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LIFE

OF

FIELD-MARSHAL HIS GRACE

THE

DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

K.G. G.C.B. G.C.H. &c. &c.

BY

W. H. MAXWELL,

AUTHOR OF STORIES OF WATERLOO, THE BIVOUAC,

&c. &c.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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CHAPTER XVII.

MASSENA RETIRES BY THE LINE OF THE MONDEGO — DESPATCHES TO LORD LIVERPOOL—ORDER OF THE FRENCH RETREAT—AFFAIRS AT POMBAL AND REDINHA—RETREAT ON CONDEIXA AND PUENTE DE MURCELLA—POSITION TURNED—AFFAIR OF CAZAL NOVA—DESPATCH TO LORD LIVERPOOL—DISTRESS OF THE PORTUGUESE TROOPS—MISCONDUCT OF THE REGENCY—LETTER TO MR. STUART—INDIFFERENCE OF THE PORTUGUESE TO THEIR ALLIES—LETTERS TO MR. STUART—EXTRAORDINARY DEMANDS FOR COMPENSATION—LETTER TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

WHILE these events were progressing in Andalusia and Estremadura, Massena commenced a retreat, as admirable, in a military point of view, as it was execrable in a moral one. In his present position, the French marshal had no longer the means of remaining. "Sickness wasted the army, food became daily scarcer, the organization of the troops was seriously lessened, the leading generals were at variance, and the conspiracy to put St. Cyr at the head of the army in Spain, was by no means relinquished."* Aware that large reinforcements were expected by Lord Wellington, Massena appeared to await their arrival in the Tagus as his signal to retire. The transports, after a six weeks' passage, landed on the 2d of March; and the Prince of Essling, having been apprized, by a secret agent, of the circumstance, broke up from Santarem on the morning of the 6th.

The French marshal had four lines open by which he might retreat; but that through the valley of the Mondego was the one which he determined to adopt; and in selecting

* Napier.

it, he secured a double route. By crossing the Mondego he might march upon Oporto, through a country as yet unexhausted, and therefore capable of affording supplies for his army while engaged in the operation; or by moving up by the left bank of the river, he had Guarda and Almeida in his rear. One objection existed to the adoption of a route by the Mondego. From the present position his corps occupied, he must execute a flank movement to his right to gain the actual line of his retreat: and burthened with 10,000 sick men, and the whole *matériel* of an army, this was a serious difficulty indeed.

With admirable skill, while removing his hospitals and baggage to the rear in the direction of Thomar, he still maintained a bold front, and seemed as if his intention was not to retire, but actually to cross the Zezere; while an able disposition of Ney's corps, which concentrated near Leyria, indicated that a movement on Torres Vedras was contemplated, and, of course, added to the uncertainty of Lord Wellington. On the night of the 5th, the grand business of the retreat commenced,—and the subsequent operations of the army of Portugal and the allied corps, were thus detailed by the British general, in a despatch to Lord Liverpool, dated Villa Seca, 14th March, 1811.

"The enemy retired from the position which they had occupied at Santarem and the neighbourhood on the night of the 5th instant. I put the British army in motion to follow them on the morning of the 6th.

"Their first movements indicated an intention to collect a force at Thomar; and I therefore marched upon that town, on the 8th, a considerable body of troops, formed of a part of Marshal Sir William Beresford's corps, under Major-General the Hon. W. Stewart, which had crossed the Tagus at Abrantes, and afterwards the Zezere, and of the 4th and 6th, and part of the 1st divisions of infantry, and two brigades of British cavalry.

"The enemy, however, continued his march towards the

Mondego, having one corps, the 2d, on the road of Espinhal, General Loison's division on the road of Anciao, and the remainder of the army towards Pombal. These last were followed, and never lost sight of, by the light division, and the royal dragoons and 1st hussars, who took from them about two hundred prisoners.

"On the 9th, the enemy having collected in front of Pombal the 6th corps, with the exception of General Loison's division, the 8th corps, and the 9th corps, and General Montbrun's division of cavalry, the hussars, which, with the royal dragoons and light division, were immediately in front of the enemy's lines, distinguished themselves in a charge which they made on this occasion, under the command of Colonel Arentschildt. A detachment of the 16th light dragoons, under Lieut. Weyland, which had been in observation of the enemy near Leyria, made prisoners a detachment consisting of thirty dragoons on that morning, and had followed the enemy from Leyria, and arrived on the ground just in time to assist their friends, the hussars, in this charge.

"I could not collect a sufficient body of troops to commence an operation upon the enemy till the 11th. On that day the 1st, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th, and the light divisions of infantry, and General Pack's brigade, and all the British cavalry, joined upon the ground immediately in front of the enemy, who had commenced their retreat from their position during the night.

"They were followed by the light division, the hussars and royals, and Brig.-General Pack's brigade, under the command of Major-General Sir William Erskine and Major-General Slade, and made an attempt to hold the ancient castle of Pombal, from which they were driven; but the 6th corps, and General Montbrun's cavalry, which formed the rear guard, supported by the 8th corps, held the ground on the other side of the town, the troops not having arrived in time to complete the dispositions to attack them before it was dark. Upon this occasion Lieut.-Colonel

Elder's battalion of Portuguese caçadores distinguished themselves.

"The enemy retired in the night; and on the 12th the 6th corps, with General Montbrun's cavalry, took up a strong position at the end of a defile, between Redinha and Pombal, with their right in a wood upon the Soure river, and their left extending towards the high ground above the river of Redinha. This town was in their rear.

"I attacked them in this position on the 12th, with the 3d and 4th divisions of infantry, and Brig.-General Pack's brigade, and the cavalry, the other troops being in reserve.

"The post in the wood upon their right was first forced by Sir William Erskine, with the light division. We were then able to form the troops in the plain beyond the defile; and the 3d division, under Major-General Picton, were formed in two lines, in the skirts of the wood, upon the right; the 4th division, under Major-General Cole, in two lines, in the centre, having General Pack's brigade supporting their right, and communicating with the 3d division; and the light division, in two lines, on the left. These troops were supported in the rear by the British cavalry; and the 1st, 5th, and 6th divisions were in reserve.

"The troops were formed with great accuracy and celerity; and Lieut.-General Sir Brent Spencer led the line against the enemy's position on the heights, from which they were immediately driven, with the loss of many men killed and wounded, and some prisoners.

"Major-General Sir William Erskine particularly mentioned the conduct of the 52d regiment, and Colonel Elder's caçadores, in the attack of the wood; and I must add that I have never seen the French infantry driven from a wood in more gallant style.

"There was but one narrow bridge, and a ford close to it, over the Redinha river, over which our light troops passed with the enemy; but as the enemy commanded these passages with cannon, some time elapsed before we could pass over a sufficient body of troops, and make a

fresh disposition to attack the heights on which they had again taken post. The 3d division crossed, however, and manœuvred again upon the enemy's left flank, while the light infantry and cavalry, supported by the light division, drove them upon their main body at Condeixa.

"The light infantry of General Picton's division, under Colonel Williams, and the 4th caçadores, under Colonel de Regoa, were principally concerned in this operation.

"We found the whole army yesterday, with the exception of the 2d corps, which was still at Espinhal, in a very strong position, at Condeixa; and I observed that they were sending off their baggage by the road of Ponte da Murcella. From this circumstance I concluded that Colonel Trant had not given up Coimbra, and that they had been so pressed in their retreat, that they had not been able to detach troops to force him from that place. I therefore marched the 3d division, under Major-General Picton, through the mountains upon the enemy's left, towards the only road open for their retreat, which had the immediate effect of dislodging them from the strong position of Condeixa; and the enemy encamped last night at Cazal Nova, in the mountains, about a league from Condeixa.

"We immediately communicated with Coimbra, and made prisoners a detachment of the enemy's cavalry which were upon the road. We found the 6th and 8th corps formed in a very strong position near Cazal Nova, this morning, and the light division attacked and drove in the outposts. But we could dislodge them from their positions only by movements on their flanks. Accordingly I moved the 4th division, under Major-General Cole, upon Panella, in order to secure the passage of the river Deixa and the communication with Espinhal, to which place Major-General Nightingale had been in observation of the movements of the enemy's corps since the 10th; and the 3d division, under Major-General Picton, moved immediately round the enemy's left; while the light division, and Brig.-General Pack's brigade, under Major-General Sir W.

Erskine, turned their right; and Major-General Alexander Campbell, with the 6th division, supported the light troops, by which they were attacked in front. These troops were supported by the cavalry, and by the 1st and 5th divisions, and Colonel Ashworth's brigade in reserve. These movements obliged the enemy to abandon all the positions which they successively took in the mountains, and the *corps d'armée* composing the rear guard were flung back upon the main body, at Miranda de Corvo, upon the river Deixa, with considerable loss of killed, wounded, and prisoners.

* * * *

"The result of these operations has been that we have saved Coimbra and Upper Beira from the enemy's ravages; we have opened the communications with the northern provinces; and we have obliged the enemy to take for their retreat the road by Ponte da Murcella, on which they may be annoyed by the militia acting in security upon their flank, while the allied army will press upon their rear.

"The whole country, however, affords many advantageous positions to a retreating army, of which the enemy have shown that they know how to avail themselves. They are retreating from the country, as they entered it, in one solid mass, covering their rear on every march by the operations of either one or two *corps d'armée* in the strong positions which the country affords; which *corps d'armée* are closely supported by the main body. Before they quitted their position they destroyed a part of their cannon and ammunition, and they have since blown up whatever the horses were unable to draw away. They have no provisions, excepting what they plunder on the spot, or, having plundered, what the soldiers carry on their backs, and live cattle.

"I am concerned to be obliged to add to this account, that their conduct throughout this retreat has been marked by a barbarity seldom equalled, and never surpassed. Even in the towns of Torres Novas, Thomar, and Pernes, in which the head quarters of some of the corps had been for four

months, and in which the inhabitants had been invited, by promises of good treatment, to remain, they were plundered, and many of their houses destroyed, on the night the enemy withdrew from their position, and they have since burnt every town and village through which they have passed. The convent of Alcobaça was burnt by order from the French head quarters. The bishop's palace, and the whole town of Leyria, in which General Drouet had had his head quarters, shared the same fate; and there is not an inhabitant of the country of any class or description, who has had any dealing or communication with the French army, who has not had reason to repent of it and to complain of them. This is the mode in which the promises have been performed, and the assurances have been fulfilled, which were held out in the proclamation of the French commander in chief, in which he told the inhabitants of Portugal that he was not come to make war upon them, but with a powerful army of 110,000 men to drive the English into the sea.

"It is to be hoped that the example of what has occurred in this country will teach the people of this and of other nations what value they ought to place on such promises and assurances; and that there is no security for life, or for anything which makes life valuable, excepting in decided resistance to the enemy.

"I have the honour to enclose returns of killed and wounded in the several affairs with the enemy since they commenced their retreat.

* * * * *

"I am sorry to inform your Lordship that Badajoz surrendered on the 11th instant. I have not yet received the particulars of this event, but I have no doubt of the fact.

"Since the enemy entered Estremadura, and has directed his efforts against that place, my attention has been drawn to the means of saving it; and Mr. Wellesley will have transmitted to England the copies of the correspondence which I have had with the Spanish officers upon this subject.

"Before the unfortunate battle of the 19th February

I had intended to reinforce the Spanish army with about 14,000 men from that under my command; and thus to force the enemy to raise the siege, as soon as I should have been joined by the reinforcement which I expected would arrive in the Tagus by the end of January. I could not detach with safety till that reinforcement should arrive.

"The battle of the 19th of February destroyed the Spanish troops upon whose assistance and cooperation I relied; and then it would have been impossible to detach a body of troops sufficient to effect the purpose, even after the arrival of the reinforcements, till the enemy should be removed from the Tagus. I had therefore determined to attack the enemy in his positions as soon as the reinforcements should arrive, if the weather should be such as to render the roads at all passable.

"The reinforcements arrived in the first days of March, but have not yet joined the army; and on the 5th, at night, the enemy withdrew from their positions.

"On the 6th, General Leite, the governor of Elvas, began to inform the governor of Badajoz, by signal or otherwise, that Massena had retired, and that he might expect assistance as soon as it was in my power to give it to him; and that he must hold out till the last extremity. I had made all the arrangements for detaching the force immediately upon the enemy's quitting the Tagus and Zezere, and some of the troops actually marched from Thomar on the morning of the 9th; and others, that part of Sir William Beresford's corps which had not crossed the Tagus, were put in motion; and their head has arrived within three marches of Elvas.

"I received at Thomar, on the morning of the 9th, accounts of a most favourable nature from Badajoz, from which I was induced to believe, not only that the place was in no danger, but that it was in fact untouched; that its fire was superior to that of the enemy, and that it was in no want of provisions or ammunition, had sustained no loss, excepting that of the governor, Menacho, and was able and likely to hold out for a month. General Imaz, a person of equally

good reputation, succeeded to the command; and the greatest confidence was reposed in him.

"On the same afternoon of the 9th I was with the British advanced guard at Pombal, and saw in front of that town the collection of the enemy's troops which I have above recited to your Lordship. It appeared to me then, that I must decide either to allow the enemy to retreat from Portugal unmolested, by the road he should prefer, and expose Coimbra and Upper Beira to be ravaged; or that I must draw to the army some of the troops, cavalry particularly, which I had allotted for the expedition to Badajoz, and which still remained at Thomar. I accordingly called to the army the 4th division of infantry and a brigade of heavy cavalry, under the conviction that Badajoz would hold out for the time during which it should be necessary to employ them. Experience has shown me that I could not have done without these troops; and it is also very clear, that if I had left them behind, they could not have saved Badajoz, which place the governor surrendered on the day after he received my assurances that he should be relieved, and my entreaty that he would hold out to the last moment.

"It is useless to add any reflection to these facts. The Spanish nation have lost Tortosa, Olivença, and Badajoz, in the course of two months, without sufficient cause; and in the same period, Marshal Soult, with a corps never supposed to be more than 20,000 men, has taken, besides the last two places, or destroyed above 22,000 Spanish troops."*

The difficulty of obtaining means of transport for his sick men, obliged Massena to destroy such stores as might be dispensed with, and the guns he could not horse efficiently. Every encumbrance had been removed four marches in his rear, and thus a great object was achieved before his retreat virtually commenced. To his reserve cavalry the protection of the sick and wounded was entrusted. They led the march, followed by the 8th corps; and the 6th, the light cavalry, and the best of his artillery formed an imposing rear guard.

* Dated Louzao, 16th March, 1811.

The skirmish at Pombal was most creditable to the British light troops, as well as to the caçadores of the 3d division, who were engaged. The old castle which the French had occupied was bravely carried—and the enemy driven from the town so vigorously, that they were unable to fire a mine, already prepared and charged, and the bridge was thus fortunately saved.

At Redinha, Ney's dispositions were those of an able soldier. Ground, highly favourable in itself, was advantageously occupied, and with such skill, as rendered it impossible for Lord Wellington to form an accurate opinion of the amount of force that held it. With his right outflanked by Erskine, and Picton on the wooded heights upon his left, the Duke of Echlingen boldly held his position, drove in the skirmishers of the 3d division, and masked his real strength so well, that Wellington hesitated to attack until additional troops were brought forward.

"In this posture both sides remained for about an hour, when three shots were fired from the British centre as a signal for a forward movement, and a most splendid spectacle of war was exhibited. The woods seemed alive with troops; and in a few moments thirty thousand men, forming three gorgeous lines of battle, were stretched across the plain, but bending on a gentle curve, and moving majestically onwards, while horsemen and guns, springing forward simultaneously from the centre and from the left wing, charged under a general volley from the French battalions: the latter were instantly hidden by the smoke, and when that cleared away no enemy was to be seen."*

Availing himself of the breathing-time his masterly dispositions had gained, Ney had rapidly withdrawn his right while Wellington's formations were being made; and while the light troops of his left held Picton's skirmishers in check, the village of Redinha was gained.

War seems at times to be an inexplicable science—the object sought so immeasurably below the means required to obtain it. This was strongly instanced at Redinha. A

* Napier.

dismounted howitzer, unserviceable in itself, produced a furious conflict. Although the village was in flames, Ney personally remained under a heavy cannonade, while "the light troops of the 3d division, chasing like heated bloodhounds, passed the river almost at the same time with the French." The marshal carried off the useless metal; but pressed steadily by Lord Wellington, after a short stand on the heights above the village, he continued his retreat to Condeixa.

Here, on the morning of the 13th, Massena was found; and his whole army, with the exception of the second corps, drawn up in order of battle. His position was particularly strong, and from the pains he had bestowed in adding to the natural protection which a morass in front of the heights occupied by Ney's corps afforded, the allies concluded that it was the French marshal's intention to make this the limit of his retreat. Deceived, however, by an exaggerated report of Trant's strength at Coimbra, the Prince of Essling declined passing the Mondego, and retreated by Puente de Murcella.

Lord Wellington had penetrated his opponent's design, and detached Picton's division to cross the Sierra de Ancèao by a mountain road, and turn the left of the enemy. Believing that their position was perfectly secure, the astonishment of the French army was unbounded, when the red columns of the English were seen far in the rear of their left, winding round the base of a mountain ridge which had previously concealed their march. Ney's camp was instantly broken up; while covered by the smoke of Condeixa, which he fired to conceal his movements, and favoured by the obstacles which abatis and stoccades presented to the advance of the pursuers, the marshal reached Cazal Nova, closely followed by the British skirmishers. Massena, who was at Fonte Coberta, had nearly been made a prisoner; and it was reported that he escaped capture "by taking the feathers out of his hat, and riding through some of the light troops."*

* Napier.

Next morning, at dawn of day, the light division moved forward; and owing to a culpable want of discretion in its commanding officer, who, from the dense fog which obscured every object at the distance of a few paces, should have cautiously felt his way as he advanced, the 52d regiment found itself on a sudden clearance of the weather, completely within the French outposts, and engaged, alone unsupported, with the whole of Ney's corps. The British light troops were instantly pushed into action to relieve a regiment so seriously endangered, and a fierce combat ensued. Gradually Picton and Cole got upon the left flank of the enemy; the other divisions, with the heavy cavalry and batteries advanced against the centre, and Ney was driven from his ground; but with consummate skill he exectued an orderly retreat, maintaining ridge after ridge, until he fell back on the main body of the French army, who occupied the strong position of Miranda de Corvo.

A second despatch,* addressed to Lord Liverpool, from Louzao, thus continues the details of his operations.

"Major-General Cole joined Major-General Nightingale at Espinhal on the afternoon of the 13th; and this movement, by which the Deixa was passed, and which gave us the power of turning the strong position of Miranda de Corvo, induced the enemy to abandon it on that night. They destroyed at this place a great number of carriages, and burned and otherwise destroyed, or consumed, the ammunition which they had carried; they likewise burned much of their baggage; and the road throughout the march from Miranda is strewed with the carcases of men and animals, and destroyed carriages and baggage.

"We found the enemy's whole army yesterday in a very strong position on the Ceira, having one corps as an advanced guard in front of Foz d'Aronce, on this side of the river.

"I immediately made arrangements to drive in the

* Dated 16th March, 1811.

advanced guard, preparatory to the movements which it might be expedient to make to cross the Ceira this morning.*

"Brig.-General Pack's brigade had been detached in the morning through the mountains to the left, as well to turn the enemy in his position at Miranda de Corvo as in view to any others they might take up on this side of the Ceira. The light division, under Major-General Sir William Erskine, was ordered to possess some heights immediately above Foz d'Aronce, while Major-General Picton's division was moved along the great road to attack the left of the enemy's position west of the village.

"The 6th division, under Major-General Campbell, and the hussars and 16th dragoons, supported the light division; and the 1st division, and the 14th, and royal dragoons, the 3d.

"These movements succeeded in forcing the enemy to abandon his strong positions on this side of the Ceira with considerable loss. The colonel of the 39th regiment was made prisoner.

"The light troops of General Picton's division under Colonel Williams, and those of General Nightingale's brigade, were principally engaged on the right; and the 95th regiment in front of the light division. The troops behaved in the most gallant manner. The horse artillery likewise, under Captain Ross and Bull, distinguished themselves upon this occasion.

"The troops took much baggage and some ammunition carriages in Foz d'Aronce.

* The combat at Foz d'Aronce was one of those sudden conceptions which so frequently marked the military operations of Lord Wellington. One rapid glance satisfied the English general that Ney could be advantageously attacked, and with characteristic celerity, its execution followed. The French left wing was overthrown; and as darkness added to the surprise which an unexpected attack occasioned, in their confusion the enemy fired upon each other, while many missed the fords and perished in the river, and others were trodden to death upon the bridge, by the impetuous rush of their own comrades from the village. With a loss of sixty men and four officers, five hundred of the French were killed or drowned; and when the Ceira fell, an eagle was recovered, which had been thrown into that river by its bearer.

"I had been prevented from moving till a late hour in the morning by the fog; and it was dark by the time we gained possession of the last position of the enemy's advanced guard.

"In the night the enemy destroyed the bridge on the Ceira, and retreated, leaving a small rear guard on the river.

"The destruction of the bridge at Foz d'Aronce, the fatigue which the troops have undergone for several days, and the want of supplies, have induced me to halt the army this day.

