लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी
L.B.S. National Academy of Administration
मसूरी
MUSSOORIE
पुस्तकालय
LIBRARY
—
अवाप्ति संख्या
Accession No. 113071
वर्ग संख्या
Class No. 909
पुस्तक संख्या
Book No. Kat

John Katz

THE WILL TO CIVILIZATION

An Inquiry into the Principles of Historic Change

SECKER AND WARBURG
22 Essex Street, Strand, W.C. 2

Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd.

First Published 1938

Made and Printed in Great Britain at
The Mayflower Press, Plymouth. William Brendon & Son, Ltd

CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE 1

INTRODUCTION 13

I. THE FAILURE OF THE STATE . . . 23

§ 1. Transcendental kinship: a defensive mechanism of primitive religion. § 2. Economy and Society: the Two Labours of Man. § 3. The State as the conscious form of human association. § 4. The State as Power and Community. § 5. The organic theory of the State. § 6. The Birth of Political Philosophy. § 7. The philosopher as the forerunner of the church. § 8. The Three Elements of Church life. § 9. Clan, State, Church, and Universal Commonwealth: the dominant institutions of the Four Epochs of History.

II. FROM CLAN TO COMMONWEALTH . . . 41

§ 1. The three originating centres of philosophic thought. § 2. The Empires of Constantine, Asoka, and Chin Shih Huang-ti. § 3. Epicureans, Stoics, and the Retreat from Civilization. § 4. Depopulation in the Ancient Empires. § 5. Hebrew State and Jewish Church. § 6. Cultural Dualism in Old Testament Religion. § 7. Churches as unifiers of Mankind. § 8. The conflict of ideologies in Western Civilization.

III. THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVILIZATION . . . 61

§ 1. The Principles of Civilization are independent of history. § 2. The Three Elements of the Human Situation. § 3. Society, Habitat, and Economy. § 4. The discovery of the Principles. § 5. Morals, Science, and Religion: the three forms of human creativity. § 6. Religion as Acceptance of the Empirical. § 7. Faith, Probability, Isolates. § 8. The Diffusion and the Equalization of Culture. § 9. Death and Social Solidarity. § 10. Any form of group life yields on inspection the Principles of Civilization.

PAGE

IV. THE END OF METAPHYSICS 81

§ 1. The empirical and non-empirical traditions in modern philosophy. § 2. The influence of Protestant Individualism upon modern philosophy. § 3. The prestige of mathematics. § 4. Kant's Individualism. § 5. The Quest for Certainty and the misunderstanding of science. § 6. The historical element in religion. § 7. The representative minds of the Modern Epoch. § 8. Non-Euclidean Geometry and the refutation of metaphysics.

V. THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY . . 103

§ 1. The constants of human behaviour. § 2. How history is possible. § 3. Patterns or no-patterns in history. § 4. The four stages of man's self-discovery. § 5. The epoch of disillusionment. § 6. The fruits of metaphysics. § 7. The Return to the Human : a fact and a prophecy. § 8. Modern totalitarianism and the Roman Catholic Church. § 9. Protestantism as an exceptional episode in the history of religion. § 10. Clerical Fascism and the present crisis of civilization. § 11. A review of the argument. § 12. The limits of sociology.

VI. THE DIFFUSION OF CULTURE 143

§ 1. The Domain of the Human. § 2. The Miracle of Culture-diffusion. § 3. Tylor, Spencer, and Renan as Anthropologists. § 4. Occultist Theories of Civilization. § 5. Theism and Civilization. § 6. Geography and Civilization. § 7. Marxism and Civilization. § 8. Marxism and Metaphysics.

VII. SCIENCE, MORALS, AND RELIGION . . . 163

§ 1. The anatomy of civilization. § 2. The Science of the Semang. § 3. The Instrumentalist View of Science. § 4. Rationalism and the Greeks. § 5. The Science of Government and the passing of Animism. § 6. Lévy-Bruhl and the 'Mystical Mentality' of Primitives. § 7. Durkheim and the Group-life of Primitives. § 8. Custom and Creativity among Primitives. § 9. 'Moral Man and Immoral Society' : the Individualist's fallacy. § 10. Religion : a compensation for the losing game played by human intelligence. § 11. The secular realism of the Greeks : a theory of its origin. § 12. The Conservation of the Instrument.

VIII. EMPIRES AND CHURCHES : ANCIENT EGYPT AND ANCIENT INDIA 191

§ 1. Ancient Egypt and Ancient India : theistic and naturalistic interpretations. § 2. From Clan to Empire : the Evolution of Ancient Egypt. § 3. Egypt, the earliest instance of the alienation of religion from civilization. § 4. J. H. Breasted's *Dawn of Conscience* : a critique. § 5. Ikhnaton's failure to reconcile national religion with supernational imperialism. § 6. India : Asoka and Buddhism.

PAGE

X. EMPIRES AND CHURCHES: ROME AND CHINA . 209

§ 1. Rome's Failure: the lack of cultural homogeneity. § 2. Creativity, Unity, and Religion: the three conditions for the survival of civilizations. § 3. Rostovtzeff on the causes of Rome's failure. § 4. Creativity: the glory and the disgrace of human nature. § 5. From Confucius to the First Chinese Emperor: a survey. § 6. China and the Problem of the State. § 7. Taoism and Confucianism.

X. THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEFEAT 225

§ 1. Jeremiah and the Rechabites: a crisis of urban civilization. § 2. Judah: a pawn in the game of the Great Powers. § 3. National Sin: an explanation of national failure. § 4. The Theory of National Sin: a rationalization of national failure. § 5. The Anachronistic Fallacy: a super-historical philosophy of history. § 6. Israel, the unsuccessful nomad. § 7. The Politics of the Old Testament. § 8. The Civilizations of the Desert and the Sown. § 9. The Five Crises of Israel's History.

XI. THE DESERT AND THE SOWN . . . 245

§ 1. Political Failure and the Message of the Prophets. § 2. The Great Schism of 937 B.C. and its importance for politics and prophecy. § 3. The Contribution of Prophecy to Morals. § 4. The Protest of the Desert against the Sown. § 5. Jahveh and Baal: the conflict of two civilizations. § 6. The Secular Warfare of Nomads and Cultivators.

II. THE MESSIANIC HOPE 257

§ 1. The Kingdom of God on Earth. § 2. The New Testament: the Five Epochal Dates, together with a digression on Scholasticism. § 3. The Failure of the Maccabæan experiment in Monarchy. § 4. The Rise of the Apocalyptic Literature. § 5. Zealots and Quietists. § 6. Jesus: the Quietist of Galilee. § 7. Why a nationalist Judaism gave birth to a universalist Christianity. § 8. Christianity: the apotheosis of defeat.

II. CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILIZATION . . . 277

§ 1. Faith and Unfaith in civilization: the Christian Paradox. § 2. Kautsky on Christian Origins. § 3. The Orthodox Theory of Christian Origins. § 4. Gnostics. Rationalists, and Liberal Theologians on the Problem of Christian Origins. § 5. Christianity, the aftermath of two failures of civilization: the Hebrew-Semitic and the Græco-Roman. § 6. The Romantic View of Jesus. § 7. Christianity: the Causes of its Success.

PAGE

XIV. THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 295

§ 1. Dominant Minorities: their lack of a philosophy of civilization. § 2. The State: the Axis of World History. § 3. England's Four Centuries of Success. § 4. English Empiricism and classical systems of metaphysics. § 5. The English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions. § 6. Newton, Spencer, and English Empiricism. § 7. The Philosopher as Critic and Architect of Civilization.

XV. TOWARDS A NEW IDEOLOGY 319

§ 1. Empiricism and Revolution. § 2. The Reaction against Empiricism. § 3. Creativity without Community: the Error of Individualism. § 4. The Nemesis of Shavianism. § 5. Either Fascism or the Creative Commonwealth. § 6. Absolute values as God-substitutes. § 7. Mankind to-day, a single ship's company. § 8. The Dogma of the Inevitability of Human Failure. § 9. The New Secularizing movements of the Near and Far East. § 10. New Highways to World Civilization. § 11. England, the leader of the West?

INDEX 341

PREFACE

THIS book is both an interpretation of history and an inquiry into the principles of civilization. The conducting of 'inquiries' was the pleasing occupation of the eighteenth-century mind. Conservative in politics and comfortably assured of the stability of his own world, a representative intellectual of the eighteenth century, such as Hume, could conduct with serene detachment his devastating inquiry into human nature. But we are living in very different times. Civilization, from being a theme for academic study, has become a public interest and an international problem.

We are passing through the second general crisis of urban civilization. The outcome of the first was the establishment of the universal churches: the Buddhist and the Christian. The universal churches have been the great unifying agencies of the world, breaking down the 'wall of separation' between the peoples. But the churches have retained an intelligible antipathy for the creative violence of the historic process to which they owed their origin. Change is costly, but the dread of change will not help the world. It may be that the outcome of this second general crisis of civilization will be a society even more extensive than the universal churches, and yet one that has not lost its faith in man as the creator of civilization. One thing is certain: we are more likely to realize the Great Society, or, as I have called it in this book, the Universal Commonwealth, if we become conscious of the historic process.

Etymologically, civilization is the way of life peculiar to city-dwellers. And as city-dwellers are inclined to

approve of themselves, they have given to the term 'civilization' a eulogistic connotation. On the other hand, those who prefer the way of life of the landed Prussian aristocracy, have followed Spengler in associating with the term 'civilization' the disagreeable idea of decadence. I suggest that we need a morally neutral term such as 'mandom' which, by analogy with Christendom, would mean 'the domain of the human'. Everything that results from human creativeness, whether an example of 'internal' culture such as the song on the lips of a tribal singer, or an 'external' artifact such as the primitive instrument accompanying the song, would all be included in 'mandom'. Creativity is a universal human quality : it may take a different and more intensive form amongst peoples who dwell in towns than amongst those who dwell on the steppe or in the forest. Creativity is, therefore, a principle of 'mandom'. And as 'mandom' is unfortunately not a current term, I have called creativity a Principle of Civilization.

Science, morals, and religion are, if I may be allowed the term, the avatars, or chief manifestations of creativity. They rank also as the three fundamental factors of the civilizational process. For by means of science (which, both in its essence and in its origins, I shall equate to generalized technology) all men, whether they belong to the primitive or to the urban civilizations, adjust their relations to, and extract a living from, nature. By means of morals, which is custom in some degree conscious of itself, and therefore capable of being codified and institutionalized, all group-members adjust their relations to one another. And finally, by means of religion (which, in its origins and in its essence, is the oxygen and not the opium of the will to live), men, sojourning in a dangerous world, are encouraged to have faith in civilization. Without religion, the creative will to civilization would have been paralysed. For intelligence is the instrument of civilization ; and intelligence, multiplying man's reasonable fears of nature a great deal faster than his contri-

vances against her, would have played a losing game with life.

Accepting, in the main, Durkheim's view of the intimate relation between religion and society, I have throughout this book, but more especially in Chapter VII, emphasized the importance of what I venture to call the doctrine of 'transcendental kinship'. Primitive peoples make the world safe for the clan by initiating the powers of nature into the clan fellowship. The mysticism, with which Lévy-Bruhl charges them, is really an excessive and uncritical sociality. To differentiate sharply between human and non-human, and to learn that not only objects in nature, but human beings outside the clan, could for many purposes, such as that of governmental control, be regarded as things, was the revolutionary discovery of the makers of the urban civilization. The rationalistic outlook of the Greeks was largely due to the accident that, coming into the Aegean as conquerors, they absorbed the technology of Egypt and Sumer, diffused over the Eastern Mediterranean, without at the same time succumbing to the animistic over-beliefs of the indigenous inhabitants.

I may say here that the identification of science with generalized technology would, I believe, do much to disperse the intellectual snobbery that has gathered round the idea of theory as opposed to that of practice, and of scientific knowledge as opposed to working techniques. The metaphysical view of science is an unhappy legacy from Plato who, as Nietzsche said, was a child of the decadence of the Hellenic civilization. The view that science is generalized technology is, in substance, the 'instrumentalism' of Professor Dewey, the doyen of America's philosophers. Professor Dewey is almost the last living representative of the empiricist tradition in Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

The instrumentalist view of science also helps to explain the diffusion of culture. In recent works on anthropology, it has been shown that the most widely diffused of all the

elements of culture are techniques such as those of the cultivation of the soil or of the working of metals. Men learn more quickly from one another how to do than how to theorize about what they do. The machine technology of our own Western civilization has been diffused all over the globe—a witness, surely, to the underlying unity, not perhaps of urban civilizations, but of 'mandom'. But philosophers have been slow to recognize the humanist significance of the principle of the diffusion of culture. In this matter Professor Dewey's position is again exceptional. Perhaps the explanation is that most philosophers are not humanists but metaphysicians; and the metaphysician is by tradition a solitary, whether of the monastery, or of its academic equivalent, the university, and therefore much more interested in analysing his own mind—epistemology is a learned name for such analyses—than in observing the social and civilizational process by which the rest of mankind obtains its knowledge. And yet what a common miracle the diffusion of culture is! A people, remote from another in space and time, can tutor it from afar; can transfer, not indeed its private feelings, but the ideas constituting its public self—it can transfer, in truth, the mind and spirit of its civilization. What one people can do for another, what all peoples may one day do for mankind, a mother does every day for her children and a schoolmaster for his pupils. Education is nothing else but the diffusion of culture. But how education is possible we cannot explain. We can only reassert the unexplained miracle in equivalent terms by postulating the unity of civilization. It is a fact of experience that civilization is a universal society of public selves.

I have assumed, then, throughout this book that creativity and unity are the two most important of the empirically discovered principles or constants of the civilizational process. Supplementary principles are the diffusion of culture, the equalization of culture, and the three avatars of creativity, science, morals, and

religion. But all these supplementary principles are specialized modifications of creativity and unity. How these principles may be discovered is discussed in Chapter III.

Before leaving the constants and turning to the variables of the civilizational process, in other words, before leaving the principles of civilization and turning to the interpretation of history, I should like here to add a word in defence of the principle of the unity of civilization. The existence of this principle is expressly denied by Professor Toynbee in *A Study of History*. Professor Toynbee holds that from the age of the pyramid-builders to that of our railway engineers, there have been in all twenty-one specimens of the species 'civilization', and that seven out of the twenty-one are still living. In other words, Professor Toynbee believes that he has discovered a repetitive unit or isolate—to use the important term which we owe to Professor Levy. Two civilizations, such as the Hellenic and the Western, are to be isolated from within the historic process, and then compared. Now I myself hold the view that the social sciences, just as much as the physical, are impossible without suitable isolates; and I have made considerable use of isolates throughout this book. A sociology, that is, a science of civilizations, is therefore possible. Whether it will be successful or not, will depend entirely on the suitability of the isolate. Indeed, any feature of the civilizational process may be isolated, and if there are enough instances of it, a sociological treatment is possible. I have myself called one of my chapters (Chapter X) 'The Sociology of Defeat', because the breakdown of a society by war is a common feature of the civilizational process.

A science, or sociology of civilizations, is certainly possible, but not a science of civilization as a whole, if by civilization is meant 'mandom', that is, the civilizational process. A philosophy or interpretation of 'mandom' is possible, but not a science. The process as a whole is unique, because man is unique. I have not been very

strict myself in avoiding the term, ' science of civilization ', but, I think, it will generally be clear from the context that some repetitive feature was intended.

And further, as human history has no other aim but the recording of the civilizational process, it follows that while there can be a philosophy of history there cannot be a science. The reader will find a discussion of this important subject in section 12 of Chapter V entitled ' The Limits of Sociology '.

This distinction between the science of sociology and the philosophy of history is one about which every writer on civilization should be clear. And as every writer on civilization has an underlying philosophy, it is also important to be clear as to what his philosophy is. The philosophy of this book is empiricist in type, and may, I think, not unreasonably be called ' creative humanism '. Perhaps, as creation involves conflict—tragic conflict too often—a better name would be ' dialectical humanism '. Now, ' creative humanism ' is not a form of vitalism. A vitalist, such as Spengler, explains the human in terms of the organic. But ' creative humanism ' asserts that while the human presupposes the existence of life, and therefore of nature, the human cannot be explained in terms of life.

There is another important distinction between creative humanism and every form of vitalism. Vitalism has no place for tragedy—for the tragic conflicts that are inseparable from human life. Tragedy does not depress, it exalts. Though human beings fail, their failure is a witness to the greatness of man's creative mind. But if a civilization is an organism such as a plant—and that is Spengler's view—there is nothing tragic about its passing from maturity to extinction. What is there tragic about the life and death of a plant ?

Israel is an instance of a national society broken by war, and Rome of a universal society disintegrated by internal decay. But the members of these societies were agonized in advance by the consciousness of impending

failure. Crisis in Israel produced prophecy; crisis in Rome produced a Roman form of Stoicism. But long before Rome became an empire the crisis in the city states of Greece had resulted in that diversion of the Greek intellect from action to contemplation which we call metaphysics. Christianity was born of the agony of Israel and of Rome. And in its depths Christianity identifies humanity with the Man on the Cross.

I return now to the interpretation of history. In Chapter V the view is worked out that we are all of us historians, actual or potential, amateur or professional. Where we differ is in range and insight. Whether the interpretation of history advanced in this book is of value or not is for the reader to decide.

Developing a suggestion from Neo-Calvinist theology, I believe that the view of history in this book might be characterized as 'the historiography of crisis'. I have already referred to the first general crisis of urban civilization. It broke upon the world between 600 and 400 B.C., so that 500 B.C. is the middle point of the storm. It is this general crisis which explains the remarkable fact that Jeremiah in Judæa, Buddha in India, Confucius in China, and Plato in Greece are, if not exactly contemporaries, yet so close to one another in time that less than two centuries separate the earliest from the latest of them. There had been a still earlier crisis in Ancient Egypt, which is considered in Chapter VIII. And it is significant that Egypt, the most ancient of urban civilizations, should also have been the first to pass into crisis.

Jeremiah was an agonized witness of the Fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Jewish polity. But Jeremiah did not preach in vain. Hebrew prophecy, itself a remarkable phenomenon demanding a sociological explanation—an explanation is advanced in Chapter X—made it possible for Judah to survive as a church. But the transformation of a state into a church is a very rare occurrence in history. A broken people dies, not of its

wounds, but of its loss of faith in the god who is the indwelling spirit of its civilization. Israel, I suggest, effected the difficult transition from state to church because it had not been long enough or successful enough in Palestine to have forgotten the earlier transition from clan to state. The reader will find this theory worked out in Chapter X.

Mr. H. G. Wells has said recently that nothing of importance has come from Palestine. He is right. Nothing of importance has come from Palestine—except a tragic consciousness of defeat and a messianic hope.

The crisis in Ancient India took a different form. Buddha preached a new doctrine of the negation of the will to live, and, therefore, of the will to civilization, utterly at variance with the underlying assumptions of Vedic religion. For Vedic religion was an expression of the Aryan conquerors' faith in Indian civilization. But the conquerors of India had failed to construct a society satisfactory either to themselves or to the peoples they had subjected. They had wielded power, but they had not discovered how to reconcile power with the need of the subjected classes for community. As a power-wielding minority they had been creative. But creativity was not enough. Creativity destroyed the pre-Aryan forms of social unity, without replacing them by others more significant and equally satisfactory. The failure to solve the problem of community was the tragedy of Indian civilization.

Buddhism began as a religious philosophy ; it was later adopted by the Emperor Asoka as the state religion ; and then, spreading over the Far East, it became by the side of Christianity one of the great universal religions of the world.

This remarkable transition from state to church, with the philosopher as the forerunner of the church, raises questions of the greatest interest and importance both for the sociologist and the interpreter of history. There seems to be a dialectical relation between the principles

of creativity and unity. These principles conflict and yet co-operate with one another in the life of a civilization. And the conflict within an organized society takes the same form, except that creativity is specialized into power.

In the Introduction I have tried to give a rapid foreshortened view of this dialectic of history.

I need not say a great deal here about Confucius, the third of my four witnesses to the first general crisis of urban civilization. Confucius travelled from one Chinese principality to another, advising rulers how to cope with the feudal anarchy of the times. China is considered in Chapter IX. What is remarkable about China is its survival into the twentieth century after a continuous national life of more than two thousand years. Throughout this period Confucianism has been the national religion. And Confucianism is a formal confession of faith in Chinese civilization.

Plato, the fourth of my witnesses, is of the greatest importance not only for the understanding of Christianity, but for the sociology of mathematics and metaphysics. Plato is at once the fascistically-minded recorder of Athens' failure, a pre-Christian Father of the Christian Church, and an escapist from the burden of secular civilization into the intellectualist utopia of metaphysics.

As students know only too well, the volume of the literature dealing with metaphysics is overwhelming, but very little has been written about its sociology. The first thing to note is that the birth of metaphysics is coeval with the first general crisis of urban civilization: the second, that though metaphysics has survived into the modern epoch in the persons of Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel—certainly the five foremost metaphysicians of modern philosophy—none of the five can be regarded as a representative modern mind. They are scholastics, who because of the cultural time-lag have survived into an age of experimental science. What makes them remarkable is their attempt to combine the

categories of the medieval with those of the modern world. The reader will find this view elaborated in the 'End of Metaphysics' (Chapter IV). The third point to note is that the alliance between mathematics and metaphysics, compacted by Plato and revived by Kant, has finally and irretrievably collapsed.

We have been taught by Bertrand Russell and by his followers, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna school of Logical Positivists, to put mathematics in its place, and to discount the claims that have been made for mathematics by all the metaphysicians from Plato to Kant. The metaphysicians have extolled mathematics as the type of certainty, immutability, and necessity. But such perfections do not exist for human beings. Twice two is the tautological equivalent of four. That truth, admittedly, is certain, immutable, and necessary. But mathematics gives us no other kind of truth ; it tells us nothing about the world. And once mathematics has been put in its place, metaphysics collapses. By no exercise of pure thought, that is, by logic, can men discover Truth, least of all the Truth about the Universe. Metaphysics is neither a solution of the world-enigma nor a genuine adventure of ideas. Primarily, it is an escape.

Perhaps I have been too sanguine in predicting the 'End of Metaphysics'. Interest in metaphysics revives when faith in civilization falters. Besides, there is a residuum of metaphysics in Marxism. Marxism is discussed in sections 7 and 8 of Chapter VI and also in section 12 of Chapter V.

Marxism is a remarkable amalgam of sociology, metaphysics, and prophecy ; and it is the failure to distinguish these constituents which has made so much of the debate upon Marxism unprofitable. I incline to the view that if Marx were living to-day he would say emphatically, 'I am a sociologist and not a metaphysician'. Marx did valiant work in refuting Hegel. But it is too much to expect of a German, born when Hegel was still alive, to have refuted metaphysics as well. The failure of the

Bolsheviks to adopt a critical attitude to the residuum of metaphysics in Marx accounts, in part, for some of the more disagreeable features of Stalinism. The Bolsheviks have forgotten that a socialist, if he is faithful to his spiritual ancestry, is an empiricist and not a dogmatist. But there has always been about metaphysics the fascination of finality. The metaphysician claims to be in possession of the truth about society, life, and the universe. And the truth can rightly be imposed upon those who do not possess it. Dissidence is sin.

In conclusion, I should like to draw the reader's attention to the general plan of the book.

In the first six chapters the general ideas of the book are formulated and developed. Then come three chapters, VII, VIII, and IX, dealing with primitive civilizations, Ancient Egypt, Ancient India, Rome, and China. Chapters X, XI, and XII are concerned with what I may describe summarily as the ' Civilization of the Old and New Testaments '. Chapter XIII is an interpretation of the origins of Christianity in the light of the ' historiography of crisis '. The last two chapters, XIV and XV, deal with the modern epoch and the rival ideologies of our own day.

Most of the authorities that I have followed are mentioned in the text. As to other writers, I am especially indebted to Adolphe Lods' *Israel* and C. Guignebert's *Jesus*, two volumes of the admirable History of Civilization Series edited by C. K. Ogden. In the same series I have also used Marcel Granet's *Chinese Civilization.* For the elucidation of the religious movements in China, Arthur Waley's edition of the *Tao Te Chang* (*The Way and Its Power*) has been of great value.

In the sections on Marxism, apart from the classical texts, I have learnt a great deal from the writings of Sidney Hook, one of the most philosophically-minded of Marx's interpreters.

Quite possibly I have failed to acknowledge a number of writers whose ideas I have assimilated. We tend on the

whole to remember better the writers from whom we differ than those with whom we agree. But I am in no doubt about my indebtedness to A. W. Butler, F. A. Ridley, and my wife for their encouragement and advice.

LONDON,

April 1938.

INTRODUCTION

TWO problems confront the human race : one is to establish a concordat with nature, the other to establish a concordat among men. With the development of urban civilization rather more than six thousand years ago, the first problem may be considered to have been solved—not completely, but adequately. The human race is still engaged upon the second. The problem of harmonizing the divergent wills of men has proved to be as intractable as that of finding a remedy for cancer; and the victims of cancer are few compare with the victims of class war and of war between states. A clan of two or three hundred primitives establishes community of will and feeling, partly by instinct, partly by custom which is the half-unconscious deposit of instinct. Its life may be precarious, but it is stimulating. Extracting a living from nature has all the zest of high creative art. Life does not pall in the frozen Arctic, nor in the burning deserts of Arabia. But life has palled in Athens and Baghdad, in Delhi and in Rome. Life can become tasteless at both ends of the social scale—at the end that bears the cost, and at the end that draws the profits of civilization. The men of the primitive civilizations have solved their problem of life, but we of the complex civilizations have not solved ours.

The failure to solve the problem of community is the burden of recorded history. Primitive peoples, like the members of the humbler creation, have nothing to record. But during the last five thousand years, the history of the complex civilizations has been a wearisome procession of conquerors and their victims—of conquerors who

became the victims of other conquerors. In the end, both the conquerors and the victims, the dominant minorities and the subjected classes lose their faith in the value of civilization. For civilization is created by human art—an art embracing all the crafts and all the sciences, all the wisdoms and all the techniques. And recurrently throughout history, men have looked upon civilization, this work of their minds and hands, and have pronounced it to be a vanity of vanities. On the day of disillusionment, the will to civilization becomes paralysed. Men having lost faith in civilization lose faith in themselves. Human beings become weary of being human and crave to become gods, superior to change and to the necessities and vicissitudes of our human life.

But while they are still pacing the earthly vestibules to eternal life, men need a temporary refuge from the worst privations of a disintegrated society. They find refuge in the church and in the monastic establishments associated with the church.

The empires disintegrate and the churches are built upon their ruins. The food of the churches is the failure of civilization. The failure of the Græco-Roman civilization is the Great Disappointment of Western Man ; and Christianity is the child of the Great Disappointment. We are told in the Book of Samuel that Eli's daughter-in-law called her son Ichabod—the glory is departed—when she heard that the Ark of the Covenant had been captured by the Philistines. Christianity is an Ichabod, the last-born child of an epoch of disillusionment. We know that the Emperor Constantine made Christianity into the official religion of the Roman Empire as a last hope of saving it. But Christianity did not save the Roman Empire ; neither did the acceptance of Buddhism by the Emperor Asoka save from ruin the caste-ridden civilization of India. Both Buddhism and Christianity are Ichabods—children of the decline and fall of two of the urban civilizations of antiquity.

A church solves the unsolved problem of community,

but it solves it in negative terms. A church is a community inspired by a common purpose. The common purpose is to obtain, in the transcendent and eternal world, compensation for having failed to solve the problems of the temporal world.

A church is, historically, a congregation of lost individuals—lost, because the national community in whose life their own lives were embedded, has either been broken by war or disintegrated by internal decay. Until it occurred, the destruction of the nation had remained an inconceivable catastrophe, contradicting the optimistic assumptions of the national religion. The individual died, but the nation could not die. As long as their nation flourished, the men of the pre-church epoch were not deeply concerned by the problem of personal immortality.

How could Babylon die when Bel was its god? Or how could Israel perish when Jahveh was its keeper? The god was the creative spirit, the indwelling energy of his people's civilization. The god was the 'pillar of fire' that went before his people as they blazed the trail leading from the clan to the state.

The clan's anxiety about its food supply had been quieted by the belief that nature was a kinsman who would not let the kinsfolk starve; but the domestication of animals and the cultivation of the soil had loosened men's dependence upon nature, teaching them a more realistic conception of the distinction between non-human nature and themselves.

The new techniques of agriculture and of stock-raising, and the new techniques of government and of administration gave power over other men to a dominant minority. Outside the family and the clan, all social relations are relations of power. It is through power that a fixed pattern—the State pattern—was imposed upon the civilizational process.

Urban civilization was the first efflorescence of man's creative mind. The semi-scientific technology, the

governmental apparatus, the working morals and the institutionalized religion—all these factors of the new urban civilization were human creations. By a process of trial and error conducted over some thousands of years, the first adventurers in the empirical method had established 'urban civilization in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India, and had diffused a knowledge of their methods over the greater part of the globe.

The making of urban civilization was the first great success of the human race. Great communities, organized in strong states and inspired by a religious faith in the spirit of their civilizations, had become so firmly established that to contemporary minds they appeared to be as eternal as the hills. But neither the nation state nor the supernational empire is the last term of the historic process. The state achieved an external unity of action, but not an internal unity of mind. The state was power, but not community. As its name implies, the state is a static moment in the civilizational flux. It summed up in itself the fruits of a manifold creativity—creativity in technology, in morals, in religion ; and it then demanded that creativity should cease. It combined the different factors of civilization into a single pattern, and ignoring the internal stresses and the individual frustrations which are the emotional costs of a large-scale society, it cherished the illusion that the pattern was eternal.

Without unity civilization is anarchic ; without creativity it is moribund. The dialectical play of these opposing principles is the dynamic of the historic process.

The historic process is not a linear progress from simple to complex, still less from good to better. History is a dialectical process in which the new destroys the old and yet preserves it. And the historic process is not from the state to a more richly significant form of human association. It is from the state to the church. The church develops the cosmopolitan features of the empire-state, admitting to its membership 'both Jew and Gentile,

bond and free' ; and yet the church repudiates as sinful not only the state's assertion of its power, but even such humane expressions of creativity as the arts and sciences. Every exercise of power, every form of self-expression—nay, life itself—becomes, in the church epoch, a sinful assertion of the creature against the Creator, or, in pantheistic systems, an illusory separation of the individual from the universe. The church stands for unity without creativity ; it has no room for man as a creator. Man can only sully those perfections which, in God the Creator, or in Totality, or in some Ideal and Transcendent World, have existed from eternity.

The creators of the urban civilizations of antiquity were empiricists, though not empiricists after a self-conscious theory of empiricism. Self-conscious empiricism was unknown before the renascence of the experimental spirit in the modern epoch. To the empiricists of antiquity technology was science, custom was morals, and the public expression of faith in civilization was religion. They had experimented confidently with life, and had revealed man's potentialities as creator. They accepted themselves and nature and the civilizational process. They were satisfied with these three elements of the 'human situation'. Being good soldiers of civilization, they did not ask for more security than this world provides ; and confident in their power to face the 'human situation', they were outgrowing the monistic animism of their primitive ancestors. The ancestors had made the world safe for man by the belief that all things are human —and therefore blood relations.

But was the universe safe for man? Were men safe from the hostility of other men? Was man a success as a creator? Was the national god an idol or a god indeed? And now that class struggles and foreign wars were bringing civilization into crisis, were they wise in rejecting the intuitions of their remote ancestors? They had keener intellects than their ancestors—intellects trained in the practice of administration and technology. Would it

economy and a world market, was mankind's second great adventure; but it was an adventure conducted at an ever-accelerated pace, incident crowding upon incident, throughout the four short centuries of the modern epoch. The modern epoch has released the Titan, Creativity, from the prison-house of the medieval world. It has called vast populations into life, and with its new resources and new powers over nature, and by its revolutionary recasting of all economic, political and social relations, the new epoch has shattered every traditional belief. What is man's duty, and what his destiny? The new masses need an answer to these questions. But there is no one to instruct them.

Creativity is the salt of life. But men need unity as well as creativity. They need not only adventure, but a collective adventure. They need not only self-expression, but self-identification—identification with the larger and stronger life of the community.

Creativity is pattern-maker to civilization. And the pattern-maker converts his creativity into power—power to impose upon his fellow men the pattern convenient to himself. Protestantism, capitalism and laissez-faire have, in the modern epoch, all combined to heighten the power of the individual pattern-maker and to depress the community's sense of its own value.

To-day, after four centuries of titanic labours, mankind is resuming its ancient quest for community. The twentieth century sees mankind both more united and more divided than at any earlier period of human history —united by the universal circulation of the machine and the outlooks and aptitudes accompanying it, and yet divided by the universal struggle for power. The machine has proved itself to be a common school in which peoples of nearly every race and of nearly every cultural level have learned from one another of their identical relations to non-human nature. That one human mind should be able to communicate its experience to another is the unregarded miracle of every day. And the miracle is

repeated on a world scale when peoples from every quarter of the globe acquire the technological heritage of mankind.

The question before the world to-day is whether a basis for unity can be found less extensive than that of a universal commonwealth.

The Nazis have invoked simultaneously the tribalism of their primitive ancestors, the fixed estates of Catholic feudalism, and the expansive nationalisms and imperialisms of the West. The Nazis have rejected the internationalism of the Communists, while covertly assimilating the latter's totalitarian ideas. And further, the Nazis have sanctified their ecclecticism by a pseudo-scientific theory of race. It is a psychological law of history that, at every fresh crisis of the historic process, men invoke the superannuated social unities of the past. In the past are discoverable the lost paradises in which men were safe. So the Nazis have invoked in turn, the clan, the state, the church—all the earlier resting-places of the historic process—in order to find a home for the new masses—*der Massenmensch*—whom the once creative capitalism of the nineteenth century has called into life, and whom it can no longer house.

There is another psychological law of history, that in a crisis, such as the crisis of to-day, the most highly individualized, and therefore, as a rule, the most highly educated members of a society succumb to the impulse to escape. For being highly individualized, they are disinclined to believe that the way out of the crisis is an advance to a more complex form of community. And so, in our post-war epoch, empiricism is no longer fashionable. Mysticism and metaphysics are once again in favour. Some of our men of letters are subjecting themselves to a neo-Brahmanic discipline in the hope of glimpsing a finished world in which nothing happens. And some of our theologizing astronomers are rediscovering God as the non-empiricist mathematician of the universe. In the hour of crisis, the intellectuals find it

more comforting to unite themselves with the cosmos than with the community.

But why should we, modern men of the twentieth century, seek to escape from the responsibility of being human? We are students of universal history. We have been present in spirit at the victories as well as at the defeats of our species. Re-interpreting the language of that great internationalist, St Paul, we can claim that we have been baptized into the sufferings and into the resurrection of the indwelling spirit of civilization. For the churches celebrate man's defeat, but never his history. Victory—if victory it can be called—the churches relegate to the transcendent world, where man has lost his self-identity and the sole victor is the obliterating cosmos.

We can claim for the interpretation of universal history that it is a form of psycho-analysis which has therapeutic virtue. For the conflicts within the body of mankind are producing a condition of world-neurosis. In their origins, these conflicts, whether within or between peoples, are very largely unconscious. Consciousness is the healer. Resisting the impulse to escape into mystical and metaphysical phantasies, it is not impossible for sick humanity to recover wholeness by becoming conscious of the historic process.

CHAPTER I

THE FAILURE OF THE STATE

§ 1. *Transcendental kinship: a defensive mechanism of primitive religion.*

ONLY in the hour of crisis does a people become conscious of itself. A people is like a company of friendly travellers upon an open sunlit road. There are no confining hedges between them and the undulating plain, and no barriers of caste restricting their intercourse with one another. There is harmony between men and nature and harmony amongst men. But gradually the day lengthens and the road dwindles into an uncertain track. Conversation ceases. The travellers begin, somewhat furtively at first, to look into one another's faces. Suddenly they realize, as by a single inspiration, that no one knows the way, and that within a very little while they will all be lost in the darkness of the unmapped wilderness.

Crisis, with its attendant self-consciousness, descends upon a people, not usually because of an unforeseen interruption in its routined intercourse with nature, but because of a sudden clash, a jolting contact with a people other than itself. Among the peoples of to-day, hunters of the Arctic like the Esquimaux or pastoral nomads like the sheep- and camel-breeders of Arabia, and among the peoples of antiquity, the pioneer cultivators who, draining the swamps of the Nile, of the Tigris, and of the Hoang-Ho, raised crops to feed the peasants, craftsmen, traders, the priests, poets, and administrators of the earliest civilizations—amongst all such past and present peoples—men have been too intent upon the

work of extracting a living from nature to accumulate an unused surplus of mental energy which they could then direct upon themselves. And even if the crops fail, or the herds perish, or the beasts prove too cunning for their pursuers—if men, in short, are bilked by untamed nature—they are shielded from an excessive self-consciousness by their religion.

The religion of primitive peoples at all times, as well as the religion of the first founders of urban civilization, is grounded in animism. Broadly speaking, animism is anthropomorphism: some arresting quality, or some distinctive characteristic of human beings such as energy, life, mind, personality, is projected upon non-human objects. In consequence, sun and stream, beast and tree, put on a human mask and shorten the distance between the human spectator and the non-human object. Just as a child, dressing up in baby clothes a rag filled with sawdust, will look on the rag as a baby, so the animist, who in imagination has dressed the non-human object with human qualities, will adopt it as a member of his family or clan or tribe—as a kinsman in fact. And if the non-human object is a great power of nature such as the heat of the sun, or the quickening quality of well-water in the desert, or the multiplicative fecundity of animal and plant, the adopted kinsman is thought of as an ancestor, as an heroic originator of the tribal culture, as a divine king. And so nature—or some conspicuous power of nature—is related to the human group not by ties of ordinary, but by ties of 'transcendental', kinship. This act of projection is not an idle phantasy of the primitive mind. On the contrary: the act of projection is set in motion by a defensive mechanism of the mind, without which progress in civilization would have proved impossible. For if the water dries up in the well or the earth is barren or animals die under the diseases of domestication—and all these misfortunes are likely to occur, partly from unexplainable causes and principally from early man's ignorance of the laws of nature—it is

important that men should not be too profoundly discouraged, shall not too readily submerge hope in fear. Above all, it was important that men should not be excessively self-conscious—conscious of themselves in helpless opposition to an unknown and uncontrollable nature. The act of projection reduces the hostility or recalcitrance of nature to the dimensions of a family dispute. By appropriate methods of conciliation, in part secular, in part religious, the unity of kinsmen—of transcendental as well as of ordinary kinsmen—can be restored.

§ 2. *Economy and Society : the Two Labours of Man.*

In the myth of Hercules, Hercules is the culture-hero who performs mighty labours for the benefit of the human race and dies a victim of the malignancy of nature. As so often, myth is a legendary recounting of historic fact : Hercules is Man—Man as creator. The labours of man are twofold : first, the labour of establishing a vital harmony, a dynamic equilibrium with non-human nature; second, the labour of establishing a corresponding harmony and equilibrium within man himself—between the individuals and peoples who are the constituents of man. Within these two labours is comprised the whole of our human achievement : everything, in fact, which is significant in the sum-total of civilization.

To find a way of life with nature, to learn by trial and error the techniques for securing food, shelter, and physical health—these techniques are the foundation-stones of the natural science of to-day—is the First Labour of Ma . ; and to find a way of life with one's fellows, to find by trial and error the techniques of efficient and harmonious relationships between man and woman, elders and children, leaders and followers, clansmen and foreigners—these techniques are the foundation-stones of morals—is the Second Labour of Man.

By his first labour, man sets up housekeeping with nature—he sets up an economy ; by his second labour,

man establishes society. Society does not follow on economy, as might perhaps be suggested by the order of first labour and second labour—society is concurrent with economy and varies with it. The societies, for instance, that exist among the nomadic tribes of Arabia are very different and have always been very different from those established by the settled cultivators of Egypt and Mesopotamia. But though man is labouring incessantly at his twofold way of life, he is wise enough to practise an economy of a different kind—an economy of attention. Man is always running the two establishments of economy and society; but he bestows upon them varying amounts of attention. In the earliest stage—the preparatory stage—of civilization, man is predominantly an 'extravert': he directs all his powers of conscious attention upon nature, upon his task of extracting a living from nature, upon the series of techniques which, when in good working order, constitute an economy; but man does not attempt, at this preparatory stage of civilization, consciously to change his social order. Customary morals are nevertheless changed—unconsciously and imperceptibly changed—if only because the children in acquiring the morals of their elders, re-interpret them to meet the exigencies of their generation.

The preparatory stage of civilization is an 'age of innocence'; it is an age when men's eyes are directed upon nature, when animistic religion softens the felt opposition between nature and man, when society is a union of kinsmen, so bound together by real or imputed ties of blood that even the possibility of a clash between different sets of social objectives is unimaginable. At this preparatory stage, men are travelling confidently upon 'the open road to life'; the road is well marked and everyone is certain that he knows the way.

§ 3. *The state as the conscious form of human association.*

The 'age of innocence' closes with the coming of the state. The state differs from the clan, the tribe, the

confederation of tribes, and even from the quasi-feudal principality which is the last milestone on the road leading to the state, because the state is impossible without a re-orientation of men's powers of attention. The state demands a conscious ordering and intentional reorganization of those social relations which the 'age of innocence' had left undisturbed—to be changed, if they were changed at all, by the unconscious passage of time. In the 'age of innocence' the centre of attention is nature; when the state arrives, the centre of attention is society.

By the time the state arrives, most of the great cultural inventions have been made, popularized, and worked into the texture of the economy. The domestication of animals, the raising of crops, the extraction of metals, the systematizing of communications by the building of boats and carts and above all by the development of writing—all these cultural inventions had already been exploited when the earliest of the great urban civilizations arose in the valleys of the Nile and of the Tigris-Euphrates. These two civilizations,—those of Egypt and of Sumer-Akkad, the progenitor of Babylon,—together with the very much later civilization of China, of which the centre was the valley of the Hoang-Ho, were all of them pioneer civilizations. Relatively small groups of pioneers, culturally but not politically united, and working from favourable sites which at first were geographically isolated, succeeded in draining the river swamps and in raising from virgin soil crops sufficient to feed not only the agricultural workers, but the craftsmen, the traders, and the chiefs.

How many centuries were taken up with this pioneer work we do not know. Pioneers carry out the work, but they are not interested in recording it. Pioneers are not historians because as a body they are not self-conscious. Self-consciousness is the spark which is kindled when one group clashes with another. The state is the outcome of such clashes, and recorded history is the

coeval of the state. The number of pioneer centuries preceding the foundation of the earliest states of history will probably have to remain a speculation of pre-history. What we know for certain is that by 3000 B.C. nation states, resulting from the fusion of pioneer groups, existed in Egypt and Mesopotamia.

How did the state arise and why? It is possible to argue that having tried out most of the great cultural inventions of the Neolithic and perhaps also of the Bronze Age, men realized that any further advance of civilization was conditional upon a change of scale in the unit of social organization. For in such an enlarged community there could be a high degree of specialization of function, an economical and efficient division of labour, and a surplus abundant enough to permit of experiments in new styles of living. At the subsistence-level of the pre-state societies, experiments in living, however interesting they might be, would be too costly to undertake. But such an argument would be unsound: it would be infected by the 'anachronistic fallacy'. The history of the last five thousand years is studded with the rise and fall of states. We who are the last comers upon the world-stage may review that history and generalize upon the services of the state to mankind. We may do so; but surely we are guilty of the 'anachronistic fallacy' if, projecting our present knowledge into the past, we insinuate it into the motives of the first founders of the state.

The advent of the state is the turning-point of human history. Throughout the millenia of the Old and the New Stone Ages, throughout the centuries of prehistory, men have been travelling on the 'open road to life' with something of the buoyant unconcern, the vital adequacy of the animal creation. They were not troubled, they were not harassed by a sense of responsibility for the maintenance or betterment of the social order. Rooted in the strong instincts of sex, of parental tenderness, and gregarious sympathy, and wrapped round and hardened by the tough bark of custom, the social order

has grown up into the sunlit air with something of the unconsciousness and the inevitability of a tree. But with the advent of the state, the age of innocent and unconscious growth is over. For now the Forester appears armed with the axe of authority; he has powers of life and death over every tree; he decides to prune here, transplant there—here to multiply and there to decimate. The Forester asserts that he and his trained assistants (all armed with the axes of authority) have worked out a technique whereby they can impose upon the wild irregularities of nature a pattern modelled by them in the Forester's bureau. The Forester asserts also that his pattern is an improvement upon nature, making possible an unlimited multiplication of the trees. The man who did the work of the Forester for Ancient Egypt was some early Pharaoh of the First Dynasty (*c.* 3400 B.C.). About the Forester of China, we are much better informed: he was Chin Shih Huang-ti, the first Emperor (221 to 210 B.C.).

The transition from the loose-strung, semi-feudal principality to the Great State can be studied best in the case of China, though it was not made before 221 B.C., some three thousand years later than the corresponding transitions in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The principalities of the Hoang-Ho had grown almost uneventfully, their semi-feudal character being due to the need for protection against the aboriginal nomads of the bordering steppes. The principality was the social form which satisfied the needs of the pioneers engaged in draining the swamps of the Hoang-Ho. The pioneers were unaware that they were laying down for all time the economic basis of Chinese civilization. But the success of the principality was its undoing. For under the pressure of a growing population, still more lands were cultivated, canals cut, and occasions utilized for trespassing upon the territories of the nomads. Inevitably, there were clashes upon the frontiers: between one principality and another, and between the nomads and their agrarian

neighbours. The clashes developed into chronic warfare. At last, the Chins, the most Prussian-like of the peoples of the Hoang-Ho, disregarding the ancient traditions of humane and moderate warfare, and exploiting ruthlessly the most recent additions to the armaments of those days —namely, cavalry and iron weapons—destroyed the independence of the principalities and founded the first Chinese Empire. The leader of the Chins was Chin Shih Huang-ti ; by which name he announced to the world that he was the first Emperor of China. And although China has relapsed not infrequently into a condition of feudal anarchy—she is in that condition to-day—the unity of the Chinese state has never failed to be restored. The persistence of the Chinese state is due to the unbroken continuity of Chinese civilization.

§ 4. *The state as power and community.*

The Chinese state, in common with all the states of history, was established by power. Power substitutes for the existing pattern of social relations a new, and sometimes a more complex, pattern approved by the dominant minority ; all possible objectors to the new pattern being intimidated by the penalties they may incur at the hands of the judiciary and the soldiery, who are the executives of power. Nevertheless the state does not rest on power alone. For no state can persist without a measure of consent from those who are compelled to be its subjects. Consent implies community—if only to an elementary or embryonic degree ; and community implies a common mind, a common purpose—it implies in fact a common civilization. But the state implies community for a deeper reason : the state is physically and materially a fenced-in area for the diffusion of a common culture. Despite racial differences, mental wealth circulates between all subjects of the state. And suggestibility to current ideas is at once the distinguishing characteristic of the human species, the basis of every

kind of social unity, and the starting-point of a Universal Commonwealth. It must be noted that every family, every clan, every petty principality is a natural field for the diffusion of a common culture. Education, indeed, is nothing but the diffusion of culture from the elder generation to the younger; whereas diffusion of culture in the wider sense is the education of one human group by another. This latter kind of education does not need the state: knowledge of the arts and crafts, of religious myths and practices, can travel widely between groups who have no political and very few economic relations. But once the state has come into existence, it binds such groups together forcibly by a network of new social relations. The state in fact is an area of heightened receptivity for the diffusion and acceptance of a common culture.

The state is at once power and community. If the state genuinely achieved community, it would have no need of power and would therefore cease to be the state; and if the state persists in being power, it perishes. This contradiction at the very heart of the state has been, for the last five thousand years, the systole and diastole of the historic process.

The states that have advanced farthest on the road to community are those formed from the fusion of pioneer groups. Some instances of this type of state are Ancient China, Ancient Egypt, and in the modern world, the United States of America. On the other hand, the exploitative states have never advanced very far on the road to community. Instances of exploitative states are supplied by Rome in the ancient, and Turkey in the modern world (Turkey in the days of the Turkish Empire). In the exploitative states, a ruling group has power over subject groups, alien not only in race and religion, but alienated by the melancholy fact that in their pre-conquest days, the subjected enjoyed a standard of life and culture superior to that ever achieved by their conquerors.

The career of the Turkish peoples, who, in their time, have set up a host of exploitative states, shows up vividly the contradiction between power and community. For the Turkish peoples are, by origin, nomads of the Central Asian steppes; and the conflict between the hungry nomad and the better-fed peasant goes back almost to the Neolithic Age. The report of the peasant's higher standard of life very soon reaches the nomad—higher, that is, from the standard of the nomad, because the nomad has a strong appetite for more food, more comfort, and fewer risks of deprivation at the hands of a niggardly or hostile nature. The nomad aspires therefore towards an 'equalization of culture'. If the nomad is human, characteristically human, in understanding the peasant's achievement, he is also human in desiring to share the profits accruing from it. If ideas can be diffused and held in common, why not the material goods which are the embodiment and fruitful outcome of ideas? Accordingly, the nomad presents himself at the peasant's frontiers as a poor petitioner for brotherly equality—for community in fact—and at the same time as a robber, resolute to seize by power what he refuses to earn by work.

As a breeder of horses, the nomad of the steppes possesses a weapon of great military potentialities. So he awaits the hour when the agrarian state, built up on a peasant economy, is riven by that inner conflict between power and community which is the chronic neurosis of every state. In that hour, when the slaves, the serfs, the subjected classes, have become indifferent about the safety of the state, and the masters, fatigued by the exertions of power and enervated by its profits, are secretly indulging a luxurious wish for death, the nomad appears and rides home to empire upon a cavalry charge.

The Turkish theory of the state is a simple one. The Levantine Greeks, the Balkan Serbs or the Russians on the Lower Volga—all of them peoples subjected by the former nomad—were regarded by the Turk in very much the same way as he, in his nomad days, regarded his

mares and colts: namely, as food-producing cattle and dumb beasts of burden. The technique of government and administration which the Turks had taken over from the Arabs, which the Arabs had learnt from the Byzantine Greeks, and which the latter in their turn had inherited from the Romans, the most notable exponents of it, was also simple. Train a few literate elements among the subjected peoples to collect the taxes, keep the accounts, and supply the court and army; reserve for yourself the control of the military machine in case the domesticated 'human cattle' threaten a return to nature, or some rival state covet the 'human cattle' for itself; and then you will enjoy for ever the pleasures of the chase, of the harem, and of untrammelled power.

§ 5. *The organic theory of the state.*

The Greeks were less brutal, and, certainly, they were livelier minded than the Turks. But was their theory of the state in essence different? It is true that Plato, the profoundest of Greek political philosophers, realized the importance of community—as well he might after the disastrous downfall of the Athenian Empire and the outbreak of class war in humiliated and defeated Athens. But the privileges of Plato's aristocratic communism are extended only to the soldiers and the philosopher-kings. The primary producers, always the largest moiety of any state, are ignored—because, no doubt, like the helots of admired and victorious Sparta, they were accounted as nothing more than 'animated tools'. This latter phrase is due to Aristotle, the biologically minded pupil of Plato. On Plato's view, which is not very different from Aristotle's, the state is an organism in which the producers are the limbs and the philosophers the brain. But the 'organic' theory of the state is only the 'machine theory' apologetically disguised.

The state is not an organism. The state is man-made, and while human beings are themselves organisms,

they cannot make organisms, even if, admittedly, they can procreate their kind. What human beings can make are machines. A machine is our closest approach to a man-made organism. And just as a machine is built by the conscious application of the techniques of physical science, so the state-machine is built by the conscious application of the techniques of law, economics, and administration. And just as a machine transmits and multiplies the effective power of the machinist, or of some source of power tapped by the machinist, the state-machine performs similar offices for the ruling class. If the state were indeed an organism, it would be an extraordinary organism in which every individual cell is actually or potentially a human brain. But there are no such organisms.

Because any member of a group is potentially an educator of every other member, each member being a centre for the transmission and reception of culture, there can be no real analogy between a society and an organism. It is true that by division of labour and specialization of function, a society may enhance its efficiency, but it is equally true that by such quasi-organic modes, a society may become paralysed. For the 'organs' of the social organism may possess enough intelligence to esteem a society unsatisfactory and not worth-while, in which they can exercise no personal initiative nor have any share in determining the form in which they are to make their contribution to the group-life.

It is easy for the state, being a man-made machine, to display logical order, but it is not so easy for the state to display instinctive wisdom. The holders of power can lay down, and for a time enforce a scheme of social relations, but only a tenderly cultivated community-sense can uphold the scheme. How to reconcile the need for efficiency with the still greater need for unity is our human problem. It is likewise the problem of the state: how to reconcile power with community.

Before the advent of the state, the problem of reconciling

power with community had not yet arisen, and hence the need of a philosophy of politics was not yet felt. The philosopher is younger than the state, but he is as old as the earliest crisis of the state. In Ancient Egypt, after a thousand years of state life under the Pharaohs of the Pyramid Age, an ethico-political literature arose which has been greeted by a modern Egyptologist as 'the dawn of conscience'. This description is picturesque but unfortunate. The Egyptian state relapsed into the feudal anarchy out of which it had sprung, because the advantages of state civilization were outweighed by the evils of a social system that allowed the greater part of the national surplus and the lives of thousands of enslaved peasants to be used up in order to build pyramid-mausoleums for the Pharaohs. Conscience is the remembered yesterday of the soul protesting against the present. This ethico-political literature is a protest against the state power, made by men who had not entirely forgotten the simplicities of communal life as they existed in the days of the pre-state clan. It is true that the Stoics, and after them the Christians, spoke of conscience as though it was a universal, eternal, and super-historical Righteousness. But that they did so has an historical explanation. It is dogmatic to assume that such a bare abstraction as conscience exists; or that it revealed itself for the first time to these Egyptian protestants. The explanation is that the Stoics, and still more so the Christians, were profoundly alienated in spirit from the Roman state—the state that was power, but not community.

§ 6. *The birth of political philosophy.*

The political philosopher is not a political reformer. A Plato is not a Solon, a Hegel is not a Bismarck. The reformer overcomes the crisis in the state, the philosopher becomes aware of it—so acutely aware of it that he is impelled to uncover the foundations of the state, of society, and of human life. Seeing that men have lost

the 'road to life,' the philosopher retraces the road on which they came and arrives at the clan and at the ancient religion of the clan. Change in religion lags behind changes in political structure. The old animistic beliefs, with their naïve but necessary assumption of a pre-established harmony between man and nature,—a harmony conceived in terms of 'transcendental kinship' —survive into the period when the federated clans form a state. The philosopher asks why the antique harmony between man and nature should not be a model for the desiderated harmony between the warring groups of tribes, classes, principalities, and city-states. And because he is so intent on looking backwards, the philosopher is at once an intellectual and a reactionary, combining scepticism with an anachronistic invocation of the past.

§ 7. *The philosopher as the forerunner of the church.*

The philosopher does not suggest that the crisis can be overcome by retaining the proved advantages of the state form and re-planning the state anew. Novelties, being without prestige, carry no authority. Only the old is authoritative. The philosopher proposes, therefore, to reinstate the old. What he really does is to project the present, or rather a sublimated version of the present, upon the past, and declare that it has existed from all time. He eternalizes the past, so as to place it beyond the grip of hateful change. Because history has defaulted, he proposes to ascend beyond the temporal into the eternal world. In short, he invokes the cosmic in order to rectify the social, and from being a political philosopher becomes a metaphysician. As the good he desiderates is not to be found in the state, he projects this good into the cosmos, transforming the nature-gods of ancient animism into ethical principles or ethical personalities, into the Good of Plato, or the Rational Cosmos of the Stoics, or the Righteousness of the Supreme Being in Jewish and Christian Theism.

Because the philosopher abandons the temporal for the eternal and the social for the cosmic, because he finds more comfort in metaphysics than in political reform, he can do very little to extricate the state from its crisis. All he can do is to anticipate the hour of the state's dissolution. In that hour it will not be possible for men to obliterate from memory the road upon which they have travelled, and to return to the naïve religiosity and the fellowship basis of the clan community. They will need a social form that looks old and is yet new, a social form expressive of their alienation from the state and expressive also of their hope for the state's restoration. Above all, they will need a social form which is a substitute for the broken state—a social form that will sustain their will-to-live, their will to preserve at least part of their former level of civilization. The social form that satisfies their needs is the church. And the philosopher is the forerunner of the church.

The church will suggest to its members that it has marvellously restored the ancient fellowship of the clan : for it will address them as brothers in God or in the Spirit. The church will calm their despair of the state, and of the civilization associated with the state, by pointing to the example of its saints. Fulfilling their vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, the saints have shown that it is possible to live without property, to live without gratifying the most urgent of physical desires and, above all, to live without the pride that comes of leadership and the exercise of authority—that, in short, it is possible to live in community and yet without power. The church will dispel men's fear of tragic change by promulgating its doctrine of the Two Worlds : the temporal and the eternal, the material and the spiritual, the contingent and the necessary, the changing and the perfect. The church, pointing to itself as the ' societas perfecta '—perfect in idea and essence, though not in historic fact—will deepen men's pessimism about the possibility of reconciling community with power. The church will not encourage

men to rebuild the broken state. And yet it will hold out vaguely a messianic hope. Not by human hands, but by the Power of God, will the state be raised up again to form the Kingdom of God upon earth.

§ 8. *The three elements of church life.*

The attitude of a church to life is a complex of three elements: (1) An element of alienation from the practical, material, social, and historic which is at its strongest in Buddhism, and which is still the most significant element in the Roman Catholic form of Christianity. We may call this the 'nihilistic element.' Without this 'nihilistic element', the religion of such a church cannot be universal and salvational. Only by stripping itself of all material attachments—all racial, national, regional, and class distinctions, can a church, in theory at least, be truly catholic.

(2) A church is a society living in the world, whose members, both priests and laymen, achieve a high degree of community of ideas and culture. The church is itself a state, or, rather, a 'substitute-state.' This side of the church's life is therefore the opposite of the 'nihilistic element.' We may call it the 'positivistic element.' This 'positivistic element' is very strongly developed in Islam. Under the early Caliphate, Islam was a remarkable union of state and church. The ephemeral character of the majority of Moslem states was proof, however, that Islam had not discovered how to reconcile community with power. Power, in the shape of political independence, has wellnigh deserted the Moslem world. Community remains—a community of law and religion.

(3) The third element is the messianic. Power and community are to be reconciled in the future. The broken state is to be restored as a Commonwealth of the World. The messianic hope is strongest in Judaism, and is by no means negligible in Protestant Christianity. The Persians who had been defeated by Alexander were sustained

for a thousand years by the messianic element in Zoroastrianism.

The historical theses of this chapter can now be formulated; they constitute in outline a possible philosophy or interpretation of history.

By way of a preface to the theses, it should be remembered that there exists an enormous literature of philosophy and religion, the writers being principally concerned to criticize or defend the truth of a particular philosophy or religion in accordance with some doctrine, generally unformulated, of what truth is. But comparatively little has been written about the sociological significance of schools of philosophy and of the closely related phenomenon of universal churches; and less still about the part that schools of philosophy and universal churches play in the drama of world civilization. In the nineteenth century—this century is the first to have a mind and to display a genius for history—the researches of the historians and the discoveries of the archæologists made it possible to draw parallels between the several regional civilizations, and even perhaps to suggest, tentatively at least, a number of the basic Principles of Civilization.

This book, then, is primarily interested, not in philosophy, but in the sociological function of the philosophic schools; and not in religion, but in the sociological function of the great churches. It is interested, therefore, in philosophy and religion as institutions, and in the interplay of these institutions with the major institution of the state.

§ 9. *Clan, State, Church, and Universal Commonwealth: the dominant institutions of the four epochs of history.*

The historical theses are as follows:

(1) The historic process of civilization is from the Clan to the State; from the State to the Church; and from the Church to the Universal Commonwealth.

(2) A philosophic school, originating in an independent

centre of culture, is a forerunner of a universal church ; and a universal church is at once an organized substitute for a broken state, a negation of, and a reaction against the state as power, and an ideal counterfeit of the state as community.

(3) In the pre-church epoch, the general sociological function of religion is to maintain ' Faith in Civilization ' —the civilization associated with a particular clan or tribe, principality, or empire.

(4) Political intelligence, relying consciously on inadequately theorized techniques of law, administration, and the communication of culture—social attitudes, sentiments, and beliefs being among the principal elements in the culture so communicated—has failed throughout the course of human history to establish a stable and satisfying community capable of transcending the limits of the instinct-governed and unself-conscious clan.

This failure of the state is the negative element in the historic process ; and this negative element is the dynamic of history, transforming the state into the church and infecting the church with a negative attitude towards the civilization associated with the state. And finally, in the modern epoch, the reaction against the negative attitude of the universal churches is the dynamic which is transforming the universal churches into the universal commonwealth.

CHAPTER II

FROM CLAN TO COMMONWEALTH

§ 1. *The three originating centres of philosophic thought.*

THE world-wide researches of nineteenth-century scholars, the translation of the Sacred Books of the East, the recovery of Egypt's, Babylon's, and India's past, the field work of the anthropologist in living contact with the primitive peoples of to-day, makes it possible to pick out the high points and the connecting ridges of the plateau of world civilization—points and ridges that were formerly inaccessible even to the generalizing faculty of a Hegel, a Comte, and a Buckle.

To-day, for instance, it is possible to take a genuinely encyclopædic view of philosophical activity ; we are free of the parochialism which understood by philosophy such philosophy as had its origins in Greece. We know to-day that in three regions of the world, cut off from one another by the isolations so common in the past, philosophic schools arose independently. These regions are : Greece, China, and India. Perhaps it is more than a coincidence that philosophic activity became important in all three regions about 500 B.C.

As a passing speculation, the following points may be noticed : the Greeks, the Chinese, and the Aryan Hindus entered the territories with which they are now severally associated in the neighbourhood of 1300 B.C. By 500 B.C. the Greeks had founded a number of city-states, the Chinese a number of feudal principalities in the basin of the Hoang-Ho, and the Hindus a number of

petty kingdoms in the upper valley of the Ganges. Perhaps an incubation period of about eight hundred years is necessary before the fundamental contradictions in the nature of the state—the contradiction between power and community—produces social and inter-group conflicts of such an acute character as to excite intellectual inquiry. The intellect, trained upon the scientific techniques of the arts and crafts and especially upon the new techniques of government and law, and stimulated to fresh activity by the commercial, cultural, and even hostile contacts between the growing cities, principalities, and kingdoms, turns upon itself and upon society. The outcome is philosophy.

In all three areas, again, the crisis in the internal and external affairs of the small states was solved momentarily by merging them forcibly into the newly founded empires. The small states were merged into the great states. A case, surely, of casting out Satan by Beelzebub ! And as though conflicts between rich and poor, between lenders and borrowers, between producers and middlemen, between great landowners and small peasants—as though all these conflicts were not enough, the empires will henceforth be confronted by the even more bitter conflict between the empire-makers and the groups they have subjected. And if the empire is far-flung, forcing together by its power groups differing in race, in language, in standards of life, and above all in religion, the cup of bitterness will finally overflow.

In Greece, the city-states, torn by class conflicts and exhausted by inter-city wars, were finally merged into the empire of Alexander and his successors, losing the last vestiges of their independence when the Roman empire swallowed up the empire of the Greeks.

In China, as we have seen, the principalities disappear within the empire of Chin Shih Huang-ti. This empire has proved the most successful and the most enduring of all the political mergers, first, because all the groups so forcibly unified were homogeneous in race and culture,

and, second, because starting in political life as pioneer cultivators, they have never for any length of time been subjected to a foreign conqueror.

