It ran into several editions. See further *The War in South Africa, prepared in the historical section of the Great General Staff, Berlin.* Authorised translation by Col. W. H. H. Waters and Col. H. Dulcane, 2 vols., 1904–06, and two French works—Capitaine G. Gilbert, *La Guerre sud-africaine*, 1 vol., 1902, and Capitaine Fournier, *La Guerre sud-africaine*, 3 vols., 1902–4. All three end with the capture of Pretoria. The student may also consult the *Life of General Sir Redvers Buller*, by Col. C. H. Melville (a defence of the General containing very little new information) and the interesting *Life of Lord Kitchener* by Sir George Arthur.

polis of the diamond fields. Cecil Rhodes threw himself into the town and assumed charge of its defence, in co-operation, and often in collision, with the military authorities.[1] They crossed the Orange River at two points and scattered in different directions in eastern Cape Colony endeavouring, not unsuccessfully, to kindle revolt.

Meanwhile the British were obtaining reinforcements both from home and from India. Sir Redvers Buller landed at Durban on November 15 to take command of operations. He had presently over 20,000 troops under his orders. Lord Methuen landed at the Cape, and received from Sir Redvers Buller a detachment of 7,000 men for the relief of Kimberley. General Gatacre was despatched at the head of 4,000 men to drive back the Boers who were invading the east of Cape Colony. After defeating the Boers in a series of hard fights, Lord Methuen was finally defeated himself on December 9 at the bloody battle of Magersfontein. He retreated and asked for reinforcements. The following day, to the east of Lord Methuen's army, Gatacre was defeated at Stormberg. And five days later General Buller suffered a crushing disaster in what was regarded at the time as the principal theatre of operations. His 20,000 men supported by 30 field guns and 16 large naval guns attacked the Boer positions on the banks of the Tugela. They were defeated. A loss of 150 killed, 720 wounded, and 250 missing was the price

[1] For the difficulties which the military command experienced from the headstrong arrogance of this megalomaniac see *Kekewich in Kimberley; being an Account of the Defence of the Diamond Fields,* October 14, 1899–February 15, 1900. By Lieut.-Col. W. A. J. O'Meara. With a foreword by Lieut.-General Sir R. Baden-Powell, 1926.

of this ill-conceived frontal attack which Buller never attempted to repeat. The same evening he sent a despatch to warn Sir George White, besieged at Ladysmith, not to expect any further advance on his part for another month. If Sir George could not hold out so long, he advised him to surrender.

Thus for the second time and in a more serious encounter the Boers had won. Both in the number and the quality of pieces their artillery was superior to the British. They possessed Krupp cannons and Creusot's heavy artillery, and their gunners were sometimes Frenchmen, more often Germans, or, if Boers, had received an expert training from European instructors. All their men were riders, and the British infantrymen, unaccustomed to fighting of this kind, found themselves suddenly faced by a host of " mounted infantry." They had the advantage of numbers. Though exact figures were unavailable the Boer troops were estimated at 40 or even 50,000. And these fifty thousand were soldiers of fine quality. The British had to deal with redoubtable adversaries—intrepid hunters, excellent shots, hardy peasants of the Biblical stamp, who after two centuries revived Cromwell's Ironsides. Nevertheless, though the events of the " black week " which witnessed the British defeats at Magersfontein, Stormberg and the Tugela produced a deep impression both in England and throughout the world, a clear-sighted observer would even at that time have felt grave doubts as to the future of the Boers. As a matter of policy was it wise to transform their war of independence into a war of aggression, to invade British territories, and annex them on the morrow of invasion? This, surely, was to oppose imperialism with a counter-imperialism

and justify all the charges brought against Kruger by Chamberlain and his followers. And, on the other hand, having decided to take the offensive, had they not given a striking proof of military inferiority by their failure to follow up their first successes? Why not march on Durban? Why leave unattacked, to the south of the Orange Free State, the enormous and undefended depôt of provisions and munitions at De Aar? Their army, adapted for guerilla warfare in small bands, shrank from the risks of a war of position in the open field, from the necessity of collective sacrifices on a large scale and the severe discipline of an organised command. To overcome their disconcertingly stubborn resistance England had only to meet it by a proportionate effort, an effort for which she was amply provided both with money and men. The Cabinet sent for Lord Roberts and made him Commander-in-chief of the army in South Africa. Lord Roberts was the famous general who, twenty years earlier, had marched an army of 10,000 men three hundred miles through the heart of Afghanistan to relieve a British force besieged in Kandahar. Sir Herbert Kitchener was appointed chief of staff under his command. The reconquest of the Sudan had revealed a talent for organisation more brilliant even than his skill as a tactician and strategist. While Lord Roberts was relieving Kimberley and Ladysmith, and occupying Bloemfontein and Pretoria, Kitchener's task would be to provide with the necessary organisation the large army now being hastily created three months too late. All the reservists, not yet summoned, were called to the colours, the seventh division, already in process of mobilisation, and special detachments of artillery were

sent out immediately. Twelve militia battalions were authorised to volunteer for foreign service. The government declared themselves prepared to enlist a sufficient number of volunteers to add a company to every battalion of troops already on active service. To supply the lack of mounted infantry, appeal was made to the Yeomanry at home, and offers received from Canada, Australia and Cape Colony were gladly accepted.[1] Obviously these rough riders from the colonies were the best fitted to cope with the Boer horsemen. All the vessels required for the transport of these reinforcements were supplied by the large mercantile marine. By the beginning of February 1900 there were nearly 200,000 men ready to take the field. In the United Kingdom over 400,000 men were under arms of whom 215,000 were volunteers.

Lord Roberts, whose immediate object was the relief of Kimberley, made no frontal attack on the lines at Magersfontein. Five thousand cavalry under the command of General French made their way unmolested to the left of the Boer lines. On February 15 they reached Kimberley which they relieved without striking a blow. The Boers fell back to the north and reformed under the command of General Cronje. Lord Roberts sent his cavalry forward and, by occupying the fords of the Modder, succeeded in cutting Cronje's communi-

[1] This colonial support of which much was heard—and the popular enthusiasm contributed to draw closer the bonds which united the mother country and the self-governing colonies—amounted in reality to very little—from the commencement to the end of hostilities, 30,000 men out of the ten million British subjects in Australasia and Canada. The terms of enlistment were for a year, or, the duration of the war, but when the year expired and the war was still unfinished almost all applied for and were granted their discharge (*Times History of the Boer War*, vol. vi. p. 279—*Report of the War in South Africa*, vol. ii. p. 35).

cations with Bloemfontein. He then made the mistake of a frontal attack on Cronje's army, just as Lord Methuen at Magersfontein and Sir Redvers Buller on the Tugela had attacked the enemy's front. Like them he paid the penalty and, unwilling to risk a second defeat, was content for the future to surround the Boer commandos with the far larger forces under his command, until, at last, after a week's resistance, Cronje was starved out and surrendered. Four thousand prisoners and six cannons were the prize of the conqueror. The surrender was made on February 27. On March 13 Lord Roberts entered Bloemfontein. Ten days earlier after a series of hard fights, not all victorious, Sir Redvers Buller had entered Ladysmith, and the Boers of the Orange Free State who had spread into the eastern districts of Cape Colony had evacuated them once more. Such were the results of the great strategic march planned by Lord Roberts from the banks of the Orange River to Bloemfontein by way of Kimberley and the Modder.

His operations were now brought to a temporary standstill. The pause is to be explained in part by the fact that, in the east of the Orange Free State, he encountered difficulties for which he was apparently unprepared. A new leader arose in the Boer camp, General Christian De Wet, who in the very neighbourhood of Bloemfontein inflicted losses on the British army and captured their convoys and guns. It was a guerilla war which could not lead to a decision, but which, as it developed, proved a source of permanent difficulty to the attacking army. It was in vain that the Commander-in-chief urged Sir Redvers Buller, now master of Ladysmith, to bring up his troops and clear

the district of the enemy. Sir Redvers who, no doubt, cherished a secret rancour against the great general who had replaced him in the command refused to obey. He wished to win independent victories in Natal and undertake a direct invasion of the Transvaal in sole command of his army. Moreover, the very speed of his march had made Lord Roberts' position at Bloemfontein difficult. How could he keep 34,000 men and 11,000 horses supplied with food, when the only line of communication with his base, over 910 miles away, was a single line of railway? And besides food Lord Roberts needed reinforcements. The British camp was devastated by a violent outbreak of enteric fever. Within ten days of the British entrance into Bloemfontein 1,000 soldiers were in hospital, three weeks later the number had doubled, and, when Lord Roberts continued his advance, he left behind him no less than 4,500 incapacitated by sickness.

Nevertheless, at the date of his advance—May 1—his strength was greater than it had been when the campaign opened. When he left the Orange River he had been in command of 34,000 men and 113 guns, now the troops under his command amounted to 70,000 men supported by 178 guns. If we add the 55,000 troops under the command of Sir Redvers Buller, the British numbers considerably exceeded 100,000 as against some 50,000 Boer troops. Lord Roberts continued his advance with a force of 38,000. If ever the Boers made an attempt to block his advance along the railway from Bloemfontein to Pretoria the British front was so extensive that their front was outflanked on both wings. To prevent their flanks being

turned and their army surrounded, as Cronje's had been at Paardeberg, the Boers hastily retreated. Lord Roberts was thus enabled to advance unopposed—without striking a blow on the way; he entered Johannesburg on May 31, and Pretoria on June 5. Mafeking had been relieved on May 17. At the end of June Sir Redvers Buller forced the passes still occupied by the Boers and effected a junction with the main body. A month later the Orange general Prinsloo surrendered to the north-east of Bloemfontein with 4,000 men and 3 guns. Yet another month, and the British army held the entire railway which linked Pretoria with the Indian Ocean, as far as the frontier station of Komati-Poort. Kruger was a fugitive and had sailed for Europe from Lorenzo-Marques. Lord Roberts had proclaimed the British annexation of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.

The Commander-in-chief entertained the belief that the war was already over and that the only task remaining to be done in South Africa was to police and administer the conquered territory. He convinced the British government. At the end of September the Cabinet decided to recall him to England to succeed Lord Wolseley in the command of the British army. Kitchener was appointed his successor. The Cabinet also decided to utilise for their political advantage a victory, believed to be complete, and dissolved Parliament. The General Election was held in October and resulted in a Unionist majority, slightly reduced but substantial, 134 instead of 152. The government had thus provided against future political risks by obtaining from the country a renewed lease of power, for six years.

The Second Part of the War. The Guerilla War (1900–1902)

Unfortunately the war was not finished. On December 1 Lord Roberts left South Africa to take up in London the duties of the post he had already held for two months. On December 13 at Nooitgedacht, 43 miles from Pretoria, four companies were trapped in a Boer ambush and only succeeded in effecting their retreat with a loss of 60 killed, 180 wounded, and 315 prisoners. This was the beginning of a long series of isolated conflicts which, if devoid of real importance, continued almost eighteen months and made the British army ridiculous in the eyes of the entire world. Lord Roberts was charged with having bungled his work. He had neglected, his critics complained, to observe the classic rule of strategy that the enemy's army must be destroyed, before his capital is occupied. They forgot that the rule was inapplicable to the present case and that, if Lord Roberts had not destroyed the enemy's army, it was for the simple reason that there was no army to destroy.[1] Because the Boers were not in the strict sense an army, they were never a danger to the British forces occupying Bloemfontein and Pretoria. The difficulty was of a different kind. It was impossible to capture the Boer commandos, which were in a position to continue over the vast stretches of the veldt an endless guerilla war. The British enjoyed a superiority of numbers, organisation, and strategy. But what strategy could deal successfully

[1] For the military organisation of the Boers see *Times History of the Great War*, vol. i. pp. 66 sqq., vol. iv. pp. 476, 513; Sir Frederick Maurice, *History of the War in South Africa*, vol. i. pp. 68; also *Dix mois de campagne chez les Boers*, by a former lieutenant-colonel Villebois-Mareuil, 1900.

with this swarm of tiny bands? The very superiority of the British organisation proved in certain respects a disadvantage to the victorious army. A highly organised army required a degree of comfort and an orderly routine which necessitated an extensive system of auxiliary services. Moreover, owing to the size of the occupied territory, the British were obliged to guard lines of communication extending for thousands of miles. Therefore when Kitchener, who commanded an army of 200,000, despatched in any direction a body of troops to round up a Boer commando whose activities were reported to him, the pursuers were often no more numerous than their foes.

Can it be said that this long-drawn war taught valuable lessons of tactics and strategy? Here for the first time smokeless powder was employed, and its use threw valuable light on the conditions of attack in modern warfare; the danger of bright uniforms, the need of invisibility, and the impossibility of attacking after the old fashion in serried columns. And on the other hand the Boers taught European staffs that heavy artillery could be employed not only to defend forts, but in a war of movement over the open country. But that was all. The long duration of hostilities and the strength of the British forces engaged must not deceive us as to the true character of the South African War. It was nothing but a guerilla war on a large scale and, after the lapse of a quarter of a century, it is amusing to find the British press, indeed the European press generally, treating as important battles skirmishes in which the casualties were counted by the dozen and the number of prisoners did not reach a thousand.

Nevertheless, this type of warfare presented far greater difficulties than the Continental critics of British strategy understood, and Lord Kitchener employed the only possible methods at his disposal to wear down his elusive adversaries. His first problem was to secure his communications over railways which traversed a vast stretch of country in which every farmer was an armed foe or a spy. Blockhouses of stone and iron, pierced with loopholes and planted at intervals of two thousand yards, secured the railways from attack.[1] The generals were also authorised to demolish farms and private houses whenever in their judgment military interests demanded it. Their inmates of whatever sex or age were to be interned in vast concentration camps where they could be supported and supervised by the British authorities, until the Boers were prepared to sue for peace. These demolitions were actually carried out, if a farmer were proved to have given armed assistance to the enemy, and even when his conduct afforded no ground for suspicion, if his farm, owing to its proximity to the railway, could be used by the Boers, with or without his consent, to shelter an attack upon the line. Finally, to capture an enemy who could so easily make his escape after a surprise attack, Lord Kitchener devised what were known as " drives." [2] A cordon of mounted infantry, spread over some hundreds of miles, drove whatever armed Boers might be contained within a given area into a vast network of barbed wire entanglements which by rendering escape impossible left the captives the alternative of surrender or death.

[1] For the blockhouse system see *Times' History of the Boer War*, vol. v. pp. 256 sqq., 324 sqq., 396 sqq.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 467 sqq.

Scarcely a week passed in which the British public were not informed of the capture of some 4 or 500 prisoners. Even on the supposition that the Boers continued the struggle, until the last Boer had been slain or taken prisoner, the day of British victory could be calculated with an almost mathematical precision. It was simply a matter of money and time. But this method of warfare was far from heroic. The Boer defence made a very different appeal to the imagination. President Kruger was in Europe doing everything in his power to excite the sympathy of the Continental nations. To the end the Boers cherished the hope that one or other of the great Powers would make an offer of mediation, and there can be no doubt that this hope encouraged them to prolong their resistance beyond all military justification. President Steyn of the Orange Free State had remained in South Africa to support the determination of his people in their struggle with the British. For two years he was reduced to live as an armed outlaw in the country which not long before he had governed in peace. The two Generals of the first period had disappeared from the scene. Joubert was dead, Cronje a prisoner. But new men had taken their place. Louis Botha in the east of the Transvaal, Delarey in the west, and the indefatigable Christian De Wet well nigh everywhere, amazed the world by an unbroken series of minor successes. Twice the Boers invaded Cape Colony, twice the population of Cape Town learned that the presence of the enemy had been signalled on the Atlantic coast. On March 6, 1902—twenty-nine months after the declaration of war—General Methuen was surprised by Delarey's troops, 180 miles from Pretoria, and com-

pelled to surrender with all his men who had not found safety in flight.