"Marshal Sir William Beresford and I had repeatedly urged the governors of the kingdom to adopt measures to supply the troops with regularity, and to keep up the establishments while the army was in cantonments on the Rio Mayor river; which representations were not attended to; and when the army was to move forward, the Portuguese troops had no provisions, nor any means of conveying any to them. They were to move through a country ravaged and exhausted by the enemy; and it is literally true, that General Pack's brigade, and Colonel Ashworth's, had nothing to eat for four days, although constantly marching or engaged with the enemy.

"I was obliged either to direct the British commissary-general to supply the Portuguese troops, or to see them perish for want; and the consequence is, that the supplies intended for the British troops are exhausted, and we must halt till more come up, which I hope will be this day.

"Since I addressed your lordship on the 14th instant, I have heard further particulars respecting the surrender of Badajoz. It appears that, on the 9th, the enemy had made a breach in the place about eighteen feet wide, but which was by no means practicable. On the same day the governor acknowledged by signal the receipt of the message which I had sent him; on the 10th he suspended hostilities, and on the 11th surrendered the place, the garrison being prisoners of war, and marching out with the honours of war,

to the number of 9,000, to an army which at the period of the surrender amounted only to 9,600 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry. The garrison wanted neither ammunition nor provisions.

"In my letter of the 6th, I had desired the Governor of Elvas to urge the Governor of Badajoz to keep secret the intelligence of Massena's retreat, lest, by means of deserters it should reach the enemy, whom I was in hopes that I should have found engaged in this siege. But he published the intelligence as soon as he received it, stating at the same time that he did not believe it. He likewise communicated it to the French general.

"Since the fall of Badajoz the enemy have turned their attention to Campo Mayor, and have moved in that direction."

With a very small force, Ney secured a safe passage for his artillery and stores; and then, having blown up the greater portion of the bridge, he held the right bank of the river, until Massena had crossed the Alva.

Circumstances favoured the French retreat. Rain fell in torrents—the rivers rose with the rapidity so common in a hilly country; and the villanous misconduct of the Portuguese government, at this trying moment, was painfully displayed. Massena's retreating army was amply provisioned; and the advancing columns of the allies were actually threatened with starvation. For the Portuguese troops no means of subsistence had been provided by their own executive,—from actual inanition they were unable to get on,—and but for the assistance rendered by the British commissariat, they must have actually perished from mere hunger. No language can describe the shameful misconduct of the regency. The most flimsy pretexts were made apologies for the most iniquitous neglect. To the wants of their own soldiers, as well as to those of their allies, they were equally indifferent,—a scarcity of fuel in a country abounding in wood, was a plea for the starvation of the

one,*—and when reinforcements landed in the Tagus, they were left in the streets of Lisbon without a meal, or even a bed to rest upon.†

The following letter to Mr. Stuart describes the wretched state of the Portuguese army, and that, too, at the commencement of a campaign, when so much depended on their efficiency.

* * * * *

"It is useless to propose any arrangement for this or any other purpose, if the Portuguese government will execute nothing.

"I repeat, that matters cannot go on as they are; there must be a radical change in the whole of the system of the

* "I enclose a note which Stuart has sent to me regarding one of your bridges, which it appears, in its present form, prevents the arrival of wood at Lisbon; and *the want of wood to make biscuit is now the reason that the Portuguese troops can get no provisions!* It is like the house that Jack built."—*Extract of Letter to Marshal Beresford.*

† "I declare that I think it disgraceful to the Portuguese government, and to the people of Lisbon in particular, that such a proposition should have been made as has come from Dom Miguel Forjaz. They have now part of one battalion in Lisbon, and some convalescents at Belem; some of the officers attached to whom must be lodged in the town. They have besides some sick and wounded officers there, and occasionally a regiment passes a night or two in Lisbon, when it lands from England or from Cadiz. Are the people of Lisbon so inhospitable that the officers of these corps must be put, on their landing, into cold, damp, and dark empty houses, without the chance of getting anything to eat? Is there an inn or tavern at Lisbon to which an officer can go in such circumstances?

"But I forgot the general officers of the army, those upon the staff, the officers of the guards (for the others can but ill afford the expense), do occasionally go to Lisbon for a day or two, for their amusement. Is Dom Miguel Forjaz serious in expressing a wish that officers of this description should go into empty houses, or into the street? Is this the mode in which the cause of Portugal is to be made popular in the British army? Is every consideration to be sacrificed to the caprice and ease of the people of Lisbon? Are officers of this class—am I and Marshal Beresford—to be provided with a lodging upon billet; but the others, who go there upon duty, and who can less afford, or bear the hardship, be put into the empty houses or into the street? As for my part, I do not go often to Lisbon: *but if the rule is made for one class it must for all, and I will have no lodging upon billet any more than any other officer of the army.*"—*Extract of Letter to Mr. Stuart.*

government in respect of the resources for carrying on the war, or I shall recommend to his Majesty's government to withdraw his army.

"It is a favourite notion with some members of the government, that the Portuguese troops can do with very little or no food. Among other good qualities, they possess that of being patient under privations in an extraordinary degree. But men cannot perform the labour of soldiers without food. Three of General Pack's brigade died of famine yesterday on their march, and above one hundred and fifty have fallen out from weakness, many of whom must have died from the same cause.

"The government neglected both establishments and troops when they were on the Rio Mayor river, and neither are in a state in which they ought to be at the commencement of a campaign. The mules of the artillery are unable to draw the guns for want of food, for any length of time; the baggage mules of the army are nearly all dead of famine; and the drivers have neither been paid nor fed.

"This is the state of the army at the commencement of the campaign: and I see clearly that, unless the government should change their system, no remedy will be applied, and the whole burden of defending this country will fall upon Great Britain.

"I have this day told General Pack and Colonel Ashworth that, if they cannot procure food for their troops with the army, they must go to Coimbra, or elsewhere where they can, as I cannot bear to see and hear of brave soldiers dying for want of common care.

"One consequence, therefore, of omitting to feed the troops, will be to throw us again upon the defensive in this part of the country; another consequence, also, which I seriously apprehend is, that the British officers serving with the Portuguese troops will resign their situations: one of them spoke to me seriously upon the subject of the state of the troops this day, and declared his intention to resign if a remedy was not applied.

"I beg you to lay this letter before the Portuguese government, and to forward it to be laid before his Royal Highness the Regent, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal."

That the Portuguese were in no ways anxious to render assistance to their allies, the following letters from Lord Wellington demonstrate. One was elicited by a formal complaint, charging the troops with the grave offence of cutting fire-wood; the other, in reference to a claim set forth for remuneration by an individual; and both sufficiently prove how little the Portuguese, from the prince to the peasant, were inclined to sacrifice to the work of their national deliverance.

"I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, on a complaint said by Dom Miguel Forjaz to be made of the conduct of the British troops at Salvaterra; which complaint, you will observe, refers not to the conduct of the British troops, but to that of the Portuguese regiments Nos. 4 and 10.

"In respect to the charge of cutting barren wood in the royal parks for fire-wood, I have to reply that I suppose his Royal Highness does not propose that his Majesty's troops shall want fire-wood in Portugal. It is reasonable that his Royal Highness, as well as other proprietors, should be paid for the wood cut upon his demesnes; but either the troops must be allowed to cut fire-wood, paying for the same, wherever the defence of his Royal Highness's dominions renders it necessary that they should be stationed, or they must be removed to the places where they can cut fire-wood, by which his Royal Highness's interests must suffer.

"I cannot avoid adverting to the disposition recently manifested by the government to complain of the conduct of the British troops, certainly, in this instance, without foundation.

"Acts of misconduct, and even outrage, I admit, have been committed, but never with impunity in any instance in which the complaint could be substantiated; and I have not

yet been able to obtain the punishment of any individual of this country, be his crimes what they may.

"If the British soldiers have committed, as all soldiers do commit, acts of misconduct, they have at least fought bravely for the country. They have besides recently shown that commiseration for the misfortunes of the people of this country which I am convinced will be equally felt by their countrymen at home, and actually fed the poor inhabitants of all the towns in which they were cantoned on the Rio Mayor river. Yet I have not heard that the Portuguese government have expressed their approbation of this conduct, very unusual in people of this class and description; nor do I find that either their bravery in the field, or their humanity, or their generosity, can induce those whom they are serving to look with indulgence at their failings, or to draw a veil over the faults of the few, in consideration of the military and other virtues of the many."*

* * * * *

"I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 9th instant, containing a complaint of the Conde de Castello Melhor, that olive trees are cut on his estate near Bucellas, for the purpose of making abatis.

"I beg that the government will be pleased to determine:

"First, whether the works which have once saved Lisbon shall be rendered as complete as they can be made before the enemy may approach them again, or whether we are to wait till the last moment to complete what may be done beforehand.

"Secondly, that they will determine whether any, and what, sums of money shall be paid to individuals for the damage done to their property by these works; and

"Thirdly, that they will order payment to be made to all the individuals in this situation, as well as to the Conde de Castello Melhor.

"Considering that this gentleman is a man of high family, who, it is supposed, will save his property from robbery

* Louzao, 16th March, 1811.

and confiscation, and his person from slavery, and his family from violation and outrage, by the measures adopted for the salvation of the country, it might have been expected that he would not have been the first to demand from the government payment for the damage which those measures do to him."*

That a demand of this description should create disgust in the mind of the British general may be readily believed. A claim, seeking remuneration for a paltry loss, might be extenuated by a plea of indigence; but in a noble of the land—a personage of large estate, in the application there was the most contemptible meanness. The time, also, when the claim was preferred, was unfortunate; at that period, on account of the expense incurred by its maintenance on the Peninsula, the recall of the British army was seriously contemplated by the ministry; and while England, during the past year, had expended nine millions in supporting the cause of Spain and Portugal, the Regent grudged fire-wood for the bivouacs of his allies; and the Conde de Castello Melhor was asking a pecuniary consideration, for the very means employed to preserve his estates from spoliation.

Whatever intentions the British government might have previously entertained of removing their army from the Peninsula, they appear to have been abandoned after the following letter was received at home. As a document, the information it contains renders it exceedingly valuable; and the sound reasoning with which it concludes, must have gone far in confirming such of the British cabinet as might have been hitherto in doubt respecting the policy of keeping the battle at a distance.

"I have received your letter of the 20th February, to which I should not have troubled you with a reply, if I did not conceive that Government have taken an erroneous view of their expenditure and their situation in this country.

* Louzao, 16th March, 1811.

"You tell me that the campaign of 1810, in the Peninsula, has cost nine millions sterling, including the transports, and six millions exclusive of transports, &c.; and you compare the expense of this campaign with that of 1808, which cost 2,778,000*l.*, and with that of 1809, which cost 2,639,000*l.* The very statement of this comparison, without adverting to the error of omitting the transports and stores, &c. sent in kind in 1808 and 1809, points out the error of all calculations of this description.

"The British army in the Peninsula, in 1808, was larger and more expensive than any that has been here since, and attended by an equal fleet of transports; but it began to arrive only in August, and the expense incurred was in the last five months of the year. Many of those expenses, viz. two months' advanced pay to the troops, &c., debts left unpaid in Spain and Portugal, were not paid in the Peninsula, or if paid in the Peninsula, not within the period of the account.

"Now, in order to show a fair comparison between the years 1808 and 1810, the charges of the same troops which were in the Peninsula in the latter end of 1808, for the seven first months of the year, should be added to the 2,778,000*l.*, and I believe it would be found that the amount would not be much less than the six millions, which is the stated amount of the expense of 1810.

"During a great part of 1809 no subsidy was paid to the Portuguese government, and the total amount of the subsidy was not half what has been paid in 1810.

"The British army, also, for more than half the year, did not consist of 20,000 men; but if to the 2,639,000*l.* are to be added the expenses of the troops in America, in Walcheren, &c. &c., which joined the army in Portugal, and swelled the expense here in 1810, it will be found that their expense would not fall far short of six millions sterling.

"In my opinion, government are not aware, and have it not in their power at present to form an opinion, of the exact expense of the war in the Peninsula. The first step

to ascertain it would be to analyse the charge, and then to see what the same army would cost them elsewhere, at home, for instance; for I suppose that if the army should be withdrawn from the Peninsula, it would not be disbanded.

"I conclude that the amount of six millions is made up from the payments at the Treasury on account of the commissary-general, and the payments on account of Mr. Stuart's drafts for the Portuguese government; but if these sums are analysed, there will be found one million in round numbers for the Portuguese subsidy; 200,000*l.* advanced to the Portuguese government, and repaid to the Treasury by the Portuguese ambassador; 300,000*l.* advanced to purchase provisions in Ireland, to be repaid in this year's subsidy; 400,000*l.* advanced to buy provisions in America, for the repayment of which the provisions themselves will provide; making nearly two millions, of which one million either has been or will be repaid this year.

"Then it has cost one million, or 20 per cent. nearly, to find specie for the army.

"Let us now see, generally, what this army would cost in England.

"The advances in Portugal only have been lately 80,000*l.* per mensem: they will now be 100,000*l.* per mensem. If the army was in England, the advances would be nearly double: at all events for the army now in the Peninsula, they would amount to 2,000,000*l.* per annum, without beer money, marching money, barrack allowances, forage for the cavalry, ordnance expenses, hospitals, &c. &c., all of which are covered by the amount of the six millions.

"I request your lordship, then, just to consider what is the real amount of the late expense incurred by your operations in the Peninsula.

"The heavy expense of the army, and one which is peculiar to a British army, is the transports, and to that I have nearly put an end; but I would observe, that of late years the government have seldom been without tonnage in their service for their whole disposable force; and it is not taking

a just view of the subject to say that the army in Portugal, in 1810, cost a large sum in transports, when the same regiments had probably the same transports in their suite in 1808 in Sweden, and in 1809 in America or Walcheren.

"In the sum of three millions stated for transports and stores sent out in kind, I imagine about half would be for transports, the other half for stores. Were no stores sent out to Portugal or Spain in 1808 or 1809? But there is another question upon these stores, which I admit are to be considered as part of the expense of the army, and that is, What is the value of the remains at the present moment? If it be true, as it is, that we have three months' supply for this army of many articles now in store, which were sent from England in 1810, it is not a true calculation to state that the stores consumed in 1810 cost 1,500,000*l.*

"The establishments of the country are certainly enormous and very expensive, let them be used where they may; but I deny that the use of them is more expensive in the Peninsula than elsewhere, or that because six millions have been spent in the Peninsula in 1810, it follows that the whole scale of expense of the empire has been increased to that amount in that year beyond the former years, in any other way, or to any greater amount, than by the expense of the Portuguese subsidy; the expense of having troops in the field abroad, instead of in quarters at home; the expense of procuring specie; and the additional price of some articles of consumption purchased in the Peninsula, which, in all, I do not calculate for the whole Peninsula at more than three millions sterling.

"In respect to the transports, there is another view of the subject, which would show that a stronger army would be a saving of expense. If I had had 10,000 men more in 1810, I would not have kept the transports; and I send them away now, because I think that the events of the campaign have brought the enemy to such a situation that the necessity for an embarkation is very remote. The transports (if not kept in government pay after being sent away from the

Tagus) would cost much more than 10,000 additional troops to this army; and much more than the difference of expense in the employment of 10,000 additional troops here, instead of keeping them at Cadiz, in Sicily, or Gibraltar, or at home.

"My opinion invariably has been, that it was the interest of Great Britain to employ in Portugal the largest army that could be spared from other services; and that no more than 2,000 or 2,500 men ought to have been stationed at Cadiz, which would not have cost a shilling more than their pay. The expense at Cadiz, which I imagine will amount to no trifle, out of the six or nine millions, has been, in my opinion, entirely thrown away, equally with the services of the troops, which would have made a great difference here early in the last summer.

"In respect to offensive or defensive operations here, if they are left to me, I shall carry on either the one or the other, according to the means in my power, compared at the time with those of the enemy, and bearing in mind always your lordship's instructions of the 27th February, 1810, marked A.

"I would recommend to government to increase the force here as much as possible, putting down the establishments elsewhere, and of course decreasing the expense in those parts of the empire from which they draw the troops. By this measure they will put it in the power of the officer here to avail himself of every opportunity, they will be sure of holding this country as long as they please, and they will save the whole expense of transports.

"I shall be sorry if government should think themselves under the necessity of withdrawing from this country on account of the expense of the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of military operations on the Continent, *they*

would incur all risks to land an army in His Majesty's dominions. Then indeed would commence an expensive contest; then would His Majesty's subjects discover what are the miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of the military operations. God forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor in the scene; and I only hope that the King's government will consider well what I have above stated to your lordship; will ascertain, as nearly as is in their power, the actual expense of employing a certain number of men in this country beyond that of employing them at home or elsewhere; and will keep up their force here on such a footing as will at all events secure their possession without keeping the transports, if it does not enable their commander to take advantage of events, and assume the offensive. *

* Letter to Lord Liverpool, Santa Marinha, 23d March, 1811.

CHAPTER XVIII.

SUPERIOR TALENTS OF LORD WELLINGTON—BARBARITIES OF THE FRENCH—DESTRUCTION OF ALCOBAÇA AND BATALHA—LEYRIA DEVASTATED—POMBAL RUINED—CONTINUATION OF MASSENA'S RETREAT—HE IS FORCED FROM THE SIERRA DE MOITA, AND RETIRES ON GUARDA—NEY AND MASSENA QUARREL, AND THE FORMER IS DEPRIVED OF HIS COMMAND—THE FRENCH ARE DRIVEN FROM GUARDA—TAKE A POSITION ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE COA—DESPATCH TO LORD LIVERPOOL—AFFAIR AT SABUGAL—GALLANTRY OF THE LIGHT DIVISION—MASSENA ABANDONS PORTUGAL—MORAL EFFECT OF THE CAMPAIGN—INEFFICIENCY OF CLOSE COLUMNS AGAINST BRITISH TROOPS IN LINE.

THE military skill displayed by the allied general during his advance in pursuit of Massena, proved him to be a master of the art of war. Never had a retreating army a more favourable country for its operations; and never was any permitted to avail itself so little of these advantages. Although every league he crossed offered to the Prince of Essling some position of matchless strength, it was seldom more than occupied, when some beautiful movement of Lord Wellington turned a flank, and caused its immediate abandonment,—science thus effecting without the expenditure of a cartridge, what, with a less intelligent commander, would have required an enormous sacrifice of life.

While these splendid operations of Lord Wellington established his military superiority over him surnamed by Napoleon "l'enfant gâté de la victoire"—the results of his successes were of paramount value in a moral point of view. Coimbra and the Upper Beira were saved; and a great city and valuable district thus escaped the fearful visitation of a relentless enemy, whose ravages had "sent fear before, and left ruin behind their track."

It is a painful task, even at this distant day, to recall to memory the frightful atrocities, which stamped an undying infamy on the retreat of the French army out of Portugal; and the detail of the barbarities they perpetrated, would now be considered too horrible for credence, were they not faithfully established by the evidence of those who were actual eye-witnesses. Colonel Napier relates the following revolting story of human suffering:—

"This day's march disclosed a horrible calamity. A large house, situated in an obscure part of the mountains, was discovered, filled with starving persons. Above thirty women and children had sunk, and, sitting by the bodies, were fifteen or sixteen survivors, of whom one only was a man, but all so enfeebled as to be unable to eat the little food we had to offer them. The youngest had fallen first; all the children were dead; none were emaciated in the bodies, but the muscles of the face were invariably drawn transversely, giving the appearance of laughing, and presenting the most ghastly sight imaginable. The man seemed most eager for life; the women appeared patient and resigned, and, even in this distress, had arranged the bodies of those who first died, with decency and care."

Again, he says:—"Every horror that could make war hideous attended this dreadful march! Distress, conflagrations, death, in all modes! from wounds, from fatigue, from water, from the flames, from starvation! On every side unlimited violence,* unlimited vengeance! I myself saw a peasant hounding on his dog, to devour the dead and dying; and the spirit of cruelty once unchained smote even the brute creation. On the 15th the French general, to diminish the encumbrances of his march, ordered a number

* "The little town of Manteigas was less fortunate. The inhabitants of the adjoining country, confiding in the situation of a place, which was, as they hoped, concealed in the heart of the Sierra de Estrella, had brought their women and children thither, and their most valuable effects; but it was dicovered and in spite of a desperate defence, the town was stormed by a force as superior in numbers as in arms. The officers carried off the handsomest women; the rest were given up to the mercy of men as brutal as their leaders."—*Southey.*

of beasts of burthen to be destroyed; the inhuman fellow, charged with the execution, hamstringed 500 asses and left them to starve, and thus they were found by the British army on that day. The mute but deep expression of pain and grief, visible in these poor creatures' looks, wonderfully roused the fury of the soldiers; and so little weight has reason with the multitude, when opposed by a momentary sensation, that no quarter would have been given to any prisoner at that moment."

The towns of Redinha, Condeixa, and Miranda de Corvo, with all the villages in their line of march, were burnt by the French rear guards. To cover these regressive movements by the smoke of the blazing houses might present a cause, although it could not offer an excuse. But other ravages were apparently committed out of mere wantonness; and, as was the case with respect to Leyria and Alcobaça, the order for their destruction was issued by Massena himself.

