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The Development of Western Civilization

1500–1941

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SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

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TO

HELEN WOLF HAINES

WILBUR EMERY HAINES

AND IN MEMORY OF

LUCY BARTLETT WALSH

WILLIAM LORISON WALSH

Preface

The Development of Western Civilization assumes as its fundamental premise that, since the present has grown out of the past, a knowledge of that growth is essential to a proper understanding of our day. We therefore have sought to present the material of European history not merely as an end in itself but also as an illustration of what seem to us to be the major truths and trends of social development. At the same time we have tried to provide sufficient detailed information so that our generalizations do not hang in a sort of vacuum. This has involved both careful selection and rigid compression and we are aware that he will be a rare expert who does not feel that we have slighted his field in the process.

Our treatment is a combination of the topical and chronological methods which, although it creates certain problems of its own, we hope avoids the individual weaknesses of either a strictly topical or a strictly chronological approach. By trial and error in actual use of the material in class we have learned to avoid some of the pitfalls. Critics undoubtedly will call our attention to others which we have not escaped. Wherever the material has permitted we have devoted part *A* of the chapter to a discussion of the major theme of that chapter, its background, its development, and its place in the story as a whole.

It is obvious—perhaps especially to us—that so ambitious a work as this owes much to many scholars. We regret that we cannot make individual acknowledgments to all those to whom we are indebted. Where our obligation is especially heavy, we have mentioned the fact in a footnote, and many of our sources are suggested in the bibliographies. It may be that now and again we have borrowed not only the thought but also the *ipsissima verba* of the original. If that has happened, it is because those phrases seemed so good to us that we have unconsciously made them part of our own speech.

We are pleased to be able, hereby, to make public acknowledgment of other obligations incurred in writing this book. We wish to express our thanks:

To Frances Elizabeth Marble Haines who designed the maps, searched diligently for apt and artistic illustrations, and made the sketches; and to Elizabeth Cantril Walsh who typed and re-typed the manuscript and aided greatly in reading the proofs and making the index.

To Dr. Dwight E. Lee, Professor of History and International Relations at Clark University, for valuable advice in the early stages of the manuscript; and to Dr. Francis A. Arlinghaus, Professor of History at the University of Detroit, who carefully read the chapters dealing with religion and whose guidance enabled us to avoid some errors of fact and interpretation. Neither Dr. Lee nor Dr. Arlinghaus is responsible for any of the mistakes we have made, nor were they necessarily in agreement with our interpretations.

To Dr. Nelson M. Blake, Dr. D. Vernon McKay, and Mr. Walter L. Wakefield, all of the History Department of Syracuse University, who co-operated in our use of this material in History 1 and who gave helpful criticisms on some parts of the manuscript.

To Miss Edith Helen Graves; Mrs. Emilie D. Benedict and Miss Mary C. Kenna of the Art Department of the Syracuse University Library; Miss Fern L. Allen of the Architecture Library of Syracuse University; and Professors Perley O. Place, George B. Cressey, and L. C. Dillenback, all of Syracuse University.

To the staffs of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the New York Public Library, the Syracuse University Library, and the Syracuse Public Library.

Finally, to our students in History 1 from 1936 to date who listened to portions of the manuscript and were the subjects of our experiments in organization and presentation of the material.

C. G. H.
W. B. W.

21 December, 1940
Syracuse, N. Y.

Contents

CHAPTER		PAGES
	INTRODUCTION	xvii–xix
XIV.	THE HUMANIZING OF RELIGION	388–421
	A. The Growth of a Spirit of Inquiry	388–393
	B. Factors Producing the Religious Revolt	394–402
	C. The Revolutionaries	402–419
XV.	SECTARIANISM	422–454
	A. The Basis of Religious Tolerance	422–425
	B. Reform in the Church	425–437
	C. The Confusion of Religion and Politics	438–452
XVI.	THE GROWTH OF ABSOLUTE MONARCHIES	455–480
	A. The Rhythm of Government	455–456
	B. Tudor Paternalism	457–468
	C. The Cardinals	468–479
XVII.	THE DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS	481–507
	A. Religion as the Bulwark of Authority	481–483
	B. The Sun King	483–495
	C. Absolutism in Eastern Europe	495–506
XVIII.	THE ARISTOCRACY OF LAND AND WEALTH	508–540
	A. On Social Change	508–510
	B. The Stuarts and the Puritan Middle Class	510–520
	C. Responsible Government and Empire	520–539
XIX.	THE DISLOCATION OF THE SOCIAL ORDER	541–571
	A. The Inadequacies of Absolutism	541–543
	B. The Progress of Scientific Thought	543–562
	C. Financial and Political Bankruptcy	562–570

CHAPTER PAGES

XX. THE TRIUMPHANT DEFEAT OF THE PEOPLE 572–604
A. Do Men Make Events? . . 572–574
B. Bastille and Guillotine . . 574–591
C. The Spread of Revolutionary Ideas: Napoleon . . . 591–604

XXI. THE SHACKLES OF TRADITION 605–629
A. The Basic Distrust of Novelty . 605–607
B. Alexander and Metternich . . 607–620
C. The British Oligarchy . . 620–629

XXII. THE MECHANIZATION OF LIFE 630–651
A. The Foundations of Cosmopolitanism 630–632
B. Charting New Seas . . . 633–642
C. Farm and Factory . . . 642–650

XXIII. CLASS DISTINCTIONS OF MODERN SOCIETY 652–683
A. Progress and Poverty . . . 652–655
B. Industrial Capitalism . . . 655–663
C. Proletarian Defenses . . . 663–682

XXIV. THE POLITICAL COMPROMISE 684–711
A. Business and Politics . . . 684–686
B. Bourgeois and Proletarian . . 686–701
C. Bourgeois Ascendancy . . 701–710

XXV. THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EUROPE 712–752
A. Racial and Historical Nationalism 712–714
B. Modern Italy 714–734
C. Imperial Germany 734–751

XXVI. THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EUROPE (Continued) 753–781
A. The Spread of the Democratic Ideal 753–756
B. The Third Republic . . . 756–768
C. Britain's Golden Age . . . 768–780

XXVII. AUTOCRATIC SURVIVALS 782–814
A. The Conservatism of Agricultural Societies 782–784
B. The Patch-Work Empire . . 784–799
C. The Romanov Road to Ruin . 799–814

CHAPTER PAGES

XXVIII. THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE 815–855

A. A New Age of Faith . . . 815–827

B. Science and Thought . . . 827–840

C. In Quest of Beauty and Reality 840–854

XXIX. "THE LESSER BREEDS WITHOUT THE LAW" 856–882

A. "The White Man's Burden" . 856–862

B. Europe Creates a Yellow Peril . 862–872

C. Light in the Dark Continent . 872–881

XXX. SAVING WESTERN CIVILIZATION . . 883–920

A. "The Road to War" . . . 883–886

B. The Division of Europe . . 886–899

C. Armageddon 899–919

XXXI. THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY. . . . 921–967

A. Idealism and Practical Politics . 921–929

B. Aftermath and Retribution . 929–956

C. Peace and the Status Quo . . 957–965

XXXII. FAREWELL THE TRANQUIL MIND . . 968–1031

A. Arms and the Man . . . 968–986

B. Bluff and Appeasement . . 986–1014

C. The War of the Dictators . . 1014–1030

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 1033–1035

INDEX 1037–1062

Illustrations

PAGE

67. The Sale of Indulgences, Holbein 396
68. John Hus, Burning 401
69. Emperor Charles V 403
70. Martin Luther, Cranach 404
71. John Calvin 411
72. Henry VIII, Holbein 415
73. The Burning of Servetus 420
74. Ignatius Loyola 427
75. Burial of the Count d'Orgaz, El Greco 435
76. Innocent X, Velasquez 436
77. The Anatomy Lesson, Rembrandt 437
78. Philip II, Titian 441
79. Calvin, the Pope, and Luther 453
80. Queen Elizabeth, Zuccaro 465
81. Elizabethan Theater 467
82. Richelieu, Champaigne 476
83. Louis XIV, Thackeray 484
84. Versailles, Exterior 493
85. Blenheim Palace, Sir John Vanbrugh 524
86. Houses of Parliament, Westminster 526
87. Sir Thomas Roe at the Court of Ajmir, Rothstein . . 530
88. Champlain's Habitation, Quebec 532
89. France, Hogarth 534
90. Hooke's Compound Microscope 546
91. The First Vaccination, Melingue 550
92. Voltaire 556
93. Costumes of the Three Orders 570
94. An "Assignat" 579
95. The Jacobin Monastery, Paris 582

PAGE
96. Napoleon I, David 590
97. Napoleon's Raft 594
98. Austrian Double Eagle 611
99. Clipper Ship 640
100. The Industrious 'Prentice, Hogarth 645
101. Marconi with His Wireless Apparatus 649
102. The Robot, Elektro 650
103. Lunch Box 682
104. Freedom of the Press, Daumier 687
105. François Guizot 691
106. The Frankfort Parliament 698
107. Cavour 727
108. "Dropping the Pilot": Bismarck and William II, Tenniel 750
109. German Helmet 751
110. Queen Victoria, Sully 769
111. Disraeli and the Sphinx, Tenniel 776
112. Lion and Unicorn 780
113. Franz Josef 786
114. Kremlin 800
115. Bargemen of the Volga, Repin 803
116. Westminster, Monet 849
117. Still Life with Cupid, Cézanne 850
118. Kneeling Figure, Lehmbruck 852
119. Mechanical Element, Léger 853
120. Franz Liszt 854
121. Perry's First Landing at Gorahama, Japan 865
122. Rhodes Memorial, Capetown, South Africa . . . 878
123. Trench Warfare 909
124. The Armistice Car 918
125. Big Four at the Peace Conference 924
126. Lenin 936
127. Masaryk 951
128. Briand 965
129. Hailie Selassie and Mussolini 997
130. The Karl Marx Hof, Vienna 1002

PAGE

131. German Ration Card 1015

132. Winston Churchill 1021

133. Hitler's Army Toes the Line 1028

134. Hitler and Mussolini Roasting the Dove of Peace . . 1030

Maps

PAGE

16. Europe in the Time of Charles V 402
17. Protestantism, Catholicism, and Mohammedanism, c. 1560 . 418
18. Europe after Westphalia (*color*) 450
19. Expansion of Bourbon France, 1601-1791 491
20. Expansion of Prussia, 1525-1795 500
21. Expansion of Russia, 1300-1796 503
22. Poland in 1740 505
23. First Partition of Poland, 1772 505
24. Second Partition of Poland, 1793 505
25. Third Partition of Poland, 1795 505
26. Colonial Empires in 1763 537
27. Napoleonic Europe 596
28. The Vienna Settlement 614
29. Exploration and Colonization, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries 636
30. The Unification of Italy 715
31. The Unification of Germany 735
32. Europe in 1914 778
33. Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, 1878 788
34. European and Japanese Empires, 1914 871
35. Alliances Before the Great War, 1914 893
36. Alignments During the Great War, 1914-1918 899
37. Europe in 1933 (*color*) 974
38. European Alliances in August, 1939 1013
39. Poland, 1925 1017
40. Dismemberment of Poland, October, 1939 1017
41. Europe, January 1, 1941 1029

Introduction

European society at the opening of the sixteenth century was in the midst of changes so profound as to foreshadow a revolution. But it would be a sorry mistake to assume that the people of that day were conscious of their destiny or were aware that the old order was passing. It is perhaps a fortunate safeguard of human sanity that men can neither foresee the future nor be fully aware of the implications and direction of the changes which surround them. From the vantage point of four centuries it is clear that trends long in the building were on the point of climax in the sixteenth century. Just as a motorist who has reached the top of a hill can literally and figuratively look back and say, "There is where we began to climb," so can we look back across the years and say, "There is where the old order gave way to the new." It seems so clear in retrospect that it is sometimes hard to realize that it was not apparent at the time. The student must bear in mind that distance gives a valuable perspective, and that actors in a scene are rarely aware of what the scene looks like.

Yet signs of change were not wholly hidden from the sixteenth-century observer, even though he was unable to read their full meanings. The revival of trade and urban life, the consequent rise of new classes, the decay of feudalism, and the rise of nation-states, among other things, all gave notice that the world was not standing still.

It would appear that the revival and continuing expansion of trade from the tenth century onward, and the appearance of free, wealthy, and growing towns most profoundly altered the whole fabric of western society. Land ceased to be the only source and measure of wealth. The new commerce offered a fresh market for labor and a new outlet for capital. The growth of money economy made possible the development of banking which, in turn, facilitated the expansion of credit, thus increasing the volume and flexibility of trade and so raising the standards of living. There was a shift in the distribution of wealth which resulted in making the new merchant prince the rival of the old feudal noble. Scarcely less important was the appearance of an urban working class which developed slowly into the pro-

letariat. The emergence of these two groups, bourgeois and proletarian, eventually transformed what we regard as typically medieval into what we term modern. They were the leaven which slowly transformed the lump. Because of them the spirituality of the Middle Ages gradually faded into the secularity which we know, and the extreme provincialism of the feudal era gave way to a broader vision.

Trade and urbanization proved a constant foe of feudalism and a constant stimulus toward freedom. Not only did the towns offer the serfs an opportunity to escape from their thralldom; the new money economy also penetrated the manor. It became more convenient and more profitable to hire services for money rather than for land grants. Many of the newly rich merchants invested in lands, buying out the feudal landlord, replacing serf labor with hired labor and beginning the capitalization of agriculture. Since serfdom was the indispensable prop of the feudal establishment, this decline in serfdom greatly accelerated the decay of feudalism.

Moreover, the bourgeoisie who had discovered that peace, security, and freedom from local feudal restrictions were necessary prerequisites to profitable trade tended to ally themselves with the rising national monarchs in order to achieve these desires. The monarchs welcomed this alliance since the taxes and loans received from the merchants helped fill the royal treasury and render the Crown less dependent upon its vassals.

The passing of the old order was, indeed, apparent in the political sphere. The loosely organized and feudal Holy Roman Empire, political counterpart of the international Church, declined steadily in power and prestige. Attacked from within by the princes whose sovereignty was already substantially recognized; attacked from without by the advancing Turks who controlled Balkania, the Empire was no match for the growing strength of the new national monarchies. In England and France especially, but also in Spain and Portugal, where Crown and bourgeoisie pooled their resources for the destruction of feudalism, political centralization had been achieved. These nations pointed the way toward the modern, national orientation of political life.

Finally, throughout late medieval culture there appeared a clearly distinguishable and increasingly important thread of personal and intellectual independence. Individuality long ran counter to the main stream of medieval life which emphasized the group rather than the individual. The revival of individualism and of confidence in human personality was slow and painful. Even its brilliant climax in the

Renaissance did not immediately affect many men. Changes in social habits are always grudging, and for most men the traditional authorities long remained acceptable. But the fortress of the *status quo* had been breached by intellectual as well as by socio-economic and political forces, and the account of the growth of a spirit of inquiry, with which this volume opens, may well serve to introduce the development of the world we know.

Chapter XIV

The Humanizing of Religion

A. The growth of a spirit of inquiry

The right of free thought and free expression has always been asserted but seldom allowed, since it exposes to criticism everything in which the majority of individuals have placed implicit faith. Most men are mentally lethargic and are constitutionally inclined to believe what they are told on authority. They resent the new since it disturbs the settled habits of their thought, not because they can rationally justify the old. Those who are attached to or profit from established order or beliefs look with profound suspicion upon anything which challenges the prevailing system. Generally, they resent criticism and regard any change as inherently bad. It is for these reasons that free thought and free speech have always been enchained, either through social ostracism of the would-be reformer or through the suppression of his ideas by law and force. Many men in Anglo-Saxon countries pride themselves upon their inalienable "right" to free thought, yet there are few who have the courage to oppose the customary and traditional. Intellectual curiosity is, indeed, man's most precious possession, but he is seldom able to exercise it without experiencing punishment either from his group or from his state.

Yet men have always been curious and inquisitive and some have always had the courage to challenge authority and tradition. It would seem that this inquisitive spirit is most common and most fruitful in those periods when society has enjoyed the cosmopolitanism of international trade and commerce. Conversely, genuine freedom of thought has been least apparent in those societies which have been predominantly agricultural and theological. Certainly men have greater opportunities to think for themselves now than they had in the age of the Renaissance; the man of the Renaissance had more

freedom to think for himself than the man of the middle ages, whose life was ordered by theology; and the citizen of ancient Greece and Rome was generally given the right to express his own opinions. The modern era is distinctly secular and cosmopolitan; so, in its way, was the ancient world.

Ancient Greece and ancient Rome were built about the Mediterranean and by mere circumstance of geography were driven to the sea and to commerce. The broadening influences of travel and trade were not lost on their political and social institutions, nor on the thought of their intellectuals. Their gods were of the elements, natural and secular, and were capable of universal veneration. Athena was the favored goddess of the city of Athens but Spartans were not thought the less of for worshiping her. Moreover, government tended toward the democratic and, while it was sometimes found politically expedient to suppress it, generally freedom of criticism was tolerated.

As early as the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. philosophers of Greece sought to penetrate the causes of things with a spirit of criticism which has been the envy of modern men. Some had no hesitation about questioning the morality of prevailing beliefs or of ridiculing the popular conceptions of the divinities. Others astonished their contemporaries by suggesting that everything was in a state of flux. These, the precursors of the fifth century Sophists, propounded the doctrine that everything must be subjected to searching inquiry. Probably no greater exponent of this doctrine than Socrates has ever lived. Brought before the bar of justice to answer for his criticisms, he asserted in unmistakable language both the supremacy of the individual conscience and the public value of free discussion. Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Skeptics found their common source in Socrates and pointed the way to liberty for all men. All of them were rationalists and materialists.

Unquestionably the greatest critic of ancient times was Aristotle, the student of Plato, the intellectual heir of Socrates, and the individual in whom all that was unique in Greek thought seemed to culminate and reach its fruition. His inquiring mind encompassed the whole range of contemporary human knowledge, from the study of the heavens through theoretical and practical politics to rhetoric. Philosophical abstractions had little appeal for him for he was ever drawn by the individual and the concrete. Within the limitations of his era, he was the exponent of the modern scientific method. No man has ever exerted greater influence upon the history of thought. His logical method appealed to the dogmatic mind of the middle

ages; his inquiring spirit showed men an escape from medieval theology; and his analytical method has become, with certain modifications, that of the contemporary era.

In the Stoic school, founded in the fifth century B.C. and lingering on to the very end of paganism, the traditions of Aristotle and his predecessors were perpetuated, though subjected to change. The Stoics made significant contributions to liberty, for they asserted the superiority of natural to human law and preferred individual freedom to established authority. Yet, in a sense, they marked the transition to the age of theological predominance to be inaugurated by Christianity. They were theists who conceived of the universe as a divine creation and of human wisdom as but a reflection of the divine. Their attitude toward all social institutions was consequently permeated with a religious element, and their conception of individuality was colored by a kind of fatalism.

While Rome produced no thinkers of the stature of Aristotle and Socrates, and no school like that of the Stoics, it nevertheless absorbed the independent spirit of the Greeks and imposed no restrictions upon freedom of thought. Nothing reflects this more clearly than the liberty accorded the critics of prevailing popular mythology, and the tolerance universally extended to varying religious beliefs. It cannot be denied that Rome persecuted Christians, but it must be remembered that this was halting and sporadic and that it was designed in the interests of public policy and not with the purpose of stifling thought.

It is the unpleasant fact that the age which witnessed the general acceptance of Christian doctrine experienced simultaneously the suppression of free thought and free inquiry. This was only natural for the very exclusiveness of Christian monotheism made it intolerant of all other beliefs. Convinced that those who did not adhere were eternally damned, the early Christians denied to others the tolerance which they had demanded for themselves and embarked upon a program of enforcing uniformity. They regarded disbelief as the work of the devil, to be shunned like a contagious disease, uprooted and exterminated by force. The Holy Scriptures, reporting the words of Christ when he said, "Compel them to enter in," were used to give divine sanction to intolerance and persecution. These latter became in fact not only a social necessity but a holy duty.

The unquestioning obedience of the early Christian was enshrined in the medieval church and, by the same token, in medieval

life. In the eyes of most men, life in this world was regarded as merely preparatory for the next, a ceaseless struggle against omnipresent evil. Obedience and faith alone could assure protection against the wiles of Satan and guaranteed eternal felicity. The spirit of free inquiry was stifled by the very character of social institutions and the strong arm of the Church. There was no place for science aside from the dicta of the Scriptures; and no place for criticism, for everything from the Church to the lowest feudal authority was divinely ordained.

Not all thought in the middle ages was cast in the mold of the Church, however, for the revival of commercial contacts with the outer world and the widening influence of Mohammedan Italy and Spain upon Europe brought a new breath of secularism. By the twelfth century, when most of Aristotle was made available through Latin translations from the Arabic, there was posed the significant and vital question as to whether the truths of revelation must give way to the truths of reason. The problem was perplexing and disruptive for it struck at the apparently unassailable edifice of medieval theology. A compromise saved the Church and made its doctrine of revealed truth triumphant for the time. This achievement was the work of one of the most remarkable thinkers the middle ages produced, Thomas Aquinas. In his masterpiece, the *Summa*, with extraordinary power of logic, he reconciled Aristotle with St. Augustine, the Holy Scriptures with classical rationalism. Reason became the handmaiden of faith.

But the very reconciliation of Faith and Reason was to prove the undoing of medieval theology, for the two were incompatible in most things. The compromise was hardly satisfactory for the thirteenth century; it was much less so for the fourteenth and fifteenth when reason was breaking its chains. As commerce grew and material prosperity increased, men began to feel more strongly the sense of their own individualities. The reviving interest in classical antiquity, particularly classical literature, guided them into new channels of secular thought which made orthodox beliefs seem anachronistic. Many things in the political and social life of the times strengthened this attitude. The universal Papacy and its political counterpart, the Holy Roman Empire, were in the process of decay, their places being taken by rising national monarchies. Science hypothecated the solar system which challenged the position of the Church; discovery seemed to indicate that science and not the Church

was correct. Against these attacks, which scientists, nationalists and humanists were leveling, the Church had difficulty defending itself.

Humanism provided an atmosphere which facilitated the emancipation of reason; it did not liberate it. There were few men before the seventeenth century who were able to break completely with the traditions of authority. The Humanists of Italy might not have hesitated to condemn the Church, but most of them paid lip service to it. The Humanists of northern Europe, more social and less individual in their outlook, were chiefly desirous of conservative, in a sense, reactionary reforms in the Church. Men of science still asserted that their speculations were in the interest of theology. Philosophers, like Descartes, compromised their mechanical views of the universe with established Church doctrine. Even in the *Essays* of the great sixteenth century French skeptic, Montaigne, there are frequent professions of Catholic orthodoxy. But probably the best evidence of all in support of the statement that the age of Humanism was not a period of free thought and free inquiry can be found in the history of the Protestant Revolutions which were products of that age. Luther denounced the authority of the pope, but he replaced it with the Bible, and theological authority remained. Calvin revolted against the Church, but established a medieval theocracy at Geneva. While both of these great reformers asserted the right of individual judgment, they emphatically denied it to all save themselves. Catholics and Protestants of the sixteenth century were equally zealous in enforcing uniformity of belief, using every measure even to the destruction of human life.

The fact remains, however, that the Protestant Revolution made a notable contribution to the advance of free thought and free inquiry. The reformers who extolled the right of free judgment could not forever deny it to their followers. Moreover, they shattered the universal authority of the medieval Church, replacing a single theology with a variety of warring theologies, which in their unhappy contests weakened theological authority in general and opened the way for the secularization of governments. At least there emerged from the period of the Renaissance and the Protestant Revolution a new individualism and a revived secular approach to knowledge. These were the stepping stones to liberty of thought and of expression.

Science completed what the Renaissance and the Protestant Revolution had begun. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the

advances of science were phenomenal. The Copernican system with the proofs offered for it shattered the medieval bandbox conception of the universe. Sir Isaac Newton proved that the planets in infinite space were governed by calculable mathematical laws. Students of human physiology dispelled the earlier mystery of bodily functions and demonstrated their mechanical characteristics. Studies of plants and of natural history reinforced the mechanistic conceptions already advanced in the other fields of science. Before these proofs of science the unsupported assertions of the theologians to the contrary seemed meaningless. By the middle of the eighteenth century an increasingly large number of intellectuals, the Rationalists, influenced by the achievements of science, challenged the whole framework of revealed religion. In a world governed by mathematically calculable laws, there was no place for supernatural intervention. Miracles were held to be frauds and superstitious beliefs a disgrace. God was only the First Cause, the Creator of a perfect and rational order who, metaphorically speaking, sat back to watch its operation but refrained from interfering with it. Since they did not believe in a supernatural God of revelation nor in the fundamental doctrines accompanying that conception, the Rationalists could see no justification for intolerance and persecution. They invoked the spirit of free inquiry.

In the contemporary era science has been enthroned and even the logical basis of the Rationalist's God has disappeared. The achievements of science are indeed more phenomenal than in the eighteenth century and not without some reason men have come to feel that their material welfare is fundamentally the result of science and industry rather than of supernatural influences. Probably the most important contribution of contemporary science to the world of thought was the development of the Darwinian concept of evolution. For many intellectuals this swept away the very foundations upon which established religion rested. All of the churches, Protestant and Catholic alike, felt the full force of these blows of science and were severely shaken although not destroyed. With greater or less success, all of them sought to adapt themselves to the changing circumstances of the times. As they met the challenge, however, they lost their privileged place in society and along with it their dominion over men's minds. After centuries of gradual change the world had again become secular, and freedom of inquiry was presumably restored.

B. Factors producing the religious revolt

Established religion was the first among human institutions to feel the impact of the reviving spirit of inquiry in the sixteenth century. The Roman Catholic Church was then, as it had been for centuries, the universal church, and as such it served as the bulwark of medieval traditions. It still had the trappings of the medieval papal monarchy and, although its prestige had been shaken by the Babylonian Captivity and the Great Schism, it still laid claim to the powers it once exercised in the era of Innocent III. The Conciliar movement had not succeeded in vitally changing the organization of the Church or the powers of the pope, any more than it had been able to eliminate the most obvious of clerical abuses. The Church had remained substantially an unaltered organism in the midst of universal change.

At the head of the Church was the pope, at once a temporal and a spiritual prince. As temporal sovereign, he governed the Italian papal possessions and claimed the allegiance of foreign kings. As spiritual sovereign, his authority was limited only by the boundaries of the Roman faith. In the administration of the vast powers to which his dual function gave rise, the pope was assisted by a neatly pyramided clerical hierarchy, descending from the papal curia through the archbishops and the bishops to the simple parish priest. Together with the regular clergy, the monks, these held a privileged station in society since they were in the service of God, and were exempt from ordinary taxation as they were also from ordinary civil law. This was the institution which administered to the vital spiritual needs of men. Because it was still generally believed that salvation was the great desideratum of human life, and that this could be attained only through the instrumentality of the sacraments which ordained clergy alone could administer, it will be seen that the Church in general and the clergy in particular held a heavy responsibility. The clergy had it in its power to unlock the gates of heaven or to condemn to eternal damnation. A function so essential to human happiness should not have been taken lightly.

But the Church of the sixteenth century seemed indifferent to its great responsibilities, and from top to bottom was honeycombed with abuse and corruption. Most of this was connected in one way or another with money and finance, since not even the clergy were, for the most part, able to escape the urge for worldly pleasures

which wealth could now assure. Clergy of all ranks fell under the spell of this pleasure-seeking age, but the Papacy was its most conspicuous victim. Alexander VI of Borgia (1492-1503), Julius II (1503-1513), Leo X (1513-1521) all to a greater or lesser degree indulged in practices which were either personally immoral or inimical to the Church and the high office which they occupied. Not without some justification Alexander VI has been held the personification of this papal corruption. He expended vast sums to embellish the papal chambers, made his pontificate a round of debasing and immoral pleasures, and as an indulgent father paid well for the marriages of his daughter Lucrezia and for the military adventures of his son Cesare. His immediate successors were no less frivolous and extravagant in their tastes and expenditures.

To defray the mounting expenses of ambitious popes, the Church was compelled to tap new sources of revenue as well as to exhaust the possibilities of the old. Collections of Peter's pence, the contributions of pilgrims visiting Rome, handsome sums paid by aspiring clergy for title and distinction, and the heavy fees of the ecclesiastical courts swelled the papal coffers. The practice of "reserving" the better benefices for papal appointment was widened and the returns from sales of "expectations" and the collection of annates increased steadily. From the practice of simony alone Leo X realized the handsome sum of a million and a half dollars. But the richest mine for papal exploitation was in the sale of indulgences.

To understand the character and significance of this practice, it is essential to know something of the doctrine of indulgences. This doctrine holds that an indulgence is a plenary (whole) or partial remission of temporal punishment for sin, exacted by Divine justice. This punishment still has to be worked off either here or in purgatory even after the sin itself has been forgiven in the sacrament of penance. Although the analogy is perhaps too secular, indulgences which perform this service might be compared to checks drawn by the pope in favor of the penitent sinner from the accumulated "Treasury of Merit." This "Treasury of Merit" was composed of all the superabundant merit or grace of the saints, the holy Mother Mary and of Christ, all of whom had accumulated more than enough to save themselves and, as in the case of Christ, more than enough to save all of the human beings in the world of his time. This inexhaustible treasure was in the keeping of the pope to be bestowed at his discretion. He could grant a plenary indulgence which would remit all temporal

THE SALE OF INDULGENCES. CARICATURE BY HOLBEIN.

This woodcut, made in 1520, attacks the abuses attendant upon the sale of indulgences in the sixteenth century. On the left is represented the sale; in the center, a little removed yet sanctioning the practice by his presence, is the pope and his curia.

punishment for sin or a partial indulgence to remit only a portion of it.[1]

During the middle ages the practice of granting indulgences had not been widely abused, the income from their sale being employed usually for religious purposes, such as Crusades. But in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries successive popes exploited them for the purpose of meeting their own financial needs. Peddlers of indulgences appeared everywhere that the secular authorities would tolerate them, particularly in Germany where papal influence was still considerable. Generally, these were not the direct agents of the pope but the employees of great financiers, like the Fuggers of Augsburg, who engaged to make the sale. The opportunities for graft were enormous, and everyone who had a finger in the pie shared its benefits. The peddler received his commission, the administrator of the diocese realized a percentage and the financier deducted his portion. Usually not more than thirty-five or forty percent of the total collections reached the papal treasury. The most famous instance of the abuse which attended this practice was the plenary indulgence sold in Germany by Leo X to secure the funds necessary to complete the basilica of St. Peter's at Rome. An agreement was reached be-

[1] Indulgences were usually gained by the recitation of some prayer or the performance of some act of piety. In some cases, contributions were also required. It was this latter provision which was often abused in practice.

tween the pope and the youthful archbishop of Mainz to *regulate* the distribution of the expected profits. The archbishop who had just purchased his post for a sum greater than he was able to pay was allowed a percentage sufficiently large to enable him to meet his remaining obligation to the pope beside a substantial profit for himself. Like the pope he had, therefore, a real interest in seeing that the indulgence would be financially successful. To clerical administrators such as these, it was a matter of indifference how and under what circumstances indulgences were sold and they had no qualms about employing unscrupulous agents. Not unnaturally the indulgence was frequently misused and its purpose completely obscured. Princes and burghers objected that this abuse bled the country of its financial resources and critics inveighed against the iniquity of the sale.

Despite these evils there is no reason for believing that the moral conditions of the Church were worse in 1500 than they had been several centuries earlier. Recent study has demonstrated quite the contrary. If corruption alone could explain the Protestant Revolution, then that revolution must have come long before the sixteenth century. Moral depravity was not the fundamental cause of rebellion against the Church, but it was the most vulnerable spot in the Church's armor and it offered the excuse for widespread attack at a time when a growing number of individuals were prepared and anxious to flout its authority.

The foundations of adherence to the Church were being eaten away by the rising currents of commerce, nationalism, and intellectual curiosity. The most subtle and yet the most effective among these was the commercial revolution which brought profound changes to the economic life of Europe and elevated the class of the bourgeoisie to a dominant position in society. Motivated by the desire for increased profits and continuous prosperity, the middle class challenged the old order at every turn. They protested against the legalized privileges of the few, especially the exemptions of the clergy and the feudal nobility from the payment of taxes; they objected to the ancient barriers to trade and furthered the cause of nationalism to offset them; and not least of all they resented the economic teachings and fiscal practices of the Church. It was upon this middle class as well as upon the peasants that church taxes and extraordinary papal exactions bore most heavily. Moreover, a large number of the bourgeoisie resented the Church's interference with the lending and borrowing of money and its objections to the accumulation of profits.

Certainly the Church set them no good example, as they had no hesitation in pointing out. Their protests were not made in silence. For the middle class, though numerically small, possessed almost limitless resources which national monarchs and even the papacy required, and they were capable of patronizing men of learning who could publicize their cause.

Even the lowliest peasant felt the impact of economic change, though he may not have understood its cause or its deepest implications. The great influx of precious metals from Africa and the new world, together with the enormous expansion of credit accompanying it, deranged the economic balance. The prices of necessities went scurrying upward, wheat alone rising from eighteen cents per bushel in 1500 to ninety cents in 1600, while at the same time the normal income of the average individual lagged sluggishly behind. The ignorant peasant faced with declining income, with rising rents and fixed obligations, was still further victimized by the greedy merchants of the towns. If agriculture was not yet extensively capitalized, at least it felt deeply the influence of urban economy. The distress of the countrymen led naturally to peasant unrest and to widespread peasant uprisings. Often the purposes of these were confused: sometimes they were directed against the feudal nobility; at other times, against the Church. Indeed, the peasant did not know the underlying cause of his misery, and was prepared to follow the leadership of any demagogue who promised the more complete and abundant life. It was no mere coincidence that the Protestant Revolutionists found their earliest support among the mass of the peasantry.

Profound political changes accompanied and were furthered by the economic revolution. These likewise militated against the traditional international Church. For several centuries nationalism had been advancing in western Europe, particularly in France and England, but now in the sixteenth century it was spreading rapidly throughout the entire continent. National monarchs, and princes who aspired to be national monarchs, conspired against feudal lords whose property and privileges they absorbed. They established national currencies, assembled national armies, created national laws, and set up national courts. In their political ambitions, they naturally resented the interference of the Church which continued to claim the allegiance of their subjects. In their greed for land to help them overawe the nobility, they looked with covetous eyes upon the numerous properties of the Church. When a satisfactory moral excuse

could be found, they could be counted upon to deprive the Church of its wealth and power. This is abundantly clear from the character of princely support given the Lutheran cause in the German and Scandinavian countries, and from the example of the religious revolt in Tudor England. Often these princes professed devotion to the Church, but that was no deterrent to their selfish lust for power and wealth. It should be observed that in the furtherance of this cause against the Church the princes had the rising bourgeoisie as accomplices. These were the revolutionaries, the nationalists, of the sixteenth century, anxious for national unity as an escape from churchly interferences and feudal obstructions.

Formerly the Church might have relied upon the common people to champion its cause against its enemies. But in the sixteenth century even this support was lacking. The Babylonian Captivity and the Great Schism had aroused an abiding distrust for the universal Church. Even simple men were becoming convinced that relief from the abuses of the Church could be best achieved through their own action or through the co-operation of their national sovereigns. *The Supplication of the Beggars* by Simon Fish in England, a pamphlet which appealed to Henry VIII to sponsor reforms in the Church, was merely symptomatic of what the masses everywhere were thinking. The foreign control of an international pope had become odious to the princes; the corruption of the clergy was arousing the hostility of the masses.

The era of the international Church was passing, and with it passed the theological dominion it exerted over men's minds. Most individuals still thought that the attainment of salvation was the ultimate goal of human existence, but an increasingly large number discarded this belief in search of the simple pleasures of earthly life. This was the consequence of the revival of pagan, classical literature which the Church had tolerated. Self-abnegation gave way to self-advancement, asceticism to worldliness; the theological middle ages to secular antiquity. This was the subversive thought which at first unconsciously and later consciously challenged the very doctrines upon which the theology of the Church was based. The Humanists in Italy who championed this intellectual movement had no timidity about criticizing the Church and not a few, carrying the secular tendency of their thought to its logical conclusion, divorced themselves completely from the Church. It might have been expected that the Papacy would have foreseen the ultimate consequences of this; but instead it absorbed the spirit of the movement

and became, paradoxically enough, its greatest patron. Several distinguished Humanists, such as Nicholas V and Leo X, even occupied the papal chair. Others, who were not Humanist, held the humanistic attitude toward life.

Humanism created a state of mind which rebelled against theology. More than that, it gave rise to classical scholarship which exposed errors and falsehoods in some of the teachings and practices of the Church. Although this developed wherever secular thought flourished, it achieved its greatest distinction in northern Europe. The Humanists of the north were more devoted to the Church than their Italian contemporaries, but theirs was not a blind devotion. From careful studies of Biblical texts and critical examinations of the early history of the Church, they concluded that existent evils were the accretions of time, and, as such, could and should be removed. They called for a return to the apostolic virtues which they believed could be effected by peaceful means. The northern Humanists were conservatives and reformers, not revolutionaries. The greatest of their number, Erasmus, attested to this when, after a long life devoted to criticism of the Church, he recoiled before the violent revolution which Martin Luther led. Yet, in precipitating that revolution Erasmus and his Humanist friends had contributed no small share.

The temper of the times precluded the possibilities of peaceful change such as the Erasmian reformers envisioned. The spirit of revolt was abroad, and while this need not necessarily have turned against the Church it was prepared to do so at a convenient opportunity.

There were men prepared to conduct a revolution against the Church, like the militant German reformer and nationalist, Ulrich von Hutten, and for these there was at hand the example of previous revolts. In the fourteenth century there had been a variety of these, stimulated by the Babylonian Captivity and the Great Schism, and led by a group of men who have commonly been called the pre-Reformers. Among the most conspicuous of these were John Wiclif of England (1324-1384) and John Hus of Bohemia (1369-1415). Wiclif, the more original thinker, had become incensed at the immorality of the contemporary Church and advocated the abolition of the temporal power together with the repudiation of papal authority. He trained his own clergy, had his own Bible translated, and set up the Scriptures as the supreme authority. For a time he had a considerable following, but all of these were ultimately compelled to recant. Wiclif's greatest victory was not in England

Courtesy of the New York Public Library

JOHN HUS, BURNING

but in Bohemia whence his doctrines were carried by students and fully appropriated by John Hus, the rector of the University of Prague. When the German students of the university denounced his teachings they were duly expelled. Hus had become not only the leader of a religious revolt in Bohemia but through it the official spokesman of Czech nationalism as well. When the Council of Constance assembled in 1415 he was delivered up to it as a heretic, was tried and burned at the stake. His death kindled a ferocious war in Bohemia which was both national and religious in character and of such wide proportions that the Church was compelled to recognize the futility of trying to exterminate the Hussite movement. A peace with the revolutionaries was consequently arranged. They lingered on as the Bohemian Brethren and continue today as the Moravians. To the pre-Reformers, particularly to Hus, the Protestant revolutionaries of Germany owed a heavy debt.

There had always been heresies in the Church and they had always been more or less successfully suppressed. The Hussite victory was an evil omen of what was to come. Common men no longer had complete faith in the Church, monarchs coveted its property, bourgeoisie resented its interferences, and intellectuals challenged



MAP 16. EUROPE IN THE TIME OF CHARLES V

the theoretical bases of its practices. All of the unique developments of the sixteenth-century society conspired simultaneously against the Church and foreshadowed its collapse as the explosion in Germany was soon to show.

C. The Revolutionaries

The general factors tending to produce religious unrest were heightened in the Germanic part of the Holy Roman Empire by local social and political conditions. It is customary for the sake of convenience to speak of this area as "Germany," but there was no German nation. On the contrary, despite some racial and linguistic unity, the region was divided into over two hundred petty states. Germany was only a geographic expression.

The governing of Germany was theoretically in the hands of the emperor who was assisted by a Diet, composed of lay and ecclesiastical princes. The real political power lay with these feudal lords. The emperor was a non-resident and his nominal vassals frequently and successfully flouted his authority. They were sure to support any cause which tended to increase their power at the im-

perial expense. Lack of loyal support in Germany was by no means the only problem which faced the emperor. The slow and tedious communication system made it impossible for one man to control so large an area, while the diversity of imperial interests effectively kept the emperor from concentrating for long on any one problem. The Emperor Maximilian I (1493-1519) and his grandson, Charles V (1519-1558), were too occupied elsewhere to pay more than casual attention to the events which were shaking Germany to its foundations.



Courtesy of The Pierpont Morgan Library

EMPEROR CHARLES V. FROM HIS BOOK OF HOURS. FLEMISH, SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

The German social system was predominantly feudal. The classes of privilege were the princes and the lesser nobility, the knights. The advent of economic and social changes had borne heavily on this latter group whose powers and prosperity had been seriously curtailed by the rising towns and townsmen. They seethed with discontent born of the comprehensible desire to recoup their losses. The bulk of the population, the peasantry, were at the bottom of the social scale. Ground down into all but hopelessness by centuries of repression, any change seemed to promise them hope and possible freedom from their fetters. There was also one class whose presence rendered all the rest of the system anachronistic. This was the numerically small but increasingly powerful group of bourgeoisie. In Germany, as elsewhere, they were the class of change. From them came the chief moral and material support of revolution.

Among the special factors which tended to produce ferment in Germany was the religious revival which took place in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. This seems to have been due in large measure to a common fear which infected the majority of the people of all classes. Recurrent plagues and the menace of an advancing Turk added a strange restlessness to the normal religiosity of the German people. Throngs of pilgrims crowded the highways,

Courtesy of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan

MARTIN LUTHER. BY LUCAS CRANACH (1472-1553).

Lucas Cranach, court painter to the Elector of Saxony, was a close personal friend of Martin Luther and left a number of portraits of the revolutionary; he painted pictures and made drawings for woodcuts which would illustrate and advance Luther's teachings. He is known for his allegories which have a naive charm.

hurrying from shrine to shrine seeking relief from their terror. The traditional faith failed to comfort them, and they sought other ways of escape. New cults arose, and new superstitions were added to the old. Often the clergy were held to be at fault and laymen took church matters into their own hands.

Into this turbulent era Martin Luther was born at Eisleben in Saxony on November 10, 1483. Nothing in his early career indicated that he was the catalyst who would one day combine the many elements of change to produce a religious revolt. His parents were peasants who had risen sufficiently in the economic scale to give their son a university education. His studies at the University of Erfurt did not make him a Humanist, but did broaden his outlook and arouse his intellectual curiosity. His father wished him to become a lawyer, but instead, he impulsively entered the service of the Church. The astonishment of his friends when he told them of his decision

to become a monk makes it appear that his decision was not premeditated. No absolute reason for his action is known, but the probable explanation involves his personal reaction to the strong religious character of the times. Whatever the reason, Martin Luther began his novitiate in the Augustinian Order in June of 1505, becoming a full-fledged monk two years later. In 1510, an ordained priest, he was appointed to the faculty of the University of Wittenberg as a lecturer on the Bible, a position which he held for the rest of his life. He was sent to Rome in that same year on business for his Order. He was deeply impressed by the sights of the Christian capital, but there is no basis for the old tale that the depravity of the papal court turned him from the Church. Certainly it did not have that immediate effect for he continued to serve his Order so well that in 1515 he was rewarded by being made vicar over eleven monasteries.

The second turning point in Luther's life came in 1516 when a Dominican monk, John Tetzel, appeared on the borders of Saxony peddling indulgences. He was the unscrupulous agent of unprincipled masters, Pope Leo X and Albert, Archbishop of Mainz and Magdeburg. Luther, who had long opposed the abuse of indulgences, now appealed to the Church authorities to restrain Tetzel. When they paid no attention, he resorted to a device popular with scholars who wished to provoke discussion of a problem. On October 31, 1517, he posted on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg ninety-five topics for debate. These theses, as they were called, were evidently not intended for the common man for they were written in the Latin of scholars. Moderate in tone, they admitted the validity of the theory of indulgences but inveighed against their abuse. Critics of the Church seized upon them as a weapon with which to attack the institution, translated them into German, and scattered them broadcast. They met with wide acclaim, and to Luther's surprise he found himself the leader of a numerous group to whose inarticulate grievance he had given voice. The sale of indulgences declined so sharply that Leo felt impelled to call upon Luther to retract the offending theses. Instead, the monk reaffirmed and expanded them. When in a long debate at Leipzig in the early summer of 1519, the papal theologian, John Eck, maneuvered Luther into an apparent support of Hussite doctrines, the break was made. Luther had become a revolutionary.

The dialectics of Eck and the logic of events drove Luther into an increasingly radical position. He dropped his plea for reform in favor of a biting and revolutionary attack on the Church. 1520 saw

the height of his offensive when he produced three pamphlets aimed at the Church. The first, *An Address to the Nobility of the German Nation*, laid down a program of reform and urged the temporal princes to carry it out. A more effective appeal to the greed and nationalistic ambitions of this class, especially since the emperor remained the champion of the Church, could not have been conceived. The second, *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, was a powerful indictment of the sacramental system and constituted a thorough break with medieval theology and ideology. Its appeal was primarily to the Humanists, intellectual critics of the Church. The third, *The Liberty of a Christian Man*, set forth in simple terms his doctrine of salvation by faith and his reliance upon the Bible as his final authority. Papal condemnation of Luther as a heretic followed inevitably in 1520. A year later he was summoned to appear before the Imperial Diet at Worms to answer charges.

Since it was customary to try cases of this sort in Rome, the fact that Luther was tried in Germany shows that he had powerful friends. It also typifies the nationalistic motives of the groups who had raised him to a position of leadership. Princes, knights, bourgeoisie, and peasants all saw in him a champion of their interests as Germans against the Italian curia. The brilliant Diet assembled to try him filled Luther with awe, but the support of the inhabitants of Worms restored his confidence. His refusal to recant made him the hero of the German people and an outlaw from the Church and from the Empire. His temerity might have cost him his life, as it had John Hus, had not his princely patron, Elector of Saxony, hustled him off to the sanctuary of the Electoral castle at Wartburg. Luther remained there until it was again safe to return to Wittenberg. During his enforced idleness he translated the Bible into German. Since he had set up the Holy Writ as his final authority, it was most important that it be available to his followers. The German Bible proved to be his strongest weapon in the continuing fight against the Church.

The Lutheran standard of revolt attracted to it all the malcontents of Germany. Extreme Waldensians, known as Anabaptists; penniless and belligerent knights; downtrodden peasants; disaffected Humanists; ambitious princes; and the secular middle class all saw in Luther an advocate of their individual hopes. For a brief moment almost all of Germany was massed behind him, but as it became apparent that his aims were not theirs, one group after another dropped away.

The Anabaptists were the first to go. They wished to carry his reforms to their logical conclusions, always an unpleasant thing for a reformer. Luther gave them no encouragement and when some of them appeared at Wittenberg claiming to be prophets he drove them out. This action had the not unwelcome result of turning the radicals from his movement.

The knights in 1522 and 1523 used the Lutheran Revolt as a screen to mask a rebellion of their own. Ostensibly seeking to unite and centralize Germany, actually they wished to regain the powers they had lost. A futile attempt at retrogression, the movement failed with the death of the knightly leader, von Sickingen. Luther's round condemnation of it deprived him of the support of this group.

Impelled by the great forces of change and encouraged by the revolt of Luther, the peasantry in 1524 and 1525 rebelled against their masters. That this was a social and economic movement of both urban and rural underprivileged was made clear by the eclectic *Twelve Articles*, its most famous general program. The rebels turned to Luther because he had explicitly and successfully flouted authority, and implicitly exalted the forgotten man. To the pained surprise of the lower classes Luther severely criticized the movement on the very medieval ground that revolt against the State was revolt against God who had established the State. So bitter was their disappointment that the peasantry deemed Luther a traitor and dubbed him a liar. Almost to a man they deserted the Lutheran Church.

The Humanists first hailed the revolutionary Luther with an enthusiasm which waned as he began to set up his own church. At first he had appeared to be the apostle of free inquiry, but as the movement progressed he proved to be violent, dogmatic, and intolerant. After considerable hesitation Erasmus finally condemned Luther and his revolt, and the majority of the Humanists followed their great leader. This was the most important defection of all because the loss of the intellectuals made it impossible for Lutheranism to remain the party of progress.

Five years after its inception Lutheranism had alienated all save the bourgeoisie and a few of the princes. They constituted a very small but disproportionately powerful minority of the German people. Motivated either by sincere faith or by self-interest they joined the Lutheran Church which was consequently strongest in the towns. The creed of the Church was set forth in the Augsburg Confession, written by Luther's colleague, Philip Melanchthon, and presented at the Diet of Augsburg in 1530. The fundamental theological differ-

ence between the new faith and the Catholic Church pertained to salvation. The Catholic Church maintained that salvation was to be attained through its instrumentality by means of the sacraments and good works. The Lutheran dogma denied the efficacy of both these, and taught that salvation was to be attained by faith alone. Aside from this major theological difference the new faith bore many traces of its debt to Roman Catholicism. Much of the ritual of the service and not a little of the dogma of the old church were retained in the new. Lutheranism was characterized by a less rigid distinction between laymen and clergymen, and particularly by a popularization of the mass. In church organization, the Lutherans retained some of the hierarchy, changing only the names, but in government Lutheranism was always distinctly national. The secular ruler of a state was the head of the Lutheran Church in that state.

The legal status of Lutheranism was determined by a series of imperial Diets and by a peace following the religio-political Schmalkaldic Wars (1546-1547). The first Diet, held at Speyer in 1526, found Charles V too occupied in fighting against France to attack Lutheranism and the Diet vested in each prince the right to choose whether his state should be Lutheran or Catholic. At a second Diet at Speyer in 1529 and again at the Augsburg Diet in 1530 this decision was reversed and Lutheranism was outlawed. By that time the Emperor had need of the support of the Lutheran middle class so that the laws against the new religion were not strictly enforced. The Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) returned to the principle of the first Diet of Speyer by reaffirming the right of princely choice. This hopefully named "Peace" was in fact only a truce because of its failure to settle the question of confiscated church property and because it failed to recognize two new faiths, Zwinglianism and Calvinism, which had grown up meanwhile in Switzerland.

The influence of Luther's revolt spread out through Europe like ripples on water. Germany remained the chief seat of Lutheranism but Denmark, Sweden, and Norway became predominantly Lutheran and scattered adherents were to be found almost everywhere. Perhaps of greater importance than the spread of Lutheran churches was the impact of Luther's ideology and the infectious example of a successful revolt. Of all the areas affected, Switzerland was the first to experience a violent reaction.

Sixteenth century Switzerland was a loose confederation of thirteen self-governing cantons. Originally a part of the Holy Roman Empire it had freed itself by a process of slow divorce from all save

a purely nominal allegiance to the emperor. The Swiss were the only free people in Europe. There was sharp cleavage between the agricultural, forest cantons like Uri and Schwyz and the industrialized urban cantons like Zurich and Geneva. The former like most agricultural communities were apathetic if not hostile to change. The latter, more affected by the secularizing Renaissance and commercial revolution, were in a state of flux. Not a land blessed with abundance, Switzerland's leading resource was her young men who hired out as mercenary soldiers. Since the pope often employed Swiss mercenaries, the connection between Switzerland and the Papacy was close, and many Swiss, especially of the forest cantons, were bound to Rome by ties of former service. In contrast a considerable portion of the people deplored the practice of exporting young men on the nationalistic ground that it weakened the state.

Among the voices raised in protest against the custom the loudest was that of Ulrich Zwingli, young preacher of the cathedral church at Zurich. Like his German contemporary, Luther, Zwingli came of peasant stock. He was educated at the universities in Basle and Vienna, and in contrast to Luther's reaction, his studies of the classics and of the New Testament roused an intellectual dissatisfaction with the teachings of the Church. Nevertheless, he entered the service of the Church, but in a carping state of mind. The abuse of indulgences, what he termed the false miracles which unscrupulous monks imposed upon the credulous, and the use of Swiss mercenaries by the pope all aroused his ire.

Long an admirer of Erasmus, Zwingli fell under the influence of Luther after he had been appointed to the church at Zurich. That canton, under his leadership, renounced the authority of its bishop in 1520, and partially accepted the Lutheran dogma of salvation by faith. The forest cantons threatened to attack Zurich, but Zwingli warned them off. Their opposition, however, did have an effect: it drove him farther along the path of revolt. A papal demand for troops in 1521 called forth a fierce denunciation of the Papacy from this recalcitrant son of the Church. Reform and anti-reform factions in Zurich contended until a public hearing was held in 1523 to settle the question. Zwingli, in sixty-seven radical theses which denied the divinity of Christ and the authority of the Church, set forth the case for revolt. His arguments convinced the town council, and Zurich withdrew from the Catholic Church. The break was completed in the following year by abolition of the mass and the destruction of the Catholic shrines.

The revolt spread during the next several years to other industrialized cantons. Berne, Basle, and other cities were won to the support of Zurich and Zwingli. The latter rapidly established himself as the tyrant of Zurich and subordinated the state to the church. In 1529 he forced Zurich and her allies to make war against the Catholic cantons which had leagued themselves with Catholic Austria. Austrian support failed to materialize so the outnumbered Catholics made peace without risking a battle. Two years later the tables were turned. Berne refused to support Zurich and the army of the Catholic cantons triumphed over the Protestants of Zurich in the Battle of Kappel. Zwingli, who had accompanied his army as chaplain, was killed in the fighting. The terms of the subsequent peace were moderate, but the loss of the leader was irreparable and both Zurich and Zwinglianism rapidly declined. Another city, Geneva, and a new sect, Calvinism, became the Protestant leaders of Switzerland.

Zwinglianism was not without influence, although the period of its greatest activity was short. At the least, it added one more sect to the existent confusion; at the most, it served as a forerunner to the Protestantism of Calvin whose dogma showed traces of Zwinglian theology. A case in point and a convenient index of change are the theories of the Eucharist held by the various groups. The Catholic belief, transubstantiation, was that an actual change from the bread and wine to the substance of the body and blood of Christ was effected by the miracle of the mass. Luther denied this and taught the theory of the real presence of Christ within the bread and wine used in the mass. The Zwinglian position was that no change took place in the elements which were only symbolic. The teaching of Calvin, more radical than that of Luther, less radical than that of Zwingli, was that the elements underwent a spiritual change in the celebration of the service.

John Calvin, leader of the more important religious revolt in Switzerland, was born at Noyon, France, in 1509. Calvin's mother died when he was very young, and he was cared for by friends. Lack of parental love and of a real home during his formative years may explain his later haughty sternness and cruel aloofness. Aided by a Church benefice, the medieval equivalent of a modern scholarship, Calvin studied theology at the University of Paris. After receiving his degree he began a study of law and this legal training was later manifest in his theology and in his concise and lucid style. A scholarly student, Calvin's contact with the Humanists led him first to a study of the work of Erasmus and later of Luther. The impact of these

Courtesy of the New York Public Library

JOHN CALVIN

powerful stimuli turned him from Catholicism. In 1533, he felt himself called, to use his own phrase, to leave the Catholic Church. His Protestantism forced him to flee before a wave of persecution which swept over France. He went first to Basle, then to Strasbourg, and finally to Geneva where, except for one short period, he lived out his life.

The city of Geneva, aided by the Protestant city of Berne, established its independence in 1536. Largely for reasons of political expediency, Geneva adopted the faith of its benefactor, and called a fiery French evangelist, William Farel, to be its pastor. The Genevans proved only moderately responsive even to Farel's eloquence, and when his old friend Calvin appeared in the city en route from northern Italy the preacher asked his assistance. Calvin was reluctant to abandon his journey, but yielded finally to Farel's importuning and stayed.

John Calvin came to Geneva with a definitely formulated theory of the proper relations of Church and State, and began at once to translate theory into practice. The State was subordinated to the Church, a form of government known as theocracy, and the whole was subordinated to Calvin. Under him, the most powerful body in Geneva was the Consistory, composed of six ministers and twelve elders of the church. Charged with the administration of an ever-increasing number of severe and comprehensive blue laws, this group exercised the strictest possible surveillance over the private lives of the citizenry. The harsh punishments inflicted for the least infraction of the rigid moral code were administered by the state, acting as a subsidiary of the church. Dancing, card-playing, and the singing of secular songs were forbidden; failure to attend church, and overly luxurious dress were subject to regulation and harsh punishments. Calvin and his Consistory established the most puritanical regime ever seen. Calvin's personal power goes far toward explaining his success in transforming Geneva into his ideal Puritan city, but what may be termed the survival of the fittest was also important. On the one hand, execution and exile ridded the city of those who would not or could not conform to his laws, and on the other hand, Puritans from all over Europe flocked to Geneva to learn at the feet of the master.

Successful tyranny bred in Calvin an insatiable lust for power and he showed himself capable of despicable action to maintain his authority. His persecution of Servetus,[1] and his use of the rack literally to break his opponents, the Libertines, or Free-thinkers, are cases in point. So far-reaching and so petty was his tyranny that the Genevan town council dared not venture to install a new heating apparatus in the town house until he had given it his approval.

The theory of Calvin's theocracy, and his theology, were contained in a remarkable book, *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, which he wrote and published at Basle in 1536. This original Latin edition was revised, enlarged, and printed in many languages before he died. The *Institutes* contained the first clearly reasoned and logical presentation of the Protestant case, and, as such, proved the most

[1] *Servetus is the Latinized name of the Spanish Unitarian, Miguel Serveto (1511-1553). Outwardly a professing Catholic, he secretly wrote a religious treatise in which he denounced the generally held views of the Trinity and of the divinity of Christ. He was so ill-advised as to send a copy of this treatise to Calvin who promptly denounced him to the Catholic authorities of Vienne where he was serving as personal physician to the Catholic archbishop. Forced to flee, Servetus hastened to Geneva and placed himself under the protection of Calvin. The latter promptly tried him for heresy, convicted him, and had him burned at the stake.*

effective weapon possessed by the Protestant cause. Calvin sought to reconstruct the bases of primitive Christianity by showing the additions which had been made throughout the centuries to the Apostolic Church. Like Luther, to whom he owed a debt he never acknowledged, Calvin set up the Bible as the supreme authority. From that premise which he deemed infallible he sought by rigid logic to deduce an unchanging dogma.

The focal point of Calvin's theology was the exaltation of God whom he conceived of as the Almighty Will. Source of all thought, of all action, of all moral standards, and of all happiness, Calvin's God was literally omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. Beside such incomparable power and majesty man was reduced to utter insignificance. Logical corollary of this legalistic conception was the Calvinistic theory of salvation. Rejecting both the Catholic and Lutheran theories, Calvin maintained that salvation was by God's will alone. The destiny of each soul was arbitrarily determined by God at man's birth and no human action could change this predestined fate. The minority to be saved were the "elect," who were said to be in a "state of grace." All others were the "damned." Calvin's precept and example kept this philosophy from resulting in an immoral or amoral society. Thrift, prosperity and ethical conduct were held to be the outward signs of the "state of grace." The very human desire to appear as one of the "elect" did the rest. It should be noted that the Calvinistic gospel of thrift and prosperity was of strong appeal to the rising commercial class, many of whom became ardent Calvinists.

Calvinism, to a far greater degree than Lutheranism, became an international religion. France, which remained staunchly Catholic,[1] felt the impact of the new faith. French Calvinists, known as Huguenots, although they never comprised more than one percent of the total population, won power far beyond the weight of their numbers. Elsewhere in Europe, the northern provinces of the Netherlands became Calvinist in the late sixteenth century. It was for this reason that the English Pilgrims, who also were Calvinists, first sought sanctuary in Holland. In Germany, the leaven of Calvinism produced the "Reformed Church." Never very large in numbers, the German

[1] *Effective reforms of ecclesiastical abuses in the late fifteenth century contented the mass of the French people with the Catholic Church. The Concordat of 1516 which vested the appointment of bishops and other important church officials in the French Crown removed the danger of a princely attack on the Church. Henceforward, the Church in France was predominantly national, and mutual support of Crown and Church became traditional.*

Calvinists were an added element of trouble in an already badly confused religious situation. Failure to extend the benefits of the Peace of Augsburg to them was one of the major religious causes of the Thirty Years' War.

The chief center of Calvinism beyond Switzerland was Scotland. Introduced by Calvin's stern and tactless disciple, John Knox, the faith rapidly became the religion of the Scottish people. The governing bodies of the churches, and often of the state, were the elders, or presbyters, whence came the name commonly applied to Scottish Calvinism: Presbyterianism. Since the organization of the Presbyterian Church served also as an organization against the hated and distrusted power of England, early Presbyterianism had a strong political tinge. In England itself the violent reaction of Calvinism and Anglicanism caused a schism in the English Church, and produced the father group of the Pilgrims, the Independents. A milder reaction resulted in the formation of a reform group, known as the Low Church or Puritan party, which sought to widen the breach between England and Rome.

Because the original schism between Rome and England was intimately bound up with the divorcing of his Spanish Queen, Katharine of Aragon, by Henry VIII, writers of fiction and partisan history have often confused the issues. More clearly than in any other country, the religious revolt in England was essentially political and nationalistic. It is indubitable that the common economic, social, and intellectual motives were present, but the initial impetus was dynastic necessity and the course was the channel of nationalism.

As early as the fourteenth century the English had signified by regulatory laws their opposition to papal taxation and to the extensive papal jurisdiction. Enforcement of these laws was sporadic, but they were never repealed. Growth of royal power in England was accompanied by sharp collisions between canon law and English common law, a tradition to which the Tudors fell heir. As elsewhere, the ambitious commercial class found papal taxes and ecclesiastical regulation very irksome, and the sight of the rich acres of the Church filled many with greed. Anti-clericalism, which was common among the English people of the sixteenth century, had its roots partly in the recurrent antagonism of the peasants toward their landlords, of which the Church was one, and partly in the rife and disillusioning clerical abuses. England also shared the intelectual quickening of the Renaissance. Indeed, the leader of the English revolt, Henry VIII,

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

HENRY VIII. BY HANS HOLBEIN, THE YOUNGER (1497-1543), IN THE PALAZZO CORSINI, ROME.

During the last decade of his life Holbein was court painter for Henry VIII.

was a product of Renaissance learning and culture. It was none of these factors, however, which precipitated his break with Rome.

When women were held to be inferior to men, the continuation of a dynasty depended on the provision of a male heir to the throne. Failure to have a son meant the end of the dynasty; failure to have a legitimate son was likely to mean a struggle for the throne and consequent civil war. Katharine bore Henry only a daughter, Mary, and when it became apparent that she would not bear him a son, the situation became acute. Henry determined to divorce his queen and remarry in the hope that a legitimate male heir might be forthcoming.

Katharine was the widow of Henry's brother, Arthur, and the divorce was sought on a technical question concerning that mar-

riage. Had it not been for the international ambitions of the Emperor Charles V, nephew of Katharine, and King of Spain, Pope Clement VII might have granted Henry's persuasive appeal. Shortly before the request was made, Charles had captured and sacked Rome. The hapless Pope was forced into a position of utter dependence upon the Emperor. It was obvious that the divorce would have seriously offended the latter, and that Clement dared not do. To be balked by a rival sovereign added nationalistic pride to political expediency. Henry prepared for war with Spain and again besought Clement to release him from Katharine. The inevitable papal refusal merged the problem of divorce from a wife with the larger question of divorce from the Roman Catholic Church. Henry resolved on the desperate measure of denying papal jurisdiction and granting his own divorce.

Pursuant to this plan, in 1531, he demanded that the reluctant English clergy recognize him as head of the church in England. Unable to withstand the pressure he put upon them, the clergy gave him their grudging recognition with an impotent reservation. Two years later Parliament forbade the submission of appeals to the papal court, and three years later, Parliament by legislative act bestowed on Henry the unqualified title of Supreme Head of the Church. That same Parliament also made definitive a conditional act, passed originally in 1532, which forbade the payment of annates to Rome. The climactic year was 1533. Anne Boleyn, whom Henry had chosen to succeed the Queen, became pregnant and to ensure the legitimacy of the child, Henry committed bigamy by marrying her in January of that year. The marriage was kept a close secret because Thomas Cranmer, newly elected Archbishop of Canterbury, had not received the papal bulls of consecration. It is an illuminating commentary upon Henry's theological orthodoxy that he felt it necessary to wait for his archbishop to be confirmed by the very authority he was engaged in flouting. His allegiance to the theology of Catholicism could not have been more clearly shown. Cranmer was consecrated in March and promptly denied further dependence on Rome. At his bidding the now submissive clergy, in April, declared the marriage of Katharine and Henry to be null and void. Two months later Anne was crowned Queen of England, and in September, to Henry's chagrin and disgust, was born a girl child who was named Elizabeth. For this he had suffered excommunication and had run the grave risk of having a crusade launched against his kingdom.

Precedent had proved so useful in denying the political power of the pope that Henry made use of it to effect a settlement of the benefits of Church lands upon the Crown. By decrees passed in 1536 and 1539 the monasteries and convents of England were dissolved and their holdings confiscated by the Crown. To make this act more palatable to his people, Henry explained it on the ground that the immorality of the clergy forced him to it. It was as good an excuse as any. By this act hundreds of religious were forced into the world which they had renounced, and many were reduced to beggary. The needy also suffered severely since, at a stroke, the chief charitable institution of the realm was destroyed. Eventually the state was forced to take over the functions which it had rendered the Church impotent to perform. Henry's action had one more vastly important result. The confiscated lands were sold mostly to the crescive commercial class. This created a vested interest in the continuance of an independent church in England. Not even the hyper-Catholic Mary dared try to regain these lands. As long as they remained in private hands no complete return to the Roman fold was possible.

Despite the completeness of the break with the pope, Henry and his people remained Catholic in theology. Positive proof of this is found in the Six Articles (1539), a law by which the fundamental tenets of Catholicism, including transubstantiation, were maintained. Neither the king nor his subjects found it incongruous that after his revolt from papal authority he continued to use the title, "Defender of the Faith," bestowed on him for an attack upon Luther's apostasy. Nor did Henry permit any deviation from his faith. Failure to conform to the creed set forth in the Six Articles constituted heresy and was treated as such.

At Henry's death in 1547 the crown passed to Edward, his son by his third wife, Jane Seymour. The actual power, however, was in the hands of regents, first the Duke of Somerset and later, the Duke of Northumberland. Acting of course in the name of their sickly boy-king, Edward VI, these men sought to force a doctrinal reformation upon the English people. By legislative acts (1549 and 1552) there was enjoined upon the churches the use of an English prayerbook, written by Archbishop Cranmer. Protestant in tone, the book was much closer to Lutheranism than to Catholicism. Cranmer's masterly prose has won his work an immortality as a gem of English literature. In 1553, last year of Edward's reign, the Six Articles of Henry were replaced by the definitely Protestant Forty-two Articles of Faith. This change in dogma was a premature, state-made



MAP 17. PROTESTANTISM, CATHOLICISM, AND MOHAMMEDANISM AROUND 1560

reformation which was ill-received by the English people. They were not ready for Protestantism, and the next reign was to prove that they were unwilling to return to the old beliefs.

Mary, daughter of the discarded Katharine, ascended the throne at the death of her half-brother. Her five-year reign was marked by a marriage alliance with Philip II of Spain and by a transient reappearance of Catholicism. Her marriage, which made England virtually a Spanish province, was most unpopular with her subjects. Since Philip was the strongest son of the Catholic Church, their nationalistic hatred of him as a Spaniard tended to produce also a hatred of Catholicism. To the English mind, Catholic became synonymous with foreign, and, conversely, Protestant with English. Once again the tremendous force of nationalism was determining the faith of a nation. Unaware of this, Mary sought to restore the religion of her mother by decrees as despotic as any her father had ever issued. Two Acts of Repeal (1553 and 1555) swept away the theological reforms of Edward, and all the revolutionary politico-religious laws of her father, save those affecting the monasteries. In addition, the pope was again recognized as the head of the Church

of England. The persecutions of heretics which marred the last two years of Mary's reign were only partly due to her religious fervor. Many of them were inspired by Philip in a vain attempt to cow the English people into submission to the half-Spanish crown. This attempt was native to the time but, unfortunately for the sovereigns' Church, Englishmen saw in it further proof that Catholicism was a foreign religion, and a revulsion began against the restored Church. England, too Catholic to follow Edward, was nonetheless too Protestant to follow Mary and Philip.

Mary's death brought to the English throne Anne Boleyn's daughter, Elizabeth, last of the Tudor line. Unlike her predecessors, Elizabeth had no strong religious faith, and, what is more, the insecurity of her grasp upon the scepter made it imperative that she unite her people both religiously and politically. She could not afford the luxury of religious intolerance which would alienate either the strong Protestant minority or the Catholic majority among her subjects. Her settlement of the religious question was a broad compromise which, if it did not please a majority of her people, at least did not violently offend them. The Church of England was established by three acts. The Act of Supremacy (1559) again denied papal authority and gave the English Crown jurisdiction over the English Church. Because of her sex, Elizabeth did not assume the title, "Supreme Head of the Church in England," which Henry had used, but she had the power although she lacked the name. The Acts of Uniformity (1559) combined and modified the two Edwardian Acts. The second prayer book was restored with three changes designed to make it more acceptable to the Catholic masses of the people. Lastly, the basis of the Anglican faith was set forth in the Thirty-nine Articles which were adapted from the articles of Edward.

This specially designed church was definitely Protestant without being extremely so. Further from Rome than Lutheranism, it was much more conservative than Calvinism. Broad enough to please all but the extremists, Anglicanism rapidly became the national religion. Proof of its strength was the fact that despite papal bulls and Jesuit proselytizing the number of English Catholics so rapidly declined that by 1585 they constituted less than three percent of the total population of England and Wales. Moreover, Anglicanism became identified with the Crown to the mutual strengthening of both. Uniformity in faith became a test of loyalty to the Crown.

THE BURNING OF SERVETUS

This sixteenth century French caricature shows the burning of Michael Servetus at the stake. See footnote, p. 412.

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Chapter XV

Sectarianism

A. The basis of religious tolerance

It must not be supposed that the Protestant revolutionaries fought for religious tolerance, despite their frequent appeals to individual conscience and individual judgment. When occasion warranted, as they frequently thought it did, they oppressed their enemies with as much fury and vengeance as the Church which they condemned. Witness the cruel burning of Servetus by John Calvin, or Luther's denunciation of the Anabaptists, or the Puritan attacks upon nonconformists in New England. Instead of inaugurating an era of religious toleration, the first fruit of the Protestant Revolution was a wave of uncompromising religious fanaticism which swept aside all hope of religious tranquillity. Protestants, as well as Catholics, were convinced that they held a monopoly upon truth and would brook no deviation, whatever might be the costs.

Yet unconsciously and quite unintentionally, the Protestant revolutionaries helped prepare the way for religious toleration. Their continuous assertion of the rights of individual conscience and individual judgment, though at first honored more in the breach than in the observance, was eventually bound to influence opinions. Certainly it provided the justification for the establishment of many small sects within the Protestant fold. The constantly growing number of these, each claiming a monopoly of truth, made many skeptical of the claims of all. The Protestant revolution shattered the religious uniformity which had obtained during the Middle Ages and thus helped give rise to a belief that in religion, truth was a probability. This lesson had to be learned before religious tolerance was possible. It was learned slowly, to be sure, for experience and tradition could not be obliterated in a decade or even a century.

In fact, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the

desire to enforce religious views prevailed. The governments accepted oppression of religious minorities as one of their duties and forcefully sought to achieve religious uniformity at home and abroad. The result was widespread persecution and religious wars. But even these contributed eventually to the general cause of religious tolerance, for they demonstrated not only their costliness but also their utter futility. The Spanish crown lost one of its most prized possessions, was reduced and humbled because of it; Germany was impoverished and depopulated without any religious faction having gained the ascendancy. Local persecutions produced substantially the same results. Religious minorities could ofttimes be forced to change their religion outwardly but there could be no guarantee that their convictions had changed, and the task of suppressing them often had to be repeated. Complete annihilation or enforced exile might eliminate the dissidents, but it was soon discovered that it also deprived the state of active and industrious peoples.

As intolerance proved futile and expensive so it was shown that toleration paid. Religious peace in Holland, for example, was no small factor in accounting for its prosperity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when other states indulged themselves in the luxuries of religious strife. Probably the greatest demonstration of the material benefits to be realized from religious toleration were demonstrated by the Electors of Brandenburg-Prussia in the seventeenth century. By being willing to invite the exiled Huguenots of France into their dominions, they raised the level of their economic life and thus gradually prepared Prussia for the ascendancy it was to enjoy in the Germanies in the era of Frederick the Great.

Simultaneously, many of the economic and social developments of the times broadened the foundations for religious tolerance. The extension of commerce, with its emphasis upon things material, helped to divert attention from religious strife. Improved facilities of communication, encouraging travel and intercourse among peoples, together with the dissemination of knowledge made possible through the printing press, helped break down the provincialism of medieval life. Knowing others is to understand them, and to understand them is to tolerate their views. The increasing cosmopolitanism of early modern times was therefore a boon to religious peace.

Even before the gathering material forces of the age brought their full influence to bear, and before sad experience with religious intolerance taught its futility, a broad theory of tolerance was taking form in intellectual circles and was gaining converts. Rational defense

of toleration is essential to its realization. The men of learning who produced this therefore contributed no small share to ultimate victory. It is significant that most of these exponents of toleration were members of smaller religious communities exposed to oppression, and that they were citizens of countries in which personal liberties were most fully protected. None came from Spain and almost none from the Germanies, but in Holland and England and to a lesser degree in France, they were fairly numerous. Of these, special mention should be made of Benedict Spinoza, Dutch philosopher of Jewish extraction; John Milton, English poet and a Puritan; and Montaigne, the great French skeptic.

The views which these men held differed in detail, but they reflected the potent spirit of developing science which was attacking the foundations of dogmatic religion and demonstrating ever more clearly the virtues of reason. They asserted that religion was a matter of opinion, and that therefore not force but merely persuasion must be employed in its behalf. They declared it absurd that the Christian doctrine which taught love and peace should be twisted to defend hate and war. They emphasized the fact that in the fundamental matter of salvation, the differences between the sects were minor and unimportant, and that therefore the conflict over such issues as creed and formality was wholly unreasonable. Some of them even advanced the opinion that religion was not the business of the state, and called for unlimited tolerance of all kinds of religious opinions; but the number of these was few. The extent of tolerance which most were willing to grant was measured by political considerations. Hence the English theorists, depending upon their own convictions, would exclude atheists, Protestant dissenters, and Papists.

The accumulation of all these intellectual, social, and material forces eventually culminated in widespread religious tolerance. When this was achieved, it was nothing really new for the citizens of ancient Greece and ancient Rome had long enjoyed it, but it was new to Christian civilization. From the beginning of the middle ages, adherence to established doctrine had been regarded not only as essential to individual salvation but as the highest social good. Persecution and oppression of religious minorities had therefore been regarded as disagreeable necessities, and were confirmed by established law. To break this tradition was then, as it still is today, an extremely difficult task. It was not accomplished until conflict between the Protestant sects and the Catholic Church, strengthened and revived by the Catholic Reformation, had taken the lives of hundreds of thou-

sands, and demonstrated its futility. But the lesson then learned has not been wholly forgotten. Persecution such as there is now, and there is much of it, to be sure, is based not upon religious non-conformity but upon political, economic, and social issues.

B. Reform in the Church

The victories won by the Protestant revolutionaries were so sweeping as to incite wonder that they were halted. This seems especially surprising in the case of Italy which appeared peculiarly open to German influence because of its many commercial bonds. Then, too, Italy, like Germany, was politically disunited—a factor which had facilitated the German movement. Italians did, of course, feel some of the effects of the upheavals across the Alps, but in the end they repudiated any similar change. Long examination of the problem by many scholars has revealed the reasons for Italian steadfastness to the Catholic Church.

Of paramount importance was the continuing loyalty of the vast majority of Italians to Roman Catholicism. For one thing, most of these people were peasants, always slow to abandon the old for the new. The old faith had served their fathers and grandfathers and they saw no reason to change. The social and economic motives so important in bringing the revolts of the German peasantry were lacking in Italy. The average lower class Italian had been affected little, if at all, by the Renaissance. That great development was primarily one of the privileges of leisure and wealth and the Italian peasant had neither. Moreover, Italian humanism never became the reforming force that northern humanism did. Italian humanists were esthetes, classicists, and individualists, not reformers. With their insistence upon the perfectibility of man, they could not accept the Lutheran and Calvinistic dogma that human efforts had no merit in the winning of salvation. Born in the Church, most Italian humanists remained loyal to it. Some gave it only formal heed, but others were sincerely devoted. This latter group frequently formed organizations consecrated to the furtherance of their religion. Typical of many such groups was the "Oratory of Divine Love," founded at Rome during the pontificate of Leo X, and dedicated to the revitalization of the Church through reform.

The political disunity of Italy seemed greater than it was. The divided Italian states were too weak to withstand the power of Spain

which was rapidly bringing all of the peninsula under her domination. More fiercely than Italy, Spain remained a Catholic country. The Spanish peasant was of no mind to rebel even had the chance offered—which it did not, and the bonds between the Church and the Spanish Crown were old and strong. It was the Church which had made possible the nationalistic and economic victory of the Crown over the Moor and the Jew and which now greatly strengthened royal absolutism by its insistence upon divine-right monarchy. The zeal of the Crown for the Church was rooted in gratitude and keen self-interest as well as in pious devotion.

The fact that the seat of the Papacy was in Italy also acted as a powerful deterrent upon revolution especially after the character of the popes abruptly changed for the better with the election of Paul III (1534-1549). Paul himself was a transitional figure. Eager to do his duty, he was sincerely desirous of raising the moral tone of the curia, and though he was guilty of some typical Renaissance deviations from the strait and narrow, he did much to accomplish his aim. At the least, he established the papacy upon a new and higher plane below which it has never since descended.

From these sources of strength and from the revival of asceticism which found expression in the establishment of many new religious orders, came the Catholic Reformation. The Protestant Revolt was undeniably a factor, but only one of many. Catholic reform had begun in Spain before the Revolts, and the latter acted primarily as stimulants. The impulse of self-preservation is discoverable in institutions, as well as in individuals, and the Church's very existence had been threatened. That a thorough reform was the best antidote for Protestantism was obvious, but there were many difficulties to be surmounted before reform was possible. Lack of leadership was perhaps foremost but that lack was supplied by Paul and his successors. Proposals for improvement, made before the various fifteenth century councils, failed primarily because their members feared any reforms which inevitably would have curtailed their personal powers. Paul and the popes after him finally rid themselves of this incubus of vested corruption by improving the quality of church officialdom through careful appointments. Headed by a purified Papacy, the hierarchy rapidly improved in both morals and morale. Political complications had also operated in the past to prevent a reform in the Church. This difficulty the new leadership managed to surmount by a policy of judicious opportunism. Reforms were pushed when

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IGNATIUS LOYOLA

conditions were favorable, dropped when they were not. Chief instruments of the purge were the Society of Jesus, the Council of Trent, and the Inquisition and Index.

The Society of Jesus, more popularly known as the Jesuit Order, was founded by a *quondam* Spanish soldier, Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556). His military career cut short by a wound, Loyola determined to become a soldier of the Cross. When he discovered that he was handicapped by lack of education, Loyola courageously began at the bottom to remedy the want. In due time he became a student at the University of Paris and it was there that he and a small group of like-minded zealots banded together in 1534 to carry Catholicism to the Moslems. Pursuant to this pledge, the little band gathered at Venice in 1537 but a war between the Venetians and the Turks prevented their departure for the East. It had been agreed previously that should this plan fail, the group would place itself at the disposal

of the pope. Loyola now did so and a papal bull in 1540 gave formal recognition to the Order.

The outstanding characteristics of the Jesuit Order, and the mainsprings of its strength, were its rigid military discipline and the excellent training it gave its members. The period of novitiate was two years and of training about twelve; only then did the candidate become a full-fledged Jesuit. The leader, called the general, the provincial heads and the rectors of the houses were all chosen by the general congregation of the Order. All members were solemnly bound to give unquestioning obedience to their superiors. Wherever the Jesuits went—and they went everywhere—they carried their insistence upon rigid obedience and upon education. Their zeal and their valor won them merited renown. They became the zealous "shock troops" of the Catholic Church, often going into countries where a Protestant majority had decreed death to all their kind, and where discovery meant instant execution. They went as missionaries and explorers to the far places of the earth—the Americas, China, Japan, and the islands of the East. They became the finest teachers and educators in the world and their schools were respected even by their enemies. Figuratively and literally, the Jesuits won back lost ground and checked the spread of Protestantism. As much as any other single factor, this compact, efficient, and devoted army revitalized the Catholic Church.

Six years after he had given formal recognition to the Jesuits, Pope Paul summoned a general council of the Church to meet at Trent for the dual purpose of ridding the Church of corruption and laying a firm foundation for an attack upon Protestantism. The first session of the Council opened at Trent late in 1545, was transferred to Bologna in 1547 and adjourned two years later. At the insistence of the emperor, the council was again convoked at Trent in 1551 and remained in session until political unrest caused its adjournment in the year following. The third and final session was opened a decade later and was finally dissolved in 1563. The interrupted course of the Council of Trent bears witness to the problems which faced it. Not only were there the great questions of reform and of Protestantism, but there were also internecine struggles for power between the popes and the Council, and between the popes and the emperors. By careful manipulation, including adjournment when necessary, the Papacy successfully maintained its hegemony of the Church. Compromises were made, many of them, but withal the successive popes skillfully made the Council an organ of the papal will.

The accomplishments of the Council may be summarized under three major heads. First, the basic doctrines of Catholicism were clarified and reaffirmed so that its creed became a model of unity in contrast to Protestant diversity. Despite some ambiguity, these doctrinal pronouncements have largely remained the best statement of Catholic theology. Secondly, the flagrant abuses were rectified by sweeping reform decrees and by setting up machinery to carry them out. Not the least important part of this machinery were seminaries which were established for the training of priests. Thirdly, heresy was roundly condemned and a vigorous attack launched against it. The tradition of enforcing conformity by means of trials for heresy was revived and the Church resumed her persecuting and proselytizing. It must in fairness be noted that the Protestants were guilty of like intolerance.

The Council of Trent as part of its war against abuses and heresies published a list of books which Catholics were forbidden to read. Such attempts to mold men's thoughts were not new; the burning of heretical manuscripts had long been a common practice of the Church. The development of printing made such censorship more important and in the late fifteenth century and the sixteenth century both Church and kings sought to limit the printing and distribution of books judged to be dangerous. The first general catalogue, or *Index*, of forbidden books was issued by imperial order in the Netherlands in 1546, and a similar *Index* was issued at Rome at about the same time. The *Index* promulgated by the Council of Trent was stricter and more comprehensive than the earlier ones, and a special body was later set up to keep the list up to date. *Indexes* are still issued by the Roman Catholic Church but the same emphasis is no longer placed upon them. Whether or not the *Index* really served its purpose is a moot question. It is probable that it enabled the Catholic Church more effectively to mold the minds of the faithful, but it is doubtful if it accomplished more than that. Fortunately there is no wholly effective antiseptic against the infection of ideas, and no permanently effective method of enchaining thought. If there were, all the world would be authoritarian and liberty a farce.

Catholics and Protestants both resorted to force to achieve conformity but the odium of such action has been attached chiefly to the former, since its persecutions were more consistent and more effective, though not more brutal. Much of this unfortunate and only partially justified reputation was due to the operation of the Spanish and Roman *Inquisitions*. The medieval Church had frequently made

use of Inquisitorial Courts, and the Spanish Inquisition antedated the Protestant Revolutions by a generation. With the threat of Protestantism, however, it became much more terrible, frequently defying both royal and papal commands. Actually less than two thousand Protestants were executed by the Inquisition in sixteenth century Spain. It was chiefly concerned with heresies and other crimes within the Catholic fold. The accused had little chance since his guilt was already assumed. If he hesitated to confess, brutal tortures were applied. Acquittals were rare and punishments, which were inflicted by the state at the Inquisition's orders, ranged from whipping to burning at the stake. Such executions were termed *autos-da-fé* (acts of faith) and were commonly presented as gruesome holiday spectacles for the crowd. The Spanish Inquisition was operative only in Spain and some of her possessions, and the Roman Inquisition only in parts of Italy. Several Catholic countries repudiated this system and refused to permit its establishment. It should be noted that the methods of the Inquisition differed from those of civil courts only in scope and efficiency. Its notoriety is due largely to the feelings of horror roused in more humanitarian periods by records of its cruelty, and by the fact that it was sponsored by the Church which claimed to be the instrument of God's gentle forgiveness.

By the opening of the seventeenth century, Protestantism had been well established and Roman Catholicism,[1] recovering from the shock of the revolutions, had put its house in order. Doctrinally, there were still many similarities between the two since much of Protestantism had been borrowed. Belief in the Trinity, in the theory of original sin and of salvation, and in heaven and hell remained common to Catholics and most Protestants. The most fundamental theological differences between them were on the question of authority, the acceptance of the sacraments, and the way of salvation. The Catholics insisted that authority rested wholly with the infallible Church, a point of view which laid great emphasis upon uniformity. The Protestants set up the Bible as the final source of authority and though few of them were prepared to admit it, this implied an inherent right of individual interpretation which could result only in increasing diversity. The Catholic Church clung to the seven sacra-

[1] Orthodox Catholicism differed from Roman Catholicism chiefly in its refusal to admit the divine right of the pope to govern the church. There were also minor differences in dogma and ritual. The sixteenth century saw the practical nationalization of the Orthodox Church into Russian and Greek branches. The two contended with each other in the Balkans. Hereafter, the terms Catholic and Catholicism will be used in reference only to the Roman Catholic Church.

ments; the Protestants ranged from a denial of all sacraments to an acceptance of several. The Catholic teaching continued to be that man was saved by participation in the sacraments. Lutherans taught salvation by faith in Christ, Calvinists by predestination, and Anglicans by an apparent combination of both.

There was sharp cleavage between Catholic and Protestant, and wide divergences among the Protestants themselves on matters of ecclesiastical organization and administration. The organization of the Catholic Church remained a compact, neatly graded hierarchy with control vested in a professional class, the clergy. Protestant churches ranged from hierarchical, as in the Anglican, to congregational control, as in the Calvinist groups. By and large, however, laymen were much more important and powerful in the Protestant church governments.

Because of the presence of religious minorities in all countries, and in the absence of complete statistics, it is impossible to give an accurate picture of the territorial division of Europe among the various religions. Speaking in general terms only, Catholicism was dominant in: France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Poland; and in the southern portions of Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands. Anglicanism was centered in England. Switzerland, Scotland, eastern Germany, the north of Ireland, and the northern provinces of the Netherlands were Calvinistic. Lutheranism was largely confined to Prussia, Scandinavia, and northern Germany.

The student who seeks to discover and summarize the changes wrought by the religious upheavals of the sixteenth century faces a difficult task. The movements were so complex and their ramifications so extensive that one must constantly guard against exaggerating their influence. Conversely, there are few things which were not affected by them directly or indirectly. Sound judgment would seem to dictate a middle course between these two extremes and to emphasize the fact that the great trends discussed below were concomitants as well as consequences of the religious developments.

Nationalism, for example, existed long before the sixteenth century and was one of the major causes of the Protestant Revolts, yet it was greatly strengthened in consequence thereof. Protestant churches were frequently bent to the service of the State. In Lutheran countries, the ruler of the state was by that very fact also head of the church. This revival of an ancient relationship measurably strengthened the power of the secular ruler by adding the moral authority of the church to his other attributes. The confiscation of church

lands in all Protestant countries commonly enriched the State and its princes and thus augmented national strength. It has been pointed out that in England loyalty to Anglicanism was identified with loyalty to the Crown to the reciprocal advantage of both. Even the Catholic Church tended to become nationalized in organization and administration. The Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges [1] and the Concordat of Bologna (1516), which gave the French Crown the right to choose the more important members of the French clergy, virtually created a Catholic Church of France. The same tendency, though to a lesser degree, was apparent in the other Catholic countries, and increasingly, Catholicism reflected nationalistic differences.

Intolerance, also, had been evident long before the sixteenth century, but it, too, was intensified by the irreparable religious schism. The ideal of unity and the ambition for universality continued to exist among all sects. Each claimed a monopoly of truth and each became a persecuting sect to prove the truth of its claim. Instead of one church demanding the adherence of all, many churches demanded it. The result was a cruel intolerance which harried all those who would not or could not conform to the dominant group. Tolerance has not yet been achieved, though intolerance has decreased since religion has ceased to be of paramount importance to the majority of men. Tolerance, in other words, is a by-product of secularization to which the Protestant Revolution contributed much.

In considering the relations between the religious changes and the growth of democracy, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the revolutionaries and the movements which they began. The former were bound by their times, the latter were not. Both Luther and Calvin were autocratic, both preached the necessity of obedience, yet Luther's action in defying the pope belied his words, and Calvin taught that sovereignty resides in the people. Most of the Protestant sects laid great emphasis upon the right of free inquiry and the priesthood of all believers. Insistence upon the former implied individual liberty; upon the latter, the equality of all men. Moreover, the congregational form of church government offered excellent training in political self-government. It is not to be deduced, however, that democracy either came solely from Protestantism or followed directly upon its appearance. Other factors intervened to strengthen or vitiate the implications of the Protestant demands and actions.

Individualism, thus implicitly stressed by the revolutionaries, had far more than political implications. To the Catholic denunciations

[1] See p. 280.

of the taking of interest as usury, it opposed the Calvinistic doctrine that such practice should be determined by personal conscience and thereby furthered the growth of capitalism. Moreover, the Calvinistic belief that prosperity was one evidence of "election" stimulated individual enterprise and put a premium upon individual thrift and business sagacity. Similar emphasis upon individual judgment in other fields spread and popularized the humanistic character of the Renaissance. Denial of traditional authority forced men to think for themselves. To the masses this was perhaps more of a burden than a blessing, but to the intelligent minority it was the blood of life itself.

The most significant of all the results of the religious upheavals was the increase of secularism. During the Protestant Revolutions the Catholic Church was stripped of many of its possessions, some of its functions, and much of its hold on men's minds. The Catholic Reformation only partially recovered these losses. The confiscation of Church lands by Protestant princes increased the latter's wealth and power at the expense of the former. When these lands were used to endow Protestant churches, the Catholic Church was further weakened by this strengthening of her opponents. Frequently, as was the case with the confiscated monasteries in England, these lands were sold to laymen, thereby filling the royal coffers and creating a group whose wealth and well-being depended upon a continuance of Protestantism.

Throughout the medieval period, the Church had performed notable social service in the fields of education, charity, and public health. These services the Church, deprived of property and authority, was no longer able to perform in Protestant countries. The Protestant churches assumed some of the burden but increasingly the state was forced to shoulder it. From this necessity there grew, in time, public schools, supported and controlled by the state; public measures for the relief of the poor; and secular laws for the control of sanitation and hygiene. Cases in point are the first Protestant school founded by laymen, which was established at Magdeburg in 1524, and the numerous statutes passed by Elizabeth of England for the oversight and care of the poor. Similar secularization in Catholic countries was delayed for more than two centuries.

Hardest of all to assess, was the secularization of the mind due in part to the continuing spirit of the Renaissance, in part to Protestant individualism, and in part to the shattering of the ecclesiastical claim to supernatural powers. Religion long continued to be a dominating force, but it had lost its pre-eminence. Slowly, but in increasing

numbers, men turned their attention from the *hereafter* to the *here*. So revolutionary a change did not—could not—come at once. Rather it was the work of centuries. The church still continues to press its claims, but with diminishing success.

No summary of the effects of the religious upheavals would be complete without reference to their effects upon the arts. The architecture and the painting of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, known as baroque from the Spanish word *barroco*, meaning a huge, irregularly shaped pearl, mirror the changing needs of state and church and the troubled character of the newly secularized society. Both in sculpture and architecture, baroque was distinguished by exaggeration of form and decoration. Buildings and their ornaments became, in effect, weapons of propaganda to win supporters by impressing men with the pomp and power of the institutions which erected them. The Jesuits, especially, made such wide use of the style that their name is sometimes substituted for "baroque." The popularly used phrase, "the Jesuit church," is likely to refer to a baroque building. The state, too, sought to make an impression upon its subjects by erecting ornately designed and lavishly decorated buildings. The style spread all over Europe, but its homeland was the south, and its pioneer was an Italian, Giovanni Lorenzo Bernini (1590-1680). The colonnades and the bronze canopy of St. Peter's in Rome are his work, as are also many of the impressive fountains of the city.

Spain, fatherland of Loyola whose Jesuits were so much responsible for the wide employment of the baroque style, was also the home of the most typically baroque artists. In painting as in building, the baroque reflects the emotionalism and the religious intensity of the age. One of the first and greatest exponents of the style was Domenico Theotocopuli, born a Cretan and known in his adopted country of Spain as El Greco (c. 1548-1625). Colors and forms are deliberately exaggerated in his work in order to arouse a more intense emotional response. Others of this Spanish school of the baroque were: Murillo (1617-1682), whose religious paintings were intended to appeal to the masses; Zurbarán (1598-1662), depicter of monks whose faces were marked with fanatical piety; and de Ribera (1588-1658), famed for his spectacular treatment of Christian martyrdoms. Contemporary with these men, but lacking their extreme religiosity, was Diego Velasquez (1599-1660), whose superb portraits reflect the aristocratic character of the Spanish grandees who led the Catholic counterattack.

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

BURIAL OF THE COUNT D'ORGAZ. BY EL GRECO (DOMENICO THEOTOCOPULI) (1542-1614). S. TOMÉ, TOLEDO.

A Cretan by birth, El Greco studied with Titian in Venice and with Michelangelo in Rome but settled in Spain to paint in his own style. He probably gives the best expression of the fanatical zeal of the Spaniards in the times of the great Inquisition. El Greco closely followed the prescription of the vicar of S. Tomé in this painting of the miracle of the Burial of the Count d'Orgaz. Saints Augustine and Stephen appear before the assembled company, lifting the body for burial, while the soul is borne to heaven. St. Peter with his keys, St. John, the Virgin, the Apostles, many of the blessed, and Christ may be seen. The elongation of forms seems to emphasize the spiritual intensity of El Greco's work.

Courtesy of the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, Boston

INNOCENT X. PORTRAIT BY (?) VELASQUEZ (1599-1660).

This portrait of the Farnese Pope is said to be a life study for the seated figure shown in the Doria Gallery, Rome. The vigorous sketch shows Velasquez' skill with the brush and his keen observation. He has been called the first impressionist.

It was to be expected that the Spanish baroque would find its way into the northern possessions of the Hapsburgs. The outstanding Flemish master was Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640). Like the great figures of the Renaissance, Rubens was a versatile genius, winning fame as a scholar and a statesman as well as an artist. His work combines some of the religiosity of Murillo with the aristocratic tone of Velasquez, but he was far more than a mere imitator. His paintings have a fire and a vitality that mark him as one of the great.

Neighbors to Flanders but as different in art as in politics and

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

THE ANATOMY LESSON, BY REMBRANDT HARMENSZOON VAN RIJN (1606-1669). ROYAL PICTURE MUSEUM, THE HAGUE.

Rembrandt's genius was recognized early. In 1632, the Amsterdam Surgeons asked him to paint an anatomy lesson for their Guild room. There is skillful grouping and expressive rendering of the individual heads.

religion were the Protestant Dutch Netherlands, only recently freed from Spain. Dutch Calvinism had no place for the flamboyant "Jesuit art," and the proud and dominant bourgeoisie no sympathy for the aristocratic tradition of the Spanish school. Yet Dutch art, despite its secularity and its reflection of bourgeois rather than noble society, was baroque in its emotionalism and in its wide use of the diagonal composition. Greatest of the Dutch painters and one of the masters of all times, was Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn (1606-1669). To compress the story of his mastery of technique into a few words is impossible, but, fortunately, his genius and his enduring fame rest less on technical skill than on the understanding, human qualities of his work. Portraits or groups, etchings or oils, Rembrandt's pictures vibrate with life and with an inner quality which cannot be caught in words. More skillfully and more successfully than his pious Spanish contemporaries, this unchurchly man caught something of the universal truth and fixed it on his canvas in a way that reaches the heart. Baroque had nothing finer to offer.

C. The confusion of religion and politics

Because of deeply rooted traditions it was natural that the religious upheaval of the sixteenth century should have been accompanied by a political upheaval equally profound and significant. Men still thought of politics in terms of religion and of religion in terms of politics. To separate the one from the other seemed unnatural and wholly unreasonable. Religious uniformity was considered a prerequisite to political solidarity, and a strong state was believed necessary to ensure religious tranquillity. It did not seem improper, therefore, that dissenters should be oppressed or harried out of the land in England, that the Huguenots should be driven from pillar to post in France, that Catholic and Protestant princes should oppress non-conformists in Germany, or that the Inquisition should be made more efficient to stamp out Moors, Jews, and Catholic heretics in Spain. Such policies were always seconded by churchmen who felt that force alone could make the truth prevail. What is certainly more significant is the fact that the majority of the people acquiesced, partly through indifference but more because of tradition and usage.

This confusing intermixture of political and religious elements operated not only to influence the character of domestic government, but it also profoundly affected international relations. If religious uniformity at home was held essential to domestic peace, it followed logically that religious uniformity abroad was believed indispensable to international peace. At all events, the desire to establish such religious uniformity was often made the moral excuse for an aggressive adventure against one's non-conforming neighbors. Religion could cloak the most selfish political ambitions as the so-called religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries demonstrate.

All political thinking was clouded with religious preoccupations. Catholics or Protestants could defend arbitrary government or denounce it with equal fervor, depending upon which enjoyed ascendancy and stood to profit most from absolute princely authority. Each in his own interests could claim divine origin of political power and defend oppression of religious enemies on the ground that the will of God was being realized. But if one happened to be the victim of such oppression, he could denounce the prince as a tyrant who frustrated God's will out of selfish motives and endangered his sub-

jects' salvation. Against such sovereigns popular rebellion or the assassin's dagger was an absolute if painful necessity. Whether one supported established authority or preached revolution was determined largely by one's religious views and especially by the extent to which these views were enforced upon or denied to others. It is significant that minority factions, whether Catholic or Protestant, were usually on the side of revolution. Thus the Calvinist Huguenots of France advanced arguments to support the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and asserted the right of the community of individuals to independent government. For the same reason, Catholic theorists defended attacks upon established authority. Perhaps the most interesting example of this type of religio-political speculation is to be found in the writings of Mariana (1536-1624), a Spanish Jesuit[1] who advocated tyrannicide as the most effective means of disposing of a prince who, through his religious policies, threatened his people with eternal damnation. Mariana, like many other Catholics, was convinced that the widespread denunciations of papal supremacy in his time were due to princely selfishness and not to popular desire. To save the people who were not responsible for the tyrant's course, which would nevertheless lead them to damnation, it was desirable and necessary that the tyrant be killed. What was right and proper for government in this age was obviously determined by one's religious predilections.

Every state in Europe witnessed the unhappy conflict between religious sects, and in all of them religion and politics became badly confused. Spain was merely the most striking example. Here the traditions of centuries had operated to establish a close bond between Church and State. From the eighth century, when the Moslem Moors had conquered most of the peninsula, the ever-expanding Christian communities of Spain had conducted the offensive against the infidel. Church and State alike stood to profit from success. Little wonder, therefore, that the clergy encouraged the ambitions of Christian princes, or that the princes came to regard the Church as their most useful ally. The alliance thus arranged on the basis of mutual self-interest did not always produce reciprocal advantages. As the frontiers of the Mohammedan receded, the powerful princes, following the example of their Christian brothers elsewhere, set forth to bend the Church to their will. Without renouncing their faith, they made the Church an instrument of the State, which in turn was obedient to the Crown.

[1] Mariana's teachings were condemned by his own Order.

It was during the late fifteenth century that this union of Church and Crown in the latter's interest was completed. In 1469, the ruling families of Aragon and Castile were united through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, who subsequently completed the territorial unification of the peninsula by conquering Granada from the Moors in 1492. Simultaneously, these sovereigns subdued the nobility, expanded the central government, and enlarged the royal powers. As elsewhere, the establishment of royal absolutism necessitated the subordination of the Church, though in this case it was achieved without a serious struggle. Ferdinand and Isabella were genuinely religious, and at their behest the pope gave the Crown almost complete control over religious affairs. Almost at once they set out to reform the Church, at the same time reviving the medieval Inquisition and driving thousands of Jews from the kingdom. In all of this there was a curious mixture of real religious devotion and political cunning. National unity was to be made more secure by religious unity.

There was no alteration of this policy after the deaths of Ferdinand and Isabella, for their grandson and heir, Charles I, was by nature and inheritance devotedly attached to the twin causes of the Catholic religion and royal absolutism. It was this Charles who by the fortune of birth became Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire, and prince of the Netherlands, as well as king of Spain and its growing possessions beyond the seas. Little interested in his Spanish inheritance to begin with, except for the resources which it could bring him, and deeply absorbed by the complicated affairs of the continent during the period of the Protestant Revolution, Charles rarely visited Spain and almost never took a direct hand in its affairs. It was with genuine relief that he bestowed the Spanish crown together with that of the Netherlands and certain of his possessions in the Italian peninsula on his son Philip II in 1555 and 1556.

Philip II (1556-1598) ascended the throne at the time when Spain was regarded as the greatest power in Europe. Her explorers had planted the Spanish flag in remote regions of the world, from which an unprecedented stream of wealth flowed into the mother country. Her dynasty was directely related to the imperial Austrian Hapsburgs, partaking of its glories but also, unfortunately, of its troubles and misfortunes. Her armies were reputedly the most efficient on the continent, and her navy practically dominated the seas. That much of this prestige was based upon an insubstantial social, economic, and political foundation was not fully appreciated either in

Spain or abroad. Appearance was confused with reality. Fundamentally, Spain was too weak to endure the burdens of greatness. Her small population had been deprived of much of its best man power in fighting the wars of central Europe for Charles V, to say nothing of the drain upon her meager resources occasioned by these foreign enterprises. Agriculture was poorly organized and the peasants were victimized by the nobility. Her productive facilities and internal financial stability were jeopardized by the persistent persecution of the Moriscos and the Jews. All the precious booty of the new world could not repair these deficiencies.

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

PHILIP II. BY TITIAN (TIZIANO VECELLI) (1477-1576). PRADO MADRID.

This portrait was done 1550-1551 on Titian's second visit to Augsburg, in response to Charles V's urgent and repeated entreaties. It was sent to England in 1553 during the marriage negotiations between Philip and Mary Tudor.

Philip was endowed with none of the qualities of statesmanship necessary to see and repair these crumbling foundations. A patriotic Spaniard, conscientious and industrious in the exercise of his duties as he understood them, he lacked vision, foresight, and understanding. He allowed the economic condition of the country to deteriorate while he enlarged the royal powers and sought with sincere devotion to the Church to guarantee religious unity by force. His foreign policy, largely determined by religious considerations, embroiled his people in costly foreign adventures which ultimately spelled their ruin. When Philip died Spain was already rapidly descending to the position of a second- or third-rate power.

Nothing betrays more clearly his shortsighted zeal in the cause of the faith than the policies which he pursued in the Netherlands. This prosperous possession on the North Sea was not a dependency

of the Spanish Crown but a territory which had come by chance to share the same sovereign. The people, jealous of their traditional independence, regretted that fate had thrown them to Philip whom they heartily disliked, a feeling which Philip, incidentally, reciprocated. They had endured the heavy demands of Charles V for they regarded him as one of themselves, but they found it intolerable to supply Spain and a foreign prince with financial resources. Most of all, a strong and growing faction of Protestants there feared Philip's obvious plan of enforcing the Catholic doctrine upon them. Philip did nothing to dispel fear and dislike, but did much to accentuate them. He tampered with the local liberties of the provinces, made heavy exactions upon their subjects, quartered Spanish troops among them, and through the Inquisition attempted forcefully to impose Catholicism. Opposition to these measures did not at first take the form of open rebellion, but in 1566, when Philip had at long last agreed to lift the Inquisition, accumulating discontent among the Protestant element flared into an ugly and destructive insurrection. Abandoning all pretense of concession with this incident, Philip reinforced the troops in the provinces and despatched the Duke of Alva, Spain's ablest general, to command them. Alva established an arbitrary tribunal, popularly known as the "Council of Blood," to bring to execution thousands who were accused of treason, and he imposed enormous taxes upon the citizenry to force them into submission. Against such measures Catholics and Protestants alike united in revolution under the leadership of William the "Silent," Prince of Orange (1533-1584). The rebels were deficient in numbers and equipment but they more than compensated for this in fighting skill and strategy. Alva soon tired of the struggle with them and in 1573 requested that he be retired. Three years later, to show how completely the Spanish policy had failed, deputies of the seventeen provinces united to pledge continued resistance against Philip until the Inquisition should be abolished and their liberties restored.

All was not yet lost for Philip. In 1578 he appointed as governor of the Netherlands Alexander Farnese, a man with an enviable reputation as a soldier and diplomat. Recognizing fundamental differences between the ten southern provinces, which were Flemish and Catholic, and the seven northern provinces, which were Dutch and Protestant, Farnese set out to sow discord among them, particularly to arouse fear of the Calvinists among the Catholics. This policy succeeded and in 1579 the southern provinces organized a defensive league against their neighbors. Having thus separated Catholics from

Protestants, Farnese was able to turn the whole of his attention to the latter. This reduced but did not greatly simplify his task. The Dutch rebels pursued their former tactics, avoiding the open field, flooding the country to imperil the invader's infantry, and fitting out a fleet which effectively preyed upon Spanish shipping. Moreover, volunteers from Protestant countries of the north and especially from England came to the assistance of the rebels. Farnese made little progress under these circumstances, nor did any of his successors, though Philip obstinately persisted with the struggle. While the war continued, the seven provinces, now known as the Netherlands (Holland), declared their independence of the Spanish Crown in 1581. This was subsequently recognized by the Powers in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Spain was left with the ten southern provinces (Belgium today), and an impoverished treasury.

This futile struggle with the Dutch directly contributed to an even more fateful contest with England. From the beginning of his reign, Philip had taken more than a casual interest in English affairs, both because the island kingdom was rapidly developing into a formidable commercial rival and because his zeal in the cause of the Church made it appear desirable to use his influence there. It would be improper to say that religious motives dominated Philip's policies in this case, but they certainly played an important part in his general program of bringing England under Spanish control. During the early years of his reign, the prospects of achieving his objective seemed unusually good since through the influence of his father he was able to arrange a marriage alliance with Queen Mary Tudor. Mary, it will be remembered, was Catholic, and scarcely needed encouragement from her husband to repeal the Protestant settlement of the previous reign and return her country to the fold of the Church. Indeed on this matter of Catholic re-establishment Philip counselled moderation and delay rather than persecution and unreasonable haste which might lose all. Nevertheless, in the eyes of Englishmen who opposed Mary's Catholic policy, Philip was guilty. Among the Catholics who should have been his chief support Philip's plans of co-ordinating English foreign policy with that of Spain, and especially of using the English fleet against his continental rivals, were thoroughly distasteful. Mary's Catholic counsellors were first of all staunch patriots who disliked Philip as a foreigner and refused to do his bidding.

Frustrated during the reign of Mary his wife, Philip still hoped to achieve his objectives in England through co-operation with Eliz-

abeth who succeeded to the throne. To facilitate this result, he offered his hand in marriage but was politely rebuffed by the wily queen who had no intention of giving herself or her country to such a master. He then sought to win English friendship by patiently bearing Elizabeth's provocations which, however, grew bolder with each new sign of weakness on Philip's part. English freebooters, oftentimes operating in the name of the queen, wrought havoc upon Spanish shipping; Spanish gold was confiscated in English ports; and financial and military aid was sent to Philip's Protestant enemies on the continent. The only alternatives left to Spain were the use of intrigue and force, both of which Philip successively tried. For a time he plotted with Mary Queen of Scots, a Catholic and Elizabeth's rival for the English throne, but the plan was discovered and Mary paid with her head. Nothing daunted, Philip bribed English Catholics, conspired with the Irish, and encouraged zealous assassins to make an attempt upon Elizabeth's life. With the discovery of each new conspiracy, Elizabeth replied with further expeditions against Spanish merchants and additional aid to Protestants in Philip's dominions. At length because of England's active support of the Dutch revolutionaries, Philip determined to invade and subdue the island. For this purpose he fitted out an "Invincible Armada," the largest fleet in the history of Christendom, composed of 130 ships, 8,000 sailors, and 19,000 soldiers to be supplemented by 33,000 additional troops in the Netherlands, and embarked in 1588 for the shores of England. His one real hope of victory depended upon a possible division among the English people over religious issues, but this was denied him. Catholics and Protestants vied with each other in offering their aid to the queen for the defense of the Kingdom. A small but efficient fleet successfully stood off the Armada. A storm completed the destruction which they had begun, and less than a third of the great Armada returned to Spain.

Meanwhile, Philip was pursuing a less disastrous but no more successful adventure in France. The acute rivalry between the Huguenots and Catholics there precipitated a bloody civil war which soon merged with a spirited contest over succession to the throne. The Valois dynasty facing extinction with the death of Francis I's direct descendants, claims to the crown were advanced by representatives of the Guise family who were actively supported by the Catholic party, and by Henry of Navarre, a Huguenot and allied to the Huguenot party. The accession of the latter to the throne

was obnoxious to Philip who, to ensure Catholic success and at the same time to pull France into the Spanish orbit, intervened against Henry. This proved unavailing and Henry succeeded in taking the throne as Henry IV in 1589. Philip nevertheless continued the struggle until in the last year of his life he found it expedient to sign a treaty of peace with Henry and abandon his attempts to interfere with the government of France. The fruit of this hapless enterprise was an aroused and aggressive French nationalism which eventually dealt the death blow to Spanish predominance in Europe.

These uniform failures of Philip's European policy were hardly balanced by his victory over the Ottoman Turks at Lepanto in 1571, important as this achievement was. During the sixteenth century, the Turks after sweeping over the Balkan peninsula and threatening central Europe began to challenge the Christian strongholds of the Mediterranean. Christians were properly alarmed and the Pope, Paul V, called for a Crusade. An international navy was formed for the purpose to which Philip gladly contributed Spanish galleys and a courageous commander, Don John of Austria. The success which he achieved at Lepanto could hardly be accounted a Spanish victory alone, though the Spanish people and Philip basked in its glory.

The exorbitant drain of so many fruitless enterprises upon Spain's meager resources and man power can be easily imagined. The royal treasury was bankrupt; the country ruined, all in vain. Spain had acquired nothing to compensate for heavy losses and what is even worse, the Spanish people were left through Philip's shortsighted domestic policies without the moral and material means to effect recovery. The dream of re-establishing the universal dominion of Catholicism had evaporated. Yet to the end Philip did not despair for he held the unshakable belief that he was doing God's will, and that ultimately his objectives would be realized. Many of his subjects shared this unwarranted optimism and despite all of their sovereign's manifest failures clung to their faith in Philip the "Wise" and the "Good."

With all of Spain's inherent weakness, the fiction of Spanish greatness was not dispelled with Philip's death (1598). It lingered during the reign of his son Philip III (1598-1621) and much of the reign of his grandson Philip IV (1621-1665). In large measure this was due to conditions abroad which operated to preserve the peace for some time, and hence to keep Spain from becoming fatally embroiled with powers whose material strength and military might outdistanced her. Indeed, for the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Spain seemed to be unusually well off. The flow of colonial

wealth was partially restored, though already England was profiting more from Spanish colonies than was Spain herself. Native energies found an outlet in colonial organization and administration, and Spanish art as well as Spanish manners and dress attained a European ascendancy. This was the time when great artists such as Velasquez, Murillo, El Greco, and Peter Paul Rubens flourished; and it is also the great era of Spanish literature, marked by the achievements of Miguel Cervantes, author of *Don Quixote*, and Lope de Vega, the most prolific and one of the most resourceful dramatists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The revival was superficial. Spain still suffered from dry rot: the economic organization which had been poorly adjusted to profit from colonial wealth remained unchanged; and the unfortunate religious policies which sapped the moral and material strength of her most productive citizens were continued and even made more rigorous. Moreover, concern with the religious situation abroad remained an active force in the Crown's foreign policy, although the experience of Philip II should have given his successors pause. Besides, Philip III and Philip IV clung to the dynastic alliance with Austria, and following in the traditions of Charles V co-ordinated their foreign policies with their Austrian cousins. All this meant that Spain continued to waste its resources upon adventures which even if successful would have been profitless. The combination of this myopic foreign policy and continued decadence at home soon precipitated Spain's collapse.

This came with the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) in which Spain as well as most of the rest of Europe became involved, though it began in the German Holy Roman Empire and was fought for the most part on German soil. No event in the history of this period reveals more clearly the extent to which religious and political issues had become confused. In its inception, the war was a logical culmination of the religious feud precipitated in the German countries by the Protestant Revolutions and aggravated by the Catholic Reformation, but from the very beginning rival political ambitions played an important part. Catholic and Protestant states outside intervened ostensibly to defend the cause of faith, though always with an eye to other advantages which might be gained. As the war progressed, political issues came to overshadow and completely obscure the religious element, but religion still remained a powerful argument in defense of intervention. In the end, the war was to show how fruitless it was to enforce religious views upon people and hence was to

prove an important factor in furthering religious toleration and in effecting a more complete separation of religious and political concerns.

The Thirty Years' War was an outgrowth of deficiencies in the Peace of Augsburg and of a spirited dispute over its interpretation. It will be remembered that according to this document the German princes were allowed to choose between the Lutheran and the Catholic doctrines. No provision was made for Calvinists so that these, who had become numerous in the Rhenish district especially, remained thoroughly dissatisfied. Besides, there was widespread misunderstanding over the interpretation of the "ecclesiastical reservations" allowed in the peace. The Lutherans had been confirmed in their seizures of church property up to the year 1555, and assumed that subsequent withdrawals of Catholic communicants from the Catholic Church in favor of Lutheranism, especially on the part of greater ecclesiastics, gave the Lutherans possession of former Catholic property. To this the Catholics naturally objected with increasing vigor as their courage and strength revived with the successes of the Reformation. The dispute over this matter, together with the discontent of the Calvinist elements, reached a critical stage early in the seventeenth century. Under the leadership of the Calvinist Count of the Palatinate the Protestants united for their defense into a Protestant League in 1608, and in the following year the Catholics joined under the duke of Bavaria. An armed truce prevailed between these two factions for a decade before a local rebellion in Bohemia, directed against the Catholic Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, precipitated hostilities.

The rebellion which broke out in Bohemia was only partly religious. It is true that the Czech nobility were generally Protestant and fearful that Ferdinand II of Austria whom they were asked to accept as king would tamper with their religious liberties. Ferdinand, who had thus been singled out for succession to the Austrian throne, had indeed a reputation for devotion to the Catholic cause which was bound to arouse concern among the Protestant elements of the Empire. But it appears that the Czech nobility were less concerned with religious matters than they were about their own nationalistic aspirations. Whatever were their motives, they refused to accept Ferdinand and committed a series of acts against the Austrian agents which were calculated to precipitate war. They then proceeded to elect Frederick of the Palatinate as King of Bohemia, hoping that they could thus enlist the support of the German Protestants.

This proved to be a vain hope. The Lutherans would have been happy to see a Protestant victory in Bohemia, especially if it were not Calvinist, but they thought the time inopportune, since they thought concessions might yet be won peacefully. The Bohemians were therefore left without sufficient support to face the Catholic armies which Austria assembled. Spanish troops were acquired, and these, supported by the forces of the Catholic League commanded by General Tilly, suppressed the revolution.

The victory of the Catholics aroused the fears of the Protestants, since the Catholic Emperor at once set about suppressing Protestantism in Bohemia, and deprived Frederick of Palatinate of his possessions because of his defections. Incidentally, Frederick's territory was given to the Catholic duke of Bavaria. This threatened to destroy the balance of power between the Catholics and Protestants in the Empire. The latter organized for defense with the assistance of the Lutheran king of Denmark, Christian IV. The resulting conflict which lasted from 1625 to 1629 ended in another Catholic victory, largely because of the brilliant strategy of the Duke of Wallenstein, a freebooter and knight of the Empire who mainly out of zeal for imperial unity organized a motley international army of adventurers to support the Emperor. Flushed with victory, Ferdinand II issued (1629) an Edict of Restitution, restoring to the Catholics all of that property which the Catholics claimed had been illegally absorbed by the Protestants since 1555. This policy was most unwise for it made peace, which the Lutherans would probably have agreed to with minor concessions, quite impossible. Even the Duke of Wallenstein regarded the Emperor's action as most impolitic and refused to co-operate in enforcing the edict.

The Protestants were not without the means or the help necessary to frustrate the Emperor's designs. Across the Baltic Sea the Lutheran king of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus (1611-1632), had watched the course of affairs in Germany with growing interest, and now signalized his intention of coming to the support of the Lutherans. He was hardly motivated by concern for the cause of Protestantism. Sweden was already a great power, dominant in the Baltic, and Gustavus saw in Germany's plight an opportunity to strengthen his control there. It was this political advantage which the Swedish king had chiefly in mind when he landed on German soil in 1630, and with Protestant German allies, challenged the Emperor and the Catholics. The Swedish phase of the Thirty Years' War lasted until the spring of 1632 when Gustavus Adolphus was

killed in action against the army of Wallenstein, who had been prevailed upon to come to the Emperor's aid. By that time the Empire was already exhausted, both Catholics and Protestants showing a willingness to lay down arms if a reasonable compromise could be effected. As a matter of fact, such a compromise was devised in a treaty negotiated at Prague (1635) among the Catholic and Protestant princes. The government of France had been taking an increasing interest in German affairs and regarded it as unwise to terminate the contest until both Austria and Spain were rendered completely impotent. France made it impossible to enforce the Peace of Prague.

The management of affairs in France was in the hands of Cardinal Richelieu who, despite his religious affiliations, was resolved to take up the cause of the German Protestants in order to humble the Hapsburgs. It should be observed that France was surrounded by Hapsburgs; Spain across the Pyrenees, the Spanish Netherlands, imperial territories along the Rhine, and Spanish and Austrian possessions in the Italian peninsula. The close dynastic alliance between Spain and Austria and the co-ordination of their foreign policies made it seem desirable to French nationalists to use any and every opportunity to break the Hapsburg encirclement. The religious war in Germany, with Austria and Spain deeply involved on the Catholic side, therefore could hardly be passed by lightly. Richelieu was resolved that it should not terminate until his larger political objectives had been realized. For this reason, he had encouraged with subsidies Sweden's intervention and when that had terminated, employed intrigue to frustrate the enforcement of the Peace of Prague. By 1635, French troops began simultaneous engagements with Spain and the German Catholics, and continued these with varying fortunes throughout the next thirteen years in Germany and the next twenty-four years with Spain. There was no alteration of policy after Richelieu died (1642), for his successor, Cardinal Mazarin, pursued the same objectives. This French period of the Thirty Years' War reveals how completely religious issues had been subordinated to political ambition. Protestant and Catholic princes were compelled to continue the useless conflict long after they were prepared to compromise in order that France might weaken her political enemies. It was not until Austria and Spain were hopelessly weakened that peace in Germany and Europe could be assured.

Negotiations for peace were begun as early as 1641, but affairs in Germany were so hopelessly confused and the French so insistent

upon a peace with victory that these could not be terminated until seven years later. The Peace of Westphalia then concluded (1648) is one of the great landmarks in the history of Europe. It brought an end to more than a century of religio-political wars; it signalized the passing of Spain as the greatest power of Europe and the simultaneous rise of France to continental pre-eminence; and it established the state system of Europe which with many intervening changes persists to our day. Among the important peace settlements of modern times, Westphalia holds a place with the peace of Vienna in 1815 and the peace of Versailles in 1919.

The Thirty Years' War having ostensibly begun over religious rivalries it might be supposed that the peace which terminated it would have been concerned largely with a religious settlement. It is indicative of the subordination of religious issues that the Peace of Westphalia dealt primarily with political matters. To satisfy France Austria, though left with its hereditary possessions, was deprived of her privileged place in the Holy Roman Empire. Each prince there was left with practically unlimited authority over his own affairs. Moreover, France was given most of Alsace and was confirmed in her seizure of important fortified towns in the Rhenish provinces. Sweden was given privileged positions at the mouths of the Oder, Elbe, and Weser rivers, thus consolidating her dominion over the Baltic area. The Protestant electorate and potential rival of Austria in the Germanies, Brandenburg, was enlarged. Several other important modifications of frontiers in the Empire were arranged. Finally, among its political settlements, the Peace of Westphalia confirmed the independence of both Switzerland and the Netherlands.

As to the religious settlements, the treaty extended to Calvinists in Germany the same liberties which had been ensured to Lutherans and Catholics in the Religious Peace of Augsburg; it confirmed in the possession of Protestants and Catholics all ecclesiastical properties held as of the year 1624; and, perhaps most significant of all, it allowed each German prince complete liberty to determine within his own territory what the religious status of his subjects should be. This latter provision opened the way for religious toleration among the more advanced and more liberal German states.

The Thirty Years' War was a tragic way of learning the futility of religious intolerance and especially the folly of attempting to enforce religious uniformity. The Germans who paid the price were left with a devastated country and a population reduced from approximately eighteen to ten million. It was a long time before the

Germans recovered from this nightmare. Yet a lesson had been learned, and that was to be continually re-enforced by the lessons of science and common sense.

While men fought the Thirty Years' War and negotiated the Peace of Westphalia, intellectuals propounded the doctrines of religious toleration. Buttressed by the achievements of science which revealed more and more how untenable many of the mysteries of revealed religion were, men of learning pointed to the absurdity of religious fanaticism. These influential scholars asserted that religion was a matter of personal conviction and that matters involving personal conviction should ordinarily be outside the province of governmental action. At least not force but only persuasion could operate effectively in this sphere of human concerns. The argument was even advanced that the religious affiliations of his subjects should generally be a matter of indifference to the prince, since his concern should be not with their salvation but with their material welfare and happiness. All of this does not mean that the advocates of religious toleration in this period had necessarily reached the stage where they would completely divorce religion and politics, broad as might have been their theoretical arguments in defense of religious freedom. Most of them partially nullified their own proposals, like John Locke of England, who, while supporting one's right to his own religious opinions, would not agree to allow Catholicism on the political ground that a Catholic was pledged to support the pope, and would not have given Protestant Dissenters equal political rights with the Anglicans. Despite these limitations, the exponents of religious toleration in this age laid the broad basis for the extension of religious liberties, at a time when practical politics seemed to make that possible. As trade grew, and dynastic ambitions enlarged, religious issues receded. The existence of religious uniformity seemed less important than it once did. Largely for this reason and partly because religious intolerance was intellectually insupportable, European governments slowly, falteringly at times, but nevertheless continuously widened the scope of religious liberties.

The country which extended the broadest religious freedom in this age was the Netherlands. The reasons for this are clear. The division between Protestants and Catholics was nearly equal, so that the little state, emerging from a bitter struggle for freedom, could not indulge in the luxury of religious feud. Besides, the Netherlands was the most prosperous commercial state as well as the most culti-

vated state of Europe so that here the new materialism and intellectual freedom were happily combined to repress religious fanaticism. Toleration was not always complete, Catholics being sometimes repressed, but, on the whole, the Decree of Toleration of 1578 providing that in religion "everyone shall remain free as he shall wish to answer to God" was scrupulously applied. Elsewhere, religious freedom was not nearly so complete though the tendencies were in that direction. In England official policy wavered between persecution of dissenters and Catholics, according to the changes of political fortune. Persecution never became a settled policy, however, and for the most part heresies were winked at though they were regarded as pernicious vices. After the Glorious Revolution of 1689, limited rights were legally accorded to most Protestant Dissenters, though not Catholics, by the Act of Toleration. Only communicants of the Anglican Church could hold political office however, but this limitation was never strictly enforced. Protestant Dissenters found methods of gaining admission to office, and the Catholics who apparently secured no relief and who could have been persecuted were left, for the most part, unmolested.

There was still no thought of extending religious liberty in Spain, but on the rest of the continent a good deal of progress was made in that direction. The Peace of Westphalia opened the door to official toleration of sects in the German countries and this was steadily though slowly accorded. In France also, a beginning was made, although unfortunately its benefits were destroyed eventually by Louis XIV. In 1598, Henry IV of France, a Huguenot originally, in order to ensure domestic peace, abjured his Protestantism, but simultaneously issued a famous edict, the Edict of Nantes, by which he accorded the Protestant Huguenots liberty of worship in their towns, and even gave them a measure of political independence. These latter concessions were regarded as dangerous to the central government by Cardinal Richelieu and were withdrawn, but the privilege of free worship was preserved until Louis XIV withdrew the decree in 1685. It is clear that in France as well as in most of the rest of Europe much remained to be done before religious freedom was fully realized, but at least by the end of the Thirty Years' War a substantial beginning had been made.

CALVIN, THE POPE, AND LUTHER

This caricature, dated "Paris, 1600," satirizes the tripartite sectarian conflict of the sixteenth century. Luther and Calvin were both dead, but their followers, as the artist suggests, were still attacking both each other and the Catholics. Notice the overthrown bishop under Calvin's feet and the papal bull upon which Luther is stepping. The former refers to the Protestant action in Switzerland; the latter, to Luther's public burning of the papal bull which excommunicated him.

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Chapter XVI

The Growth of Absolute Monarchies

A. The rhythm of government

Plato long ago declared that there were six forms of government possible, three good and three bad. The good governments, which ruled under law, were: monarchy, the governance of one; aristocracy, the dominance of the rich; and majority rule. Their three counterparts, made evil by the fact that they were not checked or limited by law, were: tyranny; oligarchy; and rule of the *demos* (mob), or democracy.

Since Plato's day many political theorists and historians have sought and some have professed to discover a sort of rhythmic alteration among these forms. For example, it has been suggested that majority rule degenerates into mob rule, bringing chaos and anarchy. In time there then emerges a small group, or oligarchy, which bends the confusion to its own ends and seizes the power, bringing some order from disorder. One of the oligarchs, it has been further suggested, by ability, craft and fortune makes himself master of his peers, emerging as a tyrant. Success and time enable him to forsake despotism for the ways of law and he becomes a monarch. Exigencies of circumstance, such as personal weakness, tend to produce a division of power under law and so replace the monarchy with an aristocracy. The final phases of the cycle are held to be the extension of power to the majority and its degeneration into democracy.

Such an orderly scheme appeals to the human mind which loves to promote its feeling of security by artificially and arbitrarily attempting to reduce the disorderliness of nature, including human, to logical order. But historians today are wary of what an earlier generation thought to be the "laws of history." The more we know of it, the less likely are we to think of human development as being a logical process of orderly evolution. If there be laws which govern

human development, we are not yet in a position to formulate them. Nevertheless, some generalizations as to tendencies are both permissible and desirable. The reader must once more remind himself that these are hypotheses, not proven facts, and that further knowledge may either confirm or disprove them.

Among the recurrent phenomena of human history is the emergence of strong governments after a period of confusion and divided authority. The new government has varied in form, in composition, in the means used to obtain power, and in the method of exercising power. In short, the scheme of alteration discussed above has not occurred in practice. But these many differences should not obscure the general truth that chaos and weakness in government have again and again been followed by the appearance of strong individuals or groups of individuals who have gathered the power into their hands and replaced the disunity with unity, the weakness with force, and the disorder with order of their own liking and making. So often has this happened that any attempt at full exemplification would be a virtual recapitulation of events already discussed. The "Rule of the Thirty" in Athens after the Athenian defeat by Sparta; the rise of the dictator, Julius Cæsar; the usurpation of the Merovingian scepter by Pepin are all cases in point. So, also, were the rule of such men as Henry II of England and Philip II of France. Early modern history has its Tudors, its Bourbons, and its Cromwells; modern history, its Napoleons and Metternichs; recent history, its Bismarcks; and contemporary times, their Communists, Fascists, and Nazis. It is indeed an oft-told tale.

This chapter concerns itself with illustrating this great trend by material drawn from the histories of sixteenth-century England and sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France. Recent discussions, with their emphasis upon the economic, social, and intellectual growths, have only touched in passing these political developments. It is now the purpose to draw these together that they may show still another figure of the great pattern of the human past. The story begins where it left off [1]: with the weakness, the disorder, the confusions which followed upon the Hundred Years' War of France and England.

[1] See Chapter IX.

B. Tudor paternalism

The Tudor family, five of whom became sovereigns of England,[1] rose to power as a result of dynastic feuds. When Henry V died in 1422 the royal title passed to his infant son and namesake, but the royal power became the prize for which the great barons of the King's Council contended. From these quarrels there grew the Wars of the Roses (1455-1485), a series of feuds among the nobility all of whom sought to increase their power at the expense of the debile Crown. This was not a popular struggle, but one between ambitious barons which finally culminated in war between the families of Lancaster and York. This generation-long combat reduced England to a state of anarchy. Rarely have English fortunes been at so low an ebb as they were when Henry Tudor, wearing the red rose of Lancaster, defeated Richard, champion of the white rose of York, at the Battle of Bosworth Field in 1485. It was a measure of the English weakness that the triumph of Lancaster was in large part due to the aid which Henry Tudor received from the French king, Charles VIII. Yet to the English people this long feud was a blessing in disguise for it so weakened the great nobles that the Tudors were able to rebuild the monarchy and, through it, to set England on the high-road of power and prosperity.

The first Tudor who, with the acquiescence of Parliament, assumed the crown as Henry VII, was by circumstance and by his own character assigned to an unspectacular role. Young in years—he was only twenty-eight in 1485—war, intrigue, and exile had so hardened his body and sharpened his wits that he appeared much older. Crafty, shrewd, hard-headed and hard-bitten, Henry VII had none of the glamor or the popular appeal of his son, Henry VIII, or of his granddaughter, Elizabeth. His task, however, called less for popularity than for the qualities he possessed.

There were four major problems which Henry had to solve. First, a parvenu, though of the blood royal, he had to secure his grasp on the scepter against the insurrections and intrigues of the Yorkists. His marriage with Elizabeth of York did not end this contest though, by uniting the two houses, it simplified the problem of succession for Henry's children. Second, the habits of civil strife were strong and the authority of the Crown limited and feeble. The

[1] Henry VII, 1485-1509; Henry VIII, 1509-1547; Edward VI, 1547-1553; Mary, 1553-1558; and Elizabeth, 1558-1603.

rebellious barons had to be reduced to subordination if the monarchy were to unite the country under its rule. Third, the royal treasury, emptied by the long wars, had to be replenished. Fourth, the habit of interference in English affairs by alien rulers had to be broken. Of these four, the strengthening of the kingship at the expense of everything else and the elimination of foreign interference were chiefly responsible for that growth in English nationalism which characterized the Tudor regime.

It is a striking thing, and no accident, that few of England's noble families today can trace their nobility further back than the Tudor period. It was a consistent Tudor policy to continue the weakening of the old nobility which the Wars of the Roses had begun. The chief instrument which Henry VII used to rebuild the royal authority was the King's Council, and, more especially, its inner circle, the Privy Council. Once the reserve of the nobility, the Privy Council was transformed by the Tudors into an agent of the royal will. Under them and by them, councilors were chosen not by reason of birth but for skill, ability, and loyalty to the monarch. Chosen mainly from the cresceive middle class, these men were often raised to the peerage as a reward for services rendered. They remained, and this was a cardinal point, the servants of the Crown.

The second Tudor instrument was Parliament whose actions and deliberations were largely guided for the Crown by the Privy Councilors. During the reign of Henry VII and the forepart of the reign of Henry VIII, Parliament was seldom summoned. Even after that, Parliament long remained the echo of the Tudor will. But, and this was highly significant, the Tudors always went through the motions of consulting with Parliament. By tampering with elections, by means fair and foul, they kept Parliament under their control though they maintained the fiction of government by Crown and Parliament. This had three important results. First, it trained the parliamentarians in the ways and means of governing and gave them that education by experience which is necessary for any successful assumption of power. Second, it so built up the tradition of the role of Parliament in the government that no monarch, as the Stuarts were to discover to their cost, could safely ignore it. Finally, it laid the foundation for the seventeenth-century rise of Parliament to a place superior to that of the Crown. One further characteristic of the Tudor parliaments should be noted: the increasing numbers and importance in them of the bourgeoisie and of the country gentry.

Third of the Tudor agencies in the recovery of royal power

were the courts. These were of two classes: the ordinary courts, administering Common Law; and the prerogative courts, which more and more introduced the concepts of Roman Civil Law with its premise of an all-powerful executive. The seventeenth century was to see a bitter struggle between the two courts and the two laws, but under the Tudors the latter helped to rehabilitate and strengthen the former. Most important of the prerogative courts was the Court of the Star Chamber, which began as a sort of committee of the Privy Council. Strong enough to bend even the few remaining great barons to its will, the Star Chamber was prized by Tudor England as champion of the weak against the strong.

None of the Tudors had either a standing army or a centralized bureaucracy. The lack was largely supplied by the country gentry who not only rallied men to their sovereign's support but also, as Justices of the Peace, became the agents of royal power. Amateur and independent, since though holding royal commissions they were unpaid, these Justices performed a unique and essential service to the Crown. By Elizabeth's time, their multifarious duties included: the arrest of criminals; trials of petty offenses; maintenance of roads, bridges, and gaols; regulation of wages and prices; and administration of the laws governing the treatment of the poor. Government by the Tudors was essentially government by the Privy Council, the courts, and the Justices.

These, then, were the chief instruments of Tudor absolutism, for the successors of Henry VII built upon the foundations he laid. The full details of his ways and means are no longer of special moment and it will suffice our purpose to suggest only a few highlights of his reign.

Partly because it was his nature to be so, but mainly because the exigencies of circumstance demanded it, Henry has won notoriety as the most parsimonious of England's kings. At the beginning of his reign, when the treasury was wholly bare, Parliament granted him the income from the customs dues for life. Only five times thereafter did he ask Parliament for money, yet when he died there was a surplus of approximately £1,500,000 in the treasury. He had accomplished the unprecedented by practising strict economy; by making sure that he received every farthing due him from the customs, the crown lands, and from the right of escheat; and by methods of extortion which often resembled downright robbery. His ministers, Dudley and Empson, bore the brunt of the unpopularity of

such measures and eventually Henry VIII rewarded his father's too-zealous servants with execution. Such was often the Tudor way.

Henry's foreign policy aimed at the freeing of England from alien tutelage. This was far more than a matter of royal or national prestige; it was vital to both Tudor and English independence. Early in his reign, Henry had to face the threat of foreign-backed pretenders to his throne. The first, that of Symonds and Simnel, supported by Margaret of Burgundy, and launched in Ireland which was strongly Yorkist, was quelled with relative ease. The second was much more serious, and for a decade the pretender, one Perkin Warbeck, was the center of plot and counterplot which led Henry into wars, treaties, and alliances with continental rulers, involving even a "war of sanctions" against the Flemish wool merchants. Three times, twice from Scotland, Henry's enemies attempted an invasion of England. Three times they were repelled and in the end Henry emerged definitely the victor. One by-product of this troubled affair is worthy of note. To punish Ireland, which had supported both plots against him, Henry sent Sir Edward Poynings to re-establish English authority. This, Sir Edward could do only in a small area around Dublin, known as the Pale, but he forced the Irish Parliament to accept the Act (1494) which bears his name and which rendered the Parliament wholly inferior to the English Crown and Parliament. But peace with Ireland was not to be bought so cheaply. Henry VIII and his immediate successors managed to keep comparative peace though their authority never extended beyond the Pale. In the reign of Elizabeth an accumulation of woes, exacerbated by bitter religious partisanship, brought three serious rebellions in which the English and the Irish both distinguished themselves for their vicious and horrible brutalities. More than half of the Queen's special war fund was expended in an effort to conquer the Irish. The victory of her general, Mountjoy, near the end of her reign seemed, incorrectly, to have achieved this aim.

The foreign policy of the first Henry was tortuous and, in his later years, often fruitless. It did, however, successfully eliminate alien interference in English affairs and it also achieved one success whose consequences were far-reaching. After a series of intricate negotiations, which were touched with the ludicrous by haggling over the dowry to be paid, a marriage alliance was arranged with Spain which brought Katharine of Aragon to England as bride of Arthur, Henry's eldest son (1501). Though her bridegroom died within a few months, Katharine remained in England, becoming

eventually the wife of Arthur's brother, Henry, and mother of the fourth Tudor sovereign, the Catholic Mary.

The reign of the first Tudor was stable, not brilliant, and therein lay its merit. The royal absolutism had been established; the power of the great nobles broken; and the Tudors entrenched upon a throne which was no longer menaced by threats of foreign intervention. Pedestrian rather than spectacular, lacking in popular appeal, Henry VII laid a solid foundation for the glories of his house and the power of his nation. If many of the methods he used in achieving his ends were both unjust and dishonest, he merely reflected the general practice of his age. His death evoked no general mourning, and the accession of his well-favored son, Henry VIII (1509-1547), seemed to promise well.

Young King Henry VIII—he was eighteen in 1509—was a product of the age of the English renaissance, and he shared many of the characteristics of the heroic figures of the Italian movement. Handsome in face and endowed with a fine physique, he was a glamorous figure of a king. Bluff, hearty, lusty lover of life, arrogant with the pride of youth, keenly aware of his power, gifted with personal charm, Henry had also a stubborn will and an irascible temper. A man of many talents, both physical and intellectual, Henry was an excellent archer, a fine horseman, a champion at tennis, and a vigorous and powerful jouster. Well-educated, he was master of four languages and gave promise of being an enthusiastic scholar. Well-rounded, he was a great lover of music, a composer of some talent and able to play many musical instruments. All in all, he was the epitome of most that was good and most that was bad among his subjects.

With his throne secure, his treasury filled, and his realm in order, the young Henry was well content to leave the business of government largely in the hands of his competent ministers. Chief among them was Thomas, Cardinal Wolsey, like most of the Tudor servants, a product of the bourgeoisie. Able, industrious, loyal to his master, but arrogant, ambitious, and cursed with a furious temper, Wolsey won his reputation as an organizer and diplomat early in Henry's reign. In rapid succession he became bishop, Archbishop of York, cardinal, papal legate, and finally chancellor. While the king occupied himself with a round of pleasures Wolsey, from 1516 to 1526, was virtually supreme in Church and State, often more master than man.

Since the domestic situation was well in hand, Henry and Wolsey were able to devote their major energies to the persecution of a vigorous foreign policy. Partly because he was bound to Spain by his marriage with Katharine, partly because of tradition, and partly because of personal jealousies, Henry embarked upon a policy of hostility to France which kept the two powers almost constantly at swords' points from 1511 to 1529. Wolsey, however, preferred peace to war, diplomacy to fighting. Under him, England began the "Balance of Power" policy which she has so consistently followed. Very briefly, the theory of the "balance of power" was, and is, that by siding now with one nation, now with the other, England could prevent the strengthening of any power to the point where it could dominate Europe. Often, in practice, this has meant less keeping the peace through a maintenance of relative equality than the dominance of England who was able to gain her ends by giving or withholding her support. For some years, Wolsey played this game with great skill, but eventually he blundered by backing the Hapsburg, Charles V, against the declining power of Francis I of France. The result was the establishment of Hapsburg supremacy which menaced both France and England.

The ambitious foreign policy of king and chancellor was expensive and the Crown soon found itself in need of funds. Successive parliaments granted many subsidies which were raised only by heavy taxation. When this proved too unpopular, resort was had to loans, voluntary at first, later forced. In 1523, for example, the clergy were required to grant the king ten percent of the annual income from their benefices for the next five years. Two years later, Wolsey sought to exact another loan from the clergy which would have amounted to one-fourth of their yearly income and from the laity to the amount of one-sixth of their income. This was too much. The people rose in their wrath and refused to pay, and the scheme was dropped. The odium of these financial exactions fell on Wolsey whose unpopularity made it easier for the king to rid himself of his minister in 1529.

The real reason for Wolsey's fall from power was not, however, his unpopularity. For reasons elsewhere related, Henry determined in 1527 to divorce Queen Katharine. Although he disapproved, Wolsey loyally sought to arrange the "king's secret matter." He failed, and it was primarily to this failure that his dismissal from office and subsequent arrest were due. He died in 1530 while under arrest and waiting trial on charges of high treason.

The great business of the last half of Henry's reign was the divorce from Katharine which led to the break with Rome and the subsequent establishment of the Henrican church. Since this has already been discussed in another setting,[1] there remains only to tie together a few loose ends.

Henry's various marital adventures, which bulk so large in "popular" history and fiction, were important only in regard to the succession. By an act of 1546, Henry directed that the order of succession should be: (1) Edward, son of the third wife, Jane Seymour; (2) Mary, daughter of Katharine; and (3) Elizabeth, daughter of Anne Boleyn.[2]

In the field of foreign affairs, Henry in 1536 made Wales an integral part of his realm; twice repulsed Franco-Scottish invasions from the north; and after three years of fighting, won a sterile victory from France in 1546. Of much more consequence was his creation of a royal navy, unique not only in function but also in the design of the ships which for the first time permitted the mounting of heavy cannon amidships and so made possible the firing of broadsides.

At first sight, the legacies of Henry VIII seem in contrast with those of his father. He had broken with the Roman Catholic Church, he had squandered his treasure on a vainglorious foreign policy and he left his son and successor, Edward VI, a treasury deficit. Yet in some respects he had followed the course charted by his father. He had continued to use the Privy Council, the courts, the Parliament, and the squirearchy as instruments of the royal will, and he had, on occasion, demonstrated to them all and sundry that they were naught but his agents. His despotism, despite some lip-service to others, was as complete as was ever any continental monarch's. So well had his people learned the habit of obedience to a national sovereign that though the troublous reigns of Edward and Mary were filled with plot and intrigue there was no return to the anarchy of the pre-Tudor England. Unscrupulous, selfish, and cruel as he was, Henry VIII left his children unquestioned heirs to a crown whose power over the peoples it represented was complete.

The reigns of Edward VI (1547-1553) and Mary (1553-1558) were interludes. Weak and sickly, the boy Edward was the uncom-

[1] See Chapter XIV for the story of the Church under the Tudors.

[2] Henry's other wives were: Anne of Cleves, whom he divorced; Catherine Howard, whom he executed on charges of adultery; and Catherine Parr, who outlived him.

prehending tool of aristocratic factions who contended for power. First Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset, well-intentioned but ineffective, then John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, scheming and unscrupulous, held the reins of power. Both failed in their foreign policies, and neither was able to halt the social and economic discontent which sprang in part from the dislocation of prices due to the influx of gold and silver from the New World. The premature Protestantism, the most significant development of the Edwardian reign, has already been discussed.

The two outstanding features of the reign of Mary were her attempts to restore Catholicism, which has also been treated before, and her marriage to the Spaniard, Philip II. Exceedingly unpopular with her people, this marriage seriously curtailed the English freedom of action and menaced the future independence of the country. Combined with the Catholic revival, it caused a serious insurrection led by Thomas Wyatt (1554), but Mary went her unwise way. Among the misdeeds of which, in English eyes, he was guilty, Philip, by involving England in a Spanish war with France, was chiefly responsible for the loss of Calais, last English holding in France. Small wonder that the death of "Bloody Mary," as she was called for her religio-political persecutions, was hailed with joy and thanksgiving.

Last, and in many respects the greatest of the Tudors was Elizabeth, queen from 1558 to 1603. Tall, red-haired, with an olive complexion and rather sharp features, Elizabeth at her accession was better looking than portraits of a later date would indicate, but she was never a beauty. In character she was a true Tudor. Able and energetic, an opportunist *par excellence*, a shrewd judge of men, and undeniably a great sovereign, Elizabeth had also the less attractive qualities of pride, conceit, arrogance, a nasty temper, and a profane and unbridled tongue. It is revealing that none who were closely associated with her bore her personal loyalty or affection. It was among her people who knew her less intimately that she was popular, and she was very popular. Her early life had been adventurous and thrilling but tragic. Her mother was executed while she was still a small baby, and during most of her girlhood she suffered from the stigma, publicly pronounced by her gallant father, of bastardy. With equal chivalry, her foster-father blackened her adolescence by involving her in an unsavory scandal. Small wonder, then, that she lacked proper delicacy and modesty!

Like her father and grandfather before her, Elizabeth depended

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

QUEEN ELIZABETH. PORTRAIT BY FEDERIGO ZUCCARO, IN THE ACCADEMIA DI BELLE ARTI, SIENA.

heavily upon the middle class not only for her counselors [1] but for her popularity and strength. Indeed, the close alliance between the monarchy and the middle class, to the mutual strengthening of both, was an outstanding characteristic of the Tudor regime. The personnel of the Tudor instruments of government—the Council, the Parliament, the courts, and the Justices of the Peace—was largely middle class. In return, the Tudors favored this group in many ways.

The basis of English prosperity had been for centuries the pro-

[1] Her most noteworthy ministers, William Cecil, later Lord Burghley, who served her faithfully and well for forty years, and the equally efficient Sir Francis Walsingham, were both from the middle class.

duction of wool and the manufacture of woolens. By Tudor times, England had become the most important exporter of woolen cloth which was produced mostly under the domestic system. This means that the labor of spinning and weaving was done by individuals and families in their own homes for middlemen who bought the raw wool, arranged for its manufacture into cloth, and sold the finished product. A growing demand for English woolens led to an increase in sheep-raising, which, in turn, profoundly affected the whole economic system. Sheep-raising required more land than subsistence farming, and to meet the new need some men "enclosed" large tracts of land for this use. This enclosure movement, so-called, worked hardship on the peasant since it deprived him of the common lands of the village and sometimes even of his own acreage. But the landlord class was well represented in Parliament, and Enclosure Acts, or grants of permission to enclose lands, were many. This not only literally displaced many people, but it also caused a decline in the production of foodstuffs which more and more had to be imported. In turn, this brought an increase in trade which led to a further growth in numbers and wealth of the mercantile group. Finally, it was this group which was most vociferous in its demands for a merchant marine, a navy, and government support in trade.

From Henry VII on, all the Tudors heeded this call and "English control of English trade" became a deliberate policy. The "Navigation Acts," which sought to exclude aliens and alien vessels from the English carrying trade, were revived and extended. Commercial treaties opening new markets were negotiated, or, alternatively, trade wars were engaged in with, among others, the Flemings and the Spanish. Voyages of discovery, like those of Cabot to America (1497) or of Willoughby and Chancellor in search of a northeast passage to China (1553), were encouraged. Merchant companies were chartered and given monopoly trading rights in specified areas.[1] In addition, both moral and material aid was given to the "Elizabethan Sea-dogs": Drake, who circumnavigated the globe, partly in search of suitable places for colonization; Hawkins, who more than once "muscled in" on the Spanish trade with the New World; and Frobisher, who vainly sought a northwest passage to China. The familiar, futile colonizing efforts of the gallant Raleigh, also encouraged by

[1] Some of the important companies were: Muscovy Co. (1554-1555), Russia and environs; Eastland Co. (1579), Baltic area; Levant Co. (1581), Near East; and the East India Co. (1600).



From *The Theatre* by Sheldon Cheney courtesy of Longmans, Green and Company, Inc. publishers

ELIZABETHAN THEATER

The period of Queen Elizabeth's reign was one of extraordinary literary activity, reflected in the development of the drama. This drawing of the Swan Theatre in London was made by a contemporary (Johann de Witt) from his personal observations.

Elizabeth, are evidence of yet another Tudor effort to promote the interests of the middle class.

This group, both landlord and merchant, country gentry and commercial aristocracy, prospered greatly under the Tudors. Probably the strongest ties which bound them to the monarchy were those of the purse-strings, but their loyalty had other sources, too. Some had profited by the purchase from the Crown of the church lands confiscated by Henry VIII, but more were united by the lib-

eral, compromise religious settlement of Elizabeth.[1] Some rejoiced at the defeat of the Armada[2] because it opened new markets, but more thrilled with relief and swelled with pride at that repulse of a threatening invasion. Some, perhaps, may have followed with satisfaction Elizabeth's crafty and tortuous diplomacy, but more, probably, were grateful that she did her best to keep England out of war.

Yet, important as it was, the alliance of bourgeoisie and Tudor monarch cannot wholly explain the growth of a national consciousness. The foreign menace played a part, as it so often does. Men were drawn together for self-defense by fear of a common foe. More, they were, by the same token, content to acquiesce in a despotism which so well protected them. The development of a national and strongly nationalistic literature—Shakespeare, Marlowe, Sidney, and Spencer were all Elizabethans—also contributed. But most important of all was the feeling of the ordinary citizen that his sovereigns understood his needs and wishes. Especially was this true of the great queen. Elizabeth was very sensitive to public opinion and she took care to win it to her side by assiduous use of the pamphletary press and by well-calculated public behavior. Her dramatic appearance in armor before her soldiers at the time of the Armada crisis did not reduce the Spanish danger, but it enshrined her in the hearts of her men as their queen. She spoke well and truly in her address to the House of Commons when she said: "Though God hath raised me high, yet this I account the glory of my crown, that I have reigned with your loves."

C. The cardinals

The Tudors disguised their absolutism behind the façade of parliamentary government. For the kings of France this precaution was unnecessary. Since the time of the Hundred Years' War, the French nation had been crystallizing about the Crown, and the evolutionary process of political development was continually pointing the way to untrammeled absolutism. The great duchies had been destroyed and annexed to the royal domain thus breaking the backbone of feudal separatism which had so long left the king politically impotent. The growth of representative institutions along lines similar to those in England had been frustrated. It will be remembered how

[1] See Chapter XIV.
[2] See Chapter XV.

completely the Estates General had been emasculated. No public institution was left to challenge the king's powers when the sixteenth century opened. Even the Catholic Church was made, by agreement with the pope (Concordat of Bologna), an agency of royal absolutism.

Yet the course of affairs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was smooth neither for the Crown nor for the French people, and the absolutism which seemed assured at the beginning of the era had to be rewon several times. In part, this was the unhappy consequence of foreign entanglements which embroiled the French people in a prolonged and costly contest with Hapsburg Austria and Spain. In part it grew out of the disruptive influences of the Protestant Revolution and the Catholic Reformation which led to civil war and a dynastic struggle for the crown.

The first of these troubles hardly requires lengthy description. It will be remembered from earlier discussions that in the later fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries Kings Louis XI, Charles VIII, and Louis XII of France had embarked upon the conquest of portions of the Italian peninsula, especially Naples and Milan. From the first, these acquisitions could not be kept without the greatest difficulty, because of the rival ambitions of other powers such as Austria and Spain, and also because of the readiness of the native Italian states to intrigue perpetually against any outsider who seemed on the point of attaining too much power among them. Indeed Naples was lost for these reasons, and Milan was held only after the expenditure of considerable effort. Because of this possession, Francis I (1515-1547) who succeeded Louis XII, asserted his candidacy for the throne of the Holy Roman Empire when that fell vacant in 1519. There was little chance of his securing the election since the traditional practice of electing an Austrian Hapsburg indicated that Charles V would be named. But his candidacy opened the way for bribery of the German electors and aroused the resentment of Charles V. From the beginning, therefore, the feud between these rival princes created a serious problem, and throughout the remainder of Francis' reign they fought each other almost continuously. In a sense this was the real beginning of the French rivalry with the Hapsburgs which continued until the latter were humiliated in the eighteenth century. For the moment, however, it brought no material gains, while it did help to accentuate popular discontent already acute by reason of internal religious strife.

Conditions at the beginning of the reign of Francis I were favor-

able to the penetration of ideas of religious reform and religious revolution. The Italian connection at least had the virtue of keeping France in close contact with Italian humanism and this, as has been observed already, merged with native influences to produce intellectual ferment. The Church in particular was exposed to criticism for its abuses so that in France, simultaneously with the religious revolts elsewhere, there was a considerable movement in favor of reforms. It should be noted that this did not develop into revolution, with some exceptions, but was concerned rather with spiritual and moral reforms within the Church. King Francis I, brilliant but superficial, lent encouragement to intellectual development and the movement for religious reform partly through patronage, partly through indifference. Political circumstances soon made him waver, however, and pursue a policy of oppression against all religious malcontents.

Lutheranism penetrated to a degree among some of the working classes, but it never took firm root. It was Calvinism which appealed mostly to those prepared for religious revolution. Their number was not especially great. The lower classes as a whole continued to remain faithful to the Mother Church so that it was chiefly from the ranks of the nobility and the bourgeoisie that converts were gained. It would be improper to say that these were won solely on the basis of religious appeals, for, as a matter of fact, many of them joined hands with the Calvinist faction for political purposes. To the nobility, successful religious revolution offered the hope of political revolution which might revive the rights of which they had been deprived by the Crown. To the bourgeoisie, it is probable that Calvinism appealed partly because of the moral excuse it advanced for economic success and the accumulation of profit. Despite the motives which persuaded these classes to adopt Calvinism, their support of it made the body of French Huguenots, as these Calvinists were called, powerful beyond their numbers. Possibly not more than five percent of the population of France were Huguenots, but they compensated in wealth and social influence for what they lacked in numbers.

Both political expediency and genuine religious zeal induced the Crown to undertake the suppression of the Protestant faction. It seemed certain that such a policy would produce results of immeasurable value. By restoring religious unity it would ensure continued political unity as well. It would deprive the nobility of one of their most potent means of contesting the absolutism of the Crown. Equally important, it might encourage the pope to side with France against the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor, and such an alliance was

not to be taken lightly. The stakes being high, the Crown therefore resorted to strong measures to achieve its purpose. These, however, were purely national in character, for the kings of France, though Catholic, were too jealous of their sovereign rights to allow the Church a hand in the matter. The Inquisition was never employed, but the repression of heresy was no less efficient for its absence. On occasions general massacres were tolerated, though the usual form of procedure was legal action. The *parlements* were empowered to ferret out heresy and when these proved inadequate to the task special courts, *Chambres Ardentes* (Courts of Fire), were set up for that purpose. Between these and the Courts of the Inquisition in Spain there would have been little for their victims to choose. In method and procedure both were horribly efficient. Nevertheless, little impression was made on the Protestant cause in France, except perhaps to encourage it to greater violence in its own defense. The Huguenots remained and the conflict persisted, merging eventually with a conflict over succession to the throne.

Henry II (1547-1559) who had pursued the policies of his father Francis I at home and abroad, and who had been particularly diligent in the suppression of religious dissidents, left the throne to a feeble minor, Francis II (1559-1560) and an unscrupulous, ambitious wife, Catherine de' Medici. The latter, named regent, was determined that the power should be concentrated in her hands, plotting and intriguing to that end with every and all factions while each of her sons, Francis II, Charles IX (1560-1574), and Henry III (1574-1589), in turn occupied the throne. The task of securing her own ascendancy was made unusually difficult by the fact that two rival families, the Guise and the Bourbon, sought to supplant her authority over her sons and seize the throne after their death. The Guises were not of royal lineage but had risen to a position of great prominence during the reign of Henry II. One of their relatives, Mary Stuart of Scotland, had been married to Francis II and while he lived the Guise faction was enabled to assert a dominant role. Ardent Catholics, they joined hands with the dominant Catholic faction to preserve themselves in power. Their rivals, the Bourbons, had the advantage of royal blood and held a legal claim to the throne when the Valois dynasty should become extinct. On this score they also sought by fair means and foul to displace the Guise part in the royal councils. The fact that their leader Henry of Navarre was a Huguenot helped to obscure their contest for power behind great religious issues. Incidentally, Catherine was unwilling that either should win, and for

the sake of her own ambition tried to play the two factions off against each other. The result was bloody civil war.

It would be fruitless to review the history of this civil war in detail. Like all of the religious strife of this period it was characterized by blind fanaticism and incidents of wanton cruelty and brutality. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve (1572) may be taken as broadly typical. An attempt had been made to resolve the dispute between the Guise and the Bourbon factions by arranging a marriage between Henry of Navarre and Margaret of Valois, sister of Charles IX. In celebration of the event, Protestants were invited to Paris. Catherine de' Medici had reason to fear that this marriage would diminish her influence over the Crown, especially since a Bourbon sympathizer and Huguenot, Coligny, had already managed to supplant it almost completely. To dispose of Coligny and to weaken the Bourbon cause now that it had grown too powerful for her own purposes, Catherine persuaded the weak-minded Charles IX to believe that there was a widespread Protestant conspiracy against the state which should be struck down at once suddenly and secretly. He gave his word to kill them and for the next three weeks the Catholic faction indulged themselves in an orgy of blood. Between three and ten thousand Protestants lost their lives.