§ 2. *The empires of Constantine, Asoka, and Chin Shih Huang-Ti.*

In India the petty kingdoms of the Punjab and those along the Upper Ganges were brought under the imperial rule of Chandragupta Maurya and of his better-known grandson Asoka. Chandragupta was a contemporary of Alexander. But the empire of the Mauryas was short-lived. Had it not been for the recovery of some stone pillars, celebrating the adoption of Buddhism, by the Emperor Asoka, every trace of this first Indian empire might have vanished. For Hindus take no interest in history. History is a memorial of victors ; and in India there are no victors, only a wearisome procession of victims. No Indian state has endured. The Indians are the most defeated of all the civilized peoples of the world. For to the many causes of conflict eating into the vitality of the state, the Indians have added the most pernicious of all—caste. The Aryan invaders neither exterminated the Dravidian aborigines nor did they assimilate them. Religion finally was called in to stabilize the initial lack of community. By that genius for pretended and counterfeit community which is peculiar to organized religion, the untouchables were persuaded that, though in every material particular they were outside the Hindu community, yet ideally, at the end of an infinitely long chain of reincarnations, they were inside it. India has never recovered from the infantile paralysis of caste. The failure to find even an elementary basis for community has made India, politically, into a hospital for incurables. It was, therefore, in the nature of things that Buddhism, the religion which maximises the negative element, the element of alienation from life—what we have called the ' nihilistic ' element

—should have originated in India and have been adopted by Asoka as the state religion of his empire.

What Asoka did for India, the Emperor Constantine, almost exactly six hundred years later, did for Rome when he made Christianity into the official religion of his empire. China, too, has found it necessary to have a state religion, in order to satisfy the need of its millions for the imaginative semblance of community. Significantly enough, the state religion of China has oscillated between the Buddhism of the Great Vehicle (that of Ceylon and Siam is the Buddhism of the Little Vehicle) and a Taoistically coloured Confucianism.

Taoism is an individualistic and quietest version, profoundly significant for later Chinese art, of the collective animism of the clan. Taoism came to life in the three agitated centuries between Confucius (551–479 B.C.) and Chin Shih Huang-ti, the first Emperor (221–210 B.C.). In this period philosophers travelled from one feudal prince to another, offering advice upon the political crisis. Confucianism is the practical outcome of China's political philosophy. Philosophy is not usually practical. Only in China, with its extraordinarily homogeneous culture, could philosophy do statesman's work ; and then only under the grave pretence that the decorum in all human relations prescribed by the Confucians had been instituted by Yao and Shun, the legendary emperors and culture-heroes of the dim past.

Buddhism was not known in China until the first century of our era. It became popular during the troubled interregnum separating the fall of the Second Han Dynasty in A.D. 228 from the rise of the Tang Dynasty in A.D. 620. For when China's fortunes have sunk low, it has tended to favour Buddhism, a religion imported from abroad ; when, on the other hand, China's confidence in the strength of the social structure and in the value of its civilization has been restored, it has gone back to Taoistic Confucianism.

When the Chinese Emperor made the annual sacrifices

to Heaven and Earth, he was, in accordance with the most ancient of ritual patterns, employing his virtue to bring all the peoples of China and the whole realm of nature into a single harmony—the harmony of the Universe. He was, in fact, invoking a generalized version of primitive animism. This the Emperor could do in virtue of China's cultural unity—the original unity of a free society of pioneers.

China, India, and Greece : three regions of philosophic activity : three empires : three official religions, all of the 'nihilistic' or salvational kind, adopted by the empires to satisfy the need of their subjects for at least the imaginative semblance of community. And finally, each of the three official religions disappoints the hopes of its imperial sponsor : within a very brief period his empire is disrupted or his dynasty cut off. The official religions become autonomous churches. The empires vanish. The churches remain.

Why did Christianity fail to save the life of the Roman Empire, and Buddhism the life of the first Indian Empire of Chandragupta and Asoka ?

Christianity and Buddhism are religions of alienation from the world. The perfect Christian and the perfect Buddhist abide within the monastery, awaiting the hour of release from this world of time and vanity. But long before the establishment of the Buddhist and the Christian churches, their philosophical forerunners had begun to sound the 'retreat from civilization'. The Brahmins who composed the Upanishads are earlier than Buddhism. The neo-Platonists who interpreted Plato and Pythagoras to the Roman world were earlier than Constantine. We are told that in all the works of Plotinus, the greatest of the neo-Platonist philosophers, there is not a single reference to contemporary events—only mysticism and metaphysics and a shutting out of the world. And we are told by Orientalists that because of Hindu indifference to history, it is almost impossible to elucidate the chronology of the Upanishads. We are too poorly

informed about early Indian history to be able to trace the decline from the almost Homeric buoyancy of the Vedas to the systematized pessimism of the Upanishads. But about the world of classical antiquity we are much better informed. We can trace back the 'retreat from civilization' from the neo-Platonists of the Roman Empire, through the Stoics and Epicureans of the Hellenistic epoch, to its philosophic fountain-head in Plato. Plato abandoned politics—there was no hope in them after the downfall of the Athenian Empire and the outbreak of civil war—finding compensation and escape in a utopia of philosopher-kings. Plato's philosopher-kings are, by anticipation, the superiors of a Christian or Buddhist monastery. The superiors and the kings practise communism in goods; but the goods are supplied from without: to the superiors by the pious laity working and producing outside the monastery walls, and to the kings by the labouring classes—those 'animated tools' whom Plato does not even notice in his Utopia.

§ 3. *Epicureans, Stoics, and the Retreat from Civilization.*

With the Epicureans, the note of escape—escape from the state and its crisis—grows perceptibly stronger. The Epicureans were men of the world: they did not believe that the robber generals of Alexander, or the even more rapacious generals of the Roman Republic had solved or could solve the problem of power and community. As men of the world, the Epicureans appreciated culture and refinement; they realized that these were possible only in the Great State with its large surplus and its high division of labour. But they realized also that the technique of government, as far as it had developed in their day, not only sanctioned but demanded a concentration of power in the hands of a dominant minority —a minority, too often, of one. No one had planned the social pattern of the clan; but the Great State was impossible without a plan. And the plan must be

imposed by power—the power of an Hellenistic king such as Antiochus Epiphanes, who proposed forcibly to hellenize the Jews ; or the power of a Roman Emperor such as Nero, intent upon destroying the critics of his connoisseurship in murder and the arts. The Epicureans were intellectuals who appreciated the 'individualist's dilemma': if a man of culture withdraws himself from the Great State, he starves to death ; if, to avoid starvation, he seeks exile amongst primitive or pioneer folk, he dies as a man of culture ; and if he accepts the cost of his culture at the hands of the Great State, he must co-operate with it upon the terms laid down by a Nero or an Antiochus.

The Epicureans appreciated the value of civilization. But civilization, the greatest work of man, the only rational object of man's existence, was impossible without the Great State, and the Great State was impossible without leadership. What value, then, could civilization have and what wisdom was there in the human race, when the leadership of the world was conferred upon a Nero ? The Stoics, but not the Epicureans, tried to revive the ancient animistic belief in a harmony between man and nature, man and nature forming a transcendental fellowship. In the terms of this fellowship, man and nature shared a common mind. And in virtue of this common mind, the universe was rational. The Stoics prayed that the universal reason might seep into the state, but they were not too hopeful.

Zeno, the founder of Stoicism and a hellenized Phœnician of Cyprus, was old enough to remember that thirty thousand of his race had been sold into slavery when Alexander took Tyre in 332 B.C. History is not a school of optimism.

The Stoics trained themselves to remain satisfied with the single spark of reason within them, and to be indifferent to everything not within their power. The Epicureans were even more individualistic than the Stoics. Individualism is one of the by-products of

the general crisis in the state. But the Epicureans, looking not with the eyes of retrospective animists upon nature, but with the eyes of men of the world upon society, found it impossible to believe in the existence of a Universal Reason, whether within them, as the pantheist, or without them, as the theist believed. The Epicureans had no solution to offer of the problem of power and community, nor did they advocate the break-up of the state and a return to the primitive. As artists and literary men have ever done, the Epicureans accepted conservatively the existing framework of society and preached the cult of the passing moment.

It is now less difficult to understand why the elevation of Christianity to the dignity of a state religion did not save the Roman Empire. Plato and Constantine are separated by seven centuries. In that period, the proportion of individuals, classes, races, peoples, who felt themselves alienated in spirit from the Roman Super-State had grown to such a magnitude that the state authority, as a last desperate measure, was compelled to regularize what it could no longer ignore. It is also less difficult to understand why classical antiquity was so slow in dying. Mention has already been made of the political device of casting out Satan by Beelzebub. This device was employed by the successors of Alexander. They resolved the crisis in the politics of Greece by injecting its virus into the veins of subjected Persians, Egyptians, and Jews. In this hellenistic period, the Greeks were invigorated, temporarily at least, by the zestful task of imposing magisterially a new pattern of civilization upon the defeated peoples of the Near East. When this stimulus was exhausted, and the crisis in politics was still more widely spread, the Romans appeared.

The Romans brought Gaul and Northern Italy within the economic and cultural system of the West. This extension of the boundaries of Europe is their greatest, perhaps their only permanent, contribution to European civilization. Civilization is costly; the Romans put

a not inconsiderable part of the cost of civilization upon the colonial peoples of Gaul and Northern Italy. Julius Cæsar, and Alexander before him, postponed the breakdown of the West. There is a parallel in the modern world. The recurrent crises in the highly capitalized countries of to-day have been from time to time overcome by infecting pre-capitalist countries such as China and India with the virus of capitalism.

Did the adoption of Christianity accelerate the breakdown of the Roman Empire? The question is difficult. On the whole it seems probable that Constantine's policy had that effect. For there was a profound miscalculation in Constantine's statecraft, as in that of Asoka. What, in effect, was the message of these rulers to their subjects? 'We know that many amongst you are alienated from us, from the state-machine, and from the world. We know that some of you in fact, and many more of you in spirit, have become monastics. It is now our will and pleasure that all our subjects should enrol themselves as members of a single licensed monastery. This licensed monastery is the Church. Within this monastery there will be peace and concord. No longer will there be pride of office, lust for power, envy of the goods of others. Only we, the rulers, will continue to remain outside the monastery. We will hold the power. You will exhibit the virtues of community. By this separation of power from community we hope to resolve the crisis of the Empire.'

§ 4. *Depopulation in the ancient empires.*

The emperors forgot that power is nothing without wealth—wealth in goods and wealth of population. But monks produce no wealth and nuns produce no children. And children were required to fill the depleted armies of the emperors, battling against the ever-growing hosts of the barbarians; and they were also required to become servants of the state, held down to a fixed and hereditary status. It is the community which generates

power, even if it is the rulers who direct it. A people seriously converted to all that Christianity or Buddhism stand for would be easy to govern, placid, and unrebellious. But would they be alive? Would they be equal to the tasks of civilization? Peace is not everything. There is peace in death. Gibbon has praised the century of the Roman Peace between the death of the Jewish polity in A.D. 70, when Jerusalem fell, and the death of the saintly Stoic, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, in A.D. 180. But the saintly Stoic was dead in spirit long before his official demise. Marcus Aurelius was more alienated from Roman civilization than many of the Christians whom he persecuted. And the Jews who lost in A.D. 70 were more alive than their conquerors. The Jews, at least, had no intention of following their conquerors on the road to racial suicide. During the century of the Roman Peace whole districts had become depopulated, not through war, but because the inhabitants had no desire to continue the experiment of civilization. If all men fulfilled their monastic vows, life would cease. In theory, the church invites all men to take such vows. But the Catholic Church has persisted because the laity has failed to grasp the implications of the church's philosophy. The church repudiated the state. But the church took over, none the less, most of the cultural and many of the political functions of the state. In the terms of its dualistic philosophy, the church assigned the 'spiritual field' to the Popes and the 'secular field' to the Kaisers, the German successors of the Roman Cæsars. During the Dark Ages, when the peoples of the West were recuperating their material power, the church satisfied men's need for at least the semblance of community. The church sustained the sagging will to live.

The Buddhism of the Indian Emperor Asoka was indigenous, the Christianity of the Roman Emperor Constantine was exotic. Buddha was an Indian, Christ a Jew. This important difference demands a sociological

explanation. Why, of all possible religions, should Christianity, which originated as the heresy of an obscure Jewish sect, have been adopted as the state-religion of the Roman Empire?

§ 5. *Hebrew State and Jewish Church.*

In attempting to answer this question, it has been impossible to avoid a sociological analysis of Old Testament religion. But there have been a number of additional reasons for undertaking this task. In the first place, the Bible and especially the Old Testament is the only source-book of ancient history which is at all well known. Then again, the substitution of the Jewish Church for the Hebrew State is, so to speak, a test on a small laboratory scale of one of the principal theses of this book. And finally, the 'messianic hope', which is so strongly marked in Judaism—the hope of reconciling power with community upon the scale of a commonwealth of mankind—is to-day the living part of Christianity.

As the historical facts connected with the transition from Hebrew State to Jewish Church are analysed in later chapters, this is the appropriate place to discuss the essential differences, and the causes of the differences, between universal churches such as the Christian and Buddhist, and a national church such as the Jewish.

It has already been shown that a universal church is impossible without a strong emphasis upon the element of 'alienation from the world'—what we have called the 'nihilistic' element. Only by calling upon men to sacrifice—in theory at least—all the distinctive functions associated with sex and race, with class and state, can a church validate its claims to be catholic. Because Judaism made no such demands for sacrifice, it could never become a catholic religion. Alienation from the world is the matrix of catholicity.

Judaism began as the worship of Jahveh, the god of

nomadic clans, whose central habitat was the Desert of Sinai. After gaining control of Canaan in 1200 B.C., the nomads assimilated the religion of the Canaanites, who were peasant cultivators worshipping the local Baalim. Two centuries later, in the days of Saul, David, and Solomon, the founders of the short-lived kingdom of United Israel, the syncretism of the two religions became the religion of Israel. Then came the great schism, when the Northern tribes, with their capital at Samaria, broke away from the tribe of Judah, leaving to it little more than David's capital, the city of Jerusalem. After the schism, the Prophets become the makers of history. The underlying political motive of the Prophetic party was to extrude from Israel's religion many of the elements assimilated from the local cults of the Baalim—always one of the principal causes of internal discord. The Prophets hoped to heal the schism and conserve the political independence of a reunited Israel by reviving the religion of Jahveh, the ancient religion of the desert. In the hour of weakness, men recall the conditions of previous success. When Jahveh was their god, the tribes had been united and victorious.

The hopes of the Prophets were not realized. After the Fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C., the disappearance of the state, and the exile to Babylon, the Jewish Church replaces the Jewish State. During the greater part of the period from 586 B.C. to the Fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70, the Jewish Church, though centred upon Jerusalem and governed by the High Priests, was extra-territorial and super-regional : there were, generally, far more members of the Jewish Church outside than inside Palestine.

This brief sketch of Old Testament religion will suffice to make it clear why Judaism could never become the religion of a universal church. For during the whole of the pre-church epoch of human history, religion, far from being alienated from the world, was most intimately associated with the whole life of a people. The physical as well as the mental, the material as well as the spiritual,

external wealth as well as internal—all had their rightful place within the life of a people. All these elements are constituents of civilization. And the sociological function of pre-church religion has ever been the maintenance of 'Faith in Civilization'—faith in the civilization associated with clan or tribe, kingdom or empire. Over against the indifference or hostility of nature and the mysteries of pain and death, men need to be reassured. When the will-to-live is weak, men need a restorative. Pre-church religion, inveterately animistic, with its device of bringing nature into 'transcendental fellowship' with man, is the great sustainer of the will-to-live.

There are a number of other differences of sociological importance between Judaism and the universal religions. First, it is significant that there is no original philosophy in the Bible. There are prophets, but there are no philosophers. For the philosopher is an individualist and an introvert, detached from politics and the recurrent crises in the state. As we have seen, the philosopher is a fitting forerunner of a universal church—a church whose very universality is impossible without a high degree of detachment and alienation from the world. But the Hebrew prophet was the impersonal voice of a young nation desperately striving to preserve its newly found identity. And yet the prophet is not primarily a publicist or a politician or even a social reformer. The prophet is a religious reformer. It must be remembered that from 1200 B.C., when the Hebrews dominated Palestine, to 722 B.C., when the Northern Kingdom fell to the Assyrians, is a period of less than five centuries. In that brief period the Hebrews had passed from tribal nomadism to urban life, and from the empire-state of Solomon to the impotent dualism of Northern Israel and Southern Judah. The prophet is a religious reformer who proposes to restore political unity through the mediation of religious unity.

§ 6. *Cultural Dualism in Old Testament religion.*

But there is something extraordinary and unprecedented in the prophet's assumption of the role of a religious reformer. We moderns, who have lived for the last two thousand years in an epoch of universal churches, will see nothing remarkable in the advent of the religious reformer. But in the pre-church epoch, religion did not assume an attitude of detachment from the secular life, nor did it distribute spiritual advice and moralistic criticism. Pre-church religion was not cast for the role of reformer, whether of society or of itself; its function was to conserve society, not to change it. Pre-church religion was immemorially the most conservative of human institutions, lagging behind the silently accumulating changes in society. How, then, was it possible for the Hebrew prophet to assume the revolutionary role of religious reformer?

The revolutionary reformism of the Hebrew prophet can be explained, if we appreciate the importance of the 'cultural dualism' of the Hebrews. The Hebrews were cultivators of the soil who had not had time to forget that they had once been pastoral nomads. Round every 'way of life' there develops an internal culture as well as an external civilization. And because pre-church religion was Faith in Civilization, two distinctive 'ways of life' could not be sustained except by two correspondingly distinctive religions. Now in the five or six brief centuries between the entry into the Promised Land and the disastrous exit from it, there confronted one another in Palestine two 'ways of life', two cultures, two civilizations, two religions. From this clash of religions there shot up the sparks of collective self-consciousness. And from these sparks was kindled the fire of Hebrew prophecy.

Upon the crisis in the Hebrew state there supervened, therefore, a crisis in religion. The prophet's call to righteousness—interpreted by the theologians of the

universal church as a call to a Righteousness abstracted from all local and temporal particularity—is, in fact, a conservative's protest. The prophet is protesting against the evils of urban civilization as seen with the retrospective eyes of an advocate for the restoration of an idealized nomadism.

§ 7. *Churches as unifiers of mankind.*

In this introductory sketch of the 'historic process', it only remains to point briefly to the evidence for its last stage—the stage from the universal churches to the universal commonwealth. It will always be impossible for the universal churches to stabilize the affairs of mankind. There is a contradiction in their nature which they have inherited from the contradiction in the empires that had hoped to save themselves by their aid. The empires were disrupted because they could not reconcile concern for the community with the power of a dominant class. The universal churches have both salvaged the empires and repudiated them. Wealth, culture, and population, which are the attributes of power, are also the substantial foundations of community. Power and community are the twin pillars of civilization. The universal churches both affirm civilization and deny it. The universal churches have reorganized the broken peoples of the empires into supernational communities, monastic in spirit, if not necessarily in fact, and have taught them to turn away their faces from the transitory adventure of the secular life.

The process of history resembles the advancing and receding waves of the flowing tide. The contradictions in the state and the subsequent contradictions in the church have generated the energy which is sweeping forward the tide of civilization to the high-water mark of the universal commonwealth.

The pattern of civilization that crystallizes out of the matrix of Time is always different from that intended by

the would-be makers of history. Receivers in bankruptcy of a bankrupt world, the intention of the universal churches was to prepare the mind of their great congregations for the final liquidation of man's affairs. But though the Day of Judgment is always with us, the Last Day is not yet.

During the last thousand years the universal churches have been, independently of their conscious intentions, the principal agencies for the unification of mankind. The barbarians of the North, whose pressure from without combined with the lassitude from within, had broken down the resistance of the Roman Empire, were shepherded into school, to be taught by the Christian Church the elements of civilization. Culture, though at a low level, was equalized over Western Europe. And many remote peoples learnt for the first time something of the underlying unity of the human race. Christendom, apart from Europe, now includes North and South America, Australia, and parts of Africa. Until recently Christendom was the greatest single field for the diffusion of a common culture.

Islam restored the self-respect of the peoples of the Near East: the peoples of Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia who had been subjected by Græco-Roman power, but had not forgotten that they had been the creators of a civilization far older and not inferior to that of their conquerors. Islam restored these peoples to an honourable place in the society of nations. Islam, too, brought many diverse peoples, from Java to Morocco, within the ambit of a common civilization.

Buddhism, again, in its two principal forms, has been diffused over an extensive area stretching from Ceylon to Thibet, and from Thibet through Mongolia to the islands of Japan. On the great questions of life and death, purpose and destiny, millions of men have learnt that they are united by a common body of beliefs and practices.

The churches have developed into great communities, by exploiting the possibilities inherent in the Principle of

the Diffusion of Culture. Ideas, emotions, and types of practical behaviour can be communalized far more readily than can wealth and power. Communism in the things of the spirit is a less arduous goal than communism in the necessities and amenities of civilization. The churches have succeeded in giving to great hosts of individual human bodies a single mind ; but they have not resolved the ancient conflict in the state between power and community. What they have done is to transcend even the far-flung limits of the ancient empires ; to give mankind a breathing space in which to recuperate from that terrible destruction of cultural values which is the price the peoples have to pay for the unending warfare of Positive and Negative—that military ' procession of the contradictions ' which is the spectacle and process of history.

Prior to A.D. 1500 it could be said that the globe was divided into four or five regions showing a high degree of religious and therefore of cultural unity. Among these cultural regions, Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism would be accounted the chief. In each of these regions there were many millions of individuals with a single mind. But since A.D. 1500 mankind has become physically a single body, and at the same time one displaying an extraordinary increase in the number of divergent types of mind inhabiting it. A condition of ' multiple personality ', where there is more than one mind in a single body—the minds being simultaneous and not successive—is a condition of neurosis.

§ 8. *The conflict of ideologies in Western civilization.*

The discovery of America, the colonization of Africa and Australia, the resumption of contacts with India, China, and the ancient civilizations of the East ; the invasion of every region of the globe by the capitalistic economy of the machine, the employment of the new technology based upon electricity and oil, have forced

mankind into a single physical body. But minds, nourished by what since A.D. 1500 has become an enormously increased variety of religions, philosophies, and outlooks, can never live in harmony within a single body of material civilization. This multiplicity of minds within a single material body is producing a condition of acute neurosis. And even if, by a very necessary miracle, all mankind were converted to a single brand of Christianity, a vital harmony would still not have been created within the body of mankind. For the 'basic dualism' of Christianity would prohibit the generation of the vital energy that is required to maintain the fabric of a world civilization. Such a universal Christianity would still continue to affirm civilization and to deny it. It would approve of the shepherding of all men into a single fold; but its pastors would none the less be impelled to teach their flocks that world civilization was the vanity of vanities, the last, as well as the most perilous, obstacle to salvation. Unless, therefore, religion becomes again what it was in the days of the clan and the tribe and of the early states, namely, Faith in Civilization, no world civilization can persist.

The break-up of the Catholic West at the Reformation and the progressive fragmentization of its ancient unity, have issued in a series of events that form a 'procession of contradictions' through the history of the last four centuries. With a better knowledge of medieval history it became clear that the renaissance of the West had made considerable progress even before A.D. 1200. Long before the fall of Constantinople in A.D. 1453 and the recovery of Greek and Roman manuscripts, the West, having assimilated the barbarians of the North and exploited their vital if crude energies, accumulated a substantial surplus, out of which it built cathedrals and endowed universities. The medieval Papacy began to identify itself more and more with the secular civilization of the time. By waging an interminable warfare with the Kaisers of the Holy Roman Empire, the church endeav-

oured to add to the papal regalia the insignia of secular power. But this abandonment of other-worldliness, this abandonment of the negativity or 'nihilism' which is the basic principle of a universal church, stirred up the revenger in the person of the monk, Martin Luther. From the standpoint of the Borgias or the Medicis, Luther and Calvin were reactionaries, negating the positive love of secular civilization which distinguished the Catholic Church of their day, and reinstating its traditional attitude of alienation from the world.

Protestantism is, in origin, a protest against the positivity of civilization. But the Protestant Reformation set in motion the Catholic Counter-reformation, which was the negative of the Protestant negation. The Protestant reply to the Counter-reformation was the Thirty Years' War (A.D. 1618–1648), the exhaustion of interest in religion, the reduction of Protestantism, first to the Independency of Oliver Cromwell, then to eighteenth-century Deism, then to Unitarianism, and then to the secularized outlook of the Utilitarians. With each successive reduction Protestantism became progressively individualistic; the communal and societal philosophy inherited from the Catholic Church—for which that church had the strongest claim upon the gratitude of Europe—becoming more and more attenuated. And finally, the 'motion of the contradictions' ends in a circular return to the very paganism which Luther had denounced. For Protestantism in the nineteenth century identified itself more and more with the science and technology of a materialist capitalism.

The recurrent duel between affirmation and negation is the way of history. The day is now approaching for the negation of the negativity embedded in the principles of the universal churches. The existence of the universal churches is proving itself incompatible with the advance to a universal commonwealth. The secularization of Russia, of Mexico, of Nazi Germany, of Turkey, and of China—Greek Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism (the three principal varieties of Christianity), Islam,

and Buddhism are all represented in this list of liquidated churches—are pointers of the way.

The physical body of mankind is crying for a soul. Only when its body has acquired a soul will mankind be freed from its neurosis. And this single informing spirit will be born when, universally, men become conscious of their history, of the historic process which has carried them from the depths of the past into the present. From this unprecedented consciousness, there may arise a faith in world civilization.

What mankind needs is not a world state, but a world community. A world state, set up by millionaire technocrats, would only revive on a world scale the conflict that has now been waged for the last five thousand years between the power of a dominant minority and the need for community of the masses of mankind.

Nor will an individualism compounded of reminiscences of the individualism of Stoic and Epicurean, of Christian mystic and Oriental ascetic, of Renaissance humanist and nineteenth-century scientist, be the way to freedom from the neurosis of the modern world. Men of courage and creativeness will not seek to escape into the asylum of the private self.

Only by faith in world civilization will mankind recover the ' open road to life '.

CHAPTER III

THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVILIZATION

§ 1. *The principles of civilization are independent of history.*

WHAT is civilization? Is there only one civilization, or are there many, regionally and temporally restricted? And if there are many civilizations, how are they related? Does civilization belong to a different order from barbarism and savagery? Or is there a single human order embracing them all?

As civilization is, in some sense, a human creation, how is it related to the raw materials upon which human creativity works? Civilization changes the face of non-human nature as well as the face of human society. A new-born child is one kind of raw material for the creative process of civilization, an undrained swamp in a newly discovered country another kind. Is what the child obtains from civilization to be called culture? And if so, what are we to call the change from the undrained swamp to the cultivated field?

Where is the material for a history of civilization to be found? Would a detailed history of the world—all the volumes, say, of the *Cambridge Ancient, Medieval,* and *Modern History*—contain all the material necessary for a history of civilization? Or, better still, would a collection of sound films, each recording automatically what every human being has ever said or done, from the earliest men of prehistory to the latest men among our contemporaries —would such a 'source-book' of history be an adequate 'source-book' of civilization?

In a later chapter of this book it will be shown in detail

that the distinction between urban civilization and primitive savagery, while it is important for an analysis of the historic process, is irrelevant to a theory of the principles of civilization. It will be remembered that in the first chapter the historic process was described as 'from clan to state, from state to church, and from church to universal commonwealth'. Now no one could ever have discovered that institutions, such as the Roman Empire or the Early Christian Church, had once existed, unless he had gone to the historical record and found out. But if principles of civilization really exist which are as something more than shorthand summaries of all the outstanding events of the historic process, it should be possible to detect them independently of the historical record. The historical record will exemplify the principles, but the principles—if there are any principles—will not be derived from the historical record. Chapters VI and VII, as well as some of the later historical chapters, will be devoted to this exemplification of the principles. Why the principles must be independent of the historical record will become clearer a little later on in this chapter. Barbarism and savagery, then, are different levels of civilization; the question of levels is important for the history, but not for the principles of civilization. Every change therefore in society and every change in the external and non-human world of which a human agent is the cause, will, in this book, be considered a part of civilization. Our imaginary sound film recording the complete biographies of all past and present members of the human species would, of course, in every inch of its length and in every second of its duration be continually changing; and yet, in one recurrent feature of it, it would be perennially the same. This recurrent feature is the 'human situation'. A group of human beings, socially related and reciprocally interactive, is one constituent of the 'human situation' and a patch of non-human nature, stimulating the group to purposive activity, is the other.

§ 2. *The Three Elements of the Human Situation.*

Man and non-human nature are the two poles of the process of civilization. Wherever there is civilization, there is man, and wherever there is man, there is always something other than man environing him. That other is the non-human world of nature. In all our thinking about the world, these two elements of the 'human situation' are presupposed. On a closer scrutiny, however, it will be seen that there is a third element: man and nature are, as we said, the two poles of the civilizational process, but what of the process itself? The third element is the process. Man acts on his natural environment, transforming it to suit his purposes; and the transformed environment reacts in turn upon man. These three elements, Man, Nature, and the Civilizational Process, are the three elements of the 'human situation'.

Man is different from nature, and yet man is united with nature through the civilizational process; the unity and the difference are equally fundamental. Already in the lives of animals and of human infants, these fundamentals can be seen at work. Animals recognize their kind. That does not mean that a lamb, straying from the flock, gets an image of the companions he has lost, or that converting the image into a concept he will say to himself 'I must rejoin the flock'; or that on catching sight of the flock he will say to himself 'There they are'. What is meant by recognition of kind is that the lamb behaves towards lambs it has never previously seen in very much the same way as it behaves to lambs of its acquaintance; yet if dogs were substituted for the stranger lambs, the behaviour of the lamb would be very different. What the animal can do, the human child does better. The first words that a child uses correctly are words for human persons, domestic animals, and for a small number of things in which it is emotionally interested—such as its food. But upon the human persons, especially the mother, the child's emotional interest is

concentrated ; they form for him a class apart—the class of entities, that will stimulate him to construct the concept ' man ' or ' human being '. Indeed, a child who not only recognizes his kind, but formulates his recognition in words, may be said to have performed ' the primordial act of the human understanding '. When, in other words, the child dichotomizes his world into Man and Not-man, he has taken the first step to civilization.

It is not, then, too strong a claim to make that the ' human situation ', with its trinity of factors—Man, Nature, and the Civilizational Process—is the *a priori* of human life. The *a priori* is that which comes first, which is of fundamental importance, which is presupposed in every subsequent discussion. For every significant statement that has been or that can be made about human life and history and civilization presupposes that the concepts Man, Nature, and Civilizational Process are already understood. Why do we include certain individual existents within the category of ' human being ' ? Because we maintain that these existents have the qualities characterizing human beings. And what is the quality characterizing a human being ? It is humanity. And what is humanity ? Why, nothing but the quality characterizing a human being. The argument is circular and it is not advanced by replacing the English ' man ' by the Latin ' homo '. ' Human being ', ' human quality ', ' humanity ' are equivalents for something unique that cannot be reduced to something different. But what cannot be defined in terms of something else is an indefinable. Similarly, Nature and Civilization (by civilization, Civilizational Process is meant) are ultimately indefinables. We can construct any number of statements in which these terms occur ; but unless we understand them from the outset, as the elements or factors of the ' human situation ', the statements themselves will be incomprehensible.

§ 3. *Society, Habitat, and Economy.*

Instead of thinking of man universally—so that by man we mean the entire human species—we can restrict man to a social unit, functioning as such within a specific 'human situation'. Such a functional restriction of man is a society. Again, we can restrict the vastnesses of nature, with her stars and suns enfolding the specks of the human sand-heap, to that small patch of nature which is the habitat of a given social group. Nature, then, can be restricted to the specific habitat of a specific human group. And finally, instead of the process of civilization in all its universality—taken universally, the process of civilization is the process of human history—we can restrict it to the interaction between a society and its habitat. As a result of this interaction, the habitat will be domesticated and transformed. Consider, for instance, the virginal habitat of American pioneers a hundred years ago and the same habitat to-day. The habitat and the society have both been transformed. The pioneers are pioneers no longer, but capitalists, technicians, and proletarians. Society and habitat conjoined set up an economy. And an economy is, literally, a business-like housekeeping; man and nature, having married one another, keep house together. And marriage, as we know, transforms the characters of the partners to the marriage. We can now substitute for Man, Nature, and the Civilizational Process,—which are the universal factors of the 'human situation'—the restricted factors: Society, Habitat, and Economy. And in a later chapter more will be said about the latter three in connection with 'human geography'.

§ 4. *The discovery of the Principles.*

The 'human situation' is 'one in three': it is the trinity of Man, Nature, and Civilization. And the

' human situation ', as we have said, is the concrete *a priori* of human life. The ' human situation ' is the matrix out of which the principles of civilization crystallize. The principles of civilization are the strong outlines, the universal features of human life. Mountains, valleys, seas stand out upon a model of the globe as the fundamental types of relief. Let the globe be our similitude for human life—human life throughout the ages. The principles of civilization distribute the relief of human life into typical and universal features.

To discover the principles of civilization, all that is necessary is a walk into the streets, or over the path across the cornfield, or a return to one's home, observing how the meals are being prepared and the children educated. The *a priori* of civilization is the concrete *a priori* : it is discovered empirically by going out into the world and observing what one's fellow human beings are doing—what they are doing every day under the sun. The concrete *a priori* of civilization is not the abstract *a priori* of the metaphysicians (metaphysician is only another name for a non-empirical philosopher). The metaphysician does not go out into the world—the world of action ; he abides in the half-world of the introspective mind. The metaphysician is a denizen of the spiritual half-world. Like the Hindu mystic, he strips himself naked—in theory at least—of all the vestures of the communal life and, turning his gaze inwards, attempts to penetrate the mystery of his own existence. It has been shown that philosophers are the forerunners of churches ; and churches, being alienated from civilization, live at best the half-life of the ' spiritual world '. And although Descartes is a modern philosopher, the concrete *a priori* of civilization will also be very different from the ' *cogito ergo sum* '—I think, therefore I exist—of his philosophy. Descartes shut himself up in his room, turning the power of his great intellect upon himself. Descartes thought about thought and was conscious about consciousness. Whoever wishes to discover the principles of civilization

must open his door wide and go out into the world—the world of action.

§ 5. *Morals, Science, and Religion: the three forms of human creativity.*

I go into the street and watch a house being built. At one end, bricklayers are placing an extra course of bricks upon a rising wall; at the other end, window-frames, already cut to pattern, are being placed upright into position. Near the road, navvies are lowering drain-pipes into deep-cut channels running up to the house. And from the wooden hut serving as an office for the clerk of the works, a man emerges, pencil and paper in his hand, and starts talking to the workmen.

This group of house-builders is a microcosm of civilization: every principle of civilization is functioning within it. But because I am a poor observer, and a still poorer interpreter of what I have observed, some of the principles at work will almost certainly have escaped me. I may therefore have to stroll into the country, or even to return home, in order to complete the list of principles. It is evident to me that this group of builders is a co-operative society—different members performing different functions, and the several functions tending to a common end. There is 'unity in difference' in the functioning of this group. In every human group, large or small, this 'unity in difference' is a constitutive principle. And this unity is not the unconscious unity of a bee-hive; it is a creative and a created unity. Trading no doubt upon a fund of instinctive—and therefore of inherited—gregariousness, human beings possess the unique power of inventing group-patterns composed of themselves. These groupings are new societies created for a consciously emergent purpose. Human beings, therefore, possess the ultimately inexplicable power of being able to create *ad hoc* societies. Such societies display unity and morals. For morals are acquired habits of action that a society has created;

and once created, has persisted in—even when impelled by its own creative urge to replace the acquired habits by other and newer habits. Such a society persists in its social order because it desires to achieve its purposed end. If any human group is inspected and considered sympathetically, the fact that it has unity as well as creativity will emerge at once. And since any human group—our group of house-builders, for instance—is a sample of civilization, the principles of the group are the constitutive principles of civilization. Every group is a harmonizing system of social relations subsisting between the members composing it. The harmony has been consciously created ; and this consciously created harmony is what we understand by morals.

It is also clear to me that the house is being built according to plan ; and that the plan—which has not been prepared upon the building site—is being communicated to the workmen. The workmen, therefore, have the faculty—the unique human faculty—of assimilating the ideas underlying a technique, although they themselves are not specialists in that technique. The workmen have not originated the architect's ideas : these have been transmitted to them from the architect's department. The architect's technique is both science and art : it is art when he himself practises it ; it is science when he transmits the rules and methods of his technique to others in order that they may practise it. As the architect's art is admittedly culture, and as the science transmitted to the workmen and applied by them is also culture, it cannot be denied that upon this building site I am witnessing the diffusion of culture from a human being to other human beings. No philosopher, sitting in his study and thinking about thought, could ever have discovered this fundamental principle of civilization. It is the Principle of the Diffusion of Culture.

In this building group there is therefore an exhibition, open to the inspection of every sympathetic observer, not only of morals but of science ; not only of the working

of one tiny department in the complex business of civilization, but of the fundamental principles underlying every civilization. Morals and science are two great fields of human creativity. Starting from the raw materials of human nature, men have discovered how to organize society; how to create original and unprecedented networks of social relations between the individuals composing it. And similarly, starting from the raw materials found in nature, men have discovered the techniques for controlling and transforming nature. The sum-total of these techniques is the substance of natural experimental science. Science is a match-maker between Man and Nature. Science has made it possible for Man to enter into a marriage of convenience with that very difficult shrew, Dame Nature.

I am confident that a closer study of the building group would yield other—perhaps the remaining—fundamental principles of civilization; and I am half inclined to go up to the scaffolding and start talking with the bricklayers. Yet I am deterred by the notice, 'No admission except on business'. I have business—the very important business of elucidating the principles of civilization, but I am doubtful if I could explain my business to the bricklayers. So I decide to take a bus into the country.

The sun is shining, although it is the first fine day for many weeks. The corn, having been beaten to the ground by rain and storm, has rotted into a black ruin. Man's marriage with nature has, in this instance, proved unhappy. If the farmer who sowed the corn had foreseen the end, he would have saved himself the means. He knew, of course, the possibility of such an end, but evidently his hopes of a better end had overcome his fears. Knowing that nature was non-human, that at any time she might 'go native', the farmer none the less assumed that she would remain domesticated and civilized. As farmers are not learned in anthropology, the owner of the corn-field most probably did not know that he had been con-

forming to a very ancient pattern of human behaviour. As has already been pointed out, primitive peoples, at the animistic level of religion, build a bridge between man and nature—the two indefinables of the 'human situation'—by bringing nature into 'transcendental fellowship' with man. In risking the possibility of rain and ruin, the farmer, unknown to himself, had been practising religion.

Religion is founded upon instinct, just as science and morals are founded upon instinct. Morals are built upon gregariousness, and the sciences upon constructiveness. Religion is built upon a duel between two instinctive opposites, upon a duel between hope and fear. But religion —the systematized religion of the group, whether the group be as small as the clan or as large as the empire—though founded upon instincts, is the conscious work of human creativity. Religion is a human creation just as morals and the sciences are human creations.

Shall we call religion a principle of civilization? Whether we do or not is largely a matter of nomenclature. It is probably better to regard Science, Morals, and Religion as the 'Prime Factors of Civilization'—the three principal forms of human creativeness—and to reserve the name 'principle' for the most general features of human life, the most significant crystallization of the common matrix which is the 'human situation'. And this is the line adopted in Chapter VII of this book.

§ 6. *Religion as Acceptance of the Empirical.*

If, however, we are anxious to regard religion as a distinct principle, we could do so by calling religion the 'principle of the acceptance of the empirical'. For civilization is empirical; it has been built upon trial and error. It is an illusion of the mystics and one encouraged by the metaphysicians that, by an act of superior intuition, it is possible to read off directly the secrets of nature and of society. As we have already seen,

the break-up of the great empires and their replacement by the churches had destroyed men's confidence in the experimental approach to civilization. There had been so many trials and so much error that men began to look for a superior, a less hazardous method—a method by which they could arrive at certainty and finality. They were weary of change and hopeless of creative change. They wanted unity, but without incurring the labours and risks of creativity. They were not interested in natural science ; for natural science is technology, an armoury of instruments for controlling nature and forcibly persuading her to set up house with man. What they were looking for was perfect knowledge. And perfect knowledge, the final insight into life and destiny was, they believed, discoverable ; but not in technology. Technology was not perfect knowledge : the instrumental techniques of technology might be of growing efficiency, but were they not always subject to the risk of breakdown ? Perfect knowledge must be sought in a ' science of reality ', a ' science of being '—of being beyond the possibility of change. Because of their despair of empirical civilization, there was only one science in which they were deeply interested : ' ontology ', the science of ' being '. The science of ' ontology ' is the principal part of metaphysics ; and metaphysics is the principal part of non-empirical philosophy.

Similarly, the survivors of the broken empires were not interested in creative morals. Seeking to escape from the unhappy creativity of the empire-civilizations, they found a refuge in the churches and especially in the monastic orders, embodying as these do the ' alienated essence ', the ' negativity *par excellence* ' of the churches. The survivors of the broken empires were yearning for the ' *societas perfecta* ', where unity and order are safe beyond every peril of change or creativeness. Instead of the empirical ethics of an ever-changing society, they yearned for an ethical absolute. Instead of natural science, metaphysical ontology ; instead of living morals,

ethical absolutes ; instead of a religious faith in civilization, a religious alienation from, an unfaith in, civilization ; in the terms of these threefold substitutions, the men of the church-epoch protested against the empirical, the changing, the uncertain.

As we have seen, the religion of the pre-church epoch has a very different character from the religion associated with the churches. Pre-church religion was not a protest against the empirical, it was an acceptance of the empirical. In the pre-church epoch, the dangers of living were accepted ; the will-to-live was not paralysed by the fringe of uncertainty upon the vestures of civilization. The pre-church peoples, especially those at a primitive level of civilization, cherished, it is true, a characteristic illusion of their own : by holding the animistic myth of ' transcendental fellowship ', they exaggerated the ' humanity ', the quasi-human or quasi-rational qualities of nature. Indeed, progress in science has consisted largely in widening the gulf between man and nature ; in regarding men as things, rather than, with the animistic primitives, of regarding things as men. Modern science has emphasized the non-human properties of nature ; and this emphatic underlining of the difference has made it easier for man to set up housekeeping with nature. Admittedly, the pre-church peoples maintained their faith in civilization by propagating myths which are no longer acceptable to us moderns. However that may be, faith in civilization was maintained. The pre-church peoples did not yearn to be delivered from the empirical, the uncertain, the dangerous concomitants of civilization. They accepted the perils of their human status : and in that sense, they were religious. Whether at the hands of non-human nature, or at the hands of non-human men, civilization is perennially in peril. But civilization cannot be maintained, still less can it be enlarged, unless the risks of a breakdown are accepted. Civilization is impossible without the acceptance of the empirical, which means that civilization is impossible without religion.

The view of the black ruin in the cornfield has yielded the insight that farmers are religious men. Only religious men with faith in civilization are prepared to take the risk of failure. But the bricklayer in the building group is also a religious man: he risks less than the farmer, but even bricklayers cannot trade upon certainties. The bricklayer is religious without being mystical. It is the mystic who persuades himself that he has eliminated all the risks attendant on our human status. The bricklayer assumes, as an act of faith, that the techniques of bricklaying pursued by him in the past will carry him successfully through his present job. He has the working faith of the empiricist in the continuity of non-human nature and in the continued availability of his own acquired skill; he assumes, that is to say, that bricks will retain their traditional properties and his hands their traditional skill. It is a matter of faith. No logical reasons can be advanced for either of the two assumptions. Why, indeed, should nature prove a faithful spouse of man? Of course, if the marriage of man and nature has been made in Heaven—and that is what mystics and metaphysicians agree in asserting—a divorce, a break-up of their intimacy, would be an inconceivable sacrilege. But empirical experience is far from suggesting that the marriage of man and nature has been made in Heaven; it is a marriage of convenience, and little more; and incompatibility of temper is a frequent ground for divorce. The bricklayer has no guarantee that nature functioning physically in the bricks or physiologically in his hands will not prove unfaithful.

§ 7. *Faith, Probability, Isolates.*

The so-called 'uniformity of nature' is not a principle of logic. Sometimes we are told that the 'uniformity of nature' is a principle of inductive logic. But after all, what is inductive logic? A penny tossed in the air turns up heads three times running. What is the probability

of its turning up heads upon the fourth toss? Assuming that heads is just as probable as tails, the question can be answered. A little sum, not in inductive logic, but in deductive arithmetic, will settle the size of the probability. But how do we know that heads are as probable as tails? Solely as a result of experience. In other words, the proposition that heads is as probable as tails is derived from, or is an induction from, empirical experience. So-called inductive logic is not logic at all, in the same sense that deductive mathematics is a branch of logic. The traditional conjunction of induction with deduction is part of the ancient metaphysical illusion that the probable truths of experimental science can be obtained without experiment—in fact that the probable truths of experimental science are of the same type as the certain truths of mathematical or logical science. I know that heads are as probable as tails as a result of two experiments in isolating bits of nature. First of all, I know from experience that a penny tossed up into the air will come to rest upon one of its two sides; and that these two positions of equilibrium are unaffected by substituting King George V for King Edward VII on one side of the coin, or substituting La France for Britannia upon the other. The position of equilibrium is an isolate: it can be isolated from the design upon the coin or from the nature of the metal—a gold coin will toss like a copper one. Again, the movements of the fingers in the technique of the tossing experiment can be isolated from the remaining characteristics of the experimenter: the technique is, for instance, independent of the fact that the experimenter is a Baptist with conscientious objections to gambling. We see, then, that the existence of two isolates is presupposed: one in the constitution of the coin, the other in the constitution of the experimenter. That such isolates exist and that up to a point they can be relied upon is the basis of empirical science; it is the basis of induction as well as of the so-called 'uniformity of nature'. That the isolates will be satisfied with their relative

isolation, and will behave as they hitherto have behaved is an act of faith on our part—an act of religious faith. There is still, however, one further assumption we have to make before we can assert that heads are as probable as tails. We assume that it is not within the power of the experimenter consciously to make the decision between heads and tails. The way he moves his fingers may in fact decide the issue, but he cannot move them purposively to that end. To decide the momentous question of who shall bat first, the captain of the Australian Test Team tosses a coin with the captain of the M.C.C. The Australian cherishes the faith that his rival is an average human being, without the special dexterity of the conjurer; he assumes in fact that there is no purposive relation between the two isolates: the fingers of his rival cannot consciously determine the side on which the tossed coin shall come to rest. Both the existence of the isolates and the existence of a negative relation between them are discovered by experiment. What experiment has discovered is reliable but not infallible. Readiness to take risks, to work upon a basis which is not founded in certainty, is the mark of the religious man, of the man who accepts the fallibility of the empirical.

Have our posts of observation, the one in the street before the building group and the other in the country upon the cornfield path, yielded all the principles of civilization? It is impossible to say. Until we have scrutinized the historic process where, necessarily, the principles are working upon a grand scale and under the greatest variety of circumstances, we can never be certain that empirical principles of some consequence have not escaped our notice. For the concrete principles of civilization are not logical or metaphysical essences; they are the large features of human life; they are what is *a priori*, in the sense of being primordial and fundamental in the empirical process of civilization. The principles of civilization are the *a priori* characteristics of our empirical existence.

§ 8. *The Diffusion and the Equalization of Culture.*

But let us follow out the original programme, and having sought out civilization in the street and in the country, let us return home. Morals, Science, and Religion are the tutelary divinities of the family. Religion is still 'acceptance of the empirical'; but it takes on a more personal and a warmer colouring; the risks incurred in bringing up a family are different from those incurred in confronting external nature. In the home, faith is indispensable, not only in the law-abidingness of external nature, but in the conformity to expected pattern of the mind and body of the growing child. And as for morals, the moral unity of the family goes deeper than the moral unity of an industrial group of house builders; the moral unity goes deeper because the diffusion of culture is so much more thorough. As we have seen, culture-diffusion is one of the basic principles of civilization. Culture is diffused from foreigners to natives, from upper class to lower class, from the dead to the living. Culture is diffused from any one group within the human species to any other. In virtue of culture-diffusion, the actual unity of every living civilization and the potential unity of a world civilization are placed beyond a peradventure. But in the family, culture is diffused from one generation to another; and the possibility of this kind of diffusion is the working hypothesis of every educator. As an outcome of the educational process, the culture of the younger generation becomes equal to that of the elder. In the family, therefore, we see at work the Principle of the Equalization of Culture.

§ 9. *Death and Social Solidarity.*

We have studied the working of this principle in a rather different connection: the struggle of the nomad with the cultivator, the envy that the nomad feels because of the cultivator's higher standard of life. In the family

the principles of culture-diffusion and of the equalization of culture are clearly exemplified. Both these principles are variants, for specific types of circumstances, of the central principle of the unity of civilization. But there is something more to be said of the unity of civilization within the family. So closely integrated, in thought, will, and feeling are the members of the family group, that we are entitled to posit a principle of social solidarity; and passing back from the family to less clearly integrated groups, to posit in all groups a principle of social solidarity. In the family, the sense for community goes deeper that even the above array of unitive principles would suggest. For in the family, the three factors of creative civilization, Science, Morals, and Religion, are interfused, bringing the unity of civilization to its richest expression in an emergent harmony or concordance. If we locate the good family in the good home, we shall discover at work not only the techniques of science—of physical as well as of medical science ; not only a moral unity and a social solidarity ; but religion also. The good home exhibits a religion of faith in the value of our transitory life. For the home is the meeting-place of the generations, and therefore an open confession to the world that change and loss and death are inescapable. To the parents, the birth of a child is a harbinger of death—the death of the elder generation. Death is the empirical condition upon which human life is made possible. But where there is religion, there is an acceptance of the empirical. Though we die, man lives. Only upon this religious principle will men consent to the rearing of the future generation ; and by consenting, they are reconciled to death.

§ 10. *Any form of group-life yields on inspection the Principles of Civilization.*

We should now be clearer as to the nature of the Principles of Civilization. We do not need to study

history, still less the history of the world in order to discover them. We have merely to look at ourselves—*ourselves as living members of a living civilization. The* principles do not define the human—the human is indefinable—nor do they exhaust all that is implied by the acceptance of our human status ; but they emphasize some of the universal implications of being human. For wherever we find man, we find civilization, and wherever there is civilization, the principles of civilization are at work. I may even choose for study the social group of which I am myself a member : the family, the club, the trade union, the common-room, and any one of the innumerable committees in which members of the bourgeoisie arrange the affairs of mankind. Any one of these groups will yield on inspection all the principles of civilization.

But if I detach myself from every social group and, retiring into the privacy of my study,—the secularized version of the monastic cell—proceed to examine my intellect,—my intellect in its purity and abstractedness and unemployed upon the business of civilization—I shall not discover the principles of science ; if I examine my will in its abstract purity while it is resting from its labours in the cause of civilization, I shall not discover the principles of morals ; and if I examine my subjective states of hope and fear as though they were psychological specimens in a museum, I shall not discover the principles of religion. But the non-empirical philosophers of the study and the cell think otherwise ; and they are in the main line of the philosophic tradition. The non-empirical philosophers forget that they were not born within the half-world, the 'spiritual demi-monde' ; that before they became recluses, they were men—full-blooded members of a living civilization ; that this self of theirs which they scrutinize with introverted intensity and dissect with all the instruments of logic is not, as they imagine, a private self ; it is a public self into which there has been diffused the culture of all the ages. If the recluse is a great man,

he is a representative man : his self represents the Great Self, which is the creative spirit of civilization.

In the previous chapter the sociological function of philosophy was considered, but only in the three principal centres of origin : Greece, China, and India. The role of philosophy in the modern world has not yet been discussed. Descartes is generally acclaimed as the Father of Modern Philosophy ; and his active life coincides with the period of the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). But as it is important to distinguish between the concrete *a priori* of the human situation and the very different *a priori* of the great non-empirical philosophies of the modern epoch, it will be necessary at this point to examine the part played by these philosophies within this latest stage of the historic process. And this examination will be undertaken in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE END OF METAPHYSICS

§ 1. *The empirical and non-empirical traditions in modern philosophy.*

THERE are two traditions in modern philosophy: the empirical and the non-empirical. The empirical tradition is predominantly the English tradition: its great representatives are Hobbes, Locke, and J. S. Mill. And it is not an accident, but in the very nature of things, that their principal interest, like that of the Chinese philosophers, was in political philosophy. Significantly enough, these English philosophers are associated with the revolutionary turning-points of English history: Hobbes with the Civil War of 1642; Locke with the Glorious Revolution of 1688; and J. S. Mill with the Liberal Era inaugurated by the passing of the Reform Bill in 1832.

But the non-empirical tradition is the great tradition in philosophy. Those who are satisfied to live in that tradition call such philosophy the '*philosophia perennis*'; by the choice of this designation they wish to impress upon us that the non-empirical tradition is the essence of philosophy. In modern philosophy the five outstanding figures of the non-empirical tradition are Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel.

The history of these five modern philosophers is of considerable sociological importance; more especially the history of their origins, what they were before they became philosophers. For these philosophers were not born in their studies; they were not suckled—literally

that is—in the universities or scientific academies which in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries had become the secularized equivalents of the monasteries of medieval Catholicism ; in short, they had not always been denizens of the spiritual half-world.

Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel were by birth German Protestants. Germany, we must remember, was the principal place of origin as well as the principal battle-ground, physical as well as theological, of the Protestant Reformation. Descartes was a French Catholic whose adult life coincided with the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648)—that terrible war in which Reformation and Counter-Reformation devastated Germany, retarding to this day the development of her civilization. And Spinoza was a Jew who had broken with the orthodoxy of the synagogue. Spinoza was descended from Spanish Jews who had escaped to Holland from the Inquisition—the Inquisition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries being a political agent of the Counter-Reformation. And because no man, however detached a philosopher he may be, can escape the influences of his origins and his epoch, these five philosophers cannot be appreciated unless they are seen against the background of the conflict between Protestant and Catholic.

The non-empirical tradition in modern philosophy is in the main line of descent from the philosophy of Greece. Modern philosophy has resumed the traditional role of ancient philosophy : it has encouraged the dissociation of religion from the concrete business of life and civilization. In the Hellenistic period, the philosophers led the revolt against the pagan worship of the gods of nature : Zeus, Apollo, and Aphrodite. But the gods of nature were the official gods of the political state ; a revolt against the official gods was, in substance—whatever it may have been in form—a revolt against the state. Religion is the expression of a living faith in a living civilization. But as Stoic, Epicurean, and neo-Platonist had lost their faith in the civilization of their day, they

could no longer subscribe to the official religion. Formally, the pagan philosophers still remained within the purlieus of the official state religion. It was left to the Early Christians to give outward expression to inner dissent. Even that saintly Stoic, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, attended wearily the gladiatorial games, which in their origins had a religious significance. It was not in public that Marcus Aurelius displayed the inner essence of his Stoicism. With Marcus Aurelius, as with the professional philosophers of the Hellenistic epoch, religion became a private matter—a matter for the individual conscience.

§ 2. *The influence of Protestant Individualism upon modern philosophy.*

Like its exemplar in antiquity, modern philosophy is a rebel; the writings of the great modern philosophers have been, in essence, anti-Catholic tracts for the times. For during the four centuries between A.D. 1100 and 1500 the Papacy had been developed into a semi-secular institution; it was the principal authority in the new civilization of medieval Europe. But the men who built cathedrals, painted pictures, founded universities, and evolved the new moral code of chivalry, had achieved too much—too much not to invalidate the negative attitude to life, the semi-Buddhistic attitude of alienation, which was the doctrinal basis of Christianity. Despite the canonical sorrows of this life, cheerfulness had a way of breaking in. The gaunt and sorrowing madonnas of the Byzantine tradition were being displaced by buxom peasant girls rejoicing unashamed in their maternity. But to rejoice in sex is to affirm life. And to affirm life vigorously is to challenge the negativity of the monastic tradition. By the emergence of its basic contradiction—the contradiction that it both affirms life and negates it—Catholic Christendom was split from top to bottom. The revolt started in the German North. In the grim North they preferred the gaunt to the blooming madonnas. The

Protestant Reformers, reinstating the ascetic puritanism of the oldest Catholic tradition, looked upon sex with the soured vision of the unfrocked monk. Protestantism tolerated sex. Sex was a necessary evil under which the Christian suffered, and an evil which he must never translate into a good.

What Protestantism rejected was the synthesis between religion and civilization which medieval Catholicism achieved. And the principal task of the great modern philosophers was to justify this rejection—to justify, that is, the dissociation of religion and civilization. In the Catholic synthesis, science and morals had been intimately associated with the public religion of the Church. But the principal aim of the new philosophers was to put science, morals, and religion upon an individualistic basis. And to prevent the adoption of a purely individualistic standpoint from resulting in an impossible anarchy, these modern Stoics—very much like the ancient Stoics—asserted that in the individual conscience they had discovered the unwritten laws of natural morality; that in the individual understanding they had discovered the unwritten laws of natural science; and that in the individual reason—the spark of Pure Reason in the individual soul—they had discovered the sure foundations of natural religion.

§ 3. *The prestige of mathematics.*

There are, however, important differences between the Old and the New Stoics. The Old Stoics, in common with the philosophers of antiquity, were the forerunners of the Catholic Church. The New Stoics, who are the non-empirical philosophers of the modern world, are the forerunners of the dissenting chapel—the chapel in which the number of the congregation may even be as low as one. And just as the Old Stoics identified the Universal Reason which they had discovered in themselves with the element of fire—the purest, as they believed, of the

natural elements—so the Modern Stoics identified the Universal Reason with logic and the perfect rationality of mathematics.

Descartes and Leibniz were original mathematicians of the highest order. Kant had such a respect for mathematics, and was so impressed by the achievements of Newton, that he devoted a considerable part of his *Critique of Pure Reason* to an analysis of the ultimate principles of geometry and arithmetic. And Spinoza was so convinced that Euclid and Pure Reason were identical that he wrote his great treatise on Ethics in euclidean form, with axioms, postulates, and numbered propositions. Even in this strange dress, something of the fervour of the Old Testament remains. But the Old Testament is concerned with the concrete problems of an historic civilization and not with the super-historical abstractions of a highly rarefied reason. Hegel, alone, had the courage to put mathematics in its place. Hegel, being a child of the Romantic Movement, was inspired to the audacity of introducing the spirit of history into philosophy. But though Hegel despised mathematics, he was sufficiently a prisoner of tradition to set great store by logic, a logic of his own invention, the logic of dialectical change. Because of his sense for history, Hegel is the only one of the five non-empirical philosophers whose thought is still alive to-day : it lives in Marx. But Hegel's logic has not proved a practicable logic of historic change ; it froze too readily into the immobility of Hegel's god, the Absolute. And in the Hegelian system of metaphysics the Absolute is an immovable block, the block universe.

There is a subtle sociological propriety in the choice of mathematics—pure mathematics and logic are ultimately indistinguishable—as the god of Modern Philosophy. For mathematics is the one science of which the whole content could, in theory at least, be invented and elaborated within the seclusion of the scholar's study. And we have already suggested that the modern scholar's

study is a secularized version of the monastic's cell. Every other science, whether it be natural or social, the seeker for knowledge must pursue upon the wide horizons of the world. The seeker for knowledge must observe how men behave; and he must himself participate, practically and imaginatively, in the proper business of civilization. In the science of pure mathematics alone can he find his first principles, his *a priori* foundations, within himself. But this *a priori* of the pure mathematician is worlds apart from the *a priori* of the concrete empiricist. To the man living in the world and not in the quasi-monastic half-world, Man, Nature, and Civilization—the elements, as we have called them, of the human situation—constitute his *a priori*. To the man living in the world and not in the half-world, what comes first is not the logical make-up of his private ego, but society, humanity, civilization. Every creature who was recognizably human must have discovered these as early as the Paleolithic Age. The cave-men knew of them fifty thousand years before Plato sought a refuge in mathematics from the turbulences of Athenian civilization. Plato's Academy is the forerunner of the Catholic monastery; and the Catholic monastery laid the foundations of the modern university. In the half-world of the academy mathematical logic came first and concrete civilization second; there, mathematics was the true *a priori*, the indubitable foundation of all human knowledge; while knowledge of civilization, of restlessly changing civilization, was secondary and inferior knowledge—it was knowledge *a posteriori*. The monastics forgot that before men can think mathematically, they must live practically. In the real world which is not the half-world, civilization comes first; and the principles of civilization are the principles by which men live. In the real world, which is also the historic world, logic and mathematics are very late arrivals. In their origins, logic and mathematics were high-brow diversions of the holiday-making intellect. Only in the modern age have

logic and mathematics become the working tools of the scientific practitioner.

Catholic and feudal medievalism and Græco-Roman paganism are outstanding instances of turbulent and short-lived civilizations, short-lived by comparison with the duration of Ancient Egypt or Ancient China. After a still shorter period of efflorescence, both of the former civilizations passed rapidly into successive phases of decay and disintegration. To the unhappy intellectuals of such epochs, the pure reason of mathematics or of logic provides an ideal asylum. For in the propositions of mathematics there is certainty, universality, immutability. Traditional theology has invested its Transcendent God with the attributes of Truth, Omnipresence, Eternity; and the attributes of its God are the characteristic virtues of mathematics. As God was a mathematician, the mathematician could aspire to be a god. And in this connection it should not be forgotten that modern philosophy, while it is the grandchild of Hellenism, is the child of medieval scholasticism. The scholastics grappled with an impossible task, that of reconciling the abstract universalism and indifference to historic change of the Greek logicians with the concrete historicism of the Catholic Church. Jesus was an historic person as well as a member of a metaphysical Trinity. And the conflict between nominalism and realism which takes up such a large place in scholasticism is an adumbration of the modern conflict between the empirical and the non-empirical traditions of philosophy. Although, broadly speaking, the scholastic philosophers have been apologists for, and the modern philosophers polemists against, Roman Catholicism, yet the joint outcome of their super-historical abstractionism has been the discrediting of the Catholic Church's historic function—the function of creating out of the débris of the Roman Empire a European community culturally united by a common civilization. In the latter half of the nineteenth century the Church exhumed St Thomas Aquinas, appointing him to

the post of philosopher-in-chief. But a non-empirical, and therefore a super-historical philosopher, cannot save an historic institution. In common with the non-empirical philosophers of the modern epoch, St Thomas Aquinas is secretly allied with the Protestant Reformers. For sociology is not to be denied. The non-empirical philosopher is not a house-builder, but a house-breaker; his sociological function is to justify the disintegration of an historic civilization, and to erect upon an individualistic basis temporary asylums for the intellectuals and the 'spirituals' during the painful period of transition from one historic form of civilization to another. Non-empirical philosophy is an interim philosophy.

§ 4. *Kant's Individualism.*

The great tradition, the non-empirical tradition, in European philosophy begins with Plato—or even with the semi-mythical Pythagoras—and culminates in a confused way with Kant: confused, because Kant tried to make concessions to the empirical school, of which Locke and Hume were the leading representatives. The ambition of this long roll of non-empirical philosophers was to divorce morals, science, and religion from their intimate union with concrete civilization, to take them up into the rarefied atmosphere of pure reason, and petrify them there into immovable statues of the Absolute.

Kant proposed to emancipate morality from the hateful jurisdiction of kings and priests by making the 'pure' will of the lonely individual—the will in all its abstractness and formality—the final arbiter of right and wrong. Kant declared that only such acts as all human beings, in all circumstances, and at all times, could perform, were indubitably right. But are there any such acts? The act of adding 7 to 5 and equating the total to 12 is one that all human beings in all circumstances and at all times can perform and perform correctly. But was it true that the principles of mathematics were of the same type

as the principles of morals? Hegel, the first of the great philosophers to have a mind for history and for empirical civilization, was a devastating critic of Kant's principles of morals. We can safely leave Kant's ethics in Hegel's competent hands. Philosophers are individualists and individualists do not love one another.

