
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A SURVEY OF

European Civilization


ARCTIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
ICELAND
FAROE ISLANDS
SHETLAND ISLANDS
ORKNEY ISLANDS
HEBRIDES
BRITISH ISLES
(LAPPS)
(FINNS)
(LETTS)
(POLES)
(CZECHS)
(MAGYARS)
(ROUMANS)
(BULGARIANS)
(TURKS)
(BERBERS)
Ural Mountains
Volga
Dnieper
Don
Danube
Rhine
Seine
Loire
Ebro
Tagus
Guadiana
Guadalquivir
Rhone
Po
Tiber
Elbe
Oder
Vistula
Niemen
White Sea
Gulf of Bothnia
Gulf of Finland
Gulf of Riga
Gulf of Danzig
Gulf of Lyons
Gulf of Venice
Gulf of Archangel
Sea of Azov
Bay of Biscay
Cantabrian Mts.
Pyrenees Mts.
Caucasus Mts.
Apennines
Balkan Mts.
Carpathian Mts.
Alps
Sea of Marmora
Dardanelles
Bosporus
Balearic Isles
Sardinia
Corsica
Sicily
Crete
Cyprus
Asia Minor
Aegean Sea
Adriatic Sea
Ionian Sea
Tyrrhenian Sea
Black Forest
Bohemian Highlands
Central Plains
South German Highlands
Lower German Plain
Pontus Steppe
Caspian Steppe
Longitude West 0° Longitude East 10° from Greenwich
PHYSICAL AND RACIAL MAP OF EUROPE
SCALE OF MILES
0 100 200 300 400 500
Names of races and peoples are enclosed in brackets ( )
Areas above 5,000 feet
" " 600
" below 600
" " sea level

TO

JOHN AND GRACE MUSSER

with admiration
and affection

Editor's Introduction

TEACHING and learning are most effectively conjoined when an alert and informed teacher engages in informal discussion with a small group of alert and informed students. If the subject be history, the students will on their own initiative and with mounting enthusiasm (it is an ideal we are describing) spend much of their time in the library, where they will be provided with tables and the necessary books for an independent study of the subject. Once or twice a week the professor will meet his pupils. In so small a group he may dispense with lectures — those exercises in which students assemble, and amiably and passively sit while the professor, with great advantage to himself, clarifies his ideas by oral discourse. The students also will have an opportunity to clarify their ideas by oral discourse. Teaching and learning will then be conjoined, as they always must be to be any way effective: professor and pupils, each according to his talent, will be both teachers and learners. This ideal system is often realized in the graduate school — in the graduate seminary. Under such ideal conditions, there is obviously no occasion for a textbook.

In our undergraduate colleges, textbooks are nevertheless everywhere in use, and even the professors regard them as indispensable. There are two good reasons for this insistence on the use of textbooks. One is that many students are incapable of studying any subject on their own initiative, but, being docile, they will do what they are told to do, and the simplest thing to tell them to do is to read, on successive Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays, successive chapters in a prescribed textbook. The second reason is that the facilities for studying history in the right way are commonly inadequate. If, some bright afternoon, all the students in philosophy, literature, and the social sciences should take it into their heads to invade the library in order to do what they are conventionally expected to do, there would scarcely be standing room for them, to say nothing about tables to work at; and the books and documents called for could be supplied by the distracted attendants to no more than a few of the first comers. The others would perforce turn away, sorrowing no doubt, with nothing for it but to review their lecture

notes and read the prescribed chapter in the textbook. As it is, most of them save time and avoid mental anguish by not going to the library in the first place. It is not wholly their fault. There is a limit to the obstacles that anyone will cheerfully surmount in order to obtain access to books. Hence the textbook is an indispensable substitute for books.

Accepting conditions as they find them, Professors Ferguson and Bruun have prepared these two volumes. Frankly designed to be used as textbooks, they are provided with the customary "select bibliographies" for such further study as the requirements of the instructor, the inclination of the students, and the facilities of the average college library may make desirable or possible. Nevertheless, knowing from experience that the textbook is likely to be the principal source of information for most students, the authors have made their books something more than summary manuals of events. Taken together, the two volumes are sufficiently comprehensive to enable the students, with reasonable mastery of their contents, to obtain an intelligent grasp of the last fifteen centuries of European history. Besides presenting the essential facts with accuracy, they have correlated and interpreted the facts in such a way that the significant events, institutions, and ideas may be understood and not merely "got up" for examinations or tests. Above all they have endeavored to make the story readable, interesting in its own right, and relevant as an explanation of the influences that have made modern civilization what it is. In short, Professors Ferguson and Bruun have attempted to write books that have merit as books, and not merely as textbooks. They have aimed to serve the practical requirements of teaching history in colleges, and at the same time make the student realize that a knowledge of history is an essential part of a "liberal education."

The period covered by these two volumes is commonly divided into three periods — Medieval, Renaissance and Reformation, and Modern. All the conventional labels employed by historians for dividing the history of civilization into periods are largely arbitrary, at best unrevealing, at worst positively misleading. The reason is that, being themselves by-products of the history they profess to clarify, they are easily outmoded by the increase of knowledge. The term medieval, to take but one example, means in itself nothing except a period in between an earlier and a later period. Actually, it originated in a mythical notion of human history, and was retained to indicate a supposedly "dark age" intervening between the golden age of Greek and Roman civilization, and the recovery of classical knowledge brought about by the "renaissance." It therefore took on a derogatory connotation, which it still

retains: in spite of all that devoted "medievalists" can urge to the contrary, "medieval" is still in common speech a synonym for ignorance and barbarism. Applied to the period between the fifth and the fourteenth centuries, the term means either nothing at all or else something that is not true.

Since textbooks must be adapted to established courses and to conventional practices, Professors Ferguson and Bruun have not thought it wise to dispense with the conventional divisions altogether. But they have made it clear that these conventional divisions are not to be taken too seriously. They have regarded their separate tasks as related parts of a common enterprise, which is to explain the evolution of "western" civilization from Roman times, and by dividing their books into "parts" which have some real relation to the successive aspects of this evolution, and in the brief introductions to the various parts, they have endeavored to correct the mistaken notions that are implied by the terms Medieval, Renaissance and Reformation, and Modern. In short, they have endeavored to make it clear that the history of Europe since the breakdown of the Western Roman Empire exhibits a continuous development without sharp breaks or dramatic dislocations.

CARL L. BECKER

Introduction

IF A justification can be found for adding to the many excellent college texts on European history already in the field, it must be sought on the ground that few writers, to date, have chosen to present the evolution of European civilization since Roman times as a continuous story that could be included within the scope of a single volume, yet with sufficient detail and cumulative emphasis. The problems of selection, organization, and compression which beset such a project are more than usually severe, and the demand, so insistently voiced in recent years, for more adequate sections dealing with social, economic, and cultural conditions has greatly increased them. Yet a unified text possesses one advantage that should outweigh these disabilities. It can offer the student an unbroken account of what was, after all, an unbroken progression, and save him as far as possible from the common misconception that European history was composed of a medieval interlude with a modern sequel.

The present text has been designed primarily for Freshman classes, and the writers in preparing it have drawn upon their experience and familiarity with the needs of such classes. The work as a whole is the result of a close and critical collaboration; but the labor of composition was divided, Ferguson writing Part I and Bruun Part II.

To the numerous friends whose encouragement and assistance speeded the task, the writers are happy to have this opportunity to express their heartfelt gratitude, in particular to Professor Carl Becker, of Cornell University, for his unfailing patience and invaluable criticism, to Professor Wesley Frank Craven, of New York University, who read the galley proof of the entire work and made many helpful suggestions, and to W. Carroll Ferguson for her inexhaustible patience in correcting proof.

W. K. F.
G. B.

NEW YORK

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Part One

TO 1660

Section A

THE ROMAN EMPIRE AND ITS DECLINE

The course of history is an unbroken stream, flowing steadily from obscure or unknown sources in that distant age when the race of mankind was young. As it enters those chronological periods for which our knowledge of events is more complete, the stream seems to broaden and deepen. It flows serenely through the open daylight of the Roman world, to dwindle into comparative obscurity as it enters that darker period that followed the barbarian conquests, and to emerge again into plainer view in the High Middle Ages, whence it flows with ever-increasing volume down to our own time. Its character changes gradually. There are no sharp breaks. There is no place where one may say: Here history changes, here an age ends and another age begins. To divide history into clear-cut periods is, therefore, in a sense meaningless and may be misleading. Yet the historian finds it convenient, indeed indispensable for purposes of discussion, to segregate and name certain large chronological periods, which seem to have a measure of unity and a character that differentiate them from the ages before and after. He must never forget, however, that his divisions are artificial and the chronological limits vague and uncertain.

For the historian who would trace the history of the European peoples, the most natural period with which to begin his study is that which com-

prises the story of the Roman Empire in the days of its magnificence and its subsequent decline. During the first five centuries of our era, the Roman Empire supplied the framework of civilization. When it collapsed in western Europe, the ancient civilization collapsed with it. In its place a new civilization gradually arose, constructed in part from raw materials brought by the barbarians from the primeval forests beyond the Rhine, but built in large part also from the shattered materials left by the wreckage of Rome. The story of that reconstruction of civilization from Roman and Germanic materials will then carry us down through the period that historians have agreed to call medieval, until it merges imperceptibly into the modern age.

CHAPTER ONE

THE ROMAN WORLD IN THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES

FOR two glorious centuries, from 31 B.C. to A.D. 180, the civilized world enjoyed peace and prosperity such as it had never known, nor was to know again, within the sheltering frontiers of the Roman Empire. It was not a large world, but it comprised all the lands that had as yet attained any degree of civilization, save for those distant countries in the Far East which were little more than names to the Roman citizen, known to him only through the luxuries imported from India by Alexandrian merchants. Various types of culture were included within this great empire, oriental, Greek, and Latin, their roots striking deep into the past. Now, with no political barriers to keep them apart, and with easy intercourse guaranteed by the protection of the Roman government, they met and, though each retained in part its own identity, they gradually fused to form a new composite, which, for lack of a better name, we may call Roman civilization. Neither the Roman peace nor Roman civilization was destined to last. When the former was broken, the latter declined. But what was left of Roman culture was to form part of the legacy of the past to the people of medieval Europe. Hence, some knowledge of the Roman world and the civilization it embodied is essential to an understanding of the periods that followed.

1. THE ROMAN WORLD

The Roman world, though composed of the margins of three continents, Europe, Africa, and Asia, was a geographical unit.[1] Save for the island outpost of Britain, the provinces of the empire were grouped about the Mediterranean Sea, and the boundaries of the empire corresponded roughly to the limits of the Mediterranean Basin. This great sea, the cradle of ancient civilization, gave to the lands about its shores a uniform, moderate climate. It served, too, as the highway of the Roman world, and from its ports the magnificent Roman roads ran straight to the farthest frontiers, knitting the whole empire together. Placed in the midst of the lands, as its name indicates, the Mediterranean was the focal center of the ancient world.

The Mediterranean Basin

[1] See map, page 6.

Facing it, the peoples of southern Europe turned their backs upon the German forests that stretched north from the Rhine and the Danube; the Egyptians, Berbers, and Carthaginians of North Africa, too, turned naturally toward it, for behind them lay the great arid expanses of the Sahara; and on the eastern shores of the sea, the thronging population of western Asia were cut off by high mountain barriers from the farther East.

Cultural divisions


Despite its geographical unity, however, there was in the Roman world a wide diversity of cultural tradition. In the centuries of the Roman peace, these various civilizations tended to blend, each contributing to the composite whole something uniquely its own; yet they were too firmly rooted in the past entirely to lose their own peculiar characteristics. Throughout the period of the empire, the Roman world remained divided culturally into two great sections, East and West. The eastern half derived its culture from Greek and oriental sources; the western half was heir to a more recent Latin civilization.

The East: oriental civilizations

The East boasted the most ancient civilizations of the Roman world. In Egypt, civilization had flourished for thousands of years along the fertile banks of the Nile. There, one empire after another had arisen, developed its own characteristic culture, and had then declined to make way for a new empire or a new dynasty. Farther to the east, in the rich Mesopotamian valley between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, the great Hammurabi had ruled a highly civilized empire from Babylon two thousand years before Christ. Later, the Assyrians of Nineveh (750–606 B.C.), the Chaldeans of Babylon (606–539 B.C.), and the Persians (539–330 B.C.) had ruled great empires in that part of Asia later to be conquered as Roman provinces. And in Syria, the Hebrew people, through periods of triumph and despair, evolved a code of morals and a lofty monotheistic religion that were to form a priceless portion of the legacy of the East to the Roman world. It was in the realm of religion, indeed, that the oriental peoples made their most significant contribution, for the Christianity which sprang from ancient Judaism was by no means the only religion to spread westward, gaining thousands of converts in other sections of the empire. During the first two centuries, in fact, it seemed much less important than any one of half a dozen oriental cults, though it was the one that eventually won its way to universal triumph.

The East: Greek culture

But these various cultural traditions, which we group together loosely as oriental, formed only a part of the characteristic civilization of the eastern half of the Roman world. Equally important, if not more so, was the splendid heritage of ancient Greece. During the fourth and fifth centuries before Christ, while Rome was still


The Roman Empire
before the Barbarian Invasions
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 600
Roman Empire
Persian Kingdom
Asiatic Nomads
Uncolored: Other barbarians outside the Roman Empire.
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
Picts
Celts
BRITAIN
Jutes
Angles
Saxons
Franks
Burgundians
Alamanni
Marcomanni
Vandals
Lombards
Vistula R.
Finns
Slavs
Home of the Mounted Nomads
Huns about 370
Volga R.
Don R.
STEPPE
CASPIAN SEA
BELGICA
GERMANY
GAUL
Chalons
Tours
Lyons
BRAETIA
NORICUM
PANNONIA
ILLYRIA
MOESIA
Ostrogoths
Visigoths
Sea of Azov
CAUCASUS
Gates of the Caucasus Mts.
BAY OF BISCAY
AQUITANIA
Rhone R.
Milan
Ravenna
Po R.
Danube R.
BLACK SEA
ARMENIA
SPAIN
Narbonne
Marseilles
Barcelona
ADRIATIC SEA
Rome
BALKAN Mts.
Sardica
Constantinople
Chalcedon
THRACE
Adrianople
BITHYNIA
Nicaea
BALEARIC ISLES
SARDINIA
CORSICA
MACEDONIA
Thessalonica
Thermopylae
AEGEAN SEA
Athens
Corinth
Argos
Sparta
PHRYGIA
CAPPADOCIA
Antioch
Tigris R.
PERSIAN KINGDOM OF THE SASSANIDS
MESOPOTAMIA
Euphrates R.
SICILY
Syracuse
Carthage
Hippo
MAURETANIA
NUMIDIA
Berbers
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CRETE
RHODES
CYPRUS
SYRIA
CYRENAICA
Alexandria
Jerusalem
EGYPT
ARABIAN DESERT

a primitive little Italian republic, Athens and the other vigorous Greek city-states had developed art, literature, philosophy, and science to a degree hitherto unequaled in the history of mankind. The epics of Homer, the drama of Euripides and Aeschylus, the sculpture of Phidias and Praxiteles, the philosophy of Socrates and Plato, and the science of Aristotle formed a rich treasury from which the later East and West alike drew freely for the inspiration of their own intellectual achievements. The legacy of the Roman to the modern world was in no small part the legacy of Greece.

This vital culture sprang from tiny, self-contained city-states, each a social, political, and religious unit, glorying in its riotous freedom. When these were conquered by Philip of Macedon about the middle of the fourth century before Christ, they lost their freedom and with it much of their exuberant vitality. In the following generation the young hero-king, Alexander the Great (336–323 B.C.), spread the Macedonian conquests beyond Greece over the whole civilized East, uniting all the conquered territories briefly into one great empire. Over these vast oriental lands, Alexander spread a thin veneer of Greek or "Hellenic" culture, so that Greek became the official tongue of all that territory which later went to make up the eastern half of the Roman Empire. But with the conquest of the eastern world, Greek culture lost its purity and its creative vigor, already checked by the loss of Greek freedom. Spread thinly over the oriental civilizations, it fell into a rapid decline. After Alexander's death, his empire was divided among his generals. These Greek and Macedonian soldiers ruled as alien conquerors over subjugated peoples, and in time their kingdoms fell an easy prey to the advance of the Roman legions. Greek traditions of government, based on the limited experience of small city-states, could not be adapted to the needs of an empire, and the Hellenic despots were forced to adopt the methods of oriental monarchs. So, too, Greek culture could not be adapted to the life of oriental races without losing its original form. The result of the mixture was a debased Hellenism, more than half oriental. The conquerors were themselves conquered by the overpowering force of long-established customs.

Decline of Greek culture

The culture of the western half of the empire was predominantly Latin. From Italy the Latin language had spread to the barbarian provinces in the years following their conquest. By the second century of the Christian era, the Celtic populations of Gaul, Spain, and Britain, and the Berber tribes and Carthaginian cities of northern Africa were almost as thoroughly Latinized as the Romans themselves.

The Latin West

Latin culture had developed during the period when the Greek civilization was declining. Far behind the Greeks at first, the Romans adopted, in the first two centuries before Christ, such parts of the Greek tradition as suited their needs and temperament. The result was a culture in which the Greek materials had been refashioned and transmuted by the stubborn Roman genius into something characteristically its own. Roman gods took on the character of their counterparts in Greek mythology. Virgil found the model for his great Latin epic in the *Iliad* of Homer. Catullus, Tibullus, Horace, and Ovid evolved a smoothly fashioned Latin poetry based on Hellenic models. But if the form was Greek, the spirit was purely Roman. Greek philosophy, too, was adapted and systematized to fit the Roman mind. The Roman could never rival the subtlety or the philosophic genius of the supple and speculative Greek; but his single-minded vigor and methodical common sense more than evened the balance. In legal and administrative ability he was far superior. When, at the end of the pre-Christian era, the sound and fury of the dying republic finally subsided into the hushed peace of the Augustan Empire, Rome had not only created a great and lasting culture. She had also made an empire.

Greek influence

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE EMPIRE

Rome began its history about the year 500 B.C. as a tiny city-state republic, with a few square miles of territory on the southern bank of the Tiber. And it was as a republic, with a city-state constitution, that Rome spread her conquests over nearly the whole civilized world during the following five centuries, reducing ancient empires and free barbarian tribes to the position of subject peoples. But conquest brought with it problems beyond the range of a primitive constitution, and the putting of new wine into old bottles had its proverbial result. The attempt to bring a world-empire within the governmental scope of a city-state republic led at last to revolution, civil war, and anarchy. Under these circumstances, city and provinces alike welcomed with a sigh of relief the firm rule of Augustus, the grandnephew of Julius Caesar, who placed himself at the head of the threatened state in 31 B.C. Rome had found that an empire needed an emperor. To Augustus and his successors during the first two centuries was left the task of completing the evolution of Rome from a city-state to a world-state with universal citizenship and political unity.

The Roman Republic

In the ancient city-states, citizenship was an hereditary right, jealously guarded, and granted to outsiders or to new arrivals in the city only under

great pressure. Rome was no exception to this rule. Even the other Italian cities, brought under Roman rule as early as 275 B.C., were not granted full citizenship until a civil war (90–88 B.C.) forced that measure upon the republic. Even then, actual participation in the government was restricted to those who lived in Rome or who could visit the city to cast their votes in person. The inhabitants of the conquered territories outside of Italy were, with very few exceptions, granted only a partial citizenship as subjects or "allies" of the state.

Roman citizenship

The government of republican Rome was not democratic, though the people had some share in it. For the most part it was controlled by a group of aristocratic senatorial families. The consuls and other officers were usually chosen from this class, as were the senators, most of whom had already held high office. The senate, by virtue of tradition and the prestige of its members, became the supreme governing power in the state. It had ruled wisely and effectively during the period of the early conquests, but it proved utterly inadequate to the government of a large empire. The lands beyond Italy, divided into provinces, were ruined by the avarice and inefficiency of irresponsible senatorial governors. Immense wealth flowed to Rome from the provinces, enriching and corrupting the aristocratic families and breeding discontent among the poorer classes. In the last century before Christ, a series of military dictators imposed themselves upon the weakened senate and paved the way for the rule of Augustus.

Government of the republic: the senate

The new empire was founded on the emperor's control of the army, and the army remained in the last analysis the effective basis of imperial authority. There was always danger, however, that the troops might get out of hand, and the emperors of the first two centuries labored to build wider and more secure foundations for their power by proving that they were indispensable to good government and by uniting the whole empire in common loyalty to them. Augustus himself owed his position partly to the support of the Roman citizens, gained by his promise to restore the old constitution. As a result, he was unable to make radical reforms and was forced to govern through republican institutions. As a matter of fact, he was practically absolute, but it was left to his successors to do away with the old forms and to establish the imperial power as the sole source of law and authority.

Augustus retains republican forms

The first step in strengthening the emperor's position was to crush the old senatorial families and to nullify the authority of the senate. The

chief danger from these representatives of the old republic lay in the fact that there was no established rule of imperial succession. On the death of an emperor the senate became the governing body of the state and had, theoretically, the right to choose his successor. Any member of the old senatorial aristocracy might aspire to the imperial purple. This danger bred suspicion in the minds of the early emperors and led to a cruel and oppressive tyranny. During the period to the death of Nero (A.D. 14–68) when the descendants of Augustus still ruled, most of the old senatorial families were destroyed and the senate was recruited from new men, chosen by the emperors from their own administrative officials and often from the provinces. Under the wiser and more secure rule of the Flavian and Antonine families, from the succession of Vespasian (A.D. 69) to the death of Marcus Aurelius (180), the senate came to represent the whole empire rather than the exclusive Roman aristocracy, and was completely under the emperor's control. Its powers were limited to advising the emperor. The question of succession was settled by the practice of adoption. The emperor himself chose the ablest man at his disposal as his adopted son and heir to the throne.

The senate under the empire

The second step in establishing the imperial authority over a united empire was taken by the development of an efficient, centralized administrative system under the emperor's immediate control. The irresponsible provincial governors of the republican régime were replaced by officers appointed by the emperor and directly responsible to him. Even the worst emperors of the first two centuries gave good government to the provinces. Two centuries of unbroken peace and security amply justified the imperial system in the minds of the provincials and secured their unquestioning loyalty.

Imperial administration

The powers of these imperial officials stopped short of local government. In this sphere, which most closely affected the lives of the people, the emperors wisely allowed almost complete freedom. "The greatest glory of the imperial administration for nearly two centuries was the skillful and politic tolerance with which it reconciled a central despotism with a remarkable range of local liberty." For administrative purposes, Italy and the provinces were divided into *civitates* or municipalities. In the eastern part of the empire, these represented survivals of the ancient city-states, with their traditions of self-government and civic patriotism. In the newer barbarian West, tribes or cantons were organized into municipalities with a city as the capital. The citizens (not as a rule including the poorest classes) elected their own officers and their own *curia* or council, chosen from a

Free municipal government

local aristocracy of wealth corresponding to the senatorial class at Rome. In each municipality the old republican government of Rome was reflected in miniature, with variations depending on the race and traditions of the individual city.

This free local citizenship did much to keep the provincials contented. But the empire could never become a truly united world-state so long as the invidious distinction between Roman citizens and all others remained in force. The emperors realized the advantages to be gained from universal citizenship. It would level all classes under their authority, broaden the foundations of their power, add to the loyalty of the provincials, and weld all parts of the state closer together. Hence, despite the jealousy of the Italians, they gradually extended citizenship to the most influential classes in the provinces, until by the *Constitutio Antoniana* of 212 all free-born citizens of the municipalities throughout the empire were made Roman citizens.

Extension of Roman citizenship

The army played an important part in the dissemination of Roman citizenship. The legions, which formed the bulk of the standing army, were recruited by voluntary enlistment from the body of Roman citizens. When these proved insufficient, provincials were admitted and by virtue of their military service received citizenship. The number thus honored was greatly increased by the military reforms of Vespasian, who barred Italians from service in the legions. The aristocratic youth of Italy might still serve in the praetorian cohorts, the picked imperial bodyguard, and after training there might be transferred as officers to the legions or auxiliary troops. But the rank and file of the legionaries were now mostly citizens of the provincial municipalities, who were granted Roman citizenship. The army, some 400,000 strong, was usually stationed at strategic points along the frontiers, where there was most to fear from invasion. The term of service was from twenty to twenty-five years, after which the retired soldier was often granted land near his old camp. Many of the legions' camps became permanent centers of Roman influence and formed the nucleus of new provincial towns. Some of these towns, formed around the *castra* or camp of the legions, still exist, as is shown by the English names, Chester, Lancaster, Manchester, etc.

The army

We have seen how the imperial administration and the spread of Roman citizenship tended to solidify the empire, while the free municipal government gave an outlet to local initiative. More than this was needed, however, to complete the evolution of the empire into a strongly coherent world-state. Imperial patriotism had to replace, or be superimposed upon, local civic patriotism. This result

Emperor worship

was accomplished in part through the institution of emperor worship. In the ancient world every city-state had had its own peculiar religion, closely bound up with the state. Men were accustomed to worship gods or heroes who were the traditional founders or protectors of the state. In Rome itself religion and patriotism were inseparable. In the earlier eastern empires, too, the emperor was himself worshiped as a god, the personification of the state. This tradition was inherited by the Hellenized monarchies that followed Alexander's empire, and in turn by the Roman conquerors. It was the grateful eastern provincials who first hailed Augustus as a god and savior. He was quick to realize the value of a cult that made imperial patriotism a religion, and one in which the emperor was himself the central figure, though he barred it from Italy lest it offend the old republican sentiment of the Romans. Even in Rome, however, Augustus was deified after his death, and during his lifetime was hailed as *divus* if not as *deus*, a divine hero if not a living god. Many characteristics of the old Roman religion prepared the way for the acceptance of emperor worship in the West, and, as the eastern influence grew with the further unification of the state, it became firmly established. Domitian (81–96) was the first emperor to claim the title *Dominus et Deus* during his own lifetime in Rome. Under his successors, emperor worship became a recognized state religion, in which all citizens took part, whatever their other religious traditions might be. There was little protest, since few of the ancient religious cults were exclusive or debarred their followers from the worship of other gods.

Even more important than emperor worship for the unification of the state was the development of Roman law into a universal civil code.

Roman law

Indeed, its legal system was perhaps Rome's greatest contribution to civilization. It was more just and humane than any previous code, and it has formed the foundation for the civil law of most modern European countries. Republican Rome had from the first its primitive civil code, based on the Twelve Tables and applying exclusively to Roman citizens. Each of the conquered territories had also its own legal system, and these the Romans permitted to continue with local jurisdiction. But as the Roman Empire assumed world proportions, as commerce and interrelations between the provinces increased, some body of law with jurisdiction over subjects as well as citizens in all parts of the empire was urgently needed.

As early as the second century before Christ, such a body of law was evolved from the praetors' edicts and from the decisions of jurists in individual cases tried in the Roman courts. This collection of praetors' law and of the precedents established by judges' decisions was strongly

influenced by the best local laws and the current practices of merchants throughout the empire. In time it came to form a common code applicable to all freemen everywhere. Based on jurisprudence rather than on legislation, the Roman code was constantly reinterpreted to keep it in harmony with the changing needs of the age. The great value of this reinterpretation by edict and precedent lay in the general recognition by Roman jurists of three fundamental principles: first, that equity is more important than strict legality; second, that all free men are equal before the law; and third, that an accused man is innocent until he is proved guilty. About the beginning of the second century of the Christian era, the praetors' edicts were restricted and formalized, but their place was taken by the emperors' rescripts and decrees, so that the construction and reinterpretation of the imperial code was continued unbroken.

3. SOCIETY IN THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES

By the second century, the Roman Empire had become a vast commonwealth of self-governing cities, whose local freedom was protected rather than disturbed by the imperial administration. Stimulated by the security and prosperity that accompanied the "Roman peace" and by the policy of the emperors, old cities took on a new life and new ones sprang up to rival them in all parts of the empire. For where there were no cities, the emperors created them. One hundred and twenty new towns were founded in barbaric Dacia. In Spain only twenty-seven of the two hundred and ninety-three communities were left without a civic center. Gaul and North Africa were thickly strewn with thriving towns, and in the more densely populated East there were scores of cities whose names indicate their origin by imperial initiative. The society of the whole empire, with all its great variety of race and culture, had become predominantly urban.

Society predominantly urban

In the prosperous years of the first two centuries, the urban population of the empire possessed great wealth, and they spent it freely in adding to the beauty and dignity of their native cities. Rome was proverbial for the splendor of its temples, theaters, circuses, forums, public baths, and palaces, while in the provincial cities the same magnificent buildings were to be found in proportionately lesser degree. Even the smaller towns of Gaul and Britain were well planned, well kept, and sanitary. The streets were wide, straight, fully paved, and clean. Great aqueducts brought water to the cities in plentiful supply. There were statues and monuments everywhere.

Luxury of city life

Private houses, too, were built with every facility needed to make life pleasant and agreeable. They had shaded central courts in which fountains played to cool the midday heat. They had running water and, in some cases, central heating. The ruins of Pompeii, preserved intact through the centuries by their covering of lava, show a degree of comfort and convenience in public and private life utterly unknown to medieval Europe. And Pompeii was little more than a third-rate town. Professor Rostovtzeff concludes his description of the cities of the empire with the following statement, rather startling to anyone who has not examined the remains of Roman civilization: "One can say without exaggeration that never in the history of mankind (except during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe and America) has a larger number of people enjoyed so much comfort; and that never, not even in the nineteenth century, did men live in such a surrounding of beautiful buildings and monuments as in the first two centuries of the Roman Empire."

Liberality of wealthy citizens

Many of these buildings and public works were constructed by the emperors or by the municipal governments. The majority, however, owed their existence to the civic pride and generosity of wealthy citizens. Markets, bridges, roads, and aqueducts, as well as all kinds of public buildings, were donated to the city by men who had been honored with public office in the local government, or by men who hoped to be so honored, or by others motivated simply by that passionate love of their native city which was so strong a force in the ancient municipality. The circuses, banquets, and other public amusements of that sociable age were also due in many cases to private liberality. Social standing and civic honors were alike the monopoly of wealth; but wealth carried with it also heavy duties of service and generosity, rigidly enforced by public opinion.


Social classes in the municipality

The municipal aristocracy was made up of the wealthier citizens who had sufficient property to qualify for offices in the local government or for membership in the *curia*. The list of *curiales* or *decuriones*, as those eligible for membership in the *curia* were called, was revised every five years. From this group men of servile birth were usually excluded. Yet former slaves, "freedmen," often rose to positions of wealth and power, and to a social ranking second only to the *curiales*. Many a highly educated Greek slave, or Syrian who had inherited the commercial genius of his race, was able to acquire sufficient money to buy his own freedom and afterwards to make a great fortune in trade. The mass of the citizens, professional men, shopkeepers, artisans, and so forth, and the poorer proletariat, who were sometimes excluded from citizenship, led obscure lives of little or no



By Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

THE FORUM OF TRAJAN, ROME
Early second century A.D.



By Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

THE COLOSSEUM, ROME
End of first century A.D.

social or political importance. There were, however, frequent public amusements, gladiatorial shows, chariot races, games, and pantomimes, to break the tedium of their lives, and most of them belonged to some club or "college," which organized banquets and social gatherings and afforded them the comforting sense of belonging to an exclusive society, so dear to the hearts of gregarious men. The slaves, of whom there were great numbers, were the lowest social class. They were the property of their masters, without social or civil rights, though a growing humanitarian spirit was mitigating the brutality with which many were treated in the early days of Rome's conquests.

Superimposed upon the municipal aristocracy, and recruited from it, was an imperial or Roman aristocracy. This was made up of two classes, the senators and the knights or *equites*. By the second century these classes had lost their purely Roman character and were composed mostly of provincials who had risen in the imperial service. The *equites* were men of moderate wealth, who had held offices in the imperial administration or the army. The senatorial aristocracy in turn was chosen by the emperor from the *equites* who had won his gratitude by faithful service. Both the imperial and municipal aristocracies were clearly defined castes, based partly on heredity, partly on wealth. Class distinctions were sharply drawn, but were not permanent. Few noble families lasted for many generations. The luxury and ostentation of the wealthy and the insidious influence of household slavery bred an unhealthy social atmosphere. The birth rate in aristocratic families was very low and the families soon died out. Their places were taken by new men from the lower classes.

Imperial aristocracy

4. ECONOMIC LIFE IN THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES

When Augustus ushered in the two centuries of Roman peace, he introduced also an era of unprecedented prosperity to Italy and the provinces. The wars which had devastated the empire were ended. The civilized world had been united in a single state, under a government strong enough to guarantee peace and security. Merchants might carry their wares freely from Pontus to Spain, from the Nile to the Thames, without crossing a frontier. And wherever they went they found the same laws, the same coinage, the same privileges, and the protection of the same government. During the first two centuries, the emperors allowed full freedom to commerce, barring slight interprovincial duties, and abstained from governmental interference in industry. New and safe markets were established in the barbarian provinces. Everywhere

new cities were founded, providing at once the supply and demand for a new economic life.

A good share of the amazing revival of commerce must be credited to the ease and security of communications within the empire. The Mediterranean Sea, though stormy and treacherous, was a broad highway through the center of the Roman world, and the imperial fleet kept it clear of pirates. In each province the emperors repaired or constructed a skillfully planned network of roads, connecting all the important cities. These roads, stone-paved and permanent, were built originally for the legions, but they served the merchants equally well. Over them messengers of the imperial service, equipped with relays of horses, could average fifty miles a day. Ordinary travelers could maintain an average speed of five miles an hour in districts where a thousand years later roads were nonexistent or almost impassable. Communications in Europe and the Near East were probably never so rapid or so safe until the coming of the railroad as they were in the first two centuries of the empire. *Communications*

Commerce with lands outside the empire flourished, but was of secondary importance. From the East, the traditional source of luxuries, came perfumes, spices, ivory, precious stones, and silk, and from central Africa, ivory, gold, precious woods, and condiments, to be paid for in manufactured goods or coin. Furs, amber, wax, and slaves were imported from Germany and Russia, in return for oil and wine. It was a colorful trade, but it was almost entirely in luxuries and its importance cannot be compared with that of the trade within the frontiers. *Foreign commerce*

Within the empire, the most important articles of interprovincial commerce were raw materials and manufactured goods for everyday use, the prime necessities of life. It was from these rather than the luxuries that great commercial fortunes were made. Corn, olive oil, wine, timber, metals, hemp, and flax could not be produced in all parts of the empire and so had to be shipped to the consumer. Some manufactured articles, too, could be produced only, or to better advantage, in certain localities. With these exceptions, goods were usually manufactured in the town where they were to be sold. Egypt had almost a monopoly on the production of linen and paper. Asia Minor, Italy, and Gaul produced quantities of woolen goods. Syria alone held the secret of Tyrian purple dyes and also led in the manufacture of fine glassware. Italian glazed pottery was unrivaled till the second century, when it was driven from the markets by the superior products of Gaul. In other wares also Gaul supplanted Italy, taking her *Interprovincial commerce*

place as the leading industrial country of the West. These and other articles, specialties of certain regions, were shipped freely and in great quantities to all parts of the empire.

Though great fortunes were made from commerce, much of the wide prosperity of the Roman world resulted directly from manufacturing.

Industry

Industry was mostly in the hands of small independent artisans. It contributed to the livelihood of the masses rather than to the fortunes of the few capitalists. When the goods manufactured were intended for the local market, as was most often the case, the artisan was merchant as well as manufacturer, selling his wares to the consumer in his own little shop. Only in the case of goods intended for a distant market was there any attempt at mass production. Wealthy men sometimes employed large numbers of slaves or free workers in their shops. However, this differed from our own factory system in that each worker completed the article he was making, from beginning to end, and that there was little use of machinery of any but the simplest sort. But even goods intended for export were often produced by independent workers.

Roman society was so characteristically urban, and commerce and industry played so important a part in economic life, that we are in

Agriculture

danger of forgetting the country and the products of the soil. Yet the fact remains that the majority of the population worked on the land, and agriculture formed the broad base on which the economic structure of the empire rested. The great fortunes accumulated through commerce or imperial favor were mostly invested in land; for land-ownership provided a safe, respectable income with a minimum of risk and worry, which was always the ideal of the wealthy aristocracy. Men of great wealth bought up large estates, which they cultivated by slave labor or let out to small tenants. Free peasants with small holdings were unable to compete with cheap labor and scientific methods of agriculture, and many were forced to sell their land, which went to swell the already large estates of the rich. The peasants themselves were faced by the melancholy alternative of joining the poor city proletariat or of becoming tenants on the land they once had owned. The wealth resulting from agriculture, then, was becoming concentrated in the hands of a relatively small class of aristocratic landed proprietors.

CHAPTER TWO

DECLINE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

TO THE student who has studied the history of the Roman Empire during her two glorious centuries of peace, prosperity, and highly cultivated civilization, the three centuries that followed must come as a disheartening anticlimax. The rapid decline of the empire, and its disappearance in the West before the end of the fifth century, will seem inexplicable and almost incredible. Generations of historians, both before and after Gibbon wrote *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, have offered their explanations. But no single explanation will entirely suffice. Each factor in the situation seems to be at once cause and effect of the general tendency. We can only conclude that there were hidden elements of weakness in the structure of the Roman world, which were not apparent so long as everything went smoothly, but which combined to cripple society once the peaceful course of prosperity and good government was broken. The principal reasons for the general decline were undoubtedly economic; but the economic decline was itself accentuated by social and political ills, some of which we can discover, but many of which elude us as surely as do the fundamental causes of our own economic depressions.

1. BEGINNING OF THE DECLINE — THE THIRD CENTURY

It was during the third century that it first became painfully evident that the Roman Empire was decaying in every root and branch of its being. The people of the Roman world were losing their vigor. The upper classes were becoming apathetic through long enjoyment of easy prosperity, while the oppressed lower classes were becoming more discontented. There was a notable decrease in the population, accounted for partly by a series of widespread epidemics, but to a greater degree by the decrease in the birth rate, due to the unwillingness of the luxurious upper classes to raise large families and to the increasing poverty of the lower classes. The general decline in vitality was reflected clearly in the falling-off of creative energy in every field of culture. Already the golden age of Roman civilization had passed and imitation was taking the place of originality.

Symptoms of decline

These, however, are merely symptoms of the decline. What were the causes? That is a more difficult question to answer. Certain economic

explanations have been offered, and are worth considering. The drain of coinage to the Far East to pay for imported luxuries must have had the effect of hampering business by causing a shortage of money. The building-up of great landed estates, worked by slave labor or by dependent tenants who were little better than slaves, undoubtedly had something to do with the decline of agriculture, which diminished the food supply of the empire and so added to the suffering of the poor. But these are scarcely fundamental causes. Those historians are probably closer to the truth who insist that the absorption of the city-states by the empire lay at the root of many of the social ills of the Roman world. The vitality of a large part of ancient civilization sprang from free, independent, and intensely patriotic city-state republics. For a long time after they were conquered, the city-states retained their local freedom as Roman municipalities. But gradually they were absorbed into the larger fabric of the autocratic empire, lost their individuality, and with it much of their energy. The extension of Roman citizenship to all freemen tended to destroy the privileged position of the municipal aristocracy, which had been the most vigorous class in the early empire. The extension of citizenship was particularly significant because it filled the army with citizens of the lowest class of society, and the army was now to take over control of the government.

Causes of the decline

When all the economic and social causes of the decline of the empire have been considered, one fact remains clear. In an autocratic state, much depends on the quality of the government, and throughout the second century the emperors had become steadily more autocratic. Until the death of Marcus Aurelius in the year 180, however, they had all been men of unusual ability, fully capable of discharging their enormous duties. Good government might not have been able to maintain prosperity much longer, but bad government certainly precipitated the decline and hurried it along. And bad government began with the reign of Commodus (180–192), the son of the philosophical Marcus Aurelius, nor did it end with his assassination at the hands of mutinous soldiers.

Failure of the government

There followed, instead, a century of chaos and anarchy, in which the army took government into its own hands. Imperial power had always depended essentially on the support of the legions, but hitherto the emperors had held them in control. Now the army assumed control of the emperors, creating and destroying them at will, and the army was composed of the lowest classes, who had been made eligible by universal citizenship. Between the years 192 and 284, there were thirty-three emperors, and most of them died by

Military anarchy (192–284)

violence. During all that time, the empire was more or less constantly a prey to revolution, civil war, and the threat of foreign invasion. Troops marched and countermarched through all the provinces, plundering as they went and rendering the roads unsafe for merchants. To make matters worse, the emperors, in order to satisfy the demands of the mutinous soldiers who had created them, were forced to impose crushing taxes on the well-to-do classes, thus striking a direct blow to trade by sapping the buying power of the most prosperous citizens. They also adopted the ruinous policy of raising money by debasing the coinage. This combination of disorder, heavy taxation, and military tyranny was all that was needed to upset the delicate economic equilibrium of the Roman world.

Once started on the downward path, the Roman Empire declined steadily. Roman society had apparently no longer the inherent strength necessary to right itself. It yet remained to be seen what the government could do, once the military anarchy was brought to an end. In the last years of the third century, the Emperor Diocletian made a desperate effort to restore the strength of the empire by the brute force of a despotic government. He reorganized the empire in the most arbitrary fashion, and for a time succeeded in checking the most obvious signs of disintegration. But in the long run, the cure proved worse than the disease. From this point on, the expedients of autocratic government were among the most potent factors in hastening the general economic and social decline.

2. REFORMS OF DIOCLETIAN AND CONSTANTINE

Diocletian establishes an autocracy (284–305)

The reign of Diocletian marks a turning point in the history of the empire, almost as significant as the change from the republic to the empire under Augustus. Like Augustus, Diocletian was faced by the task of preventing the disintegration of the state, and he strove to solve the problem in the arbitrary fashion that came most natural to a half-civilized soldier who had fought his way up from the ranks by sheer force of will. His first step was to assume all power in the state and to free himself from all constitutional checks. The emperors had been gaining steadily in power since the days of Augustus; but hitherto the old forms of senatorial government had been preserved. Diocletian abandoned all such fictions. He reduced the senate to the status of a municipal council for the city of Rome and declared the emperor to be the supreme ruler of the state, with no constitutional limits to his power. The emperor was now the sole

source of all law and authority and was himself above all law. He was the divine ruler, surrounded by all the pomp and ceremony of an eastern despot, demanding servile obedience from his subjects. This was a far cry from the days when Augustus had posed as the first citizen of Rome, to whom the body of citizens had delegated imperial authority. The very idea of Roman citizenship now disappeared. There remained only subjects.

Administration centralized

The second step was to centralize imperial administration so as to bring the whole system of government more directly under the emperor's control. Diocletian realized, however, that the task of personally governing so vast a state would be beyond the powers of one man. He recognized also that the Greek East and Latin West were drifting apart, with separate interests. He therefore chose a colleague in the year 286, a trusted general named Maximian, who was to share with him the title of Augustus or emperor and to govern the western half of the empire. Further, to avoid interference on the part of the army with the succession to the throne, each of the two Augusti adopted a younger man, who took the title of Caesar. The Caesar was to assist in the task of governing and to succeed to the title of Augustus on the death or abdication of his superior. To systematize the civil administration, Diocletian then divided the empire into four great prefectures, each governed by a prefect who was directly responsible to the emperor of his half of the empire. The prefectures in turn were divided into a varying number of dioceses (there were seventeen in all), each administered by a vicar who was responsible to the prefect. The dioceses also were divided into provinces, much smaller than the old provinces (there were one hundred and one in the whole empire), each under a governor who was responsible to his vicar. Instructions could thus be passed down from the emperor, or cases could be referred back to him, through a regular system of officials. Each of these officers was assisted by a host of civil servants and special agents. There were also scores of officials attached to the imperial courts to assist in the central administration. This highly organized system took over all the duties of local as well as imperial government. The municipalities lost their free self-government and the municipal *curiales* became merely unpaid servants of the state, who carried out the dictates of the imperial officers.

Army reorganized

The third step in reform was to reorganize the army so as to make it more efficient, more dependent on the emperor, and less closely connected with the people and their political aspirations. The military was entirely separated from the civil administra-

tion. Senators and citizens were gradually excluded from the army, as they had other services to perform for the state, and they soon lost all military spirit or ability. The old legions were posted along the frontiers as hereditary guards, while a new and more mobile force, nearly doubling the size of the army, was recruited from German barbarians and the most uncivilized subjects of the empire. This barbarous army served only for their pay and had no interest in the wishes of the people. Their officers rose from the ranks by a regular system of promotion, the highest office being that of *magister militum* or master of the soldiers. In the late fourth and fifth centuries this office was usually held by a German of barbarian origin, Romanized though he might have become.

These changes immediately strengthened the imperial authority. But the elaborate imperial courts, the numerous administrative officials, and the large mercenary army were very expensive. The emperors needed money and still more money, while at the same time the waning economic prosperity of the empire made the collection of taxes more difficult. To secure a sufficient income, Diocletian instituted a new system of taxation, which was simple, uniform, and efficient from the government's point of view, but deadly in its effect upon the people. It was to be responsible for many, if not most, of the economic and social ills of the later empire. The principal tax was on land. All the land of the empire was divided into units of varying size according to their fertility, each unit or *iugum* (so named because it was theoretically the amount of land a yoke of oxen could plow) in the municipality to pay an equal tax. There was also a poll tax on the workers of the land, the unit being a *caput* or head, which, however, might include more than one person. Later, for convenience, the two units were combined in a single tax on the land and the men who worked it. Merchants and artisans who had no land paid a special and very heavy tax. Each year the emperors calculated the amount of taxes needed. This sum was divided and subdivided among the various administrative divisions of the empire until the process ended by the assignment of a definite sum to each municipality. The municipal *curia* or council was held responsible for the collection of that sum. The system seems reasonable enough, but it left too many opportunities for graft and oppression on the part of the administrative officials, and its enforcement had, as we shall see in the next section, most unfortunate effects on Roman society.

Reform of taxation

Diocletian's system was somewhat modified by his successors, but in the main it remained in force till the fall of the Western Empire. The practical working-out of many details was left to Constantine the Great

(313–337), who after some years of civil war between rival Augusti and Caesars reunited the empire under his single rule. Diocletian's plan for dividing the administration of the empire and controlling the succession had not worked very well, but the actual division between East and West was growing too strong to be ignored. Constantine himself demonstrated that by founding a new capital at Constantinople in the East. After his death the empire was again divided, and there were nearly always two emperors thereafter, though it must not be forgotten that the division was solely for administrative purposes. In theory the empire remained one and united, under two rulers of equal power. At times, however, one must for the sake of convenience refer to the different parts as the Eastern and Western Empires.

Constantine (313–337) completes the reform

3. SOCIAL DECLINE — SOCIETY FIXED IN HEREDITARY CASTES

In the society of the early empire there had been elements of weakness that tended to sap the vigor and vitality of the people, but these were counterbalanced by the individual freedom and opportunity for advancement enjoyed by all except the slaves. Roman society under the empire was never democratic. It was divided into classes, jealous of their rights; but in the first two or three centuries these classes were constantly recruited from below. There was no legal check on the ambition of the individual to improve his social or economic position. Peasants might move to the city, or artisans might become small landowners. Any worker, except the slave, was free to choose whatever occupation seemed to offer the greatest reward. Even the slave might buy his freedom and go into business for himself. Many freedmen rose to positions of wealth and influence. Any freeborn man of unusual thrift, industry, or initiative might make sufficient money to join the curial class, the local aristocracy, and be eligible for membership in the municipal council. And any *curialis* might hope for promotion to the imperial aristocracy and the senatorial rank. The incentive to ambition provided by these opportunities for advancement was responsible for much of the vigorous economic life and the social vitality of the first two centuries, and it might have helped to restore the fading energy of the empire now that the military anarchy was ended. But all this was changed by the autocratic emperors who followed Diocletian and who, in applying his system of government, were forced to bind men to their class or occupation in hereditary castes, reducing all but the most fortunate to a dead level of slavery to the state.

The success of Diocletian's reform of the administration and the army depended on the collection of sufficient taxes to pay for their upkeep. The most important tax was that on land and on the agricultural workers. This was paid, not by the great landowners, but by the tenant or small owner who actually worked the land. Many of these, unable to pay the taxes from profits that were steadily decreasing for other reasons, were forced to abandon their land and to evade the taxes by moving to another locality or by changing their occupation. At the same time the population was decreasing. As a result, a good deal of land was deserted and fell out of cultivation, thus lessening the amount of taxable property. To check this development, which would prove disastrous to the imperial income, Constantine issued laws binding the agricultural worker, and his children after him, to the land he worked. The tax on the land and that on the worker were now united and became an hereditary obligation. No matter who owned the land, the workers remained as hereditary tenants, still legally free men except that they could not leave their land. They were called *coloni*. Slaves could no longer be sold off the land and as their saleable property value disappeared they were given the partial freedom of the *colonus*. All farm workers then were leveled to the same condition of partial servitude. A series of severe laws punished the *colonus* who left his land as rigorously as though he were a runaway slave. A great proportion of the population was thus forced to give up all hope of changing their economic or social status.

Agricultural workers bound to their land

The merchants and artisans in the city met the same fate. They had to pay a special tax, heavy enough to be ruinous in a time of constant economic depression. Certain necessary trades were being deserted since there was no longer any profit in them. The autocratic emperors could think of no way of improving conditions except to issue new laws forcing the merchant or artisan to continue in his occupation. The workers in each trade formed an hereditary caste. A baker must remain a baker, and all his sons must become bakers. There was no legal escape, even though it might become impossible to make a living, and though there might be better opportunities in other occupations.

Merchants and artisans bound to their trade

But of all the people of the empire, the once well-to-do upper and middle classes of the municipalities, the *curiales*, suffered most, being reduced to universal and perpetual bankruptcy by the disastrous system of taxation. The *curiales* had been the mainstay of the flourishing municipal life of the early empire. Membership in the *curia* had been an honor

Hereditary bondage ruins the curiales

eagerly sought. Now it became a ruinous burden. For the *curia* was made responsible for the collection of all taxes in the municipality. If it could not collect the full amount assigned to it, the members had to make up the deficit, and there was usually a deficit, from their own pockets. To keep the *curia* filled, the emperors issued strict laws forcing all men who had sufficient property to enroll in the curial class, and forcing all *curiales* to take their turn in office. In 336 Constantine made the curial position hereditary. It was still possible for a *curialis* who had sufficient wealth left after having filled all the offices a number of times to purchase senatorial rank which granted exemption from curial duties. But few were able to avail themselves of this privilege, and the sons of those who did, if born before their father's elevation, remained in the curial class. The *curiales* sought desperately to escape, and many succeeded, despite the harsh laws to the contrary, thus making the burden heavier for those who remained. By the beginning of the fifth century men of curial descent were barred from the army, the administration, and the clergy. They could not leave the city, even for a short trip, without permission; they could not reside in the country; and they could not sell or dispose of their property by will without the permission of the governor of the province. Many were reduced to such despair that they forfeited their property and sought to hide themselves as *coloni* on senatorial estates. Occasionally the emperors tried to alleviate the condition of the *curiales* in individual cases, as when Julian in 363 granted immunity from service in the *curia* to the fathers of thirteen or more children, who might be considered to have done enough for the state. But on the whole the laws regarding the *curiales* became steadily more oppressive and their condition ever more hopeless.

Senatorial aristocracy

The senatorial aristocracy was the most fortunate class, a wealthy, privileged group, riding securely on the surface of a sea of destitution. Its members no longer had any necessary connection with the senate, and their numbers had greatly increased, since the early days of the empire. Their wealth was invested in land, since they were barred by law from engaging in commerce, and most of them were owners of great estates that were steadily crowding out the small landowner. As a rule their fortunes had been made originally in the imperial administrative service, and were constantly increased by the unlimited opportunities for graft which they enjoyed. For despite all the good intentions of the emperors, it proved impossible to enforce honest administration in the provinces. Governors and the higher officers, all of the senatorial class, were able to cheat the people on the one hand and the government on the other; while the senatorial landowners were often

able to evade the taxes or to use their wealth and connection with the administration to defraud their poor neighbors or their tenants.

To summarize the course of social decline: the fourth and fifth centuries witnessed the ruin and degradation of the worker on the land and the merchant and artisan in the city, and above all of the upper and middle classes of the municipalities, who had been the backbone of old Roman society, while the only group that was still prosperous was the selfish, parasitical, and unproductive senatorial aristocracy, made up of corrupt administrative officials and great landed proprietors.

4. ECONOMIC DECLINE UNDER THE AUTOCRACY

"The salient trait of the economic life of the late Roman Empire was gradual impoverishment." The military anarchy of the third century had had a paralyzing effect on the commerce of the Roman world. It had aggravated those obscure but fundamental ills in the economic structure of the empire which were already noticeable at an even earlier date. Whether prosperity could have been restored after the restoration of internal peace and strong government by Diocletian is very doubtful. Certain it is, however, that the means employed to save the state from dissolution were such as made economic recovery impossible. Commerce, industry, and agriculture were alike crushed by taxation that ate up the profits. More serious still, and this was the dry rot that destroyed the foundations of the economic structure, the profits from all three were decreasing to the vanishing point due to the gradual disappearance of markets. The buying power of the once prosperous municipal aristocracy, as well as of the poorer classes of town and country, was steadily declining, taxed out of existence. Only the senatorial class and the government remained as important buyers. The former produced the necessities of life on their own estates, while the latter, though buying extensive supplies for the army and the people of the capitals, fixed prices so low as to be ruinous to the producer and the carrier. Economic activity seemed to be caught in a dreary, endless circle. Taxes ate up the profits; the loss of profits decreased the buying power; the failure of buying power decreased the profits and made it more difficult to pay the taxes.

Yet this vicious circle might still have been broken by the force of individual initiative, which has so often in history fought its way over or around economic obstacles, had that initiative been allowed free play, or had it been inspired by the hope of possible success. But the despotic laws which bound men to their occupations and social position paralyzed all individual effort. And

Individual initiative paralyzed

the evil was so widespread that, even were a man able to evade the laws and to rise above his hereditary class or change his occupation, he would be little better off. The peasant might move to the city, or the city worker might change his trade or move to the country, without improving his condition. Or if either were unusually successful, he might possibly make a sufficient fortune to obtain admission to the curial class, and then he and his descendants would be ruined indeed. Moreover, any evidence of unusual prosperity merely incurred increased exactions from the rapacious and corrupt tax collectors, whose demands were limited often enough only by the ability of the individual to pay. With every avenue of escape cut off, the men of the later empire came to accept the situation in a mood of passive resignation.

5. DECLINE OF ROMAN CULTURE

Roman civilization emerged from the fiery ordeal of the third century with its metal not purified but debased. The general level of culture was distinctly lower than it had been and it was given no opportunity to recover, but rather sank with increasing rapidity during the fourth and fifth centuries. It is not surprising that a period of general decline should be accompanied by a corresponding decay of culture. Literature and art, science and philosophy, and all the workings of the human mind must always be strongly influenced by the conditions under which men live. Some of the inevitable results of the political, social, and economic developments we have outlined are too obvious to demand comment; others deserve some further explanation.

Loss of civic freedom and decline of municipal aristocracy

The culture of the ancient world was the product of busy and vigorous little city-states, and especially of the aristocratic class in those states, a class wealthy, leisured, and cultivated, free and independent. After the civilized world was included in the Roman Empire, the city-states continued their free existence as Roman municipalities. They retained their strong local patriotism, their civic religions, their traditions and self-government, all factors that encouraged the ancient type of culture. But as the empire developed into a unified state, the cities lost many of their peculiar qualities and the population became more cosmopolitan. Their freedom, too, was being more and more limited by the constant extension of the emperor's authority and the scope of his administration. Old traditions were dying, and with them went much of the incentive to creative work. Even before the end of the second century, men were beginning to look backward with reverence to a golden age in the past, which they could

not hope to re-create. Latin writers began to study and imitate Cicero, Virgil, or Horace rather than to create original work of their own. The spirit that had made classic culture great was disappearing with the passing of the kind of society in which it throve, and the empire was supplying nothing to take its place. This fact became increasingly evident as the liberty of the cities and the wealth and freedom of the municipal aristocracy were destroyed under the military anarchy of the third century and the autocratic government of the fourth and fifth.

The strongest characteristic in the mental attitude of fourth- and fifth-century Romans was apathetic resignation. The great majority of the population had lost all individual liberty and all hope of improving their economic or social position, while the condition of the empire as a whole grew steadily worse. With no hope of improving conditions, men came to accept them, turning for comfort, as did the Christians, to thoughts of a happier life after death, or, as did the pagans, to wistful study of a golden age in the past. Such a state of mind was fatal to originality or creative energy. Abundant evidence of this can be found in the literature of the period. Generation after generation imitated the great classics of the Augustan age, without producing anything new or significant. Those who, like the poet Claudian or the letter writer Sidonius, still retained something of the old style and taste, had little or nothing to say. In all branches of art the same sterility, the same lowering of standards of taste, was very evident. The men of the late empire were losing their mental energy because they had lost their nerve and no longer felt competent to cope with the problems of a world that was growing too difficult for them. Roman civilization may be compared to a sick man, stricken with a malignant fever, who has still a chance of recovery if his will is strong enough, but who is doomed to certain death if he gives up hope. And the Romans had given up hope.

Loss of nerve

This gradual loss of hope and confidence was accompanied by the rise of new religions, to which many men turned for comfort and which offered emotional distraction or the hope of a happier life after death. The old pagan religions of Rome and the Greek city-states had emphasized the duties of the citizen to his native state, but they offered very little personal hope or comfort to men who had lost their confidence in the state, and as the city-states lost their identity these religions lost much of their appeal. In their place, the western world adopted a number of philosophies and religions from the East. With the exception of Christianity, the names and special characteristics of these oriental religions are relatively unimportant to a general survey of European history, as they had little or no effect on later times.

Oriental religions

Though differing widely in many respects, they shared one common characteristic. What hope they gave to the individual was purely personal and was to find its fulfillment in a future world rather than in this. If they did not actually discourage, they did little to encourage the vigorous performance of economic and social duties. Many historians have found in the spread of these religions one cause of the decay of ancient civilization.

In this depressing chapter, we have tried to picture Roman society in the centuries of decline, and to show as far as possible why it had lost its earlier strength and prosperity. Two great movements, however, of vital importance to any study of the fourth and fifth centuries, we have neglected so far, reserving them for special treatment in the following chapters. They are, first, the triumph of Christianity and its adoption as the state religion of the Roman Empire, and second, the successful invasion of the empire by hordes of Germanic barbarians. Both had a great immediate influence on the history of the dying empire, but an even greater effect in shaping the civilization of medieval Europe.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE

AS THE old pagan Roman Empire decayed, there grew up in its midst a new spiritual empire, which in course of time was to replace it in the West and to carry on in western Europe the Roman tradition of unity in administration, law, language, and culture through the long chaotic centuries of the Middle Ages. Christianity was the one vital force and the church the one living organism in the Roman world during the last two centuries of the Western Empire. When that empire disappeared, the church, so far as was possible, took its place; the popes took over the universal authority of the emperors; and the episcopal hierarchy filled the void left by the withdrawal of the imperial administration. Throughout the Middle Ages the unity of the Roman Catholic Church was the bond that held together the various races of western Europe. Christianity had made profound changes in Roman thought, ethics, and morals; it had helped to destroy much of pagan culture; yet it was through the church that such elements of Roman civilization as it could assimilate were preserved and handed on to the Germanic peoples who swept over the Western Empire, burying it beneath the flood tide of barbarism.

1. SPREAD OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES

Throughout the first three centuries, while Christianity was struggling upward against tremendous odds, the older forms of paganism were losing their vitality. As the empire became more closely knit together, the official religions gained universal recognition, but at the same time lost much of their hold on the thought and especially on the emotions of the people. The emperor was worshiped from the Euphrates to the borders of Wales, but nowhere was his cult more than a formal patriotic rite. The ancient gods of Greece and Rome, enshrined in the epics of Homer and Virgil and consecrated by official usage, were still worshiped, but in much the same formal way. There were temples everywhere to Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva and the other gods who sat upon Mount Olympus, watching with impartial interest the destinies of men, though interfering now and then for the

Decay of official religions

salvation of the state. But there was nothing left in the old mythology to give inspiration, hope, or comfort to the individual, nor to answer his anxious queries concerning his fate after death had overtaken him. Even before the disastrous third century, when public and private calamities caused men to seek more eagerly than ever for supernatural comfort, the twilight had begun to settle over Olympus. It was soon to darken into night, though the old gods long maintained a shadowy existence through official practice and in literary tradition.

Rise of oriental cults

But the waning of the ancient paganism did not mean the triumph of Christianity. Instead, other and apparently more powerful religions from the East took the place of the official cults in the active life of the people, and it was this new paganism that was to be Christianity's most serious rival. From the time of its foundation, oriental religions had spread westward through the empire, following the lines of trade. Their progress was facilitated by the remarkable ease of communication. By the third century they were the dominant religious force in the West as well as in the East. In all their various forms, these oriental cults held out much the same promise and satisfied much the same need. They offered purification from personal guilt or sin, and they promised immortality to their devotees. Through participation in their mysteries, sacraments, or initiations, the soul of the worshiper was "saved" or "redeemed," brought into closer contact with divinity. The ceremonies themselves, colorful and often verging on hysteria, made a strong emotional appeal to men wearied with a drab and hopeless existence.

Neoplatonism

The adherence of the more highly educated classes was gained through the support given to the eastern cults by the dominant philosophical system of the third century, Neoplatonism. This was a late revival of the philosophy of Plato, though in a debased form and intermixed with oriental ideas and superstitions. To the Neoplatonist, the chief aim of all thought and aspiration was to bring the individual soul into closer communication or harmony with the great spiritual force which rules the universe, whatever man may call it. And he recognized the gods of the various religions as partial and imperfect manifestations of that divine force. Neoplatonism, then, was a kind of vague monotheism, or belief in one god, who, however, might be worshiped under many forms and in many ways. As this philosophy became popular, the devotees of the various eastern religions came to accept their gods as personifications of one divine power, and many if not most of them joined more than one cult, seeking in each a different aspect of the one truth. The belief in one god, fostered by Neoplatonism, in a measure

prepared the way for Christianity. On the other hand, the acceptance of all gods made it the most dangerous enemy to the exclusive monotheism of Christianity, which branded the worship of all other gods as idolatry and a deadly sin. Neoplatonism is important, too, as we shall see, for its influence in shaping certain aspects of Christian thought and doctrine.

In the midst of all these religions, which were supported or tolerated by the imperial government, Christianity was gradually spreading throughout the Roman world during the first three centuries. Slow though its progress was at first, it gained ground more rapidly with the beginning of the general decline, until by the middle of the third century there were well-organized Christian communities in nearly every city of the empire. There were many factors in the situation which hampered the growth of the new religion. Indeed, that it spread as rapidly as it did, and that it rose to final triumph over all other religions, is the most remarkable fact in its history, the greatest of the Christian miracles. Almost from the beginning it was opposed and often persecuted by the government, and for the first two centuries at least it was generally unpopular. Christianity had begun under what might seem the most unfortunate circumstances, in a rebellious province among men of a stubborn and seditious race, which could not be assimilated and which was hated and despised by the other peoples of the empire. The first apostles were not only Jews, but Jews who had been disowned by their own people, and who, moreover, were of the lowest social rank. They gained most of their early converts from the slave and laboring classes. Christianity, too, was the only exclusively monotheistic religion in the ancient world, with the exception of its parent Judaism. The Christians would tolerate no other gods, would not participate even in the most formal way in the rites of the official or other religions, and vigorously condemned all other cults. This aroused the resentment of pagans of all types, accustomed as they were to living amicably side by side, recognizing in one another's religion the worship of the same divine power. The ethical and moral content of the Christian teaching was also very difficult for the pagan to understand or to accept.

Factors retarding the spread of Christianity

Yet, despite all the disadvantages under which it labored, there were elements in Christianity which made it irresistible. The figure of Christ loomed large in the thought of the early church. More perhaps than at any later time, the Christianity of this period was the religion of Christ. The first missionaries had known him in the flesh, and the tradition was passed on, still vivid with the charm of his magnetic personality. His followers had as the central fact of their religion a definite personal Saviour, who supplied in the only satisfactory

Factors favoring it

way that connecting link between man and God, for which the philosophers and the devotees of the pagan cults were blindly groping. This faith in an historical Saviour carried with it a definiteness of conviction in the reality of salvation, of the expiation of sin, and of the immortality of the soul (all questions that obsessed the mind of the ancient world) far greater than was possible for the mythological pagan cults. At the same time, Christianity gave men hope for the future, not only for themselves as individuals, but for the world. Where the pagan looked back with nostalgic longing to a golden age in the distant past, the Christian, especially in these first centuries, looked forward with confident expectation to the dawn of a golden age in the future, when the second coming of Christ would herald the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. Finally, Christian ethics and morals, difficult though they were for the pagan to accept, bore fruit that could not be ignored in the admirable lives led by the early Christians. Nor could the pagan fail to see that they had peace of mind, hope, and certainty, strong enough to carry them through the fires of persecution, when for the rest of the world there was no peace, when hope was dying, and certainty unattainable.

2. PERSECUTION AND TRIUMPH

Christianity as a religion and the church as an association were banned by the imperial government as soon as they became strong enough to attract the attention of the emperors. About the year 111, the Emperor Trajan issued a rescript to the provincial governors instructing them to prosecute those openly charged with adherence to the new religion, but not to seek them out nor to continue the prosecution if they were willing to take part in the ceremonies of the official cult. For the following century and a half, this rescript may be taken as a fair enough definition of the imperial policy. Christianity was not a legal religion and its members might be punished even to death, but there was no general or consistent attempt to suppress them. The initiative was left to the provincial governors, who enforced the law with more or less severity as they chose. By the middle of the third century, however, conditions had changed and reforming emperors were forced to take stronger action.

Early persecutions (c. 111–250)

One may well ask why the imperial government, usually so tolerant of all religions, should have maintained so hostile an attitude toward Christianity over a period of two centuries. Yet there was reason enough, and from their own point of view the emperors were amply justified. Christianity was opposed to the whole

Reasons for persecution

spirit of Roman civilization and of imperial government. The most serious specific charges brought against the Christians were that they were stubborn and consistent law-breakers, that they refused to discharge the duties of a citizen toward the state, and that they were organized in illegal and dangerously seditious societies. And these charges were well founded. The Christian, strict monotheist as he was, was forbidden to take part in the emperor worship which was the patriotic duty of all citizens. He could not accept public office nor serve in the army without violating his principles, as both demanded participation in certain official and, to the Christian, idolatrous ceremonies. His attitude toward the whole governmental system, so closely bound up with paganism, was one of suspicion if not of actual hatred, and in any case he felt that he owed his first loyalty to a higher fatherland than the worldly empire.

Such an attitude in individuals was sufficiently dangerous. It was made more formidable by the compact and efficient organization of the church. In nearly every community the Christians had a strong, coherent organization, with known bishops and holding corporate property. And they were in constant communication with the other churches throughout the empire. Christianity was becoming a state within and opposed to the empire. No autocratic ruler could afford to ignore it. In proportion as their numbers increased, especially with the beginning of the third century, when they were joined by many from the upper classes while the empire was itself declining in power, the Christians became an ever greater menace to the state.

Persecution under Decius (250–51)

In the year 250, the Emperor Decius undertook a vigorous program of reform to check the alarming decline, and as part of that reform instituted the first thorough attempt to crush out Christianity in all parts of the empire. All citizens were commanded to take part in the ceremonies of the official religions. Those who refused were liable to various punishments, including the death penalty. Great numbers of the Christians complied with the law, while others bought certificates asserting that they had done so. But there were also many who remained true to their faith and suffered martyrdom. The persecution raged for about a year, until it was cut short by the death of the emperor.

Last persecution (303–11)

During the remainder of the third century, the Christians were alternately persecuted and tolerated, according to the policy of the various emperors. From each persecution they emerged with numbers greatly diminished, but with their organization still intact; and at the first sign of toleration, the

apostates, as the deserters were called, returned, and with them came new converts, won over by the example of the martyrs. Despite persecution, Christianity was growing stronger and more popular. It was also becoming more inimical to the government, and hence more dangerous. The last and most thorough attempt to stamp it out was begun in 303 by Diocletian, the great reformer and reorganizer of the empire, and was continued by his successors till 311. They succeeded only in proving that the Christians could not be crushed. The next great emperor was to seek their support and to found his government on a close alliance with the once outlawed church.

Christianity freed and favored by Constantine

The abdication of Diocletian (305) was followed by years of bitter civil strife. By 312 there were four rival emperors, of whom one was Constantine the Great. Supported only by the legions of Gaul and Britain, he was the least powerful of the four. His rival in the West was Maxentius, who held Italy, Spain, and Africa, while Licinius and Maximus divided the East between them. His position was very uncertain, but he was able to form an alliance with Licinius to defeat their respective opponents in the West and East. Like himself, Licinius had taken a neutral stand during the late persecution, while Maxentius and Maximus had actively oppressed the Christians. Gathering his legions together, Constantine marched swiftly down into Italy, staking his whole career on the chance of victory against greatly superior forces. It was probably during that daring march that he decided to seek the support of the Christians. At any rate, to that period belongs the story, so variously interpreted, of his vision of a fiery cross in the sky and the words *Hoc vince* (By this conquer), which he took as his standard. At Saxa Rubra, a few miles from Rome, he met the army of Maxentius, destroyed it completely, and became sole emperor of the West. The following year he met his colleague Licinius, who had also been successful, at Milan, and there issued an edict of general and complete toleration of all religions including Christianity. Licinius was unwilling to go farther than that, but in 323 Constantine defeated him and united the whole empire under his rule. From that time on Constantine's attitude toward the Christians became steadily more favorable, until he was finally baptized into the faith a few days before his death in 337. He took no action against paganism, but his patronage of the church set Christianity well on its way to becoming the state religion.

Edict of Milan (313)

That Constantine's policy was inspired to any great degree by religious motives seems most unlikely. He was no doubt drawn toward the idea of monotheism, as were so many intelligent pagans, and in his later

years came to consider Christianity its truest expression. But his action was that of a keen and farsighted statesman rather than a convert. The Christians were still a minority in 312 (probably not more than one tenth of the population of the empire), but they were a very determined and well-organized minority, settled for the most part in the cities and wielding far more influence than their relative numbers would indicate. Constantine had seen the failure of Diocletian's attempt to crush them. Where Diocletian had failed, he himself could have little hope of success; and if the Christians could not be crushed, it would be better to have them as allies rather than as enemies. In 312 he had needed the support of the Christians against Maxentius, and after 323, when he was emperor of both East and West, he needed the aid of any organized force that would help to hold the empire together. The compact organization of the Christian Church appealed strongly to Constantine's political sense. It had shown its power in the days of persecution, when it had threatened to disrupt the state. Now it might be equally effective in helping to unify and preserve the empire.

Constantine's motives

3. CHURCH AND STATE: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST HERESY AND PAGANISM

The fourth century was a period of astounding growth in the Christian Church. The century opened with the persecution of the Christians, still a small minority of the population, by a pagan emperor. At its close, Christianity was the sole official religion of the empire, claiming at least the formal adherence of the great majority of the population, and protected by a Christian emperor who issued persecuting laws against pagans and all who departed in any way from the accepted doctrines of the state church.

The fourth century

But this rapid growth was not all pure gain to the church. The influx of great numbers of the indifferent or self-seeking inevitably lowered the general average of morality and religious zeal in the church, while at the same time introducing non-Christian elements into its doctrine and practice. Before the Edict of Milan, the Christians had been a picked group of earnest believers who were prepared to sacrifice something of worldly advantage, even if all were not prepared to face death, for their faith. Now it was to the advantage of all to join the triumphant religion. The easy conversion of those who were merely following the course of least resistance or of personal advantage signified no very vital change in their method of life, nor in their thought. They

Lowering of standards

clung stubbornly to ancient superstitions, translating them into terms of the new religion. The cult of a host of saints and martyrs sprang up to take the place of the many local gods of pagan mythology. The pagan who had relied on the protection of the homely gods of the hearth found similar comfort from the adoption of a patron saint. Christian celebrations were created to replace pagan feasts and holidays. For example, the date of Christmas was set on the birthday of Mithras (the unconquered Sun), which had long been a day of joyous celebration in the pagan world. The assimilation by Christianity of so much of popular belief and practice was in no small degree responsible for its almost universal acceptance during this period, but it involved the sacrifice of its early purity and simplicity.

New problems — church and state

The change made by Constantine in the status of the church raised several vexing problems, among them that of the relation of the state to the church, which was to trouble the peace of Christendom for centuries. Hitherto the church, being outside the law, had been left free and independent of governmental interference, save for the attempts to suppress it. Would it retain that freedom after Christianity had become the official religion of the empire? And further, would the emperor, himself a Christian, submit his conscience to the guidance of the church in matters of faith and morals, terms that might be extended to include almost any political act? Or would the emperor insist on controlling the policies of the church, which was growing rapidly in wealth and political influence, on the ground that an absolute ruler could not afford to give up his hold on so powerful an institution? The solution of these problems varied with the centuries, but in the fourth century and thereafter in the East, with few exceptions, the emperors asserted a practical control of the church.

Growth of dogma

Another problem, which though not new took on a new significance with the official recognition of Christianity, was raised by the necessity of defining Christian belief or dogma in an authoritative way so as to preserve the unity of the faith. In the early days of the church, Christian belief had been relatively simple, dominated by the personality and teaching of Christ. But as time passed, it became necessary to state more clearly certain points not fully explained in the Scriptures, in order to defend Christianity against pagan attacks and also to preserve the purity of the faith, which was in constant danger from the pagan ideas brought in by new converts. Most of the early controversies over points of dogma arose in the Eastern Church. The Greek mind, trained in philosophy and metaphysical speculation, was

forced by its own nature to work out clear logical statements of all debatable questions, no matter how abstract. Out of the innumerable controversies resulting from this urge toward speculation and definition, there grew up a body of recognized dogma, accepted by the universal church and called orthodox. The opinions of the minority in each case, which were condemned by the dominant party in the church, were called heterodox or heretical. The distinction between orthodoxy and heresy, between opinions accepted or rejected by the church authorities, was often decided partly by political considerations and after a bitter struggle between the opposing parties.

Both problems, the authoritative definition of dogma and the relation between church and state, arose in an acute form in the decade following the Edict of Milan as the result of a controversy which for some sixty years threatened to break up the unity of the Christian body. The Arian heresy was in its historical consequences the most important of all the variants from orthodox belief that troubled the peace of the early church. The dilemmas presented by the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation obsessed the minds of Greek Christians and caused in one way or another most of the early heresies. Was Christ, the Son of God, fully divine, of the same nature as God? Were the Father and Son, the first two persons of the Trinity, one or distinct, and the latter a creature, created in time and hence on a lower order than the former? And if created in time, how could he be re-created in finite human form? Had Christ become fully human? If not, how could his suffering save and redeem mankind? Stripped of all its involved subtleties and distinctions, the doctrine brought forward by Arius, a priest of Alexandria, about the year 318 was a denial of both the absolute divinity and the complete humanity of Christ. His argument was logical in a literal-minded way, but it would have robbed Christianity of its essential meaning. Both his supporters and opponents felt the question to be of vital importance.

The Arian heresy

When Constantine took over the government of the East after his defeat of Licinius in 323, he found the church divided into apparently irreconcilable parties. The emperor never did understand just what the argument was about, but he was quite certain that it must be stopped. He had favored Christianity and was prepared to support it still further in the hope that the well-organized church would help to unify the empire. It would have just the opposite effect, however, if the church were split into two antagonistic parties. The unity of the church was a vital political issue. To preserve that unity, one side of the argument or the other (Constantine did not

The Council of Nicaea (325)

greatly care which) must be established as orthodox, and those who would not accept it of their own free will must be forced to do so by the state. As a means of reaching an authoritative decision, the emperor called the first general or ecumenical council of the church to meet at Nicaea in 325. All the bishops were invited to attend, but only seven delegates came from the West. The majority of the bishops were opposed to Arius, and the emperor used all his influence to make the decision unanimous. The council condemned the Arians and drew up the Nicene Creed maintaining the full divinity and humanity of Christ, which with a few alterations has been accepted ever since by most Christian churches as the orthodox statement of faith. Following the council, Arius and his followers were sent into exile.

Arian reaction under Constantius (337–61)

But Arianism was by no means dead. It continued to spread through the East and among the Germanic tribes north of the frontier. Most of the later invaders of the empire were Arians. The prolonged life of the heresy was very largely due to the continued interference of the imperial government in church affairs. The next emperor in the East, Constantius (337–61), the second son of Constantine, who for a time shared the empire with his brothers Constantine II and Constans, became a convinced Arian and entered the struggle with partisan enthusiasm. The Arian bishops were recalled while the orthodox were deposed, and Athanasius, the great champion of the Nicene Creed, was forced to flee to the West. Council followed council with bewildering and contradictory results. Ammianus Marcellinus, the pagan historian, joyously remarked that "the highways were covered with galloping bishops," and prophesied the dissolution of the church. Heresy seemed about to triumph, but after the death of Constantius the Christians were temporarily reunited in opposition to a last desperate revival of paganism.

Pagan revival under Julian (361–63)

There were still many pagans in the empire. The government had taken no action against them, though Constantius had issued some oppressive edicts which were never enforced. The Roman senate and aristocracy were predominantly pagan, and most of the teachers in the schools carried on the old tradition. In fact, patriotism and literature were the strongest supports of the old religions, and many of the highest social and intellectual classes longed for a return to the ancient gods of the golden age, when Greece and Rome had been truly great. One of these, and the most ardent, came to the imperial throne in 361, Julian (called by Christian historians "the Apostate"), a nephew of the great Constantine. With the reunited empire under his rule Julian disowned the Chris-

tianity he had been forced to profess, and spent his brief reign in a vain attempt to revive all that was best in paganism and to make it the state religion. Julian was in many ways one of the noblest spirits of his age, but he was running counter to the current of the times. The Christians were not so hopelessly divided, nor the pagans so zealous, as he had hoped. He died knowing that he had failed and, according to a legend that is too good to be true, murmuring, "Galilaean, thou hast conquered!" His own legions chose a Christian, Jovian, as his successor.

Continued Arianism under Valens (364–78)

After the failure of the pagan revival, Christianity became again the imperial religion, and again the Arian controversy tore the eastern churches. On the death of Jovian after one year's reign, the generals of the army chose as emperor one of their own number, Valentinian I (364–75), who immediately gave the rule of the East to his brother Valens (364–78). The former in the orthodox West could afford to ignore the dogmatic controversy, but in the East it was impossible for the emperor to stand aside. Valens followed the example of Constantius and gave his support to the Arians, who nevertheless were losing ground through divisions and quarrels among themselves. Unlike the orthodox, they had no definite statement of their faith to hold them together. The year 378 was a momentous year for the Roman Empire. Valens fell in battle against the victorious Goths, the first of a long series of successful invaders of the empire,[1] and with him perished the last hope of Arianism.

Triumph of orthodoxy: Theodosius and Gratian

Gratian, the son of Valentinian, had already succeeded his father in the West. He now chose as his colleague in the East a Spanish count, Theodosius I (379–95). Both had been reared in the West and were strictly orthodox. As Arianism was mostly an eastern problem, it was left to Theodosius to crush it. In 380 he issued an edict threatening all heretics with legal punishment, and the following year summoned the second ecumenical council of the church at Constantinople, which confirmed the Nicene Creed and condemned Arianism. Further imperial edicts restored all orthodox bishops and forbade the Arians to hold services or build churches. Arianism was suppressed, as it had been fostered, by the power of the state. It still continued strongly among the barbarians, but within the empire its cause was lost. Meanwhile, Gratian was taking steps to stamp out paganism, and in 391 and 392 Theodosius issued stringent laws against idolatry. Sacrifice to pagan gods, whether in public or private, was to be regarded as treason, and paganism gradu-

[1] See below, page 57.

ally died out during the following century. The legal triumph of the church over heresy and paganism and its evolution from a persecuted sect to a persecuting state church were complete.

4. THE LATIN CHURCH: THE RISE OF THE PAPACY

The fifth century

The center of interest in religious history during the fifth century shifts to the West. The church in the East had conquered its most dangerous heretical opponent, though other heresies arose in profusion, springing for the most part from the attempt to define further the exact nature of the union of perfect God and perfect man (established by the Nicene Creed) in Christ. Political rivalry between the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Constantinople, who were all fighting for supremacy in the Eastern Church, added bitterness to these controversies. But in the long run peace was restored, the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, the imperial capital, was recognized, and through the patriarchs who were their creatures the emperors maintained their control of the church, which gradually sank into a stagnant and somewhat servile quiet. In the West, on the other hand, the imperial power was being weakened and finally destroyed under the shock of successive barbarian invasions, while the Latin Church was growing rapidly in organization, independence, and authority, with a theology peculiarly its own and under the leadership of the bishops of Rome, who fell heir to the universal authority abdicated by the emperors.

The Latin Church

The church at Rome and in the West generally during the first two centuries after its foundation was predominantly Greek, Christianity having spread first among the Greek-speaking commercial classes. As it was adopted more widely, however, by all classes, it necessarily drew its adherents from the Latin-speaking majority of the population. Before the end of the persecutions, the Western Church was almost entirely Latin, and the difference in language was significant of other and more important differences between the Christians of the West and their Greek brethren. The very small delegation sent by the western bishops to Nicaea in 325 shows how little interest they took in the problem which was threatening to disrupt the Eastern Church. Throughout the fourth century the gap between East and West was slowly widening. The administrative division of the empire and the founding of a new capital for the East at Constantinople were both cause and result of an actual diversity of interest. After the death of Theodosius in 395, under whom the empire had been briefly reunited,

the division into two empires was final and complete. In theory, of course, the unity of the empire was still maintained, but in actual practice East and West went their separate ways independently. And this division in the state was strengthened by a similar split in the church, though it, too, maintained its theoretical unity. The knowledge of the Greek language, essential to communication with the East and to an understanding of Greek ideas, was dying out in the West. At the same time there grew up, in the last years of the fourth century and in the fifth, a school of Latin theology and church policy, quite different from the Greek, and destined to shape the thought of western Christendom for more than a thousand years.

The Latin Church Fathers

The leaders of this movement were three men who are recognized by Latin Christianity as the greatest of the Church Fathers, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. Though differing widely in character and in the nature of their contributions, they were all three stoutly orthodox, doughty champions of the unity and authority of the Catholic Church.

Ambrose

Saint Ambrose (c. 340–97) was a practical administrator. From his father, the prefect of Gaul, he inherited the tradition of Roman government. In 374 he was elected Bishop of Milan, where the emperor was then residing, and soon became the most influential official in the Western Church. In all his relations with the government he insisted on the maxim that the emperor is *in* the church, not *over* it, and he had the courage and character to force even the great Theodosius to submission, refusing to administer the sacraments to him until he had done full penance for the massacres at Thessalonica. In his writings and his example, Ambrose left to the Western Church a priceless tradition of discipline and independence.

Jerome

His contemporary, Saint Jerome (c. 340–419) was the most learned of the three, a masterly scholar and linguist. Aside from his numerous works against heresy and his active promotion of monasticism at Rome (of which more hereafter), his great service was the translation of the Bible from the original Hebrew and Greek into forceful and eloquent Latin. This task, which occupied twenty years of arduous labor, was completed in 405. The Vulgate, as this version of the Bible is called, was soon accepted as the authoritative text by the Latin Church, as it still is by Roman Catholics, and had an incalculable influence on ecclesiastical literature during the following centuries.

Saint Augustine (354–430) was the theologian among the Fathers, the real founder of Latin theology. Born in the Roman province of Africa, he was trained in philosophy and classical literature and much

influenced by Neoplatonism before he fell under the influence of Bishop Ambrose and was converted in middle age to Christianity. In 395 he was made bishop of Hippo in Africa and spent the rest of his life in active pastoral work and in writing. His *Confessions*, written about the year 400, rank high among the world's great autobiographies, as well as among the finest works of religious inspiration. His longest work, *The City of God*, was undertaken after the sack of Rome in 410 to demonstrate that the calamities which had overtaken the empire were not due to the desertion of the ancient gods, but were merely signs that the old worldly empire was passing, to be replaced by a new spiritual empire, the Christian Church. But even more important than these were the numerous works in which he constructed a dogmatic system, in opposition to the Pelagian, Donatist, and other western heresies. Typically Latin, Augustine was not vitally interested in the metaphysical speculations that so attracted the Greeks. On the contrary, his thought revolved about the more human problem of how the individual Christian obtains salvation. And this problem he resolved into a logical and almost legal system of divine justice, in which he pictured all men as damned by the original sin inherited from the fall of Adam, were it not that some have been predestined or chosen from the beginning for salvation through Christ's sacrifice, which salvation comes to them, not by virtue of any action of their own will, for the human will is powerless, but through the working of divine grace upon those who are chosen. This became the orthodox belief, though the church never fully accepted the extreme statement of Augustinianism, and the revival of the question by Martin Luther in the sixteenth century caused a revolution in the church.

Augustine

The period which marked the growth of Latin theology witnessed also the completion of a centralized system of government in the Western Church. The building of a clerical hierarchy of ascending offices was a matter of slow growth, in which the church followed the lines of imperial administration. Within each Roman *civitas* or municipality since the second century, the bishop had been recognized as the supreme authority in the church. As it grew in size and wealth, lower orders of clergy were created, priests who administered sacraments and cared for the spiritual welfare of the flock, and deacons who were responsible for financial affairs, all under the rule of the bishop. The next step was to create some higher authority that could establish uniformity in belief and practice and enforce discipline over these isolated communities. In the third century councils of all the bishops in a given province of the empire were fairly com-

Organization of the Latin Church

mon. By the end of the fourth century the bishop of the provincial capital, who presided at these councils, had been recognized as the superior of the bishops in his province, with the title of Metropolitan or Archbishop. The Latin genius for government, trained to think in terms of a centralized administration and reinforced by the dangers of disunion in a time of frequent heresies and barbarian invasions, demanded some still higher authority over the whole church. This led to the elevation during the fifth century of the Bishop of Rome to a position of supremacy in the Latin Church, comparable to that of the emperor in the civil government.

The Bishops of Rome

As head of the Christian community in the ancient capital of the empire, the Bishop of Rome occupied a position of great political influence at home and of prestige abroad. Already in the fourth century, the pagan Ammianus Marcellinus had noted, with a mixture of admiration and contempt, the wealth, pomp, and power of the Roman bishops. Their importance was greatly increased after 402, when the emperor deserted the capital to establish his court in the impregnable city of Ravenna, sheltered by its impassable marshes.[1] Thereafter the bishops became the most powerful officials in the city. After the sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410, Bishop Innocent I (402–17) took the lead in directing and aiding reconstruction. It was Innocent, too, who first definitely asserted his right to supremacy in the Western Church. From the beginning of his reign, he claimed that all the churches of the West owed obedience to the Roman bishop and that in all matters of discipline and usage they should accept his decisions and follow the custom of the Roman Church.

Leo the Great

From this point on, events moved rapidly. The bishops in all the provinces were assuming greater powers, due to the collapse of the imperial administration under the shock of successive invasions. In many cities they took over the duties of the imperial officers, acting as judges and governors and using their influence to protect the citizens from their barbarian conquerors. With these new responsibilities they felt more keenly the need of moral support from some higher authority and looked more eagerly to the Roman bishop for guidance. Thus by the middle of the century, Leo the Great (440–61) was able to exercise the full authority over the church, to which as pope (for we may now use that term for the Bishop of Rome) he felt entitled, and that authority was given imperial sanction by a law of Valentinian III, conferring upon him jurisdiction over all the bishops in the Western Empire. Leo I was in many ways the most impressive figure of his

[1] See below, page 58.

generation, a man of remarkable energy, courage, and statesmanlike vision. When Rome was threatened by the Huns in 451 and sacked by the Vandals in 455, it was Leo who carried out the negotiations, successful in the former case, on behalf of the defenseless city. With inflexible purpose he forced the bishops of the farthest provinces to obedience, and in the heretical controversies of his time, he boldly asserted his right to settle the questions at issue as the final authority in matters of faith. The papacy had still to pass through many vicissitudes of fortune before it reached its full growth, but from Leo's time on, Western Christendom looked to Rome for leadership.

We have seen why some supreme authority in the church was necessary and have traced the steps by which it arose. Before leaving the subject, let us examine some of the reasons why that supremacy should have been given to the Bishop of Rome rather than to any other bishop, and also the theories which bolstered up his claims. From the first the Roman bishop occupied a unique position in the church, as heir in a way to the authority both of Augustus, the founder of the Roman Empire, and of Saint Peter, the legendary founder of the Roman Church. The dominant position of Rome in the empire, as the capital and center of imperial administration, gave to the head of the Christian community there a prestige which no other bishop could equal, and made it natural that he should become the head also of the ecclesiastical administration. Moreover, according to the legend generally accepted in the church, the Apostle Peter had been the first Bishop of Rome, and to him, as the Bible tells, Christ had given the care of his flock and the keys of heaven and hell, saying, "On this rock will I build my church." As successors to Peter, the Bishops of Rome claimed the full powers given to him by Christ. The Roman bishopric was generally known as the See of Peter or the Apostolic See. Finally their rise to supremacy was aided by the reputation for orthodoxy, built up by a long line of Roman bishops, who, with the Latin instinct for law and authority, stood steadfastly by the letter of the orthodox creeds.

Reasons for the supremacy of Bishops of Rome

5. THE GROWTH OF MONASTICISM

One further aspect of Christian life and thought, and not the least important, came into existence during this period, i.e., monastic as opposed to secular or worldly Christianity. In almost every religion which has deeply touched the emotions of men, and where the ideal of spiritual communion with God has stirred the imagination,

The ascetic impulse

some earnest souls have felt an irresistible impulse to renounce all worldly or material pleasures, in order that they might concentrate their desires on the things of the spirit, and to undergo physical suffering, so that they might conquer their bodily desires and give free play to spiritual aspiration. The practice of this renunciation and voluntary suffering is called asceticism. It was not a uniquely Christian impulse (indeed, there is no more than a suggestion of it in the teaching of Christ), but was common in other religions of eastern origin. During the third century, it was given strong support by the Neoplatonic philosophy, of which we have already spoken. In popular Neoplatonism there arose, as a sort of by-product, an oriental concept of two antagonistic forces at war in the universe, spirit and matter. This is known as dualism. It led to the idea that all material interests and all physical appetites or passions are by their nature evil, and that they must be overcome before the spirit, purified by that conquest, can reach its desired harmony with God. This conception coincided with certain aspects of Christian thought and in turn had a powerful effect upon it. Dualism in greater or less degree remained a constant factor in Christianity until at least the end of the Middle Ages. Over against God and the spirit, it set up an unholy trinity of the world, the flesh, and the devil. The truly religious life became that which forswore all connection with these three.

Monasticism

About the beginning of the fourth century, when the church had passed from persecution to triumph, this ascetic impulse took on a new and more definite form. The crown and rewards of martyrdom were no longer available for those who took their religion hard. The church was no longer a community apart from the world, but had embraced the world. The more deeply religious, then, who felt it necessary to withdraw from the world, were forced also to withdraw in a measure from the church and to seek in solitude, or in the company of an inner circle of the devout, that freedom from worldly contacts that had been enjoyed by the early church. These motives, strengthened by the growth of the ascetic ideal, drove men out into the desert to live as hermits and later to form communities with those of like mind. They were the first Christian monks.

In the East

Monasticism began, as was natural, in the East, the home of asceticism. The first monk of whom we have definite knowledge was Saint Anthony, an Egyptian, who in the last years of the third century fled to the Thebaid desert from the world that was too much with him. He lived as a hermit in constant prayer, fasting, and self-inflicted suffering. The tales of his holiness, his visions, and the miracles attributed to him spread through Egypt and attracted others

in great numbers to follow his example. The natural instinct of men to live in some kind of organized society soon asserted itself, even among these hermits who had fled from society, and before 325 the monk Pachomius founded the first monastic community with a definite rule of government. As monasticism spread from Egypt throughout the East, thousands embraced it, the majority preferring the orderly communal life with provisions for daily labor prescribed by the rule of Pachomius. There were still many hermits, however, and among these asceticism was often carried to the most eccentric extremes. The classic example is that of Saint Simeon Stylites, who in the fifth century spent thirty-six years on top of a pillar, exposed to the weather and without room even to lie down. But for the most part, the communal life triumphed over the solitary, and an improved rule written by Saint Basil before his death in 374 was adopted by most monks in the Greek Church.

In the West

Western monasticism was originally an importation from the East, though it soon became acclimatized and developed along characteristically Latin lines. Introduced at Rome, apparently by Saint Athanasius in 339, it soon attracted numbers of both men and women. At first there was some opposition to what seemed an antisocial movement, and Saint Jerome, the most vigorous and influential champion of the monastic ideal in the West, aroused a good deal of antagonism by encouraging a number of noble Roman ladies to desert the world. But once started, monasticism could not be checked. It became increasingly popular, spreading from Italy to all the provinces, and appealing to a variety of motives. The ascetic impulse was still, of course, the strongest, but there were many who embraced monasticism as a means of escape from intolerable social or family obligations. The movement here passed through the same course of development from the solitary to the communal life as in the East, but western monasticism was always more practical and orderly, laying greater stress on the necessity of discipline and labor. The monks of the Latin Church, too, were much less interested than the Greeks in theological speculation and took less part in the controversies of the age.

Saint Benedict and his rule

To trace the full development of monasticism in the West into a uniform and regulated order, we must go a little beyond the chronological bounds set for this chapter to the sixth century and the epoch-making work of Saint Benedict of Nursia. Born about 480 of a wealthy and noble Italian family, Benedict fled at an early age from the temptations and distractions of the world and, like so many of his generation, sought salvation in a hermit's cell. For three years he lived a life of rigid asceticism and complete solitude,

his home an almost inaccessible cave in a precipitous rock. But his very efforts to escape from the fellowship of men brought men to him. The fame of his holiness attracted numbers of monks to his vicinity, who begged him to be their leader. About the year 520 he founded the famous monastery of Monte Cassino, and some time later wrote for the guidance of his monks the rule which was to regulate monastic life for centuries. Wherever the rule was adopted, it checked the restless wandering and the dangerously irregular asceticism of the monks. It provided that the monk should take the three fundamental vows of perpetual poverty, chastity, and obedience, and that thereafter he was bound to remain in the same monastery for life, to obey his superior with humility in all things, to give up all private property, and to cut himself off from all relations with people, even his own family, outside the monastery. Each monastery was a separate institution, ruled by an abbot who was elected by the other monks for life. His powers were limited only by the provisions of the rule and by the supervision of the bishop of the diocese.

Life in a Benedictine monastery

Each Benedictine monastery was a small self-contained community. Its members all lived under the same roof and shared the same food at a common table. Saint Benedict had had personal experience of the dangers and temptations that accompanied too much solitude, idleness, and unbridled asceticism. He therefore provided for a full schedule of daily activity and forbade all unusual ascetic practices. Part of each day, a large part we would think, was devoted to prayer, meditation, and religious services at prescribed hours, while six or seven hours were to be spent in manual labor in the fields or about the house. Food, though not of a luxurious sort, was to be provided in sufficient quantities to maintain health. There were also special rules for the care of the sick or aged. It was an austere, hard life, but not an impossible one.

The sanity, moderation, and orderly government of the Benedictine rule appealed strongly to the western mind, and in the following centuries it was adopted by all monasteries in the West, with the exception of those in Ireland. It was also applied to the nunneries. As a result of the provisions for labor in the fields and in copying manuscripts, the monasteries became centers of civilization everywhere throughout the dark ages, and played an important part in cultivating waste land, improving agricultural methods, and preserving literary traditions.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS OF THE EMPIRE

BEYOND the frontiers of the empire lay the barbarian world, often hostile and always a menace to Roman civilization. Roman statesmen could never forget for long the danger threatening from the north, where restless and warlike German tribes milled along the Rhine-Danube border, and time and again, since before the days of Julius Caesar, the legions were called upon to expel barbarian invaders. Until the fourth century they were always successful, but the task became increasingly difficult, for the empire was fast weakening as a result of the general decline. Meanwhile, great numbers of Germans had entered the empire peacefully, in small groups, to take service in the army or to work on the large estates. Having settled within the empire, these barbarian immigrants were, in course of time, more or less Romanized, though as their numbers increased they undoubtedly helped to lower the general level of Roman civilization. But if the Roman melting pot could assimilate a slow barbarian infiltration, it could not absorb whole nations, when once the barbarians succeeded in making an armed invasion. And the mass invasions began in 376, when the Visigoths crossed the Danube frontier, setting an example that was soon followed by other tribes all along the northern border. In wave after wave, the barbarian host broke across the shattered frontier, until within a century the Western Empire was submerged beneath the barbarian flood.

Thus was added to the basic Roman culture, modified by Christianity, the third ingredient which went to make up medieval civilization, the influence of the Germanic peoples who from this time on were the dominant force in western Europe.

1. THE EARLY GERMANS

Origins

The original home of the German or Teuton race was in all probability the northern part of modern Germany near the Baltic coast and across the sea in the southern portion of the Scandinavian peninsula. Thence they expanded slowly west to the North Sea, southwest, south, and southeast to the Rhine and the Danube and east to the Vistula. In Caesar's time they occupied all the land he knew beyond the Rhine.

Our knowledge of the early Germans before they impinged upon the Roman Republic, and thus made their first tumultuous entrance upo the stage of history, is necessarily vague and uncertain. It belongs to the field of archeology rather than of history. Yet from the implements, weapons, and bones excavated from tombs and village sites we can learn something of their daily life and trace the general trend of their civilization. For actual historical information we are indebted chiefly to a brief account in Caesar's *De Bello Gallico*, known to every student who ever studied Latin, and to a more full and circumstantial account of their manners and customs in the *Germania*, written by the Roman historian Tacitus in A.D. 98. The reliability of the *Germania* has been the subject of endless debate. But even if we accept it as reliable, it must not be forgotten that nearly three centuries of contact with Roman civilization and of development in social and political customs passed between the date of Tacitus' work and the first successful invasions of the empire. Some further information may be gleaned from the German laws, written down later but based on ancient custom. The mass of Anglo-Saxon, German, and Scandinavian folk literature, too, in its earliest origins dates back to the period of the invasions and supplies us with valuable material with which to reconstruct the characteristics of the German of that period.

Sources of our knowledge

The Germans were a tall, powerfully built race. To the small, though wiry, Roman they seemed veritable giants. Their fair skin, blue eyes, and long reddish or golden-blond hair were in equally strong contrast to the swarthy races of the Mediterranean Basin. Hardy and robust they must have been, for none but the strong could survive in that land of forest and swamp, with heavy rain in summer and bitter cold in winter. Their temper reflects the stern conditions of their life. Though hard-headed and canny enough in many ways, they were of a moody and fitful temperament, given to hard drinking, reckless gambling, and fighting. Through all the earliest Germanic literature there runs a persistent strain of melancholy, illuminated by flashes of fierce delight in the heady joys of battle. Their virtues, like their vices, were those of a rough, primitive race. Physical courage, loyalty, and hospitality were their prime virtues, as they have always been among men who are called upon daily to pit their strength against the forces of nature and who must depend on their fellows for existence amidst constant dangers from a hard climate, flood, famine, and hostile neighbors.

Appearance and characteristics

At the time of our first historical knowledge of them, the Germans had already reached the iron age of civilization and had begun the practice

of agriculture, though Tacitus later describes them as still depending for the most part on hunting and on their herds of cattle and swine for their food. They already lived in village communities and, as time passed, undoubtedly developed a more settled way of life with constantly increasing cultivation of the soil. Their agricultural methods, however, remained crude and wasteful. They had very few industries and those the most primitive. The smith, who made tools and weapons, practiced almost the only honored trade. The freeman preferred to devote his time to hunting and fighting, leaving the work in the fields and the making of clothing from skins, wool, and linen to the women and slaves.

Manner of life

Tacitus divides the Germans whom he knew into four social classes: nobles, freemen (evidently the great majority), freedmen (who were little better than serfs), and slaves. Modern historians have disagreed violently as to the extent of the freedom enjoyed by the mass of the early German people. In all probability the gap between the noble and freeman widened as the Germans became more civilized and gained a more coherent organization, with social and political power becoming more closely concentrated in the hands of the noble families. The family, as in most societies, was the social unit; but there was also a larger kinship group, the *sib* or clan, composed of families related originally by blood ties. Members of the clan felt a mutual responsibility for the welfare of their fellows, avenged the death of their kinsmen and supported them in lawsuits or in battle. This clannish loyalty was necessary to the protection of the individual at a time when central government was still loosely and ineffectively organized. Distinct from these family or kinship groups was the *comitatus*, a band of warriors who attached themselves voluntarily to some chief renowned for his courage and skill in war. These "comrades" were attached to their chief by a strong bond of personal loyalty; they fought at his bidding and considered it a disgrace to survive him if he were killed in battle. In return he supplied them with arms, clothing, food, and plunder.

Social organization

The smallest political unit was the village community, which enjoyed a considerable degree of self-government. The largest unit in the early days was the tribe. In the primitive state described by Tacitus the government of the tribe was in the hands of a council of chiefs, of noble family or distinguished by their courage or wisdom; but all important questions were discussed and decided in an assembly of all the freemen (that is, of the warriors) presided over by the chiefs. During the period of migration, many of the tribes united to form larger groups or nations, and in the process the freemen apparently

Political organization

lost much of their earlier independence and share in the government. The dangers which attended the mass migration of a whole people demanded a more highly centralized government than had been needed in the early days. Before the age of the invasions nearly all the Germanic nations were ruled by kings with the aid of an advisory council of chieftains. The development of kingship was by no means uniform among all the tribes, and the powers of the king were probably not clearly defined, but depended on the character of the individual king and upon circumstances of stress or danger.

Law and justice

The social and political ideas of the early Germans were almost completely personal, having to do with family relationships or personal loyalties to a chief or king. The concept of a territorial state as a political entity had not yet arisen among them. This personal character is reflected in their laws, which dealt mostly with injuries or obligations between individuals. Their laws, moreover, were not the product of legislation on the part of the government, as in a modern state, but were made up of immemorial customs of the tribe, handed down from generation to generation, though not put into written form till after the invasions. A crime was considered, not as an offense against the state, but as an injury to an individual, for which the law gave him a means of procuring satisfaction. A trial or lawsuit, then, was a contest between two individuals, with the court acting as the arbiter. There was little attempt to sift evidence in weighing the justice of a complaint. The decision was arrived at by a formal process, in which one party or the other justified himself by a solemn oath, at times aided by the oaths of a number of his friends, or by undergoing some kind of ordeal. The penalty for the guilty was fixed by custom, and usually consisted of a fine. Even murder could be compensated by the payment of a fine or *wergeld* (man-money), the amount of which was fixed according to the rank of the murdered man.

2. THE MIGRATIONS BEFORE 376

Cause of the migrations

The "Wandering of the Nations," as the German scholars call the great migrations into the empire after 376, had in reality begun long before that date. For centuries the increase in population had driven German tribes to seek more fertile or less thickly populated lands, while the pressure of expansion from the interior of Germany piled up the southern tribes against the barrier of the Roman frontier. Germany was not densely populated according to modern standards, but it was a land of forest and swamp, and the early Germans

with their primitive methods of agriculture and their reliance on herds and hunting for the greater part of their food needed a great deal of land to support them. Their margin of subsistence was always small, and any increase in population soon caused overcrowding. The migration of a whole tribe or nation, driven from their territory by the pressure of other tribes behind them or begun of their own volition in search of more favorable conditions, was made more easy by the fact that they were not entirely dependent on agriculture and had neither the settled habits nor the traditional attachment to their land of a race of farmers. Sometimes the migrations were peaceful and unopposed; more often they involved the conquest or expulsion of the tribes who occupied the new territory.

Infiltration of Germans into the empire

As the press of population increased outside the frontiers of the empire, great numbers of Germans drifted across the border to seek employment in the Roman army or to settle peacefully in the rich and protected provinces. By the time of Constantine, the barbarian element in the army had begun to predominate over the Roman, and during the following two centuries, in the West at least, the imperial soldiers and officers, including those of the highest rank, were mostly German. Of those who entered peacefully as farmers, some were given land by the state in deserted regions, while others became tenants on the large private estates. In either case they went to swell the *coloni* class of half-servile agricultural workers. Still others were allowed to enter by tribes as *foederati* or allies, and were given grants of land by the government within the frontier on condition that they should aid in repelling further invasions. This gradual infiltration of barbarian elements into the empire played its part in lowering the level of Roman culture, but it also helped to ease the shock of the great invasions, for by that time the Roman provincials were already acquainted with German customs and the invaders found many of their own race, partly Romanized, already settled in the provinces.

Position of the nations in the fourth century

By the fourth century, the restless wandering of the German people, attended by conquests and alliances, had led to the formation of several more or less clearly defined nations, each composed of an amalgamation or federation of smaller tribes. It will be of service in tracing their later history to note the position of the more important of these on the eve of the great invasions.[1] Of the West German tribes (those whose original home was the central southern coast of the Baltic), two great confederations had formed along the Rhine, the Franks on the lower and the Alamanni on the upper part of the river. In the northwest, along the coast of the

[1] See map, page 6.

North Sea and in the Danish peninsula, were the Saxons, Angles, and Jutes who were later to invade England. Of the East Germans (those whose early home was apparently the southern part of the Scandinavian peninsula and the Baltic coast between the Oder and the Vistula), one nation, the Burgundians, had drifted westward to the Main, between the Franks and the Alamanni. The rest had moved south and east, the Vandals to the upper reaches of the Oder, with the Lombards still farther east between the Oder and the Vistula, while far to the southeast were the two great Gothic nations stretched all along the lower Danube and the Black Sea.

The Goths

By the middle of the third century, the Goths had completed their long migration from the Baltic shores and had divided into two separate nations, the Visigoths or West Goths and the Ostrogoths or East Goths. The river Dniester formed the boundary between them. Of these the Visigoths were brought into closest touch with the empire, which lay just across the Danube from them, and they were the first barbarian nation to invade the empire successfully. During the first three quarters of the fourth century, except for a brief period, 367–69, the Visigoths were on peaceful terms with the Romans and a considerable trade sprang up between them.

Introduction of Christianity

It was during this quiet interlude that Christianity was first introduced among the Goths, gaining great numbers of converts. Credit for this must be given in large measure to Bishop Ulfilas, who began his forty years of active missionary work among the Visigoths in 341. He was not himself of pure Gothic blood, being descended from a Christian family of Cappadocia taken prisoners by the Goths in a raid of the preceding century, but he was a Goth at heart. As a young man he had been taken to Constantinople, apparently as a hostage, and there received a good education in Latin and Greek. Returning as a missionary to his people, he was amazingly successful. As part of his missionary activity, he translated the Bible into the Gothic tongue, inventing an alphabet modeled on the Greek for the purpose and thereby laying the foundation for a written German literature. Hitherto the Germans had had no writing except the crude *runic* letters, suitable only for carving brief inscriptions on tools or weapons. The translation of so large a work as the Bible into a language which had no traditions of writing must have involved immense labor, even though the gentle bishop did quietly omit the more bellicose tales from the Book of Kings as an unnecessary stimulant to a people already too prone to war. Modern philologists owe a great debt to Ulfilas for this specimen of one of the Germanic dialects three centuries earlier than any other

that has survived. Through the agency of the Gothic Bible, seconded by the personal influence of Ulfilas, Christianity spread widely through the Visigothic people and from them to the Ostrogoths, Vandals, and other German nations before the end of the fourth century. But it was the Arian form of Christianity, in which Ulfilas himself had been trained during the period of Arian domination in the East. As a result, almost all the barbarian invaders of the empire were either pagans or Arian heretics, a fact which added further strain to their relations with the orthodox Romans among whom they settled.

The Huns

The final invasion of the empire by the Visigoths was not undertaken of their own volition nor with the aim of conquest, but was forced upon them by fear of the Huns, a horde of Asiatic barbarians, new to Europe. These pastoral nomads were of Mongolian or Tartar race. For centuries they had driven their herds in yearly migrations from the northern to the southern steppes of central Asia, following the seasonal changes in pasture. Forced at last by some obscure disturbance among the races of the interior of Asia to seek new pastures, they launched themselves westward into Europe, falling upon the flank and rear of the Ostrogothic Kingdom about the year 371. Short, broad-shouldered, and bow-legged from much riding, with yellow skin and hideous, beardless faces marked by deep scars inflicted in childhood, unspeakably dirty, thus did the Gothic historian Jordanes later describe these fierce and untamed savages, who seemed more barbarous to the Goth than did the Germanic barbarian to the civilized Roman. The Huns lived, fought, ate, and even slept on horseback. They were far more mobile than the German tribes and their ability to cover great distances in incredibly short time led the Goths to exaggerate their numbers. Their hideous appearance and the fierceness of their mounted attack, too, broke the spirit of the superstitious Goths. By 375 they had conquered the Ostrogoths, and the following year the Visigoths, after a vain attempt to check them at the boundary line of the Dniester, turned in panic to seek protection within the Roman frontier.

3. THE INVASION OF THE VISIGOTHS

Invasion and war (376–78)

In 376, when the Visigoths petitioned for permission to cross the Danube and settle within the empire, the imperial government had been seriously weakened by the recent death of Valentinian I, the able and energetic emperor of the West and the dominating spirit in the imperial partnership. His younger brother Valens, the eastern emperor, was thus left to meet the crisis on his own

responsibility, for he could not accept the guidance of the youthful though brilliant Gratian, who had succeeded his father in the West, as he had always done that of Valentinian. The dilemma presented by the Goths might well have troubled a stronger man than the cautious and vacillating Valens. To refuse their petition was to risk a serious war; to grant it was to admit a potential enemy to the heart of the empire. After a long and to the Goths a maddening delay, he decided to admit them on condition that they surrender their arms, give hostages, and settle as *foederati* pledged to defend the frontier. All might yet have been well had these terms, humiliating though they were to a warlike race, been strictly enforced. But the corrupt and avaricious officials who supervised the transportation of the barbarians across the Danube neglected to secure their arms, while at the same time plundering them and taking many of their young men and women as slaves. Moreover, no provision was made for feeding the host. Within a year the Visigoths, enraged by this treatment and made desperate by famine, broke their oath of allegiance and set out to plunder Thrace.

Battle of Hadrianople (378)

Meanwhile, in the West, Gratian was busy repelling an invasion of the Alamanni on the Rhine and was unable to bring aid to the East till late in the summer of 378. By that time Valens had finally arrived on the scene and had taken command of his army at Hadrianople. Jealous of his nephew's victory in Gaul, Valens decided to engage the Gothic army himself without waiting for the reinforcements which Gratian was bringing from the West. It was a disastrous decision. Before nightfall the emperor and two thirds of his army were slain and the remainder scattered. The battle of Hadrianople marks the beginning of an epoch. For the first time a barbarian host had defeated and almost annihilated the invincible Roman army.

The Visigoths and Theodosius (379–95)

The victorious Goths soon found that, though they could ravage the open country at will, they could not capture the walled towns nor consolidate their conquests. The new emperor of the East, Theodosius I, who had been chosen by Gratian as his colleague, was soon able to restore the peace. By 382 the Visigoths were settled in Thrace as *foederati* or allies, retaining their own customs and government. Under the firm rule of Theodosius, the East enjoyed a period of quiet, but in the West there was turmoil and confusion. Two successive revolts of the legions in Britain and Gaul led to the death of Gratian (383) and of his younger brother and successor Valentinian II (392). On both occasions Theodosius marched west to crush the usurping emperors who had been raised by

the army. The leader of the second revolt was one of the emperor's most trusted generals, a Frank named Arbogast, the first of the barbarian emperor-makers. For a few months after his campaign against Arbogast and his puppet emperor in 394, Theodosius ruled over the whole empire. But it was divided again after his death between his two incompetent sons, Arcadius (395–408), who took the eastern half, and Honorius (395–423), who, though only ten years old, became the nominal ruler of the West.

Alaric and Stilicho (395–408)

With the death of the great Theodosius, the Roman Empire fell upon evil times. The Visigoths, under the leadership of a young chief named Alaric who was probably raised to the kingship at this time, immediately broke the peace and set out on a plundering expedition through Thrace, Macedonia, and Greece. Alaric was no wild barbarian chieftain, but a soldier trained in the Roman army. He had commanded the Gothic auxiliaries in Theodosius' last campaign and may have turned against the empire through disappointment in not receiving a higher office as a reward for his services. Arcadius seemed helpless to defend his empire, but in the West there was one strong statesman, the commander-in-chief Stilicho, a Vandal who had risen to the highest command in the Roman army under Theodosius, married the late emperor's niece, and now acted as regent for the child Honorius. Stilicho twice marched against the Visigoths, but was prevented from crushing them by the jealousy of Arcadius and the pressure of revolts in the West. Alaric was given some military or governmental post in Illyricum, and from 397 to 401 he settled with his people in the Balkans between the upper Danube and the Adriatic. He now turned his attention to Italy and invaded it in 401 and 403, only to be driven back by Stilicho. Meanwhile, the western frontiers were falling, left unprotected as the legions were called in to defend Italy. In 406 the Vandals, with a host of allies from other tribes, swept across Gaul to the Pyrenees and later entered Spain. In 407 there was another revolt of the remaining legions in Britain and Gaul. And in 408, as though to complete the chaos, Honorius was persuaded to decree the death of Stilicho. The Vandal general, whatever his private ambitions or designs may have been (he had married his daughter to Honorius and there is something suspicious about his repeated failure to crush Alaric when he had him at his mercy), had proved himself the one man who could hold the barbarians in check. His death opened the gates of Italy to the Visigoths.

Alaric met with little opposition as he led his people down into Italy. The emperor had taken refuge behind the marshes that surround Ra-

venna; the army was disrupted; and Rome was at the mercy of the Goth. By surrounding the helpless city and cutting off supplies, Alaric soon wrung a large ransom from the terrified inhabitants. He then tried to make peace with the emperor, but Honorius, himself safe in Ravenna, refused to meet his terms. In disgust the Visigothic king again besieged Rome and forced the senate to accept an emperor of his own nomination, one Attalus, a Roman noble. But Attalus proved more intractable than Alaric had anticipated and was soon removed from his precarious dignity. As Honorius still refused, with all the stubbornness of a weak nature, to grant Alaric's demand for land, the latter again marched on Rome, captured it, and gave it over to his followers to plunder. The sack of Rome, the ancient capital of the world empire, shook the morale of the Romans as perhaps nothing else could have done. We have seen how it inspired Saint Augustine to write a defense of Christianity against the charge that the disaster had been caused by the desertion of the old gods. After pillaging the city for three days, the Visigoths moved on to southern Italy laden with plunder. Alaric probably intended to pass over to Africa, but his plans were cut short by his premature death late in 410.

Alaric invades Italy (408–10)

Sack of Rome (410)

The Visigoths, now ruled by Alaric's brother-in-law Ataulf, seem to have wandered aimlessly about for a time, finally crossing in 412 from northern Italy into Gaul. For some time their relations with Rome remained uncertain. In 414 a crisis was caused by the marriage of Ataulf to Galla Placidia, the sister of Honorius, who had been taken from Rome as a prisoner. The emperor was opposed to the marriage, but more friendly relations were restored after the death of Ataulf in the following year. Under the new king Wallia, the Visigoths fought against the Vandals in Spain as allies of the empire, and in 418 or 419 were recognized as *foederati*, forming a kingdom in southwestern Gaul between the Loire and the Pyrenees. From there they later expanded into Spain and by about the middle of the century had occupied the whole peninsula, except the northwest corner. The Visigoth Kingdom continued in Gaul until the coming of the Franks in the early years of the sixth century and in Spain till the Mohammedan invasion of 711. In the part of Gaul ceded to them by Honorius, the Goths took possession of two thirds of the land, leaving one third of each estate to the original owners, who were also allowed to remain under Roman administration.

Visigothic Kingdom in Gaul and Spain

4. THE VANDALS AND HUNS AND THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE

The settlement of the Visigoths in Gaul was followed by a brief period of comparative stability on the part of the barbarian invaders, but it was soon broken by the renewed migration of another Germanic nation, destined to rob the empire of some of her richest provinces. The Vandals, who had crossed from eastern Germany to Spain in the great invasion of 406, had finally been driven to the southern part of the peninsula by the combined force of the Visigoths and the imperial troops. Thence they cast longing eyes across the Straits of Gibraltar toward the rich grain fields and wealthy cities of the North African provinces. Hitherto the Vandals had met with no great success in their wanderings. On the eve of their departure from Spain, however, they acquired, in the person of the terrible Gaiseric (428–77), a king who was to infuse new life into his people and to lead them to victory for nearly half a century. Allowing for the exaggeration of contemporary historians, who regarded him as a bigoted Arian heretic and fierce persecutor of the orthodox, Gaiseric still stands out as one of the most ruthless, if also the most far-sighted and capable, of the German leaders of this period. Taking advantage of the disturbance caused by a rebellion of the Count of Africa, and according to tradition invited by him to interfere, the new king of the Vandals led his nation across the straits in 429 and overran the whole North African seaboard, devastating the land as he went. The death of the aged Saint Augustine during the siege of Hippo is one of the memorable events of these tragic years. The emperor was powerless to stem the tide, and in 435 was forced to recognize the Vandals as *foederati*.

The Vandals invade Africa (429)

But Gaiseric was not long content with partial success. The capture of Carthage in 439, the largest city and most important harbor on the African coast, completed his conquests. Three years later the emperor ceded the North African provinces to him. The Vandals now turned to the sea in search of further plunder. Using Carthage as a naval base, their ships preyed upon Roman commerce and the unprotected coast towns of the Mediterranean. This systematic piracy struck a deadly blow to the expiring commerce of the empire, while the loss of corn and taxes from the African provinces further depleted the already exhausted imperial treasury. The Vandal Kingdom continued to flourish for nearly a century, to be finally destroyed in 534 by the victorious armies of Justinian.[1]

Vandal Kingdom in Africa

[1] See below, page 74.

While Africa was being wrenched away, the empire maintained a precarious hold on Italy and part of Gaul, though all its powers were declining with ever-increasing rapidity. The death of Honorius was followed by the reign of a usurper, but in 425 the house of Theodosius was restored. Galla Placidia, the widow of Ataulf, had married the Roman general Constantius, and now, once more a widow, returned to Ravenna with her infant son Valentinian III (425–55). For a decade she ruled as regent and thereafter continued to exercise a strong influence over her incompetent and dissolute son until her death in 450. During this period the outstanding figure in the Western Empire was the general Aëtius. A Roman provincial, though married to a Gothic princess, he had spent some years as a hostage to the Huns. For years he maintained a close friendship with the ruling family of the Huns and relied on Hunnish mercenaries for support against the emperor, when he was out of favor, or against the barbarians in Gaul, when he was in the imperial service. Galla Placidia was suspicious of his loyalty, but she was forced to give him command of Gaul and to make him Master of the Soldiers in 429. From that time on, save for one brief period when an attempt to depose him led to civil war, Aëtius acted as prime minister of the crown, the real ruler of the Western Empire. He showed little interest in Africa, but concentrated his attentions on Gaul, where he succeeded in keeping the barbarians in check. He prevented the expansion of the Visigoth Kingdom; repelled the Franks; and with the aid of the Huns crushed the Burgundians, transplanting the defeated nation to southeastern Gaul (443), where they founded a federate kingdom between the Rhone and the Alps.

Italy and Gaul (425–50)

Meanwhile, the Huns, those fierce Asiatic nomads who had driven the Visigoths across the Roman frontier, had organized a great marauding empire to the north of the Black Sea and the Danube. Here they hung like a threatening cloud over the Eastern Empire, while Theodosius II (408–50), the son of Arcadius and almost as weak as his father, sought to placate them by the payment of tribute. About 433, the famous Attila came to rule over the united Hun tribes, the Ostrogoths, and the other subjugated European barbarians, increasing the menace by the force of a keen predatory mind and a dominating personality. Attila soon forced Theodosius to double the tribute, but for some years the relations between the powerful Mongol and Constantinople remained peaceful enough. After 440, however, the Huns began to threaten the Eastern Empire more seriously, and throughout the following decade repeatedly ravaged the provinces south of the Danube, exacting a higher tribute on each occasion. This systematic

The Huns under Attila (433–53)

blackmail was brought to an end by the death of Theodosius. Marcian (450–57), his successor, refused to pay the Hun-money and Attila, perhaps judging the devastated eastern provinces scarcely worth further plundering, turned his attention to the West.

Attila invades Gaul and Italy (451–52)

The invasion of Gaul by Attila in 451 spread terror through the West, rousing Romans and barbarians to present a united front against the dreaded "Scourge of God." Having crossed the Rhine to the north of Mayence, Attila rode southwest into the heart of Gaul. Near Troyes in the Mauriac plain he met an allied army hastily gathered together by Aëtius and composed of Roman troops, Visigoths, Burgundians, and other *foederati*. In the bloody battle which followed (popularly but inaccurately called the battle of Châlons), neither side could claim a clear victory. It was generally recognized as a Roman triumph, however, as Attila withdrew from Gaul to his capital in what is now called Hungary. The following year he returned to the attack, this time swooping down over the Julian Alps into Italy, where there were no German federates to aid the disorganized Roman army. After sacking several cities in northern Italy, Attila again retired without attempting to capture the defenseless city of Rome. Legend has accorded the credit for saving the city to Pope Leo I, who held an interview with Attila and persuaded him to spare it. Famine and fever among his plunder-laden troops, however, probably weighed more heavily with the Hun than did the arguments of the good bishop. At any rate, he returned to the Danube and died there a year later.

Disappearance of the Huns

Attila's empire, which had been held together by his strong personality, fell to pieces immediately after his death. It had never become an organized territorial state, nor had it struck roots into the soil. The vassal tribes rebelled and the Huns themselves were soon divided. Within a few years they had broken up or drifted eastward, disappearing into the shadows that for the modern historian veil eastern Europe and the Asiatic steppes. They had passed through Europe like an evil wind, but left no permanent mark, save for the débris of the empire they had helped to destroy.

The Vandals sack Rome (455)

With the retreat of Attila, the Romans breathed freely again, but not for long. Within two years Rome was in more serious danger than ever. Aëtius, who had never been fully trusted by the emperor, was assassinated by him in 454, and his murder was soon avenged by the assassination of Valentinian himself. So ended the dynasty of the great Theodosius, and in the paralysis of imperial government which followed, Gaiseric the Vandal saw an opportunity too promising to be ignored. Sailing across from Carthage, the

Vandals entered Rome without opposition. Again Leo I interceded with the barbarian, gaining a promise from Gaiseric that the lives of the inhabitants would be spared. For two weeks the Vandals looted the still wealthy city at their leisure, after which they returned home, leaving Rome impoverished.

The last years of the Western Empire (456–76)

The two decades following the sack of Rome saw the final disintegration of the empire in the West. Such vestiges of Roman administration as remained in the provinces practically disappeared, while in Italy the real rulers were the barbarian generals who, with the titles of Master of the Soldiers and Patrician, not only controlled the imperial government as their forerunners Stilicho and Aëtius had done, but created and deposed emperors at will. For the first sixteen years of this period, Ricimer, a German of Suevic and Visigothic descent, occupied this position, to be followed after a brief interval by Orestes and finally in 476 by Odovacar, or Odoacer, a Scirian German and leader of the barbarian soldiers from beyond the Danube who now made up the greater part of the Roman army in Italy. Odovacar, less imbued with the Roman tradition than his predecessors, decided to do away with the futile pretense of creating a puppet emperor. He deposed the last emperor of the West, Romulus Augustulus (the young son of Orestes and satirically named "the little emperor"), and thereafter left the throne vacant, taking the government openly into his own hands, though recognizing the nominal authority of the emperor in the East. Theoretically, this meant that the Roman Empire was once more united under one emperor, who delegated power to the patrician in Italy; actually Odovacar was the independent ruler of Italy and the empire in the West had come to an end. This made relatively little change in the conditions of government, it is true, since the greater part of the Western Empire had long since fallen a prey to barbarian kingdoms, and Italy itself had been ruled for twenty years by barbarian generals. Still, the fact that there was no longer to be an emperor of the West makes the date 476 a significant one.

5. THE OSTROGOTH KINGDOM IN ITALY

Ostrogoths invade Italy (489–93)

After thirteen years of undisputed rule in Italy, Odovacar, like so many of the emperors whose place he had taken, found his position threatened by a new barbarian invasion. The Ostrogoths had freed themselves from the overlordship of the Huns after the death of Attila and had migrated into the Balkan provinces of the Eastern Empire, where they alternately ravaged the

country and fought for the emperor as *foederati*. Under the vigorous leadership of their king Theodoric, they became a serious menace to the empire, almost equally dangerous whether as friends or as enemies. Theodoric had passed most of his youth in Constantinople as a hostage. He had gained a thorough knowledge of Roman institutions, which showed him the weakness of the empire, though at the same time it aroused in him a great respect for Roman traditions and civilization. Oddly enough, he seems never to have learned to write, but merely traced his name with the aid of a gold plate in which the letters had been cut. In 488, the Emperor Zeno sought to rid himself of a dangerous ally by commissioning Theodoric to invade Italy and suppress Odovacar. After some delay, the Ostrogoths reached Italy in 489. Odovacar was defeated in battle and took refuge in the impregnable city of Ravenna. For nearly three years the Goths besieged the city in vain. At last Theodoric resorted to treachery. Having tricked Odovacar into negotiating a peace treaty, he assassinated him. This act completed the conquest of Italy.

Theodoric, king and patrician (493–526)

For thirty-three years Italy enjoyed the advantages of a just and moderate government under the Ostrogothic king. Despite occasional reversions to barbaric cruelty and treachery, Theodoric proved a worthy successor to the best of the Roman emperors. We may discount the effusions of court poets, but the estimate of Procopius, the historian of the Eastern Empire, may be taken at its face value. "His manner of ruling over his subjects was worthy of a great emperor; for he maintained justice, made good laws, protected his country from invasion, and gave proof of extraordinary prudence and valor." He gave proof, too, of unusual wisdom and tact in handling a delicate situation, for although he was to all practical intents and purposes the independent ruler of Italy, his constitutional position was rather ambiguous. He was the legitimate king of his Ostrogothic people, but so far as the Italians were concerned his position was that of a nominal agent of the emperor, who had conferred upon him the title of Patrician. Realizing that this strengthened the legitimacy of his government without curtailing his real power, Theodoric continued to recognize the formal superiority of the eastern emperor.

The two races in Italy

The dual character of Theodoric's government arose from the fact that he ruled two distinct races without making any attempt to draw them together or to encourage fusion. The Goths had appropriated about a third of the land (some scholars say of the public land) and had settled quietly among the resident Romans. Each race retained so far as possible its own legal and judicial

system, though cases involving both Romans and Goths were apparently tried in the Gothic courts. The status of the two races was strongly influenced by the fact that the army was purely Gothic. The Goths remained the military caste; their courts were military courts; and their land was granted to them according to custom as federate soldiers. The civil government was as purely Roman. Theodoric made no change in Roman administration or laws in so far as they affected Roman citizens, and all civil offices were filled by native Italians. The old imperial officers, the consuls, and the senate remained with remarkably little change and were among the most loyal supporters of the Gothic king. Even the difference in religion between the Arian Goth and the orthodox Roman, though it caused some friction, seems not to have placed any serious strain upon their relations. Theodoric made no attempt to force his own religion on his subjects, but maintained a policy of absolute toleration. "We cannot," he wrote through his secretary Cassiodorus, "impose religion, because no one can be compelled to believe against his will."

Revived prosperity

Perhaps the greatest change made by the Gothic king was the introduction of peace, security, and revived prosperity in Italy during his long reign. Agriculture and commerce flourished as they had not done for a century. Justice was administered with greater firmness and integrity. Long-neglected harbors, aqueducts, and public buildings were restored and new ones erected. Italy was still far removed from the good old days of Roman prosperity, but better off than she had been or than she was to be again for centuries to come. Unfortunately, Theodoric's work died with him. Factional strife broke out soon after his death, and by 555 the Ostrogothic Kingdom in Italy had been crushed by the armies of the great eastern emperor, Justinian.[1]

Continued decline of culture

The brief period of peace brought with it a slight revival of intellectual life, but could not check the steady decline of Roman culture. Rather, the work of the Latin writers who flourished under Theodoric merely serves to demonstrate the drift toward barbarism in the West. The great age of classic literature was buried in the distant if unforgotten past, while the creative period of Christian writing had ended with Augustine, the last of the fourth-century Latin Fathers. The representative writers of this period, Boëthius and Cassiodorus, both Romans in the service of Theodoric, contented themselves with translations from the Greek, the knowledge of which was dying out in the West, with slim commentaries on the work of earlier commentators, and with compilations and epitomes of earlier learning. The Roman mind, half-barbarized, could evidently no longer appreciate the full scope

[1] See below, page 74.

of antique thought, nor could it create an independent literature of its own. The most original work of this age, the *Consolations of Philosophy*, written by Boëthius in prison while awaiting execution as the result of a conspiracy against Theodoric, has charm and pathos, but it is no more than an eclectic echo of various ancient philosophical systems, in which the sole originality lies in the author's choice of such materials as suited his needs. Yet the labor of these scholars was not unimportant, because unoriginal. By bringing the thought of the civilized past down to the level of a more barbaric age, they kept it alive and furnished the groping minds of a still darker period to come with material not too far above their range of comprehension, so that they might in time recover something of the fading heritage of Greece and Rome. Boëthius and Cassiodorus were to rank high among the most popular authors of the Early Middle Ages.

Anglo-Saxons in Britain

In tracing the principal migrations of the barbarian peoples during this confused period, we have so far ignored the conquest of Britain, not because it is unimportant, but because it stands somewhat apart from the main current of events on the Continent. Early in the fifth century the Roman legions had been withdrawn from Britain for the defense of Italy and Gaul, leaving the Britons to their own devices. During the next two centuries the distant island province, almost unnoticed by Rome, was overrun by a Germanic nation or coalition of nations, the Jutes, Angles, and Saxons, who sailed over from their home in northeastern Germany on the shores of the North Sea and laid in Britain the foundations of the English race. Little is known of the actual course of the conquest, save that it occupied a long period of steady migration and of thorough occupation of the land. Seriously begun probably about the middle of the fifth century (though there had been piratical raids on the east coast of Britain long before that), it was completed by the end of the following century. The Romanized Celts who made up the provincial population were either annihilated or driven back into the hills of Wales and Cornwall in the southwest corner of the island. They seem to have had little or no influence on the religion, language, or manners of the invaders, who remained Germanic and pagan. It was the most thorough and complete conquest made by any of the barbarian nations.

The Franks

We have ignored the Franks, too, in the long run the most important of all the barbarian invaders. For the conquest of Gaul by the united Frankish tribes, begun in the last years of the fifth century and completed early in the sixth, was but the beginning of a long story and one that forms the central theme of western European

history for some centuries. It will be left to a later chapter for fuller treatment than could be afforded it here.

Summary

By the end of the fifth century Roman government had completely disappeared in the Western Empire, its place being taken by a number of barbarian kingdoms.[1] Italy was ruled by the Ostrogoths, North Africa by the Vandals, Britain by the Anglo-Saxons, southwestern Gaul and Spain by the Visigoths, and southeastern Gaul by the Burgundians, while the Franks had already conquered what remained of the latter province. Of these only the Franks and the Anglo-Saxons were to retain their conquests. The remainder were soon to lose their political identity and in time even their racial identity, having merged with the people among whom they had settled. For it must not be forgotten that, except in Britain, the invaders were never more than a small minority of the population of the conquered provinces. Statistics as to their actual numbers vary so widely as to be obviously unreliable, but it has been suggested that none of the invading nations numbered above one hundred thousand. Gaiseric's army, according to tradition, counted eighty thousand fighting men, though this is probably an exaggeration. At any rate, the numbers were small enough to permit the final absorption of the barbarian by the Roman stock to a very large extent. The fusion of the two races was accompanied by a fusion of cultures. The barbarian became more civilized through contact with the Roman, while on the other hand the Roman was drawn down closer to the level of the barbarian. The final result was a mixture of the Latin and Germanic past, welded together to make up medieval civilization.

[1] See map, page 95.

Section B

THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES

With the disappearance of the Roman Empire in the West, Europe may be considered to have entered upon that period of its history vaguely known as the Middle Ages. It is a rather misleading term, but hallowed by centuries of use and difficult to replace. The term Middle Ages was first coined by Renaissance historians, who regarded the thousand years following the collapse of the Roman Empire as merely a middle period of Gothic barbarism, separating the glorious age of antiquity from their own great age of the revival of classic civilization. More modern historians have retained the term because it serves a useful purpose and has been so long accepted; but they have shown that its original meaning was based on a complete misconception of the nature of European history. The Middle Ages were much more than the name implies; for it was during those thousand years that the modern world was made, and they also produced a civilization different from that of the age before or after and well worthy of study in its own right. But if it is a mistake to treat the Middle Ages as a negligible period, it is equally misleading to treat the whole period as a single, coherent age. For even the most summary purposes of classification, ten centuries are too long a time, and they witnessed too many sweeping changes, to be grouped together under one name if that name is to retain any significance. For greater convenience, therefore, we

have made further divisions, and will treat first under the heading of the Early Middle Ages the period extending roughly from the end of the fifth to the middle of the eleventh century. Changes in plenty occurred even within this shorter period, but it had certain characteristics that mark it off from the more settled age that followed. It was during these five and a half centuries, which began with the final disintegration of ancient civilization, that in the almost purely agrarian society of western Europe and in the more cultured East the foundations were laid for that new type of civilization which we think of as typically medieval. It was in this period that the Roman Empire in the East became Byzantine, that Mohammedanism transformed the culture of a large part of the Roman world, that the Germanic and Scandinavian peoples settled down in their permanent dwelling places, that feudal society began to take definite shape, and that the feudal kingdoms on the one hand and a united Catholic Christendom on the other emerged from the tangled chaos of the barbarian conquests.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EASTERN EMPIRE BECOMES BYZANTINE

WHEN Constantine the Great by imperial decree established a "New Rome" on the impregnable site of the ancient town of Byzantium, calling it Constantinople, he gave to the eastern or Greek half of the Roman Empire a capital of its own and a focal center for its administration and its culture. Thenceforth, with occasional exceptions during the fourth century, the two parts of the empire were divided into separate administrative units. In theory the empire was still one and united, but as time passed the two sections drifted farther and farther apart, separated by differences in language and in religious and political interests, until at last the actual division assumed a greater reality than the theoretical unity. After the Western Empire was destroyed by the barbarian invaders, the last link connecting the Greek East with the Latin West was broken. Only the Eastern Empire remained, exclusively Greek in culture and inhabited by people of eastern origin. The old tradition of the Roman Empire, however, died hard. The emperor at Constantinople still claimed lordship over the lost provinces, and in the sixth century Justinian partially realized for a time the dream of restoring the West to imperial rule. Until its final collapse in the fifteenth century, the empire continued to call itself Roman. But even under Justinian the empire was drifting further from the Roman traditions, continuing the steady development of social and political institutions, religious ideas, and a culture based on its Greek and oriental heritage rather than on that of Rome. To call this later empire Roman, as did the people of the empire themselves, leads to confusion and a misconception of its true nature. A better name is that commonly used by historians and derived from Byzantium, the original name of the city of Constantinople. Hereafter we shall call it the Byzantine Empire.

1. JUSTINIAN'S DREAM OF RESTORING THE ROMAN EMPIRE

For more than a century after the death of the great Theodosius in 395, the empire in the East was not distinguished by strong government. Its rulers were able to do little more than preserve their state from the assaults of barbarian enemies, while making little attempt to save the West from destruction or to reform conditions

Justinian (527–65)


in their own empire. A new and more glorious era in the imperial annals opened with the proclamation of the Emperor Justin in 518. (An Illyrian peasant of Latin race, Justin had neither education nor experience in government beyond that supplied by his training in the army.) But he had a nephew named Justinian, who soon became the power behind the throne and directed his uncle's government until the death of Justin in 527, when he succeeded him as emperor. Thanks to his uncle's generosity, Justinian had been given all the advantages of education and training that the older man lacked. Moreover, he had intelligence of a high order and an amazing capacity for work. His tireless attention to the details of administration caused one of his courtiers to describe him as "the emperor who never sleeps." On the other hand, there were weaknesses in his character that at times threatened to nullify the results of his labor. In moments of unusual stress he sometimes showed a sad lack of firmness and decision.

Theodora

This weakness, however, was fortunately counterbalanced by the iron nerve of his wife Theodora, who more than once, as during the Nika riots in Constantinople in 532, bolstered up his failing courage and saved him and the empire from disaster. Theodora knew the people as Justinian never could. She was the daughter of a bear-keeper in the hippodrome and had herself been a popular actress there. All contemporary writers agree as to her charm and beauty, her keen intelligence and her influence over Justinian, whom she had married in the days before he was elevated to the throne. As empress her power was greater than that of any of her predecessors. Until her death in 548 she shared the government of the empire with her husband, almost as a colleague.

Justinian's aims

Throughout his reign, Justinian was inspired by one great ambition — to restore the Roman Empire to all its former greatness. Under the inspiration of that dream he undertook to reconquer the lost provinces of the West, to rebuild the fortifications and public buildings of the empire, and to dazzle the world with the splendor of his court and capital. It was an ambition noble in itself, but its fulfillment was beyond the powers of the state as he found it. A second ambition, which he thought to be a necessary part of the first, was to establish in the most complete way the absolute, autocratic power of the emperor as the sole source of authority. His exalted conception of the emperor's powers and duties led him to make much-needed reforms in the administration and law, but it did not restore the imperial tradition of the great days of Rome. Though he may not have realized it, Justinian was merely following the tendencies of the later orientalized rulers, com-


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ATLANTIC OCEAN
Orleans
Franks
Bordeaux
Lombards
Gepidae
Avars
Ravenna
Sirmium
Slavs and Bulgarians
Visigoths
Marseilles
Barcelona
Cartagena
Rome
BLACK SEA
Constantinople
CASPIAN SEA
Ceuta
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Moors
Carthage
CAPPADOCIA
Tralles
Antioch
PERSIAN KINGDOM
Ctesiphon
Alexandria
Arabs
THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE
UNDER JUSTINIAN
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 400 800
Byzantine Empire at its greatest extent.

pleting their work in making the empire an eastern autocracy. Since the time of Diocletian, Roman citizens had been reduced to the position of subjects. Now they became little better than slaves.

Reconquest of the West

Justinian's first opportunity for interference in the West was afforded by a dynastic revolution in the Vandal Kingdom in Africa. On the pretext of restoring the rightful ruler, Justinian sent an army under the command of the brilliant general Belisarius in 533. The Vandal resistance proved amazingly weak, and within a year Belisarius had completed the conquest of the kingdom. A similar dynastic dispute gave Justinian a pretext for invading the Ostrogothic Kingdom in Italy in 535. Belisarius again led the imperial troops to victory. By 540 he had conquered all of the peninsula south of the river Po. In both North Africa and Italy the imperial administration and law were reintroduced — also, unfortunately, the imperial taxation which proved ruinous to the liberated provincials. When a new Gothic king, Totila, crossed the Po to regain the kingdom, the Italians were ready to welcome him. Justinian was sadly hampered by lack of money and by war with Persia on the eastern frontier. The war dragged on until 555, when the imperial army under Narses, who had replaced Belisarius, completed the conquest of Italy. Meanwhile, Justinian had also succeeded in reconquering southeastern Spain from the Visigoths and in recovering the islands of the western Mediterranean.[1]

Diplomacy and defense

In his zeal to restore the prestige of the Roman Empire, Justinian also sought by the use of skillful diplomacy to dominate the barbarian tribes beyond the frontiers — the Lombards and other Germans, the Slavs who had migrated from what is now Russia to the Danube, and the Bulgars, Avars, and other Mongolian peoples who had followed the Huns from Asia. This was necessary for defense as well. For the wars in the West and with Persia had forced him to withdraw many of the troops from the frontiers, and though Justinian built or reconstructed at great expense a ring of forts about the empire (some six hundred in the Balkans alone), there was still serious danger of invasion. His principal aim was to gain allies among the neighboring tribes. Bribes, titles, and tribute were scattered with a lavish hand. No expense was spared to advertise the splendor and power of the emperor. Barbarian chieftains were invited to Constantinople, where the magnificence of the court and the extravagant ceremony surrounding the person of the ruler made a profound impression on their simple minds. Finally, the imperial diplomats, with that unscrupulous subtlety for which Byzantine diplomacy became famous, stirred up strife among

[1] See map, page 73.

the barbarians in order that they might destroy one another for the good of the empire. This system as perfected by Justinian, though many of the methods were already familiar, continued in force for centuries. It was not always successful; it placed a heavy strain on the imperial treasury; and it aroused the cupidity of the barbarians. Even during Justinian's reign the Balkan provinces were repeatedly ravaged by the Slavs and after his death they settled there in force.

The fault inherent in all of Justinian's grandiose plans was that their fulfillment cost more than the empire could afford. His military and diplomatic operations were expensive enough. To them was added the ruinous expense of restoring and constructing roads, bridges, aqueducts, theaters, palaces, and churches on a scale befitting the grandeur of the Roman Empire. The capital especially, part of which had been destroyed by fire during the Nika riots, was rebuilt in the rich and ornate style of architecture, more oriental than Roman, known as Byzantine. The great church of Saint Sophia, the finest example of this style, still stands as a monument to Justinian's reign, though it has long since been converted into a Mohammedan mosque and its colorful mosaics are now covered with whitewash.

Public buildings

Under such conditions the problem of filling the imperial treasury became one of the most vital concerns of the government. Justinian was sincerely anxious to be a good as well as a great ruler, but his constant need of money forced him to tolerate the methods of his hated minister, John of Cappadocia, who fleeced the people unmercifully. The Nika riots of 532 in the capital were a protest against his administration and were suppressed only after Belisarius had massacred some thirty thousand of the rioters. After this affair, Justinian undertook to reform the administration so as to protect the taxpayer from illegal exactions and at the same time to increase the income of the government by checking corruption and by making the civil service more efficient. The sale of offices, which led the men who had purchased them to recover their money at the expense of the people or the government, was abolished and salaries were increased so as to make graft unnecessary. Regular steps of promotion in the service were instituted to encourage industry and efficiency. At the same time, a good many useless offices were done away with and the whole system was brought more directly under the control of the central government, thus increasing the absolute power of the emperor. The result was an administrative machine which preserved the empire through many a crisis in the following centuries.

Administrative reforms

As has been said, Justinian was determined to make the emperor the

sole authority in the state, interpreting that authority to include every aspect of the people's life. Religion was too important a factor to be ignored by a ruler with such absolute claims, and, besides, Justinian was a theologian at heart. Since the time of Constantine, the emperors in the East had exercised a greater control over the church than had their colleagues in the West. They had dominated church government and most of them had used their civil powers to crush opposition to the dogmas which the church had declared to be orthodox. Justinian, however, went one step further, and an important step it was to prove for the future of the Greek Church. He asserted the right of the emperor to decide disputed points of dogma himself and to force acceptance of his opinions on the church and the people. He thus became the effective head of the church in matters of faith as well as of government, while the church became practically a department of state. The Greek Church was never after able to free itself altogether from this subservience to the emperors.

Justinian and the church

One further task undertaken by Justinian, the most important in its permanent and far-reaching effects on later European civilization, remains to be mentioned. This was his codification of Roman law, the work with which his name is most commonly associated. There were two kinds of law recognized by the Roman courts. First, there was the direct imperial legislation, laws called "constitutions," issued by the emperors themselves. Then there was a great body of jurisprudence, composed of decisions handed down by authorized judges and lawyers. Through the centuries a great mass of law had accumulated until it became unwieldy and confusing. Some attempt at straightening out this legal tangle had been made by Theodosius II, who in 438 had issued the *Codex Theodosianus* or Theodosian Code including the imperial constitutions since Constantine. However, much still remained to be done if Roman law were to be preserved. Justinian set himself to the task in the first year of his reign, appointing a committee of ten jurists, of whom Tribonian was the most famous, to compile a new code. The *Codex Justiniani* or Justinian Code was completed the following year and given its final form in 534. It included all imperial legislation up to that time in condensed and simplified form, with everything that was obsolete, contradictory, or repetitious eliminated and the whole arranged in logical order. The still more difficult task of carrying out a similar condensation and simplification of jurisprudence was begun in 530 under the guidance of Tribonian and completed in three years. It is known as the *Digest* or *Pandects*. To this was added a brief official handbook or

Legal reforms: the Justinian Code

text for the use of students, called the *Institutes*. These three works, together with the *Novels*, a collection of the laws issued by Justinian himself, are collectively known as the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, the body of civil law. In it was preserved all that was most valuable in Roman law in a clear and available form for the use of later generations. It forms the basis of civil law in most European countries today.

Justinian left the marks of his handiwork on many aspects of Byzantine life and government. The law, the church, the administration, diplomacy, and the position of the emperor in the state through the following centuries were all influenced in greater or lesser degree by his work, while the great public buildings he had erected remained a permanent memorial to his reign. But his greatest ambition, the dream of restoring the Roman Empire to its former size and grandeur, was doomed to failure. His plans of conquest and reconstruction had far exceeded the financial resources of the empire. On his death he left the state bankrupt and the people crushed by the weight of intolerable taxation. The empire was so exhausted that it was unable to hold the reconquered provinces of the West or to repel new invaders in the East. The following century saw the empire cut down to a mere fraction of its former size. Indeed, the conquest of the West had been a mistake. Had Justinian devoted his great powers to strengthening the empire in the East he would have deserved greater praise. He could not check the steady development of the empire into a Greek and oriental state. Such portions of his work as in fact remained tended rather to emphasize the eastern character of the empire than to restore the ancient Roman tradition.

Failure of Justinian's dream

2. THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE SURVIVES

The reign of Justinian was followed by a period of repeated losses and disasters, during which the Byzantine Empire was reduced to the territory that, with some variations, it retained till the end of the Middle Ages. Within a generation the Lombards invaded Italy and conquered most of it;[1] the Visigoths recovered the part of Spain conquered by Justinian; the Slavs and other barbarians occupied all of the Balkan provinces except Thrace and the coastline of Greece; and the Persians began a war which left both Persia and the empire exhausted. After the death of Mohammed in 632, the Arabs, now welded into an aggressive nation and inspired by his teaching, set out on a career of conquest at the expense of the empire. By the

Loss of territory (568–700)

[1] See below, page 102.

year 700, they had wrested from it all the provinces in Africa and in Asia, except the peninsula of Asia Minor which lies between the southern shore of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Thus the Byzantine Empire was cut down to a comparatively small territory, part in Europe, part in Asia, centering about the city of Constantinople.[1]

Survival of the empire

Despite the loss of so many provinces and the almost continuous danger from Mohammedans and Slavs, the Byzantine Empire survived until the middle of the fifteenth century. More than once in that long period it seemed doomed to destruction; it suffered at times from revolution, anarchy, and bad government; but it always recovered. It has been said frequently enough that the most remarkable characteristic of the empire was its power of recuperation. Until fairly recent years historians, following the example of Gibbon, have emphasized the weakness, corruption, and cultural sterility of Byzantium and have pictured the empire as in a state of perpetual decline. There were, indeed, elements of weakness, both political and social, in the Byzantine Empire. But there were also elements of strength and amazing vitality.

Elements of strength: political and social

The absolute powers enjoyed by the emperors who followed Justinian, though dangerous in the hands of a weakling, were a source of great strength when wielded by a strong ruler, and there were many strong rulers in Byzantine history. Time and again in moments of extreme danger a man of powerful personality fought his way to the throne and infused new life into the empire. His control of every department of state, including the church, made it possible for an able emperor to use all the powers of the state to the best advantage. Nor were the results of weak rule as disastrous as they might have been; for the administrative system as organized by Justinian was capable of carrying on the business of government even during a revolution. The imperial authority and the centralized administration gave a real political unity to the state, and this was further strengthened by the religious and cultural unity of Byzantine society. The people of the empire were of many races and were constantly recruited by immigration from beyond the frontiers; but whatever their origins, they were or soon became orthodox in religion and Hellenic in culture — an important factor in explaining the tenacity with which they clung to their empire against heavy odds.

Through all its changes of fortune the Byzantine Empire enjoyed an economic strength that enabled it to recover from the most serious reverses. The geographic position of the empire, and especially of

[1] See below, pages 88–90, and map.

the capital, gave it unequaled opportunities for trade. Straddling the narrow Sea of Marmara, between Europe and Asia, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the empire was the meeting-place of trade routes running east and west, north and south. The commerce of the world was trans-shipped in the harbors of Constantinople, bought and sold in its markets. For centuries it was one of the richest cities of the world, "the city of the world's desire." Stimulated by trade, the capital and other imperial cities became centers of thriving industry. Constantinople was especially famous for the manufacture of all articles of luxury.

Economic strength

Nor was it only as a commercial and industrial center that Constantinople gave strength to the empire. Its site, chosen by the warrior Constantine, made it impregnable to attack. Open to the sea, it could not be starved into submission, and built as it was on a small peninsula, only the landward side needed defense. Here it was guarded by walls so strong and so well fortified that they could be held against any army not equipped with modern artillery. Wave after wave of invasion, which might have destroyed the empire, broke against the city walls. Only twice since the days of Constantine has it been taken by siege.

The impregnable city

So much for the factors that helped the empire to survive. Let us now glance for a moment at the reverse side of the shield and note the evidences of weakness. There was one serious disadvantage in the imperial system. No fixed rule of succession had been worked out. A strong emperor might nominate his successor with a fair hope of his being accepted by the people. But the right of heredity was not legally recognized, and in theory the emperor was still proclaimed by the senate and the army with the concurrence of the people, though there was no regular method by which they could make their choice. If the late emperor's nominee were not accepted, the result was usually decided by intrigue and violence. Moreover, the absolute powers of the emperor invited revolution. So long as he ruled there was no check upon his authority. But any man who could gain the support of a powerful faction in the army, at court, in the church, or among the people of the capital might succeed, with luck, in assassinating the emperor and being proclaimed as his successor. He would then enjoy all the powers that went with the imperial purple. It was a prize worth fighting for. True, many successful revolutions placed a strong man on the throne in place of a weakling, at a time when strong government was needed. Yet the system led to perpetual intrigue, plots, and riots, which threatened the security of the government and the state.

Elements of weakness: political

Part of the responsibility for this condition must be accredited to the character of the Byzantine people. Much has been written about the vices and weakness of that cultivated, luxurious, and pleasure-loving society, always excitable, capricious, and easily aroused to factional passion. No doubt these characteristics have been overemphasized; for as one historian remarks, "It may be doubted whether any empire can live by vice alone." There must have been counterbalancing qualities of thrift, industry, and tenacious courage. Yet it cannot be denied that the society of the later empire was politically unstable. Disputes over points of theological dogma, economic or political grievances, the ambitions of a popular leader or the unpopularity of a minister could stir feeling to fever heat. The hippodrome, center of Byzantine social life, was often the scene of popular riots that sometimes assumed dangerous proportions. Two rival parties, the Greens and the Blues, sponsored the chariot races which were the chief attraction of the hippodrome, and the victory of one or the other was a matter of state-wide importance. These parties included in their ranks almost the entire population, from the imperial family down to the poorest laborer. They were in reality political parties and furnished a ready-made organization for the popular leader.

Social weakness

The Byzantine people were intensely religious and were always keenly interested in theological questions. Disputes over the most fine-spun differences in the statement of dogma could arouse a fanatical spirit, and that feeling was often used by political leaders to gain the support of the populace for their own ends. The monks and the clergy could become dangerous enemies of the government. For the most part, however, the emperors were able to maintain their absolute control of the church, sternly suppressing all heresies or movements for independence, and they found in it a useful instrument for preserving the unity of the empire. The Eastern Church had become thoroughly Greek in spirit and tradition. Differences of language, culture, and interest had divided it from the Latin Church of the West since the fourth century. For years at a time all communion between them was broken off, until in 1054 the schism or split between them became definite and permanent. Thereafter the Greek Orthodox Church, to which the Byzantine and Slavic peoples adhered, was separated by a barrier of theological belief and religious practice from the Roman Catholic world of the West.

The Greek Orthodox Church

The importance of religious interest can be clearly seen in its effect on Byzantine education and literature. The Bible and the works of the Fathers of the Greek Church occupied a prominent place in the cur-



De Cou, from Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

THE CHURCH OF SAINT SOPHIA, CONSTANTINOPLE

Constructed by Justinian in the sixth century and now a Mohammedan mosque.

riculum of the schools, while theology was the subject of a good half of the literature produced under the empire. A second influence, equally strong, was that of Greek antiquity. Byzantine culture was essentially Greek, though it had absorbed much from the Near East, from Syria, Persia, Egypt, and later from the Arabs, and the people of the empire were very proud of their inheritance from ancient Greece. The Greek classics formed the very basis of Byzantine education. Century after century the writers of Byzantium imitated the classics, wrote learned commentaries upon them, and strove to preserve the Attic or ancient Greek style. This led to the development of a distinction between the written language and the degenerate spoken Greek. Byzantine society remained cultured and learned all through that period when western Europe was sinking into the dark ages. In history, theology, and private correspondence, the empire produced a brilliant literature. But something of originality and spontaneity was lost through slavish imitation and because the language of literature was no longer that spoken by the people.

Learning and literature

In the art of Byzantium the same elements were present as in literature. Religion played fully as important a part. The churches, like Justinian's great church of Saint Sophia, were the finest examples of Byzantine architecture, and the icons or pictures of saints and religious scenes were among the best works produced by the artists of the empire. As in literature, too, the art of Byzantium drew its inspiration primarily from ancient Greece, with an additional touch of oriental color and luxurious ornament. Byzantine art has often been described as bound by tradition, formal and monotonous, incapable of originality. It was, indeed, a traditional art in many ways, dominated by fixed religious conceptions and by the models of classic antiquity. But it showed also great variety and versatility. Though drawing their inspiration from Greek, oriental, and Christian traditions, the Byzantine artists produced a style that was in reality original and characteristically their own.

Art

Byzantine civilization spread far beyond the narrow confines of the empire. It had a permanent influence on the growth of the Slavic countries of eastern Europe, as great as was the influence of Rome on the Germanic nations of the West. The Slavs who had settled in the Balkans, including the Serbs and the Bulgarians (the latter were of Asiatic race, but had adopted Slav civilization), and the various Slavic peoples who combined to make Russia, looked to Byzantium for religious and cultural leadership. The church of the Slavs was the Greek Orthodox; their writing was based on the

Influence on the Slav nations

Greek alphabet and their literature on Byzantine models; their art and architecture were strongly Byzantine in character; and their foreign trade was mostly with the empire.

But Byzantine influence was not limited to eastern Europe. Relations between Constantinople and the West were never entirely cut off. Till the middle of the eleventh century, the empire retained a foothold in Italy, and throughout the remainder of the Middle Ages there was constant commerce between Constantinople and Venice and other Italian cities. Byzantine art forms can be clearly seen in Italy, especially in Ravenna and the south, and to a lesser degree their influence can be traced in the other western countries. The extent of this influence has been hotly debated. It is, at any rate, a factor that cannot be ignored in any study of medieval culture. Above all, the Byzantine Empire performed an incalculable service for European civilization by preserving the body of Roman law and the masterpieces of Greek literature and art, which might otherwise have been lost during the dark period of the Early Middle Ages.

Influence on the West

CHAPTER SIX

THE RISE OF ISLAM AND THE EXPANSION OF THE MOHAMMEDAN EMPIRE

A FEW years after the death of Justinian, a man was born in a little Arabian town near the Red Sea, who was to have a far wider influence on the history of the world than that exercised by the great Byzantine emperor. In the century following that which saw Justinian's attempt to restore the old Roman Empire, Mohammed founded a new religion that has ever since been the most powerful rival of Christianity, and at the same time laid the foundations for an empire that spread till it included the former Roman provinces in Syria, northern Africa, and Spain and extended eastward to the borders of India. In this empire, composed of many varied races held together by a common religion, there grew up in the following centuries a civilization higher and in many ways more enlightened than that of early medieval Europe, and from which the Germanic peoples of the West learned much, despite the bar of religious antagonism. Today, that empire has long since fallen to pieces and its civilization has decayed, but millions of men still follow the teaching of Mohammed and pray with their faces turned to the town in which he was born.

1. MOHAMMED AND THE FOUNDING OF ISLAM

Arabia

Arabia, the home of the new religion, has changed very little in appearance or civilization since the death of Mohammed. It forms a large peninsula between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, with the Indian Ocean to the south.[1] To the northwest lies Syria, at that time a Byzantine province, and to the northeast the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, then the richest part of the Persian Kingdom. For the most part, Arabia is a desert of rock and sand, where nomadic tribes of Bedouin, as the desert Arabs are called, still live in tents beside the oases where they water their herds. No settled or agricultural life is possible in desert Arabia, and until very recent times much of the interior was unexplored. Along the coastline, however, to east and west there is richer land. There in Mohammed's time cities formed centers of a more civilized life, with considerable commerce and agriculture. But even in the cities political organization had not passed

[1] See map, page 90.

the tribal stage, and until the time of Mohammed there had been no attempt to found a united state in Arabia.

The Arabs

The Arabs, like the Jews, were of Semitic race. The life of the seventh-century Arabs was not unlike that of the early Children of Israel as pictured in the Old Testament. The family or tribe was the social and political unit, under the authority of the head of the family. Their religion, however, was still a crude and superstitious paganism, in which idolatry played an important part, though Jewish tribes and Christian merchants had spread some knowledge of their religions in Arabia before the coming of Mohammed, and the idea of monotheism at least was apparently not unknown. Some vague unity was given to Arab religion by the common veneration of certain sanctuaries, of which the most important was a small temple, square in shape, called the Kaaba (Cube). This was situated in Mecca, a commercial town some fifty miles inland from the middle of the Red Sea coast. To Mecca, Arabs came from all parts of the country in annual pilgrimages during the sacred months when tribal warfare was forbidden. The city of Mecca was, then, in some degree the center of Arab religion before the days of Mohammed.

Mohammed (c. 570–632)

It was in Mecca that Mohammed was born about the year 570. Later tradition tells us a good deal about his early life, his appearance and character, but very little of it is trustworthy historical information. Though pious legend ascribed to him important family connections, he was probably of humble birth. He was left an orphan at an early age and lived in poverty till he was about twenty-four years old, when he entered the service of a wealthy widow named Khadija. While working for her, he led at least one caravan on a trading trip to Syria. About the year 595, he married his employer and for the next fifteen years lived the comfortable, if uneventful, life of the ordinary well-to-do Meccan merchant. He was described as a kindly man, gifted with a winning personality. His later career shows him to have had a strong will and ruthless determination, combined with sound practical sense and great ability in judging men.

The founding of Islam

The beginning of Mohammed's prophetic mission is dated from his fortieth year, though there is good reason to believe that he had given much thought to religious matters before that time. The tradition tells us that he spent one month in every year in solitary meditation on a mountain near Mecca. Here occurred the first revelation. There seems to be no doubt that Mohammed suffered from some kind of nervous seizure of an hysterical nature, though we have not sufficient reliable information to warrant a clear diagnosis. Epilepsy

has been suggested as the cause, but most scholars have discarded it as the true explanation. At any rate, the revelations on which his teaching was based were produced after some kind of trance, which later at least the prophet could bring on at will. The first converts were members of Mohammed's own family or were close friends. Among them, his cousin Ali and his friends Abu Bakr and Omar later played important rôles. Mohammed called his religion *Islam*, meaning "surrender" — i.e., to the will of God — and his followers *Moslems*, those who had surrendered themselves. At first the Moslems formed a secret society. When at last they made their faith public, they met with opposition and persecution from the pagan Meccans, who feared that Mohammed's insistence that there was but one God, Allah, would destroy the faith of the people in idols and with it the profitable trade with the pilgrims who came annually to the Kaaba.

As Islam slowly gained ground at Mecca, the persecution became more severe. Finally, Mohammed decided to flee from the city and to seek a safer place of refuge for his followers. He found it in Medina, a city to the north of Mecca, where Jewish and Arab tribes had for some time been engaged in civil strife. The way was prepared by sending missionaries, and in 622 a delegation of some seventy converts from Medina invited Mohammed to come to their city. The flight of the prophet and his followers to Medina, known as the Hegira, marks the beginning of the Moslem calendar. Taking advantage of the feuds which divided the people of Medina, Mohammed soon became its ruler, making it the capital of a rapidly growing state.

The flight to Medina (622)

In the years following the Hegira, the character of Islam changed materially. It became a fighting religion and the prophet a political leader. Forced to provide for the refugees in his care, Mohammed began to prey upon the caravans which passed near Medina on the way to Mecca. This led to a war with Mecca which dragged on for years. The Moslems continued to raid caravans and nearby villages and to plunder the Jewish tribes. As a victorious religion, promising the blessings of paradise after death and plunder and profit in this world, Islam attracted converts from many of the Bedouin tribes. By 630, Mohammed was strong enough to conquer Mecca almost without opposition. Henceforth Mecca was to be the religious center of Islam, toward which all Moslems turn to pray, and the Kaaba its most sacred *mosque* or temple, though Medina remained for some time the political capital. By taking over the pilgrimages, the sacred city, and the sanctuary from Arab paganism, Mohammed made it easier for converts to join the new religion. Partly by conquest, partly by free

Islam conquers Arabia

conversion, he gained at least the formal adherence of the greater part of Arabia before his death at Medina in 632.

From the beginning of his mission till his death, Mohammed continued to publish a series of divine revelations, containing all his teaching on moral and theological questions, as well as his legislation on purely political matters and his comments on current events. Together they make up the Koran, collected and put in order soon after the prophet's death and since handed down with little or no change. The revelations were originally dictated by Mohammed to his friends or secretaries (it is very doubtful whether he himself could write), and were preserved as separate fragments with no attempt to keep them in chronological order. In the final edition of the Koran, they were arranged according to length, the longest chapters first, then the shorter in diminishing order. As Mohammed's ideas developed with experience or changed with the needs of the moment, the lack of dates makes it a very confusing book. Often later revelations modify or cancel earlier ones. The contradictions, however, seem to have aroused no skepticism. It was assumed that Allah, like any despotic ruler, might change his mind. Despite difficulties of interpretation, the Koran has always been accepted by Moslems as the final authority on all matters of faith and morals.

The Koran

The theological doctrines of the Koran are simple enough. There is but one God and Mohammed is his prophet. Other prophets there have been in the past, Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. To each a part of the truth was revealed; but the final revelation was made only to Mohammed. After death there will be a bodily resurrection and a future life — for the faithful in a paradise of sensuous pleasures, for the infidel in a hell (Gehenna) of perpetual fire. There are also many moral regulations. The prophet commands his followers to practice the virtues of charity, humility, and patience, and to forgive their enemies. He condemns avarice, lying, and malice, and prohibits drinking and gambling. Polygamy is permitted, the prophet setting the example himself by marrying several times after the death of Khadija, but in many ways the position of women was improved and their rights safeguarded. The practices and ceremonies of Islam are described in detail, including prayers at stated intervals during the day, pilgrimages to Mecca, and fasts from sunrise to sunset during the sacred month of Ramadan. For the rest, the Koran is occupied chiefly with legislation for the government of the Moslem state. For his ideas, Mohammed drew freely from Christianity, Judaism, and Arab paganism, though his knowledge of the first two was uncertain and inaccurate, picked up apparently from casual conversations rather than from reading.

The doctrine of Islam

Yet the result of this mixture of ideas was a doctrine, original when taken as a whole, and designed to appeal to the simple Arab of the prophet's day, while at the same time capable of holding the faith of more civilized people.

2. EXPANSION OF THE MOHAMMEDAN EMPIRE

The death of Mohammed came as a shocking surprise to his devout followers and precipitated a crisis which threatened to wreck the young Mohammedan state. The prophet had made no arrangements for the succession to his position as religious and political ruler. Ali, Mohammed's cousin and husband of his daughter Fatimah, felt that his kinship to the prophet and his unequaled reputation as a warrior gave him a natural claim to leadership. The Medinese were jealous of the Meccan companions of the prophet and wanted one of their own number, though they might have compromised on Ali. Despite this strong opposition, however, Abu Bakr was finally chosen by the aid of the redoubtable Omar. He took the title of caliph, held by all the later successors of Mohammed as religious and political rulers of the Moslem Empire. Meanwhile, the new state seemed to be falling to pieces, as tribe after tribe revolted. The Arabs had no tradition of political unity or government and resented the necessity of paying taxes. Many, too, had had Islam forced upon them by conquest. A year or more of constant warfare passed before Abu Bakr was able to reclaim the deserters and to complete the conquest of Arabia.

The crisis

No sooner had the Arabs been united under the rule of the caliph than they launched upon that amazing series of conquests, which in time was to extend their empire from the Indus to Spain. It has often been said that the motive which drove them forth to conquest was religious fanaticism, the determination to force Islam upon the infidel. Mohammed's teaching did, in fact, furnish a bond to hold the Arab tribes together and his promise of paradise to those who died fighting the infidel gave them a high fighting spirit. Actually, however, the Arabs made little or no attempt to force their religion upon conquered peoples. The motives which inspired the raids into foreign countries were really economic and political. Arabia had for some time been suffering from an economic decline and the tribes were restless and discontented. The rich lands of Syria, Persia, and Egypt attracted them as the fertile provinces of the Roman Empire had attracted the Germanic barbarians. Only their lack of unity hitherto had prevented them from making the attempt. At the same time the caliph realized that to hold the wild Bedouin tribes in

First period of expansion: motives

subjection and to check the intertribal feuds, some outlet must be given them for their warlike energy. The conquest of the rich neighboring countries offered such an outlet, combined with the promise of plunder beyond the dreams of the simple Arab. Moreover, the Byzantine Empire and the Persian Kingdom had just completed a long and devastating war, which had left both countries exhausted. The time was ripe for the venture.

The first attack was directed against Syria, late in 633. Beginning as a plundering raid, it soon became an organized invasion. The victorious Arabs captured Damascus in 635, defeated the Byzantine army the following year, and by 637 had conquered all of Syria except Jerusalem and Caesarea. The former fell in 638, the latter in 640. The Syrian provincials, crushed by imperial taxation, seem rather to have welcomed than resisted the conquerors. Meanwhile Arab armies were carrying the banners of Islam to east and west. Abu Bakr had died in 634, to be succeeded by the vigorous Omar (634–44), who pushed forward the conquests with energy and foresight. Before his death, the Mesopotamian portion of the Persian Kingdom and also Egypt had been added to the growing Moslem state. Under the next caliph, Othman (644–55), the Arabs conquered the remainder of Persia to the east and drove westward as far as Tripoli on the African coast.

First period of expansion (633–55)

Further expansion was checked for a time by civil war. Ali, proclaimed caliph at Medina, was opposed by the head of the Ommiad (or Umyyad) family, one of the leading families of the Meccan aristocracy and kinsmen of Othman, who governed Syria. The assassination of Ali in 661 finally left the Ommiads supreme, and for nearly a century the caliphate was handed down in that family. As their strongest support was in Syria, the first Ommiad caliph moved the capital from Medina to Damascus.

Civil war (655–61)

As the Ommiad caliphs gradually re-established absolute control of the whole state, a second period of expansion began. The conquest of North Africa was a long, slow process, due more to the resistance of the Berber tribes than of the Byzantine government. By about 708, however, the Berbers were thoroughly conquered and soon adopted Islam. The next step in the westward march of the Arabs was the conquest of Spain from the Visigoths, begun in 711 and completed by the aid of Berber allies within two years. From there they pushed on across the Pyrenees into southern Gaul in search of plunder, pressing steadily northward till they were turned back at Poitiers by the Franks under Charles Martel, of whom

Second period of expansion (to 715)

more will be said in the next chapter. Meanwhile, under the Caliph Walid (705–15) the Moslem Empire had reached its farthest extent to the east, stretching as far as the river Indus in India and to the borders of China in central Asia.[1]


Decline of the Ommiads

The Ommiad dynasty reached the peak of its power under Walid, only to lose control of the state within a generation. During the century of Ommiad rule, a considerable transformation had taken place within the Moslem Empire. The caliphs made little attempt to convert the conquered peoples, for so long as there were infidels to tax, the faithful could be relieved of financial burdens. But the taxes themselves encouraged conversion, and by the end of the seventh century so many of the conquered had adopted Islam that the government was forced to tax Moslems as well as infidels. The Arabs, meanwhile, though still the ruling class, had become scattered and were mingling with the other races of the empire. Thus, as the majority of the subject races became Moslem, the distinction between the conqueror and the conquered, the Arab and the non-Arab, was partially lost through the growth of common religious interests. Islam, then, rather than Arab nationalism was becoming the important factor in Moslem patriotism. And the Ommiads, though acting as both religious and political rulers, had always represented Arabian rather than the broader Moslem interests.

Rise of the Abbassids

Discontented with Ommiad rule, the more devout Arabs and non-Arabs in the empire, and especially in Persia, turned to the Abbassid family for leadership. They were descended from Abbas, the uncle of Mohammed, and could rely on their relation to the prophet's family to attract the loyalty of devout Moslems of all races. After some years of political disturbance, the Ommiad dynasty was finally overthrown in 750 and the Abbassid dynasty took its place, though an Ommiad continued to rule in Spain, separating it from the rest of the empire. Persia now took the place of Syria as the center of the empire and the capital was moved from Damascus to Bagdad on the Tigris. The Abbassids continued to stress their claims to Moslem rather than purely Arab loyalty. The Arab aristocracy were succeeded by a mixed official aristocracy drawn from all the Moslem races. The caliphs took on the character of oriental despots, with all the pomp and ceremony of the old Persian kings. And in this new Abbassid empire there grew up a civilization that was partly Arab, partly Persian, with influences from the other races of Islam. It is usually called Saracen, a name originally applied by the Greeks and Romans to the Arabs, but commonly extended to apply to the later Moslems of this period in general.

[1] See map opposite this page.


Longitude 20° West from 10° Greenwich 0° Longitude 10° East from 20° Greenwich
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
Finns
Northmen
Swedes
Angles
Saxons
Franks
Slavs
Dnieper R.
Volga R.
Tours
Asturias
SPAIN
711 719
Pyrenees Mts.
Toledo
Barcelona
Valencia
BALEARIC ISLES
Gibraltar
Ceuta
Algiers
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
MAURETANIA
700 708
Tripoli
697 98
Atlas Mts.
Atlers
Magyars
Khazars
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
Bokhara
Samarcand
Danube R.
Bulgaria
BLACK SEA
Constantinople
Adriatic Sea
Venice
Rome
Naples
Sicily
Sardinia
AEGEAN SEA
Crete
Cyprus
Antioch
Damascus
Caesarea
Jerusalem
Alexandria
Cairo
SYRIA
638
ARMENIA
Tabriz
MESOPOTAMIA
641
Bagdad
Kufah
Basrah
BABYLONIA
637
PERSIA
644
TRIPOLI
BARCA
643
EGYPT
640 43
RED SEA
Nile
Mecca
Medina
632
ARABIA
PERSIAN GULF
INDIAN OCEAN
ABYSSINIA
Aden
The Mohammedan World
about 732
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 600
Territory overrun by Mohammedans
The Byzantine Empire

3. SARACEN CIVILIZATION UNDER THE CALIPHATE

For about seventy-five years after the fall of the Ommiads, the Abbassid caliphs enjoyed an era of absolute power and great prosperity. The reign of Haroun al Rashid (786–809), whose name is familiar to all who have read the *Thousand and One Nights*, marks the point of greatest power in the history of the caliphate. Bagdad was one of the richest cities in the world, the center of an empire stretching from central Asia to the Atlantic, for though Spain was now politically independent, it still recognized the religious authority of the successors of the prophet. But that empire was too large and composed of too many varied races to be held together for long under the despotic rule of one man, unless that man were a statesman of unusual strength and genius. Shortly after Haroun's reign, the powers of the caliph declined and the empire began to disintegrate. During the ninth century, rebellious emirs or governors established independent rule in North Africa, Egypt, and Syria, while at Bagdad the caliphs fell under the control of their Turkish mercenary soldiers. The tenth century saw a further disintegration. The Ommiad emir in Spain took the title Caliph of Cordova in 928, and in Egypt a member of the Fatimite family, descended from Ali and Mohammed's daughter Fatimah, founded the caliphate of Cairo in 969, which later, 988, came to include Syria. From 945 to 1055 the caliphs of Bagdad were completely dominated by a Persian dynasty of emirs, from whom they were "rescued" by the Seljuk Turks, who had come originally from central Asia and had adopted Islam with fanatical zeal. For two centuries, Turkish emirs and sultans ruled in the name of the puppet Abbassid caliphs, reviving the political strength of the empire for a time and recovering Syria. It was with them that the crusaders had to deal. At last, in the middle of the thirteenth century, they, too, were overcome by a fresh invasion from Asia, that of the Mongol hordes, and with them the Abbassid caliphate finally disappeared.

Political history of the caliphate

But though politically divided, there was a strong religious and cultural unity in the Moslem world throughout this whole period, and Saracen civilization continued to thrive until it was destroyed by the Mongol invasions. This civilization is important to us for what the people of the West learned from it, especially during the High Middle Ages. A barrier of religious prejudice and sometimes hatred separated Islam from Christian Europe. Yet there were many points of contact. The Saracens were usually tolerant toward the "people of the Book," Jews and Christians, as Mohammed had commanded, so

Saracen civilization

long as they paid tribute. Great numbers of them lived and prospered under Moslem rule. In Spain, Sicily, and the kingdom carved out by the crusaders in Syria, Christian met Moslem in peace or war, while merchants and pilgrims passed back and forward between the lands of the cross and the crescent.

Literature

In literature, particularly lyric poetry and prose fables and tales, the Saracens of this age made tremendous advances. The language used was the Arabic, which developed with amazing speed from a primitive, unlettered tongue into a flexible and colorful literary language. For long superior to the contemporary literature of Europe, it undoubtedly exercised some influence on the growth of the various literatures of the West, especially of the Provençal poetry, though the exact extent of that influence is difficult to define. In more modern times, the popularity of the *Arabian Nights* and of the poetry of Omar Khayyám still reminds us of the literary debt we owe to the Moslem East.

Learning

Learning was also eagerly pursued in all centers of Saracen culture and was encouraged by the liberal patronage of the caliphs. Theology occupied the attention of a great many Arabic scholars, though speculation in that field was often limited by tradition and orthodoxy. In philosophy, however, they enjoyed a free field. The works of nearly all the Greek philosophers were translated into Arabic. Indeed, it was from the Arabic, translated again into Latin, that the scholars of Europe first made their acquaintance with the philosophy of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In the field of law, too, the Saracens drew freely from earlier systems. Moslem law was still based on the Koran, but the needs of a complicated social system could not be met by laws framed for primitive Arabia. As was natural, then, they adopted large parts of the Roman law which they found in the lands taken from the Byzantine Empire.

Science

To the study of science, the Saracens brought an eager curiosity and keen powers of observation. The science of Greece, which had lain dormant for centuries, was brought to life again in the hands of Arabic scholars. In medicine, the works of Galen and Hippocrates were translated from the Greek to Arabic in the early Abbassid period. To this body of medical knowledge Saracen physicians later added the results of their own valuable clinical experience, embodying the whole in great encyclopedic works on the subject. The works of Avicenna (980–1037) were later translated into Latin, and he was long recognized in western Europe as one of the great masters of medicine. In the fields of chemistry, physics, astronomy, geography, and

mathematics, the Saracens also took over the legacy of Greece, adding to it from their own scientific observation. Their work in chemistry, it is true, was hampered by the dominant interest in alchemy, that is, the attempt to transmute baser metals into gold. Nevertheless, much practical work was done in preparing and isolating chemical substances such as alkalis, sal-ammoniac, arsenious oxide, saltpeter, and crude forms of sulphuric and nitric acids. Finally, it was from the Saracens that the West took over the "arabic" numerals, algebra, and other fundamentals of the science of mathematics.

This flourishing civilization rested on a solid foundation of commercial and industrial prosperity, and its spread throughout the whole Moslem world was due in large measure to the freedom of commercial intercourse from end to end of the Saracen Empire. Even after the political disintegration of the caliphate, commerce circulated freely wherever Islam was recognized, with a freedom reminiscent of the old Roman Empire. There was also a great foreign trade, especially to the East. Saracen captains sailed their boats down the Tigris from Bagdad or put out from Aden and other Red Sea ports and traded with all the lands bordering on the Indian Ocean. Here they met and exchanged goods with merchants from as far east as China. At the same time camel caravans, so characteristic of Moslem commerce, struck out overland, eastward through central Asia to China and India, north into Russia, and south and west into Africa. At first trade with Christian Europe was very limited, but by the eleventh century a steady commerce had developed, mostly by way of Italy. For centuries the Saracen traders acted as intermediaries between the West and the Far East. It was through them that Europe acquired those eastern luxuries which with the growth of a more refined taste became necessities, as well as those goods, silks, damask cloth (from Damascus), muslin (from Mosul), paper, glassware, swords, steel mirrors, etc., which were manufactured by the Moslems themselves.

Commerce and industry

In this survey of the Saracen caliphate and its civilization, we have traveled far ahead of our story into the later centuries of the Middle Ages. It will be necessary to turn back now to an earlier period and to trace the history of western Europe through the centuries following the Germanic migrations. As we follow the gradual development of medieval civilization, however, we must not forget the existence of the Moslem world beyond the confines of Christendom nor the influence which it exerted on the formation of European culture.

CHAPTER SEVEN


THE FRANKS, THE LOMBARDS, AND THE PAPACY

IN THE three centuries which followed the deposition of the last Roman emperor in the West in 476, the foundations of medieval civilization were laid in the blending of Roman and Germanic elements, under the influence of the Catholic Church, that was to make up the composite culture of the Middle Ages. We have already seen how in that period the Eastern Roman Empire became Byzantine, how Justinian in the sixth century sought to make it once more a world empire, and how in the next century the rising power of Islam stripped it of all but a fraction of its provinces. In that same period the early Germanic kingdoms, Ostrogothic, Vandal, and Visigothic, were destroyed. Meanwhile, two new powers, destined to be of supreme importance in shaping the Middle Ages, were rising to dominate the West in close alliance with each other. They were the race of the Franks, the only Germanic nation, with the exception of the Anglo-Saxons, to found a permanent kingdom, and the Roman popes, rulers of the Catholic Church and heirs to the tradition of the Roman Empire. And in between, exercising a strong influence on the destinies of both, were the Lombards, last of the Germanic invaders.

1. THE FRANKS IN THE MEROVINGIAN AGE — THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH CENTURIES

The Franks and Gaul in the fifth century

Early in the fifth century, when barbarian nations were sweeping across the Roman Empire to found kingdoms within its frontiers, a loosely united group of German tribes, known collectively as the Franks, had established themselves on both banks of the lower Rhine. Their early history is very obscure. They were evidently one of the most backward and barbarous of the Germanic peoples. They were divided into a number of petty kingdoms, though two general groups can be discerned, the Salian Franks who dwelt in the low country about the mouth of the Rhine, and the Ripuarian Franks who lived farther up the bank (*ripus*) of the river around Cologne. At the time when the last emperor of the West was deposed, they occupied the northern angle of Gaul between the Rhine and the sea. Between them and the Loire to the south, the Gallo-Roman provincials had formed an independent "kingdom" under the


GERMANIC KINGDOMS
ON ROMAN SOIL
IN FIFTH CENTURY
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
ROMAN EMPIRE
Britons
Angles
Saxons
Jutes
Saxons
Elbe R.
Oder R.
Vistula R.
Slavs
Cologne
Mainz
Kingdom of the Franks
Thuringians
Bretons
Paris
Rheims
Kingdom of the Allamanni until 496
Orleans
Loire R.
Danube R.
Conquered by Franks 506
Burgundians 443-534
Lyons
Lombards
Kingdom of the 568-774
Aquileja
Po R.
Padua
Singidunum
Danube R.
Bordeaux
Visigoths
Genoa
Ostrogoths
Ravenna
Suevi 415-535
Narbonne
493-555
CORSICA
Rome
Constantinople
Toletum
Barcelona
Taranto
Kingdom of the Visigoths 415-711
SARDINIA
Athens
Cordoba
SICILY
Vandals 429-534
Carthage
10
0
10
20
30
50
40

rule of a Roman patrician named Syagrius. Southern Gaul, between the Loire and the Pyrenees, was part of the great Visigothic Kingdom. Eastern Gaul in the valley of the Rhone was occupied by the Burgundians, to the north of whom, in modern Alsace between the Vosges Mountains and the upper Rhine, lay the kingdom of the Alamanni.[1]

Clovis (481–511)

Such was the situation in Gaul in the year 481 when a fifteen-year-old prince, grandson of that Merowech after whom the royal Merovingian family were named, became king of one of the Salian tribes. He was called Clovis, the German form of the name Louis, later taken by so many French kings. He was a thorough barbarian, ruthless, treacherous, and avaricious, but endowed with great ability. He was not long contented with his little Salian kingdom. Gaul was divided and weakened by war. It was his for the taking. In 486, with the aid of other Salian kings, he defeated Syagrius and conquered his territory south to the Loire. Ten years later, he crushed the Alamanni and added their lands to his growing kingdom. Meanwhile, he had married a niece of the Burgundian king, named Clotilda, who unlike most of the Burgundians was a Catholic. When the battle with the Alamanni was going badly and his heathen gods seemed unable to aid him, he prayed, so the legend tells us, to the God of Clotilda and promised allegiance in return for victory.

Conversion and further conquest

The conversion of Clovis and his followers to Christianity was in itself an important event, but it was his adoption of the orthodox Catholic form of Christianity that was most significant and destined to have far-reaching results. The story of the conversion is based on legend, none too trustworthy. It is suspiciously reminiscent of the legend regarding the conversion of Constantine the Great. In all probability Clovis, like Constantine, was motivated chiefly by political considerations. Certainly the baptism of the king with three thousand of his soldiers caused no real change of heart. All the other Germanic nations which had settled within the empire were Arian Christians, that is, heretics in the eyes of the Catholic provincials. By embracing Catholicism, Clovis became the champion of orthodoxy and gained the support of the Gallo-Romans, who still formed the majority of the inhabitants, and especially of the powerful Catholic clergy throughout Gaul. The good Bishop Gregory of Tours, whose interesting *History of the Franks* (575–94) is almost our only source for early Frankish history, stresses the fact that Clovis made his attack on the Arian kingdoms of Gaul a holy war. Every historian of the period has quoted his report of Clovis's address to his soldiers on the eve of his campaign

[1] See map, page 95.

against the Visigoths in 507. "It grieves me that these Arians should hold part of Gaul. Let us march, with the help of God, and reduce them to subjection." They marched and, with the help of the Catholic population at least, conquered the Visigothic Kingdom as far south as the Pyrenees. In the remaining years of his life, Clovis consolidated the Frankish tribes. By a series of brutal and treacherous murders, he got rid of all the rival Frankish kings, leaving in 511 a great united kingdom to his sons.

Conquests completed (511–61)

The successors of Clovis for half a century continued his career of conquest. The kingdom was divided among his four sons according to the German custom, as though it had been a private estate. The theoretical unity of the kingdom, however, was preserved, and, though the kings quarreled frequently and murdered one another freely, they co-operated in extending its boundaries. Burgundy was conquered in 534, and Provence was taken from the Ostrogoths two years later. The Frankish kings now ruled all Gaul except a narrow strip of Visigothic territory on the Mediterranean. They also pushed across the Rhine and subjugated the Bavarians, Thuringians, and Franconians in central and southern Germany.

Civil war (561–613)

The last surviving son of Clovis, Chlotar, had reunited the entire kingdom under his rule before his death in 561. It was then divided again among his four sons, as it had been on the death of Clovis. The next half-century was a period of anarchy and barbarous civil war, during which the conquests ceased while the Frankish kings wasted their energy in fratricidal feuds. The history of this period, as related by Gregory of Tours, is a dreary tale of cruelty, avarice, and treachery, of debauched kings and vindictive queens, for whom Gregory sought excuses because of their defense of Catholic orthodoxy. These civil wars had one very important result. From the constantly shifting divisions and reunions of territory, three fairly distinct kingdoms emerged — Neustria, which included the whole of western Gaul, and Austrasia and Burgundy, which divided the east between them, the former to the north on both sides of the Rhine, the latter to the south on the Rhone.[1]

Decline of the Merovingians

From 613 to 639, Chlotar II and Dagobert, the last of the ruling Merovingian kings, in turn reigned over the reunited Frankish Kingdom, but already the royal power was weakening. A century of absolute power and unrestrained debauchery had fatally weakened the health and character of the Merovingian stock. After Dagobert, the Merovingian kings became mere puppets,

[1] See map, page 111.

powerless in the hands of their chief ministers, the mayors of the palace, who now ruled the country in the king's name. For more than a century these pathetic "do-nothing kings" dragged out a useless existence, shut up in a villa in the country and brought out once a year, riding in an ox-cart, to be seen by the people and to read an address prepared by the all-powerful mayor. Weak in mind and body, they made no attempt to assert their authority. Most of them died in their twenties.

Pepin of Heristal (687–714)

For a generation or more after the death of Dagobert, the civil wars between Neustria, Austrasia, and Burgundy were begun again and carried on by the mayors of the palace of the three kingdoms. At last, however, the Mayor of Austrasia, Pepin of Heristal, whose grandfather, Pepin of Landen, had been mayor under Dagobert, decisively defeated the Neustrians at Testry in 687 and reunited the whole Frankish realm under his rule. During his long reign of twenty-seven years, Pepin held the Frankish Kingdom together, repressed rebellious nobles and subjugated the frontier duchies which had become almost independent. He has been called the "second founder of the Frankish Kingdom." He was also the first of a long line of able and statesmanlike rulers of the family known as Carolingians from the most famous of their number, Charles the Great.

2. SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE MEROVINGIAN AGE

Fusion of German and Roman elements

The gradual blending of the Roman and Germanic elements of medieval civilization took place for the most part under Frankish rule. Other barbarian nations had settled in the Roman provinces and were in time absorbed by the Roman population, accepting the culture and language of the conquered, though of course retaining some of their Germanic tradition. Others again, like the Saxons in Britain, had destroyed Roman civilization and remained stanchly Teutonic. The unique contribution of the Franks is that in their great kingdom, which came to include almost all of Christian western Europe, they held the balance between the two great sources of European civilization, so that a fairly equal blending of the two was possible. Three things favored this development. First, their conquest of Gaul was an expansion of their original holdings, rather than a migration. They did not leave their ancient base to travel among an alien people, but spread their conquests while still keeping in touch with their original home land. Second, their conquests spread in both directions, to the south and west into Romanized Gaul and to the east and north into Germany, so that the Roman and German elements

remained evenly balanced. Third, the adoption of Catholic Christianity by the Franks, and the subsequent conversion of the Arian Germans whom they conquered, placed the German and Roman on the same religious plane and facilitated the fusion of their institutions.

Distribution of the races

The Franks were always a minority in Gaul, except in the northern angle which had been their home. In the "kingdom of Syagrius," where the population had been thinned out, they seem to have taken land freely, but to the south of the Loire they confiscated none of the land belonging to the Gallo-Romans except in rare instances. They had conquered the Visigoths with the aid of the provincials and so dared not alienate them. They contented themselves, therefore, with taking the land of those Visigoths who retired to Spain, and especially of the Visigothic government. In Burgundy, too, they seem to have left private property untouched and to have taken only the lands of the Burgundian king, which in themselves were extensive enough. The population of Gaul, then, was not radically changed by the Frankish conquest. In western Gaul, which became the kingdom of Neustria, and especially in the part south of the Loire known as Aquitaine, the Roman population and culture predominated. Here the language remained essentially Latin in origin, developing in time into the French tongue. In Austrasia, the German element predominated, especially beyond the Rhine, where it was almost pure. Here the language remained Germanic. In Burgundy, which the Burgundians had already made half German before the Frankish conquest, the two elements were most evenly mixed. Throughout the Frankish realm the extent of Roman and German cultural influence varied like the colors in a spectrum, from the almost pure Roman of Aquitaine in the southwest to the almost pure German of the northeast end of Austrasia, passing through all the intermediate stages between. But because it was all under one government, all parts were affected by the blending of Roman and German institutions.

Merovingian kingship

When Clovis became king, he was the military leader of a small tribe. Before his death he had become the absolute ruler of a great state, and this development was continued by his descendants. This naturally meant a great change in the position and powers of the king and in the theory of kingship. In some respects the Merovingian monarchy borrowed from Roman precedent, in others it retained German traditions, but the blend produced a new institution. The Merovingian king had the absolute authority of a late Roman emperor over all subjects, but that authority was exercised purely by right of heredity, through his descent from the Merovingian line. The Franks

never developed the conception of a state composed of citizens who had delegated supreme authority to the king, as was the original theory of the Roman Empire. On the contrary, the Frankish king regarded his kingdom as a private domain, which he had inherited and which he divided among his sons according to the German customs for the inheritance of private property. Yet even when divided, the kingdom remained theoretically united, ruled by members of the Merovingian family, each of whom kept the title, *Rex Francorum*, King of the Franks. The only limits to the king's authority were those imposed by the growing strength of the aristocracy, who might disregard his commands, revolt, or assassinate him. While he remained in power, however, he was the sole legislator, supreme judge, chief executive, commander-in-chief of the army, and practical head of the church. These powers, it is true, were gradually taken over by the mayor of the palace, but the theory remained the same, with the mayor exercising absolute authority in the name of the king.

Administration: mayors of the palace

The administrative system of the Merovingians, if it can be called a system, grew up haphazard to meet the needs of the moment in the most convenient way. The Roman system of taxation and of administration by a hierarchy of officers was too complicated for the German mind, and indeed had broken down before the Franks arrived in Gaul. The expenses of government were small. The army and the local government were self-supporting and fines paid for the expenses of justice. The expenses of the royal court were met for the most part by the income from the king's own extensive estates. No distinction was made between the king's private purse and the state treasury. The king's personal servants, then, who had charge of the king's estates and income, naturally took over the financial administration of the state as well. A corps of officials administered the business of the palace for the king, and since the king had no ready-made administrative system, it was easiest for him to extend their powers from the palace to the whole state. Thus, the marshal, who had charge of the royal stables, became commander of the cavalry; the count of the palace, the king's legal adviser, became the head of the royal courts of justice; the referendary or royal secretary took charge of all documents of state. But of all these palace officials, the chief was the mayor of the palace, who had charge over all the others. It was he who became the king's chief minister and finally his master.

For local administration, the kingdom was divided into units which in Gaul usually corresponded to the old Roman *civitates* or municipalities with their surrounding territory, and in Germany to the land occupied

by a tribe. Over each of these divisions the king appointed a count, who had full jurisdiction as administrator and judge. After 614, the counts were chosen from the noble families in the county and the title tended to become hereditary. In some parts of the kingdom, especially along the frontiers, a number of counties were gathered together under the command of a duke whose duties were chiefly military. The counts and dukes were paid no salaries, but collected their income from judicial fines, fees of various kinds, and by exploiting the people. They were often half independent of the king and many of them oppressed the people cruelly. Throughout the whole of Frankish history they were a menace to king and people alike.

Local administration: the counts and dukes

The church played a tremendously important part in the life of the Merovingian age, barbarous and immoral though the age was in general. The bishops, who governed the church, were among the most important administrative officials in the state. The bishop's diocese was usually coextensive with the territory ruled by a count, and his political power within that territory was often as great as that of the count. He had great wealth at his disposal, drawn from the numerous estates bequeathed to the church, and he had an immense moral and religious prestige. He acted as judge in many cases, supervised education, gave relief to the poor, kept up roads and public works, and protected the people from the exactions of king or count. Most of the bishops were of noble family, many of them Gallo-Romans. Unfortunately, the king often interfered in episcopal elections to appoint men of his own choosing, some of whom had little savor of sanctity about them. It was perhaps too much to expect of the king that he should leave such wealthy and powerful officials free from his control, and, indeed, it was important that the church should work in close alliance with the monarchy. The effect, however, was to make the church more worldly and to lower the general level of morality among the clergy. Still the bishops were usually far superior in character to the counts and were in many ways the strongest moral force in the kingdom.

The church: bishops

The laws in vogue in the Frankish Kingdom provide us with one of the clearest examples of the way in which Roman and German traditions lived on side by side and eventually mingled. The Franks, like all early Germans, believed that every man had the right to be judged according to the traditional laws of his own people. Except for royal edicts dealing with specific problems, there was no uniformity of law. The Gallo-Roman retained his Roman law, while the Salian Frank, Ripuarian Frank, Burgundian, or Bavarian each had

Laws

his ancestral customary code. However, the German codes did not cover many cases arising from the new conditions in Gaul and so laws were borrowed from the Roman code. As the population became more mixed, the distinction between Roman and German gradually died out, and with it the distinction between the legal systems. The result was a residue of laws in which the Roman and German elements were preserved in proportion as they suited the needs of the people and the age.

3. THE LOMBARDS AND THE PAPACY

Let us turn now to Italy, where events of great importance were taking place during this period. Part of the story has already been told. It was while Clovis was establishing the Frankish Kingdom in Gaul that Theodoric, the great Ostrogothic king, carved out for his people a kingdom in Italy, and while the sons of Clovis were conquering the remainder of Gaul, Justinian was making Italy once more a province under imperial rule. Within three years after the death of Justinian, another great change took place. A new nation of barbarian invaders, the Lombards, swept down into Italy and opened a new chapter in its history.

The Lombard conquest (568–605)

The Lombards were one of the East German nations. Their original home was on the banks of the Elbe in northern Germany. Thence they migrated south and east to the Danube, where they were converted to the Arian form of Christianity. In 568, they followed the track of earlier Germanic invaders from the Balkans down into northern Italy. Meeting with little opposition, for the country had been ravaged by war and plague, they occupied the great plain between the Alps and the Apennines, ever since called Lombardy. It was a thorough conquest. They made no pretense of alliance with the empire, as the Ostrogoths had done, nor did they leave the conquered Italians in possession of their estates. The continuity of Roman civilization, which had survived so many invasions, was at last broken, or at least severely strained. About 575, marauding bands of Lombards began to push farther south, and within a decade had occupied the center of Italy almost to the southern end of the peninsula. The emperors made some attempt to check the Lombards, but in vain. In 605, a truce was arranged between them. By that time, the Lombards had conquered all of Italy except the territories around Ravenna, Rome, Naples, and the extreme south. These were still ruled by representatives of the emperor, nominally under the Exarch of Ravenna, though the duchy of Rome and the other imperial possessions were so cut off from the exarchate as to be left practically independent. The

unity of Italy was completely destroyed, to be recovered only after thirteen centuries had passed. The Lombard Kingdom itself was not strongly united. The Lombard dukes were always half independent and often rebellious, especially in the two great duchies of Spoleto and Benevento in the center and south, which were never firmly attached to the kingdom and where the Lombards remained in the minority.

Out of the chaos of this last barbarian invasion, one Italian power, the Roman papacy, rose with greater authority than ever before. The popes had lost much of their prestige since the days of Leo the Great, though they had gained much in wealth from estates bequeathed to them in all parts of Italy. The restoration of imperial rule in Italy had been a serious blow to their authority, for Justinian had introduced that domination of the church by the state which had long been recognized in the Eastern Empire, but had never been enforced in the West. Moreover, the pope's authority outside of Italy had suffered. The bishops of Gaul were controlled by the Frankish kings, and Spain under the Visigoths was Arian almost to the end of the sixth century. But the Lombard conquests broke the power of the emperor over the pope, and in 590 the Roman Church found in Pope Gregory the Great a leader who was to set the papacy back again on the road to independence and spiritual dominion in the West.

The papacy (to 590)

Gregory was a thorough Roman, born of a noble and wealthy Roman family. In early life he held some of the most important administrative posts in the city, but gave up his political career to retire to a monastery. He was called forth to serve the church, and finally, in 590, to become pope. In that difficult position he proved himself an able administrator, a diplomatic statesman, and a stanch defender of papal supremacy. He had an indomitable will, untiring energy, and the self-confidence of the born autocrat. And all of these qualities were needed by the man who occupied the chair of Saint Peter in those troubled times. Rome was constantly in danger from the Lombards who surrounded the Roman duchy. The imperial governor, cut off from his superior at Ravenna, was powerless. It was the pope who undertook the defense of the city, negotiated with the Lombards, and used his resources to maintain public works and relieve the poor. Though still recognizing the overlordship of the emperor, Gregory made himself the practical ruler of Rome and the land about it. At the same time he pressed his claims to universal authority over the Catholic Church with the greatest vigor. He was not always successful. The Frankish bishops were polite rather than obedient, but they learned to look more than before to Rome for guidance.

Gregory the Great (590–604)

Gregory also extended the influence of the papacy by extending the boundaries of the Catholic Church. The Anglo-Saxons in England were still heathen, though missionaries from the Celtic church in Ireland had begun to work in the north. Gregory believed that the Saxons were ripe for conversion and the result proved him correct. The mission headed by Saint Augustine of Canterbury, which he sent to England in 596, met with extraordinary success. During the following century the whole of England was brought into the Roman Church.

Mission to England

In the midst of a busy life, Gregory found time to write, besides numerous letters, a long commentary on the Book of Job, called the *Moralia*, and a book of instructions to the clergy, entitled *The Pastoral Care*. These works, widely read during the Middle Ages, earned for him the title of Father of the Church along with Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. Yet in style, erudition, philosophical background, and intellectual breadth, he cannot be compared to the earlier Fathers. He knew no Greek; his Latin was far from classic; and his thought was encumbered with superstitions. Nothing shows more clearly the cultural decline that had taken place in Italy in the past two centuries than the intellectual gap which separates Gregory from Augustine. His influence, nevertheless, was very great, all the greater perhaps because he was not too far above the intellectual level of the following centuries.

Gregory's writings

The seventh century, after the death of Gregory, passed with little change in the relative positions of the three powers in Italy: the Lombards, the papacy, and the imperial government. The gradual conversion of the Lombards to Catholicism is the most important event. The emperor, absorbed in the struggle first with the Persian Kingdom and then with the rising Moslem Empire in the East, made no serious attempt to recover the land lost to the Lombards nor to re-establish his control of the papacy. The popes, for their part, kept up a formal allegiance to the emperor, fearing lest the removal of even that shadowy authority would leave them entirely in the hands of the Lombards.

The seventh century

Still, the relations between pope and emperor were none too cordial. For centuries the Latin West and the Greek East had been drifting apart until now they had little in common. Early in the eighth century the break came when the Emperor Leo the Isaurian attempted to increase imperial taxation in Italy, and then in 725 interfered in a matter of doctrine by forbidding the presence of pictures or images (icons) of the saints in the churches. The resulting

The popes break with the empire

"iconoclastic controversy" precipitated a rebellion, led by the pope as champion of both Catholic orthodoxy and Italian independence. This greatly weakened the imperial power in Italy and afforded an opportunity to the Lombard king, Liutprand, who invaded the exarchate of Ravenna and conquered all of it except the city itself. He would doubtless have taken the duchy of Rome, too, had it not been for religious scruples that made him hesitate to attack land ruled by the pope. Even so, the pope felt the danger to be so serious that in 739 he appealed to Charles Martel, the Frankish mayor of the palace, for aid. Charles, however, owed Liutprand a debt of gratitude for his help in driving back the Saracens in Gaul and so refused to serve against him. A decade later, the Lombard menace again threatened Rome. In 751, King Aistulf captured Ravenna and the exarchate was no more. Rome was now all that remained of imperial Italy, save for the Greek province at the southern tip. The position of the pope was extremely difficult and ambiguous. He still recognized the overlordship of the emperor, but was still in rebellion over the matter of the icons. He could not seek protection at the hands of the emperor without giving up his spiritual and political independence. So long as he maintained his independence, he was the real ruler of the Roman duchy, but he was also at the mercy of the Lombard king. In this emergency, he turned again, and this time with better success, to the Franks.

Let us follow his example and turn our attention again to the Frankish Kingdom, where important developments were preparing the way for a closer alliance with the church and the papacy.

4. CHARLES MARTEL, PEPIN, AND THE CHURCH (715–68)

Charles Martel (715–41)

On the death of Pepin of Heristal, the great Austrasian mayor of the palace, in 714, his title was left to an infant grandson, under the guardianship of his grandmother. In those troubled times an infant and an old woman could not hope to rule, even had the child possessed the title of king and the loyalty of the people to a traditional house. Ruling merely as mayor of the palace, his position was impossible. Neustria rebelled and the kingdom which Pepin had reunited threatened to fall once more into its component parts. It was saved by Pepin's illegitimate son Charles, later called Martel (the Hammer), who escaped in 715 from the prison where he had been confined by the infant mayor's guardian. He was then a man in his early twenties, strong, vigorous, and warlike, the obvious heir to his father's position. Gathering the Austrasian nobles about him, he crushed the

rebellion in Neustria, deposed his nephew, and by 720 was recognized as mayor of the palace in all parts of the Frankish Kingdom. Charles was above all a warrior, at a time when a fighting prince was needed. His reign was filled with campaigns, for the most part successful, against rebellious counts and dukes, against the heathen Germans to the north and the infidel Saracens to the south. The latter had invaded Gaul as far as the Loire when Martel met them at Poitiers in 732. In that famous battle the Hammer of the Franks struck the decisive blow that checked the advance of Islam to the west. Later, in 739, he drove the Saracens out of Provence with the aid of the Lombard Liutprand. At the end of his reign he left the kingdom greatly strengthened and his family firmly established in their position as the real rulers of the Franks.

Missions in Germany: Boniface

One of the most difficult problems Charles had to meet, as had his father before him and his son after him, was the subjection of the German tribes beyond the Rhine who were nominally under Frankish rule. The problem was made all the more difficult by the fact that many of them were still heathen. When Charles began his reign, the Alamanni and Bavarians were already converted, but heathenism was still firmly entrenched in Thuringia, Hesse, and Frisia, as well as among the still unconquered Saxons. Charles realized that they could never be brought fully under Frankish rule until they had adopted the religion of the Franks. He therefore gave enthusiastic support and armed protection to the missionaries who were working for their conversion. Of these by far the most important was an English monk, Winfrith, though better known by his Latin name, Boniface. England had become strongly Christian and firmly attached to the Roman Church since Gregory the Great had first sent missionaries there, and now English missionaries were returning to carry the Gospel to the heathen on the Continent. From about 716 till his death in 754 or 755, Boniface directed the missions to the Frisians, Hessians, and Thuringians under the orders of the pope and supported by the armies of Charles. Wherever his work progressed, he founded Benedictine monasteries as outposts of Christianity and organized the new church as part of the Roman hierarchy.

Pepin, mayor and king (741–68)

On the death of Charles Martel, the Frankish Kingdom was again divided between his two sons, Pepin (misnamed "the short") and Carloman. After six years, however, Carloman renounced the world and retired to a monastery in Italy, leaving the whole kingdom in Pepin's capable hands. The latter proved himself a true member of his illustrious family, ruling with wisdom and firmness, defending his kingdom and protecting the church. He crushed

rebellions in the German duchies, defeated the "wild Saxons," and in the last years of his reign completely subjugated Aquitaine, which had made a strong bid for independence. For three generations now the Carolingian mayors had ruled as sovereigns in everything but name. By 751, Pepin felt that he was firmly enough established to risk deposing the puppet Merovingian and to assume the title of king. But he would need some sanction other than that of force to offset the traditional loyalty of the people to the ancient Merovingian house. He turned naturally to the church, the greatest moral force of the age, appealing to the pope for advice. The appeal reached Rome at a crucial moment. Ravenna had just fallen to the Lombard king, Aistulf, and the pope was left without a protector in Italy. Glad of the opportunity to win favor with the powerful ruler of the Franks, the pope replied that "it was better that he should be called king who had the power, rather than he who had none." Pepin, thus fortified, called an assembly of the nobles and clergy of the kingdom at Soissons in November, 751, and there proclaimed himself King of the Franks. The saintly Boniface, as representative of the papacy, consecrated him with holy oil. The consecration was a new departure and a significant one. It was a recognition of papal supremacy over the Catholic Church, it bound church and state closer together, and it placed Pepin in the pope's debt. He was soon called upon to discharge that debt in full.

The Donation of Pepin (756)

Meanwhile, the pope's position was growing more desperate. The Lombards were threatening to take from him his independent government of the land about Rome. In the winter of 753–54, Pope Stephen II journeyed to the Frankish court to make a personal appeal to Pepin for aid. There he reconsecrated Pepin and his sons, giving the Carolingian house the full sanction of the Roman Church. In return, Pepin made two expeditions against the Lombards in 754 and 756, both of which were successful. After the second, he forced the Lombard king to give up to the pope, not only the Roman duchy, but also the land of the late exarchate. The gift of this land, stretching from Rome to Ravenna clear across central Italy, is known as "the Donation of Pepin." The keys to the cities included in it were laid upon the tomb of Saint Peter, together with a deed giving them in perpetuity "to the Roman Church, to Saint Peter, and his successors the popes." Thus was founded an independent principality in Italy under the rule of the pope and known as "the Papal States," or "the States of the Church." In making the donation, Pepin was probably influenced by a popular legend to the effect that the Roman emperor, Constantine the Great, had made a similar gift of all Italy to

Pope Sylvester who had cured him of leprosy. At any rate, it was at about this time that the forged "Donation of Constantine," which purported to be the deed of that gift, first made its appearance.

Reform of the Frankish church

The close alliance between king and pope led to a much-needed reform of the church in the Frankish Kingdom. Under Pepin's direction, regular councils of the bishops were convened and steps were taken to raise the standards of education and morality among the clergy. The rule of Saint Benedict was enforced in all the monasteries and the ecclesiastical hierarchy was reorganized so as to bring the clergy more directly under the authority of the pope.

The reign of Pepin was of great significance for the history both of the Franks and of the papacy. His fame has been somewhat obscured by the greater renown of his son Charlemagne. Yet in establishing the Carolingians as the royal family of the Franks, in suppressing rebellious nobles, in defeating the Lombards, in aiding missionaries, and in reforming the church, and finally in building a firm alliance with a greatly strengthened papacy, he laid the foundations upon which Charlemagne was to build his empire.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE AND THE NORTHMEN

THE great historical developments of the three centuries with which we have dealt in the last chapter, the expansion of the Frankish Kingdom, the conversion of the Germans to Catholic Christianity, the rise of the papacy to a position of unprecedented secular and spiritual authority in alliance with the Frankish rulers, all reached their culmination in the reign of Charlemagne. And in the Carolingian Empire, founded by the Frankish king and the Roman pope in the conviction that they were reviving the old Roman Empire in the West, the three elements of medieval civilization, the Germanic, Roman, and Christian traditions, were at last united. The Carolingian Empire lasted less than a century. It was too large for perfect cohesion. It was shaken by the assaults of the Northmen and torn apart by the rising feudal nobility. But the ideal of a united Christendom and of a universal empire remained. The nations which sprang from its ruins were Catholic and possessed of a homogeneity in which the distinction between Roman and barbarian no longer existed.

1. CHARLEMAGNE AND HIS EMPIRE (768–814)

Few names occupy so large a place on the pages of history and legend or in the minds of men as that of Charles, eldest son of King Pepin. Historians by common consent have called him Charles the Great, Carolus Magnus as the Latin chroniclers wrote it, and medieval legend has popularized the name in the Romance form, Charlemagne. When his father died in 768, Charles was not yet thirty. For three years he shared the kingdom with a younger brother, Carloman, but the unity of the kingdom was preserved by the death of the latter as it had been in the generation before by the retirement of the elder Carloman. Thereafter Charles ruled alone until his death in 814. Much of the credit for his achievements during that period must go to the three generations of able rulers who preceded him and who laid the foundations; but he fully justified his title of "the Great" by his clear statesmanlike perception of the needs of his age and of the course that must be taken to bring their work to completion, as well as by his untiring care for the material and spiritual welfare of his people.

Charles the Great

We are fortunate in possessing a contemporary description of Charles, which rescues him from the obscuring mists of medieval legend and romance. In his *Life of Charles*, the royal secretary Einhard has left us a vivid pen portrait of the genial giant who was his friend as well as his king. Here we see Charles as a tall, vigorous man, so well proportioned that his stoutness was not a noticeable defect. He was fond of hunting and swimming, temperate in his use of food and drink, though in his last years persisting stubbornly in his preference for roast meats against the advice of his physicians. He was an eager student, having acquired a fair knowledge of Latin and some Greek, but his studies had begun too late in life for him ever to have learned to write. Above all he was a tireless worker, with an inexhaustible interest in all the varied details of government. For the rest, Einhard pictures him as a kindly yet masterful man, a good companion and a fond father, whose only defect was the unrestrained interest in the opposite sex which gave rise to more than one scandal at court.


His character and appearance

One of the first important events of Charles's reign was the conquest of Lombardy. This might be classified as "unfinished business" left over from his father's time. So long as the Lombard Kingdom remained, the pope would never be secure in his government of the States of the Church in central Italy. After Pepin's death, the Lombard king, Desiderius, had retaken the cities of the exarchate which had been ceded to the pope, and in 773 Pope Hadrian called upon Charles to rescue the papacy as his father had done before him. Charles marched into Italy with a large army, defeated and deposed Desiderius and, in 774, declared himself King of the Lombards. He celebrated Easter that year in Rome and there renewed the Donation of Pepin.

Conquest of Lombardy

Another important conquest made by Charles was that of the heathen Saxon land, which extended from the Frankish frontier on the Rhine north to the borders of Denmark and east to the river Elbe. The "wild Saxons" had long been dangerous and lawless neighbors. They clung stubbornly to their pagan religion and their freedom, both endangered by the great Christian state to the south. They realized, as did Charles, that the two were inseparable. Whether the desire to protect and extend his frontiers or to convert the heathen weighed more strongly with the Frankish king cannot be determined. Certainly conquest and conversion went hand in hand, and the invaders came armed with both sword and cross. Charles led his first campaign against the Saxons in 772, but thirty-two years passed before the conquest was completed. During that time Charles directed eighteen cam-

Conquest of the Saxons


The Frankish Empire
Original Possessions
Conquests of Charlemagne
Scale of Miles
0 50 100 200 300
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
Danes
Baltic Slavs
Saxons
Anglo-Saxon Kingdoms recognizing the overlordship of Egbert
NORTH WALES
WEST WALES
London
Utrecht
Aachen
AUSTRASIA
THURINGIA
Sorbs or Wends
BOHEMIA
(Czechs)
Treves
Wurzburg
Paris
Verdun
NEUSTRIA
BRITTANY
Strassburg
ALAMANNIA
BAVARIA
Luxeuil
St. Gall
Salzburg
BURGUNDY
CARINTHIA
Avars
Croats
LOMBARDY
Venice
AQUITAINE
PROVENCE
TERRITORY CLAIMED BY THE POPE
DUCHY OF SPOLETO
Rome
DUCHY OF BENEVENTO
ADRIATIC SEA
Serbs
Moslems
Roncevalles
SPANISH MARCH
Mohammedans
ATLANTIC OCEAN
10
0
10
20
50

paigns into the Saxon land, pillaging, laying waste the country, and sometimes massacring or deporting part of the population. The "perfidious" Saxons would submit and swear allegiance, only to return to their religion and their freedom when the troops were withdrawn. By 804, however, the task was finished and the Saxons had become members of the Roman Catholic Church and subjects of the Frankish state.

Meanwhile, other wars occupied a great deal of Charles's time and energy. He put down revolts in Aquitaine, Lombardy, and Bavaria. He also waged war with neighboring nations. In 778 he invaded Saracen Spain, taking advantage of a rebellion there to strike a blow against the powerful Ommiad emir, who might again become a menace to Frankish security as in the days of Charles Martel. This campaign was a failure, though Charles later secured a strip of territory to the south of the Pyrenees, known as the Spanish March. While returning through the Pyrenees, the rear guard of the Frankish army, led by a noble named Hruodland, was cut off and destroyed by Basque mountaineers in the pass of Roncesvalles. This event is of little historical importance in itself, but is famous because it gave rise to the greatest of medieval epics, the *Song of Roland*. Against the Mongolian Avars, who had established a kingdom in Hungary and threatened his eastern frontiers, Charles had better success. In 791 he marched through their kingdom, bringing back immense booty. Later they were forced to recognize him as overlord. The protection of the newly conquered Saxon land also forced Charles into wars with the Danes to the north and the Slavs to the east across the Elbe.

Other wars

As the eighth century drew on to its close, the figure of Charlemagne more and more dominated the West. He was the acknowledged ruler of all Catholic Christendom except the British Isles,[1] feared and respected by his heathen and infidel neighbors. Only the Mohammedan caliph at Bagdad or the Greek Orthodox emperor at Constantinople could rival him in power or prestige, and the latter had fallen upon evil times. Scholars at Charlemagne's court who had studied the classic literature began to compare him to the ancient Roman emperors. More than three centuries had passed since there had been an emperor in the West, but the ideal of a universal Roman Empire still cast its spell over the imaginations of men. Its memory had been kept alive by the Roman Catholic Church, a universal spiritual empire, ruled by the pope at Rome, employing Latin as its official speech and with a hierarchical government modeled after the im-

Charles crowned emperor (800)

[1] See map, page 111.

perial administration. The church gave unity to Catholic Christendom, but many medieval thinkers felt that the divine scheme called for some secular counterpart, a political empire and a temporal ruler who would hold secular authority over all Christians (i.e., Catholic Christians) as the pope held spiritual authority. In actual fact, the King of the Franks held practically that position, yet to the medieval mind it was inconceivable that such a ruler should not be the Roman emperor. The obvious solution was to make the Frankish king emperor of a revived Roman Empire. Some such reasoning, more or less influenced by Charles's personal ambitions and by the pope's need for protection against seditious riots in Rome, must account for the amazing and epoch-making scene which occurred in Rome on Christmas Day of the year 800. As Charles knelt before the altar of Saint Peter's Church after the Christmas Mass, Pope Leo III placed an imperial crown on his head and hailed him emperor amidst the shouts of the people. Charles later denied any previous knowledge of the event. Perhaps he had not wished to receive the crown from the pope. If so, he was justified by the troubles arising from that act in future centuries. But the fact was accomplished. An empire had been created, Roman in name but more than half German in fact, and inseparably linked to the Catholic Church.

Carolingian administration

The general structure of government under Charles was much the same as that under the Merovingian kings, discussed in the preceding chapter. The addition of the imperial title made little difference. The monarch was absolute ruler of the state and exercised an extensive control of the church. The central administration was in his hands, assisted by the same palace officers as in Merovingian days, except that there was no longer a mayor of the palace and that the lay referendary had been succeeded by a chancellor who was usually a clergyman. The counts were still in charge of the local administration, though more closely associated with the bishops, who had become recognized administrative officers of the state as well as of the church. Much of Charles's success in maintaining his authority throughout the realm depended on the close personal check he kept on these local officers. This was accomplished through the institution of the *missi dominici* (those sent by the king). The *missi* had been known in earlier times as representatives of the king on special missions. Charles now regularized their duties, sending them out each year in pairs to visit all parts of a given territory. The two *missi* traveling together were usually a layman and an ecclesiastic, a count and a bishop or abbot. It was their duty to examine the administration of both church and state in their territory, to see that the king's orders were carried out,

to preserve close relations between the central and local administration, and to prevent injustice and oppression. This system checked the independence of the counts during Charles's reign, but it had no permanent value, for it was merely an extension of personal rule and its success in the long run depended entirely on the character and strength of the ruler.

Capitularies

The whole conception of Carolingian government was paternal. As father of his people, Charles felt responsible for their welfare and issued innumerable decrees or "capitularies" dealing with the most varied aspects of public and private life, religious and moral as well as material, for church and state were so closely bound together that it was impossible to make any clear distinction between their respective jurisdictions. Those of the capitularies that have survived are of great value to the historian in helping him form a picture of the age. Some of them are detailed instructions for the management of the royal estates; others regulate the discipline and organization of the church; while still others are general decrees applying to the whole realm and published everywhere by the counts and bishops. Taken together they justify the description of Charles as one of the great legislators of the Middle Ages.

Economic revival

Many of Charles's capitularies deal with economic problems and indicate some revival of prosperity. By far the great majority of the people in this age were engaged in farming or drew their income from the land. The most interesting of the capitularies are those dealing with the management of the royal estates. These show a considerable improvement in agricultural methods, which were copied on the great villas or estates of the nobles and the church. The building-up of large estates went on steadily through this period, as the small landowners lost their land and freedom under the stress of compulsory military service, which often proved too great an economic strain on the small farmer. This, of course, added to the power of the nobles and the great churchmen, a fact that was to have important results in the next century. Industry was limited almost entirely to the production on the estate of the tools, weapons, clothing, and so forth needed by the people of the villa. Commerce of a general sort had declined greatly since the conquest of the Mediterranean by the Saracens, which hindered trade with the East. In fact, during the eighth century trade was limited more and more to the meeting of local needs, and "natural economy" (the barter or exchange of goods) was steadily taking the place of "money economy" (the buying and selling of goods for cash). Nevertheless, the re-establishment of order and security in most of western

Europe by Charles led to a temporary revival of both foreign and domestic commerce. Jewish and Syrian traders brought luxuries from the East, and itinerant merchants carried their wares up and down the great river-ways and along the old Roman roads. Everywhere they had to pay tolls to the nobles who controlled the roads and bridges. Charles was forced to recognize the tolls already established, but tried to prevent the creation of new ones. He also aided commerce by establishing uniform standards for weights, measures, and coinage.

Carolingian Renascence

Despite all the multifarious activities which we have outlined or suggested, Charles still found time to take a keen interest in the education of his people and especially of the clergy. As protector of the church — and in reality its master, whatever the theory of the relation of church and state might be — he felt responsible for the purity of its teaching. The religion of the people was steeped in superstition brought over from pagan days, and the majority of the clergy were too ignorant to instruct them. Charles realized that the better education of the clergy was a matter of supreme importance. Wherever possible he encouraged bishops and abbots of monasteries to found schools for the training of priests. He himself founded a school at the palace to which he brought scholars from all parts of Europe. Paul the Deacon (Paulus Diaconus), the author of the famous *History of the Lombards*, Peter of Pisa and Paulinus of Aquileia came from Italy. Theodulphus, whom Charles made Bishop of Orleans, was a Spanish Goth. Einhard was one of the few Frankish scholars. But most important of all the teachers at the palace school was Alcuin, a Saxon monk from northern England who had received his education in the school founded by the great Bede. These men devoted themselves to the study of Latin antiquity, both classical and Christian. Their work has given to the age the somewhat exaggerated name, the Carolingian Renascence, or rebirth of culture. Actually they learned little more than the rudiments of the ancient culture. They found more that they could understand in the works of the decadent or half-barbarous scholars of the intermediate period, like Boëthius and Gregory the Great, than in the masterpieces of the golden age or in the works of the great Fathers of the Church of the fourth century. But the Carolingian revival is important none the less, for it marks the beginning of the long process by which the German people assimilated the ancient classical and Christian learning and made it their own.

2. BREAK-UP OF THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE — THE NINTH CENTURY

The reign of Charlemagne was followed by a period of disaster, darkness, and chaos, and within three generations the Carolingian Empire had disappeared. Despite its apparent strength, there were elements of fatal weakness in Charles's empire, held in check only by the force of his powerful personality. The empire had in fact no real racial or political unity. It was held together only by loyalty to the ruler and by the common bond of membership in the Roman Church. The great size of the empire, in an age when communications were difficult, made it almost impossible for any but a great administrative genius to govern all parts by the system of personal rule which was all that the German people had as yet been able to evolve. Most important of all the factors in the disintegration of the empire was the fatal weakness of the central government. And this was caused, not only by the difficulties inherent in personal rule, but even more by the growing power and independence of the aristocracy, the counts, bishops, and great landowners, who gradually took over the rights and duties of government into their own hands. All this was included in the development of that system of society known as feudalism, concerning which more will be said in the following chapter. Its earliest origins date back to the Merovingian period. Its development was controlled but not halted by the great Carolingians, and under the successors of Charlemagne it became stronger than the monarchy. To all these disruptive factors was added the ancient Frankish custom of dividing the realm among all the heirs of the ruler. Finally, as though its internal difficulties were not enough, the weakened and divided empire was subjected to a long series of devastating raids and invasions by those fierce Scandinavian pirates, the Northmen.

Disruptive factors

Charles the Great was survived by only one son, Lewis, called the Pious because of his devotion to the church. The year before his death, Charles had himself bestowed the imperial crown upon Lewis, in the hope apparently of breaking the tradition of papal coronation. This precaution was nullified, however, for Lewis permitted the pope to recrown him in 816. Thus far the unity of the empire had been saved, as in preceding generations, by the survival of only one heir. But almost at once the fatal principle of division began to cause trouble. In 817, Lewis announced his plans for the division of the empire among his three sons after his death. Six years later these plans had to be rearranged to include a fourth son, Charles, born to

Lewis the Pious (814–40)

Lewis's second wife Judith. This strong-minded lady seems to have completely dominated her amiable husband and was determined to gain a fair share, or more, of the heritage for her son. The remainder of Lewis's reign was filled with intrigues, rebellions, and civil wars, as each of the brothers strove to hold or extend his portion, while the country was ravaged, government neglected, and the imperial authority weakened. Under normal circumstances Lewis would probably have been a good ruler. But he lacked the character or ability to control his own family, to say nothing of the insurgent aristocracy and the ambitious princes of the church.

When Lewis the Pious finally died in 840, the question of division was still unsettled. One of his sons had died, but the remaining three were each dissatisfied with his share. Lothair, the eldest, who had inherited the imperial title, hoped to extend his authority over the whole empire. The two younger brothers, Charles the Bald and Lewis the German, as they were called, therefore united against him. In 841 they met in the deadly battle of Fontenoy. Great numbers of the Frankish people were slain, but neither side won a clear victory. Charles and Lewis separated for a time, but were soon forced to reunite. They met at Strasbourg in the following year and there each took an oath of perpetual loyalty to the other. The text of the oath has survived and gives interesting evidence of the development of separate popular languages within the Frankish Empire. Lewis read the oath in the Romance tongue, the ancestor of modern French, so as to be understood by his brother's troops, most of whom came from western Gaul. Charles, on the other hand, took the oath in the German dialect which alone would be understood by the men who had followed Lewis from the east. The alliance proved too strong for Lothair, and in 843 peace was concluded by a treaty arranged at Verdun. Lothair was given the imperial title and a strip of territory about a thousand miles long and rather more than a hundred wide, running from north to south through the center of the empire from the North Sea to Rome. It included most of the valleys of the Rhine and the Rhone and more than half of Italy. The portions assigned to the two younger brothers, with the title of kings, had a greater geographical and cultural unity. Charles received the Romance-speaking western kingdom, while Lewis took the German lands to the east. The Treaty of Verdun did not create new nations, but it did mark off the territories which were to become the countries of France and Germany and the "middle kingdom," the debatable land over which the French and German nations have fought almost to the present time.

Division of the empire (843)

During the remaining years of the Carolingian Empire, the chief historical interest attached to the western kingdom of Charles the Bald (843–77). They were years of anarchy and disaster. The Northmen plundered the towns and monasteries on the coast and along all the navigable rivers. The king was powerless to defend his people. Charles seems to have been a fairly capable and energetic person, but his every effort was defeated by the refusal of the nobles to co-operate or to obey his commands. He had weakened his position, as had his brothers also, by bribing the nobles with gifts of land, immunities, and privileges, in order to retain their loyalty during the civil war. There were open rebellions in Brittany and Aquitaine, and everywhere the nobles were assuming greater independence, while the people were forced to turn to them rather than to the king for protection. Yet despite his inability to rule the land he had, Charles engaged in wars to win more land from the other Frankish kingdoms. In 869, on the death of his nephew Lothair II, he took most of Lotharingia or Lorraine after a war with Lewis the German who also claimed it. Six years later, when the last son of Lothair I died, he claimed the imperial title and won it despite the opposition of Lewis.

Dissolution of the empire (843–87)

The later Carolingians who followed Charles were short-lived and dogged by misfortune. In 884, Charles the Fat, son of Lewis the German and the only surviving adult member of the Carolingian family, reunited the whole empire under his rule. But this weak and shiftless emperor was but a poor parody of his great namesake. During the two years following his accession, the Northmen besieged the city of Paris in force. Charles proved utterly unable to cope with them and finally bought them off by offering them Burgundy to plunder. The nobles of the empire rose in indignation and deposed him. He died shortly thereafter, January, 888. With him perished the Carolingian Empire. It had reached the final *reductio ad absurdum.*

The empire now broke up into separate kingdoms, one in Italy where the imperial title lingered on for a time, two in Burgundy, one in Germany, and one in the west which from this time on may be called France. Of these the latter two were to maintain their separate existences through the centuries till they formed nations in the modern sense. In Germany illegitimate Carolingians ruled till 911. In France the western branch of the Carolingian family lasted longer. For an even century after Charles the Fat they alternated with members of the Robertian family in holding the royal title, though with little more power than the great nobles over whom they

Formation of the kingdoms

claimed to rule. But the history of the feudal kingdoms which rose from the ruins of the Carolingian Empire is another story and will be told later.

3. THE COMING OF THE NORTHMEN

The Northmen

The Carolingian Empire, like its greater forerunner the Roman Empire, decayed largely because of internal weakness, but, as in the case of the older empire, the process of dissolution was accelerated by the impact of barbarian invaders from the north. These new invaders, the Northmen, who fell upon all the exposed coastline of western Europe with fire and sword in the ninth century, destroyed much of the civilization they found, as had their Germanic predecessors, but in the end they added new energy and vitality and new elements of culture to the formation of medieval civilization.

The Vikings

The home of the Northmen was in the three Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. There, cut off by the sea from the rest of Europe and hence from the influence of Rome and Christianity, they had retained their pagan religion and ancient customs, which in many ways resembled those of the early Germans to whom they were closely akin in race. Yet in one important respect they were different from their Germanic cousins in their manner of life. The rocky hills of Norway and Sweden and the marshy sandflats of Denmark afforded little room for agriculture, though they made good use of what land they had. The sea offered a better living, and the innumerable creeks or fiords provided perfect natural harbors. Of necessity, then, the Northmen had become amphibious. They were industrious farmers, but also daring sailors, fishermen, traders, and pirates, equally at home on land or sea. From this varied life they acquired remarkable versatility, reckless daring combined with sound practical sense. Above all, they were a hardy, vigorous race, toughened by the constant hardships of northern winters and storm-swept seas. Tall, blond men, vain of their gold ornaments and scarlet cloaks, their ring-mail and carved sword hilts, never so happy as when their long-handled battle-axes clove through the ranks of their enemies — such were the Vikings, as those of the Northmen were called who set out on piratical raids in ever-increasing numbers from the end of the eighth century. What were the causes of this sudden activity? Probably much the same as for the migrations of the early Germans — lack of room at home due to increase in population, the lure of plunder, and the love of adventure. For centuries the sea had cut them off from the

south. Now they discovered that it provided an open road to those who had the courage to take it.

Viking routes

The first Viking raids were directed toward the British Isles. The *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* mentions one as early as 787. But it was not till the beginning of the ninth century that they became general and assumed serious proportions. It was in the last years of Charlemagne that the Vikings first beached their long boats on the Frankish coast. Thereafter their raids continued, each year bringing more and larger boats, manned by more numerous, more experienced, and hence more dangerous crews. It is impossible to distinguish absolutely between the Vikings of the various Scandinavian countries. In general, however, those who sailed westward around the north of Scotland, to prey upon the coast of Scotland, Ireland, and the smaller islands, were Norwegians. Later these sailed farther west to Iceland, Greenland, and the coast of North America. The Vikings who turned south through the North Sea and the English Channel to England and the western coast of Europe were mostly Danes; while the Swedes took the eastern route by river through Russia to the Black Sea and eventually to Constantinople, where they met other Vikings who had sailed eastward through the Mediterranean from the Straits of Gibraltar. No part of Europe that could be reached by water was safe from these far-wandering men.[1]

Raids

The seacoast towns were naturally the first objects of their raids. Masters of the sea, they struck where they chose with all the advantage that goes with a surprise attack. Their long open boats would appear unheralded out of the morning mist, and before a force could be collected to ward them off they would have sacked the town and carried their plunder off to the safety of the sea. As they grew bolder, the Vikings struck inland, rowing their boats up the navigable rivers on which the most important towns were situated. For centuries these rivers had been the principal highways of trade. They now served the northern pirates equally well. Everywhere the Northmen sought out monasteries and churches, not so much through malice against the Christian clergy as because they had learned that there was always rich plunder to be found under the sign of the cross and that the monks and clergy had become too accustomed to the protection offered them by religious veneration to have taken the necessary precautions for defense. Great numbers of the monasteries were completely destroyed — a serious blow to learning, since the monasteries were the chief centers of education. The fear these rapacious pirates inspired is echoed

[1] See map, pages 122–123.

eloquently in the prayer, introduced into the regular church service, "From the fury of the Northmen, good Lord, deliver us!"


About the middle of the ninth century, the activities of the Northmen entered a new phase. No longer were they content to make annual expeditions in search of movable plunder. Instead they began to settle at strategic points along the coast and to carry on their depredations at closer range. The Frankish Empire had been sadly weakened by the civil war between the sons of Lewis the Pious and by the resulting division of the empire. The Danish host took advantage of the weakness of the central government to found permanent camps at the mouths of the great rivers which empty on the western coast. Toward the end of the century, however, their raids were checked as the towns improved their fortifications and the nobles began to build strong castles for defense. In 891, the German king, Arnulf, defeated a large Danish army on the lower Rhine and drove them out of that district. Thereafter the settlements of the Northmen were confined to the lower reaches of the Seine, and the raids on other parts soon ceased. In 911 or 912, the land about the lower Seine, known thereafter as Normandy, was ceded to the Northmen by the French Carolingian king, Charles the Simple. Their leader, the famous Duke Rollo, became a vassal of the French king, though a very independent one, and was converted to Christianity. Further immigration from Denmark continued for some time and Normandy occupied a rather anomalous position as at once a Scandinavian colony and a French duchy. But by the end of the tenth century, the Normans had adopted the religion, speech, and culture of the French people among whom they lived. By that time Normandy had become definitely French, though always more than half independent of the French king.


Settlements in Europe: Normandy

In England much the same development had taken place about the middle of the ninth century. In 851, the Danish fleet wintered at Thanet, and four years later a fleet of some three hundred and fifty ships spent the winter at Sheppey. In 866, the Danes began a concerted invasion which threatened to overwhelm all England. Mounting themselves on horses stolen from the coast shires, they rode inland sweeping all opposition before them. Anglo-Saxon England was divided into four separate kingdoms and failed to unite against the foreign foe. Within five years the Northmen conquered the kingdoms of Northumbria, Mercia, and East Anglia. In 871, they invaded the southern kingdom of Wessex, the last Saxon stronghold.

Settlement in England

Here they were finally checked by the skillful and courageous leadership of the young Alfred, who succeeded his elder brother as King of


75
60
45
30
15
A R
DAVIS STRAIT
GREENLAND
982
DENMARK STRAIT
ICELAND
867
60
LABRADOR
A T L A N T I C
NEWFOUNDLAND
45
NOVA SCOTIA
VINLAND
1000
Cape Cod
LONG ISLAND
AZORES
O C E A N
BERMUDAS
MADEIRA ISLANDS
30
CANARY ISLANDS
TROPIC OF CANCER
15
CAPE VERDE ISLANDS
75
60
45
30
15


0
15
30
45
ARCTIC OCEAN
North Cape
LAPLAND
ARCTIC CIRCLE
WHITE SEA
FAROE ISLANDS
SHETLAND IS.
ORKNEY IS.
HEBRIDES
CAITHNESS
SUTHERLAND
NORWAY
SWEDEN
GOTLAND
Wisby
Novgorod
RUSSIAN PRINCIPALITIES FOUNDED BY THE NORTHMEN
NORTH SEA
DENMARK
LINDISFARNE
Armagh
FRISIA
Kiev
Evreux
Bayeux
NORMANDY
Orleans
Nantes
Limoges
BURGUNDY
Saintes
Bordeaux
Toulouse
NORMAN KINGDOM OF SICILY
Constantinople
BLACK SEA
Trebizond
Erzerum
Tabriz
CASPIAN SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
RED SEA
60
45
30
15
Expansion of the Northmen
This map is on a projection which makes the scale of miles different in northern and southern parts.
The arrows show the directions taken by their voyages and inroads.
Places permanently occupied by the Northmen
Kingdom of Wessex under Alfred the Great

Wessex in the midst of the invasion. Seven years later "the army," as the Saxons called the Danish host, again invaded Wessex and were again repulsed. Later, Alfred reconquered London and part of Mercia from the Danes. England was now divided into two parts, the Saxon kingdom of Wessex south of the Thames and the "Danelaw" to the north. In the intervals between conflicts with his dangerous neighbors, Alfred turned his attention to strengthening his kingdom. He reorganized the government and the army along lines that were to be followed by his successors, fortified the towns, and created a fleet that could cope with the Danes in their own element. Like Charlemagne, to whom he has often been compared, Alfred was vitally interested in religion and education, though unlike the great Frankish ruler he was himself one of the finest scholars of his day. The heathen "army" had destroyed the greater part of monastic culture in northern England, including the school at York where a century earlier Alcuin had received the education which made him the foremost scholar at Charlemagne's court. Even in Wessex learning had declined. Both people and clergy were ignorant and were falling back into pagan superstition. Realizing the importance of educating the clergy, Alfred gave his personal attention to the founding of schools, while he himself undertook the translation of such works as the *Pastoral Care* of Gregory the Great, the *Consolations of Philosophy* of Boëthius, and Bede's *Ecclesiastical History*, from Latin to Anglo-Saxon. It was he, too, who was responsible for the institution of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, our best source for the history of his age. Both as the founder of the English kingdom and of English literature, Alfred fully deserved his title, "the Great."