St. Bartholomew's Massacre revived the religious civil war at the moment when peace seemed assured. The Protestants at once organized a Protestant Union, took over the government of the cities which they controlled, created an estates general of their own, and through the semi-independent state which they thus formed proceeded to defend themselves and to carry the offensive to the enemy. A portion of the Catholics replied by forming a Catholic League under the leadership of the Guises, supported with money and men by Philip II of Spain. Between these two factions stood a party of moderate Catholics, the *Politiques*, who believed that toleration was wiser than extermination, and who resented the connections of the Catholic League with a foreign prince. The *Politiques* consequently threw their influence in the direction of Henry of Navarre who attained such success over the Guises and their Spanish allies that when Henry III, the last of the Valois line, died at the hands of an assassin (a Dominican monk) he was able to ascend the throne as Henry IV.

Henry IV (1589-1610) was the founder of the Bourbon dynasty and one can safely add, the greatest statesman that family produced. Personally selfish and given to avarice, Henry possessed political

acumen and superior qualities of leadership. These he certainly needed for the kingdom he had just won could hardly have been in a more hapless state. The treasury was bankrupt. Fields had been devastated and were left uncultivated. Trade had languished. Besides, people had developed the habit of ignoring the Crown so that the powers it had assumed three-quarters of a century before seemed about to lapse completely. To reinvigorate royal government and to lead the country from the morass of religious strife, under these circumstances, were duties which required skill, patience, and perseverance of the highest order. Henry measured up to his responsibilities and with the very able assistance of the Duke of Sully, a close friend and Huguenot whom he made his Minister of Finance, restored economic prosperity, religious peace, and royal absolutism.

The first and most perplexing problem of his reign was religious. Henry had won his crown at the head of the Protestant Huguenots but with the active assistance of the Catholic *Politiques*. He could not afford to abandon his Catholic allies nor could he expect that the Catholics as a whole who constituted the preponderant majority of the French people could long be happy under a Protestant king. His position was one which called for wisdom, not short-sighted fanaticism. He resolved upon a compromise. In 1593 he abjured Protestantism and joined the Catholic Church to appease his Catholic subjects; and then five years later (1598) to appease his Protestant friends he issued the famous Edict of Nantes. This accorded Protestants unlimited freedom of private worship as well as freedom of public worship in specially enumerated towns; it extended them financial assistance for the management of their schools and legalized the publication of their books; it gave them full civil and political rights, including the right of assembly and the exercise of judicial functions under special circumstances; and finally, for a limited time it gave them complete political control over some two hundred fortified towns which they held. This last provision proved unwise since it actually legalized a state within a state, but on the whole the Edict was sound and so long as its religious settlement was preserved religious peace was kept in France.

Meanwhile, Henry acted with vigor to restore the languishing powers of the Crown. Before 1589 the nobility had taken advantage of the civil war to flout the Crown in their own districts and had revived the Estates General as the national instrument through which they could curb the king. One of the first things Henry did was to deal with these nobles. He occupied rebellious sections of the coun-

try with armed force and compelled the lesser nobility to submit fully and completely. The greater nobility whom it would have been impolitic to fight, he purchased with bribery. And when he had made them impotent, he refrained from calling the Estates General and relied for advice and counsel upon a small and carefully selected body of notables.

Henry's efforts to restore economic prosperity were ably supplemented by the Duke of Sully. As minister of finance, Sully introduced important economies into government, established a proper system of auditing accounts, and revised and systematized the assessing and collecting of taxes. He took a particular interest in the development of agriculture, and encouraged the draining of marshes as well as the removal of export duties so that sales of agricultural produce abroad might be made profitable. Further to facilitate agricultural development as well as to stimulate internal trade, he extended the canal system of the country and set about improving its roads. Sully had little interest in manufacturing, but the royal government at Henry's instigation sought to foster industry as well. The production of such articles as silk, glass, and pottery was encouraged by royal subsidies, and the interests of business were advanced by favorable commercial treaties negotiated with Holland and England. The fruit of this economic policy, combined with the religious settlement and the suppression of the factious nobility, was domestic peace and prosperity. France was once more in condition to assume a position of prominence abroad.

Despite his preoccupation with affairs at home, Henry never lost sight of the larger issues of foreign policy. He was concerned by the fact that France was literally surrounded by Hapsburg enemies, in Spain, Italy, across the Rhine, and in the Netherlands, and he regarded it as vital to France that this Hapsburg chain be broken. He conducted his foreign policy with this objective in mind, letting no opportunity slip which might bring it to realization. For this reason, though now a Catholic, he showed his readiness to support the Protestant princes of Germany against the Hapsburg Emperor. This clearly pointed the way to the policy which Richelieu was to pursue in Germany a quarter century later. Henry could not pursue his design as actively as he might have hoped, for in 1609 when he was on the point of intervening on the side of the Protestant princes against the Austrian Emperor he was assassinated.

The passing of the strong king threw affairs again into a state of confusion. Louis XIII (1610-1643), his heir and successor, was a

mere child under the influence of his mother, Maria de' Medici, who was named regent. Lacking in political ability but avid for power, Maria tried to govern by intrigue and bribery. The nobility, only recently subdued, now revived, and by resorting to armed uprisings managed to recover a good deal of what they had lost. The treasury was soon bankrupted again, and the prestige of the Crown was severely shaken. As an indication of the latter, a meeting of the Estates General was called in 1614. The Estates, it will be observed, never met in this era except in times of confusion. The nobility now demanded it chiefly to embarrass the Crown and the regent deemed it necessary to submit. The meeting amounted to nothing of importance, unless it be that it gave the first opportunity of a public appearance to a young man of genius, Cardinal Richelieu. Certainly it found no solution for the ills of the government.

After some ten years more of confusion and misgovernment, Louis XIII broke with his mother and allowed his great minister Cardinal Richelieu to take matters in hand. Louis, it might be said, was not without ability in his own right, but he always remained more interested in music than in government. At all events, the achievements of his minister have effectively obscured Louis XIII as a political personality.

Armand Jean du Plessis, Cardinal Richelieu, was nobly born (1589). Though not marked out originally for a clerical career, he was persuaded to pursue theological studies so that he might occupy the family bishopric of Luçon and recoup the family fortunes. It was in this capacity that he first revealed his genius for administration and gave his own political ambitions a chance to mature. Elected in 1614 to the Estates General as a representative of his order, he distinguished himself sufficiently as their spokesman so that he was recommended to the Queen Regent's service. He remained with her, loyal to her cause, until the greater interests of the state impelled him to co-operate with the king. From that time forward until his death in 1642 Richelieu was the master of France.

The two major objectives of Richelieu's administration were to complete and perfect the central government of the Crown and to advance the national cause abroad by breaking the Hapsburg encirclement. The first of these was difficult enough to attain after the turbulent years of the regency. Richelieu had to do the work of Henry IV all over again, and more besides.

Among the factions which had learned to defy the royal authority, the Huguenots took a conspicuous place. They had become

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

RICHELIEU. PORTRAIT BY CHAMPAIGNE.

accustomed to their own government guaranteed them by the Edict of Nantes, and felt that they had a legal right to act in defiance of the king. Moreover, there were among them members of the nobility jealous of Richelieu's powers and angry at his determination to centralize the government. They were anxious to use Huguenot privileges and powers to frustrate the king's minister. At all events, a year after his ministry began, Richelieu was faced with a serious Huguenot uprising. He was unable to deal with it at once because of difficulties abroad, but in 1627 he defeated the rebels in their most strongly fortified town, La Rochelle. This victory made it possible for Richelieu to deprive the Huguenots of their unique political privileges and thus make it impossible for them to defy the Crown in the future. By the Edict of Alais, the Huguenots were required to surrender their fortifications to the Crown, and were compelled to abolish their independent political assemblies. Richelieu did not tamper with the religious settlement since his interest was not in enforcing religious doctrine upon dissidents but in making everyone respect the royal authority.

The solution of the problem of the Huguenots only partly solved the problem of the factious nobility, for only a small percentage of those anxious to keep the Crown weak for their own advantage were to be found in the Huguenot camp. To deal with them, Richelieu resorted to various expedients. It happened a number of times that these noble malcontents plotted with Maria de' Medici or with the King's brother against the Crown and Richelieu. The Cardinal's spies, who were numerous, usually ferreted out these conspiracies and the ring leaders, however high their social status, were brought to stern justice. Richelieu was inexorable in his treatment of those accused of treason. Besides striking terror among noble conspira-

tors, Richelieu set out to destroy the fortified castles, their last defense against the Crown. In 1626, he issued an edict requiring that all fortifications not needed by the Crown for defense against foreign invasion be destroyed, and when this was not done independently, it was done by the royal soldiery.

Richelieu's program demanded not only the destruction of organized opposition to the Crown: it also called for the improvement of the institutions of central government. It might be suggested that what Richelieu aimed to do, and largely achieved, was to make the Crown completely absolute. He made the reign of Louis XIV possible.

Existing institutions which might be used to obstruct the royal will were either destroyed or emasculated. The Estates General, for example, he never called, allowing it to languish. He kept a close eye on the *parlements* to see that they refrained from meddling in politics. The *Parlement* of Paris concerned him particularly. This, the highest court of the kingdom, registered the king's laws and on the basis of this privilege had long claimed the right to refuse to register them, thus exercising a power of veto. Richelieu held such interference to be unjustifiable even though by resort to the old custom of the "bed of justice" (the king appearing personally before the court accompanied by the great nobility to compel it to register the law in his presence) the veto could be nullified. His strong objections weakened the influence of the *Parlement* for a considerable time. While reducing to impotence those central institutions which might challenge the king's authority, Richelieu also took great pains to develop ministries, secretaries of state, and councils of state which were dependent upon the Crown and could be expected to carry out its will promptly and efficiently.

The local administration of the kingdom he likewise reorganized in the fashion best calculated to center it about the person of the king. It had long been the custom to bestow royal governorships in the provinces upon members of the nobility. Richelieu did not break entirely with this practice, but he effectively deprived the noble governors of real power. Most of their functions were transferred to royal officials, the *intendants*, who were given extensive jurisdiction over local justice, finance, and police. Completely dependent upon the Crown, and their labors closely scrutinized by Richelieu himself, these *intendants* were the Cardinal's most important agents in the establishment of strongly centralized government.

All of the while that Richelieu was fashioning royal absolutism,

he was deeply absorbed in affairs abroad. The outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in Germany offered him an excuse to challenge the Hapsburgs and to advance France's own political interests. He did not let slip this opportunity, as has already been observed. By intrigues with the Protestant enemies of the Catholic Emperor of Austria he kept the war alive until France could intervene directly. Then in 1635, French armies began to engage Austria in the German countries, and Spain in the neighboring Spanish possessions. In most of the early engagements the French soldiery showed up badly, but their deficiencies were so effectively overcome and their skill so greatly improved that by 1642, when Richelieu died, victory was already assured. Richelieu had not only strengthened the State, but had also restored its prestige abroad.

The great Cardinal's death was followed within a year by the death of Louis XIII, but the passing of these two personalities who had co-operated so closely, this time did not produce internal confusion or lead to any fundamental alteration of policy. For one thing, the heir to the throne, Louis XIV, was still a minor and allowed the management of affairs to continue under Cardinal Mazarin, Richelieu's own choice for his successor. An Italian by birth, Mazarin had been persuaded to join the service of the French Crown and became the latter's greatest disciple. He had no inclination to change his predecessor's policies and pursued them diligently from 1642 until his own death in 1661.

There was considerable popular resentment at Mazarin's assumption of authority on the score that he was a foreigner. Taking advantage of this, disaffected elements, headed especially by the nobility who had reason to resent the continuation of Richelieu's policies, engineered a revolution. Known as the *Fronde*, this uprising which began in 1648 and continued sporadically throughout most of Mazarin's career, was quite confused in character. The extent to which the lower classes and the middle class sometimes co-operated with the nobility has made it appear as the first popular uprising in France against royal absolutism. The trouble started with a dispute between the king and the *Parlement* of Paris, the latter refusing, even before a bed of justice, to register an objectionable law involving matters of taxation. The mob of Paris rose to the defense of the *Parlement* and for several months the capital was completely out of control. Loyal troops eventually dispersed the rebels, however, and thereafter, though the revolution remained a thorn in Mazarin's side, it never really threatened his power. The defeat was another blow to

the nobility who thenceforth were to seek the protection of the Crown rather than to challenge it. *Parlement* likewise suffered and was deprived for the time being of all powers over financial and political matters.

Abroad, Mazarin continued the policies of Richelieu, bringing the feud with the Hapsburgs to a momentary and successful conclusion with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659). The former has already been described. It will be remembered that by virtue of it France was confirmed in the possession of Alsace, was recognized as having a privileged position in the Rhine country, and was assured a voice in the political affairs of the Holy Roman Empire. The Peace of Westphalia resolved the Austrian part of France's Hapsburg problem but left the Spanish part still to be settled. The Spanish Crown was optimistic about the chances of wresting victory from defeat, especially when Mazarin became so deeply embroiled with the *Fronde*. Indeed, Spanish men and money were placed at the disposal of the rebels in the hope that France might be made to collapse. When this did not result and when the *Fronde* was effectively scotched so that Mazarin was able to turn the whole of his attention to Spain, the outcome was not long in doubt, especially since France enjoyed the active assistance of Cromwell and the British fleet. In 1659, Spain was ready to sue for peace. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees she ceded all the territory formerly held on the French side of the Pyrenees and relinquished to France a strip of the Spanish Netherlands. Both the Spanish and the Austrian Hapsburgs had thus been humbled and the territorial possession of France enlarged.

Mazarin died two years after peace with Spain had been reached. He left the State strongly centralized under the Crown at home and with an enviable prestige abroad. French pre-eminence in Europe for the seventeenth century was assured. It remained for Louis XIV to bask in its glory and prepare the way for its collapse.

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Chapter XVII

The Divine Right of Kings

A. Religion as the bulwark of authority

Since the days of primitive man, priest and king have customarily found strength in union. The secular ruler has welcomed the added power and prestige derived from claiming supernatural support, and the religious leader has leaned heavily on the worldly power of the king. Like so many elements of western society this traditional co-operation seems to have arisen in the East. Priest kings were common in ancient Sumeria and during the Minoan age, and for a long period the priests of Amon were the rulers of Egypt. The rulers of pagan Greece and Rome often united in their persons command of both civil and religious activities. The early Roman emperors were the chief priests of the state cult, and the later emperors eventually presumed to personal deification. Participation of the Catholic Church in the coronation of Pepin and Charlemagne strengthened the Frankish monarchy and dramatically revitalized the ancient tie, which the failure of civil government did not break. The Church assumed the functions and burdens of the State and the connection of the two was closer than it had been since pagan times. Under Pope Innocent III, the papal monarchy became the commanding power in Europe.

The successful struggle of the rising national monarchies against the Church created a new claim: that the kings, no less than the popes, were the instruments of God's will and power. The disruption of the Catholic Church by the Protestant Revolution gave rise to nationalized state churches frequently subservient to and always closely allied with the secular government. The modern separation of church and state has now presented the world with a new aspect of the supernatural in government: the totalitarian state. In contemporary Russia, for example, service of the state has become a

kind of religion, and the worship of Lenin a sublimated adoration.

A variety of dramatizations had symbolized the part played by the clergy in secular government and the participation of the papal agent in the coronation of Pepin the Frank might have found its precedent in Old Testament history. Whether or not it did, that action introduced a new conception of monarchy to European politics. The king became "the Lord's anointed," and obedience to him was held to be a religious duty. The coronation of Charlemagne further embedded this new theory in popular practice.

During the long struggle between Church and State, the princes were handicapped by the popularly accepted belief in the divine origin of ecclesiastical power. To offset this, they recalled early precedent and claimed that the institution of monarchy also was divinely ordained. To transform the claim that monarchs were established by God to the more arrogant presumption that a king held office by the grace of God was a short step. The doctrine of divine right monarchs was the logical outcome of ambition working through the theory of the Lord's anointed. In its extreme form, this doctrine declared that kings were responsible only to God who had endowed them with power. A good king was a blessing sent by God to be received by the people with praise and thanksgiving; a bad king was punishment for past sin and was to be suffered in silent and humble contrition. Good or bad, the king was the voice of God which all must obey.

When the Church reluctantly surrendered its claims to supreme power, the theory of divine right ceased to be a challenge and became a quasi-doctrine of the clergy. They, partly from conviction and partly from calculating self-interest, were always the chief supporters of absolutisms. This new aspect of the supernatural in government was demonstrated in France by the Concordat of Bologna which, by satisfying the financial desires of the Church and the political ambitions of the king, established a mutual vested interest in the perpetuation of the Catholic Church and the absolute monarchy. In England, the politically controlled Anglican Church was given a religious monopoly and, henceforth, loyalty to it became a test of loyalty to the Crown and long remained the *sine qua non* of political advancement. The Russian Orthodox Church was no exception to this general rule. The head of the church became the agent of the czar in the days of Peter the Great, and the clergy thenceforth were almost without exception propagandists for czarist absolutism.

The complete separation of Church and State rendered the alli-

ance of priest and king less potent but it did not dissolve it. Churches have remained the protagonists of law and order and, as established institutions, have contributed to the conservative stabilization of society.

B. The sun king

The death of Cardinal Mazarin (1661) cleared the stage for Louis XIV, the most convincing royal actor and divine right monarch of the seventeenth century. From early life he had been instructed to regard himself as made of something more than common clay, as the divine agent of God through whom alone the state could move and have its being. Louis did not formulate these ideas and he did not advance them to hide personal ambition; they were a deep and compelling conviction, the mainspring of his arbitrary paternalism, and the source of his superb conceit.

Louis was not endowed with superior intelligence and he was certainly not a statesman of vision, but he possessed the uncommon genius of capturing the imagination of his contemporaries. He had the personality and bearing of a king: he was of good stature, dignified, aloof, majestic, and inordinately vain. During his last years he was devoutly religious, but he was never moral, and he lived in open adultery during most of his life. Yet in his person he identified the state and crystallized the French nation so completely that his reputed remark, "l'état, c'est moi" (I am the state), was not altogether a vain boast. Nor was his self-appointed title of "Sun King" without significant meaning, for he was the symbolic figure of divine right monarchy, around which France and all the petty princelings of Europe revolved.

The political foundations of the power and prestige of the French monarch had been carefully fashioned by Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, the momentum of whose labors carried well through Louis' reign. The nobility had been reduced to impotence, and were prepared to salvage what remained of their privileges by acquiescing to the crown. The political privileges and immunities of the Huguenots had been removed; a strong, well-organized, and efficient army had been created; and, perhaps most important of all, the administration had been centralized under the crown. Constitutional limitations upon the royal power had been allowed to lapse through disuse, both Richelieu and Mazarin, for example, having scrupulously refrained from assembling the Estates General. Louis had inherited

CARTOON OF LOUIS XIV, BY W. M. THACKERAY (1811-1863).

Louis XIV inspired many caricatures in his own day but none better than this one of the nineteenth century with which Thackeray illustrated his essay, "Impressions at Versailles" in his *Paris Sketches* (1840). In Thackeray's own words, "You see at once that majesty is made out of the wig, the high-heeled shoes, and cloak. . . . Thus do barbers and cobblers make the gods we worship."

a Crown already absolute, and the only notable contribution he made was the organization of the central administration into departments or ministries, such as might now be termed the Ministries of Justice, Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, and Navy. The functions of these were not precisely defined, so that although the reorganization contributed to greater efficiency the confusion of overlapping jurisdictions was not wholly eliminated.

Louis had a high concept of his duties as a sovereign, unlike his two equally absolute successors. He followed the course of public affairs with close attention, directed councils of state and discussed regularly with his ministers matters of public policy. In his customary fashion, he deluded himself into believing that all government emanated from his person, while in actual fact his skillful ministers through flattery managed to do very frequently as they pleased. It was merely a matter of making the king think that he originated what they had already planned to do.

The most important and original of Louis' ministers was his Controller-General of Finance, Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), a dour, energetic, and exceedingly ambitious individual. Through his father, a prosperous merchant of Rheims who had followed the

common procedure of purchasing a post in the king's official family, Colbert secured early admission into the royal service as a minor clerk in the Ministry of War. After distinguishing himself in this capacity, he was recommended to the personal staff of Cardinal Mazarin, whose financial adviser he became. He did much to amass the Cardinal's private fortune, while incidentally laying the basis for his own, and was consequently mentioned by Mazarin to Louis XIV for high service. Colbert was desirous of administering the finances of the kingdom and, to that end, conducted a successful conspiracy against Nicolas Fouquet, whom he replaced as Controller-General in 1665.

Colbert's consuming ambition was to advance the national prosperity and to increase the national wealth, which latter he and his contemporaries interpreted to be the amount of liquid capital which the state possessed. In pursuit of this end, Colbert devised a program of economic nationalism commonly known as "mercantilism" or "Colbertism." This provided that a state with natural deficiencies in precious metals might compensate for their absence by artificially stimulating a balance of trade in the national favor, and by establishing control over potential resources of precious metals and markets in unexploited regions of the world.

Briefly stated, a "favorable balance of trade" resulted when the national exports exceeded the national imports, thus rendering it necessary for foreign nations to pay the difference in gold and silver. Colbert proposed to attain such a favorable balance by the apparently simple procedure of encouraging manufacture and trade, and at the same time discouraging importations from abroad through tariffs. In the face of innumerable obstacles, he embarked upon this program and held to it tenaciously. Skilled artisans from abroad were invited to France and a number of industries were subsidized, notably the making of tapestry, silks, glass, and pottery, in all of which the nation soon gained an ascendancy. Numerous internal barriers to trade, including internal customs dues, were removed, despite the vigorous protests of vested interests; and still further to expedite the flow of commerce, Colbert returned to Sully's program of road and canal construction. Probably the most notable of his achievements in this connection was the completion of the Languedoc canal which united the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

Colbert was equally energetic in building a colonial empire for France and in organizing the colonial trade on a basis which would enable it to compete with the English and the Dutch. Under his

inspiration, the administration of New France was reorganized and made more paternalistic, while explorers were encouraged to lay claim to the Great Lakes region and the Ohio valley. Old trading companies, such as the Baltic and Levant Companies, were reorganized, an African Company was created, and all trade with the Far West and the Far East co-ordinated under the great French West and the French East Indies Companies. Through these measures, Colbert had indeed prepared France to take her place among the leading colonial and commercial powers of the world.

Unfortunately for Colbert and perhaps for France, his elaborate economic program failed to produce the expected results. In part this was due to the inherent weaknesses of his system, which failed to anticipate the possible consequences of its adoption by other nations. Failure was due even more to the sporadic character of royal support at home and to the absence of peace abroad. Colbert believed it essential for his program to have national financial stability, and for this Louis' co-operation was a vital necessity. The enormous military expenditures of Richelieu and Mazarin and their mismanagement of finances had virtually revived the disorder prevailing before the great reforms of Sully. Colbert sought to re-establish order by introducing scrupulous and efficient management. New methods of assessing and collecting taxes were adopted to eliminate peculation, and an adequate system of royal accounting was introduced. Moreover, Colbert revolutionized the whole tax system by creating a variety of indirect taxes which could be painlessly paid. These measures produced systematic financial administration and at the same time increased the national revenues. However, instead of educating the king to abate his improvident personal expenditures, they seemed to encourage his naturally extravagant tastes, and economy of government was not realized.

The greatest squandering of national wealth resulted from the needless and expensive wars which filled the greater part of Louis' reign. In part, these were occasioned by the monarch's desire to establish the "natural" frontiers of France on the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; in part, they grew out of the old Bourbon-Hapsburg feud which had begun with Henry IV and was still unsettled; but, undoubtedly, their chief cause was Louis' insatiable lust for power and glory which inspired him to seek French hegemony in Europe. Not even Louis' unquestioned skill as a diplomat obscured his motives from his contemporaries. With profound confidence in the prowess of his army, a confidence assiduously cultivated by the

Minister of War, Louvois, Louis played at the game of war like a confirmed gambler, convinced that the elimination of error must lead to certain success. It was a diabolical game which cost France and Europe an era of suffering.

The Grand Monarch's first war, the War of Devolution (1667-1668), was the result of an undisguised act of aggression. By local law in Brabant it was established that possession of land should pass to female children of the owner's first wife in preference to male descendants by a second marriage. Louis adopted the preposterous procedure of laying claim under this law to the whole of the Spanish Netherlands upon the death of Philip IV of Spain in 1665. Philip had a son, Charles II, by his second wife, and two daughters by his first wife. One of these daughters was the wife of Louis XIV, and it was her rights which he feigned to protect. When the Spanish government failed to appreciate the full force of Louis' logic, he proceeded to march his well-trained troops into the disputed territory. The speed with which his army advanced and its alarming successes aroused the apprehension of both Holland and England. The former was fearful that its own hard-won independence might be jeopardized, and the latter worried about the effects of French success upon English commerce. The two states consequently joined hands against Louis, and were soon supported by the ambitious government of Sweden. Louis, who had not calculated upon the creation of so formidable a Triple Alliance, deemed it advisable to halt operations and by his moderation allay suspicions so that his plans might be matured for the future. He therefore consented to a treaty (Aix-la-Chapelle, 1668) by which he renounced his claims to the whole of the Spanish Netherlands in return for several fortified places on its frontier.

Convinced that Holland was chiefly responsible for this initial failure, Louis set out to isolate at once the little Dutch upstart so that he might take appropriate revenge. Four years after the peace of Aix his diplomacy had apparently achieved a brilliant success. Charles II of England had been bribed to leave Holland to her fate; the Austrian Emperor had given a solemn pledge to refrain from assisting the enemies of France; and Sweden agreed to restrain Austria should she break her promise by going to the defense of the Dutch. With Holland abandoned to his none too tender mercies, Louis prepared to strike. His armies, under the distinguished leadership of Condé and Turenne, advanced upon the defenseless Dutch in the spring of 1672. The stroke was so swiftly and accurately dealt

that the extinction of Holland seemed inevitable before the end of the year. From this fate it was saved by the unique strategy of flooding the country, by the skill of its diplomats, and by the growing apprehension of other powers. Gradually the whole of Europe united against France, and by 1674 it was already apparent that Louis had again been frustrated. The war dragged on four more years before peace was arranged at Nimwegen (1678). Since neither France nor its enemies had been decisively defeated, the Treaty represented a compromise, with Louis securing some profit from the venture. Holland lost none of its territory and gained decided advantages through the removal of trade restrictions with France and the guarantee that the integrity of the Spanish Netherlands, a barrier essential to Dutch independence, would be preserved. France was allowed to annex Franche-Comté and to secure certain rectifications of territory in Lorraine.

Unchastened by previous experience, Louis XIV proceeded to break the Peace of Nimwegen. This treaty, and the Peace of Westphalia before it, had ceded several towns of Lorraine to France together with "their dependencies." The ambiguity of this clause gave wide scope to Louis' aggressive designs in the Rhine country, since it apparently left to his good judgment the determination of what the "dependencies" were. To carry out this provision, Louis created a number of tribunals, *Chambres des Réunions*, carefully packed and instructed by him, to adjudge what territories as "dependencies" of the ceded cities should legitimately fall to France. By resorting to defunct feudal precedent, skillful bribery, and diplomacy, these courts legalized the annexation of lands in Flanders, Alsace, and Lorraine. As each new territory was adjudged to be French property, royal troops proceeded to its immediate occupation. Europe followed this audacious procedure with increasing anxiety and, in 1688, the Empire, Spain, Sweden, Holland, and a number of the lesser German states formed a secret League of Augsburg to restrain the Sun King. Other powers joined this hostile coalition during the next two years, the most conspicuous being England whose sovereign after 1688 was William of Orange, implacable enemy of Louis XIV. William assumed the leadership in this combination of France's enemies, and England provided the sinews for the war which shortly followed.

The War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1698) was one of the most exhausting wars of the seventeenth century. As in the previous Dutch War, neither side gained a decisive victory, though it is significant that through the genius of Vauban, who had created

the great fortifications of the kingdom, French territory was not overrun. In 1698 peace was negotiated at Ryswick. By its terms, France was compelled to surrender all of the territory in Lorraine absorbed since the peace of Nimwegen, but was confirmed in the possession of Alsace, including the city of Strassburg. This was a serious blow to Louis XIV but far from enough to convince him of the utter futility of aggressive war.

Indeed, at the very time the Treaty of Ryswick was being signed, Louis was casting covetous eyes on Spain, the next field for his aggressive operations. Since the death of Philip IV in 1665 the Spanish kingdom had been the object of foreign intrigue. Philip had only one son, Charles II, a physical and mental weakling, who was himself childless. It was clear to everyone that upon his death both the Hapsburg house of Austria and the Bourbon house of France would lay claim to his throne, since both of these royal families were connected by marriage ties to the Spanish Hapsburgs. Yet neither Leopold I of Austria and the Holy Roman Empire nor Louis XIV could contemplate with equanimity the succession of the other's family. Nor could the English government remain uninterested in any settlement which was to be made, since it was in the interest of her trade with the Spanish colonies to keep the Spanish government weak. The problem of succession, then, was fraught with enormous difficulties. To regulate this matter to the satisfaction of all parties, the interested powers nonchalantly devised two partition treaties (1698 and 1699), calmly dividing considerable portions of Spanish territory in Italy between Austria and France, and arranging for the succession to the throne. The wishes of the hapless Charles were not consulted. Louis XIV had been the prime mover in the negotiation of these settlements but remained unsatisfied with their results. Consequently, he could look only with pleasure upon an intrigue in the Spanish court itself which sought to undo the second partition treaty, which provided for the succession of an Austrian archduke, by elevating to the throne the second grandson of Louis, Philip of Anjou. The parties to this plot eventually prevailed upon Charles II to devise a last will and testament which named Philip of Anjou his heir. After November, 1700, when Charles II finally died, Philip became Philip V of Spain.

Europe was aghast at this turn of affairs, but hardly in a mood to dispute it after the recent exhausting War of the League of Augsburg. Indeed, there is every probability that this Bourbon succession to the throne of Spain would have passed off peacefully had

Louis held his overweening ambition in restraint and offered some compensations to the other interested parties. He refused, however, to consider any concessions of Spanish territory to the Austrian Hapsburgs and, moreover, he proceeded to act as though all Spanish possessions had become a part of his kingdom. He disregarded the integrity of the Spanish Netherlands, and set about regulating their economic affairs to the disadvantage of both Dutch and English traders; he issued decrees which were obviously directed against English trade in the Spanish new world; and, to cap the climax of his folly, he publicly espoused the cause of the deposed Stuarts. Nothing was better calculated to arouse the anger of England, who proceeded at once actively to support a coalition of Louis' enemies in Europe.

The War of the Spanish Succession which followed dragged out monotonously for twelve years (1701-1713) until both parties were exhausted. Negotiations for its termination, which began as early as 1711, were finally concluded at Utrecht during 1713 and 1714. Philip V was allowed to retain the throne of Spain under condition that the French and Spanish crowns should never be united. A number of Spain's possessions in Europe were turned over to Austria, notably Naples, Milan, Sardinia, and the Netherlands, henceforth for a century to be known as the Austrian Netherlands. England received, among other things, the title to Gibraltar, and important trading privileges in Hispanic America. France neither lost nor gained on the continent.

After almost a half century of fighting for control of Europe, Louis XIV had made astonishingly little progress. It is true that he did not emerge from conflict empty-handed, and indeed most of his territorial acquisitions were of considerable importance to France, but the profit was exceedingly small when compared with the costs involved. The strength and energy of his subjects had been much too heavily taxed, and the resources of his kingdom had been drained. The mass of the French people had been reduced to poverty and misery, so much so that peasant riots were not infrequent in Louis' last years. It became increasingly difficult to collect the customary revenues, and even Louis himself, in 1709, had to pawn his gold plate for ready cash. Louis' vainglorious military ambition was in large measure the cause of widespread social unrest in eighteenth century France.

There was scarcely any compensation in domestic policy for the errors in the Grand Monarch's foreign policy. As he advanced in



MAP 19. EXPANSION OF BOURBON FRANCE, 1601-1791

years and lost the aid of able ministers trained in the school of Richelieu and Mazarin, his government became more inefficient and more arbitrary. Nothing demonstrates this latter characteristic quite so well as his short-sighted efforts to attain religious uniformity.

In later life, Louis appears to have felt strongly the sense of his own iniquities, and to have been confirmed in his fanatical religiosity by aspiring Jesuits who flocked about the court as well as by Madame de Maintenon to whom he had been secretly married in 1684. To these influential persons and to Louis himself it seemed fitting to exterminate heresy and Protestantism. The first to feel the oppressive hand of the government were the Jansenists, a puritanical group of Catholic intellectuals whose chief offense was that they denounced the immoralities of the Jesuit society. The violence used to uproot this small, innocent group was as nothing, however, compared to the brutal tactics employed against the Huguenots.

It will be remembered that the Huguenots were Calvinists, chiefly of middle class extraction, who after a period of religious turmoil in the sixteenth century had been granted privileges of worship by the Edict of Nantes in 1598. Although Richelieu had seen fit to remove the political independence guaranteed by this document, the religious liberties of the Huguenots were preserved as the basis of social and religious peace. Louis hesitated to tamper with a settlement for which his grandfather had been responsible, but was persuaded to take action against the Huguenots within the limits allowed by the Edict. By generous interpretation, this permitted a meddling in Protestantism so complete as to render religious freedom virtually a mockery. At the same time, every conceivable method of converting the Huguenots was employed at Louis' bidding, from intellectual persuasion to purchase of conversions. In 1680, violence was used to hasten this process, royal troops being ordered to establish themselves in Huguenots' homes. Under this pressure, which was horribly efficient, conversions came so rapidly that Louis shortly was convinced that the Edict of Nantes had been rendered superfluous. Consequently, he proceeded to revoke it in 1685. Almost at once those of Protestant convictions still remaining fled from the kingdom, despite efforts to restrain them. It is estimated that more than 200,000 went into permanent exile, 200,000 of the best skilled artisans and agriculturalists of the realm. Not only was the procedure of Louis in the handling of this matter morally unjustifiable, but it was dangerous to the economic and social welfare of the state.

It must not be thought that Louis, with all his fanaticism, was the willing agent of the international Church. Indeed, while the royal government let fall its oppressive hand on minority groups, Louis conducted a war against the Papacy itself. As the result of a controversy surrounding the death of a royal official at the papal court, Louis demanded for satisfaction practically the complete control of the French Church. This demand was too much and the pope refused, whereupon Louis prevailed upon the clergy in 1682 to pass the famous *Four Articles of Gallican Independence*, by which the French Crown and the French Church were declared to be virtually independent of papal authority. This accentuated rather than solved the problem and helped to prolong the crisis with the Papacy for eleven years. In the end, it was the Papacy which held out longest and most successfully, Louis finally agreeing to withdraw the offending articles, in return for the recognition of the royal right to administer vacant bishopries. There was little actually gained by



VERSAILLES, EXTERIOR
View from the terrace leading to the gardens.

this feud, but it contributed much to the widespread religious unrest which the Crown had been fomenting.

No history of the era of the Sun King is complete without some mention of its artistic and cultural achievements. These, no less than wars and politics, reveal the spirit of the times, reflect the cult of majesty, and emphasize both the grandeur and the artificiality of the age. Louis regarded literature and the arts as properly within the sphere of his control and sought to regiment them as he did his government. By patronage of various sorts he did succeed in establishing a considerable measure of control over writers, artists, sculptors, and architects. But despite his power, not all creative work was cast in a mold of his making nor was it in any sense the exclusive product of his genius. There is a continuity in the history of style as in the history of anything else, and a current fashion represents the blending of the old with the new. In the Age of Louis, that preoccupation with classical antiquity, first clearly evident in the Renaissance, was still vital for it accorded well with the air of majesty and rather grandiose dignity of the reign.

Perhaps the most faithful of all artistic mirrors of an age is architecture which bends past experience to present needs. During the seventeenth century three styles were popular in France: the baroque; the rococo, a more delicate and decorative modification of the baroque; and the academic, inspired chiefly by the examples of ancient Rome. In actual practice these styles frequently were used together so that a single structure often exemplified them all. Thus the great palace of Versailles has an academic exterior, formalized

and restrained, but its interior decoration is a mixture of baroque and rococo with the latter dominating. This colossal structure with its formal courts and gardens was a fitting monument to Louis' vanity. A magnificent symbol of his despotism, it was imitated and copied by almost all European monarchs who were proud to revolve around the Sun King like minor planets around the sun. In England, a similar mixture of baroque and academic is to be found in the work of the great Christopher Wren (1632-1723) who rebuilt much of London after the great fire of 1666. His most famous work is St. Paul's, dominated by a baroque dome. In both France and England, this was the era of great châteaux and country houses built usually in a similar combination of styles. Considerable advance was also made, especially in France, in town planning; the typical form being the use of squares or parks surrounded by houses of uniform design.

French painting in the reign of Louis was quite thoroughly regimented by means of the Academies of Architecture and Painting, founded by Colbert.[1] Poussin (1594-1665) and Gellée (Claude Lorrain, 1600-1682), the most important painters of the period, leaned heavily on the classics for both theme and style, and lesser men followed their lead. Late in Louis' reign a new style, called decorative, since the pictures were planned to decorate rooms, became the vogue. The leader in this school was Watteau (1684-1721) whose work clearly reflected the artificiality of his age. Beyond France, more significant contributions to painting were made by Velasquez of Spain, Hals, Rembrandt, Rubens, and Van Dyck of the Low Countries.[2]

Clear evidence of French pre-eminence in the world of fashion is found in furniture styles which were carried from France to Holland and England particularly, and were widely imitated elsewhere. Most important was the heavy, massive Louis XIV furniture designed for use in large rooms. The academic influence is apparent in its symmetry; the rococo in its use of gilded carvings, ornamentation, and polychrome inlays.

As in the other arts of the Age of Louis, the foundation of Renaissance classicism is also apparent in French literature, but here also it was not mere slavish imitation. French genius erected its own structure upon a classic base and dramatists like Corneille (1606-1684)

[1] Colbert also founded the French Academy at Rome which provided scholarships for French architects, sculptors, and artists, with the purpose of training them in the classic style.

[2] See pp. 434-437.

and Racine (1639-1699) used the classic theme and form to portray the life and politics of their own century. Earlier thinkers and writers like Montaigne, Descartes, and Malherbe had pioneered in the art of logical thinking and clarity of expression and the geniuses of the golden age of Louis carried on. There was developed the classic tradition in literature so-called both because of its debt to the Greek and Roman and because it became an accepted standard of theme and style. Molière (1622-1673) created characters which have become stock types of satirical comedy; and Pascal (1623-1662), author and scientist, laid down the canons of good prose usage. Dissent from the ancient standard appeared in the works of Pascal, in the *Critical Dictionary* of Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), and in the struggle between the "Ancients" who exalted the classic past and the "Moderns" who praised the merits of their own generation. The glories of the Age of the Sun King were clearly not confined to the splendors of Versailles or the doubtful glories of war.

Yet it is not difficult to understand why Louis lost the affection and respect of many of his subjects. Taxes had steadily risen as the result of the king's personal extravagances and his unhappy exploits abroad. The country had been drained of men and resources and its religious peace had been broken. There was everywhere growing poverty and disillusionment. Yet France had achieved glory; her arms were feared abroad, and her language and culture were widely imitated. It must be observed, however, that even the glory of France was superficial, at most an appearance. Louis' heritage to France was more evil than good: an exhausted state, a depleted treasury, social unrest, a parasitical court, and an all-powerful bureaucracy bent upon exploitation. Even if France had had strong kings in the eighteenth century, instead of the weak Louis XV and Louis XVI, a catastrophe would have been difficult to avoid.

C. Absolutism in Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe could offer no glories to compare with Versailles and no monarch to compete with the vainglorious Louis XIV, but its rulers were perhaps even more absolute in authority than was the Sun King. Native home of the Teutons and Slavs and adopted home of many migratory peoples, eastern Europe for a time lagged behind the new nations of the West. Paced by Austria, Prussia and Russia emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to assume the stature of European powers.

Austria originally was a small, Germanic garrison state on the Danube. Its growth was gradual, and under the leadership of its ruling family, the Hapsburgs, it had become by the sixteenth century the leading German state in the Holy Roman Empire. The office of Holy Roman Emperor, which became hereditary in the Hapsburg family, lent prestige; but Austria remained the chief source of Hapsburg power. The seventeenth century addition of Bohemia and Hungary to the Hapsburg holdings added new confusion to their essentially disunited subjects. The Hapsburgs ruled over people of Italian, Polish, Hungarian, Bohemian, German, and other racial origins. It was a union of force and convenience rather than of common interest, and the disruptive force of nationalism constantly threatened its existence.

It is not surprising that under pressure of this constant threat and warned by the fate of the Spanish crown, Charles VI (1711-1740) regarded his lack of a son as disastrous. Obsessed by fear of a possible War of the Austrian Succession, Charles emptied his treasury and his life in trying to guarantee the safe accession of his daughter, Maria Theresa. He accomplished this to his own satisfaction by means of a document, known as the Pragmatic Sanction, which he threatened, bribed, and cajoled his fellow rulers into signing. The Pragmatic Sanction supposedly warranted the indivisibility of the Austrian possessions and the succession of Maria Theresa. Charles died in 1740 leaving to her his title and crown, a weakened state with an empty treasury, and a collection of guarantees considerably less lasting than the parchment upon which they were inscribed.

Principal danger and jealous rival of the new ruler was Frederick the Great, King of Prussia. Prussia originated as an outpost of empire established in the tenth century to hold back the Slavs. It was then known as the Mark of Brandenburg. Successful expansion increased the power of the margrave and raised him to the dignity of an Elector of the Holy Roman Empire. Early in the fifteenth century the Emperor Sigismund conferred this electorate upon an undistinguished but very fortunate family of south Germany named Hohenzollern. By luck and careful management the new rulers were able to increase their power at the expense of local authorities and to extend their possessions to include Cleves (1608) and Prussia (1618). The latter takes its name from the barbarian Borussians, a Lithuanian people, who occupied it prior to the thirteenth century, when it was conquered by the crusading order of the Teutonic

Knights. An unsuccessful war against Poland, then the chief power in eastern Europe, resulted in a division of Prussia. The western portion came under the direct rule of Poland, the eastern part was given back to the Knights as a fief of the Polish crown. A member of the Hohenzollern family, Albert, became head of the Teutonic order in the sixteenth century, and followed the example of Lutheranized German princes by secularizing eastern Pussia. The failure of his line of succession in 1618 was the gain of the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns who became masters of the combined state of Brandenburg-Prussia.

The currently reigning Elector was not competent to realize the potentialities of the new holdings, but his successor was an able, constructive statesman, Frederick William, the Great Elector (1640-1688). His state was actually in three parts: East Prussia, Brandenburg, and Cleves, each under the loose rule of its local feudal diet. His first task was to knit these units together. By breaking the power of the local diets he gradually attained control of legislation and taxation. Using these powers, he centralized the army and the administration and converted his once divided state into a single political organism. The economic welfare of Brandenburg-Prussia was also a care of the Great Elector's. He stimulated agriculture and encouraged the reclamation and settlement of waste lands. The building of roads and canals was a boon to commerce and manufacturing, as was the immigration of the outlawed Huguenots which he took pains to encourage.

Domestic affairs in order, the Great Elector turned to diplomacy further to strengthen his position. His title to East Prussia was still shadowed by Poland's feudal claim. Skillful if unscrupulous diplomacy, and well-timed interventions during the Swedish-Polish War (1655-1660), netted him the recognition of full sovereignty over East Prussia. His acquisition of eastern Pomerania at the Peace of Westphalia brought with it a rivalry with Sweden, then the major Baltic power. Judging the time to be favorable, he went to war with Sweden in 1675. During the next four years his troops were victorious but he was blocked at the council table by Sweden's ally, Louis XIV, and the Peace of St.-Germain-en-Laye (1679) registered only slight gains for the Elector.

The title, King of Prussia, was the major attainment of the next elector, Frederick III (1688-1713). Because Prussia was held in full sovereignty while Brandenburg was a fief of the empire, the former eclipsed the latter, and the state became known as the Kingdom of

Prussia. King Frederick William I (1713-1740), an able and eccentric monarch, raised Prussia to the rank of a great power largely by building up an army of eighty thousand precisely drilled, rigidly disciplined troops. This new army seemed to justify itself by wresting a large portion of western Pomerania from Sweden in 1720. An effective and awesome army was not King Frederick William's only accomplishment. He set up a bureaucracy which matched the army in training, efficiency, and loyalty. By enforcing the practice of rigid economy, government finance was put on a sound basis. His paternalistic government regulated the details of everyone's life even to forcing apple sellers to occupy the interval between sales with knitting. He is himself reputed to have said that he attended to everything but salvation which he left to God. This singular personage had one peculiar hobby: tall guardsmen. His crack regiment was nicknamed the "Potsdam Giants," and he spared neither effort nor money to keep the ranks well filled with soldiers of the proper stature. Frederick William's other great preoccupation was the education of his son and successor, Frederick II, called the Great.

Frederick the Great was the prototype of the group of rulers, known as Enlightened Despots, who flattered themselves that they carried into practice the theories of rationalism. This new intellectual influence taught that man could progress by virtue of his reasoning powers and urged the reconciliation of inherited institutions with the new-found criteria of science and reason. Frederick and his peers were sure that progress must come from above since the king was to the state as the mind was to the body. This implied a monopoly of wisdom which no ruler possessed but which many claimed. Frederick accepted his responsibility gravely and professed always to consider himself as the first servant of the state.

He was a mercantilist who encouraged immigration and settlement, promoted the reclamation of land, fostered industry and commerce, and improved ways and means of communication. He instigated a codification of law and carried out a reform of punishment. He extended a limited religious toleration. He patronized Voltaire until the latter too severely criticized the monarch's bumbling attempts at poetry. Frederick's enlightenment, however, did not include an understanding of the weaknesses of the Prussian class system. Not only did he fail to make any improvement in the condition of the oppressed peasantry, he even increased their economic burden. His expensive wars and the high cost of bureaucratic regulation forced an increase in taxes and further depressed the under-

privileged. Secure in the confidence of his own greatness, he omitted to train a successor to carry on his policies. In short, in the variety of his activities as well as in the breadth of his pretensions and the shortsightedness of his errors, he was a fair sample of the group which included Joseph II of Austria, Charles III of Spain, and Catherine the Great of Russia.

Frederick demonstrated opportunism and aggressive greed in the first year of his reign when he ignored the Pragmatic Sanction and invaded the disputed area of Silesia. That rich territory had long been claimed by both Prussia and Austria, and Frederick judged that the accession of Maria Theresa to the Austrian throne furnished an auspicious time to settle the question in Prussia's favor. The other signatories of the Pragmatic Sanction gladly followed Frederick's lead, and courageous Maria Theresa found herself opposing Prussia, France, Spain, Bavaria, and Saxony in the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). The Austrian people loyally rallied to their valiant empress but the odds were too uneven despite the aid given her by England, Holland and Russia. France sided with Prussia and the war dragged on until the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) reciprocally restored all conquests, guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, and the Prussian possession of Silesia.

The rise of Prussia to the position of a great power provoked the jealous interest of the other states of Europe and produced a new series of alliances. The personal hostility of the Empress Elizabeth of Russia toward Frederick the Great led her to continue as Austria's ally. England which, for the sake of the balance of power, had been allied with Austria, shifted sides to protect the home state of the Hanoverian kings and because of the clash of French and English colonial ambitions. The skillful Austrian diplomat, Kaunitz, played up the Anglo-French colonial rivalry, and the Anglo-Prussian Treaty of Westminster (1755), which guaranteed the inviolability of Hanover, so well that he persuaded Louis XV through his mistress, Madame de Pompadour, to make an alliance with Austria. As in 1914, so also in 1756, the mutual fears and suspicions engendered by rival alliance systems pushed Europe toward war. Anglo-French hostilities in India and North America plus Austro-Russian intrigue in Silesia did the rest. A European war between France and England began in 1756, and the opportunist Frederick promptly joined. The early Prussian victories were nullified by a growing Prussian exhaustion and by the defection of her ally, England, in 1760. Only the change of dynasty in Russia in 1762 saved Prussia from sure



MAP 20. EXPANSION OF PRUSSIA, 1525-1795

defeat. This Seven Years' War was finally ended by a series of separate treaties in 1762 and 1763. The Austro-Prussian Peace of Hubertusburg gave the final endorsement to the cession of Silesia to Prussia.

Frequent reference has been made to a new nation, Russia, which appeared upon the European scene in the eighteenth century. The keys to an understanding of Russian development are, first, an acquaintance with its geography and, second, a realization that Russia and her people are neither European nor Asiatic but a combination of both.

Russia is a vast continental plain stretching from the Baltic and Black Seas to the far Pacific. The absence of large bodies of water subject this plain to rapid and extreme changes from bitter cold to blistering heat. There are three distinguishable belts of soil, ranging from the very fertile "black" soil of the south through the less fertile forest belt to the non-arable tundra of the north. All the great rivers run north and south so that transportation and communication from west to east has had to be overland. Development has been seriously hindered by this difficulty and even today Russia is handi-

capped by the lack of adequate transportation facilities. The country is landlocked since none of the rivers empty into open seas and hence czarist Russia sought consistently to gain control of some adequate ice-free port.

The earliest foreign influences to reach Russia were Asiatic and Byzantine. The former was the result of a great invasion by the nomadic Tartars in the thirteenth century. For many years Russia paid tribute to these conquerors whose influence was apparent in the appearance of Mongol blood in the Russian race mixture, in the oriental despotism of the early czars, and in the still current fatalism of the Russian people. The latter influence entered Russia over the trade routes from the Black Sea region and left its mark on the language, the legal system, architecture, and the type of Christianity which was basically Orthodox. Russia became the home of many races among whom the Slavs were preponderant.

The social and political institutions of Russia in many respects represented the earlier developments in western Europe. The medieval period which lasted until well into the seventeenth century was feudal. The nominal ruler was the *czar*, or emperor, but the real power was in the hands of the landed nobility called *boyars*. Gradually this situation changed as successive czars increased their authority at the boyars' expense. The latter remained a privileged class and continued to exercise powerful influence on the government. The bulk of the people belonged to the peasant class and by the seventeenth century most of them had become serfs, legally bound to the soil. It is significant that the bourgeoisie attained neither numerical nor political importance until late in the nineteenth century.

A period of dynastic and social struggle, known in Russian history as the Time of Troubles, began the modern era and established upon the throne the Romanov family whose first great representative was Peter I (1682-1725). A man of considerable intelligence and dynamic vitality, Peter's life and character reflected the superficiality, violence, and sudden death which had surrounded him as a child. Somewhat of an exhibitionist, he was inclined to be both cowardly and cruel. Gigantic in stature, prodigious in appetite, his lust for life was like that of the English Henry VIII whom he rather resembled.

Peter inherited a twofold domestic policy from his father and grandfather: the furtherance of absolutism and the westernization of Russia. He fell heir also to the old quest for an outlet to the sea. All of his many and too highly esteemed reforms were means to the attainment of these ends. Moreover, these reforms were largely

unsystematic and superficial. Peter was content with attaining correspondence to the western institutions he sought to imitate. The reorganization of the army was undertaken partly to diminish the power of the rebellious nobility and so increase the power of the czar, and partly to produce a more efficient fighting machine for his long wars with Turkey and Sweden. The Russian Church was reduced to a department of state to insure its subservient loyalty to the autocratic Crown. Cities were given more self-government to reduce the power of the boyars. In a futile attempt to centralize the administration, "colleges," patterned on the ministries of western nations, were set up. The chief result was to make the government more complicated and less efficient. To facilitate the collection of the new and heavier taxes which were made necessary by expensive wars and reforms, more peasants were reduced to serfdom. Peter did seek to develop trade and manufacturing along mercantilist lines but without marked success. He also established a few schools, founded the first Russian newspaper, and vainly sought to force his people to adopt western costumes and customs.

In 1689, Russia signed a treaty with China, the first ever made between the East and the West, which set the far eastern boundary of Russia at the Amur River. During the course of an intermittent and unsuccessful war with Turkey, Peter built the first Russian navy. His great military effort was a war with Sweden (1700-1721) for the hegemony of the Baltic. The first nine years of this war saw Sweden consistently victorious, but the Swedish defeat at the Battle of Poltava (1709) was the turning point. The Treaty of Nystadt (1721) gave Russia the eastern Baltic region and the longed-for door to the West.

Peter's death began a period of intrigue, violence, and court revolution which ended with the seizure of the throne by his daughter, Elizabeth. Her twenty-year reign was marked by a recovery of power by the nobles upon whom she was dependent, and by an advance in education with the founding of the universities of St. Petersburg and Moscow. Russia expanded in the Baltic area at the expense of Sweden, but whatever gain she might have derived from participation in the Seven Years' War was thrown away when the addle-pated Peter III made peace with Frederick in 1762.

Peter had been married to a young German princess, Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst, who took the name of Catherine. Shortly after Peter's succession to the throne in 1762, his ambitious wife, aided and abetted



MAP 21. EXPANSION OF RUSSIA, 1300-1796

by certain disaffected nobles, deposed him and seized the throne herself. Throughout her long reign (1762-1796) Catherine remained largely dependent upon the nobility, which explains why her liberal and enlightened pretensions almost invariably ended in reaction. It explains also two general trends of her reign: the extension of aristocratic privilege on the one hand and of serfdom on the other. To reward individual nobles Catherine frequently made huge grants of Crown land. Since the peasants went with the land, they were automatically transformed from crown peasants into private serfs. Her indebtedness to the nobility was discharged by the granting of charters which made them a class of vast power and privilege by exempting them from many civil duties and increasing their jurisdiction over their estates. This, added to their influence upon the administration, temporarily replaced autocratic government with aristocratic rule. Oppression of the peasantry by the aristocracy and crushing taxes provoked a peasant uprising, led by one Pugachev (1773). This revolt, really a social war, was the most important of many peasant insurrections of Catherine's reign.

Catherine sought to continue the reforms of Peter the Great. With much fanfare, an abortive effort at codification of law was initiated. The school system was slightly extended. Banking was encouraged, but Catherine was no mercantilist and for the most part pursued a policy of *laissez-faire*. Only in the field of public health was real advance made. Hospitals were founded and the study of medicine was aided. Despite many fiascos, Catherine's reign was a period of cultural awakening and faltering progress.

Catherine pursued an active and successful foreign policy which fully established Russia as a western power. Pursuance of westward expansion, begun by Peter the Great, brought Russia into war with Turkey and into co-operation with Prussia and Austria in dismembering Poland. Weakened by internal dissent and hamstrung by a peculiarly selfish nobility, Poland was an easy prey for these three.

Russia began active intervention in Polish affairs in 1764 by dictating the choice of the Polish king. In the succeeding years, she consistently labored to establish herself as mistress of Poland. Chronic chaos in that country gave her the easy excuse that her intervention was for the purpose of maintaining law and order. In 1769, the always ambitious Frederick of Prussia, who coveted the strip of land separating Prussia from the rest of his state, proposed the dismemberment of Poland. Russia refused then, but two years later urged the parti-



MAP 22. POLAND IN 1740



MAP 23. FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND, 1772



MAP 24. SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND, 1793



MAP 25. THIRD PARTITION OF POLAND, 1795

tion. Tripartite treaties among Russia, Prussia, and Austria accomplished this First Partition of Poland in 1772.

Thoroughly frightened, Poland began a tardy attempt to set her house in order. A new constitution (1791) bade fair to climax her successful reform movement, but Russia skillfully fomented a rebellion among a minority of malcontents. The resulting chaos gave her an excuse for the Second Partition (1793). Prussia was the accomplice in this robbery. The gallant Kosciuszko led a brave attack upon his country's despoilers but Austria, Russia, and Prussia combined to crush him in 1794. All three participated in the Third Partition in the next year, and Poland disappeared from the map until 1919. Russia received the largest share of Poland in these divisions and Austria was also able to add a rich region to her heterogeneous holdings; but Prussia benefited most, because she received the important Vistula valley, uniting East Prussia to her other possessions. All three gained temporary strength at the expense of creating a chronic danger zone, since the subjected Polish peoples clung steadfastly to their nationality and would not be absorbed.

Russo-Turkish relations were largely subordinated to the Polish question, but Catherine enjoyed consistent success there also. A war with Turkey, begun in 1769, ended with a Russian victory in 1774 which was recorded in the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji. The importance of this treaty lay less in its terms than in the later interpretations of them because it was upon certain provisions of the agreement that Russia based her claim to be the protector of all Orthodox Catholics in the Near East. Such a broad interpretation virtually guaranteed further Russian intervention in Turkey and eventually brought Russia into conflict with France and England in the Crimean War. Ten years after this treaty Russia compelled Turkey to acquiesce to the annexation of the Crimea on the ground that its perpetual anarchy injured Russia. Catherine thus obtained an outlet on the Black Sea but it was not enough. Constantinople and the Straits still blocked the sea-road to the West.

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The Aristocracy of Land and Wealth

A. On social change

Too often the very recording of a fact gives it static quality which is wholly devoid of reality. The unfortunate tendency to pigeon-hole and classify men and events is common to most of us. In daily living, this frequently leads to errors of prejudice and ignorance. For example, many people have built up a concept of a communist as a dangerous, bomb-throwing radical whose only aim is the destruction of democratic government. Consequently, when they hear some individual labeled, or, mayhap, libeled a communist, they promptly thrust him into their preconceived pattern, whether he really belongs there or not. In much the same manner, we have built up a vague, and usually incorrect, conception of "middle class." The result is confusion when we try to follow the story of social development. One must always bear in mind the fact that all human history is the story of change, and that socio-economic classes, like everything else, vary in composition, outlook, and aims.

Originally, "middle class" meant those who were between the nobility on the one hand and the peasantry on the other. Since these were mostly townsmen, engaged in trade, they became known as burghers, burgesses, or bourgeoisie. To all practical intents and purposes, those terms became synonymous so that it is perfectly correct to speak of the "middle class" as the "bourgeoisie," and *vice versa*. It is incorrect, however, to assume that this group underwent no changes in personnel, desires, or policies. Its growth in wealth and numbers, its attainments and aspirations have formed the theme of the last half dozen chapters. Particular attention has been paid (Chapter XVI) to its intimate relation with the growth of royal absolutism. Later centuries saw its transformation from ally to adversary of absolute monarchs and its eventual triumph over unbridled despotism.

This modern struggle against absolutism had its real beginning in seventeenth and eighteenth century England, where the vaulting ambition of the middle class came into bitter conflict with the stubborn absolutism of the Stuart kings. One must beware, however, of assuming that this was a struggle of the people, or that the Stuart defeat was a victory for democracy. It was neither.

The English middle class had undergone a steady transformation since its medieval genesis, especially under the Tudors. By purchase, by marriage, by gift from the Crown, or by other more devious means, many bourgeois had become landowners, and the label bourgeois no longer referred only to a town dweller. These were the country gentlemen, the squirearchy, of England, drawing their income from rents and often from trade, a connection which many did not wholly relinquish. Still the middle class between the nobility and the peasantry, this group is more accurately designated as the landed aristocracy. It was upon them that the Tudors chiefly depended for their aids and from them that the Tudors created a new nobility. For that reason, partly, the distinction between the peerage, or nobility, and the landed aristocracy was indistinct. Intermarriages were not uncommon, and furthermore, since only the eldest son of a peer inherited the title, the other children automatically dropped back into the technically inferior group. A cut below them in the social scale, and for some time inferior to them politically, were those bourgeois who still drew their wealth wholly from trade. Here again, social lines were not sharply drawn and this aristocracy of wealth was ofttimes indistinguishable from the landed aristocracy into which it frequently bought its way by purchasing estates. Also of the middle class were the small traders and little business men, often designated as the petty bourgeoisie.

It should be further observed that members of the aristocracy of land and wealth tended to become conservative as their claims and hopes were solidified into vested interests. When the Crown repeatedly interfered with what they had come to regard as their inalienable rights, they challenged the monarchy. In that, they were supported by the petty bourgeoisie who, however, were less conservative, presumably because they had less at stake, and were willing to go beyond a mere limitation of monarchical rights and powers. More specifically, the aristocracy plus the petty bourgeoisie plunged England into the first Civil War which reduced the royal authority, but it was the petty bourgeoisie who carried the challenge to its logical conclusion of regicide and republic. Again, it was primarily

the aristocracy who restored the monarchy only to again depose the monarch a generation later. The "Glorious Revolution" which accomplished this latter event was much more conservative than revolutionary. So, also, the limited, monarchical government which emerged in the eighteenth century was really government by the aristocracy of land and wealth.

B. The Stuarts and the Puritan Middle Class

Throughout the sixteenth century, the English Crown had been as absolute as any in Europe, but by 1700, Parliament had emerged as superior to the Crown, and the rule of the aristocracy had replaced that of one man. Furthermore, that uniformity in religion which Romanov, Hapsburg, Bourbon, and Tudor had used as a bulwark of absolutism had disappeared in England by the end of the seventeenth century. These were momentous changes not only for England but for her colonies and quondam colonies which shared this heritage. Before discussing them, it will be well to review briefly the legacies which the Stuarts received from their predecessors, the Tudors.

First, the Stuarts had inherited a nation whose people were conscious of their national interests and unity. Relatively secure both from anarchy within and intervention from without, England, behind her wooden wall of ships, was strong enough to be independent. The second great Tudor legacy was the tradition of paternal absolutism. Over a period of years, the English people had become habituated to a monarchy, which though sometimes lacking the formal title always had absolute power. But, equally important, there also had grown up the tradition that the king should consult with Parliament. It is true that the actual power of the Tudor parliaments had been slight and that consultation had been largely a matter of form, but it was a form that was usually observed. The third legacy of the Tudors was an increasingly prosperous trade. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, England was trading with France, Spain, Portugal, and the Baltic powers, Sweden and Russia. She also traded with the Levant,[1] and with both the West and East Indies. This trade, of course, brought increasing wealth, power, and ambition to the middle class.

Under the first two Stuarts, James and Charles, the struggle be-

[1] This is the generic term for the countries toward the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

tween the Crown and Parliament reached its acute stage. James I, who bears the added number VI, for he was James I, King of England, and James VI of Scotland, came to the throne on the death of Elizabeth in 1603 and ruled until his death in 1625. James was typical of the Stuart family who all regarded themselves as rulers by divine right, accountable to no man. Combined with the fact of power, James almost always insisted upon full recognition of his title to power. He was, in short, obsessed by the divine right theory of kingcraft; and his stubbornness bordered upon obstinacy. Joyfully received by a people who had long been accustomed to obedience, his ill-considered insistence upon the last jot and tittle of power alienated his people so that he died mourned by very few.

His son, Charles, king from 1625 until 1649, was better favored physically than his father, but he proved just as lacking in the qualities of statesmanship. James at least had understood his Scottish if not his English subjects, but Charles understood neither. Instead of seeking to conciliate those whom his father had alienated, Charles pursued the Stuart claims to absolute power with such pig-headed obstinacy that he eventually lost not only his crown but also his head. By insisting that he was answerable only to God, Charles so provoked his people that they precipitated his reporting to the Almighty.

The roots of the quarrel between Crown and Parliament which flamed out during the reign of Charles may best be treated by separating them into three parts: religious, financial, and judicial. Of course, such separation tends to impart a flavor of artificiality since these were often interlocking issues, but they cannot easily be discussed or understood as a whole.

The religious issues turned upon the presence within the Anglican church of a sizable group of reformers, known as Puritans, since they wished to purify the church of what they regarded as accreted evils. A school of thought rather than an organized party, they besought James at the Hampton Court Conference (1604) to grant them certain religious privileges. Confusing their aims with those of the Scottish Presbyterians who had tried to inhibit the royal power, fearing, in short, that any change in the established church was merely the prelude to a limitation upon his authority, James bluntly refused their requests. His tactless answer, "Conform or I'll harry (drive) ye out of the land," and his subsequent precautions crystallized their doubts into open opposition. Some of them migrated to the New World, thereby laying the foundations of the Plymouth

colony and of some of the English holdings in the West Indies, but most of them remained in England to express their growing irritation through the voice of Parliament. The Puritans came chiefly from the middle class, and the middle class was becoming more and more articulate.

Upon the important question of Anglicanism and Puritanism, James further aroused his Protestant subjects by his ill-timed and ill-considered foreign policy. He refused to support the Protestant Frederick, Count of the Palatinate, against the Catholic Emperor in the opening stage of the Thirty Years' War. More than that, James established very friendly relations with Catholic Spain, thereby increasing the fears and the antagonism of the English Protestants. Their feeling becomes more understandable when it is remembered that during the Anglo-Spanish War, the English middle class had profited by trade with the Spanish colonies, which was forbidden in times of peace.

Charles widened the breach between Anglican and Puritan. Guided and assisted by his archbishop, William Laud, he tried to make England thoroughly Anglican by insisting that any deviation from the established church was tantamount to disloyalty to the Crown. The Tudors had successfully done that, but times had changed. Since many men either would not or could not surrender their religious affiliations, they were forced into political opposition by the king's own action. Branded as disloyal, whether they were or not, they had no other choice than to join the growing number of the king's opponents.

Side by side with this religious friction was the financial issue. The majority of Puritans came from the middle class, and it was upon them that the costs of government bore most heavily. It has been noted that this group had found a sounding board for its desires and its grievances in Parliament. And grievances there were in plenty for not only were taxes high and the religious issue bitter, but also James and Charles consistently sought to curtail the rights and privileges which Parliament had slowly and painfully acquired since the thirteenth century. Ever jealous of its prerogatives and interests, Parliament tried to check the Stuarts by exercise of its control over finances. "Supply and the redress of grievances go hand in hand," was the cry of Parliament. (Let the king make such reforms as we demand and we shall grant him ample funds.) It is at once evident that such an attitude on the part of Parliament was incompatible with the Stuart claim to absolute power and was unacceptable therefore

to either James or Charles. It is quite possible that tactful management would have placated the Commons and won the king's ends, but the Stuarts would not stoop to conquer, and Parliament, alienated by James, became by degrees openly rebellious under Charles. The latter, since he could not get along with Parliament, sought to get along without it. This, of course, deprived him of funds, and he was forced to try various measures, many of them of doubtful legality, to raise monies in order to carry on the government. Among the expedients he resorted to were: the revival of obsolete taxes, the fining of those who had violated all-but-forgotten laws, and the collection of forced loans. Already angry and concerned by the suspension of Parliament, a great many Englishmen were thoroughly aroused by the king's illegal exactions.

The judicial quarrel between a king who demanded absolute authority and large groups of his subjects who were determined that he should not have it, took the form of a contest between Roman law as administered by the prerogative courts and the English common law of the ordinary courts. To recapitulate very briefly, Roman law implied the acceptance of a single, absolute authority; English common law did not. Naturally the Stuarts, seeking legal support for their financial exactions and for their claims to power, championed the theory that the will of the prince was law. Under them, the special courts, notably the Court of the Star Chamber which the Tudors used to reduce the power of the baronage, were transformed into instruments of oppression.

Limitations of space forbid more than a mere sketch of the highlights of the quarrel which raged with growing fury between Crown and Parliament. Now the Crown, and now Parliament seemed to lead, but time and the financial power of the middle class were both on the side of the latter. In 1628, Charles' third parliament (he had dissolved the first two for criticizing his policy and his ministers) asked the king to give formal promises not to violate certain rights and liberties of the citizenry. This request, called "The Petition of Right," asked (1) that there should be no taxation without the consent of Parliament; (2) that there should be no martial law declared in times of peace; (3) that there should be no quartering of soldiers on private citizens; and (4) that citizens should be free from the menace of arbitrary arrest. Charles agreed to these limitations upon his power and promised to observe them, but within a year he broke his word. When Parliament protested, he dissolved it and refused to call another until 1640. The intervening eleven years gave Eng-

land more than a taste of arbitrary rule and many Englishmen found it unpalatable. The king's punishment fell heavily on those who opposed him and his hands seized greedily on many fortunes. This was the period of Laud's attempt to Anglicanize England and Scotland, and it was, in fact, that attempt which led to the reluctant summoning of parliament. Without going into the details of the matter, suffice it to say that Charles and Laud in attempting to foist Anglicanism upon Scotland provoked a war whose costs made it necessary for Charles to call parliament. This Short Parliament, so-called since its session lasted only a few months, immediately sent up the cry of supply and redress of grievances. Charles was not prepared to yield and dissolved it. The Scots, however, were insistent that Charles pay what he had promised, so he was forced to summon a second parliament, known to history as the Long Parliament, since it was in session from 1640 to 1660.

Immediately the Long Parliament met, it again sought to curb the Stuart absolutism. It tried unsuccessfully to impeach Charles' leading minister, Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, on charges of treason. Failing this, it passed a vicious law, known as an Act of Attainder, against Strafford. An Act of Attainder, in effect, is simply a declaration that a man is a traitor, liable to execution and confiscation of property. Further evidence of the parliamentary state of mind was the abolition of the Court of the Star Chamber. As long as they confined themselves to attacking the king, the Long Parliament was virtually unanimous, but before the year was out, the question of religion had entered into the discussion, and there came a division between Anglican and Puritan. This marked the beginning of the King's Party, for the Anglicans were, by and large, royalist. In 1647, there was introduced a bill which made the schism final. American students do not always see the significance of this bill, which was known as the Militia Ordinance. Its importance lay in the fact that it proposed to put control of the militia, that is, the armed forces of the kingdom, into the hands of Parliament. This raised the question of whether England wanted an absolute king in control of the army or an absolute Parliament in control of the army. Many men who disliked Stuart absolutism also disliked the idea of an absolute Parliament. Some went one way, some the other, and Charles, in spite of himself, found that he had a strong party of supporters.

Between the king's party, the Cavaliers, and parliament's party, the Roundheads, the division was not one of class or of section but

of political and religious conviction. As always in internecine war, the English Civil War saw brother arrayed against brother, father against son. Two other parties also played important parts: the Presbyterians, drawing their inspiration chiefly from Scotland and allied with the Roundheads most of the time; and the Independents, headed by Oliver Cromwell and his New Model Army. It was the Independents and the New Model Army that won the Civil War for Parliament, and then, in what amounted to a second Civil War, seized the power for itself. By 1649, following the execution of Charles, the Army was the real ruler of England.

The period from 1649 to 1660, known as the Interregnum, or period between the reigns, was one of experimentation in government. After the abolition of monarchy by the execution of the king, a new government had to be set up. The first form tried, a republic, or Commonwealth, as it is more frequently called, lasted from 1649 to 1653. It was a government carried on by a council headed by Cromwell and backed by the army. All theories to the contrary, it was a military dictatorship, resting on armed force, and that is one reason why English people have had little sympathy with republican forms of government. They learned in the seventeenth century to associate republicanism in theory with dictatorship in fact. It proved unsatisfactory, and in 1653 there was established a Protectorate, which gave England the only single document constitution the British ever had.

The "Instrument of Government," as this was entitled, provided for government by a Lord Protector and Parliament, each to act as a check and limit upon the other. Oliver Cromwell was made Lord Protector, and gave the lie to this theory of checks and balances by becoming king in all but name. The "Protectorate" was really a dictatorship which rested upon Cromwell's genius and the power of the army. Despite innovations in government, Cromwell's policies were not dissimilar to those of the Tudors. He revived English sea power by the re-establishment of the navy; engaged in a trade rivalry with the Dutch, first through legislation and then through commercial wars; and in an imperialistic war with Spain, captured the island of Jamaica. Like the Tudors, also, Cromwell undertook a temporarily successful war against Ireland and gave vigorous force to the policy, previously followed by both Tudor and Stuart, of forcibly transferring land ownership from the Irish to English landlords. Scotland, too, he brought under the rule of the sword.

But, despite some real successes, Cromwell's rule was not popular.

The costs of foreign wars plus the expense of maintaining the large army, which alone made his government possible, entailed a heavy burden of taxation. Trade suffered and English prosperity declined. Moreover, like all dictatorships, Cromwell's government rested on force and repression. Since in the long run all governments rest on the explicit or implicit consent of the majority of the governed, unpopular dictatorships are impermanent. The Cromwellian system did not survive him. His death in September, 1658, plunged the nation into an eighteen-month crisis during which his son, Richard, sought vainly to fill his father's place. Finally, as usually happens in such crises, the power went to the man who controlled the most powerful armed force, Monk, general of the army then in the north. After a dramatic march on London, Monk decided upon restoring the Stuarts to the throne. The days of radical experimentation in government were over.

Tired of strife, disillusioned by experiments in government which ended in the rule of force, England welcomed back the Stuarts in the person of Charles II. Handsome, witty, and affable, Charles was a welcome relief from the rigid puritanism of the preceding years. A shrewd dissembler and a most capable conspirator, the third Stuart avoided most of the blunders of his father and grandfather, yet even he was unable to bend the people to his will.

The swing of the pendulum brought England not alone the restoration of the monarchy and Anglicanism but a restoration of Parliament, which had been impotent during the Interregnum. The Convention Parliament (1660), which called Charles home from his wanderings, forced him to sign the Declaration of Breda which fully recognized Parliament's control over amnesties, lands, and religion. Charles' first parliament, aristocratic, Anglican, and so royalist as to win the nickname of the Cavalier Parliament, gave further definition to the terms of the restoration. The king was deprived of the right to maintain a standing army, an evidence that England had had more than its fill of civil war and military dictatorships. The Crown was declared financially dependent upon Parliament and there was to be no further exercise of prerogative government, that is, government by royal decree without the assent of Parliament. It also gave legal basis to Anglican privilege by a series of acts known as the Clarendon Code.[1] Rigid and harshly intolerant, the Code forbade non-Anglicans

[1] So named for Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, Charles' chief supporter and adviser both in exile and restoration. Clarendon's last service was to suffer dismissal and disgrace as a scapegoat for his royal master (1667).

to hold municipal office, took from them the right of free assembly, and finally debarred their clergy from all the chartered towns in the kingdom. In extenuation of such severity it is only fair to add that incipient rebellions and plots among the dissenting groups, who had refused to compromise with Anglicanism, made such a code seem a vital necessity for the preservation of law and order.

The wave of enthusiasm which had elected the royalist Cavalier Parliament made relations between it and Charles most amicable for a few years. But the Stuarts' policies were not, in the long run, those of Parliament, and disagreements between the two became increasingly numerous. For one thing, Charles had strong leanings toward Catholicism and toward France, both of which were odious to Protestant Englishmen. For another, Charles' extravagant court and ambitious foreign policy were very costly. Charles felt that Parliament was overly parsimonious with him but, remembering what had happened to his father, he dared not push his demands for funds too hard. To solve his dilemma, he entered into agreements with Louis of France by which the latter granted him subsidies and so freed him from complete dependence on Parliament.

These three threads of religion, Francophilism, and finance make up the main pattern of Charles' reign. Anglo-Dutch rivalry, mounting since mid-century, flared out again in war in 1665. Though the Dutch navy proved itself the victor, the Treaty of Breda (1667) restored the peace and awarded the Dutch colonies in North America to England. Though this award included what became New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, many Englishmen felt that the cost of the war was overly much for what it brought. Hence, the criticism of the royal expenditures and the reluctance of Parliament to grant the royal requests for funds. At this same time, Louis XIV was engaged upon his attempts to bring the Netherlands under his sway, and the tripartite alliance of the Netherlands, Sweden, and England, formed in 1668, stood in his way. Charles' financial embarrassment gave Louis his chance and by two secret treaties exchanged a bribe for the withdrawal from the triple alliance; the second promised an additional bribe if Charles would restore Catholicism to England.

Pursuant to this second treaty, Charles in 1672 issued an edict of religious toleration, known as a Declaration of Indulgence. This was too much for the Anglican Parliament which replied with an act excluding Catholics and Dissenters from office. Among those affected was James, Duke of York, Catholic brother of Charles and heir to the crown. The fear of Catholicism, of which this was an omen,

reached its climax in 1678 with a scurrilous libel, the "Popish Plot," spread by a lying, unscrupulous demagogue named Titus Oates. Already uneasy, the English people were whipped by Oates' lies of Catholic plots against the throne into a frenzy of persecution. Catholics were excluded from Parliament, beaten, robbed, and judicially murdered. When the wave of madness was over, Parliament in order to prevent a recurrence passed the Habeas Corpus Act, one of the foundation stones of all democratic liberties, since it prevents arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. To it, we Americans owe much of our freedom since it became part of our heritage as well as England's.

To make a long story much shorter, Charles discovered that the Cavalier Parliament, though loyal, was increasingly truculent, and in 1679 he dissolved it. During its long tenure of office there had for the first time emerged political parties in the modern meaning of the term. Parties in the sense of groups holding different opinions are as old as governments, but modern parties having a theory or policy of governing, a continuous organization, and a purpose of exercising power through a majority of the legislative assembly began in late seventeenth-century England. Academic controversy continues as to the origin and early growth of this *sine qua non* of a representative, democratic government. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that the issues of royal and episcopal authority had by 1663 divided the Cavalier Parliament. On the one side stood the King's Friends, Anglican and royalist; on the other, Dissenters and parliamentarians. More clearly divided by the Clarendon Code and the foreign policy of Charles with its constant swing toward Catholicism, these groups by 1675 had crystallized into the Court Party and the Country Party, each with its "platform" and its organization. After the dissolution of the Parliament, the Country Party became the Petitioners, those who besought the king to call another parliament. The Court Party, for their opposition to that proposal, became known as the Abhorrers. In time, and in fashion somewhat obscure, the titles Petitioner and Abhorrer were replaced by the respective nicknames, Whig and Tory.

Whig pressure was so strong that Charles reluctantly ordered the election of a new Parliament. When it proved to have a large Whig majority, he dissolved it. The process was repeated four times, the last dissolution being so vigorous as to break up the Whig party. During the last four years of his reign (1681-1685) Charles ruled without a Parliament, financially dependent upon the continuing bribes of Louis XIV.

Last of the Stuart kings was James II (1685-1688). Cruel, revengeful, despotic, James bore a strong resemblance to his grandfather. His was a unique opportunity, for the Tories, those powerful Anglican squires and clergymen, were prepared to support him, or, at least to acquiesce in his rule, while the Whigs were almost hopelessly divided into three groups. So long as he kept faith with the Tories, James was secure, but with consummate Stuart stupidity and stubbornness, he sought to Catholicize England. In defiance of law, he filled his government and his army with Catholics, thus combining the odious threats of absolutism and religious war. In complement to this exercise of the "dispensing power," that is, the right which he claimed to set aside laws, James sought to extend toleration by his Declarations of Indulgence (1687 and 1688). When seven bishops refused to publish the second Declaration, he jailed them. This was too much for even the Anglican Tories. James seemed to be following the pattern Louis XIV set in revoking the Edict of Nantes and persecuting the Huguenots.

Even so, men who recalled the horrors of rebellion and civil war counseled moderation on the ground that James could not live much longer. The birth of a royal heir in June of 1688 sealed the king's fate. Appalled by the prospect of a Catholic dynasty, Whig and Tory leaders sunk their differences. A secret and illegal invitation was issued to Mary, daughter of James, and her Dutch husband, William of Orange, to come to England. James might yet have saved his crown had he been willing to abandon his absolutism. He was not, so the rebels aided him to "escape" to France. William temporarily assumed the power and a Convention Parliament, similar to the extra-legal body of 1660, was summoned in his name. After some debate, the throne was declared vacant and William and Mary were invited to become joint sovereigns. The dour Dutchman assented and the "Glorious Revolution" (1688-1689) was over.

Before the crown was bestowed upon the new sovereigns, however, they were forced to accede to the Declaration of Rights. Later enlarged and enacted into the Bill of Rights (1689), as it is more commonly known, this set forth a series of limitations upon the royal power and a list of rights reserved to subjects. The king was forbidden to make or suspend laws, to levy taxes or forced loans, or to maintain a standing army without the consent of Parliament. Furthermore, it was decreed that no Catholic might become king. Thus ended the practice of divine right monarchy in England, for it was apparent to all that William and Mary were sovereigns by will of

Parliament rather than by will of God. Parliament had won its long fight with the Crown; that power which can create a king can also depose one. When in December of 1936, Edward VIII abdicated at the behest of Parliament which then bestowed the crown upon George VI, the lasting character of the victory of the Glorious Revolution was spectacularly demonstrated.

C. Responsible government and empire

The Glorious Revolution signalized the transfer of supremacy from the Crown to the aristocracy who controlled Parliament. There remained the more difficult tasks of guaranteeing a continuance of this state of affairs and the working out of an effective means of government under the new system. The guaranty was shortly effected by a series of acts, known collectively as the Revolution Settlement, and by diplomacy and force applied to England's intimate but alien neighbors, Scotland and Ireland. The evolution of a new technique of government was a longer and more haphazard process which eventuated in the establishment of responsible government, that is, a government in which the executive is responsible to, and dependent upon, the majority group of the legislature.

The Revolution Settlement (1689-1701), which included the aforementioned Bill of Rights, was designed to safeguard the citizen and insure the continuing dominance of Parliament. Parliamentary control of the army and an insurance that parliaments would be summoned regularly were achieved by the Mutiny Act (1689) which gave the king legal power to maintain army discipline for a limited period only. This, plus the also still current practice of appropriating funds enough for only one year, has made it impossible for any sovereign to try to rule without a parliament. The Triennial Act (1694), by ordering the election of a new Parliament every three years,[1] made impossible a recurrence of a Long or a Cavalier Parliament. The Act of Settlement (1701) confirmed parliamentary control of the Crown by arranging for the succession upon Queen Anne's death of her second cousin, the Protestant Sophia of Hanover. Another part of this act removed the judiciary from royal control, and this together with the prohibition of arbitrary condemnation in cases of treason (Treasons Act, 1696) made impossible any such royal persecution of the citizens as had occurred under the Stuarts. Finally, the

[1] This term was increased to seven years in 1716, and finally reduced to its present five years in 1911.

Toleration Act (1689) gave freedom of worship to all save Catholics and Unitarians. Political disabilities upon Dissenters were not legally removed, however, and except by connivance and chicanery none but Anglicans could hold office in the state, the armed forces, or the universities.

Anglo-Scottish and Anglo-Irish relations both turned on the fact that Scotland and Ireland were, respectively, potential and actual allies of the deposed Stuarts and their French backers. The Scottish Lowlanders were temporarily content to accept the change in regime since it had enabled them to raise the Presbyterian Kirk to the status of the Established Church; most of the rebellious Highlanders were bribed into acquiescence. When it appeared that Anne, successor to William and Mary, would die childless, England feared that Scotland would ignore the Act of Settlement to which it was not a party and confer its crown upon the Stuart claimant. To avert this, England offered Scotland representation in the English Parliament and the right to participate in English trade and colonization, from which she was excluded by the Navigation Acts. Impelled by her desperate poverty, Scotland agreed to an Act of Union (1707) which abolished the Scotch Parliament but permitted the retention of the Kirk and the legal system. Thenceforward, England, accurately speaking, was only part of the Kingdom of Great Britain, and the English people a portion of the British nation.

Settlement with Ireland was not so amicably arranged. The list of Irish grievances was long: years of oppression, Tudor colonization, the Cromwellian Settlement, the exploitation of Irish resources and the crippling of Irish industry and commerce for the sake of English prosperity, and the religious issue all combined to make Anglo-Irish relations an open wound. The deposition of the Stuart gave the signal for a rebellion in his name, backed by French money and troops. Realizing full well the gravity of this menace, William himself took charge of the English troops who defeated the Franco-Irish forces of James at the Battle of Boyne (1690). The generous treaty which ended the struggle was soon repudiated by William at the insistence of his Protestant people, and the Catholic Irish subjected to studied humiliations, persecutions, and loss of liberty. Nor did the Protestant Irish of Ulster fare much better since they were subjected to restrictions which ruined their trade and prosperity. Those who could, sought escape from English tyranny by migrating to America; the majority stayed and suffered. During the eighteenth century, as in fact throughout the whole history of Anglo-Irish relations, the latent

hostility of the Irish flared up whenever England's difficulties seemed to hold out hope of success. Late in the course of the American Revolution, for example, with Protestant leadership and Catholic support, the Irish wrung concessions from parliament by threat of war. For a quarter of a century, Ireland enjoyed a limited autonomy though Catholics were still excluded from the government, and absentee landlords continued to bleed the land and its people. The French Revolution encouraged some staunch Irish nationalists again to twist the lion's tail. The result was disastrous. The rebellion, horribly brutal and mercilessly vicious on both sides, was finally crushed by England. On the English promise, later violated, to extend political rights to the Catholics, the Irish Parliament gave its consent to legislative union. An act of 1801 created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, but the Anglo-Irish problem was exacerbated rather than cured thereby.

Long before this happened, statecraft, circumstance, and chance had resulted in the evolution in England of responsible government. The circumstances of the accession of William and Mary, William's constant need for funds with which to carry on his long and very costly wars with Louis XIV, made it imperative that he have as little friction as possible with Parliament. Like the kings before him, William was assisted by the Privy Council, but since that body had grown too large for efficiency, he depended mainly upon a few very powerful members, most of whom were heads of some branch of the administration. This select group of ministers, known as the Cabinet, since it habitually met with the king in a small private room which was so-called in the parlance of that day, at first included both Whigs and Tories. But as William settled himself upon the throne and, more especially, as he resumed his stubborn struggle to curb the aggressions of Louis XIV, he increasingly favored the Whigs who were more favorable to his pet project. Finally, in 1694, he chose an all-Whig Cabinet, termed by its opponents, the Junta. The key to the Tory-Whig differences was financial. The war against France was partially paid for by levying a tax on land which fell most heavily on the Tory squires who consequently opposed the whole thing. Moreover, the Tories disliked a new technique which was developed to meet the mounting costs of war and government.

Prior to William's reign, the English government had been on a sort of completed exchange basis. The government bought a war or governmental services and paid for them at once from current income, supplemented by short-term loans. Under William this system

was changed by the creation of a permanent national debt. A government in incurring such a debt really enters into deferred exchanges with wealthy groups, receiving from them money and credits in return for its promise to complete the exchange by repaying the sums at some future date. Until that happens, the government (who is the borrower or debtor) promises to pay a specified amount (called interest) to the group (which is the lender or creditor). The government is then able to increase expenditures enormously without raising taxes proportionately since it can make up the difference between income and expenses by borrowing. The distinction between this and short-term loans is a matter of time. The latter are for a few months or years, the former for generations or even for an unspecified period. As long as the interest is regularly paid, the creditor is not likely to demand completion of the exchange. When for any reason it is desirable to complete the exchange, the government is likely to do so by again borrowing from the same or another source. This process reduces neither the total indebtedness nor the interest charges, but so long as a government meets its obligations regularly and in full, its credit is unimpaired.

Such in very brief and non-technical form was the expedient to which William and his ministers resorted and which is regularly practised by all governments today. The amount to which William and the Whigs made use of this device is clearly shown by the fact that the short-term debt at his accession (1689) was approximately one million pounds and at his death (1701), the permanent debt had reached eighteen million pounds. Incidentally, the Bank of England began in 1694 when a group loaned the government £1,200,000 in return for the right to use this amount of government credit as a basis for a private banking business. Later this bank was given the administration of the national debt and the sole right of issuing notes which were, and are, used for money.

To return now to the major theme of the development by parliament of a new technique of government, Whig predominance in Parliament did not long survive the war with Louis which ended in 1697 with the Peace of Ryswick,[1] but the Whig Junta retained office for almost a year despite the loss of its majority. The practice of choosing the ministry from the majority party and changing it when

[1] The wars of William and Queen Anne are discussed in Chapter XVII and later in this chapter. Partly for convenience but mainly because Mary in her five years on the throne was overshadowed by her husband, the policies of the joint sovereigns are usually ascribed to William alone. Her husband survived her by seven years, reigning as sole sovereign from 1694 to 1702.

Courtesy of the Syracuse University Library

BLENHEIM PALACE. SIR JOHN VANBRUGH (1664-1726).

Following the victory at Blenheim during the War of the Spanish Succession, Queen Anne of England showered honors and rewards upon England's military hero, John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough. He was given the famous royal manor at Woodstock where was erected this palace at the orders and the expense of the queen herself. Because of a dispute, however, the royal subsidies were shut off before the building was completed. Like the country estates of the aristocracy of this time, Blenheim is colossal in size yet discreetly classical. This view is of the park façade.

the majority changed was not yet developed. William's successor, Queen Anne (1702-1714), sought vainly to avoid party complications though her strong Anglican sympathies led her to favor the Tories. Despite this, the influence of her advisers, notably Sarah and John Churchill, later Duchess and Duke of Marlborough, made possible Whig pre-eminence during the first part of her reign, though the ministry was not always composed on strict party lines. In 1708, however, Anne was forced to accept an entire Whig ministry which commanded majority support in the Commons. The attacks of Anne and the Tories drove most of the Whig ministers from office before a general election in 1710 confirmed this action by returning a strong Tory majority. The Tory ministers remained in power until Anne's death in 1714 when the change in sovereign brought the Whigs back into office. As in 1710, this shift anticipated the loss of the Tory majority in parliament by several months. The principle and practice of party government, that is, of choosing the ministry from the party which controlled parliament, was crystallizing, but it had not yet reached its full development. Party rivalries and plots under Anne

climaxed on the eve of her death with a High Tory intrigue to seize power. An utter fiasco, this drove the moderate Tories into the Whig Party, and so discredited and disrupted the Tory Party that for the next forty-five years it was condemned to obscurity.

Anne's death and the Act of Settlement (1701) brought to the throne a new dynasty, the House of Hanover,[1] in the person of George I (1714-1727). Under him and his son and successor, George II (1727-1760), the Whigs continued to work out the principles and practice not only of responsible government but of Cabinet control as well. Knowing little of Britain and caring less, the first two Georges left the work of government in the hands of their Whig ministers, of whom the greatest was Sir Robert Walpole. Since neither George attended Cabinet meetings, Walpole became the king's agent as well as leader of the Cabinet and of the Whig majority in the Commons. Thus, in effect, though he never had the title, Walpole from 1721 to 1742 was the *prime* minister. Habits begun by chance hardened into tradition in this case as in so many others. By the time that George III (1760-1820) came to the throne, the traditions of party, cabinet, and responsible government were so firmly entrenched that, ambitious as he was to rule, he dared do it only by building up a personal party, the "King's Friends," which finally won control of parliament and gave him a Tory ministry of his own. That the last British king to rule as well as reign did so through the machinery of parliament is clear evidence of the strength of tradition.

In brief, by the end of the eighteenth century, the British government had achieved the form the major outlines of which have not greatly changed since that day save in the very important respect of democracy. Eighteenth-century Britain was ruled by an aristocracy, Whig until 1760, alternately Whig and Tory thereafter. Technical head of the government was the king but in practice his power steadily decreased until it was properly said of him that he reigned but did not rule.[2] The real executive was the Cabinet, chosen from the majority party in Parliament, strictly accountable to Parliament, and endowed with authority only so long as it enjoyed majority support. If any bill proposed by the Cabinet was turned down by the legislature, or if that body went on record as having "no confidence" in the Cabinet, the group either had to resign, whereupon a new min-

[1] Still the reigning house of Great Britain. The name was changed from the Germanic Hanover to the more British Windsor during the World War.

[2] The last exercise of the royal veto, for example, was in 1707, although the king still has the right to veto any bill.

HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, REBUILT 1840-1860

European architecture underwent a "Gothic revival" during the romantic reaction of the nineteenth century when architects sought inspiration from the medieval period of national beginnings. This style began in England where it was well represented in the buildings pictured here. The earlier houses of Parliament were destroyed by fire in 1834.

istry [1] would be formed by the opposition, or to appeal to the country for support in an election. Curiously, the Cabinet has no legal basis as such. Its members derive their authority from their membership in the Privy Council and from their ministerial positions. The titular leader of the Cabinet, although not invariably the actual one, is the prime minister who chooses his colleagues, directs policies, and acts as spokesman. All members share responsibility for their individual or joint actions, resigning in a body in the event of defeat or "no confidence."

Parliament, composed of the House of Lords and the House of Commons, was an oligarchic body in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, largely controlled by the landed aristocracy. Membership in the Lords was restricted to the peerage. The Commons was elected, but suffrage was so severely limited that only about one out of every ten adult Englishmen had any voice in the matter. Of the 560 members (1707-1801), forty-five were from Scotland, twenty-four from Wales, and the remaining 491 from England. There were

[1] Properly speaking, the ministry is composed of the various ministers, i.e., the administrative heads of departments of the government, not all of whom are always members of the Cabinet. Popular usage, however, has tended to make Ministry, Cabinet, and Government virtually synonymous.

three types of electoral districts in England proper: county, borough, and university, of which the 203 boroughs were by far the most important. Suffrage in the boroughs varied from the scot and lot, or "pot-walloper" boroughs where every householder of six months' residence had the right to vote, through the burgage boroughs in which only the owners of the houses or the house sites of the original voters had the suffrage, to the corporation and freemen boroughs where, respectively, only members of the borough government and a specified group of "freemen" had the franchise. Representation had been granted to many boroughs in the dim and distant past, and no account had been taken of the population shifts which had deprived many boroughs of most of their inhabitants while adding to the population of others. The result was gross injustice in the distribution of seats in the Commons with these so-called "rotten boroughs," whence all but a few inhabitants had departed, continuing to elect members to Parliament, while sections more recently populous had no representation whatever. Moreover, the system lent itself most readily to manipulation by men able to buy votes or even to buy up whole burgage boroughs. The most notorious example of this type of "pocket" or "nomination" borough was Old Sarum whose forty acres had no permanent inhabitants but whose owner continued to "elect" representatives to Parliament. The point to be noticed is that this antiquated system made possible the control of the House of Commons by a small group of wealthy men who, in effect, could buy and sell seats in that House. "Borough-mongering" became a regular profession which returned high profits in the form of patronage and favorable legislation. With vested interests in control, Great Britain drifted along until impact with three revolutions, the American, the French, and the Industrial, forced her to change her ways. Domestic affairs in the eighteenth century were overshadowed by events rising from the expansion of Europe overseas, and particularly by the Anglo-French duel for empire. Reference frequently has been made in passing to expansion, colonialism, and mercantilism; now it is time to draw the threads together and examine the pattern.

"Mercantilism" has already been defined and explained. "Expansion" is a convenient way of lumping together in one word the spread of the political, economic, and cultural system of any people into any alien area. "Colonization," an integral phase of expansion, is the means by which such extensions of power and culture are rendered more or less permanent. Expansion is apparently as old as man, but European overseas expansion began only in the sixteenth century. The fact is

sometimes overlooked that expansion has both an extroverted and introverted aspect. The former is the more familiar "outward" movement of discovery, trade, colonization, and, eventually, the Europeanization of the world. For us of the New World, expansion was the link which bound us to Europe. We are transplanted Europeans who have, indeed, developed our own culture, but whose roots are in the Old World. The "inward" aspect includes: the widening of intellectual horizons and the further breaking down of localism and provincialism, the intensification of nationalism and nationalistic competition; commercial, financial, and industrial growth; political changes due in whole or in part to overseas influence; and, in short, the entire, complicated reaction of the mother country to the powers and responsibilities conferred upon her by possession of a colonial empire.

Generalizations about the motives which led to expansion are not wholly satisfactory since the motivation so often varied. Not all men —and, after all, nations are only groups of men—are moved by the same things or combinations of forces. Nevertheless, it is possible with reasonable accuracy to group detailed motives under the three alliterative headings of gospel, gold, and glory. As the reader is aware, Christianity has always been strongly missionary. The desire to proselytize, to spread the Christian religion, has been most powerful since the days of St. Paul. Catholic and Protestant alike eagerly sought from the sixteenth century forward to spread their religions into newly discovered lands. Some men, too, sought the chance to worship as they pleased, unhampered by the religious intolerance of their homelands. Usually, be it noted, such men were not advocates of religious toleration and liberty for all. They only wanted the opportunity to worship as they themselves chose. Greed for gold and treasure led some men to the ends of the earth and some nations to extend their sway over strange places and alien peoples. More important, but less spectacular, was the desire for profits from trade and commerce. Coincidental in fifteenth-century Europe was an increased demand for and a diminished supply of eastern goods. The earliest voyages of discovery and the first empire building sought to supply that lack. Many men, too, sought neither gold nor trade, as such, but merely a new and better opportunity to make a living. The urge for glory was both personal and national. Individuals saw in the world overseas, not only chances for profits, but adventure, romance, and the winning of public acclaim. Nations, that is, groups of men, saw opportunities to increase their power and their prestige. Jealousies, and superiority complexes also tended toward the same end.

The pioneer explorers and empire builders were sent out by the Portuguese whose establishment of a strong centralized monarchy in the late fourteenth century made possible their commercial pre-eminence in the fifteenth century. Under the leadership of Prince Henry (1394-1460), entitled the Navigator for his work along these lines, exploratory voyages were undertaken along the west coast of Africa which climaxed with the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by Bartolomeu Diaz (1486-1488) and the first all-sea voyage to India by Vasco da Gama (1497-1498). These discoveries gave Portugal a virtual monopoly of trade with India and the Spice Islands. Pepper and cloves were the most valuable commodities, and the usual profit was about five hundred per cent. During its seventy-five odd years of supremacy, Portugal made no attempt at land conquests in the East, but centered its activity in gaining and maintaining commercial and maritime pre-eminence. Only in Brazil, discovered probably by accident, did the Portuguese attempt colonization. Fundamental weaknesses at home, however, made impossible the continued maintenance of empire, and in 1580 Portugal itself was annexed to Spain and its empire either merged with the Spanish or fell prey to other rivals.

Spain, finally united and given an absolute monarchy by Ferdinand and Isabella late in the fifteenth century, entered the imperial field with the celebrated voyages of Columbus. Immediate rivalry with Portugal was reduced by mutual acceptance of the Papal Line of Demarcation (1493)[1] which awarded all lands unclaimed by Christian princes to Spain if they lay west of a line approximately 37 degrees W. longitude; to Portugal, if east of that line. By a series of discoveries and conquests, Spain brought under her rule a vast empire in southern North America, Central America, and South America plus the Caribbean Islands in the Atlantic and the Philippines in the Pacific. Gold, gospel, and glory had indeed been the Spanish motives and these were reflected in her empire. Strict monopoly control was established in all parts and her colonies were valued only as markets on the one hand and producers of mineral wealth and raw materials on the other. No aliens were allowed to trade with the colonies and colonists themselves were forbidden to produce goods in competition with Spain. Prominent in all Spanish colonies were the churchmen, many of whom were explorers, conquerors, colonizers, and administrators as well as priests. The strong

[1] This was revised in 1494 by the Treaty of Tordesillas which moved the line west about nine degrees.

SIR THOMAS ROE AT THE COURT OF AJMIR. MURAL AT WESTMINSTER. PAINTING BY W. ROTHSTEIN.

This is one of a series of murals in St. Stephen's Hall, Westminster, depicting the building of Britain. Sir Thomas Roe was sent as ambassador to the court of Jehangir, the Moghul Emperor of Hindustan, by King James on behalf of the East India Company. Roe was able to obtain important commercial concessions. The painting is shown here to typify the growth of empires.

Catholicism of the so-called Latin American countries is testimony to the enduring character of their work. As was befitting the empire of an absolute monarchy, the Spanish colonies were governed directly from Spain by means of viceroys and other royal agents. The influx of fabulous amounts of gold and silver from the New World gave Spain a brief period of European power and glory, but neglect of other resources, both in Spain and in the colonies, plus the rise of Dutch and English sea power, brought decline. Spain held most of its empire until into the nineteenth century, but its day of triumph had vanished two centuries before. However, the persistence of the Spanish tongue and Spanish customs in Central and South America and the southwestern United States gives evidence that the social and cultural conquest was really lasting.

Leadership in trade and empire shifted in the late sixteenth century from Spain to its rebellious province, the Dutch Netherlands. In fact, this mercantile and maritime struggle, in which the Dutch were sporadically assisted by the English who also felt menaced by Spanish power, was part of the Dutch fight for independence. The Dutch East India Company, for example, formed in 1601 by the

amalgamation of eight small companies engaged in the spice trade with the Indies, was virtually a department of the state which on occasion supplied the government with ships, money, and men. The same relation also existed with the Dutch West India Company, chartered in 1621 to fight Spain, conquer Brazil, and trade and colonize in North America. Both in the East and in the West, the Dutch subordinated everything to trade. Such conquests as they made were primarily to promote or protect trade, and except for New Amsterdam they undertook little colonization. Anglo-Dutch rivalry, always vigorous and warlike in the reign of James I, flared out in open war under Cromwell and Charles II. The Dutch could not long match the English power and resources and by the last quarter of the seventeenth century they had lost both their commercial pre-eminence and their colony of New Amsterdam. In the East, the Dutch successfully held on to the Indies whence they had driven the English by 1625, and in 1940 they still control a colonial empire of over 733,000 square miles in that region.

France, like England and the Netherlands, first challenged Iberian colonial supremacy in the sixteenth century with voyages of discovery and exploration of which the most important were those of Jacques Cartier. This intrepid seaman reached the mouth of the St. Lawrence River in 1534 and in the next year sailed up the river past the Indian settlements, Stadacona (Quebec) and Hochlega (Montreal) to the rapids which he called La Chine (China), symbol of the fact that what he sought was a trade route to the East. Various attempts at colonization failed and religious strife plus European entanglements cut off further trials for half a century. The lure of the profits to be made from the fisheries and more importantly from the fur trade [1] led to a renewal of French efforts early in the seventeenth century. The first settlement was at Acadia (now Nova Scotia) [2] but New France really began with the foundation of Quebec (1608) by that very epitome of the French explorers, the adventurous, courageous visionary, Samuel de Champlain. Westward expansion, primarily in search of furs, secondly in search of converts to Christianity —the missionaries were very important in the development of New France—and thirdly to forestall the English, was very rapid. First individuals and then joint stock companies chartered by Richelieu

[1] A style revolution at the turn of the century made furs very fashionable and led to an increasing demand for them. Beaver hats were especially prized. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that a freak of fashion was responsible for the beginning and early life of New France.

[2] The first colony (1604) failed but a successful attempt was made in 1610.



Courtesy of the New York Public Library

CHAMPLAIN'S HABITATION. FROM CHAMPLAIN'S *VOYAGES*, 1613.

Samuel de Champlain, the real founder of French Canada, ascended the St. Lawrence River in 1608 and established a colony, soon known as Quebec, near the Indian village of Stadacona.

sought to exploit the fur trade and, very incidentally, to colonize the land. The feudal, or as it was known in New France, the *seigneurial*, system, was transplanted to the colony. Less rigid and less onerous than its European parent, the system was well adapted to the needs of the very sparsely populated colony whose greatest problem was defense against the Indians and the English. It did not, however, make for permanent settlement or for sound agriculture, and these failings, made worse by lack of manpower, constituted the greatest weaknesses of the colony.

Colbert and Louis XIV transformed New France into a royal colony in 1663, and the always oligarchic government became wholly autocratic and paternalistic. In fact the outstanding characteristic of New France was excessive paternalism. The seigneurial system was patriarchal; the secular government minutely regulated all details of

trade; and the Church kept close tabs on the life and doings of every family. Local self-government was virtually non-existent. The economic system of the colony, which by 1700 stretched from Acadia north to the valley of the St. Lawrence, westerly to the Great Lakes and down the Mississippi to the sea, was based wholly on the fur trade. Agriculture was primitive and slight. The social system was more rigid than that of the English colonies but less so than that of France. In recapitulation, New France suffered from the weaknesses of poverty, scarcity of manpower, undue emphasis upon the fur trade, and excessive dependence upon France. Yet, withal, it endured for over 160 years.

The empire of England which in 1940 covered about one quarter of the earth's land surface began primarily as a venture in commerce and sea power. It is impossible here even to attempt a sketch of its growth, but passing reference here and there has already indicated the concern which both Tudor and Stuart felt for it. By the mid-eighteenth century it included the eastern seaboard of North America between French Acadia and Spanish Florida, and Rupert's Land in the area of Hudson's Bay, Bermuda, the Westward and Leeward Islands, and Jamaica in the West Indies; and trading stations such as Bombay and Madras in India. The chief instruments in this development had been joint-stock companies like the East India Company, the Somers Company (Bermuda), the Virginia Company, the Plymouth Company, and the Hudson's Bay Company. Some colonies, for example, Maryland, the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and the Leewards, owed their existence to "proprietors," i.e., individuals granted rights of trade and colonization by the Crown. In the East, the English empire was commercial, like that of the Netherlands; in the West, it was mercantile and colonial.

English colonial policy from the Restoration to the American Revolution falls naturally into three periods. The first, 1660-1713, was strongly mercantilistic. Colonies were regarded as existing primarily for England's benefit and it was expected that in return for protection they would give trade advantages to the mother country. This was also the period of deliberate imperialism by the government as exemplified by wars with the Dutch, one of which added New Amsterdam to the English holdings, and by systematic colonization. The second period, 1713-1756, was the era of Whig dominance, and their policy was to "let sleeping dogs lie." Stringent trade restrictions were legislated, but not enforced; the question of colonial self-government was ignored; and the advancing of imperial interests was



FRANCE. AN ETCHING BY WILLIAM HOGARTH (1697-1764).

This reflects the popular English attitude toward France in the mid-eighteenth century. Notice: the flag, "Vengeance and the Good Beer and Good Beef of England"; the tavern sign, "Thin Soup"; and the officer roasting frogs—all intimating the poverty and hunger of France. The well-fed friar with his plans for a monastery and his load of inquisitorial weapons was meant to appeal to the anti-Catholicism of the English, a feeling which had been strong since Tudor times. The second plate of this series depicts England as a land of plenty.

largely left to private enterprise. The third phase, 1756-1776, was one of renewed vigor. The Navigation Acts and other trade regulations were strictly enforced to the intense resentment of the colonials who much preferred the easy-going policy of the Whigs. New duties and new taxes were imposed in an attempt to make the colonies bear their share of the burden of the long struggle with France which climaxed with the Seven Years' War (1756-1763).

The "Second Hundred-Years' War" is the title which has been applied to the long conflict between France and England which began with William's war with Louis (1689-1697) already referred to in this and earlier chapters. Broadly speaking, the two fundamental causes of this rivalry are to be found in the "Balance of Power," and the commercial and colonial competition of the two nations. The establishment of French hegemony in Europe by Richelieu and Mazarin, and more especially the aggressive expansion of Louis XIV into

the Low Countries, roused English fears. The pro-French policy of Charles II and the vigorous anti-Catholicism of the majority of Englishmen rendered these fears more real and Englishmen more ready to support William's bellicose policies. Intensive commercialism began with the mercantilism of Colbert, and it was a measure of its bitterness that an Anglo-French tariff war begun in 1678 lasted for well over a hundred years. If the reader will recall the role assigned to colonies by mercantilist theories he will at once see why the rivalry extended into the colonial field. The attempts of Louis and Colbert to build up New France, for example, were regarded by English mercantilists not alone as a threat to their colonies or to the trade in fish and furs, but also as a distinct attempt to enrich France so that she might extend her dominance over England. Despite this colonial aspect, however, the struggle until after 1748 was centered chiefly in Europe.

Since they are related elsewhere [1] there is no need to repeat here the story of these conflicts. The War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697), known in the colonies as King William's War, ended with the mutual exhaustion of both antagonists and a virtual return to the *status quo ante bellum*. Louis had been checked, however, William firmly enthroned, and the Netherlands temporarily secured. The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713), called by colonials Queen Anne's War, resulted in the additions to the British Empire of Gibraltar and Minorca, Acadia, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay region, which latter had long been claimed by the Hudson's Bay Company. Peace broke out between the two rivals in the years from 1713 to 1740, while France was under a regency and England under the first Hanoverians, but commercial and colonial rivalry continued both in America where the French constructed their chain of forts along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers, and in India where the final collapse of the Mogul Empire (1739) opened the way for European advance. The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) settled little, though the French lost Louisburg in North America to the British, and the latter lost Madras to the former.

The Seven Years' War, preceded by the Diplomatic Revolution [2] and by an undeclared Anglo-French war (1755-1756), in which the British captured part of the French fleet and over one million pounds' worth of French shipping, and precipitated by the Prussian invasion of Saxony, was the climax of the struggle. A comparison of the two

[1] See Chapter XVII.
[2] See p. 499.

Powers shows that the British position was stronger. The greater manpower of France was offset by her involvement in Europe and her liability to invasion which made it necessary to keep a large army at home, as well as to maintain a fleet for the defense of her empire. Britain, protected by her insularity, was able to depend upon her fleet for both domestic and imperial protection. French advantages in India, won chiefly by the skillful statecraft of Joseph Dupleix, Director General of the French Company in India from 1742 to 1754, were largely nullified by his recall, and by lack of sea power. In North America, the geographically compact, largely self-reliant British colonies were better situated than the hyperextended French holdings which were so dependent upon the mother country for supplies and men. Both France and Great Britain felt that mastery in Europe was dependent upon mastery of America and both were prepared to make strenuous efforts to win it.

The fascinating story of the war—of the victory won by the quondam English clerk, Robert Clive, at the Battle of Plassey (1757); of the capture of Louisburg (1758), Quebec (1759), and Montreal (1760) by British and colonial troops; and of the virtual destruction of the French fleet at the Battles of Lagos and Quiberon Bay (1759)—lies beyond the limits of this book. Most important of the British statesmen was William Pitt the Elder, Whig leader and Prime Minister from 1757 to 1761. Under his guidance every possible pressure was put on France, and Britain rose from what seemed sure defeat to victory. Pitt was driven from power before the war ended, by the disfavor of George III, but the Peace of Paris (1763) was, nonetheless, a record of Pitt's success. By its terms, Great Britain received Florida from Spain; and Senegal, Minorca, islands in the West Indies, Canada and lands east of the Mississippi from France. In payment for an alliance and as recompense for loss of Florida, France gave Louisiana to Spain. Her power in India also shattered, France salvaged from the wreck of her empire only five trading stations in India, the islands of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Santo Domingo in the West Indies and of St. Pierre and Miquelon in the north Atlantic, and fishing rights off Newfoundland. Great Britain emerged as undisputed mistress of the seas, hated and envied by the rest of Europe as the greatest commercial and colonial power in the world. Yet in the words of the ancient proverb, "Pride goeth before destruction and an haughty spirit before a fall." Within two decades a successful rebellion had deprived Great Britain of her most important colonies.



MAP 26. COLONIAL EMPIRES IN 1763

The American Revolution (1775-1783) was not the spontaneous, mass insurrection of "patriots" against the tyranny of Great Britain which legend has depicted, but the work of an active and vociferous minority. Its complex causes included selfish greed as well as altruism, personal animosities as well as the better-publicized love of liberty. It would seem that the key to the American Revolution lay in the period of Whig neglect earlier in the century. Failure to enforce the stringent trade regulations had not only led to a profitable, if illegal, trade, which added greatly to the colonials' wealth and prosperity; it also had the effect of making resentment sure if and when the restrictions should be enforced. Similarly, inaction by the British government had both permitted and, in a sense, forced the colonists to develop self-government. These things led to the growth of self-assurance and an independent spirit to which was added a strong sense of security when the Treaty of Paris removed the French threat. In such a situation it was probably inevitable that when the lackadaisical Whig policy was replaced by the vigorous mercantilistic and imperial policy of George Grenville, an explosion of some sort should occur. From his point of view, Grenville was merely seeking to make the now populous and reasonably prosperous colonies pay part of the expense of their own protection and maintenance. New legislation (the Sugar Act, 1764) was devised to reduce smuggling and to produce a revenue; and a stamp tax, calculated to return about 100,000 pounds annually, was imposed (Stamp Act, 1765). The reaction of the colonies must have been a distinct shock to Grenville. Their immediate protests were implemented by an embargo on British goods which startled the English merchants, whose trade was threatened, into putting pressure on Parliament which repealed the offensive act in 1766. Other tax laws, including the familiar tax on tea, helped keep alive irritation during the next several years. Attempts at appeasement were largely nullified by the stubborn insistence of George III upon punitive measures, and the equally obstinate determination of Samuel Adams of Boston to incite a rebellion. Finally in 1774, the Boston Port Act, which closed that port to all shipping, to the irritation of the merchants of the seacoast, and the Quebec Act, which, intended as a fair and generous settlement of the problem of Canada, roused both the fear and the anger of the inland colonists, brought matters to a head. The First Continental Congress, while protesting its loyalty, declared a war of economic sanctions against Great

Britain, and then each party sat tight waiting for the other to capitulate.

The war, begun on April 19, 1775, by the Battles of Lexington and Concord, was in many respects a civil rather than an inter-nation struggle. Loyalties were divided on both sides of the Atlantic. Many English Whigs opposed the war, seeing in it an attack upon colonial liberties which they feared was a prelude to an attack upon their own. Among the colonists, a proportion variously estimated at from 15 to 33 percent remained loyal to the Crown, and probably not more than a quarter of the population were active supporters of the rebel cause. The history of the war, familiar to every American by reason of frequent repetition, has no place here. Blundering incompetence and half-hearted action by the British, plus the intervention of France and Spain led to a colonial victory.

The consequences of the American Revolution, overwhelming in their ramifications, can only be hinted at. The Treaty of Paris (1783) recognized the independence of the thirteen colonies and paved the way for their subsequent unification. The migration of the Loyalists to Canada, during and after the war, transformed that province into a British colony which has now become the leading Dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Undoubtedly, also, the examples of a successful revolution and of equally successful nation-building have given impetus and inspiration to liberals everywhere. Finally, the loss of the American colonies produced a disillusionment which led to a temporary retreat from colonialism. In place of the avid desires for empire appeared the defeatist theory that colonies were of no value since, like fruits when they ripen, they drop from the parent stem. The American Revolution seemed to offer concrete proof of this, and the new economic theories of the Physiocrats, who will be discussed in the next chapter, administered the final blow to the old mercantilism.

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Chapter XIX

The Dislocation of the Social Order

A. The Inadequacies of Absolutism

The example of contemporary dictatorships demonstrates that absolute government is not simply an historical phenomenon. Under one disguise or another, it has always existed, has always been espoused, and has been frequently acquiesced in by men. The theories advanced to justify it have undergone frequent changes, but the fundamental excuses for absolutism are the same in every age: to provide "enlightened" government for the "unenlightened"; to ensure "efficiency" in administration; and to advance the common good. It makes little difference whether an absolutism be "divinely ordained" as in the age of Louis XIV, "decreed by the immutable laws of nature" as in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, or the result of "inexorable economic law" as in Communist Russia. In every case it is based on the assumption that the mass of men are too ignorant and too selfish to govern themselves in the common interest. Modern exponents of absolutism like Hitler and Mussolini, while flattering the masses, exercise no restraint in revealing their contempt for them.

The appeals of absolutism, like the excuses for it, have been fundamentally the same in all ages. It satisfies those with lust for power, convinced of their own superiority, and unwilling to tolerate checks upon their authority. It is likely to win approval among vested interests who feel that they are threatened under mass control, and at the same time it appeals to those who want radical changes in the social structure and are convinced that these cannot be realized except through revolution and dictatorship. Sincere reformers may defend it on the score that centralized control in enlightened hands could do more good for mankind than democratic government by mediocrities. Finally, many who are only passively concerned with government are won to absolutism since it relieves them of the responsibility of gov-

erning themselves. This seems especially true in the twentieth century. In the age of Louis XIV, lack of popular education and the strong forces of tradition deprived the masses of even this simple choice.

It is easy to construct a logical case for absolutism, provided past experience be ignored and provided one limit one's self to rationalizations upon the future. It is impossible to do so from the example of absolute governments of the past. They all betray fundamental and inherent weaknesses.

Absolute government is usually established through force and always preserved by force. Assuming omniscience, it can brook no opposition in word or deed. It prohibits the free assembly of citizens, attempts rigorously to censor thought and ideas, and "liquidates" those who have the temerity to question its motives and methods. Suspecting his subjects and fearing them, the dictator reinforces his oppression by employing secret agents, provocateurs, and secret police. He bends the courts and the law to his will and supplies himself with armed forces to make his will obeyed. At the same time he denies arms to the mass of the people. These are the basic techniques of all authoritarian governments, although they have manifested themselves in the most varied ways. The differences between the Prætorian Guard of Roman Emperors and the Militia of Fascist Italy, between the suppression of free speech in seventeenth-century France and in modern dictatorships, between the secret police of imperial Russia and those of present-day Russia, Italy, and Germany are all chiefly differences in detail. Absolute government must be preserved by force rather than by the free consent of the governed, else force would not be the instrument of every absolutism.

The dependence upon force is absolutism's greatest weakness. In the first place, it is futile to assume that uniformity of thought and ideas can be imposed permanently. One of the finest examples of this futility has already been observed in the history of the Christian Church. Despite the instruments of oppression which had been devised, it was impossible to make all religious thinking fit the same pattern. There are likewise numerous examples of failure in the attempts made to impose uniform political thinking. In the nineteenth century, the classic cases are those of Metternich in Austria and of the more reactionary czars of Russia. None of these was able to devise an effective quarantine against infectious ideas from the outside, nor were they able to keep opposition from breeding within. Not only is the use of force futile in attaining the objectives of absolutism, it

is likewise likely to recoil upon its inventor. Such was the case when the Prætorian Guard of the Roman Empire subordinated the Emperors; such also was the case when disillusioned subjects turned upon Czar Nicholas II of Russia. It is not altogether improbable that a similar fate may befall modern dictators.

One of the supposedly great virtues of absolutism is that it enables the most able personality to govern in the common interest. This is likewise one of its greatest weaknesses. While it is true that on occasions exceptional men of great vision who were devoted to the public good governed well as absolute authorities, the fact remains that there can be no guarantee that wise government, if it exists, will be perpetuated in an authoritarian regime. Indeed, it is more likely that genius will be followed by mediocrity, with the result that centralized control is badly misused. Historical evidence of this is considerable. Probably the best example can be drawn from Roman imperial history. The wise and beneficent government of the philosopher Emperor Marcus Aurelius gave way to the evil administration of his son, Commodus. Centralization which in the one case made for good government, in the other made for bad government. An absolutism is too dependent upon the individual who happens to wield the instruments of power.

B. The progress of scientific thought

The eighteenth century is often referred to as the *Age of Reason* or the *Age of the Enlightenment*. Both terms reveal fundamental characteristics of the period: the emphasis of reason over faith and authority among many intellectuals; and the wide dissemination of rational thought. In this era, the whole intellectual world reacted to the accumulating influences of the Protestant and commercial revolutions, geographic discoveries, and the phenomenal advances of science. All established thought and all existing institutions were tested in the crucible of reason, and by use of reason men were persuaded to believe that a perfect order could be realized. Not everyone shared this confidence or optimism. The masses were still excluded from intellectual riches as they were from material wealth, and there were many of the upper strata who clung to traditional faith and authority. An age which produced a Wesley and a Hume, which tolerated the publications of Voltaire and punished those who read them, could scarcely be accused of dull uniformity. Yet the temper of the times was rationalistic, and posterity has judged that those who worshiped

at the altar of Reason made the most significant contributions to human liberty.

Among the great intellectual revolutions, the Enlightenment holds a unique place in the transition from early modern to contemporary times. Like the Scholastics and the Humanists, the men of the Enlightenment still held to the view that the universe was uniform and orderly and that there was a final and infallible authority to which they could appeal. Their authority, however, was human understanding or reason, not the Church Fathers or the ancient classicists, and their inspiration was science not religion. In this latter respect, they anticipated the modern age but fell short of it through their inclination to dogmatism. They had almost unlimited confidence in the power of human reason and in the rationality of man. They had a growing faith in human progress; they were humanitarian and cosmopolitan in their views. Convinced by science that all nature, including man, was originally orderly and rational, they applied the lessons of science to the investigation of all social institutions, religion, morals, and ethics. There was much in their methods which now seems naive and many of their conclusions appear ludicrous, but the fact remains that through their effort a great deal of the accumulated rubbish of the past was swept aside.

If confidence in reason and in the capacity of science to explain the universe and refashion society was exaggerated, it was because there was little cause to doubt their validity. Since the days of Copernicus and Galileo, science had steadily widened its conquests, until it gave promise of reducing everything to simple, mathematical order. Some age-old superstitions were dispelled, and doubt was cast upon those which remained. It was perfectly natural that the tools of science, so uniformly successful in prying loose the secrets of inanimate nature, should be applied to animate nature as well. After all, every discovery of science added assurance to the growing conviction that all nature, including man, was fashioned in uniform pattern and responded to clearly observable and calculable mathematical law. The glorious achievements of seventeenth-century science, and particularly those of Sir Isaac Newton, seemed to justify this faith.

Son of a yeoman, Sir Isaac Newton trained in theology at Cambridge University before acquaintance with the publications of Kepler persuaded him to concentrate his attention upon the study of astronomy, physics, and mathematics. At the age of twenty-four he had already formulated the basic hypotheses by which he was to revolutionize these sciences, but it was not until twenty years later, after

adducing mathematical proofs, that he published his momentous work, *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (1687). This supplied mathematical evidence for the law of gravitation, that "every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force varying inversely as the square of the distance between them and directly proportional to the product of their masses." Thus the force which Galileo had used to explain falling objects on this earth was demonstrated to have universal application and was advanced to explain the motion of the heavenly planets. Nothing could demonstrate more effectively the universality of natural law. The Copernican system was at last established upon a firm basis and superstitions of the middle ages which the Church had cultivated were dealt a decisive blow.

The revolutionary implications of Newton's *Principia*, as his great work is also called, were fully appreciated by his contemporaries. Despite its dull style and its difficult mathematics, it passed through forty translations, abbreviations, and popularizations during the next century, becoming the common possession of the intellectual world. Newton was extolled as the discoverer of the universe and the greatest genius of all times. For a century scientists devoted themselves to the exposition and elaboration of his proofs; for well over a century more they stood the tests of constantly expanding science. It was not until the twentieth century that some of his minor conclusions were seriously challenged by the exponents of the theory of relativity. Even so, the basic principles of Newtonian mechanics are still accepted. Little wonder that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when there was little reason to doubt and every reason to rely upon the accuracy of his conclusions, Newton was worshiped only a little less than the Divinity.

While Newtonian mechanics demonstrated the simplicity and uniformity of nature in the universe, physical studies began to unlock the secrets of the everyday world. Newton himself investigated the properties of light, demonstrating that the rainbow is produced through the decomposition of white light, and he came close to anticipating the wave theory. It was left to his great contemporary, Christian Huygens, however, to advance this latter thesis with such clarity that it was generally accepted by the nineteenth century. These notable studies of optics were accompanied by significant technical improvements in instruments for observation, particularly the microscope and the telescope.

Speculation upon the properties of matter and the laws of motion



Courtesy of the New York Public Library

HOOKE'S COMPOUND MICROSCOPE. FROM HIS *MICROGRAPHIA*, 1664.

Robert Hooke (1635-1703), first curator of the Royal Society of England and one of the most versatile scientists of his century, improved the compound microscope which had been invented in the Netherlands and popularized its scientific use. He also improved and popularized the reflector telescope, the barometer, the air pump; his invention of the balance wheel for the watch made it possible to condense that timepiece into a more convenient form. The parts of the above illustration are as follows: Fig. 1. Apparatus for keeping lens properly shaped and smoothed; Fig. 2. Distance gauge; Fig. 3. Apparatus for measurement of light refraction; Fig. 4. Design for shape of tube in Fig. 6; Fig. 5. Reflector; Fig. 6. Compound microscope.

similarly helped to stimulate the invention of ingenious machines which facilitated experimentation and ofttimes were capable of being used widely in a practical way. Denis Papin (1647-1712), one of the first in the long line of modern inventive genius, after successfully constructing a piston pump, applied himself to the creation of the first diving boat or submarine and then to the invention of a steam engine. Further improvements upon the steam engine, encouraged by the need for efficient instruments to pump water from mines, culminated in the development of a crude but practical machine by Thomas Newcomen in 1712. The expansive power of heat and the sensitivity of matter to it opened the way to the invention of the barometer and the thermometer. Early in the eighteenth century, Gabriel Daniel Fahrenheit (1686-1736), a Danziger by birth, perfected the thermometer which still bears his name, and established a firm at Amsterdam to manufacture them. Others, like Fahrenheit, were soon encouraged to establish thriving enterprises to produce precision instruments for experimenters, and mechanical toys for socialites who dabbled in science.

Observations made from some of these mechanical toys, especially barometers and magnets, led to significant discoveries in electricity. An obscure glass-worker's revelation that under special conditions the mercury in a barometer possessed luminous qualities in darkness laid the basis for the discovery of two kinds of electricity which Franklin subsequently named positive and negative. Machines were created to produce electrical charges and a method was found to store these (the Leyden jar) for experimental purposes. The most significant as well as the most spectacular investigations into the properties of electricity were made by Benjamin Franklin of Philadelphia. He discovered that pointed conductors had greater power to draw or discharge electrical charges; he identified lightning with electricity through his famous experiments with the kite; and he invented a lightning rod which he and many others believed would protect buildings during thunder storms. More than anything else which this many-sided genius accomplished, his studies of electricity brought him an international reputation.

Hand in hand with the advancements of physics and celestial mechanics went important developments in the science of chemistry. During the seventeenth century, the versatile Irish genius, Robert Boyle (1627-1691), made a series of notable experiments which may be said to have separated chemistry from alchemy and to have made it modern. He drew the distinction between mixtures and com-

pounds, anticipated the idea of "elements" and the atomic theory, and most important of all framed the "law" that the volume of a gas varies inversely with its pressure. Despite Boyle's contributions, chemistry did not advance with the same degree of rapidity as did physics. It was bogged down by outworn traditions and hampered by unsound speculation. Not until the second half of the eighteenth century were there further notable achievements. Around 1755 Joseph Black, professor at the University of Edinburgh, made the discovery that alkalies when heated threw off a gas which he called "fixed air" and which we now know as carbon dioxide. Shortly afterward, Henry Cavendish discovered hydrogen, and in 1774, Joseph Priestley found the gas which supports combustion and which was named oxygen by the French chemist, Lavoisier (1743-1794). The greatest chemist of the eighteenth century, Lavoisier, systematized the discoveries of his contemporaries, dispelled the false doctrines which lingered, and advanced the thesis that in chemical actions though the quality of matter may change, its quantity remains stationary. This "quantitative" concept was the starting point for some of the most notable chemical discoveries of the next century.

In the eighteenth century, geography took its place among the exact sciences, under the stimulation of geographic discoveries. Partly for the same reason, geology was born. From the sixteenth century forward, considerable progress had been made in the study of rocks and earth formations, but it was an eighteenth-century Scotchman, James Hutton (1726-1797), who laid the foundation for modern geology in his *Theory of the Earth*, published in 1785. In this he maintained that the earth was not recently created but the result of gradual and evolutionary change which was observable in the rock formations and investigations of the earth's crust.

Significant discoveries were likewise made in botany and zoology. In the former a great early contribution was that of the English clergyman, John Ray, who first produced a systematic classification of plants. The Swedish scientist, Carl Linnæus, employed this procedure on a wider scale, establishing the modern nomenclature used in the plant and animal kingdoms. Much the same contribution to zoology was made by the distinguished French scientist Buffon.

As nature abandoned its secrets and seemingly justified the Newtonian implication that all nature was subjected to mechanical law, it was to be expected that the holy tabernacle of the human body should be asked to sacrifice its place of privilege. Physiological studies by such men as René Descartes and Julien de la Mettrie (1709-1751)

convinced them that the bodily functions of men and animals were mechanical. Though the former compromised his views, as will be shown, de la Mettrie remained frankly skeptical of the current physiological mysticism and propounded his heretical views in the brilliant publications: *Man a Machine* and *Man More Than a Machine*. The persecution la Mettrie suffered for his labors even met with the approval of fellow scientists who spurned mechanism when applied to living organisms, since they believed that living things transcended the laws of physics. These latter were known as vitalists. The conflict which raged between the two schools in the eighteenth century has not yet terminated.

Despite their controversy, physiologists steadily widened the boundaries of their science. Albrecht von Haller, starting from the assumption that morphological structure can explain the processes of life and thought, classified the organs of the body according to the degree of their sensitivity to stimuli, described the nerves as organs of feeling, and gave an explanation of the relations between sensation and thought. Reflex action was discovered, the action of the heart further explained, and important theories were advanced to explain the processes of reproduction. These advances contributed much to medicine, though medical science was still greatly retarded by popular superstition.

The physician in the eighteenth century was still regarded with aversion, but his status steadily improved. Medicine was a trade, not a profession, still burdened by a mass of superstitions, and exploited by innumerable quacks. Considerable progress was made, however, through the gradual establishment of clinical instruction, the issuance of scientific periodicals, and the discovery of some of the causes for the spread of contagious diseases. Probably the greatest advance of all came with the discovery of inoculation against smallpox. Records of this practice as employed in the Orient first appeared in the publications of the Royal Society of London early in the eighteenth century, and attracted the interest of practical New Englanders plagued with the disease. Experiments were successfully made in Boston with inoculations, and subsequently were practised fairly extensively, though against widespread popular objections. At the same time a beginning was made in the study of occupational diseases, the causes of yellow fever, and in scientific obstetrical surgery.

All of these victories of science, mostly in the seventeenth century, encouraged the intellectuals of the eighteenth century to transfer the scientific spirit to other fields of investigation, and to popular-

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THE FIRST VACCINATION BY DR. JENNER. A DRAWING BY GEORGES GASTON MELINGUE.

Dr. Edward Jenner (1748-1823), the discoverer of vaccination, was led to his discovery by the observation that there were similarities between a type of cow-pox and the dread disease of smallpox, and that those exposed to the former often escaped the latter. Although he began investigations of this phenomenon in 1775, with the view to finding a satisfactory preventive against smallpox, it was not until 1796 that he was able to conduct a satisfactory experiment. An eight-year-old boy, James Phipps, was then inoculated with matter from cow-pox vesicles taken from a human hand. Several months later the boy was exposed to smallpox but did not contract it. This success attracted widespread attention and within a decade vaccination against smallpox had spread to the continent and the new world.

ize it. Rationalization according to the methods of mathematics and empirical observation was asserted to provide the only certain avenues to truth. The diffusion of these views was accomplished through use of the press and especially through the establishment of scientific academies, scientific journals, and scientific museums. Among the earliest and most distinguished of the academies, founded in the seventeenth century, were the Royal Academy of London and the Académie des Sciences of France. Both of these performed notable services, fitting out important expeditions, serving as clearing houses for exchanges of knowledge, and publishing significant works. The *Transactions* of the Royal Society of London, published quarterly, to take only one example, offered an invaluable medium for the dissemination of scientific knowledge. The examples of the British and

French academies were widely copied, those of Prussia, under the fostering care of Frederick the Great, and of Russia, under the stimulation of Catherine the Great, being particularly noteworthy. Even in the new world, scientific academies of distinction were established.

The work of popularizing science was also immensely furthered through the establishment of museums by wealthy aristocrats, universities, and even state governments. The collection of interesting objects and curiosities was particularly popular among the rich who dabbled in science. Ofttimes they scarcely knew what they had assembled, but their service was for that reason no less important. By all means the greatest of the museums was the British Museum established in London in 1753. Six years later when the building was completed and opened to the public, it attracted crowds of the curious. For many this was chiefly a diversion, but no doubt a substantial number gained a new appreciation and understanding of the world.

It is impossible to say how large a percentage of the people in eighteenth-century Europe had fallen under the scientific influence, but it was certainly small. The masses were unschooled and openly hostile. The educated classes, however, had been won and "where the philosopher led the way, the man of the world, the man of letters, and the statesman, hastened to follow."[1] As with every revolution, the proponents of the Intellectual Revolution of the eighteenth century were a small but active minority which managed to make its views prevail.

The effects of science upon philosophical speculation were particularly significant. After centuries in which metaphysics had existed simply as a department of theology, it now divorced itself from revelation and allied itself with science. In fact, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries its greatest representatives were either distinguished scientists in their own right or individuals intensely interested in nature science. The first was René Descartes (1596-1650), a widely traveled Frenchman who devoted his life to scientific studies and to philosophical speculations. He made penetrating observations on human anatomy, invented analytical geometry, and popularized the effort to apply to celestial mechanics the knowledge of terrestrial mechanics. Some of the conclusions he drew from these observations were fantastic; others were deliberately expressed in terms of restraint so that the Church might not be too deeply offended. Yet Descartes always possessed the critical and skeptical spirit of the true scientist, as his philosophical publications demonstrate.

[1] Preserved Smith, *A History of Modern Culture*, II, 146.

The system of thought which Descartes formulated was a compromise between the old and the new, a dualism which drew a sharp distinction between mind and matter, between body and soul. The material phenomena of nature, he maintained, could be explained by mechanical, natural law without reference to a God of revelation. God had merely created material things and after supplying them with the attribute of motion ceased to interfere. Man, however, was an exception to this general rule. While the human body operated like a machine, as with animals, it was unique in the sense that it was endowed with a rational spirit. The seat of this rational spirit, or the mind, he placed in the pineal gland, and from this all thought and energy were transmitted along nerves to the material body. Exactly how the body could react upon the mind and how the mind could influence the body he was unable to explain, dismissing it as a mystery or a miracle. By accepting two distinct realities, matter and mind, Descartes was confronted with the delicate problem of reconciling the truths of the mind with the truths of nature. The reliability of the latter was ensured by scientific observation and experiment. The former, however, are equally true though they are not arrived at in the same fashion. The mind was created by God with the capacity to think, and deductions which it reaches clearly, distinctly, intuitively are always true, for it would be unworthy of God to deceive. From this assumption, Descartes was able to justify current dogma and advance his famous ontological proof of God: since man has the idea of God, derived from a perfect being, God exists.

Descartes' influence was enormous; until dethroned by Voltaire, he dominated the world of letters and provided the intellectual fare for the rising generations of the eighteenth century. Yet there were few who were ready to accept his dualism without qualifications. Theologians denounced his doctrines as dangerous to the Church, despite his anxiety to avoid offense, and before the end of the seventeenth century his works were placed upon the *Index*. Skeptics, on the other hand, could accept his materialism but found his defense of the spiritual distasteful. Descartes' greatness, however, is not to be measured by the degree to which his system of thought was accepted, but by the lessons which he taught: that one must admit only what he can understand; that philosophy must be approached in the scientific spirit; and that reason is the greatest glory of man.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), an English royalist and one of the most original thinkers of his age, abandoned Descartes' dualism for an unqualified materialistic interpretation of nature and of man. The

mind or the soul like matter or the body he held to be merely matter and motion. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), a Dutch lens grinder of Jewish extraction, while rejecting pure materialism was equally critical of Cartesian dualism. He rejected the distinction between mind and matter, regarding them as different aspects of the same phenomenon, which was God. God is ultimate reality, immanent in matter and thought, nature itself. This was a philosophy of pantheism which reconciled the contradictions of matter and mind without damage to either.

The impact of Newtonian science in the later seventeenth century introduced new elements into philosophical speculation of which Hobbes and Spinoza had been unaware. The champion of the new science in philosophy was John Locke (1632-1704), an Oxford graduate, a practising physician, a politician, and a distinguished political philosopher. In his famous *Essay concerning Human Understanding* he set out to defend science and to reconcile it with religion by conducting an inquiry into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge. Abandoning the doctrine of innate ideas he set up the hypothesis that the mind is blank at birth and that all ideas develop through experience which comes from sensation. Our knowledge of nature, therefore, can be merely probable since the senses cannot reveal the innate character and structure of material objects. While this would appear to contradict Newtonianism it does not actually do so, for what Locke rejected as unknowable were the supposedly mysterious forces of nature which the Newtonians also rejected. Many of his ideas soon lost their force, but Locke made a significant contribution to the eighteenth century through his application of sense and reason to the studies of ideas and the mind. He has been regarded as the representative philosopher of the Enlightenment just as Newton was its representative scientist. Partly through him there sprang up two contradictory schools of philosophic thought, extreme idealism and extreme materialism, the former essentially English and the latter essentially French.

Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716) of Germany and Bishop Berkeley (1684-1753) of England were critical of Locke's fundamental concepts which they sought to supplant by differing forms of idealism. Leibnitz, an exponent and critic of Newton and one of the most fertile geniuses of his age, asserted that the only reality was the soul which perceived, and that the only substance which it perceived was force, the essence of matter. Force reveals itself in spiritual atoms or monads which form the constituent elements of the universe, and

move according to the laws of nature. An organic being is formed through a combination of monads, of which one, the soul, possesses power of direction. Co-operation among these is ensured through a harmony predetermined by God. From these assumptions, Leibnitz concluded that Locke erred in stating that nothing existed in the mind which did not at first appear in the senses. The mind itself partakes of reality and its ideas are not mere reflections of things. This was the starting point of Kantian idealism.[1]

Bishop George Berkeley, an Anglican divine passionately devoted to religion which he believed endangered by the materialism, encouraged by science, attacked it by denying the reality of matter. He asserted there was no absolute connection between the idea of the mind and the material object perceived. Our own perception and not the object is what is known. Matter therefore possesses no reality. Reality belongs to the spirit, and this is the subject of religion, not of science.

While others debated what might be known and how this could be comprehended, a Scotch philosopher, David Hume (1711-1776) was asserting that man could actually know nothing at all. Accepting both Locke's thesis that knowledge derives from sensations and Berkeley's contention that reality exists in perceiving, Hume concluded that the mind could know only itself and therefore nothing outside. Unable to break beyond its own confines the mind of man can never know reality. This was the most complete statement of agnosticism ever advanced.

The conclusions of the scientists and the doctrines of the philosophers permeated the whole intellectual world of the eighteenth century and determined the character of the "Enlightenment." Under their impulse, the supernatural gave way to the natural, and theology to science. Many were convinced that man and the universe were controlled by natural law. Human reason which discovered natural law was exalted and virtually deified. Progress and the ultimate perfectibility of man appeared to be justified assumptions. To realize them it seemed necessary only to apply to human society the processes of reason which would discover the perfect and natural order just as it had for inanimate nature.

The propagation of these views was undertaken with missionary zeal by a group of ardent apostles who were convinced that the condition of mankind thereby could be improved. Despite the fact that the new thought had germinated largely on English soil, espe-

[1] For a discussion of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant see pp. 841-842.

cially with Newton and Locke, it was in France that it was most effectively developed. A band of intellectuals, known as the *philosophes*, pursued the task with zeal and intensity of conviction, braving persecution from governments and ostracism from vested interests, and frequently finding it expedient to live in exile. It was this which made their victories the more notable, ofttimes contributing to their popularity and success. Among their number most of the prominent intellectuals of the century could be properly included, but the most influential and most typical were Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau.

François Arouet (1694-1778), better known by his pseudonym, Voltaire, was the greatest of the *philosophes*. The literary arbiter of Europe, companion and critic of kings, an ardent reformer, dramatist, poet, novelist, and wit, Voltaire came close to being a revolutionary intellectual movement all by himself. After training at a Jesuit school, Voltaire turned to literature and acquired an enviable reputation as a dramatist and a poet. He was invited by Frederick the Great, his apostle and great admirer, to establish himself at the royal court in Berlin, but left in 1753 after a quarrel. Subsequently he established himself at Ferney in Switzerland, close to the French frontier, and henceforth made a name for himself as an historian and pamphleteer. The influence which he exerted from this safe retreat is almost without parallel in history. Sovereigns courted his favor and feared his wrath; even the French Crown released the victims of its oppression when Voltaire came to their defense. Ferney, as has been aptly said, became the capital of one of the Great Powers of Europe, the Republic of Letters.

Voltaire reflects the Enlightenment at its best and its worst. Many of his satires were repugnant and obscene. But, on the whole, his mordant wit was employed with genuine humanitarian purpose. His basic tenets he derived from Newton and Locke, and his chief objective was to encourage tolerance, freedom of thought and expression, and civil liberty. He abandoned institutional religion for natural religion, and worshiped God as the "First Cause." The established Church he regarded as "the infamous one," the greatest oppressor, to be crushed, and against it he directed his most virulent attacks.

The extent of his writing, including numerous letters, plays, poems, novels, and histories, is staggering. Many of these are lacking in originality, though greatly praised in his own day, but they are written with the art and technique of the accomplished propa-

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VOLTAIRE

This engraving, done for the *Encyclopedia Londonis*, is from a portrait of Voltaire in the prime of his powers, around the age of forty.

gandist. Indeed, this was his objective, to preach the lessons of Enlightenment through whatever media he could to gain the public ear.

It has been said that the only rival to Voltaire in disseminating the enlightenment "was not a man but a co-operative enterprise, the famous *Encyclopædia*." [1] The inspiring genius of this notable work was Denis Diderot (1713-1784), more versatile and more original than Voltaire, though his fame rests chiefly upon the editing of the most famous encyclopedia ever to be published. Bringing together as authors of the *Encyclopædia* experts of the various fields, Diderot established the model for future enterprises of the same order. The

[1] Preserved Smith, *History of Modern Culture*, II, 376.

whole work was permeated with the spirit of the new rationalism and it provided a veritable arsenal for those who were its propagandists. More important still, the several editions of the *Encyclopædia*, despite attempted suppressions, were widely circulated among the bourgeoisie and found their way into most respectable private libraries. The influence which it exerted must have been considerable.

The third leading figure among the *philosophes* stood out in sharp contrast to Voltaire and Diderot. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was not the apostle of reason and science but the defender of unreason and sentiment. Poor and deeply conscious of his social inferiority, temperamentally unstable, untrustworthy, amoral, Rousseau was ideally fitted to become the spokesman of the misfortunes of the oppressed. He disliked the rich and the fortunate, but understood the poor and the downtrodden. His thesis that man was naturally good but made to do evil through the injustices of society, dominated by the upper classes, expressed the innermost conviction of the masses of every age. The instincts and impulses of the common man rather than the learned rules of reason would be the surest guide to social virtue, order, and happiness. He therefore counseled the application of these natural instincts, the return to nature in education, politics, and morals. Despite the contrast of this to the cold rationalism of the leading intellectuals, there was much in Rousseau's argument which was congenial to the dominating thought of the time, especially his emphasis upon the necessity of establishing a "natural" order among men. He revived an intense interest in sentimentality and nature among the upper classes, and he struck a responsive chord among the discontented masses. Rousseau's greatest significance derives from the fact that he was the prophet and spokesman of democracy in the Republic of Letters.

It would be erroneous to assume that France held a monopoly on the popularizers of Enlightenment. After all, this was an intellectual manifestation which was reflected throughout the whole western world. Some of its best-known exponents were natives of the American colonies, such as Franklin and Jefferson; there were many in the other countries. The French *philosophes* were merely the best-known and most influential.

Because of the great diversity of views among these intellectuals, it is difficult to analyze their contributions to religious, social, and political thought in brief compass, without doing them injustice. In a general way, however, these fit into a uniform pattern. At

least, there was general agreement that the established order was unsatisfactory.

Most important of all, the men of the Enlightenment were severe critics of religious dogma and institutional religion. Religious bigotry and intolerance disgusted them; growing knowledge of civilizations among non-Christian peoples strengthened their convictions that the form of religion was really unimportant; and science taught them that there was no need for a supernatural religion in a universe which functioned perfectly according to natural law. Their religious views ranged all the length from attempted rationalizations of prevalent beliefs to complete agnosticism, but the great majority were Deists. Indeed, Deism was the typical religious manifestation of the Age of the Enlightenment. According to this view, God was merely the First Cause, the creator of a perfectly ordered universe who, after completing his handiwork, refrained thereafter from interference. It was inconceivable that a rational God who had created a rational world should be so irrational as to set aside his own laws of nature merely in the interest of insignificant man. They therefore rejected miracles, denied the inspiration of the Bible, and abandoned the belief in future rewards and punishments. Virtue they held to be its own reward, and human reason the sole authority of religion.[1] It is probably safe to assume that the Deists would have rejected their belief in God, even as the First Cause, had seventeenth- and eighteenth-century science advanced the doctrine of evolution. The evolutionary process was, however, only vaguely understood so that the beginning of things could be satisfactorily explained only by postulating a creator.

Deism was a compromise formulated by the majority of intellectuals, and as with all compromises it failed to satisfy extremists. A few with advanced views carried their religious skepticism to its logical conclusion and emerged as atheists; many of more conservative inclinations were persuaded to reinforce the traditional faith. Among the latter, the most important were those pious souls who had become disgusted with persistent feuds among sects, and abjured empty religious formality for emotional piety and individual Christianity. Known as pietists, these appeared among Protestants and Catholics alike. John Wesley and the Methodism which he developed may be taken as broadly typical of the whole movement. Experiencing an

[1] An important influence in spreading the doctrines of Deism was Freemasonry, which was first established in England early in the eighteenth century and soon thereafter spread to the continent.

"inward conversion" after close contact with German pietists, Wesley set forth with tireless energy to "convert" the masses. His emotionalism, neglect of ritual, and appeal to individual feeling won him numerous followers and led to the establishment of an independent church. In a broadly general way, the Quakers, the evangelical Anglicans, and the Quietists and Jansenists among the Catholics, repeated the essential features of Wesleyan Methodism.

As the intellectuals applied the lessons of science to religion, so they applied them to all other social questions. Law and legal institutions they held to be as susceptible to scientific and objective examination as the laws of nature. In fact, law was natural and needed only to be "discovered" by reason; it could not be simply "legislated." It is from this era that there came the belief that government must be a government of laws—that is, of nature—and not a government of men. The most important contributions to this new "science" of jurisprudence were made by Blackstone of England and Beccaria of Italy. The former wrote the classic handbook of English law, the *Commentaries*, and the latter, in his famous publication, *On Crimes and Punishment*, urged the abandonment of outworn legal practices in favor of "scientific" methods which would emphasize the prevention rather than the punishment of crime. This new approach to law was accompanied by penal reforms and more equitable treatment of criminals.

Economic phenomena were likewise subjected to rational speculation and "scientific" explanation. François Quesnay (1649-1774), physician to Louis XV of France, exerted the greatest influence. He believed he had found the "law" for the circulation of wealth, a law as natural and as binding as those of science. Many were persuaded to adopt his views and from this following there grew up a school of economic thought which passes under the name of the Physiocrats. These taught that all wealth was derived from the resources of the earth, particularly through mining and farming. Manufacturing and distribution did not create wealth but merely transformed and exchanged it. To interfere with manufacturing and distribution through governmental regulation was likely therefore to diminish wealth by discouraging its production at the source, which was the land. For this reason, the Physiocrats advanced the doctrine of "laissez-faire," freedom for business to develop naturally and complete freedom for competition. These views were widely adopted and directly influenced the opinion of the greatest economist of the

eighteenth century, Adam Smith, professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow. As anxious as the Physiocrats to find the natural laws by which a nation's wealth could be increased, and deeply indebted to them for many of his views, Smith nevertheless developed a richer, better-reasoned, and more logical thesis than they. His great work, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), advanced the opinion that labor is the source of all wealth. Like the Physiocrats he believed that every individual should be allowed complete freedom to pursue his own course, asserting that in such fashion the working out of natural law would contribute to the greatest benefit of all. Coming at the time when the new industrial bourgeoisie were certain that they were doing the bidding of nature, Smith's doctrine acquired the force of religious dogma.

Popular education and pedagogy also responded to the vogue of rationalism. Rousseau in his novel, *Emile*, popularized the idea that education must be "natural," while Froebel (founder of the kindergarten) and Pestalozzi carried it out with practical measures. The curricula of the schools underwent significant alterations, with the reduction in emphasis on the classics, and particularly with the introduction of the new natural and social sciences. Considerable effort and thought were expended in the direction of making education popular. Enlightened individuals of means, like John Locke, emphasized the importance of this, and conspicuous political leaders like Frederick the Great of Prussia and Thomas Jefferson undertook to make it possible.

In immediate results, the most important contribution of the men of the Enlightenment was in political philosophy. There was little uniformity in the opinions advanced, except for the fact that they were all allegedly rational. In government, as in everything else, it was believed there was a natural order which human reason could discover and enforce. Few agreed upon what this natural order was. Thomas Hobbes, the famous English materialist, found it in absolute monarchy which he defended in his famous *Leviathan*. Men, he asserted, are naturally selfish and anti-social, and if left to themselves would be the victims of constant disorder. To avoid this, in order that each might pursue his selfish ends in peace, men drew up a "social contract" by which they bestowed full authority over them to the prince. Once made, such a "social contract" could not be broken without fatal danger to peace and order. John Locke, in his *Two Treatises on Government* defended popular sovereignty

and the right to revolution as being equally logical and natural. Men have certain rights to life, liberty, and happiness, he asserted, and to guarantee these governments were created. If government fails to fulfill these guarantees, the majority have the proper right to overthrow it. Locke's views were given forceful expression by Jean Jacques Rousseau. In a famous essay on the *Origin of Inequality among Men*, Rousseau attributed inequality to the tyranny of the strong over the weak, a tyranny enforced through the possession of private property which they had seized; and in his even more famous *Social Contract*, he expounded the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. There was little originality in these publications, the ideas of the *Social Contract* were almost literally copied from Locke, but Rousseau had the uncommon capacity for popularizing them.

The most original of the political philosophers as well as the most objective was Montesquieu (1689-1755), whose *Persian Letters* and *On the Spirit of the Laws* reveal a penetrating insight into the development of political institutions. Unlike his contemporaries, Montesquieu was not swept away by the prevailing vogue of rationalism. He was unwilling to base political science wholly upon reason or science, but recognized the importance of geography, climate, and local custom in the formation of peculiar forms of government. It is an interesting commentary upon the fashion of thought at the time that Montesquieu was praised chiefly for his flattering description of the English constitution which was actually only incidental to his major contribution. British government, like British thought in general, was extolled as the best reflection of the operation of natural law in the state.

For the most part, the political philosophies of the men of enlightenment were conservative rather than radical, reforming rather than revolutionary. The most popular view among them, represented best by Voltaire, defended monarchy of the absolute stamp. There was actually little confidence in the capacity of the masses to govern themselves. But monarchs, they believed, must be "enlightened" and must undertake to realize for society the benefits of a natural order which they could introduce. This idea became popular among royalty and before the end of the eighteenth century there was ushered in the rule of the so-called "Enlightened Despots."[1] The most famous example of enlightened despotism was that of Frederick the

[1] For a description of Enlightened Despotism, especially as it was manifested in Prussia by Frederick the Great, see Chapter XVII.

Great in Prussia, but nearly every state of consequence on the continent, except for France, produced its own enlightened prince. There is scarcely a better example of the enormous practical influence exerted by the intellectual leaders of the Enlightenment.

C. Financial and Political Bankruptcy

The ideas of social and political reform fell upon fertile soil and helped to germinate a revolution whose nature and results most of them would have repudiated. After all they were not democrats. But those who wished for change, and they were many, diverted the opinions of the *philosophes* to their own purposes and employed them for their own ends. In this way, enlightened thought and revolutionary action merged during the eighteenth century.

Social abuse and discontent were widespread throughout Europe. Despite the great growth of commerce and trade and the economic transformation of life, society was still constructed along the lines of class distinction which had prevailed since the days of economic feudalism. The privileged orders, the landed aristocracy and the clergy, held a virtual monopoly upon government and wealth, and enjoyed a variety of perquisites and immunities which social station guaranteed; the unprivileged orders, comprising the great bulk of the people, carried the burdens and responsibilities. The situation which each occupied was far from justified by contemporary realities. The aristocracy performed no services commensurate with their privileges, as they had once in feudal times; while the unprivileged, particularly the middle class, performed services for which they held no commensurate privileges. A revamping of social and political institutions to right the balance was obviously necessary.

Conditions of life among the peasantry and the laborers of the towns had changed little since the sixteenth century, except possibly to grow worse. The avenues of trade were open to them, but only a very few had the ingenuity or good fortune to make the most of that opportunity, while, for the majority, the progress of commerce and trade brought hardships which outweighed immediate advantages. Their grievances multiplied as their fortunes diminished. Yet, as in the sixteenth century and before, peaceful methods of redressing these grievances were mostly closed to them. They had no voice in the government, and almost everywhere on the continent the landed aristocracy and the clergy still lorded it over them.

Serfdom was common, except for France and England, and even

there a considerable residue of the feudal epoch remained. Whether or not the peasant was still personally bound to the lord of the manor as in medieval times, he was almost always obligated to provide him as well as the church and the state with financial support. He owed money or service to his lord, paid a twelfth of his income to the church in tithes, and gave an even greater proportion in direct and indirect taxes to the king. The last of these exactions mounted steadily as the nation state became consolidated and as the financial needs of the crown grew. In France, for example, the peasant of the eighteenth century paid in direct taxes to the state the *taille* or land tax, assessed on the valuation of his property; a poll tax; and an income tax of about 5 % of his annual income. His indirect taxes were numerous, including the *corvée* or forced labor upon the roads, and the odious *gabelle*, or salt tax, which ofttimes multiplied the cost of his salt by as much as ten times. An accurate estimate of the percentage of his income which the peasant paid in this fashion to the lord, the church, and the king is difficult to reach, but it is fair to assume that it represented a very large share.

To make matters worse, especially in England and to a lesser degree in France, the peasant was placed at a serious disadvantage through the tendency in the eighteenth century to enclose the open fields for more profitable grazing of sheep or for use of scientific methods of cultivation.[1] The costs of fencing in the fields, surveying them, providing adequate drainage, paying some of the costs of roads, were usually more than the ordinary peasant could bear, so that he was ofttimes compelled to sacrifice his rights to the man of wealth. Moreover, when the fields were enclosed, the peasants generally lost their rights in the common fields, even the right of pasturage. The resources for a livelihood gone, the peasant became an agricultural laborer working for wages which were uncertain and insecure, or departed for the town to find uncertain labor and wages in the trades, or he became a charge upon his community.

The laborers in the towns were no better off than the peasants, though they were still fewer in number. The regulations of the medieval gilds which had served to protect labor for a time during the middle ages had been steadily relaxed so that the gild system, which prevailed everywhere during the eighteenth century, operated to the disadvantage of labor. The rules of apprenticeship were made more rigorous and the master was allowed to exercise his discretion

[1] For a full discussion of the causes and consequences of the enclosure movement and the agricultural revolution, see Chapters XVII and XXII.

on the number of these whom he could hire, but the door to advancement to the status of master was nearly closed. The master could not only determine the wage but he could ofttimes regulate the life of his laborer even to fixing the kind and amount of recreation, if any, and the hour of his going to bed. Prevailing philosophy justified a low wage and steady labor during waking hours as the sure means of encouraging sobriety, honesty, and godliness. This social excuse for a low wage was buttressed by "economic law." As technical improvements increased during the eighteenth century, it became profitable to employ women and children since they would work for much less, and the whole wage scale tended to be debased. Moreover, by means of the domestic system enterprisers were able to tap the cheap labor markets of the agricultural communities. Poor peasants were willing to supplement their meager incomes by whatever means availed them, and they were never too demanding about wages. The workers of the towns who had no resources other than their labor were necessarily placed at a serious disadvantage in this competition. The laborer had almost no means of redressing these grievances. Combinations of laborers to strengthen their bargaining power were held to be criminal and illegal, and were suppressed. Such as did exist in the eighteenth century, and there were some, functioned in secrecy.

The contrast between the laborers and the peasants, on the one hand, and the landed aristocracy and clergy, on the other, is striking, even when adequate allowance is made for the great dissimilarity in conditions among the members of these two privileged classes. As a group, the clergy were subjected to their own law, were largely immune from taxes, and enjoyed a position of social distinction. Not all of the clergy, however, benefited from the great wealth which the church still possessed in the form of land and endowments. Most of this was reserved for the great benefices which, in France for example, numbered about a hundred. The parish priests and many of the regular clergy in the monasteries lived in virtual poverty, little if any better off than the flocks to which they ministered. It is important to keep this fact in mind. Many of the lower clergy had grievances against their superiors which paralleled the grievances of the peasants, so that when revolution came it was not unnatural frequently to find them fighting side by side.

The landed aristocracy as a group also enjoyed important privileges such as immunity from various types of taxes, the right to hunt (this was denied the peasant), a voice in the government, and numer-

ous social distinctions which went with the mark of privilege. Again, however, as with the clergy, only a small percentage of the nobility enjoyed the fruits of their station in society. Many of the lesser provincial nobility lived under conditions which were little better than the peasantry over whom they had jurisdiction. It was the older and greater nobility who embellished the courts of princes and kings, fed at the trough of the royal treasury, and held title to fat sinecures. This group profited doubly for it was to them that most of the lucrative benefices of the church fell. While they absorbed the income of their appointments, it was seldom that they actually conducted the business of administration. This was delegated to men of low estate.