We must not be deceived by the charges which the combatants during the course of hostilities bandied in the usual fashion—the use of dumdum bullets, the slaughter of wounded soldiers, the ill-treatment of prisoners. In reality no war has been more free from "atrocities." Should we, like certain English historians, explain the fact by the community of race which made the soldiers on both sides too closely akin to cherish implacable hate? Or is not the true explanation that both combatants belonged to a race whose temperament is neither excitable nor cruel, a race peaceful and calculating even in war, and, moreover, that they were preparing by an instinctive moderation for the day when the war would be at an end and they would be obliged willy-nilly to work side by side at a common task, the development of the agriculture and mines of South Africa. Moreover, the belligerents were fighting in the presence of a couple of million Kafir and Hottentot spectators who, if they took no active part, cherished a secret antipathy to the whites on either side. It would obviously be an act of madness to carry the struggle to such a pitch that it amounted to the collective suicide of the white race in South Africa. Vast numbers of colonists from British territory came to the assistance of the sister republics. Technically, they were rebels, liable to the death penalty. But the British government treated them with a systematic leniency. Only in a very small number of extreme cases did Sir Alfred Milner shoot these "rebels." It might have been expected that the operations in the field would be accompanied by a

species of civil war between two hostile populations, waged by the methods with which the Irish had made the British only too familiar, secret societies making armed attacks on private persons unarmed. But nothing of the kind occurred. The entire contest was confined to the two armies and waged according to the accepted laws of war, with considerable obstinacy, no doubt, but with very little savagery.

The Boers fought like hunters, the British like sportsmen. The lion hunter does not strike an heroic attitude. He kills his lion or takes to flight. A man who wages war as a form of sport is well aware that he is engaged in the most dangerous of sports. He is therefore, quite legitimately, anxious to restrict the danger by rules, arranged between the opponents. On both sides, officers and men, the moment they saw themselves defeated put up their hands and the firing ceased. The British soldiers knew that, if taken prisoner, they would be disarmed and set at liberty, and the surrenders became so numerous that the imperial Parliament was alarmed for the reputation of British courage. Hence this insignificant guerilla war became a tournament, almost a child's game, and it is remarkable that the Boer War has in fact bequeathed to England and modern Europe an institution for children. Colonel Baden-Powell had become a popular hero on account of the courage and resource he had displayed for months in his defence of the little town of Mafeking on the Transvaal border against the Boers who beleaguered it. Already known before the war by a little treatise on the art of scouting, he conceived the idea of employing the methods which he advocated, for the moral education of children. To-day his

Boy Scouts are known and copied throughout the world. Is the organisation civil or military? Is its object to train citizens or soldiers? To this question nobody in the most opportunist nation on earth will ever return a definite answer. "Scouting," wrote Baden-Powell, "is like a game of football. . . . Football is a good game, but better than it, better than any other game, is that of man-hunting." [1]

THE OPPOSITION AND THE WAR. PRO-BOERS AND LIBERAL IMPERIALISTS

British Public Opinion and the War. The Opposition. The pro-Boers

As the war proceeded what currents prevailed in public opinion at home? At the close of 1899, as a year earlier during the diplomatic struggle with France, the government had the general support of the country. When, in December and January, the Cabinet called upon the country to reply to the first defeats by a military effort on a vast and unprecedented scale, they found behind them the silent unanimity of the nation. Not only did recruits pour in—200,000 in two months—but the cost of their equipment was often offered besides: the City of London furnished 1,400 men, of whom 611 were mounted infantry, for service in South Africa. While the Continent was practically unanimous in regarding England as a powerful bully abusing her strength to enrich herself by robbing two little republics of their freedom, the British were practically unanimous in the belief that they were waging a just war to

[1] *Aids to Scouting*, 1st. Ed., 1899, p. 156.

liberate their fellow countrymen, oppressed by an oligarchy of corrupt and stupid peasants: if Europe believed otherwise, it was because it was deceived by its press and the press had been bribed by the Boers. But what need to say more? To attempt to analyse a fit of patriotic frenzy would be a thankless task. The reader is likely to find more interest in following during the years of war the changing fortunes and sentiments of the parliamentary Opposition. It is easy to understand that in the opening days of the struggle, when the country was passing through the acute crisis of war fever, their mouths were closed. But when the annexation of the Boer republics, Lord Robert's return to England and the October election were followed by a further series of disappointments, we might have expected that the repeated defeats of the British army would have assisted the Opposition. This was not the case. In war-time the lot of an Opposition is hard. We must attempt to show how the internal dissensions which had afflicted the Liberal Party ever since 1895 were only accentuated by the war and how, contrary to what we might have expected, the prolongation of hostilities seemed at first to weaken instead of strengthening its position.

Out of the vast body of Liberals we propose to consider first the small group which professed an unqualified opposition to the war. They were the surviving stalwarts of Gladstonian orthodoxy, in whose eyes the maintenance of peace was the principal, one is sometimes inclined to say the sole, article of the Liberal creed. In support of their views they appealed to Cobden, John Bright and Gladstone. To be sure they had suffered of recent years many rebuffs even at the hands

of their fellow Liberals. But at the very time when Sir Alfred Milner was negotiating at Bloemfontein with President Kruger, their hopes had been unexpectedly revived by the meeting of the Peace Conference at The Hague. During the early days of October, when events were hurrying to the fatal issue, an emergency committee secured nearly fifty-four thousand signatures to a National Memorial against War with the Transvaal. When war was declared the canvass for signatures was discontinued. But the agitation was maintained by the methods traditional in England. There was a Stop the War Committee. There was a South African Conciliation Committee to prevent public opinion from being blinded by hatred of the Boers and to work for the restoration of friendly relations between the British and the Dutch in South Africa. Moreover, public meetings were held or, to speak more truly, were attempted, in London and the provinces.

But the meetings were attacked and broken up by hostile crowds, and in the provinces the houses of their organisers were often sacked by the mob. With the exception of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Westminster Gazette*, an evening paper, which with amazing adroitness contrived to preserve a certain freedom of criticism without damaging its sale, the entire press was swamped by the wave of patriotic enthusiasm. Even before war was declared, the official organ of the Liberal party, the *Daily News*, had been converted to the imperialist standpoint on the question of South Africa, and the *Daily Chronicle*, which until October had trenchantly criticised the diplomacy of Milner and Chamberlain, changed its attitude in November and dismissed all those members of its staff who—headed

by the well-known journalist Massingham—persisted in opposing the war. The sole comfort left to the pacifist leaders was the bitter and proud satisfaction of feeling themselves to be a chosen few scattered amidst a mob of lunatics. If Sir William Harcourt and John Morley expressed their views so freely, it was because their words committed only themselves. For the past year they had been for practical purposes in retirement. "I follow with languid interest," Harcourt wrote in June, "the triumph of our arms and the dissolution of our Party." [1] John Burns who, a year before, had almost capitulated to Chamberlain's imperialism, returned to his pacifist opinions. He thought British jingoism resembled too closely the Parisian chauvinism against which a year ago he had been prepared to preach a crusade. The night when London celebrated the relief of Mafeking by an orgy of rowdyism a friend met him returning home pensive and alone. He expressed his surprise at Burns' downcast air. "How can I help feeling sad," replied Burns. "Don't you see England is falling to the level of France?"

But by no means all the members of the group to whom the soubriquet pro-Boers was insultingly applied [2] abandoned themselves to despair. When the young politician David Lloyd George threw himself into the fray, he did not endanger an established position, but, on the contrary, by the notoriety he acquired

[1] Sir William Harcourt to John Morley, June, 1900 (A. G. Gardiner, *The Life of Sir William Harcourt*, vol. ii. p. 517).

[2] "The first use of terms of political slang is often a subject of inquiry. The earliest instance of the term pro-Boer, that I have come across, is in the *Daily News* of April 22, 1896: 'If it were indeed a necessity of the situation to be pro-Boer or pro-British——the one to the exclusion of the other—then as Britons we should be for the British, we admit.'" (E. T. Cook, *Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War*, p. 78.)

laid the foundation of his future popularity. Only thirty-seven years of age, he was the noisiest of those Welsh Radicals who had formed in Parliament for several years past an independent group within the Liberal Party and sold their support to the government for measures in which Wales had a peculiar interest. For the example of Parnell and the Irish Home Rulers had aroused the national consciousness of the Principality and though they did not ask for complete separation, the Welsh were beginning to demand a species of modified home rule. In race were they not closer related to the Irish than to the Saxon English? And although between their religion and the dominant religion of England there was not the gulf which yawned between Irish Catholicism and English Protestantism, their Protestantism was not of the same shade. In Wales only a minority belonged to the Anglican Church, the vast majority to the Evangelical and Calvinistic sects. Moreover, Welsh was spoken throughout the greater part of the Principality, was indeed far more living than Gaelic on the other side of St. George's Channel. It was as the mouthpiece of his little country that Lloyd George delighted to preach political morality in England. "While England and Scotland are drunk with blood the Welsh continue sane; they are walking along the road of progress and liberty."

He was a man of very humble origin. His father, an elementary schoolmaster, died in poverty when his son was still an infant. He had been adopted and educated by his uncle, a shoemaker and a Baptist lay preacher. By dint of hard work he passed the necessary examinations and became a solicitor in a little Welsh town where he immediately plunged into the squabbles of

local politics. In 1890, at the age of twenty-seven, he had been returned to Parliament as Radical member for Carnarvon for which he had since been twice re-elected with increased majorities. Once or twice he had attracted the attention of the Press by intervening violently in debate. But it was the Boer War which brought into prominence this meteoric young man, a born politician, debater and orator. In the House of Commons he had barely risen to his feet, before he stirred to fury the jingoes of the Conservative Party and the moderates of his own. Throughout the country he stood in the limelight as the most notorious advocate of the Boer cause. Once at the risk of his life he bearded Chamberlain in his Birmingham dependency. " A brave and clever little man," wrote Sir William Harcourt, " who ought to have a good future." [1]

What form did the opposition to the war assume? In the first place the pro-Boers attacked the character of those who had made it inevitable and were profiting by it. If the war disgraced England in the eyes of the world, it was not only because it presented the spectacle of the strong crushing the weak, but still more because it seemed to be waged for the possession of the gold mines at the instigation and for the profit of the Johannesburg capitalists and the City financiers, those wealthy upstarts, whose sumptuous mansions in Park Lane outraged public decency. Chamberlain's person was not spared. In 1899 considerable scandal had been caused when, a year after the dispute with France had been settled, Parliament authorised the purchase of the Niger Company's administrative rights for the sum of

[1] Sir William Harcourt to John Morley, October 13, 1900. (A. G. Gardiner, *The Life of Sir William Harcourt*, vol. ii. p. 524.)

£865,000 and it became known that Chamberlain was one of the principal shareholders of the Company with a personal interest in maintaining its interests against France in the first place and now against Great Britain.[1] In December 1900, Lloyd George charged Chamberlain, his brother and his son with being shareholders in a number of firms which supplied the Admiralty and the War Office.[2] It is true, their critics did not explicitly accuse them of making the war to fill their pockets. But the fact remained that the war filled them.

These attacks, hotly pursued during the first year of the war, and in which not only the Radical extremists, but the moderate Liberals, and even a number of Unionists took part, do not appear to have affected public opinion. A great mercantile nation like England has little fondness for the public exposure of pecuniary scandals, in which politics are mixed up with business. It is as though the Press and the political parties had entered into a tacit agreement to hush them up. The pro-Boers accordingly turned their efforts in another direction and appealed with far better success to British humanitarianism. We have already remarked on the freedom from atrocities which distinguished the South African War, and have shown how often the army authorities mitigated or abandoned the repressive measures they had adopted. But the question remains whether this reluctance to employ severe measures was not chiefly due to the strength of the humanitarian opposition. In October 1900, a large number of farms were burned by order of Lord Roberts. The burnings

[1] *Daily Chronicle*, July 6, 1899; also Chamberlain's defence H. of C., July 6, 1899 (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, vol. lxxiv. pp. 40–1).

[2] H. of C., December 10, 1900 (*Parl. Deb.* 4th series, vol. lxxxviii, pp. 397 sqq.).

aroused a tempest of indignation in England and in November Lord Roberts issued a second order defining with the utmost strictness the conditions under which a farm might be destroyed.[1] The concentration camps in which about the middle of 1901 some 60,000 Boers were interned suffered terribly from the effects of bad food, bad sanitation and overcrowding. The average mortality was almost 117 per thousand, at the Bloemfontein Camp as high as 383·15 per thousand, and among the children it approached 500 per thousand. This was an opportunity for the Stop the War Committee and the Conciliation Committee to renew their agitation. A relief fund was organised for the victims of the concentrations camps. An inquiry was opened on the spot. Finally an important debate was held in Parliament, and the Secretary for War, while defending the system and pleading extenuating circumstances in excuse of the bad organisation of the camps, undertook to carry out the necessary reforms. He was even prepared to accept the assistance of the philanthropists who had denounced the scandal. Thus, at the very time when the opponents of the concentration camps were the object of public hostility and the anathemas of the Press, they were treated with a tolerance from which in the end the country benefited. A number of Englishmen entered into friendly relations with some of their South African foes and the friendship would make reconciliation easier when peace was restored.

The supporters of the government charged the pro-Boers with prolonging the war by the encouragement which their protests gave to the enemies of Britain and

[1] *Times' History of the War in South Africa,* vol. iv. (by B. Williams), p. 493.

by their continual interference with the action of the military authorities in South Africa. This the pro-Boers stoutly denied. According to them the only way to shorten the war was to enter into negotiations as speedily as possible either with the Boer leaders in South Africa or with President Kruger. On what basis? The extremists persisted in demanding that the independence of both republics should be conceded. Among them were Labouchere the veteran Radical journalist, Sir Wilfrid Lawson the patriarch of Puritan Radicalism and Sir Leonard Courtney, a sturdy free lance of eccentric views who, after quarrelling with the Liberals fifteen years earlier on the question of Irish Home Rule, now quarrelled with the Unionists on the question of the Boer War. Few, however, were prepared to go so far. Lloyd George in particular was careful not to commit himself to so compromising a demand.[1] But all agreed in repudiating the attitude of Lord Roberts who, after the occupation of Pretoria, had rejected Botha's overtures and demanded unconditional surrender, or of Sir Alfred Milner who let it be understood that a treaty of peace was perhaps unnecessary; since the two Republics had been annexed to the Empire in 1900, the Boers had only to accept the situation.[2] Indeed, in the opinion of the pro-Boers neither

[1] H. of C., July 4, 1901, Lloyd George's speech (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, vol. xciv. pp. 891–2): "I ask (him) to point to a single speech delivered by any Liberal Member of Parliament, sitting for a British constituency . . . in which there has been put forward a claim for absolute surrender to the Boers or for the restoration of absolute independence."

[2] Lord Milner's speech, *Cape Times*, November 1, 1901: "He wished he could congratulate them that the war was over, but he had come to the conclusion that it was no use waiting till the war was over. In a formal sense it might never be over, but it might just slowly burn itself out, as it was now doing."

Sir Alfred Milner nor Chamberlain was worthy, or rather, capable of concluding that peace of conciliation with the Boers which should assure them with the least possible delay self-government such as the French Canadians enjoyed under the British flag.

The Opposition. The Liberal Imperialists.