There would no doubt be advantages in making morals as certain, as easy, and as unchangeable as the propositions of arithmetic; but there would be some disadvantages. Why should we cast into rigid bronze the form of our social relations? To men living fearlessly in the great world and following with the sympathetic imagination of the historian the ever-changing life of human societies—a life that the historian can now trace for us from the Neolithic to the most modern age of electricity and oil—the demand for a rigid immobile ethic will appear, not as a mark of moral strength, but as a sure sign of moral weakness. If we must have an abstract maxim of morality, there is only one which is even plausibly true, and it is: Behave like a human being. But like all abstract principles, this, too, is empty; it tells us nothing; it is as empty and bloodless as a ghost. For every society and every civilization redefines perennially what it is that we are to understand by the quality 'human'. Our human qualities, the characteristics that distinguish the essential part of our humanity, are not given once and for all time. We discover our humanity as we create it, and as it is created in us by the humanity of our fellows. Only men who have lost their nerve as well as their love of life would attempt the vain task of assimilating the principles of morals to the principles of mathematics. For all time, the number 'two' is the smallest of the even numbers. But no single act that Plato or Kant or Buddha or Christ approved of, is for all time the most righteous of human acts.

We have called morals 'an avatar of human creativity'. How shall we characterize a moral society? A moral society is one in which there is unity and solidarity and a

steady movement towards the diffusion and equalization of culture. A moral society exhibits unity ; but it also exhibits creativity. In a moral society there is a reshaping as well as an ordering of human relations. The non-empirical philosophies exalt the static and deprecate the dynamic in the moral order of societies ; they are infected by an almost morbid fear of change ; change, they believe, can only be for the worse.

§ 5. *The Quest for Certainty and the misunderstanding of science.*

Natural science is another avatar of human creativity. If, in the matter of science, we scrutinize the attitude of the non-empirical philosophers, we shall again find a strong tendency to divorce natural science from its intimate union with the concrete life of civilization. This tendency is more marked in Plato than in Kant ; and it may even seem an unjust animadversion upon Descartes and Leibniz, when we recall their great discoveries in mathematics. It is certainly true that without the analytical geometry of Descartes and the differential calculus of Leibniz, modern physics would have been impossible. To the massive intellects of Descartes and of Leibniz we are indebted for the invention of these powerful mathematical tools ; but they are powerful as tools, not as revelations of the true nature of physical science. Besides, the possession of extraordinary intellectual powers is notoriously compatible with intellectual extravagance. The very possession of these powers makes it more difficult for the intellectual to maintain a salutary intercourse with the common run of mankind, so that to the eccentricity of the recluse there is added the eccentricity of genius. The giant intellect of Sir Isaac Newton did not save him from the extravagances of his theological treatise on the prophecies of the Book of Daniel—a book that we know, but Newton did not, to have been composed four centuries after the events it pretends to describe. We are, therefore, justified in saying that even in physics,

which of all the branches of natural science provides the most fruitful field for the application of the tools of mathematics, the quest for certainty, inspired as it has always been by the non-empirical philosophers, has had unfortunate consequences. Newton's law of gravitation is a case in point. To a high degree of approximation, experience showed that the law worked ; in some sense it was therefore true. How was its truth to be accounted for ? Kant attempted an answer to this question. Almost exactly a century after the enunciation of the law in Newton's *Principia* (published in 1688), Kant maintained that Newton's laws of motion could be deduced from the abstract properties of space and time. Experiment could be dispensed with. Experiment was a mark of intellectual weakness and inadequacy. With adequate insight the philosopher in his study could deduce the law of gravitation and indeed all the laws of motion from purely *a priori* principles. On this view there was ultimately no essential difference between a proposition of pure mathematics and a proposition of physics or mechanics. Perhaps we ought not to expect non-empirical philosophers to show sympathy for, or understanding of, experiment ; ' empirical ' is the Greek and ' experimental ' is the Latin for the same kind of experience, one obtained by trial and error. We must recognize that, from Plato to Kant and from Kant to our own day, the failure of the non-empirical philosophers to understand the experimental basis of science has had many unfortunate consequences ; not the least unfortunate has been the widening of the social cleavage between the workers by hand and the workers by brain.

That natural science is not only the foundation of technology, but is itself founded upon technology, are statements that all the non-empiricists would deny. That astronomy is founded upon such techniques as those of the navigator ; biology upon those of the farmer ; chemistry and physics upon the techniques of the craftsman and the metal-worker—although nothing is more

certain to anyone acquainted with the concrete history of civilization—is, nevertheless, a point of view which the non-empiricists would have scorned. We know that Socrates was not uninterested in the doings of Athenian craftsmen ; but to Plato and Aristotle the craftsman was little more than an animated tool. To the Greeks mathematics was divine, but applied mathematics was plebeian ; the truths of geometry must be contemplated but not used ; navigators and carpenters, in using geometry, debased it. The social and cultural snobbery of Plato, the Biblical doctrine that labour was a curse put upon the sons of Adam for their sins, and the residual monasticism of the universities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, all combined to obscure the intimate relation between ' pure ' science and technology, and to encourage a philosophy of science that based itself upon the abstractive *a priori* of mathematics and not upon experiment and technology.

The success of a scientific technique depends upon the possibility of isolating a patch of nature, and then of applying to that patch an ordered series of physical operations. But no patch of nature can be completely isolated from the other patches. All such isolates live an adventuresome, sometimes even a precarious, existence. And therefore no technique—just because it is based upon the relative isolation of the isolates—can be infallible. At some point, every technique breaks down. But to the engineer, the medical man, the bio-chemist, fallibility is a mental and moral stimulus ; whereas to the non-empirical philosopher in his semi-monastic study fallibility is an intellectual crime. The non-empirical philosopher does not want life, he wants certainty, and he finds certainty in mathematics and in death.

Religion is another of the Avatars of Creativity. It has already been suggested that if religion is to be accounted a working principle of civilization, then it is best to regard it as the Principle of the Acceptance of the Empirical. And as human life is always experimental

and precarious, this principle is equivalent to a declaration of 'faith in civilization'. From the remotest antiquity, faith in civilization is what religion has ever been; it has been the religion of the clan, the tribe, the empire. It was only with the advent of the non-empirical philosophies, and the subsequent advent of the universal churches, that religion became, if anything, 'unfaith in civilization'. As we have seen, the transition from faith to unfaith is to be explained by the attitude to life of the philosophies and the churches: the philosophies inaugurate and the churches systematize a new temper of alienation from the state and the world. We have drawn attention to the strong Protestant bias of the great modern metaphysicians; and to the fact that one of their aims has been to divorce religion from the churches, and, in the spirit of ancient Stoicism, to make it an affair of the individual conscience. So successful, on the whole, have these efforts been that before the Romantic Reaction in the first third of the nineteenth century, it was taken as a matter of course upon the Continent (and to a lesser extent in England) that a man of some culture and enlightenment will have broken completely with denominational religion, whether Christian, Jewish, or Mohammedan. But though some traces of the Romantic Reaction can still be detected—literary rebels against our machine age have spasmodically renewed it—yet, as a strong influence upon the age, it was short-lived. The Romantic Reaction was swallowed up in the mid-Victorian triumph of technology. And the triumph of technology was so widespread, because of the still more impressive triumph of its capitalist backers.

But though the bias of the modern non-empirical philosophies towards a Protestant and neo-Stoic individualism has been a contributory cause of the disintegration of the Christian Churches, it must be remembered that the churches are communities, and that the 'community spirit' is the point at which even a church alienated from the world has contact with society and

civilization. As we have already seen, the Protestant revolt against the Renaissance form of the Catholic synthesis reinstated the innate negativity of Catholicism, substituting puritan for monastic asceticism, and an abstract rationalism based upon mathematics and the philosophy of Plato for an equally abstract rationalism based upon Scholasticism and the philosophy of Aristotle.

Now if we look at religion in the writings of the five representative metaphysicians of the modern epoch, the last thing we shall find is the 'principle of the acceptance of the empirical'. The metaphysicians do not accept the empirical, they escape from it. Descartes and Leibniz, the two original mathematicians amongst the five philosophers, have supplied 'proofs of the existence of God', as though the proposition 'God exists' was of precisely the same type as the proposition, 'the angle-sum of a triangle amounts to two right angles'. Of this we can be certain, that, when the church-epoch and the metaphysics-epoch have been dissolved into the epoch of the universal commonwealth, and mankind has returned again to its ancient faith in civilization, the attempts of Descartes and Leibniz, two of the greatest intellects of the age—perhaps of any age—to 'prove' the existence of God will be regarded as one of the curious eccentricities of human reason.

§ 6. *The historical element in religion.*

Spinoza, though a child of the synagogue, had no understanding of the historic basis of Judaism. He lived towards the end of the seventeenth century, one of the least historically-minded of the centuries. To Spinoza Judaism was not a faith in a distinctive civilization, but at best a highly abstract doctrine of the unity of God. Having been thrust out of the synagogue, he was obliged to build up with his own hands a fresh habitation for his soul. Spinoza identified God with the Universe. The Universe, he declared, was a single substance whose inner

structure had the logical coherence, the intellectual perfection of euclidean geometry. This single substance was known to us under two of its qualities, the material and the mental. These qualities were attributes of God. Spinoza's God resembles the God of the Stoics ; they, too, identify God with the Universe ; and the Universe, to them, was at once mental and material, pure reason and pure fire. The Way of Salvation to which Spinoza points is also the Way of the Stoics : let the individual identify himself with the universe, remembering that his body is part of God's body and his mind part of God's mind. By pursuing the Way of Salvation, the individual is redeemed from out the world of time and change, from all the evils of an imperfect civilization. Spinozism and Stoicism and Brahmanism are pantheistic systems ; and in all such systems there can be heard the lulling music of Nirvana. All the pantheistic systems strike a Buddhistic note, and it is this note which explains the attraction that Spinoza had for Goethe and the dissatisfied intellectuals of young Germany. Intellectuals, while ready to enjoy the amenities of civilization, are reluctant to make sacrifices on its behalf. They fall readily into a mood in which civilization appears to them as a too costly, a too difficult, form of human life. In that mood anyone announcing that he has lodgings to let in a private retreat of his own will be hailed as a saviour.

We have still to review the religious philosophy of Kant and of Hegel. Kant, criticizing incisively all the so-called ' proofs ' of the existence of God, demonstrated for all time their intrinsic absurdity. Of course, from an empirical standpoint, the absurdity is too patent to need demonstration. How can a human being whose very existence as a human being presupposes the existence of many other human beings, the existence of society, of environing nature and of a process of civilization which is as old as the human species—how can such a human being, retiring into his scholar's study or his monastic's cell, and pretending to divest himself of every tradition,

every scrap of acquired culture, proceed to evolve the universe—or the one God who is the maker and ruler of the universe—entirely out of his inner consciousness by the same method as the mathematician might evolve the properties of the number one ?

Kant, as we have seen, confused his philosophy of science by making concessions to the empiricist standpoint. Kant made a still more significant concession to empiricism by deriving religion from morals. But he was too close a prisoner of the metaphysical tradition, too deeply embedded in the pietism of his Protestant upbringing, to take the further step of associating morals with society and society with civilization. Kant's God is the guarantor of the Kantian morality. In another world the Kantian God will bestow upon immortal souls that happiness—in other words, those amenities of concrete civilization—which they have sacrificed on earth by practising the rigorous puritanism and the ascetic individualism of the Kantian ethics.

Hegel is the last of the five great metaphysicians whose attitude to religion we have to scrutinize. Hegel is the only one of the five to introduce the spirit of history into philosophy, and therefore, even to-day, there is still some life in Hegel's philosophy. But Hegel's God, like Spinoza's God, is the universe, the all-logical universe. And in the totality of the universe all distinctions vanish : change and permanence, past and present, good and bad, ruler and subject, Hellenism and Christianity, democracy and tyranny. It is the central contradiction of Hegel's philosophy that while the Spirit of History changes all things, the Spirit of the Absolute changes nothing. The metaphysician in Hegel swallows up the empiricist ; the super-historical metaphysician in him is stronger than the empiricist—even if the empiricist has, as Hegel had, a flair for history. Besides, if all changes are ultimately of no account, why weary oneself by changing anything ? And therefore Hegel's Absolute puts on the uniform of an obscurantist, of a Prussian policeman safeguarding the

status quo. There may be logic of a sort, perhaps even a logicist mysticism in Hegel's philosophy, but there is very little that amounts to religious feeling. Those modern apologists for Christianity who hoped to shore up Christianity with the help of Hegelianism, have discovered their mistake. For the essence of religion is faith, and the provocation to faith is uncertainty: the dangers and hazards of human life. But Hegel claims for his system the high-water mark of certainty, the certainty of a logical system. In Hegel's logically perfect and logically coherent Absolute—or what he regards as such—there is no room for uncertainty, and therefore no room for life and religion. When the universe is reduced to a single principle—and that is the claim of the Absolute—human life suffocates. Single-principledness is like single-blessedness, it is sterile, and its end is death.

§ 7. *The representative minds of the Modern Epoch.*

We have completed our review of the five master metaphysicians of the modern epoch. In science, in morals and in religion, the broad outcome of their intellectual labours has been to widen the gap between thought and life, between philosophy and civilization. That gap has been widened despite the great services of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant to science, of Spinoza to Biblical criticism, and of Hegel to the study of history; and despite the relatively favourable situation of the modern as compared with the ancient metaphysicians. The Ancient Stoics, who lived through the decay of the Græco-Roman civilization, could not conceive of an equal to it, still less of a superior substitute. And their pessimism was almost justified by the sequel, the relapse into the barbarism of the Dark Ages. So that in building places of refuge for distressed souls, the ancient metaphysicians were assisting in the salvage of a great civilization. But the modern metaphysicians were more fortunately situated. Though distresses were abundant—the wars of

religion contributed not a little to their number—yet the break-up of Feudalism and the disintegration of medieval Catholicism did not engender a despair comparable with the despair of the Ancient World. The age of Luther was the age of the discovery of America and of the re-discovery of Classical Antiquity. Within forty years of the close of the Thirty Years' War, when Reformation and Counter-reformation signed a truce of exhaustion, Newton crowned the experiments of Galileo and fulfilled the empiricist hopes of Francis Bacon by his epoch-making discoveries in physics. The metaphysics of an age of hope has a different orientation from the metaphysics of an age of despair. Despair is the sustaining food of metaphysics. Hope—the hope that changes will mean progress and not loss—interpolates the experimental outlook into metaphysics, transforming it insensibly from an abstract theory of the universe into an analysis of the successful hypotheses, upon which the techniques of the special sciences have been built. But there is a time-lag in culture ; different elements of culture change at different rates. Religion above other cultural element changes slowly. The negative attitude to life and civilization, which is the traditional attitude of the Christian Churches, has persisted into the modern epoch ; and has persisted even more markedly in individualistic Protestantism and in the metaphysical systems of the great modern philosophies with their Protestant bias. But in its main features the modern age is an experimental and not a metaphysical age. That up to the time of Hegel the greatest intellects should have been more deeply engaged in metaphysics than in science is an instance of the culture-lag. On a wide survey we must conclude that our five modern metaphysicians are not truly representative of the modern age. For our modern age, Galileo is more important than Descartes, Newton than Leibniz, Einstein than Spinoza, Adam Smith than Kant, and Marx than Hegel.

§ 8. *Non-Euclidean Geometry and the refutation of metaphysics.*

Hegel is the last of the great metaphysicians. Very shortly after his death in 1831 metaphysics passed under a cloud from which it has never emerged. Within a little more than a decade of Hegel's death arose the young Hegelians, of whom the most prominent were David Strauss, the famous author of the first critical history of Jesus, and Karl Marx, the first sociologist to introduce into philosophy, not Hegel's spurious and abstract, but the real and concrete spirit of history. Culture-lag explains the survival of metaphysics ; and the unfavourable atmosphere of our experimental and scientific age explains its eclipse. But there is a supplementary cause for the eclipse of metaphysics which is of the greatest importance. This cause began to operate from the very year in which Hegel died, though its full consequences were not realized until the twentieth century. This supplementary cause was the discovery of non-euclidean geometry. It has not often been noticed that the year in which Hegel died was also the year in which the great mathematician Gauss turned his attention to non-euclidean geometry and that almost simultaneously—the Zeitgeist was evidently at work—Lobatschewsky and Bolyai were independently successful in constructing systems of non-euclidean geometry.

To the non-mathematical readers of this chapter, and even to some of the mathematically learned, non-euclidean geometry will not at first sight look like a very formidable hound amongst the pack of influences that have combined to bring down the ancient stag of metaphysics. But a great deal more is involved than a merely technical advance in one branch of mathematics. The reader is at liberty to skip the concluding pages of this chapter and proceed to the next ; nevertheless, I hope he will not be deterred by the frightening sound of non-euclidean geometry and will read to the end.

Spinoza, as we have already mentioned, arranged his great work on Ethics in the style of a book of Euclid's geometry ; and a favourite dictum of Spinoza's is : This is as necessary as that the angle-sum of a triangle should amount to two right angles. Well, it is no longer necessary for the angle-sum to amount to two right angles ; it may be more or less. If we assume, as Euclid does, that through the vertex of a triangle only one line can be drawn parallel to the base, then the angle-sum will be two right angles. If we do not make this assumption—and we are not obliged to make it—the angle-sum will not be two right angles. But which of the assumptions about parallel lines is true, that of Euclid or of the non-euclidean geometers ? No one can say—as long as he remains in his study or his cell, and merely contemplates the working of his mind. To find out, I must experiment upon the shapes and figures of the material world ; and the best lump of matter to start on is my own body. I must do what the child does when it explores the material constitution and the spatial relations of the external world. I must touch and look ; I must move my limbs, rotate my body ; I must get the feeling of balance by working my circular canals ; and the feeling of symmetry by working simultaneously my two eyes, two ears, and two hands. What the child begins, the adult surveyor and astronomer develop ; the instruments they use are improved and regulated extensions of the child's hands and eyes. The child is an experimenter upon the material world ; so is the surveyor and the astronomer. Only by experiment can anyone discern which hypothesis —the euclidean or the non-euclidean—fits the facts best. Without non-euclidean geometry, Einstein's discoveries would have been impossible. Einstein assumes that if we insert a piece of matter, say a cannon-ball, into a room, we alter the type of space that fills the room. Einstein's assumption is justified because it works. And there is no other test of its validity. Euclid's assumption also works, but only in an empty space ; and as long as a human

observer remains in the flesh, no space observed by him can be completely empty.

To come to the conclusion of the whole matter : the pure geometry of the pure mathematician tells us nothing about the spatial structure of the external world ; it tells us only that if we make certain assumptions, we shall reap certain consequences. Euclidean geometry, like non-euclidean geometry, or like every other branch of mathematics, is just an exercise in logic and nothing more. If all men must die, and if I am a man, then I too must die. But this, like any other proposition of pure mathematics, or pure logic, tells us nothing I did not know before. What I am burning to know is this : whether, like Enoch and Elijah, I may be translated from this world, without suffering the common lot of death. And logic cannot quench my thirst for that kind of knowledge. Logic tells me, in a logically equivalent form, what I knew already. Logic, in common with every branch of pure mathematics, is a tautology : it repeats the same proposition in an equivalent form—if possible, a conveniently equivalent form. It is the convenience of the equivalence which makes mathematics useful. If I want to multiply 103 by 97, it is convenient to replace 103 by (100+3), 97 by (100−3) and using the tautology which asserts that the sum of two numbers multiplied by their difference is the equivalent of the difference of their squares, I know that the answer to my sum will be obtained by squaring 100 and subtracting the square of 3. In short, pure geometry tells me nothing about space, just as pure logic tells me nothing about death. Pure geometry is pure logic and pure logic is pure tautology. Logic has its uses, its very limited uses. For throughout the course of the day we make many assertions, and we do not always know what is implied by them all. What logic can do for us is to clarify the net resultant of our assertions to the useful end that some of our assertions have to be abandoned ; for without hopeless contradiction we cannot assert them all. Logic explains to us what

it is that we have said, but it never tells us whether what we have said is true.

Logic has been the dictator of the philosophical world and now the dictator is laid low. Everyone knows that in its Aristotelian form logic in the medieval period was the unquestioned dictator not only of Christian theology, but of Jewish and Islamic as well. And now, in the twentieth century, a new race of mathematical logicians has demonstrated that Aristotelian logic has not even the relative utility of mathematics. Mathematics does at least manufacture tautologies of value, but the tautologies of Aristotelian logic are like those of the threadbare syllogism about Socrates and death. This syllogism does not tell us whether we must die, nor with mathematical artistry does it equate death to a beautiful equivalence. The dictatorship of logic has been laid low. The dictator has been reduced to an accounting clerk, sending us invoices with a reminder of the many assertions we have made and suggesting that we settle up before making any more. When the state is politically troubled, a dictator is appointed because men value security above liberty. And when a civilization is in decay and men have lost their faith in life, they place certainty above adventure. Certainty is a pillow for the fatigued. When Rome fell to the Goths in A.D. 410 St Augustine found rest for his troubled heart in God. St Augustine was a representative man. In the fifth century fatigue was not uncommon in the West.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

§ 1. *The constants of human behaviour.*

BY inspecting any social group within its physical environment and at any one point of time, we discover the Principles of Civilization : that has been the thesis of Chapter III. We said that where there are human beings, there is a society ; and wherever there is a society, there is civilization. We can recognize a human being when we see one, and we can distinguish between a human being and a thing. But we do so spontaneously, and independently of the metaphysics of mind and matter. The basis of all reflection upon the world is ' the human situation ' ; and the three elements that can be detected in that situation are : Man, Nature, and the Civilizational Process. In thinking about the world we cannot leave ourselves out ; and in thinking about ourselves, we cannot leave out our physical bodies, and the physical things other than our bodies that constitute our physical environment ; and all thinking is impossible, seeing that it demands a socially intelligible language, unless we presuppose the existence of the civilizational process.

What we are, what the world is, and why the intercourse between us and the world takes the form of the civilizational process are questions impossible to answer. To explain is to substitute the better known for the less well known, the simple for the complex. But it is a fallacy to believe that everything can be explained, including the premises we start from. The starting-point of all reflec-

tion about the world is, in our view, the three elements of the human situation. If, therefore, we attempt an analysis of the physical world, ignoring the human mind, or attempt an analysis of the human mind, ignoring the physical world, we shall achieve nothing. Traditional metaphysics thinks otherwise : it believes that by introspection and analysis it is possible to arrive at the first principles of mind or spirit. For us, the three elements of the human situation come first : our *a priori* is, therefore, empirical and not metaphysical. It will be remembered that Chapter IV distinguished between the empirical *a priori* of the human situation and the non-empirical *a priori* of metaphysics.

Man remains man throughout the ages. The ape-ancestor of man was not yet man ; and if man should have an angel-posterity, posterity will be angelic and no longer man. All men are civilized because they are members of a creative society. And every society is creative because the civilization of which it is the carrier is a process and not a thing. Civilization is communicated and diffused : the parents teach the children, and one tribe tutors another. But communication is not a mechanical act of sending and receiving. Learning resembles eating ; what is taken up into the self must be inwardly digested and transformed. The learner must be a creator ; he must transubstantiate his spiritual food into the living tissues of his mind. If a human being is completely devoid of creativity, he is an imbecile, an empty shell of a man. To be human is to be capable of civilization, and even in some degree to be capable of any and every form of civilization.

We have also maintained that whenever we inspect a human group engaged upon the business of civilization, we discover the three standard forms of creativity. For every member of such a group is a scientist-technician, reacting to the physical world in accordance with a technique transmitted through the social heritage and creatively reinterpreted. And every member is a moral

agent, reacting to his fellows in accordance with a prescribed technique of social behaviour. No moral law, however ample in its casuistry, can anticipate life's ever-changing situations. To be moral, the moral agent must also be creative ; he must be a part-creator as well as a conservator of an already existing civilization. Lastly, no human being can face the risks of creativity unless he is religious. Seeing that civilization is a process and not a finished fact, this civilizational activity, while it can be imaged in advance, can never be guaranteed as to its outcome. Every technique may fail. Nature and our fellow men may both rebel against the regularities we expect of them. Without religion we should be unnerved before we had even ventured, and unless we have the hardihood to venture we cannot act. The religious man is creative both in thought and will ; he assesses the dangers of the situation, and then nerves his will-to-live, his will-to-civilization. The religious man, accepting the empirical conditions of his time-ridden existence, elects to live neither as an animal nor as a god, but as a human being.

Scientific, moral, and religious types of behaviour are the characterizing properties of all members of the human species. The truth of the science or the goodness of the morals or the loftiness of the religion are important, but not in this context. Again, every human being is a centre for the reception, creation, and diffusion of civilization. Wherever we find civilization, the principles of civilization will be operating. The principles are independent of history because they are discoverable at every point of history. The principles of civilization are the constants, the events of history the variables of the civilizational process. This does not mean that primitive peoples are aware that such constants or principles exist. Primitives educated their children without knowing that they were distributors of culture ; and they impose upon their children customary standards of behaviour without invoking the concept of morality. The principles of

civilization are independent of history, but without the help of the historical records we should never have become conscious of their existence.

Ecclesiastes was no doubt thinking of the principles of civilization when he declared that there was nothing new under the sun. Civilization is not new. It is as old as man and it will die when he dies. And the sun is not new, despite the fact that according to the physicists a new and smaller sun is reborn every day. For by the time there is a recognizable difference in the sun as we know it, the earth will have become uninhabitable, and cognition as well as recognition will have ceased. 'Of making many books there is no end.' Ecclesiastes was wearied with the persistency of the word, the spoken and the written word. Words are nothing new. When the first word was uttered, the light of civilization broke in upon the earth. When the last word has been uttered, the civilizational process will be swallowed up in night.

§ 2. *How history is possible.*

The constants or principles of civilization are the sustaining bread of human life. The spice of life is supplied by the variables or the changing content of civilization. This changing content is the substance of history, and the problem we have now to pose is the interpretation of history.

We begin by inquiring how history is possible. How is it that I can make intelligible to myself the career of a soldier such as Julius Cæsar, or of a prophet such as Jeremiah, or of a Pharaoh such as Ikhnaton; or, to go back further still to the epochs before the invention of writing, how is it that I can make intelligible to myself the lives of men whose hunting feats are celebrated in their cave drawings? All I have to go on is a piece of writing or an inscription on a stone, some physical fact connected by devious ways, often of extraordinary complexity, with a person whose life I am interpreting. But

if I receive a letter from someone whom I have never met, or if I inspect a furnished room in the absence of its inmates, or if I scrutinize the faces of my fellow-passengers in a tramcar, how do I succeed in passing from the physical facts confronting me to the human beings which the facts represent? It is certainly strange that I can have intercourse with the dead and the absent and the silent. But, in truth, the intercourse by way of speech with the living is just as remarkable. Here is a human being differing from me in education and experience, differing in temperament and occupation, differing in nationality and religion, and yet we succeed in understanding one another. How we do so is ultimately inexplicable. That we do so is a fact, an empirical and *a priori* fact of our existence. This fact and the principle underlying it is the principle of the unity of civilization.

It is the unity of civilization which makes history possible. We succeed in understanding the cave-man, the Hebrew prophet, or the Roman emperor, because we and they are members of a single civilization.

History, then, is possible because the historian is a human being recording and interpreting the behaviour of fellow human beings. What we all, as members of society, do perennially and half unconsciously and in miniature, the historian does of set purpose and on a grand scale. We are all of us historians, recording and interpreting, in memory if not on paper, the behaviour of our parents, our children, our colleagues, our politicians, and our celebrities. The anecdotist, the writer of memoirs, the autobiographer are historians in miniature. And the world historian who is the biographer of civilization and the chronicler of the whole human adventure is not different fundamentally from a parent recalling fondly an incident in the boyhood of his son. The professional historian is a public recorder and a public interpreter of the behaviour of his fellows, most of them distant from him in space and time and aggregated in millions. He has therefore developed a tested technique : a critical

attitude towards his facts and a standard of judgment in the weighing of evidence, together with methods of selection, compression, and organization of his material. In essence, the activity of the professional historian is not different from that of the amateur: and we are all of us amateur historians. Where we differ from one another is not in our professional or amateur status, but in the degree of our insight. The good historian is a good philosopher; he penetrates to some depth into the lives of his fellow men.

§ 3. *Patterns or no-patterns in history.*

But what can insight yield? Are there laws of history, and can a scientific sociology uncover them? Or is the sceptic right when he asserts that history falls into no recognizable pattern and that the accurate reporting of large events is the sole function of the historian? Theists, in virtue of their faith, are interpreters of history. Theists are not sceptics. They do indeed believe that history has a meaning, but that we must look for this meaning not inside but outside the series of historical events. We must contemplate the eternal world if we would explain the temporal; and without a revelation from the transcendent world we can discover nothing except the futility of this world. In popular Christian theism the first term of the historical series was a human act of original sin and the last term will be a divine act of judgment. On this view the events themselves—all that mankind has achieved and experienced throughout the centuries—are strictly meaningless. Only sin and judgment, the first and last members of the temporal series, have any significance.

The pantheist regards time itself as illusory, and if time, therefore history. For pantheism is even more negative than theism. To the pantheist, beginnings and endings are as meaningless as the events separating them. We appear in time, and in accordance with the doctrine

of reincarnation, so intimately associated with the oriental form of pantheism, we reappear in time—but only in order that we may learn the bitter and yet saving truth of time's unreality. A European compromise with pantheism is the doctrine of eternal recurrence : history is a revolving cylinder on whose finite surface are incised all the events that have been and shall be.

As large-scale history is principally concerned with the life of societies and of individuals who have been prominent in fashioning them, it might be thought that we ought to look to sociology to uncover for us the major patterns of the historic process. But sociology is not yet a science, and there is a poor prospect of its ever becoming one. The problem of the status of a possible science of sociology is important, and we shall take it up again at the end of this chapter. An allied problem is that of the distinction between the science and the philosophy of history.

We are in search, then, of an interpretation of history which shall not in Hindu fashion dismiss history as illusory, nor in Christian fashion invoke other worlds than our own. If, as we have suggested, we are all of us historians, differing from one another only in the quality of our insight, then there are as many interpretations possible of world history as there are historians. The historian is an artist and history writing is an art. What we demand of a work of art is that it shall be significant. The same subject can be treated in a variety of ways. The volumes, masses, lines of force of a picture—the pattern in short—may be varied, but the pattern must express the significance of the subject.

But it will be said that the analogy is false : the artist is a licensee of the creative imagination, the historian is tied to the facts. An occurrence is a fact ; it is not a toy of the imagination. We grant this objection. But are not the trees, the grass, and the light of a landscape facts ? There are no rigid boundaries between facts and the creative interpretation of facts. The boundary is

drawn differently in painting, in historical writing, and in the historical romance. But surely, it will be said, the historian like the scientist is concerned with truth, whereas the artist aims at beauty. The scientist does indeed aim at truth, but it is truth in action—pragmatic truth.

The scientist is primarily a technologist. He invents techniques for changing and controlling nature ; and he is besides a universal technologist, that is, he aims at establishing such technical procedures as everyone can adopt. If, for instance, it is a question of driving or repairing a motor-car, the technologist frames a set of rules of procedure which will be the same for a Nazi or a Jew, an American or a Russian, a woman or a man. And the science of the technologist can claim to be true to the extent that the technique inspired by the science produces the results anticipated.

The scientist effects changes because he works in the present. But the historian works upon the past, and the past is unchangeable. The historian cannot frame rules for changing the past. All that he can do with the past is to understand it. And why should there be only one way of understanding the past ? The past of the human race is also my past. I do not stand outside this past, examining it with the detachment of a physicist who is experimenting upon a patch of nature external to himself. Civilization is a unity. When I turn over the pages of human history I discover my own self, myself in an endless masquerade.

§ 4. *The four stages of man's self-discovery.*

Seeing that there are many possible interpretations of history, we are entitled to advance our own. In fact we have already done so. The reader will remember that in Chapters I and II we ventured to impose a pattern upon the historic process, describing this process as moving from the clan to the state, from the state to the church, and from the church to the universal common-

wealth. These four institutions we regarded as the vehicles of the historic process.

What is essentially the same interpretation can be laid out in a different pattern, by attending not to institutions, but to the mental activities underlying them. Environed by nature and by their fellows, men make their own history, and in the process of making it they become clearer about themselves and about their status in the world. The meaning of history is man's discovery of himself. History is the history of civilization, and, throughout the civilizational process, man remains man. What changes is man's estimate of himself. In the human situation the individual is environed by nature and society. It is true that the individual's relations with nature have changed with the development of technology. But these relations have usually changed too slowly to make him aware of them. In this respect our own machine-epoch is exceptional. Egypt, Persia, Greece, and Rome grasped in turn the hegemony of the Near East without experiencing any considerable change in their economy, or in their ways of extracting a living from nature. Societies and institutions have changed—often they have changed violently and catastrophically—and the individual living in these societies and under these institutions has been forced into awareness of them and of himself.

It is therefore possible to organize an interpretation of history, which shall be pivoted on man's awareness and discovery of his human quality. The history of civilization will then be divisible into four epochs. In the first, which is the epoch of the clan and of animistic religion, the umbilical cord uniting man to nature has not yet been severed. The powers of nature are the fathers and mothers of the clan ; they are united to the clan by the animistic principle of transcendental fellowship. The gods of nature are clansmen, and the solidarity of clansmen is beyond question. Self-awareness is the child of conflict. As long as men do not feel themselves in violent opposition to nature or to one another, they remain at the stage of

paradisaical innocence, unconscious of themselves and of their precarious nakedness before the forces of the world.

The second epoch is the epoch of the state, of urban civilization and of national gods. This second epoch is the first great age of human self-assertion. Egypt and Sumer, Assyria and Persia, Greece and Rome have all learned how to differentiate between man and nature. Nature is now domesticated and bridled, the bit of technology is put between her teeth. The animism of the earlier epoch survives, it is true, into the later, but it is no longer the dominant type of religion. The nominal object of worship may be a god presiding over some department of nature, but the real object is the nation-group itself, summed up perhaps in its theocratic king. Large-scale urban civilization is now possible, not only because men have learned how to control nature, but, what is more important, how to govern and exploit the foreigner. Foreigners stand outside the clan. Not being blood relations they have no rights. If they are allowed to live, it is by the permission and in the interest of their conquerors.

It is in this epoch, then, that man makes his first great discoveries about himself, his own nature, his powers, and his status in the world. In this epoch man discovers his intelligence, the most splendid and most elusive of all his gifts. Intelligence is the great technologist. Intelligence discovers the techniques for governing and exploiting nature, and the still more significant techniques peculiar to government and administration—the techniques by which dominant groups govern and exploit subjected groups. This is the epoch of buoyant self-assertion. National groups are in an expansive mood. They have measured themselves against their human and non-human enemies and have emerged victorious.

In this second epoch man transcends the perceptual limits of the clan. The clan is something which can be seen, the nation is something which must be thought. Some degree of abstract thought is indispensable for the

construction of a centralized government and an administrative machine, controlling the work and status of innumerable individuals and distributing creative power throughout the complex arts of urban civilization. Man discovers his possibilities. He lights upon the miracle of his creativity. Egypt and Babylon and Crete, the earliest of the urban civilizations, are also the earliest masterpieces of man's creative art, the art of social synthesis. For civilization embraces all the arts and all the sciences. Civilization is the whole art of living.

But what has been created can also be destroyed. To enlarge life is to multiply the occasions for death. The complex urban civilizations are more vulnerable, more liable to breakdown and disintegration, than were the primitive clans out of which they grew. In natural history the unicellular organisms often survive when the more complex organisms perish. Within less than a thousand years, Crete and Egypt, Babylon and Assyria, Israel and Athens, the most notable of the urban civilizations of the Near East, were forced to taste the bitterness of death. The death of individuals passes almost unnoticed amongst primitive peoples. The individual dies, the group continues. What is unimaginable to primitives is the death of the group. But this experience of collective dying, unimaginable to the primitives, was reserved for the ancient nation-states of the Near East. It is because of this shattering experience—an experience invalidating all the assumptions on which the morality and religion of groups were based—that churches first came into existence.

In the first and second epochs, the individual died and the group remained. In the third epoch, the group perishes and the individual survives. For the first time in world history, the individual becomes fully conscious of himself. Whereas in the earlier epochs he took for granted the life and immortality of the group, he is now confronted by the problem of his own purpose and destiny. In this same third epoch, philosophy makes its

first appearance. Philosophy is the intellectual rationalization of the individual's problem. Philosophy, according to Socrates, was primarily a meditation on death. The new individual, child of the third epoch, attempts to apply to the problem of death those rational methods that had proved successful in technology and administration.

The new individual, contemplating the failure of his nation, and the break-up of his civilization, communes with himself in some such terms as these : ' My nation perishes and my national god is impotent to save. I and my fellows have built everything—our morals, our religion, our whole world-outlook—on the implicit assumption that our group-life was sacred and immortal. And now I realize that man's greatest enemy is not nature but man. The fate of my group is in the hands of my fellow-men, and these have chosen to blot it out of existence. The enemies of my group have made my life meaningless. For what value has any human life, what value has any civilization—civilization which is the joint product of so many human lives—what value can we human beings place upon our own lives, when human beings destroy what other human beings have created. We human beings regard one another not as loving kinsmen but as members of a hostile species. There is neither solidarity nor compassion nor understanding amongst men. Outside the instinct-guided family and clan, men are self-destructive animals incapable of civilization.'

§ 5. *The epoch of disillusionment.*

The third epoch is one of disillusionment. Man becomes disillusioned about himself. He discovers his animality, his self-destructive appetites. He is rational to the extent of discovering but not of controlling his irrational impulses. He discovers sin in himself and the pangs of a divided conscience. He discovers death and the vanity of all his wishes. He discovers the self-contradictions of his

time-ridden existence. And because he cannot explain the emergence of his own unhappiness, he imagines he is being punished for some monstrous metaphysical sin. He remembers that in the first epoch of human history he was innocent, and that in the second epoch he was successfully self-assertive, and so by an inevitable trick of anachronism he makes Paradise and the Golden Age coeval with the genesis of human history. He believes that he is too intricately immeshed in his sinful animality ever again to succeed as man. He must therefore find the road leading back to the lost paradise. He must aspire to the status of a pure spirit, a timeless being, a god.

In this epoch of failure and disillusionment, the group-gods of the earlier epochs are denounced as idols—idols that cannot save. There is, however, one use to which the group-form, the community-tradition of human life can still be put ; individual human beings, all of them convinced of the vanity of being human, can form an association for mutual encouragement in the search for the Lost Paradise. This association, open to all individuals irrespective of sex, class, nationality and race, was the Church.

In the third epoch some new human types make their first appearance in human history : the individualist, the mystic, the monk, the metaphysician. In the first and second epochs the leaders of mankind have been men of action, battling with nature and with their rivals. They were men of character, whole and healthy, undivided in their loyalties, at one with the world and the community. But the new men are the contraries of the men of the earlier epochs. The new men are not at home in the world. They stand isolated in the community, even if the community still persists. They are not men of action ; they are introverts who turn their gaze upon themselves. They are not satisfied with being persons ; they aspire to be spirits. History, action, the complete life of body and mind, of individual self-expression and social co-operation, the integral life, in

short, of civilized men, sustaining and enlarging a common civilization—all these fundamental values are deprecated or evaded or denied. The men of this epoch, at war with themselves and the world, rationalize their inner conflict by the theory that the individual is a composite of animal and angel. And they evolve a technique for starving the animal with its lusts for power and possession, and for releasing the angel from the interior citadel wherein it is supposed to dwell.

What is sounded for the first time in man's history is the Retreat from Civilization.

The way of introversion was inaugurated some two thousand five hundred years ago. If we assign four or five hundred years to the modern epoch, we can say that men have been engaged in self-contemplation for something like two thousand years. We exclude the modern epoch because with the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, those two precursors of the French Revolution, the Retreat from the Human was halted and reversed. Making this subtraction, we must inquire earnestly about the outcome for the human race of the two thousand years' reign of the churches, with their introversion and mysticism and metaphysics. What have been the fruits of introversion? Have the men of the third epoch discovered that element in themselves which is superior to time and change? Have they indeed discovered the absolute in morals and in science?

The churchmen and the metaphysicians share the absolute between them, the churchmen claiming to have arrived at the absolute in morals, the metaphysicians at the absolute in knowledge. But if we examine carefully the major moral precepts attributed to a Christ or a Buddha, we find that these precepts are, in essence, recipes for redemption—redemption from the errors and limitations of human life. Recipes for redemption are religions and not moral precepts. For morality is a way in which men order their relations with their fellow-men; it is a way of being human and not a way of escape into

the superhuman. And to the extent that the moral injunctions attributed to Christ or Buddha are positive and practical and designed for this-world living, these injunctions are not absolute, but necessarily legalistic and empirical.

Morals are man-made, and every human being is in some degree a creator of morals. He is a creator to the extent that he alters the form and changes the content of that patch of civilization with which he is in contact. Morality is not a law, known and decided once and for all; it is a perennial problem, a problem for the creative mind.

In such matters as the divorce of married persons or the distribution of wealth, no 'laws of God' are admissible. Marital and property relations change in type as well as in particularity with the changing circumstances of the ages, and no prescriptions regarding such relations can claim finality.

§ 6. *The fruits of metaphysics.*

Is there, then, nothing in the claim that, by the way of introversion, men have discovered the Absolute in morals, the so-called Good? Something has indeed been discovered—the fact that wherever there are men, there are morals. The third epoch became aware of the universal existence of morality. In fact, what the third epoch discovered was one of the Principles of Civilization —one of the constants of human behaviour. Morality is an indefeasible form of human life; but then, so are breathing and eating, knowing and loving. The fact that all men are moral, in the sense that they consciously order their social relations, tells us nothing about the kind of order that is most appropriate to a given social situation. The problem of establishing the appropriate order, like all the problems of life, can be solved only by adventuring, experimenting, and living. Faith is necessary, faith that adventures and experiments. He

who looks for an absolute in ethics, who hopes by mystical introspection or logical analysis to solve once and for all the problems of morals and of life, is an escapist. Having failed to be a man, the escapist pretends that he is a god.

As for the metaphysicians, those new arrivals of the third epoch, we have already shown (in Chapters I and II) that they made their appearance independently in India, China, and Greece. The metaphysician is one of the leaders in the retreat from the Human. He is an isolated individual who no longer feels himself sustained by a civilization in which he can participate. He feels himself to be the victim of time and necessity, and of the frailty and irrationality of mankind. He believes that only within his private self is there left for him a residuum of safety. So he chooses the way of introversion. He yearns after that pure and original element in his being which is undefiled by the soiled vestments of the earthly life. In this transcendental self or soul, he believes he has discovered something which is incorruptible and absolute. By communing with this element, he will cease to be finite and time-ridden man and become universal and superhistorical spirit. And in the spirit there will be revealed to him the last truth about the universe and human life.

After two thousand years and more of metaphysical or non-empirical philosophy, we moderns, who have now entered into the fourth epoch of world history—the epoch of the return to the Human—are in a position to evaluate the fruits of metaphysical ideology. As in the case of morals, we ask the question : Is there anything in the claim that by the way of introversion metaphysicians have discovered the absolute, the absolute in science and truth ? Or is this claim, like that of the astrologer and the alchemist, merely an item in the cultural history of the third epoch ?

Our answer to this question about absolute science is strictly parallel to our previous answer about absolute morals. What the metaphysician has discovered is not

the final truth about the universe, but merely one of the formal Principles of Civilization. This formal principle declares that where there are men, there is science. All human beings discover rules and techniques by which they guide their reactions to the external world. These rules are communicable and intelligible. They are communicable because they are expressed in terms of word-concepts, that is, in terms of general ideas which are understood in the same sense by all or most members of the society to whom they are addressed. And they are intelligible, because all or most human beings relate their ideas to one another after the same fashion. For all human beings possess the logical power of framing sentences whose grammatical or formal structure is the same. When we take great pains about our sentences, and remove from them everything which refers to the external world, attending only to the formal and grammatical structure, we arrive at pure logic. And if we symbolize our logic, framing rules of calculation, we arrive at pure mathematics. The nature of pure mathematics and how it differs from physical science has already been discussed in the previous chapter.

What the metaphysicians really discovered in the realm of pure knowledge was not absolute truth, but merely two formal principles :

(1) The logical or formal basis of all human thought.

(2) The universality of science or technology as a formal constituent of civilization.

§ 7. *The Return to the Human : a fact and a prophecy.*

We have now arrived at the fourth epoch. The retreat from the Human has been followed by the return to the Human. In the formula adopted in Chapter I we said that the historic process was from the Clan to the State, from the State to the Church, and from the Church to

the Universal Commonwealth. As this interpretation of history is parallel with the one outlined in this chapter, the movement from Church to Universal Commonwealth will correspond to the fourth epoch.

We shall be asked whether this fourth stage of the historic process is a fact or a prophecy. It is both. The return to the Human is a fact; that this fact will envelop the globe and find its institutional expression in the Universal Commonwealth is a prophecy.

That the return to the Human is a fact is corroborated by the passing of Medievalism and the break-up of Catholic Christendom, by the humanism of the Renaissance recovering and reaffirming the civilizational values of the second epoch. It is corroborated by the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, by the Declaration of Human Rights made by the American and French Revolutions, by the gigantic increases in wealth and population resulting from modern science and technology.

That the return to the Human will be institutionalized by the creation of a World Commonwealth is admittedly a prophecy. A prophecy is legitimate if it outlines the form of a possible future for civilization. Such a future for civilization is possible if the seeds of it are already sown in the present; and it is probable to the extent that the prospective makers of the future become conscious of the possibility. A civilization is impossible if it is incompatible with the economic and social forces of an age. These forces reject what is incompatible with the age, but the unrejected remainder will still contain more than one possible future for civilization. In other words, the economic and social forces select, but they do not finally determine. A civilization is the product of human creativity. And at any moment of history, creativity can take this road or that. Every road is not free to it, but there are more roads than one. The Universal Commonwealth is a possible road for the fourth epoch of creativity, and men will choose this road when they become fully conscious of its possibilities.

But granted that the modern epoch is characterized by a return to the Human, by a new confidence in man as the creator of civilization, we may still be asked what reason we have for believing that the eventual form of the new civilization will be a World Commonwealth.

It will be remembered that we claim the role of interpretative historian for every member of the human race. The range and accuracy and insight of historians, professional as well as amateur, will vary enormously, but each, in his own way and from his own special standpoint and perspective, is interpreting the past of the human race. And, in its larger features, the past of the human race is equally the past of the historian. For this task of constructing a world historiography, we moderns are more amply equipped than were any of our predecessors of the earlier epochs. Our perspectives are larger than any that were open to the most universal of earlier historians. We know more of Ancient Babylon than did Jeremiah, more of Ancient Egypt than did Herodotus, more of Ancient Rome than did Livy, more of Ancient Israel than did St Paul. Our view of mankind is not seriously dimmed by the absence of written records for prehistoric times ; nor need it be distorted by the self-complacency of the white races over against the coloured ; nor narrowed by defective sympathies for cultures other than those of Greece and Rome and Israel. We moderns are the first to have constructed maps of the whole globe and time-charts of the whole historic process. We have been present, in body or in spirit, at the death-bed of empires and churches, of immemorial institutions and dogmatic world-views. We moderns are the first witnesses of the whole human achievement. We are the first to gather in the full harvest of human creativity. We are the first to have attained to a self-consciousness of our human quality. And this is a new experience which men of the earlier epochs were not privileged to enjoy.

Man remains man throughout all the epochs. That is

the conviction that emerges from our privileged survey of human history. Despairing of their human status, men have called upon the mystic and the metaphysician, the sacramentalist and the theologian, to find them a less precarious way than the way of civilization. But we who are the witnesses of the whole human achievement know, as our predecessors of the third epoch could not know, that all other ways have lost themselves in the inane. We moderns are the first men to become world-conscious. It is true that the number of world-conscious men is not large. Our capitalist and machine-minded civilization is one in its economy but not in its spirit. We possess already the material apparatus, the intellectual concepts, and the historical experience that are necessary, in order to bring to the two thousand million members of our species the full realization of the unity of mankind and of civilization. And, therefore, it is not only possible but highly probable that such a universal realization will one day be achieved. Moreover, when mankind, realizing its spiritual and civilizational unity, accepts the human situation it will have found religion. For acceptance of the human situation is the only possible basis for a world religion. The universal commonwealth which we have ventured to predict will be the institutional form accompanying mankind's realization of its unity.

§ 8. *Modern totalitarianism and the Roman Catholic Church.*

There are two criticisms of this interpretation of history which are sure to be made and which we should like to anticipate. It will be said that in view of the post-war crisis in human affairs, the interpretation advanced in this chapter is naïvely optimistic and is, at best, only a restatement of the discredited progressivism of the nineteenth century; and, secondly, that, underlying the interpretation, there is a shallow rationalism,

asserting that peace and plenty and the spread of science will put the churches out of business.

We propose to answer these criticisms by some historical considerations with regard to the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church dominated the third epoch and watches apprehensively the evolution of the fourth. The conflict between Romanism and Protestantism was the prelude to the fourth epoch. And in the conflicts of the Roman Church with the totalitarian states—with Communists, Nazis, and Italian Fascists—we can study the major movements of our own times.

A church is a community. To its philosophers a church is a theological system, and to its mystics a canon of personal religion, but to the masses of its adherents a church is a society satisfying their gregarious instincts. Sociologically, a church is a much more artificial—or shall we say, intentional—structure than the large-scale state which it replaces. A church, in the interests of its own solidarity, finds it necessary to go back behind the state to the still remoter clan. From the clan, the church derives its forms of address; the church-members are brothers and the church-leaders fathers-in-God. These brothers are kinsmen in spirit but not in fact. The church ranks high in mankind's list of great sociological inventions. No one living in a pre-church epoch could have imagined a society which could not be called a polity and yet was composed of individuals of widely different races and nationalities, speaking different languages and belonging to different levels of civilization.

Clans, states, polities exist in order to secure the normal and instinct-prompted ends of association—food, shelter, security—the elements of physical well-being. They achieve these ends through unity of will. Unity of thought and feeling may result from unity of will, from persistence in common purposes, but they are not in themselves the primary ends of association. In a church, however, the hierarchy of unities is reversed. A church is primarily a unity of thought and feeling; it does

not aim directly at unity of will and action. Such action as a church takes is with a view to maintaining its unity of thought and feeling.

Polities disintegrate when unity of action becomes impossible, when men can no longer work together on the political and economic plane. Yet in certain circumstances and at certain cultural levels, this very abandonment of the common task, the very despair of life and of civilization, brings men together. They form a community—the church. They are united by a common pessimism about the world of action, and by a common aspiration towards a world in which action will be unnecessary. It is possible for men to be united in religion though disunited in politics. They can form a church despite the fact that they have ceased to be a state.

But men cannot live by religion alone—and they certainly cannot live by a religion which despairs of civilization. The pessimist cannot persist indefinitely in his pessimism unless he is able to draw his rations from some non-religious organization. And religious thought and feeling cannot persist indefinitely in a non-economic and non-political vacuum, without a partial restoration of the polity or state or secular organization which has been superseded by the church.

The church, in common with all Time's products, is caught in a contradiction. She, too, is a fated victim of that play of opposing principles which constitutes the dialectic of History. The church comes into existence because of the failure of the state. And yet the church is impossible without some kind of state, some organization to do the work the state has always done. But if the church does the work of the state, it becomes the state, and cannot persist in that negative attitude to life and civilization which is the very rationale of its existence. On the other hand, if the church ignores the state and the life of secular activity, such activity will still be necessary and will continue in independence of the church. And

when such activity consolidates itself, that is, when the secular state recovers its vitality, it will have no place for a church which has a vested interest in the continuance of the state's neurasthenia.

Let us apply this dialectic to the Roman Catholic Church. Why the Church dominated the third epoch, and why it is improbable that she will survive very far into the fourth will be seen to follow from an interpretation of history which has very little in common with the facile optimism and the shallow rationalism of nineteenth-century progressivists.

In the aftermath of the Roman Empire's dissolution the Catholic Church elected to be both church and state. During the thousand years filling the interval between the breakdown of the Roman Empire in the West and the recovery of its secular tradition at the Renaissance, the Catholic Church was, to adopt a modern idiom, a totalitarian state. To believe that civilization is sin and the pursuit of civilization idolatry, and yet to uphold civilization as a necessity, is the dialectic in which a church is imprisoned. The Catholic Church grappled with the dialectic after the fashion set for it by contemporary Islam—the Islam of the Caliphs—and thereby eschewed the impotence in politics and practice which has been the fate of Buddhism. The Catholic Church could double the role of state and church as long as it was confronted by barbarians looking to it not only for religion but for secular culture as well. The fragments of Græco-Roman culture which the Church had salvaged from the wreck of the Roman Empire were so superior to the native culture of the immigrating 'Nordics' that even in such fundamentals as farming, building, accounting, the Church was the tutor of the barbarians' pupilage. The German barbarians had vitality but lacked knowledge. While subscribing formally to the philosophy of the Church, they did not really share its pessimism about this world. After all, they had done very well for themselves: possessing few assets apart from the strength of

their right arms, they were now lording it in the West. They could well afford to pay the Church its tutorial fees, and await the time when, in most of the arts of civilization, in diplomacy as well as in learning, they would be able to dispense with the Church's services.

The Church had organized the Crusades, its most signal act of political leadership. But the Crusades had not only failed of their object, they had so weakened Byzantium, the last lineal descendant of Ancient Rome, as to lead to its fall in 1453. The political leadership of the Papacy had involved Christendom in the greatest political disaster since the sack of Rome by Alaric. And then, with ever-increasing impressiveness, such events succeeded one another as made it manifest that Europe had outgrown the tutelage of the Papacy. In politics, in science, in philosophy, even in morals and religion, the erstwhile barbarians began to achieve autonomy.

At the Counter-Reformation the Catholic Church was reformed from without and from within, purged of its pagan and secular accretions, and restricted to its pristine function of organizing religion. But a church whose basic doctrine is the insufficiency of civilization, whose point of departure was the bankruptcy of mankind's greatest experiment in large-scale civilization, the Roman Empire, such a church is incompatible with a new and expansive and self-confident civilization. And a religion that is being continually pushed to the periphery of daily life will not find its isolated spirituality an adequate compensation for its loss of control over the secular life. In the long run, organized religion must not only come to terms with civilization, it must express that civilization's faith in itself.

§ 9. *Protestantism as an exceptional episode in the history of religion.*

Because religion is an emotional commentary on life, because it is the oxygen of the will to live, because, as we

have suggested, it is a principle of civilization, religion cannot, over any very long period, remain at the level of a private experience or of an individual mysticism. Protestantism is, therefore, an altogether exceptional episode in the history of religion.

Protestantism began as a form of religious atavism, a return to the primitive; it demanded of Catholicism that Catholicism should return to that aloofness from secular civilization, that ascetic denial of civilization, which had characterized the Early Church. Martin Luther and John Knox had no sympathy with humanism; whereas humanists, such as Erasmus and More, clung to their Catholicism. But, after a very few generations, Protestantism was compelled to accept the secular fruits of humanism, while it destroyed that intimate association between public life and public religion which has been the distinguishing characteristic of Catholicism.

Ignoring a thousand-year-old tradition of corporate life, Protestantism extracted from Catholicism a metaphysical doctrine of the supersocial and superhistorical character of the individual soul. Upon a number of such souls signing the social contract, a state, strictly limited and constitutional, would come into existence. If the individual souls chose to worship in company, the company might constitute itself a congregational church. If these souls did business with one another, a capitalist economy would result—an economy remarkable for individual initiative, limited liability, and private profit.

In the strict terms of its metaphysical doctrine whereby the individual soul is elevated to the level of an absolute, Protestantism is a doctrine of anarchy. But historical institutions have a way of watering their foundational doctrines with opportunism. Despite his theoretical bias towards anarchy, the Puritan did not sink into antinomianism or rebellion against the law, for he was upheld by the moral tradition of Catholicism. The Puritan might execute a Charles I or exile a James II, and yet, because England had been unified by a century of Tudor

absolutism, the Puritan could weaken monarchy without fearing a resurrection of feudal anarchy. And the same Puritan, in the role of Protestant individualist, could encourage a laissez-faire economy without suffering the penalty of civil war. England was saved from disruptive social conflicts because the great inventions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had made her into the eldorado of the entrepreneur.

But the special conditions making possible a triple alliance of Protestantism, individualism, and capitalism were necessarily short-lived. The Protestant individualist remained individualist, but as he lost his scruples he lost his Christianity. The successful pioneer ceased to be a pioneer and became a vested interest. The very successes gained by the 'Triple Alliance' converted a loose strung congeries of individuals into a highly complex society. If such a society was to survive, it would have to plan the institutions making for social integration. Neither its economy, nor its culture, nor its religion—its religion least of all—could be left in private hands. For the more complex and difficult a civilization becomes, the more faith is needed to sustain it.

In the terms of this analysis, it is no longer so astonishing that the whole liberal tradition of the West should to-day stand in jeopardy. Liberalism is rooted in Protestant individualism. Protestantism is decaying, and individualism has become impossible. A society to-day has no very great chance of surviving far into the twentieth century, unless its economy, its political structure, its culture, and its religion are the interfused components of a single civilization. Totalitarianism to-day is the savage voice in which the neglected unity of civilization is making itself heard.

What kind of totalitarianism has the greatest expectation of life? Is it the kind advocated by the Communists of Russia, or the Nazis of Germany, or the Fascists of Italy, or the semi-Fascist Catholic Clericals of Austria[1]

[1] The kind that has not yet been tried is one dispensing with dictatorship and securing the creative freedom of the believer in civilization. England might well be the leader of the West in promoting it. See Ch. xv., § 5 and § 11.

and Portugal and Insurgent Spain? Or are there other varieties of totalitarianism which have not yet been tried?

This is not the place for speculation about untried varieties of totalitarianism. We will reserve the discussion for the last two chapters.

§ 10. *Clerical fascism and the present crisis of civilization.*

What we are defending here is our interpretation of history, and we have suggested that the present position of the Catholic Church is a touchstone of our interpretation. We propose to conclude this analysis, then, by considering the attempt of the Catholic Church to rehabilitate itself into the modern world by some kind of alliance with fascism; in other words, we propose to consider the clerical form of totalitarianism as contrasted with the forms championed by the Communists, the Nazis, and the Italian Fascists.

To-day, a more or less exhausted capitalism—a capitalism that has almost forgotten its pioneering stage—is faced by the problem of social integration. Nineteenth-century capitalism was so successful that it created a society in which Liberalism, individualism, and laissez-faire, its traditional associates, could no longer function freely. Capitalism was compelled to compromise with principles the very opposite of its own. How were the many-millioned masses, made conscious by state-aided education of the existence of the nation-state to which they belong—how were these millions to be integrated into a spiritually homogeneous society? That is the problem bequeathed to our own times by a century of capitalist democracy. Capitalist democracy, as interpreted by John Stuart Mill or Herbert Spencer, did not see any necessity for spiritual homogeneity. As long as men could contract together for economic purposes, keeping their contracts under law, Mill and Spencer saw no good reason why the same men should not think and

feel as they pleased about life, society, and the universe. Religion, philosophy, the style and accent of one's personal life, were private concerns of the free, untrammelled individual. This doctrine is obsolete. The liberals who once maintained it have now become conservative. They have become conservatives because, knowing that their traditional doctrine no longer works, and having no new doctrine to advance, they feel a nervous horror of change. But change in the direction of a highly integrated society is inevitable. What is to be the structure of such an integrated society? That is the problem of to-day.

The Communists, the Nazis, and the Italian Fascists are trying out their several solutions of this problem. The Communist solution is the most original, and therefore the most disturbing to the traditions of the West. The Nazis and the Italians, while borrowing a great deal from the Communists, have tried to compromise with the past. New social forms are the rarest as well as the most difficult of human inventions. And it is this poverty of sociological imagination which has given clerical fascism its opportunity. Roman Catholicism says in effect to the contemporary world: You are looking for a model of an integrated, that is, a totalitarian society. We can supply that model. Medieval Catholicism was for a thousand years a flourishing totalitarian society. It was not a progressive society, but after all, what is progress? Progress is a fetish of the discredited liberals. Medieval Catholicism was organized in stable and statical estates, consisting of the church, the aristocracy, the craftsmen-burgesses, and the peasant-serfs. In some out-of-the-way corners of Europe such societies have survived until this day. Spain—the Spain of King Alfonso and General Franco—is such a society, or was until recently. We believe in authority from above, in hierarchy, in inequality, in the supreme value of submissiveness and resignation for the uncreative masses. There is no need to devise new forms of totalitarianism. New forms may

easily be fatal to the present holders of power. Restore to the Church even a fraction of its lost power, and the Church will dispense its well-tried recipes against that most pernicious of social diseases, the class war.

But there is a need for new forms of totalitarianism. History, being a creative process, does not repeat itself. History remains the history of man, and is therefore always subject to the Principles of Civilization : but, within these limits, it is the history of new men and new forms of civilization. To attempt to reproduce the past mechanically and uncreatively is to revive a corpse. To-day the Catholic form of totalitarianism is of all the proposed forms the least vital and the most reactionary. Clerical fascism attracts the rulers of such countries as Austria and Portugal, because in these countries there is a complete lack of creative politics. Catholicism, as a medieval form of totalitarianism, cannot compete with the modern varieties. It cannot compete because it is constricted by its underlying philosophy. To Catholicism, the real world is the transcendant and spiritual world, the other world and not this world. In this world men are absorbed in receiving, maintaining, and creatively transforming the secular civilization which has been communicated to them. And Catholicism is neither prepared to take this preoccupation seriously nor to sanction it ethically.

The experienced diplomatists of the Roman Curia, having declared open war upon the communist variety of totalitarianism, have made opportunistic advances for an alliance or at least an understanding with the Nazi and the Italian varieties. But Rome is under no delusions about the fundamental incompatibility of the Catholic with every other form of totalitarianism. These other forms, however much they may differ among themselves, agree in affirming the supreme value of a this-world civilization. And this affirmation Catholicism can never in principle accept. The present Pope (Pius XI) has denounced in turn the 'materialistic' philosophy of

the Communists, the pagan worship of the state by the Nazis, and the absorption of the Italian child by the fascist educational machine.

The Catholic Church, and indeed every church, is inhibited by the logic of its traditional standpoint from accepting the principles of secular totalitarianism. These principles imply: first, that the centre of gravity of a modern state lies in its economy; second, that a successful economy is impossible without a consciously planned integration of all the resources of the community; third, that a planned economy implies a developed technology; fourth, that technology is based upon science; fifth, that the successful pursuit of science requires a secular outlook upon life and civilization; sixth, that modern civilization is such a difficult, exacting, and exhausting form of human life that it cannot escape breakdown without faith in the value of civilization. And the faith demanded by civilization is one that affirms, and not one which, like Catholicism, denies the supreme value of civilization; seventh, that economy, technology, science, philosophy, religion, and education are so interdependent that the integrated society of to-morrow must necessarily be totalitarian. The liberalistic doctrine that the state must restrict its integrative functions to the provinces of law and economy is repudiated by the realities of the twentieth century.

Nazi-ism repudiates Christianity, not because Christianity is a universalist and Germanism a particularist religion, but because in Christianity there is no dynamic will to civilization. The Nazis would like to make a religion of Germanism, but they are somewhat uncertain whether Germanism lends itself to this high purpose. Accordingly, the Nazis silence their inner doubts by the blaring declaration that they and not the Jews are the Chosen People.