"The most venerable structure in Portugal was the convent of Alcobaça. Its foundation was coeval with the monarchy. It had been the burial-place of the kings of Portugal for many generations. The munificence of nobles and princes, the craft of superstition, and the industry and learning of its members in better times, had contributed to fill this splendid pile with treasures of every kind. Its gorgeous vestments, its vessels of plate and gold, and its almost matchless jewelry, excited the admiration of the vulgar; the devotee and the philosopher were equally astonished at the extraordinary articles in its relic-room; the artist and the antiquary beheld with wonder and delight its exquisite monuments of ancient art; and its archives and library were as important to Portuguese literature, as the collections of the Museum or the Bodleian are in our own country. Orders were issued from the French head-quarters to burn this place; that the work of destruction might be complete, it was begun in time, and the mattock and hammer were employed to destroy what the flames

would have spared. The tessellated pavement from the entrance to the high altar was broken up with pickaxes, and the ornaments of the pillars destroyed nearly up to the arches." *

The beautiful edifice of Batalha, although it had never been completed by its founder, Joam I., was one of the finest specimens of gothic architecture in Europe. As the resting-place of one of the most glorious of their monarchs, the place was hallowed in the memories of the Portuguese. But its sacredness found no favour in the sight of the Prince of Essling. Its tombs were desecrated; the remains of royalty rudely torn from their grave; and the body of Joam placed through derision "in a pulpit, in the attitude of one preaching."

But a more horrible picture of the desolation which the cruelties of the French occasioned, is thus given by Dr. Southey. In parts of the narrative there seems to be more of romance than reality; but the account, in its principal details, was confirmed afterwards by the commissioners, to whom the allocation of the money which English benevolence contributed for the sufferers, had been entrusted.

"In the district of Leyria the population was cut down by the barbarities of the enemy, by famine, and by disease, from 48,000 to 16,000; and in the subdivision of Pombal from 7,000 to 1,800. Two hundred families in the town of Pombal derived before the invasion a comfortable subsistence from husbandry; after the retreat a hundred and sixty-four of those families had totally disappeared; and the few survivors of the remaining thirty-six were suffering under famine and disease. In a principal street of that poor town the commissioners found one dismantled dwelling, standing alone in the midst of ruins, and containing three wretched inhabitants. Such was the desolation which this more than barbarous enemy had left behind them, that in what had been the populous and flourishing town of Santarem, the screech owls took possession of a whole street of

* Southey.

ruins, where it seemed as if man had been employed in reducing human edifices to a state which rendered them fit receptacles for birds and beasts of prey. The number of these birds, and the boldness with which the havoc every where about inspired them, made it frightful to pass that way even in the daytime; insomuch, that a soldier who had been promoted for his personal bravery, was known more than once to forego his mess, rather than pass to it through these ruins. Dogs, who were now without owners, preyed upon the dead. Wolves fed on human bodies in the streets of Leyria; and retaining then no longer their fear of man, attacked the living who came in their way. The servant of an English gentleman was pursued one evening by two, in the outskirts of that city; he escaped from them only by climbing a single olive tree, which, happily for him, had been left standing; it was just high enough to afford him security, yet so low that the wolves besieged him in it all night; three or four others joined them in the blockade, and when he was seen and rescued in the morning, the bark, as high as they could reach, had been scored by their repeated endeavours to spring up and seize him.

"There were parts of the country where the people, having no other sustenance, allayed the pain of emptiness without supplying the wants of nature, by eating boiled grass, which they seasoned, such as could, with the brine and scales left in the baskets from which salt fish or sardinhas had been sold, these being at that time the scarce and almost only remaining articles of food."*

Meanwhile the French marshal, after destroying the bridges of Murcella and Pombeira, took a position on the Sierra de Moita, and despatched his second corps up the banks of the Alva, while marauding parties were sent out in every direction to obtain supplies. Lord Wellington, however, speedily disturbed his plans, obliging Massena to recall Reynier; and while he concentrated his whole corps on the Sierra, the English general threw a bridge over the

* Southey.

Alva, passed the light division between Porte Muncella and Pombeira, and occupied Arganil with his right wing. These movements caused immediate alarm, and obliged the Prince of Essling to decamp. Guarda was now his object; and, hurrying to Celerico with rapid strides, he was forced to secure the defiles, by lightening his march not only at the expense of a quantity of baggage and ammunition, but by the abandonment of his more distant foragers, of whom fully eight hundred were afterwards taken prisoners.

Wellington had concentrated his divisions at the Sierra de Moita on the 19th, but he was obliged to halt the columns until his supplies came up from the Mondego; and, with the exception of the cavalry and light troops continuing the pursuit, the French were undisturbed until they reached Guarda.*

It is certain that Massena had determined to hold by Portugal to the last; and after depositing his hospitals and heavy baggage in Almeida, countermarch by Sabugal to the Elga, and thus place himself in direct communication with Joseph Buonaparte and Soult. How far that plan might have succeeded can be now only a matter of conjecture; for the insubordination of his generals had arisen to a height that rendered any unity of operation an impossibility. All were at variance with each other; and all, stranger still, on the worst terms with the Prince of Essling himself. An open rupture occurred at Miranda de Corvo between Ney and Massena; and at Celerico, the former absolutely refused to obey the orders of his superior, and in place of marching towards Coria, fell back upon

* "Guarda stands upon a plain of the Sierra de Estrella (the *Mons Herminius* of the Romans) near the sources of the Zezere and the Mondego, and near the highest part of that lofty range. Its site is said to be higher than that of any other city in Europe; the ascent to it continues nearly four miles, by a road wide enough for two carts abreast, winding in numberless sinuations along the edge of a deep precipice, the sides of which are overspread with trees. The city indeed owes its origin to this commanding situation, having grown round a watch tower (called in those days *guarda*) which Sancho the First erected there in the first age of the monarchy."—*Southey.*

Almeida. For this breach of discipline Ney was deprived of his command, and the sixth corps given to Loison, a personal favourite of the commander-in-chief.

Foiled in the design of establishing himself upon the Elga, Massena determined to hold Guarda for a time, a measure which the success of Julian Sanchez, in intercepting the supplies intended for the French garrisons in Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, rendered particularly desirable. The apparent, rather than the real strength of this city, had once conferred upon it a military reputation—and General Dumouriez had termed it "the key of Portugal." From this fine position, however, Massena was speedily dislodged by one of those masterly combinations, to which Lord Wellington was indebted for much of his success.

On the 28th, the French were driven from Frexadas; the third division secured the upper bridges of the Mondego; while the Portuguese ordenanza, under Trant and Miller, occupied the banks of the Pinhal, and cut off all communication with Almeida. "Early on the 29th, the third, sixth, and light divisions, and two regiments of light cavalry, disposed in five columns of attack on a half-circle round the foot of the Guarda mountain, ascended by as many paths, all leading upon the town of Guarda, and outflanking both the right and left of the enemy; they were supported on one wing by the militia, on the other by the fifth division, and in the centre by the first and seventh divisions."*

The imposing steadiness which marked the advance of the allied troops, effected Lord Wellington's object without a contest. Massena hastily retired from his position†—and had the British cavalry turned the confusion to advantage, which the beautiful movements of the infantry had created, Reynier must have been destroyed. Slade's pur-

* Napier.

† "Their retreat was so rapid that they had not time to execute the mischief which they intended; our troops entered in time to save the cathedral, the door of which was on fire: the wood of its fine organ had been taken by the enemy for fuel, and the pipes for bullets."—*Southey.*

suit was feeble and inefficient; and the second corps saved itself with a loss of three hundred men.

Massena took a new position on the right bank of the Coa, from which Lord Wellington determined that he should be driven. The operations which resulted were thus detailed in a despatch to Lord Liverpool from Villa Fermosa, and dated 9th April, 1811 :—

"When I last addressed your lordship the enemy occupied the Upper Coa, having his right at Rovina, and guarding the post of Rapoula de Coa with a detachment at the bridge of Ferrerias,* and his left at Sabugal, and the 8th corps was at Alfayates.

" The right of the British army was opposite Sabugal, and the left at the bridge of Ferrerias. The militia, under General Trant and Colonel Wilson, crossed the Coa below Almeida, in order to threaten the communication of that place with Ciudad Rodrigo and the enemy's army.

"The river Coa is difficult of access throughout its course;† and the position which the enemy had taken was very strong, and could be approached only by its left. The troops were therefore put in motion on the morning of the 3d, to turn the enemy's left above Sabugal, and to force the passage of the bridge and town; with the exception of the 6th division, which remained opposite the 6th corps, which was at Rovina, and one battalion of the 7th division, which observed the enemy's detachment at the bridge of Ferrerias.

" The 2d corps were in a strong position with their right upon a height immediately above the bridge and town of

* Below the bridge of Sequeiros.

† "The whole of its course is through one of the most picturesque countries in Europe, and it is everywhere difficult of access. Sabugal stands on the right bank. This town was founded about the year 1220, by Alonso X. of Leon, who named it from the number of elder-trees (*sabugos*) growing about it: the place is now remarkable for some of the largest chestnut-trees that are anywhere to be seen. It was afterwards annexed to the Portuguese dominions, and its old castle still remains a monument of King Diniz, whose magnificent works are found over the whole kingdom."

Sabugal, and their left extending along the road to Alfayates, to a height which commanded all the approaches to Sabugal from the fords of the Coa above the town. The second corps communicated by Rendo with the 6th corps at Rovina. It was intended to turn the left of this corps; and with this view the light division and the cavalry, under Major-General Sir William Erskine, and Major-General Slade, were to cross the Coa by two separate fords upon the right, the cavalry upon the right of the light division; the third division, under Major-General Picton, at a ford on their left, about a mile above Sabugal; and the fifth division, under Major-General Dunlop, and the artillery, at the bridge of Sabugal.

"Colonel Beckwith's brigade of the light division was the first that crossed the Coa, with two squadrons of cavalry upon their right. Four companies of the 95th, and three companies of Colonel Elder's caçadores, drove in the enemy's piquets, and were supported by the 43d regiment.

"At this moment a rain storm came on, which rendered it impossible to see any thing; and these troops having pushed on in pursuit of the enemy's piquets, came upon the left of their main body, which it had been intended they should turn. The light troops were driven back upon the 43d regiment; and as soon as the atmosphere became clear, the enemy, having perceived that the body which had advanced were not strong, attacked them in a solid column, supported by cavalry and artillery. These troops repulsed this attack, and advanced in pursuit upon the enemy's position, where they were attacked by a fresh column on the left, and were charged by the hussars on their right. They retired, and took post behind a wall, from which post they again repulsed the enemy, and advanced a second time in pursuit of them, and took from them a howitzer. They were however again attacked by a fresh column, with cavalry, and retired again to their post, where they were joined by the other brigade of the light division, consisting of the two battalions of the 52d, and the 1st caçadores. These

troops repulsed the enemy; and Colonel Beckwith's brigade and the 1st battalion of the 52d again advanced upon them. They were attacked again by a fresh column, supported by cavalry, which charged their right, and they took post in an enclosure upon the top of a height, from whence they could protect the howitzer which the 43d had taken; and they drove back the enemy.

"The enemy were making arrangements to attack them again in this post, and had moved a column on their left, when the light infantry of Major-General Picton's division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, supported by Major-General the Hon. C. Colville's brigade, opened their fire upon them.

"At the same moment the head of Major-General Dunlop's column crossed the bridge of the Coa, and ascended the heights on the right flank of the enemy, and the cavalry appeared on the high ground in rear of the enemy's left: the enemy then retired across the hills towards Rendo, leaving the howitzer in the possession of those who had so gallantly gained and preserved it, and about 200 killed on the ground, 6 officers, and 300 prisoners in our hands.

"Although the operations of this day were, by unavoidable accidents, not performed in the manner in which I intended they should be, I consider the action that was fought by the light division, by Colonel Beckwith's brigade principally, with the whole of the second corps, to be one of the most glorious that British troops were ever engaged in.

"The 43d regiment, under Major Patrickson, particularly distinguished themselves; as did that part of the 95th regiment, in Colonel Beckwith's brigade, under the command of Major Gilmour, and Colonel Elder's caçadores. The first battalion of the 52d regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, likewise showed great steadiness and gallantry when they joined Colonel Beckwith's brigade.

"Throughout the action the troops received great advantage from the assistance of two guns of Captain Bull's troop

of horse artillery, which crossed at the ford with the light division, and came up to their support.

"It was impossible for any officer to conduct himself with more ability and gallantry than Colonel Beckwith.

"The action was commenced by an unavoidable accident, to which all operations are liable; but having been commenced, it would have been impossible to withdraw from the ground without risking the loss of the object of our movements; and it was desirable to obtain possession, if possible, of the top of the hill, from which the enemy had made so many attacks with advantage on the first position taken by the 43d regiment. This was gained before the third division came up.

"I had also great reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Colonel Drummond, who commands the other brigade in the light division.

"When the firing commenced, the 6th corps broke up from their position at Rovina, and marched towards Rendo. The two corps joined at that place, and continued their retreat to Alfayates, followed by our cavalry, part of which was that night at Soito.

"The enemy continued their retreat that night and the next morning, and entered the Spanish frontier on the 4th. They have since continued their retreat; and yesterday the last of them crossed the Agueda.

"I have the honour to enclose the returns of killed and wounded from the 18th March. I am concerned to have to report that Lieut.-Colonel Waters was taken prisoner on the 3d, before the action commenced.* He had crossed the

* Colonel Waters was a man who united great intelligence with singular intrepidity, and many of his adventures were romantic in the extreme. When captured, he declined to give his parole; and from a friendly Spaniard at Ciudad Rodrigo, obtained a pair of spurs with sharpened rowels. On the journey to Salamanca, ascertaining that the chief of the *gens d'armes* was the best mounted of the party, when the man had occasion to alight and alter the position of his saddle, Waters dashed the rowels in his own horse, and left his escort with scanty ceremony. Although the plain behind him was for miles crowded with French regiments on the march, of whom many fired at him as he passed, while more cheered the bold adventurer, he distanced his pursuers,

Coa to reconnoitre the enemy's position, as had been frequently his practice, without having with him any escort; and he was surrounded by some hussars, and taken. He had rendered very important services upon many occasions in the last two years, and his loss is sensibly felt.

" I sent six squadrons of cavalry, under Sir William Erskine, on the 7th, towards Almeida, to reconnoitre that place, and drive in any parties which might be in that neighbourhood, and to cut off the communication between the garrison and the army. He found a division of the 9th corps at Junça, which he drove before him across the Turon and Dos Casas; and he took from them many prisoners. Captain Bull's troop of horse artillery did great execution upon this occasion. The enemy withdrew in the night across the Agueda.

" The allied army have taken up the position upon the Dos Casas which Brig.-General Craufurd occupied with his advanced guard in the latter part of the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, having our advanced posts at Gallegos and upon the Agueda. The militia are at Cinco Villas and Malpartida.

" The enemy have no communication with the garrison of Almeida, from whence they have lately withdrawn the heavy artillery employed in the summer in the siege of that place.

" My last report from Cadiz is dated the 13th of March.

" I have not heard from Sir William Beresford since the 1st instant. At that time he hoped to be able to blockade Badajoz on the 3d.

" I learn by letters of the 3d March, received this day from the south of Portugal, that after General Zayas had landed his corps at Huelva and Moguer, the Prince d'Aremberg moved upon Moguer from Seville, with 3,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, upon which the Spanish troops embarked

gained a thick wood, and on the third day rejoined Lord Wellington at head quarters, who was so thoroughly convinced he would escape, that he had carried the Colonel's baggage with his own, observing, " that Waters would not remain long an encumbrance upon Reynier."

again. It is stated that the cavalry had lost some of their equipments.

"I have no accounts of a late date from the north of Spain."*

Had not the British light troops already signalized themselves during the retreat, the conduct of these splendid battalions at Sabugal alone, was sufficient to immortalize the division. Hurried prematurely into action through the rashness of their commanding officer—embarrassed by mist and rain, which prevented them from perceiving danger, until the skirmishers and 43d were involved in a contest with the whole of Reynier's corps, and that, too, when not a division of the English army had reached its appointed battle-ground—in this desperate situation, the beautiful discipline and chivalrous courage of these gallant soldiers kept the multitude of their assailants in check, until the 52d arrived to their assistance. A brilliant charge cleared the heights; the French were forced back, and a howitzer was captured. The advance of the light regiments, however, was arrested by the enemy's cavalry — and the skirmishers quickly driven back upon the battalion companies of the 43d, which had sheltered themselves behind a

* Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Lieut.-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B., in the several affairs with the French army from the 16th of March to the 7th of April, 1811, inclusive.

Head Quarters, Villar Mayor, 8th April, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	3	1	16	8	20
Wounded	11	8	128	11	147
Missing	1	--	4	1	5
Total	15	9	148	20	172

stone enclosure. The French horsemen swarmed in squadrons over the hill; and some, more daring than the rest, surmounted the assent, and, "with incredible desperation, riding up to the wall, were in the act of firing over it with their pistols, when a rolling volley laid nearly the whole of them lifeless on the ground. By this time, however, a second and stronger column of infantry had rushed up the face of the hill, endeavouring to break in and retake the howitzer, which was on the edge of the descent and only fifty yards from the wall; but no man could reach it and live, so deadly was the 43d's fire."*

To the gallantry of the troops Lord Wellington bore ample testimony; and not only in his official details, but also in his private correspondence, he alludes with manifest satisfaction to the noble conduct of his light troops.

"We have given," he says, "the French a handsome dressing, and I think they will not say again that we are not a manœuvring army. We may not manœuvre so beautifully as they do; but I do not desire better sport than to meet one of their columns *en masse* with our lines. The poor 2d corps received a terrible beating from the 43d and 52d on the 3d."†

After his defeat, Reynier fell back on Rendo. The French loss was exceedingly heavy—as the minimum has been laid at 1,000, while others raise it to one-half more. This trial of strength seemed to have decided Massena upon abandoning Portugal altogether. On the 4th his march was rapidly directed on Ciudad Rodrigo; and on the 5th the French rear guard crossed the frontier, and left the land they had invaded without an enemy!

The discomfiture of the army of Portugal was in every way decisive; and Massena's campaign conveyed two useful lessons. Regarding the qualities of the British army, the continental belief was very general, that with much active courage and matchless endurance, they had neither talents

* Napier. † Letter to Capt. Chapman, R. E., 8th April, 1811.

for manœuvring, nor, had they possessed them, were their generals sufficient tacticians to turn them to account. This error, by Lord Wellington's recent operations, was removed. When he acted on the defensive, at every place where he awaited an attack, his positions were so ably chosen, that the French were always obliged to fight at disadvantage. When it was his interest to advance, half the objects at which he aimed were effected by previous combinations, and sometimes without losing a man. Another military delusion was exposed by the events of this campaign, namely, the irresistible effect of the French attack *en masse*. A quarter of a century had established this opinion; and the revolutionary victories acquired by movements in heavy columns, had been confirmed by the overthrow of those European powers with whom Napoleon had been more recently engaged. No wonder, therefore, that against the unpractised soldiery of Britain, they had been employed in the fullest assurance of success. But with English battalions opposed to it, the *colonne serrée* proved unavailing; and against the steady array of even a two-rank line, these perpendicular attacks of Massena ended invariably in discomfiture.

The head of a column, no matter how steadily it advances, must soon be shattered by the converging fire of the enemy who receives it in line. To be effectively employed, a close column should, wedge-like, drive itself through the obstacles opposed, reserving its fire until it gained the flank or central intersection it was launched against, and when it had consequently sufficient space to deploy. Anything short of breaking a line, or forcing itself between the intermitted spaces of a formation, must be considered as a failure in the attack. To the fire of an enemy in line, a column cannot presume to reply—a front of thirty muskets will be overwhelmed by the fire of three hundred; and with every shot radiating from its head to its centre, of necessity the leading files of the column are shot down, and the movement of the mass arrested.

"The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns which, blinded by smoke, unstedfast of footing, and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion: no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm, and even victorious at the moment when the rear is flying in terror."*

Notwithstanding these evident disadvantages, to this their favourite method of attack the French adhered tenaciously to the last moment of the war, although the trial of heavy columns against lines was repeatedly made, and always proved unsuccessful. It is an interesting coincidence, that the regiment† which, with the others of its division, proved the inefficiency of the *colonne serrée* at Sabugal, by the bloody repulses it inflicted upon Massena's 2d corps, confirmed it at Waterloo by the annihilation of a division of Napoleon's reserve; and thus produced, as has been asserted, the crisis of that battle, which immortalized the name of Wellington, and achieved the deliverance of Europe!

* Napier. † The 52d.

CHAPTER XIX.

IMMENSE LOSSES SUSTAINED BY MASSENA—HE RETIRES TO SALAMANCA—ALMEIDA INVESTED—AFFAIR OF CAMPO MAYOR—LORD WELLINGTON'S PROCLAMATION TO THE PORTUGUESE—APATHY OF THE REGENCY—LETTER TO MR. STUART—OPERATIONS OF MARSHAL BERESFORD—HE CROSSES THE GUADIANA—LOSS OF A SQUADRON OF THE BRITISH LIGHT DRAGOONS—THE FRENCH RETIRE FROM ESTREMADURA—LORD WELLINGTON ARRIVES AT ELVAS—RECONNAISSANCE OF BADAJOZ—ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH THE SPANISH GENERALS—LORD WELLINGTON RETURNS TO THE AGUEDA—HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO MARSHAL BERESFORD—MASSENA IS REINFORCED AND ADVANCES TO RELIEVE ALMEIDA—AND WELLINGTON DETERMINES TO PREVENT IT—POSITION TAKEN BY THE ALLIED GENERAL.