Within the ranks of the Opposition the pro-Boers were opposed by those who since the end of 1899 had been known as Liberal Imperialists. The appellation was coined at that date [1] by the statesman who became the unofficial leader of the new group. Lord Rosebery, the former Prime Minister, a man proud of his vast estates, proud of his colossal fortune (he had married a daughter of Lord Rothschild), proud of his magnificent racing stud (he was the king of the Epsom racecourse and had twice won the Derby [2]) and proud of his scholarship; in the academic manner, an excellent writer and a fine speaker. Driven in 1896 from his leadership of the Liberal party by the Gladstonian veterans of the National Liberal Federation he had lived in retirement for two years and returned to public life at the time of the Fashoda crisis to give his unquali-

[1] Or rather revived. Fifteen years earlier it had been applied to Lord Rosebery and accepted by him. See his Sheffield speech, October 20, 1885: "The other day I was described as a Liberal Imperialist. So far as I understand these two words that is a perfectly accurate description. If a Liberal Imperialist means that I am a Liberal passionately attached to the Empire . . . if it means that I am a Liberal who believes that the Empire is best maintained on the basis of the widest democracy, and that its voice is powerful in proportion to the number of contented subjects that it represents . . . if these be accurate descriptions of what a Liberal Imperialist is, then I am a Liberal Imperialist."

[2] A third time in 1900.

fied support to Chamberlain's policy. During the Boer War he delivered with unflagging energy an entire series of speeches in which he expounded his programme in full.[1]

There was, he insisted, a fact whose reality and importance it was imperative that the Liberal party should recognise—the existence of the Empire. Eng- was no longer the " little England "—two islands lying off the north-western coast of Europe—to which half a century earlier a Liberal statesman might safely have confined his attention. Twelve million square miles, a population of 400 million, constituted at the opening of the 20th century " Greater Britain." But the peoples of the Empire united under a single sceptre were exposed to constant danger from the keen competition of other European nations eager to found empires of their own. One thing could be predicted with certainty of the coming century. It would be a century of keen, intelligent even fierce international competition " which moreover would manifest itself more probably in the arts of peace even than in the arts of war." [2] There was no cause for indignation. Was not the law of competition the law of progress? How then could the Liberal party which prided itself on being the party of progress attempt to evade it? It was for the British nation to consider whether its organisation corresponded to the size of its empire, whether it possessed a sufficiently numerous and competent body of administrators to

[1] Speech at Bath, October 27, 1899: at Chatham, January 23, 1900: *Questions of Empire.* A Rectorial Address delivered before the students of the University of Glasgow, November 16, 1900. Speech at Chesterfield, December 16, 1901: at Glasgow, March 16, 1902.

[2] Glasgow speech, November 16, 1900.

govern it. This raised the question of national education: the education given to the British people must be extended and brought up-to-date. And the nation must also ask itself whether the constitution of the race was sufficiently vigorous, its physique sufficiently robust to bear the heavy burden it was called upon to carry. This was a question of public health which could only be solved by State action. In short the aim which Lord Rosebery set before a rejuvenated Liberal party was to increase what he termed the "national efficiency." If the Liberals were to be true to themselves, they must be the party of methodical and scientific progress.[1]

The Gladstonian stalwarts were therefore proceeding on the wrong lines when they endeavoured to arouse the pity of the public against the rigours of martial law and the horrors of the concentration camps, when they opposed the war as such and insisted that the Liberal party should be a party of peace at any price. It had not always been so, and Lord Rosebery, placing a rhetorical tribute on Lord Chatham's grave, hailed him as the founder of "Liberal Imperialism."[2] The charge which the Opposition might justly bring against the Conservatives was not that they had made an unnecessary war, but that they had made so little preparation

[1] Chesterfield speech, December 16, 1901.—See also the speech delivered earlier at Chatham, January 23, 1900: "Another great advantage they ought to get out of the war would be the learning of some important lessons. In this country we lived a great deal too much from hand to mouth. In an age of science, we did not proceed by scientific methods, or profit as other nations did by them. Great as the task before us in the field was at this moment, a greater task would remain after the war was completed, the putting the Empire on a business footing, a task which, he believed, might occupy many governments."

[2] Bath speech, November 21, 1899.

for it, and that, when it came, they mismanaged it so grossly. Arthur Balfour, leader of the Commons, seemed to take a delight in making himself unpopular even with his own party by his attitude of ironical calm, his air of detachment, and the calculated pose with which he spoke of events as a disinterested spectator, not as a minister responsible for their conduct. Lord Lansdowne and Lord Wolseley within a few weeks of their respective dismissal at the end of 1900 from the War Office and the position of commander-in-chief, scandalised the House of Lords by their mutual recriminations, as they bandied in debate the charges of incompetence and want of foresight. Broderick, who replaced Lord Lansdowne, lost no time in preparing an extensive scheme for the reorganisation of the army. But the scheme was soon abandoned and, in his turn, Broderick became the object of the attacks which had been made upon Lord Lansdowne.

What method, then, did the exponents of Liberal Imperialism suggest to provide the British Empire with the military organisation of which it was in need? The increase of parliamentary control? By no means. Lord Rosebery and his political allies were instinctively disposed to champion the executive against the criticisms of an incompetent Parliament, and Sir Alfred Milner had no better friends in London than the group of Liberal Imperialists. Lord Rosebery proposed that the Commander-in-chief should have the right to criticise freely government measures in the House of Lords, complained that since 1895 his authority had been controlled too narrowly by the civil power, and suggested that it would be a good thing if the war office, admiralty and foreign office could be entrusted to permanent offi-

cials belonging to no party.[1] He was even prepared, in direct opposition to the traditional creed of the Liberal party, to contemplate the introduction of a system of conscription.[2] "Take," he said, "the example of Prussia, for I know no other so striking, of the necessity of constant vigilance in the strict maintenance of a State." And he invited his countrymen to study and admire the Russian system of government. "It is practically unaffected by the life of man or the lapse of time —it moves on, as it were, by its own impetus: it is silent, concentrated, perpetual, and unbroken: it is, therefore, successful."[3] The two great military monarchies of nineteenth century Europe were held up as examples to constitutional and parliamentary Britain by Lord Rosebery's imperialism, which called itself Liberal.

What was the immediate aim of this campaign of oratory? Did Lord Rosebery entertain at times the dream of affecting a reconciliation with Chamberlain's Liberal Unionists and forming, in conjunction with them, a centre party sufficiently strong to defy the combined opposition of the old Tory party and the old Liberal party? There were those who, sincerely or not, professed to believe it; but nothing in the behaviour either of the Liberal Imperialists or the Liberal Union-

[1] H. of L., August 3, 1900: "I confess that, if my wish were to be carried out, I should have more officers non-political and less officers political than is now the case. So far from wishing to make the Commander-in-chief political, I would gladly see the War Office non-political, and I would gladly see the Admiralty non-political, and if it were possible—I know none of these things are possible, I am only speaking of a Utopia–I would have the Foreign Office also non-political." (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th series, vol. lxxxvii. p. 596).

[2] H. of L., January 20, 1900 (*Parl. Deb.*, vol. lxxxviii. pp. 38-9).

[3] Glasgow speech, November 16, 1900.

ists permits us to take the suggestion seriously. Or was it his object to transform the Liberal party and reassume its leadership from which he had been dismissed by the Gladstonians four years before? Was it without significance that at the first election of the London County Council the Radicals had christened their party the " progressives," and that this " progressive " party whose programme was exclusively one of administrative reform and municipal socialism had at every election maintained itself in power, though at the General Elections of 1895 and 1900 London had returned an overwhelming majority of Unionists? It is possible that Lord Rosebery, who had once been elected chairman by the progressive majority of the London County Council, impressed by its success, had conceived the project of remodelling Parliamentary Liberalism after the pattern of the municipal progressives. But was he really so anxious to return to office? Once already he had been Prime Minister, and the experiment had not succeeded. More, much more attractive was the position he now occupied, popular, applauded, urged by a host of admirers to respond to his country's desire and hold himself at her disposal, ready to take the reins of government whenever she should invite him, but persistently evading their importunities, and deliberately taking his station above the fray, content to play the easy part of adviser and umpire.[1]

[1] When he spoke at Glasgow on March 10, 1902, he addressed an audience of 5,000, and 32,000 people asked for tickets. See Sir William Harcourt's letter to his son, November 1, 1899: ... " The *Times* will get tired of puffing him and his hold on our people is limited. I doubt whether even in ten years he will be capable of leading a party. He is too selfish, too trivial, too much a *poseur*, and I fancy what he admires in Chatham was his isolation which ended in his choosing to act with no one, till no one would act with

Nevertheless, the Liberal statesmen who supported Lord Rosebery were active politicians, the ablest and most brilliant men on the front bench of the Opposition. They had held important positions in the last Liberal Cabinet. Sir Henry Fowler had been President of the Local Government Board, Henry Asquith, Home Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Anxious to retain the leadership of their party against the day, whose speedy advent they desired, when the Liberals would return to power, they found it no easy task, in the circumstances, to decide on the best tactics to pursue. They were sure that the vast majority of the nation and probably the majority of Liberal voters approved of the support which they gave to the war policy of the Unionist government. But were they so certain that they had the approval of the local leaders of the party throughout the country? If not, what could they do to win them over?

Foremost among these local leaders and organisers were the officers—the ministers and lay preachers—of the Free Churches, the hereditary enemies of the Church of England and consequently of the Tory party. For the past five or six years Lord Rosebery had been

him: . . . He will never take the rough and tumble of party warfare, but keep himself for the *réclame* of safe displays at intervals. . . ." Notice the contempt with which Lord Rosebery in his Glasgow speech (November 16, 1900) speaks of party government: "The development and expansion of the empire have produced a corresponding demand for first rate men, but the supply has remained, at best, stationary. Of course we do not employ all those that we have; for, by the balance of our constitution, while one half of our capable statesmen is in full work, the other half is, by that fact, standing idle in the market-place with no one to hire them. This used to be on a five years' shift, but all that is now altered. Anyhow, it is a terrible waste."

persistently courting the Free Churches. An inveterate foe of Home Rule, he had, since 1895, made the most of the conflicts which had occurred on the question of education between the Irish Catholics and the British Nonconformists. When the Irish Nationalists defeated a bill to provide for the erection at the public expense of a statue of Cromwell in the Houses of Parliament, it was Lord Rosebery who paid for its erection outside, at the entrance of the building, and on November 14, 1899, when the South African War had just begun, as though to remind the Nonconformists that their hero had been a great soldier, as well as a great statesman, he spoke at the unveiling. One of his principal supporters, Sir Henry Fowler, was a Wesleyan. The most active of the Wesleyan leaders, the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes, made his weekly organ, the *Methodist Times,* an imperialist newspaper whose jingoism was not surpassed by any Conservative paper. Even among the other sects—the Baptists and Congregationalists—Lord Rosebery had contrived to gain adherents—for example the Rev. Robert Forman Horton, the Congregationalist. Nevertheless, if during these troubled years it is probable that the Nonconformist squadrons lost their cohesion, and many a chapel-goer voted for the imperialist and even for the Conservatives, the vast majority of the Dissenting ministers remained true to the traditional policy of peace handed down from John Bright and Gladstone. The Rev. C. Silvester Horne and the celebrated Dr. Clifford were the natural allies of Lloyd George, himself an active member of the Baptist community as well as a Radical politician.

On the extreme left the leaders of Trade Unionism provided the Radical party with a further staff of

workers. Some years previously they had been converted to the tenets of Socialism, and Socialism was a system which seemed in every respect the antithesis of the economic individualism, cherished by the supporters of Gladstone. Could not the new creed be turned to the profit of Liberal imperialism? Was it impossible to persuade the working man that imperialism was more favourable to active measures of social reform than the orthodox Liberalism of the Gladstonians could possibly be? And, in fact, there were in the socialist ranks thinkers who advocated an alliance between the socialists and the more progressive section of imperialists against the Gladstonian Liberals, now obviously discredited.

For the past fifteen years the Fabian group had preached a Socialism from which the romantic dreams of a revolutionary Utopia were rigorously excluded. Its two leaders Sidney and Beatrice Webb were in close relations with the group of Liberal Imperialists. Sidney Webb had often come into contact with Lord Rosebery when the latter was Chairman of the London County Council, of which the young Fabian was a member, and among the intimate friends of the Webbs was Richard Burton Haldane, a young Scotch barrister, a metaphysician, steeped in German philosophy, and already a very active member of the group led by Lord Rosebery and Sir Edward Grey. Early in 1900 the faithful ally of the Webbs, the dramatist, Bernard Shaw, heralded their imperialist propaganda by a speech in which he declared war on the doctrine that small nations had the right to determine their own government. His Socialism repudiated such national individualism. He declared his conviction " that the most

governed state over the largest area is preferable to a number of warring units with undisciplined ideals. . . . The world is to the big and powerful states by necessity: and the little ones must come within their borders or be crushed out of existence." [1] Eighteen months later Sidney Webb maintained the same thesis in an article which attracted considerable attention.[2] He congratulated Lord Rosebery on having freed himself from the slavery of the traditional Liberal formulas and, three months before the Chesterfield speech, urged him to place himself at the head of a reconstituted Opposition which should take for its programme National Efficiency. But this was no more than the dream of a handful of theorists who addressed their propaganda to the middle class intelligentsia rather than to the labouring masses. What meanwhile was the attitude of the militant trade unionists? Obviously

[1] Speech delivered at a meeting of the Fabian Society, Clifford's Inn Hall, February 23, 1900. The thesis is developed in detail in *Fabianism and the Empire: A Manifesto by the Fabian Society.* Edited by Bernard Shaw, 1900.

[2] *Lord Rosebery's Escape from Houndsditch* (*Nineteenth Century*, September, 1901, vol. iv. pp. 366 sqq.). Reprinted later with important alterations as *Fabian Tract No.* 108. *Twentieth Century Politics. A Policy of National Efficiency. A Lecture to the Fabian Society, November* 8, 1901. For Sidney Webb's influence on Lord Rosebery see a letter from Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to Herbert Gladstone, September 12, 1901: . . . "In our little political world at home things appear to have been quiet on the surface, whatever movement there may have been underneath. We have had the benefit of instruction by Mr. Sidney Webb and have survived it. I recognise in his lucubration admirable sentiments which I have heard enunciated by other and greater men: which may be master and which scholar I do not know. I fear I am too old to join that Academy." To the same correspondent, December 18, 1901: . . . "All that he (Lord Rosebery) said about the clean slate and efficiency was an affront to Liberalism and was pure claptrap. Efficiency as a watchword! Who is against it? This is all a mere *rechauffé* of Mr. Sidney Webb, who is evidently the chief instructor of the whole faction." (J. A. Spender, *The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman*, vol. ii., pp. 4–14.)

there could be no question of capturing such a vast movement for the pacifist agitation. When the Trade Unions held their Annual Congress they were too prudent to risk the unity of their organisations by adopting an attitude of open opposition to the war. In 1900 a pro-Boer motion was only passed by an insignificant majority and in 1901 the congress refused by a large majority to adopt a similar motion. Nevertheless, among the secretaries of the Unions, who were often devout Nonconformists, sometimes lay preachers, the vast majority—whether they had been converted to Socialism or were still opposed to the novel creed—remained loyal to the traditional humanitarianism of the Gladstonians.

What has just been said of the Nonconformist bodies and trade unions is applicable for the same reason to the official organisations of the Liberal party—the Front Bench of the Opposition in the House, the National Liberal Federation in the country. If the Liberal party was to be kept together, there must be no breach with either wing. But by the operation of what may be termed the natural law of parties and owing to the fact that the pro-Boers represented the maximum of opposition to the policy of the government, the balance inevitably shifted by imperceptible degrees towards what is termed in French politics, the left.