The Italian Fascists, it is true, have not as yet repudiated Christianity. The Papacy, with its world affiliations, is for them too valuable an asset to be sacrificed on the

altar of logical consistency. A renovated Cæsarism is their ideal. But however reactionary or morbid or illusory may be the ideal of civilization entertained by Nazis or Fascists or Communists, their several ideals are distinguished from that of Christianity by the positive attitude they take up to the value of civilization.

§ 11. *A review of the argument.*

This review of Catholic Totalitarianism, of Protestant Individualism, and of the competing Totalitarianisms of to-day should dispose of the more obvious objections to the interpretation of history advanced in this chapter and in Chapters I and II. As the argument has covered a wide field, it will be convenient to summarize it under the following heads :

(1) The principles of civilization are the constants and the epochs of history the variants of the historic process.

(2) History is capable of as many interpretations as there are historians, and every human being is, within the limits of his capacity, an amateur of professional historian.

(3) On the interpretation advanced in this book, the epochs of history can be distinguished by the institution dominating them. In the first epoch, the dominant institution is the clan ; in the second, the state ; in the third, the church ; in the fourth, the universal commonwealth.

(4) The same four epochs can also be distinguished by the dominating attitude to life and civilization. In the first, there is unconsciousness of civilization ; in the second, affirmation of civilization ; in the third, negation of civilization ; in the fourth, reaffirmation of civilization.

(5) Change of attitude to civilization is registered by the barometer of religion. In the first epoch, religion is animistic with no clear discrimination between man and nature ; in the second, the effective deity is the nation-group, a deity symbolized by the national god and

summarized by the god-king ; in the third, the individual, isolated within the bankrupt group, locates deity in the transcendent world, theorizes deity with the aid of metaphysics, and endeavours to experience deity through mystical introspection ; in the fourth, religion returns to earth and is experienced in a totalitarian attitude to world-civilization.

§ 12. *The limits of sociology.*

One topic remains to be discussed, the distinction (to which reference was made earlier on page 109) between a science and a philosophy of history.

We said that the scientist was essentially a technologist, inventing techniques for changing and controlling nature ; and that the historian was essentially an artist recreating the past in virtue of the unity connecting past and present forms of civilization. The historian cannot change the past, he can only experience it. But the technologist can change the present—not, indeed, everything in the present, but just those selected and relatively isolated factors in external nature to which his technique refers.

' By heating water it can be made to boil.' This ' law ' of science is one of the techniques employed in making tea. A pint of water may be drawn from the tap or taken from a pool. The origins of the water are indifferent and will not affect the working of the law. They might have affected it, but from experience we find they do not. The source of heat may be a coal or an electric fire. The kettle may be of iron or of tin. Any one of these alternatives may affect the speed with which the tea is made and the cost of making it, but they will not disturb the law that heat conducted into water makes the water boil. ' Heat and water are two isolates : the other factors may be neglected, not absolutely but relatively. Scientific law is possible because isolates are possible.

Do such isolates exist in sociology ? Undoubtedly they do. Economics is a department of sociology, and

economists are continually isolating a number of factors in the economic process and asserting a fixed relation between them. Suppose an economist asserts, as quite a number of orthodox economists have done, that the way to restore profitability in a period of slump is to lower wages. Such an economist is laying down a scientific law, and is predicting some future possibilities in virtue of it. His law may be good or bad science. The future, when it arrives, may confirm or refute his predictions. But the economist's statement is undoubtedly science, because he is asserting that under assigned circumstances there is a fixed relation between two isolates, profitability and rates of wages. It is good science if, in fact, two such related isolates exist. It is bad science, if the lowering of wages leads not to profitability, but to revolution. The economist is assuming that non-economic factors such as the temper of the masses may be neglected. If the non-economic factors cannot be neglected, then the isolates exist, not in reality, but solely in the economist's analysis.

Law, again, is a department of sociology, and penology is a department of law. 'Assign the same punishment for theft as for murder, and you will not deter men from thieving, but you will incline thieves to become murderers.' Here, penology is laying down a scientific law connecting two isolates: one is the behaviour of the law-makers, one is the behaviour of the thieves.

Again, the science of administration is a department of sociology. A modern state is impossible without a number of empirical techniques for regulating the behaviour of different sections of the community. 'Underpay your officials and you encourage corruption.' In this sociological law the honesty of the officials is correlated with their pay.

The truth and the value of such sociological laws, whether of penology or of administration, depends entirely on the suitability of the isolates. The isolates of sociology are infinitely more precarious in their status than those

of physics. Thieves and bureaucrats—to revert to our former instances—are human beings who may not choose to obey the ' laws ' laid down for their behaviour. They may disobey these ' laws ', not because of wayward antinomianism, but because they are being subjected to contrary and stronger ' laws '. Thieves and bureaucrats are bigger than their labels ; they are the children of contemporary and the great-grandchildren of earlier civilizations.

All the departments of group-life vary interdependently. The economy, the politics, the class structure, the science, the philosophy, and the religion act and react upon one another. The group-life is a complex function of them all. This law of the joint variation of all the departments of group-life is perhaps the widest generalization that sociology has yet reached. Like so many wide generalizations it is formal in character ; it does not tell us what the laws of change in group-life are—if we knew them, we could predict the future pattern of society—the law simply tells us that the changes in the several departments of group-life, for whatever reason they occur, are interdependent, in other words, that the unity of group-life is maintained throughout the process of departmental change.

The religion of a clan is of one piece with its economy, the philosophy of a state is of one piece with its class-structure. The law of the joint variation of all the departments of group-life holds for all societies in all epochs. Such a universal law, because it holds for all societies at all levels of culture, is a formal Principle of Civilization. And such formal principles are discoverable by inspecting any group which is accessible and with whose life we are familiar. We do not need to go to history to discover formal principles. It will also be seen that the law of the joint variation of all the departments of group-life is not a new principle of civilization. What is being asserted is that the creativity of a group, while it disturbs the group-life, is nevertheless compatible

with its unity. The unity is dynamic and not static ; or, in equivalent terms that we have already employed, unity and creativity are dialectical opposites.

We suggest that the principle of the joint variation of all the departments of group-life is of too general a character to be a scientific, that is, a sociological law or technique comparable with those employed in law and administration. Such a principle must be counted among the principles of civilization and not amongst the laws of sociology. But if we restrict the generality of the law by isolating the economy from the other departments of group-life, and if we assert that the economy determines the class structure and the class structure determines the ideology, then we are stating some of the essential propositions of Marxism. What is the status of these propositions ? Are they sociological or philosophical ? Are they part of the science or the philosophy of history ?

These propositions of Marxism are usually said to imply ' the economic interpretation of history '. Is such an interpretation scientific or philosophical ? In the philosophy of science that we have advanced, science is impossible without isolates. Whether the economy, the class structure, and the ideology are suitable isolates or not, is not here the question. Because Marxism operates with isolates it is, in its method, scientific ; and the ' economic interpretation of history ' is a claim—whether the claim is good or not, we need not here consider—to be scientific sociology.

But Marxism is a prophecy as well as a sociology. Marxism became a great power in the world because it prophesied the victory of an insurgent proletariat and the advent of a classless society. Was this prophecy scientific ? Marxists have claimed it as such, but, in the light of our philosophy of science, can we support the claim ?

The utility of a science depends very largely upon its powers of prediction. Astronomy, one of the most

advanced of the sciences, can predict the time of an eclipse of the sun correct to a fraction of a second. Chemistry predicts the nature of the gases that are released when water is electrolysed. But sociology, too—in some of its departments at least—has predictive power. The economist predicts successfully a rise of prices ; the criminologist a fall in the number of indictable offences ; the administrator predicts accurately the social reaction to a proposed by-law. But could Pericles, the affirming humanist of the second epoch, have predicted the retreat from the Human and the rise of the Churches in the subsequent epoch? We maintain that he could not. Pericles might have had a prophetic intuition of what was coming. But a prophet is not a man of science ; he is a philosophical historian. And the philosophical historian interprets the future in the light of the past.

The scientist can predict because he works with repetitive isolates. The astronomer knows many instances of the eclipse of the sun, the chemist of the electrolysis of water, the economist of variations of price, the criminologist of the reduction of crime, the administrator of the civic reaction to a statutory by-law. But what instances could a Pericles know of the epoch of which he was the representative man? Epochs are not isolates. On the contrary, they are all-inclusive universes, providing the milieu out of which the scientific sociologist selects his isolates. And epochs do not repeat themselves. Creativity sees to that. Where there are neither isolates nor repetitive instances, science is impossible.

We can now return to the Marxist prophecy that the capitalist epoch will be replaced by the epoch of a classless society. There are no precedents for modern industrial capitalism any more than there are for the liberalism, the machine technology, and the private enterprise with which industrial capitalism is associated. The capitalistic epoch is unique ; it is not an isolate, and there are no other instances of such an epoch. Marxist prophecy cannot therefore be a scientific prediction. Prophecy is

philosophic history : it interprets the future just as non-prophetic history interprets the past. The future and the past can be interpreted because the subject of the interpretation is the future and the past of civilization—of the single civilization uniting all the epochs of history. Within his capacity, everyone is an historian; and everyone, we now add, is a philosopher. Everyone is able in some degree to prophesy the future and interpret the past, for no other reason than that the future is his own future and the past his own past. Interpreters of the future differ from one another to the same extent and after the same fashion that interpreters of the past differ from one another. Interpreters, whether of the past or of the future, differ in insight. We cannot all claim to have an insight equal to that of Marx.

The future of an epoch can be interpreted, but it cannot be foreseen. The prophet cannot foresee the future, because it does not exist to be seen. What he sees is one of a number of futures. The forces creating the future are working in him ; and they are working after the same fashion in his contemporaries. The prophet, by promulgating his vision of the future, makes propaganda for it. Of all the possible futures, the one for which propaganda has been made will have the best chance of being actualized. Communistic propaganda has for its object the verification of Marxist prophecy. Communist propaganda aims at making Marxist prophecy come true.

Our conclusion is that there cannot be a science of history. There can be a science of such social phenomena as can be isolated—not completely, but adequately—within the historic process. But the historic process itself can be neither isolated nor repeated.

There cannot be a science, but there can be a philosophy of history. There are two departments of such a philosophy : one dealing with the constants, the other with the variables of history. The principles of civilization are concerned with the constants, the interpretation of history

with the variables. Because history is the history of civilization, the constants of the historic process are the principles of civilization ; and because they are constants, and therefore discoverable at every point of time, they are independent of the historic process. The principles are the same for all the epochs ; but the epochs do not repeat themselves. Creativity gives each epoch its unique and inimitable character. The philosophical interpreter of civilization unites the future with the past and the epochs with one another ; and beneath the glories and the tragedies of the historic process he discerns the identity of the human.

With the conclusion of this chapter we have completed our general survey of the structure of civilization. Civilization is everywhere and always the same, and civilization is everywhere and always different. We have discovered some, but by no means all, of the principles or constants of civilization, and in our division of world history into four epochs we have advanced a possible interpretation of the historic process. The first five chapters of this book have been concerned with large, and occasionally, with abstract generalities. We propose in the following chapters to adopt a much more concrete treatment. Our difficulty will be one of selection. The whole of human history is there before us, providing an immense storehouse of possible illustration. What, for instance, are we to say of primitive civilization ? We have referred to the clan as the institutional type of the primitive civilization of the first epoch. But primitive civilization is the highly specialized and exceedingly voluminous study of modern anthropology. Anthropology has become very respectful to the so-called savages ; it acknowledges them to be civilized men possessing morals, science, and religion distinct from and yet continuous with the culture of the more complex civilizations.

And what states are we to select to supply the illustrative material for the second epoch of the historic process ? The second epoch is prolific in great states ; they rise

and culminate and fall. But selection there must be. We have, therefore, selected Egypt as the earliest, Rome as the greatest, and China as the solitary survivor into our own times, of the great states of antiquity.

The problem of selection is not so troublesome when we come to the third epoch, that of the churches. Churches are few in number. They are the successors of bankrupt states. And though bankrupt states are plentiful enough, it is only in exceptional circumstances that a bankrupt state is succeeded by a church. Exceptional circumstances favoured the survival of Israel and the rise of the Jewish church. Israel supplies the earliest instance of the passage of the historic process from state to church. And therefore three of the following chapters are devoted to the civilization recorded so graphically in the Old and New Testaments.

A philosophy of civilization and an interpretation of world history which have no relevance to the issues of the day would be merely an academic exercise. The last two chapters of this book therefore bring the issues of the day into the perspective of world history.

CHAPTER VI

THE DIFFUSION OF CULTURE

§ 1. *The Domain of the Human.*

WHERE there are men, there is civilization. The ideas in men's minds, the skill of their fingers, and the complex feelings with which they respond to stimuli, constitute the inner side of civilization ; while such things as domesticated animals, ploughed fields, and steam-driven ships constitute the outer side. The term ' civilization ' has misleading associations ; it suggests that only dwellers in the city are civilized. But all men are civilized because they are men and not animals. Animals respond to the stimuli of nature by linked chains of instinctive actions. Men interpose between stimulus and response the ideas derived from their social heritage. The Australian ' Black Fellow ' is a civilized man, but not after the fashion of a white denizen of London. Anthropology, ethnology, and indeed all historical studies would be clarified by the adoption of three new terms : first, a substitute for the term ' civilization,' and then two further terms, one for the inner and one for the outer aspect of civilization. The term ' culture ' which Tylor's classical work has naturalized in this country might serve for the inner aspect, the term ' civilization ' (which is too popular to be eliminated) being reserved for the outer aspect, and a distinctive term being invented to cover both aspects. We want a word to mean ' the domain of the human ' ; ' Mandom ' by analogy with Christendom would be the very word, if only it were possible.

To-day, the domain of the Human, like a landscape seen from a height, lies stretched out before us. The pioneer work of the nineteenth-century investigators in archæology, prehistory, and ethnology; the uncovering of the buried treasures of the great primordial civilizations of Egypt and Sumer, and the deciphering of their scripts; the rationalizing of the 'miracle' of Hellenism by the discovery of its Aegean origins; and above all, the critical and comparative study of the Bible and of Semitic religion—all these have made of the domain of the Human a single continuous territory. Many portions remain unmapped. The outline none the less is clear.

Within this domain lies everything that we human beings have achieved. From its frontiers all our future enterprises must start.

In this book we are concerned with the whole domain of civilization, not with the provinces that can be distinguished in it to-day, nor with those that differentiated it at various dates in the past. It may well be, as Professor Toynbee suggests, that there are in the world to-day several hundred distinct groups of men practising primitive civilizations and at most four or five large-scale groups practising complex civilizations, such as those of the Western, Islamic, Hindu, and Far Eastern civilizations. These are the complex and large-scale civilizations which have survived into the twentieth century. There are in addition a dozen or more civilizations which are defunct, such as the Ancient Egyptian in the Old World and the Maya in the New. But in this book we are not concerned with the morphology of civilization. What interests us primarily is what we may call its physiology. Accordingly, we ignore the distinction between primitive, barbarous, and advanced civilizations.

On what principles does civilization work? How does it grow from simple to complex? What different forms of human activity does it involve and how are the forms interrelated? What are the symptoms of health and disease, of integration and decay?

§ 2. *The Miracle of Culture-diffusion.*

To speak of the physiology of civilization is to employ a useful but dangerous metaphor. Civilization is neither an animal nor a plant. The analysis of civilization, like the analysis of the mind, is difficult because some form or aspect of civilization is presupposed in every discussion of its character. Every analyst of civilization is necessarily reporting on himself, on the content and origin of his own experience. He is reporting not on his private but on his public self, that public self which unites him with his contemporaries and his predecessors. Civilization is a society of public selves ; it is the great society, actual and potential, of all men ; it embraces both the living and the dead.

Instead of looking to biology for our principles of explanation, we could adapt them from physics. Physics is concerned with the dynamics of material systems ; it reduces all the forces at work to the energy of mechanical motion. Are there causes at work in civilization which are analogous to physical energies ? We know that one material body can communicate its energy to another, whether the two bodies are two billiard balls in contact, or whether the two bodies are a magnet and some iron filings placed at a distance from one another. And we also know that one human being can communicate his culture to another, whether the two are mother and child and the child is on the mother's knee, or whether the two human beings are separated by some thousand years of time and as many or more miles of space, the medium of communication being a book.

Education, whether in the nursery or the classroom, is a simple and direct form of culture-diffusion. The child imitates the sounds of the words it hears spoken round it, and one fine day it understands them. By that we mean that the child behaves as though it understands ; the appropriateness of its behaviour is the only evidence we have and all indeed that we mean by ' understanding.'

How the child has achieved what all (or nearly all) members of our species can achieve, neither we nor the child can explain. We may talk learnedly of apperception-masses, mnemic phenomena, conditioned reflexes, and the rest of the technical jargon of psychologists and metaphysicians old and new; but we have still not penetrated very deeply into another of nature's everyday miracles. Something no doubt can be learned from these attempts at analysing the educational process. But that something does not amount to much, and exercises in psychologizing may easily divert our attention from the paramount significance, for human life and culture, of this process of culture-diffusion.

What the mother communicates to the child is language; and language is the primary artifact of civilization. Races, like individuals, differ in their capacity for linguistic expression. Yet the following generalization is surely well-founded: that there is no language in existence of which the basic content cannot be made intelligible even to the most primitive of peoples. There is therefore a latent (as well as, in part, an actual) unity subsisting between the minds of all human beings, a unity which is unique and in the last resort inexplicable. A human being to whom another human being could not communicate some part at least of his culture would be accounted an idiot, and an idiot is only the poor shadow of a human being. To be a human being is to be educable, and education is essentially the transmission of culture.

We can summarize the account given and at the same time develop the analogy between sociology and physics by the following statement: Humanity is a field of culture-induction, and culture can in some degree and to some extent travel from any member of the field to any other.

Language we have said is an artifact, in other words a creation of human art. Before language can be communicated it must be created. Who creates it? The answer is: Everyone who speaks or writes it. I am engaged at this moment in writing down a sentence of

which the constituent words have meanings and grammatical relations fixed traditionally by the culture-group to which I belong, and these have been communicated to me by my teachers. But it is highly probable that no other English-speaking person has ever constructed an identical sentence. This sentence may be nothing to boast of. But it is my own, an original creation, a novel artifact, an unprecedented scrap of literary culture. We have therefore to posit a principle to which there is no correlate in physics : the principle of Culture-creativity.

It is true, of course, that variations in the germinal material transmitted from one generation of living plants and animals to the next produce, after a considerable process of selection, a number of new species ; and this entry of novelty into the domain of non-human life may perhaps be acclaimed as an act of creation on the part of nature. But nature's creativity and our own (I mean here by nature the non-human part of the world) have little in common. In the first place, the time-scale governing the distribution of the variations is entirely different in the two cases. Everything that separates the culture of Neolithic Man from that of Machine-age Man of to-day has been created in a good deal less than ten thousand years. In the same period, what novelties comparable in range has nature produced in the flora and fauna of our world? But this difference of time-scale, though striking, is not the essential difference between the creativity of nature and that of man. Nature's variations are heritable, man's are not. The human child begins at scratch where the ape-like man began. And yet, within the brief years of childhood and adolescence, the normal and average adult can acquire the substance of ten thousand years of culture. All that the genius of Archimedes and Galileo and Newton have added to the culture of mankind is transmitted each year —and it cannot be transmitted unless it is creatively appreciated—to the not-specially talented undergraduates of many hundreds of modern universities.

In addition to the principles of Diffusion and Creativity we have now to posit a third principle : the principle of the Condensation of Culture. Each generation condenses and to some extent transforms creatively the culture transmitted to it.

§ 3. *Tylor, Spencer, and Renan as Anthropologists.*

It is well known that the principle of culture-diffusion has been very much stressed in recent writings on anthropology. The author of *Primitive Culture* and his school were inclined on the contrary to stress the principle of creativity. They believed that the majority of primitive peoples lived in isolated groups with very few opportunites for culture-contacts ; and that primitive minds, under the pressure of the non-human and approximately similar environment would create the same artifacts and the same institutions, developing them in a single series of which the terms and the order of the terms would be roughly the same for all. So, food gatherers in many parts of the world would discover for themselves how to domesticate animals, becoming therefore pastoral nomads ; the pastoralists, again, in many different parts of the world would discover the secret of agriculture and become sedentary food-cultivators. Similarly, matrilinear clans would develop into patrilinear tribes, and tribes into peoples. As to religion, all primitives would begin with ghost and ancestor worship, developing this type of religion into animism, animism becoming polytheism, and polytheism monotheism. This doctrine of unilinear creation is no longer held to-day, not even by those anthropologists who are very far from subscribing to the dogma that only the Egyptians have been creative in culture, the rest of mankind being the recipients of the culture diffused from Egypt.

We must remember that in 1871, when Tylor published his *Primitive Culture*, archæology, ethnology, and Egyptology were in their infancy. To-day we see things more

clearly. On a sober view, we can say that while Creativity and Diffusion have both been at work in the making of civilization, Diffusion is incomparably the more important principle. And the principle of Diffusion implies, it must be noted, the Unity of Civilization, a unity latent rather than actual and more patchy than perfect, but still a unity. For if human groups copy, sometimes in part and sometimes wholesale, the cultural inventions of other groups, adapting and modifying them to their own advantage, they become to that extent like-minded. And such differences as remain—and very many differences will always remain—set up a reciprocal series of stimuli, each group acting and reacting on the other. It is this identity in difference which is at once a principle of diffusion, of creativity, and of unity.

The theory of culture-diffusion fits the historical facts as they are known to-day rather more clearly than the complementary theory of original creation. But the popularity of creativity-theories during the second half of the nineteenth century owes a good deal to the spiritual climate of that period. Capitalism, Liberalism, and Individualism flourished jointly. The father of British sociology, Herbert Spencer, was so possessed by his ancestral spirit of Protestant Nonconformity that he identified social progress, not with the evolution of the nation-state out of the clan, but with the dissolution of the state into anarchic individuals. Then there were the romantics of the early nineteenth century who inaugurated the cult of genius. Shakespeare-worship began. The artist was a hero of the spirit—Goethe, for instance, as seen by Carlyle. The artist was autonomous, detached, untrammelled personality, the artist was godlike. This romantic estimation of genius had not entirely spent its force even in the more scientifically minded second half of the nineteenth century. Renan 'explained' the ethical monotheism of the Hebrews by the Semitic genius for religion. Matthew Arnold 'explained' the importance of Hellenism for the modern world by the Greek genius

for clear and objective perception of the world—in other words, the remarkable mental powers the Greeks possess, they possess in virtue of their genius for those very powers. Renan and Arnold are unaware that their explanations are, at the best, romantic apostrophes or tautological truisms, and at the worst roads leading to the spurious race-theories of Houston Chamberlain, a Wagnerian romantic who derived the whole cultural inheritance of mankind from the creative genius of the Nordic Germans. The principle of creativity cannot be eliminated from the science of civilization, but it should only be invoked when other principles of explanation have failed. Creativity has become the lying spirit of so many theories of civilization because a reputation for originality flatters the vanity of aspirants to power.

Greek science and Hebrew religion have been great powers in the shaping of civilization. A science of civilization should be able to account for them, or at least to place them in the continuous texture of civilization, uncovering their origins and their appropriateness to the workings of human minds. And it will be one of the objects of this book to advance such explanations. If the theory of civilization outlined in this book can provide a reasonable view of Greek science and Hebrew religion, it will have passed a severe test of its truth.

§ 4. *Occultist Theories of Civilization.*

It will be granted that any theory of civilization is worthless that appeals to occult powers or to a *Deus ex machina*. But it is not usually recognized that the theories of Renan and of Chamberlain are in fact based upon the postulated existence of occult powers. The theory of genius is rooted in animism, one of the oldest of human superstitions. The great man, the genius, has a living body and a soul which is that living body's double. Everything the great man does is 'explained' by reference to his double: he does so and so because his

double does the same. And the racial theory is no better founded; it is the genius-theory applied to a group and served up with a sauce of a spurious biology. In the development of Chamberlain's race-theory by the Nazi philosophers, we have a materialism of a characteristically crude type; everything of importance in civilization, every product of man's creative mind, is referred to 'blood', Aryan or neo-Germanic blood. And 'blood' is folk-biology for the chromosome and genes of the germinal material handed on by one generation of Germans to the next. In scientific terms, the Nazi theory amounts to the proposition that the whole content of civilization is a determinate function of Germanic spermatozoa.

§ 5. *Theism and Civilization.*

The conventional view that everything remarkable in civilization is to be attributed to the power of the First Cause, Almighty God, and everything ordinary to man as secondary cause, is less pretentious than the theories of genius and race. A considerable number of modern churchmen and liberal theologians hold this view. They believe, for instance, that the legacy of Israel to the world can be explained by assuming a unique relation between a self-revealing God and the inspiration, or intuitive perception rising to genius, of such outstanding figures as Abraham, Moses, and Jeremiah. Not infrequently they conjoin with this belief the view that the legacy of Greece can be explained by assuming a similar relation between the Good, the Beautiful, and the True—the three objective manifestations of transcendent deity—and the intuition or genius or mystical vision of a Plato, a Phidias, or an Archimedes. This view is important in the metaphysics of theism. It claims to be the 'philosophia perennis', the philosophy of all time. But it is useless in the science of civilization, for there is no way of delimiting the provinces of the extraordinary and the

ordinary, assigning the one to God and the other to Man. If we attempt such a delimitation, we shall quickly get involved in the ancient and futile controversy as to Man's free will and God's agency. If God is the First Cause, he is the cause of everything, man's acts included. But a principle that explains everything explains nothing. The science of civilization does not set out to explain the creation of man ; it assumes his existence and the existence of the earth, man's habitat.

§ 6. *Geography and Civilization.*

As the science of civilization assumes the existence of man and of the earth, and as the earth is older than man and from the time of his first appearance constrains him to secure food and shelter in order to live, it may be asked why our science does not begin with a geographical inquiry into the resources and the hindrances of man's non-human environment. The answer is that man's progressive control of the earth is a principle of civilization, but not the earth's unprogressive control of man. As we have already pointed out, the creativity of man in making civilization is of a totally different kind from the creativity of nature in making man. The climate, the fauna and flora of a region do not determine the content and character of the civilization of its inhabitants. The territory inhabited by a hundred millions of United States citizens, most of them beneficiaries of the machine-age culture which they did not create, was until the other day the hunting-ground of a handful of primitive Amerindians. The economy of the United States and the former economy of the Amerindians are both of them compatible with the same habitat. Nature's control of man is negative and selective, not positive and creative. No society can survive if its economy is incompatible with its habitat, but the number of such possible economies is not determined by nature but by man. One measure of human freedom which is independent of ethical or

æsthetic valuations is the number and range of man's civilizational responses to the possibilities of the habitat.

The view that climate and geographical location are the prime determinates of culture is still so very popular —and a number of distinguished geographers have in the past maintained it—that it will be useful if we strengthen our criticism of this view by considering the civilization of the Semang, a primitive people of the Malaya, as described in *Habitat, Economy, and Society*, a work by a modern geographer, Professor C. Daryll Forde.

The Semang inhabit the jungle on the mountain slopes of Malaya. They raise no crops and have no domestic animals, but are dependent on the wild products of the forests. In tiny groups which rarely exceed twenty or thirty persons, they roam about, staying three or four days at most in one spot. Each group has a traditionally assigned territory of about twenty square miles; and beyond a radius of thirty miles from the centre of the territory encounters with other groups are rare and changes in the spoken dialect considerable.

Among the Semang it would seem that habitat determines economy, and economy the structure of society; but there is nothing fatal or complete about this determinism. The Semang gather the fruit from the trees, but do not tend them or select them in any way. But they might do so, either on an original suggestion from within the group or by borrowing from without. The principles of creativity and diffusion might win in a battle with the despotic control exercised by the habitat. Again, the economy—by which we mean here their methods of obtaining their daily food—is a factor but not a determinant of their social structure. The groups live detached from one another. But are they obliged to live after this fashion? The aborigines of Australia live for the greater part of the year in detached groups, yet they come together annually for the great religious festival and the rites of initiation. The Semang behave

differently, but not in obedience to any iron law of economics or sociology.

Habitat, economy, and society are co-factors but not determinants of a civilization. These co-factors must balance in a relatively coherent pattern if the civilization is to be possible. What emerges from our discussion is the importance of a new principle : the principle of the Concordance of Cultural Factors.

§ 7. *Marxism and Civilization.*

There has also emerged from our discussion a criticism of economic determinism, and this doctrine is usually included among the formularies of Marxism. As we know, the followers of Marx have developed his economics and sociology into a complete system of philosophy, that of ' dialectical materialism '. The dialectic derives from Hegel, and the materialism from the French rationalists of the eighteenth century and their successors, the economists and scientists of the nineteenth.

Dialectical materialism is a difficult philosophy, leading to a number of diverse interpretations, largely because its sources of inspiration are so disparate. Hegel's spiritual atmosphere was the romantic reaction to the French Revolution, an atmosphere enveloping the greater part of Europe for the first thirty to forty years of the nineteenth century. Hegel's merit is the reintroduction of the concept of creative change—a principle of creativity in fact—into the statical metaphysics of his immediate predecessors. We have referred already to the romantic worship of genius and æsthetic creativity. Hegel is the philosopher of romanticism. The Hegelian dialectic is the subdivision of the process of creative change into three phases : the Old gives birth to the New, the New battles with the Old, and the victorious New becomes in turn the Old—thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

That the philosopher of creative change should have been the spiritual father of the revolutionary politician

Marx and the revolutionary theologian Strauss is understandable, but that he should also have been the high priest of Prussian conservatism and state-worship is surprising. The contradiction can easily be resolved. Hegel is a metaphysician, not a sociologist. The phases into which he analyses the process of historic change are independent both of history and of change; for he holds that history is made, not by human beings, but by the Absolute; and the Absolute is beyond history. When one form of civilization is replaced by another, then, according to Hegel, the change-producing power is not the creativity of man but the logic of God. Hegel believed he had invented a new logic, superior to the logic of common sense and of science and of mathematics; he believed that he could display the whole structure of the Universe—for Hegel's Absolute is the Universe in its totality—in a continuous series of logical deductions. Hegel's Absolute, being superior to history, can be adored by conservatives who dislike change; but the real substance of Hegel's philosophy, as any reader of Hegel's work can discover for himself, is taken not from logic but from history, the history of civilization. Hegel kindled the revolutionary spirit of Marx and Strauss, because he was the first great thinker to introduce history into philosophy.

The societies with which Marx is principally concerned are separated from such a primitive society as the Semang by wellnigh the whole content of human culture. Marxism in primarily interested in the societies which have emerged in Europe since the Middle Ages. In these societies, the division of labour is considerable and the class structure clearly articulated. And in some of the greatest and most influential of them there has been a revolutionary transfer of power from the feudal landlord to the bourgeois capitalist.

While Marxism cannot be dissociated from the personality and idiosyncracy of its three principal founders, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, nevertheless its philosophic

content can be analysed and epitomized into three assertions: First, every constituent of civilization is subject to change. The Christian religion, the capitalist system, and the political hegemony of the white races are man-made, and therefore constituents of civilization. Second, the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism is an instance of dialectical change. The transition from Capitalism to Communism is again an instance of dialectical change, and is predictable in advance of its actual occurrence, because Feudalism, Capitalism, and Communism form a dialectical triad in the Hegelian sense. Third, the economy of a society, and more particularly the division of its labour and of its income—this division being the basis of class-distinctions—determines its 'ideology.' And by 'ideology', Marxism understands the ideas and feelings of the individual members of the society which find their social expression in systems of religion, morals, law, politics, philosophy, and in works of literature and art.

With regard to the first of the assertions of Marxism, it might be objected that Heraclitus had said as much many centuries ago. No doubt he had. Hegel, too, after his own fashion, had promulgated the law of change in society and civilization. But Hegel drew the line at the Prussian autocracy; beyond the Frederic Williams of Prussia there was to be no more change; monarchy was the last word of the Absolute.

§ 8. *Marxism and Metaphysics.*

We pass to the second assertion of Marxism. Feudalism, Capitalism, and Communism are the three terms of a dialectical progression. As we have said, the dialectic as a logical triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, is a doubtful legacy from Hegelian metaphysics; but the dialectic as a way of understanding the historic process is a precious gift of Hegel's to the nineteenth-century. Hegel, the leading philosopher of the romantic movement,

had an extraordinary flair for the understanding of history. To Marxism as science, Hegel contributed nothing. Marxism owes what is scientific in its sociology to the economics of Marx.

Marxism is a prophetic intuition of the future based on a realistic interpretation of the past. A new sense for history is Hegel's gift to Marxism and not a pseudo-logical assurance of final victory. The twentieth century has put logic in its place; it is impressed neither by Aristotle's nor Hegel's logic. But in the early days of Marxism the Hegelian dialectic was a metaphysical ally, inspiring socialists with a belief in the inevitableness of victory. But the essence of the Marxist faith is faith in the possibility of a socialist commonwealth—faith but not logical certainty. Faith cannot be demonstrated metaphysically. For if all propositions are excluded from metaphysics except such as can be demonstrated or whose truth is obvious *a priori*, we arrive at pure mathematics. And faith cannot be nourished on a diet of pure mathematics.

Marxism has not as yet emancipated itself completely from metaphysics. Neither has Marxism always realized that metaphysics as a cultural product, and as one limited at most to two or three culture zones—only the Greeks, Hindus, and Chinese evolved independently systems of metaphysics—demands a sociological explanation. Marxists maintain, as we know, that systems of philosophy are *post hoc* apologies for, and rationalizations of, the economy and vary with the economy. Even if this is the case, we have not had explained to us the cultural status of metaphysics; still less do we understand why all metaphysics should be false, except the one derived from Hegel.

The fact is that Marx, in common with the great majority of mankind, could not help being, to some extent at least, the child and victim of his own epoch. If Marx were alive to-day, he would not contrast his so-called 'materialism' with Hegel's 'idealism'; he would

not say 'Hegel derives the world of things from the world of ideas, whereas I, inverting the sequence, derive the ideas from the things.' What Marx would say is this: 'I am a sociologist and not a metaphysician. Metaphysics is the opium, not of the masses, but of the intelligentsia; and, especially, of such sections of the intelligentsia as derive an income from, but have no religious faith in the value of, the class-society to which they belong. Hegel is a metaphysician. I am a social scientist. Hegel traffics in super-historical categories. I, on the contrary, am a realist historian and a social psychologist. I know that of all human motives the economic motive is primary and paramount; and I would like to trace the influence of this motive throughout human history. I recognize that sociology is not yet a science, but that a beginning has been made with economics which is a part of sociology. As an economist, I believe that the private ownership of the means of production, the growing concentration of capital, the recurrent crises of over-production and under-consumption, the spread of economic knowledge among the masses and their developing class-consciousness, are all combining to strain, and finally to break, the capitalist system. As a social reformer, I believe that human welfare will be augmented by successive approximations to an equalitarian society. But my economic analysis, my ethical convictions, and my faith in the coming triumph of social justice, do not require to be buttressed by the specious ratiocinations of the pseudo-science of metaphysics.'

Marx was a student when Hegelianism swept through Europe like an epidemic. (In this country Hegelianism arrived half a century later, when the first signs of dissatisfaction with industrialization and applied science were showing themselves in our academic class.) The intellectual atmosphere of one's youth cannot easily be dissipated: it persists when youth is over. Besides, Marx, Strauss, and Feuerbach, even if they had fought the *Zeitgeist*, would have been ignored. As young

Hegelians, disciples of the outstanding thinker of the age, they got a hearing. It is becoming clearer to us to-day that Marxism will never be ground to a clean intellectual edge until it has laid the ghost of Hegel.

The third assertion contains the kernel of Marxism. Its popular but misleading designation is ' the materialist interpretation of history '. We have already stated it in the form : The economy of a society determines its ideology. By the economy is meant all the social arrangements and institutions by which a society gets its living, with special emphasis on the means of production, the division of labour, the class of owners, and the laws of property. By ideology is meant, not only the ideas, feelings, and subjective states of consciousness in the individual members of a society, but the objective expression of these states in the society's religion, morality, politics, philosophy, and art.

We must first of all dispose of the unfortunate associations of the term ' materialist ' in the formula ' the materialist interpretation of history '. The terms ' materialism ' and ' materialist ' came into Marxism as a counterblast to Hegel's so-called ' Idealism '. It need scarcely be pointed out that there is nothing intrinsically noble about ' Idealism ' or base about ' Materialism '. Yet sociology is still frequently stigmatized as ' materialistic ' because it is charged with applying to ' the things of the spirit '—what, in fact, Marxism calls ' ideology '—the formularies derived from physics, the most successful and coherent of the sciences and one popularly supposed to be the special science of ' matter '.

There are at least three sources of confusion with regard to ' materialism,' one derived from popular Christianity, one from class prejudice, and the third from philosophical terminology. It will be remembered that at the beginning of this chapter we distinguished between the internal and external aspects of civilization, regretting that distinctive terms had not been invented

for them. The ideas and feelings of Mozart belong to the internal, while his score belongs to the external aspect of civilization. Music is supposed to be the most ethereal, the most purely spiritual, of human creations; nevertheless, music is impossible without paper, ink, and instruments. All these are material—the human voice as well. Remove the vocal organs or the air, and the most spiritual of songs is suffocated. 'Mind' is inseparable from 'matter', in this world at least. But popular Christianity has so stressed the dualism and obscured the compresence of mind and matter that any reference to the external side of civilization is suspected of being anti-Christian propaganda.

The second source of confusion with regard to 'materialism' is the prejudice that there is something gross and vulgar about economic activity. Spengler, the author of *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (The Downfall of Western Civilization), is almost beside himself with fury at the thought that, since the World War, politics in Prussia have been subordinated to economics. Spengler belongs to the German academic class. In common with his patrons, the landowners and capitalists of Prussia, he takes for granted that his food, clothing, and shelter will always be forthcoming as a result of the economic activities of the working classes; and that he will be free to pursue the 'higher' activities of the scholar. In Spengler's two-volume work devoted to 'Kultur', only 48 pages out of 1140 are devoted to 'Wirtschaft' (economy). And even these 48 pages are devoted to 'Das Geld' and 'Die Machine', money and machinery, the more refined of the topics discussed by economists. The making of food and clothing is to be excluded from the privileged circle of 'Kultur'. But on what grounds? Because a residuum of Christian dualism has mingled with class snobbery? Food and clothing are not lumps of brute matter. They are matter transubstantiated into artifacts by the condensation of centuries of cultural creativity and diffusion. Economic activity is just as

spiritual and just as material as the activity of the scholar or the musician or the statesman.

The central core of 'the economic interpretation of history' is the patent fact that a society can dispense with the services of the scholar, musician, and statesman, but not with those of the cultivator of crops and the builder of houses. In this sense, the primacy of economic activity is indisputable. But if we go further than this and assert that the economy is the sole determinant of the ideology, that, for instance, Spengler's economic dependence upon the good will of the rich men of Prussia explains completely the *Untergang des Abendlandes*, then we are dogmatizing beyond the facts. This point is brought out in the writings of recent commentators on Marx, who quote the letters of Engels (the collaborator and interpreter of Marx) to a number of young Marxists. Engels prunes the extravagances of his interrogators. He admits that the ideology can react upon the economy; that the economy, in short, is not the sole determinant of the religion, morals, art of a society. Engels, too, had not entirely emancipated himself from Hegel. But it is nevertheless clear from the correspondence that the assertion, 'the economy determines the ideology', is not to be understood as a proposition of a materialist metaphysic, to be set off against the converse proposition of the idealistic metaphysic of Hegel.

Employing the sociological language of our own times, we shall say that a society is a correlated network of activities; that the economic activity is of primary, but not of sole importance. The extent to which the economic motive is primary can be gauged, in part by sociological analysis of the external social structure, in part by a psychological analysis of the states of mind of the individuals composing the several social classes. The social philosophy of Plato is unintelligible unless it is set against the background of the class struggles in the decaying city-state of Athens. Plato was a landowner and an aristocrat. The landowning aristocrat, with an assured

though fixed income, is prompted by different motives from those of the merchant-adventurer, with an uncertain income that he is ambitious to increase. And what the reactions of the aristocrat are, when his income is no longer assured, we can gather from the class struggles within most of the great societies recorded in history.

We shall say, then, that all the factors of a civilization are interrelated: the economy, the ideology, and all the institutions to which the two give rise. They are interrelated, because they are the activities of individuals within a society; and we know already that the process of the diffusion of culture operates not only as between societies, but as between individuals of the same society.

CHAPTER VII

SCIENCE, MORALS, AND RELIGION

§ 1. *The anatomy of civilization.*

FROM our examination of the culture-process and our criticism of a number of well-known theories of civilization, there has emerged a number of principles. The principles of diffusion, of creativity, and of concordance seem to be the most important and to have the largest fields of application. These principles belong to the 'physiology' of civilization; they are shorthand formulas describing how civilization spreads, how it changes, how it arrives at moments of equilibrium between interpenetrating factors.

In this chapter we are concerned more with the 'anatomy' than with the 'physiology' of civilization, but always with the object of elucidating additional principles of working. Accordingly, we propose to consider Science, Morals, and Religion as the three prime factors of civilization. Each of these prime factors will be discussed again more fully in later chapters and against the background of world history.

In our discussion of Marxism and of the materialist interpretation of history, we placed morals and religion temporally under the rubric of ideology. But we have shown that the distinction between the ideal and the material aspects of civilization is either an unreal one, born of the polemic between two systems of metaphysics, or it is confused with the real but very different distinction between the external and internal aspects of civilization. We shall show that science, morals, and religion are just as material as they are ideal; that, primarily, they are

social functions and only derivatively are they to be regarded as individual performances.

We shall maintain that, primarily, science is the adaptation of nature to group needs ; that morals is the mould of custom by which the individual is fashioned into solidarity with his group ; that religion is the mental conquest of the distance between the group and the Beyond, thereby restoring the group's self-confidence and sustaining its will-to-live. We shall show that, alike in the simple as in the complex civilizations, the principal dogma of most of the faiths of mankind is the belief in ' transcendental kinship ', the possibility of extending the kinship group so as to include the non-human entities of the world. The felt opposition between the Human and the non-Human, which is our primordial act of self-consciousness, is dissolved by faith's assumption that the opposition is only apparent, that the non-human entities are the kinsmen of the human.

§ 2. *The Science of the Semang.*

By science, we mean usually the knowledge of nature, more especially the knowledge of the external world. In what sense can we be said to know nature ? It is easy to answer the question, if we are dealing with a primitive people, such as the Semang of Malaya. They know that the sap of the upas tree, when heated over the fire, yields a sticky paste which is poisonous and which can be smeared over the tip of an arrow. They also know that if the poisoned arrow is shot from a bow at birds and small mammals, it kills them almost instantaneously ; whereas, if it is shot at monkeys or wild pigs, it takes a few minutes for the poison to prove fatal. Everyone will agree that this is precise, well-tested, and objective knowledge. It is entirely independent of any ' over-beliefs ' the Semang may cherish as to the spirits resident in the upas tree or the wild pig, and equally independent of any magico-religious ceremonies they may perform to ensure the success of their hunting. Anyone proceeding

to the territories of the Semang can repeat their procedure and obtain the same results. The science of the Semang is their knowledge of an ordered set of operations which, if performed upon a small number of selected objects, will transform them from the condition in which they are found in nature to the condition in which they are useful to the Semang.

The scientists of the Semang, in common with their confrères in the laboratories, select for their operations a limited group of objects from the unlimited field of nature, ignoring the rest. Why the rest can be ignored, the Semang do not inquire and their confrères do not know. The fact remains ; they can be ignored. And if they could not, science would be impossible : for we should have to know everything before we could know anything. Some metaphysicians do claim ' to know everything ' ; but up till now the scientists have not found them helpful. The limited group of objects selected by the scientist for his operations has been happily named by Professor Levy a group of isolates.

The isolates of the laboratory are much more carefully selected, the operations performed upon them much more subtle and resting upon a much larger *corpus* of knowledge, and the utility of the completed operations less obvious, than is the case with the isolates of the Semang. Yet the knowledge of science yielded by the jungle is identical in type with that acquired in the laboratory. The proposition that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen is a shorthand description of a connected set of operations : If a quantity of slightly acidulated water is taken and an electric current passed through it, two gases are given off whose character can be identified by performing upon them a further set of operations.

We assert that all science and, indeed, all human knowledge—with the sole exception of pure mathematics —is of the same type as the hunting rules of the Semang. We have dealt with this exception at some length in a previous chapter. Here it will be sufficient if we remember

that pure mathematics gives us no knowledge of the world, nor any rules for changing it.

It is a commonplace that by means of science we control nature. The scientist is successful in controlling nature, not because he has penetrated into 'ultimate reality' or because he has learned 'the truth about nature'—metaphysicians employ these phrases—but because, taking man and the world outside him as brute facts, compresent and yet distinct, he has devised a set of instruments for the manipulation and transformation of isolates. The Semang have their bows and arrows. Without them they could not have discovered that upas tree sap could poison animals. Without the telescope Galileo could not have discovered the moons of Jupiter. The men who used bronze tools knew, as a rule, more science than those who were dependent on stone. And iron in this respect was an improvement on bronze. The use of iron multiplied enormously the number and variety of operations that could be performed upon the soil, the wood, the stone, and the materials found in nature.

As scientists use instruments to operate upon nature, and as instruments are not usually found in nature, we may wonder how they are made. The answer is that they are made by the master instrument, the human hand. And the human hand is guided by a set of rules of operation, discovered partly by trial and error, partly by the insight of gifted individuals. These rules are communicated to the group. The group transmits them to successive generations of its members, and sometimes to other groups on the occasions of culture-contact. It may be noted that the first kind of transmission is what we usually understand by education; in the simpler civilizations, it is the education of the child by the parents and kinsfolk, the child following usually the parental model of life. In fact, we may say that diffusion of culture is the education of one group by another, whereas education is the diffusion of culture from the group to its members.

§ 3. *The Instrumentalist View of Science.*

It is one of the merits of ' instrumentalism '—the name sometimes given to the philosophy of Professor John Dewey—that it links human knowledge so insistently with rules of operation. Dewey has also been called a Pragmatist. But his pragmatism is very different from that of his fellow-countryman, William James. Religion was James's hobby, especially religion of the individualistic if not eccentric type. And the principal use to which James put his pragmatism was the defence of his hobby. In the voluminous pages of his *Varieties of Religious Experience*—a work of genius, incidentally—there is never a suggestion that religion is primarily a social affair. Of churches and rites and clerics—clerics with incomes accruing to them from the laity—there is no mention. The Protestant and the ex-Protestant individualist—America is the land of rugged individualism—has a too ' spiritual ' view of religion to be able to attend to its ' material ' or its social aspects.

In Dewey's writings on education, progress in science is associated with the progress of the practical arts, especially the arts of horticulture, weaving, and pottery. The practice of these arts in the handicraft lesson at school is advocated in order to give the children their first steps in science and, at the same time, an introduction to the history of civilization.

The instrumentalist theory of science has the very great advantage of being independent of metaphysical assumptions as to the ' ultimate ' character of the mental and of the physical and of the relation between them. And the instrumentalist view is amply confirmed by the history of science and of culture. But it will be objected that the practical arts are not science in the modern sense of science ; that science is very different from the rules of thumb of a lucky utilitarianism ; that genuine science is the fruit of abstract thought ; and that the Greeks were the first as they were the sole people of antiquity who were

capable of it. The unique genius of the Greeks, then, is the basis of the objection. Well, we have said before that recourse to genius or special inspiration should be the sociologist's last resource. The pre-eminence of the Greeks in science is capable of a sociological explanation. And we claim for the explanation we are about to give that it reinforces the instrumentalist theory of science as well as the general view of civilization that we have been advancing.

We begin by stressing the need for taking large views as to what science is. Any *corpus* of tested, coherent, and public knowledge is entitled to be called science. And by 'coherent' we do not mean 'logical'. Logic, as its etymology suggests, is a matter of words, especially the words or symbols of pure mathematics. Logic is a late and a disastrous interloper into knowledge. Scientific knowledge is coherent when it refers to an ordered series of operations; and it is true or tested when the end term of the series is, in factual experience, the one predicted by the science.

If, by science, we mean the highly specialized study of astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, as they are carried on to-day under the direction of academic teachers, then the contribution made by the Greeks to science was not very great. In pure geometry it is true their work was epoch-making. In astronomy and mechanics, where their geometry could be applied, they made a small but notable number of discoveries; but in physics, chemistry, biology, and geography their direct contributions were either negligible or obstructive of further progress.

§ 4. *Rationalism and the Greeks.*

The Greeks are the first rationalists of human history. They are the first people to look at the world and their fellow-men directly, without spectacles coloured by religious preconceptions. These characteristics are clearly marked in the way the Greeks write history. What a

contrast with the chronicles of the Hebrews ! Compare the style of Ezra and Nehemiah with that of the *History of the Peloponnesian War* composed by Thucydides. And yet, in date of publication, they are separated by not much more than half a century. Or compare the Acts of the Apostles with the *Histories* of Tacitus ; in point of date they are almost contemporary ; but in their basic assumptions about the world and man's motives they are worlds apart. They breathe a different air. The fact that Tacitus was a Roman and not a Greek is unimportant ; the Greeks were the teachers of the Romans in the art of writing history, as in so much else. What specially impresses us is that the classical historians are men of the world and not ecclesiastically minded chroniclers. Thucydides, like Julius Cæsar, is a soldier, a statesman, a sociologist, as well as a historian. Their writings read like modern works. Their presuppositions as to the probable behaviour of men and things are very close to our own. There are no miracles, no magicians, no oracles, no angels, no sacred places, no divine interventions. They see human beings naturalistically against a social and geographical background. They realize that the unforeseen occurs in war ; but that, none the less, there is a rational art of war which amounts to science. For them, the science of war consists in an ordered series of operations performed by one group of men and things upon another group. For the purposes of war, men belong to the same category as things, the category of units of force. Soldiers, it is true, have to be fed and tended, and their morale is a force-factor. Still, their souls can be neglected and the souls of the enemy likewise. The general regards the soldier from without, not from within. He ignores the transcendent powers. The science of war is for the Greek or Roman general an ordered series of operations, as a result of which the number of force-units he can assemble at a salient point exceeds that of the enemy.

§ 5. *The Science of Government and the passing of Animism.*

The Greeks were the first who dared to place human beings in the category of profane things. Whether as kinsmen and friends or as strangers and enemies, human beings had hitherto been considered sacred; for they were full of blood, breath, soul-stuff, 'mana'. Mana was the mysterious life-force circulating through the social group; through the successive generations; through all living beings; through everything remarkable in the world. The Greeks were the first to secularize that sacred being, man. And secularized men are the isolates of the science of government. It is the science of government which the Greeks originated; and in government we reckon diplomacy, administration, and war. Many of the contributions of the Greeks and Romans to the science of government are by no means out of date. Indeed it was in the science of government, and only in this science, that the Romans were superior to the Greeks. The Romans were indifferent to the mathematical, physical, and biological sciences. Their geometry was contemptible, consisting of one or two rather crude rules-of-thumb in mensuration; and their arithmetic was done in Roman numerals! Yet, despite their deficiency in mathematical knowledge, their soldiering was superior to that of the mathematically-minded Greeks.

The science of government of classical antiquity 'desacralized' man, distributing him between the profane categories of worker, soldier, and taxpayer. The isolates of this science are work-units, force-units, and money-units. The science of government might serve as an instrument of the good life; but as a science it was indifferent to ethical evaluations. Pontius Pilate was not concerned in giving the Jews a good life, but in extracting from them the legal quota of taxation, and more if possible. And what made a good life for the Romans did not make it for the Jews. Without the new science of government, the imperialisms of Greece and Rome would

have been impossible. And the imperialisms failed because the new science was not in fact an instrument of the good life.

We have brought back the problem of Greek science to the problem of the origin of the Greek science of government. The Greeks, as we have seen, were the first to discharge or neutralize the mana, the life-force which from time immemorial had been regarded as the pervading quintessence of a human being. The neutralized human being was just a thing like other things. How came the Greeks to regard human beings as things? The answer is, because they were the first people that abandoned the tradition handed down from primitive civilization of regarding things as quasi-human.

The belief that what we in our state of sophistication regard as things is pervaded by a power or soul of a quasi-human kind is usually called animism or animatism. The distinction between animism and animatism, for which anthropology is indebted to Dr. Marett, is important, but we can neglect it here. The Greeks are the first rationalists as well as the first social scientists, because they emancipated themselves from animistic beliefs. Not entirely, of course, yet sufficiently. Animism survived as a literary fashion in the Greek mythology; as a *motif* for plastic art; and in some forms of official religion. Among the masses animistic superstitions never disappeared; and when Greece was dying, they revived. Plutarch, who was a contemporary of the Gospel editors, is thoroughly ghost-ridden, as is evident from those plays of Shakespeare of which Plutarch's *Lives* are the source. But among the educated classes in the best days of Athens animistic beliefs were no longer taken seriously.

The Greeks, then, were the first rationalists because they were the first to emancipate themselves from animistic beliefs, held universally by their forbears and their contemporaries. We are in search of the historic conditions that made this emancipation possible. If they are not discoverable, we shall have to fall back upon

the theories of genius and special inspiration. We are very reluctant to do so, because these theories imply that only the clear-seeing genius can rise superior to the illusions of the multitude. On this view, the educated classes in the Europe and America of to-day (and such other parts of the world as have come under their influence) distinguish between men and things, between the human and the non-human, between mind and matter, because they are the pupils of the Greeks ; whereas all the peoples, who have not been permeated by Hellenic influences, confuse the category of the mental with the category of the physical. And these peoples include the greater part of the world's population ; and an ever-increasing part, the farther we recede from the present day. We Western intellectuals are credited with seeing the so-called facts of the world, the brute facts, clearly and distinctly, because we are seeing with the eyes of Hellenic genius. Apparently, the rest of mankind is, as it always has been, the victim of illusion.

Descartes maintained that clear and distinct ideas could never deceive us ; but on second thoughts he saw the possibility that such ideas might be hallucinatory. So he brought in God to guarantee their authenticity. Now Lévy-Bruhl, the French philosopher and sociologist, is not as logical as his fellow-countryman, Descartes. Lévy-Bruhl takes it for granted that ' civilized ' man sees the facts as they really are, while the primitive sees them through a cloud of ' mystical mentality '. As a philosopher, Lévy-Bruhl should have kept open the possibility that we also distort the facts, seeing them through the spectacles of Hellenic rationalism.

§ 6. *Lévy-Bruhl and the 'Mystical Mentality' of Primitives.*

In a series of works on anthropology, beginning with *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, Lévy-Bruhl maintains that primitives have a totally different mentality

from that of civilized men. According to him, the primitive peoples the world with occult powers, so that material objects, animals, and human beings behave like the phantasmagoria of a dream, in defiance of all those laws of identity, causation, and probability which the civilized man takes for granted and upon which he constructs his map of reality.

One of three women on a river bank—to take an illustration of Lévy-Bruhl's—is dragged under by a crocodile. The two survivors are charged with causing death by witchcraft. Crocodiles never attack human beings, so the natives say, unless instructed to do so telepathically. Besides, no event is accidental ; and every case of death is due to witchcraft. To take another illustration of Lévy-Bruhl's. Missionaries, who have spent many weeks in medical attendance on sick natives, are rewarded not with gratitude, but with a demand for compensation. The natives assume that the white man could cure them instantaneously, if he chose, by uttering the appropriate spell. As the white man, for purely private reasons, refrains from doing so, the native demands compensation for having been exploited. The natives believe that the solemn recitation of a spell, which admittedly affects the mind of a listener close by, can also produce a physical effect, remedial or deleterious according to the intention of the magician, upon distant material objects. In the case of the three women, the natives, while admitting that crocodiles are animals, credit them with the mental receptivity of human beings.

Primitives distinguish between crocodiles and their human victims—there are limits to their mysticism—and they distinguish also between the primary cause of death, which is the witch's spell or magic, and the secondary cause which is the crocodile's teeth. But they do not distinguish, as we do, between mental and physical causation.

When a doctor sets a broken limb he can consider it in relative isolation from the rest of the patient's body and

in almost complete isolation from the patient's mind; he applies to the limb the appropriate principles of mechanics, physiology, and bio-chemistry, all of them highly abstractive sciences, built up by the abstracting of isolates from the changing world. Applied medicine isolates the body from the mind-body, which is the living person; then it isolates the limb from the body; and finally it isolates the mechanical properties of the limb from its physiological or bio-chemical properties. We may say that applied medicine works with isolates of the second and third order, which, *prima facie*, are extraordinarily unlike the human being to which they are applied. Medicine achieves its greatest triumphs, when it can treat a human being as though he were a chemical compound in a test-tube. In other words, the science of the more complex civilizations succeeds by regarding human beings as things. And the science of the simple civilization fails because it regards things as though they were human beings. It fails, that is to say, in competition with the science of the complex civilizations.

What other test is there of the distinction between reality and illusion except the test of success or failure? There is nothing ethically superior about success. The white man's civilization has many million members; and in some of his habitats he can feed and clothe and house six or seven hundred people to the square mile. The Semang of Malaya number a few thousands and their mode of life keeps their population down to about one to the square mile. We have multiplied. They have not. As Professor Gordon Childe observes in his *Man Makes Himself*, survival and multiplication is one test of success. And such success, we may note, is ethically neutral.

The problem of the relation between the mental and the physical, between mentality and materiality, between the human and the non-human, between man and nature, is the crux of metaphysics and theology. Professor Broad in the last chapter of his treatise on *The Mind and its Place in Nature* discusses seventeen types of possible

relations between mentality and materiality. It is a relief to know that there are not more than seventeen. Is the view held by the primitives one of the seventeen? Perhaps primitives practise metaphysics without talking its language? Lévy-Bruhl tells us that primitives regard everything in the world as a centre of psychic force; the occult forces of their mysticism being psychic forces. It is curious that Leibniz held a similar view: according to him, the world consists of monads, the monad being a private soul. Again, such entities as crocodiles appear to Europeans to have essentially non-human, i.e. non-mental (in the human sense of mental) characteristics. But, according to Professor Broad, Hegel and his British disciples are mentalists—mentalists are idealists in the ethically neutral significance of that term. And mentalists, in Broad's words, hold 'that material characteristics are delusive appearances of certain mental characteristics.' In other words, Hegel would hold that there is nothing physical about a crocodile at all; a crocodile is all mind; a peculiar kind of mind, but still a mind.

As the primitives keep company with Leibniz and Hegel, we are justified in rejecting Lévy-Bruhl's theory, that we see objects as they really are, while the primitive projects on to them the contents of his mystical mentality. The difference between the primitives and the mentalists is this; the primitives live up to their theories, the mentalists do not. A propos of Leibniz, Professor Broad remarks that only a very learned and acute man would dream of regarding his arm-chair or his poker as a colony of souls. Leibniz's *Monadology* is after all only a logician's diversion. Leibniz can pretend he is a primitive—a very learned primitive, of course—assigning psychical properties to physical objects, because he belongs to a civilization that has achieved its greatest successes by disregarding the psyche of human beings and thinking of them as objects obeying physical laws. The primitive is a metaphysician whose civilization has failed; while so-called materialism has succeeded.

But if the animism or pan-psychism of the primitive is not an illusion, but only a relatively unsuccessful belief, how did the human race come to adopt it? For in one form or another, all peoples have held or still hold it. And further, why were the Greeks the first people to abandon it? We must answer the first question before we can answer the second.

§ 7. *Durkheim and the Group-life of Primitives.*

To answer the first question, we must turn to the group-life of primitives. Durkheim, the eminent French sociologist, has demonstrated the primacy of the group in every department of primitive culture, and most of all in the department of religion. Whatever else is illusory, group-life is not. In his important work, *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, he points out, criticizing the theories of primitive religion set up by E. B. Tylor, Herbert Spencer, and Max Müller, that they reduce religious beliefs 'to so many hallucinatory representations, without any objective foundation whatever'. And he concludes his criticism with the words: 'What sort of science is it (the science of religion is meant) whose principal discovery is that the subject of which it treats does not exist?'

For the primitive, the kinship group is an oasis in the desert of the non-human world. Whether the kinship group is the family, or the clan, or the gens, or even the tribe—the tribes of Israel were the putative children of Jacob—the group itself is, for its members, the undying fire of the Human; the defining characteristics of the human species are to be found, not in humanity as a whole—'humanity' is not a concept that has emerged as yet—but in the group. The human principle is what is common to the clansmen; and this common factor may be equated to blood or to the aliment of communal meals or to descent. But, in whatever terms they become conscious of their commonalty, of its existence they have no

doubt. This consciousness rises to a high point of effervescence at the annual religious festivals. But all primitives do not have these festivals, which in the case of the Australian aborigines are totemic celebrations. And Durkheim, as many of his critics point out—R. H. Lowie, for instance, the author of *Primitive Religion*—has probably overstressed their importance.

§ 8. *Custom and Creativity among Primitives.*

Only within the kin-group is the primitive at home. The human principle within him—we may think of it as his group-bred consciousness, provided we remember that clear ideas about the Ego are the last and not the first words of civilization—diffuses through to the other group-members and they in turn communicate to him their common culture. A kinship-group is mankind's earliest school. Education, as we have already remarked, is the diffusion of culture within the group. The first business of a school is to teach the child ; the second, perhaps, to allow the child to teach the school ; the latter process is supposed to be practised in those interesting British institutions known as crank schools ; but primitives do not tolerate cranks and are usually hostile to innovators. In primitive societies the principle of creativity is by no means dead, but it is working unobtrusively and in secret. Where his presence is noticed, the would-be creator is usually suppressed. Creativity is crime. It is not surprising, therefore, that the moral code or rather the unwritten code of customary conduct is a string of negatives. Thou shalt not steal ; thou shalt not kill. The function of the would-be innovator in primitive society is catalytic ; he precipitates the rules of solidarity ; he makes the group conscious of what its habit-structure is.

The principle of Creativity, in conflict with the principle of diffusion, gives birth to the morals of the group. The morals of the group are the forms in which the group becomes conscious of its solidarity. And solidarity is a

special form of the principle of Concordance. For it will be remembered that this latter principle ensures the balance between all the factors of a culture, whereas the principle of Social Solidarity ensures a balance between the pull of the group on the individual and the reactive pull of the individual upon the group. Every individual member of the group overtly maintains and covertly modifies the social balance ; he impresses upon his fellows the idiosyncrasies of his mental make-up and his individual though unobtrusive variations upon the common stock of received ideas ; he broadcasts throughout the group his personal accent, while listening-in to the group-voice. Social solidarity is the balance between the two functions of broadcasting and listening-in.

This brief sketch of morals and of the principle of social solidarity will be expanded in later chapters. What it shows is that morals as well as religion are rooted in the group-life ; that the group in its origins is a kinship-group, in which solidarity is external and physical and overt, as well as internal and psychical and mysterious. The ' primacy of group-life ' for morals and religion would never have been questioned and most of the dilemmas of the modern mind never have been begotten, if the individualist's fallacy was less widespread. The individualist's fallacy is the private and swollen form of the racial genius theory ; it is the doctrine that the individual can explain himself, his mental make-up, his valuations, and his purposes, entirely in terms of the private working of the principle of creativity.