WHEN Massena reached the Agueda, his army did not exceed 35,000 effective men. He invaded Portugal with 65,000—at Santarem, Count d'Erlon joined him with 10,000 more; and 9,000 reinforced him during his retreat; consequently, the losses sustained during the campaign amounted in round numbers to 40,000 men, of whom at least two-thirds were veteran soldiers.*

Although the junction of convalescents and detachments in a few days increased the strength of his *corps d'armée* to 40,000 troops of all arms, Massena did not consider himself in a state that warranted him in recommencing active operations. His troops required a season for repose, —they had been not only numerically, but physically reduced,—their energies exhausted by fatigue, and their spirit broken by a constant succession of defeats. These considerations determined the Prince of Essling to avoid

* "The army of Portugal, grievously weakened by the losses of its long and disastrous retreat, could hardly, on re-entering Spain, muster 35,000 combatants. The cavalry had only 2,000 men in a condition to march; the artillery could only muster up twelve pieces."—*Belmas' Journal du Sièges.*

hostilities for the present, and accordingly, he retired to Salamanca. In consequence of this movement of the French Marshal, Lord Wellington, cantoning his army between the Coa and Agueda, invested Almeida—while Beresford, with a corps increased by the fourth division and a brigade of heavy cavalry to 22,000 men, was detached to relieve Campo Mayor, and commence the siege of Badajoz.

The former place surrendered on the 21st, when Beresford had reached Chamusca, and his advanced guards were only two marches distant from the fortress. The very gallant defence made by a Portuguese officer, named Tallia, who, with a garrison of not two hundred men, five guns mounted on his works, and the sap pushed forward to the crest of the glacis, resisted with an open breach, and repulsing one assault, surrendered on most honourable terms, and that only when the enemy were forming their storming parties for a second effort, formed a noble contrast to the base treachery of the worthless Governor of Badajoz; and it was a subject of regret to all, that one who defended a weak fortress so bravely, could not have held out a little longer, and received the succour he so well deserved.

Although apprized of the fall of Campo Mayor, Marshal Beresford thought that he might surprise the besiegers; and with this intention he marched rapidly towards the place; and on the morning of the 25th the British advanced guard found itself in presence of the enemy. The French, commanded by Latour Maubourg, were filing out of Campo Mayor in some confusion, their force comprising three battalions of infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, a troop of horse artillery, and the siege train of thirteen heavy guns. Instant orders were issued for an attack. "Colborne marched with the infantry on the right—Head, with the 13th light dragoons and two squadrons of Portuguese on the left—and the heavy cavalry formed a reserve. Perceiving that their battering train was endangered, the French cavalry, as the ground over which they were retiring was favourable

for the movement, charged the 13th. But they were vigorously repulsed; and, failing in breaking the British, the whole, consisting of four regiments, drew up in front, forming an imposing line. The 13th instantly formed and galloped forward—and nothing could have been more splendid than their charge. They rode fairly through the French, overtook and cut down many of the gunners, and at last entirely headed the line of march, keeping up a fierce and straggling encounter with the broken horsemen of the enemy, until some of the English dragoons actually reached the gates of Badajoz, where many of them were captured."*

But from the disorderly manner with which the pursuit was carried on, the more solid advantages were lost, which a steadier and more systematic attack might have probably secured. A considerable loss was also a consequence of this rash and ill-directed gallantry; for, besides seventy prisoners, the allies had one hundred men killed or wounded; the French losing thrice that number, and a howitzer. The affair of Campo Mayor gave serious displeasure to Lord Wellington; and the light cavalry were in consequence reprimanded: † but all bore testimony to their

* Victories of the British Armies.

† "I wish you would call together the officers of the dragoons, and point out to them the mischiefs which must result from the disorder of the troops in action. The undisciplined ardour of the 13th dragoons, and 1st regiment of Portuguese cavalry, is not of the description of the determined bravery and steadiness of soldiers confident in their discipline and in their officers. Their conduct was that of a rabble, galloping as fast as their horses could carry them over a plain, after an enemy to whom they could do no mischief when they were broken, and the pursuit had continued for a limited distance; and sacrificing substantial advantages, and all the objects of your operation, by their want of discipline. To this description of their conduct I add my entire conviction, that if the enemy could have thrown out of Badajoz only one hundred men regularly formed, they would have driven back these two regiments in equal haste and disorder, and would probably have taken many whose horses would have been knocked up. If the 13th dragoons are again guilty of this conduct I shall take their horses from them, and send the officers and men to do duty at Lisbon."—*Dated* "*Celerico, 30th March,* 1811."

valour, "and the unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them."*

"In this affair, there were many opportunities for the display of individual courage and dexterity. Colonel Chamorin, of the 26th French dragoons, was encountered by a corporal of the 13th, whose comrade he had just before shot through the head: each was a master of his horse and weapon; but at length the corporal, striking off the helmet of his enemy with one blow, cleft his head down to the ears with another."†

The great object was now effected on which the Portuguese government had attached so much importance, and based so many of their complaints. Their country was no longer the seat of war; and no Frenchman, save a prisoner, was left within the frontier of the kingdom. Lord Wellington seized this as a fit occasion to enforce upon the Portuguese people the necessity of national exertion; and on the 10th of April he issued the annexed

"PROCLAMATION.

"The Portuguese nation are informed, that the cruel enemy who had invaded Portugal, and had devastated their country, have been obliged to evacuate it, after suffering great losses, and have retired across the Agueda. The inhabitants of the country are therefore at liberty to return to their occupations.

"The Marshal General refers them to the Proclamation which he addressed to them in August last, a copy of which will accompany this Proclamation.

"The Portuguese nation now know by experience that the Marshal General was not mistaken either in the

* "It was a subject of regret that this dashing exploit of the light cavalry did not receive the support it merited: had the heavy dragoons been vigorously pushed forward, the detachment and their guns must have been necessarily cut off."—*Victories of the British Armies.*

† Southey.

nature or the amount of the evil with which they were threatened, or respecting the only remedies to avoid it, viz. decided and determined resistance, or removal and the concealment of all property, and every thing which could tend to the subsistence of the enemy, or to facilitate his progress.

"Nearly four years have now elapsed since the tyrant of Europe invaded Portugal with a powerful army. The cause of this invasion was not self-defence; it was not to seek revenge for insults offered or injuries done by the benevolent sovereign of this kingdom; it was not even the ambitious desire of augmenting his own political power, as the Portuguese government had, without resistance, yielded to all the demands of the tyrant; but the object was the insatiable desire of plunder, the wish to disturb the tranquillity, and to enjoy the riches of a people who had passed nearly half a century in peace.

"The same desire occasioned the invasion of the northern provinces of Portugal in 1809, and the same want of plunder the invasion of 1810, now happily defeated; and the Marshal General appeals to the experience of those who have been witnesses of the conduct of the French army during these three invasions, whether confiscation, plunder, and outrage, are not the sole objects of their attention, from the general down to the soldier.

"Those countries which have submitted to the tyranny have not been better treated than those which have resisted. The inhabitants have lost all their possessions, their families have been dishonoured, their laws overturned, their religion destroyed, and, above all, they have deprived themselves of the honour of that manly resistance to the oppressor, of which the people of Portugal have given so signal and so successful an example.

"The Marshal General, however, considers it his duty, in announcing the intelligence of the result of the last invasion, to warn the people of Portugal, that, although the danger is removed, it is not entirely gone by. They have

something to lose, and the tyrant will endeavour to plunder them; they are happy under the mild government of a beneficent sovereign, and he will endeavour to destroy their happiness; they have successfully resisted him, and he will endeavour to force them to submit to his iron yoke. They should be unremitting in their preparations for decided and steady resistance; those capable of bearing arms should learn the use of them; or those whose age or sex renders them unfit to bear arms, should fix upon places of security and concealment, and should make all the arrangements for their easy removal to them when the moment of danger shall approach. Valuable property, which tempts the avarice of the tyrant and his followers, and is the great object of their invasion, should be carefully buried beforehand, each individual concealing his own, and thus not trusting to the weakness of others to keep a secret in which they may not be interested.

"Measures should be taken to conceal or destroy provisions which cannot be removed, and everything which can tend to facilitate the enemy's progress; for this may be depended upon, that the enemy's troops seize upon everything, and leave nothing for the owner.

"By these measures, whatever may be the superiority of numbers with which the desire of plunder and of revenge may induce, and his power may enable, the tyrant again to invade this country, the result will be certain; and the independence of Portugal, and the happiness of its inhabitants, will be finally established to their eternal honour."

The conduct of the regency in the administration of public affairs had undergone no favourable change. The same apathy—the same indifference to coming events, was observable in every department. With a grand and extended plan of operations in contemplation, the allied general found his Portuguese resources every day becoming fewer and less efficient. The militia had been already

disbanded; the regular army awfully reduced;* and the government, when apprized of the diminution in their regiments, received Lord Wellington's remonstrances with impatience; or, as more frequently occurred, with total disregard. Measures had been frequently and emphatically recommended for their adoption; but, with the existence of monarchy at stake, the retention of mob popularity seemed to influence the regency far more than the salvation of the country. Lord Wellington had frequent cause to complain of their indifference during the past year; and it would appear never with greater reason, than at this period of the war. In writing to Mr. Stuart, the following forcible observations occur in speaking of the regency:—

"They have recently adopted some of the measures recommended to them to provide an increase of revenue; but I would beg to know why those measures were not adopted in November, 1809, when I apprized them of the approaching crisis, and recommended to them to provide for their finances. Why were they not adopted when ordered by his royal highness the Prince Regent? Why not adopted when repeatedly recommended by yourself and by me?

"If they had been so adopted, the world would have been convinced that Portugal was straining every nerve in the contest; and the assistance of Great Britain would have been given with increased alacrity to a country whose

* "I beg you to mention to Dom Miguel Forjaz, that of a gross force which ought to be 18,572 infantry, which are with this part of the army, there are only 11,586 under arms, and 5,800 sick; that is to say, not two-thirds of the numbers doing duty, and nearly one-third of the numbers sick.

"Only conceive the expense of every man produced in the field for service!

* * * * *

"P. S. However, since writing the other side, I have heard that Colonel Ashworth's brigade of Portuguese infantry are as badly off as General Pack's; they have nothing to eat, and have sent here for it, having before sent to Coimbra and Figueira, where they found nothing!! So much for rice, *bacalao*, and sardinias!—W."—*Wellington Despatches.*

government was making wise arrangements and great exertions in its own cause.

* * * * *

"I recommend to them to advert seriously to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity, however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in a state of efficiency for long and arduous services. The resources which a wise government must find for these objects must be drawn from the people, not by measures which will render those popular who undertake to govern a country in critical circumstances, but by measures which must for a moment have the contrary effect.

"The enthusiasm of the people in favour of any individual never saved any country. They must be obliged, by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things, and to pay those contributions, which are to enable the government to carry on this necessary contest."

Having obtained possession of Campo Mayor, Marshal Beresford cantoned his troops in Elvas and the villages in its vicinity. The army required rest,—their recent duties had been severe,—and the fourth division in particular, had suffered much from fatigue, a scarcity of shoes having obliged them to march barefooted. At Elvas the marshal had been assured by the Portuguese authorities that he should find the necessary *matériel* for throwing a bridge across the Guadiana—a preliminary step towards the investment of Badajoz. But the amount of the means for effecting this work was found to be miserably insufficient. Instead of twenty large boats, which it was alleged had been brought from Badajoz before the siege, but five were found; and the pontoons sent up from Lisbon were so small, that they neither were calculated to withstand the rapidity of the current, nor bear the weight of artillery. By this delay, General Philippon, the Governor of Badajoz, was enabled to restore the defences and fill in the trenches; while Latour

Maubourg, who had succeeded Mortier in the command, with his accustomed activity spread his foragers over the country in all directions, and thus obtained a sufficiency of provisions to enable the fortress to withstand a siege.

"Captain Squires, of the engineers, however, undertook to bridge the Guadiana under Jerumenha, by fixing trestle-piers on each side in the shallows, and connecting them with the five Spanish boats; wherefore, a squadron of cavalry was secretly passed over by a ford, to protect the workmen from surprise. The 3d of April, the bridge being finished, the troops assembled during the night in the woods near Jerumenha, being to cross at daylight; but the river suddenly swelling, swept away the trestles, rendered the ford impassable, and stopped the operations. No more materials could be immediately procured, and the Spanish boats were converted into flying bridges for the cavalry and artillery, while Squires constructed a slight narrow bridge for infantry with the pontoons and with casks taken from the neighbouring villages. To cover this operation a battalion was added to the squadron already on the left bank, and the army commenced passing the 5th of April; but it was late in the night of the 6th, ere the whole had crossed and taken up their position, which was on a strong range of hills, covered by a swampy rivulet."*

"It is hard to reconcile with the usual energy of Latour Maubourg, the singular indifference he showed to the crossing of the Guadiana by the allies. It was not until the 7th that he advanced with a corps of 3,000 infantry and 500 dragoons; and though too late to interrupt the passage of the river, he unfortunately succeeded in carrying off a squadron of the 13th light dragoons. Under cover of the darkness, the enemy had eluded the vigilance of the Portuguese videttes, and the surprise was complete. They had even reached the village undiscovered, where head quarters were established; but being fired upon by a sergeant's

* Napier.

guard, they rode off rapidly without effecting anything beyond a momentary alarm.

Marshal Beresford, leaving the 4th division to reduce Olivenca, which surrendered on the 15th, advanced to Zafra with the remainder of his army. His object was to oblige Latour Maubourg to retire from Estremadura, and thus secure his operations against Badajoz from the interruption which the vicinity of a French corps might be expected to occasion. During this movement, a cavalry affair highly creditable to the English dragoons, occurred. Two French regiments—the 2d and 10th hussars, advancing on a marauding expedition towards Llerena, had reached Usagre, where they were encountered by the British cavalry. The 13th light dragoons charged them most gallantly, broke and pursued them for six miles, and killed, wounded, or made prisoners fully 300 men. The affair was very brilliant; and it was, in a military point of view, most valuable, for on the British side not a man was lost.

On the 16th, Marshal Beresford was rejoined by the 4th division from Olivenca; and the concentration of the allied army at Zafra was followed by the retreat of Latour Maubourg, who retired to Guadalcanal on the 18th, leaving Estremadura and its resources at the disposal of his opponent. At this time a brigade of German light infantry reached Olivenca from Lisbon—and on the 21st, Lord Wellington himself arrived at Elvas from the north, and there Marshal Beresford joined him.

On the following day, a formal *reconnaissance* was made on Badajoz. With the Germans and cavalry division of Madden, Lord Wellington forded the Guadiana, and approached close to the fortress. The accidental arrival of a convoy, under protection of infantry, and cavalry, induced the escort of Lord Wellington to attempt to cut it off, and obliged Philippon to make a sortie to protect its entrance. A smart affair ensued that caused the allies the loss of 100 men, and enabled the convoy to reach its destination.

Every thing led Lord Wellington to conclude, that Soult

would not permit Badajoz to fall, without making a vigorous effort to save it. Hence, before the place was invested, it was indispensable to secure the cooperation of the Spanish armies, and combine their operations with those of Beresford. In consequence, the allied general proposed that Blake should move from Ayamonte, and take post at Xeres de los Cavalleros; Ballasteros occupy Barquillo on his left; while the cavalry of the fifth army stationed at Llerena, should observe the road of Guadalcanal, and communicate through Zafra, by the right, with Ballasteros, and thus watch the passes of the Morena. Castaños was required to furnish three battalions for the siege, keeping the rest of the corps at Merida, to support the Spanish cavalry. It was further stipulated, that the British army should be in second line, and, in the event of a battle, Albuera, centrically situated with respect to the roads leading from Andalusia to Badajoz, should be the point of concentration for all the allied forces.

Meanwhile, as if the former delinquencies of both governments had not been sufficiently embarrassing, the excesses of Mendizabal in Portugal, on one side, and the ill-advised design of the Regency to reclaim the possession of Olivenca from the Spaniards on the other, had done all but produce a rupture between both kingdoms. Fortunately, by British agency this ruinous calamity was averted; but it delayed the replies of both Castaños and Blake, respecting the proposed operations against Badajoz. While waiting their decision, intelligence arrived that Massena was about to take the field. Napoleon's orders to that effect were imperative; and Wellington hurried back to the Agueda, leaving with his Lieutenant the following instructions, by which he was in every case to be directed.

"*Elvas, 23d April*, 1811.

"Marshal Beresford will receive with this memorandum the copy of one drawn for his use, and that of the chief engineer, and commanding officer of artillery.

"During the siege of Badajoz his object will be to place his troops in such situations as that they will be best able to carry on the operations, and to join, in case the enemy should attempt to relieve the place.

"If the enemy should make the attempt, Marshal Beresford will consider of, and decide upon, the chance of success, according to a view of the relative numbers of both armies, and making a reasonable allowance for the number of Spanish troops which shall cooperate with him in any attack which the enemy may make upon him. If he should think the enemy too strong for him, with the assistance which he will know that he will have from the Spanish troops, he will retire across the Guadiana, and thence, if necessary, towards Portalegre, taking the position of the Caya and Portalegre, successively.

"If Sir William Beresford should think his strength sufficient to fight a general action, to save the siege of Badajoz, he will collect his troops to fight it.

"I believe that, upon the whole, the most central and advantageous place to collect his troops will be at Albuera. If the enemy should attempt to turn his left, in order to march upon Badajoz by Talavera, he has his choice between attacking them in that operation, or marching by his own left, along the Talavera rivulet. If they attempt to turn his right, he has the same choice, or to march by his right upon Valverde, and place his right upon the Valverde rivulet.

"All this must of course be left to the decision of Sir William Beresford. I authorize him to fight the action if he should think proper, or to retire if he should not.

"If the enemy should advance, different measures must be adopted in respect to the operations of the siege, according to the state in which they will be when the enemy shall make the attempt to relieve the place, and according to Sir William Beresford's intentions of fighting the battle, or not."

It was a subject of general surprise how quickly the French army restored its organization during its brief rest at Salamanca; and nothing could have proved more forcibly what immense advantages in warfare are derived from military experience. As the orders of the Emperor were so peremptory, every facility had certainly been given to his lieutenant that could enable him to carry them into effect. Bessieres reinforced the Prince of Essling with 1,000 cavalry, and a battery of guns from the imperial guard—troops were drafted for a similar purpose from Leon and Castile; while Joseph Buonaparte's visit to Paris rendered disposable a large proportion of the corps hitherto retained at Madrid for the personal protection of the king, and these, also, were promptly moved forward to the Agueda. Massena's *corps d'armée* was thus increased to 46,000 effective men, of whom 5,000 were cavalry—and with this imposing force he immediately broke up from the Tormes, announcing, in a general order to "the army of Portugal," that the relief of Almeida was the first object to be achieved.

It was a manifesto, however, far better calculated to bring to memory their late disasters, than give any reasonable assurance of an approaching victory. To describe a country from which they had been so recently and ingloriously expelled, as "a scene of triumphs," and even to name "the lines of Lisbon," was to recall a period of want and misery, sickness and privations, all sustained without a single advantage, and terminated by a ruinous retreat.

When Lord Wellington arrived at Villa Fermosa on the 28th of April, he found that the French army were concentrating fast at Ciudad Rodrigo, where Massena had been stationary since the 25th. The object of the Marshal was no secret; and his superiority in point of strength had been clearly ascertained. For Lord Wellington there was no alternative—and he must either permit Almeida to be relieved, or risk a battle. Upon the latter he decided; and with 32,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, and 42 guns, he united

his detached corps, and took a position that covered the blockaded fortress.

"The country between the Agueda and the Coa is a high open tract, which falls in a gradual slope from the mountains on the south in which those rivers have their sources, to the Douro: here and there are woods of cork and ilex, and the whole tract is intersected and divided into ridges by streams which run parallel to the larger rivers during the greater part of their course, and fall most of them into the Agueda. An army advancing into Portugal might, by moving upon the ridge of Fuentes Guinaldo, turn the right of all the positions that can be taken upon these smaller streams; or if it advanced in a direct line, the parallel ridges and woods covering any movement without interrupting it, would favour it in manœuvring and directing its principal strength against either flank. The allies were cantoned along the Duas Casas, and toward the sources of the Azava; the light division being at Gallegos and Espeja, upon the latter. But the ridge between the Duas Casas and the Turon offered the most advantageous position, because on the left it was of difficult access in front, and on the right it connected with the high country about Nave-d'Aver, from whence the communications were easy in the direction of Alfayates and Sabugal."*

The allied battle position was on a table-land—the centre in front of Alameda, the left flank resting on Fort Conception, and the right in the village of Fuentes d'Oñoro,—and it had this advantage, that "the French General could not, with any prudence, venture to march, by his own right, against Almeida, lest the allies, crossing the ravine at the villages of Alameda and Fuentes d'Oñoro, should fall on his flank, and drive him into the Agueda. Hence, to cover the blockade, which was maintained by Pack's brigade and an English regiment, it was sufficient to leave the 5th division near fort Conception, and the 6th division opposite Alameda. The 1st and 3d were then concentrated on a

* Southey.

gentle rise, about a cannon-shot behind Fuentes d'Oñoro, where the steppe of land which the army occupied turned back, and ended on the Turon, becoming rocky and difficult as it approached that river."*

With these dispositions, Wellington awaited the attack of a superior enemy,—and in the conflict which ensued, while his own military qualities were powerfully developed, the fortunes of a doubtful day were decided by the gallantry and discipline of that noble soldiery, on whom their general ventured to stake the reputation of a life,—and the result proved that his confidence had been worthily reposed.