Alfred the Great (871–900)

Meanwhile, the Danes were settling everywhere north of the Thames, farming and building fortified towns or "burghs" as military and commercial centers. They were also gradually adopting the Christian religion. They failed, however, to develop any strong political organization. In the two generations following Alfred the Great, his son and grandson were able to complete his work by reconquering the Danelaw and establishing a united kingdom in England. For a time the Danes retained their own laws; but as their language and customs were not radically unlike those of the Saxons, they gradually merged with them into one indistinguishable race.

Reconquest of the Danelaw

Of the Vikings from Sweden who struck out to the east and south by way of the rivers through Russia we know less than about those who went to the west. We know, however, that these Vikings, whom the Slavs called "Russ," occupied Novgorod and

The Swedes in Russia

Kiev about the middle of the ninth century and under a leader named Rurik carved out some kind of kingdom for themselves — the first Russian state. They traded from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and kept up commercial relations with Constantinople and Bagdad. In course of time, like those Northmen who had gone to England and Normandy, they adopted the speech, religion, and customs of the people among whom they lived and so disappear as a separate race.

The contribution of the Northmen

The coming of the Northmen caused the partial destruction of civilization and learning in many parts of Europe, but their advent was not an unmitigated disaster. The outworn Carolingian Empire, which they helped to destroy, was succeeded by new kingdoms, the nations of the future. In England they made the union of the whole country into one kingdom possible by destroying three out of the original four rival Anglo-Saxon kingdoms. And everywhere they introduced new and vigorous blood. Moreover, they proved themselves capable of absorbing the culture of more civilized people and, in time, of adding to it. Above all, their keen interest in trade led to a revival of commerce and town life in the British Isles, Normandy, and Russia, for which later ages owe them a great debt.

CHAPTER NINE

THE FEUDAL SYSTEM

THE kingdoms which replaced the disrupted Carolingian Empire were feudal kingdoms; and medieval society, in which the Germanic and Roman elements had at last merged to form a new composite, was throughout a feudal society. It is feudalism that gives to the society of the Middle Ages its peculiar character, differentiating it clearly from that of Roman antiquity or of the modern age. It pervaded and gave form to every aspect of life and every institution. Economic, social, political, and judicial institutions were all parts of the feudal system — as was also the church. To understand the feudal system, then, is essential to an understanding of the life of the Middle Ages. Nor is it easy for us to understand, accustomed as we are to such radically different conditions and ideas. It is difficult for the modern man, with his conceptions of private ownership of land, to visualize a society in which no one, or at least very few, owned land outright, but instead held it as an hereditary right from some social superior in return for personal services. It is difficult, too, for us to imagine a society in which the great majority of the people, the workers, were only partly free, while the remainder formed a fighting and ruling aristocracy. It is still less easy, perhaps, to picture a state in which the body of the citizens had no direct connection with the central government and where the ordinary rights and duties of government, such as the prosecution of justice in the law courts, the enforcement of law and order, the coinage of money, taxation, and the organization of the army, had passed into the hands of private individuals.

In this chapter we shall try to explain how such a system arose and how it functioned. But we can do so only in the most general way; for feudalism grew up gradually and according to no preconceived plan, so that what is true of one place may not be entirely true of another, and what applies to one time may not apply to another. All that we can attempt is to trace the main outlines of the feudal system and to describe what was most generally true. Broadly speaking, the eighth and ninth centuries may be taken as the age in which feudalism originated; the tenth and first half of the eleventh century as the period in which it took definite shape; and the next two hundred years as the time of its highest and most complete development, to be followed by centuries of slow decay as new forms arose to take its place.

1. ORIGINS OF FEUDALISM — THE EIGHTH AND NINTH CENTURIES

Feudalism arose because it was the only system that would satisfy the needs of the age. It came as a result, not so much of legislation or governmental policy as of a vast number of bargains and arrangements between private individuals or between individuals and the monarch — bargains in which both parties made the best terms they could according to their needs and ambitions. The fundamental cause of feudalism, then, is to be found in the conditions of the period — roughly the eighth and ninth centuries — in which it arose, and of these conditions the most important was the weakness and eventual failure of the central government. Even in the best days of the Carolingian rulers, from their beginning as mayors of the palace to the death of Charlemagne, they had never provided a really adequate government. Under the system of personal rule in a primitive society, it was impossible to give sufficient protection to the poor or to prevent the great nobles from taking over some of the powers of the state. Yet feudalism made slow progress until the ninth century, when under Lewis the Pious and his warring sons the central government gradually collapsed. Weakened by civil wars and rebellions, the later Carolingians were unable to protect their people from the raids of the Northmen and the violence of the nobles, and were forced to leave them, together with many of the privileges of government, in the hands of the fighting aristocracy, whom they could no longer control and who were strong enough to give the people more adequate protection than the king could give them. Let us see how this change worked out in relation to the different classes of society.

Failure of central government

For the class of small landowners, the rise of feudalism meant the loss of free ownership of their land and with it the loss of freedom and independence. Since Roman times there had been many great estates worked by slaves and more or less servile *coloni*. Small farms were now added to these estates or were put together to form new ones, and their former owners sank to a position very like that of the *colonus*. One of the principal causes of this development during the eighth century, and especially under the warlike Charlemagne, was the heavy burden of compulsory military service laid on all freemen. During the summer months when his land needed the most attention, the freeman was often forced to go on campaigns at his own expense and without pay. For this and other reasons, great numbers of small landowners sank hopelessly into debt, and in order to cancel

Small landowners lose freedom

their debts or to escape military service they gave up their lands to some rich neighbor. Thereafter they worked the land as dependent tenants under the rich lord's protection. Freemen also who had no land or had lost it, and hence had no way of making a living, "commended" themselves to a wealthy lord. Henceforth they were "his men" and usually were given some land to work. In either case they became dependent on the lord and lost their freedom. During the turbulent ninth century this process was greatly accelerated. The necessity of securing protection from the only available source — the most powerful man in the neighborhood — forced the remaining small freemen to put themselves and their land under the protection of the local lord, even though it meant the loss of ownership and freedom, for in that lawless age security was more important than freedom. At the same time, many great landowners took advantage of their power and the lack of governmental control to force their poorer neighbors into this dependent position. Whatever may have been the steps by which this process was completed, and they are none too clear, it is evident that by the end of the ninth century almost all the workers on the land had become unfree tenants on large estates.

Rise of a military aristocracy

While the poorer citizens were sinking in the social scale, the wealthier or more fortunate were forming a military aristocracy. Since the early years of the eighth century, when Charles Martel had mounted part of the Frankish army in order to meet the Saracen cavalry on equal terms, military service had become more expensive. In course of time practically the whole fighting force came to be made up of mounted men. As a result, only men with sufficient money to provide themselves with a horse as well as with armor and weapons could afford to fight. Hence the flight from military service noted in the last paragraph, which so reduced the imperial army that Charlemagne issued edicts forcing the lords to equip and bring into the army, under their own leadership, at least some of the men dependent on them. Thus there grew up a class of military dependents, who, however, unlike the laborers, did not lose their status as freemen, since fighting was considered an honorable occupation. In the chaos of the ninth century, fighting men were at a premium. They were needed by the king and by the lords and hence were able to secure more favorable terms for themselves than were the laborers. The warrior who commended himself to a lord would receive from him the use of enough land to provide him with the necessary income for horse and armor and the leisure to devote himself to fighting. Also the freeman who had land enough to provide himself with such an income, but who needed the protection of some great lord, would give up his land to the lord and be allowed to

retain the income from it in return for military service. By the end of the ninth century, this combination of landholding and military service had become the universal rule. It was a recognized axiom that there should be no land and no man without a lord. Like the laborer, the fighter held his land from some lord whose man he was, but his position in the social scale was infinitely higher and tended to become hereditary, thus laying the foundation for a military aristocracy.

Roman and Germanic origins

The series of dependent relations established between the tenant laborers and the owners of large estates, and between the fighting landholders and their lords, which formed the framework of social feudalism, were the natural results of the break-up of the state and central government. Society was split into smaller units and men were forced to seek protection where they could find it. The actual form taken by this process, however, was conditioned by the existence of somewhat similar Roman and Germanic institutions at an earlier date. In the late and unsettled period of the Roman Empire, it was not uncommon for a freeman, who could not hold his land under the pressure of hard times and taxation, to give his land to a rich landowner, while continuing to work it as a tenant. Also poor men frequently sought the protection of a wealthy man, giving in return services as clients. The former relation is called *precarium*, the latter *patrocinium*. But these implied no military service, nor the bond of personal loyalty to be found in the relation between the feudal warrior and his lord. For an earlier model for this institution we must go back to the Germanic past, to the *comitatus*, the band of warriors who swore allegiance to their chief, fought for him and in return were provided with the necessities of life. The extent to which these institutions influenced the growth of feudalism is doubtful; but so far as feudalism did draw its origins from the past, it may be said to have been a combination of Roman methods of landholding and of Germanic methods of military service.

Powers of state fall into private hands

So far as the administration of the state as a whole was concerned, one of the most important factors in the rise of feudalism was the passing of many of the rights and privileges of government from the king to the great nobles. The legal steps by which this process took place are difficult to trace. The explanation of why they occurred is more clear. As the central government grew weaker, the nobles grew stronger and hence more independent. People turned to them for the protection they no longer received from the state. Since they were strong enough to assume one of the greatest responsibilities of government, that of granting protection and preserving

order, it was only natural that these nobles should assume the other rights and privileges of government over their people. Even had they not been anxious to seize power, it would have been thrust upon them; for the people turned naturally to the local lord for protection and justice, rather than to the distant and feeble monarch. In an age of general anarchy like the ninth century, he ruled who had the power to rule, regardless of legal right. The counts and dukes of the Carolingian Empire, whose offices had become practically hereditary, were the natural leaders of their administrative districts. It was easy for them to establish themselves as rulers in their own right rather than as officers of the crown, though still recognizing the king as their superior. In similar ways, lesser lords took over the actual government of their own districts, simply because they were strong enough to do so.

So far we have tried to show how feudalism came into existence. We must turn now to the description of the system in its completed form.

2. ECONOMIC FEUDALISM — THE MANORIAL SYSTEM


By the end of the ninth century, the manorial system of landholding and cultivation was practically universal throughout Europe. With a few scattered exceptions, the land was divided into estates, called "villas" in France and "manors" in England, of which the owner was a lord or "seigneur" and the workers were peasant tenants, dependent on him. The manor, to use the familiar English term, was the common economic unit of feudalism, for the whole feudal system was based on landholding. It was through the organization of the manor that the peasant laborer had his only contact with the military ruling class, who formed the upper ranks of feudal society. The lord was a member of the fighting aristocracy. He might have no more than a single manor, or he might hold hundreds. In any case the individual manor was an independent unit and the relation between the peasants and the lord would be the same. We may confine our study of the economic side of feudalism, then, to the organization of a single manor.

The manor, an economic unit

No two manors were exactly alike. There were infinite variations in custom and practice. Yet the general characteristics of the manorial system were sufficiently alike in all parts of Europe to justify the description of a typical manor, on the understanding, of course, that the details would vary widely in any given case.[1]

The typical manor

[1] See chart, page 131.



This chart shows all the features of an ordinary medieval manor. Note especially the arrangement of the strips in the open fields showing the intermixed ownership.

At the center of the manor, on the highest point of land, stood the lord's house, fortified to give protection to the lord and peasants in case of attack. If the manor were the home of a powerful baron, it would be a strongly fortified castle — otherwise no more than a strongly built house. Around the manor house clustered the huts of the peasants, each with a little land attached, forming the village which was an indispensable part of any manor. In the village there would also be a mill, a blacksmith's shop, a small church, and a house for the parish priest. Surrounding the village were the cultivated fields and the meadows, wastelands, and woods. Part of the cultivated land, perhaps a third, was set aside for the sole use of the lord. This was called "demesne" land. It might be all in one block, or part of it might be scattered in small pieces throughout the manor. The remainder of the land was parceled out among the peasants of the village. The meadows, wastelands, and woods were not formally divided, but were considered common land, shared proportionately by lord and peasants.

Open-field system

The land of the manor would present a strange appearance to people of today, accustomed to seeing farms divided into permanently fenced fields. On all sides of the village, the manor lands stretched in great open fields, surrounded by temporary fences only during the periods when the crops had to be protected from the cattle. This method of farming is called "the open-field system." When the crops were reaped, the fences were removed and the cattle of lord and villagers were turned loose to graze. For purposes of cultivation these open fields were divided into three parts to allow for rotation of the crops. One field would be reserved for spring planting of oats, barley, and pease; the second for the fall planting of wheat or rye, to be harvested in the following summer; the third would lie fallow, that is, it would be allowed to rest without crop, though plowed twice during the year, while the young grass which sprang up served as pasture for the cattle. Each year the treatment of the fields shifted in steady rotation, so that each field lay fallow once in three years. This system was necessary at a time when methods of fertilizing were crude and unscientific. The land would soon have become exhausted if it had not been allowed time to recover or if the same crop had been planted on it year after year.

Intermixed ownership

Scattered through these open fields, and outside the demesne farm, were the small holdings of the peasants. Each field was subdivided into numbers of long narrow strips separated by thin ridges or "balks" of grass. The shape of these strips was fixed by the plow. Usually they ran the full length of the field so that the heavy

plow, drawn by a team of four or eight oxen, would not have to turn too often. Every peasant held a number of these strips, scattered at random through each of the three fields. Sometimes the lord reserved some of them as demesne land. The amount of land held by a single peasant varied, depending on the number of strips he had inherited. This system of "intermixed ownership" may have originated as a plan for giving each of the peasants land of equal value — allowing to none the advantage of having his whole plot in especially fertile soil or near the village. Whatever its origin, the system continued because it fitted into the method of working the land employed on the manor; for, though each peasant harvested the crop from his own strips, the whole village united their labor in the communal cultivation of the fields. "Medieval tillage was co-operative in character, and all the principal operations of agriculture were carried on in common. Indeed, the association of all tenants in the open fields in a general partnership was rendered necessary, in any case, by the fact that a peasant would seldom possess sufficient oxen to do without his neighbors' assistance. Accordingly, the villagers worked together, plowing and reaping every strip as its turn came around." The intermixture of the strips guaranteed the same treatment for all. At the same time, the co-operative system checked all individual initiative. It prevented the peasant from trying new experiments or from taking advantage of any unusual skill or thrift.

The peasants


The inhabitants of the village who worked the fields were all members of the peasant class. They were all tenants, holding their land from the lord of the manor in what is sometimes called "censive" tenure; that is, in return for manual services and dues. They were all under the lord's jurisdiction and more or less dependent upon him. Yet within this class there were innumerable gradations and shades of social status and degrees of wealth and freedom — or perhaps it would be more accurate to say, of poverty and servitude. It is impossible to distinguish clearly between the various grades of peasants, as there was little uniformity throughout Europe, and even the names used to describe them are often confusing. In England the words "villein" and "serf" were used almost interchangeably for all unfree tenants, as distinguished from the higher class of "free" tenants who paid rent to their lord but owed very slight personal services. In France a distinction, not very clear, was usually made between the villeins and serfs, the latter term signifying a more completely servile class than the former. The origin of these differences in status is to be found in the manner in which the peasants' ancestors first came under the jurisdiction of the lord and in the terms of the original bargain between them; for the contract

between lord and tenant was hereditary, passed on with little change from generation to generation and fixed by custom. In general it may be said that the serfs, on the Continent at least, had no civil rights, while the villeins had all the rights of freemen, save that they were bound to the land and could not leave it without the lord's consent. The status of the English peasants was, on the whole, apparently higher than that of their continental fellows, all the unfree tenants enjoying a position more or less like that of the villein class on the Continent.

The manorial contract

The relation between the peasant and the lord of the manor can best be described as based on an unwritten but generally understood contract, to which custom had given a legal sanction. It was not a one-sided bargain. The lord gave the peasant protection, established a court where he could appeal for justice, built a mill, and provided a church for the village. Above all, he furnished the land. All the land of the manor belonged legally to the lord; but custom forbade his taking the peasant's strips of land from him, provided he had fulfilled all his obligations. Nor could the lord prevent the peasant from taking his customary share of hay from the meadows or from pasturing his allotted share of cattle, swine, or geese on the common land. Thus the peasants, though in most cases not free to leave their land, had the security which came from the hereditary right to its possession.

In return for these privileges, the peasants owed certain payments and services to the lord. All but the freest peasants were obliged to work for the lord a certain number of days each week. This "week work" was utilized for the cultivation of the demesne land and for the incidental tasks, such as carrying the lord's produce to market or to another of his manors. At certain times during the year, when the pressure of work was greatest, all the peasants on the manor were forced to work on the lord's demesne. These special services were called "boon works." All the tenants, too, owed the lord payments as rent for their land. These were usually made in kind, that is, in produce, but might in exceptional cases be made in money. The amount of the payments was fixed by custom, though in some places the lord had the legal right to exact as much as he chose from his serfs. The villagers had also to pay for the use of the lord's mill and the great oven where all baked their bread. There were other occasional dues. On the death of a tenant his heirs had to make a special payment, called "heriot," as recognition of the lord's ownership of the land and for the renewal of the hereditary contract. The unfree peasant, too, had to make a payment, called "merchet," if his daughter married outside the manor, as the lord was thus deprived of one of his serfs.



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

PEASANTS AT WORK: THE FALL PLANTING

An illumination from The Book of Hours of the Duke of Berry (the month of October), by Pol de Limbourg and his brothers (Musée Condé, Chantilly).

The manor was a little economic and political world, complete in itself. The peasant had small contact with the world outside or with any higher authority than his lord. There was little commerce, for the roads were bad and communications difficult, and most of the peasant's needs — food, clothing, and tools — were produced on the manor. The produce of the fields was mostly consumed on the manor, though grain might be carried to another manor belonging to the lord or sold in a nearby town. In short, the manorial system represented a very simple and primitive form of economy, wherein exchange of produce and services took the place of cash transactions. This remained more or less true of agricultural economy down to the beginning of the modern era, though in the Later Middle Ages, after the rise of the towns and the revival of trade had reintroduced money economy, the self-sufficiency of the manors was impaired, buying and selling began to supersede the simpler forms of barter, and cash payments gradually took the place of service or payments in kind.

Self-sufficiency of the manor

3. MILITARY FEUDALISM AND LANDHOLDING — THE FIEF

The peasants, laboriously tilling their strips of land, turning over part of their produce to the lord of the manor and cultivating his demesne farm, formed the foundation of feudal society, the widespread base on which the whole structure rested. By their unremitting toil they made it possible for their lord to live without labor and to devote his energies to the only occupation suitable for a noble namely, fighting. The clearest distinction between social classes in the feudal system was that between the non-noble laborer and the noble warrior. Both held land in hereditary tenure from some superior, it is true, but the censive tenure of the peasant was based on "ignoble" services, i.e., manual labor, whereas the feudal tenure of the noble landholder was based on "noble," i.e., military service. The right to fight was a privilege reserved for the military aristocracy, from which baseborn men were jealously excluded, save in Germany where an intermediate class of *ministeriales* stood vaguely between the class of noble and peasant. To this military aristocracy belonged originally all who could afford to live without working, and who had sufficient income to provide them with the necessary war-horse, heavy armor, and weapons. That, of course, meant all who had sufficient land to provide such an income, for to this class almost the only possible source of income was from land. We have already seen the ways in which this class arose through the combination of landholding and military service. Whatever the nature

The military aristocracy

of the original bargain between the fighter and his lord, the amount of land was necessarily greater than that involved in the contract between the laborer and the lord of the manor, and the dependent relation in the former case carried with it no suggestion of servility, but was a free and honorable bargain between two members of the same military aristocracy.

The fief

There were many variations in rank and wealth within the military class, extending from the poorest knight, who had barely enough land to furnish him with equipment, to the great count or duke, whose wide lands supported hundreds of knights who rode to battle at his command. But certain characteristics were common to them all. All were knights (warriors), set apart by that honor from the baseborn; all were in some degree lords with a greater or lesser number of dependents, for even the poorest knight was lord of at least a small manor; and each held a "fief" from some greater lord to whom he owed military service. The fief was the indispensable land unit of military feudalism. It varied in size with the wealth and importance of the holder — that of the poor knight aforementioned being merely a single manor, that of the count or duke a great territory including hundreds of manors. In any case, the holder of the fief was the "vassal" of the lord from whom he received the fief and who might be a baron, count, duke, or king, or any other lord with land enough to grant part of it to a vassal in return for military service. The vassal did not own the fief, just as the peasant tenant did not own the land he worked, but he had an hereditary right to the use of it and could not legally be deprived of it so long as he fulfilled his obligations. Fiefs composed of income from other sources than land (bridge tolls or what not) were not unknown, but they were the exception to a general rule.

Homage and investiture

The relations between the vassal and his lord, like those between the peasant and the lord of the manor, were based on a commonly understood contract, handed on with little change from generation to generation. This contract was formally renewed by a solemn ceremony, whenever the death of either party introduced his heir as a new personality into the relation. The vassal's part in this ceremony was called "homage." He knelt before his lord, bareheaded and unarmed, placed his hands between the hands of his lord, and swore to be his man (*homme*) and to be faithful to him. The lord then responded with the ceremony of "investiture," presenting to the vassal a spear, flag, or some other symbol representing the fief. The symbolical ceremony of homage and investiture constituted a binding agreement, defined by custom and enforced by public opinion. It

could not be legally broken by either party unless the other had failed to live up to the terms of the contract.

The feudal contract included a number of mutual obligations. For the vassal's part, the chief of these was to fight for his lord. Originally, no doubt, the vassal was expected to fight whenever and as long as the lord needed him. As society became more settled, however, and the need for military aid less constant, the amount of military service was usually fixed at a certain number of days (customarily forty) per annum. Each fief was valued in terms of knights' service. The holder of a single manor, rated at one knight's service, would be responsible only for his own service, whereas a baron whose fief was valued at twenty knights' service would be bound to answer his lord's call to arms accompanied by nineteen other knights, who in turn were bound to follow him because they held fiefs from him and were his vassals. Closely allied to this military obligation was the court duty. The vassal was obliged to attend the court of justice held by his lord on stated occasions, and also to do his lord honor by his presence at festive celebrations, where the number of vassals in his retinue was an indication of the lord's social importance.

Military duties of the vassal

The vassal also owed his lord certain contributions in money or produce. These were not annual payments, but were made only on special occasions. The heaviest payment in most cases was the "relief," which sometimes amounted to as much as a year's income from the fief. It was paid whenever either lord or vassal died and was succeeded by his heir. Like the "heriot" paid by the peasant tenant under similar circumstances, it was apparently a recognition of the lord's ownership of the land and a fee for the renewal of the contract, which was considered to be temporarily broken by the death of either of the contracting parties. In addition to the relief, there were three generally recognized "aids." All the vassals were obliged to contribute to making up the lord's ransom if he were captured, to defraying the expenses of the ceremony of knighting his son, and to providing a dowry when his daughter married. The vassal was also expected to house and entertain the lord and his retinue whenever he chose to visit the vassal's fief.

Relief and aids

The obligations of the lord, included in the feudal contract, were not so onerous as those of the vassal. This was natural enough, since, in theory, it was he who provided the land. The lord's most important duty was to protect his vassal from all enemies. He was also obliged to maintain a court where his vassals could appeal for justice, to act as guardian for a vassal's minor heirs, and

Duties and privileges of the lord

to secure a suitable husband for the unmarried heiress of any of his vassals. These latter duties, however, were also privileges and often very remunerative. The fines imposed in his court added considerably to the lord's income. His right of wardship over minor heirs might be a still more valuable prerogative, since he was entitled to the full income from the fief, which he managed till the heir was old enough to assume the responsibility. The choosing of a husband for an unmarried heiress was also a jealously guarded right. It was important to find her a husband as soon as possible, as a woman could not perform a vassal's duties, and it was even more important to choose as her husband some man who would fulfill those duties adequately and faithfully. In case there were no heirs, the fief returned or "escheated" to the lord. He could then retain it or grant it to another vassal at will.

The personal tie between lord and vassal was the cement that held feudal society together — if very imperfectly. The great nobles, who held fiefs directly from the king as his vassals-in-chief, split the greater part of their land into smaller fiefs, granted to vassals who thus became the subvassals of the king. These in turn might grant part of their land to vassals of their own, who would be subvassals of the king's vassal, and so on down to the fief so small that it could support only a single knight. This process is known as "subinfeudation." Had it worked out according to theory, the aristocratic feudal society would have taken the form of a symmetrical pyramid, of which the knights formed the base, the barons, counts, dukes, and other great nobles the higher ranks in diminishing numbers, and the king the apex. But feudalism had not grown up according to any preconceived theory. From the beginning, the steps in the feudal hierarchy had been uneven, and with the passage of time the natural shifts of family fortune introduced new complications with every passing generation, until the whole system was reduced to utter chaos. At the same time, western Europe was gradually becoming more civilized and settled, so that the mutual need for military service and protection was less vital and the personal tie of dependence and loyalty was weakened. In proportion as this occurred, landholding became the most important part of the feudal bargain. Thus it happened that, by marriage, conquest, purchase, or inheritance through the mother's family, nobles frequently acquired fiefs from several lords at once, to each of whom they would owe vassal's service. Again, part of such a vassal's fief might pass into the hands of a much more powerful lord, who would nevertheless become his vassal for that land. The duties of a vassal might thus become extremely complicated. Many were forced to introduce reservations into the oath

Subinfeudation

of loyalty, "saving the rights of his other lords." These complications of subinfeudation destroyed all proportion and symmetry in the ranks of the feudal nobility. There were knights who held small fiefs directly from the king; counts who held fiefs from petty barons; and untitled lords whose fiefs rivaled those of counts or dukes. The Count of Champagne, to cite a well-known example, was the vassal of the King of France for part of his lands and of nine other lords for the remainder, including the German emperor and the Duke of Burgundy.

4. THE CHURCH IN THE FEUDAL SYSTEM

Thus far we have discussed feudalism only as it affected laymen — the nobles and peasants. We must turn now to consider the position of the clergy in the feudal system; for it would be impossible to understand the history of the medieval church — or of feudalism — without an understanding of the intimate connection between the two. It was inevitable that the church should become feudalized, since it was a great landholder, and landholding on a large scale was possible only by feudal tenure. Landholding in the Middle Ages carried with it political, judicial, and military responsibilities and a complex of personal relations. As a landholder, then, the church became of necessity an integral part of feudal society, bound to the secular world by innumerable personal and economic ties. The amount of land held by the medieval church seems almost impossibly great to the modern student. It has been reckoned that during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries approximately one third of the land in western Europe was controlled by the church. Even as early as the ninth century, according to one historian's estimate, there were bishops and abbots whose lands covered more than one hundred thousand acres, while even the poorest held five thousand acres or more.

Extent of church land

These lands had been accumulated as the result of generations of pious gifts, inspired, more often than not, by the desire of a dying king or lord to reconcile himself with God and to throw some good deed into the balance to outweigh his sins. After the time of Charlemagne, most gifts of this kind were in the form of fiefs and were held in feudal tenure for the church by the bishops, as rulers of the dioceses, or by abbots, as the heads of monasteries. So much land could not be held without producing the military service expected from all vassals. Since the bishops or abbots, as churchmen, were not supposed to fight, they were forced to parcel out part of their lands to lay vassals who owed them military service, which in turn they could pass

Ecclesiastical lords and vassals

on to their lords. There was little to distinguish an ecclesiastical fief from any other. The bishop or abbot gave and received military service and the usual relief and aids like any lay noble, save that election took the place of inheritance, and land once acquired by the church could never be alienated from it. These ecclesiastical nobles were usually vassals-in-chief of the monarch, and their military support was often more important to the king than that of the lay lords, whose family ties and ambitions might interfere with their obedience.

Ecclesiastical nobles

Just as in lay society there was a clear distinction between peasant and noble, so in the ecclesiastical hierarchy there was a social distinction, though not so rigid, between the lower and the higher clergy. The parish priests were mostly of peasant stock, and those who served the manorial churches were almost as dependent on the lord of the manor as were the other peasants. The bishops, abbots, and other high officials of the church, on the other hand, were usually of noble birth. The younger son of a noble family might gain through such a position far greater wealth and power than he could hope for from his share of the family estates. As a result, the great nobles frequently interfered in ecclesiastical elections to secure a vacant bishopric or abbacy for one of their relatives, thus establishing him comfortably and gaining for themselves a wealthy and powerful ally. Still more frequently, the king would bestow an ecclesiastical office as a reward for service and in order to guarantee the faithful performance of the clerical vassal's duties by placing the office in trustworthy hands. The men who thus rose to influential positions in the church were not necessarily more religious in character or interest than the ordinary lay nobles. Their training and tastes were very similar to those of their brothers who had remained "in the world." They loved hunting and fighting and took an active part in feudal politics. Many a lusty bishop led his mounted vassals into battle, light-heartedly swinging a mace in place of a sword and thus avoiding the sin of shedding blood.

Their dual character

Yet, despite their worldly interests, these "ecclesiastical barons" had important spiritual duties to perform. The government of the church was in their hands. Their offices had in fact a dual character which led to innumerable complications and controversies. They owed vassal's allegiance to their overlords and at the same time owed obedience to their superiors in the church. Neither state nor church could afford to lose control over such powerful officials; yet they could not serve both God and Mammon — though the distinction between the two was sometimes none too clear. It was this conflict of interests and duties which caused the long struggle between church

and state, between the papacy on the one hand and the emperors and kings on the other, that for centuries disturbed the peace of Europe. The intrusion of the church into the feudal system resulted in a confusion thrice confounded.

5. THE FEUDAL STATE

The monarchy

We have seen how the whole fabric of feudal society was woven together by a vast number of personal relations, wherein every man — peasants, nobles, and clergy — owed obedience to some immediate superior. In this complex and decentralized system the very idea of a state, composed of citizens ruled directly by a central government, ceased to exist. Yet, through all the feudal period, the kingdoms maintained their existence and kings continued to govern, though with powers sadly diminished. There was no state system of taxation, coinage, laws or law courts, and no national army. But there were the feudal equivalents, and the monarchy survived in the midst of feudalism because it had itself become feudalized. The theory of feudalism recognized the king as the supreme overlord of all lords and the final proprietor of all the land in the kingdom, though most of it was parceled out to his vassals-in-chief. He ruled, then, not as an absolute monarch, nor as a constitutional monarch like modern kings, but as a feudal overlord. In place of state taxation, the king had to depend for the expenses of government on the income from his own lands — the royal estates — and on the feudal aids and other perquisites involved in the feudal contract with his vassals. He could not raise a national army, but he could call upon his vassals to perform their military service, accompanied, of course, by their vassals and subvassals. He could not issue legislation binding on all members of the state, but he could command his vassals and issue edicts in the pious hope that his vassals would pass them on to the people they ruled. He had no jurisdiction over the majority of citizens, but he could hold a feudal court for the trial of his immediate vassals and dependents. In practice, it is true, the vassals-in-chief obeyed the kings and performed their duties only when they felt it expedient to do so. More often than not in the early period of feudalism, they felt strong enough to ignore the royal commands. Nevertheless, the kings had an inestimable advantage over the other feudal lords, by virtue of the theory of supremacy, which was always recognized as valid even when ignored in practice. With the passage of time the kings, first of England and later of France, were able to make that theory a reality. In Germany and Italy the rise of the monarchy

was complicated by unusual problems which prevented the completion of the process.

Despite the theory of feudal supremacy of the monarch, however, feudalism was by its very nature antagonistic to central government. All local government was in the hands of the nobles. The king's authority ended with his own vassals; it could not reach beyond them to their dependents. Within his own fief, every noble had full jurisdiction and exercised all the powers of government. As the thirteenth-century jurist, Beaumanoir, put it, "each baron is sovereign in his barony." He held courts for his dependents; levied a kind of taxation through tolls on roads and bridges; often he issued his own coinage; and he could always raise an army, composed of his vassals, to be used for any purpose he chose.

Private jurisdictions

In no respect can the sovereign rights of the feudal lord be more clearly seen than in this recognized right to raise an army and to wage open war on other lords. Only in England, and even there not till the reign of Henry II in the twelfth century, was the monarchy strong enough to suppress private wars. The causes of feudal warfare were innumerable. Disputed boundaries, quarrels over the terms of vassalage, family feuds, personal antagonisms, greed, or sheer boredom were the most common. The nobles loved to fight. Fighting was not nearly so hazardous as in modern times, and it was often a very profitable occupation. The heavily armored knight was more likely to be captured than killed and could then be held for ransom. A further economic incentive to war was the hope of obtaining booty or land. Had there not been opportunities for profit without too great risk, the nobles would probably not have clung so tenaciously to their sovereign rights in this respect. On the whole it was the peasants who suffered most, because of interference with their work and destruction of their crops.

Private wars

The church, which despite its feudal character maintained a higher social conscience than the lay world, strove as best it could to curb the warlike ardor of the nobles, or at least to mitigate the evil effects of war on the poor and defenseless. In the last years of the tenth century, the clergy in many parts of Europe instituted the "Peace of God," requiring the nobles to take an oath not to harm the person or property of peasants, merchants, churchmen, or other noncombatants. The nobles themselves recognized the necessity of some such restriction, but old habits were too powerful to break and little good came of it. In the eleventh century a more effective check was applied by the church through the institution of the

Peace of God and Truce of God

"Truce of God," which forbade the prosecution of private war during certain seasons — at first from Friday to Sunday of each week (the days of the death and resurrection of Christ) and during the forty days of Lent, from Ash Wednesday to Easter. Later this "closed season" was extended to include the harvest season from the Feast of the Assumption (August 15) to Martinmas (November 11), and from sundown on Wednesday to sunrise on Monday of each week. The Truce originated in France where private wars were most frequent. Thence it spread to the other countries of Europe, except England, where its place was taken by the King's Peace. It was undoubtedly a beneficial institution, but it is difficult to determine how much of the gradual cessation of feudal warfare may be credited to the Truce and how much to the natural stabilization of society through the growth of royal power.

Feudalism has often been called a system of organized anarchy. The evils of the system are written plainly so that all who run may read.

Estimate

But in judging feudalism it must be remembered that organized anarchy is better than anarchy which has no organization, and that without it European society might have dissolved into complete chaos. Whatever its faults, the feudal system did at least give some order to society in a violent and lawless age, and it held the kingdoms together until such time as the rising power of the monarchy could weld them into strong coherent states. It was a phase in the evolution of western Europe from barbarism to modern civilization.

CHAPTER TEN

THE FOUNDING OF THE FEUDAL KINGDOMS AND THE REVIVAL OF THE EMPIRE

IN THE last chapter we have studied the manner in which feudalism functioned as the dominating force in the medieval state, giving form and some sort of organization to its economic, social, religious, and political life. In the preceding chapter we traced the decline and final dissolution of the Carolingian Empire at the end of the ninth century, under the shock of invasion by the pirate Northmen and through the workings of the disintegrating forces of feudalism. We saw how the greater part of England was conquered by the hordes of invading Danes, and how there and on the Continent new kingdoms were being born in the last years of the ninth century and the first of the tenth. In this chapter we shall trace the history of these feudal kingdoms through the formative period of the tenth and the first half of the eleventh centuries. It was a stormy and chaotic period, the "iron age" of feudalism. Wars, private feuds, rebellions, acts of violence and oppression were so common as to be considered the normal state of society. The menace of the Northmen subsided early in the tenth century, but the wild Magyars from the Hungarian plains took their place, and for a time added the terror of barbarian raids to the other perils of that turbulent age. In each of the kingdoms, the monarchs struggled desperately and with varying success to control their independent and warlike vassals and to establish royal authority. In Germany, during this period, the kings were more successful than elsewhere, gradually gathering the reins of government into their own hands and suppressing the great nobles. In the second half of the tenth century, they extended their rule to Italy and refounded the empire. We may end our study of them, for the time being, with the death of Henry III in 1056, under whom the imperial authority reached its greatest height. In France, this period includes the century-long struggle between the Carolingian and Robertian families for the royal title, and the founding of the Capetian dynasty in 987. We may end it with the death of Henry I in 1060, the third and least powerful of the Capetian kings, though there was no very decided improvement in the position of the kings for another half-century. During all this time the French kings were waging a losing battle against the feudal lords. In England this century and a half saw the uniting

of England under the descendants of Alfred the Great, the second Danish conquest, the re-establishment of Anglo-Saxon rule, and finally the Norman Conquest, which introduced a new era in the year 1066.

1. GERMANY, ITALY, AND THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

Feudalism in Germany during the tenth century was at once better organized and more decentralized than in France. This was due to the existence of the great tribal duchies. The population of Germany was less mixed than that of Gaul, and the ancient tribes had maintained something of their old national traditions and coherence under their own hereditary dukes. Toward these tribal dukes the people felt a more direct loyalty than they would have accorded to mere feudal superiors. Each of the five great duchies, Saxony, Bavaria, Franconia, Swabia, and Lorraine[1] (the "stem" duchies, as they were called), formed a feudal state within the kingdom. The chief problem confronting the tenth- and eleventh-century monarchs was to control the duchies. Without such control, the king was powerless outside his own lands; with it, he had a more effective government than he would have had without the tribal organization. Even in the duchies, however, the disintegrating forces of feudalism were at work. The lesser nobles, counts, bishops, knights, and margraves (the latter were counts of the marches or frontier counties) fought for independence of the dukes as the dukes sought independence of the king. Many of them succeeded in transferring their homage from their duke to the king, thus weakening the duchies, but adding little strength to the monarchy, since their very numbers made it difficult for the king to control them. The weakening of the monarchy after Henry III was at least partly due to the breaking-up of the duchies into smaller units.

The tribal duchies and the monarchy

When the German branch of the Carolingian line ended with the death of Lewis the Child in 911, the dukes and other magnates of Germany gathered to elect a new king. They chose Duke Conrad of Franconia. The nobles felt that it was necessary to have a king, but they were not prepared to surrender any of their authority to him. As a result, the royal title carried with it little more than honor — and none too much of that. As king, Conrad's authority scarcely extended beyond his own duchy. Realizing that the king, to make his rule effective, must have the support of more than one duchy, Conrad planned to improve conditions in the next reign. Before his death he made his son promise to give up his own claims to the crown

Conrad I (911–18)

[1] See map opposite page 148.

in favor of his rival Henry, Duke of Saxony, and thereafter to support his government. Such at least is the story told by the contemporary chronicler, Widukind. As a result Henry I, called Henry the Fowler, was elected in 919 and founded a dynasty that lasted for more than a century. Backed by Franconia as well as his own duchy of Saxony, Henry was able to force the other dukes to at least nominal submission. Lorraine caused him the most trouble. It was part of that debatable middle kingdom, assigned to Lothair I at Verdun in 843. Its inhabitants were bilingual, as much French as German, and hitherto had been more closely allied with the western kingdom. Henry succeeded in bringing the duchy definitely into the German Kingdom. His success in defending the eastern frontiers against barbarian invaders, too, added considerably to Henry's prestige. He defeated and drove back the heathen Wends — the Slavic people to the east of the Elbe — and the Hungarians, who were ravaging the central part of Germany. He also forced the Duke of Bohemia to recognize him as overlord. On his death, Germany was still little more than a federation of duchies, but he had laid the foundation on which his brilliant son, Otto, was to build a stronger kingdom.

Henry I (919–36)

All the dukes concurred in the election of Otto I, and did homage to the new king. Almost immediately, however, his attempts to establish an effective authority over the dukes drove them into revolt. Within the next two years he had to suppress serious rebellions in Bavaria, Franconia, and his own duchy of Saxony, as well as to defend Lorraine against an alliance of its duke with the King of France. Following these revolts, Otto strove to bind the duchies more closely to himself by granting them to his own kinsmen and by making marriage alliances between his relatives and members of the ducal houses. This policy was none too successful even in his own lifetime, and it could have no permanent value. Even a king of so commanding a personality as the great Otto could not always depend on his kinsmen, and he had to put down another widespread and dangerous rebellion in 953–54. Rather more successful was his policy, followed by most of his successors for a century, of granting large tracts of land and great administrative powers to the archbishops and bishops. While still permitting the clergy to elect these officers in the usual manner, he reserved the right of approval and to all practical intents and purposes chose them himself. To make sure of their loyalty, he invested them not only with their fiefs, but also with the symbols of their ecclesiastical office. He thus surrounded himself with powerful and loyal vassals who, because of the rule of clerical celibacy, could not leave legitimate

Otto the Great (936–73)

heirs and therefore could not establish an hereditary claim to their fiefs. For generations these ecclesiastical princes formed the strongest support of the monarchy. In these various ways, Otto gradually extended and consolidated the royal authority. Meanwhile, he was continuing his father's work in defending his eastern frontiers and conquering his heathen neighbors. He crushed the Wends and established marches (frontier counties) and bishoprics between the Elbe and Oder rivers, thus laying the foundation for the permanent extension of Germanic rule and Christianity to the east. Still more important, he administered a crushing defeat to the Hungarian invaders near Augsburg in 955. Thereafter they ceased to trouble the western kingdoms.

Revival of the empire (962)

Like Charlemagne, Otto kept an interested eye on Italy. This country had been for half a century in a condition of utter anarchy. The Lombard kings in the north were powerless against the great nobles. The Saracens had conquered Sicily and were ravaging southern Italy. In the central district, the Papal States, Roman nobles dominated the weak and degenerate popes and used the power of the papacy for their own ends. The country was ripe for conquest. In 951, Otto invaded Italy on the pretext of rescuing Queen Adelaide, the widow of the former king of Italy, who was being imprisoned and mistreated by her husband's successor, Berengar II. The expedition was successful so far as it went. Otto defeated Berengar and married the beautiful Adelaide, but was recalled to Germany by a rebellion there. He contented himself for the time with forcing Berengar to recognize him as his overlord. Ten years later he again invaded Italy. This time he deposed Berengar and proclaimed himself king, as Charlemagne had done. Still following in the footsteps of the great Carolingian, he proceeded to Rome where, in February, 962, he was crowned emperor by Pope John XII.

The theory of the empire

The Holy Roman Empire, founded by Otto the Great, was considered to be a revival of the Carolingian Empire, just as it in turn had been regarded as a continuation of the ancient Roman Empire. The new empire, however, was in reality quite different from its predecessor, as Charlemagne's empire had been different from that of the Caesars. Yet the theory which underlay and motivated its revival in the tenth century was much the same as that which brought it about in the year 800. Medieval people had inherited two great traditions from Roman antiquity — that of a universal empire and a universal church. The latter had survived and was incomplete without its secular counterpart. In an age when men thought customarily in terms of logic and theology, it seemed essential that there should


7°
12°
17°
56°
50°
45°
40°
HOLSTEIN
SLAVS
POLAND
WESTPHALIA
SAXONY
Cologne
Fulda
THURINGIA
LOTHARINGIA
Treves
Mainz
Worms
FRANCONIA
BOHEMIA
MORAVIA
Speyer
ALSACE
Strassburg
SUABIA
BAVARIA
Lechfeld
AUSTRIA
Salzburg
KINGDOM OF BURGUNDY OR ARLES (TO 1032)
CARINTHIA
HUNGARY
MARCH OF VERONA
CARNIOLA
Aquileia
Milan
LOMBARD COMMUNES
Pavia
Verona
Venice
ISTRIA
CROATIA
Genoa
Carcassa
TUSCANY
ROMAGNA
SPOLETO
ADRIATIC SEA
SERBIA
PATRIMONY OF ST PETER
BENEVENTO
Rome
Gaeta
Naples
Amalfi
Salerno
Bari
Trinidad
Otranto
SARACENS
BYZANTINE
Palermo
HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE
AND SOUTHERN ITALY
about the year 1000
SCALE OF MILES
0
50
100
150
200
Saracen Territory
Byzantine Territory
Holy Roman Empire
Independent or semi-independent Christian principalities
7°
Longitude East
12°
from
Greenwich
17°

be a universal secular ruler who, like the pope, had received his authority directly from God. Such a ruler would be at once the protector and servant of the church, the secular counterpart of the pope, with different but parallel powers over all Christians. Feudal theory, too, fitted vaguely into this conception. There should be some one ultimate overlord from whom the various kings held their land in fief. The condition of anarchy prevailing generally throughout Europe made men long for some strong, divinely appointed ruler. In actual fact, the emperors were far from being universal rulers. Though recognized as of higher rank than the kings, their government was never extended beyond the two kingdoms of Germany and Italy,[1] which Otto already held before his coronation. Even there, the imperial title brought Otto no additional power, and future emperors were to pay dearly for that empty honor. The theory of the empire bound them to a close partnership with the papacy, which in time led to a disastrous struggle for supremacy with popes who were stronger than they.[2] Moreover, the imperial title committed them to an inevitably unsuccessful attempt to rule both Germany and Italy. As a result they finally lost what real power they would have had as kings of Germany, had they concentrated their attention there instead of trying to extend their government over an alien people, divided from Germany by the towering barrier of the Alps.

The dangers inherent in the imperial claims were demonstrated in the reigns of Otto's son and grandson. The intervention of Otto the Great in Italy, successful though he was in seizing both the royal and imperial crowns and in showing his imperial authority by deposing a vicious pope, had been no more than an episode in his brilliant career. His power rested solidly on his control of the German Kingdom. Both Otto II and Otto III wasted the results of his labor by following the lure of empire into Italy. Otto III, especially, neglected Germany in his attempt to realize a vain though glorious dream of restoring the ancient Roman Empire. He was but three years old when his father's death at Rome left him heir to three crowns. His mother, a Greek princess named Theophano, educated him in the Byzantine tradition, and as he grew up his tutor, the great French scholar, diplomat, and Archbishop of Rheims, Gerbert, impressed his mind still further with the glorious legend of the ancient empire. Otto III made Rome the capital of his empire and exercised a strict control over the papacy, nominating three popes in succession, the last of whom was Gerbert (Silvester II). He died in his twenty-

Otto II (*973–83*)

Otto III (*983–1002*)

[1] See map opposite page 148.

[2] See below, Chapter XI.

second year, having lost control of Germany and with Italy rising in revolt about him.

Henry II (1002–24)

The next two kings, wiser than the erratic Otto III, turned their attention to the slow and difficult task of rebuilding royal authority in Germany and re-establishing peace and order. Henry II, a greatnephew of Otto I, was a pious, well-educated, and conscientious monarch. He depended very largely on the support of the great ecclesiastical lords, the bishops whom he himself had chosen and invested with their offices. He gave them still more land and administrative authority, and with their aid gradually suppressed the rebellious lay nobles. On his death the crown passed to Conrad II, Duke of Franconia, who founded a new dynasty. Fearing lest the clerical lords might become too strong, Conrad preferred to favor the lesser lay nobility and depend on their loyalty for aid. Otherwise he followed Henry's example in keeping order, enforcing justice, and strengthening the royal power. One event of his reign is of outstanding importance. In 1032, Conrad fell heir to the Kingdom of Burgundy or Arles, which thereafter was part of the Holy Roman Empire. It lay in the valley of the Rhone, including what is now part of eastern France and western Switzerland.[1] It must not be confused with the duchy of Burgundy, which lay to the northwest of it and was a fief of France.

Conrad II (1024–39)

Henry III (1039–56)

Due to the work of these two kings, Henry III, the son of Conrad II, was able to gain a more complete control of Germany than had been possible for any previous emperor. So great was his power, indeed, that he was able to extend it successfully to Italy. Here the papacy had again fallen into a state of degradation in the hands of unworthy popes. In 1046 there were three rival popes at Rome, to the scandal of the faithful throughout Europe. As emperor, and therefore protector of the church, Henry claimed the right to depose these men who were disgracing the holy office. In their place, he secured the election of an earnest and high-minded German bishop, who took the title Leo IX. Emperor and pope now worked together for the reform, not only of the papacy, but of the whole church. It was a valuable and necessary work, but it had unfortunate after-effects for the empire. Henry succeeded in so strengthening the papal power that future popes were able to engage in a bitter and partially successful struggle with his son Henry IV for supremacy. But that is another story.

[1] See map opposite page 148.

2. FRANCE

In the Western Frankish Kingdom, which became the Kingdom of France, the century following the death of Charles the Fat and the dissolution of the Carolingian Empire was one of turmoil and constant disorder. At the beginning of that period, the Northmen were still ravaging France, to be quieted only by the gift of Normandy in 911. They were followed by the Hungarians, whose raids continued till they were crushed by Otto the Great. The kings of France were unable to cope with these invaders, or with the great nobles who took upon themselves the defense of their fiefs, where they ruled as sovereign lords. It was a century of disintegration — disintegration of the kingdom and also of the larger fiefs — and of the most chaotic development of feudalism. Across the blurred pages of French history in this age pass the shadowy figures of the Robertian and Carolingian kings, good and able men some of them, but frustrated at every turn by the independence of their unruly vassals. Of these two royal families, the Carolingians depended chiefly on the traditional loyalty of the people to their house and on the respect of the clergy for the consecrated descendants of the great Charles. The Robertians, on the other hand, had to depend on their strength as the greatest of the feudal lords and on personal ability.

Robertians and Carolingians

The first king of the latter line was Eudes or Odo (888–98), who was elected by the nobles on the death of Charles the Fat, in default of an adult Carolingian. He was the son of Robert the Strong, Count of Paris, and holder of numerous other fiefs, who ruled most of the territory between the Seine and the Loire. Like his father before him, Eudes had gained a great reputation through fighting the Northmen. After his death, the nobles returned to the Carolingian line, for there was now an adult candidate, Charles the Simple (king 898–922; died 929). Despite his name, Charles seems to have been fairly ambitious and energetic, but doomed to failure by forces that were too strong for him. Much of his reign was spent in trying to incorporate Lorraine in the French Kingdom. In 922, the nobles, angered by his partiality for Lorraine, rebelled under the leadership of Robert, son of the late King Eudes. Robert I (922–23) was crowned king, but was killed the following year. He was succeeded by his son-in-law Raoul I (923–36), who had been Duke of Burgundy.

When the throne again fell vacant, the most powerful man in the kingdom was Hugh the Great, son of Robert I. He had added to the other titles he held as head of the Robertian family, the vague but

imposing one of Duke of the Franks, or more commonly Duke of France. Undoubtedly he could have been king, but he preferred the reality to the name of power and chose to restore the Carolingian house. Through his influence, the son of Charles the Simple, called Louis d'Outremer, was brought back from England, where his mother had fled with him when Charles was overthrown. If Hugh hoped to rule the new king, he was disappointed. Louis ignored the powerful Duke of France and followed his own plans. In 938, he undertook to reconquer Lorraine from Otto the Great. Hugh saw his opportunity to ruin the king and formed an alliance with Otto. The emperor, however, did not want to see Louis replaced by Hugh, but preferred to keep either from becoming too strong. He therefore shifted his alliance to Louis, just as the latter was reaching the end of his resources. Louis was beginning to recover his position when his accidental death cut short the reign.


Louis d'Outremer (936–54)

Louis's place was taken by his less capable son Lothair (954–86). Hugh the Great died two years later, but his rôle of leader of the opposition was ably filled by his son Hugh Capet. From his own wide lands Hugh Capet, Duke of France, could draw more income and a larger fighting force than the king could command; for the Carolingians had lost most of the royal domain and were forced to depend for support on the dubious loyalty of their great vassals. Hugh was the friend, too, of Gerbert, the tutor of Otto III, and through him gained the support of the emperor. After years of opposition, he was in open rebellion when Lothair died. Nevertheless, Lothair's son Louis V (986–87), who had already been crowned during his father's reign, was allowed to succeed to the throne. He was the last of the direct line of the Carolingians. His death after only a year's reign left the road to the throne open to Hugh Capet.

Last Carolingians (954–87)

The election of Hugh Capet (987–96) marks the beginning of the famous Capetian dynasty. For over three centuries his descendants passed the crown on in unbroken succession from father to son, gradually changing the elective kingship to one clearly hereditary. During that period, the average length of reign was nearly thirty years. The story of how they used their dual position as kings and feudal lords, together with the support of the clergy, who usually favored a strong monarchy, to increase their royal authority will be told in Chapter XII. For the present, however, the Capetian kings were merely nominal overlords of the feudal kingdom, actually less powerful than many of their vassals. Hugh Capet had been forced to give away a considerable part of his lands as bribes

The first three Capetian kings (987–1060)


NORTH SEA
ENGLISH CHANNEL
BAY OF BISCAY
FLANDERS
BRABANT
NORMANDY
CHAMPAGNE
LORRAINE
BRITTANY
ANJOU
DUCHY OF BURGUNDY
COUNTY OF BOURBON
GUIENNE
SAVOY
DAUPHINE
COUNTY OF TOULOUSE
GASCONY
NAVARRE
ARAGON
CATALONIA
ROYAL DOMAINS
PETTY FEUDAL STATES
The Chief Districts of Feudal France
SCALE OF MILES
0 20 40 60 100
Longitude West 2°
2° Longitude East from Greenwich 0°

to secure his election. What little additional power he acquired through the royal title did not compensate for that loss. As king his authority scarcely extended beyond the duchy of France, shrunk now to a narrow strip of territory running north and south through central France, with Paris at its center. This was the beginning of the so-called Île de France, the land over which the king was the immediate lord. Hugh's successors, Robert II (996–1031) and Henry I (1031–60), were unable to control even this small territory. Unruly vassals, secure behind the walls of their fortified castles, defied the kings in their own domain. Throughout the remainder of the kingdom, the nobles went their independent way with no more than lip service to the king.

The great fiefs

Feudalism in France was less well organized than in Germany and hence more difficult for the kings to grasp. There were no tribal duchies, unless Normandy with its Scandinavian racial feeling might be so designated. There were innumerable great and petty fiefs, whose boundaries and interrelations shifted constantly with the shifts of family fortune. To draw a map of feudal France in the eleventh century would have been a superhuman task even for a contemporary, because of the intricacy of the feudal relations, and even if accomplished, it would have been accurate only for one point of time. There were, however, a few great fiefs which remained fairly constant, though tending to disintegrate as the subvassals became more independent.[1] To the north of the Île de France lay the half-independent counties of Vermandois and Flanders; to the west the great duchies of Normandy and Brittany and the rich county of Anjou on the Loire; to the east were the county of Champagne and the duchy of Burgundy. Southern France was far beyond the reach of the eleventh-century kings, and separated from the north by radical differences of language and culture. The largest fief here — and for that matter the largest in France — was the duchy of Aquitaine, which stretched right across the country south of the Loire. The dukes of Aquitaine occupied an almost royal position in southern France, but, like the Capetian kings, they had very little real power over their vassals. To the south of Aquitaine lay the duchy of Gascony and the county of Toulouse. Most of these great fiefs were as large as the royal domain. What chance had the king to assert his authority over such powerful vassals?

[1] See map opposite page 152.


3. SAXON ENGLAND

While feudal kingdoms were being formed on the Continent from the wrecks of the Carolingian Empire, a united Anglo-Saxon kingdom was taking shape in the island across the Channel. The Danish conquests of the ninth century had wiped out three of the four ancient kingdoms in England, leaving only the southern kingdom of Wessex under its hero king, Alfred the Great. Before his death in the year 900, Alfred had recovered nearly half of England, while in the Danelaw to the north the invaders were already beginning to settle down and to intermingle with the conquered Saxons. During the next half-century, vigorous kings of the brilliant Wessex family carried on Alfred's work. They gradually reconquered the Danelaw, until in 954 the whole of England was included in one Anglo-Saxon kingdom. There now followed a quarter-century of peace and prosperity — the happiest age of Anglo-Saxon England. Trade and agriculture revived. The administration of the kingdom was reorganized and strengthened. The moral and educational standards of the monks and clergy, which despite Alfred's labors had sunk deplorably low, were raised by the efforts of the kings, in co-operation with Dunstan, the reforming Archbishop of Canterbury.

England united under Saxon kings

But all this changed after 978, when a boy of ten became king of England. The welfare of the country depended on the king, and, even after he grew up, Ethelred the Redeless (an appellation that has been translated as "lacking in common sense") proved utterly incompetent to govern or defend his kingdom. Across the North Sea the Viking Danes were still restless and eager for plunder. Soon after the accession of the child Ethelred, they began to raid the English coast, which they had discovered was no longer strongly guarded. Later, whole armies of Danes landed and marched about the country plundering. The witless king, unable to organize an adequate defense, bought off the invaders repeatedly by the payment of large bribes. The money for this purpose was raised by a special tax, called the "Danegeld." In 1013, King Sweyn of Denmark began the conquest of the helpless country in earnest. The Saxons, lacking leadership and confidence in their government, seem to have made little effort to unite against the conquering Danes. Each shire looked only to its own defense. Sweyn died before his task was quite accomplished, but two years later, in 1016, his son Canute completed the conquest. Ethelred died in that year, and by the following year Canute was recognized everywhere as king of England.

Second Danish Conquest



Courtesy of "American-Scandinavian Review"

SCENES FROM THE BAYEUX TAPESTRY

Eleventh Century

The first scene shows the presentation of the crown to Harold and his coronation; the second and third (which run consecutively) show the Battle of Hastings.

The second Danish Conquest meant no such mass migration into England as had the first in the ninth century. It was little more than a political revolution — the replacing of a Saxon by a Danish king — and it left no very lasting impress on the development of England. Canute (1017–35) ruled as an English king, respecting the laws and traditions of the country, and giving to the harassed people a period of peace and order such as they had not known since before the days of Ethelred. Trade was revived by free intercourse with other parts of Canute's empire, which included Denmark and Norway. After his death, however, this empire fell to pieces, and England was once more isolated. After Canute, the line of Danish kings in England lasted for only a few years, dying out in 1042. The English were then free to return to their own native royal family.

Danish kings (1017–42)

After some indecision, the Witan (the council of nobles) bestowed the crown upon Ethelred's son Edward (1043–66), later called "the Confessor." He was a pious and peace-loving man, fitted by neither character nor training for his position. He had spent nearly all his life in Normandy and was far more Norman than English in his sympathies and interests. He surrounded himself with Norman favorites, to whom he gave high offices in church and state, thus opening the way to Norman influence in England. The Saxon nobles naturally resented this preferment of foreigners and, on occasion, expressed their resentment in open rebellion. Feudalism had been growing steadily during the troubled times of the past century, when men could not depend on the king for protection. As on the Continent, the increasing power and independence of the nobles meant the weakening of royal authority. The strongest of the nobles at this time was Earl Godwin of Wessex. For the last fourteen years of his reign, Edward was dominated by this powerful earl and his son Harold.

Saxon restoration (1043–66)

In January of the fateful year 1066, King Edward died, leaving no immediate heirs. The country needed a strong king, and one whose interests would be purely English. The Witan, therefore, gave the crown to Earl Harold, Godwin's energetic son, as the strongest man in England, though not of the blood royal. His election did not go unchallenged. Across the Channel in Normandy, Duke William cast covetous eyes on the English throne. He was a distant relative of Edward the Confessor, and claimed that both Edward and Harold had acknowledged his right to the succession. His case was strengthened by the charge that Harold had broken a solemn vow to support him. Moreover, he was given the blessing and moral support of the pope, whom Harold had antagonized by exiling the

The Norman Conquest (1066)

Archbishop of Canterbury from England for political reasons. William was no mean antagonist, for Normandy had become the strongest duchy in France in the century and a half since its foundation, and was now almost an independent state. Though French in religion, speech, and manners, the Normans still possessed the wandering instincts and the vigorous, adventurous spirit of their Viking ancestors. In the late summer of 1066, William crossed the Channel with an army of adventurers and landed near Hastings on the southern coast. King Harold, who had just defeated an invading army of Danes in the north, rushed south to meet him. The two armies met at Hastings in a hard-fought battle that decided the fate of England for centuries. The Saxons were defeated. That in itself might not have been fatal to their cause, but Harold and his brothers had fallen, and England was left without a leader. On Christmas Day, William the Conqueror was crowned king, and a new era in English history had opened. Thereafter, England, with a population still about ninety-nine per cent Anglo-Saxon, was to be ruled by a dominant minority of Norman and French conquerors. This small group could not materially change the racial stock of England; but they could, and did, introduce new elements of language and culture and new feudal forms of government from the Continent.

Section C

THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES

By about the middle of the eleventh century, western Europe had passed the first stage in its slow development of a new civilization. The wild days of tribal migrations and Viking raids had passed, as well as the most unsettled age of feudalism. Christianity had spread north and east to include all the German and Scandinavian peoples; the empire of Charlemagne had given place to feudal kingdoms and the Holy Roman Empire; and the reformed papacy was emerging from a period of weakness and degradation to assert its authority over all Western Christendom. Everywhere there were signs of awakening energy, of spiritual and intellectual growth, of reviving economic life, in short, of a more rapid beat in the tempo of advancing civilization. The period that followed the middle years of the eleventh century, a period of a little more than two centuries, witnessed the full development of that type of civilization which we think of as characteristically medieval. We shall call it the period of the High Middle Ages. It saw the long struggle between the empire and the papacy, the growth of royal authority in France and Norman England, the perennial warfare of Christian crusaders against the infidel, the formalization of chivalric society, the revival of commerce and industry and the emergence of a city-dwelling middle class, the rise of the papacy to the highest peak of its power and the full development of the church as a strongly

organized universal institution, the revival of education and the rise of the universities. It was a period of vivid life and restless energy, held within the framework of a more or less stable and integrated society, whose institutions had not yet begun to decay as they did in the period of the Later Middle Ages which followed. Above all, it was the great age of the Respublica Christiana, when all nations of western Europe formed parts of the commonwealth of united Christendom.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE EMPIRE AND THE PAPACY

FOR nearly a century, from the imperial coronation of Otto the Great to the death of Henry III, the emperors were the dominant members of the papal-imperial partnership which claimed universal rule over all Christendom. Vigorous emperors of the Saxon and Franconian dynasties had patiently built up a strong monarchy in Germany in opposition to the independent interests of the feudal nobles; they had asserted a spasmodic control over northern and central Italy; and they had repeatedly attempted to reform the papacy by deposing weak and degenerate popes and replacing them with men of character and ability. The popes, on the other hand, though strong in theoretical claims, were generally powerless to enforce their authority over the whole church, or even to maintain their independence from control by secular powers. Dominated by the unruly nobles and populace of Rome, they were rescued by the emperors only to fall under their more powerful control. The whole church, in fact, seemed dominated by worldly interests. The administrative officers of the church, the bishops and others, were so inextricably entangled in the feudal system that they could give no more than formal obedience to the pope, and, often enough, they took no more than a formal interest in their spiritual duties.

It was, indeed, a dark age for the church, reflecting the evils of a turbulent and disorganized feudal society. But there were signs of returning spring in this winter of the church's discontent. There was a rapidly growing demand for reform in many places, and the purification of the papacy under Henry III made Rome the center of the reform movement. Thereafter, for more than two centuries, the popes strove to strengthen the papacy and the church by freeing them from outside influence. This inevitably brought the papacy into conflict with all secular governments, for the attempt to gain independence soon forced the popes to claim supremacy over all worldly powers. It was with the emperors, however, who ruled Italy and who shared with the popes a claim to universal rule, that the struggle for supremacy was most bitter and prolonged, ending only with the destruction of imperial authority.

1. THE INVESTITURE CONTROVERSY — HENRY IV AND GREGORY VII

The death of Henry III in the prime of life was a disaster from which the empire never fully recovered. The centrifugal forces of feudalism and local independence in Germany and Italy could be held in check only by the most alert watchfulness and by constant pressure on the part of the emperor. With Henry's death that pressure was removed for a fateful period. Henry had planned to save the empire from the dangers of a disputed election and to confirm the hereditary principle of succession by having his infant son crowned king while he himself was still alive. Henry IV (1056–1106) thus succeeded peacefully to the throne, but at barely six years of age. For the next thirteen years, until the young emperor-elect took active control of the government, feudal anarchy ran riot. Neither his mother, Agnes, who acted as regent till 1062, nor the faction of ecclesiastical and feudal nobles who then seized the government and the guardianship of the young monarch, could maintain the pressure necessary to preserve imperial authority in either Germany or Italy.

Minority of Henry IV

In Germany the development of military feudalism had created numbers of hereditary landed fiefs, held from the emperor or from the dukes by lords who no longer considered themselves royal officers and who were prepared to defy any higher authority on the slightest pretext, depending on their fortified castles and the aid of their vassals to defend their cherished independence. More and more the emperor was forced to rely for aid and counsel in peace or war on his great ecclesiastical vassals, the bishops and abbots. These the emperors had generously endowed with land, since their fiefs could not be made hereditary. They were still royal officers and it was tremendously important to the central government to secure the election of men who would be loyal to the emperor. The German towns, too, most of which were ruled by bishops, were usually loyal. But these supporters of the monarchy were useless unless led by a strong emperor.

Germany

Even more in Italy than in Germany the imperial authority depended on the constant activity of a vigorous ruler. It almost disappeared during the minority of Henry IV. In Lombardy, numerous towns, growing rapidly under the first impulse of reviving trade, were beginning to yearn for independence and were growing restless under the rule of their bishops, who represented the imperial government. Milan was especially restless. There the citizens gained a powerful ally in the pope by protesting against the emperor's interference

Imperial Italy

in the election of their archbishop, thus giving a coloring of religious reform to their revolt. In central Italy the imperial problem was further complicated by the pope's claims to secular rule over the Papal States, dating back to the eighth-century Donation of Pepin.

The Normans in southern Italy

In the southern part of the peninsula and in Sicily a new menace to imperial rule in Italy had been slowly rising, to grow strong during the minority of Henry IV. Here, until recently, there had been a number of little independent states — Lombard, Byzantine, and Saracen — none of them strong enough seriously to trouble the emperors, though all attempts to conquer them had failed. In 1016, a band of Norman knights landed at Salerno on their way home from a pilgrimage and discovered the possibilities for fighting and plunder offered by the frequent wars between the rival states. Thereafter each year brought more adventurers of the reckless Norman breed, eager to fish in the troubled waters of southern Italy. In course of time, as their numbers increased, their leaders built up small states of their own. At the opening of the reign of Henry IV, the famous Robert Guiscard, perfect type of the Norman conqueror, dominated most of southern Italy. He was the terror of the native populations of the south and a constant menace to imperial Italy. In 1059, he was given a legitimate title to his lands by the papacy. A revolt in Rome had forced Pope Nicholas II to seek armed support. Unwilling to appeal to the emperor as his predecessors had done, he turned instead to the Norman and invested Robert Guiscard with Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily. Robert replied by doing homage to the pope and assuming a vassal's obligation to protect him. Nicholas justified this rather startling gift of land by the supposed cession of all Italy to the pope in the Donation of Constantine. By thus aiding in the establishment of a strong Norman state to the south, the pope hoped to free himself from the necessity of depending on the emperor for defense and, at the same time, to acquire an armed ally to use against him if necessary. Here as elsewhere in Italy, the hostile attitude of the papacy was to prove the most serious obstacle to the re-establishment of imperial domination.

The Cluniac reform movement

The opposition of the popes to Henry IV grew out of a movement for the reform of the church, which had been active for some time before it gained weight at Rome. It had originated as a monastic reform in the Burgundian monastery of Cluny. This monastery, since its foundation in 910, had been exempt from the rule of the local bishop. Its abbot owned no superior except the pope. Under a series of able and pious abbots, it acquired a great reputation for holiness and strict observance of the monastic rules. It

was joined by a number of other monasteries, new and old, in all parts of Europe, all of whom were under the rule of the abbot of Cluny. This "congregation" of monasteries was a new departure in monastic organization. Through it the demand for reform, not only of the monasteries but also of the whole church, gained a wide hearing. The pious Emperor Henry III and Leo IX, whom he had made pope, took up the reform movement under papal direction, but with the emperor still in full control.

After the death of Henry III, a succession of reforming popes carried on the work, but no longer in co-operation with the emperor. During all this time, till he himself was elected pope as Gregory VII, the monk Hildebrand was the most active agent of reform at Rome, the power behind the papal throne. It was he who formulated most perfectly the program for reform and finally put it into effect in its most extreme form. The spiritual character of the church had suffered greatly through its close connection with feudal politics and worldly interests. The majority of the higher clergy were little more than royal officers or feudal barons, while the morals of all ranks of the clergy had degenerated deplorably. Any attempt to raise the general spiritual level of Christendom must begin with a reform of these blind leaders of the blind, to whom the care of souls was entrusted. This, as Hildebrand saw it, could be accomplished only by preventing laymen, whether nobles or kings, from influencing the choice of ecclesiastical officers and by enforcing absolute obedience from the clergy to the pope as head of the church. Thus only could the church be emancipated from secular control and be left free to perform its true duties. The reformers concentrated at first on the suppression of two abuses: first, simony, that is to say, the sale of church offices or bribery in church elections (so called from Simon Magus who had attempted to buy the gift of the Holy Spirit from Saint Peter), and second, the marriage of the clergy, which though commonly practiced was contrary to church law. Both were condemned on moral grounds, but also because simony was often the means by which outsiders influenced clerical elections and the marriage of the clergy tempted them to give more attention to providing for their children (often at the expense of the church) than to their religious duties. Further, the papacy must itself be freed from outside influence, especially from control by the emperor. It was for this reason that Nicholas II made his alliance with the Normans in 1059, and the same year issued the Election Decree, providing for the free and independent choice of future popes by the college of cardinals.

Hildebrand's reform program

When Hildebrand ascended the chair of Saint Peter as Gregory VII

(1073–85), the reform program was given a new impetus and wider scope. The character of Gregory dominates the history of Europe in these years. From a peasant home he had risen by sheer force of character and ability to the most important office in Christendom. Small and unprepossessing in appearance, he yet commanded respect by his integrity and the burning zeal that threatened to consume his frail body. He had an iron will and was inspired by an unshakable determination to do what he considered right for the church, regardless of consequences or of the means employed. For two years he strove without much success to force the bishops, especially of Germany and northern Italy, to strict obedience. Then, in 1075, he published the first papal decree definitely forbidding lay investiture. It had long been the recognized right of the feudal overlord of a bishop or abbot to invest him with the insignia of his fief and office, just as he would any other vassal. The insignia of an ecclesiastical office, however, had a spiritual significance, and the pope now claimed that no layman had the right to bestow them. There was, of course, more than a mere question of symbols involved. The right to confer the investiture carried with it the right to refuse, and so to cancel the election of an unsatisfactory candidate. Gregory's prohibition of lay investiture struck at the heart of secular control over the church. It was bound to precipitate an open conflict with the emperor, for Henry IV was now of age and determined to recover his father's authority. Other rulers might compromise; the emperor could not afford to. More than any other ruler in Europe, the emperor depended on the support of his ecclesiastical vassals. To give up the right to choose them would have crippled his power beyond hope of repair, leaving him at the mercy of rebellious lay nobles. The crux of the difficulty lay in the fact that the loyalty and obedience of the bishops was of vital importance to the pope as head of the church and to the emperor as ruler of the state.

Gregory VII and lay investiture

This practical question of control of the church at once brought to the fore the broader and more serious problem of supremacy, which had all along been present in the theory of the Holy Roman Empire, waiting only for an open conflict between a strong pope and a determined emperor to be brought out into the open. The emperor admitted the universal spiritual authority of the pope, while the pope, in turn, admitted the universal secular authority of the emperor. They had parallel powers, both divinely ordained. But in case of conflict, which had the higher authority? History favored both equally. The popes had always given the crown to the emperors, but the emperors, including the pious Henry III, as guardians of the church

Rival claims to supremacy

had frequently deposed bad popes and had chosen their successors. Faced by the necessity of establishing his supremacy in order to force the emperor to do his will regarding the investitures and other reform measures, Gregory took an exalted stand, asserting that, as the soul is more important than the body, so the spiritual is higher than the secular authority. Moreover, as the successor of Saint Peter, the pope is responsible to God for the souls of all men, including kings, and it is his duty to admonish a wicked ruler and, if he is unrepentant, to free his subjects from their allegiance lest they, too, be led astray. With Gregory, the papal claim to supremacy may have been largely a means to a practical end, but he nevertheless stated it firmly.

Gregory VII and Henry IV

Henry's attempts to re-establish imperial authority in Italy had already caused a breach with the papacy before Gregory was elected, but a rebellion in Saxony in 1073 forced him to make peace with the new pope. Henry did not reopen the conflict until two years later when he had restored peace in Germany. He then challenged the pope by investing his own candidate with the archbishopric of Milan, to which Gregory replied with the decree against lay investiture. With the aid of his bishops, most of whom were loyal and also opposed to the pope's strict reforms, Henry took the offensive and declared Gregory deposed. But he had reckoned without the restless lay nobles. When the pope replied by excommunicating the emperor and freeing his subjects from their oath of allegiance, many of the German nobles took the opportunity to rebel. Again Henry was forced to conciliate the pope in order to have a free hand against rebellion at home. Hastening to Italy, he met the pope in the castle of the Countess of Tuscany at Canossa in January, 1077. He pleaded for absolution as a penitent sinner, a plea that the pope, as a priest, could not refuse, especially when the emperor, as Gregory himself recounts, showed his contrition by standing for three days barefoot in the snow before the barred gates of the castle. The absolution of Henry, freeing him from the ban of excommunication, caused a strong reaction in his favor. The pious returned to their allegiance and the insurgent nobles lost their excuse for rebellion. Nevertheless, the emperor had set a dangerous precedent in his dramatic recognition of the pope's spiritual authority, a precedent that was to have more influence on later generations than in his own day. Still, it was an immediate victory for the emperor, though the disaffected nobles persisted in their rebellion and elected Rudolf, Duke of Swabia, as an anti-king.

It was the pope who reopened hostilities. Henry had continued lay investiture, and in 1080 Gregory took the decisive step of definitely de-

posing him and recognizing Rudolf in his place. This time general public opinion was against the pope. He was the aggressor and it was generally considered that he had exceeded his powers. With the aid of the German and Italian clergy, Henry deposed him and procured the election of an anti-pope. The emperor then besieged Rome and entered it in 1084. There he was crowned by the anti-pope Clement III. Gregory was forced to flee to his Norman allies in the south and died in exile.

Defeat of Gregory VII

Gregory's successors, especially Urban II (1088–99), continued his program of reform and his struggle with the emperor. They were generally recognized in the lands outside the empire where reform had been effected without so much conflict. Henry's pope was accepted only where the emperor could enforce obedience. Yet the schism (the split in the church between the adherents of the rival popes) continued until the emperor's death. Henry's life ended in tragedy. His last years were embittered by the treachery and rebellion of his son Henry V, in alliance with the papal party.

The struggle continues

With the accession of Henry V, the schism was ended and for a time the pope and emperor were at peace. But the new emperor was no more ready than his father had been to give up the control of ecclesiastical elections, of which lay investiture was the symbol. Through the reigns of three popes the controversy continued, often accompanied by violence. The imprisonment of the pope in 1111 and intermittent rebellion in Germany from 1112 to 1121 were the high lights of the struggle. At last, worn out by the long strife, both parties agreed to settle the investiture question by a compromise, arranged at Worms in 1122.

Henry V (1106–25)

According to the Concordat of Worms, signed by both emperor and pope, bishops and abbots were to be invested with the insignia of their secular office only (that is, their fief) by the emperor, not with the ring and the staff which symbolized their spiritual authority. In Germany the investiture was to precede consecration and the emperor was to be represented at elections. This left him still in practical control. In Burgundy and Italy, however, where the emperor had lost real authority, the imperial investiture was to follow consecration, and so was not a necessary preliminary to taking office. In France and England the question had already been settled by the monarch's giving up actual investiture, but retaining a dominant influence in elections. The emperor had retained what was most vital to him — control over the German clergy. But the compromise was really a papal victory. The emperor had given up a recognized right,

Concordat of Worms (1122)

while the pope had merely stopped short of the full assertion of his theoretical claims.

Papal gains

The papacy had, indeed, made great advances during the course of the controversy. The popes had strengthened their position as rulers of the international church and had made sweeping claims to universal authority. When the conflict with the emperors was revived, it was to be a struggle for supremacy, considered as an end in itself. Meanwhile, through his quarrel with the pope and the schism in the church, the Emperor Henry IV had lost a great opportunity in being unable to take his place as the leader of Christendom in the First Crusade, thereby surrendering that position to his opponent Pope Urban II.[1]

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY — FREDERICK BARBAROSSA AND HENRY VI

Welf and Hohenstaufen (1125–52)

During the three decades of uneasy peace between the empire and the papacy, following the Concordat of Worms, the chief interest in German history centers around the rivalry of two great feudal families, the Welfs and the Hohenstaufens. Later this feud was to spread to Italy, where the party which favored the papacy and fought for local independence called themselves Guelfs from the German name Welf, while the imperial party were called Ghibellines from the German Waiblingen, the name of one of the Hohenstaufen family possessions. This Italian feud persisted for centuries, long after the rivalry of the two German families had subsided. The feud had its origin in 1125, when, on the death of Henry V without direct heirs, the nobles asserted their right to elect the emperor regardless of hereditary rights. Passing over Frederick of Hohenstaufen and his younger brother Conrad, nephews of Henry V, they chose a Saxon noble, Lothair III (1125–37), who had no shadow of hereditary claim. This election incidentally, set an important precedent. It was a significant victory of the elective over the hereditary principle of succession. The Hohenstaufens were bitterly offended and were soon in open rebellion. They were thus brought into conflict with the Welfs, for Henry the Proud, head of that family, was the son-in-law and heir of Lothair. The rebellion was crushed, but the feud continued. By the end of Lothair's reign, Henry the Proud was Duke of Bavaria, Saxony, and Swabia, and Count of Tuscany in Italy, in fact so powerful that the nobles feared he might dominate them too strongly if he were to become emperor. They there-

[1] See below, page 201.

fore elected his rival, the Hohenstaufen Conrad III (1138–52). It was the Welfs who were now in opposition to the emperor, and throughout Conrad's reign Germany was kept in a turmoil. Innumerable family feuds and private wars added to the general anarchy. The disturbed state of the empire during the investiture controversy had given a new impetus to feudal independence. Strongly fortified castles had sprung up everywhere. Conrad's prestige was also shaken by his failure to accomplish anything in the Second Crusade. When he died, he left the imperial title almost completely stripped of its authority.

Frederick Barbarossa (1152–90)

The empire was rescued from disintegration by the next Hohenstaufen emperor, Frederick I, called Barbarossa. From the first the new emperor inspired hope and confidence in all who longed for the restoration of peace, order, and strong government. Well-built, handsome, and genial, the red-bearded monarch charmed all who knew him. Frederick was, indeed, the perfect type of the chivalrous ruler of the Middle Ages. He was a first-class soldier, with a full-blooded love of battle, but he was also a just and conscientious monarch, bent on enforcing law and order in his harassed realm. In one respect only did he fail to appreciate the needs of his age. He failed to understand or to realize the importance of the growing commercial and industrial life in the towns. For feudal Germany, however, his reign marks an era of comparative peace and of imperial authority such as had not been seen for a century. The feud between Hohenstaufen and Welf was buried, to be resurrected for a brief period only toward the end of his long reign. Frederick was himself half Welf, a nephew of Henry the Proud through his mother, as of Conrad III through his father. The current head of the Welf family, his cousin Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, was his friend and comrade in arms for twenty years. Lesser feuds were suppressed, at least so long as the emperor was present in Germany, by the enforcing of a "landpeace" forbidding private wars. The emperor's activity, however, could not be limited to Germany, and as a result his rule did not have as permanent results there as it might have had. He succeeded in re-establishing the overlordship of the emperor over his eastern neighbors, Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary. He also reasserted imperial authority in Burgundy, where it had long been ignored. Finally he strove to recover imperial control of Italy — there to meet the only failure of his career.

Frederick's first expedition into Italy in 1154–55, for the purpose of receiving the imperial crown, brought him face to face with the two powers which were to unite in successful defiance of his authority — the papacy and the Lombard cities. With the former he was at first friendly

enough, for the pope needed his aid against the citizens of Rome, who had tried to revive the ancient freedom of the city under the leadership of a reformer named Arnold of Brescia. Frederick showed his willingness to aid the pope by securing the execution of the heretical rebel before his own arrival in the papal city. The first meeting, however, between the ambitious emperor and the equally strong-minded and determined pope, Adrian IV (1154–59), proved that their friendship was no more than skin deep. Frederick haughtily refused to act as squire to the pope and to hold his bridle and stirrup. The two potentates almost parted in anger. Frederick finally submitted to what he considered an affront to the imperial dignity only when it was pointed out that there was ample precedent for the act. Two years later a similar incident brought about another strained situation, which further illustrated the real antagonism between emperor and pope. Frederick was holding a Diet at Besançon in Burgundy when he received a letter in which the pope referred to the imperial crown as a "benefice," "conferred" by him on the emperor. Frederick construed the terms, as they were probably intended, in the feudal sense, and indignantly denied that he held the imperial crown as a fief (that being the usual sense of the word benefice) from the pope. One of the papal legates replied, "From whom then does he hold it if not from the pope?" The pope was forced to explain away his words as meaning merely a benefit or good deed, but the incident was not forgotten.

Frederick and the papacy

Behind these apparently trifling incidents lay the whole question of supremacy of emperor or pope, which once more became a paramount issue. Both parties had greatly strengthened their theoretical claims since the days of Gregory VII, and the issue of supremacy as an end in itself was now more clearly stated. A host of writers on both sides had discussed the question thoroughly. The enthusiastic study of Roman law, which resulted from the great revival of learning during the twelfth century, afforded the emperor some telling arguments. Frederick based his claims to supremacy on historical precedent and on the Roman conception of the emperor's absolute authority. But the papacy, too, had been strengthening its claims by the development of a legal code, modeled after Roman law, based on the Scriptures and on the decrees of popes and councils. A full compilation of this "canon law" was completed during the reign of Conrad III by Gratian, a teacher of law at Bologna. It was known as the *Decretum* of Gratian. The church was rapidly becoming a great international state, of which the pope was the absolute ruler, with an administrative system, laws and courts of its own, and basing its claims

Question of supremacy revived

to supremacy over secular governments on legal as well as moral grounds.

The Lombard communes

The popes found allies against the emperor in the Lombard cities. Since the middle of the eleventh century, the Italian towns had been growing rapidly as the result of a great revival of international trade. The crusades had further stimulated trade, and by the middle of the twelfth century the numerous cities that dot the Lombard plain were busy centers of industry and commerce. Originally these cities had been governed by their bishops, acting as imperial officers. But with increasing prosperity, the citizens began to demand freedom of self-government. During the investiture controversy, both emperors and popes had sought their aid and had paid for it with concessions of liberty. When Frederick made his first expedition into Italy he found the cities, with the land around them, organized as "communes," practically self-governing republics. He found them also in a shocking state of anarchy, each city divided by turbulent political factions and engaged in feuds with other cities. The emperor was surprised to find these non-knightly burghers as independent and as aggressively warlike as the feudal nobility. He realized that he must crush their independence before order and imperial government could be re-established in Italy.

Frederick and the Lombard League

In 1158, Frederick made a second expedition into Italy with a large army. After capturing Milan, the strongest of the Lombard cities, he called an imperial Diet at Roncaglia. There he publicly asserted his imperial rights, as defined by the jurists on the basis of Roman law and medieval precedent. Disregarding the privileges of the communes, he claimed all rights of sovereignty, the "regalia" as they were called, including the appointment of officers and collection of taxes from tolls, markets, mints, law courts, etc. Never had the medieval empire seemed so strongly established in Italy. But the imperial officers were unpopular and taxes oppressive. Milan revolted and with her several other cities, supported by the pope. At this point Adrian IV died and there was a hotly disputed election. A majority of the cardinals elected Alexander III (1159–81), while a minority declared for Victor IV. It was the latter, more favorable to him, whom the emperor chose to recognize, thus assuring the continuance of the schism, since he was not accepted as pope anywhere outside the empire. Meanwhile, with the aid of Pavia and some other cities which were loyal to him through fear of Milan, Frederick continued the war against the rebellious communes. In 1162 he completely destroyed Milan, banishing its citizens. The discontent in Lombardy still per-

sisted. In 1166, Frederick had to make a third expedition to Italy to crush a league of cities, which had united against him and had so far forgotten their jealousy of Milan as to aid the Milanese in rebuilding their city. Alexander III, now in possession of Rome, was the heart and soul of the resistance to the emperor. Frederick, therefore, marched against Rome and captured it. His success was immediately followed by disaster, however, in the form of an epidemic that destroyed his army and forced him to retire to Germany, where domestic affairs kept him busy till 1174.

Triumph of the Lombard League

The Lombard League, led by Milan, used the years while the emperor was in Germany to gain the adherence of nearly all the North Italian cities. The league also built a new and heavily fortified city, called Alexandria in honor of the pope, where it would command the Alpine passes into Lombardy. When Frederick returned, this city withstood all his attempts to capture it through the winter of 1174–75. The war dragged on till 1176, when the emperor was disastrously defeated by the Lombard army at Legnano. Frederick accepted defeat with as good grace as possible. He made peace with Alexander III, thus ending the schism, and the following year he arranged a truce with the Lombard League, which was later confirmed by the Peace of Constance, 1183. The emperor surrendered the regalia, leaving the cities almost complete self-government. They in turn recognized the imperial sovereignty and swore allegiance. It was a decided triumph for the Lombard communes. So far as the pope was concerned, however, the results of the struggle were indecisive. Frederick had been forced to abandon his anti-pope and to recognize Alexander; but he had retained control of the church in Germany, and neither emperor nor pope had surrendered his claims to supremacy.

Last years of Frederick

Having failed in Italy, Frederick was free to concentrate his attention on Germany, where only one serious problem arose to mar his declining years. A breach in his long friendship with Henry the Lion revived the old Welf-Hohenstaufen feud. Henry had been building up a strong feudal state in Bavaria and Saxony and in the Slavic lands north and east of the Elbe. Unlike the emperor, he was much interested in the rising commercial towns and founded the fortunes of Lübeck and Munich. His government was enlightened, but it bore heavily on the lesser nobles. These brought charges of oppression against him in the imperial courts in 1179. Frederick, who had been estranged from his cousin for a number of reasons, summoned him to appear to answer the charges. Henry refused. After a year he was outlawed on a charge of treason and his fiefs were confiscated. He re-

tired to England to the court of his father-in-law, King Henry II. His duchies of Saxony and Bavaria were partitioned, split up into smaller units. This marks the end of the preponderant importance of the great duchies, and the rise in their place of a number of smaller principalities. What remained of the duchy of Bavaria was given to Otto of Wittelsbach, whose descendants held it until very recent times. Frederick's reign was brought to a close by the Third Crusade. Like so many of his contemporaries the aged emperor was fascinated by the hope of recovering the Holy Land, and in 1189 he set out with some twenty thousand knights. The story of the crusade will be told elsewhere. The gallant old fighter did not live to meet the Saracens, but perished in the icy waters of a stream in Asia Minor.

Henry VI (1190–97)

During his brief reign, Henry VI, Frederick's unprepossessing son, revived the family feud with the papacy and achieved a remarkable, though brief, success. Cruel and treacherous, Henry had none of the personal charm that had made his father so popular, but he had qualities of astuteness, learning, and determination that made up for the lack. With him the struggle for supremacy enters a new phase. The emperor's goal was now the political isolation of the pope in central Italy. Northern Italy had been won over by the grant of practical independence to the Lombard cities. The next step was to gain control of the Norman kingdom of Sicily, which included all southern Italy below the Papal States. Henry had a claim to Sicily through his wife Constance, a Sicilian princess who became the heiress to the kingdom on the death of King William II in 1189. However, Henry had to fight for the inheritance. The Sicilian nobles had given the crown to one of their own number, who was, of course, supported by the pope, the titular overlord of the kingdom. Meanwhile, a new Welf rebellion, led by the aged Henry the Lion, distracted the emperor's attention from Italy. It was not till 1194 that Henry was able to win his Sicilian kingdom. Then, however, he was in a strong strategic position. The papacy was completely surrounded by imperial lands. Henry then proceeded to establish his own vassals in the Papal States, reducing the land subject to the pope to the duchy of Rome. Hohenstaufen power was growing steadily in Italy when it was suddenly destroyed by the premature death of the emperor, not yet thirty-three years old.

3. TRIUMPH OF THE PAPACY — INNOCENT III AND FREDERICK II

Innocent III (1198–1216)

Seldom has history seen a more abrupt and thorough reversal of fortune than that which followed the sudden death of Henry VI. While rival candidates were disputing for the imperial crown, and Sicily was cut off from the empire under the rule of a child, the papacy came into the hands of the strongest of all medieval popes, Innocent III. His pontificate marks the highest point of actual power ever exercised by the papacy. Trained as a jurist in the schools of Bologna and Paris, Innocent was thoroughly versed in canon law and ecclesiastical tradition. He was but thirty-seven years old, unusually young for a pope, and in the full prime of his vigor. For eighteen years he ruled the nations of western Christendom as the successor of Saint Peter, to whom God had given authority, "not only over the universal church but also over the whole world." Never before had the papal claims to sovereignty over church and secular governments alike been stated with such absolute conviction. Yet Innocent did not regard himself as an innovator. He based his position on the time-honored theory of the papacy, embodied in tradition and canon law, which had been studied so carefully during the twelfth century. His position was different from that of Gregory VII by the measure of the legal and institutional growth of the church in the century and a quarter that lay between them. In claiming a potentially unlimited universal sovereignty, he felt that he was merely asserting the recognized "rights" of the papacy. He did not, it is true, claim direct authority over secular government in all cases. But he did assert a spiritual authority which might incidentally include secular authority, since it was his duty to judge of the sins of all Christians, including rulers, and any act that had a moral significance (as what human act does not?) came within his jurisdiction. At the same time, despite his absolute theories, Innocent was a practical diplomat. He would make concessions when it seemed expedient in order to attain his ultimate goal.

As a universal sovereign, Innocent's interests were many and various. He followed them all with inexhaustible energy. His interference in the affairs of France and England, his instigation of the Fourth Crusade and the Albigensian Crusade, his work for the suppression of heresy and for the reform and reorganization of the church will be dealt with in later chapters. Here we shall consider only his activity with regard to the empire and Italy.

Innocent had been pope only a few weeks when a majority of the

German nobles elected as emperor Philip, Duke of Swabia, the younger son of Frederick Barbarossa. They had passed over Henry's son Frederick, who had inherited the kingdom of Sicily, on the ground of his extreme youth. Not all the nobles, however, agreed to the election of another Hohenstaufen. In western Saxony and the lower Rhineland there was still a strong Welf faction. In July, 1198, they gathered to elect Otto of Brunswick, the younger son of Henry the Lion. The rival emperors, who were the protagonists in this revival of the old Welf-Hohenstaufen feud, were of about the same age — in the early twenties — but of very different character. Philip was a gentle, amiable soul, always popular, but not a great statesman or soldier. Perhaps he was too fine for success in a rough age. Otto, on the other hand, had little natural refinement. A contemporary writer described him as a reckless soldier, "roaring like a lion's whelp, incited by the desire for plunder, eager for the battle." He was, however, even less a statesman than his rival. Philip had the advantage of being supported by the large majority of the German princes, while Otto was forced to depend on Cologne and his own Welf lands, and on financial aid from his uncle Richard the Lion-hearted of England, who hoped to use him against Philip Augustus of France. The death of Richard in 1199 greatly weakened Otto's position. Meanwhile, both candidates appealed to the pope, who alone had the right to confer the imperial crown, though not to interfere in the actual election.

Philip of Swabia and Otto IV

Innocent III had taken immediate advantage of the opportunity offered by the paralysis of imperial government during the civil war to build up a strong political position for the papacy in Italy. As leader of an anti-imperial party, he ousted the German representatives of the emperor from the Papal States and Tuscany. Late in 1198, Queen Constance of Sicily died and left him as guardian to her infant son Frederick. The pope now dominated central and southern Italy. To retain his power there, he had only to prevent the re-establishment of a strong imperial government. For three years he refused to recognize either Philip or Otto, while at the same time asserting his right to decide the issue by conferring the crown on the most suitable candidate. At last, in 1201, he declared openly for Otto IV, after securing from him an admission of his right to decide the election and a full renunciation of all imperial claims to the Papal States, which were now defined at the most extreme limits ever claimed, including Tuscany. Otto was the weaker candidate, and hence the less dangerous. He was also a Welf, traditionally friendly to the papacy. Moreover, Innocent considered it vitally important for the papacy to break the Hohenstaufen

Innocent's policy

bond which tied Sicily to the empire. Despite the pope's aid, however, Otto could make little progress. By 1207 his cause was lost and he fled to England. Innocent was bitterly disappointed, but forced to make the best of a bad situation. In 1208 he recognized Philip of Swabia as emperor, just before that unlucky ruler was murdered.

Innocent and Frederick II

With Philip dead, Otto easily made good his claims. The country was tired of civil war. In 1209 he was crowned at Rome. Here he renewed his guaranty of the Papal States and made further concessions to the pope, including the practical surrender of imperial control over the German church. But promises meant little to Otto. Within a few months he had adopted the Hohenstaufen imperial policy and was threatening the independence of the Papal States. In 1210 and again the following year, Innocent excommunicated him and freed his subjects from their allegiance. The result was a Hohenstaufen rebellion in Germany in favor of the young Frederick of Sicily, son of Henry VI, who was now of age. In December, 1211, he was elected by the rebels, with the pope's blessing. Innocent had been forced to support Frederick, much against his liking, by the lack of any other available candidate to use against the perfidious Otto. Before giving his consent, he made Frederick confirm all the promises made by Otto and also made him promise to give up the kingdom of Sicily to his infant son, Henry, as soon as he was crowned emperor, thus providing for the continued division of Sicily from the empire. Meanwhile, civil war had begun again in Germany. It continued till 1214, when Otto was disastrously defeated by Philip Augustus of France on the field of Bouvines.[1]

Frederick II (1211–50)

In the year 1220, Frederick II returned to Italy, the land he had always considered his real home, there to stage the last act of the Hohenstaufen drama. It is difficult to estimate the character of this last great member of a great family, so contradictory and even hysterical are some of the judgments passed on him both by his contemporaries and by later writers. His enemies of the papal party saw in him an arch-heretic and a monster of depravity, while his admirers hailed him as "the wonder of the world." Even modern scholars have been moved to superlatives in describing him. Some have referred to him as "the first modern king," and one, writing in the *Cambridge Medieval History*, has asserted that, "among the rulers in the centuries between Charlemagne and Napoleon he has no equal." Certainly there was genius in this descendant of German emperors and Norman kings. Brought up among the intrigues and plots of a turbulent court, he had

[1] See below, page 191.

learned to trust no one but himself. He had learned all the uses of deceit and had acquired a self-confidence based on a fairly just assurance of his own mental superiority to those about him. Sicily, where he passed his youth, was a cosmopolitan country, made up of mixed Italian, Norman, Greek, and Saracen peoples, including every possible shade of social and religious opinion. As a product of that varied society, Frederick had developed a keen, skeptical mind, with little religious or moral conviction, but with an enthusiastic interest in literature, science, and philosophy, and a sanely enlightened appreciation of the needs of his kingdom.

Government of Sicily

Whenever he was free to do so, Frederick devoted his attention to his Sicilian kingdom, and it was there that his genius as a ruler showed itself most clearly. Before returning to Italy, he had persuaded Pope Honorius III to let him keep it, while surrendering the German crown to his son Henry. His first care was to recover the royal domains, which had been lost during his youth. He then took stringent measures to re-establish absolute government, building up a system of administration by royal officers who would be superior to the feudal nobles. He reorganized the royal courts and councils, recruiting his ministers from men of common birth who had been trained in law, rather than from the nobility. In 1231 he issued a new legal code, based on the principles of Roman law, to supersede the tangle of feudal laws and local customs throughout the kingdom. He also reformed the system of taxation so as greatly to increase his income. This bore heavily on the people, but was more than compensated by his intelligent encouragement of industry, commerce, and agriculture. Frederick also did much to raise the intellectual level of Sicily. He founded the University of Naples, and his liberal patronage to writers and scholars made his court the intellectual center of the West. Under his rule, despotic though it was, Sicily became the most prosperous and civilized country in Europe.

Conflict with the papacy and the Lombards

As a true Hohenstaufen, however, Frederick could not concentrate all his attention on Sicily. He seems to have cared little for Germany, but he was determined to keep Sicily and the empire together, and to unite Italy, if possible, under his rule. This brought him into conflict with the two ancient enemies of his house, the papacy and the Lombard cities. The latter were still, as in the days of Barbarossa, independent, disorderly, and constantly at war with one another. Like his grandfather, Frederick II felt it necessary to enforce order upon them through imperial authority. But, despite their mutual jealousies, they could still unite to defend their freedom from a superior power, and the emperor's first attempts to rule them

were met by the formation of a new Lombard League in 1226. Again the papacy joined the Lombards in opposition to the emperor. The grounds of disagreement, however, were not quite the same as they had been in the previous century. Innocent III had triumphantly vindicated the papal claims to universal sovereignty, and the emperor had practically lost control of the German church. The issue of supremacy was still present, but the struggle was in reality more for territorial rule in Italy. Despite his promises, Frederick was threatening the pope's control of the Papal States, while the pope, for his part, could still assert his feudal overlordship over Sicily. The pope had a weapon against Frederick in the latter's rash vow, made in 1215, to go on a crusade. Pope Gregory IX (1227–41) demanded the fulfillment of the vow immediately after his election. Frederick agreed to sail in that year, but falling sick at sea, he turned back. Gregory thereupon excommunicated him. In 1228, the emperor did finally go on the crusade and by diplomatic negotiations won Jerusalem, but still without mollifying the pope, since he had undertaken the holy war while under the ban of excommunication and had, moreover, treated peacefully with the infidel sultan. It was not till after another year of warfare that pope and emperor signed a peace treaty in 1230, which kept an uneasy truce for eight years.

The conflict revived

Meanwhile, Frederick continued with varying success his attempts to suppress the Lombard cities. In 1235, he was called to Germany to put down a rebellion led by his son Henry. Returning with German troops, he announced his intention of establishing his authority over the whole of Italy. By 1238, the pope was openly allied with the Lombard League, and in March of the following year he again excommunicated the emperor. From that time on, Gregory and his successor Innocent IV (1243–54) were the relentless leaders of the opposition to Frederick. Both were canonists, fighting for the rights of the church, which they defined more absolutely and with greater claims to secular power than even Innocent III had done. The war dragged on indecisively until the death of Frederick in 1250 brought final ruin to the imperial cause.

Italy and Germany after Frederick II

The papacy still continued in implacable enmity to Frederick's descendants, while the empire fell to pieces. Pope after pope carried on a ruthless war to stamp out "the viper brood of the Hohenstaufens." In 1265, the pope called in a powerful French noble, Charles, Duke of Anjou, younger brother of Louis IX, to win the kingdom of Sicily from Frederick's son Manfred. The following year Manfred was defeated and slain. Two years later, the last Hohenstaufen, Frederick's grandson Conradin, was

captured and executed. In Germany, meanwhile, the imperial government had completely collapsed. While Frederick II was busy in Italy, the nobles had successfully asserted their independence. Rebellion after rebellion had marked the last years of his reign, and when, the year after his death, his son Conrad IV left to carry on the war in Italy, the country was in a state of complete anarchy. After the death of Conrad IV in 1254, there was no generally recognized emperor for nineteen years, until the election of Rudolf of Hapsburg in 1273. This period is called "the Great Interregnum." During those stormy years the German nobles acquired an independence that they were never again to surrender to any emperor.

Results of the struggle

The papacy had at last triumphed in the long and bitter struggle with the emperors — at least to the extent of temporarily destroying the empire, and leaving it permanently weakened. In these two centuries of conflict, the popes had also built up a great international sovereignty, with arrogant claims to spiritual and secular authority, and with a territorial state in central Italy under their immediate rule. At the same time, the struggle had prevented the development of a strong centralized government, or even of national unity, in either Germany or Italy. Centuries were to pass before either became a national state. But the papal victory was not as permanent as it seemed. For, while the popes were fighting with the emperors, the kings of France and England had been steadily increasing their power and were gradually building territorial states out of feudal chaos. In the Later Middle Ages, the popes were to find these national monarchs more dangerous enemies than the emperors had been.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE GROWTH OF THE MONARCHIES IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND

DURING the period which we have called the High Middle Ages, the society of western Europe was still organized according to the feudal pattern. Nationalism and national states, as we know them, had not yet evolved. Most men were conscious primarily of the loyalty they owed to their local feudal lord. Yet they had also much in common with all the peoples of Catholic Europe — a common social system and a universal church. Medieval society, then, was at once more local and more international than that of modern times. In the last chapter we have seen how the results of the long struggle between the emperors and the popes helped to prolong this condition, on the one hand by establishing the popes as undisputed rulers of an international church with claims to secular powers, and on the other by destroying the central government in Germany and Italy. In this chapter we shall see how in the other two great countries of the West, France and England, the reverse development was taking place during the same period. There the monarchs, less troubled by the conflicting claims of the papacy, were slowly centralizing the loose feudal government and were laying the foundations for future national states.

1. FRENCH KINGS INCREASE THEIR PRESTIGE (1060–1180)

Weakness of the Capetian monarchy

By the middle of the eleventh century the royal house of Capet was almost eclipsed in the midst of its great vassals. The king's actual power was limited almost entirely to the royal domain, the Île de France, a narrow strip of territory running north and south from Paris. From this land he drew his chief financial and military support. Even there, however, his authority was none too great, for rebellious barons defied him from behind their castle walls or issued forth to prey upon the peasants or passing merchants and clergy. Outside the domain, the lords of great fiefs like Normandy, Champagne, Anjou, Burgundy, Toulouse, or Aquitaine, though recognizing the king as their overlord, were practically independent, each ruling his own county or duchy as a feudal sovereign.[1] The king had less real power than many of these vassals, but he had one great advantage over

[1] See above, page 153.

them. He was their overlord and he was also the consecrated king. At the time this meant little, but it might be made to mean more. The first step in the rise of the monarchy would be to exercise both royal and feudal rights as far as possible so as to raise the prestige of the king. The next step would be to use that prestige to expand the royal domain, and then to use the increased power drawn from a wider domain to assert control over the outlying fiefs. In accomplishing this, the kings could usually count upon the support of the clergy, who were more closely attached to the monarchy than the lay nobles.

Philip I (1060–1108)

The long reign of Philip I marks the first slight advance in the power of the monarchy. A practical if rather ignoble king, Philip succeeded in adding several small fiefs to the royal domain, and he suppressed at least some of the unruly barons of the Île de France. He also succeeded in maintaining control over his ecclesiastical vassals. The French kings could not influence the election of all the high church officers as the emperors could in Germany, since the Duke of Normandy and some of the other great lords had taken over that right in their own fiefs, nor was the king strong enough to combat the movement for reform in the church, which the papacy was urging so strongly during all of Philip's reign. Nevertheless, he managed to hold his own in the investiture controversy. The question was settled by a compromise in 1107. The king gave up the formal investiture of bishops and abbots, but retained control over ecclesiastical elections. Thereafter, the French kings were usually in close alliance with the papacy, but kept a firm hand on the French church. The support of both was often of great advantage to them.

Louis VI (1108–37) asserts royal authority

Philip's son, Louis VI, called "the Fat" for obvious reasons, carried on the Capetian program with far greater success than had his father. It was he who really laid the foundations of royal power, first, by suppressing the barons of the Île de France and establishing a secure position for the monarchy there, and second, by vigorously asserting the right of the king to enforce justice throughout the kingdom. Despite the growing weight of flesh, which even his tall and powerful frame carried with difficulty in his later years, Louis was constantly on the move. A king who took his duties seriously had no time for leisure in that violent age, and Louis had all the qualities needed by a medieval monarch. He was a born soldier and a just and conscientious judge. He never thought of interfering with the feudal rights of his vassals, but he did consider it his duty as king and overlord to see that feudal laws were obeyed and justice guaranteed to all. Year after year, this "ironclad judge" heaved his

great weight into the saddle and rode forth to defend the clergy, the weak, and the oppressed. His life was one long battle against feudal tyranny and rebellion, filled with sieges of castles and hand-to-hand fighting, in which the king himself, in his egg-shaped steel helmet and chain mail, swung as lusty a sword as any knight in the royal army. He left the monarchy with greatly increased prestige and a new moral ascendancy over the feudal nobles.

The Anglo-Norman menace


The greatest danger to the French monarchy in this century came from the union of Normandy — the great duchy which touched the western border of the royal domain — with England, and against this coalition Louis was able to do no more than hold his own. Henry I of England, though in theory his vassal for Normandy, was a much more powerful ruler than Louis. Both his kingdom and his duchy were better organized than France, and besides he had strong allies. His nephew, Theobald, Count of Champagne, whose fiefs bordered the Île de France on both the east and west, aided him in any action against the French king. The Emperor Henry V, too, was his son-in-law, and on one occasion formed an alliance with him against France. This danger was averted by an unprecedented rising of the French nobles in support of their king, but until the death of Henry I in 1135 the situation was always tense.

Louis VII (1137–80), early years

With the death of Louis the Fat, the rise of the monarchy was checked, though not entirely stopped. Louis VII was less wise, less decisive in action, and certainly less fortunate than his great father. At the very beginning of his reign, he added greatly to the territory of the royal domain by marrying Eleanor, heiress to the duchy of Aquitaine. However, this was not as great a gain as it might seem, and it proved to be only temporary. Aquitaine, in southwestern France, was too far away and its nobles too independent for it to add very much to the king's resources. During his first years as king, Louis showed more energy than later, but it was sadly misdirected. After a long and useless feud with Theobald of Champagne, he left France to take part in the ill-starred Second Crusade. After his return in 1149, he settled down more seriously to the business of ruling; but by that time the Anglo-Norman menace had taken a new and more dangerous form through alliance with the house of Anjou.

Rise of the Angevin house

Seven years before his death, Henry I, who had no surviving son to succeed him, had married his daughter Matilda, the widow of the Emperor Henry V, to Count Geoffrey of Anjou and Maine. He hoped in this way to provide an heir who would not only succeed to the English throne, but would also unite to


DOMINIONS OF HENRY II
10
5
0
5
10
55
50
45
40
NORTH SEA
SCOTLAND
WALES
ENGLAND
York
Dublin
Wexford
London
Dover
Calais
FLANDERS
R. Rhine
ENGLISH CHANNEL
Rouen
Caen
NORMANDY
R. Seine
Paris
CHAMPAGNE
BRITTANY
MAINE
ANJOU
POITOU
BURGUNDY
GUIENNE
Bordeaux
R. Garonne
TOULOUSE
R. Rhone
Bayonne
GASCONY
KINGDOM OF CASTILE
KINGDOM OF ARAGON
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Lands held by Henry as king
Lands held as fiefs by inheritance
Lands held or claimed through marriage with Eleanor
Lands which Henry claimed as fiefs held of him

Normandy the two neighboring counties of Anjou and Maine. When Henry I died, however, his grandson, Henry, later nicknamed "Plantagenet," was too young to take the throne, which passed instead to Henry's nephew, Stephen of Blois. In the following years, Geoffrey of Anjou conquered Normandy without serious opposition from either of the weak monarchs, Stephen and Louis VII. When Geoffrey died in 1151, his son, Henry Plantagenet, was eighteen years old, and already a keen and vigorous statesman. The following year, Louis VII, who was always swayed more by personal emotions than by motives of policy, divorced his flighty southern wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine. Henry married her almost immediately, thus adding Aquitaine to his already formidable collection of fiefs. The acquisition of Aquitaine meant more to Henry than it had to Louis, since it bordered on his Angevin domain, forming with it a solid block. In 1154, the Plantagenet became King of England as Henry II, and four years later acquired Brittany. He was now lord of more than half of France and much more powerful than his overlord Louis VII.[1] For his part, Louis had weakly allowed this dangerous collection of fiefs to take place without serious opposition, and later, when he realized the seriousness of the menace, his attempts to lessen Henry's power were feeble and irresolute. Henry remained the practically independent ruler of the lands he had acquired.

Growth of royal prestige

In the rest of his kingdom, however, Louis was more successful. He carried on his father's work of defending the oppressed and dispensing justice. He frequently answered appeals for justice against feudal law-breakers outside the royal domain and summoned even the more powerful vassals to answer charges in his court. All who desired peace and order were on the king's side against the nobles. The clergy supported him strongly, and in 1159, Pope Alexander III, who had been driven out of Italy by Frederick Barbarossa, appealed to him for protection. Thus, despite the danger from Anjou, Louis added considerably to the moral authority of the monarchy in France and to its influence abroad.

Royal administration

Much of this success was due to the work of the king's ministers. Louis VI had instituted a policy, which his son continued, of entrusting royal business to clerics or to men of low birth rather than to the great nobles who had earlier filled the offices of the king's household. These men, chosen for their wisdom, training, and ability, were not only more efficient than the ruder nobles, but were devoted to the king's interests, since they had no power of their own independent of the king and had no family ambitions to serve.

[1] See map, page 183.

Abbot Suger of Saint Denis, who served father and son faithfully from about 1130 till his death in 1151, was typical of this class. Honest, sane, and tactful, this bald-headed little man gave direction to the warlike vigor of Louis VI and saved the kingdom from disaster in the early years of Louis VII. During the king's absence on the Second Crusade, it was Suger who prevented the feudal nobles from asserting complete independence. Save for this change in the character of the ministers, the royal administration had developed very little since the early days of the monarchy. The king still drew his chief income from the royal domain, and his direct government was limited to it. Beyond the domain, he had only the feudal jurisdiction of an overlord. His court was composed of household officers, who were his personal advisers, and on special occasions the vassals-in-chief who owed him feudal service. Whether as king or as overlord, his government was purely personal and there was very little system about it. His ministers were merely people whom he had chosen to assist him and their duties were not clearly defined. It was only in the next century, when the royal domain was greatly expanded, that a more regular system of administration began to evolve.

2. ENGLISH KINGS ORGANIZE A ROYAL GOVERNMENT (1066–1189)

Let us turn now to England and see how the monarchy had been faring there. The position of the English kings at the beginning of this period contrasted strongly with that of the kings of France. At the time when Philip I was unable to exercise any authority outside the Île de France, and none too much there, William the Conqueror was master of all England. He had the tremendous advantage that the whole country was his by right of conquest. He kept a large amount of land himself, and the rest he allotted to the Norman barons who had helped him in the conquest and to the church. This land was granted out in fiefs to vassals, who held it directly from the king as tenants-in-chief, giving in return a stipulated amount of military service. This military service was provided for by regranting part of the land to knights, who thus became subvassals of the king. In theory this is the continental system of military feudalism. But in practice the new Norman feudalism in England was far better organized, and the king retained far more control, than anywhere on the Continent. The land had been given by the king to the barons, not merely in theory as confirmation of their hereditary possession of land won by their ancestors as in France, but in actual fact. Moreover, most fiefs were composed of

Norman feudalism in England

pieces of land scattered in various parts of the kingdom. No single baron was strong enough to defy the king successfully. William collected all feudal dues to the last penny, and there was also some sort of national taxation. This, added to the income from the extensive royal estates, guaranteed the financial independence and stability of the king's government. Finally, William and his successors insisted on the principle that the vassals who held land from the barons owed their first loyalty to the king rather than to their immediate lords. From the first, Norman feudalism in England was a fairly centralized system.

Administration and Domesday

William I had his full share of the peculiar Norman genius for organization and for adapting all available means to his own ends. He retained the old Anglo-Saxon system of the shires, as territorial divisions of the kingdom for administrative purposes, under royal officers called sheriffs. He also kept alive the shire courts, with their Saxon law, to offset the feudal courts of the baron or lord of the manor. To this system he added other elements brought over from the Continent. The most important of these new institutions were the itinerant ministers from the royal court (somewhat like the old Carolingian *missi*) and the sworn inquest or jury (so called from the French *juré*, because composed of men who had sworn to give true information). Perhaps the best example of how these worked can be found in the collection of information for the famous Domesday Book in 1086, that amazing survey of the land and chattels of the whole kingdom, compiled for the purpose of making sure of full payment of feudal dues and royal taxes. Ministers from the royal court, mostly educated clergymen, were sent out with writs empowering them to summon a group of freemen from each community, who were to testify under oath as to the exact wealth of each estate. In later times, these itinerant "justices," as personal representatives of the king, and the sworn jury were to be used extensively for all sorts of administrative purposes, and also for the prosecution of justice.

William I and the church

Along with his other reforms, the Conqueror made a thorough reorganization of the English church. The Hildebrandine reform movement was at its height, and William, always a pious man, was thoroughly in sympathy with the aims of the reformers, so long as they did not lessen his authority. With the aid of his friend Lanfranc, whom he made Archbishop of Canterbury, the king enforced discipline upon the lax Saxon clergy. He replaced nearly all the bishops and abbots by new men who had been trained in the stricter tradition of the Continent. He took steps to enforce the celibacy of the clergy and to do away with simony. William also set up special eccle-

siastical courts, where the clergy could be tried by their superior officers. Nevertheless, he would not accede to all the demands of Gregory VII. He clung to his right of investing the bishops and abbots, who were among his most important vassals; but Gregory was not inclined to make an issue of the matter in England as he had in Germany. The pope was interested in reform above all else, and so long as William was using his control of the church to such good purpose, Gregory did not feel it necessary to interfere.

Royal administration under Henry I (1100–35)

For thirteen years after the Conqueror's death, his son William Rufus (1087–1100) proved that royal power might be dangerous in the hands of a tyrannical king. However, his reign was not long enough to cause permanent damage. He died unlamented, shot by an arrow while hunting in the New Forest, and the crown passed to his younger brother, Henry I. Henry was a hard, cool-headed, systematic man, of the true Norman breed, with a strongly legal bent of mind and a passion for order and justice. His primary motive, no doubt, was to strengthen his own power, but he did so in ways that benefited the whole kingdom. Traveling justices, sent out from his court, investigated complaints of feudal oppression, examined the conduct of the sheriffs, and heard numbers of judicial cases, which the king claimed fell within his jurisdiction as breaches of the "king's peace." Henry was perhaps too much interested in his continental possessions for the good of England — he spent more than half his reign in Normandy — but he chose able ministers to carry on his work during his absence. One of these, the "justiciar" Roger, Bishop of Salisbury, was probably responsible for the origins of the famous court of exchequer. The central government was regularly handled by the king, or his justiciar, and the king's court, called the *curia regis*. This was normally composed of a fairly small group of ministers and any of the barons whom the king chose to summon. On special occasions all the king's vassals-in-chief might be summoned to it to form the "Great Council." It was only natural that out of this shifting court the specialized task of looking after the royal finances should be given to a more or less permanent group of experienced men, who received the taxes, audited the sheriffs' accounts, and noted expenditures. These men came to be known, from the chequered table at which they sat to reckon their accounts, as the lords of the exchequer. It was the first of several such courts, which later grew out of the shifting and formless *curia regis*. Like his father, Henry I kept a firm hand on the English church, but now the abolition of lay investiture had become the primary point of papal policy. The question was finally settled in 1107, as in France, by a compromise

wherein the king gave up nothing but the formal investiture with the ring and staff.

Henry's strong rule was followed by two dreary decades of anarchy and civil war under his nephew, Stephen, of whom one contemporary chronicler writes, "he was a mild man, and soft, and good, and did no justice." Henry's daughter Matilda asserted her claim to the crown, while the nobles and great church officers took advantage of the civil war to throw off all royal control. It was a good day for England when young Henry Plantagenet of Anjou restored the hard but just government of Henry I and the Conqueror.

Anarchy under Stephen (1135–54)

We have seen already how Henry II collected his great feudal dominion in France before he became King of England at the age of twenty-one. Though he continued to spend much of his time in his continental fiefs, it was his work in England that justified his reputation as one of the greatest of medieval rulers. Henry's energy was remarkable, even in a family noted for that quality. His superabundant vitality wore down the ministers who were forced to keep pace with him. He was constantly active, traveling from end to end of his domains, a terror to evil-doers, for despite his violent temper which occasionally burst all bonds of restraint, he had all his grandfather's love of order and justice. Every part of England knew the short sturdy figure of the homely red-headed king, the powerful set of the shoulders, and the bow legs, warped from a lifetime in the saddle. He kept in personal touch with the sheriffs whenever possible, and by developing the powers of the exchequer brought them under closer control by the central government. The anarchy of Stephen's reign had made a reassertion of royal authority very necessary. Though he added very little that was actually new to the system of administration, he developed every part of the machinery of government, until he had established a permanent centralized system that would survive the neglect or mismanagement of weaker kings.

Henry II (1154–89), a great administrator

Henry II had inherited the legal mind of that "lion of justice," Henry I, and his most permanent contributions to English institutions were in the field of judicial and legal procedure. He greatly extended the jurisdiction of the royal courts by adding to the list of cases that were recognized as "pleas of the crown" or breaches of the king's peace, and by throwing open his courts to all freemen in civil suits regarding the ownership of land, while at the same time he used the system of itinerant justices in a much more systematic way than before, so as to make royal courts easily available in all parts of the country.

Royal courts

The regular use of these traveling justices led to the transference of a large number of cases from the local feudal or shire courts to the royal courts. Royal justice was surer and more fair than that in the local courts and so became more popular. It should also be noted that the king had good financial reasons for doing everything in his power to extend the jurisdiction of his courts at the expense of others, for fines, payments for writs, and so forth were an important part of the king's income. At the same time, the royal courts did much to raise the king's prestige and to unify the kingdom, for the king's justices were gradually developing a system of common law for the whole country, which would eventually take the place of varying local customs. No parallel to this development could be found anywhere on the Continent.

The jury

Perhaps the most important of Henry's innovations was the regular use of the jury as part of the machinery of justice in the royal courts. This was an evolution from the sworn inquest used by earlier Norman kings and now put to a new judicial use. In Henry's time the jury was used chiefly for the accusation or indictment of criminals. Freemen in each locality were summoned by the king's justices and were forced to tell, under oath, if they knew of any criminals in their neighborhood. Criminals thus accused were summoned to the king's courts for trial, no matter who would otherwise have had jurisdiction over them. A further use of the jury, which in some degree foreshadows the later development of the trial jury, was the "assize," a trial in a royal court to settle disputes over the possession of land, in which the jury not only gave evidence, but also rendered a decision on the basis of their previous knowledge of the circumstances.

The quarrel with Becket

Henry's desire to extend the jurisdiction of royal courts wherever possible caused his one serious conflict with the church, when he tried to encroach on the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts and canon law. We have already noted [1] the great growth of canon law in the twelfth century and the increasingly arrogant attitude of the church toward secular governments. Some conflict between the church and a king so absolute and legal-minded as Henry II was almost bound to occur, though the pope himself was too busy with his fight against Frederick Barbarossa to press the issue in England. Henry claimed that "criminous clercs" (clergymen who had committed crimes) should be tried in the regular royal courts, like other criminals, rather than in the ecclesiastical courts where punishments were notoriously light. He also objected strongly to the appealing of cases to the papal court at Rome. In 1162, he made his most trusted minister, Thomas

[1] See above, pages 170–71.

Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, in the hope that he would be a pliant tool. He was disappointed. Now that he was head of the church in England, Becket became the most violent opponent of royal encroachment. He opposed the Constitutions of Clarendon — a statement drawn up by the king in 1164 of the restrictions to be placed on ecclesiastical courts and papal interference in England — and fled to France rather than give in. The quarrel dragged on for six years. It was ended only when Becket was murdered before the altar of his cathedral at Canterbury, by four knights who had apparently taken too literally some things said by the king in one of his towering rages. Becket was considered a martyr and people began to make pilgrimages to his tomb. The king was forced to do public penance and to withdraw the constitutions so far as they affected the trial of "criminous clercs" and the appeals to Rome.

Last years

Henry's last years were saddened and embittered by the perennial quarrels and rebellions of his four sons. The old king could rule successfully everywhere but in his own family. Two of his sons died before he did, and at the time of his own death, the other two, Richard and John, were in rebellion against him.

3. FRENCH KINGS EXPAND THE ROYAL DOMAIN (1180–1270)

Philip Augustus (1180–1223), early years

Let us turn again to the history of France with the reign of Philip I, surnamed Augustus, who opened a new era in the history of the French monarchy by greatly expanding the royal domain at the expense of the English kings. The French kings had already acquired considerable moral authority. It was time to give that authority a solid backing, based on real power drawn from a wide domain under the king's immediate government. Philip was well suited to carry out that task, and fortune favored him. He had a far more decided character than his good-natured father, Louis VII, and, though he lacked the reckless chivalrous spirit of his grandfather, he had other qualities that were equally useful to a king in his difficult position. Sane, clear-headed, and unscrupulous, he kept his eye fixed firmly on his most important objective and seized every opportunity to forward his schemes. He was a politician and a statesman, rather than a feudal warrior. In the first years of his reign, while he was still very young, he suppressed the rebellion of a powerful coalition of nobles, and gained some territory. Then by asserting an hereditary claim to Vermandois and a claim through his first wife to her fief of Artois, he paved the way for further expansion of the royal domain to the north.

By steady pressure he gradually added to it until his lands stretched north in a solid block to the English Channel, including the ports of Boulogne and Calais.

Philip's greatest ambition was to take over the fiefs of the house of Anjou, which at the beginning of his reign were three times the size of his own domain. He was largely responsible for stirring up the sons of Henry II to rebellion, but on the old king's death he had to make peace, as both he and Richard I (1189–99) had sworn to go on the Third Crusade. They went together, but soon quarreled, and Philip returned to urge John to rebellion and to begin the conquest of Normandy. Richard was captured by the Emperor Henry VI on his way home and did not return till 1194. Once back, however, the soldier-king soon won back his land, and had formed an alliance with the Welf Otto of Brunswick against France, when he was killed while besieging a castle in Aquitaine. With John (1199–1216) King of England, Philip's chances were much better. At first he supported the claims of Arthur, the son of John's deceased elder brother, Geoffrey, to the Angevin inheritance. Then, in 1202, he declared that John had forfeited his French fiefs as a contumacious vassal. John was generally unpopular and became much more so when the rumor was circulated that he had murdered the young Arthur. Philip met with little opposition from John's vassals. By 1205, he had taken possession of Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Touraine, and part of Poitou, and had conferred Brittany on a friendly vassal. These were the richest and best organized of the Angevin domains. John was left with only the southern part, the disorderly and half-independent territories of Aquitaine, Gascony, and part of Poitou.

Philip takes the Angevin fiefs

John was prevented from continuing the struggle for some years by his quarrel with Innocent III. It was not till 1214 that he was free to take the offensive. He then revived the old alliance with the Emperor Otto of Brunswick, which was joined by a number of French and German lords of the lower Rhineland, against Philip Augustus, who was supporting the Hohenstaufen Frederick II in his attempt to take the imperial crown. John hoped that while Otto was occupying Philip's attention in the north, he would be able to take back some of his lost land. However, the defeat of Otto at Bouvines proved decisive. John was unable to stand alone against the French king and had to return empty-handed to England.

Battle of Bouvines (1214)

Like his contemporaries, John and Otto, Philip came into conflict with the arrogant claims of Innocent III to supremacy over secular rulers, but on one occasion only was he forced to submit, and then on a moral

issue where he was clearly in the wrong. In 1193, Philip had married the Princess Ingeborg, daughter of Canute VI of Denmark. Almost at once, for reasons which he himself apparently could not understand, he took a profound dislike to her and repudiated the marriage. Three years later, he married again, though the pope had not recognized the annulment of his previous marriage. As soon as he became pope, Innocent took up the question with his usual determination and commanded Philip to take back Ingeborg as his lawful wife. In 1200, he enforced his command by placing an interdict on all France except the Angevin fiefs, which were recognized as belonging more to the King of England than to Philip. An interdict meant the suspension of all normal church services in the country. The pressure of public opinion forced Philip to submit and take back Ingeborg. For the rest, Philip refused to allow Innocent to dictate his policies. He persisted in the conquest of John's French lands despite the strong opposition of the pope. Later he was occasionally allied with the pope against John or Otto, but for reasons of his own. Not the least of Philip's services to the French monarchy was his insistence that the pope had no right to interfere in purely French affairs.

Philip and Innocent III

It was typical of Philip's attitude toward the papacy that he refused to waste his strength by taking part in the crusade, which Innocent had organized against the Albigenses of southern France in 1207,[1] until he saw a chance of using it to extend his domains. Knights and barons from all parts of Europe joined this crusade against the heretics. After years of fighting and bloody massacres, which destroyed the glorious culture of the rich southern land and left it desolate, the leader of the crusaders, a Norman baron named Simon de Montfort, succeeded in taking over nearly all of Languedoc from the Count of Toulouse. Philip's only part in the undertaking was to allow his son Louis to make a brief expedition after the death of de Montfort in 1218. In the last year of Philip's reign, Simon's son, Amaury de Montfort, found himself unable to defend his lands against Count Raymond VII of Toulouse and offered them to the king. Meanwhile, Philip had been gradually extending his domain south into Auvergne and Aquitaine.

Albigensian Crusade

The work of Louis VIII during his brief reign was merely a continuation of his father's expansion of the royal domain. He made a triumphal march into Aquitaine and turned what was left of the Albigensian Crusade into a royal conquest of Languedoc. He died before his task was completed, but he had accomplished so much that his son, Louis IX, was able quite easily to add Languedoc, Aqui-

Louis VIII (1223–26)

[1] See below, page 266.

taine and Poitou to the king's domain, leaving the King of England only Gascony and Guienne.

Louis IX was only twelve years old when his father's death made him King of France. His mother, Blanche of Castile, ruled as regent till he came of age, and continued to have a great deal of influence until her death in 1252. The early years of his reign were troubled by occasional rebellions of the great nobles, who feared the rising power of the monarchy, and by feeble attempts on the part of Henry III of England to recover the lost fiefs. After 1243, however, he had no further trouble with either. For the rest of his reign, he kept France at peace and strove to make peace wherever possible in Christendom. Few kings have been as popular as Louis IX, and it is safe to say that no other king ever impressed his subjects so strongly with his essential goodness. He was popularly regarded as a saint during his lifetime, and the church officially conferred upon him the title of Saint Louis shortly after his death. His mother, who was a sternly pious woman, may have been responsible for some of his strong religious devotion and strict sense of duty. He spent much time in prayer, fasting, and ascetic practices. Yet he was no pious recluse, shutting himself away from the world. Despite his saintly mysticism, he was a very practical ruler, and did his duty as king with never-failing energy, though constantly troubled by bad health. He had also a great deal of personal charm. In every way, in fact, Saint Louis was the perfect representative of the ideals of his age — as the chivalrous knight, the just ruler, and the pious saint. He was true to the ideals of his age, too, in his fanatical religious intolerance. He persecuted heretics with the greatest severity, and he would sacrifice anything to wage war against the infidel.

Louis IX (1226–70)

Louis's greatest ambition was to win back the Holy Land from the Saracens. His two expeditions mark the last gasp of the real crusading ardor. His first crusade lasted from 1248 to 1254. It began with a disastrous campaign against the Sultan of Egypt, in which Louis himself was captured and nearly died. He was a fearless fighter, despite his weak physique, but he was not a good general. The second crusade came sixteen years later and Louis's part in it was cut short by his death within a few months.

His crusades

Under Saint Louis the French monarchy of the old feudal type completed its development. The first steps in the rise of the Capetian monarchy had already been taken. The kings of the twelfth century had gained for themselves a moral ascendancy over their vassals. Then Philip Augustus and Louis VIII had converted that ascendancy into real power by expanding the royal do-

Louis IX and the monarchy

main over the greater part of the kingdom. Now Louis, during his long and peaceful reign, was able to consolidate those gains, to win the affection and loyalty of the people, and to strengthen the system of royal government. When he died, the way was open for the evolution of a more truly national monarchy of the modern type. Louis himself, however, still clung to the old feudal conceptions of government. His administrative and judicial reforms were limited to the royal domain, and when he interfered in the government of the fiefs outside, he did so in accordance with feudal law and custom. He even gave new life to feudalism within the domain itself by granting Artois, Poitou, Anjou, and other fiefs to his brothers as "appanages," in accordance with his father's will. However, they were still subject to the crown and did not weaken the central government very much, though with each generation they became farther removed from relation to the king. Yet he felt more strongly than any of his predecessors that his consecration as king gave him special sacred rights and duties. He never hesitated to assert his will in what he considered a just cause. In many ways Louis IX was one of the founders of absolute monarchy in France.

As might have been expected from his character, Louis was greatly interested in the enforcing of order and justice. He tried to secure equal justice for rich and poor in his courts, and he himself frequently acted as a judge. He did away with the trial by combat, which he considered barbarous, and abolished the old custom whereby the defendant in a trial might challenge his judge to combat if he considered the sentence unjust. Deprived of this right, the defendant's only alternative was to appeal to the royal court to rehear the case, which added considerably to the king's power and prestige. Louis also prohibited private warfare among the nobles, but even he could not stamp out that most cherished right of the nobility.

Judicial reforms

During the thirteenth century a system of royal administration was gradually taking shape in France, along lines somewhat similar to that developed in England the century before. Philip Augustus had done a great deal to systematize the government of the royal domain, by dividing it into administrative districts under royal officers, called bailiffs (in the north) or seneschals (in the south). These royal officers had great powers, which they sometimes abused. Louis IX tried to supervise their activities more closely by sending out representatives, somewhat in the manner of the English traveling justices. The king's court or *curia regis*, that vague body which aided the king in the central government, was also developing along more systematic lines during this period. There was a *chambre*

Royal administration in the thirteenth century

des comptes (though not so named till 1309), corresponding roughly to the English exchequer, and a permanent law court, called the Parlement of Paris. These specialized courts were not yet composed of a definite or permanent set of ministers, but were merely a part of the *curia regis*, sitting to hear the bailiffs' reports or to try cases. Still, there were some more or less permanent members of each, trained men who began to form a professional class of ministers and judges.

France in the thirteenth century

During the thirteenth century, France enjoyed greater prosperity than she had ever known before. Commerce and industry were flourishing, and were causing a great growth of town life. In the towns, a new class of independent "burghers," who were neither noble nor villein, were beginning to form an important part of society. During the twelfth century, many of the towns had gained independence from the local feudal lord; before the end of the thirteenth, most of them had come under the direct jurisdiction of the king. The burghers were usually inclined to favor a strong monarchy, because they needed security and order for their business. This was also a period of great educational and cultural advance, fostered by the increasing prosperity. The University of Paris was the center of philosophical and theological learning for all Europe. French lawyers were eagerly studying Roman law, and were drawing from it arguments in favor of absolute monarchy. The great epic poetry in the French language, begun in the previous century, reached its height in this period. Local dialects were beginning to give way before a common French language. True, local differences were still strong, even within the king's domain. The north and the south still spoke languages so different that they could scarcely understand each other. Men from Toulouse were foreigners in Paris. Normans were still Normans before they were Frenchmen. Nevertheless, men in all parts of France were beginning to think of themselves as Frenchmen, and to take some pride in the fact.

4. THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION DEVELOPS DESPITE WEAK KINGS (1189–1272)

We must turn now to see what was happening in England, during the period when Philip Augustus and Saint Louis were building up the French monarchy, partly at the expense of English kings. There, despite a series of absentee, unjust, or weak kings, the system of central government, which had been so strongly organized by the great Norman and Angevin kings of the past century, continued to develop steadily. England was a far more united nation than France, and when the barons

rebelled against a bad king, it was not to establish their own independence, but to force the king to rule justly and according to law. In this age of weak rulers, the English people rebelled against absolutism and laid the foundations of the English Constitution.

Richard I (1189–99)

Richard I, the "Lion-hearted," who succeeded his great father Henry II on the English throne, was an absentee king. He spent only a few months of his ten-year reign in England. The career of this irresponsible knight-errant belongs more to the history of the Third Crusade or of France than to that of his own kingdom. The royal government, however, under the justiciar Hubert Walter, who was also Archbishop of Canterbury, continued to function as efficiently as if the king had been present, though the justiciar had often a hard time raising the large sums of money demanded by the king for his campaigns. Many towns took advantage of the king's need to purchase charters giving them greater freedom of self-government. The Great Council (the full meeting of the barons in the *curia regis*) also took advantage of the king's absence to assert a little more authority. Otherwise, the strong system of royal administration left by Henry II continued with very little change.

John (1199–1216) and Innocent III

The royal government was put to a much more serious test under Richard's younger brother John, whose reign was marked by constant oppression, injustice, and failure. John did not entirely lack the ability shown by so many members of his family, but his energy was fitful and spasmodic. He was avaricious, as indeed others of his family had been, but he had neither Richard's romantic charm nor Henry's love of justice to balance it. On the contrary, he seemed to have a special genius for making enemies, and he was apparently lacking in any moral sense or appreciation of the moral sense of others. It was his misfortune, too, to be pitted against powerful adversaries and to be placed in difficult situations, which his own folly usually made worse. The first disaster of his reign was the loss of most of his continental fiefs to Philip Augustus, as has already been noted. Immediately thereafter, he rushed into an unnecessary quarrel with the powerful Pope Innocent III, who up to that time had been very favorable to him and had supported him against Philip. The occasion of the quarrel was a dispute over the election of an Archbishop of Canterbury to fill the place of Hubert Walter, who had died in 1205. Two candidates were elected, one secretly by the canons of the cathedral, the other openly by the clergy, but under the command of the king. Innocent set both aside and gave the post to Stephen Langton, a very able and learned English cardinal. John refused to accept him. The pope applied pres-

sure by laying an interdict on England in 1208, the action that had earlier forced Philip Augustus to obedience, and followed it up the next year by excommunicating the king. John retaliated by taking over the lands of the church, thus alienating the English clergy. The nobles were also becoming discontented under his oppressive government and excessive taxation, and there were threats of rebellion. Finally, in 1213, when Philip Augustus prepared to invade England in his own and the pope's interest, John was forced to submit. He not only accepted Stephen Langton, but did homage to the pope for his kingdom, which he agreed to hold as a fief from the papacy.

John's submission to the pope did not end the discontent in England. When he returned from his disastrous campaign against Philip Augustus, which had ended with the defeat of his ally, Otto of Brunswick, at Bouvines, he found the nation united against him. The barons, who were the fighting force of the kingdom, took the initiative, actively supported by the clergy and the citizens of London. In June, 1215, they forced John to set his seal to the famous Magna Carta or Great Charter. The importance of that historic document was much greater for later times than for its own day. Throughout the next century, until Parliament was definitely established, every despotic act of the king was protested as a breach of the Great Charter, and when, in the seventeenth century, the Stuart kings strove to revive absolute government, the parliamentary opposition cited Magna Carta as the original guaranty of liberty, fair trial, and representative government to all Englishmen. This was, of course, a misreading of what was in reality a feudal agreement. In actual fact, the charter was merely a promise that the king would observe the law in dealing with his vassals, though some vague phrases mention the rights of all free men. The demands of the barons, tempered by the sage advice of Stephen Langton, were moderate and conservative. They asked no more than that the king should observe the law in exercising the royal powers built up by Henry II, and that he should govern justly. Perhaps the greatest significance of the charter was the implication that the law was above the king, and that the barons, as representatives of the whole nation, had the right to force the king to obey it.

Magna Carta (1215)

John had no intention of observing the terms of the charter. Innocent III, as his overlord, refused to recognize it and absolved him from his oath. The barons, however, were determined. They rebelled again and offered the crown to Prince Louis of France, the later Louis VIII, whose wife, Blanche of Castile, was a granddaughter of Henry II. Louis accepted the offer,

Prince Louis invades England

against the opposition of the pope, but with the secret support of his father. His invasion of England was cut short by the death of John in 1216, the same year that saw the end of Innocent's great reign.

Misgovernment under Henry III (1216–72)

The opposition of the rebellious barons had been directed against John personally. After his death it was not difficult to reconcile them to his young son, Henry III. The regents, who ruled in the name of the infant king, reissued the charter and promised better government. Conditions in England were fairly normal again, when Henry came of age in 1227 and began to misgovern the country on his own authority. Henry's personal reign runs very closely contemporary with that of Louis IX, who was his brother-in-law, since they both married daughters of Raymond Berengar of Provence. Like Louis, Henry was very pious. But there the resemblance ends, and even his piety was of a very different sort from that of the saintly French king, having very little beneficial effect on his character. He was childish, vain, easily influenced by his favorites, but weakly stubborn at the wrong times. He was always hopelessly extravagant. His brilliant but unbalanced imagination conceived magnificent and expensive foreign policies that were quite impossible of fulfillment. Two characteristics of his government especially aroused the resentment of the English people, aside from the constant burden of royal taxation. These were, first, the large number of important offices he gave to foreign favorites from Poitou or Provence, who were always dishonest and usually incompetent, and second, the supine manner in which he permitted the popes to tax the English clergy and to give the richest offices in the English church to papal favorites, usually Italians. This was the period when the popes were carrying on their last desperate struggle against Frederick II and his descendants. As a result they needed more money than ever before. Only the king could protect the clergy and people from papal exactions, and he was too pious to protest, as even Saint Louis would have done.

Attempts to check royal absolutism

Henry's insane foreign policy — including a promise to aid the pope in crushing the Hohenstaufens, and to pay all the expenses of the war, in return for the recognition of his second son, Edmund, as King of Sicily — and defeats in Scotland and Wales finally aroused the barons to definite action to control the king's irresponsible government. The Provisions of Oxford, which the king was forced to accept in 1258, handed the real powers of government over to a small group of the greater barons. This provisional government failed because it gave too much power to a small feudal group who did not represent the nation. The opposition party then tried to put into

effect a much more sweeping reform under the leadership of Simon de Montfort, a younger son of that Simon who had led the Albigensian Crusade. He had come to England years earlier, had been made Earl of Leicester, had married the king's sister, and had become thoroughly English in his sympathies. After defeating the royalist army at Lewes, Montfort controlled the government for a year (1264–65), until he in turn was defeated and killed. During that time he summoned a meeting of the Great Council to approve his administration. To it were summoned, not only two knights from each shire, which had been done before, but also two citizens from each chartered town. Aside from the representation given to the towns, this "parliament" was not a great innovation. The name was already in common use for similar meetings of the Great Council. Nor did it accomplish much for the present. De Montfort's experiment failed because he tried to force changes too rapidly. However, it did bear fruit in the next reign; for Edward I had learned that it was easier to govern with the co-operation of the people's representatives than against the opposition of the nation.

England in the thirteenth century

England in the thirteenth century was politically a much more closely united state than France. But in one respect the nation was still divided. The upper class were still cut off from the rest by their Norman blood, and still spoke French. Even they, however, were much more English than in the previous century. The loss of the Norman and Angevin lands had separated them from their kinsfolk on the Continent. Throughout the thirteenth century they were rapidly becoming more insular; their French language was losing its purity and was beginning to mix a little with the native Anglo-Saxon of the great majority of Englishmen; and they were as jealous of foreigners as though they themselves had been indigenous to the country. The royal courts, which continued to function well despite the weakness of Henry III, were gradually building up a common law for the whole land — and it was a law more English than French. Norman barons and Saxon burghers united to oppose royal tyranny. The rise of the towns, most of which had bought charters of self-government from Richard, John, or Henry III, gave the Saxon element in the nation a new importance. For in England, as in France, this was an age of prosperity and rapidly increasing commerce, industry, and town life. Everything indicated that when this transitional period was over, there would emerge a nation in which Norman and Saxon elements were fused into something characteristically English.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE CRUSADES AND THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIAN EUROPE

SO FAR, in dealing with the High Middle Ages, we have concentrated our attention on the great European countries, Germany, Italy, France, and England, and on the growing power of the universal church. We have mentioned only incidentally those infidel or heathen countries, Saracen or Slav, which lay in a menacing ring about Christian Europe to south, east, and north. For centuries the great Mohammedan states had dominated the Mediterranean, firmly implanted in Spain, Sicily, North Africa, and the Near East. The half-barbarous people of Christendom could do no more than hold their own against the Saracens, whose civilization was so far in advance of their own. But with the beginning of the eleventh century, the tide began to turn. Islam had lost its political unity, and the aggressive driving force of Mohammedanism had begun to decline. On the other hand, Christian Europe was emerging from the dark ages. Its people were gaining a new strength and energy. It was their turn now to be the aggressors. During the eleventh century, the Saracens were driven out of Sicily and the long warfare against the Moslems in Spain was begun. Then, at the end of the century, the pope summoned the people of Christendom to carry the war boldly into the enemy's territory in the East, and to recover Jerusalem and the Holy Land from the infidel. This expedition was the first and most successful of a long series of crusades, which occupied much of the attention of the western races for two centuries. Generation after generation, ironclad nobles left their quarrels with the king or their neighbors to ride eastward against the Saracens; farsighted Italian merchants plied a busy trade between the homeland and the Christian outposts in Syria; and popes gave reality to their claims of universal supremacy by organizing the fighting forces of Europe in a holy war. Meanwhile, in Europe Christian knights were carrying on steady warfare against the Saracens in Spain and against the Slavs to the north and east, and were gradually expanding the frontiers of Christendom.

1. THE FIRST THREE CRUSADES (1095–1192)

The Abbassid caliphs, who had once ruled a great Mohammedan empire from Bagdad, had lost their power long before the crusaders came to the East. In the middle of the eleventh century, the barba-

rous Seljuk Turks took over what remained of their empire, though continuing to recognize the nominal authority of the caliphs as religious leaders. The Turks were brutal but effective warriors. They gave new strength to the Moslem state and made it a greater menace to Christendom. Driving westward, they took Syria from the caliphs of Cairo and most of Asia Minor from the Byzantine Empire. European pilgrims, returning from Jerusalem, brought tales of Turkish atrocities, which were probably exaggerated, and told of the defilement of the holy places. Europe, then, was already aware of the Turk and in a mood to be easily aroused, when the Byzantine emperor, Alexius Comnenus, appealed to the pope for aid against the infidel who had been threatening Constantinople. The time seemed ripe for a counter-attack. Three years before, in 1092, the death of the Turkish sultan, Malik Shah, had thrown the whole Turkish Empire into civil war and anarchy. Asia Minor and Syria were left under independent and antagonistic princes.

Moslems and Christians in the East

Pope Urban II gave enthusiastic response to the emperor's appeal. Indeed, it is possible that he may have taken up the idea of a crusade on his own initiative, without urging from the East. Certainly he planned to do more than merely send aid to Alexius. A great council of churchmen and nobles was summoned to meet at Clermont in France. There Urban issued a stirring call to arms. In a masterly speech, he played upon every emotion of his hearers, holding out every possible inducement to those who would join the expedition — remission of sins, protection of their land till their return, and the hope of plunder. He was answered by shouts of "God wills it!" Most of those present at once donned the cloth cross which signified that they were pledged to the crusade. Preachers, of whom Peter the Hermit was the most famous, traveled through France and other parts of Europe, carrying the message and arousing great enthusiasm everywhere.

Urban II preaches the crusade (1095)

The pope's reasons for urging the crusade are clear enough. The papacy had gained greatly in prestige since the days of Gregory VII. Save in Germany, where Henry IV was still in violent opposition, the pope's claims to universal supremacy were generally recognized. By placing himself at the head of a great international movement like the crusade, Urban demonstrated that he, not the emperor, was the real leader of Christendom. There was also a more powerful motive. Urban, like most of the popes after him, sincerely wished to expand the church of which he was the ruler, and to make it as nearly as possible a world church.

Motives of the pope

Motives of the crusaders

But why should rough feudal barons, knights, and even merchants and peasants have been stirred by the pope's call to take part in such a perilous undertaking? No single answer to that question can be adequate. In any great popular movement of the kind, many mixed motives must work together. The prime motive was, of course, religious. The Cluniac and papal reform movements had done much to stimulate popular piety. It was an age of violence, but also of strong religious feeling, with a decided bent toward asceticism. To the medieval man, the life of the monk was the only truly religious life. He was deeply conscious of sin; he feared eternal damnation; and he felt the necessity of doing some act of voluntary suffering as penance or atonement for his sins. Great numbers of men, to whom the regular life of the monk was impossible, did penance for their sins by going on pilgrimage to holy places, even as far as Jerusalem. The crusades were in essence super-pilgrimages. But the religious appeal went farther than that. The feudal warrior's conception of loyalty was simple. A man fought for his lord against his enemies. And how could a man show his devotion to God better — or more congenially to his natural tastes — than by fighting for Him against His enemies, the infidels who had defiled Christ's sepulcher? The crusader believed that God had called him to arms through His representative, the pope, and he answered gladly. All the adventurous spirit and love of fighting, that was so characteristic of the medieval knight, urged him on to a glorious enterprise where fighting was no sin. Besides, feudal Europe was becoming somewhat overcrowded. There were landless knights, and younger sons who were short of land. In the rich East, of which they knew little but rumor, there were tempting opportunities for plunder and land to be had for the taking. It must not be forgotten that, from the practical point of view, the crusades were expeditions for the conquest of Syria. As for the Italian merchants, who constantly aided the crusaders, their interests were obvious. They wanted to establish safe trading posts in the Near East under Christian governments. The Emperor Alexius had hoped that an expedition from the West might aid him in recovering Asia Minor. The crusaders had much larger plans.

The leaders

None of the great rulers of Europe — the Emperor Henry IV, Philip I of France, or William Rufus of England — was sufficiently at peace with the church or his own nobles to take part in the crusade. The leadership, then, was left to a group of great barons, chiefly from France and the lands bordering closely upon it. The royal domain was represented by Philip's brother, Hugh of Vermandois, central France by the wealthy Count Stephen of Blois, whose son later

became King of England, and southern France by Count Raymond of Toulouse, whose descendants of the same name ruled Languedoc till their house was ruined by the Albigensian Crusade more than a century later. From the Rhineland came Count Robert of Flanders and the more famous Duke Godfrey of Bouillon, together with his brothers, Baldwin and Eustace, and his nephew, Baldwin II. The knights of Normandy, to whom expeditions of this kind were second nature, followed Robert, the reckless son of the Conqueror; while Bohemond, the son of Robert Guiscard, and his kinsman Tancred led a formidable band of Normans of the same adventurous breed from Sicily and southern Italy. These last were a valuable addition to the crusade, not only because of their character, but because they had already had experience in fighting the Saracens and knew something of the Moslem world.

The First Crusade (1096–99)

Time was needed for preparation, so by mutual agreement the crusaders from the various parts delayed their start till the late summer of 1096, though some disorganized bands had already preceded them. They traveled by different routes, arriving in Constantinople during the following winter. The Emperor Alexius, who was rather alarmed at the size of the army, persuaded the leaders to take an oath of allegiance to him, on the understanding that they would hand over to him any land conquered or hold it as his vassals. He then aided them on their way into Asia Minor. There they captured Nicaea. Moving on, they left the city, together with most of Asia Minor, in the emperor's hands, thus accomplishing for him about as much as he could have hoped from their aid. Their next objective was Antioch, the most important coast town in northern Syria. On their way, they swung farther east through Armenia, where the friendly Christian population aided them in taking the Turkish strongholds. There Godfrey's brother Baldwin remained behind to found the county of Edessa. The siege of Antioch occupied all the winter of 1097–98. When at last, after great hardship, the crusaders broke into the city, they were themselves besieged by a Turkish army. They were in a desperate position, but their courage was revived by the miraculous discovery of the Holy Lance, or what they believed to be the lance that had pierced Christ's side on the cross. Heartened by this sign, they sallied out and defeated the Turkish army. Quarrels among the leaders and a dispute as to whether they should hand Antioch over to the emperor delayed them for some months. Finally, as Alexius failed to appear, they left Bohemond in possession of Antioch and moved on down the coast. They met with no strong opposition, for the inhabitants of the country were accustomed to conquest and cared little who ruled them. When they

arrived before Jerusalem in the summer of 1099, they found that it had been taken from the Turks by an Egyptian force and was not strongly garrisoned. The taking of the city was followed by scenes of pious joy and bloodshed. "The celebration in the church of the Holy Sepulcher, where men wept together in joy and grief, and the merciless slaughter of the inhabitants, well expressed, in combination, the spirit of the crusade."


The kingdom of Jerusalem

After the capture of Jerusalem, many of the crusaders returned home, feeling that they had accomplished their immediate purpose. The remainder stayed to spread their conquests and to organize the land they had taken as a feudal state. The first ruler chosen by the barons, Godfrey of Bouillon, refused the royal title, preferring that of "Defender of the Holy Sepulcher." His brother Baldwin, however, who succeeded him in 1100, took the title "King of Jerusalem." The work of conquest continued for a quarter of a century, greatly aided by fleets from the Italian commercial cities and by a constant stream of fighting pilgrims from the West. The result was the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, a ready-made feudal state, stretching from the southern end of Palestine all along the Syrian coast and into Armenia in the northeast. It was divided into four large units — the kingdom of Jerusalem proper (the royal domain), and three great fiefs, the county of Tripolis, founded by Raymond of Toulouse, the principality of Antioch, founded by Bohemond and Tancred, and the county of Edessa, founded by Baldwin I and Baldwin II.[1] The lords of these great fiefs recognized the king as their overlord, but were practically independent sovereigns. Within the kingdom and the three large fiefs, there were lesser baronies and knights' holdings, granted to vassals in return for military service, according to feudal custom. In the coast towns, merchants from Venice, Genoa, and Pisa built permanent trading posts and were given special privileges. The original inhabitants, of course, still made up the bulk of the population. The crusaders were never more than a small minority. The latter made themselves at home in the new land, gradually adopting the clothing and many of the customs of the natives, as more suited to the climate, which was so different from that they had known in the West.

The Second Crusade (1147)

The kingdom of Jerusalem was essentially weak. It was a long thin stretch of territory, open to attack all along the flank. Moreover, it was weakened by the rivalries and jealousies of the great lords, of the merchants from the different Italian cities, and of the two great religious military orders, the Hospitalers and

[1] See map, page 205.


15°
20°
25°
30°
35°
40°
45°
40°
35°
30°
ADRIATIC SEA
BULGARIA
BLACK SEA
Trebizond
Constantinople
Thessalonica
Nicaea
Angora
SELJUK TURKS
NORMAN KINGDOM OF SICILY
BYZANTINE EMPIRE
AEGEAN SEA
Iconium
EDESSA
Edessa
LESSER ARMENIA
Tarsus
Aleppo
Antioch
ANTIOCH
CRETE
CYPRUS
TRIPOLI
Damascus
Beirut
Acre
Jaffa
Jerusalem
KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
FATIMITE CALIFATE OF CAIRO
Alexandria
Cairo
The Eastern Mediterranean during the Crusades
SCALE OF MILES
0 50 100 150 300
Longitude East 30° from Greenwich

Templars, who had acquired a great deal of land since they were founded in the early days of the conquest. There was always feeling, too, between the older settlers and the new arrivals from the West. All that saved them was an equal lack of unity among their Moslem neighbors. The latter, however, were slowly uniting. In 1144, they reconquered Edessa without much difficulty. News of this disaster led to the organization of the Second Crusade. Moved by the preaching of Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, Louis VII of France and the Hohenstaufen emperor, Conrad III, led large armies to the East, where they accomplished little or nothing. Their failure was due largely to the jealousy and bad faith of the Syrian Latins whom they had come to aid.

The suicidal divisions among the resident Christians multiplied during the next generation, while on the other side the great Saladin was uniting both Egyptian and Syrian Moslems under his rule. In 1187, he overran Palestine, took Jerusalem, and occupied all of the kingdom proper, leaving the Latins only the county of Tripolis and the principality of Antioch.

Saladin takes Jerusalem (1187)

The fall of Jerusalem, after nearly a century of Christian rule, shocked Europe and aroused new enthusiasm for a crusade. This time the three greatest rulers of Christendom took the cross and led their countrymen to the East. The aged emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, was the first to start. He was drowned while crossing a mountain stream in Asia Minor, and most of his followers returned home. The kings of France and England, Philip Augustus and Richard the Lion-hearted, arrived later. It was not until 1191 that the latter, who had stopped on the way to conquer the island of Cyprus, joined the crusaders who were besieging the city of Acre on the coast of Palestine. Philip and Richard were of very different character and were natural enemies. Quarrels soon broke out between the two kings and their followers, nearly paralyzing the effectiveness of the crusading army. One of the chroniclers of the period asserted that "the two kings and peoples did less together than they would have done apart." Philip returned home soon after the fall of Acre, leaving Richard to carry on the war against Saladin. Innumerable romances have been woven about the campaigns of these two warriors, each so typical of his race. Both were courageous and both could be magnanimous, but Saladin showed himself the more civilized of the two. Richard won a place for himself in both Christian and Moslem legend by his reckless daring, but was unable to capture Jerusalem. In August, 1192, he concluded a truce with Saladin, whereby the Christians gained a strip of the Palestine coast from Acre to Ascalon and the right of free entry for pilgrims to Jerusalem.

The Third Crusade (1189–92)

2. LATER CRUSADES — THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

The thirteenth century, which opened with the great pontificate of Innocent III, might have been expected to produce some successful crusades. There were a good many crusades, but they were all rather inglorious affairs, and the very first one, inaugurated by Innocent himself, was shamefully diverted from its purpose. Germany at the beginning of the century was preoccupied by the civil war between the rival emperors. The knights who gathered at Venice in 1202, therefore, were mostly French. They had bargained with the Venetians for transportation, but were unable to raise the stipulated price. After much discussion they arrived at a compromise. They would pay for their passage by capturing for the Venetians the rival trading city of Zara, across the Adriatic. Europe was shocked by the use of a crusading army against a Christian city and some of the crusaders refused to serve. But worse was still to come. Zara was taken, but the Venetians drove a hard bargain and the crusaders were still short of funds. The Doge of Venice, who seems to have been the evil genius of the crusade, again tempted the crusaders by pointing out the rich plunder to be had from the sack of Constantinople, provided an excuse could be found for attacking it. The excuse was presented by a pretender to the throne of the Byzantine Empire, who promised the French knights everything they asked if they would aid him. Accordingly, they moved on to Constantinople, captured the city, and looted it amid scenes of wanton violence. Then, when the new emperor was unable to fulfill his promises, they ousted him in turn, and elected one of their own number, Baldwin of Flanders, as emperor. Venice was given special trading privileges and a good deal of territory along the coast and in the islands, as her share of the plunder. The Latin Empire of Constantinople lasted till 1261, when it was retaken by the Byzantine emperor who still held Asia Minor. That half-century greatly weakened the Eastern Empire.

The Fourth Crusade (1202–04)

Latin Empire (1204–61)

Intermittent crusades continued through the greater part of the thirteenth century, but they accomplished very little. Innocent III, who had been bitterly disappointed by the results of the Fourth Crusade, organized another just before his death. It started in 1217, led by the King of Hungary. The crusaders marched through Syria to Egypt, where they took Damietta, only to lose it two years later. The next crusade was that of the Emperor Frederick II in 1228. As has already been told,[1] he gained Jerusalem by peaceful nego-

Later crusades

[1] See above, page 178.

tiations rather than by warfare. Other crusades followed, the most important of which were the two, mentioned in the last chapter, led by the saintly French king, Louis IX. His first crusade met with disaster in Egypt. The second, in 1270, was crippled by the death of Saint Louis in Tunis, after which Prince Edward of England, who had accompanied him, went on to Syria, but accomplished nothing. It was the last serious crusade.

End of the Latin states in Syria (1291)

What was left of the Latin states in Syria dragged on a precarious existence until the last decade of the thirteenth century, but they were pitifully weak. The internal quarrels, factions, and jealousies that had proved so dangerous to them in the twelfth century were now multiplied. It was clear that they could not defend themselves for long without aid from the West — and the extent of that aid was steadily decreasing. After 1270, it practically ceased. Jerusalem was retaken by the Moslems in 1244; Antioch fell in 1268; and by 1291, the last of the Latin possessions in Syria had been wiped out. The Latin kingdom of Jerusalem had come to an end, after an existence of nearly two centuries. As wars of conquest, the crusades had achieved no permanent results; but they had served a great purpose by checking for a long time the westward advance of the Turks.

Waning of the crusading spirit

The failure to hold the lands won in the East was due not only to the weakness and folly of the Latins in Syria, but also to the gradual decline and final disappearance of the crusading spirit among the western peoples. The repeated calls issued by the thirteenth-century popes for new crusades to defend or rescue the Holy Land were answered with ever-diminishing enthusiasm. Expeditions against the Mohammedans in Spain, the Albigensian heretics in southern France, or the heathen Slavs in Prussia gave the European knight a more convenient opportunity for fulfilling his crusading vows than did the long voyage to Syria. More important than this, however, was the general feeling of disillusionment about the crusades. The diversion of the Fourth Crusade against the Greek Christians of Constantinople, and the uniform failure of the later expeditions, did much to dampen popular zeal. Tales told by the returning crusaders of the selfishness and dissensions of the Christians in Syria had the same effect. Popes and sovereigns, too, had often misused the crusading enthusiasm of the people, raising funds for crusades that were never begun. For more than a generation, the popes who followed Innocent III were more interested in their struggle with the Hohenstaufen emperors in Sicily than in the war against Islam, and preached crusade after crusade against

them. Finally, and this is perhaps the most fundamental reason for the decline of the crusading spirit, the peoples of the West were developing new interests that absorbed all their attention. Military feudalism was declining before the rising power of the monarchies and of the commercial middle class. In a thousand imponderable ways, the spirit of Europe was changing. The crusades fitted into the peculiar civilization of the High Middle Ages. As that age passed, the crusades died with it, though pious people dreamed of reviving them for two centuries longer.

Effect of the crusades on Europe

The crusades undoubtedly acted as a stimulus to the awakening economic, social, and cultural life of western Europe. They run parallel in time to a period of intellectual ferment and expanding social energy. But to what extent were the crusades a cause, and not themselves merely an outgrowth, of the rising civilization of the Middle Ages? That is a question to which many answers have been given. It is difficult to specify any single development that would not have taken place in some degree without the crusades. The Italian cities, and through them the other towns of Europe, certainly benefited directly by the trade with the Christian states in Syria and by the carrying of pilgrims and crusaders to and fro from the Holy Land. But trade with the Near East had begun before the crusades, and would inevitably have increased without their help, though not perhaps so rapidly. Europe in this period borrowed largely from the science, philosophy, luxuries, and general culture of the Saracen world. But the most direct contact between Christendom and Islam came through Spain and Sicily rather than the East. The medieval popes undoubtedly gained in prestige from their leadership of such a great international enterprise as the crusades. But their supremacy was won on other grounds. Almost the only results for the papacy, that can be traced directly to the crusading movement, were the institution of the clerical tithe, a direct papal tax levied on all the clergy, and the sale of indulgences. Both of these methods of raising money were continued by later popes after the crusades, which were the original excuse for them, had ceased. The monarchies in France and England probably gained something from the diversion of the fighting energy of the feudal nobles to a distant field. But the rise of the monarchies was due far more to other causes.

Nevertheless, despite all possible qualifications, and even though its effects may have been more in the nature of a stimulus to developments that would have taken place anyway rather than of an original cause, a movement that involved so many people over a period of two centuries

must have made a strong impression on the life of the age. The effects of travel depend entirely on the mental equipment and powers of observation of those who travel, and many who made that perilous journey probably learned little or nothing from it. Still, some among the many crusaders and pilgrims must have returned with a broader mental horizon and with new ideas. Aside from what they may have learned from the infidel, knights from all parts of Europe met together and learned the customs of one another's countries. The manners and customs of chivalry became more universal and more highly formalized. The romantic adventures of the crusaders were retold in song and story, giving rise to a new popular literature for the knightly class. Above all, the crusades shook up a fairly settled society and made it less provincial.

3. THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIAN EUROPE

While the crusaders were carrying Christianity into the distant lands of the eastern Mediterranean, other Christian soldiers were waging a more permanently successful war against heathen and infidels within Europe itself. Christianity had already spread widely in the centuries preceding the crusades through the teaching of Greek Orthodox missionaries in Russia and of Roman Catholic missionaries in the lands bordering the Holy Roman Empire. We need say nothing further here of the Christianization of Russia, but perhaps it would be well to pause at this point to note the conversion of those countries which entered the Roman Church, before going on to study the armed conquests made by Catholic Europe.

Conversion of Bohemia, Poland, and Hungary

The conversion of the Slavs of Bohemia — the modern Czechoslovakia — was begun as early as the ninth century by Byzantine missionaries. But the Bohemians, unlike the Russian Slavs, did not remain in the Greek Orthodox faith. They turned instead to the Roman Church. After the middle of the tenth century, when the German emperor, Otto the Great, forced the Czechs to recognize him as their overlord, Bohemia faced definitely westward. It became a fief of the empire, though it always preserved a separate government of its own, and its duke, who after 1158 bore the title of king, had greater power over his people than had any other of the emperor's vassals. Poland, the other great Slavic country to the east of the empire, was not converted to Christianity until the second half of the tenth century, and then through the work of Roman missionaries. Unlike Bohemia, Poland did not become a permanent part of the Holy Roman Empire, though it did remain within the Roman

Church. It covered a large territory, but seldom enjoyed strong government and was always open to attack from its powerful neighbors. Hungary, the eastern neighbor of the empire to the south of Poland, was still later in receiving Christianity. There were many Slavs in Hungary, but the dominant race were the Magyars, a nomadic people who, like so many others, had drifted into Europe from western Asia. After ravaging Germany for years, they were defeated by Otto the Great in 965 and forced to settle down. Nearly half a century later, they were converted and brought into the Roman Church by their king, Saint Stephen. During the thirteenth century, Poland and Hungary formed an invaluable bulwark for western Christendom against the attack of the fierce Mongols, who swept out of Asia across eastern Europe and founded the vast empire called the Golden Horde, which for long dominated Russia.

Conversion of the Scandinavian lands

It was not till the eleventh century that Christianity was firmly established in the Scandinavian lands to the north of western Europe. The Danes were the first to be converted by Catholic missionaries, but there were many heathen still left there at the time when King Canute (1017–35) ruled a great empire that included England and Norway as well as his own country. Norway soon followed, and finally Sweden, though not without stubborn resistance from the devotees of the old heathen gods.

Expansion by conquest to the northeast

Very different from this process of conversion was the expansion of Christendom to the northeast of the empire during the period of the crusades. Through most of the twelfth century the Germans of Saxony, Holstein, and the North Mark carried on a war of conquest against the heathen Slavs who dwelt to the south of the Baltic, between the rivers Elbe and Oder. It was a war of conquest and extermination. As German authority moved eastward to the Oder, the land was resettled by German colonists. Much of the final success of the struggle was due to the leadership of Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and head of the Welf party, of whom we have already had cause to speak.[1] Meanwhile, farther east in Pomerania, between the Oder and the Vistula, the Poles had extended Christianity to the Baltic by similarly forceful means. But the Prussians, a wild and warlike people of Letto-Lithuanian stock who occupied the territory between Poland and the Baltic beyond the Vistula, were still heathen and were a constant menace to the Poles. Early in the thirteenth century, the Poles appealed to the crusading order of Teutonic Knights, who had already done good work in the Holy Land, to aid them

[1] See above, pages 169 and 172–73.


against the heathen Prussians. They were promised whatever land they could conquer and the donation was ratified by the emperor. The Knights began their campaign in 1230, and thereafter pressed the crusade, as they considered it, so strongly that by 1283 they were masters of Prussia. They thus founded a German state on the eastern Baltic, cut off from the empire only by the strip of Polish Pomerania.[1]

Christian conquests in Spain

Still greater interest attaches to the expansion of Christendom by the conquest of the highly civilized Mohammedan country in Spain. The collapse of the caliphate of Cordova in 1034, due to internal dissensions, provided a good opportunity for the little Christian kingdoms in the north to expand at the expense of the infidels. For more than two centuries they continued the struggle with varying success, often aided by crusaders from France and the other parts of Europe. Sometimes civil wars and conflicts among themselves checked the advance of the Christians, and twice, after 1086 and again after 1146, they were driven back when their Moslem enemies received reinforcements from the fierce Berber tribes of North Africa. In the end, however, the Christians were almost completely successful in their perpetual crusade. By 1248, only the little kingdom of Granada in the south remained in Mohammedan hands. The rest of Spain was divided amongst four Christian kingdoms.[2] Castile, to which Leon had been permanently united since 1230, was the largest, occupying most of the central and western part of the peninsula. Aragon, the next largest, occupied a triangle, of which one side extended along the Pyrenees from the east and the second stretched down the eastern coast below Valencia. The King of Aragon, who had become a vassal of the papacy in the days of Innocent III, also ruled the Balearic Islands and some territory in southern France. In between Castile and Aragon on the northern border was the little kingdom of Navarre, which had been unable to expand because surrounded by its two powerful neighbors. It fell somewhat under French influence in the thirteenth century, when the crown went to Count Theobald IV of Champagne in 1234. Finally, in the southwest was the newly founded kingdom of Portugal. Spain's period of stress was now past, and she was prepared to take her place in the main current of European history. In the fifteenth century, the union of Castile and Aragon and the extinction of Granada gave her unity and strength and made her one of the great powers of the West.

[1] See map, page 219.

[2] See map on opposite page.


8° Longitude West 4° from Greenwich
0° Longitude East 4° from Greenwich
42°
38°
ATLANTIC OCEAN
ASTURIAS
Oviedo
GALICIA
KINGDOM OF LEON
OLD CASTILE
Leat by Navarre
Castile
ROUSSILLON
KINGDOM OF ARAGON
CATALONIA
Barcelona
Ebro R.
Douro R.
Oporto
PORTUGAL
COUNTY OF
ADDED BY 1150
KINGDOM OF PORTUGAL
NEW CASTILE
Toledo
Tagus R.
Zalaca
Lisbon
Cadiz R.
Chinchilla
Valencia
VALENCIA
BALEARIC ISLES
ADDED BY 1200
CASTILE
Navas de Tolosa
Cordova
ANDALUSIA
Seville
Guadalquivir R.
GRANADA
Granada
Palos
Cadiz
Almeria
Malaga
KINGDOM OF
Gibraltar
Christian Expansion in Spain
SCALE OF MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100 200
Moorish Kingdom of Granada 1250-1492
Christian Kingdom of Navarre 1230-1492
Territories held in the 11th century by Christian Kingdom of Aragon and County of Barcelona, Castile, Leon, and Portugal respectively
The shaded territories in the same colors show the conquests made by the Christian States from the Moslems.
Heavily shaded colors represent 12th century conquest and lightly shaded coloring represents additions during the 13th century

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

FEUDAL SOCIETY — THE PEASANTS AND NOBLES

IN THE preceding chapters, we have traced the main outline of the political events in the feudal kingdoms during the High Middle Ages. We have also described feudalism as a system of society, dwelling on its laws and institutions. It is now time to investigate the manner of life of the men who made up feudal society. For the lives of human beings are the essential material of history, and it is as important to know something of the daily life of the undistinguished individuals who form the great mass of society as it is to follow the careers of famous men or to study the institutions of the age. In this chapter we will try to show how the men of the two great feudal classes, the peasants and the nobles, lived. We will leave to the next two chapters the townsmen and the clergy, who, though living in the midst of feudalism, had yet a separate life and special interests of their own.

1. GENERAL CONDITIONS OF MEDIEVAL LIFE

Life in the Middle Ages was hazardous to a degree almost impossible for us to imagine, accustomed as we are to a settled society, police protection, swift and safe transportation, and the services of medical science. The life of the average man in that age was a short one and uncertain. He was a constant prey to disease, to the malign forces of nature, and, above all, to the avarice and brutality of his fellow men. Save in England, where the monarchy was usually strong enough to prevent the worst disorders, there was little security for life or property. Elsewhere, the central government was seldom strong enough to give protection to the people outside the largest cities or the immediate royal domain. The feudal nobles, whose duty it was to protect those dependent upon them, were often too earnestly engaged in pursuing their own interests to bother with police duty or justice — or were themselves a menace to the defenseless. Robbers and brigands infested the roads and made travel dangerous for all but numerous and well-armed parties. Bands of mercenary soldiers, temporarily out of employment, wandered about the country, robbing, burning, and slaying at their will. Poverty-stricken nobles rode down from their hilltop castles to rob the merchants, pilgrims, and priests who passed upon the

Lack of security

highway, or to hold them for ransom. Not content with that, they often fell upon the villages of the defenseless peasants or upon the outlying monasteries, where there was always a chance for plunder. In time of peace, the nobles were often little better than brigands. In time of war, they were usually worse.

Hazards from war

Warfare, private and public, was indeed the perennial curse of feudal society. Everywhere on the Continent the nobles had the right to wage private warfare on their neighbors, and they exercised that right freely.[1] The petty campaigns arising from private quarrels were, of course, smaller in scope than the national wars, but they were far more numerous and, in the long run, did much more damage. There were few great battles fought in the Middle Ages; but there were innumerable skirmishes and frightful destruction of the lives and property of noncombatants. It was the peasants and to a lesser extent the monks and the inhabitants of the smaller towns who suffered most from medieval warfare. The chief aim of the fighting noble was to weaken and impoverish his enemy by destroying the productivity of his land and, second to that, to acquire plunder. Consequently, he ravaged his enemy's fields, destroyed the standing crops, burned the villages after carrying off the cattle and anything else of value, and massacred or held for ransom the peasants, who were themselves valuable property and the chief source of his enemy's income. Saint Peter Damian summed up the situation when he wrote that, whenever two nobles quarrel, "the poor man's thatch goes up in flame." The following description of feudal warfare from the *chanson* of the *Lorrains* is abundantly confirmed by less poetic documents:

> They start to march. The scouts and the incendiaries lead; after them come the foragers who are to gather the spoils and carry them in the great baggage train. The tumult begins. The peasants, having just come out of the fields, turn back, uttering loud cries; the shepherds gather their flocks and drive them towards the neighboring woods in the hope of saving them. The incendiaries set the villages on fire, and the foragers visit and sack them; the distracted inhabitants are burnt or led apart with their hands tied to be held for ransom. Everywhere alarm bells ring, fear spreads from side to side and becomes general. On all sides one sees helmets shining, pennons floating and horsemen covering the plain. Here hands are laid on money; there cattle, donkeys and flocks are seized. The smoke spreads, the flames rise, the peasants and the shepherds in consternation flee in all directions.

And after the campaign is over, "windmills no longer turn, chimneys no longer smoke, the cocks have ceased their crowing and the dogs their

[1] See above, pages 143-44.

barking, . . . briars and thorns grow where villages stood of old." This is what war might mean to the peasants. And in many parts of Europe, war was almost the normal state of society.

Nor was war the only hazard of life in the Middle Ages. The medieval man was far more at the mercy of the elements than we are today. Floods often did terrible damage, sometimes wiping out whole towns or villages. Even today, there are occasional disastrous floods; but in that age they were far more numerous and more deadly, for there were no means of controlling them nor of bringing relief to the victims. More terrible than the floods were the famines that usually followed them, or that resulted from any other adverse weather condition. Medieval methods of agriculture were very crude and unscientific. Too much rain or too little, unseasonable heat or cold, an unusual number of insect pests, or any of the other natural hazards of farming, which today can be combated by scientific means, might destroy the peasant's whole crop. In the eleventh century, the chronicles record forty-eight famine years. By the end of the twelfth century, conditions had improved, but there were still eleven famines in France during the reign of Philip Augustus. There were also countless local famines; for roads were so bad that it was difficult to transport food even a short distance to places where local weather conditions, floods, or the depredations of a campaign had destroyed the crops. These famines did not mean mere shortage of food for the peasant and poor townsman; it frequently meant death by starvation. The year 1197 saw terrible famines in France. A chronicler of Liège wrote that even the rich suffered great privation, and "as for the poor, they died of hunger." The chronicler of Rheims recorded that "a countless throng of persons died of hunger."

Flood and famine

Epidemic diseases often accompanied famines, spreading like wildfire among the people weakened by starvation. Even in good years epidemics were common. The crowded towns, with their narrow, filthy streets and complete lack of sanitation, were perfect breeding places for disease, nor were the country villages much better. The chronicles of the period are filled with records of the "plague" or "pest." These were generic names for diseases which the people had not sufficient knowledge to describe more accurately. They lacked, too, any scientific knowledge of preventive or curative measures. Harsh experience had taught them that many diseases were contagious, though they did not know why. People often fled from a plague-stricken town, but as they knew nothing about disinfection, they might easily carry the disease with them and spread it through the countryside. Aside from epidemics, the death toll from other diseases or from injuries,

Disease

which today can be prevented or cured by medical or surgical science, was terribly high. Simple infection of wounds alone led to countless unnecessary deaths.

Superstition

One should not imagine, however, that the medieval man took no steps to combat the evils that befell him, but his methods were not those approved by modern science. He believed that all disasters, whether caused by the weather, insects, or disease, were of supernatural origin, a divine punishment for his sins or the malign work of the devil and evil spirits. His method of coping with disaster was everywhere the same — an attempt to obtain divine aid or forgiveness by public prayers, penance, processions, and supplications to the saints who were noted for their healing powers or who were recognized as the special protectors of the district. When his fields suffered from insect plagues, the helpless peasant turned for aid to the church, and, if he were in good standing with the local clergy, received its full co-operation; for the priest, though somewhat better educated, was as superstitious as the peasant. A solemn anathema issued by the Bishop of Troyes against the "locusts and caterpillars and other such animals that have laid waste the vineyards" of his diocese, which has survived, shows the church giving spiritual aid to the peasants on a large scale. Indeed, the "excommunication of caterpillars" was not uncommon.

When the church failed him, the peasant often turned to ancient superstitions of pagan origin, that had lasted on through centuries of Christianity, sometimes vaguely colored by Christian forms. Magic incantations, witchcraft, and sorcery held a powerful appeal for medieval men, despite the efforts of the church to eradicate them. But this magic was not always invoked to aid men. Often it was used as a threat, for there was black magic as well as white. Thus, to the normal fears of a hazardous life were added superstitious terrors — fear of malign spirits, of old women who were believed to have sold their souls to the devil and who could bewitch children or put a plague on the cattle, or of the "evil eye" which still terrifies the Italian peasants. Yet the church provided strong counter-charms — the sign of the cross or a *pater noster* — and those who were able to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of a famous saint or to touch the casket containing a relic of his body felt well-armed against the powers of darkness.

Progress

We must not, however, draw too dark a picture of the life of the Middle Ages. Despite ignorance, poverty, and the dread disasters of flood, famine, pestilence, and war, there was a great deal of stirring and vigorous life. The population of Europe was steadily increasing; the lower classes were gaining greater freedom; and, as we

shall see in the next chapter, in the growing towns a new free class was re-creating wealth through the revival of commerce and industry. Finally, the High Middle Ages was a period of great progress in education, literature, and philosophy. But we must turn now from the general conditions of life in the Middle Ages to those that especially affected the peasants, who bore the full brunt of the hazards of medieval life and were only slowly affected by the progress made during that period.

2. THE PEASANTS

An inferior social class

The lines dividing the social classes in the Middle Ages were far more clearly drawn than they are today. Between the two great classes of common and noble there stood a wide gulf that was rarely crossed. All the instincts of medieval men, and especially of the ruling classes, were opposed to change of any kind in the social system. Custom and tradition had the force of law and were supported by the religious teaching of the age. The generally accepted theory of society, as propounded by generations of theologians, recognized three great classes, each of which had a definite function to perform for the good of the whole social body. These were, first, the clergy, whose duty was to pray and to care for the salvation of their fellow men; second, the nobles, whose duty was to fight in defense of the helpless and to keep order; and finally, the peasants and artisans, whose function was to work and to provide the necessities of life for the whole of society, as well as luxuries for the upper classes. These functions were not always faithfully performed, save perhaps by the workers who had little choice in the matter, but the distinction between the classes was not merely a theory. It was based on a clear recognition of existing conditions, and from that very fact was believed to have the sanction of Divine Will. For it would be blasphemy to maintain that society could be so constituted unless God had so intended it. The duty of the peasant, then, was clear to all. He was to work and to make no rebellion against his lot. The following pious statement from a contemporary chronicle expresses the opinion of noble and cleric alike: "God forbid that the peasants, whose proper lot is daily toil, should abandon themselves to sloth and indolently spend their time in laughter and idle merriment." And toil, unfortunately, carried with it a stigma of social inferiority, for in the early feudal ages almost all the workers on the land were to some extent unfree, and even after they obtained personal freedom, their class bore the stamp of servile origin.

The freeborn, fighting noble, therefore, had nothing but contempt for

the servile, laboring peasant. He was necessary to the comfort and prosperity of his master, but as an individual person he scarcely existed. He was regarded as distinctly an inferior being. The romantic literature of the period, composed for a noble audience, reflects this attitude. When an individual peasant is mentioned, which is not often, he is described as physically grotesque, stupid, and horribly unclean — as, indeed, he very probably was. The peasant who appears in the romance of *Aucassin et Nicolete* may be taken as an example:

Attitude of the nobles

> As Aucassin rode along an old grass-grown road, he raised his eyes and saw in the way a great fellow, wondrously hideous and foul to behold. He had a shock of hair blacker than coal-dust, and more than a hand-breadth between the eyes, and thick cheeks with a huge flat nose and great wide nostrils, and blubber-lips redder than roast flesh, and great hideous teeth. He was clad in hosen and shoes of cowhide, bound round with linden-bast up to his knee; he was wrapped in a thread-bare cloak and leaned on a great knotted staff....

It is not surprising to find that the nobles exploited the peasants to the limit of their ability. There were, of course, good lords who felt responsible for the security of their peasants and acted justly according to their lights, as well as bad lords who squeezed every possible penny from them. But even the best of lords demanded full payment of the heavy manorial dues from their own peasants and were utterly merciless to the peasants belonging to their enemies. "All that the peasant amasses in a year by stubborn work, the knight, the noble, devours in an hour." So wrote Jaques de Vitry, with no more than the customary exaggeration of the moralist. The greatest of medieval popes, Innocent III, gave similar testimony in his *De Contemptu Mundi.*

Exploitation of the peasants

> The serf serves; he is terrified with threats, wearied with *corvées* [forced labor], afflicted with blows, despoiled of his possessions; for, if he possess nought, he is compelled to earn; and if he possess anything, he is compelled to have it not; the lord's fault is the serf's punishment; the serf's fault is the lord's excuse for preying on him....

The peasants often suffered, too, from the rapacity and dishonesty of the lord's officers. Under a careless lord, the bailiff who acted as his agent, the forester whose duty was to see that the peasants did not cut more than their share of wood or poach the lord's game, and the other petty officials of the manor had a good deal of power, which they frequently abused to extort money from the peasants. These manorial officials themselves sprang from the peasant class, but opportunities for advancement were so few that the desire to take full advantage of such as did



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

PEASANT LIFE

An illumination from The Book of Hours of the Duke of Berry (the month of February), by Pol de Limbourg and his brothers (Musée Condé, Chantilly).

arise usually outweighed any fellow feeling they might have retained for their old neighbors.

The church and the peasants

The clergy were not far behind the nobles in the exploitation of the peasants. True, they did not rob and kill, as the nobles did in time of war, and they did do much to aid the peasants by checking the lawlessness of feudal warfare. But they were one of the two privileged classes whom it was the duty of the peasants to support, and they clung tenaciously to their rights. The parish priests were often merciless in collecting their tithes, and seldom hesitated to use the dread threat of excommunication to force payment. Moreover, the church held a great deal of land, and ecclesiastical lords, in general, were no more lenient with their peasants than were the lay nobles. Indeed, modern research has shown that customary dues were retained with less amelioration and that serfdom lasted longer on monastic estates than elsewhere.

The peasant's work

The daily life of the peasant was a monotonous round of unremitting toil, broken only by the religious holidays prescribed by the church. These were fairly numerous, but as a rule only the most important were observed — and those somewhat unwillingly, for every hour of work was valuable to men whose margin of subsistence was as narrow as that of the average peasant. The working day began at dawn and did not end till dark. Often the best part of the day had to be spent working on the lord's land. Plowing, cultivating, and reaping, caring for the oxen and cattle, hedging, ditching, and carrying produce to market — these filled the day of the ordinary peasant. Others had special tasks which occupied most of their time, as the shepherd, cowherd, swineherd, hayward, and so forth. Women and children worked with the men in the fields at the reaping or any other task within their strength.

Tools

The peasant's tools were crude and simple. Even the plow, which was too expensive for the poorer peasant to own by himself, was a clumsy affair made of wood, though some had iron at the point. The usual substitute for a harrow was a thorn tree weighted down by logs. An inventory of a peasant's tools in the year 1301 mentions only "a hoe, spade, axe, billhook, two yokes for carrying buckets and a barrel; total estimated value, 10 *d.*" Wealthier peasants doubtless had more tools, for scythes, sickles, flails, etc., were used, but the custom of communal labor probably relieved the individual peasant from the necessity of himself owning all the tools needed for the year's work.

The peasant's house was merely a rough wooden hut, with a thatched roof. It was a squalid and filthy dwelling. In it we would find what

one modern historian has characterized as "poverty unadorned." Usually there was no chimney. Cooking was done out-of-doors in the summer. In the winter, when a fire had to be lighted in the house, the smoke escaped, if at all, by the door, and must have nearly strangled the inhabitants. Few of the peasants had ovens. They sent their bread up to the manor house to be baked in the great oven there. Even those who had ovens of their own had to pay the customary fee for the use of the lord's oven. Sometimes the hut would contain a rough bed, where all the family slept. More often there was merely a pile of straw, alive with vermin, in one corner. Geese and hens wandered freely about the house, and the oxen were usually stabled in a lean-to beside it. In summer, the peasant was probably comfortable enough, for his standards were not high, but the winters must have been terrible. We know all too little about what clothing he wore, save that it was mostly hand-made by the women of the family. The description of a peasant, already quoted, from *Aucassin et Nicolete*, will furnish a rough idea of his dress. It was almost certainly inadequate protection against the cold of a northern winter.

Houses and clothing

What evidence we have as to the ordinary food of the peasant illustrates better than anything else the extent of his poverty. Modern farmers, however destitute, have usually enough to eat. The medieval farmer, on the other hand, ate poorly even in good years, and starved in years of famine. Meat of any kind was apparently a rare luxury. A fifteenth-century writer, Hans Behan, described the food of the peasant thus: "They feed on brown bread, oatmeal porridge or boiled peas; they drink water or whey." In some places the thirteenth-century peasant was probably better off, but all the evidence shows that the same foods — porridge and black bread made of rye or oatmeal, simple vegetables, cheese and whey, with perhaps an occasional egg — were the staples of diet. Beer was available at times, but not by any means universally. Of course, on feast days the peasant was sometimes admitted to the lower hall of the manor house, where he would gorge himself on richer food at the lord's expense.

Food


The peasant's toilsome life was not entirely unrelieved by color or diversion, though there was little enough. On the great religious holidays, when he was forbidden to work, he might have some share in the excitement that attended the celebrations of his betters. He might be admitted to the feast at the castle or be allowed to watch the knights disporting themselves at the tournament. If he were fortunate enough to be sent with produce to a nearby town during a fair, he might watch the jugglers and tumblers or listen to some wandering

Diversions

"barbican," running across the front of the castle from one river-bank to the other. Between it and the castle was a large open court, the "lists" where horses were exercised and tournaments held. The barbican was designed to be merely a momentary check to allow the garrison time to prepare its defenses. The first serious obstacle was the moat at the foot of the castle wall. It was some twenty feet wide and filled with water. It was spanned by a drawbridge, which could be swung up at the first sign of danger. Above it towered the wall of the castle, twelve feet thick or more, from which round towers jutted out so that archers could maintain a cross-fire on anyone who might succeed in crossing the moat. In the center of the wall was the great gate. It was protected by a heavy iron grille, called a "portcullis," fitted into grooves in the masonry and dropped down from above. The heavy oaken gate, reinforced with wrought-iron bands, was in itself no mean obstacle, even without the portcullis. If the enemy succeeded in battering it down, they would find themselves in a narrow, low-arched passage, where there was little room for fighting and where numbers were no advantage. Meanwhile, the defenders in the guard-room above might pour down boiling water or oil through cracks in the roof of the passage. But suppose the besiegers won through. They were still only in the outer courtyard of the castle and would be subjected to a withering fire from the encircling walls. This court was the "bailey" where in normal times the servants and animals lived and where the daily work of the castle was done. The inner court was protected by still higher and more formidable walls and towers. Within it was the palace, in itself a fortress, where the baron lived. And beyond it, in the extreme point of the angle between the rivers, stood the ancient "keep." This was the oldest part of the castle, built by the lord's ancestors in the days when the Northmen were raiding his lands. It was a great stone tower, the last resort of the beleaguered garrison.

Life in the castle

Compared to the ingenuity expended on making the castle an impregnable fortress, relatively little thought was given to making it a comfortable habitation. The living quarters in a baronial castle of the better sort, such as we have been describing, were a great improvement over the old keep and were more luxurious than the small castles of the lesser nobility, but they were still dark, damp, and inconvenient. The windows in the outer walls were mere arrow-slits, set deep in the masonry. They let in very little light, but a good deal of wind, for they were without glass. There was little privacy in the castle. It was crowded with servants, men-at-arms, and transient guests, and there were very few rooms. The great vaulted hall was the center of the social life of the castle. There the lord and his family and their noble



This chart shows a castle of the larger sort, belonging to a fairly powerful baron. Note the protection afforded by the rivers.

guests ate at a table set on a raised dais at one end, while the less important folk sat at long tables stretching down the hall. There, too, after the evening meal a wandering minstrel might sing or recite one of the interminable epic poems of medieval chivalry. When the lord had retired, those who had no other place to sleep spread their cloaks on a table or on a pile of straw on the floor. In winter a great fire was lighted in the huge stone fireplace, but the hall must have been cold and drafty when one got beyond the range of its heat. The floor was flagged with stone and covered with rushes, which must have become rather foul by spring. Hunting dogs wandered about freely and gnawed the bones thrown to them by the diners.

Diversions and hospitality

Besides eating and drinking, the castle offered few diversions in time of peace. Of course, the lord and his lady found some occupation in looking after the business of the estate and in overseeing the work of the servants. Still, they were left with a good deal of time on their hands. In fine weather, hunting with hounds or hawks was the favorite amusement of both sexes. The nobles loved the chase second only to war, and guarded it as their exclusive privilege. Peasants who poached the lord's game were harshly dealt with. Then, too, the young noble would spend much of his time in practicing the use of arms, and on special occasions there would be tournaments, of which more will be said hereafter. In winter, the noble inhabitants of the castle enjoyed a variety of indoor games, most of which have a strangely modern sound. Chess was very popular, as also checkers, backgammon, various dice games, and the simple round games now relegated to the nursery. But reading, which fills so many hours for the modern man of leisure, was literally a closed book to most of the medieval nobility. Small wonder that the noble, as he sat listening to the wind howling about the castle walls, longed for spring and hoped that when it came there would be a good war, with plenty of excitement and plunder. Sometimes, the arrival of company broke the monotony. Any noble visitor, whether friend or stranger, was eagerly welcomed and entertained with lavish hospitality, no matter how large a retinue he might have accompanying him.

The noble's finances

We may ask where the baron found the money to pay for all this picturesque, if somewhat comfortless, magnificence — the great castle, the host of servants, horses and hounds, the tournaments, the open-handed hospitality and the ruinous expenses of war. Achille Luchaire, one of the greatest of modern historians of the period, gives us the answer:

> In order to keep up this style of life, it was necessary to oppress subjects cruelly and take much booty from the enemy. Even so, one could not

make both ends meet. And it is one of the striking and characteristic traits of feudal life that the noble, great and small, appears to be constantly in need of money, poor, on the watch for financial expedients, always indebted, and a prey of usurers of all kinds.

The reckless extravagance of the noble was nearly always balanced by a rapacious greed for money. When he could extort nothing more from his peasants, he levied toll, legally or illegally, on the merchants, pilgrims, or clergy who passed his castle on the highway. When specially hard pressed, he might raise a fairly large sum by selling a charter granting freedom to a town or village still under his feudal jurisdiction. Or he might borrow from the Jews or from Christian merchants at enormous rates of interest, running anywhere from twenty-five to forty-five per cent per annum. His favorite expedient, however, was to engage in a private war in the hope of securing plunder. But this in the long run merely aggravated the poverty of his class, for war destroys wealth and cannot create it. More than anything else, war was responsible for the poverty, not only of the poor peasants who were plundered, but also of the nobles who had to bear the expenses of equipment and who were dependent on the peasants for their income.

The noble lady

Hitherto, we have said little about the lady of the castle. She was not, in contemporary opinion, as important as her husband or sons, yet her position was steadily improving throughout the High Middle Ages. Feudal society was becoming more civilized, and in the more cultured courts of the higher nobility, at least, the feminine influence was strongly felt. The lady of the castle had, indeed, great responsibilities. When her husband was absent, she took command, and if the castle were besieged, she would manage the defense, often as bravely and skillfully as her lord could have done. Under ordinary circumstances she was responsible for the work of the female servants, overseeing the spinning, weaving, embroidering, and sewing. She was also the hostess, and mingled freely with the knightly visitors to the castle. She had a good deal of social freedom, but in the most important event of her life she had no voice. The feudal lady had no initiative in the choice of a husband. That was done for her by her relatives or her overlord. Feudal marriages were always marriages of convenience, involving the transfer of land or the union of two noble houses. If the lady had no brothers, she would inherit her father's fief, and it was vitally important to the overlord to see that the fief, and incidentally the heiress, were given to someone who would make a suitable vassal. Or if she were not the sole heiress, she would at least carry a dowry of money or land to her

husband. This was far more important than any romantic consideration. The noble lady was far from enjoying equal rights with the men of her class in practical matters; but, in compensation, she benefited to some degree at least from the idealization of women that sprang from the ideals of chivalry, which were slowly transforming the barbarous noble warrior into the knight and were giving him some of the manners and ideals of a gentleman.


4. CHIVALRY AND THE KNIGHTS

Every noble, if he could afford it and if he did not enter the church, was made a knight as soon as he came of age. He was then recognized as a member of that great international society of fighting gentlemen, the Order of Chivalry. The word chivalry, as applied to the Middle Ages, is often loosely used with a variety of connotations, but always in reference to the heavy-armed and mounted knights called in France *chevaliers* and in Germany *Ritters*, both words meaning originally horsemen. The word is sometimes used, as above, to denote an international order with fairly definite customs and rules, or again in referring to a band of soldiers of that class, as "the chivalry of France." More commonly today, it is used to refer to ideals of honor, gallantry, and loyalty that were supposed to belong exclusively to men of the knightly class. Chivalry as an order, and to a lesser extent as an ideal, throve in the environment provided by feudalism. It reached its highest development in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, fading gradually thereafter as it fell out of harmony with changing social conditions and became increasingly artificial. For practical purposes, nobility of birth and knighthood were almost inseparable, since men of common birth seldom attained that honor and nearly all nobles did, but a noble was not born a knight. No matter what his rank, he could achieve knighthood only after a long period of training and after he had come of age to bear the full responsibilities of a feudal warrior.

Meaning of chivalry

The education of the future knight was begun at an early age. When he was still a child, he was sent to the castle of his father's overlord, or some other friendly nobleman, to be "nourished," that is, cared for and trained in all the arts of knighthood. For the first few years, his education would be in the hands of the lady of the castle, whom he served as a page, and who taught him polite manners and the social arts that were already becoming known by the name of "courtesy." At fourteen or thereabouts, he began the really essential part of his training — the handling of arms. He then became one of the

Education of the knight



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

A MEDIEVAL CASTLE AS IT STANDS TODAY

Note the defensive advantages of the hilltop site

squires of the lord who had undertaken to nourish him. He accompanied his lord everywhere, serving him at meals and when he rose in the morning or retired at night, keeping his weapons and armor polished and in good repair, and riding with him on the hunt. He also followed his lord when he rode to war; carried his shield, helmet, and spear; and led the great war-horse, which was not mounted till the time came to charge. If his lord were thrown from his horse in a battle or tournament, he was expected to rescue him and help him back into the saddle. He was not, however, expected to take part in the fighting, except in an emergency. Meanwhile, his lord was giving him constant training in all the arts of war and was teaching him the duties of a feudal lord. At the age of twenty or twenty-one, after years of this practical education, the young squire was considered ready for knighthood.

Ceremony of knighting

Save on the rare occasion when a squire was dubbed a knight on the field of battle as a reward for signal bravery, the ceremony of conferring knighthood was reserved for one of the great religious holidays or some other special occasion, which would help attract throngs of guests and provide an additional excuse for elaborate feasts. The young knight must be started on his career with all due magnificence, and any penurious counting of the cost would shame him. Providing for the knighting of his son was, indeed, one of the most ruinous expenses in the feudal lord's budget, even though a contribution toward it was one of the regular feudal aids to be paid by all his vassals. Some lords were unable to afford it, so that their sons were forced to remain squires indefinitely. The church had its part in the ceremony, though not so large a one as in the Later Middle Ages. After a ceremonial bath the youth spent the whole night in a vigil before the altar of the chapel. In the morning he heard the Mass; his sword was blessed by the priest; and he was charged to be true to his religion, to aid the church, and to defend the oppressed. He was then clad in new armor, while one of his relatives buckled on his great sword and golden spurs. After that came the really essential part of the ceremony, the "accolade," a blow on the neck delivered by one of the important guests, usually the lord who had nourished him, though in theory any knight might bestow the accolade. Finally, the young knight mounted his horse and ran the "quintain," driving his spear at full gallop against a shield or hauberk fastened to a post. The ceremony was now complete. The young knight was emancipated, recognized as an adult no longer under paternal authority, and entitled to a share in the family estates sufficient to support him.

After the ceremony of knighting, there would be feasting and in all

probability a tournament, for no great celebration was considered quite complete without one. Tournaments were highly valued by medieval chivalry, not only as their favorite sport, but also as a training school for young knights. Even seasoned knights must have constant practice to keep their hand in. The tournament was usually divided into two parts. On the first day, pairs of knights "jousted" together, riding toward each other at full speed and shattering their lances, if they were lucky, against each other's shield. The knight who was hurled from the saddle or whose lance did not break fairly was declared the loser, and his horse and armor were forfeited to the winner. The next day, there was a general *mêlée* between two groups of knights, which in almost every way resembled a real battle. Knights were wounded, unhorsed, taken prisoner, and sometimes trampled to death. The prisoners were held for ransom, as in actual combat. The money to be won from the ransom of prisoners, horses, and armor was one of the attractions of this hazardous sport. But, if some knights made money, others lost it, and all of them flung their money about recklessly in gifts or *largesse* to heralds, minstrels and servants. The whole tone of the tournament was one of picturesque and careless magnificence — and few of the onlookers ever gave a thought to the poor peasants, whose labor made it all possible.

Tournaments

Whether in the tournament or in actual battle, the knight's success and safety depended a good deal on the quality of his weapons and armor. Accordingly he took great care in their selection, and was willing to mortgage his patrimony, if necessary, to secure the best. Many a noble thought more of his heavy and finely tempered sword than he did of his wife. In addition to the sword, a knight would carry a lance for the charge, a mace or battle-axe for fighting at close quarters, and a dagger, called a "misericorde," to put a hopelessly wounded enemy out of his agony. The armor of a twelfth-century knight was made up of a cone-shaped steel helmet, a shield, and a hauberk. This last was a loose cloak of linked mail, covering the whole body from the helmet to the knees. Later, toward the end of the thirteenth century, helmets with closed visors to protect the face, and partial plate armor came into use. The full plate armor, so often shown in modern illustrations of knightly scenes, did not appear until the Later Middle Ages. Thanks to this heavy armor, fighting was a reasonably safe sport for the knight. He was more likely to be captured and held for ransom than killed.

The knight's armor and weapons

The knight occupied a privileged position in society, but he had also greater responsibilities than had the commoner. He was expected to

maintain a higher standard of conduct along certain lines, and to make some effort to conform to the ideals of chivalry, as they were slowly taking shape. Courage, loyalty, and liberality were his prime virtues. He was also expected to cherish his honor more dearly than his life. Just what the knight meant by honor is a little difficult to define, save that he should do nothing that would bring disgrace on him-, his family, or his class, according to the current standards of the age. e must not take unfair advantage of his equals, act meanly in any way, or break his oath; but he could grind down his peasants, run hopelessly into debt, or cheat tradesmen. The laws of chivalry, too, did something, if not very much, to limit the brutality of feudal warfare. In this the church helped a good deal. Indeed, in building up the ideal of the Christian knight, as exemplified by the crusading orders or by a Saint Louis, the church did much to soften and refine the barbarous character of the medieval warrior.

Knightly virtues

But the refinement of chivalry was due, in all probability, more to the ladies than to the church. It was their growing influence in noble society that imposed "courtesy," the manners of the court, on the knights. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries witnessed the first flowering of chivalric love. Gallantry took its place beside the more primitive virtues in the knight's code. Feudal marriage, with the fief as the first consideration, left little room for romantic sentiment between man and wife. But any knight might swear devotion to a noble dame, wear her colors in the tournament and fight in her honor without giving offense, provided he followed the conventions and maintained his devotion on a spiritual plane. The highest idealization of women, combined with a practical recognition of their inferior position in the general scheme of society, was characteristic of medieval chivalry. It found expression in, and was in turn encouraged by, the romantic literature of the age.

Chivalric love

In the High Middle Ages, all serious writing was still done in Latin, but there was also a growing popular literature in the language of the people. Mostly it was intended for a noble audience and reflected their manners. In southern France, courtesy and the cult of chivalric love made their appearance earlier than in the rude northern lands. There, in the twelfth century, the "troubadours," wandering poets many of whom were knights of noble birth, composed and sang delightful little love lyrics for the delectation of the most cultured society in Europe. Though limited in scope, their lyrics treated courtly love with delicate subtlety, combining intricate rhyme and graceful meter. But this southern poetry was destroyed in its prime by the terrible devastation that accompanied the Albigensian Crusade.

The troubadours

Meanwhile, in northern France, and spreading from there to England and Germany, a different kind of literature was appearing. There the warlike *chansons de geste* were recited by professional *jongleurs* or minstrels for the amusement of the rough feudal barons. These long epic poems dealt with semi-historical characters, centering around the court of Charlemagne. Some seventy or eighty *chansons* made up what is known as the "Charlemagne cycle." In actual fact, there was little historical truth about them. Their value to the historian lies in the description of customs which were purely contemporary to the composers. In the *chansons*, Charlemagne and his peers act in every respect like twelfth-century nobles. The earliest and finest of the *chansons*, the *Chanson de Roland*, composed before the end of the eleventh century, is a grand martial poem based on Charlemagne's invasion of Saracen Spain and the massacre of his rear-guard in the pass of Roncesvalles. The spirit of these epics was purely feudal. They dealt with battle, feudal loyalty and rebellion, and hatred of the infidel. But the north, too, was falling under the influence of courtesy, and this softer sentiment found expression in the "romances of adventure," centering around the court of the mythical King Arthur of Britain. Here, in verse and prose, we have tales of knights-errant who fought bravely and often, but from devotion to their ladies or to rescue distressed damsels from ogres and magicians, rather than for the simpler feudal reasons that motivated the heroes of the *chansons*. The legends of the knights of Arthur's Round Table are still the common property of all European literatures. Many of these romances were the work of accomplished poets, like Chrétien de Troyes, who composed the romance of *Perceval* in the reign of Louis VII. The same story appeared again, in a more perfect literary form, from the pen of the German Wolfram von Eschenbach. The romance of *Tristan and Iseult*, perhaps the finest of them all, also appeared in French as well as in the German of Gottfried of Strasbourg. Sir Thomas Malory translated many of the romances into vigorous English prose. There were also other cycles of romances, dealing with the Homeric story of the siege of Troy or the adventures of Alexander the Great, as well as the more historical tales arising from the crusades.

Chansons and romances

All this contemporary literature is immensely valuable to the historian. But it is easy, and dangerous, if one thinks only of the troubadour lyrics or the romances, to idealize the medieval knight unduly. Their influence, after all, was limited to a fairly small circle in the greater courts. And one must not forget the grim brutality of the *chansons*. Respect for women was a sentiment most often honored in the breach, and religion could check only the worst excesses. It might inspire the noble to go on

crusade, to leave lands to the church, or to free his serfs in a fit of death-bed repentance, but it did little to change his daily life. Despite everything that the church, the ladies, or the ideals of chivalry could do, "the majority of lords loved only war and pillage."

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE CITIES AND THE MIDDLE CLASS — COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

THE centuries of the High Middle Ages, which saw generations of crusaders ride east to the Holy Land, and in which chivalry and feudalism reached their most perfect development, witnessed also the beginning of one of the greatest economic and social revolutions in the history of Europe. This revolution was brought about by the revival of commerce and industry and the resulting growth of cities and of an urban middle class. The burghers, as the new middle class were called because they lived in walled towns or *burgs*, did not fit neatly into the scheme of feudal society. They were neither servile workers of the soil nor noble-born warriors. They were something new — free men, though of common birth, who made an independent living by trade and industry, using money as the means of exchange, and who banded together for mutual protection in more or less self-governing associations. Their numbers were still small, compared to the great number of peasants. The fighting nobles looked down on them as baseborn upstarts. The church regarded them with a suspicious eye, as men given over to worldly concerns that were dangerous to the soul. But they had the Midas touch. They could produce wealth, and through the power of money they were in time destined to destroy the old feudal society based on hereditary land tenure and to create in its place a new society based on wealth. In those small and crowded cities, rather than in the rock-bound castles of the nobles, lay the seeds of modern society.

1. THE MEDIEVAL CITY

The medieval city must have presented a very picturesque appearance to the wandering merchant who plodded down the dusty road leading to the city gate. First he would see the high encircling wall of heavy stone, surrounded by a moat and surmounted by towers very like those of a baronial castle; for strongly fortified walls were as necessary to the security of the townsfolk as they were to the feudal lord. At sunset the great gates would be closed, and if the merchant were too late, he would have to stay out till dawn. Beyond the wall, he would see a tumbled mass of roofs, sloping at every imaginable angle, and crowned with chimney pots in which storks built their nests. Here and

External appearance

there would arise thin spires of parish churches, and in the center, if it were an episcopal city, the tall cathedral tower would shoot up high above the surrounding roofs, dominating the whole town.

The streets

Once through the gate, the visitor would find himself in one of the main thoroughfares of the city, which led to the market-place and thence on through the city to the opposite gate. This would be one of the widest streets, though still narrow according to modern standards, probably not more than fifteen or twenty feet from house to house. The other streets were mere alleys, few of them even ten feet wide. They twisted about aimlessly in a crooked maze, as though they had been laid out purely by chance — as indeed they had. The streets were necessarily narrow, because every available inch of space in the city must be utilized. The walls hemmed the city in and prevented normal expansion. Moreover, they had been built around as small a space as possible, in order to make them easily defensible and to save labor and expense. Hence the amazing congestion of population within any medieval city. The streets were usually unpaved, though the main streets in a large city might have a rough paving of cobblestones. There were no means of draining them, so that most of the year they were ankle-deep in mire. They were also befouled by the accumulation of garbage and refuse thrown out of the houses. Medieval ideas of sanitation were, to say the least, primitive. As there was seldom any system of sewage, and no garbage collection, the task of clearing away the refuse was left to the pigs who wandered freely through the streets. Small wonder that infectious diseases often swept through the city, decimating the population. All in all, the sordid reality of the streets must have been in strong contrast to the picturesque appearance of the city from without.

Houses

The streets were made more narrow, dark, and airless than they need have been by the efforts of the burghers to make use of as much space as possible for their houses and shops. The houses were often four or five stories high, and each successive story jutted out beyond the one below, so that the eaves of the houses across the street almost met. If the house belonged to a merchant or artisan — and most houses in the city did — the ground floor would be occupied by a shop, with a horizontal shutter across the front, which in the daytime was let down into the street to form a counter for the display of wares. The houses were built mostly of wood with thatched roofs, and were very inflammable. By the thirteenth century, the wealthier burghers were beginning to build stone party walls and to use tile for the roofs as a protection against fire. Even so, fires were frequent and

once started often swept over large parts of the city, for there was no way of fighting the flames except by a bucket line from the nearest well. The city of Rouen was burned six times in the first quarter of the thirteenth century.

Churches abounded in every quarter of the city, for the burghers were pious folk. The great cathedral in the center of the city was the pride of the pious and patriotic burgher's heart. It was a magnificent building, built of solid stone and adorned with intricate carvings, high-arched stained-glass windows, and soaring towers. The cathedrals of the "Gothic" type were the artistic masterpieces of the Middle Ages, never since surpassed for sheer architectural beauty. Within the cathedral there were peace and a "dim religious light" in strong contrast to the noise and bustle of the market-place outside. The only open space in the city was the square in front of the cathedral or the largest church. There the town market was held, and there the people congregated for all public ceremonies, so that the great church was the center of the life of the city. *Churches*

The busy life of the crowded city was limited to the daylight hours. At sunset the shops were closed and barred. A little later, the great bells of the cathedral rang the "curfew" as a signal to cover all fires, and the city settled down to quiet and darkness. There were no street lights and seldom was there even a light in the houses. When there was a full moon, a little light might filter down between the overhanging eaves, but it could make little impression on the inky blackness of the street below. No honest man traveled the street at night, save on important and unusual business. Then he would take as many armed servants with him as possible, carrying torches to light the way. The streets of any medieval city were dangerous after dark, for robbers abounded, and the police force, if any, was totally inadequate. *The city at night*

But if the nights were quiet, the days were filled with bustling activity. The whole city wakened at dawn. Shops were opened and business was begun with the first full daylight. The medieval city was not cursed with the heavy vehicular traffic of its modern counterpart, but the narrow streets were none the less crowded and filled with active life. Merchants did their business practically on the street. Peddlers added to the confusion with the raucous cries characteristic of their trade through the centuries. In the market-place and at street corners, jugglers and fortune-tellers gathered a crowd about them and collected a few pennies. As in our own time, the life of the city seemed intense and exciting to the peasant lad, raised in the quiet monotony of *The city by day*

a rural manor. Then, as now, the thirst for a more varied life as well as for greater opportunities led young men to leave their country homes to seek their fortunes in the city.

2. THE REVIVAL OF COMMERCE AND THE RISE OF THE CITIES

But how had this thriving city life come into existence in the High Middle Ages, after centuries during which cities had almost disappeared?

The cities and trade in the Early Middle Ages

What was the force that had given new life to old cities and created new ones? The answer is, undoubtedly, trade. Roman civilization, which had been largely urban, had depended on a wide-flung commerce. But Roman trade declined with the break-up of the empire and the cities declined with it. Only in the part of the Eastern Empire that survived about the great commercial city of Constantinople did it continue to flourish. In the West there were too many forces working against it. First the barbarian invasions from the north took their toll. Then, in the seventh and early eighth centuries, the westward thrust of the conquering Moslems cut off the Christian lands of the West from the Mediterranean, and hence from all contact with world trade. A century later, the pirate bands of Northmen threw western Europe into chaos and blocked the seacoast to west and north. Throughout the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, western Europe was practically landlocked. (Only a little trade, borne by adventurous Syrian merchants or by Northmen who alternated trade with piracy, trickled through to the interior.) Lacking the stimulus of foreign goods, even local trade declined to the vanishing point. Each manor produced what it needed and, in turn, consumed its own products. Under such circumstances, cities served no useful purpose and consequently died of inanition. Where they survived, it was with population sadly diminished, as centers of episcopal or civil administration or as fortified strongholds. In short, cities disappeared when trade was cut off. They appeared again when trade was revived in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

European commerce revived by re-establishing contact with the outside world. The first impetus came from Italy, where Venice and the Greek cities of the south had never lost contact altogether with the Byzantine Empire. When, in the eleventh century, Christendom began to take the offensive against Islam, their trade with the East increased rapidly. Finally, the First Crusade, at the end of the century, completed the opening-up of the Mediterranean to European traders. The ports of the Levant and the islands were now

Revival of international trade

in Christian hands, and there was a clear road to the East. Venice, cut off from the mainland by her lagoons and forced to make her living from the sea, took the lead in the mercantile revival. She was the trading city *par excellence*, the Queen of the Adriatic, the wealthiest city in the West. But before the end of the eleventh century, Genoa and Pisa, on the other side of the peninsula, were already formidable rivals. Like Venice, they acquired trading posts in the newly conquered kingdom of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, in the north the ports of Flanders, fortunately situated on the deep estuaries where the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Meuse flow into the North Sea, were becoming the focal centers of a similar revival of international trade. The original agents here were the far-wandering Northmen, who, after destroying the commerce of the western seas by piracy, restored it again when they turned to legitimate trade. Their long boats plied the coasts of the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Atlantic and called at English ports. This trade naturally centered about Flanders, for there the wine and other products of the interior could be exchanged for wool from England or wax, furs, and amber from the Baltic.

From these two focal centers to south and north of Europe, trade spread gradually inland. During the eleventh century, commercial relations with Venice, Genoa, and Pisa gave a great stimulus to the growing towns of the Lombard plain and Tuscany. By the beginning of the twelfth century, the commercial revival had spread to the ports of southern France and Christian Spain. From there and across the Alpine passes from Lombardy, merchants followed roads and rivers into France and Germany, until they met the northern merchants coming down the rivers from the Flemish coast. For a long time, the plain of Champagne, halfway between Italy and Flanders, was the meeting place for merchants of all lands. The penetration of trade into the interior went on slowly, but before the end of the twelfth century all the main trade routes had been opened up, and merchants traveled constantly to all parts of Christian Europe. A glance at the map will show the lines along which this inland trade flowed most commonly.[1]

Trade spreads inland

Medieval commerce was conducted largely by itinerant merchants, who carried their wares with them on long journeys. It was a hazardous life, but the profits, when fortune smiled on them, were proportionately large. When they traveled by sea, they were exposed to the attacks of pirates or commercial rivals and to the ever-present danger of shipwreck. The medieval mariner

The traveling merchant


[1] See map, page 241.

knew too little about navigation to venture far from shore, and his ship was too unwieldy to make much headway against a strong wind. There was always danger, therefore, of being blown onto a lee shore. Once stranded, he was lost, even though his ship were not destroyed; for the law of wreck, universally recognized, permitted the owner of the shore to confiscate the goods of any wrecked ship. Inland trade was equally hazardous. Few governments were strong enough to guarantee security of life or property to the traveler. The roads were infested by robbers, by mercenary soldiers who were often worse than the robbers, and, perhaps worst of all, by the impoverished knights and barons who felt that the merchant was their legitimate prey. Whenever possible, merchants traveled together in caravans for mutual protection or joined with bands of pilgrims. Sometimes, too, a merchant would attach himself to the armed retinue of a powerful lord who was traveling in the same direction.

Roads and tolls

Aside from the dangers from human violence, the state of the roads made inland travel extremely hazardous. Whenever he could, the merchant preferred to travel by river, but often he had to take to the road. Then there was nothing for it but to load his goods on pack animals — horses or mules — or in rude carts, pray to Saint Nicholas and hope for the best. Even the best roads were merely rough dirt tracks, deeply scored by ruts and pitted with sinkholes. In rainy weather the carts sank axle-deep in the mud or bogged down completely. Bridges were in equally bad condition. Sometimes they were swept away by floods and not replaced for years. Frequently they were quite unsafe for heavy traffic. Sporadic attempts were made by kings, nobles, monasteries, or religious associations to repair roads and bridges, but with little permanent result. The responsibilities of government were too thoroughly divided under the feudal system to make any consistent or widespread program of public works possible. What legislation there was worked more often to the disadvantage than to the advantage of the merchant, for at every bridge and ferry and on every road he was forced to pay a burdensome toll to the local lord for their upkeep — usually without visible results. In winter, and when the roads broke up after the spring thaws, merchant travel practically ceased. At any time it was very hazardous for the lone merchant. As a result, trade fell into definite periods, when at one place or another it was concentrated at fairs to which merchants flocked in large bands.

Almost to the end of the Middle Ages, fairs were the most important element in interregional trade. Without them, the exchange of foreign goods would have been greatly restricted, if not impossible. In the


The Trade Routes of the Middle Ages
English Miles
0 200 400 600
Bergen
Visby
Novgorod
Riga
Volga R.
Dvina R.
Nijni Novgorod
Lübeck
Stralsund
Danzig
Hamburg
Magdeburg
Vistula R.
Kings Lynn
London
Antwerp
Bruges
Cologne
Elbe R.
Mainz
Troyes
Basle
Rhine R.
Nuremberg
Augsburg
Lyons
Rhone R.
Chur
Innsbruck
Milan
Venice
Genoa
Marseilles
Danube R.
Azov
Don R.
Constantinople
Trebizond
Tashkent
Samarkand
To China
Merv
Tigris R.
Euphrates R.
Aleppo
Antioch
Bagdad
Indus R.
To India
Alexandria
Nile R.
Aden
20
40
60
80
100

twelfth century, the fairs of Champagne were the meeting place of merchants from all parts of Christendom, but there were innumerable others in every country of Europe. Fairs were normally held in cities, but they were usually under higher authority than the municipal government, being controlled by the king, or by a bishop or abbot or great feudal lord, who guaranteed "the peace of the fair." The ordinary government of the city was temporarily set aside, and the exclusive monopoly on trade enjoyed by the merchants of the city — which, as we shall see, greatly hindered the trading of foreign merchants at other times — was broken for the time being. While the fair lasted — a fixed period, varying in different places from three or four days to a month or more — any merchant who paid his toll and the rent for his booth could trade freely and securely. He set up his booth in the market square or in the open fields outside the city, exchanged goods with other merchants from distant lands, or sold his wares to the local tradesmen and smaller merchants or to the burghers of the city and the nobles of the surrounding countryside. When the fair was over, the foreign merchants packed their goods and set out in groups once more to face the perils of the highway in the direction of another fair. Commerce under medieval conditions was necessarily periodic. The fair was the perfect setting for it.

Fairs

Not the least of the advantages which attracted foreign merchants to the fairs was the guaranty of sure and speedy justice. Ordinarily, the mills of justice ground slowly in the Middle Ages, and they did not grind so very fine. Moreover, each city had its own laws and customs which foreigners — and any merchant not of that city was a foreigner, even though he came from the same country — could not be expected to know. Above everything else, the traveling merchant needed the protection of dependable courts, of laws with which he was familiar, and of speedy trials so that his departure for other parts might not be delayed. All these he found in the jurisdiction of the lord of the fair and in the special merchant courts, called in England "pie powder" courts, a corruption of the French *pied poudré*, from the dusty-footed merchants who frequented them. These courts met "from hour to hour" during the fair, as they were needed. The law meted out in them was not local or royal law, but a common commercial law, the "law merchant" recognized in all parts of Europe. This body of mercantile law had grown up by custom from the needs of the traveling merchants. It remained largely unwritten, and varied but little from one country to another. Its special field was suits for payment of debts, fulfillment of contracts, and other civil cases arising from trade.

Law merchant

The revival of commerce necessarily led to a renaissance of city life. In the first place, the traveling merchants could not be always on the road. They needed a permanent base for their operations, and that base must be at some place where they could form an association with others of their kind for mutual protection against the dangers of a lawless society that provided little security for the trader. *Commerce creates cities*

In the second place, foreign trade stimulated local trade and broke up the isolated production and consumption economy of the manor. By introducing foreign goods and skillfully manufactured articles, the traveling merchant created a demand for commodities that could not be obtained on the manor; and this demand remained to some extent constant throughout the year. At any rate, it could not be entirely satisfied by the annual or semiannual fairs. There was, then, an opportunity for resident merchants to ply their trade all the year round; and these, like their traveling confrères, sought association with their fellows and so added to the growing nucleus of the town. Finally, commerce created skilled industry. Someone had to make the clothes, weapons, armor, and so forth that the merchant sold to satisfy the demand for more skillfully made goods than could be produced by manorial workmen. So skilled artisans appeared, and they, too, congregated in places where opportunities for trade and protection had already gathered groups of merchants. Indeed, the artisan was often himself a local merchant and *vice versa*. Here, then, we have the nucleus of a town. As it grew, it became less dependent on the country about and provided a growing market in itself for its own products. But it always depended on trade. That cities followed trade is clearly shown by a glance at the economic map of Europe. All along the trade routes — at seaports, on the rivers, and at crossroads towns sprang up. To trace the rise of the cities, one has only to trace the main channels of trade and follow their spread throughout Europe.

This still leaves the problem, and one much disputed, as to just how any individual city originated and why in any particular place. Very little evidence has survived as to the early history of the towns, and local conditions must have varied widely. In general, however, the most reasonable explanation, and one borne out by such small evidence as is available, is that merchants and artisans congregated under the protection of any fortified place which was so geographically situated as to be favorable to trade. Many old Roman cities, which, thanks to the Roman genius for commerce, were usually situated on natural trade routes, had survived as centers of an episcopal diocese. They were walled and the prestige of the bishop made them *City origins*

relatively secure. There were also fortified *burgs*, built as centers of military and civil administration, like the "five boroughs" founded by the Danes in England to hold the conquered population in subjection. Feudal castles and monasteries, too, offered protection. Around the walls of any of these that were favorably situated for trade, merchants and artisans congregated. In time of danger, they could retreat within the walls. They made up the population of a "new *burg*," and it was to them that the term *burgenses* or burghers was applied. The new *burg*, in France called a *faubourg*, was in time also encircled by a wall. As it grew, it gradually engulfed the original *burg*, castle, or city, whose walls were usually destroyed as no longer necessary. The burghers were originally under the jurisdiction of the lord whose protection they sought. Such jurisdiction carried with it many onerous feudal restrictions and services, which often interfered with freedom of trade. Everywhere, therefore, we find the townsfolk working together to secure greater freedom and a larger share of self-government. In the next section we shall see how the full-grown city was governed and what was the status of the burgher class when the cities were well established.

3. THE BURGHERS AND CITY GOVERNMENT

The burgher class

The burghers formed a new social class, and they had to work out for themselves a new social status, new laws and customs, new systems of government, and new methods of regulating business. They had to experiment, for there was no precedent to guide them. Sometimes the experiments led to disaster. In any case they produced a wide variety of custom, depending on local conditions. Nevertheless, in main outline the status of the burghers and the internal government of the cities were fairly uniform in all parts of Europe, for they arose naturally from the needs of a mercantile and industrial community, which were much the same everywhere. Everywhere the burghers acquired personal freedom, and this was the most essential point in determining their social status as a privileged class. Many of the merchants who founded the early towns must have been free from the beginning, though they probably sprang from villein or servile stock. Having in some way escaped from the ancestral manor or the jurisdiction of their lord, they were free because no man knew whence they came and no lord could claim them as his own. At first, however, there were also serfs and villeins of the local lord in the town, but before long these apparently gained the same freedom as their lordless neighbors. Once the new cities were firmly established, personal freedom was recognized as the right

of all permanent dwellers within the walls. If a serf could escape from his manor and live for a year and a day in a city, he could not be reclaimed by his late lord. Next to freedom from hereditary servitude, the burghers needed freedom as individuals from the annoyances of feudal jurisdiction and laws, which having been designed for farm workers were not adapted to the needs of commerce and industry, and, finally, they needed enough self-government to enable them to regulate their own economic life. But such freedom was seldom won without cost or struggle, and only a few cities acquired full independence.

Struggle for self-government

In northern Italy, the struggle began in the second half of the eleventh century. We have already seen [1] how the Lombard cities fought for freedom against their bishops and the emperors for a century and a half, until they had forced even the powerful Frederick Barbarossa to recognize their right to self-government as practically independent city-republics. Nowhere else did the cities obtain such complete independence, though the great Flemish cities came close to it, and in Germany a few of the largest cities acquired the status of free imperial cities, subject only to the nominal authority of the emperor. In most places the burghers were content with less. They were willing to acknowledge the political authority of the king or their lord and to pay taxes. All they asked was that their obligations be defined and limited, that the town as a corporation and not individuals should be held responsible for them, and that, within the town, the burghers should be left as free as possible to manage their own affairs. Often these concessions were obtained peacefully by the purchase of a charter from the king or one of the great lords. This was particularly true in England and on the royal domain and the great fiefs in France. As a rule, the nobles, save for a few rulers of great fiefs like the counts of Champagne, were less favorably disposed toward the cities than were the kings. But they were often forced by poverty to sell charters, and they were gradually discovering that free cities were likely to be more prosperous and could pay them more taxes than those whose freedom of action was hampered by feudal restrictions. In France, many lords founded new towns on their estates, offering very liberal terms to attract settlers, in order to augment their income from the prospective taxes. The towns that had grown up under the jurisdiction of a bishop or abbot had the greatest difficulty in securing freedom. Here there was no opportunity to take advantage of the weakness of a minor or of a careless or absent lord; nor was the church so likely to be in pressing need of money. Besides, bishops who might have been personally willing to grant con-

[1] See above, pages 162-63 and 171-72.

cessions were loath to do so, lest they seem to be surrendering traditional rights of the church which had been entrusted to them. When the burghers could not secure concessions peacefully by purchase, they were prepared to fight for them. A number of towns in France formed "communes" during the twelfth century; organized their own government; and wrested recognition of their freedom from their lord, whether bishop, abbot, or noble. Later, in the thirteenth century, most of them came under royal government and lost much of their independence, but they still retained a fair measure of self-government.

City government

The government of the typical medieval city was in the hands of a council and a number of executive officers or magistrates (they went by a variety of names), who were nearly always burghers of the city and were chosen by their fellow burghers freely or in collaboration with the lord, depending on the extent of the freedom they had obtained. Their principal duty was to levy and collect taxes. There were usually direct taxes on income and indirect taxes on the sale of goods. From the money raised in this way, the city government maintained the defenses and public works and the cost of government, and paid whatever taxes the city owed to the king or its lord. The growing political power of the cities and their influence with the monarchy depended largely on this ability to raise money taxes, which had no parallel in the feudal system. The city had also its own system of civil and criminal law and its own courts and judges. City laws and judicial procedure were usually much more enlightened than the ancient customs still enforced in the feudal courts. At least, they were better suited to the needs of men who made their living from commerce and industry. The right to take part in the government of the city was seldom open to all inhabitants. It was limited normally to men of property who were legally recognized as burghers, a privilege which they defended jealously against the poor of the city or outsiders. In some places a small oligarchy of the wealthiest burghers succeeded in gaining control of the government and shutting out the rest.

Markets

Among the duties of the city magistrates was the supervision of the town market and the collection of market tolls, which formed an important part of the city's revenues. Nearly every city had the legal right to hold a market, though they often had to pay dearly for it. In thirteenth-century France, and earlier in England, the kings asserted their exclusive right to issue charters granting that privilege. The markets must not be confused with the fairs. The former were purely municipal institutions for local trade. They were held for one day only, once or twice a week. Here the peasants from

the countryside displayed their produce for sale to the burghers. In some places, in order to augment the tolls, even the merchants of the city were forced to close their shops and sell on the market during market days.

It was not only in the markets that the municipal government supervised the city's trade. Since it was their duty to protect the interests of the whole body of citizens, the magistrates felt justified in exercising a minute control of all business within the city. *Control of trade* Perhaps because the city existed in the midst of a hostile environment, wherein the citizens were forced to depend upon each other for aid, the medieval burgher felt that the interests of the individual should be subordinated to the welfare of the whole community. He had, therefore, no objection to a paternalistic government, which set prices, supervised methods of manufacture, determined the quality of goods, regulated wages and hours of labor, and prevented any individual from taking unfair advantage of his fellow citizens. The purpose of medieval economic legislation was to guarantee to the worker or seller a fair living and to protect the consumer against fraud or undue cost. Often the city government delegated the actual supervision to the guilds, of which more later, but the final responsibility remained with the magistrates.

The medieval man had no confidence in the economic law of supply and demand as the source of prices, nor in the principle that free competition is the greatest stimulus to trade. If he thought of them at all, he considered them immoral. Instead, he believed that for every commodity there was a "just price," which should be the same in time of shortage as in time of plenty. *Medieval economic theory* This just price was set by custom, based on the normal price of raw materials, plus the "reasonable" profit necessary to permit the workers and the merchant to live in the style recognized by public opinion as suitable to their status. The church had a good deal to do with evolving and enforcing this theory, but secular authorities accepted it implicitly as the basis for all legislation regarding price. The statute books of every city were filled with laws designed to enforce the sale of goods at "just" or "reasonable" prices, and the guilds, too, did their share. Of course this legislation did not always accomplish its purpose. The principle of the just price was too vague, and the severe penalties constantly re-enacted against "engrossing, forestalling, and regrating" — three kindred methods of cornering the market and withholding goods until the demand had raised the price — show that not all medieval business men allowed moral theories to interfere with their desire for gain. The condemnation of "usury" — that is, the taking of interest for money lent — arose from

a similar principle. It was believed that money was not an active force, and that to exact a price for its use was to take unfair advantage of the needs of one's fellows. But this was even less observed than the theory of the just price. Despite everything that the church and secular governments could do, money continued to be lent at interest thinly disguised.

Corporate exclusiveness and solidarity of the city

The efforts of the city government to supervise trade in the interests of the whole community were limited strictly to the city itself. The burghers formed a very exclusive body. They had no interest whatsoever in the prosperity of the nation at large or, indeed, of anyone outside the magic circle of the walls. All municipal regulations of trade from without were designed to put the foreign merchant at a disadvantage in his dealings with the burghers. The merchants of the city were assured a monopoly of its trade, and the monopoly was broken only when it was to their own advantage to do so. This exclusiveness had, as its reverse side, a very strong feeling of corporate responsibility and mutual independence among the burghers of the city. They called on one another for aid, shared in one another's bargains, and were responsible for one another's debts. If a merchant defaulted payment of a debt contracted abroad, the creditor might legally seize the goods of any other merchant from the debtor's city. The medieval city was an independent economic unit, whose citizens were banded together in a close fraternity, presenting a united front to all outsiders. And within the city, the merchants and artisans were organized in still more closely knit and exclusive associations, known as guilds, through which, as a rule, the city government exercised its control of business.

4. THE MERCHANT AND CRAFT GUILDS

The merchant guilds

A merchant guild was founded quite early in the history of most cities. It was mentioned in the original charters of many of them. Indeed, the guild was often largely responsible for the success of the city's struggle for a charter. The merchant guild was an association, in which membership was compulsory, of all the burghers of the city who made their living by selling goods, including, in its early days at any rate, the artisans who made goods and sold them directly to the consumer. No one who was not a member of the guild could buy or sell at retail within the city, though foreign merchants might be permitted to sell to the guildsmen or buy from them at wholesale, on payment of a toll, since it was to the advantage of the local merchants to secure raw materials from abroad or to dispose of their surplus stock.



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

CARPENTERS AT WORK

An illumination from a fifteenth-century French manuscript

The master was at once a worker, employer, and retail merchant. In the little shop on the ground floor of his house, in full view of those who passed on the street, he manufactured his goods with his own hands, supervised the work of his journeymen and apprentices, and displayed his products for sale. No permanent class distinction cut him off from his employees, since they themselves expected to become masters in course of time. He was not a capitalist in any real sense of the word, since the restriction imposed by the guild on the price and quality of his goods and the number of men whom he could employ prevented him from making more than a decent living for himself. These restrictions were, in part, self-imposed, for the master was a full member of the guild and had his share in choosing its officers and in making its rules. But if those rules prevented him from rising above his fellows, they also protected him from the competition of others who might try to do the same.

Masters

In this we find the chief purpose of the craft guilds. They were designed to limit competition and to keep any member from doing anything that would be to the disadvantage of the rest. At the same time, they exercised a local monopoly and protected their members from outside competition. The sense of social solidarity and corporate responsibility, the conviction that the interests of the individual should be subordinated to the good of the whole community, which we have already noted as characteristic of the medieval cities, was felt very intensely within the guilds. Hence all the minute regulation of industry. The craft guilds fixed prices, regulated wages and hours of labor, and demanded a fixed standard of quality in the goods produced. These regulations were strictly enforced by the guild officers, who regularly inspected the shops of the masters. So far as was humanly possible, each guild member was guaranteed equality of opportunity. He was given a share in the wholesale purchases of raw materials made by the guild. No other master could tempt his workers away from him. Indeed, in many guilds, the other masters were forced to lend him workers in case of special need. A regulation of the guild of White Tawyers of London shows this spirit of co-operation: "And if anyone of the trade shall have work in his house that he cannot complete, or if for want of assistance such work shall be in danger of being lost, those of the said trade shall aid him that so the said work be not lost." But the guild regulations did more than protect the guild members; they also protected the consumer, and assured to him sound workmanship and fair value. The city government, which held the final authority, would see to that, though the guildsmen themselves

Purpose of the craft guilds

took a pride in their craft and realized that it was to their advantage to have a reputation for selling sound goods at a just price.

Aside from their economic functions, the craft guilds had a distinct social purpose in caring for their members in time of adversity. They were friendly societies. If a guildsman fell ill or through any other mischance was poverty-stricken, he was cared for from the guild funds. When he died, the guild paid the expenses of his funeral and, if necessary, undertook the support of his widow and children. All the social life of the city centered in the guilds. The great feasts in the guildhall relieved the monotony of daily toil and drew the guild members closer together. The guilds had also certain religious functions. They took part in religious celebrations and processions, like the English mystery plays, and often supported a chapel or shrine. And almost everywhere they guarded against heresy among their members.

Advantages and disadvantages

The guild system offered many advantages to the medieval worker and consumer, but there were also disadvantages which became more apparent as the economic life of Europe assumed larger proportions and as the need for protective associations became less acute. The system maintained a high standard of quality in the goods produced, guaranteed honest value to the purchaser, and at the same time ensured a fair living to the guildsman, with little chance, it is true, of becoming wealthy, but also with little chance of being ruined. On the other hand, the minute supervision of work and the innumerable regulations tended to check individual enterprise and retarded invention or progress of any kind. Even the social solidarity of the guild was not an unmixed blessing to society. The guildsmen helped each other, but they were intensely jealous of other guilds which infringed on their monopoly, and they suppressed ruthlessly all competition from those who were not members. One modern historian has compared the guild in a vivid metaphor to a feudal castle, which protected but imprisoned those it sheltered and which might easily degenerate into an instrument of tyranny over those without.

The guild system survived the Middle Ages, but before the end of that period it had begun to disintegrate and capitalistic tendencies had already begun to warp its original character. In many guilds the masters gradually formed an hereditary oligarchy and used the guild monopoly to their own advantage. They relaxed the regulations limiting the number of apprentices or journeymen whom any master could employ and prevented journeymen who did not belong to the guild families from becoming masters. In other cases, especially in large industries like the cloth trade, where goods were produced in large

quantities for export, an exclusive guild of merchants gained control of the manufacturing guilds and reduced the masters to the status of hired laborers. But the break-up of the guilds came later than our present period and will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter.[1]

5. INFLUENCE OF THE CITIES ON EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

The growth of the cities and the rise of the burgher class with its active economic life, in the midst of feudal society and yet apart from it, were bound to have tremendous effects on every aspect of European civilization.

In the first place, they created a new kind of wealth and new methods of acquiring wealth. In the earlier feudal ages, when nearly all wealth sprang directly from the cultivation of the soil, there was very little money in circulation. It was not needed to any large extent, for feudal dues were mostly paid in services or produce and trade was carried on largely by barter; that is, by the direct exchange of goods, on a local scale. Opportunities for profitable investment were scarce and what money did exist was usually hoarded. The revival of commerce and industry made great changes in this respect. Money once more circulated freely wherever merchants bought or sold. Opportunities for investment arose and money began to breed money. Because they were the centers of trade, a large part of the money in circulation flowed to the cities. In its possession lay the power of the new burgher class. Their use of it revolutionized the social and political as well as the economic life of Europe.

Money economy

The burghers were not consciously interested in the fate of their peasant neighbors. Yet unwittingly they aided them to obtain better conditions and greater freedom. The burghers did not produce their own food, but they had money to buy it. They provided the peasants with a constantly growing market for their produce outside the narrow confines of the manor. This made it worth while for the peasants to increase the production of their crops and enabled them to amass a little money, with which they might purchase freedom or concessions from their lord. It also encouraged the lords to clear wasteland and place it under cultivation. In order to attract workers to the new land, the lords were forced to offer very liberal terms, including more or less complete freedom. This in turn reacted favorably on the status of the peasants on the old estates. There, many lords had to make concessions, which often took the form of emancipa-

The peasants

[1] See Chapter XXVII, section 2.

tion and the commutation of personal services into cash payments, in order to keep their peasants from running away to seek a better living or greater freedom on new land or in the cities. This was, of course, a gradual process and not uniform everywhere. But by the end of the Middle Ages, in all the most civilized parts of Europe, a fair measure of the personal freedom and the money economy of the towns had spread to the rural manors.

The nobles

The nobles, on the other hand, lost rather than gained through the rise of the cities. It was difficult for the manorial lords to increase their income to any great extent, since it was fixed by custom. At the same time, prices were rising due to the increased circulation of money, and foreign trade had accustomed the nobles to expensive luxuries, which they came to regard as necessities. The relative wealth of the nobles, then, was in general declining, while that of the burghers whom they despised was increasing. In proportion as the burghers rose in wealth and political power, the nobles lost their dominating position.

The monarchy

Anything that tended to weaken the feudal nobles was to the advantage of the monarchy. This was certainly true of the rise of the cities. In the new middle class, the kings found valuable allies to aid them in building up a strong centralized government. To maintain such a government, the kings needed money, and money in sufficient quantities could be obtained only by taxing the cities, for feudalism made no provision for regular money taxes. The burghers, for their part, needed a strong central government to protect trade and preserve order, and were willing to pay for it. The burghers were in no small degree responsible for the rise of the monarchies and the decline of feudalism.