§ 9. ' *Moral Man and Immoral Society* ' : *the Individualist's fallacy.*

The extreme individualist believes that he is a self-made man. He also tends to believe that groups are essentially wicked and individuals virtuous. *Moral Man and Immoral Society* is the title of a recent book by an American theologian. And the individualist's fallacy is very much in evidence in some modern studies of group

psychology. The group is thought of as a mob or herd, liable to panic or to outbursts of sadism and always to paralysis of judgment. Outside the herd the individual is himself; inside it his conduct is an atavistic recollection of something his prehuman ancestors did. Freud's theory of group psychology is based on similar assumptions; Freud assumes that a gang of young males, under the pangs of sexual deprivation, murdered the old man-ape and acquired the œdipus complex; and that they transmitted in some way the unconscious memory of their guilt, perhaps via the Lamarckian principle of acquired characteristics. And by this theory Freud believes that he has thrown light upon the emotional relations between the crowd and the crowd-leader. The views of Trotter, Rivers, and McDougall are all more plausible than those of Freud; and McDougall's distinction between sympathy, suggestion, and imitation, is a valuable one. In his *Social Psychology* McDougall defines sympathy as the communication of emotion; suggestion, the communication of ideas to an uncritical recipient; and imitation as the copying by one individual of the bodily movements of another. But as McDougall himself admits in a recent book on *Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology*, the fruits of all this psychologizing are meagre.

In our view, the failure of psychology to achieve a scientific status is connected with the individualist's fallacy. Mental interaction between the members of a group is the basic fact of psychology. Every analysis of the individual's mental processes presupposes it. The analyst, whether he is Hume, William James, Bertrand Russell, or Freud, is himself a social product, is himself the outcome of a complex web of mental interactions. Mental interaction, education, diffusion of culture, are different names for the same thing. A mob, a crowd, a public meeting, a parliamentary session, a church service, a church at such moments when its members are not in each other's physical neighbourhood but communicate with each other by reading the same religious literature

and being ministered to by the same body of ecclesiastics, a regiment, a school—and to close this list with its most important item—a family, are all without exception fields of culture-diffusion. The group-culture may be ephemeral and pernicious, or it may be organized by means of 'material' artifacts and esteemed respectable, but whatever value we set upon this or that form of group-life, the Primacy of the Group remains a fundamental principle of civilization.

We may and we should analyse all the forms of group-life and all the varieties of mental interaction. But we must accept with natural piety the basic facts of culture-diffusion and of the primacy of the group. Without the group and the group-culture the individual is nothing; we may count him among the homonid mammals, but he is none the less devoid of human quality. The individualist's fallacy, like the metaphysician's fallacy, comes of the desire to get behind the human—and the human is at once the mental and the social—and to explain it in terms of something else, something simpler. Neither tortuous introspection nor the fanciful reconstruction of the unconscious mind of ape-man, or of the 'mystical' mentality of primitives or of those sophisticated mystics who practise Yogi-asceticism, is likely to be of profit to the science of psychology.

We have seen that morals and religion are rooted in group-life. We have given a brief sketch of morals. We return now to the problem of religion.

§ 10. *Religion: a compensation for the losing game played by human intelligence.*

Animism was and is still the most widely distributed of all the forms of religion. We can say of animism that animatism is its primitive and undifferentiated form and Christian theism its advanced and specialized form. What is common to every form of animism and perhaps to every form of religion, with the more than doubtful exception of Buddhism, is the assumption that the characteristics which define and are peculiar to human

beings are not the exclusive possession of the individuals of a human group but can be found elsewhere. The assumption is that the group and the totality of groups is not the complete locus of the human.

Outside the group and the material objects which it has 'humanized', by converting raw material into artifacts, is the illimitable world of the non-human, or of what, *prima facie*, is different from the human. Inside our group we are at home. The soul-stuff or blood or life or whatever it is that constitutes our belief in our human essence interfuses with the several essences of our fellows. Even the uncanny non-humanity of the newborn child and the animal-like egotism (or the inhuman originality) of the adolescent are finally dissolved into the homogenous non-viscous fluid of the group-life. But outside the tiny oasis constituted by the group, there is the great desert of the circumscribing world. How is the oasis related to the desert? The primitive cannot tell. Is there a way of irrigating the desert and so extending the boundaries of the oasis? There may be such a way, but the primitive does not know it; in other words, he does not know how to control nature or he has only embryonic notions how to proceed about it. Perhaps the desert will invade the oasis and destroy it? The primitive's fears may easily submerge his hopes. Hopes and fears are the offspring of intelligence. And intelligence, that costly jewel of our human status, may paralyse the will by multiplying prodigally the number of our fears. Our intelligence enables us to look before and after and in consequence plays with us a losing game; for intelligence multiplies our fears a great deal faster than it multiplies the remedies for overcoming them. Animals meet their troubles as they encounter them; man alone meets trouble by anticipation; for him the evils of the day are not enough. When man had eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, he discovered that he was naked to the world. He would have died of fright, had he not clothed himself with the assurance that the oasis

extended into the desert; that knowledge had a wider jurisdiction than the kin-group; that the non-human world, though superficially different, was at bottom of the same stuff as the human. And because the non-human world in which he took a special interest consisted of animals and plants, of the rain and of the sun, of objects which we, pupils of the Greek rationalists, would call physical or organic, but never human, the primitive turned unconsciously into a kind of pan-psychical metaphysician, into a low-brow progenitor of Leibniz and Hegel; for he found salvation and an unpremeditated release from all his fears in the doctrine that the non-human world is peopled by a race of ghostly kinsmen, bound by all the ties of blood to succour their own.

In a famous phrase of the Danish philosopher Höffding, religion is ' the conservation of values '. The term ' value ' has been worn rather thin by excessive usage at the hands of liberal theologians; it suggests that the substance of value is eternally the same, having its prototype and source in the Good, a metaphysical entity subsisting in the transcendental heaven of Plato. But if we substitute for ' value ', ' civilization '—civilization does not claim to be eternal—then Höffding's formula is acceptable. Undoubtedly the religion of the primitives is their faith in the conservation of civilization, not of civilization in general, but that patch of civilization with which they are familiar. The kin-group is the patch; everything they hold valuable is included in it. Without faith in his civilization, without the hope which was his working hypothesis that his civilization would weather the storms of adversity and the hostility or indifference of the external world, and without the conviction that because his civilization was possible it was worth while, it is certain that the primitive would never have survived. Today the native civilization of Polynesia is dying out, not because of warfare with the white man or of infection by his diseases, but because the natives are losing faith in the value of their civilization. And should the day come when we lose faith

in the value of our civilization, then our civilization will suffer the fate of the Polynesian.

As faith in civilization, religion can never die while civilization lives; in this intimate alliance with the civilization it sustains, the life of religion is unaffected by the advance of rationalism. What rationalism criticizes are the metaphysical assumptions by which faith in civilization is upheld. Rationalism allows—or should allow, if rationalists always knew their business—that it is not unreasonable or absurd to suppose that outside our earthly commonwealth there exists a vast storehouse of mind and value, wherein is to be found the totality of all things human; that everything of significance in human history has been distributed from this central storehouse; that human life has been able to maintain itself in a non-human environment because the patterns of the human and of the non-human interlace in a design issued from the same central storehouse; that the opposition between human and non-human is not ultimate, the presumption of its ultimacy being a delusive weakness of human insight. In other words, the transcendent God of theism or the immanent and pantheistic Absolute of the Hindus, are rational hypotheses for overcoming the dualism of mind and matter and of the human and the non-human. What rationalism asserts is, that to retain the dualism, and to abandon all attempts to overcome it, yields the better hypothesis, better because it works better. And the test of better working is this: Which hypothesis inspires the greater faith in civilization?

The rationalist is also entitled to point out that all religionists, whether primitive or advanced, employ the same terminology—which the advanced sometimes take as metaphor but the primitive never—in overcoming the dualism of the human and non-human. The primitive is an animist who conquers the recalcitrance of the non-human entities external to his group by asserting that they are centres of psychic force, that they resemble the only specimens of the human known to him, namely, his

kinsmen. The advanced theist is also an animist, who believes in a Father-God and regards his fellow believers as brothers in the faith; to him, of course, the church is not a real kin-group but an ideal or imaginary one.

We have answered the question, Why did the human race adopt animism? We know now that animism conquers the distance between the group and its environment, inspiring the group with the will to live and to conserve its civilization. We can now answer the second question, Why were the Greeks the first to abandon animism?

§ 11. *The secular realism of the Greeks: a theory of its origin.*

We have seen that the animist extends his mental and social categories to the world of things, while the Greek rationalist, reversing the process, extends his category of things so as to include human beings. We have pointed out that the outstanding science of the Greeks was the science of government; and that the Romans, the intellectual heirs of the Greeks, were indifferent to the other sciences. We have now to account for the secular realism of the Greek view of life; we have to explain why the Greeks were the earliest of peoples to look at men and things with 'modern' eyes. How was it that the Greeks, and no people before the Greeks, could venture upon the sacrilegious act of stripping the physical objects of the world of most of their mystical vestments?

We have seen that the ordered series of operations by which primitives like the Semang hunt and kill their quarry is an unexceptionable example of practical science. The operations are performed either by the hand or by an instrument which is an extension of the hand. The operations are a set of external bodily movements, which anyone can observe, and, if he chooses, can imitate, without troubling himself about the state of mind accompanying them. In short, the foreign observer can acquire the science of the Semang independently of their religion, but the child apprentice of a Semang father cannot.

The child apprentice acquires the ' over-beliefs ' and the concomitant emotions long before he goes hunting with his father. The very language acquired by a child in infancy, with the distinctions of gender attaching to inanimate things, amounts to an animist's catechism. In the terminology of McDougall, a foreign observer can imitate the actions without yielding sympathetically to the emotions or becoming suggestible to the beliefs of the people observed. He can behave in fact like a Japanese copyist of Western civilization. The Japanese have acquired the science, but have ignored the religion and the philosophy and, to some extent, the fine art of the West. They have imitated the ordered set of operations necessary to build a modern battleship without becoming converts to modern Christianity. For a people to borrow wholesale the practical science of the foreigner and yet keep itself from succumbing to the ' spiritual ' culture linked with it, is a very rare occurrence. Compare the Japanese with the Franks or the Visigoths ; the latter destroyed part and absorbed more of the knowledge of practical science which then existed within the confines of the Roman Empire ; but they did not remain Franks and Visigoths ; they paid for their acquired culture by losing their national identity and becoming a Latin and Christian people.

What we have called a rare occurrence did in fact take place round about the period between 1200 B.C. and 800 B.C. The Greeks acquired the material culture, the practical science and art, of the Aegean civilization, but neither its language nor its religion. The Aegean civilization interposed itself between the migrating Greeks and the lands of Egypt and Sumer-Babylonia. And to-day we can appreciate what the men of the Renaissance and of the Eighteenth-century enlightenment had overlooked. They thought that Hellenic civilization had leaped like Athene out of the head of Zeus ; we know that Aegean civilization was the fecund mother by whom the spirit of Hellas begot Hellenic civilization. The excavator's

spade has lifted Ancient Troy and the Labyrinth of Minos from the realm of myth to that of historical fact. Crete and the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean were ancient centres of the Aegean civilization. From Egypt and Sumer-Babylonia, the two originating centres of high civilization, civilization had been diffused into the Aegean. But Egypt and Babylonia were too strong and too highly organized for the adventuring Greek raiders of 1200 B.C. Hellenic invaders of Egypt in 1200 B.C., if they survived at all, were absorbed and Egyptianized ; but many centuries had to pass, five dynasties of decadent Pharaohs had to fall (twentieth dynasty of 1200 B.C. to the twenty-sixth of 663 B.C.) before the rise of Greece and the decay of Egypt made possible the converse process of the hellenization of the Egyptians. But the people whom the Greeks succeeded in conquering were the Aegeans, and the Aegeans were partly destroyed and partly absorbed. We realize from the excavations at Knossos the astonishing high level of Minoan civilization. The Greeks, like the Japanese, acquired the practical science of a high civilization but not its ' over-beliefs '. The Greeks were fortunate in migrating to the Eastern Mediterranean, the only region of high civilization which existed as yet upon the earth. And they were still more fortunate in encountering in the Aegeans an offshoot of the high civilization of Egypt and Babylonia which could be conquered politically, but which could not retaliate by the spiritual conquest of the conqueror.

§ 12. *The Conservation of the Instrument.*

What we have called a rare occurrence is the wholesale acquisition of the practical science, the craft-lore, the tools, of a high civilization. But the piecemeal diffusion of artifacts and of practical processes is an almost universal rule. Barter, brigandage, or piracy may cause an artifact like a pot or vase to travel many hundreds of miles. But the craft-lore, the science of vase-making and decorating, may travel even farther independently of the possession

of the vase of origin. Diffusion of a knowledge of the rules of operation, that is, of the science of the art, is a well-established principle of culture-history.

The ordered series of operations required for the cultivation of crops, dependent as they are upon the use of tools such as the hoe and the plough, is a far too long and a far too surprising series to have been reinvented continually up and down the globe ; but they can easily be imitated in relative independence of the ' over-beliefs ' attaching to them. Even if it is true, as the extreme diffusionists assert, that agriculture was an original discovery of Ancient Egypt and of Ancient Egypt alone, the science of this art could surely travel round the globe, independently of the associated beliefs in the death and resurrection of Osiris or in the magical fertility imparted to the soil by the divine Pharaoh.

This almost universal diffusion of single items taken from the practical science of a culture-group draws our attention to what we may call the Coefficient of Diffusion of a culture-constituent. The external side of a culture diffuses more readily than the internal. What the observer notices is the public side of a culture, not the states of mind of its practitioners. It is true, as Professor G. Elliot Smith has pointed out, that a religion, such as Buddhism, has diffused over an extraordinarily wide field. But Buddhism is a very late arrival upon the world stage, a veritable Ichabod, the child of cultural decadence, the reaction of the human mind to an unprecedented phenomenon—its consciousness of cultural retrogression, of the fact that ' the glory is departed from Israel '. The language, religion, institutions of a people vanish not infrequently with its political defeat. But its practical science survives. There is very little evidence that any of the great cultural inventions in the practical arts and sciences have ever been lost. The script of an advanced people may have become undecipherable to barbarians, but the fact that marks upon paper or upon baked clay may be used as an instrument of communication

is not lost. We propose to call this phenomenon 'the principle of the conservation of the instrument'.

What would happen to Western civilization if its thousand foremost men of science met simultaneously with a violent death? Bertrand Russell has asked this question and answered it. He believes that our scientific civilization would very soon decay. His grounds are, that scientific theory—a knowledge, say, of Maxwell's electrodynamic equations—is the foundation of our scientific practice, and that the disappearance of the theorists would in a short time paralyse the practitioners. We believe that this view overrates considerably the dependence of a civilization upon 'pure' science. The rise of Japan, the disdain of the Romans for 'theory', and the very late emergence of 'pure' science in the Hellenic civilization—very late by contrast with the emergence of practical science—is evidence against Russell's view. For the 'pure' science of Greece is very largely the creation of the Hellenistic period subsequent to the downfall of the Athenian Empire. Thales of Miletus, one of the seven sages of Greece and the father of Greek philosophy and mathematics, died about 550 B.C., only half a century before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, which terminated with the destruction of the Athenian Empire and the bankruptcy of the city-state civilization. The theoretical science of Greece is not the source of its rationalistic outlook on the world. It is, we maintain, in the practical science of the Aegean peoples acquired by the Greeks independently of Aegean 'over-beliefs' that we have to look for that source. The 'pure' science of the Greeks was inseparable from their philosophy, and their philosophy was inseparable from their metaphysics. And metaphysics is not the source but the aftermath of rationalism. Metaphysics is the application of scientific method to religion. Scientific method had arisen from the desacralizing of things, from the growing habit of seeing things in their starkness, stripped of their anthromorphic, hieratic, and animistic associations. What is extraordinary

about the rise of Greek metaphysics is that scientific method, built up in the field of practicalities, of government and natural economy, should be applied to religion. Religion is faith in civilization. Why dissect religion scientifically if there still exists a living faith in civilization? And the answer (which we have already given) is briefly this: The rise of Greek metaphysics was a symptom of a loss of faith in Greek civilization.

When we said that the Greeks were the first people to emancipate themselves from animistic beliefs, we added the qualification that such beliefs survived among the masses and in the state religion. But what was the state religion of Athens between 600 and 400 B.C.? There were, of course, the seasonal religious festivals in which the goddess Athene and her reputed kinsmen were duly honoured. And it is obvious that the Athenian state religion was nothing but an expression, in the traditional terms of a residual animism, of faith in Athenian civilization. It was loss of faith which caused men to turn the intellectual tools of science, that had served them well in the field of practice, to a critical examination of religion. Religion was analysed because men wished to discover reasons for their loss of faith.

On general principles and in accordance with the historical evidence, we have tried to account for the rise of Greek rationalism. The principles of the Primacy of Group Life and of the Conservation of the Instrument have emerged from our discussions. The difficulty of generalization in sociology has also emerged. When we think of Comte's famous 'law of the three stages' we are warned of the dangers of premature generalization. Comte maintained that the stages of cultural progress were, first, religion; then, metaphysics; lastly, positivist science. We have seen that in the case of the Greeks progress was in the reverse direction: they began with science, advanced to metaphysics, and lost themselves finally during the Græco-Roman period in the dogmatics of Christian theology. We have been warned. Never-

theless, we shall continue our investigation of the principles of civilization by attacking specific problems of cultural history. We do not intend to generalize *in vacuo;* but, on the other hand, we cannot recount voluminously the social, political, and cultural history of the last five thousand years. What we propose to do in this book is to examine critically and concretely one or two themes that are illuminating for the science of civilization. We believe that the cultural analysis of the ethical monotheism of the Hebrews is such a theme. We have rejected all explanations which appeal to genius or to special inspiration. We are in search of a more scientific explanation.

In this chapter we have touched upon Greek science and Roman administration; and, in coupling ethical monotheism with these, we have not been unmindful of the claim that Greek art and philosophy, Roman law and order, Hebrew morals and religion, are the prime factors of the European mind. To us Europeans three legacies are said to have been bequeathed, those of Greece and of Rome and of Israel; but our largest inheritance is overlooked; apparently we are not to be considered the heirs of mankind. And without denying the special influences that have pervaded the pattern of Western civilization, is it really possible to distribute our indebtedness amongst certain peoples as the producers and certain other peoples as the carriers of our European civilization? This interpretation of history originated in the so-called enlightenment of the eighteenth century; it is still popular in academic circles. For we are inclined to become worshippers of the 'idols of the den'; and here the den is the scholar's study, where the legacy of Greece is so often identified with Plato and Aristotle, that of Rome with Virgil and Horace, that of Israel with Isaiah and St Paul. This interpretation of history does not interpret history; it invokes too readily the hypotheses of genius and of special inspiration; it becomes a subtle, because largely unconscious, propaganda for the privileged superiorities of Western civilization.

CHAPTER VIII

EMPIRES AND CHURCHES: ANCIENT EGYPT AND ANCIENT INDIA

§ 1. *Ancient Egypt and Ancient India: theistic and naturalistic interpretations.*

ONE of the objects of this chapter is to study in closer detail the transitions from clan to state and state to church. In the first chapter it was said that the historic process was from ' clan to state, from state to church, and from church to universal commonwealth ', and in the second chapter the Roman, the Indian, and the Chinese empires were cited as three outstanding examples of the replacement of empires by universal churches. The relative success of these replacements raises at once a question of considerable sociological importance: Why has this method of survival not been adopted generally? Why, for example, did the most ancient and the most long-lived of all empires, the Egyptian, fail to exploit the possibilities of its indigenous and elaborate religion? After the extinction of its national independence why did not Egypt die as a polity and live on as a church?

Civilization is a creative unity of science, morals, and religion; none of these factors can be understood except against the background of a specific civilization. But the tradition of the West, which in the main is the Christian tradition, takes a different view. Non-Christian civilizations, such as the Egyptian, are to be judged and valued by the degree to which their science, morals, and religion approximate to the universal principles which are believed to underlie the Christian faith. Assuming that such universal principles exist, they will be essentially super-

historical and unattached to a specific civilization. Moreover, Christianity takes, as we have already seen, a fundamentally negative attitude to concrete civilization. On Christian principles, what is of value in a civilization is of non-empirical, super-historical origin. This-world values are at best poor imitations of transcendent models.

Christianity, or Theism, has formed the mind of Europe, and the impress of its ideology remains in the minds even of those who repudiate every form of theism ; and the impress remains also on the trained historian the moment he is called upon to interpret the past and not merely to reconstruct it. The history of Egypt is a case in point. Egypt is a non-Christian civilization, and it is one of the most ancient of civilizations. In complete independence of the Jewish or Christian revelations—or what is claimed as such—Egypt developed for itself a very high culture. What of Egypt's morals ? Shall we study them naturalistically, sociologically ? To the sociologist the problem of morals is a practical problem in the adjustment of human relations ; it is not a question of approximating to, or obtaining a revelation of, a transcendent and universal norm. Here is a society with a specific social structure. To what extent, if any, has it solved that major problem of internal politics which is also the major problem of morals, the problem of reconciling the spirit of community with the concentration of power in the hands of a dominant minority ? To the sociologist interpreting history from a realist and empirical standpoint, morals are not spiritual values, but concrete values, created by civilized men ; morals are nothing apart from the social structure and the general lay-out of society and civilization. J. H. Breasted, the eminent Egyptologist, has not taken this view, and a criticism of his *Dawn of Conscience* is included in this chapter.

When we pass from Egypt to India, the bias of the European historian is reversed ; here he tends to accept uncritically the Hindu evaluation of India's spiritual

goods. Brahmanism, like Christianity, takes up a negative attitude, that of alienation from the world. And the European, saturated with Christian ideology, is only too eager to take a romantic view of Hinduism, exalting its spirituality and overlooking its material poverty and its political impotence.

§ 2. *From Clan to Empire : the Evolution of Ancient Egypt.*

As far as we know, the people of Egypt were the first to have passed through all the stages of development from clan to empire. A parallel development transformed the religion of the primitive clans who filtered into the swampy delta of the Nile. For the retreat of the ice in Northern Europe had caused, in the vast regions of the Sahara, an ever-diminishing rainfall, forcing men and beasts upon the strip of territory watered by the Nile. And the Nile with its fertilizing flood was the necessary instrument but not the sufficient cause of Egyptian civilization. A gigantic work of reclamation and irrigation of the soil was superadded to the advantages of nature. And this work was beyond the capacity of weak and isolated clans. Strong government, the centralized administration of the Pharaohs, was an additional condition for the successful execution of this work. We can understand how the Nile, the sun, the land, and the people came to be identified with the Pharaoh. These were the five props of the Egyptian civilization, and the five were one. Faith in the Pharaoh was faith in Egyptian civilization. The Pharaoh was the incarnation of the sun, the great life-giver. He was Osiris, dying and reborn with the resurrection of vegetation and the coming and passing of the Nile flood. He was the divine owner of all Egypt's soil and the guarantor of its never-ceasing fertility. He was the god-king and Egypt a great god-state. Divine kings and sacred chiefs are found amongst many primitive and barbarous peoples. But never before and never since have the institutions of the god-king and

the god-state been carried to such a pitch of politico-religious development. Thus surveying the history of the last 5000 years, from the first Egyptian dynasty down to our own day, it would seem that no other form of polity can compare, in stability and longevity, with the polity of the god-king. The Mikado, the god-emperor of the Japanese, is a witness to the truth of this sociological induction.

The god-king, epitomizing the god-state or god-nation, is the focus of the natural religion. And religion is indigenous and original to the extent that civilization is indigenous and original. For the perennial function of religion is the sustaining of faith in civilization, not in any and every civilization, but in the particular civilization of an exclusive group. The religions of most of the Oriental states of antiquity were of this character, among them Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, Israel. In these states, the god, the land, the people, and the king were intimately united. Assyria, for example, was the land of Ashur, its god ; and the king of Assyria was a child of the god, the name of the god being inserted into the king's name. To share names is to share natures. We have only to make a list of the Old Testament names containing the element Jah to realize the significance of the quasi-physical and quasi-transcendental kinship existing between the god, the king, and the people.

The intimate association between religion and national civilization is commonly supposed to put upon such a religion a certain degree of inferiority when it is compared with the universalism of Christianity or Buddhism. Christianity and Buddhism are dissociated religions. Christianity has dissociated itself from the Græco-Roman civilization out of which it arose, and Buddhism from the civilization of the Hindus. Although both of these world-religions carry about them unmistakable marks of their origins, nevertheless in principle they profess to be independent of the terrain from which they arose. Christianity declares its faith in God and Christ,

Buddhism in the mystical peace of Nirvana. Neither of them declares a faith in civilization.

Christianity and Buddhism have not only dissociated themselves from the civilizations out of which they arose, but also, in varying degrees, from those among which they have become naturalized. There is in both of them an unmistakable factor of alienation from what they chose to stigmatize as the material side of civilization, from its economy, its political order, its practical science. These are deprecated as profane and worldly and ephemeral. A universal religion, it is held, should concern itself with things spiritual and eternal. But alienation from material civilization does not mean indifference to group-life. On the contrary. The world-religions have a strongly developed group-life. But the group is an *ad hoc* group and its sole function is religion. The natural group, which is the state or nation or people performing all the multiple functions of a community, recedes into the background. The one-function group with which the world-religions are concerned is the church. And a universal church may be defined sociologically as an *ad hoc* society practising a non-indigenous religion. Christianity and Buddhism are nowhere racy of the soil ; in their homelands they were rejected. The religions of Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, and Israel were an integral and autogenous part of their several civilizations. In these ancient lands of the East, the function of religion was unmistakable ; religion was the oxygen which energized the will to conserve and enlarge the values already won against the malevolence of human enemies and the recalcitrance of the non-human environment. But in Christianity and Buddhism there is no bracing faith in civilization ; these world-religions are, on the contrary, opiates deadening the pains of civilized existence.

How do churches arise? Why do empires decay? What are the psychological and sociological consequences of group defeat? How can religion change from the oxygen to the opiate of the will-to-civilization? How can

single factors of a civilization survive in dissociation from the rest? What is the natural history of the dualism between the spiritual and the secular? What are the prospects of the dissociated factors of civilization being rejoined in unity? Can civilizational monism, faith in a single world-civilization, heal the breach between religion and the world? These are some of the questions we have already raised and to some extent answered.

§ 3. *Egypt, the earliest instance of the alienation of religion from civilization.*

In this chapter we shall study in its embryonic form the alienation of religion from civilization; that is, we shall study this phenomenon, within the confines of a nation-state, before the stage was reached in which the internal contradictions of the state brought about its dissolution. The earliest symptoms of this alienation can be discovered in Egypt, probably one of the oldest of the urban civilizations. In Egypt the human group had expanded to a community of several millions with a central administration, an elaborate division of labour, and public monuments of such colossal magnitude that they have spoken impressively to all subsequent ages of the power and possibilities of a highly integrated society. To the men of the Pyramid Age, the Egyptian state and nation seemed as imperishable as the pyramids. For the pyramid was at once a symbol and a guarantee of the perpetuity of the new civilization. As a mortuary of the Pharaoh, the pyramid was built to transform a house of Death into a house of Life without end. Individuals might have no survival after death; but the Pharaoh, who was the essence of the nation's life, must live for ever. The pyramids are religious as well as political monuments; they are a public declaration of faith in Egyptian civilization. And, as J. H. Breasted has pointed out, it was not until this faith was shaken that attention was drawn to the individual's survival of bodily death. It was not till

after the close of the Pyramid Age that there was 'a popular appropriation of the old royal hereafter'—to employ Breasted's phrase as given in his book *The Dawn of Conscience*.

The Egyptians were the first people to establish a centralized nation-state; they were also the first to witness its collapse. After nearly a thousand years of existence as a unified state (3400 B.C. to 2475 B.C.) the inconceivable happened; the state dissolved into the petty principalities out of which it had been unified. The Egyptians discovered that corporate life was just as perishable as individual. The pyramids had failed in their purpose; they had not secured life and felicity to the Egyptian people. It would seem then that Egypt's resources had been strained and the bodies of a hundred thousand serfs exhausted merely to gratify the egotism of a bankrupt despot. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the social convulsions that ensued, the pyramids were rifled and the statues of the Pharaohs destroyed.

As long as group life is stable, the function of religion is clear; religion strengthens the hand and steadies the nerve of the successive generations. Such religion is naturally conservative, sanctifying the *status quo*. But when there is no longer a *status quo*, its traditional sanctity having evaporated, morality becomes a problem and religion a doubt, and faith in civilization weakens. The present is contrasted with the past. Phantasy constructs a golden age. In a messianically conceived future, the golden age will return. Religion associates itself with past and future, but is alienated from the present.

§ 4. *J. H. Breasted's* Dawn of Conscience: *a critique.*

The earliest instance of this alienation of an indigenous religion from the national civilization has been called by Breasted 'the dawn of conscience'. This is the title of his book. Its object is to show that the ethical monotheism of the specially inspired Hebrews has been

anticipated by Ikhnaton's Hymn to the Universal Sun—a hymn composed some centuries before the age of Moses—and that Egyptian prophets spoke of 'Maat' or 'Social Righteousness' a thousand years before Ikhnaton and nearly two thousand years before Jeremiah. And in acclaiming Egypt as the birthplace of ethical feeling and the Egyptians as the first to formulate such ethical concepts as 'righteousness' and 'character' and 'justice', Breasted maintains that he is speaking as an historian and not as a philosopher. We suggest, on the contrary, that Breasted is speaking as a philosopher and not as an historian. Moreover, Breasted is speaking as a philosopher of the school of Kant. Kant believed that moral truths existed which were universally valid and absolutely binding. According to Kant, these truths were independent of history and of the vicissitudes of group-life. Like the propositions of pure mathematics, they flashed across the minds fitted to receive them, and the conviction of their truth was an intuition owing nothing to the trials and errors of an experimental civilization. Kant rationalized the evangelical piety of his childhood. 'Thou shalt not lie,' was Kant's favourite instance of the categorical imperative. 'Thou shalt not lie,' so Breasted tells us in his preface, was an omission from the Hebrew decalogue which he exploited as a child, but made good as a man. Breasted's moral philosophy, like that of Kant's, is a rationalization of Christian piety.

Christian piety is, in principle, dissociated from the historic civilizations amongst which morals arose. Christian ethics does not admit any indebtedness to the Greeks and Hebrews as such—as peoples to be studied historically and naturalistically by the historian and sociologist. It is only to the Hebrews as the historic vehicles of a super-historical revelation, and to the Greeks as the pre-ordained instruments of the Holy Spirit, that indebtedness can be admitted. And indebtedness in this latter sense is not indebtedness, it is destiny. The Holy Spirit, like its rationalized counterpart, the Categorical Imperative,

is above history and beyond it. Christianity, like Buddhism, is a 'dissociated' religion—dissociated from the Græco-Roman civilization out of which it arose, dissociated because of the failure of the Græco-Roman civilization to inspire that will-to-persist without which every civilization perishes.

We have said that in *The Dawn of Conscience* Breasted is writing as a philosopher and not as an historian. Breasted contrasts impressively the lust for power with the love of righteousness; he tells us that in the copper-bearing regions of the Sinai peninsula there is a rock carving in relief of an Egyptian Pharaoh striking down an Asiatic captive; and in the museum at Leningrad there is a papyrus in which a statesman of the feudal age, looking back regretfully to the law and order of the pyramid builders, speaks in praise of truth and virtue and righteousness. Power is material and a thing of naught; righteousness is spiritual and endures for ever. That is Breasted's philsophy of ethics, and in its light he interprets the dawn of conscience in Egypt. But this philsophy of his is the outcome of sixteen centuries of a Christianity dissociated in principle from the moribund Roman Empire out of which it had arisen and which it has long survived; it is the outcome, too, of some centuries of ancient Stoicism, the spiritual refuge of those noble pagans who, in Athens and in Rome, had witnessed the death of republican freedom; and lastly, it is the outcome of some centuries of Rabbinical wisdom, the wisdom of Pharisees who, abandoning hope in the political priesthood of the Maccabean kings, sought a solution of the 'Jewish question' in an implicit obedience to the Mosaic Law, an obedience which they hoped would be rewarded by the intervention of a transcendent Messiah.

Israel, Greece, and Rome alike had failed to solve the central problem of urban civilization: when the community has outgrown the limits of the clan, by what ties, equal in strength to those of blood, can the community be held together? Large-scale group-life is a compara-

tively new adventure of the human race. And the adventure is not yet concluded. The Egyptians were the first to embark upon it. By 3400 B.C. they had constructed a great society, exceeding in dimension and complexity any that hitherto existed. And by 2500 B.C. they had experienced the first disillusionment of the human race with the value of large-scale civilization. They were the first to discover the devastating dilemma of group-life. A centralized administration overcame the egotism of individuals and succumbed to its own. Authority, without which an efficient group-life is impossible, was made acceptable to the masses by indoctrinating them with a special ideology, belief in the Pharaoh's divinity. But such a god was not good company for men ; he made them servile and himself sub-human. Liberty and authority, unity and individuality, privilege and equality, law and equity—the inner strain resulting from these opposites exhausted the vitality of the urban and large-scale civilizations. And to these inner conflicts have usually been added conflicts with rival groups. War within and war without. Human groups had found it difficult enough to learn how to be at one with themselves; and still more difficult how to be at one with their neighbours. It is not surprising that faith in civilization should have faltered ; and because of this loss of faith, religion parted company with civilization. The primary function of religion was to encourage men to believe that the world was safe for group-life ; and the Egyptians were the first to discover that the world was by no means safe for group-life.

Religion is faith in civilization. But if civilization changes, in which civilization are men to have faith ? In the civilization of the pyramid-builders or in that of the feudal lordlings who succeeded them ? And which body of customs is to take precedence ? The old which was so successful or the new which has not yet achieved success ? When the Egyptian prophet spoke of *Maat*, or Righteousness, was he thinking of righteousness in the abstract, of

Kantian *a priori* righteousness? When the Hebrew prophet spoke of Righteousness, was he thinking of the Good of Plato or the Absolute Righteousness of Almighty Jehovah? The answer is this: men oppose to the present an idealized and highly anachronistic picture of the past, a past when group-life was successful and men had unquestioning faith in their civilization. Ethical reflection is born of the opposition between a dying society and one struggling to be born. Breasted himself tells us that the earliest moralists of Egypt looked back with yearning and admiration to the pyramid age. And we know how Jeremiah praised the Rechabites because they clung obstinately to the old pastoral life of the desert steppe, keeping themselves unspotted from the corruptions of urban civilization. By righteousness Jeremiah meant a highly idealized version of the customs of Israel in the wilderness.

Conscience is the consciousness of a conflict between the stable yesterday and the uncertain to-morrow of the soul. An eruption of conscience is the normal and natural concomitant of a crisis in large-scale civilization. The earliest instance of such a crisis was the collapse of the Old Kingdom in Egypt about 2500 B.C. And the earliest instance of the moralist's activity has the same date. Now we are not asserting that a crisis of civilization can have no other upshot than an outcrop of moralistic reflection. The civilization may succumb to its crisis and the moralist remain latent or unheard. That issue is common enough. The crisis in the fortunes of Assyria did not, so far as we know, stimulate the moral prophets of Nineveh; nor did the collapse of the governments set up by the successors of Zenghis Khan lead to a dawn of conscience in Mongolia—unless, indeed, we are to regard the adoption of lamaic Buddhism as a dawn of conscience. But eruptions of conscience, whenever they occur, are closely correlated with, even if they are not completely determined by, crises on civilization. And it is the business of the historian to explain the morals

and the religion of a people in terms of the structure and the fortunes of its civilization. To regard morals, in Breasted's fashion, as the arbitrary descent of a super-historical Absolute into the world of human history is to confuse history with metaphysics; more especially with the metaphysics of religions such as Christianity and religious philosophies such as Stoicism. When the Græco-Roman world was smitten with political leprosy, first the Stoic, and then the Christian detached themselves, inwardly if not always outwardly, from the unclean thing. Because of its metaphysical assumptions, Christianity cannot construct a philosophy of human history—if by philosophizing we mean the taking of large views based on an adequate survey of the data. The affairs of mortal men and the fortunes of changing societies cannot be explained in terms of super-historical absolutes. History can explain Christianity. Christianity cannot explain History.

For the ethics of Egypt Breasted finds a super-historical origin, unrelated—or related only to a subordinate extent—with the crisis in its group-life. For the 'universalism and monotheism', on the other hand, which, according to Breasted, came to their earliest expression in the religion of Egypt, he gives a purely historical explanation. 'Monotheism was but imperialism in religion.' Presumably Egyptian theism is an historically conditioned phenomenon which does not prescribe religion for us, whereas an abstract ethicism unrelated to any specific group-life is supposed to be as universally compelling as pure mathematics. In other words, the Egyptian monotheism of Ikhnaton is not to be explained as the medieval scholastics would probably have explained it, namely as an adumbration, in the obscure and misleading terms of solar theology, of the one true and universal religion, the worship of the *ens realissimum*, the transcendent and almighty God. The scholastics who, on their own premises, were logical thinkers, would have argued that the divine agency of the one God accounts for the dawn of

conscience. It is unfortunate if the sociologist has private favourites whom he exempts from the close scrutiny of scientific criticism. Religion and morals are factors of civilization. They must be explained in terms of the principles of civilization.

§ 5. *Ikhnaton's failure to reconcile national religion with supernational imperialism.*

The religion of Ancient Egypt was intimately associated with its group-life and the general structure of its civilization. Dissociation from a specific and historically conditioned group-life is the distinguishing characteristic of a church. And earlier than the sixth century before the Christian Era, churches have not yet appeared. Judaism and Buddhism emerge, though as yet indistinctly, in the sixth century. But it was not possible for the Egyptian Empire, inherited by Ikhnaton from the great conqueror of the Eighteenth Dynasty, Thutmose III (1501–1447 B.C.), to survive as a universal church. Ikhnaton did not succeed in anticipating the role of a Constantine or Asoka. Ikhnaton's *Hymn to Aton*, the universal sun, makes, it is true, important concessions to the alien foreigner; it allows that the 'Nile in the sky', that is, the rain from heaven, is just as much the work of the one God as is the Nile that waters Egypt. And what better foundation for a universal religion than the Sun that all men see? And how disappointing it must have been to Ikhnaton to discover that the Egyptians preferred the Sun that only Egyptians see, the Sun associated by the priests of Amon-Re with their local form of sun worship. After all, why should an imperial people share its god with the foreigner? Sharing their god was equivalent to sharing the good things of their civilization. And what is the point of being an imperial people unless privileges are enjoyed from which the subject peoples are excluded?

The Egyptian Empire, the earliest of the great world empires, did not succeed in solving the political problem

with which every imperialism is confronted, that of a common religion binding together peoples of disparate origins and unequal status. The Egyptians succeeded no better than the Indians, the Chinese, the Greeks, and the Romans. Where all have failed, there must be an intrinsic reason for the failure; there must be a fundamental contradiction in the imperialist politician's quest of religious unity. And the source of contradiction is not hard to perceive. An empire is a polity uniting subject peoples with a dominant group of conquerors; and a religion is faith in the civilization of which the religion in question is a factor. But unless the subject peoples have been so thoroughly assimilated to their conquerors that they have lost all consciousness of being a subject people—and when that happens, the empire is no longer an empire but a nation-state—they cannot share the conqueror's faith in the value of the conqueror's civilization. Whatever concessions the dominant group may make, it is always the civilization of the dominant group that the subject peoples are invited to accept. On the other hand, if the conqueror is politic and magnanimous and elevates to the dignity of the state religion the religion associated with the civilization of the conquered, he is undermining his own political authority and destroying the political integrity of his empire.

Egypt is an embryonic and India a mature instance of the alienation of religion from civilization. Etymologically, religion is that which binds. And imperialist politicians have ever been anxious to exploit the binding force of religion. But, in an empire, religion rarely binds, more often it loosens.

§ 6. *India: Asoka and Buddhism.*

India is the homeland of Buddhism, and the Hindus are esteemed the most religious of peoples and the most indifferent to secular history. There have been no imperial dynasties comparable to those of China or Egypt, with

reference to which the chronology of India could be built up. The *Cambridge Shorter History of India*, almost on its first page, asserts that the whole chronology of India has been built up by the identification of the Sandracottus of the Greek writers with Chandragupta Maurya. Chandragupta was a contemporary of Alexander, and was the first Indian Emperor. The idea of establishing a polity larger and stabler than one of the sixteen warring states of northern India—sixteen is the number assigned by Buddhist tradition ; little reliance can be placed on this tradition, but it has to be used, so meagre is the historical record—this idea was very probably suggested to Chandragupta by the success of Alexander. Chandragupta's grandson, Asoka, famous as the first Buddhist Emperor, is much better known than Chandragupta himself, though it was the latter who inaugurated the Maurya line of emperors.

It is not easy to reconstruct the probable motives of Asoka in making Buddhism into the state religion of his empire. The pious motives attributed to him by Buddhist tradition are of the same pattern as those assigned to Constantine by the tradition of Christian monks. It is also useful to note that the time interval between Asoka and Buddha is about the same as that between Constantine and Jesus ; and that the religion favoured by the Buddhist, like that adopted by the Christian Emperor, was neither the official and orthodox religion, nor the religion of one of the principal subject peoples. Constantine, as we have seen, found the social cement he was seeking in the religion disseminated by an obscure sect of Jewish heretics. Asoka ignored the Vedic religion and the official Brahmanic tradition as well as the many survivals of pre-Aryan tradition amongst the aboriginal inhabitants of India. Asoka believed that he had found a principle of social solidarity in that severe indictment of Brahmanic civilization which was the upshot of the Buddha's teaching. For the Aryan conquerors of India were failures ; they did not succeed in constructing a

civilization satisfactory even to themselves. Contemporaries of the Greeks and speaking a language of the same linguistic family, the Aryans arrived in the Punjab about 1500 B.C., perhaps a century or two before the Greeks invaded the Eastern Mediterranean. But they were not as fortunate as the Greeks; they could not exterminate the indigenous populations, nor assimilate them, nor be absorbed by them. From the recent excavations at Mohenjo Daro on the banks of the Indus river, it is extremely likely that the Hindu Aryans profited from the native Indus civilization in much the same way as the Greeks profited from the Minoan and Mycenæan civilizations of the Aegean. But, with similar initial advantages, the Hindu Aryans found that the work of setting up a unified polity based upon a common civilization was beyond their powers. They fell back therefore upon the caste system, an organization of group-life which was to have disastrous consequences both for the peoples they conquered and for themselves. A community of Brahmins and Pariahs is not a community; it can never experience the joy of participation in the super-individual objectives of a great society. The Pariah has failed to be a man. The Brahmin has failed to be a leader in civilization. Both of them are oppressed with a sense of failure. Why should they record the history of a civilization which has yielded them no satisfaction?

The Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Chinese are great historians; they have an absorbing interest in the stages of the process by which they created their own great civilizations. The Hindus are the only peoples with a complex urban civilization, who have taken no interest in their own history. They have not even remembered the names of the first Indian emperors. Such a people could not be induced to take a warmer interest in their own civilization by the substitution of Buddhism for Brahmanism. Buddhism repudiates caste. It was this repudiation which gave it political value to Asoka. A casteless society can be bound together politically in ways

that are impossible in a caste-ridden society. But no society can be politically strong unless it is inspired by a religious faith in the value of its civilization. And this faith Buddhism could not give. Buddhism has carried even farther than Brahmanism its defeatist rejection of the values of civilization; and in consequence Buddhism as the state religion of India was short-lived. Everywhere in India there has been a restoration of Brahmanism. For Brahmanism has a greater positive content than the religion that Buddha preached. Brahmanism has sought reinforcement in metaphysics; and its metaphysics is nothing but a rationalization of the failure to create a civilization in the value of which Hindus could believe. The religion and metaphysics of the Hindus have been acclaimed by Europeans and also by some Hindus—these Hindus are obviously on the defensive against the claim to superiority of Western civilization—as being a more than adequate compensation for the status of the Hindus as the most defeated of all the great peoples of the world.

Religion is grounded in politics, and the universal religions, the religions of the churches, are grounded in the universal politics of the empires. We have studied the interrelations of empires and religions in two notable instances, Egypt and India. We turn now to two other and better-known instances, Rome and China.

CHAPTER IX

EMPIRES AND CHURCHES: ROME AND CHINA

§ 1. *Rome's Failure: the lack of cultural homogeneity.*

THE Roman Empire was the greatest experiment in the unification of the human race that mankind has as yet attempted. The principal peoples of the world, pooling their experience and resources, had put up the scaffolding of a Great Society—the scaffolding but not the edifice. After the death of Marcus Aurelius in A.D. 180 the scaffolding began to tumble, and by A.D. 410, when Alaric sacked Rome, the foundations had given way.

The failure of the Roman Empire is the Great Disappointment—the greatest disappointment of mankind. Christianity, on its negative side, is the echo of the Great Disappointment; on its positive side Christianity is a consolation for Rome's failure; and in its doctrine of the Second Coming of Christ, it holds out the Messianic Hope of the restoration of the Empire in the form of a universal commonwealth.

Civilization does not fail. It persists and will persist as long as Man. But civilizations, limited to a special region and preserving definite characteristics over a period of time, have failed continually. Why have they failed? Is there a sociological law of failure? Can failure be explained in terms of the principles of civilization? The bankruptcy of Rome is the most notable failure of civilization in world history. By contrast the persistence of China is civilization's most conspicuous success.

The *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius are the best commentary on the failure of Rome. And the life of Commodus, his scandalous son, is an illuminating annexe to the *Meditations*. Historians have expressed surprise that so saintly a father should have reared so degenerate a son. But is it so surprising? Let us quote a representative utterance of the saintly father, together with the extraordinarily close parallel from *Ecclesiastes*. 'Constantly realize the dead—men of all kinds, of every vocation, of every nationality, all dead. Come down if you will to Philistion, Phœbus, Origanion. Pass now to other "tribes of the great dead": we too must pass whither so many have gone before—skilled orators, august philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Socrates. . . . Realize all these, all long since in the dust. What matters it to them? What, still more, to those who have not even left a name.' (Book VI of the *Meditations*.)

'There is no remembrance of the former generations; neither shall there be any remembrance of the latter generations that are to come, among those that shall come after.' (Ecclesiastes i, 11.)

This may be good philosophy for fatigued middle age, but is it spiritual food for youth? The mortuary is not usually considered a school for youth. The youth of a primitive tribe acquires from its elders the hunter's, shepherd's, or cultivator's skill. Everyone is called upon to assist in revictualling the tribal food supply. A hunter among the Eskimo will serve as an illustration. European travellers tell us that such a hunter belongs to one of the most cheerful of communities. Revictualling the food supply is his daily adventure, and renewing periodically his simple tools and household furniture is his form of constructive activity. Life does not pall upon the Eskimo. Nor has it palled upon the more extensively civilized Chinese. For the Chinaman is a pioneer. At the dawn of Chinese history he was draining swamps, sowing millet, breeding silkworms; and after three thousand years of Chinese civilization, when the population of his country

has risen to four hundred million, he is still a pioneer, renewing from year to year his creative contacts with nature. Nature may be hostile or recalcitrant, but life does not pall in the Arctic or on the Hoang-Ho. But life palled in the Roman Empire and upon no one more than upon the saintly Emperor. His Stoicism taught him to die decently but not to live creatively.

When men are released from the necessity of procuring food and shelter, what use will they make of their newly won freedom? In Rome that freedom was the privilege of the ruling class. The cost of this privileged freedom fell upon the unprivileged class. And the unprivileged and under-privileged peoples and classes were in an overwhelming majority.

What is it that is precious about freedom? It is freedom to create. The zest of life is in creativity. To be human is to be creative. And everything created by human beings is part of civilization. Where there is no room for zestful creativity, life palls.

Life can become empty at both ends of the social scale. The under-privileged bear the burden of every high civilization. They have to submit to discipline and deprivation. And why should they continue to submit, when they might enjoy the freedom—what matter if it is the precarious freedom?—of the hunter or the nomad. To hunt for one's food is instinctive and rational. But is it rational to suffer the shackles of high civilization in order to pay for a Nero's excesses?

In a modern nation-state the poorest of the poor are often the greatest patriots, identifying themselves imaginatively with the glories of their country. But Rome was not a nation; it was a congeries of defeated peoples under the control of an alien ruling class. If Rome was symbolized in Nero, who would wish to identify himself with Rome?

Rome is here, again, a contrast with China. There are no longer any defeated peoples in China. China is a continent occupied by a single people, the most homo-

geneous in race and culture of all the peoples of the earth. Homogeneity has resulted from substantial equality in social and economic status. To achieve harmony between man and nature was the aim of the Chinese pioneers. To extend that harmony to society was the aim of the Chinese moralists. Heaven and Earth, Nature and Society, Emperor and People, were believed to be united by a single virtue, that of Chinese civilization. In such a society the vices of an emperor might lead to his deposition, but not to any serious loss of faith in civilization.

Historians of the decline of Rome have often noticed the apathy of the masses towards the barbarian peril. Impregnable fortresses were abandoned to raiding parties of barbarians. But why should the masses resist the barbarians? Men who have lost their faith in a civilization will not defend it. Secretly, they wish to die as over-civilized men, and to come to life again as barbarians. For the civilized see no point in life, whereas the barbarians have at least an instinctive purpose, that of keeping themselves alive. The Roman Empire, especially the Later Roman Empire, had a strange depressive influence upon its peoples. Rostovtzeff, in his *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (page 470), tells us that, despite the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine, 'the spirit of the population remained as crushed as it had been in the times of the civil war. The only difference was that a wave of resignation spread over the Roman Empire. It was useless to fight, better to submit and bear silently the burden of life, with a hope of finding a better life after death.'

Man is the one animal who can will to die as well as will to live. Rome, conquering the greater part of the world, imposed the Pax Romana upon a multitude of highly civilized peoples. Rome established a more extensive political, economic, and juristic unity than had ever been before. But Rome roused in her subjects a will to die that was stronger than their will to live. And not only in her subjects. The desire for death is the one

strong desire that Marcus Aurelius indulges in. The desire for death expressed itself in many forms. One form was race-suicide. Depopulation set in, even in the most fertile parts of the Empire. Why should men weary themselves to continue physically a society in which they had lost faith. Only a stupid materialism can believe that there was a serious loss of natural fertility in the Roman ruling classes.

§ 2. *Creativity, Unity, and Religion: the three conditions for the survival of civilizations.*

There are three conditions that must be satisfied if a civilization is to survive : first, there must exist within it an adequate creativity ; second, an adequate unity ; and third, a religious faith strong enough to believe in the possibility of a balance between creativity and unity. Creativity, unity, and religion—religion in the form of an acceptance of the empirical—are three of the fundamental principles of civilization. They are dialectically related, because each conditions the activity of the other two. Without unity, there cannot be morals ; without creativity, there cannot be science ; without the harmony and balance of science and morals, faith in civilization is impossible.

Civilization is man's greatest triumph and his greatest failure. A competent sociology should account for both. If the theory we have set forth is sound, then the failure to achieve a balance between creativity and unity should be an adequate explanation of the breakdown of a civilization. Rome is the classical instance of such a breakdown. What a number of theories has been advanced to account for it ! From malaria to miscegenation, and from exhaustion of the soil to the acceptance of Christianity, what theories have not been advanced to explain the Decline and Fall ! Alfred Rosenberg, the official Nazi philosopher, expanding the suggestions of Houston Chamberlain and Count Gobineau, is quite certain that

the defiling of Nordic blood by non-Nordic admixture is the sole and sufficient cause. Incidentally, it should be noted that the German barbarians, Aryan brothers of the Romans, were principally responsible for this defiling of Roman blood. The Romans should have been rejuvenated by this transfusion of Germanic blood, but they were not. We know that the Nazis are sciolists—still, they have a philosophy, even if it is not one that many of us would be disposed to accept. The serious scholar, on the other hand, carrying out his specialist enquiries but having no philosophy of civilization, is inclined to hesitate about interpretating what he finds. Rostovtzeff, whose work we have already quoted, is a case in point.

§ 3. *Rostovtzeff on the causes of Rome's failure.*

On Rostovtzeff's view, the four centuries separating the birth of Julius Cæsar from the death of Diocletian in A.D. 305, were more than half filled with civil wars which were of the nature of class struggles. In the first century before the Christian era the struggle was between the old aristocracy and the rising middle class. In the third century after the Christian era the struggle was between the middle and the lower classes. Augustus terminated the first class war and Diocletian the second. Augustus reorganized the Roman Empire as a constitutional monarchy based upon the cities and the middle class. As the city-state was the traditional form of political organization, Augustus was successful ; he paved the way for two centuries of relatively stable civilization. But after the century of conflict that followed the death of Commodus in A.D. 192, the middle classes were ruined as well as decimated ; and all that Diocletian could do was to stabilize the *status quo*—a *status quo* of exhaustion, apathy, and despair. In the Augustan period the middle classes were in the ascendant, diffusing their culture over all other classes and assimilating aspirants to power in whatever class they were found. But in the period of

Diocletian the educated classes lose themselves in the barbarism of the mass. The period of Augustus stood for constitutional monarchy, world-economy, and a polished paganism ; the period of Diocletian stood for orientalized monarchy, subsistence-economy, and the mysticism of the East, especially for Christian mysticism.

Rostovtzeff concludes his book with this warning. 'Our civilization will not last unless it be the civilization, not of one class but of the masses.' We accept this dictum. But, in the last sentence of his book, Rostovtzeff qualifies it with a doubt. 'Is not every civilization bound to decay as soon as it begins to penetrate the masses?' The doubt betrays the middle-class scholar. Because most scholars have hitherto been drawn from the middle class, Rostovtzeff evidently infers that in a classless society there will be no more scholars. But this is the scholar's prejudice and not in keeping with the terms of his warning.

§ 4. *Creativity: the glory and the disgrace of human nature.*

Creativity is at once the glory and the disgrace of human nature. Every human being is potentially a creative artist, working on the materials provided by nature and the social heritage. And what the artist creates is civilization. Civilization, like our daily bread, has to be remade every day. The producer, covering the daily loss of social wealth incurred in satisfying the consumer's needs, has as strong a claim to be called a creative artist as has the engineer or the architect. Failure to obtain social recognition does not invalidate the claim. Every such creative act changes nature and society ; and the performer of the creative act is a member of society and changes with it. Every such creative act is a moral or immoral act, increasing or diminishing the social harmony ; and it is also a religious or irreligious act, increasing or diminishing the faith of men in the possibility of social harmony.

The art of civilization is the art of harmonizing indivi-

dual creativities. For every individual creator is initially an egocentric artist, using other human beings as he uses nature for the raw material upon which to practise his creative art. 'Regard human beings as ends and not means.' Kant's advice is excellent—if it were practicable. But Kant's advice is vitiated by a double fallacy ; first, there is the individualist's fallacy of supposing that the essence of an individual is to be found within his private self, and that all his relations with other individuals are purely external ; second—and this is another form of the individualist's fallacy—that the ends which the individual pursues and which we are called upon to respect, must be considered in isolation from the ends of the society to which the individual belongs.

Creativity, as we have said, is the glory and the disgrace of human nature ; it is the glory, because the fruit of creativity is civilization, the disgrace, because the competition of creativities—what with the excessive freedom to create of some and the starved freedom of others—is the principal cause of the moral evil in the world. Every human being wants to fix the pattern of society and of civilization agreeably to himself. Power means power to design, execute, and enjoy the pattern of society and civilization. The struggle for power is a twofold struggle between rival designers and also between rival consumers of civilization.

How are these rival creativities to be reconciled ? By the operation of the principle of unity. Unity is the dialectical opposite of creativity, at once conditioning and making possible a play of creativity within a human group. Empires collapse and civilizations decay because the human race has found it so different to reconcile unity with creativity. A society is, or should be, a vital harmony of creative agents. Harmony without vitality is a unity in death. Vitality without harmony is the disunity of anarchism. Rome fell because it had unity but no vitality. Greece fell because it had vitality but no unity. The anarchy of the city-states ruined peace ; and

the paralysing immobility of Rome, subsequent to Diocletian's reforms, bred indifferentism.

Marcus Aurelius thought he had done his duty by expending his life in conserving the Roman heritage. But to embalm is not to conserve. Creation is preservation. Civilization is never perfect and the task of the statesman is never done. Government is one of the arts of civilization and civilization is itself an art. Civilization is a creative art, providing mankind with ever new opportunities for its exercise. The task is endless and so are the satisfactions. But what philosophy of civilization did Rome's rulers acknowledge? Did they avow any responsibility to mankind? Did they even pretend that they had higher ends than to gorge themselves upon the spoils of the world? In the Republican days the Fathers had been creative. And the descendants? They cast themselves for the spectator's part. The Fathers had been creative artists in civilization, the descendants were to be the connoisseurs, the dilettantes, enjoying in repose a Horace's economium on the past. When art passes its creative zenith, the artist tends to become a copyist, producing stereotyped goods for a fashionable clientele; he becomes a pandar to the privileged self-expression of an uncreative class. So it is with the art of civilization. In a world empire such as the Roman, composed of heterogeneous peoples conquered but not assimilated, and controlled by an uncreative ruling class, everyone becomes a copyist of the past: the Cæsars pretended they were Roman Consuls, the subject peoples of Roman Egypt exhumed the dead religion of the dead Osiris, and the defiantly unassimilable people such as the Jews brought even the Roman epoch of their history within the jurisdiction of the Mosaic Law.

§ 5. *From Confucius to the first Chinese Emperor: a survey.*

Rome was the great disappointment of mankind; China its greatest success. Rome failed because it was an

exploiter rather than a creator. China succeeded because it never completely lost the virtues of the creative pioneers. We have already dealt with China as a world-centre of philosophy and with the Chinese form of Buddhism as the reaction of the Chinese to the periodic, though partial, failures of their civilizations. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to an analysis of this pioneer civilization.

We begin our analysis with a survey of Chinese civilization from the age of Confucius to the foundation of the Empire under Chin Shih Huang-ti in 221 B.C.

Of all the great peoples of the world, the Chinese have been the most fortunate. They wedded a virgin continent and made it fruitful. They had no need to massacre a native population or to reduce it to servility. They could develop generously the noble outlines of a great civilization, never seriously interrupted by the armed envy of the barbarians of the steppes. The Chinese solved the problem of increasing population by colonizing the empty lands on their frontiers ; these they made productive through the application of a self-evolved technique of farming. And through all the vicissitudes of the last two thousand years, with changing dynasties and inner conflicts, they have never lost their faith in the virtue of their unique civilization.

The Chinese, in common with most of the peoples of the ancient world, projected the origins of their civilization into the remote past. They thought of the present as an aberration from, and the hoped-for future as a return to, an ideally perfect past. The burden of Confucius and of the many other itinerant philosophers of the sixth to the third century, eager to catch the ear of the feudal overlord of Chu or Jong or Lu, was ever thus : Return to the ways of the Great Ancestors, Yu the Great, or Yao, or Shun. These ancestors were conceived vaguely as former kings of particular tribes, ruling over territories with fluctuating boundaries ; and when, three centuries after Confucius, the real empire of Chin Shih Huang-ti was established, the mythical empires of Yu and

Shun and Yao were arranged in chronological sequence, the last one to be created by the mythologists obtaining the earliest date. This explanation as to how Chinese prehistory was formed is advanced by Arthur Waley, in his recent edition of the Tao Te Ching (*The Way and its Power*), and it is confirmed by the chapter on 'The Ages without Chronology' in Marcel Granet's work on *Chinese Civilization*.

Ancient China, like Ancient Egypt, was a pioneer civilization. The valley of the Hoang-Ho, like the valley of the Nile, was potentially, but not actually, fertile. An immense work of reclamation, a Herculean cleansing of the earth from the accumulated marsh and jungle of the centuries was demanded before the valleys of these great rivers could become seed-plots of civilization. Both in Egypt and in China the work of reclamation was the collective undertaking of men who had formerly been nomads, who in an empty land could not look for help from an indigenous population. The Hoang-Ho, like the Nile, became a labour front, in which individual sectors were reclaimed by individual groups. The groups were related by race and language but remained politically independent. In the narrow valley of the Nile, where the total acreage of the fertile soil from the Delta to the First Cataract was considerably less than one of the eighteen Chinese provinces, the feudal period of independent nomarchs was relatively short. The geography of the Nile, while it did not enforce, yet obviously facilitated the growth of political unity—of an excessive political unity, so highly centralized in the Divine Pharaoh as to make the cultivators of the soil from the very earliest times into the serfs, if not the slaves, of the state. But in China the feudal period was much more protracted and important. The unification of China was the work of Chin Shih Huang-ti and his imperial successors; and the unity achieved was the very opposite of excessive. Fortunately for China, the political power of the emperor over the provinces was slight, the real unity of China being a

unity of culture, not a unity of administration. For in China, as in Egypt, geography facilitates, but it does not coerce. Egypt is an elongated oasis clinging to a single river valley; but China is a country of continental dimensions, a country of mountains, plains, and seas, with a considerable range of scenery and climate, and with many great rivers and fertile valleys additional to the basin of the Hoang-Ho, the originating centre of Chinese civilization.

§ 6. *China and the Problem of the State.*

The Problem of the State is the paramount problem for the complex civilizations. The state is different from the clan or tribe in the principle of its construction. For the state is a consciously constructed collectivity. Of course, the antithesis between conscious construction and unconscious growth must not be overstressed. Even a group no bigger than the family cannot be maintained except by a host of conscious decisions, most of them trifling and many of them repetitive. Whereas a state, even if it is as consciously planned as the Soviet Union, could not continue even for a day unless it was founded upon unconsciously acquired habits, formed in the days of serfdom and the Tsars. In one important respect, the problem of state-making was more difficult for the Egyptians and the Chinese than it proved to be for the Hindus, Greeks, and Romans. The Egyptians and Chinese had no models to imitate, the Egyptians because they were the earliest of state-builders and the Chinese because they were so completely isolated from the rest of Asia that the experiments of an Asoka or a Darius remained unknown to them. Western Ho-nan in the eastward bend of the Hoang-Ho was the 'Central Flower' of Chinese civilization. New provinces formed themselves on its margins, and after three or four centuries of inter-group anarchy and incessant debate —politicians, philosophers, and mystics discussing end-

lessly the nature of the State, the art of Government, the *summum bonum*—the Chins, the ruthless Prussians of the Hoang-Ho, succeeded in creating an imperial State with Chin Shih Huang-ti as first Emperor (221–210 B.C.).

What were the principal subjects of politico-philosophical debate in the three centuries between Confucius and the first Emperor? In order of urgency the questions debated were: War, authority, law, and religion. The debaters were a new class of individuals, made self-conscious by the stresses of the time. They discussed the question for which there were no precedents, that of the relation of the individual to society and the state.

Among the questions that had to be decided were those of authority and freedom, of law and order, of old as against new class distinctions. A feudal society orders its life by use and wont; but when a feudal principality has grown to the dimensions of a provincial kingdom, written law becomes a necessity. Who is to promulgate new laws? And in a country where writing is the most difficult of arts, who is to write the laws? A common system of writing will unite all educated men. But is government by the educated desirable? Why should the peasant cultivator be charged with the upkeep of a class of 'superior persons'. Superior persons are traffickers in words. They become sophistical 'discriminators'—this is Mr. Waley's translation of a Chinese term which is evidently equivalent to that of 'sophist' or 'rhetorician'. Again, the development of commerce brought new problems. For the rise of provincial kingdoms, with an income per head well above subsistence level, led to trade and the emergence of a merchant class. But the peasants were suspicious of the merchants. A class that 'rewards itself', without earning the reward by physical labour, is unintelligible to the economic naïveté of the direct producer. All these new problems were the consequences of a change of scale in the group-unit; and the change of scale itself was the result of economic prosperity and of a growth of population made possible

by prosperity. As the Chinese of this transition period put it: You cannot persist in wheelbarrow government when you are living in an age of chariots.