The Struggle between the Two Liberal Groups. The Victory of the pro-Boers. Disorganisation of the Party

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, since Sir William Harcourt's resignation, the official leader of the party,

had formerly been Secretary for War. It was over a provision in his estimates that the Liberal Cabinet had been defeated. A wealthy member of the Scottish middle class, an excellent fellow, a fine specimen of the normal healthy citizen of average ability, liked by everyone for his hearty and quiet good humour, everything pointed to him as the man who, in January 1899, could best keep the party together and prevent a definite split in its ranks. Throughout the war he made this his sole object. But the conditions were far from easy. In the first place, during those critical weeks which preceded the commencement of hostilities he offended the Gladstonians by his lukewarmness, and their opponents by his anxiety to avoid a breach with Sir William Harcourt, John Morley and their friends. When the National Liberal Federation met at Nottingham in March 1900, its chairman was not Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, but Sir Edward Grey, who might be regarded as, after Lord Rosebery, the leader of the Liberal Imperialists. When in July the pro-Boers forced a division on a motion hostile to the government they mustered only 31 votes as against 40 Liberal Imperialists who voted with the government. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and 35 Liberal members abstained from voting. The Liberal Imperialists believed that the moment had come to get rid of a leader unable to assert his authority. They founded an Imperial Liberal Council which at the General Election put forward 56 candidates whose unimpeachable patriotism it guaranteed, and declared that, as soon as the Election was over, the party must be purged of those members whose opinions rendered them unworthy to manage the affairs of a great empire. At a Council Dinner held on Novem-

ber 12, R. W. Perks, a Wesleyan and as ardent an imperialist as Lord Rosebery himself, maintained that out of the 186 Liberal members of the new Parliament, 152 were " virtually " Liberal Imperialists.[1]

But for all this the Liberal Imperialists remained in political communion with their opponents, and the Unionists had just won a decisive victory at the polls by persuading the electorate " that every seat won by the Liberals was a seat won by the Boers." And three months after the Election it was the turn of the Liberal " pro-Boers " to gain a striking success at the expense of the Imperialists. Since the war began they had suffered from the disadvantage that they were totally unrepresented in the London Press. How could they obtain a newspaper? The prudent and the aged shook their heads at the suggestion. It would cost too much, £250,000, and where could they raise so large a sum? [2] The young Lloyd George did not lose heart. He went to Birmingham and sought the assistance of George Cadbury, a wealthy chocolate manufacturer, and a prominent member of the small sect of Quakers whose ardent piety had been fertile in missionary enterprise and works of social reform. At first Cadbury hesitated. He had always refused to take part in political strife. But Lloyd George pointed out that at the present juncture there was more at stake than a mere party question, the sacred cause of peace must be upheld. Cadbury provided £20,000, Thomasson of Bolton followed his example and contributed a further £20,000. No

[1] *Ann. Reg.*, 1900, p. 223. Cf. J. A. Spender, *The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman*, vol. ii. pp. 295–6 and J. Saxon Mills, *Sir Edward Cook, a Biography*, p. 182.

[2] John Morley to Sir William Harcourt, December 3, 1899 (A. G. Gardiner, *The Life of Sir William Harcourt*, vol. ii., p. 512).

new paper was founded; the *Daily News* was purchased, its imperialist staff dismissed and their places taken by a staff of Radicals. The new staff was Puritan as well as Radical. Two characteristic decisions were made. The paper would not publish racing tips or results and would refuse advertisements of alcoholic drinks.[1]

The first campaign fought by the newspaper after its change of ownership was on the subject of the concentration camps. It caused a sensation and drove Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to take action. Speaking on June 14 at a political banquet he denounced the "methods of barbarism" employed by the British in South Africa. Three days later he supported a motion by Lloyd George calling the attention of the Commons to the question. Fifty Liberals, though they did not actually vote against the pro-Boer motion, as on the previous occasion a year before, abstained from voting. Seventy voted for the motion. The centre under the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman joined forces with the left. In future, Sir Henry would be considered a pro-Boer.

Six months later, in December, the committee of the National Liberal Federation adopted a resolution calling upon the government to state plainly the conditions on which it was prepared to make peace and demanding the immediate despatch to South Africa of a special body of commissioners to open the negotiations which Sir Alfred Milner refused even to consider. At the same time the committee rejected an amendment, proposed by the imperialists, asking that the necessary mili-

[1] A. G. Gardiner, *Life of George Cadbury*, pp. 215 sqq. J. Saxon Mills, *Sir Edward Cook, a Biography*, 1921, who in Chapter xi. gives extracts from the diary of Sir Edward Cook, the editor, dismissed when the paper changed hands.

tary measures should be taken to bring hostilities to an end. This success emboldened the pro-Boers, and in January 1902, when Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman couched an amendment to the royal address in terms sufficiently vague to preserve the unity of the party, he was severely taken to task by Lloyd George.[1]

Lord Rosebery, on his side, threw off his inertia at last and consented to become the president of an important league in which the Imperial Council of 1900 was merged. Sir Henry Fowler, Sir Edward Grey and Henry Asquith were the three vice-presidents of the Liberal League founded in February 1902 to propagate the creed of Liberal imperialism. But the conditions under which the League was now founded differed widely from the conditions under which the Council had been founded in 1900. Then the imperialists had hoped to capture the leadership of the party. Now they admitted that they were a dissentient minority in a party of which the majority remained faithful to the Gladstonian tradition, as continued by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

Indeed the politicians who controlled the Liberal League repudiated any intention of splitting the party, and it was within the party organisation to which they still belonged that they proposed to spread their views. They borrowed from their Fabian friend Sidney Webb one of his pet phrases and explained that their aim was to "permeate" the Liberal party with their ideas. What, moreover, was the exact point at issue between the opposing groups in the spring of 1902? Was it as to the best method of bringing the war to an end?

[1] H. of C. January 21, 1902 (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th Ser., vol. ci. pp. 537 sqq.).

There can be no doubt that if, on this point, any divergence of opinion remained, it was very slight. Ever since the beginning of the war Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had declared himself in favour of annexing the Boer republics and Lloyd George on his side had never opposed annexation. All that either statesman asked was that negotiations should not be delayed and that the peace should be a peace of conciliation which should admit at the earliest moment possible the citizens of the Transvaal and the Orange Territory to full political and civil rights. But in December Lord Rosebery had spoken to the same effect.[1] The question on which at the opening of 1902 Lord Rosebery and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman ostensibly differed had nothing to do with the Boer War. It was the question of Home Rule. And although for the past two years the Irish had exasperated patriotic Englishmen by the delight with which they hailed every British defeat, it was universally admitted that Home Rule at the moment was not a question of practical politics. At bottom the question which divided the two groups was neither the Boer War nor Irish Home Rule. It was—and we must bear this well in mind, if we are to understand the history of the Liberal party during the next few years—the question of the foreign policy to be pursued by the Liberals after the restoration of peace. Was it to be the policy which the party had adopted half a century before, after the Crimean War? A profound loathing of war, a determination to avoid any commitment which might lead to war, an attitude of systematic indifference to all questions of foreign

[1] Chesterfield Speech, December 16, 1901.

policy? Such was the desire of the group labelled pro-Boers. Or had conditions changed too profoundly to permit the Liberals to continue the Gladstonian tradition and yet, as in the fifties, maintain its position as a great national party? That was the belief of Lord Rosebery, Sir Edward Grey and their supporters. They were convinced that if the Liberals returned to office they would be compelled to solve the problems of imperial defence in the same spirit and by the same methods as Chamberlain and his followers.

ENGLAND AND EUROPE. THE GERMAN QUESTION

Continental Opinion and the War. The Policy of Germany

We must not imagine that the attention of the British public was so entirely absorbed by the war that it lost interest in the preservation of the balance of power on the Continent and throughout the world. Britain had seen every foreign power, with the exception of one or two Mediterranean states dependent on her protection, espouse enthusiastically the Boer cause and welcome in common the British defeats of November and December 1899. She had felt once more the anxiety which she had experienced at the opening of 1895, when the Emperor William had launched against her the Triple Alliance of the Far East, and at the end of the same year, when he had sent his telegram of congratulation to President Kruger. But if the English had at first

been afraid that the universal anglophobia might issue in some diplomatic and military combination against their empire, and alarmed by the projects of invasion which certain French and German officers had indiscreetly made public they had been speedily reassured. Events had taken another turn equally, it must be admitted, disturbing to the British public. The Powers took advantage of the fact that Britain's hands were tied by the South African War to pursue unchecked in different quarters of the globe their schemes of colonial expansion. Russia acquired a financial hold over Persia, and worked hard to strengthen her influence in Manchuria and at Peking. The Latin nations began to think of parcelling out whatever remained to be annexed in North Africa. Italy might get Tripoli, France and Spain cast their eyes on Morocco. This was to be the revenge of Italy, Spain and France for Adowa, Cuba and Fashoda. And what of Germany?

Germany acted like the rest. She had just acquired the Caroline Islands in the Pacific, she was consolidating her influence in China, and she was pushing forward the project of the Bagdad railway for which she succeeded in obtaining a concession, formally guaranteed by two treaties. But at the same time the German government was putting into practice a systematic and comprehensive foreign policy. There was no longer any question of a European combination against Britain. The scheme had definitely failed in January 1896. The policy which was being pursued at present by the Kaiser and his chancellor, von Bulow, was a policy of balance, whose principle may be defined as follows. Friendly relations with every foreign power, alliance with none. England was to be assured of Ger-

many's benevolent neutrality in her struggle with the Boers, but Germany would not accept any alliance or understanding which might alarm France or Russia. If Austria drew closer to Russia and Italy to France, Germany would raise no objection, would indeed publicly profess her approval. So long as the interests of Great Britain continued to clash with those of France and Russia, a better understanding between those continental powers could not have any very serious consequences for Germany. While England and France, and England and Russia were at variance, the German Empire was safe.

This policy was in the main that formerly pursued by Bismarck. But there was a difference between Bismarck's foreign policy and the Emperor William's. Bismarck had intended his policy to be permanent, the Emperor's was provisional. At the beginning of 1896 William II had discovered that French public opinion was not yet prepared to accept the friendship of Germany. But the time would, he hoped, yet arrive, hastened by colonial disputes with Great Britain, when the French would consent to forget that Alsace and Lorraine had been part of France. "Fashoda," wrote the Emperor, "is doing wonders." [1] William II had further realised that he did not possess the equipment necessary, if he was to put himself at the head of an anti-British coalition. For that he would require a navy at least equal to the French or the Russian. But in 1896 the German navy was still in its infancy. Henceforward the Emperor never relaxed his efforts to obtain from the Reichstag a navy adequate to the greatness of

[1] Remark appended to a letter from Count von Bulow, of July 4, 1899 (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv. 2 p. 560 n.).

Germany. That is the refrain which recurs throughout his correspondence with his ministers. "If I had a navy. . . . When I shall have a navy." "The British navy is strong enough to defy any hostile combination, Germany has practically speaking no navy. I am therefore compelled to observe the strictest neutrality. Before everything else I must provide myself with a navy. In twenty years' time when the navy will be ready, I shall speak a very different language." [1]

What language? Did William II deliberately contemplate a war with England? No. He was perhaps a megalomaniac, but a megalomaniac who preferred a safe prestige to the hazard of battle. He was fond of parading troops, but he shrank from war. Nevertheless, this policy of bluff and display was calculated to alarm foreign powers and in particular constituted a menace to the position of England. The German attitude was the more disquieting because, whenever some action of William II manifested his determination to remain on friendly terms with Great Britain, it was badly received by his people and the Emperor risked his popularity. But whenever in the course of

[1] William II. to Count von Bulow, Minister for Foreign Affairs, October 29, 1899 (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol xv. pp. 407–8). Cf. the Emperor's note written on a despatch from Graf von Hatzfeldt, the German Ambassador in London, December 20, 1899: "If we possessed a navy, Chamberlain would never have dared to act in this way" (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. p. 427). William II. to his Chancellor Count von Bulow, March 5, 1901: "Your report of yesterday about the situation in China has surprised me enormously and interested me very much. What an exciting situation! And what a fine thing it would be if only we had two squadrons of men of war ready to send out." (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi. pp. 333–4.) William II. to the Chancellor, Count von Bulow, November 12, 1902: "Be careful! They have 53 ironclads in commission, we have 8! And in 1905 England will have 196 new ironclads, cruisers and armoured cruisers ready for service, for 46 of our own." (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol xvii. p. 117.)

his campaign for a big navy he delivered a boastful and sabre-rattling speech he seemed rather to follow than to lead public opinion. Sooner or later the British people must become aware of the German attitude towards their country. Throughout the period of the Boer war the decisive factor in the determination of British foreign policy was the relationship which obtained between the two courts, the two governments and the two peoples.

The Emperor William conciliates and imposes his will on Great Britain

Since the summer of 1895 the Emperor William had not set foot in England. Official relations between the two governments having improved, Queen Victoria decided in the spring of 1899 that the time had come to seal the diplomatic rapprochement by a reconciliation between the two courts. She invited her grandson. But he did not even condescend to reply, and, when pressed to explain his insulting silence, demanded as a preliminary condition that the negotiations for the partition of Samoa should be re-opened. When the condition was accepted—for the situation in the Transvaal was becoming steadily worse, and the British government found it necessary to conciliate Germany—he promised to pay a visit in autumn, but postponed his arrival, not wishing to come over until the question of Samoa had been settled to his satisfaction.[1] A treaty

[1] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xiv. pp. 615, 620, 623, 625, 627; vol. xv. p. 410. Baron von Eckardstein's account, though containing additional information which deserves to be borne in mind, is inaccurate on several points (*Lebenserinnerungen und Politische Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii., chs. i., ii. and iii).

signed on November 14 gave him all he asked. A fortnight earlier, Cecil Rhodes had concluded an arrangement with the German government for the establishment of a system of telegraphs in East Africa. On November 20 the Emperor William, accompanied by his wife and two of his sons, landed in England on his way to Windsor.

The moral effect of his visit, made at this particular moment, was very great. It was a little over a month since the declaration of war, bad news was beginning to arrive from the theatre of operations, and England felt herself hated by the entire world. From France especially rose a volume of bitter abuse. The Nationalists took their revenge for the insults heaped upon them during the Dreyfus case, the Republicans could not fail to sympathise with the protest of the British Radicals against a war waged upon a weak people by a strong for the possession of the gold fields, and what Frenchmen would not rejoice that his country was avenged for the humiliations she had suffered a year before during the Fashoda crisis? Moreover, French invective took the obtrusive form of picture and caricature, and the caricatures did not spare the Queen herself. The British ambassador at Paris warned the Quai d'Orsay that, if the attacks in the French press continued, he would ask for his passport. This was the moment chosen by the German Emperor to testify by his visit his goodwill towards Great Britain. Britain was not after all a moral outcast among the nations of the world. The imperial visit effaced the memory of the Kruger telegram. And it covered the diatribes of the German press.