It was logical for the minority of clergy and the minority of nobility to hold on tenaciously to the established order. It was equally logical that the unprivileged should seek reforms. The Enlightenment provided the latter, especially that section of it which comprised the middle class, with the ideology necessary to justify their view. The rationalism of the intellectuals was congenial to the bourgeoisie who for very practical reasons wished to "rationalize" political and economic life.

The middle classes were the most active and most powerful agents of change in the eighteenth century. They were not large, being much less numerous than the other members of the Third Estate and not much more numerous than the clergy and nobility, but they made up in material wealth what they lacked in numbers. They amassed fortunes from commerce and trade and they held practical control of the borrowing and lending of money. Riches enabled them to ape the living and manners of the aristocracy, sometimes to secure ennoblement, but it was aggravating to find that social equality could not be purchased. Kings courted their favor when money was to be borrowed, but often spurned their advice when it was to be spent. With sufficient money, they could buy sinecures in the courts and inferior posts in the administration, but the lucrative offices were saved for others. All of this was less true in England than on the continent, but in a general way the middle class experienced the same difficulties everywhere. To make matters worse for them, the dominant aristocracy influenced government to favor agriculture at the expense of business and trade. They were ready, therefore, to give ear to the doctrines of *laissez-faire* as preached by Adam Smith and the Physiocrats, to challenge with Voltaire the intolerance and dogmatism of the old order, and to accept with limitations Rous-

seau's idea of human equality. They demanded a voice in government, equality of taxation, and for themselves, at least, social equality with the aristocracy. Since they held control over the purse strings, they were sooner or later able to make their wishes prevail.

The middle classes wished for change and knew pretty clearly what they wanted; the masses were ready for change but were unsure of the goals to be reached. One might describe these two groups within the Third Estate as the party of ideas and the party of action, respectively. One was chiefly responsible for providing the direction for alterations in the status quo; the other made those alterations possible. Actually, the only bond between these two was the desire for change. In other matters, they were far apart. The bourgeoisie could understand the peasant's complaint against taxes because they also had to pay them, but what they wanted was absolute equality of taxation not proportional taxation; they were ready to destroy the basic privileges of the aristocracy, but they were staunch defenders of the rights of property; they claimed the right to participation in the government, but they had no idea of extending a similar right to the unpropertied. The middle class had no more respect for the common people than had the intellectuals or the aristocracy. Yet an alliance between these two groups evolved, and before the eighteenth century closed it had produced momentous changes.

The French revolution was not the inevitable outgrowth of this alliance or even of the circumstances which produced it. In all of Europe social distress and inequality prevailed, in some areas considerably more than in France, so that if the law of cause and effect had operated uniformly the French revolution must have been widely duplicated. There were special circumstances in France to facilitate revolution. It was on French soil that the idea of social and political reform had been more intensively cultivated. There a series of recurrent crop failures during the eighteenth century had greatly aggravated the misfortunes of the peasantry and the town laborers. Moreover, France was not blessed with enlightened government. Attempts at reform were either half-hearted or not made at all so that respect for authority diminished and the seeds of revolution grew.

Like Topsy, the royal government of France just "growed." Ever since the late middle ages, offices had been created and new administrative machinery had been established to supplement but not to replace the old. Each decade consequently produced fresh

conflict over powers and jurisdictions. Moreover, since it had been the policy of the Crown in the era of national unification to respect local laws and customs, eighteenth-century France inherited a bewildering variety of laws and local administrations. The centralization of power under Louis XIV made the Crown more despotic but was ineffectual in eliminating political confusion. The individual was practically powerless when he became enmeshed in the toils of the government for bureaucratic red tape was literally endless.

Above this confusing and irrational substructure was the king whose powers had been rendered absolute by Louis XIV. Everything, even the political jumble beneath, existed only by his sufferance and with his consent. Simply by his order the lowliest citizen could be arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned without trial. Nor were there any effective constitutional checks upon his power. The Estates General had not been assembled since early in the seventeenth century and the *parlement* of Paris which had asserted the right of registering or vetoing the edicts of the Crown was generally submissive. Despite its arbitrary and unlimited character, the Crown was respected by most citizens, so much so that in the early stages of the revolution there was no thought of destroying the throne, only of cleansing it. If the Crown had been only reasonably competent it might have capitalized upon its popularity and through judicious reforms saved itself from destruction.

Unfortunately for it, however, the Bourbon kings of eighteenth century France were deficient in every quality of statesmanship. Louis XV (1715-1774), grandson and heir of Louis XIV, spent his time and his subjects' money in search of pleasure, indulging the whims of his mistresses, such as Madame de Pompadour and Madame du Barry, and encouraging the extravagances of his courtiers through benevolences from the royal treasury. Not without cause was he sullenly greeted by the peasants, jeered at by the artisans, and denounced by the intellectuals toward the end of his reign. His grandson and heir, Louis XVI (1774-1792), was virtuous and respectable by contrast, but without ordinary intelligence or willpower. The business of state was too much for his simple mind so that he was easily influenced by those who gained his ear, particularly by his frivolous Austrian wife, Marie Antoinette. Of stronger will, but with no more interest than her husband in politics, Marie Antoinette followed the course of least resistance, encouraging extravagances and obstructing reforms at every turn through her sym-

pathy with the court nobility. Thus was let slip the Crown's opportunity to save itself by making concessions.

On at least two important occasions, malcontents in France were encouraged to hope for reforms during the reign of Louis XVI, only to see these hopes shattered by Marie Antoinette and her friends. The first came with the appointment in 1774 of Turgot as Minister of Finance. An economist who believed in *laissez-faire* and a reformer who believed in the equalization of taxes, Turgot set out to remove obstructions to commerce and trade, and to revolutionize the financial administration. Clergy and nobility were declared subject to taxation, indirect taxes on necessities which had been particularly burdensome upon the poor were removed, and measures were taken to eliminate extravagances. The result of these courageous efforts was widespread opposition and ultimate dismissal in 1776.

The successor to Turgot, Jacques Necker (1776-1781) inspired even more confidence and hope. A brilliant young business man who had made his fortune as a banker in Switzerland, and a member of the bourgeoisie who traveled in the cultivated circles of Paris, Necker gave promise of establishing financial order. He improved the methods of collecting taxes, published the government's accounts to the great satisfaction of the bankers, and attempted to reduce the royal expenditures. The last of these measures aroused the court nobility and Marie Antoinette, who schemed and plotted and finally precipitated his destruction. It is now known that Necker's dealings were not always straightforward, but the bourgeoisie at the time knew little or nothing about his dishonesty. His dismissal caused much bad feeling among them and helped accelerate the growth of revolutionary ideas.

It is important to note that in both the case of Turgot and Necker the problem of reform in France was intimately associated with the problem of finances. This was indeed the heart of the matter. If the increasing responsibilities of the state and the extravagances of the Crown were to be met, either one or both of two expedients had to be tried: reduce expenses through rigid economies; or tap new sources of revenue, since the burden upon the taxed was already almost more than the traffic would bear. Neither of these could be attempted without danger to the social structure. To economize in expenditures would threaten the incomes of the privileged; to tax them would be the equivalent of depriving them of their privileges. It was precisely on this issue that the old order made its last stand.

The problem of finances might not have arisen in its acute form

had the government not undertaken to intervene in the American rebellion. This adventure cost dearly; and, although it ended with the humbling of Great Britain, it left the treasury nearly bankrupt, especially since these new expenditures were pyramided upon the already great costs of the Seven Years' War and the War of the Polish Succession. The existing taxes would have been enough to supply the ordinary expenses of the Crown but were not nearly enough to meet such extraordinary expenses as well. By 1786, the official debt had gone well over half a billion dollars and was steadily mounting at an annual rate of approximately $25,000,000. It became increasingly difficult to negotiate new loans, particularly since the financiers who recouped themselves by collecting taxes found it more and more impossible to make adequate exactions from the taxed. The government sought a convenient escape.

By royal command, an Assembly of Notables—nobility, bishops, magistrates—was called in 1787 to find a solution, but this completed its sessions with a series of unimportant resolutions none of which touched the problem of taxes directly. The ministry of finance consequently pursued its usual course of issuing new taxes and attempting to negotiate new loans. Such procedure, however, was no longer possible. The *parlement* of Paris, encouraged by the popular temper of revolt, refused to register the new taxes and new loans, declaring that royal taxation would have to bear the constitutional approval of the Estates General, the representatives of the people. Though the *parlements* were forthwith abolished for this impertinence, it was apparent that they had given expression to popular sentiment. The mob openly demanded restoration of the *parlements* and the meeting of an Estates General. Threatened with revolution, the Crown was compelled to acquiesce on both counts.

In 1788, Louis XVI issued the summons for a meeting of the Estates General, to be elected in the spring of 1789 and to begin its sessions in May of that year. Out of consideration for the Third Estate whose importance had increased since the last meeting in 1614, it was provided that they should be privileged to elect a number of representatives exactly equal to that of the two other Estates. But the system of voting by orders rather than as individuals was to be perpetuated so that even with this increase in the representation of the classes with whom radicalism was most popular, it was not expected that any radical measures would be adopted. This optimism was not justified from the expressions of the sentiments of the people as expressed at the time of the election.

It had been the custom of the Crown, when Estates Generals were summoned, to request the people to submit reports and recommendations for their localities in documents which were known as *cahiers*. The *cahiers* of 1789 were reflective of the public temper. They were not revolutionary in so far as they uniformly expressed loyalty to the king and avoided the expression of any desire for violent change. But they were permeated with the social and political ideas of the Enlightenment, and those from the Third Estate especially were insistent in their demands for social equality and the elimination of standing abuses. At all events, the *cahiers* revealed that the people were anxious to have the Estates General do infinitely more than the Crown and its ministers expected of it.

The elections were held at a time of acute distress. The harvests of 1788 had been particularly bad, so that by the spring of 1789 starvation threatened in town and country alike. Peasants had already taken to storming the tithe barns and to burning the estates of their local oppressors. The townsmen had already begun to storm the granaries and the food shops. No doubt the unfortunate were encouraged to resort to these measures partly because of the summoning of the Estates General. The conviction prevailed that the king was at last taking cognizance of their grievances and that they therefore had good authority for redressing them. The unrest which thus accompanied the elections was a clear indication of the necessity for reform as well as of the public expectation that the Estates General would achieve it through co-operation with the Crown. It certainly influenced those who were elected, especially among the Third Estate, and confirmed the opinion of some that the Estates General must never dissolve until reforms had been realized.

THE COSTUMES OF THE THREE ORDERS. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

The figures, from left to right, represent the First, Second, and Third Estates. The costume on the right is that of a prosperous bourgeois, probably a lawyer.

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The Triumphant Defeat of the People

A. Do men make events?

The question of historical causation is always perplexing. Occasionally it would appear that mere accidents of chance have determined human destiny; more often it would seem that a sequence of events, following each other with an inexorable logic, has been responsible. In one instance, everything might seem to hinge upon the personality of a leader; in another, the leader like everyone else seems buffeted about by the winds of fate. Depending upon the circumstances, economic factors, climatic changes, or religious scruples seem to provide the infallible key. Would Rome have fallen if there had not been a series of devastating crop failures to accelerate the forces of economic and political collapse? If these crop failures were due to climatic changes, could one not ascribe the decline of the Empire to mere accident? Or did Rome fall because it was pagan; or because it was poorly governed? If Marcus Aurelius had not been persuaded to choose his worthless son as his successor, might the forces of decline have been effectively checked? Men forever seek in vain the final and "correct" answer to questions such as these.

The answers which are supplied vary from individual to individual and from age to age. The devoutly religious find it convenient to place all responsibility upon the Almighty, relieving themselves of troubled speculation. In an equally simple way, the communist finds the answer in the economics of capitalism. The geographer may give most prominent place to geographic factors, the psychologist to human personality, the politician to the form and functioning of political institutions. All of us are inclined to interpret the past in the light of our own ideas and our own experience. During the middle ages and early modern times a religious interpretation of events was most widely accepted. During the nineteenth century

explanation by reference to the laws of nature, such as evolution, grew increasingly popular. After the effects of the industrial revolution were widely felt, people laid greater stress upon economic forces.

In every generation, there appear those who are confident that they have found in history the ultimate cause of social change. Typical and important illustrations of this are Thomas Carlyle and Karl Marx. The former, English essayist and historian, held to the view that great leaders are chiefly responsible for human affairs and mold events to suit their purpose. His historical studies, especially his biographies of Frederick the Great and Charles XII, were undertaken to prove this philosophy. Karl Marx, father of modern communism and exponent of the economic interpretation of history, propounded a doctrine which completely contradicted Carlyle. To him it appeared that all social and political changes were the logical and inevitable consequences of economic laws. Knowing these laws, he believed he could predict the course of human affairs and set out to do so in *Das Kapital*. According to this Marxian view, what men think and how they act, as well as their social, political, and religious institutions, are largely determined for them by the economic conditions of their existence. Carlyle and Marx stand at opposite poles: for the one, men make events; for the other, so to speak, events make the man.

There is much to be said on each side as a rapid review of important historical incidents will demonstrate. It would be impossible to conceive of victorious Christianity without the dominating leadership of Paul or someone like him; on the other hand, even with a Paul, would early Christianity have succeeded so well without conditions of economic distress, inefficient administration, and popular disillusionment? The Crusades would probably not have been what they were without an Urban at Clermont, but perhaps they would never have occurred at all if economic, social, and political conditions had not been favorable. It would be hard for one to decide whether Urban called the Crusades into being, or whether the circumstances of the times merely called forth Urban's leadership. Clearly there would have been no Lutheran revolt without Martin Luther, but again it is difficult to see how this revolt would have come about without distress among peasants and townsmen, lust for power among princes, and discontent among the intellectuals of the Germanies. Examples such as these might be extended almost indefinitely. They would all seem to demonstrate that no explanation

by reference to a single cause is ever adequate. Only by deliberately ignoring uncomfortable facts which do not fit into one's scheme of things, can one find a "law" of history. The stream of human affairs is fed by an infinite number of tributaries and he who would explore it must endeavor to trace each to its source.

A fair interpretation of history must make allowances for the interaction of man and his environment; it must make man neither the child of fate nor the sole master of his destiny. The individual reacts to his destiny. The individual reacts to his surroundings and in so doing helps to shape them. The period of the French Revolution offers a good illustration of this. Economic, social, and political factors helped produce it, but the course which it took was much influenced by such individuals as Rousseau and Voltaire who had helped change the pattern of men's thoughts. Rousseau and Voltaire were products of their age but at the same time they gave that age much of its unique character. It is equally true of Napoleon.

B. Bastille and guillotine

The temper of the mob in Paris and uprisings in the country encouraged reformers of the Third Estate to pursue a bold course when the Estates General finally assembled at Versailles in May, 1789. The king had already permitted the Third Estate a representation equal that of the other two Estates, but he evaded persistent demands to change the customary system of voting. The reason for this obstinacy was perfectly apparent: so long as voting by order could be maintained, the radical Third Estate could be outvoted two to one. Precisely for this same reason the representatives of the Third Estate were insistent that voting must be by head. For some time, dispute over this issue raged, with neither side showing any inclination to retreat or to make concessions, until on June 17, the Third Estate defied the Crown and proclaimed itself the "National Assembly" of France. The royal government prepared to resist. Three days later when the Assembly was to meet, it found the assembly hall locked, whereupon it withdrew to a neighboring building which had been used as a riding hall and tennis court and there took a solemn oath (the Tennis Court Oath) never to disband until it had devised a constitution for France. This was the real beginning of revolution. The king, not knowing what course of action to follow, temporized. For a week he chose to ignore the existence of the National Assembly and then, deciding that more might be gained by

co-operation than by conflict, he recognized its legality and ordered the other Estates to sit with it. In an amazingly short space of time, the old Estates General had been swept aside and the bourgeois Third Estate had usurped control of the nation.

From the very beginning a substantial number of representatives from the First Estate, mostly parish priests, and a few of the more liberal nobility from the Second Estate chose to co-operate with the National Assembly. This was tangible proof that within the privileged orders themselves there was a good deal of active opposition to the perpetuation of a monopoly of privilege. Even more significant was the fact that some of the nobility and clergy of more advanced views had chosen to stand for election with the Third Estate rather than with their own orders, and that from this group the real leadership for revolutionary action by the Third Estate had come. Comte de Mirabeau (1749-1791), the dominating figure of the National Assembly, its greatest orator and soundest statesman, was a liberal nobleman; and the Abbé Sieyès, who was closely associated with him, was a priest, distinguished more for his doctrinaire radicalism than for sound theology. These two men were chiefly responsible for victory in the contest over the issue of voting.

Despite the co-operation of some of the clergy and nobility, the National Assembly was largely middle class in membership and in ideas. The majority was drawn from the Third Estate, comprising chiefly professional men; only a handful could fairly be said to represent the peasantry, and none at all to represent the poorer classes of the cities. There were, therefore, very few who espoused radical revolution either through interest or inclination. Most of them would have been content to ensure individual liberty and social equality through mild constitutional reforms which would have guaranteed their domination, and then they would have preferred to close the door to further change. Such a simple compromise, however, was quite impossible. The masses expected that radical reforms would be forthcoming, and acted as though they had already come; the privileged classes believed the revolution had already gone much too far, and plotted and intrigued to restore the old system of things. Forever torn between these two, the middle class Assembly was reluctantly but necessarily drawn more and more toward the radical masses whose support was needed if reaction were to be successfully combatted.

This hesitating retreat to the Left under pressure from the Right appeared very early in the career of the Assembly. The king and

the privileged orders at the court had capitulated to the demands of this body only because they felt unprepared at the moment to crush it. Given enough time, they expected sufficient force could be assembled to overawe and overwhelm it. Quietly, therefore, loyal troops were drawn in from the provinces, converging at respectable distances from Versailles. News of this leaked out, and when the Assembly demanded of the king that he desist, he replied with a refusal coupled with defiance. Necker, whom he had restored to the Ministry of Finance in 1788 as a sop to the malcontents, was again dismissed. The passing of this popular minister aroused the Assembly, but more important still, it inflamed the masses of Paris. There the news produced immediate reaction. Excited by popular demagogues, the crowds demonstrated (July 12) against the king and the presence in the city of royal troops; next day the middle class leaders in Paris put an end to the royal municipal government, replacing it with one of their own supported by an armed force to protect the rights of property; and on the 14th, the mob, reaching the height of its fury, stormed the Bastille, a royal fortress and prison popularly regarded as a symbol of oppression. Bastille Day is still celebrated as the day of French independence. The king, properly impressed with this insurrection, recognized the new government in Paris and appeared in person before the Assembly to apprise it of his determination to withdraw the troops and restore Necker.

The Paris mob had won the day and saved the Assembly, but in doing so it had placed the Assembly in its debt and at its mercy. Henceforth for some considerable time Paris was to dictate the course of the revolution. The middle class Assembly was grateful to the mob for its aid, but smitten with fear by such an unruly ally. The example of its ferocity and the sight of the rabble in arms demonstrating as little respect for property as they did for privilege could scarcely inspire confidence. Partly with the view of holding it in restraint, partly to frustrate further attempts by the king and the reactionaries to assemble an army for the destruction of the Assembly, that body legalized the establishment of a middle class National Guard, and placed it under the command of the aging but liberal Marquis de Lafayette.

It was impossible for the Assembly to preserve this precarious balance between the extremes. Despite the promises which the king had made after the Paris revolution, plots against the life of the Assembly were still made with his knowledge and approval. Early in October, the rumor spread that troops from Flanders were secretly

assembling about Versailles and, indeed, among the court nobility the early return of the "good old days" was openly anticipated. Once more, and this time even more decisively than in July, the mob of Paris came to the "rescue." Conditions in the city encouraged a gesture of violence. The bad harvests of 1788 had been followed by the even worse harvests of 1789; business was abnormal; food was high in price and difficult to buy even for those who had the means. While the mob in Paris starved, rumor had it that the court at Versailles was feeding upon the fat of the land. Inspired by the desire to right this grievance and at the same time to save the Assembly from imminent destruction, the women of Paris, accompanied by a substantial number of men, resolved to march upon Versailles. On October 5, a motley crowd of Paris poor, armed with sticks and stones, riotous and uncouth, surrounded the royal palace, demanding bread. Lafayette at the head of a body of the National Guard followed at a distance and finally intervened when the demonstration gave promise of getting completely out of hand. Even so, substantial destruction was done before the night was ended. Next morning the weak-willed but well-meaning king agreed to return with his family to Paris. As the royal coach lumbered along that day in their midst the crowd was jovial and optimistic; in their simple way, they believed that since they had the "baker" and the baker's family with them, the problem of food was already as good as solved. The king was now the prisoner of Paris, and as such ceased to be a serious problem for the Assembly. As for the Assembly, which accompanied the king to Paris, it too became the prisoner of the mob. Freed from some of the pressure at the one extreme, it was placed more completely at the mercy of the other.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary contagion of Paris had spread to the provinces. During July, the towns, following the example of the capital, dismissed the royal agents, set up their own popularly elected "communes," and established local units of the National Guard. Temporarily, their autonomy was ensured by the fact that the king was powerless to challenge revolt and the Assembly too deeply absorbed by other problems to give them much thought. The elaborate centralized government of Louis XIV had literally collapsed within a month. Citizens no longer knew what authority to obey and consequently obeyed none. Taxes went uncollected and normal administration lapsed.

In the countryside, too, the peasantry took matters into their own hands. The rich granaries of the clergy were pillaged, châteaux

of detested landlords with their hated manorial records were burned. Many of the privileged sought safety in flight; others who remained were murdered. The peasants like the burghers refused to pay taxes and declared themselves free of feudal responsibilities which had oppressed them. In both town and country, government ceased to function.

The peak of this popular revolution was reached by the beginning of August; thereafter affairs took a more normal course and the revolutionary spirit, always present, lay dormant. But already by that time the changes which the people had wrought exceeded the wildest expectations of the middle class Assembly. Defiance of authority and lack of respect for property had created alarm, but the Assembly was powerless to hold the people in check. What it could not avoid, it therefore chose to accept as legal. The most striking example of this appeared with the legal destruction of the feudal system in August, 1789. Reports of violent uprisings among the peasantry had forced the Assembly to consult on measures to calm revolt. While debate on these continued, during the night of August 4, a representative of the nobility prepared the way for what appeared to be an easy solution. For himself he renounced his claims to feudal dues and services; others soon followed his example, and all that night in a fit of mass emotion, nobility and clergy vied with each other in renouncing their privileges. Next morning the feudal system of France had apparently vanished. A resolution had been passed proclaiming equality of taxation and the suppression of feudal dues and services. Serfdom was abolished, the game laws repealed, manorial courts discontinued, and all special privileges in town, country, and city presumably destroyed. It was symbolic of the temper of the middle class Assembly, however, that during the next week when sober deliberation upon these resolutions was possible, it was feared that they had gone too far. The rights of property had been trampled upon—after all, many of the abolished privileges partook of the character of property—and the Assembly undertook to retrench itself by making the complete abolition of feudal services and dues contingent upon their financial redemption. It was not until 1793 that the feudal system was fully abolished.

Despite the Assembly's insistence that feudal dues and church tithes must be met until other arrangements had been made, the peasants chose to act as though they no longer existed, just as they had also chosen to act as though the era of taxes had ceased to be. Both the Church and the State were therefore threatened with bank-



AN *ASSIGNAT*

The statement on the left end of the *assignat* which reads "The law punishes the counterfeiter with death" gives evidence of one of the many financial problems which faced the revolutionary government.

ruptcy. The Assembly sought to meet the emergency for itself by appeals to patriotic citizens for gifts and by attempts to float new loans, but these brought no material improvement. Thereupon, taking its cue from some of the clergy who insisted that their rights and holdings could not be abolished except by national legislation, the Assembly in November decreed the properties of the church to be the properties of the nation. The lands of the church thus absorbed constituted about 20 percent of the land of the nation, and with this as security, the Assembly issued a new paper currency, the *assignats*, to meet its obligations. The printing of this paper money was at first held within reasonable bounds, but as emergencies increased during the next several years, discretion was cast to the winds, and *assignats* were printed in such vast numbers that by 1799 they no longer had the value of the paper on which they were printed. For the time being, however, the *assignats* fulfilled their purpose and bankruptcy was avoided.

By meeting the financial problem in this way, the Assembly had created another with the Church. Not only had the clergy been offended; they had also been deprived of their incomes. The Assembly found it necessary, therefore, to take over virtual control of the Church and to pay the salaries of the clergy. To this end a series of decrees was issued, beginning in 1790 and culminating with the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1791. The clergy were declared to be civil servants paid by the State; they were to be freely elected by the people without consent of the pope, and the administrative districts of the Church were reorganized to conform with the new administrative set-up of the State. Monasteries were suppressed and complete religious freedom was proclaimed. To compel acceptance of these measures, it was decreed that all clergy must swear allegiance to the new constitution under pain of being deprived of their salaries. A great many of the clergy, even the parish priests who had sympathized with the revolution in the beginning, could not conscien-

tiously accede and were forced to abandon parishes. Those who were ready to make their peace with the State fell into the toils of the Church. Pope Pius VII condemned the civil constitution and excommunicated those who complied with it. Whatever choice the clergy made was fraught with danger. Under the circumstances, the utmost religious confusion reigned, and many of the clergy went abroad to swell the growing ranks of the émigrés, there to plot the overthrow of the revolution.

Despite its troubles, the Assembly was able to complete its labors with a substantial amount of constructive work to its credit. Not the least important part of this was the famous *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, an interesting summation of prevalent political thought written in the spirit of Rousseau, and the clarion call of future generations of revolutionaries. It asserted that men were born and remained free and equal in rights, the latter being defined as liberty, property, security, and freedom from oppression. It asserted that there must be freedom of speech and of the press, and in typical middle class fashion it declared property to be sacred and inviolable. There can be no denying the fact that this Declaration of the Rights of Man enormously influenced the political thinking of the epoch of the revolution as well as that of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the moment, however, it made matters more difficult because its promises of reform could not be fulfilled.

Of more immediate significance was the reshaping of the administrative system of France. The local governments whose haphazard and overlapping jurisdictions had broken down in the early stages of revolution were completely swept aside. In their place, the Assembly created some eighty departments, each about equal in size and population, and each subdivided into districts and communes. This form of administrative organization remained.

Finally, the Assembly drafted a constitution, the first written constitution in Europe of any importance. This document, completed and put into operation in 1791, provided for a limited monarchy, with a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. Nominal executive power was bestowed upon an hereditary king, who was allowed to postpone but not to veto legislative acts, and who, while serving as the head of the State, was to enjoy no jurisdiction over the local governments or the armed forces of the nation. Legislative power was vested in a single chamber to be known as the "Legislative Assembly." In accordance with the middle class views of the Assembly, it

was provided that members of this legislature were to be elected by property-holding citizens through a system of indirect election which would effectively disqualify the lower classes. This bourgeois constitution finished, the Assembly dissolved itself, and in 1791 the constitutional monarchy was installed.

The new government lived a precarious existence for one year and then gave way to a republic. No one was satisfied with it: neither the conservatives nor radicals at home who regarded it as too revolutionary or not revolutionary enough, according to their views, nor the governments abroad who feared that so radical a regime might spread infection. Torn between the extremes, and threatened with foreign invasion, the Legislative Assembly did well to last so long.

Reactionaries openly plotted the destruction of the new regime. Ever since the beginning of revolution, nobility and clergy had been taking flight to neighboring countries, there to win foreign aid and to organize themselves for the invasion of France at the propitious moment. With the co-operation of numerous sympathizers who remained behind, they accelerated their preparations in 1791 and, without serious trouble, enlisted the aid of the royal family. Louis and Marie Antoinette found the new state of affairs embarrassing and thoroughly distasteful, and in June took flight to the eastern frontier, with the view to establishing themselves with the émigrés. They were discovered near the very end of their journey and were returned to Paris. Though this had occurred a few months before the Legislative Assembly met, it cast a spell over that body. The constitutional monarch was unreliable and disloyal, and it was apparent that France was honeycombed with reactionary enemies.

Even more dangerous to the Legislative Assembly were the radicals who disliked the new establishment because it was too conservative. Though the leaders among them were bourgeois in extraction, they were steeped in republican ideas and they had a lively interest in the welfare of the proletariat of Paris over which they exerted enormous influence. This was ominous for the government since it was literally at the mercy of the Paris mob. The revolution had not yet brought material improvement for the urban poor; after two years of waiting, they were in a mood to demand a share in its benefits.

Agitation among the radicals began in certain eating houses or clubs of Paris which had become popular places for meeting and informal discussion among representatives of the National Assembly. The most famous of these were the Cordelier and Jacobin Clubs,

THE JACOBIN MONASTERY, PARIS

During the Revolution this building was used as a meeting place by the Society of the Friends of the Constitution, and from it came their nickname of Jacobin. Devoted to the ideal of a republic, the Jacobins, mostly of the prosperous middle class, sabotaged the limited monarchy established by the Constitution of 1791.

the latter of which became the more radical and stamped its name upon all political radicalism of that age. Duplicated throughout the provinces, these clubs constituted the rallying ground for revolutionary activity by those of the most advanced views.

The dominating figures of the clubs and the real organizers of radical revolution were Marat (1742-1793), Danton (1759-1794), and Robespierre (1758-1794). The first was a physician of some distinction who abandoned his career early in the revolution to serve the cause of the poor. Apart from his anxiety to see the establishment of real democracy, Marat had no clearly formulated political doctrine. He lived, so to speak, from day to day, adapting himself to the whims of the mob which he knew so well, and forever employing his trenchant pen to express its views and to destroy whatever might oppress it. Danton was much less radical and also, perhaps, less genuinely interested in the welfare of the masses, but he possessed more stable qualities of leadership. He was an able orator as well as a skilled debater who probably did more than the others of this triumvirate to crystallize public opinion in favor of a repub-

lic. The real leader of republican revolution, however, was Robespierre. Trained as a lawyer and a judge, Robespierre had become the ardent disciple of Rousseau whose reforms he sincerely and fanatically believed would regenerate France and the rest of mankind if they were applied. These views he propagated with such patience and forcefulness and with such selflessness that he became in the public mind the oracle of republicanism and was popularly dubbed the "Incorruptible."

Plagued by these radicals on the one side and endangered by the reactionaries on the other, the constitutional monarchy finally collapsed on the issue of foreign war. Conservative governments on the continent, especially Austria and Prussia, followed the course of events in France with grave misgivings, always fearful of the effects upon their own people. In August, 1791, these two great powers in the Holy Roman Empire finally issued the joint Declaration of Pillnitz, asserting that the restoration of order and monarchy in France was an object of their special interest. Neither was prepared to follow this threat of intervention with action, but the intimation that they might do so was enough to rouse patriotic Frenchmen. The question arose at once as to whether France should anticipate her enemies and declare war upon them before they had a chance to assemble their strength.

Curiously enough, all factions in the government, except the extreme radicals, favored a prompt declaration of war. The royal family and the reactionaries supported it because they thought France too weakly governed to win, in which case the revolution could be quickly destroyed, the monarchy re-established in all its power, and the old order revived. The more conservative bourgeois favored it because they believed a victory for France, of which they were confident, would strengthen the government in the eyes of the people, and thus prevent both monarchical restoration and radical revolution from the Left. Only the radicals opposed war, fearing it might lead to a military dictatorship, or at all events divert attention from pressing domestic problems which should be solved first. The opposition was weak in numbers if not in oratory, and the parties favoring war easily carried the day. April 20, 1792, war was declared.

The French armies fought with enthusiasm, but being poorly equipped and poorly led they met with serious reverses. With each defeat on the field, the excitement of the Paris mob mounted. The king and queen were suspected, and rightly, of helping to plot their own nation's defeat; the well-to-do were accused of sabotage. Ris-

ing rancor against the enemies at home manifested itself in demonstrations of increasing violence. In June, the mob demonstrated in the streets and overran the royal residence but dispersed without committing serious damage. A little more than a month later, after the commander of the allied armies had opened the way to Paris and issued the Brunswick Manifesto, threatening Paris with complete destruction unless the king were saved from harm and restored to his authority, the radicals and proletariat abandoned all restraint. The legal government of the city of Paris was supplanted with a revolutionary "commune," headed by Danton, and on August 9th and 10th the royal palace was once more invaded, and reactionaries, when found, were massacred. The king and queen threw themselves on the mercy of the Assembly which, smitten with terror itself at the temper of the mob, suspended the king from office and ordered the election of a National Convention by universal suffrage. This body when assembled was to devise a new constitution for France. Meanwhile, complete control fell into the hands of the revolutionary commune.

Danton, because of his leadership in the commune, became the virtual dictator of France. He infused now enthusiasm into the armies, secured the services of efficient commanders, and permitted stern though indiscriminate justice to be administered to those in the capital accused of treachery. By the 20th of September, the day on which the National Convention assembled, he was able to report that French arms were victorious. The Convention thereupon unanimously abolished the monarchy, and decreed the establishment of the Republic. A few months later, the king was tried for treason and, found guilty, was beheaded in January, 1793.

Executive authority was then delegated to a special committee of the Convention, the Committee of Public Safety, among whose members was included a number of distinguished Jacobins, the most prominent being Robespierre. This small group, acting secretly, exercised complete control over the national affairs: it conducted foreign policy, appointed officials, supervised the armies, and controlled the administration of justice. Its achievements were as impressive as its responsibilities, though the means which it employed have often obscured its accomplishments. Indeed, the period of the Committee of Public Safety is usually best known as the period of the "Reign of Terror," the phrase which has come to describe the character of its internal policy. Determined to uproot treason and opposition at home, the Committee, with the approval of the Convention, held

every person of noble birth, every relative of émigrés abroad, everyone who held office before the revolution, and everyone who could not produce a certificate of citizenship, liable to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Many of these were summarily tried and promptly executed. It is estimated that more than 5,000 in Paris alone were the victims of the guillotine within a single year, while more than 15,000 were executed in the Provinces. That this was bloody and brutal everyone must admit but, in fairness, the Terror must not be overemphasized.

While the guillotine worked overtime, the armies of France were thoroughly reorganized, foreign armies were driven from French soil, and the offensive carried into the enemies' territory. By 1795, the First Coalition was dissolved, Prussia and Spain had sued for peace; and Holland, formerly the Austrian Netherlands, was transformed into the Batavian Republic and closely linked with France. These amazing successes were largely the work of Lazare Carnot, one of the Jacobin members of the Committee of Public Safety. It was he who conceived the idea of instituting compulsory military service, rearranged the military units to conform with the needs of the times, and called men of talent to the commands. These innovations eventually revolutionized the military systems of the whole of Europe.

Besides its military accomplishments, the Convention, during the "Reign of Terror," inaugurated a number of reforms of lasting importance. It conceived the idea of codifying the law, and towards that end abolished slavery in the colonies, forbade primogeniture, and terminated the practice of imprisonment for indebtedness. It instituted the metric system, made French the sole language of instruction in the schools, and contemplated the establishment of a national system of education.

Religious and social experiments were more radical and more transient in nature. From active attempts to de-Christianize France, the Convention moved on to supplant Christianity with the worship of reason, and then, finally, under Robespierre's influence, abandoned the worship of reason for the deistic cult of the Supreme Being. With Robespierre's fall, this latter also fell as well, the Convention finally taking the position that religion was a private matter beyond the regulation of the state. Much of the social legislation of the Reign of Terror was equally short-lived. The active spirits of the Committee of Public Safety, especially Robespierre, were nearly socialists in the modern sense. They confiscated the properties of the émigrés

for the use of the state and the lower classes; they destroyed the large estates and parceled them out on easy terms among the poor; and they conscripted labor just as they conscripted soldiers for the army. They fixed wages and, at the same time to keep down the costs of living, they enforced the "laws of the maximum," regulating the maximum prices of prime necessities. When producers and retailers resisted these measures, rigid regulations against hoarding were applied. These heroic efforts to better the economic lot of the poor met with uniform failure. Peasants and bourgeois withheld supplies from the markets, despite the stern policies of the government, so that though prices were fixed, scarcity became an ever more serious problem. After a year of experimentation in social legislation, even the urban proletariat had had nearly enough.

By the summer of 1794, accumulating opposition to the radicalism of the Committee of Public Safety and to the terror which it had instituted had reached sizable proportions, while at the same time factional rivalries among the radical leaders had already weakened their power to resist. One by one the dominating figures of the Committee and their allies fell victims to a policy of mutual extermination, until after April, 1794, when Danton was despatched for his counsels of moderation, Robespierre was left almost alone. Thereupon, the conservatives of the Convention recovered their courage, and in July sent Robespierre too to the guillotine. With his passing the radical period of the revolution ended and the influence of the Parisian proletariat steadily declined. The Thermidorian Reaction,[1] as this retreat from radicalism and the Terror is called, represented a victory for a more conservative bourgeoisie.

From the death of Robespierre until dissolution the following year, the Convention labored to restore order and equality according to accepted bourgeois principles, crowning this effort with a new constitution, the "Constitution of the Year III" which was completed and put into operation in 1795. While this confirmed the republican system, it was distinctly conservative. Legislative power was vested in a bicameral body: a lower house of 500 to propose laws, and an upper house of 250 to enact them. Both of these were to be elected by indirect and restricted suffrage in such fashion as to ensure the domination of the propertied classes. Executive power was vested in a Directory of Five, to be elected by the legislature. Nominally though not actually, this constitution remained the basic

[1] The Republicans changed the calendar and July was baptized Thermidor.

law of France until the establishment of the Napoleonic Empire in 1804.

Under the Directory, as the government established by the new constitution was called, republican forms were preserved for four years and then gave way to military dictatorship. The causes of this transformation are to be found chiefly in the extremely difficult problems which the Directory faced and in the rising militarism of the republic with its accompaniment of generals ambitious for power. Six years of revolution left the new government a disturbing inheritance of economic, political, and financial disorder, coupled with costly foreign wars. This would have taxed the ingenuity of strong and honest government. Almost without exception the Directors were men of modest abilities, given to plot and intrigue, graft and extravagance. Under their direction, peculation in the collection of taxes became rife, the currency was further inflated with additional issues of *assignats*, and the country brought to bankruptcy. In 1797, it was found necessary to repudiate the *assignats* and to suspend the interest payments on two-thirds of the public debt. Meanwhile, discontent among both the radicals and the reactionaries grew, so that the Directory, like every other revolutionary government before it, was threatened with disaster at the hands of militant extremists.

From this fate it was saved temporarily because of the glorious achievements of its armies abroad. France was still at war with Austria, Sardinia, and Great Britain when the Directory assumed power, but within two years humiliating defeat had been inflicted upon both continental enemies. Two armies had been fitted out for this purpose: the first, presumably the better equipped and commanded, to march to Vienna from the Rhine; the second, under a little-known general, Napoleon Bonaparte, to conduct less important operations against the allies in Italy. By skillful strategy, brilliant tactics, and extraordinary good luck, Napoleon's army carried the day and humbled both enemies in an unexpectedly short period of time. Sardinia asked for peace, and was forced to cede Nice and Savoy to receive it; Austria was glad to accept the terms which Napoleon himself dictated in the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797), and agreed to cede the Austrian Netherlands to France in return for the Venetian Republic. These victories saved the Directory from its many enemies at home but placed it at the mercy of the successful general. Napoleon Bonaparte had become the most popular man in France, feared and respected by those of all shades of political opinion. The

Directory flattered him because it would have been unwise not to do so, but it sought to be rid of him at the earliest opportunity.

Bonaparte himself provided the Directory with a way out. He suggested that he be commissioned to undertake an expedition into Egypt and the Near East with the view to cutting the communications in the Mediterranean of Great Britain, which still continued to prosecute the war. The Directory consented, and in 1798 Napoleon landed an expeditionary force which soon overran Egypt, but was subsequently halted in Syria, long before the final goal was reached. Meanwhile the British Fleet, under the command of the redoubtable Nelson, had destroyed Bonaparte's transports and blockaded the coast so effectively that all thought of returning with the army to France had to be abandoned. Bonaparte therefore determined to leave the army behind and flee alone. His luck was with him, the blockade was run without serious threat of danger, and in October, 1799, he set foot once more upon French soil.

The people knew nothing of Napoleon's defeat in the East, but they were humiliated by the reversals of fortune in Europe during his absence. A Second Coalition had been formed against France, including Great Britain, Austria, and Russia, and in 1799 their combined armies had succeeded in driving the French out of Italy so effectively as to undo all that Napoleon had accomplished two years before. Little wonder, therefore, that Napoleon was greeted with wild enthusiasm upon his return; with him there was assurance of victory. His journey to Paris that autumn was like a triumphal march. The plaudits of the crowd indicated that he was the man of the hour and strengthened his determination to destroy the hated government of the Directory. Successful intrigue with one of the Directors prepared the way, and on the night of November 9th Napoleon surrounded the legislature, declared the government at an end, and appointed himself supreme military commander of the nation. Shortly thereafter he promulgated a new constitution which still paid lip service to republican principles; but the Republic had actually ceased to exist. A military dictatorship had begun and was soon to lead to the establishment of an empire under the dictator.

Only thirty years old at the time of his seizure of power, Napoleon's rise from obscurity had been little short of phenomenal. He was born on the island of Corsica in 1769 into a sizable Italian family which had cast its lot with the native forces of rebellion against French authority. Just the year before, the government of Genoa had sold the island to France, and the population, jealous of

its independence, had risen immediately in insurrection. Napoleon's father played a conspicuous part with the local rebel leader, Pasquale Paoli, as did also his mother who, incidentally, gave birth to her famous son while in camp with the revolutionaries. In due time, the rebellion was quelled through the superior might of France, and its leaders, instead of being arbitrarily executed, were granted favors in the hope that the population might thus be more readily reconciled to their new masters. This policy of appeasement provided Napoleon with his first great opportunity. He was chosen, along with the sons of other leading Corsican families, to receive a military education in France at public expense. The science of war intrigued him from the first and he entered upon his studies with keen enthusiasm, distinguishing himself as an engineer and artilleryman. The revolution which broke out just when his formal education was completed offered him an extraordinary opportunity to reveal his genius and satisfy his mounting ambitions.

Easily adapting himself to the changing moods of the revolution, Napoleon won favor and advancement, was charged by the Convention to defend it in 1795 against its enemies in Paris, and the following year was given the command of the Army of Italy by the Directory. It has been observed already that his brilliant feats in this latter capacity made him conspicuous in the public eye and almost literally catapulted him into power.

Small in stature, Napoleon was egotistical, selfish, conceited, unscrupulous, but unquestionably brilliant. He had a fanatical, almost superstitious belief in his destiny and, what is more, he had the genius and magnetic personality necessary to convince others of it as well. In military strategy he was without a peer, but his greatness transcended the military arts. He was a keen judge of men with an intuitive flare for the dramatic, capable of guiding his course in accordance with the public will and at the same time winning its confidence and unswerving devotion. He had a fine taste for the artistic and a genuine appreciation of learning, both of which he encouraged. But his dominant trait was his own lust for power which he constantly sought to satisfy by any means, fair or foul.

Shortly after his *coup d'état* in November, 1799, Napoleon issued a new constitution which thinly disguised his personal dictatorship under the forms of republicanism. Power was concentrated in the hands of three Consuls, the first of whom was Napoleon. These were instructed to select a Senate and from lists provided by the people in popular elections this body was delegated, in turn, to choose a

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

NAPOLEON I. BY LOUIS DAVID (1748-1825).

This spirited portrait of Napoleon shows that David, director of art during the Revolution and the first Empire, was a realist in temperament as well as a classicist in creed.

Tribunate and a Legislative Body. All laws were to be proposed by the First Consul with the advice of a Council of State. The Tribunate could discuss but not vote upon them; the Legislative Body could vote upon them but not discuss them; and the Senate could determine whether or not they were constitutional. Thus representative government was not wholly destroyed, though it was reduced to a mere sham.

Having entrenched himself in power, Napoleon turned his attention to the destruction of the Second Coalition which had formed during his absence in Egypt. Russia was persuaded to withdraw through successful diplomacy, and in 1800 a lightning campaign

brought Austria to her knees. The Peace of Lunéville, completed the following year, confirmed the settlement of Campo Formio. England, once more left to fight the war alone, despaired of defeating France on the continent, and in 1802 also agreed to peace in the Treaty of Amiens by which she gave up most of her colonial conquests and recognized the European settlement of Lunéville.

Taking advantage of the popular enthusiasm with which these successes were greeted, Napoleon held a plebiscite which supported his appointment as First Consul for life. Two years later, in 1804, it was a simple matter to transform the Consulate into the Empire. At an imposing ceremony in the Cathedral of Notre Dame, in the presence of Pope Pius VII who had come all the way from Rome, Napoleon crowned himself Emperor of France. Thus the revolution had run the complete cycle from absolute monarchy, through the radical republic, to authoritarian government again.

C. The Spread of Revolutionary Ideas: Napoleon

The spotlight of historical publicity has been focused so much on the military and imperial aspects of Napoleon's career that it is easy to forget that he was an administrator and reformer as well. As a reformer he was neither always original nor always wise. His most important reform, the codification of law, was begun by the Directory. Moreover, his reforms consistently ignored if they did not actually flout the demands for political liberty which had rung so loud in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*. Equality and fraternity, Napoleon could and did promote, but his rule, like that of all other autocrats, precluded individual liberty. Probably the greatest merit of the Napoleonic reforms was the energy with which they were executed. In peace as well as war, Napoleon's *forte* was action, not discussion and deliberation.

Among the reforms of the Corsican were two which involved Powers other than France: the agreement with the Roman Catholic Church, known as the Concordat of 1801; and the reshaping of the Germanies. Many French Catholics had been driven into opposition by the confiscation of church lands and other anti-clerical measures of the revolutionaries. Napoleon both desired and needed the support of a united people and of an established church. To that end he negotiated a settlement with the pope which had the effect of establishing a French Catholic Church. Catholicism, though recognized as the religion professed by most Frenchmen, was not enjoined upon any-

one, thereby perpetuating that toleration which had been a cardinal aim of the Revolution. The French State undertook to pay the salaries of the clergy as a sort of recompense for not returning the property confiscated. Lower clergy were to be chosen by the bishops, but the bishops were to be chosen by the State. Finally, no clerical synod could be held and no papal bull be binding without the assent of the French government. The Concordat did restore peace but the binding ties which it put upon Church and State resulted in grave problems and growing friction before the century was over. A further evidence of Napoleon's desire for popular support is the fact that he later extended state aid to Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Judaism, bringing the first two under State control at the same time.

The reformation of the Germanies begun by the Peace of Lunéville reached its climax in 1803 and 1806. In the former year, Napoleon forced the corrupt and politically inert German governments to accede to the abolition of over two hundred petty states in the west and the south. Their lands were absorbed by France or added to those of other Germanic states, notably Prussia, Baden, and Bavaria. Three years later, fifteen southern states were formed into a Confederation of the Rhine under a French protectorate. Shortly thereafter, Napoleon refused to recognize the ancient and dishonored Holy Roman Empire, which thereupon collapsed with the resignation of the Emperor, Francis II. The Confederation did not survive Napoleon, but his drastic surgery cleared the way for the subsequent expansion of Prussia into the German Empire.

Of his domestic reforms, unquestionably the greatest was the reduction of the numerous, confused and confusing laws of France to a uniform legal system embodied in five codes, of which the most important was the Civil Code (1804). The great need for a legal reform had been one of the causes of the Revolution, but the revolutionaries themselves had not accomplished it. Napoleon chose a board of experts and bullied them into completing a task which stands a monument to their wisdom and skill and to his driving energy. Harsh, exalting authority both in State and family, and denying equality to women, the Civil Code nonetheless deserves to rank with those of Justinian. The great gains of the Revolution—civil equality, religious toleration, the abolition of serfdom and feudalism, and the ending of special privilege—were retained in a form so compact and lucid that it became a beacon for Europe's guidance. The *Code Napoleon* was in very large measure responsible for the spread of the ideals of the Revolution.

Another of the more enduring reforms of Napoleon was the centralization of government along the lines marked out by Richelieu. Beginning in 1800, a series of laws placed the then First Consul in complete control of all local government. The powers of the local councils were curtailed, and officials (*prefects* and *sub-prefects*), appointed by and responsible to Napoleon, were given almost full authority. In addition, the Consul was empowered to control the police of the large cities and to select the mayors either directly or, in the case of towns of less than five thousand inhabitants, indirectly through the *prefects*. Uniformity was thus guaranteed at the expense of democracy. That the French have liked the system is amply attested by the fact that it was continued in operation.

Napoleon attacked the financial chaos into which the various revolutionary governments had fallen with the same zeal that he showed in legal and administrative reforms. Peculation was largely eliminated from state finance and taxes were carefully collected. The currency was stabilized and the Bank of France was established (1800) to give direction and support to financing. Protective tariffs promoted a sort of prosperity for French industry and commerce, and the expenditure of funds upon public works reduced the number of unemployed. Roads were built, canals dug, and harbors deepened and fortified the better to serve both trade and war. In addition, the public works also included the restoration of state palaces such as Fontainebleau, and the completion of the Louvre to which Napoleon brought masterpieces of art, plundered from Italy, from the Netherlands, and from Spain.

Two other reforms were markedly less successful. His attempt to establish a state-controlled system of education proved premature, the Catholic Church continued to dominate education for over two generations more. An effort to build a French colonial empire in Haiti and in Louisiana, which he contrived to get from Spain in 1800, was balked by the determined resistance of the Haitian Negroes under the leadership of Toussaint L'Ouverture and by the British navy. In 1803, Napoleon sold the vast Louisiana territory to the United States for $15,000,000, and turned his attention to Europe where a Third Coalition against him was in the process of formation.

The most impelling causes of the resumption of war involved Anglo-French relations. Napoleon's attempts at empire-building in Haiti had roused British fears for the safety of the British West Indies, and the activities of French secret agents in Syria and India had increased Britain's concern. Moreover, the exclusion of British trade and traders from all French possessions made many of the powerful



From "The Life of Napoleon" by John Holland Rose, George Bell and Sons, Ltd., Publishers

NAPOLEON'S RAFT

This contemporary woodcut was drawn from the model presented to the French Directory. The raft was designed in hexagonal shape, 2,100 feet long by 1,500 feet wide, with breastworks at all edges. Three masts fore and three masts aft provided for sailing, while four paddle-wheel mills to be turned by horses are placed on each of the long sides. The citadel stands in the center, flanked by flags which mark the stations of ten regiments.

mercantile group feel that the time had come to put Napoleon in his place and check French pretension about regaining a colonial and commercial empire overseas. As far as these two rivals were concerned, the struggle had become economic and commercial. Napoleon, fully aware of this, and realizing also that until he defeated Great Britain he could win no lasting victories on the continent and no victories at all overseas, was rather more than willing that war should be resumed. As to the continental aspects, the continuing aggressions and expansions of the French, represented for example by the annexation of Piedmont in 1802, were sufficient to align Austria and Russia on the side of Great Britain.[1]

Before the war began, Napoleon concentrated men, supplies, and ships along the coasts opposite England with the apparent intention of invading the island. Great Britain, led by its Francophobe Prime Minister, the younger William Pitt, countered by concentrating the British fleet in the Channel, preying upon French and Spanish shipping, and spending large sums of money to form the Coalition and support its troops. The threat of a Napoleonic invasion of England

[1] The Third Coalition as it finally formed also included Sweden. France had one ally, Spain.

collapsed when Nelson defeated the French fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar, thus demonstrating that Britain still held the mastery of the seas.

The War of the Third Coalition was both a military and an economic struggle. Against the continental states, the Emperor showed the same military genius as before. His army, the best equipped and trained in the world, and still moved, despite the Napoleonic dictatorship, by the ideals and aspirations of the revolutionary spirit was too much for the professional and uninspired armies of his continental foes. An Austrian army was defeated at Ulm in October (1805) and an Austro-Russian force at Austerlitz in December. The Treaty of Pressburg (1805) which Austria was forced to sign deprived her of about three million subjects and of the revenue from them; removed her from the Coalition; and reduced her to a second-rate power. Prussia after much vacillation, decided in 1806 to intervene against the French, only to be crushed promptly at the Battles of Jena and Auerstadt (October). Berlin was occupied by French troops and Napoleon concentrated his forces against the Russians whom he also defeated at the Battle of Friedland (June, 1807). A month later, he and Czar Alexander I, meeting on a raft in the Niemen River, agreed not only to a peace, the Treaty of Tilsit, but also to a Franco-Russian alliance. Prussia was made the scapegoat. Stripped of the Rhineland, which was made into the puppet Kingdom of Westphalia, and of her Polish possessions, which were re-formed as the quasi-independent Duchy of Warsaw, Prussia was also compelled to reduce her army, to accept a French army of occupation, and to pay a large indemnity. The alliance, which Napoleon desired in order to extend his trade embargo against Great Britain and which Russia entered partly to gain time for reorganization and partly because of hostility to Britain, provided that Russia should take part in the embargo and aid the French against Sweden. In return, Napoleon promised to aid Russia to get Constantinople. A secret clause bound the allies to continue the war on Great Britain if that nation refused peace on the Napoleonic terms. Pursuant to this bargain, Alexander I launched an attack on Sweden which removed her from the war and won Finland for Russia. Napoleon and his semi-ally, semi-satellite, Alexander, were indeed masters of the European continent. The successful Corsican was Emperor of a France that, strong and prosperous, stretched from the North Sea and the Rhine to the Pyrenees and the Papal States. King of Italy, master of Venice and the valley of the Po, he ruled Naples through his brother, Joseph, and enjoyed the alliance of



MAP 27. NAPOLEONIC EUROPE

Pope Pius VII. The Netherlands were also under his control, Spain and Denmark were virtually his dependents, Russia was his ally, his enemies, Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, were humbled. Only Great Britain, secured by her sea power, bulwarked by her wealth, remained in active opposition.

Against this implacable enemy which he could not invade, Napoleon employed an economic attack, which would probably be referred to now as a war of economic sanctions, but which is traditionally called the Continental System. The term implies the Emperor's aim: to establish a continent-wide embargo upon British goods. The first move was the issuance of the Berlin Decree (1806) by Napoleon, declaring that Great Britain was blockaded, and barring British ships from all harbors under French control. The blockade was theoretical since Britain controlled the seas, but it did mean that any ships which traded with Britain were liable to punishment if caught by the French. Later decrees (Warsaw and Milan, 1807, and Fontainebleau, 1810) extended the restrictions to include neutral vessels sailing from British owned or occupied ports. The British answered the decrees with a series of Orders-in-Council (January to Novem-

ber, 1807) which set up a blockade around France and her allies and demanded that in some cases neutral ships touch first at a British port. Neutral traders were thus caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. If they went to French ports, they were liable to capture and confiscation by the British, but they risked the same treatment by the French if they entered British ports. Parenthetically, vigorous British enforcement of the Orders-in-Council was one of the causes which led to the Anglo-American War of 1812.

The Continental System, as Napoleon realized, was a gamble. Could he humble the British government by strangling British trade before the European peoples under his control were ruined by the stoppage of commerce? Could he create such distress in Great Britain that the people would force the government to yield, or would the reverse be true, and European peoples force him to yield? Would his resources suffice to keep his allies faithful to a system which brought them only hardship and distress? Those were the questions that the Emperor had to answer and he decided to take the risks. Experience proved him wrong. He could and did bring bankruptcy to many Britishers, unemployment and suffering to many more, but he could not wholly choke off the trade. Europe, despite his orders, violated the system; in fact, from time to time he did so himself in order to get vitally important supplies, but the factor which really saved the British was world trade which Napoleon lacked the sea power to stop. On the whole, France suffered least from the embargo, partly because, as was just suggested, Napoleon occasionally relaxed it. The real victims were the peoples of Central Europe whose trade was almost ruined. Their strength was drained and the bourgeoisie, many of whom had welcomed the strong, orderly rule and the war business of the conqueror, was alienated.

Hatred of the Continental System proved a rallying point for Napoleon's enemies. Moreover, enforcement of the Continental System became almost a mania with the Emperor, leading him to subordinate other policies to it. The Papal States and the Netherlands were both annexed to France when the Pope in one and Napoleon's brother, Louis, in the other declined to enforce the embargo. More important still, Napoleon in a futile attempt to close the Iberian Peninsula to British trade was led into a campaign against Portugal and Spain which directly contributed to his ruin.

The personal factor in history bulked large in Napoleon's relationships with Spain. The Spanish king, Charles IV, was an incompetent, completely dominated by his coarse and sensuous queen and

her lover, the ambitious and corrupt Godoy. The latter, who was the real ruler of Spain, was controlled by Napoleon. This group hated and feared the crown prince who was as irresponsible as his father but more popular with the people. Under these conditions, it was easy for Napoleon to get permission for French troops to cross Spain in order to force his will upon Portugal. Late in 1807, Portugal was overrun and its royal family forced into exile, but the presence of French troops in the Peninsula angered the Spanish people and turned them against their weak king and his wife's favorite. To save Godoy, Charles abdicated in favor of his son, but Napoleon guilefully undid this and inveigled both king and ex-king to surrender the throne to him. Joseph Bonaparte was promoted from King of Naples to King of Spain and installed under the auspices of French troops in 1808. The new king promptly extended the gains of the Revolution—equality, abolition of feudalism and serfdom, and educational and other reforms—to his new subjects only to discover a fact oft-repeated in social development, namely, that a people prefers bad government of its own to a better government imposed by an alien authority. An outraged Spanish people rose in insurrection, defeated a small army which the Emperor had rather casually despatched to crush them, and drove King Joseph toward the Pyrenees. A guerilla war ensued with the British, for once recognizing opportunity at its first knock, lending vigorous aid to the rebels with an army led by Sir Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington. Napoleon in person led back his troops and his puppet king, defeated the main British army and reinstalled Joseph in Madrid. The guerilla war and the British aid were both resumed as soon as the Corsican departed on other business. Slowly but with almost fateful surety the allied forces drove back the French in this so-called Peninsular War (1808-1813). For the first time, Napoleon had collided with his nemesis, the intangible force of nationalism. For the first time he had to fight, not a professional army whose loyalty to its master was lukewarm, but a proud people whose spontaneous resistance and passionate patriotism made mock of the French might. It was a process shortly to be repeated elsewhere for hatred of Napoleon and the menace of his advance everywhere united peoples as never before. Austria, Russia, Prussia, and even the disparate Italies were impelled by the rising nationalism.

Meanwhile, Prussia rallied from its staggering defeat of 1806 and 1807, and under the leadership of its very able minister, Baron vom Stein, and its chancellor, Hardenberg, embarked upon a process of modernization and reform. Serfdom was abolished and the noble's

monopoly of landownership was broken. For the first time, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie were allowed a share in their country and they responded with an increased patriotism. Free trade was established in Prussia to the profit of the country in general and the mercantile class in particular. Education was fostered on the theory that an educated people strengthened the state. Some changes were also made in the forms and methods of government, although the autocracy was retained. The army, too, underwent a rejuvenation. Compulsory military service, the more acceptable when men could feel that it was for the defense of their own lands, was introduced, and it was made possible for a soldier to rise from the ranks to a position of power. The limitation of the army to 42,000 men by the Treaty of Tilsit was circumvented by training a group, dismissing them from active service, training a second group, and so on. Napoleon, watching these changes with uneasiness, forced the dismissal of Stein[1] (1808), but was unable to check the growing nationalism which manifested itself both in the support of the reforms and in the formation of such patriotic societies as the *Tugenbund* (League of Virtue).

Austria, also, was stung by defeat into making reforms which included the introduction of universal compulsory military service and of the organization and tactics used by the French. But Austria, encouraged by the situation in Spain, was led into a premature attempt to defeat Napoleon. The result was another Napoleonic victory at the Battle of Wagram (1809) and another Napoleonic triumph in the Peace of Vienna (1809). The latter forced Austria to cede part of Galicia to Russia and part to the Duchy of Warsaw, the Illyrian provinces to France, and the Tyrol to Bavaria. The price of peace also included an indemnity; the reduction and limitation of the army; and the marriage of the Austrian archduchess, Marie Louise, to Napoleon.[2]

This apparent triumph over Austria was somewhat nullified by the growing tension between the allies, France and Russia. Indeed, neither partner had kept his pact very well. Napoleon had hindered rather than helped the Russian advance both in the north and against

[1] Stein promptly went to Austria where he stirred up nationalistic hatred of the French and then to Russia where he became one of the chief advisers of Czar Alexander.

[2] Napoleon's earlier marriage with Josephine Beauharnais was annuled. His motive was a desire for an heir in whose veins ran royal blood. That wish was fulfilled with the birth of a son (1811) whom Napoleon titled "King of Rome," and nicknamed "The Little Eagle."

the Turks, and his enlargement of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1809 worried the Czar who did not relish the presence of a French puppet state on his frontier. The Continental System, furthermore, had greatly injured Russia by stopping her grain trade with Great Britain. On the other hand, Napoleon rightfully complained that Alexander, uneasy at the protests it evoked from his people, had slowly relaxed the embargo and resumed trade with Britain. The Corsican knew that if his economic war against the British failed, he was lost. The only course that he could see open was to enforce his will upon Russia by war. Accordingly he began in 1812 to gather supplies and collect men from various parts of his empire. Alexander countered by making peace with Turkey to remove that danger, and by agreements with Great Britain and Sweden which gave him their support. By June, the stage was set and Napoleon with an army of over 600,000 began to invade Russia. The Russian army, inferior both in size and efficiency, avoided a pitched battle and slowly retreated, luring the French deeper and deeper into the country. At Borodino in September the Russians made a stand. Casualties were heavy on both sides but the Russians were forced back and the road to Moscow, the capital city, lay open. Napoleon's entrance into that city was indeed an empty triumph. With rare patriotism, the inhabitants abandoned their homes, and the boots of the advancing French resounded through an empty city. That night, Moscow burst into flames with scores of fires set by the retreating Russians. Buildings and supplies alike were destroyed and only the work of the French army, turned fire-fighters for this emergency, saved the city from complete destruction. Nothing daunted, Napoleon, whose unbalanced belief in his star of destiny was at its height, stayed on, sending embassy after futile embassy to demand that Alexander surrender. Against the advice of his staff who insisted that the Czar would not yield while French troops were on Russian soil, and who warned the Emperor of the rigors of the northern winter which would soon begin, the megalomaniac kept his army in Moscow until October. Then, when it was already too late, he ordered a retreat. There are few more appalling stories in history than the one of the French retreat from Moscow. The route lay through the areas already devastated by the invasion, which meant that food and supplies were scarce or lacking. The mounted Cossacks remorselessly clung to the flanks and the rear of the retreating column, swooping down to harass it and then taking swift flight before it could re-form in battle order. Worst of all, the severe Russian winter closed in, with sleet, snow, and bitter cold.

Slowly, painfully, saved from utter rout only by the brilliant rear-guard actions of Marshal Ney, the beaten army crawled home, leaving its thousands of dead and dying along the way. It has been conservatively estimated that not less than 350,000 men were left behind either dead or captive. Napoleon, who warmly clad, well fed, and well cared for, had led the retreat, suddenly sneaked away in the night, for the third time abandoning his men to the mercy of the enemy. As the year of disaster ended, he calmly announced to his people that "the emperor has never been in better health!"

The following year found Napoleon beset by increasing difficulties. Great Britain was still at war with him, and in January, Russia and Prussia allied themselves against him by the Treaty of Kalish. Signs of serious disaffection appeared among his officers and officials, and he found it increasingly hard to recruit men for his army. Moreover, the strain was telling on the man himself. Fatigue, added to the megalomania, brought a definite waning of his powers. Yet, nonetheless, he managed to raise an army of half a million men—young, inexperienced, but an army with which he was able to win several pyrrhic victories over the allied forces. Austria, having tricked him by an armistice which enabled her to gather her troops, entered the war against him in the early summer. In October was fought the great battle of Leipzig, in which Napoleon was defeated with losses of over 50,000 troops. In full retreat, the beaten French, harassed by the allies, and ravaged by disease, crossed the Rhine, and Napoleon's power east of that river ended.

Then France itself suffered for the first time in years from a multiple invasion. Wellington, having worked his way through the Iberian peninsula, moved in from the south. Alexander of Russia, Charles of Austria, and Blucher of Prussia pressed on from the east. Napoleon, still a great general, fought desperately and brilliantly but the odds against him were overwhelming. Driven back on Paris, he sought and failed to rally the Parisians for one last stand. It was no use. The city fell in March of 1814, and Alexander of Russia led the victorious allies into the captured capital. Napoleon, beaten and despairing, retired to Fontainebleau. On April 7 he signed his abdication, then sought to commit suicide. The poison had been kept too long and to his greater humiliation of body and mind, it only made him retch and vomit. Shortly thereafter, he retired to the tiny island of Elba, the only empire his victorious enemies left him. It soon proved to be too small.

Having disposed of Napoleon, the allies set about the task of re-

construction. By the Treaty of Paris (May, 1814), France was reduced to the boundaries she had had in 1792 and most of her colonial possessions were restored to her. The Treaty also summoned a congress, in which France was to be represented, to consider the general European problems. These very moderate terms are evidence that the allies considered that their quarrel was with one man, Napoleon, not with the people of France. Further evidence of this appears also in the restoration in France itself. The Count of Provence, brother of the guillotined Louis XVI, was established on the throne as Louis XVIII,[1] but no effort was made to restore the social or political systems of the Old Regime. Louis, who owed his elevation chiefly to the mediation of the wily Talleyrand,[2] assumed the title and many of the forms of the Bourbon monarchy, but he signified his acceptance of the new order by issuing a Charter (1814) which was prefaced by the *Declaration of the Rights of Man*. This constitution gave full executive power, including control of the ministry and of the upper house of the bicameral legislature, to the Crown. The lower house was elective, but since suffrage was limited to those men who paid an annual direct tax of at least three hundred francs, it was far from democratic.

Louis' first wise moderation was gradually transformed into reaction as the returning émigrés once more made their influence felt at court. Their ultra-royalism and extreme clericalism were very distasteful to a people most of whom hoped that the Revolution had banished such things forever. Particularly obnoxious and especially menacing were the impolitic remarks about taking the lands which the revolutionary governments had confiscated and distributed. This threatened alike the bourgeois who had bought lands once held by the Church, and the peasant, who had profited from the disorder by seizing the lands he tilled. In addition, the new government both injured and offended many of the Napoleonic veterans by its tactless treatment. Discontent was widespread, a fact of which Napoleon Bonaparte on his little island was well aware.

[1] The dauphin, who would have ruled as Louis XVII, never occupied the throne but he was paid the compliment of a number just the same.

[2] Prince Charles de Talleyrand (1754-1838) was remarkable not only for his talents but also for his ability to be on the winning side. This quondam abbé and bishop had been a member of the National Assembly. His one miscue, the support of monarchism, forced him into temporary exile in the United States but he returned to become Foreign Minister both for the Directory and for Napoleon. With the imperial defeat he again shifted sides and became the chief mediator between the allies and the restored Bourbon. Later, he served France well as her plenipotentiary at the Congress of Vienna.

Meanwhile, the congress called for by the Treaty of Paris had opened in Vienna late in September of 1814.[1] Within a few months dissension broke out among the conferees which became so serious that war among them seemed likely. Of this, too, Napoleon was aware. The ex-emperor had almost exhausted the possibilities for action on Elba, which he had organized into a toy empire, and his ambitions began once more to soar. Moreover, he had grievances, real and fancied. The subsidy promised him was in arrears, his letters to his wife and son were tampered with, and he was not treated with the respect he felt his due. Late in February, 1815, he evaded his guards, stole on board a waiting vessel, and sailed for France. From the landing at Cannes on March 1, his was a triumphal return. The people welcomed him with cries of "Vive l'empereur," and supported him with money and supplies. His veterans flocked to him. Even Marshal Ney, who had sworn to bring him back to Paris in an iron cage, deserted to him with his army. Each succeeding day of his northward march saw his ranks swelled, his power greater. The Bourbon fled, and on March 20, Napoleon entered Paris to resume his interrupted rule.

It was a short-lived triumph. The Powers at Vienna stopped their bickering and renewed the alliance which they had made the preceding year. Napoleon was branded an outlaw, and troops totaling over 216,000 were rapidly assembled and marched toward France. In June, Napoleon with an army of about 180,000 went out from Paris to meet this threat. On the 18th, the French troops collided with those of the Duke of Wellington near the little Belgian town of Waterloo, south of Brussels. Not even the magnificent bravery of his "Old Guard" could save the "Little Corporal." Before the day was over, Blucher and his Prussians joined the Iron Duke and the French defeat became a rout. The "Hundred Days," as this last Napoleonic scourge is called, were over. Once again, Paris fell before the allies (July 3) and six days later, Napoleon Bonaparte, no longer emperor but a publicly proclaimed "common criminal," was arrested. Placed aboard the British ship, *Bellerophon*, he was transported to the island of St. Helena where he lived in exile until death released him in 1821. This time, France also was penalized for her support of the warmonger. The second Treaty of Paris (November, 1815) reduced her boundaries to the limits of 1790, depriving her of the Saar region; charged

[1] For the story of the Congress of Vienna, see the next Chapter.

[2] The Treaty of Chaumont, signed on March 9, 1814, which bound Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria in an offensive-defensive alliance, was to last twenty years if need be.

her with an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs to be paid in five years; saddled her with an army of occupation; and forced the return of all the works of art which Napoleon had stolen. Napoleon's megalomania was costly to his people.

No story of the Napoleonic era would be complete without some attempt to summarize, at least, the reasons for his failure. Perhaps the greatest was nationalism which he unwittingly crystallized from a vague intangible into such self-sacrificing patriotism as was revealed in Spain and Russia. As long as he fought professional armies only, he was invincible, but when he had to fight an aroused people, his day of triumph neared its end. The Continental System proved also to be a boomerang which weakened his allies and rallied his enemies. Its failure doomed him also. Closely related to it was the question of sea power. Lacking that, Napoleon was unable to conquer the "nation of petty shop-keepers," as he once scornfully termed the British, or to enforce his economic sanctions. Then, too, the very militarism which fed his greatness finally turned against him. Not only did it sap the strength of his people but it also roused among his enemies a desperation which amounted almost to a phobia. They were determined to be rid of him and his constant trouble making. Had he won at Waterloo, he must certainly have been defeated elsewhere. All Europe was united to that end. Finally, Napoleon was only a man after all, subject to the weaknesses of the species. Fatigue slowly undermined his powers, megalomania distorted his judgments, and the limitations inherent in the absolutism of any one man set a bound to his triumphs.

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Chapter XXI

The Shackles of Tradition

A. The Basic Distrust of Novelty

Because most men are conservative by nature, training, and interest, the forces of social change are always powerfully resisted. Not until the ever-shifting economic and social environment has profoundly altered modes of life and rendered obsolete older habits of thought do existing social and political institutions yield. Even then they give up slowly and reluctantly, sometimes by gradual compromise, sometimes through violent revolution. Whatever the method of effecting change, the final result is usually the same, though revolution may sometimes greatly accelerate it. In either case, the new is always adapted to the old, it does not displace the old. Again and again it has happened that when revolutionary minorities have succeeded for a time in altering social and political institutions to conform with views beyond the common understanding they have been forced to retreat. The degree of this reaction, as it is called, varies with the circumstances of time and place, but it always appears, and through its persistence a balance between the old and the new is struck. There is probably no better historical demonstration of this than the period of the French Revolution and the Reaction which followed it, though we can witness it at first hand in the contemporary era. The widespread reversion to authoritarian government in much of Europe after brief post-war experience with democracy, and the compromises of the Soviets with capitalist society, are good cases in point.

The forces which attract men to the past or to the established social and political order and make them resistant to innovations are varied and numerous. For one thing, it is easier to follow the beaten track than it is to pioneer. It requires less effort and it involves less risks. There is security in the known, though it may not always be

satisfactory, while the unknown holds perils and dangers and offers only uncertain guarantees. Most people feel this way, and because they do, they remain mistrustful and skeptical of the new and untried.

For special groups within society, this natural inclination toward conservatism is reinforced by material interests which would have to be sacrificed if radical changes in the existing order were made. In most instances, this was the reason for the vehement opposition of the landed aristocracy and the clergy to the French Revolution; it was also the reason for the opposition of the landlords and the middle classes to the communist revolution in Russia. Civil servants who have a stake in the administration, members of the army and the navy, all representatives of the vested interests, are likely to be the most active defenders of the status quo. The ruling caste dreads change and labors industriously to avoid it. This is as true for a ruling party of radical ideas as it is for a conservative group which happens to dominate.

The task of preserving the status quo is usually facilitated by the natural conservatism of the people, and it is greatly aided by the agencies of indoctrination which the ruling class controls. The most important of these are the school, the Church, and the State. Through the last those few who object can be held in line by force while the majority are induced to renew their faith by appeals to patriotism; the Church does its share by inculcating those moral and ethical doctrines which have sprung from the prevailing order; but it is the school which has done most to strengthen attachment to the existing scheme of things. In all ages, the schools have given instruction in those branches of learning which the established order of society deems useful and worth while, ofttimes deliberately, more often unconsciously, coloring this accumulated knowledge of the past with interpretations congenial to their time and class. By this means, confidence in established social and political institutions is perpetually renewed, and habits of thought are formed which resist change. This does not mean to say that the schools do not adapt themselves to the shifting social environment; the processes of adjustment are in continuous operation, but their accumulated effects are slow to appear above the surface.

Because all these various forces operate to strengthen opposition to change, reformers and revolutionaries are more than likely to be unpopular in their own times. Galileo was compelled to recant because his discoveries controverted accepted religious dogma; Darwin was pilloried because he engendered serious doubt about the accepted

views of the creation; and Woodrow Wilson was rebuffed because he demanded peace without victory. Critics of the status quo are always regarded as dangerous.

B. Alexander and Metternich

The conquerors of Napoleon at Waterloo aimed to restore the status quo as it had existed prior to the outbreak of revolution a quarter of a century before. This was no more possible than it had been for the revolutionaries to make a complete sweep of the past, but public sentiment generally favored a conservative adjustment in the interest of peace and order. After twenty years of almost continuous war, the people had come to believe that revolution meant war and starvation rather than utopia, and its lofty ideals fell into disrepute. The old order, in retrospect, seemed almost ideal. Romanticists extolled its virtues,[1] its peace and tranquillity, and professed to find in its class relationships, its religious institutions, and its political structure the key to human happiness. Almost everywhere there was a noticeable quickening of religious life, a reversion to what was nearly medieval Catholicism and a growing popular attachment to pietism, at the expense of Deism and skepticism. The political innovations of the revolution likewise lost their appeal. Confidence in monarchy, even absolute monarchy, revived, so much so that the most prominent political theorists of the post-revolutionary era were induced to advance doctrines which were little short of medieval.[2] The forces resistant to change, long at work, had at last gained ascendancy, and threatened a return to the old scheme of things, more complete than either the times or the circumstances would allow.

Even the bourgeoisie and the peasants in France who had profited most from the revolution were now joined by those who demanded peace and order in place of liberty and equality. But naturally they were not reactionaries in the sense that they wished the re-establishment of the old order. They fully expected to keep the advantages and the properties they had won, and consequently resisted the restoration of the rights and privileges of the nobility and the clergy, but with that they were ready to call the revolution to a halt. The

[1] For a description of the reactionary character of Romanticism see Chapter XXVIII.

[2] Typical examples were de Bonald and de Maistre of France and von Haller of Germany. They defended the old class structure as the basis of sound political life, inveighed against the revolutionary concepts of political equality, and stoutly supported the thesis that all power must be vested in the sovereign.

clergy and the nobility for equally selfish reasons rejected even this compromise, which was to be made at their expense. Only the more radical masses among the urban proletariat and the more advanced intellectuals wished to continue the revolution in the hope that they too might wrest some benefits from it, but they were like voices crying in the wilderness. For the time being, preponderant sentiment favored a conservative settlement; it was merely a question whether this would take the shape of bourgeois or privileged preference.

Yet it was not an easy matter to find a solution to this question, to strike a convenient balance between the old and the new. Everywhere in Europe the privileged orders labored to preserve what they had saved and to regain what they had lost, and, having many of the instruments of force still at their command, they were oftimes successful. The bourgeoisie combatted them at every turn, usually with the assistance of the radical masses and sometimes, as in France, with the aid of the peasantry. For thirty years, European society was sharply divided over this conflict: the clergy and the aristocracy were the "conservatives" seeking the restoration of the old order; the bourgeoisie were the "liberals" fighting to preserve the revolutionary settlement in France or establish it elsewhere in Europe, and the proletariat were the "radicals" seeking to make use of every upheaval for the satisfaction of their own interests. None of these groups gained complete victory, but a compromise was eventually evolved which at least satisfied the bourgeoisie.

In 1815, however, the "conservatives" definitely held the upper hand, and for more than a decade thereafter their cause was ably championed. Much of the credit for this has been properly bestowed upon Count Clemens Metternich (1773-1859), the able Foreign Minister of the Hapsburg Empire whose plotting and intrigue had helped mightily in bringing Napoleon to his knees. Born of a distinguished family of the Rhineland, Metternich was a mere youth when spreading revolutionary contagion first aroused his concern. He conceived an intense dislike for mob violence and an equally intense hatred for Napoleon who was instrumental in depriving him of his family estates. Fortune enabled him to combat both. Pursuing the career of his father, he entered the diplomatic service of Austria where, with the aid of powerful friends, he was rapidly advanced to the highest rank, becoming the actual head of the government in 1809. By cunning and tireless energy he prepared Napoleon's downfall with such skill and finesse that at the end of the Napoleonic epoch he had maneuvered Austria into the dominating position among the continental

powers and had made for himself the reputation of being the greatest statesman of the age. So great was his prestige that sovereigns deferred to his opinions and regularly consulted him. For a generation, he dominated central Europe and directly influenced the course of affairs in the other states of continental Europe. Not without reason, the period of reaction after 1815 has been called "the era of Metternich."

Linked with Metternich as the apostle of reaction, though not fairly so until the latter part of his life, was the enigmatic and temperamentally unstable czar of Russia, Alexander I. Handsome and clever, but weak and superficial, he chose at first to play the role of public benefactor and enlightened despot. He evinced an interest in social and political reforms during the course of the Revolution, counseled moderation in France after he had helped defeat Napoleon, and for a time undertook liberal reforms in some of his own possessions. The constant prodding of Metternich who mistrusted him, the influence of religious fanatics who gained his ear, and fear of revolution at home soon cured him of his reformism. He joined hands with the Austrian statesman, therefore, and threw the strength and great influence of his empire in the direction of conservative retrenchment.

Having disposed of the Revolution and Napoleon, the first care of these conservatives and their numerous associates was to restore Europe to the "normal" state of the pre-revolutionary epoch. By two treaties of Paris (1814 and 1815), France was denuded of her conquests and her frontiers fixed at substantially what they had been in 1790, the Bonaparte family was forever deprived of the imperial throne, and the "legitimate" Bourbons restored. The difficult task of disposing of the rest of Europe, so radically changed by twenty years of French domination, was left to a Congress of the powers, scheduled, by common consent, to meet in Vienna.

The Congress of Vienna assembled soon after Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of the Nations and completed its deliberations just a few days before the final and decisive engagement at Waterloo. It was an imposing gathering, attended by a host of sovereigns, great and small, and by the most conspicuous statesmen of the age, but for the great majority of these it was little more than an elaborate pageant and a pleasant diversion. The foreign ministers of the victorious powers—Metternich for Austria, Castlereagh for England, Nesselrode for Russia, and Humboldt for Prussia—with the later co-operation of Talleyrand, Foreign Minister for France, conducted the negotiations and reached the final settlement. Like the Treaty of Versailles in

1919, the Treaty of Vienna was the work of a few men working behind closed doors and, for the most part, in the utmost secrecy.

The framers of every peace treaty are always guided by "sacred" principles by which their final settlement, despite the number of its compromises, is justified before the public. In 1919, it was the right to national self-determination; in 1815, it was the principle of legitimacy. Cleverly framed by Talleyrand to defend the restoration of the Bourbons in France, this principle of legitimacy was capable of wide application. It meant both the restoration of "legitimate" monarchs and the re-establishment of their "legitimate" frontiers. This objective was kept in mind, but out of sheer necessity or deliberate intention it was frequently compromised. After all, practical considerations demanded that "legitimacy" must not exclude "compensations" to those powers which had sacrificed their manpower and resources to save Europe from the Napoleonic scourge; nor that it prevent the establishment of a *cordon sanitaire*, a ring of strong buffer states about France, to prevent that power from again becoming a menace to Europe.

The necessity of adapting the principle of legitimacy to that of compensations appeared early in the deliberations, and after one compromise had been made, a long succession of others could not be avoided. Prussia and Russia entered the Congress with an agreement by which Prussia was to be allowed the whole of the Kingdom of Saxony in return for Russia's right to incorporate the whole of the old Kingdom of Poland. Apart from the peoples to be disposed of in this cavalier fashion, there were serious objections on the part of the Great Powers, not because they resented bartering of territory but because they feared that Russia might become too powerful. A sharp conflict developed in the Congress, and for a time there was danger of war among the victors, with England and Austria lined up against Prussia and Russia. By artful diplomacy, Talleyrand was able to play the honest broker, winning a position for France in the Congress, and effecting a satisfactory compromise for the disputants. Prussia was allowed to take two-fifths of Saxony, while Russia absorbed most of Poland except for Posen and the "corridor" which were left to Prussia, and most of Galicia which was left to Austria. As further compensation, Prussia was permitted to absorb Westphalia, Pomerania, and provinces in the Rhineland; and Russia was confirmed in the possession of Finland. Since Finland and Pomerania had been taken from Sweden, who had aided the allies against France, she was allowed to compensate herself by taking the Kingdom of Norway.

Norway belonged to Denmark, it is true, but the powers felt justified in giving it away since the Danish sovereign had courted the favor of Napoleon.

To compensate Austria for her services as well as for her sacrifices of territory elsewhere in the common interest, she was given Lombardy and Venetia in northern Italy, the Illyrian provinces, and was allowed to set up Hapsburg rulers in Tuscany, Parma, and Modena. Besides, as will be explained later, she was given paramount influence in the German Confederation which the Congress established.

Courtesy of The Pierpont Morgan Library

AUSTRIAN DOUBLE EAGLE, FROM CHARLES V'S BOOK OF HOURS.

The insignia of the imperial Hapsburg family of Austria.

The Netherlands and Savoy on the French frontier were enlarged so that they might serve more effectively as buffer states, Savoy being permitted to annex the Republic of Genoa, and the Netherlands to incorporate the Austrian provinces (Belgium) together with other minor acquisitions. The independence of Switzerland was confirmed and its permanent neutrality ensured, while across the Spanish frontier the Bourbons were restored.

England was generously recompensed with colonies. Along with the French and Spanish trading posts which she had occupied during the war, she was permitted among other notable acquisitions to take South Africa, Ceylon, and a share of Guiana from the Dutch, and the island of Heligoland from Denmark.

The most complicated of all the territorial problems to be resolved by the Congress related to the Italian peninsula and to the German countries. In both of these areas the changes wrought by Napoleon had been so profound and the principle of compensations so extensively applied, that legitimate restoration in most cases was quite impossible. In Italy, for example, Genoa had completely disappeared, Lombardy-Venetia had been brought within the frontiers of the Hapsburg Empire, and the three important central duchies had been placed under Hapsburg rulers. Elsewhere, however, the old order

was revived. The Bourbons recovered the throne of the Two Sicilies, the Papal States were re-established, and the legitimate dynasty in Savoy restored.

The problem of the Germanies was infinitely more complicated. Before the Revolution, there had been some three hundred sovereign states loosely bound together in the aged and impotent Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon had destroyed this institution, reduced the number of states, and reshuffled their territories. To redraw the map in accordance with what once had been would have been a fruitless and utterly hopeless task; indeed it would have been impossible, for the more powerful families who profited from the changes were in no mood to give up what they acquired, while the lesser princes who had lost out lacked the means of persuasion. The Napoleonic settlement was therefore largely accepted. Thirty-eight independent states of the Germanies were recognized, and these, by common agreement, were loosely bound together in the German Confederation, operating as a unit through a Diet, presided over by Austria, and composed of the delegates of the reigning princes. Though the sovereignty of each of these states was, in general, unlimited, none was to enter an alliance with a foreign power against the Confederation as a whole or any of its members. This settlement was placed under the guarantee of the powers signatory to the Vienna Act. None of the arrangements which the Congress made reflects more clearly than this the degree to which "restored" Europe differed from the model of 1789.

Many of the deficiencies of the peace of 1815 are readily apparent. The principle of nationalism had been flouted at a time that was certainly no longer wise, and even the milder forms of liberalism which the Revolution had advanced and which many had experienced for nearly a quarter of a century were completely ignored. These failures had to be rectified. But on the whole the peace of Vienna was no worse than most treaties of peace and, judged by the standards of the times, it was a success. At least its settlement made for a reasonably stable Europe for half a century.

Having "restored" Europe, Metternich and the other statesmen in power determined, in the usual fashion, to preserve their handiwork for posterity. For this purpose, the victorious powers entered into two solemn engagements before they set their seal upon the final act of Vienna. The first of these, the creature of Czar Alexander I's flighty imagination, was the Holy Alliance. According to this extraordinary document, the sovereigns of Austria, Prussia, and Russia obligated themselves in holy bond to apply, in their dealings with

each other and with their subjects, the precepts of Christianity, to protect religion, foster peace, defend justice, and preserve the sacred institution of monarchy. No one took this seriously: the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns agreed only to please the personal fancy of the Czar, and even so were roundly reprimanded by the pope for having anything to do with a schismatic, and the British steadfastly refused to join. But in the popular mind this Holy Alliance was confused with the really important Quadruple Alliance, which was the active working agreement by which the victors aimed to preserve the status quo. This was signed by Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria at Vienna, and was renewed after Waterloo with the added proviso that the signatories would meet occasionally in international congresses to consult on the state of affairs and to keep watch over the settlement they had arranged. With this latter agreement, there was called into being the nebulous organization, known as the "Concert of Europe" through which the status quo was to be preserved.[1]

It was Metternich's determination that this Concert should operate not simply for the purpose of excluding the Bonapartes from France and forestalling new revolution there, as the others wished, but also for the purpose of destroying incipient liberalism wherever it might rear its head. Consequently, after the first Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) at which France fulfilled her last obligations under the treaties and was admitted to the Concert, Metternich proposed that the Powers henceforth devote themselves to the suppression of revolutionary movements within particular countries. The British Foreign Minister, Lord Castlereagh, objected to this because the policing of Europe was contrary to British interests, but the other members approved. In the subsequent international congresses, therefore, (Troppau, Laibach, and Verona in 1820, 1821, and 1822 respectively) the Concert, without Britain's assistance, devised and carried out plans for intervening in the internal affairs of countries to prevent the spread of liberal contagion. The nature of these undertakings was clearly defined in a document agreed upon at the Congress of Troppau and known as the Troppau Protocol, in which it was asserted that any state in which a change of government was effected through revolution dangerous to the other nations should be excluded from the family of nations until order and stability had been restored. This principle was applied on several occasions, but as will be seen, with diminishing success, and soon had to be abandoned. Yet, for the time

[1] Actually the beginning of the Concert can be traced to article V of the Treaty of Chaumont (1814).



MAP 28 THE VIENNA SETTLEMENT

being, it served Metternich's purposes well, facilitating his efforts to keep the lid on in Germany and Italy as well as in Austria.

In his own country, Metternich encountered little or no difficulty in making it the model of what he considered sound government should be. Trade languished for want of encouragement, and the feudal system was largely preserved so that "liberals" were few and easily hunted down. Such agitators as there were, were promptly jailed, and among the minority peoples where nationalist insurrections threatened, troops were quartered. To keep out dangerous and infectious ideas a ban was placed upon travel, and all in-coming literature was rigidly censored. Austria, so to speak, was hermetically sealed from the outside world.

The problem in Germany was a good deal more difficult, but through the Diet of the Confederation which Austria controlled, Metternich had an instrument powerful enough to hold liberalism in check for some time. There were a number of liberals in Germany, especially in University circles, who resented oppression and conservatism, and hopefully anticipated the establishment of constitutional governments, even of a united and liberal Germany. Their agitation was centered in a student society, the *Burschenschaft*, founded originally at Jena during the Napoleonic era and subsequently extended to a number of German universities. Poorly organized, uncertain in its leadership and direction, this society nevertheless struck terror into conservative hearts when at a national convention at Jena in 1817 it conducted a mild demonstration against reaction. The subsequent assassination of a prominent reactionary two years later by a demented student who had been a *Burschenschafter* offered an appropriate excuse to destroy the society and eliminate the possibility of all further revolutionary activity. Metternich acted promptly; with the collaboration of the great states, he persuaded the Diet to issue the Carlsbad Decrees, introducing the methods he was already employing in Austria into the Germanies. The universities were placed under strict supervision, students were expelled if suspected of treasonable activities, liberal instructors were removed, and the press was rigidly censored. Student societies were outlawed, constitutions and even constitutional terms of foreign extraction were forbidden, and a special police system was set up with power to arrest any individual, regardless of his citizenship. The application of these decrees drove the liberals under cover and helped considerably in putting off the day of liberal revolutions.

Metternich was equally successful in Italy, especially in Lom-

bardy-Venetia and in the Hapsburg dominated duchies, but also in the other states. Indeed, in some instances the enthusiasm of the returned princes in turning back the clock was of such proportions that even Metternich was persuaded to give counsels of moderation. In Piedmont (Kingdom of Sardinia), for example, the aged Victor Emmanuel I went so far in destroying all remnants of hated French reforms that he had the gas lighting system of Turin torn out and the French botanical gardens uprooted. Papal procedure in the pontifical states was even worse, so odious and so deplorable that Metternich recoiled before it, but at that it hardly surpassed the excesses of reaction in the Kingdom of Naples. King Ferdinand I who had been restored to his throne was almost incredibly ignorant and detestable, and a reactionary tyrant of the first order. Thus the whole of Italy was outwardly reactionary. But beneath the surface, liberal revolution seethed, beginning in Naples, where it culminated in 1820. The king accepted a constitution, solemnly swore to protect it, and then with characteristic duplicity turned to Metternich and the Concert for aid. It was not long in coming. At the Congress of Troppau, Austria was commissioned to restore "order" in Naples, and Ferdinand marched back at the head of an Austrian army to occupy once more an absolute throne. While these events transpired in Naples, Piedmont also experienced a revolution which ended with the abdication of Victor Emmanuel and the proclamation of a constitution. This was of short duration, however, and conservative government in Piedmont soon resumed its usual course. Thus liberalism in Italy as well as in Germany had so far been successfully combatted.

Metternich's system, so uniformly applied in central Europe and in Italy, was not slavishly copied in France, there, practical necessities counseled moderation. In the first place, it would have been most unwise to try to supplant liberal reforms to which the people had grown accustomed through a quarter century of experience. Moreover, complete restoration of the old order would have been stoutly resisted by peasants and bourgeoisie, upon whose support the Bourbon dynasty depended. Louis XVIII (1815-1824) was too much aware of all this to allow his reactionary friends and advisers a free hand. As he put it, he had no desire to resume his travels, especially since his great weight made traveling unusually difficult; and he was certain that flight would be necessary unless a policy of moderation were pursued.

Consequently, when he set foot upon French soil again, Louis issued a Constitution, in deference to those of liberal persuasion. It

was scarcely a liberal document, but at that it was more advanced than any other except Poland's. The Constitutional Charter, as it was called, made it clear that the constitution had been given the people as a gift by the king, that sovereignty was concentrated in his person and not in the least shared with his subjects. It provided for a bicameral legislature, a Chamber of Peers to be appointed by the king, and a Chamber of Deputies, which through provision of a subsequent election law was to be elected from a restricted voting public of approximately a hundred thousand. This legislature was empowered to discuss laws proposed by the king, but was not allowed to amend them. In this fashion, Louis confirmed the principle of representative government established by the revolution. At the same time he adopted its religious freedom and civil equality, and took over in entirety many of the administrative reforms and institutions of the Napoleonic era.

The reactionary nobility and clergy immediately raised a vehement storm of protest, and when Louis refused to retract, they instituted a Terror of considerable proportions. For several months they conducted bloody uprisings in the country and arbitrarily executed liberal "traitors." In the midst of these activities, the first elections under the Charter were held with the result that, by means of inspiring fear in the electorate, the extreme reactionaries, or ultra-royalists, gained control of the Chamber of Deputies. Fearful that these extremists might soon undo everything, Louis dissolved the Chamber early the next year and called for new elections.

His hope that moderate royalists, sympathetic with the Charter and with his policies of conciliation, would be returned, was entirely fulfilled. For the next four years the government pursued a course which was mildly but nevertheless distinctly liberal. Electoral privileges were somewhat extended, rigid censorship of the press was relaxed, and measures adopted to bring about the nation's early acceptance into the family of nations. With this type of government all but the extreme liberals and extreme reactionaries were prepared to cooperate.

In 1820, however, the period of moderation ended abruptly with the assassination of the Duke of Berry, a member of the royal family. The ultra-royalists were once more catapulted into power and hastily sought to undo the liberal reforms. The liberal electoral law was rescinded, the censorship of the press restored, guarantees of individual liberty were suspended, the educational system was placed more firmly under the control of the clergy, and an elaborate system

of espionage installed to suppress all liberal and revolutionary activities. So firmly had they implanted themselves in power that in 1823 the ultra-royalists were able to persuade the king to dispatch to Spain a French army, commissioned to suppress revolution there in true Metternichian style. The ultras did not yet seriously attempt to restore the properties and the privileges of the clergy and the nobility, but in 1824 when the moderate Louis XVIII died, they were well entrenched. Under Louis' successor, Charles X, they became more bold, and sealed their fate as well as his.

The intervention of French arms in Spain to restore "order" represented the high water mark of international reaction on the continent. After the Napoleonic troops had retreated from the peninsula, Ferdinand VII of Bourbon had been restored to power. Cruel, odious, and deceitful, Ferdinand aimed to stamp out every trace of liberalism and to that end, gagged the press, restored the Inquisition, and persecuted suspects at every opportunity. His procedure was no more enlightened than that of his relative, the Bourbon king of Naples. While he indulged in reaction, the empire which he had inherited melted away before his eyes; one by one the colonies in Central and South America raised the banner of revolt, and with the sympathetic approval of Great Britain and the United States, declared their independence. To restore what had already been lost and to prevent the further spread of infection, Ferdinand determined to despatch an expeditionary force to the New World. In 1819, troops were gathered at Cadiz for that purpose, but the paucity of their equipment and the unseaworthiness of the boats which were to convey them, inspired a mutiny. In January, 1820, the king was faced with a military revolution which spread with such rapidity that by March he felt compelled to grant a constitution. Adopting the usual tactics, he vowed to defend this document and to advance with the liberals "along the constitutional path" but at the same time he consulted with the powers to restore him his absolutism. In 1822, this appeal was acted upon at the Congress of Verona which commissioned France to carry out the measures necessary to stamp out revolutionary government in Spain. Next year a hundred thousand French troops crossed the Spanish frontier and marched to Madrid. The Cortes, as the representative constitutional body had been called, was disbanded, the constitution was revoked, and Ferdinand VII restored.

This intervention in Spain created profound misgivings in both Great Britain and the United States where it was feared the Powers might now be encouraged to undertake the restoration of the Spanish

Empire as well. This did not create a pleasant prospect for British traders who profited by the absence of Spanish dominion in the colonies, and it made Americans apprehensive lest success in restoring the Spanish Empire lead sometime to an attempted restoration of the British Empire. Having common interests in the matter, the United States and Great Britain co-operated to forestall such an enterprise. They recognized the independence of the states which had already revolted and then finished their defiance with the issuance of the Monroe Doctrine (presented by President James Monroe in 1823). Though this was a statement of American policy, it was made with the knowledge and the approval of the British government, and it asserted categorically "that we should consider any attempt on their part [the Powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." In the face of such opposition, all hope that "liberalism" beyond the seas might be suppressed had to be abandoned. This was the first serious rebuff administered to the Concert of conservative continental powers. It was soon followed by others.

At the very time that French troops were marching into Spain, a national revolution of the Greek peoples, which could not be suppressed in the usual way, was already well advanced. Organized by a patriotic secret society, the *Hetairia Philike*, this quickly spread throughout the whole of the Greek mainland and the Greek islands. The Turkish governors resisted with brutal savagery, more than matching that of the revolutionaries, but they met with steady reverses. From every state in Europe, from people of liberal and conservative persuasion alike, volunteers were organized to help the Greek cause. Popular feeling here cut the line which divided Europe into liberal and conservative. The Sultan of Turkey, faced with this mounting opposition in Greece, called to his aid his able ally and vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt. The tactics followed by Mehemet and his son Ibrahim aroused the fresh indignation of Europe, and in 1827 Great Britain, France, and Russia, completely ignoring the Metternichian principles, combined to bring about a satisfactory settlement. Mutual rivalries badly divided these allies, but in 1829 an independent Greek kingdom was recognized, and three years later it was provided with a constitutional monarch, Prince Otto of Bavaria. This was another failure for the Metternichian system.

Meanwhile, the Belgian people successfully revolted against the conservative and irritating government of the Dutch king, William I. They had resented union with the Netherlands from the first, but it

was not until they had been goaded by shortsighted policies and inspired by successful revolution elsewhere that they took matters into their own hands and declared their independence in October, 1830.

These were by no means the only victories for liberalism and nationalism in their contest with the conservatives. Indeed, by the time Belgian independence was declared and Greek constitutional monarchy established, a revolution in France put an end to the extreme reaction which had set in there after 1824, and this was followed by similar if less successful revolutions elsewhere. These will all be discussed in a later connection. At this point, it is only necessary to remember that by 1823 conservatism was already in retreat, and that thereafter the Metternichian system suffered steady decline. A new compromise between the old and the new was clearly in the process of formation.

C. The British oligarchy

Although Great Britain's insularity saved her from many of the sights and sounds of the Revolution and the Napoleonic era, it could not prevent either the infiltration of the spirit of change or the reaction which that engendered. The old order, battling stubbornly for existence, slowly gave way to a new, but it was a long process and one marked by bitterness, strife, and much suffering both physical and mental. The result, as always, was a compromise between the traditional and the novel.

It will be remembered that Britain of the late eighteenth century was an oligarchy, governed by and for the wealthy, landed minority. Agriculture was the basis of life, with more than three-quarters of the population drawing their sustenance directly from the soil. Cities were few, and the village, "a string of thatched cottages on a single street," was the usual unit of corporate existence. Life was simple and provincial. Each village sought and partially attained self-sufficiency. Industry was in the domestic stage. Farming still followed medieval practice. In short, change seemed unlikely and far away.

Almost all life was dominated by the landed gentry and the Anglican Church to which most of them belonged. Ownership of land was the only entree to society, and, until 1820, to the House of Lords also. The aristocracy was strikingly homogeneous, due chiefly to the similarity of the education of its members. Sons of the landed gentry customarily received their first training from tutors, then went on to the "public schools" such as Eton or Harrow, and concluded their scho-

lastic training at either Oxford or Cambridge. Then followed, usually, a "Grand Tour" of the capitals of Europe to round off the educational process. Most of the gentry lived on their estates as country squires, spending their time in hunting, riding, drinking, and, paradoxically, in public service. The typical squire was a justice of the peace who took his public duties very seriously. It should be added that with his other virtues and faults, the aristocrat was likely also to be a generous patron of the arts.

As justices, deriving their power from their ownership of land as much as from the royal appointment, and as administrators, the squirarchy dominated local politics. As for national politics, that too was the preserve of this group. Ministries and cabinets were chosen from it, and high officials both in the military services and in the church were ordinarily to the manor born. The House of Lords was its stronghold and the House of Commons its generally obedient agent.

The Established Church was Anglican, state-supported by tithes paid by all. Catholics and Dissenters, the latter found mostly in the commercial and lower classes, were hampered by restrictive laws. They could not legally hold any important offices, and until 1829, Catholics were excluded from Parliament. The universities were closed to them, the only marriage legally recognized by the state was that performed by the Established Church, and in many other ways non-Anglicans were legally bound to an inferior place.

British history from Vienna to the accession of Victoria in 183- lends itself to division into four periods. The first, 1815-1822, was one of extreme conservatism; the second, 1822-1828, saw the beginning of reforms; the third, 1828-1830, was again reactionary; but the fourth, 1830-1837, witnessed the triumph of bourgeois reforms. There was, of course, some overlapping but, by and large, those were the dominant characteristics of each period.

As usually happens during a war, there had been a false prosperity in Great Britain in the first decade and a half of the nineteenth century. Prices were inflated, business was overexpanded, speculation rife, and profiteering common. The price of grain, for example, rose to a high of 120 shillings a quarter-ton, and food prices soared. Again as usual, a few men amassed great riches at the expense of the rest. Benefits were not equally shared. In the case of agriculture, the landlord profited but the laborer did not. This was due mostly to the operation of the Speenhamland System. Its theory was excellent: if wages were insufficient, the laborer would receive enough from the

state to give him a living wage. But what happened was that many employers reduced wages in order to shift the burden to the state. Relief costs rose steeply from £2,500,000 in 1795 to £5,400,000 in 1815, and labor remained largely dependent upon charity.

On the other hand, when peace brought deflation—grain fell to a low of sixty shillings a quarter between 1814 and 1817—labor, which had not shared prosperity, was made to share adversity. The class-conscious Parliament came to the aid of the landlords with the Corn[1] Laws of 1815 and 1828 which attempted to peg the price of grain at an artificial high. The first Corn Law forbade the import of grain until the price of domestic grain reached ten shillings a bushel. The second established a sliding scale tariff, high when English grain prices were low and gradually decreasing as the price rose. The effect was to create an artificial scarcity and so keep up the cost of food. Once more, it was the poor who suffered particularly because the landlords sought to protect themselves by lowering wages and reducing the number employed. Much the same thing happened in industry. When peace shut off the abnormal war-time demands, manufacturers found the market glutted and their plants overexpanded. Prices tumbled, that of iron, for example, dropping from £20 to £8 a ton between 1815 and 1818. Many were forced into bankruptcy, and those who were left, cut wages and reduced their staffs. Wage disputes and unemployment both in agriculture and industry brought riots and disorders.

To make matters worse, the strain of war had increased the national debt to what was then regarded as the staggering total of £850,000,000.[2] Relief costs kept mounting, the more so since the ending of the war threw some 300,000 soldiers and sailors onto the already overcrowded labor market. Taxes, of course, had to be raised, but the ruling Tories protected themselves. The income tax, which had been used during the war, was repealed in 1816 with a resulting increase in the burdens laid upon the poor. In short, Great Britain had both won and lost the war. Napoleon was in exile, and peace was restored, Britain was mistress of the seas and the most powerful nation in Europe, but her own house was in disorder.

Secure in power were the strongly conservative Tories. George III, his bid for authority long since ended, occupied the throne, although from 1810 until his death in 1820 he was so incompetent as to

[1] "Corn" in England means wheat, in Scotland and Ireland, oats. What Americans and Australians refer to as corn is spoken of as Indian corn or maize by the British.

[2] The public debt in 1937 was £7,797,200,000.

require a regent. Lord Liverpool, to whom change and reform were things to be avoided like the plague, was prime minister, and his Cabinet was composed of like-minded men. In opposition more or less violent were the extremists of the left, chief among them Owen, Place, Cobbett, Hunt, and Thistlewood. Robert Owen, wealthy, idealistic, not only transformed his mills at New Lanark in Scotland into a model factory and community with higher wages, shorter hours, and better housing for his workers, but he was also the earnest champion of protective legislation for labor. Francis Place, a tailor of London, organized labor unions and effectively lobbied for labor legislation. William Cobbett, ex-plowboy, ex-soldier, ex-Tory pamphleteer, made his newspaper, *The Weekly Political Register*, the voice of the poor. Its low price made it widely available, its lucid and pungent style gave it popularity. Not a supporter of violence himself, Cobbett's constant and vigorous attacks upon the status quo frequently excited others to violence. Of lesser stature were "Orator" Hunt, demagogue and rabble-rouser, and Arthur Thistlewood, author of the "Cato Street Conspiracy" (1820), a plot to kill the Cabinet.

The radicalism of these leaders, and the frequency of agrarian and industrial riots, frightened the middle class into a temporary union with the aristocratic Tories. They confused demands for reform with incitement to revolution, and they answered with harsh repression. The *Habeas Corpus* Act was suspended (1816), spies and informers made their appearance, and severe punishment was meted out to agitators. A mass meeting, held in connection with a strike in the cotton mills at Manchester, was brutally dispersed by the local authorities whose action was promptly approved by the government. Ironically termed the Peterloo Massacre, to mark its contrast with the Battle of Waterloo, this disturbance led the government to pass the notorious gag laws known as the Six Acts (1819). These forbade public meetings, established a rigid censorship of the press, and momentarily quieted demands for reform.

The death in 1820 of the aged and insane George III brought to the throne his son, the ill-reputed George IV (1820-1830) who had acted as regent during the last ten years of his father's life. His vicious attempt to divorce his queen, Caroline, so irritated the people that his ministers were forced into making some concessions in the form of reducing expenditures. Gradually a trend toward reform became apparent. Castlereagh, the brilliant and able foreign minister who had become the popular symbol of repression, committed sui-

cide in 1822 and his place was taken by the more popular but no more able George Canning. It was he who withdrew Great Britain from the Concert of Europe and gave support to the nationalistic revolutions in Latin America and in Greece. Associated with him in the reorganized cabinet were the more liberal Tories, William Huskisson and Sir Robert Peel. Huskisson, as president of the Board of Trade, secured modification of the old Navigation Acts, opened colonial ports to foreign traders, and established a system of colonial preference in tariffs which favored British goods in the colonies and *vice versa*. With the co-operation of the chancellor of the exchequer, he abolished export and reduced import duties, and with the aid of Canning, he negotiated reciprocal trade treaties with foreign countries. The humanitarian Peel, as home secretary, reformed the excessively harsh criminal code, improved the penal system, and ended the persecution of the radical press. Under the influence of Place, laws forbidding the unionization of labor were repealed only to be partially re-enacted the next year following an epidemic of strikes. In this, and even more in the reforms of Huskisson, the growing influence of the commercial and industrial plutocracy is apparent. Returning prosperity, in part cyclic, in part due to the new policies, brought better times and less radicalism. The alliance of the middle class and the aristocracy tended to dissolve. It seemed a day of change, but the old-line High Tories were not yet silenced or convinced.

The retirement of Liverpool, the death of Canning who succeeded him, and the ineffectuality of his successor led to the formation of a ministry in 1828 by Wellington, the "Iron Duke." A good general but a poor statesman, Wellington at first sought to turn back the clock, then beat an undignified retreat when his position proved untenable. His first action alienated the liberal elements even of his own Tory Party; the second alienated the ultra-conservatives. The major issue of his ministry was the religious and political disabilities which ancient acts placed upon Dissenters and Catholics. In large measure these old laws had been allowed to become inoperative, but their existence was a constant threat and an offense against justice and tolerance which ill-accorded with the spirit of reform. Finally, against the protests of the timid conservatives, the Test and Corporations Act, which had excluded Dissenters from public office, was repealed soon after Wellington came to power. Immediately there arose an agitation for relief of the Catholics from laws which prevented their sitting in Parliament. Under the leadership

of the ambitious and nationalistic Irishman, Daniel O'Connell, a Catholic Association was formed in Ireland. Its growth was rapid and, to the English conservative, very disquieting. O'Connell's adherents elected him to Parliament in which he was legally forbidden to sit, and the issue was joined. Enforcement of the old law would probably have brought a civil war. With bad grace, George IV and Wellington yielded, and the Catholic Emancipation Act, opening most of the offices of the state to Catholics, was passed in 1829. However, a joker in the act disfranchised some 190,000 Irishmen by raising the property qualifications for suffrage from 40 to 200 shillings. It was a typically shortsighted move which angered the Irish and led to an agitation for self-government.

The fourth period, 1830-1837, began with the death of the fourth George which brought not only the accession of a new king, William IV, but also forced the election of a new Parliament. Wellington paid both for his basic conservatism and his grudging acceptance of the inevitable by losing fifty seats in Parliament to the Whigs. A depression which again plunged the working classes into hardship and violent despair, roused middle class fears of a social revolution. At the same time, the successful bourgeois revolution in France (1830) gave them courage to seek reforms for their own benefit. Wellington and his Tories were out of step with the times, and, his slim majority gone, the Iron Duke was forced to resign in 1830. A Whig cabinet, headed by Lord Grey, took office, and under strong pressure from public opinion, moved toward a long-discussed, badly needed reform of the British government.

Early in 1831, Lord John Russell introduced into the Commons a bill calling for a redistribution of seats in Parliament and an extension of the rights of suffrage. For a year and a quarter the fight was on. Dissolution of Parliament and a new election gave the Whigs a big majority and a clear mandate for reform. The Commons accepted the bill only to have the Lords summarily reject it. Widespread disorder gave evidence of the popular discontent. Again the Commons passed the bill. This time Wellington and his cohorts sought to amend it out of existence. Tension in the country grew apace. Revolt was in the air. For the second time the ministry resigned, and Wellington tried unsuccessfully to form another. The country would not have it. Wellington resigned and back came Grey. In his pocket was William's written promise to create enough new peers, pledged to support the bill, to ensure its passage by the upper house. That threat sufficed. Wellington and his cohorts, unwilling

to accept, not daring to reject, withdrew, and the small group of Lords left sitting accepted the Great Reform Bill in July, 1832.

More than the Revolution of 1830 in France, the British Reform Bill of 1832 marked a new era. Most of the rotten and pocket boroughs were eliminated, and the sections which had grown populous with urbanization and industrialism were given more nearly adequate representation. In both borough and county, the franchise was extended so that an estimated one out of every thirty Englishmen was given the right to vote.[1] The power of the landed gentry was thus reduced while that of the upper urban bourgeoisie was greatly increased. The working class, to its chagrin, especially since it felt correctly that its agitation was partially responsible for the passage of the bill, was scarcely affected at all. The Reform Bill, in short, was not by any means a democratic measure but it was a step which led in that direction. It made pre-eminent the House of Commons, and led directly to the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie who were there entrenched. Within half a generation they had won control of the government from the landed oligarchy which had ruled England for more than a century.

The Great Reform was soon followed by other reforms, political, social, and economic. The Scottish Burgh Act (1833) gave Scotland the first popularly elected municipal governments it had had since the fifteenth century; and the Municipal Corporations Act (1835) established democratic, local self-government in the English cities. A growing humanitarianism and social conscience, as well as a changing economic system, was reflected by the emancipation of slaves, with compensation paid to their owners by the government (1833), and by the first effective Factory Act which was passed the same year. The latter was the work of three Tories, Sadler, Oastler, and Ashley whose constant agitation finally forced the Whig Parliament to provide for the limitation of child labor. The act only partially cured the abuses, but it was a good beginning and a precedent frequently followed thereafter. The final great socio-economic reform of the Whigs was the Poor Law of 1834. The Speenhamland System had proven costly and subject to serious abuse both by employers and by recipients of relief. The reform measure sought to curb costs and cut down the relief rolls by treating poverty as a crime. The dole was stopped, and to get public aid one had to become the inmate of a workhouse where treatment was deliberately

[1] The French Revolution of 1830 enfranchised one out of every two hundred.

made harsh in order to encourage people to stay out of them. It was a drastic remedy and it earned the hatred of the lower classes.

With these reforms, the Whigs, and Parliament, settled back in a rather smug complacency, broken during the succeeding generation only by various factory acts, by the repeal of the Corn Laws, and by the proletarian movement known as Chartism.[1] Commercial bourgeoisie and landed aristocrat contentedly co-operated in the maintenance of the status quo, serene in the prosperity which marked the long reign of Victoria (1837-1901), niece and successor of William IV.

Although her accession cost England Hanover, somewhat to the relief of British statesmen who had found it an embarrassing hostage to fate, the girl-queen did not lack for empire. Scotland and Wales, thoroughly habituated to union, were integral parts of the United Kingdom. Ireland, nationalistic, smolderingly rebellious and sporadically insurrectionary, was relatively quiet. But the bulk of Britain's empire lay across the seas. On the far side of the earth was Australia, discovered by the Dutch in 1645, rediscovered and claimed by the English explorer, Captain James Cook in 1769-70. Used originally as a convict station, Australia soon attracted other settlers and by the year of Victoria's enthronement, Britain had four organized colonies there.[2] Neighbor to Australia was New Zealand, also discovered by the Dutch and rediscovered by Cook. Settled by casuals and missionaries between 1795 and 1837, the islands were annexed to Great Britain in 1840. India, won for Britain by Clive at Plassey, had been a property of the East India Company until 1784 when an act of Parliament subjected the company to partial control by the government. This somewhat anomalous situation continued until a serious revolt at the beginning of the second decade of Victoria's reign resulted in control of India being transferred to the Crown and Parliament.[3] By that time the original British holdings had been expanded until virtually all of the great peninsula was either owned outright by the British or controlled by them through acquiescent native princes. It may be noted, as a clue to British interest, that India in that period took ten percent of all Britain's exports and 33 1/3 percent of the output of the Lancashire cotton mills.

[1] For a discussion of the labor legislation see Chapter XXIII; Corn Law repeal and Chartism are treated in Chapter XXIV.

[2] They were: New South Wales (1788), Tasmania (1825), Western Australia (1829), and South Australia (1836). Victoria was organized in 1851 and Queensland in 1859.

[3] The revolt was the Sepoy Mutiny (1857) and the change in status was effected by an Act for the Better Government of India (1858).

The Napoleonic Wars and the Vienna Settlement had also enriched Britain by the addition of the Cape of Good Hope, which gave her the nucleus of an empire in South Africa; Ceylon and Mauritius in the Pacific; Tobago, Trinidad, St. Lucia, and Guiana in the Caribbean area, rounding out her West Indian holdings; Malta in the Mediterranean; and Heligoland in the North Sea.

Finally, of course, there were the provinces to the north and east of the United States: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward's Island, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Upper and Lower Canada. The migration of Loyalists as a consequence of the American Revolution had made these provinces definitely and somewhat defiantly British. The Anglo-American War of 1812 had an effect at once similar and dissimilar. The threat of American expansion tended to make the Canadians more conscious of their British connection upon which they were dependent for protection, but at the same time, their loyal support of the mother country marked their first real co-operative action as a united Canada, thus increasing the development of a national consciousness. This led to a cresceive demand by the Canadians for responsible self-government.[1] In the year of Victoria's accession, abortive and ill-led minority rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada roused the British government to the need for action. Lord Durham, a liberal Whig, was sent to investigate the situation, and his report led directly to the union of the two Canadas, and indirectly to the granting of responsible government. The latter was finally achieved in 1849 under the governorship of Lord Elgin. Meanwhile a change in British economic policy, foreshadowed by the reforms of Huskisson, had resulted in loosening the economic ties of empire and promoting Canadian-American intimacy. Any fears that this would lead to American expansion at Canadian expense or with Canadian co-operation were dispelled by the British North America Act of 1867 which united Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec (Lower Canada), and Ontario (Upper Canada), into the Dominion of Canada.

In brief reprise, when on that June morning more than a century ago, the girl Victoria was aroused from her sleep to be told that she was now Victoria Regina, Great Britain had already experienced a quasi-revolution. The political and social monopoly of the landed, Anglican aristocrat had been successfully challenged by the increas-

[1] Until mid-century, the provinces were ruled by a governor appointed by the colonial office, assisted by councils of his appointment. The elective assemblies, which were the lower houses of the legislature, had relatively little power.

ingly powerful plutocracy. Parliament had ceased to be the tool of the one and was on its way to being the voice of the other. The traditional mercantilism was slowly yielding to the free-trade demands of the classes to whom the world was a market. And Englishmen could already boast of an empire upon which the sun never set.

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The Mechanization of Life

A. The foundations of cosmopolitanism

Few aspects of the development of western society are more intriguing than the ways and means by which men broadened their horizons, literally and figuratively, and in seeming paradox, shrunk the world by bringing its many peoples into closer contact. The story is long, for it has been a continuous thread in the human pattern. It is also complex and, to him who would tell it in short compass, somewhat appalling in its ramifications. Treating it as a whole does violence to chronology but it does emphasize the element of continuity. Of the many possible approaches, we have chosen the broad ones of the growth of cosmopolitanism and the increasing mechanization of life.

In many respects men are today members of a cosmopolitan world society. If Hitler goes to Berchtesgaden, the citizens of Kansas, of Capetown, of Tokyo, will know of it within twenty-four hours and all of them, more or less simultaneously, will speculate upon its significance. At his table modern man may enjoy the tea of India or the coffee of Brazil, and perishable delicacies from the most remote regions of the earth; he may ride in an automobile which has been manufactured from materials imported from many distant lands; and if he so desires he may talk directly with most of the world by telephone. These are things so common in our daily lives that we seldom realize that they are of recent origin. Yet much less than a century ago men remained ignorant of the events in their own locality longer than we do now of events in the entire world; and their material existence was determined largely by the produce of their own communities. Economically, intellectually, and indeed politically, the bonds of human interdependence appear to be tightening steadily.

It is impossible to ascribe this transition to any single circum-

stance; it is the consequence of accumulating scientific knowledge, of constantly improving systems of communication, of mechanized industrial production, and all of those other factors in civilization's advance which have contributed to the slow conquest of time and space. The mountain barrier and the swift-running river once cut off peoples from contacts with those beyond and forced them into isolation. The mountain is now tunneled from beneath and crossed above by radio waves; the river has been bridged. The ocean is no longer a forbidding obstruction but a ready means for the communication of ideas and the transportation of goods.

A fundamental prerequisite to cosmopolitan, as distinguished from localized, society would appear to be trade and commerce, stimulating mutual understanding or possibly mutual antipathy, but in any case establishing a degree of economic interdependence. The existence of this on a fairly extensive scale is what distinguished ancient from medieval society; its great revival and extension in modern and contemporary times has helped to make our era unique. For medieval men, necessary contacts with the outside world were reduced to a minimum, and what happened beyond the confines of the manor was more than likely to be a matter of small concern. By contrast, Greece and Rome had been cosmopolitan. Life depended to a substantial extent upon the trade of the Mediterranean and isolation was neither possible nor practical. It is much less so today.

Significantly enough, however, the world-scale economy has not produced a cosmopolitan political and cultural society. The odd fact is that this was most nearly approximated in the period of medieval localism under the ægis of the Church. Yet at those times when the interchange of goods and ideas has been freest, when men have been able to project themselves beyond the limits of their own locality, there has always prevailed the hope of achieving a veritable world society. The Stoics of the Hellenistic and Roman ages envisioned this and conceived themselves to be "citizens of the world." During the eighteenth century, when the broadening effects of great geographical and economic expansion had borne in upon the intellectual world, and when science had postulated a natural order for men, this humanitarian faith was strengthened. The men of the Enlightenment also considered themselves to be "citizens of the world" and, so far as their intellectual labors were concerned, acted as though they were members of a great international republic of letters. Many of them scorned nationalism as an obstacle to the attainment of a

world society, and, in the final analysis, believed all men brothers. During the nineteenth century their faith in the rationality of men and in the imminence of a world society gave way to increasing skepticism and a rising confidence in the virtues of nationalism. But this did not mean that the hope of achieving a true world society had been abandoned. Indeed, optimistic and idealistic nationalists, influenced by the humanitarianism of the rationalists themselves, sincerely believed that the nation-state might be made the basis for a world state and that national culture might be made the basis for world culture. Others, less hopeful of the possibilities of political and cultural nationalism, came to feel that eventually the internationalizing of economic life with its accompanying speeding up of exchange of ideas must sometime clear away the practical obstructions to a true international order.

However, the fact remains that those very forces which have operated to make men more completely interdependent in an economic sense have thus far also strengthened the forces which keep them apart. The era of discoveries and explorations, and, even more, the age of expanding markets and expanding business after 1870 were precisely those times when nationalism was rampant. It is true that so long as Britain was predominant in the industrial world, the English bourgeoisie were internationalists, favoring free trade and peace among nations. But the competition of business soon made them, as well as their rivals in other nations, bent upon securing control of foreign markets and supplies and, at the same time, of protecting themselves by closing their home markets to others. Moreover, improved facilities of travel and communication probably made as many intense nationalists as cosmopolitans, and even popular education which came in the wake of international trade and commerce enforced rather than diminished the cultural peculiarities of various peoples. Against these strengthened forces of nationalism, those of internationalism and cosmopolitanism have been thus far comparatively impotent. The interdependence of men is more than ever keenly recognized; that their fortunes and misfortunes are common in the larger sense is better understood; intellectually, men are more cosmopolitan; but still they have not achieved a world society. Perhaps, however, it is not too much to hope that in some distant future, common economic needs and such instruments for the communication of ideas as the radio will clear away many of the cultural obstructions to a genuine cosmopolitanism.

B. Charting New Seas

The reader will recall that beginning in the tenth century Europe experienced a marked commercial revival.[1] This was due chiefly to the stability and security offered by feudalism which made possible the reappearance of the economic promise; the increase in population and the conquest of more land from men and from nature; and the rise of Venice and Flanders as trading centers. Trade recovery opened fresh markets for labor and for capital, tapped new sources of wealth, and made feasible an expansion of credit. It raised the general standard of living, and at the same time brought a different distribution of wealth which was mirrored in the development of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Feudalism became anachronistic; serfdom decayed; and agriculture began to change from small-scale subsistence farming to larger-scale profit farming. Politically, the change was reflected in the growth of national monarchies and the eventual emergence of nation-states. The trade revival also resulted in a steadily cresceive secularization of society in which the Renaissance represents a climactic period.

One phase of the Renaissance was the so-called Commercial Revolution, less a revolution in the usual meaning of the word than the culmination, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of a long, slow process begun at least half a millennium before. A many-sided movement, the Commercial Revolution does not lend itself to easy or short definition. It encompassed the development of new trade and new trade routes which eventually reduced the Mediterranean trade to a portion of the whole and undermined the importance and wealth of the Italian cities. At the same time it both caused a northward shift of commercial centers and was itself in part a result of that shift. It meant that commerce became national and international instead of remaining local and intermural. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this was the growth of mercantilism which was definitely a national policy. Finally, the Commercial Revolution included also an increase in the quantity and variety of goods and the development of new forms of business enterprise.

Among the factors responsible for these changes the most important was the growth of nation-states. Only nations were rich enough or strong enough to begin and maintain transoceanic commerce. It was necessary that a strong centralized government provide a peace

[1] See Chapter XI.

area in which trade could flourish at home, and, further, that the government be strong enough to protect its merchants both against pirates and against the medieval strand laws and other trade restrictions. The relationship between the nation-states and the new trade was reciprocal: each strengthened and profited the other. A second important factor was the marked increase in self-confidence among the peoples of the new nations. The Crusades were an evidence of this self-assurance; they were also a sort of preliminary trial in European colonization and business expansion. As was pointed out earlier, the Crusades stimulated and accelerated the trade revival. They aroused a larger demand for eastern goods, brought a prosperity to the Italian city-states which was reflected throughout the rest of Europe; gave practical experience in shipbuilding, navigation, and water-borne commerce; and promoted money economy and the evolution of various devices for the extension and employment of credit. It might be added that their termination released men, ships, money, and energies which soon found their way into overseas explorations and trade. Other forces which tended in the same direction were the desire for profits, always one of the strongest and most constant motives; the increase in geographical knowledge, which will be discussed shortly; the improvements made in the fourteenth century in the design and rigging of ships; and the discovery or development of instruments for navigation such as the compass and the astrolabe.

To appreciate fully the extent and the meaning of the explorations and discoveries which both preceded and were part of the Commercial Revolution, it is necessary to cast a brief glance backward to see what the situation had been. The ancients, who knew the Mediterranean area fairly well, had no notion of the world as a whole. Their most famous and influential geographer, Ptolemy (c. 130 A.D.), thought, for example, that Africa was a barren, uninhabitable desert which stretched south and east to Asia. Most of the early middle ages accepted his dicta and further obscured fact by using the Bible as their major geographical authority. On this basis, they assumed that the world was flat and that Jerusalem was its center. During the later middle ages, many voyages and journeys of discovery were undertaken but not all of this new knowledge reached Europe. The Vikings, from the ninth century on, made extensive explorations in the west, and the Arabs explored the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, but none of the Viking and few of the Arab discoveries seem to have been known to Europe. Travelers in the thir-

teenth century penetrated into the Middle East, and the famous Polo family of Venice made their way to China and returned with a detailed account of it and of their travels. Geographers, however, paid little heed until the fifteenth century. In summary, the men of the fourteenth century knew only Europe, North Africa, and the Near East; but they had heard rumors of the Far East.

The outburst of exploring activity in the fifteenth century seems to have been due to three things: Renaissance curiosity; the desire to proselytize—there was a strong wave of religiosity in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and commercial motives. The last included: (1) an increased demand for eastern goods, due to the growth of population, the increase of wealth, and the Crusades; (2) the desire to find an easier and cheaper route which would replace the overland routes controlled by the Turks and Arabs;[1] and (3) the ambition of the new nation-states to break the monopoly of this trade which the Italian cities enjoyed.

Repetition of the familiar stories of the voyages made by the explorers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries would serve no purpose even if space permitted. The pioneer was the Portuguese, Prince Henry the Navigator (1394-1460), not himself an explorer but an organizer and co-ordinator of exploring activity. He was followed by Bartolomeu Diaz who opened the route around Africa (1486-1488) which remained for four centuries the main sea road to the East; Christopher Columbus (1451-1506), too famous to need comment; Vasco da Gama who first sailed to India in 1497 and 1498; Amerigo Vespucci who may have discovered Brazil in 1499, and whose first name was given to the new continents; Fernando Magellan whose ships circumnavigated the globe (1519-1522); and many others of equal or lesser note. Suffice it to say that by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Americas, China, the Philippines, India, and the Spice Islands, and the coasts of Africa had been brought within the range of European knowledge, trade, and colonization.[2]

Part and parcel of this overseas expansion were major changes in the economic structure of society. The shift from barter economy to money economy, which began with the tenth-century commercial revival, had gone on apace. Just how this change took place is

[1] Contrary to the popular misconception, the conquering Turks did not close the overland trade routes. They did, however, levy heavier taxes on the trade and so increased the cost of oriental goods.

[2] A summary of the growth of colonial empires is given in Chapter XVIII.



MAP 29. EXPLORATION AND COLONIZATION, FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES

not wholly clear, but the phenomenon becomes slightly less baffling if one remembers that money, fundamentally, is nothing more than some desirable commodity which can be easily transported and readily exchanged for other commodities. The growth of nation-states, which as was previously explained was furthered by the use of money, greatly facilitated this change by increasing the areas wherein the national money was readily exchangeable. The expansion of credit was likewise accelerated when law and order were established within a nation, thus rendering the completion of deferred exchange both more feasible and more likely.

It will be remembered that the form of business enterprise developed by the tenth-century revival was the gild. For some centuries, these gilds served adequately but both trade and industry outgrew them in time. There appeared an *entrepreneur* or middleman who had accumulated enough capital to buy a stock of goods, transport them if necessary, and sell them to smaller-scale merchants who retailed them to the consumer.[1] Eventually the need for more capital or greater protection led individual *entrepreneurs* to form partnerships and, later, companies. The first of these companies were of the type known as "regulated" or "chartered." The typical charter, granted by the king, gave the company a monopoly of a certain trade in a fixed area. Individual members of the company were free to trade within that area, subject to the rules and regulations of the company itself. Sometimes, companies licensed non-members to trade in the area also. The distinctive feature of a regulated company was that each member traded on his own without any pooling of resources. Usually, however, each member was liable in full for the debts of his company.

This device served reasonably well but it did not solve the problem of financing the long and costly transoceanic voyages of the sixteenth century. To surmount this, there was developed what is known as a joint-stock company. These also were usually chartered by the Crown and given monopoly rights. But in distinction to the older regulated companies, a joint-stock company represented the pooling of capital. Shares were sold, first for a single voyage, later in a company. Anyone might buy and the shares were transferable. Furthermore, the shareholder's liability was limited to the value of his shares. In the beginning, each shareholder was paid off after every

[1] A similar middleman appeared also in industry and caused a gradual transformation from the gild to the domestic system. This was discussed in connection with Tudor England. See pp. 463-466.

voyage. If he desired to participate again he had to buy new shares. Later, when the shares were regarded as being in the company rather than in a single voyage, they remained valid and the owner was repaid by dividends. This corresponds quite closely to modern practice.[1]

The relation of the new companies to the national governments was close and important, but highly variable. Usually the Crown reserved a share of the profits and the governments often benefited from fees, customs dues, and other taxes. It was also the ordinary circumstance for governments to borrow heavily from the companies, and sometimes to fail to repay the loans. Company agents were frequently used by the government for diplomatic and other services, and in several instances, most notably those of the East India Companies of England and the Netherlands, as empire builders. On the other hand, some companies occasionally bent the governments to their will and benefited greatly thereby. Their effect upon national prosperity is controversial, but some experts believe that their exclusiveness, and their monopolistic and mercantilistic policies were shortsighted and eventually injurious both to themselves and to the public.

Of equal importance to this growth of commercial capitalism was the development of banking and exchange. The first medieval bankers were probably money-changers whose reputations were so excellent that men trusted them with the keeping of their valuables in deposit.[2] Gradually, the embryo banker gained permission to use (invest) some of the funds left with him, paying (interest) for that privilege. He also fell into the practice of advancing sums (loans) to his patrons for which he charged a fee (interest). Sometimes he probably held the valuables as security (collateral) that the loan would be repaid. Interest charges were high and variable, but by the sixteenth century the general European average was 16 percent. In much the same accidental way, bills of exchange, letters of credit, and checks all came into use. These various practices just sketched were quite common prior to the Commercial Revolution, but they were vastly extended and refined during it. An interesting evi-

[1] There were many variations in the development and characteristics of regulated and joint-stock companies, but the multiplicity of detail does not invalidate generalizations about them. In this and the remainder of the discussion of companies, the authors have in mind the English experiences which are thus used as prototypes of the general development.

[2] This description is largely conjectural. Details of the development of banking are unknown. The use of parentheses is for the purpose of suggesting the modern practice which evolved from these beginnings.

dence both of the growth of banking and of the northward shift of commercial and financial centers is offered by a comparison of the leading bankers of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries. The fourteenth century leaders were the Peruzzi who had an estimated capital of $800,000. They lost their leadership in the next century to the Medici, whose capital is estimated at between five and seven and one-half millions of dollars. Both Italian bankers were eclipsed in the sixteenth century by the Fuggers of South Germany who at their height had a capital of probably forty million dollars. The first of the great modern banks was the Bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1608; the foundation of the Bank of England (1698) has already been discussed in another connection.[1] Both were very closely connected with the city government of Amsterdam and the government of England, respectively.

Stock exchanges as we know them did not develop until the late seventeenth century when one was founded in London (1698). The earlier exchanges, of which the Antwerp *bourse* (1531) was the prime example, dealt very little, if at all, in stocks. There was some trading in commodities and a great deal of speculation on rates of money exchange and prices. Lotteries were common and popular, and betting was rife. Insurance, both short term life and maritime, which had appeared in medieval Italy, developed also.

Commercial and financial capitalism were partially dependent upon another development of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries: the influx of gold and silver from the New World. Late in the Middle Ages these were mined in considerable quantity in Central Europe and, after the Portuguese had opened trade with West Africa, some was imported from there. But by far the most important single source was the Spanish dominions in the New World. We have no way of knowing the amount imported or the portion of it which was coined. Neither do we know how much of Europe's whole supply of the precious metals was circulated as coinage and how much went into plates, ornaments, and the like. It is usually estimated, however, that the amount of European coinage increased about 1,200 percent during the sixteenth century.

Since gold and silver are commodities, their appearance in greater quantities rendered them relatively less desirable. This meant that an ounce of silver, for example, would "buy," i.e., could be exchanged for, smaller amounts of other goods than before. Put in more familiar terms, the price of commodities other than gold or silver rose. This

[1] See p. 525.



CLIPPER SHIP

The fastest sailing ships ever built were the "clipper ships" developed in America and England during the first half of the nineteenth century. This is a picture of the *James Baines*, an Australian packet built in the 1840's by Donald McKay for Messrs. Baines and Co. of Liverpool. It was one of the ships of the Black Ball line, as the flag indicates.

is not to say, however, that the tremendous dislocation of prices apparent in the sixteenth century was caused solely by the influx of gold and silver. The expansion of credit, the growth of banking, the existence of monopolies, and the improvements in transportation were among the other factors.[1]

Two other aspects of the Commercial Revolution should be noted before an attempt is made to summarize its results. The opening of new lands, the cheapness of water-borne commerce, and the expansion of business brought to Europe an amazing variety of new goods, among which may be mentioned by way of illustration: tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco, potatoes, and tropical fruits. Europe was also supplied with much greater quantities of such familiar things as fish, fur, lumber, silks, spices, and drugs. The second item concerns agriculture. For centuries, farming had been for subsistence; now a beginning was made in larger-scale farming for a profit. Some men

[1] Lack of statistical information prevents any detailed or wholly satisfactory discussion of the rise in prices. However, it has been estimated that in England wheat rose from about four shillings per quarter in the thirteenth century to approximately thirty-five shillings per quarter in 1660. Other prices presumably increased in similar proportions.

of wealth invested their capital in the purchase of land and the employment of labor to till it. This tended to displace small-scale farmers, reducing some of them to tenant status, forcing others to become agricultural laborers, and driving others to the growing cities in search of employment.[1]

For the sake of clarity, the more important consequences of the Commercial Revolution will be summarized under the separate headings of economic, social, and political. It must be remembered, of course, that such division is arbitrary and somewhat misleading since there was much overlapping and interaction. The steady rise in the standard of living, for example, was both an important economic and a significant social consequence. The other major economic results have already been stated or implied and need only be listed here. International and oceanic trade came to overshadow intermural and thalassic commerce, though of course, local trade not only continued but flourished. There was an increased use of specie and a further development of money and credit economy. New forms of business enterprise evolved, and new outlets were offered for wealth and labor. The amount of wealth and of capital available for further investment also increased, and the era of commercial capitalism, when wealth was derived chiefly from trade and reinvested in trade, in the domestic system and agriculture, began. The continuing shift in the distribution of wealth from landowner to merchant and manufacturer greatly augmented the numbers and powers of the bourgeoisie. It was also reflected in the growth of the proletariat. The social and political consequences of these developments have been treated at some length and will be followed in the succeeding chapters. In repetition, it may be remarked that the cresceive political power of the bourgeoisie was used first in support of royal authority and then successfully to challenge that authority. From the viewpoint of intellectual results, the Commercial Revolution enlarged the range, the variety, and volume of men's knowledge; and provided powerful stimulus for tolerance and cosmopolitanism.

There was also a close kinship between the Commercial and the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions which are to be discussed in the last part of this chapter. In the case of the Agricultural Revolution, the capitalization of agriculture provided both the means and the incentives for the improvements of methods; the higher standards

[1] One phase of this development was the English enclosure movement already discussed. See p. 466.

of living, the growth in population, and its shift from rural to urban areas produced a greater need and demand for foodstuffs. Much the same causal connection existed with the Industrial Revolution. Commercial capitalism supplied the wealth for investment in industry; the New World produced raw materials, such as cotton, in quantities too great to be manufactured profitably by hand; and the potential and actual market for manufactures was greatly expanded at home by the augmented purchasing power of the bourgeoisie, and abroad by the foundation and growth of colonies. In short, the so-called Commercial, Agricultural, and Industrial Revolutions were really climactic phases of the continuous economic changes taking place in western society.

C. Farm and factory

Despite the changes wrought by the Commercial Revolution, agriculture long continued to be the major support of life. What is more, agricultural methods remained essentially medieval until the eighteenth century.[1] Most land was still unfenced, the three-field system of planting was still practiced, and pasturage and woodlots were co-operatively owned. Tools were crude, primitive, and inefficient. Crop rotation was only vaguely understood, and little use was made of fertilizer. The majority of the people were peasantry, living in isolation or in small, rural villages. Their habitual lot was poverty, but withal, they usually enjoyed a measure of security which would compare favorably with that of union labor today. It was, of course, inevitable that the socio-economic changes of the Commercial Revolution should react upon this system; the two, in fact, cannot be divorced from each other. The first nation to feel the effects of this impact was England; and since that country led also in industrial developments, the remainder of this chapter will deal largely with the English experiences, most of which were repeated in some degree elsewhere in the West.

The most important single cause for the revolution in agriculture was the growing demand for food which was due to an amazing increase in population and to the shift in population from country to town. The rate of population growth was exceedingly rapid as attested by the fact that in England the population was augmented by more than three million between 1750 and 1801. Growth in the preceding seven centuries had been only five million. The enclosure

[1] For a discussion of medieval agriculture, see pp. 148-154.

movement, by driving small farmers from the land, placed a greater burden on those who were left and thus swelled the demand for food. As enclosures increased, and this was one aspect of the Agricultural Revolution, more men sought work in the growing towns, thus expanding both the labor supply and the number who were dependent upon others for the production of their food.

Aside from enclosures and their results, the Revolution effected many improvements in agricultural methods. New tools and implements were invented, and old ones, improved. Iron plows replaced those of wood and various devices for cultivating, such as harrows, were introduced. The pioneer in this was an Englishman, Jethro Tull (1674-1740) who invented a seed drill for planting grains, and who led in the then novel practice of cultivating crops other than grain. Another English pioneer was Lord Townshend (1674-1738) who introduced the practice of rotating crops, i.e., planting one year grain, the next clover, and so on. In this way, the soil was not exhausted of its nitrates so that it was no longer necessary to let one-third of the land lie fallow each year. Townshend also experimented with the use of fertilizer to restore and preserve the fertility of the soil. Improved implements and methods yielded larger crops, making it possible to raise more livestock. This led Robert Bakewell (1725-1795) to begin experimentation in selective breeding to produce animals especially fitted for a definite purpose. Sheep were bred for wool or for mutton; cattle for milk or for beef; horses for draft work or for riding, and so on. A fourth Englishman, Arthur Young (1741-1820), carried on extensive propaganda both for these and similar advances, and for the capitalization of agriculture which alone made such reforms possible. It seems scarcely necessary to add that the Agricultural Revolution is still going on in the fields of improved machinery, soil chemistry, and scientific farming in general.

Coincidental with and closely bound to the Agricultural Revolution was what is coming to be called the First Industrial Revolution. Like the Commercial Revolution, it was a movement so vast in scope and so long in happening that it all but staggers the imagination to attempt to picture it. Prior to it life was predominantly rural and agrarian; as a result of it, society became, in time, urban and industrial. Before it, communication and transport could move no faster than the speediest horse or sailing vessel. As invention followed invention, communication became almost instantaneous and transport unbelievably rapid. Machinery more and more supplanted

hand work; the domestic system gave way to the factory system; labor left the villages and farms to crowd into the cities near the new factories; and local self-sufficiency was replaced by international economic interdependence. Industrial capitalism[1] took its place beside commercial capitalism, eventually overshadowing it. The plutocracy definitely displaced the aristocracy of land and birth as the dominant class; the bourgeoisie continued to thrive and prosper; and scattered labor became the relatively compact industrial proletariat. In short, the Industrial Revolution and its effects permeated all of society as thoroughly as had the Church in medieval times.

This great series of changes began in eighteenth-century Britain largely because British manufacturing and exporting were already developed by that time. The gild system disappeared comparatively early in Great Britain, making possible the rapid growth of the domestic system, and British maritime superiority gave her a marked advantage in the competition for oceanic trade. The point to be remembered is that by the eighteenth century there was already a steadily mounting demand for British goods, especially cloth. Moreover, England's very insularity insulated her against European wars and disorders and thus was of great benefit to her trade and industry. Later, in the era of the French Revolution and Napoleon, that insulation enabled her to retain and increase her leadership at the expense of those areas which, devastated by war, were forced to depend more and more upon the British for manufactured goods. Peace and security within the British Isles during the eighteenth century also favored the development of industry. Furthermore, the British social system, aristocratic but flexible, offered what has been called "the social incentive to the acquisition of wealth." In other words, since it was possible to buy one's way into a higher social class, men were willing to exert themselves to that end. This, of course, was only one aspect of the ever-present profit motive. Finally, Great Britain was rich in the natural resources which were vital to industrialization. The islands produced iron, coal, and water power; the latter being especially valuable as an intermediate source of power between animals and steam. The moist, mild climate was well suited to the processing of textiles, especially wool whose threads snap and break in hot, dry air. Labor, too, Britain had in abundance, the more so

[1] Industrial capitalism is the stage where wealth, derived first from trade, later from commerce and industry itself, is reinvested chiefly in industry. Ownership of industrial and business enterprises of this stage was ordinarily synonymous with management of them.



THE INDUSTRIOUS 'PRENTICE, ETCHING BY WILLIAM HOGARTH (1697-1764).

Hogarth was one of England's outstanding artists. A man of strong convictions, he used his satirical genius to attack the abuses and ridicule the foibles of his day. This is the first of a series of 12 etchings in which Hogarth preached the moral value of industry, a theme which was popular with the rising bourgeoisie. This picture is interesting not only as an example of Hogarth's work but also because it shows something of the processes of silk manufacturing about the middle of the eighteenth century. See also p. 534.

as enclosures continued to rob the poor of the land and force them to seek subsistence from occupations other than farming.

Undoubtedly, one of the most interesting aspects of the Industrial Revolution was the inventions which transformed manufacturing, transportation, and communications. Short of an actual catalogue, it is impossible even to list all of them. The following makes no pretense, therefore, at completeness; it merely aims to suggest some of the beginnings and the highlights.

As one would expect from the fact that the greatest demand was for cloth, the first inventions in the field of production were made in the textile industry. In 1733, John Kay invented a "flying shuttle," a spring-actuated device which carried the weft (moving thread) across the warp (fixed thread) much more rapidly than was possible with hand-thrown shuttles. This approximately doubled the production of cloth and so increased the demand for thread that the

spinners using the old-fashioned wheels were unable to keep pace. This led to the invention by James Hargreaves of a "spinning jenny," a machine by which the power delivered by a single wheel was used to spin eight threads (1765). Four years later, Richard Arkwright patented a "water-frame" which spun thread by drawing out the fibers between rollers and twisting them on revolving spindles. Run first by horsepower and later by waterpower, whence its name "water-frame," this was an expensive machine which only men of wealth could afford. Here was the prime example of the working of the new economic system. Arkwright went into partnership with two wealthy men who provided the funds to construct the "frames" and install them in factories built for that purpose. The industrial capitalist had arrived. So also had industrial labor, and the factory system had begun to supplant small-scale, domestic handicraft. The next invention, a combination of the "jenny" and the "frame" called a "spinning mule" was of the same expensive type. Its inventor, Samuel Crompton (1779), was cheated by the men who bought his first "mule" to use as a model, and, though his machine made millions for others, Crompton died in poverty. These various improvements in spinning reversed the balance until the perfection of the power loom in the early nineteenth century equalized the two processes of spinning and weaving.[1] Mention should also be made of the cotton "gin," invented in 1792 by the American, Eli Whitney. This greatly facilitated the separation of the seeds from the fibers and so provided a greater supply of cotton and led to a corresponding increase in the manufacture of cotton textiles.

The efficiency of most of this machinery was limited by the lack of satisfactory mechanical power. Water power could and did serve but something more was needed. Experiments with steam engines had long been made but without practical results until Thomas Newcomen succeeded in building one (1705-1711). The Newcomen stationary engine, used chiefly for pumping water, was crude and inefficient, but it worked. The most powerful models burned thirteen tons of coal to produce twenty horsepower, and the smaller ones were proportionately wasteful. James Watt of Glasgow perfected the Newcomen engine by adding a condenser (1764-1775), and by mastering the problem of transforming the straight power of the piston stroke into rotary motion (1782). Within less than two decades, almost three hundred Watt engines were in use in Great Britain.

[1] The power loom was patented in 1785 by Edmund Cartwright, but it was too clumsy and inefficient to be profitable.

The development of engines and other machinery soon involved changes in other fields. Precision tool-making equipment such as lathes were urgently needed and were slowly developed. Some experts go so far as to call these "tools to make tools" the keystone of the whole mechanical structure on the ground that without them complicated and delicate machinery could never have gone beyond the designer's plans. The other crying need was for more and better metals with which to construct the new machinery. This demand was answered by improvements in mining and refining ores. About the middle of the eighteenth century the Darbys (father and son) succeeded in reducing iron ore by the use of coke instead of charcoal, which was fast growing scarce and costly. This coking process, which produced "pig iron," was improved by James Smeaton who devised an effective forced draft (1760). Cheaper and easier to produce than the older malleable wrought iron, early pig iron was overly brittle due to the presence in it of a great deal of carbon. About 1783 Henry Cort and Peter Onions developed a technique known as "puddling" which gave a better, tougher iron at less cost. Puddled iron remained the chief structural material until Henry Bessemer discovered a method of producing steel by forcing blasts of hot air through molten iron (1856).

The rapid expansion of industry and commerce soon created a demand for cheaper, easier, and faster means of transportation. Late in the eighteenth century, Britain, which had lagged badly behind France in this, belatedly began to construct roads and canals. Pioneer road engineers were Thomas Telford (1757-1834) and James Macadam (1756-1836), who gave his name to a type of road construction still in use. This, however, did not solve the problem of drayage and men began to experiment with steam engines. The first steam locomotive was patented in 1802 by Richard Trevithick but it was not until 1825 that George Stephenson built a successful railway locomotive.[1] The first railway to use steam power was the Stockton and Darlington (1825) of which Stephenson was the engineer.

Meanwhile, other inventors had sought ways and means of propelling boats by steam engines. An American, John Fitch, built and operated a steamboat on the Delaware River in 1790, and an Englishman, William Symington, built a steam tugboat which was used briefly on the Forth and Clyde canal in Scotland in 1802. But the first successful promoter of steamships was the American, Robert

[1] Trevithick's locomotives were designed for use on highways.

Fulton, who designed, built, and operated the *Clermont* on the Hudson River in 1807. Eight years later he built the first steam warship for the United States Navy. The pioneer steam crossings of the Atlantic were made in 1838 by the *Sirius*, which made the trip in eighteen days, and the *Great Western* which did it in fifteen days.

Communications developed more slowly. In 1837, an Englishman, Charles Wheatstone, and an American, Samuel Morse, both patented an electric telegraph. It was not until 1876 that Alexander Graham Bell produced a workable telephone.

The reader hardly needs to be told that the Industrial Revolution continued throughout the nineteenth century and is still in progress. Some historians in recent years have termed the period from about 1870 on the "Second Industrial Revolution." This is convenient and satisfactory if it is borne in mind that the separation is purely arbitrary and implies no real break in the continuity. The Second Revolution presented the same general features as the First: improved and increasing mechanization; new inventions and techniques; novel and larger forms of capital enterprises. No attempt can be made here to follow this story since to do so with any completeness would involve not only the history of the many changes but a description of the current situation as well. It must suffice to suggest by way of illustration that machinery for production has steadily become more complex and more efficient; that Stephenson's locomotive has been improved to the streamliner stage, and the *Clermont* to the *Queen Mary;* that Bessemer steel has been developed into stainless steel; and that telegraphy and telephony have been supplemented by the teletype, the telephone, and the radio.

Besides continuing already established fields, the Second Industrial Revolution has had some unique developments of its own. Industrial capitalism grew into monopoly capitalism, marked by large-scale industry, and the growth of corporative ownership which transformed the capitalist from an active owner-manager into an investor. This, in turn, resulted in the growth of finance capitalism, a stage in which ownership is almost wholly divorced from management, and control of industry and business tends to center in a few great banks and financial houses. Both Revolutions have resulted in a vast increase in wealth—and in a tendency to concentrate the ownership of that wealth in the hands of a few.

The Second Revolution was also distinguished by the marriage of science and industry which resulted in the development of whole groups of new industries. These may be listed under four headings:

Byron from T. F. Healy

MARCONI WITH HIS WIRELESS APPARATUS

Guglielmo Marconi (1874-1937), perfecter of the radio, conducted his first successful experiment with wireless transmission in 1895 in his native Italy. When the Italian government showed no interest in his discovery, Marconi secured a patent in England, and in London, 1897, there was organized the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company. Transmission was at first possible for only short distances, but improvements came so rapidly that in 1901 a trans-Atlantic communication was made.

(1) electrical, including the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, trolley cars, railways, and all forms and uses of electrical power; (2) aids to physical comfort such as heaters, refrigerators, plumbing, sewing machines, rayon, and plastics; (3) internal combustion engines—automotive, including Diesels, aviation, and the closely related fields of petroleum production and processing, rubber, and cement; and (4) photographic industries, including, of course, the movies. By no means exhaustive, this listing is merely suggestive.

The second phase was further marked by the spread of industrialism and its concomitants from Britain and Belgium to all the western world and even to the Orient; and by the steady urbanization of society. Proof of this latter change is the fact that whereas the urban, industrial population exceeded the rural, agrarian groups only in Great Britain and Belgium in 1870, by 1910 it was the larger group in Germany and the United States also.

In conclusion, since the next chapter will deal at some length with the social and political consequences of the Industrial Revolutions, it is only necessary to summarize some of the economic results which have not already been mentioned. One of the most spectacular was the tremendous increase in production. For example, the production of coal in Great Britain was 17,350 tons in 1740; 12,000,000 in 1800; 110,000,000 in 1870; and 265,000,000 in 1910 when it was only about twenty-five percent of the world's output.[1] Similarly, the value of British cotton manufactures rose 600 percent between 1750 and 1910. In addition, costs per unit were lowered, making possible a wider distribution of goods. Another consequence was the growth of international trade which may be illustrated by the fact that in 1792 the United States' export of cotton was 275 bales; in 1913, it was 9,250,000. Finally, this development plus the export of capital, enormously augmented the economic interdependence of the world.



Courtesy of Westinghouse

THE ROBOT, ELEKTRO

Elektro stands seven feet tall in his shining aluminum armor. Eleven motors, operated by remote control, enable him to obey verbal orders (according to the number and spacing of syllables), to walk forward or back, count to ten on his fingers, smoke a cigarette, talk, sing, etc. He might well stand as a symbol of the "mechanization of life."

[1] These figures, while reasonably accurate, are only approximate.

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[1] *See also* the bibliography for Chapter XXIII.

Chapter XXIII

Class Distinctions of Modern Society

A. Progress and poverty

No era of human history witnessed such phenomenal advances of material welfare as that which began with the Industrial Revolution. The machine had mastered nature and had forced her to lavish her gifts bounteously with a constantly diminishing expenditure of human energy. The prices of prime necessities declined steadily until, presumably, they were in reach of all. Per capita wealth increased and standards of living rose. Undreamed-of luxuries such as the theater, the radio, the automobile, came within the grasp of all; and an increasing amount of leisure time in which to enjoy them was made available. If he wished and had the means, the common man could light his house with electricity, heat it with steam, and supply it with running water. He could travel cheaply and comfortably, and all kinds of mechanical conveniences promised to relieve his customary drudgeries—if he had the money with which to buy them. Within little more than a century, the material welfare and potential happiness of mankind had improved beyond anything which had existed since the dawn of history and, indeed, had outstripped what the most fertile imaginations had deemed possible.

Yet the coming of the machine was not an unmitigated blessing. The majority of men, the tillers of the fields and the toilers of the factories, became its chattel slaves, dependent upon its whims and fluctuating fortunes. For a steadily increasing number, work at home in an occupation of one's choice became a practical impossibility. The factory became the only alternative, and when the laborer entered it his flaunted legal and economic freedom often turned out to be a tragic mockery. His work was reduced to rigid and monotonous discipline, both labor and leisure time were strictly regulated for him, and, what is most important of all, his wages became his

only resource. The advantages of bargaining for these were mostly with the employer, for labor, like the resources of nature, became a marketable commodity. If the supply were great, and the machine steadily enlarged it by reducing the premium on personal skills and by making production more efficient, wages diminished; if the supply were reduced, wages rose. Moreover, the legal rights of property made the employer the final judge of whom he would and would not employ. If he chose to terminate one's employment there was no appeal, and the only alternatives left were to face starvation, to become a public charge upon the community, or to secure employment elsewhere. If times were "good" it would not be too difficult to get another "job"; but if they were "bad," little or no choice remained. There was nothing in the new economic system during its early career to take up the shock of recurring crises which occurred with such regularity that they came to be regarded as one of the laws of nature. The "business cycle" ran its course from "normality" through boom and decline to the depths of depression, then leveled off and began all over again. During the long periods of decline and depression, labor glutted the market, unemployment became common, and the plight of the workers grew. Wages were usually low, and even brief periods of unemployment were so disastrous financially, that it was impossible for many to store up resources against future misfortunes.

Poverty stalked in the midst of plenty. While statistics revealed steadily mounting material welfare and the growth of national and per capita wealth, hundreds of thousands of wretchedly poor filled the slums of the great urban communities. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries humanitarian sympathies were deeply moved by these conditions; laborers sought to save themselves and organized for common action; wealthy philanthropists contributed for material relief; municipal and national governments embarked upon vast programs of social reform. Many of the worst evils disappeared, but, from the experience of the Great Depression of our own times, the conclusion seems inescapable that at best what has thus far been done to solve the problem has been a momentary palliative, not by any means a cure. The problem of poverty in the midst of plenty still remains, indeed is more acute than at any time since the machine came into being; it is the great challenge of the modern era, begging for a prompt solution.

The crux of the present difficulty would appear to be that of technological unemployment, a natural and seemingly inevitable con-

sequence of mechanical progress. Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution machinery has become both more productive and more automatic until now, in many industries, it is capable of performing all of the necessary operations under the watchful eyes of a comparatively small number of men. While formerly it was possible to absorb the labor thus displaced in pioneering adventures or in other industries which sprang up to supply a constantly expanding market, today neither of these favorable conditions prevails. Much of the frontier has been absorbed and, what is more important, improvements in machinery have proceeded more rapidly than the market has expanded. The amount of labor required to supply it has therefore actually diminished. If these assumptions are correct, the problem of unemployment is basically technological, and no solution of the contemporary economic difficulties will suffice unless this is taken into account. In the final analysis, the bulk of purchasing power belongs to those who labor; if they cannot earn a wage, they cannot buy; and if they cannot buy, business dries up. A great body of more or less permanently unemployed can therefore hold out only the promise of economic stagnation. It is important also to remember, in this connection, the suggestion of able economists that even if the solution of technological unemployment be found, there also must be discovered some way of equalizing the returns of capital and labor, so that the fundamentally important purchasing power of the latter should not tend to diminish to the point at which the market vanishes and crises in the whole economic system consequently occur. It is essential to make distribution and consumption of goods equally as efficient as production.

Every government of the western world has been struggling with the problem of poverty in the midst of plenty. Millions of unemployed in nations of great natural wealth, ample to accommodate all, is not only illogical but dangerous. The solutions offered thus far have varied all the way from the most highly regimented economic activity within the state, as in Communist Russia, Fascist Italy, or Nazi Germany, to an elaborate system of doles and public works programs within the existing political framework, as in the United States. It is fair to say that none has been really effective. Doles and expensive public works, provided for through taxes upon business and the rich, make the middle class resentful to the point at which they may threaten to dry up the financial springs of the government; and at the same time the unemployed are inspired to greater violence and threaten a veritable revolution. The Fascist and Communist

expedients are in most respects worse than the diseases which, among other things, they aimed to cure. One must seriously inquire in his own mind whether the loss of personal freedom is worth the loaf of bread which a regimented state may promise, but which it may withhold if it chooses. How best to reconcile personal liberties and personal initiative with a social and economic system which will ensure a greater degree of material security is the greatest problem of contemporary times.

B. Industrial capitalism

To use a currently popular expression, the real difficulty is that the capitalists, who own the means of production, and the laborers, who operate them, are locked in conflict. Such an arbitrary division of society into two hostile classes is superficial and technically incorrect, but it does express a fundamental truth. The control, if not the ownership of the facilities of production has become steadily concentrated in the hands of a few whose fundamental interest was profit; labor, with only its labor power to sell, was forced to accommodate itself as best it could to the profit motive. The growth of industrial capitalism gave rise to a serious social conflict.