Culture

The influence of the cities on medieval culture is less easy to appraise than their effect on social and economic conditions. The burghers were hard-working business men, and for long they were not particularly interested in art, literature, or philosophy. Yet they felt the need for education and, as some of them acquired wealth and leisure, they began to develop a secular culture that was characteristically their own. It was in the cities that the secular spirit of the Renaissance arose, and there, too, that the Reformation was born.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE CHURCH, RELIGION, AND CULTURE

ONE cannot read far in the history of the High Middle Ages without realizing something of the vast importance of religion and the church in the daily life of men. The medieval man lived in constant and intimate contact with the supernatural. He believed that the world was the physical center of the universe, and that God had created the whole mighty structure in order that the earth might serve as the stage on which men played their brief mortal drama, until death should furnish the cue for their final exit. The central theme of this human drama was the struggle between divine grace and the evil wiles of the devil for the souls of men. And, after that last mortal exit, began the new and grander drama of eternity, with the scene shifted to heaven or hell, accordingly as the individual man had played his part on earth. Every act of the drama was played under the direction of a host of spirits, good or evil, saints or devils, who did not hesitate to use all the forces of nature to protect or destroy men, to lead them to salvation or tempt them to perdition. The struggle was a close one, and the end of each man's drama was uncertain. There were bad men as well as good — and in abundance — but all were religious in the sense that they believed in the reality of the drama and strove, so far as their character permitted, to foil the devil and win for themselves a happy ending.

But if the drama of human salvation was controlled ultimately by supernatural powers, it had also its earthly directors, men to whom God had entrusted the care of souls. These were the clergy, one of the three classes into which society was divided. It was their function to aid men to secure salvation. This function was so vitally important to all men that the clergy, who exercised it, had acquired greater powers than were possessed by any merely worldly government, and these powers were vested in the church. For the priest who cared for men's souls did not stand alone. He was a member of a great international institution, which was in itself a kind of state, superimposed on all secular states and having an administrative system, laws, property, and taxes of its own. The pope was the ruler of this state; the clergy were its officers; and the laymen in all Christian countries of western Europe — for the Greek Orthodox peoples of the East stood apart from it — were its subjects.

It is the purpose of this chapter to describe briefly the organization of the church as an institution and to indicate as far as possible the

part played by religion and the church in the formation of medieval culture.

1. THE CHURCH AS AN INSTITUTION

The papacy

In earlier chapters we have shown how the organization of the church first took shape and how the Bishop of Rome became its recognized head in the days of the declining Roman Empire, and, later, how the church became involved in the feudal system, while the popes fell for a time under the domination of the emperors. Finally, we have told the story of the long and successful struggle of the popes, from Gregory VII to Innocent III, to establish their supremacy over secular rulers.[1] At the same time the popes were working with equal success to enforce their authority over all the clergy and to centralize still further the administration of the church. The bishops, who were royal officers and feudal barons as well as ministers of the church, presented the most serious problem. The popes, however, gradually succeeded in strengthening their control over the bishops by the condemnation of lay investiture and simony (which had given kings and nobles an opportunity to influence episcopal elections) and by asserting their right to confirm all elections and to settle those that were disputed. Further, by encouraging the lesser clergy and the monks to appeal from the bishops' jurisdiction to the papal court, the popes lessened the authority of the bishops, who were still too often controlled by their kings, and at the same time brought the whole body of the clergy more directly under papal control. In an increasingly large number of cases, too, the popes were taking from the bishops the right of appointing archdeacons and other diocesan officials to their benefices and were reserving it for themselves.

The curia and the cardinals

As the administration of the church became more highly centralized, a tremendous mass of business was referred to Rome, which the pope could not deal with single-handed. He was assisted by a host of subordinate officers and clerks, who made up the papal *curia* or court. He had also an advisory council in the college of cardinals. The cardinals were appointed for life by the pope and ranked second only to him in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Their importance depended largely on their exclusive right to elect the popes, which had been guaranteed to them by the decree of Nicholas II in 1059.

Outside of Rome, the principal administrative officers were the bishops,


[1] See above, pages 44–45 and 140–42.

each of whom was the head of the church in his diocese. The diocese was the most important territorial unit for church administration. A number of dioceses grouped together formed a province and the bishop of the principal diocese of the province was called an archbishop. He outranked his brother bishops and had some vague authority over them, but his relation to them was that of a chief among his equals. In the Early Middle Ages, the bishops had been almost independent rulers of the clergy in their dioceses. By the thirteenth century, they had lost a good deal of that independent power to the pope. However, they had still to attend to all the business of the diocese, to supervise the morals of the clergy, to administer the sacraments of ordination and confirmation, and to preside over the ecclesiastical courts, though, of course, some of their executive duties could be delegated to archdeacons or other subordinate officers. They had also important secular duties to perform as feudal lords or royal ministers. They were frequently summoned to the royal court or to accompany the king on a military campaign. So much of their time, indeed, was taken up with worldly affairs that many pious folk doubted whether any bishop would be saved. Still, arduous though its duties were, the episcopal office carried with it great wealth and power, and it was eagerly sought by ambitious men. Most of the bishops were nobly born, and many of them had undoubtedly entered the church from motives of ambition rather than piety. There were bishops who took their religious duties seriously and whose life was an example to the people, but there were also others whose manner of living could scarcely be distinguished from that of the ordinary lay noble.

The bishops

In the principal city of each diocese there was a cathedral, which was the bishop's church. Here there was a "chapter" of canons, who were responsible for the conduct of the services. The cathedral canons bore much the same relation to the bishops that the cardinals did to the pope. They assisted him in the administration, acted as an advisory council, and had the sole right, according to canon law, of electing a new bishop, though their choice was, in practice, frequently dictated by the king or some other feudal superior. At the head of each chapter there was a dean, elected by the canons. By the thirteenth century the cathedral chapters had acquired a good deal of land, which, with the support of the popes, made them fairly independent of their bishops. With each canon's "prebend" or office went the income from a definite piece of land. As a result, prebends were often sought by young nobles who had no particular religious interests. The popes were forced to issue frequent edicts, usually in vain, ordering canons to

The canons



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

A FUNERAL

An illumination from The Book of Hours of Etienne Chevalier, by Jean Fouquet (Musée Condé, Chantilly)

remain in residence and to attend to their duties. As a measure of reform some chapters were organized on a monastic basis with a rule of communal life.

Parishes and parish priests

The smallest unit of ecclesiastical administration was the parish, and it was the parish priest who came most directly in contact with the people. In country districts the parish was usually identical with the village or manor. The parish church was endowed with land, a fixed share in the cultivated fields of the manor. The priest drew his income from this land and also from offerings and the tithe. The last, which had originally been a free offering for any religious purpose, had become a definite tax on the income of all parishioners, enforceable by law. However, the priest was not permitted to keep all or even the largest part of his income. Part of it went to the bishop in various forms of ecclesiastical tax and part to the "patron" of the church. The latter was usually the lord of the manor whose ancestors had originally endowed the church with its land. In the feudal age the parish church, like almost everything else, had become feudalized. The church, with its lands and tithe, was a "benefice" or "living" which the patron bestowed upon the priest, while retaining a share of the church's income for himself. The patronage of a church was, therefore, a lucrative property and, where the patron was a lay lord, it might be passed on by inheritance or alienated by sale or gift. The patron had, in addition, the right of "presenting" or nominating the priest, though the presentation must be confirmed by the bishop of the diocese. This naturally produced many abuses. Lay patrons often gave the living to favorites or sold it to the highest bidder, with little regard for the suitability of the candidate for his office. Of course, many churches were on ecclesiastical estates, where the patron was a bishop or abbot, from whom greater care for the spiritual character of the appointee might be expected. Also, in many cases, the patronage of churches was given or sold by pious laymen to a bishop, a monastery or a cathedral chapter. But clerical patronage also led to abuses. The clerical patron — bishop, abbot, or dean — might hold the office of priest for himself and appoint a "vicar" as a substitute, who did all the work and received only a small proportion of the income for himself.

Character of the priests

Under such circumstances, a high standard of character and training could scarcely be expected, especially among the priests or vicars of the poorer country parishes. They were recruited mostly from the peasant class and were poorly educated, if not actually illiterate. Both secular writers, who had little love for the clergy, and reforming preachers agree in condemning the priests for carelessness and

immorality, or at least for conduct unbecoming their sacred office. We read that some neglected the church services or absented themselves entirely and hired an unfit substitute. Others misused their power in order to extort money from their parishioners, defrauded the church, or engaged in secular businesses such as money-lending. Priests could no longer marry, but there can be no doubt that the law of celibacy was frequently violated. When specific charges are omitted, the writers accuse them of being more worldly than religious, as well they may have been, considering the manner in which many of them obtained their position. "Our priests," writes a contemporary preacher, "immersed in material things, disturb themselves little about those of the spirit. They differ from laymen in dress, not at heart; in appearance, not in reality. They belie by their deeds what they preach from the pulpit. Tonsure, garb, and speech give them the superficial varnish of piety; underneath the sheep's clothing are concealed hypocrites and ravening wolves." We must beware, however, of taking the strictures of the reforming preachers too literally, for they were likely to take for granted the numerous priests who did their duty quietly and to generalize from the most notorious examples.

Ecclesiastical courts

Aside from all its other activities, the church had wide judicial powers. These were exercised in the episcopal courts, which administered ecclesiastical or canon law rather than the civil law of the secular courts. The bishops claimed jurisdiction over all persons who in any way could be classed as clergy, including students and deacons who had not been ordained priests, as well as widows, orphans, and crusaders who were regarded as wards of the church. They also claimed a variety of cases, not involving the clergy, in which the dispute was of a moral or religious nature. In this latter class fell all cases having to do with marriage, with business deals sanctioned by an oath, and testaments witnessed by a priest, as well as offenses against religion, such as violation of church property, heresy, and blasphemy. The sentences prescribed in criminal cases by canon law, which always avoided the shedding of blood, were notoriously lighter than those of the civil courts. Hence, despite the opposition of secular governments, the episcopal courts were sought by all who could claim "benefit of clergy." Fines were the most common punishments inflicted, with the result that the courts furnished a considerable part of the bishops' revenues. This fact also goes far to explain the opposition of the kings, especially in France and England, to the transference of cases from the royal to the ecclesiastical courts. They were still more opposed — and in this they had the support of the bishops — to the growing custom of appealing

cases from the local church courts to the papal *curia* at Rome. The appeals to Rome not only took a good deal of money out of the country; they also removed important cases from the jurisdiction of the bishops, whom the kings could more or less control, to a distant and independent court.

By the thirteenth century the popes had so far succeeded in the centralization of authority that they were able to draw a large income from the clergy of all parts of Roman Christendom. It was not till the Later Middle Ages, however, when the spiritual character of the papacy had declined still further, that the popes worked out fully the various methods of adding to their revenue. We will leave the subject, therefore, for further discussion in a later chapter.[1]

Papal revenue

2. THE SACRAMENTS, POPULAR RELIGION, AND HERESY

The preceding outline shows the church as a great human institution, a spiritual state, separate from and superior to the lay world, which it taxed and governed with legal authority. But how did it acquire and maintain its authority? What did religion mean to the ordinary layman who knelt before the priest? And was there no revolt? These are significant questions and must be answered in some fashion if we are to understand the religion of the Middle Ages.

A partial answer to these questions can be stated briefly. To the medieval man, religion and the universal church, with its sacramental powers, were inseparable. He could not conceive of one apart from the other. The pope was the vicegerent, the representative of God on earth, and to him and his subordinate officers God had entrusted the salvation of mankind. Could any man defy such authority with eternity at stake? Even the most thoughtless man lived under the shadow of eternity. Before him lay the awe-inspiring alternative of heaven or hell, and of these two he thought more often and more vividly of the latter. He could scarcely imagine the bliss of heaven, but hell was a place of eternal physical torment as real to him as was the land of a neighboring county. Indeed, a Norman peasant had probably a clearer mental picture of the topography, climate, and general living conditions of hell than of those of Burgundy or Aquitaine. And he believed, as the church had taught since Saint Augustine, that no man, because of the original sin inherited from Adam and the sins which he himself would inevitably commit, could by his own unaided efforts win salvation and avoid damnation. He must depend on divine grace, which

Heaven and hell

[1] See below, pages 322–23.

was administered through the sacraments of the church. The fear of hell was somewhat softened by the development of the doctrine of purgatory, which was an intermediate state between heaven and hell, where those who were not hopelessly damned but were not yet ready for heaven might spend an indeterminate period of further penance and purgation through suffering. But even purgatory could not be reached without the sacraments.

The sacraments

The doctrine of the sacraments had developed slowly since the early days of Christianity. It was not fully developed till the twelfth century. There were seven sacraments in all. That of baptism, administered as soon as possible after birth, cleansed the child of original sin and signified his entry into the church. Without it there could be no hope of salvation. The sacrament of confirmation, administered by a bishop, came later, during adolescence, and marked the communicant's conscious acceptance of the faith, thus confirming his baptism. Supreme unction was the final sacrament, the last rite performed for a dying man to prepare his soul for eternity. These three, in the normal course of events, were administered to every man and woman once. The other two universal sacraments were more frequent. The sacrament of penance, following confession and proof of repentance, washed away the guilt of sin and left only the necessity of doing some act of penance in this world or in purgatory to prepare the soul for salvation. Finally, and most important of all, the Eucharist, administered during the service of the Mass, admitted the communicant to a share in the saving grace resulting from Christ's supreme sacrifice. The two remaining sacraments, marriage and ordination, were administered to laymen and clergy respectively. Each was considered indissoluble, the former so long as both parties lived, the latter for life, though either might be broken by a special dispensation from the church.

The power of the clergy

The power of the clergy and the authority of the church rested securely on the sacramental system. For, with the exception of baptism which in an emergency could be administered by any Christian, only a priest, who had himself received the sacrament of ordination from a bishop, could administer the sacraments. The clergy, in other words, held a monopoly that guaranteed their position. They alone could purvey to the people the precious gift of salvation. The wealth, political influence, and legal authority of the church followed naturally on that fact. Disobedience or rebellion could be met by excommunication, which cut the offending person off from membership in the church, and hence, unless the ban were lifted, from all hope of salvation. Moreover, the priest was kept in close touch with his parishioners

through the confession, which must precede the sacrament of penance. He thus gained an intimate knowledge of their affairs and could wield a great influence over their lives.

Popular religion

The important part played by the sacraments in the scheme of salvation tended to make them appear to the popular mind as the only essential factor in religion. The average man of the Middle Ages, illiterate and not too far removed from barbarism, was no theologian. He might easily fail to grasp the spiritual significance of the sacraments and come to view the actual ceremonies as a sort of mechanical process sufficient to secure his entry into heaven. Despite the warnings of devout churchmen, people came to regard the material acts of the sacraments as having a supernatural power in themselves. This tendency to reduce spiritual concepts to material terms was characteristic of all aspects of popular religion. Uneducated men, whose minds were not trained to think in abstract terms, demanded physical symbols that they could see and touch, or objects of adoration to which they could give a local habitation and a name — and often they forgot that the symbol was not itself the reality.

Saints and devils

The veneration of saints and the popular belief in the constant participation of saints and devils in the events of daily life arose in part from this natural mental process. God seemed far removed from human affairs and Christ was too often pictured as a stern judge. Men felt the need of some more human and understandable figures to act as intermediaries between man and God. This rôle was admirably filled by the Virgin Mary and the saints, who had been human and might still retain human characteristics or at least have sympathy with human frailties. From the veneration of the saints came much of the warmth, color, and simple piety of medieval religion, but it also led to a good deal of materialistic superstition. The activity of the saints was not limited to keeping men from temptation or enabling them to escape punishment for their sins. They also came to the assistance of men in purely material ways, curing their sickness, protecting their crops, finding lost articles and performing a host of beneficent services for those who sought their aid. To people who believed that the universe was governed by supernatural rather than natural laws, there was no inconsistency in such supernatural interference in the ordinary sequence of cause and effect. It was a natural consequence of a literal or material interpretation of the eternal conflict between good and evil forces in the universe, which was the essential plot of the divine drama. For there were innumerable demons or devils as well as saints, and these were quite as active. They tempted men into sin; ruined their crops by

storm or insect pests; afflicted them with sickness; struck the steeple of the churches with lightning; or, more ingenious in their rage against the church, caused the choir to doze or the priest to stutter during the service of the Mass.

Relics and pilgrimages

The demand for material and tangible objects of adoration was expressed most clearly in the veneration of relics of the saints. Having once been men on this earth, the saints had left behind relics of their mortal existence — their bodies as well as their clothing and personal belongings. These relics of famous men would at any time have a sentimental value, such as today we should give to the pen used by Shakespeare, and would be eagerly sought by collectors. But the relics of the saints meant much more than that, for they shared the miraculous powers of the saints themselves. To touch them was enough to heal one's illness or to keep one from harm. The bones of one of the major saints were worth more than a king's ransom, and pilgrims came from far places to seek aid or comfort at the shrine that housed them. Pilgrimages, too, were often undertaken as a full or partial performance of penance prescribed by the church. All through the medieval centuries, bands of pilgrims might be met daily on any of the main roads of Europe.

Heretics

The great majority of medieval men undoubtedly accepted the authority and teaching of the church without question, and could not think of religion apart from it. But there were some heretics who rebelled, and their numbers increased during the twelfth century until they had become a serious menace to the church. We know less than we should like to know about the opinions of medieval heretics, since we are forced to rely mostly on accounts written by their orthodox opponents. It is clear, however, that, though different groups held quite different opinions, all the more popular heresies can be accounted for by the same general causes. They were due, in one way or another, to the failure of the church to provide satisfactory spiritual inspiration, and were motivated by dissatisfaction with the mechanical nature of the sacramental system and, still more, with the character, wealth, and power of the clergy. They were nearly all anti-sacramentarian and anti-clerical.

Albigenses and Waldenses

The two most important heretical sects, the Albigenses and the Waldenses, flourished chiefly in southern France, though they spread also into neighboring countries. The former, who were also called Cathari, were the most numerous and made their appearance as early as the eleventh century. Their central doctrine seems to have been a very literal and rather morbid identification

of everything physical or material with the forces of evil in the universe. This led to the rejection of all material symbols of religion — sacraments, crosses, relics, or images — and an extreme asceticism, at least among the inner circle of the "perfected," who were sworn to abstain from marrying, owning property, eating flesh, or shedding blood. The ordinary "believers," who made up the greater part of the sect, were allowed greater freedom. The Waldenses seem to have been much more normal and their doctrines were closer to true Christianity. Save in the south of France, where they were included in the mass persecution of the Albigenses, they were not rigorously pursued by the church, and remnants of them survived for centuries in Piedmont, Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and even in orthodox Spain. Their founder was a rich merchant of Lyons, Peter Waldo, who about the year 1170 gave away his property to the poor and began preaching in an effort to recall men to the simple doctrine of Christ as found in the Gospels. Neither he nor his followers had at first any thought of heresy, but their vigorous condemnation of the wealth and worldliness of the clergy soon led to their being condemned by the church. Forbidden to preach, they were forced to separate themselves from the church and to justify their position by the claim that any good Christian had the right to preach and that the sacraments were not necessary to salvation. Their protest against the clerical monopoly was never entirely forgotten. It undoubtedly did something, though how much is uncertain, to prepare the way for Wyclif, Huss, and Luther.

The Albigensian Crusade and the Inquisition

Throughout the twelfth century the church had made fitful efforts to suppress heretics, but it was Innocent III who first devoted the full authority of the papacy to the task of destroying these enemies of the faith. In 1207, he summoned the chivalry of Europe to take part in a crusade against the Albigenses. The story of that crusade, which was led by Simon de Montfort, has been recounted briefly in Chapter XII. The northern knights laid waste the rich lands of southern France and slaughtered thousands. They struck a mortal blow to the flourishing culture of Languedoc and Provence as well as to heresy, but the latter at least would soon have revived had the work of the crusaders not been followed by the preaching of the newly founded orders of friars and by the steady persecution of heresy carried on by the Inquisition or Holy Office, now for the first time firmly established. Inquisitorial procedure — that is, the searching out and trying of heretics — was not new. It had been a regular part of the bishops' judicial duties. But the bishops were busy men and often none too zealous. In 1233, therefore, Pope Gregory IX

gave a permanent commission, later more fully developed, to regular inquisitors who were to set up special courts, though still in formal co-operation with the bishops, for the discovery and trial of heretics. The methods of the Inquisition — the secrecy of the trials, the refusal to divulge the names of the accusers so that the accused might answer them, the full and accurate records kept by the court, and the use of torture to extort confessions — inspired dread wherever the institution was established, and in the long run succeeded in stamping out open heresy. The sentences imposed ranged from public penance to life imprisonment. Stubborn heretics, however, who refused to recant, or those who later relapsed into heresy, were turned over to the secular government to be burned at the stake.

3. THE MONKS AND FRIARS

Aside from the laymen and the "secular" clergy, who made up the active Christian community, there were large numbers of "regular" clergy, as the monks and nuns were called who lived apart from the world in accordance with the monastic rule. The rule followed by most of them was still that of Saint Benedict, or a variation upon it, and the monastic ideal had changed very little since the early days of monasticism.[1] The monks were often called simply "the religious," for their way of life was considered the most truly Christian, more likely to win salvation than that of either layman or secular priest. But the very popularity of the monastic life had led to the relaxation of discipline in many monasteries or to the observance of the letter rather than the spirit of the rule. Thousands of men and women entered the monastery or the convent for reasons that had little to do with religion — and not all of them willingly. Sons and daughters of noble families who could not be provided for from the family estates were sometimes relegated to the cloister. Weaklings who could not hold their own in a violent society, and men who sought only leisure and security found in it a refuge. Ambitious youngsters saw in it an opportunity for advancement; for the monasteries possessed wide lands and the abbot was a feudal lord with a large income and great political power. It is not surprising, then, to find many monks who lived in luxurious idleness or who left their monasteries on every possible pretext to renew contact with the world they had forsworn, so that contemporary preachers complained that one could not go anywhere without stumbling over a monk. Even had they wished, the abbots and monks could not have remained cut off

The regular clergy

[1] See above, pages 46–49.

from the world. They were often better educated than the laymen, and kings and lords used them constantly as ministers, messengers, or negotiators. Even Saint Bernard had to spend most of his life outside his beloved walls.


Monastic reforms

Yet, despite the worldliness of the majority of monks and the tendency both in the monastery and outside to an easy acceptance of the forms of religion, there were still many earnestly religious people in the Middle Ages to whom the monastic ideal made a strong appeal and who strove to put it into practice. In one monastery after another the rule was for a time rigidly enforced or was made still more stringent, until the fame of the monastery spread abroad and brought a shower of pious gifts. Eventually the reformed monasteries would become wealthy and lax. The enthusiasm for reform would die down and they would settle back into the ordinary routine. Several of the reformed monasteries founded numbers of branch houses or priories, thus forming a "congregation" under the rule of the abbot of the home monastery. The results of the reform were in this way spread over a large territory. The great Congregation of Cluny included more than two thousand houses by the middle of the twelfth century. Like most of the congregations, Cluny was exempt from episcopal control and subject only to the pope. Its influence on the general reform of the church and the establishment of papal supremacy has already been noted.[1] As its prestige declined, its place of leadership was taken by the Cistercian Congregation, founded at Cîteaux in 1098. The latter owed much of its fame to Saint Bernard, who wielded a greater spiritual influence than any other man during the first half of the twelfth century. Among the other reformed congregations the most important was the Premonstratensian order of regular canons, founded at Prémontré in 1120, who followed the Augustinian rule.

The friars

The monastic reforms raised the spiritual level of the monks, temporarily at any rate, but they could have no more than an indirect influence on the people outside the monasteries. The monks were hampered by the rule, strongly enforced in the reformed monasteries, which bound them to their houses. In order to win heretics back to the faith and to give spiritual inspiration to the people at large, what was evidently needed were the services of men who combined the unworldly devotion of the ideal monk with the ability to move freely among the people and preach directly to them. It was in answer to this need that the two great orders of friars (brothers) were created in the early years of the thirteenth century. The Franciscans

[1] See above, pages 163–64.



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

SAINT FRANCIS PREACHING TO THE BIRDS, BY GIOTTO (?)

The scene painted here, probably within a century after the death of Saint Francis, illustrates one of the many legends concerning the amiable saint's fellow-feeling for all God's creatures.

and Dominicans were a new kind of monk. Strictly speaking, they were not monks at all, for they did not live in monasteries, but wandered freely among the people getting their living by begging, whence they were called the mendicant orders.

Saint Francis and the Franciscans

Saint Francis of Assisi (1181 or 1182–1226), who founded the Friars Minor or Franciscans, was one of the most lovable of the medieval saints. His father was a rich Italian merchant, but Francis, with his romantic temperament, cared little for business. In his youth he lived a gay, irresponsible existence, loving poetry and gallant gestures. His conversion from this frivolous life came suddenly, when he was still in his early twenties. With characteristic whole-heartedness, he gave what money he had, including some of his father's, to repair a ruined chapel; cut himself off from his business-like family; and set out in absolute poverty to preach to the poor, confident that the necessities of life would be provided. In his new way of life, Francis lost none of his joyous spirit, his love of poetry and nature, or the personal charm that had always attracted men to him. He adopted poverty gaily, not as a penance but as a liberation from the ties that bind men to earth. He soon acquired followers and, in 1210, secured the verbal sanction of Innocent III for this nucleus of an order. Thereafter the brothers grew rapidly in numbers and were given a complete rule, which was confirmed by Pope Honorius III in 1223. Before long, the gray-cloaked friars were familiar figures on every highway and in every crowded slum of western Europe. They were a universal order, exempt from the authority of the bishops. Their general was subject only to the pope. As they became more popular, the ideals of the friars began to change. They accepted gifts of houses and furniture, despite the rule of poverty on which Saint Francis had insisted so strongly, and their high standard of character gradually declined. A few, however, clung to the spirit of the rule, with the result that after a long and bitter controversy the order was finally divided.

Saint Dominic and the Dominicans

Saint Dominic (1170–1221), the founder of the order of Preaching Friars named after him, was a native of Old Castile. He was well-educated and became a canon and later a subprior of the Augustinian order. In 1205, he accompanied his bishop on a mission into southern France. There he was shocked by the amount of heresy he found and soon began to preach in an effort to win back heretics to the orthodox faith. For the next eleven years he continued his preaching, though often in danger from the violence aroused by the Albigensian Crusade. Like Saint Francis, he gathered a group of followers about him. He received papal recognition

for his order in 1216, though the final rule was not drawn up till four years later. Saint Dominic was a man of admirable character, gentle and kindly and absolutely fearless; but he lacked the rare spiritual charm of the Italian saint, and his main purpose was the more limited one of converting heretics rather than giving spiritual inspiration to the orthodox, who often needed it quite as badly. He, too, insisted on the vow of poverty, but he valued it not as an end in itself, as Saint Francis did, but because it would increase the prestige and influence of the preaching brothers. When poverty seemed a disadvantage rather than an asset, the Dominicans departed from the rule without the conflict which tore the Franciscan order on that point. Friars from both orders were frequently entrusted with the conduct of the Inquisition, but it was naturally the Dominicans who gave most time to the grim task of suppressing heresy, from which came the name of *Domini canes* (the hounds of God) often applied to them.

During the first century after their foundation the mendicant orders exercised a tremendous influence that fully justified their unrivaled popularity. They converted thousands of heretics and gave new life and fervor to popular religion everywhere. The friars were given full power to hear confessions, independent of the local clergy who had so often proved unfit for their duties, and they were successful in restoring frequency of confession to a remarkable degree. In the Later Middle Ages, however, when the character of the orders had begun to decline, their confessional power frequently led to abuse, and the parish priests complained that they were both lax and avaricious, granting easy absolution in return for gifts. But the influence of the friars was not confined to popular religion. They did great services also to the cause of learning. The Dominicans were from the first devoted to education, as befitted an order created for the combating of heretical opinion. Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who were largely responsible for shaping the scholastic philosophy which sought to base the articles of faith on a firm foundation of reason, were both Dominicans. Nor were the Franciscans far behind, though Saint Francis had warned them against too much education. The names of Saint Bonaventura, Alexander of Hales, Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam witness that the Friars Minor were fully equal to their rivals in learning.

Influence of the friars

4. RELIGIOUS ART — THE CATHEDRALS

In an age when religion was so powerful a factor in everyday life, and when the church so largely dominated society, it is not surprising that


the art which best expressed the emotions and aspirations of the people should be religious art. Not that all medieval art was religious, but religion did inspire the finest products of artistic genius because it appealed so strongly to the artist's imagination, and also because religious art was encouraged and financed by the most powerful institution of the age, the church. This is particularly true of architecture, the most highly perfected art of the Middle Ages, to which all the other arts were subordinated. There were magnificent castles and elaborate guildhalls, but none of them can compare for richness of beauty with the cathedrals.

The cathedrals

All the most vital forces in medieval society were concentrated in the building of the cathedrals. They were monuments to the pride and authority of the church and also to the piety and municipal patriotism of the citizens, for both bishops and burghers contributed freely to their construction. The cathedral owed its existence to both the church and the city, and it belonged to both. Priest and guildsman alike raised their eyes in pride and veneration to its soaring towers, rising high above the central square, and ordered their day by the regular pealing of its giant bells. The cathedral, too, was the product of the collective artistry of master builders and of countless carpenters, stone masons, painters, and makers of stained glass. These nameless artists, or artisans as they were more likely to consider themselves, sharing the emotions and beliefs of their fellows and working together for a grand purpose, succeeded in creating a work of art that expresses in perfect form the religious aspirations of their age. Nothing else that remains from that time expresses so clearly what religion meant in the age of faith as the Gothic cathedral with its high pointed arches, its flying buttresses and tall spires, all leading the eye upward, and its wealth of sculptured figures, ranging from saint to gargoyle, that often caused the eye to linger on the way. It expresses both the inward yearning of the soul toward God and the outward splendor of the earthly church. Spiritual ideals and the tendency to convert them into material symbols are both there. The great age of the cathedrals was the period of the church's greatest power, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Thereafter the forces that had combined to build the cathedrals were drifting apart.


Sculpture and painting

Sculpture as an independent art scarcely existed in the Middle Ages, but it was highly developed none the less, being employed in lavish fashion for the decoration of cathedrals and churches. Painting was also used for the same purpose, though not so extensively, for in the Gothic cathedrals the stained-glass windows occupied most of the clear wall space and themselves furnished



Photograph by Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

THE CATHEDRAL OF CHARTRES



Photograph by Burton Holmes, from Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

THE CATHEDRAL OF NOTRE DAME, PARIS

color and picture. The purpose of both painter and sculptor was to edify and instruct an illiterate people, as well as to add to the beauty of the building. Their work was often cramped by tradition and conventionalized by the necessity of fitting it into the architect's plans.

It was not only through the beauty of line and color, carved stone, and stained glass, that the cathedral expressed and satisfied the artistic instincts of medieval people. It was also the scene of the colorful services of the church, the drama of the Mass, accompanied by the solemn cadences, the grand rhythms and verbal beauty of the Latin liturgy. The prayers, chants, and hymns of the Latin service satisfied the universal human craving for music and poetry, and combined it with religious emotion.

Liturgy

From early times, the singing of hymns had formed an important part of the church services. During the High Middle Ages, a large number of new hymns were added, some of which still stand as the finest poetry written during that period. Every special service for a saint's day or for one of the great seasonal festivals, as well as each of the daily "hours," had its hymns. These hymns were written in the medieval Latin that was the universal language of the church. Though not the language of the common people, it was still a living, spoken language. In poetry, frequent rhymes and a stressed accent had taken the place of the classical quantitative meter and unrhymed stanzas. But, though not classical, the Latin of the medieval hymns was far from being barbarous. It had a richness of melody and feeling that was its own justification.

Hymns

5. THE REVIVAL OF LEARNING AND THE UNIVERSITIES

During the High Middle Ages, in every field of human endeavor, the half-barbarous peoples of the West emerged from the darker ages into the full light of medieval civilization. The great revival of learning, which took place during that period, was the intellectual counterpart of the economic and social energy that produced the new trade and town life, of the religious force that built the great structure of the medieval church, and of the tendency toward social stability that was gradually imposing order upon feudal chaos. The inspiration for the new learning came largely from the Greek and Saracen East, partly through the crusades, partly through Italy, but still more from Mohammedan Spain. The scientific and philosophical works of Aristotle, the writings of the ancient Greek mathematicians and physicians, usually from the translations and commentaries made by Saracen

The revival of learning

scholars, and also the body of Roman law codified by Justinian, all of which had been almost completely lost sight of during the earlier Middle Ages, were now eagerly studied. The bare bones of the *trivium* and *quadrivium* (the elements of grammar, rhetoric, and logic, and of arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music, respectively), which had made up the sum of early medieval education, paled into insignificance before this mass of new material. The old monastery and cathedral schools were no longer adequate to cope with the demands of this enlarged curriculum. They gave way gradually before the rising universities.

Rise of the universities

The twelfth century was the period in which the earliest universities took shape. By the end of the century those of Bologna, Paris, Montpellier, and Oxford, at least, were well established. We do not know just when to date their beginnings, for they were not founded. They simply grew, evolving slowly from the need for protection of students and teachers and from the natural tendency of men with common interests to organize themselves and to form institutions. The official charters granted by king and pope in the early years of the thirteenth century were merely the recognition of an accomplished fact. The University of Paris served as a model for all northern universities, including Oxford, which owed its origin to the recall of English students from Paris about 1167, Cambridge, founded by a migration from Oxford in 1209, and the German universities which sprang up in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Early in the twelfth century, Paris became a famous center of learning, drawing students and teachers from all parts of Europe. The fame of the brilliant young philosopher, Peter Abelard, attracted hundreds of students, and after his departure the theologian, Peter Lombard, and scores of other teachers maintained the reputation of the city. Originally, these teachers had given private courses independently. But this proved unsatisfactory to both students and teachers for a variety of reasons. Some form of organization was obviously necessary.

Organization

The formation of a university or guild (the words originally meant the same thing) of teachers and students was the logical solution of the problem. In order to prevent unqualified men from teaching, the chancellor of the cathedral was empowered to grant licenses to those who had passed a satisfactory examination, which, of course, necessitated the fixing of a curriculum of studies so that the candidates would know on what material they were to be examined. Those who were granted licenses were called masters of arts and formed the governing body of the university, the faculty of arts. Following the analogy of the guild, the students may be considered as the apprentices,

and the bachelors as the journeymen with a limited license who were permitted to teach in certain elementary courses. Since the only sure test of mastery of a subject is ability to teach it, the organization of education as a training for teachers was logical enough. The master's degree was accepted as the guaranty of proficiency, sought by all, even though all did not intend to use it for active teaching. After becoming a master of arts, if the student wished specialized training in one of the professions, he might pursue a further course of study leading to the degree of doctor and admittance to the faculties of theology, medicine, or law. The University of Bologna, famous for its law school, was organized somewhat differently, for there the governing body was the society or university of students, who had first organized for mutual protection against teachers and townspeople alike. The faculties were there subordinate to the students. Most of the southern universities followed this model rather than that of Paris.

Privileges

Despite the analogy between its organization and that of the craft guild, the university was essentially a clerical institution. Both teachers and students were classed as clerics or clergy, and so were exempt from ordinary civil jurisdiction. The charter granted to the University of Paris by Philip Augustus in 1200 recognized this exemption from the jurisdiction of royal or municipal courts. Further independence of local authority was acquired shortly after by papal edict. The university, as a corporation, was freed from the jurisdiction of the bishop, and disciplinary powers were vested in the faculty, subject only to the pope. The same arrangement was also made in regard to the other universities, thus giving them a remarkable degree of corporate independence, while at the same time adding to papal power by giving the popes the supervision of all higher education.

The nations

The continental universities were all very cosmopolitan. There was no language difficulty to deter foreign students, for Latin was the language of education everywhere — whence the name "Latin Quarter" for the student section of Paris. In Paris, as in most universities, the masters and students of the faculty of arts were divided into four "nations"; the French, including also the southern Latins; the Normans; the Picards, including students from the Netherlands; and the English, in which nation were also included the Germans and Scandinavians. The nations were organized as societies and between them chose the rector, who was the chief administrative officer of the university for a brief term. Quarrels between the nations led to almost as many violent brawls as did the perennial conflict between students and townspeople.

The students were, indeed, a riotous lot at times. The medieval university provided no organized sports or student activities to serve as an outlet for youthful energy and high spirits, and it was an age when men resorted easily to physical violence. Despite all prohibitions, many a student carried a knife concealed under his gown, and used it on the slightest provocation. Contemporary preachers raised their hands in horror at the drunkenness, violence, and immorality of the students, all the more because they were legally clerics, and the student poems and "Goliardic" songs, which celebrate the less respectable joys of life in charming but inaccurate Latin, bear out the indictment. Undoubtedly the medieval students were more undisciplined than those of modern times, but otherwise they were very much like students in all ages. In the letters and records that have survived, we can find all the recognizable types — students rich and poor, diligent and lazy, those who were earnestly laying the foundations of a career, and those who were merely enjoying a vacation from home. Letters written home for more funds to meet unexpected expenses, none too well itemized, were evidently as common then as now. So were letters from parents complaining that their sons were wasting their time and their parents' hard-earned money in irresponsible pleasures.

Student life

The medieval university had very little of the physical equipment that seems so important in its modern counterpart. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it had no buildings, except an occasional residential college for poor students, no laboratories, no library, and even no regular classrooms. A staff of teachers was all that the university possessed, or rather, the masters were the university. Classes were held in a room in the professor's house or in a hired hall. In Paris, the students sat on the floor, which was covered with straw, while the professor lectured from a platform with a desk to hold his notes. The classes were long, beginning often at daybreak, and the rooms must have been cold and uncomfortable. The sole method of instruction was the lecture, based on a definite textbook. Medieval scholars had great respect for authoritative books, of which there were still relatively few, and the business of the professor was to explain and comment on the authorities in his field. Books were scarce and expensive, since all had to be copied by hand. Few students could afford to own their texts, though they could often rent them. As a rule, however, the method of lecturing made the possession of texts by all the students unnecessary. Taking the text passage by passage, the professor read it slowly so that the students could copy it verbatim. He then expounded it sentence by sentence, drawing upon his knowledge of the subject for every possible

Method of instruction

ray of light that could be shed upon its meaning. At the end of the course, the student's notes, if he were diligent, would comprise a complete copy of the text with the lecturer's gloss or explanation.

The arts faculty

The course in the faculty of arts leading to the M.A. degree, normally a six-year course with the bachelor's degree somewhere along the way, was the essential part of the university curriculum. It was taken by all students, including those who intended to enter the higher faculties later. The *trivium* and *quadrivium* still formed the framework of the curriculum, but the proportion of emphasis had shifted. By far the most time was given to the former, and of the three subjects included in it (grammar, rhetoric, and logic), logic far outstripped the rest. In the first half of the twelfth century, there had been a considerable revival of interest in classical Latin literature; but the introduction of Aristotle's *Logic* at about the same time and of his *Metaphysics* in the early years of the thirteenth century turned the attention of scholars more and more to logic and philosophy, while grammar and rhetoric sank back into second place. They became merely a means to the end of teaching enough Latin to understand the more important subjects, and the classics were used simply as examples of grammatical construction. The Latin of the medieval universities was strictly utilitarian. It was used to convey information and hence remained a living tongue, changing and adapting itself to fit the needs of the age in a way that would have been impossible had it remained bound to classical precedent. Logic and philosophy were also used for practical purposes, furnishing a method of study that could be applied to medicine, law, science, and theology. They were the universal tools of the medieval scholar, who was more given to close, hard reasoning from authoritative texts and to metaphysical speculation than to experiment or to observation of natural phenomena.

Medicine

The science of medicine, like the other natural sciences, suffered greatly from this method of study. The works of the ancient Greek physicians Galen and Hippocrates, usually from Arabic translations retranslated into Latin, and the commentaries of famous Saracen doctors like Avicenna, were accepted as authorities. From them the medieval physicians drew logical conclusions that were often totally erroneous because not checked by practical experiment or observation. The study of medicine was also complicated by the general belief in the influence of supernatural forces. The oldest medical school was that at Salerno in southern Italy, where Saracen influence was strongest, but there were also thriving medical faculties at Bologna, Montpellier, Toulouse, Paris, and elsewhere.

The logical method was much better suited to the study of law. Feudal law, with its infinite variations in practice, was largely ignored and the schools concentrated on a close study of Roman civil law, as embodied in the Justinian Code, and the canon law based on Gratian's *Decretum*, compiled about the middle of the twelfth century. Here the medieval scholars were dealing with authorities and principles, a field well suited to the method of logical deduction in which they excelled. The results of their work were of immense value both to the kings, who were trying to build up a system of royal law to take the place of feudal custom, and to the church, whose authority they placed on a firm legal foundation. The law schools attracted large numbers of students, since a degree in canon or civil law or, better still, in both, opened the way to a lucrative career. The University of Bologna was the most famous center of legal studies, but Padua, Montpellier, and Orléans were not far behind.

Law

Theology was the "Queen of the Sciences" in the Middle Ages, for it was the science that explained religion and showed men the way to salvation. Its development in this period was for the most part the work of men who were teachers in the universities, hence called "schoolmen" or "scholastic" theologians. The majority of them were connected with the University of Paris, which far outstripped all other schools in this field. Two problems especially interested the scholastic theologians. The first was the problem of conflicting authorities, for in theology more than in any other subject the basic method of study was logical deduction from close study of unquestioned authorities, of which the Bible was the chief, with the works of the Fathers and the canons of the church ranking a close second. That these authorities did not always agree was brought forcibly to the attention of the theologians in the first half of the twelfth century by that rash and brilliant young teacher, Peter Abelard, who is now remembered chiefly for the story of his tragic love of Héloise. His arrangement of conflicting authorities in direct opposition to each other in a work boldly entitled *Yes and No* (*Sic et Non*) challenged the logical subtlety of the schoolmen to bring them into harmony. Among the scholars who undertook that task, the most successful was Peter Lombard, whose *Sentences* became the standard textbook of theology.

Theology

A second and still more controversial question was the problem of universals. It is a problem so far removed from modern modes of thought as to be almost incomprehensible to the average man today, but to men trained in philosophy, as were the medieval theologians, it was a question of fundamental importance.

The problem of universals

The question is, briefly, whether the type or the individual, for example the idea of mankind or the individual man, is the ultimate reality. The Realists, as those who followed Aristotle and Plato in holding the former view were called, triumphed for a time in the thirteenth century. Using the philosophical concept of the idea as the universal reality, Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) in his *Summa Theologiae* presented logical proofs for the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the authority of the church, and all the fundamental articles of faith. This effort to base religion on a foundation of reason and scientific proof was probably one of the most important intellectual contributions made during the Middle Ages. In the fourteenth century, however, the opposing school, the Nominalists, gained headway under the leadership of Duns Scotus and William of Occam. The Nominalists asserted that the reality is particular, that, to quote the example mentioned above, the individual man and not the idea or type of mankind is the only reality. It follows from this that the only ideas are the ideas of individual men, the only reason the reasoning of mortal minds. In the field of theology, the eventual triumph of Nominalism destroyed that system of thought which made possible the conclusive, logical proof of those things which the Christian believes, and threw men back upon faith, thus preparing the way for the ideas of Luther and the Protestant Reformation. In a wider field the Nominalist mode of thinking was a step forward toward the modern preoccupation with individual things, to the historians' interest in things as they have actually occurred, and to the scientists' interest in things as they actually are and as they individually behave.

Section D

THE LATER MIDDLE AGES AND THE RENAISSANCE

No accurate dates can ever be assigned to the beginning or end of a period in the development of history, save for purposes of convenience and with the understanding that the dates chosen are purely arbitrary. Since dates are convenient, however, and having allowed for every sort of qualification and mental reservation, we have taken the year 1270 *as marking the end of the High Middle Ages. That year saw the last crusade and the death of that very medieval saint-king, Louis IX, with whom passed the predominantly feudal monarchy in France. Two years later, Edward I of England began the reign that was to found Parliament and to mark the longest step yet taken toward fashioning a centralized monarchical state out of medieval feudalism. And in* 1273 *the shattered Holy Roman Empire was revived in the weakened form characteristic of its later history with the election of the first emperor of the house of Hapsburg. Europe was now about to enter upon an unsettled period of social, political, economic, and intellectual change, marked by the steady decay of medieval institutions and medieval culture. During the following two and a half centuries, feudalism, the guild system of commerce and industry, the universal authority of the papacy, and the scholastic methods of thought and education declined, while in their place arose institutions and ways of thinking of a new and distinctly modern character.*

When this period of the Later Middle Ages was over, Europe stood on the threshold of the modern age. Centralized territorial states had replaced the local autonomy of feudal lords and burgher city governments, and had also broken up the unity of the Respublica Christiana. Man's knowledge of the world had been greatly expanded by daring explorations to the distant East and the unknown West; and man's curiosity regarding himself and the world he lived in had been stimulated by the intellectual ferment of that age, which in the history of culture is generally known as the Renaissance.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE

THE long struggle between the emperors and the popes, with the accompanying feud between the houses of Welf and Hohenstaufen in Germany and the Guelf and Ghibelline parties in Italy, had left the Holy Roman Empire a shattered wreck at the end of the High Middle Ages. After the death of the last Hohenstaufen emperor, Conrad IV, in 1254, there was no generally recognized emperor for nineteen years, though several foreigners claimed the empty title. The empire seemed about to dissolve; but in 1273, the period of "the Interregnum" was brought to an end by the election of a German emperor, and the empire continued to survive, though in a greatly weakened state. Italy was no longer a part of the empire save in theory. Few of the emperors during the Later Middle Ages attempted to exercise authority over the independent Italian city-states. Even in Germany the imperial power could not be revived in any effective way. It had become a land of semi-independent principalities and city-states, in which the emperors enjoyed more prestige than power. Leagues of districts and cities, like the Swiss Confederation and the Hanseatic League, organized themselves in mutual defense against the forces of anarchy about them and learned to depend on their co-operative strength rather than on the emperor for protection. Meanwhile, to the east of the empire, Poland was expanding into a large, though fundamentally weak, territorial state; fierce nomadic Tartars swept out of central Asia across Russia, and retired after two centuries, leaving the princes of Moscow to form the beginnings of the modern Russian state; and from the southeast the Ottoman Turks carried the crescent of Islam from Asia Minor into the Balkans, destroying the Byzantine Empire on their way.

1. THE EMPIRE SURVIVES IN A STATE OF DISINTEGRATION

The German princes had made good use of the opportunities provided by the Interregnum to establish their independence, and this they intended to keep. Nevertheless, they felt the need of a ruler who would be strong enough to suppress the worst confusion and lawlessness, though not strong enough to interfere in the government of their own states. The tradition of the empire was still strong. Only an emperor could complete the formal structure of the

Rudolf of Hapsburg (1273–91)

feudal state and give a semblance of legality to the princes' authority. There was still enough German national feeling, too, to make them insist that the emperor should be a German. They therefore agreed on the election of Count Rudolf of Hapsburg, who seemed to meet all the requirements to perfection. His family was an ancient and honorable one, with large estates on the northwestern slopes of the Alps, but it was not one of the great princely houses. He himself was popular, a fine, upstanding figure of a man, with a reputation for amiability and knightly valor. On the whole, Rudolf made a very satisfactory emperor. He used his prestige wisely to put down lawlessness and to re-establish peace wherever possible by diplomatic negotiations. At the same time, he made no attempt to interfere with the rights of the princes, and he sold privileges freely to both princes and cities. Only one thing alarmed the electors. Rudolf was bent on acquiring land and power for his family. He seized the German fiefs of King Ottokar II of Bohemia, who had refused to recognize his election, and from them granted Austria, Styria, and Carniola to his own son Albert, thus founding a strong domain in southeastern Germany, which the Hapsburgs were to keep until the present century.

Rudolf's success had shown that the imperial title still meant something, if not very much. It had also warned the electors not to leave the crown in one family, lest it become too powerful. Passing over Rudolf's son, Duke Albert of Austria, they chose Adolf of Nassau (1292–98), a Rhenish count who was willing to promise anything the electors demanded as the price of the crown. He failed to keep his promises, however, and before long the disappointed Duke Albert was able to stir up a rebellion among the discontented princes. Adolf was defeated and slain, and the Hapsburg duke was elected in his place. Albert spent his reign (1298–1308) in an attempt to strengthen the authority of the crown, but was assassinated by a member of his own family before he could accomplish anything definite. Again the electors turned from the powerful Hapsburg family. This time they offered the crown to Count Henry of Luxemburg, whose lands lay in the half-French, half-German country to the west of the Rhine. Henry VII (1308–13) had many of the qualities that should go to make a good ruler. He had also a high conception of the imperial dignity, and it was this that caused his downfall. The desire to be crowned at Rome and to reassert imperial authority in Italy, which had lured so many medieval emperors to destruction, led him to purchase temporary peace in Germany by scattering privileges among the princes and to embark on an expedition across the Alps. In Italy he was hailed with

Emperors from different families (1292–1347)

delight by many, including the great poet Dante, who hoped that he would be able to end the struggle between the Guelf and Ghibelline parties and restore peace. He himself became involved in the party feud, however, and died after three years of fruitless strife. His only solid accomplishment had been the winning of Bohemia for his son John before leaving Germany. This accession of territory for the house of Luxemburg proved again the value of the imperial title. Both Frederick of Hapsburg, the son of the late Emperor Albert, and Lewis, Duke of Bavaria, made a bid for it. The result was a disputed election, a civil war, and the final triumph of the latter candidate. During his long reign, Lewis IV, "the Bavarian" (1314–47), concentrated his attention on adding to the lands held by his family, the Wittelsbachs. He won for them Brandenburg, the Tyrol, and four provinces of the Netherlands. Save for a long-drawn-out struggle with the popes, which will be discussed later,[1] this was the most important event of his reign. Much of this territory was later lost, but the Wittelsbachs clung to the rule of Bavaria until the revolution that followed the late World War.

Weakness of imperial authority

During all this time, the passing of the imperial crown from family to family with each generation prevented the emperors from taking any consistent steps to strengthen their authority outside their family domains, or even from developing any strong desire to do so. Any move in that direction would have met with strong opposition and would have had to be carried out at the emperor's own expense; for neither princes nor cities could be forced to pay taxes or furnish military service with any regularity. No emperor could afford to undertake seriously such a colossal task, especially as the crown, with whatever increased authority he could give it, would in all probability pass to some other family at his death. Had the monarchy been hereditary, as in France and England, there would have been a much stronger incentive to make its power effective. As it was, the chief value of the imperial title was the right it gave the emperors to regrant "escheated fiefs," that is, fiefs that had reverted to the crown through lack of heirs. The emperors used this right regularly, as well as the opportunity furnished by the prestige of the imperial title to contract favorable marriages, to add to their domain. The crown, in short, was regarded principally as a good investment for the family of the emperor.

After the death of Lewis the Bavarian, the imperial title was given back to the house of Luxemburg, where it remained with one short break for nearly a century. But neither Charles IV nor his sons did anything

[1] See below, page 321.

to strengthen the imperial power in Germany. They were not really German and were not much interested in Germany. Charles had inherited the kingdom of Bohemia from his father, King John, the brilliant, erratic son of Emperor Henry VII, and he was always ready to sacrifice the empire to the interests of his family and his kingdom. A later emperor once called him "the arch-father of Bohemia and arch-stepfather of the empire." The former title, at least, he earned by his wise and conscientious rule of Bohemia. He kept peace and order there; reformed the judicial and administrative system; founded the University of Prague; and in general made Bohemia one of the greatest of the imperial states. Further, he acquired Brandenburg for his son Sigismund, taking it from the family of Wittelsbach.

Charles IV of Luxemburg (1347–78)

With unusual realism, Charles IV recognized the futility of trying to establish an effective monarchy in Germany. All that could be done, he thought, was to take steps to prevent further disintegration. He had no confidence in the Diet of the empire as an institution of government. This body, which was a meeting of all the princes as vassals of the emperor, was always hopelessly divided and had shown itself to be quite powerless. Charles turned instead to the electors who, he hoped, might co-operate to prevent war and keep order if their own position was sufficiently secure. With this in mind, he published the Golden Bull at the Diet of 1356. The bull carefully defined the method of election and the personnel of the electors so as to prevent further disputes over the imperial title, such as had so often split Germany into warring factions in the past. There were to be seven electors only, including three ecclesiastical princes (the Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne, and Trier) and four secular princes (the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Margrave of Brandenburg, the Duke of Saxony, and the King of Bohemia). The rest of the bull was taken up with provisions for protecting the power of the electors. They were to have full sovereign power within their states; their territories were not to be divided for any reason; those of the secular electors were to be inherited according to the rule of primogeniture; and the title was to remain attached to the territory. The Golden Bull was the nearest approach to a written constitution the empire ever had, and it was immensely important for the later history of Germany. It prevented many possible civil wars over elections, and it checked the breaking-up of the larger states through divided inheritance, since other princes soon followed the example of the electors in adopting the rule of primogeniture. The electors, of course, gained most from the bull. They became practically independent sovereigns,

The Golden Bull (1356)

ruling well-defined territorial states as allies rather than subjects of the emperor.

Under the sons of Charles IV the imperial power declined still further. The elder of the two, Wenceslas or Wenzel (1378–1400), was indolent and habitually intoxicated. He had difficulty in maintaining his position in Bohemia, while in Germany he neglected his duties so scandalously that the electors finally deposed him and chose in his place Rupert, Count Palatine of the Rhine (1400–10). Wenceslas was still ruling Bohemia when Rupert died, but the electors again rejected him and gave the imperial crown to his younger brother Sigismund (1410–37), who had been King of Hungary since 1387. More interested in Hungary than in the empire, Sigismund made only occasional brief visits to Germany. Save at the Council of Constance,[1] where he used his great diplomatic ability to help restore peace to the church, he did nothing to justify his election. It was at Constance, incidentally, in the year 1415 that Sigismund gave the Mark of Brandenburg with its electoral title to Frederick of Hohenzollern, whose descendants were in time to make it the nucleus of the Prussian Kingdom and finally of the modern German Empire.

Later Luxemburg emperors (1378–1437)

The election of Albert II (1438–39) and Frederick III (1440–93) of Hapsburg in succession restored the imperial crown to the house of Hapsburg, where it remained as long as the empire lasted. The change, however, brought no improvement in imperial authority. The policy of the Hapsburgs was an entirely selfish one. They were interested only in their own family fortunes.

The crown passes to the Hapsburgs (1438)

The empire was by this time little more than a geographical expression or, as one contemporary writer put it, the shadow of a great name. Germany had lost all national unity, but this was to some extent compensated for by the growing power of the rulers of territorial states like Austria, Bavaria, Hesse, and the electoral principalities. In these we find the development of strong centralized government and, in some cases, of representative institutions, very similar to that which was taking place during the Later Middle Ages in France and England. The Estates or *Landtage* of Bavaria and Bohemia in particular acquired a share in the government comparable to that of the States General in France. Outside these greater principalities, however, all was hopeless confusion. There were a number of ecclesiastical states, ruled by archbishops, bishops, or abbots, and innumerable small territories under the jurisdiction of independent barons or free knights of the empire, who

State of Germany

[1] See below, pages 328–29.


recognized no superior except the emperor. There were also some sixty free imperial cities, like Frankfort-on-Main, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Strasbourg, which were independent city-states, save for the emperor's nominal authority. In this tangled mass of petty independent jurisdictions, there was no power strong enough to enforce law and order or to give protection to life and property. Conditions were bad enough in the large states and within the walls of the imperial cities. Outside these, the most frightful state of lawlessness prevailed.

The Holy Vehm

Faced by this situation, the people, first of northwestern Germany and later in other parts, took matters into their own hands and formed a secret society for the suppression of crime. The society of the Holy Vehm (or Veme) will in some respects remind the modern American student of the Vigilantes in the lawless days of our own West. The Vehm, however, was much better organized. It was not a temporary or local phenomenon, but was active for decades in many parts of Germany. It reached the highest point of its power and prestige under the Emperor Sigismund, who, admitting his inability to enforce justice, himself became a member of the society. The Vehm held regular courts; tried those accused of serious crimes; and executed the guilty. These courts had no legal authority, but they were backed by the whole force of the society and were more dreaded than any of the legal courts of the land. In the later fifteenth century, the Vehm, like so many other lawless organizations for the enforcement of law, degenerated and its members abused their power, so that it had to be suppressed.

2. THE SWISS CONFEDERATION AND THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE

Despite the disintegration of the empire and the general lawlessness and frequent petty wars that resulted, Germany was on the whole more prosperous than ever during the centuries of the Later Middle Ages. Commerce and industry flourished in the cities. The failure of the central government was undoubtedly a great handicap, but the people of the empire did not accept a state of anarchy with spineless resignation. Many parts of the empire were forming independent states or associations. We have already noted the development of the larger territorial states. Where these did not exist, leagues of knights, districts, or cities were formed for mutual defense. Such, for example, was the League of Swabian Cities, founded by permission of Charles IV, which for some time withstood the encroachments of the neighboring princes. The various motives underlying these defensive associations, political or economic, are best illustrated by the history of the two most important ones, the


The Swiss Confederation
1291-1453
Scale of Miles
0 10 20 40
Shows the Swiss Confederation at its greatest extent in the sixteenth century
The boundaries of modern Switzerland are slightly different
Three original forest cantons
Cantons added in the fourteenth century
Cantons added in the fifteenth century
Basel, Schaffhausen and Constance are free imperial cities
6°
7°
8°
9°
10°
47°
46°
ALSACE
Basel
Schaffhausen
Constance
LAKE OF CONSTANCE
St. Gall
Zurich
AARGAU
ZUG
Sempach
Lucerne
Morgarten
LUCERNE
SCHWYZ
Näfels
GLARUS
COUNTY OF BURGUNDY
Granson
Morat
Berne
UNTER-WALDEN
Rhine R.
Chur
COUNTY OF TYROL
URI
GRISONS
St. Gotthard Pass
Splügen Pass
NORTHERN TICINO
LAKE GENEVA
Geneva
Rhone R.
SION
Rhone VALLEY
DUCHY OF SAVOY
Great St. Bernard Pass
Aosta
MILAN
ITALIAN
VENETIAN TERRITORY IN THE 15th CENTURY
Longitude East from Greenwich

confederation of the Swiss cantons and the league of the Hanseatic cities.

The Swiss Confederation, out of which has grown the modern state of Switzerland, originated in a league of three small rural districts or cantons in the Alpine valleys about the Lake of Lucerne. The league was formed for mutual defense against the exactions of their feudal overlords of the house of Hapsburg. The struggle went on obscurely through most of the second half of the thirteenth century; but it was not till the death of the Emperor Rudolf in 1291 that the three cantons of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden combined in a formal federation to assert their right to local self-government with no superior save the emperor. The three cantons occupied a mountain district no more than thirty-five miles square, but they were important because they commanded the great trade route to Italy through the Saint Gotthard Pass. Emperors not of the house of Hapsburg were glad to give recognition to the claims of the mountaineers. The cantons, however, owed their independence almost entirely to their own stubborn courage and their mastery of the technique of mountain warfare. In 1315, they won a brilliant victory at Morgarten, where they caught an army led against them by Leopold of Hapsburg in a narrow pass and almost wiped it out, killing between fifteen hundred and two thousand of the pick of Hapsburg chivalry. Thereafter, they remained practically independent states under the empire. Neighboring cities and cantons, envying them their freedom, soon joined the confederation. By the middle of the fourteenth century, there were eight members, Zug, Glarus, Lucerne, Zurich, and Berne having been added to the original three. By 1513, the number had been increased to thirteen, including the prosperous Rhine city of Basle, while the territories around the frontier in almost all directions had either been reduced to subjection or brought into a friendly alliance with the confederation.[1]

The Swiss Confederation

A passionate love of freedom and independence was the outstanding characteristic of the Swiss people. It was at once the strength and the weakness of the confederation. The cantons would stand together in sturdy defiance of all outside authority; but within the league each canton guarded its independent rights just as jealously. Each had its own separate government, though all sent representatives to a general Diet where matters of foreign policy or general interest were discussed. The laws of the Diet, however, could be enforced only through the governments of the cantons, and were enforced only if they chose to do so. There was always a good deal of friction and

Its character


[1] See map opposite page 288.

jealousy between the cantons, arising from differences in character and interest. Most of the cantons were German, but those to the southwest with their dependencies were French-speaking, while most of the subject or allied districts to the south were Italian. Moreover, the "Forest Cantons" which had originally formed the confederation were purely rural, while several of the later additions, like Zurich, Berne, and Basle, centered around busy commercial and industrial cities. Through their wealth, these latter tended to dominate the confederation, thus arousing the jealousy of the Forest Cantons who never forgot that the Swiss owed the origins of their freedom to the hardy mountaineers who defended the Alpine passes against the might of the Hapsburg.

Growth of the Hansa

While the Swiss were forming a confederation for mutual defense on the southern borders of Germany, the rich merchant cities of the north were joining in a still more powerful association to protect their commercial interests. The land along the southern shores of the Baltic had been acquired from the Slavs and settled by Germans only recently, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Here the emperor's authority had never been strong, and with the decline of the empire it ceased to function altogether. The merchants in the new German cities of this district, as well as those in the hopelessly disorganized northwestern section of old Germany, were forced to depend on their own efforts to ensure their safety when traveling and to secure trading rights abroad. This could be accomplished only by cooperation, not only of all the merchants in each city, as was done by means of the merchant guild almost everywhere during the Middle Ages, but of a number of cities together. Only so could the cities maintain a fleet large enough to suppress the pirates who swarmed in the Baltic and the North Sea, or bring sufficient pressure to bear on foreign states to make them grant favorable commercial treaties. From this necessity grew the league of North German cities, generally known as the Hansa or Hanseatic League. The first step in the association had been taken by the cities of Hamburg and Lübeck about the middle of the thirteenth century. Other cities joined them in rapid succession. By the end of the century, the Hansa had secured trading privileges of a very favorable kind in London, Bruges, Bergen, and Novgorod. These cities remained the chief foreign markets for North German trade in England, the Netherlands, Norway, and Russia respectively.

The formal organization of the Hanseatic League, however, was not completed till the middle of the fourteenth century. Even then it was no more than a vague and loosely defined confederation of cities, some seventy in all, though the number is uncertain owing to frequent deser-


The Hanseatic League and The Teutonic Knights
SCALE OF MILES
0 20 40 60 80 100 200
The cities of the league are marked by dots
Represents the possessions of the Teutonic Knights at their greatest extent
4°
12°
20°
28°
52°
Bergen
NORWAY
Stockholm
SWEDEN
ESTHONIA
Novgorod
LIVONIA
Wisby
GOTLAND
COURLAND
Düna R.
SAMOGITIA
Niemen R.
Kalmar
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
DENMARK
Schonen
Copenhagen
Königsberg
York
RÜGEN
Dantzig
Marienburg
POMERELIA
PRUSSIA
LITHUANIA
Lübeck
Hamburg
Elbe R.
ENGLAND
Norwich
Stourbridge Fair
Bremen
Weser R.
NEUMARK
Vistula R.
Dobrzin
London
Berlin
Magdeburg
POLAND
Bruges
Scheldt R.
Meuse R.
Rhine R.
Cologne
Merseburg
Oder R.
Breslau
Cracow
Longitude East 12° from Greenwich

tions and realliances. The member-cities were grouped under four general territorial divisions: those of the eastern Baltic, the western Baltic, northwestern Germany, and the lower Rhine. In these districts the cities of Danzig, Lübeck, Brunswick, and Cologne were recognized as holding a position of rather vague leadership. On important occasions, representatives from all the cities met together to decide questions of foreign policy or to make trade regulations. Despite its loose organization, the league was strong enough to play a very important part in the politics both of northern Germany and of the Scandinavian countries, and to keep an almost complete monopoly of the Baltic trade.

Organization of the Hanseatic League

Control of the Baltic was essential to the prosperity of the northern cities. From that sea came nearly all the herring and cod, for which the fasts of the church created so great a demand. It was also the highway between northern and eastern Europe and the countries that faced the Atlantic. From Novgorod and the lands bordering on the Baltic, the Hanseatic merchants carried furs, wax, amber for the making of rosaries, copper, pitch, tar, grain, flax, and timber, as well as the invaluable herring. These commodities were traded in Bruges or London for wool, cloth, and manufactured articles.

Hanseatic commerce

The second half of the fourteenth century was the period of the league's greatest power and prosperity. It remained strong for a century longer, but signs of decay were increasingly visible. Social strife between the poorer classes and the wealthy governing aristocracy at times prevented some of the cities from taking an active part in the league's affairs. The defection of the Cologne group of cities during a considerable part of the fifteenth century also tended to weaken the league. The general conditions of trade were changing. Trade routes were shifting steadily to the west; the rulers of territorial states were developing national economic policies; and the new capitalistic methods of business did not fit into the Hanseatic tradition. Finally, the conquest of the Teutonic Knights by Poland, the closing of Novgorod to German trade through the rise of the hostile principality of Moscow, and the union of all three Scandinavian countries under one ruler, all helped to shake the league's domination of the Baltic trade. The Hansa lasted for two centuries longer, but was never a great power after the end of the fifteenth century.

Decline of the league

The history of the Hanseatic League is closely bound up with that of the order of Teutonic Knights. It was these crusading warriors who had made possible the expansion of German colonies and trade to the eastern Baltic by their conquest of Prussia from its heathen inhabitants in

the thirteenth century.[1] The knights encouraged German peasants, nobles, and burghers to migrate to their newly conquered territory. Numbers of new German cities sprang up along the coast and the river-banks. Danzig, Marienburg, Königsberg, and a score of others became flourishing commercial centers. They formed one of the "quarters" of the Hansa, and the league could always count on the knights as allies in its wars with the other Baltic powers. The decline of the order in the fifteenth century was therefore a serious blow to the league. By that time, too great prosperity had begun to undermine the discipline and religious character that had made the knights so effective an organization during their period of conquest. In 1410, the Poles invaded the territory of the knights and defeated them disastrously at the battle of Tannenberg. The order retained its land for another half-century, but in a weakened and impoverished condition. A second and more disastrous war with Poland ended in the Peace of Thorn, 1466. The western part of Prussia was annexed to Poland and the grand master of the order had to do homage for the remainder of his territory as vassal of the Polish king.

The Teutonic Knights

Relations with the three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, also formed an important part of the history of the Hanseatic League. Since the break-up of the Danish empire of King Canute in the eleventh century, the Scandinavian countries had taken no active part in European affairs and were in general rather more backward than their southern neighbors. In the fourteenth century, Denmark was the most active of the three, and an attempt on the part of its king to encroach on Hanseatic trade led to a war with the league that lasted from 1361 to 1370. The league was finally successful. By the Treaty of Stralsund, the Hansa was given complete freedom of trade in Danish territory and the right to participate in the election of Danish kings, though this latter privilege was never effectively enforced. For a generation the league dominated Scandinavian politics as well as trade, but toward the end of the century its influence was endangered by the union, first of Denmark and Norway and finally of Sweden also under one ruler in the Union of Kalmar, 1397. The union, which lasted till the end of the Middle Ages, was never a very strong coalition, but it was a standing menace to the Hanseatic monopoly of northern trade. In the sixteenth century, Sweden gradually acquired a dominating position in the eastern Baltic.

The Scandinavian countries

[1] See above, pages 211–12, and map, page 291.

3. EASTERN EUROPE

Let us turn now to a brief survey of the history of eastern Europe during the Later Middle Ages. Throughout most of the fourteenth century, the Slavic kingdom of Poland, which was the empire's largest eastern neighbor, was engaged in a long conflict in alliance with the Teutonic Knights against the heathen Lithuanians, whose expanding territory stretched along the eastern frontiers of Poland from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In 1386 this situation changed abruptly. By the marriage of a Polish princess to Jagiello of Lithuania and the election of the latter as King of Poland, the two states were united and Lithuania formally adopted Christianity. The territory of Poland was thus more than doubled and she acquired an outlet to the sea at both north and south. The new power of the combined countries was turned immediately against the Teutonic Knights, who, with the conversion of the Lithuanians, had no further religious reason for their existence. We have already noted the defeat of the order and the acquisition by Poland of western Prussia in 1466. Poland was now one of the largest territorial states in Europe; but it was never able to make full use of its potential power. It lacked unity and stability. In old Poland the cities had been largely Germanized, while the country districts had remained Slavic, and in the new acquisitions to the east the population was a mixture of Lithuanian and Russian Slav having little in common with the Poles. Moreover, the elective monarchy and the selfish independence of the Polish nobles prevented the development of a strong central government. Anarchical feudalism lasted in Poland long after it had died out in the western states.

Expansion of Poland

Beyond Poland in eastern Europe the Slavs of Russia labored under the yoke of their Tartar masters. All through the Middle Ages the Russians had faced east rather than west. Since their conversion to Christianity in the tenth century, they had been members of the Greek Orthodox Church. They looked to Byzantium for leadership in religion and culture as well as for trade. The great principality of Kiev which ruled most of Russia in the early eleventh century, though Scandinavian in origin, was distinctly Byzantine in civilization. Even after it broke up into a number of minor principalities, the Greek Church and Byzantine-Russian culture continued to give some national unity to the Russian people. Then came the Tartars. They were of much the same race as the Huns and other Asiatic Mongolian peoples who had invaded Europe from time to time since the fourth century. Under the leadership of their great khan, Jenghis,

Tartar conquest of Russia


the Tartar nomads conquered a vast empire in the first quarter of the thirteenth century, which included all of central Asia, China, and southern Asia as far as the Himalayas. Later, the grandson of Jenghis Khan, Batu, led his conquering horsemen west through Russia, laying waste the country as he went. By 1242, he was raiding Poland and eastern Germany, but was recalled by the death of the great khan, the son of Jenghis. In the division of the Mongol Empire which followed, Batu was left the western section, including most of Russia, where he founded the khanate of the Golden Horde. Meanwhile, the Tartars had also invaded the Mohammedan Empire, sweeping across Persia as far as Bagdad. For some two hundred and forty years, the Tartars of the Golden Horde continued to rule Russia. They had caused tremendous destruction of life and property during their first wild invasion, but thereafter they did not interfere seriously in the life of the people save to collect taxes with an iron hand.

During the period of Tartar conquest, the Russian princes governed the people under the suzerainty of the khan, and the Greek Church was left undisturbed. Even the task of collecting taxes was delegated to native princes, and it was this fact that accounts for the rising power of the principality of Moscow. In 1328 a prince of the Muscovite family was commissioned by the khan to collect the Tartar tribute. His descendants retained the commission and used the authority delegated to them by the khan to build up the power of their family. Moscow became the center of Russian culture and, after the fall of Constantinople, of the Greek Church. Meanwhile, the Muscovite princes were expanding their territory at the expense of the cities and lesser princes about them. In 1478, Prince Ivan III conquered Novgorod, the great commercial city which had never been subdued by the Tartars and which had maintained a prosperous trade with the West through the merchants of the Hansa. Two years later, Ivan declared his independence of the khan and threw off the Tartar yoke. The Golden Horde had been declining in power for a long time and gave up its hold on central Russia almost without a struggle, leaving it to the rule of the Prince of Moscow, who thus formed the beginnings of the modern Russian state.

Rise of Moscow

While the Tartar power was fading in Russia, eastern Europe was being menaced from the south by the advance of still another race of Asiatic conquerors. The Ottoman Turks were Asiatic nomads who, like the Seljuk Turks of an earlier time, had drifted westward and had adopted the Mohammedan religion. Late in the thirteenth century, they established themselves in

The Turks invade Europe


Conquests of the Ottoman Turks
Scale of Miles
0 40 80 120 240
Turkish Conquests are left white· other territories are shaded
The dates are those of battles or of acquisition of territory by the Ottoman Turks
HUNGARY
MOLDAVIA
CRIMEA 1475
Belgrade (1456)
WALLACHIA 1462
BOSNIA 1463
HERZEGOVINA
SERBIA 1459
Nicopolis (1396)
Danube
BULGARIA
Sofia (1381)
Varna (1444)
BLACK SEA
Kossovo (1389)
RUMELIA
Scutari (1479)
ALBANIA
Adrianople (1362)
Constantinople (1453)
Trebizond 1462
Otranto (1480)
MACEDONIA
Salonika (1430)
1462 Gallipoli (1353-4)
TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE OTTOMAN TURKS in 1350
Angora (1402)
MINOR
ASIA
EPIRUS 1480
VENETIAN POSSESSIONS
1462
1470
KARAMAN 1466
MOREA 1460
Athens
KNIGHTS HOSPITALERS
CRETE
CYPRUS
MAMELUKES
18
22
26
30
34
38
42

Asia Minor. In 1350, they conquered what remained of the Byzantine provinces in Asia Minor and, three years later, they crossed the Hellespont into Europe. During the next century they gradually spread their conquests through the Balkans, though the city of Constantinople still remained unconquered. At last, in the fateful year 1453, even that impregnable stronghold fell before the Turkish attack and the last remnant of the Byzantine Empire ceased to exist. The Turks were now able to turn their undivided attention to westward expansion. They completed their conquest of Greece, Bosnia, Serbia, and Albania, and invaded Hungary. There they were checked by the courageous resistance of the Hungarians under the leadership of their heroic kings John Hunyadi and his son Matthias Corvinus. In the early years of the sixteenth century, however, the Turks finally succeeded in breaking down the Hungarian defense and taking over the greater part of the kingdom. From there they went on to threaten Austria. By 1529, they were hammering at the gates of Vienna and the whole of Europe had been made acutely conscious of the Turkish peril.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

FRANCE AND ENGLAND TO THE END OF THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

IN THE last years of the thirteenth century, both France and England were about to enter on a period of gradual transition that was to change them, each in its own peculiar way, from medieval to modern states. In France feudalism was still strong, but the Capetian kings had expanded the royal domain till it included more than half the kingdom and the monarchy was already a real power in the land. In England the royal government was much farther advanced, though feudal barons still strove to control it. In both countries the first step in the transition was marked by the realization that the military and financial methods of feudalism were no longer adequate to meet the needs of the central government. The kings of France and England were forced to levy extra-feudal taxes that were national in scope, and to this end they summoned to their courts for aid and counsel representatives of their humbler subjects who were not their immediate vassals. The feudal Great Council thus evolved into the French States General and the English Parliament. These institutions had barely begun before both countries were plunged into the long and bloody struggle known as the Hundred Years' War. The war dragged on its weary way, laying waste the richest land of France for generations and to a lesser degree draining the resources of England, but in the end leaving both well on the road to a hard-won national unity. In France the monarchy emerged triumphant and uncontrolled. In England, on the other hand, Parliament had profited skillfully from the king's need for money to carry on the war. The foundations of constitutional government were so firmly planted that they would outlast the disturbances of royal family feuds and the absolutism of Tudor and Stuart kings.

1. CONSOLIDATION OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE UNDER THE LAST CAPETIANS (1270–1328)

Philip III (1270–85)

Philip III inherited from his saintly father, Louis IX, a large royal domain and an authority that even the most powerful of his vassals had been forced to respect. To both of these legacies Philip added considerably during his otherwise rather inglorious reign. By reversion and marriage he expanded the royal

domain to include the counties of Toulouse, Poitou, and Champagne and, for a time, the kingdom of Navarre, not to mention numerous other small additions acquired on one pretext or another. Under him, too, and thanks in all probability more to the incessant activity of his ministers than to his own efforts, the royal government developed steadily in efficiency and practical power.

Philip IV and his ministers (1285–1314)

With the reign of Philip IV, called the Fair, we enter definitely on the transitional period in the history of the French monarchy. The time was now ripe for the king to assert his position as king rather than as mere feudal overlord and for him to adopt what may well be called a national policy both at home and abroad. This Philip the Fair did with momentous results; but how much of the credit or blame should be awarded to the king himself is still a matter of doubt much debated by historians. There seems good reason to believe that the real driving force behind the royal government came less from the king than from his ministers, Pierre Flotte, Guillaume de Nogaret, and others whose names are not so familiar. These men were professional administrators, of comparatively humble birth, who had been trained in the royal court and who depended entirely on the king for their position. Hence they were devoted to the king's interests. Most of them were lawyers, well versed in Roman law and impregnated with its monarchical principles. They were cool-headed, sagacious, and unscrupulous enemies of feudalism, the papacy, or any other power that infringed on the king's rights. In the midst of their vigorous activity we can only dimly discern the enigmatic figure of the king.

Foreign policy

Philip's assertion of royal authority throughout France soon brought him into conflict with his two most independent vassals, Edward I, King of England, who held the fiefs of Guienne and Gascony in southwestern France as a legacy from his Angevin ancestors, and the Count of Flanders, whose fief to the northwest included rich commercial and industrial cities closely connected by trade with England. War with the former broke out in 1294. After four years of fighting, both parties agreed to a truce which was finally confirmed by a peace treaty five years later. The Count of Flanders, however, who had joined Edward in the war, was not included in the truce. Left to himself, he was forced to submit and his rich county was added to the French king's domain. Philip's success in this direction was brief. In 1302, the Flemish burghers rose in revolt, massacred French residents, and almost annihilated a French army sent against them at Courtrai. Three years of bitter fighting followed before Philip restored

peace by giving Flanders back to its count at the price of a heavy indemnity. Meanwhile, Philip's diplomats had been pressing French claims along the eastern frontier and bit by bit adding imperial lands to France. The most important acquisition in this direction was the Free County of Burgundy (Franche Comté) which Philip acquired through the marriage of his eldest son to the count's heiress. Finally, and not least important of his foreign policies, Philip strongly opposed the interference of Pope Boniface VIII in French affairs, with far-reaching results that will be recounted in the next chapter.

His expensive wars with England and Flanders left Philip in great need of money, and his victory over the papacy opened up at least one way of recouping his losses. The religious order of Knights Templars was a tempting prey, for the Templars had grown enormously rich in land and money. They had become great bankers and had lent large sums to the king. Moreover, since the conclusion of the crusades, they had no longer any respectable reason for existence. Philip, therefore, set about cold-bloodedly to accomplish their ruin, with a view to cancelling his debts and confiscating their wealth. The prosecution, begun by Nogaret in 1307, continued for five years. The knights were arrested and forced under torture to confess to the most horrible charges of immorality and blasphemy. A widespread propaganda accompanied the prosecution, all the more effective because of the secrecy that had always shrouded the life of the order. The final act in this judicial farce was the abolition of the order in 1312 by Pope Clement V, who was completely under the thumb of the French king. Their lands were to be given to the Knights Hospitalers, but in France, at least, it was the king who profited.

Philip crushes the Templars

As the government of Philip the Fair was more nearly national than that of any of his predecessors, it is not surprising to find him breaking with feudal precedent and making a bid for popular support by summoning representatives of the burgher middle class as well as his feudal vassals and clergy to give consent to his decisions on matters of national importance. The States General, as the new assembly of all three classes or estates came to be called, was summoned only at times of crisis, such as the struggle with Boniface VIII in 1302, which motivated the first summons, or the attack on the Templars in 1308, or when unusual taxes were needed. The last was, indeed, the most important reason for the innovation. The greatly increased expenses of the royal government, particularly in time of war, could no longer be met from the regular income from the royal domain and feudal dues, or even by such extraor-

Origin of the States General

dinary measures as the debasement of the coinage or the confiscation of property belonging to Jews, Templars, or Lombard bankers. New taxes on all classes were necessary; and these could be collected more easily if the people at large had given their consent, even though it were only a matter of form, through their representatives. French kings had long been accustomed to summoning their vassals-in-chief, lay and ecclesiastical, to their court to give aid and counsel as part of their feudal obligation. What makes Philip's action a new departure was the extension of that summons to representatives of the towns — that is, to the commons who were his subjects rather than his feudal vassals — to meet with the Great Council.

The summons typical of a general tendency

Though a new departure for the French monarchy, the summoning of the States General was not, however, an isolated instance of appeal by a ruling prince for support from representatives of the rising urban middle class, whose possession of money made them an increasingly important group from the point of view of a financially embarrassed prince. Other states, including England, the Spanish kingdoms, the empire, and the territorial principalities of germany, were following the same procedure at this time. Moreover, in France itself the great feudatories, the half-independent vassals outside the royal domain, were doing the same thing in summoning the estates of their own territories. The States General were so named to distinguish them from the local or feudal estates, some of which maintained their separate existence for centuries.

Organization of the States General

The States General did not acquire their name or full organization at once, but with repeated meeting the new body gradually took shape. For consultation the assembly split up into three bodies, each made up of the representatives of one of the estates of the realm, the nobles, the clergy, and the commons respectively. The last named, the "Third Estate," was composed mainly of representatives elected in various ways by the burghers of the chartered towns. Later, at times, the election was extended to include the country districts as well. But as most land was owned by the nobles, the only commons who were important enough to be represented on most occasions were the city middle class. The function of the estates was not to initiate legislation or to control the government. Their duty was to consent to whatever the king proposed, though they might present lists of grievances in the hope that the king would take steps to redress them. The new institution was a means of bringing the royal government into closer contact with the

most important classes in the state. In its origin at least, it was rather an extension of the king's power than a limitation upon it.

The executive authority in the state still rested entirely with the king and the ministers whom he appointed. The *curia regis* was much as it had been in the days of Philip Augustus and Louis IX, save that it now handled a great deal more business and that the special departments, the king's council of confidential advisers, the *chambre des comptes*, the *parlement*, and the chancery, which did all the secretarial work for the government, were now more definitely and permanently organized.

Royal administration

After the death of Philip the Fair, his three sons, Louis X (1314–16), Philip V (1316–22), and Charles IV (1322–28) followed him on the throne in rapid and uneventful succession. All three died without male heirs. This presented an unprecedented problem of succession, as it was the first time since the foundation of the Capetian monarchy in the tenth century that there had not been a son to assume his father's crown. Louis X had left a daughter, but his brother Philip had seized the throne, justifying his action by the principle, based on a fanciful appeal to the "Salic Law" of the ancient Franks, that "a woman does not succeed to the throne of France." After that principle had been revived on his own death and that of his younger brother, the crown passed finally from the direct line of the Capetians. It was given to Philip of Valois, a nephew of Philip the Fair, who took the title Philip VI.

The sons of Philip IV (1314–28)

2. GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND UNDER EDWARD I AND EDWARD II (1272–1327)

The history of France under Philip the Fair finds in many respects a close parallel in that of England under Edward I, Philip's contemporary and natural enemy. There, too, the king expanded the territory under his immediate rule, consolidated the royal government, and appealed to popular support by summoning representatives of the commons to his council. In England, however, thanks to the constructive work of the Angevin kings in the twelfth century and of the royal ministers in the thirteenth, there was already a much more closely united state than in France; feudalism was not so decentralized; and the king's authority was more nearly universal and more effective. It needed only the work of a wise and strong king to complete the first step in welding England into a strong constitutional state. And for such a purpose Edward I was ideally qualified. His ap-

Edward I (1272–1307)

pearance and character were well suited to catch the popular imagination and to make him a national hero. He was tall and well built, a good soldier and at least every other inch a gentleman. He had, moreover, a sound legal mind and a genius for the organization of institutions. Before he came to the throne he had had a good deal of experience as the most active force in the government under his feeble father Henry III. Historians have hailed him, not only as the conqueror of Wales, but, more important, as the English Justinian and the father of the English Parliament.

Conquest of Wales

Edward's ambition to make England a strong and united state led naturally to attempts to bring all parts of the island under his rule. The mountainous districts of Wales had never been fully conquered by either Saxon or Norman. There the Welsh clansmen maintained their own Celtic language and customs and fought bitterly for the freedom they prized more highly than either settled government or economic prosperity. Norman barons, called the Marcher Lords because it was their duty to defend the march or border, had gradually encroached on the Welsh valleys until less than half of Wales was left under the native prince, and even he was in theory the vassal of the English king. Early in Edward's reign, however, the Welsh prince, Llewellyn, gave the king an excuse for conquest by throwing off his allegiance. Edward's first campaign in 1277 was successful; but it was easier to conquer the Welsh than to hold them. In 1282, the king had to reconquer Llewellyn and his rebellious mountaineers. This time he reorganized the principality, dividing it into shires of the English type, directly under the royal government. Later, he made his eldest son titular Prince of Wales, which title the heir to the English throne has kept down to the present time. There were other rebellions and much discontent among the patriotic Welsh for generations, but Edward had succeeded in making Wales a permanent part of the English state, to the eventual benefit of both peoples.

Wars with Scotland and France

With Wales conquered, Scotland remained the only part of the island outside Edward's rule. Here he had to deal with a feudal kingdom, less advanced but otherwise not greatly different from his own. The settled Lowlands, at least, were closely akin to England, containing a strong intermixture of Saxon, Danish, and Norman blood and having already adopted Saxon-Norman speech and customs. A disputed succession to the Scottish throne in 1290 gave Edward his first opportunity to interfere in the northern kingdom. Asserting a doubtful claim to overlordship of Scotland, he secured the throne for John Balliol, whom he then proceeded to treat as a vassal, with

the result that Balliol rebelled and formed an alliance with Philip the Fair who was at war with England at the time. Despite the distraction of the French war, Edward marched north and conquered Scotland in 1296. But he had reckoned without the independent spirit of the Scottish people who soon rose in rebellion against their foreign master under the leadership of the knightly William Wallace. A second conquest, accomplished in 1305, after years of campaigning, lasted no longer. The Scots rose again under a new claimant to the throne, Robert Bruce, and Edward died before he could reach Scotland to crush the new rebellion. In neither Scotland nor France had he any returns to show for his expenditure of men and money. Indeed, so far as Scotland was concerned, all that he had accomplished was to arouse in the Scottish people a lasting hatred of England and to drive them into a practically permanent alliance with France.

Royal administration and courts

The reputation of Edward I as a great statesman, perhaps the greatest in medieval English history, rests more securely on his contribution to the formation of English governmental institutions than on his conquest of Wales or his brief successes in Scotland. Institutions that had been vague and fluid took definite shape under his hands. In the interest of good government and the unity of the state, he undertook the task of making the royal administration more efficient and centralizing authority under the crown at the expense of the barons, who might still be dangerous if their wings were not clipped. Depending on middle-class ministers, trained by long service for their duties, and on the new and important class of professional lawyers, he built up a well-ordered machine of government and justice entirely responsible to the king. The *curia regis* was now fairly clearly divided into special courts with well-defined functions — the exchequer for dealing with financial matters, the courts of common pleas and the king's bench for trying civil and criminal cases respectively, and the king's council, which not only assisted the king in the general business of government, but also took cognizance of all cases that did not fall under the jurisdiction of the special courts. There was little about this system that was absolutely new, but its more definite and efficient organization added greatly to its effectiveness as an instrument of government for the whole state. All England was beginning to look to the king and his courts for government and justice.

Common law

Edward was more than a great administrator. He was also the first great English legislator. Under him the English common law — that is, the law used in the king's courts and hence common to the whole country — was given the form which it was to

keep with very little change for centuries. This law had been created by custom rather than legislation. Hitherto, the work of the king's courts had been confined to interpreting it by judicial decisions. Now for the first time the king began to legislate. Working with his council, Edward I issued statute after statute, supplementing or altering the common law so as to give it definite form and to bring it into touch with contemporary needs. These statutes formed the essential basis of modern English law. "For ages after Edward's day," wrote Maitland in an often-quoted passage, "king and parliament left private law and civil procedure, criminal law and criminal procedure pretty much to themselves." No single thing, perhaps, has done more to make England a unified state than the development of the common law. It was the king's law and the law of the whole kingdom; before it feudal and local customs faded away.

Origins of Parliament

Last, but not least, of Edward's contributions to the building of English institutions was his establishment of Parliament, including representatives from the middle class of town and country, as a regular part of the state government. Here, as with the king's council, courts, and law, his work consisted not so much in creating something absolutely new as in combining and giving a more definite and permanent form to earlier institutions. Neither Parliament nor representation were new in Edward's reign; but the two had never been combined on a national scale, or at least not with sufficient frequency to give the new institution which resulted from the combination a permanent status, for the parliamentary experiment of Simon de Montfort in 1265 had failed and other summonses of representatives had been only partial and irregular. As in the case of the States General, the origin of the Parliament as a consulting body and royal court is to be found in the Great Council of the king's vassals-in-chief, though in England it had been much more frequently summoned and was better organized than in France. By the thirteenth century, it was regularly composed of the most important lay and ecclesiastical barons of the kingdom, for the number of those holding land directly from the king had so increased that only those summoned by name appeared. To this assembly were now added representatives from the middle class, but unlike the Third Estate in France they included knights from the country as well as burghers from the towns. For the origins of this type of representation we must look to a uniquely English institution, the shire and local royal courts, to which for generations representative knights and burghers had been summoned to give information for administrative and judicial purposes, to serve on presentment juries and

even to pass judgment. They were summoned because they knew local conditions and customs. When Edward I summoned representatives from shire and town to meet with the Great Council, he was, from one point of view, merely centralizing the representation in the shire courts into one for the whole kingdom, while from another point of view he was extending the Great Council to include representatives of his subjects throughout the state as well as his great vassals.

Purpose and organization under Edward I

Edward began the regular summons of representatives early in his reign. Owing to his numerous wars and the increased scope of his government, the king was no longer able to meet his expenses from the customary taxes and feudal and judicial dues. He realized that new taxes, which must fall heavily on the burghers and small landowners, would be much more easily collected if those classes, through their representatives, had given their consent. The representatives of the commons, as they were called, were not yet an essential part of Parliament, but after 1297 it was recognized that their presence was necessary when any non-feudal taxes were proclaimed. Taxation, however, was not the only purpose of Parliament. It was also a court for the redress of grievances that fell outside the jurisdiction of the common-law courts. By including the representatives, the king opened the way for petitions of grievances from the middle class, which it was the duty of Parliament to redress. Finally, and this is perhaps the most important motive for summoning the commons, Edward desired a broader and more national basis for his government than was provided by the barons alone. "His object was to make the royal power more efficient by keeping it in constant touch with the life of the governed." The knights and burghers could furnish invaluable information regarding local conditions and the interests of their class, and on returning home they could explain the acts of the government to their neighbors. Under Edward I, Parliament was not yet organized in the form we know. When the representatives were present, they stood at the foot of the hall and took no part in the proceedings, save to give consent or to express an opinion when asked, through one of their number who acted as "Speaker." However, they were already forming the habit of consulting separately as to what decision they would give, and were thus paving the way for the formation of a separate House of Commons.

Edward II (1307–27)

Under Edward II, the first Edward's amiable but shiftless son, Parliament was still more firmly established. It took advantage of the king's weakness to assert a measure of independence that would have been impossible under Edward I. The

custom of calling the commons to consent to taxation continued regularly until it had acquired a firm basis of precedent. For the rest, the reign of Edward II was an unfortunate one. After the defeat of his badly managed army by the Scots at Bannockburn in 1314, he gave up all hope of renewing the conquest of Scotland. His incompetent government gave the barons an opportunity to reassert the influence they had lost under the strong rule of his father. After a long-drawn-out opposition, the barons broke into open rebellion in 1327 and deposed the king in favor of his young son, Edward III, who ruled England for the next fifty years.

3. FRANCE AND THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR (1337–1453)

Edward III and Philip VI had each ruled about a decade when England and France were plunged into a war that lasted intermittently through the greater part of the reigns of five kings in each country. During all that time, the war exercised a powerful effect on the development of both countries, but as it was fought entirely on French soil it had a much more immediate effect on the internal history of France than on that of England. We shall trace its course, therefore, primarily in its relation to French history. The war has been rather inaccurately named by historians the Hundred Years' War. It was in reality either more or less than that, since from beginning to end it covered more than a century, though there were less than a hundred years of actual fighting.

Causes of the war

The war might also be considered merely a continuation of the age-old conflict between the French kings and their too powerful English vassals. Philip Augustus had taken over most of the French fiefs of the English-Angevin house at the opening of the thirteenth century. His successors had encroached still further, and after the Treaty of Paris (1259) the English kings were left with only a part of Guienne and Gascony in southwestern France on the express understanding that they were to hold it as liege vassals of the French crown. But the French monarchy had meanwhile grown too strong to tolerate the possession of French land by a foreign king, while, for their part, the English kings, who were beginning to think in national rather than feudal terms, found their position as vassals increasingly humiliating. The situation was becoming an impossible one, fraught with irritation for both monarchs. It was made still more difficult by the English interest in Flemish trade and the possibility of an English alliance with the Flemish burghers against their sovereign, and by the alliance between the French and Scottish kings. This situation had led to war in the time

of Philip the Fair and Edward I. The causes of the war under Philip VI and Edward III were much the same, save that now the English king had an hereditary claim to the French crown, through his mother who was a daughter of Philip the Fair, which he was prepared to press, once war seemed inevitable, as a justification of his position and as a means of winning over the Flemish cities.

First phase of the war (to 1364)

The first phase of the war was marked by steady misfortune for France. Philip VI was hampered by a rebellion in Flanders and a civil war in Brittany over the succession to the duchy. Moreover, the French army was not so effectively organized as the English, which was now a disciplined and paid royal army rather than a mere feudal levy, and neither Philip nor his successor John II (1350–64) was a match for his opponent in military skill. The first hostilities ended with the destruction of the French fleet by English and Flemish ships off Sluys in 1340, followed by a five-year truce. The next disaster came in 1346. Edward III had landed an army of some ten thousand men in Normandy, had marched up the Seine almost to Paris, and had then turned north, pillaging the country as he went. The French army, which far outnumbered Edward's forces, finally closed with him on the famous field of Crécy. There the heavily armored but undisciplined French knights charged in vain against the dismounted English men-at-arms, while the English archers with their magnificently effective long bows spread death in their ranks. For the first time in a great battle, the modern method of combined missile and infantry fighting had triumphed over the medieval heavy armed cavalry. This fact made Crécy a sign and a portent, though its significance would not be fully realized for two centuries to come. The battle ended in a rout, and Edward went on his way to besiege and capture Calais. A truce in 1347 ended hostilities again till 1355.

Crécy (1346)

Poitiers (1356)

When the war was resumed, the Black Prince, Edward's brilliant son, began a similar pillaging march through French territory, this time from the direction of Gascony. John II, who was now King of France, hurried south with a large army and met the English at Poitiers. The battle was another triumph for the English archers. The chivalrous but incompetent King John was outgeneraled by the Black Prince, his knights were mowed down, and he himself was taken prisoner. After four years more of fighting, France was at the end of her resources. There was no choice but to make peace on the best terms obtainable. The treaty was arranged at Brétigny in 1360. The English king was given full possession, free of all feudal obligations, of Calais and Ponthieu in the north and of Aquitaine as it had been in the reign of

Henry III. Moreover, the French were to pay an enormous ransom for the release of King John. It was still not all paid when John died in 1364.

The States General and the Jacquerie

The first period of the war left France in a frightfully weakened condition. The defeat of the French armies at Crécy and Poitiers was as nothing compared to the constant devastation of the whole northern and western part of France. On their pillaging raids, the English army systematically laid waste the country along the line of march. Nor was that the worst; for both armies, lacking a commissariat, had to live off the country in time of truce as well as in war, and the companies of mercenary soldiers kept up an uninterrupted career of plunder, leaving a trail of ruined crops, burned dwellings and the corpses of noncombatants to mark their passing. War in the fourteenth century still retained this characteristic of feudal warfare, that there was more plundering than fighting and that it was the peasant and townsman who suffered most. To this general suffering was added a burden of taxation such as France had never before known. Again and again the king called the States General in the hope that they would aid the collection of the taxes needed to finance the war by giving their consent. But the people were sullen and discontented, and the estates were growing bolder. The estates called by Philip VI in the year of Crécy and the following year refused to consent and demanded reforms in the government. After Poitiers they threatened what amounted to revolution. Led by a Parisian merchant, Étienne Marcel, and backed by the armed citizens of Paris, the estates demanded and for a time secured practical control of the government, which was then in the hands of the Dauphin Charles. At this point the situation was complicated by that desperate and tragic rising of the peasants known as the Jacquerie. Goaded to desperation by their sufferings, the peasants, contemptuously nicknamed Jacques, gathered in bands in 1358, murdered their lords wherever they could find them, and burned their châteaux. The revolt, however, was hopeless. The prince with the aid of the terrified nobles crushed the poorly armed peasants and massacred some twenty thousand of them. With them fell Marcel whose opposition to the prince had been vaguely connected with the Jacquerie and had never had really national support. The States General had overreached itself and had lost its best opportunity to become a necessary and permanent part of French government.

When Charles V became king, he was prepared to profit by the lessons he had learned when acting as regent during his father's imprisonment. He at once began the reconstruction of government finances and the

reorganization of the army with a success that won for him the title Charles the Wise. He called the States General, which he had reason to distrust, as seldom as possible, and when he did he was able to secure permanent taxes which made future meetings less necessary. These taxes fell chiefly on the commons, and so were readily voted by the first two estates who formed a majority of the assembly. For the collection of the new taxes, he organized an administrative machinery that lasted for centuries. The army was put on a more regular footing, with knights and archers enrolled in companies and paid by the king. After five years of preparation, Charles was ready to reopen the war. He himself took no part in the fighting, since he was more a scholar and statesman than a warrior. Instead, he entrusted the command of the army to the capable and popular Breton knight, Bertrand du Guesclin. For the first time, the French enjoyed the advantage of superior generalship over the English. Du Guesclin may have been, as commonly reported, the ugliest man in Brittany, but he was certainly a great soldier with years of practical experience behind him. Avoiding pitched battles, he occupied, bit by bit, nearly all the territory ceded to Edward at Brétigny. On the other side, Edward III was drifting into second childhood and the Black Prince's health was failing. After the truce in 1375, the English retained only Calais and a narrow strip of coast in the south between Bayonne and Bordeaux. The next year the Black Prince died, to be followed in 1377 by his father. A renewal of the war was cut short three years later by the death of both Charles V and du Guesclin.

Success under Charles V (1364–80)

For the next thirty-five years the war languished, with frequent truces and one fairly definite peace in 1396. The English kings whose reigns fall in this period, Richard II and Henry IV, had too many domestic troubles to pay much attention to foreign war. But France was unable to take advantage of the opportunity offered, for she, too, was weakened by misgovernment and distracted by civil strife. Charles VI began his reign as a child, with his selfish uncles in charge of the government. Of these, Philip, Duke of Burgundy, was the most important, and the most unscrupulous. In 1388, the young king came of age and began a brief period of good government and reform with the aid of his father's old ministers. But this fortunate period was brought to an end within four years by the first of those violent fits of insanity which rendered Charles permanently incapable of controlling the government. For some time thereafter the Duke of Burgundy and the king's younger brother, Louis of Orléans, rivaled each other in exploiting the royal government in their own in-

Charles VI (1380–1422) and civil war in France

terests. The rivalry between Burgundy and Orléans became still more intense when, in 1404, Philip of Burgundy died and was succeeded by his crafty son, John the Fearless. John had inherited a large territory, which included Flanders and Brabant as well as Burgundy, and hoped through control of the French government to build up a practically independent state between France and Germany. As Louis was the chief obstacle to his plans, he had him assassinated in 1407. Opposition to him continued, however, under the leadership of the Count of Armagnac, the father-in-law of Louis's young son. By 1411, the two factions, Burgundian and Armagnac, had come to blows in open civil war.

After a good deal of fighting, the Armagnacs had gained temporary possession of the mad king and the government, when the new King of England, Henry V, decided to take advantage of the situation and reopen the war with France. Having secured the neutrality of John of Burgundy, Henry landed an army near the mouth of the Seine in 1415 and advanced into Picardy. The French army, led by the Armagnac princes, met him at Agincourt. Despite the defection of Burgundy, the French numbered three times the English force of about thirteen thousand. But again, as at Crécy and Poitiers, the superior discipline and tactics of the small English army gave them an overwhelming victory. Henry commenced the systematic conquest of Normandy, while the Duke of Burgundy seized Paris and the king. The Dauphin Charles now headed the Armagnac party. He was trying to reach an agreement with John of Burgundy in 1419 when the latter was murdered by some Armagnac enthusiasts. Peace between the two parties was now impossible. Philip, the new Duke of Burgundy, promptly formed an alliance with Henry V. He signed a treaty in the name of the king, whereby Henry was to marry the daughter of Charles VI, act as regent till the king's death, and thereafter inherit the French crown. Henry, however, died a few months before Charles VI, leaving to his infant son, Henry VI, a claim to the throne of France and actual possession of the northern half of the country.

The war renewed (1415)

Agincourt (1415)

South of the Loire, the Armagnacs still fought on under the leadership of the dauphin, who now took the title Charles VII (1422–61), though he had not yet been officially crowned. He was not a man of very forceful character, but he had a few able and devoted followers and managed to hold his own fairly well against the Duke of Bedford, who acted as regent for Henry VI in France. By 1429, however, his position was becoming very precarious, when the appearance of that remarkable young woman, Joan of Arc, at his court

Last period of the war (1422–53)

inspired Charles and his supporters with new confidence and energy.

Joan of Arc

The story of the peasant girl of Domremy who believed, and made others believe, that God had chosen her to save France and win the crown for its rightful king is too well known to need retelling. For a year she led the French army, raising the siege of Orléans and cutting a path for the king to Rheims, in whose ancient cathedral he was crowned and consecrated after the manner of his ancestors. It was a triumph quickly followed by tragedy. In May, 1430, "the Maid" was captured by the Burgundians who sold her to the English. After months of imprisonment, she was tried on charges of heresy and witchcraft, and finally burned at the stake. But she had not died in vain. She had given new spirit to the army and the king, though he had let her die without raising a hand to save her, and she had aroused a patriotic national fervor among Frenchmen that has never since died out. The war lasted two decades longer. It was a period of slow but steady success for French arms. The king made peace with Burgundy in 1435 and repelled the English step by step. The tactics of his general Dunois were much the same as those employed by du Guesclin, and equally successful. By 1453, only Calais was left in English hands and the Hundred Years' War was over.

France had suffered terribly during the long conflict, but she emerged from it a united state with a new national consciousness. The attempts

Results of the war

of both the States General and the great princes to control the government had failed. The way was clear for the establishment of absolute monarchical rule over the whole state. When that was accomplished in the generation following the war, France had completed the last step in the transition from feudalism to the modern state.

4. ENGLAND FROM EDWARD III TO HENRY VI (1327–1461)

Much of England's history during the Hundred Years' War has already been told through tracing the fortunes of her armies in France. We must turn now to a brief survey of the political events and the social and constitutional developments in the country itself during this period.

The reign of Edward III was a period of success and popularity for the

Edward III (1327–77) and Richard II (1377–99)

king in his vigorous youth and middle age, followed by failure and popular discontent in his premature and undignified senility. While he still retained his strength of mind, Edward was absorbed heart and soul in the war with France, and was prepared to sacrifice royal rights and prerogatives to Parlia-

ment and to give the people good government in order to secure the financial support necessary to military success. He was always a good politician as well as a brilliant general. When his powers began to fail, his son, the Black Prince, for a time took his place as a national hero. But, unfortunately, he too fell a prey to premature illness and death, leaving his unscrupulous younger brother, John of Gaunt, to act as regent for the old king and later for the prince's infant son, Richard II. During the twelve years of Richard's minority, Parliament took advantage of the weakness of royal government to press its claims more strongly than ever, and after the king came of age he was forced for a time to accept a constitutional régime. Richard, however, was arrogant, hot-headed, and foolish, determined to exercise absolute powers that were no longer practicable. A brief attempt to rule without Parliament led to a revolution. Richard was forced to abdicate in favor of Henry of Lancaster, son of John of Gaunt.

The Lancastrian kings (1399–1461)

Henry IV (1399–1413) owed his crown to Parliament. He was not the next heir to the throne, and so could not claim it by direct descent. Moreover, the fall of Richard II had demonstrated the folly of ignoring Parliament. Under the Lancastrian kings, therefore, that body developed a larger share in government than ever before. The greater part of the reign of Henry IV was spent in suppressing rebellions and in making good his claim to rule. His efforts were eventually successful. He left the power of his house so firmly established that his son Henry V (1413–22) was able to renew the French war with startling success and to threaten the power of Parliament. But at the height of his career, Henry V died and the royal government was weakened by a regency for an infant king. Even when Henry VI (1422–61) grew up, the government remained weak, for he proved to be an utterly incompetent ruler. The country was torn by the strife of baronial factions and disturbed by the lawless violence of returned soldiers who were maintained by wealthy lords. Parliament took a larger share in government than ever, but it was too often dominated by noble factions. Meanwhile, the war with France was lost and before the end of Henry's reign England was thrown into the chaos of civil war.

England and the Hundred Years' War

The effect of the Hundred Years' War on England, socially and constitutionally, was in many respects different from its effect on France, though both countries were alike in emerging from the struggle with a new national consciousness. But the English people had not suffered so much. Despite high taxes, the war was popular with all classes, for all had a stake

in it. It was always Frenchmen who were plundered and Englishmen who profited, a situation well calculated to arouse patriotic enthusiasm. The greater part of the English army was composed of yeoman archers, drawn from the non-noble class. They were paid by the king and they brought home with them their share of plunder as well as their just share in the glory of Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. Englishmen did not have to be noble to take pride in English victories or to profit from them. The commons, too, in so far as they were represented in Parliament, took advantage of the financial needs of the government much more wisely than did their French contemporaries. In one respect only did England suffer directly from the war. During its last years and after it was over, the country was flooded with restless and lawless soldiers, who were a constant source of violence and who provided the material for the Wars of the Roses.

The Black Death and the Peasants' Revolt

The war was not the only factor having an effect on the social development of England in this period. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, it was clear that the rise of money economy was slowly breaking up the old system of economic feudalism on the manors. Villeins were beginning to secure the commutation of their personal services to money payments, and were in some places securing personal freedom. In the second half of the century this process was greatly accelerated, due in part to a great international disaster. In the years 1348–50, the whole of western Europe was swept by the most widespread and deadly epidemic disease in its history, the Black Death. It was, perhaps, a form of the bubonic plague. At any rate, it was carried from the East by merchant ships to western ports, whence it spread far and wide. The toll of deaths was terribly high, possibly a third of the total population. All countries suffered, but in England, which was more ready for change, the result was a social revolution. There were not enough villeins left to till the fields. Wages rose to unprecedented heights. Many villeins seized the opportunity to bargain for freedom with their lords or ran away in search of free employment elsewhere. For years the government strove with little success to fix wages at the old levels. The chief result was a growing discontent that finally found expression in the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. The revolt failed, but strong economic forces were working on the villeins' side and their emancipation went slowly but steadily on. By the end of the fifteenth century, they had practically all obtained freedom and had become tenant farmers, or hired farm laborers, or had drifted off to seek work in the cities.

Meanwhile, the steady evolution of the English Constitution con-

tinued. A new court, the chancery, was established to take over the civil cases referred to the king's council from the common-law courts, which the council was now too busy with the increasing amount of government business to attend to. These cases were mostly outside the scope of common law. The court of chancery provided a solution by applying the principle of equity. An equally significant innovation was made in the administration of local justice during the reign of Edward III. In every county prominent knights or landowners were given power to judge criminal cases. They were called justices of the peace. Being men of respectable social position who were thoroughly acquainted with conditions in their neighborhood, their judgments were usually respected and in accord with local opinion. For centuries they remained a very important part of English judicial machinery.

Administration and justice

The most important constitutional development of this period, however, was the gradual evolution of Parliament from the rather vague body founded by Edward I to something like its modern form, and the firm establishment of its position as a permanent and necessary part of government. Before the end of the fourteenth century, the division of Parliament into two separate houses, the Lords and Commons, had been completed. We have already seen how Parliament as a whole took advantage of the kings' financial needs, and the weakness of certain rulers, to increase its powers. The Commons made especially good use of the kings' need for money to carry on the war. They had learned to bargain. Before giving consent to taxes they would present petitions for the reform of grievances, and often these petitions were made into statutes by the king and were given the force of law. The Commons were thus acquiring the practical ability to initiate legislation. Parliament, and particularly the House of Commons, had still a long way to go before reaching its present position, but all the essential ingredients were present before the end of the Hundred Years' War. Later kings might dictate to Parliament or try to override it, but none could afford to ignore it or succeed in ruling without it.

Development of Parliament

In this respect the history of the English Parliament is in strong contrast to that of the French States General, which never succeeded in becoming an essential part of government, but, on the contrary, were called less and less frequently after the middle of the fourteenth century and eventually almost ceased to exist. This fact requires some explanation besides the incidental differences in their history, such as the crushing of the revolutionary move-

Contrast with States General

ment led by Étienne Marcel, which was without parallel in English history. One fundamental difference lay in the earlier centralization of government in England while both countries were still largely feudal. The English kings were strong enough to compel the barons from all parts of the country to attend the Great Council before it evolved into Parliament. In France, on the other hand, the great lords from outside the domain remained strong enough to ignore the king's summons almost to the end of the feudal era. From the very beginning, then, the English Parliament was more truly national in scope than the estates. There was an equally fundamental difference also in the composition of the English House of Commons and the French Third Estate. The latter was composed almost entirely of representatives of the city middle class, who had no interest in the country districts and nothing in common, socially or in economic interest, with the nobles and clergy in the other two estates. The English Commons, on the other hand, included landowning knights from the shires as well as burghers, and these knights had much the same social and economic interests as the lords. Indeed, many of the knights who came up from the shires were related to the lords by family ties, for in England, unlike any continental country, the younger sons of the barons were excluded from the family inheritance and lost their status as nobles. They formed the peculiarly English class of gentry who, in society and in the House of Commons, formed a connecting link between the lords and the merchant middle class and small country landowners. From the social point of view, then, the English Parliament was more truly representative of the nation than the States General, and the two English houses could work together to influence the monarchy as the three estates never could.

The end of the Hundred Years' War found both England and France on the verge of becoming united monarchical states. Both countries had yet to pass through a brief period of civil war (the Wars of the Roses in England and the war with Burgundy in France), but when that was finished, in each country the king became the direct ruler of the whole state by virtue of his royal title rather than as a feudal lord. In England, however, the king still had to rule by constitutional means through Parliament, whereas in France, once the great nobles had been suppressed, the king was left absolute and uncontrolled. The story of these last developments we shall leave to a later time.[1]

[1] See below, pages 373–78.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

THE DECLINE OF THE PAPACY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

THE great age of the medieval papacy fell within the two centuries after the accession of Gregory VII. During that time, successive popes built up for the Roman See a spiritual monarchy over all Western Christendom, a hegemony based on canon law, on a highly centralized administrative system that brought the clergy of all lands directly under their control, and on claims, often put into practice, to supremacy over secular rulers. At the end of that period they succeeded in destroying the power of the emperors, whose opposition had been the most serious obstacle in the way of their triumphal march. It was apparently a decisive victory, but the papacy was to pay dearly for it. The last phase of the struggle with the Hohenstaufens had revolved around the temporal rule of the popes over the States of the Church in central Italy, to maintain which they had taxed the church heavily and had even preached crusades against the emperors. Their devotion to this worldly cause, which was of little general interest to Christendom, lost for the popes much of the sympathy and respect of people and clergy alike in other lands. And it was on their hold over the hearts and minds of the people, rather than on the theories of canon law, that the popes must depend for the ultimate support of their power. Moreover, the defeat of the emperors had not removed all opposition to papal supremacy. The rising territorial monarchies in France and England were to prove more dangerous opponents than the emperors had ever been. By the end of the thirteenth century, the time had passed when any pope could exercise authority over French and English kings as Innocent III had done. When Boniface VIII tried to do so, stating his claims to supremacy more strongly than even Innocent had dared to do, he failed disastrously. From that moment the power of the popes began to decline. Their prestige continued to wane through the seventy years of subjection to French influence at Avignon, through the disgraceful rivalries of the Great Schism and the opposition of the councils that followed, until, by the middle of the fifteenth century, the pope was little more than an Italian prince who was also the administrative head of the church, though even there with powers sadly restricted.

1. BONIFACE VIII AND PHILIP THE FAIR

When Boniface VIII ascended the throne of Saint Peter, he had no reason to believe that the prestige of the papacy had been in any way impaired. There had been no strong pope to put its power to the test since the end of the war with the emperors, and possibly no one could gauge the subtle changes in popular opinion that had taken place in the interim. The character of the new pope was certain to make his pontificate a crucial one in the history of the church. He was already in his late sixties and had behind him a lifetime of political and diplomatic activity. He had been one of the most vigorous and capable of the cardinals, but his great capacities were offset by equally great failings of character. He was arrogant, ruthless, and immensely vain, and he showed little evidence of deep moral or religious conviction. His ambitions seem to have been motivated more by personal and family pride than by devotion to the welfare of the church. The early years of his reign were spent in crushing the powerful Roman family of Colonna in the interest of his own less powerful house, the Gaetani. At the same time, his love of power and contempt for the rights of others drove him on to an uncompromising assertion of all those claims to universal supremacy with which his long training in canon law had made him thoroughly familiar.

Boniface VIII (1294–1303)

This conception of his position soon brought Boniface into conflict with the kings of France and England. The first crisis arose from the much-disputed question of the relation of the clergy and church property to the state. In 1296, Philip IV (the Fair) and Edward I were at war and both demanded subsidies from their clergy to help meet the unusual expenses. They argued that the clergy, as subjects of the state, should contribute to the defense of the realm in return for the protection afforded them by the royal government. The pope, on the other hand, asserted that no secular ruler had the right to tax churchmen or church property. That right could be exercised only by the pope as ruler of the church. This view Boniface expressed in a famous bull, called *Clericis laicos* from the first two words of the text. The bull forbade the clergy of any country to pay subsidies of any kind to secular rulers without the pope's consent. Philip promptly replied by forbidding the exportation of money from the country, ostensibly as a war measure, but with the effect of cutting off the papal income from the French church. Edward also took vigorous action, which amounted to the outlawing of the English clergy who refused to pay the subsidies. Faced by this decided opposition, and finding that the clergy would not

Clericis laicos *(1296)*

support him strongly against their king, Boniface was forced to withdraw the bull.

The pope, however, soon recovered confidence. The crushing of the Colonna in 1298 made his position at Rome secure, and in 1300 he celebrated a jubilee year. Immense crowds of pilgrims — their number has been reckoned as high as two million — flocked to Rome to take advantage of the special indulgences and spiritual benefits promised to all who came to the Holy City and contributed to the papal coffers. The success of the jubilee gave Boniface economic independence and an exaggerated confidence in the loyalty of the people to the church. He was ready again to assert his authority over his royal opponents.

The jubilee of 1300

It was the King of France who bore the brunt of the second conflict with the haughty pope. The immediate cause of the quarrel this time was the question of clerical exemption from civil jurisdiction. Philip the Fair had condemned the Bishop of Pamiers in Languedoc, apparently on ample grounds, for treason and other serious crimes and asked the pope to degrade him from his office prior to the execution of his sentence. As might have been expected, Boniface refused to recognize the right of a secular court to try an ecclesiastic. In December, 1301, he called the case to Rome for a new trial, and at the same time issued two bulls, one renewing the prohibitions of *Clericis laicos*, the other taking Philip to task for misgovernment. Feeling that the independence of his government was at stake, Philip decided to make an unprecedented appeal for popular support. In April, 1302, he called the first States General and stated his own side of the case to them, with the result that all three estates, including the clergy, addressed letters of protest to Rome.

Conflict with Philip (1301)

This opposition merely spurred Boniface on to a more extreme statement of his authority, extending the controversy into the wider field of the supremacy of church over state. The bull *Unam sanctam*, published in November, 1302, contained the most absolute statement of supremacy over secular rulers ever issued by any pope. Most of the arguments, including the time-honored metaphor of the two swords representing the spiritual and temporal authority which the pope claimed the power to wield, the one directly and the other indirectly through control of secular governments, were not new, but the whole tenor of the bull was without precedent in its uncompromising force. It concluded with the flat statement that "for every human creature it is absolutely necessary for salvation to be subject to the Roman Pontiff." The bull was followed by an ultimatum to

Unam sanctam (1302)

Philip demanding his complete submission under threat of excommunication.

The pope had gone too far. Feeling that submission was impossible, Philip decided to take the offensive as the only alternative left him. He called an assembly of the barons and higher clergy of France, before which his ministers accused Boniface of heresy, simony, and a host of other crimes. Meanwhile, his chief minister, Guillaume de Nogaret, was dispatched to Italy to arrest the pope and bring him back to answer the accusations of the king before a general council. On his arrival in Italy, Nogaret discovered that the unsuspecting pope had gone to the little mountain town of Anagni to escape the summer heat. There the French minister followed him, accompanied by an armed band which had been raised by the pope's bitter enemy, Sciarra Colonna. They had little difficulty in breaking into the town and seizing Boniface, whom they found deserted by his court, but arrayed in all the dignity of his pontifical robes. They did not hold him long, for the people of the countryside rallied to his rescue and freed him, but the damage was already done. The aged pope died within the month as a result of shock and chagrin. And with him died the medieval papacy.

The fall of Boniface (1303)

2. WANING PRESTIGE OF THE POPES AT AVIGNON (1305–77)

For two years after the death of Boniface VIII, the outcome of his struggle with the French monarchy remained in some doubt. The next pope elected lived for only a few months, and in the long interregnum that followed, Philip the Fair was able to bring sufficient pressure to bear on the cardinals to force the election of a French pope, who took the name Clement V (1305–14). The papacy was now brought definitely under the influence of the French king. Clement was in France at the time of his election, and Philip used every possible means to keep him there. The disturbed state of Italy, torn by the strife of the Guelf and Ghibelline factions, offered an excuse to the pope for not taking up his residence in Rome. Instead, after four years of wandering about France, he set up the papal capital at Avignon on the Rhone. There the popes remained for nearly seventy years. The city was not actually in French territory — it was in Provence, then a fief of the King of Naples — but it was just on the border of France and well within the sphere of French influence. The popes were doubtless safer there than in Rome, but it was mainly French in-

The Babylonian Captivity

terest that kept them from returning to their proper home in the ancient capital of Western Christendom. Clement's acquiescence in crushing the Templars at the request of Philip the Fair and in other matters demonstrated the importance to the French kings of keeping the popes at Avignon. And the popes, being French themselves, were willing enough to stay. Twenty-five of the twenty-eight cardinals appointed by Clement V were French, thus ensuring the election of another French pope — and so it went through seven successive reigns. To other nations it seemed that the rulers of the church were being held captive under the domination of France, whence the name "the Babylonian Captivity of the Church" generally applied to this period in papal history.

Quarrel with Lewis IV (1314–47)

The subservience of the popes at Avignon to the will of the secular government was limited to France. With regard to other powers, they still maintained their former claims. Indeed, they were encouraged to assert them by the French kings in the hope that they might thus be more useful to French policy. Accordingly, when the Emperor Henry VII died during a vain attempt to re-establish imperial rule in Italy, Clement V declared himself the temporal ruler of Italy and Germany until a new emperor had been elected and had received his sanction, on the ground that the emperor in reality held his title as a vassal of the pope. The death of Clement shortly thereafter left his successor John XXII (1316–34) to enforce this claim. In the meantime, the rivalry of Lewis the Bavarian and Frederick of Hapsburg, both of whom claimed the imperial crown, gave the popes a free hand. By 1322, however, Lewis IV was victorious and began his reign without first securing the papal confirmation. John XXII was enraged and placed Lewis under the ban of excommunication. The quarrel dragged on through the pontificates of John and the two following popes, until the death of Lewis in 1347. Neither side was able to take any very decisive action. Lewis, indeed, had himself crowned at Rome by the officers of the city and in 1338 the German Diet declared that the emperor's election was valid without the consent of the pope, but later the feeble emperor humbled himself in a vain attempt to gain the pope's forgiveness. All that makes the controversy of real importance was the work of the political theorists who rallied to the emperor's support and launched a bitter attack on papal rights.

Critics of the papacy

Lewis the Bavarian found useful allies in his opposition to the papacy in the Spiritual Franciscans, a branch of the Franciscan order who had been condemned by John XXII for their rigid adherence to the rule of absolute poverty laid down by their saintly

founder. Among these was an English professor from the University of Paris, William of Occam, whose learning and skill in debate had won for him the title of "Invincible Doctor." These intellectual weapons Occam now turned upon the papacy in a rapid fire of devastating criticism. He denied the papal claims to temporal sovereignty and even set limits to the pope's spiritual authority. His arguments were based largely on the authority of the Bible, which should be interpreted, not only by the pope and the clergy, but by "the discretion and counsel of the wisest men," a rather vague phrase that seems to foreshadow the theory of the supremacy of a council over the pope.

In the field of political theory, an even more forceful assault on papal supremacy was delivered by two secular writers, Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jandun, who published the famous *Defensor pacis* in 1324. In this significant book the authors developed theories so far in advance of their age that its full influence was felt only in later generations. Arguing that in the state and in the church, which is here defined as "the community of all who believe in Christ," the sovereign power rests with the people and is only delegated to rulers so long as they fulfill their function of ruling wisely, the authors assert that the papacy is a human institution without authority save that given it by the Christian people. The pope's supremacy over the clergy is a mere presidency created for administrative convenience. All important questions of faith should be referred to the superior authority of a general council representing the Christian community. The pope has no right to "coercive jurisdiction" which belongs only to the state, and it is the pope's claim to this that disturbs the peace of Christendom. In opposing him, the emperor is acting as "the defender of the peace." Further, the clergy, save for their spiritual duties of teaching, preaching, and administering the sacraments, are in no essential different from other Christian citizens. In temporal matters they should be subject to the government of the state.

Defensor pacis

The daring propositions of the *Defensor pacis* were too extreme to gain wide support at once. In the meantime the popes at Avignon successfully carried on the work of their predecessors in centralizing the administration of the church and in using their control of the clergy to increase their income. The popes now needed more money than ever before, for they had lost most of their revenues from the States of the Church in Italy and they had to expend large sums for the building of a new capital at Avignon with a magnificence and luxury that would uphold their prestige in Christendom. To meet ever-increasing demands, therefore, the Avignonese popes systematized and

Papal finance

perfected all the established methods of taxation and invented some new ones. The financial genius of John XXII, especially, was responsible for the extension of many old practices and for some important innovations. The clerical tithe, one tenth of the net income from ecclesiastical benefices, levied originally for the purpose of a crusade, now became a regular tax payable to the papacy. John XXII also claimed the "annates" — that is, the first year's income from the benefices of the more important clergy — as well as the revenues from all benefices during a vacancy. Even the "procurations," which were the fees paid to bishops to meet the expenses of visits of inspection in their dioceses, now went to the papacy, with the result that visitations practically ceased in many places. Finally, the popes at Avignon greatly extended the "reservation" of benefices for papal appointment, until they had secured the right, despite the canonical rules regarding election, to name the holders of many of the most important ecclesiastical offices in Christendom as well as a large number of the lesser ones. And these offices were seldom given away without some substantial return, not to mention the innumerable fees paid by the clergy for the confirmation of their offices. Never had the ancient evil of simony [1] flourished so openly at the papal court.

The heavy weight of papal taxation aroused grave discontent in the countries outside of France. In England it led to open opposition on the part of the government, for the English kings, who were at war with France, felt an especially keen resentment at seeing so much English money going to a French pope. Edward III even went so far as to protest that "the successor of the Apostles was commissioned to lead the Lord's sheep to pasture, not to fleece them." Papal "provisions" or appointments to English benefices were particularly unpopular because the offices were so often given to foreigners who either remained absent or were unfit to perform their duties. In 1351, Edward III had Parliament pass the Statute of Provisors making this practice illegal. Two years later he sought to curtail papal interference in England still further by issuing the Statute of Praemunire, which made the appealing of cases from the local ecclesiastical courts to the papal court illegal without the king's consent. In the long run, however, the statutes had little effect, save to force the popes to share some of the spoils with the king.

Opposition in England

The opposition to papal taxation was not limited to the state governments. The clergy, too, chafed under the financial burden. But in the final analysis, it was the people who paid, for the clergy recouped their losses by levying tithes and fees for their serv-

Popular discontent

[1] See above, page 164.

ices. There is ample evidence of widespread popular discontent with the administration of the church, and even of active dislike of the clergy, which was aggravated by the failure of the clergy in many instances to give the spiritual aid and leadership that the people had the right to expect. It is unsafe to accept at their face value all the denunciations of the morals and manners of the clergy made by both secular writers and reforming preachers; yet the evidence of a decline in the moral and spiritual standards of the church during the period of the Babylonian Captivity is too strong to be altogether denied. It could not well be otherwise. Appeals to Avignon from episcopal jurisdiction, the cessation of episcopal visitations, and the absence of foreign incumbents from their posts all tended to disrupt ecclesiastical discipline. Moreover, the whole body of the clergy suffered from the demoralizing effects of simony. Bishops or priests who had purchased their offices were likely to regard them as an investment and to be more interested in making them pay than in performing their spiritual duties. There were undoubtedly many earnest and conscientious priests, like the poor parson of the *Canterbury Tales*. But that Chaucer considered him an exception to the general rule is shown by his description of the other clerics who rode with that cheerful company on the road to Canterbury. One need not read far in the literature of the fourteenth century to find sweeping criticisms of the wealth, worldliness, and immorality of the clergy and plentiful signs of a general lack of respect for them.

The papacy returns to Rome (1377)

As time went on it became increasingly clear that the papacy was losing both popularity and prestige, and that this was due in part to the continued residence of the popes at Avignon, which had become a symbol of all the papal abuses of the age. A French pope could not command the loyalty of other nations as could a pope living at Rome, the traditional capital of the universal church. The Italians especially resented the absence of the popes from Italy, since it cut them off from their accustomed share in the profits of the papacy. Rome had built its entire economic life about the papal *curia*. Deprived of it, the city was left desolate and poverty-stricken, dominated by quarreling noble factions, while the States of the Church were in a constant turmoil and threatened to escape entirely from papal control. Yet this very situation made the return to Rome difficult and dangerous. A brief visit to Rome made by Pope Urban V in 1367 ended in disillusionment. He had been encouraged to go to Rome by the success of the warlike Cardinal Albornoz in crushing the Roman nobles and the despotic princes who had seized control of most of the cities in the Papal States. However, the death of the cardinal shortly after the pope's

arrival left Urban helpless. He returned to the luxury and security of Avignon, much to the joy of the French cardinals who hated the ruined city with its degraded and rebellious people. Ten years passed and a new pope was elected before the project was renewed. At last, in 1377, Pope Gregory XI decided to make the long deferred move, lest Rome and the States of the Church should be lost beyond recovery. He was welcomed with delirious joy by the Roman populace.

3. THE GREAT SCHISM, HERESY, AND THE COUNCILS (1378–1449)

All who were most sincerely interested in the welfare of the church had welcomed the end of the Captivity and the return of the papacy to Rome. No one could have foreseen that the death of Gregory within the year would plunge the church into a situation infinitely worse than anything that had gone before. The papal court was scarcely settled in Rome before a new pope had to be elected. The majority of the cardinals, who were French and homesick for Avignon, undoubtedly wanted another French pope. The Roman people, on the other hand, were determined at all costs to keep the papacy now that they had recovered it and clamored wildly for a Roman pope, or at least an Italian. The election was held in the midst of scenes of mob violence that terrified the cardinals. They hastily chose an Italian, who took the name Urban VI (1378–89). He was a Neapolitan who had risen to the rank of archbishop through the favor of some of the French cardinals at Avignon. But if the cardinals hoped that he would be grateful to them and amenable to their control, they were bitterly disappointed. From the first he treated them with a brutal contempt that led some observers to suspect his sanity. Finding their position intolerable, the cardinals withdrew from Rome and held a new conclave. They declared that the election of Urban was invalid because it had taken place under threat of violence. In his place they elected a French cardinal, Clement VII (1378–94). The new pope with his cardinals then returned to Avignon. In Rome, meanwhile, Urban denounced and excommunicated Clement and the rebellious cardinals, and appointed twenty-eight new cardinals of his own. There were now two popes and two colleges of cardinals, and the people of Christendom were faced by the problem of deciding whether the pope at Rome or the pope at Avignon was the true successor of Saint Peter. The church was split from top to bottom and the schism was not to be healed for nearly forty years.

Beginning of the schism (1378)

The question of the validity of the election of Urban VI or Clement VII was one that might honestly puzzle any impartial observer. It is still open to debate. The various states of Europe, however, made the choice of adherence to one or other of the rival popes mostly on political grounds. Italy, with the exception of Naples which was traditionally connected with Avignon, rallied to the Roman pope. France, naturally enough, recognized Clement. National enmities or alliances dictated the position of the other powers. Scotland, Spain, and those of the German princes who were friendly to France adhered to Clement, while England, Flanders, Portugal, the empire, and the Scandinavian countries gave their obedience to Urban. The schism had disastrous effects both on the prestige of the papacy and on the spiritual health of the entire church. The rival popes thundered against each other, each denying the other any claim to authority, so that conscientious men did not know which way to turn. Rival claimants fought over ecclesiastical offices and the clergy everywhere were demoralized. Moreover, both popes were in desperate need of money, since each could draw revenues only from the part of the church that adhered to him. As a result, all the financial abuses of the Captivity were multiplied, with correspondingly evil effects. Popular discontent was redoubled and criticism of the clergy and the papacy became bolder. In England and Bohemia, demands for reform crystallized into heresy.

Effects of the schism

The leader of this movement in England was John Wyclif, a distinguished scholar and professor at Oxford. His first protests against papal supremacy and the wealth of the clergy, published in 1375, won for him the friendship of John of Gaunt, who was already acting as regent for the aged Edward III. They also called forth an official condemnation from Gregory XI in 1377. The scandal of the papal schism, which occurred in the next year, urged Wyclif to a more fundamental and far-reaching attack on the whole ecclesiastical system of his day. Like the later Protestant reformers, whose doctrines he foreshadowed in many respects, Wyclif appealed to the authority of the Bible against that of canon law or the customs and dogmas of the medieval church. He felt that the ills of the church, most of which sprang from the wealth and temporal power of the clergy, could be cured only by a return to the simpler life and teaching of the early Christians. It was the duty of the state to disendow the clergy when they failed to use their wealth for spiritual ends. Wyclif's theories regarding the equality of all Christians and the superiority of the state over the church in temporal matters are somewhat reminiscent of the *Defensor pacis*, but on theological grounds he went farther than Marsiglio had done. Still

Wyclif

relying on the authority of the Bible, he denied the validity of pilgrimages, the veneration of saints, and the power of the clergy to grant arbitrary absolution for sins, and even attacked the fundamental doctrine of the material presence of Christ's body in the sacrament of the Eucharist. His doubts regarding the sacramental power of the priests, especially those who were living in sin, struck at the very heart of the church's power over the lay world. In this direction, however, he was traveling too fast for the thought of his age. It was only the weakness of the papacy and the doubtful support of John of Gaunt that enabled him, after he had been expelled from Oxford, to pass his last years in peace as a parish priest at Lutterworth. He died in 1384. His followers, who were called Lollards, preached his doctrines throughout England for some years until they were stamped out as dangerous heretics by Henry IV. But Wyclif's trenchant criticism of the church could never be wholly suppressed. Many of his ideas were to be asserted again at a more favorable time by the Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century, and in the meantime his teaching had spread to the distant land of Bohemia, where it received an enthusiastic welcome.

Huss and the Bohemian heresy

The movement for the reform of the Bohemian church in the early years of the fifteenth century was not entirely due to the influence of Wyclif. For some time before they learned of him, reforming preachers had been protesting against the wealth and immorality of the Bohemian clergy, who seem to have been unusually corrupt. It was Wyclif's teaching, however, that provided the great Bohemian reformer, John Huss, with the weapons he needed to gain popular support for his attack on the church. Like Wyclif, Huss was a scholar and professor — he taught at the University of Prague — but he was less a theologian and more a conscious nationalist than the English reformer. To his moral indignation against the corruption of the church was added a strong patriotic feeling against the German clergy who had secured most of the important posts in the Bohemian church. It was this combination that made him so popular among the native Bohemians and so dangerous an opponent of the papacy and the empire. In 1414, Huss was summoned to appear before the general council called by Emperor Sigismund at Constance to answer charges of heresy. He was tried and condemned, and after refusing to recant was burned at the stake in July, 1415. The emperor had treacherously repudiated the safe-conduct he had given him. The burning of Huss made it impossible to reconcile the Bohemian rebels to the church. The Hussites formed a separate sect, fiercely loyal to the memory of their martyred national hero. Their resistance ended only after years of

furious fighting, and then only by a compromise on the part of the church.

The growth of heresy in England and Bohemia demonstrated in the most forcible fashion the disastrous results of the schism of the papacy.

Attempts to end the schism

But even without that object lesson, the evils of the schism were so apparent that both laymen and clergy in all parts of Christendom realized that it must be brought to an end, lest the whole structure of the universal church be destroyed. The popes themselves and the cardinals on both sides loudly proclaimed their eagerness to end the schism, but none was willing to make the first move or to sacrifice his position. Even the death of the original schismatic popes did not bring about reconciliation, for new popes were elected to fill their respective places. Under such circumstances, the only hope of decisive action seemed to lie in a general council which could coerce the popes. The arguments of the *Defensor pacis* for the superior jurisdiction of a general council were at last beginning to bear fruit. But who was to call a council if the popes would not? There lay the difficulty.

Eventually a group of cardinals from each "obedience" met and took upon themselves the responsibility of summoning a general council to

Council of Pisa (1409)

meet at Pisa in 1409. Despite the doubtful legality of the council, an imposing array of churchmen attended. The first act of the council was to depose the two reigning popes, the Roman Gregory XII and his rival Benedict XIII. The cardinals present then proceeded to elect a new pope who took the name Alexander V. The latter, however, died within a few months and was replaced by Cardinal Baldassare Cossa as John XXIII. He was an able but unscrupulous man who had risen to prominence by methods more worthy of an Italian despot than of a churchman. Meanwhile, Gregory and Benedict had refused to accept their deposition and had been able to find some support in the conflicting interests of the European states. The council had merely made matters worse. Instead of two popes there were now three. *Ecce reductio ad absurdum!*

This impossible situation lasted for five years. It was the Emperor Sigismund who found the only possible solution by asserting his right as

The Council of Constance (1414–18)

Roman emperor to call a council of the church as the great Constantine had done at Nicaea. The new council, attended by representatives from all parts of the Roman Church, assembled at Constance in 1414. After much negotiation the three popes were deposed or forced to abdicate, and in 1417 a Roman cardinal of the Colonna family was elected as Martin V (1417–31). The schism was ended and the papacy was restored to Rome. In deal-

ing with other pressing problems, however, the council was less successful. We have already noted that the burning of John Huss failed to check the Hussite heresy. The attempts of the council to reform the abuses in the church, which had arisen during the period of the Captivity and the schism, were almost equally fruitless. It did, however, issue two very important decrees, one asserting the superiority of a general council over the pope, the other providing for the calling of future councils at frequent intervals.

End of schism (1417)

In this conciliar theory, the Council of Constance had left a dangerous legacy to future popes, but on the whole its action had strengthened rather than weakened the papacy, at least in so far as it had restored the pope to Rome and left him without rivals. Martin V and his successor Eugenius IV (1431–47) were able to establish themselves in a position of fair political security in the Papal States, to regain some measure of control over the clergy, and, in the long run, to withstand the menace of conciliar authority. In this they were aided by the political weakness of the greater European states. The council scheduled to meet in 1423 was so poorly attended that the pope had no difficulty in dissolving it before anything could be accomplished. The second council, however, which met at Basle in the first year of the pontificate of Eugenius, presented a more serious opposition. The necessity of ending the Hussite wars called forth a large attendance, and the success of the council in arranging a compromise that reconciled all but the most extreme Hussites to the church gave it considerable prestige. The council, moreover, was determined to effect a sweeping reform of the church "in head and members," beginning with the papacy. After long opposition, Eugenius attempted to bring the council under his control by transferring it to Ferrara; but as most of the council ignored the papal summons and remained at Basle, the council that met at Ferrara and then at Florence in 1438–39 was really a new one. The Council of Ferrara-Florence occupied itself mainly with an attempt, briefly successful, to reunite the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches. Its only lasting result was to stimulate the study of Greek at Florence through the influence of the learned Greek delegates. Meanwhile, the remnants of the Basle Council had deposed Eugenius and elected an anti-pope, Felix V. For ten years the council and its pope continued the struggle with Rome, but the selfish intrigues and political bickerings of its members gradually destroyed its prestige, while Eugenius succeeded in coming to terms with most of the European powers. At last, in 1449, Felix resigned his empty title and the Council of Basle allowed itself to

The conciliar movement fails

Council of Basle (1431–49)

be dissolved. The conciliar movement had failed; its theories were discredited; and the popes were left without constitutional checks within the church.

Martin V and Eugenius IV had done much to restore the papal authority, but the popes were still far from possessing the powers they had had before the fall of Boniface VIII. Never again could they exercise effective supremacy over secular rulers, and even within the church their control was limited by the practical power of the great state governments. This was particularly true in France where, in 1438, King Charles VII had published a law known as the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges which set definite limits to papal interference in ecclesiastical elections, papal taxation, and appeals to Rome. In short, it established a sort of national church under the control of the French monarchy. The governments of England and Germany took less radical action, but were moving in the same direction, and later the Spanish monarchy gained almost complete supervision of the church in Spain.

Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1438)

The century and a half between the bull *Unam sanctam* and the dissolution of the Council of Basle had, indeed, witnessed a terrible decline in papal prestige, even though some considerable recovery of papal power had been made after the Council of Constance. The financial exactions of the popes at Avignon and the scandal of the Great Schism, the political theories of Occam and the *Defensor pacis*, the sweeping criticisms of the church launched by Wyclif and Huss, the conciliar movement and the growing power of the national monarchies had all contributed to the destruction of papal authority, and the fifteenth-century popes, who were more interested in establishing a temporal state in Italy than in giving religious leadership to Christendom, lacked the character or ability to win back what had been lost.

Decline of papal prestige

CHAPTER TWENTY

THE AGE OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY

IN THE two and a half centuries between the last of the crusades and the beginning of the Lutheran Reformation, there occurred a profound, if gradual, transformation in the character of European civilization. It was an age of transition in which medieval institutions were slowly crumbling and characteristically medieval ways of thinking were losing their force, while at the same time evidences of modern society and modern culture began to make their appearance, at first in partial form, but as time passed with ever-increasing completeness. In Italy, the land of wealth and cities, this change began earlier and progressed with greater rapidity than in the more thoroughly feudalized lands north of the Alps. Moreover, in that land of golden opportunities, of political unrest and swiftly shifting fortunes, the break-up of medieval civilization seemed to give a new and stimulating freedom to the human spirit, so that the age of transition became also an age of great intellectual activity. New vistas opened up before the eager curiosity and limitless ambition of men who were shaking themselves free from the bondage of ecclesiastical authority and corporate society. They awoke to a new appreciation of the glories of the mortal world they lived in, with its unbounded possibilities for wealth, power, artistic pleasure, and intellectual satisfaction for those who had the will to seize them. Finally, on this rich soil, provided by the awakened genius of the Italian people, fell the seeds of antique culture, to bring forth such plentiful fruit that for centuries men thought of that age as a *renaissance* or rebirth of the civilization of ancient Rome and Greece. But the culture of the Italian Renaissance (we may as well keep the word, since it has been hallowed by centuries of use) did not owe its existence primarily to the revival of antiquity, though it was influenced by it. Its roots were fixed firmly in the Middle Ages, but the conditions of its growth were changing and the fruit was not always the same. So far as it can be defined, the age of the Renaissance was an age of chaotic change, in which there was much that was still medieval, much that was recognizably modern, and much also that was peculiar to itself. It bridged the gap between the High Middle Ages and modern times, but it was also an age to itself, filled with a great political, social, and intellectual ferment.

1. RENAISSANCE SOCIETY

If we would seek one fundamental cause for the transformation of Europe during this age, we will find it in the great increase in wealth, which came earlier and in more concentrated form in Italy than elsewhere. It was wealth that made the luxury and brilliance of the Italian Renaissance possible, and it was wealth that made a new type of society necessary. This growth of material prosperity was no new thing. It had been an increasingly potent factor in the shaping of European civilization since the beginning of the High Middle Ages. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the revival of commerce had gradually built up city life with a vigorous and independent middle class, and had introduced the general use of money economy. For a time these forces had adjusted themselves, though uneasily, to the scheme of medieval society. The burghers had formed corporate societies in the communes and guilds which gave them a secure place in the midst of feudalism. But as wealth continued to increase and the volume of business to expand, the new economic force grew too great to be contained within the structure of a social system that had not been designed for it. Its explosive energy brought medieval institutions crumbling to the ground. In time it destroyed feudalism and also its own corporate organization, which gave place to the modern individualistic methods of capitalism.[1] The effects of its action were not contemporaneous or exactly similar in all parts of Europe. In Italy, the result was the rise of a society that was distinctly urban, secular, i.e., worldly, in its interests, and highly individualistic.

Increase in wealth

Italy was a land of cities. It was perfectly situated to become the center of commerce for the western world, halfway between the fabulous East, where Venetian and Genoese merchants bought luxuries that could not be produced in Europe, and the market provided by the less advanced people of the West. Stimulated by these unique opportunities for commerce and the industry that rose from it, cities sprang up thickly during the Middle Ages in Lombardy, Tuscany, and the States of the Church. They enjoyed unique opportunities in other respects. The long quarrel between the emperors and the popes in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, followed by the temporary collapse of the empire and the absence of the papacy from Italy, enabled the Italian cities to win freedom from outside control. By the beginning of the Renaissance, most of the cities of Italy, except in the Neapolitan Kingdom to the south, were practically independent

Urban society

[1] See Chapter XXVII.

states, dominating the country districts about them. They thus became the centers of political and social as well as economic life for the whole land. The feudal nobles could not resist their attraction. Leaving their isolated rural castles, they moved into the cities and became the neighbors of the non-noble burghers. In this urban society, in which all classes were represented, medieval class distinctions inevitably became less pronounced. Birth still meant a great deal, but wealth or political power might mean more, and where these were lacking, literary, artistic, or any other outstanding ability was sufficient to gain an entry into the homes of the noble or the rich.

The secular spirit

The changes in society brought about by wealth and city life were reflected by equally significant changes in the interests and mental attitude of at least the wealthy and leisured classes. The busy life of the cities, the new possibilities for the enjoyment of life and for the satisfaction of esthetic tastes or intellectual curiosity, provided by luxury, wealth, and leisure, all tended to thrust thoughts of religion and of the future world farther into the background of men's minds. The growing disrespect for the papacy and the organized church, due to the scandals of the Babylonian Captivity and the schism, and the influence of the pagan philosophy inherent in the classic literature that was becoming so popular, did something to heighten this tendency. But more important than these in breaking the dominating force of religion were the manifold distractions and worldly interests inseparable from the society of the age. This may be easily exaggerated. Men of the Renaissance were seldom really irreligious. Few if any were atheists or even unorthodox. They were merely less vitally interested in the things of the spirit and more in the things of this world than their ancestors of the days when the life of the ascetic monk had represented the highest ideal, though seldom realized, of thinking men. Perhaps they had fallen into that "forgetfulness of God in time of prosperity" against which medieval preachers were wont to warn their flocks. Certainly the world and the flesh had no terrors for this generation, even though they might still fear the devil. This is what is meant by the "secular spirit" of the Renaissance men who threw themselves heart and soul into the full enjoyment and eager exploration of the world about them.

Individualism

In this vital urban society, with its strong secular spirit, men awoke to a new consciousness of themselves as individuals. Of the modern characteristics that were making their appearance in this chaotic age of transition, few are more significant or more difficult to define than the individualism that so many historians have

noted as a contrast to the corporate or class consciousness of medieval society. Men, of course, have always known that they were individuals. But in the perilous world of the Middle Ages, where security in this world depended on membership in a close corporation, whether guild, monastery, church, manor, or rank in the feudal system, and hope of salvation depended on strict obedience to the corporate church, men were inevitably more conscious of their ordained place in the scheme of things than of the potentialities of their own individual personality. As the medieval social structure began to crumble, however, careers were thrown open to talent. In the rapidly shifting politics of the Italian cities, nobility of birth was not essential to power; the new capitalistic methods of business enabled individuals to accumulate wealth far beyond their fellows; and the generous patronage of art raised lowborn artists high above the level of the ordinary artisan. There seemed no limit to what any man might accomplish, aided only by his own ability and fortune. In the new secular spirit, too, men found a double incentive for the full development of their individual powers. Immortal fame in this world came to seem more important than immortal life in the next; and the eager enjoyment of all that this world had to offer stimulated men to the development of all sides of their personalities, so as to wring the maximum of experience or pleasure out of life.

The ideal of the complete personality

This new realization of individual potentialities brought to life a new social ideal — that of the well-rounded personality — to take the place of the medieval ideal of the man who perfectly represented the qualities of his class or group. It was an ideal that found practical expression in the amazing versatility that characterized so many Italians in the fifteenth century. Statesmen like Cosimo and Lorenzo de' Medici, the bankers who ruled Florence, soldier-despots like Duke Federigo of Urbino, and business men like the Florentine Palla Strozzi were also scholars and cultivated patrons of the arts, while innumerable examples might be cited of artists who practiced painting, sculpture, and architecture with equal facility and still found time for the pursuit of scholarship and philosophy. And this versatility of interest was not limited to men of unusual genius. The average man of culture now sought consciously to acquire at least an adequate familiarity with all branches of human activity so as to develop his personality to its fullest extent. In the schools conducted by Guarino (1374–1460) at Ferrara and Vittorino da Feltre (1378–1446) at Mantua, the practice of arms and all forms of athletics, music and courtly manners, as well as a thorough training in the arts and classical literature, were included among the things that a gentleman should know. The

Renaissance, indeed, produced a new standard for the gentleman or courtier. As Baldassare Castiglione (1478–1529), himself a paragon of courtiers, tells us in his charming *Book of the Courtier*, the man who would make his way successfully into the highest ranks of society must now be not merely, or necessarily, nobly born, though that is an advantage, nor a great warrior, though he should be skilled in arms, but a fully developed personality, an amateur of all arts and all branches of learning and a master of some, possessing, above all, grace, tact, good manners, and personal charm. The contrast between the boisterous and often brutal manners of a Richard the Lion-hearted and the wide education and sensitive *finesse* of a Castiglione marks the development from the medieval to the modern ideal of a gentleman.

Violent contrasts

So far, as seems inevitable in dealing with the Renaissance, we have dwelt chiefly on the high lights of the age, the signs of progress and the evidences of modern tendencies. But there were also deep shadows, and the evolution away from medieval conditions was not always a progress toward higher standards. The age of the Renaissance in Italy was above all an age of confusion and contrast in politics, in religion, in morality, and in individual characters. Medieval and modern characteristics existed side by side in the same society or the same person, producing violent contradictions and startling incongruities. As the fifteenth century drew to a close, the people of Florence, who for years had followed the leadership of Lorenzo de' Medici, most cultured and worldly of statesmen, fell suddenly under the spell of the thoroughly medieval ascetic monk, Savonarola (1452–98), only to react again in a short time and burn their former idol. The despots, who ruled by force and cunning, recognized the binding power of no law, human or divine. The eager development of all man's faculties meant only too often the development of the baser as well as the higher instincts. Princes like the Visconti of Milan might combine inhuman cruelty with the most delicate appreciation of art, and artists like Benvenuto Cellini (1500–70) might be little better than thugs in their private life. The most enlightened and rational of Italian statesmen guided their policies by the auguries of charlatan astrologers. In every court in Italy the veneer of refined and learned society covered dark stains of immorality, and lavish magnificence paraded the streets of every city in glaring contrast to the most wretched poverty.

All that has been said about the Renaissance did not, of course, occur at once, nor would it all be true of any one time. The age of the Renaissance evolved slowly and was constantly changing. In the remainder of this chapter, we shall trace the historical developments of the age in

politics, literature, and art in an attempt to place the whole in truer historical perspective.

2. EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN STATES TO 1494

The Italian Renaissance was born in the midst of political chaos. The history of Italy in the fourteenth century is the history of confusion thrice confounded. In that century, Italian merchants and bankers were heaping up unprecedented fortunes; Italian industry was growing to vast proportions; the greatest of Italian poets were laying the foundations of a national literature; but as a nation in the political sense, Italy did not yet exist. Only in the southern kingdom of Naples was there any political unity. The rest of the peninsula was divided into a host of petty city-states, which had acquired almost complete independence from the overlordship of emperor and pope. Each of these states was torn by hostile factions and was frequently at war with its neighbors. The traditional feud between the Guelf and Ghibelline parties gives some slight coherence to Italian politics in this century, but that ancient quarrel had lost almost all of its original meaning in the tangle of local interests and antagonisms. Cities fought each other for control of trade routes or merely to destroy commercial rivals; country districts rebelled against domination by the cities; and within the cities the wealthy merchants and industrialists strove to control the laboring classes, who rose in revolt whenever possible, while the nobles sided with one party or the other and mercenary soldiers fished happily in the troubled waters.

Italy in the fourteenth century

In the midst of this confusion, two general tendencies may be observed; first, the destruction of democratic republican governments at the hands of despots or merchant oligarchies, and second, the expansion of the larger city-states at the expense of the less powerful ones. The first of these, indeed, was well under way at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Nearly all the cities of northern and central Italy had begun their independent career as more or less democratic communes, but this form of government proved neither strong enough to protect the city from its enemies nor sufficiently stable to provide the internal peace and order that were essential to the prosperity of business. The only possible solution of the problem seemed to be the government of the city by a dictator or despot, who would be strong enough to keep order and who would impose peace on the warring factions by taking political liberty from all. Some few states, like Venice and Florence, escaped actual despotism, but they were scarcely more

Rise of the despots

democratic, since their republican government was controlled by a small group of wealthy families. The manner in which the despots acquired their absolute power differed, of course, from place to place according to local conditions. Some turned a temporary authority, legally delegated to them as officers of the state, into an extra-legal power; others were mercenary soldiers or local feudal lords who seized the government by force of arms; while still others used their wealth to gain control of the republican governmental machine.

Character of the despots

The despots, like men of any other class, differed widely in character, but certain characteristics were common to almost all. They were mostly men of unusual ability and force of character, for only so could they have risen to power without the support of legal or constitutional claims. They were often ruthless, cruel, and treacherous, because they had to rule by force and through fear. Nevertheless, they frequently gave their cities a wiser and more stable government than they had enjoyed under the old republican communes. As Machiavelli pointed out in his justly celebrated handbook for despots, *The Prince* (1513), it was to the interest of the despot himself to maintain the prosperity of the city he ruled, and no despot could rule for long unless he did so. Most of the despots were intelligent enough to realize that they must win the respect, and, in some measure, the gratitude, of their people. It was this desire, as well as genuine love of culture, that caused so many of them to gather poets, scholars, and artists to their courts by the promise of generous rewards. No small part of the artistic and literary glory of the Renaissance was due to their liberal and remarkably discriminating patronage.

The condottieri

Still the despots could neither have won nor held their power had not the people of Italy generally lost the ability or desire to fight in defense of their liberties. Even under the old republican governments the citizens seldom took an active part in the army. The responsible citizens were too busy with profitable business to waste time in military training, and no republican party government, nor for that matter any despot, could afford to take the risk of revolution involved in arming the lesser populace. The best recruiting ground for a citizen militia should have been the *contado*, the rural territory and villages surrounding the city. But since all the growing city-states had spread their territory by conquest and steadily refused to grant citizenship to the conquered population, they could not trust the latter to fight for the state. The Italian states, therefore, were forced to depend on mercenary soldiers from outside for defense against foreign enemies and to keep down rebellion among discontented citizens or the disaffected

subjects of the conquered towns and country. These mercenary soldiers were organized in large bands under their own leaders, called *condottieri*, who sold the services of the whole band to the highest bidder. They did not care for whom they fought or why, so long as they were paid. Their chief interest was to keep the war going as long as possible, for peace meant unemployment. In the main they seem to have been fairly good soldiers, though Machiavelli criticized them severely, but their methods were behind the times. The temporary nature of their employment made it impossible for the *condottieri* to train large bands of infantry, at a time when Swiss and Spanish pikemen were proving the superiority of infantry as the English archers had a century before. They had to depend on cavalry and the terrain of Italy is for the most part unsuited to cavalry tactics. They resorted, therefore, to endless marches and countermarches, maneuvering for position, and they were always more dangerous to noncombatants than to each other. It was a vicious system, and not the least of its evils was that it left Italy without any really adequate defense against foreign invaders from the great territorial states of Europe.


Expansion of the greater states

The second general tendency in the history of Italy during this period, the expansion of the greater states at the expense of the less powerful ones, began later than the rise of the despots and was not completed till the fifteenth century. But by 1494, the year in which the first French invasion opened a new era in Italian history, it had progressed so far that only five great states and some three or four lesser ones remained of the scores that had dotted the map of Italy at the beginning of the Renaissance.[1] The five great states were respectively, the duchy of Milan, the republics of Venice and Florence, the States of the Church, and the kingdom of Naples. Of the lesser states, the republic of Siena still maintained its independence in southern Tuscany, as did the marquisate of Mantua and the duchy of Ferrara on the upper borders of the Romagna, though the latter was in theory subject to the papacy. In the States of the Church, too, there were still some practically independent little despotisms, but they were soon to be suppressed by the popes, Alexander VI and Julius II.

An attempt to trace the history of each of the original Italian states would be neither possible in the space at our command nor particularly profitable. We will limit our attention, therefore, to the development of those great states which survived.

All through the Middle Ages, Milan had been the wealthiest and most powerful of the numerous cities in the rich Lombard plain which com-

[1] See map, page 339.


ITALY
IN THE
FIFTEENTH CENTURY
8
12
16
46
42
38
THE DUCHY OF MILAN
THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE
Venice
Genoa
REPUBLIC OF FLORENCE
Florence
REPUBLIC OF SIENA
Rimini
Urbino
THE STATES OF THE CHURCH
Tiber R.
Rome
ADRIATIC SEA
DALMATIA
CORSICA
THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES
Naples
THE KINGDOM OF SARDINIA
Palermo
THE KINGDOM OF SICILY
MEDITERRANEAN SEA

mands the Alpine passes to northern Europe. In the twelfth century it led the Lombard League in the struggle for independence from imperial control. Like its neighbors, however, Milan lost its freedom to a despotic ruler at the dawn of the Renaissance. In 1311, Matteo Visconti, head of a Ghibelline family already powerful in the city, established a lasting dictatorship with the approval of the Emperor Henry VII, who gave him the title of Imperial Vicar. He also began the expansion of the city-state by the conquest of several neighboring towns. The great period of Milanese expansion, however, did not begin till the reign of Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1378–1402). This cunning and unscrupulous despot succeeded in conquering nearly the whole of Lombardy and seriously threatened Tuscany and the States of the Church. He also won international recognition for his family by purchasing from the Emperor Wenceslas the title of Duke of Milan (1395) and by marrying his daughter Valentina to Louis of Orléans, the son of Charles V of France. During the next half-century, the sons of the great Visconti, Giovanni Maria (1402–12) and Filippo Maria (1412–47), had to wage an almost constant war against Venice and its allies to defend their heritage. When Filippo Maria died, his duchy included only the western half of Lombardy. He was the last Visconti duke, having left no heirs except an illegitimate daughter who had married the vigorous, common-born *condottiere*, Francesco Sforza. The citizens of Milan took advantage of the situation to re-establish republican government, but they had lost the ability to rule themselves and within three years Sforza had made himself Duke of Milan (1450–66). Four years later he made peace with Venice, and from then on almost to the last year of the century the house of Sforza ruled Milan in comparative peace, making it one of the richest states in Italy, as well as a center of art and learning to which men of genius resorted gladly.

Milan

To the east of Lombardy the great merchant city of Venice, built out over her lagoons, commanded the Adriatic Sea. Since the first revival of commerce in the Early Middle Ages, Venice had been one of the richest cities in Europe. Her geographical position made her the natural middleman in the trade between the eastern Mediterranean and western Europe, while the lagoons which cut her off from the mainland gave her a security that enabled her to stand aloof from the tangled feuds of Italian politics. Moreover, unlike the other Italian republics, Venice had evolved a stable system of government that prevented revolutions and party strife. Since the thirteenth century, the mass of the people had been excluded entirely from the government, which was monopolized by an oligarchy of wealthy families. From these

Venice

the doge (a life president) was elected, as were also the grand council, the senate, and the powerful Council of Ten, who, after 1310, kept check on the doge and senate. This political stability enabled Venice to recover from a desperate struggle with her trade rival, Genoa, in the fourteenth century, whereas Genoa was left so badly shaken that it fell under the domination, first of France, then of Milan. The beginning of the fifteenth century marks a decided turning-point in the history of the republic. Alarmed by the Visconti conquest of Lombardy, the Venetians determined to abandon their aloof position among their lagoons and to acquire a landward state that would protect the city from its too powerful neighbor and would keep open the routes to the Alpine passes, which were so necessary to Venetian commerce. After conquering Padua, famous for its ancient university, in 1405, the republic's forces moved on into Visconti territory. The long war which followed was fought chiefly by mercenaries and the superior wealth of the merchant city was the deciding factor. When the final peace treaty was signed with the new Sforza Duke of Milan in 1454, Venice ruled a mainland state in eastern Lombardy and around the head of the Adriatic as large or larger than that of its rival Milan.

On the western coast of Italy, to the south of Lombardy, lies the district of Tuscany, bounded on the east and south by the States of the Church. All this territory, except Siena, was gradually brought under the rule of the expanding republic of Florence, *Florence* which conquered even the great mercantile city of Pisa in 1406. Florence had grown tremendously rich from its woolen and other industries. It was also one of the greatest banking centers of Europe and was, besides, the recognized leader of Italy in all branches of culture. But despite their unusually high level of intelligence and the amazingly large number of men of genius to be found among them, the people of Florence had never succeeded in working out a sound republican constitution. All through the fourteenth century and the first part of the fifteenth, the city was a prey to frequent revolutions or party feuds and was dominated most of the time by a small group of wealthy families. This system caused so much disturbance and injustice that in 1434 the majority of the Florentine people accepted without protest the control of their government by Cosimo de' Medici, the head of a great banking family which was to rule the city for the next sixty years. Florence remained a republic in form, but Cosimo and his successors were in reality its despotic rulers, though they held no official title and merely controlled the republican machinery from behind the scenes, rather after the fashion of a modern American municipal boss. On the death of Cosimo after

thirty years of wise government that won him the title of *Pater Patriae* (father of his country), he was followed by his son Piero (1464–69). Under Piero's rather uncertain guidance the power of the Medici seemed to be slipping, but it was fully restored by his brilliant son Lorenzo "the Magnificent" (1469–92). With Lorenzo the prestige of the Medici name reached its highest point. He was a man of complex character and versatile genius, at once poet, patron of art and learning, statesman and diplomat. It was in no small measure due to his diplomatic skill that Italy was kept in a state of relative peace during his lifetime. His son Piero, however, proved unfit to carry on the family tradition. His weakness in dealing with the French invasion of 1494 roused the Florentine people to drive the Medici out of the city, though they were to return later.

The States of the Church

The States of the Church stretched clear across central Italy and included the Romagna, which extended up the eastern coast almost to the borders of Venetia. This large territory was in theory ruled by the pope, but during the Babylonian Captivity and the schism petty despots had set up practically independent governments in nearly every city except Rome, and even there the popes were none too secure. After the schism was ended by the Council of Constance (1417), the fifteenth-century popes had to face the problem of bringing these independent lords to obedience, no easy task since most of them were professional *condottieri*. Greater progress might have been made had not some of the popes been more eager to replace these despots by members of their own families than to subject them to papal rule. Engrossed in these family and political interests, the Renaissance popes became more worldly until there was little to distinguish them from the other Italian princes. They formed diplomatic alliances, made and broke treaties, and hired armies of *condottieri* for wars of conquest or defense. Like the other princes, too, they kept up a luxurious court and spent huge sums of money on magnificent buildings and in the patronage of artists and scholars. Nicholas V (1447–55), who originated the Vatican Library, and Pius II (1458–64) were enthusiastic devotees of the revived classical literature. The latter, indeed, had gained an international reputation as a classical scholar under his own name of Aeneus Silvius before he became pope, though afterward he did rather repent his devotion to pagan letters. His successor, Paul II (1464–71), had reasonably sound ideals, though he was unable to put them very successfully into practice, but the three following pontificates showed a steady decline in papal morality. Sixtus IV (1471–84) and Innocent VIII (1484–92) had no interest beyond the advancement of their numerous nephews and

children, and at the end of the century the infamous Borgia pope, Alexander VI (1492–1503), reduced the papacy to the lowest depths of degradation. The reign of the Borgia, however, did much to strengthen the States of the Church politically. Alexander's vigorous son Cesare Borgia at last succeeded in reducing the greater part of the States to obedience, thus enabling the warlike Julius II (1503–13) to complete the task and build up a strong secular state. Under the latter pope and his successor, the Medicean Leo X (1513–21), the golden age of the artistic Renaissance cast over Rome a sunset light shortly to be followed by gathering shadows.

Naples

All of Italy south of the States of the Church was included in the kingdom of Naples, to which at times the kingdom of Sicily was united. Its history during the age of the Renaissance consists almost entirely of dynastic struggles between the different branches of the French family of Anjou and the Spanish family of Aragon. Here feudalism still survived as an active force, and the intellectual movements of the time made little impression save as importations at the royal court. The Angevin rule in Naples dated back to the conquest of Naples and Sicily from the last Hohenstaufen by Charles of Anjou in 1266. The Sicilian part of the kingdom, however, soon broke away. In 1282, the people of the island rebelled and gave the crown of Sicily to Peter III, King of Aragon, who had married a daughter of the Hohenstaufen Manfred. From that date till the death of Queen Giovanna II of Naples in 1435, the Angevin house ruled in Naples and the Aragonese in Sicily. As Giovanna had died without heirs, the crown of Naples was claimed and won, despite the opposition of the French branch of the family of Anjou, by Alfonso of Aragon and Sicily (1435–58), thus reuniting the two kingdoms during his lifetime. It was divided between his sons, but an Aragonese king was still ruling in Naples when Charles VIII of France revived the old Angevin claim and invaded Italy in 1494.

Italy on the eve of the French invasion

For a full generation before the beginning of the foreign invasions in 1494, Italy was kept in a more or less peaceful condition by the establishment of a balance of power among the five great states. Diplomatic relations shifted from time to time, but for the most part Milan, Florence, and Naples formed a loose alliance to hold the balance against Venice and the papacy. This alliance was cemented by a series of marriages between the Sforza family and the Aragonese house of Naples, and depended also on the friendship of both with the diplomatic Lorenzo de' Medici. Even the small, though warlike, states of Ferrara, ruled by the family of Este, and Mantua, ruled by the Gonzagas, were drawn into the circle of family

marriages. This system, however, could do no more than keep a temporary and uneasy peace within Italy. It offered no basis for union against a foreign enemy. The way for the invasion of Italy by France and the other great European powers was paved by the suspicion and antagonism with which the Italian states regarded one another and by their complete lack of Italian patriotism. But the story of the invasions, which involved all the countries of Europe in one way or another, must be left to a later chapter devoted to the states of Europe as a whole.

3. THE LITERARY RENAISSANCE

We have already noted in passing that the age of the Renaissance was characterized not only by economic, social, and political changes — increasing wealth, the development of urban society, individualism and the secular spirit, and the rise of despotic states — but also by a great intellectual and artistic activity along new lines, which expressed or resulted from the other changes in Italian society. It is this latter characteristic of the age that is often referred to exclusively when men speak of the Italian Renaissance. Like the former it marks a transition from medieval to modern times, with much that was typically its own.

Beginnings of Italian literature

One of the earliest developments of the new age was the creation of an Italian literature, which gave to Italy a national language that served as a bond of cultural unity never realized in the political field. Some signs of this development may be observed in the last years of the High Middle Ages, in the adaptation to Italian uses of forms taken from the lyric poetry of southern France, and in the synthetic "court language" fostered by Frederick II in Sicily. But the close relation between spoken Italian and the Latin that was the general literary medium, as well as the great variety of dialects represented in the numerous Italian states, had prevented the growth of a universal Italian literary tongue. Literary Italian was largely the creation of three fourteenth-century men, who were at least sufficiently typical of their age to abandon old traditions and, confident in their own creative genius, to strike out new paths for themselves.

The Tuscan triumvirate

Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio, these three were the triumvirate who first formed the literary language of modern Italy. All three were Florentine by descent, and they used the Tuscan dialect as the basis of their literary language. In other respects, however, they were very dissimilar, and the differences in their character are typical of the gradual drift away from medieval modes of thought. The first and greatest of the three, Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), seems

to belong more to the Middle Ages than to the Renaissance. The idealized love poetry of his *Vita Nuova* is nearer to the troubadour tradition of medieval Provence than to the worldly and almost pagan loves of the Renaissance poets. Above all, his greatest work, the magnificent *Divine Comedy*, presents, in its breath-taking voyage through Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, a panoramic survey of all medieval thought. Yet he is not purely medieval. In his confident individualism he foreshadows the coming age, and, despite his interest in religion and philosophy, he was a layman, a member of that secular, urban society that was to fashion the new world.

The second of the triumvirate, Francesco Petrarca or Petrarch (1304–74) was considerably less medieval. His introspective absorption in his own personality, his longing for immortal fame and the intensely human quality of his lyric poems addressed to Laura, together with his passionate interest in pagan antiquity, mark him as a true man of the Renaissance, though his occasional religious reactions and ascetic impulses show that he is not entirely removed from the Middle Ages. His influence on the shaping of Italian poetry, especially on the sonnet and brief *canzonieri*, is second only to Dante's, whose use of the Tuscan dialect he reinforced and purified.

The chief contribution of Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–75) was the shaping of an Italian prose style. Lacking the depth of character and spiritual insight of his two great fellow citizens, this amiable and worldly Florentine burgher was perhaps more typical of his city and his age than either of them. He observed the surface of life with keen enjoyment and described it with a clarity that made the stories of his *Decameron* models for later novelists.

The rapid development of Italian literature was cut short with the death of Petrarch and Boccaccio and it was not revived again till the second half of the fifteenth century. The new language could not compete with the amazing revival of interest in the classic literature of ancient Rome. Even Petrarch and Boccaccio were far more interested in this than in their Italian writings, and for two full generations after their death it thrust the "vulgar" tongue completely into the background. The relation between the "revival of antiquity" and the Renaissance has not always been clearly understood. It seems certain, however, that the former was the result rather than the cause of the economic, social, and psychological changes that we have already noted as characteristic of this age, though in turn it influenced and altered their development. The Latin classics were not a discovery of the Renaissance. Many of them were in common use, though chiefly as models

The revival of antiquity

of grammatical construction, throughout the Middle Ages. But the deep chasm which separated medieval life and medieval ideals and modes of thought from those of pagan antiquity made any real understanding of the ancient writers almost impossible. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, there was growing up in Italy a state of society, essentially urban, secular, and based on wealth, which was not so far removed from the civilization of ancient times, though it was not yet nearly so perfectly formed. It is not surprising, then, that Italians of this age should discover a new meaning in the classics. In these pre-Christian writings they found a culture that seemed to embody everything for which they were blindly groping. They applied themselves, therefore, with devout enthusiasm to the study and imitation of antiquity, inspired by the conviction that the road to progress lay in a return to the glorious past that lay beyond what they considered the Gothic barbarism of the Middle Ages.

The humanists

The men who devoted their lives to the study of the classics were called humanists. The word comes from the name given to the ancient writings, the *litterae humaniores*, i.e., the literature that deals with humanity. The humanists were primarily scholars, but humanism meant more than mere scholarship. It meant a philosophy of life, which is best described in the old epigram, "I am a man; nothing that pertains to men is alien to me." It was a philosophy in strong contrast to the preoccupation with the things of the spirit and the future world that had played so large a part in the learned writings of the Middle Ages. It both expressed and strengthened the secular tendencies of the new age. The humanists remained Christian in faith, some of them devoutly so; but few of them escaped the influence for better or for worse of pagan philosophy and morals.

Restoration of classical Latin

The humanists were indefatigable workers. They were driven by their reverence for antiquity to undertake the double task of restoring the works of classical authors to their original form, while at the same time perfecting their own knowledge of classical Latin style, including the details of spelling, inflection, syntax, scansion, and so forth, which had been almost forgotten during the Middle Ages. The only copies of the ancient authors they could find were the work of medieval scribes who were often careless and ignorant of the niceties of style. Every manuscript was filled with errors. The humanists had, therefore, to learn the rules of classic style from the study of imperfect manuscripts and then to apply that knowledge as they acquired it to the correction of the errors. This could be accomplished only by constant and painstaking comparison of all the manuscripts available.

This necessity led to a frantic search for old manuscripts. Petrarch led the hunt and inspired his friend Boccaccio and others to take it up. Monastery libraries were ransacked and every new fragment was hailed with delirious enthusiasm. Often the searchers found that they were too late, for many old monastic foundations had degenerated and their libraries had been allowed to moulder from neglect. Boccaccio tells us how he sat down and wept amidst the wreckage of priceless manuscripts in Saint Benedict's old monastery at Monte Cassino. For three generations and more the search continued. Fortunes were spent and emissaries sent to the farthest corners of Europe. One of the most fortunate of the discoverers was the Florentine humanist Poggio (1380–1459), who for forty years was attached to the papal court and made good use of the embassies on which he was sent to hunt manuscripts in the countries north of the Alps. Merchants, princes, and popes shared the scholar's enthusiasm and spent vast sums in the collection of libraries. It was they, too, who rewarded with generous patronage the humanists who wrote in the newly recovered classical style.

Search for manuscripts

The revival of ancient Greek literature in Italy came later than that of classical Latin. The knowledge of Greek had died out almost completely in the West and it was hard to find instructors who could teach even the rudiments of the language. The beginning of the revival may be dated from 1397, when a competent Greek scholar from Constantinople, Manuel Chrysoloras, was persuaded to come to Florence to teach. He stayed only three years, though he had been given the most flattering reception, but he had done enough to give the Italian humanists a start. After that they studied Greek almost as enthusiastically as the ancient Latin. The ecumenical council of Florence in 1438–39, which brought a host of Greek scholars to that city, gave a further impetus to Greek studies. A few years later, in 1453, the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks drove great numbers of Byzantine refugees to seek a living in Italy by teaching or copying and translating Greek manuscripts. The humanists of Italy eagerly absorbed all the Greek classics, but they reserved their greatest enthusiasm for the philosophy of Plato, now made available for the first time in its original form. Cosimo de' Medici found time in the midst of his manifold duties to found a Platonic Academy in Florence. There, in the later years of the fifteenth century, the learned Ficino (1433–99) and the brilliant Pico della Mirandola (1463–94) taught a synthesis of Platonic philosophy and Christian theology that was to have a profound influence on the humanists of northern Europe.

The revival of Greek

A new era in Italian humanism and literature opened with the generation who were the contemporaries of that most liberal and understanding of patrons, the magnificent Lorenzo de' Medici (1449–92). Having learned good classical Latin and Greek in childhood, the men of this generation enjoyed a wider horizon and displayed greater originality than their predecessors who had had to struggle with the task of learning and restoring the two ancient languages. They were prepared to use the classic tongues to express the thought garnered from the ancient treasury and adapted to the uses of their own age, and they were free to turn their attention to the revival of their own native language which had been allowed to lapse since the days of the triumvirate. Lorenzo himself set the example by writing verses of first-rate quality in Italian, and under his influence the scholar-poet Poliziano (1454–94) produced highly polished poems in all three languages. Thereafter, Italian was used more and more widely, until the generation after Lorenzo raised it to full equality with Latin and Greek, dignifying it with the epic poetry of Ariosto (1474–1533) and the clean-cut prose of the Florentine historians Machiavelli (1469–1527) and Guicciardini (1482–1540).

The age of Lorenzo de' Medici

We cannot leave the humanists without mentioning one important by-product of their intense interest in antiquity — namely, the development of an independent critical spirit. They were often as prone to accept without question the validity of anything found in the ancient writers as their medieval predecessors had been to accept the authority of the Bible, the Fathers, and Aristotle. But the change from one authority to another had given them a new point of view, and the training they received in comparing, correcting, and restoring the manuscript copies of the classics had furnished them with a sound critical method. This method of literary and historical criticism, detached from reverence for religious authority, was used by the Roman humanist Lorenzo Valla (1405?–57) to good effect in proving that the "Donation of Constantine," on which the papacy had based a large part of its claims to secular power, was a ninth or tenth century forgery. The Christian humanists of the north were later to use the same critical spirit in a much more far-reaching attack on medieval religious institutions.

The critical spirit

4. THE ARTISTIC RENAISSANCE

As in literature, so in art. The social and intellectual changes that were taking place in Italy during the age of the Renaissance were reflected by changes in spirit and form in all the arts, and these

were accompanied by a change in the character and status of the artist.

The medieval artist had been typical of his age. He was a member of a corporation — nearly all medieval artists were guildsmen — and he worked within the traditions and rules of his craft. He was regarded, and regarded himself, as an artisan. He no doubt took an honest pride in his work, but he was scarcely more likely to attach his name to it than a carpenter or an armorer would be. Being practically anonymous, he had little incentive to break away from the traditional methods used by his fellows, nor, probably, was he free to do so. Moreover, the purpose of his art was most often religious, not so much because religion played such a large part in his life that it was bound to inspire his work as because the church was the wealthiest and most frequent patron of his services. Here, too, he was limited by tradition, for the character of religious art had become highly conventionalized and he was not encouraged to make innovations or to copy too closely natural beauty, which was always suspected by the medieval church. Now, in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the development of a wealthy secular society, with a keen interest in art as it portrayed the beauties of this world, gradually changed the status of the artist and the conditions affecting his art. The artist of outstanding genius was in great demand. He might receive from princes, merchants, and bankers rewards far beyond those of the ordinary artisan. His name and the individual character of his work became assets to be highly valued. Working for men who were losing their respect for tradition and who were more interested in this world than the next, the artist was free to strike out along new lines and to develop his individual genius to its fullest extent in the reproduction of beauty for its own sake. Even when he was employed by the church, this was becoming increasingly true, for the ecclesiastical princes of Renaissance Italy shared the growing secular spirit of their age.

Individualism and the secular spirit in art

Of the major arts, painting was the most characteristic of the Renaissance and was developed to the highest degree of perfection. Here the Italian love of color and natural beauty found its fullest expression. Until almost the end of the period, Florence was the greatest center of painting, as of literature and the other arts. There, in the opening years of the fourteenth century, Giotto (1276–1336) took a long stride away from the stiffly formalized technique of earlier religious painting toward a greater naturalism. Throughout the rest of the century his successors were moving steadily in the direction he had indicated, though their work was still mostly religious and they had

Painting

not yet acquired the technical knowledge or skill required to accomplish their full objective. The fifteenth century was a period of adventurous experimentation and rapid progress in technique. Driven by the desire to copy natural beauty or the outward appearance of their fellow men as accurately as possible, the fifteenth-century artists mastered the laws of perspective and shadow, discovered how to give their figures the appearance of roundness and depth, and greatly improved the methods of blending colors. The art of this period was almost entirely secular, even when the subject was religious. Portrait painting, the result of that desire to be remembered by posterity which all the great or wealthy men of the Renaissance felt strongly, became for the first time a fashionable form of art. We have not space to mention all the fifteenth-century painters, but it would be unforgivable to ignore entirely the names of the three Florentine painters, Masaccio (1402–29?), who in his brief life at the beginning of the century set a standard of technical perfection far ahead of his generation, the worldly-minded friar, Fra Lippo Lippi (1406–69), whose love of realism led him to paint portraits of his fellow citizens in scenes of the Holy Family, and Botticelli (1447–1510), whose graceful paintings show most clearly the influence of classical paganism on the thought and art of the age.

The great masters

After the artists of this age of experimentation and naturalism had worked out the necessary rules of technique came the golden age of Renaissance painting with the work of the great masters who were able to use that technical knowledge and skill as a means for the expression of their artistic conceptions rather than to seek it as an end in itself. The first of these was the Florentine Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), the most versatile man of his age. He was a master of all the arts, a poet and musician as well as a practical engineer and an experimental scientist of the first rank. In this enigmatic genius there was a driving curiosity that impelled him to discover what lay beneath the surface of things. His Mona Lisa, whose mysterious smile has puzzled and fascinated generations of critics, and the disciples grouped about Christ in the Last Supper are studies in character as well as works of impelling beauty. The work of Raphael (1483–1520) is not so profound, but no one surpassed him in the perfection of his coloring or the serene harmony that pervades all his paintings. Though he died in early middle age, he produced an amazingly large number of finished works, many of them under the patronage of the popes Julius II and Leo X, including the marvelous Madonna in the Sistine Chapel and the School of Athens. It was Julius II, too, who patronized some of the best work of Michelangelo (1475–1564), having persuaded him to turn from sculpture



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

SAINT ANNE, THE VIRGIN AND CHILD

From a painting by Leonardo da Vinci, Louvre

to painting for the decoration of the Sistine Chapel. The result was a magnificent fresco, covering the whole roof of the chapel, which secures the place of Michelangelo for all time among the master painters. In it, as in everything he did, one can see the tragic driving force, the grandeur of design, and the deep religious emotion that make Michelangelo unique among the artists of the Renaissance.

Sculpture

The development of sculpture followed in most respects the same general lines as did that of painting. In the Middle Ages it had shared the religious and corporate character of the other arts, having been used mainly for the decoration of churches and cathedrals. Beginning with Niccolo Pisano before the end of the thirteenth century, Renaissance sculptors gradually worked away from Gothic conventions toward a more realistic copying of nature. As in painting, the fifteenth century was a period of experiment and technical progress, influenced to a greater extent than was true of painting by imitation of classical models, for many ancient statues were now being disinterred and studied with keen interest. Sculpture was rapidly securing recognition as an independent art devoted to secular uses and freed from its subordination to religious architecture, though many artists, like Ghiberti (1378–1455), whose bronze gates in bas-relief for the doors of the cathedral baptistery were the wonder of all Florence, still worked on the decoration of churches. The masterly equestrian statue of the *condottiere* Gattamelata by the Florentine Donatello (1386?–1466) is one of the best examples of the new independent and secular type of sculpture. The golden age of sculpture coincides with that of painting, and here again the powerful figure of Michelangelo towers above the other masters. In this, his most natural medium, his best work, including the noble David, the deeply religious Pietà, and the magnificent tombs of the Medici, were done in his native Florence before and after the years with Julius in Rome.

Architecture

The changing conditions and ideals of the Renaissance inevitably brought changes in architectural style, often resulting in buildings of great beauty. Yet it is doubtful if the changes mark a clear improvement. Though perhaps better suited to the spirit and needs of their own age, the Renaissance buildings lack the harmony and grandeur of the medieval Gothic cathedrals. In the experimental period of the fifteenth century, individualism ran riot as each architect strove to adapt the antique Roman and medieval Gothic types to contemporary needs, while at the same time expressing his own originality. Of these, Brunelleschi (1377–1446), who built the churches of San Lorenzo and Santo Spirito in Florence, was perhaps the most successful,



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

DETAIL OF THE TOMB OF GIULIANO DE' MEDICI
FLORENCE

An example of the sculpture of Michelangelo

but it remained for the Lombard architect, Bramante (1444–1514), who drew the original plans for Saint Peter's Cathedral in Rome, later altered by Michelangelo, to evolve out of the old traditions a really harmonious style suitable to his own age.

Having reached its golden age, the artistic and intellectual Renaissance did not last long. It faded with the passing of the peculiar social and economic conditions that had produced it. The loss of political liberty through conquest by foreign powers, the loss of intellectual freedom through the action of the Counter-Reformation, and the decline of economic prosperity due to the shifting of trade routes to the west sapped the energy of Italy. But meanwhile the spirit of the Renaissance had crossed the Alps to exert a great influence on the culture of the northern countries.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE RENAISSANCE IN THE NORTH

THE period of transition from medieval to modern civilization began later in northern Europe than it did in Italy and once begun, it developed more slowly and along somewhat different lines. For in the north, feudalism was more firmly entrenched behind its moats and castle walls; religion lay closer to the hearts of men far removed from the pagan beauty of the sun-drenched Italian land; and in the quadrangles of Oxford and the dusty halls of the Sorbonne, the ghosts of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus walked undisturbed, long after Italian scholars had deserted them to follow after the still older ghosts of ancient Greece and Rome. But throughout the whole of northern Europe, the same leaven was at work as had transformed society in the more prosperous south. Here, too, commerce and industry were bringing wealth and with it thriving urban centers and an aggressive, self-confident new middle class, whose energy was to disrupt medieval society. Yet the product of the transformation would not be altogether the same as in Italy, for in the north cities were fewer and farther between, and the new society would find its focus in the centralized territorial state rather than in the city.

The fifteenth century and the early sixteenth witnessed the gradual disappearance of many medieval characteristics in society, religion, and culture, and the contemporary growth of much that we recognize as modern. The old and the new existed side by side or inextricably interwoven, and the old gave place to the new so slowly that major changes are discernible only through the lengthened perspective of the years. Men of the fifteenth century did not know that the Middle Ages were dying. They knew only that times were not what they had been; that gray-bearded men bewailed the passing of the good old days, while aggressive youngsters who had studied in Florence or Bologna spoke slightingly of Gothic barbarism; and that there was now something very like contempt mixed with the envy on the face of the stolid burgher as he watched the gaily dressed knights passing the windows of his countinghouse.

1. DECAY OF MEDIEVAL INSTITUTIONS

In the fifteenth century, feudalism was fading fast. Its economic and social forms might survive for three centuries and more, but of its inde-

pendent political power there remained only a shadow by the beginning of the sixteenth century. As in Italy, it was the power of money, steadily increasing with the growth of commerce and industry, that wrecked the older forms of society. But in the great territorial states of the north, the influence of money was less direct, for there it worked through the growing power of the rulers of the states, and it was the state that absorbed feudalism into itself.

Decay of feudalism

All through the Middle Ages, the political independence of the nobles and their privileged position in society had depended in large part on their exclusive monopoly of the arts of warfare. So long as their castle walls remained a sure defense against all enemies, so long as their expensive weapons and armor, their great war-horses and the skill that comes only from long years of training gave them an indisputable superiority over common men in battle, so long as prince and people must depend on them for the defense of the state, for so long was the position of the nobles at the apex of society secure. But in the fifteenth century, the introduction of gunpowder as an effective instrument of war and siege placed a weapon in the hands of common men which enabled them to meet the heavy armed knights on relatively even terms. At the same time, the increase in the amount of money available through taxation or loans gave to the rulers of the states a tremendous advantage over the less wealthy nobles in the use of this new weapon. The kings of great states like England, France, and Spain, and even the princes of smaller territorial states like those of Germany, could now raise and maintain armies, composed largely of common soldiers, against which the nobles were helpless. As early as the fourteenth century, the English kings had used the plebeian long bow to good effect and had demonstrated the superiority of a disciplined army over a feudal levy on the fields of Crécy and Poitiers. The use of gunpowder made the state army a universal institution. Unable to ignore or oppose their king, the nobles enlisted in the royal army and took the king's pay. They still fought, such being their nature, but they fought at the bidding of the twin powers of monarchy and money.

The nobles lose their monopoly of fighting

In yet another way, money — or the lack of it — was working to deprive the nobles of their cherished independence. While the business men, who were beginning to discover the profitable uses of capital, and the monarchs, who were acquiring greater powers of taxation, were growing wealthier, the nobles as a general rule were becoming poorer, for the feudal system had never been designed to produce fluid wealth. The increase in the amount of money in circulation was having the inevitable effect of raising prices, while the

Economic decline of the nobles

income of the nobles, based on hereditary rights and immemorial custom, remained relatively the same. To make matters worse, their pride forced them to maintain their social position by an ostentatious display of luxury and pomp that would have been ruinous to men of much larger incomes. Confronted by failing resources and rising expenses, the nobles were forced to seek aid from the royal purse. And the kings were well content to aid them by the gift of pensions, sinecure offices at court, or positions in the army and church, thereby establishing a system of patronage that made the nobles more than ever dependent upon them.

Meanwhile, the same forces that were bringing about the ruin of political feudalism were also causing the break-up of medieval institutions in the non-feudal society of the towns and cities. *Decay of the guild system* There the corporate society which centered about the guilds and the city government was slowly going to pieces, to give way to a new individualistic social order. The social and economic structure of the towns in the Middle Ages had been designed to meet the needs of a still primitive system of commerce and industry, maintaining a precarious existence in the midst of a disorganized state and a hostile society. The men of each trade and the burghers of each city had been forced to adopt a strong corporate solidarity for mutual protection. That necessity was now less evident. The growing power of the central governments offered adequate protection, while at the same time the expanding volume of business and new opportunities for the accumulation of wealth tempted men to break away from the restrictions which the guild or the city government had placed upon individual enterprise in the interests of the whole community. Within and without the guilds, the modern methods of capitalism were slowly but surely triumphing over the corporate methods of the Middle Ages. The economic and social revolution which this change brought about, dividing the commercial and industrial class into two widely separated classes of proletarian laborers and capitalist employers, was not completed during the period we are discussing, but its effects were already visible. In the most influential, because most wealthy, class of city dwellers in northern Europe, something like the same shift from corporate consciousness to self-confident individualism that we have noted in a more extreme form in Italy was already taking place.

Among the other medieval institutions whose strength was decaying during the Later Middle Ages, the universal church which for centuries had held sway over a united Christendom was rapidly declining in power and prestige. As we have already seen,[1] the fourteenth and fif-

[1] See Chapter XIX.

teenth centuries were disastrous ones for the Catholic Church. The papacy, with its wide claims to supremacy over all Catholic Christians, had come into violent conflict with the growing power of the centralized territorial states and had been defeated. National interests had combined with moral disapproval to break the vast authority that the church had wielded during the High Middle Ages. The fourteenth century witnessed the tragedy of Boniface VIII, the Babylonian Captivity, the scandal of the Great Schism, the growth of a strong anti-clerical sentiment, the destructive criticisms of William of Occam and Marsiglio of Padua and the still more telling attacks on the sacramental system brought forward by John Wyclif and John Huss. The fifteenth century, in turn, opened with the menace to papal authority of the conciliar movement, and when that had passed, the popes were left in an anomalous position as Italian princes, whose power over secular governments had vanished and whose control of the church itself was limited by the rulers of the great states.

Decay of the universal church

2. RISE OF THE CENTRALIZED TERRITORIAL STATES

From the foregoing summary of the decay of medieval institutions, social, economic, and religious, during the Later Middle Ages and the beginning of modern times, one fact emerges clearly. While other and older institutions were crumbling, the centralized territorial states — in some cases one may almost call them national states — were rising to ever-greater power and importance, aided by the power of money and supported by the moneyed burgher class whose business interests demanded order and strong government. This is a fact that deserves a little further consideration in a general way. We shall see more clearly how its final steps were worked out in detail in the following chapter.

The decline of political feudalism left the rulers of the territorial states without serious rivals. Economic and social factors had contributed to this result, but from the constitutional point of view it was accomplished by a double process of consolidation of territory and centralization of governmental authority in the hands of more or less absolute princes. The growth of France as a united monarchical state is the most perfect example of this dual process. There one can see clearly how the kings used both means to transform an indirect feudal lordship into a direct royal government over the whole state. Generation after generation, they consolidated the territory under their direct rule until every fief

Centralization and consolidation of the states

in the kingdom had been incorporated into the royal domain. Meanwhile, by constantly enforcing their royal rights so far as they were able, they had gradually acquired the power to deal directly with all the people of the state, not merely with their immediate vassals. During the Hundred Years' War they won the right to tax all their subjects directly, going over the heads of the feudal lords. For a time the States General had seemed a possible rival to royal power, but when feudalism collapsed, the estates proved too weak to exercise an effective check on the authority of the king. With variations due to differences in their past history, most of the other states of Europe were undergoing a similar development as the Later Middle Ages drew to a close.

The consolidation of the territorial states carried with it the centralization of economic as well as political control. During the Middle Ages commerce and industry had been controlled by the individual cities, because the city government was the only power to which the burghers could look for adequate protection. Each city was an isolated economic unit, presenting a united front to all outsiders. However, as the central government of the state grew strong enough to preserve order, this dependence on the city ceased to be necessary. And because the state government was stronger than any city government and covered a much larger territory, the burghers found that it could be of far greater service to them, especially to those whose new individual interests ran counter to the traditional restrictions that were a part of the old city system. The central government, on the other hand, needed the support of the wealthy business men on whom the prosperity of the state so largely depended. They must be taught to depend on the state for aid and guidance. It was therefore to the mutual advantage of both to transfer the control of commerce and industry from the city to the state, thereby ending the economic isolation of the cities and concentrating the interests of the most powerful economic class on the state as a whole.

Centralization of economic control

This tendency toward centralization and the resulting unification of the interests of the people could not but have an effect, quite as important if less tangible, on the culture and sentiments of the people. As the concept of the united state loomed larger before their vision, local traditions and local interests waned. Differences in speech and custom in different parts of the state gradually became less pronounced. In short, the strengthening of the centralized state was accompanied by the growth of a common culture that was national in scope rather than local. The invention of printing in the middle of the fifteenth century by facilitating the circulation of

Growth of national culture

books in the national tongue gave a great impetus to the movement, but more time than the period we are now considering would be needed to establish it completely. Still the beginnings of the tendency can already be seen. Cause and effect, however, are not always too clear and there was probably more involved in the growth of national cultures than the mere development of centralized states. The appearance of a certain amount of national culture in Italy and Germany, where the whole country was not included in a strong centralized state, are exceptions worth noting.

Growth of national sentiment

We are on a little firmer ground when we turn to the consideration of the growth of national sentiment or, at least, of a growing feeling of loyalty to the state. Here Italy is no exception to the rule, for the Italian's loyalty was more strongly attached to his state than to Italy, and what national consciousness there was in Germany, over and above the immediate loyalty to the individual state, may be accounted for by the tradition of a united German state in the past. In the other countries, where cultural and political boundaries more or less coincided, the incipient growth of national consciousness or sentiment clearly followed the development of a strong state. In part, no doubt, it was the natural result of the established fact that the state was now the all-important unit and its ruler the power to whom all men turned for protection and government. That one was a Norman became less important than that one was a Frenchman in proportion as the feudal government of Normandy was merged with the royal government of France. The great international wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the early sixteenth also played their part in building up national sentiment, for war is always a powerful stimulus to patriotism. Whereas wars in the Middle Ages had been mostly feudal and had tended to strengthen local loyalties, these later wars developed a national character. The Hundred Years' War, with its memories of Crécy, Agincourt, and Joan of Arc, made Frenchmen conscious that they were Frenchmen and Englishmen conscious that they were not Frenchmen, and therein lay the seeds at least of modern nationalism.

Break-up of the unity of Christendom

So far we have emphasized the triumph of the territorial state over local interests and the resulting expansion of the people's horizon from the narrow confines of the fief or city to the larger circle of the state. But that is only part of the story. Equally important is the contraction of common interest from the larger unity of Catholic Christendom to the smaller one of the individual state. For in the Middle Ages, localism had existed side by side with

an internationalism unparalleled in modern times. The two are not mutually exclusive. To the man of narrow local loyalties, all people from outside his little circle are foreigners. It matters little whether they come from his own state or another. Feudalism had recognized no national frontiers. A Norman lord would do homage as cheerfully to an English as to a French king. Trade, too, was as much international as local. Merchants wandered freely from one country to another, attending the open fairs and being judged by the common merchant law. The only exclusive monopoly they encountered was that of the city governments or guilds, and that operated equally against natives of the country. Finally, the church was a great international institution that held all men of Catholic Europe together in the common brotherhood of the Christian faith and in common obedience to its laws. It gave to Europe a common culture and in the Latin tongue a common language for education and learning. This international unity was broken up by the rise of the centralized states. In so far as the political, economic, and cultural interests of the people were concentrated on the state, they ceased to be international. Even the church was falling under the control of state governments. The state was too powerful to tolerate particular interests within itself or to admit the interference within its borders of any outside power. It is this fact that goes far to explain the breaking away from the ancient church of so many of the northern states during the Protestant Reformation.

3. THE NEW PIETY IN THE NORTH

The revival of piety in Germany and the Netherlands

Despite the waning power of the universal church, however, the people of northern Europe were not lacking in piety. Corruption in the church and the failure of its authority were not necessarily accompanied by a decline in popular religion, though that was doubtless often the case. On the contrary, much of the criticism of the clergy, the opposition to the papacy, and the attacks on the sacramental system which we have noted in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were inspired by a genuine piety that engendered a sincere moral indignation against manifest abuses, and only incidentally served the interests of the state governments. At the same time there was a powerful movement of awakening piety in Germany and the Netherlands which was to have a strong influence on both the Renaissance and the Reformation in the north. But it was not piety of a kind to strengthen the loyalty of the people to the organized church of their day. This movement originated

with a group of religious mystics who, though orthodox sons of the church, cherished ideals that were not altogether in keeping with its contemporary practices, and who strove to transcend without breaking away from its mechanical organization.

The mystics

To describe or analyze pure mysticism is almost impossible. There have always been mystics and probably there always will be, but they themselves have never been able to describe their emotions in a way fully understandable to the practical mind. Perhaps it will be sufficient to say that, to the mystic, religion is a purely personal aspiration of the individual soul seeking unity and harmony with the divine power. In that ecstatic feeling of unity with God and harmony with His universe the mystic finds his supreme happiness. For our purposes, the important effects of a revival of mysticism at this time are, first, the increase in fervid piety in an age that had begun to take religion for granted, and second, a growing indifference to the sacramental system in an age when that system, though of vital importance to the authority of the church, was becoming formal and mechanical in its operation. The mystics did not doubt the necessity of the sacraments as had the Lollards and other heretics of the age. But they did place less emphasis upon their importance. Their aims were too personal, too immediate, for them to place much reliance on formalized observances, or to feel the need of having a priest to act as an intermediary between the individual soul and God.

Mysticism in Germany

The new mysticism began in Germany. Its creator was a German Dominican friar, Master Eckhart (1260–1327), and to him the movement owed its philosophy. Its influence on popular piety, however, came through the work of one of his disciples, John Tauler (c. 1300–61), who preached to the common people and gained a wide hearing. Unlike most preachers of the time, he did not represent salvation as the aim and end of religion, but emphasized the love of God as an end in itself. To this end any man, no matter how poor or ignorant, might aspire through simple faith, prayer, and purity of life. This was a practical mysticism within the comprehension of the masses. He was the leader of an organization or society, fittingly known as the Friends of God, which did a great deal to raise the standards of German morality and piety. The essence of the mystics' teaching was gathered together toward the end of the fourteenth century in a little anonymous volume which Luther, who admitted its great influence on his thought, named *The German Theology*.

In the Netherlands, mysticism flowered later and exercised a more direct influence on the thought of the new age. Here as in Germany it

produced one great book, the immortal *Imitation of Christ* of Thomas à Kempis, written in the first quarter of the fifteenth century and still popular after more than five hundred years. The doctrine of this most widely read expression of the new piety, or *devotio moderna* as it was called, was very simple: he who would be a true Christian must live as Christ lived, think as he thought, and imitate him in every possible way. It was an ideal with which the church could not quarrel, yet it ignored the elaborate system, whereby the clergy were made responsible for the salvation of men. In the Netherlands, too, the mystics formed a society, devoted to public service, known as the Brethren of the Common Life. Its founders, Gerard Groote (1340–84) and Florentius Radewyn (1350–1400), had great faith in enlightened education as an aid to true religion, and under their guidance the Brethren devoted themselves to the education of boys. Throughout the fifteenth century, the schools of the Brethren, especially the large school at Deventer in Holland, were important instruments in spreading the new learning of the northern Renaissance, and did much to shape the ideals of many of the most influential humanists.

The mystics in the Netherlands

4. THE RENAISSANCE CROSSES THE ALPS

In northern Europe the Middle Ages died more slowly than in Italy. The new economic and social developments appeared later and in less concentrated form than in the crowded urban society of the south. It is not surprising, then, that the intellectual Renaissance, which was inspired by the revival of the classics to meet the intellectual needs of the new society, did not cross the Alps until a century after Petrarch and Boccaccio had begun to spread the gospel of antiquity in Italy. And when the Renaissance did cross the Alps, it changed its character to fit the character and interests of a different people with a different past. The Latin spirit had not survived in the Germanic north as it had in Italy; and in these last years of the transitional age, there was a deeper piety and a more profound preoccupation with religion than was common among the more secularly minded Italians. Hence, when the north turned to the classics with new zeal, under the influence of the Italian Renaissance, it was more indifferent to the pagan spirit of the ancient writers. Humanists of the north might revolt against the restrictions and abuses of the medieval church, but they remained Christian, and that not merely in form, but with a deep moral and religious interest as well. They sought in the Latin and Greek classics a more humane morality and philosophy than the scholasticism of the Middle

Ages had provided, but they did not ignore the Christian past. Like the Italian humanists, they turned for guidance to antiquity, but it was to Christian as well as to classical antiquity, to the Bible and the Fathers of the church, to Jerome and Augustine, not less than to Cicero and Virgil.

The early teachers

The first generation of northern humanists, whose activity falls within the second half of the fifteenth century, were teachers. They were far-wandering men, who had been to Italy to study and who returned to their own people to share the intellectual treasure they had discovered there. Few of them wrote anything of note, for their acquisition of the new learning was too recent to be thoroughly digested. They were pioneers, breaking the ground and sowing the seed against the time of harvest. Rudolph Agricola (c. 1444–85), aptly named "the educator of Germany," was characteristic of this generation both in his eager teaching of the ancient tongues and in his deep piety. It was from him that Alexander Hegius (1433–98), the influential head master of the school of the Brethren of the Common Life at Deventer, first learned Greek. At first the old universities, with their long-established curricula, would have nothing to do with these wandering innovators. The new learning spread much more easily in the cities, among the wealthy burghers who had leisure for the pursuit of culture and the financial resources to support and encourage scholars. They had no vested interest in the old type of education as had the university faculties. Eventually, however, even the universities were forced to recognize the new learning. By the end of the century, the humanists had gained a foothold in the faculties of arts and were waging a bitter fight against the champions of medieval tradition.

Invention of printing

The spread of the new classical learning in the north was greatly aided by the rapidly increasing use of printed books during the second half of the fifteenth century, which followed the invention of printing, generally attributed to John Gutenberg of Mayence about the year 1447. Part of the technique of printing was known and used before the time of Gutenberg's epoch-making invention. A few short pamphlets or books had been printed by means of wood-cut blocks, the whole contents of a page, usually a picture and a few lines of text, being cut on a single wooden block. But this method was expensive, awkward, and wasteful. The blocks were difficult to make, could be used for only one work, and were soon worn out. The important part of Gutenberg's innovation, which made printing really practicable, was the use of movable metal type. Each letter was cast in a matrix or model. Any number could be cast from the same matrix,

thus making the production of type inexpensive and guaranteeing uniformity. The type could then be assembled in a case in any desired order, and after the book was printed could be taken apart or "distributed" and used again and again for other books.

The effects of the printing press on the general intellectual development of Europe can scarcely be overestimated. Its immediate result for the spread of humanism in the north was to place the classics and the writings of Christian antiquity at the disposal of all who could read them, at a moderate price, and to afford the humanists themselves a far wider audience than would have been possible before. Hitherto all books had been written by hand and were often inaccurate as well as expensive. Even in Italy manuscripts were scarce and dear. In the north, where there were proportionately fewer wealthy bibliophiles and the distance between libraries was greater, the study of the ancient writings would have presented enormous difficulties. Within a few years, however, after the invention of printing, the number of books in existence had increased tremendously and the cost of each would average less than an eighth of that of a manuscript copy. The new technique spread with amazing rapidity to all parts of Europe. Before the end of the fifteenth century, there were more than a thousand printers whose names are still known, and more than thirty thousand editions had been published.

Its effects

The last decade of the fifteenth century and the first two of the sixteenth marked the high tide of northern humanism. These years witnessed the mature labors of the second generation of humanists, who in their youth had entered into the full inheritance of classical and Christian antiquity. Under its inspiration they strove to reform contemporary education and religious thought and practice. They prepared the way for the Protestant Reformation, only to find many of the reforms, for which they had been working, overwhelmed in a sea of dogmatic argument and partisan passions.

The second generation of humanists

These northern humanists had all the reverence for antiquity, and all the scorn for the Middle Ages, that was characteristic of their Italian brethren. Indeed, reaction against medievalism may be taken as the keynote of their thought. The charm and purity of the ancient Latin style made them look with contempt upon the crabbed Latin of the medieval theologians, whose spiritual descendants still ruled in most of the schools and universities. The sane and well-balanced attitude toward life in this world, which they found in the classics, appealed to them more strongly than the one-sided,

Christian humanism

other-worldly philosophy of the medieval scholastic doctors. But above all, and this was their unique contribution, they found in the Scriptures and the writings of Christian antiquity a simple, vivid religion, which they felt had been distorted by long centuries of involved theological argument and buried beneath the accumulated mass of medieval church tradition. It was their task to restore this early "evangelical" faith in all its purity. To do this they believed that they must first restore and study all the Christian sources, the Bible and the early Fathers of the church, in their original form and in their original language. This necessitated a full scholarly knowledge of Greek and Hebrew as well as of good Latin. All this brought them into violent conflict with the conservative teachers and theologians, who still clung to the medieval traditions in education and theology, who preferred the medieval commentaries to the original texts, and who were ignorant and therefore suspicious of Greek and Hebrew.

Reuchlin

In Germany, the outstanding leader of this movement was John Reuchlin (1455–1522). He had studied in Italy, and after his return to Germany devoted his life to the study of Hebrew as an aid to the understanding of the Old Testament. As a preliminary step he published the first Hebrew grammar north of the Alps in 1506, a work of great service to the new scholarship. His open opposition to a scheme for the suppression of Hebrew books caused him to be charged with heresy by the inquisitor of Cologne, backed by the Dominican teachers in the university there. The resulting trial, which lasted six years, roused a storm of controversy. It was one of the first cases in which both sides appealed to public opinion through the medium of the printing press. On Reuchlin's side were the humanists, on the other the monks and conservative theologians. In this literary debate, the humanists, equipped with a far superior Latin style, had all the best of it. When argument failed, they resorted to ridicule with devastating effect. One work in particular remains an immortal monument to the wit of the humanists. The *Letters of Obscure Men*, written anonymously by one of the young humanists at the University of Erfurt, is still good reading for its hilarious humor and biting satire. It is composed of a series of letters addressed to one of Reuchlin's principal opponents, presumably from his humble admirers. Written in comically barbarous Latin, the letters exposed the ignorance, superstition, and naïve gullibility of the obscure monks and priests who rallied to the defense of tradition. A supplement, even more bitter, appeared shortly after from the pen of the bellicose German knight and poet, Ulrich von Hutten.

In France, James Lefèvre d'Étaples (c. 1455–1536) did for the New

Testament what Reuchlin was doing for the Old. He, too, had studied in Italy, returning to teach at Paris. The aim of his work was to discover the real meaning of the New Testament text, treating it as a human document, though divinely inspired. His study of the Greek originals brought new light to bear on the teaching of Christ and the apostles, and had a considerable influence on the thought of Luther and other reformers.

Lefèvre d'Étaples

The principal figure among the Christian humanists in England was John Colet (d. 1519), the dean of Saint Paul's Cathedral in London and founder of Saint Paul's School. Though not a great scholar, despite his years of study in Italy, he was a man of high character and deeply interested in reforming the thought and practice of the church. His influence directed the activity of a number of writers more learned than himself. Among his friends was Sir Thomas More (c. 1478–1535), whose famous *Utopia*, published in 1516, presented the humanist's picture of an ideal society, one that has given inspiration to social reformers ever since.

Colet and More

By far the most influential of all the Christian humanists, however, was Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (c. 1469–1536). It was he more than anyone else who formulated and popularized the reform program of Christian humanism. He was born in Holland, educated by the Brethren of the Common Life in their school at Deventer, and entered a monastery at an early age. However, he soon escaped from that narrow environment and thereafter led a wandering existence, living for years in France, England, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland, equally at home wherever there were learned men who could converse with him in the classical Latin that was almost his mother tongue. Until Erasmus was about thirty years of age, the study of the classics absorbed his attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. During these years he acquired a thorough knowledge of classical literature and the easy, graceful Latin style that was to secure him universal recognition as "the Prince of the Humanists." It was not till about the time of his first visit to England in 1499, during which he met John Colet and Thomas More who became his lifelong friends, that he turned seriously to the religious studies that were to occupy the largest share of his attention for the rest of his life.

Erasmus

The chief aim of Erasmus's work in the field of religious thought was the restoration of Christianity to its early simplicity as taught by Christ himself and by his disciples. He thought of Christianity as a guiding philosophy for the direction of daily life, rather than as a system of dogmatic beliefs or ecclesi-

The Greek New Testament



From Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

DESIDERIUS ERASMUS OF ROTTERDAM
c. 1469–1536

This Holbein portrait of the Prince of the Humanists shows him in what must have been a very characteristic pose. Note the keen, fine-cut features, the nose as sharp as its owner's wit, and the general suggestion of a strong intelligence in a frail physique.

astical practices as the medieval church had all too often made it appear. He described his religious ideal in a significant phrase, "the philosophy of Christ," in which, perhaps, we can trace the influence of the Brethren of the Common Life and the *Imitation of Christ.* This conception of religion made a thorough understanding of the original meaning of the Scriptures vitally necessary. He felt that the Vulgate, as the Latin version of the Bible accepted by the church was called, could not be entirely trusted, since it was a translation to start with and had been recopied with possible errors for centuries. Erasmus, therefore, undertook the task of editing the Greek text of the New Testament from the earliest available manuscripts. After years of labor he finally published it, with extensive annotations, in 1516. It was the first time that the New Testament had been printed in its original language. The conservative theologians, who had been accustomed to following the Vulgate as the final authority and many of whom were ignorant of Greek, were profoundly suspicious of the new edition and attacked Erasmus bitterly.

The Erasmian reform

Meanwhile, Erasmus was also working busily for the reform of those doctrines and practices in the church that to him seemed out of harmony with the Christian spirit. This he hoped would be accomplished by the growth of enlightened education and a clearer understanding of the philosophy of Christ, aided in the meantime by common-sense criticism of existing abuses. The best known of his numerous works in this field were the *Praise of Folly* and the *Familiar Colloquies,* wherein he ridiculed the wealth and self-seeking power of the clergy, the worship of saints, the monastic orders, indulgences, pilgrimages, and fasts. Erasmus had a devastatingly satirical wit and had early discovered that ridicule can sometimes be a more effective weapon than heavy argument. Because of his masterly command of Latin style and his clear intelligence and humor, everything he wrote was widely read. He was responsible in no small degree for the intellectual preparation for the Reformation, though he himself refused to be drawn into the conflict that followed it and remained within the church.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE STATES OF EUROPE AT THE DAWN OF THE MODERN AGE

(c. 1450–1519)

IN THE last half of the fifteenth century and the first two decades of the sixteenth, the period of transition from the High Middle Ages to the early modern era was drawing to its close. The general characteristics of that change we have already noted. The purpose of this chapter is to pass in brief review the history of the principal European states during these years, so as to show the general structure of Europe at the beginning of modern times, and also to describe the work of those early explorers who were then opening up new opportunities for European trade and expansion, before we pass on to the new era that began with the Protestant Reformation, the foundation of the vast Hapsburg Empire of Charles V, and the long struggle between the rival dynasties of Hapsburg and Valois. In all parts of Europe we shall find somewhat similar developments taking place. Under strong and more or less absolute rulers, aided by the support of the rising middle class, the territory of the various states was being consolidated and the authority of the central government was triumphing over the last remnants of feudal independence. At the same time, the territorial princes were transferring control of industry and commerce from the cities, which had been the focal centers of economic life under the medieval guild system, to the state government, thus laying the foundations of modern economic nationalism. Strengthened by this newly won control of the political and economic forces of their states, the monarchs of Europe also began in these years to seek additions to their territory by conquest, from which sprang those dynastic wars, alliances and counter-alliances, so characteristic of European history in the first centuries of the modern era. Finally, this period witnessed a significant shift in the center of gravity of European trade from the east to the west, due to the discovery of new lands and new trade routes in the Atlantic.

1. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

Nowhere can the developments listed above be more clearly observed than in the history of Spain, which rose during this period to the first

rank among European states. Hitherto the various kingdoms of the Spanish peninsula had played a relatively insignificant rôle in the general history of Europe. They were cut off from the remainder of the continent by the high barrier of the Pyrenees and had not yet learned to use the Atlantic as a highway of commerce to the Far East and West. Moreover, the Christian states had had to wage a long war of conquest to win their land from the Moslems, and they had since wasted much energy in fighting among themselves. In the middle of the fifteenth century, the peninsula was still divided into five separate kingdoms.[1] Of these Castile, with which Leon had been incorporated, was much the largest. It occupied the whole central plateau and included more than sixty per cent of the entire peninsula. The smaller kingdoms of Aragon and Portugal lay along the coast to east and west respectively. Far to the north, the little kingdom of Navarre straddled the Pyrenees, and in the extreme south the Moslem kingdom of Granada still remained as a reminder that Spain had once belonged to Islam.

The Spanish peninsula

The long period of warfare with the Moslems and the gradual expansion by conquest had left a permanent impress on the character of Castile. The Castilian people had grown up a fighting race, rigidly orthodox. Moreover, Castile had acquired its territory bit by bit, and each new acquisition formed a separate unit in the state under the control of half-independent feudal nobles or the orders of crusading knights. As a result, the condition of feudal anarchy common to most countries in the Middle Ages had lasted in Castile till after the middle of the fifteenth century. The power of the crown was also limited to some extent by the Cortes, an assembly representing the upper and middle classes something like the French States General. Castile was mostly an agricultural and pastoral country, none too rich, though its industry and commerce were soon to be stimulated by the opening-up of exclusive markets in the New World, and the importation of gold and silver from Mexico and Peru would bring it for a time a false prosperity. Aragon had a stronger central government, though there, too, the king was hampered by feudal nobles and the Cortes. Thanks to its position on the eastern coast, it had a more highly developed commerce than had Castile. The acquisition of Sicily in the thirteenth century and the islands of Majorca and Sardinia in the fourteenth by the ruling family of Aragon gave it a considerable share of the Mediterranean trade.

Castile and Aragon

The foundations of the future greatness of Spain were laid by the

[1] See map, page 212.

union of all the peninsula except Portugal under the rule of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, who were married in 1469. When they inherited their respective kingdoms a few years later, the two greatest states in Spain were brought under a common government, though for another generation they remained separate in theory. The combined power of the two monarchs made further conquest possible. In 1492, the year in which Columbus carried the flag of Castile to the New World, they conquered the kingdom of Granada, thus wiping out the last independent Moslem state. Thereafter, Ferdinand launched an ambitious and very astute foreign policy, designed to make Spain a power to be reckoned with in European affairs and to add territory to the possessions of his family. As a result of his part in the Italian wars, of which more later, he acquired the kingdom of Naples from the lesser branch of the Aragonese dynasty in 1503, and in 1512 he conquered all of Navarre south of the Pyrenees.

Union of Spain under Ferdinand (1479–1516) and Isabella (1474–1504)

The reign of Ferdinand and Isabella accomplished not only the territorial consolidation of Spain, but also the centralization of authority in the hands of a strong royal government. This was especially necessary in Castile, where the independence of the feudal nobles had sadly weakened the government and had produced a frightful amount of lawlessness and disorder. The monarchs began by restoring order and security for life and property through the foundation of a mounted police system recruited from the populace, called the Hermandad or Holy Brotherhood. This popular police force dispensed summary justice to all offenders and was remarkably effective. The next step was to strip the feudal nobles and the great crusading orders of their independent powers and to reduce them to subjection to the crown. In this task, Ferdinand and Isabella could count on the support of the common people who preferred a strong government to feudal anarchy. The monarchs then turned their attention to the reform of the Spanish church, which had been thoroughly feudalized and rather lax in discipline. They acquired from Pope Sixtus IV the right to nominate all the higher ecclesiastical officers in Spain and used that right to fill the church with men of high character and unquestioned orthodoxy, who would also be devoted to the crown. As a result, the Spanish church became an instrument for the extension of royal power, and was to be the strongest bulwark of orthodox Catholicism in the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century. The Spanish Inquisition, founded in 1478 under the control of the monarchy, was used to crush all signs of heresy and to root out what elements of Moslem

Rise of royal power in Spain

religion remained. The expulsion of Moors and Jews strengthened the religious and racial unity of the country, but was a sad blow to its commerce and industry. Finally, it was Ferdinand and Isabella who began the process of whittling away the authority of the Cortes of Castile and Aragon, now the sole remaining check on the authority of the crown. There were rebellions against Ferdinand's rule in Castile after the death of Isabella, but they had done their work so well that their successor was able to build up the most absolute monarchy in Europe.

Despite the union and expansion of its powerful neighbors, the little kingdom of Portugal on the western coast still retained its independence. Like the other kingdoms in the peninsula, it had played an unimportant part in European history until nearly the end of the fifteenth century. Then it, too, rose to sudden power, a change due almost entirely to the courageous energy of its great navigators. As we shall see when we come to deal with the explorations and discoveries of this era, Portuguese sailors vied with the Spanish in finding new trade routes through the Atlantic, and, like Spain, Portugal enjoyed a period of great if somewhat illusory prosperity as a result.

Portugal

2. ENGLAND

England had scarcely emerged from the Hundred Years' War (1453) when it was plunged into a long, intermittent civil strife by rival factions in the royal family and the higher nobility. The war had left England a dangerous legacy of disorder. The great nobles had become accustomed to keeping large bands of armed retainers, and accustomed also to violence and bloodshed. Every baron had a following among the knights and gentry of his neighborhood, who wore his livery (coat of arms) and would fight for him. He repaid their services by "maintaining" their interests in the law courts or in private quarrels. This custom of "livery and maintenance" frustrated the normal action of justice and restored something like the old condition of feudal anarchy. The weak government of the feeble-minded Henry VI utterly failed to keep order, as it had failed in the war against France. Moreover, the weakness of the king opened the way for quarrels between one faction or another of the baronage who sought to control the government. These factional disputes broke into open civil war in 1455 between the followers of Richard, Duke of York, next heir to the throne after Henry's infant son, and the supporters of the reigning house of Lancaster, though it was not till 1460 that York definitely claimed the

Wars of the Roses

throne. He was killed shortly after, but his son continued the struggle and succeeded in winning the crown as Edward IV (1461–83). The Lancastrian party was now in opposition to the king and the fight went on to an accompaniment of treachery and murder. On the death of Edward IV, his brother Richard III (1483–85) seized the crown from his infant nephew Edward V, and added to this fairly normal crime the more shocking one of having the young Edward and his brother murdered. This was more than the English people could stand, even in that callous age. They deserted Richard and welcomed Henry Tudor, a distant heir to the Lancastrian claims who made a successful bid for the crown in 1485. These frequent and rather petty civil wars are known collectively as the Wars of the Roses from the white and red roses that, according to tradition, were the badges of the houses of York and Lancaster respectively.

Slaughter of the barons

The civil wars had affected the majority of the population surprisingly little, save as they interfered with security and good government. The people generally were neutral. No principle of any kind was at stake. It was merely a party fight among the nobles and the royal family. But for that very reason the Wars of the Roses had one very important and lasting influence on the course of English history. They destroyed the old nobility. Each battle thinned the ranks of the old feudal families, and each turn of fortune was followed by executions and the confiscation of ancient family estates. From this time on, the monarchy would have little trouble with the barons. Feudalism in England, which had long been dying, had received its death blow.

Henry VII (1485–1509)

A new era in England's history opened in 1485 with the reign of Henry VII, first of the Tudor sovereigns. Having no very sound hereditary claim to the throne, Henry knew that his only hope of keeping it lay in giving the people the kind of government they wanted, and they wanted, above all, peace, security for life and property, and an opportunity to carry on their business under favorable conditions. They were tired of factional strife and the violence of the nobles. In short, they wanted a strong government, devoted to the interests of the people. No one could have been better suited to the task of satisfying those demands than the quiet, self-contained, and hard-headed Tudor. There was nothing very colorful or dramatic about his personality, but he had a thorough understanding of the needs of his country and a remarkable ability to get things done. Under his canny guidance, England's transformation from a medieval to a modern state was well-nigh completed.

The most vital problem facing the new Tudor king was the restoration of order. This could be accomplished only by reducing the power of the remaining barons. Henry set about the task with great energy, excluding them from his royal council and using the court of the star chamber, which was the royal council in its judicial capacity, to suppress livery and maintenance, and to punish all attempts on the part of the lords to interfere with the prosecution of justice or to oppress their humbler neighbors. With the star chamber court, which could not be intimidated, to deal with the great lords, the local courts were left free to punish the lesser criminals. A task of this magnitude takes time, and something was still left to be done by his successors, but when Henry VII died he left England in a reasonably orderly condition, with the royal authority unquestionably supreme in the state.

Restoration of order

Next to order at home, Henry needed peace abroad and recognition of his title by foreign powers. This he secured by obtaining a marriage alliance with Spain, which was rapidly becoming one of the strongest of European states. The marriage of his son Arthur to Catherine of Aragon, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, was a diplomatic triumph. The death of Arthur shortly thereafter threatened to break the bond, but it was renewed by the remarriage of the widowed Catherine to Arthur's younger brother, the future King Henry VIII. The Tudor family thus gained the support of the powerful Spanish dynasty, which was already allied by marriage with the imperial Hapsburgs, who held, among other possessions, the Burgundian Netherlands. Not the least of the benefits accruing from this alliance was that it ensured to English merchants fair treatment in the ports of Spain and the Netherlands.

Foreign alliances

Henry VII, indeed, never forgot the interests of the merchants. English commerce, especially the rich trade in wool and woolen goods, had been growing rapidly during the fifteenth century, but with very little help from the central government. Mostly it was handled by foreigners, some of whom, like the Hanseatic merchants, had greater privileges in English ports than the natives themselves. Moreover, lacking strong support from the state, English merchants had been unable to secure favorable treatment in other countries. Henry undertook to change all this as far as possible. At the beginning of his reign he passed legislation through Parliament designed to give English ships, manned by English sailors, a monopoly of carrying certain types of goods. Wherever possible, he cut down the privileges of foreign traders in England so as to give the advantage to

Encouragement of commerce

their native competitors, and where the foreigners still held privileges in England, he sought treaties with their home governments to secure reciprocal privileges for English merchants. The commercial treaties, cemented by family alliances, with Spain and Burgundy, opened up great opportunities for English trade. All in all, Henry's economic policies were typically modern. Their chief characteristics — the protection of native trade and industry from foreign competition, the securing of commercial treaties with other states, the transference of economic control from the cities to the state government which all this implied, and the close alliance between the monarchy and the middle class — were all to be followed by English governments for the next three centuries.

It was a prosperous, orderly state and a strong royal government that Henry VIII inherited in the year 1509. The young king was active and ambitious. Under his rule England was to play a larger part in international affairs and to win a new national consciousness through the establishment of a separate national church. Henry VIII looms larger than his less spectacular father on the pages of English history, but it must not be forgotten that it was the elder Henry who laid the foundations of Tudor England.

Accession of Henry VIII (1509)

3. FRANCE, BURGUNDY, AND ITALY

The successful conclusion of the Hundred Years' War was a triumph for the French monarchy. Charles VII was not the greatest of kings, but he had driven out the English and had saved his country from disintegration. The war had aroused a national consciousness in the French people and had taught them that the safety of the country depended on the king alone, for the great nobles had almost ruined France by their selfishness and the States General had proved incompetent. The people generally, and especially those of the commercial and industrial middle class, would welcome a strong royal government over the whole state; but before there could be such a government, the kings had still to complete the subjugation of the nobility and the consolidation of France by bringing the few remaining half-independent fiefs directly under their control. This task was barely begun by Charles VII. It was left for his son and grandson, Louis XI (1461–83) and Charles VIII (1483–98) to carry it to a successful conclusion.

The most powerful and independent of the French fiefs still outstanding was the duchy of Burgundy. Granted by King John to his son Philip in 1363, it became the nucleus of a rapidly growing state under


EUROPE
at the opening of
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
SCALE OF MILES
0 50 100 200 300 400
FAROE IS.
SHETLAND IS.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
IRELAND
Dublin
ENGLAND
London
Edinburgh
Stockholm
Upsala
Copenhagen
Kalmar
Konigsberg
Vilna
Novgorod
Pskov
Moscow
Smolensk
Oka R.
Volga R.
Don R.
Sweden
MUSCOVY
TARTARY
Lubeck
Hamburg
Mecklenburg
Pomerania
Bremen
Brunswick
Brandenburg
Oder R.
Warsaw
Vistula R.
POLAND
Cracow
Dniester R.
Dnieper R.
Dniepr R.
Dwina R.
Saxony
Amsterdam
Cologne
Hesse
Mainz
Trier
Rhine R.
Palatinate
Upper Palatinate
Wurtemberg
Strasburg
Bavaria
Munich
Tyrol
Inspruck
Danube R.
Buda
Pest
HUNGARY
Theiss R.
Drave R.
MOLDAVIA
WALACHIA
Danube R.
Dniester R.
Pruth R.
Kuban R.
CRIMEA
BLACK SEA
Bordeaux
Garonne R.
Loire R.
Seine R.
Paris
Lyons
Rhone R.
Avignon
Genoa
Venice
Adige R.
Brenta R.
Padua
Ravenna
Rimini
Ancona
Urbino
Florence
Arno R.
Pisa
Leghorn
Rome
Tiber R.
Naples
KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES
Palermo
Messina
SICILY
CORSICA
SARDINIA
Cagliari
Barcelona
Ebro R.
Valencia
Guadalquivir R.
Seville
Cordova
Granada
Sierra Nevada Mts.
Tagus R.
Lisbon
Madrid
CASTILE
ARAGON
NAVARRE
Burgos
Douro R.
PORTUGAL
ADRIATIC SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Salonica
Constantinople
Bosphorus
Smyrna
RHODES
CYPRUS
CRETE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Longitude West 0 Longitude East
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60

the Burgundian branch of the royal family. We have already seen[1] how Duke John and, after he was murdered, his son Philip allied themselves with the English against the French kings and the Armagnacs in the later stages of the Hundred Years' War. Philip was, indeed, almost an independent sovereign, and his impetuous son, Charles the Bold (1467–77), was determined to be recognized as such and to break completely away from France. This ambition was not essentially unreasonable, for the Burgundian house had already acquired, by marriage, purchase, and conquest, extensive lands outside of France in addition to the original duchy. These included the Free County of Burgundy (Franche Comté), Luxemburg, and the rich states of the Netherlands, and to them Charles added Alsace and Lorraine. In reality, Charles ruled a kingdom in that debatable land between France and Germany, reminiscent of the ancient kingdom of Lothair, and it is not surprising that he should desire the title of king. His ambitions inevitably brought Charles into violent conflict with Louis XI. For a time he seemed to be having the best of it, but he had also aroused the enmity of his warlike neighbors, the Swiss, and it was they who finally brought about his defeat and death. His daughter Mary kept up the struggle with France, aided by her husband, Maximilian of Hapsburg, son of the Emperor Frederick III, until her death in 1482. Maximilian then made peace with Louis. The duchy of Burgundy was surrendered and was brought directly under the French crown. Alsace and Lorraine were also returned to their former owners, but the rest of the Burgundian states were kept by Philip, the son of Mary and Maximilian, to make a formidable addition to the lands of the house of Hapsburg.[2]

Louis XI and Charles the Bold of Burgundy

Meanwhile, Louis XI was using his undoubted talent for diplomacy and intrigue to good effect in subjugating the other semi-independent feudatories of France. The character of this strange, cunning, and unscrupulous man will always be an enigma to historians. He was superstitious, treacherous, and cruel; yet he must be given credit for his invaluable services in making France a united nation. When he died in 1483, the duchy of Brittany was almost the only fief outside the royal domain. Charles VIII was still a boy, though officially of age, when he succeeded to the throne, but fortunately Louis had left his daughter, Anne of Beaujeu, with authority to act as guardian to her young brother until he should grow up. For nine years this princess, whom her wise if somewhat misogynous father had called "the least foolish woman in Europe," practically ruled

Consolidation of France

[1] See above, page 311. [2] See map, page 376.

France. It was her energy that put down the last rebellions of the French nobles and finally, after years of fighting, secured the union of Brittany with the royal domain by the marriage of Charles VIII to Anne, Duchess of Brittany, in 1491. With this acquisition the consolidation of France into a united territorial state was practically complete.

As in Spain, the territorial consolidation of France was accompanied by the centralization of power in the hands of an absolute monarchy. The nobles were robbed of almost all their political authority and the States General was reduced to a negligible position. During and after the war, the French kings had secured the right to levy taxes on their own authority throughout the state. With this financial backing, they could maintain a standing army with which the nobles could not compete. Moreover, they could ensure the subjugation of the nobility by taking them into their pay. The nobles became courtiers and officers in the royal army. In compensation for their lost independence, they retained their social prerogatives and the more substantial privilege of practical immunity from taxation. Only occasionally hereafter, under very weak kings and when the country was torn by religious strife, would the nobles attempt to reassert their independence, and then with no permanent success. Meanwhile, the middle class in France, as elsewhere, profited by the restoration of order and the assumption of economic control by a strong government. At the end of the fifteenth century, France was prosperous and all classes looked to the king as the embodiment of the national state.

Triumph of the monarchy

Charles VIII had scarcely taken over the government of his newly united kingdom from his wise sister before he began to dream of adding to his glory by wars of conquest. And Italy, rich and famous for its culture, but weakened by its fatal lack of unity, seemed a prize within the easy grasp of the absolute ruler of a great state. Moreover, he had inherited the old Angevin claim to the kingdom of Naples, and few monarchs in that age of dynastic greed could bring themselves to ignore such a claim when a favorable opportunity for pressing it was presented. In 1494, France was strong and united, while the political situation in Italy made any united resistance to an invader extremely unlikely. The balance of power in Italy, which depended on the alliance of Milan, Florence, and Naples, had been overturned after the death of Lorenzo de' Medici in 1492.[1] Alfonso II of Naples, who became king early in 1494, had turned

France and Italy

[1] See above, page 343.

against Ludovico Sforza, called "Il Moro," who had been ruling Milan since 1479 in the name of his feeble nephew, the Duke Gian Galeazzo. The latter was Alfonso's son-in-law, whence his demands that the powerful Moro should turn the government over to the titular duke, whom Alfonso could easily control. Piero de' Medici, forgetting his father's diplomatic policy, supported Alfonso's demands. To protect his usurped authority, Ludovico Sforza then turned to Charles VIII and offered to help him in the conquest of Naples. So began for France the long series of futile wars in Italy. For more than half a century French kings wasted men and money in the vain attempt to conquer and hold a land that had nothing in common, either racially or geographically, with France, while neglecting the more possible and profitable aim of rounding out their frontiers to the north and east within the natural boundaries of the Rhine and the Alps.

Charles VIII invades Naples (1494)

The first French invasion of Italy was little more than a military parade, with some comic-opera effects. Charles VIII crossed the Alps in September, 1494, marched down through the peninsula without encountering serious opposition, and by the early spring of the following year had conquered the whole kingdom of Naples, still without fighting a real battle. However, Naples was easier to win than to hold. The tactlessness and brutality of the French soon made them unpopular in the kingdom, while to the north the other Italian states, belatedly alarmed at the presence of the foreign invader, began to unite. Charles was forced to withdraw from Italy, leaving a garrison in Naples which was easily driven out by Alfonso's son Ferrante in 1496. The only immediate result of the invasion had been the expulsion of the Medici from Florence by the indignant citizens, when Piero supinely surrendered the outlying Tuscan forts to Charles.

Louis XII invades Italy (1499)

Charles's expedition, however, had shown the case with which conquests could be won in Italy, and the next French king, Louis XII (1498–1515), had not been a year on the throne before he followed his example. Louis, who was a cousin of the late king, had inherited a claim to Milan through his grandmother Valentina Visconti, Duchess of Orléans. He therefore directed his attack against Milan, which he had isolated by winning over Venice and Pope Alexander VI with promises of aid for their own selfish ambitions. The French army made short work of the Milanese mercenaries. The duchy was conquered and Ludovico Sforza was taken prisoner. Louis then prepared to move against Naples. The major difficulty in that direction was the probable opposition of Ferdinand, King of Aragon

and Sicily, who might resent the expulsion of his kinsmen of the lesser branch of the house of Aragon from Naples. Louis avoided this difficulty by inviting Ferdinand to become a partner in the conquest. Naples was again taken without serious opposition, and again the French found it impossible to hold what they had won. Almost immediately the two conquerors quarreled over the division of the spoils. War broke out between them in 1502, and before the end of the following year the French were driven out and Naples was added to the growing possessions of Spain.

The League of Cambray

With France holding the duchy of Milan in the north and Spain the kingdom of Naples in the south, the independence of Italy was sadly threatened, but still the other Italian states could not unite against the menace of foreign domination. The next few years were occupied by shifting alliances and cold-blooded land-grabbing on the part of both Italian and foreign states. Venice was the first to suffer. That rich republic had aroused the enmity and greed of the other powers by its unfortunate policy of landward expansion. Both the French king, now Duke of Milan, and Maximilian of Hapsburg, who had been elected emperor in 1493, claimed parts of the Venetian territory, as did also the warlike Pope Julius II (1503–13), whose determined ambition was to recover full control of all land that had ever belonged to the Papal States. These three formed the nucleus of the League of Cambray (1508), later joined by Ferdinand of Spain, for the partition of Venice. Most of the fighting was done by the French and papal troops, and with considerable success. The proud republic was on the verge of ruin when Julius II made a separate peace with it in 1510, on condition of receiving the lands taken by Venice from the Romagna.

The Holy League

Having won all he wanted from Venice, the pope then turned against his French allies who were becoming dangerous neighbors. In 1511, Julius succeeded in breaking up the League of Cambray and forming a new "Holy League," composed of the papacy, Venice, and Spain, and soon joined by the Swiss, Maximilian, and Ferdinand's son-in-law, Henry VIII of England. The purpose of the league was to drive the French out of Italy and, incidentally, to distract the attention of France while Ferdinand conquered Spanish Navarre. The French won an initial victory in the bloody battle of Ravenna early in 1512, but before the end of the year the Holy League had achieved its objective. The French were again forced to withdraw from Italy, leaving Milan to the Moro's son, Maximilian Sforza, under the protection of the Swiss. Florence was punished for her alliance with France by being handed back to the Medici.

For a brief period Italy was restored to something like its state prior to the invasions. But in 1515 a new king, Francis I, ascended the throne of France and immediately followed the example of his predecessors in seeking glory beyond the Alps. The young king swept down into Italy with a powerful army, defeated the combined Swiss and Milanese forces at Marignano, and within a few months had reconquered the duchy of Milan. One very important result of this invasion was the Concordat of Bologna, arranged in 1516 between Francis and the new pope, Leo X, whereby the king surrendered the "liberties" of the French church asserted in the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1439), but received in return the right to nominate all the higher clergy in France.

Francis I reconquers Milan (1515)

The wars in Italy had by this time lasted more than two decades. Italy had paid dearly for its lack of unity, and France had merely paved the way for a long and costly struggle with the house of Hapsburg, to whose rising fortunes we must now turn our attention.

4. GERMANY AND THE HOUSE OF HAPSBURG

Germany in this period presents the one great exception, outside of Italy, to the general rule of territorial and political consolidation and the rise of strong central government that applies to the other European states. We have noted in earlier chapters the effect of the amalgamation of the German monarchy with the high-sounding but impractical Holy Roman Empire in preventing the formation both in Italy and in Germany of a unified state. The last half of the fifteenth century and the first years of the sixteenth witnessed little change in the general political conditions in Germany as described in Chapter XVII. The emperors had still very little real authority. They could raise neither adequate revenue nor an effective army outside their own domains, nor were they strong enough to keep order and enforce justice save in their own family lands. The Diet of the empire — the assembly of princes and representatives from the free imperial cities — was equally powerless to secure obedience to its laws. The Emperor Maximilian I did make some attempt to strengthen the central government, but accomplished little, for like the other emperors of this period he was far more interested in advancing the position of his family than in adding to the imperial authority. This lack of unity in the empire, however, was made up for to some extent by the consolidation of the larger states within Germany. In these individual states, duchies, margravates, and the like, something like the same tendency toward

Disunion of Germany

centralization that we have noted in the monarchical states was taking place. Finally, it must not be forgotten that, despite political and social disorder, Germany was on the whole very prosperous in these years and was undergoing a spiritual and intellectual revival under the influence of the Christian Renaissance.

The Hapsburg emperors

The most striking development in German political history during this period, and one that was to have a tremendous influence on the whole history of Europe, was the phenomenal rise of the Austrian house of Hapsburg. After the election of Albert II (1438–39), the imperial title remained in the Hapsburg family generation after generation until it came to be considered almost as an hereditary right. Albert was followed by Frederick III (1440–93) and Maximilian I (1493–1519). It was the latter of these who was chiefly responsible for bringing into the Hapsburg family that vast collection of lands outside of Germany that was to make his grandson, Charles V, the greatest ruler in Europe in the next generation. Charming, cultured, and impractical, Maximilian played a part, usually pretty ineffective, in every international crisis of that crucial period when the monarchs of France and Spain were consolidating their territories and were turning to the conquest of Italy. Maximilian was the perpetual victim of magnificent and visionary schemes, for which his economic and military resources were ludicrously inadequate. His participation in the Italian wars brought him nothing but grief, while his devotion to his family interests and to foreign projects ruined his chances of building up a strong imperial government in Germany. His only success was due to the skill and good fortune with which he arranged a series of marriage alliances with other powers. But that alone was enough to make his house the most powerful in Europe.