* Napier.

CHAPTER XX.

MASSENA CROSSES THE AZAVA—FUENTES D'OÑORO—DESPATCH TO LORD LIVERPOOL—DETAILS OF THE ACTION—EXPLOIT OF THE HORSE ARTILLERY—DANGEROUS POSITION OF THE ALLIES—LORD WELLINGTON RETIRES HIS RIGHT AND CENTRE—THE MANŒUVRE BEAUTIFULLY EXECUTED—RENEWED ATTACK UPON FUENTES D'ONORO—DESPERATE CONTEST FOR THE POSSESSION OF THE VILLAGE—SPLENDID BAYONET CHARGE—FRENCH LOSS—EVENING ENDS THE CONFLICT—MASSENA DECLINES TO RENEW THE CONTEST, AND RETREATS TO CIUDAD RODRIGO—OBSERVATIONS ON THE BATTLE.

THE height of the Azava had made it a hazardous operation to cross the fords; and Massena, pushing his pickets up to the line from Espeja to Marialva which was held by the light division, waited until the waters should subside and permit an easier passage. On the 2d of May the river had fallen considerably; and early on that day, the whole of the enemy's *corps d'armée* were discovered moving from Ciudad Rodrigo. Their passage over the Azava was undisputed—for, after a slight cavalry affair at Gallegos, Craufurd leisurely retired, and crossing the Dos Casas, occupied the hamlet of Fuentes d'Oñoro.

This lovely village had been alternately possessed by the allies and the enemy; and, by a very singular good fortune, it had been hitherto respected by both. It stands in a valley on the left bank of the Dos Casas, with rising grounds on either side. The road to Ciudad Rodrigo passes through the hamlet, and a morass extends on that side, until it is bounded by a thick wood; while, on the other, the ground undulates considerably, and the surface is rocky and uneven. There were many stone enclosures

in Fuentes, which would yield good protection to the infantry that might be engaged in its defence; and the heights behind afforded a rallying point for troops if forced from the lower village, and also a means of feeding them with reinforcements from the divisions posted in their rear. The upper part of the village stands upon the edge of a ravine which rises boldly from the channel of the Dos Casas; and the old chapel and a few houses which crowned the height, were, from a situation of difficult approach, particularly defensible.

Upon this sweet village, the first and final efforts of the enemy were made. Moving towards the river, the 2d and 8th corps, in two columns, approached Alameda and Fort Conception; while a third, comprising the whole cavalry, the 6th, and part of the 9th corps, advanced against Fuentes d'Oñoro.*

The detail of the glorious contest which ensued was communicated to Lord Liverpool, in a despatch addressed to the Secretary of State by Lord Wellington, and dated Fermosa, 8th May, 1811. After noticing the operations we have already described, his lordship thus continues:—

"Shortly after the enemy had formed on the ground on the right of the Dos Casas, on the afternoon of the 3d, they attacked with a large force the village of Fuentes d'Oñoro, which was defended in a most gallant manner by Lieut.-Colonel Williams, of the 5th battalion 60th

* On this occasion Fuentes d'Oñoro shared the fate of most of the peninsular towns, in whose immediate vicinity a battle was decided. However culpable the conduct of the few might be, the subsequent reparation made by the British army, showed how deep was the generous sympathy for the sufferings of their quondam acquaintances. Colonel Napier says:—"Every family in it was well known to the light division; it was therefore a subject of deep regret to find that the preceding troops had pillaged it, leaving only the shells of houses where, three days before, a friendly population had been living in comfort. This wanton act was so warmly felt by the whole army that 8,000 dollars were afterwards collected by general subscription for the poor inhabitants; yet the injury sunk deeper than the atonement."

regiment, in command of the light infantry battalion belonging to Major-General Picton's division, supported by the light infantry battalion in Major-General Nightingale's brigade, commanded by Major Dick of the 42d regiment, and the light infantry battalion in Major-General Howard's brigade, commanded by Major M'Donnell of the 92d, and the light infantry battalion of the King's German Legion, commanded by Major Aly, of the 5th battalion of the line, and by the 2d battalion 83d regiment, under Major Carr.

"The troops maintained their position; but having observed the repeated efforts which the enemy were making to obtain possession of the village, and being aware of the advantage which they would derive from the possession in their subsequent operations, I reinforced the village successively with the 71st regiment under Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, and the 79th under Lieut.-Colonel Cameron, and the 24th under Major Chamberlain. The former, at the head of the 71st regiment, charged the enemy, and drove them from a part of the village of which they had obtained a momentary possession.

"Nearly at this time Lieut.-Colonel Williams was unfortunately wounded, but I hope not dangerously; and the command devolved upon Lieut.-Colonel Cameron of the 79th.

"The contest continued till night, when our troops remained in possession of the whole.

"I then withdrew the light infantry battalion, and the 83d regiment, leaving the 71st and 79th regiments only in the village, and the 2d battalion 24th regiment to support them.

"On the 4th the enemy reconnoitred the position which we had occupied on the Dos Casas river; and during that night they moved the Duc d'Abrantes' corps from Alameda to the left of the position occupied by the sixth corps, opposite to Fuentes d'Oñoro.

"From the course of the reconnaissance on the 4th, I had imagined that the enemy would endeavour to obtain

possession of Fuentes d'Oñoro, and of the ground occupied by the troops behind that village, by crossing the Dos Casas at Pozo Velho; and in the evening I moved the 7th division, under Major-General Houstoun, to the right, in order, if possible, to protect that passage.

"On the morning of the 5th, the 8th corps appeared in two columns, with all the cavalry, on the opposite side of the valley of the Dos Casas and Pozo Velho; and as the 6th and 9th corps also made a movement to their left, the light division, which had been brought back from the neighbourhood of Alameda, were sent with the cavalry, under Sir Stapleton Cotton, to support Major-General Houstoun; while the 1st and 3d divisions made a movement to their right, along the ridge between the Turon and Dos Casas rivers, corresponding to that of the 6th and 9th corps, on the right of the Dos Casas.

"The 8th corps attacked Major-General Houstoun's advanced guard, consisting of the 85th regiment, under Major Macintosh, and the 2d Portuguese caçadores, under Lieut.-Colonel Nixon, and obliged them to retire; and they retired in good order, although with some loss. The 8th corps being thus established in Pozo Velho, the enemy's cavalry turned the right of the 7th division, between Pozo Velho and Nave d'Aver, from which last place Don Julian Sanchez had been obliged to retire; and the cavalry charged.

"The charge of the advanced guard of the enemy's cavalry was met by two or three squadrons of the different regiments of British dragoons, and the enemy were driven back; and Colonel La Motte, of the 13th chasseurs, and some prisoners, taken.

"The main body were checked and obliged to retire by the fire of Major-General Houstoun's division; and I particularly observed the Chasseurs Britanniques, under Lieut.-Colonel Eustace, as behaving in the most steady manner; and Major-General Houstoun mentions in high terms the conduct of a detachment of the Duke of Brunswick's light infantry.

"Notwithstanding that this charge was repulsed, I determined to concentrate our force towards the left, and to move the 7th and light divisions and the cavalry from Pozo Velho towards Fuentes d'Oñoro, and the other two divisions.

"I had occupied Pozo Velho and that neighbourhood, in hopes that I should be able to maintain the communication across the Coa by Sabugal, as well as provide for the blockade, which objects it was now obvious were incompatible with each other; and I therefore abandoned that which was the least important, and placed the light division in reserve in the rear of the left of the 1st division, and the 7th division on some commanding ground beyond the Turon, which protected the right flank and rear of the 1st division, and covered the communication with the Coa, and prevented that of the enemy with Almeida by the roads between the Turon and that river.

"The movement of the troops upon this oocasion was well conducted, although under very critical circumstances, by Major-General Houstoun, Brigadier-General Craufurd, and Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton. The 7th division was covered in its passage of the Turon by the light division under Brigadier-General Craufurd; and this last, in its march to join the 1st division, by the British cavalry.

"Our position thus extended on the high ground from the Turon to the Dos Casas. The 7th division, on the left of the Turon, covered the rear of the right; the first division, in two lines, were on the right; Colonel Ashworth's brigade, in two lines, in the centre; and the 3d division in two lines, on the left; the light division and British artillery in reserve; and the village of Fuentes in front of the left. Don Julian's infantry joined the 7th division in Freneda; and I sent him with his cavalry to endeavour to intercept the enemy's communication with Ciudad Rodrigo.

"The enemy's efforts on the right part of our position, after it was occupied as I have above described, were confined to a cannonade, and to some charges with his cavalry upon the advanced posts. The regiments of the 1st division,

under Lieut.-Colonel Hill of the 3d regiment of guards, repulsed one of these; but as they were falling back they did not see the direction of another in sufficient time to form to oppose it, and Lieut.-Colonel Hill was taken prisoner, and many men were wounded, and some taken before a detachment of the British cavalry could move up to their support.

"The 2d battalion 42d regiment, under Lord Blantyre, also repulsed a charge of the cavalry directed against them.

"They likewise attempted to push a body of light infantry upon the ravine of the Turon, to the right of the 1st division, which were repulsed by the light infantry of the guards under Lieut.-Colonel Guise, aided by five companies of the 95th under Captain O'Hare.* Major-General Nightingale was wounded in the course of the cannonade, but I hope not severely.

"The enemy's principal effort was throughout this day again directed against Fuentes d'Oñoro; and notwithstanding that the whole of the 6th corps were at different periods of the day employed to attack this village, they could never gain more than a temporary possession of it. It was defended by the 24th, 71st, and 79th regiments, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Cameron; and these troops were supported by the light infantry battalions of the 3d division, commanded by Major Woodgate; the light infantry battalions of the 1st division, commanded by Major Dick, Major M'Donald, and Major Aly; the 6th Portuguese caçadores, commanded by Major Pinto; by the light companies in Colonel Champelmond's Portuguese brigade, under Colonel Sutton; and those in Colonel Ashworth's Portuguese brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Pynn, and by the pickets of the 3d division, under the command of Colonel the Hon. R. Trench. Lieut.-Colonel Cameron was severely† wounded in the afternoon, and the command in the village devolved upon Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan.

* Afterwards killed in the assault of Badajoz in 1812. † Mortally.

"The troops in Fuentes were besides supported, when pressed by the enemy, by the 74th regiment, under Major Russell Manners, and the 1st battalion 88th regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, belonging to Colonel Mackinnon's brigade; and on one of these occasions, the 88th, with the 71st and 79th, under the command of Colonel Mackinnon, charged the enemy, and drove them through the village; and Colonel Mackinnon has reported particularly the conduct of Lieut.-Colonel Wallace, Brigade-Major Wilde, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Stewart.

"The contest again lasted in this quarter till night, when our troops still held their post; and from that time the enemy have made no fresh attempt on any part of our position.

"The enemy manifested an intention to attack Major-General Sir William Erskine's post at Aldea del Obispo on the same morning, with a part of the 2d corps; but the Major-General sent the 2d battalion Lusitanian legion across the ford of the Dos Casas, which obliged them to retire.

"In the course of last night the enemy commenced retiring from their position on the Dos Casas; and this morning, at daylight, the whole was in motion. I cannot yet decide whether this movement is preparatory to some fresh attempt to raise the blockade of Almeida, or is one of decided retreat; but I have every reason to hope that they will not succeed in the first, and that they will be obliged to have recourse to the last. Their superiority in cavalry is very great, owing to the weak state of our horses, from recent fatigue and scarcity of forage, and the reduction of numbers in the Portuguese brigade of cavalry with this part of the army, in exchange for a British brigade sent into Estremadura with Marshal Sir William Beresford, owing to the failure of the measures reported to have been adopted to supply horses and men with food on the service.

"The result of a general action, brought on by an attack upon the enemy by us, might, under those circumstances,

have been doubtful; and if the enemy had chosen to avoid it, or if they had met it, they would have taken advantage of the collection of our troops to fight this action, and throw relief into Almeida.

"From the great superiority of force to which we have been opposed upon this occasion, your lordship will judge of the conduct of the officers and troops. The actions were partial, but very severe, and our loss has been great.* The enemy's loss has also been very great, and they left 400 killed in the village of Fuentes, and we have many prisoners.'

Such were Lord Wellington's brief details of a protracted action, in which defeat could have been averted only by the matchless gallantry of the allied troops, and the martial genius of their leader. Wellington never fought under more serious disadvantages. In every arm of war he was weaker than his antagonist, — in cavalry immeasurably inferior, — and Massena's cuirassiers alone should have ensured a victory. Notwithstanding that its grand outline presented a fine battle ground, the allied position was

* "Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., in the affairs at Fuentes d'Onoro, on the 3d and 5th May, 1811:—

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	11	16	208	49	235
Wounded . .	81	72	1081	101	1234
Missing . . .	7	10	300	5	817
Total . . .	99	98	1589	155	1786

"The Portuguese killed, wounded, and missing, are included in the above numbers."


Marialva
Agueda River
Fe Rodrigo
Fa Conway
Gallegos
Espeja
Fe Rodrigo
R. Doc Casas
2nd CORPS
Alameda
5th Divn
6th Divn
FUENTES D'ONORO
4th CORPS
6th CORPS
F. Conception
Poco Velha
Cavalry
B. Cavalry
Nava d'aver
River Turones
Fuente Guinaldo
Fuentes
Almeida
Castello Bom
Coa R.
Secuir
Pinhel
Prom Guarda
BATTLE
OF
FUENTES D'ONORO.
5TH MAY. 1811.

particularly dangerous. With the Coa in his rear, Wellington had but one point by which artillery could pass the river; and the narrow bridge at Castello Bom was ill suited for a rapid retreat, had any disaster obliged him to withdraw a beaten army. To turn his opponent's right,—seize his only communication with the left bank of the river,—and, once lodged upon the table-land, overwhelm the allies with heavy masses, supported by the charges of a splendid cavalry, was evidently Massena's design,—and Loison, consequently, not waiting for his arrival, endeavoured to assist the Prince of Essling's intended operation, by seizing the strong village on which the left of the allies was appuied.

The assault on Fuentes d'Oñoro was furiously made—and it was as fiercely repelled. Oppressed by a heavy cannonade, the lower village was gradually abandoned to the enemy, but the chapel and craggy eminence were desperately maintained. Loison redoubled his efforts; Wellington reinforced his hard-pressed battalions; and when night fell,* the lower houses of Fuentes remained in possession of the French, and the upper village was occupied by British regiments.

The *reconnaissance* of the next day confirmed Massena in his first intention of storming the opposite flank of the position, and gaining the plateau, which stretched away from the rugged banks of the Dos Casas. Julian Sanchez, after a short contest, was driven across the Turon,† the village

* "Night was closing; undismayed by a heavy loss, and unwearied by a hardly-contested action, a cannon, as it appeared to be, being seen on the adjacent heights, the 71st dashed across the rivulet, and bearing down all resistance, reached and won the object of their enterprise. On reaching it, the Highlanders discovered, that in the haze of the evening they had mistaken a tumbrel for a gun—but they bore it off, a trophy of their gallantry."—*Victories of the British Armies.*

† "Julian Sanchez immediately retired across the Turones, partly in fear but more in anger, at the death of his lieutenant, who, having foolishly ridden close up to the enemy, making many violent gestures, was mistaken for a French officer, and shot by a soldier of the guards, before action commenced."—*Napier.*

of Poco Velho was carried, and Montbrun poured his heavy squadrons over the level summit of the height. After a noble, but unavailing resistance, the allied cavalry were forced to retire, and seek protection from the infantry.* The French horsemen instantly galloped forward. They found the light infantry in squares, and unassailable; but as the 7th division had not effected that formation, many were cut down in line, and a troop of horse artillery completely surrounded. With other troops a certain defeat must have ensued; but at this fearful moment their own gallantry and discipline saved the British soldiers. Although surprised by the sudden rush of the cuirassiers, the chasseurs Britanniques threw themselves behind a broken fence, and maintaining a rolling fire that fell upon the assailants with murderous effect, they checked the onward career of the enemy. At one place, however, the fury of the fight seemed for a time to centre. "A great commotion was observed among the French squadrons; men and officers closed in confusion towards one point where a thick dust was rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of pistols indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly the multitude was violently agitated, an English shout arose, the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses breathing fire, and stretching like greyhounds along the plain, his guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners in close and compact order protecting the rear."†

At this period of the day, while isolated displays of gallantry might for a time have checked the progress of the French, still the final issue of the contest seemed fraught with danger to the British general. Wellington's right was

* Though weak in number, and from the scarcity and bad quality of the forage, mounted on horses too feeble to sustain the shock of Napoleon's favourite cuirassiers, the British cavalry behaved most gallantly. They met the charge, and even repulsed it; and a colonel of dragoons (Lamotte) was taken prisoner by General Stewart, after "fighting hand to hand."

† Napier.

turned—his division separated—a murderous combat raging on his left in Fuentes, and to secure success, it was imperative that his outflanked wing should be instantly thrown back, and his communications with the bridge of Sabugal abandoned. "Looking with just confidence rather to victory than to any likelihood of retreating, he drew in the right of his army, sending the 7th division over the Turon to Frenada, on its left bank." The light division, covered by the cavalry, retired over the plain—and the 1st, 3d, and Portuguese formed line nearly at right angles with their first position, now resting their battalions upon the height which ran perpendicularly with Fuentes, their left being still pivoted on that village.

To effect this delicate change of formation was indeed a perilous essay; one which a master-spirit only dare adopt, and one which might be entrusted alone to British soldiers. To retire troops across a level plain, the outer flank having a surface of four miles to traverse, surrounded by heavy masses of French cavalry, flushed with the full assurance of approaching victory, and waiting a false movement to fall on, was certainly a daring resolution. Far as the eye could range, the plateau was crowded with camp-followers and equipage. These fugitives added to the confusion, and consequently increased the risks; "and if any of the divisions had given way, the enemy would have burst in upon them with such force, as would have sent the disorderly multitude headlong against some of its own squares, and thrown the whole into irreparable confusion."*

"But in that dread hour, perhaps the most perilous of the whole war for England, she was saved by the skill of her chief and the incomparable valour of her soldiers. Slowly, and in perfect order, the squares of the 1st, 7th, and light divisions, retired for many miles, flanked on either side by the terrible cuirassiers of Montbrun, flushed with the newly won glories of Wagram; pressed in rear by the

* Napier.

columns and batteries of Ney's corps, which had broken the Russian army at Friedland. In vain their thundering squadrons swept round these serried bands, and the light of the British bayonets was, for a time, lost in the blaze of the French cuirasses; from every throng the unbroken squares still emerged, pursuing their steady way amidst a terrific fire; the 7th division successfully accomplished its long semicircular sweep, crossed the Turon, and took up its ground between that stream and the Coa; the centre of the army soon gained the ridge of heights for which it was destined; while the left, with invincible firmness, still made good the crags and chapel of Fueñtes d'Onoro. When the whole had taken up their ground, Massena recoiled from the prospect of attacking such an enemy as he had now combated, posted in dense masses on a ridge not two miles in length, and covered on either flank by a steep ravine; and, confining himself to a cannonade along its front, redoubled his efforts on the left, where he sent the whole division of Drouet against the village of Fuentes d'Oñoro."*

The attack was made with all that reckless desperation, which indicated that on success or failure the fortunes of a doubtful day were staked. Every arm was used—cavalry appeared waiting an opportunity to act—infantry burst into the lower village in heavy masses—and while the French artillery poured a storm of shot upon the houses and enclosures, the enemy advanced with imposing steadiness, although their passage led through a street choked with the dead and dying, who had already perished in vain but reiterated attempts. The British regiments, far overmatched in numbers, were gradually forced back upon the heights and chapel, after sustaining a heavy loss, two companies of the 79th having been taken, and Colonel Cameron slain.† But beyond the upper village no effort of the

* Alison's History of Europe.

† "Lieut.-Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded, by an enemy who stepped out of the ranks to aim at him. His countrymen, the Highlanders, at whose head he fell, set up a shriek, and attacked the French with a spirit not to be

enemy could drive its gallant defenders. In vain the French were frequently and strongly reinforced, until the entire of the 6th, and a part of Count d'Erlon's corps were engaged. Lord Wellington, in turn, sent in his reserves, and the assault and defence were on both sides obstinately continued, the fortune of the day alternating as fresh combatants took part in the affray. "At one time the fighting was on the banks of the stream and amongst the lower houses; at another upon the rugged heights and round the chapel, and some of the enemy's skirmishers even penetrated completely through towards the main position."*

For a moment the upper village seemed lost. A heavy column followed the tirailleurs closely—and, unchecked by a well-directed fusilade, the enemy crowned the chapel ridge, and announced with loud cheers that Fuentes was at last their own. That triumph was a short one. Colonel Mackinnon directed the British battalions to advance, and gallantly that order was obeyed. Supported by the 71st and 79th, Colonel Wallace led his own regiment on; and his brief address—"At them, Eighty-eighth!" was answered with the soul-stirring huzza, with which an Irish regiment rushes to the onset. The Imperial guard waited and received the charge—bayonet crossed bayonet—and the combatants fought hand to hand. But it was the struggle of a moment, and the best soldiers of France gave way before the Connaught Rangers. In the awful stock, many were impaled and fairly lifted from the ground; † while broken, trodden down, and slaughtered, the routed enemy were forced in wild disorder by the Irish and Highland soldiers through the same street by which, in all the confidence of approaching victory, they had so recently and gallantly advanced.