But was it nothing more than a testimony of good-

will? The Emperor had brought with him his minister for foreign affairs, Count von Bulow. They did not, it is true, see the Prime Minister. Lady Salisbury had died two days before the Emperor's arrival and Lord Salisbury made his mourning an excuse to shut himself up at Hatfield. But William II and Count von Bulow had long interviews with Arthur Balfour, who represented Lord Salisbury, and above all with Chamberlain. What was the subject of these interviews? The nature of the proposals made by the British to the German government may be guessed from the panteutonic sermon preached before the Emperor by Bishop Creighton in Sandringham Church at the express command of the Prince of Wales,[1] and from the sensational speech which Chamberlain delivered at Leicester on November 30, two days after William II set out on his return to Germany. After a sharp passage of arms with France Chamberlain expressed himself in favour of a policy of " alliance " or at least " understanding," if not with " the German press " at any rate with " the German people," and moreover, hoped that the Anglo-German alliance might be completed by a " triple-alliance of the Teutonic race " between England, Germany and the United States of America.[2] The effect

[1] *Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton, Sometime Bishop of London.* By his wife. Vol. ii. p. 417.

[2] If we can believe the German evidence (*Die Grosse Politik,* vol. xv. pp. 413 sqq.: Report of Count von Bulow drawn up at Windsor, November 24, 1899) all the proposals, which, moreover, are of a very definite nature, were made by Balfour, Chamberlain and the British royal family. The Emperor and Bulow had either passed them over in silence or explicitly discouraged them. This certainly was the impression which prevailed at the French embassy. " The confidences I have been able to gather," wrote M. Paul Cambon from London on December 1, " make it certain that with his usual impulsiveness and want of restraint, Mr. Chamberlain has spoken of the common interests of Great Britain and

produced by the speech was disastrous; it provoked a storm of protest in the press of the three countries concerned. In Germany von Bulow took fright at the attitude of German opinion. Speaking in the Reichstag on December 10 he made no allusion to the Anglo-German alliance for which Chamberlain hoped, declared his intention to remain on friendly terms with the neighbouring powers both on the eastern and western frontier and concluded by asking the Reichstag to sanction the naval programme which had been prepared by von Tirpitz. This was the prelude to the law of naval construction passed shortly afterwards by which the German government undertook to devote to the construction of men of war during the next sixteen years the sum of £74,000,000, and thus, since the programme of 1900 was in addition to the programme of 1898, to provide Germany with the largest navy of any continental power. It was evident to the entire world that Chamberlain's egregious blunder had undone the good effect of the imperial visit, and that the German government was replying to his clumsy advances by a blunt refusal.

Germany throughout the world and proposed to the Emperor an alliance or at least a general agreement on all questions which concern the two countries. The Emperor has listened to his proposals, paid him compliments, excited his hopes and made promises, but has not, it seems, committed himself." (E. Bourgeois and G. Pagè's *Les Origines et les Responsibilités de la Grande Guerre*, p. 284.) The British documents are silent as to the conversations which took place at Windsor between Balfour and Chamberlain, and the Emperor and von Bulow. An appendix, not paginated, published at the end of vol. iii gives only a memorandum drawn up on November 26 by Sir Francis Bertie after a conversation which he had held that day at the Foreign Office with von Bulow. "In the course of conversation Bulow happened to say *en passant* that he knew that alliances are not in vogue in England." That is the sole allusion, if it be an allusion, made during the interview to a British offer of alliance.

Six months passed. A popular rising broke out in the North of China. Though directed principally against the Germans and Russians, the insurrection became an indiscriminate attack on the foreigners who had begun the piecemeal dismemberment of the Chinese empire. The German minister was murdered. The legations were besieged in Peking. An expedition despatched to their assistance under the command of a British admiral failed to force its way through and retreated on Tien-Tsin. What steps would the European powers take to retrieve the initial defeat? England, fully occupied with the Boer war and obliged to maintain in South Africa an army of 200,000, could only play a minor part in the Far East. She supported the suggestion of a Japanese expedition, to which Russia would not agree, while Japan, on her part, would not agree to a Russian expedition. The German government took advantage of the undisguised hostility between the Anglo-Japanese and the Franco-Russian groups to enter the field. It secured from Russia first, then from Japan, an invitation to take control of the operations. The French government yielded to the wishes of the Russian. The British government, completely isolated, could only bow with an ill grace [1] to

[1] Von Derenthall to the German ambassador in London, Graf von Hatzfeldt, July 31, 1900: "Yesterday Sir Frank Lascelles paid his first visit after his return from London. His conversation confirmed your Excellency's reports. He spoke of the disappointment and dismay with which British statesmen view the German attitude in the far eastern question, even those who like Mr. Chamberlain were friends of Germany. . . . The ambassador also referred to the question of the supreme command and let it be known that in Lord Salisbury's opinion, unity of command was unnecessary." (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi. p. 75.) Graf von Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Office, July 31, 1900: . . . "Lord Salisbury referred to the question of the supreme command and repeated what Lascelles has already said in Berlin. He merely added that it was

the will of the other powers. The command of the international force sent to the relief of the legations was given to Feldmarschall von Waldersee. Not Feldmarschall but Weltmarschall—not Field-Marshal but World-Marshal, a German diplomatist jestingly remarked.

No sooner had the legations been relieved than the friction recommenced. The agreement of October 16 by which England and Germany covenanted to maintain in China the principle of the open door might have been expected to satisfy the demands of British commerce. The Emperor, employing the language of the Panteutonic alliance, spoke of the agreement made "with the greatest Teutonic people after ourselves." But it soon became evident that in the opinion of the German government the agreement did not apply to Northern China, where Russia was left free to mark out a sphere of influence reserved exclusively for herself. And, on the other hand, Germany insisted on the speedy evacuation of Shanghai which had been occupied during the rising by the international force and where the British, whose contingent was particularly large, seemed inclined to remain permanently. Military supremacy and diplomatic supremacy: never had the Emperor William's position been so strong. His hands held the balance of power.

Count von Bulow wrote from Windsor on November 14, 1899, "There can be no doubt that, taken as a whole, public opinion in England is far less anti-German than German opinion is anti-English" and added

a British characteristic, even, if, perhaps, an unreasonable one, not to endure the command of a foreigner and that he was obliged to reckon with it." (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvi. p. 76.)

" If the British public were aware of the state of feeling which at present prevails in Germany, a great change would come over their view of the relations between England and Germany." [1] There was in fact, as von Bulow admits in the same despatch, at least one newspaper, a newspaper, moreover, of the first importance which was doing its best to enlighten the British public. When Valentine Chirol, the *Times* correspondent in Berlin, took up his post at the end of 1895 he was entirely in favour of an Anglo-German understanding.[2] But he had soon realised that in the present temper of the German government and people it was quite out of the question, and did everything in his power to acquaint his readers with the true state of affairs.[3] And was the *Times* after all completely isolated? In all probability the German chancellor did not realise the extent to which British opinion had already taken alarm at the German attitude. There can be no doubt that the novelist, Conan Doyle, in the popular history of the South African War which he published in 1900 and which enjoyed a very wide circulation voiced the sentiments of a considerable section of the public, when he excused the violent anglophobia of France and Russia. The naval supremacy of England had been built on the ruin of the French empire and the French might well be forgiven, if they bore England a grudge.

[1] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. p. 419.

[2] See his work, *The Far Eastern Question*, which appeared in 1896, p. 194.

[3] From the end of 1899 the German government was disturbed by the attitude of the *Times*. See Count von Bulow letters of November 15 and 24, 1899 (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. pp. 412, 419). On two occasions at least it made an attempt to change it. (Letter from Count Metternich to the Chancellor, March 24, 1900, *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. pp. 496–7.) Holstein's note of October 31, 1901 (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvii. pp. 101 sqq.).

Russia was a barbarous country, and it was only natural that she should hate the most civilised nation in the world. But Germany, so deeply indebted to England for the assistance she had received in her struggle to throw off the French yoke! "Never again on any pretext will a British soldier or sailor shed his blood for such allies." [1]

Nevertheless, however galling the arrogant tone in which the Emperor William dictated to England, the word is scarcely too strong, the conditions of his friendship, his attitude towards the Boer republics could not fail to give pleasure in London. Negotiations had scarcely begun between Sir Alfred Milner and Kruger when he advised the President to compromise. And when in August a rupture seemed imminent, he had warned Kruger not to count on the intervention of Germany. The outbreak of war occasioned many difficulties, the presence in the Boer ranks of a very large number of German volunteers, and the inevitable incidents arising out of the question of contraband. But the German government persisted in observing an attitude of neutrality, almost of benevolent neutrality. When conversations were begun between Petersburg and Berlin as to the possibility of European intervention between the belligerents, it was the German emperor who broke them off and informed the British government of his action.[2] When in April 1900 an

[1] *The Great Boer War*, Ch. xii. (1st ed. 1900 pp. 195–6).

[2] Who began the negotiations? The Russian or the German government? If we are to rely exclusively on the German evidence it was the Russian government (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv. pp. 501 sqq.). But the archives of the Russian embassy in London (utilised by Sir Sidney Lee in his *Biography of King Edward VII* pp. 761 sqq.) throw suspicion on the German documents. It is certainly true that from January 27 until the end of February the initiative was taken by Mouravieff (cf. E. Bourgeois and G. Pagè's,

attempt was made by a pro-Boer to assassinate the Prince of Wales as he passed through Brussels, the Kaiser, anxious to give the Prince a public mark of his sympathy, hastened to find him and met him unexpectedly at the port of Altona, as he was re-embarking for England. At the end of 1900 when President Kruger fled to Europe he wished to visit every capital in turn to solicit the sympathy of the civilised world. In Paris he was loudly applauded and received at the Élysée; but the German Emperor refused to give him a similar welcome, and Kruger did not visit Berlin.

The Death of Queen Victoria. The Accession of Edward VII

On January 18, 1901 the British press issued the official announcement that the Queen's health had been

Les Origines et les Responsibilités de la Grande Guerre, p. 280). But he made his proposals with the encouragement of the Russian ambassador at Berlin, Count Osten-Sacken, who believed that he was carrying out the wishes of the Emperor William. And the interviews which took place between Osten-Sacken and the Emperor from the New Year until January 22 have either been reported in the German publication in a form extraordinarily different from that which they assume in the Russian or have been altogether omitted. In particular the German publication says nothing of the conversation which the Emperor held with the Russian ambassador on January 21, in which the Emperor informed the ambassador of his anxiety as to the persistent rumours that England contemplated handing Egypt over to Italy. A few days later (January 28–31, 1900) M. Nelidow wrote from Rome: "It is not easy to discover the source of the rumour that Italian troops are to be sent to Egypt or who started it. But there are indications that Germany has encouraged the report in Rome, with the object, it would seem, of creating an atmosphere of suspicion between England and Italy on the one side, and France on the other." In this connection it is worth remark that the Duke of Mecklenburg, in an interview with the editor of *L'Eclair* (an organ hostile to England and friendly to Germany) made an allusion to reports of the same nature. But this was at the beginning of February (*Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xv., p. 511.—See again: Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, February 9 1900 (*British Documents*, vol. I. pp. 250–1).

impaired by the anxieties of the past year and that her doctors had ordered a complete rest. Four days later she died, mourned by the entire nation. "As to her Majesty," wrote a clear-headed and cynical contemporary, "personally one does not like to say all one thinks, even in one's journal. By all I have ever heard of her she was in her old age a dignified but rather commonplace good soul, like how many of our dowagers, narrow-minded in her view of things, without taste in art or literature, fond of money, having a certain industry and business capacity in politics, but easily flattered and expecting to be flattered, quite convinced of her own providential position in the world and always ready to do anything to extend and augment it." But, adds Wilfrid Blunt, "the public has got to look upon the old lady as a kind of fetish or idol and nobody, even now she is dead, will dare print a word not to her glorification." [1]

The days were distant when the Queen, still almost a child, and a devoted Whig, had been the object of violent diatribes in the Tory press, when later her husband's persistent interference in politics had been warmly criticised by the newspapers or, when, later still, left a widow at the age of forty-two she had made herself unpopular by withdrawing from the duties of her position and her people's affection and making her widowhood a retreat from public life. For many years she had conscientiously performed all state functions.

At the two Jubilees of 1887 and 1897 the nation had venerated in her person the embodiment of its own greatness. The very length of her reign was impressive, a symbol of the stability and immortality of

[1] W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries*, vol. ii., p. 2.

British power. She was the grandmother of the Emperor of Germany and the Empress of Russia. During her reign three monarchs had succeeded each other on the throne of Italy, four on the throne of Spain, and two dynasties had fallen in France. And she disappeared from the scene at the moment when the embers of the South African War, which in September had been considered as finished, had been rekindled, and no end was in sight, and when the entire continent was expressing with little attempt at disguise its eager hope that Bismarck's prediction would be fulfilled and the British Empire find its grave in South Africa. A pall of gloom overcast the British horizon.

The Emperor William did not wait for the news of his grandmother's death to visit England. The moment he heard of her illness, he started, defying the customary etiquette and breaking off the preparations which were being made to celebrate the bicentenary of the Prussian monarchy. His haste produced a very favourable impression on public opinion. By the bedside of the dying Queen he was the loving and respectful grandson, to her mourning family the affectionate nephew and cousin. In the Isle of Wight, through the streets of London, and at the final scene at Windsor, he followed her funeral on foot or on horseback by the side of the new King of England. The day after the funeral he left England after a fortnight's visit, amidst the cheers of the crowd.

There could be no doubt that the new sovereign would be very different from the old Queen, whose long reign had at last ended. She had wished him to be known as Albert I, in memory of her husband. But when the Prince ascended the throne, he dropped the

name Albert with its hateful recollections of a Puritan education and chose among his other names the old Saxon name of Edward. We are told that he at once ordered the demolition of the cairn which Queen Victoria had erected to the notorious and absurd memory of John Brown, her favourite servant. Already nearly sixty years old King Edward was a man of pleasure, with the thick face, protruding eyes, and violent passions of his race; wherever society takes its amusement, he was a well-known figure, at casinos where the play is for high stakes, at race meetings and at those international watering places where he was the arbiter of fashion. There were complaints that he had admitted into his circle of intimates, otherwise very exclusive, a number of wealthy financiers, often Jews, who no doubt had brought weighty arguments in support of their claims. Moreover, his conduct had caused at times an undesirable amount of scandal. At the time, the middle classes, highly sensitive to anything which might bring discredit upon the established institutions of the country, had been shocked, but for the same reason they were now anxious to bury the past and to take for granted that, once on the throne, the new King would deserve the respect which no one would refuse the sovereign. And after all was there no excuse for the youthful indiscretions of the man who, for so many years, had been regarded as essentially the Prince of Wales? The old Queen, a born despot, prevented by the firm barrier of British institutions and customs from exercising control over public affairs, had taken her revenge by bullying her entire entourage, her family, her guests, her servants. Was it surprising that her son sought elsewhere the money his mother refused

him, and that excluded from public affairs and treated like a child at the age of forty and fifty, he had indulged in the irresponsible pranks of a boy?

In any case, he was now King. In the past his sympathies had been with France and Russia against Germany. But that was in the days of his youth; of recent years, his attitude had changed. Always a professed Liberal, he clearly showed that he belonged to the group of Liberal imperialists. His great friend, the statesman whom he valued most highly, was Lord Rosebery, the most determined opponent of France among the British politicians. Between 1895 and 1899 there had been a complete rupture between the Emperor William and himself. But they had been reconciled during William II's visit to Windsor in November 1899 and if, in the course of the following year, the Emperor annoyed his uncle by the military advice which he lavished upon him in a tone of condescending pity, his visit of January 1901 consolidated the friendship revived a year before. King Edward had long private conversations with the Emperor, who for a time was more popular at Windsor than he had ever been. A worthy descendant of the Great Elector and Frederick II, he made, we are told, suggestions which were adopted, for the reform on the Prussian model, of certain details of the British uniform.