Hapsburg marriage alliances

The first of the marriages that was to do more for the Hapsburg family than conquest had ever done took place in 1477, when Maximilian himself married Mary of Burgundy, the daughter and sole heiress of that reckless duke, Charles the Bold, who had just met his death in battle with the Swiss. To this marriage was born a son, Philip the Handsome, who inherited the Burgundian estates, including the Free County of Burgundy, Luxemburg, and the rich provinces of the Netherlands, after his mother's early death. In 1496, Philip was married to Joanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, under whom the kingdoms of Spain had been united. Within a year this marriage became unexpectedly important because of the death of Joanna's only brother, which left her the heiress to the combined territories of Castile and Aragon. Ten years after their

marriage, Prince Philip died and his wife Joanna was adjudged insane. The hereditary claims of both were thus left to their six-year-old son Charles, who immediately took over his father's Burgundian states. With the death of his maternal grandfather Ferdinand in 1516, the young Charles also inherited the united kingdom of Spain, plus the Aragonese kingdoms of Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples, and the Castilian claims staked out by Columbus and other explorers to the new world of the Americas. When, in 1519, his paternal grandfather Maximilian died, Charles added to these the hereditary Hapsburg lands in Germany, which included the duchy of Austria and the adjacent duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola and the county of Tyrol. In that same year he was elected emperor as Charles V, and thereby gained the imperial rights of government, such as they were, over all of Germany and northern Italy. With this vast accumulation of Burgundian, Spanish, Austrian, and imperial lands, Charles V, at the age of nineteen, became the ruler of a larger territory than had been collected under one monarch since the break-up of Charlemagne's empire.[1]

5. EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN HORIZON BY EXPLORATION

In this last part of the transitional period between the High Middle Ages and the beginnings of modern times, while the states of Europe were consolidating under the impulsion of economic forces to form strongly centralized units, the cupidity and economic rivalry of those states caused an eager search for new trade routes that resulted in a vast expansion of the horizon of Europe. Not only new trade routes but new lands were discovered, and a new world was opened up to European exploitation. The beginning of the modern age in Europe coincides with the beginning of the modern world.

Early geographical knowledge

What knowledge medieval Europe possessed of the world outside its narrow borders it had inherited mostly from ancient Greek geographers. This fund of information had been preserved and augmented by generations of Saracen scholars until the people of Latin Christendom were prepared to take it over. But if the Saracens preserved the knowledge of Ptolemy, they preserved also many of his errors and ingenious guesses, including his calculation, much too small, of the size of the world. Their maps, which represented the tropical portion of Africa as an uninhabitable land of burning heat surrounded by boiling water and the Atlantic as an impassable sea of

[1] See map opposite page 414, and genealogical table, page iii.

darkness, did as much to hinder as to help further exploration, though they were fairly accurate in their description of lands already known. Europe, northern Africa, western Asia, and the lands bordering on the Indian Ocean were shown fairly clearly. Much as the Moslems had done for the science of geography, however, the first great addition to western knowledge of the world during the Middle Ages was made by Christian explorers, who pressed eastward overland until they reached the rich and populous countries of the distant East.


Marco Polo

Of these the most important were three members of an enterprising Venetian merchant family. In 1271, Nicolo and Matteo Polo, who had already traded in the western portion of the great Tartar Empire that covered all central Asia as well as eastern Europe,[1] set out on a second expedition to the East. This time they took with them Nicolo's young son Marco, and they did not stop in the western lands of the Golden Horde. Instead, they pressed on through central Asia until they arrived at the court of the Tartar emperor, Kublai Khan, in the Chinese city of Pekin. They were kindly received and were given positions of honor in the Tartar government. Marco, especially, became a favorite of the great khan and was sent on numerous expeditions to almost every part of the Tartar Empire. For seventeen years he remained in the khan's service, visiting lands unknown to Europeans before his time and traveling roads where no European was to follow him until the nineteenth century. At last, wearied of exile, the Polos returned home, traveling this time by water around the eastern and southern coasts of Asia to India and thence by land to the Mediterranean.

The lure of the East

After his return, Marco Polo published his famous memoirs. His account of what he had actually seen is amazingly accurate, though to his contemporaries it seemed the wildest exaggeration. Still, if only a part of what "Marco of the millions" recounted were true, there was in the East wealth such as Europe had never dreamed of, and held, moreover, by a people who loved the arts of peace more than war. To Europeans, poor and warlike, Cathay (China) became the promised land of unbelievable wealth, an easy prey if only it could be reached, or at any rate the source of a fabulously rich trade. And aside from Marco Polo's story, the West had already ample evidence of the rich possibilities of the eastern trade. The trade in pepper, cinnamon, and other spices, which were so highly valued in an age when artificial means of preserving food were rare, in silk, precious stones and woods, etc., all luxury commodities that brought a very

[1] See above, pages 294–95.


THE PRINCIPAL VOYAGES OF DISCOVERY
SPANISH
PORTUGUESE
First voyage of Columbus 1492-3
Second " " " 1493
Third " " " 1498
Fourth " " " 1502
Route of Hojeda, Cosa and Vespucci, 1499
Route of Pinzon, 1499
" " Pineda, 1519
" " Magellan and Elcano 1519-1522
Spanish trade routes
Route of Diaz, 1486-7
" " Vasco de Gama, 1497-8
" " Cabral, 1500
Portuguese trade routes
Route of John Cabot, 1497-8
First voyage of Cartier, 1534-5
Second " " " 1535-6
ABBREVIATIONS
J-Juana, (Cuba) E-Espanola, (Haiti)
NORTH AMERICA
EUROPE
ASIA
AFRICA
ATLANTIC
PACIFIC
INDIAN
OCEAN
SOUTH AMERICA
Florida
Spain
Lisbon
Cadiz
Canary Is
Cape Verde Is
Azores
Madeira
Guinea
Congo
Angola
Mozambique
Mombasa
Melinda
Cape of Good Hope
Cape Horn
Cape of St. Matthias
Gulf of St. George
Port St. Julian
Tierra del Fuego
Magellan Strait
Panama
Peru
Quito
Andalusia
Venezuela
Trinidad
Honduras
Vera Cruz
Acapulco
Mexico
Cuba
Hispaniola
Puerto Rico
Jamaica
Rio Janeiro
Bahia
Pernambuco
Porto Seguro
Line of Demarcation 1494
Line of Demarcation 1529
Spanish trade route
Portuguese trade routes
Japan
China
India
Ceylon
Siam
Sumatra
Java
Philippines
Moluccas
New Guinea
Macao
Goa
Diu
Cambaya
Muscat
Ormuz
Aden
Arctic Circle
Tropic of Cancer
Equator
Tropic of Capricorn
Antarctic Circle

high price in proportion to their bulk and weight, had helped to found the fortunes of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa. But the Italians could not trade directly with the producers of these commodities. The Moslem middlemen, who commanded the land and water routes between India, where they met merchants from China and the Spice Islands, and the Mediterranean, took the lion's share of the profits. The long overland route through central Asia was impractical for regular trade. Was there not some other way of getting to India and China, a direct route by water that would enable western merchants to sail directly to the source of eastern wealth?

Search for a new route to the East

It was the hope of finding such a route, either by sailing south around Africa or west to the coast of Asia, which was believed to be much less distant than it was, that inspired daring Portuguese, Spanish, French, and English seamen of the fifteenth century, and even earlier, to set out on perilous voyages of exploration into the unknown Atlantic. Fear of the Atlantic was ingrained in the minds of European sailors, accustomed as they were only to coasting voyages, though by the end of the Middle Ages the use of the magnetic compass as a guide in the open sea was generally known. Exploring voyages were expensive as well as hazardous, and for a long time they brought few results. Small wonder that progress was very slow. Had it not been for the authority of the great state governments, backed by the capital and the demands of the merchant class, the age of discovery might have been postponed indefinitely. It is doubtful, indeed, if it could have been achieved by the medieval system of guild and city economy. That discovery followed the rise of the centralized states and of the beginnings of capitalism was no coincidence; nor was it coincidence that the explorations were nearly all sponsored by the states along the Atlantic seaboard. For the people who face the Atlantic felt the need of a new route to the East more keenly than the Italians, who were on the whole well enough content with their existing monopoly of the eastern trade, second-hand though it was.

The Portuguese sail around Africa

The little kingdom of Portugal, situated at the southwest tip of Europe, took the lead in fifteenth-century exploration of the African coast and of the neighboring islands of the Atlantic. They were not the first to set out, but they were the most persistent, thanks in large part to the intelligent direction and unflagging enthusiasm of a prince of the royal family, Henry "the Navigator," who for more than forty years prior to his death in 1460 devoted himself to the encouragement of exploration. Henry's motives were a strange mixture of scientific curiosity, crusading zeal,

and national ambition. Some of his ideas, such as his hope of reaching the upper Nile from the western coast by way of the Senegal River and thus outflanking the Moslems in North Africa, proved erroneous. Nevertheless, his explorers achieved important results. Before his death they had founded permanent settlements in the islands of Madeira and the Azores, had set up a regular trade, partly in slaves, with the Guinea coast, which so far as is known had never before been reached by water, and were already pushing farther south. The sure profits of the Guinea trade, however, tended to keep explorers from going farther, and twenty-six years passed before the first Portuguese ship, commanded by Bartolomeo Diaz, rounded the southern extremity of Africa in 1486. The way to India was now open, and in 1498 a Portuguese fleet under Vasco da Gama sailed into the Indian harbor of Calicut.

Portuguese trade with India

Having at last arrived at the long-awaited goal, the Portuguese threw themselves with the utmost enthusiasm into the development of the new commerce. They did not establish themselves, however, without a bloody struggle with the Moslem traders who had hitherto enjoyed a monopoly of commerce in the Indian Ocean. The tale of Portuguese conquest of Indian trade is one of terrible bloodshed and brutal atrocities. Under the viceroy, Albuquerque (1509–15), the Moslem merchants were driven out of the Indian waters and permanent trading posts were established on the Malabar (western) coast of India and at Malacca on the Malay Straits. The latter served as a receiving-point for the spices from the islands of the East Indies and for the Chinese trade. The profits accruing from the new commerce were immense, and for a time Portugal became one of the great powers of Europe. The direct water route was cheaper than the old Moslem-Venetian route overland and through the Mediterranean, and the profits did not have to be split. Venice could not compete and gradually declined, never to recover.

Discovery of America

In the meantime, while the Portuguese were still feeling their way down the African coast, other explorers were following the lure of the East out across the open Atlantic. The ancient error of the Greek geographers in underestimating the size of the world was still accepted. There were encouraging legends, too, of islands midway in the Atlantic that would serve as stepping-stones across the sea. Since they knew nothing of the two continents that barred the way (for the discovery of America by the Northmen had been long since forgotten), the explorers who sailed straight west into the Atlantic had every reason to believe that they were on the shortest and most convenient route to China or India. There was nothing novel in

the plans of the Genoese captain, Christopher Columbus, who sailed westward with a charter from the Spanish government in 1492, except his determination to sail straight on till he encountered land, instead of turning back as his predecessors had done to look for the mythical islands of the Atlantic. The result of Columbus's epoch-making voyage is known to every schoolboy. Having touched the islands of the Greater Antilles, he returned with the assurance that he had found India. Later explorations brought disillusionment. In the next few years, Spanish explorers coasted the mainland from Florida to Brazil and found it to be an impassable barrier.

Spanish conquests in the New World

Despite their disappointment at not reaching the East, the Spanish adventurers settled down to the conquest and exploitation of the lands they had found. This process was accompanied by the most frightful cruelty to the helpless natives. Yet for all their brutal exploitation of the natives, the Spaniards found in the islands where they first settled no great or sudden wealth, though the colonies they founded proved permanently valuable. It was not till they reached Mexico that their dream of finding El Dorado was realized. The conquest of the Aztecs of Mexico by Hernando Cortez and a small Spanish force in 1519 brought to light a store of gold and silver such as no European had ever seen before. A few years later, a handful of Spaniards under Francisco Pizarro began the conquest of Peru, where they took from the peaceful Incas quantities of gold and silver that surpassed even the riches of Mexico. The importation of gold and silver from the New World into Spain, from whence it eventually circulated to other countries, revolutionized the economic state of Europe. The amount of money in circulation was greatly increased; as gold and silver became more common, prices rose in proportion; and the opportunities for the accumulation of capital became much greater. As for Spain, it became the leading power in Europe on the strength of its sudden wealth.

Circumnavigation of the globe

The Spanish government, meanwhile, had not given up all hope of establishing direct contact with the East and of cutting in on the Portuguese trade with the Spice Islands. Spanish-Portuguese rivalry dates back to the beginning of the discoveries. As early as 1494, Pope Alexander VI had divided the newfound lands into two hemispheres, assigning to Spain all lands lying west of a line drawn three hundred and seventy leagues to the west of the Azores and to Portugal those east of that line.[1] One of the first results of this demarcation was that Portugal claimed Brazil — which

[1] See map, page 384.

was touched on by the Portuguese captain Cabral in 1500 on his way to India — as extending to the east of the line. The division also caused a dispute as to whether the East Indies were in the eastern or western hemispheres. It was to settle this dispute and to find, if possible, a western route to the East that the Spanish government sent out an expedition of five ships in 1519 to sail around South America. The expedition was commanded by a Portuguese noble, Ferdinand Magellan, who had sailed with his countrymen to the East, but had since entered the service of Spain. It was a long and hazardous voyage, one of the most daring as well as one of the most important of all the explorations. After following the eastern coast of South America to its southern tip, Magellan passed through the dangerous straits that are still called by his name and struck out into the southern Pacific. Three terrible months passed before he sighted inhabited islands, the Ladrones. Magellan himself was killed a little later in a fight with natives of the Philippines, but what was left of his crew went on with their one remaining ship. In September, 1522, their number now reduced to eighteen, they arrived home, the first men to have sailed completely around the world. They had removed the last great uncertainty regarding the nature of the earth.

French and English explorers

The kings of England and France were as eager as their southern neighbors to find a route to the lands of spices and gold, but they had less immediate success. As early as 1497, Henry VII sent out a Genoese captain, called by the English John Cabot, who touched the borders of the New World at Cape Breton and Labrador. Other explorers, both English and French, followed, but found little that seemed worth while, save the Newfoundland fisheries which proved a steady source of wealth. The vain search for a northwest passage to China continued throughout the sixteenth century. It was not till the following century, however, that France and England began to utilize the North American land they had found by establishing colonies that were to form the basis of great colonial empires.

Section E

THE AGE OF THE REFORMATION AND THE WARS OF RELIGION

In the first two decades of the sixteenth century, the transition from the medieval to the modern world was nearing completion. Feudalism had lost most of its independent political significance and the centralized territorial states were almost full grown. The corporate economic life of the High Middle Ages had almost disappeared, though the modern form of individual capital was not yet fully developed. The church still held the allegiance of all western Europe, but it was no longer the dominating institution that it had been in the twelfth or thirteenth century. Even that intellectual and artistic efflorescence that glorified the age of transition and which we call the Renaissance was passing its peak. Europe was again about to enter upon a new era with new problems. At the close of the second decade of the sixteenth century, two events signalized the nature of the coming age and revealed the problems that would most concern the people of Europe for the next century and a half. In 1517, *Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five theses on the church door at Wittenberg, and thereby set in motion the forces that were to break up the universal church into warring sects and to make religious controversy the focal center for political rivalries, economic and social discontents, and intellectual activity. Two years later, Charles V was elected Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, thus completing the accumulation of territory which*

brought the greater part of Europe under the rule of the house of Hapsburg and precipitating a century and a half of dynastic wars. Because of the dominating part played by the religious revolution and religious rivalry, we have called the period from about 1519 *to* 1660 *the age of the Reformation and the Wars of Religion. But it was also an age of frequent dynastic wars; it witnessed the development of modern forms of state government; and it saw the most important stages of that economic revolution which made capitalism the dominant factor in modern economic life.*

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

THE REFORMATION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCHES

(1517–55)

EUROPE was a very different place in the early years of the sixteenth century from what it had been in the thirteenth. In the intervening years the most characteristically medieval aspects of European civilization had disappeared or were rapidly disappearing, and modern society had begun to take recognizable shape. Yet one medieval institution, and that the greatest of all, still stood, unchanged in form though considerably shaken and with alarming fissures appearing here and there in its once solid masonry. The real unity of Western Christendom had been broken up; yet the Roman Church still maintained its traditional place as the embodiment of all religion in western Europe; the papacy still kept alive its claims to universal sovereignty, and the clergy still exercised their monopoly over the means of salvation. The church, it is true, had changed in some respects since the thirteenth century, but not as a rule in ways that made it a more satisfactory minister to the needs of the new age. Nothing could be more certain in this age of rapid change than that some of the people at least would demand changes in their religious life to fit the changes in their worldly existence. And such changes could not be effected without extensive changes in the church; for in that age religion was inseparable from the church, just as the church was inseparable from the state and society. The most devout churchmen recognized that a reform of the church was necessary and hoped to bring it about in ways that would leave the outward structure intact. They were too late. Before they could accomplish anything, the explosive forces of the new nationalism, the new ethical and moral interests of the bourgeois class and the new humanistic piety, combined with old grievances against Rome and discontent with the clerical system, were ignited by the fiery preaching of Martin Luther, and the resulting explosion split the unity of the ancient church beyond all hope of rebuilding. What occurred was in reality a religious revolution, and it is this revolution that is generally referred to by historians as the Protestant Reformation, or simply the Reformation.

1. CAUSES OF THE REFORMATION

The immediate acceptance of Luther's revolutionary doctrine by all kinds of people in all parts of northern Europe is sufficient proof that those who welcomed the new movement did so for a wide variety of reasons. No such spontaneous reaction of popular sentiment could have sprung from any single cause or have been inspired by a single motive. We must look for the causes of the Reformation, then, in the economic, political, social, and cultural, as well as religious, background of the age. These various causes have already been mentioned and explained in previous chapters. Here we can give only a brief summary to gather them together and to indicate their bearing on the problem of the Reformation.

Abuses in the church

The most obvious cause of the Reformation was the necessity of reforming abuses in the church, a necessity that had been widely recognized for the past two centuries or more, without much being done about it. The wealth and temporal power of the church; the special jurisdiction of ecclesiastical and papal courts; the appointment of foreign papal favorites to high ecclesiastical offices; the avarice, carelessness, ignorance, and immorality of some of the clergy; the evils of simony and the financial exactions of the papacy — all these served to arouse a strong feeling of discontent with the church as it was, particularly when they bore heavily on the purses of the laity.

Failure and influence of earlier reformers

Still the fact that there were abuses in the church would not in itself have caused such a widespread revolt from the Roman communion as took place in the Reformation. The need for reform was no greater when Luther nailed his theses on the church door at Wittenberg than in the days of William of Occam, Marsiglio, Wyclif, and Huss.[1] Yet these earlier reformers failed, while Luther succeeded. Why? Aside from the fact that Luther provided a more satisfactory theological formula to justify revolt, it is clear that in the meantime conditions had changed so that more people were prepared to break with the church than there had been before. The early critics of the church and the papacy had been voices crying in the wilderness. They had propounded many of the ideas later asserted by Luther, but they had secured only a relatively small following because the time was not yet ripe. They had not labored entirely in vain, however, for among the factors that prepared the way for the success of the Reformation the memory of their teaching, never wholly forgotten, must be given a prominent place.

[1] See above, pages 322 and 326–27.

The sacramental system was the rock upon which the early revolts against the authority of the church had foundered. However much men might feel the need of reform, they felt still more keenly the need of those services that only the clergy could perform. When, more than a century after Wyclif and Huss, Luther reasserted their doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, one of the important reasons for his success was that in the meantime certain religious and social developments had combined to make a good many men less ready to admit dependence on the priests and the sacraments for their salvation. In Germany and the Netherlands, the mystics, whom we have already noted,[1] had preached an inner piety, a religion that consisted chiefly of an immediate communion between man and God and left little room for the mediation of a priest. During that time, too, in the cities where the seeds of both the Renaissance and the Reformation found their most fertile soil, the growing individualism and self-reliance of the prosperous middle class tended to make them resent the necessity of depending for their salvation on the ministration of the priests. This tendency to rebel against the church's most fundamental belief was more dangerous to it than any amount of criticism of abuses in the clerical system.

Revolt from the sacramental system

In other ways the changing spirit of the new age was causing men, especially of the bourgeois class, to lose interest in the beliefs, ideals, and traditions of the medieval church. The medieval ideal of the truly religious life, as embodied in monasticism, had stressed poverty, asceticism, and other-worldliness as among the prime virtues. But with increasing prosperity, money was playing a much more important part in men's lives, and by the beginning of the sixteenth century the age in which Saint Francis of Assisi had sung the praises of his Lady Poverty and had enrolled enthusiastic recruits in her service had long since passed. Practical business men had begun to think of poverty as a social evil rather than as a saintly virtue. Other-worldliness made small appeal to men absorbed in the business of this world, and asceticism had few charms for the hard-working burgher who looked forward soberly to an old age spent in quiet enjoyment of the results of honest trade. Next to monasticism the strongest force in shaping the spirit as well as the form of the medieval church had been feudalism. And as feudalism lost vitality, the medieval church lost the social atmosphere that had been most congenial to it. To the middle class of city dwellers especially, whose temper was to shape the interests of the new age, the chivalric-feudal spirit of the

Changing spirit of the age

[1] See above, pages 361–63.

crusading era which was also the great age of the medieval church had very little appeal. Saint Louis was no more akin to them than was Saint Francis. The elaborate and colorful ritual of the Catholic Church rather jarred on their sober minds. In some vague way, very difficult to express, they felt it to be more suited to the gilded and extravagant society of the feudal nobility than to their own business-like world. Added to that, of course, was the economic fact that the church conferred solid benefits upon the great nobles, whose sons became bishops, whereas the economic relations of the bourgeoisie with the church represented an unfavorable balance of trade.

But for the present we are discussing the failing appeal of the ideals of the medieval church, and in that connection one further factor must be noted. The saints themselves were losing something of their appeal to the popular imagination. Not only were the ideals they represented losing conviction, but the number of saints on the calendar had grown too great for the proper observance of saints' days, and their relics had been too freely peddled about the country. Perhaps they had grown too familiar to be given the respect formerly accorded them. Certainly, no feature of church practice was dropped with less resistance during the Reformation than the veneration of the saints.

Influence of the humanists

The intellectual basis for the revolt against medievalism in the church was provided by the Christian humanists.[1] Whole-heartedly devoted to the study of antiquity, they had learned to despise medieval traditions as products of "Gothic" barbarism. Erasmus was not the only one of them who ridiculed pilgrimages, the veneration of the saints, the supernatural power of relics, the practices of monasticism, and the temporal power of the papacy, on the ground that these things were not part of original Christianity. It was the humanist emphasis on the literal study and reinterpretation of the Bible from original sources that gave Luther his most potent weapon. It was a commonplace among the enemies of the Reformation that Erasmus had laid the egg which Luther hatched.

National opposition to Rome

Among the other causes of the Reformation, the interests of the state governments and the strength of national opposition to papal authority must not be forgotten. Indeed, few if any of the changes that had taken place in the preceding century did more to make the break with Rome politically possible than the development of the centralized territorial states and the growth of national consciousness which we have noted in the last two chapters. As these grew stronger, both prince and people resented more and more

[1] See above, pages 365–69.

keenly the payment of taxes to an Italian prince, the appeal of cases from the national courts to the papal court at Rome, and the interference of a foreign power in their national affairs. This was particularly true in England, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries, where the rulers had not secured such control of the national church before the Reformation as had the kings of France and Spain. The opportunity presented to the kings and princes of these countries to gain complete control of the church in their states, as well as the financial advantages that would result from the stoppage of papal taxation and from the confiscation of church lands, was a strong inducement to them to embrace the Reformation movement. Without the help of the secular governments, it is doubtful if the new churches could have been securely established in many of the northern states.

2. LUTHER AND THE REFORMATION IN GERMANY

By the second decade of the sixteenth century, Germany was ready for a religious revolution. All that was needed was a leader who would unite men of varied interests and show them the way. That leader was Martin Luther. In his ringing phrases the inarticulate discontent with things as they were and blind gropings for a more satisfactory religious life found expression. And in his doctrine of salvation by faith alone, all who were ready to rebel against the authority of the church found for the first time a justification for revolt that carried conviction to their consciences. Luther did not cause the Reformation; but he gave the signal for its start and shaped its course. So far as any man can, Luther influenced the history of his age.

Martin Luther (1483–1546)

Luther's parents were Saxon peasant folk, stern, hard-working, and pious, somewhat better off than the average, for they were able to give their son an excellent education. In 1501, at the age of eighteen, young Martin entered the famous Saxon university at Erfurt. There for four years he studied the Nominalist philosophy that still dominated the old school, but he also read the classics and talked to the enthusiastic group of young humanists who were known as the "Erfurt poets." Having completed his course in the faculty of arts, Martin began the study of law in accordance with the wishes of his practical father. Almost immediately, however, he changed his mind and entered the local monastery of the order of Augustinian Eremites. Two years later he was ordained priest, and in 1508 was moved to the house of his order at Wittenberg to teach in the

Early years (to 1517)

new university recently founded there by the Elector of Saxony, Frederick the Wise. There followed nine years of outwardly peaceful academic activity, during which Luther lectured to students, preached in the castle church, and began to acquire a considerable local reputation. But quiet though they seemed, they were years of mental turmoil for the young monk, until the discovery of the doctrine of faith brought peace to his soul, and before long strife to all Christendom.

Justification by faith

Since his entry into the monastery, Luther had been tormented by the fear that nothing he could do would be sufficient to merit salvation. Indeed, it was this fear that caused his sudden decision to become a monk, to the disappointment of his father and the astonishment of his fellow students. He had carried with him from the peasant environment of his childhood a conception of God as a stern, unforgiving judge, and he had accepted the current teaching of the church that salvation depended on "good works," which included the sacraments, prayer, fasting, and, if one would be sure, the ascetic practices of monasticism. But though he devoted himself to an excessive asceticism, he still found no assurance that he had merited salvation. His reading of Saint Augustine further shook his faith in his own efforts by the suggestion that only those who are predestined to receive divine grace will be saved. And who can know that he is among those chosen? The answer to all his problems came to him suddenly about the year 1515, from the reading of a verse in Saint Paul's Epistle to the Romans on which he was lecturing to the university students. It contained the phrase, "The just shall live by faith." He had often read it before, but now he saw in it a new meaning — that man may be justified, i.e., saved, by faith and by faith *alone*. Doubtless only those predestined for salvation would be given faith; but to possess faith, which is the means of salvation, is also to possess the conviction that one will be saved. It took some time for Luther to work out all the logical consequences of his doctrine, for he was not essentially a systematic thinker. Eventually, however, he was forced to the conviction that, if faith alone was needed for salvation, then the good works of the church, fasts, pilgrimages, and even the sacraments, were unnecessary, and that no man was dependent upon the services of pope or priest for his salvation.

The question of indulgences

With these ideas running through his mind, it was inevitable that Luther should begin to criticize some of the practices of the church arising from the doctrine of good works. As it happened, the question that first aroused him to open protest was that represented by the papal indulgence proclaimed by Pope Leo X to obtain money for the building of Saint Peter's Cathedral in



MARTIN LUTHER
1483–1546

This portrait, from a painting by Cranach, shows the German Reformer in the years just after the Diet of Worms, when he was organizing the Lutheran Church. He was at this time in the full strength of early middle age, and the strong peasant face indicates something of the forceful character that lay behind it.

Rome. The granting of indulgences had been a common practice in the church for more than two centuries. It was an integral part of the church's scheme of salvation and had become an important source of papal revenue. In theory it was an elaboration of the penitential system, the origins of which date back to the early days of the church. Following confession and proof of contrition, the sinner received absolution for his sins through the sacrament of penance. He was then free from the guilt of sin and the fear of eternal damnation. But he still owed further atonement in the form of penance or punishment in this world and, after death, in purgatory. The first indulgences or remissions of further penance were granted by the popes, acting as the successors of Saint Peter, to the crusaders. Later, pilgrimages or other good works were substituted, until in the fourteenth century the Avignonese popes set the precedent of accepting money payments as constituting the major part of the necessary good works.

The ninety-five theses

To Luther, however, convinced that faith alone could save men from the results of sin, it now seemed clear that indulgences were not only useless but actually harmful, since thereby men were encouraged to put their trust in something that could be of no help to them. He felt bound, therefore, to issue a warning to his people. As the simplest method of securing a hearing, he prepared a list of ninety-five theses or propositions on the subject, which he announced his willingness to defend in public debate. Following the usual academic practice, he posted these theses on the church door where all could read them, and awaited developments. To his surprise the theses aroused a perfect furor of interest. They were soon printed and circulated all over Germany. That they carried conviction to their readers was attested by a sharp decline in the sale of indulgences.

Luther drifts from the church

In 1517, Luther had no thought of breaking away from the ancient church, but the next three years saw him forced step by step farther from it. In order to meet the arguments of the papal legates who were sent to demand that he recant and of the orthodox theologian, John Eck, who engaged him in public debate at Leipzig in the summer of 1519, he had to work out his ideas to their ultimate conclusion. Almost against his will, for he had a natural respect for authority, the Wittenberg monk was forced to realize that his beliefs were contrary to many of those held by the church and that there was no place for him within the Roman communion. He had found in the Bible, however, as he interpreted it, a firm support for his convictions, and resting on that divinely inspired authority he confidently defied the authority of the pope.

Leo X was delayed in taking decisive action against Luther by what seemed to him the more important business of the imperial election in 1519. This hotly disputed election worked doubly to the advantage of Luther, for his prince, Frederick the Wise, was able to secure from Charles V, as the price of his support, a promise that the rebellious friar should not be condemned without a hearing before the imperial Diet. This meant further delay, and Luther used the time to good effect by writing a series of pamphlets with a view to publicizing his beliefs and winning the support of the German people. He was amazingly successful. The *Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation on the Improvement of the Christian Estate* was a stirring appeal to German patriotism against the tyranny of Rome. In it he called on the German princes to reform the church and outlined a comprehensive program. This popular pamphlet was followed by the *Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, a more scholarly exposition of his views on the sacramental and sacerdotal system. A third pamphlet, *The Liberty of a Christian Man*, explained in popular fashion for the common man the practical bearings of his doctrine.

The pamphlets of 1520

When at last the summons came calling Luther to appear before the Diet of the empire at Worms in the spring of 1521, he went with the assurance that he had the sympathy at least of the majority of the German people. He was at the height of his popularity. All who nursed grievances against the church or hoped for reform wished him well, for the split in the church had not yet gone so far that it was necessary to take definite sides. Nevertheless, it took real courage to walk into the lions' den, with the fate of John Huss at Constance as a warning of what might happen. It was a dramatic moment when the Saxon peasant monk faced the assembled dignitaries of state and church and firmly refused to recant. Next day he left Worms. Within a few days he was proclaimed an excommunicated heretic by the church and an outlaw by the empire. But by that time he was safe in the lonely castle of the Wartburg, where he had been conducted by the orders of Frederick the Wise. There he passed a year in enforced leisure, which he put to good use by translating the New Testament into German. The Old Testament he translated later, completing it in 1532. As his whole program rested on the authority of the Bible against that of church tradition, it was essential for his success that the Bible should be readily accessible to the people. The importance of his German Bible can scarcely be overestimated. It has often been called the most powerful Reformation tract, and it had almost as much influence on the development of the German language as on German religion.

Luther at Worms and the Wartburg (1521)

Luther was a master of his native tongue, and his Bible played a part as important in fixing the standard of modern German as Dante's *Divine Comedy* did for the Italian.

Organization of the Lutheran Church

The peaceful interlude on the Wartburg marks a turning-point in Luther's career as a reformer. Hitherto he had been a sturdy rebel against church authority and a champion of individual liberty of conscience. He was now to become the organizer of a church of his own and an increasingly conservative defender of established authority. Returning to Wittenberg in the spring of 1522, he began at once the task of reconstruction. His first action was to moderate the extreme changes put into effect by some of his more radical followers during his absence. He then set about the business of organizing a new church on as conservative a basis as possible. In the Lutheran Church as it finally took shape, a good deal of the old Catholic doctrine and practice was retained. Nevertheless, there were changes of vital importance. In accordance with Luther's denial of the doctrine of good works and hence of the validity of the sacramental and sacerdotal system, all of the sacraments were abolished except baptism and the Lord's Supper, which are specifically mentioned in the Bible, and even these lost their character as miraculous good works. Pilgrimages, fasts, veneration of saints and relics, and the rest of the traditional practices based on the doctrine of good works also went by the board. The clergy, no longer considered as having special sacramental powers, were permitted to marry and live the life of ordinary men. The monastic orders were entirely dissolved. Thus was broken down the barrier that had separated the clergy from the laity and had made them a separate caste with unique privileges. Finally, the church, in everything save questions of belief, was placed directly under the control of the state government. The superintendents, who replaced the former bishops, were practically state officers.

Defection of the humanists

With the definite organization of a separate church, Luther lost the support of many who had sympathized with him before the Diet of Worms. Among these were the majority of the Christian humanists, including their leader, Erasmus. They had favored Luther's early demands for reform within the church, but were repelled by his violence and dogmatism. When the time for a final decision came, they found their loyalty to the ancient church too strong to be broken, especially as Luther's theological doctrine seemed to them no improvement on that of the old church. Erasmus was bitterly disappointed at the ruin of his hopes for a peaceful reform to be accomplished by education and without schism or turmoil,

and he found it impossible to accept Luther's denial of man's free will or ability to work out his own salvation. The defection of the humanists was a serious loss to the new church, leaving it more conservative and dogmatic than ever.

The Lutheran Church was scarcely begun before it lost the support of another and more numerous class, the majority of the German peasants and poor city workers, who were alienated by Luther's conservative attitude toward the great social revolution which swept across Germany in 1525. The Peasants' War, as it was called, was a general rising of the downtrodden peasants, frequently joined by the discontented working classes in the towns, to demand justice and relief from crushing economic and social burdens. It had been preceded by a long series of similar revolts, extending over the past two hundred years, but becoming increasingly frequent since the turn of the sixteenth century. These earlier risings, however, had been confined to limited districts or individual lordships. What made the present rebellion at once more general and more radical was that the peasants had found, in Luther's assertion that the Bible is the only real authority, a justification for revolt and a program of social reform that would unite the discontented elements of different parts of the country in a common movement. Their dream of restoring the social conditions of evangelical Christianity was impractical, but it gave the necessary religious coloring to their demands. Beginning in Swabia, the revolt spread rapidly through central and southern Germany. For a time the old order seemed seriously threatened. Luther was as much alarmed as the princes at this revolt against established authority. With a singular lack of sympathetic insight, he urged the peasants to remember the Biblical injunction to obey the magistrates. Then, when they refused to listen, he called on the princes to crush and slay the "thievish, murderous hordes of peasants." The lords needed no such encouragement. The revolt was put down with appalling savagery. The peasants and artisans sank back into a hopeless economic slavery and looked no more to Luther for guidance.

The Peasants' War (1525)

Instead, great numbers of them joined one or other of the numerous little sects which now formed as independent groups apart from both the Catholic and Lutheran churches. Luther's example had been more potent than he could have wished, especially now that he was the active head of a triumphant state church. In the days when he was in rebellion against the Catholic Church, he had confidently asserted the right of the individual man to interpret the Bible and religion generally in the light of his own reason and conscience. And though he later denied that right to others in practice, and though the

Divergence of creeds

Lutheran Church, like all other Protestant state churches, persecuted dissenting opinion, yet the ultimate sanction of Protestant belief continued to be the reason and conscience of individual men rather than the authority of a universal, apostolic church, as was true with Catholicism. As a result, Protestants in every land continued to assert the right to individual judgment in opposition to the state church, whatever it might be, and to found dissenting sects. No matter how it might organize or become established with state support, Protestantism was essentially sectarian rather than universal in character.

The Anabaptists

In Germany the sectarian revolt took a great variety of forms, with wide divergence in creed as well as in moral and social teaching. Nevertheless, they all shared a few common characteristics, and since most of them refused to recognize the validity of infant baptism and insisted on rebaptizing their converts, they were generally known as Anabaptists. They were all recruited from the submerged and downtrodden classes; they refused obedience to the state church and sometimes to the state; they founded their doctrine, whatever it might be, on a literal, unhistorical interpretation of the Bible with a view to restoring the simplicity of primitive Christianity; and they were cruelly persecuted everywhere by Catholic and Protestant states alike. Ignorant they may have been, but they were deeply pious and their history is ennobled by an inspiring record of heroic constancy in the face of persecution. Despite every effort of the persecuting state churches, they continued to exist, and their modern descendants are to be found in the Baptist, Mennonite, Moravian, and other churches.

Consolidation of the Lutheran Church

If Lutheranism lost heavily through the defection of the humanists, the peasants, and proletariat, that loss was compensated by the adherence of the middle and upper classes in an increasingly large number of the German states and free cities. Within Luther's lifetime, nearly half of Germany officially adopted his church. The princes found in it a valuable support for their governments, while the burghers found in Luther's teaching a moral and ethical ideal as well as an individual spiritual life more in harmony with their character than that provided by the medieval church. The victory of Lutheranism was in part the triumph of the territorial state over the universal church, but it was also the triumph of a new lay-bourgeois ethic over the feudal-clerical-monastic ideals of the Middle Ages. It was not the least important result of the Reformation that the good citizen — the pious layman, who was a good husband and father, honest, hard-working, and thrifty — supplanted the ascetic monk or the crusading knight as the ideal Christian.

The founding of Lutheran state churches inevitably caused grave political complications in Germany. Church and state were too closely united to admit of any degree of religious toleration. The Lutheran princes claimed the right to determine the religion of their states as Catholic rulers did, and when at the emperor's dictation, the Diet of Spires in 1529 passed a resolution denying that right, the Lutheran princes drew up a formal protest. It was from this that they came to be called Protestant, a name later applied to all non-Catholics. Shortly after this, both Lutheran and Catholic princes formed leagues for mutual protection and Germany was divided into two armed camps. Charles V was eager to restore religious unity to his empire for political as well as religious reasons, but was too busy elsewhere to bring strong pressure to bear on the heretics until 1546. He then declared war on the Protestant league, only to find that he had delayed too long. Though successful at first, he found that the new religion was too firmly established to be permanently crushed. Finally he was forced to agree to a compromise that left each prince free to make his state either Catholic or Lutheran as he chose. This was the Religious Peace of Augsburg, signed in 1555.[1] It kept a rather uneasy peace in Germany for the rest of the century.

Religious war and peace

By this time, Lutheranism had gained nearly the whole northern half of Germany. It had also spread to the Scandinavian lands. The Reformation in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden followed much the same course as in the German states, the rulers taking the lead and establishing national churches directly under the control of the state, though here the episcopal system was retained.

Lutheranism in Scandinavia

3. ZWINGLI AND CALVIN AND THE REFORMATION IN SWITZERLAND

Luther's doctrine seems to have been peculiarly suited to the Teutonic mind. Outside of Germany and Scandinavia, pure Lutheranism never gained any permanent hold, though Luther's influence and example played a large part in the spread of the Reformation to other lands. Save in England where the Anglican Church grew up under a variety of influences, the Protestants in other countries, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, and Scotland, to name the most important, followed the leadership of Zwingli and Calvin. The Protestant churches founded in these countries were generally known as the "Reformed Churches," to distinguish them from the Lutheran.

[1] See below, page 424.

To the south of Germany, and closely connected with it by bonds of tradition, language, and trade, the thirteen cantons of the Swiss Confederation maintained an independent existence as the freest and most democratic states in Europe.[1] Situated at the heart of Europe, Switzerland was in constant contact with her great neighbors, Germany, France, and Italy. Sturdy Swiss foot soldiers, the finest of their age, fought for pay in the armies of France and Italy, while the merchants of the city cantons grew rich on the trade that flowed through the Alpine passes from Italy to Germany. In the northern cities of Zurich, Basle, and Berne, Christian humanism of the northern type had taken firm root. Erasmus found at Basle a printer for his New Testament and a circle of congenial friends with whom he spent many of the later years of his life. It was in this stimulating intellectual atmosphere that Huldreich Zwingli (1484–1531) grew up and received his education. He entered the priesthood at about the time that Luther was taking his final vows in the monastery at Erfurt; but in the years when the German monk was seeking salvation in agony of soul, the future Swiss reformer was devoting himself to the study of the classics. He was a thorough humanist and Erasmus was his idol. It was due to his influence that Zwingli first turned to the study of evangelical Christianity, though for many years his interest in religion was fairly perfunctory.

Zwingli's early environment

In 1519, shortly after he had been transferred to the minster church in Zurich, Zwingli experienced a religious conversion. At the same time he began to read Luther's first pamphlets. He immediately became a reformer and preached to such good effect, appealing both to the desire for reform and the patriotic resentment of Roman domination, that he gradually won over the city council and a majority of the people to his views. In 1525, the last Catholic Mass was celebrated in Zurich. That event marked the completion of the Reformation in the canton. The "Reformed" religion, which now became the official doctrine of Zurich, was in many respects similar to Lutheranism. The sacramental system, the celibacy of the clergy, monasticism, fasts, and the veneration of saints and relics were abolished. Like Luther, Zwingli founded his teaching on the authority of the Bible, but he interpreted it more freely and with more radical results. The point on which he differed most widely from Luther was in his interpretation of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, which he considered merely a symbolical commemorative service, whereas Luther, though denying the miracle of the Mass, insisted on the real presence of

The Reformation in Zurich

[1] See above, pages 289–90.

the body and blood of Christ in the elements of bread and wine. This distinction foiled all attempts at union between the two branches of Protestantism, but it was not the only difference. Zwingli was less mystical and less absorbed in theological dogma than Luther. He was a practical reformer with much of the Erasmian conception of religion as a philosophical guide to daily life.

From Zurich the reform spread to the other city cantons and even beyond the borders of Switzerland to Strasbourg and other German cities of the upper Rhine. The five forest or rural cantons, however, were more conservative and remained loyal to Rome. In 1529 they united in alliance with Austria to oppose the Reformation. The bitter feeling between the two religious parties soon led to open war, which ended with the defeat of Zurich, left alone to face the Catholic forces, in 1531. The Peace of Cappel, which followed, was moderate, leaving each canton free to determine its own religion, but the Reformed Church had suffered a serious loss in the death of Zwingli, who was killed in the final battle. For a time it was left leaderless, until the arrival of Calvin opened the second period of the Swiss Reformation.

Spread and opposition

John Calvin (1509–64), the new leader who did more than even Zwingli had done to form the spirit of the Reformed Church in Switzerland and the other countries that adopted it, was by birth and training a Frenchman. He was born of moderately well-to-do parents in Picardy and educated at the University of Paris and in the law schools of Orléans and Bourges. At Paris he received a thorough training in the classics, which left him with an excellent Latin style and may have been in part responsible for the feeling for style in handling his native tongue that made him one of the greatest masters of French prose in his century. His legal training was equally important, for to the end of his days his thought on all religious and moral questions retained a strongly legal cast. Shortly after he had completed his studies, Calvin was converted to the new doctrine of the Reformation, through reading the works of Erasmus and Luther. But France at that time was no safe place for heretics and he was forced to flee. He took refuge in the Swiss city of Basle in 1534 and there began his first theological writing.

Calvin

Two years later, Calvin published the first edition of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion.* From time to time thereafter he added to it in new editions and also translated it from the original Latin into French. When finished, this work contained a complete summary of that system of theology and morals generally known as Calvinism. More than any other book it was responsible for the

Calvinism

spread of Protestantism to the non-Lutheran countries. Its clarity of thought and remorseless logic carried conviction more unescapably than did the mystical fervor of Luther. There was little that was really original in Calvinism, for the fundamental doctrines were Luther's almost without exception, and yet the total effect was very different from Lutheranism. The chief difference, aside from the more logical and consistent development of Calvin's thought, lay in a decided shift in emphasis. Starting with the same belief in man's inability to save himself by good works, Luther placed the greatest emphasis on the saving power of faith, whereas Calvin thought much more about the majesty and power of God, who predestines certain souls for salvation and assigns the rest of mankind to hopeless damnation. Calvin's was a sterner doctrine, and its sternness was reflected in his moral teaching and legislation. He considered it the duty of the church and state to make men moral in the strictest legalistic sense. No part of his teaching had a more profound influence on the life of the Calvinist countries than this. The civilization of America to this day shows traces of the Calvinist morality brought over to these shores by the Puritan immigrants who founded the early colonies in New England.

Predestination and Calvinist morality

In the emphasis on strict morality lay the one apparent logical inconsistency in Calvin's doctrine. Yet if it did not follow logically from his doctrine of predestination, it was psychologically necessary. No serious man — and Calvinism appealed essentially to serious men — contemplating the awful majesty of God and the foreordained alternatives of eternal salvation or damnation, could remain indifferent to his own fate in eternity. And since no man could be sure that he was of the elect, and since nothing he could do of his own will could change the immutable decree of predestination, the Calvinist lived under the shadow of a terrifying uncertainty. According to all logic, the fact that he could do nothing to change his fate should have made him indifferent to his conduct in this world, but the doctrine of predestination had instead exactly the opposite effect. For it might safely be assumed that those whom God had chosen to be saved would be men who would lead good moral lives. The fact of living a strictly moral life did not prove that one was of the elect, but if one were leading an immoral life it did prove that one was not of those chosen. Hence there was at least a partial assurance in the former case, and it was a bold man who could spurn even such uncertain comfort. Further, Calvin and his followers tended to take their conceptions of God and of morality more from the Hebraic Old Testament than from the New. To the Calvinist moral laws were veritably laws, such as Jehovah had

handed down to Moses on Mount Sinai, and in enforcing moral laws, including the strict observation of the Hebrew Sabbath, Calvinist rulers and ministers felt that they were carrying out the will of Jehovah. To understand the spiritual atmosphere of any Calvinist country, whether Geneva, Scotland, or New England, one must know the atmosphere of the Old Testament prophets and the Pentateuch.

The Reformation in Geneva

The laboratory in which Calvin worked out the practical application of his doctrine was the city of Geneva. It lay in the French-speaking district on the borders of Switzerland and was not yet a fully fledged member of the Swiss Confederation when Calvin first entered it in 1536, though it was closely allied with the Protestant canton of Berne, which was supporting the Genevan citizens in their struggle for freedom from the rule of their bishop and count. The latter two, who shared the government of the city, were both members of the house of Savoy. Owing to the bishop's double authority, the rebellion against the domination of Savoy meant also rebellion against the church. The Reformation in Geneva, therefore, began partly as a political expedient. The chief Protestant preacher, William Farel, was finding grave difficulties in organizing the Reformed Church among the people who were not all converts by conviction. Such was the situation when Calvin came to Geneva for a brief visit and was commanded by Farel in the name of the Lord to stay and help him. For three years Calvin and Farel strove to organize and purify the new church, but aroused so much opposition by their unbending discipline that they were finally driven out. The new church, however, was hopelessly divided without their leadership, and in 1541 the people of Geneva begged Calvin to return on his own terms. For the remainder of his life Calvin was the real ruler of Geneva, though all opposition to him was not crushed until 1555. Under the new constitution, which Calvin helped to form, the government of Geneva was a sort of theocratic republic, with the administration of state and church so closely interwoven that it is difficult to determine which was responsible for the moral legislation that made Geneva the most moral city in Europe.

Spread of Calvinism

From Switzerland, Calvinism spread to other countries. In some sections of southern Germany it replaced Lutheranism, but mostly its converts were found in countries where the Lutheran reform had gained no strong foothold. The Reformation in France soon became thoroughly Calvinist, and largely through Calvin's influence it gained ground steadily, despite the royal persecution which prevented the organization of Reformed churches till about 1555. The history of the Huguenots, however, as the French Protestants were called, belongs

mostly to the period of the Counter-Reformation and the religious wars in the second half of the century and will be treated more fully later. The same holds true for the Calvinist or Reformed churches in the Netherlands, Bohemia, Scotland, and such influence as Calvinism had on the Church of England. The organization of the Reformed churches in other countries, and their relation to the state, varied according to local conditions, but all showed the influence of the strict moral sense and rugged spirit of the Genevan reformer.

4. THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND UNDER HENRY VIII AND EDWARD VI

In the English Reformation the same causes were present as have been noted in connection with the revolt from Rome in the continental states; but they were present in a very different ratio. National, political, and economic motives played a much more important part in the early stages of the movement in England than did religion. Under Henry VIII, little more was accomplished — or aimed at — than the transference of the political control and of the temporalities of the English Church from the pope to the king. The religious Reformation followed the political. It was not till after Henry's death that England became in any real sense Protestant.

Preparation for the break

Henry VIII was as nearly an absolute ruler as any English king ever became, and his will was the determining factor in bringing about the break with Rome at the time when it occurred, yet Henry could never have forced his people to throw off their ancient obedience to the pope had not a great many of them been already prepared to welcome the move. National opposition to papal interference in English affairs had found bold expression from time to time since the fourteenth century. England had suffered more than most countries from the financial exactions of the papacy and from the appointment of the pope's foreign favorites to high ecclesiastical offices. The wealthy and corrupt monks and priests were no more popular in England than elsewhere. Moreover, England had been the scene of Wyclif's daring attack on the wealth and temporal power of the clergy, and though his Lollard followers had apparently been crushed, the memory of his teaching had never been entirely forgotten. The Christian humanists, too, had done their share to prepare the way for the Reformation here as on the Continent. John Colet, Sir Thomas More, and the rest of Erasmus's circle of English friends, though most of them remained loyal Catholics, had made evangelical Christianity and the idea of a practical reform of



HENRY VIII, KING OF ENGLAND
1491–1547

Henry is painted here (by Holbein) in later life, after he had lost much of his early vigor and abundant health; yet the face still shows the blunt strength and arrogant will that were characteristic of this bluff Tudor at any age.

church abuses familiar to the educated classes. Finally, Lutheranism had been brought over from Germany by merchants and wandering scholars, aided by the printing press, and was spreading slowly through the city middle class, where it found a congenial atmosphere as it had among the continental bourgeoisie. When Henry rebelled against papal authority, then, he could count on a considerable amount of popular support.

Early years of Henry VIII (1509–27)

In the early years of Henry VIII, however, there was little to indicate his future rôle in England's church history. Indeed, he was generally considered a strong champion of orthodoxy. In 1521 he published a violent attack on the Lutheran heresy, for which the pope awarded him the title of Defender of the Faith. Besides, he was too much engrossed in his ambitious foreign policy, in which he was encouraged by his chief minister, Cardinal Wolsey, to pay much attention to the reform of the church at home. For years Wolsey and the king expended the resources of the kingdom in an attempt to make England a power in international affairs by holding the balance between the Emperor Charles V and Francis I of France. And though Henry apparently realized that clerical privileges, ecclesiastical courts, and papal jurisdiction were now the only remaining obstacles in the way of his complete control of his kingdom, Wolsey, who was papal legate in England and hoped to be pope, was always able to distract his attention and stave off any action against the rights of the church. More than once, papal ambassadors warned the pope that if Wolsey fell, the church in England would suffer, and by 1527 Wolsey was slipping. His diplomacy had accomplished nothing save to waste the accumulated treasure of Henry VII and to burden the English taxpayers. Henry was already losing confidence in the cardinal, when the affair of the divorce precipitated Wolsey's ruin and brought on the break from Rome.

The royal divorce (1527–33)

In 1527, Henry had been married to Catherine of Aragon for eighteen years and, save for one daughter, Mary, was still childless. Therein lay the immediate occasion of all the momentous events of the next few years. Henry needed a male heir to preserve the Tudor line and there was apparently no hope from Catherine. The death of all Catherine's sons in infancy began to seem to the king a divine judgment upon him for having broken the Biblical injunction against marrying a deceased brother's wife, for Catherine had previously been married, briefly, to his elder brother Arthur. Henry had secured a papal dispensation at the time of his marriage, but now conscience and inclination running together were sufficient to convince him that the marriage had not been valid. He was eager to marry again and

had already chosen as his future wife Anne Boleyn. He therefore instructed Wolsey to secure a divorce, or rather an annulment, from Pope Clement VII. But in 1527 the pope was in no position to take action against Catherine. She was the aunt of Charles V, and Charles was master of Italy. The imperial troops had just sacked Rome and the pope was in their power.[1] Negotiations dragged on until Henry lost all patience. In 1529 he called a Parliament that was to declare the English Church independent of Rome. Wolsey was deprived of his office and the following year was arrested on a charge of treason. Meanwhile, Parliament had begun to pass act after act reducing clerical privileges and papal authority. By 1533 it had so far separated the English Church from Rome that the new Archbishop of Canterbury was able to grant the king his divorce.

The Anglican Church (1534)

The next year Parliament took the final step needed to establish the complete independence of the English national church. All relations with the papacy were severed and the king was declared by the Act of Supremacy to be the "supreme head" of the Church of England. This meant that one more kingdom had been lost to the once universal church. It was one more example of the triumph of central government over separate interests, of state over church, and of nationalism over the unity of Christendom that was characteristic of the age. The change was made with very little opposition because the majority were ready for it. Besides, it was a very conservative revolution. Save for the substitution of royal for papal authority and the loss by the clergy of their special legal status, there was no very marked change in the outward organization of the Anglican Church. The most radical change was the gradual dissolution of the monasteries and confiscation of their lands. Again Parliament willingly lent its authority to the king's will, for the monks had long been unpopular and the confiscation of the monastic lands enriched both the state and the wealthy burghers and gentlemen who purchased them from the king.

Conservative doctrine

There was even less change in the official doctrine of the church than in its organization. Henry was still a champion of orthodoxy so far as was possible. A few earnest Catholics, like Sir Thomas More, were executed for their refusal to accept the king as supreme head of the church, but there were as many martyrs on the other side who suffered because they were too Protestant. Parliament authorized the use of the English Bible, and some changes were made in religious practice, but Henry was determined to keep the essentials of

[1] See below, page 416.

Catholic faith. In 1539, as a Catholic reactionary party gained ascendancy at court, Henry passed through Parliament an act defining the faith of the Anglican Church in six articles, all quite Catholic in tone, and this act was enforced by severe persecuting laws. The political break with the Catholic Church, however, inevitably opened the way for criticism of Catholic doctrine and, despite everything that Henry could do, Lutheran and Calvinist opinions were spreading rapidly in England.

When Henry VIII died in 1547, he left his throne to his infant son Edward VI, and the government to a Council of Regency headed by the Protector Somerset, the young king's maternal uncle. During the next six years a doctrinal Reformation was accomplished to supplement the political and constitutional Reformation of the previous reign. There can be no doubt that Protestants, whether Lutheran or Calvinist, or a compromise between the two, were still in a distinct minority, but they were an influential minority and strongly represented in the Council. The repressive laws of Henry VIII were repealed almost at once. The next step was to prepare an English liturgy and enforce its use by an Act of Uniformity in 1549. This was the first Book of Common Prayer, the work of Archbishop Cranmer, whose grand English cadences still are heard in the services of the Anglican Church. Three years later it was revised so as to make it more acceptable to the extreme Protestants, and at the same time the official creed of the church was defined in the Forty-two Articles of Religion. These were made as vague and general as possible so as to enable those who were almost Catholics, as well as Lutherans and Calvinists, to remain within the church. England was still far from unanimity in religion. All that the government was working for at the moment was a decent outward uniformity, while at the same time favoring a steady drift toward real Protestantism. But the question was still an open one when the premature death of Edward replaced his Protestant government by the Catholic régime of Mary Tudor.

The doctrinal Reformation under Edward VI (1547–53)

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

THE STATES OF EUROPE IN THE AGE OF CHARLES V

(1519–56)

DURING the period dealt with in the preceding chapter, that in which the unity of the Catholic Church was broken and the three great Protestant churches, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican, were founded, the rulers of Europe had often other and apparently more important problems to consider than the fate of religion, though that was something that could never be entirely forgotten. The outstanding factor in the relation of the European states to each other in this period was the existence of the vast dynastic empire of Charles V, which threatened the rest of Europe with the menace of Hapsburg domination. We have already seen [1] how this great accumulation of territorial states came to be united under the rule of the young heir to the Hapsburg, Burgundian, and Spanish dynasties, and have noted at the same time the development of strongly centralized states throughout Europe, under rulers who had acquired new national and dynastic ambitions with the acquisition of absolute authority in their own lands. Before the accession of Charles V, national and dynastic rivalry had embroiled the European countries in a greedy struggle for the spoils of Italy. That rivalry now took on a new character. The Valois king of France stood pitted against the mighty Hapsburg as his sole rival for the hegemony of Europe. They had too many conflicting interests to remain at peace with each other, and the destruction of either would have meant the domination of Europe by the victor. The other states, therefore, were drawn into the struggle in the hope of maintaining the "balance of power," that is, a state of international equilibrium. Meanwhile, within each territorial state, the rulers continued still further to centralize the government and to develop unhampered sovereign power.

These major themes of European history were repeated in miniature among the German states that made up the Holy Roman Empire. Here the ambitions of Charles for centralized control and dynastic aggrandizement met the similar ambitions of the territorial princes. The German princes feared Hapsburg domination as much as did the rulers of the other European states. And in Germany, more than elsewhere, the situation was complicated by the religious revolution and by the

[1] See above, pages 382–83 and map, page 414.

constant threat of Turkish aggression from the east. The result here was the establishment of a temporary equilibrium among the German states that matches the larger equilibrium of Europe.

1. THE RIVALRY OF HAPSBURG AND VALOIS


In 1519, almost all of western Europe — the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and parts of Italy were the only exceptions — owed allegiance to one or other of three young and ambitious monarchs who for a generation were to remain the principal actors in the international drama. The youngest of the three, Charles V had just been elected emperor of the Holy Roman Empire; but the shadowy imperial sovereignty over Germany represented only a small fraction of his real power. He was already the hereditary ruler of the Hapsburg family lands in and around Austria; of the Burgundian states of Franche-Comté, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands; as well as of the Spanish kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, Sicily, Naples, and Sardinia, and those new lands in the Americas whose store of gold the Castilian *conquistadores* were only beginning to touch. This imposing array of possessions made Charles the most powerful monarch in Europe; yet not so powerful as would appear on the surface, for in actual practice the available strength of his empire was always considerably less than the total strength of its component parts. It was a purely dynastic empire, accumulated by a series of family alliances. It lacked both national and geographical unity. The person of Charles was the only bond holding his scattered dominions together. To utilize the full resources of each in a common policy, or to satisfy their varying interests, would have taxed the genius and energy of a Charlemagne. And the nineteen-year-old ruler who accepted that appalling task was not a brilliant youth. He was not even personally attractive, being of a somewhat stolid nature and having inherited the more unfortunate Hapsburg features. But, as time went on, he proved that he possessed a large measure of sound common sense, industry, patience, and a degree of determination verging on stubbornness. These qualities in the long run served him better than the more brilliant and attractive traits of his rival of the house of Valois.

Three young monarchs

Charles V (1519–56)

Francis I of France was a little older than Charles and had already won military glory by the conquest of Milan. He had a good deal of surface charm and culture; but his character was essentially frivolous, without depth or substance. Had he possessed any of the qualities of greatness, he might have fared very well in his

Francis I (1515–47)


EMPIRE OF CHARLES V
Hereditary lands of the Hapsburgs
Holy Roman Empire about 1530
SCALE OF MILES
0 100 200 300
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
K. OF SCOTLAND
IRELAND
Dublin
K. OF DENMARK
KINGDOM OF ENGLAND
London
NETHERLANDS
Amsterdam
Utrecht
The Hague
Antwerp
Brussels
Ghent
Groningen
LUXEMBURG
Luxemburg
Brandenburg
Warsaw
LITHUANIA
Glogau
Breslau
Saxony
KINGDOM OF POLAND
K. of BOHEMIA
Prague
Olmutz
THE EMPIRE
KINGDOM OF FRANCE
Paris
Freiburg
Bavaria
Brünn
Presburg
Neutra
Vienna
Austria
Styria
Graetz
Raab
Gunz
K. OF HUNGARY
Carinthia
Villach
SWISS CONFD.
Basel
Besançon
Dijon
Geneva
Gattinara
SAVOY
Turin
Piedmont
Bicocca
Pavia
Milan
Lodi
Laitch
Zengg
VENETIAN REP.
PAPAL STATES
Rome
Ancona
Pescara
Apulia
CORSICA
K. OF NAPLES
Troja
Barletta
Gaeta
Naples
Terracina
Otranto
Corigliano
Bari
Tarento
K. of SARDINIA
Cagliari
Sassari
Palermo
Messina
Syracuse
K. of SICILY
Girgenti
Taormina
Tunis
Bizerta
Malta
Rhodes
Candia
Constantinople
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
Santarem
Santiago
Leon
Burgos
Bilbao
Pamplona
Estremos
Salamanca
Zaragoza
Lerida
Barcelona
Tarragona
KINGDOM OF SPAIN
Almaraz
Toledo
Valencia
Cuenca
Xativa
Seville
Cordova
Galera
Murcia
Granada
Malaga
BALEARIC IS.
Rousillon

contest with the Hapsburg, for, though he ruled less land, it was united in one compact national state, over which he had absolute control. Instead, he was vain, inconsequent, absorbed in selfish pleasures, and gifted with a fatal genius for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

Between these two monarchs stood the Tudor Henry VIII of England. His aim was to keep the balance between them so even that the influence of England, though a relatively weak state, might become the determining factor in European affairs. It was a sound policy, but Henry got less from it than might have been expected, for both he and his chief minister, Wolsey, too often mistook pointless duplicity for diplomatic skill and he was never prepared to back his promises by determined action.

Henry VIII (1509–47)

It is a commonplace of history that war between Charles V and Francis I was inevitable, and certainly there were enough causes for friction to make peace between them impossible in that age when the personal or family interests of rulers were considered sufficient reason for war. In the first place, France was surrounded by Hapsburg territory,[1] and its king felt it necessary to break the Hapsburg power in self-defense. Then, too, Charles and Francis had conflicting dynastic claims to territory in half a dozen places. In the north, Francis held the duchy of Burgundy, which Charles claimed by right of descent from Charles the Bold, while Francis revived an old feudal claim to Charles's Netherland provinces of Flanders and Artois. In the southwest, Francis supported the claims of his kinsman the King of Navarre to the territory annexed by Charles's grandfather Ferdinand. Finally, both rulers hoped to dominate Italy. There, Francis held the duchy of Milan, which Charles claimed as a fief of the empire, while Charles ruled the kingdom of Naples, which Francis claimed as heir to the house of Anjou. And as if these various grounds for conflict were not enough, the two young rulers had been rival candidates in the imperial election, which created a strong personal animosity between them.

Causes of the war

Of the two, Francis was better prepared for immediate war, since all his resources were concentrated in a single compact state. Charles had pressing problems to meet in Spain, threatened by a serious revolt, as well as in Germany, and he was in desperate need of money. He was fortunate, however, in being able to postpone hostilities until 1521. By that time he had met the imperial Diet at Worms, had disposed of his family interests in Germany by entrusting the Hapsburg lands there to his brother Ferdinand, and had gained allies, for what they were worth, in Henry VIII and Pope

The war, to the Treaty of Madrid (1521–26)

[1] See map, page 414.

Leo X. The war opened with campaigns on three fronts, in the Netherlands, in Navarre, and in Italy, but throughout the war nearly all the serious fighting was concentrated in the last-named country. For four years the fortunes of war shifted from one side to the other, as did also the alliances of the papacy and the other Italian states. The French lost Lombardy and regained it. In the spring of 1525 their success seemed certain, when the situation was suddenly reversed. In a bloody battle fought before the walls of Pavia, the imperial troops destroyed the French army and captured the French king. It seemed like a decisive victory for Charles, but his resources were too far exhausted for him to take full advantage of it. He did not press the war, but contented himself with keeping Francis a prisoner in Spain until his resistance was so worn down that he would accept the terms dictated to him. By the Treaty of Madrid, January, 1526, Francis solemnly pledged himself to give up the duchy of Burgundy, as well as all claims to the disputed territories in the Netherlands, Navarre, and Italy.

The war, to the Treaty of Cambray (1529)

Despite his solemn oaths and the pledge of his knightly honor, Francis had not the slightest intention of keeping the terms of the treaty. No sooner was he back in France than he was busy organizing the League of Cognac, composed, with France, of the Italian states, Venice, Florence, the papacy, and Milan, which had been given as an imperial fief by Charles to one of the Sforzas. All of these now became the natural enemies of the victorious emperor through their desire to keep the balance of power in Italy. Henry VIII declared himself favorable to the league, but did not join it. It was an alarming situation for Charles. As usual, he found it hard to raise enough money for foreign war from his scattered possessions and still harder to get the money to Italy. The Constable of Bourbon, a French prince who had deserted France and now commanded the imperial army in northern Italy, found it impossible to keep his troops in order without pay. In 1527 they mutinied and forced Bourbon to lead them to Rome, to collect their own pay from the pillage of the rich papal city. The sack of Rome, which followed, was as brutal and as thorough as any that the eternal city had suffered from the Goths or Vandals. The Spanish soldiers in the emperor's army left a bitter memory of cruelty and greed, while the German mercenaries, mostly Lutheran, took a special delight in deeds of sacrilege. The capture of Rome left Pope Clement VII helplessly in the emperor's power. Neither Rome nor the papacy would ever again enjoy the same wealth or freedom. For them the glory of the Renaissance was over. A new French invasion also marked the year 1527, but again Francis saw hope

Sack of Rome (1527)

of victory turned to defeat. By 1529 both sides were ready for peace. The Treaty of Cambray was in main outline a repetition of that of Madrid, save that Francis was allowed to keep Burgundy, which Charles had learned he would not give up anyway. Like the former treaty, this was to prove no more than a truce. Nevertheless, it is an important milestone in the history of Europe. It marks the end of the first and most active stage of the war, and the beginning of that Hapsburg domination of Italy which was never seriously challenged till the nineteenth century.

The war, to the abdication of Charles V (1556)

The war dragged on through the remainder of the reign of Charles V, but intermittently. The emperor was left free from time to time to attend to the affairs of his various lands, to stem the tide of Turkish invasion, and to try to crush out the Lutheran heresy that was dividing Germany, but never for long enough to accomplish decisive results. The enmity of the Valois crippled him at every turn. More than once, the French king formed alliances with the Protestant princes of Germany and with the Turks against the emperor. Even the death of Francis I did not end the strife, for his son Henry II (1547–59) carried on the feud. The situation was still very much the same when, in 1556, Charles V voluntarily laid down the heavy scepter he had wielded so long. He left the Hapsburg lands in Germany and the imperial crown to his brother Ferdinand, his western states to his son Philip II of Spain.

Epilogue — the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559)

The concluding act of the long rivalry of Hapsburg and Valois is little more than a brief epilogue. In 1559, Philip II and Henry II signed the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, the terms of which settled the questions at issue between the two powers for the remainder of the century. France acquired some small additions of territory along her northeastern border, but in return finally renounced all claims to lands in Italy, the Netherlands, or Spain. This renunciation was in itself a solid gain for France. Her opposition to the encircling power of the Hapsburgs had perhaps been justified, but the men and money expended on the vain attempt to conquer territory in Italy, which could never have become an integral part of France, were wasted. They would have been better spent in an effort to round out the French frontiers to the north and east within the geographical limits of old Gaul. The final abandonment of the Italian dream removed one of the principal causes for war, while the splitting of Charles's empire between his brother and son reduced the fear of Hapsburg domination. A rough equilibrium among the European powers was thus established, which lasted for the most part during the coming half-century of internal religious wars.

2. CHARLES V AND HIS EMPIRE — THE PROTESTANTS AND THE TURKS

Problems of Charles V

If the contest with the kings of the house of Valois formed the central theme of the reign of Charles V, it must not be forgotten that, along with this foreign problem, Charles had also to deal with a host of problems connected with the internal government of his various states. These states were so diverse in geographical position, race, language, economic and cultural interests, and even in religion, that no one consistent policy could be applied to all. No policy, that is, except the traditional policy of the Hapsburgs, which was to capitalize every opportunity for the aggrandizement of the family. Dynastic ambition was not a trait peculiar to the Hapsburgs; it was shared by most European rulers. But Charles could not identify it with national interests as could the kings of France or England. He was born and brought up in the Netherlands, yet his empire was too large for him to subordinate his major policies to Flemish interests. He was always a foreigner in Germany and Italy. In the latter he worked for Hapsburg domination rather than Italian unity, and in the former he allowed the interests of the Austrian Hapsburg states and the distractions of his dynastic war with France to thwart his efforts to rebuild a united imperial state. So far as Charles did identify himself with any country, it was with Spain.

Spain

In the sixteenth century, Spain was the greatest state in Europe, with the possible exception of France. It was certainly the strongest of the states ruled by Charles, and it was there that he made his permanent residence, leaving it only when the pressing needs of his other possessions demanded his presence. He became in time a thorough Spaniard and won the loyalty of the Spanish people by convincing them that their country was the center of his empire and that their interests were his. His relations with them, however, were not at first happy. When he first came to Spain in 1517 as the heir of the late King Ferdinand, he was regarded as a foreigner and his Flemish ministers were distrusted and hated. The Spaniards resented the expenditure of Spanish gold to win the imperial election, which threatened to make Spain merely a province of a German empire. A widespread revolt, inspired by a mixture of social discontent with resentment of royal taxes and foreign ministers, broke out just as Charles was leaving for Germany in the spring of 1520. It collapsed, however, from lack of cohesion among its leaders, before Charles returned in 1522. For the next seven years, while the war with France raged most fiercely, the emperor stayed in

Spain and gradually the Spanish people came to accept him as the embodiment of their national state. His victories were Spanish victories, won largely with Spanish gold and the incomparable Spanish foot soldiers. Moreover, his rigid Catholic orthodoxy, which tended to alienate him from his northern subjects, was perfectly congenial to the Spaniards, the most orthodox race in Europe. They fully approved of his bloody conversion, or extermination, of the Moorish population in the southern provinces, though it meant the destruction of the most industrious class in the peninsula. There was here no conflict between church and state, but rather a strong mutual support.

In these years the wealth of Spain was a byword in Europe; yet for all its apparent prosperity, the economic strength of Spain was not so secure as it seemed. Before another generation had passed, it was destined to begin a rapid and permanent decline. The truth was that Spain was living on unearned increment, the gold and silver stolen from Mexico and Peru. This sudden wealth stimulated industry and commerce for a time, but in the end it proved a curse — the curse of Midas. There was too much gold. It raised prices to a higher level than in any other country, with the result that Spain bought more than it sold. The most lasting benefits, therefore, went to other countries. The tremendous expense of Charles's foreign wars, too, helped to drain the country of its gold, while bringing no economic return. Finally, the easy wealth of the Americas destroyed the industrious instincts of the people, such as they were, for they always had been more apt to war than to trade. This wealth lasted about two generations. When it was gone, there was nothing left.

Prosperity of Spain

Next to Spain, Charles depended most on the wealth of the Netherlands and was most at home there. Under his rule the Netherlands prospered, despite heavy taxation, and the frontiers were rounded out by occasional conquests. Save for one serious rebellion at Ghent in 1539, the people remained loyal to their native prince. Nevertheless, there was a growing discontent under the surface, the fruits of which were to be reaped by Charles's son Philip II. There was reason for the suspicion that the emperor was exploiting their resources for his own advantage rather than theirs. The prosperity of the Netherlands was due more to the industry and keen trading sense of the people than to the government, and what advantage accrued to trade from the connection with Spain scarcely compensated for the heavy taxes to support Charles's foreign policies, in which the Netherlands had no real interest. Besides, the emperor's attempts to suppress heresy in all his dominions aroused resentment, for, despite persecution that kept

The Netherlands

them under cover, Lutheran, Anabaptist, and finally Calvinist opinions were gaining many converts.

If the Netherlands were still a source of strength to the Spanish monarchy, though destined to be a ruinous expense in the next generation, Italy probably cost more than it was worth to Spain. Here the interests of Charles were purely dynastic. He made no attempt to establish national unity in Italy. All he aimed at was to acquire as much land as possible for his family and so to manage the remaining states as to bring the whole peninsula under Hapsburg domination. And this he accomplished. Milan was conquered, while Florence, Genoa, the papacy, and the smaller Italian states preserved their nominal independence only by subservience to the dominant power.

Italy

It was in Germany that Charles encountered his most difficult problems and met with the least success. Although it was the ancient home of the Hapsburg race, Charles was always a foreigner in Germany. He spent little time there, and constantly put off dealing with German problems until he had leisure from his more vital interests elsewhere. This, however, was not the only reason for his failure. It is doubtful if the most German of emperors could have revived the outworn Holy Roman Empire at this late date, or have preserved in it more than a formal unity much longer. True, there had been of recent years a marked growth of German national sentiment, which Charles might have used if he had identified himself strongly with German nationality; but class jealousies, the petty independence of free cities and imperial knights, the territorial sovereignty of the princes, and, in addition, the new religious differences were centrifugal forces stronger than any feeling of national unity.

Germany

At his first imperial Diet, that of Worms in 1521, Charles took steps to meet the two most important problems of the empire, the reform of imperial government and the suppression of the Lutheran heresy. In neither was he successful. The solution of the former problem was attempted through the creation of a council of regency, which would rule during the emperor's absence, and which he and the electors hoped would hold the empire together. After Charles left, however, the council proved powerless to act in any important matter. It had no adequate military or financial power, and even the princes on the council ignored its decisions. It was completely discredited by its failure to suppress the rebellion of the Rhineland knights, led by Franz von Sickingen, in 1522, and the Peasants' Revolt three years later, both of which were put down by the independent action of the princes most concerned. These two rebellions prove how strong was

The council of regency

the social discontent among all classes, a discontent that had its roots in the economic readjustment of the new age, but was given an additional impetus by the first impact of Luther's revolutionary teaching.

The emperor's legislation against Luther had no more effect than had the attempt to reform the imperial constitution, and largely for the same reason. The imperial authority was not strong enough, especially with Charles engrossed in affairs elsewhere, to coerce the princes or the governments of the free cities. During his long absence no serious effort was made to enforce the Edict of Worms. The Lutherans were left free to organize their church wherever they had the support of the local government. The Diet of Spires in 1526, despite a Catholic majority, passed a law, called a "recess," declaring each state free to act as it chose in regard to the new church. This was not an edict of toleration, but rather a declaration of the independent sovereignty of the separate states, a principle with which even the Catholic princes sympathized. Three years later, the news that Charles had ended the war with France and was about to return influenced a second Diet of Spires to repeal the recess, whereupon a number of Lutheran princes and cities presented a signed protest. The Protestant party was born. The following year (1530) Charles was back in Germany and presided over the Diet of Augsburg. He was determined, now that he was free from foreign complications, to take vigorous action. After an attempt at reconciliation had failed, the emperor gave the heretics six months in which to return to the church, after which, he declared, he would suppress them by force. But before he could put his threat into effect, Charles was forced to temporize by the necessity of gaining all the support he could get against the Turks, and the opportunity for decisive action was lost.

The Protestant party

For more than a century, Christian Europe had lived in fear of the Ottoman Turks. In 1453 they had completed the conquest of what remained of the Byzantine Empire by the capture of Constantinople. During the succeeding generations their conquests had continued at the expense both of their Christian and fellow Moslem neighbors.[1] Their victorious armies seemed invincible. At the time when Charles V was elected emperor, they held nearly all the land of the ancient Byzantine Empire as it had been in the days of Justinian. All the Balkan states had been lost to Christendom, and before long Europe was shocked by the news of a further Turkish advance up the Danube, under the command of the new Sultan Suleiman I, "the Magnificent" (1520–66). In 1526 his army defeated the Hun-

The Turkish menace

[1] See above, pages 296–97.

garians and killed their brave king on the field of Mohács. In 1529 the Turks laid siege to Vienna; were driven back; and now, in 1532, were advancing on Austria again.

Ferdinand and the Turks

Hitherto, Charles's brother Ferdinand, to whom he had entrusted the German Hapsburg lands, had borne the brunt of the defense against the Turks. On the death of his brother-in-law, King Louis II of Hungary and Bohemia, at Mohács, Ferdinand had been elected king of both countries. His attempts to defend his newly acquired kingdoms as well as his hereditary Austrian lands kept Ferdinand too busy to take any action against the Lutherans. The new Turkish advance of 1532 forced both Charles and Ferdinand to come to terms with the heretics. Charles dropped his plans for crushing Protestantism for the time being and came to his brother's aid, driving back the Turks and recovering part of Hungary. The demands of his other possessions, however, prevented Charles from following up his victory. Before the end of 1532 he was on his way back to Spain via Italy. Ferdinand was again left to carry on the struggle alone, which he did without much success. Finally, in 1547, he and the emperor secured a precarious peace by recognizing the Turkish possession of the greater part of Hungary.

The League of Schmalkalden

Meanwhile, with Charles once more absent from Germany and absorbed in other interests, Protestantism spread rapidly, while the Protestant party formed a defensive organization against the time of the emperor's return. As early as 1531, when there still seemed a chance of immediate action by the emperor, the chief Protestant states — principalities and free cities — had joined together in the League of Schmalkalden for mutual defense. As other princes were converted to Lutheranism, they too joined the league. Though often weakened by petty jealousies, the princes of the league made a formidable force. More than once the kings of France and England sought alliance with them against the emperor. With each year it became increasingly clear that Charles must return and crush them, or all hope of restoring the political as well as religious unity of the empire would be lost. But, what with campaigns against the Algerian pirates in the Mediterranean, wars with France and the Turks (now allies), a rebellion in the Netherlands, and other troubles, fourteen years passed before Charles was once more free to take up the task he had abandoned in 1532. By that time, about half of Germany or more was Protestant, including four of the seven electors.

Nevertheless, when Charles at last opened war on the League of Schmalkalden in 1546, he had fair prospects of success. His army was

smaller than that of the league, but it contained a large number of those Spanish foot soldiers who had proved themselves to be the finest fighting material in Europe, and it was commanded by the able and ruthless Duke of Alva. Also, he had won over the treacherous Maurice of ducal Saxony and one or two others of the Protestant princes. His chief advantage, however, lay in the lack of unity among the leaders of the league and in their equally fatal lack of military strategy. As the chief Protestant princes separated to protect their own lands, the emperor forced one after another of the smaller states to submit. Finally, only John Frederick, Elector of Saxony, and the Landgrave Philip of Hesse had strong forces outstanding. In the spring of 1547, the former was defeated and captured at Mühlberg, the latter at Halle. Charles then set about the suppression of Protestantism in the states of the vanquished princes. The next five years proved that it was easier to defeat the princes than to reconvert their people. They had been Lutheran too long to give up their religion at the command of even a victorious emperor. In 1552, the Protestant princes rebelled, aided by an alliance with Henry II of France. Three years more of anarchy at last persuaded the emperor to give up all hope of crushing Lutheranism in Germany, and to make peace.

Schmalkaldic War (1546–47)

The final settlement of the religious strife in Germany, at least for the sixteenth century, was arranged at the Diet of Augsburg of 1555. It is called the Religious Peace of Augsburg. It kept Germany free from further religious war for more than sixty years; but there were terms in the compromise that maintained a constant tension between the Protestant and Catholic parties and promised serious trouble at some future date. That promise was fulfilled in the following century in the frightful devastation of the Thirty Years' War.[1] Four major principles laid down by this treaty are worth remembering: (1) The princes of the various German states and the governments of the free cities were to be free to choose between the Lutheran and Catholic faiths. The princes were to have the right to enforce the religion of their choice upon their subjects, but the free cities on the Lutheran side could not expel a Catholic minority. This principle, which made the religion of the state that of its ruler, is generally known by the phrase *cujus regio ejus religio*. (2) This principle was to apply only to Lutheran and Catholic governments. It did not extend to Calvinists, though their number was increasing. (3) An "ecclesiastical reservation" made an exception of ecclesiastical princes (archbishops, bishops, and abbots), who ruled territorial states. In case any of these

The Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555)

[1] See Chapter XXX.

should become Lutheran, he was to surrender his state, which would remain under the control of the church; but Lutheran subjects of such princes were not to be forced to give up their religion. (4) Protestant states were to retain whatever church property they had confiscated prior to 1552. The Peace of Augsburg marks a definite stage in the disintegration of the empire, not only because it determined that Germany should remain divided between two religions, but because it recognized the sovereign authority of the princes in the important matter of religious control. It was a victory for the princes in their struggle for independence as much as for Protestantism.

The Religious Peace was followed shortly by the abdication of Charles V. His dealings with his German empire had been generally unfortunate. He was embittered by one more failure at the end. *Abdication of Charles V* He could not persuade the electors to accept his son Philip as his successor. He was forced, therefore, to split his inheritance. He surrendered the German Hapsburg lands to his brother Ferdinand, who had ruled them since 1521, and with them went the imperial crown. The remainder of his possessions, the Burgundian and Spanish inheritance, he left to his son Philip II. The abdication was completed in 1556. The weary emperor then retired to a Spanish monastery, where he died three years later. He was not an old man, but he had carried a tremendous burden of responsibility almost from childhood.

3. THE MONARCHY IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND

The kings of France who were the contemporaries of Charles V were rather less successful than he in foreign affairs, but, on the other hand, they had less trouble with the internal government of their state. We have already noted the triumph of the French monarchy over the nobles and the estates who might have checked its power. When Francis I came to the French throne, he took over a practically absolute government, and the royal power had grown still stronger when he handed it on to Henry II. It had been strengthened by one more generation of tradition, a generation in which the royal rights had been repeatedly asserted and stated in legal form by the school of legists who were trained in Roman law at the University of Toulouse. The treason of the Constable of Bourbon was the only indication that the great nobles who were related to the royal family might again be a menace to the crown; for the present at least, the nobility were obedient courtiers and soldiers in the king's pay. *Royal power in France*

Like Charles V, Francis I and Henry II were often in need of money to



FRANCIS I, KING OF FRANCE
1494–1547

This portrait possibly fails to do full justice to the gallant king, who was regarded, at least by his courtiers, as a handsome man, and more than a little of a dandy.

carry on their foreign wars. What income the government had, however, was entirely at the disposal of the king, and with reasonable care it should have been sufficient, though the expense of a standing army was considerable. The French army was strong in artillery and cavalry, having the fighting nobility to call on for the latter arm, but was always weak in native infantry. For this wing of the service, the king had usually to depend in part on Swiss and German mercenaries, who were willing to fight under any flag so long as they were paid. In addition to the army, a good deal of money was spent in pensioning nobles and on the expenses of a luxurious court. The largest part of the royal income came from the *taille*, a direct tax, the amount of which the king could increase at will. Extraordinary expenses were often met by the sale of offices, many of them unnecessary ones created solely for the purpose of sale. This, of course, created a financial burden on the government for the future. On the whole, the financial system was awkward and wasteful. Later, during the Wars of Religion, its inadequacy came near ruining the monarchy.

Taxation and finance

The royal finances and royal authority were both strengthened by the power which Francis I acquired over the church in France. The terms of the Concordat of Bologna (1516) left the king with almost complete control of appointments to the higher ecclesiastical offices in the country. He used this power freely to reward the loyalty of the nobles and also to pay the diplomats and ministers who served him, thus relieving the royal treasury of a considerable drain. A further extension of royal power over the church came in 1539, when the king transferred jurisdiction over the great majority of cases from the ecclesiastical courts to the royal courts. That the king had already acquired all the control of the national church and its wealth that he desired was one of the most important factors in deciding the fate of the Reformation in France. Had it been otherwise, Francis might easily have followed the example of other northern rulers in breaking with Rome. As it was, he remained strictly orthodox and persecuted heresy whenever he was on good terms with the pope, though neither he nor his son scrupled to ally themselves with the Protestant princes of Germany. Henry II was much more severe than his father in the persecution of French heretics, and, indeed, had more to work on, for despite persecution the Calvinist faith was spreading rapidly in France.

The king and the church

Across the Channel from France, Henry VIII inherited a government that was almost as absolute as that of the Valois kings, and, like Francis I, he handed it on still further strengthened to his son. England was now a full-grown national state. Most of the

Tudor absolutism

old medieval institutions still lived on in form, but the substance of their power had been transferred to the crown. The central government controlled commerce and industry, once the duty of the towns and guilds; it had taken over the full administration of justice, either through the royal courts or through the justices of the peace, who were the unpaid servants of the crown; and during the reign of Henry VIII the king also took over the supreme government of the English Church, thus completing his sovereignty over all institutions and all individuals in the state. Before this all-powerful monarchy, the old feudal nobility faded into insignificance. They were excluded from the king's council, which was the chief instrument of the central government, in favor of middle-class men or the new nobility created by the crown, men trained in legal and administrative service and wholly devoted to the king. At the same time, their local jurisdiction was superseded by that of the justices of the peace, who were recruited from the country gentry.

But if Tudor government was absolute, it was also popular, and scrupulously constitutional. Parliament never died out in England as the States General were dying out in France. Under Henry VIII, Parliament might seem little more than a subservient tool in the hands of the king; but it was a tool that he used constantly and kept in good condition. All Henry's major policies, for example his radical change in the government of the church and the dissolution of the monasteries, were carried out by act of Parliament. Henry VIII was, indeed, a master in the art of handling Parliament. Under his skillful guidance it became a dependable support to the royal authority by giving a legal coloring to the king's acts, rather than a check upon him. Yet all Henry's skill in avoiding the appearance of tyranny would have been useless had not the majority of his policies been genuinely popular, at least with that middle class of burghers and country gentlemen who made up the most influential class in the state. The success of the great Tudor monarchs, Henry VII, Henry VIII, and Elizabeth, depended in large part on the fact that they understood their people, that their policies were thoroughly English, and that they never forgot the economic interests of the middle class.

King and Parliament

The task of carrying on an absolute government in England was made easier by the fact that it was relatively inexpensive. High taxation would soon have destroyed the popularity of the government. But the kings of England in the sixteenth century were freed from many of the expenses that burdened the royal exchequer, and hence the people, elsewhere. There were not so many greedy nobles to pension as in France, and for some time Henry was able to take care of

Tudor finance

his favorites by means of the confiscated monastic lands. The administration of local justice cost nothing, being carried out by the unpaid justices of the peace. And, the greatest saving of all, the English kings did not need to maintain a standing army, as did the continental rulers whose borders were always open to invasion. Though Henry VIII was frequently drawn into continental complications, the number of English troops employed on the Continent was never very large. Instead of building up a strong permanent army, Henry devoted his attention to the more important, but less expensive, task of creating a royal navy. Not the least part of Henry's claim to be the founder of modern England lies in this realization of the importance of England's insular position and of defense by sea.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

THE CATHOLIC OR COUNTER-REFORMATION

FOR half a century after Luther nailed his theses on the church door at Wittenberg, the Protestant Reformation continued to spread, until the very existence of the Roman Catholic Church seemed threatened. At the end of that half-century, one or other of the three great Protestant churches was firmly established, with the active support of the state, in the three Scandinavian kingdoms, in about half of Germany and Switzerland, and in England and Scotland; Calvinism was in open rebellion against a Catholic monarch in the Netherlands and was fighting on fairly even terms in France; while the Catholic states of Germany, as well as Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary were honeycombed with the Protestant heresy, and signs of it had been seen even in Italy, the home of the Roman Church. Then the tide turned. The rising tide of Protestantism was checked and then gradually turned back. Within the next generation, the Catholic Church recovered much of the ground lost in Germany and the neighboring countries to the east, and made secure its permanent hold on the Latin nations to the south. This dramatic reversal was the work of the Catholic Reformation or Counter-Reformation, as it has been variously called, depending largely on the writer's point of view.

Historians have long debated whether the reformation of the Catholic Church in the sixteenth century was a spontaneous movement, springing from the desire of the Catholic peoples who were emerging from the age of the Renaissance for a deeper piety and a reform of ecclesiastical morals, or whether its inspiration was the necessity of rallying all the forces of the church against the growing menace of Protestantism by the revival of a more vital Catholic piety, by the strict definition and teaching of orthodox doctrine, and by the removal of those abuses that were so largely responsible for the defection of the north. The truth seems to be that it was both. That its origin was partly spontaneous is shown by the frequent and widespread demands for reform in the days before Luther was heard from, and in the following years before Lutheranism had become a serious danger to the church. A reform of clerical morality and a revival of piety within the church, a true Catholic reformation, would undoubtedly have taken place without the stimulus of the Protestant Reformation. But, lacking that stimulus, the Catholic Reformation

would have followed a very different course from that which it actually took. As the Protestant menace increased, the efforts of the Catholic reformers were turned more and more toward the combating of heresy, so that in its mature form the Catholic Reformation was in very large part a counter-reform. The activity of the Council of Trent, the repressive measures of the Inquisition and the Index, and the work of the Jesuits, which were the chief agencies of the reformation, were directed principally to the defense of the church against heresy and to the recovery of those who were lost to it.

1. THE EARLY CATHOLIC REFORMATION

The Spanish reform

The spontaneous Catholic Reformation won its first and most complete success in Spain, and it was the Spanish spirit that dominated the movement later as it drifted into the Counter-Reformation. The state of religion in the Spanish peninsula at the end of the Later Middle Ages was in many respects unique. The long crusade against the Moslems had tended to identify the defense of the orthodox faith with the growing sentiment of national patriotism, so that there was not a country in Europe where heresy was regarded with greater abhorrence. Spain had been less affected by the Renaissance revolt against medievalism and by those social changes that together helped to deaden the piety of Italy and to prepare the peoples of the north for new religious ideals and beliefs. The spirit of Spain was unquestioningly orthodox, and its piety of a type wholly in keeping with the ideals of medieval Christianity. Moreover, the monarchy had won control of the Spanish church and the interests of state and church were closely identified. Everything, therefore, favored the purely orthodox reformation, begun by Cardinal Ximenes in the closing years of the fifteenth century with the full support of the monarchy. The result was a marked improvement in the morals and educational standards of the clergy, which in turn led to a strong revival of piety among the people under their care. But the Spanish reform had also its darker side of persecution and intolerance. The Inquisition was introduced into Spain in a new and more effective form, to crush by force and terror all deviation of opinion from the strict lines of medieval orthodoxy.

Catholic reformers in Italy

In Italy, too, during the early decades of the sixteenth century, Catholic reformers were working earnestly to revitalize the spiritual life of church and people; but their efforts were isolated and did not meet with the immediate success achieved by the reform in Spain. Indeed, in this late and rather decadent period

of the Renaissance, Italy presented no very hopeful field for either clerical reform or religious revival. The upper classes were steeped in the semi-paganism of the classical revival, and some of them were prepared to give philosophical credence to the heretical ideas of the north; the great mass of the people were orthodox enough, but superstitious rather than pious; and in Italy, more than anywhere else, the papal *curia*, still headed by popes of the Renaissance type, was a perpetual stumbling-block to reform. Most of the abuses in the church had a financial reason for their existence and to remove them would cause a sharp decrease in the revenues of the pope and the members of his court. Hence the vested interests at Rome were opposed to reform. At the same time, Italy had received too many material benefits from the Italian papacy to rebel against it, as the northern states did, and there was no state government strong or independent enough to take the initiative in reform, as was done in Spain. Nevertheless, there were in Italy many earnest and devout men, some of them holding high offices in the church, who were sincerely interested in reform. In the later years of Pope Leo X, a number of these formed at Rome a loosely organized society known as the Oratory of Divine Love. Elsewhere similar groups were to be found. All were united in their hope of a Catholic reformation; but as time went on they drifted into two fairly distinct groups, separated by divergent ideas as to the policy to be pursued in regard to Protestantism. The one group, best represented by the Venetian humanist and statesman, Contarini, hoped for reconciliation with Protestant reformers on the basis of practical reform and a liberal interpretation of Catholic doctrine; the other, typified by the Neapolitan Bishop Caraffa, were equally eager for reform, but with no change or compromise in doctrine or usage, and favored the suppression of heresy by the means that had proved so successful in Spain.

Revival of religious orders

Meanwhile, though efforts for practical reform were thwarted by lack of papal co-operation, considerable progress was made in the revival of religion among the masses of the people. Much of the credit for this work was due to new or revived religious orders, of which the most influential was the Capuchin order, founded in 1526 as a reformed branch of the Franciscan. The spirit of the new order was medieval rather than modern; its inspiration was a return to the ideals of Saint Francis. Like the early Franciscans, the Capuchins devoted themselves to preaching a simple piety among the poverty-stricken masses, and no group did more to gain popular support for the early Catholic Reformation than these kindly enthusiasts, whose pointed hoods soon became familiar sights in every market-place. Good work, too, was done by the new Theatine order, founded by Bishop

Caraffa in 1524 with the object of reforming the secular priesthood. It was composed of priests who had taken monastic vows, and had a wholesome influence on the clergy in all parts of Italy.

With the accession of Pope Paul III (1534–49), following the death of the harassed and vacillating Clement VII, the Catholic reformers at last began to receive some co-operation from the papacy. Several of the most distinguished leaders of the reform party, including Contarini and Caraffa, were made cardinals, and a committee of cardinals was appointed to investigate conditions in the church. The report which they submitted showed so many abuses in the papal *curia* and throughout the government of the church that it was thought wise to suppress it, lest it give aid and comfort to the heretics. A beginning, however, was made in the reform of the *curia*, but as the energy of the aged pope declined, his zeal for reform also diminished and the results were disappointingly small. Still, the pontificate of Paul III marks an important turning-point in the history of the church, the end of the Renaissance papacy and the beginning of the reforming popes.

The papacy takes up reform: Paul III

In the early years of Paul's reign, the liberal reformers, led by Cardinal Contarini, seemed to be in the ascendancy at Rome. They were prepared to make some compromise with the spirit of the new age, as represented by both the Renaissance and the Reformation, and still hoped to re-establish the unity of the Catholic Church by a reconciliation of the Protestants. That accomplished, a general Catholic Reformation, free from the distractions of partisan strife and dogmatic controversies, would be possible. It was the policy proposed at the beginning by Erasmus, and it was doomed to failure now as then. Contarini and his friends failed to realize the fundamental nature of the differences separating the new churches from the old. They had, however, powerful support in Charles V, who was determined to restore religious unity to Germany and would have been glad to do so by peaceful means. In 1541, a serious effort was made to establish a mutual understanding at a religious colloquy, held at Regensburg (Ratisbon). Contarini was the chief representative of the Catholic Church and the liberal and conciliatory Melanchthon the principal spokesman for the Protestants. Thanks to Contarini's tactful diplomacy, both sides made surprisingly liberal concessions, yet they failed to come to any agreement on the fundamental question of the sacraments. The net result of the colloquy was to prove the impossibility of reconciliation, even under the most favorable circumstances. The party of conciliation was discredited and quickly lost influence.

Failure of conciliation

Their place was taken by the conservative reformers, under the leadership of Cardinal Caraffa. This meant that hereafter the Catholic Reformation in Italy would follow the Spanish model and would become more and more a Counter-Reformation, directed against the growth of Protestantism. For more than a decade Spain had dominated Italian politics; from this time on the spirit of Spain was to dominate Italian religion as well. The reform of practical abuses in the church and the revival of popular Catholic piety continued, but they were coupled with strict medieval orthodoxy and stern repression of all deviating opinion. Before the death of Paul III, the Jesuits had become a powerful militia in the service of the papacy and the orthodox faith; the first session of a general council had been held at Trent; and the Inquisition had begun its work in Italy.

Opening of the Counter-Reformation

2. LOYOLA AND THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

Of the various agencies through which the Counter-Reformation was brought about, possibly none had a wider influence in retaining the loyalty of those who were still members of the Roman Church, or in winning back those who had deserted it, than the devoted preachers and skillful teachers who made up the Society of Jesus. In the Jesuits, as they were popularly called, "the most powerful missionary organization the world has ever seen was placed at the disposal of the papacy."

In the year when Martin Luther faced the Emperor Charles V at the Diet of Worms, the man who was to organize the church's best defense against Luther's teaching was fighting as an officer of Charles's army in the besieged city of Pampeluna in northern Spain. He was a noble from the Spanish Basque province of Guipuzcoa, one Don Iñigo Lopez de Recalde de Loyola, better known to history as Ignatius Loyola. He was wounded before the city was taken, and in the months of anguish that followed, his whole attitude toward life was changed. He determined to abandon his career as a soldier of the Spanish king for that of a soldier of Christ. Hereafter he would fight only with the weapons of the spirit, and would strive to emulate the deeds of the medieval saints, as in his earlier days he had imitated the heroes of chivalric romance. When he had recovered, save for a slight lameness that lasted through life, he set out on his new career with characteristic enthusiasm. As he himself tells us, he had still much to learn about the religious life. Some three years passed before he gave up the hermit life and extravagant self-denial he had begun, and determined to devote his life to aiding the salvation of his fellow men. For

Ignatius Loyola (c. 1491–1556)

this purpose he realized that he would need more education, especially in theology. He therefore set about the difficult task for a man of his years of learning Latin, which was a necessary prerequisite to study in any university. In 1528, he matriculated in the University of Paris, where he remained for the next seven years, studying patiently and meanwhile gathering about him a group of disciples to aid him in his major purpose.

If Loyola never became a great scholar, he had other qualities that made men who were more learned than himself follow his leadership.

The Spiritual Exercises

Aside from his absolute sincerity, unswerving determination, and those indefinable gifts of personality that any leader of men must possess, Loyola's most valuable asset was his uncanny insight into the workings of the human mind. This was abundantly proved by his *Spiritual Exercises*, the book that helped to win his first followers and that later maintained the character of his order. Based on a detailed, introspective study of his own experience in the early days of his conversion, it gives directions for a period of intensive contemplation, lasting normally about four weeks, and designed to produce in the participant those soul-shaking emotional experiences that Loyola himself had undergone haphazard and over a much longer time. The *Exercises* left an indelible impression on the minds of those who passed through the course faithfully, and transformed them into devoted and obedient soldiers of the church.

Founding of the society

Such was the training of the little group of companions who gathered about Loyola at Paris. There were six of them when, in 1534, they took an oath to go to Jerusalem, as soon as their studies were completed, there to do missionary work among the Moslems, or, if that proved impossible, to go to Rome and place their services at the disposal of the pope. The six had been carefully selected. They were all men of unusual character, ability, or learning. Among them was the Basque noble Francis Xavier, who was to become the most famous of the Jesuit missionaries, and the Spaniards, Lainez and Salmeron, who later exercised a decisive influence at the Council of Trent. In 1537, the companions, with three more added, met again in Venice, but, finding the road to Jerusalem blocked by the Turkish war, took the alternative course of going to Rome. The next two years were spent preaching and teaching in various parts of Italy. This experience showed them the crying need for work such as they were doing, and they determined to organize as a permanent order. After some delay, they received papal confirmation of their plan from Pope Paul III in 1540. The following year Loyola was elected first general of the order. The new order was

called the Society of Jesus, but a more accurate translation of the Latin *Societas* would make it the "Company of Jesus," for Loyola intended the word to be used in the military sense. They were to be a company of spiritual soldiers, fighting under the banner of Jesus. During the next ten years, the rapidly growing society received many extensions of privilege from the pope, and these, together with a more complete draft of the constitution, were confirmed by a bull of Pope Julius III in 1550.

Its purpose

The purpose of the society was set forth clearly in the constitution, which Loyola finally completed just before his death, and in the bull of 1550. The best brief statement is in the latter: "The company is founded to employ itself entirely in the defense of the holy Catholic faith." In particular, that meant the defense of the church by helping to retain the allegiance of her people, by adding to her membership through the conversion of the heathen, and by winning back as many as possible of those who had been lost to the various Protestant sects. The order was not founded specifically for the combating of heresy, but that would be one of its chief duties. The method to be employed was fourfold: first, to educate the young in orthodox schools; second, to win influence with the doubtful through their services as confessors; third, to carry on missionary preaching in heathen or heretical lands; and fourth, to acquire diplomatic influence in international affairs by serving in the courts of nobles and princes. Unlike the earlier monastic orders, the society was not founded primarily for the salvation of its own members, though that was taken for granted, but to accomplish a definite purpose. For that reason, the keynotes of the constitution are efficiency and obedience. The spirit of the Jesuits was the spirit of their founder, and Loyola was a Spaniard and a soldier. As a Spaniard he was unshakably loyal to the orthodox faith and to the traditional practices and authority of the organized church, whose head was the pope. As a soldier he never questioned the orders or policies of his superior officer, in this case the pope, and he expected equally unquestioning obedience from those under his command. In the *Spiritual Exercises* he had insisted on the necessity of mental obedience to the church, "always defending her teaching and never opposing it," and in the constitution he stressed above all else the necessity of absolute obedience, first to the pope and second to the general and other superiors of the order.

Organization

Loyola's emphasis on efficiency, which followed naturally from his conviction that the order was intended primarily to accomplish a definite purpose, was reflected in the military organization of the society and in the rules for the selection of new members.

Novices were to be carefully chosen, with due regard to those qualities, such as good appearance, pleasing personality, intelligence, suitable character, and good social standing, that would make them most useful. Before becoming a full-fledged member of the society, the novice had to pass through a long period of spiritual training and education, during which he might be dismissed at any time. He was then assigned to one of the several different classes into which the society was divided, according to his ability or experience. All members took the customary monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, but there was an inner circle of the most experienced members who took an additional vow of special obedience to the papacy. From these "Professed of Four Vows" the executive officers were chosen. At the head of the whole order stood the general, elected for life, with absolute authority over all members. Under him were the provincials and a descending hierarchy of inferior officers, very much like that of a modern army. The Jesuits were a very mobile as well as a disciplined body. Any member could be dispatched at a moment's notice to whatever field seemed most in need of his services. As a further innovation in the interests of efficiency, Loyola freed his order from those restrictions of dress, ascetic practice, regular hours, etc., which were common in the monastic orders, but which might interfere with the duties of missionary preachers and teachers.

Growth of the society and its work

The society thus formed grew with amazing rapidity and soon spread to every country of Europe as well as to the heathen lands beyond the seas. At the death of Loyola there were twelve provinces and some fifteen hundred members. Preaching and hearing confessions made up the largest part of their work, but their service as educators was perhaps more important. Jesuit schools and colleges soon sprang up in every Catholic country, and were regarded as among the most efficient of their age. The opportunity provided by their schools to shape the thought of the younger generation, in addition to their work as preachers and confessors, enabled the Jesuits to exert a very great influence on the people, the results of which were amply demonstrated in the success of the Counter-Reformation. In later centuries they were frequently charged with working more for the formal adherence to the church of the masses of the people than for their spiritual betterment, and their methods were subjected to a good deal of criticism. The emphasis on efficiency had its dangerous side. But in their early days, at least, the people saw in them only the most unselfish and devoted as well as the most effective servants of the church.

3. THE COUNCIL OF TRENT (1545–63)

The Jesuits had barely begun their work when the rulers of the church took steps to strengthen its defenses against the Protestant heresy by the calling of a general council, which was to determine the character of the Counter-Reformation. It met in the imperial city of Trent, just north of the Italian border, in three separate periods. The first period, 1545–47, fell in the reign of Paul III, the second, 1551–52, in that of Julius III, and the last, 1562–63, in the reign of Pius IV.

Problems involved

From the very beginning of the Lutheran movement, there had been frequent demands for a general council as a means of settling the great problem of the church. At first Luther and his followers had appealed from the authority of the pope to that of a general council, and later the Catholic reformers who hoped for reconciliation, as well as the Emperor Charles V, took up the cry. They were joined by the Spanish bishops and the conservative reformers of Italy, who agreed that a council was necessary for reform, but who were violently opposed to any policy of doctrinal compromise or reconciliation. In addition, all opponents of papal authority in the church worked for a council. The popes, however, were very loath to call one, for they had unhappy memories of the councils of Pisa, of Constance, and of Basle, and feared that the chief result would be an attempt to limit their authority. When Paul III finally agreed to summon a council, he did so as the result of a policy that few of those who demanded it would entirely approve. Since the failure of conciliation at Regensburg, the pope and the Counter-Reformation party, who were now in the ascendancy at Rome, had determined on a new policy, which was to recognize the loss of the Protestants as a whole as irremediable, and to concentrate on the defense of what remained, with the hope of winning back individual heretics wherever possible. This was to be done by an authoritative definition of Catholic doctrine on all disputed points, so as to clarify the differences between the old and the new churches; by active repression of heretical opinion in all Catholic countries; and by reform of those practical abuses that left the church open to reproach. This policy appealed to the Spanish churchmen, but not to the majority in France and Germany, who still hoped for some compromise with the new ideas; and even the Spanish reformers were opposed on one very important point. They had little hope of the papacy reforming itself and felt that reform should be carried out by the council, whereas the papal party felt that this part of the task should be left to the authority of the pope.

With all these divergent ideas as to the work the council was to do, it is

not surprising that its meetings were stormy, or that there were such long gaps between them. The political interests and animosities of the various states helped to complicate the situation still further. On the whole, however, the papal party was able to carry through its policy. At the very beginning, the pope secured a working control of the council by obtaining a decision that only bishops and heads of religious orders, who were present in person, should have the right to vote. This enabled him to maintain a loyal Italian majority, for Trent was close to Italy and the prelates from more distant countries were usually prevented by wars, expense, or other inconveniences from attending in large numbers. Still, the papal control was never very secure, and the papal legates were forced to compromise on the matter of reform, permitting its discussion, but on the condition that the definition of doctrine should be taken up at the same time. As a matter of fact, most of the time of the council was occupied with the latter question. All through the council, the Jesuits Lainez and Salmeron exerted a great influence on the members and were often instrumental in winning them over to agreement with the wishes of the papal party. During the last session, the diplomatic pope, Pius IV, took pains to secure the agreement of the great Catholic monarchs before submitting his projects to the council, and so won his way through what seemed an almost impossible situation. The final triumph of the papal authority was assured when the council in its closing session voted to present all its decrees to the pope for confirmation.

The council

The most important result of the Council of Trent was the final definition of Catholic doctrine. At a time when all religious opinion was in a state of flux, and when Protestantism was splitting up into antagonistic churches with irreconcilable differences in belief, the Roman Catholic Church was given a coherent and authoritative statement of orthodox faith which would prove a powerful instrument for the preservation of unity. The lines of demarcation between Protestantism and Catholicism were sharply drawn. Almost every one of the doctrinal decrees of Trent was designed to meet some Protestant dogma. Among the most important was the decree defining authority. Luther, Calvin, the Anabaptists, and other Protestants had appealed to the sole authority of the Bible against that of the church and the papacy. This was the authoritative foundation for Luther's fundamental doctrine of salvation by faith alone as well as for the general Protestant attack on the sacramental system, the secular power of the papacy and the clergy, monasticism, the veneration of saints, and the other practices of the church which had grown up in post-Biblical

Definition of doctrine

times and hence were not mentioned in the Bible. Forced to meet this argument, the council decided that the Bible and the tradition of the church were of equal authority, and that both could be interpreted only by the church, which in practice meant by the pope as head of the church. In addition, the traditional Latin translation of the Bible, the Vulgate, was declared to be the only authoritative version. This adherence to tradition as the best weapon against the innovators was the keynote of all the major doctrinal decrees of the council. By establishing the authority of tradition, however, the Council of Trent bound the modern Catholic Church to medieval precedent and made any later change in either doctrine or practice extremely difficult. Still, the very insistence on tradition had its value, for it gave to the Roman Church the prestige and authority of unbroken continuity with the past, which the newer Protestant churches necessarily lacked.

The work of practical reform, so far as it was actually accomplished by the council, was of secondary importance. Still, it did outline a comprehensive program of reform, abolishing the worst abuses and making provision for better discipline and higher educational standards among the clergy. The practical execution of these decrees, however, was beyond the power of the council, which ceased to exist as soon as its work was done. It had to be left to the executive authority of the pope and his successors. Fortunately, the majority of the future popes proved worthy of the trust. The Catholic Church never again suffered from the lax discipline or worldly minded leadership that had left it so open to criticism during the period of the Renaissance.

Reform decrees

4. THE COUNTER-REFORMATION IN ACTION

With the conclusion of the Council of Trent, all the forces of the Counter-Reformation swung into action, under the leadership of reforming popes. Without the support of papal authority, which was strengthened rather than otherwise by the council, no permanent success would have been possible. Even before the end of the council, the papacy had been responsible for a good deal of reform, in the reign of Paul III and still more under Paul IV (1555–59), who as Cardinal Caraffa had for years been the leader of the conservative Catholic reformers. After Trent, the spirit of the Counter-Reformation ruled at Rome. During the remainder of the sixteenth century, two popes in particular, Pius V (1566–72) and Sixtus V (1585–90), were zealous exponents of clerical morality and rigid orthodoxy. Under the

Reforming popes

former, the Catholic Church took on new vigor, crushed out all opposition in the lands it controlled, and began a remarkable period of reconquest. Catholicism was no longer on the defensive. It was carrying the war into the enemy's country. Under Sixtus V, as the power of Spain declined, the papacy took its place once more as the leader of the Catholic world, though no longer with the secular power that had hampered rather than helped its spiritual authority in earlier times.

The Inquisition and the Index

In the Latin countries of Italy and Spain, where the Counter-Reformation triumphed most completely, the work of reform was accompanied by savage repression of heresy. The Inquisition, which was the chief agent of repression, was not a new institution. It had been used with terrible effect against the heretics of southern France in the thirteenth century. In the closing years of the fifteenth century, it was revived and given new and more effective powers in Spain. Then, in 1542, when the Counter-Reformation first gained headway at Rome, Cardinal Caraffa persuaded Pope Paul III to reorganize the papal Inquisition in Italy on the Spanish model. Throughout the remainder of the Counter-Reformation period, the Holy Office, as the Inquisition was officially named, with its secret trials and its power to turn over condemned heretics to the secular government to be burned at the stake, maintained a reign of terror, completely successful in stamping out all open signs of heresy in Italy and Spain. North of the Alps and the Pyrenees it never gained a firm foothold, though Philip II at one time tried to introduce it into the Netherlands. A second and almost equally important agent for the suppression of unorthodox opinion was the Index of Prohibited Books, an elaborate system of censorship of the press, designed to prevent the publication or circulation of any book that might suggest to the people ideas derogatory to the church or to orthodox belief. One of the immediate results of the Council of Trent was the publication of the Tridentine Index, which superseded earlier lists, and was enforced wherever the co-operation of the civil government could be obtained. Later, a permanent Congregation of the Index was instituted by Pius V to keep the work up to date. The effect of this rigid control of the press in moulding the thought of the Spanish and Italian people can scarcely be overestimated.

It is only fair to note that the persecution of heresy and censorship of heretical books were by no means confined to the Catholic Church. Tolerance of varying opinions in matters of religion was a virtue that found few champions in the sixteenth century. To both Protestant

and Catholic theologians, the heretic who endangered men's souls was a deadly enemy of mankind. Moreover, in every country, church and state were so closely united that a dissenting religious sect was likely to become a seditious political party, and the persecution of heresy by the state often appeared as the punishment of treason or sedition. Nevertheless, the persecution of heretics was never as thorough or as savagely enforced in the Protestant countries as it was in Italy and Spain, for in none of them was there a separate institution, with the terrible powers of the Inquisition, dedicated to that purpose.

Intolerance on both sides

However successful the negative measures of suppression might be in stamping out heresy in Catholic lands, they would never have accomplished the real revival of Catholic piety, much less the reconquest of doubtful or openly Protestant lands, which took place during the Counter-Reformation. For this, aside from the work of the Council of Trent and the reforming popes, credit must be given to the Jesuits. Their methods were positive and constructive. They preached, heard confessions and taught, reviving the piety of the indifferent, directing the consciences of the penitent, and instilling orthodox beliefs and devotion to the church into the minds of the young in their formative years. And they went out as missionaries to the lands that were drifting toward Protestantism. Some of their most effective work was done in Germany where, under the leadership of Peter Canisius, they brought about a revival of Catholic education and piety in the states whose rulers were still Catholic, but whose people were hovering on the verge of heresy.

The Jesuits

By the end of the sixteenth century, the Counter-Reformation, like the Protestant Reformation, had spent its aggressive force. By that time the religious map of Europe was fairly definitely fixed. The church on both sides had become closely identified with the national, political, and governmental interests of the state, and could count on them for permanent support when the wave of religious enthusiasm died down. France had emerged from the Wars of Religion with a recognized Protestant minority, but with Catholicism assured as the national faith. Poland had been won back from Protestantism and Germany was evenly balanced between the two opposing creeds, with little chance of further conquest by either.

Results

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

THE STATES OF EUROPE IN THE AGE OF PHILIP II

(1556–98)

THE first half-dozen years of the reign of Philip II marked the opening of a new era in the history of most of the states of Europe. The scenes shifted and new figures replaced the old on the European stage. In France, the death of Henry II left the government in the hands of his widow Catherine de' Medici and her weakling sons; in England, the last of the Tudors, Elizabeth, began her long and prosperous reign; the ill-fated Mary Stuart took over the government of Scotland in the midst of a religious revolution; and Charles V, about whom European politics had centered for nearly half a century, divided his vast empire between his brother Ferdinand and his son Philip II, who for the remainder of the century was to take his father's place as the focal center of European affairs. Nor were the changes of these momentous years merely changes of person. The strife of Lutheran and Catholic in Germany had just been settled by the Religious Peace of Augsburg, and the German states entered on a period of formal peace that makes it possible to ignore their history for half a century; in the next few years, Protestantism was permanently established in England and Scotland; the Netherlands were drifting fast toward open revolt against Spain; France gave up her claims to Italy, thus ending the long Hapsburg-Valois wars, and the French Huguenots opened the Wars of Religion that were to devastate France with civil strife for more than a generation; and in 1562 the leaders of the Catholic Church met in the final session of the Council of Trent.

These years set the stage for the history of Europe during the remainder of the sixteenth century. In many respects the age of Philip II was very different from that of Charles V. Both the Renaissance and the Reformation had passed their peak and other problems engaged the attention of the European peoples. The action is often confusing, the motives tangled and difficult to follow. But two or three main threads, often interwoven, run through the history of the whole period. They are: the Spanish-Catholic policy of Philip II, the driving force of the Counter-Reformation, and the rising commercial interests of England and the Netherlands.

1. SPAIN UNDER PHILIP II

The son of Charles V, who inherited the crown of Spain with its dependencies in the Netherlands, Italy, and the Americas, clung throughout his life to a consistent policy and to the conviction that it was God's purpose for the people of Europe. That policy may be briefly stated. It was, in the first place, to enforce absolute government and strict conformity to the Catholic faith in all his dominions; second, to use the unified force thus established to make Spain the dominating power in Europe; and finally, to use this Spanish hegemony as God's instrument for the restoration of religious unity under the Roman Catholic Church to Western Christendom. In essence it was the dream of Charles V in his later years, but narrowed and intensified in his son by the shearing away of the German half of the Hapsburg empire, by Philip's Spanish upbringing, and by the influence of the Counter-Reformation, which made Philip a more bigoted Catholic than his father had ever been. In short, where Charles had been a cosmopolitan emperor, to whom his family interests meant more than any country, Philip was a Spanish king, a Spaniard born and with a Spaniard's narrow patriotism, rigid orthodoxy, and relentless hatred of heresy. Philip's problems were made simpler than his father's by the loss of the German lands, but he had still a baffling variety of tasks to demand his constant attention, and, as in his father's case, his efforts were hampered at every turn by the utter inadequacy of the financial means at his disposal.

Policy of Philip II

He was hampered, too, by fatal inadequacies in his own character and ability. Philip had a very strong sense of duty, and he was an indefatigable worker. But, in an absolute ruler, industry may be nearer a vice than a virtue, when it is the product of a narrow, plodding mind, without understanding of men and lit by no spark of imagination. Philip's conscientious attention to every detail of government too often led to fatal delays. His best-intentioned efforts were often misdirected. His was the strength and weakness of the monomaniac. The conviction that his cause was the cause of God and Spain and he himself the chosen instrument of God's will held his spirit firm through countless trials, but it also closed his heart to mercy and his mind to counsel.

Character

Philip was successful in carrying out the first part of his policy, at least in Spain. There the enforcement of universal orthodoxy was relatively easy, for the majority of the Spanish people were as stanch Catholics and as intolerant of heresy as Philip

Religious persecution


himself. The Inquisition had done its work well in the past half-century. Still there were alarming signs of heresy here and there in the last years of Charles V. Philip's first act, therefore, on his return to Spain in 1559, was to stimulate the Inquisition to renewed activity. The fires of the *auto-da-fe*, that terrible ceremony in which heretics were burned to death, spread across Spain. The persecution was thorough and effective. Even the suspicion of heresy was eradicated and it did not make its appearance again. There was still, however, in southern Spain one large group of very doubtful Catholics, the Moriscos of Granada. They were not heretics in the ordinary sense of the word, but descendants of the Mohammedan Moors who had been forcibly converted by Charles V. Philip had good reason to believe that their professed Christianity was no more than skin deep. Determined to crush out all signs of Mohammedan faith or practice, he instituted a series of repressive measures that finally goaded the Moriscos to a desperate rebellion. The revolt was put down with frightful thoroughness. The helpless Moriscos were massacred or transported into servitude in Castile. Granada, which had been the richest agricultural land and the most prosperous center of industry in Spain, was left a barren waste.

Absolute government

Religious unity was closely bound up in Philip's mind with the establishment of his own absolute authority in Spain. Each would help the other and both were necessary in order to place the full resources of the country at the disposal of his greater purpose. The way had been prepared for him. He had only to carry on the work of Charles V in weakening the already feeble constitutional powers of the Cortes and in excluding the nobles from an active share in the civil government. His chief contribution was the development of a highly centralized bureaucratic administration, in which most of the offices were held by men of low birth who would be entirely dependent upon him. He himself was the center of the whole system, supervising the work of all departments, often down to the most petty details.

Taxation and commerce

So far, Philip succeeded in putting his policy into effect. But it did not have the desired result of making Spain a greater nation. On the contrary, both the country and the government grew steadily poorer, and when Philip died the fabulous wealth of Spain was fading to a memory. From the beginning, indeed, Philip was in constant financial straits. The ambitious foreign policies of Charles V had already reduced the government to the verge of bankruptcy, and Philip was forced to meet expenses almost as great from diminishing resources. The output of the gold and silver mines in the New World was decreasing, and a large share of it fell into the



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

PHILIP II, KING OF SPAIN
1527–98

In this portrait Titian has caught much of the essential character of his subject. The long pale face and heavy eyes indicate the cold and enigmatic character that made Philip a man respected by many but loved by very few.

hands of dishonest officials or English privateers. Italy had never contributed much to the royal treasury, and the Netherlands on which his father had depended so heavily were in revolt during most of Philip's reign, thus making them a source of expense rather than of income. The whole burden, therefore, fell upon Spain. But even from this source, the amount that could be collected steadily decreased, as stupid economic legislation and a misguided system of taxation aggravated the decline of Spanish prosperity. The net result of Philip's financial policy was to kill the goose that laid the golden egg. The *alcabala*, a tax of ten per cent on every sale of goods, to mention but one of many burdensome taxes, was in itself enough to strangle the commerce of Spain and starve her industry, and to these were added innumerable hampering regulations and prohibitions, which in the end gave most of Spain's trade to the English or Dutch and drained the country of its gold and silver.

Success and failure at home

The results of Philip's unwise policy in Spain were not at once discernible. Thanks to the conquered wealth of the New World and to the apparent strength acquired through union with the great Hapsburg empire, Spain had become the greatest of the European nations during the reign of Charles V. For a long time after his death, she was able to maintain the appearance of greatness and an undiminished prestige, but under Philip the reality of Spanish power was crumbling. Two important successes, however, helped to hide this fact. In 1571, the Spanish fleet administered a decisive defeat to the Turks at Lepanto, and in 1580, Philip succeeded in making good an hereditary claim to the kingdom of Portugal, thereby uniting the whole peninsula under his rule and adding the great colonial empire of Portugal to that of Spain. Nevertheless, in summing up the results of Philip's government of Spain through nearly half a century, one must note more failure than success. He left his country impoverished, his people orthodox and proud, but unindustrious. Spain still seemed greater than it was, but it would not be long before the internal decay would destroy its prestige.

Failure abroad

Meanwhile, Philip's attempts to carry out that part of his policy which concerned the rest of Europe had not met with even the partial success he had achieved in Spain. The Netherlands rebelled against his autocratic Spanish-Catholic government and the northern provinces broke away to form an independent Protestant state. Henry IV foiled his efforts to crush out Protestantism in France and to dominate the French government in alliance with the Catholic party. Finally, his hopes of restoring England to

the Catholic Church and of gaining control of Spain's most dangerous commercial rival led only to the supreme disaster of the Armada.

2. THE REVOLT IN THE NETHERLANDS

In almost every respect, the Netherlands were very different from Spain and they could not be made to accept the same policies or methods of government. It was one of the tragedies of Philip's reign that he never fully understood or became reconciled to that fact. The sovereignty of the seventeen provinces that made up the Netherlands was his by hereditary right, but there was no other political bond to hold them together, and each province had its own cherished institutions and ancient privileges. Even racial or linguistic unity was lacking; for the northern provinces were predominantly Germanic and Dutch-speaking, while the southern were more nearly French in tradition and language. Situated at the commercial crossroads of northwestern Europe, the Netherlands were the home of a vigorous commercial and industrial people, prosperous and independent. Their position left them open to all the cultural and religious influences of the age and, despite persecution, many had adopted one or other of the current Protestant faiths. Lutheranism and Anabaptism had been the first to make an impression, but at the time when Philip began to rule, Calvinism was spreading rapidly in the northern provinces. The government of a people who were so divided, yet so prosperous and independent, would require a good deal of tact and understanding. Charles V, himself a native of the Netherlands and their own prince, had possessed those qualities in sufficient degree to retain their loyalty, though there was a good deal of discontent in his later years. Philip had neither tact nor understanding — and he was a foreigner.

Philip and the Netherlands

The causes of the revolt were inherent in the character of Philip and his Netherland subjects and in the irreconcilable opposition between his general policies and their economic, political, and religious interests. From the beginning they distrusted him as a foreigner who did not speak their language and had no sympathy with their point of view. Philip was, indeed, a Spaniard first and last. He regarded the Netherlands as satellites of Spain, to be used for Spanish interests. Economic grievances soon gave point to their resentment of this attitude. Philip was in desperate financial straits. He was forced to begin his reign by increasing the burden of taxation, already high enough under Charles V, and most of the money wrung

Causes of the revolt

from the Netherlanders was spent in Spain. Still worse, he strove to restrict their commerce so as to give the advantage to Spanish merchants. Political grievances fed their resentment still further, as Philip tried to force upon the Netherlands a centralized, absolute government like that of Spain, regardless of the ancient constitutional rights and traditional privileges of the separate provinces. Finally, Philip's determination to crush out heresy in all his dominions permanently alienated the growing number of Protestants, while his arbitrary reorganization of the church government (including the creation of a number of new bishoprics) aroused the opposition of many Catholics. Philip's rigid Catholic policy was not the sole cause of the revolt, but once the revolt had begun, it was the factor that made reconciliation of the provinces that were predominantly Protestant impossible.

Beginning of the revolt (1565–67)

Despite these various causes of discontent, the first ten years of Philip's reign passed before there were any signs of open rebellion. Following his father's abdication, Philip remained in the Netherlands until 1559, when he returned to Spain, never to visit his northern possessions again. From that time on, he left the government of the distant provinces to a series of regents, of whom the first was his half-sister, Margaret of Parma. He always insisted, however, on a vexatiously detailed supervision of the regent's activity from his cabinet in Madrid. So far as he gave independent authority to anyone, it was to his chief minister in the Netherlands, Cardinal Granvelle, who became so unpopular that Philip was forced to recall him in 1564. The power of this foreign minister was especially resented by the great nobles, who were accustomed to being consulted in affairs of state. The most important of these, Prince William of Orange, had been shown high favor by Charles V, but now found himself neglected. He was not, however, responsible for the first outbreak of the revolt, though he was later to be its greatest leader. In 1565, a group of young hotheads from the lesser nobility, together with some of the wealthy burghers, organized to protest against the arbitrary government, the foreign ministers, and the Inquisition. The following year, some two hundred and fifty of them gathered to present a formal petition to the regent. They accomplished nothing, but the incident is memorable because it was then that the rebels acquired the name of "Beggars," applied to them in derision by one of the regent's councilors and carried by them in defiant pride throughout the revolt. The protest of the nobles was followed by wild anti-Catholic riots and image-breaking on the part of the Protestant proletariat, and Philip began to lay plans for crushing the independence of his turbulent and heretical subjects. In

1567, William of Orange resigned his offices and retired to his German estates to organize resistance; the first army of the Beggars was defeated by government troops; and Philip sent a Spanish army to the Netherlands.

Alva's reign of terror (1567–73)

The arrival of ten thousand veteran Spanish troops under the Duke of Alva, who now replaced Margaret as regent, opened one of the darkest and most blood-stained pages in European history. Philip had ordered Alva to crush all opposition both to the government and to the Catholic faith, and he could scarcely have found a more perfect instrument for his purpose than this hardened campaigner, who shared to the full his blind Spanish patriotism and hatred of heresy. For six years Alva raged through the land, imprisoning, executing, and confiscating the property of those who were suspected of either rebellion or heresy. Even the greatest nobles were not spared. The gallant Lamoral of Egmont and the Count of Hoorn were among the first to fall. In addition, Alva levied crushing taxes (including the Spanish *alcabala* or ten per cent tax on sales), which almost ruined the commercial and industrial prosperity of the Netherlands beyond repair. All this was not accomplished without opposition, but the people of the Netherlands were cowed by fear, and the duke's Spanish veterans easily defeated the German and French mercenaries recruited by William of Orange and his brother Lewis of Nassau. The only success of the rebels was won on the sea. From 1569 on, the "Sea Beggars," lawless privateers who hated Spaniards and Catholics as much as they loved fighting and plunder, preyed on Spanish shipping along the Atlantic coast. At first they had operated from friendly English ports, but in 1572 they acquired a base on the coast of Holland by capturing the harbor of Brill. This first success on land encouraged other towns in Holland and Zeeland to rebel. In July, the Estates of Holland proclaimed William of Orange their stadholder, and despite frightful sieges and massacres the northern provinces never again submitted entirely to Spanish authority. Even Philip could see that the reign of terror had borne its logical fruit in bitter hatred of Spain, and in 1573 he recalled Alva, replacing him by the more pacific Don Luis Requesens.

William of Orange unites the provinces

Throughout these bloody years, William of Nassau, Prince of Orange, was the heart and soul of the rebellion. He was a German by birth and his title was derived from a principality in southern France, but he had large estates in the Netherlands and became a Netherlander at heart. He was a tolerant man who hated religious persecution, and after the beginning of the revolt he threw in his lot with the Protestant minority. It was his grim deter-

mination, his refusal to accept defeat, and his patient and skillful diplomacy that kept the spark of rebellion alive during the darkest years. A discreet capacity for keeping his own counsel was one of his outstanding gifts, whence the name William the Silent by which he is best known in the annals of his adopted country. His constancy was rewarded by success in the years following the removal of Alva. Sternly refusing all conciliatory offers short of complete religious freedom and restoration of the old political rights, he kept up the fight, meanwhile uniting the northern provinces under his leadership and working to win the cooperation of the south. This latter object he achieved in 1576 after the Spanish troops, who had been left unpaid and leaderless by the death of Requesens, mutinied and perpetrated the horrible massacre known as the "Spanish Fury" at Antwerp. Goaded by this final outrage, the States General of the southern provinces signed the Pacification of Ghent, a treaty with Holland and Zeeland to stand together against the Spanish tyranny.

Treaty of Arras and Union of Utrecht (1579)

The union, however, did not last long. The common hatred of Spain was offset by too many differences between north and south. They did not speak the same language, and the aristocratic governing class of the industrial southern provinces had little in common with the democratic commercial states of the north. The chief barrier between them, however, was the difference in religion. The years of persecution had driven the most stubborn Protestants from the south to the more easily defended and rebellious northern provinces, which were now fanatically anti-Catholic, while the south was left fairly free from Protestantism. It would therefore not be difficult for an astute diplomat to stir up dissension between the provinces, and this was the aim of Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma, who arrived with a new Spanish army to take over the regency in 1578. The famous Parma, already renowned as a soldier but equally skilled as a diplomat, was not long in getting results. Early in 1579, a group of the southern provinces signed the Treaty of Arras, forming a league for the protection of the Catholic faith. This was immediately answered by the Union of Utrecht, in which the northern provinces banded together to resist religious persecution and Spanish rule "with life, blood, and goods." These two treaties mark the final split between north and south. In the following years, Parma conquered or cajoled the remaining rebels in the south and restored the ruined land to the Spanish crown and the Catholic Church, while the little Protestant states in the north struggled on to maintain their independence and to form the Dutch Republic.

Philip never became reconciled to the loss of the most prosperous part of his Netherland possessions. Until he was assassinated in 1584, William the Silent was kept busy defending his country against Parma's armies and trying in vain to get substantial aid from France by offering the sovereignty of the United Provinces to the king's younger brother. After his death the danger increased. There was no strong central government in the new republic, and each of the provinces claimed independent sovereign powers. Aid from England helped them over the difficult period of the next four years until events elsewhere relieved the pressure. Parma's attention was distracted, first by Philip's plans for the invasion of England, then by wars with the French Huguenots, and later with France itself. Meanwhile, two new leaders appeared who united the provinces and shepherded them through two decades of war to final security. John van Oldenbarneveldt gave wise direction to affairs of state, while Maurice of Nassau, the brilliant son of William the Silent, became stadholder of the various provinces and led the Dutch army to victory after victory. A truce in 1609 practically ended the war, but Spain did not formally recognize the existence of the Dutch Republic as an independent state until 1648. Meanwhile, the Dutch had prospered mightily. Their seaborne commerce had not been wrecked by the revolt as had the industry of the southern provinces, and, though the long war with Spain was expensive, their expanding commerce more than made up the loss. Despite its small size, the Dutch Republic was now one of the greatest commercial powers in Europe with trade extending from the West Indies to the Far East. Together with England, it fell heir to the commercial supremacy that was slipping from the hands of Spain.

Founding of the Dutch Republic

3. THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE

The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis and the death of Henry II, both in the year 1559, ended an epoch in French history — that of the long foreign wars against the encircling Hapsburg power and for the domination of Italy. For the next forty years, French history centered around new problems, as foreign wars gave place to the civil Wars of Religion.

The Reformation came to France as an importation from Germany and Switzerland, though the way had been prepared by some of the earlier French Christian humanists. From the first it had to make its way against the opposition of the monarchy, for the French kings had already acquired all the control of the church in France that they needed and regarded

Growth of French Protestantism (to 1559)

heresy as a menace to national unity. In the early years Francis I was fairly tolerant, but as Lutheranism gained ground, he commenced an intermittent persecution, which became more severe and constant in the last decade of his reign. Under Henry II, the persecution became still more severe. Nevertheless, Protestantism continued to spread, finding many converts among the burghers, gentry, and nobility, and took on a more aggressive character. The secret of this new energy was the influence of John Calvin and the shift among French Protestants from Lutheranism to Calvinism. Calvin was himself a Frenchman and a master of French prose. His logical spirit made a more direct appeal to the French mind than did the mysticism of Martin Luther. Moreover, he maintained a personal supervision of the struggling Protestant communities from his stronghold on the eastern frontier, and gave them the benefit of his genius for organization. In the year 1559, which saw the death of Henry II, the first French Protestant Synod met secretly in the king's own city of Paris to work out a national organization for the Reformed Church in France.

Rival noble families

The next step in the development of French Protestantism followed almost immediately. It became a political party, headed by a group of great nobles who were held together by family ties. Under the absolute monarchy of Francis I and Henry II, the majority of nobles were little more than courtiers and soldiers. Nevertheless, there were a few great nobles, divided into two family groups, both more or less closely related to royalty, who exercised great influence at court. Under the feeble rule of Henry's sons, they became rivals for the control of the government, and, as one group was Protestant, though of fairly recent conversion, the other extremely Catholic, their rivalry became an integral part of the religious struggle. On the Protestant side were the two foremost Princes of the Blood, Anthony of Bourbon, King of Navarre by virtue of his marriage to the Protestant Jeanne d'Albret, and his brother Louis of Condé. Allied to them by marriage was the able and deeply religious Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France, who, together with his two brilliant brothers, gave the soundest leadership to the Protestant party. Coligny was also related to the family of Montmorency, though the head of that powerful house, the aged constable, remained a Catholic. On the other side, the family of Guise headed the ultra-Catholic opposition to heresy. They were a younger branch of the ruling house of Lorraine and were closely connected by marriage with the royal families of France and Scotland. Duke Francis of Guise, the head of the family, had acquired a great military reputation and considerable popularity in the recent wars with

Spain; two of his brothers were cardinals and royal ministers; his sister Mary was Regent of Scotland as widow of James V and mother of the young Queen Mary Stuart, and the latter now became Queen of France as the wife of Henry's eldest son, Francis II (1559–60).

As Francis II was still too young to rule, though he had passed the legal age of majority, the government fell naturally into the hands of the queen's uncles, the brothers Guise. They at once made use of the known Calvinist leanings of their rivals, the Bourbon-Coligny group, to drive them from court, thus forcing them into opposition as avowed leaders of French Protestantism. During the next year, the Guises redoubled the religious persecution, filling the prisons and keeping the executioners busy, while in self-defense the Protestants were forced to organize as a political-religious party. It was at about this time that the Protestants in France came to be known by the name of Huguenot. They were drifting rapidly toward rebellion when the Guise ascendancy ended for a time with the death of Francis II, after only a year's reign.

The Guise ascendancy (1559–60)

The crown now passed to Henry's second son Charles IX (1560-74), who was still a child. His mother, Catherine de' Medici, promptly seized control of the royal government as regent. Hitherto this daughter of the famous Florentine family had played a secondary rôle as the wife of Henry II and mother of the late king, but from this time on she was to be a principal actor in the hectic French drama. For a quarter of a century she directed the government of her remaining sons, and wielded whatever power was left to the French crown. Through it all she clung to a consistent policy, though it was one that had every appearance of inconsistency. Her aim was simply to maintain control of the government for herself and her sons and to keep the kingdom at peace so far as possible. To do that, she played off Guise against Bourbon, extreme Catholic against Huguenot, and strove whenever possible to build up a center party of moderate Catholics who would be loyal to the crown and would help to keep the peace.

Catherine de' Medici

Catherine's first action was to stop the persecution of the Protestants and to issue an edict granting them a limited freedom of worship. If Catherine hoped that this would keep the peace or conciliate the Huguenots, she was mistaken. Calvinism had gained steadily and become increasingly militant under the weight of persecution. When the pressure was lifted, it spread with startling rapidity and remained as militant as ever. The Protestants were never more than a small minority of the population of France, perhaps not more than ten per cent, but their strength was far greater than their

The Protestant aggression

numbers would indicate. They were recruited chiefly from the most energetic and influential classes — the industrial and commercial townsmen and the fighting gentry from the country, to whom were added a few great nobles. They were characterized by a high morality and earnestness of purpose that made them in every way a respectable as well as formidable group. Filled with hope, they were now determined to win full freedom at all costs. Catherine's moderate edict failed to satisfy them. At the same time, it aroused strong opposition from the extreme Catholics. Fanaticism on both sides flared to fever heat. Catholics and Protestants alike rioted and desecrated each other's churches in every corner of France. In 1562, the Duke of Guise, placing himself at the head of a group of Catholic nobles, seized control of the government and forced Catherine to recall the edict of toleration. But the Protestants had gone too far to submit. They took arms to defend their faith and opened the Wars of Religion.

First Wars of Religion (1562–70)

France now entered on a decade of alternate civil war and peace that was very little different from war. Despite their great inferiority in numbers and frequent defeats, the Huguenots held their own by virtue of able leadership and unshakable determination. The murder of Francis of Guise in 1563 weakened the Catholic party, and in the following years nearly all the original leaders on both sides fell, leaving Coligny the most outstanding figure in France. Meanwhile, Catherine pursued her vacillating course, alternating persecution with toleration, and striving to restore peace and keep control of the government. In the years 1570–72, she seemed about to obtain her objective. She arranged a peace treaty, granting a fair amount of freedom to Protestants in places where they were in the majority; summoned Coligny to court; and planned to win over the Huguenot leaders by marrying her daughter Margaret to young Henry of Bourbon, who had succeeded his father Anthony as King of Navarre and would in time become the natural chief of the Huguenots.

Massacre of Saint Bartholomew (1572)

As usual, however, Catherine had failed to reckon with the fanatical passions on both sides, which indeed she could never understand. The Huguenots were still unsatisfied and the Catholics were developing a strong opposition under the leadership of Duke Henry of Guise, the son of the old Catholic leader. Moreover, Catherine began to fear the influence of Coligny with the king, now of age, whom he was trying to persuade to help the Protestant rebels in the Netherlands and to seize the opportunity provided by the revolt to annex the French-speaking provinces. Peace seemed as far away as ever, and Catherine decided to throw in her lot

again with the Guises. She persuaded herself that the admiral and the few remaining Huguenot chiefs were the principal obstacles to peace, and that if they could be removed, the Huguenot resistance would collapse. Their presence in Paris for the wedding of Henry and Margaret provided the opportunity, and on Saint Bartholomew's Eve, 1572, Catherine and the Guises laid the plans that led to the terrible massacre of the following day. They had probably intended no more than the murder of Coligny and the other chiefs, which Henry of Guise supervised himself, but, as news of the killing spread, the fanatical Paris mob rose to take a hand, and before morning some two thousand Protestants had been slain. Similar massacres in other cities soon accounted for thousands more.

Despite the loss of their leaders, the Huguenots still fought on, until in 1576 they won the most favorable peace yet accorded to them. Nevertheless, it was clear that they had passed the peak of their power and were losing ground. Their numbers had been cut down by war and massacre and it was only in the south and west of France that they were strong enough to hold their own. Protestantism was no longer spreading. On the contrary, a strong Catholic reaction had set in under the influence of the Counter-Reformation and the activity of the Jesuits. Moreover, the whole country had suffered terribly from the wars, and the ruined people not unnaturally blamed the stubborn Protestants. The royal government was almost bankrupt, and Henry III (1574–89), who succeeded his brother Charles IX two years after the massacre, was too feeble to control the situation. In 1576, the extreme Catholic party, headed by Henry of Guise, took matters into their own hands and formed the Catholic League, independent of the king, for the suppression of Protestantism. During the next few years, the league gained a wide following and also the assurance of support from Philip II.

The Catholic reaction

The death of Catherine de' Medici's fourth son, the Duke of Alençon, the last of the Valois line, brought about a crisis and precipitated the final struggle. Henry III was in feeble health and had no sons, and the nearest heir to the throne was now the Protestant Bourbon prince, Henry of Navarre, who for some years had been the most active leader of the Huguenots. Rather than accept him, the league was prepared to go to any lengths. In 1585, the leaguers signed a treaty with Philip of Spain in open defiance of their king. The war that followed is called the War of the Three Henrys. Lacking resources or the strength to use what he had, Henry III was caught between the league, led by Henry of Guise, and the

War of the Three Henrys (1585–89)

Huguenots who followed Henry of Navarre. At first the unfortunate king submitted to the dictation of the league, then in a burst of futile energy he strove to free himself by the assassination of Duke Henry. Vengeance followed within the year. In 1589, he was himself assassinated by a fanatical leaguer, and Henry of Navarre proclaimed himself King of France as Henry IV (1589–1610).

The religious settlement under Henry IV

The death of Henry III did not at once end the wars, for his successor had still to overcome the opposition of the league and of Spain. His religion was the chief obstacle in his path to the throne. Save for that, the French people would have accepted him willingly enough, for they were weary of war. After four years more of fighting, Henry IV finally realized that the obstacle was insurmountable. He submitted and formally adopted the Catholic faith. After that he had little trouble in reconciling the leaders of the league, though he had still to fight a war with Spain, for Philip II was loath to give up his dream of dominating France through the Catholic party. The war ended on terms favorable to France in 1598, the last year of Philip's reign. In the same year, Henry provided a settlement of the religious problem for France, which in main outline was to last for nearly a century. By the Edict of Nantes, he guaranteed freedom of conscience and full political rights to all Protestants. The Wars of Religion were ended. Protestantism in France had secured a legal status, but its great days were over. During the next century it faded slowly, as the interests of the age shifted. Meanwhile, with peace restored at home and abroad, Henry IV was free to turn his attention to the reconstruction of his shattered kingdom. But that is a story that must be left for another chapter.

4. ENGLAND UNDER ELIZABETH AND THE SCOTTISH REFORMATION

Catholic interlude: Mary (1553–58)

Before Protestantism was finally established in England, there was a brief Catholic interlude. When the young King Edward VI died, the fate of religion in England was still far from certain. The English Reformation had begun as a political and national revolt against Rome, supported by economic motives, rather than as a primarily religious movement. The people had acquiesced in Henry's establishment of a national Anglican Church, but neither king nor people had changed their doctrinal beliefs in any very marked degree. True, Protestant teaching of the various types emanating from Germany and Switzerland gained many

converts, especially in the influential commercial class and among the gentry of the south, and under Edward doctrinal Protestantism made rapid progress. Still, there is reason to believe that when Edward's eldest sister Mary Tudor, the daughter of Henry and Catherine of Aragon, came to the throne in 1553, the greater number of Englishmen were either still Catholic or were sufficiently indifferent to accept either church as the government should decide. The proof is that Mary, herself a devout Catholic, was able to restore Catholicism as the official religion with the aid of Parliament and to reunite the English Church to the Roman. There was no rebellion, and the Catholic restoration might have been successful but for two things. In 1554, Mary married Philip II of Spain and joined Spain in a close alliance that reduced England to the position of a Spanish satellite. And she persecuted Protestants with a harshness that won for her the name of Bloody Mary. The Spanish alliance, coupled with the persecution and the restoration of papal authority, aroused national resentment in England and hatred of Spain and the papacy. When Mary died, most Englishmen were formally Catholic, but Catholicism had become more unpopular. The issue was still to be decided.

Protestant settlement under Elizabeth (1558–1603)

The crucial decision was made by a young woman of twenty-five, Elizabeth, Anne Boleyn's daughter, and the last of the Tudors. The new queen had been raised as a Protestant, but she was no fanatic. What she wanted was a national church, free from Rome and subject only to the royal authority, Protestant in character, but liberal enough so that all but the most stubborn extremists might conform. She procured it by act of Parliament in 1559. In the matter of church government, Elizabeth followed the example set by her father. An Act of Supremacy re-established the Anglican Church under the supreme authority of the crown, with the old episcopal system otherwise unchanged. This was followed by an Act of Uniformity, which prescribed the use of a Book of Common Prayer, modeled on that of Edward VI, as the only legal form of worship. Having secured the outward uniformity that was so essential for political reasons, Elizabeth was prepared to leave a good deal of leeway in matters of doctrine. The creed as stated in the Prayer Book and the later Thirty-Nine Articles was predominantly Protestant, but the phrasing at crucial points was vague enough so that the more moderate Catholics, who did not hold strongly to the papal obedience, might attend the national church without too great a shock to their consciences, while almost all Protestants, whether they had taken their opinions from Wittenberg or Geneva, could interpret it to suit their own convictions.

The Elizabethan settlement of the church was a characteristically English compromise and amazingly permanent. Elizabeth reigned long enough to see it firmly established and it has lasted down to our own time. Divergent parties soon arose within the church — but they remained there. Only the wilder Protestant sects and the extreme Catholics remained stubbornly aloof. They were punished and harassed by fines, but were not persecuted so severely as to arouse public sympathy for them.

England and Scotland

The peaceful and permanent establishment of a Protestant church in England was closely bound up with the conversion of Scotland to Protestantism just at the time when Elizabeth was beginning her reign. The coincidence was of vital importance to both countries. United by a common religious interest, England and Scotland were both able to withstand the threat of domination by the great Catholic states of the Continent, Spain and France respectively.

The Reformation in Scotland

Scotland was still a very backward country, almost medieval in its social and political structure. Its church was dominated by lawless nobles, was disproportionately wealthy for a poverty-stricken country, and was probably the most corrupt in Europe. It was an easy target for the attacks of the Protestant reformers. Moreover, the latter had patriotic national sentiment on their side. The Scottish people were growing restless under the rule of the French regent, Mary of Guise, while their queen, her daughter Mary Stuart, was living at the French court and in 1558 married the heir to the throne of France. They resented the treatment of Scotland as a dependency of France, and as the Guises were ultra-Catholic, Catholicism came to be associated in the popular mind with French domination. All the materials for a conflagration were present. All that was needed was the fiery preaching of John Knox, who returned from Geneva in 1555, to set the land ablaze. In 1557, a congregation of Scottish nobles signed the first Covenant for the defense of the Protestant faith. Two years later, Scotland was in armed rebellion against the French Catholic regent, and in 1560 Elizabeth sent aid to the rebels to help them drive out the French troops. That action was decisive. It secured the triumph of Protestantism in Scotland and ended the long-standing enmity between the two British countries.

When Mary Stuart came to rule her Scottish kingdom in 1561, she found the Calvinist Presbyterian Church already firmly established. The fact that the Reformation had come to Scotland in the form of Calvinism and in opposition to the government made the religious situation in Scotland very different from that in England. The Presbyterian



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

QUEEN ELIZABETH OF ENGLAND
1533–1603

This painting (which hangs in the Uffizi Gallery, Florence) tells us more, perhaps, of the styles prevalent at the court of Elizabeth than of the character of the "good queen" herself, but that is probably as she would have wished it. Still the face does suggest something of the keen intelligence that its owner undoubtedly possessed.

Church was founded as the result of a revolution that swept away the old episcopal system with the royal control. As was characteristic of Calvinist churches everywhere, its organization was essentially democratic, with the final authority vested in the congregations and their elders and ministers. Such a church could not be controlled by the state, but, on the contrary, could bring powerful pressure to bear on the government. This Mary Stuart soon found to her cost. Through seven years of folly and romantic adventure, she fought the power of the church, only to be beaten by it. At last she fled from the country to take refuge in England, leaving her infant son James VI to be brought up by Presbyterian divines.

Mary Stuart and the Presbyterian Church

We must turn now to other aspects of English history, of equal importance with the religious settlement. The age of Elizabeth was the age when England rose to the first rank among the commercial nations of the world and built up the sea power that was the foundation of her future greatness. The origin of England's opportunity was the shift, already noted, in the center of gravity of world trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.[1] New trade routes, around Africa to India and the Spice Islands and straight west across the ocean to the Americas, were blazed out by Portuguese and Spanish seamen. As a result, Portugal and Spain acquired a monopoly of the rich commerce of the Far East, the African coast, and the New World. But they did not hold it long unchallenged. The Spaniards and Portuguese were great pioneers and colonizers, but they were indifferent merchants, and their methods of government were fatal to home industry and trade. It was inevitable that the hardy seagoing folk and canny merchants of England and Holland should seek their share in the New World trade — and almost as inevitable that they should get it. They had the advantage over their competitors of thriving native industries, like the woolen cloth industry, which gave them valuable goods to sell in foreign parts. Despite all prohibitions, English merchants poached on Spanish preserves in the New World, and carried on a profitable smuggling trade with the Spanish colonists, who needed the goods which they could supply to better advantage than could the merchants from the home country. Meanwhile, daring English sailors risked their lives in Arctic seas, in the hope of finding new routes to the Orient by the northwest passage around North America or by the northeast passage around Europe. The latter aim led to solid results through the discovery of

Rise of English commerce

[1] See above, pages 385–88.

the White Sea, which opened up a new and profitable trade route to Russia. English merchants, too, dared the Spanish control of the Mediterranean to carry on trade with the Levantine countries of the Near East.

The fact that open trade with the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, united into one great empire by Philip II, was denied to them forced the English merchants to become armed smugglers and pirates, and made England a militant sea power. For years before there was formal war between England and Spain, merchant-privateers like Drake and Hawkins plundered the Spanish Main, captured treasure ships, and perfected a new technique of naval warfare. Religion added bitterness to the commercial rivalry. The English merchants were mostly Protestant, and they took a double satisfaction in every blow struck against the commercial monopoly of Catholic Spain. Nor were they the only Protestant seamen who combined profit with religious satisfaction in daring assaults on Spanish commerce. By an odd coincidence, the sea power of both the Netherlands and France was almost entirely in Protestant hands, that of the rebellious Dutch and Huguenots respectively, who held the best of the Atlantic ports and issued forth to prey on the shipping of Spain. From the North Sea to the Caribbean, militant Protestantism rode the seas and harassed the great Catholic state, whose land armies were still regarded as invincible. It was the English privateers, the Huguenots, and the Sea Beggars of Holland, who, by strangling Spanish trade and cutting her off from the Netherlands, made possible the success of the Dutch revolt. Or, if that were not enough, the aid, official and otherwise, sent from England to the Protestant rebels in the Netherlands may be considered a decisive factor. Small wonder that Philip II finally determined to crush the island kingdom which had become the chief menace to his cherished plans for the restoration of Catholicism to Europe and for the aggrandizement of Spain.

Protestant sea power

It is more surprising that he did not attack England earlier, when, indeed, he would have had a better chance of success. But there were a number of good reasons for his delay. At first he had hopes of restoring the ascendancy over England, which he had lost on the death of Mary, by marrying Elizabeth, or through the queen's fear that France would press the claims of Mary Stuart. And Elizabeth's astute diplomacy maintained the delusion as long as possible. Then the Netherlands revolted and Philip put off war with England until he should have regained control of his northern possessions. He lacked the sea power to land an army in England, so

The war with Spain (1587–1604)

long as the English could count on the aid of Dutch and Huguenot privateers, and with every passing year the English themselves became more formidable opponents on the sea. Philip accordingly turned to conspiracy with English Catholics to rid himself of Elizabeth and to restore Catholicism in England by replacing the Protestant ruler with the Catholic Mary Stuart. The weak point in Elizabeth's position was that she was the last of the direct line of Tudors, that her legitimacy was disputed by all good Catholics, who had never recognized the validity of Henry's divorce from Catherine and marriage to Anne Boleyn, and that Mary Stuart, as great-granddaughter of Henry VII, was the next claimant to the throne. For years Elizabeth's life was in constant danger from Spanish-Catholic plots, which, incidentally, served to arouse in patriotic Englishmen an undying hatred of papal Spain. So long as Mary Stuart lived, neither English independence nor Protestantism was safe. Elizabeth protected the unhappy queen as long as she could, but at last, in 1587, she submitted to the popular demand and ordered her execution for treason. There was now nothing to delay Philip any longer. He declared open war immediately. It lasted until after the end of Elizabeth's reign.

The Spanish Armada (1588)

Though the war dragged on for years, its fate was settled at the very beginning by the dramatic defeat of Philip's great Armada. He had strained the financial resources of Spain to the utmost in order to build a fleet great enough to crush the English navy and transport an invading army to England. But more than money is needed to build an effective navy. Philip listened too little to the advice of experienced sailors, and entrusted the command to landsmen and soldiers. From beginning to end, the history of the Armada is a story of short-sighted stupidity and hopeless bungling. No account was taken of the new technique of naval warfare, based on the use of heavy cannon in light, handy ships, which had been worked out by Drake, Hawkins, and other privateers and introduced into the small but efficient English navy. The story of how the "invincible" Armada was destroyed by the winds and water of the English Channel, ably assisted by the men and guns of the English navy, is too well known to need recounting. The destruction of the Armada marked a definite stage in the decline of Spain's power and prestige, while for England it was the beginning of a great era of ascendancy on the sea.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

IN PRECEDING chapters we have traced the history of Europe during the period of transition from medieval to modern civilization. We have noted the transformation of society and the state, together with the accompanying changes in the realm of thought and religion, and have suggested more than once that the motive force behind many if not all of these changes was the development of new and more potent forms of economic activity. It is time now, with the political, cultural, and religious background already before us, to study at greater length the nature of the transformation of European economic life that took place during these centuries. We shall find that it amounts to an economic revolution, and one that marks what are perhaps the most fundamental differences between the medieval and the modern ages. Indeed, it is very doubtful if any of the changes of this crucial period in Europe's history had more far-reaching consequences than the change in the methods of doing business. Because the change occurred at different times and in different degrees in different places — in isolated instances in the fourteenth century, more generally in the fifteenth, and almost universally in all parts of Europe in the sixteenth century — it is difficult to trace its history in any connected fashion. We have one clue, however, to guide us through the maze. Our main task will be to follow the development of capital and to discover what it did to commerce, industry, agriculture, the state, and society.

1. THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL

The first prerequisite to the introduction of capital as a productive force in the business world was the existence of private fortunes, or accumulations of capital, large enough to furnish a surplus that could be invested in any profitable enterprise. The problem of how such fortunes were accumulated, in occasional instances before the end of the High Middle Ages and with increasing frequency during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, is one that has led to a great deal of discussion among modern historians. One point, however, is clear. They could not have existed had it not been for the gradual spread of what we call "money economy," following the revival of trade that began about the middle of the eleventh

Rise of money economy

century. In the purely feudal society of the earlier Middle Ages, there had been little use for money and but little cash in circulation. What trade there was in that age, when almost all men drew their living from the cultivation of the soil, was carried on by barter, and the obligations of man to man were usually fulfilled by personal services. With the revival of commerce, accompanied as it was by the revival of industry and town life, this primitive economic condition gradually changed. Merchants and artisans found it more convenient to buy and sell raw materials or goods for cash, and even the peasants who worked the land in time acquired the habit of buying and selling, as the growing towns offered a cash market for foodstuffs. The change from the "natural economy" of barter and personal services to the "money economy" of cash transactions took place very slowly and was not complete at the end of the Middle Ages. Moreover, the medieval organization of commerce and industry under the corporate guild system, which was designed to limit the activity of individuals in the interests of the whole city community, effectively prevented most business men from accumulating more money than they needed for a "decent" living and the current expenses of a small business.[1] Nevertheless, by the end of the thirteenth century, a good deal of money was in constant circulation, and already some few fortunate individuals had succeeded in accumulating surplus capital that might be invested to produce a profit when opportunity offered.

Accumulation of capital

Given the general use of money, we have still to answer the question of how such private fortunes or any considerable amount of surplus capital could be accumulated in the age before the feudal system had ceased to dominate agriculture and even before the guild system had lost its hold on commerce and industry. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that such long-distance commerce as that between the Italian cities and the Near East afforded unusual opportunities for individual profit even at the height of the guild régime, we shall find that most early accumulations of capital resulted from the use of political power, from money-lending, or from large mining operations.

Through political power

As has already been pointed out, the rise of money economy was closely associated with the rise of strong central governments in the European states.[2] It was the increasing possibility of raising money taxes that enabled the princes of the Later Middle Ages to hire standing armies and support a centralized administration, thus freeing themselves from dependence on

[1] See above, pages 248–53.

[2] See above, pages 356–59.

the feudal nobles. At present, however, we are interested in another aspect of the collection and expenditure of the growing royal revenue. The collection of royal taxes meant the accumulation in one place of a sum of money larger than could be gathered together in the normal course of trade. And where any large sum of public money is gathered together, there are always opportunities for the divergence of considerable portions of it into private hands. Medieval governments were notoriously careless and inefficient in the handling of finance. The king might be in constant need of money, but the officials who were entrusted with the handling of the royal revenue frequently retired with sizable fortunes. It is said that the French superintendent of finance, Pierre Remy, left a fortune equivalent to $14,000,000 on his death in 1328. Similar opportunities were afforded by the revenues of great nobles, whose lands were petty states in themselves.

Money-lending and banking

Another source of early fortunes, and one of the earliest ways in which surplus capital could be made to produce more capital, was the practice of usury, as the church called it, i.e., money-lending at high rates of interest. There had been money-lenders all through the medieval period, many of them Jews, who made large though uncertain profits, and in the Later Middle Ages an extensive banking and money-lending business, with ramifications reaching to every part of Europe, was built up first by Lombard and then by Tuscan and German bankers. The famous Augsburg banking house of the Fuggers and the Florentine bank of the Medici are but examples of a number of fifteenth-century firms engaged in what would today be called international finance, and even earlier the bankers had become a very real power in international affairs. The most important clients of the early bankers were the rulers of the European states, who needed large sums of money at short notice for the paying and equipping of armies or for other expenses of the government and the court. Edward III could not possibly have begun the Hundred Years' War had he not been able to borrow large sums from the Florentine bankers to pay his new type of non-feudal army, and even his relatively peaceful contemporary, the Emperor Charles IV, is reported to have borrowed two million francs in one year. The new centralized monarchies were discovering the potential power of money. They regularly anticipated the income from revenues that could not be collected very rapidly, and were almost constantly in debt. The profits from this sort of money-lending were usually very high, but also very uncertain, for a prince might readily disown his obligations, as Edward III did, thereby ruining a number of Florentine bankers and causing a disastrous financial

panic in Tuscany, and the heir to a throne would not always feel obliged to assume his predecessor's debts. Next to the rulers, the most constant borrowers were the feudal nobles, chronically improvident and hard-pressed for ready money, and the great ecclesiastical lords who built the magnificent cathedrals and monastery buildings on borrowed money, or squandered their incomes and all they could borrow in very much the same fashion as did the lay nobles. One thirteenth-century Archbishop of Cologne, for example, borrowed a million francs from the Italian bankers. In short, most of this early money-lending was for unproductive purposes. It did not bring profit to the borrower as well as to the lender. Hence the objections of church and people alike to the practice of usury. When money was lent, as it was beginning to be in the fifteenth century, for such productive purposes as the financing of large commercial ventures, there was little or no objection.

Before we consider the use of capital for commercial purposes, however, we must note one exceptional method of accumulating a fortune, closely allied to political power and banking, yet more productive than official graft or the lending of money to impecunious monarchs and nobles. In the Later Middle Ages mining operations on a large scale were undertaken by men, mostly bankers or princes, who had enough capital to enable them to introduce improved technical methods and enough political power or influence to secure a monopoly of mining rights in a given district. A fair share of the Fugger fortune came from the operation of German silver mines.

Mining

Mining and banking played a particularly important part in the rise of capitalism, because they helped to furnish the tools of capital — money and accounting — as well as to accumulate fortunes. In the age when modern business was just beginning, "hard" money — that is, gold and silver coinage — was a much more essential ingredient in every business transaction than it is in our own day of elaborately organized credit systems. Up to the middle of the fifteenth century, the amount of money in circulation in Europe seems to have increased fairly steadily, though slowly, as the general volume of business grew and the opportunities for profitable investment became more numerous, thus bringing hoarded money into active circulation. From the end of the thirteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century, however, the total amount of money in existence in Europe probably did not increase, or may actually have decreased; for there was a lull in mining operations and a good deal of gold and silver was drained out of Europe by the luxury trade with the East. The revival of mining on a large scale

The tools of capital: money and accounting

after the latter date, due to the investment of capital to finance difficult operations, was of great importance in adding to the supply of coinage, which was so necessary to the development of capital. This supply was still further augmented in the sixteenth century by the importation of gold and silver from the mines of Mexico and Peru.

Almost equally important was the work of the bankers, not only in mobilizing capital, but also in working out a technique of convenient and accurate accounting, which is one of the principal tools of active capital. Originating in Italy, the science of accounting by double-entry bookkeeping spread to all parts of Europe by the beginning of the sixteenth century. Its adoption marks a definite stage in the development of capitalist business. It made possible accurate estimates of profit and loss, which greatly facilitated the handling of a large business, and also had a profound psychological effect on the business man himself by clarifying his attitude toward his business and pointing out with unmistakable clearness the importance of profit as his chief aim. Moreover, the improved methods of bookkeeping enabled the bankers to work out a system of clearing or exchanging bills of indebtedness, so that international trade could be carried on with less dependence on the transfer of actual money.

In short, by the dawn of the modern age, a new type of wealth was already in existence, while a new technique for handling it and a new attitude toward its use were in the making. This new wealth was money wealth. Men had discovered the potentialities of capital and the truth of the axiom that money can make money. Business men were beginning to think in terms of investment of capital and to aim at the accumulation of profit rather than at the acquisition of a mere living. We must turn back now to trace the introduction of capital into commerce and industry, for it is investment in these productive enterprises that is the most essential characteristic of modern capitalism.

The new wealth

2. CAPITAL REVOLUTIONIZES COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

Given the existence of fortunes large enough to leave a surplus for investment, the introduction of capital into commercial life awaited only the opening-up of opportunities for the investment in trade of money in sufficient quantities to be dignified by the name of capital. Such opportunities were very few in the period of the High Middle Ages. Most medieval commerce was handled by small merchants, working under guild or


New opportunities for investment in trade

city regulations which usually limited them to dealing in one kind of goods and to a small quantity. True, they had a small working capital, but they could scarcely be called capitalists, for they seldom aimed at or achieved more than the making of a respectable living from their trade. Only in long-distance, seaborne trade, like that between the Italian cities and the East, was it possible for a merchant to deal in large enough quantities to leave room for the investment of any considerable amount of money or the making of any considerable profit. It was in this trade that the first purely commercial fortunes were founded. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, however, opportunities for larger commercial ventures became steadily more numerous and more general in all parts of Europe. These were in part the result of the larger and more concentrated demand created by the rising territorial states and the growing cities. The rulers of the new centralized states entered the market for large supplies of goods to equip their armies or for the luxurious needs of a royal court. This demand could be met more profitably and more conveniently by merchants working on a more extensive scale than that of their medieval forerunners, and frequently a single merchant or a small group would be able to secure a monopoly. The phenomenal fortune built up by the fifteenth-century French merchant, Jacques Coeur, owed a good deal to his double position as merchant and controller of the royal finances, so that as the king's agent he bought the government supplies from himself. The growth of great cities had a similar effect on trade, by creating a concentrated market for large quantities of goods from distant parts.

New trade routes and the expansion of Europe

Finally, and this is perhaps the most important single factor in creating new opportunities for the investment of capital in trade, at the end of the fifteenth century, the discovery of new ocean trade routes to Africa, India, and the Americas[1] opened up the most distant and most profitable trade that the world had yet seen. The Portuguese merchants, who brought back shiploads of spices, dyes, and silks from India, realized an almost incredible profit on their investment. Scarcely less profitable was the trade between Spain and the New World. Spanish merchants imported gold and silver, the priceless cochineal, dyes, and drugs, and sent out in return to the growing Spanish colonies all the necessities of life. Nor were the profits from these new trade routes limited to Portugal and Spain. The cargoes that came into the harbors of Lisbon or Seville were trans-shipped to the Netherlands for distribution, and

[1] See above, pages 385–88.



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

THE WEAVERS AND THEIR WAREHOUSES NEAR THE PORTA RAVEGNANA (1411)

An illumination from a fifteenth-century guild book

before long, Dutch, English, and French merchants were competing for their share in the New World trade.

But if the profits from this new ocean commerce were great, the risks and the time involved in distant voyages were also considerable and the initial investment must be fairly large. Such commerce could not have been carried on under the primitive guild system. Nor, indeed, could the expanding volume of trade within Europe itself have been handled successfully by the old methods. It is extremely difficult to trace the exact relation between cause and effect in the gradual transition from the guild system to the conduct of trade by individual capitalists; but the net result is clear. A constantly expanding volume of trade on a world-wide scale was outgrowing the framework of a system which had been designed to meet the needs of a much more limited economic life. New conditions demanded new methods, and the tradition-ridden guilds were not sufficiently flexible or adaptable to survive in competition with the relatively unrestricted capitalists, who were prepared to seize every opportunity offered by the changing times. Those centers of trade where the medieval system was too firmly entrenched to be dislodged now began to decline, while other centers where capital could operate more freely took on new life. Among the other advantages enjoyed by capital was its freedom to migrate. It could be transferred easily to the new strategic centers created by the shift in the direction of world trade. In the sixteenth century many German capitalists shifted their investments to Antwerp to take advantage of the rising Atlantic trade. Capital, in short, was a fluid force, eminently adaptable. It could be moved, not only from place to place, but from one kind of business to another, as was demonstrated by the Fuggers, who kept their money working constantly in banking, mining, commerce, and industry, piling up profit by the modern method of a constant and rapid turnover.

Commerce outgrows the guild system

The new conditions of trade, with greater opportunities for carrying goods in large quantities and from distant sources, gave rise to a new figure in European commerce, the entrepreneur or wholesale middleman. In the Middle Ages, when most international trade was concentrated in the periodic fairs, commerce was carried on by small wandering merchants, who sold their goods in large part directly to the consumer. At the same time local trade was handled chiefly by masters of the craft guilds who made their goods and sold them at retail, across the counters of their shops. This system survived through the sixteenth century, but the increased bulk demand of the cities was rapidly rendering it obsolete. Trade was outgrowing local

Rise of the entrepreneur

limits, and the transportation of goods from place to place was being taken over by wholesale middlemen, who stood between the producer and the retail merchant. Handling goods in bulk, the entrepreneur had to have considerable capital to invest, but having that, he had a great advantage over his smaller competitors. Because of his strategic position between supply and demand, and because he was often able to secure a monopoly of trade either from the state government or through association with others like himself, the entrepreneur was frequently able to control prices at both ends and thus make certain of a profit.

Partnerships and companies

As compared to the medieval method of doing business, the investment of capital in wholesale trade was essentially an individual enterprise; yet the new type of merchant found that there were still many advantages to be gained from association. In this respect the familiar guild organization provided a model that could be adapted to new uses. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed the formation of a number of merchant companies for the purpose of securing monopolies or special privileges for their members, though each member traded independently on his own capital. Such were the great London companies of Mercers, Drapers, and Grocers, who dealt in linen and silk fabrics, wholesale woolen cloth, and spices and drugs, respectively.

More characteristic of the modern development of capital, however, were the merchant associations of another kind, partnerships, family firms, and eventually joint-stock companies. As has already been suggested, the wholesale trade, and especially the long-distance trade, demanded the investment of a considerable sum of capital to finance each venture. Not every merchant had enough capital to buy a large cargo or to send a ship to distant parts. Or, if he did have it, he might not be willing to risk so much on one venture. This problem could be solved by the formation of a temporary partnership of several merchants, each of whom would contribute a share of the necessary investment and would receive his proportionate share of the profit when the enterprise was completed. Such partnerships, if repeated, might in time lose their temporary character and become permanent business firms. Partnerships or associations of capital within the limits of a family group were the most likely to assume this permanent character.

The most complete development of the principle of association was represented by the joint-stock company. Though fairly common in southern Europe before the first one was organized in England in 1553 for the exploitation of the newly discovered northeast trade route to Russia via the White Sea, they remained fairly rare in the north until

the end of the sixteenth century. As a rule the joint-stock companies were organized only when it was necessary to open up new and especially expensive or hazardous trade routes to distant lands. On the surface, their organization looks very much like that of a modern corporation. Each investor purchased a share or shares of the joint stock, thus contributing to the capital of the company, which was managed as a whole by the company's officers. However, they still kept many of the characteristics of the simple partnership, for each shareholder was responsible for the entire debts of the company.

Capital invades industry

The rise of capitalist commerce led inevitably to the introduction of capital into industry. The artisan, or manufacturer to use a more modern word, supplied the goods in which the trader dealt, and, as the merchant began to handle goods in larger quantities and to carry them farther afield, there arose opportunities for the production of goods in greater quantities than had been needed to supply a local market or the relatively small demands of the ordinary medieval merchant. This demand for a larger volume of production created openings for the investment of capital in industry, in the same way that the demands of a growing market had done in commerce, and the results were as revolutionary. Medieval industry had been essentially small industry, designed for the most part to supply a local market. The typical guild master was a retail merchant, who sold his goods in his own shop, as well as a manufacturer. Even when he sold his goods to a merchant for export, guild regulations usually limited him to a small quantity of production by prescribing the number of apprentices and journeymen whom he might employ. This system proved adequate for the needs of a relatively simple economic life. It could not meet the demands of a rapidly expanding market and a growing international trade. This was apparent first in those industries which manufactured goods chiefly for sale in distant parts. Here there was growing up a wholesale demand, which necessitated, or at least created opportunities for, wholesale production, and wholesale production meant the investment of capital. In some cases industry adapted itself to the use of capital by a natural internal growth. In others, the capitalist method was imposed upon it by the entrepreneur, who handled raw materials and goods in wholesale lots, and who found it more profitable to hire laborers to work up his goods than to sell raw materials to individual masters and buy the finished product from them. In any case, the commercial middleman tended to separate the manufacturer from the consumer, and so destroyed one of the most characteristic elements of the original craft guild system.

Radical as was the change wrought wherever capital invaded industry, it did not, as a rule, result in the immediate destruction of the guilds. Rather, it tended to transform them, until they had entirely lost their original character. There were two fairly common ways in which this was accomplished. The first occurred in those industries where a number of craft guilds in turn worked on the manufacture of a product intended for a foreign market, and where the merchant guild, which handled the finished product, succeeded in dominating the workers' guilds. The best example of this process is the cloth-making industry in Florence, England, Flanders, and elsewhere. Here there was a necessary division of labor. The wool passed through the hands of weavers, dyers, fullers, and shearmen, before it was finally bought and sold as finished cloth by the merchants of the *Arte di Lana*, as the merchant guild was called in Florence, or the drapers, as they were called in England. As the only large and constant customers, the cloth merchants, by working together, found it easy to control prices and methods of work. This the *Arte di Lana* of Florence succeeded in doing as early as the end of the thirteenth century. The next step was for the merchants, who were themselves rapidly becoming capitalist entrepreneurs, organized in merchant companies solely for the purpose of securing monopolies, to buy the raw wool in bulk and hire the members of the workers' guilds to make it into cloth. They were now large employers, who had invested considerable capital in industry; and the masters of the subordinate craft guilds had sunk to the position of mere wage-earners. Those masters who clung to their independence were forced out of competition, because cloth that had been bought and sold in small quantities by a series of independent masters cost the merchants, who were the only purchasers, more than it did under the new system, in which the merchant bought the raw wool and merely paid wages. The final step in the subjection of the workers was taken when, as occurred in England in the sixteenth century, the merchant employers began to give out their wool to workers who were not guildsmen and who, therefore, could not combine to keep up wages.

Capital in the guilds

A second way in which capital invaded the guild system was demonstrated by the rise of capitalist masters within the guild itself, where there was a demand for quantity production. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, particularly in the most thriving industrial centers in France, England, and Germany, many of the guilds were becoming very exclusive. The masters banded together to form a small oligarchy and to exclude all outsiders from mastership. Having full control of

the guild, they were able to relax the rules regarding the number of apprentices and journeymen whom any one master might employ. Each master could thus produce a larger quantity of goods. The result was that the masters, who still retained their guild monopoly of the right to sell their product in the city, became in reality merchant employers, while the majority of the workers in the craft became permanent wage-earners, who would in all probability remain journeymen for life. The growing gap between worker and employer within the guilds is shown by the numerous attempts of journeymen in all parts of Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to form guilds of their own for defense against the masters, and by the formation, as in the English "livery companies," of organizations of the wealthy masters inside the guild, for the purpose of controlling the workers and the sale of goods.

Capital outside the guilds

While capital, in these various ways, was reshaping the guild system and making it serve its own interests, there was also a steady growth of capitalist industry outside the guilds altogether. The original capital for this type of industrial enterprise was nearly always furnished by commerce. An example has already been noted in the wool merchants who gave out their wool to non-guild workers as a means of escaping the restrictions imposed by such few privileges as the guildsmen still retained. This usually necessitated the moving of industry from old established centers with traditional guilds to new towns or villages where no guild was already in existence. There the capitalist employer could pay lower wages and hence make a larger profit. And as capital inevitably followed profit, the new unrestricted centers throve and took business away from the old guild towns. The decline of many old English towns and the rise of new industrial centers in the north and west of England are good indications of the geographical shift that often followed the capitalization of industry.

One final word of warning before we leave this subject: we must not forget, in concentrating our attention on the new developments of this age, that the transformation of industry by capital was a slow process and was not completed until two centuries or more after the end of the sixteenth century. Some parts of Europe lagged behind the rest, and there were almost everywhere some small guilds that survived with little change.

So far we have been dealing with the effect of capital on the economic life of the towns and cities. But what of the great majority of the population in every country, who still wrung their living from the

cultivation of the soil? Their life was as yet almost untouched by the transforming power of capital. Agriculture was the most conservative form of economic activity, the most thoroughly bound by tradition. In most parts of Europe, the ownership of land was not yet regarded as an investment, like a commercial or industrial business. It was rather an inherited possession, handed down in noble or knightly families, and worked in small plots by peasants who were traditional tenants and who owed customary dues to the landlord. The peasant tenants had few opportunities to accumulate the capital that would have been needed to change their methods of cultivation or their economic status, and the hereditary tenant system afforded few chances to the lord for the investment of capital in technical improvement or large-scale production. In short, though political feudalism was declining, economic feudalism still persisted. Some changes, however, were taking place. Money economy had already spread from the towns to the country, and, in most places, the peasants had arranged to pay a cash rent to their lord as a commutation of the personal services they owed him. And this change, slight though it was, did something to shake the rigid structure of custom and left some openings for capitalist enterprise. In some parts of Germany, wealthy burghers were buying up land with a view to exploiting it at a profit, and in both Holland and England capitalist methods were beginning to invade this last stronghold of medieval tradition.

Agriculture

The first signs of this development can be observed most clearly in England, for there feudalism died earlier than in most continental countries. The popular outcry against "enclosures" in the sixteenth century points to one of the ways in which capital was changing agricultural methods at the expense of the hereditary peasant tenants. By this was meant the fencing-in of the open fields of the manor in order to use them for grazing sheep. This required an initial capital investment, but brought a larger profit to the landowner, first, because the price of wool was rising with the expanding English woolen industry, and second, because grazing required the employment of much less labor than did the cultivation of the soil. But, though profitable to the landlord, this was disastrous to the peasants who were driven from their ancestral lands and thrown out of employment. As a matter of fact, the amount of land actually enclosed was comparatively small, but it demonstrated a change in attitude on the part of the English landowners. Traditional rights were being less carefully observed. Before the end of the sixteenth century, in many

Enclosures in England

parts of England hereditary tenancy was giving way to leases for life or for a term of years.

3. CAPITAL AND THE STATE

We have already commented, in this and previous chapters, on the close relation between the growth of capital and the rise of the national or territorial states. This relation was so important that it deserves some further discussion, even though it may be in part repetition.

Capital and the rise of the state

The origins of that gradual centralization of power in the hands of a monarch or prince, which was characteristic of most of the states of Europe in the Later Middle Ages, can be traced back to a time before capital, in the modern sense, was a vital force in business, but not before money had become an important factor in economic life. The growing power of the monarch depended on his ability to collect money to pay and equip an army and to maintain an effective administrative system. Since money circulated most freely among the business class of the towns and cities, and since they were as a rule not a part of the feudal system, the monarch depended on them for a considerable share of his taxes. As the central governments grew stronger, and feudalism declined, kings were able to extend taxation to the rural districts, yet the commercial and industrial middle class still remained an important source of royal revenue. The growth of capital among this class, therefore, greatly increased the possibilities of royal taxation. Capitalist business increased the amount of money in circulation and, at the same time, it concentrated a large part of that money in the hands of a relatively small class, thus making the collection of taxes easier. The rulers of Europe soon realized the extent to which their own power, or that of the state, depended on the prosperity of the capitalist business men, and with that realization they began consciously to promote the interests of capital.

The state and the rise of capital

Before discussing the conscious promotion of business by the state, however, let us pause to note some of the ways in which the rise of territorial states unconsciously favored the early steps in the growth of capital. We have already explained how the development of central governments aided the accumulation of those large fortunes which were among the important prerequisites of capitalism. Royal officials and bankers who lent money to state governments were among the first to gather together surplus capital that might be invested in productive enterprises. Moreover, the supplying of goods for the state armies and the royal courts furnished

some of the earliest opportunities for the investment of capital in large-scale commercial transactions. More important than any of these factors, however, was the greater security and order which strong centralized governments alone could enforce. The free and safe circulation of trade that was essential to the success of capitalist business would have been impossible in the midst of the earlier feudal chaos. So, if the rulers of the European states realized their need of a prosperous business class, the capitalist merchants and manufacturers realized as clearly their need of a strong state government.

The state an economic unit

This close relation between the new type of state and the new type of business inevitably tended to make the territorial or national state the most important unit in economic life, just as the city had been in the High Middle Ages. Medieval merchants and artisans had looked to the city government for protection, and it in turn had regulated their activity, either directly or through the agency of the guilds, in the interest of the whole city community. All trade outside the city was in a sense foreign trade, and was intermunicipal in character. Now, with broader economic interests to consider, the capitalist merchants and manufacturers began to look to the state for protection, and the state government in turn regulated trade and industry for the good of the whole state as they conceived it. One great advantage of this transference of economic control from the city to the state was the clearing-away of the economic barriers, set up by city exclusiveness, to trade within the state itself; a second was the greater protection which the state could give to its merchants in foreign parts.

State economic policy: mercantilism

The economic policy adopted by the European states when they took over the regulation of business was in many respects similar to that of the medieval cities, save that it was carried out on a much larger scale. The activity of the individual was still controlled, though not so rigidly, for the good of the whole community. This national economic policy is generally known as "mercantilism." It was developed to its fullest extent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but it was also generally practiced in the sixteenth century and signs of it were apparent at an even earlier date. Mercantilism consists essentially in the regulation of industry and commerce by the state government, with a view to making the state more prosperous and hence more powerful in relation to neighboring states. One of the primary aims of mercantilist policy, though by no means the only aim, was the accumulation in the state of as large a supply of money — i.e., gold and silver — as possible. Actual

money played a much more important part in the conduct of business then than now. Moreover, in the days before the credit system had been so highly developed as to enable states to float large national debts, money was very necessary to pay the expenses of the growing national armies, on which the safety of the state depended. And the amount of money that the government could collect in taxes depended more or less on the amount in existence in the state. The government, therefore, regulated trade whenever possible, so as to encourage exports above imports. This was called maintaining a favorable balance of trade, for if a country sold more than it bought, more money would come into the state than would leave it. Another aim, closely allied to the first, was to increase the wealth of the state by founding colonies, as Spain and Portugal did in the sixteenth century and England, France, and Holland in the seventeenth, and to exploit them in the interest of the mother country. The mercantilist state always endeavored to maintain an exclusive monopoly of trade with its colonies, exchanging manufactured goods for raw materials of greater potential value. Since war was an ever-present possibility in the mercantilist age, the preparation for war was a regular part of every government's economic policy. This explains why some states, like France, frequently forbade the exportation of grain, so that the country would not be dependent on its neighbors for food in case of war, and why maritime states, like England, promoted the shipbuilding and fishing industries and issued navigation acts to encourage native shipping, thus building up a merchant marine manned by trained seamen as a sort of naval reserve.

State regulation of commerce: monopolies

If the purpose of state economic legislation was in many ways like that of the medieval cities, the theory which justified it was still more clearly a legacy from the Middle Ages. The right to trade was still not regarded as the natural right of every resident; it was rather a privilege to be granted by the government as it saw fit. From this it followed naturally that the government which granted the right to trade had full power also to regulate the method of trade. Every sixteenth-century state government exercised that power in a variety of ways, but nowhere was the theory of privilege and control demonstrated more clearly than in the granting of monopolies to companies or groups of merchants for some specific type of trade. Sometimes a state would grant a monopoly to foreign merchants when it needed the goods that only they could supply, or in order to secure reciprocal advantages for its own merchants in foreign countries. More commonly, however, the monopolies were granted to organizations of native merchants. Such were the

monopolies given by the governments of England, France, and Holland to the companies that opened up trade with the Far East, or the earlier monopoly of exporting English cloth to the Netherlands granted to the Company of Merchant Adventurers. These monopolies served the double purpose of excluding foreigners from the trade and of encouraging the most effective native trading organizations by freeing them from both native and foreign competition. In addition, the government often profited directly by retaining a share in the profits of the monopolistic company.

Regulation of industry

In regulating industry, the mercantilist governments followed the same principles as motivated their commercial legislation. Indeed, the two cannot be separated. Realizing that the wealth of a state depended in large part on its productive power, the best rulers of the mercantilist age made every effort to stimulate manufacturing, especially of those goods that could be exported in order to maintain the favorable balance of trade or that might be useful to the state in time of war. With this in mind they granted monopolies and even subsidies to those companies, guilds, or localities that seemed best fitted to produce needed goods. Whenever possible they strove to introduce and foster new industries that would make the state more independent of other countries. Thus, in the late sixteenth century the silk industry was introduced into France with government aid, and the glass industry was founded with royal monopolies in both France (1551) and England (1567). Government regulation and aid, however, did not always serve their intended purpose, and not infrequently industries were more hampered than helped by the well-meaning efforts of a paternalistic state.

Employment and poor relief

When the state took upon itself the task of controlling the economic life of its citizens, it was forced also to assume the responsibility for adjusting those social problems that arose from the working-out of economic conditions. This was a relatively new problem for state governments, but before the end of the sixteenth century state legislation designed to fix wages and regulate conditions of labor was fairly common. Such legislation was usually much more favorable to the capitalist employers, who could bring pressure to bear on the government, than to the unorganized laborers, yet the interests of the latter and of the unemployed were not entirely neglected. The Elizabethan Poor Laws and the famous Statute of Apprentices are but examples of numerous state laws that were intended, in part at least, to protect the laborers and care for the poor.

4. CAPITAL AND SOCIETY

We have seen how the rise of capital caused an economic revolution and fostered a political revolution through aiding the rise of the territorial states. It was the fundamental cause also of a social revolution, which had only begun in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but which when completed would have reshaped society from top to bottom. The rise of capital changed the character of wealth and the sources of power. In the Middle Ages power resulted usually from an inherited position in society, and wealth was the product of power. It was only in small part money wealth; in much larger part it consisted of the ability to command the services of men by virtue of hereditary contracts. In the modern world, on the other hand, wealth is the source of power, and modern wealth is essentially money wealth. It is money that creates the power to control the services of men. This is the essence of the social revolution that was beginning in these transitional centuries.

Capital reshapes society

As a result of this social revolution, two powers, closely allied, rose to dominate the rest of society. They were the monarchy, representing the power of the territorial state, and the wealthy middle class or bourgeoisie. The latter was eventually to triumph over the monarchy itself and was either to control or destroy it, but for the present they were content to serve its interests, secure in the knowledge that its interests were also their own. Meanwhile, as the state grew stronger and the wealthy bourgeoisie more influential, the power of the feudal nobility declined.[1] They still maintained their social prestige, their pride of class and many of their special privileges, but they were no longer the dominating class in European society.

Triumph of the state and the bourgeoisie

The nobles, however, were not the only class to suffer because of the rising power of money. Capital reduced to complete subjection the much more numerous class of industrial laborers. They were no longer included among the bourgeoisie and did not rise with them to power; for the introduction of capital into industry had driven an ever-widening wedge between the few who became rich employers and the many who became mere wage-earners, with little chance of ever rising above that position. This is perhaps the most significant of all the changes wrought by the rise of capital. In the High Middle Ages, when nearly all industry was confined within the limits of the guild system, no such permanent division between em-

Subjection of the proletariat

[1] See above, pages 355–57.

ployer and worker had existed, for every apprentice and journeyman expected some day to become a master and an employer on a small scale, and every employer had been at one time a wage-earning journeyman. At the end of the sixteenth century, this might still be true in some places, especially in the smaller crafts; but in the large industries a very different condition existed. The great majority of industrial workers already formed a class in society by themselves — the proletariat. Unorganized, or with organization strictly controlled by the state, unrepresented in government, uneducated, and lacking the surplus capital that was the source of power in the new society, men of this class had little hope of bettering their condition, either individually or as a whole. They were the victims of the new economic system, reinforced by the tacit alliance of their employers with the state.

In conclusion, we must note two striking results of the capitalist revolution, which are so important that they cannot be ignored, by the historian or by anyone else. The first is the vast increase in the total wealth of the world produced by the capitalist system; the second, the concentration of a disproportionately large share of that wealth in the hands of a few people, thus opening up a tremendous gap between the economic and social status of the rich minority and the poor majority. Whether the latter condition will remain permanently as yet remains to be seen.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FRANCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ABSOLUTE MONARCHY

(1598–1660)

THE sixteenth century, which had opened with such brilliant promise for France, drew to its close in the midst of disillusionment and disaster. When the century began, France had seemed about to enter upon a new and glorious epoch of national strength. The monarchy had apparently won at last its long fight for centralized government and national unity against the independent feudal nobility, and the dream of extending French power across the Alps into the fabulous land of Italy seemed already an accomplished fact. But sixty years of foreign wars ended with the abandonment of the costly Italian dream; and a further generation of civil Wars of Religion left France distracted and desolate, powerless in foreign affairs and internally divided, with her people impoverished and her government bankrupt, and with the ancient specter of feudal independence once more raising its head to mock an impotent monarchy. Just as the century ended, however, there were signs of renewed hope. Henry of Bourbon, King of Navarre, had become King Henry IV of France, and under his strong hand, peace, unity, and order were restored to the troubled land. Once secure upon his throne, Henry devoted himself to the task of reconstructing his shattered country and restoring the power and prestige of the monarchy at home and abroad. Many of the results of his work were wasted in the years following his death, but the task of strengthening the state was taken up again by Richelieu and by Mazarin, to such good effect that when the young King Louis XIV took over the personal government of his kingdom he found France the foremost power in Europe and himself an absolute monarch, whose authority was questioned by neither noble nor commoner.

Meanwhile, keeping pace with the evolution of the national monarchical state, the national culture of France was taking form. In the midst of the foreign and civil wars of the sixteenth century, France reaped the late fruits of the Renaissance and utilized the legacy of antiquity to aid in the formation of her national tongue. And when peace and order were restored, the aristocracy and intellect of France combined to lay

the foundations of that refined society and polished literature that were to be the envy and despair of Europe in the age of Louis XIV.

1. HENRY IV RECONSTRUCTS FRANCE (1598–1610)

Though Henry IV had inherited the royal title in 1589,[1] five years of fighting passed before he was officially crowned, and it was not till 1596 that he received the submission of the last of the Catholic League. Meanwhile, he had been forced into war with Philip II of Spain, and peace at home was very uncertain with the real issue of the Wars of Religion still unsettled. Born soldier though he was, Henry was eager to restore peace, so that his country might have an opportunity to recover from the devastating turmoil of the preceding generation. In 1598, he brought the war with Spain to an end by the Treaty of Vervins, and in the same year he issued the epoch-making Edict of Nantes, which accomplished the still more important objective of securing internal peace for France by a fair settlement of the vexatious religious problem. Henry had become a Catholic for reasons of state, because he was to be the ruler of a country that was predominantly Catholic, but he had not forgotten his old Huguenot friends. The Edict of Nantes granted them complete freedom of conscience, the right of public worship in all places where it already existed and in a number of other specified places, and the right to hold any public office. As a temporary guaranty that these rights would be respected, the Huguenots were also given the privilege of governing and garrisoning some two hundred cities, mostly in southern and western France. This was a dangerous concession and caused trouble later, but the establishment of religious toleration was wise and just. That part of the edict remained in force for nearly a century. It reunited the kingdom and made France the one country in Europe where men of two different religions could dwell together in peace and equal citizenship.

Peace restored (1598)

Edict of Nantes

With the restoration of peace at home and abroad, Henry IV was free at last to take up his colossal task of reconstructing France, restoring the power of the monarchy, and rehabilitating French prestige in Europe. It was a task that might well have daunted a lesser man, for it involved every aspect of government. In the first place, the government must be rescued from bankruptcy and its finances put on a firm footing. Next, the people must be aided to recover their lost prosperity. Then the authority of the central government

Henry's task

[1] See above, pages 455–56.

must be strengthened and the nobles reduced to obedience. And finally, the king must use all the power of the revived state, with the aid of skillful diplomacy, to teach the other powers of Europe that France was still a nation to be reckoned with.

Henry and Sully

For the carrying-out of this great task, no king in French history was better suited by nature than Henry IV, or, perhaps it would be fairer to say, than Henry IV aided by that most careful, energetic, and honest of French ministers, the Duke of Sully. The restoration of France was the product of the cordial collaboration of these two men of very different character. They had been friends and companions in arms from their youth up. During the troubled years of the Wars of Religion, Henry had learned to depend on Sully, then Marquis of Rosny, for those compensating qualities which he himself lacked. They were both good soldiers, though Sully fought with a cold Calvinist fury that was in marked contrast to the king's reckless, swaggering gallantry, but it was in the council rather than in the field of battle that Sully proved his worth. For Henry needed someone to check his tendency to extravagance. He was genial, friendly, endowed with the personal magnetism and understanding of men's characters which are essential to a leader, but also inclined to be profligate. His best qualities of mind were clear intelligence, sound common sense, and the kind of constructive imagination that is needed to shape the general policies of a state. In short, Henry was a popular king and a wise statesman, but he had not the qualities that make an administrator. And France needed an administrator. Henry realized that need and knew that in Sully he had the man to meet it. A rigid Protestant, grim, cautious, economical, and unshakably honest, Sully would never be popular, but he could be trusted to the limit, and he had all the tireless energy and passion for detail that are the marks of the born administrator. Henry might conceive wise policies, but it was Sully who attended to the practical problems of the business of government.

Reconstruction of royal finance

Sully's most immediate and pressing problem was to free the government from its apparently hopeless financial embarrassment. Years of foreign and civil wars, the weakness of the last Valois kings, and the confusion, inefficiency, extravagance, and corruption that pervaded every branch of the financial administration had combined to bring the state close to the verge of bankruptcy. The people were crushed by heavy and inequitable taxes; yet the royal income was utterly inadequate to meet current expenses. In part this was the result of a vicious financial system inherited from the Middle Ages. A badly organized multitude of officials and a criminally careless

system of bookkeeping made waste and corruption almost unavoidable. Moreover, the method of levying taxes was unjust and terribly wasteful. The *taille*, a personal and property tax, which represented the largest part of the royal income, was paid almost entirely by the poorer classes, since nobles and clergy were exempt and the wealthy bourgeoisie could often escape their just share. In order to raise money quickly, this and other taxes were "farmed out" to private persons or corporations in return for a lump sum. The tax "farmers" then collected as much as they could — usually far more than they had paid the government — from the defenseless people. It has been reckoned that under a weak administration not more than twenty-five per cent of the taxes paid by the people ever reached the royal treasury. Sully made no serious effort to reform this vicious system, but he did try to ensure its being honestly administered. He imposed a reasonable amount of order upon the administration, insisted on a strict accounting for all income and expenditure, did away with a number of useless offices, forced dishonest officials to disgorge, and saw to it that the money collected in taxes did not disappear on its way to the treasury. By such measures, Sully was able to decrease the *taille*, while at the same time increasing the royal revenue, and by cutting down waste and extravagance he was able to provide plenty of money for all the legitimate expenses of government, including the cost of building up a strong army and financing public works and other measures for promoting general prosperity. By the end of Henry's reign, he had recovered much of the royal domain, alienated by his predecessors; had paid off nearly a third of the national debt; and had accumulated a substantial surplus for use in any emergency.

Promotion of economic recovery

In his preoccupation with the finances of the royal government, however, Sully did not forget that the wealth of the state depends in the long run on the prosperity of its citizens. Careful though he was to keep down royal expenses, he spent money freely on the improvement of roads, bridges, canals, and harbors, thus stimulating the economic life of the state by providing safe and convenient means of communication. He was also greatly interested in the promotion of agriculture, which he believed to be the true basis of national prosperity. With characteristic energy, he undertook the draining of marshes, the reclaiming of wastelands, and the resettling of districts deserted during the late civil wars. In addition he opened up a foreign market for the farmers by removing the prohibition on the exportation of grain from the country. To all this the king gave his hearty support, and also added some important innovations of his own. Henry,

indeed, was a sounder economist than Sully, and took an active interest in both industry and commerce, which his minister tended to ignore. It was the king who introduced the silk industry into France, stimulated other industries by subsidies and monopolies, made favorable commercial treaties with Spain and England, and founded the French colonial empire by sending out the first colonists to New France, the Canada of the future. And, most important of all, Henry gave to France a dozen years of peace and security, which was all a naturally industrious people needed to work out their own economic salvation. When Henry's reign ended, there was still much poverty in the country, but the general economic condition was vastly improved, and France had taken a long step in the direction of national recovery.

Meanwhile, Henry had to deal with other than economic problems. Equally important was the task of restoring the authority of the crown, on which the security of the state depended. The civil wars, which had come near to ruining the monarchy, had given a new lease on life to political feudalism. The great nobles had recovered a part of their old independence, and they were always a destructive and disorganizing force in the life of the nation, unless kept well in hand by a strong king. In his struggle for the crown, Henry had been forced to buy off the great nobles of the Catholic League, but once his position was secure he taught them that he was their master. More than once discontented nobles rebelled, but the rebellions were easily crushed. The mass of the people, and especially the solid middle class, were unshakably loyal to the king who had given them peace, security, and a chance to prosper. With their backing, Henry built up as strong a monarchy as France had yet seen. His government was an intelligent, unoppressive absolutism, and that was the best that France could hope for under the circumstances. France had no institutions capable of building up a constitutional monarchy, and the civil wars had proved that the only alternative to absolutism was anarchy.

Subjection of the nobles

Much of Henry's energy, too, was taken up with foreign affairs. He saw the issues clearly and pushed every advantage, so that the growth of France's prestige abroad kept pace with her internal recovery. The king's foreign policy may be summarized in a very few words. His main objective was to free France from the menace of the encircling Hapsburg powers, by weakening Spain and Austria in any possible way. The Hapsburg states were not as strong as they had been, but France still lay wide open to invasion from four different directions. To the south, Spain held Roussillon on the French side of the Pyrenees; to the north, she held Flanders, and to the east, Franche-

Foreign policy

Comté, both divided from France by indefensible frontiers; and to the southeast, Savoy, friendly to the Hapsburgs, opened the way to invaders from northern Italy. With her enemies inside her only geographical defenses, France would never be safe while the Hapsburgs remained strong enough for aggressive action. While giving his country time to draw its breath and recover its strength, Henry devoted himself to diplomacy. He won the alliance of the Duke of Savoy, thus blocking the road from Hapsburg Italy; and in Germany he succeeded in mobilizing a group of Protestant princes in opposition to the Hapsburg emperor. Meanwhile, he was building up a national army and waiting for the right moment to strike a more forcible blow.

When the moment came, Henry rushed to war with his old enthusiasm, but death stopped him before he could accomplish anything. The cause of the war was the death, in 1609, of the Duke of Cleves, Jülich, and Berg, three small but strategically important states on the lower Rhine, near the borders of France. There were two claimants to the succession, both Lutherans, though the people were Catholic. The Emperor Rudolf promptly sent an Austrian army to occupy the duchies, pending the settlement of the succession. Henry naturally considered this act a menace to France. He mobilized his troops at once and rallied his Protestant allies in Germany and Holland. It was to have been a general war against the Hapsburgs in both Germany and Spain. Everything was ready and Henry was about to join his army in the field when an assassin struck him down as he rode through the streets of Paris. The king's death paralyzed France. She withdrew from the war and the anti-Hapsburg alliance disintegrated.

The Cleves-Jülich succession

2. RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN ESTABLISH ABSOLUTE MONARCHY (1624–61)

With the death of Henry IV, the character of French government changed abruptly for the worse. Fourteen years passed before France found again, in Richelieu, a strong hand to guide her destiny. Those years form an interlude of waste, misgovernment, rebellion, and a shiftless foreign policy, during which the best results of Henry's reign were frittered away. For the first half of that period (1610–17), France was ruled by a stupid and irresponsible woman, Henry's widow, Marie de' Medici, acting as regent for their young son Louis XIII, and by her worthless Italian favorites. The queen had no understanding of her late husband's

Interlude of disorder: the regency

policies. She reversed almost every one of them, with disastrous results. She discharged Sully and the rest of Henry's ministers; she wasted the money he had saved and allowed the administration to lapse back into its old state of inefficiency and corruption; she permitted the great nobles to rebel and bought them off, instead of crushing them by force; and finally, she reversed Henry's anti-Hapsburg policy and sought an alliance with Spain, the alliance to be cemented by the marriage of Louis XIII to the Spanish infanta.

Early reign of Louis XIII

Meanwhile, the young king was growing up, disregarded by his mother and humiliated by her all-powerful favorite, the Italian adventurer, Concini, who had become chief minister of the kingdom. In his loneliness, Louis turned for friendship and counsel to his royal falconer, who accompanied him on the hunting expeditions that were his favorite pastime. With this rather obscure gentleman he planned the overthrow of his mother's arrogant minister. The plot was put into effect in 1617. Concini was killed and the queen-mother was banished from the court. The king then took over the government in his own right, with the former falconer, now Duke of Luynes, as his chief minister. The change, however, did not bring any marked improvement in government, for Luynes was a fool and the king was young and inexperienced. So the interlude of disorder continued until 1624, when Louis handed over the government to the capable hands of Cardinal Richelieu, who remained his chief minister almost to the end of his reign.

Richelieu (1624–42)

For eighteen years, Richelieu was master of France. He dominated every branch of the government and shaped the policies of the state. Yet he could not have done so without the steady support of the king. Louis gave him complete authority because he was convinced that Richelieu was the most capable man in France. That Richelieu overshadowed the king does not prove that the latter was a weakling, for no weakling could have backed the terrible cardinal with such stubborn determination against the hatred of the royal family and the whole court. For Richelieu was never popular. Indeed, Louis himself never really liked his awe-inspiring minister, but he trusted him and approved his policies. Throughout his ministry, Richelieu devoted himself with fanatical energy to the accomplishment of two main objectives: first, the unification of the whole state under the absolute authority of the crown, and second, the raising of France to a dominating position among the nations of Europe. It was part of the policy of Henry IV, but only part; for Richelieu, though utterly devoted to the crown and the state, cared nothing for the welfare of the French



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

CARDINAL RICHELIEU
1585–1642

From a painting by Champaigne, Louvre. Armand de Richelieu was a noble as well as a churchman, the king's chief minister as well as a cardinal. The finely chiseled features would appear equally in keeping above the ornamental armor of a seventeenth-century noble. In any case it is the face of a man of refined intelligence and implacable will.

people. He never realized, as Henry did, that the strength of the state depends on the prosperity of its people. He was prepared to sacrifice their interests ruthlessly to what he believed to be the good of the state.

That lack of human interest and understanding kept Richelieu from being a really great statesman, but in one respect at least his ruthlessness was justified. A stern hand was needed to control the great nobles, for under the weak rule of the regent and the young king they had resumed their old lawless ways. They must be crushed if the king was to be really king. In his devotion to the ideal of absolute monarchy, therefore, Richelieu became the avowed enemy of the nobles, and no name or title was too great to save a traitor from the executioner's block. He had spies everywhere, and one conspiracy after another ended in a series of executions before it could become a menace to the state.

Richelieu and the nobles

The same motives determined Richelieu to crush the political power of the Huguenots. He was not a religious fanatic and did not believe in the practical utility of persecution, but the Huguenots as a political party were a menace to the king's authority and to the unity of the kingdom. The Edict of Nantes had left them in armed possession of a number of walled towns and with a religious-political organization of their own. Moreover, they were prepared to use their privileged position to make a bid for further independence. They had rebelled once in 1621 before Richelieu came into power, and he had been minister for only a year when they rebelled again. This time he had to make peace, for the government was not yet strong enough to crush them, but he was working busily so that when the next opportunity occurred he would be ready to take decisive action. He had not long to wait. In 1627, the irresponsible interference of England on the side of the Huguenots precipitated another rebellion. The war lasted for two years, with most of the action centering around the siege of the strongly fortified seaport of La Rochelle. It held out for a year, but when it fell the Huguenot resistance soon crumbled. In 1629, the rebels submitted, giving up all their fortified strongholds and the last of their special military and political privileges. Richelieu had accomplished his purpose, and having done so, he wisely refrained from religious persecution. The main body of the Edict of Nantes, which guaranteed the Huguenots freedom of conscience and equal citizenship with Catholics, was left intact. Shorn of their political organization, but otherwise untouched, the French Protestants settled down to become loyal and useful members of the state.

Suppression of the Huguenots

Having now nothing to fear from the Huguenots, and not much from the great nobles, Richelieu was free to turn his attention to the aggrandizement of France on the international stage. His foreign policy was a revival, *in toto*, of that of Henry IV. His aim was to win security for France and a possible expansion of territory by weakening the Hapsburgs. He was the natural ally of all enemies of Austria and Spain, and would aid them with money or arms as the occasion demanded. To this end he devoted the largest part of his energy in the later years of his ministry. That story, however, belongs more properly to a later chapter dealing with the Thirty Years' War, in which he played a conspicuous part.

Foreign policy

At the end of his life, Richelieu might well look back upon his career of service to the state with satisfaction. He had accomplished everything he really cared about. He had raised French prestige abroad; he had crushed all dangerous opposition to the monarchy at home; and he had built up a strongly centralized government. Yet Richelieu's administration was far from being an entirely successful one, and nothing shows the limitation of vision which kept him from being a really great statesman more clearly than his inability to realize the extent of his failure. His successes had been won at too great a cost to the state, and he left France miserable and impoverished. The people were ground down by the excessive taxes raised to pay for his foreign wars; commerce and industry languished with little aid from the state; and even the government was drifting perilously close to financial ruin. Compared to the standard set by Henry IV and Sully, he cannot be called a successful administrator. He not only neglected the economic interests of the people, but he failed to check extravagance, waste, and corruption in the royal administration, so that both the government and the people suffered more than was necessary even to meet the heavy expenses of the war.

Richelieu's administration

In only one respect did Richelieu attempt to reform the unwieldy administrative system. He sent out royal officials, called "intendants," with arbitrary powers to take over many of the duties of the nobles, governors of the provinces, and other traditional local officials. This reform was in keeping with his general policy of centralizing the government of the state under the king's council and strengthening the authority of the crown at the expense of such feudal institutions as still survived. The intendants were usually well-trained, middle-class men, on whose loyalty the king could rely more securely than on that of the great nobles. Though not as systematically established under Richelieu as they came to be later, the in-

The intendants

tendants already formed the basis of a governmental bureaucracy that would be of great service in holding the country together in any political crisis.

Mazarin and the youth of Louis XIV (1642–61)

The structure of central government which Richelieu had created was put to a severe test in the years following his death. For the king died within a few months after his minister (May, 1643), and the crown was left to a four-year-old child, Louis XIV, with his mother, Anne of Austria, acting as regent. Such a situation almost inevitably spelled trouble, but Richelieu had bequeathed to the young king, with the centralized administration, an able minister to act as his successor, and together they saw the royal government through a troubled period of foreign war and rebellion at home to eventual triumph. The new minister was an Italian who had been for years in Richelieu's service, the Cardinal Mazarin. Until his death, early in 1661, he remained chief minister of France, and in that time he carried out most of Richelieu's policies to their final conclusion. Supple and conciliatory, where Richelieu was hard and ruthless, the Italian cardinal had not the awe-inspiring personality of his terrible predecessor, but he was intelligent and he walked faithfully in the path prescribed by his former master.

That path led him safely through the early years of the regency and to the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War in 1648. But Mazarin was an even worse financial administrator than Richelieu. The expenses of the war grew heavier by accumulation, and with each year the burden of taxation became more intolerable to the people. Moreover, the great nobles who had hated and feared Richelieu hated his successor also, but did not fear him so much. In 1648, a group of the great nobles took advantage of the economic discontent to break into open rebellion in uneasy alliance with the citizens of Paris. This was the first of the two rebellions that are collectively known as the Fronde. It was quickly ended by a compromise. The trouble, however, was not ended. The next year the rebellion was renewed on a broader scale. For two years (1650–52) it threatened the hated minister and the whole system of absolute royal government. The danger would have been greater if the rebels had been united in their interests or had had the backing of strong popular support. But the Fronde was not really a constitutional struggle. The princes who led it were irresponsible, motivated by nothing more praiseworthy than the desire to ruin the cardinal and to weaken the royal government to their own selfish advantage. The solid middle-class adherents of the Fronde were soon disillusioned, leaving the nobles and the mob to go their own reckless

The Fronde

way until the rebellion crumbled. The futile activity of the Fronde was in reality the death flurry of political feudalism in France. Never again would the nobles take arms against their king. It left the monarchy stronger than ever, for it reinforced the conviction of the French people that the only hope for peace and security lay in the absolute authority of the king. One of the tasks begun by Henry IV and carried on by Richelieu was finished at last.

Triumph of France and the monarchy

Another, however, still occupied Mazarin's attention. Although the Thirty Years' War had ended in 1648, France was still at war with Hapsburg Spain. Mazarin carried on the war with fair ability against a weakening enemy, and at last brought it to a successful conclusion with the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, whereby France acquired Roussillon and some other important bits of territory along her frontiers, in addition to that awarded her at Westphalia.[1] Mazarin had now not long to live, but he had the satisfaction of knowing that he had completed Richelieu's work. France was indisputably the first power in Europe; the Hapsburg states were tottering; and the young King Louis XIV, who was soon to take over the government into his own hands, would find himself the unquestioned master of his kingdom. If the French people still groaned under an insupportable burden of taxation; if the administrative system was still wasteful and inefficient; if the government was still not far from bankruptcy, that could not be helped. Richelieu's dream, if only a part of that of Henry IV and Sully, had been fulfilled.

3. GROWTH OF FRENCH LITERATURE AND CULTURE

Evolution of national literature

The final establishment of absolute monarchy in a united state completed a long process of evolution. There was no doubt now that France was a nation, closely knit together and conscious of its national identity. The same period saw also the completion of another evolution, that of the national language, which had kept pace through the centuries with the evolution of the state. This development was no more peculiar to France than was the growth of nationalism. Every country in Europe had developed a vital literature in the tongue of the people, though still marred by a variety of dialects corresponding roughly to the local divisions inherited from the feudal régime, before the classical revival of the Renaissance temporarily checked the development of the "vulgar" literature. For a time the ancient Latin of the humanists' adoration displaced

[1] See below, pages 526 and 528.

the more modern languages. But the age of the Renaissance was also an age of rising nationalism, as the great territorial states were consolidated under strong monarchies, and in the long run nationalism proved stronger than the international heritage of ancient Rome. When once the first enthusiasm for the literature of antiquity had spent its force, the national languages asserted themselves more vigorously than ever. The new art of printing helped, for it made books cheap and circulated them more widely. A wider reading public, not thoroughly versed in Ciceronian Latin, demanded books in their native tongue. The humanists had made Latin too perfectly classical, so that it had become difficult for any but the most learned to read, and still more difficult to write. With the passing of the Erasmian age of humanism, Latin gradually subsided into the status of a dead language, reserved for the use of scholars. The vigor of the Renaissance passed over into the modern languages. The lessons of style and taste that the humanists had learned from the classics were now applied to the refinement of the vernacular. Moreover, the freer circulation of books made possible by printing, together with the closer union of all parts of the state into a conscious nationality, gradually wiped out local differences of dialect and cleared the way for the development of truly national literatures.

The late Renaissance

After the full daylight of the classical Renaissance in France had passed with the great age of the humanists, there was a long twilight in which the interests and influences of the Renaissance lived on in modified form to inspire the founders of modern French literature. Before the end of the sixteenth century, two Frenchmen of this late Renaissance left the indelible imprint of their style and personality on the literature of their country. The first, François Rabelais (1494?–1553), belongs, almost, to the age of the humanists. He was a profound classical scholar, and his egregious enjoyment of life was typical of the Renaissance spirit at its highest tide. But he foreshadows the coming age in his determination to write in his native language and for the people rather than for the limited world of scholars. His fabulous tale of *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, which won instant and lasting popularity by its wild humor and lusty glorification of the physical universe, may be said to mark the beginnings of modern secular French literature. The second outstanding literary figure of the sixteenth century in France was a man of very different character, the thoughtful essayist Michel de Montaigne (1533–92). He was a product of the troubled era of the Wars of Religion. That age of violent passions, however, had not made him a partisan. On the contrary, the conflict of dog-

Rabelais

Montaigne

matic beliefs had suggested to his reasonable mind the possibility that neither side of the religious, or any other, argument was in possession of all the truth. With calm curiosity, he examined one after another the problems that vexed his age, and, having examined them from all sides, left them in his brilliant *Essays* illuminated but still unsolved. He was at once the heir to the inquiring critical spirit of the Renaissance and the father of modern rationalism. Nurtured on the classics, Montaigne brought to French prose a perfection of style that makes him as important a figure in the history of the language as in the history of thought.

Meanwhile, an earnest little group of Montaigne's contemporaries, raised like himself in the classic tradition, were working conscientiously at the task of refining and perfecting French poetry, by applying to it the lessons learned from the poets of ancient Greece and Rome. There were seven poets in the group, whence the name of the Pléiade which they took for themselves. Their leader, and the only first-rate poet in the group, was Pierre de Ronsard (1524–85). By both precept and example he set a new and more conscious style in French poetry, while his friend Joachim du Bellay (1522–60) set forth the aims of the group in a *Defense and Illustration of the French Language*, asserting its potential equality with the ancient tongues.

The Pléiade

Thus ordered, purified, and expanded by adaptation of the classics, the national language was already approaching its modern form when Henry IV restored peace and began the rebuilding of the state. During the next half-century, the work of standardizing and perfecting literary French continued. Two generations of uninspired poets and second-rate writers devoted themselves to a laborious study of the rules of grammar, to perfection of form, and to precision and refinement in the use of words. This devotion to refined form won for them the name of "Précieux," originally a term of respect, but turned to one of ridicule when, having outlived their usefulness, they fell victims to the biting satire of Molière. The vigorous writers of the golden age of Louis XIV have overshadowed their less inspired predecessors, but they owed the excellence of the language they used in no small degree to the men who had worked so hard to perfect its form. The age of Richelieu, too, had provided French literature with a permanent tribunal of literary taste, consecrated to the standardization of the language, for the cardinal had founded the French Academy in 1635.

The Précieux and the Academy

The refinement of the French language was closely connected with

the development of a more refined society. Freed from civil war, the French aristocracy turned their attention to the perfecting of social life and manners. In countless salons, under the watchful eye of aristocratic hostesses, of whom none was more brilliant than the Marquise de Rambouillet, high society devoted itself to the study of form and the elaboration of rules for both manners and language. The Précieux and their feminine counterparts laid the foundation for that perfection of formal etiquette which later made the court of Louis XIV the wonder of Europe.

Refinement of society

Respect for form and a growing consciousness of national unity under the absolute monarchy were the outstanding characteristics of French culture in the seventeenth century, and they carried over into the religious life of the people. Religion, however, now that the wars were over and the Edict of Nantes had established legal toleration for the Huguenots, no longer occupied the foreground of French thought. A not unnatural reaction followed the intense religious strife of the past century, leaving the majority of the people somewhat disillusioned and indifferent. Thanks to the skillful work of the Jesuits, they remained within the church, but those champions of the Counter-Reformation seemed now more successful in keeping the people orthodox church members than in arousing vital religious enthusiasm. Their methods, indeed, left them open to the charge that the former was all they aimed at achieving. At any rate, the religion of the court and the aristocracy, and perhaps that of the mass of the people, like the literature and manners of the age, was more distinguished by attention to form than by emotional content or spiritual disturbance. This was not, however, universally true. There are in all ages men to whom religion is an overpowering emotional experience and who cannot be satisfied with formal observance. In the first half of the seventeenth century, a group of such deeply pious and sternly moral souls, under the name of Jansenists, led a reaction against the formal religion of their age and especially against the facile methods of the Jesuits. Their fate was the common fate of enthusiastic minorities. They were declared to be heretics and were suppressed by royal edict. But if the majority of Frenchmen were formally orthodox, the French church was not always on the best of terms with the papacy. The growing spirit of nationalism and the absolute claims of the monarchy led to a revival of the "Gallican" tradition of a French church controlled by the state and in its political structure more or less independent of Rome. The reassertion of the "Gallican liberties," first stated in the fifteenth century by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, strained

Religion

relations between the king and the pope almost to the end of the century.

Meanwhile, under the surface of good manners and formal religion, the skeptical rationalism of Montaigne was working quietly, to come to light again in the following century. And most important of all, the new scientific spirit, posthumous child of the Renaissance, was beginning its work of transforming modern thought.

Rationalism and science

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

THE DECLINE OF THE MONARCHY IN ENGLAND

(1603–60)

WHILE in France the first two Bourbon kings and their ministers were busy restoring the unity of the country after prolonged civil religious wars and were building a firm structure of absolute monarchy, across the Channel in England events were following an almost exactly opposite course. There, the first two Stuart kings were effectively, if unconsciously, destroying absolute monarchy and were driving a united nation, which had grown strong and prosperous during years of internal peace and firm government, to disunity and the final outbreak of civil religious wars. The end of the sixteenth century saw England approaching the close of one of the most glorious periods of her history, the reign of Queen Elizabeth. This last representative of the house of Tudor had guided England through troubled waters to confidence and security. She had defended England's independence against the aggressive power of Spain and had defended English Protestantism against the driving force of the Counter-Reformation. She left to her Stuart successors a country that was prosperous, loyal to the crown, and with a strong national consciousness that had found expression in a magnificent national literature. Yet it was a country that would need very careful handling if the Stuart kings were to continue the absolute government established by the Tudors. The story of the next half-century is the story of their utter failure to carry on the Tudor tradition. In that crucial half-century, absolute monarchy was broken, never to be restored, and Parliament won for itself a permanent place in the government of England.

1. THE LEGACY OF THE TUDORS

Tudor absolutism

The age of the Tudors came to an end in 1603 with the death of Queen Elizabeth. The crown then passed to the house of Stuart with the accession of James I. But if the reign of the Tudors was over, the results of their rule remained as a legacy to their Stuart kinsmen. One important part of that legacy was a tradition of absolute government. It was, however, absolutism of an unusual

kind, dependent on conditions that were peculiar to England. The Tudors were satisfied with the practical exercise of royal power. They did not insist on defining their authority, nor did they put forward sweeping claims to unrestricted rule. On the contrary, they were scrupulously careful to cloak their absolute power in a decent covering of constitutional legality. Both Henry VIII and Elizabeth, whose reigns covered most of the sixteenth century, took great pains to secure the consent of Parliament for their most autocratic acts. This, in truth, had not been difficult, for their policies were for the most part popular with the majority of Englishmen; the people felt the need of a strong government in a time of general insecurity; and both Henry and his brilliant daughter were masters of the art of persuading the people's representatives in Parliament that what they wanted was for the best interests of the state.

Under this system of legal absolutism, Parliament, though it lost the habit of independent initiative, was actually consolidating its position. In practice, the act of Parliament was little more than the official seal affixed to the expression of the royal will; but the fact that the king's authority was repeatedly expressed through act of Parliament built up a tradition that Parliament might use against the king, if the two ever came into conflict. In short, the Tudors kept alive a subservient Parliament to give legal or constitutional sanction to the acts of their absolute government; and as a result of that policy they left, as part of their legacy to the Stuarts, a constitutional body which was not yet conscious of its power, but which might become a menace to the authority of less popular rulers.

Parliament

The potential power of Parliament depended largely on the peculiar structure of English society, and was increased by certain changes that took place under the strong and peaceful government of the Tudor monarchs. Following the destruction of the greater part of the old feudal nobility in the Wars of the Roses, Henry VII was able to rid England of the last remnant of independent feudalism. In time, the Tudors created a new peerage to take the place of the old; but England no longer had anything that could be called a noble class, such as existed in every country on the Continent. Only those few peers who sat in the House of Lords were legally recognized as noble. All the rest of the landowning aristocracy, including the younger sons of the peerage, were classed as gentlemen (or collectively as the gentry), and were represented in the House of Commons. These country gentlemen were roughly of the same social class as the lords, though with many gradations of social importance, yet they were not

Tudor society

cut off by any impassable barrier from the professional or commercial burghers of the cities, for younger sons of the gentry often enough sought their fortunes as apprentices in the business houses of the towns or entered the professions, and many a country gentleman owed his estate to some wool-trading ancestor whose daughter had married into a county family. It was from this class of the gentry that the great majority of the members of the House of Commons were chosen, whether as representatives of the country shires or of the towns. The English Parliament, then, was a body which represented all the influential classes in the state, and it was not split by any strong division of class interest between noble and common or between country and city.

There was a latent menace to absolute monarchy in such a Parliament, but during the Tudor period it remained steadfastly loyal to the crown. England in the sixteenth century developed a strong national consciousness and an aggressive patriotism, as it rose from a position of insecurity and comparative insignificance in European affairs to confidence and power. And that national patriotism came to be more and more closely associated with loyalty to the ruling house. More than anything else, the struggle against the combined forces of the Counter-Reformation and Spain during Elizabeth's long reign contributed to this mingled feeling of patriotism and loyalty. The reverse side of English national consciousness was hatred of Spain and the papacy; for the conspiracies of Philip II to place the Catholic Mary Stuart on the English throne, and his later attempt to invade England with the avowed intention of restoring the Catholic Church there, united Catholicism with the threat of Spanish domination in the minds of the English people, just as it made Protestantism synonymous with English independence and reinforced their loyalty to Elizabeth, who stood as the defender of both. After the victory over Philip's great Armada, Englishmen felt a new pride in their country, and were obscurely conscious that that pride included the queen and the Protestant religion.

National sentiment

But if the victory over Catholic Spain made Englishmen more patriotic and more loyal to the queen, it also made them feel less keenly the need of a strong monarchy. England had at last won a sense of security to which it had long been a stranger. Protestantism and English independence were safe now. There was no longer any serious threat of foreign invasion or internal division. And to this feeling of national security was added a growing sense of personal security among the well-to-do classes of country and city, as a result of years of orderly government and an increasing national prosperity.

National security

Thus, the last of the Tudors left a country in which the influential classes were patriotic and loyal, but also more secure and hence more independent.

The Englishmen of Queen Elizabeth's day had good reason to be proud of themselves, their country and their queen, and out of that pride there grew, among other things, a great national literature, which was not the least enduring part of the legacy of the Tudors. As in France, a literature in the language of the people had grown up in England during the Later Middle Ages, had then been superseded for a time by the Latin of the classical Renaissance, and was now revived in a more modern form with the growth of national consciousness. But still more than in France, the literature of the Elizabethan age reflects the patriotic enthusiasm of the people, even though literary traditions and forms might be borrowed from Italy or from the Latin classics. Edmund Spenser (1552–99) borrowed the romantic-epic form for his great poem, *The Faërie Queene*, from the Italians and colored it with classical allusions, but its theme was praise of England and England's queen. Shakespeare, too, though his genius was far too universal in its scope to be limited to a single theme, devoted many of his plays to the glorification of English history, while at the same time his immortal work so dignified the English speech that it need never again fear comparison with that of ancient Rome

National literature

2. DECLINE OF THE MONARCHY — JAMES I AND CHARLES I (1603–40)

The man who fell heir to the Tudor legacy in 1603 was Elizabeth's cousin, James Stuart, the son of the unhappy Mary Queen of Scots. Since infancy he had held the title of James VI of Scotland, and now in middle age he became also James I of England, thus uniting at last the two kingdoms of Britain. Few kings have entered upon the government of a country with better intentions than James, and few have ruled with more disastrous results. His character, ideas, and training made him singularly unsuited to the task of carrying on the Tudor tradition. Education he had in plenty. No more learned man ever sat on the throne of England. But his education was of a pedantic kind, and he was much given to theories of "kingcraft" that had very little relation to reality. He had had plenty of experience in government, too, but it was in the government of a country still partly medieval and certainly very different from England. For all his learning, he was hopelessly ignorant of the peculiar laws, traditions, and senti-

James I (1603–25)

ments of the English people, or even of the fact that they had any. And if he never came to understand the temperament of the English people, he was equally unfortunate in his judgment of individual men. By a kind of fatality, he surrounded himself with friends who were either rogues or fools, and, because of the strong human affections that made him a lovable man, if an untrustworthy king, he allowed his worthless favorites to administer the government as they chose. James was not in any way a bad man. He was merely miscast for his royal rôle. Had he been a country gentleman with a taste for learning or a professor of philosophy and dialectic at one of the universities, he would have lived out a happy and useful life as an honored member of the community. But it is from such miscasting that human tragedies are made.

The divine right of kings

The new king's most cherished theory was that of the "divine right of kings." That kings received their authority directly from God and that to oppose their will was to fly in the face of Providence was an idea already familiar on the Continent. It appealed to James because of its theoretical completeness, and also because his sad experience with turbulent barons and stubborn Calvinist ministers in Scotland had persuaded him of the value of an absolute government which drew its sanction from some more stable source than popular consent. This theory he brought with him to England, and he never came to realize how antagonistic it was to the English tradition. Where the Tudors had ruled in fact, but had carefully preserved legal and constitutional forms, and had been satisfied with an authority that was all the more real for being undefined, James insisted on the extreme definition of his rights, and even when he was forced to make concessions in practice, he spoiled the effect by blatant assertions of his superiority to the law and to the will of the people as represented in Parliament.

Policies of James I: the Puritans

The first three years of James's reign decided the fate of the Stuart monarchy, for in those years the new king committed himself to definite policies on all the most perplexing problems of government. One of his first actions was to announce a decided policy of opposition to the Puritans. It is difficult to say exactly what is meant by Puritanism, for the term has been very loosely used. It covers a variety of types and a variety of opinions on doctrine and church government. The Puritans whom James first met on his way down from Scotland were not the Puritans who later founded New England, nor yet those who made up Cromwell's godly cavalry. As yet, the term Puritan signified only the more extreme Protestants, more or less Calvinist in theology, who wished to "purify" the church of the

remnants of Catholic ritual and practice that still remained as part of the Elizabethan settlement of the Church of England. That settlement had been essentially a compromise, and so long as the terms were not too rigidly defined, both "High Church" Anglicans, with a leaning toward ritual, and Puritans, who wished a simpler service, remained peacefully within the church. The Puritans, however, were anxious to have their position made more secure, and hence presented a petition to the new king asking recognition of their right to a modified service. James argued with the Puritan clergy, for he could never resist an argument, and in the end lost his temper. The real reason for his opposition was that he suspected them of wanting to adopt a democratic form of church government like that of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, which had already caused him so much trouble. James realized that absolute government would be impossible unless the state church were ruled from the top through the bishops. To destroy the episcopacy would be to strike a death blow to absolute monarchy. Shouting his famous epigram, "No bishop, no king," James swore that he would make the Puritans conform or would "harry them out of the land." James's bark was always worse than his bite, and very little active persecution followed. But he had made permanent enemies of a constantly growing number of stern and pious men, most of whom belonged to the influential classes of city burghers or country gentry. They could not as yet be called a party, but they formed the backbone of the opposition to all the king's unpopular policies.

The Catholics

While James thus alienated the left wing of Protestantism, he was equally unfortunate in his dealings with the Catholics, who stood at the opposite end of the religious spectrum. True to his large ideas of kingcraft, he at first treated the Catholics leniently, in the hope of uniting all religions under his beneficent rule. But when the fines levied on those who did not attend the Anglican Church were lifted, so many stayed away that he became alarmed and re-enforced them. Embittered by this betrayal of their trust, a group of extreme Catholics hatched a plot to blow up the Parliament buildings at a time when the king, his council, and the whole Parliament would be assembled in November, 1605. This was the famous Gunpowder Plot. It was discovered in time, however, and its chief result was to renew in the minds of English Protestants the fear and hatred of Catholicism which had existed before the defeat of the Armada. James might have utilized that feeling, but instead he turned it against himself by seeking an alliance with Spain.

In foreign policy, James looked to find a perfect field for the exercise

of kingcraft. His theories were often very sound, but they seldom worked out successfully, and about all he accomplished was the further exasperation of his already discontented subjects. His first move, the ending of the war with Spain in 1604, though entirely justified, was unpopular with the Protestant merchant class who had been carrying on an illicit trade with the Spanish colonies. The opposition to this move, however, was nothing to the sullen fury aroused by his negotiations, pursued from 1619 to 1623, for the marriage of his son Charles to the daughter of the King of Spain. These were the years when Spain was actively aiding the Austrian Hapsburg emperor in crushing Protestantism in Germany.[1] Protestant England looked on appalled, as the king deserted the German Protestants in their hour of need, stopped the persecution of Catholics in England, and worked to give England a Spanish Catholic queen, who might, in time, give England a half-Spanish and possibly Catholic king. Religious and national sentiment united in violent opposition. The negotiations failed, and young Charles returned from Spain, still a Protestant and a bachelor, to the great relief of the people. But the damage was done. "More than any other part of James's schemes ... this project of the Spanish match made the ordinary man a Puritan at least in his politics."

Foreign policy

The general discontent with the king's foreign and domestic policies found a means of expression in Parliament. The time had come when that body, so long subservient to the Tudors, was no longer content to accept the dictation of a less popular ruler. The Commons was filled with men from just those classes that were most decidedly opposed to the government on religious, national, and commercial grounds. A majority of the members were Puritans, or at least strongly Protestant, and, though most of them were of the gentry, a large number held borough seats and represented the city merchants who regarded Spain as a commercial rival as well as a religious and national enemy. Independent, practical, and often austerely pious men, they openly resented the extravagance of the royal government, the incompetence of the king's favorites, and the evil reputation of the court, which seemed much more immoral than it really was to simple gentlemen unused to the ways of the capital. To make matters worse, James showed no tact in dealing with them, and from the first alienated Parliament by disregard for their traditional privileges. He lectured his first Parliament on the subject of the divine right. The startled Commons replied with a unanimous expression of dissent. Hitherto they had not troubled themselves greatly about the definition

James and Parliament

[1] See below, page 520.

of their authority, but now they began a careful study of English history, gathering together, and occasionally distorting, every precedent that would strengthen their position. The king's extravagance gave them their best weapon. Lavish in his gifts to friends and surrounded by careless and corrupt ministers, James was unable to live within the independent royal revenue. Additional taxation was generally regarded as subject to the consent of Parliament. At any rate, the Commons now asserted that right, and threatened to hold up appropriations unless the king would redress their grievances. Time and again, James dismissed a stubborn Parliament, only to be forced to call another. The struggle was still going on when James died and left a sadly discredited monarchy to his son.

Perhaps it was not yet too late to undo the damage of James's reign, but Charles I did nothing to heal the breach between king and people. He heartily subscribed to his father's theories of divine right; he continued to govern through the ministry of worthless favorites; and he was even more strongly opposed than his father had been to Puritanism. Charles was a dignified, cultured, and kindly man, loyal to his friends, but woefully lacking in the kind of imagination that is essential to a statesman. Though born in England, he had no more understanding of the English people than had the Scottish James, and he had much less understanding of the Scots whom he was also called upon to rule.

Charles I (1625–49)

The events of the early years of Charles's reign ended all hope of co-operation between king and Parliament. Until he was assassinated in 1628, the Duke of Buckingham, favorite of both James I and Charles, was the power behind the throne. The new king could scarcely have made a more injudicious choice than to entrust the government to this brilliant but unstable man. Under his reckless guidance, England careered into a hopeless war with Spain, the fatal marriage of Charles to the Catholic daughter of Louis XIII of France, and a brief war with France that could end only in humiliation for England. The war with Spain and that in aid of the Huguenots against the French king should have won the support of Parliament; but the utter incompetence of Buckingham served only to enrage the Commons, while the French marriage aroused all the old fear of Catholicism. Parliament, therefore, refused supplies and threatened to impeach Buckingham. The king dismissed one Parliament after another with nothing accomplished, and finally tried the experiment of raising money for the war by forced loans and martial law. In 1628, however, Charles was forced to call Parliament again, and as the price of its co-operation in

Petition of Right (1628)

raising taxes, he accepted the Petition of Right. This petition, one of the corner stones of British freedom, was a clear statement of the illegality of the exercise of absolute power on four crucial points, martial law, the billeting of soldiers on the civilian population, arbitrary taxation, and arbitrary imprisonment. The first two were a protest against the means used by the king to support an army without funds, a protest inspired in part by fear lest the army be used to coerce the people. The second two points were designed to protect the right of Parliament to control such taxes as were not a recognized part of the royal prerogative, and to protect individual citizens from arrest and imprisonment by the king for political reasons. These provisions, if respected, would have made absolute government impossible. Charles accepted them; then broke them; and when Parliament in protest again refused supplies, he determined to rule without it.

Experiment in absolutism (1629–40)

For eleven years, from 1629 to 1640, Charles tried the experiment of personal government without calling Parliament. To the king, it seemed the only possible alternative. If he could not rule with Parliament — and he could not without abandoning his principles — he would rule without it. He recognized in part what that decision meant. He would have to give up all thought of a vigorous foreign policy for lack of funds, and would have to strain every legal means of taxation within the royal power to the utmost. What he did not realize was that such a policy was doomed to failure. Had Charles possessed a strong army, he might have coerced the whole population into the payment of unparliamentary taxes. Lacking that, he chose rather to distort the laws, laying a heavy burden of taxes on the relatively small but very influential class of propertied gentry and burghers who fell within the scope of royal taxes. This policy aroused a deep resentment among just those people whom he could least afford to offend, while at the same time it did not bring in enough money to maintain an army with which to meet a rebellion. One factor, however, worked in the king's favor. So long as he could avoid calling Parliament, the general discontent had no means of expression. Without leadership, the English people, unused to rebellion, were sullenly but helplessly passive.

Laud and the church

So they might have remained if Charles had not, in addition to economic and political oppression, trespassed upon their freedom of conscience. He gave a free hand to Archbishop Laud, the most thorough exponent of High Church Anglicanism, whose greatest ambition in life was to force all England to conform to the strictest form of Anglican ritual and practice. Laud's plan was to



CHARLES I, KING OF ENGLAND
1600–49

This portrait is probably somewhat stylized, as are most portraits by Van Dyke. But Van Dyke's style was peculiarly suited to express the character of the unfortunate Stuart king — dignified, courteous, gentle, and a trifle lacking in substance.

smother Puritanism by preventing every possible means of expression. He banished all clergy suspected of Puritan leanings from the church; he censored the press; and he used the authority of the government to suppress all meetings for religious purposes outside the established church. Under this steady pressure, the gap between Puritan and High Churchman widened and became a more conscious antagonism. Religious doctrines and political theories became curiously involved, as men of many different types silently ranged themselves in opposition to king and church. Puritanism now represented a complex of ideas, sentiments, and resentments, held in varying proportion. The men who sat sullenly through the prescribed services of the Anglican Church, and muttered threats against the government as they returned home to read their Bibles in privacy, were characterized by some or all of the following — by a Calvinist belief in predestination, which was directly opposite to the Arminianism common among High Churchmen; by a strict morality that showed itself in stern simplicity of life and disapproval of Sunday games; by a growing hatred of ritualistic church services, of all bishops and of Laud's hand-picked clergy; and by an equally strong hatred of royal despotism. Parliament had long been a Puritan body. Now that Parliament no longer met, all Puritans were Parliamentarians, and all who resented divine right absolutism, as practiced by Charles Stuart, were, more or less, Puritans.

Revolt in Scotland

It was Scotland that gave the signal for rebellion and provided the opportunity. In 1637, Laud and the king determined to extend the enforcement of Anglican service to Scotland, to replace the traditional Presbyterian form. This was sheer madness, as James I, who knew his stubborn Scots even if he never learned to know his Englishmen, might have told them. More accustomed to the ways of rebellion than their law-abiding English neighbors, the Lowland Scots rose as one man, and swore to a Covenant to defend their religion. Charles then marched north with a meager army to force them to obedience, only to find a nation in arms awaiting the attack with a godly fervor. Lacking money and with his people heartily out of sympathy with his plans, Charles could not raise anything like an adequate army. The two "Bishops' Wars" of 1639 and 1640 were no more than futile demonstrations. The king was forced to make a humiliating peace with his northern subjects and to promise them a large indemnity as the price of the withdrawal of the Scottish army from England.

Absolutism without adequate financial resources had failed. In

October, 1640, Charles summoned a Parliament to raise money to pay the indemnity. This was the Long Parliament, which lasted through years of opposition, civil war, and the experiment of the Commonwealth. It provided the long awaited opportunity to organize the opposition to the king.

The Long Parliament (1640)

8. THE CIVIL WAR, THE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE PROTECTORATE (1640–60)

The members of the new Parliament were almost unanimous in their determination to curb the absolute powers of the monarchy. Led by John Pym, a Puritan gentleman of great ability, the Commons at once launched an attack on Laud and the Earl of Strafford, the two chief ministers of the king. Laud was sent to the Tower, while Strafford, more dangerous because more powerful, was condemned to death by an act of attainder. Parliament then proceeded by one act after another to strip the king of the powers that had made absolute rule possible. Provision was made for regular meetings of Parliament, which was not to be dismissed arbitrarily. The arbitrary and more or less extra-legal courts of star chamber and high commission were abolished, as were also those taxes which kings hitherto had been able to collect without consent of Parliament. In the course of a few months, this determined Parliament destroyed absolutism in England forever. For when the monarchy was restored in 1660, it was the limited monarchy left by these acts of 1640–41.

Parliament curbs absolutism

So far, Parliament had been nearly unanimous. The Puritan majority, however, were not content to stop there. They went on to a "root and branch" attack on the episcopal system in the church and to claim for Parliament powers over the army and the executive authority that would have made Parliament as absolute as the king had ever been. Divisions now began to appear in the ranks of the Commons. Many men who had joined heartily in the acts to curb royal absolutism hesitated at proposals to transfer full authority from king to Parliament, contrary to constitutional precedent. And the same men, though willing enough to check the power of Laud's High Church bishops, suspected as they were of leaning toward Catholic practice, balked stubbornly at Puritan proposals to do away with the Prayer Book, endeared to them by years of familiarity. Parliament was dividing on religious and political grounds, with Puritans and Parliamentarians on one side, moderate Anglicans and rather reluctant Royalists on the other. At last in 1642 the crisis came, and men in Parlia-

Division of parties

ment and in the nation had to make a definite choice. In January, Charles made a frustrated attempt to arrest five members of Parliament who were recognized as the leaders of the opposition. In self-defense, the Commons took unconstitutional measures to raise an army. The king fled to Oxford, and with him went the Royalist minority in the Commons and a majority of the Lords. There was now open war between king and Parliament, or what was left of it.