During the very early stages of the Industrial Revolution, the relations between the capitalist and the laborer were sometimes cordial and always direct. The factory was small and the owner was usually also the operator, personally managing affairs. Expanding markets, accumulating capital, and the introduction of new and more productive machinery, however, resulted in the continuous expansion and rapid impersonalization of enterprises. The owner delegated management to paid employees and turned his attention either to new undertakings which would produce more profit or to the formulation of general business policies. By the middle of the nineteenth century, economic conditions made even this form of private ownership inexpedient for many. Larger factories, equipped with the most efficient new machinery, held out the prospect of greater net returns and provided some insurance against competition, even the chance of securing a monopoly, but the risks involved were more than one wealthy man could bear. Private ownership gave way to partnerships and these in turn gave way to great corporations, collectively owned by a number of stockholders. The corporation had great advantages. It distributed risks, and the resources which it could tap for its capitalization through the sale of profit-sharing stocks of

small denomination were almost limitless. More than that, it encouraged the consolidation of small enterprises operating near the margin in a number of fields of production, and by reducing overhead expenses, eliminating costly duplications, and destroying cutthroat competition, it either reduced the cost of the commodity to the consumer or increased the profits of the shareholder, or it struck a happy medium between both. But with the establishment of the great corporations, ownership and management were completely divorced. Many laborers, to be sure, were enabled to share an interest by becoming stockholders, but this was not the general rule, and when they did invest it was usually in such small proportion to the total that they had little or no opportunity to control policy. The men of wealth who held great blocks of stock became the directors of the corporation, determined its general policies, and then turned over its management to a trained agent whose primary obligation was to see to it that there should be profits to distribute among the shareholders.

While the corporation widened the basis of ownership through the sales of stocks, it also concentrated the control of the most important agencies of production in the hands of fewer and fewer individuals. By well-placed investments, men with sufficient liquid wealth have been able to acquire controlling stock in a variety of enterprises, and by establishing a holding company or by setting up a variety of interlocking directorates, have actually dominated industries with capitalizations many times as great as their investments. Thus, for example, it has been estimated that J. P. Morgan and Company, with a capitalization of something above 50 million dollars controls a series of productive enterprises with a capitalization roughly estimated at 55 billion dollars. Because this form of remote control has been realized through financial manipulation, it is usually referred to as finance capitalism. It means that ultimate responsibility for the policies of key industries rests with this relatively small number of finance capitalists, many times removed from the laborers who run the machinery. The growth of an increasingly impersonal relationship between the factory and the worker is one of the elemental characteristics of the present capitalistic system, and because of it labor and capital find it difficult to understand each other and to reach adjustments.

Besides the concentration of production control and the impersonal relationships between labor and capital, the "factory system" of industrial capitalism created other grounds for social conflict,

especially during its formative years. It would be difficult, indeed, to exaggerate the evils and abuses of the early factory. Some of these were entirely new with the Industrial Revolution; others, almost as old as civilization itself, grew greater in extent and degree. As will be explained in the next part of this chapter, many of these evils were mitigated before the end of the nineteenth century, but not without struggle and difficulty. Some of the worst of them remain. It is most convenient to describe these by reference to England, since it was there that the factory system first took shape and there that its evils and abuses appeared in clearest form. It must be understood, of course, that these were often duplicated wherever the factory was established; but, in general, the rest of Europe and the United States learned some of the ways to avoid the British experience.

One of the natural consequences of the factory system was the concentration and grouping together of workers under one establishment. While this ultimately facilitated common action in mutual self-defense, its first result was to deprive the worker of his personal freedom and expose him to a rigid, and often heartless discipline. Close regulation of the employee's activities in enterprises employing hundreds of men was obviously necessary unless chaotic conditions were to prevail, but there is little question that the early codes of conduct established by the factory owners frequently exceeded the bounds of reason. To take a typical example from a cotton factory of Manchester, England: the laborer's hours of beginning and leaving work were precisely fixed, and any deviation was punished with a fine; if he were ill and failed to secure a satisfactory substitute, the fine was six times as great as for late arrival or early leaving; coming to work dirty was punishable by fine, but so also was washing oneself during working hours; whistling or conversing with others was prohibited; and the most minute regulations governing the use of machinery and equipment, in the interest of operating economy, were enforced through a scale of graduated fines. In many instances, the factory owners went further, fixing the hour in the evening at which the laborer must be in his house, regulating his recreation when he was not at work, and limiting his privilege of travel to specified distances from the factory. These had to be endured, unless the laborer wished to face starvation, for governments during the early nineteenth century did not assume the responsibility of protecting him, and, in many fields of production, the machinery was much too cumbersome and too expensive for the laborer to become an independent producer.

The factory also brought with it the concentration of populations into urban communities. At the end of the eighteenth century more than 95 percent of the population of western Europe was rural; by the beginning of the twentieth century more than 50 percent was urban, with the concentrations steadily continuing. Great cities like London, Paris, or Berlin, with inhabitants numbering well into the millions, outdistanced anything which former ages produced, and gave the tone to contemporary civilization and culture. Industry and trade were the elemental factors in their growth, and, naturally the cities took shape in accordance with the needs and interests of both of these. There was at first little or no planning; where the factory should be located, how and where the laborers lived, were determined by the incidence of profits. Both in the older cities and in the new factory towns which sprang up close to sources of power, markets, or supplies, the living quarters of the workers were barren, congested, lacking in light and air, devoid both of hygienic facilities and recreational advantages. Disease was a natural consequence of these conditions, as was also, of course, social unrest.

Probably the worst feature of the early factory system was the nature and extent to which the labor of women and children was used. As an evil in kind this was not new. Women and children had always been employed in one form or another, and even before the Industrial Revolution the abuse had become vicious enough to excite humanitarians. John Locke, for example, had become seriously concerned over it in the late seventeenth century. But the Industrial Revolution exaggerated the problem beyond anything of which Locke had dreamed. It was of the very nature of the machine that it required simple and routine operations rather than highly specialized manual skills. A woman or a child could run it as well as a man, and what was most appealing to the factory owners, they could and would do it for considerably less wages. Therefore, because it was regarded as profitable, the employment of women and children in the factories which were so adapted became the general rule. In the cotton industries of England alone during the early nineteenth century, it has been estimated that fully 75 percent of the labor was that of women and children.

The conditions under which the children labored were particularly baneful and abusive. There were two forms of child labor, that of the "workhouse" children, or the children of the pauper poor who lived upon parish poor relief, and that of the so-called "free labor"

children who lived more or less independently with their families and contributed to the general family income through their work in the factory. The former was the more vicious and the first to arouse public concern. Many of the earliest textile factories, powered by water, had to be set up where there was no concentration of population and where, consequently, it was necessary to import labor. The easiest and cheapest arrangement was to appeal to the parish poor law authorities for children of the poor under their care, and, since this would have certain material advantages for them, the poor law authorities were frequently happy to comply. To be rid of some of the poor meant the possible opportunity of cutting down the poor law rates (taxes) of the local property holders, while at the same time it was argued that useful and disciplined employment would have great moral advantages for the children as well as for the community. Contracts were easily arranged between the poor law authorities and the manufacturers, to the advantage of all parties except the children. They were apprenticed to the factory owner usually around the age of seven and, with certain exceptions, were bound to him until the age of twenty-one. The owner promised to provide them with lodging and a certain minimum of clothes, and undertook to see that their morals were developed. The child's part of the contract could not be broken, but the manufacturer's obligation ceased if he felt it expedient to close his factory or, perchance, went bankrupt. Labor under these conditions was usually indescribably bad, as revealed by contemporary Parliamentary investigations. Hours of employment averaged between 14 and 16 per day, with no time off for breakfast and dinner, which had to be eaten while one was engaged at his regular operations. Often on Sundays a sizable portion of the children were occupied cleaning and oiling the machinery so that no time would be lost when the work-week began next day. Those not so engaged were required to attend church services, and since the church was usually located at a considerable distance from the factory, that meant a long and tiresome walk after a week of labor without adequate rest. The accommodations for these children were not calculated to give them relief when they were not at work. In a number of instances, it was revealed, as many as a half dozen children were required to occupy one bed; there was inadequate ventilation; and there was no properly controlled hygienic system.

The "free labor" children were little if any better off, though they did have the advantage of living with and under the jurisdic-

tion of their parents. The problem of this group arose in its acute stage with the development of machinery powered in such fashion as to enable the manufacturer to set up his establishment in urban communities where the labor supply was abundant. Since the labor of the children was cheaper, the frequent practice of the employer was to engage the services of the adults only in case the children worked. And, indeed, in accordance with prevailing wages, the combined labor of the entire family was absolutely necessary for subsistence. Once in the employ of a factory owner, the children were under his jurisdiction during all of their working hours, which usually ranged from five or six o'clock in the morning until about ten or eleven o'clock at night. With all of this there was usually time off for only one meal.

Neither the "workhouse" nor the "free labor" children secured anything approaching the absolutely minimum requirements of sleep, rest, or recreation. Undernourished and exhausted, they fell victim to disease and, if fortune blessed, died early; but if fate was unkind, lived on to endure added years of hardship in poverty or despair. There were many who were genuinely shocked by these conditions, but the extraordinary fact is that many were left unmoved, holding the wretchedness of the children to be the unfortunate but inescapable law of nature. Harriet Martineau, one of the early British propagandists of the virtues of the factory system, has left this choice morsel on child labor in her *Autobiography*:[1]

> The only hope [for the wretched factory children] seems to be that the race will die out in two or three generations, by which time machinery may be found to do their work better than their miserable selves.

The extensive employment of women and children at low rates naturally debased all wages, so that labor for excessively long hours with inadequate compensation was common for men as well. The normal working day hovered around fifteen or sixteen hours, with average wages ranging, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, from $2.25 to $7.50 per week. Throughout the remainder of the century, for reasons which will be examined subsequently, the hours of employment gradually declined and wages gradually increased. In 1897, the average agricultural laborer in England was receiving $4.00 per week and the skilled artisan $10.00 per week, for about a ten-hour labor day. The improvement was not inconsiderable, but

[1] Quoted in C. J. H. Hayes, *A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe*, II, 71.

relatively, when compared with the mounting incomes of the middle class manufacturers, it was hopelessly inadequate. The disparity between those who employed and those who labored grew steadily greater and more apparent. Possibly no feature of the factory system did more to build up the psychological basis for vigorous attacks upon it.

Low wages and excessive hours were accompanied by unhealthy, unsanitary, and unsafe conditions of labor in the factory. In the textile factories, where a certain type of humidity had to be regularly maintained, and in the glass factories, too, adequate ventilation was prohibited. Often unbearably hot during the summer, they were as unbearably cold during the winter. Adequate provision of rest rooms was the exception rather than the rule. Worse still, few if any precautions were taken against accident. If the laborer became enmeshed in unguarded belts or was maimed by exposed shafts, the fault was likely to be regarded as his, and he or his family bore the consequent financial losses from lack of employment. The owners regarded the costs of fencing in hazardous equipment as too great. Even as late as the 1850's in England their protests against government compulsion were so general that a national association of owners was created to combat it, an association which Charles Dickens properly dubbed "The National Association for the Mangling of Operatives."

By all means the most serious of the evils growing out of the factory system was the laborer's insecurity of employment. As was intimated previously, the employer held the legal right to engage or discharge a worker at will. Only his own sense of social responsibility could operate as a restraint, and while this was not lacking in some, for the majority it was certainly fickle and uncertain. If the employer discharged his employees because of the compulsion of economic circumstance, the laborer, of course, was left with no resource for the moment. His low wages were almost always so closely approximating primary poverty that unemployment for a week or two was enough to use up his meager reserves; and prolonged unemployment was potentially fatal. It was the laborer who suffered the greatest deprivation during periods of depression. For him, this dependence upon his continuously uncertain ability to sell his labor was made the more serious by the fact that through the concentrations of populations in urban communities, he was divorced from the soil, and had no avenue to prompt relief through his own

efforts. In comparison, his misery was worse than that of the medieval laborer, for the latter, at least, had some soil to which he could turn for a living. It was no relief for students, with the long range point of view, to point out that the convulsions of business and labor were only temporary; that unemployment occasioned by mechanical improvements would never last long for the labor displaced would soon be absorbed elsewhere. It never has been easy for men who have learned certain types of skills and physically adjusted themselves to them to turn to new and different employment; and, of course, during the time lag which usually intervened between employments, misery could be critically acute. Whatever might be said of the virtues of the modern age of business, it must be remembered always that it has failed miserably in providing a great proportion of the population with any reasonable degree of security. Technological advancements within the last quarter of a century have not improved this situation; indeed, they seem to have made it more critical.

Very naturally, the search for economic security constituted the central theme of the social as well as the political history of nineteenth-century Europe; it still does today in the twentieth century. It was this which vitalized the political revolutions of the '30's and the '40's, both for the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; for the former, because they felt that their own prosperity and indeed the fortunes of labor depended upon their controlling the government; for the latter, because they believed that the possible chance of securing political rights would enable them to protect themselves. It is significant that throughout much of the nineteenth century the proletarians constituted the backbone of democratic movements. The first approach to the problem of security through alliance with bourgeois parties, through parties of their own, and even through unions was basically political. Their influence was enough to make a number of the governments democratic and to force others to make concessions in the direction of democracy.

The democratization of governments brought great material improvements in the lot of the laboring classes, as will be seen shortly: public schools to which they could send their children, public care of the indigent, state regulation of factories to improve the hours and better the conditions of labor, and even public insurance against some of the more serious stresses and strains of the business world. Far-reaching and important as all of this was, it was not regarded as sufficient. To ensure greater security, labor unions resorted to eco-

nomic pressure to win better wages and secure redress of grievances. And among an increasing number of the more radically minded, the hope was held out that the whole capitalistic system might be destroyed, to be replaced by social control of the workingmen themselves.

C. Proletarian defenses

Among the instruments of self-defense which labor devised for its protection under the factory system, probably the most important and the most efficient was the labor union. It was built upon the logical premise that only through combination could the laborers attain an equality of bargaining power with the employer. The individual employee could not bargain, for if he were unwilling to work at a given wage or under prevailing conditions, the employer could be reasonably sure of engaging someone else who would. By combination, the situation could be potentially reversed. Through joint action on any considerable scale, the workers could substantially close the labor market in a local or even a national enterprise, and force the employer to come to terms. If he proved obstinate, they could strike and, by picketing, prevent others not pledged to the union from working, or, if it seemed advisable, they could institute a boycott to cut off the market of the manufacturer's product. By these means, the labor union aimed and still aims to win fair wages, reasonable hours, and favorable conditions.

Labor unions were not new in the nineteenth century but it was then that they sprang into prominence and became an accepted feature of the business world, though the winning of recognition and legal right to exist resulted only after a long and difficult struggle. In both France and Great Britain, labor unions had been organized during the eighteenth century, but in both countries they were held to be illegal, and strikes were considered criminal. The English Combination Laws of 1799 and 1800, restricting the rights of labor to organize, remained upon the statute books and were rather strictly enforced for the first quarter of the century. Considerable distress among the working classes, accompanied by agitation and violence, however, induced Parliament to review existing legislation and radically to reshape it by two acts (1824 and 1825). These measures legalized the formation of unions for the purpose of consulting and agreeing upon wages and hours of labor, but, in substance, they denied the unions the effective means of the strike as an instrument

for bargaining. Nevertheless, the growth of unions was rapid during the next decade and strikes were frequent. In 1834, the characteristic tendency of this period to organize all workers on a national scale, culminated in the formation of the Grand National Consolidated Trades Union, which aimed at a general strike to secure an eight-hour working day. Its growth had been too rapid, its organization was too weak, and the obstructions of the employers and the government too strong for it to succeed, and it disintegrated almost as soon as it had been established. For some time thereafter the union movement lost in popularity among the workers, who diverted their attention to the attainment of political and social reform through the Chartist Society. But in 1845 the unions began a new growth, organized locally by trades and gradually became federated on a national scale. The establishment of trades councils, representing the various trades unions and functioning in their common interest in the leading industrial centers, facilitated co-operation among all union members and laid the basis for a national labor movement. By 1869 the gradual evolution of conferences among delegates of these trades councils culminated in a national congress, or parliament of labor, which thereafter became an annual event. The steady and substantial growth of unionism which these developments reflected led shortly to an adjustment of the legislation governing union activities. Between 1871 and 1876, a series of laws more clearly defined the legal rights of the unions, allowed them to hold property and accumulate funds, and permitted the use of peaceful means to gain their ends. The number of unions and their membership increased immediately, and by the end of the century they had an enrollment of above 2,500,000 members. Two serious legal rebuffs, however, threatened to curtail their activities. In 1901, the House of Lords handed down the judgment (Taff Vale Case) that under existing statutes a union might be sued in its registered name and that its funds might be impounded for damages sustained against it. This threatened the unions with extinction by financially exhausting them. Eight years later, the House of Lords (Osborne Case) also maintained that a union could not employ its funds to support members of Parliament representing labor, nor could it tax its members for this purpose. This threatened to deprive the unions of the opportunities for political action in their own behalf. The labor vote was sufficiently sizable, however, to secure satisfactory legislation to annul the most damaging consequences of these decisions. In 1906, a Trade Disputes Act forbade the courts to entertain actions against the unions

for acts committed by or in their behalf; and in 1913, a Trade Union Act allowed the unions to use their funds for political purposes, provided the majority of members, through secret ballot, indicated their consent to such use, and provided members were not compelled to make contributions to this end. On the eve of the World War, therefore, the battle for recognition and rights had been substantially won, and by 1914 the unions had a membership of approximately 4,000,000. Throughout this period, the British unions concentrated their attention chiefly upon the improvement of wages and conditions of labor through direct economic pressure, though they did not neglect to use political methods for this purpose as well. Radicalism did not become as strong a force as it did in some quarters on the continent.

Next to Great Britain, the labor union movement enjoyed its greatest development in Germany. Political disunion and the tardiness of the industrial revolution, however, largely prevented its growth prior to the Franco-Prussian War. When it did take shape, it became identified with Marxian socialism and consequently suffered from repression under the Bismarckian legislation of the 1870's which was directed at the socialists. Nevertheless, a number of unions, secretly organized, continued to carry out their functions. In 1890, they were at length accorded full legal recognition and the right to employ the strike. Thereafter the unions were chiefly organized into three principal groups, one under the Social Democratic Party, one which was Catholic, and another which was expressly non-political. Including the smaller unions not affiliated with any of these groups, the unions in Germany in 1914 had a membership of 2,000,000 or more.

Trade unionism in France did not keep pace with that of either Germany or England. Eighteenth-century legislation against combinations of labor was vigorously enforced throughout more than the first half of the succeeding century, and what organization existed was largely secret. The continuing expansion of business, however, encouraged the working classes to redouble their agitation for the repeal of these statutes. In 1864, they won a partial success when they were given the right to unite for the purpose of the strike but were denied full opportunity to organize. Without abolishing these restrictions, the government, in 1868, announced that it would "tolerate" workingmen's combinations. A number of unions were thereafter organized, though without any basis founded in law, and it was not until 1884 that they were accorded full legality and were permitted to combine into federations. Despite this victory, the union move-

ment long lacked inherent strength. From the very first, the laborers became deadlocked in dispute as to whether the union should be used for political or non-political action. The National Federation of Syndicats (or local unions) which was formed in 1886 fell under Marxian influences and split for this reason. The opponents of the Marxian faction proceeded to organize *bourses du travail* (labor exchanges) in opposition to the syndicats, federated these nationally in 1892, and adopted the non-political general strike as the weapon with which to win satisfaction for the laborers. The controversy between these and the Marxians prevented united action by French labor until 1902 when an adjustment of differences permitted the formation of the General Confederation of Labor. This body adhered chiefly to the idea of non-political action through the general strike. It is to be noted that the French unions were distinctly more radical than either the German or the British. Generally speaking, they renounced the idea of winning small victories in favor of a complete economic or political revolution which would place production in the hands of the workers. Partly for this reason, and partly because of the continuing preponderance of agriculture in French life, the unions had a membership of only slightly more than a million in 1914.

Throughout the remainder of Europe the trades union movement paralleled in character and in growth that of the three major Powers. After the World War all of them experienced phenomenal expansion: membership in Britain rising by 1921 to about 8,000,000, that of Germany to 13,000,000, that of France to above 2,500,000. Throughout the world in 1921 it was estimated that there were 41,000,000 union members, 34,000,000 of whom were in Europe. Their great numerical strength and their generally identical aims inspired attempts at the formation of an International Labor Union Movement. Complete co-operation proved impossible, but in 1923 an international organization was formed at Vienna which combined some 7,000,000 various national union members and managed to co-ordinate some of their political programs. The Great Depression, and the rise of the Fascist and Nazi dictatorships, which "liquidated" organized labor in its entirety, both helped to emasculate the unions nationally and, of course, rendered the efforts to effect international union nugatory. The Third International of Soviet Russia alone has maintained a measure of international organization and this gives little indication of being popular among the workers.

Since before the war, but even more since the 1920's, a significant

change in union organization has been taking place. The older form of combining members of specialized trades in a variety of industries has been steadily losing ground. The newer method, represented in the United States by the C.I.O., is to organize both skilled and unskilled workers by industries.

Labor unionism formed the background for the development of *Syndicalism*, one of the most radical of the labor movements of modern times. Originating in France, chiefly through the influence of George Sorel, *Syndicalism* has aimed at destroying capitalist society through direct action of organized labor. The chief methods to be employed are sabotage, destructive interferences with business to gradually wear down the resistance of the capitalists; and the general strike of all organized labor, which it is expected will terminate capitalism by paralyzing it and the government which sustains it. Sorel's hope was that when the strike had fully carried out its functions, labor would take over the industries in which it was organized and run them; these might then be federated nationally and, ultimately, internationally. These ideas took a strong hold in France as well as in Spain and in Italy. It is interesting to note that the modern Syndicalist and Corporative State of Fascist Italy sprang partly from the Syndicalist movement which had existed there before and after the World War. But Syndicalism lost much of its popularity and influence in France after an attempted general strike in the 1920s turned into a miserable fiasco.

Much less radical than *Syndicalism*, but like it in the sense that it is based upon labor organization and aims at social transformation, is Guild Socialism in Britain. This had its beginnings shortly before the World War, but enjoyed its greatest prominence for a brief period after the war. There have been some marked differences of opinion among the exponents of this movement as to the way in which society is to be organized eventually. But, generally speaking, their project would call for the organization of individuals as producers into guilds or societies of workingmen, each controlling a particular field of production, and all of them together federated on a national scale. For what would concern individuals as consumers, they would keep the existing state, to preserve order, conduct foreign affairs, and regulate other matters of mutual concern. Above the state, which would represent the interests of the individuals as consumers, and above the federation of guilds, which would represent the individuals as producers, they would place a committee, composed of representatives of both, to co-ordinate social production and consumption.

One of the most fruitful adventures of labor, in its effort to protect and defend itself against some of the most serious evils of the factory system, was that represented by the co-operative movement. Chiefly English in origin and initial development, the co-operative is based upon the premise that labor by combining its efforts and pooling its capital can produce, distribute, and lend money under its own jurisdiction, setting up its own rules and saving for itself the profits which ordinarily go to capital. As can be gathered from this, three forms of co-operatives have taken shape: the producer's co-operative, the consumer's co-operative; and co-operative banking. The advantages which these have demonstrated have been apparent not only to labor but to very many of the *petit bourgeoisie* as well, so that increasingly the co-operative has been cutting across proletarian lines to include a larger and larger percentage of the consuming public.

The first successful co-operative venture was made by a small group of unemployed London weavers who set up, in 1844, the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers Society, a small scale consumer's co-operative. Through sound and careful management, this soon proved to be an extraordinary success, and similar co-operatives were launched elsewhere in the Kingdom and in continental Europe. These were supplemented by producer's co-operatives which first developed significantly in France, and by finance co-operatives which took shape largely in Germany. By 1914 there were 1,550 co-operative societies of various types in Great Britain, with a membership of 2,500,000 and a capitalization of £110,000,000; there were over 23,000 in Germany, with a membership of almost 3,500,000; and in France there were approximately 2,000. During and after the war the co-operative movement grew rapidly. By 1920 it was estimated that about 30,000,000 families in Europe, representing about 100,000,000 persons, had connections with consumers' co-operatives in one form or another. Great Britain kept the leadership, for approximately a third of her whole population was supplied in whole or in part by co-operatives, but numerically, the largest co-operatives have been established in Soviet Russia. Recently their growth in the Scandinavian countries has attracted considerable attention.

While labor organized co-operatives, established labor unions to attain better wages and working conditions, and demonstrated its numerical strength at the polls, governments did not remain indifferent. Throughout the nineteenth century, both because of sincere humanitarian motives and because of sheer expediency, the social conscience was sufficiently awakened to deal with the most patent

evils of the factory system. Reform was neither swift nor easy. The long established legal rights of property and the strong beliefs of the economic liberals in economic individualism had to be broken down. Neither of these admitted of interference by the government into the affairs of private property, and so long as the bourgeoisie, who staunchly defended non-interference, held a preponderant influence in government, there was little chance that factory regulation would effectively materialize. Concessions were made, but it was not until labor won the right to the ballot that these became extensive.

Naturally, it was in Britain, where the factory system first revealed its abuses, that the battle for government regulation was first fought and won. It would be useless to follow the history of this in great detail. Suffice it to say that in 1802 a meager beginning was made with the passage of the Health and Morals of Apprentices Act which dealt with the worst evils of employment among the "workhouse" children. It prohibited the apprenticing of children under the age of 9 and required that the employer fulfill certain minimum regulations to protect the health and the morals of those whose services he engaged. The act was pitifully inadequate, both because its enforcement was feeble and because it did not touch the increasingly acute problem of the "free labor" children. This latter deficiency was rectified in 1819, and in 1833 a famous Factory Act established for the first time the basis of effective enforcement. The principle that the state might properly interfere in the affairs of private business to ensure the social welfare had thus been established, though, it is significant to note, primarily with reference to the cotton factories where the gravest abuses had occurred. During the next several decades the legislation was broadened to include all textile and then nontextile factories, the minimum age for child labor was gradually and generally raised to twelve, the hours of work for women and children were fixed at ten per day, manufacturers were required to install safety devices and make adequate hygienic provisions, and the industries most dangerous to life and limb were strictly and minutely regulated in every respect. Most of this legislation had been embodied in separate acts dealing with specific problems in specific industries as they arose, creating, in consequence, a considerable amount of confusion and duplication. A Consolidating Act of 1878 and another of 1901 brought standardization and uniformity. Meanwhile, the mines had been placed under governmental jurisdiction, beginning with an important Mines Act of 1842, which was supplemented in many details by additional legislation throughout the remainder of the century.

While all of these measures eliminated an abundance of abuse, they did not touch the problem of wages. The acuteness of this was revealed by investigations into the so-called "sweating" trades, outside the immediate jurisdiction of the factory acts, and in 1909 an important Trade Boards Act was passed to meet it. The Act was made applicable at once to those businesses in which wages were especially low, but the Board of Trade was empowered to add others, with the consent of Parliament. This fixed rates of minimum wage, deviations from which were punishable by heavy fines. For thousands of the most destitute it brought substantial material relief, and for others it held out the promise of similar official intervention. Thus the government had not only assumed the responsibility of improving the conditions under which labor was employed, but it had also undertaken to regulate the wages of labor as well.

Great Britain had pioneered in regulatory legislation for the remainder of Europe and indeed for the whole industrial world. By the time the nations on the continent began to experience the evils of the factory system, the path to reforms already had been cleared and it was not surprising, therefore, that they should have embarked upon them without the same struggles which had appeared in Britain. By the outbreak of the World War, every country of the continent had a code of law establishing the conditions under which labor would be employed, and for the most part these had taken shape in accordance with British models. In France, a comparatively important act of 1842 established a minimum age at which children could be employed in certain types of factories and undertook to regulate the hours of employment for those who could be engaged, but for the most part there was no adequate legislation until the Third Republic had been established. A comprehensive and significant measure passed in 1874, applying to both mines and industries, firmly and soundly established the basis for all subsequent legislation. The minimum age of employment for children was generally fixed at twelve, night work for boys and girls under specified ages was prohibited, and adequate provision for sanitary measures was required. Amended in details many times before 1914, its fundamental principles were finally incorporated into an excellent Labor Code which was substantially completed that year. In Germany, the need for labor legislation became acute during the period of extraordinary industrial expansion which followed the establishment of the Empire. The legislation which had formerly prevailed in Prussia and then in the North German Confederation was spotty in details and feeble in application.

A law promulgated in 1878, setting up government inspectors for factories, brought some improvement, but it was not until 1891 that a really comprehensive and efficient industrial code was adopted. This prohibited employment of children under thirteen and required that those above that age could be employed only in case they had received a primary education; special regulations protected the health and the morals of the employees; and industries were obligated to equip themselves with appropriate safety devices. The other countries of the continent largely copied from these various codes.

Regulatory legislation made labor in the factories infinitely less dangerous and exhausting, but it did not provide security against unemployment and consequent loss of income occasioned by the convulsions of business, by accident, or by sickness, nor did it insure the worker against the misfortunes of old age when he could no longer secure employment. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an increasing number of economists and socially minded individuals, sometimes known as the state socialists, insisted that the state must assume the responsibility of providing social insurance to protect the worker against these insecurities.

Germany was the first nation to embark upon an extensive program of this type. The impelling motives were curiously mixed. Not only had Germany enjoyed a long tradition of paternalistic government which eased the way to such intervention, but even more the German Chancellor, Prince Bismarck, was faced with the mounting agitation of the Socialists, whom he had been unable to repress, and had come to the conclusion that the easiest thing to do would be to kill their agitation with kindness. By giving labor much of what it wanted, it was reasonable to expect that the popularity of the Socialists would probably diminish. Very largely with this in mind, Bismarck secured the passage of a Sickness Insurance Law in 1883, an Accident Insurance Law in 1884, and an Old Age Pensions Law in 1889. The funds for the first of these were established through contributions by the workers and the employers, two-thirds by the former and one-third by the latter, and these were administered to provide free medical attention and a percentage of regular wages during incapacity for half of each year. The employers alone provided the accident insurance funds which were used to relieve the worker during periods of incapacity or to pension his dependents in case of death. The Old Age Pensions Act guaranteed pensions to those in the lower wage brackets when they had attained a fixed age, the funds being supplied by equal contributions on the part of the

employer, the employee, and the state. No unemployment insurance was devised before the World War, although it was seriously discussed on a number of occasions, but the municipalities and state governments sought to fill this gap. After the War an extensive unemployment insurance program was inaugurated.

The German system of compulsory insurance was severely criticized in Great Britain when it was first instituted, yet, curiously enough, Great Britain soon outdistanced Germany in its use. In 1906 the Liberal Party inaugurated a program of social legislation to relieve the lot of the poor, and, within the next five years, insurance against accidents, old age pensions, sickness insurance, and even an experimental unemployment insurance plan were enacted into law. The Workmen's Compensation Act (1906) required employers to compensate laborers who sustained injuries impairing their earning power for one week or more, at a fixed percentage of their regular wages; required that in the event of a laborer's death a part of the medical and funeral expenses be borne by the employer; and if a family were solely dependent upon the deceased laborer for support, the employer was compelled to supply the family with the equivalent of three years' wages. Under the law, the employer did not need to secure insurance to meet these obligations, but he usually did. The Old Age Pensions Act (1908) differed fundamentally from that in operation in Germany. The funds providing for it, instead of being accumulated from contributions of employers, employees, and the government, were drawn from regular taxation. Every person, male or female, a British subject for twenty years and a British resident for twelve years, if he had a regular income of not more than approximately $150 per year, was entitled to a pension upon attaining the age of seventy. The amount given each recipient was graduated in accordance with his income. In 1911, the social insurance thus begun was further extended by an important National Insurance Act which provided insurance against sickness and, partially, against unemployment. Generally speaking, every British subject between the ages of sixteen and seventy who labored and received an income of not more than about $800 per year was compelled to take out insurance against sickness, the employer contributing a sum exactly equivalent to his, and the state supplying an additional contribution. From these funds, medical, maternity, invalidity, and sickness benefits were administered, the amounts varying with the need and in accordance with local conditions. The experiment with unemployment insurance involved the engineering and building trades. Workers above the age

of 16 engaged in either of these were required to make a regular contribution, approximately matched by the employer, and supplemented with subventions by the state. From the funds thus accumulated, the laborer was guaranteed a fixed weekly benefit for a period not exceeding fifteen weeks of each year in case he were unemployed. In 1916 and again in 1920 the provisions of this act were broadened to include all other categories of laborers, excepting agricultural laborers and domestics, and in 1924, when post-war unemployment had become acute, the maximum annual limit of fifteen weeks for the payment of benefits was abandoned for continuous benefits in case of need. With this act, the so-called "dole" was established. The more or less permanent character of British unemployment after the War and its growth during the depression made the "dole" a serious drain upon national finance, and other methods of relieving the situation, such as elaborate public works programs and the stimulation of British trade abroad, were resorted to.

France lagged behind Great Britain and Germany in the adoption of state-regulated compulsory insurance, but before 1914 had also worked out a fairly extensive program. Voluntary associations for protection against sickness long had been in existence, and the government brought them under its close supervision in a series of measures, culminating in 1898. Except for miners and seamen, for whom compulsory insurance was instituted, all sickness insurance remained voluntary under these state supervised mutual aid societies. Accident insurance was likewise voluntary, but through legislation between 1898 and 1906, it was established that employers were liable for all occupational accidents. In 1910, an Old Age Pensions Act, modeled to a considerable extent upon that operating in Germany, was passed. The pension fund, made up from contributions by employers as well as employees, was used to distribute benefits to all wage earners of the lower categories when they attained the age of 60 or 65. In 1930, a consolidating Social Insurance Law set up a complete and unified system of social insurance, providing for unemployment, as well as for old age, sickness, and invalidity.

That regulatory legislation and compulsory social insurance, copied throughout the whole of Europe, immensely improved the conditions of labor under the factory system cannot be gainsaid. Yet there were many who believed and who still believe that they were palliatives and not cures of fundamental evils in the existing order. Indeed, the question has been raised as to whether any kind of legislation can ever hope to deal with these effectively, especially so long

as it is based upon the idea of perpetuating capitalism. Among an increasing number of the more radical socially minded, the conviction grew that only a complete and thorough transformation of the economic, and consequently also the social and political bases of life, could bring lasting improvement. Adherents of this view have popularly been called "socialists."

A complete and wholly accurate definition of socialism is quite impossible for it has meant so many different things to so many different men. Few words have been so badly abused and so generally misunderstood. Everything from revolutionary programs aiming at the destruction of the rights of private property to remedial legislation merely pretending to mitigate some of the evils of capitalism has at one time or another been labeled "socialistic." To avoid this popular confusion, it would be well to bear in mind that socialism as a distinct movement has had three central objectives which clearly distinguish it from other reform movements. In the first place, socialism aims to abolish private property which it holds to be the basis of capitalism and consequently the source of existing evils. Land and factories, the agencies of production and of distribution, would become social rather than private property so that all of the people would have immediate access to the means of securing a livelihood. There has been no uniformity of opinion among socialists as to whether the ownership of one's own clothes, money, and house should be retained or abandoned. Secondly, all of the facilities of production and distribution, after they have been socialized, would become the property of the state which would manage them in the common interest. And finally, the state would require that all members of society contribute to social production. There would be no leisure class living upon the fruits of private property or, as it has been claimed, upon the exploitation of the labor of others. There is little agreement on the method by which individual effort should be remunerated under this system, whether in accordance with one's needs or on the basis of one's industry, initiative, skill, and ability. It is claimed that the attainment of these three objectives will give substance to the vague doctrine of equality by assuring all men equality of opportunity, put an end to unhappy social conflicts by eliminating class rivalries, and make possible common human understanding, thus ensuring international peace.

Socialism was essentially the product of nineteenth-century industrialism, but its original philosophical inspiration came from the eighteenth century. It will be recalled that during the Age of the Enlight-

enment there was widespread confidence in the rationality and perfectibility of man and a great deal of concern over the fact that existing social and political institutions hindered rather than helped the attainment of human happiness. To Rousseau and his followers the original and greatest evil, from which all others had sprung, was the existence of private property. If this were abolished so that man could return to his natural state; if men could be permitted to give their own instincts free play without external compulsion, it was expected that human happiness might be realized. To perfect humanity it was, therefore, required that there be provided the proper environment, where each individual could be given full opportunity to develop according to his capacity, and where private property and the profit motive would not be exalted.

The application of these ideas to the problems which nineteenth-century industrialism raised, produced what is commonly called utopian socialism. Its first able exponent was Count Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), an eccentric individual of aristocratic descent who had made and lost a fortune during the period of the French Revolution, and who spent his last years of abject poverty searching for the cure of social misery. His writings were voluminous, abstract, and ofttimes confused, but they contained the germ of an idea which exerted a powerful influence over the next generation of French social thinkers. St. Simon's basic hypothesis, unlike that of his eighteenth century predecessors, was that the greatest happiness of mankind had not existed in the remote and "natural" past but was yet to come. The machine gave promise of utopia provided it could be properly managed in the interest of all. For this purpose, he believed it necessary that the state take over the control of production and distribution, but, having great confidence in individual initiative and enterprise, he recommended that everyone should be rewarded in accordance with his industry and skill. St. Simon hoped that socialism would hold out to the individual even greater inducements than the competitive system.

The foremost exponents of the utopian idea that ideally created environments would eliminate social abuses and bring human happiness were Charles Fourier (1772-1837) of France and Robert Owen (1771-1858) of England. Both drafted plans for the organization of ideal communities and attempted to put them into operation. Fourier's scheme was based on the conviction that the ideal community would be one comprising approximately 1,800 persons, working co-operatively in occupations which were congenial. When all of society had

been organized into these communities or phalanxes. Fourier hoped that they might be federated on a world scale. He did not expect by this means to equalize all classes or even to destroy all private property, but he did expect that the worst abuses of the prevailing economic order would be eliminated. A number of attempts were made to establish these phalanxes experimentally, but all but a few ended in prompt failure. One of the most famous was Brook Farm in the United States.

Robert Owen was the most interesting of the utopian socialists. Born into humble circumstances, through his own abilities he had become one of the foremost textile manufacturers of Great Britain. Always keenly conscious of the evils of the factory system, he had also become one of the earliest exponents of factory regulation and had himself undertaken to transform his own factory community at New Lanark into a social reform experiment. His disgust and impatience at the slowness with which other industrialists and Parliament followed his leadership eventually encouraged him to propagate the idea of more radical social reform. Much like Fourier, he believed that society should be organized into small, virtually self-sufficing communities with an average population of from 500 to 3,000. These were to be basically agricultural, but with a variety of occupations, and all of the members were to live under one roof and eat from a common kitchen. Owen believed that these communities might be established by private individuals, by local governments, or by the state, and that ultimately they might be federated on a national or international scale. He expended much of his own personal fortune setting this plan into operation, but all of his experiments ended in failure.

It will be noted that the utopian socialists wished to transform the whole of society; their concern was not solely with the industrial workers. Moreover, their schemes were impractical both because they placed too much confidence in the sweetness and reasonableness of human nature, and because their piecemeal experiments suffered the great disadvantage of competing with capitalistic production. The recognition of these deficiencies inspired the more practically minded, who agreed with the general objectives of the utopians, to search for more effective means of attaining them. Among these, the most conspicuous figure was Louis Blanc (1813-1882) of France.

Blanc, an able and popular journalist, was convinced that the problem was chiefly that of the workingmen, who might be expected to help themselves best through their own combined efforts. To make

this possible, he urged first that the state should be reconstructed on a broad democratic basis so that the workers might gain the voice in government which they deserved because of their numbers and interests, and, second, that when democracy had been achieved the state should set up "national workshops" which the workers themselves would manage in their interest. When once the state had made it possible for the workers to control the agencies of production and distribution, its intervention would cease, for the workingmen would be quite capable of running the workshops themselves. Blanc's ideas took strong root among the working classes and exerted great influence during the revolution of 1848 when, for a time, it appeared that the provisional republican government would undertake to set up the contemplated "national workshops." The whole program was, however, effectively emasculated by the more conservative bourgeois elements.

Much like Louis Blanc, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864) of Germany believed that the workers could save themselves from the abuses of capitalism only through their combined efforts. He too espoused the complete democratization of government in labor's interest and urged the establishment by the state of workshops which the workers themselves would control and operate. Lassalle, however, was a much more trenchant and brilliant critic of the capitalistic system than was Blanc, and in many respects he bore a closer affinity to the Marxian or scientific school of socialist thought which was taking shape during his times.

Judged by its full and reasoned argument and by its profound and continuing influence upon social thought and action, the most important socialistic doctrine was the so-called scientific socialism of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). The former of these, son of an ambitious Jewish lawyer, had prepared in philosophy and history for an academic future, but finding employment difficult had embarked upon a short but stormy career as a journalist during the turbulent 1840's. His ardent espousal of democracy and a free press brought suppression of his newspaper by the Prussian government in 1843, and for the next five years he eked out a livelihood as a journalist in Paris and Brussels. In France he first became keenly conscious of the degradation of the proletariat and turned his thought to potential reforms in their behalf. Personal discussions with Louis Blanc, independent study of the utopian socialists, and painstaking economic researches, combined with the Hegelian philosophy which he had studied at the University of Berlin, formed

the background of his doctrine which gradually matured during the remainder of his life. Closely associated with Marx from the days of his exile in Paris, was Friedrich Engels, son of a wealthy German cotton manufacturer, and for many years manager of his father's branch factory near Manchester, England. Like Marx, Engels had been deeply moved by the plight of the workers, and had become an active exponent of reform. He too had fallen under the spell of Hegelian philosophy. An uncommonly close friendship developed between these two reformers and revolutionaries, and throughout the remainder of their lives they collaborated in the exposition of their doctrine, which they developed with the same care as the scientist and which they hopefully believed was "scientific."

The essential principles of Marxian socialism are to be found principally in two documents: the *Communist Manifesto*, issued jointly by Marx and Engels in the year of revolutions, 1848; and *Das Kapital*,[1] a voluminous treatise, which purported to be the philosophical, historical, and economic demonstration of their doctrine. Briefly, these principles might be outlined as (1) the concept of "economic determinism" or the materialistic interpretation of history; (2) the labor theory of value; (3) the doctrine of surplus value; and (4) the idea of an inevitable class war, growing out of the logic of events and terminating in the destruction of the capitalistic order.

The materialistic interpretation of history is fundamental to the entire Marxian thesis; the whole argument is built around it, and by means of it the Marxians have believed they could predict with reasonable accuracy the course of events to come. This interpretation asserts that all social and political institutions—religion, government, the schools—and the patterns of thought in any given period are the direct outgrowth of the prevailing economic system of production. Changes in the mode of production produce changes in institutions and in patterns of thought, but not without struggle and conflict. The class which has attained to power establishes vested interests which it will not freely sacrifice, and it yields only when another class has grown sufficiently numerous and sufficiently powerful forcefully to displace it. History, Marx was convinced, was merely the record of this conflict for power among the classes of human society. In a sense, this was the translation to social studies of the biological concept of evolution; but even more it was an adaptation of Hegelian dialectics to social and economic "science." For the convolutions of

[1] The first volume of *Das Kapital* was published in 1867; the other two were not printed until after Marx's death.

society followed the uniform course of the dialectic from synthesis through antithesis to synthesis, and then began all over again until the proletariat attained power, and by eliminating class distinctions called a halt to class conflict. Marx painstakingly, and with considerable skill, fitted the course of historical events from remote to contemporary times into this preconceived pattern, and consequently lent logical force to his contention that the capitalistic system, like all earlier systems of production, contained the germs of its own destruction.

In analyzing the factors which would lead to the ultimate destruction of capitalism, Marx placed special emphasis upon his theory of value. All value, he believed was derived from labor. This was not a new idea; indeed, Marx derived it from some of the soundest of the "classical" economists, but he gave it a new twist. Although labor produces all value, Marx pointed out that labor does not receive in return the full value it produces. All that it receives, like any other marketable commodity, is its market value which is regulated by the accidents of supply and demand. If labor is abundant and the demand of business is low, wages fall; and, conversely, if the supply is low and the demand high, wages rise. In general, the level approaches bare subsistence; it never equals the value which labor produces. From this observation, Marx deduced his idea of surplus value, which he distinguished as the most important feature of the capitalistic system.

Briefly, surplus value, as Marx explained it, was the difference in value of what labor produced and what it received in return in the form of wages. For example, a laborer might be hired to perform certain operations during the course of a twelve-hour day. In six hours he may have produced goods which in value equal the wages for his twelve hours of labor. Nevertheless, he is required to work the remaining six hours. The goods which he produces in this latter period represent surplus value, which is absorbed by the capitalist. In this fashion, labor is perpetually exploited. With surplus value, the capitalist proceeds to enlarge his plant, secure new equipment, and purchase luxuries. For a time, Marx believed that the expansion of business encouraged in this way would tend to strengthen capitalism, and even lead to slight improvements in the normal conditions of labor, but eventually it would bring disaster to capitalism. A few would accumulate more surplus value than others, and to avoid competition, they would ruin or absorb the businesses of the less fortunate bourgeoisie. Eventually, only a small number would control all

of the facilities of production, and the lesser bourgeoisie would be driven into the ranks of the proletariat. The latter, meanwhile, would face an increasingly desperate situation, for the continuous development of technological improvements would reduce the demand for labor and create a great army of unemployed. Sooner or later these would find their lot intolerable and they would rise up to destroy their oppressors.

Thus would occur the inevitable class conflict between the steadily diminishing body of the bourgeoisie and the increasing body of the proletariat. While this is in the very nature of things, Marx held that it is the task of the socialists to prepare the way by stimulating the class consciousness of the proletariat and to hasten the dissolution of the capitalistic order. Neither Marx nor Engels clearly and definitely stated whether this process of hastening the course of events was to be peaceful or violent, for both methods were suggested. Best opinion seems to hold to the view that the choice depended entirely upon the circumstances of the moment and the locality involved. It is erroneous to conceive of the early Marxians solely as blood-thirsty revolutionaries.

When the proletariat had finally succeeded in winning political power, Marx believed their first task would be that of setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat. The duties of this dictatorship were not clearly defined, but its essential purpose was to be that of uprooting the vestiges of capitalism, economically, politically, socially, and intellectually. Since ideas and traditions are tenacious, it was not believed that this objective would be realized in anything less than a generation. But ultimately, the last remnants of capitalism would have disappeared, society would own and operate all of the means of production, and the state, then no longer needed, would wither completely away. Class conflict would have ceased, for only one class would have remained, and the dialectic which previously had operated with inexorable force would cease to function. Then the era of peace and human happiness would have dawned.

Even in their own time these contentions and prophecies of Marx and Engels were exposed to serious criticism, not only by the conservative bourgeoisie, but by men of radical inclination who were prepared to accept a socialist program. Statistics revealed that the assumption of the steady decline in numbers of the bourgeoisie was wholly incorrect, even though control of production became concentrated in the hands of fewer individuals; the supposed continuous degradation of the proletariat was not forthcoming; it seemed dif-

ficult to fit all individuals in society neatly into two distinct and mutually hostile classes, for there was and still is a confusing overlapping and intermixture of social groups; and, finally, serious doubt was cast upon the materialistic interpretation of history, both because it seemed to place undue emphasis upon purely material considerations, and because it was illogical to assume that if it operated at one epoch it should suddenly cease at another. The idea of class conflict, in particular, disconcerted many, for it seemed better to emphasize inter-class co-operation and evolutionary progress in the direction of socialism rather than to stir up hatreds, non-co-operation, and violence.

A group of "revisionists," headed by Eduard Bernstein of Germany, set about to revise the Marxian doctrine in a more conservative sense. They urged collaboration of the proletariat with the democratic forces in each country, welcomed legislative reforms in the interest of the worker, and aimed at gradually taking over the government when the time was ripe. Then they intended to realize the same objectives as the pure Marxians, the socialization of all of the facilities of production and distribution. The most important group of "revisionists" anywhere in Europe were the Fabians of Great Britain, a relatively small body of intellectuals with such prominent members as George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells, who devoted themselves to the task of educating the public to the necessity of ultimate socialization.

This conflict between the Marxians and the "revisionists" was best reflected in their struggles within the various socialist political parties which Marx and his followers had created. It is important to note that this venture into socialist political organization was one of the most significant contributions of Marx to the modern socialist movement. In 1864, he had created the International Workingmen's Association, generally called the First International, to spread his doctrine among the proletariat on an international scale. As an institution this was potentially weak and torn by internal dissension, and it formally dissolved in 1879.[1] But some of the national sections which sprang from it survived and flourished. The most important of these was the Social Democratic Party of Germany, which first adopted the Marxian program in entirety and aimed to paralyze the bourgeois government by non-co-operation. Eventually, however, it was won to "revi-

[1] A "Second International" formed from the several national socialist parties was established in 1889. This was disrupted by the World War. In 1919, the more radical or Communistic Groups organized a Third International at Moscow.

sionism" and persisted in this course until its extinction under Hitler. Both before and after the World War it was the largest and most influential party of Germany. The Social Democratic Party became the model for similar parties elsewhere, and by 1914 socialism was an important political force in all of the states of Europe. Except for relatively small left-wing groups which professed adherence to pure Marxism, the majority of these socialist parties were dominated by the revisionists. Historically, the most important of the minority purists were the Bolsheviks of Russia who eventually attained to power and set up a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Politically, socially, and intellectually Marxian socialism has been and continues to be one of the greatest forces of modern times. The very fear of it compelled many of the most unyielding to make concessions to the working class. Without it, it may well be that many of the great reforms which have been achieved to date would not have been realized.



LUNCH BOX
Symbolic of modern industrialized labor.

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The Political Compromise

A. Business and politics

Consciously or unconsciously, people continually evaluate governments in terms of the degree to which they contribute to their material welfare. The farmer believes that government to be best which ensures a stable market for his produce and low cost for the supplies he must buy; the manufacturer wants those things which will contribute most to the prosperity of his enterprise; and the laborer expects government to provide him steady work at a good wage. Sometimes selfishly, but more often because of shortsightedness, each one interprets the common good in terms of his own, and believes that if only his point of view could prevail everyone would be happy. The deficiencies in his scheme of things are all too likely to be ignored or minimized, while its virtues are exaggerated. From the clash of these conflicting views, political opinions are formed, political philosophies evolve, and revolutions are born.

Time and again this simple truth has been demonstrated. The medieval townsman chafed under the restraints of the feudal system and so espoused the cause of national monarchy; the feudal nobility resented the consequent loss of privileges and immunities and obstructed it. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the commercial bourgeoisie favored the national system of economy, with state intervention, known as mercantilism; after it, with equally good reason, the industrial bourgeoisie insisted that the state must not interfere with business. The landed aristocracy of England secured tariffs to protect agriculture, but the industrial bourgeoisie, after a political revolution, abandoned them. The workers of all the industrial countries demanded democratic governments in the hope that by being able to control them they could redress their grievances. These are merely a few of the more obvious cases in point to demonstrate that there is

always a close correlation between one's economic status and his political views.

It is natural for men, however, to obscure their material ambitions behind lofty ethical and moral principles. For the bourgeois "liberals" of the nineteenth century, the struggle for complete economic liberty was merely part of a great crusade in behalf of human freedom, including such inestimable boons as freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Similarly, the exponents of economic individualism in contemporary times justify their views on the score that they alone can preserve freedom and liberty. The Marxian socialists claim for their system not only distributive justice but the eventual achievement of a classless society, in which human conflicts will be absent, and in which all men will live in a natural state of peace and contentment. Fascists and Nazis insist that through their schemes unhappy social conflicts give way to genuine social co-operation in the common interest. In such fashion, by appeals to sentiment and emotion, by postulating an ideal goal and inspiring faith in its achievement, rather than by emphasizing what is basely materialistic, do men build up the justification for their objectives. This does not mean to say, however, that there is not much genuine altruism among the zealots of every cause; there are, in fact, many who are prepared to make every personal sacrifice in behalf of an ideal. But for most people, idealism is heavily adulterated with personal, material ambition, consciously restrained, perhaps, but no less real.

The degree to which men succumb to political panaceas is oftentimes the best measure of their economic distress. It is common practice to place the blame for material misfortunes upon the government, especially in times of acute economic disorder. Then political changes can be made most easily, and if these seem inadequate or unsatisfactory, revolutions may ensue. It is not mere coincidence that the most far-reaching political compromises and the most important political revolutions since the nineteenth century have occurred in periods of depression. Ideal objectives may have obscured material motives, but the driving force in each case was the economic factor. It was thus with the democratization and socialization of governments in nineteenth century Europe; it was no less so with the Communist, Fascist, and Nazi revolutions and with the evolution of the New Deal in the United States.

The revolutionary period in Europe, from 1830 to 1848, to be discussed in the next part of this chapter, provides an excellent case study. When it opened, government was largely in the hands of

landed aristocracy and functioned in their interest; when it closed, the new industrial bourgeoisie had won a stake in government for themselves in many quarters. As usual, the old order did not give way completely but was compromised with the new; the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy found a basis for co-operation, and the mass of the people were still excluded from control. It is significant to note that this was a period of industrial expansion and one of recurring crises. There were too many obstructions to business to suit the industrialists, and there was too much insecurity to please the growing proletariat of the towns. It was natural, therefore, that both should seek appropriate change, and this they did under the banners of liberalism, constitutionalism, nationalism, and humanitarianism. These were goals upon which all, even the proletariat which stood to gain little in material benefits, could agree.

B. Bourgeois and proletarian

The number and extent of revolutionary movements in Europe between 1830 and 1848 is so great that it is impossible to deal with all of them in a brief survey. There were frequent upheavals in Italy, France, Hungary, and the German countries, and occasional ones in Poland, Greece, Serbia, Belgium, and Holland, to mention only the more important. In each case, peculiar local conditions determined the time and character of revolutions, and yet, in a general way, they were alike. Everywhere the revolutionaries sought to displace arbitrary government with liberal constitutional government, and in those areas where national unity or independence had not yet been achieved, this was supplemented by nationalist aspirations. The revolutionaries themselves were drawn everywhere from the same general classes of the citizenry: the intellectuals, the liberal nobility, the middle class, and the urban proletariat. In each case, the revolutionary movements were strongest in the towns, a certain indication that they were closely connected with the new industrialism. The country remained quiescent, was even hostile to revolution, and eventually frustrated revolutionary successes or forced the revolutionaries to give ground. Those regions which were still preponderantly agricultural experienced few important changes, those with large and growing urban communities experienced the most. Finally, among the distinguishing characteristics of this revolutionary epoch, it is interesting to make note of the unique leadership of Paris and of France. In every important instance, revolutionary movements which began there

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. BY HONORÉ DAUMIER (1808-1879).

The inscription reads "Do not meddle."

Daumier is most widely known as a caricaturist, but he was also a painter of unusual power, with a deep understanding of humanity.

spread quickly to the rest of Europe. Paris needed only to give the signal to inspire all liberals with fighting courage.

The doctrines of liberalism to which most of the revolutionaries subscribed were partly the heritage of eighteenth-century rationalism and partly the outgrowth of prevailing economic thought. From the former was derived the belief that the individual must be freed from all restraints of class and government, that freedom of speech and press must be unimpaired, that everyone should have the right to worship as he pleased, and that equality before the law must be ensured. To these, nineteenth-century intellectuals added the desire to free nations from "restraints" and "oppressions" in much the same way that individuals were to be emancipated. From the economic theories of the classical economists, the revolutionaries derived their belief that economically the individual must also be completely free, free to compete, free to employ or secure employment on such terms as he could make, free to trade where he pleased. The fusion of these two streams of liberalism, one philosophic and the other economic, gave the liberal movement of the first half of the nineteenth century its peculiar and specific quality. It championed free thought and

religious liberty; it called for government which would be representative and constitutional in such form as to allow the dominance of the propertied bourgeoisie; it insisted that the state must not actively intervene in economic life, but must merely protect property and preserve order; it called for untrammeled economic individualism, demanding especially that legislation benefiting the landed aristocracy be abandoned; it asked for peace abroad; and it championed the cause of national independence.

While these views predominated among the intellectuals, the middle class, and the humanitarian nobility, they were not wholly acceptable to advanced radicals and to the proletariat. Among the latter, growing doctrines of socialism took root, and there appeared champions of democratic, republican government who believed that the state must not only be controlled by the people, but must exercise its authority over economic life in such fashion as to protect the proletarian interests. These were not without influence in the revolutionary movements of this period, but the mass of conservative opinion, bourgeois and peasant, was against them.

Economic unrest, occasioned by decline in trade and consequent unemployment, coupled with accumulating discontent with the post-Napoleonic reaction, opened the era of "liberal" revolutions in Paris during the summer of 1830. For six years, King Charles X (1824-1830), leader of the reactionaries in France, engaged in an active campaign to restore the old order, heaping insult upon injury to bourgeois liberals and proletarian radicals. The press was stifled, freedom of assembly was impaired, and real fear was engendered lest the privileges of the clergy and the nobility be restored. The interests of the Church were openly fostered; its monopoly of education was ensured. As for the nobility, Charles X sought to reimburse them financially for their losses of privileges and lands. For this purpose, the public debt was reorganized in 1825, and the interest on bonds was reduced from 5 percent to 3 percent, inflicting a heavy loss upon the bourgeoisie. All who had profited by the revolutionary settlement were aroused by these measures to such opposition that, despite restricted and controlled elections, the Crown met with a series of decisive rebuffs at the polls in 1829 and 1830. Following the last of these in July, 1830, Charles, ignoring the advice of his friends, issued a series of ordinances, the July Ordinances, substantially nullifying the Constitutional Charter. Besides dissolving the newly elected Chamber before it had assembled and calling for new elections, these ordinances so rearranged the electoral procedure as to place the vote

almost exclusively in the hands of the great landowners. This was too much for the bourgeoisie and the workmen of Paris. Two days later, July 28, the barricades were raised in the streets, and Charles, without effective military support, was forced to flee to England in disguise.

The proletariat who had won the revolution wanted to establish a republic, but the bourgeoisie, who wished no such extreme "solution," took the initiative in inviting Louis Philippe, head of the Orleanist branch of the Bourbon house, to the throne. His liberal conduct during the French Revolution had ensured him a popular following and made him an acceptable compromise candidate.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary movement had been spreading rapidly to other sections of Europe. Directly inspired by the example of Paris, Belgian nationalists rose in rebellion against their Dutch oppressors and declared their independence, which was subsequently recognized in 1839 by a six-power treaty. Plans of the conservative states to frustrate this Belgian undertaking were forestalled by the stern attitude of Britain and France, and by the danger of revolutions nearer home. Indeed, when the Russian government ordered troops in Poland to prepare themselves for the coercion of Belgium, the intensely nationalistic Polish peoples rose in unsuccessful revolt. Foreign assistance, upon which they had calculated, failed to appear, and the Russian government was soon able to reassert its authority. The Polish constitution was revoked and hundreds of Polish patriots were sent to the wastes of Siberia or forced to flee the country in exile.

Uprisings in the German countries, mostly in the south, resulted in the modification of some existing constitutions and the adoption of new ones, but Germany as a whole remained quiescent. Neither in Austria nor in Prussia did the liberals yet dare to raise their heads. In central Italy, revolutions broke out in Modena, Parma, and the Papal States, but all of them proved abortive, partly through lack of organization and partly because both Austria and France intervened to re-establish "order." Outside of Belgium and France, the revolutionary movements of 1830 produced few changes, but liberals and nationalists were nevertheless inspired with confidence and hope. Throughout the next decade, their agitation grew more bold and their preparations for revolution more complete.

It was in France that typical mid-nineteenth century liberalism scored its first notable success. The bourgeoisie had capitalized upon the July Revolution by choosing a bourgeois king and establishing a

bourgeois frame of government. They rewrote the Constitutional Charter, depriving the king of his absolute sovereignty and his arbitrary powers, and establishing parliamentary government with ministries responsible to an elected bicameral legislature. In the customary fashion, they restricted the ballot to themselves by setting up tax qualifications which effectively excluded all of the workers and most of the peasants; only about 250,000 property-holding citizens were accorded this privilege. Nevertheless, this was regarded as a "liberal" settlement for it placed power in the hands of men of wealth and brains, men who believed they knew and understood best what was good for the state.

In the very nature of things, the government of France during the reign of Louis Philippe (1830-1848) functioned by, through, and for the middle class. Business was actively encouraged by the importation of machinery from abroad and by the development of systems of communication, especially railroads, for which the government lent its financial aid. At the same time, the policy of *laissez-faire* was scrupulously applied with reference to manufacturing and the accumulation of wealth. The state neither engaged in business for itself nor interfered with the business which it encouraged, and it rigorously enforced the legislation against trades unions on the score that they prevented "freedom of contract." To please the business interests, moreover, it abandoned the liberal doctrine of free trade, keeping intact such tariffs as would best protect the infant industries of the country. In other matters, such as education and religion, the government sought to apply accepted liberal principles. The number of schools was increased, the Church being allowed to continue jurisdiction over the elementary ones, but the secondary and higher schools were brought more under state control. Religious toleration was guaranteed, although the Concordat of 1801 was preserved.

The chief agents of this liberal, bourgeois compromise were Adolphe Thiers (1797-1877) and François Guizot (1787-1874), the former the dominating minister of the government before 1840, and the latter from 1840 to 1848. Both were bourgeois intellectuals, famed historians and men of wealth; both were distrustful of the masses and admirers of the middle class virtues. Of the two, Thiers was inclined to be the more openminded, but neither could be accused of radicalism. These two men represented different factions among the governing middle class: the Party of Progress which, with Thiers, favored gradual though not excessive democratization at home and assistance to

FRANÇOIS GUIZOT

liberal revolutionaries abroad; and the Party of Resistance which, with Guizot, regarded the revolution as completed at home and favored peace abroad at any price. Louis Philippe, who was arbitrary at heart, much preferred the latter, though he encouraged the Party of Progress to assume power in the first decade of his regime with the hope of killing it by kindness. In 1840, the threat of a serious crisis accomplished his purpose, and henceforth for the remainder of his reign the Party of Resistance was in undisputed control. By bribery and undisguised electoral manipulations, Guizot so consistently and so effectively built up his majorities in the Chamber of Deputies that the government seemed unassailable.

Yet the strength of the government was more apparent than real. While it satisfied the upper bourgeoisie by enabling them to enrich themselves, it was regarded with increasing disfavor by most of the remainder of the people. The workers denounced it for its oppressive and rigorous application of the laws against labor; the petty bourgeoisie, especially those of more advanced views, and many of the peasants, were disgusted with its corruption and its legislation in behalf of the few; and many of the sympathizers with the Bourbon cause, drawn from all walks of life, objected to the government because it was usurped and illegitimate. This accumulating opposition was reflected in attempts which were made upon the life of the King, each of which called forth restrictions of press and assembly, and also in the growth of radical, revolutionary parties.

The most extreme of these parties were the Socialist and the Republican. The former, led by Louis Blanc, was almost exclusively working-class. It demanded the complete destruction of monarchical institutions in favor of a democracy which should function in the interest of the workers. The Republican Party, made up chiefly of

liberal-minded bourgeois and artisans, was more conservative in its views, but it also favored universal manhood suffrage and republican institutions.

On the opposite wing were the conservative monarchists, the Legitimists as they were called, drawn from the landed classes and actively supported by many of the clergy who disliked Louis Philippe's religious policies. Less conservative than they but at the same time somewhat more radical than the governing party, was the so-called Dynastic Opposition of the Chamber. Made up of bourgeois who favored perpetuation of the Orleans dynasty, this group nevertheless believed that further extensions of the franchise, but not universal manhood suffrage, should be made. The differences among these various opposition factions precluded the possibility of combining their strength, and so long as Guizot successfully manipulated the elections there seemed little prospect that any one of them would succeed. Least of all the socialists and the republicans, who had come to believe that their aspirations represented ideals to be accomplished only in the distant future. Yet with unexpected swiftness the bourgeois monarchy collapsed in 1848, and the radical parties were the first to profit from its destruction.

The real reason for this collapse was economic unrest and unemployment which had grown increasingly acute from 1846 forward, and had put the proletariat of Paris in an ugly mood. Having already learned to dislike the King and Guizot for their labor policies, they were now ready for revolution. The precipitating cause of collapse, however, the incident which incited the rebellious mob, was the government's tampering with "Reform Banquets." In 1847, after the press had been muzzled and the right of assembly restricted, the Dynastic Opposition resorted to the device of "banquets," harmless affairs, at which they could express their demands for moderate reforms. The fact that these were attended by socialists and republicans gave them a reputation for radicalism which they scarcely deserved, and inspired fear in governmental circles. Because of this, a banquet scheduled for February 22, 1848, was prohibited. This was too much. On the day appointed for the banquet, crowds roamed the streets demanding reform and the dismissal of Guizot, and the day following they got so completely out of hand that the armed forces, many of whom joined with the rioters, were unable to restore order. Guizot resigned, but it was already too late, for the barricades had been thrown up and the people now demanded the abdication of the King himself. Like Charles X before him, Louis Philippe lacked the means

to defend his throne, and so he abdicated, February 24, and fled in disguise to England.

The sudden collapse of the monarchy left the radical mob in control. The Chamber of Deputies which had acted upon the advice of the departed king and named his infant son as his successor, was forced to abandon this decision because of riotous demonstrations in favor of a republic; and, on February 25, a provisional republican government was formed. This was established upon the initiative of middle class republicans, headed by Lamartine, who favored republican institutions but opposed radical social legislation such as the proletarians, led by Louis Blanc, were demanding. The popularity of the latter with the Paris workers was so great, however, that their representation in the government could not be completely prevented, and therefore three of them, including Blanc, were invited to participate. The six others were chiefly middle class republicans.

From the very beginning, this Second Republic lived a precarious existence. The members of the provisional government were able to agree only upon the establishment of republican institutions with universal manhood suffrage. On the important question of whether this should be a socialist or a middle class republic there were irreconcilable differences. The socialists, with the enthusiastic support of the Parisian proletariat, were determined to institute the socialist republic without delay; the middle class members preferred to temporize until the country had spoken in popular elections for a National Constituent Assembly, which was scheduled to draft a permanent constitution. There were sound reasons for believing that the mass of propertied peasants could be rallied against the radicals who were bent upon regulating the rights of property in the interest of the worker. It was precisely because the socialists understood this as thoroughly as their opponents that they demanded prompt reform before the Assembly should meet.

The views of the radicals at first prevailed, for, until sentiment in the country had had enough time to crystallize, the Provisional Government was completely at the mercy of the Paris mob. The National Guard which had been reserved formerly for the middle class was opened to all citizens; a special commission was created to investigate and recommend necessary social reforms; elections of the National Assembly were delayed; and "National Workshops" which the socialists demanded were established in an emasculated form. These "National Workshops," as conceived by Blanc and his friends, were supposed to be co-operative enterprises with the encouragement

and assistance of the state and managed by the workers themselves. The middle class republicans could not be persuaded to accept them, and a poor compromise was adopted in the form of a national public works program which was both inadequate and badly managed. Despite this modification of this plan the stubborn resistance of the middle class majority to social legislation, the workers of Paris were inspired with great optimism in the spring of 1848. Trees of liberty were planted in the city, the red flag was adopted as the national emblem, and the possibilities of destroying the rights of private property were openly and seriously discussed.

Meanwhile, however, the opposition of the country had been steadily gathering force, and as early as April the conservative members of the Provisional Government were able to accumulate sufficient reliable armed forces to hold the mob in check. Fresh demands that the elections of the National Assembly be delayed were therefore ignored. The elections were held in May, and the Assembly met the following month. As was to be expected, the members, who were chosen by universal manhood suffrage, reflected the predominating conservative sentiment of the country. Only a few were socialists, the majority was composed of middle class republicans and upper class monarchists. In consequence, the period of social experimentation promptly ceased, the subsidies to the workers of Paris were cut off, and the National Workshops even in their modified form were closed. This sudden retrenchment reduced the poorer citizens of the capital to a state of unspeakable misery and occasioned a violent rebellion against the Assembly. Faced with this emergency, the Assembly placed virtual dictatorial powers in the hands of General Cavaignac, and the revolution was stamped out in blood. These terrible "June Days," as they were called, ended with the death of some ten thousand workers, transportation of four thousand more to the penal colonies, and execution or imprisonment of most of the radical agitators. The socialists had been beaten, and the breach between the urban proletariat and the bourgeoisie had been measurably widened.

Freed from troubles in the capital, the Assembly set leisurely about the task of laying the foundations for the Second Republic. Moderate concessions were made to all classes and factions; the sacred rights of property were confirmed; as a sop to the workers, a commission was established to investigate social reforms; the Catholics were promised control of education; and for the radical democrats, the tricolor was adopted as the national flag and the *Marseillaise* as the national anthem. Slavery in the colonies was abolished, and the crim-

inal law was made more humanitarian. As to the form of government, the constitution adopted by the Assembly in 1848 called for the establishment of a democratic republic. The executive authority was vested in a president, elected for a four-year term by universal manhood suffrage. Like the President in the United States he was to be permitted to choose his own cabinet, but was neither allowed to veto acts of the legislature nor to stand for re-election. The legislature, a single chamber body, was also to be popularly elected, and was to be solely responsible for legislation.

This settlement was eminently bourgeois. During the few years of life which the Republic enjoyed, the legislature functioned chiefly in the interest of business. Manufacturing and trade were encouraged, taxes were kept low, restrictions were placed upon radical agitators, and methods of effectively disenfranchising the unpropertied were contemplated. Still the legislature was more socially minded than that of the bourgeois monarchy, for although it refrained from indulging in radical experiments, it did undertake to improve housing conditions in the capital, provide better relief for the poor, and set up better regulations governing the employment in factories of adults and children.

While this Second Republic took shape in France, the tide of revolution was sweeping over the rest of continental Europe, toppling governments of the old order and leaving behind a considerable residue of liberalism. In the Italian peninsula not a single state escaped. Revolutionaries in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had actually anticipated Paris, forcing King Ferdinand to grant a constitution as early as January. Pope Pius IX at Rome was compelled to grant concessions to his subjects and when these proved odious to him, he abandoned the city to the radicals who promptly established a republic. The Hapsburg Princes of the Central Duchies followed the general example, conceding the demands of the liberals, and in March, King Charles Albert granted a liberal constitution, the *Statuto*, to his Piedmontese subjects. Meanwhile, also, nationalist agitators of Milan and Venice organized rebellion against the "oppressive" regime of Austria in Lombardy-Venetia, and soon won the support of liberal Italian nationalists everywhere. Before the end of March, 1848, Charles Albert of Sardinia came to the relief of the Milanese insurrectionaries, declared war upon Austria, and with the unorganized assistance of volunteers from all of the peninsula forced the Austrian forces to retreat. Not only was there success in establishing liberal

governments for the time being, but there was widespread optimism that even Italian national unity might be achieved.

The success of the Italians against Austria was due largely to the temporary paralysis of Austria, induced by revolution. Significantly enough, it was in the Hapsburg dominions, stronghold of Metternich and seat of continental conservatism, that the repercussions of the February revolution were first felt. The storm began in Hungary with a public demand voiced in the Magyar parliament by Louis Kossuth, outspoken leader of the nationalist movement, for parliamentary autonomy. Immediately, other minority groups made the same demands; first the Czechs in Bohemia, and then the liberal German element in Austria. By the 12th of March, Metternich's system was on the verge of collapse and the Hapsburg dominion seemed on the point of dissolution. The next day crowds of students and workmen overran the streets of Vienna and were scarcely molested by the troops. Metternich, convinced that he could no longer master the situation, fled in disguise to England. With his departure, the revolutionary movement reached full stride. Emperor Ferdinand I hastened to make his peace with the revolutionaries; a liberal ministry was established, censorship of the press was abolished, and a liberal constitution was promised. When the sovereign finally bestowed a constitution (April) providing for parliamentary, constitutional government in the whole of the Empire, exclusive of Hungary and Lombardy-Venetia, the liberals refused it. They would have a constitution of their own making, not one graciously given them. It was demanded that a National Constituent Assembly, elected ostensibly by all the citizens but actually by the bourgeoisie, be convened to devise a new instrument of government. Ferdinand could only submit, and while the elections were held and the Assembly gathered at Vienna, he retired to the more congenial, conservative atmosphere of Innsbruck.

In Hungary, the revolution moved with equal speed. Feudalism was abolished, the press was freed, and the parliament, to be composed of middle class taxpayers as well as landed aristocrats, was declared to be autonomous. A national flag was adopted, and although nothing was done formally to destroy Ferdinand's claims, the state acted like an independent one. The Czechs were less successful, partly because of rivalries among them and partly because of the hostility of the Germans who were numerous in Bohemia. Nevertheless, they secured from the Emperor the right to transform their local Diet into a national parliament and were allowed to establish their own

national guard. By June of 1848, the successes of liberalism and nationalism in Austria-Hungary were such as would have been deemed impossible six months before even by the most visionary idealist.

From the Hapsburg dominions the revolutionary movement swept on to the Germanies where Metternich's influence had long been paramount. The most remarkable uprising of all occurred in Berlin, capital of conservative Prussia, just a few days after Metternich's flight. The rapidly growing middle class there, aided by crowds of workingmen and students, followed the Viennese example, demonstrating in the streets and erecting barricades. The muddle-headed Frederick William IV, romantic, paternalistic, arbitrary, faced the rebels at first with musketry; but when this merely drove them into a more ugly mood he hastily capitulated to their demands. He adopted the revolutionary colors on March 19th, established a liberal ministry, and convoked a National Constituent Assembly, elected by universal suffrage and preponderantly liberal in sentiment. Smitten with fear, the princes of the lesser German states quickly followed suit, so that by June most of Germany was governed under constitutions of varying degrees of liberalism.

One of the most important and certainly the most interesting outgrowth of these days of revolutionary enthusiasm in Germany was the convoking of a national parliament at Frankfort, with the view to creating a liberal and united German state. At the request of some of the new liberal governments, the Diet of the German Confederation in April, 1848, authorized the election of such an assembly by means of universal manhood suffrage. Since many of the conservatives refrained from exercising their right to the ballot, the elections returned an Assembly of distinctly liberal leaning. When this met at Frankfort in May, the Diet of the old Confederation ceased to function, a National German Empire was declared to have come into existence, and the drafting of a new constitution was begun. Had it been possible to complete these labors in the first flush of enthusiasm it is conceivable that a united Germany might then have taken shape through peaceful means. But the obstacles which it encountered were almost insuperable, and the resulting delays cost the Assembly dear. It was difficult to decide whether the government should be republican or monarchical, but more difficult to choose an acceptable prince after the monarchical principle was decided upon. It was impossible to reach a solution on the question as to whether only Austria proper or the whole of the Hapsburg Empire should be included in the new state. The "Little Germans," including Prussia, wanted the former;



FRANKFORT PARLIAMENT, 1848. AFTER A PAINTING BY FRITZ BAMBERGER.

This assembly of German liberals made an abortive effort to unify the Germanies during the "year of revolutions." In all likelihood, the artist was present at some of its meetings.

the "Great Germans," including Austria, would have nothing but the latter. Over these questions, as well as over the problem of what should be included within the written constitution, the Assembly lost so much time that when its labors seemed nearly completed it was already overwhelmed by the tide of reaction which was sweeping with full force over central and eastern Europe.

Reaction began, just as had revolution, in the Hapsburg dominions. The reason for this is not difficult to find. In the first place, the conservative traditions were strongly entrenched through long practice, and the majority of the people, who were peasants, had little enthusiasm for the revolutionary movements of the towns. The bourgeois were not numerous, except in the larger communities, and while they were able to master the situation for a while, they could not forever work at loggerheads with the more conservative country. In addition, there was a good deal of dissension between the bourgeois townsmen and the urban proletariat, much as there was in France, so that gains already made could hardly be consolidated against united opposition. To make matters still worse for the revolutionaries, there were profound disagreements among the various nationalities of the

Hapsburg Empire. The South Slavs disliked the Italians and the Magyars, who reciprocated their feelings. The Germans and Czechs hated each other. Under the circumstances, co-operation which alone would have ensured the gains of each was quite impossible, and the Hapsburg rulers, playing upon and utilizing these hatreds, were able to subjugate them all.

The first reversal of revolutionary fortunes occurred in Bohemia, where rivalries among the Czech patriots, and Czech-German feuds, so crippled the liberal autonomous regime that Prince Windischgrätz, the imperial commander, was able to make use of a riot in Prague in June swiftly to destroy the liberal government. The reforms of the preceding months were revoked and the area placed under martial law. Shortly afterward, the Austrian troops who were fighting the Italians were able to capitalize upon the weaknesses of Italian arms, occasioned by local reactions, to inflict a humiliating defeat upon Charles Albert and his allies. These successes revived the courage of the Emperor Ferdinand who now determined to crush the Hungarian and Viennese revolutionaries as well. To the attack of the former he dispatched a Croatian general, Jellacic, and to the attack of the latter, he dispatched General Windischgrätz. Jellacic set to rout an Hungarian army which had been sent to Vienna's relief, and in October the imperial troops beat down the resistance of the capital. A reactionary ministry was then established under Prince Schwarzenberg, relative of Windischgratz, and a deliberate effort was made to set back the clock.

To release the government of any commitments it had made to the liberals, Schwarzenberg persuaded the incompetent Ferdinand to resign the throne and name his nephew, Franz Josef, as his successor. This done, the prime minister concentrated his energies upon the subjugation of Hungary. The task was more difficult than anticipated, but with the aid of Russian troops, the Hungarian nationalists were forced to their knees by the autumn of 1849.

Successful reaction in the Hapsburg Empire inspired the conservative elements of the German countries to try their hand at counter-revolution. Frederick William IV of Prussia took the lead. When the Constituent Assembly which he had convoked began to discuss the destruction of feudal privileges and of royal prerogatives, he supplanted his liberal ministry with a reactionary one and surrounded the Assembly with troops. Shortly thereafter he dissolved that body completely, resuming political power for himself and his ministers, though he promised to consult on certain matters with a parliament

which would represent the upper classes. Many of the other German princes once more followed suit.

This turn of the tide left the Frankfort Parliament in an embarrassing position. The liberals hoped that their labors might yet bear fruit, and, as a last resort, they offered the hereditary imperial crown of Germany to Frederick William, expecting that in this way his opposition to liberalism might be overcome and Germany be united under the headship of Prussia. The king was flattered and toyed with the idea, but was induced to reject the invitation by stern remonstrances from his powerful Austrian and Russian neighbors. Thereupon the Parliament dissolved and the hope of a liberal, united Germany vanished. In 1849 and 1850, Frederick William of Prussia, however, still contemplated the establishment of a united Germany, and persuaded a number of German states to co-operate with him in devising a plan. This, too, was prevented by the intervention of Austria which compelled Prussia to sign a treaty at Olmütz agreeing to the restoration of the German Confederation under the presidency of Austria. With the "humiliation of Olmütz," as this treaty was called by Prussian patriots, the last flicker of hope for a united Germany, even a conservative one, had been extinguished for the time being.

As in Germany and Austria, so in Italy the conservative elements managed to gain the upper hand almost everywhere. With the aid of French bayonets, the Roman Republic was destroyed and Pope Pius IX restored to the Holy City. King Ferdinand of Sicily recovered his power and filled his prisons with such revolutionaries as he did not execute. Everywhere, except in Sardinia, most of the concessions to liberalism were withdrawn, and the governments were fitted back into the old grooves. By June of 1849, many of the achievements of the revolutionaries were undone.

Because of the nature and the extent of the reaction, it might appear that the revolutions of 1848 had been almost completely futile. But, in fact, a considerable residue of liberalism remained after the flood had passed. Serfdom, which had been abolished by the revolutionaries in the Hapsburg Empire, was never restored, and elsewhere at least the forms of constitutional government then established were perpetuated in one way or another. Among the most notable of the constitutional regimes to survive was that of Sardinia, founded in the *Statuto* of 1848 and modeled after the British system. With it, Sardinia was able to take the leadership among the liberal movements of Italy and eventually unify the nation. Even in conservative Prussia, a constitution was decreed in 1850 which allowed for a popularly

elected lower house, even if it did not subscribe to the principle of ministerial responsibility. Everywhere the monopoly of the landed aristocracy was severely shaken, and the growing body of bourgeois was accorded a conspicuous place in the management of government.

C. Bourgeois ascendancy

When the smoke and dust of the "year of revolutions" cleared away, the peoples of Europe discovered that they had exchanged one set of rulers for another. The land-owning aristocracy, although it retained considerable prestige and influence, had lost its monopoly and was forced to share the power with the great industrialists, financiers, and merchants (the plutocracy) who dominated the bourgeoisie. For the next several decades, aristocrat and plutocrat, with the petty bourgeois trailing after, compromised their aims in order to share the power to the exclusion of the proletariat. Lip service was largely paid to liberalism and democracy, humanitarianism was a real force, but government remained by the classes, not by the masses. Nationalism, so perfect an expression of the arrogant self-confidence of the bourgeoisie with its emphasis upon profit and glory for the individual and his group, reached its first maturity. Everywhere, the old order having been broken, the newly elevated rulers sought to make their power permanent. Further change, save in the interest of the ruling classes, became anathema to them; radicalism, socialism, and republicanism, things to be avoided like the plague. In fact, to carry the last simile further, the ruling classes regarded these things as dangerous diseases which had to be stamped out by disinfecting the peoples and isolating the carriers. The remainder of this chapter seeks to illustrate these trends by the case histories of France and Great Britain during the decades of the eighteen forties, fifties, and sixties.

The brief history of the Second French Republic (1848-1852) and of its successor, the Second Empire (1852-1870) center around the figure of the romantic adventurer, son of Louis Bonaparte and nephew of Napoleon I, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (1808-1873). Exiled from Paris at the age of seven, educated in Switzerland and southern Germany, he grew up persuaded that he also was a man of destiny, heir of the Napoleonic tradition and the French Revolution. Forced by circumstance into the role of a conspirator, Louis Napoleon had joined the *Carbonari* in their rising of 1831, been captured and released by the Austrian police; made an abortive attempt

to raise a revolt against Louis Philippe (1836) which resulted in exile to America; and again sought to unseat the bourgeois monarch in 1840. Jailed for this failure, he escaped to England in 1846, returning to France in time to become a member of the National Convention which drew up the constitution of the Second Republic. Entering the contest for the presidency, the magic of his name made him the beneficiary of the build-up which Louis Philippe's government had given his uncle. His undeserved reputation for liberalism and his vague and sentimental utterances in favor of democracy, the rights of man, and social justice won him the votes of the "radicals." The glamor of the family name won the support of those who had been taught to regard the Empire as the "good old days" of French power and glory, and his tactful treatment of the conservative bourgeois and peasantry earned him their backing. "All things to all men," Louis Napoleon Bonaparte won the election by an overwhelming majority and became the first, and last President of the Second Republic.

President Bonaparte was an interesting if not an impressive man. Gracious and pleasant, he charmed most of those with whom he came in contact. Later, his failures and his vacillating and sometimes contradictory policies angered and dismayed those who had first hailed him. A dreamer of dreams, he had visions of himself as the dominating power in Europe. Convinced of the reality of his "mission," he was avidly ambitious to perform it. His policies, usually cloaked in fine-sounding phrases of liberalism and nationalism, were personal, designed to bring the fulfillment of personal ambitions. Despite his pose as the heir of the great general, he hated and feared war and bloodshed. Conspiracy and intrigue, not open force, were the means he preferred. Although he possessed some ability as an administrator and more as a demagogue, he was essentially weak.

Between him and the conservative, monarchistic Legislative Assembly, elected at the same time, an intense rivalry grew up. France, a republic with few republicans in office, had a president who longed to be emperor, and an assembly which wanted to re-establish a monarchy. Only in their essential conservatism were they agreed. With consummate skill Louis Napoleon bid for the support of all classes. He won Catholic backing by sending an army to crush the Roman Republic and restore the pope (1849), and by securing passage of the Falloux Law (1850) which restored control of education to the Catholic Church. Special favors to the army won its loyalty, and the conservatives and standpatters were aligned on his side by

his anti-socialist, anti-radical speeches and actions. By 1849, persecutions and censorship had broken the republican party. On the other hand, he gained the favor of the urban proletariat by a law which permitted voluntary old-age insurance (1850), and won the plaudits of the masses by his loud demands for universal manhood suffrage.

This latter issue he twisted into a means to personal victory. The Assembly in 1850 passed a new electoral law which virtually disfranchised about a third of the nine million adult Frenchmen. The president at once sprang forward as champion of this group, denied the legislature's right to limit the suffrage, and demanded a retraction. A deadlock ensued which lasted a year until Louis Napoleon, with army support, pulled off a coup d'état. When the Assembly ignored his ultimatum calling for the re-establishment of universal manhood suffrage, he proclaimed a temporary dictatorship, forcibly dissolved the Assembly, restored the suffrage to those disfranchised, and sought a plebiscite (December, 1851). Force and exile stilled the opposition, and a popular vote approved his action and empowered him to revise the constitution. The revision was a triumph of hypocrisy. It still called France a republic and provided for an assembly chosen by manhood suffrage. But it subordinated that assembly to a Senate and Council of State, both to be appointed by the President, and reduced its power to nullity. The presidential term was lengthened to ten years. Thus under the guise of liberalism and democracy he paved the road leading to an imperial scepter.

The succeeding months, Louis Napoleon devoted to selling the French people his dream of empire. Napoleonic insignia reappeared, and he made "good-will" tours through the provinces. A portion of one of the speeches he delivered during such a trip is both interesting and revealing of the man and his methods. "I would conquer for the sake of religion, morality, and material ease, that portion of the population, still very numerous, which, in the midst of a country of faith and belief, hardly knows the precepts of Christ; which, in the midst of the most fertile country of the world, is hardly able to enjoy the primary necessities of life. We have immense uncultivated districts to bring under cultivation, roads to open, harbors to construct, rivers to render navigable, canals to finish, and our network of railways to bring to completion. . . . This is what I understand by the Empire, if the Empire is to be re-established. These are the conquests which I contemplate, and all of you who surround me, who, like myself, wish the good of our common fatherland, you are my soldiers." [1]

[1] Quoted by Hayes, C. J. H., *A Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe.* Two volumes. N. Y., 1936. II 193.

The people listened and were convinced. In December of 1852, with the approval of another plebiscite, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was proclaimed Napoleon III, Emperor of the French. The Second Empire had replaced the Second Republic. He had won the bourgeoisie by his repression of the radicalism which haunted them like a specter, the proletariat by his farce of popular suffrage, and the nationalist by his dream of a new place in the sun to be won for France. The Government which he established was an autocracy, veiled, but real. By laws which limited the rights of debate and of legislation, he controlled the legislature. Elections were manipulated by gerrymandering, by control of nominations, and by the exercise of pressure on the electorate through the dependent and therefore loyal bureaucracy. The press was gagged by restrictive censorship and the universities muzzled by extra-legal pressure. Courses in modern history, always a target for dictators, were suppressed as being dangerous to the regime. The Church was bribed by continuing its control of education and by other favors. Private opposition was silenced by an active and efficient secret police and by the imprisonment or exile of offenders without benefit of a civil trial. His hypocritical mouthings about popular sovereignty to the contrary, Napoleon III, like all other dictators, ruled by force. The steel was no less hard for being hidden with velvet.

Napoleon's major support came from the bourgeoisie, and of their aims and wishes he was tenderly solicitous. "Economic liberalism" was both his theory and his practice. The doctrines of *laissez-faire* were applied, and government restrictions upon business and industry decreased. Free trade was furthered and an Anglo-French commercial reciprocity treaty was negotiated (1860). At the same time, with an inconsistency which has never troubled either business or government, the latter which was reducing its interference in the form of restrictions was increasing it in the form of aid. This contradictory situation in which business demands and gets non-interference on the one hand, and government assistance on the other is a still-recurring paradox. Napoleon III granted large subsidies to railroads and to the merchant marine with the result that both railway trackage and foreign trade increased five hundred percent under his regime. Metallurgical industries, with government aid, also developed rapidly; the great munitions firm of Le Creusot, for example, having been founded in this period. Banks, too, were encouraged by the government and a national bank, *Le Crédit Foncier*, was established. Altogether, it was

an era of prosperity, with prices, profits, and wages all rising, and speculation increasing.

The Emperor was wise enough to conciliate labor. Labor unions, strikes, and producer and consumer co-operatives were all permitted; and unions were given government subsidies to enable them to provide pensions and social insurance for their members. Many asylums, hospitals, and public pawn shops, where the poor could get small loans at reasonable rates, were established. An extensive program of public works relieved unemployment and gave some aid to commerce and industry. As the Emperor had promised, harbors were deepened, roads improved, and canals dug. Paris was rebuilt into "the most beautiful city in the world" and deliberately made the play city of the world as well.

Less successful but more spectacular were the foreign adventures of the Emperor who saw himself as the "arbiter of Europe." Napoleon's first aim was always the attainment of personal triumph and renown which would enable him to remain in power, for he was sensible of the fact that the Napoleonic reputation, fed on conquest and glory, would starve without victories. His second purpose was to give France an empire once more. His third was to pose as a champion of liberalism and a friend of "self-determination." But the underlying fact of his foreign policy was his desperate determination to live and die an emperor. It was this, primarily, which tied his foreign to his domestic policy and caused frequent interaction between them.

He began his adventuring by joining Great Britain against Russia in the Crimean War (1854-1856).[1] No important French interests were involved, and there was no real reason why France should have aided Britain to keep the Russians out of Constantinople and maintain the Anglo-Turkish trade connection. But Napoleon sought personal glory, and sent his troops to die in the Crimea that he might have it. A year later he again allied with Great Britain, this time against China, and the two powers won trade concessions from the Chinese. This done, he nibbled away at China's vassal states, annexing Cochin China (1862-1863) and setting up a protectorate over Annam (1870). Meanwhile, he had completed the conquest of Algeria, begun in 1830, and had become involved in the Italian situation.

Searching still for glory, toying with the idea of succoring an

[1] For more extensive treatments from other viewpoints of Napoleon's adventures refer as follows: Crimean War, pp. 728-796; Far East, pp. 864, 866; Sardinia and Austria, pp. 728-729; and Prussia, pp. 743-764.

oppressed people, and with romantic allusions to his days in the *Carbonari*, Napoleon III allied himself with Cavour (1858) for a price—the cession of Nice and Savoy. Cavour maneuvered, literally and figuratively, and the Austro-Sardinio-French War began. Amid the plaudits of the liberals, French troops marched off to defeat the Austrians at the battles of Magenta and Solferino (1859). Then, though Austria was not yet driven from the Italian peninsula, as he had boasted she would be, Napoleon suddenly withdrew from the war. The reasons for this action were threefold but they are all bound together with his determination to remain in power. Prussia, uneasy at the French advance, and ready to fight if need be to save Austria, had asked Russia and Great Britain to mediate. Napoleon dared not risk either a diplomatic or a military defeat which would have certainly jarred him from his throne. Secondly, he had alienated the French Catholics and the Church by supporting a movement which they correctly guessed would menace the temporal power of the pope. Their complaints swelled the murmur of domestic discontent to a volume which worried the Emperor. Finally, Napoleon belatedly woke to the realization that he was aiding a possible future rival.

But not even his *volte face* could repair the damage already done. Desertion of Cavour did not restore the Catholic's faith in him, and it did alienate the liberals. Austria, weakened by defeat, was an easier prey both for Italy and Prussia so that Napoleon, despite himself, contributed to a radical change in the status quo. Moreover, the Italians, embittered by his abandonment of them, would consent to no compromise to save the old order. By plebiscite, the central Italies, with the benevolent support of Great Britain, voted to join Sardinia. Napoleon had to acquiesce. Finally, much troubled by the cresceive discontent among his subjects, Napoleon attempted a policy of appeasement. Censorship laws were relaxed and some authority was given the legislature. The result was not contentment but a swelling chorus of criticism.

Napoleon looked about for some easy triumphs with which to gag his critics. If he could win new victories, or, better, give France an empire, all might yet be forgiven and forgotten. Russian and Prussian hostility precluded any further advances in Europe, but troubled times across the Atlantic seemed to offer a wonderful chance to capitalize on others' misfortunes. In the first years of the American Civil War, he toyed with the thought of an alliance with the South, but when Britain flatly rejected his milder scheme for offering mediation,

he was forced to give up all idea of intervention. However, if the States were closed to him, Mexico, always in a ferment, was not. What was more, Mexico was heavily in debt to Britain, France, and Spain, and President Juarez had suspended all payments on the debts (1861). A tripartite expedition was despatched to force Juarez to meet his obligations (1862). Britain and Spain, correctly suspecting Napoleon of ulterior motives, soon withdrew their troops. The French pressed on, captured Mexico City, dispossessed the government and set up a puppet empire. As a conciliatory gesture, Napoleon offered the throne to the well-intentioned dilettante, Archduke Maximilian of Austria, who accepted it to please his wife.

It was a mistake pregnant with tragedy. The Mexican people rose in rebellion and only French bayonets kept Maximilian on his shaky throne. For Napoleon, life grew steadily more complex. The Civil War over, the United States put heavy pressure upon Napoleon to withdraw his support from his puppet Mexican empire. In Europe, Bismarck was forcing Austria toward war and Prussia toward expansion. Napoleon could afford no trans-Atlantic complications if he were to attempt to set a limit to the Prussian's advance which so menaced his own prestige. Worse yet, his critics at home were growing more outspoken and more dangerous. There was no choice. The Emperor of the French recalled his troops. The Emperor of Mexico played the hero and the fool and stayed to be shot by Juarez' firing squad (1867). The Mexican adventure had ended in utter failure. Money and men had been spent in vain, and the carefully nurtured Napoleonic prestige approached its nadir.

The costs of foreign adventure were piling up, and mounting taxes cooled the bourgeois enthusiasm for empire. The proletariat, their earlier naive trust in Napoleon now turned to ashes in their mouths, listened eagerly to radical leaders. A new Republican Party led by the young Léon Gambetta, rose surging toward power. Catholics, still disillusioned, grew increasingly hostile. Napoleon's house of cards was falling in upon him with each angry blast from his now unmuffled opponents. Abroad, the clouds of disaster gathered fast and in most of them appeared the face of Bismarck. No matter what diplomatic twists and turns he took, the Emperor could not match the Prussian *Junker's* victory over Austria (1866). Nor was the future brighter. Russia had not forgotten the Crimea, nor Austria, Magenta. Italy recalled Napoleon as the traitor who took his pound of flesh despite his treachery; and Great Britain smugly distrusted his too-often demonstrated duplicity. Alone and friendless, aging and tiring,

the little Napoleon still followed the star which led him to his Waterloo.

One desperate gamble remained. Hatred and fear of Prussia united all the French. Dare he make his bid on that? He did. Another revision of the constitution (1870) reduced his power to that of a constitutional monarch. The clamor of discontent lessened but did not still. He tried to drown it out with blasts upon a war trumpet. From across the Rhine, the wily Prussian answered in kind, and two peoples were again made mad by martial music. An invitation to occupy the throne of Spain, left vacant by revolt, provided the fuse. Once refused by its recipient, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, it was renewed and accepted at Bismarck's insistence. Under strong protest from France, Leopold changed his acceptance to refusal. Then, Napoleon, ill-advised, sought to press his advantage by extracting a promise from the Prussian king that no member of his family would accept the proffered crown. The king's reply was vague, but Bismarck so changed its form and content before he gave it to the press that it sounded to the Prussians as though their king had been insulted and to the French as if their ambassador had been humiliatingly rebuffed. The spark had touched the fuse; war began almost at once.

The details of that struggle are of little moment now. Despite their swaggering boasts the French were ill-prepared, and no match for Bismarck's well-trained, efficient troops. In September less than six weeks after the war began, the Emperor himself was captured by the Prussians at the battle of Sedan. The Second Empire was over. Republicans in Paris, chief among them Gambetta, declared the Emperor deposed and a republic established. That belongs to another story. Napoleon, ex-emperor now, remained in a German prison until the final peace was made in 1871. Then, utterly broken, he made his way to England where he died two years later, a disillusioned, broken-hearted man.

The nation which sheltered the exiled Napoleon, no less than the nation which drove him out, had been through the era of the political compromise. The aristocratic Tory and the bourgeois Whig had effected a tacit, informal, undefined and often disavowed alliance whose real purpose was to "keep labor in its place." By and large, this so-called Victorian Compromise sought to carry into practice the basic tenets of bourgeois philosophy. This was the heyday of "economic liberalism" with its insistence upon *laissez-faire* and the rights of "rugged individualism." The rights of private ownership

were held more sacred than justice or even human life. That government was most esteemed which governed least, and no government worthy of its name would interfere between a man and his right to make a profit, no matter what the cost to others. Labor was free to sell itself wherever it could do so best; free also to starve if there were no sale. By the same token, the employer was free to hire and fire as he chose, and to pay as little for labor as he could. Poverty, it was held, resulted from imprudence and the operation of the "natural laws" which weeded out the weak. Private philanthropy might, and often did, relieve the sufferings of the poor but that was charity and not the business of the government. Trade should be free from government impost, though it might accept government aid. Democracy, universal suffrage, the will of the people, were but the cant of unworldly fools. Possession of property alone could give a voice in the government; and the more property, the louder that voice should be. These were the guiding principles of the Victorian Compromise.

Certainly they would have been less widely accepted had it not been for two things which were both measure and symbol of middle-class power: Chartism and the free trade movement. Chartism, so-named for the People's Charter, as the program of its adherents was called, was a social and economic movement of the disfranchised which first appeared in 1836. Stung by what it held to be its betrayal by the bourgeoisie in the Reform Bill of 1832, injured in both body and spirit by the Poor Law of 1834 and suffering from the recurrent depressions, the proletariat sought political power as a means to gain social and economic reforms. Definitely a class conscious movement, it not only rejected bourgeois support but was anti-bourgeois in character. Since the ballot was denied them, the Chartists sought to gain their ends by petitioning Parliament. Three times they tried and three times they failed, yet, to us, their demands seem moderate. They asked for six things: (1) universal manhood suffrage; (2) annual parliaments; (3) equal electoral districts; (4) voting by ballot; (5) abolition of the property qualifications for members of Parliament; and (6) the payment of members of Parliament. Read in the light of the Victorian Compromise it is easy to see why these demands, which would have overturned the status quo, were rejected. Chartism failed in its immediate purpose, and its "radicalism" discredited labor as revolutionary, but in the end its failure turned to success. Undoubtedly the movement speeded the passage of regulatory laws like the Mines Act, but more importantly, the program itself, once the taint of radicalism had vanished from it, was eventually accepted and put

into effect by the middle class. It is worthy of note both that conditions were such as to call forth this movement by the underprivileged, and that its program succeeded only when it later won the blessing of the dominant bourgeoisie.

More clearly than Chartism, the successful contest for the establishment of free trade reflected the attainment of superiority by the middle class. Symbol and center of the old policy, were the Corn Laws, passed by and for the landlord class for its own profit. Never fair to the people at large, the Corn Laws had become more unjust as an industrialized England became increasingly dependent upon imported foods. The fight against the laws was led by the Anti-Corn Law League, founded, organized, and financed by the manufacturing interests, but drawing the bulk of its members from the proletariat. From its founding at Manchester in 1838 39, the guiding geniuses of this lobby were Richard Cobden and John Bright, both wealthy manufacturers. The two formed an excellent team. The dynamic Cobden organized and directed the movement and won financial support for it from his colleagues; Bright, an unexcelled orator, won labor to its side. The motives which led the capitalists to contribute to the League were interesting and complex. Humanitarianism and an honest sense of justice were important, but so also was a desire to increase private profits by reducing the living costs of labor and so making lower wages possible. Some men saw in the League an answer to Chartism; others thought of it as an attack upon the aristocracy. Class interests played a part and so did the belief that free trade was for the national good. As for labor, its membership was recruited by promises of cheaper bread, and of the ballot.

For seven years, the lobby brought increasing pressure to bear, but its ultimate success was partially due to other contributing forces. Sir Robert Peel, Tory leader, became convinced of the justice of repeal and slowly made up his mind that loyalty to his country transcended loyalty to his party. Economic depression with its unemployment, and bad harvests in the "hungry forties" made some action seem the more imperative. But the deciding event was the horrible Irish famine (1846-1847) which took over two million lives, and forced the British government to vigorous action to relieve the distress. In such a case, an import tax on grain seemed wholly criminal. The Corn Laws were abolished in 1846, and the middle class had won. With the repeal of the last of the Navigation Acts in 1849, the old order had given place to the era of free trade and bourgeois ascendancy.

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[1] *See also* the bibliographies for Chapters XXI, XXV and XXVI.

Chapter XXV

The Political Foundations of Modern Europe

A. Racial and historical nationalism

"Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer" ("one people, one state, one leader") was the slogan used by the propaganda agencies of Nazi Germany prior to the annexation of Austria and Sudetenland in an effort to incite and popularize what may be designated as racial and historical nationalism. As Chapter IX pointed out, the force of nationalism is exceedingly hard to define since it is an intangible which lacks any common frame of reference. For purposes of discussion, nationalism might be defined as, positively, the possession of a sense of national unity in background, aims, and interests; negatively, as a feeling that one's own nation differs from all others. In this sense, nationalism can be in the possession only of an already existent nation such as France, the United States, Bavaria, or Sardinia. It cannot be the attribute of a disunited people who lack a common background, culture, or interest.

Racial and historical nationalism, or unionism, as it might be called, was, however, a powerful force in the small states of Central and Eastern Europe during the nineteenth century. In distinction from nationalism, unionism may be defined as a desire for political union based less on actual resemblance than on the following factors: (1) a vague sense or a propaganda myth that certain peoples came once from the same racial stock, for example, Roman, or Slavic, or Germanic; or (2) a hazy recollection of some past union such as that of ancient Poland, or the Roman Empire; or (3) certain cultural affinities. Probably unionism was inspired in part by the example of nations already formed by the amalgamation of diverse groups as had happened in the cases of France, Spain, Great Britain, and the United States. Another source of inspiration was the intellectual movement of the early nineteenth century which is known as Ro-

manticism, one phase of which laid great stress upon "racial" or "nationalistic" history. Typical of this school of historians was the German pioneer, Johan von Herder (1744-1803), who began the collection of Germanic folksongs and folklore as evidence in support of his thesis that each people had its own peculiar character, genius, and mission.

As an intellectual and sentimental force only, racial and historical nationalism was not strong enough to bring similar but individualized groups together. It was, however, of tremendous importance in preparing for that end. Peoples had to be taught the stories—true and false—of their common origin and past glories. They had to be educated to desire unification with other groups. An excellent and recent case history of this process is found in the actions of Nazi Germany toward Austria and the Sudetenland which climaxed in 1938. Austrians and Sudetens were both Germanic in culture, background, and interests, but neither was German. The distinction is real and important. For months, even years, both peoples were bombarded with German propaganda designed to promote the feelings of racial and historical nationalism. Only when the way was thus prepared did the Nazi government carry out what it called the "unification" of these peoples with the Third Reich. Most of the world, however, termed these actions "annexation" or "expansion," a significant key to an understanding of what took place in Italy and the Germanies late in the nineteenth century. The "unifications" of 1938 and of the Germanic states into the German Empire and of the Italianate states into the Kingdom of Italy in the nineteenth century have much in common. In all of them, a propaganda appeal eased the way for political action which was carried out partly with the compliance of and partly at the expense of the peoples involved.

The delay in what is traditionally called the "unification" of Germany and Italy, but which is more accurately termed the expansion of Prussia and Sardinia into the German Empire and the Italian Kingdom, respectively, was due chiefly to three things. First was the long submergence of these areas under the rule of more or less alien dynasties. When Capetian France and Angevin England were slowly extending their domains, the Italianate and Germanic states were members of the Holy Roman Empire. The theoretical unity of this empire hindered but, as the expansion of the Mark of Brandenburg into the Kingdom of Prussia proved, did not stop nationalistic growth. It did, however, result in the formation of what were actually small, independent, sovereign states, of which more will be said shortly.

When Napoleon finally buried the long-dead carcass of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, he replaced it with an empire of his own in which these small states, though reduced in number, were still submerged. The Vienna Settlement established the hegemony of Austria in the Germanic Confederation, and assured her direct or indirect control in most of the states of the Italian peninsula. This meant that Austrian domination had to be ended before any other state could expand.

The second, and in many ways the gravest obstacle was the existence of what have been termed particularisms. The actual disunity of the various empires had given rise to scores of states, some tiny, some fairly large, which developed local or particular nationalisms. Most of these states had their own aims and aspirations. Some of them had dialects so distinctive as to be almost a separate tongue. In short, these various states, such as Prussia and Bavaria in the Germanies, and Sardinia and the Papal States in Italy, were really small nations. Naturally they were reluctant to surrender rights and powers which they had exercised for years. To bring them together required not only propaganda, but also concessions and force.

The third set of circumstances which retarded the movement were geographic and economic isolation, the latter being partly one of the aspects of particularism. Until a customs union (the Zollverein) was initiated by Prussia in 1819, the various Germanic states were separated by customs barriers which greatly hindered trade. In Italy, there was a contrast between the northern portion which was influenced by industrialization by mid-century and the southern part which remained pre-eminently agricultural. Economic sectionalism thus tended to keep the various regions separated. A satisfactory working agreement among them had to be effected before a lasting union was possible. The ways and means by which alien dominance was shaken off, particularisms overcome or temporarily downed, and isolations broken constitute the major theme of this chapter. A study of the methods employed and the type of states established will confirm the description of this movement as a kind of expansion.

B. Modern Italy

For nearly a half century after the Congress of Vienna, Italy remained, as Metternich once described it, a mere geographical expression. Yet within the short span of two years (1859-1861), prac-

MAP 30. THE UNIFICATION OF ITALY

tically the whole of the peninsula had been joined together into the Kingdom of Italy, under the House of Savoy; and within a decade more, through the acquisition of Venetia from Austria and what remained of the Papal States, United Italy took its place with the nation states of Europe. None of the important territorial transformations of modern times was of deeper significance. Austria's domination of eastern and central Europe had been shattered; the temporalities of the Papacy had vanished; the balance of power in the Mediterranean had been unsettled; and, of greater import still, the fires of nationalism had been fed everywhere in Europe, especially in Germany, in Poland, and in the Balkan States. The unification of Italy

was, indeed, one of the great landmarks in the evolution of the modern age.

The obstacles to "union" or even "federation" of the Italian states had long made many despair of its achievement. Divided for centuries, and torn by mutual rivalries and jealousies, there seemed little hope that the reigning dynasties could be persuaded to co-operate, and still less that they could be swiftly banished. There were strong vested interests in each state which clung tenaciously to the status quo, but, of more importance, was the fact that the mass of people, largely peasant and illiterate, had deep-seated local loyalties and marked cultural peculiarities, both of which inclined them to regard federation or union with distrust if not with actual antipathy. Moreover, the Church, which exercised the greatest influence among the peasantry, and a great deal among the other classes as well, vigorously opposed territorial changes which might jeopardize the temporal rights of the Papacy. This was, indeed, the hardest hurdle for the exponents of unity to clear. To create a United Italy without the Papal States and perhaps the city of Rome was impossible; to incorporate them by force was to incite the anger of the Catholic world and to undermine the state from the beginning by antagonizing millions of devout native Catholics. The Papal States stood athwart Italy, a perpetual challenge to the prophets of territorial change. Besides such powerful deterrents was one other: foreign powers, especially Austria, which, because of established interests in the peninsula or for reasons of policy, deemed it essential to perpetuate the existing order. Popular feeling against the "foreigner" was general, but could not be capitalized upon unless the various governments would cease working at cross purposes, which seemed unlikely, or unless the momentary aid of a great friendly state could be enlisted, which to some seemed a pipe-dream and to others a positive danger. That each of these obstacles was successfully overcome was the result of much propaganda, the fortuitous concurrence of economic and political circumstance, and astute, if Machiavellian statesmanship.

The background for this *Risorgimento*, as the period of the "resurgence" and unification of Italy is called, was laid in the post-Renaissance era. The shift in the center of European trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic which occurred then condemned the flourishing cities of the peninsula to economic stagnation. Their grasp upon the surrounding countryside relaxed, and the economic, social, and political bonds which held the city-state together slowly but steadily loosened. Transactions across the frontiers became more fre-

quent; the people ceased to be drawn to the old metropolis. The consequences of this change reflected both in the granting of more autonomy to the smaller towns and communes, and in the steady reduction in number of sovereign states. This latter tendency was particularly marked during the eighteenth century, and even the Congress of Vienna, despite professed intentions to restore the old order, ended by reducing still further the number of independent states. Thus gradually the way was pointed toward complete unification, unconsciously, but in response to the social and economic needs of the Italian people.

During the eighteenth century, the forces leading toward unification were noticeably quickened. Of particular significance was a cultural revival everywhere apparent and everywhere characterized by an awakened social consciousness. Though this was much influenced by French rationalism, which was widely imitated, it possessed a peculiar Italian quality and was reflective of native genius. Literature of other lands, especially England and France, was translated and interest stimulated in the achievements of these united peoples. Local abuses of society and government were exposed, and princes persuaded to institute reforms which might eliminate the danger of future revolution. It is worth noting that much had been accomplished in this direction, under the stimulus of the intellectuals, before the revolutionary storm broke in France. Thus the path to liberalism was cleared. But probably the most important contribution of the intellectuals was their demonstration that the problems of various Italians were common problems, that they partook of a common heritage, and that culturally they were more alike than different. Though none of them actually espoused political unification for these reasons, they helped make it possible for later generations to do so.

To this end the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire also made a notable contribution. The course of the Revolution in its early years had been followed with close attention in the peninsula; many were fearful that the contagion might spread, others, attracted by its ideology, hoped that it would. Among those with more advanced views, it was felt that the revolutionaries might be persuaded to help their Italian brothers win freedom too and then, with self-sacrificing devotion, leave the Italians to their own devices. In this quarter, the advancing troops of France were first greeted with open arms. But optimism soon turned to disillusionment, and disillusionment grew into open opposition, for the French proved to be oppressors bent upon making Italy a dependent province of the French

imperium rather than freeing it. The ruling families were swept aside, and all of the territory, exclusive of Sardinia and Sicily, was made to satisfy the requirements of imperial policy. The Republics, first set up as little more than French dependencies, soon gave way to the dynastic ambitions of Napoleon. Piedmont, Genoa, and even Rome were annexed and the remaining duchies and kingdoms were turned over to Napoleon's family or friends.

These changes might have been less offensive to the Italians if genuine efforts had been made to govern them in accordance with their own traditions and needs. But Napoleon determined to orient Italy toward Paris. Old systems of administration were abandoned; the schools and universities were freed from the control of the Church and brought under the control of the Empire; commerce and trade were diverted toward France; and French agents frequently took over the exploitation of native resources. Native opposition grew, manifested in such forms as secret societies pledged to overthrow the French or to petition the government of Paris, or even to the establishment of an independent and united Italy. Significantly enough, Napoleon himself facilitated the spread of this discontent by breaking down the old frontiers and improving systems of communication. French control gave proof of what the pre-revolutionary intellectuals had already discovered, that the Italian people were much alike, and even more it provided them with a common enemy to fight. These were the real contributions of French dominion to the cause of Italian unity. Yet it cannot be said that French occupation left a real national sentiment, except in the minds of the very few. It was not until the mellowing effects of time combined with oppressions and changes of economic life, that the germs planted in Napoleonic times were able to mature.

For the majority of Italians, hatred of the French was more intense than any desire to set up an independent, national state. It was for that reason that they acquiesced so readily to the "restoration" of the Congress of Vienna and to the establishment of native, reactionary governments. Indeed, the extent of popular feeling against the foreign tyrant who profaned God and disturbed the public peace was so great that the new governments were persuaded to go farther in turning back the clock than was either wise or necessary. Almost all of them made the mistake of abandoning not only "French" reforms but also many of the pre-revolutionary era as well; of failing to restore the local autonomies which were highly prized and which the French destroyed; of silencing all public criticism by force; of align-

ing themselves directly or indirectly with Austria. Their very enthusiasm for reaction spelled their doom, and reawakened a popular interest in the principles which the French Revolution had expounded but had not realized.

Public functionaries, including a number of bourgeoisie, who had served during the Napoleonic era, and were now dismissed by the "restored" governments, radicals of advanced views who were threatened with execution or imprisonment, as well as brigands and malcontents of all types who were ready for any adventure, combined to oppose the restoration. Taking their cue from the secret societies, especially Freemasonry, which had become popular among the cultivated classes during the eighteenth century, they created a number of secret sects, pledged to violence and revolution. The largest and most powerful of these was the *Carbonari* (Charcoal Burners),[1] which established branches in all the Italian states, but conducted its operations chiefly from Naples. Apparently founded by the Spanish liberals who contested the Napoleonic occupation and drafted the famous constitution of 1812, it spread to southern Italy in the latter days of Napoleon where it conducted operations against the French. With the collapse of the empire, it passed through a rapid transformation; its doors were opened to those who had felt the sting of reaction, and it emerged as the champion of reform. Its spread was rapid thereafter, and it soon became the model for and spiritual head of a number of other secret societies.

Composed of divergent groups whose only bond was discontent, crude and obscurantist, the Society of the Carbonari was inherently weak. Its objectives could never be clearly defined, even within the local chapters; and between the branches of the various political divisions, there were the widest differences of opinion. Some wanted only conservative local reforms; some preferred to adopt a constitution of the English model, while many more believed in the constitution of 1812; some would have abandoned monarchy in favor of a republic; and there were not a few who envisioned a united Italy. Indeed the constitution of the Carbonari, adopted in 1816, established as its motto "Unity, Liberty, Independence." But it may well be questioned whether the majority had more than the vaguest notion of what this meant. Most of them, especially the leaders, were attached more to lofty principles than to dull realities; they believed in abstract doctrines without understanding them, and had an unreason-

[1] So-called from their patron saint, St. Theobald, whom they asserted spent his ascetic life in the woods burning charcoal.

ing faith in the conquering power of ideas. To devise a theoretically ideal constitution and then secure its adoption, whether it fitted practical needs or not, was all that seemed necessary. The secret societies were scarcely capable of conducting successful revolution, yet they were responsible for recurrent uprisings between 1816 and 1831 which kept alive the hope of ultimate success. During 1820-1821, they compelled both Naples and Savoy to grant constitutions which were modeled upon the Spanish constitution of 1812. With the actual or promised support of Austria, the sovereigns of these two states quickly revoked the pledges made under duress, and together with all the other governments of the peninsula set about exterminating the secret societies. Austria took the lead, subjecting to execution and imprisonment some 1,500 suspects. Elsewhere the repression was proportionately as great. Despite the severity of these measures, the Societies were by no means completely suppressed; but they were made more cautious. During 1830 and 1831, they were again responsible for widespread revolutionary uprisings. Hoping this time to have the passive support of France against Austria, since Louis Philippe had encouraged their plot, they arranged for simultaneous outbreaks throughout the whole peninsula. Their operations on this occasion were somewhat more than vaguely unitary in character. Beginning in Modena, they soon spread throughout central Italy, including Rome, but elsewhere the movement was disappointing, and the assistance from France never materialized. After a brief and only partial success, the sectarian revolutionaries again succumbed to reaction which Austria promptly supported. These uniform failures condemned the Secret Societies in the eyes of the rising generation of Italian patriots, and they gradually disappeared. But they left a permanent impression upon subsequent revolutionary movements, all of which learned much in the art of conspiracy from them as well as a clearer knowledge of the difficult problems which had to be overcome. What is certainly equally significant, they had helped to mold opinion in favor of that unity toward which the circumstances of life and thought were moving a growing number of the Italian people.

It was no mere coincidence that Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1873), the first individual to give clear expression to the ideal of Italian national unity, was one of the Carbonari. Born in Genoa, the son of a struggling doctor imbued with liberal ideas and of a mother whose deep piety and religious emotionalism left a permanent impress upon his character, Mazzini was exposed during his impressionable years to influences which aroused in him an almost fanatical zeal for the

cause of Italian nationalism. At the age of 22 he joined the *Carboneria*, becoming involved shortly thereafter in the abortive uprising against the government of Savoy (1830). He was imprisoned, but since absolute proof of guilt was lacking, a mild sentence permitted him to retire into exile. Accepting his fate with a heavy heart but a dauntless spirit, Mazzini left for France, and from Marseilles in 1831 launched a new patriotic society, the *Giovine Italia* (Young Italy), to propagate the cause of liberty and unity among the Italian people.

The creed of the *Giovine Italia* embodied the essence of Mazzini's political thought. The complete development of man, progress for the whole of human society, he held, could not be realized without the attainment of absolute freedom, that is to say freedom of the individual and freedom of nations. The French Revolution had made the former possible; the latter had still to be won. When once nations of free individuals were free, then all of them could be united into a vast association of sister republics which, by mutual love, co-operation, and peace, could carry out their respective missions and the missions of divine Providence. National unifications of peoples was thus elevated to a holy cause; and Mazzini preached it with the fanatical ardor of the crusader. It was this religious quality of his movement which gave it its powerful driving force. He saw Italy playing the leading role in the fulfillment of this mission, just as France had pointed the way toward freeing the individual. But he was not provincial, for he both hoped and believed that the Polish and German people would contribute their share. It was for that reason that he organized (1834) a *Giovine Europa* (Young Europe) among Polish, German, and Italian patriots, to supplement the *Giovine Italia* which he had created for Italy.

Fundamental in his whole system of thought was the idea that the attainment of complete freedom be realized only through the establishment of national republican governments, since these alone were based upon free association of free individuals. For Italy, therefore, the course of procedure seemed perfectly clear: drive out Austria; destroy the local tyrannies; and then, abolishing all traditional political frontiers, unite the Italian people under one republican government. He was convinced that the Italians could accomplish all of this alone and unassisted.

Directing activities from abroad, Mazzini established secret branches of the *Giovine Italia* in the principal towns and cities of the peninsula, keeping in touch with them through their committees and through the periodical, *Giovine Italia*, which he published and smug-

gled into the country. As with the older secret societies, members were recognized by signs and passwords, which changed with consistent regularity to elude detection by the police. They were to be young men under forty, pledged to active propagation of unity and the republic, prepared to sacrifice their lives, if need be, for the cause. That "action" was intended was made clear from the fact that each member was expected to supply himself with a dagger, a gun, and fifty cartridges.

Though the movement spread rapidly among the youth and inflamed their revolutionary temper, Mazzini was always overly optimistic about its strength. Theoretically, there were enough followers to conduct successful uprisings, but while many of them sympathized with Mazzini's ultimate objectives, they shrank from acts of violence. Moreover, he failed to realize that the task of simultaneously overthrowing all of the governments, including Austria, was quite hopeless. His frequent incitement to revolution was foolhardy and even dangerous to the cause of unity. Only the most ardent spirits responded and paid for their pains with execution or imprisonment. The heroic but hopeless enterprises of some of these during the decade, 1834-1844, doubtless awakened the slumbering patriotic sentiments of some, but among others, including some of Mazzini's own followers, they seemed more like leading the most courageous youth of the land to the slaughter. By the late 1840's the Mazzinian movement had become identified in many quarters with indiscriminate violence, and its prestige steadily declined.

It is difficult to estimate Mazzini's influence in the *Risorgimento*. The methods he employed were unwise; his objectives were unattainable. The people, upon whom he counted, were not yet unitarians and they were certainly not republicans. That he helped to make them so can scarcely be questioned, but how much no one can say. Obviously, he did not make them republicans. No doubt he did much by way of popularizing the idea that union of the Italian people must be by fusion of the various states rather than by federation, and the extent to which he did this facilitated the unification which was ultimately realized.

While Mazzini plotted, the groundwork for Italian unity was being more surely prepared in economic and social forces which were not exclusively Italian in scope. In Tuscany, in Piedmont, in Lombardy-Venetia, the people were caught in the sweep of the industrial revolution, became conscious of their economic interdependence, and were strongly drawn by economic and hence by intellectual ties to

the "liberal" states of France and England. There was no startling advance of industry in the period before 1848, but its expansion elsewhere greatly influenced the established economic habits of life. The few bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy became keenly conscious of this change and were stimulated to search for means by which they could keep up with it. Among them there developed a Moderate Liberal movement. Frowning upon violence both by princes and peoples, they sought to realize reforms within the framework of existing institutions. Typical liberals, they sponsored free trade, free speech, a free press, popular education, and the advancement of agriculture and industry through the application of technical knowledge. They agitated for the establishment of a customs union among the Italian states, and, to help the Italian people benefit from the economic recovery of the Mediterranean area, they sponsored the construction of a system of interlocking railways on a national scale. They did not obscure their desire for Italian political independence, but they placed political considerations second to economic. What mattered most was not the actual political form under which economic co-operation would be realized, though all of them were loosely attached to representative institutions, but the fact that such co-operation was to be attained. Indeed, at first the Moderate Liberals had little thought of changing the political status quo at all; it was only when they had come to realize, by the middle of the century, that the achievement of their program depended upon some form of union that they espoused it.

Rejecting Mazzini's program, they adopted the idea of an Italian federation of states. Various proposals of methods by which this might be established were made during the 1840's; but the one which made the deepest impression was that of Vincenzo Gioberti in his *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians* (1843). A Piedmontese priest, devoutly Catholic and patriotic, Gioberti had been exiled for suspected liberalism in 1833, and consequently wrote his work abroad. In it he claimed for Italy and the Italians qualities which made them pre-eminent among mankind, but he observed that the unfortunate political conditions of the country prevented them from fulfilling their great mission to civilization. To eliminate this obstacle, he recommended that an agreement should be reached among the Italian princes to form an Italian Confederation, which the Papacy, because of its great moral prestige, should head. This was a unique suggestion which would not have been altogether impractical if the Papacy could have been made to reconcile its spiritual with its political func-

tions. For at least five years, Gioberti's publication exerted an enormous influence over the political thinking of the moderates.

The death of the aged and reactionary Pope Gregory XVI (1846) inspired widespread hope that the Giobertian scheme might be quickly realized. The College of Cardinals, sensitive to the temper of the times, passed over the names of those candidates associated with reaction, and, without awaiting the arrival of the Austrian primate who could have vetoed their action, elected as pope a more or less obscure Cardinal, known locally for his piety and common sense. The new head of the Church, who took the title of Pius IX, had some acquaintance with Gioberti's publications, and was doubtless moved by them as well as by his own patriotic sentiments to institute reforms in the Papal administration. Amnesty was extended to political prisoners and exiles, a shadow of representative government was established, and a Civic Guard created to keep the peace in the city of Rome. Inhabitants of the Papal States were overjoyed, and those of the other states, who were anxious for federation, almost believed that the regenerator of Italy had appeared. The fact that Pius seemed to adhere to his course even in the face of Austrian opposition crystallized popular sentiment in his favor.

The pope was literally overwhelmed by his mounting popularity. The people had misjudged him. A kindly, pious man, ready for some reforms, he was neither a liberal nor a reformer; a patriot, in the sense that he wished for the welfare of Italy, he was not the man to unify the country. His first obligation was to the Church whose interests could not in fact be reconciled with the interests of an Italian national state. The people misunderstood this and made him in popular imagination the political leader they hoped him to be. The importance of the reforms which he instituted was thus exaggerated much beyond their due, and motives were attributed to him which he never possessed. The course of revolutionary events in the fateful year, 1848, proved this beyond doubt.

It has been already observed that in 1848 the whole of Italy seethed with revolution,[1] and that an uprising against Austria in the kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia culminated in a general Italian war against Austria. The latter event was of great significance in the evolution of the unitary movement, and it was, to a large extent, an outgrowth of the unjustified enthusiasm which Pope Pius had unwittingly engendered. After the news of Metternich's fall, patriots drove out the Austrian troops, forcing their retreat to the mountains. The

[1] See Chapter XXIV.

patriotic enthusiasm of the Italians everywhere mounted to fever pitch, for it seemed that the day of liberation had dawned. Governments were forced to respond to the popular demand that aid be sent to the insurgents to complete the work. Piedmont took the lead, declared war upon Austria, and was followed by the other governments, some of which submitted only reluctantly to public pressure. Even the pope was persuaded to dispatch some of his own troops, blessed with his own hand, and bearing the cross of the Church upon their uniforms. This seemed another proof of the pope's fidelity to the Italian cause; even more, it imparted the character of a holy war to the struggle. The optimism of the Papal Federalists knew almost no bounds. Out of the baptism of fire they imagined a League of Italian states would be formed, and Italy would be freed.

They were completely disillusioned. The pope who had thus far allowed himself to be carried along by events had come at last to the parting of the ways. As the spiritual leader of Christendom, how could he countenance war, much less wage it upon a Catholic brother? How could he reconcile his spiritual obligations with the political responsibilities of a great state? His duty he felt was clearly to the Church. Therefore, soon after his troops had crossed the frontier, he recalled them, justifying his act on the score that he could not fight a Christian power. That was the death knell of Papal Federalism.

The papal action was followed by the withdrawal of the other troops, until Piedmont, with untrained volunteers, was left to carry on the hopeless struggle alone. Defeated (August, 1848), and forced to sign an armistice, Piedmont nevertheless revived the struggle the following spring only to meet again with swift defeat. The War of Liberation had ended in failure, but it taught a lesson and indicated the future course. Federalism had been discredited. Not only had the pope abandoned its leadership, but the sorry demonstration of "cooperation" among the various states against a common enemy clearly revealed that federation of any kind probably would be impossible. Union through fusion with Piedmont seemed to be the only way. As if to add weight to this conviction, the Republics, established under Mazzinian inspiration in Venice, Tuscany, and Rome, demonstrated their inefficiency and weakness. Before the war with Austria had ended, a movement in northern Italy to effect union with Piedmont was already under way.

The hope which the Moderate Liberals reposed in Piedmont was not unjustified. Since 1835, the government at Turin had steadfastly

pursued the course of mild reforms, accelerating the pace in the 1840's. More than that, it had shown its hatred for Austria on more than one occasion. To be liberal and to be anti-Austrian were absolute necessities. Piedmont had one other asset which contributed to its popularity: its sovereign, Charles Albert (1831-1849). Unhappy experience with the revolutionary uprising of 1821, which he seemed to encourage and then to repudiate, made him long suspect to liberal patriots, but his willingness to institute conservative reforms and his expressed dislike of Austria largely restored him to their good graces. By 1846 he was the most popular prince of Italy, and, though temporarily overshadowed by Pius IX, he emerged to greater popularity in 1848 and 1849 through his granting of a constitution and the leadership which he assumed in the Austrian war. The constitution, or *Statuto*, was particularly important in this connection, for it embodied all the liberal principles which the Moderates had been expounding, including a popularly elected Assembly and the basis for the establishment of responsible government.[1] When Charles Albert abdicated after the humiliating defeat, his son and successor, Victor Emmanuel II (1849-1878), staunchly defended the constitution despite the remonstrances of Austria. With such a government, wedded to the liberal idea, ready to lead the Italians against Austria in the name of independence, the Moderate Liberals and a great many patriots without political stamp were ready to effect a fusion of the Italian states.

It was Piedmont's good fortune to enjoy the services of a statesman capable of bringing the dream of Italian unification under her leadership to realization. Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810-1861), the creator of modern Italy, was born of noble lineage near Turin. Following the family tradition, he trained for a military career and then served for a while in the royal court, but found both of these distasteful. Abandoning them, he traveled extensively, especially in England where he was deeply impressed by the economic development and by the operation of the British government. He returned to Piedmont, confirmed in his adolescent liberalism, ready to espouse the Moderate Liberal cause, in which he soon took prominent part. In 1847, he settled in Turin, where he contributed much to the Liberal newspaper, *Il Risorgimento*, and helped prepare the foundations for the *Statuto*. Elected a deputy to the first parliament assembled under this constitution he was immediately included in the

[1] This *Statuto* was made the basis for the constitution of United Italy. It will be discussed in that connection (p. 732).

ministry. His great abilities in administration and his capacity for political manipulation singled him out for leadership. In 1852 he was made prime minister and thenceforward, with only one brief intermission, he served in this capacity until his death.

CAVOUR

It is easy to be carried away with enthusiasm by Cavour's genius, astuteness, and success. He had a clear vision of what had to be done to enable Piedmont to assert its leadership. He was genuinely attached to constitutional forms of government, and he was a bold innovator and reformer. What is more, he had an uncanny mastery of the diplomatic arts in which he was without a peer. But it must be remembered that however lofty his motives, and however desirable the union of Italy which he achieved, his methods were those of deception, intrigue, and war. Men less astute and less successful than Cavour have been condemned for their immorality.

The tasks which Cavour performed to bring about Italian unity were twofold: (1) to make Piedmont the strongest and most liberal of the Italian states so that it might win the support of liberal and unitary elements; and (2) to so conduct foreign policy as to win the aid of France against Austria. He pursued both of these courses simultaneously, but for purposes of clarity it is well to follow each of them separately.

By way of strengthening Piedmont and cementing its liberalism, he devoted himself to the completion of her railway system, to the encouragement of industry and agriculture, and to the solution of the problem of Church and State. This latter was a delicate undertaking, for the young king, Victor Emmanuel II, despite occasional lapses from the moral code, was a staunch Catholic who objected to interferences with the Church. Nevertheless, royal, conservative, and clerical objections were overridden, and the Church in Piedmont was deprived of its independent juridical status, and the ecclesiastical privileges were suppressed. Even more important to Cavour was the creation of a strong, well-trained army, which he labored to develop without regard to the heavy costs which Piedmont could ill afford.

In the final analysis, this was indispensable to the realization of his larger program.

Meanwhile, Cavour played his diplomatic cards well. His essential objective was to isolate Austria and then drive her out of the peninsula with the aid of one of the liberal states. The union of the peninsula under Piedmont might then be achieved. Events seemed to conspire naturally to this end, and Cavour was careful to bend them to his will. It was his great good fortune that Napoleon III, an arch-intriguer, an exponent of Italian nationalism, and an enemy of Austria restored the Napoleonic Empire.[1] Capitalizing upon the Emperor's weaknesses, playing successfully upon his sympathies, Cavour managed to identify French policy with his own and inveigle Napoleon into fighting for him in the contemplated war against Austria. The first step in this direction was taken during the Crimean War. After Austria had rejected a Franco-British request for assistance against Russia, Cavour proffered them the aid of Piedmont. This was a stroke of diplomatic genius. It further isolated Austria, and it established a credit, so to speak, for Piedmont with France and Great Britain which was to be useful subsequently in pleading the Italian cause with them. Cavour was quick to realize the full advantage of his act. At the Congress of Paris (1856), Cavour succeeded in bringing the whole Italian question to the official and public attention of Europe. He had won the sympathy of Napoleon and, with favorable circumstances, he could translate that sympathy into actual assistance.

Two years later (1858) this plan matured. In a secret meeting which the emperor arranged with Cavour at Plombières, an agreement for common action by France and Piedmont against Austria was arranged. There is no finer example of Machiavellian diplomacy in modern history than this. In return for a marriage alliance with the House of Savoy and ultimate cession of Nice and Savoy to France, Napoleon promised to give military assistance against Austria, and to assist in the establishment of a kingdom of Italy, to include the whole of upper Italy, Piedmont, the Duchies, and the Romagna. It was not clearly established what disposition would be made of the remainder of the peninsula, though the Emperor thought vaguely of a Confederation, and Cavour probably thought secretly of effecting their union with the kingdom which was to be established. The fulfillment of these pledges was made contingent upon some act of

[1] For a characterization of Napoleon III and his part in the movement of Italian unification, see Chapter XXIV.

aggression by Austria which would provoke Piedmont to declare a defensive war. Cavour was left to his own devices to goad Austria into committing an act which would put her in the wrong. This was an easy matter. The story of his procedure is a masterpiece of subtle intrigue. Provoking Austria but never exceeding the limits of absolute legality, building up his army to a war footing and supplementing it with volunteers from the other Italian states, he finally succeeded in gaining his objective. An ultimatum from Austria in April, 1859, demanding that Piedmont disarm, provided the required excuse, and the war with Austria was on.

The Piedmontese and the French armies swiftly repulsed the Austrian troops in Lombardy-Venetia, but before inflicting upon them decisive defeat, or completely clearing them out of Italy, Napoleon III for reasons of expediency decided to terminate the campaign.[1] Offers of an armistice were accepted by Austria and on July 11, 1859, over vigorous Piedmontese protests, the Truce of Villafranca was signed. According to this agreement, Austria ceded Lombardy to Napoleon who in turn gave it to Piedmont; the central Duchies and the Romagna were to return to their old rulers; Austria was to keep Venice. The plan for Italy drafted at Plombières had thus been completely blasted, and for the moment Cavour's larger project of union seemed wholly beyond realization. In anger and disgust, Cavour resigned his ministry. But events proved that all was not lost, and Cavour soon returned to the government.

Before the Truce of Villafranca had been signed popular revolutions in the north, in the central Duchies, and in the Romagna had driven out the established governments and had erected provisional regimes which promptly requested political union with Piedmont. The provisions of the Truce were completely ignored and their demands for union were persistently renewed. Under the circumstances, it would have required the intervention of Austria and France to restore the old governments, but neither power was prepared to do so. Cavour was well aware of this and capitalized upon it. He proposed to Napoleon that Piedmont be allowed to annex the provinces, after popular plebiscites were held to show the wishes of the people, and that in return, France, by applying the same formula of plebiscites, be allowed to annex Nice and Savoy. This offered Napoleon a way of allaying public ill-will engendered among his subjects by the conduct of the Italian war and he accepted. In March, 1860, Parma,

[1] See Chapter XXIV.

Modena, Tuscany, and the Romagna were formally joined with the expanding kingdom of Piedmont.

From this point, events moved with almost breath-taking speed toward the completion of Italian unification. During the war with Austria, and especially after the annexations of March, revolutionaries in Naples and Sicily were encouraged to attempt the overthrow of the hated Bourbon government. They extended an invitation to assist with this to Giuseppe Garibaldi, an adventurer who had already fought most successfully with volunteers against Austria. On condition that native insurrection be sufficiently well organized to give promise of success, and that Naples and Sicily subsequently unite with Piedmont to form the kingdom of Italy, Garibaldi consented, and in May of 1860 embarked for Sicily to head the revolution which within a few months toppled the throne of the Bourbons and laid a kingdom at the feet of Victor Emmanuel II.

Garibaldi (1807-1882) was one of the most colorful figures of the *Risorgimento*. Born at Nice, he took to the sea in early youth, and thenceforth pursued a career of adventure which has been rarely matched. For some time he was established in South America where he organized an Italian legion to fight for independence of the Americas from Spain; he was a candle maker in New York City; but most important of all he managed to be in Italy whenever revolution brewed to contribute his aid to the winning of liberty and independence. Bold and courageous, an able strategist, a born leader of guerrilla warfare, he managed to perform such extraordinary feats with handsful of untrained volunteers that a popular myth of invincibility soon surrounded his name. At his call thousands were ready to rise in revolution. But with all this, Garibaldi was a man of unstable opinions, given to swift changes of loyalty, and consequently unpredictable. Only his attachment to Italy was sure. During his youth he joined Mazzini's Young Italy, and for most of the remainder of his life he leaned toward republicanism. At the time of the Austrian war, however, he declared himself in favor of union under the monarchy of Savoy, believing that Piedmont alone could ensure success. His faith was somewhat shaken by the cession of his native Nice to France, but not enough to divert him to republicanism. Nevertheless, Cavour was unsure of his loyalty when he went to Sicily to head incipient revolution.

Taking with him approximately a thousand volunteers, Garibaldi landed at the western extremity of the island and, with the aid of native insurgents who swelled his ranks as he marched eastward, suc-

ceeded in annihilating the Bourbon armies of Sicily by the beginning of August. It had taken less than three months to complete this extraordinary achievement. Successfully eluding the Sicilian authorities, Garibaldi next crossed to the mainland to repeat the adventure. With his appearance, the corrupt government at Naples collapsed, most of its army melted away, and Garibaldi, almost without opposition, entered Naples on September 6. At this point, Cavour, who at first secretly and then almost openly aided Garibaldi in every way possible, deemed it advisable for the Piedmontese government to intervene. There were substantial reasons to justify this. It seemed likely that the hot-headed Garibaldi might march on into the Papal States to destroy the temporal power. This most certainly would have created serious complications with France, whose troops were defending the pope, and the unity of Italy now so nearly won might have been delayed. More than that, Cavour was fearful that republican elements might gain influence over Garibaldi and thus make immediate union under the Savoy dynasty difficult. For these reasons, when Garibaldi arrived at Naples, Cavour, having already made the necessary diplomatic preparations, ordered the royal army to occupy Umbria and the Marches (papal territory) which promptly voted for union with Piedmont, and with the territorial connections thus established the army moved into Sicilian territory under the leadership of Victor Emmanuel II. On November 7, 1860, the King and Garibaldi entered Naples together. A short while before, popular plebiscites confirmed the desire of the people to unite under Victor Emmanuel. The Parliament of the Kingdom of Piedmont thereupon dissolved, and in February, 1861, a new Parliament, elected by all of Italy except Venetia and what remained of the Papal States, approved the establishment of the kingdom of Italy which was formally proclaimed March 17. Thus Cavour had made Italy within the short span of two years. Exhausted by his almost ceaseless labor he died shortly thereafter.

Italy was united but not complete. Venetia and the Papal States were still under foreign rule. To acquire the former, Cavour's successors joined in alliance with Prussia in 1866 to fight Austria.[1] By treaty the following year, they were confirmed in the possession of Venetia. The acquisition of Rome and the Papal States was a much more difficult and perplexing problem. Since his abandonment of federalism and reform, the aging Pius IX held tenaciously to the papal temporal rights, though compelled to make sizable sacrifices in 1860

[1] For further information on this alliance, see p. 743.

and 1861. The moral support of much of the Catholic world was no insignificant weapon of defense, but greater still was the active support of French arms. For reasons of domestic politics, Napoleon III had maintained troops in the Papal States more or less consistently since 1849. These he could not withdraw without serious damage to his prestige. Italian patriots were therefore confronted with the danger of war with France if they attempted to seize the territory by force; while every attempt to negotiate a settlement either with the pope or with Napoleon ended unsuccessfully. The dilemma was solved easily enough when the imperial armies were defeated in the early stages of the Franco-Prussian War. The seizure of Rome could then no longer create complications, so in September, 1870, after a short encounter with papal troops, Rome was occupied. The temporalities of the Papacy were abolished and, with the exception of some few irredentist (unredeemed) territories (Trento, Trieste, and Istria) held by Austria, the unification of Italy had been completed.

From the time of its formation until the Fascist Revolution (1922) the kingdom of Italy was governed under the slightly modified constitution of Piedmont. This provided for the parliamentary system, with a two chamber legislature, an appointive Senate, and a popularly elected Chamber of Deputies, to which the ministers of the government were responsible. Very much as in Great Britain, the king reigned but did not rule. While this provided for constitutional forms, it did not ensure democracy. The franchise was very restricted, partly out of fear among the bourgeoisie and landed classes, partly because of the high percentage of illiteracy which prevailed throughout the country. These restrictions were gradually relaxed, however, and finally (1912) universal manhood suffrage was established. Experience with this was very brief before the nation was overwhelmed by the World War and then by the Fascist revolution. Not only was democratic government not firmly founded, but it did not succeed in gaining popular respect. There were extensive political manipulation and corruption and a good deal of ministerial instability.

The problems which this new government faced would have taxed the ingenuity of men with much greater experience in constitutional democracy. One of the most serious of these was the application of a uniform system of administration to areas which had long been separated and which had their own customs and traditions. Uniform success was not achieved in this direction until the very eve of the World War.

Another serious problem was that of maintaining national financial stability. The country was poor in natural resources, dependent upon the outside for materials necessary in its manufacturing and to a considerable extent for food. Its trade balance was long unfavorable. In the face of this it was difficult for the government to get along, for, though taxes were high, it was long impossible to make revenues meet expenses, which tended to rise in proportion to the government's attempt to play the role of a great power. Through consistent economy, through the financial returns from its emigrants abroad, and through the healthy improvement of economic life, this situation was gradually reversed. There had been a noticeable development of business enterprise, particularly in the production of silks and metals. In the use of hydro-electrical power, Italy easily took first place. Even so, Italy's trade did not rise to equal that of Belgium.

Long the most perplexing problem of the kingdom of Italy was its relations with the Papacy. After the seizure of Rome, an attempt was made to reach an accord with the pope, and when this failed because of Pius IX's refusal to recognize the new state, Parliament sought to solve the difficulty by the Law of Papal Guarantees. Besides securing the inviolability of his person, recognizing his right to perform the customary activities of a sovereign, and confirming his possession of certain properties, this law also provided generous financial recompense for his loss of the temporalities. Nevertheless, Pius refused to recognize the validity of the law, and declaring himself to be the "prisoner of the Vatican" refused to set foot upon Italian soil. The tradition thus established persisted until the Lateran accords in 1929.[1] Meanwhile, Pius sought to paralyze the government by requesting that all Catholics refrain from participating in national elections. Though formally adopted by Pius' successors, these restrictions upon voting were gradually relaxed and were substantially inoperative by 1914. Nevertheless, the coolness in relations between the Papacy and the kingdom continued, accentuating the normally difficult problems of political life.

During the very early years of this conflict with the Papacy, there was real fear that the popes might seek asylum with one of the other Catholic powers of Europe, and thus endanger the stability of the regime, since it seemed logical that if he should depart he would probably return again at the head of a foreign army. It was partly for this reason that Italy sought an alliance with Germany, and even-

[1] For these Lateran Accords, see Chapter XXXI.

tually joined the Triple Alliance (1882) with Germany and Austria.[1] But there were also other significant reasons for this important step in her foreign policy, among them her anxiety to secure some co-operation in the establishment of an Italian empire.

Like all of the Great Powers, Italy succumbed to imperial ambitions. After the French took Tunis, Italy hastened to seize possessions in the area of the Red Sea. These brought her an African Empire which touched Abyssinia, upon which the imperialists, especially Francesco Crispi, long prime minister, had designs. Attempts to dominate this independent African state led to swift disaster when (1896) an invading colonial force was annihilated by native Abyssinians. This humiliating defeat plus the great costs of imperial adventures temporarily cooled the ardor of the Italian imperialists, but in 1912 the expansionist movement once more reasserted itself. With the active or passive consent of the other Great Powers, Italy declared war upon Turkey and took from her the African province of Libya. None of these acquisitions were worth the effort expended to secure them. They were and still are liabilities to the Italian people.

C. Imperial Germany

The national unifications of Germany and Italy paralleled each other in many ways. Like Italy, Germany was merely a "geographic expression" at the beginning of the nineteenth century; there were marked cultural differences among the German people, accentuated by religious rivalries inherited from the era of the Protestant Revolt; there were much the same particularisms, entrenched by centuries of usage; there was the same enemy, Austria, to be immobilized or extruded before union could be achieved. Besides, one state, Prussia, effected union by establishing its hegemony over the other German states as Piedmont did over the remainder of Italy; and one statesman, Bismarck, using the same methods of deception, intrigue, and war employed by Cavour, achieved this result. In each case, unification was accomplished in a relatively brief period of time; but, in each case, the way was eased by deliberate planning, accidental circumstance, and an abundance of good fortune.

The obstacles to union of the Germanies had long seemed insurmountable. Loosely held together by the decrepit Holy Roman Em-

[1] For a description of Italy's part in the pre-war alliance systems, see Chapter XXX.



MAP THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

pire, the three-hundred-odd German states, each enjoying sovereign rights, each with its own bureaucracy, each playing its own game at high politics, consistently worked at cross purposes. Even the presence of a common enemy was not enough to make them abandon their petty particularisms, until all were humiliated or crushed. This state of affairs was further aggravated by the fact that the two largest German countries, Prussia and Austria, both Great Powers, had become rivals for supremacy over all the Germanies. Fearing the ascendancy of either one of them, the lesser states aligned with one or the other or combined momentarily against both to preserve the status quo, and for a long time were able to forestall a Prussian or an Austrian dominated union. These dispersive forces were in part the cause and in part the result of deep-seated local traditions, which, in turn, were perpetuated by backward governments. Except for Prussia in the time of Frederick the Great, and a few of the other states which copied his example, the governments of the Germanies during the eighteenth century were corrupt, inefficient, and enervated. The mass of the people were so effectively held in restraint that the ideals of

liberty and nationalism which were elsewhere taking root had little opportunity to develop.

Nevertheless, during the eighteenth century a remarkable intellectual awakening prepared the way for a fundamental transformation of German political life. Following the general lines of the Enlightenment in France, the *Aufklärung* in Germany revealed a new interest in the things of the mind and a critical approach to social and political problems. Poets and dramatists, philosophers and publicists [1] exposed the abuses of petty princes, proposed social and political reforms, nourished the seeds of revolution, and molded the culture of the Germans after a common pattern. As in Italy, the leaders of this intellectual movement had little thought of aiding the development of political nationalism, which some of them actually characterized as a political monstrosity. They were cosmopolites and humanitarians believing in a world society. Their propaganda, however, contributed toward the national awakening which was first clearly revealed during the French Revolution.

In cultivated circles the upheaval across the Rhine was enthusiastically greeted as the signal for the collapse of absolutism and the emergence of German liberty. The excesses of the Reign of Terror and the mounting imperial ambitions of revolutionary France soon dampened their ardor but inflamed their latent nationalism. As in Italy, the French "deliverer" became the foreign tyrant and oppressor. Increasingly, poets and philosophers directed their attention to the task of "saving" Germany. Native virtues were contrasted with the excesses of the French, the beauties of the German tongue extolled, and the supposed greatness of the German past emphasized to arouse the determination to resist. This movement reached its stride in Prussia following the humiliating defeat at Jena. The government made heroic efforts to regenerate the country [2] and its efforts were supplemented by able intellectuals who expounded the cause of militant nationalism. Led by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, whose *Addresses to the German Nation* (1807-1808) expressed so eloquently the hope of creating a single nation, the patriotic chorus was taken up by poets and disseminated among the youth through Gymnastic Societies. The War of Liberation which followed brought the national enthusiasm of this epoch to its climax.

[1] This was the "Augustan" age of German literature, the period of such notable literary figures as Goethe, Lessing, and Schiller.

[2] See Chapter XX.

The political and social transformation wrought in the Germanies by Napoleon aroused hope among the most ardent patriots that when he had been destroyed a liberal and united Germany might take shape. The impotent Holy Roman Empire had been swept aside; more than two hundred of the petty states had been completely destroyed; and almost everywhere the old regime had been dealt a decisive blow. An impressive number of German delegations petitioned the Congress of Vienna to complete the process by creating a liberal German union. These hopes were not to be realized. The German Confederation which was created was in reality neither liberal nor a union. The thirty-nine states were virtually independent; there was no common policy and no common defense; and the whole organization was dominated by conservative Austria whose chief interest was to preserve the status quo. None of the liberals or nationalists were satisfied with such a settlement. The history of Germany from 1815 forward is concerned largely with their efforts to break it.

While there was agreement that the Confederation was unsatisfactory, there were substantial differences of opinion as to what should replace it. Some believed a union of the north under Prussia and a union of the south under Austria would be best; others hoped for a tripartite settlement, in which Prussia and Austria would be offset by a combination of the lesser states; some wished for complete national union under Prussia; and still others hoped for a democratic union effected by the people themselves. Most of the active exponents of change, intellectuals and bourgeoisie, were liberals who wished that whatever the settlement might be it should be peacefully made and should allow for some form of constitutional government. During the revolution of 1848 the Frankfort Assembly attempted to realize this program but without success. Its failure permanently injured the chances of establishing a liberal United Germany. Thereafter the unitary movement centered about Prussia, and while Prussia was prepared to unite Germany by imposing her will upon the other states, her government intended to make no genuine submission to liberalism.

Prussia's gradual rise to leadership in the German Confederation during the first half of the nineteenth century was the result of circumstances only incidentally connected with its political development, which was, in fact, of such character as to make many nationalists and most liberals despair of its influence. In part, it grew out of its size and political power. Exclusive of Austria, whose varied holdings made it seem almost non-German, Prussia was the largest

of the German States, with scattered possessions from the Baltic to the Rhine, and with a population of above 15 million. Though there was a hostile Polish minority and though many of the Germans acquired at the Congress of Vienna were resentful of annexation, its interests were essentially German. In part, also, Prussia's prestige derived from its pre-eminence in the intellectual world. Despite reactionary politics, education was fostered, and men of learning were accorded substantial freedom for the pursuit of their labors. Some of these, especially a group of distinguished historians, did notable service in advancing the cause of German unity under Prussia's leadership. But even more, Prussia's position as the potential unifier of the Germanies was ensured by its own economic policies and by natural economic circumstances to which most of her partners in the Confederation were exposed.

The sprawling and scattered possessions of the State together with the heavy financial burdens which it inherited from the Napoleonic wars, centered the attention of Prussian statesmen upon economic problems. Drastic economies were introduced, but so long as internal customs and varying tariffs among different sections made smuggling profitable there was little hope that sufficient revenues could be collected. In 1818 a beginning was made in the direction of unifying the customs of the kingdom, introducing free trade, and relaxing the tariffs on foreign produce so that they could be collected and smuggling be discouraged. The beneficial consequences of this procedure were immediately recognized by Prussia's neighbors who, because of the steady increase of commerce, desired to participate but were fearful that Prussian political domination might follow. Nevertheless, in 1819, the first little State joined in a customs union with Prussia; others soon followed, and in 1828 Prussia scored a notable success by securing the adhesion of Hesse-Darmstadt. Meanwhile, neighboring states created their own customs unions to forestall further Prussian successes, and in 1831 these amalgamated with Prussia to form the Prusso-German Union, or *Zollverein*. Most of the members of the Confederation, except Austria which Prussia did not wish to include, hastened to follow suit. The establishment of the *Zollverein* was one of the most notable achievements of Prussian diplomacy. Being the largest, the richest, and the most populous State in the Union, she was able to dominate it and to use it as the stepping stone to her own political ascendancy.

The *Zollverein* helped to create economic unity where political unity was lacking. Internal and foreign trade grew; railroads and

highways to facilitate it were constructed; industry expanded; banking and credit greatly increased. The rising class of bourgeoisie sought new opportunities for the exploitation of the national wealth. They chafed under the restraints imposed upon them by petty governments, grew impatient of the political boundaries which separated the country, and regretted that Germany was not so organized as to make its influence felt abroad. Increasingly, they came to feel that economic union must be supplemented by political union.

The success of the Italians and French over Austria in the War of 1859 indicated the path by which political union might be realized. Many had long since reached the conclusion that Germany could not include two great Powers, Prussia and Austria, and were now convinced that the impotence of Austria might be capitalized upon and unity achieved through Prussia. A *National Union* movement was established in Hanover to propagate this cause throughout the Germanies, and to persuade Prussia to copy Piedmont's leadership in establishing liberal reforms which would make Prussian domination more acceptable to the other German peoples. This agitation exerted a powerful influence in preparing the way for union under Prussia, but it failed to make Prussia liberal.

Aided by the powerful Junker landed aristocracy, who dominated the army and the bureaucracy, the Hohenzollern dynasty of Prussia had managed to preserve the substance of conservative and paternalistic absolutism. The Revolution of 1848 necessitated momentary concessions of constitutional government but these were largely withdrawn two years later when a constitution was granted which allowed for a Parliament elected by the most restricted suffrage but almost completely subservient to the royal will. The growing body of the Prussian bourgeoisie and many of their friends elsewhere hoped that these deficiencies might be rectified by the Crown itself. Little was to be expected from Frederick William IV (1840-1861) who after wavering between liberalism and reaction had at length submitted to the latter, but the future succession of his brother, William I (1861-1888) held out some prospect of change for the better. William became regent in 1858 when Frederick William was no longer mentally capable of handling affairs and three years later ascended the throne. Honest, straightforward, conscientious, sensible, but with only average intelligence and little imagination, the new sovereign was a welcome change after his two fickle and vacillating predecessors. He was patriotic and ambitious for Prussia as well as for himself, but he was staunch in his belief in Hohenzollern absolutism and was opposed

to sacrificing any more of the royal prerogatives. Prussia's prestige and leadership in the Germanies, he felt certain, would be assured not by concessions to liberalism but by a large and powerful army. The hope that the Crown might grant constitutional government therefore vanished at the very inception of William's reign.

Disappointed by his conservatism, the Liberals determined to wrest from the king what he would not concede. William's decision to enlarge and strengthen the army offered them their opportunity. According to the constitution of 1850, it was required that the Crown secure the consent of Parliament to any increases in taxes, and since the contemplated military reforms necessitated greater expenditures and therefore increased revenues, Parliament had the right, if it wished, to prevent the adoption of the royal program. The bourgeoisie of the Lower House resented any increase in the taxes and, moreover, hoped that they could force the king to grant constitutional responsibilities to Parliament if they withheld their consent. William had no intention of capitulating to the demands for reform, nor was he willing to abandon his military program. So serious was the conflict which ensued between the Crown and the parliamentary Liberals, that in 1862 William contemplated abdication to avoid concession. In one last effort to force the passage of the military bill on his own terms, William named as minister-president a conservative and aggressive Prussian Junker, Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), whose friends were convinced that he could resolve the issue in the king's favor. Meeting with continued opposition in the lower Chamber, Bismarck, relying upon the support of the bureaucracy and the army which the king controlled, and upon the Upper House which was dominated by Junkers like himself, proceeded to collect the taxes without parliamentary consent and to institute William's military reforms. Censorship of the press and manipulation of the elections restrained the mounting opposition which was soon made impotent by the brilliant successes which Bismarck achieved in foreign policy with the use of the reinvigorated army. Liberalism was killed, but the cause of German unification won a champion whose uncompromising use of force quickly cleared away the obstacles to unification under Prussia's leadership.

Born into a family of landed aristocrats distinguished for their loyalty to the Hohenzollerns and their attachment to the established order, Bismarck conceived an early hatred for all democratic and liberal attempts to destroy the privileges of his class or reduce the prerogatives of the Prussian kings. University studies which he pur-

sued with lighthearted indifference did little to broaden his views and, in contrast with Cavour, he avoided the liberalizing influences which might have come from extensive travel abroad. After completing his education, he entered the civil service but became bored with its monotonous routine and soon retired to the family estates, the fortunes of which he successfully recovered. Though intensely patriotic, Bismarck evinced little direct interest in political affairs during these early years. The revolutionary upheaval of the 1840's, however, aroused his fighting spirit, and impelled him to abandon the peaceful life of the country squire. He entered the lists in defense of the king, fought against the revolutionary settlement of 1848, and became the most uncompromising and outspoken exponent of the political status quo. In return for this loyalty, he was named Prussia's representative to the government of the German Confederation at Frankfort (1851), a position which he held for the next eight years. It was while serving in this capacity that he perfected the arts of diplomacy which he was to use so successfully later, and formulated his opinion of the means by which Prussia might sometime unite the Germanies. The invaluable experiences of these years at Frankfort were supplemented by diplomatic service at the imperial courts of Paris and St. Petersburg before he was named minister-president of Prussia.

An opportunist, ready to employ whatever means seemed most likely to ensure results, Bismarck brought to his new office no clearly formulated plan of unifying the Germanies, but he did have some settled convictions on the general procedure to follow. He rejected the liberal idea that union would result from Prussia's adoption of constitutional government, asserting that Germany could not be made by phrases and pretty speeches. Unification achieved through peaceful negotiation he regarded not only as unlikely but as wholly undesirable, since in a union of equals Prussian pre-eminence would never be realized, while at the same time mutual jealousies would prevent the establishment of a strong state. Prussia alone could make Germany by forcing the lesser states to coalesce with her and, as Bismarck understood the situation, this could be accomplished only through the elimination of Austria. So long as the lesser states could count upon Austria's age-old rivalry with Prussia to assure their political independence, so long Germany would remain separated. Bismarck, therefore, believed that the first step toward unification was the extrusion of Austria, and this, he was convinced, would require the use of armed force. It was for this reason that he vigorously supported the royal military reforms, despite the dangers of internal

revolution, and sought the first opportunity to pick a quarrel with Austria.

Events seemed to play directly into Bismarck's hands, but he was careful to turn them to good purpose. A national dispute which flared up in 1863 among the Danes and the Germans of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein quickly brought the "German" policies of Austria and Prussia into sharp conflict and provided Bismarck with the excuse for war upon Austria. The sovereign of the duchies had been the king of Denmark, but both states had enjoyed a semi-independent status which allowed Holstein, for example, to be part of the German Confederation. The inhabitants, however, were mostly Germans who were anxious to have their own German prince. The death of King Frederick VII of Denmark (1863) offered them the opportunity to protest the succession in the duchies of his Danish heir, Christian IX, and they appealed to the German Confederation to support the establishment of their independence. German "national" sentiment favored these native aspirations to such an extent that when Christian IX signed a constitution which incorporated Schleswig into his kingdom it was popularly demanded that the German Confederation resort to strong measures. The Diet ordered that an army be sent into the duchies, but Bismarck, anxious to profit from the situation, raised objections to such common action. A previous agreement among the Great Powers, including Prussia and Austria, had already regulated the disposition of the duchies in such an eventuality, and Bismarck claimed that it was the duty of Austria and Prussia, as signatories, to see that Denmark respected this pledge. Acting in this sense, Prussia despatched an ultimatum to Christian IX demanding withdrawal from Schleswig and the removal from the Danish constitution of the provisions by which that province had been incorporated into Denmark. The Austrian government, disliking Prussia's procedure but unwilling to see her score a great "national" victory alone, followed suit. It was physically impossible, as Bismarck well realized, for the Danish government to meet the terms of the ultimatum, whereupon Austria and Prussia declared war. The result was a foregone conclusion. Denmark was defeated and the duchies were turned over to the victors.