There was therefore nothing in the change of sovereign to jeopardise the good relations between England and Germany. And there were other circumstances which may well have helped to improve them. If, at the time of the Queen's death, Lord Salisbury was still Prime Minister, he was no longer Foreign Secretary. The Cabinet had been remodelled in the previous

autumn and Lord Lansdowne had exchanged the War Office for the Foreign Office. It was a double triumph for the partisans of an understanding with Germany. For since 1895 Lord Salisbury had been a stubborn opponent of the policy; Lord Lansdowne, on the contrary, who belonged to the same group of Liberal Unionists as Chamberlain and the Duke of Devonshire, had no sooner reached the Foreign Office than he made it known that he wished to re-open negotiations with the German government for a closer understanding. The negotiations had already begun when the German emperor landed in England on January 20.[1] They were continued after his departure. Their primary object was the settlement of the Morocco question which had been raised already in 1899, and the terms of a partition were discussed. England might have Tangiers and the control of the Mediterranean sea-board, Germany receiving Rabat, Casablanca and Mogador. In addition the possibility was explored of a formal treaty of alliance on the following terms. If Germany were at war with a single foreign Power, England would not intervene, but if she were at war with two powers, England would come to her assistance.[2] Berlin put forward demands which the British government found impossible and which were probably made in the expectation that they would be rejected. The negotiations were, therefore, finally broken off. But, with the encouragement of the German government, the preliminary discussions had been

[1] Freiherr von Eckardstein *Lebenserrinerungen und Politische Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. pp. 235 sqq.

[2] Freiherr von Eckardstein, *Lebenserrinerungen und Politische Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. pp. 274 sqq. *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvii. pp. 1 sqq.

accompanied by similar negotiations with the Japanese government, and it was not with Germany, but with Japan, that England signed a treaty of alliance on February 12, 1902.[1] The treaty was framed on the model of the draft treaty with Germany of the previous summer, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance cannot have been regarded unfavourably at Berlin, for it irretrievably embroiled England with the Franco-Russian group of powers. In fact the Russian government began once more to sound the German as to the possibility of a great continental alliance against Britain.[2] Germany refused, as she had always done since 1896.

Growth of anti-German Feeling

But in the interval between the failure of the negotiations with Germany and the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, an incident, in itself absurdly unimportant, suddenly opened the eyes of the British public to the intensity of the German anglophobia. In a speech at Edinburgh on October 23 Chamberlain had informed his audience that, to put an end to the guerilla warfare in South Africa, England might possibly find herself compelled to have recourse to severer measures of repression. " If that time comes, we can find precedents for anything we may do in the action

[1] For the circumstances under which the negotiations with Japan were grafted into the negotiations with Germany, see Freiherr von Eckardstein, *Lebenserrinerungen und Politische Denkwürdigkeiten*, vol. ii. pp. 360 sqq. *The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi*, 1915, chs. iv. and v. (pp. 114 sqq.). Also Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, November 9, 1901 (*British Documents*, vol. ii. pp. 73 sqq.)—Cf.: A., vol. I. p. 260: Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Lansdowne, August 20, 1901.)

[2] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. xvii. pp. 152 sqq. See especially Holstein's note March 15, 1902 (ibid. pp. 175 sqq.).

of those nations who now criticise our 'barbarity' and 'cruelty,' but whose example in Poland, in the Caucasus, in Algeria, in Tongking, in Borneo, in the Franco-German war—whose example we have never even approached!" The French and Russian press appear to have received with a philosophic indifference attacks to which they had become accustomed, but the inclusion of Germany in the same condemnation as the other continental powers aroused on the other side of the North Sea such a violent outcry,[1] that von Bulow judged it necessary to intervene to satisfy public opinion. Speaking in the Reichstag on January 8, 1902 he replied to Chamberlain with the words of Frederick the Great "Leave this man alone, he is biting granite." "I do not give lessons to a Foreign Minister," retorted Chamberlain, "and I will not accept any at his hands." [2]

The episode produced a strange effect on British opinion. Undercurrents of mistrust which the German policy had aroused, but which, hitherto, had been submerged by incompatible or contradictory sentiments, rose suddenly to the surface. It is no doubt curious that the incident had been occasioned and von Bulow's rejoinder provoked by the statesman who had conceived the ambitious project of a panteutonic alliance. Henceforward the isolation of Germany became a favourite topic of the British press. Sometimes the

[1] It is difficult to understand at first why the German government took up so warmly an attack which equally concerned the other powers. But Chamberlain's speech had followed a campaign in the *Times* against the atrocities committed by Germany in 1870–1. See the letters in the issue of September 3 and 6, signed "Memor," which had provoked replies from the German press.

[2] Speech at Birmingham, January 11, 1902.

writer was content to state it as a fact [1] and explain it as the natural result of the blunders and insolence of German foreign policy. But it was also presented as the object which British policy should deliberately pursue. The *National Review* under the vigorous editorship of Leo Maxse, whose tendencies hitherto had been anti-French, now began to advocate a radical change in the British policy towards France. It would be interesting to know the names of the contributors, obviously well informed, who writing under the signatures A.B.C. etc. opened the campaign in November and December. They advocated, in opposition to Germany, a rapprochement with Russia and, indirectly, with France.[2] " Great Britain is confronted with the

[1] See the cartoon in *Punch,* December 25, 1901. It depicts a ballroom. The Czar Nicholas is dancing with Madame France, " Britannia with her Colonies." Alone and leaning against a doorpost the Emperor William is twisting his moustache. He is annoyed that he cannot find a partner. Underneath are the words: *Britannia:* After all, my dear, we needn't trouble ourselves about the others. *Colonies:* No, we can always dance together, you and I.

[2] *British Foreign Policy* by " A.B.C., etc." *Some Consequences of an Anglo-Russian Understanding,* by " A.B.C., etc." (*National Review,* vol. xxxviii.pp. 343 sqq., 513 sqq.). Cf. in the January number the article entitled *A Plea for the Isolation of Germany,* signed C.P. (*National Review,* vol. xxxviii. p. 703 sqq.). See especially p. 713: " Combat . . . German Anglophobia, I would say, by working all round at the isolation of Germany. Bring home to her the perils of her detestable geographical position between France, watching for a *revanche,* and Russia at the head of irreconcilable Slavism." Ogniben, *Great Britain and Germany* (*Contemporary Review,* February, 1902, vol. lxxi. pp. 153 sqq.) an anti-German article. The writer's conclusion, however, is not easy to follow: " Because Germany is resolved to be our enemy, it does not follow that any other European State is suitable or needful as an ally. The truth is—and it takes a long time to dawn on the minds of British politicians—that a World-Power like ours should be able to treat the question of friendships and alliances on the mainland of Europe as devoid of actuality. Having duly shaped our relations with other World-Powers, Russia and the United States, courtesy, firmness and aloofness should mark our dealings with all the other States. Self-sufficiency is an essential

development of a new sea power, founded on the same economic basis as herself and impelled by a desire to be supreme. But *l'ocean ne comporte qu'un seul maître.* We have secured in the past the sovereignty of the seas and our sceptre cannot be wrested from us without a desperate and bloody struggle." On the whole, we shall return to the question later,[1] the evidence points to the group of Liberal imperialists as responsible for the conception of this new policy—the reversal of the policy pursued since 1898. What else

characteristic of a World Empire. Much, very much, remains to be done before that stage of 'splendid isolation' can be reached." Cf. the article by Archibald Ross Colquhoun entitled *Our German Ally* (*Monthly Review,* January, 1902, vol. vi. pp. 73 sqq.). Chalcas who for the past eighteen months had conducted in the *Fortnightly Review* an anti-German and pro-Russian campaign, *Crux of Foreign Policy* (August 1900)—*Why not a treaty with Russia?* (October, 1900)—*Will England Last the Century?* (January, 1901)—*Will Germany Fail?* (May, 1901)—*Russia and Her Problems* (June and July, 1901), was encouraged by the article in the *National Review* to go further in the same direction. See his article entitled *The Crisis with Germany—and its Results* (December 1, 1901, vol, lxx, pp. 934 sqq.) And when certain French journalists complained that Chalcas had omitted their country from his calculations he wrote, to satisfy them, an article entitled *The Revival of France* (May 1, 1902) vol. lxxi. pp. 785 sqq.) in which he advocated a rapprochement with France at the same time as a rapprochement with Russia.. The historian would give a good deal to discover the identity of these pseudonymous writers. See also on this press campaign, Jacques Bardoux, *Essai d'une psychologie de l'Angleterre contemporaine. Les Crises politiques. Protectionisme et Radicalisme,* pp. 106 sqq.

[1] See below, p. 214, Lord Grey of Fallodon in his *Reminiscences* (*Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916,* 2 vols., 1925) says nothing of any steps he may have taken during the Boer war to advocate a better understanding with France. But he relates (vol. i. p. 53) a sarcastic remark by Lord Rosebery about his French "friends," which is extremely significant. Lord Rosebery must be excepted from the conclusion in the text. He remained to the end in favour of an understanding with Germany. Nevertheless even he was disagreeably impressed about this time by the account which his son who had gone to Germany to finish his education gave him of the state of feeling which prevailed there. (Count von Bulow to Count Metternich, March 13, 1902; *Die Grosse Politik,* vol. xvii. p. 151 and footnote.)

should we expect from the operation of the party system? In their zeal for imperial expansion the Liberal imperialists vied with the followers of Chamberlain. On what point then could they oppose the policy of the government? They could not, like the political heirs of Gladstone, entirely renounce a policy of alliances. They must therefore devise a new system directed against a different Power.

We do not, of course, mean to ascribe the formation of this body of opinion hostile to Germany to the Edinburgh speech and the explosion which it produced.

The incident could only provoke an explosion, because the train had already been laid. In fact, five or six years before, public opinion had begun to take alarm at the threat to British manufacture and commerce from German competition, and it was obvious that the new German naval programme must completely transform the balance of power. Of these two factors, which exercised the more powerful influence over the public mind at the opening of 1902?

In the first place, we must remember that the competition between German and British trade was not so menacing to the latter in 1902, as it had been six years earlier when the Unionists took office. In Britain the depression of the previous years had been followed by a boom, whereas the forced growth of German industry had produced a very serious crisis. Moreover, public opinion had fully supported the persistent attempt which the government had made during the interval to effect a military alliance with Germany. And if there was a country whose industrial competition was of a nature to alarm the British, it was not Germany but

the United States.[1] The formation of the gigantic Steel Trust and its absorption of an important British steamship company and several minor companies was of ill-omen for the future of British trade. However, the anxiety it caused did not betray itself by any outbreak of hostility to America in the press, and the government could pursue without opposition from public opinion their policy of friendship and benevolence towards the United States. In 1901 Great Britain, after discussions which lasted a year and in which the attitude of the American Senate had been as disagreeable as ever, left the United States complete liberty to dig and administer the projected Panama Canal and gave up all the safeguards which America had accepted by a formal treaty fifty years earlier. The historian must be careful not to exaggerate the economic explanation of history.

It was very different with the naval question. This was beyond all doubt the decisive factor which determined the breach between the two nations. In 1895 Germany had only possessed a third class navy. The great naval law of 1901 proclaimed her intention to provide herself with a fleet inferior only to the British and capable of proving a match even for the British

[1] W. J. Ashley *The Tariff Problem*, 1903, pp. 197 sqq.: "The question of the future is not German and English competition so much as American competition with both countries. Germany and England are naturally marked out to be friends by their position in face of the United States and Russia. And if Germany seeks to secure an outlet for her population in distant possessions worth having, e.g., in Mesopotamia—if she seeks to secure by treaty a permanent trade with the German people of Southern Brazil, it is difficult to see why this country should not watch her efforts with benevolent neutrality." This however is the opinion of a solitary individual, and it is very significant that his contention, though from the purely economic standpoint extremely plausible, was not shared by any other British writer of the period.

navy, if not all over the world, at least in the North Sea. Her latest men-of-war, though as yet few in number, but whose rapid increase in the near future had been announced to the world, were remarkable for the excellence of their construction and the quality of their crews. So long as the Boer War continued, the army, for once, eclipsed the navy in the interest of Parliament and Press, but now when the war was approaching its end we are not surprised to find an entire group of naval experts—Lord Charles Beresford, Arnold White and Archibald Hurd [1]—drawing the attention of the public to the new threat to Great Britain constituted by the German navy. They demanded more modern methods of training for the officers, the establishment of a naval base in the North Sea, a better distribution of the squadrons. If fewer ships were stationed in the Mediterranean, a larger number could be concentrated in home waters.[2] Did these experts also advocate an understanding with Russia and France as a counterpoise to the naval power of Germany? On this point the state of public opinion about the end of the Boer war is difficult to analyse. Although it was obviously impossible to continue for very

[1] Archibald S. Hurd, *The British Fleet. Is it sufficient and efficient?* With an introduction by Admiral the Hon. Sir Edmund R. Freemantle, 1901—*Naval Efficiency. The War Readiness of the Fleet—Lists and Particulars of effective ships of the World's Navies*, 1902—Arnold White, *Efficiency and Empire*, 1901, pp. 294 sqq. *The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford* written by himself, 1914, vol. ii. p. 479.

[2] Already the Admiralty had quietly taken the following measures to protect the coast. 1. The reserve squadron had been transformed into a real squadron, in which every ship was ready to go into action. 2. The four training ships had been, or would shortly be, replaced by six armoured cruisers which in an emergency could be employed as a squadron on active service (Archibald S. Hurd, *Naval Efficiency*, 1902, pp. 78–9).

long to maintain, as in 1902, a navy costing as much, or almost as much, as the four navies of France, Russia, Germany and Italy [1] there is no evidence that anybody in professional circles had as yet faced the inevitable. Both the French and the Russian governments were speeding up their programme of naval construction, the French invention of the submarine was beginning to disturb the Admiralty, and the colonial policy of the two allies remained the same. Under these circumstances how was it possible to abandon the principle that the navy must be kept at a sufficient strength to be a match for the combined French and Russian fleets? [2] And if the principle were to be maintained, the most reasonable policy was clearly an understanding with the German government, if not with the German people, provided the former was sufficiently enlightened to understand the value of British friendship and keep in check its subjects' anti-British feeling? Under these circumstances, we can well believe that neither the Foreign Office nor the Admiralty encouraged this outbreak of hostility towards Germany, that, on the contrary, Chamberlain's quarrel with Berlin embarrassed the Foreign Office, as much as his attacks on other Powers a few years before. The change of feeling which occurred during the winter months of 1901–2

[1] H. of C., March 21, 1901, February 26, 1902, E. Robertson's Speech (*Parl. Deb.*, 4th Ser., vol. xci. p. 779, vol. ciii, p. 925).

[2] Arnold White, *Efficiency and Empire*, 1901, p. 275: "German efficiency has already secured a formidable and homogeneous fleet . . . Germany has already stretched out the trident. Neither France nor Russia is impatient to assist us to recover the supremacy which we have listlessly allowed to slip from our hands." Archibald S. Hurd, *The British Fleet*, 1901, pp. 62–3 is content to remark that: "While the first importance attaches to the navies of the French and the Russians, it is impossible to ignore the vast sums which are being laid out in Germany and in the United States."

and whose fundamental cause was certainly the threat offered to British naval supremacy by the German navy took place outside official or professional circles. It was a reaction of that vague entity called public opinion, a reply of British feeling to German, a revolt of the public against the caution of the government departments.