Cavalier and Roundhead

All through the summer of 1642 the opposing sides were mustering their forces. In the long run, only a minority of the population took an active part, but they were the influential minority. The great mass of agricultural laborers remained neutral, save when pressed into the infantry on one side or the other. The volunteers were yeoman farmers, gentlemen, and the industrial and commercial classes of the towns. The line between Royalist and Parliamentarian, however, represented no clear class division. Yeomen and gentlemen fought on both sides, and, though London and the seaports were the strongholds of Parliament, there were Royalists in every city and a majority in some. In general the Royalists were stronger in the north and west, while Parliament could count on a majority in the eastern and midland counties. But even this geographical alignment was only partially valid. It was not a war of sections any more than it was a war of classes. In the final analysis it was a war of opposing political and religious principles or sentiments. The ancient feeling of loyalty to the crown was the force that rallied men about the royal banner. Some of those who found that they could not desert the king in the face of a call to arms were Puritans, but most of them were Anglicans, Catholics, or men to whom religion was not a dominating passion. Among them were enough of the hard-drinking, hard-riding gentry to give the whole Royalist party the name of Cavaliers. On the other side were men in whom the memory of royal oppression was stronger than the sentiment of loyalty. For the most part they were Puritans, for it was the Puritans who had suffered most under the recent absolutism, and the stern determination to win religious freedom was one of the few sentiments strong enough to make Englishmen take up arms against their king. Yet not all Parliamentarians were Puritans, and not all Puritans were of the strict type painted by popular fancy. There were enough of the latter, however, to win for their party the name of Roundheads, from their refusal to wear the flowing curled wigs affected by their less godly opponents.

The war lasted four years. The limits of space forbid our giving a description of the campaigns, nor would the attempt be particularly

profitable. It was a strange, scrambled affair, with much aimless marching about. Only the Royalists had a definite strategy in the plan to converge on the city of London and capture it, which, however, never succeeded. Parliament had the advantage of holding the great seaports and controlling the wealthiest cities, so that they could draw supplies from abroad and could pay for superior equipment. The navy, too, was on their side, and Scotland was their ally. In the long run, though, the deciding factor was the New Model Army, recruited from among the most extreme Puritans and organized by the only real military genius whom the war produced, Oliver Cromwell. Well armed, well drilled, and kept under a strict military and moral discipline, the New Model were the shock troops of the Parliamentary army. Cromwell's "Ironside" cavalry proved their disciplined worth against Prince Rupert's wild Cavaliers at Marston Moor in 1644. By the end of the war the New Model included about a fourth of the Parliamentary forces, and by far the most effective part.

The civil war (1642–46)

With the surrender of the king in 1646, Parliament faced the difficult problem of arranging a permanent settlement. One question was what to do with the king. Few men were prepared to abolish monarchy. But could Charles be trusted to maintain a constitutional authority, limited by Parliament? And while Charles foiled all negotiations by his bewildering inconsistencies and double-dealing, another vital problem rose to the surface. As the price of the Scottish alliance, Parliament in 1645 had agreed to make Presbyterianism the state religion of England. It was a compromise that satisfied most Puritans, for some kind of state church was needed, though few were really Presbyterian in the Scottish sense. It did not, however, satisfy the New Model Army. This grim organization had been recruited from among the most extreme Protestants, men whose individualistic love of religious freedom made them oppose any state-controlled church. They were the Independents, differing among themselves in theological views, but united in the conviction that each congregation must be free to determine its own religion. Now, the Presbyterian Parliament, flushed with victory, made two serious mistakes. It persecuted Anglicans, on the one hand, thus embittering the defeated Royalists, and, forgetting who had won the war, it also passed persecuting acts against the Independents and proposed to disband the New Model without its back pay. The result was a second brief civil war, with Royalists, Parliamentary Presbyterians, and Scots in a curious alliance against the Independents. The latter, led by Cromwell, were again victorious. And, not to be cheated of the fruits of victory

Independents vs. Presbyterians

the army chiefs now took control. In December, 1648, they forcibly "purged" Parliament of its Presbyterian members, leaving only a small minority who could be trusted to do what the army wished. Two months later, this "Rump Parliament" abolished the House of Lords.

Execution of Charles (1649)

The Independent army was in the saddle, and in no temporizing mood. Parliament had betrayed their hopes of religious freedom, and they could not trust the king. All hope of a peaceful, amicable settlement that would preserve the things they had fought for seemed lost. They were riding the tiger, and there was nothing to do but to go on. Cromwell was now the undisputed leader of the army and what remained of Parliament. He had labored patiently to preserve a constitutional monarchy, but was now convinced that that was no longer possible. With grim courage, he accepted the logic of the situation and instituted the trial of the king. Charles Stuart met his death with dignity, while England staggered under the shock, and men who had fought against him united with those who had rallied round his banner to hail him as a martyr. The execution of the king wiped out the memory of his oppressive government and made the great majority of Englishmen Royalists at last. England was a republic now, but a republic ruled by a small minority of armed men who could not count on the support of the people.

Commonwealth and Protectorate (1649–60)

During the next eleven years, England passed from one experimental form of government to another. The first was the Commonwealth, a republic governed by a council chosen by the Rump of the Long Parliament, which still held the legislative authority. This was changed in 1653 by the forcible dissolution of the Rump, and a new constitution was substituted, making England a Protectorate, with Cromwell as Lord Protector and a carefully selected Parliament to hold the legislative authority. Even the most carefully chosen Parliament, however, could not co-operate with the army chiefs, and further changes followed, making Cromwell king in all but name. Whatever the form of constitution, in actual fact England was ruled by Oliver Cromwell with the backing of the army. It was not the kind of government that anyone wanted, perhaps least of all Cromwell. But it was apparently the only form of government possible at the time; the only form that could save the country from anarchy or further civil war. England was not yet ready to restore the Stuart monarchy, and there was still too much division of opinion to permit of a true republic. The rule of Cromwell and the army provided a working government, which, however, dared not permit a freely elected Parliament. Such a government could not last long; but under



OLIVER CROMWELL
1599–1658

Cromwell is shown here in the unornamented armor, simple collar, and cropped hair that were characteristic of the Puritan soldier. His plain, stern face, too, fitted his position as commander of the New Model Army and ruler of the Puritan Commonwealth.

the capable guidance of Cromwell it lasted long enough to give England time to recover from the civil wars and to restore her prosperity and her prestige abroad.

Cromwell's foreign policy

The internal government of England under Cromwell was peaceful and orderly, but the warlike spirit of the Puritan army had plenty of opportunity to express itself in relation to Ireland, Scotland, and the neighboring states of the Continent. During the period of the Commonwealth, Cromwell had to crush strong opposition in both Ireland and Scotland. In the former, the Catholic majority rose in support of the Stuart heir, the future Charles II. The Puritan army invaded Ireland and put down the Catholic rising with a barbarous cruelty such as they had never shown in dealing with their Protestant enemies. To this day, the "curse of Cromwell" holds an unforgettable place in the memory of the Irish people. In Scotland, where the opposition was Presbyterian rather than Catholic, Cromwell was much more merciful. After defeating the Scots, he left them with a settlement that was eminently fair, though unpopular because it was forced upon them by the English and also because Cromwell insisted on the toleration of other Protestant sects. Having restored peace to the British Isles, the militant Commonwealth turned to war with the Netherlands, the chief commercial rival of England. More than any other group in the population, the new government represented the commercial class. Cromwell zealously fostered their interests, reviving trade with the colonies and striving by a new navigation act to build up England's carrying trade at the expense of the Dutch. The war with the Netherlands proved that England had not lost her mastery of sea warfare and left her once more mistress of the Narrow Seas. Later, Cromwell, as Protector, launched another naval war against Spain for similar commercial reasons and with equal success. Before his death in 1658, he had made England a ranking power again among the nations of Europe.

The Stuart Restoration (1660)

On the whole, Cromwell accomplished a great deal, and much that was of permanent value, for many of his economic policies were carried on by the restored Stuart monarchy. Yet his government grew steadily more unpopular. Englishmen who had fought against the king had not fought to substitute a military despotism for the ancient monarchy. The new government had not given the people political freedom, and, though Cromwell guaranteed a large measure of religious toleration to all save Catholics and Anglicans, the Puritan government instituted a moral oppression as irksome as the religious oppression of Charles had been. Under

the pressure of what would today be called blue laws, enforced by the army, many a former Puritan turned Cavalier and many a former Parliamentarian turned Royalist. When the death of Cromwell left the Protectorate to his feeble son, the nation was very nearly unanimous in its opinion that only one course lay before it — to restore the Stuart monarchy in the person of Charles II, with adequate guaranties that the powers of Parliament, as fixed by the acts of 1640–41, would be respected. This decision was put into effect without further civil war, thanks to the intervention of General Monk, now in command of the army, who used his power to secure a freely elected Parliament, which invited Charles II to return. In 1660, the new king was welcomed home with delirious demonstrations of joy. England had a legitimate king again; but he would not be an absolute ruler, nor would any king in the future successfully revive the claims of the first two Stuarts. The Anglican Church, too, was restored and for a time persecuted dissenters; but the principle of religious freedom was not lost sight of and was soon to come into its own.

CHAPTER THIRTY

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

THE first half of the seventeenth century witnessed the last and greatest of the religious wars, a war that for thirty years (1618–48) devastated Germany and involved, before it was over, nearly every state in Europe. For more than half a century before the war began, the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) had served to maintain an uneasy peace between the Protestant and Catholic forces in Germany. But conditions had changed since 1555, and with the opening years of the seventeenth century it became increasingly apparent that the settlement could not last much longer. The revived energy of Catholicism under the impetus of the Counter-Reformation, the rising power of militant Calvinism, the territorial greed and jealous independence of the German princes, the dynastic ambitions of the house of Hapsburg in both its branches, and the national interests of France, Sweden, and other European powers all tended to increase the tension and to produce a situation that menaced the peace of Europe. In these years, Germany was a vast powder magazine, which any chance spark might ignite with devastating results. For there were more than religious problems involved. Political and economic motives played their part in the war from the first, and as the war continued, religious issues sank into comparative insignificance before the greed and mutual hatred of territorial states and ruling dynasties. When the war was over, Germany lay prostrate; the Holy Roman Empire had been reduced to an empty shell; and out of the final settlement emerged the modern state system of Europe.

1. THE BACKGROUND OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Counter-Reformation in Germany

The years immediately following the Religious Peace of Augsburg marked the high tide of Protestantism in Germany. For a time the momentum gained by the Lutheran Reformation in its early days carried it on to further conquests, especially in northern Germany. But as the century drew on, the tide turned. The Catholic Church in the period of the Counter-Reformation gained a new and aggressive energy and began to recover some of the lost ground. In every German state where the prince was still Catholic, the Jesuits set up their efficient schools and exerted a steady, tactful

influence on both the people and their princes. One Catholic prince after another seconded their efforts by energetically enforcing the principle of the religious peace which gave the prince the right to dictate the religion of his subjects. Thus large sections of southern Germany, including Bavaria, the Austrian Hapsburg lands, and the ecclesiastical states of the Rhineland, were purged of their numerous Protestant population and became almost unanimously Catholic. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, German Catholicism had developed a decidedly militant spirit, and had found two powerful and devoted champions in the young Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, and his contemporary, Ferdinand of Styria, cousin and heir of the Hapsburg emperor.

Calvinism in Germany

In contrast to this Catholic revival, Lutheranism seemed to be sinking into a state of passive apathy. All that was positive and aggressive in the Protestant faith was now concentrated in the growing Calvinism, which had established itself in several of the upper Rhineland states and in Bohemia, and had won over the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Brandenburg. The stern faith of Calvin provided the moral force needed to meet the revived energy of Catholicism, but the growth of Calvinism in Germany weakened rather than strengthened the Protestant cause, for Lutheran and Calvinist were divided by an antagonism almost as deep as that which separated Protestant and Catholic.

Defects of the Peace of Augsburg

The growth of Calvinism, indeed, was one of the principal factors that tended to nullify the settlement arranged by the Religious Peace of Augsburg. In 1555, Calvinism had not yet become a power to be reckoned with in Germany, and the Calvinists had been excluded from the terms of the peace.[1] Thus, unlike their Lutheran neighbors, they had no legal status. But even the Lutherans were no longer fully protected by the religious peace. It had recognized the right of the Lutheran princes to hold those church lands which they had confiscated prior to 1552. A good deal of church land, however, was secularized (i.e., taken over by the Lutheran lay governments) after that date. So long as Protestantism was in the ascendant, no effective protest could be made, but as the Catholic forces gained new strength, they asserted that these lands were not included in the peace and still belonged to the church. A similar problem arose from the interpretation of that part of the peace known as the ecclesiastical reservation. According to this clause, ecclesiastical princes (bishops or abbots ruling territorial states) who became Protestant were

[1] See above, page 424.

to give up their land, which was to be retained by the church. This provision, however, had been violated on numerous occasions, and most of the bishoprics in northern Germany, as well as many smaller ecclesiastical principalities, had become secular Protestant lands.

The Evangelical Union and the Catholic League

The growing feeling of insecurity among the Protestant princes led in 1608 to the formation of an armed league, the Evangelical Union, under the leadership of the Calvinist Elector Palatine. It was largely a Calvinist league, for they were in the most serious danger, but some Lutherans were included, though the sequel was to show how little they were prepared to sacrifice for their Calvinist allies. The following year, the challenge of the union was met by the formation of a Catholic League led by Maximilian of Bavaria. The Protestant and Catholic forces in Germany were now ranged in hostile armed camps. Peace was maintained only by the even balance of power. Should any circumstance upset that balance, war would be inevitable.

Position of the Hapsburgs

This intricate adjustment of forces in Germany was further complicated by the rather anomalous position of the Hapsburg emperors. Though they were all orthodox Catholics, the emperors (Ferdinand I, 1556–64; Maximilian II, 1564–76; Rudolph II, 1576–1612; and Matthias, 1612–19), whose reigns occupied the time between the abdication of Charles V and the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, were not aggressive champions of Catholicism. Their interests were confined in large measure to the aggrandizement of their hereditary family lands, which included, besides Austria and the other Hapsburg territories in southern Germany, the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary. In addition, of course, they held such vague authority over the entire Holy Roman Empire as still adhered to the imperial title. The princes of Germany, however, both Catholic and Protestant, had already gained a good deal of independence, and desired more. This fact tended to prevent any whole-hearted co-operation between the emperors and the other Catholic princes. Indeed, the emperor was pointedly left out of the Catholic League. The league might join with him in a common effort against the Protestants, but the princes of the league would be careful to see that the imperial authority was not strengthened by a victory over the Protestant princes. In the long run, the only support on which the Hapsburg emperors could count without question, outside of their own territory, was that of their cousins of the Spanish branch of the family. Always intensely conscious of their dynastic solidarity, the Austrian and Spanish branches of the house of Hapsburg, though divided since the abdication of Charles

V, had maintained a very close relationship, reinforced by frequent intermarriages. Any German war involving the Austrian Hapsburgs, therefore, would certainly involve Spain also. And Spain, though greatly weakened through internal decay, was still to all outward appearances the greatest power in Europe.

Bohemia

As it happened, the Hapsburgs were involved in the coming war, and that from the very beginning, for the spark that ignited the conflagration was the revolt of the Bohemian Calvinists against their Hapsburg ruler. The rebellion was motivated by a mixture of national and religious aspirations. Nowhere in Europe was national consciousness stronger than in this Slavic land, where a Czech population had for centuries been ruled by German kings, and heresy was ingrained in this people, whose ancestors two centuries before had defied the might of Catholic Christendom in memory of the martyred John Huss. Under the feeble rule of the emperors, Rudolph and Matthias, the Bohemian Protestants, the most aggressive of whom were Calvinists, had gained a measure of religious freedom. Their rights were guaranteed by a royal charter, but they depended in reality upon the weakness and tolerance of the emperor. This fact explains the consternation of the Bohemians when, in 1617, the childless Matthias designated as his heir his cousin Ferdinand of Styria, notoriously the most fanatical opponent of Protestantism in Germany. To make matters worse, Matthias forced the Bohemian Diet to accept Ferdinand as their hereditary king, in violation of the ancient tradition that the Bohemian crown was elective. Seeing both their religious and national freedom endangered, the Czech nobles determined to strike without delay, before Ferdinand could consolidate his power.

2. THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR (1618–48)

Periods of the war

The story of the thirty years of warfare, which opened with the Czech-Calvinist rising in Bohemia, is a rather complicated one, but it is made somewhat easier to follow by the fact that it falls readily into four major periods: (1) the Bohemian revolt, beginning in 1618; (2) the Danish intervention, beginning in 1625; (3) the Swedish intervention, beginning in 1630; (4) the French intervention, beginning in 1635 and lasting till the end of the war.

The Bohemian revolt was begun with a dramatic gesture of defiance. Determined to commit their fellow countrymen irrevocably to rebellion, a group of Czech noblemen entered the royal palace at Prague and heaved the emperor's representatives bodily out of a window, from

which they fell, with considerable loss of dignity, but with no fatal injury, into the moat below. There was now no turning back. The Bohemians organized an army, though with characteristic irresponsibility the nobles refused to contribute the money necessary to make it really effective, while on the other side, Ferdinand began to mobilize his forces. He could count on a certain amount of support from Spain, the pope, and the Catholic League, and early in 1619 the opportune death of the aged Matthias gave him the additional prestige of the imperial title as Ferdinand II (1619–37). Still he might have been left practically alone to deal with his rebellious subjects if the Bohemians themselves had not called in outside aid and turned the rebellion into a general religious war. In the summer of 1619, the Bohemian Diet elected Frederick, the Calvinist Elector Palatine, King of Bohemia, and that rash young prince accepted the dangerous honor. The choice of Frederick had been inspired largely by the hope that he would be able to secure aid from his father-in-law, James I of England, as well as from the other Protestant princes of Germany. But James, who was engaged in negotiations for a marriage alliance with Spain, contented himself with giving good advice, and the Lutheran princes had no desire to risk a war for the sake of Calvinism and the elector's territorial ambitions. On the other hand, the union of the Calvinist Palatinate with Bohemia threatened to upset the delicate balance between the religions, and drove Maximilian of Bavaria and the Catholic League to the assistance of the emperor. The campaign in Bohemia was brief and decisive. The combined army of the emperor and the league, commanded by Maximilian's veteran general, Tilly, routed the undisciplined Bohemians outside of Prague in the fall of 1620, and the unfortunate Frederick fled the country.

(1) The Bohemian revolt

The net result of this first stage of the war was a triumph for militant Catholicism. Ferdinand proceeded to stamp out Protestantism in Bohemia with ruthless severity. The lands of the rebels were confiscated and a relentless persecution drove the Protestant populace to give up their religion or emigrate. Meanwhile, a similar fate befell Frederick's native County Palatine on the Rhine. Sincere Catholic though he was, Maximilian of Bavaria was not above demanding a high price for his services to his church. The emperor was forced to turn over to him Frederick's electoral title and with it his lands. The conquest of the Palatinate kept the war going till 1623, and the fear and indignation aroused among the Protestant princes by this high-handed act, coupled as it was with a threat to the rest of German Protestantism by swinging the balance of power to the Catholic

Catholic triumph

side, ensured the continuation of the war on a still broader basis through foreign intervention.

For the present, German Protestantism seemed to have collapsed into a state of helpless passivity. But aid was soon forthcoming from outside Germany. England had broken off the marriage negotiations with Spain, and young Charles was eager to revenge his humiliation. The Dutch, too, were willing to co-operate in any Protestant alliance that would enable them to fight Spain. Finally, with the promise of aid from England and Holland, Christian IV of Denmark was ready to invade Germany and join hands with the Lutheran princes in a war against the emperor and the Catholic League. Christian's motives were partly religious, for he was a Lutheran; but in rather greater degree he was moved by the hope of winning territory and by the necessity of protecting certain secularized church lands already in the possession of his family. The Protestant princes of Germany, too, had lands as well as their religion to protect. The time seemed ripe for intervention as the Danes marched into northern Germany in 1625.

(2) The Danish intervention

Meanwhile, the Emperor Ferdinand, unwilling to trust entirely to the army of the league and too impoverished to raise an adequate army himself, had turned for assistance to one of the most remarkable adventurers in the history of Germany, the enigmatic Wallenstein. This obscure Bohemian noble had fought his way to power, wealth, and titles by sheer ability and the driving force of an unscrupulous ambition. Born a Protestant, he had become a nominal Catholic, but was unencumbered by any religious loyalties. By skillful profiteering in confiscated lands after the Bohemian revolt, he had accumulated a colossal fortune, and he now offered to raise an army at no expense to the emperor, provided he were given a free hand to support it by plunder and to repay himself in conquered territory. His great military reputation, backed by promises of good pay and plunder, brought soldiers of fortune flocking to his banner from every country in Europe and representing every variety of religious creed. He had an army of over fifty thousand men when he marched north to co-operate with Tilly and the army of the league. Together they were too strong for Christian, who had found small support from his allies. The Danes were defeated at Lutter in 1526 and slowly withdrew from Germany. The Catholic-imperial forces were left in control of northern Germany, and Wallenstein proceeded to establish what amounted to an independent sovereignty in captured territory along the Baltic coast. It is not clear just what were the plans of this inscrutable genius; but he

Wallenstein

seems to have offered Ferdinand a military despotism, based on religious toleration, that would make Germany a united state under an absolute Hapsburg monarchy. The emperor, however, was too irresolute, perhaps too suspicious of his powerful general, and certainly too strongly Catholic to accept such a proposal. He listened instead to the urging of the Catholic League that he use his victory for the Catholic cause.

The Edict of Restitution (1629)

The league had not forgotten the confiscated church lands nor the secularized bishoprics and abbacies. If the lost ecclesiastical states could be won back to the control of the church, the provision of the religious peace which empowered a prince to dictate the religion of his people would enable Catholic bishops or abbots to stamp out Protestantism in some of the richest cities and territories in northern Germany. It seemed too good an opportunity to be ignored, and in 1629 Ferdinand issued the Edict of Restitution, commanding the restoration to the church of all ecclesiastical lands secularized since the Peace of Augsburg. The edict was a fatal blow to peace, for it aroused Protestant feeling from passive resignation to bitter resentment and ensured the continuation of the war, just at the time when the Treaty of Lübeck with Denmark seemed about to end it. To have carried out the edict would have meant taking from princes and people land and religious freedom which they had held securely for two or three generations. It would have meant the end of Protestant territorial supremacy in northern Germany. Further, the enforcement of the edict depended largely on Wallenstein and his personal army, for it could be put into effect only by a powerful army and by methods of brute force. And Wallenstein, who disapproved of the edict because it meant the ruin of his larger plans, was fast drifting into open antagonism to the league. Ferdinand would have to choose between the two. He had, in fact already chosen. In 1630 he submitted to the demands of the league and dismissed his great general.

(3) The Swedish intervention: Gustavus Adolphus

When Ferdinand thus gave up the only armed force strong enough to enforce his rash policy, a new champion of the Protestant cause had already landed in Germany. The decision of Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden (1611–32), to take up the cause of his fellow Lutherans in Germany opened the third period of the war, that of the Swedish intervention. The motives of Gustavus, like those of most of the participants in the war so far, were a mixture of religious partisanship and territorial greed, save that with this hero-king, "the Lion of the North," religion was a more

sincere motive than with most and his territorial ambitions were but part of a long campaign to make his country secure and a power in the north. Ever since his accession, at the age of seventeen, to the throne of a beleaguered, impoverished, and divided kingdom, Gustavus had fought to consolidate his state and to win for it that supremacy in the Baltic upon which its economic and political life depended. His reign was from the beginning a perpetual war — war with Denmark, 1611–13, war with Russia 1614–17, and war with Poland, 1617–29. As a result of each, he had won additional territory on the Baltic coast and a more complete control of the Baltic trade. Now all that he needed was a foothold in northern Germany to make the Baltic indeed a "Swedish lake." For years he had been watching the course of the war in Germany and biding his time. In 1630, he decided that the time for intervention had come. He was free from the threat of war elsewhere; the collapse of German Protestantism demanded instant action; and he had the promise of financial aid from France, whose cardinal-minister Richelieu was willing to forget religious differences in his eagerness to aid anyone who would indirectly serve France by weakening the Hapsburgs.

Protestant successes

The Protestant deliverer received at first a cold welcome from the Lutherans whom he had come to defend. They had been overawed by the power of the emperor and the league and they were suspicious of the foreigner. The Electors of Brandenburg and Saxony maintained a stubborn neutrality, while the city of Magdeburg, which had declared for Gustavus, was captured and cruelly sacked because the former would not permit the Swedish king to cross his territory to its relief. It was not till Gustavus had invaded Brandenburg and ranged his guns before the walls of Berlin that the elector finally consented to join forces with him. The imperialists under Tilly then tried to win over the Elector of Saxony by a similar show of force, but with the opposite result. The cautious elector was finally aroused to opposition and joined Gustavus with a force of some eighteen thousand men. Thus reinforced, the Swedish king fell upon the Catholic imperial army at Breitenfeld, not far from Leipzig, in September, 1631. The Saxon contingent proved worthless, but the Swedish army, which Gustavus had reorganized along entirely new lines, justified its reputation as the most formidable military machine in Europe. Outmaneuvered and outfought, Tilly retired with the shattered remnants of his army, while Gustavus proceeded on a triumphal march through the Rhineland into Bavaria, where Tilly was again defeated, and this time the old Bavarian general was left dead on the field. The Swedish king

now dominated Germany, and the balance of power swung high in favor of Protestantism. In desperation the emperor turned again to Wallenstein. For months Gustavus and Wallenstein fenced carefully, but at last, in November, 1632, the two great generals met in a desperate battle at Lützen. The result was a victory for the Swedes; but it was a victory more disastrous than any defeat, for it cost them the life of their king. With his death the Swedish-Protestant cause lost direction and cohesion. Only Gustavus could have reaped the fruits of his brilliant victories.

For a time, however, the momentum of victory carried the Swedes on to further conquest under the guidance of the Chancellor Oxenstjerna, who acted for the child Queen Christina. But they were weakened by heavy losses and by the defection of the Elector of Saxony, who refused to co-operate any longer, though he continued the war as an independent party. Meanwhile, Wallenstein was leisurely refitting his army in Bohemia and refusing to take decisive action. Perhaps he was plotting treason. Ferdinand, at any rate, grew suspicious and decided, now that the greatest danger was past, to rid himself finally of his dangerous general. In 1634, Wallenstein was assassinated by some of his own soldiers. In the same year the Swedes were defeated at Nördlingen by an imperial army. The tide was turning against them and they soon lost a large part of their conquered territory. The emperor was quick to take advantage of this favorable turn to make peace with Saxony and the other German Protestant princes, for both sides were tired of the war, and the emperor's own resources were nearly exhausted. According to the terms of the Peace of Prague (1635), all disputed ecclesiastical lands were to be restored to those holding them in 1627. This amounted to a revocation of the Edict of Restitution. With the signing of the Peace of Prague, the religious phase of the war ended. And the war itself might have ended, had France been willing to permit it.

Peace of Prague (1635)

The religious significance of the war had always been a matter of secondary importance to Cardinal Richelieu. Heir to the foreign policy of Henry IV, ~~the cardinal's aims were clear and simple, however complex the methods he might see fit to use~~. He could never forget that France was still surrounded by Hapsburg territory. To make his country secure and powerful, the Hapsburg states must be reduced to impotence, and France must win defensible frontiers on the Rhine and the Pyrenees. So long as other powers — the German princes, Holland, England, Denmark, or Sweden — were engaged in the process of wearing down the resistance

Richelieu's foreign policy

of Spain and Austria, Richelieu was content to wait, offering no more than diplomatic and financial aid to the enemies of the Hapsburg dynasty. After the Peace of Prague, however, the war seemed about to end with the Hapsburg power still not completely crushed. The Swedes were not included in the treaty, but they could not continue long alone. It was time for France to intervene with all her strength.

(4) The French intervention

With the active intervention of France in 1635, the war broadened to truly European dimensions. Before declaring war on Spain and Austria, Richelieu had formed an alliance with the Swedes, the Dutch, who were to attack the Spanish Netherlands, and Savoy, which opened the gates to northern Italy. German princes were again involved in the war on one side or the other. For thirteen years the war continued, with few notable battles but terrible devastation of the occupied territory. Although there was fighting along the Pyrenees, in northern Italy, and in the Netherlands, it was still Germany that suffered most from the ravaging of native and foreign armies. During the early stages of their intervention, the French met with small success. In course of time, however, the undrained wealth and reserve energy of France began to tell against the already exhausted Hapsburg states. The French army became more efficient with experience and gained the additional advantage of able leadership when the command was given to two young generals, the Prince of Condé and Turenne, of whom the former was responsible for the decisive defeat of the Spanish army at Rocroi in 1643. Richelieu had died before this brilliant victory, but his successor Mazarin carried on the war with equal energy. As the war drew on, the French and Swedish armies joined forces, invaded Bavaria and closed in on the home territory of the emperor. Meanwhile, peace negotiations had begun. They dragged on interminably, but at last the terms were agreed upon and the Thirty Years' War ended in the Peace of Westphalia.

3. RESULTS OF THE WAR — THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA AND THE PEACE OF THE PYRENEES

Peace of Westphalia (1648)

The Peace of Westphalia was the work of the first great European peace conference. It marks the end of the era of religious strife and the beginning of the new era of dynastic and national wars for economic or territorial aggrandizement. In its adjustment of territorial boundaries and in the recognition of the sovereignty of states hitherto considered subject to the empire,

it laid the foundations for the modern state system of Europe. Until the Napoleonic era, most of the further territorial changes were considered merely readjustments of the settlement of Westphalia.

The victors in the long struggle demanded, and received, additions of territory as compensation for their efforts. (1) France, the laborer come late to the vineyard, profited most, receiving the strategically important bishopric of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and the "sovereignty" of Alsace except for the free city of Strasbourg, thus making a notable advance toward the Rhine. (2) Sweden obtained western Pomerania and some neighboring territory on the Baltic, as well as the bishopric of Bremen which controlled the mouth of the Elbe on the North Sea. (3) Brandenburg received, in return for the surrender of western Pomerania, three secularized bishoprics and the succession to the archbishopric of Magdeburg, and was confirmed in the possession of eastern Pomerania. (4) The problem of the Palatinate was solved by dividing it between the Duke of Bavaria and the son of the late Elector Palatine, both to hold an electoral title.

Territorial compensations

The peace also recognized certain important changes in the political status of the powers involved. (1) The Holy Roman Empire, though continuing to exist as a formal entity, was practically dissolved, since each prince in Germany was recognized as a sovereign power, free to make peace or war and to govern his own state independently. As a result, the authority of the imperial Hapsburgs was limited more than ever to their own hereditary lands, and their policy became more and more a purely Austrian one. (2) France and Sweden acquired, with lands in the empire, the right to vote in the imperial Diet. (3) The accomplished fact of the independence of Holland and Switzerland was formally confirmed, and they entered the state system of Europe as free and independent powers.

Political provisions

The religious issues of the war, almost forgotten, were settled in the simplest possible way by recognizing the facts of the existing situation. (1) Secularized church lands were to remain in the possession of those holding them in 1624. (2) The Calvinists were admitted to the privileges of the Religious Peace of Augsburg with the right, accorded to Lutheran and Catholic princes, to determine legally the religion of their states. The Peace of Westphalia did not establish religious toleration, but Germany was too impoverished for any prince to risk the loss of subjects by enforcing religious uniformity.

Religious settlement

The most important results of the war, however, were not of a kind

that could be summarized in the terms of a peace treaty. For three decades the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse had ridden through all the rich land of Germany, scattering death, disease, and destruction in their wake. No war in the history of Europe, not even the terrible struggle in this century, was so destructive or brought such suffering to the civilian population. Pitched battles were few and unimportant compared to the appalling loss of life from famine, disease, and the brutality of marauding soldiers. The armies on both sides plundered, burned, tortured, and killed, without regard to the supposed friendship or enmity of the helpless people. Such statistics as can be procured regarding the decrease in population in Germany and Bohemia during the war reveal an almost unbelievable situation. It is confidently asserted that the total population was reduced to a half and possibly to a third of what it had been. The relative loss of property was still greater. But even this shocking loss of life and property was perhaps less important in its lasting results than the complete moral and cultural degradation of a people who, in the preceding century, had given cultural and religious leadership to all northern Europe. It is a commonplace, all too true, to say that Germany was set back at least a century in the development of her civilization.

General effects of the war

For Spain, too, the war was disastrous. She had been drained of her vitality and was to suffer still more, for she was not included in the Peace of Westphalia. She had already lost Portugal, which had taken advantage of the war to assert her independence, and had lost Roussillon to the French. Moreover, her possessions in Italy and the Netherlands were threatened. Nevertheless, Philip IV still hoped to recoup some of his losses, and Mazarin was loath to make peace till he had completed the ruin of France's most dangerous enemy. The war between France and Spain, therefore, continued. At first it seemed certain that nothing could save Spain from a crushing defeat that would leave her shorn of her most valued possessions. She was saved just in time by the outbreak of the Fronde in France. That futile rebellion of the French nobles distracted Mazarin's attention, and when it was over France was too weak to carry on the war alone. In 1657, Mazarin made an incongruous alliance with the Protestant regicide, Cromwell. Thus reinforced, France had again the advantage over her enfeebled enemy. In 1659, Philip IV was forced to accept a peace, which was humiliating enough, but not as bad as it might have been if France had been able to push home her first successes.

France and Spain

The Peace of the Pyrenees ended the long struggle between the rival

dynasties of France and Spain. It ended also the last vestige of Spain's claim to ascendancy in Europe and transferred that claim to France. By the treaty, France acquired Roussillon, which meant the winning of the Pyrenees as a southern frontier, and the county of Artois from the Spanish Netherlands. The peace was sealed by the marriage of the young king, Louis XIV, to Maria Theresa, the daughter of Philip IV. With the conclusion of this treaty, Mazarin could die content, for the greater part of the task begun by Henry IV and carried on by Richelieu was now complete.

Peace of the Pyrenees (1659)

Part Two

SINCE 1660

Section A

EUROPE IN THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

(1660–1715)

There is no date of which it may be said: Here modern European history begins. The transition from medieval to modern times in Europe was a slow and painful evolution still far from complete in the middle of the seventeenth century, the point at which this part of the volume opens. The political map of Europe, it is true, had already acquired a distinctly modern appearance, with England, France, Spain, and Portugal enjoying approximately the same boundaries as today. Dynastic and commercial rivalry had superseded religious or feudal disputes as a primary incentive to war, and the unity of medieval Christendom had yielded to a system of national territorial states under secular control. But much that was characteristic of the medieval centuries — relics of half-discarded institutions, social distinctions, legal codes, customs and habits of thought — still profoundly influenced European society.

A political fact of importance that should be noted about this Europe of 1660 was the ascendancy of France. Spain was in decline, the Austrian Hapsburgs were embarrassed by the Turkish menace, the Germanies had not recovered from the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, and England had recently been disturbed by a revolution. These favoring factors made it possible for Louis XIV of France, as head of the strongest and most highly

centralized state on the Continent, to play a dominant rôle in European affairs during his long reign. Because Louis, who began his personal rule about 1660, *was supreme in France, and France was unquestionably the first state of Europe, the period from* 1660 *until his death in* 1715 *has been distinguished as the Age of Louis XIV.*

CHAPTER ONE

EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN . . . to which we owe, under the Immortall God, our peace and defence.

THOMAS HOBBES (1651).

IN 1660, after nearly a century of civil and international warfare, the peoples of Europe enjoyed once more the almost forgotten blessings of a general peace. By the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) the terrible Thirty Years' War in the Germanies had been brought to a close. Rivalry between the Bourbon and Hapsburg dynasties kept France and Spain in conflict for eleven years longer, until they reached an agreement which was embodied in the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659). So weary had the nations grown of warfare and its inseparable evils that the powers determined to stamp out the last embers of the general strife, and Sweden, Poland, and Brandenburg, which were still engaged in a three-cornered struggle among themselves, were persuaded to end their hostilities by the Treaty of Oliva (1660).

The Century of General Readjustment


The era thus brought to a close, the century of tumult between 1560 and 1660, is often termed "The Period of the Religious Wars." It had opened with the revolt of the Dutch against their Spanish masters, had included the religious wars in France and the defeat of the Spanish Armada by the English, and it culminated in a great struggle which devastated the Germanies from 1618 to 1648. Religious fanaticism had done much to provoke these wars, but trade rivalry and dynastic ambition had urged them on. It is obvious that a series of conflicts which spread across the breadth of a continent and lasted for generations must have gathered strength from many sources. The phrase "Religious Wars" emphasizes one issue unduly, an issue which, as the struggle matured, was overshadowed by the rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg and the dynastic ambitions of the German princes. A better title for this period might therefore be "The Century of General Readjustment."

For it becomes clear, from our point of observation in a later century, that what the European states passed through between 1560 and 1660 was a period of brutal and convulsive reorganization. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries tremendous forces were unloosed which broke up the ordered habits of the medieval world. In the Middle Ages land had been the chief source of wealth, but with the expansion of com-

merce and the voyages of discovery, merchants became more wealthy than feudal lords. This social and economic change brought such far-reaching results that it has been called "The Commercial Revolution." At the same time the intellectual revival which came at the close of the Middle Ages, the renewed interest in the classical literature and art and in secular learning, which is known as the Renaissance or rebirth of the European mind, swept out a number of old ideas and swept in a multitude of new ones. In the sixteenth century the Protestant Reformation, following closely upon the impact of these earlier forces, shattered the unity of the Roman Catholic Church and divided Europe into hostile religious camps. By 1560 these three great movements — the Commercial Revolution, the intellectual revival, and the Protestant Reformation — had largely spent their force, but they had filled Europe with wreckage and confusion. The three foremost institutions of the Middle Ages, the Universal Church, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Feudal System, were crippled and disrupted. It required a hundred years of repair and readjustment, of civil and religious and dynastic struggle, to reduce European society to some degree of stability and order once more.

1. THE SYSTEM OF CENTRALIZED TERRITORIAL STATES

In the end a new Europe was hammered out upon the iron anvil of war. Turn to the map of Europe on the next page and note how modern it is in appearance. All the wars and revolutions from that day to this have changed the boundaries of the states surprisingly little, for by 1660 Europe was divided into territorial areas which correspond to the European states of today. No such centralized territorial states existed in the Roman Empire or during the Middle Ages. They had emerged slowly as the Middle Ages waned, and as slowly organized themselves. It was not until the seventeenth century that the concept of Christendom as a united whole yielded definitely to a state system composed of autonomous (that is, self-governing) territorial units, and for this reason modern history is often said to begin in the seventeenth century. To the political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), the sovereign state appeared so portentous a social organism that he called it a *Leviathan*, a "mortall God." In his opinion citizens submitted to the authority of the state, wielded by an absolute monarch, because they realized that such despotism was their only sure protection against anarchy, and in a condition of anarchy the life of man would be "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short." Like most of his contemporaries, therefore, Hobbes considered monarchy the best form of government,


EUROPE
after the
TREATY OF WESTPHALIA (1648)
SCALE OF MILES
0 100 200 300
Boundary of the Empire
TERRITORY GAINED
France
Sweden
The Hohenzollerns
Bavaria
Districts that became Independent
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
ENGLAND
WALES
FRANCE
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
NAVARRE
CATALONIA
ROUSSILLON
LANGUEDOC
PROVENCE
DAUPHINY
SAVOY
PIEDMONT
MILAN
GENOA
REP. OF VENICE
TUSCANY
PAPAL STATES
KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES
SARDINIA
CORSICA
BALEARIC IS
MINORCA
MAJORCA
SICILY
CRETE
NETHERLANDS
BRABANT
FLANDERS
ARTOIS
LORRAINE
ALSACE
HESSE
ELECTORATE OF SAXONY
BRANDENBURG
MECKLENBURG
HANOVER
WESTPHALIA
PRUSSIA
EAST PRUSSIA
POLAND
LITHUANIA
LIVONIA
ESTHONIA
INGRIA
FINLAND
RUSSIA
BOHEMIA
MORAVIA
SILESIA
AUSTRIA
BAVARIA
STYRIA
CARINTHIA
TYROL
HUNGARY
TRANSYLVANIA
VOLHYNIA
PODOLIA
MOLDAVIA
WALLACHIA
BESSARABIA
BOSNIA
SERVIA
TURKEY
Amsterdam
Haarlem
Leiden
The Hague
Utrecht
Brussels
Ostend
Bruges
Ghent
Antwerp
Calais
Boulogne
Dunkirk
Amiens
Rouen
Paris
Reims
Verdun
Metz
Nancy
Strasburg
Brest
Vannes
Nantes
Orleans
Loire R.
Richelieu
la Rochelle
Bordeaux
Limoges
Lyons
Marseilles
Toulon
Nimes
Montauban
Toulouse
Bayonne
Santander
Oviedo
Corunna
Vigo
Oporto
Lisbon
Tagus
Madrid
Saragossa
Cordova
Seville
Gibraltar
Granada
Malaga
Cadiz
Algiers
Tunis
Naples
Rome
Florence
Bologna
Milan
Turin
Genoa
Venice
Trieste
Fiume
Ragusa
Cattaro
Belgrade
Temesvar
Buda
Vienna
Presburg
Prague
Dresden
Leipsic
Berlin
Hamburg
Bremen
Lubeck
Munich
Ulm
Augsburg
Frankfort
Cologne
Mainz
Coblentz
Aix-la-Chapelle
Posen
Warsaw
Cracow
Lemberg
Jaroslau
Kiev
Moscow
Konigsberg
Dantzic
Riga
Revel
Abo
Stockholm
Upsala
Gothenburg
Gothland
Malmo
Copenhagen
Aberdeen
Inverness
Edinburgh
Berwick
Belfast
Dublin
Limerick
Cork
Waterford
Chester
Oxford
Norwich
London
Bristol
Portsmouth
Plymouth
Exeter
York
Dover
Calais
Boulogne
Ostend
Bruges
Ghent
Antwerp
Brussels
Mons
Namur
Liege
Aix-la-Chapelle
Cologne
Coblentz
Mainz
Frankfort
Strasburg
Nancy
Metz
Verdun
Reims
Paris
Rouen
Amiens
Calais
Boulogne
Dunkirk

and held that the sovereign expressed in his august person the concentrated will, authority, and majesty of the state.

Thus two important facts are to be noted about Europe in 1660. The first is the existence of these autonomous states. The second fact concerns the form of government common to these states: they are all, or almost all, absolute monarchies. The sovereign power, in the great majority of cases, is vested in a prince who claims to rule by divine right. It need hardly be explained that this triumph of the kingly power was not obtained without a struggle. In France, nobles tenacious of their independence resisted the growth of the royal authority until their last revolts were crushed by Richelieu and Mazarin and Louis XIV. In the Germanies, the dukes and electors subdued their subjects and fought their overlord, the Holy Roman Emperor, until they won what amounted to sovereign independence for each of them. In Spain and Portugal the people were taught to accept the will of the king without protest, even if he proved wicked or incompetent. Only the English had dared to flout the divine right of kings, but, although they sent Charles I to the block (1649), they received back his son Charles II eleven years later as "King by the grace of God." In 1660, monarchy was the accepted form of government everywhere in Europe, with the exception of Switzerland, which was a republic, and Holland, where an elected officer exercised the power of a king under republican forms.

Divine-right monarchies the rule

The new organization of Europe, consolidated during the Century of Readjustment, proved remarkably stable. For a hundred and thirty years the settlement endured without essential changes, while Europe continued to progress within the lines laid down by 1660. Though the balance of power between one state and another shifted from time to time, a general equilibrium was maintained. No civil wars or serious revolts threatened the European monarchs, who continued to rule by divine right, except in England where the ruler was made responsible to Parliament. The Century of Readjustment, it seemed, had produced an order of things that possessed the virtues of stability and permanence.

Unfortunately, the new order also brought grave evils. The most important characteristic which the national states held in common was a lust for self-aggrandizement. Though religion had been eliminated as a cause of international strife (the Thirty Years' War was the last of the religious struggles), war remained a persistent scourge none the less. Like the monster in the fable, it seemed to have grown three heads for one that was stricken off. If

Nationalism

states no longer clashed over religious differences, they found more imperious issues, such as greed for territory, jealousy over each other's trade, or the desire to monopolize the new lands discovered across the seas. More than once an ambitious king plunged Europe into war to advance the claims of his dynasty. So bitter and so relentless have national antagonisms proved in the modern state system that the system itself has been called "Ishmaelitish nationalism," the term being borrowed from the story of Ishmael in the Old Testament, whose "hand was against every man and every man's hand against him."

The danger that as the states developed the wars between them would grow more frequent and more destructive alarmed far-seeing statesmen and philosophers before 1660. Sully, the able minister of Henry IV of France, formulated in his master's name a "Grand Design" for uniting all the European states in a permanent alliance. General councils were to arbitrate all international disputes, and war was to be restricted to campaigns against the infidel Turks. In 1623, a French scholar, Émeric Crucé, in a book called *The New Cyneas*, proposed that armies should be abolished and a world court created to adjust disputes. Two years later, the great Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), published a treatise *On the Law of War and Peace* in which he attempted to distinguish between just and unjust wars, urging that if war proved unavoidable the nations engaged should at least pledge themselves to abstain from needless barbarities such as the massacre of the wounded. Unfortunately, to most practical statesmen the "Grand Design" and the suggestions of Crucé and Grotius appeared idealistic and unenforceable. Believing that no nation could expect to escape a war once in every generation, these men held it wisest to prepare for the stern eventuality by making their respective states as self-sufficient as possible, by building up armaments and seeking allies for the expected struggle.

Balance of power

The result was the formation of alliances for purposes of offense and defense, a process which often went forward until the states of Europe were aligned in two hostile groups. If these groups were evenly balanced, the outcome of a war between them was difficult to predict, a fact which the diplomats extolled as the best possible guaranty of peace. So long as a just balance of power was maintained, few states would be reckless enough to invite a war which they stood an even chance of losing. Moreover, small countries would be preserved from the rapacity of powerful neighbors by other powers interested in maintaining the international equilibrium. This somewhat optimistic ideal, which had been invoked in the sixteenth century

(and earlier), became in the seventeenth century the guiding principle of international diplomacy.

The gravest flaw in the political state system of seventeenth-century Europe was this perpetual threat of war. A second defect was to be found within the states themselves, and was inherent in their form of government. Divine-right monarchy is successful if the monarch is equal to his task, but not otherwise. Political thinkers who had witnessed the evils that sprang up to plague a nation during a civil war or interregnum declared that people were safe and happy only when their ruler had adequate power to maintain order, and could hand on that power without interruption to his successor. As they found these two qualifications implicit in absolute monarchy, they praised it as the best system of government. But there is a Latin proverb to the effect that the best, when corrupted, becomes the worst. Under a capable king monarchy might justify itself admirably, but under a bad one it was almost certain to prove execrable. Unfortunately, not every prince who inherited a throne also inherited a talent for ruling. For one king born with genius there were ten who were mediocre if not actively mischievous. If the ministers of a stupid or wicked king were too servile to restrain him, a whole nation might suffer for his mistakes. His subjects had no redress against the injuries he did them, for in theory the king was answerable for his acts to God alone. The people might pray to God to soften his heart and enlighten his understanding; but if their prayers proved unavailing there was nothing they could do, except, as one writer has wittily observed, "to give thanks for the evil which the king neglected to do."

Defects of absolute monarchy

2. THE EUROPEAN STATES IN 1660

Had an Englishman of 1660 decided to take advantage of the restoration of peace in Europe to make a grand tour of the Continent, he could have learned much in a year of travel and adventure. Desiring to visit as many countries as possible, he might plan to sojourn a month or two in France, travel through Holland to the Germanies and Scandinavia, and then turn south to Austria and Italy. From Genoa he could, if he wished, take a ship to Spain, explore the Iberian Peninsula until the time came to board a merchantman at Lisbon, and conclude his year of wandering by a sea voyage to London. The stages of his journey may be followed with ease by referring to the map following page 534.

If we suppose our imaginary traveler to have started from London

in June, 1660, he must have left behind him a city gay with flags. The English people were celebrating the return of Charles II. Weary of the grim austerities of the Puritan régime, the nation hailed the restoration of the monarchy as an omen that England was to be "Merrie England" once more. Theaters were reopened, dancing and card-playing came back into fashion, and fine clothes were no longer frowned upon as a mark of vanity. The wit and affability of the new king pleased his subjects and earned him the title "The Merry Monarch." Beneath his charming manners he concealed thoughts that were selfish but sagacious. England, with a population of some four and a half million people, together with Scotland and Ireland, formed a kingdom no monarch need spurn. Charles had determined to escape if he could from the limitations set upon his authority, but to defer to Parliament if necessary rather than "start again upon his travels."

England

Leaving London to welcome its new king, our traveler of 1660 caught a coach for Dover. Recently inaugurated, these coaches were introducing a revolution in land transportation, for they ran more or less on schedule and jogged men and baggage over the vile English roads at the surprising average of four miles an hour. The traveler was much relieved, after crossing the Channel, to find the French roads much better. A few days' journeying brought him to Paris, which was rapidly becoming the foremost city in Europe, as France was becoming the foremost state. In June, 1660, the Parisians were celebrating the marriage of their king, Louis XIV, to Maria Theresa, daughter of the Spanish king, Philip IV. This wedding was solemnized with a pomp and luxury remarkable even for an age which loved sumptuous display, for Louis XIV, then in his early twenties, was the most powerful monarch in Europe. For over half a century he was to maintain his position as the most dreaded, the most flattered, and the most troublesome figure on the European stage.

France

On the northeastern frontier of France lay the provinces of the Spanish Netherlands which Louis coveted; and beyond these the populous cities of the Dutch Republic whose inhabitants Louis despised. Yet his contempt for the Dutch merchants was mixed with envy, for they were the wealthiest merchants and traders in Europe. Our traveler, who paused a few days in Amsterdam, was amazed to see the harbor so dark with the masts of ships that it looked like a level forest. It was said the herring trade alone brought the Dutch more wealth than Spain had drawn from all the mines of the Indies. All the nations shared the envy felt by Louis XIV at the spectacle of Dutch prosperity, but Louis had two additional reasons for

The Dutch Republic

disliking his neighbors. He disliked them because they were Protestant and he disliked them because they were republican.

The Germanies

Leaving Holland behind and ascending the river Rhine, the traveler soon found himself in the heart of the Palatinate. The Thirty Years' War had ended in 1648, but traces of its ravages were apparent everywhere, so that an Englishman might well be thankful his own country had escaped such a visitation. This wave of destruction which had overwhelmed the Germanies helps to account for the ascendancy gained by France in the seventeenth century. German civilization had been thrown back a hundred years; large areas were swept as clean as a desert, and more than half the population of the empire had perished from the sword or plague or famine. With the re-establishment of peace, the German princes took up the task of restoring prosperity to their shattered domains, the most successful being Frederick William of Brandenburg, known to German history as the "Great Elector" (1640–88). By his political and military reforms Frederick William laid a foundation for a strong Prussian state in northern Germany. Settlers were drawn from all parts of Europe to people his depleted villages through the promise of good government and freedom from religious persecution. Hearing of the Great Elector's statesmanlike rule, our traveler decided to visit Berlin. He found the future capital of Germany a grim and cheerless town of ten or twelve thousand inhabitants, situated in the midst of a desert-like countryside, and his disappointment led him to hasten on for a view of the Scandinavian countries.

The Baltic states

Five states disputed the control of the Baltic Sea in 1660: Sweden, Denmark, Russia, Brandenburg, and Poland. As a temporary truce had been concluded, the traveler was able to visit Copenhagen, the capital of the united kingdom of Denmark-Norway, and to linger in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden. It astonished him to learn that these kingdoms, which desired to play the rôle of great powers, had a population of only a little over a million each. Remembering how Brandenburg was developing, and pondering what he had heard of Russia, a vast and little known country on the eastern fringe of Europe, the Englishman decided that Sweden and Denmark were unwise to waste their resources fighting each other when they might soon have such much more powerful rivals. Being tactful, however, he kept his opinion to himself, and resumed his journey down the Baltic to Danzig and thence across Great Poland on his way to Vienna.

In that ancient city on the Danube, the Emperor of the Holy Roman

Empire, Leopold I, had recently celebrated his election. His reign (1658–1705) was to prove a critical half-century in Austrian history. Despite his grandiose titles, the emperor's power was crumbling: the Peace of Westphalia had virtually terminated his authority over the German princes, France was powerful and aggressive in the West, and the Turks, having overrun Hungary, were pressing up the Danube toward Vienna. Twenty years later, as we shall see, they were to besiege the city, from which Leopold fled in panic. Only the heroic action of John Sobieski, King of Poland, saved eastern Europe for the cross. With a small relief force of Poles and Germans, Sobieski hastened to the aid of Vienna, and routed a Mohammedan host that outnumbered his own by three to one (1683).

Austria

In the cathedral of Saint Stephen the grateful Viennese intoned the text, "There was a man sent from God whose name was John"; but for the timely aid Sobieski had rendered, the proud Hapsburgs showed scant gratitude. Poland, in 1660, was a loosely organized kingdom that occupied an area as large as France. A little over a century later, as we are to learn, it disappeared from the map of Europe completely, partitioned and annexed by the rapacious rulers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Poland

It is recounted that in the hour of their defeat before the walls of Vienna, the Turks were dismayed to see the shadow of an eclipse blot out the crescent moon from the evening sky. The crescent was the emblem of Mohammedan power, and the Islamic Empire for a thousand years had stretched from Asia Minor across Africa to Spain, a menacing crescent with its horns closing on Christian Europe. The western horn had been blunted at the battle of Tours (732) and broken off when the Spaniards ended the Moorish power in Spain (1492). But in the same century the fall of Constantinople (1453) saw the eastern horn of the crescent plunged into the heart of the Hapsburg Empire. The siege of Vienna in 1683 marked the farthest gain in this advance. Thereafter the Turkish power in the Balkan Peninsula was doomed to ebb with the centuries like a slowly receding tide.

The Turks

The summer of 1660 changed to autumn while the traveler lingered in Vienna, but before the snows could deepen in the Alps he hastened across the Brenner Pass, and saw the waters of the Adriatic for the first time at Venice. The city of the doges, once the greatest commercial port of Europe, had lost its supremacy with the development of the Atlantic sea lanes, and its glory was waning. Had the traveler been a Catholic, he might have continued his journey from

Italy

Venice through the Papal States to Rome, where he could have paid his respects to the pope; but, as he was an Englishman and a Protestant, he visited instead the lovely cities of northern Italy, stopping in Bologna, Mantua, Milan, and Pavia, before he embarked at Genoa in a swift galley that carried him to Barcelona in Spain.

On his way across the valleys and plateaus which separate Barcelona from Madrid, the traveler came to understand why Spain, the dominant nation of Europe a century earlier, had fallen into decline. *Spain* The peasants appeared lazy, disliking to work more than a few hours a day, although one day in four was a religious holiday. The irrigation systems by which, in Moorish times, farmers had coaxed produce from the arid soil were no longer tended. The only roads in many parts were the water courses, impassable after rains when streams had the right of way. Trade languished, for the government, which had driven out the industrious Moors and Jews, was also ruining Christian merchants by exorbitant taxes. Remembering how commerce was encouraged in his own country, the Englishman confessed his astonishment at this, but the noble hidalgo to whom he revealed his thoughts explained that in Spain shopkeeping was considered a mean pursuit in which no gentleman would stoop to engage. If the merchants were heavily taxed, he added with a shrug, they doubtless fared as well as they deserved.

Madrid proved to be a medieval city with a multitude of beggars in the narrow and noisome streets. The government was constantly in financial straits, while many noble families had little or nothing left except their pride. Even that had been damaged by the recent national misfortunes, such as the capture of Jamaica by the English (1655) and the concessions extorted by the French in the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659). A further reverse demanded acknowledgment, for Portugal, united to the Spanish crown in 1580, had revolted in 1640, and the Portuguese were making good their independence under John IV, a king of their own choosing. The Spaniards, however, remained loyal to their own royal line, although inbreeding and degeneracy were soon to bring it to an end. In 1661, an heir was born to Philip IV, a diseased and sickly prince who astonished his doctors by surviving the maladies of childhood. He was to astonish all Europe by living until 1700 as Charles II, last of the Spanish Hapsburgs.

An overland journey of some weeks carried the traveler from Madrid to Lisbon. The Portuguese, in their struggle for independence, had developed friendly commercial relations with England, and he had little difficulty in discovering a merchantman bound for London. A year of

wandering had taught him much about the life led by the European peoples of his day. It will be interesting to imagine some of the conclusions he may have reached.

3. LIFE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

From England to Italy and Prussia to Spain, the traveler must have found three fourths of the people leading miserable lives without leisure or luxury. In the cities most of the inhabitants subsisted on the verge of destitution, toiling as artisans or apprentices, as servants poorly paid and overworked, as porters or ostlers, linkboys or lackeys, peddlers or beggars. But there were few cities in Europe of even fifty thousand inhabitants, and the great majority of Europe's eighty or ninety million people lived amid rural surroundings, their horizon bounded by the limits of the local hamlet or feudal estate. The open countryside, when it did not begin at their doorsill, was within sight or walking distance and this was one great advantage which they possessed. But in most other respects their lives were wretched, burdened as they were by a host of inescapable hardships, by intermittent famines and plagues and unceasing toil.

Difficulty of transportation

The difficulty and cost of transportation confined the poor to their native community: thousands of people lived and died without traveling fifty miles from their birthplace. The roads were often no more than mud ruts, impassable for months in the year. This absence of easy means of transport or communication kept society in the country districts "frozen" as it were. Many hamlets still preserved the same spirit of self-sufficiency and semi-isolation which they had possessed in the Middle Ages. Attention was confined to local affairs; the villagers had little incentive to speculate about the world beyond the horizon, for their days were filled with a multitude of duties, and when they paused to gossip it was of personal concerns. The passage of a regiment of soldiers on the highroad some miles away, or the sojourn of a nobleman overnight at the inn, were casual echoes of the great world that disturbed them little.

In that era before the advent of labor-saving machinery, life presented an endless succession of inescapable tasks. The farmer had his stock to feed and his fields to tend. Tools called for resharpening, roofs had to be rethatched, there was always wood to be hewn or water to be drawn, so that little leisure was left for amusement or study. Few outside of the professional classes ever learned to read, but news circulated about the community by word of mouth or was announced at the church

on Sundays, and the illiterate masses carried a store of ballads and tales, as well as the details of local history, in their memories. Everyone in a village knew everyone else, his uncles and his cousins and his aunts, and the fact that families had dwelt in the same neighborhood and intermarried for generations bound the community together. The status of each person was thus fixed by custom and known to all; few had the opportunity to rise above their class; and the occupation a man inherited from his forbears might determine, not only his place and duties in village life, but his name also, as the Bakers, Millers, Taylors, Smiths, and other common surnames still bear witness.

To hold some settled position, to "belong" in the community, was then a matter of pride, and families clung tenaciously to ancient privileges and pretensions however humble. The craving for distinctions and honors was particularly strong among the rising bourgeois class, and it has been estimated that in some towns one half the population purchased minor rôles or offices of one kind or another in the administration. In a society where the position of everyone is well known and defined, strangers are usually viewed askance, and it is not surprising to find in the seventeenth century that most localities maintained special laws against "rogues, vagabonds, and sturdy beggars." Gypsies, traveling tinkers, and strolling players were treated with suspicion as immoral and dishonest vagrants, a prejudice that has been slow in dying out. The wars of the seventeenth century flooded Europe with disbanded soldiers and other masterless men who begged or stole as the mood pleased them, and against such "sturdy beggars" the laws were particularly severe.

Harsh laws

In the Middle Ages poverty, or at least a contempt for worldly riches, had been considered an admirable quality, and begging assumed the dignity of a profession. But this tolerant attitude toward mendicancy had changed by the seventeenth century, especially in Protestant countries. A new sense of the dignity of useful labor had developed, and merchants and guild masters who needed workers for their shops and factories urged severe laws against idleness. Able-bodied men who declined to work were cured by whipping, forced labor, or, if they proved incorrigible, by transportation to the colonial plantations. For graver crimes the laws were proportionately harsher. Thieves, bandits, smugglers, and murderers might incur penalties which ranged from a term in the galleys, branding or mutilation, to hanging or breaking on the wheel. Executions were public, the condemned were urged to make edifying speeches at the gallow's foot for the benefit of the audience, and the bodies of criminals were left hanging from the

gibbets as a warning to other evildoers. Unfortunately, these cruel laws were administered in so clumsy and unequal a fashion that they proved more ferocious than salutary; yet few people protested against the stupidity of the system, for it was in the spirit of the time to take the evil with the good and accept the established customs in government or society without much questioning.

It must be remembered, too, that the coarseness and crudity of living conditions three centuries ago bred in the mass of the people an indifference to suffering which today would be considered inhuman. Some old European towns still preserve a whipping-post in the market-place to recall the days when misdemeanors were punished by a public flogging. Bear-baiting and cock-fighting were popular sports, and the wretched inmates of the insane asylums were sometimes exposed in cages for the amusement of visitors who might poke and tease them as if they were animals. Pain and suffering were such commonplace things in an age before anesthetics, when surgical and dental methods were elementary, that people grew insensible to the thought of them. Death and disease carried off every second child before it was ten years old and struck down the strong man in his prime. The air was full of "farewells to the dying and mourning for the dead," and the resultant sense of helplessness, of the mystery of life and the imminence of death, partly explains why people then cherished their religion more closely, for the clergy alone presumed to offer an answer to the enigma of existence.

The peasants and laborers who made up the larger part of the population in every European state clung to their established mode of life with dogged and unenlightened conservatism. The prejudice against changes and innovations was so strong that frequently new and better methods of doing things, of planting crops or breeding cattle, were rejected simply because they were new. Forks were a long time coming into fashion because people were accustomed to lift the food to their mouths with their fingers. The belief that night air was harmful led people to seal up doors and windows at night. All the members of a family often slept in a single room, huddled together on a straw mattress, or stretched on the level top of a brick oven for the sake of its comfortable warmth. The dwellings were frequently no better than barns, with earth floors and thatched roofs. Water had to be drawn from a well or stream; there were no baths, and bathing was a luxury it was easier to forgo. The poorer classes could not afford to buy meat and subsisted chiefly on coarse vegetables; inadequately nourished, they were less fitted to resist the diseases and plagues to which their unsanitary mode of life exposed



A MODEST SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY DWELLING

Millions of peasants and artisans in the seventeenth century occupied houses less comfortable or commodious than this one. Note the barrel set to catch rainwater, and the garage-like annex for stabling animals. Peter the Great of Russia lived in this cottage for a short period in 1697, *when he was studying shipbuilding in Holland.*

them, and they lacked the reserve of energy and courage which might have moved them to rebel against their condition.

This picture of life in the seventeenth century, as it was lived by the majority, is a dark one, but there were signs even then that a change was coming, though it was coming all too slowly. The era of exploration and expansion which had begun as early as the fourteenth century gradually brought to Europeans a widening horizon and a richer life. New dress materials, such as muslin and calico, were introduced from the East; cotton cloth was developed as an addition to wool; and new foods, such as potatoes, tomatoes, and sugar, supplemented the monotonous diet. Coffee and tea were added to the list of common beverages in the seventeenth century, and the habit of smoking, or "drinking tobacco" as it was called, was acquired from the American Indians. The rich were the first to enjoy these innovations, but, as they grew cheaper and more common, the new types of food and clothing became available for the poorer classes also.

Signs of change

Yet most of the wealth created by the revival of trade remained concentrated in a few — too few — hands. While the lot of the poor had improved but little since the close of the Middle Ages, the prosperous merchant had begun to enjoy luxuries unknown to princes a few centuries earlier. The clean and comfortable interiors of Dutch houses, with their handsome furniture, polished utensils, pictures on the walls and rugs on the floors, as they are preserved in many a seventeenth-century painting, prove that well-to-do people had learned in that day how to surround their lives with comfort and charm. The country château of many a noble, the town houses of many a merchant prince, were crowded with rich collections of silver plate, carved furniture, and woven tapestry. But the enjoyment of such possessions was a privilege reserved for the rich and the powerful, and for one man who drank his wines from a silver goblet and amused himself with the intricate variety of a thirty-course dinner there were a hundred who called themselves blessed if they had a chicken to put in the pot on Saturday night.

All these impressions and many others might have crowded through the mind of our imaginary traveler as he concluded his grand tour. But not the most thoughtful and intelligent observer could have been expected to detect in the Europe of 1660 the dynamic forces which were to enable Europeans, in less than three centuries thereafter, to dominate the world. Europe, the smallest of the continents and by no means the most ancient in its civilization, which in 1660 possessed less than one seventh of the world's population, was destined to reduce four

larger continents to subjection and tribute. The story of this amazing expansion, which was to carry the impress of European civilization to every quarter of the globe, is the main theme of modern history. The Europeans had never been peacemakers, but they were to come nearer than any other people had ever done to inheriting the earth.

CHAPTER TWO

LOUIS XIV DOMINATES FRANCE AND ASPIRES TO DOMINATE EUROPE

Homage is due to kings, they do what pleases them.
(Maxim from the young Louis XIV's copybook.)

IT IS the fortune of some men to personify so fittingly the dominant spirit of the period in which they live that they give their name to their age. Louis XIV of France was such a figure. The spirit which he exemplified was royal absolutism, and so impressively did he play his part as king, by the grace of God, of the leading European state of the time, that the latter half of the seventeenth century is still called the Age of Louis XIV.

1. FRANCE AT THE ACCESSION OF LOUIS XIV

Louis's long reign lasted from 1643 to 1715, and fate ordained that its glory should exceed even its length. Three factors combined to heighten the unique prestige of the *Grand Monarque.* The first was the general state of Europe in the seventeenth century. As explained in the previous chapter the turmoil and dissension of the religious struggles, followed by the civil war in England and the internecine strife known as the Fronde in France, aroused a profound longing among European peoples for peace and stability. If a king sought to gratify this wish, he would have to maintain a balance between the turbulent nobles, ambitious bourgeois, and oppressed peasants, by proclaiming himself the symbol of the state and raising the state above faction. The century thus offered an astute monarch a rare opportunity to demonstrate the saving virtues of royal absolutism as a method of government, and Louis made the most of this opportunity.

The second factor which helped to augment his prestige was the happy combination of royal supremacy with national supremacy. With Germany ruined and half-depopulated by the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), England torn by civil war (1642–49), and Spain already in decline, France under Louis XIV stood forth as the leading European power. The labors of Richelieu and Mazarin in consolidating the royal power had made the authority of the French king more extensive and more absolute than that of any other contemporary monarch. Louis became arbiter of France at the moment that France was becoming arbiter of

Europe, and this second factor largely explains his historical importance.

The third factor was the king's personality. Historians have long debated whether Louis XIV deserved to be called great, and the verdict, paradoxically enough, seems to be that he was not a great man, but he was a great king. In appearance he was of average height, endowed with natural grace and dignity and by some accounted handsome. In youth he revealed no precocious talents and as a man he was by no means learned, for he possessed little more than a smattering of history and Italian and enough Latin to construe Caesar's *Commentaries*. But if his intelligence was mediocre, his character had elements of grandeur. A lonely and diffident childhood had taught him to be self-sufficient, to discipline his feelings and conceal his thoughts; and he reached manhood with the determination to devote all his faculties to the business of kingship. There is something attractive in the picture he has left of himself at twenty-two when Mazarin's death called him to command the ship of state. Outwardly, he knew, he must reveal nothing but calm resolution, but within he was beset with qualms and uncertainties. To his relief this timidity vanished once he set his hand to the task. "I really seemed to myself," he wrote later, "to be a king, and born to be one. I experienced a delight, in fact, which it is difficult to express." Unfortunately, years of flattery dissolved away his early sense of modesty and moderation, and made him selfish and bigoted.

Character of Louis XIV

Believing himself chosen as God's vicegerent to guide the destinies of France, Louis accepted his power as a serious responsibility. He schooled himself to evaluate character, to choose able subordinates, and to weigh decisions. If he lacked genius, he possessed the best substitute for it, which is an infinite capacity for taking pains. The multifarious details of the kingly trade engrossed him, he toiled at them relentlessly, and not even in sickness or defeat would he permit the routine of councils and ceremonies to be interrupted. For over fifty years Louis sustained without faltering the exacting rôle for which he had trained himself, and history, as a reward for the technical perfection of that performance, has awarded him the title of the "Grand Monarch." To contemporary Europe, his example was a practical proof of the divine right of kings, for no demagogue lifted to power by the will of the populace and no conqueror who might "wade through slaughter to a throne" could hope to sway a scepter with so sure a hand as this legitimate and consecrated king. Among a host of writers who flattered Louis by proving that God had ordained kings to rule and endowed them with peculiar gifts for the

The divine right of kings

task, the most eloquent was the Bishop of Meaux, Bossuet (1627–1704), who based his arguments on the Holy Scriptures. Those who presumed to criticize or resist the Lord's anointed were declared to be not only political rebels but heretics and blasphemers, for, as Bossuet proclaimed, the king's power was without limits and he was answerable for the use he made of it to no one on earth.

Absolutism of Louis XIV

When Cardinal Mazarin, who had governed France during the minority of Louis XIV, died in 1661, the young king announced that he would thenceforth take upon himself the duties of first minister. He was determined to preside over the councils of government in person and guide with his own hand the destinies of the first state of Europe. There was no force in France strong enough to dispute his wishes. Louis XIV enjoyed greater powers than any of his predecessors because every faction in France which might have resisted him had been reduced to impotence or taught to serve the royal will. The king had become much more than the executive head of the state; he was the center of all authority and order, a sun radiating light and warmth to every corner of the realm. His most important vassals and ministers were no more than satellites, circling in their orbits about his august person, reflecting his glory, but forbidden to approach too near. Louis chose the sun as his symbol because it was a unique body of matchless power and radiance, and its dominant position in the heavens suggested the rôle which he felt himself called upon to assume in France. The methods by which he reduced the kingdom to an obsequious obedience offer a fascinating study in statecraft.

Position of the First Estate, the clergy

The threefold division of society into clergy, nobles, and commoners still survived in seventeenth-century France. The clergy were known as the First Estate, and occupied an anomalous position, for as Frenchmen they were subjects of the king, while as churchmen they were servants of the pope. It is not difficult to foresee that under a king as jealous of his power as Louis, the exact division of authority between the king and pope was likely to become a subject of dispute. Louis was anxious to be esteemed orthodox, as befitted one who bore the title "His Most Christian Majesty," but he disliked to see the pope interfere in French affairs. His predecessors on the throne of France had wrung a number of concessions from the papacy, so that the Gallican Church (as the Roman Catholic Church in France was called) enjoyed a semi-independent position. Among the privileges assumed by the French kings was that of collecting the income from certain clerical offices

whenever they were vacant, a custom extended so broadly by Louis XIV that in 1673 his claims were repudiated by Pope Innocent XII. As the quarrel deepened, Louis allowed Bossuet to draw up a declaration which defined the "liberties of the Gallican Church," asserted the king's independence of the pope in temporal affairs, and proclaimed that a general council was superior to the papal authority. To this declaration the French clergy gave their consent (1682), but the threatening schism was composed ten years later when Louis, having won his way in the matter of appointments, permitted the bishops to withdraw from the unorthodox position he had persuaded them to assume (1693). The strong can afford to be generous and Louis had come to the conclusion that the pope would be of more service to him as an ally than as an adversary.

The Second Estate, the nobility

Like the clergy, the nobles were taught to accept the royal authority. Under Louis XIV the great feudal vassals finally lost the power to rebel. They had been the architects of their own ruin, for the long story of their selfishness, treason, and dissension had converted the French people to the belief that the rule of one despot was preferable to the misrule of many. The days when a powerful noble could maintain his private army, wage his private wars, and even defy from his impregnable castle the anger of his impotent king, were past. Under Richelieu and Mazarin royal troops crushed the last revolts and royal orders leveled many of the provincial castles to the ground. The rebellion of the Fronde represented in its main aspect the last convulsive struggle of a decadent feudalism before it yielded definitely to the shackles of the kingly power. Throughout his reign Louis XIV was resolute in withholding from the nobles all political or military authority. Stripped of such power they were harmless, and he had no wish to humble them further. Their titles and honors he left intact and even multiplied, his policy being to domesticate these feudal lions rather than to destroy them. Summoning to his capital the leading nobles of France, he consoled them with pensions and flattered them with empty but impressive duties at court. Ruin or imprisonment would have made these erstwhile rebels the objects of popular sentiment and the heroes of a lost cause, so Louis bound them to him astutely with golden chains. Like the giant Antaeus in the Greek fable, their strength drained away when their feet no longer trod their native earth, for their real power was derived from their lands and their armies of loyal retainers. Cut off from these, they became parasites at the court of the Sun King. Like the orange trees in silver tubs which graced the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles,

they were decorative and expensive, but they no longer served any useful purpose.

The Third Estate

The Third Estate, although it included over nine tenths of his subjects, Louis found by far the easiest to manage, for the commoners had never been accustomed to the exercise of political power. From this class he drew his most trusted councilors and officials, knowing such men would be dependent upon his whim and powerless before his wrath. The subservience of the Third Estate in France is most interesting, especially when compared with the arrogance of the English Commons, which proved strong enough in the seventeenth century to get rid of two unpopular kings. In France, however, the continuous expansion of the royal power had stunted the growth of representative institutions. Yet the French monarchs, though not obliged to consult the wishes of their subjects, could not altogether ignore them. One organ through which they might learn of popular opposition to a new edict was the *parlement de Paris*. This body was not a "parliament" in the English sense. It was the most important of several similar legal courts, and one of its privileges was to register royal decrees. The councilors of the *parlement* interpreted this to mean that they might on occasion *refuse* to register a law which appeared to them contradictory or unconstitutional, but the king could silence all objection by summoning the councilors to a *lit de justice* (bed of justice) and commanding them to accept the disputed decree as an expression of his will. As further opposition would not hinder the promulgation of the law, the *parlement* usually yielded at this point, though occasionally the members persisted in their opposition and were banished from Paris as a sign of the royal displeasure. Louis XIV was so jealous of the royal prerogative that even this shadow of resistance annoyed him, and early in his reign the *parlement de Paris* was deprived of the right of protest.

Because he controlled the national income and well-paid clerical appointments, and was not dependent upon appropriations granted by a jealous parliament as were contemporary English monarchs, Louis XIV could bind the great nobles of France to him by gifts, reserving the most lucrative church offices for members of the leading families. The rising prices of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had impoverished many a knight and baron whose feudal income was fixed by custom, and many a titled bankrupt was happy to retrieve his fortunes through the king's generosity. But although Louis willingly bestowed sinecures at court upon such nobles, or rewarded younger sons with clerical appointments, he preferred to entrust political duties to able



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

LOUIS XIV OF FRANCE
1638–1715

This portrait of Louis (from a painting by Rigaud, Louvre) in his robes of state suggests the poise and self-confidence which made him a model for the lesser despots of his age

members of the Third Estate. More than one ambitious bourgeois served the king loyally as councilor or intendant, in the hope of winning a title thereby, and he usually paid a goodly sum into the royal exchequer in addition when he received the coveted coat of arms. These new "nobles of the robe" were scorned by the older "nobles of the sword," but they acted as a counterweight in preserving the social equilibrium, which answered the king's purposes excellently. Favored by circumstances, Louis XIV thus evolved a system in which the old nobility were paid to be subservient, the ambitious bourgeois, subservient and industrious, paid to become nobles, and the bishops and the abbots of the Gallican Church, chosen from the ancient nobility, subordinated the church to the accessory rôle which Louis intended it to play in his absolutist state.

2. HOW LOUIS XIV CONDUCTED HIS GOVERNMENT

The administrative system over which Louis presided was a highly centralized and complicated mechanism. The executive power was exercised through four royal councils, which met regularly each week and dispatched their business under the king's direction. The council of state decided questions of foreign policy, peace and war, etc. The council of dispatches regulated the internal affairs of the kingdom, but left matters of a fiscal nature, such as taxation and tariffs, to the council of finances. The privy council was a court of the king's justice, but possessed extraordinary powers so that it could act as a final court of appeal and could arrest or withdraw a case from the inferior courts at its discretion. The power of these councils reached into the farthest corners of the kingdom, where financial and judicial matters were entrusted to royal officials known as intendants, each of whom administered a province in the king's name, and corresponded regularly with the council of dispatches. All the business of the kingdom was thus supervised from Versailles; all important decisions (and many that were unimportant) came before the king for his signature, with the natural result that officials preferred to evade decisions and contented themselves with obeying orders. Thus summarized, the machinery of government sounds comparatively simple, but as it had grown up haphazardly there was actually an endless confusion and overlapping of authority; the lower officials lacked independence and initiative, and an increasing burden of details was thrown upon the central councils. An energetic king and capable ministers could force the machine to function with a certain majestic

The four councils of government

ponderosity, but it was, for all that, a desperately wasteful and inefficient system.

Colbert

In the first part of his reign Louis XIV was fortunate in commanding the services of Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619–83), perhaps the greatest financial administrator in French history. Appointed controller general of finance in 1661, Colbert doubled Louis's revenue within ten years, not by increasing the taxes, but by cutting down the wastage and defalcations. A dour and friendless man, consumed by a passion for work, Colbert had the acuteness to realize that most systems of raising revenue ended by killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. Too many finance ministers thought only of pleasing their royal masters by filling the treasury, and cared little where the burden fell; but Colbert worked with four aims in mind, all praiseworthy. He sought (1) to collect an adequate revenue by the most honest and efficient system; (2) to expend the sums collected wisely and economically; (3) to distribute the burden of taxation upon those classes best able to sustain it; and (4) to stimulate with exemptions and subsidies those branches of farming and manufacture in which the nation was deficient so that it might grow more self-sufficing and independent of its neighbors.

Mercantilism

The last point embodies the most significant element in Colbert's policy. The doctrine that a state which is politically independent should make itself economically independent also is known as "mercantilism," or sometimes, in honor of its greatest exponent, as "Colbertism." As applied by Colbert, the theory rested upon two main suppositions: (1) In peace, and more especially in war, a state should be able to produce within its borders or draw from its colonies all the commodities necessary for its national existence. (2) To prosper, a state should sell its surplus commodities to foreign countries, but should buy as little as possible in return, for if the value of its exports always exceeds that of its imports, the difference must be paid by the purchasers in gold, so that a store of the precious metal will accumulate in the coffers of the state adhering to mercantilist principles.

Mercantilism, though a selfish and egotistic policy, appealed strongly to the rulers of the new nationalistic states. To make France economically independent, Colbert imported skilled artisans from all parts of Europe so that they might teach the French workmen to manufacture Dutch cloth, Venetian lace, Flanders tapestries, English steel, Italian pottery and blown glass and mirrors. To protect the new industries from foreign competition, he erected high tariffs against foreign commodities; French subjects were warned that it was "unpatriotic" to

buy abroad, and were forbidden to send gold out of the country. Colbert hoped to raise French manufactures to such a level of excellence that they would outsell Dutch goods in Amsterdam and Venetian goods in Venice. To hasten this end he enforced exacting regulations and punished careless workers. His paternal efforts improved French industrial processes enormously and French trade profited from his improvement of roads, canals, and harbors. But there were some qualities which he could not create by legislation, qualities of initiative, of imagination and daring, and for lack of these some of his greatest schemes went astray. The great trading companies which he founded in the fond hope that they would rival the Dutch and English East India Companies failed after a few years. The navy which he built up at great expense to extend the French colonial empire in India and Africa and America could not compete successfully with those of England and Holland. The tariffs he enforced to protect French industry provoked other nations to similar measures against French goods and created a tradition of economic hostility so intense that every war in which France has been engaged since Colbert's time has been in part at least a tariff war. But the basic cause for the failure of Colbert's grandiose schemes is to be found in the conflict between his aims and those of Louis XIV. The resources of France, though great, would not permit her to seek commercial supremacy on the seas and military supremacy on land at the same time. To lay the foundations of a world empire or to snatch at the military hegemony of Europe were the two courses open to Louis, and nursed upon traditions of conquest he chose the latter. For France, for Europe, and for the world it was a momentous decision.

Louvois

The evil genius whose influence was largely to nullify the achievements of Colbert was the minister of war, Louvois (1641–91). Under his direction the French army became the most efficient in Europe. France was the first state to keep a standing army in the modern sense, drilled, uniformed, and paid by the government. To promote discipline Louvois held frequent inspections, punished breaches of order, and berated indolent officers. Every branch of the service felt the impulse of his brutal and dynamic spirit, and he increased the reserves until the French army reached the total of two hundred thousand effectives. Louis was delighted with the toy which his energetic minister had placed at his command. In Condé and Turenne he possessed the foremost generals of the age; in Vauban he had the greatest master of siege warfare in all time. A city defended by Vauban, ran a popular saying, is impregnable; a city attacked by Vauban is doomed. With such resources France was secure from any

threat of invasion, but Louvois was not content to see his weapon rust in peace. He played upon the king's love of "glory" and urged him along the path that led to conflict, well knowing that war alone could demonstrate the excellence of the army he had fashioned and assure his triumph over his great rival Colbert.

3. THE COURT OF THE SUN KING

Versailles

To provide a suitable stage upon which the Grand Monarch might live and move and have his being, the foremost artists and architects of Europe were pressed into service. Henry IV had held his court in the Louvre, close by the Seine, but Louis XIV never liked Paris. He remembered from his childhood the insolence of the Parisians during the wars of the Fronde, and early in his reign he moved his residence to the small hamlet of Versailles, eleven miles southwest of Paris. There on a low crest of rising ground he had constructed a palace and gardens so vast they became the wonder of Europe, and so costly (the expense has been calculated at one hundred million dollars) that Louis ordered the accounts destroyed. At infinite labor water was pumped from a nearby river to supply the fabulous fountains and fill a "Grand Canal" two hundred feet wide and a mile long. The clipped hedges, statuary, arbors, and shaded walks made the garden an ideal setting for the fêtes and masquerades in which the courtiers delighted; while the palace itself, when finally completed, contained a theater, a chapel, a "marble court," with long connecting halls and glittering galleries, as well as sumptuous apartments for the king and his officials.

The modern visitor is likely to find the desolate splendor of Versailles oppressive, and to feel disappointed at the monotony with which the palace and parks are laid out. Tastes change, and Versailles today is like a lantern with the light extinguished. Yet even in the seventeenth century there were critics courageous enough to declare that this royal residence (and the later palace built for Louis XIV at Marly) demonstrated nothing except the king's "invariably bad taste" and his delight in "doing violence to nature." To its admirers, however, the beauty of Versailles consists in the harmony and proportion of the whole design. The architect Mansart and the landscape artist Le Nôtre studied to subordinate each part to the classic ideal of order and restraint, so that nothing alien or exotic was introduced to mar the purity of the general pattern. Versailles embodies the spirit of an age. Its virtues were the virtues of Louis XIV himself: it was formal, orderly, and elegant;


but its limitations reveal no less surely the limitations of Louis's character. Even at its best Versailles had grandiosity rather than grandeur; it was crowded with unoriginal artificialities; it was, in a word, dull, for it lacked cloudy perspectives, and the lift of distant horizons to set the spirit free.

As his reign advanced, Louis indulged his love of ceremony until his smallest daily acts were encrusted with ritualistic observances. On rising from bed in the morning (the king's *lever*) he was attended by a roomful of privileged nobles who esteemed themselves honored if they were awarded the distinction of holding one arm of his shirt or adjusting his shoe buckles. His meals, his drives, his promenades were each an affair of state; and when he retired, he was assisted to bed by courtiers eager to attend the king's *coucher*. The burden of such regulated pomp would have amused some men, and wearied most, but Louis found the business of kingship "grand, noble, delightful." He was at once the high priest and the idol in this cult of majesty and he succeeded in persuading his courtiers that they enjoyed their part in it, too, so that existence away from Versailles was "a living death." If a noble displeased him, Louis might banish the man to his country estate, where the poor wretch was likely to fill his days petitioning friends at court to secure a revocation of the sentence before he died of ennui. Flattery explains in part this exaggerated anxiety to remain close to the king; vanity explains it in part, too, for Versailles was the center of fashion; but greed was the most potent incentive. Only those who caught the king's attention could hope to profit by his generosity. When besought to aid some needy noble who seldom appeared at court, Louis was wont to answer, "That is a man I rarely see. I have forgotten him."

Court ritual

Seated at the pinnacle of the pyramid of state, and worshiped almost as a divinity, Louis must sometimes have found life a little lonely. Yet he allowed no inner doubts to ruffle the serenity of his manner; even in the darkest days his fortitude sustained him, and the hand that held the scepter, though it might grow weary, was never seen to waver. Nor was he always serious; in his younger days especially he delighted in entertainments and the court exhausted its resources to amuse him. His wife, the worthy but stupid Maria Theresa, daughter of Philip IV of Spain, was an uninspiring consort, and even before her death in 1683 Louis had permitted himself a succession of mistresses. The gentle and nunlike Louise de la Vallière was followed by the dazzling Marquise de Montespan, who had wit and beauty and the taste necessary to encourage great artists. In 1679

Louis's mistresses



From Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

THE PALACE OF VERSAILLES

This engraving illustrates the elegance and order which distinguished French court life in the Age of Louis XIV. The cost of laying out the palaces and gardens at Versailles was so enormous that Louis ordered the accounts destroyed.

there was a new favorite, a Mademoiselle de Fontanges; but by this time Louis was coming more and more under the influence of his children's governess, Madame de Maintenon. The king was growing sedate and middle-aged; he liked the grave demeanor and earnest piety of this unassuming woman, and in 1684 he secretly married her. "Madame de Maintenon," a witty historian has said, "was not so much Louis's last mistress as his companion in repentance, and it might almost be said, a part of his penance." By encouraging his zeal for the Catholic faith she was to help him toward the greatest blunder of his reign, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

4. THE "GREAT AGE" IN LITERATURE AND ART

Louis XIV was not only the greatest king of his age, served by the most brilliant diplomats and the most invincible generals; he also patronized artists and writers whose work was the admiration of Europe. Pierre Corneille (1606–84), the greatest of French tragedians; Molière (1622–73), whose satirical comedies still delight audiences today, and Racine (1639–99), the noblest of French dramatic poets, brought such prestige to the French stage that it remained the model for over a century. The critical Boileau (1636–1711) helped to purge the language of barbarisms and laid down the rules of elegant diction. Before the reign of Louis XIV ended, French plays, French novels, and French manners had been adopted by cultured people everywhere, and a knowledge of the language was indispensable to any who hoped for a social or diplomatic career.

Corneille, Molière, Racine

There was one rôle which the polished nobles at the court filled with honor and distinction: they patronized — and sometimes created — great literature. Few writers have wielded a pen so steeped in malice, so cruel yet candid in the details of its portraiture, as that with which the Duc de Saint-Simon wrote his memoirs of Louis and his court. The letters, too, which Madame de Sévigné composed for her daughter, relating with delicious wit and irony the gossip of Versailles, are still used as models of epistolary style. The *Fables* and *Contes* of La Fontaine are miracles of art for which he often compressed hours of labor into a single naïve but inimitable line; and the caustic, patrician wit of the Duc de la Rochefoucauld preserved the observations of a lifetime in a book of *Maxims*, each polished like a jewel at the hands of a master lapidary. These, and a score of other writers

Saint-Simon

Madame de Sévigné

La Fontaine

La Rochefoucauld

whom there is not space to mention, helped to refine the French taste at the court of Louis XIV and to sustain the traditions of elegant intercourse for which French salons have long been famous.

Royal patronage of art

Royal patronage profoundly influenced the art of the "Great Age." The indefatigable Colbert (among a host of other offices he held that of minister of fine arts) issued charters for an Academy of Painting and Sculpture, an Academy of Architecture, and an Academy of Music. Music was, indeed, the only art for which Louis XIV possessed any real taste, and the first French operas date from his reign. For the rest, the official, not to say officious, interest of the government in matters artistic, the rules and definitions laid down by the academicians, the prizes offered for poems in praise of Louis, and the pensions accorded men of art, stimulated the production of much sycophantic craftsmanship. Yet an age in which Mansart designed the dome of the Invalides, in which Lebrun produced his admirable battle scenes and portraits, and Poussin his poetic and delightful landscapes, must always rank high in the annals of art, nor must it be forgotten that all these men were pensionaries of the Grand Monarch.

5. WHY LOUIS XIV PERSECUTED THE JANSENISTS AND HUGUENOTS

Limits of seventeenth-century tolerance in religion

To many European thinkers the Wars of Religion, so profitless in other respects, had taught one valuable lesson. They demonstrated conclusively that it was impossible to heal religious schisms by the sword. Persecution had failed to reunite all Christians in one belief; bloodshed had only intensified the hatred existing between the sects, until rulers were driven, reluctantly, to tolerate divergent creeds and make the best of it. But in the seventeenth century such tolerance was regarded, not as a virtue, but as a necessary evil. Where tolerance appeared, it was the fruit of exhaustion or of expediency, for religious passions were still narrow and strong and few men were really tolerant by conviction. The wise statesmanship of Henry IV, who consolidated France by extending protection and liberty to his Protestant subjects in the Edict of Nantes (1598), gained him many critics and few admirers. The absence, in the seventeenth century, of that genuine tolerance which recognizes every man's right to seek God after his own fashion must be kept in mind in judging the religious policy of Louis XIV.

To Louis the fact that a minority of his subjects clung to beliefs which

he disliked indicated that they were self-willed to the point of treason. His desire to see all Frenchmen orthodox Catholics was not inspired by zeal for Rome; during most of his reign he was on hostile terms with the papacy; but he considered that to be one hundred per cent French and one hundred per cent royalist, a subject must share the religion of his king. His conviction that to be unorthodox was to be disloyal — a conviction, be it noted, that often had some foundation — goes far to explain why Louis persecuted both the Jansenists and the Huguenots.

The Jansenist controversy

The Jansenists were a group of austere and dogmatic enthusiasts who derived their name and much of their teaching from a certain Jansen, Bishop of Ypres (1585–1638). Their somewhat unorthodox views of salvation brought them into conflict with the Jesuits and were condemned by a papal bull in 1653. But the movement took on new life when Blaise Pascal, the famous scientist (1623–62), defended it in his *Lettres Provinciales* in 1656, so that the controversy between the puritanical doctrines of the Jansenists and the more worldly teaching of the Jesuits stirred all France. In 1661, Louis determined to suppress the Jansenists. He had little patience with their austere morality, considered them hair-splitting trouble-makers, and knew that many of them had sympathized with the Frondeurs. The effort to silence them was only partly successful; toward the end of his reign Louis was driven to invite the assistance of the Pope, Clement XI, who obligingly condemned the Jansenist doctrines in 1708 and again in 1713, while Louis had the convent at Port-Royal, a center of Jansenist piety near Paris, leveled to the ground. He preferred his subjects to be religious without too much enthusiasm; and he never forgot, as his memoirs attest, that some of the Jansenists had once engaged in anti-royalist activities.

Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685)

The same spirit actuated Louis in his treatment of the French Protestants. The right to garrison a number of towns, a right which had been accorded these Huguenots by the Edict of Nantes (1598), had been rescinded by Richelieu, but they still retained their freedom of worship and the full liberties of French citizens. Unhappily, influences were at work which convinced Louis by 1680 that he owed it to his greatness to convert this recalcitrant minority among his subjects to the Catholic faith. He was engaged at the time in his controversy with the pope, and it was a politic method of proving that although he might disagree with Rome he had the propagation of the faith at heart. Moreover, his orderly mind disliked exceptions, and he was afraid that the Huguenots might find their loyalty divided when France was at war with a Protestant

power. So he acquiesced in a campaign of conversion. The Huguenots were gradually stripped of their schools and places of worship. Gifts of money were offered those who accepted Catholicism, but professional proselytes discredited this method by their repeated conversions. Then harsher means were invoked, and the minister of war, Louvois, encouraged his officers to quarter dragoons and other troops in Huguenot homes, with instructions to make their presence as unpleasant as possible. That Louis knew of the indignities to which many industrious and law-abiding citizens were subjected during these *dragonnades* is improbable. He was surprised and pleased at the number of conversions that followed, and in 1685, believing that there were few Huguenots left, he was persuaded by Madame de Maintenon and his Jesuit confessor to revoke the Edict of Nantes.

The result was a loss to France of some two hundred thousand of her worthiest citizens. They fled for refuge to Holland, to England, to Prussia, and even to America, taking with them what they could of their wealth, but taking also an even more precious gift to the countries they reinforced, their skill in trade and manufacture, their industry and their courage. The emigration of these trained artisans was a severe blow to the progress of French industry which Colbert had so zealously fostered, but this was not the only evil. The poorer Huguenots, who could not afford to flee, took up arms in defense of their faith and defied from their fastnesses in the Cevennes all the royal efforts to crush them. Their resistance did not end until after the death of Louis XIV, when they were finally pacified by a grant of toleration. The bigotry of the Great King not only failed to bring about that religious uniformity which he desired for his kingdom, but weakened France and enriched her enemies. Yet such was the spirit of the age that the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was widely hailed in Catholic countries as the most statesmanlike, the most courageous, and the most glorious act of Louis's reign.

6. THE WARS OF LOUIS XIV

The greatest defect in Louis's character, greater even than the bigotry which impelled him to revoke the Edict of Nantes, was his love of martial glory. The predominance of France made that nation secure from foreign attack, therefore the wars which Louis precipitated were wars of deliberate and undisguised aggression. Where there is a will there is always a way to find a subject for international dispute: the most fertile

The doctrine of the natural frontiers of France


cause of conflict in the seventeenth century was the Bourbon-Hapsburg rivalry, and Louis revived that by asserting the need of France to realize her "natural frontiers." The map on the opposite page will show that Nature has set certain geographical barriers which might be taken to represent natural boundaries for the French kingdom, the most important being the river Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. To appreciate how conveniently the doctrine of "natural frontiers" accommodated itself to the furtherance of Louis's dynastic policy, it should be noted that in order to reach the Rhine the French would have to annex Franche Comté, the Rhenish Palatinate, the Spanish Netherlands, and about one fifth of the Dutch Republic, all of which (except the last-named) were territories under the sovereignty of Spanish or Austrian Hapsburgs.

The War of Devolution (1667–68)

A clause in the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) had provided that Louis XIV should marry Maria Theresa, eldest daughter of the Spanish king, Philip IV. Philip died in 1665, leaving one other daughter, and (by a second marriage) a sickly son who succeeded him as Charles II. Louis promptly claimed the Spanish Netherlands as his wife's share of the Spanish Empire, advancing a doubtful argument known as the "principle of devolution," which was based upon the legal rule that property (in some provinces of the Netherlands) descended exclusively to children of a first marriage. The Spanish replied that an empire was not landed estate, and repudiated Louis's demands, whereupon he found stronger arguments. In 1667, he conquered a number of towns in the disputed territory, and the following year his armies overran Franche Comté. The European states regarded these martial parades with growing apprehension. England and Holland forgot a trade war which they had been waging shortly before, and joined with Sweden in a Triple Alliance against the warlike French king. Louis decided to make peace before a general conflict ensued, and agreed to restore Franche Comté, but retained eleven towns in Flanders, including Lille, Tournai, and Charleroi (Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668).

The Dutch War (1672–78)

The sturdy Dutch boasted somewhat arrogantly that their promptness in forming the Triple Alliance had checked the Sun King in mid-career. Louis had no love for these "maggots" whom he disliked for their republican institutions and their Calvinist theology. Moreover, the Dutch had recently introduced retaliatory tariffs damaging to French trade. So Louis shrewdly prepared his revenge. Sweden was detached from the Triple Alliance by liberal bribes; English neutrality was purchased by pensioning the venal


Gains of Henry IV, 1601-1643
Gained by Treaty of Westphalia, 1648
" " " " the Pyrenees, 1659
Gains of Louis XIV, 1668-1697
Gains of 1697-1766
ENGLAND
ENGLISH CHANNEL
SPAIN
THE EMPIRE
SAVOY
SWITZERLAND
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
FLANDERS
FRANCHE COMTE 1674-1678
D. OF ALBRET 1607
C. OF ARMAGNAC 1607
KGD. OF NAVARRE 1620
C. OF FOIX 1607
C. OF BIGORRE 1607
Antwerp
Bruges
Cologne
Brussels
Liege
Aix-la-Chapelle
Calais 1559
Lille
Maubeuge, 1678
Meuse
Philippeville, 1659
Charlemont 1678
Bouillon 1678
Montmedy, 1659
Longwy, 1679
Mayence
Dieppe
Amiens
Marienbourg 1659
Sedan 1642
Stenay 1641
Saarlouis 1680
Havre de Grace
Rouen
Seine
Reims
Clermont 1682
Chalons
Paris
Ivry
Dreux
Versailles
Mezieres
Toul
Strasburg
Mayenne
Rennes
Chartres
Vassy
Troyes
Orleans
Loire
Angers
Blois
Tours
Amboise
Sancerre
La Charite
Nantes
Chinon
Nevers
Dijon
Arnay-le-Duc
Besancon
BUNDGAU 1648
Chalon
La Rochelle
Macon
BRESSE 1601
BUGEY
Geneva
Jarnac
Clermont
Montbrison
Lyons
Vienne
Rhone
Valence
Bordeaux
Nimes
Avignon
Arles
Aix
Marseilles
Castres
Toulouse
Montpellier
Narbonne
CERDAGNE
ROUSSILLON
EXTENSION OF THE FRENCH FRONTIERS, 1552-1766
SCALE OF MILES
0 25 50 75 100
2
6
52
48
44

Charles II (Treaty of Dover, 1670). In June, 1672, without warning, Louis hurled his well-trained army against Holland. The Dutch opened the dikes and flooded the countryside to delay the invaders, and in their desperation they murdered their grand pensionary, John de Witt, whom they blamed unjustly for their predicament. The defense of the republic was then entrusted to William, youthful head of the house of Orange, who was thus initiated at twenty-two into his lifelong task of humbling Louis XIV.

Treaty of Nijmegen (1678)

Sympathy for the Dutch and fear for themselves soon drove other European states to oppose France. The Emperor Leopold and the Elector of Brandenburg came to the aid of Holland; Denmark, Spain, and finally England joined the alliance; and by 1678, Louis was ready to make peace. Although the French soldiers under Condé and Turenne had won brilliant successes against the allies and earned the title of Huns by the ferocity with which they had devastated the Palatinate, France was suffering from exhaustion. By the Treaty of Nijmegen (1678) Louis retained Franche Comté and exchanged some frontier positions in Flanders to his advantage. He had taken another step toward the Rhine, once more at the expense of Spain; but the Dutch had escaped his vengeance, and even managed, in the final treaty, to extort from France a more favorable tariff for their goods.

The "gnawing peace"

Changing his tactics, Louis now strove to establish legal claims to the territories which he sought to conquer. He appointed special courts, or "chambers of reunion," to resurrect forgotten titles of sovereignty on the strength of which his armies would quietly occupy the disputed ground. In 1680, the cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun were declared annexed to France; in 1681, the imperial city of Strasbourg was seized; and in 1683, it was the turn of Luxemburg. To resist the unscrupulous projects of the French king, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, Holland, Sweden, and Bavaria united to form the League of Augsburg (1686), and when Louis attempted to seize the Rhenish Palatinate (1687), he precipitated a third war.

War of the League of Augsburg (1689–97)

The opening of the war in 1689 was marked by an event which augured ill for France. In 1688, the English drove out James II (who had succeeded his brother Charles II in 1685) and welcomed William of Orange as their king. This "Glorious Revolution," which is related in the subsequent chapter, united the resources of Holland and England under a man who had proved himself the most patient, the most skilled, and the

most implacable of Louis's opponents. England promptly joined the League of Augsburg, and the struggle which ensued showed that the preponderance of France was passing. The French navy, which Colbert had dreamed of making the strongest in the world, was outfought by the English and Dutch; the French army failed in the later years of the war to repeat its early successes. In the Peace of Ryswick (1697), Louis was compelled to restore almost all the territories adjudged him by the chambers of reunion except Strasbourg; to abandon Lorraine and his claim to the Palatinate; to recognize William of Orange as King of England; and to concede a favorable commercial treaty to the Dutch.

Philip of Anjou ascends the Spanish throne

In 1700, the long-expected demise of Charles II of Spain brought to the fore the question of the Spanish succession. With death at his elbow, Charles had summoned strength to dictate a testament naming Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, as his successor. The will was a triumph of French diplomacy, but Louis knew that his enemies would never permit such aggrandizement to befall the house of Bourbon without a struggle. Nevertheless, he accepted the bequest, and bade his grandson mount the throne at Madrid. As if he was determined to make war unavoidable, he then seized some border fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, and proclaimed the exiled Stuart Pretender (the son of James II) King of England. As a result his adversaries organized a "Grand Alliance" against him, which by 1702 included Austria, England, Holland, and Brandenburg. Thus opened the War of the Spanish Succession, the last and most exhausting of the wars of Louis XIV.

William of Orange (William III of England after 1689), who had been the moving spirit in forming the Grand Alliance, died at the opening of the war (1702), but the English possessed an even more brilliant soldier in John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough (1650–1722), whose victories at Blenheim (1704), Ramilies (1706), Oudinarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709) drove the French out of the Germanies and wrested the Netherlands from their control. In the south the French halo of invincibility was likewise stripped away by the inspired tactics of Prince Eugène of Savoy, for the duchy of Savoy, which guarded the passes into Italy, had also joined the Grand Alliance. The resulting exhaustion and misery of France forced the Grand Monarch to sue for peace in 1709, but, finding the allies' terms too severe, he appealed to the French and Spanish people to continue the fighting. In 1710, the Whigs, the war party in England, were overthrown, and England practically withdrew from the struggle. The next year a worse embarrassment confused

the councils of the Grand Alliance. They had been planning to place the Archduke Charles of Austria on the Spanish throne after expelling the Bourbon, Philip V, but by 1711 a succession of unexpected deaths in the Hapsburg family made Charles heir to the Austrian and imperial thrones also. The English and Dutch were profoundly dissatisfied to think that they had fought a ten years' war in order to replace a Bourbon preponderance by a Hapsburg hegemony.

Peace of Utrecht (1713–14)

In the peace settlement France profited by the disagreement among her enemies. The treaties which concluded the War of the Spanish Succession were negotiated in 1713 and 1714 and are known collectively as the Peace of Utrecht. The terms of this settlement, which brought Europe thirty years of comparative peace, may be summarized as follows.

(1) Philip V was allowed to retain the Spanish throne on condition that the crowns of France and Spain were never to be united.
(2) In compensation the Austrian Hapsburgs received the Spanish (henceforth to be known as the Austrian) Netherlands, and Milan, Naples, and Sardinia.
(3) The Dutch were reinvested with the "barrier fortresses" against France, and were granted a trade monopoly of the river Scheldt.
(4) The Elector of Brandenburg acquired Spanish Guelderland, and was permitted to assume the title of "King in Prussia."
(5) The Duke of Savoy was rewarded with the title of king and the addition of Sicily to his domains. (In 1720 he exchanged Sicily for Sardinia and styled himself King of Sardinia.)
(6) England was not interested in continental lands, though she kept Gibraltar and Minorca which she had wrested from Spain. Her prizes were the French colonies: Newfoundland, Acadia, and Hudson Bay, supplemented by such commercial privileges as a preferential tariff with Spain, the right to send one ship a year to the Spanish colonies to trade, and a monopoly of the lucrative traffic in slaves.

Death of Louis XIV (1715)

France was still a great nation, but her ascendancy no longer threatened Europe. War had exhausted the state and impoverished the people. Louis XIV outlived his most capable servants, outlived his son and his grandson, and almost, one might say, outlived himself. "My child," the dying monarch exhorted his great-grandson, five years of age, "you are going to be a great king. Do not imitate me in my taste for building, nor in my love of war. Strive, on the contrary, to live in peace with your neighbors.... Make it your endeavor to ease the burden of the people, which I, unhappily, have not been able to do...." The sentiment was excellent, but it shared the fatality that attends most good resolutions in that it came too late. And Louis XV was too young to profit by it.

CHAPTER THREE

THE TRIUMPH OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND

In all cases where government subsists, the legislature is the supreme power.
JOHN LOCKE (1690).

WHILE Louis XIV was dazzling Europe with his brilliant and irresponsible display of power, across the Channel in England the cause of royal absolutism suffered a reverse. The English had never taken kindly to the rule of a despot, and the same years which saw the French monarchy reach its apogee witnessed in England the triumph of the Parliament over the king. By 1715, France and England had come to represent two divergent types of government. In France an absolute king, with the support of the privileged aristocracy, claimed the right to make the laws by the will of God; in England, a Parliament controlled by the ruling classes of the kingdom limited the royal prerogative and allowed the sovereign to make laws only "by and with the consent of the lords, spiritual and temporal, and the commons."

It is not easy to account for this divergence. One important factor to note, however, is that the French had found it necessary to concede arbitrary power to their kings as the best security against the invasion or disunion of their country, and the greatness of the monarchy had come to symbolize for patriotic Frenchmen the glory of France. The English kings, although they furthered the national growth, were never in the same degree essential to it, for the island kingdom was practically secure from invasion and possessed a geographic unity. Hence, while in France the right of maintaining a large army, of collecting and spending the revenue, and even of borrowing and repudiating debts, were left to the king's discretion, in England these privileges were gradually curtailed by a critical Parliament. When Charles I, misunderstanding the situation, attempted to rule like a despot, he precipitated a civil war and paid for his misconception with his head (1649).

Restoration of Charles II

Yet the English people were royalist at heart. A decade of kingless rule under the stern and militaristic Protector, Oliver Cromwell, left the nation weary of the Puritan Commonwealth. Cromwell's death in 1658 prepared the way for the restoration of the Stuart line, and in 1660, Charles II (son of Charles I) was acclaimed king "by the grace of God." At the same time he agreed to

limit his power and promised to summon Parliament regularly, with the understanding that he was to levy no taxes and make no changes in religion without parliamentary approval. This was a reasonable compromise and might have proved a durable one if Charles, and his successor James, had been honest in keeping their part of the bargain.

1. CHARLES II: A DESPOT IN DISGUISE

The general desire for harmony prevalent in 1660 assured the settlement a fair trial, but its perpetuation until after Charles's death in 1685 is a tribute to that monarch's duplicity. Though he played the rôle of a Protestant and constitutional ruler, Charles was a Catholic and absolutist in his secret convictions — if so shifty a character may be said to have convictions. This witty, affable, indolent Stuart was one of the most capable conspirators that ever held a throne. Confined in his prerogatives by a jealous and watchful Parliament, he plotted for twenty years by bribery, by adroit encroachments, even by treason, to win to absolute power, and he had reached the point of success when death cut short the fruition of his plans in his fifty-fifth year.

Charles II (1660–85)

The haughty Louis XIV chose for his motto, *Nec pluribus impar* (not unequal to many, or a match for all), but Charles II followed the more cautious precept, *Divide et impera.* To "divide and rule" the various political factions until he could play one against another and make himself master of all was the cue to his patient policy. There were four major factions in England under the Restoration: (1) The Anglicans, who wished to see the Church of England the state church, and opposed the tolerance of dissenters. (2) the "squirearchy," country squires and gentry who had, many of them, opposed the despotism of James I and Charles I, but finding the civil war and the Puritan Commonwealth even less to their liking, had welcomed the restoration of Charles II. These first two groups were closely identified. In addition there were: (3) the merchant and trading classes of the cities which desired to control Parliament in order to supervise taxation and direct foreign policy; and (4) the "dissenters," a term applied to members of various Puritan sects who were denied civil and military offices because they "dissented" from the teaching of the Anglican Church. Nor must the Roman Catholics be forgotten, of whom a minority still persisted in England despite persecution, while by far the greater number of the Irish people were of that faith.

For the first ten years of his reign Charles trod warily, for he found the "Cavalier" Parliament, elected in 1660, loyal but headstrong.

The "Cavalier" Parliament (1660–79)

This Parliament was dominated by the squirearchy and the supporters of Anglicanism, who promptly applied their power, the country gentlemen to obtain remission of the remaining feudal dues levied on their lands and the Anglicans to restore the Church of England to its full privileges and to punish dissent. All who were not Anglicans were barred from a share in municipal government (Corporation Act, 1661); two thousand Puritan clergy were expelled from the church for refusing assent to the prescribed Prayer Book (Act of Uniformity, 1662); and dissenters who persisted in attending nonconformist services were condemned to imprisonment or transportation (Conventicle Act, 1664). Charles himself had little patience with this persecution; his secret desire was to make not Anglicanism but Catholicism triumphant; but he bent for the time to the wishes of Parliament.

In 1665, the "Great Plague" carried off thousands of people in London, to be followed a year later by the "Great Fire" which destroyed half the city. To many a Puritan these disasters were signs of God's anger against a wicked and immoral king, for Charles set the example for a licentious court and was held responsible, as well, for the persecution which Parliament enforced against the dissenters. In 1667, a third misfortune occurred when a Dutch fleet sailed up the Thames to London and burned a number of English ships.

England had begun a second trade war with Holland in 1665 (the first was fought in 1651–54 under Cromwell). The scepter of commercial supremacy was passing from the Dutch to the English and London had become the great trade rival of Amsterdam. In his languid way Charles helped to promote this development. The Navigation Acts, limiting British colonial trade to British ships, were renewed, the navy improved, new possessions acquired (Tangiers and Bombay), and in 1664, New Amsterdam was captured from the Dutch and renamed New York. Dissenters, persecuted at home, swelled the population of the colonies, while city traders and courtiers eager for profit organized companies, such as the Honorable Company of Gentlemen Adventurers Trading into Hudson's Bay (better known as the Hudson's Bay Company), which was chartered in 1670. As the various companies, encouraged by the English, French, Dutch, and other national governments, often held conflicting charters, the traders frequently descended to acts of war and piracy at the expense of their rivals. In this somewhat unscrupulous contest the English were

Expansion of English trade



CHARLES II OF ENGLAND
1630–1685

This Stuart monarch was indolent and sensual, but he had affable manners and a shrewd mind.

destined to outstrip all competitors and secure the lion's share of the spoils. And the spoils were a world empire.

The extraordinary prosperity of the Dutch in the seventeenth century made England and Holland inevitable trade rivals, but the two states had also two strong sentiments in common: both were Protestant and both feared and hated France. It was therefore logical that the two maritime powers should draw closer together as the lengthening shadow of a French hegemony spread across Europe. How deeply the English people feared France and Catholicism, Charles II failed to comprehend. By the secret Treaty of Dover (1670) he promised to aid Louis XIV in the attack the latter contemplated against Holland, and agreed to restore the Catholic faith in England in return for a subsidy that would make him practically independent of parliamentary grants. Charles's first step was to issue a declaration of indulgence for dissenters including Catholics (1672). To his surprise there was an immediate protest, rumors of a Catholic plot began to spread, and Parliament insisted upon the withdrawal of the indulgence. Though the English were hoodwinked into joining in the war on Holland (1672), their conviction grew that in so doing they were furthering the sinister designs of Louis XIV and in 1674 they withdrew from the conflict.

Third war between England and Holland (1672–74)

Fear of a popish plot, once roused, continued to terrify the nation. James, Duke of York, brother of Charles and heir to the throne, confessed himself a Catholic and became the hope of that party, but Charles, more astute, took refuge in hypocrisy. In 1678, an adventurer named Titus Oates announced his discovery of a conspiracy to murder Charles and set his brother in his place with the assistance of a French army. Conspiring of a sort there had undoubtedly been, though it is doubtful if Oates knew anything about it, but his perjured testimony sufficed in the frenzy of popular fear to send a score of innocent Catholics to death. And Charles, who "believed not one word of what was called Oates's plot," signed the warrants.

The popish plot (1678)

In the tension of feeling excited by the popish plot, political leaders ranged themselves more definitely in two opposing parties and the shadow of a second civil war hung over the land. Those who supported the king and the Anglican Church were nicknamed Tories,[1] while the faction which favored a constitutional monarchy under a Protestant king, with toleration for

The Exclusion Bill (1679)

[1] Those who sought to preserve the prerogatives of the crown were called Tories by their opponents, the term being borrowed apparently from the Irish, who applied it to certain outlaws professedly royalist.

dissenters, came to be known as the Whig Party.[1] In the elections of 1679, the Whigs swept the country, ending the eighteen-year rule of the Cavalier Parliament. They promptly proposed an exclusion bill to bar James from the throne as a Catholic. Charles thereupon dissolved Parliament; but a second Whig Parliament was elected and passed the bill (1680), only to see it thrown out by the House of Lords. A third Parliament met at Oxford with the Whigs blustering and arming. "Like father, like son," they declared, and prepared to fight for their liberties in the spirit of 1642. But they overreached themselves; hatred of military rule was still strong in England and the country was not prepared to follow the Whigs into another civil war. If war was the only alternative to despotism, the nation preferred the genial despotism of Charles and respected him when he dissolved the unruly Oxford Parliament as soon as it assembled. The only point the Whigs had won in their campaign to limit the king's power was their passage of the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), which provided that no subject accused of crime was to be held at the king's pleasure, but must be brought before a judge within a specified time and the charge against him indicated.

After 1681, Charles felt strong enough to rule alone and refused to summon another Parliament. Left in this way without any constitutional means of resistance, some of the more desperate Whigs plotted to assassinate Charles and James and set the Duke of Monmouth, an illegitimate son of Charles, on the throne. The discovery of this Rye House Plot (1683) led to the execution or exile of the principal Whig leaders. With the opponents of the crown thus discredited, Charles was secure in his despotism and the Tories helped him to stifle self-government in the towns and suppress free speech. A subsidy from Louis XIV permitted him to meet expenses and increase his army. But the plan to re-establish Catholicism he dropped from his program: that was the price he had to pay for Tory support and Charles was too shrewd to miscalculate the temper of the nation a second time. After twenty years of trimming, he had found a way to rule without Parliament and without serious opposition from the country, but death cut short his triumph in 1685.

Charles rules alone (1681–85)

2. JAMES II: A DESPOT IN DIFFICULTIES

When James II (1685–88) ascended the English throne, he had many circumstances in his favor. Although he was known to be a Catholic,

[1] The Whigs were Scottish Presbyterians who defied the royal power in defense of their religion. Hence the name was applied derisively to the party which desired to limit the royal prerogatives and tolerate dissenters in England.

it was supposed that he would make his faith a private matter and confirm the privileges of the Anglican Church. In return for such protection, the churchmen were prepared to teach the doctrine of non-resistance, i.e., that it was wicked and blasphemous to resist the king, because he was ordained of God. So long as James was careful to retain the support of the Tory Party (the Anglican clergy and the country squires), his throne was reasonably safe; for many Whigs hesitated to oppose the legitimate king; others wanted the Duke of Monmouth in his place; while still others favored William of Orange, Stadholder of the Dutch Republic, who had married James's daughter Mary. Divided in this fashion, the Whig Party was powerless to prevent the coronation of James.

Monmouth's rebellion and death (1685)

Nevertheless, in June, 1685, simultaneous revolts were organized in England and Scotland by followers of the Duke of Monmouth, Charles's illegitimate son. Both failed and were followed by the famous "Bloody Assizes" under Judge Jeffreys, in which over a thousand suspected persons were condemned to death or transportation. James rewarded Jeffreys's zeal with the lord chancellorship, and sent Monmouth, who had been taken prisoner, to the block. Nothing could have been better calculated to strengthen the cause of the opposition faction; the bloody reprisals disgusted many people, while the death of Monmouth left the Whig malcontents no choice but to unite in support of William and Mary. At the same time the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes sent thousands of French Huguenots to England, where the vivid tale of their sufferings taught Englishmen what they might expect at the hands of a Catholic king.

Charles II had discovered that the English people might be made to endure absolutism, but would never accept Catholicism, but James was blind to the handwriting on the wall. As if determined to alienate every element in the nation, he proposed to maintain a permanent standing army, to repeal the Test Act which barred Roman Catholics from office, and the Act of Habeas Corpus also. When the Parliament which he had summoned protested, he prorogued it (November, 1685). Catholics were admitted to the privy council, granted commissions in the army, and even appointed to high office in the Anglican Church and the universities. In 1687, James issued a declaration of indulgence offering all his subjects the free exercise of their religion. The High Church Tories, even those who had preached that it was wrong under any circumstances to resist the lawful sovereign, found that these proceedings overstrained their loyalty, and James thus alienated many who, aside from the religious issue, were his stanchest partisans. Nor

were the dissenters grateful to him for the indulgence as he had hoped; in England and Scotland nonconformists joined in denouncing an act which granted freedom of worship to Catholics. Still blind to consequences, James persisted in uniting the realm against him. A second declaration of indulgence was issued in 1688, and when seven bishops of the Anglican Church ventured to draw up a petition against it, James had them tried for libel and sedition. All England waited anxiously for the decision, and the news that the jury had voted for acquittal was the signal for wild rejoicing. It was ominous for James that even the royal army, which he had assembled near London to keep his capital in awe, cheered the verdict.

In the same month (June, 1688) a son was born to James and the news crystallized the discontent into active opposition. Many had been prepared to endure James's misrule, because he was over fifty and would be succeeded on his death by his Protestant daughter Mary. The birth of a son who would be raised in the Catholic faith ended this hope, and political leaders from both the Whig and Tory Parties dispatched a secret invitation to William of Orange to come and take the throne. William's life purpose was to defend Holland against the attack of Louis XIV; as King of England he might be able to combine the forces of both countries against France, and this argument persuaded him to accept the challenge. It was a dangerous stroke; the odds appeared to be all against success; but he displayed prudence and decision. At the news that William had landed (November 5, 1688), the English turned to him as a deliverer and James found himself deserted. William purposely allowed him to escape to France, for he had no wish to make his father-in-law a prisoner.

3. THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION OF 1688

James's flight enabled a Convention Parliament, which met promptly, to offer the throne to William and Mary on the pretext that "King James... having violated the fundamental laws, and having withdrawn himself out of the Kingdom, had abdicated..." But the English had no intention of giving themselves into the power of a new despot; Parliament had learned at last not to put too much trust in princes and drew up a settlement which was enacted into law as the Bill of Rights. It provided: (1) That the sovereign had no power to suspend or dispense with the laws, to erect special courts of justice, maintain a standing army, or levy taxes without the consent of Parliament. (2) That Parliament should meet

The Bill of Rights (1689)

frequently, the members to be freely elected and allowed freedom in their debates. (3) That subjects were entitled to petition the monarch without fear of prosecution, that those charged with crimes could not be refused jury trial, nor could they be exposed to cruel or unusual punishments.

The religious settlement was embodied in the Toleration Act (1689), which granted freedom of worship to all except Catholics and Unitarians. This act did not establish religious equality; the Anglican Church remained the privileged state church, and the Test and Corporation Acts still barred dissenters and Catholics from civil and military office. Nevertheless, a long stride had been made toward genuine toleration, for after 1689 the government ceased to persecute, imprison, or transport people on religious grounds and the mobs lost their zest for Jesuit-hunting.

Unfortunately, this statesmanlike moderation was not applied to Ireland. Cromwell, it may be recalled, attempted to keep the Irish in subjection by dividing the land among Protestant proprietors, thus reducing the native Catholic Irish to a position of social and economic bondage. The plan failed because the English settlers were too unpopular and too few in number. James II determined to restore the Catholics to power and his overthrow grieved his Irish subjects as deeply as it delighted the English. In 1689, an uprising of the Irish broke the Protestant yoke, and in 1690, James came over from France to lead the rebellion and if possible to invade England with a French and Irish force. William III realized that his newly won throne was in danger. The French fleet, having defeated the English and Dutch at the battle of Beachy Head (June, 1690), was free to land an army on the English coast itself. To control Ireland and restore James II were to Louis XIV but preliminary moves in his vast struggle for the hegemony of Europe. The success or failure of an Irish revolt was thus transformed into a matter of European significance, and when William defeated James at the battle of the Boyne (July 1, 1790), it meant that Louis XIV had lost the first round in the War of the League of Augsburg which was just opening.

The Irish problem

For the Irish the battle of the Boyne spelled further subordination and exploitation at the hands of their stronger neighbors. Irish commerce was regulated and sometimes ruined for the advantage of English trade, while all but a minority of the inhabitants of the unhappy isle were shut out from a share in their own government because they were Catholics. This determination to hold the native Irish in subjection was founded in the fear that Ireland might

otherwise join any European power that attacked England, a danger that has always warped the Englishman's mind when he considered the Irish question. This sacrifice of justice to expediency has sown a bitter heritage of discord between the two countries and the Irish have never forgiven their centuries of tutelage and subjection.

4. ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND BECOME GREAT BRITAIN

Between England and Scotland a happier settlement was achieved. Following the "Glorious Revolution" those Scottish clans still favorable to James were offered a chance to make peaceful submission and swear allegiance to William, although one which was dilatory in complying was given over to cold-blooded slaughter as an example — an infamous episode known as the "Massacre of Glencoe." The tie which united England and Scotland was in reality a frail one; an accident had made James VI of Scotland James I of England (1603), but each state retained its separate parliament and its peculiar laws. When William and Mary replaced James II, the dynastic tie was weakened and it appeared more than probable that the nations would drift apart. The Scots, who numbered less than a million, were distrustful and envious of their southern neighbors who had five times the population and a world-embracing trade, but the English, who dreaded lest Scotland desert to the side of France, were prepared to offer generous terms, to achieve a "more perfect union." Under William's successor, Anne, this end was attained by the Act of Union (1707), which provided that the two kingdoms were to be known as Great Britain, the Scots sending forty-five representatives to the English House of Commons and sixteen to the House of Lords. Presbyterianism was recognized as the established faith in Scotland.

Act of Union (1707)

The Act of Union, like most of the developments in English politics during these years, was an indirect response to the French threat. During twenty of the first twenty-five years that followed the expulsion of James, England was fighting Louis XIV, in the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–13). Throughout this period James II (and after his death in 1701, his son who took the title James III) threatened to invade England and regain the throne with the aid of a French army. A Stuart restoration thus became inseparable from the idea of national humiliation and defeat, a consummation few Englishmen were prepared to applaud. It is a fact not without irony that, by aiding the Stuarts, Louis XIV, the supreme

absolutist of the Continent, did more than any other single individual to assure the triumph of Parliament in England.

The political leaders who had invited William and Mary to take the throne, in order "to save the liberties and the religion of England," felt it best to safeguard the revolutionary gains won through this act of usurpation by regulating the succession. It was provided that if William and Mary died childless, the throne should pass to Mary's sister Anne and her descendants. Unfortunately, Anne's children died young, and the fear that her own death would leave the crown to the Pretender moved Parliament to decree as her successor her nearest Protestant relative, the Electress Sophia of Hanover.[1] By this Act of Settlement, Parliament once again arrogated to itself the right to select the sovereign and to define the conditions under which he must rule. In an age of legitimacy, such an act appeared to many, even in England, an illegal and revolutionary decision. The Pretender had his partisans, and the whole revolutionary settlement still hung on the question whether, on Anne's death, the Tories would proclaim the Pretender as James III or the Whigs would bring in the Hanoverian line. In the outcome, despite Jacobite [2] plots, Whig principles triumphed. On Anne's sudden death (1714), George, son of the Electress Sophia, was proclaimed King of Great Britain and Ireland. A rising in Scotland in 1715 in favor of the Stuart Pretender was put down and the rule of Parliament assured under the king that Parliament had chosen.

Act of Settlement (1701)

5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY IN ENGLISH HISTORY

In the century which ended in 1715 the English people had overturned, re-established, and remodeled their monarchy until they had reduced it to a pattern which satisfied them. In the same period they had fought strenuously on land and sea, laying the foundations of a colonial empire and commercial supremacy. It is not always easy for a student who follows the crowded events of these years to distinguish the main lines of development, so that it may be helpful to pause at the date 1715 and decide what were the really significant and durable achievements of the seventeenth century in English history.

In politics the nation had succeeded after two revolutions in reducing

[1] See the Genealogical Table, of English Rulers in the Appendix.

[2] Those who favored the Pretender were called Jacobites from the Latin word for James, *Jacobus*.

the royal power within clearly stipulated limits. The sovereign had become dependent upon Parliament for his revenue, he could not raise an army without parliamentary approval, nor could he any longer deprive a subject of his liberty or property at pleasure, for the laws guaranteed anyone accused of crime a fair and public trial before a jury of his fellow citizens (Habeas Corpus Act, 1679; Bill of Rights, 1689). Citizens were no longer to be persecuted for their religious beliefs (Toleration Act, 1689); but the Bill of Rights provided that no one who was a Roman Catholic or married to a Roman Catholic might occupy the English throne, and Parliament asserted this principle by excluding the legitimate Stuart claimants and choosing the Hanoverian line to succeed Anne (Act of Succession, 1701). When George I ascended the English throne in 1714, he became king by the will of Parliament, and he knew it; English sovereigns thenceforth were to *reign* but not to *govern*, and the rule of Parliament was assured. In analysis, this meant the rule of the nobles, the country gentry, and the merchant classes, for these were the groups which dominated Parliament. Under William and Anne it became the custom for the sovereign to select Whig or Tory leaders to compose the royal council, according to which party held a majority in the Commons, and the council thus chosen exercised the executive power in the king's name, but in response to the wishes and subject to the approval of Parliament.

Political achievements

The seventeenth century was also for England an age of swift economic development. New companies were chartered, new colonies seized or founded almost yearly. For the aid which the English rendered in checking the power of Louis XIV, they received a generous reward. The Peace of Utrecht transferred Acadia, Newfoundland, and the Hudson Bay region to English rule, as well as Gibraltar and Minorca. Great Britain was rapidly becoming the foremost mercantile and colonial power in the world, which helps to explain why the country was able to establish a dozen settlements in America, to challenge the maritime supremacy of the Dutch, and finally to endure the enormous burden of the struggle against Louis XIV, without serious privation, while France, a nation with more than three times the population of England, was reduced to the verge of bankruptcy.

Commercial expansion

Part of the explanation for the English victories must be sought in the financial expedients to which the government resorted to meet the cost of the wars with France. The annual revenue proving insufficient to cover the expenditures of the war years, borrowing was found to be the best solution, with the result that the national debt rose by 1715 to the hitherto unimagined figure of £50,000,000. In

Financial solidarity

1694, the Bank of England was founded and invested with banking privileges in return for the loans it advanced to the government. At first sight this extensive borrowing might appear reckless and improvident, but it had certain advantages. Without it the nation could not have prosecuted the war to a successful conclusion and reaped the rewards of victory. A precedent was established and a credit structure developed which was to serve the government needs admirably in later wars; England's financial strength has often proved the mainstay of her allies. Moreover, the thousands of people with capital to spare who invested it in government bonds did so with the confidence that Parliament (which the moneyed class largely controlled) would see to it that principal and interest were repaid. Only defeat or a Stuart restoration could endanger the national debt, so these creditors had a powerful motive for supporting the existing régime. When a responsible Parliament backed a bond, it meant more than the word of an absolute king. The English government was able to borrow all the funds it required at six and seven per cent, while Louis XIV found it difficult to secure loans even when he offered fifteen to twenty per cent. As observers began to contrast the success and prosperity of Great Britain with the losses and impoverishment of France, they grew less confident that absolutism was really the ideal form of government. In the eighteenth century, as we shall discover later, Frenchmen conceived a profound admiration for the system of government which the English had established. Their desire to reshape their own absolute monarchy until it resembled the English model was one of the causes which brought about the great French Revolution that broke out in 1789.

Achievements in literature and art

In literary achievement the close of the seventeenth century fell short of its opening years — "the spacious times of great Elizabeth." The political and religious controversies which absorbed the energies of the nation colored the work of even the greatest writers. John Milton (1608–74), who had given his best years and worn out his sight in the service of the Puritan Commonwealth, withdrew at the restoration of Charles II, "blind, old, and lonely," to compose his majestic epics *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained.* The poet laureate of the Restoration was John Dryden (1631–1700), who produced a number of poems, satires, and dramas to amuse the dissolute court of Charles II, at which it became the fashion to ridicule the sober habits and bigotry of the Puritans. Despite this mockery, the most widely read work of the age came from the pen of a Puritan tinker, John Bunyan, who wrote his *Pilgrim's Progress* while in jail for preaching without leave. The common sense and moderation which dis-

tinguished the civil and religious settlement of 1689 are admirably represented in the writings of the philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), particularly his *Letter on Toleration* and *Two Treatises of Government.* The controversies of the seventeenth century stimulated the rise of pamphlet literature and created a class of readers in England capable of criticizing public affairs. To keep this class informed was the task of the journalists, who consequently demanded "freedom of the press," and finally won it in principle after 1694. Pamphlets and periodicals multiplied, and by the reign of Anne they had attained a vast influence and a high standard of literary excellence, a development not surprising when it is remembered that the sardonic humor of Jonathan Swift (1667–1745), the author of *Gulliver's Travels*, as well as the wit of Joseph Addison (1672–1719), borrowed this means of expression.

In architecture the outstanding figure of the period was Christopher Wren (1632–1723), to whom the Great Fire of London in 1666 proved a generous patron, for it brought him innumerable commissions. He is credited with designing over fifty churches, including Saint Paul's Cathedral, where he is buried beneath the inscription, *Si monumentum requiris, circumspice* — "If you seek [my] monument, look about you." The arts of painting and music throve but meagerly under the Restoration, for Charles as a patron had little taste or discrimination, while the Puritan spirit which still animated the middle and lower classes was inimical to art. In England the true intellectual greatness of the late seventeenth century must be sought among those minds devoted to science and mathematics. The development of modern science, however, is not a national but an international movement, and the achievements of such men as Sir Isaac Newton will be discussed in a later chapter where they can be more conveniently linked up with the contributions of Newton's illustrious contemporaries in other lands.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DECLINING EMPIRE OF THE HAPSBURGS

The dear old Holy Roman Realm,
How does it hold together . . .
GOETHE, *Faust*, Part I, Scene v.

AS ALREADY explained, the aggrandizement of France in the seventeenth century involved a corresponding decline in the fortunes of the Hapsburg dynasty. Part of Flanders, of Lorraine, and the whole of Franche Comté were seized by Louis XIV; and after 1700, Spain, under a Bourbon prince, became the constant ally of France, the two powers being bound together by a common hostility toward Austria and toward England. The title of Holy Roman Emperor, though still retained by the head of the Austrian Hapsburgs, had become an illusory honor, for the empire was little more than an historical fiction kept alive by the force of tradition. These vicissitudes in the fortunes of a once dominant dynasty have already been described in part. The present chapter will trace the history of the Hapsburg dominions in greater detail through the years 1660 to 1715, and relate at the same time the contemporary developments in Italy and eastern Europe.

1. THE AUSTRIAN HAPSBURGS

The Emperor Leopold I (1658–1705), whose long reign filled the greater part of the period under discussion, was a timid and irresolute man, no match in either war or diplomacy for his aggressive cousin Louis XIV. As Archduke of Austria, and King of Bohemia and of Hungary, Leopold was hereditary ruler of dominions which, had they been better organized, would have constituted a powerful state of some nine or ten million people. In addition, he enjoyed the elective title of Holy Roman Emperor, which meant that he was the nominal ruler of the twenty-five million people living within the boundaries of the empire.[1] In this rôle he symbolized the unity of Germany, and the Hapsburgs might, under happier circumstances, have transformed the empire into a national German state, the most populous and powerful in Europe. But two persistent forces frustrated this project, although it was a consummation toward which many patriotic German hearts secretly aspired. The first obstacle was the jealous particularism of the German princes (especially the rulers

[1] See map following page 534.

of Brandenburg-Prussia), who clung to their semi-independent status and would not sacrifice it to consolidate the German-speaking peoples into one great nation. The second obstacle was the jealousy of France. It was a cardinal principle of French foreign policy to promote German disunity lest France be endangered by the formation of a powerful neighbor across the Rhine. In prosecuting this policy, France often allied herself with Prussia and other recalcitrant German states.

Weakness of the imperial government

The machinery of government whereby the emperor sought to impose his will upon his federal empire had been out of joint since the Protestant Reformation. The imperial court (*Reichkammergericht*), to which the princes sent representatives, had grown insolent and unmanageable; the imperial council (*Reichshofrath*), appointed by the emperor himself, was more tractable, but its decrees were often evaded or disregarded. Concerning all important matters which related to the empire as a whole, it had become the custom to consult the Diet, a sort of parliament composed chiefly of the leading German princes and representatives from the free towns. But in this assembly likewise the princes held the real power and would never vote the emperor the quota of men or money he demanded for fear that they might give themselves a real master. Their contributions for the defense of the empire were so niggardly that the imperial army often took the field with less than one fourth of its nominal strength. Not even the emergency created by the Turkish advance up the Danube could subdue the selfishness of the princes, and Leopold was obliged in 1663 to accept the aid of thirty thousand men in French pay to repel the invaders; while in 1683 he had John Sobieski and his Poles to thank that Vienna was saved from capture. The lack of support offered by the princes can be explained in part by the fact that many of them were Protestant and saw no advantage in strengthening a Catholic emperor, who might, if he gained the power, suppress the Protestant faith as an earlier emperor had essayed to do in the Thirty Years' War.

The Hapsburg Empire

Not even in his hereditary domains could Leopold exercise the control of an absolute monarch. The provinces most securely in his power were Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, the archduchy of Austria, and the county of Tyrol. In Bohemia he ruled as king, with the assistance of a Diet, while in Hungary (nine tenths of which was held by the Turks in 1660) he found it expedient to confirm the ancient liberties of the nobles. Ineradicable barriers of language, of custom, and of topography contributed to the disunity of the Hapsburg lands. The disruptive forces of feudalism had survived too long, the havoc of the religious conflict had left wounds too deep, the lure of im-

perial pretensions had distracted the emperors too persistently from the task of consolidating their local domains, until the opportunity of building up a national state escaped them. Certainly the problem of unifying these mosaic possessions defied the mediocre talents of Leopold I. He clung inertly to his throne through the vicissitudes of the late seventeenth century, and, if the closing years of his reign witnessed a revival in Hapsburg prestige, the credit for this must be given to Austria's allies for their aid, and to her enemies for their blunders, rather than to any vigorous activity within the Austrian lands.

2. THE TURKISH MENACE

From the fourteenth century to the seventeenth, the Danube Valley was a vast battlefield where it seemed as if the resistance of the Christian inhabitants was destined to be slowly crushed by the power of the Turkish invaders. The western European nations, preoccupied with their own politics, remained amazingly indifferent to this threat from the East. Had the Turks possessed the ability to *govern* as well as the ability to *conquer*, half of Europe might have been theirs for the taking, and the future of the European peoples profoundly altered, but fortunately for the Christian states the Mohammedan Empire was a prey to internal ills which frequently paralyzed its armies in the hour of victory.

Characteristics of Turkish rule

The chief limitation from which the Turks suffered was an inability to assimilate and organize their conquests. They remained always an alien military caste in Europe, living on the tribute they extorted from the conquered in the form of money, recruiting their armies from the tribute they extorted in men: for it was their custom to conscript boy children whom they raised as Mohammedans and trained for military service. Knowing better how to destroy than how to create, they left matters of trade and details of local administration to their subject peoples. At its core their government was an oriental despotism in which the reign of a strong sultan was usually characterized by pitiless autocracy, the reign of a weak one by harem intrigue and military anarchy. Such a system of despotism presents one great advantage, for it affords the really capable ruler unlimited power to energize the state. This fact largely explains the vicissitudes of fortune which have attended the march of the crescent, for, as "Sultan after Sultan with his Pomp abode his Hour or two and went his way," the prosperity of Islam fluctuated according to his capacity or that of his vizier.

The latter half of the seventeenth century witnessed a revival of the

Mohammedan offensive under the leadership of the Kiuprili family. As the power behind the throne, Mohammed Kiuprili (and later his son Achmed) stamped out anarchy and united all "true believers" in a war to the death against the Christians. *Turkish offensive (1655–83)* An attack on Hungary was repulsed at Saint Gothard (1663) by an imperial army aided by French troops; but in 1669, Crete was captured from the Venetians, and the Ukraine annexed from Poland in 1676. To crown these successes by a blow that would astonish Christendom, the grand vizier planned an irresistible drive against Vienna. With an army of one hundred and fifty thousand, he reached the walls of that city in 1683, but the arrival of John Sobieski with reinforcements led to the overwhelming defeat of the besiegers, and the Turkish tide ebbed as swiftly as it had risen. When peace was re-established between the emperor and the sultan by the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699), the Hapsburgs had recovered the greater part of the fertile Hungarian plain, and the suzerainty over Transylvania.[1] Corruption and anarchy had begun once more to devitalize the Mohammedan Empire and it settled into a slow decline. The crescent had made its last conquests from the cross.

In a second conflict — the dynastic duel with the Bourbons — the emperor was fortunate in finding powerful allies. Marlborough and Prince Eugène saved Vienna from the French in 1704 as Sobieski had saved it from the Turks in 1683. But, although the allies were victorious over France in the War of the Spanish Succession, the Hapsburgs lost the Spanish throne. Reluctant to acknowledge this reverse, the Emperor Charles VI[2] attempted in 1712 to continue the war against France unaided, although it was clear that France, even in exhaustion, was more than a match for Austria, and the Spaniards were ready to defend their Bourbon king devotedly. In 1713–14 the allies, whose assistance in the war had saved Austria from ruin, showed themselves equally generous in the peace.[3] Spain they could not restore to the house of Hapsburg, but in compensation Naples, Milan, Sardinia, and the Spanish Netherlands were handed over to the emperor, so that he was consoled for the loss of Spain by a practical hegemony in Italy. Recognizing at the same time that the house of Austria was too feeble to prevent further French aggression, the diplomats provided that the Dutch should garrison certain "barrier for- *Peace of Utrecht (1713–14)*

[1] See map following page 534.

[2] Leopold I died in 1705 and was followed by Joseph I, whose death in 1711 brought to the Austrian throne the Archduke Charles, Hapsburg claimant to the Spanish throne also.

[3] The treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden are styled collectively the Peace of Utrecht.

tresses" in what were to be thenceforth the Austrian Netherlands, so that France might be held in check, while at the same time Savoy was organized as a buffer state between Bourbon and Hapsburg frontiers in the south.[1]

The house of Austria thus emerged, after the most critical half-century in its history, victorious over the Ottoman Turks, with extensive gains in Hungary, and suzerainty over half of Italy. Of his imperial pretensions little was left to the emperor beyond the shadow of a great name, the Holy Roman Empire having ceased, in Voltaire's famous phrase, to be either holy or Roman or an empire; but in compensation he found himself the personal ruler of some twenty million people dwelling in a federation of rich and lovely provinces which possessed almost every blessing save that of national unity. For two hundred years the Hapsburg monarchs were to dedicate themselves to the heroic task of preserving this mosaic "Empire on the Danube" from the dissolution to which it was predestined.

3. SPAIN IN DECLINE

In the sixteenth century, under Charles V and Philip II, Spain had played the dominant rôle in European politics, but before the end of the seventeenth century, the Spaniards had seen this ascendancy transferred to France, while their own country sank to the position of a second-rate power. After 1700, the reforms of the Bourbon kings induced a slight revival, but the Spanish nation did not recover the energy, the prestige, or the intellectual vigor which distinguished it in the age of gold. The explanation for this decadence appears to lie in the character of the Spanish people and in the unsound economic principles which the monarchy enforced to the detriment of Spanish trade.

Economic decline

For many of the ills afflicting Spain the misguided policy of the government may be held responsible. In 1609, His Most Catholic Majesty, Philip III (1598–1621), ordered the Moriscos (descendants of Christianized Moors) expelled from the country, a measure which strengthened the religious solidarity of the realm, but crippled many trades and handicrafts in which the Moors had specialized. Trade was further hampered by the *alcabala*, a tax of ten per cent on all sales, by the debasement of the coinage, and by the monopolies and restrictions enforced by the unenlightened sovereigns. By the reign of Charles II (1665–1700), all manufacture save that of a few necessities had come to an end; beggars multiplied and privation increased, until many, even

[1] See map following page 534.

of Spain's half-million nobles, were reduced to a degree of poverty the more tragic because their pride forbade them to confess it. Charles II, or Charles the Sufferer as he was named out of pity for his numerous ailments, the heritage of that inbreeding too long pursued by the Hapsburg clan, was the tragic symbol of a monarchy and a nation which appeared to have reached the nadir of exhaustion. Rapacious neighbors waited impatiently for Charles's death as a signal to partition imperial Spain and confiscate its possessions, while within the kingdom misery increased, trade and population continued to decline, and the credit of the state foundered in a sea of bankruptcy.

Decline of agriculture and of population

The decline in agriculture was no less serious. Too much property was owned by absentee landlords whose agents neglected it. Large areas which might have been rendered productive were used as pasture for sheep-raising, an occupation which attracted the indolent class of Spaniards and helped by its promise of easy profits to discourage the virtues of industry, thrift, and foresight required for successful farming. The agricultural districts were gradually deserted and the fields abandoned. The population of Spain declined steadily throughout the seventeenth century, for the colonies lured the most venturesome spirits in each generation, while the ten thousand convents and monasteries withdrew the most devout from the stream of national life. The result of this double depletion is clearly to be traced in the progressive deterioration of the Spanish character, a consequence more fatal in its ultimate effects than the twenty per cent loss in population.

Intellectual decline

The most un-European of European peoples, the Spaniards clung tenaciously to their peculiar customs and revealed slight susceptibility to foreign influences. Little affected by the Renaissance, and still less by the Protestant Reformation, they kept a distinctive culture which in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was imitated by other nations because of Spain's commanding position as a colonial and military power. This golden age of Spanish civilization was the prelude to a swift decline. Art degenerated, literature grew pompous and empty, the universities became strongholds of medieval theology, and the Spanish Inquisition discouraged free speculation and scientific inquiry. The great Spanish novelist Cervantes (1547–1616), writing at the opening of the seventeenth century, created in Don Quixote a character which exemplified many of the virtues and vices of his countrymen. Brave, loyal, and courteous, Don Quixote was also stubborn, superstitious, and impractical, and failed lamentably in the daily business of life because his fancy was encumbered with the lingering

figments of fairy tales, feudal lore, and medieval superstitions. Like him, many Spaniards preferred to live amid the ghosts of the past rather than grapple with the commercial and industrial problems of an age that had forsaken medievalism and chivalry. Bound by the dictates of a religious zeal corrupted by mysticism and materialism, they clung complacently to outmoded methods, and fortified themselves against the impact of newer forces or the winds of agnostic speculation.

The death of Charles II in 1700 and the accession of Philip V, followed by the European struggle over the Spanish succession, stirred the Spaniards rudely and awakened them to a show of resistance. The Portuguese, allied with the English,[1] invaded the western provinces, while to the east Catalonia was occupied and Madrid captured (1706). Spanish pride resented the attempt of the allies to force the Archduke Charles upon the nation. In the outcome Philip V remained, and his reign (1700–46) witnessed the introduction of some moderate reforms. The government of Spain and the colonies was better centralized, local laws and special statutes were abolished in favor of a national code, while trade restrictions were broken down somewhat by the *Asiento* Treaty (1713), which yielded a share in Spanish colonial trade to the English. Throughout the eighteenth century, Spain was to exhibit a slow but measurable progress.

4. THE ITALIAN STATES

Italy, the "Mother of arts, as once of arms," had, like Spain, subsided in the seventeenth century into a mournful decadence. It seemed as if the initiative and fecundity of the great Renaissance masters had exhausted the race, for the gifted Italian people had declined by 1700 from a position of leadership in the arts and sciences to a condition of intellectual apathy and political impotence. Three causes contributed to this decline: (1) the languishing trade of the Mediterranean ports which suffered when the discovery of the New World turned European commerce into the Atlantic sea lanes; (2) the Counter (or Catholic) Reformation, which consolidated the power of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy, and produced an atmosphere unfriendly to the pagan spirit of the Renaissance with its secular interests and unfettered thought; (3) the conflict in Italy of French, Austrian, and Spanish forces, each seeking to dominate the peninsula and transform the Italian states into pawns to be controlled by diplomats sitting in Madrid or Paris or Vienna. This

[1] The Methuen Treaty (1703) allied Britain and Portugal in a friendly commercial and political understanding.

third factor was the most evil in its effects, for it reduced Italy to a battle-ground to be ravaged by contending armies, reduced many Italian states to subject provinces that were "robbed rather than governed" by their alien masters, and condemned the Italian people to play an insignificant rôle, not only in the period 1660 to 1715, but throughout the eighteenth and a large part of the nineteenth century.

Period of Spanish control (1559–1713)

From the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) to the Peace of Utrecht (1713–14), the Spanish dominated Italy, for they held the Milanese, Naples, and Sicily. Their oppressive rule produced two serious revolts in Naples and Messina during the seventeenth century, revolts which were followed by reprisals as stupid as they were ferocious. When the Spanish throne passed to the Bourbon line, Spain's Italian possessions were handed over to the Austrian Hapsburgs,[1] but the change involved little that was new for the Italian inhabitants in these states except that they were to be governed thenceforth from Vienna instead of from Madrid.

Florence

Of the Italian states which still managed to preserve their independence in this period, four — Tuscany, Genoa, Venice, and Savoy — deserve passing notice. Florence had degenerated from an intellectual center, the Athens of Italy in the high Renaissance, to a provincial capital where the later Medici princes held their court as Grand Dukes of Tuscany. The memory of Dante and Machiavelli still shed luster upon the city of their nativity, and beauty still lingered untarnished, but the days of Florentine greatness were done.

Genoa

Genoa fared little better, though it preserved its republican institutions, and its banking business still assured it a moderate prosperity. In 1684, a French fleet bombarded the city on slight justification, and Louis XIV rebuked the independent pretensions of the citizens by imposing a humiliating peace.

Venice

In spite of the fact that Venice had been declining for two centuries, the doge and his councilors managed by skillful diplomacy to maintain the dignity of the waning republic, and even carried on an intermittent war against the Turks from 1645 to 1699. Venice in decay was still "Europe's bulwark 'gainst the Ottomite," but the Turkish power also, it must be remembered, was on the wane, and although the Treaty of Carlowitz (1699) brought Venice a portion of Dalmatia, Greece, and the Aegean Islands, it was in reality a peace of exhaustion between crippled giants whose strength was spent. As the

[1] The Hapsburgs acquired Milan, Naples, and Sardinia by the Treaty of Utrecht, but in 1720 they exchanged Sardinia for Sicily and thus held all of Spain's former possessions in Italy.

main stream of European commerce shifted more and more decisively to Amsterdam and London, the erstwhile "Queen of the Adriatic" became a city of empty palaces and desolate splendors, retaining to the last, however, the fantastic beauty which had crowned her in more prosperous days, when "the exhaustless East poured in her lap all gems in sparkling showers."

Duchy of Savoy

The only truly progressive and independent state in seventeenth-century Italy was Savoy, which had been welded into a compact duchy by the genius of its duke, Charles Emmanuel (1580–1630). With territory strategically placed so that it commanded both the coast route into Italy and the famous Mont Cenis pass over the Alps,[1] the dukes of Savoy could prove useful allies to any power which aspired to the control of Italy. Bargaining astutely between the French and Spaniards, they had strengthened their position and added to their territory. Victor Amadeus II joined in the War of the League of Augsburg against France to his profit; but it was the War of the Spanish Succession that gave him his real opportunity and raised Savoy to the position of a European state. Siding first with France, Victor Amadeus had the foresight to desert Louis XIV in 1703, and his army, brilliantly led by Prince Eugène, aided materially in the ultimate defeat of the French. For this assistance the allies rewarded Victor Amadeus with the island of Sicily and the title of king. In 1720, he exchanged Sicily for Sardinia, and the duchy of Savoy was generally known thenceforth as the Sardinian Kingdom. In the nineteenth century the house of Savoy was destined to head the movement for Italian unity and provide the first king of a united Italy.

The papacy

The States of the Church in central Italy shared the general decline in papal prestige which made Rome less important as a diplomatic center in the seventeenth century than Paris, Vienna, or even London. Seven popes occupied the chair of Saint Peter in the years 1660 to 1715, but none was noteworthy. Innocent XI (1676–89) was the most upright and possibly the most capable. He defended his prerogatives against Louis XIV, and aided with subsidies in the defeat of the Turks in 1683. But the mediating power which the popes had once wielded over Europe was gone; their pleas for peace passed almost unheeded in the clash of the dynastic wars that disfigured the close of the century, and Clement XI (1700–21), who at first upheld the claims of France in the War of the Spanish Succession, was compelled by the allies to reverse his judgment under threat of invasion and deposition. The eighteenth century held no better days in store for the papacy; in-

[1] See map following page 534.

deed, it was to see the authority of the church still further weakened and that venerable institution reduced to the nadir of its fortunes.

5. SUMMARY OF THE PERIOD, 1660 TO 1715

When the major political developments that filled the period, 1660 to 1715, are passed in review, it becomes clear that the balance of power between the European states was perpetually shifting because several states were in decline and threatened to disintegrate. Thus Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, the Italian states (except Savoy), the papacy, Sweden, Poland, Turkey, and even Holland were stationary or decadent. France, on the other hand, despite its reverses, was still an aggressive power of the first rank, while Great Britain was developing vigorously. It was not difficult to foresee that these two leading powers might clash severely; by 1688, England had recognized France as her most dangerous commercial rival, and a titanic struggle between the two for commerce and colonies was to provide the leading drama of the eighteenth century.

By 1715, religious issues had been subordinated to political expediency and no longer constituted a serious cause for war. On the other hand, trade rivalries had grown more intense. Dynastic greed remained an active force, ready as ever to promote hostilities for its own profit. The long duel between Bourbon and Hapsburg lost much of its bitterness with the decline of the Hapsburg power, but new antagonists were waiting to crowd upon the stage. In the Germanies the meteoric rise of Prussia was to upset the balance of power by adding a first-class military state to the European system, while farther east Russia was about to emerge and claim its share of influence. The five great powers of the eighteenth century include, therefore, three states already familiar to us — France, Austria, and England — and two new powers, Prussia and Russia. The wars of the eighteenth century grow out of the conflicting interests of these five powers. Their methods and motives will be found to differ little from those described in the preceding section. Each state seeks to consolidate and aggrandize itself, the weaker form alliances against aggressive neighbors, and the diplomats defend the principle of the balance of power as the surest guaranty of peace and equilibrium. In all this the eighteenth century differs scarcely at all from the period just studied. But the emergence of Prussia and Russia modified the structure of European politics so sharply that their entry marks a new period and merits a new section, while the progress of new ideas among the enlightened classes gives to the eighteenth century an intellectual temper distinct from that of the seventeenth.

Section B

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

(1715–89)

Although the seventy-four years between the death of Louis XIV and the outbreak of the French Revolution filled in reality less than three fourths of "the eighteenth century," they constitute a distinct period in European history for which no better name suggests itself. This period was marked chiefly by a balancing of forces. The threat of French domination had been checked, and the diplomats labored to maintain a more or less stable equilibrium among the powers. This political equilibrium was preserved with fair success to the end of the period, despite such disturbing developments as the rise of Prussia to the rank of a first-rate power, the decline of Austria and Turkey, and the westward expansion of Russia.

It proved less easy, however, to preserve a balance of forces between the social classes. As the power and wealth of the middle class increased, and the influence of the privileged orders, the nobles and clergy, declined, stress and discontent developed which could only be eased by radical social and political readjustments. The failure to carry through the necessary reforms promptly and peaceably resulted, after 1789, *in the outbreak of the Great Revolution in France, the prelude to a quarter of a century of tumultuous and far-reaching change which affected every country in Europe.*

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA

Our greatest enemy is space. Russian proverb.

NO STUDENT who studies the map of Europe can fail to note how markedly the western part of the continent is divided into segments. The British Isles, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula possess a geographical unity of their own, while for France the ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees form a natural boundary for the greater part of the frontier. Western Europe thus enjoys a wide diversity of scenery and of climate, and the rising national states there have found the sea-coast and the mountain ranges a protection behind which each could develop its culture and its institutions more or less unmolested.

The Great Plain of eastern Europe

The geography of eastern Europe is surprisingly different. Instead of an irregular coastline and snow-capped peaks, there stretches a vast and monotonous plain. From the Baltic to the Black and the Caspian seas, from the Carpathian Mountains on the border of Hungary to the Ural Mountains on the border of Asia, this great inland plain extends, large enough to contain England, France, and Spain together. In the north there are many swamps and thick forests of coniferous trees; the central belt produces a mixed deciduous growth; the plains of the southland are semi-arid and bare. These bare, uncultivated steppes of the south, stretching above the Black and Caspian seas into the heart of Asia, provide an undefended route down which the Asiatic nomads have swept at intervals, to break like a destructive wave on the frontiers of eastern Europe.

To the Romans the broad steppes beyond the Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea were known as Sarmatia. The Romans traded with the natives for furs and amber, but they cared little what happened in such a cold and forbidding region which for them lay shrouded in a twilight beyond the bounds of their empire. In the fifth century the Huns rode out of this shadowy East, to devastate the weakened provinces of Rome, and, although they retired after the death of their leader Attila (453), other Mongols continued to threaten Europe with new invasions throughout the Middle Ages. Yet the trade routes in this region were kept open even after the fall of Rome; Viking adventurers from Scandinavia penetrated the steppes and gave their name to part of the area (*Russ* was originally a Finnish name for Swede); and Byzantine merchants from Constantinople continued to traverse the

territory and to navigate the rivers. Throughout the dark ages the dwellers of the Great Plain were thus exposed to the stimulus of Norse enterprise and Byzantine culture. But it was difficult for them to raise cities or cultivate the arts in an area where Roman civilization had laid no foundations, where natural frontiers were lacking, and the possibility of new invasions from Asia was a constant threat.

Slavic characteristic

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Slavic peoples of eastern Europe remained politically backward and semi-barbarous while the Latins and the Germans were making substantial advances. The original home of the Slavs is believed to have been the basin of the Pripet River, whence they migrated across the Great Plain, or filtered into the Balkan Peninsula. The earliest accounts picture them as an agricultural people, generous and hospitable in character, fond of music, and deeply religious. Most of these characteristics still distinguish their descendants.

1. THE RISE OF MUSCOVY

In the ninth century the impact of a new wave of Asiatic invaders split the Slavs into several groups. The eastern Slavs, who were to lay the foundations of the Russian state, built up a principality with Kief, on the Dnieper River, as its center, but after two centuries Kief declined before a fresh wave of invaders from Asia. Thereupon the eastern Slavs established new cities within the forest zone to the north, of which Moscow proved the most important. Here they were better able to resist the horsemen of the plains, and Norse adventurers and traders helped them to organize a federation of feudal principalities. Until the fifteenth century, the Mongols, who had established their capital at Sarai on the Volga, continued to levy tribute on the eastern Slavs, but in 1480, Ivan the Great, Prince of Moscow, defied the Khan of the Golden Horde, as the Mongol ruler was termed, and his supremacy was broken.

Byzantine influence

Ivan the Great (1462–1505) married Sophia Paleologus, niece of the last Byzantine emperor, Constantine Paleologus, who perished when the Turks captured Constantinople in 1453. Ivan considered himself heir to the Byzantine traditions, called himself Czar (Caesar) and successor of Augustus, and Protector of the Orthodox (Greek) Church. Moscow became the "Third Rome." This assumption of imperial dignity by a Slavic prince is more easily understood when it is realized that missionaries from Constantinople had converted the eastern Slavs to the Greek faith, and a strong Byzantine influence tinctured the culture of the Russians. Their mosques and their icons, their

calendar, and even their alphabet, were borrowed from Constantinople. It was an interesting anomaly, this adoption of the outworn, sophisticated, and highly conventionalized art of Byzantium by a race of vigorous barbarians who still retained many of the oriental customs of their Asiatic conquerors. The blend of these diverse influences was to make the Russians unlike any other European people.

The slow task of consolidating and extending the principality of Moscow, or Muscovy, engaged the energies of successive czars. Ivan IV, also known as Ivan the Terrible (1533–84), subdued his boyars, or vassals, with ruthless cruelty, conquered the last Tartar strongholds in European Russia, and pushed his frontiers eastward to the Ural Mountains and westward until he clashed with the Poles and the Swedes. In the seventeenth century, under a new dynasty, the Romanovs, this westward expansion was resumed. The absence of any natural barrier made it possible for the Muscovite state to expand in all directions, but the nations of western Europe remained indifferent to this rise of a new power in the East. So long as Sweden and Poland stood as buffer states, the Russians could not interfere directly in European affairs, and the English, French, and Italians thought of Russia as an Asiatic rather than a European country.

By the close of the seventeenth century, however, both Poland and Sweden were in decline, and they yielded before the inexorable pressure of the Russian advance. A glance at the map on page 603 will indicate how rapidly the Russians pressed forward. In 1660, they were still shut off from the Baltic Sea, for the Swedes held the littoral provinces from Finland to the mouth of the Dwina River, where the Polish dominions began. But Sweden, with a population of a little over a million, was unequal to the burden of guarding her empire. Even with the aid of French subsidies, the Swedish kings found it difficult to hold their Baltic provinces against the rapacity of Poland and Brandenburg.

2. PETER THE GREAT OF RUSSIA

The decline of Poland and Sweden invited further Russian expansion, and the westward advance of the Muscovites was renewed under the restless and autocratic czar, Peter the Great (1682–1725). Ambitious to see his backward and semi-barbarous subjects acquire the culture and the institutions which made France, England, and Holland powerful and respected nations, Peter determined to hasten the "Europeanization" of Russia by opening "windows to the west." By windows he meant ice-free seaports through which European trade, European travelers,

and European culture could enter Russia, and before he died in 1725, he had secured outlets on both the Baltic and the Black seas.

Peter's youth, and his later career, too, ran in channels of intrigue and violence. Moscow was the scene of much factional strife in the last years of the seventeenth century, and the impressionable young czar saw more than one of his friends murdered before his eyes. He was proclaimed joint ruler with his weak-minded stepbrother Ivan in 1682, but he had to wait until 1689 to overthrow the regency of his stepsister Sophia. The death of his mother in 1694, however, followed by that of Ivan in 1696, left Peter sole lord of Muscovy. Over six and one half feet in height, dexterous with his hands, and consumed with a quenchless curiosity concerning ships and navigation, machinery, and all technical processes, the new czar was destined to change the current of Russian history. His first taste of success came in 1696, when he captured Azov from the Turks with the aid of a fleet constructed by foreign shipwrights under his command. Although the Turks later regained this Black Sea port (1722), the czar's desire for further conquests was whetted by this campaign of 1696.

Youth of Peter the Great

The following year Peter set out on a tour to study the civilization of Europe for himself. Mathematics, physics, chemistry, anatomy, and engraving claimed his attention by turns, but it was the art of warfare and particularly naval warfare that absorbed him most. In Holland and England he worked in the shipyards, and he dispatched five hundred artisans to Russia to instruct his subjects in the newer technical methods. In Vienna his tour was interrupted by the news that revolt had broken out at home among the *streltzi*, or royal guards. Hastening back to Moscow, Peter revealed the less amiable side of his character by condemning two thousand of the rebels to torture and death, as a lesson to his subjects on the futility of resisting his will.

Revolt of the streltzi

Then the Russian people were startled from their fatalistic conservatism by a succession of imperial reforms. With his own royal hand Peter clipped the beards of his nobles, and tailors stood ready to shorten their long oriental robes, for the czar desired to initiate European dress and habits. The women were summoned to court from their domestic seclusion, but being unused to social freedom they huddled modestly at one end of the hall while their lords and masters drank themselves under the table at the other. Peter comprehended that his *ukases* or decrees, even when they were emphasized by knout and scaffold, could not change his people so swiftly as the penetrative influence of European ideas. To provide closer contacts he fostered trade agreements, sent young Russians abroad to study, and invited Europeans to



PETER THE GREAT OF RUSSIA
1672–1725

The old-fashioned armor and ermine cloak are merely the trappings of royalty, and the artist has idealized Peter's features. As a despot this Muscovite giant was by turns pious, cruel, resourceful or naïve, for he possessed a disharmonic but forceful personality.

sojourn in Russia. When his alien innovations led to conspiracies among his discontented subjects, he punished the rebels mercilessly, his own son being numbered finally in the list of victims. Believing many churchmen, and especially the monks, hostile to his reforms, Peter created a holy synod, or council, responsible to himself, placed it in charge of religious affairs, and abolished the office of patriarch (1700). Other departments of the government were likewise reconstructed and rendered more efficient, despite the fact that the czar possessed so few trained officials that he was compelled at times to employ Swedish prisoners of war in administrative posts.

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of Peter's reforms. The calendar was improved, the western system of enumeration introduced, printing presses set up, and schools and hospitals established. Peter even founded a Russian Academy of Sciences, composed, perforce, almost entirely of foreign savants. But there were some projects that could not be achieved by peaceful means. The annexation of a port where the ships of all nations might come freely to trade cost Peter twenty years of warfare, a hazardous struggle in which he was opposed by the most brilliant, the most daring, and the most erratic monarch of the age Charles XII of Sweden.

Peter's reforms

3. THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR (1700–21)

The famous French writer, Voltaire, who composed an *Histoire de Charles XII*, observed shrewdly that Charles carried all his virtues to such an excess that they became more dangerous than their contrary vices. Charles crowned himself King of Sweden in 1697, at the age of fifteen, showing immediately a temper so imperious and abilities so precocious that the *Riksdag*, or Parliament, dispensed with a regency and voted him absolute powers. He thus became master of Sweden, with its million and a quarter inhabitants, at almost the same time that Peter assumed full control in Russia, and the stage was set for a contest between the two young autocrats and the two empires.

Charles XII of Sweden

In 1700, Russia, Saxony, and Denmark took advantage of Charles's youth and presumable inexperience to attack Sweden, but the boy-king speedily astonished Europe by the daring of his counterstrokes. In a single campaign he forced the Danes to sue for peace; then, marching with eight thousand men to the relief of Narva, in Esthonia, he hurled his veterans through a blinding snowstorm upon the Russian lines and routed the czar's army of forty thousand men. These victories won for

Charles the sobriquet "The Lion of the North," but their ultimate effects were disastrous for his character and for Sweden. Instead of following up his victory at Narva, he chose to regard the Russians as vanquished, and turned to deal with his third enemy, Saxony.

Frederick Augustus I of Saxony (1694–1733) was also by election King of Poland (1697). Charles speedily deposed him from the latter throne and had a rival candidate, Stanislaus Leszczynski, elected in his place. The young Swedish king was now the arbiter of northern Europe, for the western powers were occupied by the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13), but his blind and imperturbable self-confidence drove his enemies to unite and exasperated his friends. Moreover, the five years which he spent in reordering Polish affairs permitted Peter the Great the needed leisure to reknit the Russian armies, so that by 1707 they were able once more to press to the shores of the Baltic Sea.

This insolent advance of the Russians goaded Charles into attempting a project at which Napoleon was to meet disaster a century later: he marched on Moscow. Scattering a Russian army at Holowczyn (1708), the Swedes pressed on through a country stripped bare of provisions by the retreating foe. But to reach Moscow proved impossible, and rather than retreat, Charles turned his devoted army southward, and sought an alliance with the Cossacks of the Ukraine. The terrible winter of 1709 harassed his ragged veterans more pitilessly than the Russian horsemen, and when summer came, Peter was able to crush the remnant of Charles's army at Pultawa (1709). Charles took refuge with the Turks, stirred them up repeatedly to attack the Russians, and finally, after incredible adventures, returned to Sweden in 1714.

Battle of Pultawa (1709)

Although his country was exhausted, the defiant monarch insisted upon maintaining the struggle against Russia, Prussia, Poland, Saxony, Hanover, and Denmark. But in 1718 he was killed while attacking the Danes, and Sweden sank to the level of a third-rate power, while the victorious allies seized her empire. Russia was the last to make peace, and Peter had the satisfaction of adding Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia to his empire by the Treaty of Nystad (1721).[1]

As early as 1703, Peter the Great had begun the construction of a new capital for his dominions on the marshy ground where the river Neva drained into the Gulf of Finland. Despite the constant danger of Swedish reconquest, of floods, and of fevers, Saint Petersburg rose slowly from the treacherous lagoons, and in 1712 it was recognized as the new seat of government. Moscow,

Founding of Saint Petersburg

[1] See map following page 534, and map on page 603.

symbol of the old Russia, was humbled before the splendor of this "western" city, where Peter established his court and assumed the novel and grandiloquent title "Emperor of all the Russias." Alone of all the great powers, Russia was to have its capital city, not near the center of the country, but upon the frontier; not in an ancient town with long traditions, but in a modern seat of administration, built upon conquered ground, the least Russian of all the Russian cities. Yet so well had Peter labored that not even his premature death in 1725 could undo his life-work, and for good or ill the destiny of Russia had been joined with that of Europe.


4. THE SUCCESSORS OF PETER THE GREAT

As Peter had married twice, and left descendants by both marriages, it is not surprising that the first sixteen years following his death were filled with disputes concerning the succession. In 1741, however, his daughter Elizabeth began a reign of twenty years and the empire regained a comparative degree of tranquillity. But there was still a deep conflict between the old and the new forces in Russia, and a deep resentment among the conservative classes at the spread of foreign ideas and the elevation of foreigners to high posts in the state. This opposition between a pro-Russian party and a pro-European party remained a permanent heritage in Russian politics from the time of Peter the Great, for many Russians felt that their country possessed a peculiar and distinct culture of its own which could not successfully be blended with or remodeled after that of the western European nations.

The Czarina Elizabeth (1741–62)

During Elizabeth's reign this conflict between old and new forces produced a deadlock, but foreign influences, particularly French, continued to win an ascendancy. Russian policy, both at home and abroad, gained during these years but mediocre successes. Despite the political stagnation, however, the arts and sciences progressed, education was encouraged for the upper classes, and the Czarina Elizabeth, though a dissolute woman herself, endeavored to elevate the morals of her subjects and to ameliorate the ferocious penal code.

A minor conflict with the enfeebled Swedish state brought Russia additional gains in Finland by the Treaty of Abo (1743); and in 1756, Elizabeth joined France and Austria against Prussia and England in the Seven Years' War (1756–63). The Russian armies penetrated East Prussia and won several victories, but their sacrifices were in vain, for on Elizabeth's death in 1762 her nephew and successor Peter III (grand-


GROWTH OF
RUSSIA
TO 1725
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400
ARCTIC OCEAN
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
Gulf of Bothnia
BALTIC SEA
G. of Finland
White Sea
Archangel
Onega
URAL MOUNTAINS
St Petersburg
Novgorod
Volga R.
Riga
Niemen
Vilna
Moscow
Nijni Novgorod
Kazan
Orenburg
POLAND
Kiev
Dniester
Dnieper
Poltava
Donetz
Volga
Ural
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Bug
BESSARABIA
RUMANIA
Odessa
Sea of Azof
Crimea
Don
Astrakhan
BULGARIA
BLACK SEA
CAUCASUS MTS.
CASPIAN SEA
Batum
TURKEY
PERSIA
Grand Duchy of Moscovy in 1480
Territory acquired 1480-1689
" " 1689-1725
Boundary of Russia in 1914
Long. East from Greenwich

son of Peter the Great) arbitrarily reversed the alliance, and came to the aid of Frederick II of Prussia in time to save that hard-pressed monarch from ruin.[1] Peter's admiration for Frederick and his readiness to fling away the fruits of Russian victories to gratify his personal whims speedily excited a palace revolution, and before the close of the year 1762 the erratic and vicious young czar had been deposed and murdered. In his place the guards acclaimed his wife Catherine "Autocrat of all the Russias."

5. CATHERINE THE GREAT (1762–96)

Catherine's character

Sophia Augusta Frederica, better known to history as Catherine the Great, was the daughter of a Prussian general, Prince Christian Augustus of Anhalt-Zerbst. Married to the despicable Czarevich Peter at the age of sixteen, and received into the Orthodox Church under the name of Catherine, this German princess passed several lonely years at the Russian court, where she had few friends and was shamelessly neglected by her husband. She consoled herself with wide reading, learned the Russian language, and identified herself so loyally with the interests of her adopted country that she was chosen to succeed her degenerate husband in 1762. Indiscriminate in her love affairs, and often Machiavellian in her politics, Catherine was none the less a woman of remarkable sagacity and proved an inspired ruler. Under her shrewd guidance Russia once again played a rôle equal to its importance, recaptured its waning prestige, and took a leading part in the affairs of northern Europe. Whenever possible, Catherine appointed Russians rather than foreigners to office, and showed herself at all times deeply devoted to the glory and greatness of Russia. But she introduced reforms after the European pattern when she could do so without stirring up discontent, and proved herself, especially in her foreign policy, the real executor of Peter the Great's bequest.

Catherine the Great as an enlightened despot

Catherine's long reign (1762–96) lasted until after the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789. She was thus a contemporary of Frederick II of Prussia (1740–86), Joseph II of Austria (1780–90), Gustavus III of Sweden (1771–92), and other rulers of the second half of the eighteenth century who are often styled the "enlightened despots." These monarchs were all inspired by a conscientious desire to improve their realms and to make their subjects happy, and something more will be told about their reforms later. Catherine was exceedingly anxious to be considered

[1] See below, page 618.

an "enlightened despot" herself, but her title to the honor is a little dubious. Of her good intentions there can be no question; she wrote to Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert, and other illustrious critics of society and government, inviting them to advise her how best to make her subjects contented and civilized. With her own hand she drew up a liberal plan for revising and codifying the Russian laws (1766), in the hope of making them at once more inflexible and more humane. She dreamed of establishing schools in every town and village in order to elevate her people to the responsibilities of citizenship. She encouraged artists and writers, and permitted radical books, which the authorities in France had condemned as dangerous and seditious, to circulate freely in Russia.

Among the noblest monuments to her kindliness of heart were the hospitals and orphanages erected under her patronage. She submitted herself to vaccination so that her subjects might be encouraged by her royal example to accept this newly discovered preventive against smallpox. For the millions of serfs toiling on the lands of Russia she expressed deep commiseration, and she hoped that some day they might be liberated. But she took no serious steps to free them. Between Catherine's wishes and her acts there was often a wide divergence, for she had a kind heart but a calculating mind, and it was the dictates of her shrewd brain that guided her. Her sympathy for the serfs did not prevent her granting large estates to her courtiers, which further increased serfdom. When she divided Russia into fifty provinces, she professed to wish each district to control its own local affairs, but she kept the real power in the hands of a governor appointed by herself. Thus, despite her pretensions of benevolence, the practical results of her administration revealed more despotism than enlightenment.

Limits of Catherine's reforms

For her failures in this respect Catherine must not be blamed too harshly. In politics one seldom does the best or even the next best thing: one does the best one can. Because her power rested upon the loyalty of the nobles she had to please them; hence the grants of land and the increase of serfdom. Her orders might be humane and wise, but if unsympathetic officials disdained to enforce them, she dared not rebuke them too sharply. Her desire to play the part, or at least to *appear* to be playing the part, of an enlightened ruler was genuine enough, but she was too clear-headed a realist to forget for a single moment that she had been called to govern an empire of barbarous peoples by the methods they had been trained to understand, the methods of an oriental despot.

6. THE DISMEMBERMENT OF POLAND


The expansion of Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries helped to weaken and finally to destroy the kingdom of Poland. When Catherine II ascended the Russian throne in 1762, Poland was already enfeebled and disorganized. The Poles, like the Russians, were of Slavic origin, but they had been converted to the Roman Catholic instead of to the Greek Orthodox faith, and were thus affiliated by ties of religion and culture with the western rather than the eastern European peoples. In the fourteenth century, Poland had been united to Lithuania, and by the sixteenth the Polish dominions extended across the plains between the Black Sea and the Baltic in a loosely knit kingdom almost twice as large as France. In that golden age of Polish history the able rulers of the Jagellon dynasty were strong enough to resist the pressure of the Muscovites in the east and the Turks in the south, but in the seventeenth century, Poland was weakened by the attacks of Turks, Tartars, Swedes, and Russians. Although King John Sobieski (1674–96) arrested the decline momentarily, and even rescued Vienna from the Turks (1683), the greatness of Poland had passed and the eighteenth century witnessed the extinction of the kingdom.

Poland in decline

The decline and final dismemberment of Poland was the result of (1) indefensible frontiers and (2) political anarchy. The accident of geography which made their homeland a level plain left the Poles no natural barriers, such as high mountain ranges, behind which they could rally to check an invasion. The wide steppes, transected by slow-moving rivers which favored navigation, made it possible for Poland to expand rapidly in the days of her power, but also left her open to the inroads of her enemies in the days of her decline. Worse, however, than this territorial instability was the political instability of the kingdom. The government of the country was so wretchedly organized that it has been called "a legalized anarchy tempered by rebellion." The Polish Kingdom was in truth little more than a loose federation of feudal principalities somewhat like the Holy Roman Empire, and the people did not even possess unity of religious faith, being predominantly Catholic in Poland, Greek Orthodox in Lithuania, and Protestant in the area adjoining East Prussia. By the eighteenth century the royal authority had been dispersed, the power of the Diet all but nullified, and the state reduced to impotence, a process deliberately hastened by the watchful and rapacious neighbors of Poland.

Political instability

Perhaps the worst enemies of the unfortunate country were the Polish nobles. The monarchy was elective, and these vassals were unwilling


PARTITION OF THE KINGDOM OF POLAND
Scale of Miles
0 50 100 150 200
Russia
Prussia
Austria
"CONGRESS POLAND" Polish Territory taken from Prussia, and Austria and given to Russia by the Congress of Vienna.
Boundary of the Republic of Poland in 1925.
10 15 20 25 30 35 40
55
50
15 20 25 30 35
DENMARK
SWEDEN
BALTIC SEA
Copenhagen
Riga
Vitebsk
Smolensk
Dvina R.
Niemen R.
Dansig
Königsberg
PRUSSIA
Vilna
Grodno
Minsk
Berlin
Elbe R.
Oder R.
Posen
Warsaw
Vistula R.
Bialystok
Brest-Litovsk
Pripet R.
Dniester R.
(1772)
(1795)
(1793)
SAXONY
Dresden
Breslau
SILESIA
UPPER SILESIA
Prague
BOHEMIA
Teschen
Cracow
GALICIA
Lemberg
Lublin
RUSSIA
Kief
UKRAINE
Dnieper R.
PODOLIA
MORAVIA
Danube R.
Vienna
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
Buda
Pest
Theiss R.
AUSTRIAN DOMINIONS
TURKISH DOMINIONS
MOLDAVIA
Pruth R.
BESSARABIA
Bug R.
Odessa
To Russia 1792
To Russia 1774
To Russia 1783
Sea of Azof

to give themselves a master who might call them to account for their misrule. They saw to it that the elected king lacked sufficient authority to curb them, sometimes extorting pre-election promises from him, sometimes choosing a French, Saxon, or Swedish prince unfamiliar with Polish affairs. Denied an income or an army large enough to defend his position, the king was often a sorry figure. But if the royal rôle was ignominious that of the Polish Diet was even more futile. Controlled likewise by the nobles, the Diet was incapable of effecting any reforms because its decrees were binding only when they were passed unanimously. Any member might block a bill or dissolve the chamber by exercising a privilege known as the *liberum veto*. Under this fantastic constitution, the selfish nobles, who had nothing to fear from Diet or king, exploited their serfs mercilessly. Poland had been known as the "Peasants' Hell" in the Middle Ages and continued to deserve the title. The townsmen, also, lacking political power, were unable to protect their interests, and Poland drifted steadily toward economic and political ruin, with the nobles blocking every suggestion for reform.

With the rulers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria eager to acquire more territory, the fate of Poland could not long remain in doubt. In 1772, Catherine came to an understanding with Frederick II of Prussia and the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria that each should annex a small share of the enfeebled kingdom. Too disorganized to resist, the Poles saw a fourth of their territory snatched away. Sobered by this experience, the nobles made a belated effort to strengthen the kingdom and repair the disorder, but the three neighboring powers deliberately encouraged further confusion in order to have an excuse for renewed intervention. In 1793, Russia and Prussia seized coveted sections in a second partition, and in 1795, Austria, Prussia, and Russia divided what remained, despite the heroic resistance offered by a small army of Polish patriots under Kosciusko. Few transactions, even in that age of callous diplomacy, could equal this heartless obliteration from the map of Europe of a proud and independent state, but it must be admitted that the Poles had invited such a fate by the suicidal anarchy to which they had reduced themselves.

The partitioning of Poland

By the successive Partition Treaties, six million subjects and 183,000 square miles of territory were added to the Russian Empire. Russia had become a neighbor of both Austria and Prussia, and had acquired an interest in German affairs. In the south also Catherine saw her power extended as the result of two wars against the Turks. By the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774) she won Azov, and the right to protect the Christian subjects of the sultan, ten years later the sultan ceded

her the Crimea, and the Treaty of Jassy (1792) brought her the lands on the Black Sea lying between the Bug and Dniester rivers. With this Catherine had to content herself, although she had cherished the dream of expelling the Turks from Constantinople, and making the czars of Russia masters of the (Eastern) Roman Empire in the ancient Byzantine tradition. Her second grandson was baptized Constantine in anticipation of the hoped-for triumph, and the dream of reaching Constantinople, unrealized in Catherine's time, persisted as a glittering legacy to spur the ambition of later czars.

CHAPTER SIX

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA

It is the unfailing rule of princes to aggrandize themselves as greatly as their means permit.

FREDERICK THE GREAT.

BY THE middle of the seventeenth century, it will be recalled, the medieval German Empire of the Holy Roman Emperors had crumbled into more than three hundred political fragments. The main causes for this dissolution may be traced to (1) the system of electing the emperors, which resulted in the passing of the imperial title from one princely house to another and prevented any one family from knitting the Germanies into a dynastic state; (2) the conflict between the popes and emperors, which weakened the imperial power and stimulated the disruptive forces of feudalism; (3) the Protestant Reformation, which might have developed into a movement for national unity under a sympathetic emperor, but encountered instead the stubborn opposition of Charles V. Left half-Catholic and half-Protestant, the Germanies were doomed to a century of religious strife which culminated in the terrible Thirty Years' War (1618–48). When the Peace of Westphalia ended this struggle, the country was half-depopulated and wholly disorganized, with the emperor's authority damaged beyond repair. Thenceforth "Germany" or the "German Empire" as a political entity had no real existence and it is customary to speak instead of "the Germanies."

Inevitably, the lack of a central authority exposed the Germans to the attacks of aggressive and better organized neighbors. France took Alsace during the Thirty Years' War, and Sweden annexed Pomerania. At a time, too, when Spain, Portugal, France, England, and even Holland and Sweden, were establishing colonial empires beyond the seas, the Germans, because of this fatal lack of political cohesion, were denied a chance to participate. The seventeenth century was thus a melancholy interlude in German history, when the imperial machinery which had lent a ponderous grandeur to the medieval empire had finally broken down, when society itself appeared to be on the verge of dissolution, and the new forces which were to shape from this chaos a modern national state had not yet made themselves apparent.

1. THE ELECTORATE OF BRANDENBURG

Nevertheless, the forces of national reconstruction were already at work. The nucleus about which they centered was the little North German state of Brandenburg, where a competent prince, Frederick William I, better known as the Great Elector, had begun his reign (1640–88) toward the close of the Thirty Years' War. His forbears, of the Hohenzollern family, had been rulers of Brandenburg for over two centuries, but none had inherited problems more grave or discouraging. Like the rest of the Germanies, Brandenburg had been laid waste by the war. Frederick William's possessions were disorganized and disunified, for, in addition to his title of Elector of Brandenburg, he was Duke of (East) Prussia, and he had acquired by the Treaty of Westphalia the cities of Magdeburg and Minden and a part of Pomerania, and annexed shortly thereafter (1666) three little duchies near the Rhine — Mark, Cleves, and Ravensburg.[1] Being an administrator of patience and insight, he realized that his primary task was to link his scattered domains together as firmly as possible by means of a centralized bureaucracy, establish a single treasury to administer the revenue, and build up an army strong enough to maintain a vigorous defense. The chaotic state of the Germanies made the maintenance of a strong army an indispensable precaution, and the Great Elector spent every thaler he could spare upon his splendidly drilled regiments.

The Great Elector (1640–88)

His prudence, economy, and skill made Brandenburg-Prussia the foremost state in the Germanies. In 1701, his son and successor, Frederick, took the title of King in Prussia, and the scattered Hohenzollern dominions came to be known thereafter as the kingdom of Prussia.[2] The grandson of the Great Elector, King Frederick William I (1713–40), was a bluff, soldierly disciplinarian, who continued the consolidation and annexed Swedish Pomerania from Sweden. When he died, he left Prussia with an army that ranked fourth in Europe, a well-filled treasury, and a deserved prestige. Destiny had selected the Hohenzollern dynasty to retrieve Germany from disintegration, and to point the way later toward a national resurrection. But the duties of such leadership are grave and the Hohenzollern princes no less than their subjects were sternly disciplined for their task. In its struggle to survive and expand in those anxious times, Prussia became (1) the most militaristic state in Europe,

Organization of the Prussian state

[1] See map, page 615.

[2] Frederick was styled "King *in* Prussia" because East Prussia lay outside the bounds of the Holy Roman Empire. Within the empire he was nominally Elector of Brandenburg. Under his successor the title "King of Prussia" came to be used indiscriminately.

and developed (2) a highly efficient, centralized bureaucracy. Furthermore, the prominent rôle played by strong rulers in the rise of Prussia fostered (3) a deep-rooted tradition of paternal despotism. It is highly important to bear these formative influences in mind in order to understand the trend of later German history.

2. FREDERICK THE GREAT (1740–86)

Exactly one hundred years after the death of the Great Elector, his great-grandson ascended the throne as Frederick II. This keen-witted prince was to play an even more important rôle in the eighteenth century than his illustrious ancestor had played in the seventeenth. His brilliant talents, unceasing labors, and enlightened rule won him the title of Frederick the Great, for he not only raised Prussia to the rank of a first-class power, but he made the force of his personality and his example felt throughout the Germanies, so that his career, like that of a Richelieu or a Napoleon, is part of the history of his age.

Frederick's youth

There seemed little in Frederick's youthful character that was prophetic of future greatness. His father, bluff old Frederick William I, feared that his son would prove a disgrace to the house of Hohenzollern. *Der Fritz ist ein effeminerter Kerl* (Fritz is an effeminate fellow), he lamented, disgusted by the lad's preference for flute-playing and French poetry. When Frederick attempted flight, to escape the rigorous discipline which his father imposed, he was imprisoned for a year, and was compelled to witness the execution of a friend who had aided him. Then for ten years the youth suffered a drastic training in the business of statecraft, toiling like any clerk over minute details of civil and military administration. Few rulers have had such exemplary training, and fewer still have possessed the genius to profit by it. When Frederick ascended the Prussian throne at twenty-eight, he was admirably equipped for his duties, and the severe training had tempered and toughened him. The poet who had once planned to write great dramas had become a prince who aspired to act them, a Machiavellian prince who had learned to conceal his feelings and had grown daring and cynical. The change is not wholly to be regretted. Frederick made an inspired ruler: he would almost certainly have made an uninspired poet.

The European balance of power

It is a permanent rule with princes to aggrandize themselves to the limit of their power, the young prince decided in 1738. Even at twenty-seven his shrewd mind penetrated the web of European intrigue with an ease that surprised older statesmen. Austria, he perceived, was decadent and crumbling. A war

between the Bourbons and Hapsburgs over the Polish Succession (1733–36) had demonstrated to all Europe the weakness of the Hapsburgs, who had purchased peace by sacrificing the duchy of Lorraine to France. Yet the decline of Austria, if carried too far, might leave Europe at the mercy of "these modern Romans" as Frederick styled the French. The lesser powers would be safer if they could preserve a balance between Austria and France, and so maintain an equilibrium in the body politic of Europe. "It is like the human body" — Frederick was drawing upon his dubious knowledge of physiology — "which can only subsist by the commixture of equal parts of acid and alkali. . . ." But secretly he hoped to raise the Hohenzollern prestige until he could claim an equal position with the two older dynasties, adding some Prussian iron to the French acid and the Austrian alkali, as it were. Within a few months of his accession he found an opportunity for a bold stroke of self-aggrandizement.

3. THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION (1740–48)

In an age of keen dynastic rivalries a disputed succession is a fertile source of conflict. The death of Charles II of Spain, it will be remembered, plunged Europe into the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13), a vacancy on the electoral throne of Poland precipitated the War of the Polish Succession (1733–36), and the death of the Hapsburg emperor, Charles VI, without a male heir, had the same melancholy result in 1740. Charles wished his daughter, Maria Theresa, to inherit the Hapsburg lands intact, and he labored during the last years of his life to assure her succession by means of a Pragmatic Sanction which he bribed or persuaded the European powers to accept. Two hundred thousand fighting men would have been a far better guaranty, in the opinion of the cynical Frederick II, who took prompt advantage of Charles's death to seize the province of Silesia. For Frederick saw no profit in keeping a pledge which other princes were plotting to break. His house held plausible titles to a part of Silesia, and this seizure of the upper valley of the Oder strengthened and enriched the Prussian kingdom.[1] To the Silesians he explained that he was guided by his concern for their liberties, which Austria (ironic truth) was not powerful enough to protect. These explanations were designed, of course, to conceal Frederick's true motive, which was a ruthless desire for self-aggrandizement. But this was something which he could hardly be expected to confess, even to himself. "We are all," he admitted,

Frederick seizes Silesia

[1] See map, page 615.

It is a permanent rule with princes, he might have added, to find good motives for bad acts.

Lured by the hope of spoil, France, Spain, Saxony, and Bavaria joined Prussia in attacking Austria. Great Britain, already at war with Spain,[1] thereupon became the ally of the empire of the Danube. The War of the Austrian Succession was therefore two wars in reality, (1) a commercial and colonial conflict waged by France and Spain against Great Britain, and (2) a continental struggle in which Maria Theresa fought to retain her hereditary dominions against the rapacity of Prussia, France, Spain, and some lesser states. In both contests the outcome of the fighting was surprisingly negative. The maritime struggle ended in a restoration of the *status quo* (Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748), while Maria Theresa, "a woman with the heart of a king," repulsed her aggressors and emerged from the contest with her empire almost intact. Almost, but not quite, for Frederick, by the Treaty of Dresden (1745) retained possession of Silesia.

Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748)


4. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION

Frederick's plan to advance Prussian prestige had succeeded almost too well, for the unscrupulous use which he had made of his powerful army alarmed both Bourbons and Hapsburgs. The rise of a new power in northern Europe drove Austria and France together, and eight years after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle these perennial enemies became allies. Maria Theresa's passionate desire to be revenged on Frederick made her welcome the new combination, and Louis XV of France was converted to the project by his strong-willed mistress, Madame de Pompadour, whom Frederick had antagonized. To seal Frederick's fate, the Czarina Elizabeth of Russia, who hated the Prussian king for his satirical verses, also joined the coalition. The mischief which these three women were plotting against him was no secret to Frederick: he felt, he declared maliciously, as if he were pursued by the Three Furies, and he placed his armies in readiness to meet an attack.

The machinations of his enemies had left him without an ally on the Continent, but Frederick hoped for assistance from Great Britain. For hostilities between the English and French had already broken out again in America with the commencement of the French and Indian War (1754), neither side being satisfied with the indecisive peace of 1748. The renewal of war with

The "Diplomatic Revolution"

[1] The War of Jenkins's Ear. See below, pages 626–27.


EXPANSION OF PRUSSIA
UNDER
FREDERICK THE GREAT
Scale of Miles
0 25 50 75 100
Prussia in 1740
Additions by Frederick the Great
SWEDEN
DENMARK
BALTIC SEA
NORTH SEA
EAST FRIESLAND 1744
SWEDISH POMERANIA
Lübeck
POMERANIA
1648
Stettin
NETZE
1773
WEST PRUSSIA
1772
EAST PRUSSIA
ERMLAND
1772
Königsberg
Memel
Niemen
Thorn
Vistula
Bug
Warsaw
POLAND
HANOVER
BRANDENBURG
Berlin
Spree
Elbe
Weser
Aller
Münster
CLEVE
1624
MARK
Cologne
Rhine
Rosbach
Leipzig
Hubertsburg
Dresden
Kottbus
Glogau
Saale
Eger
Moldau
Lusatia
SILESIA
1742
1763
Breslau
Liegnitz
Sandomierz
Vistula
UNITED NETHERLANDS
AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS
Treves
Mainz
Maine
BAYREUTH
BOHEMIA
10°
8°
12°
14°
16°
18°
20°
22°
54°
52°
50°

France, however, meant that French armies might embarrass the British government by invading the German electorate of Hanover, to which the English (Hanoverian) kings still retained the title. When Frederick the Great offered to protect Hanover with his veterans in return for a treaty of mutual defense with England, the British readily agreed (Convention of Westminster, 1756). Thus, between 1748 and 1756 a double reversal of alliances took place. In the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) England and Austria fought France and Prussia, whereas in the Seven Years' War (1756–63) England and Prussia were to fight France and Austria. This realignment of the powers, which brought France and Austria, enemies of two hundred years' standing, into the same camp, marked such a complete change of established policy that it is called the "Diplomatic Revolution."

The motives which inspired the powers to change their partners for the Seven Years' War are more easily understood when this second war is seen to be really two wars, just as the War of the Austrian Succession had been. Great Britain and France carried their struggle for colonial supremacy in India and America to a decision, while Austria and Prussia engaged once more over the disputed province of Silesia.

5. THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR (1756–63)

Frederick II was not the man to wait passively while Austria, Russia, and France prepared to dismember his kingdom. Instead, he forced the issue by a sudden descent upon Saxony, for he knew the elector of that state was plotting with the coalition. His hope was to crush the Austrians before the French could come to their aid, but a reverse in Bohemia compelled him to fall back on the defensive. What followed after that is too intricate to describe in detail. For five years Frederick campaigned back and forth across his ravaged dominions, as desperate and cunning as a wolf at bay. The English furnished him with subsidies but little military aid, and Prussia, with four and a half million people, had to hold off the forces of three empires with a combined population twelve times as great.

Advantages of Prussia

That Prussia survived the ordeal must be attributed to its possession of three great advantages: (1) The Prussian troops could be moved from one scene of battle to another more rapidly than those of the allies because they possessed what are termed the "inside lines." (2) The Prussian State was admirably organized and unified in its efforts, while the allies were often at odds and failed to concert their attacks. (3) The Prussian armies were commanded by



FREDERICK THE GREAT OF PRUSSIA
1712–1786

Frederick had a cynical mind, a bitter tongue, and a contemptuous opinion of what he called "this damned human race"; but he rose early and toiled late for the welfare of his subjects.

one of the most audacious tacticians of the age in the person of Frederick II.

Prussia survives the war

Having routed a French army at Rossbach (1757) and relieved the pressure in the west, Frederick swept east into Silesia in time to overwhelm the Austrians at Leuthen. Next it was the turn of the Russians, who were repulsed at Zorndorf (1758) after ten hours of bloody carnage. These were victories won by inspired generalship against odds that were never less than two to one, but they could not continue indefinitely. At Kunersdorf (1759) Frederick's daring overreached itself disastrously, but the Austrians and Russians neglected to profit by their victory, and complete his ruin. In the two years that followed he continued to slip back and forth between the encroaching armies with ever dwindling forces. Yet even when England withdrew her support, Frederick refused to capitulate, hoping against hope for a turn of fortune, until in 1762 it came. The death of the Czarina Elizabeth brought to the Russian throne the erratic Czar Peter III [1] whose admiration for Frederick led him to propose a generous peace. The coalition had shattered itself against the obduracy of the Prussian king and all the contestants were weary of war. By the Peace of Hubertsburg (1763), Frederick not only extricated his kingdom intact, but forced Austria to acknowledge permanently his title to Silesia. In the separate Treaty of Paris of the same year, England secured the greater part of the French colonial empire.[2]

6. FREDERICK THE GREAT IN TIME OF PEACE

In the years of peace after 1763, Frederick, who was already illustrious as the most brilliant general of his age, gained new laurels as the model of enlightened despots. To heal the wounds of war he remitted taxes in stricken districts, set cavalry horses to the plow, and distributed free seed grain to destitute farmers. Canals and roads were constructed, bridges built, and fifteen hundred square miles of marsh and waste land reclaimed under his direction, so that he could well boast that he had thereby "added a province to his kingdom." To increase the population new villages were founded, and settlers drawn to them from all parts of Europe, encouraged by the promise of just laws, religious toleration, and financial assistance.

In his efforts to stimulate manufacture, Frederick resorted to protective tariffs, and encouraged backward industries by royal patronage. The results were not uniformly successful. To gratify the king's desire

[1] See above, pages 602–04.

[2] See below, page 628.

to see Prussia economically self-sufficient, silkworms were imported, mulberry trees grown for them to feed on, and a silk industry artificially developed despite the unsuitable climate. But Frederick's attempt to discourage his subjects from drinking coffee because it could not be grown at home, and was not, as he assured them, so healthful as beer soup, led to wholesale smuggling and damaged his popularity. Money spent outside the country he regarded as lost, his idea being to make the Prussian people provide all their essential commodities, sell the surplus abroad, but import as little as possible in return. This was the one certain method of increasing the wealth of a state according to the precepts of Colbert, the minister of Louis XIV, who had extended the principles of the mercantile system in the previous century. All the states of Europe were striving, more or less successfully, to follow this system in the eighteenth century, and Frederick accepted the prevailing ideas.

Frederick's mercantilist policies

With inexhaustible patience Frederick forced himself to dispatch the tiresome details of administration. Often he was at work by five in the morning, and indolent or inefficient subordinates lived in terror of his critical eye which appeared to overlook nothing. The remotest corners of the kingdom were quickened by the energy of his example, for he visited all the provinces in person, checking errors and correcting abuses. To enforce the laws more firmly and justly, he had the legal codes unified and simplified, forbade the use of torture to extract confessions, and warned the judges that cases must not be permitted to wait indefinitely for a decision. Toward his subjects Frederick played the part of a kindly, though somewhat despotic, father, guarding the welfare of children who were well-meaning but ignorant and stupid. He labored, and expected others to labor, for the glory of Prussia as he saw it, never permitting himself to forget that his duties were proportionate to his rank, and that a king was, in his own phrase, "the first servant of the state."

"The first servant of the state"

In 1772, the annexation of West Prussia from Poland added a new province to Frederick's kingdom, as large as Silesia and almost as valuable. The decline and dismemberment of Poland have been described in the previous chapter. The Prussian share in the First Partition, though considerably smaller than that of Austria or Russia, promoted the solidarity of the kingdom, for it united East Prussia to Brandenburg.[1] With a population swelled to five million, and an army of two hundred thousand, Prussia had become a first-class power, the dominant state of the Germanies and a rival of Austria. Frederick's

[1] See map, page 615.

prestige made him not only a Prussian but a German hero; his achievements wakened a patriotic pride among all the German-speaking people; and one of his latest triumphs, before his death in 1786, was the formation of a league of German princes, organized for mutual defense against Hapsburg aggression. In thus consolidating German sentiment, he was unknowingly establishing the foundation of a greater Germany, but another century was to pass before the project of political unity could be realized.

Frederick and Voltaire

In the lighter intervals between his official labors, Frederick found time to compose melodies for his flute, to indulge his literary bent (his writings fill thirty volumes), and to enjoy the company of philosophers, poets, and scientists. "Philosophers should be the preceptors of the world and the masters of princes," he declared; and he invited the great French satiric genius, Voltaire, to be his honored guest at his palace, *Sans Souci*. There were amusing supper parties at which Frederick and his companions discussed life and literature in witty and often irreverent fashion, ridiculing the frailties and superstitions of men and exalting the advantages of a free, unprejudiced, rational mind. Unfortunately, Frederick and Voltaire discovered that even rational men do not always agree, and Voltaire's visit ended in a scandalous quarrel between them. But for Voltaire's writings Frederick retained the liveliest admiration, for strangely enough this Prussian king, who was a national hero to the German people, preferred to speak and write in French. He regarded his native tongue as uncouth and undistinguished, and his preference for the French classic style completely blinded him to the brilliant literary revival in the Germanies which marked the closing years of his reign. Compared with the tragedies of Corneille and Racine, the early work of the young Goethe seemed to him a "detestable imitation" of the "abominable plays of Shakespeare."

In 1786, Frederick the Great died quietly in his armchair at *Sans Souci*. He had raised Prussia to the rank of a great power, made it the acknowledged rival of Austria in the direction of German affairs, doubled the army and the area of the Prussian State, and afforded Europe a dazzling example of the success which a despot might achieve if his genius and industry were equal to his opportunities.

CHAPTER SEVEN

OVERSEAS EXPANSION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMERCE AND COLONIES

We will go on, even if we have to eat the leather on the ships' yards.
FERDINAND MAGELLAN.

IN THE Middle Ages the people of Europe did not speculate very much about what lay beyond the boundaries of their small continent. They knew less of geographical science than the ancient Greeks and Romans. India, with its millions of inhabitants, was a land of fable to them, and the vague wonders which they had heard of China (Cathay) and Japan (Cipango), they dismissed as travelers' tales. Of North and South America, and Australia, they knew nothing whatever. Their ignorance, of course, was due not so much to a lack of curiosity as to a lack of the means for gratifying it. Travel was slow, costly, and dangerous. Not until the revival of commerce made it profitable to visit distant lands for trade did the Europeans find it worth while to seek new continents.

1. THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: SPAIN AND PORTUGAL EXPLOIT THE WEALTH OF THE TWO INDIES

With the voyage of Columbus to America (1492), of the Portuguese captain Da Gama around Africa to India (1497–98), and of Magellan's expedition around the globe (1519–22), the people of Europe came to realize that hitherto they had known less than one quarter of the earth. They were delighted and amazed by the discoveries of that time very much as people might be excited today by the return of explorers from the moon or the planets. No report concerning the wonders of the new lands was too incredible to win belief, whether it concerned Eldorado, the mythical "Golden City" supposed to exist somewhere in South America, or a fountain of perpetual youth hidden in the Florida wilds.

Among the many fabulous things reported about the new realms of Asia and America, two facts particularly impressed the Europeans of the sixteenth century. The new lands contained immense riches, so that the "treasures of the Indies" became a by-word for unimaginable wealth, and they were peopled by races less aggressive and less skilled in warfare than the Europeans. It followed that the natives might be subdued with the aid of firearms, and

Motives inspiring the explorers

robbed with ease, or at least compelled to sell their products cheaply. A thirst for gold, and for the silks and spices that were worth their weight in gold, lured the explorers on; but in some cases they had a loftier motive, their desire to serve God by bringing the blessings of Christianity to the heathen. The conquest and colonization of the Americas reveals both these motives at work, so that the record presents a strange pattern of courage and cupidity, piety and piracy, martyrdom and massacre, interwoven, as the opportunities of the new land excited the noblest or the basest instincts of the conquerors.

Spain and Portugal took the lead in promoting the earliest voyages of exploration, so that they seemed destined in the sixteenth century to divide the heathen world between them. Such a twofold division of the non-Christian portions of the globe was actually promulgated by Pope Alexander VI in 1493. Spain received a title to North and South America, while Portugal inherited Africa, India, and the Spice Islands of the East. The papal line of demarcation was subsequently declared to run from the North to the South Pole through a point three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, and this gave Portugal the eastern half of Brazil also. These vast possessions brought enormous wealth to the Iberian peoples, but they also excited the envy of the Dutch, the French, and the English, who not unnaturally coveted a share of colonial trade and territory. By 1600, the Portuguese in the East and the Spaniards in the West had built up empires of measureless extent and wealth. It remained to be seen whether they could maintain their dual monopoly of the new lands.

The Portuguese Empire

The empire which the Portuguese established in the East Indies was an empire based upon trade. Fortifying themselves at convenient points — at Ormuz, Goa, and Diu in India, at Malacca, the Spice Islands, Java, and Sumatra — they monopolized the commerce and grew rich on its profits. But they sent out few white settlers, for the lands of the East were already densely populated, and their missionaries converted a very small proportion of the natives to Christianity. The "unchanging East" accepted their presence and their extortions, but their empire was an artificial one, without roots. It had been created by the genius of the viceroys, Almeida and Albuquerque, who broke the naval power of the Arabs in the Indian Ocean and substituted that of Portugal (1505–15). While their supremacy held, the Portuguese shipped yearly their rich cargoes to Lisbon, spices and rare fabrics from the East, gold and ivory from Africa, sugar, emeralds, and dyestuffs from Brazil. Then, after 1600, the Dutch and English tracked the Portuguese wealth to its sources, invaded the In-

dian Ocean with superior naval forces, and divided the vulnerable Portuguese Empire there between them.

During the same period the Spaniards in America were laying the basis of an empire of a different and more enduring kind. Finding the western world sparsely populated, they embarked upon a policy of wholesale conquest and colonization. In 1519–21, the redoubtable Cortez overthrew the Aztec Empire in Mexico; ten years later, Pizarro, with equal daring, made himself master of the Inca cities in Peru. The enormous treasure which these conquests yielded drew a stream of adventurers to the New World. Central and South America were parceled out as viceregal provinces; the Indians were subdued and converted to the Catholic faith; and the forests, mines, and plantations were soon yielding their tribute to Spain. When Philip II, coveting the Portuguese trade also, united the crowns of Spain and Portugal in 1580, he made himself master of an empire upon which the sun never set, and Europe trembled at the power of a monarch who could draw upon the wealth of the two Indies. But the vast imperial structure, reared by Spanish and Portuguese sea power in less than a century, lacked inward strength and was not destined to endure.

The Spanish Empire in the Americas

2. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: COMPETITION OF THE DUTCH, THE FRENCH, AND THE ENGLISH FOR COLONIES AND TRADE (1588–1688)

The beginning of the Spanish decline was marked by the loss of the Dutch Netherlands. Many Dutch merchants had already grown wealthy as middlemen, buying cargoes of Portuguese spices and reselling them throughout Europe, before the Dutch provinces broke into revolt against Spanish control (1566). In their struggle for independence the Dutch found that they could enrich themselves and cripple their foe by preying upon Portuguese and Spanish shipping. The English, already jealous of Spanish maritime power, aided the Dutch, and the destruction which overtook Philip's Invincible Armada (1588) proclaimed the fact that Spain had passed the zenith of her greatness.

The first maritime nation to profit by the decline of Spain was the new Dutch Republic. By 1600, Dutch ships had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and the oriental empire of Portugal was at their mercy. A Dutch East India Company was formed (1602), and within ten years the hardy Hollanders had made themselves masters of the eastern trade. Spanish and Portuguese ships were unable to face them on the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic,

Decline of Dutch maritime power

and for a time a Dutch expedition even occupied the Brazilian coast. These spectacular successes, and the commercial prosperity which they brought to the United Provinces, made the Dutch the envy of all Europe, but their supremacy lasted barely half a century. After 1650, England on the sea and France on land almost crushed Holland between them. In a series of trade wars (1652–54, 1665–67, 1672–74) the English captured a share of the eastern trade and annexed New Amsterdam, which they renamed New York. Further weakened by the attacks of Louis XIV, the Dutch were driven after 1674 to seek an alliance with their later despoiler, England, as the only means of resisting the French preponderance. The accession of a Dutch stadholder to the English throne, in the person of William III (1689), cemented this alliance, and the ambitions of Louis XIV were successfully curbed. But the Dutch had lost ground in the struggle and their maritime supremacy had passed to Great Britain.


English settlements in America

The English colonial empire, which was ultimately to surpass all others, included in the seventeenth century only some islands in the West Indies and a strip of coast in North America stretching from Maine to South Carolina.[1] To this may be added a disputed claim to Newfoundland and to the little known regions of Hudson Bay. But the English, like the Dutch, took advantage of the Spanish decline to organize an East India Company (1600), and several associations were formed in the following years to promote English trade and colonization in North America. Religious persecution at home helped to swell the colonial population, for nonconformist exiles founded Plymouth in 1620, and Roman Catholics flocked to Maryland after 1632. By 1700, the English colonies on the mainland had a population of well over three hundred thousand souls, imbued with a hardy, aggressive, and independent spirit.

The French colonists in North America were only about one tenth as numerous, but they had extended their settlements from the mouth of the Saint Lawrence River to the Great Lakes, and had established a claim to the Valley of the Mississippi. The accompanying map reveals how this extension of French influence confined the English settlements, preventing expansion to the north, the west, or the south. A thoughtful observer might easily have foretold, in 1700, that the century would bring a long struggle between France and Britain for the control of the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys.

The great Colbert, minister to Louis XIV of France from 1661 to 1683, had striven earnestly to build up the French navy and merchant marine

[1] See adjacent map, *The Colonial Situation About 1689.*


THE COLONIAL SITUATION
ABOUT 1689
British possessions
Dutch possessions
French "
Portuguese "
Spanish possessions
NORTH
AMERICA
Hudson Bay
NEWFOUNDLAND
NEW FRANCE
LOUISIANA
NEW SPAIN
Florida
Bermudas
Jamaica
Barbados
Caribbee Islands
New Granada
Guyana
PERU
BRAZIL
SOUTH
AMERICA
Rio Plata
CHILE
Cape Horn
PATAGONIA
TERRA DEL FUEGO
PACIFIC
OCEAN
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
BRITISH ISLES
FRANCE
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
Gibraltar
MADEIRA I.
CANARY I.
AZORES I.
C. VERDE I.
Guinea
AFRICA
Cape Coast Castle
St. Paul
St. HELENA
Natal
Cape of Good Hope
EUROPE
RUSSIA
SIBERIA
ASIA
ARCTIC CIRCLE
TROPIC OF CANCER
EQUATOR
TROPIC OF CAPRICORN
ANTARCTIC CIRCLE
INDIA
Bombay
Goa
Madras
Pondicherry
CEYLON
Bengal
Arracan
Pegu
Siam
PHILIPPINES
SUMATRA
BORNEO
CELEBES
MOLUCCAS
JAVA
Pt. Timor
NEW GUINEA
REUNION
INDIAN
OCEAN
PACIFIC
OCEAN

in order to win control of the seas and their trade. But Louis, preferring the vision of European dominion, wasted his resources in continental wars, and England, victorious at sea, gained Acadia (Nova Scotia) and a clear title to Newfoundland and the Hudson Bay territory from France in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713–14), which ended the War of the Spanish Succession. From Spain, the ally of France, the English gained Gibraltar and Minorca in the Mediterranean, the right to send one ship a year to trade with the Spanish American colonies, and the highly lucrative privilege of supplying these colonists with negro slaves. This agreement was known as the *Asiento*.

The advantages possessed by the English

The decline of Spain and Holland had left France and Britain to dispute for the crown of maritime supremacy. In this keen contest France had the advantage of a larger population, but the English were able to throw more energy into the struggle. They could devote all their resources to naval development because a strong fleet was at once the best defense from invasion and the best protection for their shipping. Great Britain possessed, moreover, a parliamentary government which was responsive to the demands of the influential merchant class. Parliament favored commerce and had freed it from the restrictions and the crippling supervision which still burdened French traders. In other words, England had evolved into a mercantile state, with the requisite economic machinery — banks, joint-stock companies, an independent merchant class, and a strong maritime tradition — while France remained largely an archaic feudal state with rigid institutions unadapted to control and direct the new forces to the best advantage. The French colonies in Canada were laid out like transplanted feudal fiefs, and the settlers, despite brilliant leadership, never acquired the energy and initiative of the English colonists. Similarly, the French trading companies, organized and subsidized by royal decree, failed to compete profitably with rival ventures which owed their existence to the enterprise of Dutch or English merchants.

8. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE DUEL OF FRANCE AND BRITAIN FOR COLONIAL SUPREMACY (1689–1763)

The French in India

In the quarter of a century which followed the Peace of Utrecht (1713–14), the French made the most determined efforts they had so far shown to check the British in India and America. Of the lost Portuguese Empire in the East, the Dutch had taken the islands while tacitly relinquishing India to British enterprise.

Eager to gather some of the profits of the India trade themselves, the French entered the race, and speedily alarmed the English by their competition. They had organized a French East India Company (1664); now they established posts and factories in India, defended them with forts and garrisons, and concluded treaties with the native princes. Trade, however, was by no means the sole attraction which drew European adventurers to India. It was a much more lucrative venture to aid the Indian rulers in their wars against one another, for the presence of a small European force with its superior weapons could decide important campaigns, and the rajahs were ready to pay for such aid with a king's ransom. When, after 1741, the able and ambitious French governor general, Dupleix, began to recruit and drill Indian troops and meddle in the affairs of the Great Mogul's Empire, the British were convinced that he planned to make French influence supreme and expel them from the peninsula.

Anglo-Spanish rivalry

Between Spain and England also a hostile spirit reigned, for the Spaniards wished to monopolize the trade of their South and Central American colonies. The Treaty of Utrecht, which permitted the English to sell the colonists slaves, and to send one trading ship a year to the Isthmus of Panama, revealed to them how profitable commerce with New Spain might be, and they coveted more of it. Had it been possible, they would have seized the Spanish cities in the New World, but the empire of Spain was vulnerable only on its fringes. Stretching from the Rio Grande to the Rio de la Plata, with its ports of entry well guarded, New Spain has been compared to a tortoise which hides under its shell and defies its enemies. The English had to content themselves with the gains they made by bribing the Spanish authorities and so carrying on a smuggling trade with the colonists. This equivocal state of affairs created ill-feeling on both sides. When, in 1739, a Captain Jenkins came before the English Parliament avowing that his ship had been boarded and his ear cut off by the Spanish officials, a conflict developed between Spain and England known as the "War of Jenkins's Ear."

War of the Austrian Succession

The following year (1740) Frederick II of Prussia seized the Austrian province of Silesia and plunged Europe into the War of the Austrian Succession, in which England and Austria were allied against Prussia, France, and Spain. The European aspects of this struggle, which left Prussia in possession of Silesia, have been described already.[1] In India and America the French and English fought with varying fortune but indecisive results. By the

[1] See pages 613–14.

Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), England, France, and Spain restored all conquests, and the English consented to abandon the *Asiento* in return for an indemnity of £100,000.

The interval of peace which followed 1748 was only a breathing spell in the colonial struggle, a preparation for a definitive test of strength between France and Great Britain. To the victor would go the mastery of the seas and a colonial empire without parallel in history, yet even this glittering prize failed to excite the French to a supreme effort. Under the indolent Louis XV, they turned their attention more willingly to Polish or German problems than to the needs of their colonies. Brilliant leaders like Dupleix in India and Montcalm in Canada worked heroically for the glory of France, with inadequate resources and scant encouragement, while the national revenue was being gaily squandered by the courtiers at Versailles. In America, especially, the French commanders displayed foresight and energy in their efforts to hem in the English by a line of forts stretching from the Valley of the Saint Lawrence down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to the Gulf of Mexico. But too many Frenchmen thought with Voltaire that Canada was only "a few acres of snow," and failed to appreciate that the expenses of a single campaign on the Rhine might have secured half a continent across the ocean.

Hostilities between the French and English broke out again in America in 1754, where the new struggle was to be known as the French and Indian War. Its European phase began in 1756, and was marked by the heroic defense which Frederick the Great of Prussia maintained against France, Austria, and Russia.[1] While the Prussian king waged his desperate campaigns year after year, his ally, England, was concluding the colonial duel with France. Fortune proved unfavorable to British arms in the first campaigns; a force under General Braddock was ambushed and almost annihilated near Fort Duquesne on the Ohio River; and expeditions directed against the French forts at Niagara and Crown Point were unsuccessful. But in 1757 the British were inspired to new efforts by the great war minister, William Pitt (the Elder), and their victories broke the French resistance. In 1759, in a battle which cost both leaders their lives, Wolfe wrested Quebec from the French veteran Montcalm, and Canada, with its sixty thousand settlers, was lost to France. The British flag seemed destined to wave undisputed from the Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic Ocean.

The French lose Canada

In India the success of the English was no less complete. The ambitious projects of Dupleix were frustrated by the military skill and

[1] See above, pages 616–18.

audacity of a young commander, Robert Clive, whose astonishing feats with insignificant forces broke the French influence. The southwest coast of India (the Carnatic) as well as the rich province of Bengal were brought under British control. When the Seven Years' War ended in 1763, French naval power had been shattered and French commerce had all but disappeared from the seas.


The stakes in this most arduous and exhausting colonial war yet fought had clearly gone to the English. Yet it would be a mistake to imagine that the extension of British influence and the annexation of new lands benefited all Englishmen equally. The classes which profited directly were the investors who drew larger dividends from the fur trade with the American Indians, the colonists and land speculators who could exploit the rich territory beyond the Alleghanies now freed from French control, and the adventurous officials in India whose lucrative meddling in native affairs now met no serious competition. These were the classes which had done most to provoke the war, and had pressed Parliament most vigorously to carry the struggle to a victorious conclusion.

Treaty of Paris (1763)

The Treaty of Paris (1763) reflected the magnitude of the British triumph. It left England in control of French Canada, and of Florida which was ceded by Spain. As compensation, the Spaniards received a title to the lands, only partly explored, lying between the Mississippi and the Pacific Ocean. In India the French retained some of their trading posts, but their activities were so restricted that they could no longer offer any effective opposition to British expansion. The Treaty of Paris assured Great Britain the position of the world's leading commercial and colonial power, a position which her less successful rivals found it difficult to contemplate without envy. Smarting from their losses, and from British arrogance, the French, the Dutch, and the Spanish all nursed a hope of revenge. They were to find an opportunity to gratify it shortly by helping to disrupt the British dominions in America.

4. THE BRITISH COLONIES IN AMERICA WIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE

In the eighteenth century colonies were valued chiefly because they provided non-European commodities, such as rice, sugar, and tobacco, for consumption in the home country, and thus helped to render it independent of the products of other nations. This attitude toward colonies was an extension of the prevailing Mercantile System, formulated in the belief that a great power should accumulate gold by selling



SHIPS OF WAR OF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

Insignificant as these sailing ships appear when compared to a modern dreadnaught, they enabled the European nations, two centuries ago, to dominate the oceans of the world and build up large colonial empires.

to its neighbors while buying as little as possible in return. As early as 1650, the English Parliament passed more stringent Navigation Acts, which declared that only English ships could bring colonial products to English ports. Later edicts commanded the English colonists to trade only with the mother country, and forbade them to compete with manufacturers in England. For instance, the colonists were forbidden to make hats for sale in England, while the English people were forbidden to raise tobacco which was a colonial monopoly. It irked the merchants of Boston and Philadelphia that they were expected to sacrifice potential profits by trading only with English firms, when they could obtain tea from the Dutch or molasses from the French at cheaper prices. The regulations were frequently evaded and a smuggling trade developed which the British government made little serious effort to repress. This tolerant attitude eased the friction which might otherwise have developed, and the colonists were reasonably satisfied as long as the government at London pursued a policy which has been defined as "salutary neglect."

After the Seven Years' War this tolerant state of affairs underwent a change, and the British government assumed a more despotic tone in matters of colonial administration. With the establishment of peace in 1763, the prime minister, George Grenville, prepared to regulate colonial trade more vigorously. New import duties were imposed upon coffee, wines, calico, etc., entering the colonies, and although the duty on foreign molasses was reduced (1764), a determined effort was made to keep the American merchants from smuggling it in duty free as they had been doing. The colonists had been in the habit of selling their products in the foreign West Indies, buying in return the sugar and molasses from which they manufactured cheap rum to exchange for Indian furs and African slaves. When this form of exchange was checked by the British regulations, the colonists found themselves running short of hard money wherewith to buy British goods; and when they sought to issue paper currency to supply the shortage, Parliament restrained them (Currency Act of 1765). To British statesmen, conscious that England had incurred heavy expenses in order to win the Seven Years' War, it appeared no more than just that the colonists should pay in part for their defense. The effort to suppress smuggling and increase the customs revenue reflected this policy, and the government sought to raise further funds by a Stamp Tax (1765), requiring all pamphlets, newspapers, and legal documents to bear a stamp. The colonists, however, argued that they could not legally be taxed by a Parliament sitting in London, to which

Great Britain "oppresses" the colonists

they elected no representatives, and so loudly did they raise the protest of "no taxation without representation" that the Stamp Tax was withdrawn in 1766.

Nevertheless, the British government still insisted upon its right to levy duties if it saw fit to do so. The colonists were requested to provide for the maintenance of British garrisons stationed in America for their defense, and additional duties on imports were introduced to meet this expense (Townshend Acts, 1767). Twenty years earlier the colonists might have furnished such a contribution willingly, for they needed the protection of British regulars while the French still menaced their settlements. But the Seven Years' War had transferred Canada to England and broken the French power in the West. This newly won security fostered a spirit of independence and self-confidence in the British colonists, and they found it easy to convince themselves that the policy of George III and his ministers was a despotic infringement of their liberties.

When the British attempted to employ coercive measures, they excited armed resistance (1775). Both sides were determined not to compromise, and the colonists prepared to fight for their rights and if possible enlist outside support. In 1776, a Continental Congress representing all thirteen colonies assembled in Philadelphia and issued a Declaration of Independence. In taking this extreme step the delegates were strongly influenced by the knowledge that the French government might aid them materially if they gave proof that they sought complete separation from England. But the new nation thus ushered into existence was at first neither free nor united. The British were determined to hold the empire together by all the armed force at their command, while in America many colonists, known as "loyalists" or "tories," were opposed to the complete separation demanded by the "patriots."

The Declaration of Independence (July 4, 1776)

The Declaration of Independence attributed the outbreak of hostilities to the tyrannous rule of George III, but the true causes were deeper and more complicated. The Americans, who numbered about two million in 1775, were accustomed to managing their own affairs. By toil and daring they had subdued and colonized a strange land. To survive and prosper under such conditions required courage and initiative and bred a spirit of self-assurance and independence. A clergyman writing in 1781 estimated that the English settlers had killed eighty-six thousand Indians in fifty years; and on the lands thus cleared they had set busy towns and rich plantations. It was perhaps no more than natural that these Americans should resent the orders of a cabinet in London, which

understood little about their problems and had long treated them with comparative indifference and neglect. The removal of the French menace, as already explained, gave the colonists a new sense of strength and security; the attempts of the British officials to regulate their trade and supervise their affairs more straitly crystallized their discontent; and the treatment accorded to the newly conquered French Canadians added a final grievance. For by the Quebec Act (1774) the British government extended the boundaries of Canada south to the Ohio River (territory the American colonists coveted for themselves), and promised the French Catholics the full privileges of their religion, customs, and laws, measures which gratified the Canadians as deeply as they affronted the New England Puritans. Thus the ties which bound the English colonists to the mother country had been progressively weakened before the Declaration of Independence broke them.

Britain is attacked by France, Spain, and Holland

At first it appeared improbable that the Americans could maintain the independence which they had proclaimed. When, after three years of campaigning, the tide of success began to turn in their favor, France came to their aid (1778) and was joined by Spain (1779) and Holland (1780). Great Britain could not maintain a successful struggle against this coalition. The high-handed use which the British had made of their maritime supremacy had left them without a friend in Europe, and they were willing by 1782 to purchase peace at the price of concessions. The thirteen colonies were recognized as independent [1] and became the United States of America; the territories of the new nation extended from the Atlantic seaboard to the Mississippi, and from the Great Lakes to Florida. Florida itself Great Britain retroceded to Spain, while France regained some posts in India, two islands in the West Indies (Saint Lucia and Tobago), and Senegal and Gorée in Africa. The British had tasted the medicine of defeat and their prestige had been somewhat reduced, but Great Britain still remained the foremost colonial and maritime power of the world.

5. THE ABATEMENT OF COLONIAL RIVALRY AFTER 1783

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Spanish, Dutch, French, and finally the English had discovered that it was easier to found settlements overseas than to retain them. Colonies, as one French statesman observed, were like fruits: they dropped from the parent tree as soon as they were ripe. To waste blood and treasure establishing such colonies, only to see them fall into other hands or assert their independence,

[1] Treaty of Paris, 1783.

seemed a dubious investment, especially because most of the islands and coastal areas in the New World had been claimed, and the further exploitation and colonization of the interior promised to be an even more costly and hazardous enterprise. This mood of disillusionment may explain in part why the powers relaxed their colonial rivalries for nearly a century after 1783. Wars were not for that reason less numerous or less destructive, but they were inspired by events in Europe itself and were little affected by colonial questions. Not until after 1870, as we shall note later, did new factors drive the nations to revive their interest in overseas empires, and the spirit of a "New Imperialism" make colonies once again a major source of armed conflict.

British colonial administration

The reverses suffered in America might have provided British statesmen with valuable lessons in the art of colonial administration, but there is little evidence that they derived much conscious profit from them. Their attitude toward French Canada remained benevolent but conservative. The Quebec Act of 1774, as already explained, conciliated the *Canadiens* by preserving their customs and religion, and this statesmanlike treatment of the conquered kept French Canada loyal while the thirteen colonies revolted. In 1791, representative assemblies were established in Upper and Lower Canada (Ontario and Quebec), but the Canadians had to stage a minor rebellion (1837) before they obtained a measure of genuine popular government, and not until 1867 were the scattered provinces knit into a self-governing Dominion.

Ireland likewise, though granted a local parliament in 1782, was deprived of this privilege in 1801 when England was struggling against Napoleon, and the Irish remained bitterly discontented with British rule throughout the nineteenth century. In India a somewhat more liberal and conscientious policy prevailed after 1784, when the East India Company was brought under stricter government supervision lest it abuse its great power, but there also a bloody rebellion, the so-called Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, was needed to awaken the British administrators to the importance of reform.

Decline of mercantilist theories

The mercantilist philosophy, the application of which had helped to disrupt the British Empire in America, held its ground for some decades after 1783, but yielded slowly to the newer doctrines of free trade. Many economists, especially in France, had come to believe that governmental regulation of trade by means of monopolies, tariffs, and bounties was artificial and constrictive, creating more evils than it cured. To govern better, they argued, it was necessary to govern less, for trade languished under arbitrary

rules and could prosper to best advantage only when it was allowed to follow a normal or natural development. The most able exposition of the new theory was propounded by the Scotsman, Adam Smith (1723–90), in a monumental study entitled *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. By a coincidence, Smith's work, which was to become a bible for those who advocated a liberal trade policy, appeared in 1776, the year the American colonists proclaimed their independence. The mercantilist theory thus received two blows, one in the practical and one in the theoretical field, during the same year. When the liberal bourgeoisie secured control of the English Parliament in the nineteenth century, they were to lead the way in advocating the doctrine of non-interference with trade, or *laissez-faire*, and to see their theories apparently vindicated by the unequaled prosperity which British commerce and industry enjoyed throughout the greater part of the century. But this prosperity was founded upon a combination of favoring circumstances which could not endure indefinitely, and in the twentieth century even the British, as we shall discover, found that free trade could become unprofitable in practice.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION

True philosophy expounds nature to us; but she can be understood only by him who has learned the speech and symbols in which she speaks to us. This speech is mathematics, and its symbols are mathematical figures.
GALILEO GALILEI (1564–1642).

If I have seen farther than Descartes, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.
SIR ISAAC NEWTON (1642–1727).

THE most significant changes in human history, developments fraught with incalculable results for the destiny of mankind, have sometimes passed all but unnoticed in their time. To European people in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the misery of the Thirty Years' War, the troublesome ambitions of Louis XIV, the rivalry of France and England for colonies or of France and Austria for conquests, seemed matters of the highest importance. And so, in their time, they were. But the historian who looks back on those centuries can detect a movement of another kind, a movement which proceeded without thunder of cannon or fanfare of trumpets, yet was destined to change the course of history more profoundly than all the wars from that time to the present. This development was the progress made in the study of natural science.

1. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

The Italian Renaissance in the fifteenth century had liberated a remarkable outburst of creative energy, and the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth had shaken the power of the universal church and weakened the hold of tradition. More men had begun to think for themselves, and by the seventeenth century they were looking about them with a new self-confidence, a new audacity, a new inquisitiveness. Rejecting accepted beliefs, natural philosophers in all parts of Europe turned to probe Nature for her secrets with sharpened curiosity, and the result was a flood of discoveries. In a few generations men learned more truths about the universe in which they lived than their ancestors had brought to light in all previous history. Linking one discovery to another, formulating bold hypotheses and then confirming them by observation and experiment, scientists created a new heaven and a new earth, sweeping into the discard many of the most venerable beliefs which they had inherited from previous

Rise of the scientific spirit

ages. Compared with this revolution in thought, the social and political changes of the period were insignificant, but the new theories were unintelligible to most people and were consequently ignored by them. Then as now scientific speculation proved too abstruse to be grasped by the lay mind, and the progress of science depended upon the labors of a small class of experimenters and specialists.

Some of the earliest and most brilliant victories of the new scientific method were won in the field of astronomy. Although in ancient times several Greek astronomers had taught correctly that the earth revolved about the sun, during the Middle Ages the people of Europe believed that the earth was the immovable center of the universe, and that round it the other heavenly bodies revolved once in twenty-four hours. This theory had been expounded so convincingly by an astronomer of Alexandria, Claudius Ptolemaeus, who lived in the second century of the Christian era, that it is still referred to as the Ptolemaic theory.

For thirteen centuries this fallacious view prevailed, until in 1543 a learned Polish astronomer, Nicolas Copernicus (1473–1543), offered a new theory to explain the movements of the heavenly bodies. He suggested that the sun was the center of the system, that the earth and planets revolved about it, and that the earth also rotated on its axis once every twenty-four hours. This view, which we accept today as self-evident, is termed the Copernican theory because it was first advocated in the work Copernicus prepared *On the Revolution of the Heavenly Bodies.*

Copernicus

As this book was written in Latin, and was difficult to understand, only scholars paid any attention to it at first. Some found it convincing and declared that a more patient and exact observation of the heavens would confirm its thesis. Others rejected the whole theory as fallacious, even asserting that it was dangerous and blasphemous to publish views which seemed to contradict the Bible and the teaching of the church. But the stars in their courses were fighting for the new theory and unprejudiced astronomers were gradually convinced. By the opening of the seventeenth century, a sharp conflict had developed between the champions of the Copernican theory and the orthodox defenders of the Ptolemaic system.

In 1600, an Italian philosopher, Giordano Bruno, was burned at the stake by sentence of the Inquisition, for teaching the new astronomy and other heresies. Yet the movements of the planets had by this time been calculated so carefully that a German astronomer, Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), was able to formulate mathematical laws for them. He showed (1) that each planet in its orbit

Kepler

around the sun does not describe a perfect circle, but an ellipse of which the sun is one of the foci; and (2) that the speed of each planet changes, growing swifter as it passes nearer the sun and slower as it swings around the more distant segment of its orbit, so that its radius vector traverses equal areas in equal times. These conclusions led Kepler to his supreme discovery or third law. (3) The time interval which a planet requires to complete its journey around the sun depends upon its mean or average distance from the sun. This dependence Kepler reduced to the formula: the square of a planet's periodic time is proportional to the cube of its mean distance from the sun.

The invention of the telescope at this time brought fresh evidence to support the Copernican hypothesis and justify it as a system. In 1610, the Florentine scientist, Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), turned this new instrument upon the heavens and disclosed a succession of marvels. For the first time the mountains of the moon, the rings of Saturn, the moons of Jupiter, and the phases of Venus were made visible to the eyes of men. Doubters who had found it easy to scoff at theories were shaken by observable facts. Yet to many it still appeared wicked to teach that the earth, far from being the center of things, created by God's special care as the stage for the drama of man's fall and redemption, was in reality no more than a ball of mud spinning on an endless spiral through infinite night. Galileo was warned by the Inquisition that in defending the new astronomy he was weakening Christian belief and the respect due to established authority. When he persisted, he was summoned before the Inquisition, compelled to forswear his belief in the movement of the earth, and forbidden to teach the theory thenceforth. Had he refused to yield, he might have been imprisoned for life or burned at the stake like Bruno.

Galileo Galilei

Despite discouragement and opposition, however, the scientists intensified their speculations and experiments, spurred on by the conviction that the heavens had further secrets to yield. The order and permanence which prevailed in the solar system drove them to ponder what force could hold the moons and planets to courses of such undeviating regularity. In 1600, an Englishman, William Gilbert (1540–1603), suggested that the earth might be regarded as a huge magnet which attracted bodies to itself by magnetism or gravitation. Kepler developed this idea, arguing that the force of attraction exercised by a body increased with its mass and extended far beyond that body, so that the earth, for example, must exert a constant attraction upon the moon which the moon resisted through some equivalent counter-force.

It remained for the English mathematician, Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727), to reduce these inferences to order and explain the movements of all the celestial bodies as consequences of one general law of gravitation. In 1687, in his immortal *Principia*,[1] Newton formulated his conclusion that the force of attraction between two bodies varies directly as the sum of their masses and inversely as the square of the distance between them. To test his hypothesis he had applied it to explain the movement of the moon about the earth, and when he found his figures working out correctly, he was so deeply stirred by the splendor of his discovery that he had to ask a friend to finish the calculations for him. For further verification he extended his computations to the planets, to the tides, even to the apparent vagaries of comets, and found that all proclaimed the universality of the law his genius had discerned.

Sir Isaac Newton

In the century and a half following the death of Copernicus scientists had stripped most of the mystery from the heavens. Inexorable laws were found to govern the movements of all sidereal bodies, so that the smallest comet hurtling through the darkness of outer space could not vary a hair's breadth from the path prescribed for it by mathematical calculations. Edmund Halley, a friend and disciple of Newton, was able to compute the orbit of a comet which appeared in 1682 and predict its reappearance in seventy-seven years. Halley's comet not only justified this computation by reappearing in 1759; it returned in 1835 and 1910, and may be expected again about 1986. The medieval superstition that comets were sent to announce an approaching disaster or the death of a king was thus forced to yield, like many another superstition, to the matter-of-fact explanation of the scientists. It is not difficult to understand why opposition grew between those people who chose still to believe in omens and miracles and the rationalists who insisted there was no place for miracles in a universe governed by inflexible laws.

While the study of astronomy advanced thus with giant strides, the other sciences were not standing still. In physics, chemistry, anatomy, and a score of related fields, investigators only a little less illustrious than Galileo or Newton pressed on to new discoveries. In their search they found it necessary to invent tools more delicate and more accurate than the human senses, like the telescope, microscope, thermometer, and barometer. Unfortunately, there is no space to tell here how William Harvey (1578–1657) discovered the circulation of the blood, how Anton van

"The Century of Genius"

[1] The full title is *Principia Philosophiae Naturalis Mathematica.*



© *National Portrait Gallery*

SIR ISAAC NEWTON
1642–1727

The painter has represented Sir Isaac Newton with a globe beside him and a book, apparently filled with geometrical figures, to suggest Newton's outstanding contributions to natural philosophy and mathematical science.

Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723) first observed bacteria under his microscope, or how Robert Boyle (1627–91) formulated the law that the volume of a gas varies inversely with the pressure. Merely to list the outstanding discoveries of these eventful years would require several pages. So productive were the experiments of these fathers of modern science, so profound their speculations, that the seventeenth century has been well named "The Century of Genius." Of the many triumphs only the epic of the astronomers has been related in any detail because it reveals best of all two *habits* which the scientists had cultivated, to which they owed their amazing success. These were (1) the habit of translating all calculations whenever possible into a new and special language, the language of mathematics; and (2) the habit of basing all conclusions upon observation and experiment instead of appealing to ancient writers or to popular belief for the truth. Both these practices were so important and so revolutionary that they demand explanation.

2. THE PROGRESS OF MATHEMATICS

The scientists of the seventeenth century first clearly perceived that "mathematics is the skeleton of God's plan of the universe."

The "Language of Nature"

The most brilliant achievements of the astronomers, from Kepler's discovery of what he well named *The Harmony of the Heavens* to Newton's law of gravitation, were all expressed in mathematical formulas. It delighted these natural philosophers to think that they had at last stumbled upon the language in which Nature wrote her secrets. "This language," proclaimed Galileo, "is mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other mathematical figures." A peculiar charm invested this language of numbers, for it was flexible, accurate, and international.

The development of modern mathematics is the most original achievement of the human intellect. Although the ancients had laid down many of the first principles of the science, their legacy, in comparison with the progress of modern times, is like the simple melody of a flute contrasted with the intricate harmonies of a hundred-piece orchestra.

Decimals

To this science of numbers "The Century of Genius" made four pre-eminent contributions: (1) The introduction of decimals, first written with a decimal point in 1616, saved vast labors in the handling of fractions.

Logarithms

(2) Of even greater value was the conception of logarithms, announced by a Scotsman, John Napier, in 1614. Because they offered a short cut through cumber-

some calculations, logarithms doubled the lives of astronomers by halving their labors. (3) A further advance in method is associated with the name of the French philosopher, René Descartes (1596–1650). In 1637, Descartes revealed in his analytic geometry how facts ascertainable in geometry may be translated into algebra, and *vice versa*, thus offering a dual method of attack whereby stubborn problems could be outflanked. (4) A fitting culmination to these previous gains was the formulation after 1680 of the differential calculus, developed independently by Sir Isaac Newton and the German philosopher Leibnitz, and acclaimed as "perhaps the most important step in the progress of mathematical science

Analytic geometry

Differential calculus

3. THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD

The second habit to which the scientists owed much of their success was their practice of appealing to observation and experiment as the surest test of truth. No statement, though repeated by ancient and venerable sages and long accepted by the mass of mankind as too obvious for argument, was to be accepted if it contradicted established facts. Copernicus, for instance, rejected the opinions of men of learning and the evidence of his own senses, all of which assured him that the earth was immovable. But because this theory failed to explain the motions of the planets, he abandoned it, observed the phenomena, pondered them, and then devised a new theory which would include and account for the motions of all the heavenly bodies. Reasoning in this way from a number of particular cases to a general conclusion is called *induction*. The triumph of Copernicus was one of the first in a long series of successes won by the method of experiment, observation, and induction.