The French loss was never accurately given. It was

resisted: the man who had slain their commander was pierced by many bayonets at once—and the leader of the French, a person remarkable for his statue and fine form, was killed, while the Highlanders in their vengeance drove the enemy before them."—*Southey.*

* Napier. † Alison.

erroneously estimated after the action at little short of 5,000 *hors de combat*, but probably half the amount would come nearer to the truth. The French absurdly stated their casualties at 400—and one circumstance alone would prove that this was ridiculously incorrect, as 500 of their dead and wounded horses were left upon the battle-ground.

"Evening closed the combat. Massena's columns on the right were halted, and his 6th corps, with which he had endeavoured to storm Fuentes d'Oñoro, was withdrawn—the whole French army bivouacking in the order in which they had stood when the engagement closed. The British lighted their fires, posted their pickets, and occupied the field they had so bravely held; and 'both parties lay down to rest, with a confident assurance on their minds, that the battle was only intermitted till the return of daylight.'

"A brigade of the light division relieved the gallant defenders of Fuentes—and preparatory to the expected renewal of attack, some works were thrown up to defend the upper village and the ground behind it. But these precautions were unnecessary; Massena remained during the next day in front of his antagonist, but exhibited no anxiety to renew the combat. The 7th found the British, as usual, under arms at dawn, but the day passed as quietly as the preceding one had done. On the 8th, the French columns were observed in full retreat, marching on the road to Ciudad Rodrigo; thus proving that the French marshal, with an army reinforced by every battalion and squadron he could collect from Galicia and Castile, had been beaten by four divisions of the British army. With that unblushing assurance, however, for which the French marshals have been remarkable, defeat was tortured into conquest, and Massena did not hesitate to call Fuentes d'Oñoro a victory. But the falsity was self-apparent—the avowed object for which the battle had been fought was unattained—he failed in succouring the beleaguered city—and Almeida was left to its fate."*

* Victories of the British Armies.

In calmly reviewing the varied fortunes of this long and sanguinary conflict, it is impossible, in weighing the merits of those commanding, not to award an immeasurable superiority to the talents of the British general. Obliged to abide a battle, and that too upon a field in no way favourable for an inferior force to sustain the assault of a superior enemy, Wellington's dispositions were masterly, and every arm he had was ably and usefully employed. Massena, on the other hand, displayed none of that military genius which had placed him foremost among Napoleon's lieutenants. He wasted his strength upon the village of Fuentes d'Oñoro; and with the key of the position in his possession, he allowed this advantage to remain profitless, when through Pozo Velho he could have poured his whole force upon the plateau, and overwhelmed the British right wing by mere numbers.* The ground was favourable for cavalry to act efficiently—but the French marshal's magnificent dragoons were neither skilfully nor vigorously employed; and while they should have been deciding the fortune of the fight, they were trifling with the partidas of Julian Sanchez. "Having indicated all the errors of the English general's position, the Prince of Essling stopped short at the very moment when he should have sprung forward."† To whatever cause it may be ascribed, the movements of the French marshal throughout the 5th were marked by irregularity and delay; and his attacks upon opposite flanks, which, to have ensured success, should have been simultaneous, were made with a con-

* "After the right wing was thrown back, on perfectly open and level ground, one point only resting on the strong village in question; yet was that strong point constantly attacked, while the army was left totally unassailed."—*Raoul.*

† "By some this has been attributed to negligence, by others to disgust at being superseded by Marmont; but the true reason seems to be, that discord in his army had arisen to actual insubordination. The imperial guards would not charge at his order; Junot did not second him cordially; Loison neglected his instructions; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight; and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle being shaken, would not work."—*Napier.*

siderable interval between them. In short, Massena's genius seemed asleep, and none could have imagined that the victor of Aspern, was he who failed so signally at Fuentes d'Oñoro.

CHAPTER XXI.

ALMEIDA CLOSELY BLOCKADED—THE GOVERNOR PREPARES TO BLOW UP THE FORTRESS—FAULTY DISPOSITIONS IN THE BLOCKADE—BRENNIER'S ESCAPE—DETAIL OF IT TO LORD LIVERPOOL—LORD WELLINGTON DEEPLY MORTIFIED AT THE OCCURRENCE—NAPOLEON AND WELLINGTON COMPARED—LETTER TO GENERAL CAMERON—SIEGE OF BADAJOZ—IT PROGRESSES SLOWLY, AND IS RAISED ON THE NIGHT OF THE 13TH—LORD WELLINGTON ARRIVES AT ELVAS—HIS RAPID JOURNEY—ALBUERA—ALLIED POSITION—BERESFORD'S ORDER OF BATTLE—RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE ALLIED AND FRENCH ARMIES—SOULT'S DISPOSITIONS—BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

MASSENA'S retreat was instantly followed up by a closer blockade of that fortress, which he had avowedly crossed the Agueda to relieve; and as it was known that the scanty supply of food within the walls of Almeida was almost exhausted, the fall of the city was deemed inevitable. Brennier, who had already distinguished himself at Vimiero, where he had been wounded and taken prisoner, but subsequently exchanged, was governor; and to a more trusty soldier the custody of a place of strength had never been confided.

Although fully expecting that the Prince of Essling would succeed in his operations, and oblige the blockading division to withdraw, Brennier, nevertheless, had mined the works, and made every preparation by which he might, if necessary, ruin the defences of the place. The heavy firing at Fuentes told him that a severe action had been fought. A day passed—no succour came; and during the night, a French private reached the fortress, having with wonderful sagacity eluded the sentries and pickets who were on duty. Tillet confirmed Brennier's suspicions that Massena had

been seriously repulsed—and brought with him, at the same time, the Prince of Essling's order for the immediate evacuation of Almeida.

Every precaution had been taken by Lord Wellington to ensure the capture of the garrison; and, at his own solicitation, to General Alexander Campbell the details of the investment, with ample means to effect it, were entrusted.

"Too great confidence, either upon the allied strength or the weakness of the garrison, most probably led him to adopt an imperfect system of blockade, which led to mortifying results. His dispositions were entirely erroneous. It is true that the right face of Almeida was vigilantly watched—but there, no movements could have been made with any prospect of succeeding. The left unfortunately was neglected—and the banks of the Agueda, and bridge at Barba de Puerco, on the direct route to the French outposts, were left unguarded. This oversight was generally noticed; and though the blockade of the fortress had been in the first instance unreservedly confided to Campbell, the faulty method of his dispositions obliged Lord Wellington to order the division of Sir William Erskine to march and observe the left face of Almeida, while a battalion was ordered to the bridge. But this was not effected in proper time; and a delay in the transmission of the orders produced a very annoying event, and enabled the French garrison to get away."*

For two days Brennier continued his work of destruction; and it was effected with so much cleverness, that frequent explosions attracted no particular attention from the blockaders.† At midnight of the 10th, all being ripe for the attempt, the mines were fired—and by moonlight, the garrison issued from the fortress in solid columns, bayoneting

* Victories of the British Armies.

† "He ruined all the principal bastions, and kept up a constant fire of the artillery in a singular manner, for always he fired several guns at one moment with very heavy charges, placing one across the muzzle of another, so that while some shots flew towards the besiegers, and a loud explosion was heard, others destroyed pieces without attracting notice."—*Napier.*

any sentries whom they encountered, and passing between the quarters of the reserves with a precision that seemed unaccountable. Lord Wellington was justly irritated at this singular escape; and in his official letter to Lord Liverpool, he detailed the particulars of an occurrence which he justly considered so discreditable to all concerned.

"My Lord, "*Villa Fermosa, 15th May*, 1811.

"No part of the enemy's army remained on the left of the Agueda on the evening of the 10th instant, excepting one brigade of cavalry, close to the bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo. The 2d corps had crossed at Barba de Puerco and the ford of Val de Espino, and were cantoned in that neighbourhood; and our advanced posts were upon the Azava and the Lower Agueda.

"The 6th division resumed the duty of the blockade of Almeida on that evening; and Major-General Sir William Erskine was ordered to send a battalion to Barba de Puerco to guard the bridge there, which had been previously ordered, and had been posted, to observe the passages of the Dos Casas between Aldea del Obispo and Barba de Puerco.

"The enemy blew up some mines which they had constructed at the works of Almeida at a little before one of the morning of the 11th, and immediately attacked the pickets by which the place was observed, and forced their way through them. They fired but little; and they appear to have marched between the bodies of troops posted to support the pickets; and in particular could not have passed far from the right of the Queen's regiment.

"Upon the first alarm Brig.-General Pack, who was at Malpartida, joined the pickets, and continued to follow and fire upon the enemy, as a guide for the march of the other troops employed in the blockade; and Major-General Campbell marched from Malpartida with a part of the 1st battalion 36th regiment. But the enemy continued their march in a solid, compact body, without firing; and were well guided between the positions occupied by our troops.

"The 4th regiment, which was ordered to occupy Barba de Puerco, unfortunately missed the road, and did not arrive there till the enemy had reached the place, and commenced to descend to the bridge, and at the same moment with the 36th regiment with Major-General Campbell, and the light battalions of the 5th division, which Major-General Sir William Erskine had detached from Aldea del Obispo to Barba de Puerco, as soon as he had heard that the enemy had come out from Almeida.

"The enemy suffered very considerable loss, both in prisoners and in killed and wounded, as well in the march from Almeida as in the passage of the Agueda. It appears that that part of the 2d corps which was in San Felices formed upon the river, to protect their passage, as soon as they heard the firing; and Lieut.-Colonel ——, of the —th, who had crossed with a detachment of the —th and —th regiments,* was obliged to retire with some loss.†

"I enclose the reports of Major-General Campbell, Brig.-General Pack, and other officers employed, upon the transactions of this night; to which I add the reports of General Regnier, and of General Brennier to the Prince of Essling, which have been intercepted and brought to me. From the former your lordship will observe that the arrival of the

* 4th and 36th.

† "Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Lieut.-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B., at Barba de Puerco, on the 11th May, 1811.

"*Head Quarters, Villa Fermosa, 15th May*, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-com. Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	—	—	4	—	4
Wounded	1	—	15	—	16
Missing	1	1	14	—	16
Total	2	1	33	—	36

garrison at Barba de Puerco was entirely unexpected; and that it was, as reported in my letter of the 10th instant, left to its fate by the enemy.

"The enemy are indebted for the small part of the garrison which they have saved principally to the unfortunate mistake of the road to Barba de Puerco by the 4th regiment. During the whole period of the blockade, but particularly during the period that the enemy's army were between the Dos Casas and the Azava, the garrison were in the habit of firing cannon during the night; and the pickets near the place were frequently attacked. On the night of the 7th there had been a very heavy fire of cannon from the place, and the pickets were attacked; and another on the night of the 8th; and the Queen's regiment in particular, and the other troops employed in the blockade, were induced to believe that the explosion which they heard on the morning of the 11th was of the same description with those which they had heard on the preceding nights; and the Queen's regiment did not move at all, nor the other troops, till the cause of the explosion had been ascertained.

"Since the 11th instant the enemy have continued their retreat towards the Tormes; and it has been reported to me that they have crossed that river, and are on their march towards the Douro. But I have not received this report from any authority on which I can rely.

"I have detached from this army, into the Alentejo, the 3d and 7th divisions of infantry; and I have ordered the 2d hussars, which have arrived as Celerico, to march in that direction likewise. My reason for making this detachment is to be able to support Sir William Beresford in strength, if the enemy should attempt to interrupt the siege of Badajoz; and as all is now quiet on this frontier, I propose to return to the Alentejo in the course of a few days.

"Sir William Beresford invested Badajoz on both sides of the Guadiana on the 8th, and broke ground on both sides on that night. The enemy made a sortie, and endeavoured to prevent our troops from occupying the ground, from

which they were to direct their attack against the outwork of San Christoval, but the enemy were driven in. They had made another sortie on the morning of the 10th, in large force, and were driven in again by our troops; but I am concerned to add that our loss upon this occasion was very severe, owing to the gallant but imprudent advance of the troops quite to the glacis of San Christoval, and to a situation in which they were exposed to the fire of musketry and grape from that outwork, as well as from the body of the place.

* * * * *

"Your lordship will observe from Major-General Campbell's report of the transactions at Barba de Puerco, that the same imprudence to which I have above referred was the cause of the loss sustained upon that occasion; and all the loss of prisoners in the action at Fuentes d'Oñoro on the 3d and 5th instant, was to be attributed to the impetuosity of the officers and troops, which could not be kept within bounds.

"The corps of Spanish troops under General Blake, which had been landed in the Guadiana, had drawn near the frontiers of Estremadura, in order to cooperate with Sir William Beresford in the attack of Badajoz; and I understand that Marshal Soult is employed in fortifying Seville, where he has collected a large body of troops."

The partial escape of the garrison of Almeida, was, in every point of view, a most annoying and discreditable occurrence. "It seemed as if, by this untoward event," says a staff officer, "all the advantages obtained by the battle of Fuentes d'Oñoro were thrown away. Not that we very deeply regretted the escape of the individuals: they were brave men, had made a bold venture, and deserved that it should be crowned with success; but it was mortifying to reflect that now Massena might, with some show of reason, speak of his late operation as a victory, and not as a defeat. He might, in a specious manner, inform Europe that he had manœuvred merely for the purpose of bringing

off the garrison of Almeida; and as the garrison had actually escaped, how could we contradict him? It is not worth while longer to dwell on this affair; but I will venture to affirm that no one who witnessed the effect this disappointment produced upon our army, will ever be able to forget it." *

That Lord Wellington was deeply chagrined at the carelessness and bad arrangements which occasioned the affair, may be inferred from the frequent allusions to it in his correspondence. In a second and private letter to Lord Liverpool, he thus more strongly expresses himself.

"Possibly I have to reproach myself for not having been on the spot; but really, when the enemy's whole army had crossed the Agueda, with the exception of one brigade of cavalry, in front of Ciudad Rodrigo, I did not think it probable that the attempt to escape would be made; and having employed two divisions and a brigade, to prevent the escape of 1,400 men, who I did not think it likely would attempt to escape, the necessity of my attending personally to this operation, after I had been the whole day on the Azava, did not occur to me. However, it is that alone in the whole operation in which I have to reproach myself, as everything was done that could be done in the way of order and instruction.

"I certainly feel, every day, more and more the difficulty of the situation in which I am placed. I am obliged to be everywhere, and if absent from any operation, something goes wrong. It is to be hoped that the general and other officers of the army will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success can be attained only by attention to the most minute details; and by tracing every part of every operation from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and ascertaining that the whole is understood by those who are to execute it."†

* Lord Londonderry's Narrative.

† Dated Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

It has been customary with those whose wishes lead them to place Wellington's character in an unamiable light, to compare him with Napoleon, in representing both as stern and unpitying soldiers, working their purposes out, reckless of the sufferings they occasioned, and dead to the kindlier sympathies of humanity. But in the rare exhibitions of softer feelings made by both, no men differed more. Napoleon's was a public display; Wellington's a secret offering. An ostentatious visit to his hospitals—a condolatory address to a passing *ambulance* which bore his wounded from the field—the parade of sorrow beside a dying friend—all with Napoleon assumed the semblance of acting, and seemed rather intended to elicit applause from the lookers-on, than give expression to heartfelt sympathy. Wellington made no open show of sorrow. He saw old friends fall—he rode past "the dying and the dead"—the same stern calmness in his look—the same firm and unalterable determination in his bearing. For the sufferers he had no empty words; but when others slept, he was toiling in his bureau to obtain means for their relief; and when none expected him, he visited his hospitals in private, and from personal inspection, assured himself that those to whom his sick and wounded were committed had not neglected their trust.

At Fuentes d'Oñoro a casualty occurred which, from accidental circumstances, excited unusual interest. In defending the village during the last furious assault of the 6th corps, the 79th Highlanders sustained a heavy loss; and among those badly wounded on the occasion, the son of General Cameron, a young officer of high promise, was included. Of this misfortune Lord Wellington had already apprized his father; but, as the result proved, he had not told the worst. Young Cameron's wound was mortal; and though oppressed with the details of a voluminous correspondence at the moment, the British general still found time to convey to the bereaved parent the melancholy tidings. The simple language in which the fatal event was communicated, carries its own evidence of coming from the

heart. The consolation was a soldier's—but the spirit of the letter showed how acutely the writer felt the sorrow it would occasion to a gallant veteran.

"When I wrote to you last week I felt that I conveyed to you information which would give you great pain; but I hoped, that I had made you acquainted with the full extent of the misfortune which had befallen you. Unfortunately, however, those upon whose judgment I relied were deceived: your son's wound was worse than it was then supposed to be: it was mortal, and he died on the day before yesterday, at two in the morning.

"I am convinced that you will credit the assurance which I give you, that I condole with you most sincerely upon this misfortune, of the extent of which no man is more capable than myself of forming an estimate, from the knowledge which I had, and the just estimate which I had formed, in my own opinion, of the merits of your son.

"You will always regret and lament his loss, I am convinced; but I hope that you will derive some consolation from the reflection that he fell in the performance of his duty, at the head of your brave regiment, loved and respected by all that knew him, in an action in which, if possible, the British troops surpassed everything they had ever done before, and of which the result was most honourable to his Majesty's arms.

"At all events, Providence having deprived you of your son, I cannot conceive a string of circumstances more honourable and glorious than those under which he lost his life, in the cause of his country. Believe me, however, that, although I am fully alive to all these honourable circumstances attending his death, I most sincerely condole with you upon your loss."*

Immediately after the battle of Fuentes d'Oñoro, the Prince of Essling, with Ney, Junot, and Loison, returned

* Dated Villa Fermosa, 15th May, 1811.

to France, leaving the army of Portugal in cantonments on the Tormes, under the command of Marmont, Duke of Ragusa. At the same time intelligence reached Lord Wellington, which induced him to repair instantly to Elvas; and while Massena was hastening towards the Pyrenees, his successful opponent was hurrying to the Guadiana.

The information conveyed in his last despatch to Lord Liverpool, respecting Beresford's operations, had been substantially correct. Badajoz* had been invested on its southern face upon the 4th of May, and on the other (right) bank of the river upon the 8th. After dark, and on the same evening, ground was broken before Fort Christoval, and false attacks made on the Pardaleras and Picurina. "That against the Pardaleras consisted in opening the old French parallel on the Sierra del Viento, and throwing up a battery for four guns. That against the Picurina was nearly a similar undertaking on the hill of St. Michael, at 900 yards distance from it."† The progress of the work was slow; "the soil proved extremely hard and rocky, and the garrison opened a very heavy fire of shot, shells and musketry, before the first gabion was placed; in consequence, cover was only obtained to enable ten men to work in the battery at day-light, nor would the trench of support cover more than thirty."‡

From the inefficiency of the marshal's resources in the *materiel* for carrying on a siege, and the weakness of the numbers he could afford for the working and protecting parties, his operations went tardily on. On the 12th, intelligence reached him that Soult was in full march to relieve the place, and that his advanced guard was already at Llerena. Not a moment was to be lost—his force must be instantly concentrated—orders to that effect were issued accordingly, and the siege of Badajoz was raised.

"On the night of the 13th all the artillery was withdrawn from the batteries, the platforms taken up, and the

* Badajoz, *ante* 249.

† Jones's Journal of the Sieges.

‡ Ibid.

splinter proofs removed. On the 14th every exertion was used to send the artillery and stores to the rear, and at night the fascines, gabions, and materials which could not be moved were burned. At noon on the 15th, the whole of the siege artillery and ammunition being across the Guadiana, the flying bridge was drawn ashore. Part of the army had already marched to Valverde, and the 4th division and some Spaniards only remained on the left of the Guadiana to cover these operations. On the 15th they also moved, and the siege was completely raised. At the moment the rear guard drew off, the garrison made a sortie in force, by which a Portuguese light battalion suffered severely, making the total loss during the operation above 100 killed and 650 wounded."*

On the same evening Lord Wellington left Villa Fermosa, accompanied by a part of his staff—and travelling at the rate of sixty miles a day, without baggage or impediments of any description, arrived in Elvas before dark on the 19th. Whilst performing this arduous journey, a variety of rumours relative to late transactions met him at every stage. At one place it was stated that the enemy were coming on in force, and that a battle might hourly be expected; at another, that Marshal Beresford had resolved upon a retreat, not feeling himself equal to oppose the French; and, at a third, that a great action had been fought, and that it had ended in favour of the allies. "It will readily be imagined," says the narrator,† "that the last rumour, though it entered in no respect into particulars, tended, in no slight degree, to elevate our spirits, and quicken our pace. On reaching Elvas, however, more accurate details were given; for Colonel Arbuthnot, from the marshal's head quarters, met us here, and from him we received an official account of one of the most obstinate, as well as sanguinary actions, in which British troops were ever engaged."