Peace with the Boer Republics. The Coronation

On June 1, 1902 peace was concluded with the Boers. The first attempt at negotiation had begun long before, when, immediately after the occupation of Pretoria, Louis Botha had approached Lord Roberts. But the latter, who believed that the Boers could not possibly hold out any longer, had demanded unconditional surrender and the war had continued. In 1901 official conversations had been held. But they failed and on August 7th the Commander-in-chief issued a proclamation sentencing to perpetual banishment from South Africa any Boer officer of whatever rank who had failed to surrender by September 15. The proclamation seemed a final barrier to further negotiations. Nevertheless, when in the spring of 1902, the Queen of Holland proposed that they should be re-opened, not only were preliminary discussions begun between the representatives of the British government—Sir Alfred, now Lord, Milner and Sir Herbert, now Lord, Kitchener—and the accredited representatives of the Boer republics, but the readiness with which the suggestion was welcomed was a guarantee that this time the negotiations would not break down.

Is it reasonable to suppose that when Chamberlain agreed to re-open the discussions he yielded to pressure from King Edward? In default of evidence we are not entitled to affirm it. But we may well believe that, on the one hand, the King was anxious that peace should be concluded before his approaching coronation, and, on the other, that in his previous attitude Chamberlain had been influenced by the avowed political representative of his policy in South Africa, Lord Milner. The latter, an administrator rather than a diplomat, who put his faith in force, had welcomed the idea that the Boers were rebels, not belligerents, and that any negotiations with them were therefore legally inadmissible. Lord Kitchener on the other hand had long been eager to finish with the war. He had no love for the vast army of amateurs, hastily improvised, of which he had been compelled to take command.[1] He was annoyed by the way in which Lord Roberts, having plucked the laurels of an easy victory, had left him to do the dirty work, a thankless task, the more so, because no one in Europe appeared to realise its difficulty. He blamed Lord Milner for the failure of the negotiations of the previous spring [2] and was determined this time to overcome his opposition. His success was the easier be-

[1] To Lady Cranborne, March, 1900: "We are still here" [at Bloemfontein]: "It is very disappointing, but it is quite impossible to calculate on anything in this army. I must say, I like having the whole thing cut and dried and worked out; but people here do not seem to look upon the war sufficiently seriously. It is considered too much like a game of polo with intervals for afternoon tea." (Sir George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, vol. i. pp. 312–3.)

[2] A. Brodrick, March 22, 1901: "I did all in my power to urge Milner to change his views, which on this subject" (the question of an amnesty) "seem to me very narrow. Milner's views may be strictly just, but they are to my mind vindictive." (Sir George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, vol. ii. pp. 21–2.)

cause he had behind him the practically unanimous opinion of the British nation. The peace of Vereeniging was a typically English peace, inspired from beginning to end by the spirit which buries old scores.[1]

The Boers of the Orange and the Transvaal renounced their independence. But an undertaking was given that those burghers who should surrender or were already prisoners, should return to their farms and should be left in full possession of their property and personal freedom. They would not even be obliged to surrender their arms. The Boers were guaranteed the use of Dutch in the schools and courts of law. At the earliest possible date the military was to be replaced by a civil administration and, as soon as circumstances permitted, representative government set up. Many in England had hoped that the cost of the war would be defrayed by a tithe on the produce of the goldfields. These expectations were not realised by the treaty of Vereeniging. Not only did a clause in the treaty formally provide that no tax on real estate should be levied either in the Transvaal or the Orange River Colony to defray the cost of the war, but the British agreed to pay £3,000,000 for the restoration of the farms destroyed in the course of hostilities, and if that amount should

[1] For a good account of the Vereeniging negotiations, see Sir George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, vol. ii. pp. 90 sqq. See especially pp. 93 sqq.: Lord Kitchener's despatch of May 21 in which he sets out his differences with Lord Milner on the financial clauses of the treaty. See also J. D. Kestell, *Through Shot and Flame. The Adventures and Experiences of — Chaplain to President Steyn and General Christian De Wet*, 1903, pp. 273 sqq. See also in Lord Shaw of Dunfermline's *Letters to Isabel*, 1921, pp. 202–3, the account of a remarkable interview between Lord Kitchener and General Smuts which seems to have decided the Boers to sign the treaty, and in Henry W. Nevinson's *Changes and Chances*, pp. 318–9, the story of an equally remarkable interview with Milner on May 27.

prove too little, a loan was promised on extremely generous terms. When in August the three Boer generals, Botha, Delarey and De Wet, visited London to settle further questions connected with the restoration of peace they were welcomed by the noisy cheers of the crowd.

The little war, begun so light-heartedly, had lasted thirty-one months. It had cost £250,000,000. It had been found necessary to send out to the other end of the world 450,000 troops, of whom 22,000 never returned.[1] Nevertheless, the final victory seemed enough to save the credit of a Cabinet which, during the last year of the war, had made itself unpopular by its carelessness and sloth and by the manner, too cool in all conscience, in which it counted on patience and time to supply the admitted lack of method and ability. The internal dissensions which weakened the Liberal party and which the war had only aggravated, encouraged the government in the belief that in spite of the difficulties which several serious problems of internal policy were likely to cause, it would be a long time yet before the Opposition was ready to take their place. And for the next three months a succession of excitements blinded the public to the weariness left by a strain of almost three years.

The coronation had been fixed for June 26. But the King's health was bad. It was believed, indeed he

[1] Official figures. Total number of troops on service in South Africa: 448,725, classified as follows: Regular Army 256,340. Militia of the United Kingdom, Yeomanry, Volunteers 109,048. Colonial contingents 30,333. Troops raised in South Africa 52,414. Slain 5,774. Deaths from wounds or sickness 16,168. Wounded 22,829. Sent back to the base 75,430. (*Times' History of the Boer War*, vol. vi. p. 279.) Cf. *Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa*, p. 35 (where a different method of classification is adopted).

believed himself, that he was suffering from a cancer, and he looked forward with dread to the terrible fate of his brother-in-law, the Emperor Frederick. On the eve of June 26th the arrangements were countermanded, since an immediate operation had been declared necessary. It was performed; the disease was found not to be of the malignant nature which had been feared and King Edward's recovery was so rapid that the Coronation could take place on August 9 with the customary ceremonial. It was a brilliant pageant which revived the imperial pomps of 1887 and 1897, and its effect on the spectators was enhanced by the fact that, owing to the length of the previous reign, only octogenarians could remember the last coronation. Edward VIII was proclaimed King not only " of the United Kingdom and Ireland " but also " of the British dominions over the seas " and not only King but Emperor—" Emperor of India." An imperial style, calculated to impress the world. But the diplomatic situation continued to give cause for anxiety. When a great naval review was held in Portsmouth Harbour in which a hundred ships manned by 30,000 sailors took part, only four foreign men-of-war came to pay their respects to the new King—two Japanese, one Italian and one Portuguese.

A colonial conference followed. The number of colonial premiers present had been reduced by the union of the six Australian governments in a single confederation, the Commonwealth of Australia. The same questions were discussed which had always come up since 1887. How far was it possible to obtain from the colonies a formal agreement by which they bound themselves to take their share in imperial defence?

Canada refused to make any financial contribution towards the increase of the British navy, and the contributions offered by the other self-governing colonies were very small. Not a single colony would consent to incorporate any portion of its forces in the imperial army. How far, moreover, was it possible to unite Great Britain and her colonies in an imperial federation? The colonies undertook to make certain reductions in their tariffs in favour of British imports. They would not offer more, so long as England, bound by the dogma of absolute free trade, refused their imports a reciprocal preference.

Arthur Balfour Prime Minister. The Emperor William in England. The Venezuelan Embroglio. The Anglo-German Rupture

Meanwhile, the Foreign Office continued to struggle against the Russian penetration of Persia and the French penetration of Morocco. In July, Lord Salisbury had definitely resigned. Arthur Balfour succeeded him as Prime Minister. The Duke of Devonshire had been passed over. Was this a deliberate rebuff to the partisans of an understanding with Germany? There is no proof of it. If the tension between the two peoples was more acute than ever, diplomatic relations between the two governments continued to be extremely friendly and a series of official gestures showed the intention of both parties that they should remain so. The Prince of Wales' visit to Germany in January was followed in April by a visit of the Duke of Cambridge to Hamburg to be present at the unveil-

ing of a statue of the Empress Frederick, and in September the Secretary for War, Saint-John Brodrick and the Commander-in-chief, Lord Roberts, who, a year before, had been decorated with the Black Eagle by William II, attended officially the great German manœuvres. Then William proposed a visit to Edward VII. He landed in England on November 8.

The following day he was at Sandringham. He stayed there until the 15th engaged in the customary ritual of a royal visit. He shot wild duck, pheasants and partridges; planted trees to commemorate his visit; was present at the performance of a little drama by Conan Doyle called " A Story of Waterloo." On this occasion his chancellor Bulow did not accompany him, but Count von Eulenburg was with him, and he had conversations with the Prime Minister, Chamberlain and Lord Lansdowne. On November 15 he left for the North where he was Lord Lonsdale's guest at Lowther Castle for four days, and spent some hours with Lord Rosebery at Dalmeny. On the 20th he sailed from Queensferry. Meanwhile the King of Portugal had arrived at Windsor on the 19th where he stayed until the 24th.

The Emperor's official reception had been brilliant; the attitude of the public extremely hostile. It was very different now from what it had been during his two earlier visits, when England was passing through difficult times. Even before he landed a chorus of protest had been raised in the press.

Among the Unionist papers, the *Daily Telegraph*, which was supposed to reflect the views of the Chamberlainites, was polite, and the *Saturday Review* conspicuous for its moderate language. But the *Standard*,

the organ of the old Tory party, addressed severe warnings to the Emperor, and the violence of the *Times*, *Morning Post*, *Daily Mail* and *Globe* knew no bounds. No one, it is true, contested the high personal merit of the royal visitor. At this period he was universally regarded as a man of outstanding ability. But what were his intentions? Was there to be further talk of an alliance? The principle of the balance of power forbade England ever to tie her hands by a treaty. She must keep herself free to crush whatever nation appeared at that particular juncture " the greater menace to Europe." [1]

On the Liberal side, the *Westminster Gazette*, it is true, uttered a warning against exchanging the Gallophobia of the preceding years for a hatred of Germany equally dangerous to the peace of the world.[2] But the *Daily Chronicle*, the mouthpiece of the Liberal Imperialists, surpassed all the other newspapers in the violence of its attacks, delivered at the very moment when the Emperor William was the guest of their leader Lord Rosebery at Dalmeny. It was not satisfied with political arguments to prove the danger of a German alliance, it entertained its readers [3] with ludicrous stories of all the Emperor's previous visits to the British court, beginning with the long forgotten occasion when, at the mature age of four, the mischievous " imp " bit the calves of the little Princes Arthur and Leopold in the Royal Chapel at Windsor. The *Daily News*, the semi-official organ of the Opposition, claimed to know every detail of the plot being hatched between the

[1] *Morning Post*, October 31, 1902.
[2] *Westminster Gazette*, November 10, 21.
[3] *Daily Chronicle*, November 7.

British and German governments. It connected the Emperor's visit to Sandringham with the King of Portugal's visit to Windsor, and asserted that the British government wished to obtain the assent of Germany to an agreement which it was making with Portugal in regard to Delagoa Bay. It was rumoured that Germany with French support was asking in return for the evacuation of Shanghai. Was this, it asked, the result of Chamberlain's policy? It was high time that Balfour made up his mind to shake off the yoke.[1]

Disconcerted by the outcry, the government thought it necessary to reassure the public. Speaking on November 10 at the Guildhall banquet Arthur Balfour protested against the " fantastic inventions " occasioned by the imperial visit. The interview, he assured his hearers, had not been in any way concerned with politics. The Emperor's visit had been merely an unofficial visit to " his nearest relatives." But if the public were relieved of their fears for the moment, their indignation was the greater when, on December 7, they were informed that England and Germany after sending a fruitless ultimatum to the Republic of Venezuela were establishing a joint blockade of the Venezuelan coast, and that British and German cruisers were actually capturing or sinking Venezuelan gun boats.

We remember that seven years before, when the Unionists took office, there had been a Venezuelan question. We remember also that it had been finally

[1] *Daily News,* November 10. For the *Daily News* Chamberlain is the object of suspicion, and the *Times,* though throwing doubt on the *Daily News* revelations, relates a very animated discussion between the Emperor and Chamberlain on the morning of the 9th. For the interview, which bore very little resemblance to the imaginations of the press, see William's letter to Bulow of November 12, 1902 (*Die Grosse Politik,* vol. xvii. pp. 115–6).

settled by arbitration, and that, ever since, Great Britain had been determined to avoid even the semblance of a conflict with the United States, and that during the Spanish American war the British Press had been unanimous in hailing the victories of the United States, as being not so much American victories as victories of the Anglo-Saxon race. This attitude was a bid in advance for American sympathy with any successes British imperialism might achieve elsewhere. And now Balfour and Lord Lansdowne were upsetting the delicate balance of this mighty combination, a combination not so much political, as sentimental. Though President Roosevelt's attitude was far more moderate than Cleveland's had been in 1895, the mere shadow of danger to the country's good relations with the United States was sufficient to arouse general alarm. Moreover, what were the conditions under which the naval demonstration had been made? France, Italy and the United States had grievances against President Castro similar to those of England and Germany. But Germany was the only power which had taken part in the demonstration—Germany, whose grievances seemed less solid than those of any other nation, Germany, which was widely believed, and especially in the United States, to entertain the design of planting a colony somewhere on the South American coast, Germany, eager to display her new navy to the world. Was it well done of England to help her, and moreover, before the eyes of the whole world, to realise her desire? The outcry in the press was even louder than it had been in November. The *Times* published a letter from Sir Robert Giffen whose heading "The Venezuelan Mess" caught the public fancy. "Ger-

many," he wrote, " is a false partner, as Austria-Hungary found out in the Schleswig-Holstein business. Our own experience in China lately has been by no means satisfactory. Germany is also our deadly rival and means an attack upon England at a convenient opportunity." [1] And the same paper published a poem, more violent than even Sir Robert Giffen's letter, in which Rudyard Kipling charged the Government with lying, almost with treason:

> Last night, ye wrote, our voyage was done
> But seaward still we go;
> And ye tell us now of a secret vow
> Ye have made with an open foe! [2]

The previous month, certain Liberal organs attempted to restrain public feeling by protesting, as we have seen, against the excessive hatred towards Germany displayed by the remainder of the press. This time they swelled the chorus. Nowhere was the cause

[1] *Times*, December 20, 1902.
[2] *Times*, December 22, 1902. In the lines which follow, the poet unburdens himself of the bitterness accumulated during the three years of the Boer War:

> That we must lie off a lightless coast
> And haul and tack and veer,
> At the will of the breed that have wronged us most,
> For a year and a year and a year.
>
> The dead they mocked are scarcely cold.
> Our wounds are bleeding yet,
> And ye tell us now that our strength is sold
> To help them press for a debt!

It is a curious fact that both Sir Robert Giffen's letter and Kipling's poem were printed by the *Times* in small type, as though the Conservative organ were afraid the expression of public resentment might endanger the Government.

of Anglo-American friendship held more sacred than among the pacifist intelligentsia which led the Liberal party, and who, if they would not support even a war against Germany, were still more opposed to a war waged, in central America or elsewhere, as her ally. And the Liberal imperialists, delighted to find the Party for once united on a matter of foreign policy after long years of dissension, were unwearied in their attacks upon the Cabinet. Foremost among the politicians who were demanding that the understanding with Germany should be brought to an end were Sir Edward Grey and Haldane.