Scholastic thinkers of the Middle Ages had been disposed to spin fine theories while ignoring facts, or to interpret facts in such a fashion that they would appear to support established theories. Believing, for example, that the sun was a perfect, unchanging body because the Greek philosopher Aristotle had said so, the later schoolman offered this statement, which they could not prove, as a refutation of the Copernican theory. When the newly invented telescopes revealed spots on the sun which moved across its face, the Aristotelians declared the notion inadmissible and argued that the flaws must be in the telescope because they could not be in the sun. Similarly, the scientists demonstrated by dissection and experiment that accepted beliefs in anatomy or physics were wrong, but they found it difficult to convince orthodox thinkers, who rebuked them for their

Authority vs. experiment

irreverence and repudiated the evidence submitted to them. Some theologians even affirmed that the Devil mixed himself in scientific experiments and falsified the results in order to confuse men and shake their faith in true principles. In the face of such obscurantism it is not altogether surprising that advocates of the newer sciences learned to feel contempt for the scholastic philosophy and for its defenders.

The experimental method, on the other hand, seemed to promise man infinite possibilities for bettering his lot and controlling his destiny. The English lord chancellor, Francis Bacon (1561–1626), thought so highly of it that he drew a prophetic picture of the glories of the future in his *New Atlantis*, and scorned the hoary errors of the past. In breaking with tradition the new thinkers came to prize independence of judgment above mere book learning. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), who sometimes acted as secretary to Bacon and later wrote dogmatic works on political philosophy, was wont to boast that if he had read as much as most men he would probably know as little. "Reasoning from the Authority of Books," he declared, in his caustic fashion, "... is not Knowledge, but Faith." Descartes found so many errors in the works on anatomy which he consulted that he turned to Nature for the truth. "These are my books," he told a visitor, pointing to the bodies of animals which he was dissecting. But these scientists, though they sometimes scorned the learning of earlier centuries, understood the value of sharing their discoveries with each other. "If I have seen farther than Descartes," admitted Newton, who lived half a century later, "it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."

4. THE SCIENTIFIC ACADEMIES

It was, therefore, by means of learned journals, correspondence, travel, and exchange of views that the earliest scientists sought to keep alive the flame of curiosity, which, while it sometimes burns brightly in one lonely genius, is never so productive as when it feeds upon the combined enthusiasm of many workers. In their impetuous search they were like mountaineers who attack a mighty peak from many sides, convinced that they were destined to converge until they met together at the summit and found that all truth was ultimately one. Newton had compared himself to a child playing on the seashore with the great ocean of truth all undiscovered before him, but many of his followers were less modest and more sanguine. Already they had learned how a discovery in physics might supply the clue to an obscure problem in astronomy, and this in turn depend for solution

upon a recent advance in mathematics. The most versatile genius could not excel in all fields, but he might utilize the principles and proofs established by gifted contemporaries if he could avail himself of them. By such borrowing a scientist was in a position to follow experiments in a hundred laboratories at once, observe the stars from every corner of Europe on the same night, and help himself to the answers which the labor of others had wrung from arduous computations. Such collaboration speedily became a habit with the scientists, as fruitful in its results as the habit of using observation and induction to seek new truths and the habit of expressing them in mathematical terms when found.

The easiest way to share ideas is by personal contact, and societies organized for discussion and experiment were one of the first proofs that the scientific revolution had begun. An "Academy of the Lynx-Eyed" was formed at Rome in 1601, and an "Academy for Experiment" made its appearance at Florence in 1657. After 1660, when war ceased for a time to absorb the major attention of princes, several new societies were established under royal patronage. The most distinguished were the "Royal Society for Improving Natural Knowledge" incorporated at London in 1662, and the French "Académie des Sciences" chartered by Louis XIV in 1666. To record their deliberations and experiments these academies published scientific journals, and to encourage research they collected funds to build libraries and observatories and to purchase retorts and furnaces, telescopes and microscopes, chronometers, barometers, air pumps, and all the other paraphernalia which laboratory workers had discovered they needed in their pursuit of "Natural Philosophy."

The Royal Society

Académie des Sciences

By the eighteenth century, scientists were no longer persecuted; they were honored and rewarded. Galileo had been silenced by the Inquisition for his novel opinions, but when Sir Isaac Newton died in 1727, less than a century later, he was buried with honors befitting a king. Science had begun to capture the popular imagination. Even people who did not understand much about it were persuaded that it provided a new and marvelous method for unveiling Nature's secrets. Cultured ladies and gentlemen read books explaining Newton's laws and attended lectures on astronomy. Some wealthy men equipped laboratories of their own and conducted experiments in the hope of adding to the sum of human knowledge. And the sum of knowledge continued to grow. In chemistry the elements hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen were iso-

Eighteenth-century interest in science

lated and their general properties analyzed; in physics valuable progress was made in studying the nature of heat and sound; in zoology, Buffon (1707–88) and Linnaeus (1707–78) reduced the study of animals to a descriptive science. Benjamin Franklin demonstrated that bolts of lightning were not hurled by Satan as many people still believed, but were discharges of electricity which could be turned harmlessly aside by a lightning conductor. Astronomy, anatomy, biology, geology, and mineralogy likewise had their triumphs and flourished apace, so that although the seventeenth century takes rank as "The Century of Genius," the eighteenth has been well named "The Scientific Renaissance."

5. THE INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION

In every age the great majority of people are too absorbed in their private affairs, in trade, or crops, or home-making, to pay much attention to the progress of abstract ideas. Few Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for instance, were aware that their habits of thought were changing, for the changes came in slow and subtle ways. Nevertheless, each generation brought some modification of ancient beliefs and outworn ideals, each decade contributed some new discovery, until all educated Europeans, without being aware of it, had passed through a revolution. This revolution was in no way sudden or violent, but it was a revolution none the less. For it overturned a hierarchy of intellectual values, freed civilized men from many obsolete prejudices, knocked the shackles from their minds, as it were, and turned their thoughts from the past to the future. Above all, it filled them with an intoxicating wine, the wine of a new self-confidence.

A very old and intelligent man, looking back let us say from the year 1760, might have observed that within his own lifetime people had altered many of their ideas. A man of unusual perception might even have noted that this change could chiefly be distinguished as "a waning of fear." With each generation it seemed as if men had less dread of the wrath of God, less reverence for the wisdom of the ancients, less awe respecting Nature and her unknown forces. How was this change coming about and what factors promoted it? Whence arose this skeptical and arrogant spirit in the hearts of men which is such a striking component of the modern temper? It will be an interesting task to try to answer these questions.

With the rise of natural philosophy, theology was displaced from

its proud position as "Queen of the Sciences." The Great Schism, the Revival of Learning, and the Protestant Reformation had all tended to weaken the unity and authority of the medieval church, and the religious wars which racked Europe for a hundred years, sapped by their futile fanaticism the faith of many Catholics and Protestants alike. By the eighteenth century religious fervor was yielding before the spirit of tolerance or indifference. It was no longer the custom to burn witches, or to martyr as heretics those who wished to seek heaven in their own fashion. Theologians who threatened the unorthodox with rack and fagot were denounced for their bigotry and obscurantism, and enlightened monarchs no longer insisted that their subjects must all profess the same faith as the king. Secular concerns and worldly pursuits had obscured the sense of intimate dependence upon religion which people had felt so keenly in earlier centuries. Some skeptics dared to repudiate all belief and to deny that the theologians were or ever had been the custodians of divine truths which could guide men to salvation.

Decline of theology

The new learning offered man a more vainglorious picture of himself, and rooted itself in his pride, whereas his religious beliefs had been the fruit of his humility. Man was a miserable creature, the theologians had taught, condemned, because of his corrupt nature, to err and suffer endlessly unless he were rescued by divine grace and intervention. But the rationalists were moved to question this view. Perhaps, they suggested, man was intended to control his own destiny, instead of bowing fatalistically to the will of an inscrutable Providence. If God granted him intelligence, there could be nothing blasphemous in using it. It might be that the plagues and miseries from which he suffered were not after all the righteous punishment for his sins, but only the logical consequences of his folly. Instead of being "born to trouble as the sparks fly upward," he might be born to improve his lot on earth far beyond his hopes or dreams. The "original sin" which brought woe to men might not be the sin of Adam, but the sin of their own stupidity. These and similar arguments of the philosophers, disseminated by a few bold minds, won converts and leavened the consciousness of European society because they were suited to the temper of the new age.

Rise of rationalism

The decline of theology was reflected in the waning faith in miracles. If God had established majestic and inflexible laws for the movement of the stars and other phenomena of the physical world, it seemed illogical to suppose that He would interfere arbitrarily with the working of them. To imagine that God

Growth of deism and skepticism

could be swayed by human passions or prayers, so that He would make the sun stand still, conjure up a hurricane to punish a blasphemous sailor, or overwhelm a wicked city by a specially invoked earthquake, appeared to the rationalists both stupid and irreverent. They preferred to conceive of God as a remote and impersonal deity, a First Cause or First Principle, or an ideal constitutional monarch who never violated the laws which He had established for the government of the natural realm. Thinkers who embraced this view were termed deists, but some went so far as to deny the existence of a deity altogether, and thereby proclaimed themselves atheists.

A waning reverence for the wisdom of the ancients has been cited as the second symptom of the Intellectual Revolution. In the general assault upon authorities and institutions long established, the reputation of the classical authors suffered considerably. Under Louis XIV some French savants, proud of the greatness of their own age, dared to challenge the title of superiority commonly accorded the great men of Greece and Rome. Half the conclusions of Aristotle, they pointed out, had been disproved by modern students of science; Plato, the "divine Plato," was after all no more than human; Virgil, for all his suavity, was somewhat cold and barren; and even the great Homer could sometimes nod — and make readers nod — with his tedious digressions. At this blasphemy the champions of the "ancients" sharpened their pens and hastened to combat these audacious "moderns." Seas of ink were spilled and the controversy dragged well into the eighteenth century without reaching a decision. But thinking men in general came to feel that the moderns were partly right; that in mathematical and scientific progress, and perhaps in music also, their own age was supreme, though they were willing to concede that ancient masterpieces in art and literature might remain unsurpassed. This "Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns," a small affair in itself, was one more token that the western world had come of age. For over a thousand years Europeans had looked backward with a sense of nostalgia and tragic loss to the fading gleams of the Age of Gold. They had hoarded the crumbs of wisdom from the classical times as mankind's rarest heritage of culture, for, in the barbarism of the dark ages, such veneration was not altogether misplaced. Now they were escaping from this tutelage of the past and learning to anticipate such glorious progress in the future that all previous accomplishments would seem but a prelude to it.

"Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns"

The third and possibly the most important change which the Intellectual Revolution brought to western man was a new attitude toward

The medieval attitude toward Nature

Nature. Medieval students neglected the natural sciences, and scarcely one important discovery in physics or chemistry, in astronomy or mechanics or medicine, was made during the Middle Ages. This failure to investigate Nature does not prove that medieval thinkers were necessarily less intelligent or industrious than modern scientists; it does indicate, however, that their values were different, that they reasoned from different premises and pursued a different aim. They neglected the study of Nature, because they conceived the chief end of man to be that he should live in accordance with God's will and strive for eternal salvation; and they subordinated all lesser studies to that of theology, because theology taught how men might be saved. Compared with the world of the spirit, the world of matter was corrupt and transitory. Undue concern with earthly affairs diverted the soul from God and might lead to damnation. The investigator who dabbled successfully in alchemy, astrology, or other pseudo-sciences, became to the popular mind a wizard or magician who had doubtless purchased his uncanny art by selling his soul to the devil. To the majority of people in the Middle Ages, illiterate, ignorant, and superstitious, the world was like a haunted house; in which they moved about cautiously and timorously, respecting the jealous whims of the unknown beings, and trusting to the aid of the saints and angels to save them from the devils and goblins.

When the austere wind of scientific speculation blew away the mists of medieval fantasy, it disclosed a universe built on a grander scale and a different plan from that previously imagined. To the eye of the scientist Nature emerged as a vast and intricate machine of severe and geometric beauty. All fear of supernatural forces seemed idle to the rationalist because for him there were no supernatural forces, no miracles, no angels, and no devils. The great machine was governed by eternal and immutable laws. To suppose that such a universe could turn from its course to strike a man to earth for presumptuous questioning, or that the sea would part and allow him to cross it dry-shod in his need, was to yield to a naïve and implausible presumption. "In Nature there are neither rewards nor punishments, there are only consequences." And it appeared to follow that if man had faith in himself and in science, if he applied himself to the study of Nature and mastered her secrets, he could learn to avoid evil consequences and assure good ones, thus becoming the arbiter of his destiny. Such at least was the dazzling promise held out by many apostles of the new enlightenment.

This optimistic faith in man's capacity for progress inspired the Age of Reason. Liberal thinkers everywhere urged that manners, morals,

modes of education, of government, of religion, should be analyzed rationally, brought to perfection, or discarded. Once the existing laws and institutions had been perfected, the rationalists felt confident that humanity would undergo a miraculous regeneration. This conclusion appeared to follow logically from the teaching of John Locke (1637–1704), who had proclaimed in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) that man's knowledge and beliefs are the fruit of his training and environment and are not predetermined by innate ideas or the curse of original depravity. The mind of a newborn child Locke compared to a blank sheet of paper. "Let us suppose the mind to be, as we may say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas — how comes it to be furnished?" he asked, and answered his own question with the one word "Experience." It appeared, therefore, that children born into a just and equitable society, children trained in right thinking under a rational régime, could not fail to grow into good citizens. The first step toward reform was to abolish all irrational practices, all abuses, all myths and superstitions, and to establish wise principles, just laws, and rational institutions.

The Age of Reason

In thus insisting that man must be freed from all myths and superstitions, the philosophers overlooked the possibility that to cling to myths and superstitions might be part of his nature, and in their relentless war against prejudice and error they failed to take account of their own delusions. They erred concerning the past, particularly the Middle Ages, the significance of which they misunderstood and underrated; and they erred even more seriously concerning the future, for they evinced a touching faith in human perfectibility and underestimated the obstacles to human happiness which still confronted them. They imagined that the millennium was at hand because they had found a fruitful method for investigating the physical sciences, and they leaped to the false conclusion that this method could be applied to the social sciences with the same success. Some ages ask questions, others answer them. The eighteenth century was of the latter type. Its intellectual leaders were of the opinion that they could find the answers to all the problems of society, they burned to apply them, and infected all classes with their contagious enthusiasm. It is not difficult to understand why the eighteenth century was loud with projects of reform, nor surprising that it should have ended with a revolution.

CHAPTER NINE

GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY UNDER THE OLD RÉGIME

I should have wished to be born in a country in which the interest of the Sovereign and that of the people must be single and identical; to the end that all the movements of the machine might tend always to the general happiness.

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU.

THE system of government and the organization of society under which the European peoples lived before the great French Revolution broke out in 1789 is commonly spoken of as the *ancien régime* or old régime. It was an outmoded and inefficient system with glaring deficiencies. The wreckage of feudalism still weighed like an incubus upon society, and governments functioned in a makeshift and haphazard fashion, for none of the states had developed administrative machinery adequate to deal with the complexities of a mercantile era. It is the purpose of this chapter to reconstruct a picture of life under the old régime, and to emphasize the defects and abuses which incited the French people to rise against the system. As France was in many respects the typical land of the old régime, the discussion will deal with France in particular, but the student may think of the conditions described as prevailing with local variations throughout most of Europe.

1. DIVINE-RIGHT MONARCHY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

In the Middle Ages two small but powerful classes, the clergy and the nobles, had come to dominate society. Above these, as the separate states organized themselves, rose the power of the king. By the seventeenth century, in almost all the European states, monarchs had made their authority supreme in theory and in fact. What the king willed was law; his peculiar function was to be at once the benevolent father of his people and the dread sovereign who animated and directed the life of the state. The laws were executed in his name, the coinage was stamped with his image, the nobles enjoyed his bounty and the priests offered prayers for his preservation. For a subject to refuse homage, or to question why one man, who might be endowed with no particular brilliance of mind or nobility of character, should enjoy royal honors, was considered sedition. The king held his office through hereditary right, an office glorified by tradition and sanctified by religion. The throne was revered as the altar was revered, because

both were regarded as symbols of God's divine authority governing the world through His instruments.

In practice, needless to say, the absolute power of the king was modified by a thousand contingencies. He was dependent upon a host of subordinate officials who supplied him with information and exercised delegated powers in his name. Even an industrious monarch like Louis XIV of France, the model of absolute despots, could not supervise all the business of the state; under his indolent successor, Louis XV (1715–74), France was governed in reality by the ministers of the royal council. These councilors sometimes met together with the king presiding, but more often assembled in smaller committees, as the council of state, council of dispatches, council of finance and commerce, and council of war. As the functions of the councils were not very clearly defined, there was much confusion and business piled up more rapidly than it could be dispatched. The councilors were often compelled to waste their time on trivial matters while important issues waited, but they hesitated to delegate the decision to subordinates for fear of sacrificing their jealously guarded authority.

The royal government

Confusion in the capital bred chaos in the provinces. The royal government in France had extended itself gradually, as it was superimposed by successive rulers upon the relics of feudalism and upon the vestiges of local institutions older sometimes than the monarchy. The kingdom had been acquired by fragments and organized by fits and starts. At one time it had been divided into *baillages* and *sénéchausées*, later into *gouvernements*, and finally, under Richelieu, into *généralités*. Each *généralité* was controlled by a royal official known as the intendant, and the power of the intendants had grown so great that they were called in the eighteenth century the "thirty tyrants" of France. Yet the governors of the provinces still held office, as relics of an older organization, and some of the provinces preserved a shadow of independence under their local assemblies, or estates, and were known as *pays d'état* to distinguish them from provinces which lacked this privilege, the *pays d'élection*. Finally, the country was further separated into segments for ecclesiastical administration, segments which bore little relation to the political subdivisions, and into judicial districts which bore little correspondence to anything, even to one another.

Chaos in the provinces

The centralization of authority in the hands of the bureaucracy had stifled the initiative and enterprise of local officials, who found it easiest to refer every difficult decision to their superiors. An army of civil

servants was required to handle the flood of reports, dispatches, and petitions which poured in from the provinces. The royal government of France was no worse than that of Spain or Austria; it was served by many hard-working and intelligent administrators; but their efforts were of little avail in a system which seemed to have been specially devised to perpetuate confusion and procrastination. When advisers warned Louis XV that reforms were desperately needed, the pleasure-loving king replied that the machine would last out his day. He left it to his ministers to make minor repairs and readjustments and to keep the machine running.

Disorder in the administration

What the state required was a radical and exhaustive reconstruction in every branch of the administration. The partial and often capricious reforms instituted by the ministers in the hope of clearing a way through the disorder only added to the confusion. Their instructions were commonly so involved, so lengthy, and so loaded with amendments that their subordinates found it impossible to master them. Worst of all, where a sound and simple statute existed which might have served as a guiding principle, it was speedily corrupted by a list of exceptions each more complicated than the original. Critics of the old régime in every state in Europe were agreed that the reform of paramount importance was the preparation of a simple and unified code of laws. An absolute monarch, it was urged, might bring order out of the existing chaos by defining the duties and functions of his government in a few logical and invariable rules. Or, if the prince neglected his duty, the people themselves might prepare a constitution which would safeguard their liberties by establishing the government on true and inflexible principles. Throughout society, from the king's councilors to the petty tradesmen in provincial towns, irritation at the administrative disorder was growing into a passion.

2. THE PRIVILEGED AND UNPRIVILEGED CLASSES

The feudal stratification of society into three classes, the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Third Estate, had become iniquitous and illogical by the eighteenth century. In France, a country with perhaps twenty-five million people, the clergy and nobility together constituted less than two per cent of the population, yet they enjoyed the income from the richest lands of the kingdom, were exempted from the most onerous taxes, and occupied by right of rank the highest and best paid offices in the government, the army, and the church.

The Roman Catholic Church in France owned approximately one fifth of the land. Its income was enormous, one half as great as the royal revenues according to some estimates, and was derived from two main sources. The estates of the church brought in the modern equivalent of $200,000,000 a year, and a sum almost as large was furnished by the tithe. This was a tax, theoretically one tenth but in practice more often one fifteenth or less, commonly levied upon the annual yield from land cultivated by laymen. The church itself paid no taxes to the king on its property, but the clergy voted "free gifts" to the royal exchequer from time to time as a partial substitute. Part of the revenue of the church went for charitable purposes, part as salary for the 130,000 clergy; but the salaries were very unevenly distributed. Many abbots and bishops, nobles by birth in most cases, disposed of princely incomes, but the humble and hard-working parish priests were often little better off than the peasants among whom they labored. The impending revolution was to prove that many village *curés* had less loyalty to the First Estate to which they nominally belonged than to the Third Estate whose grievances they understood.

The French clergy

The second privileged class, the nobles, numbered about 110,000 souls, and likewise enjoyed the income from about one fifth of the land. As a rule this land was cultivated by tenants who paid the noble owner rent and services for the privilege. Some of the nobles did not even reside on their estates, preferring the more amusing and expensive life at court. Bailiffs collected from the tenants the income which these absentee landlords often squandered on gambling and display. There was a further injustice in the fact that the nobles who enjoyed this unearned revenue, amassed by the toil of others, were free from the more burdensome taxes which the impoverished peasant still had to pay. It was the dream of many a wealthy bourgeois to win his way into this privileged caste, and members of the Third Estate occasionally gained patents of nobility through purchase or distinguished service. Such newcomers were termed the "nobility of the robe" to distinguish them from the prouder "nobility of the sword" whose titles often dated from feudal times. In addition to their exemptions and the income from their estates, many nobles received pensions from the king, while others, who had ruined themselves through extravagance and failed to secure a share of the royal charity, had to retire to their mortgaged lands and a life of penurious obscurity.

The privileges of the nobility

The millions of unprivileged subjects who made up the Third Estate

scarcely needed the writings of the philosophers to persuade them that the system under which they lived was out of joint. *The Third Estate*

The simple peasant, who plowed his land and dreaded the visits of the tax collector, might not understand much about political economy, but he had grievances that were concrete and specific. It irked him that when he had scattered his seed in the furrows the pigeons from the lord's dovecote might scratch it up again; that he was forbidden to molest the deer when they nibbled his vegetable garden because they were maintained for the nobleman's pleasure; that when his tender crops which represented weeks of care and toil were trampled by a hunting party from the castle, he had no means of claiming compensation. It was troublesome, too, that he had to carry his grain to the lord's mill to have it ground, and leave part of it as payment when he had too little for himself, or that he might be summoned to work on the road (the *corvée*), or to draw wood to the castle, when his threshing was overdue and his apples were rotting in the orchard because he had no time to press the cider.

The heavy and unequal taxes were a special source of bitterness. All the ranks of the unprivileged, the upper middle class, the lower middle class, the artisans, the servants, the peasants, down to the thieves and vagabonds of the highway, hated the fiscal system. This was not surprising since the burden of taxation rested most heavily upon those least able to support it and crushed the peasant most cruelly of all. For in addition to the rent and services paid to the lord of the manor, and the tithe paid to the church, poor Jacques had to discharge a land tax (the *taille*), a poll tax, an income tax, and a salt tax (the *gabelle*). Peasants too poor to buy food were still compelled to purchase salt at exorbitant prices, and if they attempted to smuggle enough for their need in order to avoid paying the royal revenue on it, they were punished with barbarous severity. Many of them deliberately sank into a state of destitution, knowing that to improve their dwellings or increase the yield of their lands would only expose them to higher assessments and heavier taxes.

The middle-class dwellers in the towns, though better off than the peasants, were even more critical and discontented. The professional and business classes, the bourgeoisie, included the most cultured, the most intelligent, and the most progressive elements in the nation. *The bourgeoisie*

From the bourgeois class came the most competent officials in the king's service; it included the bankers who tided the government over its financial crises with their loans, and the business men who increased the prosperity of the state by their commercial and

industrial enterprise. Yet this energetic and intelligent class was denied political power, and its members were forced to accept a position of inferiority, while the highest offices in the church, the army, the law courts, and the diplomatic service were bestowed upon men whose only claim to preference was their noble birth. Knowing their own worth and importance, conscious that in wealth, ability, and education they were the equals of the titled few, ambitious members of the bourgeoisie hated the system which denied them their deserts. They possessed both the intelligence and the motive for starting a revolution, and they fed their discontent by studying the abuses in the government, particularly those connected with the administration of law and the collection of taxes.

3. LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ABUSES

The confusion of authority under the old régime is well illustrated by the condition of the law courts. Instead of a uniform code of laws in force throughout the nation, France was burdened with some three hundred and sixty differing codes, with the inevitable result that jurisdictions overlapped, decisions conflicted, and litigation grew to interminable proportions. Moreover, an offense punishable in one court by a fine might earn branding or ten years in the galleys from another, although it was obvious, as the rationalists pointed out, that there could not be several penalties for the same crime and all of them just. The humane spirit of the age was further shocked by the barbarous practices of judicial torture, mutilation, branding, and breaking on the wheel. It was not unknown for judges to dismiss guilty criminals brought before them rather than inflict the brutal sentences prescribed by the statute books. But the worst terror in this legal jungle was the arbitrary power of the king and his ministers, who could imprison any citizen without warning, without trial, and without appeal, and on the sole authority of a royal *lettre de cachet* confine him in a secret dungeon "at the king's pleasure."

Harsh laws

Another active cause of discontent was the stupid and oppressive legislation which fettered the expanding trade and industry of the age. Interior customs lines restricted the normal flow of commodities, feudal overlords still levied toll on certain goods passing through their dominions, and town wardens stopped merchandise at the gate for an entrance fee. A load of wine on its way to Paris, for instance, might be assessed for duty over twenty times, with much consequent waste and delay. In industry, progress

Obstructions to trade and industry

was checked by the obstructive and antiquated guilds, which guarded their monopolies jealously. Artisans were forbidden to change from one trade to another, and better and speedier methods of manufacture were frequently outlawed because of ancient ordinances which had outlived whatever usefulness they once possessed.

Had the government of Louis XV pursued an energetic and successful policy abroad, Frenchmen might have overlooked their domestic ills. But in the wars of the eighteenth century, France was singularly unfortunate, and by 1763 the country had lost all but a remnant of its colonial empire, and amassed a heavy debt. Frenchmen knew that their country was one of the most populous, most favored and wealthy in Europe, yet every year they saw the national indebtedness increase, until bankers hesitated to lend money to the state even at twenty per cent interest. One grave fault of the fiscal system was the custom known as "farming out the taxes." A group of wealthy men would advance a sum of money to the king in exchange for his permission to reimburse themselves by collecting the taxes due. As they often collected more than they had advanced, this practice of discounting the revenue meant in reality that it was carried to the king as it were in a leaking bucket. A second grave fault was the absence of a budget. The monarch treated the national revenues as a private credit account, and might squander upon his mistresses and his amusements the resources which should have been devoted to urgent national needs.

Evils of the tax system

4. THE CRITICISM OF THE PHILOSOPHERS

Against these numerous abuses the rationalists of the eighteenth century leveled a stream of brilliant, satirical, and destructive criticism. With the Intellectual Revolution a spirit of rationalism and skepticism had spread among the enlightened classes of society. In France the movement was particularly strong, for it was led by a unique group of writers who are known as the *philosophes* or philosophers. No tradition or institution, however ancient or venerable, was sacred to these critics, who delighted in holding up to public ridicule the stupidity, hypocrisy, and irrationality of existing customs, and who pleaded, in the name of humanity and right reason, for a program of intelligent reforms.

The philosophers of the eighteenth century

The most famous of the *philosophes* was François Marie Arouet, better known as Voltaire (1694–1778). Like the other *philosophes*, Voltaire was not a philosopher in the English sense of a profound, original and

systematic thinker. Rather he was a popularizer of ideas, an inspired journalist, whose tireless and sarcastic pen never rested. The ninety volumes of his collected writings show him in every mood from delicate irony to thunderous denunciation and fully explain why he found it necessary to pass much of his life beyond the borders of France. Against the theologians in particular Voltaire delighted to turn the flood of his mockery. He was the self-appointed champion of all victims of bigotry and injustice and he made Europe a court which rang with his appeals. Religion had originated long before priests, he believed, but it had been exploited ever since "the first knave met the first fool." To break the power of a corrupt and intolerant priestcraft Voltaire considered a service to humanity; he raised the battle cry, *écrasez l'infâme!* (destroy the infamous thing!) insistently, for to him organized religion symbolized all that was stupid, irrational, and degrading in the old régime. A "natural religion," he pointed out, was one that would "enjoin us to serve our neighbors through love of God," but we had been led by intolerance and bigotry into the monstrous error of "persecuting and butchering them to His greater glory."


Voltaire

Scarcely less influential than Voltaire was Denis Diderot (1713–84), who edited an encyclopedia to which almost all the philosophers contributed. The encyclopedia proved an arsenal of arguments for the rationalist cause and was completed in 1765 after repeated efforts had been made to suppress it by the clergy and the censors. While avoiding controversial subjects as far as possible, the encyclopedists wrote to convince the thoughtful reader that science, and the growth of a tolerant spirit, had contributed more to the happiness of mankind than the tenets of a thousand warring religious faiths. Theological doctrines were not excluded from the work, nor were they openly combated, but they were overshadowed and robbed of significance by the space and emphasis devoted to more practical and secular matters.

Diderot

No evil stirred the philosophers more profoundly than the inequality of the laws, for they were almost all members of the Third Estate and resented the immunities enjoyed by the privileged orders. Also, they had personal grievances, for several of them (like Voltaire) had been imprisoned for audacious writing, or (like Diderot) had seen their books burned by order of the censor. Furthermore, the spectacle of criminals going to execution was a constant reminder of the barbarous codes in force. In 1764, an Italian *philosophe*, the Marquis Beccaria, published *An Essay on Crimes and Punishments*,

Beccaria



Photograph, courtesy of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston

VOLTAIRE
1694–1778

Jean François Marie Arouet, better known by his pen-name, Voltaire, was the most brilliant and versatile writer of the eighteenth century. In this likeness of him, the sculptor, Jean-Antoine Houdon, has managed to suggest the keenness of wit, self-conceit, and genius for mockery which made Voltaire a tireless critic of the irrational customs and stupid abuses of the Old Régime.

in which he denounced the use of torture and the infliction of cruel and outmoded punishments. Beccaria even ventured to urge the abolition of the death penalty, arguing that "crimes are more effectively prevented by the *certainty* than the *severity* of the punishment." His essay was translated into several European languages and exerted a strong influence on theories of criminal jurisprudence.

The physiocrats

In view of the disorder prevailing in the national finances, it is not surprising that some of the philosophers were attracted to problems of political economy. François Quesnay (1694–1774), court physician to Louis XV, became the leader of a group of thinkers known as the physiocrats because they believed all governments should conform to "the natural order of things." They regarded most legislation as a curse rather than a benefit, insisting that trade, for instance, developed most vigorously when least interfered with, since artificial regulations constricted it. Hence, "To govern better, govern less." The mercantilist theory that a state grew wealthy by accumulating gold they declared unsound; the wealth of a society was the *produit net*, the surplus of agricultural, mineral, and other natural products accruing from the labor of its citizens. Agriculture they considered the most vital interest of a nation and they believed it important to improve the lot of the French peasantry because "poor peasants make a poor kingdom."

To dedicate oneself to the task of rooting out abuses and destroying the obstacles to human happiness is a noble adventure. The philosophers liked to think of themselves as knights-errant of humanity, and could be flattered to tears at the picture of a grateful posterity raising a statue to their memory. They did not doubt that mankind was on the threshold of a new age, in which right reason would triumph, and all citizens would enjoy their natural and imprescriptible right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Some oversanguine dreamers even anticipated the installation of a Utopian society which would assure prosperity and contentment to all classes under laws so reasonable and so just that the people "could not choose but be good."

Faith in "natural law"

This hope of achieving social harmony was based in part on the deepening reverence for natural law. It seemed impossible that Nature, or Nature's God, could have *intended* confusion and disorder to reign in human affairs, for the rest of the universe, to the orbit of the farthest star, obeyed majestic and inflexible laws. There must be a *natural* order of society, the principles of which had been lost or ignored, and it was the business of the legislators to regenerate society by discovering and applying

these natural principles. Once enunciated, the new precepts would be accepted by all right-thinking people. Some of these natural and axiomatic laws the philosophers believed they had already discovered, but they lacked the authority to put them into force. They appealed, therefore, to the princes of Europe, urging them to employ their despotic authority to inaugurate the new régime. So successful was the appeal, and so readily did the rulers lend an ear to the proposed program, that in 1768 Diderot declared enthusiastically, "There is no prince in Europe who is not also a philosopher." Monarchy was to have a last chance to justify itself as "enlightened despotism."

5. THE ENLIGHTENED DESPOTS

The European rulers of the eighteenth century were for the most part earnest and benevolent princes. In recognition of their high sense of responsibility, and their sincere desire to improve the lot of their subjects, they have been styled the "enlightened despots," and the middle and later years of the eighteenth century constitute "the monarchs' age of repentance." These princes strove to undo in one century the mistakes their ancestors had committed in five. Had they succeeded, benevolent despotism might still be accepted as the ideal form of government in Europe, but their intelligence was not equal to their intentions, and several of them, in their attempts to improve matters, ended by making them worse.

Frederick the Great of Prussia

The most brilliant exponent of enlightened despotism was Frederick II of Prussia (1740–86). Many of his reforms anticipated the writings of the philosophers, and, although he delighted to honor these illustrious thinkers whom he called the "masters of princes," his success as a ruler was due less to their advice than to his own practical sense, his energy, and his genius for administration. The improvements he wrought in Prussia have already been described,[1] as well as his military triumphs which won him the title of "the Great."

Catherine II of Russia

Catherine II of Russia and her attempts to pose as an enlightened despot have also been mentioned, as well as the obstacles which vitiated her reforming zeal.[2] The admiration which Catherine felt for the philosophers, and the interest she took in their recommendations, led her to invite several of them to her court. But Catherine, like Frederick II, was a practicing politician rather than a

[1] See above, pages 612–20.

[2] See above, pages 604–09.

political theorist, and she never made the mistake of regarding the philosophers as seriously as they regarded themselves.

The most sincere and least successful of this group of benevolent princes was the Emperor Joseph II of Austria (1780–90). It was Joseph's ambition to transform the disunited Hapsburg possessions into a centralized military state on the Prussian model. His program embraced many admirable reforms; he wished to liberate the serfs, codify the laws, balance the budget, and stimulate trade; but his personality and his methods stirred up a surprising opposition. "Joseph always wishes to take the second step before he has taken the first," was the shrewd judgment of Frederick the Great. In Belgium, Hungary, and the Tyrol the people revolted against the emperor's proposals to unify the imperial administration and make German the official language. The nobles resented his attacks upon their privileges, Pope Pius VI protested against his interference in religious affairs, and the jurists criticized his attempt to improve the legal code. Even his councilors grew discontented and insolent. The mounting opposition only increased Joseph's determination. "The father of a family," he declared, "who holds the welfare of his children at heart, must not allow himself to be turned from a salutary course because of ill-judged complaints."

Joseph II of Austria

Failure attended his foreign no less than his domestic policies. An attempt to exchange the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria was frustrated by Frederick the Great who was ever vigilant to combat any extension of Austrian power in the Germanies. Seeking aggrandizement in another direction, Joseph allied himself with Catherine of Russia and commenced a war with the Turks in 1788. Lacking military talent, he met with reverses, and in 1789, broken in health, he returned to Vienna to die. The thought of his failures obsessed him and in his last months he withdrew all his reforms. "Here lies Joseph II" was the epitaph he composed for himself, "who, with the best intentions, was unsuccessful in everything that he undertook." The judgment of history has been more generous. Peasants long remembered him as their friend, and Protestants and Jews in Austria blessed his memory for his tolerance in lightening the restrictions under which non-Catholics labored.

Of the lesser European states, scarcely one escaped the rough hand of the reformer in the eighteenth century. In Spain the conscientious Charles III (1759–88) curbed the power of the Inquisition and expelled the Jesuits from the kingdom (1767). Religious bigotry, lawlessness, and economic decay were too deeply rooted

Spain and Portugal

in Spanish life to be extirpated in a single reign, but Charles sought by wise legislation to reduce the effects of these evils. Like measures were pursued in the neighboring kingdom of Portugal by the autocratic Pombal, minister of Joseph I (1750–77). Pombal secured the expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal in 1759, and the Society of Jesus, already widely unpopular, was suppressed by a papal decree in 1773. It was Pombal's patriotic aspiration to reinvigorate the Portuguese Empire by sending the life blood of trade coursing once more through its enfeebled frame, but his arbitrary temper won him many enemies and he fell from power in 1777.

The prestige of Sweden, which had suffered eclipse in the great northern war,[1] was partially restored during the enlightened reign of Gustavus III (1771–92). This versatile monarch possessed a magnetic personality and labored with zest to reform the finances, improve agriculture, promote education and religious tolerance, and ameliorate the harshness of the laws. Unfortunately, he excited the opposition of various privileged groups, and in 1792 he was assassinated by some discontented nobles. *Sweden*

In Denmark-Norway,[2] Count Struensee, able minister of the king, Christian VII, likewise paid with his life for his presumptuous attempt to play the enlightened despot. As the power behind the throne from 1771 to 1772, Struensee reorganized the administration and attacked everything that was corrupt in the state of Denmark, until his enemies combined to impeach him and send him to the block. But the memory of his reforms survived him, for legitimate ideals and aspirations are more difficult to silence than their mortal advocates. *Denmark-Norway*

It was a curious anomaly that while French writers everywhere led the attack upon the abuses of the old régime, and French philosophers taught the princes of Europe the axioms of good government, the glaring evils in French administration went unreformed. Louis XV (1715–74) was too selfish and too indolent to work at the arduous rôle of enlightened despot, and his ministers contented themselves perforce with a policy of palliatives and expedients. The peasants continued to groan beneath the burden of their taxes, the bourgeoisie murmured, and the government debt mounted steadily, while the privileged few continued to revel in the golden splendors of the court like butterflies which dream the summer has no end. *France*

[1] See above, pages 600–01.


[2] The kingdoms of Denmark and Norway were united under the same crown from 1397 until 1814.

The accession of Louis XVI in 1774 brought a promise of better days, for one of his first acts was to appoint the able and courageous Turgot controller general of the finances. Turgot was a friend of the philosophers and favored many of the reforms which they had proposed. "Give me five years of despotism," is a saying attributed to him, "and France shall be free." The danger of insolvency he met with the bold policy: "No bankruptcy, no increase in taxation, no loans." Only a rigid curtailment of expenditures could make the plan a success, yet, when Turgot attempted to introduce economies in order to balance the budget, he created a host of enemies, from the extravagant young queen, Marie Antoinette, to the holder of the smallest sinecure. "There is no abuse that does not give someone a livelihood," he admitted bitterly, but he held to his course. Fresh opposition greeted his proposal to relieve the peasants of the hated *corvée* and to suppress the obstructive trade guilds; the clergy were unfriendly because he favored religious toleration; even the *parlement* of Paris, popular with the people because it was considered a check on royal absolutism, joined in blocking his reforms. Had Louis XVI supported him firmly, he might have fought his way through, but in 1776 his enemies won the king over and Turgot was dismissed after twenty months in office. "Do not forget, sire," was his final prophetic plea, "that it was weakness which brought the head of Charles I to the block." But Louis was too confused and too irresolute to profit by sage advice. Turgot's fall sealed the fate of the French monarchy, for under his successors in office the old expedients were revived, new loans were floated, expenditures increased, and the ship of state drifted steadily toward the rocks of revolution.

Turgot

6. ROUSSEAU AND THE DOCTRINE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

When intelligent Frenchmen saw the king and his ministers delay so long in carrying through the needed reforms, they began to ask themselves whether there was not some other authority in the state to which they might appeal. They knew that in the previous century the English people had grown impatient with their monarchy, had sent Charles I to execution (1649), and later had driven James II from his throne and kingdom (1688). These acts had shocked Europe in an age when almost everyone accepted the principle of the divine right of kings, and the English revolutionists had endeavored to justify their unconventional procedure. The philosopher John Locke (1632–1704)



JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
1712–78

The sensitivity, and the feeling of personal maladjustment, which made Rousseau the most eloquent critic of eighteenth-century society, with its artificialities and inequalities, are clearly discernible in this likeness of him.

argued very reasonably that governments were instituted by the people to protect their lives and property; that when a government failed to fulfill these functions, or a king abused his power, the sovereign people had the right to change their government for a better one. This was what the English had done in 1688–89 when they expelled the absolutist James II and invited William and Mary to reign in his place as constitutional monarchs.[1] They found comfort in Locke's doctrine, which assured them that, far from being rebels, they had in fact acted as honest and courageous citizens defending their natural rights.

John Locke did not originate this idea of the sovereignty of the people, but he was one of the first writers to present it clearly and make it popular. Any people desiring to throw off allegiance to an unpopular monarch could now find an argument to justify the act. In the American War of Independence, the "patriots" invoked Locke's philosophy to prove that the tyranny of George III had absolved the colonists from their allegiance to the English king, and that they were asserting no more than their "natural rights" in setting up an independent government. The idea that the people were not created to obey the king, but that kings were merely executive magistrates responsible to the sovereign people, was indeed a revolutionary concept. In France, where it was to precipitate the greatest revolution of all, the new philosophy found an eloquent advocate in one of the most moving and passionate spirits of the century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78)

Rousseau was born in Switzerland in 1712, but first achieved fame as a writer in Paris when he composed a prize essay in 1749. He followed this with several works wherein he attacked the evils of society and government, not coldly and rationally as more philosophical critics had done, but with a fresh and emotional style that charmed his readers. Rousseau's contempt for the frivolous and artificial society of the time was partly a defense to cover his morbid sensitiveness; his passion for quiet pastoral scenes and lonely walks verged on misanthropy, and his sympathy for the poor and unfortunate was sincere largely because they belonged to the one class he could find no reason to envy. To the *blasés* and superficial frequenters of the salons, however, his artistically written diatribes seemed outpourings of passionate honesty and they wrought a revolution in sentiment. Fine gentlemen neglected their cards and their dice to take lonely walks and commune with Nature, the queen and her ladies-in-waiting played at being dairymaids, and courtiers

[1] See above, pages 575–78.

and commoners alike began to cultivate deep but voluble emotions like the characters in Rousseau's novels.

Rousseau's Social Contract

In *The Social Contract* (1762) Rousseau formulated his philosophy of government, and pictured the state as a corporate body of citizens who subordinate their individual aims to the "general will." The sovereign power resides in the citizens, but it is indivisible, and the government derives its authority from the consent of the governed. The concept of the "general will" baffled many readers, but they applauded Rousseau for his fearless defense of popular sovereignty, and understood his meaning without difficulty when he wrote: "The depositors of the executive power are not the people's masters but its officers . . . it can set them up or pull them down when it likes."

The revolutionary nature of his doctrines brought Rousseau into trouble with the authorities and he was obliged to flee from France. But the ideas he had voiced and the criticism poured out by the *philosophes* continued to circulate through men's minds, dissolving like a subtle acid the presuppositions upon which the old régime was founded. By 1789, people had been so widely converted to the new philosophy that a great historian has ventured to declare: "The French Revolution was accomplished before it began."

Section C

THE ERA OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND NAPOLEON

(1789–1815)

The French people were the first to raise the cry of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and to challenge in radical fashion the right of a small group, the nobles and clergy, to enjoy wealth, privileges, and immunities while the vast majority of Frenchmen were shut out from such favors and from all political power. In 1789, *the leaders of the middle class prepared to sweep away the old régime with its inequalities and abuses, but they ended by sweeping away the French monarchy also, and plunged their newly proclaimed republic into a war with the rest of Europe. The issues at stake in this struggle, the fashion in which the revolution influenced neighboring states, and the succession of events which made Napoleon Bonaparte master of France, and of a great part of Europe, form the subject matter of this section. Although the revolution failed to usher in the social Utopia of which its early protagonists dreamed, it broke through the entrenchments of the old régime, liberated the middle classes in the greater part of the Continent from irritating disabilities and obsolete restrictions and the peasants from the burdens of an outmoded feudal servitude. The revolutionary years marked the appearance in Europe of a new social order in which the middle class, the bourgeoisie, were destined to hold the dominant position.*

CHAPTER TEN

THE FRENCH PEOPLE DESTROY THE RELICS OF FEUDALISM AND OVERTURN THE MONARCHY

The end of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance against oppression.

Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789).

WHEN revolutions occur, they do not necessarily break out in the most backward countries, or among the most miserable and most oppressed people. As explained in the foregoing chapter, the inequalities and restrictions of the old régime weighed upon the unprivileged classes in every state on the continent of Europe. As it happened, the French people were the first whom a sense of injustice and a desire for reform goaded into revolution, but the reason for this was not because the French were the most brutally governed or the most unhappy nation, but rather because they were the most enlightened and most eager for reform. The unprivileged classes in France toward the close of the eighteenth century were on the whole better treated than in some neighboring states, and in general their lot was improving. But for this very reason they were less disposed to tolerate abuses, less inclined to put their implicit trust in princes, and less willing to wait indefinitely for the reforms which their leading thinkers had propounded with so much brilliance and conviction.

1. THE STATES GENERAL IS SUMMONED

By 1788, the French monarchy was threatened with bankruptcy. All other expedients for raising money having failed, Louis XVI yielded to the advice of his councilors and agreed to convoke the ancient representative body of the French nation, the States General. His finance minister, Necker, announced the decision to the people as "a New Year's gift" for 1789, and it excited fervent enthusiasm. For the first time in nearly two centuries the French people were to be consulted on the management of their national affairs. When it was learned that the "good king" had agreed in addition to grant the Third Estate double representation, the people "bathed the edict with tears of gratitude."

One hundred and seventy-five years had passed since the previous

meeting of the States General in 1614. Dusty records were searched to discover the forgotten modes of procedure, and royal instructions were issued to the puzzled electors. From February to May, 1789, the elections went forward, in orderly fashion for the most part, although all classes of the nation were stirred by the flood of pamphlets and the passionate debates. They were stirred, too, by a spirit of loyalty to the king, their friend and counselor, and by a spirit of generosity which infected even the privileged orders. In this early and idealistic phase of the revolution the mutual enthusiasm frequently transcended class distinctions and some of the leading advocates of reform were men of noble birth. The Marquis de Lafayette, for instance, had fought in the American War of Independence, and had waited impatiently for the day when he might aid the French people also to gain their rights and liberties.

The cahiers

While choosing delegates the electors of the three orders, in each town or parish, were permitted to draw up instructions for them. The king had invited the people to list their grievances, and the result was a flood of memorials filled with advice, complaints, and remonstrances, which are known as the *cahiers*. The peasants begged for relief from the salt tax, from the hated *corvée* or forced labor on the roads, from the destruction wrought by the hunting privileges of the nobles, and from the feudal dues paid to the overlord. Men of the middle class had other grievances: the law courts were costly and often corrupt, trade and industry were checked by stupid restrictions, all high offices in the army, the church, and the government were reserved for the sons of noblemen. The *cahiers* suggest that the twenty-four or twenty-five million Frenchmen who constituted the Third Estate were in substantial agreement: (1) that the privileged orders, the clergy and nobles, would have to surrender their immunities and pay their full share of the taxes, and (2) that France must have a definitive constitution, a written charter of liberties which would limit the irresponsible powers of the government, guarantee each citizen against arbitrary arrest, assure him justice in the courts and protection of his life and property. On the other hand, the nobles and clergy, while approving the convocation of the States General, were disposed to argue that France already possessed an unwritten constitution sanctioned by custom and precedent. They favored some revision and minor concessions, but they expected to remain in a position to safeguard their interests and preserve their social preeminence.

As the spring approached, Louis XVI viewed with mounting dis-

trust the wave of popular enthusiasm that his proclamation had called forth. Even his liberal minister, Necker, the idol of those who prayed for reform, was alarmed by the spirit of lawlessness that burst out frequently into acts of violence. *Divided aims at court* Many of the courtiers who surrounded Louis in his palace at Versailles were hostile to the idea of change, and warned him not to make any definite promises. To them, the convocation of the States General was merely an expedient to raise money. If more gold could be found to grease the wheels, they felt certain that the old machine of government would run smoothly enough. But the friends of reform in the royal council had another aim. They hoped to use the indignation of the people as a threat whereby they could compel the nobles and clergy to tax themselves, and to this view they had more or less converted Louis. Tired of the selfishness of the privileged orders, he was prepared to coerce them a little, but his ideas went no further than that. If he could have brought himself to recognize the force of the popular movement, have deserted the elegant but useless nobility, and gone over whole-heartedly to the side of the Third Estate, he might have saved his throne. But such a step was no part of his program.

The truth is, he had no definite program. Slow-witted, irresolute, and unmanageable, Louis XVI was tragically unfit to command in a time of crisis. He had virtues of a high order, physical courage, morality, genuine religious conviction, and deep affection for his family. As a private citizen he might have rounded out an obscure and honorable life; but he had neither talent nor liking for the business of kingship. In council he found it difficult to keep awake; pageants and parades bored him; his chief enthusiasm was hunting, and his chief aptitude leaned apparently toward mechanics. Because he was troubled with a conscience he endeavored spasmodically to fulfill the duties of royalty, but he had neither the will nor the interest to sustain long the rôle which he had inherited and could not resign. *Louis XVI*

On the queen, Marie Antoinette, more severe judgments have been passed. Beautiful, extravagant, and indiscreet, she made herself the center of a coterie at court and the object of considerable scandal. By birth she was a daughter of Maria Theresa, and she had been betrothed to Louis to strengthen the Austro-French alliance which dated from the Seven Years' War.[1] The alliance had never been popular in France and neither was the Austrian-born queen. Her interference in affairs of state helped to split the court into cabals, *Marie Antoinette*

[1] See above, pages 614–16.

whereby the queen, the king's brothers (the Count of Provence and the Count of Artois), and the ministers of state conspired and maneuvered to control the vacillating mind of Louis to their own advantage. This was a tiresome task, and as difficult, the Count of Provence admitted, as holding together a handful of oiled ivory balls. For Louis it was a species of martyrdom that drove him on occasion into fits of irrational obstinacy. His moods added the final erratic touch to policies already enfeebled by duplicities and contradictions.

2. THE STATES GENERAL MEETS

On May 5, 1789, the deputies of the three estates assembled at Versailles to hear the proposals of the king and his ministers. In a short speech by Louis and a long speech by Necker, they were lectured on a fact which they already knew: that the government was faced by a financial crisis. But concerning the question of reforms and a constitution nothing definite was said; and the problem of the vote "by order" or the vote "by head" was left unsettled. For the Third Estate this last was a vital issue. Hitherto, the three estates, when assembled, had been in the habit of meeting separately, and presenting their separate petitions and responses to the throne. If this rule were maintained, the deputies of the Third Estate, although they represented over ninety-five per cent of the nation, might find themselves opposed and outvoted by the two privileged chambers. They had hoped that the "good king," in doubling their representation, had intended the deputies of the three orders to sit together and vote their decisions by head, for in a single chamber the six hundred delegates of the Third Estate, with the aid of friendly nobles and priests, would hold an assured majority. But this, they gathered, was not to be, and they left the royal session with a sense of injury and disappointment.

Vote "by head" or "by order"?

Sullenly they declined to organize as a separate body. Twice they invited the nobles and clergy to meet with them. The offers were declined, but on June 13 three parish priests joined them. Others followed, and on June 17 the Third Estate took a momentous step: it proclaimed itself the National Assembly. The whole theory of a democratic revolution was implied in this step which set the dignity of numbers against the dignity of caste. Two days later, a majority of the clergy voted for fusion, and some of the nobles were yielding. The reactionaries at court decided to call a halt to these irregular proceedings. On the morning

The Tennis Court Oath (June 20, 1789)

of June 20, when the deputies of the Third Estate assembled for their daily debates, they found their meeting-place closed while carpenters prepared it for a royal session to be held on the twenty-second. Alarm and indignation seized the representatives. Believing that their session had been intentionally prevented, they hastened to an indoor tennis court nearby, determined to hold it there. On the proposal of Mounier, one of their number, they swore that they would not separate, and would meet whenever necessary, until they had given France a constitution. This was the famous Tennis Court Oath of June 20, 1789.

Louis, under pressure from conservative advisers, had resolved to be firm with his obstinate commoners. At the royal session held (a day late) on June 23, he scolded the deputies of the Third Estate for wasting time, and warned them that he might lose patience and send them home. There must be no further resistance to his decree. "Gentlemen," he stated in conclusion, in his rough, unmusical voice, "I command you to dismiss immediately, and to assemble tomorrow morning each in the chamber allotted to your order." He left the hall, the nobles and clergy followed, but the Third Estate remained, irresolute yet defiant. Before them appeared suddenly the master of ceremonies, the Duc de Brézé, to remind them of their duty. "Gentlemen, you have heard the king's intentions." Then the tempestuous Mirabeau, a noble born, but sitting as a deputy of the people, poured out the accumulated indignation of his colleagues upon the startled functionary. "Go tell your master," he thundered, "that we are here by the will of the people, and that only bayonets can drive us forth." De Brézé sought the king to learn his wishes; the regiments were within call; but Louis as always was unequal to a decision. He allowed the commoners to hold their ground in defiance of his expressed orders. It was the first step on a road which was to carry him within three years to the guillotine.

The specter of counter-revolution

It may be that Louis hesitated to call upon the soldiers because the government no longer trusted its own troops. Several of the regiments stationed in Paris had been infected with the revolutionary fever, and the soldiers declared openly that they would never fire upon the people. So four days after his unsuccessful attempt to overawe the deputies, Louis conceded their demands, and reversing his previous decision, he ordered the privileged classes to sit with the Third Estate. Meanwhile, fresh regiments were summoned to surround Paris, Swiss and German mercenaries whose discipline could be relied upon. By July 8, twenty thousand soldiers were encamped near Versailles, and the deputies of the Assembly,

watching in apprehension, petitioned the king to withdraw them. Louis responded that the troops were there only to repress disorderly members of society. If *they* felt alarmed, they could remove themselves to some other city. The deputies thought the reply ironic, but Louis was probably sincere. The queen and the Count of Artois had persuaded him that it was necessary to curb the growing riots, and he had yielded to the argument that a large body of troops would be the surest guaranty against bloodshed. Secretly, the Count of Artois was less sanguine and less squeamish. "If you want an omelet," he confided to a friend, "you must not be afraid of breaking eggs."

Philip of Orléans

Paris was in a ferment. Much still remains obscure regarding the disorder that spread among the people in the early days of July, but some historians have come to believe that anarchy was deliberately fostered. Rich bankers who had lent money to the government saw in the National Assembly the one power likely to stabilize the finances, and therefore urged the mob to defend it. There is some evidence to suggest that the food supplies in Paris were deliberately withheld, so that famine might add to the exasperation of the populace. One person who played a dubious rôle in the preliminaries to the revolt was the king's cousin, Philip, Duke of Orléans, the head of a collateral line of the Bourbons descended from Louis XIII. Orléans early espoused the people's cause and made the gardens of his residence, the Palais Royal, a rendezvous for the politically disaffected. Some of his adherents hoped to set him on the throne if Louis XVI were forced to abdicate, and they purposely aggravated the general discontent to further this end. It is unwise, however, to overemphasize such influences. Throughout the revolution there were many men who, like Orléans, sought to fish for their own advantage in the troubled waters. But the movement was too vast and too complicated to be charged to the designs of any individual, and the conspirator who attempted to control it for his own profit found himself in the position of a man who has summoned up an earthquake to grind his axe.

On the eleventh of July, the king, who had come under the influence of the reactionaries, curtly dismissed Necker and three other liberal ministers. The news stunned the Assembly, where the most radical deputies saw the shades of a prison house already closing about them. They protested earnestly, they debated eloquently, but they were bitterly depressed, for they knew that in reality they were powerless against a royal *coup d'état*. On the populace of Paris the news had a more stimulating effect. For weeks dark rumors had been spreading that the court planned a Saint Bartholomew's Massacre of the patriots,

and through the hot July days the storm of revolt had been gathering. With the news of Necker's overthrow it burst.

3. THE CAPTURE OF THE BASTILLE

Word of Necker's dismissal reached Paris on July 12. At the Palais Royal a young journalist, Camille Desmoulins, harangued the people on their danger and the alarm spread rapidly. Mobs began to pillage the gunshops to secure arms, and were joined by mutinous soldiers from a friendly regiment, the French Guards. At the Hôtel de Ville a new municipal government organized itself, with the backing of the middle class, in an effort to curb the mounting anarchy. A civic militia, later to become famous as the National Guard, was created to patrol the streets, for many better-class Parisians felt with reason that they had as much to fear from the thieves and cutthroats running loose with the mobs as from the disciplined soldiery of a kindly though ill-advised king. The establishment of this illegal communal government, with a Parisian deputy, Bailly, as mayor, was the bourgeois reply to the mob violence on the one hand and the court project for a *coup d'état* on the other.

In their search for arms and powder the emissaries of the people, on the morning of July 14, demanded entrance to the prison of the Bastille. This ancient castle of the king was garrisoned by over a hundred soldiers; grim and ill-omened, it stood in the midst of a more modern Paris, a fit symbol of the old régime, with frowning walls and narrow dungeons, in the depths of which innocent victims of the royal displeasure were believed to languish. When the commander, De Launay, courteously declined to lower the drawbridge, the anger of the mob crystallized. An assault began and was carried on with considerable loss to the besiegers. The garrison could have held out, but agreed to capitulate, and the mob streamed in. Only seven prisoners, and none of them altogether innocent, were discovered, and De Launay and some of his men were massacred after they had been disarmed. This rather ugly episode of mob violence was immediately embroidered with legends and became one of the vital myths of the revolution. *July 14, 1789*

The first news of the storming of the Bastille filled the National Assembly with deeper gloom. Nevertheless, the lawless citizens, by their audacity, had broken the force of the counter-revolution. Warned by the outbreaks, the Count of Artois left France, and a number of conservative nobles followed. The council of state was reorganized

and Necker recalled to office. Realizing their debt to the populace whose violent intervention had saved them, the deputies resolved to applaud an act which filled many of them with secret misgiving; and they even condoned the butchery of defenseless men. "Was the blood that they have shed then so pure?" one deputy named Barnave demanded. Before long many of these legislators were to find smooth phrases for still less agreeable facts, and to speak unctuously of the salutary justice of the people, and the need of watering the tree of liberty from time to time with the blood of tyrants.


Louis condones revolt

On July 17, Louis XVI paid a visit to his rebellious capital. He came in peace, once more the "good king," and he donned a red, white, and blue cockade to signify his acquiescence in the recent developments. The crowds, suspicious at first, cheered him when he reached the Hôtel de Ville, and restored him to a sort of conditional popularity. Had he possessed the art or the acumen he might still have deserted the privileged orders who were deserting him, have flung aside his empty feudal title of King of France, and become the King of the French, but the rôle was beyond his skill. He had taught the bourgeois to distrust him and had driven them into an alliance with the common people, an alliance fraught with grave implications, which threatened to carry the revolution farther than the average bourgeois had any real desire to see it go.

4. THE DESTRUCTION OF FEUDALISM AND THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN

"The Great Fear"

Not only in Paris, but everywhere throughout France, revolts seemed to break out spontaneously in the spring and summer of 1789. The storming of the Bastille gave this progressive disintegration of order a swift impulsion. The fabric of society appeared visibly to rend itself apart and the structure of government threatened to dissolve in the rising tide of anarchy. The peasants, many of whom had imagined that their feudal dues had been abolished with the election of deputies, grew impatient at the delay and rose to reckon with their masters, dragging out the records of their obligations in order to burn them, and sometimes burning the lord's château as well. Reports spread that bands of brigands were abroad; in some villages the inhabitants armed themselves for self-protection while in others they locked themselves in at nightfall, oppressed by a terror so vague yet so widespread that it has been called "The Great Fear." Without doubt, under cover of the disorder and dismay, real brigands



STORMING OF THE BASTILLE

The Bastille, part of which dated from the fourteenth century, was a gloomy fortress and prison standing in the suburb of old Paris known as the Faubourg St. Antoine. As political and other prisoners were sometimes confined in its dungeons, the edifice acquired a sinister reputation, and the Parisians, looking up at its frowning walls, may well have come to regard it as a symbol of the Old Régime. There is no proof, however, that the mob which attacked it on July 14, 1789, *had any motive beyond the desire to procure arms. When, after a short defense, the commander agreed to capitulate, he and several of the garrison were massacred by the mob. This dubious episode was transformed into a heroic legend by revolutionary poets and orators, because it symbolized so satisfactorily the popular idea that the French people had risen in generous wrath and freed the victims of tyranny. As a matter of fact, only seven prisoners were discovered in the Bastille, all of whom had been sentenced to jail for adequate reasons.*

were active; but in most cases the violence was a consequence of the illimitable expectations of the spring, of the hopes of reform too long deferred, and of the economic hardships which the political disruption had augmented.

Session of August 4–5

By the opening days of August reports of these disturbances were pouring into the Assembly from all quarters. To the anxious deputies it seemed as if the whole of France was lurid with the light of burning châteaux. Among the great landowners the conviction was growing that it would be a wise and humane move to surrender their personal privileges voluntarily, but they hoped to obtain adequate compensation for their real rights. On the night of August 4, while the Assembly was debating measures to calm the provinces, the Viscount de Noailles proposed that the nobles should renounce their seignorial privileges and so abolish the injustice of the feudal system by a single edict. Even the conservative leaders of the privileged orders were prepared to make some concessions, but as the evening advanced enthusiasm swept the Assembly into a series of extraordinary decrees which constituted the death warrant of the feudal system. Nobles vied with churchmen in renouncing traditional rights and immunities, but personal calculations were not entirely forgotten. The landlords anticipated financial compensation for their losses, and many consoled themselves with the thought that the peasant outbreaks had reduced their prerogatives to a dead letter in any case. At dawn, the deputies, with an enthusiasm as sincere as it was illogical, proclaimed Louis XVI the Restorer of French Liberties, and dispersed to their lodgings, drunk with fatigue and emotion.

The legislation of August 4 extended the scope of the revolution and added a social and economic program to the political reforms. For in abolishing feudal obligations, suppressing serfdom and the game laws, commuting taxes such as the *aides*, the *gabelle*, and the *tithe*, and proposing civil equality, equality of taxation, and an equal opportunity for public service to all Frenchmen, the National Assembly transformed the French people from subjects to citizens. If the full implications of these decrees were carried into effect, it meant the end of the old social system with its corporate groups and classes vested with special rights, and the end of the old economic system with its guilds, industrial monopolies, and feudal prerogatives. Finally, it meant that the National Assembly would have to prolong its session indefinitely in order to draft the detailed legislation required to carry through this complicated program.

Humanity, which had lost its birthrights, was now on the way to

recover them, and it seemed wise that they should be written down for all men to read. In the remaining days of August the deputies prepared a table which listed the inalienable rights of free citizens. The formulas chosen for this famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen were suggested in part by English and American models, and were permeated by the democratic philosophy of Rousseau. Every citizen was declared to be born free. He could not be arrested or imprisoned except by due process of law, and in the making of the laws which he had to obey he was entitled to participate directly or indirectly, since a valid law was the expression of the general will. Furthermore, the citizen was entitled to enjoy religious liberty and freedom of speech and of the press. All officials who helped to govern a state were the responsible servants of the sovereign people, and if they abused their trust, the people had the right to resist and to depose them, however exalted their rank. It is unnecessary to point out the conflict between such teaching and the theories of absolute despotism. The Assembly had traveled far in four months, but the philosophers had been preparing the ground for over forty years.

Declaration of the Rights of Man

The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was intended to serve as a preface to the constitution upon which the deputies were busily laboring. In the debates on this subject, however, certain differences of opinion had already betrayed themselves, suggestive of a cleavage between the ideals of the people of moderate wealth and the poorer folk who owned no property. The middle class, the bourgeoisie, desired the revolution to stop short with political and legal reforms, which would leave them in charge of a responsible constitutional monarchy. But the laborers in the towns and the peasants in the fields had been inspired by radicals and demagogues to hope for a social revolution, which would introduce a genuine egalitarianism. They had a confused idea that men were to be equal, not only in rights and liberties, but in education, in opportunity, and even in wealth. Among the deputies themselves there were some ecstatic dreamers who believed that it was possible by enlightened edicts to legislate poverty and ignorance out of existence, and to render all citizens virtuous and happy. Men engaged in a herculean effort, such as a war or a revolution, are often seduced by vague and shining ideals which help to blind them to the uglier aspects of the work they have to do. The French Revolution produced more than one leader who was prepared, in his attempt to construct a Utopia, to sacrifice his own head and a hundred thousand others with it. To

Divisions within the Third Estate

such men, and to the credulous masses which heeded them, the revolution could not fail to bring the bitterness of disillusionment.

5. THE MARCH TO VERSAILLES

The fever in Paris, which had been eased a little by the blood-letting in July, threatened to mount again with the autumn. The National Guard, under the command of the Marquis de Lafayette, endeavored to hold the riotous elements of the populace in check, but the news from Versailles was disturbing. Louis, it was learned, had again been corrupted by evil counsels. He had withheld his approval to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and was furtively concentrating troops. In the last week of September, the Flanders Regiment arrived, and the officers demonstrated their loyalty to the king by trampling under foot the tricolor cockade of the Revolution. Marat, a popular leader and the editor of a journal called *The Friend of the People*, rushed out to Versailles to investigate for himself the truth of these rumors, and returned filled with alarm, "making as much noise," his fellow journalist Desmoulins wittily averred, "as four trumpets on the Day of Judgment." The crowds were ready to follow any leader, for back of these inflammable rumors was the hard reality of hunger, to render men and women furious at a king who vacillated and an assembly which theorized, while starvation stalked the streets. If the king dwelt in Paris, it was argued, instead of twelve miles away in Versailles, he would understand better the needs of his people and do something to alleviate them.

Accordingly, on October 5, an unorganized mob composed largely of women started a march to Versailles to petition the king to reduce the price of bread. Louis made gracious promises, but the crowd remained encamped near the palace. In the evening Lafayette arrived with the National Guard, but the precautions which he took were insufficient to prevent assassins slipping into the palace before dawn in an unsuccessful attempt to murder the queen. The majority of the visitors, however, had no murderous intentions; they were appeased and gratified when Lafayette, acting a doubtful rôle as intermediary, persuaded the royal family to return with them to Paris, and they escorted the carriage back on the morning of October 6, shouting that they had brought with them "the Baker, the Baker's wife, and the Baker's little boy." By noon, Louis had taken up his residence at the Tuileries, in the heart of his capital. Thenceforward he was to be a hostage of the people.

This removal from Versailles to Paris exercised a profound effect upon the course of the revolution. For the National Assembly considered it expedient to follow the king, and a long bare riding-school near the Tuileries, the Salle de Manège, was furnished for its sessions. With its rows of mounting benches sweeping around the walls, and a cleared space in the center, the new home of the Assembly suggested an arena, and such it was to prove. In the upper galleries space was provided for visitors, and the common people soon swarmed there, to criticize the debates and applaud vigorously their favorite orators. During more than one grave crisis, in the days that were approaching, groups of disorderly onlookers, full of brandy and patriotism, were to render calm deliberation impossible and force the Assembly to measures from which a majority of the deputies secretly recoiled.

6. THE CIVIL CONSTITUTION OF THE CLERGY

The threat of bankruptcy, which had led to the convocation of the States General, proved one of the most difficult problems which faced the Assembly. In the general confusion taxes could not be collected, and the Assembly found it necessary to borrow over two million livres for current expenses. The economic plight of the government drove the deputies to undertake a measure which proved in many respects a serious mistake. The lands held by the church and by the various monastic orders in France were valued at about three billion livres, which was approximately the amount of the national debt. On November 2, 1789, the Assembly decided to appropriate these lands for the needs of the nation, and to issue paper currency, or assignats, for which the church property would serve as security.

Having in this way relieved the clergy of their wealth and their income, the Assembly then assumed responsibility for their support. As part of the political program, France was to be cut up into some eighty-three new *départements*, and the ancient ecclesiastical dioceses were reconstituted to coincide with these new divisions. Priests and bishops became salaried servants of the state, and were to be chosen by election like other public officials, which meant that Huguenots, Jews, freethinkers, and other non-Catholics might help to choose them. Monks and nuns were urged to forsake their cloisters and find some secular occupation. All members of the clergy were required to swear an oath that they accepted the new settlement which was styled "The Civil Constitution of the Clergy," and those who refused were deprived

"The Civil Constitution of the Clergy"

of their offices and persecuted as non-jurors (French *jurer*, to swear). The civil constitution turned half the French clergy into non-jurors, and also made many laymen bitter opponents of the revolution. Unfortunately, too, the confiscation of the church property failed to solve the financial problems of the state, for the land sold slowly, and the assignats, which were issued with reckless prodigality, declined in value to fifty, then to thirty, and by 1795, to less than two per cent of their face value. However, the paper money helped somewhat to provide for government expenses during a critical period, and the sale of the lands, though slow, gradually created a class of landowners who could be counted upon to support the revolution because the restoration of the old régime would have meant the loss of their newly acquired estates. In its final effects this break-up of the landed estates and the transference of ownership to members of the middle and lower classes was perhaps the most significant change wrought by the revolution, and, coupled with the ultimate abolition of all feudal dues without redemption in July, 1793, it dissolved the economic foundations upon which the old régime had rested.

7. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791

The members of the National Assembly had sworn in the Tennis Court Oath (June 20, 1789) to provide France with a constitution. The main features were settled in 1789, and by the spring of 1791 the momentous document, which was to transform France from an absolute to a limited monarchy, was completed. The powers which the king had formerly exercised were transferred to a legislative assembly elected by the people. Louis was no longer to make laws or to collect taxes. He lost his right to appoint and dismiss at will the local administrative officials throughout France, for henceforth these men were to be elected by the people and paid by the nation. Nor could he declare war or make peace without the vote of the legislative assembly which represented the nation. This assembly was to consist of a single chamber, the members of which were to be chosen by election every two years, and the king had no power to dissolve it. A few rights, however, had been left to him. He could choose the ministers who composed his council; could supervise the conduct of foreign affairs; and might veto a law passed by the assembly if he disapproved of it. His veto, though termed suspensive, was all but absolute, for a law had to pass three successive legislatures to become effective in the face of his opposition.

The monarchy limited

Thus, in less than two years, the nobles had been stripped of their privileges, the church of its wealth, and the king of the greater part of his authority, which had passed to the representatives of the nation. Yet the nation as a whole was not satisfied. The humbler classes, the people who had no wealth or property, were beginning to suspect that they were being cheated, that the Revolution was not destined to fulfill their hopes. The new constitution established liberty for all, but it did not establish equality. Despite the assurance of the Declaration of Rights that every Frenchman was entitled to assist, directly or indirectly, in the making of the laws, the people found that only those citizens who paid a direct tax equal to three days' wages were to be given a vote, while none but citizens of comparative wealth would be eligible to sit in the legislative assembly. Popular leaders were quick to point out that under such a constitution the middle class would control the government. Some radicals even went so far as to denounce the deputies of the National Assembly as traitors, because they had betrayed the interests of the people as a whole into the power of the propertied classes.

Persistence of discontent

To a certain extent this charge was justified. The members of the National Assembly were nearly all middle-class men, loyal to their group and its traditions. Many of them sincerely believed the most ignorant class of citizens unfit, without further training, to exercise the responsibility of electors. "The veil that hides the dazzling figure of Liberty," they argued, "must not be torn away too suddenly." In the early days of the revolution, the deputies of the National Assembly had allied themselves with the people through fear of the court; but after the relics of feudalism had been destroyed and the royal power reduced, the middle class, the bourgeoisie, was left supreme in the state. The Constitution of 1791 represented an attempt of the bourgeoisie to arrest and stabilize the revolution at this point. The attempt failed (1) because Louis XVI was untrustworthy and hated the rôle of a constitutional monarch; (2) because the Parisian populace was determined to see the revolution continue until it brought equality as well as liberty; and (3) because a radical minority in the new assembly, as well as counter-revolutionaries in France or in exile, and the apprehensive princes of Europe, all desired (though for different reasons) to see the settlement fail.

The power of the middle class

Although Louis had accepted the reforms which had been forced upon him, he was not reconciled to them. On June 21, 1791, when their labors were almost completed, the deputies of the National As-

sembly were dismayed to learn that the king had fled from Paris. His plan was to join with loyal troops in the east and north of France, win the support of the provinces, and return to his capital as master once more. Such a step had been suggested to him earlier by the great orator Mirabeau, who had been brought secretly into the pay of the court. But Mirabeau died in April, 1791, and Louis had no other adviser with sufficient statesmanship to manage the project. The attempt at escape miscarried; the royal family were recognized *en route* and arrested at Varennes; and within a week they were brought back to Paris as prisoners.

The flight to Varennes

The deputies of the Assembly were in a quandary. Their new constitution called for a king; if they definitely deposed Louis and set up a regency or a republic, the move might throw the revolution into the hands of the people. For the moment they compromised by suspending the king from his functions. When a crowd assembled on the Champ de Mars, on July 17, to petition for the removal of the king, the National Guard dispersed it with musketry. The Assembly, growing daily more conservative, decreed that Louis should be restored to his throne, and that there should be no further change in the constitution for at least ten years. Confident that these measures would check the democratic movement, the deputies resigned their places, and closed their last session with the announcement (ironic prophecy) that the revolution was at an end.

Republic or monarchy?

Their labors had earned them the right to rest. In a session of a little over two years the National (Constituent) Assembly had inaugurated the most startling program of destruction and reconstruction in modern history. (1) It had decreed the doom of feudalism and serfdom in France, although the liquidation of the old system remained incomplete. (2) It had obliterated the old, bewildering patchwork of provincial, judicial, fiscal, and ecclesiastical divisions in France and replaced them by eighty-three approximately equal departments. (3) It had suppressed the chaos of the conflicting legal tribunals, *parlements*, and feudal courts which had complicated the administration of justice under the old régime, and supplanted them by a graduated system of judicial courts with elected judges. (4) It had stripped the church and the monastic orders of their wealth and power and made the clergy the servants of the state. (5) It had relieved an absolute monarch of the greater share of his authority and confided it to an assembly of the sovereign people. The following months were to decide whether the revolution could be arrested at this point.

Achievements of the National Assembly (1789–91)

8. THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (1791–92)

The retiring deputies of the National Assembly had decreed themselves ineligible for immediate re-election, with the result that the new legislature was composed very largely of obscure men with little political training. They arrived in Paris, as one observer noted, "discontented to find the farce over and the curtain down," for many of them "were eager to win glory by destroying something" — an ominous portent, since there was nothing great left that they could destroy except the throne. From its first sessions the Legislative Assembly found itself divided into a party of the Right, which sought to preserve the constitutional settlement, and a party of the Left, which criticized the king and sought to lead the revolution into greater extremes. Among the leaders of the Left were several brilliant young deputies from the Department of the Gironde, and from them the whole group, which was aggressive in its tactics and republican in its sentiments, came to be known as the "Gironde" and its adherents as the "Girondists."

Opening of the revolutionary war (1792)

The most momentous step which the Legislative Assembly took was to plunge France into a war with Austria and Prussia in the spring of 1792. The first reforms of the revolution had been greeted with applause from all parts of Europe, but as the months passed this early approval changed to doubt and then to hostility. Three issues in particular provoked ill-feeling between France and her neighbors. (1) The *émigrés* (French royalists who had "emigrated") found refuge chiefly in the Germanies, where they plotted a counter-revolution and intrigued for foreign aid. (2) The abolition of feudal tenure deprived some German landlords of their rights in Alsace and they demanded compensation. (3) The National Assembly, at the request of the citizens of Avignon, had annexed that city to France (1790), although it was a part of the papal possessions. When Austria and Prussia joined in a demand for satisfaction on the last two points, the Girondists decided upon a war. "It may be," one deputy opined complacently, "that the revolution has need of a war to consolidate it." The struggle so light-heartedly begun was destined to last, with breathing spells, for twenty-three years, and before it ended France was to send her armies through the capitals of all her enemies on the continent of Europe.

With the outbreak of hostilities the position of the royal hostages in Paris became desperate. The Girondists openly accused the king

and queen of sympathizing with the enemy, and the charge had a basis of truth. Louis hoped that the invaders would hasten to Paris and restore his powers, and Marie Antoinette transmitted information concerning the French plans to her Austrian fellow countrymen. Excitement and suspicion flamed up in Paris at the news of French reverses, and on June 20, 1792, a rowdy mob stormed into the Tuileries "to pay a visit to the king." Louis faced his unwelcome visitors calmly and courageously, drank a glass of wine to the revolution, and had the relief of seeing them finally disperse. Nothing had been smashed except a few window-panes. The indignity to the king even caused a brief reaction in his favor, and the Assembly, which considered king-baiting its peculiar prerogative, stopped scolding Louis in order to scold the mob. These eloquent legislators, who loved to hurl audacious and inflammatory phrases from the tribune, were suddenly sobered when they saw a mob translate their suggestions into acts.

June 20, 1792

Louis's throne was already tottering when the *émigrés* decided to come to his aid, and all was lost. On July 25, these short-sighted partisans persuaded the Duke of Brunswick, commander of the invading armies, to issue a manifesto to the French nation. In bombastic language it warned all Frenchmen, if they still refused to lay down their arms, that they would be treated as rebels to their king, and promised, if any harm befell Louis or the queen, that Paris would be handed over to total annihilation. It seemed impossible to doubt any longer that the king was in collusion with the enemy. The Parisians decided that the monarchy would have to be destroyed; a revolutionary committee took charge and directed matters from the Hôtel de Ville; the sections vomited forth their hordes of "patriots," and on August 10 the mob attacked the Tuileries.

The Brunswick Manifesto

The royal family, having been warned in time, retired to the hall of the Legislative Assembly for protection, but the king's Swiss Guard, left to defend an empty palace, was sacrificed to the fury of the mob, which massacred and mutilated its victims in ghastly fashion. The leadership of affairs had passed into the hands of the revolutionary committee which had organized itself at the Hôtel de Ville, under the direction of a violent but patriotic lawyer named Danton. In obedience to this committee the Legislative Assembly suspended the king, and then summoned a new and special convention to decide the fate of France and construct a second constitution.

Fall of the throne (August 10, 1792)

In the interval between August 10 and September 21, 1792, Danton

and the insurrectionary commune provided the only real impetus behind the dislocated national government. With prodigious energy Danton spurred on the work of recruiting soldiers to resist the invading armies. To cow opposition all aristocrats and enemy sympathizers were sought out in a house-to-house search. The prisons of Paris were soon crowded, and the populace feared the prisoners might break out and massacre the good citizens while the soldiers were away at the battle-front. This served as an excuse to exercise "the salutary justice of the people." Self-appointed judges visited the prisons; hired executioners accompanied them; and over a thousand victims, after the shadow of a trial, were butchered in the prison yards. For three days the massacres went on, while the deputies of the Legislative Assembly waited nervelessly, and Danton with culpable negligence forbore all protest. The annals of the revolution offer no darker page or more sanguinary example of popular violence than these prison massacres of the first days of September, 1792.

The September massacres

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE FIRST FRENCH REPUBLIC AND ITS STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE

The French Republic is one and indivisible.
Constitution of 1793.

BY OVERTURNING the throne on August 10, 1792, the people of Paris ended the first phase of the revolution. The constitutional monarchy had failed and the king was a prisoner. To meet the crisis a National Convention was summoned and held its first session on September 21, 1792. Three problems of the utmost importance confronted the new assembly: (1) What was to be done with the dethroned king? (2) How was France to be saved from her invaders? (3) What form of government should be devised to replace the monarchy? The fate of France and of the revolution depended upon the answers which the members of the National Convention found for these questions.

1. THE NATIONAL CONVENTION (1792–95)

France becomes a republic (September, 1792)

At their opening session the deputies of the Convention lost no time in declaring royalty abolished in France. A few days later, with considerably less enthusiasm, they decided to style France a "republic." Their hesitation reflected the general uncertainty of the time. Although some radical leaders in Paris had urged a republican form of government as early as 1791, after Louis's flight to Varennes, and most educated Frenchmen professed admiration for the city-republics of ancient times, the idea of transforming France into a republic did not appeal very strongly to the nation in 1792. Conservative members of the bourgeoisie feared such a step might deliver the government into the control of the populace, and many people in the provincial centers were still attached to the monarchy, although they had lost confidence in Louis XVI. The proclamation of the new régime was accepted as a more or less unwelcome but logical alternative to the discredited monarchy, but even the champions of the republic were constrained to admit that its birth occurred in a manner obscure and unpropitious.

So long as the ex-king lived, it seemed inevitable that the royalists would plot to overthrow the republic and restore him to power, and this danger made it the more necessary to decide his fate promptly. An

active group of deputies seated high on the benches of the left in the assembly hall (the "Mountain") were determined to condemn the king, and they found support in the Jacobin Club, a powerful political society dominated by ardent revolutionaries, which had affiliated itself with local groups throughout France. Maximilien Robespierre, popular and radical deputy of Paris, carried the verdict of the Jacobins to the Convention. "I demand," he proclaimed from the tribune, "that Louis XVI shall be condemned to death." The Girondists, the party which had dominated the Legislative Assembly, made half-hearted efforts to win a reprieve, but were out-maneuvered by their Jacobin opponents on the "Mountain." In the final test vote, Louis was condemned to death by a small majority. His execution (January 21, 1793) deeply shocked the courts of Europe and made the new French Republic an Ishmael among the nations.

Louis XVI guillotined

By this drastic solution of one problem, the Convention greatly aggravated a second, the question of national defense. The Austrian and Prussian forces had withdrawn from France temporarily after suffering a reverse at Valmy (September 20, 1792), but they planned a new invasion for the spring of 1793. After the execution of the king, Great Britain, Spain, Holland, and some lesser states joined the coalition against France. The allied monarchs pledged themselves to avenge the death of Louis and to destroy the revolution, believing that the superiority of their resources assured them an easy victory. Yet, although France was to fight alone against the greater part of Europe, the contest was less unequal than it appeared. Oppressed classes in every country were stirred by the French example, and to them the National Convention made appeals urging them to rise against their tyrants. It was against governments rather than against embattled nations that the revolution had to struggle in these early years. The allied powers, moreover, were far from maintaining a close accord, and the allied statesmen neglected at first to give the French situation the serious attention which it warranted.

First coalition against France (1793)

Nevertheless, the dangers threatening France in the spring of 1793 might have sobered the most sanguine patriot. They failed, however, to silence the quarrel in the Convention, where the two factions, the Girondists and the Jacobins, wasted precious months wrestling for leadership. The Girondists drew their chief support from the provinces, were opposed to the dominant rôle which Paris had assumed in the affairs of France, and were disliked by the Parisian populace. They accused their political opponents, the Jacobins, of currying favor with the mob and of planning to confiscate

Quarrel of the Girondists and Jacobins

private wealth for the benefit of the indigent. The Jacobins retorted that the Girondists wished an "aristocratic republic"; that their project for exalting the departments would destroy the unity of France, and that at heart they were secretly royalist. These charges and countercharges masked a quarrel which was at bottom a fight between two revolutionary groups for control of the new government. In the end the people of Paris settled the issue by a fresh insurrection (May 31 — June 2, 1793) which crushed the Girondists. Several of the proscribed deputies escaped to stir up armed revolts in the provinces, but their cause was speedily compromised by royalist overtures. The victorious Jacobins consolidated their victory by drafting a popular constitution and submitting it to the voters. On obtaining a favorable response, they laid aside this Constitution of 1793 and chose to regard the result of the referendum as a justification of their high-handed rule.

Thus, by the midsummer of 1793, the Jacobins had won control of the central government, but the republic appeared to be on the point of dissolution. The army was disorganized, for many of the officers (nobles by birth) had deserted. The administration was dislocated, the allied troops were advancing from the east while royalist or Girondist insurgents held the chief western departments. It seemed all but certain that Paris would fall before the converging forces and the revolution end in defeat and obloquy.

2. THE ORGANIZATION OF VICTORY

In this critical summer of 1793, the allies proved themselves the unintentional saviors of France. Coalitions are notoriously inept in concentrating their forces; each of the powers had selfish ends to serve and each preferred to let its allies bear the brunt of the fighting. Austria and Prussia were less interested in crushing France than in securing further remnants of Poland, for that unhappy kingdom had just undergone its second partition (1793). As a result, the invaders advanced too cautiously, and failed to destroy the French armies and seize Paris while they had the chance. Twenty years were to pass before such a favorable opportunity recurred.

The Spirit of '93

Strong winds extinguish a small fire, but they feed a large one, and the misfortunes which beset the French Republic in 1793 fanned the fervor of the revolutionaries to a white heat. Though civil war raged in the Vendée, though Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulon had risen against the Convention, though the fortresses of the north, Condé and Valenciennes, fell before the allied advance, these

reverses proved to be hammer-strokes which fashioned a new France on the anvil of war. In their inconclusive attempts to blow out the torch of the revolution, the monarchs fanned it to a mighty conflagration. Patriotic Frenchmen of all classes flocked to the armies, prepared to die for *la liberté* and *la patrie*. Too late the allies were to learn they had provoked a volcano to pour its molten lava across Europe.

The organization of victory

Fortunately for France, the National Convention, controlled by the Jacobin element, provided the iron leadership necessary for a nation in arms. An executive cabinet, the "committee of public safety," assumed dictatorial powers. It dispatched deputies to the departments to supervise the organization of the defense; it called all able-bodied men to the colors to swell the "fourteen armies of the republic," and appointed young and audacious generals to positions of command with the warning that a defeat might cost them their heads. This energetic policy swiftly turned the tide. By the close of 1793, the royalists in the Vendée had been checked, Toulon recaptured, and the Austrians and Prussians thrown upon the defensive. In 1794, the French armies swept on to further triumphs. France was cleared of her invaders, her generals took the offensive, and Lazare Carnot, the military genius of the committee of public safety who had directed the campaigns, was acclaimed "The Organizer of Victory." But the victory had been dearly bought. It will be well to pause here to note how the struggle for national defense in 1793 and 1794 militarized the revolution and deflected its aims.

3. THE JACOBIN DICTATORSHIP

Although the National Convention remained in power for three years (1792–95), it failed in the primary task for which it had been summoned; i.e., to provide a permanent and satisfactory constitution for France. The Constitution of 1791, it will be recalled, had been cast aside when the king was deposed. Consequently the National Convention was an "extraordinary" or "revolutionary" assembly with no constitutional limits to its authority. It conducted the affairs of the nation with despotic assurance, repressing criticism, crushing its opponents, and spurring the citizens to supreme efforts. The French people submitted to this tyrannical war-time régime because they believed it was "a bridge of bronze" by which they would pass from a corrupt monarchy to a regenerated republic.

But the war wrenched the revolution from its course and the "regenerated republic" remained an unrealized dream, though for this

the war was not wholly to blame. Almost from the first an inner conflict checked the progress of reform measures, a conflict between the bourgeoisie and the classes without wealth or property. The bourgeoisie wished the revolution to end when the control of the government had passed from an autocratic king and a selfish nobility to the hands of an enlightened middle class; i.e., to themselves. But among the poorer classes there were many enthusiasts who construed liberty, equality, fraternity, more literally. They thought equality meant not only equality before the law, but equality of birth, of opportunity, and of wealth. A political revolution was not enough for them, they wanted a social revolution, which would extinguish poverty by distributing the property of the wealthy among the poor. Against such egalitarian doctrines the bourgeoisie fought relentlessly, asserting at every opportunity that private property must be considered sacred and inviolable.

The bourgeoisie and the citizens without property

Not even Robespierre, who posed as the champion of the poor, and earned by his scorn of wealth the title of "The Incorruptible," dared openly to attack the sanctity of private property. "Souls of mud," he upbraided those who accused him of such an aim, "I do not wish to touch your wealth however unclean its origin." Nevertheless, under the pressure of the war, he urged the National Convention to adopt measures which penalized the rich to benefit the poor. The assignats, the paper money so recklessly issued by the revolutionary assemblies, declined in value until it was almost worthless. To meet expenses the Convention seized the property of *émigrés* nobles, and forced rich citizens to "lend" money to the state, part of which was used to relieve the poverty of "indigent patriots." When the poor complained at the cost of bread, the Convention attempted to fix the price of necessities at a fair level, and threatened profiteering merchants with the guillotine. Such experiments in what, today, would be termed state socialism helped to placate the populace and were accepted by the bourgeoisie as temporary war-time measures.

In the same acquiescent spirit the French people accepted the extraordinary decrees passed against traitors and enemy agents. A special revolutionary tribunal was established (1793) to judge "enemies of the people," and as the struggle grew more intense the list of victims mounted. The queen, Marie Antoinette, the Duke of Orléans who had joined the revolutionaries and renamed himself Philippe Égalité, revolutionary generals accused of incompetence, leaders of the defeated Girondist Party, all took their turn on the guillotine. Nor did humbler victims escape. Seamstresses who ventured

The Reign of Terror

to sigh for the days of the monarchy when business was better, and loyal servants convicted of concealing a noble master, met the same fate. By the spring of 1794, the condemned were dispatched to the Place de la Révolution in batches of thirty and forty a day, there to make their bow before what Danton, with wry humor, referred to as the representative of the *executive* power.

Danton's grim jest possessed its element of truth, for the executive committee of public safety was using the guillotine as a political weapon. In March, 1794, it destroyed the Hébertists, a radical group which desired to push the revolution to further excesses, under the leadership of Hébert, editor of a scurrilous journal *Le Père Duchesne.* A few weeks later the committee struck at an opposing group, the "Indulgents," because they sought to retard the revolution and arrest the Terror. Having dispatched Danton and other leaders of the indulgent faction to the guillotine (April, 1794), the committee of public safety was master of the field, and Robespierre was regarded in France and abroad as master of the committee. What use would the Incorruptible make of his extraordinary prestige?

The Republic of Virtue

In Robespierre's narrow mind one ideal burned clearly. He aspired to establish a Utopian republic in which all citizens would possess pure morals, high ideals, and unselfish patriotism. But France was growing weary of his exalted creed. As the victories of the republican armies dispelled the threat of invasion, Robespierre found himself blamed for maintaining the Terror when the excuse for it had passed. He felt the decline of idealism and the waning of his popularity, and it seemed to him that the revolution was losing momentum at the very moment when the goal was in sight. "My reason," he confessed, "though not my heart, is at the point of doubting that Republic of Virtue of which I have traced the plan." In July, 1794, he appealed to the Convention to support him in a further "purification" of the government, but the men of property were beginning to distrust him and his enemies declared he aspired to establish a dictatorship. The Convention voted him under arrest with several of his friends, and although the Parisian populace, through their representatives at the Hôtel de Ville, attempted an insurrection in his favor, the movement failed and Robespierre perished on the guillotine.

4. THE THERMIDORIAN REACTION

From 1789 to 1794 the revolution had been dynamic, gaining momentum with each year that passed. The overthrow of Robespierre

Decline of revolutionary idealism

on the Ninth of Thermidor, as the date was styled in the revolutionary calendar (July 27, 1794), was followed by a period of reaction. From 1795 to 1799 the revolution appears "frozen" or "stagnant." The men who destroyed Robespierre had been concerned chiefly with saving their heads, but they found themselves hailed as heroes who had ended the Terror. The prisons were emptied, the committee of public safety and the scarcely less powerful committee of general security were stripped of their despotic authority, and the Jacobin Club was closed. A spirit of frivolity, extravagance, and dissipation supplanted the austere ideals of the Reign of Virtue. Fortunes which had been acquired by speculation and profiteering were spent in gambling and amusements. Social life in Paris had never appeared more vivacious, but the gaiety, the glitter, and the immorality disguised a mood of cynicism and disillusionment.

The destitute, however, had no superficial gaieties to alleviate the sharpness of their misery. Feeling that the revolution had betrayed their hopes, they began openly to regret the passing of Robespierre, and attempted to assert once more the "sacred right of insurrection." In April, 1795, and again in May, mobs invaded the Convention demanding bread and a constitution. But the nation as a whole was weary of radicalism and terrorism and breathed more easily when these outbreaks were crushed. The Jacobin ideals had been discredited, the leading terrorists of 1793 and 1794 were dead or in hiding, and a desire for a strong and permanent government inclined many Frenchmen to favor a restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. This sentiment was stimulated by priests and royalists, who, finding the laws against them somewhat relaxed after 1794, ventured to slip back into France.

Two powerful groups, however, opposed a return to the Bourbon rule. The first included men who had grown rich and acquired confiscated property during the revolution, and knew their fortunes would vanish if the republic fell. A second group, the regicides, stood to lose even more. For if the Count of Provence ever ascended the French throne as Louis XVIII,[1] those deputies of the Convention who had voted the death of Louis XVI would face death or exile. So these two groups, the speculators and the regicides, united to hold the revolution from retrograding. Clinging to power, they struck alternately at the radicals and the royalists, using the army to preserve their unpopular régime. From 1795 to 1799 the

Profiteers and regicides

[1] The dauphin, son of Louis XVI, died in Paris, in prison, a year and a half after his father's execution. Although he never reigned the royalists styled him Louis XVII.

balance of power in the government remained in the hands of this coalition of trimmers.

Any subterfuge provided these opportunists with an excuse to remain in office.[1] When the National Convention was driven to prepare a constitution and dissolve itself (1795), it decreed that two thirds of its members must be re-elected to the chambers of the new assembly and would take their places whether they were elected or not. Furious at this parody of popular representation, the Parisian sections rebelled, but the insurrection was promptly suppressed by the army. Among the officers who aided materially in crushing this revolt of Vendémiaire 13 (October 5, 1795) was a young Corsican captain of artillery named Napoleon Bonaparte, to whose shrewd mind it must already have been clear that the real control in France was slipping slowly but surely into the hands of the army leaders.

5. THE DIRECTORY (1795–99)

So the great Convention which had guided France through three years of war and tumult passed into history and the nation sullenly accepted the new government provided by the Constitution of the Year III (1795). This new régime was known as the Directory because the executive power was vested in a committee of five directors. The legislative branch consisted of a Council of Ancients (with two hundred and fifty members) and a Council of Five Hundred, chosen by the voters who possessed the requisite property qualifications. The leading director was Paul Barras, a profligate and unscrupulous man of mediocre ability, and, despite the fact that both chambers contained many deputies of patriotism and talent, the moral tone of the Directory was corrupt and sordid. Society became increasingly cynical, dissolute, and heartless as the revolution lost the impulse of its early ideals. Dishonest politicians and profiteers amassed fortunes at the public expense and spent them in wasteful display, while starving thousands cursed them. The directors did little to relieve the famine and suffering, for they were chiefly intent upon safeguarding their power against royalist intrigues and popular revolts. When the elections of 1797 returned a number of reactionaries to the legislature, the regicide directors called in the army once more to "purge" the chambers of royalists lest they muster a majority and invite the Bourbons back.

While the political prestige of the Directory sank, the army pursued its successes abroad. Trained and tempered in the school of war and

[1] The Constitution of 1793 (see page 690) had never been applied.

condemned to be brilliant or to face the revolutionary tribunal, the young republican generals had developed a tactical audacity which numbed their opponents. As the French in their turn became the invaders, the proud coalition formed against France in 1793 fell to pieces. Prussia, Holland, and Spain made peace with France in 1795, and Napoleon Bonaparte, appointed to command the French army in Italy, brought Sardinia to terms (1796) and compelled the Austrians to sign the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797). Of the imposing combination of powers which had threatened to dismember France three years earlier, only Great Britain remained at war, and the British were on the defensive.

Collapse of the first coalition (1795–97)

France had thus secured for herself an ascendancy in Europe unequaled since the time of Louis XIV. The government of the Directory used this advantage to "revolutionize" neighboring states, surrounding France with a ring of sister republics. Belgium was annexed outright; Holland (the Batavian Republic) was bound to France by a close alliance; the left bank of the Rhine was in French hands, while in northern Italy French influence erected the Cisalpine Republic with Milan as its capital and the Ligurian Republic which included Genoa. These new states were not only tied to France by treaties; they paid a heavy indemnity and subscribed to the support of the French armies which had conquered (or "liberated") them. If the citizens complained that the burden of tribute was too heavy, the cynical directors assured them that the French had brought them liberty and "it is impossible to buy liberty too dearly."

6. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION (1789–99)

It will be useful at this point to enumerate the most important changes wrought in France by a decade of revolution. Feudal privileges had been cancelled, the church stripped of its property, the monarchy abolished, the ancient historic provinces of the kingdom carved into new departments, the anarchy of the old legal system replaced by simpler codes and elected magistrates. Unfortunately, this mighty work of destruction had not always been followed by constructive labors of equal magnitude. Too often the new institutions remained impressive sketches, distinguished by nobility of concept rather than by practicality. The revolution had signally failed to establish a government founded upon liberty and equality, for liberty had little meaning under the Directory which was in reality a corrupt and unpopular oligarchy sustained by military power. The bourgeoisie had

The rule of the middle class

flouted the principle of equality by entrenching themselves in a position of social and economic privilege, while denying even a vote to the poorest citizens. But the protests, and even the revolts, of the masses had little effect. "The revolution is not finished," declared the popular leader Babeuf, "for the rich monopolize all the wealth and govern exclusively, while the poor toil like veritable slaves, languish in misery, and count for nothing in the state." Babeuf was voicing a protest which in the nineteenth century was to become the leading argument of the socialists, but his ideas were premature and the conspiracy which he organized against the Directory brought him to the guillotine (1797).

Politically, therefore, the revolution had done little more than to shift the control of the government from an inept king and a selfish aristocracy to a vigorous bourgeoisie, but in other fields of endeavor the results were somewhat more heartening. Through the labors of enlightened thinkers like the philosopher Condorcet, a system of public instruction had been adopted which made the state responsible for the education of children. At first the new primary schools in particular were gravely handicapped by the insufficiency of funds and of teachers, but a start had been made in the great task of training all Frenchmen to become patriotic and literate citizens. Unspectacular reforms of this nature are the most easily ignored because they require many years to reveal their benefits; and the same is true of such innovations as the metric and decimal system of weights and measures, introduced by the National Convention to replace the confused standards of the old régime, but adopted all too tardily by a populace wedded to more cumbrous and diversified methods of calculation.

Educational reforms

Legal reform, that favorite project of the eighteenth-century rationalists, was likewise greatly advanced by the revolutionary assemblies, though it remained for Napoleon to cap with his codes the structure they erected. The new legislation recognized the peasant's freedom from onerous duties and the artisan's liberation from obsolete guild restrictions. Merchants and manufacturers were encouraged by the legal abolition of internal customs and the freedom allowed to business initiative. Perhaps most far-reaching of all in their social effects were the new laws of inheritance which assured all the children of a family a share in their father's estate, a policy which tended to break up large estates and foster the wider distribution of property.

Legal reforms

The printing of the assignats, continued by the National Convention with injudicious prodigality, reduced France to financial chaos, and by 1798 this paper money had become practically worthless. But the currency inflation, while it worked great hardship

Economic reforms

on many people, also furthered the sale of property confiscated from the church and from "enemies of the republic," and throughout the years of the revolution this property tended to pass into the possession of bourgeois and peasant purchasers until France numbered a larger class of independent landed proprietors than any other European country. The poorest peasants and day laborers were seldom in a position to profit by this unusual opportunity, but many a well-to-do farmer or townsman realized his dream of becoming a landowner and blessed the revolution for it. The comparative stability of French society since the revolution has been due in no small measure to the existence of this numerous and conservative group of citizens with "a stake in the country."

The effects of these changes were not easily perceived in 1799 after a decade of tumult and confusion, and to most Frenchmen it appeared that the revolution had been a costly failure. But the dubious successes achieved at home were partly offset by the brilliant triumphs on the battlefield. The war of defense upon which France had entered in 1792 had been changed by 1794 into a vigorous offensive. Yielding to the lure of imperial conquests, the French speedily established a military hegemony which destroyed the balance of power in Europe. The government of the Directory, unpopular at home, sustained itself by the revenues extorted from Dutch, German, and Italian provinces, and prolonged the hostilities because the conclusion of peace would bring the republican generals back to Paris, victorious and insubordinate. The directors had no definite policy other than to postpone the day when they might be called upon to account for their corrupt and inadequate rule. The government was at the mercy of the army leaders, and the first ambitious general who fully comprehended this fact might brush aside the incompetent Directory and make himself master of France.

CHAPTER TWELVE

NAPOLEON AND FRANCE

We must not pass through this world without leaving traces which may commend our memory to posterity.

NAPOLEON.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE was born in 1769 on the island of Corsica, which had become a French possession the previous year. At the age of ten he was sent to a military school in France, a shy, uncouth boy, who spoke French awkwardly and envied his schoolmates their more polished manners and larger incomes. Lacking a title or a powerful patron, he would most probably have remained a lieutenant or captain under the old régime, but the revolution threw open the gates of opportunity. The desertion of the nobles created many vacancies in the staff of the republican armies, and Bonaparte, a second lieutenant of artillery in 1789, had been promoted to be a general of brigade by 1794, mainly as a reward for his services in the recapture of Toulon. Suspected as a partisan of Robespierre, he suffered a brief arrest after the latter's fall, but was soon released. In 1795, he was in Paris seeking a new appointment when the insurrection of Vendémiaire broke out. Called upon, with other available officers, to defend the Tuileries, Bonaparte collected some batteries of artillery and met the insurgents with "a whiff of grapeshot." There were, as he later explained laconically, "certain splashings," and the revolt collapsed. His presence of mind made a favorable impression on his superiors and his name was on everyone's lips. Napoleon had entered history with a salvo of artillery.

Napoleon's youth

1. THE ADVENT OF BONAPARTE

From the new government of the Directory, which he had thus helped into power, the young general received further promotion. Appointed (1796) to command the Army of Italy, he left his newly married wife, Josephine, and led his thirty-five thousand ragged French troops across the Alps. The Austrian and Sardinian armies holding northern Italy were taken by surprise, and the King of Piedmont speedily agreed to an armistice. Turning swiftly against the Austrians, who still outnumbered his forces two to one, Bonaparte laid siege to Mantua, captured it (February, 1797), after defeating the Austrian armies sent to its relief, and pursued

First Italian campaign (1796–97)

the discomfited enemy to within a hundred miles of Vienna. Threatened by a second French army in southern Germany, the Austrians sought peace, and Bonaparte, turning diplomat, persuaded them to acknowledge the French annexation of Belgium, offered them Venice (which his troops had lately seized) as compensation for their losses, and demanded recognition for his Italian conquests which he organized as the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics. When he returned to Paris, the populace turned out to see him present this successful Treaty of Campo Formio to the directors. France was delighted with this young general of twenty-eight who knew not only how to wage war but how to conclude peace.

Finding his presence an embarrassment, the directors appointed him commander of the Army of England. But to cross the Channel with an army Bonaparte judged too hazardous. England and Russia were the "great intangibles": to the end of his reign both were to evade the full power of his smashing blows. Not yet strong enough to make a bid for supreme power, and fearful that he would be forgotten if he let his sword "grow rusty," Bonaparte proposed a plan to the directors whereby he might strike at Britain indirectly. His imagination turned to the East; he planned to conquer Egypt and thence attack the British posts in India. "I saw myself," he confessed later, "on the road to Asia, perched on an elephant, a turban on my head." But this romantic dream of following in the footsteps of Alexander the Great led him to the borders of disaster. Though Egypt was easily overrun, Bonaparte's fleet was destroyed by the English admiral Nelson (battle of the Nile, August 1, 1798), which severed his connections with France. His invasion of Syria carried him no farther than Acre. The proposal to invade India by land had been from the first a piece of incredible audacity as Napoleon now realized. "I allowed my imagination to interfere with my practice . . ." he admitted. "I shall take good care not to let it run away with my judgment again." He could appraise himself with the same cold rationality which he employed in judging his subordinates.

The Egyptian expedition (1798–99)

In Europe, meanwhile, the situation had changed to the grave disadvantage of France. In 1798, Great Britain, most implacable enemy of the republic, drew Austria and Russia into a new coalition, designed to check French conquests in Italy and the Mediterranean. Within a few months the French forces in Italy had been routed by an Austro-Russian army (battle of Novi, 1799), and the Rhine frontier laid open to invasion. Then the French rallied. Masséna checked the Russians at Zurich; and to fire the reviving French hopes

The second coalition



NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
1769–1821

This portrait of Napoleon as a young man emphasizes the stern, relentless and unsympathetic elements in his character. His likeness was not an easy one to transfer to canvas, for his moods shifted rapidly and he was a consummate actor. When it suited his purpose few men could appear more frank, winning or persuasive.

came the news that Bonaparte had landed at Fréjus, October 9, 1799. Leaving his marooned army to waste away in Egypt, he had slipped through the British blockade and returned at an auspicious moment. A month later he was to be master of France.

The government of the Directory was tottering. Discredited, bankrupt, and incompetent, it had thrown away the fruits of Bonaparte's Italian victories and involved France in new wars. Both Jacobins and royalists were plotting to overturn it, while moderate republicans under the lead of Sieyès looked about for a soldier to help them "revise the constitution." Bonaparte's arrival in October, 1799, could not have been better timed.

The coup d'état of Brumaire

A plot was formed which called for Sieyès, Ducos, and Barras, three of the five directors, to resign (November 8). Under the pretense of checking a Jacobin conspiracy, Bonaparte's friends proposed that he should be given command of the Parisian troops. Then the Council of Ancients and the Council of Five Hundred were persuaded to adjourn to Saint-Cloud to deliberate on the crisis (November 9). The conspirators hoped to give their *coup d'état* the appearance of legality by persuading the two chambers to approve the necessary changes, but the Council of Five Hundred grew suspicious and were on the point of voting Napoleon's arrest when his brother Lucien, president of the Five Hundred, appealed to the soldiers to clear the chamber. Lucien's presence of mind and the bayonets of the guard saved the conspirators. Of this, however, no mention was made in the proclamation posted in Paris the following day, which announced to France that the constitution would shortly be revised, and that in the interval Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Ducos would act as consuls. From their first meeting Bonaparte presided.

Napoleon's character

The man who thus at thirty became master of France was to bestride Europe like a Colossus for fifteen years. Innumerable books have been written to explain the peculiar genius and temperament of Napoleon Bonaparte, but there is space here for only the briefest summary of his character. In appearance he was short, with an olive complexion, sharply cut features, and a penetrating gaze. The qualities which make a ruler — knowledge of men, an untiring capacity for work, a rarely failing memory for detailed facts, the power of instant and inspired decision — he possessed in a unique degree, and these very largely explain the success of Napoleon the man. But he added to them a personal magnetism that could exact the utmost in devotion from his followers, an imagination incredibly romantic in its wild sweep, and a sense of the dramatic which made him the architect of his own legend.

These help to explain Napoleon the myth. For a great many people the myth has obscured the man, transfiguring all his defects of judgment and character and investing him with attributes almost superhuman. "People will often give me credit," Napoleon prophesied, "for a great deal of depth and sagacity on occasions which were, perhaps, most simple in themselves; I shall be suspected of plans which I never formed." In his own lifetime people had begun to confuse the man and the legend.

That Napoleon was a master of military tactics and political finesse is conceded by almost all authorities. But he was no such universal genius on a throne as some admirers pretend. His taste in art and literature was mediocre; his knowledge of the sciences (aside from mathematics) was dubious and second-hand; his command of history was capricious and his economic beliefs were marred by disastrous errors. His character was inferior to his intellect and a deficient moral sense permitted him to stoop to ignoble deceptions and the basest tricks of Machiavellian polity. Nevertheless, with all his limitations he remains the most dominant and arresting personality in modern history, and the years from 1800 to 1815 are justly named the Era of Napoleon.

2. COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND COALITION

Frenchmen welcomed Bonaparte's ascent to power because they believed he would put an end to internal disturbances and conclude the war which had burdened France since 1792. Other republican generals — Hoche, Pichegru, Moreau, Masséna — had proved that they could win victories, but Bonaparte had crowned his Italian campaign with the Peace of Campo Formio. Knowing that the desire for peace was widespread, the First Consul opened his régime with proposals for a general truce. On Christmas Day, 1799, he dispatched conciliatory overtures to London and Vienna, but he strained every effort none the less to be prepared for further hostilities. The British response was vague, and the reply from Vienna left Napoleon in no doubt that the Austrians would never yield France the advantages she desired without a struggle.

The First Consul settled the issue with his customary speed. "Napoleon," admitted a contemporary, "is the only man in Europe who knows the value of time." Crossing the Alps in May, 1800, he snatched victory from defeat with the aid of Desaix and Kellermann at Marengo, and concluded a second Italian campaign even more decisive than his first. The following December, Moreau defeated the Austrian army in the Germanies at

Second Italian campaign (1800)

Hohenlinden and peace was assured. The Treaty of Lunéville practically recapitulated the terms arranged at Campo Formio four years earlier.

The defeat of Austria broke the second coalition. Negotiations with the Czar Paul I (1796–1801) ended in the withdrawal of Russia in 1801, and Great Britain was left to carry on the struggle against France alone. For a year these wary adversaries bargained and finally signed a grudging peace.[1] The French Republic had established a political hegemony in Europe. Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, and Piedmont had been annexed outright. Holland (the Batavian Republic) and Switzerland (the Helvetic Republic or Swiss Confederation) were bound to France by a close alliance that amounted to vassalage. In Italy, the Ligurian Republic (Genoa) and the Parthenopean Republic (Naples and Sicily) were under French control, while the Cisalpine Republic (renamed the Italian Republic) acknowledged Bonaparte as president. The French justified their acquisitions on the ground that the inhabitants of the annexed territories welcomed union with France, and that the people of the subject states, the Dutch, the Swiss, and the Italians, regarded the French as allies and liberators. To a certain extent this was true; but the liberators were also conquerors, and the other European powers, disregarding subtler distinctions, complained that republican France had pursued with unexampled success the foreign policy of Richelieu and of Louis XIV.

French hegemony in Europe

The English in particular found it difficult to accept this French expansion. They deplored the fate of Belgium, for Antwerp in enemy hands was "a pistol pointed at the heart of England," as Napoleon clearly appreciated. The subjugation of the liberty-loving Swiss and the fall of the Venetian Republic after centuries of glorious independence inspired the poet Wordsworth to eloquent protests. The English merchant classes, disappointed that the Treaty of Amiens did not open Europe to their commerce, and alarmed because Bonaparte proposed to revive French colonial activity in the West Indies, in Louisiana, and in India, complained that peace was more disastrous than war. The French on their part likewise nursed grievances which they attributed to English perfidy, and neither party executed its treaty promises in full. It is not surprising, therefore, that the general peace with which Bonaparte gratified France proved to be an illusory peace of the briefest duration. The causes which led Britain and France to renew hostilities in 1803 will be discussed in the following chapter.

English hostility toward France

[1] Treaty of Amiens, 1802.

3. NAPOLEON RECONSTRUCTS FRANCE

In December, 1799, the French people approved by 3,011,007 votes to 1526 the "Constitution of the Year VIII." This interesting document provided for a dictatorship under the guise of a democratic republic. As First Consul, Bonaparte was to wield the executive power for ten years. A second and third consul, a council of state appointed by himself, and a senate filled with his supporters, assisted in his decisions. To preserve the appearance of popular sovereignty for which Napoleon had no real sympathy — "Your Rousseau was a madman," he asserted privately — provision was made for two elective chambers, the tribunate and the legislature. The tribunate had the privilege of discussing laws, but could not vote on them; the legislature might vote, but could not discuss them. This arrangement, coupled with the fact that legislation was to originate with the First Consul and the council of state, placed the legislative as well as the executive power in Bonaparte's hands. This negation of popular rule, to gain which the French had just waged a revolution, was not easily apparent to the people because all male citizens retained the right to vote. But this, too, was rendered illusory. The electors of each commune chose one tenth of their number to form a communal list; members of all the communal lists in each department then chose one tenth of their number for the departmental list; and the departmental delegates chose one tenth of their membership for the national list. Public officials and members of the tribunate and legislature could then be appointed by Napoleon and the council of state from the national list, a system which left the voters free to cast their ballots and Napoleon free to promote only those men whose loyalty to himself assured their co-operation in his aims. Actually, most appointments were made before the lists were complete.

Constitution of the Consulate

If the French people lost their political liberty and initiative, they gained a government of unparalleled efficiency and vigor. The farmer who had paid two and even three fifths of his income in taxes under the old régime now paid one fifth, yet the state revenues had doubled. New and more competent judges stiffened respect for the law, and special courts curbed the widespread disorder and brigandage. Ruined roads and bridges were restored, harbors dredged and canals deepened. The consolidation of the national debt and attainment of a balanced budget by 1801 revived business confidence, and trade expanded under an administration which proved it could assure tranquillity. After ten years of political vicissitude France enjoyed a competent, honest, and

energetic government, and the merchant in the city and the peasant on the farm gave Bonaparte the credit. To assure permanence for the new régime the constitution was amended (1802) making him consul for life with the right to nominate his successor, and the French people approved this extension of power by 3,568,885 "ayes" to 8374 "noes."

The First Consul's most popular reform was his solution of the religious problem. The breach between republican France and the papacy created by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy [1] grieved a majority of the French people who were still Catholic in sentiment. In 1801, a *concordat* was negotiated, whereby Pius VII agreed to renounce all claim to church property confiscated and sold by the revolutionary assemblies, and to permit the French government to nominate French bishops who would in turn appoint the lower clergy. In return the Roman Catholic faith was declared the religion of the great majority of Frenchmen and the constitutional clergy (i.e., those who had defied the pope and accepted the civil constitution) were replaced by priests duly consecrated. This settlement meant: (1) that the ten-year schism between Rome and the Gallican Church had ended with the spiritual authority of the pope unimpaired; (2) that the purchasers of confiscated church lands might for the first time consider their titles strictly valid; and (3) that the French clergy would prove submissive to the consular government because the selection of bishops and the payment of salaries had become a function of the state. Though ardent republicans disliked this compromise and called it a step backward, the mass of Frenchmen welcomed reunion with the Church of Rome. Those Catholics who had opposed the revolutionary settlement on religious grounds were mollified by the *concordat*, which remained in force for over a century.

Concordat (*1801*)

Critics had frequently protested, both before and during the revolution, that France would never be tranquil until the laws had been reduced to a clearly formulated code. Napoleon considered it his chief claim to glory that under his direction this gigantic and confusing task was completed. He drove his committee of lawyers relentlessly until by 1804 the main principles of the revolution concerning persons and property had been embodied in a civil code. Four additional digests followed, on civil procedure (1806), commerce (1807), criminal instruction (1808), and the penal code (1810). Of the five the civil code was by far the most influential and forms today the basis of civil law, not only in France, but in Belgium, Holland, Italy, and parts of Germany.

The Code Napoléon

[1] See above, pages 681–82.

A law passed in February, 1800, went far to reconstruct the centralized bureaucracy familiar to Frenchmen from Bourbon times. In the departments the authority of elective councils created by the revolution was subordinated to that of a prefect appointed by the first consul. Similarly, a subprefect directed the affairs in each district and a mayor in each municipality. This relatively simple and centralized administrative system has survived in France up to the present day very much as Napoleon left it, demonstrating its efficiency through four changes of government.

Centralized administration

The leaders of the revolution, having closed up the church schools, had planned to replace them by a system of national education. This project also Napoleon carried to completion with his customary genius for organization. The Imperial University (1808) crowned a state school system which embraced primary schools, high schools, and colleges. The curriculum was rigidly designed to train good citizens and the pupils learned their duty to the head of the state more thoroughly than they learned anything else. To Napoleon's mind the youth of France might have been so much raw material, to be manufactured into civil servants or soldiers as the need required. Even the adult population remained in a sort of tutelage, reading only censored journals and official *communiqués*, or attending plays specially designed to inculcate "sound principles." Napoleon was fulfilling the *philosophes'* dream of a paternal despot to a degree perhaps undreamed of in their philosophy.

Education

All his reforms — the legal codes, the centralized administration, the obedient church, the schools that trained his councilors, and the barracks that disciplined his cannon fodder — all had been erected to the greater glory of Napoleon. Moralizing in his captivity at Saint Helena, Napoleon declared his constant motto had been "Everything for the French People." But if he made France the most efficiently ruled and the most powerful state in Europe, it was less from love of France than from love of power. "Power is my mistress . . ." he confessed with truer insight. "I love it as an artist." So, despite the glory he won for France, his popularity waned. In reducing thirty million Frenchmen to be the instruments of his will, he did violence to human nature, for man does not wish to be regarded as a means to an end, but as an end in himself. Under Napoleon's barrack-room methods the finer flowers of the human spirit, art and literature, were slow to blossom. In the end his system failed in its primary purpose, for it did not provide administrators so efficient nor officers so inspired as the revolution had bequeathed to him. "The men of 1812 were not the men of 1792," he complained,

criticizing his second generation of officials for their lack of initiative. Perhaps he had drilled it out of them.

4. THE IMPERIAL ADVENTURE

The Constitution of the Year VIII (1799) had made Bonaparte consul for ten years, the Constitution of the Year X (1802) made him consul for life. His ambition, however, was not yet satisfied. He began deliberately to surround himself with a royal etiquette and ceremonial and took up his residence in the palace of the Tuileries where Louis XVI had held his court. In 1804, the obedient senate was persuaded to offer him the title of emperor. Several attempts had been made upon his life; agents of the exiled Bourbons and of the British government were plotting his removal; and the French people were troubled that such a beneficent régime should depend upon the safety of one man. To establish a Bonaparte dynasty appeared the surest way to perpetuate his reforms. At the same time, to deter conspirators, Napoleon had the Duke d'Enghien seized near the French borders, tried before a military court, and shot, a stroke which filled Europe with horror, but ended the plotting of the duke's Bourbon kinsmen. Several republican generals, including Moreau and Pichegru, were also arrested on the charge of conspiracy, and these drastic measures silenced all effective opposition to the establishment of the empire.

Plots against the life of Napoleon

At Napoleon's invitation, Pope Pius VII journeyed to Paris to assist at the coronation of the first "Emperor of the French." The imposing ceremony took place in the Cathedral of Notre Dame (December 2, 1804), but instead of waiting to receive his crown from the pope, Napoleon set it upon his own head and then crowned his wife Josephine empress. High-sounding titles were invented to honor a new hierarchy of imperial officials. Napoleon's elder brother, Joseph, became grand elector. Leading generals were promoted to be marshals of France, leading statesmen became grand dignitaries with the title of "Highness," while even senators were to be addressed as "Excellency." The creation of a new order for distinguished service, the Legion of Honor, enabled Napoleon to flatter the vanity and reward the merit of loyal followers by distributing ribbons and medals carrying with them a comfortable annuity for the recipients. Thus, after purging itself of one privileged caste in the fires of revolution, the French people beheld the formation of another, but the new nobility differed in one important respect from the old. The aristocrats of the old régime claimed their titles and privileges by right of birth, but the

The imperial hierarchy

imperial notables won their promotion on the basis of service. Napoleon's motto remained as it had been, "Careers open to talent," and he boasted that any private in his armies "might carry a marshal's baton in his knapsack." "It was my intention," he maintained, looking back on these crowded years from the loneliness of Saint Helena, "to put an end to all feudal institutions in Europe by reconnecting the idea of nobility with that of public service, and detaching from it all prescriptive or feudal notions."

Those who served the Emperor of the French successfully might hope for a title, a dukedom, even a royal crown. Not from France alone, but from all parts of Europe men hastened to learn the commands of the Man of Destiny whose aspirations seemed limitless, whose good fortune appeared inexhaustible. Napoleon in the plenitude of his power suggests Shakespeare's description of Mark Antony:

> in his livery
> Walked crowns and crownets, realms and islands were
> As plates dropped from his pocket.

But unlike Antony, he lacked magnanimity. Toward failure he had no pity, and he insisted that to serve him was to serve France, a presupposition which grew increasingly dubious as he staked the security of France and the lives of his soldiers more and more recklessly on his foreign ventures.

Nor was Napoleon always just in his distribution of awards. As his empire extended itself, he yielded to an excessive nepotism, showering undeserved honors upon the members of his family. His stepson Eugène (Josephine's son by her first marriage to General Beauharnais) he appointed Viceroy of the Italian Kingdom. One brother, Joseph Bonaparte, became successively King of Naples and of Spain, another brother, Louis, he made King of Holland, a third, Jerome, King of Westphalia. His sisters acquired titles and estates and his mother a princely income. As a family the Bonapartes possessed more than ordinary talents, but none to warrant such promotion. Moreover, Napoleon displayed partiality even in his nepotism, for Lucien, next to himself the ablest of the family, was left to languish in the cold shades of the imperial disfavor because he dared to marry against the emperor's wishes.

Napoleon's nepotism

It was a source of deep concern to Napoleon that his first wife, Josephine, bore him no children. In 1810, he divorced her for reasons of state, and married the Archduchess Marie Louise of Austria. In 1811, a son was born and received the title "King of Rome," for Rome had become the second city of Napoleon's

The imperial succession

international empire. With the imperial succession assured, Napoleon predicted that his reign was about to enter a second and even more glorious chapter. In reality his star was approaching a disastrous eclipse, the causes of which will be explained in the succeeding chapter.

5. RESULTS OF NAPOLEON'S RULE IN FRANCE

Napoleon called himself "the son of the revolution"; he even said, "I am the revolution"; and he never ceased to remind Frenchmen that they owed to him the preservation of all that was beneficial in the revolutionary program. It will be interesting to decide how far his claim was justified.

Political reaction

In the political sphere Napoleon's work was reactionary. He not only ended the republic; he re-established hereditary monarchy and revived many distinctive features of Bourbon rule. His prefects ("emperors on a small scale," he termed them) were replicas of the former intendants; his council of state was the royal council remodeled. His censorship regulations and his police agents had little to distinguish them beyond their greater effectiveness from those of the old régime. Behind a screen of popular deceptions he restored absolutism in France both in theory and practice, an absolutism buttressed by institutions more efficient and more highly centralized than those fashioned by Richelieu or Louis XIV. An incomparable army, a highly organized administrative bureaucracy, a state-controlled church, a standardized educational system — these were the instruments of his will, and the legacy he bequeathed to France. But these instruments were scarcely the product of the revolution, although the revolution had cleared the way for them. Rather they approximated to the ideal of government endorsed by Frederick the Great or Joseph II of Austria, just as Napoleon himself approximated to the ideal of an enlightened despot. The French people accepted him because he was successful and because his régime provided an escape from ten years of revolutionary strife, but they never quite forgot and never quite relinquished the democratic dreams of 1793 which had beckoned like an apocalyptic vision before the clouds of disillusionment tarnished them.

Civil and economic gains

Napoleon discarded liberty, but he preserved that other great revolutionary watchword, equality. The class privileges, the iniquitous taxation, the feudal obligations of the old régime, disappeared along with the archaic modes of punishment and the arbitrary administration of justice. The *Code Napoléon* assured all Frenchmen equality before the law regardless of rank, riches, or

religion. Furthermore, proprietors who had acquired land confiscated from the church or from exiled nobles could thank Napoleon for confirming and legalizing their titles of ownership. Business men applauded the abolition of internal customs barriers, the improvements in roads and harbors, the benefits of a uniform system of weights, measures, and coinage, revolutionary projects which Napoleon perpetuated. The peasants were grateful for the abolition of feudal dues, for the suppression of disorder and brigandage, and for the restoration of the Catholic faith. In fact, there was no class in France which did not have some substantial reason for blessing Napoleon's régime. He undid much of the political work of the revolution, but he preserved and extended the civil and economic reforms.

The revolution had killed feudalism in France: Napoleon buried it and reared a new order of society upon its tomb. But beyond the French borders feudalism was still alive, and the privileged classes would fight until their last battlement had fallen. For if the revolutionary notion of equality triumphed, it meant the ruin of the old aristocracy. The dues their peasantry paid them, the rent from inherited estates, the sinecures gained through family connections, and the promotions assured by right of birth — all these the spreading revolution would destroy. Even the laws which had long fortified the aristocrats in their pretensions would be changed to the advantage of the vulgar. Custom had hitherto reserved the most lucrative positions in the state, the church, and the army for the nobly born, but few aristocrats could hope to win such offices if the more capable commoners could compete for them on equal terms. It is not difficult to understand why the privileged classes throughout Europe resisted the revolution as an impious and subversive movement, or why Napoleon, in extending it, found them among the most implacable of his enemies.

As the son of the revolution, he was condemned to extend it, and he believed that "every man must fulfill his destiny." When the powers leagued themselves against his spreading influence, he fought and defeated them. "I always appear to be attacking," he complained more than once, "yet what I am doing is defending myself all the time." The student will be better able to decide how much reliance to place on this statement after reading about Napoleon's European projects and campaigns.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

NAPOLEON AND EUROPE

Throughout my whole reign I was the keystone of an edifice entirely new, and resting on the most slender foundations. Its duration depended on the issue of my battles. I was never, in truth, master of my movements; I was never at my own disposal.

NAPOLEON.

IN 1802, the wars which had grown out of the French Revolution came to a momentary close. The French had proved by force of arms that they would suffer no interference from the other powers, and the monarchs of Europe, weary of bloodshed, abandoned their plan to crush the revolutionary movement and restore the Bourbons to the French throne. Unfortunately, this temporary truce did not endure. Fighting broke out again in 1803 and continued with mounting casualties until Napoleon was finally defeated and sent into exile. It is the purpose of the present chapter to explain why, between 1800 and 1812, Napoleon was able to extend his control over the greater part of Europe, and why, after 1812, his empire collapsed.

1. THE REVOLUTION SPREADS

When Napoleon became First Consul in 1799, the French Republic had already secured control of several states beyond its legitimate boundaries. Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine had been annexed, while Holland, Switzerland, and northern and southern Italy were regarded by the French as part of their "system" of allied republics. Napoleon had to maintain and defend this extension of French influence or risk his popularity. Because of his military genius he was able to conclude a general peace by 1802 without making any concessions, but the peace was not likely to endure if he attempted further conquests, for England and Austria were intensely jealous of the French success. If Napoleon had sincerely desired peace, he might well have rested content with the laurels won, but he had a passion for reconstructing and reorganizing things. One country was too small for his ambition, and looking abroad he decided that the people of Italy and Germany would be happier if he brought to them a few of the masterly reforms which had already been introduced in France. It was easy to find a pretext for interfering because many Italians and Germans admired Napoleon for what he had done in France and were willing to defer to him and to welcome his assistance.

So Napoleon disregarded the warnings of Austria, of England, of Prussia and Russia, and continued to extend his power by extending the work of the revolution. At first he had on his side the force of public opinion and the force of arms. Many Europeans outside of France sympathized with the ideals of the revolution and regarded Napoleon as its directing genius. People of the middle class in particular envied the French bourgeoisie who had thrown off the stupid and oppressive rule of priests and nobles and made themselves the dominant class in the state. Of course kings and nobles everywhere were opposed to any extension of revolutionary principles, and they could set the armies of Europe in motion, but Napoleon believed himself a match for them. The French battalions were the better organized and were commanded by a group of generals without equals in Europe, while at their head rode one of the greatest military strategists of all time. Moreover, Napoleon knew he would be fighting foreign governments rather than the nations they ruled, and he believed he could easily turn his foes against one another.

Admiration for revolutionary France

2. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ITALY

An Italian by descent, Napoleon knew that the people of Italy had learned during four centuries of oppression to hate the rule of the foreigner. He engaged their support by promising them liberty and self-government, and he prophesied that before long Italy would take her merited place among the powers as a strong and united nation. When he became president of the Cisalpine Republic (1802), he changed the title to Italian Republic, and the name stirred a patriotic response in the hearts of his new subjects. It seemed a further proof that the First Consul was working for Italian independence, and this hope long steeled the Italians to endure his exactions and to furnish men for his wars.

But in Italian affairs as elsewhere there was a wide divergence between Napoleon's pretended and his actual aims. Julius Caesar, it will be remembered, described Gaul when he first invaded it as divided into three parts. The modern Caesar returned the compliment, for he divided Italy into three parts and maintained the division. It had been a maxim of statecraft since Roman times that a country is more easily held in subjection when it is partitioned, and Napoleon feared that a strong and united Italian state, once formed, would prove difficult to control.

In 1805, the Italian Republic became the Italian Kingdom, but it still included only about one third of the peninsula. Napoleon came to

Milan as a modern Charlemagne, to be crowned with the iron crown of the Lombard kings, and he designated his stepson, Eugène Beauharnais, as viceroy. In the following year the Parthenopean Republic was transformed into the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily with Napoleon's brother Joseph as king. The remaining Italian states were gradually annexed to France, Piedmont in 1801, the Ligurian Republic (Genoa), Parma, Piacenza, and Guastella in 1805, Tuscany and the Papal States including Rome in 1809. The map following page 720 shows the limits of the Italian Kingdom, the Kingdom of Naples, and French Italy, in 1810, when Napoleon's power was at its height. Note that the Illyrian Provinces, seized between 1806 and 1809, were not added to the Italian Kingdom, but were annexed to France.

Though Napoleon treated Italy as a vassal state, he introduced many beneficial reforms. The Inquisition was abolished, the feudal régime swept away, taxation more equitably apportioned, and justice administered according to the new codes. The bands of brigands which had long terrorized sections of Italy, particularly Naples, were ruthlessly suppressed. An attempt was made to reduce the illiteracy and superstition of the Italian masses by establishing a state school system, improvements in agriculture and in public hygiene were introduced, and roads, bridges, and parks constructed for public use. But ten years of enlightened administration could not cure the corruption and inertia into which Italy had declined, and the French reforms, like the promise of national unity, remained more of a hope than a reality. With Napoleon's downfall Italy once again found herself chained by the forces of reaction.

Benefits of French rule

3. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE GERMANIES

The three hundred or more states, large and small, which composed "the Germanies" were likewise destined to benefit from Napoleon's passion for rearrangement. His plan at first was merely to weaken Austria by strengthening lesser German principalities such as Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt. As France had annexed nearly a hundred small states on the left bank of the Rhine, he encouraged the German princes, dispossessed by these changes, to seek "compensation" by seizing ecclesiastical lands and free cities on the right bank. After Austria had been induced to consent (Peace of Lunéville, 1801), the German Diet authorized the procedure by a decree known as the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* (1803), and by 1806 two hundred small German states, too weak to defend themselves, had been swallowed up

by their larger neighbors. There were still nearly a hundred separate states in the empire, but a long stride had been taken toward a political consolidation of the Germanies.

Napoleon had no intention of welding Germany into a powerful and united empire any more than he planned to transform Italy into a single kingdom. But he knew that if the South German States owed their political aggrandizement to France, they would prove valuable allies in the event of a new war with Austria. He did not believe the Hapsburgs would allow him to usurp their leadership in German affairs without striking another blow, and when the new war came he wished to be prepared for it.

With Great Britain hostilities had broken out again in 1803. The English prime minister, William Pitt (the Younger), was a son of that resolute minister who had helped to strip France of her colonies in the Seven Years' War.[1] The Younger Pitt proved an equally implacable foe of French ascendancy. Napoleon, when he found a renewal of war inevitable, determined to concentrate a fleet of transports at Boulogne and other French ports for a blow against England. "If we are masters of the Channel for six hours," he boasted with undue optimism, "we are masters of the world." To deflect the impending blow, Pitt stirred up resistance on the Continent, and pouring out gold with a lavish hand he persuaded Austria and Russia to join in the formation of a third coalition. Whether Napoleon seriously meditated a descent upon England has been doubted by some historians. If he did, he abandoned his campaign projects against his principal enemy without hesitation, and marching his divisions toward the Rhine with incredible rapidity he overwhelmed an Austrian army of fifty thousand men at Ulm (October 20, 1805).

The war of the third coalition (1805–06)

One day later (October 21, 1805) an English fleet under Admiral Nelson (1758–1805) destroyed the combined French and Spanish[2] squadrons off Cape Trafalgar, a victory which cost Nelson his life, but assured the English control of the seas to the end of the war. Once again, as in Egypt, Napoleon had felt the might of British sea power, and once again he pressed on undeterred. December 2, 1805, the anniversary of his coronation as emperor, he attacked an Austro-Russian army at Austerlitz and completely defeated it. For the third time he had forced Austria to a humiliating peace. By the Treaty of Pressburg the South German States which had aided France were enlarged and declared independent, Bavaria and Württemberg becoming kingdoms.

[1] See above, page 627.

[2] Spain had been the passive ally of France since 1801.

Napoleon now made his German policy clearer by organizing these new kingdoms and a dozen lesser states into the Confederation of the Rhine, with himself as protector. The princes of the confederation agreed to support France in the field with sixty thousand men, and to renounce all connection with the Holy Roman Empire. On Napoleon's assertion that he no longer recognized a Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II agreed to abandon that title and style himself Francis I, Emperor of Austria, instead (1806). Such was the ignominious end of that impressive medieval empire, the rulers of which had traced their authority to Charlemagne and Augustus.


End of the Holy Roman Empire (1806)

The battle of Austerlitz shattered the third coalition and hastened the death of Pitt. "Roll up that map," he is reported to have said, pointing to a chart of Europe. "We shall not need it these ten years." Yet, as Napoleon complained, he had no sooner broken up the third coalition when a fourth threatened him. While pushing on his reorganization of the Germanies, Napoleon had kept Prussia neutral by promising Frederick William III Hanover and the leading rôle in a North German Confederation. Realizing by 1806 the hollowness of these promises, the Prussian war party persuaded Frederick William to defy France. But at Jena and Auerstädt, a double battle fought October 14, 1806, the Prussians learned that their army, famous since the days of Frederick the Great, was no match for the revolutionary tactics of the French. By the end of October, Napoleon was in Berlin. Pushing on he encountered a Russian force at Eylau (February, 1807) and fought it to a sanguinary draw. For the moment he was checked, but the following June he sought out the Russians again at Friedland and won a victory as conclusive though not so dramatic as that of Austerlitz or Jena.

Intervention of Prussia (1806)

The young Czar Alexander I was ready for peace, and Napoleon, who had learned to respect the fighting qualities of the Russians, was prepared to be generous. By flattering Alexander and offering him a free hand in dealing with Turkey and Finland, he won Russia to his side. But for Frederick William III of Prussia, who had so rashly yielded to warlike advice and defied him, he had no pity. Stripped of half its territory, Prussia became a second-class power with an army limited to forty-two thousand men. Prussian Poland Napoleon reconstructed as the "Grand Duchy of Warsaw," and the Prussian possessions west of the Elbe River he joined with some lesser states to form a new "Kingdom of Westphalia" for his brother Jerome. At the same time he secured control of the North German coastline to the Baltic,

Peace of Tilsit (1807)



WILLIAM PITT, THE YOUNGER
1759–1806

Precocious political talents made Pitt prime minister in 1784 *at the early age of twenty-five. After the outbreak of the French Revolution his resolute opposition to the expansion of French influence led the revolutionaries to proclaim him "the enemy of the human race."*

including the free cities of Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, and Danzig. North as well as South Germany was now in his control.[1]

The Peace of Tilsit marked the high tide of Napoleon's fortunes; after Tilsit, it has been said, he "began to attempt the impossible." Even his splendid mind was not immune to the insidious and corrupting influence of an unmeasured despotism. Hitherto he had extended his control less by conquest than by converting others to his projects, harmonizing their selfish aims with his own grand designs. Now he grew increasingly irritable at any form of criticism or opposition, and, while multiplying his own exactions, showed himself less willing to concede the desires of his allies and his vassals. He should have recalled how foreign interference after 1792 excited France to a militant protest, and have realized that his rough treatment of other nations must soon provoke them to a similar resentment. But this he failed to appreciate, misled very likely by the readiness with which the Austrian Netherlands, Italy, the Rhineland, and Poland had submitted to his control. These territories, disunited and misgoverned by their rulers, welcomed a change of masters, but when he humiliated independent national states such as Prussia, Spain, Portugal, and Russia, he unleashed the wrath of their people and united them behind their governments in a patriotic crusade.

Napoleon corrupted by power

4. NAPOLEON AND ENGLAND

The Nemesis of the Napoleonic Empire was Great Britain. With their colonial and commercial supremacy at stake, the English could not afford to compromise, and, as Napoleon found it impossible to strike at them directly, he decided to ruin this "nation of shopkeepers" by cutting off their trade. As master of the Continent he sought by his Berlin Decrees (1806) and Milan Decrees (1807) to close all European countries to English merchandise. By ruining the commercial classes which controlled Parliament he was confident he could bring the English government to sue for peace or face bankruptcy and revolution. He dared to stake the solidity of his empire on a test of strength and endurance, but the gamble was a gigantic one. It compelled him to close all the continental ports against England, and to stifle the hostility of Europe's millions who would be deprived of the English goods they desired to purchase.

The Continental System

The British struck back by issuing decrees known as "Orders in Council," by which they hoped to regulate trade so as to force their own

[1] See map following page 720.

wares upon Europe while strangling the export trade of France and her allies. The French emperor believed that Britain, if unable to sell goods, would have to pay for necessary purchases abroad in gold, thus depleting her reserves, straining her credit, and dislocating her economic structure, while unsold products glutted her warehouses. The outcome belied his hopes. Though suffering severely from the curtailment of markets, British merchants and manufacturers still managed to defy the Continental System. Napoleon on his part found that the system was enormously difficult to maintain, and it led him into expedients which undoubtedly hastened his fall.

The principal points of entry for British goods were the German ports such as Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen, the Dutch ports, and Lisbon in Portugal. These Napoleon endeavored to control, but goods were still smuggled into Germany, Louis Bonaparte enforced the system leniently in Holland, and the Portuguese refused to drive the English ships from Lisbon. Napoleon, therefore, dispatched an army to Portugal (1807). The following year he forced the stupid Spanish king, Charles IV, to resign, and appointed his brother Joseph Bonaparte to the vacant throne. To subjugate Spain would require some twenty-five thousand men, he imagined, and take only a few months. But he underestimated three serious obstacles: (1) the mountainous nature of the country which favored guerrilla tactics; (2) the stubborn patriotism of the Spanish people; (3) the military assistance which Great Britain might render to the Spaniards. In the end Napoleon found ten times twenty-five thousand men insufficient to quell the Spanish resistance, although he came in person to supervise operations. The expeditionary force which the English sent to Spain, brilliantly commanded by Sir Arthur Wellesley, later Duke of Wellington, contributed in no small measure to the decline of Napoleon's military hegemony, particularly after 1810.

The Austrian war of 1809

From Spain Napoleon was summoned hastily to the Danube (1809), where Austria, somewhat prematurely as it proved, had proclaimed a war for the liberation of the Germanies. Although he seized Vienna (May, 1809), Napoleon suffered a check at Aspern and had to call up reserves before he repaired his hazardous plight by the victory of Wagram. In the Treaty of Schönbrunn, Austria yielded territory to Russia, to Bavaria, and to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and acknowledged the French annexation of the Illyrian Provinces.

Nevertheless, Napoleon recognized that for a moment his fortune had wavered. He was impressed by the refashioned Austrian battalions

(the Archduke Charles was learning by defeat) and angered at the bad faith of the Russians. Alexander had failed as an ally, for it was in his power to keep Austria harmless if he really willed it. These circumstances moved Napoleon to substitute Austria for Russia as the pivot of his European system. In 1810, after divorcing his first wife, Josephine, he married Marie Louise, daughter of the Hapsburg Emperor Francis I. Two years later, France and Austria contracted a defensive and offensive alliance, but this union of the youngest and the oldest dynasties in Europe had a touch of the fantastic about it. The Hapsburgs might overlook the humiliation of Campo Formio, of Lunéville, of Pressburg and Schönbrunn, but they could not forget the traditions of a thousand years wedding them to the old régime.

The Austro-French alliance

5. THE RUSSIAN DISASTER AND THE WAR OF LIBERATION

The Franco-Russian Alliance, born at Tilsit in 1807, dissolved rapidly after 1810. Dislike of the Continental System and of Napoleon's Austrian marriage; resentment at the French annexation of the North German coast which dispossessed the czar's relative, the Duke of Oldenburg; apprehension at the choice of a Napoleonic marshal, Bernadotte, as heir to the King of Sweden — all these factors poisoned Alexander's friendship. But the gravest injury was the secret hope Napoleon held out to the Poles that they might recover their independence, for Russia held the greater part of Poland and Alexander had no intention of yielding it.

Nor did Napoleon lack grievances on his side. He reproached Alexander for failing in his promise to exclude all English products from his dominions, and he was alarmed when the czar stole a march on him by offering the Poles independence under Russian protection (1812). He had come to view his erstwhile friend as a "shifty Byzantine," and abandoning negotiations he concluded a military alliance with Austria and moved half a million men toward the Russian frontier. "What is the road to Moscow?" he demanded of the last of Alexander's envoys. "Sire," was the proud rejoinder, "one takes the road to Moscow at will. Charles XII chose the route by Pultava." [1] Napoleon knew the fate of the mad Swedish king who had marched on Moscow a century before, but he disregarded the lesson.

Rupture of the Franco-Russian alliance

Through the heat and dust of summer the Grand Army pressed forward, defeated the Russians at Borodino (September 7, 1812), and found

[1] For the Russian campaign of Charles XII, see page 601.


NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE
AT ITS HEIGHT
SCALE OF MILES
0 100 200 300
Empire of Napoleon
Dependent States
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
ENGLAND
WALES
NORTH SEA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
BALTIC SEA
HELIGOLAND
DENMARK
ESTHONIA
LIVONIA
KURLAND
RUSSIA
RUSSIAN EMPIRE
GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW
POMERANIA
PRUSSIA
CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE
KINGD. OF WESTPHALIA
KINGD. OF SAXONY
BAVARIA
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIAN EMPIRE
HUNGARY
GALICIA
MOLDAVIA
BESSARABIA
BLACK SEA
KINGD. OF ITALY
LOMBARDY
KINGDOM OF NAPLES
SICILY
CORSICA
SARDINIA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
CRETE
Longitude West
Longitude East

Moscow a deserted city. For five weeks Napoleon camped in the Russian capital waiting for overtures of peace from Alexander which never came. Fires of mysterious origin leveled three quarters of the city, provisions ran low, and disorder spread through the ranks, until on October 18, Napoleon reluctantly gave the order to withdraw. The slow retreat became a nightmare of horror as hunger and frost decimated the ragged troops while Cossacks rode out of the blizzard to cut down the stragglers. When Napoleon recrossed the river Niemen in December, less than one fifth of the Grand Army remained to him. Some of his men were captives, many had deserted, but a quarter of a million had paid for his mad gamble with their lives.

The retreat from Moscow (1812)

The Russian campaign destroyed the myth that Napoleon was invincible. In 1813, with a hastily conscripted army, he found himself defending his hegemony in the Germanies against Russia, Prussia, and finally Austria. After their defeat at Jena in 1806, the Prussians had set quietly to work under the patriotic Baron vom Stein and Chancellor Hardenberg to reform their army, abolish serfdom and other social abuses, and prepare themselves, despite Napoleon's watchful eye, for a "War of Liberation." At the "Battle of the Nations" (or battle of Leipzig), October 16–19, 1813, Napoleon was decisively defeated by the allies and compelled to retreat across the Rhine. His grand empire collapsed almost overnight, his confederates deserted him, and the opening months of 1814 found him on the defensive in France itself, attacked at five different points by armies which totaled over four hundred thousand men.

"War of Liberation" in the Germanies (1813)

Before the battle of Leipzig, Napoleon might have had peace if he would have contented himself with retaining France and her natural frontiers; after that, with hope almost gone, he fought on in a defensive campaign as brilliant as it was desperate. His fortunes had changed, but not his character, and the egotism, the audacity, the gambler's faith in his luck which had extricated him from earlier dilemmas now became vices which betrayed him, lending a deeper truth to his boast that "Character is Destiny." On March 31, the allied forces entered Paris, and Napoleon, who was a few miles away at Fontainebleau, agreed to abdicate. He was granted a pension of two million francs a year and sovereignty over the little island of Elba, near his native Corsica in the Mediterranean Sea. The French Senate decreed the restoration of the Bourbon line, in the person of Louis XVIII, brother of the unfortunate Louis XVI who had been guillotined in 1793. The little dauphin, son of Louis XVI, who

Abdication of Napoleon (April, 1814)

died in a Paris prison in 1795, had been styled Louis XVII by the royalists, although he had never reigned.

6. THE HUNDRED DAYS

This settlement satisfied the victorious powers, Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria. They allowed France to retain the boundaries of 1792, and imposed no indemnity, fearing to excite further resistance from that exhausted but still redoubtable nation. Moreover, since they had decided to restore the Bourbons, they could not very plausibly have offered them a dismembered state. Louis XVIII was urged to be moderate. He acknowledged the impossibility of undoing the work of the revolution and granted his new subjects a constitutional charter. There was to be a lower chamber elected by limited franchise and an upper chamber of hereditary peers after the fashion of the English Parliament. Louis retained the efficient bureaucracy established by Napoleon, and preserved almost unchanged the administrative centralization, the system of finance and taxation, and the legal codes which he found in force. He also did what he could to soften the hostility between the royalist followers who returned with him from exile and the imperial officials who had risen to power under Napoleon.

Many high dignitaries of the empire had foreseen Napoleon's fall in time to negotiate with his enemies. The urbane Talleyrand regained the portfolio of foreign affairs, although Louis XVIII could not forbear to remind him that he had dug the grave of three previous administrations. Talleyrand acknowledged the imputation. "There seems to be an inexplicable something in me, sire," he hinted, "that brings bad luck to governments that neglect me." But, however readily courtiers might turn their coats and serve a new master, the middle class and the peasants of France learned within a very few months to dislike and distrust the restoration government. They found Louis XVIII a colorless figure after Napoleon's fiery energy, and they feared to see the returning *émigrés* and priests regain the privileged position they had enjoyed before 1789. France had been thoroughly weary of Napoleon at the time of his abdication, but after nine months of Bourbon rule, people began to think more kindly of him, and to contrast his glorious achievements with the mediocre compromises of a king who had returned "in the baggage wagons of the allied armies."

This change in sentiment offered Napoleon the chance for a last fling at fortune. In February, 1815, he slipped away from Elba, and landing at Cannes, March 1, he started for Paris on what proved a veritable

tour of triumph. The troops dispatched to arrest him deserted to his standard, the Bourbons fled at his approach, and by March 20 he was back in his capital. His belief that the French would support him had proved right; his hope that the allies would not oppose him proved wrong.

Last flight of the eagle

For at Vienna, where the diplomats were already quarreling over the spoils, the news of Napoleon's escape brought swift unanimity. Prussia and Russia had been on the verge of war with Austria and England, but the four powers hastily composed their differences and concentrated their forces. Realizing that he must fight to keep his throne, Napoleon set feverishly to work organizing an army. To rally France to his side he outdid himself with promises. The Bourbons "had learned nothing and had forgotten nothing," but for himself he swore he had profited by past errors and would initiate a liberal régime and abandon wars of conquest. But he knew that his fate must first be decided on the battlefield, and that his only chance was to repulse his foes separately.

On June 16 he hurled back a Prussian corps advancing through Belgium, then turned to face a second army gathered near Brussels under the command of the Duke of Wellington. "I tell you Wellington is a poor general, the English are poor soldiers, we will settle the matter by lunch time," he insisted to his marshals. "I sincerely hope so," responded Soult, who had faced Wellington in Spain and knew better. Throughout the day Wellington held his position against the most desperate assaults, the Prussians under the redoubtable Blücher returned in time to aid him, and by nightfall Napoleon's army was completely routed. This was the battle of Waterloo, June 18, 1815.

Battle of Waterloo (1815)

Abdicating a second time, Napoleon chose to surrender to the English. "I come, like Themistocles," he wrote the prince regent, "to claim hospitality at the hearth of the British people." For the security of Europe, the British government decided to imprison him on the lonely island of Saint Helena in the South Atlantic. There he beguiled the oppressive days dictating memoirs to explain and justify his career, and there, on May 5, 1821, he died.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE VIENNA CONGRESS

Universal expectation has perhaps never been raised to such a pitch. Men had promised themselves an all-embracing reform of the political system of Europe, guaranties for universal peace; in a word, the return of the Golden Age.


. . . The real purpose of the Congress was to divide amongst the conquerors the spoils taken from the vanquished.

FREDERICK VON GENTZ.

THE overthrow of Napoleon brought the revolutionary era to a close. For twenty-five years Europe had been convulsed by war and social ferment, many landmarks of the old régime had been swept away, thrones had toppled, church lands had been secularized, nobles had lost their estates, while hitherto unprivileged commoners climbed to power and office. The new aristocracy which Napoleon created, as already pointed out, was an aristocracy of talent. His ablest marshals rose from the ranks, his officials won their promotion by ability and not by birth. It was largely for this reason that the administration of the empire functioned with an energy and efficiency unknown in the older governments of Europe, and it was natural that Napoleon, with his love of order, should have endeavored to extend the revolutionary reforms throughout the Continent. To do for Europe what had been done for France, to link the disparate states by a uniform code of law, a universal system of weights and measures and coinage, to free trade from frontier tolls and promote it by transcontinental highways, to end national wars by establishing a Roman peace under the hegemony of France — such was the imperial dream at which the Corsican had clutched. But the hostile powers had no faith in his design and refused to submit to it. His titanic struggle with Great Britain corrupted the scheme and the national resentment which he stirred up in Spain and the Germanies ruined it. Europe, weary of this inveterate trouble-maker with his mania for rearranging things, banished him to the lonely island of Saint Helena for the last six years of his life.

1. THE CONGRESS ASSEMBLES

In combining against Napoleon, the associated governments had proclaimed him the enemy of peace and of humanity, and laid upon his head all responsibility for the suffering and bloodshed. In fighting him, the people were assured, they were fighting to end tyranny and social injustice. Many believed this, and made the sacrifices demanded



ARTHUR WELLESLEY, DUKE OF WELLINGTON
1769–1852

The leading traits in Wellington's character were his remarkable self-discipline and moderation, which inspired the British poet laureate, Alfred Tennyson, to laud him as

Rich in saving common-sense,
And, as the greatest only are,
In his simplicity sublime.

of them in a high spirit of idealism. They looked to the Congress of Vienna not only to re-establish peace, but to remake European society and lay the foundations of a fairer world. Such idealistic hopes are needed to sustain men in the heat of a great struggle. Frederick von Gentz, a Prussian statesman who acted as secretary for the congress, noted these golden expectations in a passage quoted at the head of this chapter, and being a shrewd man he knew that they could never be fulfilled. Whatever settlement the congress reached was certain to disappoint a great many people. The evil that wars do lives after them, leaving a heritage of hatred and jealousy to becloud the peace discussions and corrupt whatever generous intentions the delegates may possess. The Vienna Congress was no exception to this rule. It was, moreover, an assemblage of statesmen and rulers; the common people had no voice in it, no legitimate means to make their wishes known, or to show their approval or disapproval of the decisions taken. The princes and their ministers were to make the peace and the people would have to put their trust in princes.

Hopes vested in the peace conference

For, with the tempest of war and revolution over, "kings crept out again to feel the sun," and many nobles and churchmen, remembering how pleasant life had been (for them) in the days before 1789, planned a return to the old régime. They hoped to re-establish the obsolete class distinctions of an older day, to rebuild the forts of privilege, restore society to its ancient foundations, and make the world safe from democracy. Europe, wearied by too many and too rapid changes, was to plunge from an era of revolution into an era of reaction.

In this temporary triumph of conservatism over liberalism, Austria played a leading part. The empire of the Hapsburgs was still a land of the old régime. Stricken repeatedly by Napoleon's swift blows, Austria had emerged toughened and consolidated by her reverses, and had been able to hurl her forces against the "Son of the Revolution" with decisive energy in 1813 when he was already wavering in the saddle. The choice of Vienna as the seat of the peace conference was a tacit recognition of this revival in Austrian prestige, for it seemed natural and fitting that a congress of reactionaries should choose for their sessions the capital of the most reactionary state in Europe.

Recovery of Austria

The leading Austrian statesman in 1814 was Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince von Metternich (1773–1859), the self-appointed spokesman of the reactionary forces of the day. As host to his fellow delegates at the conference, Metternich had an opportunity to display his unrivaled diplomatic gifts and

Rôle of Prince Metternich

to labor for a settlement which would undo the work of the revolution while exalting the position of his imperial master, Francis I. Metternich was an egotist who believed that he had been selected by Providence to re-establish the fortunes and the security of the Hapsburg Empire on a firm foundation. But as Austria was a land of the old régime, it could be preserved in tranquillity only if Europe were rendered as static as possible, with the privileged classes once more in power. Metternich sided, therefore, both by policy and inclination, with those who regarded the French Revolution as an unparalleled disaster inspired by false and irresponsible reasoning. Liberty and equality, as preached by the Jacobins, he recognized as subversive and disintegrating ideals which might have destroyed the Austrian Empire if they had not been checked. In politics, therefore, he argued that the safest methods were those which had been tried and tested; innovations, even when they promised great benefits, were likely to prove dangerous because they outran control and often destroyed what they sought to improve. As the old proverb had it, "the best is often the enemy of the good." Beguiled by the siren voices of demagogues and dreamers, the French people had attempted to introduce radical reforms with the result that Europe was plunged into twenty-five years of confusion and bloodshed. To repair the damage and to guard against a recurrence of such disorders, Metternich regarded as a practical duty. "To the dreamers," he admitted frankly, "I have never belonged."

With one notable exception his princely colleagues at the conference shared the Austrian chancellor's views. The exception was Alexander I of Russia (1801–25). A grandson of that enlightened empress, Catherine the Great, Alexander had been tutored in his youth by liberal thinkers. The desire of the Poles for national unity and of the French for constitutional government struck a responsive chord in his heart which caused Metternich grave apprehension. It seemed incongruous that a prince born to rule despotically over a great empire like Russia should harbor genuine sympathy for popular causes. To his fellow monarchs Alexander's character appeared a curious blend of piety and hypocrisy, of mystical concern for the welfare of humanity and hard-headed political acumen. His importance compelled them to treat the whims of this "crowned Hamlet" with deference, but in private they distrusted and feared him.

Czar Alexander I

The mediocre Prussian king, Frederick William III (1797–1840), was particularly subject to Alexander's influence. The czar had promised to help Prussia to obtain Saxony if Frederick William supported the Russian plans for Poland. The interests of Great Britain were ably

defended at the congress by the astute foreign minister, Castlereagh, and by the Duke of Wellington, who had defeated Napoleon at Waterloo. To represent France the newly restored Bourbon king, Louis XVIII, dispatched to Vienna the subtle and audacious Talleyrand. A bishop of the church under Louis XVI, and foreign minister under Napoleon, Talleyrand had offered his services to secure for France the best terms that could be wrung from defeat. For although loyalty to princes might be with him, as he confessed blandly, "a matter of dates," his loyalty to France did not falter.

The delegates of the lesser states were doomed to play an insignificant rôle, for the representatives of the "Big Four," Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, formed an inner circle and decided the most important questions with small regard for minority opinions. Into this charmed circle Talleyrand edged his way with the convenient principle of "legitimacy," a strange password in his mouth, but one which found favor with the victors. It should be the aim of the congress, Talleyrand suggested urbanely, to restore the states of Europe wherever possible to the control of their former rulers. This principle served France and the Bourbons well, for even after the "Hundred Days" the congress abstained from seizing territory "legitimately" French, and punished the nation instead by demanding an indemnity of seven hundred million francs on the payment of which all foreign troops were to be withdrawn. On the whole this was generous treatment to accord a defeated power, especially if it be compared with the terms meted out to Germany by the victorious allies a century later.

2. THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

It was not France, therefore, but her allies that paid a territorial forfeit. The great powers, while professing at Vienna their earnest desire for a just settlement, were in reality guided (1) by their greed for compensation to defray the enormous costs of the war, and (2) by their anxiety to erect safeguards against a fresh wave of French expansion. The final act of the congress, embodying these aims, was signed June 9, 1815, and a brief survey of its provisions will reveal how the spoils taken from the vanquished were divided among the victors.

Austria

Austria acquired once again a deciding voice in the affairs of Italy and the Germanies as well as increased territory. The Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) were not restored; but in compensation Austria gained Salzburg and the Tyrol, the Illyrian Provinces, and (in Italy) Venice and Milan and dynastic control over the


EUROPE
IN 1815
SCALE OF MILES
0 100 200 300 400 500
P - Parma M - Modena
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
BAY OF BISCAY
ENGLAND
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
FRANCE
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
PRUSSIA
AUSTRIA
RUSSIA
SWEDEN
NORWAY
DENMARK
SWITZERLAND
ITALY
TURKEY
GREECE
ALGIERS
MOROCCO
BARBARY
TRIPOLI
ARABIA
Longitude West from Greenwich
Longitude East from Greenwich

duchies of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany.[1] No attempt was made to revive the defunct Holy Roman Empire. Instead, the thirty-eight German states were loosely organized into a Germanic Confederation at the Diet of which the Austrian delegate presided.

The Germanies

Many liberal and patriotic Germans had hoped to see their fatherland take its place among the powers as a strong and united empire. But the petty jealousies of the German princes and the ancient rivalry of Austria and Prussia rendered the fulfillment of this dream impossible at the time, although the cause of German unity had received a powerful stimulus during the revolutionary era. Politically, the Germanies had been reduced from over three hundred states to thirty-eight, a long step toward ultimate unity. A spirit of national patriotism had developed rapidly during the War of Liberation against Napoleon, and had found expression in the teaching of philosophers like Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in the poems of Theodor Körner and Ernst Moritz Arndt, and the broad-visioned labors of statesmen like the Baron vom Stein. Napoleon, by his aggressive interference, had hastened the political consolidation and stimulated the national spirit of the Germans. Indirectly and unwittingly he had made himself the godfather of the later German Empire. But in 1815 the time was not yet ripe and the ideal of a united Germany remained a frustrated dream.

Prussia

The peace conference was delayed for a time in its discussion of German affairs by the immoderate demands of Prussia. The Saxon king, Frederick Augustus, had been slow in deserting Napoleon, and to punish him the Prussian government proposed to annex the whole of Saxony. Austria, France, and Great Britain were prepared to oppose such a step by force of arms if necessary, and Prussia in the end received only two fifths of Saxony, but gained Swedish Pomerania on the Baltic and further possessions on the lower Rhine. It was hoped that these Rhineland annexations would make it possible for Prussia to maintain a "watch on the Rhine" and protect the German people from the danger of a new French invasion. The rulers of the house of Hohenzollern thus acquired a tutelary rôle in the affairs of the North German States which was equivalent to an international recognition of their leadership.

Russia

The handsome and enigmatic young Russian czar, Alexander I, helped himself to an immodest share of the spoils. Finland, seized from Sweden in 1809, and Bessarabia, conquered from Turkey in 1812, he proposed to retain; while Poland was to be reconstructed as an independent kingdom under Russian protection, with himself as

[1] See map following page 728.

king. Austria firmly declined to cede her Polish territory for such a purpose, but the czar gained a slice of Prussian Poland, added it to the lion's share which he already possessed, and announced himself king of a united Poland. He even bid for the loyalty of his Polish subjects by granting them a constitution, to the disgust and apprehension of Metternich who distrusted such concessions to popular desires.

Great Britain

For Great Britain, as banker of the successive coalitions, the wars had proved enormously expensive. The British national debt quadrupled in a quarter of a century, largely as a result of loans to other countries which were never repaid. The British rewarded themselves, however, by expanding their trade and adding to their colonies. Malta and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean Sea, Tobago, Trinidad, Saint Lucia, Honduras, and part of Dutch Guiana in the New World, Capetown in South Africa, Mauritius and Ceylon in the Indian Ocean — all passed under the British flag. The Congress of Vienna failed to regulate the abuse initiated by British men-of-war of searching neutral vessels on the high seas. Nor, although this high-handed practice had precipitated a war between Great Britain and the United States in 1812, was the "right of search" defined when these two countries concluded the Treaty of Ghent in 1814. The British had secured an unparalleled predominance upon the Seven Seas, and they were determined to brook no curb upon the exercise of their naval supremacy.

The fate of the lesser states

In readjusting the claims of the lesser states, the diplomats evinced a callous disregard for national aspirations and popular preferences, bartering and subdividing densely inhabited areas as if they had been so much vacant real estate. To strengthen Holland, for instance, and compensate the Dutch for the loss of Capetown and Ceylon (which the English declined to restore), Belgium was joined to Holland to form the Kingdom of the Netherlands under William I of the house of Orange (1813–40). The Belgian provinces, which had been administered successively by Spain, Austria, and France, thus passed under Dutch control despite the opposition of their inhabitants. In the same fashion, Sweden received Norway, having lost Swedish Pomerania to Prussia and Finland to Russia; but in compensating the Swedes the diplomats paid scant attention to the wishes of the Norwegians. Norway had been administered by the Danish kings for over four centuries, but the Dano-Norwegian Kingdom was split as a punishment to the Danes for supporting Napoleon overlong. Even worse treatment awaited the Italian people whose desire for self-government and national unity was completely overridden. Only the Kingdom

of Sardinia survived as an autonomous state under the house of Savoy, strengthened, indeed, by the addition of Genoa the better to serve as a check on French expansion in the south. Of the remaining Italian provinces, Venetia and Lombardy were in Austrian hands; Parma, Lucca, Modena, and Tuscany were restored to princes who looked to Vienna for their instructions; the States of the Church passed again under the theocratic rule of Pius VII; while Naples and Sicily accepted the return of that despicable scion of the Spanish Bourbons, Ferdinand I, of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The principle of legitimacy was extended to Spain also, where the crafty and unscrupulous Ferdinand VII (1813–33) hastened to re-establish the Inquisition, welcome back the Jesuits, and surround himself with all the symbols of despotism which the French had suppressed.

3. THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

To maintain peace and safeguard the Vienna settlement, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain extended their wartime coalition into the post-war era, and pledged themselves to preserve a common agreement in international affairs by means of frequent congresses. After 1818, France was admitted to a sort of conditional membership and the Quadruple Alliance became in reality a Quintuple Alliance. This putative attempt at a League of Nations is usually called the Concert of Europe and it functioned with comparative success for several years after 1815. Congresses called under this plan assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), at Troppau (1820), at Laibach (1821), and at Verona (1822), but already by 1820 the divergent policies of the great powers had crippled the co-operative project, and it finally broke down for reasons to be explained in the following chapter. Great Britain, never friendly to the idea of permanent alliances, was the first of the powers to resume a position of diplomatic isolation; further rifts developed among the remaining members of the concert, and by 1825 the British minister Canning was able to declare with satisfaction, "Europe is once more back to the situation in which every nation is for itself, and God for all." His words might serve as an epitaph for the Concert of Europe, and marked the dissolution of one more attempt at international co-operation.

The Quadruple Alliance

Because it appeared to stand for the preservation of legitimacy and the *status quo*, the Quadruple Alliance was bitterly hated by all apostles of liberty and progress. In their denunciations they sometimes confused it with a second league formed at the same

The Holy Alliance

time and known as the Holy Alliance. The concept of the Holy Alliance, propounded by Alexander I in one of his more mystical and pious moods, was accepted by his deferential fellow monarchs with considerable skepticism. The czar proposed in all seriousness that the princes of Europe should pledge themselves "to take for their sole guide the precepts of the Holy Religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace..."; and that they should base their reciprocal relations as well as their conduct toward their subjects "upon the sublime truths which the Holy Religion of our Saviour teaches...." Unlike the Quadruple Alliance, which was a political compact between nations, the Holy Alliance was no more than a moral pledge subscribed to by the monarchs. Though Castlereagh expressed the general opinion when he called it "a sublime piece of mysticism and nonsense," all the princes of Europe signed the text except the Prince Regent of Great Britain, the pope (who declined to enter such an agreement with non-Catholics), and the Sultan of Turkey whom it was considered superfluous to approach. Despite its lofty phrases this "sonorous nothing" had no discernible effect upon the cynical diplomacy of the time, and liberals and republicans denounced it as a nauseating example of princely hypocrisy. Yet it would be unfair to Alexander and some of his colleagues to doubt that they were sincere in their wish to see a new era of human brotherhood succeed the slaughter and sacrifice of the war years. Great wars instill such a vivid impression of their horror and destructiveness that they are always followed by an earnest desire to avoid future conflicts. It is the tragedy of such good resolutions that they always come too late and are forgotten too early.

In 1815, the tragedy of war had burned itself so deeply into the hearts and minds of men that the generation which had witnessed the retreat from Moscow and the slaughter at Leipzig could never be tricked into thinking of war as a romantic and chivalrous game. The impression of its horrors, however, faded with the years; already by 1830 a new generation was growing up to which Napoleon was almost a myth and war an untried adventure; but it was not until 1854 that Europe beheld again the outbreak of a major conflict between the great powers. That forty years' interval of comparative peace is the longest in modern European history. Part of the credit for it must go to the statesmen who shaped the Vienna settlement, for if the primary purpose of a peace conference is to make a peace as permanent as possible they were unusually successful. The merit of their work, however, has been ignored because it was overshadowed by the defects; the problems they solved are obscured by the problems they failed to solve or for which they found the wrong

solution. This is natural, for it is the unsolved problems that focus attention on themselves and make subsequent history.

4. DEFECTS OF THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT

Most of the diplomats who assembled at Vienna were unaware that the eighteenth century was over. They had been trained to serve the dynastic interests of princes, had inherited the aristocrat's disdain for the masses, and saw no reason to consult by a plebiscite or other democratic device the peoples whose fate they were deciding. This disregard for democracy and contempt for national sentiment betrayed the congress into a succession of blunders the rankling injustice of which undermined the stability of the international settlement.

In five important cases where the congress sought to fix political frontiers in defiance of national sentiments, its work was later reversed. The enforced union of Belgium and Holland lasted only fifteen years, for Belgium broke away in 1830. Norway, unhappy in its union with Sweden, finally secured its independence in 1905. The Italians, resenting the rule of the restored Hapsburg and Bourbon princelings, drove them out and succeeded in realizing their dream of a free and united Italy by 1870. In the same year the German people, doomed by the congress to disunion and impotence, saw the triumph of their deferred hopes in the proclamation of a German Empire. Last of all, Poland, the iniquitous dismemberment of which the congress perpetuated, emerged again in 1919 as the independent Polish Republic. The diplomats of 1815 lacked the foresight and the courage to provide for these developments because they underestimated the force of nationalism.

The attempt to defend legitimacy and to preserve what remained of the old régime against the rising tide of democracy proved equally futile in the end. It was not difficult, in the wave of reaction, to place princes back on their thrones, but no settlement could have been devised in 1815 to make those thrones secure. All that the Congress of Vienna and the governments of the restoration could do was to check the revolutionary movements for the moment, drive them underground, and usher in a decade or two of severe reaction. The next chapter will trace the history of Europe during these years of reaction from 1815 to 1830, when the conservatives labored with maximum success to keep society "frozen" and to chain the forces of liberalism and nationalism. The attempt was foredoomed to failure because liberalism and nationalism were the most vital and dynamic forces of the nineteenth century and they were working from the first to disturb the Vienna settlement.

Section D

THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

(1815–71)

Inspired by the example of the French revolutionists, the unprivileged classes in other European countries agitated for similar reforms during the turbulent era, 1789–1815, *and the victories of the French armies spread the influence of the revolution across Europe. But in their struggle to preserve and to extend the new ideals, Frenchmen became extremely nationalistic. Napoleon's ruthless treatment of neighboring countries, even when it led to beneficial reforms, stimulated the patriotic resentment of Germans, Dutch, Spaniards, etc. When the revolutionary era closed with Napoleon's overthrow, it left behind as a heritage to nineteenth-century Europe an intensified and mounting spirit of nationalism, and a conquering faith in liberalism, which, though it was temporarily checked by the Restoration, was destined to revive and spread. When the bourgeois class had rallied and consolidated their victory, they were to dominate nineteenth-century society.*

It is important to note, however, that the typical bourgeois, although liberal in principle when fighting for power, was generally conservative in his attitude toward the lowest classes, especially the city proletariat, when these in turn demanded full political recognition. This division of interests frequently paralyzed the liberal movement at critical moments. Note also that the sentiment of nationalism, which tended to grow more intense among all the European peoples during the nineteenth century, sometimes worked in harmony with, sometimes in opposition to, the spirit of liberalism.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE ERA OF RESTORATION AND REACTION

In striving to reweld the chain of time, broken by a fatal interlude [i.e., the French Revolution], we have expunged from our memory — as we would that they might be expunged from History — all the evils which have afflicted the country during our absence.

LOUIS XVIII, *Preamble to the Charter of 1814.*

Yet, Freedom! yet thy banner, torn but flying,
Streams like a thunder-storm against the wind;
Thy trumpet voice, though broken now and dying,
The loudest still the tempest leaves behind.

LORD BYRON (1818).

WHEN the news of the capture of the Bastille first spread through Europe in 1789, it excited many favorable comments. Few contemporaries foresaw, in that bright dawn of the revolution, the profounder implications of the movement, or guessed that the thunder of its repercussions would soon shake the entire continent. But the mob violence, the Reign of Terror, and the long ordeal of the revolutionary wars brought discredit upon the whole movement and taught people to undervalue its real achievements. This change of mood made the more stable society of the old régime appear almost attractive in contrast to the turbulence and slaughter the revolution had brought with it, so that many people, after Napoleon's fall, were ready to welcome a period of restoration and reaction.

1. THE REACTION FROM THE AGE OF RATIONALISM

The philosophy of conservatism

One of the first statesmen to sound a note of warning on the developments in France was Edmund Burke (1729–97), whose *Reflections on the French Revolution* (1790) attacked the principles on which the revolutionary ideologists built their hopes. They erred, Burke submitted, in their conviction that society could be radically transformed in a brief period, that ancient institutions could be remodeled overnight as it were. In their impatience with the old and their zeal for the new they had allowed themselves to be carried away by the belief that it was possible to tear out the scribbled pages of the past and start humanity afresh with a clean sheet. To confront this revolutionary or cataclysmic theory of reform, Burke offered the sober principle of the continuity of history. Each generation, he reasoned, is but one link in a lengthening chain. It is not for us, the creatures of a day, to decide what part of the heritage of

the ages we will preserve, what part we will remodel or destroy. We are not the owners, but only the custodians, of humanity's baggage. It would be presumption on our part to discard old customs and institutions because their purpose is not clear to us; no one generation should set itself up as judge of society's future needs; the ties which knit together a state or a people have a mystical sanctity, and the rationalist who strikes right and left in a fanatical desire for progress may end by destroying the vital but intangible forces which preserve a civilization. To Burke, Reason did not seem an entirely safe guide. "We ought to venerate where we are unable presently to comprehend," he insisted. He distrusted the revolutionaries because they envisaged man, not as he was, but as he might be or ought to be; they were ideologists who expected human nature to perfect itself to fit their formulas. But "the lines of morality are not like the ideal lines of mathematics," Burke pointed out, and his challenge marked the waning of the Age of Reason.

As the revolution spread and its excesses mounted, the conservative classes of Europe found Burke's arguments more and more convincing, and his masterpiece became a bible for the reactionaries. The revolution, its enemies contended, might seem to promise advantages, but experience proved them illusory, for in the outcome the sacrifices outweighed the gains. Revolutionists made the old mistake of the dog in the fable, which, crossing a bridge with a piece of meat in its mouth, saw reflected in the brook below another dog with a morsel even more juicy and attractive. Dropping its own prize, the dog plunged into the water, sacrificed the substance for the shadow, and emerged with neither. In similar fashion the Jacobins had clutched at the vision of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and plunged Europe into chaos.

Distrust of the intellectuals

Between 1789 and 1815 this distrust of radical experiments filtered through all classes and the people of Europe underwent a change of mood. The monarchs who returned to their thrones after Napoleon's downfall were convinced that Louis XVI had ended his life on the guillotine because he yielded to liberal advice. They blamed the enlightened despots of the eighteenth century also for preparing the way to revolution by experimenting with reforms and encouraging the radical doctrines of writers like Voltaire and Diderot. That day was now past. After 1815, liberal writers who dared to comment freely upon political abuses were viewed with hostility. Princes no longer honored them nor read their books; instead they suppressed such criticism and persecuted the authors of it. Painters, sculptors, and musicians were tolerated because their work

did not lend itself readily to propaganda, but so long as the fear of the great revolution endured (and it lasted far into the nineteenth century), all liberal poets, philosophers, and pamphleteers were viewed with suspicion and treated with official disfavor.

The statesmen of the restoration believed likewise that the decay of organized religion in the eighteenth century, the prevalence of skepticism, deism, and atheism, had done much to weaken morals and promote revolution. In restoring Pius VII to his Italian domain, the Congress of Vienna sought to revive the former authority of the Roman Catholic Church. The Society of Jesus, suppressed in 1773, obtained permission to reorganize; ecclesiastical censorship grew more severe; and many secular governments renewed obsolete statutes against blasphemy and heresy. In Spain and Italy this revival of orthodoxy stifled audacious speculation, and the schools, restored to the supervision of the priesthood, remained inadequate and unprogressive. Even in France, home of revolutionary principles, Catholicism had a powerful revival, the writings of François-René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848) and the arguments of Joseph de Maistre (1754–1821) converting many to the defense of papal absolutism. But ultramontanism — that is, the practice of appealing "beyond the mountains" (the Alps) to the pope at Rome as the supreme authority of the Catholic world — did not find favor with secular rulers. Monarchs might be anxious to renew the historic alliance of "altar and throne" against the forces of revolution which threatened both, but in reviving the spiritual authority of the church, they had no intention of restoring the political authority also, as it had functioned in medieval times. They regarded religion as a convenient handmaid of absolutism, and they expected the clergy, for favors received, to teach the people submissiveness and gratitude toward their rulers.

Revival of organized religion

In Protestant countries a new awakening of religious fervor had already stirred the common people in the eighteenth century. The German Pietists repudiated dogmatism and lifeless ritual in pursuit of a more intense and personal faith, and reanimated the Lutheran Church with their pure zeal for the Christian life. In England the passionate preaching of John and Charles Wesley spread the movement known as Methodism and induced many people to experience the sense of a "new birth." These religious revivals helped to elevate the morals of the poorer classes, to stir compassion for the sick and needy, and to direct attention to the wretched inmates of prisons and asylums. In their humanitarian zeal (though in little else) the revivalists were in harmony with the rationalists. "Humani-

Protestant sects

tarianism" was the only tenet in the creed of the *philosophes* which survived the revolution unimpaired and won favor with the society of the restoration. The strength of the sentiment is manifested in the abolition of the slave trade by the Congress of Vienna, in the spirit animating the text of Alexander's Holy Alliance, and the abandonment of branding, flogging, and other "cruel and unusual punishments" in the prisons.

2. THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT

Another reaction to the Age of Rationalism took the form of a vital outburst of artistic and creative energy known as the "Romantic Movement" or the "Romantic Revival." No simple formula will describe this dynamic outburst, which included revolutionary and reactionary elements and drew its strength from many sources. In one sense it was a revolt against the formal classical style of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Poets of the romantic school deliberately broke away from the discipline of classical forms, turned back to Shakespeare with his "monstrous irregularities" and to the makers of medieval ballads for inspiration, extolled the joys and sorrows of the common man and the beauty and majesty of Nature as the authentic subjects of great verse. Sincerity and passion meant more to them than a precious style, for they sought to appeal to the emotions rather than the intellect. "For all good poetry," declared William Wordsworth, one of the first of the English romantic poets, "is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings...." Wordsworth chose characters from "humble and rustic life" and wrote about them in a simple, unadorned style, because, as he explained, "My purpose was to imitate, and, as far as possible, to adopt the very language of men."

Romanticism attracts the middle class

Forewarnings of the romantic revolt appeared in the eighteenth century when tales of mystery and imagination achieved enormous popularity, and the generation which had worshiped the cynicism of Voltaire turned with even greater enthusiasm to the sentimentalism of Rousseau. As the claims of the heart reasserted themselves against the dominant rationalism, the century abandoned the pompous odes and "rocking-horse meter" of the classicists in favor of the "unpremeditated art" of the newer bards. Middle-class readers of average education could appreciate the common touch and the direct appeal of romantic poetry even better than sophisticated courtiers, and its democratic flavor pleased them. The spread of the Romantic Movement coincided with the

rise of the bourgeoisie to social and political dominance. For in its reassertion of personal values and its emphasis on the dignity of the common man, romanticism harmonized with the political tenets of the revolutionary age. In Germany much of the early work of Johann Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) and Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749–1832) echoed revolutionary sentiments, and the English poets, George Gordon, Lord Byron (1788–1824), and Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822), were ardent champions of political liberty.

Romanticism and Reaction

But the Romantic Movement also had its reactionary side. In the novels of Sir Walter Scott the old régime and the Middle Ages lived again under a veil of romantic glamor, for Scott had a "feudal soul" and found much to admire in the so-called "Dark Ages." This romantic interest in the past linked itself readily with the deepening national sentiment of the time. The decades after 1815 saw the foundation of new state historical societies and the publication of great collections of documents, as scholars labored to trace the slow and painful steps whereby the national institutions, laws, and languages of the various European peoples had evolved. Men who appreciate how deeply all contemporary culture is rooted in the past are inclined to distrust sudden and revolutionary changes, and in this respect the study of historical continuity exerted a conservative influence upon political thought.

It will not be possible to trace here the effect of the Romantic Revival upon music and painting, although the wide range of the movement, its search for new themes and new forms, its tempestuous vigor and emotionalism, invaded and enriched these and other departments of art equally with literature. Not until the second quarter of the nineteenth century did its impetus abate, and it left a vital heritage. From Russia to Spain artists had responded to the new intellectual quickening so that the Romantic Revival may almost be ranked with the Renaissance and the Intellectual Revolution in the richness and variety of its contributions to modern culture.

3. THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA

The distrust of "French ideas" after 1815, the revival of organized religion, and the shift toward more conservative lines of thought were related phases of the general reaction which found its most vigorous expression in the policies of the restoration governments. In this swing toward the right, Austria and Russia became the chief protagonists of conservatism for reasons which must now be more fully explained.

Character of the Austrian Empire

In the ill-assorted empire of the Hapsburgs, which lacked racial, geographical, and even linguistic unity, the principal bond holding the diverse provinces together was their common allegiance to the imperial crown. Hapsburg rulers possessed "an almost inexhaustible influence and invulnerable prestige"; they treated their subjects with paternal benevolence, but they guarded the privileges of their dynasty with jealous hands. Austria remained, even in the nineteenth century, a feudal rather than a national state, with a nobility powerful and privileged, a middle class slight in number and influence, and a passive peasantry living chiefly as tenants on entailed estates. To foreigners the empire on the Danube appeared artificial, an anachronism with the dusty flavor of medievalism about it, a "mummy" preserved in a lifelike semblance by the strong tincture of tradition. The great personal authority of the ruler, the haughty and languid spirit of the officials, the disjointed and ponderous machinery of administration suggested an oriental satrapy rather than a European state. Even Metternich had been known to complain that "Asia begins on the *Landstrasse*," the eastern suburb of Vienna. Yet, despite handicaps, Austria possessed greater vitality than its enemies appreciated, and so long as the dissolving forces of nationalism and liberalism could be shut out it was capable of sustaining the rôle of a great power.

But Austria could not remain immune to revolutionary experiments if liberal agitation stirred again in neighboring states. The most rigid censorship of books and journals, the most careful scrutiny of travelers' baggage and papers, could not prevent ideas from filtering across a border. Self-preservation drove the Austrian government to urge the repression of radical movements everywhere, and Metternich, as the high priest of conservatism, labored to unite all the monarchs of Europe in a common resistance to revolutionary changes. He helped to dissuade Frederick William III from granting the Prussian people the constitution which they had been led to expect, and he constantly warned the other German princes, through their representatives in the Diet of the Germanic Confederation, to be perpetually on guard against secret revolutionary activities.

Unfortunately, minor disturbances in the Germanies soon provided Metternich with an excuse for further repression. In several universities the students had organized societies pledged to advance German liberty and unity. These fraternities, or *Burschenschaften*, held a congress at the Wartburg in 1817. The date was the fourth anniversary of the battle of Leipzig and the castle had been made

famous by Martin Luther at the commencement of the Protestant Revolt three centuries earlier. After patriotic demonstrations, the students imitated Luther's burning of the papal bull, and flung into a bonfire the copies of several reactionary books, the *Code Napoléon*, and a corporal's staff, to indicate their contempt for political and military tyranny. Two years later an unbalanced student named Karl Sand assassinated the dramatist Kotzebue, believing him to be a Russian agent whose death would help to liberate Germany from the influence of the Czar.

Nothing more was needed to convince the German rulers that revolution threatened. They dissolved the *Burschenschaften* and ejected liberal-minded professors from the universities, while a council of ministers meeting at Carlsbad (1819) narrowed the laws of censorship and spurred the police on their hunt for radicals. These Carlsbad Decrees mark the high tide of repression in the Germanies and their stupid and unnecessary harshness added to the grievances of the discontented masses.

Carlsbad Decrees (1819)

In Russia, likewise, the pendulum swung toward reaction after 1815. Alexander I (1801–25) was a handsome and gracious prince, but he lacked the patient and inflexible character needed in executing the reforms of which he dreamed. With the aid of a practical minister, Michael Speranski, he opened his reign by consolidating the departments of government and even drafted a constitution for Russia. Face to face with fundamental issues of reform, however, his decision failed him. The intricacy of Russian affairs, and the dishonesty of the officials for which he could find no cure, drained away his enthusiasm. Not unwillingly he turned his attention from domestic difficulties to the long and absorbing duel with Napoleon. The annexation of Finland (1809), Bessarabia (1812), and further portions of Poland (1815) gratified the practical side of his nature, and it flattered his mystical temperament to picture himself as an instrument of the Divine Will in the stirring drama of Napoleon's downfall.

Reaction in Russia

Yet a tincture of liberalism remained sufficiently strong in Alexander's complex nature to cause Metternich moments of uneasiness at the Congress of Vienna. The Holy Alliance, although it came to be viewed as a conspiracy of tyrants, originally reflected a sincere effort of the czar, under the influence of the religious mystic, Baroness von Krudener, to infuse a more humane and Christian spirit into political affairs. But once again the pressure of events proved too strong for Alexander's unstable enthusiasms. The ingratitude expressed by the Poles at the constitution which he granted them, a mutiny in the imperial regi-

ments, and the murder of his agent Kotzebue, cured him of his liberal fancies. At the Congress of Troppau (1820) he confessed his conversion to Metternich. "You are not altered. I am. You have nothing to regret. I have." Thenceforward, Alexander aligned himself with the protagonists of reaction until his death in 1825.

Nicholas I (1825–55)

The Grand Duke Constantine, legitimate successor to Alexander I, preferred to resign his throne to the youngest of the three brothers, Nicholas. In the temporary confusion of the interregnum a group of Russian army officers organized a revolt at Saint Petersburg in favor of "Constantine and the Constitution" (December 26, 1825). Nicholas easily crushed this uprising of the "Decembrists" and punished the leaders with death or imprisonment. He had none of Alexander's sympathy for liberalism; trained as a soldier he based his faith upon discipline and autocracy; and he succeeded throughout a thirty-year reign in keeping political movements in Russia stagnant. To ensure this end he created the famous "Third Section," a special division of the imperial government organized to combat agitation and discontent. Nicholas could favor improvements in administration, as his codification of the Russian law (1832) and reform of the finances attest, but only if they left intact his autocratic powers. So successfully did he preserve his "system," even when his brother monarchs were driven to compromise, that he enjoyed the admiration of conservatives and the detestation of liberals throughout Europe.

The Russian novel

Political stagnation, however, could not altogether dam the intellectual currents of the age. Russian writers escaped from their earlier dependence upon French and German models and developed in the nineteenth century a literature distinctively national. Wherever cultured people foregathered, at city salons or rural villas, new developments in music, painting, or architecture evoked animated discussion. New novels above all were read with emotion and criticized with tireless enthusiasm. For in the hands of such masters as Gogol (1809–52), Turgenev (1818–83), Tolstoi (1828–1910) and Dostoievski (1821–81) the Russian novel gave expression to the fervent political and social speculation of the day. Questions which could not be debated in parliament, because none existed, nor aired in the daily press, because of the censorship, found voice in works of fiction which were often political pamphlets thinly disguised. Permitted to indulge their mania for discussion, many Russian intellectuals developed radical and revolutionary theories, the more so because they were denied the opportunity to influence the government of the empire

or to learn the sobering lessons of practical politics. It is an ominous portent for any régime when the intellectual classes become persistently hostile. In Russia, as in eighteenth-century France, the interminable discussions and philosophical ferment were to be the prelude to a revolution.

4. THE BOURBON RESTORATION IN FRANCE

However greatly the statesmen of the restoration might desire to turn back the clock, the achievements of the French Revolution could never be wholly undone. Particularly in France too many momentous changes had intervened for Louis XVIII to see his wish realized that all the evils of the previous twenty years might be "expunged from history." Being an intelligent man, Louis recognized the facts and prepared to compromise. Napoleon's gibe that the Bourbons "had learned nothing and had forgotten nothing" was only partly true. The charter Louis granted his subjects in 1814 embodied the best of the revolutionary gains and made France the most liberal monarchy in Europe, for it promised a bicameral legislature consisting of a Chamber of Peers and a Chamber of Deputies, the latter to be chosen by about one hundred thousand voters. The best of Napoleon's achievements were likewise preserved; his centralized bureaucracy still functioned smoothly, the Bank of France continued to stabilize the admirable fiscal system, the schools were much as he left them, the *concordat* remained in force. Most important of all, the *Code Napoléon* assured all citizens equality before the law and all the children in a family a share in their father's possessions.

Social and economic results of the revolution

Nor could the church lands which had been confiscated and sold, and the estates of the nobles which had passed into other hands, be returned to their former owners. The revolution had created a solid class of peasant proprietors, men who held their farms free of feudal dues, conservative citizens desiring peace and order. The law of primogeniture had previously conserved entailed estates by transferring them intact to the eldest son or next male heir, but the revolutionary legislation provided that all the children must receive a share. By subdividing the land into smaller and smaller holdings, the new laws of inheritance induced an unexpected decline in the French birth rate. For a tradesman or peasant whose patrimony would barely provide for one family could not split it among several children and leave each an adequate means of livelihood. The most simple solution was to have only one

or two children, and for this and other reasons large families became less common in France. During the last hundred years the birth rate has steadily declined until the population has become almost stationary. In this way the French have achieved a social solidarity and compactness unrivaled by any other nation. Freed from the problems of an expanding population, France does not need to ship her surplus sons to the colonies, nor do many Frenchmen emigrate to other lands.

The ultra-royalists

Thus the major social and economic results of the revolution proved remarkably effective and stable, but political stability was a goal more difficult to attain. Throughout the nineteenth century the French people oscillated between the opposing ideals of an autocratic monarchy and a democratic republic. Though Louis XVIII sought to steer a middle course as a constitutional monarch, the ultra-royalists (followers more royalist than the king) drove him toward a policy of reaction. In 1820, the Duke of Berry, the king's nephew, who stood in the line of succession to the throne, fell before the dagger of a fanatic, and the resulting wave of popular indignation brought the ultras into power. They proceeded to shackle the press and revise the electoral laws so as to strengthen the party of the Right, and having secured an overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies, they decreed that the Chamber should remain in office for seven years.

Charles X (1824–30)

With the accession of the Count of Artois as Charles X (1824), the ultras found a king after their own hearts. More honest and more scrupulous than Louis XVIII, Charles was also more stiff-necked and despotic. The aristocrats, never reconciled to the loss of their confiscated estates, now pressed for reimbursement to the extent of a billion francs (1826). By converting the rate of interest on the national debt from five to three per cent, the government proposed to save twenty-eight million francs a year and apply it toward this indemnification. Capitalists and middle-class holders of national bonds would forfeit two fifths of their income from this source to benefit an undeserving nobility. A proposal to re-establish primogeniture in defiance of the Charter of 1814 increased the resentment of the bourgeoisie to the danger point, but Charles X persisted in his course, blind to the signs of popular discontent. In 1829, he attempted to override the parliamentary opposition by appointing as premier the stiff-necked and unpopular Prince de Polignac, thus violating the principle of responsible government. The consequences of his folly — the French Revolution of 1830 — will be described in the succeeding chapter.

5. TEMPORARY REACTION IN GREAT BRITAIN

Even in England, which Britons considered the historic home of political liberty, the period after 1815 proved an era of reaction. With the return of peace came economic depression and the evils of unemployment. The parliamentary system had ceased to be representative, owing to the shifts in population, and it had never been democratic, but distrust of the masses and of "French ideas" made the governing classes hostile to reform. When riots broke out in 1816, the government suspended the Habeas Corpus Act, the Englishman's guaranty of fair and speedy justice. When police and soldiers found it necessary to break up a mass meeting in Manchester with the loss of several lives (the so-called "Massacre of Peterloo"), the ministry succumbed to panic. They hastened to draft the Six Acts (1819), repressive enough to have pleased even Metternich, which curbed the long-established right of freedom of speech, muzzled the press, and limited the extent and purpose of public meetings.

Reaction (1815–22)

Not until 1822 did the panic wane and more liberal policies prevail. It was a sign of better times when the draconic penal code, which prescribed the death penalty for such offenses as stealing a sheep or picking five shillings from a pocket, was ameliorated in accordance with the more humane spirit of the age. Another concession long overdue was the removal of religious disabilities. Formerly candidates for almost all important offices in the state had to be members of the Church of England, a rule which excluded Roman Catholics and dissenters (members of Protestant sects other than the Anglican) from a share in the government. The abolition of these restrictions in 1828 and 1829 gave the English people, who had boasted religious freedom since 1689, the wider tolerance of religious equality. The Catholic Emancipation Bill (1829), passed reluctantly by the bigoted English Tories, was a particular boon to the Irish, for it enabled this predominantly Catholic people for the first time to elect representatives of that faith to the English Parliament.

Beginning of liberal reforms

Though conservative at home during the years that followed Waterloo, Britain was often the champion of liberalism abroad. Such discrepancy between the domestic and foreign policies of a great power is not uncommon, and statesmen who sought to curb the popular demands in England actually aided the people of Greece and Belgium and South America to rebel against the governments that ruled them. In return Britain gained the gratitude — and the trade — of the

liberated states, but displeased conservative powers like Prussia and Austria. It was, in fact, Britain's refusal to co-operate with her late allies in suppressing revolutionary outbreaks that introduced the first serious schism in the councils of the Quadruple Alliance and prepared the way for the disruption of Metternich's system.

6. THE FIRST RIFTS IN THE CONSERVATIVE SYSTEM

Liberal agitation

Driven underground by the official repression, European liberals after 1815 planned new revolts in the name of liberty and democracy. Kings sat uneasily upon their thrones, remembering the fate which had overtaken Louis XVI, and spurred their police to burn revolutionary pamphlets and hunt down conspirators. Nor was this dread of secret societies without foundation. In Italy, the famous *Carbonari* (or "Charcoal Burners") numbered thousands of members pledged to abolish tyrants and establish a free and united Italy. In Spain, the attempt of the restored Bourbon monarch, Ferdinand VII, to reconquer his rebellious American colonies, led to a revolt among the troops embarking for that purpose. Thoroughly alarmed, Ferdinand hastened to grant his subjects a constitution and made lavish promises of a liberal régime. Taking heart from this example, revolutionists in Naples compelled Ferdinand I of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to accept a constitution likewise. The following year the liberals of Piedmont won a smaller concession, forcing King Victor Emmanuel I of Sardinia to resign the throne to his brother Charles Felix.

The Troppau Protocol (1820)

Without loss of time the apprehensive monarchs united for a counter-offensive. At the Congress of Troppau (1820), to which all the great powers sent delegates, the governments of Russia, Prussia, and Austria pledged themselves to intervene, by armed force if necessary, in any state rent by a menacing revolt, and to restore the legitimate government to power if it had been overthrown by a revolution. The following year at the Congress of Laibach the Austrian government was commissioned to suppress the Neapolitan liberals, and Ferdinand I, restored to absolute power, took a barbarous revenge upon his late advisers, who paid with their lives for the folly of trusting their prince's oath. As the Sardinian government had failed to suppress the revolt in Piedmont, an Austrian army invaded that state also and extinguished the embers of rebellion. As a means of combating liberalism and maintaining the *status quo*, the principle of armed intervention had scored a brilliant success, and Metternich

could congratulate himself that his system had shown itself "triumphantly fireproof." Because of its zeal in hastening to extinguish revolts, the Austrian army was derisively dubbed "the fire brigade of Europe."

Although Great Britain declined to endorse this international practice of armed intervention, the Congress of Verona (1822) decided to extend the principle to Spain. This time France received the mandate of the powers to intervene, for France had been admitted to the councils of the Quadruple Alliance in 1818 at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. To prove that the French people had repented of their revolutionary debauch and had been converted to conservative ideals, Louis XVIII dispatched an army across the Pyrenees to subdue the Spanish liberals. In 1823, the French captured Cadiz, and Ferdinand VII, shamelessly revoking his promises, condemned hundreds of his subjects, who had been implicated in the revolt, to exile or execution. Master once more in his own house, he begged the powers to assist him further to bring his Central and South American colonies, which had broken away from Spain during the Napoleonic Wars, back under his control.

British attitude on armed intervention

The prospect of extending their war on rebels and republicans to the New World was not unpleasing to the allied monarchs, but here for the first time their reactionary zeal encountered a definite check. The British government had protested with increasing force at the alacrity with which the allies rushed troops across Europe and disregarded national frontiers. Ignoring the British attitude, the autocrats had had their will upon the Continent, but to transport an army to South America might prove a hazardous undertaking if the Mistress of the Seas seriously opposed it. As the British had established a profitable trade with the independent Spanish-American republics, they had no inclination to permit a restoration of the Spanish monopoly.

The Monroe Doctrine

Furthermore, the foremost power of the New World, the young United States of America, regarded an attempt of the allied monarchs to extend their repressive measures to this continent as a threat to all republics. In 1823, President James Monroe made it clear in a message to Congress that interference with the liberties of any independent American republic by a European power would be construed "as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." In the face of British and American opposition, the absolutist powers did not venture to proceed.

The rift thus opened in the Concert of Europe steadily widened.

Greek War of Independence (1821–29)

The spirit of revolt could not be exorcised, and the fitful outbreaks of 1820 and 1821 had scarcely been suppressed when a new insurrection threatened. Embittered by centuries of oppression, the Greeks opened a sanguinary war against their Turkish masters. Cultured Europeans everywhere, who had received a classical education, felt a lively sympathy for these modern Hellenes, regarding them as the heroic descendants of the ancient Athenians and Spartans. Metternich insisted, however, that they were none the less rebels against their "legitimate" ruler, the Sultan of Turkey, and he urged that the revolt be allowed to "burn itself out beyond the pale of civilization." By 1826, the Greek resistance seemed broken, the murderous and energetic Ibrahim Pasha having depopulated the Morea in an apparent determination to make a solitude and call it peace. But the powers had finally decided to bestir themselves, Russia because of her traditional hostility toward the Turks, Britain from sympathy, and also because her bankers, having backed the Greeks, were anxious to collect, France because it had long been her policy to play a rôle in Mediterranean affairs, and all of them because none would trust another to intervene unsupervised. Having attempted in vain to resist the will of these powers, the sultan was forced to grant complete independence to the Greeks (Treaty of Adrianople, 1829).

The Greek Revolution illustrates better perhaps than any other event of the time the essential weakness of the Concert of Europe. Russia, as a signatory to the Protocol of Troppau, should have been willing to suppress the Greek revolt, but Russia was traditionally committed to the policy of hastening the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Austria, though opposed to revolution, was equally hostile to Turkey. Great Britain, on the other hand, favored in a general manner the preservation of Turkish integrity, but the English statesmen, with their classical education, sympathized with the Greek insurgents, and English banking and shipping interests stood to profit if Greece became independent. The consequence of this division of motives and clash of national policies was a series of blunders and half-measures at the end of which Greece emerged as an independent state.

The guiding principle of the conservative system, the joint action of all the powers against any people which sought to change its government by revolutionary means, had broken down. The outcome of the Greek War of Independence displeased strict legitimists, but they found some consolation in the fact that the Greeks were not permitted

to set up a republic, but accepted a monarchy instead, with a Bavarian prince mounting the new throne as Otto I of Gréece. Nevertheless, it was an ominous portent for the defenders of the established order that the ideal of political immobility had been openly violated by governments pledged to maintain it. The system had suffered a serious blow, and the events of the year 1830 were to strain it still more severely.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE BOURGEOISIE SECURE CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE

In the silence one can hear a soft monotonous dripping. It is the dividends of the capitalist continuously trickling in, continuously mounting up. One can literally hear them multiply, the profits of the rich. And one can hear too, in between, the low sobs of the destitute, and now and then a harsher sound, like a knife being sharpened.

HEINRICH HEINE (1842).

ANY fundamental change which affects a large number of people, altering their mode of living, their habits of thought, or their form of government, may be styled a revolution. The progress of natural philosophy in the seventeenth century was described in an earlier chapter as the "Intellectual Revolution" because it induced thoughtful people to revise their ideas about God and Nature. The action of the French nation after 1789 in destroying the monarchy and substituting a republic is an outstanding example of a political revolution. In this present section a third type of revolution is to be discussed, a revolution caused by the substitution of machinery for hand labor in many manufacturing [1] processes. The new machines changed conditions in the handicraft trades so radically and multiplied the output so enormously that they produced an Industrial Revolution the accelerating consequences of which still dominate our modern civilization.

1. THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

The quickening of trade after 1750

For reasons not yet fully understood, the eighteenth century brought an unusual increase of population to the European countries. This can be explained in part by the improvement in living conditions, the stricter sanitation and cheaper food. Between 1750 and 1800, the English population rose from six to nine million and the French from nineteen million to twenty-six. The same years saw a rise in the general standard of comfort, so that sugar, chocolate, coffee, tea, furs, and silks came to be looked upon as necessities rather than luxuries in the homes of the well-to-do, while even the poor were enabled to vary their diet with new vegetables like cabbages and carrots, and to afford cotton and

[1] It is interesting to note that "to manufacture" meant originally, not to produce by machinery, but to make by hand. The word derives from the Latin *manus*, a hand, and *factura*, a making, from the verb *facere*, to make.

linen clothing. The normal consequence of this increased demand was a marked quickening in trade, especially colonial trade, and a speeding-up of all business life. Anvils rang and spinning wheels hummed to a swifter tune, roads and canals were bettered that goods might travel with greater dispatch, and sailing ships bound for distant markets crowded on more sail in the hope of a fleeter passage.

Rising demands meant greater profits, and the urge to speed production led manufacturers to experiment with new methods. When English foundry-owners discovered that they could not satisfy the orders for iron because sufficient wood was lacking to smelt the ore, they found a way to use coke instead. This meant more business for the mine-owners, but they were handicapped by the water in the mines, until they solved the problem with a steam-driven pump invented by Thomas Newcomen and improved by James Watt.

Effect of machinery on the cotton trade

In like fashion, when spinning and weaving by hand proved too slow and costly a method of producing cotton fabrics for an expanding market, an improved loom was constructed by John Kay (1733) and a swifter method of spinning devised by James Hargreaves (1764). Five years later, Richard Arkwright invented a still better spinning frame, only to see it superseded within ten years by Samuel Crompton's mule, a machine which, under one worker, could equal the output of two hundred hand spinners. To eliminate the tiresome task of picking all the seeds from the raw cotton by hand, an American, Eli Whitney, invented the cotton gin (1793). For motive power to turn the spinning and weaving machines the owners first tried dogs and horses, then water power, and finally, where streams were lacking, Watt's steam engine was found to provide the needed energy. A fabulous increase in the production of cotton goods was the result. By 1790, Great Britain imported thirty million pounds of raw cotton a year, and the acceleration of the new processes was such that by 1810 this sum had quadrupled.

Why England led in the Industrial Revolution

Similar mechanical improvements in the weaving of silk and woolen goods, and the knitting of hosiery and lace, came more slowly, but in these industries also Great Britain attained an unquestioned supremacy, possessing by 1812 more than twice as many knitting frames as could be found in the remainder of Europe. A unique combination of favoring circumstances explain this British leadership. (1) Nature had endowed the British Isles with the rich coal and iron deposits indispensable in the production of industrial machinery, and had provided in addition the damp climate most suitable for cotton spinning. (2) The wars of the eighteenth century

left England with a colonial empire from which to draw raw materials and a maritime supremacy which enabled her ships to carry the manufactured product to every market. (3) Even before 1750, England led in the textile industry; her business men possessed surplus capital to purchase the new and costly machinery; and the extension of new farming methods, which drove many workers from the land, provided in this way a supply of cheap labor for the new factories. (4) Lastly, the disruption of economic life on the Continent resulting from the wars of the revolutionary era (1792–1815) favored British trade, spurring it to feverish activity and unparalleled expansion. Helped by these circumstances, Britain not only survived the financial burden of the struggle with Napoleon, but emerged in 1815 as "the workshop of the world."

2. THE FACTORY SYSTEM

Evils of the system

Unfortunately, the Industrial Revolution possessed a dark as well as a bright side. In many trades, which had formerly demanded skill and craftsmanship, the introduction of machinery reduced the worker to an automaton, whose duties consisted of twisting together an occasional broken thread or periodically throwing a lever. The pride which an artisan had once felt in his handicraft vanished when he saw a machine supersede him and he became that machine's attendant, condemned to repeat motions of stultifying monotony all day long. Previously, under the so-called "domestic system," spinners and weavers had worked by their own firesides, receiving the raw material from merchants or middlemen who later called and paid for the finished product. But the factory system ended this casual part-time labor and herded the workers together for long hours in ugly and humid workshops. No longer their own masters, the spinners and weavers learned to hate the pitiless machines and their equally pitiless masters. Forced by the changing conditions to abandon the farming and other domestic activities which had brought them a living, and to toil for starvation wages in wretched factories, many workers held the machinery to blame for their plight and for the mounting unemployment after 1815. In a burst of vengeance as pitiful as it was futile, they fell to wrecking frames and power looms, and were speedily hanged or transported for their folly. They might as well have sought to sweep back the tide with a broom.

If men found the factory conditions cruel, for women and children they were all but insupportable. Yet women and children, it appeared,

could tend machines as capably as men and would work for lower wages. Parsimonious employers hired wards from orphan asylums for their keep, and forced them to labor ten, fifteen, and even eighteen hours a day. It was not unknown for such children to be chained to their machines and locked up at night to prevent their running away. Overworked and usually underfed, without schooling, exposed to the brutal and promiscuous habits of the older hands, such children could hardly fail to grow up anemic and vicious. A few philanthropic employers attempted to better conditions, notably Robert Owen, who established a model industrial community at New Lanark in which the employees had a share in the ownership and profits of the factories. But the majority of owners were heartless or indifferent and the conscience of the nation remained numb.

Employment of women and children

Men who are growing rich, and who see their country growing rich, through their efforts, seldom fail to find good arguments to justify the existing conditions. Employers not only defended the factory system as wholesome and profitable; they fought all efforts of the government to investigate or improve the lot of the workers. Business prospered best when let alone, the economist Adam Smith had argued in his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776). Business men pointed to the expansion of British industry as proof that a *laissez-faire* (i.e., non-interference) policy, without tariffs, regulations, or other trade restrictions, was the soundest course for a government to pursue. It was, they agreed, most regrettable that so many people lived on the margin of starvation, but inexorable economic laws ordained that it must be so. "Population," Thomas Malthus proclaimed in 1798, "has a constant tendency to increase beyond the means of subsistence." If war and disease failed to curtail a nation's growth, he went on to explain in his *Essay upon the Principles of Population,* actual starvation would keep it within the limits determined by the food supply. Another political economist, David Ricardo, applied similar reasoning to the problem of the laboring classes. If wages rose above the margin of subsistence, he argued, the workers took advantage of their increased income to raise larger families. This soon produced a surplus of unemployed laborers who, underbidding those with jobs, brought wages back to the subsistence level. It was not the greed of employers but the inexorable weight of economic laws which decreed that the poor must be damned for the greater glory of Mammon, a doctrine which naturally found favor with the governing classes.

Laissez-faire ideals

Commencing as an economic phenomenon, the Industrial Revolution precipitated social and political changes of the highest importance. *Capital and labor* It raised two classes to new prominence and widened the gulf between them. On the one hand stood the men of wealth, men with the capital and the initiative to build factories, play for the high stakes offered by the rapidly expanding industries, and win for themselves the rank of an industrial aristocracy. On the other hand stood the workers, or proletariat, a class waxing in number, but without property, without any share or direction in the industry that employed them, and without the means to better their condition. In the years after 1815, years of economic adjustment and social strain, both these classes grew conscious of their importance and both began to seek political power.

3. THE ENGLISH REFORM BILL OF 1832

Though admired by Europeans as the home of representative government and political liberty, Great Britain in 1815 possessed institutions far from liberal. The government may best be described as a "plutocracy," for the wealthy classes ruled the Parliament, particularly the city merchants, shipowners, landlords, and country nobility. As only one person in thirty-two had the right to vote, it was possible in many "rotten" boroughs to buy a seat in Parliament by bribing a majority of the local electors. In others, termed "pocket" boroughs, the most powerful local landowner controlled the election, nominating a candidate and persuading or intimidating the voters to support his choice. As the ballots were recorded publicly, a tenant openly invited his landlord's displeasure if he opposed the latter's selection. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that the House of Commons should represent the English governing classes rather than the English people. Nor must it be forgotten that two highly privileged groups, the peers and the bishops of the Anglican Church, sat in the House of Lords and exercised through that chamber a potential veto on all legislation. Clearly the plutocracy held all the entrenchments of power.

Abuses in the English system

Projects for the reform of Parliament, designed to make it more popular and more truly representative, had been debated forty years earlier, but the outbreak of the French Revolution filled the ruling classes in England with panic and discredited democratic ideas. When the war with France ended in 1815, the Tory government embarked upon a policy of repression, fearing that any concessions might en-

courage revolts and revolts lead to revolution. Within a decade, however, as described in the previous chapter, this reactionary mood weakened. The amelioration of the penal code and the passage of the Catholic Emancipation Act [1] indicated that liberal sentiment was gaining the day.

At this point (1830) the Whig politicians, political opponents of the Tories, came forward as the champions of parliamentary reform. At heart the Whig leaders had little sympathy with democratic ideals, but they allied themselves with the discontented workingmen because they hoped by reform to keep themselves in power. The Tories drew much of their strength from the "rotten" and "pocket" boroughs, particularly in the south of England. They enjoyed the support of the great country landowners, and deserved it by the manner in which they favored and protected the agricultural interests in Parliament. The Whigs, on the other hand, were more closely identified with the middle-class dwellers of the cities, with merchants, traders, bankers, factory and mill owners. As already noted, the Industrial Revolution had rapidly increased the importance and wealth of the industrial aristocracy, causing factory towns to spring up around the coal-fields of the western counties. But the unreformed Parliament ignored this shift in population and denied important manufacturing centers, such as Manchester, Sheffield, and Birmingham, a single representative, although ancient and decayed boroughs, shrunken to a few families, continued to send a member to London. The first item on the Whig program was, therefore, a redistribution of seats, which would increase the representation of the new cities at the expense of depopulated counties.

Unequal representation

The second item of reform which the Whigs proposed was an extension of the suffrage. Hitherto less than four per cent of the population had enjoyed the right to vote. If this right were extended to all householders who paid the equivalent of ten pounds rent a year, many of the lesser bourgeoisie of the towns and leaseholders in the counties could share in the elections, increasing the number of voters from 435,000 to 656,000. As this was roughly one in twenty-two instead of one in thirty-two of the population, it will be seen that the measure stopped far short of genuine democracy. A majority of the laborers on the farms and workingmen in the cities were to be left no better off than before.

Extension of the suffrage

Nevertheless, the struggle for reform enlisted the ardent support of the city workers, who demonstrated, by mass meetings, riots, and

[1] See above, page 747.

occasional acts of violence, that they had reached a dangerous mood. The Whigs could also count upon the support of the intellectual radicals, a small but distinguished group of writers and scholars led by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–73). These Benthamites, or Utilitarians, believed the purpose or utility of a government should be gauged by the degree to which it afforded "the greatest good to the greatest number." To fulfill this function it should be genuinely representative; hence the Utilitarians favored universal manhood suffrage, but they were willing to endorse the Whig program as a step in the right direction. Prospects brightened when the news that the French had driven out the absolutist king, Charles X, precipitated a cabinet crisis in England which caused the fall of the Tory Party and brought the Whigs into office (1830). The moment for an experiment in constitutional reform had arrived.

The Reform Bill passes (1832)

The Whig prime minister, Earl Grey, found the House of Commons divided on the merits of the proposed bill and called for a general election to discover the wishes of the electorate. The Whigs were returned to power with a large majority, but their second bill, though it passed in the Commons (1831), was rejected by the House of Lords. In 1832, therefore, the Commons passed a third reform bill. Again the Lords rejected it. Popular indignation had risen to the verge of revolution at this persistent frustration of the nation's expressed will. Yet when Earl Grey resigned as a protest, the stubborn king, William IV, called upon the Tory Duke of Wellington to take office. But not even the Iron Duke's resolution, which had defeated Napoleon at Waterloo, could stem the liberal tide. After a few days the king found it necessary to recall Grey to power, with the assurance that if no other means sufficed, the Crown would create enough new peers to break the deadlock in the House of Lords. The threat proved sufficient. Rather than see their august rolls defaced by a host of new titles minted for the occasion the Lords yielded, and the Reform Bill became law in June, 1832.

A revolution had been accomplished by constitutional means, and the strength of the old régime in England definitely broken. In effect, the Reform Bill of 1832 elevated the industrial aristocracy to a level with the older landed nobility and divided the control of the government between them. In a more final sense, however, it meant the triumph of the manufacturing interests over the agricultural. The clearest proof of this is to be seen a few years later in the repeal of the Corn [1] Laws. The tariff on grains had assured the great land-

[1] In England the term "corn" is applied to oats, barley, wheat, etc.

owners a profit on their crops. The abolition of this tariff proved a blow to agriculture, but a boon to the city workers for whom it meant cheaper bread. And the city dwellers had to be served, for they had become the most important element of the population. By 1846, for the first time in English history, over half the people lived in towns, outranking in wealth and number the dwellers of the countryside. This rapid increase in the urban population was the most startling social change introduced by the Industrial Revolution.

4. THE CHARTIST MOVEMENT

Their somewhat hesitant espousal of the Reform Bill (1832) won for the Whigs the distinction of being the "Liberal" Party in England throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, while their Tory opponents became known as the "Conservatives." The Liberals used their ascendancy after 1832 to hasten further reforms which reflect both the idealism and the selfishness of the middle class. Having won control of Parliament, the Liberals proceeded to reorganize the town governments also, to assure middle-class control in local affairs (Municipal Corporations Act, 1835). Trade and industry profited by a reduction in the tariff rates, by the construction of better roads and canals, the extension of steam railway lines, and the institution of a "penny post" system (1840). The abolition of slavery throughout the British colonies with compensation to the slaveholders (1833) stands out as a triumph of humanitarian sentiment, and the same spirit dictated further amelioration of the penal code and more humane treatment of criminals. But where the impulse toward kindliness warred too sharply with business profits, the middle-class legislators showed themselves less generous. A new Poor Law (1834) saved the taxpayers' money, but subjected paupers to a régime so harsh that it made them feel that poverty had become a crime. Slaves on the plantations overseas might celebrate their liberty, but the factory workers at home too often appealed in vain for a lightening of their economic serfdom. Employers insisted that for the government to interfere in, or even to investigate, the lot of the workingmen, would be a violation of that *laissez-faire* policy under which business prospered best.

Liberal reforms after 1832

The workers who had paraded and petitioned for reform in 1832 thus found that they had gained little by it. Their hope that a further extension of the franchise would soon follow was rudely shattered, and Earl Grey himself declared the Reform Bill was "final." Too late

Disillusionment of the workers

the workers comprehended that they had helped to place in power a class actually hostile to their own interests. The "conservative" Tories were more disposed to help the factory workers than were the "liberal" Whigs. It was a Tory peer who proposed that children under ten years of age should not be worked over nine hours a day (Factory Act, 1833); and a Mines Act (1842) prohibiting the employment in the mines of women, or children under ten, passed with Tory support. Such reforms, however, were but feeble palliatives for a deep-rooted evil.

Chartism

Though strong in numbers the working class was weak in organization. Since a Parliament dominated by landowners and business men might remain permanently indifferent to their needs, they determined to force further democratic reforms, secure the right to vote, and send their own delegates to Westminster. They drew up a People's Charter embodying six demands which became known as the "Six Points of Chartism" (1838). These were: (1) universal manhood suffrage; (2) secret balloting; (3) annual Parliaments; (4) equal electoral districts; (5) no property qualification for members of Parliament; (6) a salary for members of Parliament. This program would have transformed Great Britain into a genuine democracy, but the Chartists failed to secure its adoption by "moral" pressure and hesitated to resort to armed revolt. In 1848, the movement reached its climax. Several years of poor harvests and business depression had caused grave suffering among the submerged classes, and a monster petition, reported to bear six million signatures, was prepared for presentation to Parliament to support the Chartist demands. When Parliament rejected it, the resulting disorders were easily put down and the Chartist Movement collapsed.

Yet it is interesting to note that the Six Points, considered radical in their day, have almost all been adopted since in all democratic countries. The Chartist Movement itself lost force largely because of the growing prosperity which affected all the leading industrial states after 1850. Railways and steam navigation quickened transportation. The construction of steel ships made England not only the workshop of the world, but the mistress of its carrying trade also, and so rapidly did capital increase that London became the banking center of the world. In this flood tide of prosperity the "benevolent bourgeoisie" conceded better terms to the workers and eased the tension between the two classes. The workers themselves, discouraged in their plans for political representation, turned instead to the formation of stronger trade unions and bargained directly with their employers.

5. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830

In France, the Industrial Revolution developed later than in Britain and wrought no such swift and startling transformation. The English migration to the cities, which increased the population of Manchester and Birmingham forty per cent between 1820 and 1830, had no parallel across the Channel, where a majority of the French people continued to cultivate the fertile earth and to remain content with the rewards of agriculture.

It has been estimated that in 1815 no more than fifteen steam engines were serving French industry and that most of these had been set up to drive mine pumps. The importation of machinery from England was prohibited until after 1825, and the poor quality and scattered distribution of French coal offered a further difficulty, but by 1830 the fifteen engines had increased to six hundred, and a small group of factory-owners and a growing class of factory-workers added to the problems of the Bourbon régime. The owners reinforced the discontented bourgeoisie, the workers joined the discontented proletariat of the cities.

Overthrow of Charles X

The reactionary policies of Charles X (1824–30) gravely displeased the French middle and lower classes. Charles's determination to strengthen the privileges of the old nobility and to restore royal absolutism in France have been discussed in a previous chapter.[1] His policies, if fully successful, would have robbed the bourgeoisie of the broad advantages which they had gained since 1789. In 1829, Charles betrayed the principle of responsible government by appointing the Prince de Polignac prime minister despite the opposition of the Chamber of Deputies. Dissolving the obstinate Chamber, Charles called for an election (1830), but the new Chamber threatened to prove still more recalcitrant. Refusing to accept the verdict of the electors, the stubborn monarch prepared four summary ordinances: (1) The liberty of the press was severely limited. (2) The new Chamber was declared dissolved before it assembled. (3) Three fourths of the electors lost their right to vote. (4) A new election was decreed. The posting of these ordinances (July 26, 1830) stirred Paris to revolt, the royal forces proved unable to curb the movement, and after three days of fighting Charles fled to England.

Success so sudden and so unexpected left the Paris revolutionaries divided in their aims. Radical leaders of the populace demanded a democratic republic such as the Jacobins had attempted to establish

[1] See above, page 746.

in 1793. Bourgeois moderates urged a constitutional monarchy. A republic, they pointed out, could not hope to survive in a Europe dominated by the spirit of reaction, for the monarchs would unite their forces in opposition to it. The middle class won the day, and the Chamber of Deputies offered the vacant throne to Louis Philippe, Duke of Orléans. Orléans was the son of the notorious Philip of Orléans of revolutionary fame who changed his name to Philippe Égalité, was elected a member of the National Convention, and voted for the death of Louis XVI. In 1830, the son was living quietly in Paris like any middle-class gentleman. His fellow citizens admired his simple tastes and bourgeois virtues; they recalled that he had fought for the French Republic in 1792, and they felt certain that if they placed him on the throne he would make an excellent "citizen king." The aged Lafayette, the hero of two worlds and three revolutions, used his influence to persuade his fellow citizens to accept the compromise which seemed happiest under the circumstances, and the "July Revolution" ended with the tricolor replacing the white flag of the Bourbons while Louis Philippe accepted the title "King of the French."

Louis Philippe becomes king

Like the English radicals after 1832, the Paris radicals and workingmen felt that they had been cheated. To shed their blood upon the barricades that the middle class might set up a bourgeois monarchy appeared to them a mockery of their hopes. They had not even secured to themselves the right to vote, since this privilege was restricted to some two hundred thousand "men of property." In 1830 they had to yield, however, because they realized that they were not strong enough to set up the republic they desired, but they continued to dream of democracy, and their discontent slowly undermined the foundations of the "July Monarchy."

Word that the French had again dethroned a legitimate king ran like an electric spark throughout Europe. Monarchs trembled on their thrones as if they had heard an echo of republican armies chanting the *Marseillaise*. "Gentlemen, saddle your horses," said Nicholas I when the news reached Saint Petersburg, "France is in revolution again." Liberals, on the other hand, hailed the event with delight, and prepared to rise in arms for a general war of liberation. The Poles, counting upon French aid, prepared to cast off the yoke of Russia, and the Belgians, who hated the union with Holland decreed for them by the Congress of Vienna, proclaimed their independence. At this resurgence of liberalism the monarchs of Europe took hurried counsel, fearing France was about to loose a new wave of revolutionary fury upon them. But their appre-



LOUIS PHILIPPE, KING OF THE FRENCH
1773–1850

Caricaturists opposed to the July Monarchy delighted in drawing Louis Philippe with a pear-shaped head, thus emphasizing his heavy expression, somewhat narrow forehead, and fleshy jaw.

hension proved groundless. The French middle class did not wish a war which might dislocate trade, and Louis Philippe assured his fellow monarchs that France would lend no aid to revolutionaries in other countries. This cautious policy proved a second disappointment to the French republicans, who, still fascinated by the great days of 1792, believed France owed it to her destiny and to Europe to take the lead in a general movement against the tyranny of kings.

The Germanies and Italy

This lack of French aid or intervention partly explains why the revolts of 1830 in the Germanies and Italy met with small success. A few secondary German states — Brunswick, Saxony, and Hanover — won limited constitutions, but Prussia remained unshaken, and Austria, the stronghold of reaction, stood so solidly amid the general unrest that Metternich was able to spare an Austrian army to quell the revolts in Italy. Rome was recaptured from the hands of a group of radicals who had proclaimed an Italian republic there; Parma and Modena received back their petty despots; and Italian liberals who had sprung to arms in the hope of liberating their country were hanged, imprisoned, or exiled.

Polish Revolt (1830–31)

Even more tragic was the fate of Poland. The constitution granted by Czar Alexander I in 1815 failed to satisfy the Poles, and the news of the French Revolution of 1830 crystallized their discontent and spurred them into a futile stroke for freedom. Nicholas I (1825–55) had far less sympathy for Polish national aspirations than his brother Alexander had shown, and he encouraged his armies to crush the revolt without pity. When, after a brave and desperate defense, the kingdom lay at his mercy, he proceeded to punish the patriot leaders, abrogate the constitution, and incorporate Poland into the Russian Empire. Its cities acknowledged Russian garrisons, and Russian officials controlled the administration. As Prussia and Austria both held small fragments of Polish territory, their governments felt no regret at this extinction of Polish nationalism. France, under the citizen king, Louis Philippe, declined to interfere, and Great Britain, though sympathetic toward the Poles, possessed no adequate motive for intervention. The British government preferred to reserve its special attention for the troublesome question of Belgium.

The Belgian question

In joining Belgium to Holland in 1815, the diplomats had sought to compensate the Dutch for colonies lost to England, and at the same time to strengthen them against a possible renewal of French aggression. The Belgians resented this union with a stronger, Protestant state, for they feared that their Catholic faith, their liberties, and their language might be endangered. The stern

policies of William I, as King of the United Netherlands, increased these apprehensions. In 1830, therefore, the Belgians took their cue from the French and repudiated the rule of an unpopular king. Frenchmen of all classes favored the cause of Belgian independence, although the new bourgeois government was not prepared to risk a war in support of it. British merchants looked to Belgian independence to benefit their trade. Accordingly, in 1831, the great powers signed an agreement at London recognizing Belgium as a separate state. It was necessary to find a king for the Belgians, republics being in disfavor, and a German prince, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, accepted the crown. William I of Holland clung to his Belgian provinces stubbornly until forced to yield by French military intervention and a British blockade. Holland did not, in fact, formally renounce her claims until 1839, whereupon Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia pledged themselves to respect the perpetual independence and neutrality of Belgium, a treaty which remained in force until the German government violated it in 1914.

By 1830, the conservative system, or as it is often called, the system of Metternich, had suffered some severe reverses. The success of the Greek Revolt, the overthrow in France of the legitimate king, Charles X, and the proclamation of an independent Belgium were all developments which violated the established order and the principle of legitimacy. For these setbacks the allied monarchs could largely blame Britain for lack of co-operation, for had the British government so chosen, its navy could have hindered the revolt of the Belgians and have assured the collapse of the Greek Revolt. But in each case the British government had thrown its influence on the side of the rebels, just as it had been the first to recognize Louis Philippe's usurpation of the French throne. It would be a mistake, however, to assume from these instances that the British cabinet was liberal and favored revolutions: on the contrary, its policy from 1815 to 1832 was, as already explained, one of repression and reaction. Nevertheless, the British government often found it profitable to press a liberal policy abroad in the interests of British trade. The creation of small independent states, in South America, in Greece, or in Belgium, favored British manufacturers and merchants who could not exploit these markets so easily while they were in the control of a strong and monopolistic power. In this sense, the exigencies of trade triumphed over political principles, and the Industrial Revolution became one of the most dangerous foes of the conservative system. The old feudal-monarchical order of society which the diplomats had labored to patch together at Vienna could not hold in check the growing pressure of national and liberal sentiment, especially when this was reinforced by

the transforming influences of the factory system. The new forces were destined to crack open a static society as irresistibly as a great tree pushes its way through the walls of a crumbling house.

It is interesting to study the gathering of the new forces, especially after 1830. Wherever factories increased the numbers of the urban workers, the republican party gained ground. Wherever railways spread across the countryside, they transformed and quickened the industrial and social life, facilitating travel and the interchange of ideas and goods. The new faith in progress, the increase in material wealth, the opening of new vistas and new opportunities made men more and more impatient with the obsolete class distinctions, outworn regulations, and inefficient methods of administration. The Revolution of 1830 and the Reform Bill of 1832 assured the new middle class the lead in the two most progressive European countries, France and Great Britain. A generation later the expanding forces gathered strength for a fresh explosion and another wave of revolution passed over Europe in the years 1848–49. How the wave gathered and how it broke will be described in the following chapter.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT OF 1848–49 AND ITS COLLAPSE

The Revolution had come before its time.

PIERRE JOSEPH PROUDHON.

THE Paris insurrection on July, 1830, gave France a "citizen king" in the person of Louis Philippe,[1] but it did not go far enough to please the working classes or the republicans. The new régime represented, and was supported by, the bourgeoisie, and it made the promotion of business prosperity its chief aim. From 1830 to 1848, "Peace and Order" were to be the official watchwords in France. As war would have involved a disruption of trade, the government pursued a discreet and unaggressive foreign policy, and so far abandoned that authoritative stand customarily assumed by *la grande nation* in the affairs of Europe that ultra-patriots characterized the course as "peace without honor." In 1840, Louis Adolphe Thiers (1797–1877), who had attempted to revive French prestige by an aggressive policy in the Near East, had to resign his office to the more conservative François Guizot (1787–1874). The policy of caution had triumphed, and under Guizot's ministry, from 1840 to 1848, the unprogressive character of the régime became more and more apparent. Restrictions muffled all attempts at outspoken criticism, the government gratified the timid bourgeois with a foreign policy which eschewed glory but assured peace, and society grew daily more dull and respectable. The German poet Heinrich Heine shrewdly observed that Guizot's main qualification for office was the high degree to which he had perfected the art of immobility. "He does nothing," Heine wrote in 1842, "and that is his secret of preservation."

1. DISCONTENT IN FRANCE UNDER THE JULY MONARCHY

So long as its opponents remained divided, the government of Louis Philippe had little to fear. At least five factions desired its overthrow, but of these the Legitimist followers of Charles X and his line wasted no love on the Bonapartists who sought to revive the Napoleonic tradition, the Clericals resented chiefly the weakened authority of the church under a usurping king and had no sympathy for the Republicans who clung to the hopes betrayed in 1830, while the Socialists, though growing

[1] See above, page 762.

in number, alarmed all the other factions by their projects for establishing a communist society. Of the five groups the Legitimists counted least and had few serious adherents outside of the Faubourg Saint-Germain in Paris, where the ancient aristocrats lived in decayed elegance with their memories. The Bonapartists likewise lived on memories, but the Napoleonic legend had vitality, and when the ashes of the emperor were brought from Saint Helena to Paris in 1840, people could not help comparing the vigorous rule of Napoleon with the mediocre government of the citizen king.

The Clericals

The third group, the Clericals, were more than a political clique, yet could scarcely be termed a party. The clergy, who had formed the privileged First Estate under the old régime, regained a share of their lost power and wealth on the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814. They erred, however, in linking their fortunes to the legitimist line, for, with the fall of Charles X in 1830, they lost their chief protector and most of their privileges. Excluded from teaching in the schools, the priests became opponents of the July Monarchy and assailed the secular schools as godless institutions that would corrupt the youth of France. The bourgeoisie paid little heed to this clerical criticism, but the peasants still reverenced their priests and resented the official discrimination against them. Among them the priests built up an intangible but powerful sentiment against the July Monarchy.

The Republicans

To the Republican standard rallied a number of young intellectual radicals disgusted with the existing government and its static ideals. The ministers of Louis Philippe turned a deaf ear to proposals for reform, and agitators who urged a wider franchise so that they might enjoy a share in the government won from Guizot the curt advice to work harder, grow rich, and so gain the ballot. As the administration solidified, the governing class became a closed official caste and the hope of constitutional reform steadily waned. It seemed as if nothing less than a revolution could break the torpid hold of the bourgeois régime, and young Republicans read eagerly the histories of the great French Revolution which poured from the press. Statesmen of that day prepared to make history by writing it. Thiers had first won fame by a *History of the French Revolution*, Alphonse Lamartine (1790–1869) composed a *History of the Girondins*, Louis Blanc (1811–82) wrote a *History of the French Revolution* and attacked the existing government in his *History of Ten Years*, while Guizot was the author of a voluminous *History of France* and a *History of the Revolution in England*. Reading of the great days of 1793 and 1794, the young republican ideal-

ists of the 1840's were fired with impatience to emulate the heroes of the past.

The Socialists

Eager to find allies for an attack upon the royal government, the Republicans turned to the Socialists, and in 1843 the two groups joined forces in a fusion party. The Republicans sought a wider franchise and an abolition of the property qualifications which barred many of them from a part in politics. The Socialists had more radical demands and loftier dreams. The earliest Socialists, Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) and François Marie Fourier (1772–1837), concocted visionary schemes for the reorganization of society, and dreamed of establishing ideal communities where the citizens would live lives of simplicity and harmony blessed by the dignity of labor. The working classes for whom these Utopian schemes were specially devised paid them scant respect, preferring the more practical suggestions of Louis Blanc, who understood their grievances and made himself the fearless champion of their hopes. The state, Blanc declared, was responsible for the welfare of the poor, and ought to abolish unmerited poverty by organizing the great industries of France on a co-operative basis as "national workshops," with employment assured to all who sought it. This doctrine violated the *laissez-faire* principles popular with the capitalist employers, but it seemed just and reasonable to the workers and the radical intellectuals.

2. THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (1848) AND ITS SEQUEL

As its following increased, the reform party in France, like the Chartists in England, advertised its demands by monster petitions, mass meetings, and parades. By 1847, this agitation had taken the novel form of political banquets, and a "Banquet Campaign" grew to proportions that alarmed the government. Still true to his principle of immobility, Guizot refused concessions, and the civil authorities attempted to halt the agitation by forbidding a banquet scheduled for February 22, 1848. The thwarted populace reacted indignantly and the following day barricades blocked the streets of Paris. Too late, Guizot resigned, and Louis Philippe offered concessions, but the revolt grew more serious and on February 24 the king abdicated. The Chamber of Deputies yielded the control of the state to a group of popular Socialist and Republican leaders who formed a provisional government.

The success so speedily achieved as speedily revealed the anomaly of the Republican-Socialist coalition which had made it possible. Afraid

at first to antagonize the working classes, the moderate Republicans admitted four Socialists to a place on the provisional government, and reduced the working day in Paris from eleven to ten hours. But it soon became apparent that the majority of the French people had little real interest in social experiments. Louis Blanc's demand for the immediate establishment of national workshops was held up by his less radical colleagues. Instead, a substitute program, a parody of Blanc's project, was entrusted to an unsympathetic minister who hired thousands of unemployed at two francs a day and set them to work digging ditches. The burden on the state of this wasteful and stupid work persuaded many taxpayers that Blanc's scheme was a costly failure, a deception easily propagated because the middle classes and the conservative farmers were already frightened by the nightmare of socialism.

Defeat of the Socialists

In the elections of April, 1848, clericals and aristocrats, peasants and bourgeois united to choose a Constituent Assembly of distinctly moderate temper. Beaten at the polls, the Paris radicals resorted to the futile alternative of a bloody insurrection (June 23–26, 1848) which ended with the execution or deportation of eleven thousand of the insurgents, the suppression of the Socialist newspapers, and the abandonment of the plan for national workshops.

With the Socialists crushed, the Assembly soon completed a constitution for the Second French Republic. The right of free speech and a free press, security from arbitrary arrest, and permission to assemble peaceably and to petition the government, won legal recognition. The constitution further provided for a single legislative chamber of seven hundred and fifty deputies, to be selected by universal manhood suffrage, and a president to be chosen in the same broad and direct fashion. The moderates believed it safe to entrust the vote to all male citizens because they counted upon the peasant majority to offset the influence of the radical city proletariat and elect a "Party of Order."

Election of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte

The results more than justified these expectations. Of three leading candidates competing for the presidency, the Socialist Ledru-Rollin was feared as the standard-bearer of a party identified with the madness of the June revolt, while General Cavaignac, hope of the middle-class Republicans, was disliked because he had crushed that revolt by shedding the blood of Frenchmen. This illogical division of feeling, characteristic of electorates, defeated two capable men and opened the way to a third candidate, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who represented the Party of Order. He was (if legitimate) a nephew of the great Napoleon, his parents being Louis Bonaparte and Hortense de Beauharnais, the stepdaughter of

Napoleon I through his marriage to Josephine de Beauharnais. The death in 1832 of Napoleon's son, born of his second marriage to Marie Louise of Austria, left Louis Napoleon Bonaparte heir to the imperial succession. In 1848, monarchists, Catholics, militarists, patriots, peasants, and workers combined to elect, by a majority of five and a half out of seven million votes cast, an adventurer about whom they knew little save that he bore the name Napoleon.

It was an ominous portent for the stability of the Second Republic that the "prince-president" had already made two comic-opera attempts (in 1836 and 1840) to seize control of France by a military *coup d'état*. Imprisoned by the government of Louis Philippe after the second escapade, he finally escaped to England, where he was living in exile when the Revolution of 1848 brought him his opportunity. During the years of waiting, Louis Napoleon had published a book on *Napoleonic Ideas* in which his uncle emerged (somewhat unrecognizably) as the champion of peace and liberty. He also wrote on military science to prove that he had inherited soldierly interests, and even cultivated Socialist support by a work on *The Extinction of Poverty*. When, at forty, he assumed the executive rôle in the Second Republic, he felt himself under a fatal impulsion to follow in his uncle's footsteps. France had grown sated with mediocrity, and Louis Napoleon, if he would justify his name and his opportunism, was "condemned to be brilliant." But behind his enigmatic pose he possessed little of his uncle's genius or energy; his leading traits were a mystical faith in what he called his "destiny" and a fund of shrewd political sense.

From the outset of his rule, Louis Napoleon used his presidential office to build up a following for himself, especially in the army. As the Assembly declined to consider an extension of his term beyond the four years for which he had been elected, he prepared a military *coup d'état*. The date chosen was December 2, 1851, anniversary of the great Napoleon's coronation and of his victory at Austerlitz. Without warning, the leaders of the Monarchist and Republican parties in the Assembly found themselves arrested, and Paris awoke on December 3 to the rule of martial law. Despite resistance and bloodshed in Paris and some of the larger towns, the French nation ratified the president's stroke by an overwhelming plebiscite. In 1852, the Second Republic gave place to the Second Empire, and the European monarchs debated whether or not they ought to compromise their dignity by addressing Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, as "brother."

Coup d'état *of December 2, 1851*

The story of the Second Empire and the rôle which Napoleon III

attempted to play in Europe between 1852 and 1870 will be related in the chapter which follows. First, however, it will be useful to note the repercussions which the French Revolution of 1848 exerted upon the rest of Europe.