Just as Bismarck hoped and expected, a dispute at once arose between Prussia and Austria over the disposition of the spoils. Anxious to preserve the German Confederation and maintain her influence in it, Austria favored making the duchies a part of that organization. Prussia insisted upon virtually annexing them and had her

way. Holstein was turned over to Austria for administration; Schleswig was given to Prussia. Such a settlement was calculated to cause trouble. It was easy for Bismarck to find fault with Austria's management of Holstein; it was natural for Austria to resent Prussian protests and interferences. The relations between the two powers grew steadily worse, reaching the breaking point in June, 1866. Early that month Austria submitted the question of the duchies to the Diet of the Confederation for consideration. This Bismarck construed to be directly contrary to the Austro-Prussian treaty regulating the matter and he forthwith ordered the occupation of Holstein by Prussian troops. Austria then persuaded the Diet of the Confederation to prepare for war against Prussia. Bismarck held this to be illegal, asserted that the Confederation had thereby terminated its existence, and on June 16 declared war upon Austria.

Before allowing the crisis to mature, Bismarck had carefully made the necessary diplomatic preparations. Through vague promises of future rewards, he encouraged Napoleon III to remain neutral. By direct negotiations with Italy he arranged a treaty (April, 1866) which pledged the Italians to join Prussia in a war against Austria within a period of three months, in return for which she should acquire the province of Venetia. Thus, practically certain that France would not interfere and assured that Austria would have to fight simultaneously on two fronts, Bismarck felt reasonably sure of success. With only the feeble assistance of a few members of the German Confederation, and with an army much inferior to that of Prussia, Austria was brought to her knees within the extraordinarily brief period of seven weeks. By July, 1866, hostilities had ceased and in August the Peace of Prague formally ended the war. Apart from the cession of Venetia to Italy, Austria's territorial losses were not great, nor was she compelled to pay a heavy indemnity. With an eye to the future support of Austria in European affairs, Bismarck had made the terms especially lenient, despite the aggressive ambitions of some of the military men and especially King William himself. Bismarck's chief aim of eliminating Austria completely from German affairs was realized, for by the Peace of Prague, Austria consented to the dissolution of the German Confederation and agreed to withdraw from the Germanies.

During the course of the war Prussia occupied adjoining German states whose enmity or uncertain loyalty justified such procedure on the score of self-defense. These were subsequently annexed, enlarging the Prussian Kingdom by some 1,300 square miles, increasing its

population to nearly twenty-five million, and uniting its scattered possessions from the Baltic to the Rhine. Thenceforth Prussia controlled nearly all of the seacoast and more completely dominated the economic life of the German people.

With enlarged Prussia as a nucleus, Bismarck created a new German confederation of the twenty-two states north of the Main River. The remaining southern states were allowed to determine their own fate, especially since it was realized that sooner or later they must come to terms with the larger union forming in the north. Bismarck himself drew up the plans for the North German Confederation, devised its constitution, and directed its destinies. The king of Prussia became the chief executive, under the title of President of the Confederation, and as such was to have the army under his control and was to name the ministries of the government. For all practical purposes, the sovereigns of the lesser states abandoned their sovereignty to him. As a sop to the princes and as bait for the Liberals, the constitution of the Confederation called for a Parliament of two houses, whose joint approval on all laws and all taxes was necessary. The Upper House (Bundesrat) resembled the Diet of the Old Confederation, in that it was composed of the representatives of the princes of the separate states who voted according to the instructions of their home governments. Prussia was allowed 17 votes out of a total of 43, a number which made it possible for her to dominate the deliberations since it was easy to cajole the smallest states into co-operation. The Lower House (Reichstag) was composed of slightly less than 300 representatives elected according to the principle of universal manhood suffrage. Unlike the British system, this popularly elected branch had no superior powers, and the ministries of the Crown were not made responsible to it. Bismarck could well afford to make this concession to Liberalism, since it deprived the government of none of the substance of power, while it did hold out the hope of democratic government in the future. Political expediency demanded that a gesture should be made in this latter direction because the traditions of liberalism were strong in the southern states whose incorporation into Germany, which was taking shape now, became Bismarck's chief preoccupation.

By enlarging and extending the scope of the Zollverein, Bismarck made clearer to the southern states the economic advantages of union. Even more forcefully this was impressed upon them by the great prosperity which came to the people of the north following the creation of the North German Confederation. But Bismarck's trump card

in dealing with the southern states lay in cultivating their fear of France. Before the War of 1866 Napoleon III had been offered as bait for his neutrality the idea that he might compensate himself for Prussia's enlargement through absorption of German territories in the Rhine country. Bismarck had made these promises purposely vague, never intending to fulfill them, but he hoped that they might sometime be employed to Napoleon's disadvantage. When the French emperor, therefore, sought to recoup his waning prestige and restore the balance in Europe, which Prussia had tipped to France's disadvantage by calling for the fulfillment of Bismarck's pledges, the Prussian unscrupulously revealed the whole affair in such fashion as to place the odium upon Napoleon among his own subjects, among the States abroad, and especially among the German people of the south who were to suffer most by such shady dealings. Much as they disliked Prussia, the southern states disliked and now feared France even more, and consequently were not unwilling to join with Prussia in a defensive alliance which Bismarck generously held out to them. Their military affairs were substantially co-ordinated with Prussia's, so that in a military sense Germany was already united by 1867, with a potential army of more than a million men. There were good grounds for believing that if France could be made to provoke a war the military alliance would promptly give way to political union and Germany would be made. Bismarck became convinced that this was the case and therefore sought deliberately to goad France into making war.

The story of the Franco-Prussian War, which soon developed in the way in which Bismarck hoped, has been partly told in another connection.[1] Suffice it here to review Bismarck's share in the manipulation of events. The excuse for war grew out of a Franco-Prussian conflict over the proper succession to the Spanish throne, made vacant by revolution in 1866. The provisional Spanish government, determined to have no more Bourbons, undertook a diligent search among the capitals of Europe for an appropriate sovereign, and three times extended the invitation to a member of the Prussian Hohenzollern House. It was refused on each occasion, but the knowledge that France would have regarded acceptance as a cause for war on the ground that France would then suffer humiliation by being surrounded by Hohenzollern states, persuaded Bismarck to connive secretly for a renewal of the invitation as well as for its acceptance if tendered. On July 2, 1870, news reached Paris by way of Madrid

[1] See Chapter XXIV.

that Leopold of Hohenzollern had accepted the Spanish Crown, and both popular and official feeling against Prussia rose to fever heat. A French embassy to King William I requested that the king, as head of the Hohenzollern House, withdraw Leopold's candidacy. William acquiesced both because he had no wish for war with France and because Leopold himself had no desire to go to Spain if there were a convenient way out. Bismarck was despondent at this turn of events for all cause of war seemed to have disappeared. But the blundering tactics of the French soon gave the Chancellor renewed hope. A demand upon William I that he renounce the throne of Spain for the Hohenzollern House for all time was given the prompt but courteous refusal which it deserved. The king who was vacationing at Ems when this latter demand was made of him telegraphed a review of his interview with the French ambassador to Bismarck, allowing the latter to publish it or not as he chose. Harmless as this Ems despatch was in its actual content, Bismarck saw in it "a red flag" to wave before "the Gallic bull." Without falsifications, but by abbreviations of such type as to completely alter its tone, Bismarck's summary of the despatch, which he gave the press, made the interview of the king and the French ambassador appear to be abrupt and discourteous on both sides. Public sentiment in both countries was immediately inflamed, and the war hawks of Paris lightheartedly prepared for war. On July 15, sufficient credits were voted by Parlement, and four days later France declared war upon Prussia. Bismarck had managed to make France appear the aggressor.

The Franco-Prussian War was of short duration. During its early stages the Second Empire collapsed, and while a provisional government of National Defense took its place and manfully fought on, the French armies were never a match for the Prussians in strategy and equipment. In January, 1871, France capitulated, and in May a definitive treaty was signed at Frankfort. Unlike Austria who had been Prussia's victim four years before, France was compelled to pay a heavy indemnity and to sacrifice two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine. Bismarck demanded the latter under pressure of the military men, and somewhat against his better judgment, for purely strategic purposes. It was a blunder of the first rank, for while France might have resigned herself to the loss of Alsace whose population was more akin to the German, the loss of Lorraine was regarded as an intolerable humiliation. A great deal of the subsequent hostility between France and Germany can be traced directly to this provision of the peace.

The most important immediate result of the war, as Bismarck had anticipated, was the creation of a united Germany. Co-operation on the field of battle and the joy of victories commonly shared solidified the national sentiment of north and south. Before the war had ended the southern states abandoned their independent status and joined the North German Confederation, which on January 18, in an elaborate ceremony at the Palace of Versailles, was declared to be the German Empire.

The constitution of the Empire, incorporating the treaties of union of the four southern states, and embodying the essential features of the constitution of the North German Confederation, was put into operation in April, 1871. Structurally, the new Empire was a federation of twenty-six states, each of which retained some local jurisdictions but bestowed upon the central government sovereign rights over all matters vitally important to the common welfare. These states were all allowed to continue their own forms of government, most of them being monarchies, but the executive powers of the federation were given to the king of Prussia, who also took the title of German Emperor. Head of the army, responsible for war and peace, the emperor was given virtually a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. But in domestic affairs his domination had to be achieved through indirection. He had no power to veto laws of the legislature, but the ministry he appointed was responsible to him, and through the control which he could exercise over the Prussian representatives in the Upper House, he was usually able to get his wish or at least frustrate the plans of his opponents. The Upper House of the legislature, the *Bundesrat*, like that in the North German Confederation, represented the governments of the states in the federation. Of sixty-one members, Prussia had seventeen, directly under control of the emperor. Voting as a bloc, they were able to prevent any changes in the constitution, which required a two-thirds vote for passage. The Reichstag, or Lower House, representing the people, was elected by universal manhood suffrage. It had less initiative than the *Bundesrat* in legislation and was given no direct control over the ministries. Somewhat democratic in form, the government of the German Empire was never actually democratic in practice. Dominated by Prussia, it perpetuated the traditions of Prussian, Hohenzollern, authoritarian government. The growth of bourgeois and workingmen's parties which secured domination of the Reichstag in the twentieth century threatened the continuance of this system. The demands for political reforms became so loud that in 1912 the

government promised they should be made. The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the World War, however, made any changes appear to be inexpedient even to those who demanded them and, in consequence, they were not made.

The political unification of Germany was followed by nearly a half century of remarkable economic progress. Because of the disappearance of the artificial barriers to trade, the abundance and wealth of natural resources, the encouragement of the government and partly as the result of the rapid payment of the French indemnity, business experienced a mushroom growth during the first decade of the Empire. Though the immediate results of this, wild speculation followed by depression, were unfortunate, the basis was laid for making Germany one of the great industrial nations of the world. Foreign trade multiplied several times over; Germany rose to third rank among the great coal producers of the world; outstripped England in the manufacture of iron; took second place with its merchant marine; and assumed the leadership in the electrical and chemical industries. Agriculture kept pace through the application of science to cultivation, but it ceased to be the most important economic resource of the nation. By 1914, German society was preponderantly urban, and Germany was one of the top-ranking manufacturing nations of the world.

Bismarck who had engineered the creation of this great Empire was given the title of prince and for nearly two decades continued to control its destiny. His foreign policy was brilliant [1] in the sense that he maneuvered Germany into the dominating position in Europe and easily succeeded in laying the basis for a German Empire overseas, but his domestic policy lacked the same skillful touch. The most serious of the early problems which he faced concerned the relations between the Empire and the Catholic Church. He resented the Church's influence in education and its aloofness from the state, but more than that he feared the Church, which was strongly entrenched in the south and among the minority peoples, might become the center for a separatist movement which would threaten imperial unity. The intrigues of the French clericals with disgruntled German Catholics gave the entire situation a critical aspect since it was feared that a clerical government in France might use the Church as an ally in fighting a war of revenge. To avoid these potentials dangers, Bismarck persuaded the Reichstag in 1872 to expel the Jesuits. He followed this with legislation in Prussia (1873-1875), making civil mar-

[1] See Chapter XXX.

riages compulsory, depriving the Church of influence in education, placing the appointment and dismissal of clergy in the control of the State, and disbanding a variety of religious orders. The Catholics responded to this *Kulturkampf* (fight for civilization), as it was called, with obstinate resistance and created a Catholic political party in the Reichstag which made Bismarck's control of that body annually more precarious. Political expediency made some understanding with the Church necessary. Beginning in 1878 the offending measures were gradually abrogated until almost all of them disappeared in 1887. Bismarck's ruthless campaign had been ill advised and it was he rather than the Church which suffered final defeat.

The most important factor operating to produce this reversal of policy was the growth of a Socialist Party which threatened to be more dangerous than the Catholics. The great expansion of industry and the resulting increase of the urban proletariat laid the basis for the creation of the Social Democratic Party which incorporated the teachings of Marx and Engels. Founded prior to the establishment of the Empire, this organization stood for every form of liberalism which Bismarck detested, especially democracy and the control of the state by the workers. As their political influence increased, Bismarck, branding them as traitors, secured the passage of exceptional laws allowing for their expulsion from the state under certain circumstances, and rigidly restricting their rights to free speech and free assembly. These stern measures merely drove the socialist movement under ground without greatly weakening it. Therefore, after making his peace with the Church, Bismarck reversed his former policy in favor of one calculated to kill the socialist movement with kindness. He adopted the essential features of State Socialism, abandoned laissez-faire practice, and embarked upon a program of extensive social reforms. The Socialists remained skeptical of these measures, but the majority of workers were appeased, and the dangers of social and political transformations were temporarily overcome. The Social Democratic Party thereafter became more conservative, though it adhered to its policy of fighting for democracy in government.

The death of William I (1888), Bismarck's loyal friend and collaborator, loosened the "Iron Chancellor's" grip on the government. The brief reign of the old king's son was followed by that of his grandson, William II (1888-1918), a young man filled with enthusiasm, confident of his own greatness, and certain both of his right and his capacity to govern as his own chancellor. It was practically inevitable that he should clash with Bismarck, and that the latter should

"DROPPING THE PILOT": BISMARCK AND WILLIAM II, BY JOHN TENNIEL (1820-1914)

The artist who did this cartoon for *Punch* was for a half a century on the staff of that magazine. Tenniel's deserved reputation as one of the greatest of the European caricaturists rests in large measure upon the political cartoons which appeared in *Punch*. See also "Mosé in Egitto," p. 776.

be displaced by the very instrument of royal power which he had devoted his life to strengthening. The break came over a somewhat trivial affair growing out of diplomatic negotiations with Russia, and Bismarck, pouting and disgruntled, was compelled to resign in 1890. William was careful thereafter to appoint to the office of chancellor men who would be his obedient servants.

The era of William II was one of continuing prosperity, intellectual advancement, and social reform in domestic affairs, but it was also a period of ambitious foreign policy and aggressive expansion. The Bismarckian system of insurance against France was allowed to lapse partly through negligence, and partly through diplomatic bungling.[1] But the colonial policy which Bismarck had successfully initiated through acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific was vigorously continued, especially in the Near and the Far East where William himself took the lead. The objections of rival powers to this expansion were ofttimes answered by threats of force, by regular increases in armaments and the army, and by the establishment of a strong navy. William took especial interest in the latter and with the aid of a capable but shortsighted sailor, Admiral von Tirpitz, built up an imperial navy of such strength and fighting power that it was capable of challenging Britain's domination of the seas. The British became alarmed at this and the naval rivalry which ensued between the two powers was one of the important factors helping to precipitate the First World War. Meantime, Germany established and retained formal relations of alliance with Austria and Italy, as protection against its continental and colonial rivals, Russia, France, and Great Britain.

[1] See Chapter XXX.

Deliberate efforts were made to prevent the latter three from combining, but the methods of forceful persuasion employed were scarcely calculated to ensure success. The Triple Entente gradually took shape in opposition to the German dominated Triple Alliance, and as it solidified, Italy was weaned from Berlin. By 1914, Germany had created powerful enemies but was left with few friends.



GERMAN HELMET. SKETCH.
Imperial dress helmet of the German Empire.

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[1] *See also* the bibliographies for Chapters XXIII, XXIV, XXIX and XXX.

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Chapter XXVI

The Political Foundations of Modern Europe (Continued)

A. The Spread of the Democratic Ideal

Political democracy may be briefly defined as a form of state organization in which the people govern themselves through agents of their own choice whom they elect to serve in representative institutions which are directly responsive to the public will. In applying this definition to existing governments, it is important to remember that *form* must not be confused with *substance*. A state may easily possess the democratic structure and yet not be democratic at all. Thus, for example, Communist Russia possesses representative institutions which on superficial examination appear to be responsive to the public will. Yet the people are not freely permitted to exercise their political choice. True democracy is possible only where the individual is free from any restrictions on the press, speech, or assembly. In this sense, democracy never has been fully and completely realized, though it has been closely approached. There are always powerful obstacles to frustrate majority rule: the control by an aggressive minority of the instruments through which public opinion is molded, such as the press; social and economic pressure; and always, of course, the high percentage of apathy and indifference on the part of the electorate. These have made many pessimistic of democracy's future, while they have led others to the opinion that political democracy can be realized only when the people themselves control all human activities, social and economic as well as political.

The growth of democracy prior to the nineteenth century was slow, halting, and sporadic. Neither Athens nor the Roman Republic was organized according to modern democratic concepts for they followed the practice of exclusive citizenship which deprived the

majority of a voice in the government. The limited democracies which they did establish gave way to authoritarian regimes, and it was the experience of the latter rather than the former which became the heritage of medieval Europe. During the feudal epoch, however, some of the foundations of modern democracy were laid, more or less by accident. To a very limited extent, the communal life of the early Christians, which was continued in modified form within the monasteries, and the development of the conciliar movement contributed to this end. More important were the results of the conflicts among ambitious kings and feudal aristocracy, and the influence exerted by the growing group of bourgeois toward eliminating class privilege. It will be remembered that the Magna Carta, a reactionary measure which eventually became the charter of British democratic liberties, was extorted from King John by the aristocracy. Both in England and elsewhere, political and financial expediency compelled medieval sovereigns to concede some form of representative institutions to their subjects. To this limited extent, and it was very limited indeed, it can be said that the way was opened during the middle ages for the evolution of modern democracy.

From the fifteenth to the nineteenth century the growth of the democratic ideal was more rapid, largely because of the influence of important intellectual and economic factors. The emphasis which the Humanists and the Protestant Revolutionaries placed upon individualism was an important contribution, though it was at the time more theoretical than practical, for neither was intentionally democratic. Religious conflicts, however, inspired the formulation among oppressed Protestant and Catholic minorities of democratic philosophies which defended popular sovereignty and representative government. Seventeenth-century science and eighteenth-century rationalism also facilitated the development of the democratic ideal by postulating the existence of a natural order for mankind and the rationality of men. But the most important factor of this period was the Commercial Revolution and the consequent rapid rise to prominence of the bourgeoisie. Merchants and traders labored to destroy the restraints of the feudal era and demanded a greater voice in government. In England, they gained control of Parliament during the Glorious Revolution, limited the powers of the Crown, and ensured the practice of representative government. This was not yet democracy, but the establishment of representative government was the starting point for subsequent democratization. Elsewhere the bourgeoisie were less successful, but the French Revolution inaugurated the series of victories

on the continent which they won by the middle of the nineteenth century. Representative government, however limited its scope, was an important beginning toward democratic government.

During the nineteenth century a variety of forces conspired to hasten the development of democracy. Among these were a number of important intellectual movements, stemming from eighteenth-century rationalism or from the industrial revolution, which asserted the equality of men and their right to individual emancipation. The most advanced were the Utilitarians of England. Proclaiming that the proper function of government was to ensure the greatest good to the greatest number, these insisted that government must be by the majority of all the people, and proposed that education, the law, and legislation be democratized. Less practical but seeking much the same objectives were the Utopian Socialists like Robert Owen, who were convinced that men could be made perfect under proper environmental conditions, and who attempted to establish social, economic, and political equality through ideally constituted communities. Among the Romanticists as well, though some of the earliest subscribed to political reaction, confidence in the individual personality tended steadily toward confidence in democratic government. The propaganda of these intellectuals contributed a great deal to the establishment of democratic procedures when economic and social pressure seemed to render them necessary.

The Industrial Revolution, by breaking the economic ties of the old order and establishing individual economic "freedom," by speeding up the exchange of goods and ideas, by concentrating populations in urban communities, and especially by creating a proletariat which became increasingly class conscious, provided the requisite economic and social foundations for democracy. The mass of the workers, seeking redress of grievances, continually demanded the control of government, to which they believed their numbers and their interests entitled them. Their pressure was strong enough to win representative institutions and to widen the suffrage.

The principle and practice of universal manhood suffrage was established nearly everywhere in Europe during the nineteenth century. In England, the vote was extended to most of the industrial workers by the borough franchise reform of 1867, and to most of the rural inhabitants by the reform of 1884; in France, universal manhood suffrage was one of the products of the revolution of 1848, though honored more in the breach than in the practice during the Second Empire; in Italy, the restricted franchise was relaxed during

the 1880's and in 1912 universal manhood suffrage was instituted; in Germany, Bismarck conceded universal manhood suffrage as early as 1867; Austria followed suit gradually, liberalizing the franchise in the 1890's and establishing universal manhood suffrage in 1907; even autocratic and imperial Russia felt the sweep of the democratic advance, establishing a Duma (1905) elected by restricted suffrage. To the extent to which the right to the ballot symbolizes the existence of democracy, it can be said that the whole of western Europe had been democratized before the First World War. But it is important to remember that universal suffrage was often more of a sham than a reality. This was especially true in Germany and to a lesser degree in Italy. Authoritarian practice continued under thin disguise.

Nevertheless, in all of these countries, either because of the continued pressure of the unenfranchised proletariat or because of the influence which their representatives exerted, notable advances were made in the direction of democratizing social and economic life. With a few important exceptions, educational facilities were opened to all classes; governments assumed responsibility for the care of the poor; civil equality was guaranteed; and the inauguration of social insurance provided a greater degree of economic equality.

In view of this progress toward democracy, it is not difficult to understand why so many were optimistic in the early twentieth century that the world would soon be completely democratized. It seemed inherent in the very nature of things, the inevitable counterpart of economic advancement and human progress. The First World War was regarded by many as a crusade to complete the process and, indeed, when it was over much of Europe supplemented universal manhood suffrage with woman suffrage and made representative institutions responsive to the public will. But democracy was not deeply rooted in the minds or the experience of most continental peoples and under the pressure of war or of economic misfortune it has been widely abandoned for dictatorship. Moreover, under the fateful tensions of 1939 and the war to which they led, authoritarianism replaced democracy, at least temporarily, even in those nations which claimed to champion the democratic ideal.

B. The third republic

The establishment of democratic government in France was one of the consequences of the Franco-Prussian War. The Second Empire collapsed after the disastrous battle of Sedan (September, 1870)

and the defense of the nation fell into the hands of a Provisional Government, headed by Léon Gambetta, and established with the aid of his republican friends in Paris. Its heroic efforts to stem the Prussian advance proved futile and in February, 1871, the Provisional Government gave way to a National Assembly which had been elected by universal manhood suffrage to deliberate for the nation on the peace which should or should not be made with Germany. During the elections for this body, the exponents of the Republic lost heavily because of their insistence that the war be continued; the conservative exponents of monarchy gained because they espoused the more popular cause of peace. For this reason the National Assembly, which met first at Bordeaux and then at Versailles, had a sizeable majority of monarchists who threatened to destroy the infant Republic.

The pressure of immediate problems growing out of the war, however, prevented prompt deliberation upon the permanent form of government to be established. Without committing itself, the Assembly named a constitutional monarchist, the aging Adolphe Thiers, as "chief executive" and empowered him to assume the odious responsibility of negotiating peace with Germany. The fulfillment of this difficult task was delayed by bitter civil war which the radical elements of Paris precipitated. Peace and order at home were the necessary preliminaries to peace with the enemy, and it was useless to assume that either could be realized or that a permanent government could be created until the authority of the Assembly was respected.

Reduced to actual starvation by prolonged siege of the German troops, the traditionally radical mob of Paris had emerged from the war with its rebellious temper inflamed. It had assumed the initiative in declaring for the Republic when the Empire collapsed; it was in no mood to capitulate before the conservative country which had elected the monarchical Assembly. For its part, the Assembly adopted measures which aimed to bring the Parisian revolutionaries into line with the rest of the nation. The Assembly met at Versailles instead of Paris and cut off the pay of the popular militia which had been organized to defend the city during the siege and was now the main source of strength of the radicals. To make matters worse, the Assembly most unwisely terminated the moratorium on rents and debts, instituted during the siege, and thus exposed the citizenry to legal action for non-payment at a time when it was virtually impossible

to meet any obligations. The first of these measures injured the pride of the Parisians; the last two incited them to open rebellion.

As early as February, 1871, the local militia or National Guard of Paris had established a central committee to protect the interests of that body and to defend Paris and the Republic against the Assembly, if need be. It was now encouraged to act. An attempt by the Assembly further to weaken the National Guard by depriving it of some of its cannon resulted in a bloody encounter in the middle of March. Shortly thereafter the civil inhabitants joined with the rebellious Guard. A popularly elected general council of the city united with the central committee of the National Guard to form the Commune of Paris. Composed of radicals of all stamps, from Jacobin republicans to anarchists, and including some Marxian socialists, this Commune was pledged to the violent overthrow of the Assembly and to the establishment of decentralized, autonomous communes, loosely federalized on a national scale. Contrary to the interpretation carefully fostered by those groups, the Commune was neither socialist nor communist and its uprising was the product of despair and disgust at incompetent and unsympathetic government rather than an ideological movement.

To subdue the Communards, the Assembly was ultimately compelled to besiege Paris once more. For two months the stubborn revolutionaries held their ground until, threatened again with starvation, they were forced to surrender on May 28. The victorious Assembly wreaked frightful vengeance. Some fifteen thousand were killed after the surrender and as many more were deported to the penal colonies. The authority of the Assembly had been made good but at a terrific cost, and for the moment radicalism had been drowned in blood.

Meantime, the negotiations with Germany continued and were finally completed with the Peace of Frankfort. Alsace and part of Lorraine had to be ceded outright and a heavy indemnity had to be paid before the German army of occupation was to be withdrawn. Under the energetic leadership of Thiers, the Assembly proceeded to meet these harsh terms with unexpected alacrity. By 1873 the indemnity had been paid and the last German troops had departed from French soil.

Thus far the Assembly, which had shown no intention of dissolving, had left the constitutional question unsettled. On the face of it, it should have been an easy matter for the monarchists, who outnumbered the republicans two to one, to set up a monarchy. But the fact that they were divided into three groups and could not

agree upon a single candidate for the throne had influenced them to delay the final settlement. One of these factions, the Imperialists or Bonapartists who wished to restore the Napoleonic regime, had little numerical strength. The dispute was confined chiefly to the Legitimists, whose candidate was the Count of Chambord, grandson of Charles X, and the Orleanists who favored the Count of Paris, grandson of Louis Philippe. Intense personal rivalry between the two claimants and fundamental differences in principles among their followers had long dashed every hope of reaching an agreeable compromise. Many of the more liberal royalists, among them Thiers, had therefore reached the conclusion by 1873 that a monarchical settlement was impractical and had accepted the idea of the Republic as the only reasonable way out. This growth of defection in their ranks induced the monarchists momentarily to set aside their differences. Thiers was voted out of office and replaced by Marshal MacMahon, a confirmed and active royalist, who, it was hoped, might keep the throne warm until a royal occupant had been found for it. Scarcely had this adjustment been made by the Assembly, when an agreement for the succession was personally arranged between the Count of Paris and the Count of Chambord. The latter, being childless, was to occupy the throne during the remainder of his life, and thereafter the succession was to be fixed in the line of the Count of Paris. So reasonable an arrangement gave every promise of success, but it was quickly broken by the Count of Chambord, a shortsighted and unbending reactionary, who insisted upon the restoration of absolutism with all of its symbols. A monarchy under such conditions was impossible and all but the most reactionary royalists in the Assembly joined hands with the Republicans to draft a Republican constitution, hoping that it might be a temporary arrangement and that when the Count of Chambord had died the Crown might be restored.

Under the circumstances, it was no easy matter to come to terms on a constitution, since the royalists wished to do nothing which would jeopardize some future monarchical restoration, and the Republicans aimed at preventing such an eventuality. The settlement finally reached was a compromise, embodied in a series of "constitutional laws" completed in 1875. Purely practical, these provided for a system of government modeled partly upon British and partly upon American practice. Legislative power was vested in a bicameral legislature: a Senate of three hundred members, elected indirectly for a term of nine years; and a Chamber of Deputies, elected directly by universal manhood suffrage for a term of four years. Both houses

were endowed with equivalent rights of initiative in legislation, except that all financial measures were to originate in the Chamber, but the latter body, like the popularly elected House of Commons in Great Britain, was to exercise dominant influence over the Cabinet of Ministers. The Ministry, drawn from the legislature and completely responsible to it, was made the real executive, obligated to enforce the laws and determine national policies. Nominally, however, executive authority was vested in a President, elected jointly by both houses of the legislature for a term of seven years, and eligible to re-election. It was required that all of his acts receive the countersignature of the ministry so that his position became chiefly that of a figurehead. The system of parliamentary government thus established by the constitutional laws has remained substantially unaltered.

With the constitution completed, the Assembly was dissolved and the Third Republic embarked upon a troubled career. The first elected legislature contained a republican majority in the Chamber and a royalist majority in the Senate so that the unhappy struggle between these two factions continued. The royalists, who had the advantage of controlling the presidential office through Marshal MacMahon whose term of office was not to expire until 1880, openly labored to hasten monarchical restoration. Officers of the army were encouraged to use their influence in this direction, and the president, through the ecclesiastical patronage which he controlled under the Concordat, enlisted the co-operation of the clergy. Clerical influence in education was strengthened; political activity of the Church was encouraged; and official hope was held out that intervention in Italy in behalf of the pope might materialize. The royalists intended to make the Church the chief bulwark of the monarchy.

The republicans bitterly assailed this policy, and for perfectly understandable reasons attacked the royalists by striking at the clergy and the Church. Their leader in the Chamber, Léon Gambetta, a skillful politician as well as a brilliant and popular orator, expressed the matter succinctly when he said, "Clericalism, there is the enemy." By 1877, the royalist-republican controversy reached an acute stage when MacMahon, hoping to be rid of his republican adversaries in the Chamber, arbitrarily appointed a clerical-royalist ministry and, with the aid of the Senate, dissolved the Chamber, ordering new elections. The campaign which followed was a test of strength between MacMahon and Gambetta and between the royalist and republican sympathies of the people. The result was a decisive republican victory. The clerical-royalist ministry was compelled to resign and Mac-

Mahon was forced to accommodate himself to a divided legislature. Two years later, in the Senatorial elections, the republicans also managed to gain control of that house. It was impossible for MacMahon to remain in office with the legislature completely republican, and he resigned in 1879. The republicans promptly elected one of their own number, Jules Grèvy, to the presidential office, and transferred the seat of the government from Versailles to Paris. The Third Republic was at last dominated by republicans, but its future was far from secure.

The royalist cause had suffered defeat but the group of royalist sympathizers, aided by the clerical reactionaries, was still sufficiently large and powerful to cause grave concern. Equally disconcerting was the revival of radicalism among the urban proletariat, who came to regard the republic, dominated by bourgeois politicians, as too conservative. Under the leadership of Jules Guesde, a Labor Party was formed in 1876, incorporating the doctrines of the Marxian Socialists. Though this organization failed to exert any material influence, largely because of disruptive influences within the labor movement, Guesde was finally able to create a working coalition of socialists during the 1890's which won substantial successes at the polls. The royalists and socialists had nothing in common except their opposition to the Republic, but their combined agitation was sufficient to threaten seriously the permanence of republican institutions.

It was not difficult for these enemies of the Republic to find weaknesses and corruption which seemed to justify their condemnations. Political factionalism in the Chamber was rampant, producing frequent ministerial changes, and consequently giving the Republic the false appearance of instability. More than that, a series of ugly financial scandals involved some of the most prominent figures in political life, including a member of President Grèvy's own family who was found to have been engaged in the sale of decorations of the Legion of Honor. This latter revelation was regarded with such seriousness that Grèvy, who had just been re-elected President in 1886, was forced to resign the following year.

Widespread public disapproval of the corruption in public life brought the accumulating discontent of the Republic's enemies to a head and precipitated a serious crisis. For a brief period, it appeared that a leader had arisen who was capable of uniting all of the malcontents for one final and decisive blow at the government. This was General Boulanger (1837-1891), a dashing officer of perfect poise who had endeared himself to the soldiers and who knew how to

flatter and captivate the crowd. Having denounced the monarchists and expressed his devotion to radicalism, he gained appointment as minister of war in 1886, and forthwith exploited his office for his own personal aggrandizement. By appearing frequently in parades, fraternizing with the soldiers, and hinting at a possible war of revenge upon Germany which was popular with all patriots, he raised his popularity to formidable proportions. Fearing that he might become another Napoleon, the Government, in 1887, compelled him to quit the ministry of war and resign his post in the army. Instead of relieving the crisis, this merely aggravated it. Boulanger was regarded as a martyr, and many of the malcontents of all factions, from monarchists to radicals, called upon him to take matters in hand and reform the government. Throughout the nation his name was proposed as a candidate for places in the Chamber of Deputies when they fell vacant, and the extent of his popularity was revealed by the majorities which he accumulated in department after department. The climax to this unofficial plebiscite in his favor came in 1889 when he carried radical and republican Paris by a huge majority. At that time the fate of the Republic hung in the balance. Had Boulanger possessed the courage, he could have destroyed the Republic and established a personal dictatorship. But at the last moment his resolution weakened, and, fearing that a threat of arrest for conspiracy might be carried out, he fled the country and two years later committed suicide.

The Republic had been saved less by its own strength than by the weakness of its enemies, but the fact that it had been preserved gave it added prestige for the future. After the storm had been successfully weathered, the government reorganized the army to exclude the active monarchists from it and embarked upon a program of social reform to appease the laboring classes. These policies were supplemented by the action of Pope Leo XIII who called upon the French clericals to cease their political activities against the Republic and devote themselves to the much more important task of social reform. Not all of the clergy heard the Pope's bidding but enough of them did to create a serious breach in the clerical alliance with the royalists. The latter were so seriously and permanently weakened by it as well as by their failure to make good the opportunity of 1889 that they ceased henceforth to be a serious menace.

The Republic rose steadily in the public esteem after the Boulanger crisis had been passed, but it was not long before it encountered a new challenge which its enemies hoped to exploit. A

wave of anti-Semitism swept over the country in the 1890's, largely directed by a Parisian journalist, Edouard Drumont, who accused the Jews of responsibility for prevalent evils in civil and political life, attributed the plight of the poor and the misfortunes of the religious suffering under anti-clerical legislation to their influence, and denounced them as traitors who were ready to sell state secrets to the enemy. By curious twist of fortune and by deliberate provocation, two events occurred in 1894 which gave credence to these preposterous claims. One was the exposure of the most unedifying corruption among the members of the government who had speculated on a Panama Canal venture, and the other was the reported discovery that an Alsatian Jew, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, had sold certain secrets of the French army to Germany. These revelations awakened the latent hostility of all the old enemies of the Republic, the royalists and many of the clericals in particular, and engendered the added opposition of a number of ardent patriots.

The Dreyfus affair once more put the Republic on trial. At a military court martial in 1894, Dreyfus had been tried, found guilty, and sentenced to penal servitude for life on Devil's Island. Subsequent investigation revealed, however, that Dreyfus had not sold the military secrets but that a Major Esterhazy, an anti-Semite and a royalist, who had made the sale, pinned the responsibility upon Dreyfus by means of forged documents. The fact that Esterhazy shortly fled the country and that one of the forgers committed suicide (1898) lent added weight to the findings of the investigation. With these discoveries, the most active republicans, anxious to see justice done and relieve the Republic of the odium attached to it by the whole affair, demanded that the army agree to a new court martial. The high officers were deeply offended by this, claiming that the "honor" of the army was at stake if a new trial were held, and enlisted the aid of the royalists, clericals, and extreme nationalists to prevent it. The Chamber of Deputies was badly divided over the question, but a coalition or *bloc* of all the parties supporting the Republic, was able to establish a ministry in 1899, and subseqently won the day. In that year the Supreme Court decreed that a new trial for Dreyfus should be held. The army men, still touchy on the point of "honor," once more declared Dreyfus guilty but recommended that he be pardoned because of extenuating circumstances. This shifted the responsibility to the President of the Republic who immediately granted the pardon. Dreyfus, however, remained unsatisfied until the verdicts of the

courts-martial were annulled by the Supreme Court (1906) and his place in the army restored to him.

Throughout this crisis, the clericals and the royalists had tried desperately to subvert the Republic, and it was natural that the victorious republicans should have dealt with them severely when it was over. The process of eliminating royalist sympathizers from important posts in the army and the administration was speeded up; but more important than that was the fact that the government hastened to destroy every important vestige of influence in public life which was still held by the Church.

Militant republicans had from the first regarded the Church as their worst enemy. Traditionally conservative and allied with the monarchists, the clergy were in an excellent position to influence the attitude of the people and thus undermine the state. The administration of much of the public charity had been placed in the charge of clerical Associations, and, during the Second Empire, the Church had attained preponderant influence in both primary and secondary schools. These functions, and especially that of educating the youth, it was argued, belonged properly to the state. Therefore, after the republicans had gained ascendancy in the government, they proceeded to circumscribe the activities of the Church. A series of educational laws (the Ferry laws) passed during the 1880's at the instigation of Jules Ferry, the great republican imperialist who was then minister of public instruction, terminated the clerical monopoly in primary education. A national system of free, publicly supported schools was established, in which laymen alone could teach and in which no religious instruction was to be offered. Primary education was made compulsory for all children, but it was not required that they attend the new free schools. If, however, parents chose to send them to private institutions such as were under the jurisdiction of the Church it was necessary for them to bear all the expense. Thus substantial material inducements were offered the people to abandon the Church schools. To further weaken these, the government also formally dissolved a number of the clerical teaching orders, including the Jesuit Society, which was expelled from France. This legislation of the 1880's, affecting national education, was supplemented by measures which legalized only civil marriages and empowered the courts to grant civil divorces.

Many devout Catholic laymen and the majority of the clergy deeply resented these interferences with the Church's customary privileges and redoubled their efforts to destroy the "unchristian"

and "atheistic" republican regime. They took a conspicuous part in the struggle against the government during the Boulanger and the Dreyfus crises, despite the admonitions of Leo XIII to refrain from political activity. It was for this reason that the republican *bloc* of the Chamber of Deputies, after having successfully weathered the Dreyfus storm, determined to deprive the Church of the means of effectively influencing public life.

An Associations Act (1901) required that all religious orders wishing to continue their activities in education, in missionary work, or in the administration of charity, must receive official authorization from the government and submit to its regulation. Under the rigorous enforcement of this measure, most of the religious orders were dissolved and their members were required to seek refuge abroad. In 1904, the influence of the Church in education was further restricted by a law which provided that at the end of a ten-year period no clergy, whether members of authorized orders or not, were to be permitted to teach in either public or private schools. This severely crippled the Church schools, for it was impossible satisfactorily to train lay teachers in so brief a period of time, but it benefited the national schools which by 1914 controlled the education of eighty percent of the children.

The climax to the anti-clerical legislation of this period was reached in 1905 with the passage of the Separations Act. Since 1801 the relations between the Church and State in France had been regulated by the Concordat which Napoleon had negotiated with Pope Pius VII. This permitted the State to nominate bishops who, upon investiture by the pope, were empowered to name the parish priests, thus giving the State substantial control over the ecclesiastical organization. It also required that the nation assume the responsibility for clerical salaries. Most of the republicans disliked this arrangement, holding that religion was a private matter and that it was neither sound nor just policy to tax the citizens for the support of churches in which they had little or no interest. They had long contemplated the complete separation of Church and State and at length found a convenient excuse to bring it about. A visit of the president of France to the king of Italy in 1904 led to an official protest from the pope, who since 1870 had not recognized the Italian sovereign and had requested the heads of Catholic States to refrain from visiting him at Rome. Construing this papal protest as an unwarranted interference in the affairs of the French nation, the government recalled its Ambassador from the Vatican and shortly thereafter passed the Separa-

tions Act. This measure discontinued the payment of salaries to the clergy of all denominations, renounced for the State the right to nominate bishops, and declared all Church property to belong to the nation, subject to its regulation and disposition. To secure the use of the churches for ordinary purposes of worship, it was required that associations of laymen be formed to make the proper arrangements with the government. The Jewish and Protestant churches acquiesced at once, but the Catholics, led by the pope, raised a storm of protest. The pope forbade Catholics to observe the law and prohibited the formation of associations of Catholic laymen to secure the use of the churches from the State. So great was this opposition that the government deemed it expedient to arrange a compromise, and in 1907 the Separations Act was amended in such fashion as to allow the clergy the use of church buildings even when associations of laymen had not been formed. The Church accepted this settlement, though it meant that the Church and State were henceforth to be effectually separated. The clergy gradually accommodated themselves to the new situation, devoting themselves primarily to social and religious concerns, so that by 1914 clericalism ceased to be a grave danger to the Republic.

Passionate controversy over royalism, clericalism, and republicanism had dominated the political life of the Third Republic from its inception, making it turbulent and seemingly unstable. Changes of ministry were frequent, sometimes almost kaleidoscopic, especially at those times when the sympathies of the nation were sharply divided. But this was not solely the result of social cleavage though that was the most impotrant factor in producing the delicate shadings of the various political parties. In part, this grew out of local factors which determined the character of political parties as they evolved, and in part it was the result of constitutional procedure. Unlike Great Britain and the United States, France did not develop a two party system, nor even parties endowed with more or less permanent organizations and adhering to more or less fixed principles. The parties which took shape in the Chamber of Deputies were fluid, formed after the deputies had been elected rather than before. It was not essential that the candidate declare his political affiliation during the campaign, and he was free to join that party or group which seemed to express his views best, and equally free to abandon it for another if he chose. The consequence of this was a multiplicity of parties, representing the most minute shadings of opinion from the extreme radicals on the Left to the extreme conservatives on the Right. No

single party was ever able to form a ministry; only a combination or *bloc* of parties was able to do so. Depending upon the circumstances of the moment, the *bloc* might have been made up chiefly of the parties of the Center, representing views between the extremes, or the parties of the Right, or the parties of the Left, or possibly a combination of either of the last two with some groups of the Center. A ministry thus formed could have no assurance of permanence, for the defection of even one small group was ofttimes enough to tip the delicate balance against it. The multiplicity of the parties in the Chamber and their fluidity was one of the most important factors, therefore, in producing ministerial changes. Another, quite as important, was the fact that the constitution allowed that the ministry might be interpolated on any issue, great or small, and if it failed to carry the majority of the Deputies it was forced to resign. This always encouraged the enemies of the ministry to challenge it continuously and to make an issue of government out of relatively unimportant matters. Though these various factors operated to produce frequent ministerial changes, it is erroneous to assume that it made the government dangerously unstable. A highly efficient bureaucracy and civil service kept a continuity of policy, so that it was only the political superstructure which appeared to change radically.

There were no signs of weakness in the material progress which France enjoyed during these years. The government spared neither pains nor money in improving facilities of communication, deepening harbors, building railroads, and constructing highways. Industries multiplied at a rapid pace, supplying most of the needs of the domestic market and increasing foreign exports by approximately twenty-five percent. The bourgeoisie, who effectively dominated the various ministries, gave official encouragement to this expanding business enterprise by erecting tariffs to protect the native industries. With all of this growth of manufacturing and trade, agriculture still remained the basic resource of the people, as testified by the continued preponderance of rural over urban population. Naturally, therefore, the government could not afford to neglect the tillers of the soil. Subsidies were extended them for the improvement of their crops; cooperative societies, banks, and insurance societies were established to provide them with greater material security; agricultural schools were set up; and a ministry of agriculture was created. Great prosperity accompanied these measures, so that the value of agricultural produce was nearly doubled during the period preceding 1914. Little

wonder that the peasants became the staunchest defenders of the Republic.

The accumulation of capital, the result of business profits and peasant savings, representing an increase of more than thirty percent prior to 1914, enabled France to take its place once more among the great imperial powers of Europe. Foreign investments multiplied four times between 1870 and 1914. A good share of this went to Russia to bolster up the Franco-Russian alliance, but most of it was used in the Near East and in the unexploited areas of the world available for economic and political expansion. France, which was almost without an empire when the Third Republic began, emerged by 1914 as the second largest colonial power of the world. The majority of her acquisitions were concentrated in Africa and the Far East, where for long she was Britain's chief rival. The man most responsible for the revival of colonialism was Jules Ferry, a moderate republican, who believed that expansion would restore the past glories of France and enrich her more than would a war of revenge upon Germany which many of the republicans in the 1880's still felt should claim all of the energies of the nation.

Economic prosperity and imperial expansion quickly raised France from the position of a third- or fourth-rate power, to which she had receded after the Franco-Prussian War, to first rank with Germany, Britain, and the United States. The recovery of her prestige was accompanied by a significant development in foreign policy. So long as Bismarck remained at the helm in Berlin, France had been substantially isolated. But his resignation and Russia's simultaneous search for financial aid and political friendship opened the door to the conclusion of a Franco-Russian alliance (1894). This was subsequently supplemented by the Entente Cordiale with Great Britain (1904), and with that France stood at the center of a great constellation of powers which potentially was more than a match for the Triple Alliance.

C. Britain's golden age

The development of Great Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century followed along the general lines already marked out. The industrial revolution with its complex social and economic concomitants went on apace. New advances in science and invention continued to extend man's control of his environment and to bring the peoples of the world into closer contact. Politically, the British

Courtesy of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

QUEEN VICTORIA. PORTRAIT BY THOMAS SULLY (1783-1872).

This portrait by an American artist was painted in 1837 soon after the eighteen-year-old Alexandrina Victoria became Victoria Regina. Before her reign of almost sixty-four years was over Victoria had not only restored the prestige of the crown, which had fallen to a low ebb under her predecessors, but she had also won the affectionate respect and admiration of her people.

continued to move in the direction of democracy. Suffrage was broadened; education was expanded so that men might be trained to participate in their government; and the powers of the aristocracy were curtailed. Labor rose in strength as trade unions grew; a Labor Party was formed; and experiments were made in social legislation. Imperialism reached a climax with political and economic expansions in Asia and Africa; and British foreign policy slowly shifted from isolation to co-operation and alliances. Paradoxically, a new leniency appeared in the governance of the empire. Attempts were made to

solve the Irish problem and self-government was bestowed upon some of the colonies.

Throughout this story one of the factors of major importance was the economic development of Britain. British agriculture went through two phases: a "Golden Age" which lasted roughly from 1850 to 1870, and a still-continuing decay which followed. The unexpected era of prosperity was due to a combination of many things. Improvements in technique, the use of chemical fertilizers, the extensive reclamation of waste lands, and the development of farm machinery were in part responsible. So also was the growth of population, which increased the demand for food, and the Crimean War which stimulated the cultivation of grain by cutting off the Russian supply. The repeal of the Corn Laws and favorable weather conditions over a long period likewise contributed.

The prolonged depression which set in after 1875 was due chiefly to foreign competition, which, in turn, was largely an outgrowth of scientific and mechanical advances. Railroads and steamships not only expedited transportation, they also cut the costs of freightage. Improved agricultural methods and especially the wide adoption of farm machinery in the American and Canadian grain fields greatly increased production and at the same time lowered costs. The subsequent development of refrigeration resulted, among other things, in the flooding of England with Australian mutton, American beef, Danish eggs and butter. In addition to this vigorous competition, British farmers were further injured by a series of poor harvests in the late 1870's and by epidemics of disease among cattle and sheep. Labor suffered heavily from this depression, and Great Britain as a whole was rendered dependent upon foreign sources for her food. The threat of starvation should she lose control of the sea has been and remains an ever-present nightmare. Successive governments sought to relieve the situation by redistributing land, by education, by tariffs, and by the development of co-operatives. In the period under consideration (1865-1914) they were only slightly successful.

The story of British industry in this period, however, presents a different picture. By the middle of the nineteenth century Britain was the undisputed master in industry and manufacturing. Her head start and her insular position gave her an enormous advantage. By the century's end, competition had become vigorous but British losses were relative and not absolute. By and large, her industry enjoyed a steady and substantial growth up to 1914. The bases of her wealth continued to be textile manufacturing, coal, iron, and steel; the carry-

ing trade; and banking. In all of them steady gains were made. The value of her woolen exports, for example, rose from about £22,200,000 in 1882 to about £34,200,000 in 1907. The ten-year average of coal production jumped from about 160,780,000 tons in the decade of 1880-1889 to about 252,500,000 tons between 1900 and 1909. Merchant marine tonnage increased from 5,500,000 in 1870 to 11,500,000 in 1910, and ship-building approximately doubled in the same period. The value of her foreign trade in 1865 was about £418,000,000; in 1910, about £1,805,000,000. The estimated domestic wealth more than doubled in the same period and foreign investments grew rapidly. Endless statistics could be cited as evidence of this trend, but these will suffice to show the rate and measure of growth. Finally, it should be noted that both population and urbanization grew rapidly. One example will suffice to illustrate this fact. London in 1940 had a population of almost nine million—more than the population of all England in 1801.

However imposing the statistics on British prosperity may appear to be, it must be borne in mind that the people as a whole did not evenly share its benefits. The agricultural revival prior to 1875 benefited chiefly the land-holding classes; agricultural labor was poorly paid and often exploited. Naturally, though the proprietors suffered with the long depression which ultimately set in, it was mainly the laboring element which bore the brunt of the hardship. Many of the workers in the factories experienced the same difficulties, living in veritable poverty while the national wealth mounted. These social consequences of the great economic developments profoundly influenced the political life of the British nation. Labor played an increasingly important role, forming its own party eventually, but also compelling the established parties to take it into consideration.

This was first reflected in the political rivalry between Benjamin Disraeli (later Lord Beaconsfield) and William Ewart Gladstone who dominated English political life for almost a generation after the death in 1865 of Lord Palmerston. Alike in ambition, in vitality, and in love of power, they were unlike in character, training, and politics. Between the clever, calculating, and adroit Disraeli and the methodical, emotional, and more violent Gladstone were many of those sharp contrasts which delight a biographer.

Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881) was the scion of a wealthy Jewish family of London, who chose to identify himself with the country aristocracy; Gladstone (1809-1898) was born into the commercial aristocracy and chose to identify himself with the bourgeoisie. Dis-

raeli was educated by tutors, Gladstone at Eton and Oxford, where his brilliance in studies and in debating won him early fame and a seat in Parliament when he was twenty-four. Disraeli began his public career and won his first fame as the author of bright and "daring" novels. As fiction, their value was slight but they were brilliant analyses of the British political scene. His theme and his proffered solution of the problems he posed were that the Tories should take the leadership in bringing social reforms and thus bind the masses to themselves and to the Crown. Despite this expressed preference for the Tories, Disraeli did not at first become associated with them. Only after a brief appearance as a Radical did he become a Tory M.P. in 1837. By then, young Gladstone had found favor with Peel and had come to be regarded as the probable future leader of the Tory (Conservative) Party. But the issue of the Corn Laws brought a change. Gladstone followed Peel when the latter broke with the tradition of his party and supported repeal, and from then (1846) until 1858 he remained a "Peelite Tory." Disraeli, who had been scorned and suppressed by Peel, made use of the issue to force the leader from the party and then took over the place himself, slowly rebuilding what he had helped to disrupt. Gladstone gradually shifted toward the left, and after serving as a liberal-Conservative chancellor of the exchequer (1852-1855), entered Palmerston's Liberal government in 1858, again as chancellor of the exchequer. Upon the death of Palmerston he succeeded to the party leadership and held it as long as he lived. Four times—1868-1874, 1880-1885, 1886, and 1892-1894—he served his country as prime minister. Disraeli, meanwhile, also held the exchequer in 1852, 1858, and 1866-1868, stepping from that post into the office of prime minister in 1868. His tenure then was very brief, but he again won the office in 1874 and held it for six years.

In policies and politics the two men were antithetical but, in a measure, complementary. Disraeli's strength and interest lay in foreign affairs and in imperialism, of which he was a herald. Yet it was Gladstone, a "Little Englander," an opponent of expansion, who was responsible for the British occupation of Egypt. Disraeli was clever and aggressive in his conduct of foreign affairs; Gladstone was pacific and bungling. The former balked Russia in Afghanistan and combined with Austria and Germany to check the Russian advance into the Near East in 1878. The latter sought peace, maintained neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War, and arbitrated the American *Alabama* claims, but came into serious conflict with Germany over

Africa (1884-1885). In short, force of circumstances often compelled the two rivals to pursue similar foreign policies. With the notable exception of the Irish problem, in which Gladstone followed a unique path of action, this was generally true in their domestic policies as well. Gladstone was a vigorous champion of domestic reform and was largely responsible for electoral, educational, and religious legislation, but he confused social reform with socialism which was anathema to him. Disraeli, in contrast, though not a reformer, was a consistent opponent of *laissez-faire*, which he regarded as a selfish middle class policy. Again, Gladstone was the most active exponent of political reform in 1866 but it was Disraeli who, adopting and enlarging his rival's program, carried it through the following year.

It will be remembered that the Reform of 1832 had made possible that alliance between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie which is known as the Victorian Compromise. A medley of motives led to its replacement by an equally loose and informal co-operation between labor and the bourgeoisie which may be differentiated as the New Compromise. In essence, this was an alliance of employer and labor against the old aristocracy; of city against country. The probable motives which led to this new alignment were the desire of labor for the ballot and of the middle class for the power which would accrue to it if it could gain control of the votes of the urban proletariat. Other factors, including both a sincere faith in democracy and a plutocratic jealousy of the aristocracy, were of course involved. It should be remembered also that labor sought political power primarily for the purpose of effecting social and economic reforms.

The first demonstration of the New Compromise was the movement for widening the franchise which was launched in 1866 by the bourgeois Liberals. This was Gladstone's bill which was defeated by a combination of the country (or Whig) Liberals and Disraeli's Conservatives. In 1867 the wily Disraeli stole Gladstone's thunder and secured the passage of a bill which virtually doubled the electorate by enfranchising the majority of urban workers. Some fifty percent of the male citizens remained politically disfranchised, but the Reform of 1867 was nevertheless a distinct step toward democracy. Further evidences of the co-operation of the bourgeoisie and labor are to be found in the introduction of the secret ballot (1872) to protect the workers' freedom of suffrage, and in the Reform Acts of 1884 and 1885. The former extended the suffrage to nearly all male householders so that about eighty percent of the male population had the right to vote; the latter redistributed seats in the Com-

mons on the basis of proportional representation and finally put an end to rotten boroughs. The final steps in achieving democracy may be hastily sketched. In 1911, payment was provided for members of Parliament, thus opening that body to labor's representatives.[1] After all classes of men had been forced to lay down their lives "for king and country" in the war of 1914-1918, it was deemed wise to establish universal suffrage. This was done by the Reform Act of 1918 which enfranchised all males over twenty-one years of age and all females over thirty. Finally, the so-called "Flapper Franchise Act" of 1928 reduced the minimum age limit for women to twenty-one years, and universal adult suffrage was fully established.

Long before universal suffrage had been attained, the problem of educating the masses to assume the responsibilities of democratic government demanded a solution. Logically, it was felt that an illiterate, ignorant people could not successfully govern themselves. The whole process of democratic government is predicated upon the existence of popular education, and Great Britain in 1867 lacked just that. Approximately 27 percent of the population was illiterate; virtually all schools were private; and education was the privilege of the few. The extension of suffrage by the Act of 1867 threw into sharp relief the problem of training the newly enfranchised classes. An additional complication was the necessity for somehow fitting the existing private schools, most of them run by various religious groups, into an expanded system. This involved not only the existent physical plants but also the delicate question of the proper relation of education to religion. Obviously, no public school system could be bound to any one religious denomination. On the other hand, any attempt to divorce religious from secular training was sure to arouse the fierce antagonism of the dominant Anglicans. The pioneer attempt to solve these problems was the Forster Education Act of 1870. State-supported schools, known as "board schools," since they were controlled by local "Boards of Education" created under the Act, were established, and additional state subsidies were extended to the existing private schools. The question of religious education in the public schools was compromised by providing that such instruction be given either at the beginning or end of the school day so that those who desired could withdraw their children without loss of secular training. The Forster Act was only a beginning, but it is impossible here to

[1] Property qualifications for M.P.'s had been abolished in 1858, but the lack of any salary made it virtually impossible for a man lacking private means to accept office.

trace the whole story. Suffice it to say that by 1880 elementary education had been made compulsory, and eleven years later, free.

As the influence of the masses increased, democracy was further strengthened through the curtailment of the political power of the aristocracy, who controlled the House of Lords. This was an hereditary not an elective body, and, therefore, was neither responsible nor responsive to the people. Yet the Lords still held an absolute veto on all legislation. Agitation for a reduction of that power had been growing steadily when the Budget Bill of 1909 brought the issue to a head. This Bill, the work of David Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, sought to shift the burden of government expenses onto the landed classes. Key provision, and focal center of the opposition was a proposed tax of twenty percent on the unearned increment of land and a special levy on undeveloped tracts in rural areas. The Budget was accepted by the House of Commons, but rejected by the House of Lords upon whose members the new taxes would have borne most heavily. At once, the financial issue was eclipsed by the demand that the House of Lords be stripped of its power. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that this bitter constitutional struggle was finally resolved by the Parliament Act of 1911, which took away from the upper house the right to veto any "money bill" and left it with a suspensory veto on other bills. The effect of the Act was to make the House of Commons virtually supreme in the government, although the House of Lords retained its judicial power as the court of final appeal.

Meanwhile, increased democratization of government was accompanied by social legislation and the growth of a strong labor movement. This has already been discussed in Chapter XXIII, and need only be referred to here. Unionization was legalized in 1871 but its growth was slow until the successful dock workers' strike in 1889 demonstrated labor's ability to organize peacefully and efficiently. The setback of the Taff Vale Decision (1901) led to an effective alliance between the trade unions and the newly formed Labor Party. The reversal of that decision by the Trades Disputes Act (1906) was an evidence of the growing political power of the Laborites. So also were the provision for the payment of M.P.'s (1911) and the reversal in 1913 of the Osborne Judgment (1909) which had forbidden the unions to pay the campaign expenses of their candidates for political office. Under the guidance of its three most important leaders, Keir Hardie, Philip Snowden, and Ramsay MacDonald, the Labor Party grew steadily in strength. The passage of regulatory legislation such

Courtesy of the New York Public Library

"MOSÉ IN EGITTO": BENJAMIN DISRAELI BY JOHN TENNIEL

This cartoon first appeared in the English humorous weekly, *Punch*, in December, 1875, just after Disraeli had purchased the Suez Canal shares from Ismail of Egypt. Although the canal had been built by the French, the British were its chief users. Disraeli's action gave the British representation on the Board of Directors and enabled Great Britain to dominate the canal company even though it did not hold the majority of the stock. See p. 750 for information about the caricaturist, John Tenniel.

as the Mines Code (1906) and of social insurance laws like the National Insurance Act of 1911 were evidences not only of the growing political power of labor but also of an awakening social conscience among the electorate. The trend, which became consistently more marked, was toward government interference with industry and trade to aid and to protect the workers.

The expenses involved in the acceptance by the government of such responsibility to render services to its people, plus the tremendous costs of "preparedness" for war, greatly increased the burden of taxation. Since the Liberals, who were in power from 1906 to 1916, were committed to a policy of free trade, the necessary funds had to be raised by new taxes. This was the *raison d'être* of Lloyd George's Budget of 1909 which sought to shift the burden of taxation to the shoulders of those best able to bear it. An appeal to the electorate was necessary before so revolutionary a measure finally became a law in 1910. Later events proved the scheme less successful than its proponents hoped.

The period from 1865 until the World War was not only one of domestic prosperity, of social upheaval, and growing democracy, but it was also the period of marked revival of British colonialism and imperialism.[1] This was in part due to political motives, particularly to a desire to bid for the vote of the newly enfranchised classes who were taught to identify their personal welfare with the profits to be won from empire. Such appeals were popular both because of

[1] See Chapter XXIX for a discussion of modern imperialism.

close personal ties with many of the colonists and because many of the workers were employed in industries which did profit from foreign trade. From the time of Disraeli also, imperialism served as a rallying point for the Conservatives, many of whom, disagreeing upon domestic policies, could be united only by stressing foreign affairs. It would seem that the other most likely motives were emotional, including both the appeal of the "yellow" press and of such literate enthusiasts as Kipling. Certainly the Jubilee of 1887 and, more especially, the Diamond Jubilee of 1897 were designed to cement the empire and to rouse popular enthusiasm for it. Many lands and many peoples were forcibly brought under the British flag before the imperialistic Boer War (1900-1902) brought a revulsion of feeling.

In the meantime, efforts had been made to strengthen the bonds of empire and at the same time to give recognition to the growing demands of the self-governing colonies for a part in imperial government. A series of Imperial Conferences, beginning in 1887, partially placated the colonials and paved the way for the much later transformation of the Empire into a Commonwealth of Nations. Various proposals for imperial tariffs which would make the empire an economic unit were wrecked upon the free trade policy of the mother country and the diverse needs of the various peoples. However, dominion status was conferred upon Australia in 1900, New Zealand in 1907, and the Union of South Africa in 1909.[1] The loyal support which these Dominions gave Britain in the World War were conclusive evidence of the success of this policy of leniency.

In contrast were the British relations with Ireland, the most troublesome portion of the Empire. Essentially, the "problem" of Ireland was that for centuries that country had been governed as a colonial dependency whose privileges were few, whose rights were fewer, and whose function was to serve the mother country. Ruled by the British Parliament in which its voice was all but inaudible, divided by religious friction between the Catholic south and the Protestant north (Ulster), the plight of the Irish was grave. The first British statesman to champion the Irish cause was Gladstone, who began by separating Church and State in Ireland and freeing the Irish from the compulsion of supporting the Anglican Church (1869). He also attacked the vicious agrarian system under which absentee landlords drained the land of all it could produce, leaving the hapless Irish

[1] Canada was made a Dominion in 1867; Newfoundland, acquired self-government in 1855 but in the face of financial difficulties requested in 1933 that it be reduced to the status of a Crown colony.

MAP 32. EUROPE IN 1914

tenant farmers in miserable poverty, made worse by the frequency of evictions on flimsy or whimsical grounds. It was Gladstone's aim to establish fair rents, give the tenant a reasonable security of tenure, and permit him to dispose of his interest in the property. His pioneer Land Act (1870) was not successful, and it was not until the great landlords were virtually bought out by the government late in the century that the problem approached solution. By that time there had arisen another issue: Home Rule (self-government) for Ireland. From the defeat of Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill (1886) to the acceptance in 1914 of a Home Rule Act which was promptly suspended because of the War, the issue complicated British politics with murders, scandals, and parliamentary paralysis. It is sufficient for our purpose, however, merely to note that despite some real progress the Irish "problem" had not been solved prior to 1914.

The British part in events which led up to that conflict will be treated in a later chapter (XXX), but mention should be made here of the fact that British foreign policy underwent a momentous change about the turn of the century. Under Gladstone and Disraeli, as under Palmerston, Great Britain had pursued a policy of avoiding all entangling commitments upon the continent. When the circumstances warranted, she intervened in the affairs of Europe as, for example, when Disraeli joined Austria in forcing Russia to submit the whole problem of the Near East and the Balkans to a general conference, but her policy was one of "splendid isolation." However, a series of imperialistic clashes in the late 1890's made her isolation seem less "splendid" and more dangerous. After several attempts (1898-1901) to form an alliance with Germany had failed, Britain allied herself with Japan in the Far East (1902), and more surprisingly, came to an understanding (Entente Cordiale) with France in 1904. Three years later, this led to an agreement with Russia, and Great Britain had become a full member of the party which faced the rising power of Germany.

It will be noted that this brief survey has made no mention of the Crown and little of the various ministers. This was done in the hope that the broader view might leave a more useful and lasting impression than the usual detailed story of British political life. For the sake of completeness, however, it should be added that upon Victoria's death in 1901 the Crown devolved upon her son, Edward VII, who ruled until his death in 1910. He, too, was succeeded by his son who as George V ruled from 1910 until 1936. Neither Edward nor George were nonentities, but law and custom so hedged them about

that such power as they exercised sprang almost wholly from personal influence upon men and ministers. Of the leaders, it need only be said that none possessed the dramatic appeal of Disraeli and Gladstone. After Gladstone's death, his party fell into a decline so marked that the years from 1895 to 1906 are sometimes called the "Conservative Era." Then the wheel turned and from 1906 until 1916, when the exigencies of the War forced the formation of a coalition government, the Liberals were in power.

LION AND UNICORN

Famous seal of the British monarchy. The use of animals, like the lion and unicorn, as "supporters" of the shield was an outgrowth of medieval heraldry. The unicorn, a fabulous animal, renowned for great strength and fierceness, was first employed on the Scottish royal seal and was not used along with the lion on the English seal until the reign of James I.

It seems that the rampant "lion" was originally intended to be a leopard. Since medieval armorists had no clear idea of the leopard, they showed it as a lion, but distinguished the two animals by having the lion's head in profile rather than turned to show the full face, which view meant the leopard.

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[1] *See also* the bibliographies for Chapters XXIII, XXIV, XXIX, and XXX.

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Autocratic Survivals

A. The conservatism of agricultural societies

Throughout the long story of the development of western civilization one of the most striking phenomena is the conservatism of agricultural groups.[1] Again and again that fact has appeared as one of the major truths of social growth. When agriculture has been the dominant mode of life, the least advance has been made in the arts of living. Similarly, agricultural peoples have been consistently the slowest to abandon the old and the last to embrace the new. During nearly the whole of the Middle Ages when Europe was almost exclusively agricultural, change was slow, and progress toward what we consider higher standards, slight. Only with the revival of trade and industry and the resumption and growth of urban life did change and progress speed up. Countries whose populations remained overwhelmingly agrarian lagged far behind those lands where trade and cities offered a ready escape from the soil. The great empires of the Austrian Hapsburgs and the Russian Romanovs offer the most important illustrations of this truth.

Like so many others, this phenomenon is easy to observe but very hard to explain, and any attempt to do so must be regarded as suggestive rather than definitive. The most likely cause is the security of life which is offered by the land. It is true that droughts destroy and insects devour the crops, and that famine may stalk the farmlands, but it is also true that even though trade fails, cities collapse, and governments change the land continues to reward its cultivators. The city man, more dependent upon his fellows, has no such security. Conditions far beyond his control may deprive him of work and wages and force him to become a parasite upon society. The farmer, by contrast, can be reasonably sure that honest hard work will pro-

[1] The American frontier groups were conservative in religion if not in politics.

vide him with food, shelter, and clothing. His life may be hard and barren, but it is comparatively secure. The result is that he is less likely to need or desire change. As long as his wants can be satisfied from the land, and, more importantly, as long as he has little hope of reaping material benefit from change, the farmer prefers the tried and true to the new and doubtful.

Besides this rather subtle mental cause there are other, physical causes arising from the exigencies of earning a living from the soil. The farmer's work is arduous and the hours of it, long. Sheer fatigue and lack of leisure make it hard for him to pursue any ends not immediately connected with personal needs. No agricultural society has ever led in science or in art for the very adequate reason that wresting a livelihood from the land requires all of a man's strength and time. Moreover, money is usually scarce in an agricultural group so that there is not the wherewithal to support artists and intellectuals. Without patronage, advance in those directions is impossible. One consequence is that an agricultural society suffers from the lack of stimulation and tends to sink into a rut of self-sufficient smugness. Intellectual radicals, whatever else they may or may not be worth, have at least the merit of irritating people into making changes.

Another physical factor which tends to deprive agrarian groups of this healthful irritant is isolation. The nature of farming requires a sparse population. The city man is constantly subjected to novelty through contact with his fellows. Carriers of commerce are also bearers of new manners, modes, and thoughts which continuously modify and replace the old. The farmer is removed from this leavening influence simply because he is removed from active contacts with alien peoples and ideas. Moreover, agricultural peoples are notoriously immobile. Commonly they are born, live, and die in the same place. The world neither comes to them nor do they go to it.[1]

To all these forces which tend to produce a static society must be added the greatest enemy of change: habit. The human animal is essentially governed by habit; the more so, of course, when new influences are few and far between. An agricultural society offers the clearest example of this. Crops are planted when folklore, which in this case means tradition and custom, dictates, and the harvest is gathered at the usual time. The regularity of the seasons themselves contributes toward this end. It is plausible to assume that thoughts

[1] The development of the automobile, the telephone, the press, the movies, and the radio is rapidly altering this situation with consequences not yet predictable.

similarly follow the ancient pattern and that anything which might break the routine would therefore be shunned. Only a great need, or a particularly bright hope of improving itself can shake an agricultural group out of its furrow.

B. The patch-work empire

The sprawling empire of the Austrian Hapsburgs offers the student an excellent case history in the conservatism of an agricultural society. With the exception of its northern fringe, the Hapsburg Empire remained predominantly agrarian throughout its entire existence. Indeed it was not until the revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century that feudalism was legally abolished and its traditions and habits lingered long after that. There was a small middle class and a smaller group of wealthy and privileged aristocracy but the majority remained in the status of peasantry. This dependent position effectively deprived them of any voice in the government and made them pawns in the dynastic and factional struggles for power. Potentially dominant, they remained inarticulate and bound to tradition.

This essential fact was partially eclipsed by the spectacular heterogeneity of the peoples within the Empire. The dominant group economically and politically were the Germans, numbering about ten million, who lived chiefly in and around Vienna and Graz. Next in importance were the twelve million Magyars, preponderantly peasants, whose home was in the Danube valley. To the north and northeast of the Germans, in Bohemia and Moravia, lived the Czechs and the Slovaks, both of Slavic origin. The Czechs, partly because of the rich mineral resources of Bohemia, became the industrial rivals of the Germanic Austrians; the Slovaks were chiefly peasants. Also of Slavic origin were the Poles and the Ruthenians who were most numerous in the northeast portion of the empire. Like the Slovaks they were mostly peasants. In the southwest lived the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, generically known as the South Slavs. They were also peasants and herdsmen. All told, the Slavic peoples constituted approximately half of the fifty million subjects of the Hapsburgs. Nor was that all; Italians and Rumanians, to the number of about four million, lived within the empire. The former were found mainly in the Trentino and on the eastern coast of the Adriatic; the latter, in Transylvania and the Banat. In addition to all these groups were the Jews who dwelt in the cities and the Gypsies who roamed the countryside. These many groups were not mutually exclusive. They were con-

fusingly intermixed so that few sections were not vexed by the problem of national minorities.

The student may well wonder why so varied a composite hung together at all. One cohesive force was the Roman Catholic Church to which many of these peoples belonged. Another was the economic unity of the area, a factor which developed in proportion to the industrialization of the Germans and Czechs. These needed the peasantry both as a market for manufactures and as a source of foodstuffs. The peasants, conversely, depended upon the cities as markets for food and sources of manufactured goods. The forces of habit and tradition and the weight of inertia also played a part. The Hapsburg Empire was venerable and hoary and the traditions of centuries had accustomed the peoples to Hapsburg rule. Many of them preferred the known and habitual to the unknown and unpredictable. Some credit must also be reserved for the skill of the imperial government in playing off one group against another. This policy was made possible by the mutual greeds, ambitions, jealousies, and suspicions of the various groups, many of whom hated Austrian rule less than they hated each other.

The unsuccessful revolutions of 1848[1] demonstrated both the unpopularity of the Hapsburgs among the subject peoples and their inability or unwillingness to unite. From that trial by fire the empire and its newly crowned emperor, Franz Josef (1848-1916), emerged apparently as strong as ever. Hungary was punished by loss of her historic rights of local self-government; Italy was again subjected to Austrian rule; and Prussia was humiliated at Olmütz. Within less than two years the revolts had been suppressed and the emperor had resumed the Metternichian practice of absolutism supported and guarded by repression. But while Franz Josef sought to make his world stand still, his neighbors in Sardinia and Prussia were moving toward expansion. In 1859 the unwary Austrian found himself entangled in a disastrous war engineered by the wily Cavour and fought largely by the troops of that philanthropist-unaware, Napoleon III. The defeat inflicted upon Austria encouraged the Magyars almost to the point of an open rebellion. To avert that crisis Franz Josef abandoned his open absolutism for a more subtle form of government. In 1861 he granted a constitution establishing a bicameral parliament which was given the power to grant or withhold taxes. This *Reichsrat* was by no means democratic but it represented a distinct concession to liberalism. The Magyars, however, refused either to recognize the

[1] See pp. 695-701.



FRANZ JOSEF

constitution or to participate in the *Reichsrat*. They argued that Hungary was a state in its own right, with its own customs, laws, boundaries, and constitution. They declared that this latter had been illegally suspended in 1848 and that Franz Josef had no authority to replace it by another arrangement without their consent. Behind the technicalities and legal phraseology of their attack lay the fear that they would be submerged by the new constitution which gave them only eighty-five out of the 343 members of the *Reichsrat*. Led by the able Francis Deák, the Magyars agreed that the empire must be strengthened by some form of union but they stubbornly refused to accept the constitution. For four years the antagonists remained deadlocked but time fought for Deák and in 1865 the reluctant Franz Josef opened negotiations in an attempt to find a satisfactory compromise. Before a settlement was reached the Austrian position was further weakened by the Seven Weeks' War with Prussia (1866). By keeping Hungary loyal, Deák put Austria in his debt and thus gained an advantage in the bargaining. Moreover, the swiftness of the Prussian victory made the weakness of Austria embarrassingly evident. The negotiations thus facilitated, an understanding known as the *Ausgleich* or Compromise was accepted by both parties in 1867.

The *Ausgleich* transformed the old Hapsburg state into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Franz Josef continued as emperor of Austria and was accepted by Hungary as her king. Each state had its own constitution, parliament, responsible ministry, and administration. Each was to manage its own domestic affairs. The union was symbolized by the emperor-king and by a common flag. It was given practical force by joint ministries of finance, foreign affairs, and war; by a common tariff; and by the "delegations," a body made up of representatives from both parliaments and empowered to enact such joint legislation as was necessary. Each state was to share the common expenses, the amount assumed by each to be determined every ten years by treaty. This cumbersome machinery creaked, groaned, and

often threatened to break down completely, but it lasted for over half a century. Its longevity is ascribable to the conservatism of the peoples and to the ever-present minority problem. Only two of the many minorities, the Germans and the Magyars, were completely satisfied and they were unwilling to change for anything else. By concessions to certain of the other groups they were able to divide the opposition.

Both Austria and Hungary adopted the forms of parliamentary government at the time of the *Ausgleich*, but their constitutions were so devised that political power was concentrated in the hands of the Germans and Magyars. The property restrictions on suffrage in Hungary were so severe that only about twenty-five percent of the male population had the right to vote. A reform in 1873 entrusted the election of the Austrian *Reichsrat* to four classes: the landowners, the cities, the chambers of commerce (representing the wealthy bourgeoisie), and the rural districts. Suffrage was so distributed that by 1890 the chambers of commerce had one deputy for every twenty-seven voters, the landowners one for every sixty-three, but the rural districts had only one for every 11,600. To the difficult minority problem was thus added the continuous demand for an extension of the suffrage.

Austria and Hungary chose to meet these problems in different ways. Austria pursued the policy of playing off one group against the others. Polish Galicia was granted self-government in 1869 and allowed to dominate the minority group of Ruthenians. Thenceforward, the Poles opposed any extension of national rights to other groups lest they lose their favored position. Attention then turned to the Czechs whose claims were almost identical with those put forward by the Magyars prior to the *Ausgleich*. Franz Josef attempted to give them equal rights, thus creating a Triple Monarchy, but was blocked by the Germans and Magyars. In lieu of this definite steps to placate the Czechs were taken by Count Taaffe, Prime Minister of Austria from 1879 to 1896. His task was made delicate because of the economic development of the Empire. Large-scale enterprises, controlled by the Germans, not only employed much Czech labor but also competed with the small business men among whom there were an increasing number of Czechs. Economic rivalry and class hostility thus aggravated nationalistic hatred. Some of the concessions were material and tangible, but more of them were designed to please the Czech nationalist spirit. Czech schools ranging even to a university were established, suffrage was extended, and Czechs were

MAP 33. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE BALKANS, 1878

admitted to the bureaucracy, hitherto a German monopoly. These gains encouraged a new group of Czechish agitators led by Thomas Masaryk and known as the Young Czechs to demand greater nationalistic privileges and radical social and political reforms.

In addition to attempting to conciliate the Czechs, Taaffe carried through several other noteworthy reforms. The financial affairs of the government were put in order and a surplus replaced the deficit. Currency was put on the gold standard in 1892, and a policy of state socialism, including such things as railway and canal construction and

public works, was instituted. These policies were continued by Taaffe's successors to the satisfaction of the German element. Meanwhile, alarmed by the concessions to the Czechs, the Germans had begun an active propaganda of their own for closer connections with Germany. Their influence was enhanced because Taaffe's state socialism made the government increasingly dependent for loans upon the German bankers and capitalists.

The problems of nationalism and liberalism continued to plague the Dual Monarchy. To gain their nationalistic ends, the "minorities" indulged in obstructionist tactics in the *Reichsrat*, often forcing the dissolution of that body. It became necessary to govern without it whenever possible or to indulge in political chicanery to win its approval when its consent was vital. A very limited extension of the franchise in 1897 increased rather than checked the agitation for wider suffrage particularly among the Marxian Socialists who had rapidly increased in number in the nineties. This reform gave them their first voice in the *Reichsrat* but because of the class system the representation was totally inadequate. As a counterweight to the Socialists there developed the Catholic party which offered a program entitled "Christian Socialism." Conservative, anti-Semitic and harshly critical of the wealthy, this party appealed especially to the petty bourgeoisie, and soon became the chief supporter of the government in German Austria.

The Russian Revolution of 1905 was reflected in Austria by a wave of violent demonstrations against the government. Repression having been vainly attempted, the government grudgingly consented to an extension of the suffrage (1907). The class system was abolished and all men over 24 were enfranchised. The immediate result was to make the Socialist Party the largest single group in the *Reichsrat*. The new law continued national inequalities, however, thus perpetuating past difficulties.

Hungary also was kept in constant turmoil by the problems of race and nationalism. In fact, she was bedeviled by nationalisms within nationalisms. On the one hand was the opposition of the Magyar extremists to the *Ausgleich*, and on the other the hostility of the subject peoples to the Magyars. Since the severe property restrictions on suffrage made Parliament a Magyar body, the contest there was mainly Magyar against Magyar: pro-*Ausgleich* against anti-*Ausgleich*. The latter demanded a more complete recognition of their nationality and frequently resorted to obstructionism. Several times they forced the dissolution of Parliament with the result that the

bureaucracy more and more came to be the real government. At the same time, the Magyars doggedly refused to extend to others the nationalistic freedom which they so heatedly demanded for themselves. Except for granting autonomy to Croatia in 1868, the Hungarian government consistently sought to Magyarize all its subject peoples. To that end it followed a policy of repression, suppression, and terrorism. Magyar was made the language of the courts, the army, the schools, and all branches of the public service. All non-Magyar activities, including even festivals and theatricals, were forbidden by law. What could not be legislated out of existence was crushed by brutality and force.

Most troublesome of the subject groups in Hungary were the Croats and the Serbs who, with the Slovenes of Austria, composed the group known as the Jugoslavs or South Slavs. This, too, was a case of wheels within wheels. Differing among themselves in virtually everything except folk origin, each of these peoples desired national autonomy. At the same time, there were leaders among them who wished the establishment of a Jugoslav state which would combine all groups. Thus there were demands for individual national freedom and for the freedom of a united Slav state as well. To make matters worse for the Dual Monarchy, behind these little Slavs loomed always the great Slav state of Russia. The government sought to meet this problem by playing off one group against the other. Austria, by making many concessions to the Slovenes, quieted their clamor, but Hungary was not so successful. The Croats' enjoyment of their autonomy was largely vitiated by a burning desire for independence to which was added an ambition to dominate the other South Slav groups. To minimize this, the Magyars tried to checkmate the Croats by favoring the Serbs. The policy was fraught with great danger. Every concession to the Serbs was reflected by an increase in Serbo-Slav agitation for the formation of a Jugoslav state which would be dominated by the Serbians. Jugoslav nationalism was further encouraged and fostered by the small but aggressive little state of Serbia and by the Pan-Slavists of Russia. The Dual Monarchy thus faced not only a domestic problem but an international one as well.

In 1905, the Dual Monarchy was confronted with a crisis. The Magyar nationalists combined to threaten the very existence of the *Ausgleich* and forced the liberal Hungarian premier, Count Stephen Tisza, from office. A Serbo-Croat Coalition promptly extended their sympathy to Tisza and sought to unite the Jugoslavs. It has already been noted above that the repercussions of the Russian Revolution

had brought to a head the agitation for a more liberal suffrage. The situation was further complicated by Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne. Virtually an outcast from the court because of his marriage to a woman not of royal blood, Franz Ferdinand had become the intimate and spokesman of the bankers and industrialists. Like them, he believed that some radical change would have to be made in the existing arrangements, but he never made up his mind as to exactly what the changes should be. His apparent indecision alternately encouraged and then discouraged one group after another as each thought for a moment that he was in favor of its particular project.

The crisis was settled by forceful action. The Magyar extremists were brought to terms by a threat to establish universal suffrage which would have submerged them in the sea of Slavs. The suffrage was extended in Austria proper with consequences discussed above, and two *quondam* friends of Franz Ferdinand were elevated to high office. Conrad von Hötzendorf, a vigorous and belligerent militarist, was appointed Chief of Staff and at once sought to divert attention from domestic troubles by restoring the military power of the Dual Monarchy. This was complemented by the appointment as Foreign Minister of Count Aehrenthal, whose aim also was the restoration of the prestige of Austria-Hungary. He immediately embarked upon a vigorous policy in the Balkans which culminated in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908.[1] This almost provoked a European war but the danger was averted and Austria emerged with new self-confidence and greater prestige than she had enjoyed for some time.

Such strenuous efforts proved to be only palliative, not curative. The Magyar nationalists, still pursuing national freedom, plunged the Monarchy into a new crisis in 1908. Meanwhile the situation in the Slavic provinces had grown steadily worse. Franz Ferdinand's known dislike of the Magyars, the attempts to Magyarize the newly annexed provinces, Pan-Slavism, and politico-economic difficulties with Serbia all combined to increase the unrest among the Jugoslavs. The authorities of the Dual Monarchy, dependent upon spies and informers for their knowledge of the situation, sought to provoke overt acts of treason which would justify the use of force. The policy proved to be a boomerang. One of their *agents provocateurs* supplied them with documents which purported to show that the leaders of the Serbo-Croatian Coalition had had treasonable relations with Serbia. On the

[1] See pp. 895-896.

basis of these documents, and acting through an intermediary, the government publicly accused these leaders of treason. The latter promptly sued for libel and at the trial it was conclusively proved that the documents were forgeries. The Coalition had been ruined but at the cost of placing Aehrenthal and his colleagues in a most odious light. He was soon charged with having been a party to the forgery. The accusation was false, but it was widely believed at the time, and caused most of the other Western Powers to treat Austria like a moral leper. Aehrenthal believed, mistakenly as it was later proved, that Serbia and Russia were in large measure responsible for his discomfiture, and relations with those countries became more strained than ever.

The annexations, the trials, and their aftermath accelerated the pace of the Pan-Slav movement, and this was echoed also by an increase in nationalism among the non-Slavic groups. The government aggravated the situation by encouraging these latter groups in the hope of offsetting the Slavs. The Ruthenians, encouraged to bait the Slavic Poles, soon turned to making demands upon Austria. The Czechs, maddened by German opposition, resumed their obstructionist ways in the *Reichsrat;* and even the Italians, who had been kept relatively quiet by numerous concessions, began to kick over the traces. The south continued to be a hornets' nest which was now considerably stirred up by a resurgence of Pan-Serbian agitation. This movement was carried on not only by propaganda but also by terroristic activities which specialized in assassinations. The government of the Dual Monarchy was rapidly coming to the desperate conclusion that force and force alone could hold the rambunctious Balkan peoples in check and save the empire.

The complex story of the Balkan peoples involves three major threads: their relations to the Turkish Empire; their connections with the other European Powers; and their associations with each other. The Ottoman Turks, last of the great waves of Asiatic invaders, appeared upon the European scene late in the middle ages. Masters of Asia Minor in the thirteenth century, they pushed with an irresistible force across the narrow straits into Europe. The hinterland was rapidly brought under their sway, and in 1453 Constantinople finally fell before them. Their empire in Europe reached its height in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, extending north of the Danube, including all of Hungary, and reaching almost to the gates of Vienna. The tide turned as the latter century closed and the Turks were driven from Hungary, but they continued to exercise suzerainty

over Balkania. That term conveniently designates the area lying south of the Danube and Save Rivers plus Rumania which is situated north of the Danube. The geographical features of the area are such that, although it is an integral part of Europe, Balkania faces toward Asia, and has therefore long been the battleground, politically, economically, and culturally, of East and West. That fact, plus the mountainous character of most of the region, has tended to retard the development of its inhabitants. Except for the Greeks, these peoples were mostly of Slavic origin but cultural differences built up during the centuries divided them into Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Montenegrins, and others. Also resident in the Ottoman Empire were Arabs, Armenians, Syrians, and Jews and even that does not exhaust the list.

Over these heterogeneous peoples the Turks were content to remain as a minority of conquerors, drawing their power from their monopolies of government and landownership. The basic antagonism of conqueror and conquered was sharpened in Balkania by religious and economic contrasts. The Turks were Moslems and aristocrats; most of their subjects were Orthodox Catholics and peasants. It will be clearly seen that the maintenance of Turkish authority depended upon an efficient army and administration. When these began to decline in the eighteenth century, Turkish power likewise decayed. Despite serious internal weaknesses, however, Turkey stubbornly refused to collapse. Its government in the nineteenth century was an absolute monarchy, headed in theory and sometimes in practice by the Sultan who was also the religious leader (caliph) of Islam. Associated with him and often exercising more power were various ministers. Imperial administration was by means of provincial governors, appointed by the central authority. There was no uniform system of law, of taxes, or of administration. Corruption and incompetence were rife, and the Sultan's nominal agents were rather more likely to ignore his orders than not. Such a condition was a standing invitation both to the subject peoples to revolt, and to the other Powers to encroach upon Turkish territory. The so-called Near Eastern problem was essentially an outgrowth of Turkish weakness and nationalistic ambitions and greeds.[1]

The liberty-loving Serbians, still fired after five centuries by the legends of their once powerful state, were the first of the subject peoples to revolt. Partly because of the inaccessibility of their country and its distance from Constantinople, and partly because of their

[1] See pp. 795-796 for an account of Russian expansion at the expense of Turkey.

own strong resistance to foreign control, Turkish rule had rested rather lightly upon them. Just as the nineteenth century opened, however, the Sultan sent to Serbia a specially privileged army group who at once began a brutal exploitation of the people. The crisis (1804) called forth a leader, George Petrovich, commonly called Kara (Black) George. A dealer in hogs in times of peace, Kara George proved an excellent leader, and under his guidance the power of the oppressors was broken. He and his followers then demanded the right of local self-government and enlisted the aid of Russia against the Sultan. These ill-matched allies made successful war upon the Turks from 1806 until 1812 when the threat of the Napoleonic invasions caused Russia to make peace with Turkey. Free from her more powerful antagonist, the latter turned upon Serbia. Kara George, who had made himself the virtual dictator of the land, deemed the situation hopeless and fled. His place was taken by Milosh Obrenovich, who promptly submitted to Turkish rule (1813). The submission was a blind, and two years later Obrenovich raised the standard of revolt. The rebels soon cleared Serbia of the Turkish armies, and in 1817, the Sultan, fearful of Russian intervention again, granted the Serbians partial autonomy. Obrenovich, elected prince by the people, set up a dictatorship. Kara George, returned from his flight, was murdered, perhaps by the prince's order, and a blood feud which lasted until 1903 broke out between the Obrenovichs and Karageorgevichs. The Greek Revolt and the friendship of Russia enabled the prince to complete his work. Full autonomy was granted in 1829, and save for the continued payment of tribute and the presence of Turkish garrisons, Serbia was virtually independent.

The Greek Revolt, even more clearly than the successful insurrection in Serbia, exhibited all three threads of the intricate Balkan pattern. By and large the Greeks were the most favored of all the subject races. They were the merchants and traders of the Empire, and from them the Sultan frequently chose many of his officials. Nevertheless, the French Revolution and the Serbian Revolt roused a sense of nationalism which was furthered by the creation of a new Greek language in the early nineteenth century.[1] Russia, eager to weaken the Turks, fostered this nationalistic unrest and encouraged the Greeks to throw off the rule of the Sultan. Among the Greeks the movement was led by a secret society, the *Hetairia Philike*

[1] This was largely the work of the scholar, Adamantios Korais (1748-1833), who merged the vulgar tongue of his own day with classic Greek to produce a new national language.

(League of Friends), which pretended to be interested only in the preservation of Greek antiquities. When the standard of revolt was raised in 1821 the Greeks flocked to it and Turkey was confronted with a genuinely nationalistic revolt. The viciously brutal war lasted until 1829 and was marked by atrocities on both sides. The Greeks were so successful for the first several years that the Sultan felt constrained to bribe his nominal vassal, Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, to come to his aid. Ali did so with such vigor that the Greek cause must surely have been lost had not the Powers intervened.

The Greek Revolt had aroused an astonishing enthusiasm and sympathy among the peoples of Europe. The statesmen, however, under the sway of Metternich, had been unresponsive to popular demands for intervention. That situation abruptly changed in 1826 when Russia signified her intention of aiding the Greeks by attacking Turkey. This at once aroused England's latent fear of possible Russian expansion in the Near East. To forestall any such eventuality and to insure herself a share in any benefits which might flow from intervention, England invited Russia to substitute a joint declaration to the Sultan for the proposed war. Russia accepted and the two Powers jointly urged the Sultan to grant autonomy to the rebels (1826). This action brought no result and in the next year France, who was also eager to participate, signed an agreement with Russia and England to put pressure on the Sultan. Before the machinery thus assembled had begun to work, an "incident" between the joint Anglo-French fleet and the Turco-Egyptian fleet flared into a battle in which the latter was destroyed. England at once apologized and withdrew. France, though she kept some troops in Greece, virtually followed suit and Russia was left alone. She declared war on Turkey in 1828 and defeated her. The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) made Greece a republic under the protection of western Powers, and rewarded Russia with a protectorate over the former Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. Anglo-Russian jealousies delayed the final delimitation of the boundaries of Greece until 1832. The next year the Powers intervened again to put an end to a virtual state of anarchy by establishing Otto of Bavaria as king. The new kingdom had a difficult road ahead. Several Greek-inhabited territories still lay outside its boundaries so that there was a serious irredentist problem, and its dynasty was alien in both race and religion. However, it was free from its former master.

In the same year as the establishment of the Greek Kingdom, there arose another crisis in the affairs of Turkey. Mehemet Ali, dis-

satisfied with the reward bestowed upon him for his aid against the Greeks, had revolted against the Sultan in 1831. Hard-pressed, the latter reluctantly accepted Russia's proffered aid, knowing full well that the Czar would in his turn demand compensation. The other Powers, alarmed and jealous of Russia, tried to short-circuit the Russian design by forcing the Sultan to grant Ali's demands and thus render any aid superfluous. Russia refused to be balked. In 1833 she compelled Turkey to sign the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi which established Russian pre-eminence in the region of the Black Sea and the Straits. The other Powers were furious but temporarily impotent. Their chance came in 1839-1840 when Mehemet Ali again rose in revolt. Under the bold leadership of England, the Powers, save France, set a limit to the pasha's ambition and made him accept it. Also under England's guidance, the Powers then combined to force Russia to sign the Straits Convention (1841) which nullified the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi.

The bitter rivalry between Russia and England flared up again in the next decade and finally burst into the flame of the Crimean War (1854-1856) of which it was the basic cause. The incident which precipitated the quarrel involved France, however, rather than England. Napoleon III, avid for glory, constituted himself champion of the Roman Catholic monks resident in the Holy Places, and lent them his support against their Orthodox Catholic rivals who were backed by Russia. The latter, coincidentally, had reawakened the always latent hostility of England by seeking to exact concessions from Turkey. Diplomatic maneuvers soon gave way to war, with Russia fighting a combination of Turkey, France, England, and Sardinia. The details of the struggle are no longer of great moment. Russia was defeated and compelled to sign the Treaty of Paris (1856). This guaranteed the independence and integrity of Turkey, deprived Russia of her control over Moldavia and Wallachia, and demilitarized the Black Sea. In effect, these arrangements gave Turkey a new lease on life and excluded Russia from the Balkans and the Near East for two decades.

These international complications inevitably had repercussions among the Balkan peoples. The Powers, who had replaced the Russian protectorate over Moldavia and Wallachia with one of their own, were unable to agree on what to do with them. The leaders of the provinces took the matter into their own hands and combined the two into the new state of Rumania. The Powers were angered by this move, but accepted the *fait accompli* and Turkey recognized the

autonomy of the new state in 1861. After a period of relative quiescence the Balkan problem flared up once more in 1875 when the peasants of Bosnia and Herzegovina rose up in rebellion. Numerous factors, internal and international, entered into this revolt. In large measure it was an insurrection of the Catholic peasantry, whose economic position was little better than serfdom, against the Moslem landlords. Merciless exploitation had made the peasants willing subjects for Pan-Slav agitation. In addition high Austrian officials, eager to provoke a a situation which would permit them to gain control of the provinces on the ground that their continued chaos menaced Austrian safety, further encouraged the peasant movement. The revolt, once begun, swiftly spread throughout Balkania, Turkey proving herself too weak to cope with the situation. As a result the Great Powers again prepared to intervene but their interests were so conflicting that joint action proved impossible. When the Turks in retaliation for the uprising massacred some thousands of Balkan Christians, the diplomacy of the Western Powers was complicated by humanitarian demands that the Turks be punished for the atrocities. Austria drafted a projected settlement; Great Britain mildly protested; while Russia, still seeking to dominate the Straits, went to war with Turkey in 1877. With the assistance of Rumanian troops the Russians overcame the heroic defense of the Turks and pushed on toward Constantinople. The frightened Sultan sued for peace.

The Treaty of San Stefano (1878) marked Russia's price for her assistance to her fellow Slavs. The treaty recognized as independent the states of Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania, and created a new country, Bulgaria, which included territories inhabited by Greeks and Serbs. It was Russia's expectation that this state which she called into being would help to further her interests in the Balkans. In addition Russia was granted territory in Armenia and Dobrudja, and an indemnity. This arrangement pleased none but the Russians. Serbia and Greece objected to the inclusion of their nationals in the new Bulgaria. More importantly Great Britain and Austria were deeply offended by the extension of Russian power, and refused to recognize the Treaty. The threat of war compelled the reluctant Czar to consent to the submission of the whole problem to a European congress.

At the invitation of Bismarck who claimed to be interested only in fair play the Congress met at Berlin in June of 1878. Before the delegates assembled a series of pre-Congress agreements had settled the more important questions. Great Britain had obtained the right to occupy the island of Cyprus to offset the Russian holdings in

Armenia. Austria had won permission to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria was reduced to an autonomous principality of the Sultan and more than half its territory was stripped from it. Macedonia was returned to Turkey; eastern Rumelia was separated from Bulgaria and also returned to Turkish rule; and Serbia was enlarged at the expense of her hapless neighbor. To Rumania was awarded the Dobrudja which gave her access to the Black Sea. Russia received Bessarabia and small portions of Armenia. The Congress and the Treaty, which was signed in July, gave formal approval to these arrangements. The nationalistic imperialism of its terms was glossed over by the insertion in the Treaty of clauses which theoretically bound Turkey to undertake reforms.

This Treaty of Berlin did not settle the Near Eastern problem, but it is a significant landmark in the international relations of Europe. Russia was deeply offended at Great Britain and Austria for depriving her of the fruits of her victory. She was angered also at Bismarck whom she suspected with reason of not always playing the part of the honest broker which he claimed for himself. Austrian control of Bosnia and Herzegovina aroused the apprehensions of Serbia with consequences which have been discussed above. The Balkan nations in general were dissatisfied with the treaty arrangements and dangerous irredentist movements appeared in Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Finally, this attempt to cure Turkey by surgery failed, and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire continued.

In 1881 Turkey was enjoined to give Thessaly and a part of Epirus to Greece. The following year Great Britain occupied Egypt and made it a virtual protectorate. Eastern Rumelia broke away in 1885 and joined Bulgaria. Meanwhile nationalistic agitation in other parts of the Empire, notably Armenia, weakened the Sultanate, and financial difficulties forced Turkey to mortgage its resources to European financiers.

The common denominator of the further development of the Balkan states was their essentially agrarian character. Although some economic advances were made, the mass of people remained dependent peasantry, having only slight voice in the government of their countries. The result was that the political history of these countries is largely the story of contending factions. In Rumania, which was declared a kingdom in 1881, the struggle was between those who favored Russian protection and those who leaned toward Austria. The same situation was observable in Serbia in the struggle

between the pro-Austrian Obrenovich family and the pro-Russian Karageorgeviches. Settlement of the feud by the extinction of the Obrenovich line in 1903 made Russian influence predominant and eventually produced collision with Austria. Bulgaria, also, was prey to dynastic rivalries and international ambitions.

C. The Romanov Road to Ruin

Basis and backbone, strength and weakness of the Russian Empire was the serf. Ignorant, illiterate, superstitious, and ultra-conservative, ground down by centuries of servility and debased by an Oriental fatalism, the serfs comprised ninety-four percent of the total population at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Largely indolent and inert, though capable of violent action when aroused, the serfs played a negative role for the most part, but, nevertheless, they conditioned the whole of Russian history. Their tolerance and submission alone made possible the autocracy; their hatred of change long reduced reform agitation to intellectual vaporings. Terribly poor, living always close to starvation, largely leaderless, their very inertia perpetuated the system which made them so. Yet their presence determined the character of Russian life and thought, and their emancipation from serfdom produced such a marked change that it became a pivotal date between the Pre-Reform and Post-Reform eras.

Nineteenth-century Russia, in short, was a land of base servility and equally debasing privilege. The Czar ruled his vast empire with powers legally absolute, but actually somewhat limited by dependency upon the powerful nobility. His decrees (*ukases*) were law, his decisions final. The Russian Church had become a department of the state and a very effective tool for the preservation of the status quo. The nobility, who counted their wealth by the number of "souls" (serfs) whom they owned, constituted the great body of privilege. Originally given land and serfs as a payment for service to the State, they had been exempted from service largely by the Czarinas, Elizabeth and Catherine II, and retained only the privileges. It has been estimated that early in the nineteenth century there were 140,000 noble families of whom about 120,000 were relatively poor. The nobility monopolized the offices in the army, the church, and the civil service; enjoyed exemption from many taxes; and ruled their serfs with a despotic hand. The middle class, so important elsewhere in Europe, was virtually non-existent, and the few free peasants were, for the most part, not much better off than the serfs. Serf



Culver Service

KREMLIN

The word *kremlin* means a citadel, but it is generally used to indicate the citadel at Moscow. This walled structure has a perimeter of about a mile and a half. Inside the high walls are buildings varying in age. Among the oldest are the cathedrals built by Italian architects employed by Ivan III (1462-1505). The style is fundamentally Byzantine, with various overlays and adaptations. Because the Soviet government is partially housed here, the word Kremlin is sometimes used to indicate the Russian government.

and peasant commonly lived in a village community called a *mir*, roughly comparable to the tiny villages of feudal Europe. Agricultural methods were primitive and inefficient with the result that there seemed to be a continual land shortage. The vast mineral resources of Russia were as yet untapped, and the lack of roads, the tremendous distances and the absence of east to west waterways virtually isolated sections of the country. The government was a blending of extreme centralization with extensive local powers. Landlords were the virtual rulers of their estates, but they were subject to the authority of the Czar. The real administration, as in all absolutist countries, was the large, usually corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy.

The immediate successor of Catherine the Great was her son, Paul I. An embittered and broken man when he became czar in 1796, he went insane under the burdens of office and was finally murdered (1801) when he resisted an attempt to remove him from power. His reign, marked by violence and confusion, did nothing to advance Russia along the lines marked out by Peter I and Catherine II.

Alexander I (1801-1825), who followed his father upon the throne, remains an enigma. A mystic and a dreamer, he began his rule with strong tendencies toward liberalism, proved himself a match for the great Napoleon, and finally became the apostle of reaction and oppression. Part of the explanation probably lies in his responsiveness to the influence of others. Imbued with liberal ideas by his French tutor, La Harpe, he surrounded himself by like-minded young men when he came to the throne. With them he discussed and even planned the granting of a constitution and the abolition of serfdom. The backwardness of his people, his own dependence upon the no-

bility, and the interruptions of the Napoleonic Wars rendered such plans nugatory and fleeting. One notable result of the Russian participation in the defeat of Napoleon was the introduction of the young nobles to western customs and ideals. This led, in time, to the appearance of a tiny group of nobles who desired political reform. By then, Alexander had come under the sway of Metternich and his earlier liberalism had vanished. The reformers perforce became conspirators who, with an impractical idealism long characteristic of Russian revolutionaries, sought to establish a constitutional monarchy when Alexander died. Known as the *Dekabristi* (Decembrists) because their comic opera revolt took place in December, this small and unorganized group was doomed to failure by the complete apathy and hostility of the Russian people. The chief result of their action was to confirm the new czar, Nicholas I (1825-1855), in his policy of stern, unbending reaction.

The reign of Nicholas is marked by such striking contrast that Russian historians have called it a period of "outward repression and inner liberation." His motto was "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationalism," and to carry it out he established a brutal, efficient system of espionage, censorship, and harsh punishment. Under the "Nicholas System" every effort was made to seal Russia against infection from the liberal west. Beyond his borders, Nicholas' active support of reaction earned for him the sobriquet of "the gendarme of Europe." He crushed the Polish Rebellion of 1830 and subjected the Poles to a policy of merciless Russification, suppressed the Hungarian Rebellion in 1849, and successfully interfered with liberalism in Germany. Progress, he is reported to have written, is "[a] word [which] must be deleted from official terminology." [1]

Despite his thoroughly reactionary policies, however, he did much to advance the well-being of his state. Governing largely through "His Majesty's Own Chancery," which he expanded from a consultative council to an executive organ, he codified the law, stabilized the currency and backed it with a reserve of gold and silver, and forwarded the expansion of business. Despite rigid restrictions and censorship, education was encouraged by the establishment of new schools which were eagerly patronized by the slowly growing middle class. The problem of serfdom loomed large. Changing economic conditions rendered it less profitable, humanitarian agitation by the more advanced groups condemned it, and perpetual land shortage

[1] Quoted by W. H. Chamberlain, *The Russian Revolution*. Two volumes. N. Y., 1935. I:13.

made the serfs so restless that there were 536 serious uprisings during his reign. The Czar was well aware of the necessity for action but he hesitated to incur the hostility of the landlords by liberating all serfs. The condition of Crown serfs was much improved by giving them local self-government, increasing their allotments of land, and teaching them better agricultural methods. A law issued by Alexander in 1803 which permitted landlords to free their serfs was expanded in 1842, but remained largely inoperative. The government also issued several laws designed to aid the serf by defining his duties, regulating the punishments which might be inflicted, and prohibiting the sale of serfs at public auction.

An even stranger contradiction was the cultural development which took place. The movement was small and almost exclusively confined to members of the privileged classes, but it marked the beginning of modern culture in Russia. Socialism, based upon the teachings of the Frenchmen, Saint-Simon and Fourier, was introduced. Idealistic and impractical, it was the root from which later Russian socialism grew. It was also at this time that the intellectual struggle between the Slavophiles and the Westerners first attained major proportions. The Slavophiles took the view that Russian civilization rested upon different bases than that of Europe, and had developed along different lines. Western Europe, they said, was moving toward ruin, and Russia, therefore, should eschew all things western and cling to her own unique heritage. Specifically, they urged the retention of the *mir* and of the benevolent autocracy. The Westerners, on the other hand, insisted that Russia differed from the rest of Europe only in degree, that she was more slowly pursuing the same course as her western neighbors. Hence, they argued, Russia must make every effort to catch up to the other nations. They particularly longed for the establishment of a constitutional government. Both groups wanted greater personal freedom, the abolition of serfdom, and public control of the bureaucracy. Both groups were also definitely nationalistic and from them there emerged the Pan-Slav movement. Briefly, the Pan-Slavists argued that the common race ancestry of the Slavic peoples bound them together, and urged that Russia, as the greatest Slav nation, should take the lead in uniting them. This view became very popular in government circles with momentous results. Since Austria-Hungary dominated many of the Balkan Slavs she became the *bête noir* of the Pan-Slavists, a fact which goes far toward explaining the hostility of the two Powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pursuit of the Pan-Slav ideal was very im-

of The Metropolitan Museum of Art

PEASANT BARGEMEN OF THE VOLGA, BY ILJA JEFIMOVICH REPIN (1844-1918).

A romantic study by imperial Russia's best known painter.

portant in producing the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, the so-called Balkan Problem of the early twentieth century, and finally the Russian participation in the World War.

Further evidence of this cultural advance is found in the development of a graceful architecture adapted from the French "Empire" style, but the greatest achievements were in the field of literature. Russia's greatest poet, Pushkin, and Gogol, the father of the Russian novel, produced their finest works during the reign of Nicholas I; and the great Turgenev, Dostoevski, and Tolstoy made their first appearances then, though their triumphs came later. Russian national music also began in this reign with the works of Glinka, and modern Russian painting with Ivanov.

Nicholas' life ended during the Crimean War (1854-1856) which arose from the clash of Russian with British and French interests in the Near East. His policy of intervening in Europe to preserve the status quo had made Russia very unpopular, and in the eyes of the West, the war partook of the nature of a crusade against a backward, Oriental despotism. The Russian troops fought bravely enough, but they were made helpless by the inefficiency, incompetence, and corruption of their leaders. The result was a humiliating defeat which stung the upper-class Russians into demanding reforms. Nicholas died feeling that his reign had been a complete failure, and the throne passed to his son Alexander II (1855-1881).

Whether Alexander liked it or not, he was forced to become a reformer on a grand scale. The first problem attacked was serfdom. Growing discontent both among the intellectuals and among the serfs made some action necessary. So clearly did Alexander see this that he publicly remarked that "It is better to abolish serfdom from above than to wait until it begins to abolish itself from below." Moreover, serfdom was becoming increasingly unprofitable because of the nascent Russian capitalism, and many landlords had grown to prefer the money they would receive as compensation to the possession of serfs.[1] The emancipation decrees were steam-rollered through the government by the Czar, and serfdom, created by an autocrat, was abolished by an autocrat. The first and most important *ukase*, issued on March 17, 1861, freed the serfs on the landed estates; the second (1863) freed serfs in domestic service; and the third (1866) emancipated the serfs of the Crown. The serfs became citizens, subject no longer to the landlords but to the State. No compensation was given the former owners for the serfs, but the government paid them for the lands allotted to the newly created peasants. The latter, in their turn, had to pay the government an annual "redemption tax" for forty-nine years to pay for their farms. The land was not awarded to individuals but to the *mir* which assigned it as it saw fit. Each *mir*, in effect, was made into a corporation, responsible to the government for the payment of taxes, distribution of land, and control of the peasants who were forbidden to leave it without special permission.

The results of this great reform, profoundly good and equally bad, were highly significant. In general, the amount of land given to the peasants was much too small, its quality poor, and the price exacted from them for it too high. Moreover, the *mir* acted as a brake upon individual effort by perpetuating strip farming and other primitive methods which made the land shortage acute. The peasants themselves were violently dissatisfied with the arrangement as the 647 recorded riots, which took place between March and July of 1861, testified. The lot of the peasant remained hard especially since an increase in population aggravated existing evils. Famines remained common, and even in good times the average peasant literally did not get enough to eat. The peasant problem remained the most pressing of the many which plagued Czarist Russia.

The more beneficent effects of the emancipation, though much

[1] It had long been agreed that the serfs must be given land with their freedom, and that the government must somehow arrange to recompense the landlords for their loss.

slower to appear, were just as real. Millions were freed from slavery, and Russia ceased to be a servile state. The long-run effect of this upon Russian life and thought is hard to estimate, but it was great. Since the domestic serfs received no land and since many others legally or illegally abandoned it, labor was made available for the industrialization of Russia. Without it, the Industrial Revolution could not have come. The social and economic monopoly of the land-owning nobles was broken, though they long retained a dominant place, and the way was prepared for the rise of the bourgeoisie. New reforms were necessitated, breaking down the absolute power of the Czar and starting Russia along the road toward a constitutional monarchy. In short, modern Russia began with the emancipation of the serfs.

Removal of the governing power of the landlords necessitated the setting up of some administrative organ to fill the void. This was done by a decree of 1864 which provided for the establishment of local units, the District Zemstvo Assembly. Assembly members were elected by the *mirs* and by individuals possessed of a certain minimum of property. One meeting was held each year for the discussion of local economic affairs. Much more important were the District Zemstvo Boards which were established by the same law. Members were chosen from the Assembly, and constituted a sort of permanent committee of that body. The Zemstvo Board was given jurisdiction over schools, roads, public health, and insurance, and was empowered to levy taxes. The Zemstvos were supervised by the provincial governor and the minister of the interior. Some of their powers were later taken from them, and they were always dominated by the nobility, but the Zemstvo marked a clean break with the old order by giving representation to non-nobles for the first time. Six years later (1870) Municipal Councils with much the same powers gave local government to the cities. The Zemstvos and the Councils furthered the economic advance of Russia, and gave great impetus to liberalism. Until the calling of the Duma in 1905, they remained the only schools of self-government.

Alexander II also effected an important judicial reform which abolished the old system of one law for the peasant and another for the noble. Henceforth, all citizens were equal in the eyes of the law. This equality was further emphasized by the establishment of universal compulsory military service (1874). Prior to this, the rank and file of the army had been chiefly peasants, forced to serve for twenty-five years. The new law reduced the term of service and spread the

burden over all classes. The "Reform Czar" relaxed the stringent censorship, removed restrictions upon teaching, and greatly increased the number of and improved the quality of secondary schools. A beginning was made in the education of girls, and the Zemstvos greatly aided the work by opening many primary schools. To pay off old debts, and better to bear the burden of a modernized state, attempts were made to reform the fiscal system, but with only moderate success.

One very important result of these reforms was the growth of political opposition to the government and the spread of radicalism. This seems surprising in view of the advances made, but as the French political scientist, de Tocqueville, once remarked, "The most dangerous moment for a bad government is when it begins to reform." Liberals, encouraged by the reforms and emboldened by the removal of censorship, freely voiced their disappointment that more had not been done. Reaction from the extremes of absolutism and the characteristic, zealous idealism of the Russian intellectual, which made him eager to risk his all for a cause, were also partly responsible. Throughout this period Russian socialism grew apace. Its forms varied but until the end of the nineteenth century they all shared two distinguishing features. Unlike the socialism of western Europe, the Russian brand was agrarian and nationalistic.

The three outstanding figures of early Russian socialism were: Alexander Herzen (1812-1870), Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876), and Nicholas G. Chernishevsky (1828-1889). Herzen's revolutionary activities forced him into exile when he was thirty-five and he lived out his life in alien lands. His influence was greatest just prior to the emancipation edict when his weekly magazine, *The Bell*, published in London and smuggled into Russia, was very widely read. His major theme was the introduction of socialism through the medium of the *mir*. Bakunin was also a professional revolutionary who, after being outlawed in 1840, appeared wherever there were uprisings. His creed was anarchy: complete destruction of all social groups in order to free the individual. Chernishevsky, perhaps because he more nearly approached the Marxian socialism, was more influential in the long run than either of the others. Like Herzen, he too edited a liberal magazine, *The Contemporary*, which exerted considerable influence upon the intelligentsia. He also advocated the retention of the *mir*, but only as a means of saving Russia from class war and the rise of the proletariat. Broken by his exile to Siberia in 1862, his powers waned, but he was long venerated by radical groups.

The first school of socialist thought to dominate the Russian intelligentsia was Nihilism. Rooted in the materialistic philosophy engendered by the new scientific discoveries, Nihilism scorned all but science and "reality." Partly a reaction from repression and from romanticism, it was also evidence that the educated classes were no longer drawn only from the nobility. Princes stood side by side with sons of serfs, and daughters of army officers followed the lead of petty bourgeoisie. The first most important expression of this new state of affairs was the populist movement which flourished from 1870 to 1875. Its inspiration was a phrase of Herzen's "V narod!" (To the people!), and its participants were known as the *Narodniki.* In pursuit of their dual purpose of educating the peasant and imbuing him with socialism, scores of young men and women flocked to the *mirs* as doctors, teachers, and even laborers. To their astonishment, the peasants were apathetic and even hostile, frequently denouncing the agitators to the police. The movement was broken by hundreds of arrests, and its results were negligible. The few who escaped turned now to terrorism as the only available weapon. The "Land and Liberty Party," the first formal Russian revolutionary organization, was organized in 1878. The increasing use of violence caused a split in its ranks, and the extremist group formed itself into a party called the "People's Liberty," whose primary aim was the assassination of the Czar, the symbol of autocracy. After several failures, this aim was finally attained in March of 1881. Alexander II was blown up by a bomb while riding in St. Petersburg. The arrest and execution of the terrorist leaders, a growing sense of the futility of terrorism, and the breaking down of the theories of peasant socialism under the impact of Marxist doctrines combined to bring a temporary period of quiescence.

The Polish Insurrection of 1863 and the increasing radicalism of the intelligentsia, including an attempt upon his life in 1866, swerved the Czar from his liberalism. A vicious cycle began which culminated in his death. The more radical the agitators became, the more vehement was the governmental reaction, and *vice versa.* It is not strange that Alexander, feeling that he had been betrayed by those whom he sought to help, ruthlessly crushed the Polish movement and relentlessly hunted down the liberals. It could hardly have been otherwise.

Besides his reforms, Alexander won fame by greatly expanding his empire. Temporarily thwarted in the Near East by the Crimean War, Russia turned her attention to the Middle and Far East. During the decade of the fifties, she consolidated her gains in the Caucasus

area, and acquired the Amur Region and part of Sakhalin Island in the Far East. In the sixties, she added to her possessions Turkestan, and Samarkand; and in the next decade, Khiva, the western part of the district of Ili, and the rest of Sakhalin. Anglo-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan resulted from the Russian advance, and the friction thus induced long kept the two Powers mutually hostile. Encouraged by these gains and by the growing weakness of Turkey, Russia in 1877 went to war with that Power, ostensibly to protect the Balkan Slavs, actually to get Constantinople. The war was a success, but Russia was balked by the Powers at the Congress of Berlin (1878) with consequences noted elsewhere.[1] The outburst of revolutionary activities which came at this period was due partly to this war which revealed defects in the government, and partly to the rage of the Russian intelligentsia when Bulgaria, freed by Russian arms, received a constitution which was denied her liberators.

Alexander III (1881-1894), who became Czar upon the death of his father, was devoted to reaction. In some measure this was because of horror at the assassination of the "Reform Czar," apparently an act of basest ingratitude, but even more it was due to the influence of the Procurator of the Holy Synod, Constantine Pobiedonostsev. The latter, for years the real power behind the throne, was not only a reactionary but a philosopher of reaction to whom liberalism was a positive anathema. Under his guidance the "Nicholas System" of rigid repression, vigilant censorship, and ruthless Russification was introduced in a vain effort to turn back the clock. Pobiedonostsev and his master were, however, tilting against time and change. It was during this reign that the full force of the Industrial Revolution reached Russia.

The beginnings of the industrialization were dimly apparent by 1800, but the number of workers employed was only about 95,000.[2] By the middle of the century the figure had risen to 460,000 and by the accession of Alexander III to 770,000. During his reign the number of workers more than doubled and the number of factories increased from 21,173 to 32,483. At the end of the century there were close to two million workers in about 39,000 factories. Much of this development was in such large-scale industries as textiles and metallurgy. An equally significant index was railway trackage which increased almost eight-fold between 1867 and 1897. The rapid growth of urban population is indicated by the fact that it increased approxi-

[1] See pp. 797-798.

[2] These figures are only approximate.

mately forty-five percent during the decade of the sixties. Much of this rapid development was due to the influx of foreign capital. France was the heaviest investor, especially in the years just preceding and after the Franco-Russian Alliance (1894). It is estimated that over thirty-two percent of the foreign capital invested in Russia in 1914 was French, with British capital second, and German, third.

The leader of this economic progress was Sergius Witte (1849-1915), minister of finance under Alexander III and Nicholas II. Witte stabilized Russian currency by putting it on a gold basis, founded government banks and credit establishments, greatly increased transport facilities, protected industry with tariffs, and offered special inducements to capital. He was, in short, a sort of one-man chamber of commerce who by his own efforts did much to transform Russia into an industrialized power. Despite his successes, however, Russia remained predominantly agricultural. She imported both raw materials and manufactured goods, and her only major export was foodstuff. This did not balance her liabilities for goods and capital import, and Russia remained a debtor nation.

The course and results of the Industrial Revolution in Russia followed the usual pattern. The growth of the bourgeoisie and of the proletariat gave Russia for the first time a sufficiently wide social basis for reform movements. Heretofore, Russian socialism and liberalism had been agrarian, theoretical, and wholly impractical because of the lack of these groups to whom they could appeal. Hereafter, these movements became industrial, more realistic, and practical. There could have been no Russian Revolution in 1905 and 1917 without this change. Combined with the perennial agrarian unrest, it produced the so-called "Liberation Movement" which led to revolutions, finally culminating in the overthrow and execution of Nicholas II, son of Alexander III, and Czar of Russia from 1894 to 1917.

An autocracy is dependent upon the character of its ruler. Much power both for good and for evil rests with the sovereign. Nicholas II, last of the Romanovs, was tragically miscast for his part. Weak and vacillating, stupid and stubborn, apparently incapable of deep reaction to any event, no matter how important, he was totally unfit for the place into which he was thrust by the accident of birth. Even his one likable trait, his devotion to his wife and family, led him finally to disaster. The Czarina, Alexandra, as strong in character as the Czar was weak, but equally incompetent, dominated him so completely that she became the real ruler of the empire in the perilous years of 1915 and 1916. A fervent convert to and a rabid protagonist

of the traditional absolutism, she continually urged the Czar to assert himself and play the despot. Nothing loath, the Czar tried to do so, and, until the Revolution of 1905, pursued and intensified his father's policy of repression. It was this failure to recognize or heed the changed conditions of Russia that finally drove him from his throne.

After a period of apathy in the eighties and early nineties, revolutionaries and their doctrines once more took on new life. The presence of a growing bourgeoisie and proletariat gave them recruits and the basis for a movement in the cities. A long-continued agrarian crisis arising from agrarian over-population and under-production made the peasants ripe for revolt. The ruthless exploitation of labor which outstripped that of the nations earlier industrialized prepared the way for the introduction of Marxian Socialism on a large scale. Active in its propagation were some former members of the Land and Liberty Party, notably Plekhanov, and younger revolutionaries among whom was the man of destiny, Vladimir Ulianov (Nicholas Lenin). Various "Unions" for the improvement of labor sprung up in the major cities and representatives of them met in a general congress at Minsk in 1898. The group named itself the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, and adopted a program derived from the teachings of Karl Marx. Checked by numerous arrests of its members, the party maintained a precarious existence and in 1902 founded a revolutionary newspaper, *The Spark*. The next year, the Social Democrats split into two groups known by their Russian names of Bolsheviki (majority) and Mensheviki (minority). Though obscured by personalities, the main issue between the two, as it finally developed, was on the nature of the coming revolution. The Mensheviki desired a liberal, bourgeois revolution; the Bolsheviki, led by Ulianov or Lenin, the pseudonym by which he is better known, wanted the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasant. It was to those groups, but especially to the former, that the Bolsheviki appealed. It was typical of Russian socialism that this party, for the proletariat but not yet of it, split upon the question of an as yet ephemeral revolution.

At almost the same time, another party of discontent appeared. This was the Social Revolutionary Party, an offshoot of the old populist movement, non-Marxian and devoted to the fomenting of agrarian revolt. Like its predecessor, it ran heavily to terrorism, even setting up a "Fighting Organization" for that purpose. Among its victims were the Grand Duke Sergius, an uncle of the Czar, and von Plehve, reactionary minister of the interior.

The bourgeois liberals did not organize until 1905 when they formed the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) Party. Composed largely of bourgeoisie, professional men, and Zemstvo workers, this party stood for moderate social reform and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. As its aims were realized and as its socialist opponents grew more radical, the Cadet Party moved consistently to the right. By 1917 it was, to all intents and purposes, the conservative party of Russia.

Industrial expansion in the nineties gave way to a period of depression and hard times which greatly favored the growth of industrial socialism. After 1903 there were numerous and widespread strikes, and it is noteworthy that the strikers demanded political reform as well as economic and social change. At about the same time the always smoldering peasant discontent flared up in rioting and disorder. It was partly because of this tense situation that the government, grossly overconfident of its military prowess, welcomed a war with Japan which arose from imperialistic conflicts in Korea and Manchuria (1904). The story of the war does not need repetition. Russia went from one inglorious defeat to another, first on land and then on the sea. As in the Crimean War, the fault lay not with the soldiers but with the gross incompetence, corruption, and maladministration of the officers and the government. Instead of easing the tension, the successive defeats roused more discontent and finally provoked a revolution.

Beginning in September, 1904, the Zemstvo workers began to demand a representative assembly and the agitation was taken up by "Unions" of professional men. Agitation became real revolution after the infamous "Bloody Sunday," January 22, 1905. On that day, an unarmed crowd of workers, led by the police-supported priest, Father Gapon, streamed through the streets of St. Petersburg bearing a petition to the Czar. Nicholas fled, and his loyal subjects were greeted with volleys of rifle fire from the Cossacks. No longer could the people make themselves believe that their once-beloved "Little Father," the Czar, would help them if he knew of their plight. It had become painfully apparent that he knew but did not care.

The spring and summer of 1905 were filled with strikes and agrarian riots. One Russian historian[1] has calculated that the total number of strikers in 1905 was 2,865,145. Since there were only about two million workers at the time, it is obvious that many of them went on strike again and again. It is also estimated that sixty-

[1] Balabanov. See Chamberlain, *The Russian Revolution*. I:49.

four percent of the strikes were political in purpose. Naval mutinies and disaffection among the returning soldiers added to the government's worries. The climax was reached in a true General Strike which began on October 23. Factories closed, trains and street cars stopped, power plants shut down, lawyers refused to plead, jurors to listen, and even ballet dancers would not dance. Faced with this almost complete stoppage of life, the Czar and his advisers had to yield. Witte was made premier, and on October 30 a constitution was granted, guaranteeing civil liberties, and vesting the legislative power in an elective assembly, the Duma. As Witte had hoped, the constitution drove a wedge between the moderate liberals and the more radical socialists, among whom Trotsky and Lenin were prominent. A wave of violent anti-Semitism, inspired and arranged by the government, further deflected the people from revolt. Agrarian riots continued to flame up spasmodically in a true class war against the landlords, liberal and reactionary alike. The government, however, was slowly regaining its power largely because of division and lack of leadership among its opponents. After crushing a last outburst of revolt in Moscow in December, 1905, the government felt itself strong enough to renege on its earlier promises. An overwhelmingly conservative State Council was given powers equal to the Duma when that body first met in April of 1906. When that did not suffice, the Duma was dissolved (July) and Witte replaced by the less liberal Stolypin. He dissolved a second Duma (June, 1907) which had proved too liberal, and, by use of the *interim* power granted by the constitution, changed the election law. The third Duma was sufficiently tractable and was allowed to serve its term.

The Duma, as it finally took shape, was not at all representative of the Russian people. There was no principle of ministerial responsibility, and it could be short-circuited by decrees issued by the government between sessions. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Duma did mark the legal end of the autocracy. Its control of the budget and its right of interpellation of ministers gave it considerable influence. It was, in short, a start, but only a start, toward a constitutional, bourgeois monarchy.

For the next seven years Russia continued its social and economic progress. Industrial growth was at about the same rate as in the United States, but it must be remembered that it is easier for a slightly industrialized country to double its output than for a highly industrialized one to do so. Russia was, however, making noteworthy progress though she continued to lag far behind the nations of the

west. Largely because of the agrarian riots of 1905-1907, the government felt that it could no longer depend upon the *mir*. This, coupled with a realization of the backwardness of the *mir* system, led Stolypin to break down the compulsory features of the *mir* by decrees in 1907, 1910, and 1911. Thereafter, individuals were free to own land and to move about. The chief beneficiaries were the few well-to-do peasants who bought up the lands of the less fortunate. At least two-thirds of the peasants continued to live upon the margin of subsistence. The assassination of Stolypin in 1911 retarded further agrarian reforms and the constant land hunger of the peasants was not appeased.

Striking advances were made also in education. Between 1908 and 1913 the number of primary schools was increased from under 100,000 to 150,000. Secondary schools and colleges also increased in number, and, moreover, began to teach an ever greater group of students. Despite some clashes with the government, there was almost complete freedom of teaching. Much remained to be done, however. Education was still a privilege and not a right. The Russian intelligentsia were markedly brilliant, registering triumphs in science, literature, and music, but over sixty percent of the people remained illiterate. Gradually the wide rift between the masses and the minority was being closed, but the task was huge. What might have happened remains unknown.

The World War, which interrupted these developments, made another revolution probable but not inevitable. The upper classes were solidly behind the government in 1914, and even the revolutionaries and peasants were relatively quiescent. Had the Czar chosen to do so, he might have united his people by taking them into his confidence. Instead, aided and abetted by Alexandra, he chose the other course and alienated everyone by seeking to regain autocratic powers. Russia entered the war badly unprepared. She had, for example, only sixty batteries of artillery as compared with Germany's three hundred and eighty-one. This disparity was rapidly made worse by the truly incredible inefficiency, incompetence, and corruption of the Czar and his underlings. At the very crucial moment of 1915 the Czar, disregarding all advice, chose to take command of the armies, leaving the civil administration to the Czarina. The latter, by this time, had come under the malevolent influence of Gregory Rasputin. This remarkable man, an ignorant Siberian peasant, was apparently possessed of hypnotic powers. Admitted to the Imperial Court through the superstitious credulity of some of its members, he soon convinced Alexandra that he was a holy man who could cure her

only son of hæmophilia. By 1916 Rasputin was making and breaking ministers at will and really ruling the country. The situation had become intolerable, and Rasputin was finally assassinated by a small group of responsible men late in December. The damage, however, had been done. The Czar would heed no appeals, listen to no advice. He was soon to pay for his blind stubbornness with his throne and his life.

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Chapter XXVIII

The Religion of Science

A. A NEW AGE OF FAITH

It is almost impossible to exaggerate the debt which modern society owes to its scientists. Technological improvements of infinite variety, communications systems, popular amusements, in fact almost everything which we regard as unique in contemporary life can be traced in part to the laboratory. No department of western culture has escaped the ubiquitous influence of science. Art, music, literature, religion, government, and our very thoughts bear evidence of its impact. Most of us seldom realize the depth to which science has penetrated our lives, although in a superficial way some have come to feel that the progressive improvement of material welfare and the answer to the problem of ultimate reality can be solved only by science. It has made men humble and conceited, has encouraged limitless hopes and fateful forebodings, and has both strengthened and weakened an abiding faith in human progress.

Men placed greater faith in science in the nineteenth century than they do today, chiefly because they had little reason to doubt the validity of its conclusions, and every reason to defend it on the score of its accomplishments. Scarcely a decade passed which did not reveal some noteworthy success of the scientific method, or some new proof of scientific hypotheses. These seemed the more certain because they usually found application in the tangible world of material affairs, since science in the nineteenth century was allied with industry. This happy alignment was deliberate, and found its best expression in the development of scientific laboratories operating in conjunction with business enterprise. The union of business and science, one of the most unique features of the nineteenth century, was a boon to both. Science had ceased to be the purely theoretical handmaiden of theology or philosophy.

In the physical sciences, the star of Galileo and Newton was still in the ascendant as the nineteenth century opened, and their simple materialistic concept of reality as matter and force served as the basic hypothesis from which most physical researches began. The uncomfortable fact that many discoveries failed to fit easily into this Newtonian scheme aroused little doubt until the abundance of accumulated evidence seemed overwhelming. Indeed, although the most impressive achievements of this century controverted long-established generalizations, few were distressed at their metaphysical implications.

Among the most significant accomplishments of nineteenth-century physics was the discovery of the property of heat, and the establishment of thermodynamics as an important department of physical studies. Through a number of epoch-making discoveries in the thirties and forties, James Prescott Joule (1818-1889), a young, untrained English scientist, produced evidence that heat was a form of energy and a mode of motion. He demonstrated experimentally that "work and heat were equivalent," and reached the conclusion that the total amount of energy, the power to produce work, was constant. The quantity of energy apparently lost as work merely reappeared as heat. This gave force to a new physical concept, known as the conservation of energy, and best expressed by H. L. F. von Helmholtz (1821-1894). One of the most fruitful generalizations of modern times, this opened up new fields of investigation and provided a new springboard from which scientists were able to leap to important physical conclusions before the groundwork had been prepared by laborious experiments. It laid the basis also for a so-called second law of thermodynamics, the dissipation of energy, expounded by Lord Kelvin. While accepting the idea that energy is constant, this law asserts that useful energy is perpetually disintegrating into nonuseful, and anticipates the time when all useful energy will have been expended.

The properties of light, like those of heat, remained largely a mystery before the nineteenth century, although various theories had already been advanced. A number of experiments conducted by Thomas Young (1773-1829) and Augustin Fresnel (1788-1827) established the idea that light was wave motion, traveling in straight lines. The formulation of this classic wave theory of light was paralleled by the development of spectrum analysis. From Newton's suggestion that the appearance of colors in glass prisms exposed to the rays of the sun was due to the decomposition of white light, there began

the fruitful investigations of the physical properties of colors. Two German scientists, G. R. Kirchoff (1824-1887) and J. von Fraunhofer (1787-1826), distinguished the differences between the spectrums of solid, gaseous, and liquid bodies under varied conditions, and by demonstrating that certain chemical substances produce distinctive light, laid the foundation for modern spectroscopy. Determination of the chemical composition of a number of the planets has been made possible through these discoveries. Although not exactly an outgrowth of investigations into the physical properties of light, the beginnings of modern photography coincided with these studies. The magic lantern, in use since the sixteenth century, and knowledge of the sensitivity of silver compounds to light, revealed in the eighteenth century, constituted the background for epoch-making experiments in the first half of the nineteenth century. L. J. M. Daguerre (1789-1851), a French painter, was the first to make "picture taking" a commercially profitable venture, so much so that "daguerreotype" came to be practically synonymous with photography itself. W. H. Fox-Talbot, an Englishman, subsequently perfected a process of instantaneous photography, and at the end of the century, a kinetoscope invented by Thomas Edison and a projector developed by Thomas Armat opened the way for the development of moving pictures.

No physical science has influenced human life more deeply than electromagnetism. From a mysterious "imponderable fluid," electricity was reduced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to corpuscular physical substance, made available for light and power, and finally used to explain the mysteries of life itself. The accidental discovery of the galvanic or voltaic cell, a primitive primary battery, by two Italian scientists, L. Galvani and A. Volta, inaugurated the intensive study of electricity and its properties. Shortly afterward, Michael Faraday (1791-1867), the self-educated son of an English blacksmith, provided the new science with its modern terminology, invented a dynamo, and demonstrated the commercial possibilities of electroplating. The discovery of countless practical uses for this new power followed swiftly. Samuel Morse and Alexander Graham Bell employed it for the telegraph and telephone respectively; Thomas Edison made it available for artificial light by the invention of an incandescent lamp; and from it Guglielmo Marconi developed the radio and radio telephone. Electricity has almost realized for man the occult powers of all the pagan gods of antiquity.

While electrical power was being utilized for human needs, theo-

retical scientists speculated upon its properties. In the middle of the nineteenth century Sir James Clerk-Maxwell suggested that electromagnetic waves would respond to the same laws as light, the two being aspects of the same phenomenon. Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894) subsequently produced experimental evidence to confirm Maxwell's hypothesis, thus establishing a definite link between optics and electromagnetism, and making possible the monumental work of Marconi with radio (Hertzian) waves some years later. The composition of electricity still remained a mystery, but much of this was soon dispelled. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, a Dutch scientist, Hendrik Lorentz (1853-1928), suggested that electrically charged particles were common to all things and "identical in all elements." These particles, known as electrons and protons, were demonstrated experimentally by Joseph Thomson in the 1890's. Another experimenter, Wilhelm von Röntgen (1845-1923) accidentally discovered a mysterious ray capable of penetrating opaque substances, and, for want of a better name, called it an X-Ray. The similarity between this and the penetrating rays which emanated from uranium and its compounds soon led to the discovery that all substances were composed of electrically charged atoms. The disintegration of these by centrifugal bombardment in a magnetic field, it was discovered, was what produced the X-Ray. The rays of uranium and its compounds, while differing from the X-Ray in length and penetrating qualities, were produced in similar fashion spontaneously. By this means, the way was prepared for fruitful investigations in the field of radioactivity so ably furthered by Pierre (1859-1906) and Marie Curie (1867-1935), who discovered the element of radium and made it commercially available.

The Electron Theory which Lorentz had formulated challenged the finality of the Atomic Theory, advanced by chemists early in the nineteenth century to explain the ultimate composition of matter. Suggested in ancient times by Democritus, the Atomic Theory received its classic definition at the hands of John Dalton (1766-1844), an obscure Quaker schoolmaster of Manchester. Every substance, he asserted, could be reduced to minute particles or atoms, incapable of observation and subdivision, which combined in certain definite weights and proportions to form all chemical compounds. There was some confusion for a time between these "atoms" and the "molecules" which Count Avogadro (1776-1856) almost simultaneously distinguished as the ultimate particles of gases, but this was clarified by designating "atoms" as the ultimate of simple elements, and "mole-

cules" as the ultimate of gases and compounds. By elaborate experimentation, the weights and distinctive properties of a number of elements were soon determined, and, in the 1870's, a Russian chemist, Dmitri Mendeléyev (1834-1907), demonstrated that every eighth element, when these are listed in the order of ascending weights, has certain similar properties. This Periodic Law enabled chemists to predict the existence of elements before they were actually discovered. The development of the Atomic Theory was one of the most fruitful hypotheses of the nineteenth century, and continues to be the point of departure for quantitative chemistry, despite the fact that electromagnetic studies have necessitated its modification.

Perhaps the most distinctive developments of chemical science were made in the fields of organic and synthetic chemistry. It had long been thought that an insurmountable barrier stood between organic and inorganic substances since it was believed that the former were created by a "vital" process, spiritual in origin and therefore incapable of scientific analysis. In 1828, however, this lingering superstition vanished when a German chemist demonstrated the possibility of making urea, an organic compound, from inorganic materials. The barrier between organic and inorganic studies had thus been finally surmounted, but the complexity of the former made advisable its continuance as a separate science. Production of synthetic substances swiftly developed into a major industry, especially in Germany and the United States, and before the end of the nineteenth century, chemistry took its place among the major engineering sciences. Apart from its contribution to modern industry, the study of chemistry has been an invaluable aid to agriculture, medicine, and biology, with which it is closely allied.

Despite their phenomenal growth, chemistry and physics were relatively old sciences when the nineteenth century opened, while geology and biology, destined to exert enormous influence upon contemporary life and thought, were still in their infancy. Like astronomy several centuries earlier, they challenged and uprooted traditional beliefs in which men's minds had been steeped for centuries. One denied the generally accepted Biblical account of the creation; the other applied to man the laws of natural causation, challenging the doctrines of dogmatic theology.

The first important criticism of the Biblical account of creation was made by an English gentleman farmer, James Hutton, in his *Theory of the Earth* (1785). In this he remarked upon processes of stratification and fossilization, still observable, which he believed

would account for the peculiar character of earth formations. These observations were not generally accepted until Sir Charles Lyell published his monumental *Principles of Geology* (1830-1833). A diligent and thorough Scotsman, Lyell produced a mass of evidence to support the view that the earth was much older than was assumed in the Bible, and established the fact that its structure and character were determined over a long period of time by purely natural circumstances. With this great work, it might be said that geology had its birth, and the doctrine of evolution its first scientifically supported statement. Anthropological studies, emanating from geology and biology alike, further substantiated Lyell's basic hypotheses. Discoveries of the remains of primitive men greatly strengthened belief in the growing doctrine of evolution by demonstrating the existence of a pre-literary period of human history.

The father of modern biology and the great exponent of the doctrine of evolution was Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882), son of a remarkable country doctor and grandson of a scientist of considerable repute. Abandoning the study of medicine for that of theology, his keen interest in nature led him to give up the idea of entering the church, and he shipped as naturalist aboard the sailing vessel *Beagle* for a five-year voyage in South American waters. During the voyage he formed the habits of keeping careful record of his observations and of wide reading. After some twenty years of painstaking research and additional observation, he finally expounded his famous thesis of evolution in the *Origin of Species* (1859), supplementing and buttressing it in a variety of other publications prior to his death.

The Darwinian theory repudiated the prevalent concept of immutable, independently created separate species, and advanced the hypothesis that all living things sprang from an originally common source. The diverse characteristics apparent in the different types of animal and vegetable life, Darwin ascribed to the accumulation of small variations over a long period of time. These he believed sufficient to explain the shaping, or the "evolution," of each species. Among the factors operating to produce variations, Darwin suggested three in particular: "natural selection," "sexual selection," and the "inheritance" of characteristics acquired through environmental influence. Upon the first of these, he placed special emphasis. It was his observation that individual members of a species differ from each other in innate qualities, some of which have better "survival value" in the competition for existence. The individual with superior survival qualities has the surer chance of living and producing offspring.

Over a long time, the cumulative effects of this modify the race and even produce a new variety. Thomas Huxley called this concept of "natural selection" the "quintessence of Darwinism." The peculiar qualities of color and structure of members of each sex, Darwin explained as the consequence, over a long period, of "sexual selection," that is, the preference shown by members of one sex for certain peculiar qualities in the other. While Darwin regarded these "selective" factors, and especially that of "natural selection," as most important, he did not hesitate to adopt the view, advanced by Lamarck, that the evolution of the species may result from inheritance of characteristics acquired through environmental influence. Indeed, this latter idea did not find wide acceptance until Darwin advanced it.

The scientists, if not the laymen, accepted Darwin's conclusions almost without question, and for years allowed his methods of observation and experimentation to languish. At the turn of the century, however, slow accumulation of evidence made it clear that the Darwinian hypothesis was not tenable in every respect, least of all in so far as it assumed that characteristics acquired through environmental influence could be transmitted. August Weismann (1834-1914), through a careful study of body and germ cells, demonstrated that the latter, which alone give rise to new organisms, tend to descend in a pure line, uninfluenced by environment. The germ plasm, he explained, has an unbroken history, and that while body cells might respond to environmental changes these did not influence the germ plasm perceptibly, and hence environment could not account for the development of a new species. The publication of these views was at first regarded as heretical, but they were soon supported by a variety of evidence. After much careful research, the great English biologist, William Bateson (1861-1926), asserted that there were two major problems which the Darwinian hypothesis failed to explain when applied to the evidence: (1) the apparent magnitude of variations from which new forms arise; and (2) the way in which variations are perpetuated since those with superior survival qualities bred with those in whom they were absent. He expressed the belief that large, intermittent variations, rather than the slow accumulation of small variations, might better account for the rise of a new species. Experimental evidence which partly validated this assumption already had been discovered by Gregor Johann Mendel (1822-1884), an obscure Austrian monk. Mendel had not been satisfied with the Darwinian explanation by "natural selection" and put some of his own theories to experimental test in the breeding of varieties of peas.

He demonstrated that if dwarf and tall peas were mixed the succeeding generation of plants would bear all of the outward qualities of the taller variety. If these were then allowed to fertilize themselves, however, only approximately three-fourths of the following generation of plants would be tall, while the remaining quarter would bear the qualities of the original dwarf variety. As this process continued, he noted a more or less definite mathematical relationship between the qualities transmitted or lost in successive generations. From these experiments, Mendel concluded that changes or "mutations" of the species might be large and intermittent rather than small and cumulative as Darwin had suggested. These findings remained hidden in an unknown, local publication until 1900 when their discovery created a considerable stir in the academic world. The more recent researches of T. H. Morgan and his associates in the United States have modified Mendel's conclusions, but have made it more abundantly clear that the Darwinian hypothesis is far from being definitive. There is at present no uniformly accepted doctrine of variations. Some biologists adhere largely to the theory of natural selection, some to Mendelian mutations, some are frankly skeptical of either, and still others are convinced that variations occur as the result of elements lost rather than elements gained. Probably the truth is composite. At least Darwin's theory is not accurate in every detail, although it rests on a broad and solid foundation. Certainly no contribution of nineteenth-century science exerted greater influence upon thought. Darwin's place in the history of modern culture is as secure as that of either Newton or Einstein.

Less spectacular than the formulation of the theory of evolution, but no less important, were the contributions of a variety of lesser-known scientists working in physiology and bacteriology. F. J. Gall (1758-1828) and Johannes Müller (1801-1858) described the structure of the brain and the function of its various parts, and Claude Bernard (1813-1878) charted the way for extraordinary discoveries in biochemistry by revealing the influence of the nervous system upon nutrition and secretion. Two German scientists, Schleiden and Theodor Schwann, introduced the study of embryology, and Rudolf Virchow (1821-1902) carried over the study of cell structures, thus begun, to the examination of diseased tissues. These studies showed a remarkable identity among all types of animal and plant life, and strengthened the belief in the unity of nature. Even the physical concept of the conservation of energy was made to apply to the living organism when it was established, before the end of the nineteenth

century, that the action of the human body could be traced to energy produced through the combustion of food. The discovery of the functions of various glands contributed to the mechanistic interpretation of life, and gave invaluable aid to the development of preventive and curative medicine. The now common uses of insulin, thyroxin, and adrenalin are the result of obscure and unheralded physiological discoveries.

Of even greater importance to preventive medicine was the discovery of microbes and bacteria, and their relation to disease. The result of the labors of a number of scientists, this achievement has been commonly associated with the name of Louis Pasteur (1822-1895), a Frenchman who succeeded in isolating the germs of various diseases through the use of primitive cultures. Appropriate means of treating a number of the most deadly maladies were thus made possible. Within the next half century the bacilli of diphtheria, malaria, bubonic plague, sleeping sickness, tuberculosis, tetanus, to mention only a few, were isolated and methods of prevention and cure found for many. The discovery of germs and their relation to disease proved a boon to surgery as well. Lack of proper precautions and ignorance of septicemia had made the outcome of surgical operations exceedingly problematical. Some of the danger from infected wounds was eliminated by Lord Lister (1827-1912), professor of surgery at the University of Glasgow, who demonstrated the antiseptic properties of carbolic acid and carbolized catgut. The publication of his findings in 1867 marked the real beginning of modern scientific aseptic surgery. Somewhat earlier, the discovery of surgical anæsthesia and its successful application by W. T. G. Morton of Boston (1846) had already helped to make surgery painless. So great has been the saving of human life resulting from preventive and curative medicine, that one might designate bacteriology, its fountain source, as the most important science of the nineteenth century.

The notable advance of physiology, bacteriology, and medicine was paralleled by psychology which now confidently claimed a place among the sciences. Prior to the nineteenth century it was chiefly a branch of metaphysics developed rationally through the process of deduction, and, indeed, so it continued to remain for some time in Germany. But with the naturalistic and mechanistic interpretations of life everywhere taking shape, and the knowledge of the human organism constantly growing, it was hardly possible for psychology to remain immune from the scientific impulse. Alexander Bain (1818-1903) of England, a member of the Benthamite school, and a fol-

lower of John Locke, introduced introspective methods for the study of the mind and, tracing mental phenomena to sensations, inaugurated "association psychology." This maintained that our complex ideas are derived from simple ones through the process of association. The beginnings of modern experimental psychology can be traced most clearly to E. H. Weber (1795-1878) of Leipzig who made a number of penetrating observations on the intensity and limits of sensations. Wundt (1832-1920), also of Leipzig, supplied additional evidence on measured sensations and, for the first time, collected the scattered threads of the new science into a coherent pattern. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the relation between physical and mental phenomena was for the first time closely observed, a study which continues to have great possibilities. Probably the most scientific of the numerous psychological "schools" which has developed during the past century, although it treats with only a small segment of the subject, is Behaviorism, introduced by J. B. Watson in the first quarter of the twentieth century. The Behaviorists, aiming to be as objective as the chemists and physicists, have confined themselves to the observation of measurable animal and human behaviors. They regard man as merely a bundle of stimuli and responses, and have attempted to reduce all mental phenomena to mechanical processes. Behaviorism has produced highly significant results but its concentration upon animal studies has set definite limits upon its usefulness. More recently psychologists have manifested a growing interest in the interaction of human personalities, in the hope of explaining social behavior, and have sought to penetrate the deep mysteries of the mind, in neither of which is exact scientific measurement possible. Like most of the "sciences" devoted to social phenomena, psychology has for the time being thrown off the pretense of being purely scientific.

During the nineteenth century such doubts of the validity of science and the scientific method were rarely expressed in the academic world, while among an increasingly large body of laymen the wonders and accomplishments of science inspired a boundless hope and unreasoning faith in human ingenuity. The darkest secrets of nature had been revealed and the basic hypotheses which served to unlock them gave promise of solving such mysteries as still remained. The boundaries of science appeared to be fixed, and within the area which they defined, all that seemed to remain was to complete the exploration. The fact that some questions remained unanswered or obstinately refused to be answered by prevailing scientific

theories perturbed only the few. It would be an unpardonable error to assert that the mass of men in the nineteenth century believed unquestioningly in the infallibility of science, but it is certainly clear that society had become science-conscious, and that scientific achievements contributed enormously to a pervading optimism which lasted well through the first decade of the twentieth century.

It could hardly have been otherwise. Through science technological advancement had leaped beyond the bounds of imagination; disease and suffering had been brought within human control; and the drudgeries and hardships of life were rapidly disappearing. It did not require an understanding of the sciences themselves to appreciate these material benefits. If one were inclined to forget them he was always reminded by the profusion of popular articles appearing in the public press or by instruction in public and private schools. Small wonder that traditional religion was loosed from its moorings. Science had itself become a religion, the laboratory its shrine, and the scientist its high priest.

Sensational developments in physics, mathematics, and astronomy within the past quarter century have undermined the whole foundation upon which "scientific truths" of the nineteenth century were based, and have made them far less certain and definitive than they once seemed. A new set of basic hypotheses has displaced or modified the old, and the boundaries of science, once thought to have been fixed, have vanished away. Life, the universe, man, have become again unfathomable mysteries, and the final definitive statement of reality, it is now clear, has not yet been made. Dogmatic science of the nineteenth-century variety has disappeared.

The application of higher mathematics to astronomy produced the first serious breach in the older edifice of science. Albert Einstein, a German scientist, suggested in a series of epoch-making monographs between 1905 and 1915 that the Newtonian concept of gravitation and the prevailing ideas concerning the motion of light and heavenly bodies were probably unsatisfactory. He reduced physical reality to energy, of which matter and its property of gravitation were merely manifestations, and he dissolved the distinction between time and space by defining time as merely the fourth dimension of space. These modifications of prevailing hypotheses were embodied into what was called the Theory of Relativity which startled and confounded the scientific world. Close and careful observation has demonstrated the accuracy of a number of deductions from this theory, particularly that light, like all matter, is subject to the laws

of gravitation, and that motion is not absolute but purely relative to the observer. The accuracy of Einstein's observations has not changed our habits of life, but it necessitated a revamping of beliefs which had prevailed since the days of Newton. Time and space are no longer absolute, the universe is finite though boundless, rays of light do not travel in straight lines but are curved by gravitational pull, and the dimensions of moving and stationary bodies, as well as their weight, vary according to their state of motion. The only constant factor of the universe recognized by the Theory of Relativity is the velocity of light, and recently even that has been challenged.

Equally disconcerting have been the results of recent astronomical observations, made with the aid of greatly improved technical instruments. The universe has been extended beyond the ken of the most fertile imagination, and the earth and man, already reduced by Copernicus to secondary importance, have become wholly insignificant specks in an appallingly large cosmic ocean. Even the sun has lost its privileged place among the heavenly planets. It is only one of the smaller bodies in the galaxy which constitutes our universe, and this galaxy, it is now known, is only one of perhaps an incalculable number. It is impossible for anyone to comprehend the magnitude of our own galactic universe with its estimated three hundred trillion stars, much less to visualize the modern astronomer's universe, measured in thousands of light years, each one of which represents approximately six trillion miles.

Recently physical investigations into the structure and activity of atoms have produced equally startling and sensational results. The application of electromechanics to these studies had already revealed the fact that the atom was not indivisible but a complicated structure almost as complicated as the universe itself. Indeed, by some (Bohr theory) it has been described as a solar system in miniature with a nucleus and a variety of electrons revolving as planets around it. More recently a new Theory of Wave Mechanics (de Broglie and Schroedinger) has described the atom as merely "a vague pulsating sphere of electricity, something like an expanding and contracting balloon." These intensive studies of atomic structure and motion exposed an even more startling fact, that it was impossible to predict scientifically the actions of electrons and protons and that, therefore, the principle of causality, considered so firmly established that it was said God himself might have subscribed to it, could no longer apply. Professor Max Planck of Berlin, observing this, sought to offer an explanation by his Quantum Theory, by which he suggested that

energy, instead of being released continuously by electrical particles, was released in bundles or quanta. Neither the amount nor the time of release could, however, be predicted. As a corollary to Planck's law, Professor Heisenberg in 1927 advanced his Theory of Uncertainty, in which he explained that it is not only impossible to predict the behavior of single electrons, but that it was impossible ever to do so. If true, this is indeed disquieting, for it would indicate that definite limits have been fixed to physical studies in this direction.

None of the cherished hypotheses of the nineteenth century can any longer pretend to reveal reality and truth in entirety. Newtonian concepts have had to be radically modified, Darwin has been corrected, and the almost sacred law of cause and effect has proved to be a doubtful theory. The deeper science penetrates, the more elusive does reality appear, and the mystery of life remains. It has been aptly said that the "only certainty of science today is the certainty of uncertainty."

B. Science and Thought

It has already been observed that sixteenth and seventeenth century science reoriented and revolutionized habits of thought, but, extraordinary as its influence was, it was hardly comparable to that of the nineteenth century. Discoveries came slowly enough to be absorbed by intellectuals, if not by common men whose daily lives and habits went on much as they had for centuries. Moreover, with all its emphasis upon the order and simplicity of nature, Newtonian science had left the spiritual side of man unchallenged, and still found reason for God, if only as the First Cause. The swift advances of nineteenth-century science, permeating and transforming every phase of life, and subjecting man himself to material law, changed all this. Few intellectuals were able to keep pace with discoveries as science grew more highly specialized and departmentalized, and it became increasingly difficult to arrive at broad generalizations. Science and philosophy, which had developed harmoniously until the time of Kant, perforce parted company, with resulting misfortunes for both. One despised experimentalism and the other scoffed at visionary speculations, while only the most profound and penetrating students saw that neither revealed the whole truth. The man who tilled the fields or labored in the factory knew little of this academic combat, though he felt the sweep of the victorious advance of science. He saw theology retreat before its impact, sent his children to public schools to

learn its rudiments, gave up many of his petty superstitions and fears, and came to feel in a vague, uncertain sort of way that perhaps everything was material. He often spoke glibly of evolution although he knew nothing about it, and he frequently scoffed at religion though he scarcely knew why. Science had penetrated the deepest recesses of human life and challenged much of the foundation of established belief.

Perhaps the greatest manifestation of this was the widespread popularity and influence of materialistic, mechanistic philosophy. A compound of the most significant scientific revelations of the century, this held the universe and man to be godless and irrational, the objects of demonstrable mechanical law. From Newtonian physics, reenforced by chemical studies of the atom, it drew its basic hypothesis that reality was nothing more than simple matter and force. From thermodynamics, it derived the idea of the conservation of energy, which denied biological vitalism and provided the basis for its fatal determinism. From Darwin, it drew its concept of orderly evolution, and from all the sciences together it received confirmation of the law of cause and effect which it believed universally applicable. Materialist philosophy was the child of nineteenth-century science. It scorned mystical speculation, and showed little concern for spiritual questions or for the age-old philosophical problem of knowledge. Mind and nature, men and the universe, were merely varied expressions of reality which, divested of its mysterious trappings, was nothing more than matter, force, and energy.

The greatest exponents of this thought were to be found among the most uncompromising protagonists of the theory of evolution, Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) of England, and Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) of Germany. Despite differences of approach and opinion, the thought of all three showed remarkable uniformity. They were convinced that man and his institutions, as well as all animate and inanimate life, followed the course of blind, albeit orderly, evolutionary growth. The process was from the simple to the complex, from disorder to order. These materialists were optimists who believed evolution worked inexorably to produce a better and more perfect state for man. Their arguments deeply influenced the growing belief in human progress.

Thomas Huxley was the most combative and the most prolific writer of the optimistic materialists. A distinguished scientist in his own right, with uncommon power of expression, he devoted his life to dispelling what he considered the prevailing obscurantism of his

age. He vigorously attacked theological dogma and scoffed at the miraculous and supernatural. Although not prepared to deny completely the existence of the "spiritual," he nevertheless believed that all could be reduced to matter, which in turn responded to the ubiquitous force of evolution. Haeckel was even more uncompromising. The greatest champion of Darwinism in Germany, he summarized his views in a monumental work, *The Riddle of the Universe*, published in 1899. Everything, Haeckel contended, developed from the protoplasm, which was spontaneously generated from nitrogenous substance. All of life had evolved from this simple common beginning. The organic and inorganic, the mental and the material, thus had a common ancestry. Haeckel conceived all reality to be a simple unity, evolved but not created.

The most prominent and most influential materialist was Herbert Spencer, a self-educated railroad engineer of London. From independent study he had reached important conclusions on the process of evolution, before Darwin revealed the results of his painstaking researches. *The Origin of Species* exerted an enormous influence upon Spencer's thought and confirmed his growing faith. He immediately entered the lists in defense of Darwin, coining the famous phrase, "survival of the fittest," which has ever since been attached to the Darwinian doctrine. In 1860, he drew up the sketch of a complete evolutionary philosophy, and spent more than the next thirty years filling its details into a ponderous work (*Synthetic Philosophy*) of ten volumes. His fundamental thesis was that all things, through differentiation, adaptation, and selection, developed from the simple and homogeneous to the complex and heterogeneous. His chief preoccupation was to apply this to the study of all social phenomena, emphasizing the evolutionary development of human institutions and mental life. Believing that these grew best by trial and error, he regarded attempts to impose reforms as both unnatural and dangerous. Such ideas met with the hearty approval of economic individualists and gained an enormous vogue. Spencer did not reject the idea of a Supreme Being responsible for the evolutionary process, but he insisted it must remain Unknowable, since it cannot be observed. Although he rested too much confidence in the Darwinian hypothesis, his application of it to the study of society proved of inestimable value to the developing study of sociology. Like Haeckel and Huxley, Spencer believed that the unseen, uncontrollable force of evolution was progressively working in orderly fashion to a perfect end.

Other materialists were inclined to be less optimistic. Influenced

also by science, these were inspired by the lowly origins and animal characteristics of the human organism to visualize the darkest future. They regarded man as imprisoned by matter and forever victimized by his base appetites and passions. For these pessimists, appeal to the individual will, arbitrarily and selfishly evoked, offered the only escape from bondage, and provided the only avenue to a utopia of supermen. Common social amenities, which others extolled as the beneficent working out of evolutionary law, they condemned as parasitical forces operating to eliminate the strong and perpetuate the weak. They were literal exponents of the doctrine of survival of the fittest.