When Soult was fortifying Seville he had no fears for

* Jones's Journal of the Sieges. † Lord Londonderry.

the safety of Andalusia, but, determined to raise the siege of Badajoz, he wished to deceive Beresford, and thus induce a false security. On the first tidings however, of his advance, the marshal, contrary to the advice of his engineers, exercised a sound discretion and raised the siege.

At an interview at Valverde with the Spanish Generals, on the 13th—the intelligence of the rapid approach of the Duke of Dalmatia having been confirmed—it was unanimously determined that a battle should be risked; and Albuera having been selected as the best position, Blake undertook that the detached divisions of the Spanish army should be concentrated there, before noon of the 15th.

The village of Albuera is a street of mean houses, with a church, situated on a little river, from which it is named. This village is traversed by the high road leading from Seville to Badajoz; which, about two hundred yards to the right, crosses the river by a handsome bridge of stone. Immediately to the left of Albuera, and just below the rough and rising ground on which it stands, there is another bridge, of unhewns tone, old, narrow, and incommodious. The river, in summer, is not above knee-deep. Its banks to the left of the old bridge, and directly in front of the village, are very abrupt and difficult; but to the right of the main bridge the passage of the stream is easy for all arms.*

The position chosen by the allied leaders was an undulating ridge, having the Albuera river in its front and the Arroya in its rear. The extreme extent might be four miles. A rivulet called the Ferdia unites itself immediately above the village with the Albuera; and the intermediate surface, and the whole country beyond the larger stream, are thickly, but dispersedly, covered with ilex trees, a species of wood sufficient to conceal the formation, but not interrupt the movements of an army.

At three in the afternoon of the 15th, the allied cavalry were driven, in great confusion, over the Albuera, aban-

* Sherer.


BATTLE
OF
ALBUERA.
Lowder
Road to Valverde
To Almendral
4th Div.n
Harvey
Arroyo
R.
Fusileers
9th CORPS
Werle
Brigade
Abercrombie
Colborne
SPANIARDS
2nd Div.n
PORTUGUESE
From Badajoz
13th Div.n
Gen.l Alten's
ALBUERA
To Torre d Almendral
Albuera R.
Galvez
La Carte

doning the wooded heights to the enemy, an advantage of which Soult instantly availed himself.

With but a few miles to march, Blake moved so tardily, that his leading brigades did not reach their intended battle ground until midnight, and the entire were not up for some hours afterwards. In his disposition of the allies, Beresford gave the Spaniards the right of the position, as the ground was more elevated, and consequently less assailable. But unfortunately a wooded height which overlooked the Valverde road was left unoccupied; and this mistake enabled the French marshal to concentrate, during the night, 15,000 men and 40 pieces of artillery within cannon-shot; and any advantage the ground might have afforded for defence, was greatly overbalanced by the facilities of attack which the possession of the Valverde wood gave to an enemy, who knew so well as the Duke of Dalmatia did how the omission could be turned to the best account.*

The Portuguese brigades were on the left; the British in the centre; and the cavalry in the rear. The allied force amounted to 30,000 men, of whom about 2,000 were cavalry. Of these, nearly one-half were Spanish troops; the remainder, British and Portuguese, in nearly an equal proportion.

In gross numbers the French marshal was inferior to his opponent; in infantry, he was weaker by a third; but in the other arms, dangerously superior. He brought 4,000 cavalry and 50 heavy guns into action; all were French troops; and all consequently, admirable soldiers. In every requisite Soult's *corps d'armée* was complete; and, save his master, few could employ it more skilfully, and none with more promptitude and determination.

* "General Blake's corps was on the right in two lines; its left, on the Valverde road, joined the right of Major-General the Hon. William Stewart's division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road, where commenced the right of Major-General Hamilton's division, which closed the left of the line. General Cole's division, with one brigade of General Hamilton's, formed the second line of the British and Portuguese army."

After a careful *reconnaissance* on the evening of the 15th, the Duke of Dalmatia selected the right of the allies as the object for his greatest effort. Favoured by the darkness, he lodged Girard's corps, Ruty's artillery, and the cavalry of Latour Maubourg, in the wood; and when morning broke, a powerful force was already formed in close column, and perfectly concealed, though within ten minutes' march of the Spanish line.

"The enemy, on the morning of the 16th, did not long delay his attack. At eight o'clock he was observed to be in movement, and his cavalry was seen passing the rivulet of Albuera, considerably above our right; and shortly after, he marched out of the wood opposite to us a strong force of cavalry, and two heavy columns of infantry, pointing them to our front, as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera. During this time, under cover of his vastly superior cavalry, he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river beyond our right; and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank, and to cut us off from Valverde."*

On perceiving that the right was seriously menaced, Beresford had sent Colonel Hardinge to request that Blake would change his front. But the Spanish general doggedly insisted that the village was the true object of attack, and refused to correct his alignment. The marshal rode in person to the right; and as the French columns were now observed in rapid march, "yielding to this evidence, Blake proceeded to make the evolution, yet with such pedantic slowness, that Beresford, impatient of his folly, took the direction himself."†

But before the change could be effected, the day might have been considered by Beresford as lost! "Two-thirds of the French were in a compact order of battle on a line perpendicular to his right, and his army, disordered and composed of different nations, was still in the difficult act of

* Beresford's Despatch to Wellington. † Napier.

changing its front. It was in vain that he endeavoured to form the Spanish line sufficiently in advance to give room for the second division to support it; the French guns opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry, and their cavalry, outflanking the front and charging here and there, put the Spaniards in disorder at all points; in a short time the latter gave way, and Soult, thinking the whole army was yielding, pushed forward his columns, while his reserves also mounted the hill, and General Ruty placed all the batteries in position."*

Seeing the desperate state of affairs, General William Stewart bravely, but rashly, endeavoured to restore the battle; and pushing his brigade up the hill, he mounted, for greater despatch, by columns of companies. But as the regiments were endeavouring to open into line, each as it crowned the ridge in the loose order it had advanced in, the French light cavalry, under cover of a heavy shower of rain, passed round the right flank of the brigade, and came in a thundering onset direct upon their rear. A sad slaughter ensued—and every regiment, except the 31st, which fortunately had not begun to deploy, was literally cut to pieces. The lancers galloped right and left, spearing men without mercy who could neither escape, nor, from confusion and surprise, offer an effective resistance; while the Spaniards, regardless that their fire was falling fast upon the English ranks, kept up an unabating fusilade—but when ordered to advance, and succour men who were perishing through the brave but rash celerity with which they had rushed to their assistance, no power could move them forward.†

* Napier.

† "When Stewart's imprudence in loosely bringing Colborne's brigade into action, had occasioned it a loss short only of annihilation,—and the Spaniards, though they could not be induced to advance, fired without ceasing with an English regiment in their front, Beresford actually seized an ensign and dragged him forward with the colours, hoping that these useless troops would be inspirited to follow. Not a man stirred—and the standard-

Happily the weather cleared; and the distressed brigade was observed by General Lumley, who rode at speed to the rescue. The British cavalry charged nobly. In turn, the lancers were taken in the rear; and numbers of these desperadoes fell beneath the sabres of the English horsemen.

The mist which had favoured this sanguinary charge, averted also in a great degree, the fatal consequences it must have otherwise produced. Soult, from the obscurity of the weather, could not see the battle field with sufficient clearness, to allow him to push forward his infantry, and consummate the destruction of a brigade, already half exterminated. The 31st regiment steadily maintained its ground—the British artillery came up—Houghton's brigade cleared the hill and deployed in beautiful order—two Spanish regiments were brought forward,—and the battle was restored.

Though for a moment checked, the French soon renewed their efforts to break the English line; but the British regiments stood with a stubborn gallantry that refused to yield an inch. On both sides, the batteries poured torrents of grape at half range, and the roar of musketry was incessant. Upon the close formation of the French, the storm fell with terrible violence—whole sections fell—but still these noble soldiers remained unshaken by this crushing fire; and their reserves were coming rapidly up. A column appeared already moving round the right flank of the British, — ammunition failed, — their fusilade gradually became feebler,—the lancers charged again, and a battery was taken. That moment was the crisis. To retreat, was Beresford's first thought,—orders were being issued to

bearer, when the marshal's grasp relaxed, instantly flew back to herd with his cold-blooded associates. In every change of the fight, and on every part of the field, Beresford was seen conspicuously; and whatever might have been his failing as a general, his bravery as a man should have commanded the respect of many, who have since treated his arrangements with unsparing severity."—*Victories of the British Armies.*

commence it,—when Colonel Hardinge saw that the battle might yet be won—and, without having obtained the marshal's permission, he ordered the 4th division and a brigade of the 2nd to advance, and thus redeemed the fortunes of a day which all besides thought desperate.

"In a few minutes more the remnant of the British must have abandoned the hill or perished. The French reserve was on its march to assist the front column of the enemy, while with the allies all was in confusion; and as if the slaughter required increase, a Spanish and English regiment were firing in mutual error upon each other. Six guns were in possession of the French, and their lancers, riding furiously over the field, threatened the feeble remnant of the British still in line, and speared the wounded without mercy. At this fearful moment the boundless gallantry of British officers displayed itself; Colonel Arbuthnot, under the double musketry, rushed between the mistaken regiments, and stopped the firing; Cole pushed up the hill, scattered the lancers, recovered the guns, and passed the right of the skeleton of Houghton's brigade, at the same instant that Abercrombie appeared upon its left. Leaving the broken regiments in its rear, the fusileer brigade came forward with imposing gallantry, and boldly confronted the French, now reinforced by a part of its reserve, and who were, as they believed, coming forward to annihilate the 'feeble few' that had still survived the murderous contest. From the daring attitude of the fresh regiments, Soult perceived too late, that the battle was not yet won; and, under a tremendous fire of artillery, he endeavoured to break up his close formation and open out his front. For a moment the storm of grape, poured from Ruty's well-served artillery, staggered the fusileers,—but it was only for a moment. Though Soult rushed into the thickest of the fire, and encouraged and animated his men,—though the cavalry gathered on their flank and threatened it with destruction—on went those noble regiments; volley after volley falling into the crowded ranks of their

enemy, and cheer after cheer pealing to heaven, in answer to the clamorous outcry of the French, as the boldest urged the others forward.

"Nothing could check the fusileers; they kept gradually advancing, while the incessant rolling of their musketry slaughtered the crowded sections of the French, and each moment embarrassed more and more Soult's efforts to open out his encumbered line. The enemy's reserve coming forward to support their comrades, was forced to the very edge of the plateau, and increased the crowd without remedying the disorder. The English volleys rolled on faster and more deadly than ever—a horrid carnage making all attempts to hold the hill vain, and thus uselessly increased an unavailing slaughter. Unable to bear the withering fire, the shattered columns of the French were no longer able to sustain themselves,*—the mass were driven over the ridge,—and trampling each other down, the shattered column sought refuge at the bottom of the hill.

"On that bloody height stood the conquerors. From 1500 muskets a parting volley fell upon the routed column as it hurried down the height. Where was the remainder of the proud array of England, which on the morning had exceeded 6,000 combatants?—Stretched coldly in the sleep of death, or bleeding on the battle ground!"†

Thus terminated one of the bloodiest conflicts upon record: for Godinot, perceiving that Latour Maubourg was repulsed by Lefebre's guns and a threatened charge from Lumley's cavalry, abandoned his efforts against the left,

* "Few battles have ever given the contending powers so high an opinion of each other. The French exhibited the highest possible state of discipline that day: nothing could be more perfect than they were in all their movements; no general could have wished for more excellent instruments, and no soldiers were ever directed by more consummate skill. This was more than counterbalanced by the incomparable bravery of their opponents."—*Southey.*

† Victories of the British Armies.

and drew back from the village of Albuera. At nine o'clock the conflict commenced,—at two it closed,—and the French, under a heavy fire of artillery, retired their beaten infantry across the river, and left the field of battle to the conquerors.

CHAPTER XXII.

NIGHT OF ALBUERA—SUFFERINGS OF THE WOUNDED—HEAVY CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES—ANECDOTES—SOULT RETREATS—OBSERVATIONS ON THE BATTLE—ERRORS OF SOULT AND BERESFORD—THE INTREPIDITY OF BOTH—LORD WELLINGTON'S OPINION OF THE ACTION—AFFAIR AT USAGRE—HILL SUCCEEDS BERESFORD, WHO IS RESTORED TO HIS FORMER COMMAND—ALARMING STATE OF THE PORTUGUESE ARMY—LETTERS TO LORD LIVERPOOL AND MR. STUART.

A TEMPESTUOUS night closed the memorable day of Albuera. The rain, which during the action had fallen heavily at intervals, became more constant and severe as evening advanced; and the streams which rolled down the heights and mingled with the waters of the river, were not unfrequently observed to be deeply tinged with blood. The village of Albuera had been plundered and destroyed by the enemy,—every house was roofless,—every inhabitant had disappeared; and had there been a place of shelter near, there was neither carriage nor beast of burden by which the wounded could have been removed. Throughout the night, and during the following day, the dead and the disabled lay upon the field as they had fallen; and nothing could be more painful than the groans and complainings of the wounded. Almost every man who had escaped unhurt was needed for picket duty; and the few who remained otherwise disposable, were quite unequal to afford assistance to half the sufferers who required it. "In this cruel situation Beresford sent Colonel Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake; but wrath and mortified

pride were predominant in that general's breast, and he refused; saying it was customary for the allied armies for each to take care of its own wounded;* and he declined extending the least relief to these heroic sufferers, who, by a prodigal expenditure of their blood, had saved his sluggish legions from extermination.

That such continued and desperate fighting must cause an enormous loss may be readily imagined. Besides 2,000 Spaniards and 500 Germans and Portuguese placed *hors de combat*, the British casualties amounted to 4,407;† an enormous loss when it is remembered that little more than 6,500 English soldiers were actually on the battle ground. Almost all the field officers were killed or wounded. Houghton died, cheering his men on; and Myers‡ and Duckworth, at the heads of their respective regiments.

* Napier.

† "Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the corps of the army under the command of Lieut.-General Viscount Wellington, K.B., under the immediate orders of Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, K.B., in the battle with the French army commanded by Marshal Soult, at Albuera, on the 16th of May, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	34	33	917	63	984
Wounded . .	181	146	2666	35	2993
Missing . . .	14	28	528	17	570
Total . . .	229	207	4101	115	4547

‡ While Myers was being carried by his servants to the rear, the body of General Houghton was borne past him on a mule, to be interred at Elvas. "Upon seeing it, Sir William desired, that if he should die they would bury him on the spot. He lived, however, to reach Valverde, and till the following day. When his dissolution drew near, he desired that his ring might be taken to his sister, and that she might be told he had died like a soldier. Six of his own men bore him to the grave, and laid him under an olive tree near Valverde."—*Southey.*

Stewart, Cole, Inglis, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkeshaw, were wounded. Few regiments could muster in the evening a third of the number with which they went into action; and the loss sustained by the 57th—known afterwards by the sobriquet of "die-hards"—stands without a parallel. Its strength, when led into fire, was about five hundred and seventy bayonets; and its casualties, at two o'clock, were twenty-three officers, and above four hundred rank and file.*

Both armies claimed a victory; but the title rested indubitably with the allies. Soult was master of a howitzer, some stands of colours, and 500 prisoners, of whom the greater proportion rejoined their regiments within a fortnight.† Beresford remained upon the battle field, from which his assailants had been deforced, and his trophies were sad but certain attendants on success—the bodies of the slain, and numbers of maimed unfortunates, too badly wounded to bear removal. Soult's total loss exceeded 8,000 men: and, in common with the British, the French field officers suffered heavily. Two generals were killed, and three wounded;‡ while a thousand of the enemy lay disabled on the heights; "and horrid piles of carcases within their lines told, with dreadful eloquence, who were the conquerors."

* "It is impossible by any description to do justice to the distinguished gallantry of the troops; but every individual most nobly did his duty, which will be well proved by the great loss we have suffered, though repulsing the enemy; and it was observed that our dead, particularly the 57th regiment, were lying as they had fought, in ranks, and every wound was in front."—*Beresford's Despatch to Wellington.*

† "About 300 of his prisoners were put into a convent which had been converted into a prison: they undermined the wall, and escaped with their officers at their head. The peasantry guided them, and supplied them with food on their way, and they rejoined the army in a body on the thirteenth day after the battle."—*Southey.*

‡ "The latter fact we learned from our prisoners, who asserted that the casualties among their leaders had been such as to leave the troops in many instances at a loss from whom to receive orders; and that this circumstance, more than any other, led to the retreat from the height, and the abandonment of further operations."—*Lord Londonderry's Narrative.*

The banner gained from a regiment almost exterminated in its defence, confers more honour in the loss than in the acquisition. Through many a hand the English colours passed, before a single stand was obtained by the assailants. Two were picked up upon the ground—for all immediately about them were dead or dying; and several, like those "of the Buffs, were recovered, after signal heroism had been displayed in their defence. Ensign Thomas, who bore one of the flags, was surrounded, and asked to give it up. 'Not but with my life!' was his answer, and his life was the instant forfeit; but the standard thus taken was regained, and the manner in which it had been defended will not be forgotten when it shall be borne again to battle. Ensign Walsh, who carried the other colours, had the staff broken in his hand by a cannon ball, and fell severely wounded; but, more anxious about his precious charge than himself, he separated the flag from the shattered staff, and secured it in his bosom, from whence it was taken when his wounds were dressed after the battle."*

It was generally expected that Soult on the next morning would have renewed the combat; and certainly, he was in every arm infinitely more effective than his opponent. The storm of war had fallen heavily on Beresford's best troops; and though he sternly held his ground, he dreaded a second trial for which he knew his strength was quite unequal. On the evening of the 17th, a British brigade joined him by a forced march; and, on the same night, Soult sent off all his wounded men who could bear removal, to Seville, and retreated next morning by a flank march on Solano. Hamilton's Portuguese brigade partially reinvested Badajoz; and the allied cavalry were despatched to follow the enemy with caution, as from their great inferiority no serious impression could be expected.

Albuera holds a singular character among the peninsular battles. It was a glorious display of British bravery, and a useless expenditure of British blood. On its

* Southey.

ensanguined heights the decided superiority of the "island soldiery" was established; and the high compliment was paid them by the ablest of the French marshals, that "they could not be persuaded they were beaten."*

The battle of Albuera has afforded for more than a quarter of a century a fruitful field for military controversy; and Beresford's conduct, while in command of the separate *corps d'armée* in Estremadura, has undergone an ordeal of public opinion, more remarkable for its severity than its justice. His errors have been rudely exposed—and his deserts ungenerously passed by unnoticed, or "damned with feeble praise."

There is no doubt that time was lost in the Alentejo; and when Badajoz was at last invested, that Beresford conducted his operations with a deliberate confidence, which nothing but a false security could have created. Although amply warranted by his instructions, every military consideration should have deterred him from abiding a battle at Albuera; and when the resolution was rashly taken, neither the previous dispositions were perfect, nor the after details of the action unobjectionable.

It was probably his greatest error, that to the opinions of others Beresford sacrificed his own. As was the case invariably with the Spanish commanders, Blake and Castanos were as ardent for a battle, as they were blind to the disadvantages under which an action must be fought. The British regiments were also impatient of the previous inaction in the Alentejo. Many of them as yet had never been under fire; "a burning thirst for battle was general; and Beresford had not the art either of conciliating or of exacting the confidence of his troops. It is certain that if he had retreated, a very violent and unjust clamour would

* "Soult is said to have acknowledged, that, in the whole course of his long service, he had never before seen so desperate and bloody a conflict. He is said also to have observed, 'There is no beating those troops, in spite of their generals! I always thought them bad soldiers, and now I am sure of it; for I turned their right, and penetrated their centre; they were completely beaten; the day was mine, and yet they did not know it, and would not run.'"—*Southey.*

have been raised against him; and this was so strongly and unceremoniously represented to him by an officer on his own staff, that he gave way."*

When he yielded to these considerations, he must have been conscious that his chances of success were doubtful. It was not because the ablest of the marshals, with an army complete in every arm, and capable of executing with rapidity the most complicated evolutions, was opposed to him, that he had cause to fear;—it was from his own troops that he had every thing to dread, on half of whom no reasonable confidence could be reposed. The Spaniards were unable to manœuvre. They were "an ill-commanded and ill-disciplined force, half-starved, half-armed, worn down by fatigue, and beaten repeatedly by the very troops they were again obliged to encounter."† Could Beresford rely upon their steadiness, when the history of all their battles told that an idle panic would disband them in an instant?‡ With such soldiers, numbers conferred no real advantage. True, they might stand to be cut down; but if a slight change of formation would have secured the fortunes of the day, of that they were incapable. All the fury of the fight, consequently, fell upon the British brigades; and, of necessity, their casualties were enormous.§

* Napier

† Victories of the British Armies.