3. THE GERMAN PEOPLE FAIL TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL UNITY (1848–49)

Attention has been called before this to the political disunion which weakened the Germanies. The breakdown of the Holy Roman Empire, the heritage of feudalism with its disruptive tendencies, the jealous independence of the German princes, and the rivalry of Austria and Prussia from the seventeenth century onward, combined to delay German unification until late in the nineteenth century. Napoleon I gave a great impetus to the work of consolidation by encouraging his allies among the more powerful German rulers to annex the smaller states, bishoprics, and free cities, a task which they performed with such alacrity that by 1815 three hundred and sixty states had been reduced to thirty-eight. But the Congress of Vienna showed no disposition to complete the amalgamation. Instead, it disappointed the friends of union by instituting a Germanic Confederation so loose and ineffectual in its structure that the thirty-eight fragments all enjoyed a practical autonomy. Poems and pamphlets pleading for closer political bonds were suppressed, and the princes displayed their loyalty to the spirit of the past by discouraging all sentiment in favor of liberty or unity.

Particularism in the Germanies

For a time these methods of repression proved successful. The German people could not have a revolution, as the poet Goethe humorously declared, because the police would not permit it. When the French rebelled in 1830 and drove out the unpopular Charles X, German liberals reacted in several states of the federation to the extent of demanding a larger share in the government and freedom of the press, but their agitation led to no serious violence and to few important reforms. Nor did it advance the national movement. The German people, because of their political impotence and disunion, seemed destined to forfeit indefinitely the important rôle which they deserved to play in European and world affairs.

Yet economic forces were drawing them together, though political bonds failed to knit. The multiplicity of tariffs erected by thirty-eight separate governments proved a severe hindrance to trade, so great that in 1818 Prussia adopted a uniform customs

The Zollverein

policy and invited her neighbors to merge their policies with hers. By 1834, seventeen German states had entered this *Zollverein* or customs union, and six others shortly followed. German manufacturers profited by the disappearance of internal trade barriers and by the common tariff which partly protected them from French and British competition. The exclusion of the Austrian Empire, with its mixed population, from this economic alliance, foreshadowed the unification of the strictly German states under Prussian leadership.

The Frankfort Assembly (1848–49)

The success of the *Zollverein* convinced the business classes that political unification would prove a further boon to trade, for they saw that it would make possible a simpler postal, currency, and banking system and a single code of law. Professors urged it in the lecture room and journalists pleaded for it in the press. When, following the February disorders in France, a revolutionary wave broke over Europe in 1848, German liberals and nationalists believed that the auspicious moment had arrived to realize their hopes, and called an assembly at Frankfort to prepare a constitution for a federated commonwealth. All Germany anxiously followed the deliberations, but the delegates found themselves challenged from the first by two issues that defied a satisfactory solution: (1) Should the proposed German commonwealth be a republic or a monarchy? (2) Should the Austrian lands be included or excluded from the union? A third problem, which threatened for a time to precipitate a general European war, concerned the inclusion of Schleswig and Holstein, for these provinces, though largely German in population, were subject to the Danish king. Finally, the determination of the Prussian government to bring its segment of Poland into whatever German union might be formed raised another racial difficulty.

Failure of the Frankfort Assembly

When, in the preliminary discussions at Frankfort, the delegates voted to make the greater Germany which they planned a constitutional monarchy, seventy-nine republicans walked out in disgust. From that point a fatal division weakened the national cause. On the second problem, concerning the inclusion of Austria, the Assembly attempted to compromise. Since the Slavs, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, and Italians in the Hapsburg Empire could not properly be included in a Germanic union, only the German provinces of Austria were invited to join. The Austrian government, hostile to any federation it could not aspire to dominate, rejected the compromise and recalled its representatives from Frankfort. Still hopeful of forming a smaller German Empire under Prussian leadership, the Assembly offered the imperial crown to Frederick William IV of Prussia (March,

1849). His curt refusal, with the intimation that he might accept it from his fellow princes, but could not take a crown from the hands of a revolutionary assembly, extinguished the last hopes of the Frankfort delegates. Most of them dispersed in disillusionment, and the handful of extremists who attempted to resort to radical measures were driven out by force.

The aspirations of the German nationalists, so promising in 1848, had changed by 1849 to a sense of ignominious failure. In 1850, the old Germanic Confederation was re-established, a signal victory for Austria and for conservatism. Nevertheless, Germany had heard the call to union, and liberals could find a few grains of comfort in the fact that constitutional privileges had been extended in several states, while Prussia, hitherto a stronghold of autocratic principles, acquired a measure of representative government. For during the riotous days of 1848, Frederick William IV had been intimidated into promising his subjects a constitution, and he fulfilled his word, although the charter which he granted could not be called liberal. It created a House of Representatives, but the deputies possessed little power beyond the right to reject new taxes. It assured universal suffrage, but nullified its effect by dividing all the voters into three classes according to the amount of taxes they paid. As each class chose the same number of deputies, the very rich and the moderately wealthy controlled the parliament, while the third group, including the millions of peasants and workers, had a minority representation. In 1854, Frederick William established an upper chamber, or House of Lords, the noble members of which were to hold their seats by hereditary right or by appointment for life. This insincere constitution, so cleverly designed to wear the appearance of democracy while checkmating its effects, possesses more than a passing importance because it later became the constitution of the German Empire.

Prussia wins a deceptive constitution

The failure of the revolutionary movement of 1848–49 sobered the German liberals and turned their thoughts from finespun theories about the ideal form of union to a consideration of indissoluble, brute facts. They saw more clearly now that if Prussia was to unify the German-speaking people, it could only be accomplished in defiance of Austria, probably as the result of a military decision in which Austria suffered defeat. For such a test of strength between the two leading powers in the Germanies, the time was not ripe in 1849, but the problem had been clarified and the issue defined. Within twenty years the Germans were to unite their fatherland, despite domestic feuds, and in the face of French and Austrian opposition.

4. AUSTRIA RESTORES HER HOUSE TO ORDER

No European dynasty was more firmly wedded to conservative principles in 1848 than the house of Austria. From his palace in Vienna the ageing Metternich watched with disapproval the resuscitation of democratic ideas, as firmly convinced as ever that government by the people would lead to anarchy, and that the spirit of nationalism agitating the Italians, the Germans, and the subject peoples of the Hapsburg Empire formed the gravest threat to the peace of Europe. Like Guizot in France he sought to preserve his immobility in a world that ebbed and shifted, but his deep-seated conviction that any change in political or social relations was likely to prove dangerous can be ascribed to something more than prejudice. Metternich may well have foreseen, what subsequent history has made clear, that the triumph of liberalism would ultimately destroy the old régime in Austria and that the triumph of nationalism would result in the dissolution of the polyglot empire. He fought to preserve the dynasty he served, and the empire he administered, from forces which threatened both with destruction.

Despite all his precautions, however, the revolutionary fever of 1848 invaded Austria. A popular uprising in Vienna forced him into exile, while the liberals wrung the promise of a constitution from the feeble emperor, Ferdinand I (1835–48). In Bohemia the Czechs demanded local autonomy with their own elected Diet, while the Magyars prepared to establish Hungary as an almost independent kingdom. This last proposal roused opposition among the repressed Slavs who split the Hungarian Kingdom in two by proclaiming a Southern Slav State to include the Croats and Serbs. All the new governments demanded recognition from the paralyzed ministry at Vienna, and all adopted liberal programs, promising the peasants relief from feudal dues, the middle class freedom of speech and the press, and all the citizens the benefit of a representative government. Metternich's apprehensions had crystallized into facts; the bulwarks of absolutism in the Hapsburg Empire were tottering, and the empire itself seemed on the point of dissolution.

Then the tide turned. The insurgent factions fell to attacking one another and the conservative forces seized the opportunity to strike back. Rivalry between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia enabled Prince Windischgrätz to recapture Prague for the imperial government. In Italy the veteran Austrian general, Radetsky, suppressed the Italian outbreaks in Lombardy and Venetia. These victories encouraged the emperor's advisers to suggest a counter-

Defeat of the Austrian liberals

stroke against the liberals in Vienna. As a feud had already developed in the reform ranks between the middle-class moderates and the more radical workingmen, Windischgrätz found it possible to reoccupy the capital in October, 1848. Ferdinand resigned the throne to his nephew, Francis Joseph I (1848–1916), who dissolved the revolutionary assembly, threw out the newly completed constitution, and restored much of the conservative régime. The indifference with which the Austrian people accepted this defeat of the liberal experiment proved that the movement had excited little real support outside Vienna.

Though threatened for a time, the old régime in Austria had demonstrated its capacity to withstand revolutionary change. Where the liberal cause had joined forces with the national urge, however, as in Hungary, a fiercer blaze had been kindled and one more difficult to extinguish. But the imperial court, long adept at the game of playing one national faction against another, cleverly selected Count Joseph Jellachich, leader of the Southern Slavs, to head a campaign against the rebellious Magyars. Windischgrätz followed with a second imperial army, and in 1849, Czar Nicholas I marched a Russian force to the aid of Francis Joseph and helped to destroy the Hungarian Republic in the interests of legitimacy. Weakened by dissensions and crushed by superior forces, the Hungarian patriots under the heroic Louis Kossuth were compelled to yield, and the Hapsburg ruler could congratulate himself that he was master in his own household.

Metternich's system "triumphantly fireproof"

The prestige which accrued to Austria from these triumphs over the forces of liberalism and separatism enabled the government at Vienna to adopt a decisive tone in German affairs also, and to oppose successfully the project for the unification of the Germanies under Prussian leadership. Austria had once again shown herself the vigilant champion of conservatism, and Metternich, though he did not resume the office of chancellor, returned to Vienna to write his memoirs, consoled by the assurance that his life-work had proved itself "triumphantly fire-proof" in the years 1848 and 1849.

5. ITALY REMAINS IN BONDAGE

National uprising in Italy (1848)

In Italy as in Germany the events of 1848 roused the nationalists and liberals to action. Hatred of the rule of foreign despots had been growing steadily in the Italian states since 1815, but the revolutionary factions possessed no central committee and no concerted plan. In 1848, an uprising of the Milanese forced

the Austrian garrison to withdraw, and the Venetians likewise expelled the Austrian authorities from their city and proclaimed it a republic. A surge of national defiance swept the peninsula as Charles Albert of Sardinia took the field and prepared to drive Radetsky's white-coated contingents from Italian soil. Even the pope, Pius IX, and the reactionary Neapolitan king, Ferdinand II, sent troops to aid in the War of Liberation. The Austrian government, paralyzed at home by the liberal outbreak in Vienna and the revolts in Bohemia and Hungary, could hardly be expected to maintain a firm hold upon its Italian provinces.

Yet, despite these hopeful circumstances, the Italians signally failed to break the Austrian yoke. Pius IX and Ferdinand II soon recalled their contingents from the struggle, and Charles Albert of Sardinia, defeated by the Austrians at Custozza and again at Novara, resigned his throne (1849). Reaction swept Italy as it was already sweeping Europe. Constitutions were revoked, popular assemblies dismissed, and Italian liberals hanged, jailed, or exiled. Austria had displayed unexpected strength, but the real fault for their failure lay with the Italians themselves. The excesses of the republican radicals in Milan, in Naples, and especially in Rome, where they drove the pope from the city and set up a Roman Republic, brought discredit upon the idea of "government by the people" and disgusted moderate-minded men. If the alternative to Austrian or papal absolutism was to be the murderous anarchy of a Roman mob or of Neapolitan brigands, sober citizens found that they preferred to live in reasonable security under princely despots. This division between the outlook of middle-class Italians who favored constitutional monarchy and radicals who sought to set up democratic republics so disrupted and crippled the national-liberal movement that the Austrians found it easy to reoccupy Milan and Venice, while a French expeditionary force (dispatched by the newly elected prince-president, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte) restored Rome and the Papal States to the rule of Pius IX. In Italy as elsewhere the revolutionary movement of 1848 had ended in failure in 1849.

6. THE LESSONS OF 1848–49

In fact, few upheavals of equal magnitude in the history of Europe have produced such apparently negative results. The Second French Republic, established in 1848 on the ruins of the monarchy, after destroying the Socialists was itself destroyed that an imperial adventurer, Napoleon III, might restore the throne. The Frankfort Assembly,

summoned to unite the Germanies in 1848, closed its sessions in ridicule and failure in 1849. The widespread revolts in the Austrian Empire produced little in the way of permanent reform beyond the belated abolition of the remnants of serfdom in central Europe, while the Italian campaign for liberty and independence collapsed in defeat and anarchy.

Yet of these hopes betrayed in 1849 fully half were to be realized within a generation. By 1871, the French had proclaimed a Third Republic, destined this time to endure; the Germans had transmuted their dream of unity, so long deferred, into an actuality; the Italians had won their independence and a constitutional government. Note, however, that these were mainly nationalist causes, and that they triumphed largely because nationalism had the support of the industrial and mercantile classes. The social program of 1848, in so far as it sought the emancipation of the workingmen, ran counter to the powerful interests of employers and the prejudices of the wealthy, and this partly explains why socialism faltered while nationalism advanced. The propertied classes had, in fact, been so gravely alarmed by the socialist and communist menace in 1848 and 1849 that they cast about for measures to combat it, and in several states (France, Austria, Prussia) the government and the middle class repented the curbs which they had imposed upon the Roman Catholic Church and welcomed it again as a useful ally in combating socialist heresies.

Socialism discredited after 1848

Among Socialists and Republicans the collapse of their hopes produced a profound sense of disillusionment. Yet all the expense of blood and spirit had not been vain, for through defeat they achieved a more realistic and more practical comprehension of their task. The Russian liberal, Alexander Herzen, recorded this change of mood. "It is a strange thing: since 1848 we have all faltered and stepped back, we have thrown everything overboard and shrunk into ourselves, and yet something has been done and everything has been changed. We are nearer to the earth, we stand on a lower, that is a firmer, level, the plow-cuts more deeply, our work is not so attractive, it is rougher — perhaps because it really is work." The romance of dreaming a social revolution was over; the work of preparing one had begun. But for some years after 1849, socialism languished, partly because it had suffered a setback, partly because the 1850's brought an era of business prosperity that exorcised the specter of unemployment and eased the lot of the worker.

Nor were signs lacking that the bourgeoisie might learn benevolence and soften the hostility between capital and labor by reasonable concessions. It was a favorable omen that the plight of the working classes

had already attracted the sympathy of essayists and novelists who held up a mirror to society and pricked the consciences of the wealthy by descriptions of slum life and the degradation of poverty. In England the novels of Charles Dickens (1812–70) pleaded in all keys from humor to pathos the case of the wretched and impoverished. Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881), the Scottish historian and philosopher, launched flaming indictments against the evils of the factory system which rotted the hearts and souls of rich and poor alike. Across the Channel, Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850), perhaps the greatest of French novelists, depicted with dispassionate skill in his *Comédie Humaine* the ambition, selfishness, and avarice that infect a society ruled by the love of money, and revealed how petty and soulless life may become for people who know (like Oscar Wilde's cynic) the price of everything and the value of nothing.

The influence of such literature, though slow in its effect, could hardly fail in time to sensitize the rich to the problems of social justice. Books are more powerful than bombs in pleading a just cause. The violence of the radicals of 1848 and 1849, who sought to remake society by force, defeated its own aims because it welded the conservative classes together more solidly against the urban workingman. In all European countries the proletarian groups of 1848 were minority factions, and for this reason their successes, if they won any, were certain to be bloody and impermanent and to leave a heritage of obloquy upon their perpetrators. The anarchist Proudhon perceived this when he lamented that "the revolution had come before its time." It remained for established governments and conservative statesmen to make halting concessions to the popular demands after 1860.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE: NAPOLEON III

I believe that from time to time men are created whom I will call providential, in whose hands the destinies of their countries are placed. I believe myself to be one of those men.

LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

STUDENTS who delight in the conviction that history repeats itself often note remarkable similarities between the First French Empire created by the great Napoleon and its counterpart erected half a century later by Napoleon III. Like his more famous uncle, Napoleon III transformed a republic into an empire, allied himself with the Roman Catholic Church, promised peace and made war, nurtured vast colonial dreams, fought an Italian campaign against the Austrians, sent an army to invade Russia, attempted to interfere in the Germanies, lost his throne and empire on the battlefield, and died in exile. To insist too far, however, on these striking resemblances between the two reigns would prove dangerously misleading. History never repeats itself without significant variations. The Second French Empire was no more a re-creation of the first than Louis Napoleon was a reincarnation of Napoleon I. The points of comparison suggest a case of historic plagiarism rather than historic repetition, and the Second Empire as a political experiment can be most profitably judged if it is judged by itself.

Parallel between Napoleon I and Napoleon III

1. "THE EMPIRE IS PEACE"

As explained in the previous chapter, the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, by which Louis Napoleon made himself master of France, was confirmed by an enormous majority of the French voters. A second plebiscite, announced officially as 7,839,000 "ayes" to 253,000 "noes," sanctioned the establishment of an empire. In approving this move the French peasants remembered that an earlier Napoleon had secured them their property, reduced their taxes, and maintained public tranquillity; they forgot that he had also consigned their sons to slaughter on distant battlefields. The French middle class welcomed a strong government that would cope with the threat of socialism, though they dreaded that the name Bonaparte might spell military hazards for France and for business. Such fears the new emperor sought to dispel by a public

denial. "In a spirit of mistrust certain people say 'The Empire is War.' I say 'The Empire is Peace.'" Whereupon he outlined the peaceful aims to which he hoped to dedicate his reign: the construction of railways, canals, and harbors which would create work for the unemployed, the expansion of commerce, the stimulation of agriculture, and the development of the French colonial empire. Nor did he forget the enrichment of culture and the propagation of the Catholic faith.

In his plans to promote the prosperity of his subjects, Napoleon found himself favored by extraneous circumstances. The decade between 1850 and 1860 was a period of great business activity, especially in France. Prices rose steadily, farmers and manufacturers found a ready market for their commodities, and workers found employment without difficulty in the expanding industries or the public projects inaugurated by the imperial government. Frenchmen told themselves that they had lost nothing by surrendering some of their liberties to an autocrat, for at least the emperor knew how to give them security and prosperity. In actual truth, the business "boom" was due to many complicated economic factors, such as the quickening effect of the Industrial Revolution in France, improvements in the methods of manufacture and transportation, and the discovery of gold in California (1848) which increased the world supply of that precious metal and made commodity prices appear to rise as gold became cheaper. But as few people understood such complicated matters, Napoleon III received more credit than he deserved for his efforts on behalf of better business.

France had become bored, to borrow a famous expression of the poet and historian Lamartine, by the unimpressive appearance and mediocre policies of Louis Philippe. Napoleon III studiously avoided this danger by entertaining his subjects with lavish displays and dramatic actions designed to keep the person of the emperor constantly in their thoughts. He toured the country delivering political addresses full of high-sounding platitudes, dedicated town halls and hospitals and railway stations to the public service, and laid corner-stones with eloquence and dexterity. The Parisian populace soon learned to shout *Vive l'empereur* as he drove past with a clattering escort of guards, and crowded to watch him when, dressed in a brilliant uniform, his moustaches waxed to a point, he distributed decorations to his loyal soldiers.

Modernization of Paris

To make Paris a more beautiful capital for the Second Empire, Napoleon had the city modernized under the direction of his able friend Baron Haussmann. At enormous expense beautiful boulevards and broad squares replaced many of the city's ancient and crooked streets. The program of reconstruction provided

labor for the unemployed and made Paris the most elegant and spacious capital in Europe, but it also made the task of the troops easier in case of insurrection. Broad boulevards are less convenient to barricade than narrow lanes, and crowds in open squares are defenseless before gunfire or cavalry.

At an exposition held in 1855 to celebrate the progress of French art and industry, visitors were dazzled by the beauty and gaiety of the city. Paris had become once more what it had been under Louis XIV and Napoleon, the world center of art, fashion, and diplomacy. At the palace of the Tuileries the Empress Eugénie, a beautiful young Spanish girl whom Napoleon III married in 1853, presided gracefully over the imperial court. French writers, under the leadership of Gustave Flaubert (1821–80), set the standards for a new realist school of fiction which supplanted the romantic tradition of the preceding generation. All Europe acknowledged in Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve (1804–69) the dean of literary critics. *Carmen* by Prosper Mérimée and *La Dame aux Camélias* by Alexandre Dumas the Younger, both destined to serve as the inspiration for famous operas, were written in these years, while Victor Hugo, a giant surviving from the romantic era, published his novel *Les Misérables* and much of his greatest poetry during the Second Empire. Frenchmen were proud to feel that their country had resumed again that leading position in art, literature, diplomacy, and military prestige to which *la grande nation* was entitled.

Prestige of the Second Empire

2. ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN

It has been said of Napoleon III that even upon the throne he remained a conspirator at heart. His diplomacy always had a hint of the subterranean about it, and his idea of government was to divide the nation into a multiplicity of factions all bound to him by private understandings while he alone held the strings. There is some justice in this criticism, but the same charge may be leveled with more or less truth against every successful politician. It is but another way of saying that Napoleon was a practicing politician upon a throne, and a very proficient one at that, until his many promises and diverse commitments combined to trip him up.

To win the support of the French Catholics, Louis Napoleon, before his *coup d'état*, had dispatched a military force to Rome to restore the Papal States to the rule of Pius IX after the outbreaks of 1848. In 1850, the Legislature of the Second Republic passed the Falloux Law which placed French schools under the super-

The Catholics



NAPOLEON III, EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH
1808–1873

The dull gaze and enigmatic expression which made Napoleon III seem a sphinx to his contemporaries are well suggested in this portrait.

vision of the clergy. The panic created by the Socialist agitation in 1848 and 1849 had softened the hostility of the anti-clerical bourgeoisie toward the church and convinced them, as already noted, that religious instruction could best check the spread of radical and subversive doctrines among the masses. So the Empress Eugénie busied herself with Catholic charities, Napoleon posed as the champion of that faith, and felt confident that, so long as he maintained a garrison at Rome to safeguard the papal dominions and preserved the favored position of the clergy in France, he could count upon Catholic support. Nor was he mistaken.

The bourgeoisie

The bourgeoisie were disposed to endorse any government which promised peace and order. In addressing this class Napoleon disavowed any warlike intentions and promised economic prosperity and liberty of trade. Through the establishment of a sort of government bank, the *Crédit mobilier*, which lent large sums of money for business projects, Napoleon encouraged the extension of railway, steamship, and telegraph lines. Industry throve, profits mounted, and the business classes applauded the emperor for his sage administration throughout a decade of unparalleled expansion (1850–60). In 1859, on his own authority, Napoleon negotiated a free-trade agreement with Great Britain which speedily doubled French exports, but angered many French manufacturers because it swept away the tariff protection which had shielded them from British competition. Through this interference in trade he had offended a group, numerically small, but powerful in the business world, an omen of the increasing difficulties which were to beset him in the later years of his reign.

The peasants and the workers

The peasants had little fault to find with a régime which protected their religion and assured cheap transportation and a ready market for their produce. To them the fifty per cent rise in the cost of commodities which came after 1850 proved a blessing, for it meant a higher reward for their labors, but to the city working class it meant that food grew dearer while wages lagged. Napoleon succeeded to some extent in raising wages and reducing unemployment by his program of public works, and he sought to combat the evils of poverty by organizing insurance societies which would encourage the poor to save, and by rebuilding the tenement districts at public expense. The government reformed the pawnshops which had preyed upon the poor, the Empress Eugénie devoted herself to charity, the emperor constantly protested his deep concern with social problems. But socialism continued to spread among the city proletariat none the less, for the workers judged the régime less by its promises than by its fruits and saw that too few of the fruits fell to them.

Officers and men in the military services knew that with a Bonaparte at the head of the state they would not be forgotten. No dictator can afford to estrange his army; Napoleon had relied upon it for the *coup d'état* of 1851; and the beat of distant drums was to persist like a fateful chorus throughout the twenty years of his reign, growing louder and more ominous as the Second Empire drifted toward the final tragedy of Sedan. While protesting that the empire meant peace, Napoleon raised the prestige of the army and fed it with expectations. Nationalists, ashamed of the "peace without honor" policy that had been pursued by the government of Louis Philippe, applauded Napoleon when he dispatched troops to Rome (1849) to prove that France as well as Austria could meddle in the affairs of Italy. In 1853, he sought to please Catholics and nationalists alike by challenging Russia in a dispute over the holy places of Palestine, a controversy which involved France in the Crimean War.[1] At the same time an aggressive foreign policy led to an extension of the French influence in Algeria, the transformation of Cambodia (in Indo-China) into a protectorate, and the acquisition of islands in the Pacific, so that France came to rank second only to Great Britain as a colonial power, although the penalty of such imperialism was a constant danger of war. But Napoleon believed in his destiny, and destiny for a Bonaparte spelled war. Despite his own preference for peace and the assurances he had given that he would maintain it, war proved the deciding factor in his fortunes.

The army

3. THE LIBERAL NEMESIS

The emperor's attempts to reconcile all factions failed to win over many clear-sighted intellectuals, or to appease the ardent republicans and socialists. These groups would not forgive Napoleon his usurpation of power, nor the bloodshed, the arrests, and the deportations by which that illegal usurpation had been consecrated. Official manipulation of the elections, official supervision of the press, and official suppression of liberal courses in the universities reduced the opponents of the imperial régime to impotence, but intensified their resentment. France, the liberals held, had betrayed the high cause of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, and made herself the slave of one man. The army, the clergy, and the commercial classes might support Napoleon the Little, as Victor Hugo named him, but an unreconciled minority of his subjects still insisted that his throne was built upon sand and must dissolve in the rising tide of European liberalism.

[1] See below, pages 787–89.

Napoleon was prepared, if he could, to conciliate the liberals also. In 1860, he compromised his absolutism by political concessions and opened the second phase of his reign, the Liberal Empire. A general amnesty for political prisoners freed the bitterest foes of his régime from captivity, an opposition press was permitted to appear, and the Chamber of Deputies gained the right to criticize Napoleon's ministers, to control the budget, and to make public its debates. This ingenious attempt to harmonize absolute with parliamentary government produced little except an opposition party supported by various discontented factions, by Legitimists and Orléanists, by Catholics antagonized when the emperor helped the Italians toward unity, by manufacturers who suffered by the commercial treaty with Great Britain, by the persistent Republican minority and the radical Socialists. Napoleon, prematurely aged, with his health failing, lost his faculty for reconciling discordant elements. He continued to make concessions to the growing liberal demands until his empire had become by 1870 a constitutional monarchy. Still the republicans and socialists harassed him, determined that the throne itself should be overturned and the republic restored. This rising menace which threatened his rule and the succession of his son, the prince imperial, was one reason why Napoleon in 1870 gambled on a war with Prussia in the effort to regain his waning prestige.

The Liberal Empire

But in foreign as in domestic affairs fortune had deserted him after 1860. The subsequent pages will outline the foreign policies of the Second Empire, and endeavor to explain the complex motives which led Napoleon III to seek a war with Russia which added to his prestige, to provoke a war with Austria which added to his perplexities, and to accept a war with Prussia which overturned his throne.

4. THE SECOND EMPIRE AT WAR: THE CRIMEAN CONFLICT (1854–56)

Throughout the nineteenth century, European statesmen, particularly British statesmen, were haunted by an almost superstitious fear of Russia. The enormous size of the Muscovite Empire, larger in area than all the rest of the European states together, was in itself an alarming reflection. Napoleon's disastrous march on Moscow in 1812 furnished seeming proof of Russian invulnerability, and Alexander I, by his determined stand at the Congress of Vienna, had indicated that the great Slavic power was not yet satiated and lusted for more territory. As if driven by an irresistible pressure, the Russian frontier moved east-

ward until it reached the Pacific Ocean. By 1860, the province north of the Amur River had been wrested from China, and Vladivostok ("The Conqueror of the East") founded as a Russian port on the Sea of Japan. At the same time Russian armies in the Middle East pressed into Mongolia and overran Turkestan to the borders of Afghanistan and India. In the Near East the shadow of the Russian giant hung like a dark threat above the crumbling Turkish Empire, and the czar's forces waited only for a favorable opportunity to seize Constantinople.

British merchants were convinced that their Mediterranean trade would suffer if Constantinople fell to Russia, and the British people persuaded themselves that an army of Cossacks might soon be pouring through the passes of the Hindu Kush to compete for the control of India. A deeper knowledge of the internal weaknesses of the Russian Empire would have dispelled much of this anxiety, but few western Europeans had traveled there and the czar's subjects could not journey abroad without special permission. So to foreigners Russia remained shrouded with the vague menace which always invests an unknown and unpredictable force.

Turkey the "sick man" of Europe

Even peaceful overtures from Saint Petersburg aroused misgivings. "We have a sick man on our hands," declared Nicholas I in 1853, referring metaphorically to Turkey; and he proposed to the British ambassador that, as chief beneficiaries of the Ottoman bequest, England should establish a claim to Egypt while Russia "inherited" the sultan's Balkan provinces. The British cabinet doubted the czar's good faith, but Nicholas apparently took their refusal for a diplomatic "yes."

Thereupon Russian armies anticipated the "sick man's" demise by occupying the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia [1] and the British government prepared to aid the Turks. Meanwhile, a dispute had developed between France and Russia concerning the claims of Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox monks to control and exhibit to pilgrims certain holy places in Syria. Napoleon III needed the prestige of a successful war; he was annoyed at Nicholas because the latter had declined to greet him as "my brother" when he made himself Emperor of the French; and he hoped to please the Catholics in France by claiming the right to protect Catholics in Turkey. So Napoleon deliberately fostered a conflict for which there was little cause and no justification, and Britain joined France in order to fight for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.

In 1854, the two powers dispatched an expedition to the Black Sea

[1] See map following page 728.

to besiege the Russian fortress of Sebastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. After heavy losses and terrible suffering on both sides, Sebastopol was evacuated by the Russians (September, 1855) and the allies (France, Great Britain, Turkey, and the Kingdom of Sardinia, which had joined them in 1855) agreed to suspend hostilities. The British, who had conducted their share of the war with heavy casualties and tragic inefficiency, would willingly have continued it, but Napoleon III was satisfied with his victory such as it was. As for the Russians, they had never really desired the war, and had been disillusioned by the hostile attitude of the Austrian government, which had accepted Russian aid in crushing the Hungarians (1849), but failed to reciprocate in Russia's hour of need. Gratitude was never a Hapsburg virtue.

Siege of Sebastopol

So the Crimean War was terminated by a congress of diplomats who met at Paris to work out a new settlement for the Near-Eastern Question. To hold Russia in check the victors ordained: (1) That no great power should construct fortifications or maintain warships in the Black Sea. (2) That Moldavia and Wallachia (modern Rumania), which Russia had occupied in 1853, and later evacuated, should become an autonomous principality while remaining under Turkish suzerainty. (3) That the Danube River should be open to the trading ships of all nations. The Congress of Paris had the further significance of admitting Turkey for the first time to a recognized place in the European concert of nations, and of formulating a "Declaration" defining the rights of neutrals and the question of protecting neutral property in time of war. The attempt to limit the destructiveness of warfare and to impress a respect for certain humane conventions upon all the belligerents marked a distinct advance in the evolution of international law. Though frequently violated since, the "Declaration" of the Congress of Paris, because of the ban it placed upon privateering and the limits it set upon the right of blockade, has proved the most permanent benefit of the war.

The Treaty of Paris (1856)

For in so far as it represented an attempt to settle the Near-Eastern Question the Treaty of Paris proved a tragic failure. The sultan, after swearing to grant equal justice to his "Christian cattle," conveniently forgot his promise. After a few years Russia coolly ignored the provisions prohibiting armaments on the Black Sea, and a generation later a new congress had to be convoked to protect Turkey from the Russian advance. For this negative result, Britain, France, and Russia had shattered a truce which had restrained the great powers from war with one another for thirty-nine years; for this a sum equivalent to two billion

dollars had been poured away, and half a million lives sacrificed to war, disease, and negligence. But Napoleon III had won the honor of presiding over a peace conference in Paris; British traders could sleep more soundly in their beds because for the moment the Russians ceased to threaten Constantinople; and Cavour, who had plunged Sardinia into an alien conflict to gain the friendly interest of Napoleon, could turn that interest to his own astute ends.

A new period of armed conflict had opened in Europe, for the Crimean War proved the first of five struggles which disturbed the great powers between 1853 and 1871. The second, which broke out in 1859, found Napoleon leading an army into Italy to expel the Austrians. Napoleon's reasons for engaging in this Italian war of 1859 were numerous and complicated. His mind was a strange crucible in which generous impulses and humanitarian ideals blended obscurely with dynastic aims and political calculations. As a youth he had campaigned with the Italian patriots in their ill-starred uprising of 1830, and as an emperor he continued to declare his sympathy for suppressed peoples, Poles, Germans, or Italians. To drive the Austrians from Italy and replace their influence by a French hegemony, as the first Napoleon had done, must certainly have appealed to him as an undertaking that would shed luster upon French arms and strengthen his throne. But he took no active steps to aid the liberals in Italy until, in 1858, an impatient Italian patriot named Orsini threw a bomb at his carriage to refresh his memory.

Far from deterring Napoleon, Orsini's conspiracy crystallized his resolution to aid the Italians. He knew that the only state in Italy strong and independent enough to take the offensive in a war to expel the Austrians was the Kingdom of Sardinia. With elaborate secrecy he arranged a meeting with Count Camillo di Cavour, the tireless and far-sighted Sardinian diplomat who was the most ingenious statesman of his time. The two agreed that Austria should be tricked into attacking Sardinia, whereupon a French army of two hundred thousand men would hasten to the aid of the Sardinians. Italy was to be freed from "the Alps to the Adriatic," and France as a reward would annex the province of Savoy and the city of Nice. Privately, Napoleon felt confident that a victory would enable him to make French influence supplant Austrian domination in the Italian Peninsula.

It will be convenient at this point to pause in the discussion of the Second Empire, and turn back to trace the drama of Italian unification up to 1859 in order to appreciate better how skillfully Cavour had prepared the stage for Napoleon's entry.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

THE POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF ITALY

Italy is one nation; unity of customs, language, and literature must in a period more or less distant unite her inhabitants under one sole government, and Rome will without the slightest doubt be chosen by the Italians as their capital.
NAPOLEON I, at Saint Helena.

DISREGARDING the national aspirations which had stirred in Italy during the era of Napoleon I, the Congress of Vienna sought in 1815 to restore the Italian people to that condition of disunity and subjugation under which they had languished before the French Revolution. How well the congress succeeded may be seen by comparing the status of Italy in 1648 and in 1815. Old states and old governments reappeared, and princes long in exile returned to claim their privileges in the name of legitimacy. In the south Ferdinand I, despicable scion of the Spanish Bourbon line, assumed the crown of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Central Italy, from Rome to Ravenna, was reconstituted as the States of the Church under the temporal rule of Pius VII. In the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the neighboring duchies of Parma, Lucca, and Modena, petty despots, most of them Hapsburg dependents, returned to their thrones. North of the Po the new map differed slightly from that of 1789, because Austria now held both Lombardy and Venetia, while to the west the congress strengthened the Kingdom of Sardinia by incorporating with it the late republic of Genoa. Those patriotic Italians who cherished the dream of a free and united Italy in 1815 found the prospect disheartening. The nine fragments into which the peninsula had been redivided were not linked by even a loose confederative bond, and most of them were ruled by princes of foreign extraction who had no sympathy for the ideal of Italian unity and independence.

Italy in 1815

1. THE NATIONAL SPIRIT STIRS (1815–48)

Nevertheless, though the map of Italy might be redrawn on the eighteenth-century model, the Italian people had acquired a new spirit, new memories, and new ideas. Everywhere in Europe the revolutionary epoch had quickened national feelings. The Poles, the Germans, and the Italians, who possessed no independent fatherland of their own, had grown fiercely conscious of their right to liberty and unity. In Russia and Spain the appearance of Napoleon's

Nationalism


UNIFICATION OF ITALY
SCALE OF MILES
0 50 100 150
The dates are those of annexation to the Kingdom of Sardinia, and after 1861 to the Kingdom of Italy.
6° 8° 10° 12° 14° 16° 18°
48° 46° 44° 42° 40° 38° 36°
Danube
Vienna
Drave
Laibach
Trieste
Venice
Fiume
Brod
Save
Pola
Zara
Sebenico
Ancona
Castelfidardo
Fermo
Ascoli
Teramo
Pescara
Ragusa
Spalato
LISSA
Leghorn
Pisa
Florence
Siena
Cortona
Perugia
Orvieto
Orbetello
Viterbo
Civitavecchia
Rome
Gaeta
Capua
Naples
Salerno
ISCHIA
CAPRI
Otranto
Castrovillari
Paola
Cosenza
Nicotera
Messina
Gerace
Reggio
LIPARI IS.
C.St.Vito
Palermo
Trapani
Marsala
Taormina
Catania
Girgenti
Syracuse
Tunis
PANTELLARIA
MALTA (Brit.)
SAVOY (to France) (1860)
Chambery
Aosta
Susa
Turin
Alessandria
Saluzzo
Coni
Genoa
Gulf of Genoa
Spezia
Lucca
Monaco
(to France) (1860)
C.Corso
CORSICA (to France)
Ajaccio
CAPRERA
Sassari
SARDINIA
Cagliari
TYRRHENIAN SEA
LIGURIAN SEA
ADRIATIC SEA
IONIAN SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
AFRICA
Longitude 8° East 10° from 12° Greenwich 14° 16°

armies had aroused the people to deep patriotic resentment. The intensification of the feeling of nationalism during the years of war and revolution made it the most dynamic political force in the modern world. How this vital sentiment can spread among a people, converting them to a belief in their own uniqueness, their common historical and cultural heritage, and their right to political unity and self-government, is well illustrated by the story of the Italians.

The Risorgimento

The Italian people had never forgotten that in ancient times Rome was the mistress of the known world, and that a thousand years later the scholars and artists of the Renaissance made Italy the "mother of arts." Unfortunately, with the discovery of the New World, Mediterranean trade declined and the Italian cities lost the primacy which they had enjoyed, many of them falling under the thralldom of French, Spanish, or Austrian masters. By the eighteenth century little remained of Italy's former greatness save her "fatal gift of beauty." Yet when Napoleon, to serve his own purposes, sounded the call of Italian freedom, he wakened a spirit which survived his fall. Though subjected again to the rule of foreign despots, Italian patriots refused to abandon their dream of liberty. Secret societies, such as the famous *Carbonari*, plotted against the Austrians; poets and dramatists like Alessandro Manzoni (1785–1873) and Giacomo Leopardi (1798–1837) celebrated the past glories and the undying genius of the Italian people, while all classes felt the stir of a genuine resurrection of the Italian spirit, a rebirth, or *risorgimento*. If Italy could but win liberty and unity, the patriots urged, she would take her merited place among the great nations of the world and lead the march of civilization.

Abortive revolts

In 1820, the spirit of revolt blazed up in Naples, and in 1821 in Sardinia, but these ill-planned and sporadic outbreaks lacked direction and co-ordination and were easily extinguished by Austrian intervention. Uprisings in Parma, Modena, and the Papal States in 1831 produced the same negative results. The conspirators, hunted down by the Austrian police, were sentenced to death or imprisonment. Their failure, however, and their fate, fanned the fervor of other Italians, who perceived more clearly each year that there could be no liberty anywhere in Italy until the Austrian yoke was broken. Their hatred for the Austrians was well depicted by Robert Browning, whose *Italian in England* exclaims:

> I would grasp Metternich until
> I felt his red wet throat distil
> In blood thro' these two hands...

2. THREE CONFLICTING PROJECTS FOR UNIFICATION

The liberals, though eager to end foreign influence, could not agree upon the best form of government to establish in Italy when the nation attained freedom. Joseph Mazzini, one of the most inspiring leaders of the *risorgimento* in the years after 1830, hoped to sweep away the vestiges of the separate monarchical states and to found a democratic republic in Italy, and devoted his whole heart to the project. An idealist swayed by the loftiest motives, Mazzini preached the gospel of liberty and democracy with the ardor of an apostle, proclaiming that humanity stood on the threshold of a golden age, when all peoples, having established free governments, might dwell together in peace and justice. The English poet Swinburne, in his *Songs Before Sunrise*, hailed Mazzini as

Joseph Mazzini (1805–72)

> the world's banner bearer
> Who shall cry the republican cry;

but both Swinburne and Mazzini were dreaming of a sunrise that never came. An ideal society requires ideal citizens, and not even Mazzini's burning faith could endow his fellowmen with the unselfishness, the generosity, and the fair-mindedness of which he believed them capable.

Exiled in 1831 by the Sardinian government for his revolutionary activities, Mazzini organized Young Italy, an association dedicated to the establishment of a free and democratic society in defiance of prelates and princes. Scores of generous-hearted Italian youths, fired by his eloquence, risked their lives in fruitless insurrections which wasted precious blood without advancing the cause of liberty. Despite his sincerity and his personal magnetism, Mazzini lacked the qualities of a practical leader. His unitary democratic state appealed chiefly to the lower classes, for his dogmatic republicanism alarmed conservative Italians, and his denunciations of the Catholic faith as an outworn superstition offended many of his orthodox fellow countrymen.

Young Italy

As an alternative to Mazzini's republicanism, many Italians, especially members of the propertied classes and the aristocracy, favored the idea of uniting the states of Italy in a confederation with the pope as president. This project found an earnest advocate in Vincenzo Gioberti, who wrote a lengthy and widely read work *On the Moral and Civil Supremacy of the Italians* (1843). The great virtue of Gioberti's plan lay in its solution of what was called "The Roman Question"; that is, the problem of founding a united

The Roman Question

Italy without antagonizing the pope, who naturally declined to surrender the States of the Church to the rule of a secular government. For centuries it had been the consistent policy of the papacy to oppose the establishment of any government in the Italian Peninsula strong enough to threaten the papal patrimony. By conferring upon the head of the church in perpetuity the office of president of the proposed Italian confederation, it seemed probable that this opposition could be overcome, for in this way the pope could be assured of the power to maintain a theocratic rule in his temporal dominions.

Accession of Pius IX (1846–78)

The election to the papal chair of the winning and charitable Pius IX (1846) gave a powerful stimulus to the plan. Pius opened his pontificate by an amnesty for many political offenders, dismissed his Swiss Guard, and appointed popular ministers to his council. These reforms won him an enthusiastic following, particularly among liberal Catholics who were good churchmen and also good friends of Italian independence. But republicans and anti-clericals expressed a doubt that the pope's liberalism could be either deep or sincere, and continued to work for a secular state without religious affiliations.

The Sardinian Party

Advocates of yet a third project of unification looked to the Kingdom of Sardinia [1] to lead the movement. As the only independent Italian principality ruled by a native dynasty, the Piedmontese state enjoyed a unique position in Italy. With its hard-working peasantry, influential middle class, and well-trained army, it ranked as a third-class power, and might aspire to play the rôle in Italy which Prussia was playing in the Germanies. Ardent revolutionaries like Mazzini distrusted the Sardinian king, the enigmatic Charles Albert (1831–49), believing him a traitor to liberal ideals because he had refused his subjects a constitution and hesitated to challenge Austria in a war for Italian liberation. To a large body of moderate liberals, however, the thought of unifying their country under the sober-minded Sardinian king seemed an admirable solution, for what they most desired for Italy was a secular government that would be independent of Austrian and of papal influence. Believing in the old Latin proverb that middle roads are safest, such men could be counted upon to support the Sardinian government if it steered a sane middle course between radical republicanism and clerical domination.

[1] The student should understand clearly that "Kingdom of Sardinia" refers not to the island but to Savoy and the Piedmont. See the map following page 790.

3. THE DEFEATED HOPES OF 1848–49

At the opening of 1848, that year of revolutions which saw the throne of Louis Philippe overturned in Paris and Metternich driven from office by an outbreak in Vienna, Italy was shaken by spontaneous revolts from Venice to Sicily. Charles Albert at Turin, Ferdinand II at Naples, Pius IX at Rome, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany at Florence, all endeavored to pacify their rebellious subjects by granting constitutions. Nationalism and liberalism seemed on the point of obtaining a mutual triumph as the Venetian populace expelled the Austrian garrison and established a republic under the liberator Daniel Manin, while at Milan leaders of the national movement proclaimed the independence of Lombardy. The Austrian government was paralyzed at home by revolts in Vienna, Bohemia, and Hungary,[1] and this knowledge encouraged the Italians to attempt a general war of independence. Even the papal and Sicilian governments yielded to the popular fervor and contributed detachments to swell the gathering army of liberation.

Italian uprisings of 1848

With belated zeal, Charles Albert of Sardinia rallied to the head of the national movement. "*L'Italia farà da se*" (Italy will do it herself) he announced proudly, and launched his army against the retreating Austrians. But the weakness and the unharmonized ideals of the Italians betrayed them. As the first flush of enthusiasm passed, the papal and Neapolitan contingents were recalled, for Pius IX and Ferdinand of Naples recollected their duties to the side of tradition and legitimacy. At the same time, the Austrians, rallying strongly under their octogenarian field marshal, Radetsky, defeated Charles Albert's mixed forces at Custozza (July 24, 1848). With the failure of moderate leadership, the more radical of the Italian insurgents swung to the left and set up republics (1849) in Florence and Rome. Pius IX fled from the Vatican as Rome passed under the control of a popular government headed by Mazzini and defended by the tireless knight of liberty, Giuseppe Garibaldi.

"Italy will do it herself"

But the Italian people were unprepared for a sharp transition to democracy, and the Roman Republic could hardly have survived in any case amid the general reaction of 1849. Its death warrant, however, was signed by Louis Napoleon, newly elected president of the Second French Republic, who dispatched an expeditionary force to Rome which overcame the heroic resistance of Garibaldi's republican guard and re-

Collapse of the republican movement (1849)

[1] See above, pages 775–76.

established the papal government by means of French bayonets. At the same time Austria aided the lesser Italian despots to remount their thrones and revoke the constitutional guaranties which they had granted in the first months of the popular movement. By the close of the year 1849, the most determined and widespread effort yet made to free Italy from foreign oppression and domestic tyranny had ended in the blackest failure.

Yet one Italian state conserved its liberty even in defeat. Crushed by the Austrians at Custozza, and a second time at Novara (March 23, 1849), Charles Albert resigned his throne to his son Victor Emmanuel II, who made the best terms he could with Austria. A legend later grew up that Radetsky sought to coerce Victor Emmanuel into revoking the Sardinian *Statuto,* or constitution, proclaimed the previous year, and that the new king proudly refused. Actually, however, Radetsky softened his terms out of consideration for Victor Emmanuel, whom he considered more conservative than his father, and he did not criticize the *Statuto.*

Sardinia remains independent

Two lessons might be drawn from the failures of 1848–49. The first suggested that neither the Republican nor the Clerical Party would succeed in uniting Italy. The collapse of the Roman Republic left Mazzini and his colleagues, not exactly leaders without a party, but certainly leaders of a discouraged and diminished party. The Catholic liberals, on the other hand, now found themselves a party without a leader, for Pius IX had returned to Rome completely cured of his liberal sympathies. With the party of the Right and the party of the Left losing ground, it became clear that the party of the Center might yet win the day, and make the Kingdom of Sardinia the nucleus of a resurrected Italy. This was the first lesson to be learned from the events of 1848–49. But there was a second conclusion to be realized, a bitter one for Italian patriots to accept. Italy could not "do it herself." The Italian people possessed neither the forces nor the co-operation needed to drive out the Austrians; to attempt the task unaided was to invite further failure. Fortunately for the cause of Italian freedom, there was at least one statesman in Italy capable of appreciating both these lessons. His name was Camillo di Cavour.

Republicans and Clericals lose ground

4. CAVOUR CONTRIVES

Cavour was born in Turin in 1810, the second son of a noble family. After graduating from military school at the age of sixteen, he obtained

a commission in the Sardinian army, but his dabblings in liberalism and his indiscreet comments upon the backward political condition prevailing in Piedmont got him into trouble, and after a brief imprisonment he resigned his commission. His liberalism had made him a marked man, and the Austrian police in nearby states were warned that he was "deeply corrupted in his political principles." From 1831 to 1848 he pursued private interests, experimented with new methods of agriculture, studied, traveled, and accumulated a fortune, but his mind was constantly absorbed with political affairs in which he was denied a part. Then, in 1848, conditions changed abruptly. Charles Albert granted his subjects a constitution, and Cavour was elected to the recently created Sardinian Parliament. In 1850, the new king, Victor Emmanuel II, appointed him minister of commerce and agriculture, an office which permitted him to display at once his extraordinary grasp of political and economic questions.

Camillo di Cavour (1810–61)

Few people would have guessed from Cavour's appearance that he was one of the dominant personalities of the nineteenth century. With his stocky figure, plain garb, and metal-rimmed spectacles, he looked a shopkeeper or clerk. His life-purpose was to free Italy and give the Italian people a parliamentary government on the liberal English pattern, but he made no passionate speeches about the rights of man like Mazzini, nor did he lead the van of hopeless and heroic charges like the fearless Garibaldi. His unique talent consisted in his ability to grasp realities, to move only as fast as events permitted, to take practical advantage of the political forces at work in Europe and quietly direct them to his own ends.

The first step in Cavour's program was to make the Sardinian Kingdom known as a liberal and prosperous state to which all other Italians would look with pride and envy. His wide study and observance had made him an authority on commerce and agriculture, on railroads, finance, the methods of parliamentary government, and the conduct of foreign affairs. Once in office he pushed his reforms with implacable deliberation. The Sardinian Parliament ordained that marriage should become a civil contract, and forbade the gift of further property to the church, a policy aimed at curbing the influence of the clergy. Commercial treaties with other nations and a revision of the tariffs benefited the poorer classes. While assiduously cultivating the friendship of France and Britain, Cavour maintained a firm and cool attitude toward Austria, so that Sardinia came to be recognized as a state guided by liberal counsels where men dared to

Cavour's ministry



CAMILLO DI CAVOUR
1810–61

Cavour was often careless in his dress, and his appearance was not impressive, but he proved himself the most astute and successful diplomat of his day.

plan the liberation of Italy. This was precisely the impression Cavour wished to convey to the discontented citizens in other Italian provinces, and to Mazzini's republican insurgents.

Few of Cavour's contemporaries understood the intricacies of his foreign policy, yet his aim was comparatively simple. Believing that the Italians must have the aid of a great power to help them to expel the Austrians, he sought for such an ally and found it in France. How he joined Britain and France in the Crimean War has been mentioned already.[1] Sardinia had no real quarrel with Russia, but the intervention won Cavour a seat at the peace conference in Paris, where he had an opportunity to impress Napoleon III and to bring the Italian question before the European diplomats. Three years later, Cavour and Napoleon held a secret interview at Plombières, and the stage was set for the War of Italian Liberation. Napoleon insisted upon two stipulations: Austria must appear to be the aggressor, and France must receive the county of Savoy and the city of Nice as compensation for the aid rendered. Cavour hated to sacrifice a portion of the Piedmontese realm, but he knew that the population in the disputed sections was more French than Italian, and that France could not be expected to fight a war for pure altruism. Cavour was a realist.

Cavour finds an ally

A policy of astute provocation incited Austria to declare war against the Kingdom of Sardinia in April, 1859, and Napoleon III fulfilled his promise by leading an army of two hundred thousand men into Italy. But after the Austrians had been driven from Lombardy in the bloody battles of Magenta and Solferino, and half Europe feared to see the French emperor follow up his successes as brilliantly as his uncle had done sixty years earlier, Napoleon III suddenly abandoned the campaign and signed a truce with the Austrians.

What were the motives which moved Napoleon to end the war before Italy had been freed from "the Alps to the Adriatic"? Well, for one thing, he had been appalled by the carnage of the battlefields. A second and weightier reason was the growing hostility of the Prussian government which had mobilized its army and could threaten France with an attack on the Rhine. Then, too, Napoleon had come to suspect that he had underrated the strength of the Italian movement for independence, which now seemed likely to create, not a loose Italian federation which he could dominate, but a unified state which might menace France in the south. Finally, if the Italians succeeded in forming a united kingdom, they would

Napoleon abandons the war

[1] See above, pages 788–89.

seek to include Rome as their capital, a course which must deprive the pope of his temporal possessions and cause French Catholics to blame Napoleon for endangering the papal patrimony after he had promised to safeguard it.

Accordingly, to prevent the developments from outrunning his aims, Napoleon made peace with the Austrian emperor, Francis Joseph (Truce of Villafranca). As the Austrian forces remained strongly entrenched in the circle of fortresses known as the Quadrilateral (Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago), Francis Joseph could still bargain, and although he agreed to surrender Lombardy he insisted that the rulers of Modena and Tuscany should retain their thrones. The two emperors also decided to promote the formation of an Italian federation under the presidency of the pope, a step which Napoleon counted upon to placate the French Catholics.

Overwhelmed with disappointment at this desertion of his ally before the successful completion of a war from which he had hoped so much, Cavour for once lost his good sense, demanded that Sardinia carry on the struggle alone, and, when Victor Emmanuel prudently refused, threw up his office. Equally chagrined at the developments, but more level-headed, the Sardinian monarch acquiesced in the terms arranged at Villafranca, which at least promised to bring him Lombardy. But this inadequate settlement, so galling to Italian pride, was destined to be speedily superseded. Seized with patriotic enthusiasm, the people of Parma and Modena, as well as the population of the Romagna, in the Papal States, voted for unification with the Kingdom of Sardinia. The Romagna formed part of the patrimony ruled by Pius IX, which Napoleon had agreed to protect. Nevertheless, he offered to approve the enlargement of the Sardinian Kingdom on condition that France obtain Savoy and Nice, for, although he had failed to keep his full promise made to Cavour, Napoleon still desired his reward. After the inhabitants of the districts concerned had signified their approval through plebiscites, France incorporated Savoy and Nice, while Sardinia annexed Lombardy, Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna (Treaty of Turin, 1860).

Enlargement of the Sardinian Kingdom

Cavour, recovering from the bitter mood into which Napoleon's separate negotiations had driven him, returned to office in time to complete these diplomatic exchanges with a masterly hand. His policy, though not wholly successful, since Venice still remained to the Austrians, had doubled the area and population of the Sardinian Kingdom. But many patriots, Garibaldi among them, denounced him as a traitor because he had relinquished Savoy and Nice to France.

5. GARIBALDI MARCHES

Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–82) ranks with Mazzini and Cavour as the third in the great triumvirate of Italian liberators. While still in his twenties he joined Young Italy, and plunged, with the courage of a lion and the heart of a child, into the war against tyrants. In 1834, he was sentenced to death, but escaped to South America, where he fought for the liberty of alien republics until the outbreaks of 1848 afforded him another chance to strike a blow for Italy. The following year he defended Mazzini's Roman Republic, and barely escaped with his life, to resume his career of adventure and exile. The War of 1859 found him back in Italy, leading a free-lance company against the Austrians once more. The involutions of politics and the sagacious statesmanship of Cavour he neither understood nor approved. What he did understand was the nobility of taking up arms in the cause of liberty and fighting side by side with honest men. An alliance with a despot like Napoleon III, or the bargain by which Cavour traded Nice to France, appeared to Garibaldi, who had been born in Nice, an act of treason.

Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–82)

It is not surprising, therefore, that when Cavour wished to rest in 1860 and consolidate the Sardinian gains, Garibaldi insisted that the struggle must continue until all Italy was free. Organizing an expedition, the famous "One Thousand," he sailed from Genoa on May 5, to attack the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Francis II (1859–61) had an army of over one hundred thousand men, but many of his subjects hated him and his soldiers were half-hearted in their allegiance. Within six months Garibaldi's "red shirts" had conquered the island of Sicily in the name of Victor Emmanuel, and crossing to Naples they entered the city in triumph on September 7, after Francis II had fled. The south of Italy had been won for the Italian Kingdom, and the next step, logically, was to march on Rome. But Cavour, fearing that such an affront to the pope must bring a French army to his rescue, frustrated Garibaldi's impetuosity. With the tacit consent of Napoleon III, Victor Emmanuel led a Sardinian force across papal territory into the Neapolitan State, and completed the conquest of it; but at the same time he eased the tension by taking the leadership out of Garibaldi's hands. It is possible Garibaldi felt somewhat slighted, for, although he agreed to drive through the streets of Naples with Victor Emmanuel, the only favor he asked for his great services was that Cavour should be dismissed, and when this was refused, he retired to his farm on the island of Caprera.

"The Thousand"

By the close of 1860, Sicily, Naples, and the papal provinces known as the Marches and Umbria,[1] had voted for union with the other states now ruled by Victor Emmanuel, and the following March the Sardinian monarch was proclaimed king of a united Italy, although the kingdom remained incomplete. But the enormous labor, the hopes and the disappointments of the crowded years 1859 to 1861 had exhausted Cavour, and he died on June 6, 1861. In his last hours he consoled himself with the thought, *L'Italia è fatta* — Italy is made.

Death of Cavour (1861)

6. THE WINNING OF VENICE AND ROME

Italy was made, but it was not yet complete, for the papal government still ruled at Rome and the Austrians held Venetia. The successors of Cavour had to wait for a favorable moment to add these "unredeemed" segments to the Italian Kingdom. One such chance came in 1866, when Prussia fought Austria in the "Seven Weeks' War." [2] The Prussian statesman Bismarck arranged an alliance with the new Italian Kingdom, which joined in the attack and attempted to seize Venetia. Although they were defeated by the Austrians on both land and sea, the Italians received Venetia for their assistance when the triumphant Prussians negotiated the Treaty of Prague after their victory over the Austrians at Königgrätz.

To crown the new kingdom by the acquisition of Rome as its capital had now become "an inexorable necessity." Twice Garibaldi led a force of volunteers to seize the Eternal City, but he was checked by Victor Emmanuel's troops (wounded "by an Italian bullet" he complained) on the first attempt (1862), and defeated by the French garrison at Rome on the second (1867). Diplomacy seemed powerless to achieve a settlement of the "Roman Question," yet the Italian government feared that if the pope were dispossessed by force he might summon the Catholic nations to his assistance. In 1870, however, the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War directed international attention elsewhere, and compelled Napoleon III to recall the French guard at Rome for home defense. The moment was too auspicious to overlook. On September 20, 1870, Italian troops marched into Rome, and the citizens voted, by a majority of 134,000 to 1500, for incorporation into the Italian Kingdom. Cavour's great project had been completed nine years after his death.

Occupation of Rome (1870)

[1] See map following page 790.

[2] See below, pages 810–11.

7. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Stripped of his temporal possessions, Pope Pius IX retired within the environs of the Vatican, where he chose to regard himself as a prisoner. In 1871, the Italian Parliament passed a Law of Papal Guaranties recognizing him as a sovereign within this tiny domain, and offering him a sum equal to $650,000 as compensation for the territory which had been seized. This offer Pius refused, and he and his successors[1] preferred to remain voluntary prisoners rather than recognize a government which they regarded as guilty of an act of inexcusable and illegal usurpation.

Conflict of liberalism and clericalism

From the days of the great French Revolution, when the National Assembly confiscated the church lands in France, the papacy had shown itself more opposed than ever to liberal and revolutionary doctrines. After the Congress of Vienna restored the States of the Church, which Napoleon had seized, to the rule of Pius VII, the church allied itself with the conservative governments of Europe during the Era of Reaction. Catholics were warned to be on their guard against the seduction of liberal notions, which, as experience had recently proved, often led to revolution and tragic social excesses. Yet, although liberals were denounced as atheists and enemies of society, liberal and national ferment continued to spread despite all efforts at repressing it. The outbreaks of 1848 and 1849, which shook conservative governments everywhere and drove Pius IX from Rome, not unnaturally convinced him that all revolutionists, whether they called themselves liberals, socialists, or republicans, were a menace to the established order. Nor was the pope alone in this opinion. Napoleon III greatly strengthened the position of the Roman Catholic clergy in France as the best defense against socialism. The Austrian government signed a *concordat* with the papacy (1855), and several lesser states restored to the clergy the control which they had previously exercised in matters of censorship and education. The panic over socialism which followed the revolutions of 1848 had modified the hostile attitude of the bourgeoisie toward the church. The clergy, it was now felt, might prove invaluable allies in the combat with radical thinkers, who were misleading the people by their attacks upon religion and their demands for the confiscation of private property. When the liberals, socialists, and other rebels who dreamed of remaking society found the church entrenched upon the side of the propertied

[1] Until 1929, see pages 986–87.

classes and the established governments, they assailed it as the greatest obstacle to progress, and denounced it much as the eighteenth-century *philosophes* had done. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century, the liberals were inclined, not without reason, to regard the clericals as their most ingenious and most consistent foes.

Pontificate of Pius IX

The policies of Pius IX (1846–78) did much to confirm this widespread impression that the church would always be found on the side of the conservatives and the reactionaries. In 1864, Pius issued an encyclical, *Quanta cura*, accompanied by a *Syllabus of Errors*, in which he reaffirmed the independence of the Catholic Church and its supremacy over all secular governments, condemned all those who favored granting toleration to other sects, those who advocated civil marriage, lay schools, or curtailment of the privileges of the clergy, and those who sought to deprive the pope of his temporal possessions. Pius thus arrayed the church against liberalism and nationalism, the dominant social and political ideals of the day, at a time when a more cautious and more conciliatory diplomat might well have hesitated to antagonize and add to the anti-clerical forces.

Growth of skepticism and agnosticism

For the opponents of organized religion in the middle of the nineteenth century had already opened a fierce and dangerous attack from another quarter. The spread of scientific doctrines concerning the age of the earth and the origin of man [1] appeared to contradict the teaching of the church, while a more critical study of history and of comparative religion led many people even in Catholic countries to question the authority of the pope, to deny the validity of religious dogmas concerning the fall of man and the divine revelations of the Gospels, to repudiate, in fact, the whole structure of theology, which supported the Christian faith, as a complicated mythology inadmissible to minds steeped in the truths of science. In every country a growing number of people, especially among the educated classes, found their faith weakened, and many became frank agnostics or atheists in matters of religion.

Vatican Council (1869–70)

In meeting this attack upon the intellectual front, Pius IX displayed the same firmness and consistency which had inspired his unequivocal condemnation of so many political and social currents of the age. The sharpest answer to those who presumed to question the papal authority was furnished by the Vatican Council which met at Rome in 1869. Before it was prorogued in 1870, the council declared it to be a dogma "divinely revealed" that when the pope officially pronounced upon a question of faith or morals he

[1] See below, pages 851–53.

was endowed with infallibility. Thus, in the same year that his temporal possessions were reft away, Pius IX was invested with spiritual claims as absolute as any exercised by his mighty predecessors Gregory VII or Innocent III in the Middle Ages.

To the theologians who proclaimed it, the dogma of papal infallibility was a definition of, not an addition to, the papal prerogatives. Among the laity, particularly among non-Catholics, it excited opposition, distrust, and ridicule. The *Kulturkampf* in Germany, the breach between the Italian government and the papacy, and the conflict of church and state in France, as well as the feuds of clericals and anti-clericals elsewhere, were all intensified by the misapprehensions aroused by the papal claims. To Leo XIII, who succeeded Pius IX in 1878, fell the task of healing estrangements and harmonizing the position of the church with the existing forces and realities of the modern age. While retracting nothing, Leo endeavored with tact and skill, and with considerable success, to reveal the possibility of a working compromise on the political and intellectual issues which had separated the church from most of the secular governments and dug a gulf between religion and science. The careers of Louis Pasteur and Gregor Mendel were cited as proof that it was possible to be a great scientist and a good Catholic, and the Vatican archives were opened to accredited historians in the hope that a more thorough study of the early centuries of the church would tend to reconcile the secular with the orthodox interpretations. In this way part of the opposition to clerical authority was skillfully dissipated, and the opening years of the twentieth century found the Roman Catholic Church performing its historic mission with renewed vigor, to the surprise of many prophets who had been prepared thirty years earlier to predict its imminent collapse.

Leo XIII (1878–1903)

CHAPTER TWENTY

THE FORMATION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

... Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided — that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 — but by blood and iron.

OTTO VON BISMARCK.

THE panic which seized the governing classes throughout Europe during the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848 and 1849 made itself felt with particular force in the Germanies. After 1849, the Austrian government, strengthened by its military victories over the Italians and the Hungarians, turned its forces to the congenial and familiar task of stamping out the last embers of revolt. The proposals for German unification sponsored by the Frankfort Assembly had fallen to the ground, largely because of Austrian hostility to the project; and a Prussian scheme to organize a federation of states excluding Austria met with the same haughty opposition, with the result that Prussia abandoned the plan (Humiliation of Olmütz, 1850). In 1851 the old inept Diet of the Germanic Confederation of 1815 resumed its sessions, and the Austrian chancellor, Schwarzenberg (Metternich's successor), advised the German princes how best to cancel the liberties which they had conceded to their subjects during the popular turmoil of 1848. In the test of strength between Prussia and Austria, for leadership in central Europe, the hesitant Frederick William IV (1840–61) had been steadily outmatched by the purposeful Schwarzenberg, and the Prussians, unprepared for war, had been forced to concede the dominance of Austria and to stomach a diplomatic defeat.

1. THE DECADE OF REPRESSION AFTER 1848

For German liberals the decade from 1850 to 1860 was a tragic era. Their books censored, their letters opened, their homes searched, they endured the bitterness of official persecution until many of them were literally hounded out of the country because of their political convictions. Hardest to bear of all their misfortunes was the knowledge of their failure. They had come so near to establishing a constitutional government in a united Germany that the reaction covered them with the blacker discredit. Convinced in their disillusionment that democracy could never thrive in the poisoned soil of Europe, with its rooted prejudices and ancient hatreds, thousands emigrated to shape their lives anew in the freer air of the New World. Of these many found homes in

the United States and contributed in substantial fashion to the growth of the American Republic.

Those who remained behind found that a change came over the spirit of their dream. A harder note of cynicism, a readiness to face essential facts, replaced the tendency toward metaphysical speculation and sentimental eloquence which had paralyzed the Frankfort Assembly. The German people had long been noted for the dreamy and philosophical bent of their thought. "The English inhabit the sea, the French the earth, and the Germans the air," Napoleon observed at the opening of the nineteenth century. But after 1850 a more practical and realistic tone asserted itself in Germany. Scientific experiments attracted a generation which had lost faith in philosophical vagaries; business prosperity and the progress of industry opened a new avenue of advance to a people depressed by the frustration of their national hopes. The common-sense methods by which Cavour fused the Italian states together made a deep impression upon the Germans, who perceived more and more clearly that Prussia was the only state strong enough to play for them the rôle assumed by Sardinia in the drama of Italian liberation. Able historians, such as Johann Gustav Droysen and Heinrich von Sybel, wrote scholarly works extolling Prussian achievements in peace and war, and the conviction grew, among nationalist groups, that the Hohenzollern rulers of Prussia had been chosen by the logic of history to lead the cause of German unity. Liberals might still plead the principles of democracy and urge the German people to unify themselves, but the liberals were losing ground, while the national cause, drawing its strength from other and more conservative sources, forged steadily ahead.

The German spirit changes

It is true that after 1858 the spirit of repression abated somewhat, but liberals gained little by the change. William I, who succeeded his brother on the Prussian throne in 1861 (he had been regent since 1858), possessed a more open mind than Frederick William IV and a firmer character, but he had no less faith in authority. Austria, defeated in the Italian War of 1859, still championed the cause of reaction, though with diminished prestige. Yet the tide was slowly turning in favor of the German nationalists and they renewed their efforts with zeal. The business classes in particular, aware of the advantages they would derive from closer political ties, worked for the day when Germany, as a great power, would acquire the position and the prestige to safeguard and extend their commercial interests at home and abroad. But before unification could be achieved the Germans had to reckon with Austria and France, and the reckoning was to be settled on the battlefield.

2. THE EXPANSION OF GERMAN INDUSTRY

Industrially, Germany had lagged behind Great Britain and France; the people had remained conservative because German society, as late as the middle of the nineteenth century, was still dominated by agricultural and feudal concepts. But the decade 1850–60 saw the beginning of a dynamic change. Banks were organized, factories built, new railway lines transected the countryside, and Old-World towns expanded into modern cities. If the Industrial Revolution came late to Germany, it made up for the delay by its unparalleled acceleration. All the available statistics reflect the same trend after 1850, but as the major effects of the industrial awakening were not felt until the last decades of the century they will be described in a later chapter.

Rise of German industry

Of the many factors which combined to promote this mid-century prosperity in the German lands, the *Zollverein* or customs union deserves mention because it reduced internal trade barriers, while the gold discoveries in California (1848) and Australia (1851) provided an increase in bullion and tended to raise prices by making gold cheaper. Eager to take advantage of advancing prices, industrialists borrowed the money which was readily available, to install newly invented machinery and adopt improved processes for speeding manufacture, and the general prosperity of the period encouraged such speculation and richly rewarded the business enterprise of the rising capitalists. The German people made excellent industrial workers, for they were frugal, diligent, patient, and intelligent. They showed special aptitude for the technical trades, and the schools hastened to equip the young with the practical knowledge required in their elected professions. In every field of manufacturing technique, research specialists collaborated with the business men, until the Germans excelled the British, the French, and the Americans in the fruitful alliance which they developed between modern science and modern industry.

Politically, the influence exerted by the new industrialists became a powerful force working for national unity. As business men, the manufacturers, mine-owners, steel barons, and railway builders desired the uniformity of laws, of taxes, tariffs, postal service, currency, weights and measures, which would follow political union, and they desired even more the support and protection in foreign lands which a powerful government could command for them. Familiar, moreover, with the traditional efficiency, economy, and vigor of the Prussian administrative system, the leaders of trade and manufacture were disposed to favor the

establishment of a national government under the initiative of Prussia and on the Prussian model.

3. THE PRUSSIAN SYSTEM

What was this Prussian system to which its advocates pointed with such admiration? Since the days of the Great Elector (1640–88) the government of Brandenburg-Prussia had been a military and bureaucratic despotism in the best sense of the term. Supported by loyal and intelligent officials and a resolute army, the Hohenzollerns had transformed their scattered heritage into a powerful, well-governed state. Defeated and humbled by Napoleon, the Prussian ruling class profited by the lessons of adversity, rooted out abuses and remodeled the army, with the result that Prussia emerged after 1815 with territory increased and prestige restored. Yet how could this small kingdom continue to play the rôle of a great power when its population was less than eleven millions, its lands divided and largely unfertile, its industries backward, its merchant marine undeveloped? The answer was to be found in the Prussian System. A scrupulous economy in every department of government provided a surplus for the exorbitant expense of a first-class army, conscripted by compulsory military service. Even in time of peace Prussia became a state disciplined for war, a militarized machine served by competent officers and obedient subordinates. The ranks were filled by the peasants, laborers, and artisans; the officers and administrators were drawn chiefly from the noble landowning families of East Prussia (the "Junker" class) or from the bourgeois group of the cities. At the threat of war the Prussian armies could take the field and strike with swift and deadly precision; but in a prolonged struggle the kingdom was certain to suffer from its lack of economic resources.

This inescapable deficiency in its economic reserves partly explains the inactivity of Prussia after the Napoleonic Wars: it was the quiescence of recuperation. From 1815 to 1848, Austria dominated the Germanies and Prussia followed the Austrian lead. But a rift developed between the two states in 1849 when Frederick William IV granted his subjects a constitution and maintained it in force despite Austrian disapproval. As a constitutional state and leader of the *Zollverein* (which excluded Austria) Prussia made a stronger appeal to German liberal and national sentiment than the Vienna régime, which was dedicated to reaction and anchored in the past. It is an error, however, to imagine that Prussia had become liberal in any true sense: the government remained intrinsically an enlightened military despot-

Prussian Constitution deceptive

ism. Under the new constitution the parliament consisted of an elected (but not truly representative) Chamber of Deputies and a permanent upper Chamber, but its powers remained exceedingly dubious.[1] The king continued to rule "by the grace of God" and retained the right to choose his ministers. He could levy established taxes, but could not impose new ones. Such an ill-defined compromise between king and parliament, between responsible government and absolute despotism, invited a crisis to determine on which side the real authority lay. The test came when William I ascended the Prussian throne in 1861, a test the outcome of which profoundly influenced the future of Prussia, of Germany, and of Europe.

King vs. *parliament*

A soldier's training had confirmed in the mind of William I the belief that authority should come from above, and had given him a special fondness for the army. While still regent he nominated Hellmuth von Moltke head of the Prussian general staff and Albrecht von Roon minister of war, and these inspired appointments demonstrated his shrewd knowledge of men. In 1860, he approved a plan to reduce exemptions under the military service law and double the reserve period for conscripts, thereby increasing the Prussian army to 190,000 men in peace-time and 450,000 in war. The Chamber of Deputies fought this project stubbornly, agreed finally to vote the extra appropriation it necessitated for one year, but refused to extend it in 1862. Rather than yield on a measure which he considered indispensable if Prussia was to fulfill the destiny marked out for her, William I was prepared to resign his throne. His resignation had been already written out when he changed his mind and determined to hold resolutely to his course. For he had found a minister, Otto von Bismarck, who shared his views and was prepared to defy popular opinion and overrule the parliament in order to carry through the military reforms.

4. OTTO VON BISMARCK (1815–98)

The Bismarck family, dwellers in the Elbe Valley since the fourteenth century, had furnished many capable soldiers and servants of the state. The future chancellor of the German Empire inherited his faith in absolutism and militarism from ancestors who had learned to venerate those principles under the Great Elector and Frederick the Great. Even during the liberal days of 1848 and 1849, the young Bismarck remained a frank reactionary, openly voicing his contempt for parliamentary govern-

[1] See above, page 774.

ment and his admiration for the inflexible conservatism of the Austrian régime.

But this admiration faded when, as Prussian ambassador to the Diet of the Germanic Confederation, Bismarck studied Austrian diplomacy at closer range. Between 1851 and 1858 he came to view a war between Austria and Prussia for control of the Germanies as inevitable, and he pressed toward it so fervently that William I (then regent) "put him on ice," as he expressed it, by transferring him to Saint Petersburg. As ambassador to Russia, Bismarck set himself to strengthen the friendly feelings between Prussia and Russia, for he knew how invaluable the czar's friendship would be to the Prussians when the moment came for them to fight Austria.

Such was the determined and experienced man whom William I appointed as his chief minister in the crisis of 1862. For the next four years Bismarck overrode the opposition of the Prussian parliament, muzzled the press, and took from the treasury the funds required for army reform. Few men have been so fiercely denounced, so bitterly hated and vilified, but attempts at impeachment and even at assassination left him unmoved. He had set his talents to the task of making Prussia supreme in Germany and Germany supreme in Europe, and he held no illusion that such a triumph could be achieved by compromise or persuasion. The great questions of the day, he affirmed in a statement which became famous, were settled "by blood and iron."

Bismarck's methods

5. THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR

With such a man directing Prussian policy it is not surprising that the German Empire was forged in the flame of war, of three wars, in fact, all fought within a period of six years. In the first conflict Austria and Prussia united to wrest the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark, cutting with the sword of war a Gordian knot of tangled diplomatic claims. The two duchies, though peopled largely by Germans, had long been subject to the Danish kings. But in 1864 they were overrun by the Austro-Prussian forces despite a courageous resistance, and Christian IX of Denmark had to relinquish his claims to the conquerors (Treaty of Vienna, 1864).

The Danish War (1864)

Although they had united temporarily for the purpose of despoiling Denmark, Austria and Prussia fell to quarreling again after the conclusion of peace. A sharp dispute over the disposal to be made of the conquered duchies brought them to an open breach in 1866. Austria con-

trolled the Diet of the Germanic Confederation and could count upon support from the South German States. Prussia had a secret alliance with Italy, but even so the odds appeared to be against her, and few people doubted that Austria, so much superior in wealth, area, and population, would have the victory. But the Prussian troops carried a newly invented "needle gun" which was three times as deadly as the old muzzle-loading type, and their tactics were devised by the greatest strategist of the age, Hellmuth von Moltke. What followed was a stunning demonstration of Prussian efficiency. Austria's German allies proved of little assistance, for the capitals of Hanover, Saxony, and Cassel fell within two weeks; the opposition of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt collapsed almost as swiftly. Three Prussian columns converged upon the Austrian army in Bohemia and shattered it on July 3, 1866, in the decisive battle of Königgrätz. Within five weeks the war was virtually at an end.

The Seven Weeks' War (1866)

Instead of marching on to Vienna, Bismarck persuaded William I to offer Austria a generous peace. By the Treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866) the Italians, who had collaborated by attacking the Austrians in Venetia, received that province for their assistance; [1] Prussia annexed Schleswig and Holstein; and the Germanic Confederation was formally dissolved, leaving Prussia to control the Germanies. Bismarck spared the Hapsburgs all undue humiliation, anticipating a time when the friendship of Austria might prove helpful to his projects. Wisely he forbore to prolong the conflict or to take ruthless advantage of a victory which had already alarmed the other powers. Napoleon III, lulled into neutrality by the half-promise of Belgium or other territorial compensation on the Rhine, realized overlate that he had missed a rare chance to hold the scales between the combatants. To retrieve prestige he began to press for his "concessions," and Bismarck, who had no real intention of gratifying him, was happy to extricate the Prussian armies from Bohemia before a French offensive could materialize.

Peace of Prague (1866)

The "Seven Weeks' War" definitely ended Austrian interference in both Germany and Italy, the two countries which the Hapsburgs had so long sought to dominate for their own advantage. This curtailment of inflated pretensions, though a blow to their pride, actually strengthened while it constricted the empire on the Danube. Convinced at last of the need for internal reforms and liberal adaptations, Francis Joseph granted the seventeen Austrian provinces a constitution in 1867, establishing responsible par-

Austrian reconstruction after 1866

[1] See above page 801.

liamentary government with a bicameral legislature chosen by indirect suffrage. At the same time Count Beust, the Austrian imperial chancellor, and Francis Deák, a Hungarian leader, worked out an agreement whereby the relationship between Austria and Hungary was readjusted. This *Ausgleich* or Compromise of 1867 established Hungary as a semi-independent kingdom with a separate constitution and parliament. Francis Joseph remained Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, and in addition to possessing the same monarch the two states were represented by a joint ministry for the conduct of foreign affairs, war, and finance. This curious Dual Empire established in 1867 survived for fifty years despite its seemingly cumbrous and impracticable form, for the settlement satisfied the German element, which retained a dominant position in Austria, while the Magyars controlled Hungary. But the subject races, the Czechs, Slavs, Poles, etc., grew increasingly restless as their national ambitions steadily mounted while the autonomy which they demanded was as steadily refused. This discontent, particularly among the Slavs, many of whom dreamed of uniting with Serbia and Montenegro to form a pan-Slav kingdom in the Balkans, had become a serious danger to the solidity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by 1914. It will be explained later how the resultant antagonism between Austria and Serbia produced the incident which precipitated the World War.


6. THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION

The strong can afford to be generous. Not only toward Austria, but toward the German liberals also, Bismarck displayed a spirit of patience and conciliation after the victory of Königgrätz had vindicated his policies. From the Prussian parliament, in which for the first time he enjoyed the support of a friendly majority, he requested a decree legalizing his former unconstitutional measures. It was voted at once, together with further appropriations for the victorious army, and substantial rewards and honors were heaped upon the leaders who had made the triumph possible.

Bismarck's popularity after 1866

The Peace of Prague, which closed the "Seven Weeks' War," left four South German States — Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt — free to organize as they chose, but the remaining states, north of the river Main, were at the mercy of Prussia. Schleswig and Holstein, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, the Kingdom of Hanover, and the free city of Frankfort, Prussia annexed outright, thereby acquiring some splendid ports on the North and Baltic seas, and a consolidated territory stretching from the Rhine to the Russian

Prussian annexations



OTTO VON BISMARCK
1815–98

This portrait shows Bismarck as an old man, but the strong will, keen mind, and realistic outlook which distinguished the "Iron Chancellor" can still be read in his expression.

border. With a population raised to twenty-four million, the Prussian Kingdom after 1866 comprised two thirds of Germany and included nearly two thirds of the German people.

But Bismarck desired more than the aggrandizement of Prussia: he was aiming at the unification of Germany. At his invitation the twenty-one North German States joined Prussia in a new union to replace the defunct Germanic Confederation. After the rulers had consented, a convention elected by universal manhood suffrage approved the constitution of the alliance, and the King of Prussia became president of the newly formed "North German Confederation." This federal state was created with a popular chamber (the *Reichstag*) to represent the people, and an upper chamber (the *Bundesrat*) to represent the princes. Bismarck had been careful to leave the component states the illusion of independence and individuality, but the really vital matters, such as the direction of the military forces and the conduct of foreign affairs, had passed under the control of Prussia. Through his dynastic prestige, and his authority as president of the Confederation, the Prussian king could dominate the *Bundesrat*, for of its forty-three members seventeen were Prussian deputies and a sufficient number of the others subservient to his wishes to assure Prussia a majority control.

The North German Confederation

7. OPPOSITION OF FRANCE TO GERMAN UNIFICATION

Throughout the decade 1860–70, while he was laboring to prepare the way for the unification of the Germanies, Bismarck had constantly to be on his guard against the possible intervention of France. Since the time of Richelieu, French statesmen had encouraged the existing disunion in the Germanies by playing one state there against another, for the creation of a powerful and unified empire across the Rhine was likely to prove a disadvantage and a danger to France.

The spectacular rise of Prussian power and prestige under Bismarck's guidance filled many Frenchmen with alarm, and they blamed the government of Napoleon III for failing, either to prevent it, or to secure reciprocal compensations. Unfortunately, Napoleon's efforts to delay German unification brought him no advantage and even hastened the result which he desired to postpone. The Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 took him and many other European statesmen by surprise, but he hoped to derive one advantage from the Treaty of Prague, for it left the four South German States (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt) independ-

Bismarck outwits Napoleon III

ent, and he believed he could make them allies of France. But Bismarck impressed upon the rulers of these states the dangers of isolation, showed them proofs of Napoleon's desire for German territory, and persuaded them to sign secret military treaties with Prussia (1867). At the same time they joined their commercial interests with those of the North German Confederation in a common *Zollverein* or customs union. Economically, therefore, Germany might be considered one empire after 1867, although distrust of the autocratic Prussian methods kept the South German States politically sundered for four years longer.

The diplomatic reverse which Napoleon thus suffered in the Germanies came at a time when his régime was growing more and more unpopular in France. The liberals had never forgiven his seizure of power, and his efforts after 1860 to reconcile their opposition by transforming an autocratic into a "liberal" empire failed to appease them. More than ever he felt the need of doing something truly Napoleonic.

The Mexican misadventure

The Polish insurrection of 1863 afforded him one chance, for French liberals and clericals sympathized with the desire of the Poles to liberate their fatherland, but Napoleon hesitated to offend Russia, Austria, and Prussia, all of which held fragments of Poland. Instead, he dispatched an expeditionary force to Mexico, where disturbed conditions provided the great powers with an excuse to intervene. Largely under French protection a Mexican Empire was set up (1863) and the Archduke Maximilian, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria, accepted the crown. Napoleon hoped in this way to make Austria his ally, to conciliate Catholic sentiment by protecting church property in Mexico which the revolutionists threatened to confiscate, and to secure commercial benefits for France. The American government regarded the presence of a European army in Mexico as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine,[1] but could make no effective protest until the war between the States was concluded in 1865. Then, rather than risk the possibility of war with the veteran Union forces, fresh from their victory over the Confederate States, Napoleon withdrew his troops from Mexico, and Maximilian, who remained behind, was captured and shot by the revolutionaries. Instead of the brilliant *coup* which he had projected, Napoleon had precipitated a tragic fiasco.

In Europe, Napoleon's diplomacy proved equally disappointing after 1867. The possibility of a clash with Prussia made it at least advisable that France should come to a friendly understanding with one of the other powers, but despite negotiations nothing was achieved. The Italians would not join France so long as a French contingent remained

[1] See above, page 749.

at Rome, especially as this French garrison defeated an attempt of Italian patriots under Garibaldi to seize the Eternal City (1867). Between France and Russia the question of Poland remained a source of friction which discouraged attempts at a friendlier co-operation. Austria remained as a possible ally, and should have proved a likely one, for Austria had suffered at the hands of the Prussians in 1866. Diplomatic overtures between Paris and Vienna dragged on from 1868 to 1869, but they resulted in nothing conclusive. Meanwhile, Napoleon's difficulties at home were increasing. In 1870 he offered further concessions by enlarging the powers of the Chamber of Deputies, but far from being satisfied, the liberals and republicans increased their criticism. Several of his closest advisers, ultra-imperialists who feared for the safety of his dynasty, urged him to do something forceful to retrieve his waning prestige, preferably some clever diplomatic stroke which would humiliate Prussia. The summer of 1870 brought the opportunity for such a stroke.

8. THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

The Spanish question

A revolution having driven Isabella II from Spain in 1868, the Spanish people decided, after two years of confusion, to offer the throne to a German prince, Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. Fearing the possibility of an alliance between Prussia and Spain if a relative of the Prussian king should don the crown at Madrid, the French government entered a protest. The news that the young prince, unable to secure his father's approval, had declined the honor, eased the tension, and should have satisfied the French, as it afforded them a tacit victory. But the ultra-imperialists who surrounded Napoleon III wanted to humiliate Prussia in some more signal fashion. They persuaded him to ask an assurance from bluff old William I that he would promise never to authorize the candidature of his kinsman at any future time should the Spanish offer ever be renewed. This unwise action played directly into Bismarck's hands.

The Ems dispatch

For behind the scenes Bismarck had been deliberately working for war. He knew that a struggle with France would consolidate the German nation and forge the bonds of a political union as nothing else could do, but it was essential for his plan that France appear the aggressor. He had privately encouraged the Spanish offer of a throne in order to alarm the French, and the news that Leopold of Hohenzollern had declined it (July 12) filled him with gloom because it wrecked his plans. Then the French envoy, Benedetti, sought William I at Ems, where the Prussian king was resting, and pressed the French

demands for further assurances so insistently that William dismissed him with some abruptness. To Bismarck at Berlin the king dispatched a telegram recounting the incident (July 13), and in this Ems dispatch Bismarck saw his opportunity to retrieve his hopes. He condensed and published the telegram in curt phrases which persuaded the French that their ambassador had been repulsed, while patriotic Prussians were convinced that their venerable king had been insulted.

Napoleon III did not want war, but he allowed himself to be pushed into it by the ultra-imperialists. Seemingly the advantage in the approaching conflict lay with France; actually the French had a doubtful cause (interference in a neighbor's affairs), an inferior army (courageous, but obsolete in tactics and equipment), and poor leaders (Napoleon III and his second-rate ministers and marshals). On July 15, 1870, the French prime minister, Émile Ollivier, announced the imminence of war to the Chamber of Deputies, and declared that the ministry accepted the prospect "with a light heart." Misled by incorrect information on the causes of the conflict, by jingoistic oratory, and by vague assurances of support from Austria or the South German States, the Chamber voted to declare war on Prussia (July 19) while the Parisian crowds cheered and shouted "On to Berlin."

The conflict which had been accepted "with a light heart" led France within six weeks to the *débâcle* of Sedan, where Napoleon III was forced to surrender with 86,000 men (September 2, 1870). On October 27, General Bazaine handed over a second French army of 175,000 men which the Prussians had shut up in Metz. In Paris, where the régime of Napoleon III [1] had been overthrown two days after Sedan, the newly proclaimed "Government of National Defense" prepared the city to resist an inevitable siege, but starvation forced the Parisians to surrender, January 28, 1871. The newborn republic had fought desperately for five months against the forces which had destroyed the empire in five weeks, but further opposition would only have prolonged a hopeless war.

A French National Assembly, convoked at Bordeaux, elected Adolphe Thiers "Head of the Executive Power" and authorized him to negotiate for a peace settlement. By the Treaty of Frankfort, May 10, 1871, France surrendered the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany and agreed to pay an indemnity of five billion francs (about one billion dollars). The Germans were to occupy French key fortresses until the last of the indemnity had been paid.

Treaty of Frankfort

[1] Napoleon III, released by the Germans in 1871, joined his wife and son who had escaped to England. He died there in 1873. Six years later his heir, the prince imperial, was killed while fighting with the British in Zululand.

It was not with Prussia but with a united German Empire that France concluded peace. The South German States had joined the North German Confederation in the struggle with the hereditary foe, and the common patriotic effort, as Bismarck had predicted, forged the bonds of union. In the Hall of Mirrors at Louis XIV's stately Versailles palace the German princes hailed William I as "German Emperor" (January 18, 1871) while the guns of Paris ten miles away were firing their last despairing volleys. After long delays and multiple discouragements, after peaceful projects had fallen through and liberal hopes miscarried, German unity had been finally sealed in the midst of war and under the direction of the conservative and autocratic Bismarck.

Proclamation of the German Empire (1871)

Thus the Franco-Prussian War made Germany an empire and France a republic. Nor did this complete the changes of the historic year 1870–71. The withdrawal of French troops from Rome for service against Prussia made it possible for the Italians to occupy the Eternal City and complete the Kingdom of Italy by the acquisition of its predestined capital.[1] The entrance of Italy and Germany into the circle of great powers profoundly altered the pattern of European politics, and made it difficult for France to attempt again the rôle of *la grande nation*, interfering ruthlessly in the affairs of her weak and divided neighbors across the Rhine and the Alps. Henceforth, until the World War, five first-class powers, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, and Russia, were to strain against each other in the narrow confines of Europe while Great Britain looked on and sought to preserve a balance of power among them for her own security.

The most significant development in the troubled years between 1848 and 1870 had been this triumph of nationalism. All the major conflicts of the period — the Italian and Hungarian revolts of 1848–49, the Polish insurrection of 1863, the Crimean War which grew in part from the Balkan ferment, the War of 1859 for Italian liberation, the Danish War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 — are traceable to the pressure of this movement for national consolidation. After 1871 the more powerful and legitimate national aspirations had been satisfied, the Germans and Italians had achieved unity and the Hungarians had been quieted by the Compromise of 1867. That a considerable measure of solidity had been attained is attested by the fact that the conflicts which had disturbed Europe on the average of one every three years from 1848 to 1870 are remarkable for their scarcity after the latter date. The remaining decades of the nineteenth century form the most peaceful period that Europe has enjoyed in modern times,

[1] See above, page 801.

although beneath the calm new antagonisms were deepening and frustrated national emotions gathering force, especially in the Balkans. The year 1870 is, therefore, an important date to remember, like 1815 or 1789, because: (1) it closed a broken period marked by frequent conflicts; (2) it signalized the establishment of a new relationship among the great powers; and (3) it opened a forty-three-year period of comparative peace, of great scientific progress, and of growing imperialistic tendencies.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The Russian government of this period is the most monstrous abstraction.... The government exists for the sake of the government, the people for the sake of the state... material force in place of an ideal, material power in place of authority.

ALEXANDER HERZEN (1812–70).

IN THE nineteenth century as in the eighteenth the impressive expansion of the Russian Empire alarmed and disconcerted the other European powers. The costly victories achieved by France and Britain in the Crimean War (1854–56) checked the Muscovite ambitions in the West temporarily, and preserved Turkey from dismemberment, but Russian imperialism continued its drive to the east and south. In the twenty years that followed the Peace of Paris (1856), Russia gained the Amur Province from China and subjugated Turkestan.[1] This Asiatic territory, acquired in two decades, exceeded in area all the annexations that the Russians had won in Europe in two centuries. Clearly, the settled and civilized European states could withstand the Russian encroachments much more successfully than the backward and disorganized peoples of Asia.

1. THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRIMEAN WAR

Russia is a bridge between Europe and Asia, not only in a geographical sense, but in a cultural, historical, and military sense also. The Crimean War had demonstrated that the fighting forces of France and Britain surpassed the Russian armies in training, organization, and equipment as greatly as the Russians in their turn surpassed the Chinese. Throughout the czar's empire the blunders and defeats of the war produced a mood of disillusionment and discontent. The Russian army had been an object of special pride to Nicholas I (1825–55) and his last days were darkened by the reverses which it suffered on the Crimean Peninsula. These reverses could not be attributed to lack of manpower or of resources, for Russia possessed both in abundance. The common soldiers had fought stubbornly and bravely; but the collapse of the commissariat service, the breakdown of transport facilities, and the graft and corruption among high officials nullified the sacrifices of the rank and file. The war revealed defects in the Nicholas

[1] See map following page 890.

System which could not be covered up, and the army, the favorite instrument of the autocrat, lost much of the prestige which it had enjoyed since the struggle with Napoleon half a century earlier.

The spreading discontent encouraged the new czar, Alexander II (1855–81), to inaugurate an era of reforms. Autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationalism remained the watchwords, but Alexander proposed, within limits, to bring Russian institutions into closer harmony with the progressive and humanitarian spirit of the nineteenth century. He lacked his father's military firmness and had little experience in administrative tasks, but he was patient, cautious, and kind-hearted. People recalled how his uncle, Alexander I, had planned half a century earlier to play the part of a reforming czar, but had gradually abandoned the ideal. Alexander II possessed a less ardent zeal but a firmer purpose, and he was destined to carry through an administrative revolution before he, too, wearied of the mounting difficulties and relapsed into conservatism.

Character of Alexander II

2. THE EMANCIPATION OF THE SERFS

Alexander's greatest single achievement was his emancipation of some forty million Russian serfs, a deed which won him the title of the "Czar Liberator." To visit a rural Russian community in the earlier nineteenth century was like stepping back into the Middle Ages. Nine tenths of the land was held by something less than one hundred thousand noble families. The serfs, attached to the soil, could be sold with the estates to new landlords, conscripted into the nobleman's household to work as domestic servants, or even sent to the factories in the towns for their master's profit. Though some nobles exercised their authority in a kindly and paternal fashion, others overworked their serfs, flogged them cruelly for slight faults, and interfered insolently in their private affairs and family relations. A serf could not marry without his master's consent, could not leave the estate without permission, and might be pursued, brought back, and punished if he sought to escape. He lived at the mercy of his master's caprice.

Serfdom in Russia

This iniquitous and archaic system of human bondage was rightly resented by intelligent Russians as a stigma upon their civilization. As the landlords declined to modify the system voluntarily, Alexander II took the initiative, and after careful consideration he issued a *ukase* abolishing serfdom in 1861. Supplemented by further decrees in 1863 and 1866, this proclamation transformed the serfs into free citi-

zens, and permitted them to retain their cottages, tools, and sufficient land for them to maintain themselves by their common efforts. The aristocrats ceded part of their estates to the peasant *mir* or community village, and for this sacrifice the government promised compensation. They also received some financial reimbursement for the loss of peasant dues and personal services, but instead of evincing gratitude for this settlement many nobles complained that they had been unjustly impoverished.

Discontent with the terms of emancipation

The peasants were dissatisfied also, but with greater reason. The land apportioned to the *mir* proved often an infertile tract, and the allotments inadequate. They discovered, moreover, that far from obtaining freedom they had in reality become serfs of the state, for the government expected them to pay off by a special compensation tax the enormous sums expended to reimburse the landlords. This meant in application that a serf was to purchase his land and liberty by annual payments extending over a period of forty-nine years. Many peasants found it difficult to believe that the "Little Father," as the czar was affectionately named, really intended to burden his children so heavily after treating the aristocrats so generously. It seems doubtful, however, if Alexander had it in his power to execute a fairer settlement. Despite the complaints of the landlords and the bitterness of the liberated serfs, the benefits of emancipation soon showed themselves in the form of larger crops, increased areas under cultivation, better living conditions for the peasants, and a rise in trade. The freeing of the serfs was without question the most important event in Russian history during the nineteenth century.

3. OTHER REFORMS OF ALEXANDER II

The zemstvos

The emancipation edict had stripped the landlords of much of their judicial and paternalistic responsibility and had created many million new citizens. It appeared wise, therefore, to the czar and his advisers, to train the people in self-government by creating provincial and district assemblies, or *zemstvos*, composed of delegates representing the landlords, the townsfolk, and the peasants. Each *zemstvo* was to be a sort of local parliament, entrusted with the responsibility for maintaining the roads, schools, churches, and jails of the district. It had authority to levy taxes for local purposes and to relegate the execution of its decrees to a permanent committee. Admirable in theory, the *zemstvos* proved a disappointment in practice.



ALEXANDER II OF RUSSIA
1818–81

Some admirers of Alexander II professed to read in his haunted glance the tragedy of a ruler who was foredoomed to die by a terrorist bomb. His enemies declared that his fishlike eyes proclaimed the callous autocrat.

The members too often lacked political training, and the imperial officials, wedded to the methods of a centralized bureaucracy, distrusted and overruled the provincial legislators. Alexander recognized the defects in the system, but he hoped it would improve with time.

In all his attempted reforms, the czar found himself gravely handicapped by a lack of honest and experienced officials. This difficulty proved acute when he sought to reorganize the law courts. In place of the secret and arbitrary methods of the bureaucrats, he decreed (1862) a court system modeled on that of the western nations, with local justices of the peace, district tribunals, and a high court of final appeal. Criminals won the privilege of trial by jury and the proceedings in civil and criminal cases were opened to the public. Despite these improvements, the ignorance of the Russian masses left them still confused at the working of laws intended to guarantee their rights, and the incradicable corruption and graft of the old legal system persisted and poisoned the new. Moreover, Alexander himself failed to make the new order either consistent or universal, for he preserved the infamous "Third Section" and the secret police tribunals organized by his father to punish political offenders. The Czar Liberator was like an architect who installs more spacious windows and widens the corridors in the upper floors of a feudal castle, while leaving unchanged the submerged dungeons with their dark secrets and instruments of torture.

Judicial reforms

While his zeal lasted, Alexander also sketched the plan for a system of public instruction, with primary schools, secondary schools, and colleges, supported and supervised by the state. He relaxed the strict censorship of the press, permitted Russians to travel abroad freely, and treated the Jews and other minority races in the empire with greater consideration and leniency than his father had shown. But the chorus of criticism which greeted his endeavors daunted and discouraged him. The conservatives denounced his policies as dangerously radical, the liberal intellectuals called them nervelessly moderate, while the peasants resisted all innovations with pious apathy. The fatalism that permeated the lower orders is reflected in the reply of an old *muzhik* who was urged to boil his drinking water because of the cholera epidemic. "If God wished us to drink hot water," he responded, "He would have heated the Neva." The indifference and the active opposition which he encountered checked Alexander's reforming efforts after 1865, although he still maintained a pretense of enthusiasm. But his liberalism had been more largely the fruit of expediency than of conviction and the mood had passed.

4. THE REACTION IN THE LATER YEARS OF ALEXANDER II

Undoubtedly one factor which turned Alexander II toward reaction was the Polish uprising of 1863. Stirred by the spread of liberal ideas and by their invincible dream of national independence, Polish patriots organized a revolt, but were defeated by the superior Russian forces. Determined to destroy this troublesome Polish nationalism once and for all, the Russian government executed or exiled the leaders of the revolt and sequestered their lands. Russian became the official language, and the Catholic Church in Poland was weakened by the loss of much of its land and the suppression of monasteries. From this harsh treatment one benefit resulted to the stricken people, for the confiscated lands were distributed among the peasantry, and Alexander remitted the feudal obligations in order to punish the disaffected ruling classes while securing the loyalty, or at least the gratitude, of the tenants and serfs.

Polish uprising (1863)

An attempt to assassinate him, made by a fanatic in 1866, dispelled Alexander's last liberal sympathies. Convinced finally that in tampering with the Nicholas System he had opened the door to anarchy, the czar turned his back on reform. Thenceforth the *zemstvos*, the law courts, the journals, and the schools found their privileges steadily curtailed; vigilant police spies circulated once more among all ranks of society; and teachers, writers, and others who had hailed the reform era too eagerly felt again the chill breath of imperial disfavor. Even the great novelist and philosopher, Count Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910), confessed that he felt surprise each morning on awakening to find that he was not on the road to exile in Siberia.

A considerable group of Russians, known as Slavophiles, or Nationalists, applauded the czar's resumption of the traditional policy of autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationalism. The Slavophiles held that Russia was a unique country, with customs, beliefs, and institutions peculiar to itself. To adopt the dress, the manners, the legal and political ideals of the western European states appeared disloyal to these ardent nationalists, whose dislike of the "westernizers" and their servile imitation of European culture dated from the days when Peter the Great had opened his "windows to the west." The innovations introduced by Alexander II, such as trial by jury and representative *zemstvos*, they were inclined to disdain as foreign importations, and when these reforms failed to work smoothly, when the Poles broke into revolt, and anarchists multiplied, they laid the responsibility upon the czar's liberal experiments instead of blaming

The Slavophiles

the evils which those experiments were designed to cure. The Slavophiles themselves had little to offer in the way of a constructive program. Their ideals were for the most part vague and negative, but they had a strong following, for their insistence upon preserving the integrity of Holy Russia appealed alike to the reactionaries, the nationalists, the orthodox clergy, and the inertly conservative masses.

The "westernizers"

Placed upon the defensive, the "westernizers" tried to argue that the late reforms had proved disappointing, not because they went too far, but because they did not go far enough. They besought Alexander to continue his liberal efforts, but they lacked any constitutional means of action aside from the crippled *zemstvos* and their petitions brought no response. Turning, therefore, from the government to the people, they planned to make war upon the dense ignorance and superstition of the masses, as the chief obstacles to progress. Hundreds of ardent young intellectuals dedicated themselves to the work of instructing the liberated serfs, hoping by daily contact and kindly example to inculcate a gospel of enlightenment. But they soon grew discouraged at this seemingly hopeless task. Crushed between the hostility of the government and the apathy of the peasants, the liberals faced a crisis which split their ranks. The more moderate continued to hope that improvements might be introduced slowly through the spread of education and administrative reforms, but the more radical, losing patience with such dilatory methods, began to advocate more direct and desperate remedies.

Alexander Herzen (1812–70)

The "Father of Russian Liberalism" and a leading protagonist of constitutional reform had been Alexander Herzen (1812–70). From his points of exile in France and Germany, Herzen had done much to encourage the liberal experiments that marked the period 1855–65, for his pamphlets and journals, smuggled into Russia despite the censorship, were read by many high officials including the "Czar Liberator" himself. But with Alexander's conversion to a more cautious policy after 1865 and Herzen's death in 1870, the more moderate program of constitutional reform lost its appeal, especially for the younger radicals, and many of them embraced new and more violent modes of revolutionary activity.

5. THE SPREAD OF ANARCHISM, NIHILISM, AND TERRORISM

This change of temper after 1870 is reflected in the activities of the anarchists, nihilists, and terrorists. The word "anarchism" was first popularized by the French writer Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–

65), who, believing that all government based upon physical force was iniquitous, urged an ideal order of society in which men would live together in peace and liberty without governments, without a police force, and without compulsion of any kind. Proudhon's theories, which might have sufficed to govern a community of saints, appeared utterly impracticable for the guidance of a society in which most individuals are constantly seeking to enrich themselves by exploiting others. Nevertheless, his argument that the institution of private property, protected by the law, the police, and the government, is part of an iniquitous system whereby a favored group of individuals monopolize the wealth and power to the exclusion of the rest, struck a responsive chord in the heart of a Russian noble, Michael Bakunin (1814–76). If Herzen was the father of Russian liberalism, Bakunin may be considered the father of Russian radicalism.

Anarchism

Born in 1814, Bakunin visited Germany and France as a young man, and joined in the revolutionary movement of 1848. Arrested in Dresden and transported to Russia, he was exiled to Siberia, but escaped in 1861, and wandered thenceforth from land to land preaching his fanatical brand of anarchism. His hand was lifted against everything which imposed upon or restrained the liberty of the individual, against the God of the theologians, against marriage, and against the state. Kindly and simple in manner, Bakunin yet felt himself dedicated to a career of universal destruction and revolt, urged on by his pity for suffering humanity which he saw as crushed beneath the tyranny of existing institutions. That government, while it benefited some members of society more perhaps than others, might none the less be indispensable for the protection of all, he could not see, and in countries such as Russia, where the evils of despotism were more apparent than the advantages provided by the administration, his doctrines won many converts among the radical thinkers.

Michael Bakunin (1814–76)

The intelligent and educated minority among the Russian population tended to form, in the later nineteenth century, a curiously rootless, irreverent, and unconventional group. Isolated from the masses of peasants, denied participation in practical political affairs, the Russian intelligentsia indulged themselves in the pastime of criticizing existing conditions. Because they found little to commend in society, they repudiated government, religion, the sanctity of tradition, and the veneration usually accorded to that which is old. This iconoclastic attitude of mind, particularly admired among the younger members of the educated classes, came to be termed "nihilism," a nihilist

Nihilism

being one who bowed before no authority without weighing its virtue, and accepted nothing on faith. The nihilists vented their disgust and ennui in passionate and pessimistic debates, arguing interminably and inconclusively upon the meaning of life, the purpose of government, and the tenets of religion. Most of them were harmless eccentrics, content to discuss philosophical dilemmas or invent theoretical projects, but a few, more ruthless and determined in their convictions, sought to compel reform by direct means. These swelled the group of the so-called terrorists.

The terrorists

The terrorists were apostles of action who believed that no orderly or legal cure could be found for the evils of the czarist régime. The government, irresponsible and autocratic, had failed to curb its own abuses, and stubbornly refused to let the Russian people institute reforms through a representative parliament responsive to their wishes. The only method which remained, the terrorist held, was to frighten the czar and his ministers into making reforms by a deliberate policy of violence and assassination. Secret revolutionary groups, working with extraordinary patience and cunning, plotted one assassination after another, despite the incessant activity of the police. In 1879 an attempt was made to blow up the czar's train; and shortly thereafter an explosion shattered part of the Winter Palace. Alexander II was no coward, and he insisted that these revolutionaries must be crushed; but he decided at the same time to satisfy some of the popular demands by drafting important reforms. Before the program could be completed, however, he fell a victim to a terrorist bomb (1881).

6. ALEXANDER III AND THE POLICY OF RUSSIFICATION

Alexander III (1881–94)

This drastic effort to temper despotism by assassination proved a failure. The revolutionaries gained no advantage from the violent death of the Czar Liberator, for his son and successor, Alexander III, showed himself a strong-willed despot who promptly announced his intention to avenge his father's murder and to preserve the autocratic régime. In Constantine Pobiedonostsev (1827–1907) and Venceslas de Plehve (1846–1904) he found subordinates ready and willing to carry out this policy. Pobiedonostsev, as "Procurator of the Holy Synod," directed the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. He had rationalized his distrust of parliaments, popular education, and the press into a veritable philosophy of reaction, and he exerted a compelling influence over the mind of the new czar. For the more practical task of running conspirators to earth, Alexander

III relied upon Plehve, who directed the state police with such ruthless efficiency that for several years revolutionary activity all but ceased.

Russification

Like most despots, Alexander III was disposed to favor a high degree of uniformity throughout his empire. This was the more difficult to attain because the advance of the Russian frontier had brought millions of alien people under the rule of the czar, until the minorities actually exceeded the real Russians of Great Russia in number. Alexander's ambition to promote cultural, linguistic, and religious unity pleased ardent pan-Slavists and "Russifiers," but it antagonized the Poles, Finns, Jews, and other racial minorities. The Poles, since their abortive revolt of 1863, had suffered bitterly under the policy of coercion designed to make better Russians of them. The Finns, Lutheran in religion and jealous of their vestiges of independence, suffered the same encroaching pressure until Nicholas II curtailed their constitution in 1899. But the most defenseless victims of this program of Russification were the Jews, for although they numbered over five millions, they were scattered throughout western Russia, possessed no one locality which they could call their own, and were subjected to periodic *pogroms*, or murderous persecutions, which were permitted, if not actually instigated, by the imperial authorities.

The Socialist Revolutionaries

Naturally these abused minorities furnished numerous volunteers for the revolutionary cause. Had all the discontented factions in Russia discovered a formula upon which they could unite, the autocracy would not long have survived their onslaught. But the revolutionists were swayed by divergent ideals and interests. The peasants, constituting a majority of the Russian population, were primarily interested in the land question, and their hopes rested with the Socialist Revolutionaries or "S–R" Party. To destroy czardom, seize the landed estates of the aristocrats, and award a free farm to each peasant family was the S–R program, a program which any peasant could understand and support. The S–R leaders hoped to substitute a free association of communes for the existing bureaucratic tyranny, they accepted violence and assassination as a means of hastening this end, and they counted upon the assistance of the dissatisfied bourgeoisie and the workingmen of the towns in their war against autocracy.

The workingmen of the towns, however, were formulating a revolutionary program of their own. Industrialism spread rapidly in Russia in the late nineteenth century, especially after 1890, and the construction of factories and railways brought trade unions, strikes, and the recurrent clashes between capital and labor which were already common in western

Europe. The pan-Slavists opposed the new industrialism as a western importation, but it spread prodigiously under the direction of Sergei de Witte (1849–1915), who was minister of finance from 1893 to 1903. Witte favored a protective tariff for the benefit of the manufacturers and social legislation for the benefit of the workers, hoping thereby to keep both classes contented. But the growing ferment, the strikes, and the spread of Marxian socialism among the new proletarian classes greatly alarmed the reactionaries, as well it might, and Witte was forced to resign in 1903.

The Industrial Revolution in Russia

Witte's downfall could not check the spread of the Industrial Revolution, which, for good or ill, had struck Russia with its transforming magic. A new revolutionary class had emerged, a Russian workers' party, nursed on socialist doctrines, and more dangerous, more defiantly radical than the Socialists of France or Germany. Organized as the "Social Democrats" the Russian workingmen prepared the way for the destruction of the czarist régime by means of strikes, propaganda, and mass action. They had little use for independent acts of terrorism and assassination, and they expected little help from the peasants. To these industrial proletarians the coming revolution was to be their revolution.

The Social Democrats

7. NICHOLAS II AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1905

Alexander III was succeeded by his son Nicholas II in 1894. Nicholas was an amiable man, but narrow in his outlook and his sympathies, intermittently stubborn without perseverance, despotic in principle yet weak in will. Like Louis XVI of France, he inherited a revolution and was destined to pay with his life for the mistakes of his ancestors as well as for his own. Although his father's policy of reaction and Russification had created mounting opposition, Nicholas made no concessions. He retained Pobiedonostsev in office and multiplied the powers of the hated pan-Slavist, Plehve, until the latter's assassination in 1904.

Nicholas II (1894–1917)

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), a consequence of the pan-Slavists' ambition to enlarge the Russian foothold on the Pacific Ocean, brought rude disasters which the rotten imperial system was ill-suited to endure. As one defeat followed another, and evidence of corruption and inefficiency in high official circles came to light, a ferment of complaint, criticism, and disorder swept the empire. Assassinations multiplied, armed revolt broke out in Poland, and in Saint Petersburg a procession of petitioners led by

Revolutionary movement of 1905–06

a priest, Gapon, was fired upon by the soldiers. Revolution threatened to engulf the imperial régime and Nicholas II agreed reluctantly to offer concessions. He proclaimed religious toleration for minority sects, cancelled the arrears which many peasants still owed for their communal lands, removed unpopular officials, and promised (June, 1905) to establish a Russian parliament. This promise he reaffirmed four months later in his "October Manifesto," which guaranteed popular liberties, a limited suffrage, and responsible government under a bicameral legislature.

The reaction in 1906

By 1906, the revolutionary wave had begun to ebb. The Social Democrats in the cities and the Socialist Revolutionaries in the country could not combine their efforts; many middle-class liberals were satisfied with the October Manifesto (and were consequently known as "Octobrists"), while others (termed the Constitutional Democrats, or Cadets), wished to press on toward a genuinely democratic government. The reactionary classes, disconcerted in 1905, began to rally their forces, and, feeling confident that the threat of revolution was waning, they urged Nicholas to withdraw his promises.

The first, second, and third Dumas

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the first Russian Parliament, or Duma, which assembled in May, 1906, found itself powerless to control the czar's ministers. When the representatives of the empire demanded a responsible ministry, the Duma was dissolved by imperial decree. The Cadets, the most defiant group among the deputies, attempted to reassemble at Viborg in Finland, and appealed in vain to the Russian people to support their stand. A second Duma was summoned to meet in March, 1907, but when it showed the same independent spirit, it likewise was promptly dissolved. Nicholas now determined to revise the electoral system in such a way that the more radical elements were curbed or disenfranchised. The third Duma, in which the moderates and conservatives predominated, proved more conciliatory and was permitted to sit until 1912. But its rôle had been reduced from that of a legislature to the feeble dignity of an advisory or consultative body, and the Russian government continued to justify Herzen's indictment that it was "material force in place of an ideal, material power in place of authority."

The third Duma (1907–12)

In 1906, Nicholas chose as his prime minister an able compromiser, Peter Stolypin (1863–1911). Stolypin was a man of firm character who dealt vigorously with political offenders, but he sought at the same time to render the government more popular by improving the lot of the peasants and workingmen. After 1908, revolutionary agitation slowly subsided, acts of violence grew less

frequent, police reprisals less severe, but this did not prevent Stolypin himself falling victim to an assassin in 1911. This act, however, did not disturb the comparative tranquillity of the empire.

Election of the fourth Duma (1912)

In 1912, a fourth Duma was elected and evinced the same moderate disposition as its predecessor in compromising with authority. The activities of the pan-Slavists continued to alarm the national minorities, but one pan-Slav project, the enlargement and reorganization of the Russian army, was approved by the Duma because of the growing tension in Europe between the Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente*. Russia had achieved a momentary balance between the forces of liberalism and despotism. It remained to be seen whether, under wise statesmanship, the empire would advance peacefully along the constitutional path, or whether a new crisis would precipitate a second revolution more radical, more sanguinary, and more destructive than the inconclusive effort of 1905.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

THE LESSER STATES OF EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

. . . We know of no reason in the nature of things why a state should be any the better for being large . . .

SIR JOHN R. SEELEY, *The Expansion of England.*[1]

IN THE drama of modern European history the great powers have tended more and more to usurp the center of the stage and to dwarf and obscure the significance of the secondary states. The peoples of the smaller countries justly resent this subordination, but a textbook which attempted to assign equal space to the history of France and Finland, or Britain and Belgium, in the nineteenth century, would develop abnormal and confusing proportions. Of the ten or more states discussed in the present chapter, several played dominant rôles in earlier centuries, but none has exerted a decisive influence in the last hundred years. For this reason their more recent annals, though intensely interesting in themselves, have been severely and perhaps unjustifiably compressed.

1. THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Sweden

The prominent part which Sweden played in European affairs during the seventeenth century came to an end with the Great Northern War of 1700–21.[2] Deprived of its hegemony in the Baltic, the kingdom declined into more peaceful days and economic decadence. The turmoil of the Napoleonic struggles, which left no part of Europe unstirred, drew Sweden into the later coalitions against France, and despite the fact that the Swedish campaigns were largely defensive the Congress of Vienna united Norway to Sweden as a reward (1814). On the death of Charles XIII (1809–18) without heirs, the Swedish throne passed to his adopted successor, the French general Bernadotte, as Charles XIV (1818–44). The Bernadotte dynasty still reigns in the northern kingdom.

Long a people of aristocratic traditions, the Swedes continued in the nineteenth century to accept the dominance of the great landowners and (with the development of mining and manufacturing activities) of the great industrialists. A constitution promulgated in 1863 did little to break this oligarchic rule, and the consequent discontent of the lower

[1] The Macmillan Company.

[2] See above, pages 600–02.

classes promoted the growth of socialism and helps to account for the phenomenal emigration. Over a million Swedes left their homeland between 1850 and 1900, the great majority of them settling in the United States.

Norway

The neighboring kingdom of Norway, united to the Danish crown from 1397 to 1814, was ceded in the latter year to Sweden. By approving this decision the diplomats at the Congress of Vienna hoped to console the Swedes for the loss of Finland (seized by Russia in 1808) and at the same time to punish the Danes for aiding Napoleon. This forced political union of Norway and Sweden left the Norwegians full control of their domestic affairs, but it irked this hardy and freedom-loving people none the less, for they cherished their distinctive speech and traditions. In 1905 the Norwegian Parliament, or *Storthing*, voted for complete independence and the people confirmed this decision by a plebiscite. The Swedish king, Oscar II, gave reluctant consent to the separation, and a Danish prince mounted the Norwegian throne as Haakon VII. Further democratic amendments to the constitution abolished the royal veto and permitted women to vote on the same terms as men (1913), Norway thus becoming the first state in Europe to accord women this right. Like Sweden, Norway has suffered heavy losses through emigration. The population at the opening of the twentieth century was less than two and one half million; but the Norwegians ranked fourth among the nations of the world in the tonnage of their merchant marine.

Denmark

The Danes, in their small seagirt kingdom of peninsulas and islands, endured two attacks by the British fleet (1801 and 1807) during the Napoleonic Wars, because they had been subordinated to French policy. The peace that followed brought a further injustice in the loss of Norway. In 1864, Austria and Prussia united to wrest the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein from the Danish monarch,[1] and the diminutive kingdom became the smallest of the Scandinavian states. Denmark retained, however, as tokens of those heroic centuries when Norse adventurers pushed their dragon-prowed vessels into unknown seas, the islands of Iceland and Greenland, forming a colonial empire fifty times the area of the Danish State, but sparsely populated with one hundred and twenty thousand settlers. In 1918, Iceland gained the status of a sovereign principality under the Danish king.

Farming, chiefly dairy farming, forms the principal source of wealth of the Danes, who export large quantities of butter, eggs, fodder, and

[1] See above, page 810.

animal products to England and Germany. The lack of mineral resources and of rivers suitable for providing hydroelectric power has retarded industrial development, but wood and textile manufactures are expanding. The campaign for political democracy, which made little headway in Denmark during the later nineteenth century largely because of the stubborn opposition of Christian IX (1863–1906), won a victory in the twentieth century with the extension of the franchise to all men and women of twenty-five or over who possess a fixed place of abode.

Scandinavian literature

With their combined population of less than eleven million people, the three Scandinavian states could not play, or expect to play, a very ambitious rôle in the military, political, or economic affairs of nineteenth-century Europe. But if the material contributions of the Scandinavian peoples were modest, their intellectual influence was great. The foremost sculptor of the century, Albert Bertel Thorwaldsen (1770–1844), was a Dane, and Denmark could also boast of producing the greatest literary critic of his time in Georg Brandes (1842–1927). Still another Dane, Hans Christian Andersen (1805–75), made his name a household word in Europe and America by his exquisite fairy tales. The plays of the Norwegian, Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906), stirred widespread controversies by their unflinching diagnosis of social problems, and Norway also produced a world-renowned composer in Edvard Grieg (1843–1907). To list but one more name from many which might be included, the Swedish dramatist, August Strindberg (1849–1912), had no equal among his contemporaries in his capacity for bitter, pessimistic, and ironic characterization. The contribution which these men made to European culture is a fitting reflection of the high standards of intelligence and education prevalent among the Scandinavian nations.

2. HOLLAND, BELGIUM, AND SWITZERLAND

The Kingdom of the Netherlands

Endangered by the military might of France and the naval supremacy of Britain, Holland has invariably suffered when these two powers were at war. In the first years of the nineteenth century, Napoleon forced the Dutch into his Continental System, a step which afforded the British an excuse to deprive Holland of the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon. But Dutch enterprise in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had built up an empire which still remains imposing despite such losses, and includes a native population (1931) of over sixty millions. It embraces Java, Sumatra, the Celebes,

Dutch Borneo, and Dutch New Guinea in the East Indies, Curaçao and some lesser islands in the West Indies, and Dutch Guiana in South America. The immense volume of trade, both colonial and international, which flows in and out of northern Europe through the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, lends the Kingdom of the Netherlands an economic importance out of proportion to its size (12,580 square miles) and population (8,031,679 in 1931).

The Congress of Vienna decreed in 1815 the junction of the Belgian provinces (previously the Austrian Netherlands) with Holland, thus forming the United Kingdom of the Netherlands under William I of the house of Orange. From this union the Belgians seceded in 1830. In 1848, the Dutch adopted a new constitution providing for a responsible ministry and a restricted suffrage, but the growth of democratic sentiment throughout Europe later led to cautious extensions of the franchise until today the electorate includes all men and women over twenty-five years of age. Fear of foreign aggression induced the Dutch to increase their naval and military forces considerably after 1890.

Belgium

Upon proclaiming their independence of Holland (1830), the Belgians established a constitutional monarchy with a German prince, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, as their first king. To protect the new state from the designs of more powerful neighbors, the leading nations of Europe, Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, guaranteed the independence and neutrality of Belgium by solemn accord in 1839. The new kingdom was soon stirred by the quickening effects of the Industrial Revolution, with a consequent exploitation of its mineral resources, and a rise in population which has made it the most densely inhabited state in Europe (estimated population in 1930, 8,129,824). A liberal government, controlled after 1884 by the Catholic majority, promoted education, broadened the franchise, and improved the condition of the working classes through enlightened social legislation. In 1908, the immense Congo territory in Africa, which had been exploited largely through the business initiative of the astute Belgian monarch, Leopold II (1865–1909), and established as a free state under his sovereignty, was annexed to Belgium as a colony. Like the Dutch, the Belgians became increasingly apprehensive concerning their security in the tense years which preceded the outbreak of the World War in 1914 and followed the general trend in augmenting their armaments.

Switzerland

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Swiss Confederation was little more, politically, than a loose agglomeration of cantons, each practically autonomous. Their inhabitants were bound together by a common love of liberty and of republican

institutions, but divided by differences in customs, language, and religion. A majority of the Swiss people speak German, but French prevails in five of the twenty-two cantons and Italian in one, while some thousands of the country folk speak a Latin dialect known as Romansch. In addition to these linguistic barriers there are religious differences, for the Protestants predominate in twelve cantons and Roman Catholics in ten.

Yet, despite these racial and religious divergencies, the Swiss have found it possible in recent times to transform their loose association into a well-knit federal state. A constitution adopted in 1848 established an executive federal council and a bicameral legislature. Uniform coinage, tariffs, postal regulations, and law codes followed; and a federal militia, efficient but expensive, was created for national defense. Swiss citizens enjoy universal suffrage, manifest a lively interest in matters of cantonal and federal administration, and possess two novel constitutional prerogatives. They may, if they wish, demand a plebiscite on any important legislative measure (the referendum), or on any issue proposed and sponsored by fifty thousand voters (the initiative).

Farming, industry, and the tourist trade have combined to make Switzerland, with its four million inhabitants, one of the most prosperous states in Europe. The unrivaled Alpine scenery draws millions of visitors annually. Farming, particularly dairy farming, provides a living for almost one third of the Swiss people, while one half find employment in the manufacture of clocks, watches, silk articles, and other high-grade products. The plentiful water power supplied by the mountain torrents, a public utility controlled by the federal government, provides cheap electricity throughout the country, and permits the electrification of the greater part of the Swiss railway system, most of which is likewise state controlled.

3. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

Spain

The history of Spain in the nineteenth century is largely a story of retarded economic development, maladministration, intrigue, and civil war. The secession of the South and Central American colonies [1] had deprived the Spanish government by 1820 of its major source of revenue, leaving it to stagger on as best it might under a burden of insolvency. As a considerable part of the Iberian Peninsula is a semi-arid plateau too infertile for easy cultivation, Spain lacked the agricultural wealth of France and has failed to develop an

[1] See above, page 749.

independent class of sturdy industrious peasant proprietors. Industry likewise, despite the existence of natural deposits of coal and iron, has made slow progress, for the Spaniards possessed little capital and less initiative. The powerful and privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church, the devout and conservative temper of the masses, the widespread superstition and illiteracy, and the lack of modern facilities for internal communication have served to insulate Spanish society from the transforming effects of commerce and invention.

The strength of Spanish conservatism lay in the fact that it was a peculiar blend of patriotism and religious fervor. The rough attempts made by Napoleon to modernize Spanish institutions, after setting his brother Joseph on the throne (1808), intensified the national prejudice against liberalism as an alien and sacrilegious importation. Enlightened and enterprising Spaniards conceded the advantages of reform, but, in the absence of a powerful and progressive middle class, the reform movement drew its chief strength from the circle of the intellectuals and the discontented army officers. These minority groups, while active enough to stir up occasional revolts and issue *pronunciamentos* (proclamations), could not awaken the masses from their lethargy. The enterprise of a firm and enlightened monarch might have turned the scale in favor of reform, but Spain has been cursed during the past hundred and fifty years with more stubborn and incompetent rulers than almost any other European state. The reign of the despicable Ferdinand VII (1814–33) has been described already.[1] His decision to set aside the Salic law and transmit the throne to his daughter Isabella II (1833–68) led to the so-called Carlist Wars (1833–40), in which the supporters of Ferdinand's brother Charles contested the succession. Although Isabella finally made good her claim, her despotic rule and immoral life disgusted the Spanish nation and a revolutionary upheaval in 1868 drove her from the kingdom.

Between 1868 and 1875, Spain endured kaleidoscopic shifts as the Carlists, Liberal Monarchists, and Republicans battled for control. In 1870, the throne was offered to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a move which excited a diplomatic crisis and precipitated the Franco-Prussian War.[2] Subsequently Prince Amadeo of Savoy, younger son of Victor Emmanuel II of Italy, was invited to become King of Spain, only to abdicate in discouragement three years later. Finally, in 1875, Alphonso XII (1875–85), son of the deposed Isabella, assumed the crown and restored peace to the distracted nation. With the aid of two remarkable statesmen, Marshal Martínez Campos and Antonio

[1] See above, pages 748–49.

[2] See above, pages 816–17.

Cánovas del Castillo, Alphonso inaugurated a happier era under a moderately liberal constitution. Following his early death (1885), the throne passed to a posthumous son, Alphonso XIII, who was declared of age in 1902. In the interval the widow of Alphonso XII, Maria Christina, acted as regent.

Spanish-American War (1898)

A stupid, tyrannical, and short-sighted colonial policy, which had already disrupted the once vast colonial empire of Spain, induced a stubborn revolt (1895–98) in the chief remaining dependency, the island of Cuba. With the intervention of the United States, Spain suffered a decisive defeat, and surrendered all title, not only to Cuba, but to Puerto Rico, and to the Philippine Islands and Guam in the Pacific, in return for twenty million dollars compensation. The loss of these last fragments of a mighty empire deeply wounded Spanish pride, and the nation entered the twentieth century with a heritage of defeat, impoverishment, and social unrest. Past colonial misfortunes, however, did not deter Alphonso XIII and the military chiefs from embarking upon a campaign for the subjugation of the native tribes of Spanish Morocco, an essay in imperialism which brought expenses and defeats so ruinous that in 1923 revolution appeared imminent. For the moment it was averted by a *coup d'état* which established General Primo de Rivera as chief minister of the Spanish cabinet with dictatorial powers.

Spanish Revolution of 1931

For eight years longer the amiable but extravagant Alphonso XIII clung to his shaking throne, but in 1931 the expected revolution broke out and the monarchy collapsed. A republican constitution, adopted December 9, provided for the confiscation of church property, suppression of religious instruction in the schools, and the expulsion of religious orders such as the Jesuits. All men and women over twenty-two were accorded the right to vote and a unicameral legislature established. During the first years of its existence the new republic survived serious strikes and disorders. Admirable progress was made in cutting down wasteful expenditure of the inadequate national revenue, and in promoting education, but grave problems remained to be overcome. A satisfactory solution of the clerical question proved difficult to find, and the new government's declared intention to parcel out the estates of the nobility, aggregating some fifty million acres, encountered obstacles.

Portugal

A close historical parallel has long existed between the annals of Spain and Portugal. Like Spain, the smaller Iberian Kingdom lost its American possessions (Brazil) in the 1820's, and suffered a disputed succession and civil war in the 1830's, which left a

woman, Maria II (1834–53), on the throne. The reigns of Maria's two sons, Peter V (1853–61) and Louis I (1861–89), were marked by comparative stability and some progress, but political corruption, delay in essential reforms, and excessive taxation drove many thousand Portuguese to emigrate, and fostered the growth of anti-clericalism, socialism, communism, and anarchism among those who remained at home.

Portugal differs from Spain in retaining an extensive colonial empire which includes the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique in Africa, Goa, Damao, and Diu in India, Macao in China, and part of the island of Timor in the East Indies. The cost of administering an empire so widely distributed and estimated at twenty-six times the area of the mother country has strained the resources of the Portuguese treasury. Portugal entered the twentieth century with a heavy burden of debt, a population two thirds of which was illiterate, a heritage of political confusion and incompetence, and a government apparently blind to the need and demand for progressive reforms.

Portuguese Revolution of 1910

The not surprising result was the outbreak of a popular revolution in 1910. Manuel II (whose father, Charles I, and elder brother had been assassinated in 1908) fled from Lisbon, and a republic was proclaimed. The new constitution established a government resembling that of France, with a bicameral legislature, universal manhood suffrage, and a president chosen by the national deputies. The separation of church and state, confiscation of the property of religious orders, and the erection of a system of free popular schools followed; but in dealing with economic problems the new régime showed a bourgeois bent, and the government was more concerned to protect private property than to alleviate the condition of the working classes.

4. THE CRUMBLING EMPIRE OF THE SULTAN (1815–78)

The decline of the Turkish Empire, already far advanced in the eighteenth century,[1] continued in the nineteenth, with the prospect of a complete dissolution growing yearly more imminent. Each of the great powers stood ready to claim a goodly share of the Ottoman bequest, but each was apprehensive lest a rival secure a more coveted section. As a consequence the diplomats frequently protested their hypocritical anxiety to protect and preserve the integrity of Turkey, by which they really meant to protect it from each other and preserve it for themselves. It is significant to note that each successive compromise which they

[1] See above, pages 584–85, 608–09.

negotiated was preceded by a clause emphasizing the importance of preserving the Ottoman Empire intact, but each inevitably led to a further diminution of the sultan's possessions.

As a result of the Hellenic War of Independence [1] the Greek Peninsula slipped the Turkish yoke and was recognized as an independent kingdom by international agreement. The great powers considered Turkey then at the point of disintegration, and Russia pressed her military advantages so well that she was able to establish a protectorate over the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, and to annex the territory of Georgia in the region of the Caucasus (Treaty of Adrianople, 1829). At the same time the hardy Serbs, who had been in rebellion against their Turkish masters for years, won practical independence under their hereditary prince, Milosh I (1830). The map which follows page 916 will reveal the extent of these Turkish losses. Note that Greece and Serbia are the first fragments of the Ottoman Empire to secede as independent principalities. Russia would readily have assumed a protectorate over both these states, the inhabitants of which were most of them of the Greek Orthodox faith, but the opposition of the other powers held the Muscovite ambitions in check.

The unhappy status of the sultan's remaining Christian subjects, oppressed by special taxes and denied civil equality, provided a constant motive for foreign intervention. Members of the Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey looked to Russia for protection, while Roman Catholics commonly sought sympathy for their lot from France. The solicitude which these two powers expressed for the welfare of the "Christian cattle" of the sultan was often no more than a cloak for moves aiming at the establishment of a protectorate. In 1854, as already explained,[2] mutual rivalries led France, in alliance with Great Britain, to attack Russia in the Crimea, and the Treaty of Paris, which closed this Crimean War, solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, frustrated Russian designs for the moment, and protected British trade in the Near East. For this respite the sultan was grateful and he made eloquent promises of reform which as usual he forgot to redeem.

In thus preserving Turkey, Britain and France were playing a rôle suspiciously like that of the dog in the manger: they would not themselves free the Balkan peoples from the sultan's misrule nor permit Russia to do so. But the spirit of nationalism which fused Italy and Germany into unified states during the decade 1860–70 had penetrated the Balkans also, and drove the Serbs, the Rumanians, and the Bulgars to demand autonomy despite the pro-

The Serbs and Rumanians

[1] See above, pages 750–51.

[2] See above, pages 786–89.

crastination of the western powers. In 1867, the Serbian ruler, Milosh Obrenovich III, secured the withdrawal of the last Turkish garrison from Serbia, although the sultan refused to acknowledge the complete independence of that state until 1878. In the same years the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia [1] voted to establish a common government, chose a noblemen, Alexander Cuza, as their prince, and proclaimed the union of the two Danubian provinces (1861). Like the Serbs, the Rumanians had to wait until the Congress of Berlin assembled in 1878 before they won acknowledgment of their status as a sovereign nation, the independent principality of Rumania.

The Bulgars

The last of the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula to escape from Turkish oppression were the Bulgars. A national and cultural revival preceded their demand for political freedom, and the Bulgars fought to emancipate themselves at one and the same time from the domination of the Greek clergy and the Turkish tax collectors. In 1870, the sultan permitted them to establish their own national church, but when they attempted to assert their political independence also (1876), they were punished by massacres so brutal and so sanguinary that all Europe was filled with indignation. Seizing the opportunity furnished by the general horror at these "Bulgarian atrocities," the Russian government intervened as the champion of the Christian minorities and declared war on Turkey (1877).

Russo-Turkish War (1877–78)

Once more the Near Eastern Question had created a European crisis. As the Russian armies advanced with Constantinople as their ultimate objective, the British government dispatched a fleet to the Black Sea, and Austria mobilized an army to curb Russian activities in the Balkan States. To avoid a clash with either of these powers, and to secure the gains already made, the czar concluded the hasty Treaty of San Stefano with the sultan (1878). This provided for the creation of an extensive, free Bulgaria, and decreed complete independence for Serbia, Rumania, and little Montenegro. But the vigilant powers, particularly Great Britain and Austria, were not satisfied with this solution. They viewed with alarm the creation of a greater Bulgaria under Russian influence, and they insisted upon calling an international congress to revise the Treaty of San Stefano. Sullenly the Russians submitted. Berlin was chosen as the meeting-place for the diplomats, and Bismarck, who declared that Germany had no direct stake in the Near East and was therefore the best arbiter, proposed to play the part of an "honest broker" whose only desire was to reconcile his clients' interests.

[1] See map following page 916.

Not since the princely delegates hastened to Vienna to celebrate the overthrow of Napoleon in 1814 had Europe beheld a diplomatic gathering of greater moment. The powers stood dangerously close to war, for, although the Russians had exacted fairly modest concessions from the Turks, British popular feeling was opposed to any compromise, and the audiences in the London music-halls were chanting in belligerent fashion:

Congress of Berlin (1878)

> We don't want to fight, but, by Jingo, if we do,
> We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too.

This spirit of "jingoism" as it came to be termed made a judicious settlement of the dispute extremely difficult, but in July the leading British delegate to the congress, Lord Beaconsfield (Benjamin Disraeli), was able to announce that he had brought back "peace with honor," and British "jingoists" applauded their returning prime minister and his imperialistic diplomacy. Later, however, his colleague, Lord Salisbury, was to confess that they had "backed the wrong horse" at Berlin, for, in checking Russia, Britain had not only helped to frustrate a promising solution of the Balkan tangle, embodied in the Treaty of San Stefano, but had encouraged the advance of Austria in the Balkans. Thirty years after the Congress of Berlin, the British had to ally themselves with the Russians to hold Austria, backed by Germany, in check.

For the moment, however, peace had been preserved by Russian concessions, and Great Britain and Austria mollified by the diplomatic device known as "reciprocal compensation." Russia was permitted to annex the province of Bessarabia on the Black Sea between the Danube and the Dniester deltas, and also the Armenian districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum.[1] In return, Austria-Hungary received the right to administer the late Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Britain, by a separate convention with Turkey, assumed possession of the island of Cyprus. Thereupon the powers once more repeated their solemn determination to respect and to preserve intact the territorial unity of the Turkish Empire, or what remained of it.

The wishes of the Balkan peoples, who were most vitally concerned in the settlement, won scant and illogical consideration. Bulgaria was split into three parts, the northernmost section winning practical independence, the middle section administrative autonomy, while the southern section, including Macedonia, was restored to Turkish control. For Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the congress decreed complete independence and some increases in territory, but the national aspira-

[1] See map following page 890.

tions of the inhabitants were far from being satisfied. The Greeks, who were permitted to add Thessaly to their diminutive peninsula-kingdom, had the most substantial reason for gratitude.

The treaty of Berlin failed to solve the Near Eastern Question, failed to safeguard such Christian minorities as still remained under Ottoman rule, and failed to ensure the needed reforms which experience had shown the Turks might promise but would never execute. It may be that the problems involved were too intricate for solution, but in truth the diplomats revealed little honest desire to settle them equitably, being too deeply engrossed with their own plans for imperial aggrandizement to study the issues dispassionately. The Balkans remained a center of disorders, rivalries, and intrigues fermenting with national unrest, until two generations later they provided the spark which generated a World War.

Section E

THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ERA: THE CONFLICT OF CAPITAL AND LABOR, AND THE RIVALRY OF THE IMPERIALIST POWERS

(1871–1914)

In the twenty years preceding 1871, *Europe had been shaken by no less than five wars, each involving two or more of the great powers. All these struggles — the Crimean War, the Italian War of* 1859, *the Danish War, the Austro-Prussian conflict, and the Franco-Prussian War — grew in large part out of the tension resulting from the progress of national consolidation. Italy, Germany, and to a less degree Russia, were striving to round out their territories and achieve a higher degree of political unity. By* 1871, *however, Italy had been organized into the Italian Kingdom, the Germanies had been welded together to form the German Empire, and Europe was permitted to settle down to a condition of relative peace and equilibrium. Twenty years of strain and frequent warfare were to be followed by over forty years of peace.*

But history never stands still, and during these peaceful decades forces were at work which aggravated old problems and created new ones. The most impressive single factor affecting European civilization after 1871 *was the rapid industrial development. Stimulated by new and revolutionary advances in science and technology, industry superseded agriculture as the main source of livelihood for a majority of the people in the industrialized states. But this further extension of the factory system deepened the conflict*

between the owners of the machines and the workers, while the steady accumulation of capital and the need for raw materials drove the powers to exploit backward countries and expand their colonial empires. As a consequence the period from 1871 *to* 1914 *was characterized by social conflict and the rise of socialist parties* within *the industrialized states, and by keener commercial and colonial competition* between *the industrialized states. As the tension grew, the powers were driven into two competing systems of alliances, while the people suffered the burden of ever-increasing armaments. A succession of diplomatic crises culminated, in* 1914, *in the outbreak of the most tragic and destructive war in European history.*

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

THE NEW WORLD WHICH SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY HAVE CREATED

Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay.
ALFRED TENNYSON.

EVERY student of history who peers back into past centuries will find himself drawn to certain periods with the conviction, "Here was an eventful age!" To have walked on the banks of the Nile when the Great Pyramid was rising, or through the streets of Athens in the fourth century before Christ; to have visited Cathay with Marco Polo and seen the court of Kublai Khan, or dwelt in Florence in the height of the Italian Renaissance, would doubtless have provided rich and stimulating experiences. Yet it is safe to say that at no point in the past could one find an age which, for eventfulness, for extension and diffusion of culture, rapidity of change, interest and complexity, might prove a rival to contemporary times. To have lived in Europe or America during the past half-century is to have lived in the most advanced civilization and the most extraordinary epoch in the recorded history of the human race, an epoch in which man's knowledge of the universe which he inhabits, his control over the forces of nature, his ability to produce the necessities of life and to prolong life itself, have increased more rapidly than in any comparable era of the past.

1. THE MARCH OF SCIENCE

The element in modern civilization which has made possible the dynamic changes of recent years is the progress of science and industry. An earlier chapter [1] described the beginnings of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the advances in mathematical method, and the brilliant discoveries in astronomy, physics, and other fields of investigation. The scientists of the eighteenth century extended and systematized this new knowledge with such success that they made their period an Age of Rationalism, a Scientific Renaissance. But it was not until the nineteenth century that the fruits of their researches really made themselves felt in the life of the common man. A hundred and fifty years ago farmers still plowed their fields much as they had since Roman times two thousand years before. The horse provided the chief

[1] Chapter VIII, pages 635–48.

means of transportation on land, the sailing vessel on water. The swiftest means of communication was to signal a message from one hilltop to the next. Nevertheless, although the people of that age could not foresee its outcome, a revolution was at hand which speeded up the methods of communication, of transportation, and of production more effectively in a single lifetime than in all previous history. Men born in 1800 saw within the span of an average life the advent of the age of steam and steel.

The revolution in transportation

In the eighteenth century it required as many days to travel the hundred and sixty miles from London to Manchester as now suffice for the crossing of the Atlantic or a journey from New York to San Francisco. Today goods can be shipped from England to Japan or Australia at less cost and labor than it demanded then to transport them from London to Edinburgh. The introduction of the steamship and the railway a century ago shrank this planet so surprisingly that distant continents became more accessible than neighboring states had been a few decades earlier. As a result, Europe was able to lay the world under contribution, drawing the products of every clime and every continent to her ports. The high speed and low cost of steam transportation made it possible for manufacturers to feed their factories with raw materials drawn from the ends of the earth, and to ship the finished articles back across the ocean to distant markets. The inhabitants, moreover, of the new industrial centers no longer cultivated gardens or raised their own food. For the whole world had become their garden, and from every part of it ships were racing toward them with the supplies of food which they no longer found it profitable to produce.

There is no easy comparison to be found in history for this revolutionary change. In days of old a king, perhaps, might obtain fresh fish from a lake in the next province by exhausting relays of fleet slaves, or draw melting snow from a mountain-top by the same means when he wished to cool his wine. Today every common man in a civilized community commands privileges which the king could not have imagined. The average Englishman, for example, will sit down unthinkingly to a breakfast gathered from five continents. He chooses casually between an apple from British Columbia and an orange from Tangier, coffee from Brazil or tea from Ceylon, lambs' kidneys from Australia or bacon and eggs from Denmark. The breakfast table may be of Venezuelan mahogany, the cloth of Egyptian cotton, the cutlery compounded perhaps of Canadian nickel, Swedish chromium, Chinese tin, and Mexican silver, all blended at Sheffield, England.

The newspaper folded beside his plate likewise bears witness to a revolution, not in transportation, but in communication. From every part of the world the events of the previous twenty-four hours have been gleaned for his entertainment and information. News of an earthquake in Tibet, a fire in Buenos Aires, or a shipwreck off the Aleutian Islands is crowded together with market quotations from Chicago and Tokyo and messages from explorers in the Amazonian jungles or near the South Pole. To draw in this medley of details a wire net has been woven from a mileage of submarine cables long enough to girdle the earth a dozen times and a length of telephone wire that would reach to the sun. The more recent devices of wireless telegraphy and radio are already accepted as commonplaces by people whose tastes are jaded with so many scientific wonders. Yet the greatest marvel of all, and the one most frequently ignored, is the fact that the inventions which make this collection and diffusion of news possible, the telegraph, telephone, and wireless systems, the linotype, and the rotary press, have all been perfected within the memory of men yet living.

The revolution in communication

While the conveyance of goods, passengers, and news was thus being speeded up, an equally momentous change took place in the methods of production. Industrial centers, able suddenly to draw upon the whole world for supplies, demanded them in prodigious quantities and doubled their demands every few years. The production of iron, an essential commodity of the machine age, increased a hundred-fold in the nineteenth century, and the output of coal kept pace with it. New inventions, such as the internal combustion engine, created new demands, and the world production of petroleum after 1900 leaped ahead one thousand per cent in thirty years. To satisfy the insatiable demands of expanding industries men learned to tap pools of oil miles below the earth's crust, to draw nitrogen from the atmosphere, and to extract bromine from the sea. Power for their engines was obtained by a reckless consumption of coal, oil, or gas, or by harnessing the tireless waterfalls.

The revolution in production

Nor did science lag in finding new ways to augment the food supply for the hungry millions. By the use of fertilizers, by experimenting with new and more nutritious types of grains and fruits, by the invention of agricultural machinery, power-driven plows, tractors, and threshing machines, the world's food supply has been augmented until in recent years the surplus has proved an embarrassment and its distribution a problem. By means of refrigerator cars and steamers millions of tons of fruit or meat can now be shipped from continent to continent, or,

sealed in sterilized cans, may be preserved for years until needed. The dread specter of famine which had lurked like a lean wolf on the edge of every human community since the beginning of history seemed about to vanish at last.

This increase in material wealth has made the world a vastly more luxurious and amusing place for many people. Today the citizen of modest circumstances can afford luxuries which a Roman noble with a thousand slaves could not obtain. The electric light, telephone, and radio, the steamship, train, and automobile are at the disposal of millions. The Caesars carried no timepiece as accurate as a dollar watch, nor could their banquet table provide the variety of flavors obtainable at a modern soda fountain. Silk, once the apparel of princes, has become a household article, materials unknown or unprocurable to the ancients, such as rustless steel, aluminum, rubber, and a hundred synthetic products, have suddenly become so cheap that they are discarded after use as too worthless to salvage. Science and industry have accustomed civilized men to regard the supply of materials, raw and manufactured, as inexhaustible, so that they cast aside daily as rubbish the tons of newsprint, bottle glass, tin cans, old tires, or broken pottery which have served their purpose, indifferent to the question whether their mines and forests can long withstand such ruthless depletion.

2. NEW CONCEPTIONS OF MAN'S PLACE IN NATURE

While becoming richer and more interesting in the past hundred years, human existence has also become healthier and safer. The scientists did not rest content with exploring the inorganic universe from stars to atoms, they turned their investigations upon organic (that is, living) things as well. As a result of these researches they have been able to conquer many deadly diseases and prolong man's span of life, at the same time formulating new and revolutionary theories regarding his origin and place in nature.

In pursuing those branches of knowledge which concern man, however, such subjects as biology or psychology or politics, the scientists had to overcome a problem which had troubled them little in physics or chemistry. This problem might be called the human factor. It is an inescapable, and to the scientist a troublesome, fact, that man, who likes to put the rest of the universe under the microscope, objects to being put under it himself. For he has learned from experience that the results are likely to humiliate and bewilder him. It disturbs him little when the scientists dispute about the speed of light or the temperature of the sun,

but his vanity is affronted when they tell him their evidence indicates that he is descended from the apes instead of from the angels. The poets may agree that "the proper study of mankind is man," but the scientists have found it is often considered an improper study. However warily they walk, however scrupulously they weigh their observations, by popular prejudices and passions or invalidated by their own unsuspected loyalties.

One of the first shocks which modern science administered to human vanity was the Copernican theory.[1] If the universe was, indeed, nothing more than a vast machine, then all life on earth might be merely "the superficial phenomena of arrested radiation on the outer crust of a cooling nebula." Yet men clung to an inherited belief that the trees which bore fruits for them to eat, the lakes teeming with fish, the valleys which they plowed, and the hills to which they lifted up their eyes had been shaped to serve human needs by a benevolent Creator. How else could the mountains and the lakes, the river valleys and the fertile plains have achieved their present useful and familiar conformation?

Geology

In 1830–33, Charles Lyell attempted to answer that question in his *Principles of Geology*, explaining that the irregularities of the earth's surface were the result of natural processes still at work; that the actions of volcanic pressure, of winds and rain and rivers, the formation of strata, and the rising and sinking of the earth's crust would, in the course of sufficient time, produce all the results now apparent. The theories of this great English scientist, which won rapid acceptance, presupposed a much greater age for the earth than the six thousand years suggested by Biblical chronology. Some modern calculations have named a figure in excess of two thousand million years.

Paleontology

Stimulated by Lyell's hypothesis, geologists began, by patient scrutiny and classification, to estimate the age of the various types of rock found in the earth's crust. Discovery of the fossil remains of plants and animals in some of these stratified formations provided a clue to the origin of life on this planet. The earliest indications revealed the most primitive forms of organic structures, successive later strata retained the impressions of shellfish, vertebrate fish, insects, trees, reptiles, mammals, and finally of man. In 1863, Lyell published a second important work on *The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man*, in which he submitted that relics of human tools and skeletons had been traced back at least fifty thousand years. Thus the geologists

[1] See above, page 636.


and paleontologists (that is, students of fossilized animals and plants) discovered "books in the running brooks, sermons in stones," and opened up a new and amazing vista which stretched from the portals of written history back to the first algae in the proterozoic slime.

The advances in geology set the stage for the most epoch-making conclusion of nineteenth-century thought, the theory of biological evolution. Since the time of the Greeks independent thinkers had pondered the suggestion that all life might have developed originally from a simple cell, but the proposition appeared untenable because, so far as man could observe, all living things were divided into fixed species, each producing "after his kind," as the Book of Genesis had ordained. It followed that if species were, indeed, unchanging or *immutable,* they could not all have derived gradually from the same common ancestor. But the new calculations regarding the vast age of the earth, the discovery of prehistoric forms and species now extinct, and the variations found to exist between families of living animals and their fossilized forbears provided the clue that species were not immutable after all, but were, indeed, changing imperceptibly through vast periods of time.

How the variation, progression, and multiplication of life forms not only *might* have come about, but inevitably *must* have come about, as a result of natural forces, occurred independently to two English naturalists, Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace, but Darwin reached his conclusion first and fortified it most carefully. Breeders of mice or pigeons, as Darwin knew, by mating only the dark- or light-colored offspring in successive generations, could produce in time a pure white or pure dark strain, and he reasoned that, if such a process of selection were carried on long enough, it could change the entire character of the stock. If the deer with the fleetest legs or the giraffes with the longest necks had been selected from each generation for millions of years, the cumulative effect would result in the emergence of new species. That such a process of *natural selection* had actually taken place, Darwin postulated as a corollary of the struggle for existence, explaining that the favored individuals of each species, the fleetest or the fiercest or the most intelligent, had the better chance to survive and propagate according as they were better adapted to their environment. In the course of time this principle of "the survival of the fittest" would bring about the evolution and differentiation of living organisms into an infinite variety of types and species. In 1859, Darwin offered this conclusion to the world by publishing his momentous work *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection.*

Charles Darwin (1809–82)

The Darwinian theories, as propagated in the philosophy of Herbert



CHARLES DARWIN
1809–82

There is little in the appearance of this mild and venerable figure to suggest the bitter controversy that Darwin excited by his theories on biological evolution.

Spencer and the lectures of Thomas Henry Huxley, aroused deep opposition especially among theologians. Efforts to confirm or confute them led to a more intensive study of comparative anatomy and to a more careful classification of all forms of organic life. That all living things were built out of microscopic organisms or *cells* had been demonstrated as early as 1839. Further improvements in the microscope enabled Louis Pasteur to prove that the fermentation of wine and yeast and many diseases in plants and animals were caused by minute living organisms or *germs*. For the first time physicians were given the opportunity to recognize enemies which hitherto they had fought in the dark. Pasteur demonstrated that many dangerous disease germs could be killed by such a simple device as raising the temperature of their environment (pasteurization), and that others could be combated by inoculating or immunizing human beings against their ravages. A Prussian physician, Robert Koch (1843–1910), raised bacteriology into a science, and within a decade (1884–94) the bacillus of typhoid, tuberculosis, cholera, lockjaw, diphtheria, bubonic plague, and other scourges had been identified. Although the greatest scientists were generally the most modest in their claims, enthusiasts hoped that the twentieth century would see the passing of the great plagues.

Louis Pasteur (1822–95)

In surgery the results of the germ theory were not less important. The knowledge that infection and suppuration of wounds was due to the presence of microbes emphasized the value of antiseptics and the importance of sterilizing all the implements, bandages, etc., used in operations (asepsis). At the same time, the introduction of ether and chloroform as anesthetics not only spared the patient incalculable pain, but made possible longer and far more complicated investigations. The miracles of modern surgery would be impossible without these discoveries which now save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people yearly.

Throughout the civilized world the methods popularized by Pasteur, Koch, and others led to a concerted war against disease which has had spectacular results. The medical profession, the public health authorities, and a more enlightened public adopted measures of hygiene and sanitation which in many parts of Europe cut the death rate in half in fifty years. The result has been a phenomenal increase in population, due not only to the advances in medical science, but also to the new methods, already mentioned, of producing and distributing vast quantities of cheap food. Because of the mitigation of plague and famine, the


Increase in population in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

population of Europe has more than doubled since 1800. But Europe is not the only continent affected. It is estimated that during the same period the population of the earth has trebled until it stands today at two billion souls, a result made possible not so much by increasing the birth rate, but by decreasing the death rate.

This unprecedented gain in population, made possible by the achievements of modern science and industry, is the most arresting fact in modern history. It has created profound problems, for mere multiplication of the human race is not a blessing unless the newborn individuals are offered a chance to lead happy and profitable lives. It is pertinent to ask what sort of lives these added millions are condemned to live, what chance they have to find happiness, and what type of environment science and industry are providing for them. These are questions which the next section will endeavor to answer.

3. THE NEW ENVIRONMENT WHICH SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY HAVE PROVIDED: THE "CIVILIZATION OF CITY DWELLERS"

After 1870, the acceleration of the forces shaping modern life, the flood of inventions and the multifold discoveries, grew so rapid that it really constituted a second Industrial Revolution or what might better, perhaps, be termed a Technological Revolution. Successive innovations, such as the automobile, motion picture, airplane, and radio, led to the establishment of new industries overnight, industries which, like the older weaving and metallurgical trades, required hundreds of thousands of workers and were centered often in mushroom cities created to house their plants and their employees. The new methods of quantity production necessitated the co-ordination of all the processes of an industry, and of associated trades, so that the garment-makers tended to congregate in one locality, the makers of automobile parts in another. Miners crowded into dingy dwellings near the pit mouth, cotton spinners into congested towns where cheap power, a damp climate, or convenient transportation facilities had concentrated the factories. The machines demanded power to run them and raw materials to feed their tireless maw, hence it was most profitable to establish them where these essentials were easily available. Thus, in selecting the site of operations the machine was the master, and the workmen who had to tend it were condemned to live nearby. Too often this meant that thousands of mill hands had to pass their lives under the smoke-laden sky of a factory town, where the grass withered from the fumes of the blast furnaces and the streams were polluted



ESTIMATED INCREASE IN THE POPULATION OF EUROPE DURING THE LAST THREE CENTURIES

No official records of European population before the last century are in existence, and even today census statistics are not absolutely dependable. Estimates calculated from various sources indicate that there was a slow rise in the total population from the close of the Middle Ages until the eighteenth century, followed by the extraordinary increase of modern times.

with the wastage of tanks and vats. The migration of the population toward the new industrial centers, a shift already observable in England at the close of the eighteenth century, continued at an increasing rate throughout the nineteenth in all the leading European countries.

The result was the growth of cities at the expense of the country districts. The most notable feature about the population in the modern industrial state is the fact that it is predominantly an urban population. Until a century ago, and even later, the people of the British Isles, of France, or Germany lived chiefly on the land, supporting themselves by some form of agricultural labor. England was the first state to discover, about 1850, that the town dwellers had grown to outnumber the country folk. That process has continued inexorably until today four out of every five Englishmen live in cities of ten thousand or upwards. In France and Germany the same phenomenon is to be observed, induced by the same causes, but it has not yet developed so far. The trend, however, which affects the whole of Europe, is startling enough. A century ago there were scarcely a dozen cities in Europe with a population over two hundred thousand. Today there are more than one hundred, and they are still growing.

The growth of cities

Yet so swift has been the transformation, so recently has modern civilization become a civilization of city dwellers, that the thought, the language, the mental background of most urban inhabitants are still impregnated with rural images. City children who never visited a mill stream or plundered a farmer's orchard sing songs about the old swimming hole and the old gray mare, but they have little comprehension of these things. For most modern children know nothing of barefoot days or calling the cattle home; the world in which they are growing up has come to be a world of paved streets and angular buildings, of lighted shop windows and dark alleyways, of gasoline fumes and factory whistles. This is the environment in which the man of the twentieth century seems destined to pass the greater part of the twenty thousand days that fate allots him, divorced from the forests and the fields which were home to his grandfather, but in which a dwindling proportion of his fellow countrymen now dwell.

It follows that the proper regulation and development of those cities in which so large a part of the people elect to live must be of pressing concern to modern governments. Cities are vast agglomerations of unique and artificial growth. To police them, to safeguard their thousands or millions of inhabitants, to direct their traffic or dispose of their refuse, employs an army of public servants. Many modern

cities have grown up so hurriedly and haphazardly that vast sums must later be expended to provide an adequate water supply, to create port and railway facilities, playgrounds, parks, and traffic speedways. A little foresight and foreknowledge might have solved many of these problems in advance, but the rapid changes of the machine era took governments by surprise and found even the experts largely unprepared to cope with the riddles of a dynamic civilization.

4. THE INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETY: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LABOR AND THE RIDDLE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

The rise of the bourgeoisie

In the Middle Ages, when land was the most important form of wealth, a man's power and riches were computed in terms of the number of fertile acres which he possessed. His income depended upon the produce raised on his estates, part of which was turned over to him by his tenants or serfs as rent. As the yield from the soil could not be greatly increased under existing methods of cultivation, medieval wealth and medieval society tended to remain the same from one generation to the next. By the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, other factors introduced a change which helped to bring the Middle Ages to an end. The story has already been told of the improvements in communication, the slow revival of commerce, and the rise of the towns, which raised a new class to prominence, the class of manufacturers, bankers, and traders. The wealth of these men was not in land, but in the commodities which they sold, in bills of exchange, and in money. Though scorned at first by the feudal, landowning nobles, the merchant class gained steadily in power and wealth and influence. For whereas the landowner's income was limited by the yield of his land and the rents paid him by his tenants, the commercial classes grew wealthier as their business grew in volume. In time this emerging middle class became strong enough to challenge the privileged position of the feudal aristocracy, and in the end they succeeded, with the aid of the seventeenth-century revolutions in England and the great revolution in France, in dominating state policies. By 1832, as explained in Chapter XVI, the bourgeoisie, the class composed of manufacturers, merchants, traders, bankers, professional men, and shopkeepers, had secured control of the government in France and Great Britain.

At this point, when the leaders of the new "commercial aristocracy" were tasting the fruits of political power, they tapped a new source of economic gain through the wider application of machinery. The Indus-

trial Revolution had begun, and it proved the truth of the scriptural adage that to him that hath shall be given. For only men who already possessed surplus capital could afford to experiment with and to install the new spinning and weaving machines which revolutionized the production of cotton and woolen fabrics. Men with foresight and initiative, who had capital to invest or knew where to borrow it, made surprising profits, and those who utilized their dividends for the purchase of still more machines might multiply their fortunes and lift themselves to the rank of great industrial capitalists.

The rising power of capital

But the factory system not only enriched the capitalist class; it also multiplied vastly the number of unpropertied wage-earners, the class which has come to be called the industrial proletariat. The machines provided wide employment for the unskilled and semi-skilled laborer, but too often he found life in a factory little better than economic serfdom. In some respects his lot was even harder than that of a serf in the Middle Ages, for the medieval peasant could not be deprived of his land or his means of livelihood, poor as it might be, but a factory worker might be discharged at any time and face starvation if he found no other work. The peasants of the Middle Ages had usually accepted their lot with resignation, but the industrial laborers of the nineteenth century, living in larger groups, could combine and protest more effectively than their thirteenth-century forbears. They agitated for better working conditions and better wages, and organized themselves in order to fight for their rights. Dissatisfied and unemployed workingmen were among the first to raise the barricades in the Paris revolutions of 1830 and 1848, and they swelled the ranks of the Chartists in England.

The industrial proletariat

The attempts of the workers to organize trade unions to promote their interests met at first with strong opposition, and the unions were condemned and disbanded as "conspiracies in restraint of trade." Labor combinations formed for the purpose of gaining better hours, wages, or working conditions did not enjoy full legal protection in England until 1871. In France, although co-operative societies were permitted, workingmen's combinations formed to bargain with employers (*sociétés de résistance*) were first forbidden, then tolerated (1868), and finally given legal status (1884). In Germany, the laborers' right to combine for the purpose of winning more favorable wages and working conditions was not recognized legally until after 1890. It is to be noted that in all three countries the statutes which forbade the combination of the workers with the object of forcing wages *up* also

Trade unions

contained clauses prohibiting combinations of employers for the purpose of forcing wages *down*, but in the latter case the legislation remained very largely a dead letter.


Karl Marx (1818–83)

After the middle of the nineteenth century, the deepening antagonism between the capitalist or bourgeois employers and the workingmen acquired new significance through the writings of Karl Marx. Born in Treves, Germany, Marx enjoyed an excellent education, but his political activities on behalf of the lower classes got him into trouble in his homeland and also in France, where he joined in the revolution of 1848. So he settled in London in order to devote himself to study and to the development of those theories which have earned him the title "the father of modern socialism."

Armed with profound learning and a powerful intellect, Marx formulated a new philosophy of history, based upon his conclusion that the factor which is common to society in every age is the exploitation of one class by another. In modern society Marx found this "class struggle" exemplified in the contest between capital and labor, the capitalists being the "expropriators" and the workingmen the "expropriated," and he prophesied that the struggle would gradually split society into two hostile camps with no middle ground between. For the progress of the Industrial Revolution seemed destined to increase the profits of the machine-owners while the proletarians grew more numerous and more conscious of their violated rights. In the end the proletariat would take over the machinery of production to run it for the benefit of all, and the "expropriators" would be expropriated.

Criticism of Marxism

To its exponents the chief attraction of this "economic interpretation of history" lay in its logical prediction that the ultimate triumph of the proletariat must come about in the natural course of events. Critics have objected, however, that at this point Marx abandons his realistic approach and becomes almost as Utopian as Fourier or Saint-Simon. For he implies that the proletarian revolution will be followed by the creation of a co-operative commonwealth without expropriating or expropriated classes. Such a conclusion appears to presuppose either (1) that the class conflict is not a constantly operative and rigidly determined principle, or (2) that the human mind, by understanding it, can alter conditions and arrest the endless series of revolutions to which the class struggle has given rise — neither of which offers a wholly logical explanation. Most socialists were encouraged, however, by the Marxian prophecy that capitalism would dig its own grave, and that, although the advent of socialism



KARL MARX
1818–83

A capacity for profound and dispassionate thought made Marx the outstanding philosopher of socialism, but opponents who rejected the gospel according to Marx found that he could also be a passionate controversialist.

might be delayed, it could not be prevented. Since the workers of all countries had the same general grievances, Marx urged them to unite in pressing the class war, disregarding national ties and boundaries, for all the workers of the world were "comrades."

In 1864, socialists from various countries attempted to organize an international movement for which Marx prepared a constitution. Weakened by the desertion of the moderates and the expulsion of the anarchists, this First International foundered in 1873, but a Second International was formed in 1889. Meanwhile, socialist groups in the leading European countries entered the political arena and socialist voters polled an increasing number of ballots. By 1914, the Socialist Parties in France and Germany had each over a hundred deputies in parliament, while in the British House of Commons the Labor Party held forty seats.

The First and Second International

The spread of democracy in the period 1870–1914 and the extension of the suffrage to all classes naturally favored the growth of the Socialist Parties. Their leaders hoped a time would soon come when the workers, as the most numerous class in each state, would control the parliaments through the deputies whom they elected, for when they secured this control they could transform the capitalist system by legislative decrees. All moderate-minded men naturally hoped that the ends of social justice might be realized by constitutional means and that the problems growing out of the class struggle would find an *evolutionary* rather than a *revolutionary* solution. The parliaments of the nineteenth century had generally avoided these problems, and, true to the bourgeois doctrine of *laissez-faire*, or "let alone," they had left the workers to the mercy of their employers. But there seemed good reason to hope after 1900 that the parliaments of the twentieth century would abandon this evasive course and grapple honestly with the task of reconciling the demands of capital and labor. Unhappily, this hope was to be temporarily blasted by the outbreak of the World War in 1914.

Evolution or revolution?

Like the "class struggle," the World War was very largely a product of the new forces which science and industry have let loose in society. The economic rivalries of imperialistic powers which helped to provoke this war, the machine guns, submarine boats, and poison gas which multiplied its horrors, and the airships which dropped bombs on frightened towns were no less the products of the new world which science and industry have provided than the cheap food, the rapid transportation, and the protection against plagues. The Industrial Revolution not only helped to intensify the class struggle *within* the modern states;

it also helped to intensify the jealousies existing *among* the modern states, as the next section will explain.

5. THE INDUSTRIALIZED STATE: THE COMPETITION AMONG THE GREAT POWERS FOR COLONIES AND MARKETS

In medieval times, when highways were few and poor and ships small and slow, the inhabitants of a village or dwellers on a barony had to raise the necessities of life in their own neighborhood. Meat and eggs, fruit and grain, wine and olives, were largely consumed where they were produced, for it was costly and difficult to preserve or to transport them. The same principle applied to almost all the commodities of existence. Traders had to limit their load to light and precious wares, such as salt, spices, silks, and jewels. After the revival of commerce and the voyages of exploration in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the European peoples learned to enjoy many foreign products, such as coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco, etc., but until the nineteenth century the European states still remained to a high degree self-sufficient and self-supporting.

The Industrial Revolution tended to destroy this economic equilibrium. A modern industrial state such as England, with four fifths of the people living in towns, would find it impracticable if not actually impossible to raise at home the food required for its urban millions. Instead, the English people have learned to utilize the cheap and rapid transportation of the steam age to import vast supplies of wheat from Canada or Argentina and tons of frozen mutton from Australia. For this food, which makes good their own deficiency, they pay with shipments of manufactured articles from their humming factories, and so satisfactory did the method of exchange appear that British agriculture has been permitted to languish. In 1840, British farmers grew enough wheat to supply ninety per cent of the population of the United Kingdom, but by the close of the century their crops sufficed for only ten per cent. The German population has tended since 1870 to outgrow the domestic food supply in the same way, and, despite state encouragement and subsidies to the farmers, Germany has become partly dependent upon imported foodstuffs. On the other hand, France still demonstrates the balance which may be maintained between agriculture and industry, and has remained the most self-sufficient of the three powers, but France is not so highly industrialized as England or Germany and has a stationary or almost stationary population.

Agriculture vs. industry

For the industrial state an equally serious problem arises from the fact that the insatiable capacity of the machines tends to outrun the domestic supply of raw material. England, long famous for the quality and quantity of her domestic wool, was able until a century ago to provide her mills with home-grown fleece. But industrial development rendered the local supply insufficient, and today four fifths of the wool utilized in the British textile trades comes from overseas. Where the raw materials of a trade cannot be raised in England, as in cotton manufacturing, the dependence upon foreign sources may be even more complete. Great Britain's imports of raw cotton have increased from a few million pounds a year in the eighteenth century to something over a billion, and her re-exports of cotton textiles have been valued at six hundred million dollars for a single year. Yet this gigantic industry, like many others in the British Isles, is dangerously dependent upon the vicissitudes of world trade. The ships which carry these cargoes back and forth are the indefatigable shuttles weaving the fabric of British commercial greatness. If they ceased to operate, even for a few weeks, British industry would face economic paralysis, and if the tie-up lasted several months, the British people would suffer the severest privation. This danger, in a greater or less degree, faces all states which devote a major part of their energies to the profitable but precarious hazards of modern industry.

The web of empire

Under these circumstances the great industrial powers must be prepared to safeguard their communications and to maintain contact with the foreign markets and sources of supply without which their home industries would languish. The incoming tide of raw materials and food, the outgoing flood of manufactures, these are the life blood of empire, and the railway and steamship lines are the channels through which this life blood ebbs and flows. This is the reason why modern governments often subsidize private transportation companies, why they build railways along strategic routes in the battle for trade, and are prepared to go to war to keep control of them. It also explains in part the interest which the great powers show in colonies and markets in the so-called "backward countries" of the world.

But there is a second and less obvious reason which drove the powers to engage in an undignified scramble for control of the less civilized portions of the globe, especially after 1870. In all the industrialized states capital was accumulating as a result of business enterprise, and as the opportunities for highly profitable investment at home were narrowed by competition, the masters of this disposable capital looked abroad for new fields

The scramble for control of backward countries

which might promise higher returns. They "exported" their capital to the backward countries, using it to open up untapped natural resources, to build roads and railways, and to develop new enterprises under favorable conditions which assured them a high rate of interest. Frequently the local rulers, as the Khedive of Egypt or the Sultans of Turkey and Morocco, invited this influx of capital because it helped to modernize their domains. The profits to be reaped from thus opening up backward and often anarchic countries were great, but the risks were great also, for local disturbances might endanger the plant or property which the investors' money had established. It was but natural, therefore, that British investors, for example, should appeal to their government to safeguard their investments by establishing a protectorate over the area they were exploiting. In its hidden but effective fashion, this pressure which British or German or American investors might bring to bear upon their respective governments to safeguard their exported capital provided a more persistent impulse toward imperialist expansion than either the profits of colonial trade (which were often negligible to the mother country) or the need to obtain raw materials (which could usually be purchased in the world's markets).

These several motives help to explain why the vast and half-unknown continent of Africa was parceled out among the European powers in little more than a decade after 1880, and the ancient but feeble Chinese Empire carved into "spheres of influence" as the Russians, British, French, Germans, and Japanese vied for control of the oriental resources. Even scattered islands in the seas, hitherto ignored as of no value or interest, were annexed as possible naval bases or sites for a cable or wireless station. Not since the colonizing ventures of the seventeenth century had Europeans shown such zeal in planting their flags on alien shores as in this era of the New Imperialism.

The threat to world peace

The native peoples of Africa and Asia frequently resented the imposition of foreign control, and all the colonizing powers became involved in frontier wars which were settled in almost all cases by the superiority of the white man's weapons. The New Imperialism brought with it, however, a threat of more serious conflict, of an armed struggle among the great powers themselves growing out of their clashing activities and claims. The tension already existing among the European nations was intensified by colonial rivalry and commercial competition; the result was a mutual increase in armaments which in turn increased the fear and suspicion. The final fruit of this spirit of jealousy and of international covetousness

was to be a world conflict fought on a scale and with resources hitherto unimagined. The roots of this World War will be examined in the two following chapters which discuss the class struggle within the industrialized states and the national antagonism among the industrialized states during the period 1871–1914.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

THE SOCIAL CONFLICT WITHIN THREE INDUSTRIAL STATES: GREAT BRITAIN FRANCE, AND GERMANY

(1871–1914)

... Proclaiming social truth shall spread,
And justice, ev'n though thrice again
The red fool-fury of the Seine
Should pile her barricades with dead.
ALFRED TENNYSON, *In Memoriam*, CXXVI.

THE middle years of the nineteenth century were years of exceptional prosperity for the British people. As the greatest manufacturing, colonizing, and naval power of the world, Britain enjoyed a unique prestige in international affairs, a prestige which the Whig leader, Lord Palmerston, influential in foreign affairs throughout the period from 1830 to 1865, maintained vigorously by brandishing a "big stick" over the lesser nations. A spirit of complacency permeated the British ruling classes during this "Palmerstonian Era," which neither the blunders of the Crimean War [1] nor the murmurs of the exploited masses could seriously disturb. The poet-laureate, Alfred Tennyson, might lament "the faithless coldness of the times," but the rapid industrial expansion provided employment for all who sought it, and brought wealth to a growing number of business men, who were naturally disposed to agree that all was for the best in the best possible of worlds.

British prosperity in the mid-nineteenth century

1. THE MARCH OF DEMOCRACY IN GREAT BRITAIN (1867–1914)

The Chartist Movement had collapsed in 1848, but the prophets of democracy, the liberal and radical reformers, still raised their voices to demand the franchise for all adult males. Heartening reports of progress came from abroad. The establishment of a liberal monarchy in Italy (1859–61), the emancipation of the Russian serfs (1861), and the liberation of Negro slaves in the United States (1863), were events hailed by English liberals as milestones on the road to democracy. They demanded that England, the historic land of freedom, should lead the way in vindicating the rights of man and extend the vote to the common

[1] See above, pages 786–89.

citizen. But the ruling classes remained hostile or indifferent to the idea of parliamentary reform. When, in 1866, William Ewart Gladstone (1809–98), the most popular and eloquent leader in the Liberal Party after Palmerston's death the previous year, proposed to add some four hundred thousand voters to the lists, his bill was rejected and the Liberal ministry resigned from office.

The Reform Bill of 1867

The defeat of Gladstone's bill created an outburst of popular indignation and was followed by threatening demonstrations in London and elsewhere. The brilliant and versatile Benjamin Disraeli (1804–81), who succeeded Gladstone and headed a Conservative ministry, decided that if the Conservatives wished to remain in power they would have to make concessions. So in 1867, Disraeli introduced a moderate reform bill and blandly permitted Gladstone, and the aggressive Liberal, John Bright, to amend it until it became more radical than the defeated bill of 1866. As finally passed, the Reform Bill of 1867 (supplemented by similar measures for Scotland and Ireland) added a million voters to the rolls and almost doubled the electorate. Disraeli's admitted purpose was to "dish" the Whigs (i.e., Liberals) by stealing their thunder, and he hoped that the workingmen whom he had enfranchised would vote for the Conservative Party out of gratitude. In obeying such selfish calculations, Disraeli did not stand alone, for many of the Whig members also had compromised with their prejudices and supported reform in order to attract the new voters. The vitriolic Thomas Carlyle, a friend of the oppressed but not of democracy, declared in a pamphlet on the bill — which he called ominously *Shooting Niagara: and After?* — that "Traitorous Politicians, grasping at votes, even votes from the rabble, have brought it on." Stanch reactionaries, who still clung to the time-hallowed conviction that the people who own a country, the propertied classes, were the only ones sane and stable enough to be trusted with political power, viewed the change with alarm and despondency.

Whatever their several motives, Gladstone, Disraeli, and Bright had advanced the British people a long stride on the way to complete democracy. Many tenant farmers in the country and all householders in the city, as well as all lodgers paying the equivalent of ten pounds a year for rent, won the ballot. Disraeli's argument that the Conservatives had shown themselves the true friends of the people, and his attempt to build up a "Tory-Democracy," met, however, with dubious success. The growing radical party in Parliament, including many delegates of the laboring classes, preferred to collaborate with the Liberals, who returned to power in 1868.

In 1884, Gladstone introduced a further reform, extending the suffrage to include some two million agricultural laborers. The following year a Redistribution of Seats Bill enacted that each member of the House of Commons should represent a constituency of approximately fifty thousand inhabitants, but, as this provision was not consistently applied and no device included for redrawing the constituencies in obedience to the shifts and changes in population, proportional representation continued to be an ideal rather than a reality.

Third Reform Bill (1884) and Redistribution of Seats Bill (1885)

After 1884, four out of five adult Englishmen possessed the right to vote and the House of Commons might be considered to be fairly representative of the nation. But the House of Lords remained a stronghold of class privilege. Its membership was composed of several hundred hereditary English peers, two score elected peers chosen to represent the aristocracy of Scotland and Ireland, and the leading prelates of the Anglican Church. As all legislation had to be approved by both chambers, this aristocratic body enjoyed a virtual power of veto over the acts of the lower house. Usually, as in the case of the Reform Bill of 1867, the Lords showed the good sense to yield to the popular will, but their occasional opposition to liberal measures irritated many people who had come to consider the House of Lords a feudal anachronism.

In 1909, the upper chamber excited particular indignation by throwing out a fiscal measure, although by custom all legislation concerning the budget had long been regarded as secure from such treatment. The Liberals, then in office, decided that the time had come to curtail the Lords' prerogatives, and despite Conservative resistance they passed the Parliament Act of 1911. Under this act all money bills voted by the House of Commons were to become law after the lapse of one month, with or without the approval of the House of Lords. Other measures which the Lords opposed would become law after two years if passed by three successive sessions of the Commons. The members of the upper house could hardly be expected to approve the Parliament Act, but had they persisted in rejecting it the Liberal prime minister, Herbert Asquith, would have called upon George V to create enough new peers to change the balance, a move to which the king had pledged his agreement. As in the case of the Reform Bill of 1832, the threat sufficed and the Lords yielded.

The Parliament Act of 1911

In 1914, the Liberal program was interrupted by the outbreak of the World War. A vote for every adult male was assured, however, by the Reform Bill of 1918, and also for every woman over thirty provided that either she or her husband was eligible to vote in local elections.

Full legal equality for women followed in 1919, a tribute to their varied services during the war, and in 1928 they obtained the ballot on the same terms as the men enjoyed. Great Britain had become, in theory at least, a land where the will of the people was the supreme law. The major demands of the Chartists, considered so dangerous and radical in the 1830's, had been adopted as matters of common practice less than a century later.

Triumph of woman suffrage

Of the Six Points of the Chartist program,[1] the abolition of the property qualification for members of Parliament had first been enacted into law (1858); then followed the introduction of the secret (sometimes called the Australian) ballot (1872); the establishment of approximately equal electoral districts (1885), a salary for members of Parliament (1911), and universal adult male suffrage achieved through the successive reform bills of 1832, 1867, 1884, and 1918. The provision for annual Parliaments has not yet been adopted, but a five-year period has been set as the maximum interval that may elapse between elections.

The Six Points of Chartism vindicated

This onward march of democracy is one of the most significant developments in British history during the past hundred years. Without revolution, without serious disorder or bloodshed, the English liberalized their institutions and made their Parliament, once a stronghold of the privileged ruling classes, a flexible and responsive instrument of the people's will. This was a truly remarkable achievement, unmarred by violence or persecution, and Englishmen have reason to boast that theirs is a land "Where freedom broadens slowly down from precedent to precedent." If, as many of its protagonists had sworn, democracy held the answer to the ancient riddle of social justice, then a government which represented all classes should have been able to resolve the conflicts between those classes, and the legislators at Westminster, as democracy progressed, should have seen their way more and more clearly as they sought a remedy for the evils of the class struggle. To some extent they did; but in several important respects they failed. The story of that quest for social justice and its indeterminate outcome must now be told.

2. GREAT BRITAIN (1871–1914): THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

From the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the English workingmen had been confronted by two alternative programs for bettering their condition. The first was a political program. They might agitate for a

[1] See above, pages 759–60.

more democratic franchise, elect delegates to Parliament, and work through their delegates for legislation that would assure them shorter hours, easier working conditions, and better wages. But such a workers' party had little chance to develop while the unpropertied classes still lacked the vote, and at first the English workingmen, especially in the years of depression which followed the Napoleonic Wars, gave little thought to politics. Instead, they favored a second program calling for more direct action. They organized trade unions or combinations whereby the metal workers or the weavers or the paper-makers might band together and extort more favorable terms from an employer by threatening a strike that would tie up his business. The law was hostile to such combinations, but they continued to operate, and the workers placed more confidence in such direct methods of bargaining than in tedious and uncertain political action. They were confirmed in this opinion when the Chartist Movement, despite the support that it received from the masses, failed to secure any parliamentary gains and broke up ignominiously after 1848.

Nevertheless, the occasional successes won by the trade unions did not obviate the fact that their members might be exposed to prosecution and their funds to confiscation under the existing laws. This difficulty did not disappear until after 1871, but with the passage of the Trade-Union Act of that year the organization of labor in Great Britain entered a new, legalized, and aggressive phase. Strikes became frequent, employers were thrown upon the defensive, and in 1899, the British Labor Movement was consolidated by the creation of a Federation of Trade Unions.

Trade-Union Act (1871)

Then came a serious setback. In 1901, the House of Lords, sitting as a court of final appeal, sustained a decision awarding the Taff Vale Railway Company £23,000 damages against the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants for loss and destruction of property resulting from a strike. At a stroke of the pen the accumulated savings of all the trade unions, collected penny by penny to sustain the members through the possible privation of a strike, were placed in jeopardy. By this decision the unions would be exposed to possible suits for damages whenever their leaders ordered the members to lay down their tools.

Taff Vale decision (1901)

Leaders of the Trade-Union Movement now realized that perhaps organized labor had erred in avoiding the field of practical politics. If the existing laws worked against them, the existing laws would have to be changed by act of Parliament, for otherwise the gains of many years and many strikes might be undone by a

Labor enters politics


few adverse verdicts. As early as 1893, a small Independent Labor Party had been organized by Mr. Keir Hardie, and there was in addition a Social Democratic Federation pledged to work for Marxian socialism. Furthermore, the members of the Fabian Society, a group of advanced thinkers which included the witty dramatist George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells the novelist, and writers on political and economic questions such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb, were winning a strong following among the intellectuals and had begun to popularize socialist ideas among the liberal middle-class thinkers. These associations pressed their campaign so energetically between 1901 and 1906 that by the latter year Labor controlled twenty-nine seats in Parliament and had become a force in national politics.

The Liberal ascendancy and the era of social reform (1906–14)

The election of 1906 also brought the Liberal Party back into power after a decade of Conservative rule. By combining forces with the Laborites and with the Irish Nationalists (a parliamentary group seeking Home Rule for Ireland), the Liberals were in a position to control 514 seats against 156 held by the Conservatives. Under the leadership of the cool-headed Herbert Asquith, prime minister from 1908 to 1916, and the eloquent, mercurial Welshman, David Lloyd George, this *bloc* carried through a series of daring social reforms.

Social legislation

One of the first fruits of the Liberal-Labor coalition was the Trades-Disputes Act (1906), which protected trade-union funds from the menace of the Taff Vale decision. Then the "New Liberals," having partly abandoned the old *laissez-faire* principles, attacked the evils of the industrial system with legislation which their opponents rightly termed "socialistic." A Workingmen's Compensation Act (1906) compelled employers to compensate a worker (or, in fatal mishaps, his family) for injuries incurred at his trade. Stringent regulations for the health and schooling of the young, and state pensions for the indigent old, followed in 1908. To relieve unemployment a government employment office was opened in 1909 to assist able-bodied workers to find occupations suited to their talents, and the same year a Trade Boards Act established commissions to regulate the wages and protect the employees from undue exploitation in the so-called "sweatshops." The crowning achievement of this program of social reform was the adoption (1911) of a National Insurance Act. From premiums subscribed in part by the workers, in part by the employers, and in part by the state, a fund was established which gave the assurance to over two million workers that in case of unemployment they would receive an allowance of seven shillings a week. A much larger number were guaranteed free medical



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DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

Dynamic energy and facile eloquence raised Lloyd George to political eminence, despite the attacks of opponents who accused him of being an opportunist devoid of sincerity or profundity.

attention and weekly allowances in case of sickness, thus exorcising to some extent the cruelest fear that haunts people of small income and no resources.

The Budget of 1909

To meet the mounting state expenditures resulting from the Old Age Pensions Act, the extension of education, and other items in the list of social reforms, the fiery crusader, Lloyd George, proposed to tax the rich. As chancellor of the exchequer he brought in a budget in 1909, which he frankly designated "a war budget" in the campaign against poverty. It not only increased the existing income and inheritance taxes, but laid a heavy strain upon the great landowners. In parts of England where land had recently increased in value, often through no effort of the owner, the government proposed to appropriate twenty per cent of such unearned increase. Idle land, particularly acreage set aside for private parks or game preserves, incurred a two per cent levy, and royalties derived from mineral deposits discovered on private property paid a five per cent tax. The House of Lords opposed this attempt "to lay the heaviest burden on the broadest back," a stand which moved the Liberals, as already explained, to reduce the obstructive power of the upper house to little more than a temporary or suspensive veto.

To rectify an old injustice and satisfy the Irish Nationalist Party, which had over eighty members in Parliament, the Liberals also passed a Government of Ireland Bill embodying a project for limited home rule. The bill excited frantic opposition from the inhabitants of Ulster, most of them Protestant descendants of English or Scottish settlers in northern Ireland, who feared that Home Rule would leave them at the mercy of the Irish Catholic majority. The Ulsterites and the Irish Nationalists were on the verge of armed conflict when the outbreak of the World War overshadowed their dispute and caused the suspension of the Government of Ireland Bill until the close of hostilities.

The war also brought to a close the era of the New Liberalism. In the progressive years, 1906–14, the political leaders had waged an energetic campaign against social injustice, relieving poverty, educating and elevating the masses, and distributing more equitably the burden of taxation. Yet these significant innovations had been fitted, with characteristic British caution, into the existing framework of government and society. The new architects had sought to compromise with, not to uproot, the old traditions, and even the emergence of a well-organized political group, pledged to socialist principles, had alarmed conservative opinion less than it might have been expected to do, perhaps because the new group called itself, not the "Socialist," but the "Labor Party."

Viewed as a triumph of political compromise, the reforms of 1906–14 might be called a success; but measured against the high hopes which a Thomas Jefferson or a Joseph Mazzini had reposed in the possibilities for good which would lie within the reach of a genuinely democratic government, they left much to be desired. Not in England only, but in all Europe, the decade before the war provided the best chance democratic statesmen had ever enjoyed to solve the conflicts within and between the different states. Some thinkers would have it that democracy failed to meet the test. Some are disposed to believe it succeeded as well as could be expected. Still others have argued that government by the people was never honestly tried, or that it failed to bring the peace and harmony expected of it because democratic institutions had been conceived in the eighteenth century when all nations were predominantly interested in agriculture, and applied in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the Industrial Revolution was remoulding society on different lines. All these are speculations which the student might profitably ponder as he compares the social legislation introduced in France and Germany after 1871 with that which was passed in England.

Democracy on trial

3. FRANCE (1871–1914): CONSOLIDATING THE BOURGEOIS REPUBLIC

After the government of Napoleon III disappeared like an "insubstantial pageant faded" in the *débâcle* of Sedan, the French people pursued for six months longer a war that was already lost. Hostilities between the newly born French Republic and the newly proclaimed German Empire were formally closed by the Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), whereby France yielded the best part of Alsace and Lorraine and an indemnity of five billion francs.[1]

Not yet, however, were the misfortunes of "the terrible year" at an end. The National Assembly, which had been convoked at Bordeaux in February, 1871, was monarchist and bourgeois in temper, and the radical elements of the Parisian populace, led by Republicans and Socialists, repudiated its authority. Then followed a second siege of Paris, in which the defenders of the Commune, as the radical city government was termed, massacred their hostages and set fire to important buildings before they were suppressed in desperate street-to-street fighting by the national troops. The victims of this fratricidal strife exceeded fifteen thousand, and all

The Paris Commune (April–May, 1871)

[1] See above, page 817.

Europe stood aghast at "the red fool-fury of the Seine." The merciless suppression of the *communards,* with the wholesale executions and deportations which followed, temporarily crushed the Socialist movement in France and left the bourgeois middle class securely entrenched, but it bequeathed a heritage of hate which has continued to divide the workers from the propertied classes.

The quasi-republic (1871–75)

Having restored order at this terrible cost, the National Assembly should have lost no further time in fulfilling its task and creating a permanent government for the republic. But the deputies were by no means certain whether they wished to make France a republic or a monarchy. The Monarchists, it is true, outnumbered the Republicans 500 to 200, but they were themselves split into Legitimists, Orléanists, and a few Bonapartists. In their dilemma they compromised by naming Adolph Thiers "President of the French Republic," as a temporary expedient, but when Thiers frankly defended the Republic as "the form of government which divides us least," the Monarchist majority replaced him (1873) by a stanch royalist, Marshal MacMahon, who could be counted upon to make way for a king at the right moment. The Legitimist pretender, the Count of Chambord (grandson of Charles X), might have mounted the throne as Henry V, but his insistence that before he did so the white flag of the Bourbons must replace the revolutionary tricolor proved a stumbling-block. Slowly the tide turned in favor of the Republican cause, which was championed indefatigably by the fiery and eloquent Léon Gambetta (1838–82). In 1875, the reluctant Assembly passed five constitutional laws which clarified the status of the quasi-republic, but the danger of a monarchist *coup* did not really wane until the elections of 1879 gave the Republicans control of the Senate as well as the Chamber of Deputies.

The government of the Third French Republic

The Third Republic, established in this indefinite fashion, proved the most stable and enduring régime that France had known in a century. A Senate, the members of which were chosen through electoral colleges, and a Chamber of Deputies elected by universal manhood suffrage assured popular control. The president, elected for a seven-year term by the senators and deputies jointly, possessed a minimum of executive authority, the real power resting with the ministry or cabinet responsible to the Chamber of Deputies. In general, from 1879 to 1914 the successive *blocs* or coalition groups which controlled the Chamber and the cabinet represented the moderate republican point of view. The powerful middle class which had created the Third French Republic held it true to bourgeois principles.

This middle-class rule was not maintained without a struggle. Two factions in France, the Clericals and the Royalists, were definitely hostile to the republican régime. They sought to discredit the leading Republican deputies by charges of dishonesty and incompetence, some of which were well deserved. Many Frenchmen, disgusted with the graft and intrigue that disfigured party politics, yearned for a ruthless and efficient dictator of the Napoleonic type, a leader who would unite France and perhaps wage a war of revenge against Germany. From 1886 to 1889 General Georges Boulanger, minister of war, courted popularity and posed as the man of destiny, but Boulanger was no Napoleon and hesitated to gamble upon a *coup d'état*. When the republican government ordered an investigation of his activities, he fled from France, and the Boulangist Movement collapsed in ridicule, to the discomfiture of its supporters.

The "man on horseback"

Five years later the rivalry between the friends and foes of the republic provided the passionate and dramatic setting for a new dispute. In 1894, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew and an officer in the French army, was convicted by a military court of communicating important secrets to a foreign power, and sentenced to life imprisonment in a penal colony off the coast of French Guiana. Members of Dreyfus's family and others who had convinced themselves of his innocence (among them the famous novelist, Émile Zola) demanded a new trial, but the anti-Dreyfusards, led by high military officials, Clericals, and Monarchists, were satisfied of his guilt. Many of them regarded him as a symbol of the corruption, treachery, and commercialism which they conceived to be ruining France under the republican rule. But when subsequent revelations (1897–99) proved that the real culprit, a Major Esterhazy, had been shielded, and the evidence against Dreyfus withheld from those who sought to reopen the case, lest the prestige of the army staff should suffer, French public opinion underwent a profound reversal. Dreyfus, brought back from Devil's Island for a retrial (1899), was again found guilty by his hostile judges, but President Loubet pardoned him, and the supreme court of France finally exonerated him completely (1906). Royalism, clericalism, and militarism had been so thoroughly discredited by the revelations of this famous case that, from 1899 until the outbreak of the war in 1914, Republicans and Socialists controlled the Chamber of Deputies.

The Dreyfus case

One of the first steps taken by the Republican-Socialist "Cabinet of Republican Defense" of 1899 was to "purify" the army, too long a stronghold of royalist sympathizers, and subordinate it to the civil authority. Having thus "republicanized" the military institutions, the

cabinet attacked the more difficult task of curbing clerical activity harmful to the republic. By the *concordat* of 1801,[1] which still remained in force, the government of the Third Republic was committed to an agreement to pay the salaries of the clergy, although the clergy might be and in some cases were actively hostile to the republic. Furthermore, the clergy had continued to supervise the training of the young, and might, it was thought, teach them to grow up reactionary Monarchists instead of ardent Republicans. The first blow struck against this clerical influence was the Associations Law (1901), which had the effect of dissolving most of the religious orders engaged in teaching and charitable work in France, and of curbing religious instruction in the schools. The second blow followed in 1905 with the repeal of the *concordat*. A Separation Law stripped the Catholic Church of its privileged position, ended the payment of state salaries to the priests, and the state appointment of bishops. The Roman Catholic Church in France was left to stand on practically the same footing as other religious cults.

The republic triumphs over Militarists and Clericals

Though its birth had been ill-omened and its early decades unauspicious, the bourgeois republic had attained at the end of its first thirty years a position of remarkable strength and solidity. Despite frequent cabinet crises caused by party shifts in the Chamber of Deputies, France had evolved a régime which appeared to meet her needs, with the army and the church subservient to the rule of the middle class. But in France as in England this rule of the middle class was threatened at its foundations by the growth of an organized labor movement and the spread of socialism. This development must now be considered.

4. FRANCE (1871–1914): THE SPREAD OF SYNDICALISM AND SOCIALISM

The bloody suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871 shattered the Socialist Party in France for a generation. French workingmen retained, however, the privilege of forming labor unions and could call a strike to enforce their demands. In 1876, a labor congress convened at Paris, representing unions or *syndicats* from all parts of France, and in 1884 the government granted the *syndicats* full legal recognition. Unfortunately, the labor leaders could not agree among themselves concerning their aims or their methods. Some favored the idea of working with the Socialists for legislation that would reduce the hours of labor and compel employers to improve the conditions in mines and

[1] See above, page 706.

factories. But a majority of the French workers, like the English trade-unionists, were persuaded that they could do best for themselves by direct bargaining. If we elect leaders to the Chamber of Deputies, they argued, we shall have no control over them if they choose to compromise our interests and go over to the side of our masters.

So the members of the *syndicats* told the Socialists to go ahead in their own fashion, but for themselves they considered it more profitable to organize their forces in a General Confederation of Labor (1895). In this way they planned to work for the day when they would be strong enough to bring their capitalist employers to terms through a general strike, and expropriate the expropriators as Karl Marx had prophesied that they would.

The General Confederation of Labor

Several times between 1900 and 1910 the *syndicats* attempted to test their strength by strikes, and several times they gained concessions, but the results were not conclusive. Their most ambitious effort, a strike of the railway workers, proved their most signal defeat. To tie up all railway transportation even for a few days would not only cripple the industries of a modern state, but would also cut off the food supplies from the great cities. The syndicalists believed that they would have the government of France at their mercy, but when they called their strike, the government struck back cleverly and effectively. The prime minister, Aristide Briand, had formerly been a Socialist, but his sympathy for radical measures did not restrain him from proclaiming a national emergency and calling in military aid to keep the trains moving. The strikers were faced by a difficult dilemma. As soldiers in the class war, their duty was to preserve a passive resistance, but as soldiers in the French army (all able-bodied Frenchmen are liable for military service), they could be ordered to drive the trains or face a court martial. In the test military discipline triumphed over syndicalist solidarity and the strike collapsed (1910).

The railway workers' strike (1910)

Through this lesson the French syndicalists learned, as the English trade-unionists had discovered a few years earlier, that they had little chance of scoring a decisive triumph with the forces of law and government against them. But, as in England, their Socialist allies had been gaining political recognition during these same years, and were in a position to win concessions by less revolutionary means. In 1905, a United Socialist Party was organized in France and polled a million votes the following year. By 1910, the Socialists counted 105 delegates in the Chamber of Deputies, led by the patriotic Alexandre Millerand and the profound and witty historian and journalist Jean Jaurès. All the important measures which succeeded the *dénouement* of

Socialist legislation

the Dreyfus affair, the "republicanization" of the army and the separation of church and state, were passed by a *bloc* composed of the parties of the Left — that is, of Republicans and Socialists. As a reward for their co-operation, the Socialists asked the adoption of old age insurance. Between 1905 and 1910 a compulsory pension system was worked out to assure all men and women workers a retirement allowance when they reached the age of sixty, the premiums to be subscribed by the workers, their employers, and the state. The state also encouraged the introduction of accident and liability insurance on a large scale, but left the management of it to private associations. A ten-hour day in the factories, more sanitary conditions to safeguard the workers' health, and strict injunctions against overworking children to the detriment of their welfare and education, were further legislative achievements resulting from the initiative of the Socialists.

These concessions to the proletariat, in so far as they were designed to improve social and industrial conditions, often won the approval of Catholic deputies on the Right as well as Socialist deputies on the Left, though for a different reason. Heeding the advice offered by Pope Leo XIII in 1892, a section of the French Catholic Party rallied to the support of the republic and were known in consequence as *Ralliés*. Organized after 1901 as the Party of Liberal Action, this group pledged its representatives in the Chamber of Deputies to accept the republican régime instead of opposing it as some Catholics and monarchists still insisted upon doing, to labor for the protection of the Catholic faith in France, and to promote legislation favorable to the working classes. It was the hope of these leaders of liberal clerical opinion that the spread of socialism might be curbed if the conflict between capital and labor were eased by means of remedial legislation which reflected a spirit of Christian charity. Despite their efforts, however, the Socialist Party continued to grow, and in 1914 there were over 130 deputies in the Chamber who might be considered as Socialists, although only 102 belonged to the United Socialist Party. In France as in Great Britain this rising influence of the proletariat was the outstanding political development of the pre-war era. The socialists defended their platform on the ground that it would assure a larger share of the profits of industry to the workers, and they also hoped to reduce the danger of war by curbing ruthless commercial competition and negotiating with other socialist governments for a general reduction of armaments. British and French socialists were encouraged by the fact that in Germany, also, socialism was advancing, although there it pursued a somewhat dissimilar course.

The Party of Liberal Action

5. THE GERMAN EMPIRE (1871–1914): FOUNDATION AND EXPANSION

Bismarck's pronouncement that the great questions of the day would be decided by blood and iron rather than by speeches or majority votes had proved true of the events which led to the forging of the German Empire. The Danish War (1864) had cut short the argument whether Schleswig and Holstein should or should not be incorporated in the new Germany. The Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) had repulsed and excluded outside influences, leaving Bismarck at liberty to organize the Germanies into a powerful state under Prussian leadership. These conflicts were the birth-pangs of a new international order, for the sudden emergence of the German Empire, which was created, like the goddess Athena, full grown and fully armed, replaced the existing balance of power in Europe by what amounted to a German hegemony.

Constitution of the German Empire

Unlike Cavour, who died before Italian unity had been fully realized, Bismarck enjoyed the opportunity to direct for nearly twenty years the policies of the empire which he had helped to create. The leading German princes, it will be recalled, proclaimed William I of Prussia "German Emperor" on January 18, 1871, at Versailles. The constitution of the new federation was not promulgated until some months later and proved to be a severely practical document. The states previously allied in the North German Confederation (1867) were now joined by the four South German States. All twenty-five [1] members of the new *Bund* were to send delegates to a federal council or *Bundesrat* of 58 members, a body comparable in some respects to the United States Senate, with the difference, however, that the members were not elected, but appointed, and the state representation varied from Prussia, which held seventeen votes, to the smallest states with one apiece. There was also a popular lower chamber, the *Reichstag*, made up of 382 deputies. Outwardly, the imperial German government corresponded to the bicameral legislative systems of Britain and France, but there was one significant point of difference. Instead of providing for a cabinet of ministers responsible to the *Reichstag*, the

[1] The states composing the German Empire in 1871 included the four kingdoms of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg; the six grand duchies of Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Saxe-Weimar, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and Oldenburg; the five duchies Brunswick, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, and Anhalt; the seven principalities of Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Waldeck, Reuss (older line), Reuss (younger line), Lippe, and Schaumburg-Lippe; and the three free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck. Alsace-Lorraine ranked as an imperial territory and remained without representation on the *Bundesrat* until 1911.

constitution vested all ministerial authority in a single official, the president of the *Bundesrat*, who, as imperial chancellor, held his office at the emperor's pleasure and was not answerable for his actions to the assemblies. This all-important chancellery post Bismarck reserved for himself.

The German government not truly responsible nor democratic

It was a matter of grave import for German and European history that this constitution failed, despite appearances, to establish a government that was representative of the German people or responsible to them. The chancellor was not a prime minister obedient to the will of a parliamentary majority. Furthermore, the *Bundesrat*, the members of which were nominated by the German princes, was superior to the *Reichstag* elected by the German people. The *Reichstag*, finally, did not meet the requirements of a truly representative and democratic assembly because its members were elected under the three-class franchise system already functioning in Prussia,[1] which gave the wealthy classes and the property-owners a controlling voice. In short, the government of the new empire was more nearly an autocracy or oligarchy than it was a democracy. A second point to note is the dominant position assumed by Prussia, a position so commanding that it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Germanies had been conquered and "Prussianized" by that militant kingdom. Bismarck had been solicitous to leave the smaller states the illusion of sovereignty; but the facts were that the King of Prussia had become German Emperor, and he appointed the all-powerful chancellor, who in turn selected the chief functionaries of the imperial government. In the *Bundesrat*, Prussia held 17 of the 58 votes and could as a rule dominate the deliberations.[2] The union of states was indissoluble and the Prussian vote could defeat any amendment to the constitution.

Rights reserved by the states

Powers not specifically relegated to the imperial government were reserved by the component states, which continued to handle their own fiscal, religious, educational, and administrative problems. So tactfully had Bismarck gathered the reins of power into his own hands that the minor states were unaware of the degree to which they had compromised their independence. The coinage, the banking system, the railways, telegraphs, and mails, and later the codes of civil and criminal law, were all harmonized and subjected to the regulation of the imperial bureaucracy. Although several states, notably Bavaria, Württemberg, and Saxony, maintained their separate

[1] See above, page 774.

[2] Subsequent to 1871, Prussia acquired the vote of Waldeck, and the two votes of Brunswick, raising her total for all practical purposes to twenty.

army contingents and even their separate consular services, these survivals of particularism steadily lost significance as the authority and efficiency of the imperial government increased.


As the disparate segments of the empire were knit into an indissoluble whole, the German merchants and manufacturers discovered that political unity was a boon to business. The federal administration of the transport and communication services made them the nerves and sinews of a new economic order, and Bismarck counted upon the effects of the industrial expansion to vindicate and strengthen his political architecture.

The Industrial Revolution in Germany

For the German people after 1871 encountered the full transforming force of the Industrial Revolution, that irresistible ferment stirred by mechanical innovations, which had appeared in England a century earlier and had modified French society during the reigns of Louis Philippe and Napoleon III. The effects of the factory system and of machine production came still later to Germany, but for that reason they came with accelerated force. In Great Britain the mechanization of industry had been achieved in successive stages, from the eighteenth-century improvements in spinning and weaving to the technical inventions which multiplied in all trades after 1850. But in Germany the Industrial Revolution did not really manifest itself until approximately the middle of the nineteenth century. Then, borrowing the experience and the machinery of the British and French, German industrialists proceeded to overtake their rivals. In this they were enormously aided by the scientific progress made after 1870. Thus, the first wave of the Industrial Revolution (which had introduced the steam engine and the factory system in England a century earlier) and the second wave (for such the flood of technological inventions, electrical devices and chemical discoveries that began about 1870 may be called) both struck Germany in the same years. This largely explains the phenomenal development of German industry under the empire, but it must not be forgotten that the political consolidation achieved in 1871 smoothed the way for the industrial expansion which was already overdue.

6. THE GERMAN EMPIRE (1871–1914): ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

As in England and France, the spread of the factory system created in Germany a class of proletarian workers who organized trade unions to protect their rights and adopted socialistic views in politics. Until



Photograph by Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

MODERN INDUSTRIAL PLANT

The manner in which the machinery of modern industry can change and dominate the countryside is well illustrated by this photograph of German steel mills at Bremen.

1875, the German workingmen were divided, some adhering strictly to the teaching of Karl Marx, while others joined a Socialist Party formed in 1863 by Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–64). The union of these two factions into a single Social Democratic Party (1875), pledged to seek immediate legislation for the relief of the workers, and ultimate socialization of industry, alarmed the forceful Bismarck. As he had no liking for democracy or socialism, he determined to destroy the Social Democratic Party before it grew strong enough to constitute a menace.

The German Social Democratic Party

Although the constitution rendered the chancellor independent of the *Reichstag*, Bismarck knew that he could not rule without the approval of some powerful political groups. From 1871 to 1879, while he was consolidating the new imperial régime, he leaned upon the National Liberals, a party chiefly representing the upper middle class, the business men, bankers, lawyers, doctors, professors, etc. To satisfy the National Liberals, who favored free trade and responsible parliamentary government, Bismarck proposed low tariffs and pretended to have more patience for the ideals of free speech and freedom of the press than he really felt. The National Liberals supported him in his task of strengthening the central government and he joined them in making war upon the Catholic Church in Germany. The story of Bismarck's clash with the church is interesting for the light it throws upon his prejudices and his ability to profit by his mistakes.

Bismarck and the National Liberals (1871–79)

The German Catholics, finding themselves a minority in the new empire, organized a strong Center Party after 1871 to protect their interests. The Center Party drew most of its support from the South German States, where many people were inclined to be distrustful of Protestant Prussia and of the centralizing policy pursued by Bismarck and the National Liberals. The Catholics in Germany, however, were themselves divided in sentiment, for the pope had recently been proclaimed infallible in matters of faith and morals by the Vatican Council, a decree not altogether popular in Germany. As one group of German Catholics, known as the "Old Catholics," declined to accept the decree of papal infallibility, Bismarck encouraged this schism by supporting them against the orthodox bishops, and this opened a conflict honored by the grandiose title of the *Kulturkampf* or "struggle for civilization." In 1872, the Jesuits were expelled from Germany and diplomatic relations severed between Berlin and Rome. In 1873 and 1874, the Prussian government prohibited the appointment of anyone to a clerical office in Prussia unless he were a

The Kulturkampf *(1872–79)*

native German and had attended a German high school and university, and declared all clerical appointments subject thenceforth to state approval. When the Catholic clergy opposed these decrees, they were expelled or arrested, and within a few years two thirds of the Prussian Catholic bishops had been driven from their dioceses and four hundred parishes lacked pastors. But instead of disintegrating, the Catholic resistance throve under this persecution and the Centrists increased their representation in the *Reichstag*. Awake to the danger which might result if the Centrists and Socialists fused their forces in an opposition *bloc*, Bismarck decided to change his tactics and halt the *Kulturkampf*. His enemies declared that, like the headstrong emperor, Henry IV, four hundred years earlier, he had "gone to Canossa" — that is, yielded to the pope — but it would be more just to say that, like Henry IV, he had escaped from a threatening situation by an adroit move.

For, dropping his war on the Catholics after 1878, Bismarck freed his hands for a struggle with the Socialists. His aims were: (1) to cripple the Social Democratic Party by repressive decrees; (2) to placate the discontented workingmen who voted Socialist by introducing legislation which would ease their grievances; and (3) to make the imperial government financially independent of state contributions by erecting a high protective tariff on imports. To follow this new course meant a break with the National Liberals, who disliked repressive legislation and opposed high tariffs. But the chancellor believed that he could win the Center Party to his side, and he counted upon the support of the landowners and manufacturers who would profit by a tariff which would protect them from the agricultural and industrial competition of other lands.

Social insurance

Two attempts at assassination made against the venerable William I (1878) provided an excuse for harsh measures against all radical agitators. They were forbidden to publish or propagate their doctrines, or to hold meetings, and were exposed to arbitrary arrest. To reconcile the working classes and give them a motive for supporting the state, Bismarck drafted a comprehensive code of social insurance. The Sickness Insurance Law (1883) provided a fund, to which the employers contributed one third of the premiums, whereby workers were assured half-pay and medical attention for six months in case of illness. By the Accident Insurance Law (1884) employers were compelled to establish a fund providing compensation to workers partially or totally disabled through accidents of their trade, and a pension of one fifth the annual wages to the dependents of a worker killed while working. Most ambitious of all was the Old Age Pension Act (1889).

Compulsory contributions from employers and workers, augmented by the state, provided a retirement annuity for all workers who reached their seventieth birthday or became incapacitated before that age. Although Socialist leaders denounced these measures as a means of insuring the capitalist system rather than the workers, and exhorted their followers not to be lulled by such pretended charity into a forgetfulness of their rights, the state insurance laws in Germany did much to alleviate the misery and anxiety of the poorer classes. Moreover, the extraordinary prosperity of German industry enabled the employers to carry their contributory burden with ease. It is not without interest to note that the autocratic and conservative Bismarck anticipated by more than twenty years the social legislation later enacted by the Liberal-Labor coalition group in Great Britain and by the Republican-Socialist *bloc* in France.

William I died in 1888 and was succeeded by his son, Frederick III, who reigned only a few months. On the latter's death in the same year the throne passed to William II (1888–1918), a prince of versatile talents, but unstable and impetuous moods. Determined to be his own chief minister, William II relieved Bismarck of his office in 1890, and the great chancellor retired with bitterness and foreboding in his heart. His successors in office, the rigid and pious Caprivi (1890–94), the aged Prince Hohenlohe (1894–1900), the supple Prince von Bülow (1900–09) and the ill-starred von Bethmann-Hollweg (1909–17), were none of them men of Bismarck's stature, and German policy, domestic and foreign, lost much of its earlier unity of will and direction.

William II dismisses Bismarck (1890)

Disapproving of Bismarck's harshness toward the Socialists, William II allowed the repressive legislation against them to lapse, and the Social Democratic Party, which had elected 9 deputies to the *Reichstag* in 1878, and 35 in 1890, increased its representation to 79 by 1907. By 1912 the Social Democrats held 110 seats and constituted the largest party in the *Reichstag*.

Thus, despite repression, and despite the paternal legislation intended as a sop to the workers, the Socialists had gained ground as their doctrines appealed to a wider and wider circle of voters. The class which Bismarck had called "the disinherited" appeared to be headed for ultimate control in Germany as in Great Britain and France. It is important to note, however, that as socialism became more popular in these three countries it became less radical, and Socialists abandoned the call to revolution in favor of more cautious and constitutional reforms. In this way they attracted many liberal-minded people who approved of remedial legisla-

tion for the benefit of the workers, higher income and inheritance taxes aimed at the rich, and a policy of progressive socialization of industry. With respect to foreign policy, Socialists were disposed to "view with alarm" the excessive growth of armaments and to denounce the methods by which most governments acquired and exploited the lands of backward peoples principally for the benefit of capitalists and business men at home. But the acquisition of colonies and the possession of a strong army and navy pleased so many unthinking people and flattered their patriotic pride so much that the Socialist leaders met with little success when they sought to reduce armaments and curb the aggressive imperialism of the era 1871–1914. In matters of foreign policy nationalism proved a stronger force than socialism.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

THE COMPETITION AMONG THE INDUSTRIALIZED STATES: THE RACE FOR COLONIES AND MARKETS

(1871–1914)

The day of small nations has passed away; the day of Empires has come.
JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN (1836–1914).

THE nineteenth century witnessed an exodus of European peoples to other parts of the globe in a remarkable migration surpassing anything of its kind in previously recorded history. Accurate statistics are lacking on many phases of this mass movement, but competent estimates place the number of European emigrants who took up permanent residence in the Americas, Asia, or Australia between 1800 and 1900 at forty to fifty millions. The greater number of these emigrants settled in the United States or the republics of Central and South America, lands dominated by European culture, but no longer attached politically to any European empire. But part of the tide also flowed to the colonies and dependencies of the European powers and helped to build up their overseas dominions. It is the purpose of the present chapter to describe the empires overseas which were acquired by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, how they were governed, and especially how the rival powers clashed more and more frequently as they competed for the unclaimed areas of the earth and sought to win them as fields for imperial exploitation.

THE NEW IMPERIALISM AFTER 1871

As already explained in an earlier chapter,[1] Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England all established overseas empires in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the close of the Seven Years' War in 1763, Great Britain had usurped the lion's share of both colonies and trade, and her rivals, defeated and discomfited, largely lost interest in the competition. For the first three quarters of the nineteenth century, the European peoples gave their chief attention to the problems arising from the French Revolution, and to the national movements which culminated in the unification of Italy and of Germany. After

[1] See Chapter VII, pages 621–34.

1871, the question of colonies came again to the fore, and Europe entered a new and dynamic phase of overseas expansion often referred to as the "New Imperialism." Like the growth of cities or the rise of socialism, the New Imperialism will be found upon examination to derive its strength from the forces let loose by the Industrial Revolution. For the highly industrialized state, colonies had suddenly acquired a new value as fields for the investment of surplus capital, as sources of raw material, as potential markets which could not be closed by foreign tariffs, and as reservoirs for the excess population of the home country.


2. THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN 1871

Following the loss of the thirteen American colonies, the slow growth of more liberal policies and democratic ideals in England inspired British statesmen to administer the colonial dependencies more tactfully. In Canada, which had been conquered from France (1763), the settlers, predominantly Catholic and French, had been reconciled by the assurance that they might retain their language and religion undisturbed (Quebec Act, 1774). Friction between the French and incoming English colonists was difficult to avoid and discontent with the royal administration led to small revolts, but a measure of local self-government eased the tension (1840), and Canada was later raised to the status of a confederated state by the British North America Act (1867). A bicameral legislature modeled upon the British Parliament assured the Canadian people control of their own affairs, and a governor general appointed from London fulfilled the constitutional and largely nominal duties discharged in England by the king. As a self-governing dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada has begun to develop her vast natural resources, linked up her scattered provinces with transcontinental railways, and increased her population to over ten million (1933).

The Dominion of Canada

The island continent of Australia first became substantially known to the English when it was visited in 1770 by the famous navigator, Captain James Cook. The first settlement was established (1788) as a place of banishment for criminals, but during the nineteenth century five separate areas were colonized, with a sixth colony on the nearby island of Tasmania, and a seventh on New Zealand, twelve hundred miles to the east. The discovery of gold about 1850 and the profits of sheep-raising drew an increasing stream of immigrants to Australia, and in 1900 the separate provinces on the mainland joined with Tasmania to form the Commonwealth of Australia,

Australia


ASIA
1914
SCALE OF MILES
0 200 400 600 800
Longitude East from Greenwich
RUSSIA
EUROPEAN RUSSIA
ASIATIC RUSSIA
MONGOLIA
Desert of Gobi
CHINA
TIBET
PERSIA
ARABIA
INDIA
BRITISH INDIA
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
SIAM
BURMA
CEYLON
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
JAPAN
FORMOSA
Constantinople
St. Petersburg
Moscow
Berlin
Tehran
Kabul
Delhi
Agra
Lahore
Bombay
Calcutta
Madras
Colombo
Singapore
Hongkong
Canton
Shanghai
Nanking
Hankow
Peking
Manila
Aden
Muscat
Baghdad
Basra
Kuwait
Yarkand
Urga
Irkutsk
Tashkent
Bokhara
Khiva
Orenburg
Samara
Kazan
Archangel
Vladivostok
Harbin
Mukden
Port Arthur
Tientsin
Hankow
Amoy
Swatow
Macao
Haiphong
Saigon
Bangkok
Rangoon
Mandalay
Patna
Lucknow
Jaipur
Baroda
Nagpur
Hyderabad
Madras
Pondichery (Fr.)
Karikal (Fr.)
Mangalore
Bangalore
Mysore
Andaman Is.
Nicobar Is.
Penang
Sumatra
Java
Borneo
Celebes
Timor
Gulf of Aden
Gulf of Oman
Persian Gulf
Red Sea
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Lake Baikal
Yellow Sea
Sea of Japan
Sea of Okhotsk
Arabian Sea
Bay of Bengal
China Sea
Celebes Sea
Pacific Ocean
Tropic of Cancer
Equator
Himalaya Mts.
Kuen Lun Mts.
Tien Shan Mts.
Altai Mts.
Hindu Kush Mts.
Elburz Mts.
Zagros Mts.
Ural Mts.
Yablonovoi Mts.
Khingan Mts.
Nan Shan Mts.
Yang-tse-kiang R.
Yellow R.
Amur R.
Lena R.
Yenisei R.
Ob R.
Volga R.
Danube R.
Euphrates R.
Tigris R.
Indus R.
Ganges R.
Irrawaddy R.
Mekong R.
Salween R.
Sphere of Influence
Persian Sphere
Russian Sphere
British Sphere
Neutral Zone
Kharput
Mosul
Basra
Kuwait
Muscat
Aden
Gulf of Aden
Gulf of Oman
Persian Gulf
Red Sea
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Lake Baikal
Yellow Sea
Sea of Japan
Sea of Okhotsk
Arabian Sea
Bay of Bengal
China Sea
Celebes Sea
Pacific Ocean
Tropic of Cancer
Equator
Himalaya Mts.
Kuen Lun Mts.
Tien Shan Mts.
Altai Mts.
Hindu Kush Mts.
Elburz Mts.
Zagros Mts.
Ural Mts.
Yablonovoi Mts.
Khingan Mts.
Nan Shan Mts.
Yang-tse-kiang R.
Yellow R.
Amur R.
Lena R.
Yenisei R.
Ob R.
Volga R.
Danube R.
Euphrates R.
Tigris R.
Indus R.
Ganges R.
Irrawaddy R.
Mekong R.
Salween R.
Sphere of Influence
Persian Sphere
Russian Sphere
British Sphere
Neutral Zone

the second largest self-governing dominion within the British Empire. As in the case of Canada, the Australian Parliament consists of a bicameral legislature and a governor general appointed by the British crown.

The separate group of islands known as New Zealand attained dominion status in 1907. Politically the colonists have distinguished themselves chiefly by their democratic and socialistic experiments. Universal suffrage, state ownership of railways, state departments for life, accident, and fire insurance, old age pensions, and compensation for workers injured at their trade were all introduced in New Zealand before 1900. Both Australia and New Zealand have adopted a rigid immigration policy, so that their joint population of over eight million (excluding aborigines) in 1934 was drawn almost exclusively from peoples of European ancestry. *New Zealand*

In India the British extended their influence inland from the trading posts, established in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, until they controlled the whole country with its teeming millions. Until 1858, the management of this empire, continental in its vast extent, was left in the hands of the British East India Company under the supervision (after 1784) of a royal board of control known as the "India Office." The sudden outbreak of a serious revolt in the Ganges Valley (1857), led by the native troops or *sepoys* and consequently termed the Sepoy Mutiny, led to cruel reprisals by the British, but also to a more enlightened type of rule. A secretary of state for India in the British cabinet and a governor general at Calcutta, assisted by a council and by provincial governors, superseded the régime of the East India Company (1858). In several hundred states, comprising perhaps two fifths of India, the native potentates continued to govern under British supervision, but in the larger part of the peninsula the white conquerors took charge of the administration. *India*

The benefits conferred by British rule in India, in the form of better agricultural methods, irrigation systems, highways, canals, and railways, might be more deeply appreciated by the native population if the British had shown equal solicitude in promoting education and training for self-government. But to interfere with the social and religious customs of an oriental people is a dangerous experiment, and the British have allowed nine tenths of India's three hundred and fifty million people to remain in a state of illiteracy and often of degrading superstition. In defense of this policy many Englishmen have argued that western ideals of education and democracy are unsuited to the eastern mind; that, despite the influence and prestige of the British adminis-

trators, they could not, even if they would, change the habits of an ancient and unprogressive people. Their position in India, like that of white men everywhere among less aggressive and less civilized peoples, has brought them a sort of "bewildered omnipotence" which they scarcely know how to use. They have, however, no wish to resign their authority.

National Movement in India.

Since 1900, a growing body of Indian nationalists have demanded a greater measure of self-government so that the Indian peoples may learn to modernize themselves in their own way. Limited representative assemblies were conceded to most of the provinces of British India in 1909, but, despite this beginning of reform, nationalist sentiment has grown steadily and has led to acts of violence, the assassination of British officials, and consequent measures of repression. India is "the brightest jewel in the British crown," not only because of the valuable crops of cotton and wheat raised there, but also because it provides a market for textile and factory products. As a self-governing dominion, India might attempt to exclude British goods or even to secede from the empire. Naturally the possibility of such a grievous economic loss makes it difficult for the British people to view the Indian nationalist movement in a candid and impartial fashion, and they find it easy to believe that the nationalists represent only a noisy and discontented minority of India's millions and that the inarticulate masses are truly grateful for the benefits of British rule.

The lesser portions of the British Empire in 1871 included a number of crown colonies and protectorates scattered about the globe, as Gibraltar and Malta in the Mediterranean; British Guiana, British Honduras, the British West Indies, Bermuda, and the Falkland Islands in the New World; Aden, Ceylon, Lower Burma, and Hongkong in Asia; and Gambia, Sierra Leone, Cape Colony, and Natal in Africa. This impressive heritage, which the British had built up in the course of two hundred and fifty years of conquest and colonization, was destined to undergo further expansion under the stimulus of the New Imperialism.

3. BRITISH ACQUISITIONS (1871–1914)

Egypt

In 1875, the imperialistically inclined Disraeli was able to increase British influence in the Mediterranean by purchasing a considerable share in the Suez Canal, the completion of which six years earlier had opened a new and shorter sea route to India. To safeguard the canal became one of the guiding motives of

British foreign policy. When the Khedive (or ruler) of Egypt defaulted on his debts to European bankers, France and Britain established a condominium over that country (including the canal), despite the fact that it formed part of the Turkish Empire. The French government was only passively interested, but the British increased their military control, repressed an insurrection of the Egyptians (1882), and soon enjoyed a protectorate in everything but name. Anglo-Egyptian forces subdued the fierce Mohammedan tribes of the Sudan after several reverses, and by 1900 the upper valley of the Nile had been marked out as a sphere of British influence.[1]

At the headwaters of the Nile the area known as Uganda, lying to the north of Lake Victoria, was proclaimed a protectorate in 1894, and the following year the territory between Uganda and the Indian Ocean, which had already been chartered by the British East Africa Company, became a protectorate also. Though bisected by the Equator, British East Africa proved suitable for white settlers in the elevated sections. Less healthy, but valuable because of the tin, rubber, palm oil, and ivory produced there, was the lower Niger Valley, proclaimed a British protectorate in 1914, and the hinterland of the Gold Coast (Ashanti), annexed in 1886. British Somaliland, at the mouth of the Red Sea, became a protectorate in 1884, and the territory lying back of Sierra Leone was delimited as a sphere of British influence in 1889.

The Boer War (1899–1902)

The most important area which the British won in the partitioning of Africa remains to be mentioned last. Since 1806, when they conquered Capetown from the Dutch, the British had made it a port of call for their ships on the long sea voyage to India. Preferring to keep their independence, the Dutch settlers, or Boers, moved inland and established the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic. But discoveries of gold and diamonds in South Africa after 1886 brought an influx of British colonists and precipitated an armed conflict between the Boer Republics and the British Empire. Such a war could end only one way, but unequal as it seemed, the struggle cost the British three years of fighting before they could break the resistance of the Boers, whose stubborn courage won the admiration of the world. By granting favorable terms, including $15,000,000 for the farms destroyed, the British government endeavored to placate their late adversaries. Seven years after the conclusion of peace, the provinces of Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, and the Transvaal united to form the self-governing Union of South Africa (1909).

[1] See map following page 898.

Under the inspiration of an indefatigable empire-builder, Cecil Rhodes, the British pressed inland from their South African settlements to establish a protectorate over Bechuanaland (1885) and occupy the area traversed by the upper Zambesi River, now known as Rhodesia. With the proclamation of a protectorate over Nyasaland (1891) and the submission of the Boer Republics (1902), Rhodes's dream of a railroad that would run from Capetown to Cairo without leaving British territory seemed at the point of realization. But the proclamation of a German protectorate over the East African mainland opposite Zanzibar (1890) and the extension of this protectorate inland until it linked itself with the Belgian Congo at the head of Lake Tanganyika effectively broke the contiguity of the British possessions.[1]

Anglo-Russian diplomacy in Asia

In Asia, British expansion since 1871 has been largely confined to the task of consolidating and extending the frontiers of the Indian Empire. To forestall Russian interference, the Indus Valley from Sind to Kashmir had been occupied between 1840 and 1850; Beluchistan was added in 1876, and Afghanistan transformed into a buffer state under British influence.[2] In 1904, the Chinese province of Tibet likewise became a "sphere of British influence"; and in 1907, Persia was subdivided into a northern (or Russian) zone, a neutral center zone, and a southern (or British) zone. The compromise over Persia reflects the more amicable spirit which developed between England and Russia after 1905. As Russia had suffered a defeat at the hands of the Japanese, and the British were alarmed at the growth of German power, the diplomats at London and Saint Petersburg were more disposed to reach an agreement over Indian frontier problems than they had been in the nineteenth century.

Burma

On the northeastern boundaries of India, the British had already conquered Assam and Lower Burma before 1871. In 1886, the native ruler was deposed, and the whole of Burma, a kingdom larger in area than the State of California, became part of the British Indian Empire. Holding in addition the Malay States, the Straits Settlements, and the northern coast of Borneo, Britain enjoyed a dominant position on the South China Sea.

Hongkong and Canton

A war with China (1840–42), occasioned by the efforts of the Chinese government to forbid importations of opium, delivered the island of Hongkong into British hands. The trade in opium, which was raised in India and sold in China to the considerable profit of the British East India Company, helped to produce a second

[1] See map following page 898.

[2] See map following page 890.

Chinese War (1856–60). By a joint offensive, Britain and France compelled the Chinese to pay a further indemnity, open new ports to trade, admit and protect Christian missionaries, and permit the traffic in opium. As a consequence of this "Second Opium War" the British gained a foothold at Canton and established another "sphere of influence" in the Yangtze Valley.

4. FRENCH COLONIAL ENTERPRISE

Since the days of the crusaders the French have maintained a persistent interest in the conditions affecting the eastern Mediterranean and the seaboard of northern Africa. Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt (1798) intensified this interest, although his conquests were speedily abandoned. In 1830, however, the dispatch of a punitive expedition against an insolent Dey of Algiers brought the French the control of several Algerian ports. Years of economic penetration and military campaigns gradually subdued the great Sahara Desert, and in 1881 Tunis as well as Algeria became a protectorate of France. The impotent protests of the Sultan of Turkey, who claimed a feeble suzerainty over northern Africa, failed to delay the march of events and served but to advertise the decline of the Turkish power. *Algeria and Tunis*

The French were in some respects more successful than the British in consolidating their African conquests, for in 1885 they linked their expanding posts on the Congo (French Equatorial Africa) with their West African dominions by way of the Ubangi River. Morocco, established as a French protectorate in 1912, rounded out the northeast corner of their African Empire. Including the island of Madagascar, which was proclaimed a French colony in 1896, the French African possessions had come by 1914 to exceed even those of Great Britain in area. The scramble for territory on the Dark Continent had provided France with a colonial empire larger than the whole of Europe, and much of it adjacent to the mother country. *Morocco*

Nor were the French possessions in Asia insignificant. In the middle of the nineteenth century, France held no more than two hundred square miles of Asiatic territory surrounding five small posts on the Bay of Bengal, the most important of which, Pondicherry, had been established by the French East India Company two centuries earlier. In 1858, however, the government of Napoleon III dispatched an armed expedition to Cochin China to avenge the murder of some Christian missionaries, and this province, nominally *French Indo-China*

a part of the Chinese Empire, became a French protectorate five years later. A successful policy of war and diplomacy brought Annam, Tonkin, and part of Cambodia under French control in the decades which followed. The Chinese government was forced to renounce its shadowy sovereignty over these regions, concede favorable tariff rates on goods from Tonkin, and permit the French special privileges on the railroads of southern China. In less than fifty years the French had acquired an Asian Empire as large as Texas, with an industrious population half that of France itself. By agreement with Great Britain, the Kingdom of Siam was recognized as an independent buffer state between British Burma and French Indo-China.[1] Toward the east, however, France might aspire to enlarge the boundaries of Tonkin, and the lease of Kwang-chow (1898) near the island of Hai-nan hinted at such intentions.

5. ITALY ENTERTAINS IMPERIALISTIC DREAMS

When the Italians achieved political unity in the decade 1860–70, they found their national government burdened with debt, embarrassed by the unfriendly attitude of the papacy, and confronted with the problem of educating a largely illiterate population. Yet these domestic difficulties did not deter them from the attempt to play an imperialistic rôle in imitation of older established powers. Italian patriots not only regarded the Istrian Peninsula and part of the Austrian Tyrol as territory to be "redeemed," but cast covetous eyes across the Mediterranean Sea to Tunis on the North African coast. When the French thwarted their aspirations in this direction by annexing Tunis (1881), the act created a deep and lasting resentment between the two Latin powers.

Abyssinia

Worse fortune awaited the Italians in Abyssinia. After establishing a colony at Massowah on the Red Sea (1885), the Italian government attempted to secure control of the inland empire of Abyssinia, or Ethiopia, a state lying between the Nile Valley and the Red Sea, ruled by the Ethiopians, a Hamitic tribe which professed Christianity. But the Italian hopes of creating a sphere of influence in East Africa went down to defeat in 1896 when the Abyssinians overwhelmed their expeditionary force in catastrophic fashion at the battle of Adowa. The protectorate was abandoned, and Abyssinia remained independent under the rule of Menelek II, the only native African ruler who had successfully repelled a European

[1] See map following page 890.

army. Italy retained, however, two strips of coastline in the neighborhood, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea.[1]

Restrained for the moment by this costly and humiliating reverse, Italian imperialists proceeded more cautiously in their next African venture. The provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica were marked out as fields for Italian exploitation by 1901, but it was not until ten years later that Italy took the initiative and wrested them from Turkey after a brief struggle.[2] The expense of improving the new conquests and subjugating the desert tribes of the interior proved a heavy burden for the Italian taxpayers, but their pride was gratified by this evidence that Italy could compete successfully with the older nations in the scramble for colonies. They named their new possession Libya.

Libya

6. GERMANY ENTERS THE RACE FOR COLONIES

Distracted by their own dissensions and handicapped by the lack of a competent central government, the German people took little share in overseas exploration and colonization before 1871. While Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England were fighting to found and maintain colonial empires, the German princes remained absorbed in the petty play of central European politics. Even after national unity had been achieved and the victory over France had made the new empire the leading European power, Bismarck displayed little inclination to compete for colonies. His chief concern was to consolidate the position which Germany had won for herself on the continent of Europe. To participate in the scramble for backward countries, when the best areas suitable for white men to live in had already been pre-empted, seemed to him a dubious game offering few rewards and likely in the end to embroil Germany with Great Britain, the leading colonial power of the world.

Nevertheless, the expansion of German industry and the growth of the German maritime interests prepared the way for a more aggressive colonial program. In 1884, after negotiations with Great Britain, the German government proclaimed a protectorate over South-West Africa, and annexed in the same year a strip of coastline on the Gulf of Guinea which shortly expanded into the German Kamerun. In 1885, German East Africa was acquired, and proclaimed a protectorate in 1890. Though less favorable for

German protectorates in Africa

[1] See map following page 898.

[2] The Turko-Italian War, 1911–12. See below, pages 898–99.


colonization or trade than the choicer sections of Africa already claimed by other nations, the new German colonies were by no means negligible in either wealth or area.

Once embarked upon the imperialistic race, the Germans pressed forward with energy. The murder of two missionaries (1897) provided an excuse for armed intervention in Shantung, and the Chinese government was compelled to lease the port of Kiaochau to Germany with some two hundred square miles of territory attached. In Oceania, a portion of the island of New Guinea was recognized as a German protectorate (1884); the two largest Samoan Islands were acquired in 1899; and the Caroline and some lesser groups of Pacific islands purchased from Spain in the same year.

7. THE RIVALRIES OF THE POWERS IN AFRICA

The competition for colonies quickened the jealousies of the great powers, and more than once, particularly during the partitioning of Africa, their rivalry brought them to the verge of war. Between 1880 and 1914, scarcely a year passed without its diplomatic incident or minor crisis concerning some disputed sphere of influence on the Dark Continent. But African protectorates were a little too remote from the knowledge and interest of the average European citizen to appear worth a war to him; and Austria and Russia, which held no African territory, had no wish to be drawn into a struggle over colonial questions by their allies. But although the acrid disputes arising from African rivalries were all settled by arbitration, they added considerably to the international animosity and helped in this way to prepare the stage for the World War.

When France established a virtual protectorate over Tunis in 1881, disappointment and irritation induced the Italians to sign a treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria the following year. This Triple Alliance, directed against France in particular, assured Italy of support if she became involved in a war over the disposal of North African territory. Five years later (1887), Italy and Great Britain agreed to respect each other's rights in the Mediterranean; and after 1901, Italy and France achieved a partial compromise whereby Tripoli was marked out as a potential sphere of Italian exploitation, while the French strengthened their hold on Morocco. In 1911, judging the moment opportune, the Italians seized the Tripolitan ports and compelled the Sultan of Turkey to acknowledge their right of control. This acquisition of a colony five times as large as Italy provided some


AFRICA
1914
Scale of Miles
0 200 400 600 800 1000
British
French
Italian
German
Spanish
Portuguese
Belgian
Independent
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
EUROPE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
PERSIA
EGYPT
NUBIA
ABYSSINIA
BELGIAN CONGO
ANGOLA
RHODESIA
GERMAN EAST AFRICA
KENYA
SOUDAN
NIGERIA
SAHARA DESERT
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
TUNIS
TRIPOLI
Tangier
Algiers
Tunis
Tripoli
Alexandria
Port Said
Suez
Akaba
Teheran
Medina
Mecca
Suakin
Khartum
Kodok
Addis Abeba
Jibuti
Berbera
Zeila
Harrar
Lake Rudolf
Lake Chad
Kano
Sokoto
Timbuctoo
Agades
Bida
Zaria
Lokoja
Benin
Freetown
Monrovia
Accra
Lagos
Bonny
Calabar
Victoria
Buea
Duala
Bamenda
Yaunde
Rio Muni
Libreville
Loango
Coquilhatville
Leopoldville
Stanleyville
Elisabethville
Ruwenzori
Albert Nyanza
Victoria Nyanza
Lake Tanganyika
Lake Nyasa
Kilwa
Mombasa
Zanzibar
Witu
Beira
Sofala
Lourenco Marques
Durban
Pretoria
Johannesburg
Kimberley
Orange Free State
Transvaal
Zululand
Swaziland
Walfish Bay (Br.)
Zandfisch Hafen
Cape Town
Mossel Bay
C. of Good Hope
C. Blanco
C. Frio
Madeira Is. (Port.)
Canary Is. (Sp.)
Cape Verde Is. (Port.)
Portuguese Guinea
Sierra Leone
Liberia
Gold Coast
Togoland
Dahomey
Ashanti
Northern Territories
Ivory Coast
Gambia
Fernando Po (Sp.)
Prince's I. (Port.)
St. Thomas (Port.)
Annobon (Sp.)
Equator
Tropic of Cancer
Tropic of Capricorn
German South West Africa
Cape of Good Hope
Egyptian Sudan
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan
Uganda Protectorate
Somaliland
Eritrea
Nile R.
Niger R.
Congo R.
Zambezi R.
Orange R.
Victoria Falls
Khama
Lobengula
Rhodes

compensation to Italian pride for the loss of Tunis and dispelled the Franco-Italian rivalry.

Between France and Great Britain, the two powers most active in dividing Africa, an even sharper antagonism had risen and waned. While far-sighted Englishmen were dreaming of carrying the Union Jack from Egypt to Cape Colony, energetic Frenchmen were pressing eastward from the region of Lake Chad. The map which follows page 898 will show that these conflicting lines of advance must clash in the upper Nile Valley. In 1898, General Herbert Kitchener, fresh from his victory at Omdurman, where he had reconquered the Sudan for the Khedive of Egypt (and for England), learned that the intrepid Captain Marchand had hoisted the French flag at Fashoda, where the White Nile parallels the Abyssinian border. With the control of the upper Nile region at stake, both nations drifted dangerously close to a war mood, but the crisis passed when the French finally agreed to recall Captain Marchand. Following this incident, both rivals made an effort to improve their relations and avert such threats to peace in the future. The terms of the Anglo-French *Entente* of 1904 included a compromise affecting African questions, Great Britain retaining Egypt and the Egyptian Sudan, while acknowledging the right of France to win Morocco as compensation.