The most prominent pessimistic materialists were both Germans, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Schopenhauer, after an early life of the most depressing domestic misfortunes, studied philosophy at the University of Berlin. He was soon carried away from the prevailing "idealism" at Berlin by an overpowering interest in Hindu philosophy. Compounding this with his own unhappy personal experiences, he evolved a philosophy of dejection and despair which was given its first expression in *The World as Will and Idea*, published originally in 1818. Reality, he maintained, could be ascertained not by science, which is concerned purely with external phenomena, but only by intuition. This reveals will as reality, and will is wholly irrational, activated by animal impulses and passions. These latter forces are what govern and enchain man, and forever deprive him of happiness. This being true, the greatest misfortune to befall man is to be born.

Schopenhauer's philosophy of "will" received greater elaboration at the hands of Nietzsche. Born into a pious parsonage, Nietzsche in his early years was inspired to prepare himself for the church but, after a brief interest in music and art, he finally completed his doctorate in philosophy, which he taught for a number of years at the University of Basle in Switzerland. At first a mild critic of social institutions, he became steadily more outspoken, particularly in his attacks upon Christianity. His masterpiece, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, published in 1885, embodies the fundamental tenets of his mature thought. In this book, Nietzsche condemned society for protecting the weak because of adherence to the false Christian virtues of kindness, gentleness, and generosity. The only instinct which he recognized as true was the "will to power" which commanded man to trample the weak and raise up the strong. Solely by obeying the commands of this imperious "will" is it possible to realize progress

and rear a race of supermen. Doctrines like these ran counter to the main stream of nineteenth-century philosophic thought, but they were as much the products of science as the more optimistic views. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer had less vogue than Spencer and Haeckel, but they offered a ready excuse for Machiavellian imperialism, and they served as an antidote for students of social phenomena.

A variety of influences combined to emphasize the importance and extend the scope of social studies during the nineteenth century. The steady secularization of life since the era of the Renaissance, which made present happiness vastly more important than future bliss, had already directed thought in the eighteenth century to problems of social betterment. Rapid industrialization, the spread of the factory system, the tendency toward the development of a world society produced by the newer systems of communication, together with a growing interest in government manifested by common men everywhere, helped to focus attention upon the relationships between individuals and their social environment. Perhaps the most powerful stimulant to social studies was the development of such sciences as biology, anthropology, and psychology, which provided a key to human progress and the tools with which to measure man's reactions. With these, there was inspired the hope that social studies might become as objective as the physical sciences, and many enthusiasts envisioned the growth of a "social science."

The first of the social studies to assume the trappings of pure science, with its objective detachment and its emphasis upon measurement, was sociology. Largely an offshoot of political philosophy, this new "science" aimed to discover the "laws" of human development and to determine the forces which govern the relationships between individuals within the social milieu. Two approaches were made to this problem. One, growing out of the humanitarian rationalism of the eighteenth century, took the whole scope of human history for its province, and sought to deduce from it the basic laws of social progress. The other, conforming more nearly to the atomizing tendencies of the physical and chemical sciences, tried to conduct detached and exhaustive investigations of small groups of individuals. Both methods added greatly to the understanding of contemporary society: the former emphasizing the variety of influences in the larger sphere which determine society's unique structure; the latter contributing a knowledge of individual reactions to the varied stimuli within the social grouping.

A beginning in the synthetic approach to sociology was made

by the brilliant but erratic French Utopian socialist, Count Henri de Saint-Simon, but its systematic development and exposition was the work of his able student, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who is oftimes called the father of sociology. Of middle class origins, Comte received his formal education in the sciences at the Paris Polytechnic, before contact with the Saint-Simonians stimulated his interest in social problems. Comte aimed to make the study of society as scientific as the study of physics, and, by analyzing the moral, religious, and political institutions of men, make possible a sane, reasonable, and scientific reorganization of the entire social structure. His efforts in this direction culminated in a ponderous, erudite, and somewhat fanciful work entitled *Positive Philosophy*, published during the years 1851-1854. This gave birth to a movement of thought, known as Positivism, which enjoyed a popularity and exerted an influence comparable to philosophic materialism. It was Comte's contention that a survey of human history revealed three distinct stages of evolutionary development, from the theological and fictitious through the metaphysical and abstract to the scientific and positive. The nineteenth century had reached the last stage when men no longer sought for supernatural causes but remained content with a knowledge of facts. From his generalizations upon the evolution of modern society and the evolutionary processes which he perceived continued, he drew a number of fertile suggestions for social and political reform. Perhaps the most unique was his proposal that there be established a new religious cult in which humanity should be the object of worship. There was much of value in Comte's thought which inspired a number of nineteenth-century humanitarians and intellectuals, notably John Stuart Mill of England, to give serious consideration to problems of social reform.

The other great advance in sociological studies followed from the development of the statistical method in the later half of the nineteenth century. Inaugurated by Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882) of France, this soon outstripped Comte's synthetic method both in popularity and importance. The accumulation of evidence which this method of research produced very soon demonstrated that the "science" of society was much less simple than supposed, if, indeed, it were a science at all. Many of the springs of human conduct obstinately refused analysis and explanation. The fact remains, however, that sociological studies, even though they were compelled to throw off their scientific disguise, made enormous contributions to human happiness.

The parent of sociology, political science, likewise responded to the scientific stimuli of the nineteenth century. Beginning first with a Linnean approach, students of politics and government sought to list, define, and classify the various forms and manifestations of political life. Later, they employed the scientific method of observation and measurement. The pioneer in the latter and more fruitful field was the great French student, Alexis de Tocqueville, whose *Democracy in America* became the model for comparative studies in government. The doctrine of biological evolution provided a key to the evolution of political institutions, and the science of statistics made possible "atomic" studies of the body politic. The allied fields of economics, sociology, and history helped also to broaden the approach of political scientists who are now deeply conscious of the influences upon political life of the manifold economic and social forces of the contemporary era. As in sociology, it has been impossible for political science to claim complete objectivity, but it has made fruitful advances under the scientific impulse.

Economics remained largely a branch of metaphysics until the nineteenth century was well advanced, as the Classical School of economists clearly indicates. Made up basically of "laws" deduced from broad observations, it represented an attempt to fit the facts of economic life into a preconceived system of thought. An evolutionary approach to economic investigations, inaugurated by the German Historical School, and the introduction of statistical methods, greatly modified and enriched the field. With the application of these scientific tools, students of economics claimed their study as one of the more accurate social sciences. As with the rest of these so-called social sciences, the claim was premature. After the great depression began, the "laws" of economics were found to be in such a state of confusion that an attempt in the United States to summarize their major truths was abandoned as hopeless.

History, the foster parent of all the social studies, responded as fully to the ubiquitous touch of science. An early attempt to attain complete objectivity and reduce history to an unembellished accounting of facts, was made in Germany, under the influence of Barthold Georg Niebuhr and Leopold von Ranke. Claiming that truth was possible only after the most scrupulous and painstaking examination of evidence, this school of historians was content only with documentary investigations. This set definite limits upon their field of studies, since an abundance of precise documents was usually available for only political and military events of more remote periods.

Most historians of the nineteenth century fell under the spell of this school, and in their desire to be objective, ignored the importance of social and economic factors which were less easy to measure but no less important. The more recent trend has been away from this older conventional approach and has been marked by attempts to include every tributary of the stream of life in the story of history. This newer development has been maturing only within the last quarter of a century. Historians no longer make any pretense at complete objectivity which, in fact, is quite beyond possibility. Any study which treats of the human emotions can never wholly escape the subjective element. A complete treatment of all the other social sciences, such as the study of laws and human geography, would show that these, too, while aiming at ideal objectivity, have likewise failed to reach that goal. Far from condemning them, this merely indicates that limits have been found to the usefulness of the scientific approach.

It is perhaps well to observe, in passing, that the most important leavening agent among all social studies was the evolutionary hypothesis. No concept of nineteenth-century science exerted greater influence upon man's understanding of his origins, growth, and development. It completely revised his time concepts by carrying his life span back to obscure beginnings. It snatched him from his place among the angels and set him in the category of the beasts. Perhaps even more important, it enabled man to postulate a continuous human progress. All of the social sciences were permeated with these ideas, at least until into the twentieth century when there seemed less certainty of the processes of evolution and the finality of any of the sciences. So long as the Darwinian evolutionary hypothesis remained substantially unchallenged, it could serve to explain the most perplexing human problems and actions. Its common expression, "survival of the fittest," was translated in imperialistic sentimentalism as the "white man's burden"; it excused immoral diplomacy; it gave force to national patriotism; and it was made to defend rampant militarism. No published work, except the Bible, ever served as the authoritative excuse for so many things.

Nineteenth-century interest in humanity, reflected in the phenomenal growth of social studies, was likewise manifested in the development of education. Here, too, the most unique and important influence was science, ably supported by growing industrialization and noteworthy developments in the direction of democracy. Curricula were broadened to include more instruction in the vernacular,

the new social studies, technical and industrial subjects, and finally the natural sciences. Meanwhile, educational theory and practice kept step with the new evolutionary theories, made possible by the development of genetic psychology which emphasized the evolutionary development of the mind. This greatly furthered the work of Friedrich Froebel (1782-1852), who early in the nineteenth century introduced the kindergarten and established the first experimental school. The great advances in psychology, particularly child psychology, the establishment of psychological and educational laboratories, all reflected the growing interest of educators in the use of scientific methods for the improvement of education. As was to be expected in an age of industrial prosperity, the chief emphasis in education was placed upon its utility. Preoccupation with social and political problems in the contemporary period, however, has been shifting this to the creation of good citizens—good fascists in Italy, good nazis in Germany, good communists in Russia, and good democrats in democratic countries.

Without question, the influence of science which most distressed men was in the field of religious ideas. There had been a considerable growth of skepticism and atheism among the intellectuals of the eighteenth century, but this had hardly caused more than a ripple upon the surface. Indeed, deism and atheism were more than matched in 1800 by the spread of evangelical pietism, with Methodism well in the lead. During the first half of the nineteenth century, there was a noticeable quickening of religious fervor almost everywhere in western Europe, induced no doubt by disillusionment following the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, as well as by the searching of the common masses for some release from the drudgeries of industrial labor. Gradually, however, this was undermined by the achievements and growing popularity of science. The Darwinian hypothesis and materialistic philosophy which followed largely from it definitely turned the tide in the direction of agnosticism and paganism.

The first serious shock to established religious beliefs was produced by archeologists and anthropologists. The former produced evidence from the study of earth formations which revealed the inadequacy of the Biblical story of creation; the anthropologists by demonstrating the evolutionary growth of religious ideas, and especially the emergence of Judaistic and Christian doctrine from primitive folklore, made adherence to the doctrine of divine revelation difficult. These developments challenged the fundamental bases of

Christian doctrine and Biblical authority, and provoked a new scientific approach to Christian religious study. The most celebrated early examples of this were the critical, dispassionate examinations of the life and times of Jesus by David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874) of Germany and Ernest Emert Renan (1823-1892) of France. The former, an exponent of Darwinism, denied the inspiration of the New Testament, denounced miracles, and assailed the belief in a supernatural Christ. At the University of Tubingen, Strauss applied the newer sciences to all phases of Biblical study, creating thereby the Tubingen School of Higher Criticism which soon gained renown throughout the Christian world. Renan established no school but helped immensely in the popularization of the newer forms of criticism. After training for the priesthood, he developed an interest in science which he proceeded to use for a careful study of early Christianity. Extensive researches in Palestine convinced him that the Holy Scriptures and the body of Christian doctrine were evolutionary outgrowths of primitive mythology, and that Christ was an unhappy deluded man. These ideas were forcefully and subtly presented in his *Life of Jesus* (1863). The charm and lucidity of his style, together with the notoriety he gained as the result of his dismissal from a professorship by Napoleon III, gave his study of Jesus a wide reception. Strauss and Renan laid the foundations upon which subsequent Biblical criticism was built. The prestige of the Bible as an authoritative holy book thereafter steadily declined, until at present, by an ever increasing number, it is cherished chiefly for its literary merit and its moral teachings.

The most devastating effect of these critical studies of Christianity was upon the prevailing code of morals and ethics, representing the practical side of religion. Christian morality rested upon two commandments—"Love thy creator" and "Love thy brother," both of which derived their sanction and obligatory character from Biblical authority. When this was assailed and the concept of creation destroyed, the long established sanctions of morality disappeared as well. The problem of ethics became the difficult one of seeking new sanctions which would possess the force of command equal to those which had been displaced. In various forms, these have been sought chiefly in either one of two ways: (1) by appeal to Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative which bases morality upon innate conscience, or (2) by appeal to a naturalistic explanation, based upon practical necessity or the discoveries and teachings of science. The Utilitarians, for example, explained moral action as that which produces the great-

est good for the greatest number, while the protagonists of biological evolution believed moral instincts to be only accidental variations which, however, had been preserved by reason of their utility. None of these could lay claim to the same degree of authority possessed by existing Christian ethics, and it is significant to note that among a growing number of individuals a premium was placed upon success rather than upon adherence to moral law. The doctrine of the survival of the fittest, emphasizing survival qualities, had seriously undermined the moral code.

All institutional religions were challenged by these influences, were compelled to take an accounting of their doctrines, and finally forced to adapt themselves to the new ideas and conditions of life. Protestantism, in particular, was severely shaken. Divided into a variety of warring sects, the number of which continued actually to increase, it lacked the strength of centralized control which helped Catholicism to weather the storm. It was further weakened by the fact that it had derived its authority, since the days of the Reformers, from the word of God as revealed in the Bible. The new Higher Criticism loosened Protestantism from this comfortable mooring. Perhaps even more damaging was the fact that its appeal to independent judgment and individual conscience deprived it of an effective means of retaining its membership. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century there was a noticeable diminution in church attendance and a disconcerting growth of godlessness, especially in urban communities.

In an effort to meet this situation, particularly the challenge of the evolutionary doctrine, the Protestant churches divided into two opposing camps. One group, known as the fundamentalists, sought to save religion by denying completely the validity of science and asserting the literal truth of the Biblical explanation. The other, the modernists, sought to achieve the same end by assimilating the discoveries and teachings of science. The fury of the early conflict between these two Protestant schools has vanished although the division persists in many places, but the tendency seems to be steadily in the direction of moderation and compromise.

The Catholic Church was not immune from the same disruptive forces, but it was better able to meet them. As the greatest bulwark of conservatism and authority in Europe, it was inevitably met with opposition from liberals of all stamps: political, social, and intellectual. It was regarded, even in many Catholic countries, as the enemy of nationalism, freedom, and progress, and it was the bugaboo of most

champions of liberty. This is the reason Catholicism was compelled to fight its hardest battle, paradoxically enough, in its own fortress, the Latin countries of southern Europe. In an effort to destroy its enemies, it made futile attempts to stem the tide of democracy and stifle freedom of speech and the press. Its most serious problem, however, came not from political and social liberalism, but from its clash with the theories and claims of science.

Pope Pius IX (1846-1878) chose to meet this threat by closing the ranks of Catholicism, by reasserting and reinvigorating established dogma, and by discouraging the study of the sciences. This was the same procedure the Church had used at the Council of Trent to gird itself for defense against advancing Protestantism. In 1864, the Pope issued a famous encyclical, *Quanta Cura*, in which he pled for a return to the earlier ideal of the Christian Church, and scored the modern tendencies toward liberalism and secularization. This vigorous and sweeping attack upon "abuses" was supplemented by the even more famous *Syllabus of Errors*, in which were reproduced all the doctrines and ideas which he condemned. So expansive in scope was this denunciation that it left nothing and no one out, from free thinking and Free Thinkers to rationalists, Freemasons, and indifferent persons. The *Syllabus* aroused indignation among Catholics and non-Catholics and probably helped to arouse popular interest in intellectual liberalism, rather than to stifle it. Shortly after the *Syllabus* had been issued, the first church council in three hundred years assembled at the Vatican to discuss important Church problems, particularly modernism. By far its most sensational act was the definition of papal infallibility. Like the *Syllabus*, this was widely regarded as a reversion to medievalism and was made the excuse for further attacks upon the Church.

Pius IX fought a valiant but losing battle which his gifted, erudite successor, Leo XIII (1878-1903), saw no object in continuing. While adhering strictly to established doctrine, Leo showed an unexpected tolerance toward science and modern scholarship. He granted greater privileges in the Vatican Library to students, erected a personal observatory, and employed a personal staff of scientists. The conflict between science and the Catholic Church consequently became less violent. Meanwhile, Leo turned his attention and that of the Catholic world to the fruitful field of social reform. In a famous encyclical, *Rerum Novarum* (1891), he placed the Church definitely on the side of labor, which he hoped to protect both against the "economic royalists" and the Marxian Socialists. He defended property and the

family, but insisted that the workingman must be given a living wage. Frequently called the charter of Catholic Socialism, this encyclical earned for its author the title of "the workingman's Pope." By bringing the Church into line with the major problems of life, Leo did much to restore its power and influence. Under his successor, Pius X (1903-1914), the Church was strong enough to crush the few attempts made to introduce modernism.

The Jewish religion followed a course roughly comparable with the Protestant, dividing into fundamentalist (orthodox) and modernist (reformed) factions. Before the end of the nineteenth century, the latter group had greatly outstripped the former among the educated Jews. Jews suffered severely from a revival of anti-Semitism which drew its strength from rampant nationalism and excused itself by reference to science. National pseudo-scientists sought to establish the fact that Jews were aliens, characterized by internationalism, selfishness, and cowardice. Preposterous as these arguments may appear, they nevertheless served as the defense of many widespread discriminations against the Jews, especially in Russia and Rumania. After 1933 they were given the authoritative support of the Nazi regime in Germany. It was as the result of this anti-Semitism that a nationalistic movement, Zionism, took root among the Jewish people. Founded in 1897 by a Hungarian Jew, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), Zionism gained enthusiastic support and eventually made possible the restoration of Palestine to the Jews under British protection at the end of the World War.

In all churches there has been a deliberate movement toward socialization during the last quarter of a century. Greater emphasis has been placed upon social obligation than upon conversion. One of the most striking signs of this trend is the church's attempt through secular entertainments to attract and keep its membership. This has been particularly noticeable in Protestant and Jewish Churches, but has not been absent in the Catholic Church. Perhaps the necessity for socializing the church has been due less to a universal skepticism than to the fact that it has had to compete with other agencies which have appealed more to the human appetite for pleasure. The church can no longer claim to be the center of community social life.

Among the very recent developments which challenge institutional religion has been the growth of the totalitarian state. Even more than pre-war nationalism, this newer manifestation has taken on many of the attributes of religion, with myths, dogma, and claims

upon the whole life of man. Fascism in Italy, nazism in Germany, and communism in Russia, despite their differences, are all alike in this respect. In the case of communism, in particular, deliberate attempts have been made to discourage all institutionalized religion.

Despite these many anti-religious tendencies, church membership has not diminished, nor has the general interest in religion passed. Indeed, since science has become less certain of its "truths," an increasingly large number of intellectuals have returned to religion in their proverbial quest for reality. The conflict between science and religion, much less bitter now than half a century ago, gives promise of disappearing. This is due partly to the fact that religion has stripped itself of many useless excrescences, and partly to the general realization that there is much which science has not explained and perhaps never can. Within the last decade, a number of distinguished scientists, such as Sir James Jeans and A. S. Eddington, have entered the lists in defense of religion. It is likely that some of the revived interest has been a natural reaction against the widespread unrest and despair which prevailed in the post-war years. This would help to explain its appearance among the masses who have had no occasion or no opportunity to learn of the doubts of science.

C. In quest of beauty and reality

The process by which thought and ideas are mosaically fashioned from the total experiences of an age is admirably exemplified in the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature and art. Each of the momentous changes of life which flowed from the acceleration of industry, the phenomenal conquests of science, and political revolutions, stamped its impression upon the forms of human expression, which had already been molded and continued to be deeply influenced by the accumulated experience of the past. No era could boast a greater variety of tributaries to the stream of culture, and by the same token, no age could lay claim to greater confusion and less uniformity. While it is possible to trace out the contributions of any one influence to a limited extent, it is really impossible to follow closely the irregular course of the main stream of thought. Therefore, any attempt to catalogue the cultural manifestations of modern times must be more arbitrary than accurate. Broadly speaking, it may be said that there have appeared three fairly distinct movements, usually designated as Romanticism, Realism, and Naturalism. These cannot be neatly separated, although in a general way they seem to represent

a steady progression from metaphysical abstraction to scientific realism, and from profound self-confidence to equally profound disillusionment.

The Romantic movement which dominated literature and art during the first half of the nineteenth century was, in its beginning, primarily a reaction against eighteenth-century rationalism. Intellectuals of the Enlightenment had assumed that man was primarily a rational being, anxious to establish a perfect order by effacing his past and building anew from reason. Ignoring the vagaries of the human mind and the powerful force of human emotions, they erroneously believed that society, like nature, might be made to respond to mathematical law. To a considerable extent these ideas became embodied in the ideology of the French Revolution, whose failings, in consequence, came to be identified with the weaknesses of the Enlightenment. All that many saw in the Revolution was indiscriminate bloodletting which disturbed peace and security by embroiling the whole of Europe in war for a quarter of a century. It was out of this sense of defeat and disillusionment that Romanticism drew its strength.

The metaphysical groundwork of Romanticism was prepared by Jean Jacques Rousseau and the structure was completed by the German "idealists" Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Protesting against the rationalism of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists, Rousseau asserted the freedom of the individual will and extolled the "natural man," who, breaking from confining conventions, allows his passions and emotions to assert themselves. His famous novel, *Emile* (1762), written in this vein, exerted a powerful influence and marked the beginning of the Romantic attempt to emphasize emotion and sentiment rather than reason. Kant incorporated much of Rousseau's thought, and made it the basis for his moral philosophy, which in turn, constituted the spring from which most romanticists drew their metaphysical inspiration. While agreeing that science reveals everything, including the individual, as objective reality, Kant emphasized the independent reality of "self." This "self," responsible for its own actions, possesses also a creative faculty by which it constructs the world of objective reality around ends and purposes. The world thus was to Kant, still somewhat uncertainly, the creation of the individual.

In the hands of Fichte, Kant's concept of the individual took on a richer and fuller meaning. Fichte regarded the world of movement and sensation as real only to the extent to which the individual self

constructs and organizes it for his own actions. In the broadest sense, Fichte conceived the physical world as the construction of *Absolute Self*, of which each individual was simply a part, a finite manifestation. The only real world, then, is the one created by the activity of the individual. Hegel subscribed generally to the thought of Fichte, whom he succeeded at the University of Berlin, but devoted his attention to resolving the apparent conflict between material reality and the reality manifested in self. He perceived the world of experience as one of contradictions and conflicts, out of which self reconstructs a new synthesis, through a process of dialectics. In one sense, this was merely a way of describing the evolutionary growth of human ideas. What Hegel, as well as Fichte and Kant, sought to do, was to raise up the individual as independent reality, not only beyond the scope of natural laws, but actually the creator of them. This was a complete reversal of the emphasis of the rationalists and fitted in with the general searching for an escape from the Revolutionary period.

Despite the seeming paradox, Romanticist philosophy was the philosophy of political reaction rather than of personal freedom. This was especially true of the German "idealist" school, which tended to identify the absolute state with the absolute self. Hegel, particularly, extolled tradition and espoused Prussian absolutism. In a measure, this was true of all romanticists who were drawn, by their aversion to revolutionary rationalism, to the past which they endowed with unmerited perfection. However, Romanticism was never consistent, and sometimes championed liberty and democracy. Everywhere it was the exponent of nationalism, and of national independence.

The literary aspect of Romanticism, despite national and local variations, was characterized chiefly by love of fields and country, revolt against conventional ethics, emotional sentimentality, deep interest in history, and widespread opposition to classicism, both in theme and style. Every student can call to mind evidence of this from his studies of the great English romantic poets, particularly Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Keats, Browning, and Tennyson. In the field of the novel, Sir Walter Scott emphasized in romantic vein the virtue and glamor of medieval life, while his perhaps more famous successors, Thackeray and Dickens, wrote sentimentally, or critically, of contemporary social problems. Though generally less well known to American students, poetry, drama, and the novel in continental Europe took on much the same appearance. Probably the greatest

masterpiece of romantic literature as well as the greatest drama in the German language, was *Faust*, completed by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) shortly before his death. In like manner Johann Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805) compiled a variety of romantic historical dramas, of which his *Wilhelm Tell* is probably the best known, while Ernst Moritz Arndt (1769-1860) stirred the patriotic fervor of his countrymen, and Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) and Ludwig Uhland (1787-1862) composed charming, witty, and satirical studies of their folkways.

After England and Germany, Russia produced the richest romantic literature of the era. Introduced by the dominating figure of her literary history, Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837), whose poetry and drama (especially *Boris Godunov*) sang the glories of Russia, Romanticism flourished in the works of Nikolai Gogol (1809-1852), Ivan Turgenev (1818-1883), and Fedor Dostoevski (1821-1881) whose keen interest in the Russian masses was reflected in their masterpieces, *Dead Souls*, *Fathers and Children*, and *Crime and Punishment*. In the Latin Countries, eighteenth-century classical influences long persisted, and not until the nineteenth century was well advanced did romantic tendencies predominate. The French school, by far the most important, ranged the whole field of romantic interests. Victor Hugo (1802-1885) was, in a sense, the Walter Scott of France, whose fame derived more from his historical romances than from the drama, in which he aimed to excel. *Les Miserables* is perhaps his best-known work. Alexandre Dumas, *fils* (1802-1870), even more prolific than Hugo, is renowned chiefly for *The Three Musketeers*. The Charles Dickens of France was Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850) who devoted his extraordinary genius to exposing and satirizing the vices and weaknesses of the bourgeoisie in his extensive *Human Comedy*.

Spanish literature was largely barren during this period, but in Italy romanticism developed into a strong literature, heavily tinged with popular aspirations for national unity. The leading figures were Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837) in poetry, and Alessandro Manzoni (1785-1873) in prose. The latter's *I Promessi Sposi* (*The Betrothed*) is, indeed, one of the best romantic novels of the era.

Among the fine arts, painting was the most completely romantic. In many quarters the vogue of classicism continued, but the major tendencies were revolutionary. Greater emphasis was placed upon landscapes and nature painting, in which two Englishmen, John Constable (1776-1837) and Joseph Turner (1775-1851), set the pace.

After these, probably the most important landscape artist was Jean Baptiste Corot (1796-1875) who inspired a school of landscape painting, known as the Barbizon School.[1] Besides the sentimental return to nature which these reflected, there was likewise a notable increase in historical paintings, inspired by the revived interest in the past, and by the rapid development of nationalism. Scarcely a public building in western Europe can claim to have escaped at least one canvas vaunting the "national spirit." The best-known painter to devote his energies to such subjects was the Frenchman, Meissonier (1815-1891). One of the most interesting manifestations of revolutionary tendencies in romantic painting was the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood of England. Composed of four artists (Dante Gabriel Rossetti, Burne-Jones, William Holman Hunt, and William Morris), who protested against the ugliness of their age, this group endeavored to escape stilted classical forms by turning to the early Italian renaissance artists for guidance. Their inspiration, like their technique, was largely medieval.

The Pre-Raphaelites reflected in painting the direction of most of the newer developments of architecture. Before 1830, the predominant influence was classical, but this gradually gave way before a revived interest in the Gothic. The "Gothic revival" in architecture was due in part to the work of Augustus Pugin (1812-1852) of England, but even more to the impassioned defense of the Gothic by John Ruskin (1819-1900), the dominating and domineering English critic of art. Most popular in England, where it is well exemplified in the national courts of London, it had its ardent exponents also in the remainder of Europe. The Sainte Clothilde of Paris and the Votivkirche of Vienna are splendid examples. For the most part, however, extreme Gothic was avoided but adaptations of it were used to modify the classical. This produced a form roughly comparable to that of the very early Italian renaissance, which has been given the name of eclectic classical.

Sculpture, more romanticist than architecture, was very popular, due to a combination of circumstances, among which the most important were nationalism, which inspired the creation of a vast number of memorials in stone, and industrial prosperity, which enabled the *nouveaux riches* to patronize this as well as the other fine arts. Geniuses, however, were few among the sculptors.

Music was the most thoroughly romantic of all the arts, and for the first half of the nineteenth century attained a richness and gran-

[1] So called from the town of Barbizon on the edge of the Fontainebleau wood.

deur it had never before enjoyed. A variety of new instruments and the perfection of many others contributed greatly to this end, as did also the increasing number of music's patrons. In the field of symphonic music, the quantity of genius which appeared is almost staggering.[1] For piano music alone, Franz Liszt (1811-1886) and Frédéric Chopin (1810-1849) were the dominating figures. The newest and most characteristic musical development of the era was the opera, in which the two leading personalities were Richard Wagner (1813-1883) of Germany and Giuseppe Verdi (1818-1901) of Italy. The opera in particular became the medium for the expression of nationalism and emotion, as manifested in Wagner's *Ring*[2] and Verdi's *Rigoletto* and *Trovatore*, although symphonic music reflected the same tendencies.

Romanticism dominated literature and the arts for more than the first half of the nineteenth century and, in many quarters, continued to flourish well beyond that time. Gradually, however, it was overshadowed by a newer movement, known as Realism, which derived its inspiration chiefly from the popularization of science, materialist philosophy, and the growing social consciousness of the industrial age. Like Romanticism, Realism ranged the whole field of human interests and manifested itself in an infinite variety of ways. In general, however, all Realists sought escape from sentimentalism. They analyzed the passions and psychoanalyzed man, they showed a deep concern for problems of the family and the factory, and, like the scientists, they were painstakingly careful of detail, both in form and expression.

Realist literature flowered first in France among a group of distinguished novelists, beginning with Gustav Flaubert's (1821-1880) *Madame Bovary*, a candid study of marital infidelity which shocked the smug bourgeoisie of the sixties. In much the same manner Guy de Maupassant (1850-1893) wrote his penetrating, analytical short stories which won him wide renown. Émile Zola (1840-1902), a prolific if less talented realist, devoted himself chiefly to the cause of social reform which he furthered considerably. The greatest of all realists was Jacques Thibault (1844-1924), better known as Anatole

[1] The following were the leading composers of orchestral music. Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827), Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy (1809-1847), Robert Schumann (1810-1856), Franz Schubert (1797-1828), Johannes Brahms (1833-1897), Charles Saint-Saens (1835-1921), Jules Massenet (1842-1912), Alexander Borodin (1834-1887), M. P. Moussorgsky (1839-1881), Peter Ilitch Tschaikovsky (1840-1893), and Nicolai Rimsky-Korsakov (1844-1908).

[2] The *Ring* cycle, drawn from the legend of the Nibelungen, is composed of four operas: *Rheingold*, the *Valkyrie*, *Siegfried*, and the *Twilight of the Gods*.

France. Witty, satiric, skeptic, Anatole France took pleasure in pitilessly exposing the fundamental weaknesses of human nature. Since Voltaire, whom he much resembled, no one so completely dominated the world of literature.

Much like Anatole France, with the same iconoclasm but with less subtlety, was Samuel Butler (1835-1902) of England. His opposition to Christian doctrine, his pessimism, and his revolt against what he construed to be the emptiness of his age, found best expression in his autobiographical *The Way of All Flesh*. Among the English novelists contemporary with Butler, two of the most famous Realists were George Meredith (1829-1909) and Thomas Hardy (1840-1928). The former was chiefly renowned for his psychological analyses of character, as in *Diana of the Crossways;* while the latter pursued the fatal working out of the struggle for existence, as in his *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*. Even more "scientific" were the early romances of Herbert George (H. G.) Wells (1866-), scientist turned novelist. George Bernard Shaw (1856-) in the field of the drama was the British social realist who, in many of his early plays, dealt with all types of social problems in entertaining, ironical fashion.

In northern Europe, the most distinguished realist was Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906), Norwegian by birth but German by choice. His world-famous dramas, such as *An Enemy of the People*, were merciless denunciations of social evils. German literature was deeply influenced by Ibsen's example but, except for Gerhart Hauptmann (1862-), few writers attained international distinction. Among the Russians, Count Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) was the towering genius, although in later life his work merged with developing tendencies toward anarchism and mysticism. Anton Chekhov (1860-1904) and Maxim Gorky (1868-1936) were more definitely Realist, the former manifesting a keen interest in psychological analysis, and the latter depicting peasant life and espousing revolutionary social reforms. The greatest Italian Realist was the playwright, Luigi Pirandello (1867-1936), a profound pessimist who had faith in nothing except individual personality.

Coexisting with scientific and social Realism were a variety of other literary "schools" compounded of Romanticism and Realism, and demonstrating the many diverse tendencies of modern thought. Especially noteworthy among these were the mystics who, in style or in theme, sought to give expression to the mysterious and unusual. Sometimes philosophical, in search of ultimate realities, as in Tolstoy's

Resurrection; sometimes fantastic, with excursions into the dream world of spirit, as in the plays of Maurice Maeterlinck (1862-); Mysticism also was purely stylistic, seeking emotional effect by word painting and by the use of the esoteric. In its latter form this movement has been known as Impressionism and Symbolism, and is best exemplified by Oscar Wilde (1856-1900), Walter Pater (1839-1894), and Algernon Swinburne (1837-1909) of England; and by Stephané Mallarmé (1842-1898) and Paul Verlaine (1844-1896) of France. This Mysticism was occasioned by growing doubts of science and by the introduction of oriental culture.

Along with Mysticism there developed also a strong nationalistic literature, deeply permeated with the romanticist penchant for folklore and "national spirit," and, at the same time, characterized by the use of science or pseudo-science in the defense and emulation of patriotism. By far the best-known member of this school in the English-speaking world was Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936), the poet of imperialism. In France, Maurice Barrès (1862-1923), in the spirit of Nietzsche, extolled the national "will" and defended the doctrine of national self-sufficiency in his famous trilogy, *The Romance of National Energy*. Giosuè Carducci (1836-1907) and Gabriele D'Annunzio (1864-1938) were the poets of modern Italian nationalism. Both championed expansion and the annexation of the "irredentist" provinces. D'Annunzio, in particular, was devoted to the philosophy of Nietzsche, whose doctrine of the "will to power" became the theme of his many poems and plays. All literature in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was, in fact, deeply imbued with the spirit of nationalism.

Among the fine arts, music continued to follow the romantic tradition and made the least response to the major realist tendencies of the era. This is hardly to be wondered at since most of the great composers of the earlier period spanned the realist age as well, and since the impetus which they gave to musical development had not spent its force. Music continued, therefore, to be chiefly patriotic and sentimental. In some quarters, however, there were evidences of reaction against accepted forms and efforts were made to introduce the realistic or impressionistic ideals of literature. Rimsky-Korsakov experimented with newer forms of expression in his *Coq d'Or,* and Richard Strauss (1864-) of Vienna, a close student of Nietzsche, sought to portray the latter's ideas in some of his compositions. The most important innovator, however, was Claude Debussy (1862-1918), who determined to break with convention both in theme and tech-

nique. His *Pelléas et Mélisande*, based upon Maeterlinck's play of the same name, attained originality through a novel use of scales and dissonances.

As music was the least, so painting was the most, realistic of the fine arts. In its beginnings, realistic painting was essentially a technical revolt against the lingering traditions and conventionalities of both classicism and romanticism. Deeply influenced by oriental art, with its emphasis upon detail, and by the technique of Velasquez and the Dutch Renaissance artists whom they studied, the new school of painters aimed at more accurate representation of light and atmosphere. They scorned religious and allegorical subjects and turned from the studio to the world about them, aiming to depict it with photographic accuracy. Impressionism, as this is commonly called, therefore bore a close resemblance to the atomizing tendencies of both the natural and social sciences.

The foremost innovator of impressionism was Edouard Manet (1832-1883) of France. Well-educated, well-bred, and as meticulous in the routine of life as he was in painting, Manet developed a technique of conveying sharp and accurate impressions of nature. He substituted flat for sculpturally modeled forms, used few shadows, and built up his object in a mosaic pattern of tones which the spectator blended for himself. These principles became the guide for a school of Impressionists which included, among its distinguished members, Claude Monet (1840-1926) and Auguste Renoir (1841-1919) of France, and James McNeill Whistler (1834-1903), an American-born artist who spent his life in England. These successors of Manet were chiefly concerned with an accurate representation of bright light, local color, and shadows, in which they perceived coloring. Using first bright pigments, and then introducing complementary colors into shadows, they eventually treated the whole subject by patches of pigment. Although meeting at first with abuse and ridicule, this technique made possible a more colorful recording of nature. It likewise offered an excuse for the primitive distortions of color and form so characteristic of the two least stable impressionists, Paul Gauguin (1848-1903) and Vincent Van Gogh (1853-1890).

Building from impressionism but avoiding its extremes, Paul Cézanne (1839-1906), considered by many as the most talented artist of the nineteenth century, aimed "to make out of Impressionism something . . . solid and durable. . . ." Instead of portraying nature by patches of pure pigment which tended to destroy local color and



Courtesy of The Art Institute of Chicago
(Mr. and Mrs. M. A. Ryerson Collection)

WESTMINSTER, BY CLAUDE MONET (1840-1926).

This is an example of the impressionist painting of atmosphere. Monet is known for his pastel tones, with the broken colors giving a shimmering light to his pictures.

the structure of the object, Cézanne sought to unite form and color by meticulous blending of tones to conform with the planes of light and color into which he perceived the object was broken. Although not appreciated in his own day, it was this technique which began the vogue of "geometric" art.

One of the most unique and interesting arts of this age of realism was that of caricature, made popular by the widespread development of the public press. The first, and certainly one of the greatest caricaturists, was Honoré Daumier (1808-1879), an unhappy French artist who was not held in high regard by his contemporaries. His characterizations of royalty, the bourgeoisie, and the government were extraordinarily incisive. Among those who followed in the course he had so ably begun, the most famous were Jean Louis Forain (1852-1931) of France, and John Tenniel (1820-1914) who was affiliated with *Punch* for more than a half century.

Courtesy of the Syracuse University Library

STILL LIFE WITH PLASTER CUPID. BY PAUL CÉZANNE (1839-1906).

With his original genius, Cézanne strove to make each painting a living entity, whether landscape, figure, or still life. In this work the planes of light in the background screen foreshadow the cubist mode.

Sculpture continued to be largely patriotic and romantic, although in the late nineteenth century there was a noticeable attempt to break from tradition by returning to "primitive" form or by introducing the newer biological and psychological concepts. Probably the most influential sculptor, chiefly influenced by this latter tendency, was the Frenchman, Auguste Rodin (1840-1917). His *Thinker* and *The Man with the Broken Nose* are among the most notable examples of his romantic "realism."

Architecture was being prepared for a significant transformation. The enormous growth of industry and the increasing urbanization of life introduced architectural problems which classical and even eclectic classical techniques could not solve. At the same time, there was made available to architects a great variety of new structural materials such as steel and concrete, which permitted and even required revolutionary treatment. It was from this combination of modern needs and new materials that "functionalism" was born. Aiming at the adaptation of the structure to its environment and use, architects experimented with materials and forms most appropriate for an industrial, urban civilization. The development of reinforced concrete was perhaps the most notable result. The classical and eclectic classical traditions, however, were too strong in Europe to allow the new mode to become immediately popular. It was in the United States that "functionalism" was first widely adopted.

It is always difficult to evaluate contemporary developments since ideal detachment is more than usually difficult to attain. Least of all, can one hope to speak with certainty of modern cultural trends, even though in certain respects these seem reasonably clear. Everywhere it is apparent that classical, romantic, and realistic influences continue, but the pervading optimism which formerly characterized most of these seems to have passed. At the same time there appears to be

under way a marked return to the mystical and the spiritual, perhaps as a reaction against pessimism. These tendencies, diverse and seemingly contradictory, are doubtless the inevitable result of the disillusioning developments of the last quarter of a century. Science, to which dogmatic realists could always appeal, became quite uncertain of itself as Einstein, Planck, and Heisenberg revealed the inadequacy of its one-time "authoritative" laws and hypotheses. The nightmare of the World War engendered universal doubt as to the rationality of men and the "progress" of mankind, and hastened a general moral decline. Even more, the nineteenth-century faith in industry's ability to relieve humanity of drudgery and poverty vanished almost completely under the pressure of universal post-war distress. If there is a common thread running through the fabric of contemporary culture, that thread is disillusionment; and close by it is a universal searching for security.

Literature and art, despite their many "isms," seem to manifest clearly these general characteristics. One school of writers, represented by D. H. Lawrence (1885-1930), James Joyce (1882-1941), and Aldous Huxley (1894-) of Great Britain, and by Marcel Proust (1871-1922), and Romain Rolland (1866-) of France, by means of Freudian psychoanalysis, has sought to emphasize the influences of sex and animal passions. Outside the novel this method became popular with such literary biographers as Emil Ludwig and André Maurois. Whether purely analytical or designed to appeal to sublimated desires, this type of literature has been dominated by a fatalistic and altogether pessimistic tone. Scarcely less so are the works of those whose interests lie chiefly in the study of social phenomena. The more recent contributions of George Bernard Shaw (1856-) have manifested a feeling of helplessness in the face of seemingly insurmountable social obstacles, and even H. G. Wells, at least in his *Outline of History*, has turned pessimistic. John Galsworthy (1867-1933) in his *Forsyte Saga*, and Thomas Mann (1875-) in his *Buddenbrooks* depicted the decline of the bourgeoisie and, not without foreboding, envisioned the rise of the mediocre masses. Mysticism in literature has also continued to grow, accompanied by a variety of "fads" of which the most notorious is the attempt to achieve rhythmical and emotional effect by meaningless combinations of words and sounds. More significant has been the revival of literature with a deep religious tinge, mostly, but not wholly, Catholic. Chief among its exponents have been Hilaire Belloc

Courtesy of the Museum of Modern Art

KNEELING FIGURE. BY WILHELM LEHMBRUCK (1881-1919).

The dignity and grace of this attenuated figure make it one of the finest pieces of sculpture of our times.

(1870-) and Gilbert Chesterton (1874-1936) of England, Giovanni Papini (1881-) of Italy and Sigrid Undset (1882-) of Norway. Along with these varied literary movements, there has developed also a literature designed simply to please and to entertain. Sir James M. Barrie's plays, Hugh Walpole's and Joseph Conrad's novels, and Edmond Rostand's dramatic fantasies in verse, might properly be included within this category. John Masefield, the contemporary poet laureate of England, and a number of other litterateurs have for the most part continued the traditions of earlier realism.

In the fine arts there has appeared the same diversity. Music is now commonly divided into two categories: classical and modern. The former, appealing to more conservative tastes, continues to be inspired by the romanticism of a century ago; the latter, impetuous and ofttimes primitive, is attuned to the speed of mechanized contemporary life. Among the most famous modern composers of symphonic music is the Russian, Igor Stravinsky (1882-). Painting has been characterized by even more revolutionary tendencies. Henri Matisse (1869-) and Pablo Picasso (1881-) of France, proceeding with techniques introduced by the Impressionists and especially by Cézanne, have inspired a number of artistic "isms," of which the best known are Cubism, Futurism, and Surrealism. The first emphasizes geometric structure and form and is largely a study in method; Futurism seeks escape from all convention and emphasizes motion; Surrealism, equally unconventional, attempts to depict the dreams of the subconscious mind. All of them represent singular efforts to portray both the concrete and the abstract. So also with contemporary sculpture, in which the

Courtesy of the Solomon R. Guggenheim Collection

COMPOSITION BY FERNAND LÉGER (1881–)

In this oil painting the French Expressionist-Cubist uses his abstract conception of a mechanical element to interpret the force and speed of the modern world.

most distinctive achievements have been the development of new techniques to attain greater abstraction. Among the greatest, and certainly the most prolific of the contemporary sculptors, is Jacob Epstein, an English artist of American-Jewish extraction. His unique treatment of bronze and his distinct creative faculties have won him wide distinction. Following the World War, functionalism in architecture attained an extensive popularity, particularly in Germany, Austria, and Russia, where socialist governments tried to solve difficult housing problems by constructing numerous community apartments in the new mode. The German, Erich Mendelssohn (1887-

), is the best-known contemporary exponent of functional architecture in Europe.

The preoccupation with the mystical and the abstract which characterizes much of contemporary literature and art would appear to represent one of the distinguishing features of modern culture. Idealist philosophy stemming from the German romantics has acquired popularity once more, while materialism has suffered a marked decline. Benedetto Croce (1866-), the distinguished Italian idealist, has forcefully reasserted the influence of "spiritual" forces in life and, since the beginning of the twentieth century, has affected thought profoundly. While springing from evolutionary biology, the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) has become equally abstract through its emphasis upon instinct and intuition. A number of distinguished scientists, as has already been remarked, have turned to spiritual explanations of the vital, yet scientifically inexplicable forces of life. Prominent thinkers give evidence of increasing mysticism and acceptance of psychic phenomena.



From "Europe Since Napoleon" by Palm and Graham, Courtesy of Ginn and Company, publishers

FRANZ LISZT

Franz Liszt (1811-1886), Hungarian piano-virtuoso, conductor, composer, and critic, was an exponent of romanticism in music. One of the first to champion program music and to use the *leitmotif*, or recurrent musical theme, in symphonies, Liszt's compositions were melodious if rather showy and their appeal was emotional and direct. This caricature is from a contemporary print.

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"The Lesser Breeds Without the Law"

A. "The White Man's Burden"

No other phase of European development has been as vital to the world as the expansions of European power and culture. The world we know is largely a product of those expansions. Our own culture is rooted and grounded in the European. So also, in varying degrees, are the cultures of Central and South America, Africa, Australasia, and Asia. New needs and circumstances have of course led us to diverge materially from the ways of Europe, but the fact remains that the history of Europe is the story of our ancestors, near or remote as the case may be. The statement is true also for the Canadian, the Brazilian, the South African, and the Australian among others.

The expansion of European peoples and the spread of their political power, their customs, their culture, and their ideals is an oft-repeated movement. Much of our story thus far has dealt with this phase of human growth and change. There have been, of course, climactic periods when the movement was unusually intense and vigorous. The Crusades which carried Christian culture into the regions of the Baltic, the Iberian Peninsula, and the eastern Mediterranean are cases in point. In modern times there have been three such periods of unusual activity, not of course separate and existing in a sort of vacuum but bound together by times of less vigorous expansion. The first overseas expansion began in the late fifteenth century. This was the period of the first great colonial empires when Portugal and Spain, then the Netherlands, France, and England won and lost immense transoceanic holdings.[1] Only the Dutch and the English still retain any large part of those first empires. The revolutions, political, economic, and intellectual, checked this stage and though some acquisi-

[1] See Chapter XVIII, part C.

tions were made[1] there was no further intense activity until about 1870. At that time there began a very strong movement which is known as imperialism with which this chapter will largely deal. Temporary satiation, the World War and its subsequent problems caused a short lull in expansion, but the last decade has seen a revival. Contemporary imperialism has included both overseas expansion such as that of Japan into China and Italy into Ethiopia and Albania, and expansion into contiguous territories like that of Germany into Austria and Czechoslovakia, or Russia into Outer Mongolia.

The term "imperialism," unknown before 1870 and little used until 1900, is today of ill-repute. Scholars dislike it because it has been too carelessly used; liberals are offended by its implications and by its association with war and totalitarianism. But it is a useful word, when properly understood, and it covers the fact that roughly half the world is subordinated to the other half. As used in this text, it means the attempts, successful or not, of materially progressive nations to attain political or economic supremacy, or both, over less advanced regions and peoples for the purposes of exploitation. That definition alone, however, needs to be clarified by the suggestion of some of the concrete meanings of imperialism.

To the conquered peoples, imperialism has meant many losses and some gains. Political freedom has been wholly or partly taken from them, and they have been subordinated to alien rule. Their economic independence has been lost also, and they have been forced to produce goods needed by an industrialized world. Their natural resources have been depleted and their labor has almost always been exploited, sometimes literally enslaved. Indigenous customs and culture have been submerged by European substitutes. Native religions have been forced to bow to Christianity and native codes of ethics have been supplanted by those of the white conquerors. Sometimes this has been beneficial but more often it has left the conquered peoples with no real code, native or alien, and it must be remembered that the natives have also learned such things as the hypocrisy of white diplomacy. Native arts and handicrafts have given way to machine-made goods imported from the conquering whites. White vices and diseases have also been imposed upon the conquered peoples to their permanent injury. But undoubtedly, the conquerors have raised the material standards of the peoples; taught them something of sanitation and hygiene; given them a trifle of education, which

[1] For example, Britain acquired South Africa and greatly expanded her possessions in India, and France annexed Algeria.

must often have rendered them unfit to live in native society; and brought them new goods and new services.

To the conquering peoples, imperialism has meant an increased prestige of empire and stirring but empty national glory. It has provided a larger quantity and a wider range of raw materials and an almost infinitesimal increase in markets for goods and capital to the notable benefit of a very few and to the cost of the rest. It has resulted in international ill-will; in an increase of militarism, navalism, and armaments; in accelerated nationalisms and jealous fears. It has been one of the causes of war. Navalism and militarism, wars of conquest, and protective occupations have been exceedingly expensive so that imperialism has meant huge increases in taxation and government borrowing. This, in turn, has limited the amounts to be spent on domestic social improvements such as public health and education. The growth of empires has vastly increased vulnerability and added to the far-flung responsibilities of the expanding nation. Imperialism, in short, has profited the few at the expense of the many.

Why, then, has it happened? What have been its motives? It is difficult to give a definitive answer. Imperialistic groups have customarily shrouded their real motives in veils of plausible excuses, and more confusing still, imperialism and emotionalism are twins. No force which operates mainly upon the emotions is wholly susceptible of rational explanation. One thing alone is sure: no one cause can explain a movement so complex. Motives have shifted with passing time, changing circumstances, and varying personalities.

The most frequently assigned motives are those dealing with the economic needs and aspirations of nations and groups. The popularity of this explanation is due partly to the influence of communist thinkers, who call imperialism the dying stage of finance capitalism, and partly to the fact that some economic motive or excuse is always discoverable. The vastly increased production brought by the Industrial Revolution resulted in an increasing demand first for raw materials with which to make goods, and then for a market in which to dispose of those goods. Coal, oil, rubber, iron, copper, manganese, tin, and many other minerals were constantly needed to supply the huge new factories. Mutual greeds and suspicions made many people feel that the only way to be sure of an adequate supply of these necessities was to own or control their sources. As nation after nation became industrialized, the competition for markets became feverish. The populations of Africa, and more especially of Asia, seemed the best possible answer to this need. Here again, many men accepted

the belief that trade follows the flag, and hastened to raise their national flag over as many "backward" peoples as possible. To a very limited extent their hopes were fulfilled, but the gains to the few were hardly worth what it cost the majority.

The population of Europe continued to grow rapidly, and the rising standard of living plus faulty distribution of purchasing power made it appear that Europe was overcrowded. New colonial possessions seemed to be the solution to this also, and many nations claimed that they were seeking an outlet for the pressure of the greater numbers. The new holdings did appeal to some among their citizenry, but, unhappily for the proponents of this means of relief, much of the land opened up was unfit for white habitation. Moreover, the older settled lands in North and South America proved more attractive to migrants than did even the best of colonies. Sometimes a sincere motive, the argument that new colonies were for the relief of overcrowding, was more often a cloak for some other aim.[1]

The Industrial Revolution also increased surplus capital in the various states, and, like trade goods, this wealth sought a market. The less advanced regions of the world offered an inviting opportunity for speculation. The building of railways and the exploitation of natural resources called for large sums of money which industrialized nations were eager to provide at a profit. Besides, many native potentates rapidly developed a lust for costly European luxuries. Since their incomes usually were too small to support such extravagances, they often mortgaged parts of their possessions to provide the wherewithal. Law and order, including the recognition and fulfillment of contractual obligations, were rarely a virtue of these "backward" regions so the governments of the creditors early developed the technique of armed intervention to protect the interests of their nationals. Because it has proved much easier to invade a debtor nation than to retreat from it, this practice has frequently led to permanent occupation and annexation.

The tremendous force of nationalism has often been one of the most powerful motives of imperialism. Because it can and has assumed so many and so various forms, this is a difficult motive to describe. It has masqueraded as love of country, jingoism, the "will-to-power," a superiority complex, and so on. Careful analysis, however, shows these to be merely different aspects of the one great force.

Patriotism, or love of country, may assume various forms, and

[1] Its most recent exponent is Hitler who demands more "room to live" (Lebensraum) for his people.

one of its manifestations is a greed for size. To extend the boundaries of one's native land, to bring thousands of acres and many peoples beneath one's national flag, has been the end and aim of some men. In a sense, this is a prestige motive, i.e., these men are moved by a belief that the biggest nation is perforce the best, and so, of course, they want theirs to be biggest. Sometimes the desire to rule over more peoples has had a very practical application. France has more than once expanded in order to increase her actual or potential man power.

Patriotism and national pride when carried to an extreme become "jingoism," a boastful aggressiveness. A people under the spell of this malevolent force have sometimes seized lands for which they had no use, simply to forestall their neighbors. Or, again, they have seized lands simply because their neighbors have done so and they feel under the necessity of keeping pace. The close relation between the jingoism motive and the prestige drive is obvious.

Some philosophers, notably the Germans, Nietzsche and von Treitschke, have sought to explain imperialism on the ground that nations and men are driven by a greed for power. This will-to-power, which they hold to be inherent in human nature, is expressed by dominating other peoples. A mechanistic, even fatalistic explanation, this tries to make of imperialism an inevitable expression of a basic human appetite. Other apologists for imperialism have also adhered to the theory of inevitability by speaking of the "expansionist urge of a mature state." This theory would likewise seek to make imperialism the work of an impersonal force.

One of the major motives which has carried white men to conquest has been their belief in their marked superiority. Perhaps a superiority complex is necessary for the continued existence of a nation; certainly it is found among all peoples. Sometimes it has given rise to the bald claim to supremacy as a fitting tribute to the superiority of the whites. More often, a sense of responsibility has been added, namely, that it was the duty of the superior whites to spread the blessings of their civilization. In one sense, it is really an expression of a belief in a biological superiority, and is, therefore, an offshoot of the theory of natural evolution. No one nation has had a monopoly upon this complex. Germany developed the Nordic and later the Aryan myths to support her claim that these "races" were destined by natural talents to be the rulers of the world. Public men in the United States have from time to time spoken grandiloquently of the "manifest destiny" which led us to conquer Indians and Spaniards, and appropriate their lands. Other imperialistic nations have also

known the feeling well, none more so than the British who had Rudyard Kipling, poet-herald of empire, to hymn it for them. It is a phrase from his famous "Recessional" (1897) which has given this chapter its title.

If, drunk with sight of power, we loose wild tongues that have not
Thee in awe,
Such boastings as the Gentiles use, or lesser breeds without the Law—
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget!

To Kipling, also, imperialists owe another much-used expression which has well accorded both with the feeling of superiority and with its concomitant, the missionary urge.

Take up the White Man's burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need,
To wait in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild—
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
Half-devil and half-child.[1]

The cynical disillusionment of the post-war years has made this phrase seem an empty boast and a supercilious mockery, but it was not that to those hundreds of men and women who fearlessly, devotedly, and selflessly gave of themselves to share what they held to be the truth. The sincere and honest desire to proselyte and to spread the Christian religion and western culture has been one of the consistently powerful driving forces in the expansion of Europe.

These various motives and excuses explain the actions of the empire-builders, those men who for personal or national profit and glory led their peoples along the pathways of conquest. But what of the average man? Why did he acquiesce in and frequently encourage a movement which cost him dear and returned him little? Why did he pay gladly with his sweat and blood for an empire in which his share was infinitesimal? Propaganda by interested groups is part of the answer. The man in the street was misled sometimes by deliberate intent, more often by the ignorant sincerity of his leaders who actually knew little more of the costs of imperialism than he did himself. Honor, glory, profit, and prestige were the dust thrown to blind his eyes. He reveled vicariously in the pomp and circumstance of empire,

[1] "The White Man's Burden," written in 1899.

and it gave him a badly needed chance to expand his little ego by feeling that he was a part of a great and powerful nation. True, some classes of labor shared slightly in the economic gains, but the most compelling reasons were those of emotion and sentiment.

B. Europe creates a yellow peril[1]

There existed in the Far East two nations, China and Japan, who were almost unaware of European power and pretensions until well into the nineteenth century. Although both had some slight trade relations with the West, both remained secluded, mysterious, and closed to all foreigners. Content as they were, they knew nothing of European civilization and cared less. It was European greed and ambitions which brought them into the orbit of western Powers, and if they eventually surpass their despoilers, as some expect them to, the West will have only itself to blame.

China was a vast empire claiming control of an area some three thousand miles long and three thousand miles wide. Her people were numbered in the hundreds of millions, and her potential resources were huge. So ancient was her culture, that, despite her ancestor worship, its very origins were forgotten. Head of the state was the emperor, the "Son of Heaven," and assisting him were numerous civil servants who won their places by passing examinations in the ancient classics of China. Self-sufficient, smugly complacent, China's contact with Europe was confined to supercilious, but profitable, relations with a few traders at the Portuguese factory of Macao, established in 1557, and at the port of Canton. Only one western power, Russia, had treaty relations with China. In their ignorance of the changing world, the Chinese regarded all foreigners as barbarians bearing tribute to the "Son of Heaven." They had not the slightest comprehension of either the culture or the might of the West.

Early Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch traders and missionaries had timorously approached the islands of Japan in the sixteenth century, and had found the Japanese people friendly and courteous. Cutthroat competition, both in trade and in religion, so disgusted the Japanese that they expelled all foreigners in 1638, and hermetically sealed themselves against western peoples and influences. Only the Dutch were allowed to trade there, and they were permitted to send only one ship each year. Shipwrecked whalers and other unfortunate

[1] The epithet, "The Yellow Peril," was popularized by Kaiser Wilhelm II.

mariners who landed upon Japanese shores were either coldly repulsed or promptly imprisoned.

The Japanese emperor, the *Mikado*, regarded as too sacred to profane himself with secular affairs, was hardly more than a worshipfully tended symbol. The actual ruler was the prime minister, or *shogun*. He was supported by the powerful and dominant warrior class (the *samurai*) who headed a rigid feudal caste system. The bulk of the population eked out a meager existence by intensive cultivation of the land. Japan was small and her resources scanty, but her population was eagerly and fanatically patriotic.

China's introduction to the dynamic civilization of the Occident came when she tried to shut off the trade in opium. British traders regarded this humanitarian action as an unwarranted violation of their rights, and the final, intolerable straw of Chinese interference with their business. The British government backed them up, and high-handed action by both parties led to the Opium War (1840-1842). The ancient classical culture of China was no match for the new industrial civilization of Britain. The Treaty of Nanking, which ended the war, gave Britain the island of Hong Kong, extracted an indemnity from China, and opened four new ports to European traders. China was made to promise that all European nations would be given equal trading rights, a principle later known as the "Open Door," and she further agreed to the establishment of a uniform tariff rate. This treaty was supplemented in the following year by a very important agreement which has become known as the "most favored nation clause." By it, China promised to extend to Great Britain any and all further trading concessions which might in the future be granted to other nations. This provision was later incorporated in most of the treaties signed by the western powers with both Japan and China. The United States and France quickly took advantage of these violations of Chinese sovereignty and exacted trade treaties. The American treaty, negotiated in 1843 by Caleb Cushing, contained the stipulation, known as the right of extraterritoriality, that American offenders in China should be tried not by Chinese officials and Chinese law but by American consuls and American law. This principle, which had long been practiced in the Levant, was necessitated by the vast difference between eastern and western legal concepts. Other nations soon extracted similar concessions from China.

China was not yet convinced by the superior military prowess of the "barbarians" and refused to abide by her treaties. It is only fair

to add that even if she had scrupulously executed her promises, it is highly probable that the western nations, by making new and more extensive demands, would have forced her to resist. The inevitable result of the Chinese action was a second war (1857-1860) in which France joined Great Britain against China. When China failed to observe the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), which opened the interior of the country to traders and missionaries, the allies invaded her and captured the imperial city of Peking. Beaten, but not humbled or even aware of her weakness, China signed the Treaty of Peking (1860) which ratified the previous treaty, reduced the tariff, guaranteed the toleration of Christianity, and permitted foreign ambassadors to reside in Peking. Great Britain, France, and the United States were the beneficiaries of these grants. Russia, meanwhile, had been pursuing her separate aim of acquiring an ice-free port on the Pacific. Under the skillful and aggressive guidance of Count Muraviev-Amurski, she forced China in 1858 and 1860 to cede to her the territory north and east of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. On the shores of a magnificent bay, Amurski founded a city, destined to become Russia's stronghold in the Far East. Significantly enough, the name he gave it was Vladivostok, meaning "Rule of the East."

The introduction of Japan to the ways of the West was effected by the United States. Increasing American commerce on the Pacific, plus the growing use of steam vessels, made it imperative for the United States to acquire coaling stations and supply ports in Far Eastern waters. Conscious of her increasing strength, the United States determined to force the opening of Japanese ports to American vessels. In 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry was sent with a small fleet to make a treaty with Japan. His instructions directed him to be courteous but firm, and authorized him to threaten the use of force if necessary. With four ships, he sailed into the inshore waters of Japan in July of 1853, and by combining skillful diplomacy with a judicious display of force succeeded in making preliminary arrangements. Six months later, he returned with an augmented force, and crowded the reluctant Japanese into signing a treaty. This treaty was only an unsatisfactory beginning, however. A much more significant one was negotiated in 1858 by the first American consul-general to Japan, Townsend Harris. The Harris treaty opened additional ports to trade, granted religious toleration to Americans, permitted the residence of an American diplomatic agent at the capital, and included both the most favored nation and the extraterritoriality

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PERRY'S FIRST LANDING AT GORAHAMA, JAPAN

Commodore Perry's name is closely associated with the opening up of Japan to the western world. The illustration above, from an old print, depicts the landing at Gorahama on the first (1853) of his two visits. American ships may be seen anchored in the background, while in the middleground Americans are going ashore.

clauses. The European nations followed the lead of Perry and Harris almost immediately.

The entrance of the Occidental Powers coincided with a period of crisis in the internal affairs of Japan, which was made more bitter by the new problem of whether or not Japan should be reformed on the western model. After a struggle, the reform party won, and a veritable revolution ensued. The *shogun* abdicated his power, and the *Mikado* reassumed imperial authority. The warrior class (*samurai*), some voluntarily and some under pressure, surrendered their privileges, and Japan, divesting herself of feudalism, embarked upon an astonishing process of westernization. Only the devotion of the Japanese people to their ruler made possible the almost miraculously rapid adoption of western, industrial civilization. The telegraph, the telephone, and the radio replaced older ways of communication. Railroads, steamships, automobiles, and airplanes speeded up transportation. Compulsory elementary education was introduced, and secondary schools and universities were soon developed. The army and navy were modernized with the aid of western teachers, and a constitution, modeled upon that of Prussia, was established. In the space of two generations, Japan transformed herself from a tiny hermit nation into an industrialized world power. Unhappily, she

adopted and adapted the Occidental vices as rapidly as the virtues, and has become one of the most vigorously aggressive, imperialistic nations of the world.

The two score of years following the opening of China and Japan witnessed further lessons administered to these two peoples by an aggressive West. In China, the slow disintegration of the authority of the Manchu emperors was hastened by numerous insurrections, and the Occidental powers took advantage of this inherent weakness to rearrange China more to their liking. The impotent Chinese, whose only really strong ruler was the able but ignorant Dowager Empress, were forced to establish a board of foreign affairs (the *Tsungli-Yamen*) and to receive foreign diplomats on terms of equality. Christian missionaries, both religious and medical, hastened to spread their own peculiar ideas and customs among the not overly eager Chinese. New trade concessions were demanded and granted, and contacts between the East and West increased although the Chinese people as a whole remained either hostile or indifferent to the newer civilization. In the north, Russia annexed a large portion of the Kuldja region, and in the south, France seized Cochin China, Annam, and Tongking. Great Britain, moved largely by a desire to forestall France and protect India, deprived China of Burma. Nevertheless, the great majority of the Chinese pursued their obscurantist ways with passive serenity.

Japan, a much more ready pupil, vigorously embraced the forces of nationalism and imperialism. As early as 1871, she intimated to the foreign nations that the time had come to abolish extraterritoriality and foreign control of her tariffs. Twenty years of agitation, plus her need for an ally against Russia, convinced Great Britain of the truth of this contention and arrangements were made which led to the granting of the Japanese demands by 1900. The other western Powers promptly accorded Japan the same recognition. Japanese imperialism, rooted in her need for natural resources and more land, was driven on both by her desire to be recognized as a great power and by her well-founded fear of Russia. Chinese weakness invited her no less than it did the western Powers, and war between the two eastern empires grew more likely with each passing year. Crux of the situation was the little kingdom of Korea, over which China claimed suzerainty. The covetous glances which Russia cast at Korea made Japan feel it a necessity of self-preservation that she control it. A rebellion there in 1894 led to a clash when both China and Japan sent troops to restore order. The western powers watched

with intent interests and some alarm as little Japan proceeded thoroughly to defeat the Chinese giant. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) which made Korea independent of China and gave Formosa, the Pescadores Islands and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, startled three western nations into action. Russia, Germany, and France joined to force Japan to give the peninsula back to China. The Sino-Japanese War and this tripartite intervention were pregnant with meaning. The rising sun of Japan cast long shadows over Asia and Europe. China had been proved defenseless; Japan a nation to be considered. Henceforth there was to be a new orientation of policies affecting the Far East: powerless China was to be prepared for dismemberment; Japan was to be admitted to the family of dominant Powers by an alliance with Great Britain in 1902.

China had become a battleground of European antagonists even before her defeat by Japan. Their mutual conquests of Chinese territory had brought France and Britain face to face on the southwestern borders of China in 1885. France sought to increase her power by building a political empire in the Far East; Britain strove to maintain her dominant commercial position in China. Neither considered China as anything but a pawn in their struggle. By a series of treaties in the late 1880's, France extorted numerous concessions from the Chinese. On the basis of the most-favored-nation clauses of her treaties, Britain tried to force China to extend the same concessions to her. This failed, and in 1894 she began the policy of wresting compensatory concessions from the luckless Chinese. Supported by her new ally, Russia, and emboldened by the Sino-Japanese War, France answered this "Battle of Concessions" in kind. The other European Powers hastened to grab whatever they could. Germany forced China to lease to her the region of Kiaochau in 1897. Russia promptly demanded and secured a long lease on the Liaotung Peninsula which they had helped take from Japan. Not to be outdone, France forcibly leased the area surrounding the Bay of Kwangchau, and Britain took over the port of Weihaiwei (1898). In addition to these land grabs, each of these nations staked off a "sphere of influence" in which she sought to gain a dominant or at least a preferential economic interest. These "spheres" really indicated the portions of China the powers intended to seize when the long anticipated dismemberment occurred. Only their mutual jealousies kept them from openly precipitating such an event.

The United States, whose interests in China were exclusively commercial and financial, looked askance at the efforts of the Euro-

pean powers to establish economic monopolies. With the blessing of Britain, the Secretary of State of the United States, John Hay, in 1899, asked the various Powers to promise to observe the "Open Door" in China. The Powers, who already accorded each other mutual recognition of their respective spheres, responded favorably, but their pledges remained of doubtful value. From then until 1913, the United States was an active participant in the affairs of China, less to protect the Chinese, however, than to further American commercial and financial interests. The armed forces of the United States joined in the suppression of the Boxer Rising (1900), American missionaries and individuals went to China in increasing numbers, and American bankers participated in various loans to China.

Western aggression had produced numerous anti-foreign outbreaks among the Chinese, but the climactic one was the Boxer Rising of 1900. The encroachments of the West had produced two schools of thought in China. One, headed by the emperor, believed in reforming China on the Occidental model so that she might become mistress of her own house. The other, led by the aged dowager empress, felt that China must strengthen her military forces to the same end. Accordingly, the empress was instrumental in developing local militia groups who became known as the Boxers. An abortive effort by the reform party to remodel China was cut short by the violent attacks of the Boxers upon all foreigners, culminating in the siege of the foreign legations at Peking. An international army relieved the legations, and looted the city. The humbled Chinese again were forced to punish the leaders of the Rising, pay a heavy indemnity, and give guarantees of future good behavior.

Both Japan and Russia took part in the action against China, although their own relations were rapidly approaching a crisis. Strengthened by her alliance with Britain, Japan was able to take a strong stand against Russian attempts to penetrate Korea, which she had earmarked for herself. Diplomatic protests having failed, the Japanese resorted suddenly to force, and attacked the Russian Far Eastern squadron off Port Arthur (February, 1904). The world watched with intense interest as the immense Russian war machine creaked into action against the cocksure midget. To the world's astonishment, the Japanese self-confidence was justified; she defeated Russia on land and sea. Then, almost exhausted by her effort and urged on by British bankers who feared the loss of money they had loaned her, Japan asked the United States to mediate for peace.

Russia, torn by the Revolution which the war had engendered, had little choice. The plenipotentiaries of the two Powers met in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to arrange terms. The treaty returned the Liaotung Peninsula and the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan, and recognized her supremacy in Korea. Verily the sun of Japan was rising.

The Japanese success greatly encouraged the nationalist reform party of China, and they pushed through extensive social and economic changes aimed at modernizing the empire. Political reform, however, did not keep pace with the agitation for it. A start was made, but at this crucial moment the old dowager empress died, leaving the throne to a baby emperor and an incompetent regent. The inevitable revolution broke out in west and central China in 1911, and rapidly spread to the southern provinces. These, under the guidance of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, declared their independence and set up a republic. The movement reached its climax in 1912 when a united Chinese republic was established. Sun Yat-sen resigned the presidency in favor of Yuan Shih-k'ai, last of the imperial premiers, in the vain hope that this would aid in the process of unification. Yuan, who favored the establishment of a strong executive, soon clashed with the liberal Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang) which wanted to make China a real democracy. Disorder and confusion, which outlasted Yuan's death in 1916, resulted in the rise of local war lords who became the real rulers of China. Despite this fundamental weakness and disunity, China entered the war against Germany in 1917 mainly in the hope that the subsequent peace would include the restoration of the lands and rights which had been taken from her. The Treaty of Versailles, which China refused to sign, blasted these dreams and assigned the former German area of Shantung to Japan who had taken it from Germany in 1914 and refused to return it to its original owner, China.[1] This led to an anti-foreign movement among the Chinese and to an effective boycott of Japanese goods. China refused to sign the Treaty and later made a separate peace with Germany. She also became a member of the League of Nations by accepting the Treaty of St. Germain. However, neither that membership nor the two Nine Power Pacts, one "guaranteeing" China's integrity and the other promising revision of tariffs and extraterritoriality, which resulted from the Washington Con-

[1] Shantung was returned to China in 1923 as a result of a Sino-Japanese treaty signed at the time of the Washington Conference. The area was again conquered by Japan in the war which began in July, 1937.

ference (1921-1922), gave any real benefit to China. Certainly they offered no protection against invasion and despoilment.

The history of China since the World War is a complex of domestic strife, party struggles, foreign complications and foreign invasions. Poverty, hardship and disillusionment rising from its shabby treatment at the hands of the Occidental Powers made China a fertile field for the seeds of communism which Soviet Russia eagerly sowed. The Kuomintang, which under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen had made itself master of the Canton area, enlisted the aid of Russia and of the Chinese communists in its struggle to unite the country and free it from foreign domination. This phase ended when Chiang Kai-shek, the general who rose to the leadership of the Nationalists after Sun's death in 1925, joined the anti-communist faction of the party. By 1928, most of the war lords who had been ruling China had submitted, and the Kuomintang set up a national government with its capital at Nanking. The Nanking government, by a series of treaties with the western States, won tariff autonomy and freed China from some of the extraterritorialities. Chiang Kai-shek's government was, however, weak and the Kuomintang divided against itself. War lords rose to contest with the Nanking government and with each other, communist insurrections flared out, and in 1931 a rival government was set up in Canton. The remainder of the story is intimately bound up with the expansion of Japan.

The World War came as manna from heaven to the Japanese. They declared war on Germany in August of 1914, and, in November of that year, captured and appropriated not only the German leased port of Tsingtao but also the German economic interests in the Shantung province. In January of 1915, Japan presented China with "Twenty-One Demands" which, if granted, would have guaranteed Japanese supremacy over large sections of her neighbor's land. Chinese resistance, and the fear of incurring too much odium among the western Powers, led Japan to modify her plans slightly. However, a series of treaties were extorted from China in 1915 which recognized the paramount economic interests of Japan in Shantung, southern Manchuria, and part of Mongolia. Alarmed by these and other evidences of Japanese imperialism, and faced with the prospect of a naval race among Japan, Great Britain and the United States, the latter Powers sought to call a halt. At the invitation of the United States, the Powers interested in the Far East met at a conference in Washington late in 1921. The tension was temporarily relieved by agreements which reduced the number of capital ships, built



MAP 34. EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE EMPIRES, 1914

or building, by forty percent, and limited future construction of capital ships and airplane carriers. Other treaties promised to maintain the status quo in the Pacific, and the Powers agreed to respect the independence of China.

It proved to be a transient settlement. The military clique soon rose to power in Japan and embarked their country on a policy of vigorous economic and territorial expansion. Japanese trade goods, low in cost largely because of the cheapness of labor in Japan, have found their way into the world's markets, frequently forcing out Occidental competitors. More dramatic has been the imperialistic advance of Japan into China. The first goal was Manchuria, rich in mineral resources and foodstuffs, populous enough to be a good market but roomy enough to permit colonization, and virtually independent of China. Steady economic penetration had won Japan almost sovereign rights in several sections of the country and China's difficulties in 1931 offered her a chance to gain full control. An "incident" in September was used as the excuse for a Japanese invasion which rapidly conquered Manchuria. The following spring, Manchuria, renamed Manchukuo, was declared "independent" under the regency of Henry Pu-yi. The rapidity with which the Japanese closed the "Open Door," among other things, soon made it almost painfully clear that Manchukuo was only a puppet state, ruled by Japan. Meanwhile, China had lodged a futile protest with the League of Nations and had resumed its boycott against Japan. The latter led directly to the attack and capture of Shanghai by the Japanese. Its ransom, which the Chinese paid, was the lifting of the boycott. Continuing expansion in and from Manchukuo next led to a further undeclared war on China which ended only when a provisional government of North China agreed to the establishment of a demilitarized, Japanese "protected" zone between China and Manchukuo (1933).[1] Japan had accomplished what her occidental tutors in imperialism had once hoped to do themselves.

C. Light in the Dark Continent

Africa occupies a unique place in the story of European development because, although it was one of the cradles of European civilization, it was also the last great land mass to be explored and colonized. The lands of northern Africa form part of the Mediter-

[1] The story of the continuing expansion of Japan into China after 1933 will be found in Chapter XXXII.

ranean basin and have lain within the orbit of European development since time immemorial. Early sailors in their halting search for the East, the later traders in their desire for profits, touched the eastern and western coasts, and Portuguese, Dutchmen, and finally Englishmen settled on the southernmost tip of the continent. Not until the nineteenth century, however, did any of them penetrate into the hinterland. The explanation of this seeming paradox lies in the geography of the continent. Africa is not an hospitable land. Its coast has few harbors, and its great rivers are not easily navigable by ocean-going vessels. Moreover, ranges of hills and mountains, which roughly parallel the coast, shut off the interior. Comparatively little of the continent is suitable for white habitation. The coastal plains are mostly too hot and much of the interior tableland is too arid. The great Sahara Desert in the north and the Kalahari Desert in the south form further barriers to penetration and use. In spite of these unattractive features, Africa has considerable resources. Agriculture is possible in some large areas and grazing in others. The mineral resources are valuable and important, and African slaves, ivory, and rubber have proved a powerful lure to white traders.

Numerous trading posts had been established along the coast as early as the sixteenth century, but the first real penetration of the continent began only with the British acquisition of South Africa in 1815. Prior to this, South Africa had been, first, a Dutch way station on the route to India and, later, a Dutch colony. The colonists, who were known as Boers, were not consulted when the change of ownership was made and they vigorously resented the advent of the British. This initial friction was rapidly aggravated by various unwise policies, and between 1835 and 1840 some ten thousand Boers migrated into the interior to escape British rule. After a series of clashes, two small independent Boer states, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, were set up in 1852 and 1854, respectively. The British continued to advance in that region, finally annexing the Transvaal in 1877, but, in the meantime, the chief scene of action had shifted to the northern coast.

French trade with the Mohammedan states of that area, which had lapsed during the Napoleonic period, slowly revived after 1815. This commercial recovery was hampered by the frequent depredation of the piratical rules of these so-called Barbary states. Count Polignac, minister of Charles X (1824-1830), sought to quiet political unrest in France and at the same time to restore French prestige

abroad by a war against these pirates. A pretext was soon found and, despite vigorous British protests, an expedition conquered Algiers in 1830. The new government of Louis Philippe accepted the conquest as a *fait accompli* and proceeded at very considerable expense to extend and consolidate the new French possession. After the Franco-Prussian War, France embarked upon a program of assimilation. Algeria was made an integral part of France, huge sums of money were invested in public improvements, and co-operation with the native population was strenuously and successfully furthered. Algeria has been France's most successful colony.

The ancient land of Egypt had long been subject to the attention of France and Great Britain. Both Louis XIV and Napoleon had planned its conquest, and the growing British interests in the East made Egypt increasingly more important to her. In theory, Egypt was a province of Turkey, but the chronic weakness of that empire prevented the exercise of any real authority. The meteoric rise of an Albanian soldier, Mehemet Ali, to the position of virtual sovereign of Egypt, increased the interests of Britain and France in that country. France supported Mehemet Ali, in the hope of winning the hegemony of the Levant by making him dependent upon her. Britain supported Turkey because she believed that a subservient Turkey was the best guaranty of her interests. The growing Red Sea trade, which was largely in British hands, became the immediate point of conflict. Mehemet Ali and the French revived an ancient scheme for a canal across the Isthmus of Suez. The British supported a railway from Alexandria to Suez as a counter-project. Eventually both were built, the latter under British auspices and the former under the ægis of France. Almost from the beginning the canal, which was the more important, became essentially a British venture, and after Disraeli purchased a large block of Suez Canal shares from the penniless Egyptian ruler, Ismail, in 1875, there was no question as to the real controller of the water route.

The financial condition of Egypt continued to grow steadily worse until finally in 1878, France and Great Britain felt themselves forced to assume control of Egyptian finances. This Dual Control lasted until an anti-European outbreak in 1882. The French drew back at the last moment, and a British army conquered Egypt in the process of restoring order. Reiterated promises to withdraw when the situation warranted eventually ceased to fool even the British themselves. The importance of Egypt to the British route to India, plus imperialistic conflicts in Africa, combined to guarantee

the continuance of British control. Moreover, as the vital importance of the Nile to the life of Egypt became increasingly apparent, the British were led to extend their control into the region of the Sudan.

The proximity of Tunis to Algeria and the financial and political chaos in the former made French expansion there likely if not inevitable. The establishment of French financial control in Tunis (1869) was so violently protested by Italy and Britain that joint control was substituted, and the Franco-Prussian War further delayed French action. When the Congress of Berlin (1878) was presented with the notice of the British acquisition of the island of Cyprus, Bismarck joined Disraeli in urging the French to find consolation in taking Tunis. Italy, uninformed as to this maneuver, tried to further her own ambitions in Tunis. Her purchase of a small railway there in 1880 stimulated the French government to action. The Bey of Tunis bowed to the superior force of the French, and Tunis became a French Protectorate (1881) to the intense but temporarily impotent anger of Italy. The French administration has been wise and successful, and the protectorate has paid its way in money and loyalty.

Late in the eighteenth century, hardy and ambitious European explorers began their perilous journeys into the heart of Africa. Close on their heels came traders and missionaries, and the nineteenth century saw the great continent opened to European exploitation. Some few of these hardy pioneers have attained a lasting fame, but the majority are today forgotten. Easily the most famous among them were the Englishman, David Livingstone (1813-1873); the Anglo-American, Henry M. Stanley (1841-1904); and the French-Italian, Savorgnan de Brazza (1852-1905), whose real name was Brazza Savorgnani. To them goes the credit for the unveiling of the great Congo region, but it should be remembered that they built upon the foundations left by their lesser known predecessors.

The commercial penetration of the Congo Basin was the work of King Leopold I of Belgium. Disguising his aim under the cloak of intellectual interest, he was instrumental in forming the "International African Association" (1876). On the face of it, this organization proposed to extend the benefits of European civilization to Africa. One section, known as the "Committee for the Study of the Upper Congo," engaged Stanley, ostensibly to explore that area. His real purpose, which he carried out between 1879 and 1884, was to establish a protectorate, in the name of the Committee, over

the tribes of central Africa. By skillful maneuvering, Stanley was able largely to forestall de Brazza who had been sent out by the French government with similar instructions.

These activities roused the British, who sought to steal a march on the rest of Europe by making a treaty with Portugal which would have closed the Congo River to the other nations. Not to be balked in this fashion, Germany, supported by France, forced the submission of the whole problem to an international conference. Before the conference met at Berlin, the treaty was abandoned, and the International Association of the Congo (which had replaced the International African Association in 1882) was recognized as an independent state. Its labors thus reduced, the Berlin Conference (1884-1885) attempted to localize and regulate the struggle for African territory. The "Congo Free State" was erected, and the principle of the "Open Door" there was proclaimed. The new State was placed under the rule of Leopold and he, in the absence of any controlling body, soon transformed it into a personal possession. Large portions of the State were turned over to concessionaires who paid Leopold well for the very profitable privilege of ruthlessly exploiting the country and its peoples. Gradually, reports of the atrocities and brutal exactions leaked out, and an outraged world opinion forced Leopold to modify his methods. By that time, also, the easy profits had been taken and with questionable generosity, Leopold transferred the Congo Free State to the Belgian people in 1908. Under Leopold's successor, Albert, the administration of the Congo was reformed, the natives released from their virtual slavery, and a long-range program of economic development replaced the earlier exploitation. To date, the expense of the colony has been greater than its return, but the careful and provident management of the Belgians seems to be slowly changing that situation.

The French dream of empire embraced far more than Algeria and Tunis. It was in fact nothing less than a grandiose scheme to bring all north Africa from the Mediterranean to the Congo and from the Atlantic to the Red Sea under the tricolor. To realize this plan, French agents sought to penetrate Africa from east and west. In 1883, French Somaliland was set up on the shores of the Red Sea, and in the following year, de Brazza established the great Protectorate of the French Congo. The greatest obstacle to the fulfillment of the French dream was Great Britain. On the west coast, the French were more successful than their great rivals, and the British were able to salvage only one large area, Nigeria, and a few

small enclaves, but in the region of the Upper Nile the story was different. Having learned the vital importance of that river to Egypt, and stimulated by the dream of connecting Cairo with Capetown, the British began a systematic advance up the Nile in the early nineties. While they were slowly taking over this region, the French were moving eastward toward their goal. The two finally clashed in the persons of the British General Kitchener and the French Major Marchand, at the little village of Fashoda in September of 1898. There ensued a very acute crisis which almost resulted in war. The two Powers finally compromised their differences (March, 1899) by a mutual recognition of British rights in the Sudan and French rights in western and central Africa. The British thereupon set up the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the French consolidated their gains. By 1900, the latter owned all of northwestern Africa except Nigeria, the German Kameruns, a few small sections of the west coast, and Morocco. The eastern boundaries of this huge area were the Sudan and the Belgian Congo.

Germany was a late-comer to the African scene though Bismarck apparently began to plan for German colonies there as early as 1880. In 1883, a German merchant, with Bismarck's support, leased the area of Angra Pequena on the southwest coast, and in the following year, Germany annexed Togoland, the Kameruns, and Southwest Africa. Only hasty action by the British forestalled German annexation of Nigeria. On the other side of the continent, Germany established the large colony of East Africa in 1885, and attempted to extend her sway over Uganda. An Anglo-German Agreement (1890) provided for an exchange of territories which consolidated the German holdings and briefly relaxed the tension which had been building up between the two nations. During the World War, the German colonies were conquered by the Allied Powers and stripped from her by the Treaty of Versailles. In the field of colonial administration, Germany profited by her early mistakes and became an efficient and successful colonizing power. From a financial point of view, however, the German colonies, like those of most other Powers, remained a liability.

Great Britain, in the meantime, was active in preserving and promoting her interests. Despite the opposition of the other Powers, she remained firmly entrenched in Egypt, and after an ill-timed attempt at withdrawal soon began to expand in the Sudan. Under the aggressive leadership of Cecil Rhodes, Britain made Bechuanaland a protectorate (1885) to forestall the German advance, and,



Ewing Galloway

RHODES MEMORIAL, CAPETOWN, SOUTH AFRICA

Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902), multimillionaire and empire builder extraordinary, won his fabulous fortune in the gold and diamond fields of South Africa when he was still a young man. Largely through his efforts, the British acquired vast areas north of Cape Colony, including those territories which were joined (1895) to form the province named Rhodesia in his honor.

in that same year, she also set up a protectorate over Nigeria. In the next year, she divided the holdings of the Sultan of Zanzibar with France and Germany. Then in rapid succession she extended her sway over Somaliland, Mashonaland, Matabeleland, and Uganda. The discovery of gold in the Transvaal, with the resulting influx of British prospectors and miners, sharpened the already existent Anglo-Boer hostility which flared into war in 1899. This unhappy conflict lasted three years and before it was over the British were forced to call upon the resources of their empire to subdue the stubborn Boers.[1] The Peace of Pretoria (May 31, 1902) which ended the struggle was quite generous. The two Boer Republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, were firmly annexed to the British Empire, but they were also promised self-government. This promise was kept within five years, and in 1909 these two colonies joined

[1] The British Army finally numbered about 250,000; the Boers never had more than 40,000 fighting men.

with Cape Colony and Natal to form the Union of South Africa. The development of this new dominion has been stormy and difficult, but fortunately for the British Empire two former Boer generals, Louis Botha and Jan C. Smuts, lent their influence and ability to the British cause, and the Union today is a loyal and very valuable partner in the Empire.

The various imperialistic successes of the British, French, and Germans roused yet another nation to seek territory in Africa. Almost from its inception, the kingdom of Italy had longed to prove by the acquisition of colonies that it, too, was a great Power. Balked in Tunis, Italy was forced to look elsewhere, and, with the active encouragement of the British, who used her to forestall the French, she turned her attention to the Red Sea region. Italy acquired a small holding there in 1882, and three years later expanded it into the colony of Eritrea. In 1889, she claimed a protectorate over Somaliland and the last native free state in Africa, Abyssinia (Ethiopia). Her plans for an advance in the latter area were suddenly cut short when the Abyssinians inflicted a crushing defeat upon an Italian army at Adowa in 1896. The Italians perforce withdrew and turned again to northern Africa, but they did not forget.

Only two sections of north Africa remained unoccupied, Morocco and Tripolitania. The former, a rich and desirable region, France had long since marked out for herself, and only fear of European reactions had kept her from taking it. The changed international situation enabled her to remove that fear early in the twentieth century. Her ally, Russia, without interest in Morocco, had no objections; Spain and Italy promised her a free hand; and the establishment of very friendly relations with Great Britain (1904) seemed to remove most of the danger, even though Germany who also was interested in Morocco had not been consulted. Accordingly, the French foreign minister, Delcassé, intervened in Morocco in 1905. The immediate result was a diplomatic explosion when the angry Germans heard of the French attempt. Delcassé lost his position, and France was forced to submit the question to the Conference of Algeciras (1906). The French, loyally backed by the British, scored a triumph at the conference which placed Morocco under the joint supervision of France and Spain. That was not, however, all that the French had hoped and they continued to push toward complete control. A second Moroccan Crisis suddenly broke upon a fearful world in 1911. This time the diplomatic situation was even more favorable to France, and Germany was forced to accede to a

bargain which recognized French primacy in Morocco in return for the transfer of part of the French Congo. A formal French protectorate over Morocco was declared in 1912, and France began the arduous and costly task of extending her control over the country. The occupied area has steadily grown and the increasing economic development of the country has made the French very hopeful for the future. The small portion of Morocco accorded to Spain at the same time has not kept pace with the successful development of the larger area.

Italy, having learned both from her own experience and that of the French, proceeded to make very careful arrangements before she moved against the Turkish province of Tripolitania. Germany, Austria, and Great Britain had recognized the Italian interest there in the late eighties, and by recognizing the French interests in Morocco and Russian interests in the Straits, Italy had won their consent to her expansion into Tripolitania. These preliminaries over, she forced a war with Turkey in 1911. The struggle took longer than the Italians had expected, but the Treaty of Lausanne (1912) surrendered Tripolitania to Italy. The piecemeal conquest of the native tribes was interrupted by the war, but Fascist Italy has resumed it with vigor. The colony has been renamed Libya and an attempt has been made to assimilate it. The Fascists have made very real advances in the economic development of Libya but to date its only consistent product has been a heavy deficit.

The most recent chapter in the story of European imperialism in Africa was written by Italy in 1935-1936. Still hungry for colonial proof of her greatness and still smarting under the defeat at Adowa, Italy determined to add Ethiopia (Abyssinia) to her empire. Diplomatic preparations having been made, a border incident furnished the necessary excuse. Frantic negotiations by France and Britain failed to halt the Italians, and October, 1935, saw the formal opening of the Italo-Ethiopian War. The highly organized, mechanized Italian armies proved far too strong for the divided Ethiopians, whose war equipment was woefully outmoded. Nevertheless, both the people and the country offered a stubborn resistance to the invaders, and it was not until May 5, 1936, that the Italians entered and occupied the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa. Four days later, it was announced in Rome that Ethiopia was "placed under full and complete sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy," and in June, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland were joined to form Italian East Africa.

The Italian conquest of Ethiopia is a fitting conclusion to this account of greed, selfishness, and force, since it follows the usual pattern of imperialism. It cost Italy thousands of men, over a billion dollars, and inestimable good will. For its sake Europe was again brought perilously close to war and a people were deprived of freedom. Whether or not the benefits which Italy hoped to derive from her action will offset the tremendous cost is an open question. All imperialisms, including this recent one, appear to belong on the debit side of civilization's ledger.

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Saving Western Civilization

A. "The road to war"

Peace propaganda and wishful thinking to the contrary, war has become almost habitual among the communities of men. From the era of primitive war clubs to the present age of machine guns, shrapnel, and poison gas the members of the human race have fought among themselves. The appeal to force, open or concealed, and the resort to war as the final arbiter in periods of crisis, even by those devoted to peace, are universal. War is the irrational, emotional reaction of men to problems involved in living together. The disheartening conclusion is that a great many humans are not truly rational beings, that they are not capable of solving a problem by reason and therefore turn to force. It may be that fighting and war are primarily expressions of that basic human urge, self-preservation. That men will fight for their lives is a profound truth as well as a truism. The corollary is that men will bow to a superior force to preserve their lives if necessary. Moreover, men will fight to continue their established habits of life, so opposed are they to change.

Because fighting is irrational, the things which move men to war are not rational but emotional. Men will fight for their homes, their families, their fortunes, their countries. Nor is it necessary that these things actually be threatened; the fear that they may be endangered at some future time has often been enough to set men at each other's throats. Fear is perhaps the most powerful lever by which men are impelled to war, and here again the motive appears to be primal and universal. Fear has always been a driving force and usually what men have feared has been change and novelty. Men fight also because of greed for wealth and power and the desire to dominate their fellows. To analyze that motive would be to

explain ambition—one of the many things that men do not yet know how to do.

It may well be argued that men would not so often resort to war if war never paid for itself. There have been many occasions when the ends gained have seemed to justify the means employed, as, for example, in the cases of the American Revolution and the formation of the German Empire. Whether or not wars can be justified on that score is a question that each must answer for himself, but it may be suggested that reason would perhaps have been capable of producing the same results more cheaply and with greater permanence. It must be recognized, moreover, that the apparent successes of force have been a potent factor in educating men to its use. The military successes of Prussia, to cite only one of many instances, certainly tended to incline the Prussian people toward regarding wars as worth their cost.

The World War, because of its size, its complexity, and its still intimate relation with the life of today, offers the best case-history of wars in general. Before it was over, all possible motives had come into play and nearly all the world had become involved. This very complexity renders generalizations about it both difficult and dangerous, but certain apparent truths seem to stand out. Its fundamental and underlying cause was the universal assumption that the final appeal must be to force and the consequent acceptance of war as a legal, equitable, and justifiable instrument of national policy. Upon that basic premise depended all other causes, immediate and remote. Without it, there could have been no war. The systems of alliances and of militarism were built upon it; the forces of nationalism and imperialism were strengthened by it; and propaganda campaigns took it for granted.

The systems of secret alliances, inspired by mutual fear and distrust, divided Europe into two hostile groups. For a time these groups helped to preserve peace but they also made it inevitable that war, when it came, should involve all of the major European powers. As the rivalry between the two groups became keener, the preservation of them seemed ever more vital to their members. The least friction between any individual members of the opposing combinations instantly became the concern of all. When the crisis arose in July of 1914 it was not a question of Austria and Russia alone but of the two alliances and their respective satellites. Austria was, of necessity, supported by Germany; Russia, by France and Great Britain.

Militarism, which was greatly accelerated by the alliance system, included both the maintenance of large armed forces with their equipment and the existence of a small but disproportionately powerful class of professional military men. There was nothing new about either. Europe had had large armies and professional soldiers for many years. The various peoples supported these expensive burdens partly because they had come to believe that the surest way to preserve peace was to prepare for war. The military caste, aided and abetted by the armament makers, made frequent use of this argument which appealed essentially to fear and the desire for security. If the people seemed disinclined to continue their support, an engendered "war scare" soon brought them back into line. The end result was not peace and safety but a vicious circle of fear which led the nations on and on in the race to have the biggest and deadliest war machines.

Nationalism, which has consistently played a leading role in the drama of human development, again takes prominent part as a cause of war. Here, too, it appears in a variety of make-ups. Love of country, pride in national achievements, and the greed for national glorification are emotional appeals which rouse men to fighting pitch. The clash of nationalistic ambitions has tended to irritate peoples and exacerbate international relations. An intangible element in social development, it is hard to tell whether nationalism is itself provocative of war or whether it is used by interested groups to bring about conflicts. Probably it is both, and certainly it has produced a ready response to the machinations of chauvinistic elements. Imperialism figures as a cause of war largely because it is likely to bring nations into conflict. There is no question but that the rivalry of two powers in the fields of economic and political imperialism has often colored their other relationships and produced a long-lived and fateful tension between them.

Without modern methods of communication and particularly without such means of disseminating information and misinformation as the newspaper press, war on such an enormous scale would be impossible. As molders of public opinion, the men who control the press must bear a large share of the responsibility for inciting their readers to war. By playing upon the motives of nationalism and by appealing to the forces of fear and greed, the press did much to create a state of nervous excitement among the peoples of Europe. Rumors of war, accounts of the growth of their neighbor's armaments, and interpretations or misinterpretations of the speeches of

native and alien political leaders effectively created a state of mind which made war inevitable. Once the war had begun, the various powers used the press and other vehicles of propaganda to urge their citizens to more strenuous efforts and to drag other nations into the conflict.

B. The division of Europe

The pre-war systems of alliances were the outgrowth of Bismarck's fear of France and of his desire to maintain Germany in the dominating position he had won for her. With excellent reason the German chancellor feared that France might launch a war to avenge the defeat she had suffered at his hands in 1870-1871. To his mind the isolation of France meant the insulation of Germany and constituted an elementary precaution which he had no choice but to take. Accordingly, in 1872, he inspired the emperors of Austria, Russia, and Germany to make an informal agreement to maintain the status quo. The conflicting ambitions of Austria and Russia in the Balkans made this *Dreikaiserbund* (Three Emperors' League) weak from its very inception but for the nonce it served its purpose by depriving France of possible friends.

Beginning in 1875 a series of rebellions against the Turks rocked the Balkans, and aroused a demand in Russia for intervention. Austria, who feared Russian hegemony in the Balkans perhaps more than she feared anything else, so bitterly opposed the Russian plan that for a time an Austro-Russian war seemed likely. Bismarck, who wished to remain on friendly terms with both Powers, was finally forced to choose between them. He chose Austria, thereby averting the war but undermining Russo-German friendship. To soften this blow he urged Austria to recognize the Russian interests in the Balkans, and sought to effect a compromise between his two partners. Russia, balked in her plans to humble Austria, patched up a temporary agreement with the latter, and went to war with Turkey (April, 1877). Within a year the Turks were badly defeated and forced to sign the Treaty of San Stefano (March, 1878). This settlement practically expelled the Turk from Europe and created a large Slavic state in the Balkans under the ægis of Russia. Austria and Great Britain at once protested most vigorously, the latter even sending her fleet to Constantinople. Once more a possible war was averted when the Russians bowed to the Austro-British demand that the whole Near Eastern question be submitted to a general Euro-

pean congress. The Congress of Berlin (1878) [1] virtually nullified the Russian gains. The Turk was returned to Europe; Bulgaria, the Russian protégé, was reduced in size; and Austria was given the right to "occupy and administer" the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia did not forget that on all important questions Bismarck had sided against her, and although the German's genius prevented an open rupture, Russo-German friendship was irreparably damaged.

This course of events impelled Bismarck in 1879 to conclude an alliance with Austria which remained the keystone of Austro-German policies until 1918. This so-called Dual Alliance was originally defensive. If Russia attacked either partner, the other was to come at once to its assistance, and if any other Power (meaning France) should attack one signer, the other was to maintain "at least a benevolent neutral attitude towards its fellow." In addition, should the attacking Power be aided by Russia, the attacked Power would be aided by its partner. This alliance, the terms of which were secret, was to run for five years. Subsequent renewals in 1883 and 1902 kept it in force as long as the two empires lasted. Neither party foresaw its long life nor that it would eventually force Russia to ally with France, and involve Germany in the Balkan muddle. At the time it merely served to keep the peace by forcing Russia to resist her desire to expand in the Near East.

Bismarck had not forgotten his primary motive which was to keep France isolated, and he assiduously tried to regain Russian friendship. His efforts bore fruit in a renewal of the *Dreikaiserbund* in 1881, which, in essence, guaranteed Russian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German or Austro-Italian war in return for an Austro-German promise not to assist Great Britain against Russia in the Near East. These promises, which were renewed in 1884, became untenable after another Balkan crisis and were allowed to lapse in 1887. Holding steadfast to his plan, Bismarck thereupon negotiated a treaty with Russia. Known as the "Reinsurance Treaty," this promised Russian neutrality in a possible Franco-German war, and German neutrality in an Austro-Russian or Russo-British war. In addition, Germany recognized Russian interests in the Balkans and Near East, and promised to further Russian aims in Bulgaria and Turkey. Bismarck was safe in making these concessions only because a tripartite agreement among Austria, Great Britain, and Italy (1887) to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean basin effec-

[1] See pp. 797-798.

tively kept Russia from translating plans into actions. As long as he remained in power Bismarck successfully kept his various agreements from colliding, but the task was too difficult for his successors, and the treaty with Russia was discarded in 1890 with what proved to be disastrous results.

In the meantime, the Dual Alliance had become the Triple Alliance with the addition of Italy in 1882. This new alignment, also strictly defensive in purpose, was primarily a result of Italian fears. The new and weak kingdom of Italy was still apprehensive about the Papacy which steadfastly refused to recognize it, and which sought French and Austrian support. The possibility that France might offer aid to the pope seemed less remote to the Italians after the French seizure of Tunis. This bit of imperialism was not the decisive factor in bringing Italy into alliance with the Central Powers, but it helped to do so. Another motivation was the uneasiness of the Italian monarch over the continuing republicanism of some of his subjects. That convinced him of the need for a closer connection with successful autocracies. The Italians desired an alliance with Germany only, but Bismarck insisted that Austria be included. Neither the Austrians nor the Italians were enthusiastic about this plan, but Bismarck had his way. A secret treaty, signed on May 20, 1882, bound Austria and Germany to assist Italy if the latter should be attacked by France. In return, Italy promised to come to the aid of Germany should she be attacked by France. Another article provided for tripartite co-operation should any one of the three be attacked by two non-signatory Powers. When the treaty came up for renewal in 1887 the Italians found that their position had improved. The failure of an attempted Franco-German *rapprochement* and the Balkan crisis, already mentioned, convinced Bismarck that he must meet the new demands made by Italy. Accordingly, to the old treaty, which was renewed as it was, were added an Austro-Italian and an Italo-German treaty (Feb. 20, 1887). The former provided for reciprocal compensation in case either party should undertake expansion in the Balkans. The latter promised German support to Italy in case Italy should find it necessary to take steps to prevent further French expansion in North Africa. In short, the Triple Alliance had abandoned its defensive character and had become an instrument of aggression directed against France. France suspected as much, and the second renewal of the Alliance in 1891 increased her uneasiness. She would have been more uneasy had she

known that this time Germany had bound herself to aid Italian imperialism in North Africa.

France, though she had been acutely aware of her isolation from the beginning, had been powerless to change the situation. The imperialistic rivalry between her and Great Britain had made it useless to seek support from that quarter, and, besides, the British were inclined to hold themselves smugly aloof from continental combinations during the two decades after 1870. On the continent, all avenues of approach were closed to her until, late in 1887, Bismarck made a mistake. In his effort to dispel the war clouds rising from the Balkan crisis, he closed the German money market to Russia. Her nascent industrial revolution and the expenses of increasing her armament necessitated foreign loans, and she turned to Paris. The French were overjoyed to respond, and from then until the Russian Revolution in 1917, an untold, but enormous, quantity of French gold was poured into Russia. It was this golden chain which in the end tied these two very dissimilar Powers together. That event was delayed, however, by Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty. Upon his dismissal from office, the new masters of German foreign policy, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Baron Friedrich von Holstein, allowed the treaty to lapse. Just prior to that, Great Britain, weary of competing with Germany in Africa, had signed an agreement [1] which removed the causes of friction between the two Powers and seemed capable of bringing them into closer relationships in the near future. The renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891, therefore, clearly demonstrated the isolation of both France and Russia. Nevertheless, Russia was exceedingly reluctant to come to terms with the French and sought to induce the Kaiser to renew the Reinsurance Treaty. His brusque refusal and the interruption of loans by France forced the unwilling czar to come to an understanding with the source of his income.

An exchange of notes on August 27, 1891, signalized the beginning of the *entente*. The vague and limited co-operation provided for by these notes did not satisfy the French who pressed for a formal alliance. The General Staffs of the two powers reached an understanding in 1892 but the Russian government still held back. 1893 proved the turning point. A crisis rising from a conflict of imperialistic aims in Siam brought France and Great Britain to the very verge of war. In this emergency, the British sought German aid, thereby convincing the Russians, who were also having trouble

[1] The Heligoland Treaty of 1890.

with the British in Asia, that an Anglo-German rapprochement was not unlikely. Furthermore, a projected increase in the strength of the German army made both France and Russia more ready to strike a bargain. The still reluctant czar at last consented to the ratification of an alliance agreement in January of 1894.

This Franco-Russian Military Convention followed the general pattern of the guarantees exchanged by the members of the Triple Alliance. An attack upon France by Germany, or by Italy and Germany, would bring Russia to her partner's assistance; and France was to aid Russia in the event of a German or Austro-German attack. It was further mutually agreed that both Powers would immediately mobilize their armed forces if any member of the Triple Alliance did so. The terms of this contract, which was to last as long as the Triple Alliance, were kept secret, but the fact that the bargain had been made was admitted in 1895.

The formation of this new dual alliance temporarily restored the balance of power which had been destroyed by the unification of Germany and the Franco-Prussian War. During the next several years conditions in Europe itself were relatively stable and the attentions of the Powers were focused on the extension of their holdings and influence in Africa and Asia. The European alliance systems were by no means forgotten but neither were they mutually exclusive. France and Russia, it is true, were emboldened by their new partnership to promote their imperialisms in Asia with great vigor and considerable success, but upon occasion, as in the case of their intervention following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, they welcomed the co-operation of Germany. The latter encouraged Russia to concentrate her attention on the Far East and frequently assisted her in that region. Russia accepted German support gratefully and until her defeat by Japan was so absorbed in Asiatic expansion that she even joined her ancient rival Austria in guaranteeing the status quo in the Balkans (1897). Germany was temporarily in a position to play off Great Britain against the Franco-Russian combination. By siding first with one and then with the other, she checked both.

Great Britain was the chief butt of the Powers and it was gradually borne in upon her that her policy of isolation was a distinct handicap. The crushing defeat of China by Japan killed the long-standing British plan for an alliance with China which would have bolstered her position in the Far East. Eventually it resulted also in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902), but not until Great Britain

had tried vainly to get an ally in Europe. A British suggestion for a *rapprochement* with Russia fell upon deaf ears, and in 1898, Great Britain turned to Germany with the great imperialist, Joseph Chamberlain, as the prime mover. Germany was not interested then nor in the next year when Britain tried again. Anglo-German imperialistic conflicts and the passage of a new navy law, obviously aimed to provide Germany with a fleet strong enough to challenge Britain's, temporarily made the plan impossible. The situation improved soon after, but another British proposal in 1901 was allowed to drop. The failures of these negotiations were primarily due to overconfidence on the part of the Germans. They believed, first, that they were strong enough to stand alone, and, second, that Britain would never come to terms with France and Russia. In other words, they saw no need to ally with Britain since they were certain that the British neither would nor could join the Franco-Russian Alliance. They were wrong on both counts.

Twice during the decade of the nineties Great Britain and France had teetered on the edge of war over imperialistic conflicts, and both times they drew back from the precipice. The brief but sharp crisis over Siam in 1893, coupled with growing rivalries in southwestern China, forced the two nations either to compromise or to fight. They chose to compromise and the Salisbury-Courcel Agreement of 1896 partially cleared the air. The Fashoda crisis of 1898 was also settled by a compromise which, by implicitly recognizing the British possession of Egypt, removed that chronic source of irritation. There were still many points of issue to be settled but the pathway to co-operation had at least been staked out. During the next few years, while Britain was vainly angling for an alliance with Germany, France improved her position by a series of negotiations with Italy. The habitual hostility between these two Latin states gradually quieted down after the Italian defeat at Adowa and the consequent fall from power of the bitter Francophobe, Crispi. The ending of a tariff war in 1898 was a prelude to a mutual recognition of each other's aims in Morocco and Tripoli. The renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902 was followed by a secret agreement with France in November of that year. Stripped of its technical verbiage, this was nothing less than a promise by Italy to remain neutral when, as, and if France and Russia should go to war against Germany. Only the Italians have ever been able to reconcile it with the obligations assumed in the Triple Alliance.

The failure of her alliance overtures to Germany turned Great

Britain back toward her trans-Channel neighbor. Reciprocal state visits by Edward VII and President Loubet served to introduce long and involved diplomatic negotiations. There were many controversial issues, but both Powers wished to succeed. The Russo-Japanese War, which involved the allies of both and thus opened the possibility of drawing France and Britain into the war, speeded the settlement which was finally signed on April 8, 1904. In a series of three documents, the outstanding colonial rivalries of the two Powers were amicably adjusted. The most important deal exchanged a recognition of French primacy in Morocco for a similar recognition of British hegemony in Egypt. A secret agreement, signed at the same time, made arrangement for an eventual division of Morocco between France and Spain. No word of these documents dealt with Europe, but the adjustment of colonial disputes established an *Entente Cordiale* (sincere harmony) between the two Powers which made their co-operation in Europe both possible and probable. The immediate effect was to checkmate the German practice of playing one off against the other; the later result was the formation of a new alliance system definitely opposing the Triple Alliance.

When her defeat at the hands of Japan forced Russia to turn again toward Europe and the Near East, she found that the situation had materially changed. Throughout the nineteenth century it had been Great Britain who had constantly supported Turkey against the Slav. Now, in the twentieth century, the British had largely abandoned the Turks to the Germans who, with no more altruism than had once moved the British, came forward as the champions of Turkey. Moreover, the Russian ally, France, now on good terms with her traditional enemy, was very eager to patch up an understanding between her two confederates. The British were nothing loath and the new, liberal Russian foreign minister, A. P. Izvolsky, was enthusiastic. His fundamental purpose was to open the Straits to Russia and, once he found that Great Britain was inclined to look favorably upon that plan, he facilitated the negotiations by large concessions to British imperialism. The formal understanding, signed on August 31, 1907, consisted of three documents, concerned with Anglo-Russian relations in Tibet, Afghanistan, and Persia. The effect was essentially the same as that of the Anglo-French agreement with the added fact that the *Entente Cordiale* had become the Triple Entente.

The World War looms so large as the *bête noir* of our own



MAP 35. ALLIANCES BEFORE THE GREAT WAR, 1914

time that it is all too easy to see in the years from 1904 to 1914 the almost mechanical working out of an inevitable end. To do so is to mock the truth by reading our present knowledge back into the past. The formation of the Triple Entente did eventually lead to the war between it and the Triple Alliance but there was nothing inevitable about it. The statesmen of that period could no more foresee the future than can those of today, and though they may have been apprehensive they could not have known the eventual results of their squabbles and machinations. They lived pretty much from day to day, as we do. Each new crisis held the potentiality of war but its settlement seemed to prove, if it proved anything at all, that war could be avoided. No man could have predicted with surety the course of events which filled those years nor foreseen the disaster into which the world stumbled in 1914. At no time until that conflict actually began did it appear inevitable to the majority of the peoples of the world or their leaders. It is only to us, wise after the event, that the happenings of those years seem to form a pattern, and we must guard against reading into the past interpretations which

belong only to the present. In the light of our knowledge the three major crises of the decade from 1904 to 1914 are all too likely to overshadow the fact that for most people life went on as before during those years, and the brief flurries which the crises produced were buried beneath the routine details of everyday life. Moreover, numerous peace efforts like the two conferences at the Hague (1899 and 1907) lulled people into what proved to be a false sense of security. The striking, albeit superficial, resemblance to our own situation lends a poignant interest to the years immediately before the war.

The Germans received the news of the Anglo-French *Entente* with an apparent complacency which they did not feel. Deeply concerned, they were at a loss to know what to do. The Kaiser favored making a continental alliance against Great Britain, but his attempt to do so failed. Baron Holstein and Chancellor von Bülow then prodded him into acquiescing in their plan to strike at France through Morocco. By so doing they hoped by a single stroke to further German interests in that area and to weaken the *Entente*. The climax of the German challenge came when the Kaiser, in a speech made at the Moroccan port of Tangier in March of 1905, declared that that country was and must continue to be independent. The German government then demanded that France dismiss her foreign minister, Delcassé, who had been largely responsible for advancing both the *Entente* and French plans in Morocco, and submit the whole Moroccan question to a general conference. France squirmed and twisted but in the end she was brought to terms by the German threat of war. Delcassé was forced out of office and a conference was set for January of 1906. Germany had won the first round but at the price of arousing the national pride of France and her colleague, Britain.

In the meantime, the Kaiser gave evidence of the German inability to pursue one course by indulging in a curious bit of diplomacy on his own responsibility. At a private meeting with Nicholas II of Russia, Wilhelm wheedled the Czar into signing an agreement for a Russo-German alliance which he hoped would be the nucleus of an anti-British system. Russia was to persuade France to adhere to this bargain, which was known as the Treaty of Björkö (July, 1905). Bülow, however, made this impossible by further antagonizing the French with his demands in regard to Morocco, and the Russian foreign office, which did not approve of the treaty anyway, persuaded the Czar that it would have to be changed. This the Kaiser refused to do, and the treaty was dropped, but repercussions of it lingered.

When the conference on Morocco opened at Algeciras, Russia felt herself compelled to stand loyally by France in order to dispel any doubts that might have been raised by the Czar's misadventure.

One other important development took place before the conference opened. The new British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, though he refused to enter into a formal alliance with France, did authorize the British military staff to make plans with the French general staff for joint military action in case of war. These conversations, which became henceforward a regular feature, were expressly declared not to bind the British government to any plan of action, and Grey consistently maintained, even in his speech asking war with Germany in August, 1914, that Britain was free to act as she saw fit. Whether or not she was matters less than the fact that these military conversations formed an extremely strong tie which so implemented the *Entente* that the French were encouraged to count on British support in a crisis. The British, it may be added, did not betray their colleague's confidence.

Fortified by these developments, France entered upon the Algeciras Conference with justified confidence. Not only did Great Britain and Russia stand by her, but Italy and the United States also supported her, and Germany discovered that she had only one real friend, Austria-Hungary. France made a few concessions to Germany but, on the whole, obtained an approval of her plan to Gallicanize Morocco. The German plan had proved a boomerang: the *Entente* was strengthened and the French intrenched in Morocco.

The second great crisis of the decade centered around the Austrian seizure of the Turkish Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Its deeper significance was that it strengthened the Triple Entente much as the Moroccan crisis had strengthened the *Entente Cordiale*. The genesis of the crisis was a bargain struck by the Austrian foreign minister, Aehrenthal, with the Russian foreign minister, Izvolsky, in September of 1908. Briefly, Russia exchanged her consent to the annexation for the Austrian promise not to oppose the Russian attempt to open the Straits to the free passage of her men of war. The joker in this agreement was that the Austrian proceeded to announce the annexation in October before the Russian had completed his arrangements. The furious Izvolsky demanded a general European conference which Aehrenthal refused to consider. The difficulty was increased because Russia felt compelled to support Serbia's claim for compensation, based on the fact that the population of the two provinces was predominantly Serb. Since part of the Austrian

plan had been to cripple the Pan-Serb agitation in the Balkans, she would not even listen to the Serbian demand. Deadlocked and with the tension steadily increasing, both Powers began war preparations. Austria, with the wholehearted backing of Germany, was in a much stronger position than Russia whose allies gave her only diplomatic support. Finally, in the spring of 1909, a German note which the Russians construed as an ultimatum demanded that Russia recognize the annexation. Izvolsky had no choice but to abandon Serbia and give his grudging acquiescence. This apparent victory of the Central Powers was canceled by the fears which their success generated. Russia, France, and Great Britain felt obliged to co-operate more closely in the future in order to keep Germany and Austria within bounds. In addition, Russia was moved to reorganize and increase her army, and Great Britain was led greatly to speed up her naval construction.

During the next two years Germany painfully built up more friendly relations with the Entente Powers, but her efforts were nullified when she made a second attempt to inhibit French expansion in Morocco. The new head of the German foreign office, Kiderlen-Wächter, thought he saw a chance to do this in the spring of 1911 when he learned of the French plan to occupy Fez, the Moroccan capital. He planned by a show of force to maneuver France into making compensation to Germany, and in July of 1911 sent a German warship to the port of Agadir to protect German subjects there. Since there were no Germans at Agadir it was clear that he was striking at France, and a new crisis cast its shadow over Europe. France played her cards very skillfully, and the agreement finally made in November recognized her protectorate over Morocco. All that Kiderlen-Wächter got for having run the risk of war was an unimportant slice of the French Congo. Throughout the crisis, Britain, much alarmed at the German action, apprehensive over her trade losses to Germany, and fearful of the expanding German navy, stood loyally by her colleague. This, in turn, worried Germany and led her in 1912 to plan a further increase in her fleet. Before the appropriation necessary to carry out this was voted by the Reichstag, the two Powers made a futile attempt at a *rapprochement*. The effort failed because, caught in the vicious whirlpool of the armed alliances, neither government dared make any real concessions to the other.

The next two years saw a further consolidation of the two alliance systems. The French premier, Poincaré, successfully insured closer co-operation with Russia by a series of military and naval con-

versations based on the French promise to back her ally against Austria in the Balkans. The passage of the new German naval bill enabled him to convince the British of the need for furthering their joint plans, and in 1912 the two governments agreed to naval co-operation. Britain concentrated her fleet in the North Sea and assumed the responsibility of protecting both herself and France. The latter concentrated her naval forces in the Mediterranean and agreed to protect British interests there. Britain was never as intimate with Russia, but the relations between the two were cordial. The Triple Alliance also presented a more unified appearance. Trouble in the Balkans seemed to tie the three Powers more closely together and led to the extension of plans for joint military and naval action. Nevertheless, war between the two systems did not seem likely. On the contrary, the two seemed to be on the point of working out their problems, especially after a series of economic agreements cleared the air. With the exception of the bellicose Balkans, the outlook was exceptionally good.

The master key to the bewildering Balkan problem was nationalism. In the nineteenth century, the working of this force had resulted in the winning of independence by some of the Balkan peoples and of autonomy by others. In the twentieth century, it produced a variety of conflicts both among these peoples themselves and between them and Turkey. In addition, there were superimposed upon this conflict the nationalistic ambitions of the Great Powers. Russia, still seeking a free outlet to the west, not only coveted the Straits, but wished also to protect that interest by esablishing a *bloc* of subservient states in the hinterland of the Balkans. Austria-Hungary, harassed by the problems inherent in her heterogeneous holdings, wished at all costs to prevent such an extension of Russian interests, and to stifle the increasing clamor of the Serbs for a Pan-Serb union. The Dual Monarchy was in a very real sense fighting for its life, since to admit the claims of any one of its many national groups was to prepare the way for its own disintegration. The German interest in Turkey and the Balkans was primarily economic, but in the end this proved less important than the exigencies of the general situation which forced her to support her ally against the rival alliance system. Such support was the more imperative since Italy, who had her own ambitions in the Balkans, could not be depended upon. Great Britain and France were no longer interested in the Balkans *per se*, but just as Germany felt bound to support Austria, they felt constrained to back Russia.

These various interests might conceivably have checkmated each other if Turkey had been able to pursue the uneven tenor of her ways, but the Ottoman Empire was rocked by revolution in 1908. Planned and carried out by a group, known both because of their age and because of their ideas as the Young Turks, this outburst appeared to result in the formation of a truly liberal empire, whose keynote was to be Turkish patriotism and Turkish unity. The optimistic Young Turks underestimated the nationalisms of their subject peoples and overestimated the altruism of the Great Powers. Bulgaria, backed by Austria, completely freed herself from all traces of Turkish rule. Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina thereby setting off a general European crisis and rousing the Serbs to futile frenzy. An attempted Cretan revolution failed, but meanwhile the Young Turk movement was rapidly proving that it stood not for a constitutional and united Turkey but for Moslem domination of the empire. Their policy of Ottomanization further weakened their State by provoking a successful revolt in Albania and a war with Italy. Long interested in Tripolitania, the Italians were of no mind to see that area snatched from them, and in 1911 they went to war with Turkey for the express purpose of gaining it. The Italian success, registered in the Treaty of Lausanne (1912), was hastened by the outbreak of war in the Balkans.

Under Russian guidance, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro had united in a Balkan League (1912) with the purpose of freeing their kinsmen from Turkish rule. The reverberations of the Italian guns sounded to these hotheads like the knocking of opportunity and they precipitately declared war on Turkey in October of 1912. The Ottoman Empire collapsed under the impact, and by the Treaty of London (May, 1913) surrendered all of its territory in Europe except a small section around Constantinople. Within a month the members of the League had quarreled over the division of the spoils, and had gone to war among themselves with Bulgaria fighting not only her former allies but also Rumania, who saw a chance to gain more territory, and Turkey, who hoped to win back some of her losses. This second Balkan War ended with the Treaty of Bucharest which deprived Bulgaria of much truly Bulgarian territory and cut her off from her natural economic outlet. Thus truncated and embittered, Bulgaria was left impatiently to await her chance for revenge.

Serbia, gorged but not at all satiated with the fruits of her victory, became overly self-confident. Her bounding ambition now visioned



MAP 36. ALIGNMENTS DURING THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918

a great Serbia which should include not only Bosnia and Herzegovina but all Jugoslav lands. In her path lay Austria whose apprehensions kept pace with Serbian ambitions; behind Serbia stood the colossus of Russia whose dream of a Pan-Slav empire seemed closer than ever before.

C. Armageddon

The Austro-Serbian feud culminated in the summer of 1914 in a crisis which engulfed the entire world in war. For sometime the authorities at Vienna had deemed it advisable that a member of the royal family appear among the peasants of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the hope of reconciling them to their new masters. Military maneuvers scheduled for June of 1914 within the vicinity of Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, offered a splendid opportunity which the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne, was reluctantly prevailed upon to take. After the maneuvers had passed without incident, the Archduke and his wife journeyed to Sarajevo on Sunday, June 28, to be formally welcomed by the local authorities of the province.

Along the path which the procession was to take, three assassins lay in wait. One discharged a bomb without injury to the royal pair; one lost courage and fled; but the third made good an accidental opportunity to kill both the Archduke and his wife. The world was horrified at this new exhibition of Balkan violence, yet no one imagined that it would produce a universal catastrophe.

Austria immediately accused the Serbian government of complicity in the plot, an accusation which could hardly be supported by the meager evidence available at the time, but which recent revelations have largely justified. The three assassins were all Bosnians, as the government at Belgrade innocently claimed, but all had spent much time in Serbia where they had close affiliations with the most violent of Serbian nationalist organizations, the Black Hand, whose membership included a number of Serbians prominent in circles of government. Pledged to terrorism, this society already had to its credit an unenviable record of inhuman cruelty before the projected visit of the Archduke to Sarajevo offered the excuse for its last and greatest plot. With a cold and calculating deliberation which defies comparison in modern times, leaders of the Black Hand worked out every detail of the plan, gave the assassins training in shooting and bomb throwing, provided them with the necessary materials stolen from government stock, arranged for their crossing of the Bosnian frontier unmolested, and by means of its secret agencies spirited them through the province without arousing the suspicions of Austrian officials. News of the plot leaked out in Belgrade fully six weeks before it could be executed, but the government, partly for fear of retribution at the hands of the terrorists, partly because it sympathized with the diabolical scheme, refrained from taking the proper precautions. The least it might have done would have been to warn Austria of impending danger, but, except for offering vague hints, it neglected this simple international obligation. The circumstantial evidence against the Serbian government is so incriminating that even the staunchest advocates of its innocence have been forced to admit its guilt.

Possession of these facts would have been helpful but hardly necessary to Count Berchtold, Austrian foreign minister, who was now unalterably convinced that the future safety of Austria lay in the annihilation of Serbia. There were many in official circles who shared this view, but there were likewise those who opposed it. The aged, unhappy, and somewhat superstitious Emperor Franz Josef,

who had never led his nation in successful war, wished nothing more than to end his reign in peace. Count Stephen Tisza, the forceful, competent premier of Hungary, thought the time not yet ripe for a final reckoning with Serbia, and, moreover, did not relish the idea of adding more Slavs to the Empire, as he feared would happen if war came. These objections might have been enough to stay Berchtold's hand had the German government not made the error of offering him its support in chastising Serbia by whatever means he deemed advisable. It is doubtful whether the German kaiser or Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg expected Austria to use force; certainly they neither plotted nor visualized a world war, but by giving Austria this "blank check" (July 5) they committed an irreparable but understandable blunder. Twice before Germany had restrained Austria in the Balkans; there was danger that repetition of such procedure might deprive Germany of its only remaining reliable friend. Such was the vicious result of the alliance system.

Having received the "blank check," Berchtold, with almost the same cold, calculating deliberation with which the Black Hand had planned Franz Ferdinand's assassination, secretly settled down to weave his plot against Serbia. Fearing that Germany might yet change its mind and interpose objections at the last moment, he henceforth carefully refrained from consulting fully with his ally until a policy could be chosen from which there could be no retreat. Meanwhile, with subtle and artful cunning, he used Germany's vague promise to pry loose the objections of the emperor and Tisza to his determined plan. At a Council of Ministers on July 7 he recommended strong measures but without result. Two days later Franz Josef, upon the recommendation of Tisza, still objected to forceful action, but by July 14 Tisza had been convinced, and with him the emperor, that unless strong action were taken at once against Serbia, Austria's friendship with Germany might be jeopardized. By the grossest and most inexcusable exaggeration Berchtold had made it appear that his policy of force had been urged upon him. With opposition removed at home and Germany honor-bound to support whatever plan he devised, he proceeded at once to compose such an ultimatum as Serbia could never accept. Under condition that Austria renounce all claims to Serbian territory except for certain minor frontier rectifications, Tisza agreed to its terms. It met with the approval of a Council of Ministers on July 19, and was despatched next day to the minister at Belgrade, with instructions that it be not presented until

the afternoon of July 23.[1] In the usual fashion, the secrecy which shrouded all these preparations could not be completely kept. Diplomatic circles seethed with rumors of the demands which Austria would make, some being astonishingly correct, but repeated efforts to secure precise information from Berchtold were gracefully but forcefully rebuffed. Even Germany had no complete knowledge of the terms of the ultimatum until the evening before its submission, when it was already too late to water them down. Severe enough to make unconditional acceptance impossible, they were scarcely more severe than circumstances now seem to have demanded.[2] Serbia was given forty-eight hours in which to produce a satisfactory reply.

Officials at Belgrade were hard pressed to reply within the stipulated time. Presentation of the ultimatum on the afternoon of July 23 found the Council of Ministers out of the capital participating in an election campaign. They were hastily recalled, but it was impossible to settle down to the formidable task until the 24th and, even then, the reply could not be framed and completed until almost the very moment at which the ultimatum expired. Working without foreign advice and in feverish haste, their reply stands as one of the monumental diplomatic achievements of all time. Seemingly conciliatory, seemingly acquiescent, it was a masterpiece of delusive evasion. With numerous qualifications and reservations, Serbia agreed to accept all the Austrian demands except that which required Austrian assistance in hunting down and punishing those responsible for hostile propaganda. In a final flourish, the Serbian reply proposed that the whole dispute be submitted to the Hague Tribunal for dispassionate arbitration. Berchtold could not have anticipated an answer so astute as actually to put him on the defensive, but he had expected it to be unsatisfactory. The minister at Belgrade had collected his files and packed his baggage well in advance of the Serbian reply, and was able to leave Belgrade with his entire suite a half hour after it had been submitted.

[1] President Poincaré's visit to Russia at this very time occasioned the delay. It was thought best to await his departure before presenting the ultimatum since it was feared that he might encourage the warhawks at Petrograd.

[2] After condemning anti-Austrian propaganda which it called upon the government of Serbia to repudiate, the ultimatum demanded (1) that anti-Austrian newspapers be suppressed, (2) that the Narodna Odbrana (ostensibly a patriotic cultural society) be dissolved, (3) that teachers and (4) officials of the army hostile to Austria be removed, (5) that Austria be permitted to assist in the inquisition of those responsible for hostile propaganda, (6) that proceedings against those suspected of complicity in the murder be undertaken at once, (7) that two known accomplices be hunted out by the authorities and arrested, (8) that suspected frontier guards be dismissed, (9) that anti-Austrian statements of Serbian officials be forthwith explained, and (10) that Austria be promptly notified of the execution of these measures.

Diplomatic relations with Serbia were thus broken the evening of July 25 and that same day both Powers proceeded to mobilize their armies.

Until this time there was some hope but little prospect that an Austro-Serbian war might be localized. Every capital of Europe had been shocked at the murder of the Archduke, but as weeks passed by it became clear that few statesmen were prepared to sanction the extinction of Serbia as the appropriate form of chastisement. Russia, in particular, watched developments at Vienna with growing suspicion, fearful lest her position in the Balkans be endangered by the destruction of her protégé. The Pan-Slav press came out openly in Serbia's defense and, as usual, the Foreign Office shortly followed suit. By July 21, Sazonov, who had already let it be known among the foreign diplomats that he thoroughly mistrusted Austria, remarked that Russia could "not permit Austria-Hungary to make threats against Serbia or to take military measures." If there remained any doubts in the foreign minister's mind as to the wisdom of so strong a course of action, they were soon dispelled by President Poincaré of France, who at that very time was visiting Russia with the avowed purpose of strengthening the bonds between the two allies. Although the crisis over Serbia had not been responsible for the visit, arranged long before, it was the problem of vital interest at the moment and consequently uppermost in the minds of both statesmen. The French president, as fearful for the future of the Franco-Russian alliance as the Germans were for the Austro-German, let it be known that France would support her ally in a policy of determined opposition toward Austria. Assured by this French "blank check," Sazonov had reason to expect a decisive diplomatic victory which would efface the defeat suffered at Austria's hands in 1908. There is no indication that Sazonov expected war to follow necessarily, but he did not now shrink from such an eventuality.

It was in this frame of mind that Russian statesmen received the news of the Austrian ultimatum on the morning of July 24. Sazonov, visibly excited and determined to prevent Austrian absorption of Serbia at all costs, consulted at once with the military authorities about the possibility of partially mobilizing the army against Austria. He intended to hold the threat of war as the trump card with which to win his diplomatic game with Berchtold. Nothing could have been more dangerous to the peace of Europe. The military party, believing and hoping that war would come, was extremely apprehensive of partial mobilization, which they thought neither possible nor desir-

able. War with Austria they understood meant war with Germany as well, and they had made their plans accordingly. To change these when danger was imminent would throw the military machinery completely out of gear and expose the nation to fearful dangers. These arguments were compelling, and, during a Ministerial Council on July 25 to discuss the matter, Sazonov compromised far enough to allow the militarists the privilege of enforcing a secret "Regulation concerning the Period Preparatory to War." This was actually no less than the first step toward general mobilization. Troops were to be given instruction as to the probable disposition of the enemy; furloughs were to cease, horses to be bought and properly equipped, banks on the frontier to be evacuated, possible provisions for the army to be husbanded, European freight cars to be kept within Russian territory, and ships made ready for naval use. Beyond consenting to this step, the Ministerial Council agreed that troops be recalled from summer maneuvers to their quarters, cadets be promoted to officers, and that a "state of war" be declared in all towns containing fortresses on both the German and Austrian frontiers. These measures, which constituted neither partial nor general mobilization but were a decisive step toward the latter, were promptly put into effect July 26. Sazonov suffered the delusion that he had thus provided himself with a trump card. What he actually did was to pass his whole hand to the militarists and set in motion forces which swiftly got beyond control.

Meanwhile, the rest of Europe was justifiably alarmed at the prospect of an Austro-Serbian conflict becoming Austro-Russian and consequently European. No statesman really wished for this. As early as July 20, Sir Edward Grey had proposed that Austria and Russia consult together on the demands to be made upon Serbia or, at least, reach some cordial understanding regarding them after they had been submitted. Poincaré, believing that strong pressure at Vienna was more desirable for Franco-Russian solidarity and prestige, objected to this sensible suggestion as "dangerous." On July 24, when the terms of the ultimatum were made public, Grey proposed that the four less interested Powers (Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy) use their influence to mediate the differences between Austria and Russia. Germany accepted, but Poincaré still preferred pressure upon Vienna. On July 26, Grey made a third suggestion: that the less interested Powers assemble in conference to discuss the matter, while Austria, Russia, and Serbia refrain from further military preparations and await results. Germany, properly suspicious of Italy,

believed such procedure would result in a united front against Austria and endanger Germany's relations with her. Bethmann-Hollweg therefore recommended that the Conference project be shelved and offered to urge Austria and Russia to compose their differences amicably between themselves. Sazonov willingly accepted Bethmann's idea of conversations and took steps to set them going. Berchtold, however, never once having thought of reviewing the ultimatum as Russia wished, or of withdrawing from a final reckoning with Serbia, cut the ground from under this hopeful beginning by swiftly declaring war against Serbia, July 28. This was almost two weeks earlier than the military authorities of Austria had expected.

Europe now rushed headlong to the precipice. Until the declaration of war, German statesmen continued to believe that the Serbian problem might be solved peaceably to the satisfaction of both Russia and Austria, but they had placed unjustifiable confidence in the loyalty and trustworthiness of the obstinate Berchtold. Only at the last moment did Bethmann-Hollweg awaken to stark reality, and then, in despair and anger, he vainly sought to apply the brakes. By July 27, when he first saw a full copy of the Serbian reply, the Kaiser also was convinced that "every ground for war disappears." He, too, made strenuous efforts to stay impending disaster. The very day Austria declared war he devised a plan, known as the "pledge plan," by which Austria was to be allowed to occupy Belgrade as a guarantee of Serbian promises while he mediated with Vienna for peace. Such a solution seemed highly practicable, since it would have allowed the warhawks at Vienna a chance to use the army, would have quelled Russia's fears that Serbia was to be completely annihilated, and would perhaps have satisfied the French who had always insisted upon such pressure at Vienna. Sir Edward Grey gave his approval to the project and it was delivered at Vienna with the request for an immediate reply. Twice on July 29, Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed for the answer, and the next day he became more insistent. Berchtold was visibly distressed at this threatened defection of his ally, but saw no escape and, consequently, summoned a Ministerial Council for July 31 to help him frame a reply. German pressure was at last working in Vienna, but, at the time the Council of Ministers assembled, all hope for peace had vanished with the news that Russia had already ordered general mobilization.

The militarists in Petrograd, convinced that war had already come, had been able to set some of the machinery of mobilization going as early as July 26. Two days later when it was learned that Austria

had declared war, they were able to extort from the civilian authorities the promise to speed it up. Sazonov wanted only partial mobilization, but effective objections were raised against this, and a compromise was reached by which a decree for partial and one for general mobilization were compiled for the Czar's signature. These were both signed on the morning of July 29. In the meantime, the Kaiser intervened with the Czar, asking that military preparations be halted while he use his influence to preserve the peace. Nicholas acquiesced and withdrew the order for general mobilization. However, the next day, July 30, he allowed his mind to be changed again by the military men who already had Sazonov completely in their clutches. A new order for mobilization was signed and despatched that same evening. Russia had thus cut the Gordian knot. Peace in Europe was henceforth inconceivable.

The nervous haste with which the other powers rushed to arms during the next week constitutes a story of confusion and despair which has little more than academic interest. Peoples were whipped to white-hot patriotic frenzy; channels of trade were blocked; international intercourse ceased. Men and nations had once more submitted their differences to the arbitrament of war.

Germany, who had the most to fear from international war, was actually the last to mobilize. Her greatest danger was the threat of simultaneous invasion on both the western and eastern fronts by France and Russia, whose potential man power was infinitely greater than hers. The German military experts, in consideration of this almost inevitable possibility, had staked all on technical superiority, the slowness of Russia's military machine, and the swiftness of German mobilization. If the proper steps were promptly taken, it was thought possible to annihilate France before Russian troops had begun to move. The army could then devote itself entirely to the eastern front. Everything, therefore, seemed to hinge on Germany's getting the jump on her enemies. Bethmann-Hollweg, however, insisted that no irretraceable steps be taken until all avenues to peace had been closed. Consequently, he held the anxious military men in leash until unmistakable evidence of Russian general mobilization was produced on the morning of July 31. Shortly thereafter Germany adopted "preparatory measures." It is interesting to observe that France had already begun to take this step six days before.

As the machinery of mobilization got under way in Germany, Bethmann-Hollweg despatched ultimatums to Russia and France. The former, with a twelve-hour limit, threatened German general

mobilization unless Russia desisted from hers; the latter, with an eighteen-hour limit, called upon France to pledge her neutrality in case war came between Russia and Germany. Both ultimatums expired without satisfactory reply on August 1. German general mobilization followed immediately. France had ordered general mobilization a half hour before. That same day Germany declared war upon Russia, and two days later she declared war upon France.

While all this was happening on the continent, Great Britain remained a doubtful factor. Attempts by France and Russia, in the early stages of the crisis, to tie the British government had drawn from Sir Edward Grey only indefinite and evasive replies. Indeed, British business was opposed to war, and public opinion, in general, seemed against it. Divisions in Parliament and in the Cabinet reflected this divided state of the public's mind, making it extremely dangerous for the government to commit itself to any settled policy. Grey leaned heavily toward France, but was unable to carry the Cabinet with him, until the German government played directly into his hands by violating Belgian neutrality.

To annihilate France swiftly, German military experts had long been convinced that some great flanking movement would be necessary to bottle up the French army. Since the strongly fortified Rhenish frontier in Alsace made this impossible on the Franco-German border, necessity dictated an advance through Switzerland or Belgium. France was incautious enough to leave these frontiers undefended. The fact that the neutrality of both states was guaranteed caused little concern to military men who were interested only in results. Count Schlieffen, who had devised the German plan of campaign against France, planned to concentrate his thrust on the right wing. Using Belgium, he intended to send several armies at top speed across the French border, rolling the unsuspecting French back upon the Swiss frontier. This plan was the one military experts planned to use in 1914, so the civilian authorities faced the delicate task of reconciling the Powers to the infringement of Belgian neutrality. On August 2, an ultimatum was presented to the Belgian government, requesting the use of her territory for the duration of the war. Belgium refused to grant the request, informed the Powers of her determination, and called upon them for protection.

Great Britain had reason to expect this eventuality, for as early as July 29 Bethmann-Hollweg, in an attempt to make a "strong bid" for British neutrality, gave assurance that Belgium's rights would be scrupulously respected after the war. This blunder by the German

Chancellor strengthened the Francophile party in the British Cabinet which four days later, at the news of Germany's ultimatum, gained the upper hand. On the afternoon of August 3, Grey appeared before Parliament, and in a masterly address called upon the British people to respect their "obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian Treaty." That evening the Cabinet decided to demand the withdrawal of Germany's ultimatum. Germany refused, and at midnight August 4 war began. Only two determined pacifists resigned from the Cabinet, giving certain proof of the extent to which the infringement of Belgian neutrality had united the country.

Meantime, the German armies moved with swift precision to encircle the French forces already advancing, as expected, upon the German left wing in Alsace-Lorraine. Schlieffen's original plan had called for three armies in the Alsace sector. These were to fight a holding battle, gradually retreating to lure the French on until they would butt their heads fruitlessly against the fortified places about Metz. While the majority of French forces were thus occupied, four stronger armies on the right wing were to cross Belgium into France, pivot on Dusseldorf, and describe a long arc just north of Paris, driving the disordered French into the net which was being prepared for them. Helmuth von Moltke, Schlieffen's successor, had weakened this brilliant plan by strengthening the armies in Alsace and allowing them to assume the offensive. The right was therefore weakened, but for the first several weeks it carried out its scheduled operations with comparative ease. Luxemburg was occupied on August 2, Belgium overrun by August 23, Paris in danger of encirclement to the northeast by September 3. The exhausted Belgian army and the small British expeditionary forces seemed incapable of stemming the tide which threatened to sweep all before it. Only serious weaknesses in the German line, appearing as communications lengthened, and the ability of General Joffre, French commander in chief, to use these advantageously, saved the Allies from complete disaster. Moltke's weakening of the right now proved disastrous. Joffre gathered together British and French troops and awaited the proper moment to strike. Beginning September 5, he drove a wedge into a twenty-mile gap which had opened between the German First and Second armies. As the wedge penetrated, the German staff justifiably feared encirclement, and a general retreat was ordered on September 9. This first Battle of the Marne was decisive only in the sense that it completely frustrated Germany's hope of inflicting a swift defeat upon France. By September 16, the German armies had completed an orderly re-

FRENCH WARFARE

Zigzagged trenches communicating with advanced and rear lines were so constructed to provide protection against murderous fire down the line by the attacker.

treat to the Aisne river, where they dug themselves into almost impregnable entrenchments and defied their enemies for four years.

With the retreat to the Aisne, the war took on a new character. Except for efforts that same autumn to outflank each other in the flat and marshy plains of Flanders, and the memorable Battle of Tannenberg in the east, the war of movement had ceased. Both sides entrenched themselves and settled down to a test of endurance, to a war of attrition which was to be won not on the field of battle but by the starvation and utter exhaustion of millions of civilians. In a struggle such as this, fortune favors that side which controls the routes of transportation and commands the greatest resources in man power, goods, and technical skill. To attain such command both sides sought friends and allies among neutral states and attempted to cut off each other's sources of supplies.

Italy was unquestionably the choicest of the neutral Powers on the continent. If she joined with the Allies, Austria would be further imperiled by the necessity of dividing her armies for use on three fronts, while France, freed from menace in the Alps, could concentrate attention entirely upon Germany. If Italy threw her weight with Austria and Germany, France would be weakened and Austria strengthened. Both sides consequently bid heavily for Italian support. At first,

however, Italian public opinion, under the influence of the pacific Socialist and Catholic press, seemed determined to remain aloof. The government consequently made use of an escape clause in the Triple Alliance treaty, formally declared its neutrality, and announced its intention of pursuing its own interests. A sudden and determined shift of public sentiment against Austria soon dictated a more definite policy. Profiting by its favored position in relation to the belligerents, the government proceeded to bargain simultaneously with each. Austria was asked to cede the Irredentist territories (Trentino, Trieste, Istria), give Italy control of Albania, and bestow upon her certain cherished places on the Dalmatian Coast. In return, Italy promised to help Austria. Under German pressure, Austria finally consented to meet some of these demands, but the total price was higher than any government could afford. Meanwhile, France and Great Britain, with nothing to lose, could be more generous with Austria's territory. On April 26, 1915, while Italy was still negotiating with Austria, she signed the secret Treaty of London with France and Great Britain. Beside recognizing Italy's claims to the Irredentist provinces, the Dalmatian Coast with certain of its islands, and her right to dominate Albania, this treaty agreed to share both Turkish and German possessions with her at the end of the war. Italy agreed to denounce the Triple Alliance, and on May 23 she declared war upon Austria.

Before Italy cast her lot with the Allies, Germany had already won the support of Turkey, with whom she signed a secret treaty as early as August 2, 1914. The Allies remained completely ignorant of this engagement and continued to bid for Turkey's aid until the end of October. At last, in the middle of November, the Sultan proclaimed a holy war against the British, French, and Russians. With heavy Moslem populations under her jurisdiction, Great Britain was most alarmed at this turn of events. Strenuous efforts were made to keep the lid on Egypt and defend the Suez. To prevent the rich oil fields at the head of the Persian Gulf from passing into Germany's hands, an overly ambitious expedition was sent to Bagdad. In the early spring and summer of 1915, the British likewise attempted to seize Constantinople by storming the Dardanelles, followed by a land offensive on the Gallipoli peninsula. This project ended in a complete fiasco. For two years the Turks held out successfully against their enemies.

Meanwhile, the Balkan states were eagerly courted. Bulgaria, in particular, enjoyed a favored position. For her support, both the Allied and Central Powers were prepared to offer portions of Serbian

Macedonia, territory from Greece, and even compensation at the expense of Turkey. In this case, the Central Powers could better afford extravagant generosity. Despite high bids, King Ferdinand, Bulgaria's crafty and unscrupulous sovereign, held out until victory seemed certain for one side or the other. In October, 1915, fortune seemed to favor Germany when a determined Austro-German attack upon Serbia was begun by the redoubtable Mackensen. On October 12, Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in the attack. By the end of the following month, the Serbian armies were driven in complete disorder across the mountains of Albania. Except for Rumania in the north and Greece in the south, the Central Powers now dominated the Balkans. The Baltic Sea and the Persian Gulf were almost linked, forming an expanse of territory which was not only rich in man power and resources but which also practically isolated Russia from her western allies.

Rumania and Greece fell as prizes of uncertain value to the Allied Powers. The former, in much the same position as Italy before the war, was officially connected with the Triple Alliance but was drawn by interest toward the side of the Triple Entente. So long as the Hapsburgs held millions of Rumanian nationals in Transylvania, an alliance with Austria-Hungary was literally meaningless. The aged Hohenzollern king, Carol I, hoped to keep his written promises, but public opinion was largely against him. The government therefore declared its neutrality when hostilities opened, though it soon bargained with both sides. Finally in August, 1916, when a Russian offensive against Austria proved brilliantly successful, Rumania threw her lot with the Allies. On the seventeenth of that month, a treaty was signed granting her her maximum demands in the Banat, the Bukovina, and Transylvania. Ten days later she declared war upon Austria. Swift retributions followed. Under the leadership of two German generals, von Falkenhayn and von Mackensen, a terrible pincers closed upon Bucharest, which fell before Christmas of 1916. The Rumanian army, in considerable disorder, withdrew toward the Russian frontier where it remained in enforced idleness for the rest of the war. Rumania's declaration of war had proved to be a blessing in disguise for the Central Powers. By her swift defeat, their front in the Balkans had shrunken several hundred miles, and much-needed resources of grain, minerals, and oil fell into German hands.

Greece was even more of a problem to the Allies, although in the end she provided them with an invaluable base in the Balkans. When the war broke out, councils of government were much divided over

the course to follow, but Venizelos, the Premier and the most powerful figure in public life, believed that only the Allies could win and satisfy the Greek dream of empire. Between him and the pro-German King Constantine no agreement was possible so Greece officially declared her neutrality. Then followed an exhibition of revolting intrigues among the contending factions in Greece, and of Machiavellian diplomacy on the part of France and Great Britain. Venizelos, on his responsibility, promised aid to the Allies, and invited them to send troops to Salonika (October, 1915). Constantine vainly protested, but managed nevertheless to preserve momentarily the fiction of neutrality. During 1916, Venizelos, determined that Greece should join the Allies, plotted with the French and British for the overthrow of the monarchy. A republic, which he proclaimed, promptly received the support of these two Powers who shelled and starved the opposition into submission. Neutrals and belligerents, especially the United States and Russia, were so shocked at this procedure that France and Great Britain decided to let matters stand for the time being. Their scruples disappeared completely, however, after Russia collapsed and the United States joined the war. June 11, 1917, Constantine was compelled to abdicate, and less than a month thereafter Greece declared war upon Germany. Meanwhile, the accumulating Allied forces in Greece languished in idleness.

As diplomats battled for Balkan aid, most of the remaining important neutrals became ensnared in the meshes of war. Japan, covetous of German possessions in the Pacific area, cast her lot with the Allies early in August, 1914, and little Portugal followed suit three months later. Except for Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, the whole of continental Europe had thus been drawn into the conflict. The neutrality which these managed to preserve was constantly endangered. The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries were, unquestionably, in the least enviable position. In close proximity to Germany, they provided the means for the Central Powers to reach out to the western hemisphere for badly needed supplies. Even with Britain's mastery of the seas, the economic strangulation of Germany might have been less prompt had the neutrality of these states been fully and completely respected. Great Britain, however, undeterred by international law, declared a blockade in the whole area of the North Sea. The little neutrals were thus cut off from the outside world almost as completely as Germany itself. Their protests were ignored by the British admiralty which, before the end of the war, high-handedly rationed supplies among

them. Even the cry of starving civilians in Germany failed to arouse the humanitarian sympathies of the British public.

The British navy was tightening the noose about Germany's neck. The Kaiser and his advisers had hardly calculated upon such an eventuality, since they confidently expected that France would capitulate within a few months. Moreover, an open challenge to the superior British fleet seemed too dangerous to risk. The German navy, except for a few ships which managed to prey upon allied commerce, was therefore kept on the defensive, behind the impregnable fortress of Heligoland. Occasional sallies to the British coast were designed chiefly to weaken civilian morale. When it appeared that the war might last indefinitely and as the problem of food supplies became serious, the German authorities determined to do something to break the blockade. In February, 1915, a submarine campaign was announced. All enemy merchant vessels, within a specified zone about the British Isles, were warned that they might be sunk and that it might be impossible to save crews and passengers. This campaign reached its climax in May, 1915, with the sinking of the *Lusitania*, after which it was stopped at the forcible insistence of the United States. The submarine having failed to produce satisfactory results, Admiral Scheer, newly appointed commander of the High Seas fleet, decided to divide the British forces in the North Sea, wear down their tonnage superiority, and then, if possible, inflict a fatal blow. The British had advance news of the plan, and on May 31, 1916, when the flower of the German navy sallied forth toward the coast of Norway the two fleets seemed prepared to engage in battle. Strategy, the elements, and technical skill were with the Germans, but they were overwhelmingly outnumbered and outweighed. Scheer cunningly avoided combat, eluded the British, and took his crippled fleet back in safety. This battle of Jutland was really not a battle at all, although it was the most important event in the uneventful struggle of the war. It was decisive only in the fact that it demonstrated clearly to the Germans the utter futility of trying to break the blockade by ordinary means.

By December, 1916, acute food shortage and a desire to win the war by starving Great Britain induced the German command to revive submarine warfare, despite the fear of American intervention. Announced in February, 1917, the new submarine campaign reached its stride in April, when one of every four ships leaving British waters was sunk, and a total of almost a million tons of Allied shipping

destroyed. Starvation by Christmas threatened, until the convoying of merchant ships was found to be an effective means of defense. By September, sufficient destroyers had been released for this purpose to cut losses to twenty percent of the April total, and by the end of the year the menace had largely passed.

The most significant result of the submarine campaign was American entrance into the war. Subjected to subtle and concentrated propaganda chiefly from the *Entente* but also from the Central Powers, bound to Europe by financial ties, its shipping interfered with everywhere on the high seas, the United States was able with great difficulty to maintain neutrality for two and a half years. Great Britain was the first to give offense through her blockade of the North Sea. Strong protests were registered at London, but Wilson and his advisers at Washington hesitated to implement these with forceful measures, especially since bankers, business men, and the public press manifested a keen solicitude for the Allied cause. It was otherwise with the Germans. When the first submarine campaign was announced, President Wilson sternly warned the German government that it would be held to "strict accountability" for possible loss of American life and property. Within a month one American had drowned on a torpedoed British boat, and two American ships were sunk. While President Wilson was finishing a strong protest against these sinkings, there came the great tragedy of the *Lusitania* (May 7, 1915) with the loss of more than 1,000 persons, 114 of whom were Americans.[1] The American government immediately demanded a disavowal of the act, reparation, and a promise from Germany that it would prevent the recurrence of such incidents. In essence, what President Wilson wanted was to subject submarines to the same rules of war as larger vessels. For technical reasons this was impossible and would have meant complete renunciation of submarine warfare.[2] The German government, neither wishing to deprive itself of an effective instrument of war nor to offend the United States too deeply, sought

[1] American citizens had been warned not to sail on the *Lusitania*, both because of the fact that its course took it through the restricted area and because it was known to carry munitions of war. Moreover, it appears now that the heavy loss of life was due chiefly to the negligence of the ship's Captain Turner, who ignored warnings of the British admiralty to change his course and was culpably negligent in not giving passengers adequate lifeboat drills and in not keep his lifeboats in good condition.

[2] The submarine was too small to save passengers and crews. Moreover, it was completely helpless above the water. If it rose to give warning, it was threatened with destruction by any armed merchant ship. If enemy merchant boats had used their own flags, it might have been possible to save neutral shipping but all the belligerents, Great Britain in particular, freely used neutral flags.

to straddle the dilemma and finally, out of deference to Wilson, postponed submarine warfare indefinitely in March, 1916.

Meanwhile, American sentiment shifted steadily toward the Allied cause, under the influence of business, financial, and cultural interests. Nevertheless, President Wilson remained firm in his determination to preserve American neutrality. This, he believed, was the mandate of the people who re-elected him in the famous campaign of 1916. As late as January, 1917, he remarked to his intimate friend, Colonel House, that "This country does not intend to become involved in this war." Yet a month later, diplomatic relations with Germany were severed. This somewhat sudden though not unexpected change of policy was provoked by the German revival of submarine warfare. Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, after vainly seeking to dissuade his government, submitted the notice of its decision to Secretary Lansing on January 31. Three days later Bernstorff was given his passports. President Wilson, still not convinced that this meant war, sought to negotiate a peace between the belligerents. When these efforts failed, he reluctantly decided to take the final step, and, in a special message to Congress on April 2, called for war against Germany. By an overwhelming majority Congress declared war four days later.[1]

When America joined hands with the Allies, the Central Powers still enjoyed a superficial advantage. Even though German offensives on the western front had produced no significant results, neither had the Allies been able to penetrate behind the German lines. In fact, serious mutinies in the French army made it seem likely that French morale would crack, while suffering from the submarine campaign intensified defeatism in Great Britain. In October, 1917, the Italian armies were disastrously defeated at Caporetto and forced to retreat behind the Piave. Two months later, Russia withdrew from the war, after experiencing a violent revolution, and in March, 1918, signed with Germany the peace of Brest-Litovsk. Rumania shortly followed suit. In the meantime, Allied victories were confined to minor advances on the western front and to successful engagements against Turkey. The German staff had reason to feel that if the strength of the nation could hold out a little longer, the war might yet be won in the west, before the weight of American man power had been thrown into the scales. With this end in view, war production was geared to its highest peak, and troops concentrated at strategic points

[1] Cuba, Panama, Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, Liberia, Siam, and China shortly followed America's example.

for the final and greatest offensive. In March, the storm broke, and continued with steadily diminishing fury until July. The German troops, attacking with extraordinary ferocity, recovered recent British gains in Flanders, drove the British back to Amiens, and penetrated behind the French lines to the Marne, within striking distance of Paris. At almost any one of the great salients which had thus been driven into the Allied lines victory might have been snatched had Germany possessed the requisite strength.

The prolonged strain of war had everywhere produced weariness and distress among the embattled peoples of Europe. Russia had been the first to feel its consequences seriously but none of the other powers was immune from dangers brooding underneath. Defeatism was rife in Italy, dangerously active in France, growing in Great Britain. Socialists and pacifists became increasingly critical, and everywhere strong measures were necessary to keep discipline intact and martial fervor alive. In this test of endurance, the Allies, possessed of inexhaustible resources, had a decisive advantage over the Central Powers whom they gradually strangled. The food situation, bad in 1915, became very acute in 1918, resulting in widespread riots which no amount of German organizing skill could prevent. Demoralization of the civilian population spread also to the army, provoking mutiny and rebellion. Even so, Germany might have lasted longer had not her allies succumbed.

Completely exhausted, Bulgaria was the first to capitulate. Almost continuous fighting since the first Balkan war had worn down her man power, while civilian morale was cracked by bad harvests and insufficient food. During the summer of 1918, the army literally melted away as thousands of soldiers deserted, and when, in September, the Allies attacked, the feeble remnant fled in terror. Appeals to Germany and Austria having passed unheeded, the government at Sofia begged the Allies for peace. On September 29, a tentative agreement was reached, and on October 3, after Ferdinand had abdicated, an armistice was signed. A little more than three weeks later (October 30) Turkey followed the same course after British troops, with Arab aid, had driven back the Turkish armies and occupied Damascus and Aleppo.

The defection of Bulgaria, with the resulting threat to Austria from allied powers in the Balkans, was a terrible blow to the enfeebled Hapsburg Empire. Food was almost unobtainable, and heroic attempts by the government to put the citizenry on rations provoked popular rebellion. The army, never trustworthy or dependable, was

falling apart under the pressure of nationalist movements which gained in strength as Hapsburg authority weakened. After the aged Franz Josef died in 1916, his successor, Karl, sought to save what he could by fathering constitutional government. The Nationalist parties would have none of this, with the result that repeated efforts to assemble a national Reichstag ended in miserable failures. Karl then tried to negotiate peace with the Allies, and when this was contemptuously scorned, he made elaborate promises of autonomy to the various nationalities in the Empire, cloaking these under Wilson's Fourteen Points. Perhaps these would have been acceptable a few years before, but in 1918, the subject nationalities would have nothing less than complete independence. Moreover, President Wilson, on October 21, let it be known that his sympathies lay with the latter. A "Federal State" which had been hopefully decreed on the fifteenth thereupon collapsed. Hungary denounced the Ausgleich on the twenty-third, and, in the meantime, South Slavs and Czechs set up their own governments. While the Hapsburg Empire was disintegrating, the Italian army resumed the offensive. Attacked on October 29, the Austrian army fled in complete disorder. An armistice, requested on the following day, was signed on November 2.

The withdrawal of her three allies made Germany's increasingly dangerous situation desperate. The great advances on the western front between March and July had used up the last ounce of energy, extended the battle line beyond the capacity of her depleted man power, and exposed her to withering attacks from the Allies. Moreover, the Allies had at last sufficiently reconciled their differences to centralize the command under the persevering French General, Foch. In August, he began a series of simultaneous attacks along the entire front. These continued through October, until the Germans were driven behind the Hindenburg line, their last and most famous trench system, and were compelled to relinquish two-thirds of the territory they had captured in France. On September 29, Ludendorff, the German Chief of Staff, gave up all hope of victory and persuaded the Kaiser to seek an armistice. President Wilson was consequently requested, early in October, to use his influence for the restoration of peace. When he replied that the Armistice must be such as to make revival of war impossible, the military experts protested, since they had hoped merely for a rest period in which to reconstruct their lines. The civilian authorities would not hear of further delay and, on October 23, the President's demands were officially accepted. Ger-

Wide World

THE ARMISTICE CAR

In this railway car the Germans, in November, 1918, accepted the armistice terms imposed by the victorious Allied and Associated Powers. France preserved it as a national monument. In June, 1940, the conquering Nazis summoned the beaten French to this car to make formal recognition of their defeat. The car was then removed to Germany as a trophy of victory.

many's request for an armistice was then turned over to the Allied military experts in France for consideration.