§ 7. *Taoism and Confucianism.*

And lastly, there was the question of religion. Religion, in some ways the least urgent, was the most pervasive of all the issues confronting the Chinese in the three to four centuries previous to the founding of the empire. For the religion of the Chinese, more obviously so than the religion of any other people, is bound up with their civilization. Disregarding the prehistoric past about which there is an impenetrable fog of didactic myth, and starting from the age of Confucius, we can say that from Confucius down to the opening up of China to Europeans, the religion of China has been essentially the same. The Chinese are Taoists, and Taoism is animism. But Taoism is a highly civilized animism which emphasizes the ethical implications of a pioneer civilization. For what is Tao? Tao is the Way, the Way of the Ancestors. To the Chinese the Way of the Ancestors is the Way of Heaven and of the Universe. And China is the Universe. China is at once Heaven and Earth and the Chinese race. The rational harmony subsisting between the Chinese and the Universe was the gift of the Ancestors who were the pioneer-founders of Chinese civilization.

In the centuries preceding the foundation of the Chinese Empire—the centuries of crisis—the religious issue was not between Taoism and a possible rival, but between two different interpretations of Taoism. One group of interpreters were activists with a sustained interest in public life. A second group were quietists, sensitive to the inter-group anarchy. The quietist reacted to the discords and injustices of large-scale civilization by advocating retreat, to rustic simplicity and the life of quiet things, and then, a still deeper retreat, to the walled city of the inner self.

Quietism, individualism, and rationalism are associated phenomena of great sociological importance. When these appear, a society that has hitherto advanced into the future with the unconcern and self-confidence of most living things, is now beginning to falter, doubtful of the road to take, and fearful of the unmapped wilderness in which the road may end. Religion, the immemorial soother of human fears, has assured the pioneers that they would be successful in their work of domesticating nature. Nature has been successfully domesticated, but not man. It is the shock of this discovery that brings about an unprecedented attitude to life. Hitherto, civilization had been the pioneer's achievement and his joy. Now, there begins a conscious reaction against civilization. The enemy is no longer nature, it is man.

Chinese Buddhism is the culmination of the quietist reaction against civilization. But China has been more fortunate, and deservedly more fortunate, than Rome. Christ triumphed over Jupiter, the patron of Roman civilization ; but Buddha did not triumph over Confucius. The Chinese have had their defeatist moods, when they, too, have despaired of civilization. Chinese Buddhism is the expression and the ennoblement of this despair.

In its defeatist attitude to civilization, and more especially to the last phase of the decaying Roman Empire, Christianity is the sorrowing sister of Buddhism. But the Chinese as a people have never abandoned themselves to despair. The resilience of their will to live expresses itself in Confucianism, and Confucianism is faith in Chinese civilization. Confucius, with his eyes on the concrete fact of Chinese civilization, was not interested in the transcendent world. Christianity is so committed to the transcendent world that even its messianic hope cannot be realized except by an incursion of the transcendent into the temporal world.

It may sound a little ironical to-day to acclaim China as the most successful of the human race's experiments in civilization. But can we say that Western civilization

has been more successful? China has over-stressed the importance of stability and uniformity. She is learning in the school of suffering to assign a higher place to change, directed change. But China has not lost the virtue of a pioneer civilization in which men are united by their common work in controlling nature.

We have studied the reactions of politics upon religion in four of the great empires of antiquity. We have seen that only in the most exceptional circumstances can a broken people survive as a church. The national god of a people is the indwelling spirit of its civilization. The god is its Holy Ghost. The defeat and death of a people is the defeat and death of its god. There are very few exceptions to this iron law of history. And yet there are exceptions. Israel is one of them. Israel's survival as a church is as remarkable in its causes as in its effects. The explication of these causes is the object of the next chapter.

CHAPTER X

THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEFEAT

§ 1. *Jeremiah and the Rechabites: a crisis of urban civilization.*

THERE is perhaps no text in the Old Testament which is of greater sociological importance than the thirty-fifth chapter of Jeremiah. Jerusalem is about to fall into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon. Jeremiah has no words of comfort for Zedekiah, the last of the line of Judæan kings, who for four brief centuries had ruled in Jerusalem ever since its capture by King David. Assigning 586 B.C. to the fall of Jerusalem, 1025 B.C. to the accession of Saul, and allowing about two centuries for the period covered by the Books of Joshua and the Judges, the cultural experiment conducted by the Hebrew nomads, who had come to Canaan to taste the superior satisfactions of an urban civilization, had lasted only six centuries and was about to end in disaster and disillusionment. King Zedekiah, who was to end his days in Babylon, a captive with his eyes put out, may well have doubted whether the substitution of house for tent and vineyard for wilderness was an unqualified advance in cultural values. Such, too, was the secret doubt in the mind of Jeremiah; for he goes out of his way to congratulate the Rechabites on their abiding loyalty to the old nomadic way of life. Fear of Nebuchadnezzar's troopers had forced the Rechabites to seek refuge behind the walls of Jerusalem, but in normal times they lived the nomadic life—a simple matter when we remember that the desert steppe is only a day's journey from Jerusalem. And Jeremiah assures the Rechabites

that their way of life will survive the destruction of Jerusalem.

It is hardly necessary to add that the passage we have quoted has no sociological significance if we assume with the ecclesiastically-minded editor of the Book of Chronicles that Zedekiah perished miserably because 'he humbled not himself before Jeremiah the prophet speaking from the mouth of the Lord'; nor is there any sociological significance in Jeremiah's address to the Rechabites, if we assume with the writer on Jeremiah in the recent Anglo-Catholic *Commentary on Holy Scripture* that Zedekiah had sinned because he allowed the religion of Judah to degenerate from 'its true and pure origin'. This same writer also tells us that 'God always punished sin'. We know, of course, that the Old Testament is Holy Writ to two great churches, the Jewish and the Christian; and to regard the Old Testament as Holy Writ amounts to an interpretation of history. It is for the sociologist to account for this interpretation. But an empiricist interpretation becomes impossible, if the historian, abandoning secondary causes, accepts divine agency in the sense that such agency is postulated by the churches.

§ 2. *Judah: a pawn in the game of the Great Powers.*

The northern kingdom of Ephraim had even a shorter life than the four centuries allotted to Judah. In 722 B.C., about a century before Jerusalem fell, Samaria, the northern capital, was taken by the Assyrians and the population deported. The interval between 586 B.C. and 722 B.C. was a period of almost unremitting crisis for the feeble principality of Judah. Judah was a pawn in the political game of the great powers. In those days the great powers were Egypt and Assyria. Egypt, under the semi-alien rule of Ethiopian Pharaohs, had been overrun by the Assyrians under Esarhaddon; had recovered itself under Psamtik I of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty; and had witnessed the overthrow of Assyria in 612 B.C.

at the hands of the Babylonians and the Medes. During this struggle for power, the life of Judah had more than once hung upon a thread ; and after surviving an attack by the Assyrian Sennacherib in ' good ' King Hezekiah's time, Judah suffered disastrous defeat at the hands of Pharaoh Necho in 608 B.C. when, at Megiddo, the ' good ' Josiah, the restorer of pure Jahveh worship, was slain, and Judah was tossed about in an alternating vassalage between Egypt and the new star in the political firmament, Babylon. With the destruction of Assyria and the capture of Nineveh, a new struggle for ascendancy broke out, this time between Egypt and Babylon. Pharaoh Necho, who had defeated Josiah at Megiddo, was himself defeated by the Babylonians at Charchemish on the Euphrates in 605 B.C. Judah became the vassal of Pharaoh Necho only to discover that the Pharaoh could not protect his vassal against the rising power of Babylon. And the end came in 586 B.C. Fate and history ' had trodden as in a wine-press the virgin daughter of Judah '.

Why did the kingdom of Judah perish ? Why did the Jewish church survive ? These questions are of great interest to the sociologist, for the Jews are a classical instance of a people which has perished as a nation and survived as a church.

§ 3. *National Sin : an explanation of national failure.*

Why did the kingdom of Judah perish ? Because the people of Judah had sinned. That is the traditional answer. According to the ecclesiastical editor of Chronicles, the sin of Judah was its disobedience to Jeremiah ; according to the Anglo-Catholic theologian whom we have already quoted, the sin was Judah's apostasy from the pure religion to which it had been dedicated from birth, that is, from the age of Moses, or perhaps even further back, from the age of the Patriarchs. But were the sins of Judah more grievous than the sins of Nebuchadnezzar ? And if, as the Book of Job has taught

us, the requital of sin is a poor explanation of the misfortunes of individuals, is it any more illuminating in explaining the misfortunes of societies? Or are we to accept a modernized version of the doctrine of sin and punishment, believing that history is destiny, and destiny divine judgment, and failure to succeed a sin against the eternal laws of success? '*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.*' This is Carlyle's theory; the hero is the one who succeeds; the failure is the sinner against success. But the sociologist cannot accept, because he cannot use, the doctrine of a nation's sin. The sociologist is not concerned with the ultimate causes of group failure —ultimate, in any case, is a metaphysical category that has no meaning for him. He can indicate the secondary causes for the defeat and disruption of peoples, and only secondary causes have any causal significance. Judah went into captivity because, ever since the great schism of 937 B.C., when the tribes of Northern Israel broke away from Solomon's impolitic son, the kingdom of Judah was militarily weak at a time when the Babylonians were politically strong. The victims of history are not the victims of God. The poignancy of defeat would be unbearable if it were so. Peoples perish at the hands of other peoples. And they perish utterly when their faith is shattered in the possibility of conserving the distinctive values of their own civilization.

§ 4. *The Theory of National Sin: a rationalization of national failure.*

Why did the Jews survive? Because the theory of national sin—however inadequate as a clue to destiny—provided them with a rationalization of their failure. Faith in a national civilization and in the distinctive values of group-life very rarely survives an annihilating political defeat. How can it? The individual dies, but the group-life lives for ever. That is the basic dogma of every national religion. The social function of a national

religion is to strengthen the hearts of the people by guaranteeing the immortality of the nation. 'Be strong and of good courage : for thou shalt cause this people to inherit the land which I sware unto their fathers to give them.' Such, according to the Book of Jushua, were the words of the Lord to the successor of Moses. 'The Lord' was the projection of Hebrew self-confidence. Possession of Canaan was what the hungry nomads desired ; and Canaan was in the gift of the Master of the Universe. The Master would naturally bestow the gift upon his favourite ; and the religion of the nomad identified the favourite with himself. Religion was justified by the event ; the nomads inherited the land—to be disinherited by the Chaldeans. How could their faith in Jahveh survive the defeat of Jahveh's people ? When Nebuchadnezzar put out the eyes of their king, he put out the eyes of their god. The individual can sin against his people, but against whom can a people sin ? The individual, led astray by his wilful creativity, may attempt to innovate upon the immemorial customs of the group, which have been the laws of safety to endless generations. The sin of the individual is against society ; but against whom can a society sin ? Only against itself, against its own past—or against what it believes to be its past. In the past it was successful ; in the past it was the favourite of its god. If only it could return to its past, it would recover the secret of success. But against the importunities of the disastrous present, how can one believe in the second advent of the past ? Nevertheless, Judah did believe and the Jewish Church survived. The theory of national sin is therefore a first essay towards a philosophy of history.

§ 5. *The anachronistic Fallacy : a super-historical philosophy of history.*

To seek to escape from the unhappy present by picturing the future as a return to the more fortunate moments

of the past is a psychological rule of human behaviour which almost merits the rank of a sociological law. And to stimulate faith in the return of the fortunate past, the past is thought of as a primordial state of affairs which in essence has never changed. The Good, the Beautiful and the True—in brief, all the things that men desire—are supposed to have existed always. Temporarily they are obscured, and this obscuration is the cause and consequence of sin. The past is thought of *sub specie æternitatis;* it is so eternalized that it is no longer a component of the historic process. The past acquires the prestige of deity, it becomes as unchanging as God. In the terms of this philosophy of history, historical changes are illusory—an illusion cast by sin ; all the essential values of life and of civilization become independent of the time process ; and the face of the historic nation is transfigured into the stylized features of the eternal church.

A nation has a history. A church, in principle, has none. A nation is a changing and evolving group. A church, in theory, is a finished supertemporal society, a *societas perfecta.* A church is beyond history, its institutions were laid down with the foundations of the world. The seven sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church are a case in point. According to Catholic doctrine, all the seven were established by Christ ; and Christ is more than the historic Man of Galilee : in essence he is the Eternal Man. The Catholics eternalize the sacraments, the Jews the Mosaic Law. According to orthodox Jewish doctrine, it was Moses in the wilderness who fixed the perquisites of the priests some centuries before the building of the Temple, and not of course the priests themselves. And Moses was the mouthpiece of the Eternal God. Even Confucianism, the least church-like of the national creeds, feels impelled to eternalize Chinese history. For Confucius yearned after Chinese national unity some three centuries before Chin Shih Huang-ti, the first emperor, created it. Confucius believed that what ought to exist must always have existed ; that what

he was recommending was not new, but a return to the past. Accordingly, the *Shu-King* (the Book of History attributed to Confucius) begins with an account of the Five Sovereigns. The Five Sovereigns were culture-heroes, semi-divine personages, who were as divine as they were in fact mythical.

So widely distributed and so extensive in its ramifications is this super-historical philosophy of history, and so significant of the difference between the secular and the religious outlooks, that we must tabulate it amongst the principal fallacies that beset the interpretation of history. We propose to call it 'the anachronistic fallacy' by analogy with 'the pathetic fallacy' of Ruskin.

The problem of time and change is the crux of metaphysics just as the problem of evil is the crux of theology. Men usually become aware of change when things change for the worse. It is in the crises of group-life that men first become acutely conscious of the insecurity of human affairs. As long as the enemy was nature, religion had a remedy: religion brought nature within the fellowship of the clan; religion gave her the status of a transcendental blood relation, on the understanding that with blood relationship went friendship. But when the enemy was a member of one's own species and yet a foreigner, religion was at fault. The foreigner, by definition, is not a member of the clan. At best, the foreigner may be overcome by the power of the clan's god who, for the securing of victory, is advanced to the rank of War Lord or Lord of Hosts. At the worst, the foreigner may conquer; the enemy War Lord will in that case be supreme; and the religion of the defeated has no remedy. The god of the group is nothing but the group, idealized and objectified so as to make the group conscious of itself. When the group succumbs in battle, god and group succumb together. And now, having lost faith in its god and in itself, the group is in danger of complete destruction. Only one road of escape remains open, to combine the anachronistic fallacy with a doctrine of sin. The

group can then still believe that its god has not deserted it ; that the values of its civilization are undiminished by time ; that when it has purged itself of sin, the traditional values will shine with the old brightness.

The Jews survived the destruction of their polity because, owing to an extraordinary combination of historic circumstances, they were able to believe wholeheartedly in the anachronistic fallacy. The Jews eternalized their past, explaining the unhappy present as a punishment for sin, and sin as a wilful declension from the customs hallowed by tradition and rewarded by good fortune ; and prescribing, as a cure for sin, a return to Jahveh, the guardian of the past and the hope of the future. The historic circumstances that made it possible for Israel to survive were not extraordinary in themselves ; what was extraordinary was the combination of circumstances. But in this combination of circumstances a special gift for religion played no part. There is no evidence that prior to the schism of 937 B.C., when Ephraim shattered the unity of Israel, there was any more religiosity or of a higher standard in Israel than in Phœnica or Moab. Nor shall we include among these extraordinary circumstances the guiding hand of Providence. We shall assume that Jahveh's choice of Israel for his people was the expression, in the transcendental vocabulary of faith, of the historic fact that Israel had chosen Jahveh for its god.

From the election of Saul in 1025 B.C., as first king of Israel, down to the Fall of Jerusalem in 586 B.C., and the consequent extinction of national independence, the history of Israel has been the history of crises, leaving an indelible mark upon the national consciousness. The Israelites are important for the science of civilization because they are the first people to make religion out of history and history out of failure.

§6. *Israel: the unsuccessful nomad.*

The Israelites were unsuccessful nomads. Their inroads into Canaan did not result in effective occupation until about 1200 B.C., only two centuries, therefore, before the election of Saul. As a loose confederation of desert tribes, some nearly, some only very distantly related, they made the wilderness—the wilderness was the desert steppe between the Sinai peninsula and the south of Palestine—a point of concentration for a series of disconnected raids into Canaan. Canaan had been a protectorate of Egypt's for many centuries; and it was not until the collapse of the Nineteenth Dynasty, the weakening of Egypt, and the loss of its empire—all these events happening within twenty years of the death of the great Pharaoh Ramses II (1292–1225 B.C.)—that the Israelites got their opportunity. Their sojourn in the wilderness of Sinai had led them to adopt the worship of Jahveh, who was most probably a local storm god. Storm and weather gods were not uncommon in the Near East. It is also probable that Moses, the sheikh of one of the tribes of Sinai, was instrumental in popularizing Jahveh worship and in making it a basis for tribal unity. But Jahveh worship was a tender plant and had to compete with the weeds—weeds to the mind of the devout Jahvist—of the indigenous Canaanite religion. Isolated bands of raiders, not too successful in dispossessing the natives of their land, were just as likely to absorb the religion of the peasant as to maintain their own. The religion of Jahveh, so impressive in the desert, was all too easily submerged by harvest festivals of Canaanite revellers. Rejoicing in the fertility of the soil—and incidentally of his own loins—the Canaanite peasant celebrated a traditional ritual which was of the nature of sympathetic magic; man, beast, and land were stimulated by the ritual to improve upon their natural fertility. Passover, Pentecost, and Tabernacles, the three harvest festivals of spring, early

summer, and autumn are the gifts of the Canaanites to the religion of Jahveh. But whatever influence Jahvism may have had in creating a sense of national unity was more than dissipated by the absorption of the local Canaanite cults. Every hill-top, every prominent tree, was a sacred place of the Canaanites ; and the best that Jahvism could do was to initiate a process of religious syncretism, associating the sacred places of the Canaanites with the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. At these sacred places, the patriarchs were believed to have enjoyed a vision of Jahveh.

The patriarchs themselves have, very probably, the reality of eponyms. Certainly the twelve sons of Jacob have this and no greater reality. The unity of a group larger than that of kinsmen is a difficult conception for peoples who have not yet experimented in urban civilization. How were they to envisage the unity of Israel ? Only by representing the tribes, some of them quite possibly of non-Hebraic origin, as the sons of a common ancestor. ' Jacob ' was probably the name of a tribe that enjoyed for some time a position of ascendancy amongst the other tribes ; and this position was thought of in terms of a father-son relationship. But at this point of our description of Hebrew origins, we must be on our guard against falling a victim ourselves to the anachronistic fallacy. These stories of the patriarchs were not collected before the eighth century, that is, more than a century after the schism, when the political penalties of national disunity were being reaped. Only three Hebrew kings were kings of a united Israel, and of the three Saul was a failure ; David, who at long last succeeded in capturing from the Canaanites the fortress-city of Jerusalem, was the victim in his old age of palace conspiracies ; and before the death of Solomon it was obvious that the expense of his garish imperialism was undermining the loyalty of the tribes. Less than three centuries had elapsed since the tribes had enjoyed the anarchic freedom and the simple laws of the desert ; and three centuries

was too short a time to change the sons of the desert into the serfs of imperialism.

The stories of the patriarchs, as they are recounted in the Pentateuch, are political propaganda ; in fact it is not too much to say that many of the books of the Old Testament are political tracts, having for their object the restoration of national unity and national independence. The Israelite was an unsuccessful nomad. The primary object of the Old Testament writers was to explain Israel's failure and to devise means for surmounting it.

§ 7. *The Politics of the Old Testament.*

The view that the Old Testament, in the intention of its principal writers, is a book of political propaganda and only incidentally a book of religious edification, may surprise even those who are acquainted with the results of the higher criticism of the Bible. But the great work of the higher criticism was to emancipate us from the anachronistic fallacy, a fallacy from which no religion of the church epoch is ever entirely free. The higher criticism established the composite authorship of the Pentateuch ; it showed that two separate accounts of the same events—the Jahvist and the Elohist—one originating in Judah and the other in Ephraim, and both not earlier than the eighth century, and therefore later than the schism of 937 B.C., had been interwoven by later editors ; it showed that the Book of Deuteronomy was a Tract for the Times ; and that the time in question was the reign of the Josiah who was slain by Pharaoh Necho at Megiddo in 608 B.C. The object of Deuteronomy was to make propaganda for the abolition of the local cults ; for the centralizing of national worship at the Temple in Jerusalem ; and especially for the re-establishment of national unity by inducing the remnants of the Ephraimite population left in Palestine—the ' lost ten tribes ', in fact—to look to Jerusalem as its religious and therefore as its political centre. In short, the higher criticism showed

us that the Old Testament was a palimpsest; underneath were the historical documents of a nation; above were the anachronistic myths of a church.'

About the middle of the period of Persian rule, when all hope of national independence had been abandoned, the Jewish nation became the Jewish Church. From being a nation of warriors they became a nation of priests and scribes. And the priests and scribes, under the influence of the anachronistic fallacy, eternalized their own function, antedating the Jewish Church to the very beginning of Hebrew history. King David was transmuted into a psalmist, the prophet Samuel into a kingmaker, the monarchy itself into a sin against the theocracy, against the direct rule of Jahveh and the indirect rule of Jahveh's High Priest.

Every king of northern Israel, that is, of the Ephraimite tribes, did 'that which was evil in the sight of the Lord, and followed the sins of Jeroboam the son of Nebat, wherewith he made Israel to sin'. And only one or two of the kings of Judah did 'what was right in the eyes of the Lord'. Jeroboam was the man who rent the kingdom out of the hands of Solomon's son, taking ten of the twelve pieces. According to the ecclesiastically-minded editors of the Book of Kings, the sin of Jeroboam was against the unity of God by the setting up of a form of bull-worship, the golden calves of Bethel and Dan. But behind this indictment we can easily detect the political judgment of the Hebrew nationalist. For the real sin of Jeroboam was not against Jahveh but against Israel: Jeroboam was the destroyer of the nation's unity. Curiously enough, the purely political motives of Jeroboam in setting up the bull-worship are laid bare in the twelfth chapter of the Book of Kings: Jeroboam saw with a statesman's eye that political dualism necessitated religious dualism; accordingly he set up a royal chapel at Bethel as a rival establishment to Solomon's temple at Jerusalem.

On principle, the churchman takes no interest in politics. Politics belong to the mundane realm of vanity

and vexation. The statesman or the soldier is the foolish man who attempts with human hands to shape the destinies of nations. Of what use to Israel were the military feats of Omri, the father of Ahab ? His prowess may have so impressed the historians of Assyria that they called the Ephraimite kingdom the Land of Omri. But why should a churchman waste ink on him ? The business of the churchman chronicler is to denationalize the history of his nation, and to show that even the patriarch-founders of Israel, even Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were from the first churchmen and not nationalists. Israel was dead as a nation, but it could live on as a church.

So complete, indeed, is the alienation of the Jewish Church from secular civilization, and so completely is it enthralled by the anachronistic fallacy, that the history of Israel, from Moses to Jeremiah, becomes one long sustained act of religious apostasy. Israel had been called by God to be a holy People, and he had ignored his call ; Israel looked on the world with fleshly eyes and not with the eyes of the spirit. In his vanity Israel was not satisfied with his nomad status ; he desired promotion into a superior grade, so that he might rank as a practitioner of agrarian civilization. But God was angered by the pretensions of the promoted nomad. And because Israel had ignored the high purpose to which he had been called, preferring a national to a supernational mission, he had been cast down by Assyria and by Babylon, the predestined whips of an offended God.

The New Testament is the record of a church, the Old Testament of a nation ; the one is church history, the other national history. The Jewish churchman has edited his nation's history, giving it an eternalistic cast. He has antedated the major events of that history, taking them out of their political and economic setting. But the churchman has been unable to cover up completely the secular face of Israelite history. In saying this, we do not mean that after the higher criticism has purged the

text of all the churchman's glosses, the palimpsest of the Old Testament will reveal itself to be the secular history of a non-religious people. On the contrary. Every book of the Old Testament is full of religion ; but it is religion as the ally of nationalism, not as a substitute for it. With the exception of the Book of Daniel and the Psalms, much the greater part of the Old Testament was composed prior to the building of the second temple in the Persian period. In this earlier period the hope of national unity and national restoration had not yet faded out. What was the leading *motif* of this literature? Superficially, it seems to say : We have failed as a nation, let us succeed as a church. But churches are not built in this self-conscious fashion, least of all, the first church of recorded history. When the influence of the anachronistic fallacy and of the Jewish churchman's alienation from the world had been allowed for, we discover that the religion of Israel, in common with the indigenous religions of all Israel's contemporaries—Egypt, Assyria, Moab, and the rest—was intimately interwoven with its group-life and its distinctive civilization. The religion of Israel was faith in Israel and in Israel's civilization. But Israel's civilization was that of a promoted nomad ; and the promoted nomad had failed to make a successful transition from the civilization of the desert nomad to that of the urban cultivator.

§ 8. *The Civilizations of the Desert and the Sown.*

Israel's destiny is interwoven with two civilizations—the civilization of the Desert and the civilization of the Sown. It is the tension between these two which makes the drama of Israel's life. It is the failure to reconcile these two which divides Israel's conscience, giving him his extraordinary sense of national sin. In a brief national life of scarcely more than three centuries—from Saul in 1025 B.C. to the Fall of Samaria in 722 B.C.—the Israelites had lived under two lines of kings, one Ephraimite and

the other Judean ; had practised two types of religion, the one Jahvist and desert bred, the other an orgiastic cult of the Baalim, borrowed from the Canaanites and ultimately derived from the fertility of the Sown ; had practised two types of morals, the simple customs and the social equality of men who live in tents, and the complex laws of property and the fierce class conflicts of men who live in houses. The Rechabites, whom Jeremiah so admired because they did not build houses, nor sow seed, nor plant vineyards, are exemplars of the desert civilization ; and King Ahab, the patron of the prophets of Baal, who married Jezebel, a Zidonian, that is, a Canaanite princess, was a type of the urban and agrarian civilization.

An acute sense of national sin is as rare as it is remarkable. The sin of the individual is a theme of the New Testament ; the sin of the nation is the overpowering theme of the Old. There is scarcely a parallel in world history to the Hebrews prophets, a professional class of self-appointed denunciators of the nation's government, morals, and religion. The very existence of such a class is so extraordinary a phenomenon that it deserves a close examination by the sociologist. For if we dismiss the conventional explanations that the prophet is an ethical and religious genius, or that he is the divinely inspired preacher of the higher morality and universal religion, we have still to show how it was that the prophets gave Israel a bad conscience. A bad conscience is not a common disease of nations. A nation is usually the keeper of its own conscience, its moral standards are its own. Who, then, can accuse a nation of sin ? Every nation is pharisaical ; it thanks its god that it is not like other nations. And most nations are assured by the national religion that its laws and customs have remained unchanged ; that from the beginning of time, when the social framework was cast by the divine founders, the laws and customs have persisted in their original form, entirely unchanged into the present. All religions, whether

of primitives or of nation-groups or of denationalized churches, tend to eternalize their origins; they are, one and all, exploiters of the anachronistic fallacy. Consequently, the strongest preventive of a national sense of sin is the national religion; and the gravest disability in the hour of crisis is that overweening confidence in the national destiny for which the anachronistic doctrines of a national religion are largely responsible. 'What we are, we have been from all eternity and shall be till the end of time.' When national ruin shatters this assurance, the politically bankrupt group discovers that it has no spiritual assets.

With the exception of Israel, there is scarcely another instance in world history of a broken people surviving as a national church. The Parsees of India, who might perhaps be cited as a parallel, continue to practise the pre-Muslim religion of Ancient Persia; but they cannot be regarded as adequate representatives of the Persian people. With the rarest of exceptions, broken nations do not survive as churches because, as we have shown, the national religion is too closely integrated with the national life to be subsequently dissociated from it. The national religion, which is the historic basis of the nation's self-confidence, cannot readily be converted into a church, because a church, on principle, repudiates the secular features and, therefore, a not inconsiderable part of the national life. Nations cannot survive as churches; but the civilization of a disintegrated empire can survive in part as the civilization of a church. The adoption of Christianity by the Emperor Constantine and of Buddhism by the Emperor Asoka have already been discussed. In neither case was the religion adopted the religion of the dominant group; that is, it was not a national religion. Christianity and Buddhism became imperial religions because of their supposed restorative virtue as medicines for debilitated polities; but the polities were not restored to health. Within a century of the deaths of Constantine and Asoka, the barbarians

had triumphed over the Cæsars and Mauryas alike. The universal churches that succeeded the empires were alienated from them because of their secular failure ; the more advanced and complex civilization had succumbed to the simpler. What a judgment on secular civilization ! But some portions of empire civilization were salvaged by the churches, because the wiser of the barbarians adopted the churchmen as their teachers. The barbarians were eager to adopt more complex ways of life, and therefore they were prepared to use the recollections of the churchmen as a primer of the higher civilization.

Although a well-established nation does not survive the destruction of its polity, the Israelites survived because they were so young a nation. The Israelites were peasants and town dwellers who had not had time to forget that they had once been pastoral nomads. This cultural dualism is the secret of Israel's survival ; and the understanding of the struggle between two different types of civilization is the key to the literature of the Old Testament.

The sociological importance of the Old Testament is of no interest to the ordinary reader of the Bible. He feels that he is not concerned with it as a part of the public record of mankind. He reads it solely for his own private edification, and the agony of nations becomes a kind of spiritual sport for his recreation. And because the Bible is not read as history, but, like all church documents, as the recital of facts subsisting in a timeless ether, the dating of the events recorded in it is deprecated as an intrusion of the spirit of profane learning. But history without dates is unintelligible ; and the failure to note the time-intervals between the principal events makes any analysis of cause and effect impossible. We suggest, therefore, that the importance of cultural dualism for the history and destiny of Israel is usually overlooked because the ordinary reader of the Old Testament has not even a modicum of dates to guide him.

§ 9. *The Five Crises of Israel's History.*

The essential history of Israel is the record of five crises :

(1) 1200 B.C., when the exhaustion of Egypt, the collapse of its empire, the fall of the Nineteenth Dynasty—all within a quarter of a century of the death of Ramses II, the last of the great Pharaohs—made it possible for the Israelite nomads concentrated in the Sinai peninsula to adventure upon the conquest of Canaan.

(2) 1025 B.C., when the political weakness of the anarchic tribes necessitated the election of Saul, the daring soldier, as the first king of Israel. With his election, the desert clans, traditionally anarchic and individualist, became conscious of their nationhood. The story of the descent from a common ancestor Jacob is at once a myth to explain the national union and propaganda to maintain it.

(3) 937 B.C., when the northern tribes under Ephraimite leadership broke away from Judah. The Great Schism is the turning-point of Israelite history. Within a century of the foundation of the monarchy—the monarchy was both a symbol and a substance of national unity—the anarchism of the desert rebelled against the necessary authoritarianism of an agrarian society.

(4) 722 B.C., when the Northern Kingdom, after two centuries of unceasing and largely meaningless warfare with its immediate neighbours, fell a victim to the power of Assyria. To consolidate itself against Judah, weak in number and resources, but strong in the possession of Jerusalem and the Temple, the Northern Kingdom set up a rival religion, far more heavily weighted with the fertility cults of Canaan than was the case with the nominally Jahvist religion of Judah.

(5) 586 B.C., when the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar closed the career of Judah as an independent nation. What was left of the ruling aristocracy was deported to Babylon—there had been a preliminary deportation in 597 B.C. which included the future prophet

Ezekiel. The period of one hundred and twenty-five years from 722 to 597 B.C. had been called the Great Reprieve. Jerusalem, expecting hourly to meet the same fate as had befallen Samaria, by what must have appeared a miracle to the contemporaries of Isaiah, outlived Nineveh. Nineveh, the capital of Assyria, fell to the Medes in 612 B.C.; and Jerusalem escaped Assyria's fate, only to be destroyed by Babylon. On the scaffold a condemned man reviews in agony the vicissitudes of his career. From 722 to 597 B.C., for a century and a quarter, Judah was a condemned nation, interpreting in anguish the meaning of the brief centuries that separated it from its nomad days. Within the period of the Great Reprieve, the three major prophets of the Old Testament, Isaiah of Jerusalem, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel received their spiritual education. Within this same period, two kings of Judah, who were especially approved by the post-exilic church as 'good,' Hezekiah and Josiah, attempted a belated unification of the Israelite remnants by suppressing the local cults and making the Temple worship a concentration-point of national unity. And, what is even more important, it is to the intense creativity and the spiritual concentration of this fateful period that we owe the conception of a 'Bible'. Collections of popular ballads, tribal sagas, and royal annals and, above all, legends of the seers and prophets, were already in circulation. But the idea of organizing such collections and using them as propaganda for survival, or at least as a prophylactic against extinction, was born during this period of reprieve.

History, as we have said, is meaningless without dates; and sociology is impossible without a comparative measure of the time-intervals between crucial events. Four centuries separate us, here in England, from the Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, and the popular monarchy of the Tudors—all of them part causes of the awakening of our national consciousness. They are four centuries crowded with events; yet how slow in *tempo*

compared with the four centuries that separate in Israel the birth of national consciousness and the death of national existence. The election of Saul, the inauguration of the empire under Solomon, the schism which cleft the nation into two portions, paralysing each of them into impotence, the irretrievable ruin of the one, the precarious reprieve of the other, and the final sentence of indefinite servitude passed upon the surviving remnant—the time-span of all these events was only four centuries.

Always keeping in view the five landmarks of Israel's history, we are now in a position to show how the cultural dualism, that is, the conscious struggle within a single nation-group of the nomad and peasant types of civilization—intensely conscious because of the four brief centuries in which it was fought out—explains the ethical monotheism which is supposed to be Israel's legacy to the world.

Ethical monotheism is the name usually given to a supposed new kind of morality and a supposed new kind of religion, preached to Israel and through Israel to the world by the Hebrew prophets of the pre-exilic period. It is claimed that the new morality like the new religion transcends national limitations; both being super-national and universal; and, according to orthodox theology, they derive these characteristics ultimately from the divine source of the prophet's inspiration. Now we have said more than once that doctrines of genius or of special inspiration have neither place nor value in the science of civilization. We must see whether cultural dualism and the five major crises of Israel's history cannot explain the phenomenon of Hebrew prophecy and of the morality and religion preached by the prophets.

CHAPTER XI

THE DESERT AND THE SOWN

§ 1. *Political Failure and the Message of the Prophets.*

THE turning-point of Hebrew history is the schism of 937 B.C. After the disruption of their short-lived unity, it became suddenly clear to the children of the desert that the Promised Land had not fulfilled its promise. The lot of the nomad was hard and his standard of life low; but he was a free man amongst free men, enjoying a stable if austere existence. After more than two centuries of unceasing warfare (1200 B.C. to the capture of Jerusalem by David) Israel had at last overcome the Canaanites, assimilating their culture and a great part of their religion, only to discover that against the new cultural assets there were heavy liabilities. The civilization of the Sown is not the same as the civilization of the Desert: the cultivator has one economy, the nomad another; the cultivator needs a great deal of government, the nomad very little. The wealth of the cultivator excites the militant envy of his neighbours, whereas the poverty of the nomad protects him. Where the land is the means of production, there are class conflicts between landlord and peasant, between rich and poor—an arresting contrast with the substantial equality of the wilderness. Wealth is power, but it is also weakness. The cultivators, for their self-protection, are forced into a polity; and the polity is one of a number of competing polities. Warfare, which in the desert is a brigands' diversion, may in the sown be a forced choice between victory and annihilation. In the sown the

prizes are more valuable and the penalties of failure correspondingly more terrible.

Israel's consciousness of failure was something new in world history. And this consciousness burnt intensely in the prophets, a class of professional religionists descended from the customary ecstatics of a pastoral society. The Hebrew Prophet is a professional brother of the Arab Dervish and the Siberian Shaman ; and there is nothing derogatory in placing him in this, his proper sociological category. The Prophet, the Dervish, the Shaman, are inspired by the austere spirit of a pastoral civilization. The group-life burns vividly in them. For what is the god whom they invoke, and what is the ' lord ', whose ' word ' comes commandingly unto the Hebrew Prophet ? Are we to accept the naïve realism of the prophet, when he locates the source of his inspiration in a Transcendent Being ? Are we to believe that the prophet is, in truth, the privileged recipient of communications from above ? And if not, what alternative explanation can we advance for the prophet's confidence in the objectivity of his message ? The prophet maintains that it is the god who is speaking and not the prophet's private self. Shall we then, in agreement with Lévy-Bruhl, explain such phenomena as prophecy by the mystical mentality of primitives and other untutored peoples ? We have already rejected this theory, as Durkheim rejected similar theories, on the ground that it makes religion into an illusion. We hold that prophecy is neither a mystic's illusion nor an overflow of the unconscious. The mechanism of the prophet's vision is no doubt a proper subject for the psychologist ; and the distortion introduced into the prophet's message by his unconsciousness of this mechanism may be corrected by a psychology of the unconscious ; but the substance of the message stands. We hold that the prophet is a social point of concentration for the group-life ; he is the vessel into which the civilization of the group has been poured ; he is more concerned for its safety and success, more responsive to the quiver

of its changing life, than the prosaic and unimaginative multitude.

'The word of the Lord' is the authoritative declaration of the group-mind. And by the group-mind we do not mean a secular counterpart to the 'mind of God'. The group is not a person; in the personal sense it has no mind. But the group is a field of culture-diffusion; the members of the group, in solidarity with one another, become conscious of common objectives and of their identity as a group. In the prophet, the group knows itself as a group, it becomes aware of its problems and troubled about its destiny.

§ 2. *The Great Schism of* 937 B.C. *and its importance for politics and prophecy.*

In a series of short historical notes, we propose to develop the thesis that cultural dualism, that is, the clash between the two civilizations of the Desert and the Sown, underlies the phenomenon of Hebrew prophecy; and that the 'universalism' of Hebrew prophecy in morals and religion is a programme for the synthesis of these discordant civilizations.

(1) The prophecy that is historically important is subsequent to the schism of 937 B.C. The schism followed immediately upon the death of Solomon and the rapid disintegration of his empire. But Solomon in all his glory, arrayed in nomadic Israel's short-lived success as the manager of an urban and agrarian civilization, was congratulated rather than denounced by the prophets of his own age. Success justifies itself. It is failure that raises doubts as to the validity of a civilization in which men have hitherto believed with the entirety of religious faith. Even in Solomon's lifetime the opposition was led, not by the prophets, but by the politicians. One of Solomon's ablest administrators, Jeroboam the son of Nebat, 'the man who made Isreal to sin', became the first king of Ephraimite Israel.

(2) In politics, the conflict between the two civilizations is displayed in the contradictory attitudes of the members of the Prophetic Party: they are unionists, and at the same time anti-imperialists and isolationists; they are anti-Ephraimite and anti-secessionist, and yet they sympathize with the anarchic nomad's hatred of the landlords, the tax-collectors, and the press-gang captains. The prophets associate unionism in religion with unionism in politics by favouring the centralization of Jahvist worship in the Temple at Jerusalem, and yet they deprecate 'the multitude of sacrifices'. The bullocks, lambs, and he-goats, the 'vain oblations on the new moons and sabbaths', are part of the conspicuous wastefulness of agrarian plutocracy and a stone of offence to the traditions of the plain living nomad.

(3) The battle between the two civilizations, fought out within the prophet's soul, makes him at once a reactionary and a visionary; he looks back to the simple laws and the simple social system of the desert, and forward to a universal and distributivist agrarianism in which every man will be at peace in his own vineyard and under his own fig tree.

(4) The prophets are militant nationalists and supernational pacifists. Up to the destruction of the Ephraimite monarchy in 722 B.C.—and perhaps even to the death and defeat of the 'good' Josiah at Megiddo in 608 B.C.—the prophets believed that the restoration of religious unity would be a prelude to political unity. Jahvism, though in fact a syncretism of the religions of Sinai and of Canaan, was regarded by the prophets as the immemorial religion of nomadic and united Israel. In this view they were strengthened, of course, by an extensive use of the anachronistic fallacy. But the unionists' remedy was applied too late: after the fall of Samaria in 722 B.C., the murderous militarism of Assyria postponed the restoration of an independent Davidic monarchy into the messianic future. What with the decline of Egypt, the rise and fall of Assyria, the short-lived resurrection

of Babylon, and the arrival of the Medes, it was becoming clear to the prophets that the small principalities of Palestine and Syria, drawn into the vortex of great power politics, would never survive. Isolationism was the prophets' policy ; but unhappily Israel's neighbours made it void. Where there is no immediate remedy men can live only by sustaining themselves in hope ; perhaps in the messianic future, men will beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks. Not that the prophets had any pity for the conquered Canaanites : the nomad has no scruples about the subjection of peasant cultivators. But the Israelite nomad had himself become a cultivator ; and what he had done was now to be done to him, and by organized groups of cultivators mightier than himself. National defeat is a good school of supernational pacifism.

§ 3. *The Contribution of Prophecy to Morals.*

Against the background suggested by this historical outline, we can now come to close grips with the problem of ethical monotheism. Hebrew prophecy made original contributions to morals and religion. We will consider, first, the contribution to morals.

From what has already been said, it is clear that the Hebrew prophet is not an ethical philosopher anxious to discover the universal principles of morality. What is remarkable about his ethical doctrine is not the particular morals he champions, but that he has a doctrine at all. The existence of moralists and of professors of morality we moderns take for granted ; but we are the heirs of all the civilizations, and can compare and criticize their respective values. But in the days of the prophets, nations, as far as their internal social relations were concerned, formed closed groups. Knowledge of the arts and crafts, what amounts to practical science, diffuses readily ; so does knowledge of cosmic myths, of folk-tales, of religious rites ; but what has the lowest coefficient of diffusion is

the morals of a group. The morals of a group is the body of customary practice upon which all social order is based. No one subtracts from custom ; no one innovates upon it ; and no one, except in advanced communities which arrange for legislative activity, ever adds to it. And it is surely a sheer anachronism on the part of the liberal theologian of to-day to assert that 'pure' religion has ever been the custodian of 'pure' morality ; understanding as he usually does by 'pure' morality, a morality independent of all civilizations and yet underlying each of them. It has never been the function of religion to criticize morals ; its function has been to maintain them. The morals of a community is the social basis of its civilization ; and religion's business is to stimulate faith in civilization, not to disturb it. The religionist is not a social reformer ; if anything he tends to be a reactionary rather than a meliorist. Even to-day, the well-meaning churchmen who, hoping to humanize the capitalist system, interest themselves in ' social guilds ', do not easily discover in the Gospels a practical programme of social reform. And similarly, if we collect and collate all the ethical passages in all the major and minor prophets of the Old Testament, we shall not discover even one practical suggestion, one hint for legislation or government, which could be used to combat the inevitable injustices of an agrarian society. What we do find—and it is something new in world history —is a protest ; the Hebrew prophet is a protestant ; and what he protests against is the shortcomings of his own civilization.

§ 4. *The Protest of the Desert against the Sown.*

The Hebrew prophet is a religionist ; and religionists do not usually protest against their own civilization, against the civilization in which their religion teaches them to have faith. How is it, then, that the Hebrew prophet is a protestant ? In the light of the Old Testament history that has been outlined above, the answer

is clear : in the Hebrew prophet the spirit of nomadic Israel protests against the civilization of the Canaanites. Idealizing and antedating the past and reconstructing it in the light of the present, the prophet believed that when Israel entered the Promised Land Jahveh was with Israel, in other words, that Israel was then at the height of success, Jahveh and Israel being ultimately indistinguishable. But Israel rebelled against Jahveh, in other words Israel abandoned pure nomadism and assimilated the culture of Canaan. And this rebellion had been his undoing—he was successful when he was a conquering nomad, but has ceased to be successful as an agrarian settler. What is remarkable about this protest is that the protestant is himself a half-assimilated, a semi-Canaanite ; three or four centuries of culture-diffusion having left their mark upon him. The act of protest is remarkable, but not its content ; the content is surprisingly narrow. Indeed, if all the ethical passages of Old Testament prophecy are collected, they will be found to be variants on three or four standard texts. And as the first five chapters of Isaiah contain these texts, we can clinch the argument by quoting them.

(1) Isaiah i, 23. Thy princes are rebellious, and companions of thieves ; everyone loveth gifts, and followeth after rewards : they judge not the fatherless, neither does the cause of the widow come unto them.

(2) Isaiah iii, 14 and 15. The Lord will enter into judgment with the elders of his people, and the princes thereof : It is ye that have eaten up the vineyard ; the spoil of the poor is in your houses :

What mean ye that ye crush my people, and grind the face of the poor ? saith the Lord, the Lord of Hosts.

(3) Isaiah v, 8. Woe unto them that join house to house, that lay field to field, till there be no room, and ye be made to dwell alone in the midst of the land !

What have we here, if not the familiar diseases of an agrarian society ? The small peasant is squeezed out, or reduced to serfdom. The landed estates expand into

latifundia. The law is administered by the ruling class in its own interests.

In the ancient city-states, and notably in Rome, the civil discords turned almost invariably round the question of the land. It has been said that from the time of the Gracchi, it was easy to recognize the agitator who might become dangerous to the dominant minority. If two of the planks in his political platform were, first, the re-division of the land and, second, the cancelling of debts, then he was a man to be feared.

There is nothing, then, extraordinary in the prophet's criticism of the shortcomings of an agrarian society; what is extraordinary is that the critic should be a religionist speaking in the name of his god. As we have said, it is not often that the religionist is a critic of his own civilization. The Hebrew prophet is the exception, because the civilization he is criticizing is not one civilization: it is two civilizations in conflict. The morals of an idealized nomadism, associated by Prophetism with Jahveh the nomad god, are compared and contrasted with the morals of an agrarian society, associated with the Baalim, the gods of fertility.

The prophetic call for righteousness is not a demand for a universal morality abstracted from a particular civilization; it is a demand for the synthesis of the two civilizations with which the prophets were acquainted. Civilizations change, but groups are usually unaware of the change-process. Only in exceptional circumstances are groups forced to interrogate their destiny. The crisis in Israel's history was the cause of prophecy; the crisis produced national self-consciousness; and national self-consciousness produced prophecy.

§ 5. *Jahveh and Baal: the conflict of two civilizations.*

Finally, there is the problem of Hebrew monotheism. The solution of the problem is, in fact, identical with the solution of another problem, that of the ethical demands

of the prophets. The prophets demand that the social morality of the Desert shall not be obscured by the social morality of the Sown. And they also demand that the God of the Desert shall be acknowledged as the God of the Sown. But the God of the Desert, though he originated in a storm-god of Sinai, is not located at Sinai ; he is the travelling companion of the Children of the Desert in all their wanderings. The God of the Desert is no other than the spirit of nomad civilization ; he is the desert-group's consciousness of its group identity. And when the Desert conquers the Sown, the Lord of the Desert becomes the Lord of the Sown. But the Sown, though weaker in warfare, is stronger in culture. Baal, the Lord of Canaan, had succumbed to Jahveh, the Lord of Hosts ; but in the longer battle of the civilizations Baal had almost triumphed over Jahveh. When Solomon, ' loving many women, turned his heart away to other gods than Jahveh ' the triumph of the Baalim was complete. But Solomon died and his empire with him ; and the disaster of the schism reawakened the spirit of the desert.

The one God of the prophets is not the *ens realissimum*, the transcendent perfection, of our Hellenized Christian theology ; he is the Lord of all the earth, of as much of the earth as the prophets knew. And how much of the earth did they know, or know about ? Any reader of the Old Testament can answer the question for himself. The Old Testament is still our most valuable source-book of ancient history ; it enables the reader to escape from the metaphysical abstractionism which is the unfortunate part of the legacy of Greece to Europe.

The Desert and the adjacent Sown : these comprise the complete circle of the prophets' world. Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia, the three portions of the Fertile Crescent—we owe this apt phrase to Breasted—and the great desert of Arabia, to the south of the Fertile Crescent, comprised the whole earth as the Hebrew prophets knew it.

In the concrete thought of the prophets, the unity of

God is the unity of civilization. And only two types of civilization exist for them : that of the Desert and that of the Sown. Until the pastoral peoples had made their peace with the cultivators and the cultivators had made their peace with one another, the problem of civilization, as the prophets understood it, would be unsolved.

Just as Comte believed that Paris would become the capital of Western civilization and the sanctuary of the 'religion of humanity', so Isaiah hoped that many people would 'go and say, Come ye and let us go up to the Mountain of the Lord' in Jerusalem. In his vision of a unified civilization, Isaiah, like Comte, did not cease to be a nationalist. Isaiah had lived through the Assyrian terror, when Jerusalem was hourly expecting the fate that had overtaken Samaria in 722 B.C. Isaiah had experienced the insane destructiveness of war; he encouraged his fellow-countrymen to hope—as they are still hoping—for the unity of civilization.

§ 6. *The Secular Warfare of Nomads and Cultivators.*

We have chosen Ancient Israel as the subject-matter of this chapter, because the duel between the Desert and the Sown is one of the major themes of world history. Urban civilization had its oldest seats in Egypt and Babylon ; these two extremities of the Fertile Crescent were therefore the first to feel the pressure of the nomadic peoples. Militarily, Egypt and Babylon were generally too strong to be themselves objects of direct attack ; the superior social organization of great agrarian polities giving them an initial advantage. But the outlying parts of these empires—the Egyptian protectorate over Palestine is an instance—were more vulnerable ; and we know how the death of Ramses II and the collapse of the Nineteenth Dynasty was nomadic Israel's opportunity.

We know that air tends to flow in from areas of high pressure to areas of low pressure, and that the result is an equalization of pressure ; similarly, a hot body will

diffuse its heat over contiguous areas of lower temperature, the result again being a relative equalization of temperature. There is an analogous principle at work in the relations between the simpler and the more complex civilizations. The complex civilizations have a standard of life which the simpler civilizations desire for themselves. The Desert is an area of high deprivation ; the Sown is an area of low deprivation. A cultural draught is set up ; and the nomads are set in motion towards the territories of the cultivators. So strong and so frequent is this cultural draught that we have already found for it a distinctive name, the principle of the Equalization of Culture. This principle is an obvious consequence of the principle of culture-diffusion ; enough of the superior culture of one group diffuses over into the inferior culture of another to make the less fortunately situated group desire a greater measure of equality. To employ the terminology of contemporary politics, the nomadic peoples are the out-élite and the cultivators the in-élite. The craving of the out-élite to share the privileges of the in-élite has, during the last three thousand years, been the mainspring of world history.

The Semites, the Nordics, and the Mongols have all at different times played the role of the out-elite nomad, challenging the privileges of the in-elite cultivators. As we know, one great wave of Nordic migrants overran the Punjab, Persia, and the Eastern Mediterranean, a century or two in advance of the Hebrews of 1200 B.C. ; the second wave broke upon the Roman Empire in the fourth century of our era.

The Turkish Mongols destroyed the political and cultural hegemony of the Arabs, advancing their own conquests over the ruin of Byzantium almost to the walls of Vienna. And one of the descendants of Zenghis Khan, the great Mongol conqueror of A.D. 1200, became the Great Khan of Tartary on the Lower Volga, and another became the Emperor of China.

As for the Semites, almost from the dawn of recorded

history they have left their hungry deserts for the more delectable regions of the Fertile Crescent. After the surrender of Babylon to Cyrus in 538 B.C. and the destruction of Carthage by Rome in 146 B.C., the Semites were temporarily absent from the great stage of world affairs. The Jewish Church, under the high priests of Jerusalem, was the sole surviving exponent of Semitic culture. But another great eruption of the Arabian Desert brought the Semite back. Within a hundred years of the death of Mohammed in A.D. 632, the Muslim Empire extended from Persia to the Atlantic.

In religion, though not in morals, Mohammed is the true descendant of the Hebrew prophets ; his monotheism has the same concrete objectives as theirs ; Allah, like Jahveh, is the reconciling unity of the Desert and the Sown. The God of Islam, like the God of Israel, is the one Lord of all the earth ; but the earth has now more than doubled its area, for the Sahara has been added to the deserts of Arabia, and the valleys of Andalusia to the Fertile Crescent.

In the New Testament the spiritual heir of Hebrew prophecy is identified with Jesus. Indirectly Jesus is no doubt in the line of descent from the Old Testament prophets, but immediately he is in the line of the great rabbis. He is addressed as master, that is, rabbi, by supporters and opponents alike. And the rabbis are the pastors of the Jewish Church and not, as the prophets were, the counsellors of the Hebrew nation. But the Hebrew nation as an independent polity ceased to exist in 586 B.C. ; and the synthesis between the civilizations of the Desert and of the Sown which the prophets desiderated was deferred until the age of Mohammed, more than a thousand years later. Now men cannot live without faith in civilization, without faith in themselves and in their destiny. Over the interval of a thousand years there had to be a substitute for the shattered polities of the Semites, and that substitute was the Church.

CHAPTER XII

THE MESSIANIC HOPE

§ 1. *The Kingdom of God on Earth.*

TO regard the messianic hope as an illusory wish-fulfilment or as the phantasy-mongering of pious ignoramuses is to take a superficial view of the historic process. The messianic hope took on a multitude of historic forms; it was the hope of the end of the world, of the liquidation of the unhappy past and the evil present, of the inauguration of a new era of love and justice—and what is a summary of all these hopes—it was the hope that a kingdom of God would be established on earth.

The argument that the historic Jesus, the authentic preacher of the kingdom of God, must have been superior to these ' eschatological hallucinations ' is both superficial and confused. Jesus, so runs the argument, was the Word or Logos, the metaphysical principle of absolute truth. And absolute truth is unconditioned by the historic needs and weaknesses of men who, because they are men, grope blindly in the unlit vestibule of the future. The Logos, therefore, could not have shared the messianic delusions of the apostles. It is admitted that the apostles, and notably Peter, put the traditional construction upon the messianic hope, and that outwardly Jesus did not differ from them. But it is said that this outward acquiescence was an act of condescension; that Jesus was being delicately considerate of their untutored simplicity. As Logos, Jesus was omniscient; as the Man of Galilee, he shared the limited insight of time-conditioned

men. Being an illusion, the messianic hope of tradition must inevitably have failed. Between the forcible entry of Pompey into the Temple in 63 B.C. and its destruction by Titus in A.D. 70, there had been a number of political messiahs and all of them had failed. But Christianity succeeded. Therefore its founder could not have shared in the messianic delusions of his disciples. It is this argument which we have criticized as being both superficial and confused.

The power of illusion must not be under-estimated, least of all by an alert sociology. Even when that has been admitted, it still remains incredible that a world movement such as Christianity, a movement of unprecedented range and influence, a movement which for two thousand years has been the educator of a not inconsiderable fraction of the human race—it is incredible that such a movement could have been launched upon the world by the unaided power of an illusion. We believe that the messianic hope was something more deeply founded.

Before proceeding with our analysis, it is worth pointing out that the Lord's Prayer, the most popular of all Christian formularies, is pervaded by messianic and eschatological ideas. 'Thy kingdom come' should be construed as 'May the kingdom of the Messiah come.' With the coming of the kingdom, the epoch of strife and struggle, of civil and national wars will be terminated, and a new era of justice and felicity will be inaugurated. The kingdom of God will be established by God. The faithful will be the passive and adoring witnesses of the work done on their behalf.

It should be noted that the faithful have not always been content to remain the passive witnesses of their salvation. The kingdom of God has proved a revolutionary ferment, stirring up the subjected classes. Wycliffe and Hus were the forerunners of the revolutions of 1789 and 1917 as well as of the Protestant Reformation. The peasants and craftsmen to whom they preached had not

been educated in abstract metaphysics and absolutist ethics. With coarse realism these members of the medieval proletariat equated the transcendental kingdom of God to a classless society upon earth.

The messianic hope is important sociologically, but we cannot understand it unless it is seen against the background of six centuries of history. As we have remarked before, a great deal of the Bible is unintelligible because few read it, except the devout; and the devout, unfortunately, read the Bible not as a sociological record but as sacred history. And sacred history is history *sub specie aeternitatis*, eternalized history; and eternalized history is no longer history.

§ 2. *The New Testament: the Five Epochal Dates, together with a digression on Scholasticism.*

The messianic hope is the key to the understanding of the New Testament. And the New Testament, like every other historical document, is unintelligible without dates. We propose, therefore, to organize our sociological analysis round the following five dates: (1) 538 B.C. Fall of Babylon and the beginning of Persian rule over Palestine. (2) 444–400 B.C The reorganization of the Jewish Church under Nehemiah and Ezra, religious doctrine and practice being based upon the Mosaic Law.

(3) 167 B.C. The conflict between Judaism and Hellenism comes to a head in the revolt captained by Judas Maccabæus.

(4) 63 B.C. Pompey establishes the Romans as overlords of Judæa.

(5) A.D. 70. The revolt against Roman rule crushed by Titus, and the Temple and the High Priesthood destroyed.

(1) 538 B.C. With the fall of Babylon in 538 B.C. Judæa became a Persian province. Small bands of exiles were encouraged to return from Babylon to

Jerusalem. And some twenty or thirty years later the Temple was rebuilt.

(2) 444–400 B.C. A century and a half to two centuries had elapsed since the destruction of the monarchy, the loss of political independence, and the exile of the ruling classes to Babylon. By this time hopes of a political restoration had faded out. The community in Jerusalem was reorganized as a church under the rule—partly civil, partly religious—of a high priest. The faithful were uninterested in politics and the concrete everyday life of a changing society. Like the religionists of all churches, they were alienated from life in the present, and disciplined to live in an eternalized past. And by a liberal use of the anachronistic fallacy, modes of social and religious organization which were no older than the period immediately before and after the Babylon exile, were sanctified by being ascribed to Moses, and through Moses to God. This antedating of the Mosaic Law has been irrefutably established by the higher criticism of the Bible, and is, indeed, one of its greatest triumphs. Sometimes the authority invoked is even more ancient than Moses; the customary practice of an Abraham, a Noah, even an Adam, may be cited to sanctify what is in reality an innovation. To the scribe who followed in the footsteps of Ezra, progress—if indeed one can speak here of progress—concluded with the patriarchs, and all subsequent history was one long record of rebellion and degeneration. The scribes maintained that the Mosaic Law was the sum-total of divine revelation. Nothing could be added to the Law, except commentary and exegesis. The prophets were creative publicists. The scribes were uncreative schoolmen.

Scholasticism is an important sociological phenomenon. There is scholasticism in Jewish and Christian and still more in Islamic and Brahmanic literature. If one turns over the pages of the Sacred Books of the East—that invaluable series edited by Max Müller—one soon

discovers that they are unreadable except by the scholar or the sociologist. And the reason is not far to seek ; the spirit of creation has deserted them ; they are the dry bones of literature. Scholastic literature consists principally of commentary and exegesis, or of pseudo-logical equivalencies for chains of scriptural texts. Sometimes the scholastic spirit invades the scriptures themselves. It is noteworthy that the founders of religions do not usually compose scriptures. Mohammed is the exception ; and the intentional character of his achievement has not enhanced the literary value of the Koran. What is interesting in the scriptures is the stories of the founders or the legends of the saints ; what is pedestrian is usually the result of the logicizing spirit vainly endeavouring to construct a systematic doctrine. Scholasticism is the bane not only of theology, but of a great deal of metaphysics. Every original theology or metaphysic claims to be an account of reality, claims therefore to be the last word upon its theme. What is there, then, for the disciples and followers to do, except to write commentaries and ingeniously to manipulate texts ?

There is very little scholasticism in our Bible and comparatively little theology. In consequence, the Bible is the freshest and most readable of all sacred books. This estimate is not, we think, an Englishman's prejudice in favour of the sacred book with which he has been familiar from childhood, but is based upon two substantial reasons : first, the Old Testament is the record not of a church, but of a civilization which had not yet become a church ; second, what is living in the New Testament is the biographical record of two protagonists of the messianic hope, Jesus and Paul. The Jewish church, set up by Ezra and Nehemiah in 444 to 400 B.C., developed in the period between the Old and the New Testaments, and of this period there are comparatively few records in our Bible. So the Bible escaped the fate which has overtaken the majority of the world's sacred books, the fate of becoming a Talmud, a commentary

upon commentaries. Again, the New Testament, with the important exception of the Gospel of St John and the pseudepigraphical letter of St Paul to the Hebrews, is not a treatise on theology, nor is the founder of Christianity a theologian. The Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels is an outspoken rebel against scholasticism. The rabbi survives in Paul; nevertheless the creative theologian in him is far stronger than the uncreative schoolman.

(3) 167 B.C. We come now to the third of our five dates, that of the Maccabæan revolt against the Hellenizing policy of Antiochus Epiphanes, the overlord of Palestine at that time. After almost exactly two centuries of Persian rule (538 to 330 B.C.) Palestine came under the rule of the Greeks. At first the change of rulers made little difference. Like the Buddhists of Ceylon who had seen in turn Portuguese rulers replaced by Dutch and Dutch by British, they were indifferent to the vanities of the great world; the eternal Law of Moses satisfied their needs. But suddenly they were translated back from eternity to time. Their Greek overlord, Antiochus Epiphanes, was not content with the sweeping victories gained by Hellenism over the native cultures and religions of the Near East. Antiochus must needs accelerate the almost irresistible process of Hellenization by ordering a sacrifice of pigs to Zeus upon the altar sacred to Jahveh. The Jews were dumbfounded. It was no easy matter for a church to organize resistance to the lawful state. Churchmen who, for centuries, had lived a quiet secluded life, paying the taxes and disregarding politics, were completely at a loss. We know how Hebrew civilization saved itself by substituting for the pre-exilic Jewish State the Jewish Church; it was now a question of saving the Jewish Church from complete destruction by the converse process of converting the Jewish Church into an independent Jewish State. The struggle lasted for almost exactly a hundred years (167 to 63 B.C.) and for eighty years (143 to 63 B.C.) there was actually in existence a Jewish State, as extensive as the empire of Solomon.

Just as David and Solomon exploited the political breathing space between the decline of Egypt and the rise of Assyria, so the brothers and great-nephews of Judas Maccabæus won for Palestinian Jewry an ephemeral independence in the brief interval between the crumbling of Greek power and the rise of Rome to world hegemony.

(4) 63 B.C. This is the fourth of our five dates. A.D. 70, the fifth of our dates, closes this chapter of Jewish history. In 63 B.C. the arbiter of destiny in the shape of Pompey the Great arrived in Palestine. Political independence had been a short-lived episode, it had lasted eighty years and it was never to be renewed. Hellenistic kings had once been the overlords of Syria. Now the kings were giving place to Roman legates and the legates were far more ruthless and efficient and exploitative than the kings. After the usual proportion of Rome's new subjects had been crucified, sold into slavery, or reduced to beggary, the Jews began to appreciate their new political situation. For eighty years the Jewish Church had functioned as a state, and preoccupation with the Mosaic Law had been interrupted by the conduct of a political experiment, combining the priesthood with the kingship. The descendants of Judas Maccabæus had been responsible for the experiment and it had failed completely.

§ 3. *The failure of the Maccabæan experiment in monarchy.*

How signally the Jews had failed to establish a kingdom of God upon earth, or for that matter a kingdom like the ancient kingdom of David, is shown by two petitions, presented to the Romans by the Pharisees; the first, shortly after the death of Alexander Jannæus, the most successful of the line of Maccabæan kings, and the other after the death of Herod the Great, who though of Edomite extraction had married, and murdered, Mariamne, one of the last surviving princesses of the Maccabæan line. The Pharisees petitioned the Romans to abolish the kingship and to allow them to live in peace.

as a religious community under the jurisdiction of the High Priests. Alexander Jannæus was an able soldier ; Herod was the acutest politician of the age. These two were the most distinguished of the new line of Jewish kings ; the first incorporated Galilee into Judæa, the second had rebuilt the Temple at Jerusalem in such grandiose fashion as to give both Jewry and himself a world-wide advertisement. But both these kings were subhuman monsters, surpassing in the intensity of their lusts and cruelties the worst models of the age. We say, advisedly, surpassing, because these kings were the heads not only of a civil, but also of a religious, community ; they added to the corruptions of the secular the corruptions of the spiritual power. The cosmopolitan Jewish Church of Jerusalem derived a considerable income from the shekels contributed by the faithful of the Diaspora. In this point the Church of Jerusalem resembled the Catholic Church of Rome. The Papacy was dependent on Peter's pence as the High Priests were dependent on the Temple's shekels. Now it has been said that, during the nineteenth century, the Papal States were the worst governed States of Europe. When a church descends from the spiritual to the secular, and takes over the direction of civil affairs, it rarely succeeds in investing the temporal with the perfection of the eternal, but sullies both. Time and eternity do not mix. Alexander Jannæus and Herod were responsible for the conduct of religion as well as of politics. In consequence, their acts were bloodshot with a peculiarly unrestrained diabolism.