Anglo-French rivalry — the Fashoda affair

The active participation of the German government in the scramble for African territory may be dated from 1884, when an international congress was held in Berlin to delimit spheres of influence and provide for the adjustment of rival claims. The congress erected an international Congo Free State under the sovereignty of King Leopold II of Belgium, but sought to preserve freedom of trade and navigation on the Congo River. At the same time (1884–85), Germany took possession of Togoland and the Kameruns, secured a block of coastland farther south which became German South-West Africa, and proclaimed the German East African Protectorate.[1] As already explained, these German annexations struck a sharp blow at British hopes. South-West Africa had been considered of little value, but in German hands it might become a threat to British South Africa. German East Africa, extending inland to the shores of Lake Tanganyika, prevented the British from linking Rhodesia with their Uganda protectorate at the head of the Nile. With good grace, however, they suppressed their disappointment and concluded an agreement recognizing the new German claims (1890). In addition,

Anglo-German rivalry

[1] See map following page 898.

Germany received the island of Helgoland in the North Sea in return for recognizing the British claims to Uganda, Nyasaland, and Zanzibar.

It will be noted that three of the lesser European states also developed African colonies, more or less under the sufferance of the great powers. The Portuguese, once foremost in exploring the coastline of the Dark Continent,[1] still preserved some trading posts in the nineteenth century which they enlarged into the protectorates of Angola and Mozambique. The Congo Free State, established as a neutral concession under international sanction (1884), was annexed as a Belgian colony in 1908. The Spaniards held, as remnants of ancient claims, a small Guinea protectorate, a stretch of northwestern coastline, the Rio de Oro, and a diminutive slice of Morocco opposite Gibraltar. Had their resources permitted the effort, the Spaniards would no doubt have subjugated the whole of Morocco, but this enterprise devolved upon the French instead. Britain was acquiescent, but Germany sought to block this French design, the result being a series of diplomatic clashes which brought the European nations close to war on three occasions.

The Moroccan question

By 1905, Morocco was entirely hemmed in on the landward side by French territory, but the sultan was still a nominally independent ruler. The German government wished him to remain independent, or, failing that, favored some system of international control. In 1906, a conference held at Algeciras (Spain) sustained the German view, but conceded France and Spain "police powers" to enable them to maintain order in the semi-civilized sultanate. Morocco had become a pawn in a dangerous diplomatic game, for the duel between France and Germany over Moroccan independence was at bottom a test of prestige between the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy) and the Triple *Entente* (France, Russia, and Great Britain). A second Moroccan crisis developed in 1908 when French military police invaded the German consulate at Casablanca and arrested deserters from the French Foreign Legion. The German government entered a vigorous protest against the use the French were making of their police power, but were partly placated by an assurance that the trade of all nations would be equally protected in Morocco. The French, however, continued to push their plans for a systematic conquest of the country, and in 1911 the German government protested a third time. On this occasion Great Britain ranged herself firmly at the side of France, demonstrating that the Anglo-French Alliance had acquired new force, and the Germans agreed to a compromise. In return for one hundred thousand square miles of the French Congo they permitted the French

[1] See above, pages 621–22.

government to declare a protectorate over nine tenths of Morocco (1912).

All the colonizing powers advanced laudable motives to justify their annexation of African land, but the real forces which drove them into this form of imperialistic gambling remained hidden. Not even the citizens who paid their taxes and aided their governments in the task of conquest comprehended the cost or understood precisely who benefited when new protectorates were established. They were pleased in a general way to see new areas on the map marked out as part of their empire, and they supposed that they were doing a noble and progressive thing in bringing the Christian religion and the advantages of a higher civilization to backward peoples. But the strongest motive in most of these ventures was economic, and behind each diplomatic crisis or tribal war in which a government engaged there lurked the shadow of the bondholders and the investment brokers who were the chief and sometimes the only beneficiaries of the imperialistic game.

The profits of imperialism

For by 1875, not only in Great Britain, but in France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, surplus capital had accumulated, and bankers and brokers were turning the golden flood toward foreign fields where the interest return promised to be high. Only a comparatively small group in each country drew a real profit from these imperialist enterprises — the investors who owned stock in the business or trading companies, or who bought the bonds which the Khedive of Egypt or the Shah of Persia might float in Europe, the investment bankers who made a good commission handling the bonds, and the civil and military officials who supervised or defended the undertaking. To the great majority of the people in England or France or Germany, however, these ventures brought no dividends, and might even mean higher taxes if their government yielded to the persuasion of the interested minority and fought a war or proclaimed a protectorate in order to safeguard the capital of a small group of investors. Because most of the profits derived from the imperialistic exploitation of Africa and Asia went to a small upper-class group, the socialist leaders in every European country opposed such expansion, while the bondholders, militarists, bankers, munition-makers, and others were likely to support a conservative *bloc* which would fight for an aggressive foreign policy, for imperialism, and (since interference in other countries often breeds war) for militarism. Thus the Industrial Revolution not only aligned the proletariat and the capitalist class on opposite sides in questions of domestic politics, it also separated them in much the same fashion on matters of foreign policy.

No small minority, however influential, can long control the foreign policy of a great power unless it wins some support from the masses. In every country there were citizens, sometimes well-meaning, sometimes stupid, who played the imperialists' game for them. Many devout people thought chiefly in terms of Christianizing the heathen. Many jingoists applauded their government's foreign policy, right or wrong. The self-sacrificing missionaries, such as David Livingstone (1813–73), and the courageous explorers, like Henry Morton Stanley, who made Africa known to Europeans, were inspired by altruism or the lure of adventure rather than any hope of gain. But shrewd business men with a sharp eye for profits built on their labors and organized commercial ventures with attractive titles, such as the International African Association (1876), the German African Society (1878), the British East Africa Association (1885), and the British South Africa Company (1889). On the basis of concessions secured from the native chiefs, the agents of these companies exploited African resources, and, when blocked by rival companies or by native resistance, they appealed to their governments for protection. The result was the long succession of international disputes and rivalries already described, some of which missed war by the narrowest margin. With the native population the colonizing powers found it impossible to avoid hostilities. The French conquest of West Africa was a saga of unsung strife; the Germans had to suppress costly uprisings in South-West Africa and in East Africa; the British fought a score of frontier wars between 1871 and 1914 against the Zulus, Basutos, Ashantis, Swazis, Matabeles, and other African tribes; while the Belgian officials in the Congo Free State exploited and massacred the Bantu peoples there with a cruelty that finally aroused international protest. Yet, despite harsh incidents, the white man has brought many benefits to the native Africans, for he has curbed their tribal wars, reduced plagues, suppressed cruel and degrading practices, improved communications, and, in some colonies, fostered education.

The fruits of imperialism

8. THE RIVALRIES OF THE GREAT POWERS IN ASIA

As a field for imperialistic effort, the continent of Asia differed from Africa in several important respects. It had a population six times as large, and the level of civilization among the Asiatics was considerably higher than among the Negroes. Moreover, the Asiatics, notably the Japanese, revealed a marked capacity for assimilating the European arts of war and peace, and might learn in time to resent and to resist alien intervention in their affairs. But this possibility did not deter

aggressive Europeans from exploiting Asia for their own purposes. The twentieth century will reveal whether in so doing they have not created a Nemesis for themselves, for Asia holds one half the world's population, and the Asiatics, if trained in the use of modern weapons of war and in the arts of machine production, might offer a serious challenge to the supremacy of the white races.

During the greater part of the nineteenth century, the chief protagonists of European imperialism in Asia were Russia and Great Britain. The Russian advance to the Pacific and to the borders of Persia and India has already been described.[1] The British, while consolidating their Indian Empire, opposed the Russians in the Near and Middle East, fought them in the Crimean War (1854–56), and resisted their demands on Turkey at the Congress of Berlin (1878). In the Far East, Russia and England did not clash directly, but both established spheres of influence in the Chinese Empire, the British making Tibet and the Yangtze Valley a field of special interest, while the Russians penetrated Mongolia and Manchuria.

Anglo-Russian jealousy

These encroachments, supplemented by the French conquest of Indo-China, made it seem probable in the last quarter of the nineteenth century that China would suffer the same fate as Africa and pass completely under the domination of foreign powers. In 1894, a new claimant to the spoils appeared when Japan wrested the Korean Peninsula and the island of Formosa from the feeble sovereignty of the Celestial Empire. This Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 also gave the Japanese a foothold on the Liaotung Peninsula, but this the other powers compelled them to relinquish. The evident helplessness of China invited a race for concessions. Germany seized the bay of Kiaochau in Shantung Province (1897), Russia secured Port Arthur (1898) and began to construct a railway across Chinese Manchuria, while the British occupied the harbor of Wei-hai-wei. A glance at the map following page 890 will show how these acquisitions on the Yellow Sea threatened the Chinese capital at Peking. Meanwhile, the French obtained the port of Kwang-chow in southern China, close to their Tonkin protectorate.

The hatred that developed in China against the "foreign devils" led to an uprising in 1900 known as the Boxer[2] Rebellion. It had been fomented with the approval of the reactionary empress, Tzu-hsi, but was crushed by an international army dispatched by Japan, Russia, Great

[1] See above, pages 786–87.

[2] The Chinese patriots who were most active in the attempt to drive out all foreign barbarians were called "Boxers" because many of them belonged to secret societies, the most important being "The Fists of Righteous Harmony," or, as it is sometimes translated, "The Society of Harmonious Fists."

Britain, France, and Germany. Europeans who were besieged in Peking were relieved and the capital occupied by the allied troops until the Chinese government promised an indemnity of about $330,000,000 and commercial concessions to the victors. This salutary lesson convinced even the dowager empress of the need for reform, and projects were introduced for modernizing the military, political, and educational institutions of China. A proposal sustained by the United States (1899) had inaugurated an "open-door" policy in regard to Chinese trade, whereby all nations were to receive equal preference, even in those ports leased by foreign powers. The attitude of the United States, which had respected the integrity of China, and the jealousy of the other great powers, each eager to block the others, delayed the further dismemberment of China after 1900.

The rise of Japan

The astonishing rise of Japan also furnished a curb upon the spread of European imperialism in the Far East. Until 1853, the Japanese had little contact with Europeans and desired less; but the visit of a naval squadron under Commodore Perry forced them to open some of their ports for trade with the United States (1854) and later with other nations. Recognizing the superiority of western methods in war and peace, the Japanese embarked upon a program of modernization unique in history. Prior to 1867, the administrative powers in the Land of the Rising Sun had been dissipated among numerous feudal vassals (the *daimios*), while a sort of mayor of the palace (the *shogun*), had grown so powerful that he overshadowed the emperor. This situation was remedied by a peaceful revolution when the enlightened emperor, Mutsuhito, began his epochal reign in 1867 by concentrating the power in his own hands. In the name of reform he abolished feudalism and serfdom, organized a national army and navy, instituted modern methods of government, industry, and education, and finally promulgated a constitution (1889). Young Japanese students were sent abroad to attend American and European universities, and instructors were invited to Japan to teach the Nipponese the arts and sciences of the western nations. So thoroughly and so successfully was the "revolution" carried out that Japan acquired in a single generation the essential distinguishing characteristics of a western power.

Having organized a splendid army, modeled partly on that of Prussia, and an effective navy on the British type, the Japanese could feel secure from foreign aggression. They could still learn from the example of the powers, however, and realized the uses to which these armaments could be put for imperialistic purposes. The rapid spread of industry increased the population and strained the limited resources of the island kingdom,

so that Japanese merchants and manufacturers looked to China as a market for their products and a source of raw material. Imitating European methods, the Japanese made war upon China in 1894, freed Korea, which was later annexed to Japan (1910), gained the island of Formosa, an indemnity of one hundred and eighty million dollars, and commercial privileges in four Chinese ports (Treaty of Shimonoseki, 1895). But the Japanese remained dissatisfied because the European powers compelled them to restore Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula, to "preserve Chinese integrity." Such sudden solicitude for the protection of China on the part of nations lately engaged in despoiling the Celestial Empire appeared hypocritical to the Japanese, who suspected that it was a device to cheat them of the fruits of their victory. This suspicion was confirmed a few years later when Russia obtained a lease to the coveted Port Arthur (1898).

If the Russians once made good their hold on Manchuria and fortified it, the Japanese knew that they would lose their fairest field of expansion on the mainland of Asia. The growing tension between the two powers brought on a war in 1904 which demonstrated how competently the Japanese had learned their lesson. The Russians suffered defeat on land and sea, and by August, 1905, were ready to agree: (1) to transfer their lease on Port Arthur to Japan; (2) to evacuate Manchuria; (3) to recognize the special Japanese interest in Korea; and (4) to cede to Japan the southern half of the island of Sakhalin (Treaty of Portsmouth). The European nations noted with amazement this discomfiture of the Russian giant by an Asiatic state with one third the population and one fiftieth the area of the czar's empire. But the struggle had not been a true test of strength because the Russians had been taken partly by surprise, had been crippled by the impossibility of bringing sufficient men and supplies to the scene of conflict, and had yielded largely because the discontent of the Russian masses threatened to break into revolution. On the other hand, the Japanese had been thoroughly prepared, had been stirred to intense patriotism by a struggle which involved their national existence, and enjoyed a position near the seat of war where they could use their military and naval superiority in the East to best effect. A longer struggle might have overstrained their finances and ended in a less unequal peace.

Russo-Japanese War (1904–05)

The scramble among the nations to seize and exploit backward countries reached its climax about 1900. By that year almost all of Africa, a large part of Asia, Australasia, and the far-scattered islands of the Pacific Ocean had been divided among the powers. In North and South

America the European states had made no recent annexations out of deference to the position taken by the United States, which had made it clear that such intervention would be viewed as an unfriendly act.[1] But, in assuming this preponderant and protective rôle in the New World, the United States had in reality manifested a form of imperialism. In 1898, the question of Cuban independence brought on a war between the United States and Spain which ended in a Spanish defeat. Cuba became a republic under American protection, and Spain also transferred the Philippine Islands to the United States.

The Spanish-American War, the Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, the Italian defeat in Abyssinia, and the English conquest of the Sudan all fell within the years 1895–1905. Occurring in widely separated parts of the globe, these events reflect how completely the whole world had been caught within the net of imperialism. There was no longer a country so obscure or so remote that it might not serve to awaken the spirit of covetousness and become the object of international conflict.

The competition for colonies was a grave threat to world peace because it sharpened antagonisms already existing among the European powers. The next chapter will explain why the period 1871–1914 has been named "The Armed Peace." Throughout Europe fear and misunderstanding between the states were fed by jingoistic patriots and intensified by the competition in armaments until the period ended in the most destructive war that has threatened modern civilization.

[1] See above, page 749.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES: INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE ARMED PEACE

(1871–1914)

The factors which really constitute prosperity have not the remotest connection with military or naval power, all our political jargon notwithstanding.
NORMAN ANGELL, *The Great Illusion.*[1]

THE Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 did much more than end an empire (that of Napoleon III) in France and consolidate a new empire (that of William I and Bismarck) in Germany. It shifted the center of gravity in European politics, increased the international tension, and augmented the spirit of militarism. Berlin superseded Paris as the diplomatic capital of Europe, and the new German Empire emerged as the dominant nation on the Continent. The old balance of power had been destroyed with disconcerting suddenness. For the neighbors of Germany it became a matter of the utmost importance to discover what use the Germans planned to make of their ascendancy. Would the Prussian forces, after winning three wars in seven years, be content to put away their weapons now German unity had been secured? And if not, which state would prove their next victim? The rapid industrial expansion, the increasing population, and the unrivaled military efficiency of the Teuton Empire filled weaker nations with jealousy and apprehension. In the tense and suspicious atmosphere of modern statecraft, a powerful neighbor is likely to be viewed as a perpetual threat.

1. THE GERMAN HEGEMONY AFTER 1871

Bismarck appreciated the general distrust which the Prussian victories had aroused. As chancellor of the German Empire he desired peace, and after 1871 he labored to prevent war as successfully as he had sought it hitherto. For he knew that the prevalent fear of Germany might easily favor the growth of a hostile coalition, and it lay in the logic of things that France, so brutally humbled in the process of German advancement, would furnish the nucleus for such a combination. Standing alone, France constituted no very grave danger, but Bismarck did not underrate the skill, patience, and patriotism of French statesmen, nor the jealousy which German success had fostered in international circles. He was haunted by the presentiment that sooner or later France would

[1] G. P. Putnam's Sons.

secure allies and assume the rôle of a Nemesis fated to destroy his life-work. The rapidity with which the French paid off their indemnity and restored their national prosperity after 1871 increased his misgiving so strongly that in 1875 he considered, but abandoned, the thought of inflicting a second and more crushing defeat upon France before that nation won wider support. Bismarck's friends chided him for entertaining a "nightmare of coalitions," but history has revealed that his fears were later to materialize as grim realities.

The isolation of France

That Germany was able, under such circumstances, to leave France diplomatically isolated for twenty years and to build up friendly relations with all the other continental powers, was partly the result of circumstances, partly a tribute to Bismarck's moderation and astuteness. He arranged treaties of alliance and good-will with Austria, Russia, and Italy before France could turn to them for aid or encouragement. These agreements, consolidating the recent Prussian military triumphs, rendered the position of Germany unassailable during the years that Bismarck remained in office. It will be useful to examine the Bismarckian system of alliances in detail, because they largely determined the diplomatic history of the period 1871–1914.

The Three Emperors' League (1873)

Bismarck's first endeavor after 1871 was to unite Germany, Austria, and Russia in a cordial understanding. Although the Austrians had been defeated by the Prussians in 1866, they had been generously treated by the victors and were ready to forgive and forget; while the Russians had found Prussia friendly during the Polish Rebellion of 1863 and after. The three governments had several important interests in common: they were all concerned in keeping the Poles in subjection, they were all monarchies with an absolutist bent, and they were all hostile toward republican ideas. It was not a matter for great surprise, therefore, when Francis Joseph of Austria, William I of Germany, and Alexander II of Russia established a friendly compact known as the "Three Emperors' League" in 1873. Confident that this accord would assure a more stable peace, Bismarck turned his attention to projects for the internal consolidation of the German Empire, a complicated task which he was anxious to carry through undisturbed.

Unfortunately for his hopes, the Three Emperors' League soon dissolved. Jealousy between Austria and Russia in the Balkans almost brought these powers to war in 1877. How a temporary settlement of this Near-Eastern Question was worked out at the Congress of Berlin the following year is told elsewhere.[1] Here it is sufficient to explain that

[1] See above, pages 842–44.

Bismarck, though he strove to be impartial, leaned to the side of Austria in the controversy and so forfeited for a time the friendship of the Russians. The Three Emperors' League lost its force, Russo-German relations grew cold if not actually hostile, and Bismarck was denounced in Saint Petersburg as a false friend.

2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

Wasting no time in fruitless efforts to soften the hostile mood of the Russians, Bismarck hastened to Vienna and arranged a dual alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary which was destined to endure for forty years. This highly important treaty of 1879 provided that Germany and Austria would make war together should either of them be attacked by Russia; if either were to be attacked by France, the other promised to observe benevolent neutrality. The effect of this agreement was to bind Germany and Austria in a close understanding directed against Russia and France, but the two latter powers were carefully left in ignorance of the arrangement. The "High Contracting Parties" specifically agreed that "This Treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful intentions, and to avoid any misinterpretation, be kept secret . . ."

Austro-German Alliance (1879)

Three years later the Dual Alliance was expanded into the Triple Alliance by the admission of Italy (1882). The Italians had been irritated by the French annexation of Tunis the previous year, and welcomed the assurance of German support in the event of a war developing with France over the North African littoral. The terms of the Triple Alliance provided that if Italy or Germany were attacked by France, the three allied powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) would fight together, or if any one of them were attacked by two other great powers, all three would provide mutual assistance. The treaty might be renewed after five years, and its terms were to remain secret. The Italians stipulated, however, that its provisions should not be regarded as directed against Great Britain.

The Triple Alliance (1882)

Still Bismarck was not satisfied. In 1881, he had succeeded in resurrecting the Three Emperors' League, Germany, Austria, and Russia pledging each other not to join any fourth power (France, for instance) against any member of the league. But this second Emperors' League proved no more permanent than the first, and when Czar Alexander III declined to renew it in 1887, Bismarck agreed instead to a secret Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia. Each party promised to remain neutral if the

The Reinsurance Treaty (1887)

other were attacked by a great power. Stripped of their ambiguities, the commitments which Bismarck had negotiated bound Austria, Italy, and Russia not to join France in a war of aggression against Germany. So long as the Bismarckian system of alliances remained in force, the French, if they opened a war of revenge, would have to enter it alone.

Even the Balkan States, Serbia and Rumania, were drawn into Bismarck's system, Serbia by a secret treaty with Austria-Hungary (1881) and Rumania by an agreement for mutual support negotiated with the members of the Triple Alliance (1883). When the Emperor William II relieved Bismarck of his office (1890), the Iron Chancellor retired with the knowledge that he had consolidated the preponderant position of Germany and successfully frustrated for the moment the composition of a counter-alliance. Yet within the Bismarckian system dangerous rifts were already widening. Austrian pressure in the Balkans was almost certain, sooner or later, to estrange both Russia and Italy. The Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia was not renewed in 1890. The loyalty of Italy could not be depended upon — "her promise will have no value if it is not in her interest to keep it," Bismarck had predicted shrewdly. Great Britain, though friendly toward Germany, might easily be alienated if the Germans pressed their commercial and naval rivalry, and their quest for colonies, too aggressively. To resolve these problems would have taxed even Bismarck's skill, and his successors in office were not his equals in diplomacy. By 1914, little remained of the Bismarckian system save the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria, and a counter-coalition had been formed to oppose the Central Powers, a coalition more dangerous, more powerful, and more circumscribing than Bismarck's darkest apprehensions had foreshadowed.

Rifts in the Triple Alliance

3. FRANCE SEARCHES FOR ALLIES

Shamed by defeat, without friends, and weakened by the internal conflict between republicans and royalists, France played a minor part in international affairs from 1871 to 1890. Bismarck approved of a republican government in France for the precise reason that he opposed it in Germany, because he believed that republican institutions were unstable and unsuited to military enterprise. The political quarrels of the French factions and the frequent cabinet crises at Paris left foreign courts in doubt whether the Third Republic could long endure, but by 1890 the republican régime had acquired an appearance of permanence and French

policies were accorded more serious attention as they gained in firmness and continuity.

Between 1891 and 1894, France secured her first ally, Russia. It might appear surprising that a liberal republic and a conservative autocracy should reach a "cordial understanding," but the exigencies of foreign policy often forge strange alliances. The Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty had lapsed in 1890 and the German government was disinclined to renew it. Russia, in need of capital for railroad construction and other industrial enterprises, found the French government benevolently inclined and French bankers obliging. The friendly feeling thus engendered was confirmed by a secret convention (1894) which stipulated:

Franco-Russian Convention (1894)

(1) If France should be attacked by Germany, or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia would employ all her available forces against Germany.
(2) If Russia should be attacked by Germany, or by Austria supported by Germany, France would employ all her available forces to attack Germany.

This "rigorously secret" convention was to endure as long as the Triple Alliance remained operative, a condition which proved that it was intended as a counterweight to that alliance, which French and Russian statesmen feared the more because they were ignorant of its precise terms. It was also important to France and Russia in 1894 to present a united front in the face of British imperialism, particularly as there were rumors that Great Britain also might be drawn toward the Triple Alliance.

In 1898, the year of Bismarck's death, Théophile Delcassé became French minister of foreign affairs. He was to retain that important post for the unusually long period of seven years, and during that interval (1898–1905) he helped to bring about a diplomatic revolution which nullified much of Bismarck's labor. It was Delcassé's conviction that the security of France depended upon the creation of a coalition powerful enough to defy the Triple Alliance. Faced, when he took office, by the Anglo-French crisis concerning the occupation of Fashoda,[1] he sought a peaceful solution for the affair, and after France had yielded, he strove to obliterate the memory of the clash of interests and to promote closer relations with Great Britain. The accession in 1901 of Edward VII (1901–10), who liked the French and admired Delcassé, helped to create a friendlier feeling between the two powers. Irksome colonial disputes were smoothed away by negotiation, Great Britain agreeing in 1904 to recognize French interests as paramount in Morocco, while the French in return agreed to insist no longer

Théophile Delcassé

[1] See above, page 899.

that the British vacate Egypt. In its secret clauses this convention of 1904 further provided that France and Britain should afford each other diplomatic support on all questions concerning North African territory.

Because of the strong British prejudice against entangling alliances, this understanding with France was termed an *entente*, and no formal treaty was signed, but the *rapprochement* was full of significance none the less. The British government, like the French, had come to feel that the peace of Europe might be rendered more secure if the preponderance of Germany and her allies could be offset by a counter-combination of powers. As Germany, Austria, and Italy had formed a Triple Alliance, France, Russia, and England might form a Triple *Entente*. Yet as late as 1900 an alliance which would bind England to her erstwhile foes, France and Russia, seemed no more than a remote possibility, and few people in England or on the Continent would have prophesied such a development. Ten years later, however, the alliance was an actuality. The motives which inspired this "diplomatic revolution" may be traced to the sharp competition which developed between Britain and Germany in commercial, colonial, and naval affairs.

4. ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY

Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century, the British had been content to maintain a policy of "splendid isolation." By 1900, however, isolation began to seem less splendid. The Boer War (1899–1902) revealed to the British people their military unpreparedness and their wide unpopularity. A sense of insecurity clouded the mood of complaisant superiority which they had derived from their industrial and maritime supremacy, for that supremacy was definitely passing. After 1880, British trade had begun to falter while that of Germany forged ahead. In all the world's markets, even in the British Isles, German goods sold in mounting quantities. Germany was the most enterprising, the most aggressive, and the most successful competitor, but the British monopoly suffered further reverses through the progress of industrialization in France and the United States.

It has been said that "race hatred is founded upon international covetousness." For a few years the British endeavored to preserve an attitude of "fair play" toward their chief rivals. They acknowledged the right of Germany to acquire colonies, and they clung to the belief that British commerce could meet all competition. But when the Germans continued to overtake them, when the German steel production surpassed their own, and German ships transported German manufactures that

undersold the British in their own colonies, the note of sportsmanship yielded to one of anxiety. Unofficial British suggestions for a friendly agreement were coolly received in Berlin. After 1898, a race in naval armaments added to the tension, for the young kaiser, William II, declared that, in order to protect her growing commerce, Germany must construct a navy second to none. This challenge was promptly met by the British, who determined to launch two warships for each keel that the Germans laid down, in order that the British navy might continue to be a match for any other two fleets in the world combined. This two-power standard imposed an enormous strain upon the British taxpayer, but he accepted it as indispensable to his security, for the British Empire was founded upon sea power and any nation which could destroy its shipping in time of war could starve the island kingdom into surrender.

Between 1900 and 1914, the British admiralty steadily concentrated its forces in the North Sea to meet the German threat. Warships which had been scattered around the world to protect British interests, which had lain anchored in Rangoon, or Nanaimo, or the Bermudas until they "had grounded on their own beef bones," as one authority phrased it, were either scrapped or remodeled and recalled to home waters. A treaty of friendship and alliance, signed between Britain and Japan in 1902, enabled the British to withdraw a portion of their Pacific squadron with the assurance that the Japanese would watch over their interests in the Far East. After the establishment of the *Entente cordiale* with France in 1904, the naval defense of the Mediterranean Sea was largely relegated to the French in order that the British might further strengthen their North Sea fleet. Although the public remained generally ignorant of this redisposition of naval forces, it was fraught with a deep significance for the peace of Europe, and was a part of the tragic process which was aligning all European powers into two hostile camps.

Naval rivalry

5. THE TRIPLE *ENTENTE*

The formation of a Triple *Entente* including France, Russia, and Great Britain was indirectly hastened by the result of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05). France as the ally of Russia and Britain as the ally of Japan were both anxious to prevent the war from spreading, lest they should be drawn into it on opposite sides. The defeat of Russia proved to the English that their long-nursed fear of the Muscovite power had been largely unnecessary and exaggerated. At the same time the Russian reverse showed the French that their only ally had feet of clay and would

prove no match for Germany in case of war. The revelation of Russian weakness inspired the Germans to a new truculence, while France labored to draw Russia and England to her side and unite the three in a firm understanding in order to meet the Central Powers on a more equal footing.

Formation of the Triple Entente

The outcome was the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian *Entente* of 1907. As in the case of the Anglo-French *Entente*, arranged three years earlier, no definite treaty of alliance was signed, but the British and Russian governments smoothed away long-standing difficulties by an agreement to demarcate their spheres of influence in Persia and arbitrate any disputes that might arise concerning the frontiers of India. English sentiment toward Russia had been warmed by the promises of liberal reform made by Nicholas II after the revolutionary movement of 1905–06,[1] and the accord was further strengthened by a meeting of the English and Russian monarchs at Reval, the naval base of the Russian Baltic fleet, in 1908. Edward VII of England took a much more active part than usually falls to a constitutional monarch in the creation of the Triple *Entente*, which re-established the balance of power in Europe on a clearly defined basis. When he died in 1910, he was mourned by his subjects as "Edward the Peacemaker."

Ill-success of German diplomacy

To German eyes, however, the Triple *Entente* wore anything but a peaceful aspect. It seemed rather a deliberate attempt to "encircle" Germany and Austria and stifle their free development. Everywhere that the Germans turned for expansion, they appeared to find themselves hemmed in by the insidious encroachments projected by *entente* diplomacy. In reality the agreements existing between France, Russia, and England were extremely vague, and were designed to operate only in the face of German aggression. Unfortunately, in a situation which would have taxed Bismarck's astuteness, the kaiser and his associates pursued a contradictory policy of overtures nullified by truculence and compromises inspired by pacific intentions, but marred by indiscreet saber-rattling. The blustering, touchy, and ill-advised attitude of the German foreign office helped more effectively than the machinations of the *entente* statesmen to forge the links in the chain that was being drawn about the Central Powers. A dozen times between 1906 and 1914, when the interests of the Triple Alliance and the *entente* powers clashed over some minor issue, the Germans had the melancholy success of driving England, France, and Russia closer together, and cementing

[1] See above, pages 830–32.

the nebulous *entente* into an effective alliance by the very methods which they had adopted in the hope of dissolving it.

6. INTERNATIONAL CRISES: MOROCCO

In the ten years that preceded the outbreak of the World War, the increasing tension between the Triple Alliance and the nations which combined to form the Triple *Entente* gave rise to a series of diplomatic shocks which might be likened to the premonitory tremors which presage a violent earthquake. Several of these incidents were connected with the French penetration of Morocco. In 1900, France and Italy reached a secret agreement relegating Tripoli and Cyrenaica[1] to Italian enterprise while the French sought supremacy in Tunis and Morocco. This understanding eased the Franco-Italian feud over North African territory, and two years later, Delcassé won a secret promise that the Italians would not join in a war of aggression against France. Spanish possessions in Morocco were delimited by a Franco-Spanish accord of 1904, and the same year Great Britain assented to the French designs in the convention establishing the Anglo-French *Entente.*

First Moroccan crisis (1905–06)

Suspecting the bent of Delcassé's intrigues, and annoyed by the conviction that German interests had been ignored, William II intervened brusquely in Moroccan affairs in 1905. The German government had selected a favorable moment to oppose France, for Russia had suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Japanese, and the French dared not risk a war until their ally had recovered some strength and morale. Reluctantly the French cabinet yielded to the German demand for an international conference on Moroccan affairs, and acceded to the German hints that Delcassé's resignation of the portfolio of foreign affairs would ease the situation. The conference met at Algeciras (Spain) in 1906, and the delegates agreed solemnly that the sovereignty and integrity of the sultanate of Morocco must remain intact. At the same time, however, France and Spain were authorized to direct the police force, protect foreigners, and maintain order.

To carry out this mandate, the French soon found it necessary to land troops in Morocco (1907). The following year French military police, searching for deserters from the Foreign Legion, invaded the German consulate at Casablanca and precipitated further trouble. A settlement was effected after the affair had been submitted to the

[1] See map following page 889.

Hague Tribunal, a permanent court of international arbitration which had been established in 1899. Germany conceded that her interests in Morocco were economic, not political, and the French government gave assurances that it would not abuse its privileges there to favor the commerce of any nation unduly. This compromise displeased many Germans, who perceived that "the power of France had spread . . . like an oil stain," until the greater part of Morocco had been subordinated to French control despite German vigilance.

Compromise concerning Morocco (1911)

When French forces occupied Fez, the chief city of Morocco, in 1911, the German government dispatched the warship *Panther* to the Moroccan port of Agadir as a protest. For several months the threat of war hung over Europe, but the British government showed its determination to support France, and Germany accepted a compromise. The French were permitted to establish their long-sought protectorate over Morocco, and Germany received two strips of the French Congo as compensation. This settlement removed one dangerous subject of dispute which had exacerbated the mood of French and German patriots, but a heritage of ill-will remained, and the enmity between the two powers, though transferred to other issues, was not appreciably lessened by the compromise.

7. INTERNATIONAL CRISES: THE BALKANS

The Bagdad Railway

While France and Germany quarreled over the disposition of Moroccan territory, Russia and Austria pursued their tortuous rivalry in the Balkans. Although Bismarck had once declared that the Near-Eastern Question did not interest Germany sufficiently to be worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier, his successors in office modified this judgment. With the spread of industry and of transportation facilities German business men awoke to the possibility of exploiting the Turkish Empire as a commercial field of considerable importance. In 1902, they obtained concessions from the sultan's government for the construction of a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad and thence to Basra on the Persian Gulf. By linking up such a line with the German and Austrian railway system they hoped to develop important trade relations with the East, for the new overland route to the Indian Ocean would be shorter and speedier than the British or French maritime connections through the Suez Canal.

The German directors of the Bagdad Railway were willing to have


EUROPE
1900
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400
ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
ARCTIC CIRCLE
LAPLAND
WHITE SEA
SIBERIA
RUSSIA
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
ENGLAND
FRANCE
SPAIN
PORTUGAL
GERMANY
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
SWITZ.
BELG.
NETHER.
DENMARK
SWEDEN
NORWAY
ITALY
SERVIA
BULGARIA
RUMANIA
TURKEY
GREECE
AFRICA
BAY OF BISCAY
ENGLISH CHANNEL
ADRIATIC SEA
Longitude West 0 Longitude East

the project financed and controlled as an international venture, but the British and French declined to co-operate. Fear of the German *Drang nach Osten*, or "drive to the east," was growing keener in British business circles by 1902. German diplomatic influence had become paramount at Constantinople, German officers were drilling Turkish regiments, and German manufacturers were demanding preferential tariffs in order to win the markets of Asia Minor. British jingoists, who had been loud in their declaration twenty years earlier that the Russians should not have Constantinople, suddenly perceived that German control of the Bosphorus had become an even more imminent danger. A century earlier, Napoleon had affirmed (with picturesque exaggeration) that the power which controlled Constantinople could control the world. After 1900, it seemed likely that this key position of the eastern Mediterranean would fall under the sway of the Central Powers. The British lion and the Russian bear neglected their ancient rivalry to watch the shadow of the Prussian eagle, and the two-headed eagle of Austria, sweeping toward the Dardanelles.

The Drang nach Osten

A glance at the accompanying map will show that the fear of German influence in the Near East was somewhat exaggerated. Direct communication between Berlin, Vienna, and Constantinople depended upon the attitudes of the Balkan States, particularly Serbia and Bulgaria. The Serb population, which was predominantly Slavic, looked to Russia as the "Big Slav Brother" for sympathy and support, and Serb patriots nursed dreams of creating a Pan-Slav state in the Balkans which would include their fellow nationals living under Austrian administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is scarcely necessary to point out that such a project, the success of which would threaten the integrity of the Hapsburg Empire, was resented and resisted at Vienna. Any attempt either to expand or to constrict Serbian territory was certain to bring Russia and the Central Powers face to face in a duel of prestige, and as the Pan-Slav enthusiasts were constantly active, such a clash was likely to come at almost any time.

The Pan-Slav dream

The spirit of nationalism which had stirred the Balkan peoples spread to Turkey also. Turkish patriots were disgusted by the signs of decadence and disintegration in the Ottoman Empire, which in less than a century had lost control of most of its European provinces, and allowed France to seize Tunis and Morocco while Britain occupied Egypt. In 1908, a Young Turk Association, inspired by the motto "Union and Progress," organized a

First Near-Eastern crisis (1908)

revolutionary movement and compelled the reactionary sultan, Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909), to grant a constitution. This apparent rejuvenation of Turkey alarmed the Austrian government, for the Young Turks wished to take over Bosnia and Herzegovina which Austria had administered by virtue of the decision reached at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.[1] To forestall the Young Turk claim, Austria annexed the two provinces (1908), a move which displeased the Turks and infuriated the Serbs. For the Serbs regarded the Bosnians as fellow nationals destined to be incorporated into a greater Serbia, and the Austrian action dealt a fatal blow to their aspirations. They hastened to arm, counting upon Russian aid, but Russia had not yet recovered from the conflict with Japan, and found France and England cool toward the Serbian demands for aggrandizement. Advised "to avoid everything that might lead to an armed conflict," the Serbs yielded in sullen impotence, and the crisis passed.

Three years later, a situation of grave tension developed in the Near East as a consequence of the Turco-Italian War of 1911–12. The success of the Italians in seizing Tripoli proved to the world that Turkey was still feeble and could be attacked with impunity. Furthermore, as both the combatants, Italy and Turkey, were nominal allies of Germany and Austria, this dissension within the ranks of the Triple Alliance provided secret satisfaction for the *Entente* powers. Waiting for the repercussions that were certain to follow upon the Turkish defeats in North Africa, the European diplomats turned their scrutiny upon the Near East once more.

Second Near-Eastern crisis (1912–13)

The repercussions soon displayed themselves and provided a second Near-Eastern Crisis in 1912–13. Heartened by the evidence of Turkish enfeeblement, the Balkan states, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, launched a campaign against the Ottoman forces. Their victories were as surprising as their cooperation, and within a few months the allied armies had almost driven the Turks from Europe. But when the time came to divide the spoils of this First Balkan War of 1912, the Bulgarians, dissatisfied with their share, attacked their late allies, and were severely defeated in the Second Balkan War of 1913. Rumania, hitherto neutral, and even Turkey, entered the conflict against Bulgaria, which was stripped of the greater part of its earlier gains. Throughout the peace negotiations, in which the great powers insisted upon taking a hand, Austria showed a firm resolve to check the aggrandizement of Serbia as far as possible. By insisting that the liberated Turkish province

[1] See above, page 843.

of Albania must be organized as a separate independent principality, Austrian statesmen denied Serbia an outlet to the Adriatic Sea.[1]

In Vienna, the Pan-Slav Movement, with the potential might of Russia behind it, was viewed with mounting alarm. In fighting it the Austro-Hungarian government was fighting to preserve the Hapsburg Empire from disintegration, for if the Austrian Slavs were permitted to secede, other minority races would demand similar privileges. Germany was constrained to support Austrian policy because she could not afford to alienate her only firm ally. Russian statesmen saw in the Pan-Slav Movement an opportunity to harass Austria and extend their own influence in the Balkan Peninsula. The French and British governments were anxious to preserve the existing balance of power in the Near East and to prevent either Austro-German or Russian influence from becoming paramount. With so many conflicting forces concentrating their effects in a small area, and with all the great powers ready to utilize the local rivalries and feuds to further their own designs, it is easy to understand why writers in 1913 constantly described the Balkans as "the powder magazine of Europe." Sooner or later a chance spark was likely to set off an explosion that would bring the old order in Europe crashing down in the chaos of a general war.

The "powder magazine of Europe"

8. THE GROWTH OF ARMAMENTS

Nothing reflects the growing fear and tension in Europe between 1900 and 1914 more clearly than the increase in armaments. Following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, all the European powers except Great Britain enforced the principle of compulsory military training for practically all able-bodied male citizens, thus building up huge conscript armies, with a still larger reserve. The expense of drilling and equipping millions of men imposed a staggering burden upon the national budgets, and a secondary loss resulted because these men were necessarily withdrawn from peace-time occupations during some of the most important years of their early manhood. Yet the spirit of fear and of international distrust defeated all proposals for a limitation of armed forces, and led instead to a constant increase in the number of effectives, to extensions in the period of service, and additions to the military appropriations. In 1913, on the eve of the World War, all the great powers increased their expend-

Military conscription

[1] See map following page 954.

itures for defense, and even lesser states like Belgium and Switzerland found it expedient to augment their forces.

Such gigantic preparations made it certain that any war which might develop would involve an unprecedented number of combatants. Wars were no longer to be waged between small professional armies, but with all the available man-power of great and populous states. Civilians might likewise be mobilized and compelled to produce food and munitions, and the danger and destruction would not be confined to the battlefields. For the new weapons which science and invention were producing promised to add new horrors to the ancient art of human massacre. Mines and torpedoes which would explode on contact, dreadnoughts with guns that hurled projectiles weighing a ton, new and deadly high-explosive shells, and machine guns that sprayed bullets as a hose sprays water, had all been brought to a high degree of effectiveness. With the invention of the airplane and the dirigible airship, as well as the submarine boat, it became possible for men to slay each other, not only on land and sea, but beneath the waves and above the clouds. Troops far back of the firing line might now be bombed in their billets and cities rocked with the concussion of explosives dropped from the skies.

New weapons

The deepening conviction that war would certainly come if the nations continued to prepare for it, and the belief that it would bring nothing but loss and tragedy to all concerned, led many earnest men and women to organize peace societies and to advocate a limitation of armaments and the arbitration of international disputes. The most important result of this widely diffused sentiment for peace was an international conference held at The Hague in 1899, at the suggestion of Czar Nicholas II of Russia. The delegates designed a formula whereby disputes between sovereign states might be submitted to arbitration, and a second conference (1907) strengthened the Hague Tribunal as an international court of justice. There was no power, however, aside from public opinion, which could compel nations to submit their quarrels to this impartial court, nor did the court have any means whereby it could enforce its decisions. Governments evinced little faith in its efficacy as an instrument for the prevention of war, and the efforts made at the Hague Conferences to effect a limitation or reduction of armaments came to nothing.

Peace societies

For side by side with the advocates of peace, who denounced war as unchristian or argued that under modern conditions it would ruin victor and victim alike, there stood an opposing group of thinkers who defended it as a harsh necessity of the struggle for existence. These

realists, as they liked to style themselves, pointed out that history revealed that men had fought each other since the dawn of time, that in the animal world Nature showed herself "red in tooth and claw," and that mankind could not escape the call to strife because it was an inherited biological necessity. The contemporary clash and rivalry of the imperialistic powers they held to be the modern application of the ancient law of battle. Peace-loving peoples, averse to war and unprepared for it, would be herded to the wall by those nations which had conserved the military virtues and had arrayed their warriors to conquer. Since war, regrettable and destructive though it might be, was none the less a visitation likely to confront each nation at least once in a generation, the sane course for a state was to prepare for it, to maintain a large and well-trained fighting force, and if possible to secure allies. For the fate of the unprepared peoples could be read in the history books, and it was written, not in black and white, but in red.

The belief that impressive armaments, and particularly a far-flung navy, helped a power to control and exploit the backward regions of the earth, and so increase its prestige and prosperity, was a political maxim so generally accepted at the opening of the twentieth century that few people undertook to dispute it. The fact that a small state like Switzerland could hold its own in the commercial race, although surrounded by four great military powers, or that Norway, with an insignificant navy, ranked fourth among the nations of the world in the extent of its maritime tonnage, did not shake the faith of the militarists in the efficacy of armed force to promote the prosperity of a nation. Precisely how battleships or howitzers captured trade was not made clear, but the belief that they were necessary to guarantee a nation's prestige and security, and to extend its commercial and colonial ambitions, appeared to be sufficient justification for their expense. It was even argued in all seriousness that the more heavily the nations armed, the less likely they were to fight, because the more destructive war became, the less profit there would be in it for the victor. And if war did come, some militarists averred, it would be over sooner if the states were fully prepared for it; unpreparedness only delayed the decision and so prolonged the agony.

The armed peace

As a consequence of this contradictory and muddle-headed attitude, the European peoples prayed for peace and prepared for war. Each nation built up its armaments under the impression that its neighbor meditated an attack, and in so doing inspired its neighbor with the same dread. These mounting fears were stimu-

lated by the patriotic and militant utterances of such writers as Frederick von Bernhardi, who declared it to be the law of life that the strong must vanquish the weak, and urged his fellow Germans to prepare for war. But German writers were not alone in defending militarism: in Russia, France, Austria, Italy, and England writers and teachers were active, inculcating in the minds of the young men and boys the belief that to risk their lives on the battlefield in defense of their country was a supreme privilege and duty. Of course, the war envisaged was always a war of defense, for no people and very few leaders had any wish to provoke a conflict if it could be honorably avoided, but military strategists were in general agreement that the best defensive was an offensive, and the high command in each state developed plans for hurling an army across its neighbor's frontier as the first measure of self-defense. As rumors of new and secret weapons and plans for sudden attacks filtered back and forth, they created a nightmare of suspicion and fear from which there seemed to be no possible escape. If one power increased its military budget, its opponents matched the increase and lengthened the period of conscript service; a strategic railway leading toward the frontier was countered by the construction of a new line of fortifications. By 1914, all Europe was tense with the strain and the expense of the long-drawn-out competition, and for some the bursting of the storm came almost as a relief.

Section F

THE WORLD WAR AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD

(1914–35)

The outbreak of a general European war in 1914, *which ultimately involved almost all the nations of the globe, marked the opening of a new and unsettled era. Despite the enormous destruction and the tragic sacrifices which it caused, the World War solved few problems and created many. Both victors and vanquished suffered irremediable losses, and the heritage of hate which the conflict bequeathed made a satisfactory settlement difficult.*

From the nightmare of war the European peoples emerged into a scarcely less desperate era of political turbulence and economic confusion. Although all classes earnestly desired to safeguard the world from future conflicts, the post-war years brought a general increase in armaments and a growing fear that Fate held even more destructive wars in reserve unless the machinery of peaceful arbitration could be greatly strengthened. Politically, the most significant development of the post-war period was the challenge to democracy and to democratic ideals afforded by the establishment of a new régime in Russia founded upon communist principles, and new governments in Italy and Germany which substituted the authoritarian rule of a single well-disciplined party, headed by a dictator, for the parliamentary rule of a popularly elected and representative assembly.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

THE WORLD WAR

We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples...
WOODROW WILSON (1917).

There never was a good war or a bad peace.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

THE incident which precipitated the long-dreaded war between the European powers in 1914 originated in the Balkans. A dispute which broke out between Austria and Serbia drew in Germany, as the ally of Austria, and Russia, as the protector of the Serbs. France was bound to Russia by treaty, and Britain chose to stand by France and Russia under the terms of the *Entente*. Thus the system of alliances which was supposed to preserve a balance of power not only failed to prevent war, but made it, when it came, an all but universal tragedy.

1. THE COMING OF THE WAR

For more than a decade before 1914, the governing classes in Austria-Hungary had grown increasingly alarmed at the spread of nationalist sentiment among the Slavic peoples of the Balkan lands, and they were particularly hostile toward the Serbs, who had taken the lead in urging the creation of a Slavic state to include if possible all the Balkan Slavs. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 had dealt a severe blow to these Serbian aspirations, and Austrian opposition prevented Serbia acquiring all the territory she desired after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13.[1] In revenge the Serbs waged a tariff war against Austria, their newspapers stirred up anti-Austrian feeling, and Serbian secret societies strove to excite the Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire to rebellion, despite the fact that the Serbian government had pledged itself to restrain such unfriendly activities.

Hostility between Austria-Hungary and Serbia

The Serbian plots to disrupt the Hapsburg Empire would not have constituted a serious menace if the Slavic subjects of Francis Joseph had been contented with their lot. But, although half the fifty million people living in Austria-Hungary were of Slavic origin, they possessed little political power, for the Germans and Magyars practically controlled the

[1] See above, pages 918–19.

government and were unwilling to relinquish their privileges. Some Austrian statesmen agreed that the best way to placate the Slavs and consolidate the empire was to extend greater political power to the subject Slavs, perhaps to transform the empire from a dual into a triple monarchy so that the Slavs might enjoy equality with the Germans and Magyars. Among the leaders believed to favor such a compromise was the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, nephew and heir of the Emperor Francis Joseph. The Serbian patriots, who hoped to win over the discontented inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina and unite them to a greater Serbia, feared that their chance might be lost if Franz Ferdinand mounted the throne and granted concessions. Many Germans and Magyars likewise regarded Franz Ferdinand with dislike because they feared his reforms might strip them of their preponderant influence in the empire. Whatever changes the archduke may have meditated (his intentions have never been made clear), his path was certain to be hedged with difficulties.

Assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand

But Franz Ferdinand was not destined to mount the Austrian throne. On June 28, 1914, he was assassinated while visiting the town of Sarajevo in Bosnia. The assassin was a Bosnian youth, Gavrilo Princip, but it was later proved that the act had been plotted in Belgrade and that officials in the Serbian army and the Serbian government had helped to provide the means. There is even some evidence to suggest that more than one member of the Serbian cabinet knew in advance of the conspiracy.

Austrian ultimatum to Serbia

The Austrian government, already hostile to the Pan-Slav Movement in the Balkans, could hardly fail to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered for a reckoning with Serbia. On July 23, the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary, Leopold von Berchtold, dispatched an ultimatum demanding in substance: (1) that the Serbian government suppress all anti-Austrian activity in Serbia and dismiss officials guilty of fomenting it; and (2) that Austrian officials be permitted to aid in this work of suppression and in the punishment of the conspirators who had planned the archduke's death. A reply to this ultimatum was demanded within forty-eight hours. The Serbian government yielded to the greater part of the Austrian demands, but some details they questioned, offering to submit them to a decision of the Hague Tribunal or a concert of the powers, and protesting that the active intervention of Austrian officials in Serbian affairs was inadmissible because it would violate the constitution and the law of criminal procedure. The conciliatory tone of the Serbian response of July 25 was contradicted, however, by Serbia's simultaneous mobilization for war.

The Austrian government, proclaiming the reply evasive and unsatisfactory, declared war against Serbia July 28.

The belligerent attitude of Austria was founded (1) on a promise of support from Germany, and (2) on a conviction that Russia, the natural protector of Serbia, would not intervene. But this time the Russian government was confident of French aid, for the president of the French Republic, Raymond Poincaré, had visited Saint Petersburg in July, 1914, and assured the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Serge Sazonov, of Franco-Russian solidarity. The Russians, therefore, began preparations for a general mobilization as early as July 25. On the same day, as the threat of a general war became apparent, the British foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, proposed a conference of British, French, German, and Italian ambassadors, to avert an Austro-Russian clash. Unfortunately, neither France nor Germany would endorse Grey's proposal for fear of offending their respective allies. Privately, however, Germany was advising Austria to show greater moderation, and urged that Russian fears should be allayed by a promise from Austria to respect Serbian integrity (July 28). Disregarding the advice from Berlin, the Austrians chose that date to declare war on Serbia.

The impotence of the diplomats

After July 28, the Serbian issue was completely overshadowed by the German alarm over the progress of Russian mobilization, officially decreed July 29 (a preparatory state of war had been proclaimed four days earlier). Mobilization made hostilities all but inevitable, and Kaiser William telegraphed Nicholas II entreating him earnestly to withdraw his order. The harassed czar thereupon "suspended" the order for mobilization against Germany, but his advisers persuaded him to renew it the following day (July 30). The kaiser, though proclaiming a "state of imminent danger of war," had delayed German mobilization while making his appeal to Nicholas. On July 31, he offered the Russians twelve hours in which to countermand their continued mobilization, waited twenty-four hours for a reply, and then, on August 1, announced that a state of war existed between Germany and Russia. From France, where mobilization had been going quietly forward since July 30, the German government demanded a statement of policy, and as no clear answer was obtainable (France had already promised Russia to fulfill her obligations as an ally), Germany declared war against France also (August 3).

If Germany and Austria fought Russia and France, could Great Britain remain neutral? The British were bound by no formal treaties, but the British fleet was pledged, by private agreement between the govern-

ments, to protect the northern French coasts while the French warships patrolled the Mediterranean. Sir Edward Grey, who had negotiated this "gentlemen's agreement," considered that Britain was bound in honor to aid France, but would the British Parliament and the British people see the matter in this light? On August 2, Grey's painful dilemma was solved by German ruthlessness, for on that date the German government demanded permission to march its armies through Belgium to attack France. This permission the Belgian government courageously refused. On August 4, the British government notified the German government that a state of war would commence at midnight unless Germany promised to respect Belgian neutrality. There was no reply, and Britain considered herself at war. It is not easy to see how neutrality could have been preserved in any case, for two days earlier, before Belgium had been invaded, the British cabinet had accepted responsibility under the "gentlemen's agreement" to protect the French coast.

The British attitude

Thus, within a week five great powers had plunged into a war of unpredictable dimensions. Italy, as might have been expected, deserted the Triple Alliance and issued a declaration of neutrality on the ground that Austria and Germany were engaged in an offensive, not a defensive, conflict. But a sixth power came into the struggle on August 23, when Japan declared war against Germany; and one week later, Turkey joined the "Central Powers." At first glance the "Allies" or "*Entente* Powers," Britain, France, and Russia, together with Japan and Serbia, appeared to have a great advantage over the Central Powers, Germany and Austria and their dubious ally Turkey. For the Allies possessed the world's greatest sea force, the British navy, and a combined potential man-power three times that of the Central Powers. They hoped, in consequence, to see a speedy conclusion to the war. But in modern warfare, training, equipment, and generalship count more than numbers, and here the superiority lay with the Central Powers and encouraged them also to look for an early victory. Only a few farsighted realists anticipated that the struggle might last three or four years, or apprehended the full magnitude of the tragedy which had overtaken European civilization.

From the outset each side endeavored to lay the full responsibility for the war upon the other, and each government in turn published an official explanation to justify its course of action. These accounts, the British Blue Book, the German White Book, the French Yellow Book, etc., were presented as impartial diplomatic surveys of the events leading to the outbreak of hostilities, but in actuality they were subtle instruments of justification and propaganda. Supported by a carefully cen-

sored and not infrequently a subsidized press, they convinced the people in each belligerent country that their government was in the right, and that they were fighting for their liberties against an unprovoked attack by scheming and unscrupulous foes. No people and no government (a few reckless individuals aside) had planned or desired war; but once war came, a wave of patriotic fervor swept the rival populations into a maelstrom of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice. This spirit was deliberately intensified by carefully circulated tales of enemy perfidy and brutality manufactured for purposes of propaganda by the governments participating. Some of the atrocities recounted were true, for war is a brutal and brutalizing affair, but most of them were inventions. In justifying their own acts and blackening the case of the Central Powers, the Allied governments enjoyed an important advantage, for they controlled the sea routes and the ocean cables of the world and were enabled to impress their version upon the neutral nations. By their indefatigable propaganda, they succeeded in fastening upon the Germans in particular a reputation for infamy and inhumanity, which the latter did much to earn by the barbarous and destructive acts they committed in their drive through Belgium and northern France. To the neutral observer, the fact that Austria had attacked Serbia, while Germany had violated Belgium and invaded France, made the Central Powers appear the aggressors and largely invalidated any explanation which they might attempt to offer.

The question of war guilt

No question in modern history has been the subject of such bitter controversy and such intensive research as this concerning the responsibility for the World War. The finger of guilt has been leveled in turn at the Austrian foreign minister, Berchtold, for his imperious note to Serbia; at the Russian foreign minister, Sazonov, for encouraging the Serbs and resisting mediation; at the French president, Poincaré, who assured Sazonov of French support, but failed to urge him to take a less aggressive stand. Throughout the war the German Kaiser, William II, was represented in the Allied countries as the arch-fiend who had planned the whole desperate drama in advance, with the aid of his ministers and generals. Still other critics have blamed Sir Edward Grey, arguing that, if Great Britain had pledged support to France and Russia earlier, Germany and Austria would have backed down; but as British statesmen appreciated at the time such a pledge might have moved Russia to greater belligerence. After twenty years of debate, the question "Who caused the war?" is still unsettled, but it has become reasonably clear that all the statesmen involved did what they earnestly believed to be their duty, and served the interests of their governments

and their allies in the fashion that seemed to them best. The issue therefore would appear to be not so much "Who caused the war?" as "What caused the war?" If the answer to the latter question can be found in a single word, the word is nationalism, or the juxtaposition of aggressive and imperialistic nation-states, each bent upon augmenting its power, each prepared to go to war in defense of what it assumes to be its legitimate interests, and each indisposed to recognize any authority, moral or political, as superior to itself. So long as this condition of international anarchy persists, an appeal to arms must remain an imminent possibility at all times, and the threat of war must continue to hang, like the sword of Damocles, above the apprehensive nations.

2. THE WAR ON LAND (1914–17)

The Schlieffen plan

The plan of the German high command called for a vast enveloping movement which would destroy the French armies in the west before the dilatory Russians could concentrate their forces in the east. Five German armies were to advance through Belgium and northern France, the First Army sweeping past Brussels on a semicircle which would carry it west and south of Paris, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies pivoting with it on concentric arcs with Metz as a center. Enveloped by this prodigious flanking movement, the French armies were to be herded against the Alsatian frontier, where the Sixth and Seventh German Armies formed an anvil upon which they could be pounded to pieces. Time was the most vital factor in this plan, time and a powerful right wing, for the First and Second Armies on the extreme right had the longest arc to follow and the heaviest resistance to overcome. Despite the heroic opposition of the Belgian forces, the Germans swept rapidly forward, driving back the French and a small British expeditionary force of one hundred thousand men. By September 5, the German First Army was within thirty miles of Paris and ahead of its schedule. But it was weaker than the original plan, designed by Count von Schlieffen in 1906, had ordained, and the troops were wearied by long marches. On September 6, the French attacked it desperately. In defending his right, the German general, von Kluck, opened a gap twenty miles wide between his forces and the Second Army on his left. French and British troops were hurled into this opening, making the position of the Germans still more hazardous, and after four days of fierce conflict they retreated. This first battle of the Marne (September 6–12) had not only saved Paris, but had irreparably dislocated the Schlieffen plan.

Throwing up entrenchments, the Germans quickly fortified a line against which the Allied troops pounded in vain (battle of the Aisne, September 13–21). By October this line stretched from the North Sea coast near the Franco-Belgian frontier to neutral Switzerland. The Germans hoped to capture the French seaports, Dunkirk, Calais, and possibly Boulogne,[1] in order to cripple communications between France and Britain, but they were blocked by the stubborn British resistance at Ypres. Before the close of 1914, the struggle in the west had changed from a war of movement to a war of position. Both sides constructed intricate systems of trenches fortified with barbed-wire entanglements and machine guns against which cavalry regiments were useless and infantry battalions hurled themselves in vain. The armies were unprepared for this type of warfare, and the commanders clung to the belief that, by wasting enough men in concentrated attacks, it would prove possible to break through the enemy lines and open a rapid deployment. In March, 1915, the British advanced one mile on a three-mile front at Neuve Chapelle, after an unprecedented bombardment, but the German lines held and the gain was dearly bought with thirteen thousand dead. A month later, the Germans surprised the Allied forces at Ypres with waves of poison gas, but this new and ghastly instrument of war failed to drive the defenders from the city and increased the reputation of the Germans for treachery and inhumanity.

The deadlock in the west

The year 1916 brought still further tragic proof that the western battle-line could not be broken. From February to June, the Germans assailed the great French fortress of Verdun. They gained over one hundred square miles of shell-torn ground, throwing in reserves until their casualties approached half a million, but the French had sworn, "They shall not pass," and Verdun still stood. In the north the Allies attacked in their turn, winning an equivalent area of tortured ground at twice the cost. In these prolonged battles the defenders suffered almost as heavily as the attackers, and the terrible slaughter weakened the morale of soldiers and civilians on both sides. There seemed, at the opening of 1917, to be little hope of forcing a decision in the west.

On the eastern front the campaigns had been more dramatic, but had proved even less favorable to the Allies. As the Russians had mobilized first, and with unexpected rapidity, they were able to invade East Prussia on the outbreak of war. To check their advance, the kaiser called from retirement General Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934), a clear-headed strategist of sixty-seven, who possessed an intimate knowledge of East Prussian topogra-

Battle of Tannenberg (August 26–31, 1914)

[1] See map following page 916.

phy. With a Napoleonic gesture, Hindenburg hurled his forces between two larger Russian armies, and won, at Tannenberg, the most decisive victory of the war. Driving the Russian Second Army into the morasses of the Masurian Lake region, he practically destroyed it, taking ninety thousand prisoners and two hundred guns; then turning against the Russian First Army, which was advancing on his left, he forced it to retreat behind the frontier. The losses suffered by the Russians were enormous, but their early drive had caused the German high command to recall several divisions needed on the western front and this depletion helped to weaken von Kluck's First Army in its decisive encounter on the Marne.

Against the Austrian armies the Russians continued for a time to compete with greater success, capturing the province of Galicia and one hundred thousand prisoners in September, 1914. But the tide turned when German reinforcements under von Hindenburg and von Mackensen came to the relief of the Dual Monarchy. Between May and September, 1915, the Russians were driven from Galicia and Poland with losses so catastrophic they appear incredible; at least one million of the czar's soldiers were made prisoner, and the list of killed and wounded must have reached twice that sum. From this drain of men and material Russia never recovered. Bulgaria decided the moment had come to join the Central Powers (October, 1915), and Serbia, vulnerable from three sides, was easily overrun. Before the end of 1915, the armies of Austria and Germany dominated the Balkans and had secured a direct land communication with their ally Turkey.

Austro-German victories in the east (1915)

Strategically the Central Powers possessed several important advantages, for they held the "inside lines" and could move their forces from one sector to another with rapidity and ease. Also, they were in a position to cut Russia off from easy communication with France and Britain by blocking both the Baltic and the Black Seas. The Allies, hoping to force their way to Constantinople and open the Black Sea to their ships, prepared an attack on the Dardanelles early in 1915, but were compelled to abandon the project after a year of costly blunders. A British expedition which advanced from the Persian Gulf toward Bagdad in 1915 was likewise defeated. To offset these staggering reverses on the eastern and Turkish fronts, the Allies had the meager satisfaction of repelling several assaults which the Turks directed against the Suez Canal.

The Dardanelles campaign

One other important development of the year 1915 was the intervention of Italy in the conflict. On May 23, after eight months of bargain-



From Ewing Galloway, N.Y.

FIELD MARSHAL PAUL VON HINDENBURG
1847–1934

As a field marshal in the World War, and later as president of the German Republic, Hindenburg displayed in marked degree the self-discipline, inflexibility of temper, and devotion to duty which have long distinguished the Prussian ruling class.

ing with the opposing camps, the Italian government declared war against Austria. In return for this assistance the Allied Powers promised her all those sections of "unredeemed Italy" to the north and east of the Adriatic Sea which she coveted, and more if she could take it, for in disposing of enemy territory the Allies could afford to be generous. Among themselves, the Allies had already agreed that when the war had been won Russia should have Constantinople, France should reoccupy Alsace and Lorraine, and Great Britain should acquire the lion's share of the German colonies. But as 1916 succeeded 1915, bringing victory no nearer, the optimism of the Allied nations began to fade. In the west the indecisive carnage of Verdun and the Somme decimated the conscript armies. In the south the Italians were hard-pressed to hold their own against the Austrian offensives. In the east a valiant Russian drive in Galicia (June–July, 1916) raised undue hopes and encouraged Rumania to declare for the Allies, whereupon the armies of the Central Powers swiftly overran the kingdom and seized the Rumanian harvest. Thus the closing months of 1916 found the Central Powers holding Belgium, part of northeastern France, Poland, Serbia, Montenegro, and most of Rumania. So far as land operations were concerned, they appeared to be winning the war despite their costly failure at Verdun.

Italy joins the Allies (1915)

3. THE WAR ON THE SEA

The operations on land, however, did not tell the whole story. On the sea the Allies had applied their superior naval forces with immediate effect, capturing, sinking, or driving into port all ships flying the flags of the Central Powers. Great Britain then declared all enemy territory in a state of blockade and attempted to seize as contraband all materials useful in the prosecution of the war. As the months passed, the British government increased the list of goods liable to be confiscated, and even restricted the importation of merchandise into neutral countries like Holland and Denmark on the ground that any surplus was intended for Germany. The United States and other neutral nations protested vigorously against the British actions, which violated international agreements, and the Germans complained with justice that the Declaration of Paris [1] and later declarations concerning the seizure of contraband in time of war were being flouted daily. To this the British replied that the German government had been the first to disregard international laws and treaties, and insisted that it must bear

The naval blockade

[1] See above, page 788.

the responsibility if its civilian population suffered hardships because the supply of fuel, cotton, and foodstuffs had been curtailed by the blockade.

In addition to the strangling effect of this state of siege, which steadily reduced the morale and resistance of the German people, the Allies took advantage of their control of the sea to isolate and capture the German colonies, to transport their own supplies and men to the scene of conflict, and to maintain the shipments of food and raw material without which British industry and the British population would have slowly starved. Furthermore, England and France could purchase munitions in the United States, where factories were kept running day and night to fill their orders, while Germany and Austria were cut off from this important source of supplies. Under the circumstances it is not altogether surprising that the Germans decided upon a program of retaliation against Allied shipping, planning by means of submarine boats to enforce a counter-blockade.

The German submarine blockade

Early in 1915, the German government pronounced the waters surrounding the British Isles a "war zone" in which any merchant ship of the Allied nations might expect to be torpedoed without warning. This application of a new naval weapon, the submarine boat, proved at first highly successful; British ships were sunk almost daily, the most important being the giant liner *Lusitania* which was torpedoed on May 7, 1915, with a loss of over eleven hundred lives. But the campaign of the undersea boats failed to stop the flow of Allied commerce, although it seriously depleted the supply of merchant ships. Moreover, it injured the German cause by inflaming neutral opinion against the Central Powers. The arrogance of the British, in searching ships on the high seas and confiscating their cargoes, appeared almost pardonable in comparison with the inhumanity of the German U-boat commanders who sank ships, cargoes, and passengers indiscriminately. Strong protests from the United States after the sinking of the *Lusitania* impelled the German government to modify its procedure for a year, but in January, 1917, it announced a policy of "unrestricted submarine warfare" under which any ship, belligerent or neutral, which entered the danger zones surrounding the coasts of the British Isles, France, or Italy, would expose itself to destruction without warning. The Germans hoped by this defiant course to destroy one million tons of shipping a month and cripple the Allied transportation system beyond salvation, but they failed in their objective and sealed their fate by drawing the United States into the war on the side of their opponents.

In the years preceding the war, an American naval historian, Captain

(later Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan, wrote several widely read books to prove that in warfare a power which controls the sea possesses a decisive advantage over its adversary, an advantage which, if it be maintained, must almost certainly assure victory in the end. The Allied peoples found this argument a consolation during the dark days of the World War; but some German theorists retorted that, even if Mahan's conclusions had held true in the past, the submarine had changed conditions, for it gave the Central Powers a means to control the seas also. But before the war ended, the destructiveness of the submarine boats had been severely curtailed by the improved tactics and vigilance of surface craft, and flotillas of merchant ships, heavily guarded, were passed safely through the forbidden zones. Had the Germans made good their threat to destroy the ships of the Allies faster than they could be replaced, the war might have had a different ending, but since the Allies did succeed, though with difficulty, in maintaining their control of the sea, Mahan's thesis appeared to be vindicated.

Only once throughout the war did the German High Seas Fleet risk a major engagement with the British Grand Fleet. On May 31, 1916, the British admiral, Jellicoe, learning that the Germans had left port, converged upon them with superior forces, and attempted to draw them into a trap by advancing his cruiser squadron as a lure. When the German admiral, von Scheer, discovered the ruse, he extricated his slower fleet with exceptional skill, and after darkness had fallen slipped through a British destroyer screen to safety. Both sides claimed a victory, the Germans because they inflicted losses double their own upon a superior enemy force, the British because they remained masters of the scene of combat and held their supremacy without a second direct challenge until the end of the war. In marksmanship, maneuvering, and night fighting, however, the Germans had displayed a technical superiority which won the admiration of their foes.

Battle of Jutland (May 31, 1916)

The battle of Jutland probably represents the only occasion when the war could have been won or lost in half an hour. Had the English seized this unique chance to destroy the German High Seas Fleet, they could have opened the Baltic and secured their sorely needed communication with ice-free Russian ports. On the other hand, a striking German success which broke the blockade and exposed Allied merchant shipping to the risk of capture and destruction by German cruisers would have proved more paralyzing than the submarine campaign at its worst. But because Britain continued to rule the waves, and because the arrival of American naval reinforcements after April,

Effects of the blockade

1917, made a further sally by the German fleet an unwise gamble, the inexorable pressure of the blockade continued. The growing shortage of rubber, oil, nickel, cotton, and many other substances necessary in the conduct of modern technical warfare, sapped the resistance of the Central Empires. The curtailment of the food supply was less vital, for by strict rationing and the use of substitutes the beleaguered peoples learned how to dispense almost entirely with the luxury of foreign products. There can be no doubt, however, that malnutrition, added to the horror and the strain of war, induced the final collapse of their morale.

4. THE WAR ON LAND (1917–18)

The war might well have ended in 1916 in a general stalemate and a compromise peace. Allied mastery on the sea largely nullified the successes won by the Central Powers on land, and all the belligerents had come to realize that a decisive victory would demand disproportionate slaughter and ruinous expense. Yet, when the German government proposed "to enter into peace negotiations" (December 12, 1916), the Allied Powers returned a joint refusal, declaring the offer a ruse designed to create dissension in the Allied countries, and stigmatizing it as "empty and insincere." In the same month President Wilson dispatched a note through the state department of the United States, urging the adversaries to draw up an outline of their war aims. Wilson pointed out that the precise objectives for which the nations were fighting had never been definitely stated, and he suggested that an interchange of views might clear the way for a conference. To this friendly overture the Central Powers responded that they had themselves proposed an interchange of views a few days earlier. The Allied nations replied at greater length with a general but not entirely frank definition of their objectives, including "the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro . . . evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, and in Rumania . . . liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign [i.e., Austro-Hungarian] domination, [and] the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks . . .' The Allies also demanded compensation and indemnities, and adequate guaranties for the future peace of Europe.

Peace negotiations of 1916

Only definite defeat could bring the Central Powers to accept such terms, for they involved the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire. The insistence of the Allied governments that Germany and Austria were exclusively responsible for the war, and the rejection without thanks of

the German peace overture, destroyed all hope of an early conference and condemned Europe to nearly two more years of bloodshed. In choosing this course the Allies were influenced chiefly by the fear that in 1916 they would enter negotiations at a disadvantage, and by the hope that by further and better concerted action they might win a decisive victory and dictate their own terms.

Outbreak of the Russian Revolution (1917)

Following the rejection of the peace proposals, Germany turned to new and more ruthless methods of submarine warfare, for more than ever Time had become the enemy of the Central Powers. The Allies planned to make 1917 a year of synchronized attacks from all sides, but their hopes were betrayed through the collapse of Russia. Demoralized by the terrible slaughter, the failure of supplies and of munitions, and the despair which had followed on their disastrous reverses, the Russian armies and the Russian people broke into a popular revolt and the forces of government dissolved in spontaneous anarchy. Nicholas II was compelled to abdicate (March 15, 1917) and a republic was proclaimed. For several months the French and British clung to the illusion that the new Russian government would press the war with fresh vigor, but after a second revolution in November, 1917 (which is treated more fully in Chapter XXIX), the radical faction known as the Bolsheviki secured control and arranged a truce extremely favorable to the Central Powers. The withdrawal of Russia from the war was formally confirmed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which was signed in March, 1918.

The United States enters the war (April, 1917)

While losing one ally, however, the *Entente* nations found another and more powerful one. The campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, opened by the Central Powers in February, 1917, imperiled the lives of such American citizens as chose to sail on ships entering the war zones. Hostility toward the Central Powers had grown steadily in the United States. It was fostered by Allied propaganda, by sympathy for France and Belgium, and by the ill-advised activities of German agents who attempted to prevent the shipment of munitions from the United States to the *Entente* nations. The fact, too, that American financiers had advanced a billion and a half dollars in credits to the Allied governments played its part in shaping sentiment toward intervention. On February 3, 1917, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, and on April 6, Congress voted to declare war. This action meant that the enormous wealth, the industrial equipment, the natural resources, and the undepleted man-power of the American people would be available for the French, British, and Italians to draw upon. Sweeping measures were

rushed through Congress extending loans to the Allied governments, mobilizing millions of men for military service overseas, and speeding up the production of ships, shells, guns, airplanes, and all the other forms of material and equipment essential to the vigorous prosecution of a modern war.

The German offensives of 1917 and 1918

Fortune was clearly deserting the Central Powers, but the German general staff, now dominated by Erich von Ludendorff, was still confident of victory and decided to risk everything upon a gambler's chance. With Russia in collapse, and the United States unprepared to train and dispatch large forces to Europe for at least a year, the Germans possessed a numerical superiority on the French and Italian fronts at any point where they chose to concentrate their reserves. In October, 1917, they launched a drive against the Italians at Caporetto, and the resulting *débâcle* cost Italy three quarters of a million men and all but drove the nation out of the war. Then the Germans prepared for a spring offensive on the western front, a drive of unparalleled proportions by which they hoped to bring the French and British to terms. All the nations were war-weary, the spirit of defeatism had infected soldiers and civilians alike, and both the French and Italian governments had crushed serious mutinies among the troops by wholesale executions. The Germans believed that the morale of the Allied armies would break under a new assault before July, 1918, so that the American reinforcements, even if they escaped the hazards of submarine attack, would reach France too late to turn the tide of war. In March, 1918, von Ludendorff delivered his first blow in this "Victory Drive," shattering the British Fifth Army, but stopping just short of the important railway junction of Amiens. A second blow parted the British lines before Lille. The numerical preponderance which the Germans enjoyed had given them two important though not decisive victories, but the cost exacted was half a million casualties. Their third drive, against the French this time, carried them forward thirty miles to the Marne River, so that they were almost as close to Paris as during their first rush of 1914. Ludendorff now prepared his fourth stroke, which was designed to capture Reims and dislocate the Allied front so completely that it would end the war.

The German drive fails (July, 1918)

This supreme offensive opened in mid-July, 1918. The Allied armies, recently unified under the command of General Ferdinand Foch, were learning to concert their resistance to better effect; they held firm against the fury of the German assault, and after three days they counter-attacked so energetically that the whole aspect of the war changed in two weeks. This second battle of

the Marne (July 15—August 2, 1918) was even more decisive than the first. With American reinforcements coming into line by the hundreds of thousands, Foch gave orders to General Haig, who directed the British expeditionary force, and to General Pershing, who commanded the American army in France, to attack the enemy along the whole line. With the advantage of numbers now turning against them, the Germans were driven slowly back, in a rearguard action of such magnitude that it cost them another half-million casualties by the middle of September. The tide had turned irreversibly and the end was in sight.

Withdrawal of Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary (September—November, 1918)

In September, Bulgaria sued for peace. An Allied army, operating from Salonica, had reconquered Macedonia and Serbia, and was threatening the Bulgarian capital. A few weeks later, the Turkish Empire collapsed. The British had entered Jerusalem (December, 1917), and, after joining forces with rebellious Arab leaders, General Allenby opened a campaign in 1918 which overthrew the Turkish strongholds from Bagdad to Aleppo. With her southern allies dropping out of the war, Austria-Hungary could not hope to resist invasion. Her subject peoples were rising in revolt and her armies falling back before the Italians when the Dual Monarchy capitulated on November 4, 1918. In reality, even while the envoys were signing the armistice, the proud Austro-Hungarian Empire had ceased to exist, for the same day the Emperor Charles VII (who had succeeded Francis Joseph in 1916) renounced his throne, and the Poles, Czechs, Croats, and Slovenes were organizing independent states.

Fully aware that the war was lost, but preserving their admirable discipline throughout the retreat, the German armies fought on stubbornly while their allies fell away from them and Foch's unremitting attacks multiplied from day to day. In the end it was the civilian population of Germany which first broke under the strain of defeat, starvation, and disillusionment. Repudiating the imperial government which had promised victory and now stood forsworn, the inhabitants of Munich and Berlin, and the sailors in the naval squadrons at Kiel, raised republican flags during the first week of November. On the tenth, William II fled to Holland, and the following day the German delegates, who had been sent to ask for an armistice, signed under protest the terms of surrender which Foch had drawn up. The reversal of fortune in the final months of the war had been so swift that the Allied Governments chose to regard the Germans' acceptance of a truce as an unconditional capitulation. Firing ceased at eleven o'clock on the morning of November 11, 1918.

5. THE COST OF THE WAR

For over three years the leading nations of the world had strained their resources to the breaking point in the work of slaughter and destruction. Before its close the World War had involved over thirty states and left no part of the planet or its population unaffected. The magnitude of the struggle blunted the comprehension even of those who lived through it, and no later description can give more than a feeble suggestion of its horrors. Statistics are but a ghostly residue of what were once flaming facts, and it is better perhaps that no ciphers on a page can ever borrow the power to clothe with reality for later eyes this greatest of modern tragedies.

Eight million soldiers, the finest of their generation, had perished, over six thousand a day for each day that the war continued. Nearly three times as many had been wounded, some in such ghastly fashion that they took their own lives rather than survive as blinded, crippled, or paralyzed invalids. Losses of life among the civilian population from shell fire, air raids, submarine attacks, the hardships of the blockade, and other causes, cannot be easily estimated; and it is still less possible to find any measurement for the spiritual anguish endured, the waiting for word from the missing, the disruption of family life, the shock and the grief as the friends and relatives of eight million men faced the knowledge that the dead would not return.

Loss of life

For the material costs of the war the figures are too vast to bear any recognizable relation to familiar things. The property destroyed, mines flooded, trees shattered, buildings razed, ships and cargoes sunk, have been valued at thirty billion dollars. Modern methods of fighting proved far more expensive than anyone had conceived and grew more so daily, until the combatants were spending ten million dollars *an hour*, and piled up a grand total of war expenditure by November, 1918, which has been estimated at one hundred and eighty-six billion dollars. But when, to the cost of mobilizing sixty-five million men for military service, one adds the sacrifice entailed by withdrawing them from profitable and productive occupations, the loss to civilization becomes vastly greater. This expense of energy and of gold, turned into channels of peaceful accomplishment, might have replaced all the tenements in all the cities of Europe and America by model houses; might have curbed disease and provided medical service which would have saved as many lives as the war cost; might have banished illiteracy among the civilized nations and endowed free libraries in every town. Applied to more prosaic purposes, these billions would have cancelled

Material costs

the national debt of all the belligerent states and eased the burden of taxation, instead of leaving the governments in a state scarcely distinguishable from bankruptcy.

The scientists and inventors who had done so much to enrich and extend the life of man in recent generations were summoned by the warring governments to devise new methods of mass murder and new safeguards against it. Guns remained the principal weapons, but all types, from the light machine guns to the German long-range cannon which shelled Paris from a point seventy miles away, were developed to an extraordinary pitch of efficiency. Of new devices the most terrifying was poison gas, first utilized by the Germans, and the most effective the cumbersome armored tractors or "tanks," a British invention designed for smashing a way through entrenchments and barbed-wire entanglements impassable for infantry. Bombs dropped from the air, another innovation, were generally more spectacular than effective, but the airplane proved an invaluable aid in reconnaissance work and in directing artillery fire. The construction of underground defenses, often reinforced with sheet iron and concrete, and of fortified machine-gun stations led to a much wider demand for high-explosive shells, which were used to destroy these positions as completely as possible before the infantry attempted to pass.

In sea fighting the most novel diversion was provided by the submarine boat, but it is a truism in warfare that new weapons are met by new defenses. Before the conflict ended, the British and their allies had perfected methods for the detection and destruction of undersea craft which seriously curbed their activities. The question whether the giant battleships, which were the pride of all the pre-war navies, could survive the threat of airplanes and submarines remained open to debate, but most naval experts were satisfied that the dreadnought would preserve its relative invulnerability, and they continued to repose their trust in these floating fortresses with their armor plate a foot thick and their guns which hurl one-ton projectiles.

More than any previous struggle, the World War proved itself a war of steel and gold. Only nations which possess huge financial reserves, and can command the industrial equipment to supply the munitions required, are capable of waging a modern war successfully. The day had past, also, when a state could entrust its defense to a small professional army while the people went about their daily business. Not only the able-bodied men, but all the citizens of a society, may be conscripted for war service of one sort or another in the modern state. Nor are all the casualties confined to the firing line, as the British discovered when their

merchant ships were torpedoed and German airships dropped bombs on London. With no fireside secure, and the pervasive force of official propaganda reaching every quarter of the country, it was practically impossible for any citizens to preserve an indifferent or an open mind on the issues of the struggle. Patriotism triumphed, and on both sides, as the casualties mounted, a sense of loyalty to the heroic dead demanded further sacrifices from the living.

To maintain their peoples in this exalted mood, governments resorted to every device which could stimulate a waning morale. Indeed, the "propaganda offensive" waged by all the belligerents was perhaps the most significant weapon which the war developed. Official spokesmen of the Allies and the Central Powers consistently idealized their own acts and objectives while unscrupulously misrepresenting the aims and actions of their enemies. In this deceptive art the governments of Great Britain and France displayed a marked superiority, impressing, not only their own nationals, but many neutral observers also, with the unimpeachable justice of their cause. They represented the war as a struggle between the forces of autocracy and democracy, between despotic rulers swayed by lust for conquest and free peoples defending their liberties, this despite the fact that Russia, most autocratic of the European governments, fought on the side of the Allies. World opinion was further impressed by the Allied claims after the United States joined in the war in the spring of 1917. Woodrow Wilson proclaimed with stirring phrases that the free peoples of the world were fighting to make the world "safe for democracy" and to secure a just and lasting peace. In warfare slogans are sometimes more effective than shells. The idealization of Allied war aims which Wilson presented as his "Fourteen Points" (January 8, 1918) not only inspired the people in all the Allied countries, but influenced the German and Austrian nationals also. When, in the autumn of 1918, the war-weary German people sued for an armistice, it was to Wilson that they appealed, and to his program. But Wilson referred their request for a peace based upon the Fourteen Points to the Allied and Associated Powers, and these powers accepted it "subject to . . . qualifications." What these qualifications were will be explained in the next chapter.

War propaganda

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT OF 1919

The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interests of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world.


WOODROW WILSON (January 8, 1918).

NO PEACE conference has an easy task to perform, for the disputes which precipitate a war are seldom settled by the strife and the bloodshed, and new problems are certain to be created during the struggle. The student will recall the high hopes with which the people of Europe waited for the Congress of Vienna to assemble in 1814, and the disillusionment which followed as they concluded that the chief interest of the diplomats was not to secure a just settlement, but "to divide among the conquerors the spoils taken from the vanquished." After the World War ended in 1918, the nations, victors and vanquished alike, passed through a similar transition from hope to bitterness, and their dissatisfaction over the peace settlement of 1919 was even more profound and more general than the disappointment which succeeded the Napoleonic Wars a century earlier.

1. IDEALS AND REALITIES

Wilson's idealism

There were many complex reasons why the delegates who met at Versailles in 1919 could not justify the hopes reposed in them. The chief difficulty, perhaps, was the gulf which had been dug between ideals and realities. While the World War raged, neither the Allied governments nor those of the Central Powers had admitted frankly and publicly the concrete advantages which they hoped to derive from victory. As early as 1916, President Wilson had proposed privately that the Allies summon the Central Powers to a peace of no annexations and no indemnities, intimating that if Germany and Austria refused this offer the United States would help to enforce it. But the Allied statesmen, bound by their secret projects for national aggrandizement, evaded the suggestion. When, a year later, the United States declared war against Germany, Wilson insisted that the American people had no selfish ends to serve. "We desire no conquest, no dominion," he averred. "We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind."



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WOODROW WILSON
1856–1924

Wilson's enigmatic personality puzzled his associates. Some considered him a sincere humanitarian, some a clever politician, and some a dogmatic idealist; but almost all agreed that he was a difficult colleague with whom to work.

By implication, the other "champions of the rights of mankind," Great Britain, France, and Italy, were likewise fighting to put an end to armaments and the spirit of militarism, to assure the principle of self-determination to all oppressed peoples, and to organize a world league of free nations pledged to live together for the future in peace and harmony. But unfortunately, these ideals were above the level of events, as the pre-election promises of politicians are above the predatory machinations of a party eager for the spoils of office.

David Lloyd George, prime minister of Great Britain after December, 1916, and the fiery French premier, Georges Clemenceau, recognizing the enthusiasm which Wilson's peace program evoked among the war-weary population, identified themselves with it and allowed Wilson to appear the spokesman for all the Allied and Associated governments. Everywhere people came to think of Wilson's Fourteen Points as embodying the generous aims for which the Allies were fighting, and even the Germans and Austrians trusted that the United States would contribute its powerful influence to assure a just treaty in accordance with Wilson's program. It is time, therefore, to examine the famous Fourteen Points in detail, before seeking to explain what happened to them when the congress finally assembled. A summary of them follows.

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at...
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas... alike in peace and in war...
III. The removal, as far as possible, of all economic barriers...
IV. Adequate guaranties given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims...
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement... as will secure [for Russia]... an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy...
VII. Belgium... must be evacuated and restored...
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France in the matter... of Alsace-Lorraine... should be righted.
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary... should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free access to the sea...
XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured

a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule . . . autonomous development . . .

XIII. An independent Polish state . . . should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations . . . [and should] be assured a free and secure access to the sea . . .

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

These were lofty and unselfish aims which would, many people hoped, remove the causes that were responsible for past wars, and safeguard the world from armed conflict in the future. Of course, it was easy to foresee that some of the points, such as the demarcation of Italian or Polish frontiers "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality," might prove more complex in practice than in theory, but it was hoped that any hasty or unwise decisions compounded in the hurry of a general settlement could be rectified later by an appeal to the League of Nations. The creation of such a league, though not mentioned until the last clause of Wilson's program, remained to him the point of first importance.

The secret treaties

What the advocates of a "just peace" failed to allow for were the national passions which propaganda and sacrifice had fanned to an irrational pitch; the distorting effect of the "war-guilt" thesis, which had convinced millions of people in the Allied countries that William II and his responsible subordinates ought to be punished for their "crimes against humanity"; and the malign force of those secret agreements which Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and Rumania had already concluded with respect to the disposal of the Rhineland, the Adriatic littoral, the Turkish Empire, and the German colonies. Allied forces, chiefly British and Japanese, had conquered all the German colonies by 1918, and possession is nine tenths of international law. French statesmen had informed London and Saint Petersburg of a project to detach the left bank of the Rhine from the German Empire in the interests of security. Russia had been promised control of Constantinople and the Straits, although guaranties made to Russia might conveniently be revoked because that country had made a separate peace and was in no condition to insist upon the bargain. But the other parties to the secret treaty of London (April 26, 1915), to the secret accord with Rumania (August 17, 1917), and the secret conventions which drew Greece to the side of the Allies, were not likely to renounce their promised rewards. Wilson had been too sanguine in his assumption that the day of "secret covenants," of "conquest and aggrandizement," had gone by. The cause for which he strove

was lost in advance before he sailed for Paris, and the "war to end war," as an embittered humorist remarked, seemed likely to be followed by "a peace to end peace."

2. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

In defiance of customary diplomatic usuage, the four defeated nations, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria, were excluded from any share in shaping the treaties of peace. Nor did any of the lesser states among the thirty-two "Allied and Associated" victors play a significant rôle. The real masters of the conference were the "Big Four," the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. Lloyd George, who was the idol of his countrymen and had guided England through the last two years of the war; Clemenceau, whose fierce resolution had silenced the "defeatists" in France when they abandoned hope of victory; Vittorio Orlando, prime minister of Italy, and the only one of the Big Four who spoke no English; and Woodrow Wilson, the first president of the United States to visit Europe while he was in office and participate personally in a peace congress — these were the men who formed the real deliberative committee which decided the peace.

The "Big Four"

In the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, where the German Empire had been proclaimed on January 18, 1871, a peace conference assembled exactly forty-eight years later to signalize the ignominious defeat of that empire. By May, the treaty had been drafted and the Germans were summoned to sign it. Stunned by the severity of the terms, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, head of the delegation, entered an earnest protest at the contradiction between the draft of the treaty and the assurances granted the Central Powers when the armistice was negotiated. The Allied governments, however, were adamant in their hour of victory, and on June 28, yielding to necessity, the Germans accepted the treaty, acknowledging "the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies" (Article 231).

The terms of the armistice, supplemented by the peace treaty, condemned the Germans to make restitution for property destroyed by their armies in the occupied regions. They turned over thousands of locomotives, railway cars, automobile trucks, farm machines, horses, swine, sheep, and cattle to the Allied govern-

Material surrendered

ments. They also surrendered the best part of their merchant marine as compensation for Allied shipping sunk by their submarines, and promised to construct up to one million tons of new ships for the same purpose. Substantial payments in the form of coal, dyestuffs, chemicals, etc., were likewise required of them, and the German-owned ocean cables passed under the control of the victors.

Territorial concessions

The Treaty of Versailles reduced the area and population of the German Empire by approximately one tenth. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were restored to France; some small districts (Eupen, Moresnet, and Malmédy) were transferred to Belgian sovereignty; and the Saar Valley, with its valuable coal-mines, was placed in pawn for fifteen years, after which the inhabitants might vote for independence, for union with France, or for reunion with Germany. On the eastern frontier, Germany surrendered all the segments of Poland acquired in the eighteenth-century partitioning of that state. To provide Poland with an outlet to the Baltic Sea, a "corridor" was created which separated East Prussia from the remainder of Germany, while Danzig, with a population predominantly German, was incorporated in the Polish tariff system as a (nominally) free city. Germany also lost part of Upper Silesia to Poland although a plebiscite (1921) indicated a German majority throughout the greater part of the disputed territory. The city of Memel was finally allotted (1924) to the Lithuanian Republic; and a plebiscite in the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein gave Schleswig back to Denmark.

Colonies

Article 119 of the treaty declared that "Germany renounces in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions." Japan acquired the German posts and privileges in Shantung Province, China, and all the Pacific islands north of the Equator where the German flag had flown in 1914. Islands south of the Equator passed into British control, and the British also took over German East Africa and German South-West Africa. The French added the German Kamerun territory north of the Congo to their empire in Equatorial Africa. A suggestion put forward by the Germans that the computed value of these colonies might reasonably be deducted from the reparations total was disallowed by the Allied governments.

Reparations

Unable, in the few months at their disposal, to compute the total bill for reparations, the peacemakers contented themselves with stipulating that "Germany undertakes that she will make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population." A reparations commission, created to assess the damages and

to examine the capacity of the Germans to pay, set the sum (1921) at thirty-three billion dollars. Although economists pointed out that there was no precedent for such a huge indemnity, and insisted that it could never be collected, the politicians and the Allied peoples were more sanguine, for the treaty entitled the victors to take punitive measures if the Germans fell behind in their payments, and the slogan that Germany should be made to pay to the last penny had been reiterated too long to be easily relinquished. Ten years of economic confusion and a world-wide depression in trade and manufacturing activities supervened before the Allied governments could be persuaded to reduce the German obligations to a sum which might be transferred without dislocating the machinery of international finance.[1]

Guaranties

The Allied high command maintained the economic blockade in force after the Central Powers had capitulated, an exercise of rigor which caused an alarming spread of tuberculosis and other diseases fostered by malnutrition among the enfeebled population of the demoralized states. This policy, insisted upon by the French, was short-sighted as well as inhuman, since it was equivalent to starving the goose which was expected to produce golden eggs in the form of reparation payments. Of further resistance from the defeated nations there could be little fear, for the Germans had surrendered their navy to the British under the terms of the armistice, and Allied troops held the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads on the right bank at Mainz, Coblenz, and Cologne. The Treaty of Versailles exacted further guaranties that Germany would keep the peace, reducing the German army to one hundred thousand men and the navy to a handful of small or obsolete ships. No submarines or military aircraft were to be maintained, and all fortifications dismantled in the areas occupied by Allied troops and up to a line drawn forty kilometers to the east of the Rhine. Provision was made for the gradual evacuation of the occupied districts, to be completed within fifteen years, but the Allies retained the option of delaying, or even of reoccupying the left bank "to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guaranties" (Article 429).

Repeatedly during the war the Allied spokesmen had emphasized the point that their quarrel concerned the imperial government of Germany rather than the German people. President Wilson had reaffirmed this view. "We have no quarrel with the German people," he declared on April 2, 1917. "We have no feeling toward them but

[1] See below, page 1001,.

GERMANY AFTER THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war." Such protestations had encouraged the Germans to hope that, after they had overthrown the kaiser (November, 1918) and adopted a republican constitution (February, 1919), they would be permitted to join in the peace discussions, and to enter the League of Nations as an equal. The Socialist majority in the National or Weimar Assembly elected Friedrich Ebert provisional president of the German Republic, and this choice of a man who had begun life as a saddler, together with the democratic guaranties which distinguished the new constitution, advertised to the world that the German people had repudiated the ideals of their late masters. But this espousal of democracy gained them little appreciable advantage in the form of more lenient terms of peace. The Allied statesmen, who had professed a desire to see Germany a democratic republic, dealt the new government a deadly blow by forcing it to assume the onus of concluding a peace which patriotic Germans could never remember without a sense of humiliation. The Weimar Régime, as the republican experiment was called, never succeeded in clearing itself before the bar of German opinion for its inescapable part in "the betrayal of 1919."

The Weimar Assembly adopts a republican constitution (1919)

3. THE SETTLEMENT WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND TURKEY

Before the Peace Conference assembled in January, 1919, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had ceased to exist. The subject peoples of the Hapsburg domains had felt little enthusiasm for the war, and the defeat of the Central Powers brought them a chance to assert their independence. It devolved, therefore, upon the Peace Conference to draw geographical boundaries for the nascent states in accordance with the principle of the self-determination of nations.

The Allies embodied their terms to Austria in the Treaty of Saint-Germain (September 10, 1919), which limited the Austrian Republic to an area one tenth the size of the former Hapsburg Empire. The six and a half million Austrian Germans who inhabited the diminutive state realized that a free national existence under these restricted conditions was impracticable because of economic problems. They asked to be united to Germany, but France feared to permit this aggrandizement of her defeated foe and the treaty specifically prohibited such a fusion. Hungary suffered a similar fate

Fate of Austria and Hungary

by the Treaty of the Trianon (June 4, 1920), the once proud Magyars retaining control of a small state comprising some thirty-six thousand square miles and nine million people. Like Austria, Hungary was called upon to bear part of the burden of reparations, although the ability of either country to pay, or even to survive, in its mutilated condition was open to doubt. As the Allies refused to permit the Hungarians to recall a Hapsburg to the throne, Hungary remained a kingdom without a king.

From the peripheral areas of the defunct empire the peacemakers constructed one new state and enlarged four others. The new state, the Republic of Czechoslovakia, included over three million Germans, Magyars, and Slovenes, for the Allied statesmen proved more generous toward the demands of the Czechs and Slovaks than just toward the German and Magyar minorities. The province of Galicia, lying to the north of Czechoslovakia across the Carpathian Mountains, was transferred to Poland; and Rumania received, as a reward for joining the Allies, the extensive province of Transylvania and part of the district known as the Banat. The remainder of the Banat and the late Austrian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were united to Serbia and Montenegro to form the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Finally, the Italians received the district known as the Trentino, and claimed all the Istrian Peninsula, including the cities of Trieste and Fiume. These claims were based upon the secret understandings which Italy had reached with her allies; but President Wilson refused to approve the cession of Fiume, and the Italian delegate, Orlando, withdrew from the conference in protest. A separate agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia (Treaty of Rapallo, 1920) finally divided the disputed area and established Fiume as a free city.[1]

Bulgaria

By the Treaty of Neuilly (November 27, 1919), the Bulgarians paid for their mistake in joining the side destined for defeat, by losing part of the gains which they had saved from the Balkan Wars and also their World War conquests. Greece and Yugoslavia (Serbia) were the principal beneficiaries, and the Bulgarians, in addition to promising reparation payments and reducing their armed forces, were obliged to see a million of their fellow nationals placed under foreign rule.

Of the four defeated powers, the Turkish Empire, which had been the first to crumble, was the most truculent in adversity. The Allies planned to divide the greater part of the Ottoman possessions among themselves as protectorates, but the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920),

[1] See map following page 954.

embodying these intentions, proved unenforceable. The Turks were stirred to national resistance by the severe terms, denounced the treaty, and repudiated the helpless sultan at Constantinople who had accepted it. In 1919, the Greeks, who had been promised a share of Anatolia, landed an army at Smyrna to help in carving up the Ottoman possessions, but in 1922, this expeditionary force was driven into the sea by the armies of the newly organized Turkish Republic. The English were chagrined, the French secretly gratified by this development, for the two powers were already pursuing divided aims in the Near East, and the Turks profited by this divergence to secure their hold on Constantinople and demand recognition of the complete independence of the Turkish Republic. Even the humiliating "capitulations," which had previously defined the special privileges enjoyed by foreigners in Turkey, were abolished. Though limited to the Anatolian Cape and a small strip of European territory,[1] the new Turkish State, with its capital at Angora, has undergone a remarkable transformation under the inspiring and progressive dictatorship of Kemal Pasha.

Revival of Turkish power

Over the Arabian Peninsula, where the Arab tribes had been encouraged during the war to rise against their Turkish masters, France and Great Britain were more successful in establishing a tutelary control. On a rough basis of self-determination the victors carved new states from the disintegrating Ottoman realm. The French acquired a mandate over Syria, including Lebanon, the British over Palestine and Irak. The Arab principality of Trans-Jordania and the little known hinterland which stretches from Aden to the Persian Gulf are also under British supervision and protection.

4. THE FATE OF THE FOURTEEN POINTS

To demonstrate how far the final peace terms diverged from the principles laid down in Wilson's Fourteen Points, it will be of interest to consider these points one at a time and to note the fate which overtook each.

I. *Open covenants, openly arrived at.* The peace discussions of the Big Four were so rigidly guarded that even their lesser allies were ignorant of the settlement until the treaty had been completed. Even Wilson conceded that treaties could not always be openly arrived at.

II. *Freedom of the seas.* Out of deference to British prejudices on this point, it was dropped before the conference assembled.

[1] See map on the following page.


EUROPE
of Today
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500
ARCTIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
BAY OF BISCAY
ICELAND (Den.)
Reykjavik
FAROE IS. (Den.)
SHETLAND IS.
ORKNEY IS.
HEBRIDES
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
Glasgow
Belfast
Edinburgh
Dublin
Cork
Liverpool
Manchester
North Cape
Hammerfest
Lapland
Trondhjem
Bergen
NORWAY
Oslo (Christiania)
Stockholm
Helsingfors
FINLAND
Gulf of Bothnia
Reval
ESTHONIA
Leningrad (St. Petersburg)
L. Onega
L. Ladoga
WHITE SEA
Archangel
Dvina
Moscow
Nizni Novgorod
Perm
Kazan
Samara
Ufa
Orenburg
Tula
Saratov
Astrakhan
Baku
Batum
Sevastopol
Crimea
Odessa
Kharkov
Kiev
Minsk
WHITE RUSSIA
Riga
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
Kovno
Libau
Vilna
EAST PRUSSIA
Danzig
Free City
Gothenburg
Skagerrak
Kattegat
Copenhagen
DENMARK
Kiel
Hamburg
Berlin
Leipzig
Dresden
Warsaw
POLAND
Lodz
Krakow
Lemberg
Prague
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Vienna
Budapest
HUNGARY
RUMANIA
Belgrade
Bucharest
Sofia
BULGARIA
Constantinople
Philippopolis
Salonika
Athens
CRETE
RHODES
CYPRUS (Br.)
Smyrna
Angora
Erzerum
Tiflis
Azerbaijan
Caucasus Mts.
Euphrates
Tigris
Amsterdam
Rotterdam
The Hague
NETHERLANDS
Antwerp
Brussels
Cologne
Frankfort
LUX.
London
English Channel
Havre
Paris
Seine
Loire
Rhine
Elbe
Oder
Vistula
Dniester
Dnieper
Volga
Don
Donetz
Ural
Caspian Depression
Kara Kum Desert
Aralsk
Orsk
Ural Mts.
Siberia
Obi
Irtish
Yenisei
Lena
Arctic Circle
Meuse
Rhone
Po
Danube
Tagus
Douro
Lisbon
Oporto
Madrid
Barcelona
Valencia
Malaga
Gibraltar (Br.)
Str. of Gibraltar
C. St. Vincent
C. Finisterre
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Bordeaux
Lyons
Marseilles
Nice
Genoa
Milan
Turin
Alps
Munich
Zurich
Geneva
Basle
FRANCE
Corsica
Sardinia
Balearic Is.
ITALY
Rome
Naples
Palermo
Messina
Str. of Messina
Fiume
Trieste
Zara
Zagreb (Agram)
YUGOSLAVIA
Adriatic Sea
Tirana
Valona
Corfu
Ionian Sea
Aegean Sea
Dardanelles
Sea of Marmora
Bosporus
Black Sea
Crimea
Sea of Azov
Kuban
Terek
Daghestan
Azerbaijan
Baku
Batum
Caucasus Mts.
Euphrates
Tigris
Algiers
Tunis
Fez
Morocco
Malta (Br.)
AFRICA

III. *Removal of economic barriers.* The effect of the treaties has been to increase the number and augment the importance of economic frontiers.

IV. *Adequate guaranties for disarmament.* Only the vanquished were disarmed. The victors continued to maintain armaments, more costly in many cases than those of 1914.

V. *Impartial adjustment of colonial claims.* The victors divided the spoils.

VI. *Evacuation of Russian territory and an opportunity for independent political development to be granted the Russian people.* The Allied governments interfered repeatedly in Russia (1918–20) in their efforts to overthrow the Soviet régime.

VII. *Belgium to be evacuated and restored.* This point was carried out.

VIII. *All French territory to be freed and restored, and Alsace-Lorraine returned to France.* This point was likewise carried out.

IX. *Readjustment of the Italian frontier along recognizable lines of nationality.* The final compromise placed over half a million Germans and Yugoslavs under the Italian flag.

X. *Autonomous development for the peoples of Austria-Hungary.* Carried out in the main, with the Slavs winning most disputed areas at the expense of the Germans and Magyars.

XI. *Self-determination for the Rumanians, Serbians, and Montenegrans.* Vindicated in general.

XII. *A secure sovereignty for the Turkish portion of the Ottoman Empire, and self-determination for the subject races.* The Turks finally achieved a stable régime despite interference. The self-rule permitted the subject races by the French and British is more nominal than real.

XIII. *An independent Polish State with access to the sea.* This point was realized.

XIV. *A general association of nations.* The covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles.

In his anxiety to assure the principle of self-determination to subject peoples, and to win general acceptance for the idea of a League of Nations, President Wilson found it necessary to acquiesce in five significant compromises which violated his program in fact and spirit: (1) The Germans living on the left bank of the Rhine were placed under the control of France for a period which might last fifteen years or even longer. (2) Several hundred thousand Germans and Yugoslavs were incorporated into the Italian Kingdom, many against their will. (3) The German colonies were parceled out among the victors without

any honest regard for an "impartial adjustment of colonial claims." (4) Instead of the just peace between equals which Wilson had envisaged, the treaty condemned the Germans and Austrians to assume the sole guilt for the war and to pay as much as they could in restitution. (5) Reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic security (Point IV) was enforced upon the Central Powers, but wholly ignored by the victors.

The failure to disarm

The failure to disarm provided a particular disappointment for lovers of peace throughout the world, the more acute because the Allied governments, throughout the duration of hostilities, had blamed the pre-war armament race upon the initiative of the Germans, and had excused their own preparations for war as unavoidable measures of self-defense. Yet with Germany reduced to impotence they still maintained, and even increased, their military forces. It was still possible to hope, however, that the sober judgment of conscientious men, exercising itself through the agency and the decisions of the League of Nations, might yet retrieve the ground lost through the unavoidable compromises, and that for each problem a final solution might be found in which the claims of justice would triumph over the forces of expediency.

5. THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Precedents for the League

More than once, in earlier centuries, proposals had been drawn up which aimed at the establishment of a permanent group or league of nations pledged to promote peace in Europe. The Duke of Sully, minister of the French king, Henry IV, drafted such a plan; Napoleon aspired to end war by organizing Europe into one great empire under French leadership; and the diplomats who assembled at Vienna after Napoleon's downfall proposed to maintain peace in Europe by calling frequent congresses of the powers. But the spirit of co-operation which inspired this last suggestion, and evoked the more mystical experiment known as the Holy Alliance, soon yielded to the older anarchic spirit of each nation for itself. Although advocates of peace continued to plead the advantages that would flow from an international court created to adjust disputes between states, the only important result of their efforts was the establishment (1899) of a permanent court of arbitration known as the Hague Tribunal.[1]

The failure of the diplomats, with their system of competitive al-

[1] See above, page 920.

liances and balance of power, to prevent the World War, and the casual violation by the belligerents of many existing treaties and conventions, convinced thoughtful people more completely than ever that some organization was essential for the amelioration of this condition of international anarchy. In 1917, Wilson gave the concept new force by including the proposal for "a general association of nations" among his Fourteen Points. When the Peace Conference assembled in Paris in 1919, the organization of a League of Nations found a place in the agenda and the Covenant of the League was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles. But here again the clash between ideals and realities compelled a number of compromises. The French statesman, Clemenceau, while endorsing the League, wished to see it an association dominated by the victors, pledged to preserve the Versailles settlement against all who might seek to disturb it. Although the French stand was later modified, the League as first constituted included none of the defeated powers and was too largely dominated by France and Britain. A second curb upon its efficiency and universality was imposed out of deference to the United States, and concerned "regional understandings." American statesmen had stood by the Monroe Doctrine for a century and had consistently opposed European interference in New World affairs, and American public opinion was not disposed to welcome League intervention in questions arising between American countries. The Monroe Doctrine was, therefore, recognized as a "regional understanding" which would be respected by the League. Other points upon which the framers of the Covenant were compelled to abandon their objectives were: (1) disarmament, (2) the recognition of the racial and religious equality of all member nations, and (3) the proposal to endow the League Council with authority to execute its decisions against recalcitrant states by invoking force. Because of the grave difficulties which had to be overcome in any attempt to settle these issues, all three were compromised or abandoned.

The Covenant

The Covenant or constitution of the League of Nations affirms that the member states have agreed to accept obligations not to resort to war, and have promised to observe open, just, and honorable relations, and a scrupulous respect for treaties, in their dealings with one another. The original list of members included some forty-two states, the British self-governing dominions, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, receiving individual representation. Any self-governing state was declared eligible for admission, and any member might withdraw after providing two years' notice of its intention to do so. The cost of administra-

tion was to be met by contributions levied upon the members in proportion to their national budgets, and Geneva was chosen as the permanent seat of the League bodies.

The Assembly

The machinery of the League includes (*a*) an Assembly, (*b*) a Council, (*c*) a Secretariat, and (*d*) a Court of Arbitration. The Assembly includes representatives from all the member states, large and small, each state casting but one vote, although it may send as many as three delegates. The most important functions of the Assembly are: (1) the admission of new states into the League; (2) the election of non-permanent members to a seat on the Council; (3) the investigation of disputes specifically referred to the Assembly for consideration. These are in general responsibilities of a secondary nature and many small states have protested that the rôle assigned to the Assembly is a lame and impotent one. In practice, however, the importance of the Assembly has tended steadily to increase.

The Council

It is true, however, that the functions of the Council appear more masterful in comparison. Composed of one member each from Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, and one each from four (later increased to nine) lesser nations, the Council as originally constituted was little more than an executive cabinet dominated by the Allied Powers. As the United States declined to join the League and the Soviet Government of Russia had not been accorded official recognition, the places reserved for these powers on the Council remained vacant; but Germany was granted a permanent seat on her admission to the League in 1926. In 1933, Japan and Germany announced their intention to withdraw from membership, and in 1934, Russia was admitted, and received a permanent Council seat. The Council meets at Geneva, official headquarters of the League, at least once each year, and may deal with "any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." Its decisions, unless otherwise specified, must be unanimous, a rule which also applies to the resolutions of the Assembly.

The Secretariat

Much of the current work of the League is conducted by the permanent Secretariat, or by commissions. A secretary-general appointed by the Assembly directs the work of the Secretariat in conducting correspondence, investigating disputes, and registering treaties. In addition, commissions have been nominated under the League to investigate international evils, such as the traffic in narcotics, to curb the spread of malaria, cancer, and tropical diseases, to promote intellectual co-operation, to further the codification of international law, to abolish slavery, and to protect minorities.

Responsibility for the welfare of backward peoples is also entrusted to special commissions, and the powers which acquired control over former German colonies, or any other regions, by the Treaty of Versailles, administer these areas as "mandates" of the League, subject to the supervision of the Commission on Mandates.

The World Court

To settle disputes having to do with the legal claims of states under existing treaties and conventions, the Covenant provided for an International Court of Justice which was established in 1921. Like the Hague Tribunal, this World Court may accept cases referred to it for decision, and its verdicts contribute to the growing body of international law. But the most important function of the League is to find a prompt solution for the sudden disputes which arise between nations and threaten war, and this function falls upon the Council and Assembly. All members of the League are pledged to submit their quarrels to arbitration, and to abide by any decision endorsed unanimously by the Council members and accepted by the other party to the dispute. The real strength and significance of the League, therefore, depends upon the degree to which the members observe this compulsory arbitration clause (Article XII), and upon the effectiveness of the measures taken by the League to punish those members which dare to flout it.

Against defiant member states which refuse its mediation and violate the terms of the Covenant, the League may recommend punitive measures, such as a general economic boycott, or it may even invite the other members to employ their armed forces to discipline the refractory member. But it is highly doubtful that a unanimous vote (the participants to the quarrel excluded) could ever be passed through the Council and the Assembly to authorize such drastic action. The efficacy of the League in combating war rests less upon its power to punish violators of the peace than upon its ability to mobilize world opinion against such violators. The vital part played by propaganda in the World War furnishes proof that public opinion, when marshaled in support of a cause, can prove a mighty, if not a decisive, factor in achieving victory. It is the function of the League of Nations to marshal public opinion against the use of force in international disputes, and against the nation which shows itself overeager in drawing the sword or overreluctant in laying it aside.

In the first fifteen years of its existence, the League arbitrated a number of disputes, arising between lesser states, with a creditable degree of firmness and impartiality. In sharp territorial disputes which involved Sweden with Finland, Poland with Lithuania and with Czechoslovakia,

and Greece with Albania and with Bulgaria, hostilities were averted, or were arrested after they had broken out, by judicious intervention. But the League proved less effective in dealing with the great powers. In 1923, following the murder of an Italian officer on Greek soil, the Italian government delivered a twenty-four-hour ultimatum to the Greeks, and, finding the reply unsatisfactory, bombarded and occupied the island of Corfu. Although Greece appealed to the League, the Italian delegate to the Council refused to approve any action, and the matter was finally decided by the Council of Ambassadors under whose authority the murdered official had been engaged in delimiting the Greek frontier. The settlement provided for the evacuation of Corfu by the Italians and the payment of an indemnity by the Greeks, although it was not proved that Greek citizens had been responsible for the murder.

In a second case involving a great power, the League Assembly displayed a resolution more creditable to its dignity. Following an investigation of the aggressive measures pursued by the Japanese military forces in Manchuria, the Assembly unanimously adopted a report condemning the Japanese policy. The Japanese delegates thereupon withdrew from the Assembly; but the Japanese government continues to hold several Pacific islands as mandates, and will undoubtedly insist upon retaining them, even though it sever all connection with the League. Such dilemmas and rebuffs must continue to beset the League so long as its decisions remain "paper verdicts."

It rests with the years, therefore, to decide whether the League of Nations, the most earnest and the most intelligent attempt so far made to curb the destructiveness of war, will survive the stresses of the post-war era, or whether it will founder, as similar projects have foundered hitherto, in the sea of international rivalries. Clearly, the mere creation of such a court can do little to curb international anarchy unless the peoples of the world can be taught to respect the League and to support it. If the World War and the peace which closed it can be said to have proved anything, they demonstrated that no mere rectification of local inequalities or emancipation of suppressed racial minorities will end the danger of war while the fundamental causes of it survive undiminished. Agitation over the fate of Frenchmen in Lorraine or Slavs in Bosnia doubtless helped to stimulate a war spirit in 1914, but today, when the map of Europe has been brought into closer correspondence with the desires of the various national groups, and several submerged minorities have acquired independence through the principle of self-determination, the danger of armed conflict is no less great, and militarism holds Europe as tenaciously as ever in its iron grip.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

RUSSIA UNDER THE RULE OF THE SOVIETS

We shall have a soviet government, without the participation of bourgeoisie of any kind...

NICOLAI LENIN.

THE suppression of the revolutionary movement of 1905–06 in Russia left a heritage of hatred and ferment behind which the stupid and stubborn attitude of Nicholas II did little to dissipate. Although the Russians rallied loyally to their government in the fervent patriotism of the first months of the World War, distrust soon began to undermine their allegiance. The stupendous losses which their armies suffered on the eastern front, the lack of war materials and munitions, and the graft and corruption which disgraced many sections of the high command and the supply services, ripened the mood of rebellion. Rumors that alien influences were at work in the court, the malign power which the monk Rasputin was known to exercise over the czar and czarina, and the suffering caused in many cities by the virtual blockade of Russian trade resulting from the war, combined to destroy the last foundations of the monarchy.

1. THE MARCH REVOLUTION

In March, 1917, strikes broke out in Saint Petersburg. Nicholas, who had remained blind to the realities of the situation, and had refused to heed the advice of his own ministers or the remonstrances of the Duma, believed that the old methods of repression would once more prove effective. From his headquarters with the army he telegraphed orders to suppress the rioters and dissolve the Duma. But the troops refused to fire on the crowds, the Duma declined to dissolve, and the Autocrat of all the Russias suddenly found himself abandoned and helpless. On March 15, he abdicated a throne which had already collapsed.

Abdication of Nicholas II

Habits of thought often lag behind events. The Russian people did not recognize at once the magnitude of the changes which were occurring, a fact which is not surprising when the size, complexity, and apathy of the Russian population is borne in mind. But even the political leaders at Saint Petersburg were slow at first to comprehend the depth of the movement which they had unchained. A provisional government was proclaimed, headed by a liberal nobleman, Prince Lvov, and the eloquent revolutionary, Alexander Kerensky, but

The Kerensky régime

it was out of touch with the masses, its bourgeois affiliations excited distrust, and its program for continuing the war against the Central Powers aroused little enthusiasm. Kerensky's efforts to galvanize the armies for a new drive broke down before the war-weariness of the soldiers. The peasants, who coveted the estates of the nobles, grew impatient with a régime which hesitated to attack private property, and the workers in the towns began to demand a genuine social revolution instead of a mere political shift. By the autumn of 1917, it was clear that the provisional government would have to ally itself firmly with the propertied classes and defy the "confiscators" or else swing definitely to the Left and appease the land-hunger of the peasants by dispossessing the nobles. Kerensky's failure to strengthen his government played into the hands of the more radical revolutionaries. Even before 1914, the Russian Socialist Party had divided into two groups, the Mensheviki (minority) who hoped to introduce socialism by peaceful reforms and the Bolsheviki (majority) who planned to establish the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by a sudden and violent change.


Nicolai Lenin

After the outbreak of the revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviki urged the immediate introduction of socialistic measures, and they remained defiant in their refusal to compromise with the bourgeois provisional government. The most important points in their program were: (1) the immediate conclusion of peace, (2) confiscation of large estates without compensation, and (3) control by the workers of the means of production. Their most intelligent leader was Vladimir Illyich Ulyanov, better known as Nicolai Lenin (1870–1924), a student of the writings of Karl Marx and a prophet of the proletarian revolution. With the collapse of czardom, Lenin had returned from his exile in Switzerland to put his profound understanding of social forces to practical use. Before his death seven years later, he was to make his name known throughout the world, and impress his ideals more forcibly upon the thought of the twentieth century than any other contemporary leader.

Throughout the summer of 1917, under the shadow of the shaky provisional government, the framework of a new order was being reared.

The soviets

The unit of the new organization was the *soviet* or council. Soviets of soldiers and workers and peasants were spontaneously organized in every regiment, factory, or village in the land, each sending delegates to higher committees, and these in turn choosing a national congress. At the First Congress of Soviets (June, 1917) the Bolsheviki were in the minority, but their strength grew rapidly. By October, Lenin's demand, "All power to the Soviets," had become a rallying cry, and the promise of land, peace, and bread made an ir-



NICOLAI LENIN

1870–1924

To those who stood in his way, Lenin seemed a modern Tamerlane, ready to sacrifice millions of victims without reason or compunction, but today his tomb is a shrine to the Russian masses.

resistible appeal to the land-hungry peasants, to soldiers weary of war, and to workers threatened with famine. Kerensky had called for the election of a constituent assembly on November 25, but the events were moving too fast for legal formalities.

2. THE BOLSHEVIKI IN POWER

At the beginning of November, the Bolsheviki prepared to seize control. They were still a minority organization of perhaps one hundred thousand members, but they were resolute and unscrupulous, while their opponents, the dwindling factions of Mensheviki, and the more cautious Social Revolutionaries, were still seeking a middle path. Kerensky attempted to call in troops from the front to sustain his régime, but the railway employees refused to transport them; and on November 7, Lenin was able to tell the Second Congress of Soviets that the provisional government was at an end. A resolution was immediately adopted calling for a three months' armistice with the Central Powers and a peace with no annexations and no indemnities.

The November Revolution

Unfortunately for the Bolsheviki, the Germans were in dire need of supplies and determined to press every advantage. With the Russian front crumbling, they were in a position to write their own terms, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed March 3, 1918, was a peace-at-any-price to the Russians and "the peace that passeth all understanding" to their disconcerted allies, England and France. Russia abandoned her claim to one fourth of her pre-war territory, including Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Livonia, and Finland, and conceded valuable commercial and economic privileges to the Central Powers. Kars and Batum were restored to Turkey. Many Russians felt that this ignominious treaty was a betrayal, and the Bolsheviki found themselves menaced by a campaign of resistance and terrorism, but they clung defiantly to power. The National Constituent Assembly which assembled in January, 1918, declared the Soviet régime illegal, whereupon the Bolsheviki dissolved the Assembly by force. A department of secret police, the dreaded *Cheka*, was organized to frustrate all "reactionary" activity and Lenin pressed on to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

The peasants were invited to cultivate the land they worked free of rent, all private ownership having been abolished. Workingmen took over the management of the larger factories; the railways, banks, mines, and other enterprises became the property of the state; and the wealth of

the Russian Orthodox Church was confiscated without compensation. The debts of the czarist administration, domestic and foreign, were repudiated, to the alarm and indignation of the foreign governments which had helped to finance Russia since pre-war years. Even in normal times such profound economic changes could not fail to disrupt the life of a nation, and their effect upon Russia, which had suffered more grievously than any other power from the shattering effect of the war, was to plunge the nation into a chaos from which there seemed no escape.

Nor were the Bolsheviki left free to work out a solution in peace. Their late allies, the French and British, grew steadily more hostile to the revolutionary régime, until they instituted an unofficial blockade and used the expeditionary forces which they had landed at Vladivostok, at Archangel, and on the Black Sea, to attack the Soviet government under the pretense of protecting Russian minorities. Disaffected classes in Russia organized a militant resistance and "White Armies" appeared in half a dozen sections. By the fall of 1919, the Bolshevik control had been reduced to the area around Moscow and the collapse of the Soviet régime appeared to be a matter of weeks.

The struggle to survive

Then the picture changed. A Red Army organized by the indefatigable Leon Bronstein, better known as Trotsky, began to check the advances of the "White" generals. Kolchak, who had established a provisional government at Omsk, was overtaken and executed; Yudenich, operating in the Baltic area, and Denikin, who advanced from the south, were both forced back by the close of 1919. But the struggle was not yet over. In 1920, Poland declared war against the Soviet government, and a White Army from the Crimea, commanded by General Wrangel, advanced upon Moscow. Trotsky agreed to a sacrifice peace with the Poles, which left him free to turn his Red Guards against Wrangel's forces and destroy them. The Allies had abandoned their blockade early in 1920, and two years later the Japanese withdrew their forces from eastern Siberia. Soviet Russia had demonstrated its right to survive, but the sacrifice had been great. Wholesale execution of suspects and hostages by Red and White forces alike had marred the records of every campaign in the civil war, the most illustrious victims being Nicholas II and his entire family, executed at Ekaterinburg on July 16, 1918.

While crushing insurrections and consolidating their power, the Bolsheviki attempted to carry out their program to nationalize all land and industry in Russia, but by 1921, Lenin recognized that the task was too great for immediate execution. In many industries production had fallen to less than one fifth of the pre-war out-

The NEP (1921)

put. The peasants, eager enough to take over confiscated lands, were disillusioned when the government demanded that (as part of the collectivist experiment) they surrender their crops to feed the city workers. Agriculture, like industry, seemed on the point of foundering when Lenin prepared a compromise known as the New Economic Policy, or more briefly, as the NEP. The NEP restored the smaller industries, employing no more than fifteen to twenty workers, to private control, and permitted the peasants to sell their grain for profit. Furthermore, capital was obtained by extending concessions to foreigners and commerce began to revive. With economic conditions improving, the Communist Party, as the Bolsheviki had named themselves (1919), grew more and more popular, and when Lenin died in 1924 the desperate experiment which he had directed during five perilous years was on the road to success. As the Communist régime represents the most interesting social experiment so far undertaken in the twentieth century, it will be useful to examine its ideals and methods.

3. THE PHILOSOPHY AND PROGRAM OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS

Proletarians preferred

In proclaiming the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Russian Communists sought to establish a state in which the workers would be the controlling and the favored class. They accepted the teaching of Karl Marx that wealth is the product of human labor, and they believed that the workers, instead of piling up surplus profits for their capitalist masters, should themselves be the chief recipients and beneficiaries of the wealth created by their efforts. The so-called non-producing members of society, aristocrats, capitalists, employers of labor, priests, etc., were refused a vote, and received smaller rations of food than the "workers." Society was thus deliberately turned upside down. Ex-nobles, ex-officials of the czarist government, rich bourgeois, and churchmen now formed the unprivileged class, while peasants and workers were preferred to them, receiving better food, readier accommodations on the state railways, more habitable dwellings and lighter taxes.

Secret police

Needless to say, the members of what had been the property-owning classes were embittered by the change. But they were too small a minority to offer any effective protest, for no powerful and well-entrenched middle class had developed in Russia comparable to the bourgeoisie of England or France. Furthermore, all those who had been dispossessed were known and were watched by the

secret police. Conspiracy against the Soviet government, or even unguarded criticism of it, was likely to be followed by arrest, a secret trial and a secret execution. The "Extraordinary Commission" created in 1917 for combating counter-revolutionary activity proved remorselessly efficient, hunting down the disaffected even more competently than the czarist police had done. By 1922 this commission, or *Cheka*, under the command of Felix Djerzinsky, had served its purpose so well that it was replaced by a new organization of political police known briefly as the *Ogpu*. A calculation of the number of counter-revolutionaries condemned to death in Soviet Russia since 1917 is difficult to make, for estimates have varied from a few hundred to over a million. Since 1922, however, exile to Siberia has largely replaced the death penalty, and has been invoked even more extensively than in czarist times.

The war on religion

No institution of the old régime excited more criticism from the Communist leaders than the Russian Orthodox Church. At first the Bolsheviki were content to confiscate the property of the church, expecting that religion would soon lose its force if deprived of wealth and official support. Finding, however, that the clergy continued to be active and even to increase their following, the government adopted repressive measures, circumscribing the activities of priests in educational and charitable work, and inaugurating a campaign among the people to free them from "superstitious beliefs." The hostility felt by the Bolshevik leaders toward religious dogmas was due in part to their conviction that faith in miracles and the efficacy of relics was contrary to the modern, realistic, and scientific attitude toward life which they desire to instill. But they advanced another and profounder objection. They had accepted the doctrine of Marx that "Religion is the opium of the people," and they wished to extirpate it because they held that the spirit of humility and resignation which the Russian priests long urged upon the masses was a device of the ruling group to keep the people fatalistically resigned to their lot. According to this view the church was no more than a subtle and successful instrument of propaganda for perpetuating the enslavement of the credulous peasants and proletarians by teaching them to accept their suffering as imposed by the will of God.

Education

The children of Soviet Russia are undergoing a careful training in a new social philosophy. To fit them for a practical share in the duties of a proletarian state, they receive free instruction, are promoted on a basis of merit, and will take their places as artisans, engineers, laborers, or peasants according to their aptitudes. They are being trained also to compete with each other in the quality

and quantity of their work, but to scorn the thought of toiling solely for material advantage or profit. Whether, under changed conditions, the Russian workers can be persuaded to take such pride in their labor that they will give as much effort and attention to ordinary tasks as the workers in other lands, who are stimulated by the desire for material gain, is not yet certain. The Russians, however, are indoctrinated with the belief that their fellow toilers in capitalistic countries are heartlessly exploited under an unregulated system of ruthless and selfish competition, and they believe that the proletarians everywhere, when they realize this, will take heart from the Russian example, throw off their chains, and unite in a World Federation of Workers' Republics. Because they travel very little, and have no means to contrast what they are taught with the actual conditions elsewhere in the world, most Russians believe that in the western states of Europe society is honeycombed with dry rot and the capitalistic system is on the point of collapse. The morale and faith of the hundred and fifty million people in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is maintained at a high pitch by means of the campaign of education, and is fortified through radio, newspaper, and pictorial propaganda circulated for the same purpose.

4. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (or U.S.S.R.) is not a centralized empire, but a federation of many semi-autonomous states bound together by constitutional treaties. It includes over nine tenths of the Russian population. A constitution, adopted by the All-Russian Congress in 1918, and revised in 1924, defines the union as a federal state, and assures each of the participating republics the right to withdraw at will.

Governing committees

All men and women over eighteen who are engaged in socially useful work possess the vote and may help to choose the members of their local soviet. District soviet congresses in turn elect delegates to a Congress of the Union on a basis of one representative for each 25,000 city electors and one for every 125,000 rural electors. The All-Union Congress of about two thousand deputies corresponds to a Russian Parliament, but most of its duties are relegated to a central executive committee of four hundred and fifty members. The central executive committee in turn appoints a presidium of twenty-seven members, and a council (or cabinet) of sixteen commissars. The titular head of the Russian government is the chairman of the presidium.

Two interesting points should be noted about this somewhat intricate political machine. The first is the concentration of legislative, executive,

and judicial functions in the hands of the central executive committee and subcommittees. There is no provision for a separation of power between a legislative chamber which enacts the laws, a supreme court which interprets them, and an executive which enforces them. The second point to note is that the constitution does not tell the whole story because it makes no mention of the Communist Party. This energetic organization of some three million members is controlled by a central committee which in turn appoints a political bureau. Three fourths of the delegates to the All-Union Congress are members of the party, and so firm and effective is the influence which the political bureau exerts upon the government that, since Lenin's death, Joseph Stalin, secretary-general of the Communist Party, has become the practical dictator of Russia, although he holds no important political office.

The Communist Party

In a land where all national resources, lumber, minerals, etc., are held in trust by the government for the benefit of the people, the power of the commissars who control the exploitation of the resources is almost unlimited. With no opposition party to criticize their acts, and no system of administrative checks and balances to delay their projects, the council of commissars can co-ordinate their efforts and apply with ruthless determination the plans which Stalin and his economic advisers have worked out for the expansion of Russian industry and the improvement of Russian agriculture. The Communists have not only sought to transform the social philosophy and ideals of one hundred and fifty million people within a decade, but they have sought in the same space of time to modernize Russia, exploit her natural wealth, and make the Soviet State one of the richest and most productive of the great powers.

5. ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The New Economic Policy which Lenin instituted in 1921 represented a compromise between capitalist and Communist practices. But the Russian leaders did not intend to halt halfway on the road to socialism, and in 1928, Stalin and his advisers decided that the hour had come for a new advance. The result of their determination was the Five-Year Plan, a gigantic project calling for the expenditure of over twenty billion dollars to speed up Russian industry, develop electric power, multiply mineral output, and create new factories capable of providing the tractors, automobiles, railway engines, airplanes, and other mechanical equipment necessary to a modern state. All lines of activity were to be co-ordinated, each mine or factory was given a quota to fill, and so

keen was the enthusiasm of the workers that the government held out hope of realizing the Five-Year Plan in four years. The goal set for Russian industry was a general increase of 133 per cent within five years. Engineers and technicians were hired from Germany, England, and America to supervise the establishment of new factories and train Russian workers in processes about to be introduced.

State planning commission

A state planning commission kept the records, and cast a balance each year, commending those branches of industry which achieved their quota, and investigating those which had failed. The Communist leaders have extolled their system as a signal improvement upon the unco-ordinated competition which distinguishes the march of industry under a *laissez-faire* régime, for they can plan the future, regulating in advance the miles of railway to be built, the output of iron, coal, oil, electrical power, etc., which will be required each year, and the number of workers and of working hours needed in each unit of the gigantic whole.

For the peasants the Five-Year Plan entailed a progressive socialization of agriculture, the wholesale introduction of machinery, and the creation of state farms. The Communists had been displeased to find that their plan to divide the land into small holdings of some ten acres for each family had failed to work satisfactorily. In each rural community the more energetic and farsighted farmers had prospered, increasing their acreage, hiring helpers, and emerging as men of property, so that ten years after the great estates of the nobles had been confiscated a new class of landowners was in process of formation. Against these well-to-do peasants or *kulaks* the government opened a campaign of intimidation and suppression. Peasants were urged to merge their private holdings in collective farms, a movement which made rapid progress despite the opposition of many *kulaks*, who disliked to lose their improved status and see their farms submerged in the collective experiment.

Socialization of agriculture

By 1932, the "socialized sector" comprised three fourths of the cultivated land, and its total area, already vast, was still expanding. Under modern conditions it is much more profitable to manage large farms with power-driven machinery, and the Russian government had made enormous efforts to supply the tractors, reapers, harvesters, and threshers needed to supplant the primitive methods previously followed by the peasants. To stimulate the trend toward collective management and demonstrate the efficiency of mechanized agriculture, state farms have been established in all parts of the country. Some of these include hundreds and even thousands of

square miles of farmland. The workers live in model villages, possess their own newspaper, motion-picture hall, library, hospital, and recreation grounds, and share, through the delegates they elect to the local soviet, in shaping the policies of the management. But they have lost the freedom of choice which they knew briefly as independent farmers, and not all of them are happy in the change.

Second Five-Year Plan

On December 31, 1932, a little over four years after its inception, the first Five-Year Plan was officially terminated. Not all the objectives had been achieved, but the results appeared encouraging. Unemployment had been greatly reduced, the increase in the manufacture of machinery was gratifying, and the production of coal and minerals, which had lagged behind, was speeding up. In the development of collective farms the results had exceeded all hopes. A second Five-Year Plan was drafted which projected the complete socialization of agriculture by 1937, with a fifty to two hundred per cent increase in the various crops, a doubling of the output of basic industries, and a sixfold increase in the production of electric power. These achievements were to be reflected in the living conditions of the Russian people, who were promised a six-hour working day and a threefold increase in the amount of the goods to be utilized for domestic consumption.

In attempting to judge the Soviet experiment, however, it is necessary to realize that almost all the statistics available are "official," and that governments seldom make out an unfavorable case for themselves. Thus, the Soviet factories may exceed their quota, as stated, but it is relevant to ask how many of the tractors or harvesters, for instance, break down when put to use, and how many are ruined by peasants unused to handling machinery. Under the Five-Year Plan, government figures record, the extension of collective farming surpassed expectations, but unofficial sources reveal that many *kulaks* slaughtered their domestic animals rather than surrender them, so that Russia suffered from a serious shortage of meat. The Soviet régime has undoubtedly accomplished wonders, but they are wonders chiefly because of the difficulties overcome. The efficiency of Russian industry and agriculture is still far below the standard maintained in a country like the United States, and Russian products, in cost and quality, do not equal those produced under methods of mass production in capitalistic states.

Moreover, it would be an error to invest Soviet economists with all the credit for the remarkable advances made by the Russian people since the World War. Industrial development and the mechanization of agriculture would have made some gains even under a chaotic or

a reactionary régime, for the Russian masses could not have remained altogether immune to the effect of the mechanical and technological revolutions. But the Communist leaders have hastened the transformation by several decades, and have instituted the first attempt on a grand scale to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. The success or failure of the Communist experiment in Russia will have repercussions throughout the world and may well prove the most interesting chapter in the history of the twentieth century.

6. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF RUSSIA (1917–35)

At the time of its creation in 1917, the Soviet government stood without friends in a hostile world. Not only the Central Powers with which Russia was still at war, but also the Allied nations, France, Britain, and Italy, refused their recognition to the Bolshevik régime, and lent their aid to the counter-revolutionary forces. It is not difficult to find reasons for this opposition. The Bolsheviki repudiated the debts of the czarist government, published the secret treaties to which it had been a signatory, and proclaimed a world revolution of the working classes against their capitalist masters. The Allied statesmen were embittered at the Russians because they made a separate peace with Germany, and they became alarmed when the Communists attempted to inspire proletarian uprisings in other lands. In proclaiming a blockade of Russia, the Allied governments sought both to punish the Russians and to prevent their dangerous doctrines from spreading. Even after the Soviet régime had defeated the "White" forces and proved its strength and stability, it was still refused international recognition.

Very gradually this unfriendly attitude changed. The Communists learned that the "Third International," which they organized at Moscow in 1919 for the purpose of furthering a world revolution of the working classes, made them feared and distrusted by other nations, and they found it expedient to deny any official connection between it and the Soviet government. The need of reviving Russian trade moved the Bolshevik leaders to seek commercial understandings with neighboring states; political recognition followed, first from Germany (1922), then from Great Britain (1924). By 1933, when the United States reestablished formal diplomatic intercourse, Russian foreign relations were normal and friendly once more. In addition to trade agreements the Soviet government had signed non-aggression pacts with fourteen states, and had ratified the Kellogg Pact (1928) renouncing war as an instrument

of national policy.[1] In 1934, Russia joined the League of Nations and accepted a permanent seat on the Council.

In the Far East the relations of the Soviet government with Japan proved less amicable, and a non-aggression pact proposed by Russia was not ratified. The chief source of contention continued to be the Chinese province of Manchuria. When Japan defeated the czar's forces in 1904–05, the Russians abandoned their claims to Manchuria which remained technically a part of China. The victory of the Japanese, however, enabled them to persevere in their economic penetration and establish a disguised protectorate.

The Japanese in Manchuria

Their aim was to make Japanese influence paramount throughout the Chinese Republic before other powers could forestall them or the Chinese Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) could organize an effective national resistance. In the midst of the World War (1915), Japan presented twenty-one demands which would have subordinated the vast Chinese realm to Japanese designs had not the other powers protested. Frustrated for the moment, the Japanese imperialists moderated, but did not abandon, their aims. The surprising victories of General Chiang Kai-Chek (1926), which established the power of the Kuomintang throughout the greater part of China, warned the Japanese that a strong Chinese Nationalist government would seek to reknit Manchuria to China proper. The increasing friction moved the Japanese to launch a sudden attack on Mukden, the Manchurian capital, in 1931, and they rapidly expelled all Chinese forces from the province. In retaliation the Chinese proclaimed a boycott of Japanese products, whereupon the Japanese attacked Shanghai (still without a formal declaration of war), but withdrew after encountering a stubborn and surprising resistance.

Japanese designs on China

Spurred by an appeal from China, the League of Nations investigated and condemned the aggressive tactics of the Japanese in Manchuria and Shanghai (1933). To disguise their suzerainty over the conquered province, the Japanese organized Manchuria as the independent state of Manchukuo under the rule of Henry Pu-yi, the boy emperor who had been deposed from the throne of the Chinese Empire by the revolution of 1911. Although the powers declined to recognize Manchukuo, the Japanese continued to consolidate and enlarge the new state, to the grave concern of the Russians, who operated the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria to Vladivostok.[2] After prolonged and critical negotiations, the Russians agreed to sell their share in the railway (1934) and the tension in the Far East relaxed,

Russo-Japanese tension

[1] See above, page 1007.

[2] See map following page 890.

but further clashes between Russia and Japan may easily develop at any time in Mongolia or in the neighborhood of Vladivostok. In wrenching Manchuria from China, the Japanese not only defied the League of Nations, but created a Far-Eastern problem which seems foredoomed to precipitate further armed clashes.

CHAPTER THIRTY

FASCIST ITALY

For Fascism the state is an absolute before which individuals and groups are relative.

BENITO MUSSOLINI.

AMONG the Allied Powers which emerged as victors from the World War, the Italians were the least satisfied with the results and the most deeply infected by the post-war mood of disillusionment. The war effort and war losses had dislocated the economic and social life of the nation, for Italy was less highly industrialized than France or Britain and less fitted to endure the financial strain of a war. The re-establishment of peace was followed in 1919 and 1920 by growing poverty and unemployment. The cost of living rose, and the government, unable to balance the budget, drifted toward bankruptcy. Italian industry was crippled by the necessity of importing coal from foreign sources, and Italian agriculture did not produce a food supply sufficient to feed a nation of forty million people. As conditions grew worse, the failure of the government to alleviate the distress or devise remedies for the economic situation aroused widespread discontent.

1. POST-WAR CONFUSION IN ITALY

Many patriotic Italians were further incensed by what they considered the inadequacy of Italy's war gains. The Trentino and the southern portion of the Tyrol, Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula, had been added to the kingdom by the Versailles Treaty,[1] but these territorial conquests did not satisfy the ardent nationalists who had hoped in addition for the port of Fiume and the Dalmatian coast. Moreover, they had another and more legitimate grievance concerning the division of colonial spoils, for France and Britain took possession of the German protectorates and choice portions of the Turkish Empire, and established their control over these mandates while ignoring the claims of the Italians for an equal share.

For several years after the war the tide of Italian discontent continued to rise, fed by the protests of the thwarted nationalists, by Socialists dissatisfied with the bourgeois régime, and by Communists who hoped to overturn the government and establish the rule of the proletariat. The nerveless and inefficient government failed signally

Growth of disorder

[1] See map following page 954.

to check the growth of opposition or to satisfy the popular demands. In 1919, the Socialists won 156 seats in Parliament, the largest number held by a single party, for the spirit of war-weariness, combined with the misery of the workers and the agricultural laborers, had turned many people toward socialism as a remedy. But in 1920, when strikes tied up the metal industries, and peasants, stirred by Communist ideals, began to seize and divide the landed estates, the fear of communism turned moderate citizens conservative, and the property-owning classes fought to protect their interests. In the midst of strikes and disorders, which affected all the larger cities of northern Italy, opposing factions rioted in the street, broke up each other's meetings, and endangered life and property by their constant turmoil.

Desire for stability

Out of this national chaos, a new political group, the Fascists, rose to power. The Italian people desired a firm and efficient government, which would save the country from communism, re-establish industrial peace, promote national prosperity, and gratify national aspirations. After almost four years of post-war turbulence the moment was ripe for a party professing these aims to take over the government. Such a group, commanded by an extraordinarily able and energetic leader, Benito Mussolini, was already in existence and a dramatic revolution placed it in control in 1922.

2. BENITO MUSSOLINI

Born near Forli in 1883, the son of a blacksmith, Benito Mussolini rose to prominence through his own unaided efforts. By working and saving, he managed to enter the University of Lausanne, but was expelled from Switzerland in 1904 as a Marxian Socialist. When the World War broke out ten years later, he had risen to a high post in the Italian Communist Party, and was editor of the Socialist journal *Avanti*, published at Milan. His associates bitterly opposed the idea that Italy should enter the war, but Mussolini changed his views on this point, advocated war, and thereby lost favor with the Communist and Socialist groups with which he had been affiliated. Starting a new paper of his own, *The People of Italy*, he appealed to the patriotic sentiment of the Italians, and when Italy entered the war he fought in the ranks until wounded and discharged in 1917.

The formula of Fascism

With the eye of a realist, Mussolini had perceived that nationalism was too powerful a force in Italian life to be ignored. The Socialists had won wide support by their demands for social justice and improved conditions for the workers, but they had also of-



Photograph from Soibelman Syndicate

BENITO MUSSOLINI

The personal qualities which enabled Mussolini to rise to power are ruthless will, stern self-confidence, and a gift of vehement eloquence.

fended Italian patriots by their indifference toward the question of "unredeemed Italy," by their frank espousal of pacifistic ideals and their pleas for disarmament. The formula for a successful political party, Mussolini realized, might be found by blending elements of socialism and nationalism, by combining an aggressive foreign policy with proposals to tax the rich and benefit the poor. The impotence and extravagance of the representative parliamentary régime made a strong, even a despotic, rule seem preferable, and Mussolini strengthened his appeal by demanding a moral and administrative reform of the Italian State which would purge it of bolshevism and other foreign or corrupting influences. The nation was to be purified, regenerated, and dedicated to the task of regaining that historic leadership in arts and arms which the people of Italy had attained in the days of the Roman Empire and of the Renaissance. Few patriotic Italians could remain cold to such a national appeal; Mussolini's condemnation of bolshevism and communism reassured the property-owners, and the element of socialism in his program won over many members of the working classes. He preached a composite, but a conquering faith.

The "March on Rome" (1922)

In the chaotic days which followed the war, Mussolini organized aggressive groups pledged to promote the new faith. Many of his followers were, like himself, ex-soldiers and Socialists, and the Society called itself the *Fascio di Combattimento*, or "Union of Combat." Frequently resorting to violence, the Fascists attacked their political opponents, particularly the Communists, breaking up their meetings, smashing their printing presses, combating strikes, and in some cases compelling the strikers to return to work. It is not clear that Italy was ever in very grave danger of becoming a Communist state; the attempt to seize the factories for the benefit of the workers and set up soviets had already failed by 1922; but the Fascists claimed the credit of saving the nation from bolshevism, denounced the ineffective ministry headed by the premier, Luigi Facta, and prepared to march on Rome and take over the administration by direct action. At this point (October, 1922) the king, Victor Emmanuel III, offered Mussolini the post of prime minister, which he accepted. Although the *coup d'état* which placed the Fascists in power was irregular and perhaps illegal, it was as much a moral revolution as a triumph of force.

Constitutional changes

Declaring that the Parliament had failed ignominiously at the task of government, Mussolini demanded and obtained a grant of autocratic powers from the intimidated deputies. A vigorous policy of economy and efficiency was adopted, Mussolini himself assuming the portfolios of foreign affairs, and of the interior, to

which he later added five other cabinet posts. A new electoral law, forced through the Parliament in 1923, provided that the political party obtaining the largest number of votes cast in an election (providing these amounted to twenty-five per cent of the total) would receive two thirds of the seats in the Chamber. The following year, after some official pressure, the Fascist or government party won the election by a large majority. The Socialist minority, however, continued to oppose and criticize the Fascist dictatorship. When a Socialist deputy, Giacomo Matteotti, threatened to make public some discreditable facts concerning Fascist methods of rule, he was abducted and murdered (1924). This act produced "a profound moral oscillation" in Italy, as Mussolini himself admitted, and almost overturned the new régime. Nevertheless, the Fascists continued to consolidate their control and press forward their designs for the reorganization of the state.

Fascist repression

The policy of silencing political opponents by violent methods, the most regrettable phase of Fascist activity before the March on Rome, continued to disfigure the record of Fascist success. Systematic beating, dosing with castor oil, and even worse barbarities, awaited those rash enough to oppose the new government. Newspapers survived at the price of a humiliating subservience; teachers in schools and universities took an oath to instill Fascist ideals into their students, or lost their positions; obdurate foes of the Fascist Party who had fled the country were punished by the loss of their rights and property, while many who failed to escape were transported to a prison colony on the Lipari Islands off the coast of Sicily. As head of the state, responsible to the king alone, Mussolini ceased to be dependent upon a Fascist-controlled Parliament and could issue decrees with the effect of laws. The cabinet members were his appointees, and the *podeste*, or local officials placed in control of the communes, were dictators in miniature executing his orders. Thus the minority opponents of Fascism were left without protection and without a court to which they might appeal.

3. THE CORPORATE STATE

Between 1925 and 1928, sweeping reforms initiated under the Fascist dictatorship transformed the government of Italy into a new type of political organism which was termed the "corporate state." From the first the Fascists had made clear their desire to control or dissolve all clubs, unions, or other associations outside their own ranks, to replace the confused tangle of political parties by a single National Party (Fascist), and to bring the political, economic, social, and intellectual life

of the nation into harmony with Fascist ideals. By a decree issued in 1926, the National Sydicates or unions of Italian workers were legalized by the government, and a second decree established a ministry of corporations to control their activities. Six employers' associations and seven workers' associations were to be co-ordinated under the minister of corporations, but this reorganization meant that the workers would lose the right of independent action, the syndicates would no longer have the power to declare a strike, and no new or unofficial associations could be formed. Not only industry, but agriculture, commerce, banking, etc., were to be regimented by these enactments, which made it possible for the government to curb the conflict between workers and employers, and regulate the vital productive activities of the entire nation. The liberal philosophy of the nineteenth century, which had taught that business prospered best when left alone, and that governments should interfere as little as possible in the disputes of capital and labor, had thus been abandoned in favor of a policy of strict regulation which subordinated all the individuals and enterprises of a society to the welfare of the state as an entity. Critics of the Fascist régime have objected, however, that the corporations have never really been organized, except on paper, and that they do not function, so that the workers have lost the advantage of collective bargaining and gained nothing in return.

New electoral system

The final transition from the parliamentary to the corporative system of government was not proclaimed until 1928. In that year a new electoral law went into effect which made the hierarchy of official syndicates, directed by the minister of corporations, the "organs of the state." Universal manhood suffrage was discarded, and the right to vote limited to those men who could prove they were members of a recognized syndicate, paid one hundred *lire* in taxes, or held a position of responsibility. These provisions disfranchised some three million voters out of twelve million. The most striking innovation, however, concerned the nomination of the candidates for election. The Chamber of Deputies was reduced to four hundred members, electoral districts disappeared, and Italy became one great constituency. These measures were designed to curb the spirit of sectionalism, with the inevitable compromises and petty political bargaining which had disfigured the parliamentary régime before the Fascists came into power. Henceforth each deputy would represent, not one local district, but the Kingdom of Italy as a whole. Finally, the task of preparing a list of eight hundred candidates was confided to the executive councils of the thirteen national employers' and workers' federations. Two hundred additional nominees were chosen by professional associations, teachers, authors,

artists, etc., and this list, now comprising one thousand names, was turned over to the Fascist National Grand Council (the central executive committee of the Fascist Party), which drew upon it in composing a final reduced list of four hundred "deputies designate." In the first election held under the new system (1929), the voters were invited to record their acceptance or rejection of the list of designated deputies as a whole. Out of some 8,650,000 ballots cast, only 136,000 had been marked "no." Should the official list be rejected by the voters, a second election is held for which all recognized organizations in the state with five thousand or more members prepare lists of candidates.

Authoritarianism vs. democracy

The effect of the new law has been to curtail greatly the importance of the electors and of the Chamber of Deputies, while augmenting the power of the cabinet ministers and especially of the "Head of the Government," as Mussolini is termed. All important legislative enactments originate with the ministerial council; and the Chamber of Deputies can be relied upon to approve them. The Senate is likewise in general harmony with Fascist policies, although a few individual members have remained unsympathetic. Senators are appointed for life, but Mussolini can assure his government a favorable majority in the upper chamber by requesting the king to appoint loyal Fascists to that body from time to time, and he has nominated nearly one hundred new senators in this fashion since 1922. The reconstructed Italian government thus represents a compromise between the authoritarian and democratic principles with authoritarianism predominating. Mussolini has contended that the new government is more genuinely democratic than the old, because it directs the welfare and furthers the aspirations of the nation as a whole, whereas the Parliament it supplanted was dominated by a cabal of lobbyists seeking advantages for selfish interests or favored classes.

The validity of such a contention can be decided only by students of political science who possess a full appreciation of its implications. Mussolini extended the argument to justify the censorship of the Italian press, declaring that under a "liberal" régime, so-called, the "free" journals are too often the lying organs of vested interests or political factions. If, he insisted, newspapers are compelled to limit their comments on controversial issues to quotations from official sources, the public will be spared much mendacious argument, special pleading, and misinformation. This is true; and under a state-controlled press, he might have added, the government will also be spared much embarrassing criticism. But criticism is sometimes good for governments, and a free press and a freely elected legislature are the best checks European

political ingenuity has devised to keep a government responsible to its trust. There are undoubtedly great advantages in a system of enlightened paternalism; in times of crisis an honest and vigorous dictatorship is more efficient than the cumbrous machinery of parliamentarism with its checks and balances and delegated powers. But no method has yet been devised to guarantee that an able dictator will find an equally able successor, or that enlightened paternalism may not deviate into an unenlightened despotism.

The vigor and success of the Fascist experiment in Italy encouraged the growth of Fascist movements in other European countries. Citizens who viewed with alarm the economic dislocation which followed the war, or grew disgusted with the mediocrity of professional politicians, re-echoed Mussolini's pronouncement that good government was more important than representation, and were disposed to agree that the parliamentary system, devised by theorists in the eighteenth century who envisaged the state chiefly as an agrarian democracy, was inadequate to deal with the complex administrative problems of a modern industrial commonwealth. The Fascist doctrines appealed particularly to those people who, for one reason or another, were most strongly opposed to Socialism and Communism. Thus Russia and Italy provided Europe and the world in the post-war era with two dynamic and antagonistic political faiths, Communism and Fascism.

4. BENEFITS OF THE FASCIST ADMINISTRATION

Under Fascism the Italian people have been stirred by a new spirit of pride and accomplishment. Monster mass meetings, parades, and demonstrations, inspired and directed by the authorities, serve to keep their patriotic enthusiasm aflame; the young boys are trained by courses in group calisthenics, maneuvers, and games to prepare themselves for military service; subsidiary organizations teach the girls to perfect themselves in those accomplishments which will make them good wives and mothers. A renewed sense of the purpose and dignity of life, a renewed faith in the grandeur and destiny of the country, and a deeper and more earnest response to the imperious call of duty have been bred in the hearts of Italian youths by the Fascist ideals and training.

The firm and purposeful methods of Fascist rule are designed to impose social and industrial peace upon the Italian nation. Strikes and lockouts are forbidden and all labor disputes are settled by compulsory arbitration. Riots, disorders, and crimes of violence are rigidly repressed. The secret societies, such as the *Mafia* and the

Justice

Camorra, which had long been a scourge to honest citizens in southern Italy and Sicily, extorting payments from shopkeepers and others under threat of violent reprisals, have been broken up by wholesale arrests and severe sentences. To eliminate delay and corruption in the courts and make sure that the laws are executed promptly and inflexibly has been one of Mussolini's foremost aims. In the cities and towns, where, since 1926, the elected mayors and councils have been superseded by *podeste* appointed from Rome, the administration of local affairs has functioned with new vigor and efficiency.

Agriculture

On agriculture, the most vital industry of the nation, the Fascist ministers have bestowed much paternal thought. Circulars of information have been distributed to dairy farmers and improved methods of cultivation recommended to those engaged in wine, olive, and silk production. Reclamation and irrigation projects have added to the acreage of arable land, and experiments with new types of grains and fruits are conducted by government experts. An agricultural credit bank, established to assist farm proprietors through their financial difficulties, has enabled many farmers to expand their holdings and enlarge their crops.

Industry

In attempting to stimulate the mechanical trades the Fascist government has faced serious obstacles. To offset the dependence upon foreign coal and petroleum supplies, new power stations have harnessed the rivers, and three fourths of the power available for industrial purposes is now drawn from hydroelectric sources. In comparison with England or Germany, however, Italy is still a backward nation in this respect, for the industrial establishments provide work for less than one tenth of the population. Unemployment has proved a severe and stubborn problem, the number of jobless workers passing the million mark in 1932. Despite the best efforts of the government to provide work rather than doles, and to stimulate business by regulations and subsidies, the decline in world trade after 1929 had a serious effect upon Italian exports. By 1934 the annual deficit in the national budget promised to reach half a billion dollars.

Financial difficulties

Since the proclamation of the Italian Kingdom in 1861, fiscal problems have never ceased to embarrass the national government, and the Fascists inherited a burdensome legacy of debts, internal and international. Since 1922, with the aid of a loan from foreign bankers, the finances have been improved, the *lira* stabilized at a little less than one fourth its pre-war value, and the gold standard reestablished (1927). But the Italian people remain relatively one of the highest taxed nations of Europe, and continue to labor under the disad-

vantage of an unfavorable balance of trade. Despite the recent improvement in the agricultural yield, Italy still imports large quantities of foodstuffs as well as coal, copper, wool, seed oils, etc. This economic situation makes it difficult for the nation to sustain the heavy expenditures for armaments in time of peace, and renders it vulnerable to the effects of a blockade in time of war. The appropriations for the military, naval, and air services amount to more than a quarter of a billion dollars annually.

5. FOREIGN POLICY OF FASCIST ITALY

With its expanding population and limited resources, modern Italy has suffered more heavily than any other great power through emigration. The exodus of native-born Italians to other lands has decreased somewhat under Fascism, but many thousands still depart annually to seek work in France or make new homes overseas. Despite this, Mussolini has sought to raise the birth rate, and Italy, with little more than half the area of France, now surpasses her older Latin sister state in population. This trend of vital statistics has been cited by Fascist orators to justify an Italian policy of expansion at the expense of neighboring states. Jingoistic demands for the "redemption" of Nice and Savoy from France, for the annexation of neighboring Mediterranean islands and the Adriatic littoral, have frequently roused Italian audiences to enthusiasm and have alarmed France, Yugoslavia, and Greece. As a consequence Italian foreign policy has been watched with grave apprehension and Italy has constituted one of the dynamic and disturbing factors in the post-war diplomatic situation.

Albania

The settlements which concluded the World War, and the Treaty of Rapallo in particular,[1] gave Italy a dominant position on the Adriatic Sea, but placed nearly half a million Yugoslavs dwelling in the Istrian Peninsula and Trieste under the Italian flag. As a consequence, relations between Italy and Yugoslavia have remained tense, despite negotiated agreements. The backward and disorganized principality of Albania[2] has become a pawn in this international match, with Italy endeavoring to subjugate the Albanians to her policy. Economic penetration, loans, military assistance, and a twenty-year treaty of alliance (1927) bound Albania so closely to Italy that Yugoslavia became alarmed. Command of the Albanian port facilities would make it possible for the Italians to move an army into Albania in a few days for a campaign against the Yugoslavs in the event of war. But the possibility

[1] See above, page 953.

[2] See map following page 954.

that Albania might be reduced to the position of an Italian protectorate diminished after 1930 as the Albanians acquired greater self-confidence and independence under the rule of a king of their own choosing, Skanderbeg III.

These circumstances have driven the Yugoslavs to cultivate the friendship of France, the dominant military power on the continent of Europe since the Treaty of Versailles, and the counterbalancing force adequate to hold Italy in check. In 1930, France began preparations to fortify her Alpine (Franco-Italian) frontier, whereupon the Italian government increased its military budget ten per cent, creating a situation tragically reminiscent of the armament rivalries which preceded the World War. But after 1932, the hostility between France and Italy was somewhat diluted by the apprehension both felt at the revival of German nationalism and the avowed determination of the German (Nazi) government to rearm in defiance of the provision of the Versailles Treaty. A later chapter will explain how the Germans, like the Italians, sought to escape from economic and social confusion by adopting a strong government of the Fascist type after 1932. The student might be disposed to imagine that a Fascist Italy and a Fascist Germany would prove natural allies, but it must be remembered that the strongest element in Fascism is nationalism and two nationalistic states seldom make friendly neighbors.

Franco-Italian rivalry

With the revival of Germany and of German dreams of expansion, the diminished and defenseless Austrian State became a pawn for control of which the powers competed. The Italians no less than the French feared that the Austrian Germans might join with Germany, thus adding to the population and strength of the German *Reich*, and extending its borders until they touched those of Italy. In his determination to prevent such a development, Mussolini announced (1934) that he would march the Italian army into Austria if circumstances required such a move, in order to preserve the independence of the Austrian Republic. Europe was thus presented with the spectacle of three leading powers, France, Italy, and Germany, facing each other in a tense, triangular hostility which magnified every diplomatic incident into a miniature crisis.

Austria

In the colonial sphere, the desire to join the Italian East African possessions, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, by annexing the intervening Abyssinian territory, led Italy to provoke a war with Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935. The Ethiopian ruler appealed to the League of Nations, which threatened Italy, as an aggressor nation, with economic penalties, but the Italian armies continued their subjugation of Ethiopian territory.

6. THE FASCIST STATE AND THE PAPACY

One signal triumph of Mussolini's statesmanship was the conclusion (1929) of an accord between the Italian government and the papacy. Since 1870, each succeeding pope had accepted the precedent set by Pius IX and had regarded himself as the prisoner of the Vatican. The student will recall that when the forces of the new Italian Kingdom occupied Rome, Pius IX refused to sanction this infringement of his authority or to accept compensation for the loss of his temporal possessions. This papal policy of non-recognition, awkward alike for the Italian government and for the papacy, prevailed for nearly sixty years. After 1922, the aggressive and multifarious activities of the Fascists threatened to create new emergencies and to widen the existing rift, until in 1927 Pius XI found it necessary to condemn the Fascist theories concerning the supremacy of the state.

Two years of negotiation followed during which the Fascist chiefs succeeded in softening the papal displeasure. Mussolini recognized that the opposition of the church might prove a serious threat to his authority in a state where nine tenths of the people professed the Catholic faith. A mutual desire for reconciliation resulted in the Lateran Treaty of 1929, which recognized the pope as temporal sovereign of the Vatican City. This minute state of about one hundred acres in the heart of Rome was to enjoy complete independence, with its own rail, postal, and coinage facilities, and its own radio station. As compensation for the loss of that larger patrimony which former popes had ruled, the Italian government agreed to make restitution to the extent of 1,750,000,000 *lire* (about $92,000,000). The government further consented to declare the Roman Catholic faith the official religion of the state, to provide for religious instruction in the schools, and to enforce the canon (church) law throughout Italy. In return the Holy See formally recognized the Italian Kingdom with Rome as its capital. To many people it appeared that the Fascists lost more than they gained by this *concordat*, but the Fascist régime was strong enough to afford concessions, and, although many points of possible friction remained, this reconciliation of church and state contributed to the tranquillity of Italian society.

Lateran Treaty (1929)

Moreover, Catholicism and Fascism could work better as allied than as antagonistic forces, for they possessed some common aims and common enemies. In successive encyclicals, Pius XI upheld the sanctity of private property and defended the claims of capital, while insisting with equal force that real progress in

Fascism and Catholicism as allies

the industrial sphere must rest upon an equitable adjustment of the burdens and rewards of industry between the owners and the workers. This solution of the class conflict accorded well with Fascist principles. Pius further stressed, as Leo XIII had done, the mutual interdependence of capital and labor, and adjured the wealthy to remember and exercise the sacred duty of charity toward the victims of economic pressure. His denunciation of birth control and divorce coincided with the Fascist drive to raise the Italian birth rate. Nor must it be overlooked that the church and the Fascist State were united by the common battle against the principles of communism, for both fought and condemned unreservedly the communistic program for the abolition of private property, the socialization of industry and agriculture, the suppression of organized religious bodies and the confiscation of their wealth.

The Fascists could not, however, derive an unmixed satisfaction from the papal pronouncements. For Pius denounced the competition in armaments and the national rivalries which threatened the peace of the world in phrases which lashed the more militant Fascists no less sharply than the ultra-patriots and jingoists of other nations. Mindful of the great influence for peace which the church exercises throughout the world, the pope issued an apostolic letter (1931) urging a crusade for the relief of the suffering and the indigent, in the hope that social and national rancors might be quenched by the pure zeal of a great religious and humanitarian effort, and that part of the funds expended so lavishly upon armaments might be diverted to more humane services.

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE COMMONWEALTH

No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a Dominion . . . unless . . . that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof.

Statute of Westminster (1931).

TO THE undiscerning eye it might well appear that Britain had gained more by the World War than any other great power. Her most dangerous trade rival had been crushed, her naval position strengthened by the destruction of the German fleet, and the major share of the German colonies had passed under the British flag. Although nearly seven hundred thousand British soldiers had lost their lives in the various theaters of conflict, the civilian population had escaped the horrors of invasion, and the fatalities from German air and naval raids totaled less than fifteen hundred. Britain had no shell-torn fields or ruined towns to reclaim, and her vast industrial plants had expanded under the stimulus of the war demands.

1. THE BRITISH ECONOMIC DILEMMA

But there was another and less hopeful picture to be drawn. Millions of tons of British shipping had been destroyed by submarines. Government indebtedness had risen enormously, and the loans which Britain had advanced to her allies in the World War were largely uncollectible. The prosperity of the United Kingdom before the war had been a result chiefly of the Industrial Revolution, which had made Britain the workshop of the world. In addition, there was the large annual return on British capital invested abroad, and the profits derived from the British merchant marine which transported half the world's trade. Dependence upon these sources of wealth, however, made it impossible for Britain to recover from the exhaustion of the war years until world trade revived, and the political and economic chaos of the post-war era delayed such a revival. With Russia in revolution and Germany prostrate, with the reconstructed European states raising new tariff barriers, and the Indian Nationalists boycotting British goods, the anticipated revival had little chance to materialize.

Nor were these the worst features of the dilemma. In the decades before the war, British manufacturers had already found themselves

embarrassed by the industrial progress of other nations and even of the British Dominions. Following the war this rivalry grew more serious. Japanese textiles competed with the product of British looms for the markets of China and India; merchandise from the United States undersold British manufactures in South America. The British coal exports, long an important source of revenue, declined rapidly, for motors driven by electricity or gasoline were supplementing the steam engine. Even at sea the British encountered a new spirit of competition, and soon express liners built in Germany and Italy were capturing the best of the Atlantic passenger trade while the shipyards on the Clyde and the Mersey lay idle. By 1921, two million workers in England were without occupation; during the decade which followed, the number was to vary from three quarters of a million to approximately three million registered unemployed, as the business tide ebbed and flowed. The problem of providing relief for these victims of economic circumstances became the gravest issue of the post-war years.

Unemployment relief

Under the stress of these abnormal conditions the social insurance acts passed by the Liberals between 1909 and 1911 [1] proved lamentably inadequate. Although in 1921 nearly three million people were receiving annuities under the Widows', Orphans', and Old Age Pension Acts, while another million were the recipients of poor relief, and upwards of two million more received war pensions, the government found it necessary to assume the burden of relieving the unemployed to the further extent of fifty million dollars. Within ten years this aid to the unemployed had increased fivefold; and the total annual cost of social services amounted (1931) to nearly two billion dollars. The increased taxes necessitated by this expenditure augmented the burden and the difficulties under which British industry already labored, while the income, inheritance, and land taxes drove many property-owners to sell their estates or transfer their investments to other countries.

Britain abandons free trade

As three fourths of the inhabitants of the United Kingdom had become town dwellers by the twentieth century, British farmers were a neglected minority and the urban millions depended upon the food supplies imported from other lands. How to pay for these imports, and for the raw materials consumed by the factories, when the British export trade was languishing, became a problem of the utmost gravity. The world-wide economic depression which set in after 1929 reduced British trade and credit to such a serious extent that the government abandoned the gold standard (1931) and the pound sterling depreciated thirty per cent in terms of gold currencies. This

[1] See above, pages 872–74.

financial crisis was followed by a frank abandonment of the free-trade principles which had dominated British commercial practices for nearly a century. With other nations raising their tariff walls against British manufactures, it became inevitable that Britain should retaliate. The Import Duties Bill (1932) levied a ten per cent duty on foreign goods entering British ports, but left the government at liberty to negotiate a lower tariff accord with countries which accepted British products on favorable terms; and to raise the import duty as high as one hundred per cent on goods produced by those nations which discriminated against British exports.

The Washington Naval Conference (1922)

The mounting economic pressure also proved an important factor in modifying British naval ambitions. Before the World War, Great Britain had attempted to maintain a fleet equal to any two other navies in the world combined, but by 1922 the naval forces of the United States and Japan had increased to such a point that Britain was driven to abandon this policy. The destruction of the German High Seas Fleet, the ships of which were sunk by their own crews after their surrender, left the British an unquestioned superiority in European waters; but their Pacific squadron could no longer compete with the American and Japanese forces. Great Britain, therefore, welcomed the proposal for a conference on naval limitation set forth by the American government in 1922. The most important treaty resulting from this Washington Naval Conference provided that Great Britain, the United States, and Japan should accept a quota regulating the strength of their respective navies in the proportions of 5:5:3. At the same time the three powers agreed to maintain their fortifications in the Pacific at their existing status. The Japanese were the least satisfied with the agreement, which permitted them a navy only three fifths as strong as the two leading naval powers, but the treaty achieved its main purpose in that it postponed the prospect of an unrestricted naval rivalry at least until its expiration in 1936.

2. BRITISH POLITICAL PARTIES (1919–35)

During the last two years of the World War, Great Britain was governed by a coalition cabinet, resting chiefly upon Conservative support, but headed by the indefatigable Liberal leader, David Lloyd George. This fiery Welshman was one of the few British politicians who emerged with enhanced prestige from what he later described as "our blood-stained stagger to victory," but his popularity waned in the troubled post-war period. The mounting economic distress after 1920 found

British opinion divided regarding the best course to follow, the Conservatives generally favoring a tariff to protect the manufacturers, while a growing Labor Party demanded increased government relief for the unemployed and the progressive socialization of industry. In the national election of 1922, the Conservatives secured a majority of the seats in the House of Commons, but Labor also gained and became the official opposition party. A second election (1923) gave the Conservatives 258 seats, the Laborites 192, and the waning Liberal Party 158. By combining forces, the Laborites and Liberals were enabled to control Parliament, and James Ramsay MacDonald became the first Socialist prime minister to direct the destinies of Great Britain.

First Labor government (1923–24)

This first British Labor government lasted less than a year. MacDonald sought to lower duties, to modify the more aggressive features of British imperialism (a proposed naval base at Singapore was abandoned), and to conclude trade treaties with Soviet Russia. But the British electorate declined on appeal to support his policies and returned the Conservatives to power with a majority of two hundred in the election of 1924.

Conservatives in power (1924–29)

For the next five years the Conservative government wrestled with the problems of trade and unemployment under the premiership of Stanley Baldwin. Business taxes were reduced and the pound restored to par value (1925), a victory for the bankers and the creditor class generally. But the Conservatives found themselves compelled to augment the "dole" to the unemployed, from fear of revolution if not from more humanitarian motives. For a time the sinking coal industry was buoyed up by government subsidies, but when these were curtailed (1926), and the mine-owners attempted to cut wages, the miners went out on strike and were joined by unionized transport workers. For over a week business stood still, while the British people endured with rare common sense and good humor the discomforts of the gravest and most costly labor crisis in their history. The outcome proved a defeat for the miners; and public opinion endorsed the prompt passage of a new Trade Disputes Act which prohibited further "general" strikes, forbade picketing, and weakened the influence of the workers' combinations.

Second Labor government (1929–31)

In the general election of 1929, the Labor Party came into power a second time, but once again the control of Parliament depended upon the co-operation of the Liberal group. In the face of the international business depression which set in almost immediately, Ramsay MacDonald, as prime minister, found it increasingly difficult to obtain a balanced budget, and heavy

French withdrawals of gold from the Bank of England in the summer of 1931 precipitated a financial crisis in London. Bankers and business men blamed the fiscal dilemma of the government upon the cost of unemployment relief and other public services which had steadily increased until they cost the taxpayers two billion dollars annually; but the Labor group in Parliament, led by Arthur Henderson, refused to approve a slash in the "dole." The result of the deadlock was a dramatic and unprecedented reconstruction of the cabinet. In August (1931) a coalition government was formed, under the domination of the Conservatives, but it was still headed by Ramsay MacDonald, who had deserted the Labor Party in order to do his duty as he saw it for his country. On September 21, Britain abandoned the gold standard and the pound fell from $4.86 to $3.40.

The National Party triumphs (1931)

This new coalition government or National Party appealed to the people in an election held the following month. The result proved a signal repulse for both Liberals and Laborites, for the National Party gained 554 of the 615 seats in Parliament. The British electorate had backed the forces of stability and given the new government a clear mandate to develop its policy of retrenchment, protection, and economic nationalism. Ramsay MacDonald again became prime minister in a cabinet dominated by the Conservatives. Thirteen Laborites had followed him into the National Party, but the Labor Party proper, weakened and disrupted by his desertion, was reduced to fifty members and formed an insignificant opposition to the triumphant Nationalists. The Conservative preponderance, however, was too overwhelming to endure unchanged, and, although business conditions improved in 1933 and both imports and exports expanded, the Labor Party showed indications that it might in time revive sufficiently to challenge the Nationalist *bloc*.

3. THE IRISH FREE STATE

Although, to the people living in post-war Britain, the crises in domestic affairs appeared to outweigh all other issues, the Parliament at Westminster was forced in these same years to decide questions which concerned the empire at large. For London is the center of a commonwealth of nations which includes one fourth of the habitable area of the world and more than one fourth of the world's population. Decisions of momentous consequence for the inhabitants of Ireland, of India, and of other portions of the British Empire were reached between 1919 and 1934, and these must now be discussed.

No problem in British history has excited more bitterness of feeling than the Irish Question. The ill fate which has frequently frustrated attempts to settle the difficulties between England and Ireland did not fail to attend the Government of Ireland Bill which the Liberals passed in 1914.[1] This act was suspended because of the outbreak of the World War, and the hostility between the inhabitants of Ulster, who were largely Protestant and pro-British, and the Irish Catholic majority in the remaining four fifths of Ireland remained unappeased. Irish national feeling found its most vigorous expression in the movement known as "Sinn Fein" (Gaelic for "we ourselves"); and in 1916 a group of reckless patriots attempted to proclaim an independent Irish Republic. The swift and deadly measures adopted by the British in crushing this attempted "Easter Rebellion" made reconciliation between England and Ireland all but impossible. A majority of the Irish members elected to the British Parliament in 1918 refused to take their seats, and set up instead an independent Irish Parliament at Dublin, under the presidency of a stanch member of the Sinn Fein group, Eamon de Valera. The Irish situation had reached a point indistinguishable from civil war.

The Irish Question

Stubbornly refusing to acknowledge the right of the Irish to self-determination, the British government endeavored to crush the irregular forces of the Irish Republic during three years (1918–21) of savage ambushes, assassinations, and reprisals. The struggle, which was characterized by acts of ferocity and treachery disgraceful to both sides, ended in the negotiation of a treaty between the Republicans and the British government on December 6, 1921, and the following year the Irish Free State was organized. Although fanatic Republicans favored the forcible inclusion of Ulster and repudiation of all ties with Britain, a more moderate settlement was worked out. The Irish Free State achieved Dominion status with its own Parliament (the *Dail Eireann*) and membership in the League of Nations, but deputies to the Irish Parliament were to take an oath of allegiance to the British king, and the military and foreign policy of the Free State remained a matter of proprietary concern to the British government.

Irish Free State proclaimed

It was further provided that no religious legislation should be enacted which discriminated against citizens of the Free State or Ulster. As the six counties of Ulster refused to join the Free State, they were granted a separate government. The capital of Northern Ireland is Belfast, and the six Unionist counties which thus remained loyal to the British tie contain forty per cent of the population of Ireland.

Northern Ireland

[1] See above, page 874.

The active head of the Irish Free State is not the governor general appointed by the British crown, but the prime minister, or president of the executive council, as he is termed. From 1922 to 1932, this office was filled by William T. Cosgrave, a leader of statesmanlike moderation who guided the new Dominion through its first decade of tense and troubled history. The agitation of an irreconcilable minority led by Eamon de Valera continued to disturb Anglo-Irish relations. In the general election of 1932, De Valera's party (the *Fianna Fail*) obtained a majority, and he replaced Cosgrave as president of the council. The *Fianna Fail* had pledged itself to abolish the oath of loyalty to George V, and De Valera's new administration repudiated the annuities due the British government under financial agreements ratified by the Cosgrave régime. The British government retaliated by imposing a tariff on imports from the Irish Free State, whereupon the Free State taxed imports from Britain. The chief burden of this economic war fell upon the Irish peasantry whose produce was thus excluded from its normal (British) markets. How far the Irish people are prepared to indulge national sentiment at the price of economic disadvantage remains to be determined.

4. INDIA

The Diarchy

In recognition of the loyalty displayed by the Indian princes and peoples during the war, and as a concession to the growing Nationalist sentiment agitating India's teeming millions,[1] the British government passed a Government of India Act in 1919. Native-born civil servants who displayed the requisite ability were to be admitted to important offices in the administration. The people received a larger share of control in matters of local government, as taxation, education, and public health; and most important of all, the bill established a national government for India, to consist of a Legislative Assembly and a Council of State meeting at Delhi. In both these chambers a majority of the members were to be elected, the remainder appointed. This approach to representative government failed to satisfy the Indians, because by a division of power termed "diarchy," control of the police, the law courts, and the army, as well as the direction of foreign affairs, were reserved to the British authorities.

Instead of moderating, Indian opposition increased under the Diarchy, and an unofficial assembly known as the National Congress became the focal center of the resistance. The most influential leader of the Na-

[1] See above, page 892.

tionalist cause was Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, known to his followers as the *Mahatma*, the holy or saintly man. Gandhi adjured the Indians to win independence by passive resistance, and organized (1920) a movement of non-co-operation whereby all British goods, courts, laws, and institutions were to be passively boycotted. Despite Gandhi's injunctions against violence or rioting, disturbances inevitably broke out and he was jailed as an agitator (1922). From prison he continued to exhort his followers to practice non-co-operation and non-resistance; and after his release, finding that the British government still refused to make concessions, he advocated complete independence for India. In 1930, he defied the authorities by extracting salt from sea water (the manufacture and sale of salt in India is a government monopoly), and as this ostentatious act of defiance was followed by renewed disturbance, he was again imprisoned.

Non-co-operation

The calling of a Round Table Conference to meet in London for the discussion of Indian affairs eased the tension at the close of 1930, and the second British Labor ministry, then in office, sought to pacify the Nationalists with a promise of Indian autonomy. But the Indian Nationalist leaders were themselves divided concerning the relative representation to be accorded Hindus and Mohammedans in an Indian Parliament, and religious prejudice barred the way to equality for the hundred million "untouchables," the Hindus of the lowest caste. In September, 1932, Gandhi, who was again in jail, declared he would "fast unto death" unless the "untouchables" received adequate representation in the legislatures and a fair share of the official posts. These terms were conceded, and the task of drafting a more liberal constitution for India proceeded slowly during 1933. To devise a settlement acceptable to the diverse religious and social groups that make up the population of British India is a herculean task; to decide what status the semi-independent domains of the Indian princes shall enjoy in an Indian federation involves further complications, while to appease the anxiety of British capitalists, who fear to lose two billion dollars which they have invested in India, is perhaps the most difficult task of all. Any extension of Indian self-government must be approved by the British Parliament, and the Nationalist Party, which has enjoyed an unprecedented majority in Parliament since 1931, is less disposed to make concessions than the Labor group or the Liberals might be. It appears probable, therefore, that several years must pass before India can receive Dominion status on the same basis as the other self-governing Dominions constituting the British Commonwealth of Nations.

5. EGYPT, IRAK, AND PALESTINE

Egypt

To the Indian Nationalists, whether they stood like Gandhi for complete independence, or were members of the more moderate *Swaraj* or Home Rule Party, it appeared unjust that the British should grant practical autonomy to protectorates like Egypt and Irak while withholding it from India. Great Britain had controlled Egypt for thirty years before the World War, but did not declare the ancient land of the Pharaohs a British protectorate until 1914. The resentment felt by the Egyptians at this domination led to increasing disorders, until the British consented to end the protectorate (1922), withdraw their armed forces, and permit the native population to set up a constitutional monarchy under their own sultan, who took the title Fuad I, King of Egypt. Egypt is not, however, an entirely independent state, for the British government continues to scrutinize Fuad's policies and has reserved the right to fortify and guard the Suez Canal. Moreover, the vast hinterland of the Sudan, stretching from the twentieth parallel north latitude almost to the Equator, remains under British control.[1]

Irak

As a result of military operations in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the British were able to claim Mesopotamia as a mandate after the World War ended. The native Arab tribes, however, which had welcomed British aid in throwing off the Turkish yoke, did not wish to exchange one conqueror for another and demanded complete independence for their homeland, which they termed Irak. Accordingly, after the Emir Feisal had been proclaimed King of Irak (1921), the British agreed to recall their armed forces provided their interest in the rich Mesopotamian oil-field was safeguarded. In 1930, the official mandate was replaced by a treaty of alliance between Irak and Great Britain, and in 1932 the Irakian Kingdom became a member of the League of Nations. Irak has a population of almost three million, and its capital is located at Bagdad, the ancient city of the caliphs.

Palestine

When British forces conquered Palestine from the Turks in 1917, the foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, declared that Great Britain favored "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People. . . ." At the conclusion of the war, the British received Palestine as a mandate under the League of Nations with the understanding that the Jewish people would be encouraged to settle there, but the discontent of the Arabs, who desired self-government and

[1] See map following page 898.

resented the immigration of Jews, led to constant turmoil. Faced by seemingly unsolvable difficulties, the British government was driven (1930) to modify the Balfour Declaration, and announce that it was necessary to suspend Jewish immigration until unemployment in Palestine decreased, because the land available for Jewish settlers and for the increasing Arab population was proving insufficient. Although the proportion of Jews in Palestine almost doubled in the decade which followed the war, they still formed less than one fifth of the population, and the British, with a hundred million Mohammedans in their empire, could not afford to antagonize the latter by dispossessing the Palestinian Arabs.

6. THE SELF-GOVERNING DOMINIONS

The political tie which binds Great Britain to the self-governing Dominions, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the Irish Free State, has been largely transformed in recent years into an empire partnership between semi-autonomous states. As early as 1897, the prime ministers of the British Dominions (as then constituted) assembled in London for the first Imperial Conference, and numerous meetings of this empire cabinet have been held since that date. Its resolutions are recommended to the separate Dominion governments, which may or may not adopt them, and the divergent interests of the sister states not infrequently make co-operation difficult and complete agreement impossible. Nevertheless, the wisdom of allowing these major colonies to assume complete control of their own affairs has been strikingly vindicated, for the Dominions have grown increasingly loyal as the political bonds which united them to Great Britain slackened to a nominal tie.

War efforts of the Dominions

The World War afforded effective proof of the solidarity of the British Empire. Although not technically bound by the treaty commitments of the mother country, the colonies rallied enthusiastically to her support, and contributed generously to the final victory. They raised nearly 1,500,000 men to support the British military operations and incurred heavy expenditures in the prosecution of the war. In recognition of these efforts, the self-governing Dominions received separate representation at the Peace Conference and individual membership in the League of Nations.

At imperial conferences held in 1926 and 1930, the question of the precise status of the British self-governing Dominions was further elaborated, and subsequently defined in the Statute of Westminster passed by the House of Commons in 1931. Henceforth the Dominions were to be

recognized as "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or foreign affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . ." In virtue of their new dignity, the Dominions have the privilege (with reservations) of contracting treaties with foreign states, and may establish direct diplomatic relations by appointing ministers to foreign capitals. As the white population of the empire overseas is increasing much more rapidly than the population of Great Britain, it is possible to envisage a time, a few years hence, when the Dominions will achieve an equality in numbers, in wealth, and in power, which will accord logically with their equality of rank.

Statute of Westminster (1931)

New economic forces working for imperial unity have come into play since 1931 when Great Britain abandoned the principle of free trade. While imposing a tariff upon many articles of foreign origin, the new regulations still permitted goods from the British colonies to enter the United Kingdom free of duty. The co-operation of the Dominions was invited with a view to establishing a general system of imperial preference which would help to promote imperial trade relations and make the empire largely self-sufficient and independent of foreign markets. But the Imperial Economic Conference held at Ottawa (1932) revealed the difficulties attending such a course, for the Dominions showed a disposition to protect their nascent industries against British competition, and as individual partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations they were more concerned with safeguarding their national interests than in promoting the economic unity of the empire. Nevertheless, the Ottawa accords gave Great Britain a favored position as a market for such products as Canadian wheat and Australian mutton, while the Dominions agreed to accept British coal, iron, and steel, and various commercial products, in preference to similar exports from foreign sources.

Imperial preference

Increased liberties involve increased responsibilities, but the Dominion governments have been slow to realize this and reluctant to acknowledge their dependence upon the protection afforded them by the British fleet. The forty-five million inhabitants of the United Kingdom support by their taxes the naval forces which constitute the empire's first and almost only line of defense, while the twenty million people living in the self-governing Dominions devote a much smaller proportion of their revenues and their attention to the problem of imperial armaments. Australia and New Zealand, through fear of Japan, have

Imperial defense

displayed a greater readiness to co-operate with the mother country on this matter than Canada or the Union of South Africa, but in general the attitude of the emancipated colonies has been one of complacent acquiescence in benefits received. Their people felt, perhaps rightly, that in founding new provinces and subduing new lands to the uses of British civilization, they were serving the empire in an original fashion and in adequate measure.

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

FRANCE SEEKS SECURITY

If Germany will not pay up, the Treaty of Versailles affords us a remedy. Article 248 gives the Allies a priority claim against all the property and resources of the German Empire and the German states.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ (1922).

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

BRIAND-KELLOGG PEACE PACT (1928).

THROUGHOUT the World War the French people fought for their national liberties in the profound conviction that they were defending their fatherland against an unwarranted and premeditated attack. This assumption that Germany and her allies were responsible for the war, that they had plotted it in a desperate gamble for European hegemony, and fought it with the systematic intention of crippling France, in particular, beyond the possibility of recovery, has colored the outlook of the French people ever since 1914 and still determines their attitude on questions of foreign policy. Believing themselves to have been the innocent victims of Teutonic fury, they emerged from the war with two fixed ideas: that Germany must be made to pay to the utmost possible limit for the loss and damage which France and her allies had suffered, and that Europe must be safeguarded in future from the danger of a second conflict precipitated by German lust for conquest.

1. THE WORK OF RECLAMATION

The devastated regions

The French war losses, in proportion to the population and wealth of the country, were heavier than those of any other great power. The war dead numbered 1,385,000; the war expenditures exceeded $26,000,000,000; and the property destroyed in the devastated regions was estimated at a further $20,000,000,000 or more. Ten of the richest departments of the republic, the heart of industrial France, had suffered for over four years from the destructive effects of warfare and enemy occupation. Forests had been cut down, mines flooded, factories wrecked, thousands of towns, villages, farms, wells, and bridges destroyed, and an area as large as the State of Maryland transformed into a waste region of ruin and desolation.

Upon the conclusion of peace, the French people devoted themselves with admirable decision and energy to the work of reclaiming the devastated regions. Trenches and barbed-wire entanglements were removed, fortifications and gun emplacements demolished, hidden mines extracted, and the poisoned earth of shell-torn fields restored to productive uses. The replacement of ruined factories and wrecked machinery provided an opportunity for remodeling and modernizing many of the industrial plants, with results highly beneficial and stimulating to French manufacturing methods. Moreover, the colossal task of rebuilding and refurnishing three quarters of a million private dwellings and other edifices provided employment for millions of workers and induced a wave of prosperity in many lines of trade. In less than ten years the scars left by the war had all but vanished and the countryside of northeastern France once more supported five million industrial workers and farmers. Only a few square miles of desert, preserved in all their desolate horror as mementoes of the conflict, bore witness to man's ingenuity in the art of destruction and served as a warning to future generations.

The work of reclamation

The enormous outlay required for this work of reclamation greatly increased the French national debt. German reparation payments were expected to cancel the expenditure, but unfortunately for the French hopes it proved impossible to make Germany pay the sums anticipated. A large portion of the French people, convinced that the Germans were deliberately defaulting, favored strong measures, and clung to the belief that full reparation could be exacted if the Allied governments preserved an implacable attitude. A stubborn conviction that Germany could pay and should pay for the devastation wrought by the invading armies blinded Frenchmen to the realities of the situation, and greatly complicated the whole question of war debts and reparations from 1919 to 1932.

2. THE REPARATIONS TANGLE

When the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June, 1919, seven months after the war ended, the Allied governments had not yet filed their complete claims for indemnification against Germany. The Germans were ordered to commence payments in money and materials, but they did not learn until 1921 their total liability, which the reparations commission fixed at approximately $33,000,000,000.[1] Financial experts pointed

[1] This was an approximate sum, which was to be increased if it were found that the capacity of the Germans to pay had been underrated. The Allied Governments had demanded (January, 1921) a total of $56,000,000,000.

out that no precedent existed for the transfer of such an enormous sum, and that even if the payments were spread over many years the attempt to collect them would dislocate the framework of international finance, but the cupidity of the victors rendered them deaf to the cautions of the economists.

Germany defaults

The German nation was crippled by the strain of war and the long blockade, by the loss of valuable colonies and shipping and the cost of supporting an army of occupation. Moreover, the Germans regarded the demand for reparations as totally unjust and had no will to contribute more than they were compelled to yield. In 1922, instead of the $180,000,000 in gold marks demanded, they paid only $112,000,000; and their payments in goods, estimated at $550,000,000, likewise fell behind. Recognizing that Germany had been brought to the verge of a ruinous financial collapse, the British government proposed a revision of the reparations terms; but France, dominated by a Nationalist *bloc* headed by the intractable Raymond Poincaré, favored punitive measures. Declaring Germany in default, Poincaré ordered French troops to seize the Ruhr Valley, the nerve-center of German industry, and hold it until payments were forthcoming.

The Dawes Plan (1924)

A catastrophic collapse of German credit followed. The mark, already inflated when the French entered the Ruhr (January, 1923), fell faster than the printing presses could operate, until notes for a billion marks were needed to pay for a single meal. Since the stabilization of German currency was an indispensable preliminary if Germany was to resume payment, the late Allies agreed to reduce the burden of reparation temporarily to $250,000,000 a year, and to arrange for a foreign loan of $200,000,000 to promote the recovery of German industry. The international committee which devised this compromise was headed by an American, Charles Gates Dawes, and the project was subsequently known as the Dawes Plan. Under this arrangement Germany paid $1,896,860,000 between 1924 and 1929. The French and Belgian troops which had occupied the Ruhr Valley were withdrawn in 1925.

The Young Plan (1929)

In 1929, the Dawes Plan was superseded by a new project which took its title from another American adviser, Owen D. Young. The Young Plan fixed the sum which Germany still owed on reparations at $9,000,000,000 and provided for a scale of annual payments to run for fifty-nine years. Ratification of this new pact was followed (1930) by the withdrawal of the last Allied forces from the Rhineland, and Germany indicated her good faith by continuing her payments to the extent of $685,916,000.

In 1931, however, the world-wide economic depression led President Hoover of the United States to suggest a one-year moratorium on all intergovernmental debts, a proposal which the debtor nations readily adopted. Recognizing that Germany would not be in a position to renew reparation payments when the moratorium expired, the Allies concluded a fresh agreement known as the Lausanne Settlement (1932). The reparations total still outstanding was cut drastically to about $2,000,000,000, a sum which the German government might reasonably discharge in time. But subsequent developments in Germany, which will be discussed in the following chapter, made it improbable that any further remittances on the reparations account would be forthcoming.

The Lausanne Settlement (1932)

With the Lausanne Settlement the Allied governments finally acknowledged the impossibility of making the defeated nations pay the indemnity demanded. Reparations ceased to be a vital problem in international affairs, and the fierce and acrid controversy which had beclouded the issue for thirteen years passed into history. Yet even in the ledgers Allied and German estimates continued to clash, for the Germans calculated the value of their total remittances at nearly $13,000,000,000, while their late foes credited them with less than $5,000,000,000. This eight-billion-dollar discrepancy is traceable to divergent estimates regarding the value of the "tangible assets" — ships, cars, cattle, munitions, manufactured and raw material, etc. — which Germany had surrendered.

In releasing Germany from nine tenths of the obligations specified in the Young Plan, the delegates of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the other nations represented at the Lausanne Conference, were influenced by the hope that the United States in turn would cancel the loans advanced to the Allies during the World War. These obligations the American government had already reduced from eleven to seven billion dollars, but the debtor states sought to make further repayment conditional upon the collection of the reparations demanded from Germany. In other words, France, Britain, Belgium, etc., would pay the United States when and if Germany paid them. It followed from this argument that since Germany in 1932 was relieved of all but a small fraction of her reparation liabilities, the debts owed by the Allies to the United States should be cut in the same proportion. This confusion of reparations and intergovernmental obligations the United States refused to sanction, with the result that after 1932 all the European nations in debt to America (except Finland) made reductions in their payments, and many of them defaulted altogether.

The war debts

3. THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY

After 1924, the French attitude toward Germany was characterized by greater moderation and a more conciliatory spirit. The intransigent policy of Poincaré and the Nationalist *bloc* having failed to solve the reparations tangle, a new French cabinet was formed from the parties of the Center and Left. The portfolio of foreign affairs was entrusted to Aristide Briand, whose efforts from 1924 to 1931 to promote more cordial relations among European states won him the Nobel peace prize.

Poincaré, savior of the franc

But to solve the financial dilemma created by the cost of reconstruction and by official extravagance, the French turned again to Poincaré in 1926. The franc had fallen from its pre-war value of nearly twenty cents to less than two, and France hovered on the verge of that bottomless pit of inflation which had engulfed German credit three years earlier. Poincaré's firm policies, as head of a Nationalist government, saved the day, and the franc was stabilized at approximately four cents. By 1927, France revealed signs of a brisk business recovery, and by 1931 French prosperity excited the envy of the world. With little unemployment, humming factories, a good wheat and potato crop, and an enormous gold reserve, the republic appeared immune to the general depression which had set in. But Poincaré, the "savior of the franc" as he had been named by the grateful bourgeoisie, was forced to retire in 1929 because of ill-health, and the National Union ministry which he had headed fell from power.

Despite the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine, the World War left France weaker in man-power than in 1914. The consciousness that their fatherland had a smaller population than any other great power, and that the death rate equaled, when it did not exceed, the birth rate, filled Frenchmen with apprehension for their future security. As better protection against a new invasion from Germany, they demanded that the left bank of the Rhine should be ceded to France, or at least erected into a neutral state. But Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson opposed these claims at the Peace Conference, and Clemenceau was driven to accept instead the promise of a treaty whereby the United States and Great Britain would guarantee France against any future threat of unprovoked aggression. This Wilsonian pledge was repudiated by the United States Senate and subsequently disallowed by Great Britain. In chagrin and disillusionment the French turned to more practical measures of protection.

The war divided the European states into two main groups: those which had gained by the peace settlements and those which had lost by

them. French statesmen decided, in realistic fashion, that the nations which had gained territorially, especially those which had acquired more perhaps than their just share, would be eager to stand with France against any power or combination of powers that favored revision. To encircle Germany with a coalition of states pledged to oppose any renewal of the Teuton threat became once again, as before the war, the cardinal aim of French diplomacy.

Belgium

With Belgium, France concluded a secret defensive alliance in 1920. Comrades in war, the French and Belgians were also united in peace, for they had substantial interests in common, including fear of a German revival and the claim to a major share of the expected indemnity.

Poland

Poland, re-created by the peace treaty from territory which before the war had belonged to Russia, Germany, and Austria, likewise anticipated with misgiving the day when Germany would arise from her defeat. A Franco-Polish Pact was concluded in 1921, providing for a common policy in foreign affairs and a concerted defense if either of the signatories were attacked. The following year France strengthened the alliance with gold links, advancing several hundred million francs for the construction of Polish armaments and other national projects. France was buying allies.

The Little Entente

The three states which profited most extensively from the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire — Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Jugoslavia — were particularly concerned to avert the possible return of the Hapsburgs to Vienna and the resurrection of the Dual Monarchy. In 1920, these succession states formed a protective alliance known as the Little *Entente*. Poland, already allied with France (1921), entered into an understanding with the Little *Entente* later in the same year. A new network of pacts and protocols was thus rapidly taking shape, to replace that which had preceded the war. France definitely bound the Little *Entente* powers to her side by contracting formal treaties with Czechoslovakia (1924) and Jugoslavia (1927). Loans for the purchase of French munitions were advanced with a lavish hand, and French officers were commissioned to assist in organizing the armies of the new allies. In knitting together this band of armed and vigilant states, which stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic, French statesmen served two purposes at once. The menace of the hostile band encircling their borders could be relied upon to keep the defeated nations (Germany, Austria, and Hungary) neutral and quiescent. But a further service of the league, no less important in French eyes, was the exclusion of Russian revolutionary influences from

Europe. The student should study the map following page 954, and note how successfully the French system of alliances served both these aims. Poland, reconstructed chiefly at Russian expense, and Rumania, which had seized Bessarabia without Russian consent, could be counted upon to maintain a jealous guard and to constitute a *cordon sanitaire* which would check the infiltration of Bolshevist propaganda into Europe.

Nor did the French neglect, while securing allies, to augment their own military forces. Their army in the post-war decade was the most powerful in the world. Their air force was the largest and perhaps the best equipped. Their armament appropriations were more extravagant than in pre-war years. They spent billions of francs for the construction of defenses along their German border, and after 1930 they strengthened the fortifications along their Italian frontier also.

French armaments

Although Germany had been disarmed, and France had inherited the litary hegemony of Europe, French statesmen were harassed by the fear that secret projects would be formed for a war of revenge, just as ck, after the Prussian triumph of 1870–71, was haunted by his "nightmare of coalitions."

Uneasy lies the head that wears a victor's crown. From 1919 on, a succession of fears harried the French public: fear that Germany would become a communist state and join Bolshevist Russia in proclaiming a world revolution; fear that the Germans were secretly rearming; fear that Italy would support Germany in demanding a revision of the Versailles Treaty. It was such alarms that made a rational consideration of the reparations problem impossible, and precipitated the seizure of the Ruhr Valley (1923), with the subsequent collapse of the German mark. In 1931, a projected customs union between Germany and Austria, which might have relieved the desperate economic plight of the Austrian people by linking them commercially to their stronger neighbor, was frustrated largely through French opposition. Such a pact, it appeared to the enemies of Germany, might easily prove the prelude to a political union of the two German states, and the Treaty of Versailles had specifically prohibited such an *Anschluss*.

4. THE PEACE PACTS

Since it was the earnest desire of French statesmen to maintain the *status quo* as established by the Treaty of Versailles, they stressed the defensive character of the alliances which they negotiated, and affirmed that France was ready at all times to enter any wider accord that would guarantee greater security and tranquillity to the nations of Europe and

the world. France, and Italy also, sent delegates to the Washington Naval Conference of 1922,[1] and both these states agreed to a limitation of naval armaments on a ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 for Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy, respectively. France also supported the League of Nations in its efforts to promote peace and arbitrate disputes (so long as the League did not recommend any revision of the Versailles Pact), and the League's repeated attempts to find an acceptable formula for the limitation of armaments enjoyed French approval "in principle." In 1924, Premier Edouard Herriot of France and Ramsay MacDonald of Great Britain formulated a project (the Geneva Protocol) for the pacific settlement of international disputes, but the agreement failed to thrive after MacDonald's Labor ministry in England was overthrown by the Conservatives a few months later.

The Locarno treaties (1925)

In 1925, abandoning for the moment the search for a general formula against war, Aristide Briand of France and Gustav Stresemann of Germany joined in urging a conference to settle some of the outstanding controversies which threatened European peace. At Locarno, Switzerland, representatives of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia concluded five treaties of arbitration, the most important of which bound France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium to guarantee the existing boundaries between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France. By this Rhine Pact, the French abandoned any proposal to set up a buffer state in the Rhineland and the Germans acknowledged the permanent loss of Alsace-Lorraine, a compromise which did much to mollify the bitterness between the two nations. Furthermore, France, Germany, and Belgium pledged themselves to refer their future disputes to arbitration, and Germany made a similar agreement with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Lovers of peace everywhere hailed these "regional understandings," and pledges to negotiate, as corner-stones for the temple of peace, but in actuality the Locarno treaties were monuments to a momentary good-will rather than enduring evidence of a new spirit or policy. The French, at least, saw nothing inconsistent in signing at the same time pacts of mutual defense with Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact (1928)

Briand's efforts to curb war did not end at Locarno. In 1928, as a result of diplomatic conversations which he had conducted with Frank B. Kellogg, secretary of state for the United States, an anti-war pledge was devised and submitted to the representatives of fifteen nations meeting in Paris. This Briand-Kellogg Pact (or Paris Pact as it is often termed) was ac-

[1] See above, page 990.

cepted within a short time by nearly fifty nations. The contracting governments pledged themselves to renounce war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another, and to seek a solution for any disputes which might arise among them by pacific means and pacific means only. In adopting this solemn and definitive agreement to outlaw war, however, each nation reserved to itself the right to take up arms in its own defense, or in order to punish a state which had violated the pact or flouted the Covenant of the League of Nations. As civilized states never resort to war save on the pretext that they are defending their rights, these reservations all but invalidated the purpose of the earlier clauses.

Increase in armaments

How little genuine trust the governments of the European states placed in the various peace pacts which they negotiated was grimly reflected in their armament budgets. With the exception of Germany and Austria, compulsorily disarmed after their defeat, all the great powers increased their military and naval defenses during the decade 1920–30. Great Britain, France, and Italy had expended approximately $900,000,000 on armaments the year before the World War opened, pleading fear of German militarism as their chief excuse; yet in the ten years which followed a peace treaty which left Germany prostrate, they not only failed to reduce their expenditures for war purposes, but raised them to a total of $1,250,000,000, an increase of almost forty per cent. The secondary powers likewise felt constrained to waste their resources in the same desperate competition, to the great profit of the munitions manufacturers, who did not hesitate to foster the existing fears and rivalries in order to increase the demand for their death-dealing wares.

World Disarmament Conference (1932–33)

In the period before 1914, the era of the Armed Peace, military and naval rivalry intensified international fears and suspicions until the European peoples were psychologically disposed to view war as inevitable. To many statesmen it seemed clear that the mounting armaments of the post-war years must exert a similar baleful effect, and that the more carefully the nations prepared for war, the more certain it became that war would materialize. Peace societies and other public bodies, therefore, petitioned in favor of a world conference on disarmament, and in 1925 the Assembly of the League of Nations appointed a commission to draft the agenda for such a conference. Seven years elapsed, however, before the conference was summoned, and even then its deliberations proved sterile and profitless. Although sixty countries dispatched delegates and a variety of projects for the gradual reduction of armaments were submitted, no



Keystone View Co.

ARISTIDE BRIAND
1862–1932

The shrewdness of mind, unaffected manner, and keen sense of humor which distinguished Briand are all suggested in this unconventional camera study.

agreement could be worked out. In June, 1933, the conference adjourned temporarily. When it reconvened the following May, the members found the prospect of an accord more remote than ever, and promptly adjourned a second time with nothing to show for their labors. The French representatives at this abortive arms parley favored the establishment of an international military force to preserve peace and maintain the existing political settlement. For France was haunted more profoundly than ever by the fear that Germany would rearm and demand a revision of the Versailles Treaty under threat of war — a fear fed by the rise of the National Socialist Party in Germany and the sharp resurgence of German patriotism after 1932. The failure of the French government to prevent the German recovery, or to save France from the delayed effects of the world economic depression, rendered the administration exceedingly unpopular, and scandals and abuses involving members of the government crystallized this discontent. Sharp rioting in Paris (February, 1934) was followed by the formation of a National Union Cabinet with Gaston Doumergue as premier. This fourth cabinet crisis in less than four months left France shaken but sobered, and the new ministry was able to introduce some necessary economic reforms at home and pursue a more determined policy abroad. To offset the reviving German threat, France drew closer to Italy, and signed an accord with her Latin sister at the close of the year which fortified the dubious French hegemony in Europe. But the apprehensions of the French people were not dissipated, for their strong sense of realism warned them that neither the faith of fickle allies nor the high-sounding phrases of a peace pact could offer sure or lasting protection against a more powerful neighbor endowed with a sense of wrong.

Persistence of French fears

CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

GERMANY SEEKS EQUALITY

And in this moment I can only repeat, within the hearing of the world, that no threat and no force will ever induce the German nation again to renounce those fundamental rights which no sovereign state can be denied.

ADOLF HITLER (January 30, 1934).

THE revolutionary outbreaks in Germany during the last days of the World War,[1] which overturned the imperial régime and drove the kaiser into exile, delivered the fate of the empire into the hands of the Socialists. Had the Social Democratic Party remained united, it might have commanded an unquestioned majority in the subsequent elections, but during the war it had been split into three groups. The Majority Socialists headed by Friedrich Ebert and Philip Scheidemann favored a moderate program aiming at the progressive socialization of industry; the Independent Social Democrats insisted upon the immediate socialization of industry by constitutional decree; while the radical Sparticists clamored for the dictatorship of the proletariat on the Russian model. From the resulting struggle for control after the armistice, the Majority Socialists emerged in the lead. A Sparticist revolt was harshly suppressed, and an assembly elected to prepare a constitution (January, 1919). This Weimar Assembly accepted the peace treaty dictated by the Allies, and organized a government for the German Republic.

1. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC

Under the Weimar Constitution, proclaimed in August, 1919, Germany became a democratic republic of federated states. The executive authority was vested in a president, elected by direct ballot for a period of seven years. The legislature consisted of the *Reichstag*, a popular chamber of more than five hundred members chosen by universal suffrage, and the *Reichsrat*, a federal council or senate of some seventy members in which the eighteen states composing the new Germany were represented in the order of their importance. The constitution confided the control of foreign affairs, national defense, tariffs and taxation to the central parliament at Berlin, ordained that the local governments in the component states should be republican and democratic in form, guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press, and

The Weimar Constitution

[1] See above, pages 950–52.

promised equality before the law to all citizens. Popular rule was safeguarded by permitting the *Reichstag* to overrule the *Reichsrat* by a two-thirds vote, and by making the federal chancellor and ministry responsible to the lower chamber. In an emergency, however, the president had power to suspend the constitution and rule by decree if the *Reichstag* consented.

Friedrich Ebert became the first president of the German Republic and Philip Scheidemann the first chancellor. A *bloc* composed of Majority Socialists, Christian Democrats (the former Catholic Center Party), and Democrats (Bourgeois Republicans) dominated the cabinet, while the Independent Socialists on the Left Wing (the People's Party) and the Nationalists on the Right Wing (Conservatives and Monarchists) sat as a divided opposition. Public opinion shifted steadily away from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie and the more radical promises of the revolutionary days were not fulfilled, but earnest efforts were made, despite the financial confusion of the early post-war years, to construct public parks, gymnasiums, swimming pools, and libraries for the workers, to shorten hours and improve labor conditions, and to replace slum districts with model living quarters at a moderate rental.

This moderate program, a "betrayal" of the proletariat in the opinion of uncompromising radicals, incited the Communists to further abortive plots which the government suppressed without grave difficulty. More threatening were the Nationalist demonstrations, sponsored by ex-army officers disgusted with the rule of Socialists and liberals who had "betrayed" Germany by signing an ignominious peace. Two leading liberal statesmen, Matthias Erzberger and Walter Rathenau, who had earned the hatred of the Nationalists, were assassinated, and several attempts were made to overturn the republic by a monarchist uprising. In 1920, a group of ex-soldiers headed by Waldemar Kapp marched on Berlin, but were foiled by a general strike of the Socialist workers. Three years later, General Erich von Ludendorff and a vigorous political orator, Adolf Hitler, sought to organize a *coup* to overthrow the "inglorious republic," but were likewise unsuccessful. Hitler with several of his followers was arrested and sentenced to prison.

Nationalist plots

2. ECONOMIC CHAOS AND RECOVERY

The staggering financial burden of the war overtaxed the credit of the imperial German government and before the conclusion of peace the mark had declined to half its value. The peace terms, the sequestration of the

Rhineland, deprivation of colonies and shipping, and imposition of reparations made German economic recovery almost impossible. The paper mark, nominally worth about twenty-four cents in gold, continued to fall in value until by 1923 it became literally worthless, and a new currency had to be issued for which the agricultural and industrial wealth of Germany was pledged as security. The Dawes Plan,[1] which provided for a foreign loan of $200,000,000 to stimulate the recovery of German industry, marked a turning-point in the tide of economic distress. Thereafter business conditions improved slowly, but the inflation had ruined a large creditor class, and millions of Germans had seen their bonds, mortgages, and other securities repudiated or else paid off in paper marks which were finally redeemed at one billionth of their normal value.

The inflation

Yet all was not lost. Despite the suffering, the sacrifices, and the financial *débâcle*, the German people still possessed their habits of industry and efficiency, the workers had not lost their craftmanship nor the experts their technical training. With the stabilization of the currency, business revived, industrial plants expanded, and exports increased rapidly. The annual reparations tribute of $250,000,000 payable under the Dawes Plan, though galling to national pride, was lighter than the cost of maintaining first-class armaments. Factories and shipyards worked overtime to replace the goods and ships surrendered to the Allies, unemployment decreased, and the frugal living standards in Germany enabled the manufacturers to produce their wares more cheaply and invade foreign markets despite discriminatory tariffs. By 1929, the German merchant marine was approaching the total of its pre-war tonnage, the industrial output exceeded that of 1913, and for the first time in fifteen years the value of Germany's exports surpassed that of her imports.

German economic recovery

After 1929, however, this promising expansion of German industry suffered a series of checks. Domestic replacement and reconstruction was largely at an end; world trade declined sharply under the blight of the economic depression; foreign loans to Germany practically ceased; and several foreign nations inflated their currencies and offered sharper competition in the world markets. By 1934, the German trade balance had once more turned passive; that is, German exports fell short of German imports in value. One reason for this economic decline was the spirit of distrust and antagonism which the Germans excited among their neighbors after 1932. The political vicissitudes in Germany which gave rise to this international suspicion must now be discussed.

[1] See above, page 1002.

3. STRESEMANN AND THE SPIRIT OF CONCILIATION

The heritage of hate left by the World War, and the grievance felt by all Germans at the harsh terms of peace, made it difficult for Germany to re-establish normal relations with neighboring states. Bitterness over the reparations issue culminated in 1923 when the French, declaring Germany in default, seized the Ruhr Valley. With the adoption of the Dawes Plan the following year, however, and the subsequent evacuation of the Ruhr, Franco-German relations improved. The German people continued to resent the "guilt clause" in the Versailles Treaty and to condemn the extortion of reparations; they denounced the confiscation of their colonies without compensation and deplored the humiliating and defenseless status to which the treaty had reduced them; but their economic recovery after 1924 made them more philosophical about these injustices, and they sought for peaceful means whereby they might recover the equal place among the great powers to which their population, culture, and industrial progress entitled them.

The Locarno Pacts (1925)

From 1923 to 1929, the portfolio of foreign affairs in the German cabinet was held by Gustav Stresemann, a statesman who displayed remarkable tact in restoring Germany's international prestige. As a patriot and a realist Stresemann comprehended that a policy of conciliation might win favorable revision of the peace terms, whereas a policy of recalcitrance would only aggravate the evils of an unjust settlement. In 1925, he proposed that France and Germany abandon their watchful hostility by negotiating a security pact through which both would guarantee to respect the existing frontiers. Fortunately, Stresemann found in Aristide Briand, French foreign minister, a statesman no less eager to improve international relations, and the fruits of their joint labors were the Locarno treaties.[1] Germany agreed to arbitration pacts with France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and renounced all claim to Alsace-Lorraine. The spirit of cordiality which prevailed at Locarno proved that there could be peace among men of good-will and seemed a hopeful augury for the future of European tranquillity.

The admission of Germany to membership in the League of Nations (1926) marked a further triumph for Stresemann's diplomacy, for, in assuming an equal status and a permanent seat on the League Council, the German Republic cast off much of the stigma of isolation and defeat which since 1919 had excluded the nation from its merited place among the European states. When the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact was pro-

[1] See above, page 1007.

posed in 1928,[1] Germany was one of the first to concur in renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. In the year of Stresemann's untimely death (1929), he was able to perform a final service for his country by facilitating the negotiation of the Young Plan,[2] winning a promise that the last Allied forces of occupation would be withdrawn from the Rhineland by the following year.

The honesty and moderation of Stresemann's policies had thus wrung some notable concessions from the victor powers, and the stability and responsibility of the German Republic seemed to be assured. The German people were by no means reconciled to the position of disarmament and economic vassalage imposed by the Versailles Treaty, but they were disposed to emancipate themselves by peaceful and diplomatic means provided these promised them relief within a reasonable period. To ardent German nationalists, however, the concessions gained by Stresemann appeared too meager and too dilatory. As the memory of the war dimmed, the mood of socialism and pacifism which had dominated the first years of the republic waned also, and a mounting nationalistic fervor replaced it.

The election (1925) of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg as president of the republic revealed a latent veneration among the masses for those principles of discipline and authority which had distinguished the imperial régime. Hindenburg served the republic in his new capacity with the same rugged fidelity and dignity with which he had once served his emperor, and in 1932 the German people re-elected him, at the age of eighty-five, for a second presidential term. But it was significant that the monarchists and militarists, who had supported him in 1925, found his loyalty to his oath of office and to moderate republican principles a disappointment, and in 1932 he owed his re-election to the votes of Socialists and bourgeois republicans.

Hindenburg as president

4. HITLER AND THE SPIRIT OF RECALCITRANCE

Hindenburg's chief opponent in the election of 1932 was Adolf Hitler, a popular leader whose spectacular rise to power gave a new direction to German politics. Born in Austria in 1889, Hitler had served in the German armies during the World War, and after the peace had plunged into a career of political agitation. For his share, with Ludendorff, in an attempt to overthrow the republic (1923), he was imprisoned for a short term, but on his release he renewed his efforts

Adolf Hitler


[1] See above, page 1007. [2] See above, page 1002.

to organize a party modeled on the pattern of the Italian *Fascisti*. Like Mussolini, Hitler recognized that nationalism and socialism were the two strongest political forces of the day, and he attempted to fuse them into a National-Socialist program. By his impassioned oratory, and his denunciation of the "pacifist traitors" who had "stabbed Germany in the back" in 1918, in order to establish the republic, and crowned their infamy by accepting a dishonorable peace, he awakened a fierce response, particularly among youthful enthusiasts, and discredited the Weimar Constitution. Organized bands of National-Socialist (or "Nazi") agitators carried Hitler's banners throughout Germany, attacked his political opponents, especially the Communists, with violence, and committed many brutal and disorderly acts. The Jews were marked out for systematic persecution on the ground that they had evaded their patriotic duties during the war and had enriched themselves in unscrupulous fashion amid the national misery that followed it. The Nazis' use of violence, terrorism, and even assassination to promote their aims made them abhorrent to many observers, particularly outside Germany, but they continued to increase their following by exploiting the inflamed spirit of German nationalism, and by a shrewd appeal to the German middle class which had been largely reduced to ruin and impotence by the war, the currency *débâcle*, and the taxes imposed by the Socialist régime.

Rise of the National-Socialists

The successive election totals tell the story of the National-Socialist triumph. In 1928, the Nazis held only 12 seats in the German *Reichstag*. But the mounting economic difficulties deepened the indignation of the electorate, and the business depression multiplied the number of unemployed to over four million by 1930. The election of that year raised the National-Socialist representation to 95. The cabinet, resting chiefly upon the support of the Center and the People's Party, under the chancellorship of Heinrich Brüning, steadily lost ground. Had France and Britain proved more prompt in easing the reparations burden, or made some other substantial concessions to German pride, the Brüning régime might have survived; but instead, the projected customs union between Germany and Austria [1] was frustrated chiefly through French opposition, and the Germans, thus forcibly reminded once again of their ignominious vassalage, listened the more readily to the defiant proposals of the National-Socialists. In 1932, the latter doubled their vote, winning 230 seats in the *Reichstag*, and emerging as the strongest political party of the republic. Hindenburg, who distrusted Hitler as a demagogue, hesitated at first to invest

[1] See above, page 1006.



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ADOLF HITLER

The remarkable influence which Hitler gained over the minds and hearts of the German people is largely achieved through his passionate oratory. Opening his speeches on a note of gloomy and concentrated defiance, he can lift his audiences to a pitch of hysterical applause and enthusiasm.

him with the chancellorship; but in January, 1933, he yielded, and a cabinet was formed under Nazi direction.

The Reichstag fire

With their advent to power the National-Socialists undertook a complete reorganization of the republic. A new election, ordered in March, 1933, confirmed their supremacy, increasing their parliamentary lead to 288, which gave them a clear majority, as they could count upon the support of 52 Nationalist deputies. A fire of incendiary origin which destroyed the *Reichstag* building on the eve of the election was promptly blamed upon the Communists. In retaliation the government suspended civil liberties, suppressed opposition newspapers, and invoked coercive measures against recalcitrant voters. Although the Communist leaders denounced the *Reichstag* conflagration as a Nazi plot, and denied all responsibility for it, they were imprisoned and their party dissolved. The following June, the Social Democratic Party (the Majority Socialists), which had elected 118 representatives, was likewise suppressed and its deputies unseated. Thereupon the Nationalists fused with the Nazis, and the Center Party voluntarily dissolved, leaving but one political organization, the National-Socialists, in control of the government, the *Reichstag*, and the republic.

5. THE TOTALITARIAN STATE

At its first session after the Nazi triumph in the election of March, 1933, the *Reichstag* voted Hitler and his cabinet dictatorial powers for a period of four years. Hitler's avowed purpose, after silencing opposition in the peremptory fashion already described, was to weld Germany into a centralized national state under the domination of one party. The vestiges of particularism which even Bismarck had respected were to be stamped out, the semi-autonomous powers reserved by the leading component states under the federal empire of 1871 and the federal republic of 1919 lapsed, and local diets yielded up their authority to the central government in order that Germany might become a truly unitary state. As a means of increasing the efficiency, economy, and absolutism of the government, this consolidation of federal, state, and local institutions had much to recommend it. But when the leaders of the new régime sought to extend their control over the *Reichswehr* (the small but highly efficient German army), and attempted to reduce youth leagues, labor unions, and even the German Evangelical Church to state control, they awakened apprehension and opposition, and were forced to make some minor compromises. In general, however, the German people supported the Nazi policies with enthusiasm, and accepted Hitler's

eloquent assurances that loyalty, unity, and discipline would restore the *Reich* to a position of power and dignity among the nations and ease the economic distress through a planned revival of industrial and agricultural activities.

Unemployment relief

In Germany as in other industrial states the gravest social and economic problem of the post-war era was the necessity of providing relief for the millions of unemployed workers. The National-Socialist government attacked this problem aggressively, portioning the *Reich* into thirteen sections under the control of thirteen labor trustees, all supervised by a supreme economic council. Trade unions and strikes were prohibited, for the establishment of wage scales, hours, and conditions of work, and all other regulations governing the relationship between employer and employee, had passed under the supervision of the state. By shortening the working day more jobs were created, and a nation-wide drive raised funds to care for the indigent. Yet the workers were not wholly satisfied with the new system. Like the Italian laborers under the Fascist régime, they found their freedom of action greatly diminished and their welfare relegated to the paternal but bureaucratic care of a committee of experts. Many workers had rallied to the National-Socialist cause in the earlier years because they were attracted by the more radical phrases in the Nazi program, such as "the abolition of all income acquired without work," and "the distribution of the profits of large industries." But the National-Socialist leaders, who had secretly accepted financial aid from the great industrialists in order to achieve their victory, could not afford to alienate such powerful allies by adhering to radical projects which called for an attack upon private and corporate wealth.

The "June Purge"

By the spring of 1934, the realization that the National-Socialist program was likely to prove more "nationalist" than "socialist" in operation had roused secret discontent among the radical members of the Nazi Party. At the same time the "storm troopers," the thousands of uniformed youths who had formed the "shock troops" in the National-Socialist campaigns, were bitterly disillusioned by the report that their leader, Hitler, planned to dissolve them after they had raised him to power by their efforts. Whether a genuine conspiracy had been organized among storm troop officers to precipitate a "second revolution" is not clear, but in June, 1934, Hitler struck a sudden and deadly blow at the suspected malcontents. Over sixty persons who had been marked out for vengeance were shot down in their homes or executed without trial. Following this paralyzing lesson on the dangers of insubordination, Hitler prepared to reduce the

number, privileges, and duties of the storm troopers, and transferred his dependence to the *Reichswehr* instead, the officers and soldiers of which had long resented the favors shown the semi-military storm troop detachments.

With Hitler's advent to power, President von Hindenburg, already in failing health, had been forced somewhat into the background of affairs. On August 2, 1934, he died, and a decree of the cabinet invited Hitler to assume the duties of president of the *Reich* in addition to those of chancellor. The German electorate, in a plebiscite held August 19, approved the step by a ninety per cent majority, and *Der Führer* as Hitler was termed, assured in this fashion of the undiminished loyalty of the German people, accepted the presidential office. No previous German leader had been vested with more extraordinary powers.

6. GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AFTER 1932

In their climb to power the spokesmen of the National-Socialist Movement had insistently proclaimed their determination to free Germany from the stigma of the "War Guilt Clause" in the Treaty of Versailles,[1] to repudiate further reparations payments, and to demand parity in armaments for Germany or an equal degree of disarmament for her neighbors. When the League of Nations refused to countenance the demand for parity in arms, Hitler announced the resignation of Germany from the League (October, 1933), and the German people, on appeal, sustained his act by a plebiscite majority of ninety-five per cent. Thereupon the German government proceeded to ignore the treaty restrictions and took active steps to enlarge the military, naval, and aerial defenses of the *Reich*.

The economic stalemate

In the matter of reparations the attitude of the new German government proved equally firm, and no further payments were made after the adjournment of the Lausanne Conference in 1932.[2] In 1933, German export trade declined sharply, partly as a consequence of the general economic depression and partly as a result of a world-wide boycott of German products which many anti-Fascists supported as a protest against the treatment accorded Jews and Communists under Nazi rule. This fall in trade helped to induce a perilous reduction in the German gold reserve. Payments on all German foreign debts were suspended, and the government declared that Germany could pay neither principal nor interest to foreign bondholders until

[1] See above, page 948. [2] See above, page 1003.

more favorable terms could be wrung from their respective governments. The reality of the German dilemma was doubted abroad, and many foreigners suspected the German government of deliberately depressing the export trade and the gold reserve in order to create a pretext for defaulting. For the German people the adverse balance of trade meant a condition of enforced self-sufficiency, and they were urged by their government to find domestic equivalents for the curtailed imports, to the end that Germany might become self-sustaining in peace or war. This ideal of economic self-sufficiency for the nation was extolled under the name of autarchy.

The fate of Austria

One development which the National-Socialists desired to promote was an Austro-German *Anschluss* or amalgamation. The six and one half million inhabitants of the truncated Austrian State were more than nine tenths German, and many of them favored the projected union with their stronger neighbor. Such a step, it was generally agreed, would alleviate the grave economic difficulties to which Austria had fallen heir. As delimited by the Treaty of Saint-Germain,[1] Austria was completely landlocked, with no natural trade outlets. Furthermore, one fourth of the population lived in Vienna, which gave the country a disproportionately large head for a puny body, thus increasing the economic problems and aggravating the political disharmony. The Austrian Socialists, who had organized a democratic republic in 1919, were opposed by a coalition of Catholics and Nationalists, and the form of the government shifted after 1929 toward a Fascist dictatorship. In 1932, Engelbert Dollfuss assumed the chancellorship with the approval of the French, British, and Italian governments, his program based upon the principle that Austrian independence must be maintained and internal order restored. The resistance of the Socialists was broken after severe fighting in February, 1934. Dollfuss then sought to curb and disarm the groups of Nazi agitators in Austria who were clamoring for the *Anschluss*. Believing the moment ripe for a *coup*, desperate Nazis assassinated the chancellor in July, 1934, but the plot to seize control of the government and proclaim a Nazi revolution was frustrated. France and Great Britain authorized Italy to intervene if it were deemed necessary, in order that Austria might be safeguarded from German interference. The German government found it expedient to disown all connection with the Austrian Nazi plots, and the Clerical-Fascist régime at Vienna punished the assassins of Dollfuss and sustained his policies.

The reverse which German policies encountered in Austria was com-

[1] See above, page 952.

pensated six months later by the recovery of the Saar Valley. Fortunately, by the opening of 1935 the international tension in Europe had grown easier, and the League of Nations was able to discharge a difficult duty with dignity and success. The Versailles Treaty had provided for a plebiscite in the Saar District after fifteen years to determine whether the inhabitants desired: (1) permanent annexation to France; (2) an independent status under League protection; or (3) reannexation to Germany. An overwhelming majority voted for reunion with their German fatherland, and the French accepted the verdict without opposition. Such a peaceful settlement of a rancorous issue was hailed as an augury of more tranquil and more stable times, and statesmen cast about for a formula which would entice Germany back into the League of Nations and resolve the deadlock concerning German rearmament. With the inequalities created by a one-sided peace treaty largely adjusted, and the economic depression of 1929–33 on the wane, it seemed possible for the people of Europe to look to the future with more hope and confidence than at any time since the World War, although such confidence was tempered by the threats of a second world conflict which already darkened the horizon, and by the specter of unemployment which continued to stalk through the cities.

Germany regains the Saar District

7. CONCLUSION

Even in relatively tranquil years the tension and the inconsistencies latent in western civilization can hardly fail to provoke grave misgivings in the thoughtful mind. The material achievements of the modern age surpass those of any preceding epoch, and it is perhaps no more than just to pay tribute to these achievements before attention is called to the darker side of the picture. The triumphs of modern science in prolonging and enriching human life have been outlined already in Chapter XXIII. Each year advances the war against disease, introduces new labor-saving devices, marks the attainment of higher speeds, the construction of longer bridges, the erection of taller towers, and the measurement of more distant nebulae. These marvels of science are the chief glory of the contemporary era and it is impossible to overpraise the labor, the devotion, and the inspiration which have made them possible. Nor is there much reason to doubt that the immediate future will prove to be an age of technological development so outstanding that the present will be reduced in comparison to a period of apprenticeship. Machines are destined to become immeasurably more

intricate and more powerful, and the marvels and complexities of this machine-dominated civilization cannot fail to increase yearly.

Yet this development imposes a vast responsibility upon the masters of the machines, a responsibility which, it may well prove, they are not prepared for and are not competent to accept. There is a mounting disparity observable between the limitless capacity of the engines and the limited faculties of their human managers. It is easy, for example, to treble the speed of a motor vehicle, but the deliberations and reactions of the driver are limited by his mental and muscular inheritance and cannot be greatly accelerated. This failure of the human machine largely explains why there have been one hundred thousand automobile fatalities in the United States within three years. Similarly, the rotary press and the radio have recently combined to bring the news of the world to the attention of every interested citizen, but the capacity of the average man to select, analyze, and pass judgment upon that news has not expanded in proportion as the information multiplied, and he has found that knowledge spells bewilderment. A third example, perhaps the most ominous, of this growing disparity between the acceleration of mechanized processes and the lag of human adaptation involves the menace of warfare. Few modern diplomats can aspire to reach a decision as quickly as Napoleon was in the habit of doing more than a century ago, yet Napoleon in his swiftest campaign required six weeks to seize the enemy's capital, whereas today any capital in Europe might be bombed from the air *two hours* after the declaration of war. With the danger of war and destruction thus reduced to a matter of hours, deliberation becomes impossible, the human machine breaks down and abandons its rôle of arbiter. The diplomats, as custodians of peace, cannot hope to evolve solutions in such emergencies, and it becomes a matter of the utmost importance to anticipate crises and prepare a channel for the arbitrament of international disputes in advance.


War and poverty remain the most desperate enigmas confronting western civilization, and in democratic countries the solution to them lies in the creation of a more enlightened and more humane citizenry. It seems possible to hope that the patience and ingenuity which have won so many triumphs for European man will not fail him here. Of the four horsemen enumerated in the apocalyptic vision as the four principal scourges of mankind, two, Famine and Pestilence, have been strikingly curbed in their ravages by modern productive methods and medical skill. Even Death, the rider on the pale horse, has been persuaded to allow the average European to live out at least his twenty thousand days. But the rider on the red horse still raises his sword

above the nations, and the conquest of war remains the supreme challenge facing modern man. Only the spread of international good-will, transmuting fear to fair-mindedness and national greed to national co-operation, can brighten the hope for peace. The growth of such a spirit will depend upon many factors, but the most important must be the will of anonymous millions in every country who seek to distinguish and to support policies of reason, humanity, and justice.


Appendix A

GENEALOGICAL TABLES


THE PATRIMONY OF CHARLES V, SHOWING THE ANCESTORS FROM WHOM HE INHERITED HIS LANDS




GENEALOGICAL CHART OF THE ENGLISH SOVEREIGNS AFTER 1603



GENEALOGICAL CHART OF THE FRENCH KINGS AFTER 1610



GENEALOGICAL CHART OF THE BONAPARTE DYNASTY



Appendix B

LIST OF RULERS

A LIST OF EUROPEAN RULERS TO THE MIDDLE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

RULERS OF THE CAROLINGIAN FAMILY

Pepin of Heristal, Mayor of the Palace, 714
Charles Martel, Mayor of the Palace, 715–41
Pepin I, Mayor of the Palace, 741, King, 751–68
Charlemagne, King, 768, Emperor, 800–14
Lewis "the Pious," Emperor, 814–40

WEST FRANKISH KINGDOM

Charles "the Bald," King, 840–77, Emperor, 875
Lewis II, King, 877–79
Lewis III, King, 879–82
Carloman, King, 879–84

MIDDLE KINGDOMS

Lothair, Emperor, 840–55
Lewis (Italy), Emperor, 855–75
Charles (Provence), King, 855–63
Lothair II (Lorraine), King, 855–69

EAST FRANKISH KINGDOM

Lewis "the German," King, 840–76
Carloman, King, 876–80
Lewis, King, 876–82
Charles "the Fat," Emperor, 876–87,
reunites empire, 884, deposed 887

THE EMPERORS OF THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

SAXON EMPERORS
Otto I, King, 936, Emperor, 962–73
Otto II, 973–83
Otto III, 983–1002
Henry II, 1002–24

FRANCONIAN EMPERORS
Conrad II, 1024–39
Henry III, 1039–56
Henry IV, 1056–1106
Henry V, 1106–25
Lothair III (of Saxony), 1125–37

HOHENSTAUFEN EMPERORS
Conrad III, 1138–52
Frederick I "Barbarossa," 1152–90
Henry VI, 1190–97
{Philip of Swabia, 1198–1208
{Otto IV (Welf), 1198–1215
Frederick II, 1211–50
Conrad IV, 1250–54

INTERREGNUM, 1254–73

EMPERORS FROM VARIOUS HOUSES
Rudolf I (Hapsburg), 1273–91
Adolf (Nassau), 1292–98
Albert I (Hapsburg), 1298–1308
Henry VII (Luxemburg), 1308–13
Lewis IV (Wittelsbach), 1314–47
Charles IV (Luxemburg), 1347–78
Wenceslas (Luxemburg), 1378–1400
Rupert (Wittelsbach), 1400–10
Sigismund (Luxemburg), 1410–37

LIST OF RULERS

HAPSBURG EMPERORS

Albert II, 1438–39
Frederick III, 1440–93
Maximilian I, 1493–1519
Charles V, 1519–56
Ferdinand I, 1556–64
Maximilian II, 1564–76
Rudolf II, 1576–1612
Matthias, 1612–19
Ferdinand II, 1619–37
Ferdinand III, 1637–57
Leopold I, 1658–1705

HAPSBURG KINGS OF SPAIN

Charles V, 1516–56
Philip II, 1556–98
Philip III, 1598–1621
Philip IV, 1621–65

THE KINGS OF FRANCE FROM HUGH CAPET

CAPETIAN KINGS
Hugh Capet, 987–96
Robert II, 996–1031
Henry I, 1031–60
Philip I, 1060–1108
Louis VI, 1108–37
Louis VII, 1137–80
Philip II "Augustus," 1180–1223
Louis VIII, 1223–26
Louis IX (Saint Louis), 1226–70
Philip III, 1270–85
Philip IV "the Fair," 1285–1314
Louis X, 1314–16
Philip V, 1316–22
Charles IV, 1322–28

VALOIS KINGS
Philip VI, 1328–50
John, 1350–64
Charles V, 1364–80
Charles VI, 1380–1422
Charles VII, 1422–61
Louis XI, 1461–83
Charles VIII, 1483–98
Louis XII, 1498–1515
Francis I, 1515–47
Henry II, 1547–59
Francis II, 1559–60
Charles IX, 1560–74
Henry III, 1574–89

BOURBON KINGS
Henry IV, 1589–1610
Louis XIII, 1610–43
Louis XIV, 1643–1715

THE KINGS OF ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST

NORMAN KINGS
William I, 1066–87
William II, 1087–1100
Henry I, 1100–35
Stephen, 1135–54

ANGEVIN KINGS
Henry II, 1154–89
Richard I, 1189–99
John, 1199–1216
Henry III, 1216–72
Edward I, 1272–1307
Edward II, 1307–27
Edward III, 1327–77
Richard II, 1377–99

LANCASTRIAN KINGS
Henry IV, 1399–1413
Henry V, 1413–22
Henry VI, 1422–61

YORKIST KINGS
Edward IV, 1461–83
Edward V, 1483
Richard III, 1483–85

TUDOR KINGS
Henry VII, 1485–1509
Henry VIII, 1509–47
Edward VI, 1547–53
Mary, 1553–58
Elizabeth, 1558–1603

STUART KINGS
James I, 1603–25
Charles I, 1625–49
INTERREGNUM, 1649–60

A LIST OF EUROPEAN RULERS SINCE THE MIDDLE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

THE PAPACY

Alexander VII, 1655–67
Clement IX, 1667–69
Clement X, 1670–76
Innocent XI, 1676–89
Alexander VIII, 1689–91
Innocent XII, 1691–1700
Clement XI, 1700–21
Innocent XIII, 1721–24
Benedict XIII, 1724–30
Clement XII, 1730–40
Benedict XIV, 1740–58
Clement XIII, 1758–69
Clement XIV, 1769–74
Pius VI, 1775–99
Pius VII, 1800–23
Leo XII, 1823–29
Pius VIII, 1829–30
Gregory XIII, 1831–46
Pius IX, 1846–78
Leo XIII, 1878–1903
Pius X, 1903–14
Benedict XV, 1914–22
Pius XI, 1922 —

AUSTRIA

Leopold I, 1658–1705
Joseph I, 1705–11
Charles II, 1711–40
(as Holy Roman Emperor he ranked as Charles VI)
Maria Theresa, 1740–80
Joseph II, 1780–90
Leopold II, 1790–92
Francis I, 1792–1835
(as Holy Roman Emperor until he abandoned the title in 1806 he ranked as Francis II)
Ferdinand I, 1835–48
Francis Joseph, 1848–1916
Charles I, 1916–18
Republic, 1918 —

FRANCE

Louis XIV, 1643–1715
Louis XV, 1715–74
Louis XVI, 1774–92
Republic, 1792–1804
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1804–14
Louis XVIII, 1814–24
Charles X, 1824–30
Louis Philippe, 1830–48
Second Republic, 1848–52
Napoleon III, Emperor, 1852–70
Third Republic, 1870 —

GREAT BRITAIN (ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND UNTIL 1707)

Charles II, 1660–85
James II, 1685–88
William III, 1689–1702, and Mary II, 1689–94
Anne, 1702–14
George I, 1714–27
George II, 1727–60
George III, 1760–1820
George IV, 1820–30
William IV, 1830–37
Victoria, 1837–1901
Edward VII, 1901–10
George V, 1910–36
Edward VIII, 1936 —

LIST OF RULERS

PRUSSIA

Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, 1640–88
Frederick II, Elector of Brandenburg, 1688–1701
King of Prussia, 1701–13
Frederick William I, 1713–40
Frederick II, 1740–86
Frederick William II, 1786–97
Frederick William III, 1797–1840
Frederick William IV, 1840–61
William I, 1861–88
German Emperor after 1871
Frederick III, 1888
William II, 1888–1918
Republic, 1918—

RUSSIA

Alexius, 1645–76
Theodore II, 1676–82
Ivan V and Peter I, 1682–89
Peter I "the Great," 1689–1725
Catherine I, 1725–27
Peter II, 1727–30
Anna, 1730–40
Ivan VI, 1740–41
Elizabeth, 1741–62
Peter III, 1762
Catherine II "the Great," 1762–96
Paul, 1796–1801
Alexander I, 1801–25
Nicholas I, 1825–55
Alexander II, 1855–81
Alexander III, 1881–94
Nicholas II, 1894–1917
Union of Socialist Republics, 1917 —

SPAIN

Philip IV, 1621–65
Charles II, 1665–1700
Philip V, 1700–46
Ferdinand VI, 1746–59
Charles III, 1759–88
Charles IV, 1788–1808
Joseph Bonaparte, 1808–13
Ferdinand VII, 1813–33
Isabella II, 1833–68
Amadeo, 1870–73
Republic, 1873–75
Alphonso XII, 1875–85
Alphonso XIII, 1886–1931
Republic, 1931 —

Appendix C

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PART I

CHAPTER I

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