On February 6 Sir Edward Grey, addressing a public meeting, declared himself unable to attach unreserved credit to the assurance given by the government that there existed no alliance or secret understanding with the German government. Had not such a pact been quite recently Chamberlain's avowed policy? Though he wished England to remain on friendly terms with Germany, it must not be at the cost of good relations with France or Russia, and still less with the United States. Ten days later, on the very eve of the new session, Haldane took the chair at a meeting at which members of every party were on the platform, among them Leo Maxe, the editor of the *National Review*. The object of the meeting was to demand a squadron in the North Sea and a naval base on the East Coast. When the session opened, it was plain that the ponderous administrative machine had at last been set in motion. The Cabinet, disavowed by its own supporters and attacked by the Opposition, adopted several new measures. A Council of Defence was formed composed of four Cabinet ministers and four

members holding high command in the Army and Navy: the Council had as a matter of fact been promised for more than six months. The Budget provided for an enormous expenditure on the navy. As the *Times* pointed out, never before, either in peace or during war, had the naval estimates been so high. What did these preparations portend? They were bound up with a further measure, in conformity, as we have just seen, with the unanimous wish of the House, which occasioned no debate in Parliament, no comment in the press. On the eve of the day when the naval estimates came before Parliament Arthur Balfour announced the Government's intention to establish a new naval base on the North Sea at the entrance of the Firth of Forth. It was obvious that in the opinion of the Admiralty the danger to British naval supremacy was no longer from the traditional foe, to be met in the Channel. It was on the Norfolk coast that an invasion was now feared, and under the cover of a fleet which would not be French.

THE NEW PELICANS

March 1939

A 41 WE EUROPEANS.....Julian Huxley, A. C. Haddon, and A. M. Carr-Saunders

A 42 THE BASES OF MODERN SCIENCE .....J. W. N. Sullivan

A 43 INTRODUCING SHAKESPEARE .....G. B. Harrison

A 44 THINKING TO SOME PURPOSE.....L. Susan Stebbing

A 45 THE ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE.....Josiah Wedgwood

A 46 THE LETTERS OF GERTRUDE BELL (Part I)

A 47 BELIEF IN GOD .....Bishop Gore

A 48 LORD SHAFTESBURY .....J. L. & Barbara Hammond

A 49 MUTUAL AID.....P. Kropotkin

A 50 A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE (Epilogue: 1895-1906: Part I) Élie Halévy

LATEST "SPECIALS"

BRITAIN..... Mass-Observation

WHAT HITLER WANTS.....E. O. Lorimer

THEY BETRAYED CZECHOSLOVAKIA G. J. George

I WAS HITLER'S PRISONER....Stefan Lorant

CHINA STRUGGLES FOR UNITY J. M. D. Pringle

BETWEEN TWO WARS?....."Vigilantes"

Others Coming.

THE NEW PENGUINS

January 1939

181 AN INNKEEPER'S DIARY.....John Fothergill
182 NIGHT FLIGHT .....Antoine de Saint-Exupéry
183 THE FIGHT OF THE FIRECREST.....Alain Gerbault
184 SELECTED STORIES OF "SAKI"
185 CONFESSIONS OF A YOUNG MAN.....George Moore
186 PENANG APPOINTMENT .....Norman Collins
187 THE EGYPT'S GOLD.....David Scott
188 THE MURDER IN THE MAZE.....J. J. Connington
189 BUT SOFT: WE ARE OBSERVED .....Hilaire Belloc
190 DEATH OF MY AUNT .....C. H. B. Kitchin

March 1939

191 ORDINARY FAMILIES.....E. Arnot Robertson
192 BARNHAM RECTORY .....Doreen Wallace
193 SLEDGE.....Martin Lindsay
194 HELENE.....Vicki Baum
195 THE CITY OF BEAUTIFUL NONSENSE...E. Temple Thurston
196 FOUR PLAYS .....A. A. Milne
197 THE STORY OF AN AFRICAN FARM.....Olive Schreiner
198 AMATEUR ADVENTURE .....Gandar Dower
199 IN THE MIDST OF LIFE.....Ambrose Bierce
200 BACK TO METHUSELAH .....Bernard Shaw

PENGUIN BOOKS

COMPLETE LIST OF PUBLICATIONS TO THE END OF 1938

FICTION *orange covers*

"Bartimeus" — *A Tall Ship*
Arnold Bennett — *The Grand Babylon Hotel*
Algernon Blackwood — *The Centaur*
Phyllis Bottome — *Private Worlds*
Marjorie Bowen — *The Glen O'Weeping*
Ernest Bramah — *Kai Lung's Golden Hours*
Ann Bridge — *Peking Picnic*
Louis Bromfield — *The Strange Case of Miss Annie Spragg*
D. K. Broster — *Sir Isumbras at the Ford*
J. L. Campbell — *The Miracle of Peille*
G. K. Chesterton — *The Man Who Was Thursday*
Susan Ertz — *Madame Claire*
Now East, Now West
William Faulkner — *Soldiers' Pay*
E. M. Forster — *A Passage to India*
Leonhard Frank — *Carl and Anna*
Crosbie Garstin — *The Owls' House*
Stella Gibbons — *Cold Comfort Farm*
John Hampson — *Saturday Night at the Greyhound*
Ian Hay — *A Safety Match*
Robert Hichens — (2 *vols.*) *Paradine Case*
James Hilton — *Dawn of Reckoning*
Constance Holme — *The Lonely Plough*
Claude Houghton — *Chaos Is Come Again*
I Am Jonathan Scrivener
W. W. Jacobs — *Deep Waters*
M. R. James — *Ghost Stories of an Antiquary*
Sinclair Lewis — *Mantrap*
Rose Macaulay — *Crewe Train*
Denis Mackail — *Greenery Street*
Ethel Mannin — *Children of the Earth*
Ragged Banners
R. H. Mottram — *The Spanish Farm*
Beverley Nichols — *Self*
Liam O'Flaherty — *The Informer*
D. Kilham Roberts (editor) — *Penguin Parade* (1)
Penguin Parade (2)
Penguin Parade (3)
Penguin Parade (4)
E. Arnot Robertson — *Four Frightened People*
V. Sackville-West — *The Edwardians*
Ramon Sender — *Seven Red Sundays*
Graham Seton — *The W Plan*
Beatrice Kean Seymour — *Youth Rides Out*
Edward Shanks — (2 *vols.*) *Queer Street*
Ignazio Silone — *Fontamara*
Osbert Sitwell — *Before the Bombardment*
Somerville and Ross — *Some Experiences of an Irish R.M.*
Alan Steele (editor) — *Selected Modern Short Stories* (1)
Selected Modern Short Stories (2)
Ralph Straus — *The Unseemly Adventure*
Tchehov — *Tales from Tchehov*
Angela Thirkell — *Wild Strawberries*
Edward Thompson — *An Indian Day*
Ben Travers — *A Cuckoo in the Nest*
Hugh Walpole — *Mr. Perrin and Mr. Traill*
Sylvia Townsend Warner — *Lolly Willowes*
Evelyn Waugh — *Black Mischief*
Decline and Fall
Vile Bodies
Edith Wharton — *Ethan Frome*
P. G. Wodehouse — *My Man Jeeves*
E. H. Young — *William*
Francis Brett Young — *The Crescent Moon*

CRIME FICTION *green covers*

Anthony Armstrong — *Ten Minute Alibi*
H. C. Bailey — *Mr. Fortune, Please*
E. C. Bentley — *Trent's Last Case*
Anthony Berkeley — *The Piccadilly Murder*
Alice Campbell — *Spider Web*
John Dickson Carr — *It Walks by Night*
The Waxworks Murder
Agatha Christie — *The Murder on the Links*
The Mysterious Affair at Styles
G. D. H. and Margaret Cole — *Murder at Crome House*
J. J. Connington — *The Dangerfield Talisman*
Death at Swaythling Court
A. Conan Doyle — *The Hound of the Baskervilles*
John Ferguson — *The Man in the Dark*

[Contd.

Richard Keverne *The Havering Plot*
The Man in the Red Hat
The Sanfield Scandal
C. Daly King *Obelists at Sea*
Philip Macdonald *The Rasp*
Ngaio Marsh *Enter a Murderer*
A. A. Milne *The Red House Mystery*
John Rhode *The House on Tollard Ridge*
The Murders in Praed Street
Sax Rohmer *The Mystery of Dr. Fu-Manchu*
Dorothy L. Sayers
The Documents in the Case
W. Stanley Sykes *The Missing Moneylender*
Edgar Wallace *The Four Just Men*
H. G. Wells *The Invisible Man*

TRAVEL & ADVENTURE *cerise covers*

J. Johnston Abraham *The Surgeon's Log*
Edmund Blunden *Undertones of War*
F. S. Chapman *Watkins' Last Expedition*
Apsley Cherry-Garrard
(2 *vols.*) *The Worst Journey in the World*
Alexandra David-Neel
With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet
Anthony Fokker *Flying Dutchman*
Alfred Aloysius Horn *Trader Horn*
Anne Morrow Lindbergh
North to the Orient
C. A. W. Monckton
(2 *vols.*) *Some Experiences of a New Guinea Resident Magistrate*
J. M. Scott *The Land that God Gave Cain*
Captain von Rintelen *The Dark Invader*
Nora Waln *House of Exile*

BIOGRAPHY & MEMOIRS *dark blue covers*

H. C. Armstrong
Grey Wolf (Mustafa Kemal)
Lord of Arabia (Ibn Saud)
Margot Asquith (2 *vols.*) *Autobiography*
E. F. Benson *As We Were*
Charlton *"Charlton"*
Pamela Frankau *Find Four People*
B. H. Liddell Hart (2 *vols.*) *Foch*
Ethel Mannin *Confessions and Impressions*
André Maurois *Ariel*
Disraeli
Beverley Nichols *Twenty-Five*
Maurice O'Sullivan
Twenty Years A-Growing

MISCELLANEOUS *yellow covers*

Earl Baldwin *On England*
Francis and Vera Meynell (editors)
(2 *vols.*) *The Week-end Book*
Alexander Woollcott *While Rome Burns*

DRAMA *red covers*

THE PENGUIN SHAKESPEARE, edited by Dr. G. B. Harrison; these plays, each in a separate volume with special Notes and Introductions, are available so far:

Twelfth Night	*Henry the Fifth*
Hamlet	*As You Like It*
King Lear	*A Midsummer Night's Dream*
The Tempest	*The Merchant of Venice*
Richard II	*Romeo and Juliet*
Julius Caesar	*Henry IV (part 1)*
Macbeth	*Henry IV (part 2)*
Othello	*Much Ado About Nothing*
The Sonnets	*Antony and Cleopatra*

SEVEN FAMOUS ONE-ACT PLAYS, by Alfred Sutro, A. P. Herbert, Clifford Bax Stanley Houghton, W. W. Jacobs, J. A. Ferguson, and Oliphant Down.

[Contd.

ILLUSTRATED CLASSICS ★

Art Director: Robert Gibbings; Introductions by G. B. Harrison

Jane Austen *Pride and Prejudice* (illustrated by Helen Binyon)
Robert Browning *Selected Poems* (Iain Macnab)
Daniel Defoe (2 vols.) *Robinson Crusoe* (J. R. Biggs)
Richard Jefferies *The Story of My Heart* (Gertrude Hermes)
Herman Melville *Typee* (Robert Gibbings)
Edgar Allan Poe *Some Tales of Mystery and Imagination* (Douglas Percy Bliss)
Laurence Sterne *A Sentimental Journey* (Gwen Raverat)
Jonathan Swift *Gulliver's Travels* (Theodore Naish)
David Thoreau *Walden* (Ethelbert White)

PENGUIN SPECIALS

Norman Angell *The Great Illusion—Now*
The Duchess of Atholl *Searchlight on Spain*
Phyllis Bottome *The Mortal Storm*
Charlton, Garratt and Fletcher *The Air Defence of Britain*
G. T. Garratt *Mussolini's Roman Empire*
S. Grant Duff *Europe and the Czechs*
Louis Golding *The Jewish Problem*
Lord Londonderry *Ourselves and Germany*
W. M. Macmillan *Warning from the West Indies*
Edgar Mowrer *Germany Puts the Clock Back*
Mowrer in China
Wickham Steed *The Press*
Geneviève Tabouis *Blackmail or War*

PELICAN SPECIALS

Arnold Bennett *Literary Taste*
Anthony Bertram ★ *Design*
Arnold Haskell ★ *Ballet*
Robert Gibbings ★ *Blue Angels and Whales*

PELICAN BOOKS

light blue covers

F. L. Allen ★ (2 vols.) *Only Yesterday*
Clive Bell *Civilisation*
G. D. H. Cole *Practical Economics*
Socialism in Evolution
J. G. Crowther ★ (2 vols.) *An Outline of the Universe*
Dobrée and Manwaring *The Floating Republic*
J. H. Fabre ★ *Social Life in the Insect World*
Sigmund Freud *Totem and Taboo*
Psychopathology of Everyday Life
Roger Fry *Vision and Design*
J. B. S. Haldane *The Inequality of Man*
Élie Halévy (3 vols.) *A History of the English People in 1815*
G. B. Harrison (editor) *A Book of English Poetry*
Julian Huxley *Essays in Popular Science*
Sir James Jeans ★ *The Mysterious Universe*
R. S. Lambert (editor) ★ *Art in England*
H. J. Laski *Liberty in the Modern State*
H. J. and Hugh Massingham (editors) (2 vols.) *The Great Victorians*
W. J. Perry *The Growth of Civilisation*
Eileen Power ★ *Medieval People*
D. K. Roberts (editor) (2 vols.) *The Century's Poetry*
Bernard Shaw (2 vols.) *The Intelligent Woman's Guide*
Olaf Stapledon *Last and First Men*
J. W. N. Sullivan *Limitations of Science*
R. H. Tawney *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*
Beatrice Webb (2 vols.) *My Apprenticeship*
H. G. Wells *A Short History of the World*
A. N. Whitehead *Science and the Modern World*
Leonard Woolf *After the Deluge*
Virginia Woolf *The Common Reader*
Sir Leonard Woolley ★ *Ur of the Chaldees*
★ *Digging up the Past*

★ ILLUSTRATED

BOOKCASES



FOR YOUR PENGUINS

In response to hundreds of requests from readers who find their Penguins outgrowing their shelf space, we have designed a special Penguin bookcase on the unit principle —in four different sizes and four different styles. The construction is simple but well finished ; the corners are dovetailed, avoiding the use of unsightly nails or pins.

FOUR SIZES



FOUR STYLES

PLAIN PLYWOOD
PLAIN CEDAR
FLAT-PAINTED PLYWOOD
GLOSSY-PAINTED PLYWOOD

TWENTY COLOURS

Ivory	*Light green*	*Orchid*	*Jade green*
Primrose	*Light red*	*Chocolate*	*Medium green*
Medium blue	*Dark red*	*Maroon*	*Light grey*
Tangerine	*Royal blue*	*Dark brown*	*French blue*
Chestnut	*Canary*	*Ultra blue*	*Medium grey*

Prices

Sizes	B		D
PLAIN PLYWOOD	2/6	1/6	1/3	1/-
PLAIN CEDAR	5/-	3/-	2/6	2/-
PAINTED PLYWOOD	5/-	3/6	3/-	2/6

★ Orders should be placed through your local bookseller, but if you have any difficulty in obtaining these bookcases we shall be pleased to supply them direct (postage extra). Please make it quite clear which price and style you require. The plain plywood style can be supplied immediately from stock, but the cedar and the painted plywood styles would take about a week to deliver. Bookcases in other materials, such as Oak, Mahogany, etc., can also be supplied; prices on application.