The complete failure of the Maccabæan experiment in kingship and independence, the failure, that is, to recreate a state and a society in which men could renew their ancient faith, was publicly acknowledged by the rejection of the First and Second Books of the Maccabees from the Old Testament canon. The First Book of the Maccabees is one of the most valuable, and certainly one of the most stirring, of all the Jewish histories. To the sociologist, interested in the transitions from state to

church and from church back again to state, no book could be of greater interest. But why was a book celebrating the heroic deeds of their race, rejected by the framers of the Old Testament canon? Because the Maccabees had been hailed as saviours of Judæa—and humanly speaking they were its saviours—and yet, after a brief interval of success, the saviours failed to save. The disillusionment was proportionate to the early promise. For nearly five centuries Jewish independence lay in the grave, and with the victory of the Maccabees there followed a glorious resurrection. And now the resurrection was followed by a death more cruel than the first. We can understand with what bitterness the Pharisees rejected these new messiahs of the tribe of Levi—the Maccabees were of priestly origin—and with what reluctance they petitioned the Romans to remove them. The disillusioned Pharisees asked for nothing more than to be allowed to return to the undisturbed practice of religion. Since the days of Nebuchadnezzar and the Babylonian exile they had lived on as a church. They would continue to live on as a church, occupied daily with the scholastic exegesis of the Mosaic Law.

Who were the Pharisees? They were the anti-Hellenizers, the Ironsides of Judas Maccabæus, and also the strong supporters of the new line of priest-kings. The Pharisees who took the field with Judas were activists; action was the road by which they re-emerged from the eternal world of religion to the temporal world of politics. But there was another, and probably a much larger, body of Pharisees who were quietists. The quietist, the mystic, the contemplative, is the predominant partner in every church. By detaching itself from mundane civilization, a church renounces the road of action. To the quietists among the Pharisees, the return to politics was by no means easy. On their doctrine, the Law of Moses, the man of God, was the first and last word of moral truth. Truth and morals were revelations from on high; they were not to be discovered by trial and error, by the

series of daily experiments in living which society conducts upon itself. Moreover, pre-exilic society having been destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar, where could the survivors look for truth and morals, if not to the transcendent world? In the transcendent world the good was safe beyond the vicissitudes of politics. It was comforting to look upon the good as a superhistorical perfection.

§ 4. *The Rise of the Apocalyptic Literature.*

Every theism, whether that of Plato or of Aquinas, of a Pharisee or of a Moslem, eternalizes morals in order to conserve them. But what theism eternalizes is not a living morality, relevant to an actual, social situation. What theism eternalizes is either an empty *a priori* principle or a concrete fragment of a salvaged civilization, a fragment which was once relevant and alive, but which has now been transformed into a mummified moralism. In the Law of Moses and the Pentateuch, or in any of the other Scriptures, the Pharisees could not discover any references to such an enemy of God as Antiochus Epiphanes had shown himself to be. But God, the maker of history and the guardian of His people, must have foreseen the violence of Antiochus and have laid His plans accordingly. If God's people were to survive, it was necessary to discover God's plan for their salvation.

From this impasse there was one way of escape. A sacred scripture must have been composed somewhere in the eternalized past, revealing God's plan against Antiochus. No sooner was this belief arrived at than the hoped-for scripture appeared. The scripture was the Book of Daniel, ascribed to a prophet who was believed to have lived in Babylon three centuries previously. Daniel, speaking the language of prophetic symbolism, had foreseen the wickedness and the impending fall of Antiochus Epiphanes. Did the unknown author realize that he was perpetrating a pious fraud? He certainly did not. On his own principles he was convinced that

the eternal was the source and the controller of the temporal; and that the particular form in which this great truth was demonstrated was a matter of literary convenience and not of intellectual conscience. The Book of Daniel is the earliest example of a new *genre* in sacred literature, the apocalyptic. This literature, as its name indicates, purports to uncover the secrets of history —more especially, the secrets of future history—by a study of the eternalized past. This, then, was the road by which the quietists among the Pharisees found their way back from the past to the present, from the detached world of religion to the living problems of politics.

The apocalyptic literature had a wide range: it included writings prophesying the messianic age, the end of the world, the restoration of Israel, the unity of all races in a single commonwealth, the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment, the return of mankind from exile into the enjoyment of the millennium. There are endless gradations and variations. Here the emphasis is upon the historic, there upon the eternal factor; here upon personal, there upon group, immortality; here upon the salvation of favoured groups, such as Israel or the Christian Church, there upon the salvation of mankind.

The apocalyptic literature is unique; its principal exponents were either Jews or Jewish Christians. Why it is unique is understandable from its historic origins. Brahmanism is a national religion even as Judaism; Christianity, again, is a universal religion comparable with Buddhism; but neither Buddhism nor Brahmanism has anything comparable with an apocalyptic literature. And the reason is clear. Neither of these religions is interested in history; having turned away from concrete civilization, they show no desire to return. To Buddhism and Brahmanism, the concrete, the historic, the empirical are in the last resort illusory; only the eternal and the metaphysical are real. Buddhism and Brahmanism are consistent in their alienation from the world. But neither Christianity nor Judaism is in this respect

consistent. The Christian and the Jew are Europeans. It is true that Palestine is not in Europe. But neither is Ionia. Whatever concessions Europeans may make to the spirit of negation, they never quite succeed in extinguishing their interest in concrete civilization; they continue to believe in the solvability of the social problem, that of constructing a just and harmonious society. The typical Oriental—the Buddhist or Hindu or Moslem—has never entertained the messianic hope; the typical European has never abandoned it.

Modern Biblical studies have added considerably to our knowledge of the apocalyptic literature. As the Pharisees rejected it—and in the circumstances they were right in rejecting it—copies have often survived only in translations. Some translations, for instance, those into Coptic, have become accessible only within recent years. The Book of Daniel in the Old Testament, the poignant Books of Esdras (composed after the fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70) in the Apochrypha, and the Book of Revelation in the New Testament, are the best-known apocalyptic works. But the recovery of the Book of Enoch—to mention an outstanding instance—has revealed the range and power of this remarkable literature. It was almost certainly a Pharisee who composed the Book of Daniel. But the works which the Pharisees accepted in 167 B.C., they rejected a hundred years later. The Pharisees began once more to retreat into the detached spirituality of scholastic learning.

The Sadducees had no distinctive religious philosophy; they were political churchmen of the same type as the Maccabæan kings abhorred by the Pharisees. To the Sadducees, religion was a profit-making business; what alone interested them was the profits.

§ 5. *Zealots and Quietists.*

But two classes remained who, after the renewed loss of independence in 63 B.C., were not prepared to follow

the Pharisees and the Essenes in their retreat from politics. As is usual in such cases, one class was activist, the other quietist. The activists were the Zealots, the party that fought and lost in A.D. 70. The quietists were the Pharisees of the country districts, especially those of Galilee who, strongly influenced by the apocalyptic literature (the educated read it and the unlearned heard it) were not as strongly disillusioned as the Pharisees of Jerusalem. We know that after the death of Herod in 4 B.C. the situation in Palestine deteriorated rapidly. The alien Romans were more efficient than the Greeks, but their methods were very much the same—government by massacre and exploitation. The death of Nero in A.D. 64 and the outbreak of the struggle for power between Vespasian and his rivals was the Zealots' opportunity. Had the Zealots been supported by the quietists, the rebellion might have had a greater chance of success. But Josephus, the Jewish commander, was no Judas Maccabæus; and after A.D. 70, the cause of the Zealots was lost for ever. To the quietist, waiting patiently upon the will of God, the activist seems wicked—a man of blood, who, because he takes up the sword, is destined to perish by the sword. The quietists have a lower death-rate than the activists; it is not surprising that the quietists survive. None the less, it is the activists that make history. The quietists, too, make history; but they make it negatively, by trying to escape the responsibility for making it.

§ 6. *Jesus: the Quietist of Galilee.*

And so at last we come to Jesus, the Quietist of Galilee. We shall not apologize for this long prelude. The Christ of theology has no history any more than has a principle of logic or mathematics. But Jesus of Nazareth is embedded in history, in a highly complex and little-understood history.

Jesus did not write an apocalyptic book, he enacted one. Although the story of his controversies with the Pharisees is coloured by the propagandist needs of the early Christian Church—the Church was anxious to dissociate itself from the ' rebels ' against the Roman Empire—yet there is no reason to doubt his opposition to the Pharisees. For the Pharisees, having largely abandoned apocalyptic ideas and phantasies, had retreated into a rabbinical scholasticism. Scholasticism, as we have seen, is the necessary bane of all such churches as found themselves upon the superhistorical ; and scholasticism, with its strong appetite for juristic logic, tends to be arid. All logical studies, with the exception of those connected with mathematics, have this character. Because the Pharisees were legalistic instead of vital, our sympathies are instinctively with Jesus. Life is more than logic, more abundant and not so safe. The Pharisees retreated into the eternalized past of the Mosaic Law. Jesus innocent of subversive intentions with regard to the Law, advanced into the future. In the future there would be other laws than the Mosaic. None the less, the Pharisees were right in disavowing Jesus. They clung tenaciously to their rigorous interpretation of the Mosaic Law. Where the Maccabees had failed so miserably, what hope was there of a kingdom of God on earth ? A thrice-broken and disillusioned people could not have survived another experiment in the reconstruction of traditional values. To cling desperately to the past was their only hope of survival. But Jesus was also right in refusing to abandon the messianic hope. And Jesus was no less right in sharing the Apocalyptists' hope—the hope that was never realized—of the coming, even in his own lifetime, of the kingdom of God on earth. It was this hope which inspired his disciples, giving the Christian movement its actuality and distinguishing it from the mystical religions and philosophies of the day.

We know that the messianic hope was not fulfilled. A penitent Israel and a regenerated mankind were not

restored to paradisaic felicity. The disappointment was glossed over by the anachronistic doctrine that the kingdom of God was the Catholic Church. On this forced interpretation the Gospel—the good news—was not the coming of a regenerate society but the coming of the Catholic Church; we were to believe that Jesus, the Quietist of Nazareth, the heir of all the prophets and of the Apocalyptist seers, had not yearned for the Messianic Kingdom, but for the establishment of the Catholic Church.

Jew and Catholic, Moslem and Confucian, none can dispense with the anachronistic fallacy. The procedures of the present have to be justified by projecting the present upon an eternalized version of the past. And yet, so overwhelmingly strong was the tradition—that the Messianic Kingdom and not the Church was the Good News—that no open-minded reader of the New Testament can escape the conviction that the Messianic Hope is the central core, the central fire, of Jesus's teaching. It is true that St John's Gospel strikes a different note. But St John's Gospel is a propagandist metaphysic and not a biography. The Lord's Prayer, the parables, the controversies with the Pharisees, the fateful mission to Jerusalem, and the Cross itself, have no meaning except upon the assumption that Jesus believed passionately in the immediate coming of the Messianic Kingdom.

Are we to depreciate Jesus because he was mistaken or are we to pretend that he was not? The great man is the representative man; he works within the circle of contemporary ideas, refining them, intensifying them, publishing to the world their vital essence. The great man is an artist in ideas—ideas which are not, or only to a subordinate degree, his own ideas. Judæa was a small country and Jerusalem an unimportant city, but in the hour of crisis a representative man, such as Jesus was, could enunciate foundational ideas about the purposes and values of our existence. In the hour of crisis, when men are divided by conflicting views of life, the

representative man, addressing his countrymen, has an opportunity of addressing the world.

The Pharisees, the Sadducees, the Zealots, and the Apocalyptist Quietists represent four fundamental types of *Weltanschauung*, four outlooks upon history and life. Jesus was fortunate that he lived in a time of spiritual ferment. And this ferment was the consequence of an agonizing preoccupation with the ultimate problems of existence. What was at stake was the life of a society with a cultural tradition transmitted through the centuries, and that was something of greater moment than the life of individuals. This preoccupation with the fate of Israel had lasted eight centuries. But a preoccupation of a very different kind had also lasted eight centuries; from the epoch of Pericles to that of Constantine the Greek philosophers had been busy examining the constitution of the universe. The Greek philosophers were intellectually far better equipped than the Hebrew prophets. Yet on the great questions of life's purpose and man's destiny, the prophet has been more influential than the philosopher. The world continues to harbour a suspicion that the philosopher, even the sincerest, is an intellectual to whom the great questions of life's purpose and man's destiny are nothing more than an intellectual exercise.

In disavowing the speedy coming of the messianic kingdom, the Pharisees were soon followed by the Christian Church. In A.D. 410, less than a century after the conversion of Constantine, Alaric the Goth sacked Rome. Henceforth the messianic kingdom became the shadow of a dream. Nothing remained of Apocalypticism, except the formal acknowledgment in the Creed of a possible return of Christ. The Buddhistic road of monastic negation was more appropriate to the spiritual climate of A.D. 410 than the messianic fervour of the first century.

§ 7. *Why a nationalist Judaism gave birth to a universalist Christianity.*

We are now in a position to answer the two questions with which we prefaced this inquiry. The first question was: How did a national religion such as Judaism give birth to a universal religion such as Christianity? The answer is this: After their disillusionment with the Maccabæan state, the Pharisees found a spiritual refuge in an eternalized and anachronistic version of the Mosaic past. Such a past could not be the future of mankind. The messianic kingdom which the Pharisees rejected was, none the less, the essential contribution of Judaism to the universal religion of the future. Unitarians, liberal Jews, and other apologists for monotheism do not agree with this estimate. The metaphysical dogma of the Unity of God is, in their opinion, the essential contribution of Judaism to world religion. But such a view, we suggest, is unhistorical. Israel did not survive because it echoed the abstract formulas of Platonist theism or of Aristotelian deism. Our second question was: Why did Constantine, adopting a policy different from that of Asoka, go outside the Græco-Roman world and the highly cultivated tradition of Greek philosophy in order to discover a new religion for his empire? The answer is this: In that sick and melancholy age men needed no invitation to take the Buddhistic road. Platonism, Stoicism, and neo-Platonism were all of them lengthy marches on that road. If all that Constantine was seeking was a philosophic defence of national and racial suicide, there was no need for him to go outside the tradition of Greek philosophy. But what men needed in that sick age was not a new apology for death, but a new motive for existence. They found it in the messianic hope, the hope of a regenerate civilization.

But there was another, and perhaps a profounder, reason why Christianity triumphed over all possible rivals. In that degenerate age, when men set little value on human life—their own or that of others—when

the lives of slave and soldier and peasant were cheap, what was needed was an increase of compassion, compassion for the weak, the suffering, the defeated. The Roman Empire was the greatest social synthesis that men had yet attempted ; and the synthesis was being eaten into daily by the spreading cancer of social disease. What, then, could men hope for ? There was no possibility of their being united by a sense of common achievement, of equal participation in a great and progressive civilization. They could be united only by a sense of common failure.

§ 8. *Christianity : the apotheosis of defeat.*

Christianity is the apotheosis of defeat—not the seasonal defeat of a god of Nature, such as Osiris, but the defeat of man and of the whole human race. In the Old Testament, the prophet deprecates the lamentation for Tammuz, the Semitic equivalent for Adonis. But the suffering of the vegetative earth in the icy embrace of winter, which, by the working of the pathetic fallacy, became the illusory suffering of Tammuz—this type of suffering is very different from the suffering of Christ upon the Cross. Aided perhaps by the music of a Bach, we can forget our private sorrows by identifying ourselves with the suffering Christ. And this act of identification is made possible for us because, despite all theological prepossessions, Christ at that moment is not a God, but a symbol of the human race. Christ is a possible symbol of the human race because he was the representative of a defeated people. The Bible is unique in being the literature of defeat.

Our identification with the suffering Christ will be all the closer if we recall that there were no compassionate witnesses of the crucifixion. Several modern critics have pointed out—C. Guignebert, for instance—that, after the arrest of Jesus, Peter and the disciples fled to Galilee. These critics suggest that the poignant incidents of the Passion are a sympathetic creation of the folk-mind

working on suggestions supplied by the Servant-texts of Isaiah, especially Chapter liii. The suffering Servant is Israel. Israel is the devout community of the Lord. It is Israel who 'hath born our griefs and carried our sorrows: yet we did esteem him stricken, smitten of God and afflicted'. The suffering Servant with whom Christendom identifies itself in the Passion of the Cross is neither the historic Jesus nor the Christ of theology, but Man. It is the martyrdom of man which is celebrated symbolically in the Cross. Men have yet to realise that all the civilizations have lived and died for their sakes. Only when men participate in the martyrdom of man can they hope to be witnesses of man's resurrection.

CHAPTER XIII

CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILIZATION

§ 1. *Faith and Unfaith in civilization : the Christian Paradox.*

ACCORDING to the theory of civilization developed in this book, a re-orientation of mind and outlook in the West followed upon a loss of faith in civilization. A loss of faith is always the chief cause of the decline of states and civilizations. And this loss of faith was expressed institutionally by the substitution of universal churches for universal empires. The simple faith in tribal or national civilization which was the essential religion of the pre-church epoch is now complicated by a growing loss of faith, amounting to an unfaith, in the value of the great states and empires, an unfaith of the subjected groups and classes unable to identify themselves with the Leviathan in whose belly they were recumbent, and equally an unfaith of the dominant minorities who, enervated by the profits of their privileged position, had grown weary of maintaining the ever-crumbling edifice of civilization. Religion being ' the acceptance of the empirical ', and the debility and decrepitude of Leviathan being the new fact of world history, the new function of religion was the upholding of a paradox : Religion declared that while it still had faith in life, it had faith no longer in civilization. And Christianity, which is less logical but richer in content than Buddhism, upheld the paradox by equating human life to eternal life, and by substituting for the pagan civilization it repudiated a civilization of its own. This

new Christian civilization was a syncretism resulting from a salvage of two broken civilizations, that of Israel and that of Rome. This book holds that Christianity and Buddhism are interim religions, necessary episodes in the trough and swell of the civilizational process; that when Leviathan recovers—and the Leviathan of the future will not be a Mediterranean or a Western civilization, but a World civilization—men will recover their faith in civilization. On the day of that recovery the sociological function of Christianity and of Buddhism will be concluded. Humanity will have come into its own. But the religion of the universal commonwealth will not be the worship of humanity. Worship of every kind will be abrogated, for worship presupposes that what is best in human life is not located within human life, but in some transcendent source. Religion, ceasing to be worship, will be restored to its pristine function, a humble acceptance of the empirical conditions and therefore of the dangers and the transitoriness of human life. Religion will accept life humbly, and yet religion will also assert passionately that the practice of the art of civilization is the highest activity of man.

We have suggested that Christianity is richer, is of a more subtle and complicated pattern, though less starkly logical, than Buddhism. Buddhism is logical, it reiterates in highly ritualized equivalences its fundamental dogma of the nothingness of human life. To Buddhism everything is vain; the one abiding value is the ecstasy of Nirvana. But the richness of Christianity is the richness of paradox. Down to our own day the paradox is bearing fruit, variegated and surprising fruit. Christianity both affirms and denies the value of all things human. Christianity claims to be an historical and yet a super-historical religion; to be of time and yet of eternity; to have been founded by a real historic personage, Jesus, and never to have been founded, but to have existed before the world was made, as the timeless intention of the transcendental and metaphysical Christ. Christianity asserts that the

individual soul is infinitely precious, is the depository of all moral values; but it also asserts that the concrete human being, the creature of flesh and blood, is a worthless sinner deservedly condemned to die. Christianity proclaims that all human beings are equal in the sight of God, even as all finite numbers are equal zeros by comparison with infinity. Christianity also declares that man-created differences of power and station and income must not be questioned; these differences, even if they are created by man, are sanctioned by God. And because of the spiritual construction it puts upon the idea of equality, the *status quo* in society is, for Christianity, as good and as just as any other status. All possible variations of the *status quo* ought to be a matter of indifference to men living upon the spiritual plane. Again, Christianity holds that freedom is an alienable human right—the right to be ourselves, namely, spiritual persons. But Christianity also holds that freedom on any plane other than the spiritual, such as freedom to inherit the fruits of man-made civilization and freedom to create new forms of civilization, is not freedom, but vanity and self-assertion.

In the hierarchy of permissible emotions we know the exalted rank which Christianity has conferred upon fraternal love. We know that the pre-eminence of charity has been hymned by St Paul in the language of mystical ecstasy. Because they are mystically one in Christ, all Christians should be united by bonds of fraternal love. But Christians are not brothers upon the naturalistic plane; they are not even co-operators in a common society. On this view, an earthly society is not the real home of man and human ties are not the real ties. Christians are members of a transcendental fellowship; they are united with one another after the fashion that primitives believe themselves to be united with the mysterious powers of nature. But this transcendental fellowship is not incompatible with war and the mutual destructiveness of rival groups. The group as such is non-Christian; it lives its simple life upon the material plane.

Christianity is a great Gothic cathedral with vast empty spaces and a multitude of architectural details. The richness of its basic paradox is extraordinary. And because the paradox is so abounding, the ability to account for its many forms is a severe test of such a general theory of civilization as is outlined here.

§ 2. *Kautsky on Christian Origins.*

First with regard to Christian origins. There have been innumerable theories of Christian origins—orthodox, semi-orthodox, and unorthodox. Ever since David Strauss, a hundred years ago, published the first critical life of Jesus, the literature on Christian origins has grown enormously. Amongst unorthodox theories, the attempt of Karl Kautsky, in his *Foundations of Christianity* (1908), to explain the origins of Christianity in economic terms is a notable exercise in Marxism. As the economic factor is generally overlooked, Kautsky has done useful work in emphasizing its importance. But Kautsky's categories are not wide enough. First of all, the economic factor is in reality the *economico-political* factor ; and even this is too highly abstract for an understanding of religion. The proper unit of understanding is civilization. Religion is a principle of civilization, and in the last resort religion can be understood only in the context of the civilization which it is religion's function to conserve. Undoubtedly, the failure of Græco-Roman civilization was an economic failure. After the death of Marcus Aurelius and the passing of the *pax Romana*, the standard of life of the masses deteriorated catastrophically. But the causes for the deterioration were highly complex. Rome failed to solve not only the economic problem, but in addition the problem of defence against barbarian attack ; not only the problems of government and administration, but what in a sense comprises all these problems, the social problem. And the social problem is the problem of social unity, homogeneity, and solidarity. In the long run no society

that has failed to solve the social problem can endure. Religion will not save it. Religion encourages the will-to-live despite the buffets of non-human nature and despite the evils inflicted by one section of the community upon another. But once these social evils have become endemic, men lose their faith in human nature, their own as well as that of their oppressors; they lose their faith in the value of civilization; and with that loss of faith a society is doomed.

There is a still more general criticism to be made of Kautsky's historiography. Kautsky, in common with the majority of rationalists, regards Christianity as a system of opinions about man and the world; but as a Marxist he should have realized that institutions are more important than opinions. The Christian Church was a substitute for the Roman Empire; the substitution of a Christian for a pagan ideology was relatively unimportant. Besides, Kautsky overlooks the fact that this substitution of church for empire was not a unique phenomenon restricted to the European West. Marx, as a revolutionary politician, was entitled to neglect the operation of the dialectical process in civilizations other than the Western. From feudalism to capitalism and from capitalism to socialism was the historical formula in which Marx was interested. But Kautsky, being a pure theoretician and writing in the twentieth century, ought to have generalized the phenomenon of Christianity. For what is dialectic? Dialectic is the reciprocal conditioning of interpenetrating opposites; it is the principle of contradiction at work, not in logic, but in history; it is ultimately indistinguishable from the principle of paradox. Dialectic, contradiction, and paradox permeate the life of every church; for every church affirms civilization and yet denies it.

§ 3. *The Orthodox Theory of Christian Origins.*

We may be asked: By what right do we ignore the orthodox Christian view of Christian origins? As there

is an irreducible subjective factor in every interpretation of history—and in the history of religion, who can neglect it?—why should not the view of the believer be at least an authoritative as that of the unbeliever? The answer is this: The question at issue is not one of belief or unbelief; it is a question of constructing a sociology, in which the part played by Christianity in the historic process becomes intelligible. But no Christian can be a sociologist on the subject of Christianity. Sociology operates with historical and never with superhistorical categories; whereas Christianity claims to be a paradoxical combination of the superhistorical and the historical, of the metaphysical and the concrete. Sociology explains the superhistorical not as a fact, but as a construction in the mind of the believer. But orthodoxy cannot take this line. Orthodoxy affirms that in the reigns of the Emperors Augustus and Tiberius, there was an irruption of the divine into our world—an irruption upon an unprecedented scale. And as the divine is by definition unaccountable to human laws, no reason can be assigned why the irruption did not take place earlier or later than it did, or why, above all other regions of the earth it took place in Palestine. The Christian is satisfied with affirming that the divine was manifested upon earth because of the arbitrary fiat of Almighty God.

We know how eager the early Christians were to find a reason for the incarnation; how they searched the Old Testament for oracles of the Messiah—the oracles, unfortunately, were removed from the events to which they were supposed to refer by six or more centuries. But even if we could accept the Early Christian exegesis of the oracles in Isaiah and in other books of the Old Testament, our sociological problem would only be thrown back a stage or two; for we should have to ask why the Jews were predestined to produce a Messiah whom they were predestined to reject. And in this form the question is incapable of being answered; the believer must again fall back upon the arbitrary will of God. In the chapters

devoted to the cultural dualism of the Desert and the Sown, we hope to have shown that a sociology of the Old Testament is possible, but not on the presuppositions of Christian or Jewish orthodoxy.

We can put in another way the difficulty that Christianity necessarily experiences in accounting sociologically for its origins. Christian theology is a paradoxical combination of metaphysics and history. Now metaphysics deals with ultimate, and therefore non-empirical, questions; history with the empirical and concrete questions of civilization. What is known as the problem of Christology, the problem of the twofold nature of the God-Man Christ, is a notable expression of the Christian paradox. The Ecumenical Councils of the Church debated this problem with impassioned intensity. The debate lasted for several centuries, and more than one Roman emperor was forced to intervene in the furious conflicts of the rival theologians.

A competent sociology would assign to Christianity an intelligible position in the historic process and would regard it as a complex of natural and not of supernatural events. What neeeds did Christianity satisfy in the first four centuries of its existence, and what needs is it satisfying to-day? That is the kind of question that would be asked and answered in a sociological approach to the problem of Christian origins. A competent sociology of Christian origins could illumine many of the problems of to-day—the problems of the individual and society, of freedom and authority, of equality and class differentiation. But before outlining the sociological view that we propose, it may be worth our while to glance for a moment at the reactions which the Christian paradox has induced in the minds of three different groups of critics. One group belongs to the first centuries of Christianity, the other two are our contemporaries. Let us now recall what the Christian paradox is. Jesus was a human being, and a human being is concrete and historic, with a definite place and time in a specific

society and civilization. The Christ, on the other hand, is a metaphysical entity ; and metaphysical entities are abstract and superhistorical, unrelated to, and in general alienated from, the civilizational forms and principles of human life.

§ 4. *Gnostics, Rationalists, and Liberal Theologians on the Problem of Christian Origins.*

The earliest group of critics to attack the problem of the historical and the metaphysical in Christianity were the Gnostics. The Gnostics ignored the Jesus of Nazareth, glossing over his Jewish origins and submerging in the metaphysical Christ the greater part of the historic tradition. To the objection that a living person had been the beloved Master of the Apostles and not a metaphysical principle, the Gnostic replied with the dogma that a metaphysical principle can assume, if it chooses, an illusory appearance of human personality. But the Church clung to its paradox, fighting many fierce battles with the Gnostics. Of the books of the New Testament the Gospel of St John comes nearest to being a Gnostic document. In this gospel the stories of Christ's infancy are suppressed, and Christ is made to discourse about himself like a metaphysician expounding a system. The Jews are no metaphysicians, such metaphysics as they can show are derivative. And metaphysicians—they share this propensity with other types of intellectuals—do not look kindly upon those whom they regard as their intellectual inferiors. For this reason and for others, the author of St John's gospel is hostile to the Jews ; indeed, the author enjoys the distinction of having composed the earliest of anti-Semite tracts.

Another school of critics—their best-known representative in this country was J. M. Robertson—agree with the Gnostics in denying the historic reality of Jesus ; they differ from the Gnostics, however, in repudiating the metaphysical reality of Christ. To this school Christ

is not an historic person but the God of a mystery religion. Like Attis, Serapis, and Mithra, he dies and rises again ; and his historic reality is of the same order as theirs. The influence of the mystery religions upon Christianity has been admitted by many competent scholars, but this admission is not equivalent to a denial that Jesus ever existed. The school holding this view numbers many learned and ingenious men. Unfortunately, while learned in many departments of knowledge, they are not learned in Christian history and theology. But these views would not have been so popular if men of our own epoch had not experienced some difficulty in understanding the basic Christian paradox.

The third school is that of the liberal theologians. Their best-known representative was Professor Harnack, a contemporary of the ex-Kaiser. The liberal theologians take a diametrically opposed view to that of the Gnostics. They dismiss the theological Christ as a metaphysical figment of the Catholic Church. What is real to them is Jesus, the historic person. But this Jesus of the liberal theologians, though historic, is unique ; he is entirely free of his Jewish environment ; he is not involved, not even ideologically, in the bitter struggle that Jewry had been conducting ever since the outbreak of the Maccabæan wars against the alien culture of the Gentile world. In all these things of the mind and spirit Jesus is as independent of Jewish tradition and society as the liberal individualist believes himself to be of the community that provides him with an income. In short, to Harnack and his school Jesus is a liberal individualist, who depends solely upon his private consciousness for his intuitions of the moral and the divine. Harnack tells us that Jesus was a teacher of morals and religion whose doctrine was comprised in a single formulary : the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man. The opposition of Pharisee to Sadducee, of the unlearned working classes of Galilee to the educated middle classes of Jerusalem, the apocalyptic phantasies of men groaning under the

oppression of a Herod or of a Pontius Pilate—all these concrete historic factors, conditioning the morals and the outlook of Jesus and his contemporaries, are ignored. The concrete historic factors appear unimportant to the superhistorical, super-social intuitions of the liberal individualist. It would seem as if morality and divinity were the individualist's private property. The liberal individualist would not demean himself by receiving morals and religion from the coarse hands of Demos.

This view of Jesus, as held by liberal theologians, is a typical Protestant view—the view of a reduced Protestantism it is true, very much reduced from the robust originals of Luther and Calvin. Protestantism is a justifiable revolt against the Renaissance form of the Catholic synthesis. But as a consequence of this revolt, the most precious part of the Catholic heritage was destroyed, its sense of community. The loss of this sense of community is the principal cause of the *malaise* of Western civilization. Loisy and the Catholic modernists replied to Harnack, and replied very effectively. Again, the eschatological school, of whom Dr. Schweitzer is the principal representative, has put Jesus back into his own century and has in consequence cut him off from ours. But there is no point in multiplying references to schools of 'higher' criticism. The explication of the Christian paradox is not likely to prove easy. Still, we have enough faith in our method to venture upon the task.

§ 5. *Christianity, the aftermath of two failures of civilization: the Hebrew-Semitic and the Græco-Roman.*

We begin by asking three questions: one is of a general character and the other two are derivatives of the first. (1) Are we justified in regarding Christianity as a universal religion which is the sociological outcome of two failures of civilization—the failures being partly contemporaneous and partly overlapping? The two civilizations in question were the Hebrew-Semitic and the Græco-Roman.

In this connection it should be remembered that Babylon fell to the Persians in 534 B.C. and that Carthage was destroyed by the Romans in 146 B.C., and that the semi-independent high priests of Jerusalem were, until the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in A.D. 70, the sole official representatives of Semitic culture. Indeed, between A.D. 70 and the coming of Islam, Christianity is the principal disseminator of Semitic culture. As regards the Græco-Roman civilization, the break-up of the Empire, the subjection of the Greek-speaking peoples to the economic exploitation and the ruthless militarism of the Romans, the growing evils of a decadent Cæsarism —all these were debilitating influences, wearing down the health and vitality of the Græco-Roman world. (2) How did a national religion like Judaism give birth to a universal religion like Christianity? (3) Why did the Emperor Constantine, in deciding the official religion of the Roman Empire, patronize a religion founded by Jews? Why did he ignore religious philosophies, such as the Stoic and the neo-Platonist, which were rooted in Hellenic soil? Why did not Constantine do what Julian the Apostate tried to do, and what the Indian Asoka did successfully when he made Buddhism into the religion of India—why did not Constantine exploit the indigenous culture and the philosophic tradition of his own race?

§ 6. *The Romantic View of Jesus.*

We have to meet at the outset an objection that we have overridden more than once. The objectors hold that our sociological approach to these questions deserves to be discounted forthwith, because history can be explained in Carlyle's fashion as the parade-ground of men of genius. Christianity, therefore, should be explained in terms of the religious and ethical genius of Jesus. It is worth noting that the orthodox trinitarian view of Jesus is more impersonal than the view under discussion. To the orthodox Christian Jesus is not a human genius;

he is involved in, and in fact is the director of, the cosmic process. But those who are most insistent upon explaining Christianity in terms of the genius of the founder are not infrequently intellectuals who have ceased to believe in Christianity. The intellectuals ascribe to Jesus a mystical intuition of deity and an ethical intuition of absolute righteousness. This type of intellectual is, as often as not, a romantic individualist who loves to take the dilettante's or spectator's view of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. The romantic pictures Jesus, not as a practical, though partial, creator of the good, but as a gifted artist in morality, enjoying a perfect vision of its essence; not as a man battling for the true, as all men have to battle for it, but as a quietist enjoying in holy ecstasy a perfect vision of reality. The romantic, disliking the dust and sweat of conflict, and annoyed by the grinding of the social mechanism that manufactures each day anew a standardized mass of necessary social relations, loves to imagine the super-historical goodness of historic persons such as Jesus. The romantic exploits Jesus, he makes him into a vehicle of escape from the trials and errors of empirical civilization. By identifying himself effortlesssly with Jesus, the romantic hopes to convert the choicest values of humanity into property owned privately by his ego. Romanticism of this sort is no new thing; it is the ancient call upon the imagination to do the work of the will. Plato was one of the earliest and the greatest of the romantics. Plato called upon the Good, that figment of his metaphysical imagination, to redress the balance of the lost Athenian Empire.

But though we reject the romantic estimate of genius, we do not believe that Christianity can be explained in complete disregard of an historic Jesus. Christianity began as a movement, and every movement is a movement of ideas and feeling, not in a metaphysical continuum, but in the brains and hearts of individual persons. Every human group is liable to become a field of diffusion, diffusing complexes of ideas and feelings. But diffusion is

never a purely passive process ; creativity always supervenes upon reception. Every member involved in the movement receives, creates, and in turn communicates to others. He who is outstandingly creative is the master ; but though the master creates, he also receives ; and though the disciples receive, they also create.

§ 7. *Christianity : the Causes of its Success.*

With the meagre information at our disposal, it is now impossible to separate the creativeness of Jesus from that of the Apostles, or the creativeness of the Apostles from the organized movement of the Early Church. As Loisy and the Catholic modernists, and indeed the great majority of the higher critics down to the latest of them—Guignebert—have shown conclusively, all the Gospels are Church documents, making propaganda, as far as the tradition would permit, for specific trends of Church policy. It is no longer possible, therefore, to reconstruct the authentic personality of Jesus. All that the sociologist is entitled to assume is this : There was a Man of Galilee, a Jew, living during the reign of Tiberius, who, during a public activity of a year or two's duration, became a point of crystallization for the turbid currents of the Jewish world. The existence of the man must be admitted but, in the circumstances, it is upon the current of thought and feeling that sociological inquiry must be directed and not upon the man.

It was also suggested, in our second chapter, that the messianic element was the living spark of the Christianity of to-day, and that the understanding of this element was one of our principal reasons for undertaking a sociological analysis of Old Testament religion. Christianity is, and always has been, a highly complex, a highly paradoxical association of variegated elements. In common with Buddhism, Christianity contains a marked element of negativity, of alienation from the world, what we have

called the nihilistic element. In common with Taoistic Confucianism, Christianity follows a ritual pattern of sacrifice which is as old as the oldest of animistic practices. Christianity is also to some extent a mystery-cult, resembling the cults of Attis, Serapis, and Mithra, all of which became popular in the degenerate close of the Græco-Roman epoch. As regards these mystery-religions, a more critical and less sensational scholarship has shown us that while they originated in remote antiquity, the form in which they became popular was a creation of the first four centuries of our era. The mystery religions, in their popular form, were therefore no older than their Christian rival. If remoteness of origin is a mark of antiquity, Christianity, originating as it did in Hebrew civilization, was at least as old as the mystery religions.

The mystery religions were, in fact, the resurrection, at an individualistic level, of the partially submerged rituals of the pre-church epoch. The ancient gods of death and resurrection, such as Osiris, ensured life and renewal to a national society, confronted, as all such societies were confronted, by a parallel cycle of death and resurrection in nature. But when Osiris degenerated into the confused and syncretistic form of Serapis, the cult was no longer that of the strong nation, but of the lost individual. The individual counted himself lost, because the society and civilization in which he trusted, which sustained him materially as well as spiritually, had disintegrated. We know that some of these disintegrated societies lingered on—Egypt was an instance—but only as pitiful shadows. The lost individual, who had formerly been satisfied with the immortality of his group, craves now a personal immortality. Here Israel is an instance. In the days of Israel's independence, the dead were dispatched to Sheol, the equivalent of the Homeric Hades. But in the days of disillusionment, the Pharisees, the survivors of a broken Israel, developed a belief in the physical resurrection of the dead. The Pharisees were lost individuals, remnant of a broken nation. But the day was approaching

in the West when the peoples of a world empire—the greatest empire of antiquity—would feel themselves to be a congeries of lost individuals. They would look about them for consolation, and they would find it in the mystery cult of the God-Man. The Catholic Church elaborated this cult, making it a centre-point of worship. And in the ritual of the Mass the lost individuals died to the world and rose again with the crucified Christ. We can understand, then, the rising importance of the cult among the factors making for the success of Christianity. But there were many other cults and mysteries in the Roman world besides those of Christianity. Christianity must have had other grounds of appeal. What was it that decided the issue in its favour?

Lacking the nervous energy to deal with the problems of the day and benumbed by the consciousness of failure, a sick age found in Christianity its escape. But if Christianity provided an escape from the impasse into which civilization had drifted, so did Stoicism and Neo-Platonism and the main tradition of Greek philosophy. If it was a question of treading 'the Buddhistic road', of detaching oneself from the concrete world, of withdrawing into spiritual contemplation, of being pessimistically ascetic with regard to the flesh and the world, the educated Gentile had no need of Christianity. The educated Gentile could model himself on Socrates and on Plato. Socrates was the first contemplative, and Plato the first monk of the Hellenistic epoch.

If, then, neither its cult nor its negativity can account for the success of Christianity, what other possible explanations remain? It may be urged that in its communal or positivistic element Christianity had an initial advantage. We know that the earliest converts to Christianity were amongst the Hellenistic Jews living outside Palestine. The Hellenistic Jews of the Diaspora, being urban nomads, had worked out, upon a cosmopolitan scale, a technique of communal worship and a system of social organization. It is certainly true that in

the synagogue Christianity had a social model and, at first, an open forum. But, then, the Jews of the Diaspora were not the only international and religious brotherhood, and their unpopularity with the Gentiles was not helpful to the Church. It is also true that the early Christian missionaries could appeal to the great literature of the Old Testament. But this literature was unattractive to the educated Gentile. To a taste cultivated by the study of the Greek and Roman classics, the Old Testament would seem barbarous.

Perhaps it will be urged that we ought to assess more highly the joint importance of the cult, community, philosophy, and literature of early Christianity, and that, if we do this, the total effect of these several factors will be a sufficient explanation of the success of Christianity. But if we accept this view, we should be guilty of the anachronistic fallacy; we should be projecting on to Christian origins the Christianity of to-day. For, in the first place, we should have to explain the conversion of the Jewish proletarians of Galilee, and secondly the conversion of the Jews of the Diaspora. Sacraments and mysteries of central importance for Catholicism had not that importance for the Early Church; they could not have had, if for no other reason than that sacraments and mysteries were almost unknown in Judaism. A cult of the dying and resurrected god is the natural religion of the cultivator of the soil. The cultivator is dependent upon the cycle of the winter-death and the spring-resurrection of nature. But, as we have shown, Judaism was the outcome of the victory of the Jahvism of the Desert over the Baal worship of the Sown. The cultivator has sacraments and mysteries, but not so the nomad. We should therefore have been seduced by the anachronistic fallacy, if we believed that the first disciples, the proletarians of Galilee, were attracted by an embryonic version of the Eucharist, or that, like St Augustine four centuries later, they were inclined to adopt a Palestinian equivalent of a neo-Platonist treatise, with all its abstractionist meta-

physics and its invitation to escape from the pains and perplexities of civilization.

No. The belief that set on fire the heart of Jesus's disciples, the belief that in the form of a secret wish took on the pale features of a ghost, confronting Paul on the road to Damascus, was the belief that Jesus was the Messiah. The messianic era had been outlined vaguely by the Prophets, as a consolatory escape from the storms and stresses of Israelite politics. Beset by enemies from without and weakened by schism from within, the Israelite community was relieved of its anxieties and sustained in its hope by dreaming of the messianic era. The coming of the Messiah became an almost neurotic obsession of important sections of the Jewish community during the century that separated Jesus from the early triumphs of the Maccabees.

CHAPTER XIV

THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY

§ 1. *Dominant Minorities: their lack of a philosophy of civilization.*

CIVILIZATION is the sum of human achievement. The primitives of the Palcolithic age; the men belonging to the ancient states of Egypt and Babylon, of Rome and China; the churchmen who believe in Judaism and Christianity, in Brahmanism and Buddhism; all these have been partners in a co-operative enterprise. Clan, state, and church have made their contribution to human enlargement, and have their share of responsibility for human defeat.

The social heritage is the working capital of every living soul. No man is self-made, least of all the man of genius. The genius earns the highest rate of interest upon the social capital, but he cannot set up business without capital. Nor can he do anything with the interest except reinvest it in the community. We are all deserving or undeserving beneficiaries of civilization, and that fact alone attests the underlying unity of mankind.

Literally, we cannot call our souls our own. It is not we who think, but civilization which thinks in us. Yet we are not the passive vehicles of a transcendent revelation. The individual is a creator of the future as well as a transmitter of the past. The individual is civilization writ small, civilization is the individual writ large.

Civilization is our spiritual home. In nature's house we are aliens. As long as we remain human beings and do not aspire to be gods, our relations with nature can

never be intimate. Some five or six thousand years ago, at the beginning of recorded history, men had more or less succeeded in regulating their relations with non-human nature. Poorly equipped in the technology of regulation, they pretended that nature was a foster mother, a member, therefore, of the human family. This game of pretending was the animist's religion ; it made him at home with nature during the period when men were waiting for the advance of science.

To-day the pretence is at an end. We are declared aliens in the domain of nature. Nature sustains us, but we are not of her kind. With the progressive advancement of man's estate, nature has lost her quasi-human and superhuman status. Nature has become the raw material of civilization : the point where man applies his scientific techniques. Now that we have arrived at a working concordat with nature, we can leave it to nature poets and nostalgic mystics to pretend that there can be any re-establishment of the old intimacy. Intimacy is for our own kind—the intimacy of love and hate.

It is no longer nature, it is man, our fellow human beings, who excites our keenest emotions. For the clan, nature was the exciting stimulus ; for the state, the exciting stimulus is man. The failure of the state to establish a concordat amongst men is the tragedy of civilization.

The state is the external framework of society, and a high civilization presupposes the existence of a great society. When the state fails, society disintegrates and the will to civilization is paralysed. For there is no natural necessity about high civilization. Men may elect to die or to commit racial suicide, refusing to perpetuate their kind. Or they may drift impotently into barbarism, no longer convinced that the upkeep of a complex civilization is worth while. Or they may deliberately prefer the coarse savour of a primitive existence.

It is true that as long as man endures, civilization in some form or other will not perish from the earth. But

civilization is of many kinds : men may live a life that is just recognizably human, or they may live in the grand manner befitting the premier species of the animal kingdom. But no high civilization can endure without a sustained and articulate will-to-live. What an ironic commentary on the claims to pre-eminence that have been advanced for the so-called Aryan race, when its European and Indian branches have given the world the two leading instances of the paralysis of the will-to-live ! India and Rome are the chief reactionaries against civilization. Buddhism is the crown of India's reaction against civilization, Christianity of Rome's.

The Aryan is the world's greatest conqueror. To put the cost of civilization upon the defeated and to appropriate the profits for the conqueror is the rationale of success in war. But the rationale has proved irrational. Success has turned into failure. Not because the conqueror became in his turn a victim of a later conqueror—that experience came later and was the consequence and not the cause of the initial failure. The initial failure was a failure of will. Will is activity directed to a consciously conceived end. And the will breaks if the end palls. What was the end for the Aryan conqueror ? This question did not exist for him so long as he was enjoying his instinctive combativeness and self-assertion. But when the emotions of superiority had been gratified beyond satiety—what then ? Then the time came when the evaluating of the end could no longer be shirked.

Where is the conqueror to discover an ordered scale of ends ? Now that he is dying of success, his greatest need is for a philosophy of life. The peoples he has conquered have less need for a philosophy ; they can, at least, hope for a change of fortune, or for the latter-day fulfilment of a messianic hope. Are we not informed that at the coming of the Messiah the poor shall be exalted and the haughty debased. But if fortune changes for the conqueror, the change can only be for the worse. Shall the conqueror eternalize himself as conqueror, and aim at

being the petrified ruler of a petrified society? But life is creation. Creativity directed to novel ends is the zest of life. Without zestful creativity life is an empty waste.

New worlds to conquer? But if the old conquests are vanity, the new conquests will be a vanity of vanities. What then remains? The building of a new civilization? The transcending of the conqueror-conquered relation? To die as a parasitic non-creative class and to find new life in a unified society? That would indeed be a way of refreshing the tired will-to-live. But what class is prepared to die as a ruling class, even if dying is the only road to life? What ruling class has ever surrendered its own devitalizing prerogatives?

Stoicism is the quietism of the West, Quietism is the stoicism of the East. Stoic and quietist suffer from an internal conflict; they are impelled by an instinctive appetite for life, and this appetite is crossed by an unconscious wish for death. The conflict emerges into consciousness as a reflective enquiry about the ends of life. Neurosis is the father of philosophy. Philosophy is the forerunner of a church. When the blood of a ruling class is poisoned by its secret wish for death, the ruler becomes a philosopher and the philosopher will one day become a churchman. Marcus Aurelius was a Roman, and Buddha an Indian, aristocrat. The Roman was a stoic and the stoic was an ascetic and a saint, an anticipatory member of the Roman Catholic Church. The Indian was a quietist, a Brahmin in revolt against Brahmanism, the clear-sighted interpreter of the failure of Aryan civilization.

A church does not resolve the conflict between the instinctive appetite for life and the unconscious wish for death; it maintains the conflict, but in other terms. A church denies the value of civilization, and yet, because a church is a community and persists as such, it affirms the value of that which it denies. Philosophy is a meditation on death; religion is a daily discipline in dying. Yet the most pessimistic of philosophers does not usually commit suicide; and Buddhism, the most negative of

all the churches in its attitude to existence, is full of compassion for the humblest forms of animal life.

It is not the cosmic problem, it is the social problem which rouses men from their dogmatic slumbers. The creation myths of primitive peoples satisfy their need for a cosmology. But the speculation that everything in the world is a form of water or of fire or can be reduced to solid atoms and empty space is a superior quasi-scientific myth of the world's first rationalists—the comfortable middle-class merchants of Ionia or Magna Græcia, as yet unvexed by Persian militarism. Thales of Miletus, Heraclitus, Democritus, and the rest were not seriously troubled about life's meaning. They were half poets, half scientists ; it is significant that they wrote their scientific speculations in verse. But it was the failure of the Athenian Empire which was the starting-point and which gave the impulse to Plato's philosophizing.

There is no serious social problem in the clan or tribe ; nor was there such a problem in those early states that had arisen from the fusion of communities of pioneers. It is true that classes, social as well as economic, may develop within the community. Some of the freemen may decline into serfdom ; some of the more prosperous peasants may acquire the dignities of an hereditary aristocracy. But because such peoples start life as pioneers, they retain a high degree of social and cultural homogeneity. Labour is held in honour. The pioneers venerate the culture-heroes whom they credit with the primary inventions such as the growing of corn or the breeding of silkworms. But the warrior is not a hero to the pioneers. For they know that, even if the warrior is creative in war, his descendants will be parasitic in peace.

Where there is no social problem, there is no questioning of life. What leads to the interrogation of destiny is not the challenge of nature, but of man. To extract a living from nature is an instinctive, absorbing, and unself-conscious occupation. Besides, whatever challenge there may be in nature is neutralized by religion. The

animistic religion of the clan or tribe or early state gives men the necessary self-confidence; they are convinced that the community will be adequate to nature's challenge. In primitive communities and in the early states, religion, like society, is half instinctive and almost entirely unreflective. Life is innocent. The serpent in the garden, inciting Adam to become conscious of his nakedness, is not nature but a rival Adam.

With the coming of the exploitative state founded on conquest, the state of innocence was at an end. Rome was the great Leviathan whose iron feet lay heavy upon the prostrate peoples of the earth. Rome's failure (linked as it was with the earlier failure of Greece) we have called the Great Disappointment. In Rome's failure is summed up the failure of the early states such as Egypt, Babylon, Israel; the subsequent failure of Byzantium, the lone survivor till 1453 of the wreckage of the Eastern Roman Empire; the failure of the Moslem states, which modelled themselves upon Byzantium, to achieve a new stability by fusing the militarist state with the Islamic church; the failure of the Holy Roman Emperors of the first German Reich to construct a state which should be independent of the Papacy.

§ 2. *The State: the Axis of World History.*

For the last five thousand years the state has been the axis of world history. And the changes in the fortunes of the state mark the principal changes of that history. There are four such stages, and each constitutes an epoch. The epochs necessarily overlap; and in different parts of the world, they have not always followed one another in a strict chronological sequence. But in each of the four epochs the relation to the state is the differentiating factor. First, there is the epoch of the early states such as Egypt and Babylon. Second, there is the epoch of the failure of the great empire-states such as Persia and Rome. Third, there is the epoch of the

revival of the state at the close of the Middle Ages, when the foundations of the modern nation-states such as England, France, and Spain were laid down. And fourth, we are witnessing the dawn of a new epoch. It may be the epoch of the transcending of the state by a universal commonwealth ; it may be the epoch of a second failure of the state and of a second dark night of civilization.

Each epoch has its characteristic relation to the state and its characteristic type of civilization. And in each epoch the relation to the state is the principal motif of the historical symphony, the other aspects of civilization deriving their musical colour from the principal motif. By the other aspects we mean religion, morals, and world-view—ideology in short. The ideology of each epoch is largely determined by the relation to the state.

In the early states, the essence of religion is the group life itself. But in an epoch haunted by a sense of group failure, the world-view, the religion, the morals, the whole ideology changes. For the failure of the state involves failure of society, the breakdown of civilization, the destruction of unreflective and half-instinctive confidence in the continuity of group life. How shall we characterize the spirit of this epoch of state failure ? We almost need a new word such as ' kinophobia ', fear of movement and therefore of change, to do justice to the deterioriation of morale which is so widespread among the peoples living in this epoch. For the community was the traditional basis of all values. If the community suffered shipwreck, what value was secure ? What anchorage could be found for such values as remained ? By their action in dissolving the community, time and change had shown themselves to be the secret agents of death. How could men be delivered from the power of death ?

There are only two ways of escaping death and death's confederate, time : one is to march with the sun, the other is to call upon the sun to stand still. The latter is the way chosen by epochs of broken morale ; for when the state fails, society and civilization disintegrate, and the

power to create is paralysed. Civilization is the work of human art, the greatest work of human art. But if a malignant enemy destroys the works of the artist faster than he can produce them, the power to create is broken by despair. If the power to create is still intact, even a broken state may be reformed. But when the will crumbles, the reformer is submerged in the defeatist. In this epoch of state failure, no statesman, no philosopher, no prophet comes forward with plans for reconstructing the shattered fabric of civilization. No one dared to hope that old death might be overcome by new life. The men of this epoch chose another way. They said : Let us salvage what remains of our broken civilization ; and let us keep time at bay by embalming the *status quo*. They also said : Let us cherish the belief that the best in human life does not need to be created ; that it exists already in the transcendent world ; and, since it exists already, we shall be independent of human agency and shall not be required to postpone the fulfilment of our hopes into some distant and precarious future. This is the language of Western theism. This is the way by which an Israelite might comfort himself for the destruction of his people's independence, or a Greek for the disintegration of his city-state. The Indian pantheist, confronted by the failure of Indo-Aryan civilization, speaks in a similar strain ; all human values pre-exist in Brahm, who is the static totality of the universe ; time is an illusion ; and when, after successive reincarnations, men have atoned for their presumptuous self-assertion, they will be absorbed in Brahm.

We are misled by the liberal use which Christianity and Hinduism make of the anachronistic fallacy into believing that theism and pantheism are very ancient theories of the universe. We have seen that a metaphysic is a non-empirical theory of the universe. But before the Aryans became disillusioned by the fruits of their Indian conquests, their favourite literature was not the metaphysical Upanishads, but the heroic Vedas. And before the

Greeks were nonplussed by the internal contradictions of city-state civilization, they preferred the liveliness of Homer to the speculations of Plato. It is important to remember that theism and pantheism belong to the ideology of an epoch of state failure. Nor is it difficult to see how theism and pantheism have been developed out of the animism of the earlier epoch. For the pioneer states succeeded because they had made a working concordat with nature. Nature was admitted into the community as a transcendental kinsman, so that community and nature became one. And the life of the community was summed up in the divine Pharaoh or the Chinese Son of Heaven, the Pharaoh and the Son of Heaven being at once rulers of nature and of man. Such god-kings ruled the community by their wisdom and controlled nature by their virtue. But the day arrived when the state failed, not through the default of nature, but of men. To this unprecedented state of affairs, the ideology of the animist was inapplicable. The religious imagination, however, is conservative; men continued to speak of the god-king. But as the community was bankrupt, the god-king's home was no longer in the community. Originally the god had come from nature. It was not difficult to believe that he had returned to nature or to some unspecified point beyond.

It is well known that in this epoch of state failure, conservatism in religion leads to the revival of obsolescent forms of animism; and it is these which constitute the so-called mystery religions. Orphicism is an instance. Plato's theism, mysticism, and doctrine of immortality of the soul are coloured by Orphicism. We see, then, that the old religious phraseology is retained even when there is a shift of interest from the community to the transcendent world. This shift of interest shows up strikingly in the new doctrines of immortality. In the earlier epoch men achieved immortality by identifying themselves literally with the immortal community, summed up in the god-king. But when the community

defaulted, individual survivors of it sought immortality by identifying themselves mystically with the god-king whom they now located in the transcendent world. The god-king of the transcendent world was, therefore, in origin an idealized projection of the community.

We have suggested that kinophobia was the characteristic neurosis of this epoch of state failure. We might also have called it an epoch of ' collective aphasia ', temporary paralysis of the creative function. This twilight of Western civilization has a long history of nineteen hundred years. The twilight set in with the fall of the Athenian Empire in 405 B.C., and it can hardly be said to have lifted before A.D. 1942, with the discovery of America. We are not, of course, denying that the pulse of creativity was audible in the Hellenistic period—Aristotle and Archimedes were audible enough—nor that it was imperceptible in A.D. 1200, when the medieval cathedrals were being built and the universities founded. What we are asserting is that after the fall of Athens and before the discovery of America and the subsequent rise of Spain, England, and France to the new dignities of nationhood and empire, there were very few Europeans who believed in the possibility of a rebirth of civilization.

§ 3. *England's Four Centuries of Success.*

We do not always realize how severe was the wound inflicted on the mind of Europe by the decline and fall of the Græco-Roman civilization. We in this country realize it less than most other Europeans, for since 1492 we have enjoyed four centuries of almost uninterrupted progress. We have been the most fortunate and the most successful of all the European peoples. We have, indeed, a shrewd eye for success, but no very profound insight into the sociology of defeat. To the Englishman religion means practical benevolence, sobriety of conduct, and in general a sanctification of success. The basic British religion is faith in British civilization. Some

Englishmen might like to substitute for faith in British, faith in world, civilization ; and they might desiderate a more critical attitude even to the values of British civilization. They might, for instance, be inclined to ask what proportion of our population had access to the major values of British civilization. Still, from the standpoint of this book, we have no quarrel with a religion which is faith in civilization. But what we have to remember is that the British type of Protestantism is far removed from the Catholicism which has been the principal religion of Europe for fifteen hundred years, a Catholicism which in the essentials of its outlook is older than Constantine and even older than Christ. The Stoic and the neo-Platonist are 'natural catholics'. Plato, indeed, is the pre-Christian Pope of the Catholic Church. For Catholicism was the religion of men who believed that life was a failure. They believed this because the community to which they belonged had failed. Without the community the individual is lost. The church is a substitute for the civil community, but substitutes are unsatisfactory. The Church, at best, is a doss-house, sheltering the lost individual during the dark night of civilization. It is not our Protestantism which separates us from Catholicism, but our success. Catholicism is an Ichabod, born when 'the glory had departed' from Western civilization ; it will die when the glory returns. Englishmen are not at home in the Catholic tradition of Europe ; but neither do Catholics appreciate the ideological gulf between the pre- and the post-Reformation Englishman. For Englishmen are conservative in their ideology and revolutionary in their practice.

We still speak of Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, Burgesses, and the Fourth Estate as though England was a feudal state of clerics, gentlemen, guildsmen, and serfs. In the terms of this ideology England is still what the Nazis call *ein Ständestaat*, or the Italians a corporative state. The *Ständestaat* is a polity consisting of hereditary estates in which there is no promotion from class to class,

no circulation of the élite, no levelling of class distinctions. One reason amongst others why the Nazis are anti-Christian is because the struggle between Emperor and Pope in the Medieval period, and the later struggle between Catholic and Protestant, retarded Germany's development, putting her back hopelessly in the race for power. None the less, the *Ständestaat*, which is the polity of fixed estates, is the traditional form of the state in Catholic Europe. Indeed, the fathers of the *Ständestaat* are Diocletian and Constantine.

As we saw in a previous chapter, the later Roman Empire kept itself alive by obedience to the formula, 'unity without creativity.' Rome was spiritually dead, but the decomposition of the corpse was delayed by the embalming of the *status quo*. The *Ständestaat* is the kind of polity in which Catholicism is at home, for it is hierarchical, authoritative, and static. Once a ruler, for all time a ruler. Once a subject, for all time a subject. In the *Ständestaat* the ruling class has two sections: the spiritual section is the authority for faith and morals, the secular section is the authority for law and order. The Nazis fuse the two sections into one; the Italian Fascists to some extent keep them apart, allowing the Catholic Church a little say in matters of faith and morals.

As we have shown in previous chapters, creativity and unity are complementary and yet dialectically opposed principles of civilization. To preserve the balance between the two is the central problem of civilization. But epochs of exhausted creativity, such as the one we are now considering—the epoch of state failure—are driven to adopt a policy of embalming the *status quo*. To such epochs life has nothing more to give. To be becalmed motionlessly and for ever upon the vast ocean of existence becomes the object of the statesman's art.

The attitude to time is the touchstone of an age. Ages of exhausted vitality suffer from kinophobia. They relieve their neurosis by weaving myths of immortality or by elaborating symbolical rituals in which their perishable

part becomes imperishable. They are not prepared to accept the empirical conditions of their human status. In the epoch of the early states religion was the acceptance of the empirical. But in the epoch of state failure, men are not satisfied with being human, they wish to share in the immortality of the gods.

The Catholic Church, with its profound insight into human nature, has recognized the strength of this craving for immortality. It has gratified the craving by organizing its ritual round the Eucharist. When the priestly celebrant, on behalf of the congregation, drinks the blood and eats the flesh of Christ, he is enjoying and distributing the food of immortality. For the supreme objective of Catholicism is eternal life.

To glorify God and enjoy him for ever is a famous Protestant definition of the supreme end for man. Early Protestantism and late Catholicism did not differ seriously in their formularies ; but, as we have said, Britons are conservative in their ideology and revolutionary in their practice. The definition we have quoted is still taught to Scotsmen in the catechism. But to modern Scotsmen, as to modern Englishmen, the real objective is British civilization. If the day arrives—has it arrived already? —when the impulse to British civilization becomes exhausted, then we, in common with the Fascists, will be inclined to embalm the *status quo* in order that we may enjoy our possessions for ever.

§ 4. *English Empiricism and the classical systems of metaphysics.*

We have already drawn attention (in the fifth chapter) to some of the natural affinities between Catholicism and Fascism. Here we would emphasize fascist uncreativeness in politics. The uncreative are afraid of time. They have no policy except the eternalizing of the *status quo*. If the present social structure is embalmed, the momentary ruling class will enjoy its power for ever. Employers will remain employers, and workmen workmen.

And presumably the S.S. men, the black guards of the Nazi Party, will fill for ever the role of the Wotan-intoxicated, ruthless barbarians who destroyed the Roman Empire. The object of Diocletian's reforms was the embalming of the corpse of the Roman Empire. The object of the fascist reform of capitalist democracy is the embalming of the corpse of capitalism.

We said in one of the theses of the first chapter that the metaphysician was the forerunner of a universal church. Metaphysics is a department of ideology, and creative and uncreative epochs have very different ideologies, just as they have very different relations to the state and to secular civilization. From the standpoint we are now considering, we can restate the thesis of the first chapter in the following form : a religious philosophy such as that of Plato is the swan-song of a creative epoch, and a scholastic logic such as that of Aristotle is the strident hoot of a learned owl, announcing the arrival of an uncreative epoch, the night of civilization. For a metaphysic is a pseudo-logical treatise on immortality. It is an intellectualistic attempt to arrive at the imperishable core of the universe. A metaphysic is a quest for reality. The term ' reality ' is derived from the Latin ' *res* ', a thing. Material things had a reputation for abiding permanence by contrast with the impermanence of living things. Time is the enemy of the metaphysician as death is the enemy of the Catholic. And every metaphysic, including some modern metaphysics of time, is at great pains to prove that time is ultimately unreal. Even Bergson, the philosopher of the *élan vital*, concludes his book, *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, with the dictum that the universe is a ' machine à faire des dieux '. In other words, time and space, as we know them, are instruments for obtaining eternal life.

Every metaphysician is in search of an absolute solid which will not crumble at the touch of time. So we get the ideal forms of Plato, rhythmically regimented by the eternal marshal whom Plato calls the Good. Then we

have the unmoved mover of Aristotle who, hurling all existences into time, remains himself serenely unconscious of his titanism: so much so that he spends eternity enwrapped in self-admiration.