Generals Foch, Haig, Pétain, and Pershing met on October 25 to discuss terms. Opinions varied from Haig's request for moderation to Pershing's protest that the Germans be given no armistice at all. The terms which were finally agreed upon were then submitted to the political authorities of the Allied governments, working through a steering committee composed of the prime ministers of France, Great Britain, and Italy (Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando), and Colonel House, who represented the United States. After lengthy and heated discussions, the terms were put into final form by November 4. The Germans, notified immediately, sent a commission to meet with General Foch on November 8. They were asked to accept the terms within seventy-two hours under the threat of a resumption of hostilities. Next day, the German government fell, and on November 10 the provisional government accepted the armistice which was definitely signed the morning of November 11. Germany was compelled to evacuate France and Belgium, supply the

Allies at once with huge quantities of guns, munitions, railway materials, and ships, renounce the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, and promise to pay reparations for all the damages she had inflicted upon her enemies.

By the armistice with Germany, fighting ceased, and the greatest war of human history had all but legally terminated. Thirty-three nations had been locked in a conflict which had cost the lives of over eight million soldiers, and the partial or permanent disablement of some twenty million more. This does not include those who died of starvation or disease for which the war was responsible. Direct monetary costs have been placed at approximately two hundred billion dollars, and the indirect costs at one hundred and fifty more. Perhaps worst of all, the economic life of the entire world was deranged beyond hope of immediate recovery, and the whole of western society brought to the brink of ruin.

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Chapter XXXI

The Search for Security

A. Idealism and Practical Politics

Perhaps no group of men has ever borne a heavier burden of responsibility than did those statesmen who assembled in Paris in January, 1919, to dictate a peace to Germany. The peoples of the world, unutterably weary of war, looked to them for peace and guaranteed security. Peace meant a cessation of war, but what constituted a guaranty of security? On that question there was and is a tragic difference of opinion. Peoples schooled in patriotism and whipped raw by nationalistic propaganda can see only one kind of security, their own. It is not strange after four years of horror, four years during which nationalism was kept at white-hot heat, that the statesmen sought not the ideal security of all but the politically practical security of their own people. The armistice had silenced the guns and halted the marching men, but the world was still in the clutch of a horrid fear. War psychosis was the greatest obstacle to a just and lasting peace. Men sought not justice but vengeance. Uppermost in the minds of the majority were two demands: first, that Germany be made to pay the cost of the war; and, second, that Germany be shorn of her strength so that she might never again menace the status quo. There were few who understood the causes of the war and they were as voices crying in the wilderness. So often had the Allies claimed that Germany alone was responsible that they finally believed it. Besides, Germany had been beaten. Did that not prove that justice was on the side of her enemies? The gods of war had spoken.

Nor was war psychosis the only problem which confronted the peacemakers at Versailles. Their *quondam* ally, Russia, had come under the control of the ambitious Bolsheviks, and conservative statesmen shuddered at the well-founded fear that communism might spread. Economic distress in Germany, which the continuing block-

ade rendered more dreadful, made that country peculiarly susceptible to Russian influence. It was because of the common horror at the new Russian regime that Paris, rather than Geneva which had been suggested at first, was chosen as a meeting place for the conference. Wilson, especially, feared communist influence in the Swiss city. All the great statesmen felt that something must be done to check the new Russia, and they wasted much time in fruitless discussions of ways and means.

Literally scores of minority interests sent agents to plead their cases and their often opposing demands constituted another problem which had to be solved. The Wilsonian declaration of the principle of self-determination roused the hopes of minority groups ranging from Polish nationalists to the advocates of a reconstituted Zion. All sought independence of former masters, feeling that that way lay security. Again and again these minority aspirations rose to bedevil the powers that were.

Moreover, all the important statesmen at Paris were hampered by either personal or national promises made prior to the conference. All had made the gesture of accepting President Wilson's Fourteen Points as a basis for the peace, but actually he alone felt bound by them or sought to translate them into practice. Lloyd George had thought it necessary to strengthen his position by holding a general election before the Conference met and in his election speeches he had promised, among other things, to hang the Kaiser and to saddle the cost of the war upon Germany. Clemenceau was bound by no such promise, but France and Great Britain were both committed by treaties which they had made with Italy and Russia during the war. These secret treaties, which were in the nature of bribes, apportioned the enemy territory among the Powers. Russia was to be given Constantinople and other territory in the Near East; Italy, the Austrian Tyrol, the Dalmatian Coast of the Adriatic, and colonies. The Allied promises to Russia had been repudiated by the Soviets, but Italian memories were as keen as her ambitions and she had to be considered.

The organization of the conference was in itself a very considerable task. There were jammed into Paris over one thousand official delegates, representing the twenty-seven participating nations, and a huge number of experts, lobbyists, and secretaries. Adherence to the Wilsonian principle of "Open covenants . . . openly arrived at . . ." would have made necessary the participation of all these peoples in the making of the peace. This was not only a physical impossibility; it was also regarded by the Great Powers as antithetical

to their interests. In the end, eight general sessions were held, but only the one dealing with the League of Nations was of any importance, and that session, it may be noted, was not open but secret. In the last analysis, the terms of the peace were arranged by the heads of the three Great Powers: the United States, France, and Great Britain. They were assisted by various committees but the final decision rested with three men: Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. Personalities were far more important than organization.

Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, was the most powerful if not the most imposing individual in the world in 1919. His various wartime speeches, and particularly the Fourteen Points,[1] which he had laid down as a basis for peace, made him the champion of what the world hoped would be a new order. He was an idealist and an autocrat who apparently enjoyed a sublime self-confidence. He was perhaps at his best on a lecture platform and at his worst in the give and take of a politician's conference. His wisdom and his judgment are open to debate but no one can deny the indomitable courage or absolute sincerity with which he championed what he thought was right. He stood alone for what he considered a just peace, never realizing that, like all other men, his sense of justice had been warped in the inferno of the War.

Georges Clemenceau, the Tiger of France, had won his nickname by a long lifetime of often unscrupulous belligerency. A disillusioned and cynical old man of 78, he vividly remembered the Prussian humiliation of France. The Conference of Versailles was to him an opportunity to guarantee forever his nation against Germany. No idealism for a universal good moved Clemenceau. His devotion was to France and to her alone. Keen-witted, experienced, and owning no aim but the future security of his country, he was a powerful and awesome figure.

[1] The Fourteen Points were embodied in an address delivered on Jan. 8, 1918, in New York City. Briefly they were as follows: (1) open covenants . . . openly arrived at; (2) complete freedom of the seas; (3) the removal of economic barriers; (4) adequate guarantees of international arms reduction; (5) impartial adjustment of colonial claims with attention to the interests of the populations concerned; (6) evacuation of all Russian territory and the recognition of the right of Russia to pursue her own course of political development; (7) evacuation and restoration of Belgium; (8) restoration of all French territory, ". . . and the wrong done . . . in 1871 . . . righted . . . ,"; (9) readjustment of the frontiers of Italy on the basis of nationality; (10) the autonomous development of the peoples of Austria-Hungary; (11) rehabilitation of the Balkans along the lines of national and economic independence; (12) maintenance of Turkish sovereignty over Turkish peoples, with the promise of autonomy to other peoples in the empire, and the permanent opening of the Straits; (13) the erection of an independent Poland which should have free access to the sea; (14) the formation of a general association of nations to guarantee the future political and territorial integrity.

BIG FOUR AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Reading from left to right, the "Big Four" are Orlando, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Wilson.

Less awesome but equally powerful and astute was the little Welshman, David Lloyd George. Born with the gifts of a quick wit and a magnetic personality, L. G., as his associates called him, had developed the qualities of leadership in the hurly-burly of British politics. Details he scorned to know, those were for subordinates to study and settle. His eyes were on the main issues, and he was a past master in the art of opportunism. Moreover, his position was peculiarly favorable since Britain had already won her main objective when the Conference opened.

These three were from time to time assisted or hindered by various lesser lights. Wilson's chief confidant and adviser throughout most of the Conference was Colonel E. M. House. Clemenceau was supported and advised by André Tardieu, and Arthur Balfour played second fiddle to Lloyd George. The demands of Italy were presented by Vittorio Orlando. Of some prestige and not without influence were Venizelos of Greece, Beneš of Czechoslovakia, Paderewski of Poland, and Koo of China.

Clemenceau and Lloyd George paid lip service to the Fourteen Points, but only Wilson sought to realize them and he was forced many times to compromise his ideals. The fundamental touchstone of the settlement was security as interpreted by the various Powers. The peace treaty was grounded on the assertion that Germany was responsible for the war. Not only was it the common belief of the peoples of the Allied and Associated Powers, it was also the only speciously valid basis for demanding that Germany make reparations to the Allies. Article 231 of the treaty which the German representatives were forced to sign on June 28, 1919, read as follows:

> The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Unfair as this statement is now realized to be, it must be remembered that no less would have satisfied the peoples of the victorious powers. This was the war psychosis in action.

It was also primarily the force of public opinion which drove the peacemakers into demanding huge reparations from Germany. France had suffered a tangible material loss of approximately $6,000,000,000, it was to be expected that she would be unyielding in her demands for compensation. Britain's losses were far less, but Lloyd George himself had once promised his constituents that Germany would pay $120,000,000,000. Neither he nor Clemenceau dared to be moderate, and even Wilson, apparently, was determined that the fallen foe be made to pay. When it came to the actual drafting of the treaty, the three were faced with a dilemma. Germany could not pay if they set the figure too high, but it would have been political suicide to make it moderately low. They finally demanded $5,000,000,000, to be paid in two years as a first installment, and then established a Reparations Commission to set the final amount. In an effort to guarantee payment, the treaty provided that Germany should support an Allied army of occupation in the Rhineland until she at least had satisfied this Commission as to her good faith.

Having saddled Germany with a crushing burden of debt, the victors, with a most unfortunate short-sightedness, proceeded to render her incapable of meeting her obligations. She was forced to make restitution for the shipping she had destroyed by ceding most of her

merchant marine to the various Allied Powers and by building new ships for them. Her economic resources were in large measure impounded to pay for the rebuilding of devastated areas in France and she was required to furnish thousands of tons of coal to Italy, Belgium, and France. By direct annexation or by annexation cloaked under plebiscites she was deprived of the economically important areas of Alsace-Lorraine, Posen, Danzig, a strip of West Prussia, and large portions of Schleswig and Upper Silesia. In addition, she lost the rich region of the Saar for fifteen years. These concessions were not counted as part payment of reparations, nor was she given any credit for her forced surrender of her overseas possessions. The forfeiture of her colonies represented a very real loss of invested capital, but since they had never paid for themselves, she was really relieved of a considerable financial burden. That was small comfort, however, for the injury done to German pride.

In a vain attempt to attain security by rendering Germany impotent, her army was reduced to 100,000 officers and men; her fortifications were destroyed; her production of war material was limited, and she was forbidden to import any, and her navy was cut down to a skeleton patrol force. She was also forced to promise the surrender of the Kaiser and other high officials for trial by an international court.

Wilson put his trust not in these provisions but in the project nearest his heart, the League of Nations. He was adamantine in his insistence that the treaty of peace contain the charter of such a world union. Clemenceau and Lloyd George were not enthusiastic about the plan, and they used it as a pawn in their bargaining with the American. It is fair to say that the vengeful terms imposed upon Germany was the price Wilson had to pay for his League. He, at least, was satisfied with the bargain.

The "covenant" or constitution of the League, which was written into the treaty, provided for an assembly, a council, and a secretariat. The assembly which was really a forum for the discussion of international problems was to include delegates from all member powers. In it was vested control of the budget,[1] the right to admit or expel members, and the power to appoint committees. The council, which was the executive body, was made up of the agents of the Great Powers. It was to act as a mediator in all disputes, to take action

[1] The League was to be supported by contributions from its members.

against an aggressor nation, and to supervise mandates. Both the council and the assembly were to be in session only intermittently. The secretariat, a permanent body, was set up to carry on between sessions and to perform the necessary clerical and research tasks.

The League had four major purposes: (1) to prevent war; (2) to organize peace; (3) to execute certain provisions of the Treaty of Versailles; and (4) to forward co-operative world action in matters of general concern. To aid the League in performing these functions the treaty established two supplementary bodies: the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labor Organization. The "World Court," as it was usually called, consisted of fifteen justices appointed by the Assembly and Council of the League. This court was in permanent session at The Hague and was empowered to adjudicate any dispute referred to it by the contending parties and to give advisory opinions when asked to do so by the League. The Labor Organization was entrusted with the task of studying labor conditions throughout the world with a view to discovering and recommending improvements. It has proved to be one of the most effective and valuable bodies set up by the treaty.

Partly because of mutual fears and jealous suspicions and partly out of deference to Wilson, the enemy colonies were not openly partitioned among the Powers. Instead they were given the name of "mandates" and distributed among the various "mandatory" powers to administer under the guidance of the League of Nations. To further complicate matters, the mandates were divided into three classes.[1] The "Class A" group, comprising the Turkish possessions in the Near East, were shortly to be given independence. The former German colonies in Africa except one were put in "Class B," and were to be given independence eventually. "Class C" mandates in-

[1] A full list of the mandates is as follows:

	Area	*Mandatory*	*New Name*
Class A	North Syria	France	
	South Syria	Great Britain	Palestine, Transjordania
	Mesopotamia	Great Britain	Iraq
Class B	German East Africa	Great Britain Belgium	Tanganyika Territory Ruanda-Urandi
	Togoland	France, Great Britain	
	Kamerun	France, Great Britain	
Class C	German South Sea Islands	Japan	
	German New Guinea	Australia	
	German Samoa	New Zealand	
	Naurau Island	Great Britain	
	German South West Africa	Union of South Africa	

cluded the former German colony of Southwest Africa and various islands in the Pacific. No provision was made for the granting of independence to these mandates which were virtually annexed to the mandatory powers.

Since the Treaty of Versailles dealt only with Germany it was necessary to make separate treaties with her allies. Austria signed, on September 10, 1919, the Treaty of St. Germain which reduced her to a state of penurious impotence. From her once great empire was created in whole or in part the new nations of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia. She was also forced to cede territory to Italy and to Rumania; to give up her seaports; to reduce her army; and to pay an indemnity.

The Treaty of Neuilly, which Bulgaria was forced to sign on November 27, 1919, confirmed Rumania's possession of Dobrudja, deprived Bulgaria of the Thracian coast, which went to Greece, and of most of Macedonia, which was handed over to Jugoslavia. Bulgaria also was required to cut down her army and to pay an indemnity.

Hungary fared no better. The Treaty of the Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, reduced her territory from 125,000 to 36,000 square miles and her population from 22,000,000 to 8,000,000. The new states were again the chief beneficiaries. Czechoslovakia was given the Slovak province; Croatia and part of the Banat were ceded to Jugoslavia; and Rumania was enriched by Transylvania, the remainder of the Banat and other lands. The Hungarian army was also limited.

Disputes among the Allies and a civil disruption in Turkey held up the peace settlement with that empire. Finally the sultan's government accepted the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), but a group of nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal, repudiated it. This "strong man" of Turkey backed up his refusal with effective, forceful resistance. The situation cleared when, under cover of a Græco-Turkish War (1921-22) and aided by France and Italy, Mustafa Kemal made himself master of a new Turkey. A very delicate series of negotiations led to the Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed on July 24, 1923. Since Turkey participated in these negotiations she became the only defeated power who escaped a dictated peace. She was, however, forced to consent to the demilitarization and internationalization of the Straits and to the loss of Palestine, Syria, Transjordania, Mesopotamia, and the Hejaz.

One other country also made separate treaties of peace. The Senate of the United States refused to ratify the general European treaties and the United States remained technically at war until treaties were made with Germany, Austria, and Hungary in 1921.

B. Aftermath and Retribution

The victory of the Allies was construed by casual observers in the early post-war years as the crowning glory of constitutionalism and democracy. The old autocracies had vanished with the smoke of battle, and the "people" had at last gathered the reins of power into their own hands. Idealists believed this presaged a new era of international peace and understanding, guaranteed by the League of Nations, itself a manifestation of successful democracy. Such unbounded faith in the rationality of men and the selfless effacement of democracies was hardly justified by the treaties and the short-sighted policies of the victors. Democracy itself, faced with unprecedented problems of social and economic reconstruction which it could not everywhere solve successfully, was on trial.

In England, the mother of modern democracies, constitutional government was put to a very severe test. Even before the war, British industrial supremacy had been rudely shaken by the expansion of industrialization to both hemispheres. The restoration of peace left this situation unimproved, for the war had impoverished many buyers and had encouraged the growing independence of others. Japan had captured much of the textile trade of China; India was producing an ever-increasing share of goods for its own markets; and the United States challenged London's supremacy in the financial markets of the world. Shortly after the peace of Versailles there began in Great Britain a prolonged depression, unequaled by anything in British history. Trade fell off with alarming speed, and as unemployment increased the distress of labor led to a growing number of strikes which culminated in the nine-day "general strike" of 1926. Under the circumstances, Liberal, Conservative and Labor Governments alike resorted to the most extraordinary palliatives. Believing that part of the difficulties resulted from outmoded business methods and organization, the Government encouraged, sometimes through direct subsidies, the scrapping of old machinery and the introduction of new manufacturing processes. Industries were induced to establish measures of self-regulation, and attempts were made at controlling markets and prices. Great public works pro-

grams were devised, the best known of which was the slum clearance and housing project. Free trade was abandoned for protective tariffs, limited only by preferential rates accorded to the Dominions. To solve the distressing conditions of unemployment, which the social legislation of pre-war years had not relieved, a system of doles was instituted. These drastic measures improved conditions, but did not solve the problem of economic stagnation, so that unemployment remained a chronic sore in British life.

The economic misfortunes of the country naturally influenced British politics. After the war Lloyd George's Government was retained, but its life was rendered precarious by its inability to solve the Irish question and by the problem of unemployment. In 1922 the Ministry was defeated by the Laborites and Conservatives in a general election, and a Conservative Government was established. Two years later the growing Labor Party, led by Ramsay MacDonald, formed its first Ministry, after both Coalition and Conservative Governments had failed to meet the pressing problems of economic distress. This Labor Party, founded in the early twentieth century, had grown steadily before the war and had now reached the proportions of a major party. It was not a revolutionary workers' organization, since it expected to socialize government through constitutional means. Even if it had aimed at radical reforms, its plans would have been frustrated by the large representations of both Conservatives and Liberals in the House of Commons. During its first brief ministry little was done to relieve the conditions of unemployment, although Russia was recognized in the hope that the revival of Russian trade might lead to some material improvement. MacDonald's negotiations with the Soviet aroused both the Liberals and Conservatives who withdrew their support from the Cabinet and forced a general election. This produced an ample Conservative majority, assuring Conservative Government under Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin for the next five years. Baldwin had as little success with the problem of unemployment as his predecessors, and in the general elections of 1929 the Labor Party, advancing an elaborate program of social reforms, gained enough seats to force its resignation. MacDonald, however, as in his first ministry, did not have a clear majority in Parliament, and, having to rely upon the support of Liberals and Conservatives, was compelled to limit his Party's program. He had to content himself with a liberalization of unemployment insurance, and arrangements for prices and marketing in the much-harassed mining industries. Indeed, as the

depression of the 30's set in, the prospect of undertaking further expensive social reforms became much obscured. Faced with mounting deficits, the Government was compelled to increase taxes or curtail social security expenses. The Labor Party split on this issue and MacDonald resigned (1931), to head a National Coalition Government supported in part by a section of the Labor Party, the National Liberals, and an embarrassingly large body of Conservatives.

Meanwhile, the British Government was faced with the most perplexing imperial problems. Although the Dominions had cooperated faithfully in the war, their spirit of independence had gained strength during its prosecution. South Africa, Canada, and Australia emerged as virtually independent nations, tied to the mother country by only a few common interests and the tenuous connection of the British crown. Successive Imperial Conferences (1917, 1926, 1930) fully recognized this fact, confirmed in 1931 by the Statute of Westminster. Apart from the growing independence of these older dominions, Britain's most serious imperial problems were to be found in Ireland and India. In the former, a nationalistic movement, already well established before the war, reached its maturity. But as in 1914 so also in 1918 the solution of the Irish question was complicated by the mutually hostile programs of the Protestant North, which wished to preserve official connections with Great Britain and the Catholic South, which sought complete independence. Although these differences were not wholly composed, a compromise was reached (December, 1921) by which northern Ireland (Ulster) was allowed to preserve its separate existence from the Irish Free State, recognized by the British Government. By this arrangement Ireland achieved dominion status, with the right to its own parliament and local government, but still recognized the suzerainty of the British crown. The extremely nationalistic party of Irish Republicans, led by Eamon De Valera, refused to abide by this settlement and precipitated a bloody civil war, which the properly constituted authorities terminated only after great difficulty. The Republicans were not restored to good graces until 1927. Five years later De Valera and his party won a substantial majority in the Irish Parliament which they have succeeded in keeping.

In India, Britain's problem was no less difficult. The Indian nationalists, led by the Mahatma Gandhi, asked for nothing less than self-government. The British Government sought to meet this demand by the Government of India Act of 1919, which established

a measure of self-government in the Provinces as the basis for native political training. Otherwise, political administration by the British government remained substantially unchanged. Gandhi and the Nationalists refused to accept this arrangement, and a few years later Parliament set up a committee under Sir John Simon to make a thorough investigation of Indian affairs. The Simon Commission failed to find an immediate solution and its report in 1930, favoring the strengthening of British administrative control, was obviously unsatisfactory. Then a series of Round Table Conferences, attended by British and Indian representatives, canvassed the whole field of British-Indian relations; and after the third (1932) a new constitution for India was devised.

The Indian problem and the Irish question were only the most important among the imperial problems of the British Empire. Others have been equally aggravating. Japanese expansion in the Far East threatened Singapore and Britain's favored position in China; while the demands of unsatiated or disaffected powers such as Italy and Germany raised problems of unpredictable proportions.

Post-war France was economically better off than the democracy across the channel, but was perplexed with problems no less difficult. The most highly industrialized and resourceful region of France comprising fully a tenth of her territory had been over-run and held in occupation by German troops for the duration of the war. In expectation of German reparations, this was swiftly "restored," the expenses being paid from extraordinary budgetary allowances to be recouped from Germany later. This procedure put a false light on French recovery and finances, although it guaranteed for the moment French economic supremacy on the continent. Germany's inability to pay the expected indemnities, even under the pressure of an invasion of the Ruhr (1923), punctured the bubble of artificial prosperity and produced a downward spiral of economic development which culminated only with Premier Poincaré's drastic measures (1926) of incorporating the "recovery" budget with the regular budget and stabilizing the franc. Together with the natural expansion of French trade resulting from "recovered" enterprises and the deliberate stimulation of tourist travel, this fended off serious economic difficulties until the depression of the 30's was well advanced. Then, however, growing budgetary deficits which threatened financial stability, and spreading unemployment, produced widespread unrest and led to a number of serious political crises.

Republican France had never been distinguished for its political

stability. The varieties and shadings of political parties had made party government a practical impossibility and had necessitated the establishment of coalition governments which were no stronger than their weakest member. This instability produced numerous and confusing cabinet changes which frequently defy explanation by the trained observer. At times parliamentary government had been seemingly paralyzed by such procedure, only to recover when the future seemed blackest. For several years after the World War party factionalism abated before the general desire to present a united front to Europe, to assure French security and peace, and to exclude the threat of Bolshevism. By 1924 this self-imposed quiescence of party leaders was broken. The many radical parties showed signs of recovering their strength, and the fear of communism declined. Ministerial changes became more frequent thereafter, accelerating their pace as the depression gradually reached the depth of its trough in 1934.

Apart from purely economic and political difficulties, the course of French government did not run smoothly after the war. Widespread fear of a possible "revival of 1914" encouraged the adoption of a defensive program of stupendous proportions, in which the most ambitious and expensive project was the construction of the Maginot Line of fortifications on the German frontier. Even this was not enough to produce the security which so many French citizens demanded. At the same time the government was greatly perplexed by problems arising out of its war-time acquisitions, especially in Alsace-Lorraine and its mandate of Syria. Attempts to absorb the German cultural minority in the former were met with serious objections and were never completely successful. In Syria, the difficulties have been even greater, since efforts to superimpose French culture have given rise to a strong nationalist reaction which has not yet responded to treatment. But by far the most persistent and potentially dangerous problem of democratic France grew from the development of the Fascist states, Italy and Germany.

Great Britain and France despite their difficulties had remained democracies, but to the horrified astonishment of many peoples some of the other Powers did not fulfill the promise of the "war to make the world safe for democracy." Partly because of the continuing power of that shibboleth, but more because of the education and tradition of democratic peoples, there has been a strong tendency to interpret these post-war developments, especially in Russia, Italy and Germany, as being retrogressive. A re-examination of the history

of those countries shows, however, that the establishment of dictatorships in them is not a deviation from their tradition and background. Russia remained legally an autocracy until the establishment of the Duma in 1905, and actually an autocracy until 1917. Italy, theoretically a constitutional monarchy, was really an oligarchy from its very formation, and the German people have enjoyed less than a decade of republicanism. It is, therefore, hardly to be wondered that under the stresses and hardships of the contemporary world these peoples turned not to the comparatively unknown democracy but to the more familiar government of dictators and oligarchs.

The world was startled in 1917 by two revolutions in Russia which not only deposed the Romanovs but also embarked that country upon a program of sweeping social change. Riots and rebellions were not new in Russia, but successful revolutions were, and the second of these was so comprehensive in its scope that it is still impossible to estimate it accurately.

The fundamental causes of the revolution lay deep in the political and social structure of the Russian state. Russia was definitely a land of privilege and contrasts. At the top were the czar, the nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie who monopolized the government, the land, and the wealth. At the bottom were the underprivileged and exploited city workers and the land-poor peasantry.[1] The middle class was small, amounting to less than seven percent of the total population in 1917. The continuance of this system of inequality depended very largely upon the presence of a firm and capable autocrat, and Nicholas II, last of the Romanovs, was vacillating and incompetent. When the added burden of the war fell upon his narrow shoulders and narrower mind, he proved unable either to bear it himself or to shift it to more competent men. The middle class was neither sufficiently large nor sufficiently trained to assume the government; and the power fell, therefore, to the first organized minority which promised land to the peasants, peace to the soldiers, and food to the workers.

When the war began, nearly all the upper classes, including the bourgeoisie, rallied to the support of the czar with a patriotic fervor unmatched since the days of the Napoleonic invasion. A more able ruler than Nicholas might have used this opportunity to unite his

[1] It is estimated that in 1905 30,000 landlords owned 189,000,000 acres while 10,500,000 peasants owned only slightly more than 200,000,000 acres of land.

people under a true constitutional monarchy, but Nicholas and his czarina were autocrats by training and inclination if not by ability, and they refused to compromise their ambitions. A judicious policy of liberalism might well have saved both the monarchy and the monarchs. Nicholas chose instead to try to make the war prove the strength of the autocracy, and by refusing both the pleas and the advice of those who might have helped him, he alienated those whose support he most needed. Successive defeats shattered the army and ruined the morale of the patriots at home who might have remedied or at least improved the situation had the czar allowed them to do so. The only remedy which occurred to the panicky powers-that-were was to call more and more men to the colors, thereby reducing production, breaking down the system of transport, and otherwise gravely exacerbating existing evils. It is significant that the revolution began with bread riots in Petrograd in March of 1917. Unable to withstand the terrific pressure placed upon him, the czar abdicated and after a terrible moment of hesitation the Duma set up a provisional government. With the power in their hands, the bourgeois leaders were at a loss to know what to do with it. To the problems of the war, food shortage, and agrarian unrest were added the calamities of vacillation, incompetence, and the lack of leadership. Out of this welter of confusion there emerged in the next few months a minority group, the Bolsheviks, and two remarkable leaders, Trotsky (Leo Bronstein) and Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov).

Neither this party nor its leaders were strange to the ways of revolution. The party was an offshoot of the Social Democratic Party which had been formed in 1898 and had five years later split into two groups, the *menshevik* (minority) and the *bolshevik* (majority). Both men had been agitators from their youth, and both had been at one time exiled to Siberia. The party split divided the two men, but the Revolution of 1905 found them both in Russia and both acting against the government. The reaction which followed that affair drove them both once more into exile and the outbreak of the World War found Lenin in Austria, Trotsky in the United States. The German government, correctly gauging the value of Lenin to their cause, permitted him to return to Russia in April, 1917. Trotsky came back to Russia shortly thereafter and the two temporarily forgot their differences to join in seizing their golden moment.

Wide World

LENIN

At the same time that the weak, bourgeois, Provisional Government had been established the Socialists had organized a Soviet[1] of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. Composed of about a thousand "delegates" from labor and army groups, the Soviet was a mildly anti-bourgeois organization. Controlled at first by the Mensheviki, it contented itself with interfering with the new government in various ways and thus rendering the existent confusion worse. The advent of Lenin and Trotsky transformed the Soviets into a Bolshevik organization, and supplied the strong leadership which had been lacking. The now radical Petrograd Soviet, followed by local soviets which had been formed throughout the country, consolidated its power and organized its energies. Lenin, with a remarkable acuteness and total lack of ethics, was rallying the lower classes to his support by promising food, land, and peace—none of which he was in a position to confer. Very cleverly outwitting and outmaneuvering Kerensky, who emerged as the leader of the Provisional Government, Lenin forced the break and on November 7 proclaimed the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of a proletarian state. Subsequent pronouncements promised peace, the destruction of capitalism and private property, and the gift of the land to the peasants and the control of production to labor. The Second Congress of Soviets so decreed and legalized the temporary government known as the Soviet of People's Commissars. The most important members were Lenin as President, Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and a revolutionary, named Dzhugashvili, but usually called Stalin, as the Commissar for Nationalities. The Commissars were to hold office until a Constituent Assembly could be summoned to establish a permanent government. When the Assembly finally met in January of 1918, it was so definitely anti-Bolshevik that Lenin found the means

[1] "Soviet" is the Anglicized form of the Russian word СОВЕТ which is usually translated as "Council."

to destroy it and kept the power in the hands of the Commissars.

The new rulers of Russia, who had won that place less by their own merit than because there had been no unified opposition to them, now faced the more difficult task of maintaining themselves in power. Not only were they under the necessity of at least making a show of keeping their promises, they also had to face the violent opposition of those whom they had dispossessed and the hostility of the Allied and Associated Governments. That hostility became active after March, 1918, when the Bolsheviks in desperation made the separate peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany. The Allies blockaded Russia, landed an expeditionary force in Siberia and aided the counter-revolutionaries with money and supplies. Only the fact that the latter were unable to co-operate because of personal differences and their geographical location saved the new government. Perhaps the hardest problems of all were the food shortage and the agrarian unrest. Lenin had planned to barter manufactured goods for food, but the worker-controlled factories did not produce enough goods and the peasants had to be forced to surrender their grain. By playing off one group against the other, by quieting the workers with talk of the proletarian state and the peasants by gifts of land with promises of more to come, by building up a strong and loyal army, and by using terrorism to drive opposition underground, Lenin and his associates performed the truly remarkable feat of consolidating their power. The first crises were past but there were hard days to come.

While the civil war was yet raging, the Bolsheviks worked out their system of government. Czarist Russia included many minority peoples, and these the new rulers sought to incorporate into their system. Despite high-sounding promises of autonomy and self-determination for all nationalities, the basic Soviet policy was to incorporate into the new state as many of the subject peoples as possible. When there was no chance of so doing, as in the case of the Baltic states and Poland, the new government let them go with an outward show of good will. In 1923 a constitution knit the various peoples into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Around the nucleus of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) were grouped four federative and two unitary divisions. In theory these component parts are free to rule themselves and even to separate from the whole if they so desire, but in practice they are bound to the R.S.F.S.R., which dominates them.

The first constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., formulated in 1918, established a very intricate system of administration which at first glance appears to vest the sovereign power in the proletariat. As a matter of fact, this elaborate system was merely a mask. The real power lay not with the masses but with the few leaders of the Bolshevik Party.[1] Lenin, who until his death in 1924, was the guiding genius of this new state and whose principles continue to dominate much of the Russian thought and action, expressed his stand thus: "The state means the workers, the most advanced, progressive section of the workers, the advanced guard—that is, ourselves." In other words, Lenin dominated the inner group which controlled the Bolshevik Party. The party dictated to the proletariat, and the proletariat ruled the country. There could be no purer dictatorship. The advent of Stalin upon the death of the master and the new constitution of 1937 have made no essential change in the situation. Stalin's authority derives less from his official position than from the fact that he heads the Bolshevik Party. That party carries a tremendous burden, for it constitutes less than two percent of the total population of the U.S.S.R. Its strength stems from its rigid organization and discipline which resemble the sixteenth-century Jesuits, and from its use of a secret police which parallels the Spanish Inquisition. The party members are true fanatics in the service of a new religion. Theirs is the only party permitted in Russia, and they guard their monopoly with the fierce determination of self-preservation.

Soviet domestic policy centered about the efforts to solve the tremendous problem of re-establishing and promoting the industrial and agricultural development of the country upon a wholly new basis: the national ownership of the tools of production, the land, and the resources of the land. The World War, the Revolution and its ensuing troubles, and the transformation of the system reduced Russia to desperate economic straits in the early days of the new regime. It has already been noted that industrial production fell so low that the barter of manufactured goods for grain proved impossible. The coming of civil peace failed to improve matters, and in desperation Lenin retreated to a compromising of pure communism with capitalism. This hybrid, known as the New Economic Policy (NEP), went into effect in 1921 and continued until 1928. The state retained control of foreign trade, transport and large industries, but agriculture and small industries were restored to private

[1] In 1919, the party name was officially changed to "Communist" but the older form is used throughout this discussion to avoid confusion.

ownership. Internal trade was opened to individual enterprise, and the peasants were no longer forced to surrender their surplus production to the state. The NEP was sufficiently successful so that in 1928 Stalin, who had made himself the real ruler of Russia, was able to inaugurate the famous Five-Year Plan. The audacious and somewhat pompous aim of this plan was to transform Russia in five years from an agrarian to an industrialized state, strong enough to stand alone. The process was marked by a return to the so-called "War Communism" of the early years. Internal trading was once more restricted, the government control over industry strengthened, and an attempt made to replace individual with collective farming. Before the allotted time was up, Stalin declared that the major objectives had been obtained, and closed the campaign in order to begin upon a second Five-Year Plan. In the absence of trustworthy statistics it is impossible to measure exactly the success of the first plan. Considerable advance was made in industrial production, but apparently it was at the expense of the Russian people whose living standards seem to have suffered from lack of consumer goods. The second plan, incidentally, was aimed at increasing the production of such goods. In agriculture the success was considerably less. The peasants, often by passive means, resisted collectivization and brought starvation again and again to many of their countrymen.

Next to the Five-Year Plan the world in general has been most interested in the Russian social experiment. Education, welfare of the masses, atheism, and a code of social ethics in which the state is paramount to its members have been its cardinal points. Here again it is still impossible to report exactly what has been accomplished. There is no question but that education in the new way of life has been widely undertaken, but no reliable index of the progress made is available. The figures offered to show the increase in schools and colleges, even if accurate, do not measure the amount or caliber of the instruction provided. Distinct efforts have been made to provide the masses with adequate living quarters, sufficient food and clothing, and medical care. To date, however, though much has been done, much more yet remains to be accomplished. Branding religion as a bundle of superstitions and "a narcotic for the people" the Soviet state has, from its inception, pursued a policy of substituting its dogma and faith in its power and accomplishments for the older faith in God. The new generation has been successfully trained in the new credo, but many of the older people remain true to the faiths of their fathers. The new code of ethics has centered around

more liberal divorce laws. The "nationalization of women" once alleged has long since been proved a peculiarly slanderous piece of anti-Bolshevik propaganda.

Italy managed to last out the war, but her situation in 1919 was grave. Naturally deficient in resources, the financial strain of the war and its aftermath had imposed an almost insupportable burden upon the Italian people. Supplies of prime necessities were woefully inadequate, business and agriculture were almost completely paralyzed and widespread unemployment, engendered by the derangement of economic life, was dangerously aggravated by the demobilization of the army, already rife with mutiny and rebellion. A strong government might have met these difficulties with heroic measures, but the Italian government was notoriously weak. Long before the war political life had been corrupted by self-seeking politicians, and to this was now added parliamentary paralysis resulting from the emergence of a variety of new parties. While the Chamber of Deputies argued and debated fruitlessly, the people resorted to primitive methods of self-preservation. Conditions were ripe for revolution.

If maturity and numerical strength had counted, either the Syndicalists or Socialists might have profited from popular distress. During the 1890's both of these parties had taken strong root. The Socialists, in particular, had grown to such proportions that on the eve of the war they controlled a majority in Parliament and practically dominated public life, but war psychosis and an unhappy dispute among the party's leaders divided its ranks after hostilities began. The breach was so wide that it could not be bridged, despite temporary reunion in the early post-war years. It was not difficult for the Socialists to encourage strikes or by other means cripple the economic life of the entire nation, but the hopelessly weak and divided leadership of the party made it impossible to reap profit from resulting distress. Meanwhile the golden opportunity passed to other hands.

As early as 1917 there appeared in the wealthy agrarian and industrial valley of the Po, the stronghold of the Socialists, a number of patriotic clubs designed to protect property and preserve law and order against the anarchical forces of socialism, communism, and syndicalism. Much like the vigilance committees of the American frontier, these grew spontaneously out of the forces of the time. Some were agrarian, some industrial; some wore black shirts, some blue, some gray; some were extremely radical while others were conservative and reactionary. These *fasci*, as they were called, had little

in common except the methods of violence which they used to destroy their enemies or appease the greedy appetites of adventurous leaders who dominated them. There is a curious resemblance between these "patriotic" clubs and the armed bands of the *condottieri* of the Renaissance.

The genius of one man molded the diverse and scattered *fasci* into a coherent, smoothly working political machine which in the brief span of three years imposed its will upon the Italian people. Son of a village blacksmith and local demagogue, Benito Mussolini (1883-) was introduced in early youth to the world of intrigues and revolution with which his family and friends had close affiliations. After a meager education in the local schools of Forlì he attended the College of the Salesian Fathers at Faenza and then, at the age of eighteen, secured a position teaching in an elementary school. Intimate association with Socialists soon put him in the bad graces of the local authorities, and after an altercation with the mayor he was promptly dismissed. As a vagabond, hunted by the police, he spent the next several years in Switzerland, moving always in the circle of revolutionaries who flocked about Geneva. This brief exile is already shrouded in mystery and legend, though it culminated in a misadventure with the Swiss authorities and his expulsion from the country. In Italy again, after teaching French in a private school and writing for the local newspaper of Trento, he secured an appointment as secretary of the Socialist association at Forlì in 1910. Here he established a newspaper, *La Lotta di Classe* (Class War), in which, as an orthodox Socialist he assailed Parliament as a corrupt anachronism, and preached the dictatorship of the proletariat. The vigorous, uncompromising spirit of his editorials, his round denunciation of the conservatively inclined leaders of the Socialist Party, and his relentless campaign against the imperialistic Tripolitan War of 1911 brought him a considerable following and made him a power to be reckoned with in his party. Never one to let an opportunity pass, Mussolini used his influence in 1912 to reorganize the party directorate and, incidentally, to acquire for himself control of its principal organ, the *Avanti*. That he was a journalist of more than ordinary acumen is attested by the fact that the newspaper's circulation soon more than doubled under his direction.

When the World War broke out, Mussolini, perhaps the most widely known if not the most influential Socialist in Italy, was so vigorously opposed to Italian intervention that he threatened the state with a general strike and civil war if neutrality were aban-

doned. It was not long, however, before he completely reversed his position, was expelled from the staff of the *Avanti*, and soon emerged with a new paper, *Il Popolo d'Italia*, the mouthpiece of the party of interventionists who demanded war upon Austria. Whether this sudden change of front was due solely to genuine patriotism or to suspected Entente bribery matters little, for with his new adventure his star was definitely in the ascendant. *Il Popolo* supported the war on the front, helped to stem the tide of growing defeatism, and, finally, when Socialists sabotaged and crippled local political and business life, became the champion of law and order. It was chiefly through his newspaper that Mussolini organized his first *fascio* at Milan in 1915 and six years later united the various other *fasci* into the Fascist Party.

When the government seemed to abandon the nation to its fate, Fascism under Mussolini's still uncertain leadership took on the aspect of a crusade. Strikes were halted by force, Fascists themselves supplying the men to operate machinery. Socialists were threatened with violence, beaten, forced to gorge themselves with castor-oil or have their teeth pulled by "dentists" who made no pretense of being painless. The success of these measures vaulted the embryonic Duce's soaring ambitions. In 1921 at a national congress of *fasci*, the Fascist Party was definitely organized under Mussolini, who proceeded at once to formulate its political program.

Coming from one of the greatest opportunists of recent times and adapted to a polyglot group of malcontents, it is not difficult to understand why this program defies definite statement. It denounced the monarchy and then defended it; it was hostile and then tolerant toward the church; it was socialist for the laboring class and capitalist for the bourgeoisie; and finally, it defended and then condemned the parliamentary system. It was consistent only in its determination to regenerate the nation and establish an empire. Under the circumstances, a more tangible program would probably have meant the defeat of the party. Its strength lay in its flexibility and swift adaptability, in its consistent inconsistency. Inspired Fascist philosophy has since endowed this quality with the requisite respectability.

The formulation of the party's program had hardly been made when the strikes which had paralyzed the country began to diminish and Socialist influence began to wane. With the prospect of having no enemies to fight, Fascist leaders justifiably feared that their organization might well collapse through internal dissension.

To forestall this, Mussolini, in 1922, directed his attack more specifically against the Chamber of Deputies, which happily for him was deadlocked, and spoke openly of a revolution to save the nation. Offers of several posts in the cabinet were made in a vain effort to appease him, but these he refused. In October, 1922, he convoked a congress of his party at Naples to announce that unless the government capitulated he was prepared to seize power. On the 28th his blackshirts occupied the capital; and the following day King Victor Emmanuel III, who had been unable or unwilling to use force against him, called upon Mussolini to form a ministry.

The victory was still far from decisive. Within the party itself Mussolini's authority remained tenuous, while the Chamber of Deputies, whose co-operation he needed for the time, was anti-Fascist. To establish his independence of pushing allies, he dismissed the blackshirt army with which his *coup* had been effected and then settled down to conciliate his enemies. A coalition ministry, composed of only four Fascists and a majority of Liberals, Nationalists, and Democrats, was formed, and several weeks later Mussolini apologized before the Senate for the rudeness with which power had been seized. Toward the Chamber of Deputies he was less deferential but hardly less conciliatory; there was no evidence yet of a determination to dispense with constitutional forms. All that he asked was unlimited powers for one year in order to make the necessary economies of government and to settle the troubled state of national economic and political life. The country did not consider this request unreasonable and it met with the approval of a considerable majority in the Chamber.

The opposition parties, however, had been silenced only momentarily. Incipient rebellion in the Chamber flared up ominously before the year of probation had passed. The Catholic *Popular* Party, which had negotiated a truce with the Fascists, soon denounced the government for its disrespect of individual liberties. Fortunate circumstances enabled Mussolini to eliminate its leaders, and the party melted away. To consolidate this gain and to kill the Socialist Party, from which he had really the most to fear, Mussolini now proposed a new election law which would give the party receiving a bare majority of votes two-thirds of the representation in the Chamber. This bill was passed in July, 1923, and in the "honest" election which followed shortly thereafter, the Fascists won a clear fifty percent of the votes. This was perhaps a surprise even to Mussolini,

who by it, however, was enabled to entrench himself more strongly in power.

Even in this "reformed" Chamber, opposition was not yet silenced. The Socialists became so violent in their attacks that Mussolini, in June, 1924, threatened to clear the Chamber. Within a week of this ultimatum the most uncompromising of the Socialist deputies, Matteoti, was ruthlessly assassinated. Mussolini publicly denounced the use of violence, promised to reconstruct the cabinet, cleanse the government and reorganize the party, but public opinion was hardly satisfied. At no time in his career was his position more precarious, but he had a genius for turning misfortune into advantage. After several vain attempts to conciliate the growing opposition in the Chamber, he suddenly declared war upon it. On January 3, 1925, he announced that the Socialist deputies, who had meanwhile withdrawn to function as a separate body, would be crushed. Appropriate measures to carry out this project were forthwith adopted, the press was muzzled, and all publications of literature hostile to the regime suppressed.

This done, the mask of constitutionalism was at last dropped and the totalitarian state gradually took shape. Suspected liberals were imprisoned, anti-Fascist lawyers and teachers were forbidden to practice their professions, opposition to the regime was made a political crime, and reorganization of the courts of law was undertaken with the view to eliminating hostile influence. Meanwhile, a series of decrees enlarged the scope of the Duce's authority. Dictatorial power was guaranteed by a measure which made the prime minister responsible to the king and empowered him to issue decrees having the force of law. Local political democracy likewise vanished, the central government assuming the right to fill by appointment all important local offices. By 1926 Mussolini had made the Fascist Party the only recognized political body of the nation with himself as master.

The German people, convinced that their cause was the righteous one of self-defense, entered the war with an almost unanimous patriotism. Four grueling years brought war weariness and an increasing hatred of the Imperial Government and the ruling classes who were blamed for the growing misery. To this disillusionment, Allied propaganda, especially Wilson's Fourteen Points, the blockade, and the Russian Revolution contributed no small share. Military disasters late in 1918 and the shortage of food which was rapidly becoming more acute combined to break the morale of the German people.

The kaiser and his advisers vainly sought to stem the flood of discontent in October, 1918, by abolishing the autocracy and turning the government into a parliamentary monarchy. Their concessions came too late. Led by the Socialists and inspired by a mutiny in the navy, the people demanded the abdication of the ruling families and a new deal in government. Mass demonstrations and strikes forced the government to acquiesce in the replacement of the liberal chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, by the Socialist, Fritz Ebert, on November 9. Despite bitter party friction, the various Socialist groups rallied behind Ebert and on the following day a Socialist German Republic was proclaimed in Berlin. This proclamation emanated from a workers' and soldiers' soviet, which, despite its name, was neither Russian nor Bolshevist. The government was entrusted to a coalition committee until a constituent assembly could be chosen to frame a constitution.

At the election in January, 82 percent of all adult Germans exercised their right of suffrage, and the National Assembly so elected opened its sessions at Weimar in February. Under a temporary constitution Ebert was chosen president and a coalition ministry was named to assist him. The assembly's major task of drafting a permanent constitution was interrupted in June by the necessity of dealing with the Versailles Treaty. The Assembly had no choice but to accede to the Allied demand for an immediate and unconditional acceptance of it, and the ratification was made on June 23. Unfortunately many people blamed the Assembly for accepting what it could not refuse and an understandable but unjustifiable odium was thus attached to the Assembly and to the constitution which it placed in effect on August 11.

The Weimar Constitution represented a unique combination of democratic and socialistic elements. The forms of government were republican, but the emphasis placed upon the reciprocal duties of the State and its citizens was socialistic. The new German republic was a strongly centralized State with much power vested in the president, who was chosen by direct election for a seven-year term. With the consent of the lower house, the Reichstag, he could suspend the constitution, dissolve the Reichstag and govern by decree. Normally the functions of the government were to be discharged by a bicameral legislature consisting of the Reichsrat, a federal council of seventy members; the Reichstag, composed of five hundred members elected by universal suffrage; and a ministry responsible to the

latter body. The Reichstag was given power to overrule the upper house and to override the president's veto.

The young German republic was immediately beset by frightening difficulties. It was bedeviled by plots of communists, monarchists and other malcontents, including, in 1923, an abortive rebellion led by an obscure Austrian, Adolf Hitler. The economic system of the country, already overburdened by the cost of the war, was gradually collapsing under the added weight of the reparations charges. Finally, late in 1922, Germany defaulted in the reparations payments, and France who thought her late enemy was bluffing moved an army of occupation into the Ruhr District. The hapless Germans offered the only resistance they could, they refused to work, and the bottom fell out of the financial bucket. Germany was unable to obtain credit in the world's markets and went into involuntary bankruptcy. The mark, once worth about twenty-five cents, plunged downward in value as the government presses roared constantly in a hopeless effort to stop the unstoppable by inflation. By August, it took 1,100,000 marks to equal one dollar, and by November, a dollar would have bought from three to four billion marks. The resulting chaos and hardship should stand as a sufficient warning to any nation which contemplates inflation as a way out of difficulties. The most important result of the German travail was the practical wiping out of the middle class. The *bourgeois* became, temporarily, the forgotten man.

At a moment when the republic seemed doomed, the chancellorship passed to an ardent German patriot, Gustav Stresemann. Essentially a monarchist, and probably a chauvinist, he proved himself to be above all else, a realist. His far-sighted statesmanship, his policy of conciliating Germany's *quondam* enemies, and his vigorous actions stamp him as one of the greatest figures of the post-war era. He at once began the painful and unpopular process of stabilizing finances by issuing a new currency, the rentenmark, equal to one billion of the old marks. When his people proved fractious he met force with force and made them swallow the bitter pill of rehabilitation. Turning then to foreign relations he bowed to the French occupation of the Ruhr and so removed their immediate hostility. He followed up this policy of *rapprochement* with the Locarno Pacts (1925) which were really a Franco-German guarantee to maintain the status quo with Great Britain and Italy as co-guarantors. His reward was the evacuation of the Ruhr and the admission of Germany into the League of Nations (1926). Two years later he

again demonstrated his desire for peace by bringing Germany to adhere to the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact outlawing war. Meanwhile his policies had resulted in marked improvement in the economic situation. In 1924, he had been instrumental in bringing about the revision of reparations known as the Dawes Plan. This arrangement which lasted until 1929 not only reduced the amount of the yearly payments but, what was more important, provided for foreign loans to Germany. Under the guidance of Stresemann and with the stimulus of the foreign loans German business began to recover, but the government continued to incur a yearly deficit. In an effort to alleviate this situation and to make a final settlement of the reparations problem, a group of international bankers, headed by Owen D. Young of the United States, produced a new plan for scaling down the debt (1929). The untimely death of Stresemann in August of that year, and the beginning of the worldwide economic depression doomed this scheme to failure.

Following Stresemann's death the leading figure in German politics was the president, Paul von Hindenburg, who had been elected after the death of Ebert in 1925. The choice of this former servant of the kaiser was at first expected to mean the end of the republic, but the old war lord proved at first as staunchly loyal to his new responsibilities as to his earlier ones. After a few years, however, Hindenburg, approaching his dotage, became a pawn of contending factions. To the undoing of the republic, his clouded brain remembered clearly only his loyalty to his fellow Junkers. Whatever hope there was that he might hold Germany to moderate policies of reconstruction was buried under the combined impact of the depression and the Allied insistence upon the payment of reparations. From 1929 to 1933 the government waged a losing battle against overwhelming odds. The collapse of German industry which by 1932 had thrown six million men, almost a tenth of the total population, out of work was mirrored in the growing unrest of the people. The blocking of a proposed Austro-German Customs Union by France in 1931 also increased the strength and numbers of the malcontents. Successive elections returned more and more of this group to the Reichstag until in July, 1932, the party of discontent, *par excellence*, the National Socialist German Workers (Nazis), won 230 of the 500 seats, and Adolf Hitler, the party leader, became the dominant figure in German political life.

Among the lesser powers, Poland was the largest and the least happily situated. After a turbulent period of national regeneration

during the late war years, an aggressive war with Russia (1921), and the seizure of Vilna and of territory in Galicia, Poland reemerged by 1924 as the sixth largest nation of Europe, with a population of approximately thirty million. The fact that much of its territory was occupied by self-conscious racial minorities and that its boundaries were arbitrarily drawn in a fashion considered injurious by bordering great powers, always endangered the life of the state. The gravest problem centered around the "Polish Corridor," a narrow strip of land following the Vistula valley, which gave Poland access to the Baltic. This separated East Prussia from Germany and exposed Poland to a very real German danger. Scarcely less serious was the difficulty over Vilna which Lithuania never ceased to claim. Besides this, Poland had the misfortune of being geographically situated between Russia and Germany, with whose future her own destiny was inevitably tied. These circumstances were largely responsible for Poland's fairly constant attachment to France, and they also deeply influenced the marked trend of government from democracy to dictatorship.

The republic of Poland, as established in 1918, was closely modeled after that of France, with universal suffrage, a bicameral legislature, and a president, elected as in France by the two legislative bodies. As has so frequently occurred on the continent, these attractive democratic institutions were crippled by political inexperience and factional strife. Marshal Josef Pilsudski, the most active of Poland's founding fathers, was alarmed by the resulting instability of the government, and, in 1926, with the aid of the army, established a virtual dictatorship. Without destroying democratic forms, he manipulated the elections and eventually revised the constitution in such fashion as to greatly enhance the powers of the executive. He refused the office of president but bent the government to his will, and retained his power until his death in 1935. Colonel Rydz-Smigly then inherited Pilsudski's mantle and carried on his traditions.

Despite its unsteady political life, Poland enjoyed a measure of prosperity. Agricultural resources, though slight, were profitably exploited; and Polish industry was making effective use of such mineral resources as were available. The artificial port of Gdynia, created on the Baltic, might be taken as the measure of its commercial growth. From a barren waste, this city had developed into one of the most prosperous ports in northern Europe.

Like Poland, Lithuania had once been a great state and had long been submerged in Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution provided the

opportunity for its re-establishment. Following the practice, common to all the Baltic states, a republic was created in which legislative authority rested with a single-chamber legislature, elected by universal suffrage. The deliberations of this Assembly were soon made difficult by the appearance of numerous parties, and its prestige declined in direct proportion to its failures in foreign policy. It lost Vilna to Poland, and for its seizure of Memel in 1923, it was reprimanded by the League of Nations in the following year. In 1926, Conservatives and militarists under Antanas Smetona limited the powers of Parliament and concentrated authority in the hands of the president, whose power for all practical purposes thereby became dictatorial.

The little republics of Estonia and Latvia followed the example of Poland more slowly. Both these states emerged from the Russian Revolution with their independence and both of them adopted democratic institutions roughly comparable with those of Lithuania. Both experienced the same difficulties and in 1934 suspended their representative chambers, while the president of Estonia and the premier of Latvia proceeded to govern with dictatorial authority.

Finland alone among the little Baltic states had successfully adhered to the democratic institutions with which its independent postwar career began. In a measure this was probably the result of the extensive experience of the Finnish people with self-government in various forms. For a long time Finland had enjoyed autonomous rights under Sweden, and these were subsequently respected by Russia until a few years before the war. As an independent state, Finland established a constitution of the most democratic type, vesting power in a single-chamber legislature and a president. The life of this democracy had not been easy, but all attempts of the extreme left and the extreme right to establish authoritarian government had failed until the Russo-Finnish War (1940).

Homeland of one of Europe's greatest autocracies, it is not astonishing that Austria abandoned democracy after brief experiment and reverted to authoritarian government. Even if her political traditions had been otherwise, it is probable that the helpless and almost hopeless state in which she was left at the end of the war would have been quite enough to produce this result. Smaller than Portugal, severed from resources and markets, rendered defenseless, almost completely surrounded by enemies, Austria began its career as a republic on the brink of disaster. That it survived at all is remarkable; that it should have lasted fifteen years is miraculous. The con-

stitution which was promulgated in 1920 established a unicameral legislature, a responsible ministry, and a popularly elected president. The attempt to include a provision for eventual unification with Germany met with effective opposition from the Allied Powers. Neither the aristocratic upper class nor the urban masses placed confidence in the new regime. The former, led by Prince von Stahremberg and others, imitated Italian Fascists, created a party militia, and agitated for the establishment of a fascist dictatorship. Among the latter, the Viennese proletariat, gaining control of the city, established a socialist government which they sought to defend with a militia of their own. Constant conflict between these socialist and fascist groups kept post-war Austria in a state of turmoil.

Hungary has had a political career scarcely less turbulent than her former partner. Count Michael Karolyi, a liberal of aristocratic extraction, established a "provisional government" after the military collapse of the Empire, and subsequently declared Hungary an independent republic. From its accession, this regime was without support, and was harassed by the most extraordinary difficulties. All attempts to conciliate the former subject races failed, and when in 1919 it became clear that the victorious allies meant to dismember Hungary, Karolyi resigned his authority to Bela Kun, a communist recently returned from Russia. His dictatorship of the proletariat was swiftly engulfed in war with Rumania, whose army occupied Budapest. Bela Kun fled in terror in August, and the government fell to a group of aristocrats headed by Admiral Nicholas Horthy and Count Stephen Bethlen, who declared Hungary a monarchy, with the former in the capacity of "regent" and the latter functioning as virtual dictator. This government, frankly reactionary, was remarkably popular and stable. It consistently espoused Magyar nationalism and continuously labored to win back the nationals it had lost to Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia. In the pursuit of this policy, Hungary received the sympathetic support of Fascist Italy.

Hungary and Austria were almost completely surrounded by new states who profited from their heavy losses. Czechoslovakia was the most prosperous and most stable of these, but the most unhappily situated. Scarcely more than a hundred miles wide at any point, it extended eastward from Germany for the distance of six hundred miles. On all sides it faced potential enemies: Germany, Poland, Austria, and Hungary. This precarious position made Czech states-



Wide World

MASARYK

men peculiarly sensitive to the need of preserving the status quo through international machinery such as the League and encouraged them to pursue a strong, if defensive, foreign policy. Possessed of rich resources, and with a population trained to industry by experience, Czechoslovakia was able to enjoy the blessings of economic prosperity. This contributed to the stability of its government which was patterned largely after that of the United States, and facilitated the work of its two able statesmen, Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Beneš. Both of these men, ardent protagonists of Czechish nationalism before the war, were the most active exponents of democracy in Czechoslovakia. As time went on, however, democratic institutions were threatened by perplexing minority problems and their outgrowths. Beside the Czechs, there were considerable Germans, Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Poles. Among these, especially among the Germans, there developed nationalist political parties whose obstructionist tactics in Parliament embarrassed the government.

The nucleus of Jugoslavia was pre-war Serbia and Montenegro, plus a generous share of the former Hapsburg Empire. Except for a vociferous Magyar minority, the mass of people in this new state were south Slavs. These were descended from common origins, but time and circumstances had wrought important changes between them and dissolved many of the bonds of racial unity. The Croats and Slovenes, long under the Hapsburgs, had assimilated western culture, while the more numerous Serbs had succumbed to the Turks, and were deeply influenced by the Orient. These differences made the creation of a national government difficult and have ever since threatened its existence. The constitutional monarchy of pre-war Serbia was preserved, but the Croats and Slovenes from the beginning showed themselves unwilling to acquiesce to Serbian predominance. There were a number of bloody brawls in the Jugoslav Parliament and one sovereign, Alexander II, was assassinated as the result of

these misunderstandings. At one stage in the critical life of the government, a royal dictatorship was established (1929).

Of all the victorious powers emerging from the war Rumania profited most. From the previous Hapsburg Empire she annexed the rich territories of Transylvania and the Bukovina, both of which were occupied by sizable and obstreperous Magyar minorities. During the turbulent period of the Bolshevik Revolution, she seized from Russia the province of Bessarabia, with a heavy Russian population. She was also confirmed in the possession of the Dobrudja which she had seized from Bulgaria during the second Balkan War. Economically, these acquisitions were of great value and, added to the already rich nucleus of pre-war Rumania, made her one of the wealthiest states of eastern Europe. There are great deposits of coal, various mineral ores, and petroleum, to say nothing of the fertile soil which has long given Rumania distinction as the "granary of the Balkans." Despite all of this potential wealth, Rumania's political life was neither healthy nor happy. Constitutional forms were preserved, and universal suffrage granted by a liberal constitution in 1923. In practice democracy was not realized, partly because of fear of racial minorities which composed almost twenty-five percent of the population, and partly because of the traditions of political life which were largely authoritarian. The great preponderance of peasant proprietors prevented the development of radical Socialist parties, but a strong Fascist movement grew around the nucleus of an organization known as the Iron Guard. King Carol II, who had renounced his throne for love, but who returned in a romantic *coup* in 1930, was able to forestall the Fascists, while at the same time creating a thinly veiled dictatorship of his own.

Greece, like Rumania, was one of the most fortunate beneficiaries of the treaties of peace, and one of the least satisfied. Besides definitely acquiring possession of Macedonia and most of eastern Thrace, Greece was given the administration of Smyrna. Good fortune acted like an intoxicating stimulant upon patriotic nationalists, who already saw visions of a new Greek Empire. Losing all sense of proportion, they set upon hapless Turkey to take further advantage of her weakness, and in the war which inevitably ensued (1920-1922) were lucky to escape without complete disaster. Smyrna and Thrace were irretrievably lost, while the hatreds engendered among the Turks helped disturb the precarious balance of the Balkans.

Meanwhile, the Greek people must have found it difficult to keep pace with the frequent changes of their government. Within

the span of three years, three kings occupied the throne, including the unfortunate Constantine who, during his career, was twice forced to abdicate. The abdication and exile of George II in 1923 was followed by a momentary termination of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. After struggling for two years with the problems of post-war adjustment, of which the influx of Greek refugees from Turkey was the most pressing, the republic succumbed to dictatorship. Running true to form, this also lasted two years. Republican government was re-established, but after a series of revolutions the exiled George II was restored in 1935. The military party which engineered this revolution dissolved the National Assembly. Throughout this series of misadventures the outstanding figure was Eleutherios Venizelos. Cretan by birth and revolutionary by profession, he was chiefly responsible for the national regeneration of modern Greece, which he furthered with the same Machiavellian policies that brought immortal fame to Bismarck and Cavour. It was he who sent the Greek army successfully against Bulgaria in 1913, guided the nation through the tortuous course which brought her into the World War on the side of the Allies, and who, by the respect which he commanded among the negotiators of Versailles, realized for Greece enormous benefits. After the war he was the leading exponent of republican government in Greece which he defended until his death in 1936.

The only state in the Balkans to sustain material and territorial losses as the result of the war was unhappy Bulgaria. Once a leading power in the peninsula, she had twice experienced reversals of fortune. Enfeebled by the Second Balkan War, she was reduced to impotence by the World War. Seven thousand square miles of territory, including her natural outlet to the Ægean, were bestowed upon her neighbors, and she was burdened with a huge indemnity which she could not pay. To the resulting national poverty there was added a powerful irredentist movement which augured ill for the future of the Balkans. Numerous natives of Macedonia who claimed Bulgarian nationality employed every means, including organized violence, to obstruct persistent efforts by Greece and Jugoslavia to nationalize them. The fact that many of these fled across the border to Bulgaria to conduct their activities from there threatened to embroil the government in war with its neighbors on more than one occasion. In the midst of all these difficulties, the government followed the same stormy, uncertain course which characterized the post-war history of all her neighbors. The democratic forms of con-

stitutional monarchy, never strongly established, gave way to intense party strife, violent political assassinations, and eventually to dictatorship.

By a curious irony of fate, the once corrupt and feeble "sick man" of Europe was transformed after the war into the most stable power of the Near East. The chief credit for this achievement belonged to Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938). A radical from youth, Kemal rose to distinction in the ranks of the Sultan's army, against whom he revolted with the Young Turks in 1908. During the World War he successfully fended off the British in the Gallipoli campaign, and eventually attained to such popularity that the weak-willed Sultan "exiled" him to an unimportant post in Anatolia where it was hoped he would languish in obscurity. Greek aggression in the early 20's saved him from this fate, and cleared the path for revolution against the feeble government at Constantinople. Putting himself at the head of a Nationalist Party which he was largely instrumental in creating, he preached an Ottoman crusade against the invading Greeks. The government sought vainly to outlaw him but the majority of the people flocked to his cause. Like Wallenstein and Cromwell, he molded the growing army of raw recruits into an efficient military machine which, under his capable leadership, eventually expelled the Greek army in October, 1922. The Sultanate collapsed almost immediately. The victorious Allies, who had disposed of Turkey and were still bickering over the spoils, could hardly have dreamed such recovery possible. They were now compelled to review their relations with Turkey. Eastern Thrace, Constantinople, and Asia Minor were restored, the capitulations canceled, and Turkish sovereignty recognized.

Having cleared the country of its enemies and restored its dignity, Kemal proceeded to reorganize Turkey from top to bottom. In conformity with Ottoman national traditions, the provincial town of Angora became the new capital of a Turkish republic, formally proclaimed October 29, 1923. The constitution provided that legislative authority should rest in the hands of an elected Assembly, though it practically nullified this by extending to the executive, Mustafa Kemal, almost unlimited powers. As virtual dictator, Kemal governed the country like a benevolent despot. His social reforms were especially noteworthy. The Mohammedan church was deprived of its special privileges, the calendar was changed to conform with western Europe's, and business was nationalized and subsidized. Even the place of women in Turkish society underwent momentous and

revolutionary change. The veil was banished and suffrage was extended to women in 1929. Permeating all of these reforms was an intense spirit of nationalism. Kemal westernized Turkey to free her from western domination.

Almost everywhere in the Near, Middle, and Far East, European civilization felt the impact of advancing nationalism. Arabs in Iraq and the Hejaz achieved their political independence; those in Syria seethed with rebellion against British and French mandatory administration. Both Persia and Afghanistan shook themselves free from British protection, asserting their complete sovereign independence. India asked the right of national self-determination, while Japan and even China distressed the West by manifestations of rampant nationalism. Even northern Africa was aroused from its slumbers by national self-consciousness among Mohammedan tribesmen whose spirit of independence was inflamed by a noticeable revival of religious fanaticism. While most of this was held forcibly in check, Great Britain felt compelled to grant partial recognition of Egyptian independence. Like all nationalisms wherever they have developed, these newer manifestations were characterized by aggressive exclusiveness, mutual hatred, and fear. For the development of these trends the World War was not in itself responsible, but like the Napoleonic wars of a century before, it acted as a powerful catalyst upon materials which were ready at hand. Among those who subscribed to the "sacred" principle of national self-determination, the evolution of these new lesser powers was regarded with satisfaction, but the inescapable fact remains that these have produced more problems than they have solved, and in those areas which impinge directly upon western Europe, they have operated to accentuate the already perplexing problems of the post-war era.

Among the lesser powers, none has aroused greater hopes and fears than post-war Spain. Once the greatest power in Europe, she was the victim of a series of misfortunes which reduced her to practical insignificance at the opening of the nineteenth century. Little of the Iberian peninsula is suitable for agriculture and the resources which constitute the backbone of modern industry are limited. The Spanish people seemed condemned to poverty. To make matters worse, they had never experienced the blessings of good government. The notoriously weak Bourbon monarchy sought to retain power by the unsatisfactory procedure of playing the ends against the middle. The mass of illiterate peasants had no interest in politics, while the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy were always so

hopelessly divided in their aims that they could not make up for royal deficiencies. Revolutions when they came, therefore, and they were rather frequent in the nineteenth century, were always enfeebled by their extremist character. In 1876, there was promulgated a constitution which provided Spain with the framework of democratic government, but perpetuated much of the authority of the Crown and the aristocracy, who controlled the Senate. Under this constitution, Spain managed to get along without too much trouble until the eve of the World War. Meanwhile, difficulties were brewing in various quarters. Industrialization in some of the more important urban communities brought with it a miniature reflection of the proletarian radicalism which had already infected the more important industrial nations. The Syndicalist movement grew in strength, while socialism, destined to flourish among the working men during the depression of the 30's, took root. The establishment of these working-class movements was marked, as in France and Italy, by numerous acts of extreme violence. As social unrest grew, King Alfonso XIII, last of the Spanish Bourbons, conceived the idea of diverting popular attention to the creation of a new empire in Africa. Negotiations with France and Great Britain in 1904 proved favorable, but the occupation and pacification of the promised prize in Morocco proved too much of a task. Men, money, and energy were wasted in the fruitless enterprise which culminated in inglorious defeat at the hands of the native Riffs in 1923. During this crisis, General Primo de Rivera, with royal support, erected a dictatorship. The army and navy were strengthened, but, unfortunately for him, de Rivera did little to appease discontent among the laboring classes. Rebellion broke out against the regime, causing it to collapse in April, 1931, and to drag the monarchy down with it. The revolutionaries declared for a republic and put into effect that same year a remarkably liberal and democratic constitution. A unicameral legislature with a responsible ministry was established, and universal suffrage guaranteed. Sweeping reforms were immediately undertaken. The Church lost its privileges and its control over education. A great number of new secular schools was created to wipe out illiteracy, large landed estates were confiscated in the interest of agricultural labor, and hours, wages, and conditions of labor in industry were strictly regulated. These measures disturbed both the conservaties who thought they were too radical and the radicals who thought they were too conservative.

C. Peace and the status quo

The new Europe which emerged with the treaties of peace differed in many ways from the Europe of 1914. Germany had been crushed, Austria-Hungary extinguished, and Russia reduced to temporary impotence. The boundaries between these three Great Powers, established at the Congress of Vienna, were redrawn, supposedly in conformity with the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination. Poland was recreated; Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland were restored; Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia were born; and all the victorious powers were enlarged at the expense of the vanquished. The most novel innovation was the League of Nations, which, it was hoped, would prevent the forces of international anarchy from reappearing. Many were optimistic enough to believe that with these changes there had begun a new era of peace and fellowship among men.

If passions had been less inflamed, if fears and hatreds had been less intense, if nationalism had vanished, if the victors had been in a less truculent mood—in other words, if men had not been men, the era of peace and fellowship might have dawned. Unfortunately, irreconcilable differences between peoples had not been extinguished, and within less than a decade international co-operation had succumbed once more to international anarchy.

The reparations tangle held a conspicuous place in producing this unhappy result. The Allied Powers, not content with humiliating Germany, carving up her territory, absorbing her colonies, and depriving her of needed resources and capital goods, determined to make her pay for the war of which she stood accused. No one imagined that she could possibly pay all, but it seemed only fair to demand the utmost. What the amount should be and how payments should be made mattered little for the moment. The negotiators at Versailles simply charged the war to Germany and then turned the baffling problem of itemizing the bill and arranging the payments over to a Reparations Commission. After a German offer to pay approximately $25,000,000,000 had been scornfully rejected by the Allies and a demand by the latter for about $60,000,000,000 had been as vigorously repulsed by Germany, the Reparations Commission finally presented a bill for $33,000,000,000 in April, 1921. Thirty-three times greater than the indemnity of 1870 which had provoked the wrath of France, this "London Schedule" was much more lenient

than many experts had predicted, and considerably less than most of the Allies had expected. A German protest that the figure was impossibly high and quite beyond her capacity to pay was promptly met by a threat of occupation of the Ruhr.

Meanwhile, the Allies deprived Germany of the means with which to meet her obligations. Payment in gold was, of course, wholly out of the question, and paper marks would have been completely worthless. It was clear that German commerce and industry could alone provide the necessary goods and services with which reparations could be paid, but this avenue was also blocked. None of the victorious powers relished the idea of German economic recovery with its inevitable threat to their own economic stability. Indeed, they had already taken pains to avoid such a calamity by shutting off potential German markets, crippling her merchant marine, and denuding her of resources. Without markets abroad or profitable business at home, it was utterly impossible, as the Allies soon learned, for Germany to satisfy her enemies, to say nothing about keeping herself alive. By the time the Reparations Commission had reported, Germany had already been condemned to economic destruction. Hoping to solve matters, the government of the republic resorted to inflationary measures which in time reduced the mark to worthless paper, paralyzed business and commerce, and made further reparations payments impossible.

By 1923 Britain had awakened to stark reality and suggested that reparations be scaled down. France would hear none of this, and a conference, hopefully assembled at London in January to discuss the matter, terminated without result. Poincaré, the Germanophobe French premier, defended his action on the ground that the London Schedule was already inadequate to meet the demands of French recovery, that Germany could pay, and that any attempt at conciliation would simply make her more impertinent. At his suggestion, the Reparations Commission was thereupon induced to declare Germany in voluntary default. Using this as an excuse, Poincaré sent a French army into the Ruhr (January 11, 1923), the nerve center of industrial Germany, and attempted to carry out his threat of forcible collections. A petty war ensued. The German people sabotaged the factories, refused to work, and by every conceivable means attempted to make the French enterprise a total failure, which, in fact, it was. In the midst of this unfortunate exhibition of French intransigence, the German government was compelled to declare itself completely bankrupt.

The repercussions of Germany's economic collapse were so widespread that even Poincaré soon acquiesced to the British proposal that the reparations issue be reviewed by an international committee of experts. In November, 1923, the Reparations Commission appointed such a body, including among its important members Sir Josiah Stamp together with General Dawes and Owen D. Young, both of the United States. Its report, known as the Dawes Plan, was submitted in April of the following year. Unfortunately, this said nothing of the total obligation which Germany was to meet, since this had been specifically excluded from the deliberations, but it did recommend a temporary solution. Germany was to be given uncontested jurisdiction over her economic resources, and was to receive loans which would facilitate her recovery. When there was proof that her equilibrium was restored, Germany was to pay a stipulated minimum annually, or more in case the degree of her prosperity warranted it. The Allies accepted the plan, France somewhat grudgingly, and only after Poincaré had toppled from power. In July, 1925, French troops were withdrawn from the Ruhr.

The Dawes Plan was not intended to be more than a momentary palliative. Consequently, in 1929, another committee of experts, under the chairmanship of Owen D. Young, assembled to effect "a complete and final settlement." The plan which it offered and which the Allies accepted, scaled down the annuities well below the Dawes level, and provided that these be paid according to a graduated scale over a period of fifty-nine years, a period which exactly synchronized with Allied debt payments to the United States. A bank of International Settlement to receive these payments was established in Switzerland. By this means the amount of the bill had at last been fixed, and that at approximately a third of the displaced London Schedule. This seemed a hopeful augury for the future. The plan further called upon the Allies to terminate their occupation of the Rhineland by June, 1930. Curiously enough, this last and purely incidental portion of the plan was the only part which could be carried out. The financial provisions were obsolete almost as soon as they were made.

By the end of the year 1929 the whole world stood on the brink of economic disaster. Within two years the foundation of German business was collapsing, and by the summer of 1931, Germany was again threatened with bankruptcy. At that point, to save the world from ruin, President Hoover proposed a one-year moratorium on all intergovernmental debts. This was accepted by all the Powers.

Meanwhile, debtors and creditors involved in the reparations tangle, exclusive of the United States, met at Lausanne, in June, 1932, to arrange a more satisfactory understanding. This established an entirely new set of obligations, displacing those provided for in the Young Plan, and reduced the total German debt to approximately $2,000,000,000. A supplementary understanding, which made ratification of this new plan contingent upon American willingness to review the payment of inter-Allied debts, practically nullified it, since the United States steadfastly refused to be a party to such an arrangement. But since collections were impossible, for all practical purposes, German reparations were wiped from the slate.

With this controversial issue there was closely linked the problem of inter-Allied debts. During the War the Allied Powers had borrowed heavily from each other, and after American participation Great Britain and France, especially, dipped deeply into the resources of American finance. Including those extended after the armistice, these loans totaled approximately eleven billion dollars. At the time, there was little doubt that these loans would be paid eventually, but the treaties of peace had scarcely been signed before there was an almost universal demand for reduction or cancellation. In such fashion, it was said, America could bear her fair share of the burdens of the War. Great Britain promised that she would match American generosity by making corresponding reductions or cancellations of debts which the Allies had contracted with her, a promise which helped to unite all debtor nations in a common effort to convince the United States. The most telling argument for reduction was advanced by France, who proposed that her debt payments be graduated to conform with Germany's reparations payments. This assumed that reparations and war debts were closely interrelated, and made it possible for France to place some of the odium attached to the reparations tangle directly upon the shoulders of the United States. The Young Plan accepted this view to all intents and purposes, but, officially, the American government continued to insist that war debts and reparations must be treated separately. It had no objections, however, to reductions within limits. Between 1923 and 1930 a series of debt-funding agreements with all its debtors were arranged, which, by reducing interest rates, extinguished a large portion of the debts. These agreements satisfied neither the American nor the European people, and with the coming of the Great Depression it was clear that they could be carried out no more successfully than the plans for German reparations. The Hoover mora-

torium of 1931 temporarily relieved the Powers of payment, and gradually thereafter all of them, with the exception of faithful Finland, declared themselves each year in default. The legal obligation of the debts remains, but since 1932 it has not been honored. It is a matter of some significance to note that it was dire necessity and not a spirit of mutual co-operation which induced the Powers temporarily to shelve the problem of reparations and debts.

So far as the matter of reparations was concerned, it should be pointed out that the economic depression was only one of a number of factors which pushed it into the background. Other points of friction had developed into much more acute dangers. In Eastern, Central, and Balkan Europe there were wars or constant threats of war, engendered by conflicts of aggressive national interests. Poland took up arms against Russia, bullied Lithuania into giving up Vilna, even threatened to dismember Czechoslovakia. The latter, in turn, working in close co-operation with Rumania and Jugoslavia, held a mailed fist over Austria and Hungary. With each threat or pretended threat of Hapsburg restoration or Austro-Hungarian, or Austro-German unification, these Powers lost no time mobilizing armies on their frontiers. Greece fought one war with Turkey and threatened Bulgaria with another. Italy snatched Fiume from Jugoslavia and these two Powers lived in a passive state of war for almost a decade thereafter. Moreover, Mussolini, exceedingly touchy on the point of national dignity, which Greece had offended, seemed bent upon taking the latter's island of Corfu.

In western Europe, the tension was almost as great. The clash of French and Italian interests in the Mediterranean produced a dangerous naval race between the two and a noticeable strengthening of their land armaments. At the same time, France always regarded the Rhenish frontier with nervous expectation, which no amount of guarantees seemed capable of removing. Europe before the War gave no greater exhibition of jealous suspicions and hatreds, and was certainly less inclined to meet each new threat with increased preparations for war. Armaments, growing continuously after the War, very soon reached proportions which the past generation would have deemed inconceivable. Bred upon hatreds which it intensified, the remilitarization of Europe stood as a perpetual threat to the peace of the world.

The machinery of the League of Nations absorbed a number of smaller shocks which came with recurring crises, as did the Concert of Europe in the pre-war epoch, but in major issues it was no

more successful. It settled amicably, quickly and with questionable justice, a dispute between Sweden and Finland over the Aaland Islands. It patched up but did not solve difficulties between Lithuania and Germany over the city and territory of Memel. It intervened successfully between Austria and Hungary and the Powers of the Little Entente, and with equal success arranged differences between Great Britain and Iraq. It stopped an impending war between Greece and Bulgaria, and on more than one occasion, by standing ready at hand with facilities for arbitration, it managed to arrange some other minor problems before they became acute. Where the major interests of Great Powers were involved, however, the League was helpless. It allowed Poland to take Vilna with impunity, and impotently albeit gracefully retired from the Græco-Italian dispute over Corfu.

The friends of the League found many ways of excusing its obvious deficiencies. The abstention of the United States they regarded as the first and basic weakness from which all the others in turn sprang. The great prestige which the American government enjoyed at the culmination of the War, it was pointed out, might have made the League work more efficiently in the interest of peace. Certainly without the greatest and wealthiest nation of the world, it was impossible to expect "sanctions," whether military or economic, to be completely effective against aggressors. Yet, even without the United States, it was claimed that the League might have worked effectively, provided it had been endowed with an international army to enforce its will. Just how this was to be realized was more than all but optimistic idealists were able to explain. More pessimistic, although no less dispassionate, critics of the League regarded its machinery for peace as totally inadequate. Their arguments were based chiefly upon two fundamental premises: first, that its efficiency was impaired by its obligation to preserve the status quo; and second, that instead of escaping the evils of nationalism it was forced by its very nature to succumb to them. The League was bandied and buffeted about by its leading members who hardly obscured the fact that they intended to use it for the satisfaction of their national interests. Unhappily, it was true that the League was tied to the Treaty of Versailles and the other post-war treaties, whose none too satisfactory settlements it was forced to interpret as definitive. The complaint raised by the defeated and unsatisfied Powers that the League was the victor's mechanism to perpetuate the oppression of the vanquished, possessed a grain of truth.

Various attempts to strengthen the League met with uniform

failure. A proposal that constituent members accept a common definition of aggression and agree to specifically stated economic and military measures against the "aggressor" (the Geneva Protocol) grounded on the shoal of mutual suspicion. The admission to the League of Germany (1926) and Russia (1934), together with lesser powers, seemed to offer the prospect of making it truly a "League of Nations," thereby removing the complaint of its exclusiveness. Such optimism was premature.

Because the League was incapable of guaranteeing the security which each Power naturally defined as its own, the various nations of Europe, with France taking the lead, resorted to the old practice of independent negotiations and alliances. Neither satisfied nor convinced that Germany had been crushed, the French foreign office sought and obtained a close understanding with Belgium, Poland, and the Powers of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania), who had meanwhile combined among themselves for mutual defense. Among the lesser states, these agreements were regarded as necessary to their new-found freedom; to France, they seemed essential to prevent German aggression in the Rhineland. In 1925, the latter menace gave promise of disappearing. The French troops having withdrawn from the Ruhr, Gustav Stresemann suggested that France and Germany collaborate with other interested Powers in setting up mutual guarantees to put an end to fears on the Rhine. Edouard Herriot, successor of the combative Poincaré, responded favorably, and in 1925, for the first time victor and vanquished canvassed a delicate issue in conciliatory fashion. The negotiations resulted in a series of engagements, known as the Locarno Pacts, by which Germany and France and Germany and Belgium pledged to keep peace on the Rhine; Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy agreed to aid either France or Germany if it were threatened by the aggression of the other. This statesmanlike procedure momentarily cleared the surcharged atmosphere of Franco-German relations. France still showed no inclination to sever its alliances, and the following year storm clouds gathered anew. Germany, who had been induced to request admission to the League during the Locarno negotiations, was left standing outside while the members gave an exhibition of their petty nationalism. The German people could hardly have been blamed for scoffing at the "spirit of Locarno" which was supposed to have permeated international relations. Criticism against joining the League became so outspoken that a national

plebiscite was deemed advisable. The government won, but the heavy opposition was an evil omen.

Before long, Franco-German rivalry revived over the difficult disarmament question. By the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had been compelled to reduce her standing army to 100,000 men. The hope, expressed at the time, that the victorious powers might voluntarily effect corresponding reductions was never realized. The League of Nations, however, fulfilled its obligations by summoning a commission (1926) to investigate the matter. After five sessions had ended in futile deadlocks, the sixth (1930) produced a draft convention which was adopted by a bare majority. In February, 1932, the first world's disarmament conference assembled at Geneva. For almost every issue suggested for discussion by the convention the various Powers had submitted reservations designed to protect their own interests. The Conference consequently degenerated into futile bickering. Though the difficulties revealed by the deliberations were legion, that which involved possible German rearmament took precedence. The German delegation had entered the conference with a very simple program: that either the Powers should disarm to the German level or that Germany be allowed complete freedom to rearm. France was unwilling to accept either alternative, and Germany would accept nothing less. Thereby had arisen an insoluble conflict between French demands for security and German demands for equality.

Meanwhile, some progress had been made in the matter of naval disarmament. Shortly after the war, the United States, which was well on its way to becoming the greatest naval Power of the world, assumed the initiative and invited the various nations to participate in a conference at Washington (1921-1922) to consider the question of naval limitations.[1] The threat of Japan in the Pacific and the possibility of her joining hands with Great Britain in a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance were probably the motivating factors. Besides the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, France and Italy were also represented. The three former Powers set restrictions upon the use of their Pacific possessions for naval purposes, established a ten year "naval holiday," and placed the ratio of capital ships at five each for Great Britain and the United States, and three for Japan. For France and Italy the tonnage ratio was fixed at 1.67. Attempts to outlaw the use of poison gas and to limit the use of the submarine failed. In 1927, the United States invited the same Powers to reach

[1] See Chapter XXIX.

an agreement on auxiliary ships, but the objections of France and Italy reduced representation in the conference to the three major Powers, who failed to produce significant results. In 1930, the acquiescence of France and Italy made a five-power conference possible, and it assembled in London. The Naval Treaty then signed, except by France and Italy who were at loggerheads in the Mediterranean, regulated tonnage of cruisers and submarines among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. An "escalator" clause practically allowed each Power complete freedom to build without limit in any category which national interest demanded. This substantially nullified the agreement.

Wide World

BRIAND PLEADING THE CAUSE OF PEACE AT THE LEAGUE

Aristide Briand (1862-1932), prominent statesman of France after the World War, was a forceful and effective orator who often swayed the League of Nations with his appeals for world peace.

Despite the failure of the disarmament conferences, the pacificism of the peoples of the world grew and it was optimistically believed that there would be no repetition of the World War. An agreement, fathered by Mr. Kellogg, Secretary of State of the United States, and Aristide Briand, French foreign minister, and generally known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), voiced this optimism by formally outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. Despite this declaration and the apparent sentiment for peace, there were some who realized that the seeds of conflict were germinating and that the era of world peace had not yet dawned.

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Farewell the Tranquil Mind

A. Arms and the Man

Peace was not to be assured by pacts outlawing war, by deliberations at disarmament conferences, by regional or collective security agreements, or even through the agencies of the League of Nations so long as millions of men were still convinced that "security" could be interpreted only in terms of the national interest. This was, perhaps, the major equivocation of the post-war years. Behind the elaborate façade of the peace structure the conflict of selfish nationalism still raged. To break that down, if indeed such a result could have been possible, would have required an unlimited and generous willingness to compromise on every side. Mankind had not reached that stage in its development. So while some men talked of peace and proclaimed its virtues, others, appealing to human jealousies and hatreds, swayed millions with doctrines of the propriety, the justice, and even the virtue of war. That these apostles of violence should have gained the ascendancy was eloquent testimony to the powerful force of contemporary nationalism; that they should have been able to dominate the international scene and embroil the world in war was due in no small measure to the fact that national self-interests kept those states which professed love for peace from pooling all their resources in its defense.

The most important victory for the forces hostile to peace and the status quo came with the establishment and consolidation of the National Socialist regime in Germany in 1933. We are still too close to the event to evaluate accurately the many factors which made this momentous revolution possible, although some of them seem reasonably clear. In part, it represented a repudiation of the democratic machinery installed by the Weimar constitution. The Republic was alien to the experience of many of the German citizenry; it suf-

fered the odium which went with defeat; many held it in slight respect since it signed the Treaty of Versailles and then acquiesced to Allied pressure under the treaty; still others accused it of responsibility for the economic misfortunes which the German peoples experienced. The virtues of the Weimar republic were less apparent than its shortcomings and, therefore, it was not too difficult for those who preached the doctrines of authoritarianism to win the public ear. Of equal importance, perhaps, was the psychological reaction of defeatism among many of the German people, stimulating the desire for national recovery and revenge. Such things as the pressure for reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr inflamed resentment and strengthened the determination to turn the tables upon the victors. Nazi revolutionaries subtly nurtured this spirit of revenge and capitalized upon its spread. But unquestionably the most important causes of the successful National Socialist Revolution were economic: the impoverishment of the middle classes, and the widespread conditions of unemployment which developed during the early 30's. Bourgeois and proletarian alike lost faith in the established order and were ready to search for security in revolutionary change, although they could not agree upon the forms which this change should take. The proletariat was inclined to support a radical socialist revolution, patterned generally after the Soviet model, with the controls in the hands of the workers; the bourgeoisie, deprived of its investments and savings by the inflation of 1923 and fearful of even greater losses at the hands of social revolutionaries, favored a change which would provide security for the rights of property. Clever revolutionaries like the Nazis were able to play upon the hopes and fears of both these groups and win their passive or active support.

The National Socialist German Worker's Party was not impressive in its early years. Springing from an obscure political organization of limited local influence in the city of Munich, it remained for some time after its founding (August, 1920) just another of the many German parties which sprang up in the post-war years. Great national crises such as the occupation of the Ruhr tended to increase its membership and spread its influence, but until 1929 it did not attain national significance. Indeed, at one stage in its early career, the Nazi organization was threatened with extinction. In 1923 its leader and organizer, Adolf Hitler, was encouraged by existing unrest to make a premature bid for power in the state of Bavaria. The government, with advance information of the plot, crushed this

"Beer Hall Putsch," [1] as it was called, outlawed the party and its agencies and brought Hitler himself before the bar of justice. For nearly a year thereafter Hitler was in jail, compiling *Mein Kampf* (*My Battle*), the bible of his party, and reflecting upon the ways of revolutions. When he was released and the party was legally revived its fortunes had reached a low ebb. But the loyal ardor of the Nazi leadership and the hardships of Germany saved the party from collapse.

Adolf Hitler, the organizing and directive genius who led this party from obscurity to national and then international prominence, was an Austrian of lower middle-class extraction. Born in a little Austrian border town, in 1889, the son of a petty customs official, Hitler himself tells us that his early years were made unhappy by a domineering father who had little appreciation for his son's artistic ambitions. The death of his father in Hitler's twelfth year and the death of his mother three years later made the young man's lot still harder. He became the charge of relatives who begrudged his keep. At last, at the age of 17, in expectation of fulfilling his boyish artistic ambitions, Hitler departed for Vienna to take the entrance examinations for the Austrian Academy. Misfortune stalked his path. He failed the examinations and as a poor and friendless orphan was compelled to seek a livelihood where he could. Sometimes he managed to keep body and soul together by painting picture postcards; at other times he served as a building trades helper, carrying bricks and mortar. None of these occupations were to his liking. Ordinary workmen he despised as inferiors. The conviction grew that the whole social and economic structure was out of gear. Like many other profoundly disillusioned young men he believed the weaknesses were in the "system," not in himself, and he began the search for Utopia. It was in this mood that he fell in with the anti-Semitic and Pan-German elements of the Austrian capital, and the ideal future began to take shape in the form of an expanded German Empire free from what he held to be degrading and disruptive Jewish influences. Probably under the stimulation of these ideas Hitler was influenced to leave Vienna for Munich in 1912, there to continue his obscure career as house painter, handyman, carpenter, and amateur architect until the outbreak of the war.

Overwhelmed with joy at the declarations of war in 1914, a

[1] So-called because the meetings of the Nazi party were customarily held in the Munich Beer Hall, and because it was from there that Hitler declared the Bavarian government deposed.

war which he hoped would bring the Pan-German ideal to fruition, Hitler volunteered in the German army and soon found service on the western front. His military career was not spectacular, as is testified by the fact that he never rose above the rank of corporal, but he lacked neither loyalty nor courage. During the last months of fighting he was badly gassed. For some time his life was despaired of and even when it was certain that he would survive there were fears that his eyesight might be permanently impaired. His recovery was more complete than at first was supposed possible, but the period of convalescence was long, and it was during this time that Hitler first thought seriously about embarking upon a political career. The organization of the National Socialist Party followed soon thereafter.

It is not yet possible to make a completely adequate appraisal of this unusual man's abilities, although it seems obvious to everyone that they are of an extraordinary character. He is possessed of all the fanatical zeal of a crusader, sure that he alone is the savior of Germany and possibly also of the western world. What is probably even more important is the fact that he is endowed with those qualities of personality and skills of oratory which have enabled him to convince millions that he is their savior. He has shown himself to be the past-master in the arts of propaganda. And like so many other great revolutionaries he has displayed an uncanny sense in properly timing the blows which he directs at his enemies. Brutal and ruthless, though apparently panic-stricken at times by fears of personal retribution, he has been uncompromising in destroying the obstacles which stand in his path. Yet he has almost never struck until all preparations have been completed by cunning deliberation. A dreamer and a visionary with a single-track mind, impetuous and imperious, seemingly loathing decisions yet apparently making them without appeal to the rational processes, an associationalist moved to action by some awakening hint, an orator seeming to possess unshakable conviction in which he says at the moment yet immediately afterward contradicting himself with equally passionate conviction, Hitler's personality is indeed the subject for investigation by the abnormal psychologist.

That Hitler possessed uncommon skills in organizing and leading a party is sufficiently well testified from the history of the Nazis. Despite its early misfortunes, Hitler tenaciously held to his course and exploited every opportunity and used every expedient in its behalf. Like the Communist Party in Russia and the Fascist Party in Italy, the Nazis developed a smoothly working party hierarchy,

sworn to unswerving obedience to the leader. It was supplied with abundant military support in brownshirted storm troopers and black-uniformed guards to protect the leader, as useful in suppressing opposition as in swaying elections. It developed an efficient press organization of its own which by 1932 provided news for every village and city in the German Reich. It was adept in hypnotic oratory and in the use of a myriad of ingenious devices to awaken the public interest and win its support. No other party was so well endowed. Naturally it grew as distress increased. With a membership of 27,000 in 1925, of 178,000 in 1929, it expanded with such rapidity in the depression years that by June, 1932, its members totaled well above a million. No longer was the Nazi organization insignificant. It had become one of the largest as well as one of the strongest political parties.

Despite this great growth, Hitler showed little inclination to employ the method of violent revolution to attain power. His Bavarian experience in 1923 had apparently convinced him that the better means would be the strictly legal and constitutional one of winning preponderant influence through the national elections. The prospects of success seemed reasonably good. In the elections of September, 1930, the Nazis won 107 seats in the Reichstag, becoming the second largest party in that body. Two years later their successes at the polls were even more striking. In March of 1932 at the end of President von Hindenburg's first term of office, Hitler stood against von Hindenburg as a candidate for the presidency. The results were ominous, for although Hindenburg eventually won, his success was not easy. Hitler polled 37 percent of the popular vote to 53 percent for Hindenburg. Three months later in Reichstag elections the Nazis won 230 seats, thus securing the largest party representation though not a clear majority.

These successes naturally encouraged the Nazi leaders to make a strong bid for political power, while ministerial changes and political intrigues in high quarters played directly into their hands. At the beginning of the depression in 1930 President von Hindenburg had employed the emergency powers allowed him under the constitution and had kept in power a ministry in which he had confidence, even though it did not command political support in the Reichstag. This procedure had some merit in that it preserved political stability, but it had dangerous implications for the future since it meant that the ministry existed only at the sufferance of the executive. It was a great political misfortune for the German republic that

such enormous powers should have fallen into the hands of the aging Hindenburg. Allowing himself to be influenced by intriguers from among his own Junker class, he withdrew his support from the Brüning ministry (1930-1932) in May of 1932 and extended it in turn to his friend Franz von Papen and to General von Schleicher. Neither of these enjoyed Reichstag support and each conspired against the other. Finally, in January, 1933, the president, doubtless at von Papen's suggestions, named Hitler chancellor and von Papen vice-chancellor. Apparently the latter believed that he might use Hitler to advance his own cause and that in any case he could hold him in check. This time, however, the arch intriguer, von Papen, had overreached himself. Having won power by constitutional means, Hitler and his friends were not willing to let it slip from their hands.

The Nazis possessed the largest representation of all of the parties in the Reichstag at the time of Hitler's elevation to power, but they did not possess a majority. It was deemed expedient to correct this deficiency in order, among other things, to establish the ministry's independence of the executive. Less than two weeks after the Nazi government had been installed, an excuse was found to hold elections under conditions deemed favorable. Several days before the election the Reichstag building was set afire—by the Communists, the Nazis claimed—as part of a plot to precipitate a Left revolution; the enemies of the Nazis said it had been fired by the Nazis themselves so they could pin the blame on the Communists and capitalize upon German fears in the forthcoming elections. The evidence in the case is not clear, but the latter interpretation appears to be correct. At all events, the Nazis exploited the popular fears of Communist revolution to the full and in the elections for the Reichstag polled the largest popular vote in their history. Even so they did not secure a majority representation, but by the simple expedient of excluding the Communist members, now condemned of treason, a working majority was established. Henceforth the road to dictatorship was unobstructed.

The purified and Nazified Reichstag dutifully extended dictatorial powers to the Führer for a term of four years so that he might restore the economic stability of the nation unmolested, and then disbanded. No time was lost thereafter in forging the instruments of totalitarian dictatorship and in consolidating its power. Enemies within the civil service were deprived of their offices; opposing political parties were gradually emasculated and then made illegal after

July, 1933; complete control was established over the written and spoken word; and the federal structure of the state was destroyed. Within a single year the Nazis had established a dictatorship such as the world had never seen.

Consolidation of political power over the nation was accompanied by the cleansing of the party so that it might function as the more perfect instrument of the Führer's will. Division of opinion as to what the political program of the party should be was tolerated while it was still seeking power; it was intolerable after power had been achieved. Moreover, there were individuals within the ranks who were suspected of being ambitious and there were fears that these, with the aid of the motley brownshirts, might attempt a revolution within a revolution. Hitler ruthlessly undertook the extermination of the dissidents, committing them to the assassin's bullet in a blood purge in June, 1934. Thereafter, Hitler's authority over the party was uncontested within the ranks or, at all events, those held in suspicion were more quietly purged by an efficient secret police agency working within the party.

Firmly entrenched, the Nazi leaders hastened to translate their program and doctrines into policies of action. In accordance with the concept of Nordic supremacy [1] and in the supposed interest of Nordic purity, they inaugurated a policy of exterminating the Jews. The Semitic peoples, it was held, were responsible for all of the evils in contemporary civilization and were secretly engaged in a diabolical plan to contaminate and weaken other races. For this reason they intermarried with Nordics, fostered communism, and sought to gain control of the press, education, and business. Absurd as these arguments may appear to be, the Nazis advanced them so often and so vigorously that they persuaded many of the German people and probably convinced themselves. Jews were harried on the streets, they were driven out of the professions, their shops were ravaged without let or hindrance, and finally in the infamous Nuremberg Laws of 1935 they were denied the rights of German citizenship. But with all of this their cup of grief was not filled. They were herded into ghettos and on the slightest provocation their properties were confiscated. In November, 1938, when a young German Jew,

[1] The doctrine of Nordic supremacy, that is to say, the concept that the northern Teutonic peoples, identified by their blond hair and fair skin, represent a superior group among the animal species, was not new with the Nazis. It was first advanced by an Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who subsequently became a German and who in his last years probably influenced the thought of both Hitler and the philosopher of National Socialism, Alfred Rosenberg.

whose parents had been maltreated, sought revenge by taking the life of a German diplomatic officer in Paris, the Nazis wreaked vengeance upon all of the Jewish people under their jurisdiction. Synagogues were burned, property destroyed and the whole Jewish community compelled to pay an enormous fine. The scene was so revolting that the American government withdrew its ambassador from Berlin as a protest.

Meanwhile, the government sought to co-ordinate all the cultural and religious life of the nation. A Chamber of Culture was set up to supervise all production in the fields of literature, the press, broadcasting, the theater, music, art, and the films. The schools and universities were purged of suspected teachers, and new qualifications and standards of student achievement, measured in terms of the party interest, were established. Youth organizations, functioning as divisions of the party, were made available for the young, to take them from the family and church in leisure hours so that ties with the recent past might be more easily broken. The churches, too, did not escape the ubiquitous hand of the government. On the score that division among the Protestants was detrimental to their interests, an attempt was made to unite them under one head. The object, of course, was to Nazify the church, and when this aim was understood it was sternly resisted in some quarters. On this point the Nazis found it expedient to compromise. Relations with the Catholic Church were more cordial at first, but the Church's natural objection to the party's effort to absorb all of the life of the individual led to disagreement. An attack was directed at the priesthood on the ground that they were either immoral or acting as traitors, the publication of diocesan letters by offended bishops was prevented, and prohibitions against sermons with political implications were established. The climax of the anti-Catholic movement was reached, following the absorption of Catholic Austria into the Reich,[1] when the primate of former Austria was publicly insulted and rich properties of the Church were taken over by the state. By intimidation the Nazis hoped to keep the churches from becoming the centers of counter-revolution.

Still more significant was the regimentation of the economic life of the German people. Labor unions were outlawed and then replaced by the Nazi-controlled Labor Front. Strikes and lockouts were forbidden, all labor disputes being settled by arbitration and judicial procedures over which the Nazis exercised control. To solve

[1] See pp. 1001-1005.

the problem of unemployment, elaborate public works programs were inaugurated and producers were compelled to provide employment beyond their needs. At the same time new installations to facilitate the rearmament of the nation were established and with the artificial demands which these stimulated, unemployment soon ceased to be a problem. Indeed, Germany began to suffer a labor shortage after 1936 and was compelled to import employables from abroad.

The costs of these undertakings were staggering and could not be met by conventional financing. The alternatives were either the abandonment of the rearmament program or fiscal revolution. The latter was accepted as preferable. Force was necessary to command respect and to effect territorial expansion, and if expansion could be realized Hitler had always maintained that economic problems would take care of themselves. A combination of factors determined the character of the fiscal revolution which followed. First, the heavy demands for imports of raw materials to create the instruments of war and to establish public works reduced Germany's capacity to produce exportable goods, while at the same time increasing the international obligations it had to meet for the payment of imports. The problem of foreign exchange consequently grew increasingly acute. Bills of exchange had to be rationed out in order to ensure the flow of needed supplies, and payments on foreign debts had to cease. At the same time, the Nazis embarked upon a campaign to make Germany an *autarchy*, that is, to make her economically self-sufficient. This too interfered with the customary movement of international trade to and from Germany and necessitated additional expedients. In due course, when even the rationing of bills of exchange proved inadequate, because there was not enough foreign money accumulated, the Nazi government embarked upon a program of international barter. Trade agreements were made wherever possible with other nations, allowing for the payment of Germany's imports by shipments of Germany's exportable goods. In this fashion, the Balkan states were tightly drawn into the economic orbit of Berlin.

While the problem of foreign trade was thus being met, the problem of domestic financing was solved in much the same fashion. Finding that negotiation of loans on ordinary terms was no longer possible by 1938, Nazi financiers devised methods little short of expropriation. The government was to be allowed to pay for some of its expenses in the form of I.O.U.'s, while much of the remainder was to be met by a kind of new circulating medium, based on anticipated taxes. None of these were to carry rates of interest.

The administration of these fiscal measures gave the Nazi government substantial control over most business enterprises. Since the national interest was to be given first consideration, the distribution of all imports had to be strictly regulated and rationed. And since the accumulation of foreign exchange was a vital necessity those businesses engaged in foreign trade had to accommodate themselves to the needs of the government. Not only had labor been regimented but capital as well, and with such completeness that the distinction from Communist Russia was one of detail rather than form.

It is apparent that the economic policies of the Nazi regime were very profoundly influenced by one compelling consideration: the rapid rearmament of Germany. To this Hitler had committed himself in *Mein Kampf* as the first essential of German regeneration and the absolute prerequisite of any German expansion. That this was the objective of the Nazi regime was scarcely concealed from the time of its inception. The limitations of Versailles were flouted and ignored, and the way was cunningly prepared for their repudiation. In 1933, the German government withdrew from the Geneva disarmament conference on the ground that it had failed to recognize Germany's right to military equality. For this same reason she withdrew from the League of Nations at the end of the year. Two years later, in March of 1935, Hitler found a convenient excuse to declare the military clauses of Versailles no longer operative, and in the summer of that same year he secured by negotiations with England the virtual repudiation of the naval clauses as well. Germany was to be allowed a navy 35 percent as large as Great Britain's. Meanwhile, the production of German military equipment went on apace and a mighty instrument of war was rapidly forged. All talk of disarmament in Europe had to be abandoned. A new arms race began which dwarfed that preceding the World War. Even the lesser states, who had accepted limitations or had had them imposed upon them, requested that these too be lifted. The freedom to arm as they chose was substantially restored to Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Nazi Germany had indeed toppled over the palace of peace which proved to be only a house of cards.

The political repercussions of the National Socialist Revolution were well-nigh universal. Either because of its example, or because of the direct aid which it extended, or because of the immediate threat which it created for Germany's neighbors, the Nazi movement was a powerful stimulant to the anti-democratic forces everywhere in Europe. And at the same time it helped the exponents of

democracy to begin closing their ranks for defense. The people of Europe were compelled to choose sides in the conflict which was impending. In Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Jugoslavia the Nazi party organized the local German minorities for co-operation with Germany and helped finance native Fascist movements which were springing up. Under this pressure, even the thin disguises of democracy which remained had to be abandoned in considerable measure, if only for reasons of self-defense. Conflicts between authoritarian and democratic forces developed in the Baltic Republics and in Finland, precipitated a bloody civil war in Spain, as we shall see in the next section of this chapter, and disturbed the tranquillity of the greater and longer-established democracies of Europe. Far-away Japan felt these influences and drifted rapidly away from the democratic tendencies which had characterized its early post-war history.

The Fascist dictatorship in Italy, the example from which Hitler had drawn much of his inspiration, was further consolidated, and as the impact of Nazism was more keenly felt, it was more and more patterned after the German model. Like the German leaders, the Fascist authorities in Italy built the economic life of the nation largely around the requirements of its military establishments. This was certainly a more compelling consideration than the professed desire to ensure greater social justice among the producing classes.

After 1933 the regimented controls over the economic life of the Italian people were continuously multiplied and strengthened. In large measure this was due directly to the enormous costs of the Ethiopian campaign (1935-1936) [1] which Italy could ill afford, to the economic consequences of sanctions which were then applied, and in general to the unfavorable economic position which Italy occupied in relation to the rest of the world. Imports and exports were strictly regulated, complete governmental control was established over foreign exchange and foreign securities, domestic prices were fixed, and key enterprises like shipbuilding and the merchant marine were taken over directly by the government. All the while taxes steadily mounted, and on occasions the authorities were compelled to make capital levies upon property holders so that they might hold to their course.

Perhaps the most interesting accompaniment of this accelerated state control by the Fascists was the formulation and establishment of the so-called corporative state. It must be observed that early in the history of the regime, workers, and employers, as well as profes-

[1] See pp. 880-881, 996-998.

sional classes, were encouraged to form Syndicates whose objective ostensibly was to co-ordinate the productive agencies of the country, lay the basis for co-operation rather than conflict among the producing classes, and provide the means for the settlement of capital-labor disputes. Fascists were satisfied that this Syndical system functioned efficiently so far as it went, but they were not convinced that it realized that intimate co-operation between employer and employee which was held to be the desired objective. Moreover, the system did not lend itself easily to national planning for production. To meet these latter needs, therefore, a system of Corporations was built upon the foundations of the system of Syndicates (1934). According to this novel arrangement, production was divided into 22 different categories, each representing production from the basic raw materials to the finished product. For each of these categories a national Corporation was established, including representatives from employers and employees within the fields of production as well as representatives of the Fascist Party and economic experts. The linking together of employees *and* employers in an organization in which the Fascist Party was represented, the co-ordinating agency of Italian national life, was expected to bring to realization the desired co-operation of all the producing classes in the national interest. Each of the 22 Corporations was to plan and regulate production in its field and to that end was to co-operate with the government's Ministry of Corporations and with the National Council of Corporations, the unitary body of this elaborate structure. It took some time to put these plans into operation, and there was a good deal of skepticism relative to their practical application before the outbreak of the war in 1939.

The Corporative structure was, however, used as the basis for a change in the political structure of the State. Mussolini had long since maintained that the Chamber of Deputies, the remnant of old democracy, was outdated, and had already altered its powers and composition before 1933, as we have seen. But he still remained dissatisfied with it and promised its complete extinction when the Corporative State took form. In 1938 this promise was fulfilled when the Chamber voted itself out of existence and was replaced by a new Chamber of Fasces and Corporations, comprising the membership of the National Council of Corporations and with the National Council of the Fascist Party. This change was actually only one of form for it did not alter in any way the absolute power which Mussolini already exercised.

Throughout these years, as necessity and expediency dictated, Fascist Italy took over bodily some of the policies of the Nazi regime. The best-known of these was the policy of *racism*, leading to anti-Semitism. Beginning in the summer of 1938 the propaganda machinery of the government was extensively employed to generate public hostility toward the Jews, and before the end of that year legislative measures were adopted to realize the "public will." These were no more generous than their German counterparts, but in Italy the misfortunes of the Jews were not so great in extent for the simple reason that there were fewer Jews in proportion to the remainder of the population.

While Fascism spread and gathered strength under the impact of the Nazi Revolution, the other great European dictatorship, Soviet Russia, seemingly strengthened itself both at home and abroad for resistance. Indeed, one of the factors which helped to popularize the Fascist and Nazi movements derived from their vigorously asserted opposition to the Soviet Regime. Such opposition was calculated to win considerable approval among many democratic peoples, but, of necessity, it also put the Soviets on their guard. The superficial character of all the mutual recrimination which followed was not to be revealed until the autumn of 1939.

In the period after 1933 the Soviet government completed its Second Five-Year Plan and embarked upon a Third. In general, the objectives of all these plans was to bring the process of industrialization in Russia to maturity and to eliminate all remaining traces of class conflict. While these objectives were in line with the ideology of the Communist movement, they also were of a more immediately practical nature, since industrialization was vitally important to the defense of the state. How much this consideration was kept in mind is clear from the Third Five-Year Plan which laid great emphasis upon the development of important manufacturing establishments in areas further removed from the frontiers of troubled western Europe.

Significant progress was made under these last two Plans in the direction of industrialization and in the collectivization of agriculture. As a matter of fact, by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan the collectivization of agriculture had been made complete, thus ensuring the socialization of all the agencies of production. Both industry and agriculture were now removed from private control and placed under the direct or indirect control of the State. The consequences of these acts are very much in dispute. In general,

however, it is agreed that they may have brought some partial improvement in the general standards of living.

The controls of the state were steadily tightened. To speed up production, persuasion, minute regulation, and force were employed both for the peasants and the factory workers. Indeed, on the eve of the present war, the authorities at Moscow were led to increase the hours of labor, reduce the social insurance benefits of the employed, and hold the workers to their factories by rigid regulations. It could hardly be said that their economic freedom was increased. Moreover, the heavy costs of the ambitious arms program in which the government indulged with expansive and suggestive displays to foreign powers, increased the taxes which were borne through increased costs of prime necessities.

Supposedly, however, as a result of the successes of the Second Five-Year Plan, a new constitution for Soviet Russia was devised by dictator Stalin in 1936 and, with the acquiescence of the Party, was put into operation. According to the Russian propagandists, this constitution was the model of what democracy should be. It lifted all restrictions upon voting and assured universal suffrage; it placed no formal prohibitions upon the formation of opposition movements within the body politic; it presumably placed all sovereign power in the hands of the people's representatives in the elected Councils of Union and Nationalities which were to meet and deliberate at Moscow at regular intervals. It guaranteed freedom of the press, though it cautiously defined the distinctions between "freedom" and "license"; it ensured religious liberty; and it contained an elaborate bill of rights, promising the citizen, among other things, inviolability of person. Last of all it guaranteed to the individual citizen certain personal property rights, such as the right to his own bank account, to his own house, and to certain types of movable property and certain amounts of land. On the face of it the document reads well, but it obviously was not attuned to the political realities of contemporary Russian life. Stalin abandoned none of his control over the Communist Party, which under this constitution still possessed a monopoly of power. The dictatorship had a new mask, but that was all.

That this was the case, was clear from the fact that elections under the new system ran true to form, and the people's representatives still served as Stalin's rubber stamp. It was clearer still from the way in which the authorities openly flouted all of the constitution's guarantees in the Bill of Rights. While the constitution was

being formulated and put into operation, the Communist leadership began one of the greatest purges in its history, making a mockery of the pledged inviolability of person. This greatest of all "purges" in Russian history began in 1936 and lasted through 1939. Neither its causes, the details of its developments, nor its results are yet clear. The Stalinist Communists adopted the official argument that it represented a cleaning out of the Trotskyite influences which were attempting to sabotage the revolution; the Trotskyites explained that it was a frame-up to conceal weaknesses within and to consolidate the personal power of Stalin. Both explanations perhaps have some truth in them. Whatever were the circumstances, literally thousands were imprisoned or executed. The losses of men which resulted, and the fears which the trials and purges generated among the more fortunate, very probably contributed to a decline in efficiency in both the army and the civil administration. In any case, the purges made it clear that as yet there was little "liberty under the Soviets."

The forward march of dictatorships in this era multiplied and aggravated the problems which had to be faced by those nations still clinging to democratic forms. Among these, Great Britain was perhaps the least directly affected so far as its internal politics was concerned. A native Fascist movement was formed under Oswald Moseley, but it attracted only a small following and its activities were easily curbed by the government in 1937. Probably of more significance than the formal organization of a Fascist movement, was the sympathy for dictatorships abroad which was felt among various classes in British society. This sympathy arose partly from fears of socialization and partly from the immediate fear of Soviet-dominated Communism. It was reflected in prominent political circles, such as the so-called "Cliveden set," which formed around some of the conservative parliamentarians. What significance this had was chiefly in the conduct of foreign policy rather than domestic policy, for even the "Cliveden set" was not reputed to favor any change in the existing pattern of British government.

Britain's problems were primarily economic and imperial. It has been observed earlier that the unfortunate consequences of the depression to Britain's trade, finances, and employment led to the fall of the second Labor Government and the establishment of a National Coalition. Following elections in the autumn of 1931 this Coalition was heavily weighted with Conservatives, who, after the retirement of Ramsay MacDonald in 1935, took over the government. Under Stanley Baldwin and then under Neville Chamberlain, the

Conservatives maintained control up to and partly through the new war. These latter years were not free of economic troubles, but on the eve of the war, unemployment showed a considerable decline, trade appeared to be "recovering" and national finances were better stabilized. Whether this was because of the expedients of the National or Conservative governments or in spite of them is not clear.

On the imperial front there were a variety of delicate and difficult problems, all of which were influenced in greater or lesser degree by the political upheaval of the continent. Nearest home was the Irish question. The Free State, which had been set up under the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1922, had not satisfied all of the Irish nationalists. There was opposition to the continuing connection of Ireland with the British Crown and government and there were objections that the six northern counties of Ulster were not yet incorporated into the Irish nation. This opposition centered around a Republican group headed by Eamon de Valera. At first conducted by boycotts and acts of violence, the program of the Republicans was diverted into legal channels and in 1932 they gained control of the Parliament. Henceforth Anglo-Irish relations steadily grew worse. The oath to the king was unilaterally abolished by law, and payments required on old land installments were shut off. To these measures Britain retaliated with prohibitive tariffs on Irish goods, precipitating a serious economic crisis among the Irish agricultural classes. De Valera nevertheless adhered to his course and in 1937 secured the adoption of a new constitution which declared Ireland completely independent and provided it with a republican government. The British were persuaded to believe that further resistance would prove futile and in 1938 accepted the accomplished fact. An agreement was reached with Ireland, scaling down the latter's financial payments, conceding to her the Crown's rights in certain of the Irish coast towns, and restoring the basis for normal trade relations between the two countries. Anglo-Irish relations were for the moment much improved, though the problem of Ulster still remained.

Equally troublesome was India. The several Round Table conferences which had been held in the early 1930's to deal with this issue had at last resulted in a plan for political reform which was eventually embodied in the Government of India Bill, passed by Parliament in 1935 and put into operation two years later. This measure, described as a step toward dominion status for India, allowed for a limited amount of representation both in the central and provincial governments; it reduced the Viceroy's powers, and

enlarged the native electorate to 36,000,000, still a small percentage of the total. Unquestionably, this represented improvement, but it was not deemed adequate by the Indian nationalists who wished for nothing less than complete independence or at least full dominion status. Their opposition under the Mahatma Gandhi therefore continued.

Elsewhere, especially in Egypt and Palestine, the British government faced difficulties. Egypt had never been a formal possession but the British after 1882 had enjoyed a special position there. There was at no time any question of abandoning these privileges, especially since they were necessary for the defense of the Suez canal, but after the World War there was a desire to maintain these in a fashion more acceptable to the Egyptians. It was not easy to strike such a compromise, since the Egyptian nationalists were always insistent upon the recognition of their right to complete independence. Their resistance consequently long delayed the completion of a mutually satisfactory understanding. It was not, in fact, until 1936, and then under the pressure of the Ethiopian campaign, that post-war Anglo-Egyptian relations were actually clarified. A treaty of alliance was signed in that year, recognizing substantially Egypt's independence but at the same time according to Britain special military privileges in the canal area.

The matter of Palestine was much more complicated, not only because of normal difficulties on the spot but also because of the international issues created by the spread of anti-Semitism. We have already observed that before 1933 a nationalist conflict had developed in Palestine between native Arabs and Jews. This was greatly inflamed after 1933 because of anti-Semitic propaganda and because of Britain's anxiety, as the mandatory power, to find refuge in Palestine for the growing number of Jewish refugees. It was impossible to please both parties to the dispute, and almost equally impossible to keep them from flying at each other's throats. Several commissions were appointed to investigate and recommend solutions. One of these recommended in 1937 that Palestine be partitioned, part going to the Jews as a Jewish state, part going to the Arabs, and part remaining as a neutral area under British jurisdiction. This pleased neither the British Parliament nor the League of Nations, and of course it did not please either the Arabs or the Jews, and had to be abandoned. Another commission in 1938 proposed that Britain encourage the Jews and the Arabs to come to a mutual understanding among themselves, and to this end an Arab-Jewish conference

was assembled at London in February, 1939. But this got off to a bad start, since Arabs and Jews would not sit together at the conference table, and no positive solution could be reached. Subsequently the British government advanced a new plan of its own but this had to be held in abeyance because of the intervening European war.

French political life was much less stable in the period following 1933 than was that of her political ally across the channel. Authoritarian doctrines had already made considerable advances among those factions which were traditionally opposed to republican institutions and their influence spread after the Nazi Revolution. In part this was due to disgust with the frequent ministerial changes, to fresh evidences of corruption in republican administration, and in part to continuing economic difficulties. At all events a number of Fascist and semi-Fascist societies took shape such as the *Jeunesses patriotes*, the *Solidarité française*, *Les Francistes*, and the *Croix de Feu*. Their combined membership by 1939 constituted an impressive total. Among their adherents or sympathizers were leading manufacturers, prominent military men, and even high political figures such as André Tardieu and Pierre Laval. These organizations did not profess the same principles—some leaned toward Italian Fascism, and others to German Nazism—but they were all alike in repudiating the republican regime. In this latter respect, at least, they could join hands with the Communist Party, whose influence also grew until the outbreak of war.

The republic was weakly defended against its enemies. Particularly unfortunate was the Stavisky scandal and the political consequences which ensued from it. In December, 1933, an underworld stock manipulator who had managed to buy good political connections in the ministry and the Chamber of Deputies absconded with funds which he had illegitimately collected through a municipally owned pawnshop at Bayonne. The enemies of the republic pounced upon this evidence of corruption and soon turned the affair into a major political crisis. In February, 1934, after futile efforts by several ministries to solve this and other problems, a great demonstration against the government, resulting in bloodshed, was staged in Paris. A "National Union" government was quickly formed under ex-President Doumergue to save the Republic. Doumergue, though old, was believed to be a strong man and held the public confidence. But his relatively brief administration was not happy or successful. Constitutional reforms which he proposed in order to strengthen the executive and to ensure greater ministerial responsibility failed

of passage, and in November, 1934, the "National Union" government retired. The Fascist and Communist elements were encouraged to greater activity.

By 1936 the growth of Fascism at home and abroad finally persuaded the parties of the Left to coalesce to save the nation from totalitarian dangers on the Right. A Popular Front Party, comprising mostly the Socialists, the Radical Socialists,[1] and the Communists, was formed under the leadership of the Socialist Léon Blum and took over the government in 1936 to hold it for a year. The leadership in this coalition was not well endowed and it was faced with disrupting issues both from within and from without its own organization. Its more moderate members resisted radical measures while its radical members urged it on to greater socialization; and outside the coalition the government faced the strong resistance of the conservative classes, still entrenched in the Senate. In consequence, Blum's ministry was reduced to adopting half-measures and compromises which tended to aggravate rather than to allay unrest. Farm relief and public works programs were extended, the government took over the arms factories, a forty-hour working week was established, and the Bank of France was reorganized and democratized. There was much that was good in these measures but they were costly and the Senate balked at giving Blum the broad financial powers he would have needed to carry them through. The ministry was consequently compelled to resign.

Thereafter, for the two years preceding the war, the governments were Radical Socialist or moderately conservative, mostly under the leadership of Edouard Daladier. Gradually, the social legislation of the Blum era was withdrawn, as the work week was increased, pensions allowances reduced, and economies instituted in the public works expenditures. This retrenchment, accompanied by increasing taxes, satisfied neither the radicals nor the conservatives and continued to keep alive much of the opposition to the republican regime.

B. Bluff and appeasement

The Fascist and Nazi dictatorships have been frankly and openly aggressive from the first. Both rose to power partly because of popular dissatisfaction with the peace settlements, and both were com-

[1] This party was not what its name would imply. In fact, it was chiefly the party of peasant proprietors who were opposed to socialization.

mitted to treaty revision. They complained that the treaties had been intentionally vindictive and that the status quo which had been established was filled with the most obvious injustices. England and France, they argued, had established their hegemony over the continent, and along with Russia and the United States, held a virtual monopoly of the world's resources. Needy and "creative" peoples such as the Germans and Italians were left only a few paltry morsels. To make matters worse, the dictators contended, the great democracies at the end of the war had hopelessly divided Europe into a variety of small states, each of which raised barriers to trade and squandered the wealth which others might have used more profitably. They scornfully brushed aside the explanation that the new map of Europe had been drawn in accordance with the principle of national self-determination, and accused the democracies of hypocritically using that as a mask to conceal their own ambitions. They appealed to mankind's sense of justice to rectify these abuses and inequalities.

If the dictators had been content to limit their demands to minor adjustments in the existing order, to be arranged by bargaining and compromise, these might have been met without prejudice to the peace. But their ambitions were unlimited in scope as was to become painfully apparent. Mussolini spoke of the new Roman Empire which was to take form in the Fascist era, referring to it in vague phraseology when it seemed dangerous to arouse Britain and France, but describing it in detail when he could afford to be bold. The Mediterranean, he said, was to become an Italian sea. Suez, Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria were to be wrested from British hands; Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Tunis were to be taken from France. The imperial patrimonies of these two "decadent" democracies would sometime fall into the virile hands of Fascist Italy. The little states of the Balkans would feel the sweep of Rome's civilizing genius, and the backward peoples of Africa would be given the blessings of European society by the Blackshirt legions. Rome would once more take its proper place of leadership in the world.

The Nazis felt the same strong urge to expansion. Indeed, this is the central theme permeating the whole of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and the elaborate, almost fantastic, ideology which the Nazis have formulated in recent years. It was absurd to believe, they said, that sixty million Germans, the most creative peoples in human society, should be limited to an area of 600,000 square miles, while forty million inhabitants of "decadent" Britain hold sway over a quarter

of the earth's surface. It was equally absurd to imagine that twenty million Germans outside the Fatherland should suffer under the jurisdictions of alien governments. They claimed the right to a "fair" share of the world's material resources and the right to complete national unity. For these reasons the Nazis never limited their demands for a change in the existing order simply to the restoration of territories lost at the end of the last war. These would have been quite inadequate. What they aimed to accomplish was to include all German-speaking peoples of the continent in the Fatherland, and at the same time to supply them with a sufficiently sizable territorial area, endowed with all the necessary resources, so that they could maintain an independent living and leave an adequate heritage to the 250,000,000 Germans whom Hitler was sure would exist at the end of the next millennium. This vague and indefinable area the Nazis called their *Lebensraum* (living space). Final definition of this was left to chance and opportunity. Hitler implied in *Mein Kampf* that it lay to the east and included the region of the Ukraine, but expediency modified this concept. Indeed, as the Nazi regime developed, and as opportunities presented themselves, expansionists within the ranks drew attention at times to the *Lebensraum* in the west and in the colonial world. The most visionary of the prophets even began to see that Germany needed most of the world for *Lebensraum.*

The almost unlimited scope of their respective ambitions appeared to make impossible any future Fascist-Nazi co-operation. Their programs and policies seemed mutually exclusive and contradictory. Yet these barriers were hurdled, largely because both had the same interest for the moment in destroying the status quo, and both were faced with the same forces of opposition.

In support of their claims to expansion, Fascists and Nazis appealed to the specious arguments of imperialism as well as to the revelations of their own party doctrines. Both complained of "excess" populations and demanded additional space. As Mussolini baldly phrased the case for Italy, it was either "expand or explode." The dictators left no other alternative, for both encouraged a higher birth rate and refused to consider the idea that some of their peoples move elsewhere. If this "necessary" expansion had to be accomplished at the expense of other peoples, they felt that there was nothing inherently wrong with that. What Britain and France had taken, they pointed out, had once belonged to others, and if it was right that the British and French should hold what they possessed and even seize more as occasion arose, it was also right that Germany

and Italy should take what they needed. Especially did they feel justified in making these claims because they were both convinced that they possessed "superior" qualities which gave them the natural right to dominate "inferior" or "decadent" peoples.

The doctrines of "racial" and "national" superiority to which both Fascists and Nazis subscribed in varying degrees were new only in the forms of their expression and the breadth of their application. They had been developed and used by others before. Fascists claimed that the Italian nation possessed unique creative genius and they attempted to substantiate this by reference to the achievements of imperial Rome, to Italy's leadership in the organization and spread of Christianity, and to the fact that Italy mothered the Renaissance. The past was held sufficient proof of present Italian greatness. It was only because of feeble democratic governments and because of the stifling limitations imposed by the status quo that the rest of the world had been deprived lately of what Italy could contribute. The Italians were a young and virile people who had the right to carve a place under the sun fitting to their genius. If they profited from it, so too would the rest of mankind.

The Nazis were even less modest. Their ideology was based on the premise that among all the "races" of mankind, the Nordic clearly predominated through its creative capacities. History, as they rewrote it, offered abundant proofs, from the great empires of the ancient world to the civilizations of the contemporary era. All that was really great, all that was creative, they shouted, could be traced to the influence of this people, whose native stock had flourished on German soil. What little of the "race" remained in its primitive purity was concentrated in the German Reich. It was the duty of the Nazis, as they conceived it, to preserve this blessed heritage, to find for it fields of adventure commensurate with its genius, and to bestow its blessings upon the rest of inferior mankind. Nothing was to be allowed to stultify its growth and development. Nothing was to curb its freedom of action—certainly not the irrational political boundaries which selfish and "decadent" peoples had established. The Nordics were the "strong" among men, and the "laws of nature" dictated that the strong should subordinate the weak, should give guidance and direction. Little sovereign states which stood in the path of Nordic expansion could therefore claim no moral right to existence. Indeed, as "inferior peoples," if they were incorporated within the Reich system and were made to enjoy its blessings, they

would sometime thank the Reich for ending their supposed independence. Germany could creat a "new order" ruled by supermen.

Doctrines such as these were advanced not only in defense of expansion but also in defense of war as a means of achieving it. Hitler and Mussolini both abhorred perpetual peace, though when it appeared expedient they claimed to be its champions. Mussolini, for example, stated on more than one occasion that Italy co-operated with the League of Nations not because of the principle of collective security for which the League stood, but because Italy wished to destroy the League. "Not only do I not believe in everlasting peace," he said, "but I would also hold it as depressing and destructive of the basic virtues of man, which only in a bloody effort can shine in the full light of the sun." Hitler echoed these sentiments, contending that only in violence are the creative forces of human society liberated. War they believed to be not only a means to an end but, to a certain extent, an end in itself.

Neither of the dictators concealed his intention of resorting to aggression at the first opportunity nor his willingness to engulf the rest of the world in war. Yet few in the democracies were ready to take these "boastings" and "rantings" at their face value, even when unmistakable evidence showed that they might have been made in dead earnest. Some complacently brushed aside all fear with the facile assumption that what the dictators said was meant only for "home consumption," in order to keep the public in a state of perpetual alarm, or possibly to divert its attention from some unhappy domestic situation. These men were "rationalists" who could prove from statistics that neither the Nazis nor the Fascists had the material means with which to wage war. If they did embark upon some foolhardy adventure, it must be clear even to the dictators, so it was argued, that they would suffer swift defeat.

Not all people in the democracies were "rationalists" of this type. The great majority probably thought little of the complicated problems of war. Most of them were either pacifists or anti-militarists who wanted no war and wished to avoid it at almost any cost. If peace could be kept by making concessions to the dictators, they were ready to go a long way toward that end. This was perhaps the most tragic weakness in the defense of post-war democracy, for it helped to prevent the necessary military preparations and deprived potentially strong leaders of the popular support necessary to dam the tide in time.

It is likewise probably true that many in the democracies were

inclined to view the Nazi and Fascist dictators as the lesser of two evils; the greater being Communism, personified and led by Soviet Russia. The economic and social upheavals of the post-war years aroused fear of a proletarian revolution, and since both the Nazis and the Fascists claimed to be anti-Communist and acted accordingly, some believed it unwise to do anything to challenge their stability. So long as they stood, the Soviet Government might be held in leash. This attitude was one factor leading toward a policy of appeasement.

Apathy, misapprehension, a false sense of security, the widespread spirit of pacifism, and conflicting political loyalties which helped to produce these reactions, created the first serious breach in the peace structure of the democracies. The second sprang from their mutual jealousies and conflicting ambitions, both of which prevented that pooling of resources necessary to the attainment of a common objective. Not until the eleventh hour were these rivalries put aside.

When the dictatorial offensive really began with the rise of National Socialism in Germany in 1933 there was still a great deal of confidence in the power of the League of Nations to preserve the peace. But the League was already nearly broken as the result of a serious reversal which it suffered during the Manchurian crisis in the Far East. During the autumn of 1931 Japanese forces began the systematic occupation of the Chinese province of Manchuria.[1] China appealed to the League and to the United States who responded with efforts directed toward mediation and peaceful settlement. But it soon became clear that Japan neither intended to withdraw her armies nor to negotiate, except upon her own terms. The American Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, in view of this situation was ready to propose strong measures against Japan and so urged the League, but the unwillingness of members of the Council to commit themselves to heavy responsibilities in the Far East frustrated Mr. Stimson's plans. The Council of the League created the Lytton Commission to investigate the dispute. This had its merits, for the Lytton report revealed the full extent of Japan's responsibilities as an aggressor. But while the Commission deliberated and reported, the Japanese military extended and consolidated its conquests. Japanese troops occupied Shanghai, partly in retaliation for a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods, and China was persuaded to rush another appeal to the League for help. This time the League machinery worked, less because of its inherent strength than because the enterprise was a costly one from which Japan was anxious to escape. In

[1] See p. 872.

May, 1932, the Japanese troops withdrew from Shanghai under supervision of an agency of the League Assembly. The Manchurian enterprise continued, however, with Japan setting up a puppet state, Manchukuo (March, 1932) and still resisting the Council's efforts for peace. The Chinese Government, therefore, decided to turn the matter over to the Assembly which had been successful in Shanghai. During February the Assembly passed a resolution denouncing Japan as the aggressor, whereupon Japan immediately withdrew from the League and continued its efforts to establish a "new order" in Asia by force. Except for adopting the policy already formulated by Secretary Stimson of non-recognition with reference to Japanese conquests, the League did nothing more to chastise the aggressor. Moral sanctions were allowed to produce what result they could which, in this case, was practically nothing at all.

This clear-cut demonstration of the League's inability to resist aggression strengthened the determination of the western dictators to open their offensive against the status quo. In October, 1933, the Nazi Government, after having embarrassed the Geneva Disarmament Conference with fresh demands, withdrew from that body and simultaneously resigned from the League. This was the first phase of a German attack upon the League which was to develop with increasing boldness and ferocity. Fears for the future of the League naturally increased, but these were allayed somewhat by the easy assumption that Germany might be induced to come back if the powers would grant her military equality, and by the fact that Russia was admitted to the League in 1934. The Soviets too were beginning to fear Germany and were ready to abandon their scruples regarding the "League of Robber Nations," as they had once referred to it. But their admission added little to the League's strength.

Meanwhile, the nations most desirous of maintaining the status quo sought to buttress the crumbling structure by political understandings, mutual assistance pacts, and non-aggression treaties. Thus, for example, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania, the grouping of the Little Entente, agreed to closer economic co-operation (1933) and even worked out a plan (1934) by which their Foreign Ministers would regularly meet together to discuss their common problems. Under Turkey's leadership, Greece was also encouraged (1934) to join with Jugoslavia and Rumania in a Balkan Entente, to "keep the Balkans for the Balkan people" and to preserve the peace by maintaining the existing order. Both of these combinations in south-

eastern Europe came in response to the rise of aggressive Nazidom and were designed in part for the purpose of closing this region to German expansion. But they were also directed at Hungary and Bulgaria, former allies of Germany, who showed signs of being sympathetic with the Nazi program of treaty revision.

The little republics of northern Europe were likewise influenced to consolidate in the interest of common defense. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia agreed (1934) to hold diplomatic conferences regularly, to aid each other in common problems of foreign policy, and to settle peaceably among themselves any disputes which might arise. Unquestionably they had in mind both the danger from Soviet Russia and from Nazi Germany. The Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and the Netherlands, together with Belgium and Luxemburg, combined to form the so-called Oslo Group. By regular meetings and consultations on problems mutually affecting their interests they too hoped to stem the tide of international anarchy. The little Republic of Finland, forever fearful of the designs of Soviet Russia, participated with this Oslo Group more or less as a silent partner.

France also endeavored to fortify and extend its own system of political alliances. The most notable undertaking in this direction was the cultivation of close relations with Soviet Russia. After the gradual abandonment of strong post-war prejudices against the Communist regime, republican France finally sought Russia as a political ally. Trade relations were fostered, France sponsored Russia for admission into the League of Nations, and in 1935, the two powers negotiated a mutual assistance pact which allowed for consultation on matters of common interest and actual military co-operation in case either party were the victim of unprovoked attack. During that same year France courted the friendship of Italy by signing the Laval-Mussolini Pact with the Fascists. This engagement allowed Italy to buy shares of stock in the Ethiopian railway, extended territorial concessions on the desert frontiers of Libya, and arranged a mutual settlement of most outstanding difficulties between the two Powers in Tunis. In return France expected to secure Italian co-operation against Germany on the continent. At the same time France endeavored to tighten the bonds between herself and Great Britain. Throughout all of the post-war period Britain had constantly refused to subscribe to any binding commitments which would involve her in continental troubles. This opposition continued, although the government in London did show its willingness to come

to the support of France in case the latter were the victim of direct attack, and in fulfillment of this intention inaugurated military and naval conversations with the French staffs in 1936. These understandings were supplemented by additional agreements with France's lesser allies, except Belgium who, because of the mounting pressure on her German frontier, asked and secured release in 1936 from her long-standing treaty obligations to the French.

Meanwhile, Soviet Russia, in search of protection against the Nazis, accelerated her negotiations for non-aggression pacts with immediate neighbors and potential enemies. Ten such pacts were concluded in 1934, by the so-called London agreements, in which the signatories pledged that they would not harbor enemies of each other nor tolerate any action upon their territories which would disturb the general peace. It was hoped that pacts such as these might serve as a deterrent to aggressive ambition.

Like the League of Nations, these political security pacts were impressive only on the exterior. Behind them mutual jealousies, national ambitions, and selfish interests still held sway. Britain would not be responsible for the whole of the continent and so, in substance, virtually repudiated France's continental security structure. Unsure of British support, France, in consequence, did not feel that it could afford to support its other allies with the necessary vigor. This was certainly one of the weakest links in the chain of defensive pacts which the status quo powers had developed. But other nations, too, were equally short-sighted. Poland, for example, fearful of Soviet Russia and not unsympathetic to Nazi Germany, signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1934. With a foot in each camp, the Polish government hoped to profit no matter what the future might bring. Jugoslavia and Rumania also leaned more and more upon Germany economically and eventually drew closer politically.

Internal stresses such as these within the peace structure were a godsend to the aggressive dictators who exploited them to the full. It was not difficult to divide friends who were suspicious of each other, and, under the circumstances, the dictators were able to march easily from one victory to another. Hitler began the attack, and scored the first notable success. After withdrawing from the Geneva Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations in 1933, the Nazi government boldly began the creation of a new German military machine, despite the legal limitations of the Treaty of Versailles which still applied. These preparations did not pass unnoticed

but nothing was done. Instead, it was hoped that some formula might be found which would satisfy the Nazi desire for remilitarization without endangering the peace of the rest of the world. A plan was presented to Germany early in 1935 with this objective in mind. Briefly, it proposed that in return for the concession of military equality Germany should promise: (1) to respect the independence of Austria; (2) to respect the integrity of the little states on her eastern frontier; (3) to join in security agreements which would supplement the Locarno Pacts; and (4) to agree to return to the League of Nations. If Germany had really wanted peace as well as equality, there was nothing in this proposal to which she could object. Yet it was ignored and the Nazi dictator set out to attain the desired equality without any restrictions upon Germany's future freedom of action. On March 16, 1935, Hitler startled the world by announcing that Germany henceforth would not respect any of the clauses in the Versailles document which set limitations upon her military establishment. This was a clear-cut case of treaty-breaking. France was ready to sponsor joint action by the League, but Britain was unsympathetic and Italy objected, with the result that nothing of a positive nature was done. To be sure, each of the offended powers registered protests at Berlin, and eventually the League formally criticized Germany's procedure, but these were simply gestures which the Nazis could afford to ignore.

The deed accomplished, Hitler, in one of his famous addresses to the German nation and the world, gave assurance that he was a man of peace. He said he abhorred war and intended to devote his energies to its prevention. It was to be understood by other nations, therefore, that German remilitarization was not meant for belligerent purposes. And to lend strength to his argument, Hitler asserted that Germany had no designs upon other people's territory. So far as he was concerned, the French and Belgian frontiers were permanently fixed; France had nothing to fear. As for Austria, Germany had no intention of interfering in its domestic life and certainly no designs upon its territory. Other neighbors could rest at ease, for the Nazis did not plan to incorporate alien peoples into the Fatherland. This forthright denial of everything for which the Nazis stood put many who were fearful at their ease. It was taken as a sign that perhaps the Nazis were really becoming legal and "respectable" now that their authority had been established. At all events, the British government seemed inclined to this view and agreed to negotiate for the elimination from the Versailles treaty of those clauses

which placed limitations upon the German navy. In July, 1935, a British-German naval agreement was signed, giving the Nazis the right to build up a navy 35 percent the size of Great Britain's, and another hindrance to German rearmament had been removed.

Less than a year later Germany again struck successfully. The Nazis were not satisfied simply with the freedom to rearm, they aimed at achieving complete military independence. This was impossible so long as the demilitarization of the Rhineland was enforced under existing treaties. It will be recalled that the Treaty of Versailles had stipulated that Germany must not fortify or maintain military establishments in the Rhineland within fifty kilometers of the right bank of the Rhine. Subsequently, this clause had been reaffirmed in the Locarno treaties which the German Republic had freely helped to negotiate. To tear up both of these documents seemed like a dangerous undertaking, but Hitler was equal to the task. Choosing his time well, when the League and the status quo powers were divided over the Ethiopian dispute, he suddenly declared in March, 1936, that the German army was marching into the Rhineland and that henceforth Germany would respect no restrictions upon her freedom of action there. Once more the opposition was paralyzed. The League deliberated, but, as Hitler had calculated, all that resulted were formal protests which could be cynically ignored. This startling success in the Rhineland was of momentous significance. It enabled Germany to fortify its western frontier and immobilize the French armies on the Maginot Line while its own attention was turned toward conquest in the east; it encouraged weak and faltering states, especially those sympathetic with revisionism, to line up with the strong aggressor; and, finally, it was at least partly instrumental in bringing Fascist Italy into an alliance with the Reich.

The Fascists, in the meantime, had not been idle. Encouraged by the increasing signs of weakness among the defenders of the status quo, Mussolini brought to completion plans which he boasted he had long since formulated for the conquest of Ethiopia.[1] Late in 1934, the Fascist-controlled press began a concerted campaign of recrimination against the Ethiopian emperor and his people; military preparations in Italian Somaliland and Eritrea in East Africa were accelerated; and finally in December, 1934, Italy made an issue of a clash at a frontier watering place. The Ethiopian Government was ready to be conciliatory and recommended that the issue be solved by an arbitration commission. Mussolini stalled for time, while he sped

[1] See pp. 880-881.

the shipment of men and munitions to East Africa. Throughout the spring and summer of 1935 various efforts, including those of the League of Nations to which the Emperor Hailie Selassie had appealed, were made to reach a peaceful solution. All were repudiated or ignored by Mussolini, and on October 1, 1935, without a declaration of war, the mechanized Italian armies marched into Ethiopian territory. There is no better example of a deliberate act of aggression in modern history.

HAILIE SELASSIE AND MUSSOLINI

Pierre Laval of France and Sir Samuel Hoare of England, as policemen, watch Mussolini, the thug with the club, while Hailie Selassie explains his case in front of the League Police Station.

Led by Great Britain, now deeply concerned for the future of its own empire and apparently genuinely anxious to make the principles of collective security operative, the League of Nations was spurred on to action. Less than two weeks after the Italian armies had begun their march, Italy was condemned as the aggressor, and steps were taken to implement this condemnation by the application of economic sanctions. Exports and imports to and from Italy, except for such really vital things as oil and coal, were to terminate in the middle of November, unless the Italians ceased their operations. In accordance with these plans, the British Government reinforced its Mediterranean navy to be ready for eventualities. But there were few in a commanding position in League affairs who had enthusiasm for this adventure in sanctions. France, especially, hesitated. As has been noted, France had just signed with Italy some few months before the Laval-Mussolini Pact, adjusting outstanding problems between the two states as a preliminary to securing Italian co-operation against Germany on the continent, and Premier Laval was not anxious to do anything to alienate his new friend. France's position, indeed, was not an enviable one: it seemed neither wise to abandon Italy in view of the German threat nor yet to estrange Britain whose support was also so vitally necessary. And in this Ethiopian affair these two friends were at sword's points. Laval,

partly because of his own sympathies with Fascist Italy, sought to find a solution. With the British foreign secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, who was also anxious for a peaceful solution, Laval reached an agreement by which Ethiopia was to be partitioned in such fashion as to give Italy a very substantial portion of territory. The Hoare-Laval agreement was made public in December, 1935, and aroused such a storm of protest in Great Britain that Sir Samuel Hoare was compelled to retire from office. His successor, Anthony Eden, pledged a vigorous League campaign against Italy, and France reluctantly agreed to co-operate.

Limited League sanctions were applied for the duration of the Ethiopian campaign. But inasmuch as these did not apply to oil and since other Great Powers like Germany did not co-operate in their application, they did no great damage to Italy's war efforts although they caused considerable hardship for the Italian people. As a matter of fact, their results were quite the contrary of what had been anticipated. Instead of discouraging the Fascist aggressors, they awakened keen popular resentment in Italy, and this, in turn, encouraged Mussolini to pool his resources with Nazi Germany.

One of the immediate products of the Ethiopian controversy was the Rome-Berlin Axis. Prior to 1935 Mussolini had been inclined to range himself on the side of France and Great Britain against Nazi Germany, largely, no doubt, because of his personal fears of German expansion into Austria. These fears had not passed but they were felt with less intensity since Britain had emerged as a dangerous enemy in the Mediterranean and since Germany had been willing to co-operate with Italy against the application of sanctions. Official and unofficial exchanges of visits between Rome and Berlin during 1936 foreshadowed the development of outwardly cordial relations between the two dictators. In July, 1936, these were at last published to the world with the announcement of a specific understanding, defined by Mussolini himself as the Rome-Berlin Axis, between Germany and Italy. What precise agreements had been reached by the two dictators was kept a secret, but it soon became apparent that they implied mutual co-operation on a grand scale. Unquestionably this Rome-Berlin Axis represented a diplomatic revolution of the greatest significance. Its importance was enhanced the following year, when Italy and Japan signed an "Anti-Comintern Pact," ostensibly directed against Soviet Russia, but really broadening the scope of aggressive co-operation against the status quo.

The first fruits of the German-Italian co-operation were reaped

on the battlefields of Spain. It will be recalled that the Spanish Republic, established after a bloodless revolution in 1931, had been gravely weakened by factional strife from the beginning. The inhabitants of Catalonia and the Basque Provinces demanded and received virtual independence. Moreover, within the numerous parties which supported the Republic there was little willingness to compromise ideological differences. The Communists, Syndicalists, and Socialists insisted that the revolution had only just begun, while the moderates and conservatives agreed that the revolution was over. Disagreements among these factions cleared the path for reaction.

The conservative enemies of the Republic—landowners who were threatened with the confiscation of their properties, most of the old army officers, those who were fearful of communism, and a sizable portion of the clergy—pooled their strength. An attempt to incite revolution in 1932 failed, but during the next few years they managed to improve their position in Parliament. The elections of 1934 were definitely a conservative victory. This swing to the Right was reflected in substantial modifications of the religious, agrarian, and educational reforms of the preceding years; it was also reflected in the increasing boldness with which the enemies of the Republic plotted its destruction.

In February, 1936, however, the conservatives lost their control of Parliament when the republican parties at last set aside their differences and in the national elections united as a Popular Front Bloc. The balloting was close, but the Popular Front, through the accidents of the election, managed to gain a decisive majority in Parliament. In consequence, the next few months were characterized by the swing of the political pendulum to the Left. Agrarian and educational reforms were once more pushed and there was a marked revival of anti-clericalism. Energetic measures were also adopted to rid the army of reactionary officers and to republicanize it.

Fearful that these plans might succeed, the threatened military men decided to rebel. They were reasonably sure of support from the clerical party, the monarchists, and the most conservative republicans, and, what is more, they had apparently received assurances of sympathy and support from Italy and Germany. On July 17, 1936, the revolt began among regiments in Morocco, under the leadership of General Francisco Franco, and soon spread to the mainland.

From the beginning this revolution was an issue of international importance. Three Great Powers in particular revealed a very spe-

cial interest in it: Russia, Germany, and Italy. The Soviet Government apparently hoped that the revolution might be diverted into channels of communism, and to that end gave aid and advice to the legal, Popular Front government. For Germany, the establishment of a friendly dictatorship in Spain held out the prospect of weakening France. This was worth substantial material assistance which the Nazis showed no hesitation in giving. But the Power most keenly interested in the outcome of the revolution was Fascist Italy, chiefly for reasons of power politics. The Ethiopian campaign had just ended successfully but it had revealed more than ever the fatal weak spots in Italy's Mediterranean position. Hostile England held both Suez and Gibraltar and therefore, with the co-operation of France, was in a position to strangle Italy. Mussolini believed it worth the risk to break this control, and Spain afforded the opportunity. With a government in Spain which would be obligated to him, he might expect to control the Balearic Islands, standing athwart the British and French sea routes to Africa. Besides, there was the chance of establishing a position in Spanish Morocco which might possibly immobilize the British at Gibraltar. In the hope of gaining these objectives, the Fascist government lavishly endowed General Franco with munitions, airplanes, and "volunteers" to the extent of approximately 100,000 men.

Great Britain and France too had important interests at stake, but neither power was ready to assume the risks necessary to protect them, partly because public opinion was divided over the revolution and partly because of fear of becoming involved in war. They had the legal right under international law to permit the passage of munitions to the recognized Loyalist government, but they refrained from using it since Italy and Germany let it be known that this would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Instead, France and Britain took the lead in organizing a movement to prevent intervention by any of the powers on behalf of either side. If this had proved truly effective, in all probability the Loyalists would have won, but it was a complete farce from the beginning. The London Non-Intervention Committee, as it was called, contained representatives from twenty-seven different nations, including Germany and Italy. The latter two Powers were able to sabotage all of the Committee's efforts. While professing attachment to the non-intervention principle, they openly and publicly flouted it. And they were able to pursue this policy of unconcealed deception for more than two years.

Nothing more clearly reflects the poverty of Franco-British diplomacy in the Spanish crisis.

While the Non-Intervention Committee pursued its futile debates, supplies and men continued to flow into Franco's Nationalist Spain but supplies to the Loyalists were practically stopped. The results were to be expected. Loyalist defenses were slowly worn down, and early in the spring of 1939 General Franco emerged victorious. It is significant that this success was hailed in Italy as a national victory. Such indeed it was, and it was a German victory as well. Britain was now challenged at Gibraltar, and France was literally surrounded with totalitarian enemies.

In the meantime, the Nazis had already overrun and extinguished both Austria and Czechoslovakia. The Austrian Republic had lived a troubled existence from the beginning, and had been sustained only by a combination of compulsion and generosity on the part of the victorious nations. Its lack of resources and the more or less unfriendly attitude of most of its neighbors gave rise to serious social and economic disturbances, and long encouraged many of its inhabitants to hope that sometime union might be effected with Germany. These hopes had been successfully blasted by the powers who persistently refused to tolerate any form of union. This issue of *Anschluss*, as it was called, took a serious turn with the rise of the Nazis to power in Germany.

It appears that many of the Austrian people lost their enthusiasm for *Anschluss* with Germany after Hitler's assumption of power, partly because of his anti-religious policies which offended the Catholics, and partly because of his labor policies which alienated the working classes. But the dwindling enthusiasm of the Austrians did not serve to deter the Nazis who were determined to incorporate Austria into the Reich. An Austrian Nazi party was created and, aided and abetted by the authorities at Berlin, it attempted to precipitate an internal political revolution which would serve as a prelude to German occupation. The Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss, launched a vigorous counterattack. The Nazi party was outlawed. Dollfuss, partly at least to strengthen his nation, established a personal dictatorship (1933) and attempted to form a native totalitarian party, the Fatherland Front, dedicated to the preservation of Austrian independence. Germany retaliated, but Dollfuss proceeded on his course apparently with the consent of Great Britain and France, and certainly with the active encouragement of Mus-



Courtesy of the Syracuse University Library

THE KARL MARX HOF, VIENNA

Built by the socialist government of Vienna, the Karl Marx Hof was one of the first and most famous of municipal housing projects. During the civil war of 1934, it served as a socialist stronghold and was virtually destroyed by the Austrian army.

solini. Fascist Italy at this time was still very anxious to preserve Austria as a buffer against Germany.

The sympathy of foreign governments was valuable to Dollfuss in resisting Nazi pressure, but what he needed most of all was popular backing at home, and this he failed to get largely because of his own blundering policies and lack of foresight. There seems to be little doubt that the majority of the nation at first was with him and that had he shown a modicum of statesmanlike vision he could have retained this support. But personal ambition, misunderstanding, and possibly bad advice from Fascist Italy, led him to alienate the well-organized working classes. As a conservative and a provincial he was suspicious of Social Democracy which controlled Vienna and he aimed to destroy it. In February, 1934, therefore, he decreed the abolition of all political parties and organizations except the Fatherland Front, and when the Social Democrats showed intentions of resisting, he brutally crushed them with force. He attained his objective of destroying the Socialists but at the same time he created a cleavage in Austrian society which damaged irreparably his chances and those of his successor to preserve Austrian inde-

pendence. During the next few years Austria gave the appearance of unity but underneath it was a mass of seething intrigue.

The Nazis quite naturally sought to profit from this state of affairs. Their agitation against Austria both within and from the outside intensified, and in July, 1934, an attempt was finally made to seize the Austrian Government. It was premature, but as the result of the attempt Chancellor Dollfuss was assassinated. All Europe, and Italy especially, was shocked at this exhibition of violence and was fearful that the immediate occupation of Austria by German troops might be impending. The Fascist government at once took a strong stand, concentrating troops on the Brenner Pass to march to Austria's defense at the first sign of a German threat. This prompt action no doubt persuaded the Nazis to be more circumspect. They denied that they had had any intentions upon Austria, and pledged that the activities of overly enthusiastic members of the party, whom they said had irresponsibly precipitated the crisis, would be curbed.

During the next two years Austria, with Italian support and encouragement, virtually isolated herself from Germany, and the successor of Dollfuss, Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg went on developing a pro-Austrian, anti-German policy along much the same lines as his predecessor. Like Dollfuss, Schuschnigg lacked the essential qualities of statesmanship. Honest, sincere, patriotic, a man of honor, he was out of touch with the masses and isolated from his companions in government. He failed to appreciate the necessity of recapturing the support of the working classes. Perhaps his greatest deficiency was his inability to judge character. A devout churchman, he constantly deluded himself into believing that his fellow churchmen at least would not deceive or betray him. The enemies of the state, some of them men whom he counted as his close friends, were able in time to exploit this naive credulity.

Schuschnigg's dictatorship like that of Dollfuss lacked adequate popular support and was sustained principally by the moral and material backing which it received from Fascist Italy. When this support was withdrawn, the dictatorship was unable to defend itself or the nation. In 1936 as the result of the Ethiopian crisis and as a means of buying German co-operation for the future, Mussolini abandoned Schuschnigg and Austria to their fate. The first sign of what was happening came in July, 1936, when the Austrian Chancellor was persuaded by Mussolini to come to terms with Hitler in an agreement which required Austria to include Nazi sympathizers in its

cabinet. Later on that autumn, the negotiations which brought the Rome-Berlin Axis into being, implicitly if not explicitly, recognized that Austria was now a free field for German adventure.

Thereafter Schuschnigg was forced to concede steadily increasing German demands upon him. In particular, he was induced to grant amnesty to a number of the Nazis who had helped with the murder of Dollfuss, and to extend to German Nazis in Austria the right to wear their party insignia openly without fear of punishment. This allowed the German Nazi organization virtually a free hand in organizing agitation for union with Germany. By January, 1938, Schuschnigg had become genuinely alarmed at the course which affairs were taking, and ordered reliable police to descend upon Nazi headquarters in Vienna for the purpose of confiscating whatever incriminating documents might be found. The startling discovery of an elaborate plan, bearing the initials of a high German Nazi, aiming at the destruction of the Austrian Government, heightened the Chancellor's concern. It might well have had this effect for indeed the German Nazis were just then bringing their plot to destroy Austria to maturity.

While in this troubled state of mind, Chancellor Schuschnigg was persuaded by his friends in the Cabinet, chiefly by the Nazi sympathizers who meant to betray him, to accept an invitation to visit Hitler at Berchtesgaden early in February. This visit was to seal the fate of Austria. After crossing the Austrian frontier, Schuschnigg had a foretaste of what was to come. German soldiers were everywhere in preparation for what might be the occupation of Austria, and at Berchtesgaden he was received and treated most uncivilly. Hitler stormed and ranted, made excessive demands, and when the Austrian appeared to stand firm revealed to him what preparations were already made for the occupation of Austria in case he did not submit. Hard pressed, and realizing he could not count on foreign aid, Schuschnigg agreed to some dangerous concessions, especially to the inclusion of more Nazis in his Cabinet and to the extension of legal recognition to the Nazi movement in Austria.

The next few weeks were hectic. The Austrian Nazis, convinced of German support, set no bounds to their violence and agitation. Schuschnigg, hoping against hope that an escape might be found, labored to outwit Berlin. He hit upon what appeared to be a clever scheme, when he announced that on March 12 a popular plebiscite would be held to determine whether the Austrians wished to maintain their independence. Even the Nazis were convinced that if this

took place Austria would be lost to them. Hitler, therefore, decided to act at once. Four ultimatums to Austria followed each other in quick succession, demanding the abandonment of the plebiscite and Schuschnigg's resignation. The government capitulated to avoid bloodshed and Seyss-Inquart, an avowed Nazi, illegally took the chancellorship. He immediately invited Hitler to send in his troops to restore order. On March 12 Austria's independence was lost, and two days later Hitler himself entered Vienna in triumph.

The German absorption of Austria placed the republic of Czechoslovakia in a precarious position, as a glance at the map will show, even though Hitler was generous in his promises that the Czechs had nothing to fear. That these promises were valueless was well appreciated by the statesmen at Prague, for ever since the rise of the Nazi regime across the frontier Czechoslovakia had been the victim of Nazi intimidation emanating both from the Reich and from its own numerous German citizenry (about three million) in the region of the Sudetenland. With financial aid and counsel from Berlin a local Nazi Party had been formed among these Germans as early as 1933. Because of premature violence it was dissolved by the government and its leaders were driven into exile. But it was not long before the Nazis renewed their activities under thin disguise. A Sudeten German Party was created under the leadership of an obscure gymnast and bank clerk, Konrad Henlein, which before long became purely Nazi in character. With the aid of party organizers from the Reich, Henlein was soon able to develop a formidable political organization which by 1938 controlled from 85 per cent to 90 per cent of the total German vote. The co-ordination of this party with the Nazi Party in Germany, in everything but name, gave Hitler a powerful instrument of attack.

The open Nazi offensive against Czechoslovakia began in 1936. A heavy barrage of radio and newspaper propaganda was laid down from Berlin. Czechoslovakia was accused of conniving with the Bolsheviki and tales of brutal treatment of Germans by the Czech police were circulated. Czechoslovakia adopted measures of conciliation and self-defense. Political, cultural, and economic concessions were made to the various minority elements in the republic, and more were promised for the future. At the same time the police were reorganized and threatened frontier districts were placed under military control to protect the state against extremists and the danger of attack from Germany.