In the modern epoch beginning with Descartes, we get a crowd of substance metaphysics. But metaphysics has no place in the modern epoch. It should have died at the Renaissance along with scholasticism, and left the field free for experimental science. As we said in Chapter IV, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel are unrepresentative of the modern epoch. But metaphysics has continued to exist, partly by the operation of a time-lag favouring the survival of some departments of an ideology, but principally because the Renaissance was literally a re-birth of the past rather than a confident advance into the future. There is much in the Renaissance which is classicist rather than classical. We are beginning to recognize to-day that medieval painting, sculpture, literature have a great deal more power and originality than the classicist products of the Renaissance. An enthusiasm for Plato was one of the by-products of the Renaissance. Plato, as we have suggested, was an Ichabod, the brilliant child of Athens' misfortunes. But the revival of Plato at the Renaissance has been an intellectual misfortune for the modern epoch.

Let us scrutinize again our list of the prospectors for the pure gold of the absolute substance, the substance that cannot be bitten by the acid of time. First, there is Descartes with his two substances, mind and matter. Then there is Spinoza with his single substance, which is the universe. Leibniz has an infinite crowd of substances, each of which is a soul. Kant, who in the terms of his own deicide philosophy had no business to have a god, but has one all the same, salves his intellectual conscience by equating God to the categorical imperative. Then there is Hegel, whose absolute is a spirit swollen to the dimensions of the universe. And so on. Even Professor Alexander, who tells us that philosophy is the empirical

study of the *a priori*, has a non-empirical absolute which he calls 'space-time'. Space-time is the source of everything, both of the ordinary space and time of experience and of ourselves. Professor Alexander prophesies that space-time will one day produce a superhuman extension of ourselves which he calls deity.

Here is another reason—and an important one—why the modern Englishman finds it difficult to understand the continental Catholic. The Catholic takes metaphysics seriously, the Englishman does not. The Englishman is an empiricist to his toes. He will, of course, make pious genuflections before mysteries which he has never tried to understand, and he will preserve a modicum of Plato and Aristotle as constituents of a genteel education. But despite these diplomatic genuflections in the Temple of Rimmon, the fact remains that not only the Englishman, but the English philosopher is a thoroughgoing empiricist. Bacon and Hobbes conduct a violent polemic against scholasticism. Locke, Hume, J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer are publicists, economists, educationists, and scientific methodologists—metaphysicians they may be, but not by intention.

It is not fanciful, nor a lapse into a crudely materialist interpretation of history, to see a connection between the menopause of British capitalism and the rise to popularity of Anglo-Hegelianism. In the 'eighties of the last century British capitalism was in a depressed condition. Its fertility and resource were in decline. It contrasted sharply with the rising capitalism of Germany. Germany had buried Hegel half a century earlier, and reoriented its energies from non-empirical metaphysics to empirical science. The empiricist is the experimenter; the experimenter looks for novelties and makes them. The experimenter is interested in new worlds. Only the elderly are interested in finished worlds. They wish the world to stand still because they are too tired to march. England was tired in the 'eighties, and Germany was young and aspiring. The Germany of the 'eighties

turned to science after having doped herself on metaphysics for a century. England—or rather the academic class of England—turned to metaphysics after three hundred years of unabated empiricism.

The empiricist is a natural revolutionary. For the empiricist is a religious man accepting loyally the empirical conditions of our existence. And within those conditions he recognizes nothing sacrosanct about the *status quo*. Because the empiricist is satisfied with being a man, he desires to be the best possible kind of man and a member of the best possible kind of society. He recognizes that a society must have leaders, but he sees no reason why they should always be the same leaders. There must be a division of labour, but not one according to hereditary castes. There must be law and order, but not an eternal law and a hierarchic order. The empiricist is satisfied with being a man ; he has no aspiration to become a god and no satisfaction in becoming a beast. Aristotle said very wisely that to live independently of the community—which amounts to saying independently of civilization—a man must be either a god or a beast. But Aristotle forgot his own dictum when, in his works on ethics and politics, he elevated contemplative metaphysicians to the rank of gods and degraded working men to the level of beasts.

The empiricist is not afraid of life. Within the limits of our human status many different lives may be lived ; and the empiricist prefers an adventuresome and creative, a rich and complex life. Such a life is impossible without the intersection of many cultural streams, without a multiplicity of contacts between the individuals and subgroups of a community, and between national communities themselves. A complex life is a zestful life, but it is also a dangerous and difficult life. An oyster has a safer but not such a varied life as a horse. The complex communities break down more readily than the simple.

No doubt the tribes of Scythian nomads scouring the Russian steppes outlived the imperial Athens with which

they traded in the ports of the Black Sea. But Athens became a great empire because of the enterprise of her sailors, the eager curiosity of her traders, and the varied cultural contacts within her cosmopolitan population. Athens failed because she could not solve her social or her international problem ; and these are the narrower and wider aspects of the same problem of community. Because Athens failed, and even before she had irretrievably failed, Plato sounded the retreat. Freud tells us that we can infer a man's character from his jokes ; his jokes are his unconscious wishes so expressed as to avoid social reprobation. Still more truly can we infer a man's unconscious wishes from the structure of his imaginative utopias. Plato imagined a quiet nook in Crete, untroubled by foreigners and traders, where the philosophers (*alias* the clerics) were the spiritual rulers ; where the soldiers (*alias* the S.S. men of the Nazi army) were the secular rulers ; where the unfranchised mass of helots (*alias* the serfs of medieval and the wage-earners of modern Europe) were the producers. The helots were to be the producers and the philosophers and soldiers the consumers of civilization. And the philosophers and soldiers (but not the helots) were to be educated upon mathematics, mathematics being the type of certainty, immutability, and perfection. One last point : the community was to carry its mathematico-eternal symbol upon its forehead by restricting its numbers to a beautiful mathematical number, namely, factorial seven which is the product of (7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1).

§ 5. *The English, American, French, and Russian Revolutions.*

We said that the empiricist was a natural revolutionary and that the greatest English philosophers were empiricists. The logical inference is irresistible ; England's philosophers were revolutionaries. And that is precisely what they were. English thought has been the revolutionary ferment of the modern world. The four great

revolutions of the modern world are: the English revolutionary movement of 1642 to 1688, the American of 1776, the French of 1789, and the Russian of 1917.

John Locke, the publicist, educationist, the friend and admirer of Sir Isaac Newton, was the empiricist philosopher who worked out the ideology of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Newton was the victorious general in the decisive battle between empiricist science and scholastic metaphysics. Newton and Locke were naturalized in France through the mediation of Voltaire. In consequence, the empiricist spirit of England overcame the Cartesianism of the French. If the French intellectuals had clung to Descartes and rejected Locke, the French revolution would still have happened. Economic forces do not wait upon the decisions of the intelligentsia. But the ideology of the revolution would have been different. De Maistre, a Catholic reactionary of the early nineteenth century, said very truly from his point of view: 'to differ from Locke is the beginning of wisdom.'

Long before the French revolution English empiricism invaded America. The Deists and the Unitarians of England and America, shedding the greater part of Calvinist dogma, went over to the empiricist standpoint. The consequences were momentous; the American revolutionaries were equipped with an appropriate and highly militant ideology.

Lastly there is the Russian revolution. There seems at first sight a wide ideological gap between Locke and Marx. But there are solid bridges connecting them. Adam Smith and the new economists are striking testimony to the fruitfulness of the empiricist spirit not only in natural, but in social science. From Sir William Petty to Adam Smith and David Hume, and from these to Ricardo and J. S. Mill—to mention only the pioneers of the new economics—empiricist thought analysed realistically the new social situation brought about by the rise of the capitalist class. Marx was their pupil. He appreciated the empirical nature of economic science better than

did the pioneers. The pioneers were under the spell of Newtonianism. If there were iron laws for the physical world, why not for the social? But there are no iron laws. Even in physics the so-called iron laws are nothing more than statistical uniformities. Still less are there iron laws in an historical situation, which every day is being transformed by the very operation of these laws. There is, in fact, as Marx saw and the classical economists did not, a dialectical process at work in history which breaks down every so-called iron law.

§ 6. *Newton, Spencer, and English Empiricism.*

Empiricism is a strenuous creed, or rather a strenuous refusal to have a creed. Many so-called empiricists do not live up to their profession. They tire of the experimental attitude. They glide into a middle-aged view of the world. Having once been active in changing the world, they want the world to settle down into a position of stable equilibrium. The non-empiricists have their absolute, their '*res*', their ultimate reality; they have their unmoved mover, their spiritual substance. Why should not the empiricists as well have their ultimate reality, their '*res*', their last word? And here Newtonianism is the seducer, and they fall. Newton himself remained to the last an empiricist in science and a semi-orthodox eccentric in religion. But the Newtonians went much further; they made matter and motion into absolutes. Here, then, was the real stuff of the world which could be set off against the spiritual stuff of the non-empiricists. And so Herbert Spencer found his '*res*', his absolute reality in the principles of the conservation of mass and energy. Whatever else changed, the quantity of change did not. Here, then, was the principle of cosmic immortality. And what a heavily loaded stick with which to beat the backs of the believers in spiritual immortality! And how ready the believers were to be intimidated by the unbelievers! Mechanism, so they

feared, had triumphed over spirit. And how relieved they were, and how prompt in announcing to the world that God had reascended to His Heaven, as soon as they learned of the physicists' admission that the electron, the smallest unit of matter (the stop-press may be announcing something smaller still) did not behave according to Newtonian laws.

The empiricists should have known better. Their 'scientific' materialism was just as much a metaphysical dogma as the doctrine of the spiritualists. A consistent empiricist repudiates metaphysics. As was said in Chapter IV, a metaphysical proposition is either a tautology, useful in mathematics and useless elsewhere, or it is a piece of nonsense, or it is rhetoric induced by the spectacle of the universe. Metaphysics has been defined as the reasoned science of the universe. But there can be no science of the universe. In order that science should be possible we must have, first, isolates, and second, an observer who stands outside the isolates. But the universe is not an isolate, since by definition all existing isolates are found within it and no isolate is found outside it. And no observer can stand outside the universe, for if he did what he would be observing would not be the universe.

The prestige of Newtonian mechanics has had two unfortunate consequences: it has made physicists into metaphysicians; and it has made economists into reactionaries. Physicists and economists are men of science, and men of science should remain faithful to empiricism. But not very many economists have remained faithful. Economics is a branch of sociology. Sociology analyses the complex web of social relations into a number of social isolates. And economics is specially interested in such social processes as production, distribution, and exchange. It isolates them, analyses them, and makes statistical generalizations as to trends of development, reliable at most for a very limited period after they have been made. And that is all. When the

trends to change develop into decisive movements, the social structure changes, and a new analysis is called for. But under the influence of Newtonianism, the classical economists assume that the capitalist system was like euclidean space : its structure remained unaffected by the processes taking place within it. A star might collide with another and the result be a planetary system, but euclidean space remained space as before. The capitalists might amalgamate themselves into a single capitalist, and the workers in their millions might wander unemployed about the streets, the capitalist system of the orthodox economist was still the same capitalist system. Orthodox economics has become propaganda for the political *status quo* of the nineteenth century. It has ceased to be science. It has become an apology for reaction.

§ 7. *The Philosopher as Critic and Architect of Civilization.*

We have already discussed (in Chapter V) the difficulties attending the science of sociology. We maintain that just as there cannot be a science of totality, so there cannot be a science of civilization. There can be a science of civilizations because, obviously, such civilizations as the Egyptian or the Western can be taken as isolates and their features and relations can be analysed. But if we mean by civilization all that this book has taken it to mean, namely, everything created by human art, whether in men's minds or in the world outside them, then there cannot be a science of civilization. There can be a philosophy, but not a science. A science could be constructed only by an angel or some other superhuman visitant, to whom the whole of human life, past as well as present, was an object to be inspected and reported on. But every conceivable scientist would necessarily be stationed inside civilization and not outside it. And therefore there cannot be a science of civilization.

We said that there can be a philosophy of civilization, but not a science. We suggest that to philosophize about

civilization is the only function that will remain to the philosopher of the future. For the philosopher is not a scientist. Nor is it likely that society will be prepared to go on paying him a salary as a professor of metaphysics. Metaphysicians will become extinct, or if not extinct as disreputable as astrologers. But mankind will still have need of critics of civilization. Basing himself on the natural and social sciences, the philosopher will point out that there are always a number of alternative courses open to mankind, and he will indicate what they are to the men of his own generation. The philosopher, in fact, will criticize and compare the possible futures of the civilization of the day. And if the philosopher is a man of wide sympathies and profound intuitions, the world will be glad to hear which of these alternatives he prefers. There will no longer be chairs of philosophy, any more than there could at any time be chairs of inspiration, prophecy, or good taste. The philosopher will be a leading figure and a representative man, the critic, architect, and prophet of civilization.

CHAPTER XV

TOWARDS A NEW IDEOLOGY

§ 1. *Empiricism and Revolution.*

THE empiricist is a natural revolutionary, the non-empiricist a natural conservative. The empiricist is prepared to experiment with new religions, new social structures, new ways of extracting a living from nature. He regards science as an instrument for making changes, not as a pathway to a pre-existent and absolute reality. The empiricist is a natural enemy of the pre-capitalist *Ständestaat* with its uncheangeable estates, with its ecclesiastics, landlords, burgesses, and serfs.

The question before the world to-day is whether we are to have a post-capitalist *Ständestaat*, or whether there is enough creativity among empiricists to advance to a new kind of society, one not frozen into any fixed form, but retaining perennially the mobility of life.

Death is easier to achieve than life. The post-capitalist *Ständestaat* is the grim possibility of to-morrow. In the pre-capitalist *Ständestaat*, the Roman Catholic Church was the arbiter of faith and morals ; in the post-capitalist *Ständestaat*, the Nazi ideologists will take over the functions of the Church. Instead of the feudal landlords, we shall have capitalist employers suitably refrigerated by the state machine. Instead of the medieval burgesses, we shall have lower middle-class clerks and shopkeepers suitably regimented and incorporated. And instead of serfs, we shall have the labouring masses. The labouring masses will be cleaner than the medieval serfs and more comfortable, but they will be kept down in that state of

life to which it has pleased their fascist overlords to call them.

How has the present situation come about? How is it that the issue is in doubt between fascism and democracy. Or to avoid using terms which are emotionally explosive and call up all kinds of irrevelant associations, let us ask why the issue is still in doubt between the uncreative *Ständestaat* and the creative commonwealth.

In essentials we are ready with an answer to this question. The answer is: The creativity of the empiricists has outrun their sense for unity. Civilization is the most difficult of arts. At any time it is liable to be wrecked by a failure to strike a balance between the dialectically opposed principles of creativity and unity.

The pre-capitalist *Ständestaat* is as old as Diocletian. It lasted a thousand years. Its religion was Catholic. Its science was metaphysics. Its economy was a subsistence agrarianism. Its spiritual leaders were Catholic ecclesiastics. Its secular governors were feudal lords. The thousand years of the *Ständestaat* were followed by four hundred years of revolution. Between Luther and Lenin there are exactly four centuries. Luther nailed his theses on the great door of the church at Wittenberg in 1517. Lenin nailed a different set of theses on the eastern door of Europe in 1917. Despite himself, Luther was the great disintegrator of the *Ständestaat.* Great men are the vehicles of the *Zeitgeist.* If Luther could have seen his face in the glass of time, he would have shrunk back in horror from himself as the leader of revolutionary empiricists. As Luther reacted against the neo-paganism of the Renaissance, he naturally imagined that, as far as secular matters were concerned, he was restoring the *Ständestaat.* For the Renaissance was an ideological revolt against the *Ständestaat,* conducted from within. The revolt was not only unopposed but encouraged by the Papacy. So that Protestantism began as a revolt against Catholicism's lapses from Catholicism. Luther remained a scholastic just as Newton remained a theologian. And yet, despite

these temporary fixations of ideology, one break with the *Ständestaat* involved another. Science became as unorthodox as religion. The empiricists in science, captained by Galileo, started the war of experimental science against hide-bound scholasticism. But the widest breach in the *Ständestaat* was made by the confederate forces of the new economy and the new politics. Protestantism destroyed the spiritual, and the rising bourgeoisie destroyed the secular power of the dominant classes of the medieval world. Three revolutions, the English, American, and French, were historically necessary before the empiricist spirit could capture the citadel of the old order. The citadel was the medieval view of the world. In this war of revolutionary empiricism, the new ideology was fighting at the front. Locke, Voltaire, and Franklin—to mention no others—were militant ideologists on the side of empiricism.

§ 2. *The Reaction against Empiricism.*

The course of history never runs smooth. Action was followed by reaction, the Reformation by the Counter-Reformation, the English revolution by the rise of Toryism, the French revolution by the rise of Napoleon. But why was there a reaction against empiricism? Feudalism had been destroyed. The *Ständestaat* was in ruins. The old ruling classes had been replaced by new. In every department there had been a revolutionary overturn. In political, economic, and intellectual life, the old fixity was gone. Everything had become fluid. There was life and novelty and creativity in abundance. Why were men still dissatisfied?

We said in the previous chapter that the world history of urban civilization could be divided into four epochs, according to the relation existing between civilization and the state. The first epoch was that of the early state, the second epoch that of the failure of the state, and the third epoch that of the rebirth of the state in countries such as

Spain, France, and England. There existed, therefore, in the world a powerful movement towards social integration basing itself upon nationality. But there was an opposite movement towards the disintegration of the religion, the class structure, and the ideology which had been inherited from feudalism. Here we have the root of the contradiction in the four empiricist centuries of the modern epoch. The pre-capitalist *Ständestaat* under Catholic guidance did not believe in secular civilization. Nevertheless medieval Europe was a unity. Pre-capitalist Christendom was a community of unbelievers in secular or this-world civilization. A community of unbelievers is still a community. Now the post-reformation empiricists set out to destroy this community, to destroy every form of ancient order and authority. But the masses of men cannot live without community. What new community, new society, new social synthesis was to take the place of that which had been destroyed? The empiricists unconsciously assumed that there would always be enough of the old society left to enable the community to function. And as the empiricists were drawn almost exclusively from the rising bourgeois classes, they assumed that a mixture of anti-Catholicism, of capitalism and individualism, made palatable to the masses by occasional infusions of liberalistic reforms and occasional participation in some of the advantages of the new scientific technology, would be sufficient. They were mistaken.

If there must be a forced choice between creativity and unity, the masses will choose unity. The careers of the two Napoleons, those pre-Bolshevik anticipations of Mussolini and Hitler, is sufficient evidence for that. For in the last resort the dictator is the nominee of the masses —a self-appointed and violently imposed nominee, but still their nominee. Creativity is a precious human prerogative. It is the zest of life. It is the oxygen of the will to civilization. But community, the unity of men with one another, is an older and more fundamental

need. Quite apart from the benefits that acrue to men enjoying access to the social heritage, and quite apart from the dependence of their standard of life upon social co-operation and a division of labour, men have need of the community. They need the community because it is greater and more permanent than their individual lives. They need the community because, by participating in its life, they conquer death and the mockery of time. If the price of creativity is to be the atomization of society ; if society has no other purpose than to provide the intelligentzia, the technicians, the administrators, the scientists, the artists, the metaphysicians, with opportunities for the exercise of their creativity ; if, in fact, society exists for the creative members of the bourgeoisie and for them alone, then the masses will prefer that there be no creativity. It is highly significant that in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (I quote from the forty-fourth edition of 1933), the very elaborate index does not show a single reference to *Wissenschaft*, science. And yet German science, and not German militarism, was the secret of German greatness. If the masses have to choose between creativity and unity, they will prefer the unity of the *Ständestaat* to the creativity of liberalistic individualism. The death of individual creativity will mean the embalming of the *status quo* and the freezing down of social status. It will mean that workmen will remain workmen and employers employers. It will mean that such members of the lower middle classes as have become Nazi bosses will found boss dynasties. There will be no individual, but there will still be collective creativity and that of the most violent kind. For collective creativity will take the form of totalitarian war with the other fascist states of a fascist world. And post-capitalist feudalism will console itself with the thought that pre-capitalist feudalism lasted for a thousand years.

Revolution is not an end in itself. The empiricists have forgotten this important truth. Housebreaking should clear the site for a new house and not leave the

ground a wilderness of individual bricks. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution had a common objective, the break-up of the pre-Reformation *Ständestaat* together with the ideology that buttressed it. Authority, hierarchy, and staticity were the principles of the *Ständestaat*, and the revolutionary empiricists set out to liquidate those principles. So far so good. Four hundred years of housebreaking may be required to clear the site covered by a thousand-year-old edifice. But when the site has once been cleared, what new house of humanity did the empiricists propose to erect? To-day we are discovering that they had made no plans; they were the destroyers of an effete, not the architects of a new, civilization. So-called progressivism has ceased to progress. With the destruction of medievalism, it declared its mission at an end. And that is why individualistic liberalism, surviving into the twentieth century, is no longer solvent.

§ 3. *Creativity without Community: the Error of Individualism.*

Creativity without community can never be an end in itself. And this the liberal individualists have forgotten. Their exaggerated individualism has made creativity into vanity. To seize upon the fruits of the creative sufferings of the past, to exploit the creative struggles of the present, with no other end in view than to give momentarily to privileged members of the bourgeoisie a series of superior states of consciousness, is to degrade the objective art of civilization into a futile subjectivism. Fine art, instead of being a purge of passion and an enhancement of social harmony, becomes an expression of 'significant form'. But if we evaluate this once fashionable cliché sociologically, it means that art becomes an expression of insignificant form, of the form that titillates the palate of the dilettante and makes the artist into a pandar purveying private sensation for a privileged clientele. And this subjectivistic degradation of art

extends to science and religion. Science becomes pure research, an intellectualistic pathway to 'reality', a private vision of the truth, and only derivatively, if at all, an instrument in the community's warfare with nature. And the religion of the liberal individualist becomes, once again, a purely personal mysticism. As his private consciousness is his only good, he wants to retain possession of it for ever. So he projects his ego upon the cosmos and calls it God or the Good. Or if these terms are old-fashioned, he will apply to the Orient for a licence to perpetuate his beloved ego through an endless series of reincarnations.

The wheel has turned full circle. The liberal individualist has cancelled out successfully a thousand years of feudalism in order to bring us back once more to the Epicureanism, Stoicism, and neo-Platonism of the pre-Christian world. The individualism of antiquity was the consequence of the failure of the city-state. It made no suggestions for the transcending of the city-state. It made no plans for a greater, and more generous, and more widely distributed civilization. This pre-Christian individualism was the forerunner of Christian individualism and of the authoritarian and hierarchical state. When Constantine turned Christian, the pagan individualists accepted baptism. Quite a number of our liberal individualists, who reject socialism because they are afraid of the curtailment of their privileges, are inclined to accept baptism at the hands of the fascists.

There is a very intimate relation between the ideology of an age and its politico-economic trends. The ideologists of creative and triumphant capitalism, such as Buckle and Herbert Spencer, preached the rugged individualism of self-confident pioneers. After all, capitalism had multiplied England's population by four, had covered the world with railways and the sea with ships, had forced a capitalist technique upon every country of the world, and had created an international market without precedent in world history. What a titanic energy there was in this

pioneer capitalism ! But twentieth-century capitalism has ceased to be creative and self-confident. Everywhere in the world to-day the capitalist democracies are interrogating their destiny. England and France have grown into world-wide imperialisms. Their ruling classes announce to the world that they are tired and sated and want to rest. They confess that their creativeness is over. Their one desire is for the stabilization of the *status quo*. But the sleeping sickness of a society is a highly infectious disease. From politics and economics it spreads to culture. Our literary individualists are no longer rugged but querulous. They find it difficult to resist the bribery of fascism. For the fascist says to the literary, artistic, and intellectualistic gentlemen of our age : 'You are individualists. You want to enjoy the æsthetic moment. To do so, you must sell your cultural wares to a clientele whose philosophy of life is similar to your own. But such a clientele you can only find amongst the more expensive classes. Join us and we will guarantee the incomes of the expensive classes and therefore yours. You are highly spiritual persons, superior to economics, superior, as an orator said recently in the French Chamber of Deputies, " to the sordid preoccupation of the masses with material things ". Join us and you can indulge your spirituality without stint. Why should you cast your literary and intellectual pearls before the swinish herd. Join us and we will guarantee to keep the swine in their appropriate sties. We shall make the sties hygienic, but they will still be sties.' One thing is certain : unless our ideologists are men of courage, inspired by a vision of a new and creative civilization that shall take the place of our tired capitalism, they are likely to succumb and to accept baptism into the fascist creed.

§ 4. *The Nemesis of Shavianism.*

The acceptance of fascist baptism by the intelligentsia is one, and the bankruptcy of Shavianism is another, symbol of the times. Shaw is the invincible Protestant.

Despite his advocacy of a limited and purely instrumental collectivism, Shaw has remained the most unflagging and the most anarchistic of all individualists. In a brilliant series of plays, he disposed of the authority of parents, husbands, doctors, schoolmasters, clerics, politicians, capitalist magnates, labour leaders, and finally of Shaw himself. And what remains? Are we now on the road to a new civilization? Not at all. A literary man's utopia is as good an index to his unconscious wishes as are his jokes. In the *Back to Methuselah* mankind has discovered how to live for ever; and one of Shaw's young ladies, having discarded love and food and the residual fripperies of her sex, can find nothing better to do than to retire to the woods and contemplate numbers. Apparently Shaw wishes to become a monk and to continue contemplating for ever.

§ 5. *Either Fascism or the Creative Commonwealth.*

Either Fascism or the Creative Commonwealth. Either a congeries of fascist states, each consisting of fixed estates and each hostile to the rest, or a federation of commonwealths. That is the choice before us. Capitalist democracy no longer ranks as a third alternative. Capitalism has had its day. Its creativeness is over. The greatest need of the world is for community. The world is too crowded for social atomism to be any longer possible. An integrated society is inevitable. We have to decide whether it shall be a creative or uncreative integration.

To fashion the human race into a world community! That is the greatest, the most arduous, as it will be the most satisfying of all human enterprises. All the arts of civilization—and civilization is itself an art, the architectonic art—will require to be enlisted if men are to advance to that grand consummation.

The universal commonwealth is possible to-day, as it has never before been possible in the history of mankind. The ground-plan of the Great Society can be outlined

because we possess not only the physical, but what is even more important, the intellectual tools that are necessary for its construction. 'Mandom' has become a reality for us. 'Mandom' is a reality because we possess the conceptual framework within which we can hold it before the mind. No previous age was acquainted with the history of human origins. No previous age could take a synoptic view of the whole of the human achievement. No previous age could draw a map of the world, locate upon its surface the two thousand million members of our species, and then, proceeding from space into the time-dimension, construct a film showing the story of man's adventures through the five thousand years of recorded history.

Civilization is the sum of human achievement. To-day we can estimate the achievement and analyse it. We can construct a sociology of success as well as one of defeat. We can appreciate man's greatness and man's limitations. We are beginning to do justice to his uniqueness and to shed our illusions about his place in nature. We are the first to take a realist view of world history; to report truthfully upon our experience in encountering our ancestors. Every modern reader of world history who is not blinded by prejudice, whether of race or class or religion, will get from his study an overwhelming impression of the unity of mankind. Despite all differences of outlook and knowledge and ability, human beings are human beings. The men of the Old Stone Age and the men using the latest devices in electricity are members of a single species. As far as we can know, and therefore as far as we need to know, they are utterly different from all other existents either below or beyond the sun. But the men of the Old Stone Age and the men of the Modern Age are united by something more than the possession of the same unique qualities. They are members of a unitary society, the most catholic of all societies, civilization. The men of the Old Stone Age have been able to transmit their culture to us because they are of one mind

with us, and we can appreciate our indebtedness to them because we are of one mind with them.

We moderns are like men upon a crowded ship. We cannot change our quarters or our shipmates ; and we have nothing but the ship between us and the unplumbed depths of the sea. We are inclined to hate our fellows because we cannot escape from them. Our ancestors were not so helpless. The world was small in their days ; it had vast uninhabited spaces where men could try their luck and change their company. But they had still another remedy when their fellows made life unbearable. Migration, in any case, was impossible for the sedentary populations of the great empires, and it was these who suffered most at the hands of their fellow human beings. So they extended the locus of humanity beyond the earth —where they had looked for humanity in vain—to places in the non-human world. They peopled the cosmos with father-gods and mother-goddesses. Their philosophers advanced the theory that the human and the non-human were one ; that there was far more of the human—and that, too, of a perfect kind—to be found in the non-human world than could be found among men. And if one school of philosophers discovered friends and companions for men in the superhuman world amongst the gods, another school discovered them in the sub-human world amongst the animal and plant creation. The first school of philosophers were theists, the second were vitalists. The first school said that man's essence was his mind and that the origin of that essence was the mind of God. The second school said that man's essence was his life and that cosmic life and human life were one.

Neither in fact nor in phantasy can we escape from our fellow men. The aeroplane, the wireless, the world economy, and the international money-market—the whole modern apparatus of communication has forced mankind upon the individual's company. And the imaginative escape into other worlds, super- or sub-human, is likewise becoming more difficult.

§ 6. *Absolute values as God-substitutes.*

The moderns are more and more disinclined to believe that the good for man pre-exists in the transcendent world, whether in the form of a Person or a Principle. They are inclined to reject both the theist's God and the platonizing ethicist's impersonal substitute for God. Absolute values and moral perfections are the god-substitutes of the non-conformist conscience. To take such concrete goods as health, security, comradeship, social recognition, and creative work—all of which have no meaning apart from society and civilization, and all of which are necessarily transformed by every transformation of society and civilization—to take such goods, to skim from off their surface the descriptive adjective 'good', and then to make an eternal moral substance out of the adjective, is the traditional procedure of the so-called ethical realists. They call themselves realists because they believe that in ethics they have discovered the ultimate reality, the statical centre of a changing world. But if we look at ethical realism historically, we discover that it is a platonizing substitute for theism, a hallowed avenue of escape for men who have been overwhelmed by the cost and difficulty of civilization.

To say that the good is eternal is either a meaningless metaphysical tautology or a rhetorical decoration upon the empirical fact that wherever we find man, we find civilization ; and wherever there is civilization, there is creation ; and creation presupposes choice—a choice between the alternatives possible at the moment. The alternative that is chosen is good. It is good because it is chosen : it is not chosen because it is good. What light do I throw upon my choice by pretending that it is a copy of an eternal and pre-existent model ? I do not throw any light, but I lull myself into the belief that I have eliminated the risk of a wrong choice. In the last resort I cannot explain my choice, any more than I can explain civilization and man and nature, the three

indefinables of the human situation. It is only when men are afraid of life that they have a desire to explain everything. An explained life, a completely rationalized life, is a safe life. But life is dark and mysterious and dangerous, and the vital are not afraid. If civilization could be completely rationalized, faith would be superfluous.

§ 7. *Mankind to-day, a single ship's company.*

The sudden contraction of mankind to a single ship's company, making the voyage of life together, marks a new epoch in world history. But mankind is not prepared, either in its habits or its philosophy, for a public life on such a scale. The immediate reaction of the majority of individuals to this new situation is a feeling of exasperation, of nervous hatred. There is more bad temper in the world to-day than at any time since the close of the wars between Protestant and Catholic. And this bad temper is the opportunity of the fascist. For fascism offers an alternative to the policy of reconstructing the world-ship, of making every passenger a member of the crew, and of overcoming bad temper by a new feeling of loyalty to the ship. For fascism proposes strictly to confine each section of the world-ship's crew and passengers to their respective quarters. The third-class passengers are not to mingle with the first, nor the passengers with the crew, nor the officers with the men, nor the whites with the coloured people. And these class and race and occupational restrictions upon intercourse are to be enforced for the whole of the journey. Men will not love one another, but their vitality having been lowered by confinement to stuffy and unventilated quarters, their hatreds will be less destructive. Fascism offers an uncreative enforcement of the *status quo*.

It is part of an uncreative outlook upon the world to believe that Roman Catholicism, or some other form of Christian theism which stands closer to Islam and

Judaism, will be the religion of the future ; or to believe that Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism are destined to remain side by side, even in the remote future, as the major religions of mankind. The peoples engaged upon building the Tower of Babel were forced to abandon the work, not so much because they spoke divers tongues —that difficulty might have been got over by bi-lingualism—but because they began to practise different religions. To perform the same task and to persevere in the same work, men must have the same faith in the value of the work. But not one of the four major religions of the world is prepared to accept civilization as the supreme value for men, whatever it may be for gods. One of the principal theses of this book has been the view that alienation from the world, from men, and from civilization, is one of the characterizing features of a church ; and that this feature is most pronounced in Buddhism and Christianity. Up to our own times, these four major religions have been responsible for the world-view, the philosophy of life, the ideology of much the greater part of mankind. And because of the time-lag in culture, many of those who had ceased to believe in these religions have failed to emancipate themselves from the world-views that go with them.

§ 8. *The Dogma of the Inevitability of Human Failure.*

International science and world economy are driving all the peoples of the earth into a single compound ; but a compound is not a community. And without a unified community, high civilization is impossible. Men cannot be united by negations. Even the churches that deny the value of secular civilization affirm its value, by the very fact that they unite men in great communities. We have maintained that these great communities are, in their origins, substitutes for the bankrupt states of antiquity. But because the state failed in the past, must it always fail ? Is man doomed to fail, and must every civilization

perish? It is not difficult to deduce an iron law of failure out of the failures of the past. Man, on such a view, is born to fail, and he must find his compensations in another world. The blindness, weakness, and perversity of man will then be elevated by religion to the dignity of a metaphysical dogma. Men live up to their anticipations. As long as men believe that they must fail, they will fail.

The greatest need of the world to-day is for a philosophy of life which repudiates the dogma of the inevitability of human failure. Men failed because success was so difficult. The physical means, the conceptual framework, the leadership, and the faith were all of them lacking. And all are necessary if we are to advance to the construction of a planned world. The universal commonwealth must be a planned, a consciously planned, civilization. It can only succeed if men desire it, if it is desired by all the peoples of the earth. If the peoples feel that the universal commonwealth is indeed universal, that their welfare is contained within it, that they can participate in it, that they are responsible for it, that they have equal access to its resources, that they are at once renewing and reshaping it, then and only then will they feel that human life is justified.

Throughout its long history the human race has been the prisoner of necessity. For the first half million years or so of its existence it has been the prisoner of nature; for the last five or six thousand years it has been the prisoner of its instincts, of the aggression and self-assertion so markedly developed in the exploitative peoples. To-day an advance is possible from necessity to freedom. The essence of freedom is freedom to create, and the essense of equality is equal access to the social heritage and to the resources of civilization in order to create, and the essence of fraternity is comradeship, the joining in the common task or enterprise.

There can be no doubt that the dogma of the inevitability of human failure is being extensively repudiated to-day. At first sight it would appear as though the

precise contrary of this assertion ought to be made. For are we not witnessing the failure of capitalism or at least the exhaustion of its creative impulse? The failure of capitalism has discredited the ideology of progress. Liberalism, individualism, and freedom have been degraded from the dignity of unquestioned values to the level of dubious shibboleths. The traditional unbelievers in progress have rejoiced. Fascism has announced its readiness to embalm, and Catholicism its readiness to sanctify, an uncreative, diminished, and discredited capitalism. But the failure of capitalism is capable of a different construction. Capitalism can be regarded, not as another instance of human failure, but as a stage in a creative advance to a higher and more generous civilization. And besides, in an experimental age, when one scientific invention crowds in upon another, it is not easy to persuade the world that in the field of social relations experiment must henceforth cease. The fascists have therefore been compelled to pose as social revolutionaries, as contrivers, in appearance at least, of a new society; and what is more of a society that has a right to command the allegiance of the masses. But, however specious may be their claims, the fascists cannot make them plausible without repudiating the dogma of the inevitability of human failure. And this repudiation brings them into conflict with the churches.

The Nazis have solved the problem of reconciling reaction with the pretence of progress by going back to Germany's pre-Christian past. And the Nazis, from their own point of view, are justified. The Germans were more successful in their pre-Christian days than they have been since. Their great success was the destruction of the Roman Empire.

The Italian fascists have made their peace with the Roman Catholic Church. But they are drawing their inspiration from the pre-Christian days of the Roman Empire. The Papacy is Mussolini's prisoner. It is world-renouncing in name, and an instrument of Italian

imperialism in fact. Its attitude to Abyssinia throws a searching light upon the new relation between a church which, in principle, denies, and a fascist state which, in principle, affirms, the value of secular civilization. Christians may take secular failure for granted, but not so Italians.

§ 9. *The New Secularizing Movements of the Near and Far East.*

This negation of a church's negativity is by no means restricted to the Christian world. Ataturk has repudiated Islam, its institutions and its ideology. The Turks are affirming very vigorously the value of Turkish civilization. And there are increasing signs that, in imitation of the Turks, Persia, Afghanistan, Egypt, and even Arabia will learn to place nationality before religion.

Even the Jews, whose negative attitude to secular civilization has never been pronounced, and whose messianic hope has never faltered, are beginning to transform Judaism into Zionism. This means that they are not prepared to wait for the descent of a Messiah out of the transcendent world, but are determined to be their own Messiah. The Zionists, in effect, are substituting for faith in God faith in Hebrew civilization.

Even in India and China secularizing movements are afoot. The British in India are inclined to trade upon a continuance of the conflict between Hinduism and Islam. It is probable that they will be disappointed. In India Hinduism has trodden the older, Islam the younger, path of world renunciation. But times have changed. The very strength with which the British in India have affirmed the value of British civilization has elicited from the Indians an affirmation of the value of Indian civilization. During the last hundred years there has been a great increase in India's population. A meaningless fertility has been compensated but not balanced by an equally meaningless mortality. Where men have no creative interest in civilization, the last thing they control

is population. The masses proliferate like rabbits, while the upper classes, inclining to race suicide, send their sons into the world-denying church. The problem of population, like most other human problems, can be solved if men have faith in civilization. For if men believe that civilization is worth while, they will procreate children not to silence a physiological urge, but to express their joy and confidence in life. If men have faith in civilization they will not willingly be accessories to race suicide. They will refuse to believe that nothing matters except perhaps the sensations of the moment. They will ignore the argument that, when they are dead, it will be indifferent to them whether posterity is alive to enjoy sensations as trivial and as vain as theirs.

§ 10. *New Highways to World Civilization.*

Soviet Russia is almost the only country of importance left in Europe where there is still a rising birth-rate. It is significant that in Russia there has been the strongest repudiation of Christianity, and therefore by implication of the dogma that human failure is inevitable. For Russia, despite the atavistic lure of czarism, is creating a new civilization ; one in which the gravest social crime is exploitation ; a civilization of pioneers in which men, with undivided will and undiminished energies, can concentrate on the task of controlling nature. They can control nature because they have learned the art of controlling their appetites. Russia is a country where men are thrilled because a thousand miles away a river has been bridged, a railway-track doubled, a hospital or theatre built. There every creative talent has an outlet ; and what anyone creates, he creates for all. There every group has equal access to the social heritage and an equal claim upon the resources of the state.

Even some professed Marxists have not, as we think, adequately gauged the nature of Russia's achievement. Scratch a certain type of socialist and you discover either

an anarchist or an old-fashioned materialist. The overthrow of the capitalist regime and of all established authority, the emancipation of the individual from every kind of control by society, were alleged to be the major aims of Socialism. To attempt to see farther was utopian. The untrammelled individual must be free to be married and divorced as often as he pleased, free to entertain every conceivable philosophy of life, society, and morals, free to work or not work as long as he did not make others work for him, free, in short, to play the anarchist in a completely atomized society. And by the extent to which anarchism has been realized, Russia's achievement was to be measured. The other type of socialist revels in statistics. He measures the success of the new civilization by the number of tractors, the number of tons of wheat and oil, and the rouble-value of the average income. What both these types fail to realize is that the best constructed of states is something more than a bag full of contraptions, designed to secure conveniences for the individual. Civilization is the end for which state and society exist. Civilization is the creation of the individual; he maintains, transmits, and creates it from day to day. And the individual is the creation of civilization. The spirit of civilization enters into him and makes him human; it brings him gifts from all the ages; it endows him with skill and knowledge and wisdom. The relation between the individual and the group is reciprocal and dialectical. The most comprehensive group of all is humanity, and the culture of humanity is part of world civilization.

What, then, is the measure of Soviet Russia's achievement? Surely it is in the fact that a hundred different races, speaking almost as many tongues, and practising in czarist days almost as many types of religion, have found a common purpose, an end in which they can participate. Russia's millions feel themselves to be the creators of a creative civilization. Over a hundred and seventy millions of human beings—a number nearly three times as great as ever existed in the Roman Empire—have

recovered that faith in civilization which once existed in the clan and tribe, and for a very brief period in the earliest of the states. They are free of the animistic superstition that nature is quasi-human. They are free of the compensatory belief that the best in human life pre-exists in the transcendent world. Despite the residual metaphysics of dialectical materialism, Russian socialists, whether learned or unlearned, cannot really believe that they have a rationalistic key to the ultimate verities. The true socialist is an empiricist and not a dogmatist. He accepts nature and man and the civilization process in which man and nature are united. And because the socialist accepts man and nature and civilization, because he is not afraid to live nor afraid to die, because as an empiricist he does not pretend to explain everything, the socialist is a religious man.

§ 11. *England, the leader of the West?*

Russia has started on the road to the creative commonwealth. Can the capitalist democracies of the West—England, France, Scandinavia, Holland, and Belgium, which at present are in considerable danger of being embalmed as semi-fascist nationalisms—can they make the advance from capitalist to complete democracy? Above all, can England be the leader of this advance? For if we in this country take up the attitude that we are a tired, sated imperialism, whose one remaining desire is to stabilize the *status quo*, then we shall drift into fascism. If we decline the leadership of the West, what rejoinder can we make to the claims of Italy, Germany, and Japan? They are only doing what we have done. Unless we are the leaders in an advance to new political forms, we are bound to admire the imitative self-assertion of the fascist states and to acquiesce in their claims. We are bound to return to Germany her colonies, and to approve Japan's conquest of China. And all that we can hope for is that when the imitative imperialism of the fascist powers

has been sated, we shall obtain as stable a world as an embalmed world is likely to be.

England, with her Protestant, empiricist, and revolutionary traditions is the ideal leader of the West. English culture and the English outlook still dominate the world. Englishmen have won their great position in the world because they have been imbued with the spirit of the pioneer. Only an exhausted and uncreative England can feel herself attracted towards fascism. Fascism, after all, is the second-hand creed of reactionaries. Russia in the East has built a highway—a very faulty and unmacadamized highway—to world civilization. England in the West, with greater resources and wider experience, can do better as a builder of highways.

The League of Nations has failed because of a fundamental flaw in the philosophy of civilization by which its creators were inspired. Parliament, as we know, is in its origins a feudal institution; it is a conference of estates, the Lords Spiritual, Lords Temporal, and the Burgesses. The League of Nations was thought of, similarly, as a parliament of national estates. The nation-states were to be sovereign and autonomous, like the individuals of the laissez-faire state, and these were to be united by external relations maintained solely for individual convenience. But the League of Nations, as the embryonic organ of world government, as the preliminary intelligence department of mankind, as the spiritual home of the world mind—these conceptions had no place in liberalistic theory.

The gates of the future stand open before mankind. We can enter fearlessly provided we have faith. We are nourished by two abiding miracles, the miracle of unity and the miracle of creativity. It is a miracle, ultimate and inexplicable, that any human being can communicate his knowledge, his skill, the very essence of his being to any other human being. And it is a miracle, not to be rationalized or reduced, that human beings can create what has never before existed in the history of civilization.

Civilization is the greatest of all human creations. Civilization is the unity in which all human beings are one. It has been said that the world is a machine for creating gods. When men recover their faith in civilization, it will be said that the world is a school for making men.

INDEX

A

Abyssinia, 335
Ahab, King, 237, 239
Alaric, 209, 272
Alexander, 38, 42, 46, 47, 48, 205
Alexander Jannæus, 263 f.
Alexander, Professor S., 309 f.
Alfonso, King, 130
America, United States of, 31
Animism, 17, 171
Anthropology (-ists). *See* Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Tylor, Religion of Primitives, Science of the Semang.
Antiochus Epiphanes, 47, 262, 266
Apocalyptic (-ism), 266, 270
Apochrypha, Book of Esdras in, 268
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 87 f., 266
Arabs, the, 33
Archimedes, 147, 151, 304
Aristotle, 33, 92, 157, 304, 308 f., 311
Arnold, Matthew, 149 f.
Aryan (-s), 8, 41, 297 f., 302
Ashur, 194
Asoka, 8, 14, 43 ff., 49 f., 205 f., 220, 273, 287
Athens, 9, 33, 113, 312
Assyria (-ians), 53, 113, 226 f., 243, 248
Ataturk, 335
Augustine, St., 102, 292
Augustus, Cæsar, 214, 282
Austria, 128, 131

B

Babylon, 15, 27, 121, 227, 249, 259
Bach, 274
Back to Methuselah (Shaw), 327
Bacon, Sir Francis, 19, 310
Bergson, Henri, 308
Bentham, Jeremy, 19
Bible, the, 51–53, 85, 141, 144; Books of: Deuteronomy, 235; Joshua, 225, 229; Judges, 225; Kings, 236; the Psalms, 238; Ecclesiastes, 210; Isaiah, 251; Jeremiah, 225 f.; Daniel, 238, 266 f. 268; St. John, 262, 271, 284; the Acts, 169; To the Hebrews, 262; origins of, 243; politics in, 235 f.; Servant-texts in, 275
Bismarck, 35
Bolyai, J., 99
Brahm (-inism), 45, 193, 206 f., 267, 302
Breasted, J. H., 192, 196 ff., 253
Broad, Professor C. D., 174 f.
Buckle, H. T., 41, 325
Buddha (-ism), 7, 14, 43, 45, 50, 56, 89, 95, 125, 187, 201: Chinese form of, 223; compared with Christianity, 277 f., 298, 332
Byzantium (-ine), 83, 126, 255, 300

C

Cæsar, Julius, 49, 106, 169, 214
Caliphate, 38, 125
Calvin, 59, 286
Cambridge Shorter History of India, The, 205
Carlyle, Thomas, 149, 228, 287
Carthage, 256, 287
Catholicism, Roman, 87, 122 ff., 230, 271, 286, 289, 298, 305, 310, 319 f., 331, 334
Chamberlain, Houston S., 150 f., 213
Chandragupta Maurya, 43, 45, 205
Charchemish, battle of, 227
Charles I, King of England, 127

Childe, Professor Gordon, 174
China, 11, 59, 210 ff., 335: Buddhism in, 223; Confucianism in, 7, 9, 44, 217 ff., 230 f.; first Emperor of, 29–30, 42 f., 218 ff.; problem of State in, 220 ff.; Taoism in, 44, 222 ff., 290
Chinese Civilization (Granet), 11, 219
Chin Shih Huang-ti. *See* China, first Emperor of.
Christianity, 8 f., 202; and failure, 273 f., 286; and Hegelianism, 97; Messianic hope in, 38, 256, 272; origins of, 284 ff.; nihilism in, 38, 124, 289 f.; paradox of, 277 ff.; universalist character of, 37, 273 f., 332
Churches, 14 f., 36 f.; as empire-substitutes, 37, 55, 191 ff.; prospects of, 332; three elements in the life of, 38 f.; as unifers of mankind, 55 ff.
Civilization, Aegean, 185 f., 206; British, 305 f., 338 f.; conditions for survival of, 213 ff., 333; creativity as principle of, 4, 69, 140, 177, 215 f., 339; criticism of Spengler's theory of, 6, 160 f.; criticism of Nazi theory of, 214, 319; etymology of, 1, 143; retreat from, 47, 116; unity of, 2, 5, 62, 107 ff., 149, 254, 328 ff.
Commentary on Holy Scripture, A New (Anglo-Catholic), 226
Commodus, Roman Emperor, 210, 214
Communism (-ists), 21, 123, 129. *See* Marxism.
Comte, Auguste, 41, 189, 254
Confucius (-ianism). *See* China.
Constantine, 14, 43 ff., 48 ff., 212, 272 f., 287, 306, 325
Counter-Reformation, 59, 82, 98, 126, 321
Crete, 113, 312
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), 85
Cromwell, Oliver, 59
Crusades, the, 126
Culture, principle of the diffusion of, 57, 68, 76, 104 f., 145 ff., 149, 187; principle of the equalization of, 32, 76, 254 f.
Cyrus, 256

D

Darius, 220
Darwin, Charles, 19
David, King, 52, 225, 234, 245
Dawn of Conscience, The (Breasted), 192 ff.
De Maistre, 313
Democritus, 299
Descartes, 9, 66, 79, 81 ff., 172, 309
Deux sources de la morale et de la religion (Les), 308
Dewey, Professor John, 3, 4, 167
Dialectical Materialism. *See* Marxism.
Diffusion of Culture. *See* Culture.
Diocletian, 212 ff., 306, 308, 320
Durkheim, Émile, 3, 176 f., 246

E

Ecclesiastes, 106, 210
Egypt (-ology), 3, 7, 16, 23, 27 f., 113, 141, 144; criticism of Breasted, 197 ff.; earliest crisis in, 200–202; Pharaohs of, 186, 193, 197, 203, 226 f., 233, 235; Pyramid Age in, 196–197
Einstein, Albert, 98, 100
Empiricism (-al, -ist), 4, 6, 19, 66; English tradition of, 81, 307–311, 313 ff., 339; reaction against, 321–324; religion as acceptance of, 70–73, 77; revolution associated with, 319, 323. *See* Science
Engels, Friedrich, 155, 161
Englightenment, the, 19, 116, 120
Enoch, Book of, 268
Epicureans (-ism), 46–48, 82, 325
Erasmus, 127
Essenes, 269
Ethical Monotheism, 244, 252
Euclid, 100 f.
Ezekiel, the Prophet, 243
Ezra, the Scribe, 169, 259 f., 261

F

Faraday, Michael, 19
Fascists (-ism), 123, 129–133, 325, 327–329, 334, 339. *See* Nazis
Fertile Crescent, the, 253, 256
Feudalism, 98, 156 f.
Feuerbach, 158
Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures (Les), 172

Forde, Professor C. Daryll, 153
Formes élémentaires de la vie religeuse (*Les*), 176
Franco, General, 130
Franklin, Benjamin, 321
Freud, Professor S., 179, 312

G

Galileo, 98, 147, 166, 321
Gauss, K. F., 99
Gibbon, E., 50
Gobineau, Count, 213
Goethe, 149
Goths, 102
Gnostics, 284
Granet, Marcel, 11, 219
Guignebert, C., 11, 274, 28

H

Habitat, Economy, and Society (Forde), 153
Harnack, Adolf, 285 f.
Harvey, William, 19
Hegel (-ianism), 9, 10, 35, 41, 81 ff.; in England, 310 f.; influence on Marx, 154 ff., 175, 182, 309
Heraclitus, 156, 299
Hercules, the myth of, 25
Herod the Great, 263 f., 286
Heroditus, 121
Hezekiah, King, 227, 243
Histories (Tacitus), 169
History, anachronistic fallacy in, 229–232; Christian philosophy of, 108; dialectic of, 8 f., 124, 281, 320; economic interpretation of, 154; four epochs of, 39–40, 110–114; amongst Hindus, 109; principles of civilization independent of, 61, 78; sin as theory of, 228 f., 237 f.
History of the Peloponnesian War, 169
Hitler, 322 f.
Hobbes, 81, 310
Hoffding, Harald, 182
Hook, Sidney, 11
Humanism, creative, 6; dialectical, 6
Human situation, the, three indefinables of, 63–65, 86, 103
Hume, David, 1, 19, 88, 179, 310, 313
Hus, John, 258

I

Ideology (-ies), conflict of, 57–60; Marxist view of, 156–162; metaphysics and, 308; of progress, 334; Shavian, 327; totalitarianism and, 128; of a universal commonwealth, 40, 60, 119 ff., 339; of the world religions, 332–335
Ikhnaton, 106, 198, 202, 203 f. *See* Egypt.
India, 8, 14, 16, 41, 45, 49, 297, 335
Individualism, in America, 167; antique forms of, 60; Christian, 279; error of, 93, 324 f.; fallacy of, 178 f., 216; liberalistic, 129; Protestant, 83 f.; of men of letters, 326
Inquisition, the, 82
Instrumentalism. *See* Science
Ionia, 299
Isaiah, the Prophet, 243, 254
Islam (-ic), 38, 56, 57, 125, 256, 287, 300, 331
Isolates, 5, 74–75, 134 ff., 165 f.
Israel (Judah), 6, 7, 113; crises in, 242–244; cultural dualism in, 54, 241, 248 ff.; monarchy in, 234 f., 237 ff., 242 f., 244, 247; pre-exilic religion of, 51–53; prophecy in, 7, 53, 239, 244 ff., 249, 293; theory of sin in, 227 f., 237 ff.
Israel (Lods), 11

J

James, William, 167, 179
James II, King of England, 127
Jeremiah, the Prophet, 7, 106, 121, 157, 198, 201, 225 ff., 243
Jeroboam, 236
Jerusalem, High Priests of, 52
Jesus, 87, 99, 256, 261, 269 ff., 275, 278, 283 ff.
Jesus (Guignebert), 11
Jews, 47, 50, 335. *See* Israel.

Jezebel, 239
Josephus, 269
Josiah, King, 227, 235, 243
Judaism, 38, 51, 331. *See* Israel
Judas Maccabæus. *See* Maccabæus
Julian the Apostate, 287

K

Kant, 9, 10, 81 ff., 309 : Breasted and, 198 ; individualism of, 88 ff. ; religious philosophy of, 82, 95 ff. ; his theory of morals, 89, 96, 216 ; his theory of science, 85, 91
Kautsky, Karl, 280 f.
Knossos, 186
Knox, John, 127
Koran, the, 261

L

Lamarck, 179
League of Nations, 339
Leibniz, 9, 81 ff., 175, 182, 309
Lenin, 155, 320
Levy, Professor H., 5, 165
Lévy-Bruhl, 3, 172 ff., 246
Livy, 121
Lobatschewsky, N. I., 99
Locke, John, 19, 81, 88, 310, 313, 321
Lods, Adolphe, 11
Logic, formal, 101 ; inductive, 73 ; Hegelian, 85, 157 ; Aristotelian, 102, 157. *See* Mathematics.
Logical Positivists, 10
Loisy, A. F., 286, 289
Lowie, Dr. R. H., 177
Luther, Martin, 59, 98, 127, 286, 320

M

Maccabæus, Judas, 259, 262, 263, 285
Maccabees, 1 and 2, 264
McDougall, Professor W., 179, 185
Man Makes Himself (Childe), 174
Marcus Aurelius, 50, 83, 209 f., 217, 280, 298
Mariamne, 263
Marett, Dr. R. R., 171
Marx (-ism, -ist), 10, 11, 85, 98, 99, 137 ff., 154 ff., 281, 313, 337 f.
Mathematics, Euclidean geometry, 85, 100 ; Greek, 92, 168, 312 ; Kant's theory of, 91 ; modern theory of, 10, 101 ; non-Euclidean geometry, 99 ff. ; prestige of, 84 ff., 312 ; Roman, 170
Maxwell, Clark, 188
Meditations, the (Marcus Aurelius), 210
Megiddo, battle of, 227, 235
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 323
Metaphysics, 9–10, 18, 21, 45 ; as non-empirical philosophy, 81 ff. ; ontology, 71 ; search for Absolute in, 118 f., 308 ; substance as category of, 159, 309 f., 314 f. *See* Philosophy
Mexico, 59
Mikado, the, 194
Mill, J. S., 81, 129, 310, 313
Mind and its Place in Nature, The (Broad), 174
Mohammed, 256, 261
Mohenjo Daro, 206
Monadology (Leibniz), 175
Mongolia, 56, 201
Mongols, 255
Moral Man and Immoral Society (Niebuhr), 178 f.
Morals, absolutist theory of, 201 ff., 330 : contribution of prophecy to, 249–252 ; as form of creativity, 2, 26, 67 ff., 77, 90 ; Kantian theory of, 96, 216 ; amongst primitives, 13, 177 f. ; and social psychology, 179
More, Sir Thomas, 127
Moses, 150, 233 ; Law of, 259, 260, 262, 263, 265
Mozart, 160
Müller, Max, 176, 260
Mussolini, 322

N

Napoleon, 321, 322
Nazis (-ism), 21, 59, 123, 129 f., 214, 308, 312, 319 f., 334
Nebuchadnezzar, 225, 229, 242, 265–266
Nehemiah, 169, 259, 261

Neo-Calvinism, 7
Neo-Platonism, 45, 46, 82, 287, 291, 305, 325
Nero, 47, 211, 269
Newton, Sir Isaac, 19, 90, 98, 147, 313 ff., 320
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 178 f.
Nietzsche, 3
Nirvana, 95, 195, 278

O

Omri, King, 237
Orphicism, 303
Osiris, 187, 193, 217, 274, 290

P

Papacy, the, 58, 83, 126, 131, 264, 300, 320, 334
Parsees, 240
Paul, St., 22, 121, 261, 279, 293
Pericles, 138, 272
Peter, St., 257, 274
Petty, Sir William, 313
Pharisees, the, 263, 265, 268 ff., 285, 290
Phidias, 150
Philosophy (-ers), as forerunner of church-religion, 8, 9, 18, 36 f., 39, 46 ff.; future function of, 297, 316 f.; influence of Protestantism upon, 83 ff.; as meditation on death, 114; originating centres of, 41 ff.; of primitives, 175 ff. *See* Metaphysics, Plato, Stoicism, etc.
Pilate, Pontius, 170, 286
Plato, in relation to the Crisis of Hellenism, 7, 35, 45, 48, 291, 297, 302 f.; Ethical Absolutes in, 36, 151, 182, 238, 308; and mathematics, 10, 86, 91, 92; and reaction, 3, 9, 46, 161 f., 312; Renaissance study of, 309
Plotinus, 45
Plutarch, 171
Pompey, 258, 263
Portugal, 129, 131
Pragmatism, 167
Primitive Culture (Tylor), 148
Primitive Religion (Lowie), 177
Principia (Newton), 91
Probability, 74
Prophecy (prediction), 10, 59; possibility of, 120–122, 138–139
Prophets, the Hebrew. *See* Israel
Protestantism, 38, 59, 83, 126 ff., 149, 286. *See* Individualism
Protestant Reformation, 19, 59 ff., 98, 305, 307, 320 f.
Psychology, social, 179, 185: of prophecy, 246
Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology (McDougall), 179
Pythagoras, 45, 88

Q

Quietism (mysticism), 18, 21, 45, 268 ff., 288, 298

R

Rationalism (-ists), 183, 284; Greek, 168 f., 184 ff.
Rechabites, the, 201, 225 f., 239
Reformation. *See* Protestant
Religion (-s), as acceptance of the empirical, 72, 76, 92; as form of creativity, 2, 67 ff.; future of, 278; mystery, 285, 290, 303; of primitives, 24, 172–175, 180 ff.; sociological function of, 53, 181; *See* Churches, Christianity, Buddhism, Roman Catholicism, Israel, etc.
Renaissance, the, 19, 116, 120, 125, 309, 320, 324
Renan, Ernest, 149 f.
Revolution (-s), the four principal, 19, 312 f., 321; the English, 81, 313; the American, 120; the French, 120, 324
Ricardo, David, 313
Rivers, W. H. R., 179
Robertson, J. M., 284
Roman Empire, crisis in, 6, 7, 14, 46, 48, 125, 141: as exploitative State, 31, 42, 297; the failure of, 209 ff., 290
Rosenberg, Dr. Alfred, 213
Rostovtzeff, M., 212 ff.
Ruskin, 231
Russell, Bertrand, 10, 179, 188
Russia (-ians), 32, 59, 336 f.

S

*Sadducees, 268, 285
Saul, King, 52, 225, 234, 244
Scholasticism, 260 ff., 309 f., 321
Schweitzer, Dr. Albert, 286
Science, as a form of creativity, 67 ff.; of government, 170 f.; Greek contribution to, 168 ff., 184 f.; instrumentalist theory of, 3, 167 ff.; misunderstanding of, 90 ff., 325; technology as basis of, 3, 112, 188; of the Semang, 164 f. *See* Isolates, Mathematics, Sociology
Semang, the, 153, 155, 164, 174, 184
Sennacherib, 227
Shakespeare, 149, 171
Shaw, Bernard, 326 f.
Shu-King (Confucius), 231
Smith, Adam, 19, 98, 313
Smith, Professor G. Elliot, 187
Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Rostovtzeff), 212
Social Psychology (McDougall), 179
Sociology, isolates in, 315; limits of, 6, 109, 134 ff.; of Marx, 10, 99, 158 ff.
Socrates, 92, 102, 114, 291
Solomon, King, 52, 53, 244
Solon, 35
Sparta, 33
Spencer, Herbert, 19, 129, 148, 149, 176, 310, 314, 325
Spengler, Oswald, 2, 6, 160 f.
Spinoza, 9, 81, 94 ff., 309
Stalinism, 11
State, the, 26–31; Chinese problem of, 29, 220; earliest crisis in, 7, 196 f.; English theory of, 81; four epochs of, 300 f., 321; Greek theory of, 33–35; exploitative types of, 31, 300; Nazi theory of, 305, 310 f.; and Roman Catholicism, 306 f., 319, 322; Turkish theory of, 32 f.; as universal commonwealth, 39, 120–122, 333
Stoics (-ism), 35, 36, 46 f., 50, 82, 84, 97, 211, 287, 291, 298, 305
Strauss, David, 99, 155, 158, 280
Study of History, A (Toynbee), 5
Sumer, 26, 144

T

Tacitus, 169
Tammuz, 274
Taoism. See China
Tao Te Chang, 11
Thales, 188
Thucydides, 169
Tiberius, Roman Emperor, 282
Titus, Roman Emperor, 258 f.
Toynbee, Professor Arnold J., 5, 144
Transcendental Fellowship, 3, 23–25, 180–182
Trotter, W., 179
Turkey (Turks), 31 ff., 59, 335
Tylor, E. B., 143, 148, 176
Tyre, 47

U

Unitarians, 59, 273, 313
Untergang des Abendlandes (Spengler), 160 f.
Upanishads, 45, 46, 302
Utilitarians, 59

V

Varieties of Religious Experience (James), 167
Vedas, the, 46, 302
Vespasian, Roman Emperor, 269
Vitalism, 6, 329
Voltaire, 313, 321

W

Waley, Arthur, 11, 219, 221
War, the Thirty Years, 59, 79, 98; science of, 169
Way and Its Power, The, 11, 219
Wells, H. G., 8
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 10
Wycliffe, 258

Z

Zealots, the, 268
Zedekiah, King, 225 f.
Zenghis Khan, 201, 255
Zeno, 47
Zionism, 335
Zoroastrianism, 39

लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी, पुस्तकालय
Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration Library
मसूरी
MUSSOORIE

यह पुस्तक निम्नांकित तारिख तक वापिस करनी है।
This book is to be returned on the date last stamped

दिनांक Date	उधारकर्ता की संख्या Borrower's No.	दिनांक Date	उधारकर्ता की संख्या Borrower's No.

113071

अवाप्ति सं. 9877
ACC No.....

वर्ग सं. पुस्तक सं.
Class No. 909 Kat Book No.....
लेखक
Author.....Katz, Joshua.....
शीर्षक
Title...The will to civilization

909
Kat

~~9877~~

LIBRARY
LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI
National Academy of Administration
MUSSOORIE

Accession No. 113071

1. Books are issued for 15 days only but may have to be recalled earlier if urgently required.
2. An over-due charge of 25 Paise per day per volume will be charged.
3. Books may be renewed on request, at the discretion of the Librarian.
4. Periodicals, Rare and Refrence books may not be issued and may be consulted only in the Library.
5. Books lost, defaced or injured in any way shall have to be replaced or its