During the spring of 1938 German propaganda against Czecho-

slovakia was intensified and the demands of the Sudeten German Party grew more uncompromising. Henlein, no doubt at Hitler's advice, spurned Prague's every effort at conciliation. During the early summer the situation grew critical when rumors of German troop movements toward the frontiers spread throughout Europe. Simultaneously more Czech soldiers were mobilized and concentrated at the danger points. War seemed to threaten, and France and Russia, though cautioning Czechoslovakia to be conciliatory, showed a disposition to fulfill their alliance pledges. Great Britain, however, was especially anxious to save the peace and undertook positive measures to that end. The Czechs were asked to accept the services of a British mediator, Lord Runciman, who would attempt to arrange a solution. Prague agreed reluctantly and in August, 1938, Runciman took up his duties. His negotiations aroused suspicions, and there were substantial grounds for concluding that officially or unofficially he was trying to ease the way for the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. At all events, during his visit the Sudeten German Party adopted a more intransigent attitude, despite the fact that the Czech government showed itself ready to make generous concessions. The crisis came September 13. That day Henlein fled Czechoslovakia and announced that it was no longer possible for the Germans to live in the same state with the Czechs. This followed by one day a speech in which Hitler demanded national self-determination for the Germans in Czechoslovakia. There was now real danger of war.

In a dramatic effort to keep the peace, Prime Minister Chamberlain of Britain flew to Germany, first to Berchtesgaden on September 15, and then to Godesberg on September 22 to consult personally with Hitler. As the result of the first of these visits Chamberlain promised to bring pressure upon the Czechs by way of having them abandon to Germany that territory in which more than fifty percent of the population was German. On the second visit, Chamberlain was told that these concessions, which the Czechs had accepted with great reluctance, would have to be made by October 1, else the German armies would march. Chamberlain could not bring himself to accept this ultimatum and during the following week frantic preparations for war were made on all sides. The intervention of Mussolini and President Roosevelt at the last moment, however, seemed to save the peace. It was decided to regulate the cessions of territory in conference, and at Munich on September 29 representatives of France, England, Germany, and Italy met for this purpose. The German demands were all satisfied. Hitler now asserted he was con-

rent, declared he wanted no Czechs, and promised to consult frankly with Britain on problems affecting their interests in the future. Chamberlain returned to London "bringing peace for our time."

At the very moment when Hitler was solemnly promising that he was satisfied with the Sudetenland and wanted no Czechs the official acts of the Nazi Government belied his words. The campaign to dismember Czechoslovakia completely was already under way. It was not difficult to prosecute this plan since the moral and physical strength of the nation had been sapped and the discontented elements among the remaining minorities were encouraged to hope for their redemption.

In October, 1938, while Reich troops occupied the Sudetenland, the government at Berlin winked at and acquiesced in the Polish seizure of the district of Teschen with 77,000 Poles and 130,000 Czechs. During the next month Germany, with Italy's co-operation, arranged to dispose of the Magyar minority, ostensibly to satisfy the wishes of Hungary. Hungary was given a generous slice of Slovakia with its Magyars and 200,000 Slovaks besides. Later, with Germany's consent, Hungary took another 100,000 Slovaks.

Meanwhile, German propagandists manufactured a new crisis to facilitate the complete dismemberment of what remained of the Czech republic. The Vienna radio was especially energetic in pursuing this enterprise, having begun its campaign during the week of the Munich conference. The attack was centered chiefly upon Slovakia which was encouraged to demand its autonomy. In response to this agitation and in the hope of avoiding another grave crisis, the government at Prague set up a federal state early in October. This arrangement did not satisfy certain Slovak extremists and it did not satisfy the Nazis who now encouraged the Slovaks to demand complete independence. A crisis was reached on March 14 when as the result of an ultimatum from Berlin, the government at Prague was forced to recognize the independence of Slovakia which had been declared on that day. The Czech regions of Bohemia and Moravia in the west, and the Carpatho-Ukraine in the east were now isolated from each other. There was no choice left for the Carpatho-Ukraine but to follow Slovakia into independence. This it did on March 15. But the independent Carpatho-Ukraine lasted scarcely twenty-four hours, for the next day Hungarian troops marched in to occupy the country.

Meanwhile, the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, now in a hopeless position, were being subjected to German occupation. On the

day Slovakia had declared its independence the president of Czechoslovakia, Emil Hacha, was summoned to Berlin. The details of his night-long meeting with Hitler have not been told, but it is obvious that Hacha was confronted with an ultimatum: either peacefully to turn over Bohemia and Moravia to Germany, or submit to German invasion. The Czech president capitulated and was permitted to return to Prague the morning of March 15. When he arrived he was greeted by the new German military governor and by German troops. Even while Hacha negotiated in Berlin, the German army had moved in and occupied the country. Czechoslovakia had vanished completely.

As a kind of anti-climax to this bold and unscrupulous act the long arm of the Nazis reached out to seize the city and territory of Memel. This city formerly belonging to East Prussia had been severed from Germany at the end of the World War and had been set up as a free city under Allied control. Neighboring Lithuania, however, coveted it, and in 1923 incorporated the city into its own sovereign territory. Thenceforth, and especially after the rise of the Nazis, conflict between the native German population and the Lithuanian government developed into serious proportions. Finally, on March 20, 1939, Hitler summoned the Lithuanian foreign minister to Berlin, with the inevitable result that Memel was ceded to the Reich.

Up to this point Germany had reaped most of the profits from the Rome-Berlin Axis. Mussolini was obviously anxious to share in them too. He found a field for adventure in Albania. This little state on the eastern shores of the Adriatic had fallen under Fascist protection during the post-war years and by 1939 was little more than an Italian dependency. But with the example of Germany before him Mussolini apparently wished to transform this state of dependency into one of complete subjection. As a justification, the Fascist government pointed out that King Zog of Albania was suspected of trafficking with the democracies, that he was squandering on himself all the money Italy had been lending to Albania, and that he was trying to disturb Italo-Jugoslav relations. These explanations were probably as good as any which might have been supplied. At all events, in April, 1939, Italian troops suddenly descended upon Albania and in a few days the capital was occupied and its sovereign was driven into exile.

While Fascists and Nazis marched from one victory to another in Western Europe, Japanese imperialists in Asia occupied themselves

with the fashioning of a "new order" for the Far East. Though widely separated geographically, the activities of these Eastern and Western enemies of the status quo bore a striking resemblance to each other and in many ways were closely integrated. Japan, like Germany and Italy, professed a profound dislike for an order which concentrated the world's wealth in the hands of a few great Empires such as the Russian, the British, and the French. Like the Fascists and the Nazis, Japanese expansionists conceived an intense hatred for the Communist experiment and claimed the right to help free the world of this evil phenomenon. And to these sentiments of opposition to common enemies, the Japanese added a peculiar racial nationalism of their own, which differed in detail but not in spirit from that of their Fascist and Nazi friends. They complained at the interferences of the West in the Far East and, taking a leaf from the Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed Asia to be for the Asiatics alone. As the greatest power in the eastern world, it was argued that it was Japan's duty to assume the leadership in attaining this objective, and in thus establishing peace, order, and happiness in the Far East. The imperialists innocently contended that this was not imperialism but the fulfillment of a heavy and holy responsibility for eastern society.

The comparison between eastern and western aggressors does not stop with similarities in ideology. As a matter of fact, the Japanese with their traditional skill at adopting the apparently successful methods of the West, soon developed a pattern of government modeled after that of the western dictators. Given the established traditions of Japanese life, this transition was not difficult to effect. Gradually during the 1930's extremist elements from the military organizations of the state pressed upon the governing authorities their determination to have an authoritarian government and a policy of expansion. The extent of their success was already apparent in the early stages of the expedition into Manchukuo, but their boldness steadily increased as the evidences of victories for the European dictators multiplied. In February, 1936, these elements staged a bloody attack upon the liberal forces in the Imperial Ministry and forced the acceptance of an extremist military regime. From that time on progress in the direction of a totalitarian regime continued rapidly until it culminated in 1940 in the establishment of a nearly European type of dictatorship under Prince Konoye, supported by a single political party and exercising its domination over all of the political, economic, and cultural life of the nation.

This period of internal political transformation was likewise a

period of intense military activity on the Asiatic mainland, for it was not only in changing forms of government that the Japanese reacted to developments in the West. As Great Britain and France retreated before the blows of Hitler and Mussolini and became deeply concerned with their own defense at home, it seemed logical that Japan could enforce its will upon China without encountering serious danger. Indeed, the weaker France and Britain seemed to grow with each new Fascist and Nazi advance, the bolder grew the Japanese imperialists. Whether deliberately intended or not, the attack upon the status quo both in the East and the West was closely synchronized.

Following the abortive attempt of the League of Nations to intervene in the Manchurian crisis, Japan pressed forward with the consolidation of its control in the puppet state of Manchukuo as well as in the neighboring province of Jehol. Soviet Russia was induced (1935) to abandon its rights in the Manchurian railway in return for financial compensation, and the foreign oil interests of Manchukuo were displaced by a Japanese controlled monopoly. Britain, France, and the United States protested against this interference with foreign economic interests, claiming it to be contrary to the policy of the Open Door as well as to the Nine Power Pact, but these protests were rejected. Nothing was done by way of following up protests with positive action.

Faced with all of these retreats by the Western Powers before the aggressor, China, the principal victim, was forced to accommodate itself to hard reality. In May, 1933, the Nanking government accepted a truce with Japan, establishing a demilitarized zone on the frontiers of Japan's controlled area. Subsequently (1935) a number of Kuomintang offices which had become offensive to the Japanese were closed and in some cities municipal officials more acceptable to the Japanese were appointed. But these concessions in turn alarmed many Chinese nationals. Leaders from Canton warned the government that civil war threatened if it continued to give way, and the Communist war lords, with whom Chiang Kai-shek, president of China, had been fighting for some years, backed up the threat. These latter seized Chiang prisoner in a mysterious kidnaping late in 1936 and an important compromise was arranged by which Chiang apparently agreed to abandon his fight with the Communists while the latter pledged their co-operation if he resisted the Japanese. Subsequently the Chinese attitude toward Japan stiffened.

The extremists who had by this time gained control in Japan re-

taliated by proceeding to an undeclared war against China in July, 1937, doubtless hoping to settle the issue quickly and to their own advantage. The principal Chinese ports were blockaded, Japanese air forces carried devastation into the interior, and the soldiery marched on to occupy Nanking. But still China did not collapse. The national armies were no match for the well-equipped Japanese but they resisted heroically, destroying everything in the areas which they were forced to yield, and then retired deeper into the interior. The government itself withdrew eventually to Chungking in the distant interior province of Szechwan, to continue the war from there as best it could. Bands of Chinese guerillas were formed to harass the enemy in the territories he occupied. So devastating were their effects that increasingly with each passing month Japan was forced to despatch more men and munitions, until this China "affair" became a major military adventure.

The supplies upon which the Chinese relied in the continued struggle, insofar as they came from the outside world, were derived chiefly from Russia over a long land route, by railroad from French Indo-China, and over the recently opened Burma Road. The Japanese military hoped to close these remaining doors, and between 1937 and 1939 attempted to attain this objective by a dual policy of force and intimidation. The turmoil of Europe encouraged them in taking the risk. It was as part of this program of increased belligerency toward the West that the American *Panay* was "unintentionally" bombed, that the Chinese island of Hainan, off the coast of Indo-China was seized (1939), that the Spartley Islands just west of the Philippines, claimed by France, were annexed (1939), and that embarrassing pressure was brought to bear in areas of traditional British influence. Where this campaign affected Britain and France it enjoyed some success, but it aroused the United States. American sympathy for China and mounting opposition toward Japanese aggression led to an increasing tenseness in relations with Japan. The United States officially lent financial aid to embattled China, applied a moral embargo on airplane parts to Japan, and finally, in July, 1939, announced that it was terminating its established commercial treaty relations with Japan. Russia also seemed to have adopted a more hostile attitude. At all events Soviet-Japanese controversy over fishing rights, and over frontier incidents on the borders of Mongolia and Manchukuo during 1937 and 1938, seemed to threaten a Russo-Japanese conflict. None of this opposition, however, brought an end to Japanese aggression in China.

It was not possible for Britain and France to avoid retreat in the Far East, especially in 1939 when they had at last determined to halt "appeasement" of the dictators in the West. The problem created by advancing Nazism and Fascism was at once more serious and more immediate.

The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, had at last shattered all hope of keeping the peace with Germany by a policy of continual sacrifice. Until this time it was possible to argue that the Nazis would be satisfied with the incorporation of strictly German peoples into the Reich and that Nazi expansion would have its logical end. But the annexation of Bohemia-Moravia and the virtual annexation of Slovakia revealed that the German expansionists were completely unscrupulous, that they had not the slightest hesitation in breaking their plighted word, and even more, that their ambitions knew no bounds. Both small and great had reason to fear, and especially Poland and Rumania who now lay directly in the path of the Nazi steam roller.

The British government took the most serious view of this turn of events, especially since less than six months had passed since Hitler had faithfully promised Prime Minister Chamberlain that Germany would have enough with the Sudetenland. If Europe was to be preserved against the Nazi menace, Mr. Chamberlain believed that urgent measures were necessary. In co-operation with France, he endeavored at once to organize an eleventh-hour resistance. Poland, which seemed most directly menaced, was given a joint pledge (March 31, 1939) by both Britain and France that the two powers would immediately come to Poland's assistance if its independence were threatened. Several weeks later this unilateral pledge was reinforced by a joint Anglo-Polish declaration which took the form of a reciprocal guarantee, and thus paralleled the long-standing treaty of mutual guarantee between France and Poland. After the Fascist occupation of Albania, Britain and France similarly guaranteed the integrity and independence of both Greece and Rumania. In May, Britain and Turkey signed a treaty of alliance, promising mutual co-operation in case of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean. France followed suit in June, after ceding to Turkey the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Republic of Hatay), formerly part of Syria. All the while both Britain and France feverishly endeavored to speed up their delayed military and naval preparations.

Inasmuch as Poland, Rumania, and Turkey were all rather distant from France and Britain, it seemed impossible that the latter could



MAP 38 EUROPEAN ALLIANCES IN AUGUST, 1939

bring them the full material assistance which their pledges anticipated unless the aid or co-operation of Russia were enlisted. This proved the fatal stumbling block. During the spring and summer of 1939 Russia was still smarting under the rebuff administered her at the Munich conference and apparently was still suspicious of British and French intentions. More important, probably, was the fact that Russia hoped to secure British and French consent to Russian control in the Baltic Republics and over strategic islands possessed by Finland. Neither of the two western powers was willing to confer such support except with the consent of the republics concerned, and this was never provided. But possibly a decisive factor in preventing the conclusion of an agreement with Russia was the fact that the Soviet authorities may have seen in the rising complications of Europe an opportunity to precipitate an exhausting "bourgeois" war. This possibility had never ceased to form a part of the Soviet government's calculations. In any case, there was more certainty of a European war if Germany were given a free hand in Poland than if Russia used her influence to frustrate the Nazis.

Meanwhile, as the great western democracies were being blocked at the most crucial stage of their defensive negotiations, the dictators were girding themselves for the offensive. In May, 1939, the Rome-Berlin Axis was transformed into a formal ten-year military alliance. Both powers promised to consult with each other on mutual interests, to co-ordinate their economies for wartime purposes, and to assist each other in case either one of them became involved in war. At the same time Germany pursued her own negotiations with Russia and to the astonishment of Britain and France and the entire western world succeeded in arranging a non-aggression pact with the Soviets on August 23. This was a decisive diplomatic stroke. At one blow the Nazi dictator had freed Germany's eastern front of the danger of Russian opposition, had made British and French aid to Poland a virtual impossibility, and had opened the way to an easy invasion of Poland at the moment he chose.

C. The War of the Dictators

Relations between Poland and Germany had become strained immediately after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Prior to that time Hitler had professed friendship for the Polish peoples, had signed with them a ten-year non-aggression pact (1934), and following the Munich Conference had given his personal pledge that so far as Germany was concerned all that was desired was to live in harmonious relations with the Polish Republic. After March, 1939, it was no longer necessary to be circumspect. Poland's flank had been turned and pressure could now be made for territorial concessions. There followed therefore the application of the now familiar Nazi tactics. German newspapers resorted to a concerted campaign of heaping abuse upon the Poles, accusing them of hostile designs upon Germany, and of basely maltreating German citizenry. Incidents were manufactured to supply the needed evidence for these accusations. Finally, in April, 1939, Hitler showed his hand and demanded of Poland that she cede to Germany the city of Danzig and a narrow strip across the Corridor which would provide connections for a motor road between Germany proper and East Prussia. In return, Hitler generously consented to guarantee the integrity of the Poland which was left. The government at Warsaw refused to consider this proposal, pointing out that Germans already had free passage across the Corridor, and suggesting that both powers jointly guarantee their respective rights in the Free City of Danzig. The German reply was



Wide World

GERMAN RATION CARD

At the outbreak of war in September, 1939, the German government immediately introduced a system of food rationing.

the repudiation of the Non-Aggression Pact. Subsequently throughout the succeeding months both contestants made military preparations. Britain and France, as guarantors of Poland, kept a close watch while trying futilely to find the basis of a common agreement, mutually acceptable to both Poland and Germany.

Following the Russo-German non-aggression pact the controversy rapidly developed into a serious crisis. As it became increasingly clear that Germany intended to employ force both Britain and France took the precaution of warning Berlin that any hostile act would bring an immediate Anglo-French declaration of war. At the same time they offered their good services by way of bringing about a direct settlement between Poland and Germany. The Nazi government seemingly accepted this proposal on August 29 but insisted that a Polish emissary would have to appear by midnight the following day to conduct the discussions. This was obviously impossible, and in the very nature of things must have been so intended. Two days later Hitler announced that since Poland had not despatched an emissary he considered that his offer to reach a peaceful settlement had been rejected. The German army therefore began its march into Poland early on the morning of September 1. Britain and France im-

mediately submitted ultimatums, demanding the withdrawal of German troops from Polish territory within forty-eight hours. Two days later they were officially at war with Germany.

German strategy apparently called for the delivery of a lightning blow to Poland, forcing its surrender before Britain and France could marshal their forces for an attack in the west. At all events, the German command threw the great bulk of its infantry and *Panzer* mechanized divisions, as well as a sizable portion of its air force, against the Poles. Only relatively light contingents, protected by the recently constructed fortifications comprising the Siegfried Line, were left to spar with the western enemies.

The great concentration of heavily mechanized troops upon the Polish front, and the heavy battering administered the weak Polish air force in the early days of the fighting, proved more than Poland could take. Its large and well-trained army, poorly equipped so far as modern machinery of war was concerned, was no match for the fast-moving German columns. In a little less than three weeks all of the western provinces had been lost to the invader. Yet the Polish retreat was not disorderly, and it was still hoped that it might put up a good stand on the reduced line of the San-Bug-Narew Rivers, where it would be supported by heavy artillery. Unfortunately, it was never able to exploit this opportunity, for on September 17 by way of complete surprise Russian troops moved up from the rear to "protect" the White Russians and the Ukrainians in Poland. Faced with two enemies and with its line of retreat cut off, the Polish army rapidly disintegrated. The capital city of Warsaw continued to resist heroically until September 27, but at last was forced to accept an armistice.

Two days after Poland's collapse, Russia and Germany divided the spoils between them. A boundary running roughly along the San-Bug-Narew Rivers was established to mark the line of division between the Russian and German spheres of influence. This was subsequently subjected to minor revisions. Of the part which went to Germany a considerable portion was immediately annexed to the Reich, and in this area the Polish inhabitants were deported to make way for German colonists imported from the Tyrol in Italy as well as from the little Baltic Republics. The remainder of the German-dominated portion was provided with a special settlement and was given the name of the "Government General." On August 25, 1940, this, too, was formally joined with the Reich.

Having conquered Poland so quickly, Hitler apparently felt that



MAP 39. POLAND, 1925

MAP 40. DISMEMBERMENT OF POLAND, OCTOBER, 1939

he could afford to be generous. At all events, early in October he held out the prospects of peace to his western enemies. The Treaty of Versailles he affirmed was now dead and Poland, an unnatural creation of the post-war years, would not rise again. So far as the Reich was concerned it was now satisfied except for its colonial possessions to which it felt it still held a legitimate claim. He suggested that a rational solution of Europe's problems was possible and promised that if it could be made he would be ready to sanction the new status quo and reduce armaments in so far as that was economically possible. This sounded very much as of old and the British and French governments promptly refused to have anything to do with the proposal.

Meanwhile, all was nearly quiet on the western front. During the Polish campaign General Gamelin, commander-in-chief of the allied forces, had cautiously marched his troops toward the Siegfried Line to ease the pressure on the east, but the swift collapse of Poland influenced him to withdraw these again behind the Maginot Line. Both the British and French commands apparently believed that the best strategy now called for a holding of that line, without needless sacrifices of men, while the noose was tightened by the fleets around Germany's neck. This was to be from the beginning a war of attrition. Under the circumstances, the bulk of the fighting in the west developed on the high seas during the early months, with the British attempting to cut off all German trade, and the Germans, in turn, by means of submarines, surface raiders, and magnetic mines, attempting to cut off the supplies of goods to the British Isles. At times the conflict in this theater developed dramatically, but it did not produce any immediately noticeable results for either side. In conjunction with a parallel war in northern Europe, between Finland and Russia, however, it was to become a precipitating cause of important land operations in the early spring.

After the partition of Poland, Soviet Russia, ostensibly with the purpose of strengthening its own defense, made demands upon the little Baltic Republics and Finland. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia felt incapable of resisting the pressure placed upon them and in October, 1939, conceded special privileges to Russia in their territory for naval, military, and air defense. In return for these concessions, Russia faithfully pledged to respect their sovereignty. This pledge was forgotten less than a year later when on June 14, 1940, in response to Russian ultimatums, all of these republics joined the Soviet Union.

Similar demands for concessions of territory, the better to protect

Leningrad, and islands to improve Russia's naval defenses in the Baltic, which were made upon Finland, were not fully accepted. By the middle of November, 1939, negotiations between these two countries were broken off and Russia, following the Nazi pattern, manufactured a crisis against its little neighbor. On the ground that Finland had designs upon Russia, the Soviet authorities moved their troops to the frontier and invaded the republic on November 30. Finland's resistance was heroic, and it was not apparently until the Russian military men were convinced that only a major operation would dislodge the enemy that the tide of battle turned in their favor. With the use of an abundance of heavy artillery and an indiscriminate use of the air force, Finland was finally forced to sue for peace on March 12, 1940. The Russian demands were higher than before the war began, but this time Finland had to submit. Substantial concessions of territory had to be made; ten percent of Finland's population was lost, and its second largest seaport, Viborg, had to be turned over to the Soviets. Besides, Finland had to make other concessions, the most important of which was perhaps the promise to construct a railway which would enable Russia to establish direct commercial contact with Sweden. Russia apparently had an eye on the other Scandinavian countries.

Norway, Denmark, and Sweden had been deeply moved by Finland's misfortune and citizens of all of those countries had volunteered in considerable numbers to fight on Finland's side. Yet officially none of these governments was willing to co-operate actively in the war, partly because to have done so might have deprived the Finns of needed supplies and partly out of fear that they might become involved in the other war in the west. This latter fear kept Norway and Sweden from permitting the use of their facilities by Britain and France for active extension of aid to the embattled Finns. It was generally understood that Germany would not tolerate such concessions inasmuch as they would have the effect of cutting off the supplies of Swedish ore which at this time she consumed in large quantities.

The complications of the Finnish war merely pointed up the importance to Germany of the Swedish ore supply. Britain and France had already contemplated the possibility of cutting this off. Since most of the ore was sent across Norway from the Swedish mines to Narvik for shipment during the winter months, the British blockade authorities hoped to find a way of shutting off these shipments along the Norwegian coast. German coastwise vessels were in the habit of

hugging the shore line, within the three-mile limit, thus evading the sea patrol. To stop this practice Britain had requested Norwegian co-operation but the Norwegian government apparently felt powerless to stop the infringement of her neutral rights. At all events, British patrol boats themselves began to penetrate the coastal waters in search of their prey and finally, April 8, 1940, it was announced that the Allies had mined those waters at key points.

By accident, it seems that this British announcement paralleled in time the completion of a German plan to occupy Denmark and Norway as a means of helping break the blockade and as a defense for Germany if she were sometime to attack on the western front. In any case, on the following day ultimatums were submitted early in the morning to both Denmark and Norway, and before breakfast the whole of Denmark had been occupied. Almost simultaneously German troops landed near Oslo and as far north on the Atlantic coast as Narvik. Obviously, the attack had been long planned and the preliminaries of its execution had been made days in advance of the British mining operation. Norway put up resistance, but it appears that to a considerable extent it was betrayed by "fifth columnists" and its resistance was soon broken. Britain and France promised immediate aid, but it was difficult to fulfill this promise because the Germans dominated the air and had managed to capture all of the key landing ports in the first operation. Some French and British troops did engage the Germans and a considerable battle for the control of Narvik developed, but eventually by the end of April the Allies were forced to withdraw. These reversals had important political consequences in both France and Britain, but chiefly in Britain where Prime Minister Chamberlain was forced to resign. Next day he was succeeded by Winston Churchill who was expected to prosecute the war with vigor.

Churchill's assumption of power was greeted by startling events. Before dawn on May 10 the Nazis launched an attack simultaneously upon Holland, Belgium, and Luxemburg, offering the excuse that they were moving in anticipation of the British and French. Hitler declared that the battle which was now beginning would determine the destiny of Europe for the next thousand years. The heavily mechanized German forces struck with great speed and ferocity, aided by the air force and by parachute troops dropped behind the lines. During the first hours of fighting the attacking forces gained a number of decisive advantages and the Dutch and Belgian troops, though fighting bravely, were compelled to give ground rapidly. Within five

Wide World

WINSTON CHURCHILL

days the kingdom of the Netherlands had been reduced and its government put to flight. This success was decisive in the war with the Belgians for their left flank was now completely exposed. Nevertheless Belgium held out for two weeks more because of the mechanized British and French troops who were rushed in to give them support. But the momentum of the German attack continued with such terrific force that the British and the French were not able to form a stable line and were compelled to resort to strong rearguard actions. Brussels was soon occupied, and King Leopold concluded that further resistance would be futile. On May 28 he surrendered unconditionally. The British and French armies were left in what seemed a hopeless situation.

Meanwhile, in the course of its general advance the German army had already inflicted a disaster upon the Allies further south. When the British and French forces had moved to Belgium's support, German troops struck savagely at the weakly defended lines about Sedan and opened a gap of sixty miles into this front, capturing strategic bridgeheads and threatening the Allies both on the left and on the right flanks. Oddly enough in this region the French had not taken the precaution to build an extension of the Maginot Line either in strength or in depth. When the news of this reverse reached Paris, Premier Paul Reynaud immediately made a number of changes in the command, replacing General Gamelin with General Weygand. The latter was known to favor offensive rather than defensive war and it was hoped that he might be able to re-form the front and take the offensive. But this was impossible. The German armies, with heavier equipment and heavier firing power, continued their relentless advance, while the French were hindered by breakdowns in the communication systems and by the clogging of the roads with fleeing refugees. The British and French troops caught in the Belgian pocket

were now literally threatened with complete annihilation, for the speedy German advances upon French soil promised to cut them off from all retreat except by sea, and even this seemed quite impossible. Nevertheless, the British by close co-ordination of the air and sea arms managed in an epic retreat to save some 350,000 of the 400,000 doomed troops and returned them safely to England from the port of Dunkirk. Most of their equipment, however, had to be left behind. It could not now be replaced nor could the man power withdrawn across the Channel be sent back in time to save France. The German troops moved on with undiminished speed. On June 14 Paris fell and by that time German mechanized divisions were already speeding southward along the Channel coast. To make matters worse, Italy, a few days before (June 10), no doubt counting on French collapse and the imminent end of the war, declared war upon Britain and France. This tied about a million French troops to their posts on the Italian front and prevented their being brought up for a last stand. Amidst all these reverses, a crisis developed in the Cabinet over policy and Premier Paul Reynaud resigned June 16. Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, the eighty-four-year-old veteran of Verdun, an Anglophobe and sympathetic with totalitarian movements, took over the government. An appeal for an armistice followed almost immediately.

Hitler did not appear anxious to hasten armistice negotiations and it was not until June 22 at Compiègne forest, in the same railway car in which the armistice of 1918 was signed, that an armistice was agreed upon, to take effect three days later. By virtue of this document Germany was allowed to occupy more than half of France, including all of the northern industrial region and a strip along the coast to the Spanish frontier. France promised to pay the costs of occupation. Most of the military and air forces, except what were needed to maintain internal order, were to be demobilized and placed under German and Italian control. All undamaged military equipment was to be turned over to the victors on demand, and there was to be no manufacturing of war materials in the future. All German prisoners in French possession were to be returned without reciprocity. French radio stations were to be silenced. A separate armistice signed with Italy allowed the latter to occupy a narrow strip of Alpine territory, arranged for a thirty-mile demilitarized zone between France and Italy, and a somewhat similar demilitarized zone on the borders of French and Italian African colonies, and finally called for a demilitarization of fortified French coastal zones in the Mediterranean.

The Third French Republic died as it had been born, in a humiliating defeat. Bad military planning, unjustified confidence in the invulnerability of the Maginot Line, internal political weaknesses, and treason in high places all contributed to the unexpected collapse. Early in July, 1940, the two Houses of Parliament paid the Republic their last respects, and at Vichy, the new seat of Government in unoccupied France, bestowed upon Marshal Pétain the power to devise an authoritarian constitution. The marshal thereupon took for himself the title "Chief of the French State," incorporating the duties of premier and president, and appointed a cabinet of totalitarian sympathizers to support him. One of the first acts of this new Government was to arrest, imprison, and hold for trial all officials of former Governments accused of involving France in a war for which it was unprepared. These distinguished prisoners were held at Riom to await final judgment sometime later. In the meantime, various measures were taken to co-ordinate the new French totalitarianism with that of its conquerors. The multi-party system was to be abolished, the productive life of the nation was to be regimented, and a rigid censorship was generally applied. There is little doubt that especially in the economic reorganization the Vichy government was carefully following the bidding of Berlin.

Most Frenchmen accepted this revolutionary change because there seemed no other choice, but a few refused to co-operate. These latter, under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle, escaped to the empire and to Britain where they hoped to continue the struggle. In London, de Gaulle established a Provisional French National Committee to collaborate with Great Britain, and rallied around him what "Free French" sympathizers he could. The British Government recognized this committee on June 28th, 1940. Throughout the autumn months, de Gaulle enjoyed a substantial success in bringing various parts of the French empire under his control, though much of the empire continued to support Vichy.

The effects of the French collapse were widely felt. Russia, profiting from it for her own protection against victorious Germany, seized the Baltic Republics and on June 26 demanded and secured Bessarabia from Rumania. The little Balkan states in general also felt the full impact of this disaster. Rumania, which had been flirting with the Allies, now attempted to make its peace with the Axis. King Carol reorganized his administration with this object in view and showed a willingness to come to terms, but he was soon victimized. Both Bulgaria and Hungary had long-standing grievances against Rumania and

they believed that the time had come to rectify them. Bulgaria, assisted by Germany, opened negotiations with her neighbor and an agreement was reached by which the South Dobrudja was restored to Bulgaria. The transfer was completed on September 15. Meanwhile, Hungary had demanded Transylvania. Both Axis partners intervened on this occasion and handed down a decision on August 30 granting Hungary the greater part of the territory. The losses which Rumania sustained gave rise to serious internal disturbances, engineered by the pro-Nazi, anti-Carol Iron Guard. Carol's position became untenable and he was forced to flee for his life. A dictatorship was then established by General Antonescu, under King Michael, and Rumania was given over to Iron Guard terror. In October, 1940, German troops descended upon the country ostensibly to keep order but actually to ensure the rich oil wells to Germany and possibly also to open the road to invasion of the Near East.

Meanwhile, Great Britain was forced to bear the full weight of the Axis attack. France had been beaten and the British hold upon the continent was completely gone. But if there were no chance of striking at the enemy on land, neither was there a good chance of a direct German invasion of the British Isles so long as the British fleet controlled the seas. Unfortunately for Britain, however, it could not feel sure of its mastery of the sea until it knew what disposition was to be made of the French fleet. It was felt that no confidence could be placed in the Italo-German pledge to keep it idle. British efforts were therefore made, both before and after the armistice, to clarify this matter peacefully, but when it finally became apparent that the Pétain regime did not intend to respect Britain's wishes, the British admiralty felt compelled to destroy those French warships which were not already in its hands. Consequently, on July 3, the bulk of the French navy, concentrated in the African port of Oran, was given the choice of surrendering or being destroyed. The French commander refused to capitulate so the British attacked and destroyed or badly damaged all but one of the French ships. This shifted the balance of sea power once more in British favor.

Great danger still remained on land and in the air. While France was collapsing the Germans had begun to concentrate heavier air attacks on the British Isles and on convoyed shipping and these attacks steadily mounted in intensity. The Nazis said they were employing the "softening up" process preliminary to the final blow. At the beginning of September it was announced by Berlin that this phase had ended and that the final, destructive stage had now arrived. On Sep-

tember 6, furious attacks upon London began, continuing night after night and day after day almost without any intermissions for ten days. By that time it had become clear that the British anti-aircraft and fighter squadrons had been taking a terrific toll of the attackers and the fury of the onslaught momentarily abated. During this time it was generally believed that the Nazis planned an invasion. If such plans had been made, they were doubtless called off because complete mastery of the air was unattainable. But the attacks did not cease. The Germans concentrated more and more upon the industrial centers of the Midlands, presumably hoping to cripple British production. At the same time, by sea and air, they stepped up their efforts against British shipping and brought the monthly totals of British and neutral losses to the high figure of approximately 300,000 tons.

The British were also faced with what appeared to be serious dangers in Africa. During August and September the Italian armies there directed attacks against the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Kenya, and British Somaliland which they managed to overrun completely. The establishment of this Italian post on the Red Sea held out some hope of a pincers attack upon the British-dominated Suez Canal. The other arm of the pincers was to close in from Italian Libya across northern Egypt. To effect this operation, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, a seasoned desert fighter and one of the conquerors of Ethiopia, was placed in charge. By September 12, he had advanced some seventy-five miles into Egypt to Sidi Barrani where he halted to consolidate his position. These advances were taken rather seriously by the British in view of the limited defenses then at their command in northern Africa.

Likewise, there were constant threats to Gibraltar, at the other end of the Mediterranean. Spain, which had fallen under Axis influence during the civil war, seemed to lean toward Italy and Germany. But shortages of food and Britain's ability to cut them still shorter probably influenced General Franco to move cautiously. The danger to Gibraltar was constant, but no attack materialized. Occasional heavy bombings by the Vichy regime in retaliation for British acts or the acts of "Free French" forces caused some damage but did not diminish the rock's defensive power.

After October, 1940, some of these dangers to the British in the Mediterranean seemed to disappear, at least for a time. The Spanish government, after a number of secret negotiations with the Axis, finally signed a financial and trade agreement with Great Britain, thus temporarily allaying British fears of action in that quarter. But the

most significant events occurred in the Italian theater of action. Following the German military occupation of Rumania and Hungary's formal association with the Axis in October, Mussolini determined to settle old scores with Greece. Whether his plans were formulated with German consent or against German wishes is not yet known. In any case, after condemning Greece for its acceptance of British protection and accusing it of giving aid to Britain's war efforts against Italy, the Italian armies which had been accumulated in Albania were ordered into Greece on October 28. The Italian attack pointed in two directions: toward the great stronghold in Salonika in the east and along the Ionian sea in the south. As the Italians complained, neither of these thrusts developed in blitzkrieg fashion because of the bad weather and the difficulties of the terrain. This was certainly a factor, but so also was the inefficient co-ordination of the attacking forces and the sturdy resistance of the Greek defenders. Within two weeks the latter took the offensive and drove the Italians back across the Greek frontier and into Albania. In their counter-offensive the Greeks by mid-December, 1940, had managed to seize the most important Italian strongholds in southern Albania and even threatened the Italian forces there with complete disaster. Some of this unexpected success was certainly due to British assistance in the air and on the sea, for just as soon as the Italian attack began Britain occupied a number of strategic Greek islands, including Crete. From these favorable positions the Royal Air Force was able to co-operate in the attack against Italian advanced lines in Greece and Albania, and, even more important, the British navy was able to conduct important operations against Italy. In a brilliant operation at the naval base of Taranto a number of heavy units of the Italian navy were crippled (November, 1940). The British government proudly claimed that this success alone greatly changed the naval balance in the Mediterranean in Britain's favor. At the same time, units of the British navy challenged Italian transport in the Adriatic Sea and created difficulties for the Italian command in bringing up reinforcements to the hard-pressed armies in Albania. These unexpected reverses appeared to weaken the Italian morale and Mussolini was either persuaded to "change the guard" in the command or was forced to accept such a change. In December, Marshal Badoglio, Italy's most famous soldier and one of the conquerors of Ethiopia, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, "resigned" along with other conspicuous leaders.

The British command in northern Africa soon exploited the weaknesses which these events indicated. Counting on the inability of the

Italian navy to get the necessary supplies to Marshal Graziani's forces in northern Egypt, the British commander in the east, General Sir Archibald Wavell, planned and executed a surprise attack upon Italian units there on December 7. Within a week the British blitzkrieg drove the Italian forces from Egypt and then began to move on to the attack in Italian Libya. The fact that units of the British navy were able to co-operate closely with the land forces in this operation was sufficient indication that the British had complete control of the Mediterranean.

The turn of the tide in the Italian theater of war awoke renewed optimism in Britain and also in the United States where Great Britain's struggle had been followed with increasing anxiety throughout the summer and autumn of 1940. American opinion at the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 was one of great sympathy for the Allies, but most people felt at first that their sympathy need not be expressed by actual co-operation on the allied side. Material aid to the democracies but non-involvement for the United States expressed both the official and public reaction. In conformity with this view the Neutrality Act of 1937, which restricted shipment of goods to belligerent countries, was repealed in November, 1939. This repeal was accompanied by the adoption of a "cash and carry" plan which required that goods purchased here be carried away on foreign vessels and be paid for at the time of purchase. American ships were prohibited from trafficking in belligerent waters. In this way it was hoped that the United States could place its great industrial machine behind the democracies of Europe and yet not expose itself to incidents on the high seas, such as occurred during the World War, which might involve the American people in military operations. This policy seemed adequate until the collapse of France threw the whole burden of fighting the dictators on the shoulders of Britain. Public opinion and official Washington both became alarmed at the prospects of a British defeat and especially at the effect which such a defeat might have upon the United States and the Western Hemisphere in general. More direct aid and co-operation with Britain seemed expedient. In consequence, the American government agreed to give fifty over-age destroyers to Great Britain in return for naval bases, some of which were on the strategic British islands in the Caribbean area where the United States was interested in rounding out its defenses of the Panama Canal. More vigorous efforts were also made to supply the materials which Britain needed. Following the presidential elections of November, 1940, in which the European crisis played a very important part,



HITLER'S ARMY TOES THE LINE

President Roosevelt, the first American President to be elected for a third term, announced that henceforth Britain would in general be allowed 50 percent of American production for defense. Meanwhile, the United States had begun intensive preparations for national defense, including the conscription for one-year military training of men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six.

One problem which complicated the American position with reference to the European war grew out of the continuing bad relations between the United States and Japan. It has already been observed that these had grown steadily worse after 1931, and shortly before the outbreak of war in Europe had resulted in the abrogation by the United States of commercial treaty relations with Japan. The German victories in Europe encouraged the Japanese to broaden the area of their conquests, especially at the expenses of the embattled British and French, and to show greater boldness in ignoring American opposition. The Government at Washington, however, stiffened its diplomatic resistance, and countered each move which the Japanese Government made. The seizure of parts of French Indo-China by the Japanese (September, 1940) was thus countered by additional financial advances to China and by a partial embargo upon shipments of scrap iron and steel to Japan. The conclusion of a ten-year military alliance among Japan, Germany, and Italy on September 27, obviously intended to immobilize the United States both in the Pacific



MAP 41 EUROPE, JANUARY 1, 1941

and the Atlantic, was followed by the State Department's order that American nationals in the Far East return home, and by closer collaboration between the British and American governments in the Far East. Probably with American encouragement the British government in October, 1940, opened the Burma Road, which they had previously closed at Japanese demand, as a supply line to China. When, in December, Japan formally stated that in certain contingencies Japan would be expected to make war upon the United States in accordance with its alliance with the European Axis, President Roosevelt retaliated by further tightening the embargo. The growing tenseness thus indicated in the relations between Japan and the United States considerably influenced the American attitude toward aid for Britain, especially since the United States was not yet equipped with a two-ocean navy with which to enforce its views in both spheres simultaneously. It was becoming increasingly apparent that the War of the Dictators threatened to engulf the United States both from the east and from the west.



HITLER AND MUSSOLINI ROASTING THE DOVE OF PEACE

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Index

Abelard, 315-316, 323
Abyssinia, see Ethiopia
Acropolis, The, 31 (illus.)
Act of Union, 521
Adams, Henry, *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres*, 325
Adrianople, Battle of, 68
Adrianople, Treaty of, 795
Aehrenthal, Count, 791-792, 895-896
Aeschylus, 33
Aethelred, 165 166
Africa, 67, 417-419, 619, 795-796, 872-881, 984, 996-998, Abyssinia, 879, 880-881, 984, 996-998, Algeria, 874, and Belgium, 875-876, and France, 873 ff., and Germany, 877 ff., and Great Britain, 873 ff., and Italy, 879, 880-881, 996-998, and Morocco, 879-880, Belgian Congo, 875-876, Berlin Conference, 876, Congo Basin, 875-876, "Congo Free State," 876, Egypt, 417-419, 619, 795-796, 874-875, 984, Ethiopia, 879, 880-881, explorers, 875, Fashoda crisis, 877, French Congo, 876, 880; geography, 67, 872-873, Libya, 880, South Africa, 873, 877-879, the Boers, 873, 878-879, Suez Canal, 874, the Somalilands, 876, 879, Tripolitania, 880, Tunis, 875
Agincourt, Battle of, 201
Agriculture, medieval, 152 ff
Agricultural Revolution, 640-643
Aix-la-Chapelle, Peace of, 499
Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 487
Alaric, 68, 70
Albania, 1008
Albertus Magnus, 317
Albigensian, 193, 254, 256-257; Crusade, 254; heresy, 193
Alchemy, 320
Alcuin of York, 309, 310
Alexander I, Czar, 595, 601, 688, 612-613, 800-801
Alexander II, Czar, 803-808
Alexander III, Czar, 808 809
Alexander III, Pope, 227
Alexander VI, Pope, 395
Alexander the Great, 40-41
Alexandra, Czarina, 809, 813
Alexandrine Empire, 41-43
Alfonso XIII, King (Spain), 956
Alfred the Great, 165
Algeciras Conference, 895
Alhambra, Hall of Justice, 242 (illus.)
Allah, 108 ff.
Altarpiece (Van Eyck), 385 (illus.)
Alva, Duke of, 442
Ambrose, Saint, 94
American Revolution, 538-539
Amiens, Treaty of, 591
Anabaptists, 406-407
Anatomy Lesson, The, 437 (illus.)
Angelico, Fra, 376
Angles, Saxons, and Jutes, 68, 163
Anglicanism, 419, 463, 482, 512, 516-517, 518, 519, 620, 621
Annates, 273
Anne, Queen (England), 524-525
Anschluss, 1001 ff.
Anselm of Bec, 264, 315
Antioch, 81, 86, 87, 235
Aphrodite Anadyomene (Cyrene Venus), 33 (illus.)
Apostolic Church, 82-83
Apostolic See, 86, 87
Apostolic Succession, 86
Aquinas, Thomas, 317-318, 391
Ara Pacis Agustae, 55 (illus.)
Arabia, 106-107
Arabs, 105; and Byzantine Empire, 111, expansion of, 111
Aramaic, 21
Architecture, ancient, 18 (illus.), 31 (illus.), 32, 54 (illus.), 56 (illus.), 57, 58; Byzantine, 103 (illus.), 336, 337 (illus.), 338 (illus.); Gothic, 340 ff., 343 (illus.), 348 (illus.); Louis XIV, 493-494, 493 (illus.); medieval, 93 (illus.), 142 (illus.), 183 (illus.), 195 (illus.), 273, 296 (illus.), 335 ff., 337 (illus.), 338 (illus.), 340 (illus.), 343 (illus.), 345 (illus.), 346 (illus.), 348 (illus.); functionalism, 850, 854; Renaissance, 365-366, 367 (illus.); Romanesque, 164, 336 ff., 340 (illus.); Romantic, 844
Aristides, 29
Aristotle, 35-36, 308-309, 314 ff., 389, 390
Arius, 90

Arkwright, Richard, 646
Arles, Council of, 90
Armada, Spanish, 444, 468
Armat, Thomas, 817
Armistice Car, The, 918 (illus.)
Arouet, François, *see* Voltaire
Art, ancient, 20 (illus.), 30-37, 43-46, 46 (illus.), 98 (illus.); and the religious upheaval, 434-438, barbarian, 71 (illus.); baroque, 434-438, 435 (illus.), 436 (illus.), 437 (illus.), Byzantine, 103, 372 (illus.); Celtic, 71 (illus.), medieval, 84 (illus.), 129 (illus.), 145 (illus.), 149 (illus.), 185 (illus.), 191 (illus.), 214 (illus.), 223 (illus.), 273 (illus.), 301 (illus.), 304 (illus.), 334 ff.; Mohammedan, 241-243; primitive, 75 (illus.); Renaissance, 147 (illus.), 365-386, 441 (illus.), 465 (illus.)
Artaxerxes II, King, 38
Asculta fili, 270
Assignat, An, 579 (illus.)
Assyria, 21-22
Astrology, medieval, 320
Athelstan, 165
Athens, 26-27, 29-30, 36-37
Aucassin et Nicolette, 331
Augsburg, League of, 488
Augsburg, Peace of, 408, 447
Augustine, Saint, 94
Augustus Caesar, 52, 55, 56, 60
Ausgleich, 786-787
Austria, *see also* Austria-Hungary; 496, 499-500, 502, 504-506, 587, 588, 591, 595, 599, 611, 615-616, 695-701, 705, 706, 720, 724-726, 728 ff., 734-739, 741-743, 784-792, 886 ff.; agrarian character, 784; and German Confederation, 615, 697-698, 700; and German "Unification," 734, 735, 737, 738, 739, 741-743; and Hungary, 785-786; and Italy, 611, 615-616, 695-696, 720, 724-726, 728 ff., 785; and Napoleon I, 587, 588, 591, 595, 599; and Poland, 506; and Prussia, 499-500, 697-698, 700, 741-743, 785, 786; and Russia, 499-500, 502, 504-506; and the Second Empire, 705-706; *Ausgleich*, 786-787; cohesive forces, 785; constitutional changes, 785-786; expansion, 506; nationalities, 784-785; origins, 496; Revolution of 1848, 696-697
Austria, Republic of, 949-950, 1001-1005; and Fascist Italy, 1001-1003; and Nazi Germany, 1001-1005; *Anschluss*, 1001 ff.; Berchtesgaden, 1004; Fatherland Front, 1001, 1002; Karl Marx Hof, 1002 (illus.); Nazi movement, 1004
Austrian Double Eagle, 611 (illus.)
Austrian Succession, War of, 499, 535
Austria-Hungary, 784 ff., 786-792, 886 ff., 916 ff., and Russia, 886 ff., *Ausgleich*, 786-787, crisis of 1905, 790-791, crisis of 1908, 791-792, dissolution, 916 ff., economic life, 788-789, expansion, 791, foreign policy, 886 ff., government, 787, 789, minority problems, 787-788, 789-792, nationalisms, 784 ff., Pan-Slavism, 790, 792, political reforms, 789
Austro-Prussian War (1866), 743
Avignon, Papal Palace, 273 (illus.)
Avignon Captivity, Avignonese Papacy, *see* Babylonian Captivity
Avogardo, Count, 818

Babyloma, 16-17
Babylonian Captivity, 271 ff., 399, 400
Bacon, Francis, 365
Bacon, Roger, 319
Bailli, 194
Bain, Alexander, 823
Bakewell, Robert, 643
Baking in Constance, 149 (illus.)
Bakunin, Mikhail, 806
Balance of Power, 462, 534
Baldwin, Stanley, 930, 982
Balkan Entente, 992-993
Balkans, 792-793, 886, 895, 897 ff., agrarian character, 798; and Russia, 796-797, 895, 897 ff., early history, 792-793; nationalism, 793 ff., 897; problems, 897 ff.; revolutions of 1875, 797, 886, Treaty of San Stefano, 797, 886
Balzac, Honoré de, 843
Banalities, 151
Bank of England, 523
Bank of France, 593
Barbarians, Germanic, 65 ff., 308; art, 71 (illus.), culture, 70-71, cultural legacy, 308, numbers of, 70; social and political customs, 65-66
Barrès, Maurice, 847
Basil, Bishop of Neo-Caesarea, 95-96
Basilica, 335-336
Bastille, 576
Bateson, William, 821
Bayeux Tapestry, Fighting Bishop Odo, 185 (illus.)
Bayle, Pierre, 495
Beaconsfield, Lord, *see* Disraeli
Beccaria, 559
Becket, Thomas à, 207, 265
Bede, The Venerable, 309
Bela Kun, 950
Belgium, 619-620, 689, 875-876, 993, 1020-1022

Bell, Alexander Graham, 648, 817
Bellini, the, 382-383
Benedict, Saint, 96
Benefice, 136, 137
Beneš, Eduard, 951
Beowulf, 329
Berchtesgaden, 1004, 1006
Berchtold, Count, 900 ff.
Berengar of Tours, 313
Bergson, Henri, 854
Berkeley, Bishop George, 553-554
Berlin, Conference of, 876
Berlin, Congress of, 797-798, 887
Bernard, Claude, 822
Bernini, Giovanni Lorenzo, 434
Bessemer, Henry, 647
Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor, 901 ff.
Bibliography, general, 1032-1035, note on, 11, *see also* References at the end of each chapter
Big Four at the Peace Conference, 924 (illus.)
Bill of Rights, 519, 520
Bismarck, Otto von, 671, 707, 708, 734, 740-750, 750 (illus.), 886-889, and Austria, 741-743, 886-887, 888, and France, 707-708, 886, 887, 889; and German "Unification," 741-747, and Napoleon III, 743, 745-746, and Russia, 886-889, and Socialism, 749, and the Dual Alliance, 887, and the Ems Despatch, 746, and the North German Confederation, 744-745; and the Roman Catholic Church, 748-749; and the Triple Alliance, 888, Danish question, 742, dismissal, 749-750, foreign policy, 886-889; minister-president, 740
Black, Joseph, 548
Black Death, *see* Bubonic plague
Black Plague, *see* Bubonic plague
Blackstone, *Commentaries*, 559
Blanc, Louis, 676-677, 691, 693
Blenheim Palace, 524 (illus.)
Blum, Léon, 986
Boccaccio, Giovanni, 353-354
Boer War, 884-886
Boers, 873, 878-879
Boethius, 71, 307-308
Bohemia, 277, 401, 447-448, 696
Boleyn, Anne, 416, 463
Bologna, University of, 321, 322, 323, 324
Bolshevik Revolution, 935-937
Bolsheviki, 810
Bonaparte, Joseph, 595, 598
Bonaparte, Louis, 597
Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon, *see* Napoleon III
Bonaparte, Napoleon, *see* Napoleon
Boniface VIII, Pope, 197, 267, 269-271
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 791, 797, 798, 895
Bosworth Field, Battle of, 457
Botticelli, Sandro, 376-378
Boulanger, General, 761-762
Bourgeoisie, 297 ff., 302-305, 403, *see* middle class
Boxer Rising, 868
Boyle, Robert, 547-548
Brahe, Tycho, 363-364
Bramante, 366
Brandenburg, Mark of, 496-497
Brazza, Savorgnan de, 875
Breda, Treaty of, 517
Brest-Litovsk, Peace of, 915, 937
Brethren of the Common Life, 357, 360
Bretigny, Peace of, 200
Briand, Aristide, 965
Briand Pleading the Cause of Peace, 965 (illus.)
Bright, John, 710
Britain, Briton, *see* England
British Empire, 521-522, 529, 531, 533-539, 611, 625, 627-628, 776-779, 863-864, 873-875, 877-879, 931-932, 983-985; and Egypt, 874-875, 984; and Ireland, 521-522, 625, 777-778, 931; Australia, 931; British North America Act, 628; Canada, 539, 628, 931; Commonwealth of Nations, 931; India, 529, 531, 533, 535, 536, 627, 931-932, 983-984; post-war problems, 931-932; South Africa, 611, 628, 877-879, 931; Statute of Westminster, 931
British Museum, 551
Britons, 162
Brueghel, Peter, 147 (illus.), 386
Brunelleschi, Filippo, 366
Bubonic plague, 156, 202, 213
Budé, Guillaume, 359
Buffon, 548
Bulgaria, 953-954, 961, 1023-1024
Bulgars, 134
Bülow, Chancellor von, 894
Buonarroti, Michelangelo, 369-370, 380-381, 381 (illus.), 382 (illus.)
Burgher, burgess, bourgeois, *see* bourgeoisie, townsmen
Burial of the Count D'Orgaz, 435 (illus.)
Burma Road, 1011, 1030
Burschenschaft, 615
Butler, Samuel, 846
Byzantine Empire, 100-106, 118-119, 238, 285, 313-314, 372, 501; and Arabs, 111; and Europe, 313-314; and Papacy, 118-119; and Russia, 501; and Venice, 238, 285; art, 103, 372 (illus.); beginnings, 100; changed character of, 105; Ex-

archate of Ravenna, 118, 119, expansion, 101 ff., government, 100-101; legacies of, 105-106

Cæcilian, Bishop of Carthage, 90
Cæsar, Julius, 52
Caligula, 60
Calvin, John, 410-413, 411 (illus.), 453 (illus.)
Calvin, the Pope, and Luther, 453 (illus.)
Calvinism, 410-414, doctrine, 410, 412-413, spread, 413-414, theocracy, 412
Campo Formio, Treaty of, 587, 591
Canada, 531-533, 535, 536, 538, 539, 628, 931
Canning, George, 624
Canossa, 221
Canterbury Tales, 331-332, 334
Canute, 166
Capet, Hugh, 130, 158, 160
Capetian dynasty, 130, 158 ff.
Capitalism, 635-640, 644, 655-663, commercial, 635-640, 644, finance, 656, industrial, 644, 655-663
Caracalla, Baths of, 54 (illus.)
Carbonari, 719
Carducci, Giosuè, 847
Caricatures, 396 (illus.), 420 (illus.), 453 (illus.), 484 (illus.), 750 (illus.), 776 (illus.), 849, 854 (illus.), 997 (illus.), 1028 (illus.), 1030 (illus.)
Carlsbad Decrees, 615
Carlyle, Thomas, 573
Carnot, Lazare, 585
Carol II, King (Rumania), 952, 1024
Carolingian Empire, *see* Frankish Empire
Carolingian renaissance, 124-125, 308-313; goldsmithing, 129 (illus.)
Carthage, ancient, 41, 43, 50-51, 68, 90
Cartier, Jacques, 531
Cassiodorus, 71, 97, 307-308
Castlereagh, Lord, 609, 613, 623
Catherine the Great, Czarina, 502, 504-506
Catholic League, 447-448
Catholic Reformation, 425-437; and Italy, 425-426; and Papacy, 426 ff.; and Spain, 425-426; effects, 431 ff
Cave Painting, 75 (illus.)
Cavour, Count Camillo di, 706, 726 ff., 727 (illus.), 729-731; and Napoleon III, 706, 728-729; and Piedmontese expansion, 729-730; and creation of the Kingdom of Italy, 731; estimate, 727; program for unification, 727
Celtes, Conrad, 357
Celts, 162
Cézanne, Paul, 848-849, 850 (illus.)
Chalcedon, Council of, 91
Chalice of Antioch, 98 (illus.)
Chalons, Battle of, 68
Chamberlain, Joseph, 891
Chamberlain, Neville, 982, 1006, 1012, 1020
Champlain, Samuel de, 531
Champlain's Habitation, 532 (illus.)
Chansons de geste, 329-330
Charlemagne, 120-126, 482, administration, 121-122, conquests, 121, coronation of, 124, 482, estimate of, 125-126
Charles I, King (England), 511, 512-515
Charles II, King (England), 516-518
Charles II, King (Spain), 489
Charles V, Emperor, 403, 403 (illus.), 416, 440
Charles V, King (France), 200-201
Charles VI, Emperor (Austria), 496
Charles VII, King (France), 204
Charles VIII, King (France), 204, 205
Charles X, King (France), 688, 689
Charles Albert, King (Piedmont), 695, 726
Charles Martel, 117
Charles of Anjou, 269
Charles the Bald, 126, 127
Charter of 1814 (France), 602, 616-617
Chartism, 709-710
Chartres Cathedral, 343 (illus.), 345 (illus.), 346 (illus.), 348 (illus.)
Chaucer, Geoffrey, 332, 333-334
Chaumont, Treaty of, 603, 613
Chekhov, Anton, 846
Chernishevsky, Nicholas G., 806
Chiang Kai-shek, 870, 1010
China, 502, 862, 863-864, 866-868, 869, 872, 991-992, 1010-1011, 1030, and Communism, 870, and France, 864, 866, 867; and Great Britain, 863, 864, 866, 867; and Japan, 866-867, 869, 870-872, 991-992, 1010-1011; and League of Nations, 991-992, and Russia, 502, 862, 864, 866, 867, and the United States, 863, 864, 867-868, 870, "Battle of Concessions," 867, Boxer Rising, 868, Burma Road, 1011, 1030; extraterritoriality, 863, Kuomintang, 869, 870-1010; Nanking government, 870, 1010, "Open Door," 863, 868; Revolution of 1911-1912, 869; "Twenty-one Demands," 870
Chivalry, 140
Chopin, Frédéric, 845
Christ, *see* Jesus
Christ in the Garden, 373 (illus.)
Christian Church, early, 79-98; and Pope Gregory I, 94-95; Apostolic Era, 82-83, 84-85; Apostolic See, 86; Arians,

90-91, asceticism, 95, becomes state religion of Roman Empire, 84, beginnings, 79-82; Church Fathers, 94; communal life and teachings, 82, development of doctrine, 89-90, doctrine of Apostolic Succession, 85-86; doctrine of the Trinity, 91, Donatists, 90, *episcopus*, 85, extended toleration, 83-84, influence upon thought, 92-94, influences of Judaism upon, 81, *Logos*, 79, martyrolatry and hagiolatry 92; monasticism, 94-98, organization, 82-85, 85-86, 86-88, pagan influences, 79, 89, 92, persecutions, 83, place in medieval life, 97-98, Petrine Theory, 87, *presbuteros*, 85, presbyters and deacons, 82, reception of, 81-82, Ritual of Mass, 92, "Second Coming," 82, 85; simple rites, 82-83, social status of members, 83, supremacy of Rome, 87-89

Christian Church, medieval, 115-120, 123, 124, 126, 139 ff., 163-164, 169, 174-185, 197, 207-210, 215-257, 262-267, 274-280, 287, 313-322, 356, 361-365, 399-400, abuses 304-307, *annates*, 273, and Commercial Revolution, 397-398, and England, 163-164, 169, 207, 208-209, 210, 263-267, 277, and feudal Germany, 174 ff., and feudalism, 139 ff., 178-185, and France, 197, 267 ff., and Frankish Empire, 115-116, 117, 118-119, 120, 123, 124, 126, and free thought, 300-301; and Humanism, 356, 361-362, 391 ff., 399-400, and Mohammedan learning, 313 ff., and Mohammedanism, 232 ff., and nationalism, 398-399, and Saxon England, 164, and science, 319-322, 363-365, 392-393; and trade, 288, clerical marriage, 182-184, Cluniac reformation, 182 ff., ecclesiastical courts, 249-250; ecclesiastical weapons, 249, Great Schism, 274-280, height of, 244 ff.; hierarchy, 245-247, Inquisition, 250, lay investiture, 183-184, 219 ff., 262-263; monastic revival, 255-257, pilgrimages, 232-233, political functions, 216 ff.; politico-religious character, 215 ff.; priesthood, 250; pseudo Isidorian Decretals, 179; reform movements, 181 ff.; sacraments, 251-252; simony, 182, sources of strength, 181; temporalities, 247 ff.; weaknesses, 252-253

Christian Church, modern, *see* Anglicanism, Calvinism, Christianity, Lutheranism, Presbyterianism, Protestant Revolution, Orthodox Catholic Church, Roman Catholic Church

Christianity, early, 79-84, 89, 92; and Roman Empire, 83-84; beginnings, 79-84, debt to Judaism, 81, influence of Hellenic and Hellenistic philosophies upon, 79, 81, Jesus of Nazareth, 79-80; missionary activity, 81; pagan influences, 79, 89, 92; the *Messiah*, 80

Christianity, Irish, 163-164

Church and State, 124, 179, 184-185, 207, 215 ff., 259-280, 481-483; medieval theories, 216 ff., 259-263, 272, 275-276, modern theory, 215, 481-483

Church Councils, 90, 91, 233, 234, 246-247, 276, 278-279, 401

Church Fathers, 94

Church of England, *see* Anglicanism

Church of St. Francis of Assisi, 255 (illus.)

Churchill, Winston, 1020, 1021 (illus.)

Cicero, 54-55

Cimabue, 373

Cistercians, 255

City of God, 94

City-states, ancient Greek, 24-25, 37, ancient Roman, 50-51, origins, 10

Civil War, English, 510-515

Civitates, 294, 295

Clarendon Constitution, 265

Claudius, 60-61

Clemenceau, Georges, 922 ff.

Clement V, Pope, 271, 272

Clement VII, Pope, 416

Clericis laicos, 267, 270

Clerk-Maxwell, Sir James, 818

Clermont, Council of, 233, 234

Clipper Ship, 640 (illus.)

Clive, Robert, 536

Clovis, 115-116

Cluniac reformation, 182 ff., 218

Cluny, Hôtel de, 183 (illus.)

Cluny, monastic order of, 182

Cobbett, William, 623

Cobden, Richard, 710

Code Napoleon, 592

Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 484-486, 532

Colet, John, 358

College of Cardinals, 184

Colonial empires, 527-530; France, 531-533; Great Britain, 533-539; Napoleon I, 593, Netherlands, 530-531; Portugal, 529; Spain, 529-530

Columbus, 529, 635

Commatus, 66, 136

Commendation, 136

Commercial Revolution, 397-398, 633-642, and Agricultural Revolution, 640-642; and banking, 638-640; and Renaissance, 633-642; and the medieval Church, 397-398, business organization,

637-640; capitalism, 635-640, consequences, 641-642; New World gold and silver, 639-640
Commodus, 61
Communes, 298-299
Comnenus, Alexius, 233, 235
Compiègne, Armistice, 1022
Compromise, The New, 773
Comte, August, 832
Concert of Europe, 612-613, 616, 618-619; Congresses, 613, 616, 618, Holy Alliance, 612-613; Quadruple Alliance, 613
Conciliar movement, 91, 276 ff.
Concordat of Bologna, 432, 482
Concordat of 1801, 591-592
Confederation of the Rhine, 592
Confession of Golias, 327-328
Conrad II (German Emperor), 177-178
Constable, John, 843
Constance, Council of, 278-279
Constance, Peace of, 227
Constantine, 62, 63, 70; and the Christian Church, 90-91; Donation of, 119-120, 247, 260, 362
Constitutional Charter, 616-617
Continental System, 596-597
Co-optation, 160
Copernican hypothesis, 363
Copernicus, Nicholas, 363
Corn Laws, 622, 710
Corneille, 494-495
Coronation Charter (Charter of Liberties), 170
Corot, Jean Baptiste, 844
Corpus Juris Civilis, 104, 322
Corvée, 151
Cosmopolitanism, 630-632
Cranach, Lucas, 404 (illus.)
Cranmer, Thomas, 416, 417
Crécy, Battle of, 200
Crimean War, 705, 728, 796, 803
Croce, Benedetto, 854
Crompton, Samuel, 646
Cromwell, Oliver, 515-516
Crossbow, 214 (illus.)
Crusades, 231-244, 285-286; and feudalism, 243; and indulgences, 244; and the Papacy, 231 ff., 243-244; and trade, 285-286; causes of, 231-235; estimate of, 238, 243-244; First, 234-236; Fourth, 238; leaders, 235, 236; military orders, 236; Second, 236; Third, 236
Curia regis, England, 171; France, 194
Curie, Pierre and Marie, 818
Cushing, Caleb, 863
Cylix, by Execias, 46 (illus.)
Cynics, 44-45, 59
Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, 90
Cyrillic alphabet, 181
Czechoslovakia, 950-951, 961, 992, 1005-1008, and Germany, 1005-1008; and Great Britain, 1006-1007, betrayal of, 1006, Bohemia-Moravia, 1007-1008, dismemberment, 1006-1008; Nazi movement, 1005; Sudetenland, 1005-1007
Czechs, 696, 699, 784, 787-788, 950-951

Daguerre, L. J. M., 817
Daladier, Edouard, 986
Dalton, John, 818
Danegeld, 165
Danelaw, 165
Danes, 165-166
D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 847
Dante, 331, 332-333
Danton, 582, 584
Darwin, Charles Robert, 820-821
Darwinism, 820-822, 834
Daumier, Honoré, 687 (illus.), 849
David, Louis, 590 (illus.)
Deák, Francis, 786
De Ribera, 434
De Valera, Eamon, 931, 983
Debussy, Claude, 847-848
Decameron, 353-354
Declaration of Pillnitz, 583
Declaration of the Rights of Man, 580, 602
Defensor Pacis, 275
Deism, 555, 558-559
Delcassé, Théophile, 894
Demarcation, Papal Line of, 529
Demesne, 148, 150, 151, 152
Democracy, 432, 753-756, 773-774, 990-991; and the World War, 756; definition, 753; "Democratic" alliances, 1012; early, 753-754; early reaction to dictatorship, 990-991; franchise extension, 755-756, 773-774; medieval, 754-755; nineteenth-century, 755-756
Demosthenes, 34
Denmark, 611, 742, 993, 1019-1020
Descartes, René, 548, 551-552
Devolution, War of, 487, 517
Diaz, Bartolomeu, 529, 635
Dickens, Charles, 842, 843
Diderot, Denis, 556-557
Diocletian, 61-62, 68-69, 83
Diplomatic Revolution, 499
Disarmament, 964-965
Disraeli, Benjamin, 771-773, 776 (illus.)
Divine Comedy, 331, 332, 333
Divine Right, doctrine of, 482
Dollfuss, Englebert, 1001-1003
Domesday Book, 169, 170 (illus.)
Dominic, Saint, 255-256
Dominicans, 210, 256-257

Donatello, 369-370, 369 (illus.)
Donation of Constantine, 84 (illus.)
Donation of Pepin, 119, 247
Donatus, 90
Dostoevski, Fedor, 803, 843
Doumergue, G., 985
Draco, 26-27
Drama, medieval, 331
Dreikaiserbund, 886, 887
Dreyfus, Alfred, 763-764
"*Dropping the Pilot*": *Bismarck and William II*, 750 (illus.)
Dual Alliance, 887
Dual Monarchy, *see* Austria-Hungary
Duccio, 373, 373 (illus.)
Dumas, Alexandre, *fils*, 843
Duns Scotus, 318
Dupleix, 536
Durer, Albrecht, 384

aster, celebration of, 75
bert, Fritz, 945
ck, John, 405
conomic life, *see also* Trade
conomic life, ancient, 36-37, 43, 62-65; Hellenistic, 43; Greek, 36-37; Rome, 62-65
Economic life, middle ages, 146 ff., 283-305; feudalism, 146 ff.; towns, 294-305
Economic life, modern, 485-486, 522-523, 562-564, 585-586, 593, 596-597, 620, 621-622, 630-682, 704-705, 738-739, 748, 767-768, 770-771, 788-789, 799, 801-802, 804-805, 808-809, 811-812, 929-930, 932, 934, 938-939, 946, 947, 957-959, 969, 975-977, 978-979, 980-981; Austria-Hungary, 788-789; British, 522-523, 596-597, 620, 621-622, 642-650, 657-661, 770-771, 929-930; commercial capitalism, 638-640; Commercial Revolution, 397-398, 633-642; France, 485-486, 562-564, 585-586, 593, 596-597, 704-705, 767-768, 932; Germany, 748, 946, 957-959, 969, 975-977; Industrial Revolution, 642-682; Italy, 978-979; Prussia, 738-739; Russia, 799, 801-802, 804-805, 808-809, 811-812, 934, 938-939, 980-981
Edict of Nantes, 473, 475-476, 492
Edict of Restitution, 448
Edison, Thomas, 817
Education, 307 ff., 311-313, 322-324, 351, 360, 362-363, 433, 560, 620-621, 764, 765, 774-775, 813, 834-835; and Age of Reason, 560; Brethren of the Common Life, 357, 360; cathedral schools, 311-313; France, 764, 765; Great Britain, 620-621, 774-775; Humanism, 362-363; medieval, 307 ff., 322-325, 323 (illus.); nineteenth-century, 834-835; Protestant school, 433; Russia, 813, 939; *trivium* and *quadrivium*, 312, 324
Edward I, King (England), 211 ff., 266-267
dward III, King (England), 199, 212
dward VI, King (England), 417-418, 463-464
dward VII, King (England), 779
dward VIII, King (England), 520
dward the Confessor, Saint, 166
gypt, ancient, 17-19, 77
gypt, modern, 619, 795-796, 874-875, 984; and Great Britain, 874-875, 984; British occupation, 874-875; independence, 984; Suez Canal, 874
Einhard, 310
Einstein, Albert, 825-826
Elektra, The Robot, 650 (illus.)
El Greco, 434, 435 (illus.)
Elizabeth, Queen (England), 416, 419, 443-444, 460, 464-465, 465 (illus.), 468
Elizabethan Theater, 467 (illus.)
Enclosures, 466, 563, 641, 642-643
Engels, Friedrich, 677
England, early, 162-166; Roman conquest, 162-163; the Danish conquest, 164-165
England, medieval, 171-172, 191, 198-204, 205-213, 248, 263-267, 277, 358-359; administration of Henry I, 171; Adulterine Castles, 171-172, 207; and Calais, 200; and Flanders, 199; and France, 171, 191, 198-204, 208, 212-213, 266; and Innocent III, 248; and Scotland, 211; and the Church, 163-164, 169, 207, 208-209, 210, 263-267, 277; and Wales, 211-212; Angevin kings, 205 ff.; Clarendon Constitution, 265; common law, 207; Coronation Charter, 170; Great Council, 210; Humanism, 358-359; jury system, 206-207; King's Council, 171; Lollards, 277; *Magna Carta*, 209-210; Parliament, 210-211; reforms of Henry II, 206-208; Renaissance, 358-359; social change, 213; statute law, 211; towns, 210
England, Norman, 166-171; and the Church, 169; conquest, 167 ff.; *Domesday Book*, 169, 170 (illus.); effects of conquest, 169-170; feudalism, 168-169; Great Council, 169, 171
England, Saxon, 163-164, 166-167, 328-329; and the Church, 163-164; government, 166-167; heptarchy, 163; literature, 328-329; social and economic life, 167; *Witanagemot* (*Witan*), 166
England, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century, 499, 509-539; and courts, 513; and France, 499, 517, 518; and Ireland,

515, and Netherlands, 515, 517, 531; and Scotland, 514, Bill of Rights, 519, 520; Cavalier Parliament, 516-517, Cavaliers, 514, Civil War, 510-515, Clarendon Code, 516-517, 518, Commonwealth, 515, Crown vs Parliament, 511-515, 519 ff., Declaration of Indulgence, 517, 519, Glorious Revolution, 519-520; Habeas Corpus Act, 518; Hampton Court Conference, 511, Independents, 515, "Instrument of Government," 515, Interregnum, 515, Long Parliament, 514; middle class, 512 ff.; Militia Ordinance, 514; New Model Army, 515, Petition of Right, 513; political parties, 518; Protectorate, 515; Puritans, 511 ff.; Revolution settlement, 520-521; the Restoration, 516-517; Roundheads, 514, Short Parliament, 514; Whig and Tory, 518 ff.; *see also* British Empire, Great Britain
England, Tudor, 414-419, 457-468, 509-510; and Catholic Church, 414 ff.; and courts, 458-459; and Ireland, 460; and Spain, 443-444; balance of power, 462, economic life, 465-468, 509, 510; Elizabethan Sea-dogs, 466-467; Elizabethan theater, 467 (illus.); legacies, 510; middle class, 509; Parliament, 458; pretenders, 460, Privy Council, 458, Protestant Revolution, 414-419, 463, Wars of the Roses, 457
Enlightened Despotism, 498-499, 504, 561-562
Enlightenment, Age of, *see* Reason, Age of
Enqueteurs, 194
Entente Cordiale, 892 ff.
Epaminondas, 39
Epicureans, 44-45, 59
Epstein, Jacob, 853
Erasmus, Desiderius, 360-361, 361 (illus.), 400
Essays (Montaigne), 359
Estates General, 197-198, 203, 205, 271, 473-474, 475, 569-570, 574
Estonia, 949, 993
Ethiopia, 879, 880-881, 996 ff.; and Italy, 879, 880-881, 996 ff.
Eucharist, 83, 86, 89, 251
Euripides, 33
European expansion, 48, 154-155, 231 ff., 506, 527-539, 627-628, 705, 791, 856-857; and the continuity of social development, 48, 856-857; Austrian, 506; British, 533 ff., 611, 627-628, 863, 864, 866; Dutch, 530-531; in the Far East, 862-866; French, 531-533, 705; medieval, 154-155; motives, 528; Portuguese, 529, in Russia, 502, 503, 504-506, 807-808, 864, 866, Spanish, 529-530; the Crusades, 231 ff., for expansion after 1870 *see* Imperialism
Evolution, animal, 1-2, biological, 820-822, 834, social, 8, 508-510, 605-607
Exarchate of Ravenna, 118, 199
Excommunication, 249
Explorers, 529, 634-635, 875

Fabliaux, 330-331
Factory system, *see* Industrial Revolution
Fahrenheit, Gabriel Daniel, 547
Fairs, medieval, 200-201
Faraday, Michael, 817
Farnese, Alexander, 442-443
Fascism, *see* Italy, Fascist, and Germany, Nazi
Fashoda crisis, 887, 891
Feltre, Vittorino da, 362-363
Ferdinand I, Emperor (Austria), 696
Ferdinand and Isabella (Spain), 440
Ferry, Jules, 764, 768
Feudalism, 134-156, 168-169, 172 ff., 178-185, 243 ff., and the Church, 139 ff., 178-185, 247 ff., and the Crusades, 243, and the towns, 155; castles, 141, 142 (illus.), 143; decline of, 154-156; fees and taxes, 138, 151-152; freemen, 150, German, 172 ff., lord and peasant, 149 ff., Norman, 168-169; peasant life, 153-154; serfs, 150-152; social groups, 144, 146-147; social life, 141 ff., 145 (illus.), 149 (illus.), Third Estate, 144-145
Feudalism, economic, 146 ff., 156 ff.; beginnings, 146-148; 147 (illus.), manor, manorialism, 148
Feudalism, political, 134 ff., 143 ff.; and the Church, 139 ff., estimate of, 145-146; *homage* and *fealty*, 136; origins, 134 ff.; wars, 138 ff., 143-144
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 841-842
Fief, 137
Finland, 949, 993, 1018-1019
Finno-Russian War, 1018-1019
First Estate, 146-147, 564
Fitch, John, 647
Flanders, wool trade, 199, 286
Flaubert, Gustav, 845
Flight into Egypt, 373 (illus.)
Forty-two Articles of Faith, The, 417-418
Fourier, Charles, 675
Fox-Talbot, W. H., 817
France, Anatole, 845-846
France (*Hogarth Etching*), 534 (illus.)

France, Bourbon, *see also* French Revolution
France, Bourbon, 449-450, 469, 472-479, 483-495, 499, 517, 518, 521-522, 534-536, 562-570, 602, 616-618, 688-689, and England, 499, 517, 518, and Great Britain, 521-522, 534-536, 534 (illus.), and the Netherlands, 487-488, and Spain, 479, 489-490, and the Hapsburgs, 469, 474, 486-490, and the Huguenots, 492, and the Roman Catholic Church, 491, 493; and the Thirty Years' War, 449-450, 478; art and culture, 493-495; centralization of government, 473-474, 475-477, 483-484, 566-567, *Chambres des Reunions*, 488, Charter of 1814, 602, 616-617; Colonial Empire, 485-486, 531-533, economic life, 473, 474, 485-486, 562-566, Era of Metternich, 616-618, I states General, 473-474, 475, 569-570; *Fronde*, 478, 479, *Intendants*, 477, July Ordinances, 688, Louis XIV, 483-495, *Parlement*, 477, 478-479, 567, 569, restoration, 602, 616-618, Revolution of 1830, 688-689, royal incompetence, 567-568, taxes, 563
France, Louis Philippe, and Africa, 873-874, government, 690-692; opposition, 691-692, Reform Banquets, 692; Revolution of 1848, 692-693
France, medieval, 158 ff., 171, 189-205, 208, 212-213, 248, 266-269, 271, 275-276, 280, 359-360, and England, 171, 191, 198-204, 208, 212-213, 266, and Flanders, 199, and Innocent III, 248, and Italy, 204-205, 269, and the Church, 197, 267 ff., 275-276, 280, Capetian kings, 158 ff.; co-optation, 160, I states General, 197-198, 203, 205, 271, expansion, 189-193, feudal beginnings, 158 ff.; Great Council, 194; Humanism, 359-360; Jacquerie, 202; legal system, 194-196; *Parlement*, 194, 196, 204; Renaissance, 359-360; royal government, 193 ff.; social turmoil, 202-203
France, Second Empire, 665, 677, 693-694, 700-708, 745-746, 864, 873-874; and Austria, 705-706, and Franco-Prussian War, 745-746; and Italy, 700, 705-706, and Prussia, 707-708, 745-746; Crimean War, 705; economic life, 704-705; establishment, 703-704; expansion, 705, 706-707, 864, 873-874; foreign policies, 705-708; government, 704; labor policy, 705; Labor Unions, 665; "National Workshops," 677, 693-694
France, Second Republic, 693-695; character, 695; constitution, 694-695; June Days, 694
France, sixteenth-century, 444-445, 463-473, and Italy, 469; and Spain, 444-445, and the Protestant Revolution, 470, and the Roman Catholic Church, 469 ff., Bourbons, 471-472, *Chambres ardentes*, 471; Guise, 471-472; *Politiques*, 472, 473, Valois dynasty, 444, 471-472
France, Third Republic, 665-667, 670, 673, 756-768, 867, 874-877, 886 ff., 890 ff., 932-933, 946, 948, 958, 959, 961, 963-964, 985-986, 993-994, 997-998, 1000-1001, 1012, 1013, 1015-1023, 1024; and Africa, 874 ff., and China, 867; and Franco-Prussian War, 756-758; and Germany, 756-758, 879, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 894 ff., 946, 958, 959, 963-964, and Great Britain, 867, 874 ff., 889, 891-892 ff., 993-994, 997-998, 1000-1001, 1012, 1013, 1015-1023, 1024, and Italy, 875, 888, 891 ff., 961, 993, 1022; and Poland, 948, and Russia, 768, 889-890 ff., 993-994; and Spain, 1000-1001; and the Roman Catholic Church, 760-761, 762, 764-766, and Tunis, 875; anti-Semitism, 763; Associations Act, 765, Boulanger affair, 761-762; Chambord incident, 759; constitution, 759-760, corruption, 761; death of, 1023, Dreyfus affair, 763-764; economic life, 767-768; education, 764, 765; expansion, 867, 874-875, 876-877; factory regulation, 670; Fascist movements, 985-986; General Confederation of Labor, 666, government, 758-760, 766-767, 932-933, Labor Unions, 665-666; Maginot Line, 933, 1018, 1021; National Assembly, 757-759; Paris Commune, 757-758; party politics, 766-767; Popular Front, 986; post-war, 932-933, 985-986; royalism, 758-759, 760-761, 764; Separations Act, 765-766; social insurance, 673; Stavisky scandal, 985; Syndicalism, 667
France, Vichy, 1023
Francesca, Piero della, 376
Francis I, King (France), 469-470
Francis, Saint, 255-256
Franciscans, 210, 255-257
Franco, General Francisco, 999, 1001
Franco-Prussian War, 708, 745-746
Franco-Russian Alliance, 889-890
Frankfort Parliament, 697-698, 698 (illus.), 699-700, 737
Frankfort, Treaty of, 746, 758
Frankish Empire, 115-130, 133-134; and the Church, 115-116, 117, 118-119, 120, 123, 124, 126; Carolingians, 118 ff., culture, 124-125; decline of, 128-129, 133-134; division of, 126; expansion of,

121; *major domus*, 116-117; Merovingian (Merovings), 115-118; multiple succession, 116
Franklin, Benjamin, 547
Franks, 70, 115 ff.
Franz Ferdinand, 791, 899
Franz Josef (Austrian Emperor), 699, 785 ff., 786 (illus.), 900
Fraunhofer, J. von, 817
Frederick Barbarossa (German Emperor), 224-228, 236, and the Lombard towns, 226-227
Frederick II (German Emperor), 229-230, 319-320
Frederick III, King (Prussia), 497
Frederick of the Palatinate, 447-448
Frederick the Great, King (Prussia), 498-499, 561-562
Frederick William I, King (Prussia), 498
Frederick William IV, King (Prussia), 697, 699-700, 739
Frederick William, the Great Elector, 497
Freedom of the Press, 687 (illus.)
"Free France," 1023
French Revolution, 562-593; abolition of privilege, 578; and Europe, 583-584, 585, 587-588, 590-592, 593 ff.; and the Roman Catholic Church, 578-580, Assembly of Notables, 569; assignats, 579, 579 (illus.); Bastille, 576; Brunswick Manifesto, 584; *cahiers*, 570; causes of, 562 ff.; Civil Constitution of the Clergy, 579-580; Committee of Public Safety, 584 ff.; Constitution of 1791, 580; Constitution of the Year III, 586 ff.; Declaration of Pillnitz, 583; *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, 580; Directorate, 586 ff.; Estates General, 569-570, 574; financial problems, 568-569, 578-579, 587; Jacobins, 581-582, 582 (illus.); Legislative Assembly, 580-581; National Assembly, 574-581; National Convention, 584 ff.; *Parlement*, 567, 569; radicalism, 581 ff.; reaction, 581; Reign of Terror, 584-585; religious experiments, 585-586; social classes, 562-566; Tennis Court Oath, 574; Thermidorian reaction, 586; Third Estate, 575; wars, 583 ff.; *see also* Napoleon
Fresnel, Augustin, 816
Froebel, Friedrich, 835
Fronde, the, 478, 479
Fulton, Robert, 648

Gaiseric, 68, 70
Galerius, 83
Galileo, 364
Gall, F. J., 822
Gallican Independence, Four Articles of, 492
Galsworthy, John, 851
Galvani, L., 817
Gama, Vasco da, 529, 635
Gambetta, Léon, 707-708, 757, 760
Gamelin, General, 1018, 1021
Gandhi, Mahatma, 931, 984
Gargantua and *Pantagruel*, 359
Garibaldi, Guiseppe, 730-731
Gattemalata, 369 (illus.)
Gauguin, Paul, 848
Gaulle, Charles de, 1023
Geography, 2-8, 22, 500-501, 634, 872-873; Africa, 872-873; Africo-Arabian Region, 6-7; ancient and medieval theories, 634; and history, 3 ff.; divisions of Europe, 6 ff., Greek, 22, land-mass variations, 4-5; Mediterranean Region, 7; northeastern Europe, 7-8; northwestern Europe, 8; Russia, 500-501
George I, King (England), 525
George II, King (England), 525
George III, King (England), 525, 622, 623
George IV, King (England), 623, 625
George V, King (England), 779
Gerbert of Aurillac, 312-313
German Confederation, 611, 612, 615, 697-700
German helmet, 751 (illus.)
German Ration Card, 1015 (illus.)
Germany, Empire, 665, 670-672, 734-751, 756-768, 877 ff., 886-891, 894 ff., 897 ff., 937; and Africa, 877 ff.; and France, 756-758; and Great Britain, 877, 889-890, 891, 897 ff.; and Italy, 888; and Russia, 886-891, 937; and Third Republic, 879, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 894 ff.; colonies, 877; creation, 747; economic life, 748; era of William II, 749-751; factory regulation, 670-671; foreign policy, 748, 750-751, 886 ff.; *Kulturkampf*, 748-749; Labor Unions, 665; political organization, 747-748; State Socialism, 671-672
Germany, feudal, 172-178, 222 ff., 357-358; and Humanism, 357-358; and Italy, 175 ff., 222 ff.; and the Church, 174 ff.; and the Papacy, 176 ff.; and the Renaissance, 357-358; barbarian menace, 173, 175-176; decentralization, 172 ff.; Otto the Great, 174-177; Salian dynasty, 177-178; Saxon dynasty, 173 ff., 177; stem duchies, 172

Germany, Nazi, 947, 968-978, 986-990, 994-996, 998, 1000-1008, 1014-1018, and Austria, 1001-1005; and Czechoslovakia, 1005-1008; and Fascist Italy, 998, 1000, 1003-1004; and Great Britain, 995-996, and Poland, 994, 1014-1018, and Soviet Russia, 1014; and Spain, 1000-1001; and the Jews, 974; and Treaty of Versailles, 994-995, 996, dictatorship, 973 ff.; doctrines, 974, 986-990; dynamics of Nazism, 969, 971-972; economic life, 969, 975-977, expansion, 987-990, 1001-1008; foreign relations, 977; Hitler peace promises, 995-996, influence of, 977-978; Memel, 1008, National Socialists, 947, 969 ff.; 1934 Blood Purge, 974; Nordic myth, 974, 989-990; party organization, 971-972; Ration Card, 1015 (illus.); rearmament, 994; Reichstag fire, 973; religion, 975, Rhineland occupation, 996
Germany, "Unification of," 592, 595, 601, 603, 712-714, 734-748; and Austria, 734, 735, 737, 738, 739, 741-743, and Franco-Prussian War, 745-746; and Napoleon I, 592, 595, 601, 603, 737; and the French Revolution, 736; and the German Confederation, 737-738, 742-743; Danish question, 742; intellectual awakening, 736; middle class, 737-739; obstacles, 734-736; *Zollverein*, 738, 744
Germany, Weimar Republic, 944-947, 957-960, 963-964, 968-969; and France, 946, 958, 959, 963-964; Assembly, 945; Constitution, 945-946; Dawes Plan, 959; economic life, 946, 947, 957-959; foreign policy, 946-947; government, 945-946; Hoover Moratorium, 959-960; inflation, 946; reparations, 947, 957-960; revolution, 945; Ruhr, 946, 958; Young Plan, 959, 960
Ghibelline, *see* Hohenstaufens
Ghiberti, Lorenzo, 369
Gibraltar, 111, 1025
Gilds, eighteenth-century, 563, 564; medieval, 291-293
Gioberti, Vincenzo, 723-724
Giorgione, 383
Giotto, 373-374, 374 (illus.), 386 (illus.)
Giovane Italia, 721-722
Gladstone, William Ewart, 771-773
Glorious Revolution, 519-520
Godesberg, 1006
Godric of Finchale, 289-290
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 843
Gogol, Nikolai, 803, 843
Goliardic verse, 326-328
Gorki, Maxim, 846
Government, evaluation of, 684-686; functions of, 132-133; reasons for, 131-134
Grant of immunity, 137
Graziani, Rodolfo, 1025
Great Britain, 521-527, 529, 531, 533-539, 587-588, 593-598, 600, 601, 603, 611, 627-628, 642-650, 657-661, 663-665, 667, 669-670, 673, 679-680, 682-683, 708-710, 768-779, 795-797, 842, 846, 847, 851-852, 863-864, 866-867, 873-875, 877-879, 889-892, 897 ff., 929-932, 982-985, 993-998, 1000-1001, 1006-1007, 1012-1013, 1015-1024; Act of Union, 521; American Revolution, 538-539; and Africa, 873 ff.; and China, 863, 864, 866, 867; and Czechoslovakia, 1006-1007; and Egypt, 874-875, 984; and Fascist Italy, 997-998, 1000; and France, 521-522, 534-536, 534 (illus.), 874 ff., 889, 891-892 ff.; and imperial Germany, 877, 889-890, 891, 897 ff.; and India, 529, 531, 533, 535, 536, 627, 931-932, 983-984, and Ireland, 521-522, 625, 777-778, 931, 983; and Napoleon I, 587-588, 593-597, 598, 600, 601, 603; and Nazi Germany, 995-996; and Palestine, 984-985; and Russia, 795-796, 797, 890, 892 ff., 1012-1013; and Scotland, 521; and Spain, 1000-1001; and the Boers, 873, 878-879; and Third Republic, 867, 993-994, 997-998, 1000-1001, 1012-1013, 1015-1023, 1024; Bank of England, 523; beginnings of national debt, 522-523; beginnings of responsible government, 523-526; Budget of 1909, 775, 776; Cabinet government, 522, 523-526; Catholic Emancipation Act, 625; Cato Street Conspiracy, 623; Chartism, 709-710; "Cliveden Set," 982; colonial empire, 533-539, 611, 627-628, 776-779, 873, 874-875, 877-879, 931, 983-985; Combination laws, 663; Corn Laws, 622, 710; "dole," 673; economic life, 620, 621-622, 642-650, 657-661, 770-771, 929-930; education, 620-621, 774-775; Era of Metternich, 620-625; expansion, 533 ff., 611, 627-628, 776-778, 863-864, 866, 867, 873, 874-875 ff., 931-932, 983-985; extension of suffrage, 773-774; factory acts, 626, 669-670, 776; factory regulation, 669-670; Fascist movement, 982; "Flapper Franchise Act," 774; Forster Education Act, 774; government, 525-527, 625-626, 773-774, 775; Great Reform Bill, 625-626; Home Rule, 778; House of Hanover, 525, 622, 623, 625, 627; Imperial Conferences, 777, 931; imperialism, 776-778, 863, 864,

866, 867, 873, 874-875 ff., Japanese alliance, 867, 890, Labour Party, 775-776, 930-931, 982; literature, 842, 846, 847, 851, 852; Osborne Case, 664, 775; Parliament, 526, 625-626, 773-774, 775, Parliament Act of 1911, 775; parliamentary oligarchy, 526-527, 620-621; Peterloo Massacre, 623; political parties, 522 ff.; 772 ff.; post-war democracy, 929-932, 982-985, Reform of 1867, 773, Reform of 1884/85, 773-774; Reform of 1918, 774; Six Acts, 623; social insurance, 672-673, 776; Socialism, 667; Speenhamland System, 621, 626; Statute of Westminster, 931, Suez Canal, 874; Taff Vale Case, 664, 775; Test and Corporations Act, 624, the New Compromise, 773; Trade Disputes Act, 664-665, 775; Trade Union Act, 665, Victorian Compromise, 708-709; Whig reforms, 626-627
Great Charter, *see Magna Carta*
Great Schism, 274-280, 399, 400
Greece, ancient, 22-47; and Persia, 27, 37-38; artistic and cultural, 30-37; beginnings, 23-24; citizenship, 24, 26, city-states, 24, 25; colonies, 25; economic life, 36-37; games, 37, geography, 22, independence lost, 43; legacies of, 49; literature, 24, 31, 32-34, Persian War, 27; philosophy, 34-37, 389-390; *polis*, 24-25; political history, 25-29, 37-40; religion, 37, 77; *see also*, Athens, Hellenic, Hellenistic, Sparta, Thebes
Greece, modern, 619, 794-795, 952-953, 961, 1026; and Turkey, 952; *Hetairia Philike*, 619, 794; independence, 619, 794-795; Italian war, 1026
Greek, *see* Greece
Greek Lectionary, 372 (illus.)
Gregorian Reform, *see* Gregory VII
Gregory I, Pope, 88-89, 94-95, 163
Gregory VII Fleeing Rome, 223 (illus.)
Gregory VII, Pope, 184-185, 219 ff., 223 (illus.); and Henry IV, 220-222
Grenville, George, 538
Grèvy, Jules, 761
Grey, Sir Edward, 895, 904 ff.
Grosseteste, Robert, 319
Guelf, *see* Welf
Guizot, François, 690-693, 691 (illus.)
Gustavus Adolphus, 448
Gutenberg, Johannes, 365

Habeas Corpus Act, 518
Hacha, Emil, 1008
Haeckel, Ernst, 828-829
Hailie Selassie, Emperor, 997
Hailie Selassie and Mussolini, 997 (illus.)
Haller, Albrecht von, 549
Hammurabi, 16
Hammurabi's Code, 16 (illus.)
Hanover, House of, 525, 622, 623, 625, 627
Hanseatic League, 292-293
Hapsburg monarchy, *see* Austria, Hapsburgs
Hapsburgs, 403, 416, 418, 419, 440-446, 464, 469, 474, 486-490, 496, 499, 611, 695-701, 784-792, 916 ff., and sixteenth-century France, 469, and Bourbon France, 474, 486-490; family insignia, 611 (illus.)
Hardy, Thomas, 846
Hargreaves, James, 646
Harold, King (England), 167-168
Harris, Townsend, 864-865
Hastings, Battle of, 168
Hebrews, 21
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 841
Heisenberg, Professor, 827
Hellenic, architecture, 31, art and culture, 30-37; literature, 24, 31, 32-34, philosophy, 34-37, sculpture, 31-32, *see also*, Greece, Hellenistic
Hellenistic, 37-46, 49, 53-54; art and culture, 43-46, beginnings, 40-41, cultural legacy, 45-46, 49, 53-54; defined, 41, economic life, 43, literature, 44, philosophy, 44-45, politics, 41-43; science, 45, sculpture, 44; *see also*, Greece, Hellenic
Helmholtz, H. L. F. von, 816
Henlein, Konrad, 1005, 1006
Henricus de Allemania Lecturing, 323 (illus.)
Henry I, King (England), 170-171
Henry II, King (England), 171, 205 ff., 264-266
Henry III, King (England), 210
Henry VII, King (England), 457-461
Henry VIII, King (England), 414-417, 415 (illus.), 461-463
Henry IV, King (France), 444-445, 472-474
Henry the Fowler, King (Germany), 173
Henry III (German Emperor), 178
Henry IV (German Emperor), 178, 219 ff., 221 (illus.), 223 (illus.)
Henry VI (German Emperor), 227, 228, 247
Henry the Lion (Germany), 224, 225
Heraclius, 105
Heresy, 85, 90, 193, 253-254, 277-278, 429-430; Albigensian, 193, 254; and the Inquisition, 429-430; Arian, 90;

definition of, 85, Donatist, 90, Hussite, 277-278, Waldensian, 253-254, 277, Wichlifite, 277-278
Herodotus, 33
Herriot, Edouard, 963
Hertz, Heinrich, 818
Herzen, Alexander, 806
Herzl, Theodor, 839
Higher Criticism, School of, 835-836
Hildebrand, Hildebrandine Reform, *see* Gregory VII
Hincmar of Rheims, 179-180
Hindenburg, Paul von, 947, 972, 973
History, 2-3, 13-14, 48-49, 73 ff., 100-101, 572-574, 605-607, 833-834, and geography, 3 ff.; continuity of, 13, 48-49, 73 ff., 100-101, 605-607, defined, 2, literary, 13-14, modern and contemporary, 833-834, pre-literary, 2, theories of causation, 572-574
Hitler, Adolf, 946, 947, 969 ff., 987, 988, 990, 995-996, 1001, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1012, 1014, 1015, 1016, 1022
Hitler and Mussolini Roasting the Dove of Peace, 1030 (illus.)
Hitler's Army Foes the Line, 1028 (illus.)
Hittites, 20-21
Hoare-Laval Agreement, 998
Hobbes, Thomas, 552-553, 560
Hogarth, William, 534 (illus.), 645 (illus.)
Hohenstaufens, 224 ff., 230-231
Hohenzollerns, 496-497, 739, 740, 745-746, 747
Holbein, Hans the Younger, 361 (illus.), 384, 396 (illus.)
Holland, *see* Netherlands
Holy Alliance, 612-613
Holy Roman Empire, 120, 123 ff.
Holy Roman Empire, German, 173, 175-177, 219 ff., 224, 226-231, 248, 402-403, 446 ff.; and barbarians, 173, 175-176; and Innocent III, 228-229, 248; and Lombard towns, 226-227, and Norman Italy, 228, and the Thirty Years' War, 446 ff.; beginnings, 176-177; decline, 230-231; extent, 177; Hohenstaufen line, 224; sixteenth-century, 402-403; Welf *vs.* Hohenstaufens, 224 ff., 248
Hooke, Robert, 546
Hooke's Compound Microscope, 546 (illus.)
Horace, 54-56
Horthy, Nicholas, 950
Hotzendorf, Conrad von, 791
Hugo, Victor, 843
Huguenots, 413, 470 ff., 492
Humanism, 352-365, 391 ff., 399-400, 407; and critical scholarship, 362, and education, 362-363; and Lutheranism, 407, and the medieval Church, 356, 361-362, 391 ff., 399-400; and the Papacy, 355-356; and the Protestant Revolution, 400, 407, classical learning, 353, 354 ff.; defined, 352; in England, 358-359, in France, 359-360; German, 357-358; Italian, 352-357; northern, 356-361, Spanish, 360
Hume, David, 554
Hundred Years' War, 198-202, 212-213
Hungary, *see also* Austria-Hungary, 696-697, 785-786, 950, 1007; and Austria, 785-786; post-war, 950, 1007, Revolution of 1848, 696-697
Huns, 66
Hus, John, 277-278, 400-401, 401 (illus.)
Husinec, Huss, *see* Hus
Huskisson, William, 624
Hutton, James, 548, 819
Hutton, Ulrich von, 358, 400
Huxley, Thomas, 828-829
Hyde, Edward (Earl of Clarendon), 516

Ibsen, Henrik, 846
Iconoclast, the, 119
Iconoclasts, 105
Île de France, 158, 160, 342, 344
Iliad and *Odyssey*, 24
Imperialism, 734, 776-778, 791, 830-831, 856-881, 890 ff., 927, 931-932, 983, 985, 987-990, 991-992, 996 ff., 1001-1008, 1010-1011, 1018-1019, 1023, 1028-1030, in Africa, 872-881, 996 ff.; and nationalism, 859, 861, Austria-Hungary, 791, Belgian, 875-876; British, 776-778, 863, 864, 866, 867, 873, 874-875 ff., 931-932, 983-985; diplomacy of, 890 ff.; economic motives, 858-859; in the Far East, 862-872, 991-992, 1010-1011, 1028-1030; French, 867, 874-875, 876-877; German, 867, 877 ff., 987-990, 1001-1008; importance, 856-857; Italian, 734, 879, 880-881, 996 ff., 1008; Japanese, 866-867, 869, 870-872, 991-992, 1010-1011, 1028-1030; mandates, 927; meaning, 857-858; missionary impulse, 861; motives, 858-862; Rudyard Kipling, 861; Russian, 797, 803, 808, 811, 866-870, 1018-1019, 1023; "superiority complex," 860-861; will-to-power theory, 830-831, 860
Impressionism, 848, 849 (illus.)
Index, 429
India, 529, 531, 533, 535, 536, 627, 931-932, 983-984
Indulgences, 244, 395-397, 405; sale of,

396-397, 396 (illus.), 405; theory of, 395
Industrial Revolution, 643-650, 652-682, 770-771, 808-809, 811-812; business organization, 655-656; child labor, 658-660; class conflict, 655 ff.; Co-operative movement, 668; early factory abuses, 657-662; economic results, 650; factory regulation, 679-681; factory system, 652 ff.; First, 643-648; general problems, 652 ff.; Great Britain, 644-645, 770-771; inventions, 645-648; labor of women, 658-660; Labor Unions, 663-667; machinery, 645-647; materials, 647; new industries, 648-649; organization of labor, 662 ff.; reforms, 668-674; Russia, 808-809, 811-812; search for economic security, 662 ff.; Second, 648-650; social and political consequences, 652-682; social insurance, 671-673; Socialism, 667, 674-682; transportation and communication, 647-648, 649; unemployment, 653-655, 661-662; urbanization, 658; wage scales, 660-661
Industrious 'Prentice, The, 645 (illus.)
Industry, Regulation of, 626
Innocent III, Pope, 208-209, 228-230, 238, 244 ff., 259, 261, 266, 268; and Church hierarchy, 245-247; and England, 248, 266; and France, 248; and Frederick II, 229-230; and the German Holy Roman Empire, 228-229, 248; reforms, 245; temporal powers, 247 ff.
Innocent X, Pope, 436 (illus.)
Inquisition, 250, 429-430, 440
Institutes, see Justinian Code
Intellectual Revolution, *see* Reason, Age of
Interdict, 249
International Labor Organization, 927
International relations, 1870-1914, 797, 798, 867, 876, 877, 885-908; Algeciras Conference, 895; Anglo-French military conversations, 895; Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 867, 890; Anglo-Russian Agreement, 892; Balkan problems, 897 ff.; Balkan Wars, 897-898; Berlin Conference, 876; Bosnian crisis, 895-896; Congress of Berlin, 797-798, 887; consolidation of alliances, 896-897; crisis of 1914, 899 ff.; diplomacy of imperialism, 890 ff.; Dreikaiserbund, 886, 887; Dual Alliance, 887; *Entente Cordiale*, 892 ff.; Fashoda crisis, 877, 891; first Moroccan Crisis, 894; Franco-Italian agreements, 891; Franco-Russian Alliance, 889-890; Franco-Russian Military Convention, 889-890; Hague Peace Conferences, 894; Mediterranean Triplice, 887-888; Reinsurance Treaty, 887, 889; Salisbury-Courcel Agreement, 891, second Moroccan crisis, 896, Treaty of Bjorko, 894; Triple Alliance, 888 ff.; Triple Entente, 892 ff.
International Relations, 1918-1940, 870-871, 946, 947, 957-965, 986-1030; Albania, 1008; *Anschluss*, 1001 ff.; Anti-Comintern Pact, 998; Austrian crises, 1003, 1004-1005; Balkan Entente, 992-993, British-German Naval Agreement, 996; Czech crises, 1005; Danzig crisis, 1014; "Democratic" alliances, 1012; Disarmament Conference, 964, Ethiopian crisis, 996-998; Far Eastern crises, 991-992, 1010-1011; Franco-Russian Alliance, 993; German-Polish War, 1014-1016, Hoare-Laval Agreement, 998; Kellogg-Briand Pact, 947, 965; Laval-Mussolini Pact, 993, 997; Little Entente, 963, 992; Locarno Pacts, 946, 963; London Non-Intervention Committee, 1000-1001; Memel, 1008; minor wars, 961; Munich Conference, 1006, naval conference, 964-965; non-aggression pacts, 994; Oslo Group, 993; Reparations and War Debts, 957-961; Rhineland occupation, 996; Rome-Berlin Axis, 998; Russo-German Non-aggression Pact, 1014; War of the Dictators, 1014-1030; Washington Conference, 870-871, 964
Ireland, 163-164, 309, 460, 515, 521-522, 625, 777-778, 931, 983; and England, 460, 515; and Great Britain, 521-522, 625, 777-778, 931, 983; Catholic Association, 625; Free State, 931, 983; Home Rule, 778; independence, 983; Irish Christianity, 163-164, 309
Irish Free State, 931, 983
Irnerius, 322
Islam, defined, 108
Isocrates, 34
Italo-Ethiopian War, 880
Italy, 175 ff., 204-205, 222 ff., 269, 295-297, 352-357, 425-426, 469, 587-589, 595, 611, 615-616, 689, 695-696; and Austria, 611, 615-616; and feudal Germany, 175 ff., 222 ff.; and medieval France, 204-205, 269; and France, 700, 705-706; and Napoleon I, 587, 588-589, 595; and sixteenth-century France, 469; and the Catholic Reformation, 425-426; Humanism, 352-357; medieval towns, 295-297; Renaissance, 352-357; revolutionary movement, 689, 695-696
Italy, Fascist, 880-881, 940-944, 961, 978-980, 986-990, 996-998, 1000-1004, 1008, 1022, 1026; and Albania, 1008; and

Austria, 1001-1003; and Ethiopia, 880-881, 996-998; and Great Britain, 997-998, 1000, and Nazi Germany, 998, 1000, 1003-1004; and Spain, 1000-1001; and Third Republic, 961, 993, 1022; causes of Fascism, 940-941; Corporative State, 978-979, doctrines, 986-990; economic life, 978-979; expansion, 986-987, 996-998, 1008; Greek War, 1026; opposition, 943-944, party organization, 942-943, racism, 980; rise of Fascism, 940 ff.; War of the Dictators, 1022
Italy, Kingdom of, 731-734, 843, 846, 847, 854, 875, 879-881, 888, 891 ff., 898; and Africa, 879, 880-881; and Ethiopia, 879, 880-881; and imperial Germany, 888, and Ottoman Empire, 880, 898; and the Papacy, 733; and Third Republic, 875, 888, 891 ff.; colonial empire, 734; government, 732; literature, 843, 846, 847, 854; problems, 732-733; Triple Alliance, 733-734
Italy, "unification of," 713-732, 743; and Austria, 720, 724-726, 728 ff.; and France, 717-719; and the Papacy, 716, 723-725, 731, 732; dynamics, 716-719, 722, 723; *Giovane Italia*, 721-722; Napoleon III, 728-729; obstacles, 713-716, Prussian alliance, 731, 743; secret societies, 719-720
Izvolsky, A. P., 892, 895-896

Jacobin Monastery, The, 582 (illus.)
Jacquerie, 202
Jahweh, 21, 78, 79, 108
James I and VI, King (England), 510-512
James II, King (England), 519
Jansenists, 491, 559
Japan, 811, 862-863, 864 ff., 890, 964-965, 991-992, 998, 1008-1011, 1028-1030; alliance with Great Britain, 867, 964; and China, 866-867, 869, 870-872, 991-992, 1010-1011; and League of Nations, 991-992; and Manchukuo, 872; and Rome-Berlin Axis, 998, 1009, 1028, 1030; and Russia, 866, 867, 868-869, 890, 1010, 1011; and the United States, 864-865, 868-869, 870-871, 964-965, 1011, 1028-1030; Chinese War, 1011; expansion, 991-992, 1010-1011; Fascism, 1009; government, 863, 865; isolation, 862-863; modernization, 865-866; opening of, 864-865, 865 (illus.); Russo-Japanese War, 811; "Twenty-one Demands," 870
Jean de Meun, 332
Jellacic, 699
Jenner, Edward, 550
Jerome, Saint, 94
Jerusalem, 80, 111, 232, 233, 235, 236
Jesuits, Jesuit Order, *see* Society of Jesus
Jesus, 79 ff.
Joan of Arc, 201-202
John Hus, Burning, 401 (illus.)
John, King (England), 191, 208-210, 266
John XII, Pope, 176
John XXIII, Pope, 276, 278
John of Jandun, 275
John the Scot, 311
Joule, James P., 816
Judaism, 78, 79, 80, 81, 839
Jugoslavia, 951-952, 961, 992
Julian the Apostate, 84
Jury system, 206-207
Justinian, 101 ff.; legal reforms, 103-104
Justinian's Code, 104

Kaaba Stone, 76, 106, 109, 110
Kant, Immanuel, 841-842
Karageorge, 794
Karl Marx Hof, 1002 (illus.)
Karolyi, Count Michael, 950
Katharine of Aragon, 414, 415, 416, 460-461, 462
Kay, John, 645
Kellogg-Briand Pact, 947, 965
Kelvin, Lord, 816
Kemal, Mustapha, 954-955
Kepler, Johannes, 363
Kiderlen-Wachter, 896
Kipling, Rudyard, 847, 861
Kirchoff, G. R., 817
Kneeling Figure, 852 (illus.)
Knights in Chain Mail, 191 (illus.)
Knox, John, 414
Kôm Ombo, Double Temple at, 18 (illus.)
Koran, 108-109, 113
Kosciuszko, 506
Kossuth, Louis, 696
Kremlin, 800 (illus.)
Kuchuk-Kainardji, Treaty of, 506
Kulturkampf, 748-749

Labor Unions, 663-667; and Fascism, 666; France, 665-666; general European, 666; Germany, 665; Great Britain, 663-665
La Disputa, 379 (illus.)
Lafayette, Marquis de, 576-577
Lanfranc, 313
Langton, Stephen, 209, 266
Lasalle, Ferdinand, 677
Latin Gospels, Golden Cover of (Carolingian), 129 (illus.)

Latin, medieval, 325, 353
Latvia, 949, 993
Laud, William, 512-514
Lausanne, Treaty of, 928
Laval, Pierre, 993, 997-998
Laval-Mussolini Pact, 993, 997
Lavoisier, 548
Law merchant, 292
Law of Papal Guarantees, 733
Lay investiture, 183-184, 219 ff., 262-263
League of Augsburg, War of, 488-489, 535
League of Nations, 926-927, 961-965, 991 ff., 997-998, and China, 991-992, and Ethiopia, 997-998; and Japan, 991-992; German withdrawal, 992, organization, 926-927; successes, 962; weaknesses, 962-963, 991-992
Legnano, Battle of, 227
Leibnitz, Wilhelm, 553-554
Lenin, Nicholas, 810, 935 ff., 936 (illus.)
Leo I, Pope, 87
Leo III, Emperor, 105
Leo X, Pope, 395, 396, 405
Leo XIII, Pope, 838-839
Leo the Isaurian, 119
Leopold I, King (Belgium), 875-876
Lepanto, Battle of, 445
Le Play, Frédéric, 832
"Liberalism," nineteenth-century, 687-688, 708-709
Linnæus, Carl, 548
Lion and Unicorn, 780 (illus.)
Lister, Lord, 823
Liszt, Franz, 845, 854 (illus.)
Literature, 24, 31-34, 44, 54-56, 210, 239-241, 308 ff., 325-329, 352 ff., 362, 494-495, 803, 842-847, 850 ff.; ancient, 24, 31, 32-34, 44, 54-56; Anglo-Saxon, 328-329; contemporary, 850 ff.; English, 842, 846, 847, 851, 852; French, 494-495, 845-846, 847, 854; German, 843, Goliardic, 326-328; Italian, 843, 846, 847, 854; medieval, 210, 308 ff., 325 ff.; medieval Latin, 325-326, 352, 362; Mohammedan, 239-241; Realism, 845-847; Renaissance, 352 ff.; Romantic, 842-843; Russian, 803, 843, 846, 847; *see also*, Vernacular literature
Lithuania, 948-949, 961, 993
Little Entente, 963, 992
Liutprand, 119
Livingstone, David, 875
Lloyd George, David, 775, 776, 922 ff.
Locarno Pacts, 946, 963
Locke, John, 553, 560-561
Logos, 79
Lollards, 277
Lombard, Peter, 316
Lombard League, 227, 230
Lombards, 102, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121
London, 163, 210
London Non-Intervention Committee, 1000-1001
Lorentz, Hendrik, 818
Lothair, 126-127
Louis IX, Saint (France), 193, 268-269
Louis XI, King (France), 204
Louis XIII, King (France), 474-478
Louis XIV, King (France), 478, 483-495, 484 (illus.), 517-518, and Charles II, 517-518, architecture, 493-494, 493 (illus.), centralization of government, 483-484, culture, 493-495; domestic policy, 483-485, 486, 490-495, furniture, 494, literature, 494-495, wars, 486-490, 517
Louis XIV, Cartoon of, 484 (illus.)
Louis XV, King (France), 567
Louis XVI, King (France), 568-569, 574 ff.
Louis XVIII, King (France), 602, 616-618
Louis Philippe, King (France), 689, 690, 692
Louis the Fat, King (France), 161, 267
Louis the German, 126, 127
Louis the Pious, 126
Loyola, Ignatius, 427-428, 427 (illus.)
Lunch Box, 682 (illus.)
Lunéville, Peace of, 591
Lusitania, 913-914
Luther, Martin, 404-408, 404 (illus.)
Lutheranism, 402-410; and Humanism, 407; and the imperial diets, 408-409; Augsburg Confession, 407-408, doctrines, 408, 410
Lyell, Sir Charles, 820
Lytton Commission, 991

Macadam, James, 647
MacDonald, Ramsay, 930, 982
Macedonia, ancient, 39-43
MacMahon, Marshal, 759, 760-761
Madonna of the Rocks, 377 (illus.)
Maeterlinck, Maurice, 847
Magellan, Fernando, 635
Magic, medieval, 321
Magna Carta, 209-210
Magyars, 133-134, 784, 785-786, 787, 789-790, 791
Manchukuo, 872, 992, 1009, 1010
Mandates, 927
Manet, Edouard, 848
Mann, Thomas, 851
Manor, manorialism, 148 ff.
Mantegna, Andrea, 376, 376 (illus.)
Manzoni, Alessandro, 843

Marat, 582
Marcel, Étienne, 203
Marconi, Guglielmo, 649, 649 (illus.), 817
Marconi with Wireless Apparatus, 649 (illus.)
Marcus Aurelius, 45, 52, 61-62
Maria Theresa (Austria), 496-499
Mariana, 439
Marie Antoinette, 568
Marsiglio of Padua, 275
Martin Luther, 404 (illus.)
Marx, Karl, 573, 677
Mary, Queen (England), 418-419, 443, 463, 464
Masaccio, 375, 375 (illus.)
Masaryk, Thomas, 788, 951, 951 (illus.)
Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve, 472
Maupassant, Guy de, 845
Maximilian, Emperor (Mexico), 707
Maximilian I, Court of, 145 (illus.)
Mazarin, Cardinal, 449, 478-479, 483, 485
Mazzini, Giuseppe, 720-723
Mecca, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110
Mechanical Element, 853 (illus.)
Medici, 354-355
Medici, Catherine de', 471-479
Medici, Cosimo de', 354
Medici, Lorenzo de', 354
Medici, Maria de', 475
Medicine, eighteenth-century, 550, 550 (illus.); medieval, 321; nineteenth-century, 823
Mehemet Ali, 619, 795-796, 874
Meissonier, 844
Memel, 1008
Menander, 44
Mendel, Gregory Johann, 821-822
Mendeléyev, Dmitri, 819
Mendelssohn, Eric, 853
Mercantilism, 485, 527
Merchant Ship, 304 (illus.)
Meredith, George, 846
Messiah, the, 78, 80 ff.
Methodism, 558-559
Metternich, Count Clemens, 608-609, 612, 613, 615-616, 696, 697
Metternich, Era of, 607-629; and Italy, 615-616; Austria, 615; bases of conservatism, 605-608; Concert of Europe, 613, 616; failures, 619, 620; France, 616-618; German Confederation, 615; Great Britain, 620-625;
Mettrie, Julien de la, 548-549
Michelangelo, *see* Buonarroti
Middle class, 508-510, 512 ff., 565-566, 575, 578, 597, 607, 608, 626, 641, 644, 662, 684-691, 695, 701, 702, 704-705, 708-710, 737-739; and revolution, 686; and the Commercial Revolution, 641; and the Industrial Revolution, 644, 662; defined, 510; France, 565-566, 575, 578, 597, 607, 688-690, 691, 695, 702, 704-705; Great Britain, 626, 644, 708-710, "Liberalism," 685-686, 687-688, Prussian, 737-739; seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, 512 ff.; struggle with absolutism, 508-509, 565-566; Tudor England, 509
Milan, Edict of, 83-84
Mill, John Stuart, 832
Milton, John, 424
Minoan, art, 20 (illus.); civilization, 19-20
Mirabeau, Comte de, 575
Missi dominici, 123
Mithraism, 59, 78
Mohammed, 107-110
Mohammedan, 239-243; agriculture, 239; art, 241-243; commerce, 239; literature, 239-240, 241; philosophy, 240-241; science, 240
Mohammedan Empire, 113-115; Abbasids, 114-115; Caliphate, 113-115; Ommiads, 113-114
Mohammedanism, 107-110, 112 ff., 232 ff., 313 ff.; and Christianity, 232 ff.; and medieval learning, 313 ff.; as a state, 113 ff.; code of ethics, 109; doctrines, 107 ff.; Hegira (*hijra*), 109, 113; Koran, 108-109; successful expansion of, 107, 110 ff.; *sunna*, 113; treatment of non-Mohammedans, 112-113
Moldavia and Wallachia, 795, 796
Molière, 495
Moltke, Helmuth von, 908
Monasticism, 94-98, 182, 255-257, 308 ff.; and learning, 308 ff.; Basilian Rule, 95-96; Benedictine Rule, 96-97; Cluny, 182; *eremos*, 95; influences of, 97; medieval revival, 255-257
Monet, Claude, 848, 849 (illus.)
Monk, General, 516
Monroe Doctrine, 619
Montaigne, Michel de, 359-360, 424
Monte Cassino, 96
Montesquieu, 561
Montfort, Simon de, 210-211
Moots, 166-167
More, Thomas, 358-359
Morgan, T. H., 822
Moroccan Crises, 879-880
Morse, Samuel, 648, 817
Morton, W. T. G., 823
Mosé in Egitto, 776 (illus.)
Moslem, 111-112, 117, 125, 232 ff., 439; *see also* Mohammedanism
Müller, Johannes, 822

Munich Conference, 1006
Muraviev-Amurski, 864
Murillo, 434
Muscovy (Russia), 45, 133
Mussolini, Benito, 941-944, 988, 990, 996, 997, 998, 1003, 1006, 1008, 1026
Mysticism, 846-847, 854

Nanking, Treaty of, 863
Napoleon I, 587-604, 590 (illus.), 717-719; and Austria, 587, 588, 591, 595, 599; and Egypt, 588; and Great Britain, 587-588, 593-597, 598, 600, 601, 603; and Italy, 587, 588-589, 595, 717-719, and Josephine Beauharnais, 599, and Marie Louise, 599; and Prussia, 595, 598-599, 601, 603; and Russia, 595-596, 599-601; and Spain, 597-598; and the Coalitions, 587, 588, 590-591, 594 ff.; and the Directory, 587-589; and the Germanies, 592, 595, 601, 603; and the Roman Catholic Church, 591-592; centralization, 593; colonial empire, 593; Continental System, 596-597; Elba, 601, 602, 603; finances, 593; Hundred Days, 603-604; Peninsular War, 598; reasons for failure, 604; reforms, 591-593; St. Helena, 603; the Consulate, 589-591; the Empire, 591-604; the man, 588-589, 599, 601, 604; wars, 587-588, 590-591, 593-604; Waterloo, 603
Napoleon's Raft, 594 (illus.)
Napoleon III, 701-703, 705-708, 728-729, 743, 745-746, 864, 866; and Cavour, 706, 728-729; and China, 864, 866; and Bismarck, 743, 745-746; and Mexico, 706-707; and Prussia, 707-708, 743, 745-746; coup d'état, 703; disaster, 708; foreign policies, 705-708; presidency, 702-703; program, 703
Nationalism, 11, 187-189, 398-399, 431-432, 612, 631-632, 712-713, 784 ff., 793 ff., 842, 847, 859-861, 885, 955, 968; and Austria-Hungary, 784 ff.; and cosmopolitanism, 631-632; and imperialism, 859-861; and Romanticism, 842, 847; and the Church, 398-399, 431-432; and war, 885; Balkan, 793 ff.; definitions, 187-188, 712; dynamics, 188-189; post-war, 955, 968; racial and historical, 712-713; Vienna Settlement, 612
Navarre, Henry of, *see* Henry IV, King (France)
Navigation Acts, 466, 534, 710
Nazis, *see* Germany, Nazi
Near Eastern Problem, 793-799, 802-803, 886-887, 955; Balkan Revolutions, 797, 886; Congress of Berlin, 797-798, 887; Egyptian crises, 796; post-war, 955
Necker, Jacques, 568, 576
Neo-Platonists, 44, 59, 311
Nero, 61
Netherlands, 441-443, 487-488, 515, 517, 530-531, 611, 619-620, 1020-1022; and Bourbon France, 487-488, and England, 515, 517, 531; and Spain, 441-443; and War of the Dictators, 1020-1022; colonial empire, 530-531, revolt, 442-443
Neuilly, Treaty of, 928
Newcomen, Thomas, 547, 646
New France, 531-533
Newton, Sir Isaac, 544-545
Ney, Marshal, 601, 603
Nibelungenlied, 329
Nicea, Council of, 91
Nicene Creed, 91
Nicholas I, Czar, 801-802, 803
Nicholas I, Pope, 179-180
Nicholas II, Czar, 809-814, 934-935
Niebuhr, Barthold Georg, 833
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 830-831
Nika Revolt, 103
Nimwegen, Peace of, 488
Nine-Power Pacts, 869
Nominalism, 315
Nominalist-Realist controversy, 315-317
Norman Conquest, *see* England
Norsemen, *see* Vikings
North German Confederation, 744-745
Norway, 610-611, 993, 1019-1020
Novellae, 104, 105
Nuremberg in the Fifteenth Century, 301 (illus.)
Nystadt, Treaty of, 502

Obrenovitch, Milosh, 794
O'Connell, Daniel, 625
Odoacer, 70
Ommiad family, 113-115
"Open Door," 863, 868
Opium War, 863
Oratory of Divine Love, 425
Origin of Species, 820-821
Orthodox Catholic Church, 87, 430
Orthodox Catholic Church, Russian, 482, 502, 506
Oslo Group, 993
Ostrogoths, 67 ff., 70, 102
Ostrogoths, Kingdom of, 102-103
Otto I (The Great, Germany), 174-177
Ottoman Empire, 506, 619, 792-798, 880, 886-887, 898; and Italy, 880, 898; and Russia, 506, 795-798, 886-887; spoliation, 798; weaknesses, 793; Young Turk Revolution, 898
Owen, Robert, 623, 675-676

Pachomius, 95
Painting, 347, 361, 371-386, 403, 404, 494, 843-844, 848 ff., 852, 855, contemporary, 852, 853 (illus.); Impressionism, 848; medieval, 347; Realism, 848 ff.; Renaissance, 361 (illus.), 367 (illus.), 371-386, 373 (illus.), 374 (illus.), 375 (illus.), 376 (illus.), 377 (illus.), 385 (illus.), 403 (illus.), 404 (illus.); Romantic, 843-844; seventeenth- and eighteenth-century, 494
Palace of the Popes, Avignon, 273 (illus.)
Palace School, 310
Palazzo Comunale, 296 (illus.)
Palestine, 984-985
Pandects, 104
Pan-Slavism, 790, 792, 802-803
Papacy and Empire, *see* Church and State, medieval conflict
Papacy, medieval, 86-89, 94-98, 117-119, 124, 126, 176 ff., 197, 208-209, 219-222, 225 ff., 231 ff., 243 ff., 255-257, 262-263, 271 ff., 355-356, 395-397, administrative organization, 246, and Humanism, 355-356; and Cluny, 182 ff.; and Crusades, 231 ff., 243-244, and England, 208-209; and feudal Germany, 176 ff.; and France, 197, and indulgences, 395-397; and monasticism, 94-98, 255-257; and the Byzantine Empire, 118-119; and the conciliar movement, 275 ff.; and the Frankish Empire, 117, 118 ff., 124, 126; and the Hohenstaufens, 225 ff.; and the Welfs, 225 ff.; Babylonian Captivity, 271 ff.; beginnings, 86-89; Cluniac reformation, 182 ff., College of Cardinals, 184; *curia*, 246; development under Gregory I, 94-95; ecclesiastical weapons, 249; Great Schism, 274 ff.; Gregory VII and Henry IV, 219-222; height of, 244 ff.; investiture controversy, 183-184, 219 ff., 262-263; Patrimony of St. Peter, 247; pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, 179; sources of strength, 181; strengthening, 179; temporal powers, 247 ff.; weaknesses, 252-253
Papacy, modern, 395, 426 ff., 716, 723-725, 731-733, 838-839; and Italian "unification," 716, 723-725, 731, 732; and Kingdom of Italy, 733; and the Renaissance, 395; and the Catholic Reformation, 426 ff.; *Rerum novarum*, 838-839; *Syllabus of Errors*, 838
Papal Bull (illus.) and defined, 256
Papen, Franz von, 973
Papin, Denis, 547
Paris Commune, 757-758
Paris, Conference of, 921-924; Big Four, 924 (illus.); Fourteen Points, 923; organization, 922-923; problems, 921-922
Paris, Peace of (1763), 537-538
Paris, Treaty of (1783), 539
Paris, Treaty of (1814), 602, 609
Paris, Treaty of (1815), 603-604, 609
Paris, Treaty of (1856), 796
Paris, University of, 275-276, 323-324
Parlement, 194, 196, 204, 477, 478-479, 567, 569
Parliament, 210-211, 213, 458, 511 ff., 518 ff., 522-527, 620-621, 625-626, 773-774, 775; Act of 1911, 775; before Reform Bill, 526-527, 620-621; beginnings, 210-211; beginnings of responsible government, 523-526; Cabinet government, 522, 523-526; "Flapper Franchise Act," 774; Good, 213; Great Reform Bill, 625-626, Model, 211; Montfort's, 211; origin of Commons, 211; origin of political parties, 518; Reform of 1867, 773; Reform of 1884/85, 773-774; Reform of 1918, 774; rotten boroughs, 527; seventeenth- and eighteenth-century, 511 ff., 519 ff.; Tudor, 458; Whig and Tory, 518 ff., 522 ff.
Parliament, Houses of, 526 (illus.)
Parthenon Frieze, 32 (illus.)
Pascal, 495
Pasteur, Louis, 823
Patrocinium, 136
Paul I, Czar, 800
Paul III, Pope, 426, 428
Paul, Saint, 80-81
Paul of Tarsus, 80-81
Paul the Deacon, 310
"Peace of God," 140
Peasant Bargemen of the Volga, 803 (illus.)
Peel, Robert, 624, 710
Peking, Treaty of, 864
Peloponnesian League, 26, 27
Peloponnesian War, 30
Penance, 251-252
Peninsular War, 598
Pepin, Coronation of, 118, 119, 482
Pepin, Donation of, 119, 247
Pepin of Heristal, 117
Pepin the Short, 117-118, 119, 120
Pergamum, 41, 43, 44
Pericles, 29-30
Perry, Matthew C., 864-865, 865 (illus.)
Perry's First Landing at Gorahama, Japan, 865 (illus.)
Persia, 21
Pétain, Henri Philippe, 1022, 1023
Peter I, Czar, 501-502
Petition of Right, 513

Petrarca (Petrarch), Francesco, 352-353
Petrine Theory, 87-88
Philip II, King (France), 189 ff., 267-268
Philip II, King (Spain), 418, 419, 440-446, 441 (illus.), 464
Philip IV, King (France), 196 ff., 270-272
Philip VI, King (France), 199
Philip of Macedonia, 39-40
Philosophes, 554 ff.
Philosophy, 34-37, 44-45, 57, 59, 240-241, 311, 389-390, 455, 551 ff., 827-831, 841-842; and eighteenth-century science, 551 ff.; and nineteenth-century science, 827-831; Aristotelian, 35-36; Cynic, 44-45, 59; Epicurean, 44-45, 59; Hellenic, 34-37, 389-390; Hellenistic, 44-45; materialist, 828-831; Mohammedan, 240-241; Neo-Platonic, 44, 59, 311; Platonic, 34-35, 455; Roman, 57, 389, 390; Romantic, 841-842; Stoic, 44-45, 59, 390
Phœnicians, 21
Physiocrats, 559-560
Picasso, Pablo, 852
Piedmont, 695, 700, 725 ff.
Pietism, 558-559
Pilgrims, English, 413, 414
Pilsudski, Josef, 948
Pirandello, Luigi, 846
Pisa, Council of, 276
Pisani, 368, 386 (illus.)
Pitt, William (the Elder), 536
Pitt, William (the Younger), 594
Pius VII, Pope, 591, 596, 597
Pius IX, Pope, 695, 724-725, 838
Place, Francis, 623
Planck, Max, 826-827
Plato, 34-35, 308-309, 314 ff., 354, 389, 455; the *Republic*, 35
Plessis, Armand Jean du, *see* Richelieu
Plombières, 728
Pobiedonostsev, Constantine, 808
Poema del Cid, 330
Poincaré, Raymond, 896, 902, 903 ff., 932, 958
Poland, 504-506, 610, 689, 947-948, 961, 994, 1014-1018; and Austria, 506; and France, 948; and Nazi Germany, 994, 1014-1018; and Prussia, 504-506; and Russia, 504-506, 610, 689, 948, 1016; German-Polish War, 1014-1016; partitions of, 504-506; Republic of, 947-948, 961
Political theory, 35-36, 216 ff., 259-263, 275-276, 482, 541-543, 560-561; absolutism, 482, 541-543; Age of Reason, 560-561; ancient, 35-36; Divine Right, 482; medieval, 216 ff., 259-263, 275-276
Polybius, 44
Pompeii, 56 (illus.), 57 (illus.), 58 (illus.)
Population, growth of, 70, 154, 231, 284, 285, 642
Portugal, 529
Poynings Act, 460
Prætorian Guard, 60, 62, 542, 543
Pragmatic Sanction, 496, 499
Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, 280
Prague, Peace of, 743
Precarium, 135-136
Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, 844
Presbyterianism, 414
Pressburg, Treaty of, 595
Prevôts, 194
Priestley, Joseph, 548
Prince Henry the Navigator, 529, 635
Printing press, 365
Protestant League, 447
Protestant Revolution, 392, 394-421, 430 ff., 470, and Humanism, 400, 407, and Roman Catholic Church, 430-431, and sixteenth-century France, 470, causes of, 394-403; effects, 431 ff., England, 414-419; German, 402-408; revolt of German knights, 407, revolt of German peasants, 407; Switzerland, 409-413
Prussia, 496-500, 502, 504-506, 595, 598-599, 601, 603, 610, 697-698, 700, 707-708, 731, 737-746; alliance with Italy, 731, 743; and Austria, 499-500, 697-698, 700, 741-743; and Napoleon I, 595, 598-599, 601, 603; and Poland, 504-506; and Russia, 499-500, 502, 504-506, 610; and Second Empire, 707-708; economic life, 738-739; expansion of, 497, 499, 504-506, 739-746, 743-744; Franco-Prussian War, 708, 745-746; Humiliation of Olmutz, 700; militarism, 498; origins, 496-497; position, 737-738; Revolution of 1848, 697; *Zollverein*, 738, 744
Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, 179, 260
Pugin, Augustus, 844
Puritans, English, 413, 414, 511 ff.
Pushkin, Alexander, 803, 843
Pyrenees, Treaty of, 479

Quadruple Alliance, 613
Queen Anne's War, 535
Queen Elizabeth, 465 (illus.)
Queen Victoria, 769 (illus.)
Quercia, Jacopo della, 370
Quesnay, François, 559

Rabelais, François, 359
Race, 10, 14; Indo-European, 14; Nordic (Teutonic), 14; Semitic, 14

Racine, 495
Ranke, Leopold von, 833
Raphael, 380, 379 (illus.)
Rasputin, Gregory, 813-814
Rationalism, 393
Reaction, nineteenth-century, 605 ff., 698-699
Realism, 315, 845 ff.; literature, 845-847; music, 847-848, painting, 848 ff.
Reason, Age of, 543-562, and education, 560, defined, 543-544, Deism, 555, 558-559, economic theories, 559-560; law, 559, Newton's influence, 545; *philosophes*, 554-555 ff.; Physiocrats, 559-560, Pietism, 558-559; political theories, 560-561; science, 544 ff.; scientific societies, 550-551
Reign of Terror, 584-585
Reinsurance Treaty, 887, 889
Relativity, Theory of, 825-826
Religion, 16-19, 21, 37, 57-59, 73-81, 83-84, 106 ff., 306 ff., 319-322, 363-365, 391-421, 425-437, 551 ff., 555, 558-559, 585-586, 820, 835-840, 939, 975, ancient Greek, 37, 77; and medieval thought, 306 ff.; and Nazi Germany, 975; and science, 319-322, 363-365, 391-393, 551 ff., 820, 835-840; and Soviet Russia, 939; and the French Revolution, 585-586; and totalitarianism, 839-840; animism, 74; Arabia, 106 ff.; Babylonian, 16-17, 77; Catholic Reformation, 425-437; charms, 75 (illus.); Christian, *see also* Christian Church, Christianity; Christian beginnings, 79 ff.; continuity of development, 73 ff.; Deism, 555, 558-559; development of priesthood, 75-77, Egypt, 17-19, 77; fetishes, fetishism, 76; Hebraic, 21, 78, 79, 80, 81; *Logos*, 79; Methodism, 558-559; Mithraic, 59, 78; Mohammedanism, 107 ff.; mystery cults, 78; Pietism, 558-559; polytheism, 77-78; primitive, 73 ff.; Protestant Revolution, 392, 394-421; return to, 840; Roman, 57-58, 77-78, 83-84; *shaman*, *shamanism*, 76; School of Higher Criticism, 835-836; supernatural defined, 73; taboos, 76-77
Rembrandt, 437, 437 (illus.)
Renaissance, 350-386, 395, 403, 404, 633-642; and Commercial Revolution, 633-642; architecture, 365-366, 371 (illus.); art, 365-386; de' Medici, 354-355; Flanders, 384-386; Humanism, 352-365; painting, 371-386, 371 (illus.), 373 (illus.), 374 (illus.), 375 (illus.), 376 (illus.), 377 (illus.), 385 (illus.), 403 (illus.), 404 (illus.); Popes, 395; revival of individualism, 350-351; science, 363-365; sculpture, 368-371
Renaissance, twelfth-century, 314 ff.
Renan, Ernest Emert, 836
Renoir, Auguste, 848
Reparations, 925, 946, 947, 957-960; Dawes Plan, 959; Hoover Moratorium, 959-960; Lausanne Agreement, 960; Reparations Commission, 957 ff.; Ruhr occupation, 946, 958; Young Plan, 959, 960
Reparations Commission, 957 ff.
Rerum novarum, 838-839
Reuchlin, 357
Revolutions, nineteenth-century, 605-607, 618-620, 684-689, 692-693, 695-697, 700-701, 794-795; Austria, 696-697; Belgium, 619-620, 689, causes, 686-688; estimate, 700-701; France, 689, 692-693; Greek, 619, 794-795, Hungary, 696-697; Italian, 689, 695-696; "Liberalism," 687-688; Prussia, 697; Spanish colonial, 618-619; the political compromise, 605-607, 684-686
Reynaud, Paul, 1021-1022
Rhodes, Cecil, 877-878, 878 (illus.)
Rhodes Memorial, 878 (illus.)
Richard the Lion-Heart, King (England), 191, 208, 229, 236
Richelieu, Cardinal, 449, 475-478, 476 (illus.), 483
Right of jurisdiction, 137
Rijn, Rembrandt Harmenszoon van, *see* Rembrandt
Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 845, 847
Risorgimento, 716 ff.
Rivera, Primo de, 956
Robespierre, 582-583, 585, 586
Robot, 650 (illus.)
Rochdale Equitable Pioneers Society, 668
Rodin, Auguste, 850
Roe, Sir Thomas, at Court of Ajmir, 530 (illus.)
Roman Catholic Church, 414 ff., 425-437, 439 ff., 469 ff., 491, 493, 559, 578-580, 591-592, 748-749, 760-762, 764-766, 956; and Bismarck, 748-749; and Bourbon France, 491, 493; and French Revolution, 578-580; and Napoleon I, 591-592; and Protestantism, 430-431; and sixteenth-century France, 469 ff.; and Spain, 439 ff., 956; and Third Republic, 760-761, 762, 764-766; and Tudor England, 414 ff.; *Index*, 429; Jansenists, 491, 559; Reformation, 425-437
Roman law, 59-60, 103-104, 262; revival of, 322
Romance languages, 328
Romance of the Rose, 332

Romanticism, 841-845, 847, 850; and nationalism, 842, 847; architecture, 844, literature, 842-843; music, 844-845; painting, 843-844; philosophy, 841-842; sculpture, 844, 850
Rome, ancient, 49-65, 68-69, 77-78, 162-163, 389-390; and Carthage, 50-51; and Christianity, 83-84; architecture, 54, 56 (illus.), 57, 58; art and culture, 53-57; Assembly, 50; barbarian invasions, 65 ff.; *colon*, 63; conquest of England, 162-163; *consuls*, 50; *curiales*, 62-63; debt to Hellenistic Age, 53-54; decline, 60 ff.; division of empire, 68-69; early expansion, 50-51; early social organization, 49-50; economic and social changes, 62-65; empire, 11, 52 ff.; *equites*, 51; law and administration, 59-60; legacies of, 49; literature, 54-56; *patricians*, 50; philosophy, 57, 389-390; *plebes* (*plebeians*), 50; *pontifex maximus*, 52; Prætorian Guard, 60, 62; Punic Wars, 51; religion, 57-58, 77-78; Republic, 50-52; Senate, 50, 51, 52
Rome-Berlin Axis, 998; and Japan, 998, 1009
Roncaglia, Diet at, 226-227
Röntgen, Wilhelm von, 818
Roosevelt, President F. D., 1006
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 557, 560, 561, 841
Rubáiyát, 241
Rubens, Peter Paul, 436
Rumania, 796-797, 952, 961, 992, 1023-1024
Runciman, Lord, 1006
Ruskin, John, 844
Russell, Lord John, 625
Russia, 45, 133, 499-506, 595-596, 599-601, 610, 689, 705, 728, 768, 795-798, 799-814, 843, 862, 864, 866-870, 886-892, 895, 897, 939, 1018-1019, 1023; and Austria, 499-500, 502, 504-506; and Austria-Hungary, 886 ff.; and Byzantine Empire, 501; and China, 502, 862, 864, 866-867, 868, 870; and Great Britain, 795-796, 797, 890, 892 ff.; and imperial Germany, 886-891, 937; and Japan, 866, 867, 868-869, 890; and Napoleon I, 595-596, 599-601; and Ottoman Empire, 506, 795-798, 886-887; and Poland, 504-506, 610, 689; and Prussia, 499-500, 502, 504-506, 610; and the Balkans, 796-797, 895, 897 ff.; and Third Republic, 768, 889-890 ff.; Asiatic influence, 501; "Bloody Sunday," 811; Bolshevik Revolution, 935-937; Bolsheviki, 810, 935 ff.; Crimean War, 705, 728, 796, 803; Duma, 812, 934, 935; economic life, 799, 801-802, 804-805, 808-809, 811-812, 934, education, 813; emancipation of serfs, 804-805, expansion, 502, 503, 504-506, 797, 803, 807-808, 811, 864, 866-867, 868, 870, 1018-1019, 1023, geography, 500-501; Industrial Revolution, 808-809, 811-812; Japanese War, 811; "Liberation Movement," 809-812; literature, 803, 843; medieval, 501, Menshiviki, 810, 935 ff.; *mir*, 800, 804, 813; "Nicholas System," 801, 808, Nihilism, 807; Pan-Slavists, 802-803, political opposition, 806-807, 810-812, reforms of Alexander II, 804-806; Revolt of *Dekabristi*, 801; Revolution of 1905, 811-812; serfdom, 799, 801-802, 804-805, social system, 799-800, 934, socialism, 802, 806-807, 810; Soviets, 936; Stolypin reforms, 813; the Slavophils, 802, the Westerners, 802; World War, 813; Zemstvo assemblies and boards, 805
Russia, Soviet, 915, 933-940, 948, 980-982, 993-994, 1000-1001, 1010-1014, 1016, 1018-1019; and Allies, 937, and Germany, 937, 1014, 1016; and Great Britain, 1012-1013; and Japan, 1010, 1011; and Poland, 948, 1016; and religion, 939; and Spain, 1000-1001; and Third Republic, 993-994; Communist Party, 938 ff.; Constitution of 1936, 981-982; economic life, 934, 938-939, 980-981; education, 939; establishment, 936 ff.; Finnish War, 1018-1019, Five-Year Plans, 939, 980; government, 937-938, 981-982; New Economic Policy, 938-939; non-aggression pacts, 994; purges, 982; R.S.F.S.R., 937-938, revolutions, 933-937; social experiment, 939-940; Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 915, 937; U.S.S.R., 937, 938
Russian Revolutions, 933-937
Russo-Japanese War, 811, 868-869
Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), 797, 803, 808
Rydz-Smigly, 948
Ryswick, Treaty of, 489

Sacraments, 251-252
Saint Germain, Treaty of, 928
Saint-Simon, Count Henri de, 675, 832
Sainte Chapelle, 195 (illus.)
Sale of Indulgences, 396 (illus.)
Salvation, medieval concept of, 216
San Ambrogio, 339-340, 340 (illus.), 341 (illus.)
San Clemente, Church of, 93 (illus.)
San Stefano, Treaty of, 797, 886
Santa Sophia, Church of, 102, 103 (illus.)

Sanzio, Raphael, *see* Raphael
Sappho of Lesbos, 32
Saracens, 134
Sardinia, Kingdom of, *see* Piedmont
Saul of Tarsus, 80-81
Saxons, 163 ff.
Sazonov, Serge, 903 ff.
Schiller, Johann Friedrich von, 843
Schleswig-Holstein, 742-743
Scholasticism, 314 ff., 391
Scholastics, 314 ff.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 830-831
Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 1003-1005
Science, 45, 57, 240, 319-322, 363-365, 391-393, 543-551, 552 ff., 815-840; Age of Reason, 544 ff.; ancient, 45, 57, and eighteenth-century philosophy, 551 ff., and nineteenth-century philosophy, 827-831; and religion, 319-322, 363-365, 391-393, 820, 835-840; and thought, 827-840, astronomy, 363-364, 544, 825-826, atomic theory, 818-819, bacteriology, 822-823; biology, 820-823; botany, 548; chemistry, 320, 547-548, 819; Darwinism, 820-822, 834; doctrine of evolution, 820-822, 834; electricity, 817-818; electromagnetism, 817-818; geology, 548, 819-820; medicine, 823; medieval, 319-322; Mohammedan, 240; nineteenth-century, 815-827; nineteenth-century attitude toward, 815-816, 824-825; photography, 817; physics, 364, 544-547, 816-818, 826-827; psychology, 823-824; physiology, 548-549, 822; optics, 816-817; Renaissance, 363-365; spectroscopy, 816-817; thermodynamics, 816; twentieth-century, 825-827; x-ray, 818; zoology, 548
Scotland, and England, 212, 514; and Great Britain, 521; Calvinism, 414
Scott, Sir Walter, 842, 843
Sculpture, 16, 31-33, 44, 55, 346-348, 368-371, 844, 850, 852-853; ancient, 16, 31-32, 33 (illus.), 44 (illus.), 55 (illus.); contemporary, 852 (illus.), 853; Gothic, 368; medieval, 346 (illus.), 347-348; Renaissance, 368-371, 369 (illus.); Romantic, 844, 850
Second Estate, 146-147, 564-565
Second Hundred Years' War, 499-500, 534-536
Serbia, 790, 791, 792, 793-794, 897-899
Serfs, 145 ff., 150-152
Servetus, Michael, 412, 420 (illus.)
Seven Years' War, 499-500, 535-536
Sèvres, Treaty of, 928
Shaw, George Bernard, 846, 851
Shiites, 113-115
Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 867
Sic et non, 316
Sieyès, Abbé, 575
Simon, Sir John, 932
Simony, 182, 395
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), 866, 890
Six Articles, Henrican, 417
Slavs, 66-67
Sluys, Battle of, 200
Smeaton, James, 647
Smith, Adam, 560
Social development, agricultural conservatism, 782-783; continuity of, 13, 48-49, 73 ff., 100-101, 351, 605-607
Social groups, 8 ff.; city-states, 10; family, 8-9; tribes, 9; *see also* Race
Social studies, economics, 833; history, 833-834; nineteenth-century, 831 ff.; political science, 833; sociology, 831-832
Socialism, 667, 674-682, 802, 806-807, 810; criticism of Marx, 680-681; defined, 674; Fabian, 681; Guild, 667; Marxian, 678-681; origins, 674-675; political parties, 681-682; "Revisionist," 681-682, Russian, 802, 806-807, 810; "Scientific," 678-681; State, 671-674; Utopian, 675-677
Society of Jesus, 427-428, 434
Socrates, 34, 389
Solon, 27
Song of Roland, 329-330
Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst, *see* Catherine the Great
Sophocles, 33
Sothic calendar, 17
Spain, 425-426, 439-446, 479, 489-490, 529-530, 597-598, 618-619, 955-956, 999-1001, 1025; and Bourbon France, 479, 489-490, 618; and Catholic Reformation, 425-426, and Fascist Italy, 1000-1001; and France, 444-445; and Great Britain, 1000-1001; and Napoleon I, 597-598; and Nazi Germany, 1000-1001; and Soviet Russia, 1000-1001; and the Netherlands, 441-443; and the Roman Catholic Church, 439 ff., 956; and Third Republic, 1000-1001; and Tudor England, 443-444; colonial empire, 529-530; colonial revolutions, 618-619; greatness, 440 ff., 445-446; London Non-Intervention Committee, 1000-1001; Loyalists, 1000, 1001; Popular Front Bloc, 999; revolution of 1936, 999-1001; War of the Dictators, 1025; weaknesses, 441, 445-446
Spanish March, 121
Spanish Succession, War of, 489-490, 535
Sparta, 25-26; *helots*, 26; leadership, 37-39

Spencer, Herbert, 828-829
Speyer, Diets of, 408
Spinoza, Benedict, 424, 553
St. Mark's, Venice, 337 (illus.), 338 (illus.)
St. Peter's, Rome, 367 (illus.)
Stained glass, 346-347, 348 (illus.)
Stalin, Joseph, 936, 981-982
Stanley, Henry M., 875
Star Chamber, Court of, 459, 513, 514
States of the Church, 247
Statute of Westminster, 931
Stein, Baron vom, 598, 599
Stephen II, Pope, 119
Stephen IV, Pope, 126
Stephenson, George, 647
Still Life with Plaster Cupid, 850 (illus.)
Stimson, Henry, 991-992
Stoics, 44-45, 59, 390
Stolypin, 812, 813
Strassburg Oath, 127
Strauss, David Friedrich, 836
Stresemann, Gustav, 946-947, 963
Stuarts, House of, 510-520
Sub-infeudation, 137, 138 (illus.)
Sudetenland, 1005-1007
Suez Canal, 874
Sully, Duke of, 473, 474
Sumerians, 14-16
Summa Theologica, 317-318
Summer, 147 (illus.)
Sun King, the, *see* Louis XIV
Sunna, 113
Sun Yat-Sen, 869
Super-state, medieval concept of, 216 ff.
Sweden, 448, 610, 993, 1019-1020; and the Thirty Years' War, 448
Switzerland, 408-413; Protestant Revolution, 409-413
Syllabus of Errors, 838
Syndicalism, 667
Syracuse, 43, 44

Taaffe, Count, 787-789
Talleyrand, Prince Charles de, 602
Tara Brooch, the, 71 (illus.)
Tenniel, John, 750, 750 (illus.), 776 (illus.), 849
Tennis Court Oath, 574
Tetzel, John, 405
Teutonic knights, 236, 496-497
Thackeray, W. M., 484 (illus.), 842
Thebes, 39
Themistocles, 27, 29
Theocritus of Syracuse, 44
Theodora, 101
Theodoric, 68, 70
Theodosius, 84
Thibault, Jacques, 845
Thiers, Adolphe, 690, 757, 758
Third Estate, 144-145, 562-564, 565-566, 575
Thirty-nine Articles, Elizabethan, 419
hirty Years' War, 446-452
homson, Joseph, 818
Three Orders, Costumes of, 570 (illus.)
hucydides, 33-34
iberius, 60
illy, General, 448
ilsit, Treaty of, 595
intoretto, 383
isza, Count Stephen, 790, 901
itian, 383-384, 441 (illus.)
ocqueville, Alexis de, 833
oleration Act, 521
oleration, Edict of, 83
oleration, religious, 388, 390-391, 392, 422-425, 432, 438 ff., 451-452, 473, 475, 476, 517, 519, 521, 558
olstoy, Leo, 803, 846
"Tours," Battle of, 117
Towns, medieval, 210, 226, 227, 230, 294-305, 301 (illus.), beginning, 294 ff., *burgen*, 294-295; charters, 297 ff.; *civitates*, 294, 295; *communes*, 298-299, consequence of development, 302-305, England, 210, government, 298 ff., Italian, 295-297; Lombard, 226, 227, 230, 298-299; physical aspects, 300-301; population, 300
Townsend, Lord, 643
Townsmen, 297 ff.
Trade, 25, 30, 36-37, 43, 53, 64-65, 71, 239, 281-294 ff., 301-305, 631-640; and banking, 638-640; and civilizations, 282-283, 631-632; and medieval towns, 294 ff.; and nation-states, 633-634, 637, and the Crusades, 285-286, 634; and the medieval Church, 287; barter, 282, 635; chartered companies, 637; consequences of medieval revival, 301-305, 633 ff.; Flemish, 286; gilds, 291-293, 637; Hanseatic League, 291-293; Hellenic, 25, 30, 36-37; Hellenistic, 43; joint-stock companies, 637-638; late Roman Empire, 53, 64-65, 71, 283; medieval fairs, 290-291; medieval goods, 294; medieval *law merchant*, 291; medieval obstacles, 286 ff.; medieval revival of, 283 ff., 633; medieval theories, 286-287; merchants, 289-290; Mohammedans and, 239, 283-284; money and, 282, 635-638; primitive, 281-282; Venetian, 285-286
Trafalgar, Battle of, 595
Trench Warfare, 909 (illus.)
Trent, Council of, 428-429
Trianon, Treaty of the, 928

Tribute Money, The, 375 (illus.)
Triple Alliance, 888 ff.
Trivium and *quadrivium*, 312, 324
Trojan War, 20
Troppau Protocol, 613, 616
Trotzky, Leon, 935 ff.
Troubadours, 330
Troyes, Treaty of, 201
"Truce of God," 141
Tudor, House of, 213, 414-419, 443-444, 457-468
Tull, Jethro, 643
Turco-Italian War, 880
Turgenev, Ivan, 803, 843
Turgot, 568
Turkey, Republic of, 954-955
Turks, Ottoman, 445; Seljuk, 232
Turner, Joseph, 843
"Twenty-one Demands," 870
Tycho Brahe's Quadrant, 364 (illus.)
Tyler, Wat, 213

Ulianov, Vladimir, *see* Lenin
Unam sanctam, 271
Union of South Africa, 879
United States, 619, 863, 864-865, 867, 871, 913 ff., 964-965, 1011, 1027-1030, and China, 863, 864, 867-868, 870; and Japan, 864-865, 868-869, 870-871, 964-965, 1011, 1028-1030; and the War of the Dictators, 1027-1030, and World War, 913 ff.; Monroe Doctrine, 619
Universe, age and size of, 1
Universities, medieval, 322-325, 323 (illus.)
Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, 796
Urban II, Pope, 233-234
U.S.S.R., *see* Russia, Soviet
Utopia (More's), 358-359
Utrecht, Treaty of, 490

Vaccination, The First, 550 (illus.)
Valla, Lorenzo, 362
Vandals, 68, 70, 102
Van Eyck, Hubert and Jan, 385, 385 (illus.)
Van Gogh, Vincent, 848
Varangian trade route, 133, 287
Vassal, 136
Vassalage, 137, 138
Velasquez, Diego, 434, 436 (illus.)
Venice, 238, 285-286, 298
Venizelos, Eleutherios, 912, 953
Verdi, Giuseppe, 845
Verdun, Treaty of, 127
Vernacular language, 71, 328
Vernacular literatures, 328-334; Anglo-Saxon, 328-329; Arthurian cycle, 330; Carolingian cycle, 329-330; German, 329; lyric poetry, 330; Romance, 329-334
Versailles, exterior, 493 (illus.)
Versailles, palace of, 493-494, 493 (illus.)
Versailles Settlement, 925-929
Versailles, Treaty of, 869, 925-928
Vespucci, Amerigo, 635
Victor Emmanuel II, King (Italy), 726
Victoria, Queen, 627, 628, 769 (illus.)
Victorian Compromise, 708-709
Vienna, Congress of, 603, 609-612
Vienna, Peace of, 599
Vienna Settlement, 610-612; crises, 610, estimate, 612, German Confederation, 611, 612; principles, 610
Viking Ship found at Oseberg, 155 (illus.)
Vikings, 133, 134, 155 (illus.), 163, 286
Villafranca, Truce of, 729
Vinci, Leonardo da, 378-380, 377 (illus.)
Virchow, Rudolf, 822
Virgil, 44, 54-56, 333
Visigoths, 67 ff., 70
Vives, Juan Luis, 360
Volta, A., 817
Voltaire, 555-556, 556 (illus.)
Vulgate Bible, 94

Wagner, Richard, 845
Waiblings, *see* Hohenstaufens
Waldensians, 253-254
Waldo, Peter, 253
Wales, *see* England
Wallenstein, Duke of, 448
Walpole, Robert, 525
War, causes of, 883-886
War of the Dictators, 1014-1030; Africa, 1025-1027; air war, 1024-1025; and the United States, 1027-1030; Balkans and Near East, 1023-1024, 1025-1026; Battle of Oran, 1024; British blitz in Africa, 1026-1027; campaign in the west, 1018, 1020 ff.; Compiègne Armistice, 1022; Dunkirk, 1022; effects of French defeat, 1023-1024; Franco-British declaration, 1015-1016; German peace proposals, 1018; Italian intervention, 1022; Italo-Greek War, 1026; naval war, 1018, 1019-1020, 1024, 1026; Norwegian campaign, 1019-1020; Polish war, 1014-1016; Russo-Finnish War, 1018-1019; Spain, 1025; western blitzkrieg, 1020 ff.
War, medieval, 191 (illus.), 214 (illus.)
Wars of the Roses, 213, 457
Washington Conference, 871-872
Waterloo, Battle of, 603
Watson, J. B., 824
Watt, James, 646
Watteau, 494

Wavell, General Sir Archibald, 1027
Weber, E. H., 824
Wedmore, Treaty of, 165
Weimar Assembly, 945
Weimar Republic, *see* Germany, Weimar Republic
Weismann, August, 821
Welfs, 224 ff.
Wellesley, Arthur, *see* Wellington
Wellington, Duke of, 598, 603, 624-625
Wells, H. G., 846, 851
Wentworth, Thomas (Earl of Strafford), 514
Wergeld, 66, 167
Westminster, 849 (illus.)
Westphalia, Peace of, 443, 449
Weygand, General, 1021
Whistler, James McNeill, 848
Whitby, Synod of, 164
Whitney, Eli, 646
Wiclif, John, 277, 400
William and Mary, 519, 521, 522-523
William I (German Emperor), 739-740
William II (German Emperor), 749-751, 750 (illus.)
William IV, King (England), 625, 627
William, Duke of Normandy, 167, 168 ff., 263-264
William of Lorris, 332
William of Ockham, 318
William of Orange, 488, *see also* William and Mary
William the Conqueror, *see* William, Duke of Normandy
William the Silent, 442
Wilson, Woodrow, 914 ff., 922 ff.
Windischgrätz, Prince, 699
Witanagemot (*Witan*), 166
Witte, Sergius, 809
Wolsey, Thomas, Cardinal, 461-462
World Court, 927
World War, 813, 870, 871, 883-886, 899-919, 924-929; and the United States, 913 ff.; Armistice, 917-919; Balkans and Near East, 910-912; blockade, 912 ff.; capitulations, 916 ff.; causes, 883-886, 899-908; costs, 919; crisis of 1914, 899-908; declarations of war, 907-908; dissolution of Austria-Hungary, 916 ff.; Far East, 870, 871, 912; First Battle of the Marne, 908-909; invasion of Belgium, 908; military history, 908-919; mobilizations, 903 ff.; peace efforts, 904 ff.; peace treaties, 924-929; problem of neutrals, 910 ff.; Russia, 813; Sarajevo, 899 ff.; Schlieffen Plan, 908; secret treaties, 910; submarine campaign, 913 ff.; trench warfare, 909
Worms, Concordat of, 222-223
Wren, Christopher, 494
Wundt, 824

Xenophon, 34, 38
Ximenes, Cardinal, 360

Yathrib (Medina), 109, 110
Young, Arthur, 643
Young, Thomas, 816
Young Italy, *see Giovane Italia*

Zionism, 839
Zola, Émile, 845
Zollverein, 738, 744
Zurbarán, 434
Zwingli, Ulrich, 409-410
Zwinglianism, 410


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IRELAND
ENGLAND
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
POLAND
FRANCE
SPAIN
HUNGARY
ATLANTIC OCEAN
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To Venice


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