‡ "We do what we please now with the Portuguese troops: we manœuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have some dependence on them; but these Spaniards can do nothing, but stand still; and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away."—*Wellington Despatches.*

§ "Our loss is very large; but we must expect loss whenever we engage the British troops with the Spaniards as allies."—*Ibid.*

"The Spaniards, by all accounts, behaved remarkably well; but they were immovable; and their want of discipline, and of the power of manœuvring, appears to me to have created a necessity for using the British infantry in all parts of the field, and to have thrown upon us the great burden of the battle. This was exactly the case in the battle of Talavera; and only that the Spanish troops were more distant from the fire, I suspect it was the case at the battle of Barrosa."—*Ibid.*

It was a great error of Beresford to neglect the occupation of the height in front of the right of his position,—and to that omission, the impression made by Soult upon the Spanish line is chiefly attributable. Blake's delay was embarrassing,—his subsequent conduct most perplexing,—and his obstinacy had nearly ruined the allied army. For this, no censure can attach to Beresford; and if he failed in directing Blake upon the battle ground, Wellington himself had been equally unsuccessful in managing Cuesta at Talavera.

Nor was Soult blameless in his dispositions. His opening success needed little indeed to have secured him a brilliant victory. He continued to fight in close column far too long; and when he saw his mistake, the murderous fire of the British troops in line, rendered his efforts to deploy ineffectual. "He employed the whole of Godinot's division of infantry in the attack of the village that gives its name to the battle; yet, when evacuated by Alten's brigades, it proved of no use whatever, for the battle was fought and decided on open ground, at the other extremity of the field, where an entire division of infantry would probably have turned the fate of the day."*

The personal bravery of both generals was boundless; and both were seen throughout the day, wherever the battle raged most furiously. By voice and gestures, Soult urged his soldiers forward; and when they finally recoiled from the slaughtering volleys of the fusiliers, to the last the French marshal was observed "in the battle's front," using brave, but vain attempts to rally and renew the combat. "During the hottest of the action, Marshal Beresford exposed himself with a degree of intrepidity, which could hardly fail of spreading an example of heroism around. The person of the general-in-chief was indeed seen everywhere, a gallant soldier!"† He repeatedly dragged the Spanish officers from their ranks, compelling them to lead their men forward, and show them the way; and when

* Raoul. † Napier.

individually charged by a Polish lancer, he grappled his adversary by the throat, threw him from his saddle, and an orderly dragoon despatched him.

On the 21st, Lord Wellington rode over the field of battle, examined the position carefully, and expressed himself as perfectly satisfied with all that had occurred. In a letter written next day he thus makes honourable mention of the battle :—

"You will have heard of the marshal's action on the 16th: the fighting was desperate, and the loss of the British has been very severe; but, adverting to the nature of the contest, and the manner in which they held their ground against all the efforts the whole French army could make against them, notwithstanding all the losses which they had sustained, I think this action one of the most glorious and honourable to the character of the troops of any that has been fought during the war."*

In the meantime, Beresford's advance was of necessity a slow and cautious movement. At Almendralejoz some of Soult's wounded men fell into his hands; and the operation was terminated on the 25th, at Usagre, by a very brilliant affair of cavalry. General Lumley having by able dispositions induced General Bron, with a brigade of heavy cavalry, to cross the river unsupported, charged with the 3d and 4th dragoon guards, assisted by a flank movement of Madden's Portuguese, and under the fire of a troop of horse artillery. The attack was bravely executed; and the French, driven back upon the bridge by which their companions were advancing to their assistance, were disordered and cut down, sustaining a loss of more than 200 in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

At this period of the campaign, General Hill arrived at Lisbon from England; and Lord Wellington was enabled to

* Wellington Despatches.

restore his Portuguese command to Marshal Beresford, and reappoint Hill to the second division which illness had obliged him to resign. In consequence, "Beresford went back into Portugal to the important charge for which he was so eminently qualified, and in which he had rendered a service to the common cause of Europe, never to be mentioned without respect. Admirable as a second in command, skilful to organize a new-raised army, a good aid in battle, and personally intrepid, the marshal with all this was not popular; and therefore, perhaps, it is that the censures of his conduct in this battle have been so constantly, and with so little abatement, reiterated. However, despite all censure, his name will go down to posterity associated for ever, and that too in the relation of commander, with those unconquerable soldiers who upheld the fame of England upon the bloody field of Albuera."*

It was imperative indeed, that an effort should be made to restore the Portuguese army. The military attitude which Lord Wellington had assumed, offered a singular contrast to that of the preceding year. Then, it was questionable whether, even within the lines of Lisbon, he should have been enabled to maintain himself; now, he had expelled beyond the frontiers the last Frenchman of that splendid army, especially directed by Napoleon "to drive the leopards to the sea." One fortress had already been recovered,—another was besieged,—and, with a divided army, Wellington had fought and won two battles. Still, victories produced a heavy expenditure of human life, and increasing successes required an increase of means; but while his operations progressively extended, he found the only allies upon whom he could place reliance, deteriorate in strength and efficiency, until the diminution of the Portuguese army seemed the forerunner of its total dismemberment. The apathy and corruption of the regency showed themselves in every department; and the sad

* Sherer.

condition to which their military establishment had been reduced, will be best imagined from the perusal of two extracts from Lord Wellington's correspondence; one addressed to Lord Liverpool, and the other to Mr. Stuart:—

"The attention of the British government has been frequently drawn to the state of affairs in this country by the reports of Mr. Stuart and myself, particularly as that state affects the military departments and establishments; but as the success of the military operations has recently been much impeded by the defects of constitution, by the disobedience and neglect of those employed, and by the failure of all the departments of the Portuguese army, I consider it my duty to draw your lordship's attention to the subject again in a particular manner.

"The Portuguese troops with this part of the army do not produce in the field half of their effective strength, because the soldiers have been ill fed and taken care of; and vast numbers of them are in hospitals. Before I broke up from the cantonments on the Rio Mayor river I took upon me to make an arrangement by which the troops serving in the same divisions with British troops should be fed by the British commissaries, of which I enclose a copy; under which arrangement five brigades of infantry of seven doing duty in this part of the army were taken charge of, and there remained but two, and one brigade of cavalry, to be taken care of by the Portuguese departments.

"These two brigades of infantry have been starving ever since; and, whenever there is any call for the military service of the troops, they are obliged to call upon the British commissariat for subsistence, thus reducing the quantity for the consumption of the British divisions.

"The Portuguese cavalry are so much reduced by want of food, that a regiment which I was desirous of employing in the recent affairs with the enemy could produce in the field only sixty men.

"None of the Portuguese officers or troops are paid;

and the consequence is that the officers are suffering the extremity of distress, and the soldiers desert in large numbers.

"The mules attached to the artillery, not having been fed during the winter, were unable to perform service when the army broke up from the Rio Mayor river. After having reduced the quantity of ammunition drawn with each brigade, I have lately been obliged to send away two pieces of cannon belonging to one Portuguese brigade of artillery.

"In the actions of the 3d and 5th (Fuentes d'Oñoro) the quantity of ammunition expended by the Portuguese brigade of artillery engaged, very nearly amounted to the whole quantity they carried with them; and I was obliged to have recourse to the expedient of picking up the enemy's shot which had been fired into our camp, and of making it up into ammunition with powder and materials drawn from the British artillery.

"The reserves of Portuguese ordnance and musket ammunition are at this moment not less than six marches from the army, owing to the want of means of transport to convey them; and I have been obliged to order the commissary general to use the means of transport destined to convey provisions for soldiers and forage for horses, to bring up the Portuguese ordnance and musket ammunition.

"The Portuguese wounded soldiers are taken care of in our hospitals, as they have none of their own.

"These are facts affecting our existing situation which press upon me at the moment; and I state them to your lordship as instances of the description of inconvenience, which might amount to risk and danger, resulting from the defects, the neglects, and the ignorance of the Portuguese departments. It is obvious that no officer can venture to conduct any military operation against an active enemy with such means; and I do not scruple to acknowledge that I have felt the greatest uneasiness respecting the success of the operations which I am now carrying on, on both sides of the Tagus, in consequence of the diminution of the numbers

and of the efficiency of the Portuguese army, owing to the defects of all the departments attached to it.

* * * * *

"My Lord, the state to which the enemy are reduced in the Peninsula may enable us to carry on our operations under all the disadvantages described in this and the enclosed letters; but your lordship will judge for yourself of the consequences which might result from the facts which I have related. I think it proper, however, to inform your lordship that, if the enemy should be enabled to increase his force again in the Peninsula, the difficulties, which are the consequences of the defects in the Portuguese departments, will be vastly aggravated, and the danger increased to such a degree, that it may become a question whether His Majesty's troops ought to be exposed to it.

* * * * *

"At this moment Colonel Ashworth's brigade, which I have ordered from Beira into Alentejo, in consequence of the battle of Albuera, are living upon the supplies of the British army. As usual, they were living from hand to mouth, generally starving, when the order to march arrived, and Sir Brent Spencer was obliged to supply them with every thing to enable them to move! This is called maintaining an army for service!! One brigade cannot move from one province to another, because the government will not supply it with food!!!

* * * * *

"I rather imagine that you have mistaken the nature of the paper I have sent you regarding the ammunition at Coimbra. There are no troops at Coimbra; but we are informed that there was ammunition at Coimbra for the Portuguese army in Beira, which, considering that the battle was fought on the frontier, was far enough, God knows! But the paper which I sent to you proved that the reserve ammunition for the army was not even at Coimbra; and if a serious battle had been fought the Portuguese troops would have had none.

"These dignitaries of the church are always dreaming of battles; but I should like to know whether they ever dreamt that a soldier with a musket could not fight without ammunition, and that in two hours he can expend all he can carry."

This was a sorry but it was a faithful picture of the military state of an ally, on whom so much of England's treasure had been lavished, and from whose professions so much valuable cooperation had been expected. For every reason, the insensibility of the Portuguese and Spaniards to the immense exertions made by Britain for their deliverance, was to be deplored. In other quarters, the dawning of liberty had broken. Peninsular successes had dispelled the idle belief that Napoleon was invincible; and many, on whose opinions disastrous warfare had produced despondency, in the shadows of coming events perceived the promise of a glorious consummation. None, through the darkest hours of the contest, saw more clearly than Lord Wellington, that Napoleon's was a career too brilliant and too dangerous to bear the test of human uncertainty; and—a brief period in a life—four short years, confirmed his predictions.

The sad mistakes hitherto committed by the government at home, arose from the ignorance they betrayed in the application of their means,* by frittering England's strength away in desultory and useless efforts. Even now, experience had not taught wisdom—for still these idle projects were largely entertained, and partially acted on. Instead

* Income and expenditure of Great Britain for 1810:—

I.—INCOME.

Ordinary Revenues.

Customs	£9,909,735
Excise	18,495,178
Stamps	5,546,082
Land and Assessed Taxes	8,011,205
Post-Office	1,471,746
Crown Lands	110,273
Lesser Sources	1,250,697
Total permanent	£44,794,916

[*Extraordinary.*

of consolidating her wondrous resources, Britain tried military and naval experiments here and there, incurring the danger of defeat, without having objects sufficiently important, if fortunate, to render conquest valuable. Descents upon the eastern coast of Spain had recently occupied the attention of ministers, and met a favourable consideration. To Lord Wellington, however, the intended operations had been communicated, and, fortunately for the country, his marked disapprobation saved Britain the expense and mortification which attended these idle and unproductive expeditions.

Brought up	£44,794,916
Extraordinary.	
Customs	3,906,483
Excise	6,855,812
Property Tax	13,492,215
Lottery	471,250
Irish Loan	2,448,470
Surplus fees of officers	136,398
Loans, including 1,400,000*l.* Irish	13,242,356
Grand total net payments	£85,350,900 !

II.—EXPENDITURE.

Interest of National Debt, and charges of management		£21,773,227
Sinking Fund		11,660,601
Interest of Exchequer Bills		1,815,105
Civil List		1,533,110
Civil Government of Scotland		118,186
Miscellaneous		775,399
Navy		20,058,412
Army		18,536,300
Ordnance		4,652,331
Loans to other countries, viz.—		
Sicily	£425,000	
Portugal	1,247,898	
Spain	387,294	
		2,050,082
Miscellaneous		2,270,867
		£85,243,620

"I earnestly recommend to you," he said, in his letter to Lord Liverpool, "not to undertake any of the maritime operations on the coast of Spain upon which you have desired to have my opinion. Unless you should send a very large force, you would scarcely be able to effect a landing, and maintain the situation of which you might obtain possession. Then that large force would be unable to move, or to effect any object at all adequate to the expense or to the expectation which would be formed from its strength, owing to the want of those equipments and supplies in which an army landed from its ships must be deficient.

"It is in vain to hope for any assistance, even in this way, much less military assistance, to such expeditions, from the Spaniards. The first thing they would require uniformly would be money; then arms, ammunition, clothing of all descriptions, provisions, forage, horses, means of transport,* and every thing which your expedition would have a right to require from them; and, after all, this extraordinary and perverse people would scarcely allow the commander of your expedition to have a voice in the decision on the plan of operations to be followed, when the whole should be ready to undertake one.

"Depend upon it that Portugal should be the foundation of all your operations in the Peninsula, of whatever nature they may be; upon which point I have never altered

* The enormous demands made by the Spanish Junta would scarcely be credited. In one official application to Mr. Stuart, he was peremptorily required to furnish *without delay*, ten millions of dollars, five hundred thousand yards of cloth, four million yards of linen for shirts and for the hospitals, three hundred thousand pair of shoes, thirty thousand pair of boots, twelve million of cartridges, two hundred thousand muskets, twelve thousand pair of pistols, fifty thousand swords, one hundred thousand arobas of flour, besides *salt meat and fish!* The assistance rendered in return may be estimated from a postscript to one of Lord Wellington's despatches to his brother:—

"P.S. Just to show you the kind of people the Spaniards are to deal with, I mention that I cannot station even a corporal's party, or send a patrole, into the Sierra de Gata, or the Sierra de Francia, without giving the corporal money to pay for rations for the horses and men of his party, while the French take every thing in the same district for nothing."

my opinion. If they are to be offensive, and Spain is to be the theatre of them, your commanders must be in a situation to be entirely independent of all Spanish authorities; by which means alone they will be enabled to draw some resources from the country, and some assistance from the Spanish armies."

We mentioned that public opinion had undergone a change. Indeed, men could not have continued much longer blind to the growth of that controlling power on the Peninsula, which was gradually sapping Napoleon's strength, and weakening an influence hitherto paramount over Europe. This change was not the loudly-expressed display of popular exultation—that evanescent joy which a victory calls forth, and a defeat extinguishes. It was the well-grounded assurance of success, slowly and cautiously received, and hence the more likely to be permanent. Of the whig members in the lower house, some most remarkable for their bitter opposition to the continuance of an army on the Peninsula, now saw their error, and acknowledged that they had been mistaken. Among this number was Mr. Whitbread; and with an honest and manly sincerity, that gentleman wrote to Lord Wellington, admitting his high deserts, and renouncing his own previously-expressed opinions as erroneous. At the same time, the Chancellor conveyed to him the thanks of the Lords; and in terms of similar compliment, the Speaker communicated the approbation of the House of Commons. Of these flattering testimonials, Mr. Whitbread's letter was undoubtedly the proudest offering. It was a moral triumph, achieved entirely by individual merit over the rancour of prejudice and party; and that he felt it to be such, his reply to Mr. Whitbread clearly establishes.

"*Elvas, 23d May*, 1811.

"My dear Sir,

"I was most highly gratified by your letter of the 29th April, which I received last night; and I beg leave to return my thanks for the mode in which you have taken the

trouble of informing me of the favourable change of your opinion respecting affairs in this country.

"I acknowledge that I was much concerned to find that persons, for whom I entertained the highest respect, and whose opinions were likely to have great weight in England and throughout Europe, had delivered erroneous opinions, as I thought, respecting affairs in this country; and I prized their judgment so highly, at the same time that I was certain of the error of the opinion which they had delivered, that I was induced to attribute their conduct to the excess of the spirit of party.

"I assure you that, highly as I am gratified and flattered by the approbation of —— ——, and yourself and others, that which gives me most pleasure in the account which I received last night from England, is to be convinced that such men could not be unjust towards an officer in the service of the country abroad; and that the opinions which they had delivered, however unfavourable to him, were the real dictates of their judgments, upon a fair view of all the circumstances which had come to their knowledge. To the gratification arising from this conviction, to one who appears destined to pass his life in the harness, you have added that which I received from your obliging letter; and I assure you that I am very sensible of the kindness towards me which induced you to write to me."

Immediately on the arrival of the 3d and 7th divisions, the siege of Badajoz was actively resumed. On the left bank of the Guadiana the investment had been commenced by General Hamilton on the 19th. That on the right was effected on the 25th by the 7th division, under Major-General Houstoun; and on the 27th Picton forded the river above the fortress, and united the third division with the Portuguese corps already before the place.

CHAPTER XXIII.

STRENGTH OF THE ALLIES ON THE GUADIANA BUT TEMPORARY—DELAY IN BESIEGING BADAJOZ—PLAN OF THE ATTACK—THE PLACE TWICE ASSAULTED WITHOUT SUCCESS—DETAIL GIVEN TO LORD LIVERPOOL OF THE CAUSES OF HIS FAILURE BY LORD WELLINGTON—OBSERVATIONS ON THE SIEGE—MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH MARSHALS—THE ALLIES MARCH FROM THE AGUEDA—CAVALRY AFFAIR NEAR ESPEJA—MARMONT UNITES WITH REYNIER AT ALMAREZ—IS DELAYED IN CROSSING THE TAGUS—CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT HAVE RESULTED.

THE superiority of Lord Wellington's strength upon the Guadiana, he was well aware, could be but temporary, and Badajoz must fall at once, or not at all.* The place was too important for the French to allow it to be lost without making strenuous exertions for its deliverance. Marmont, no doubt, would move with all his disposable force upon the Tagus; and Soult, more formidable than ever from the large reinforcements which had joined him, would easily effect a junction with the army of Portugal, and thus complete a magnificent "*corps d'armée*," too powerful in every arm for any thing which Lord Wellington could oppose to it.

Nor could the siege be immediately commenced. The battering-train had been injured so much in its hasty removal to Elvas, that by the engineer's report, eleven days

* "We break ground at Badajoz to-morrow, and we hope to get the place in a few days. If we do not succeed in a few days, we shall not succeed at all, as the seventeen or nineteen battalions, and some cavalry of the ninth corps, are on their march to join Soult, and I think will join him the second week in June."—*Letter to Mr. H. Wellesley, Elvas, 29th May*, 1811.

would be necessary to repair the carriages, and render the guns serviceable.

The plan adopted by Lord Wellington was similar to that pursued by Marshal Beresford, but the means of aggression were increased, and counter-batteries, armed with guns and mortars, were erected to keep down the fire of the place. Both San Christoval and the castle were to be attacked at the same time; and the siege artillery was thus distributed:—

Attack of San Christoval.

24-pounders	12
16-pounders	4
10-inch howitzers	2
8-inch ditto	4
24-pounders in reserve, brass	4

Attack of the Castle.

24-pounders	14
8-inch howitzers	4
10-inch ditto	2

The 24-pounders were supplied with 600 rounds a gun; the 16-pounders with 300; the 8-inch howitzers with 350 shells each; and the 10-inch with 200. The wheels of the howitzers were taken off, and the carriages placed on the ground, so as to fire at an elevation of thirty degrees in place of mortars. "Since the last operation, a convoy of stores had arrived at Elvas from Alcacer do Sal; and there were now conveyed to depôts, close to the two attacks, 3,500 entrenching tools, 60,000 sand bags, 600 gabions, 600 fascines, a liberal supply of splinter-proof timber, platforms and plank, and all the carpenters' and miners' tools and small stores received from Lisbon."*

Limited in time, and crippled in every thing required for carrying a siege through, Lord Wellington endeavoured to overcome by energy and daring, disadvantages from which

* Jones's Journal of Sieges.

others would have shrunk at once. On the 3d, his batteries opened. On the 6th, San Christoval was assaulted without success. Again, upon the evening of the 9th, the trial was made and proved unfortunate; and on the 10th the siege was raised.

The details of his failure are thus given in an official letter addressed to Lord Liverpool, as remarkable for its clearness as its candour.

"My Lord, "*Quinta de Granicha, 13th June*, 1811.

"In consequence of a report from the chief engineer, Lieut.-Colonel Fletcher, that the fire from San Christoval might occasion the loss of many lives in the operations on the left of the Guadiana, and the breach in that outwork having been apparently much improved by the fire throughout the 6th, I directed that an attempt might be made to carry San Christoval by storm that night. Major-General Houstoun, who conducted the operations of the siege on the right of the Guadiana, accordingly ordered a detachment under Major Macintosh, of the 85th regiment, to make the attempt. The men advanced under a very heavy fire of musketry and hand-grenades from the outworks, and of shot and shells from the town, with the utmost intrepidity, and in the best order, to the bottom of the breach; the advanced guard being led by Ensign Dyas, of the 51st regiment, who volunteered to perform this duty; but they found that the enemy had cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp; and, notwithstanding that they were provided with ladders, it was impossible to mount it.* They retired with some loss.

* "The fort was evidently weakly manned, and the garrison not having yet brought any very destructive fire on the assailants, the officers considered the opportunity favourable for an attempt to force in by escalade, and directed twelve ladders of 15 feet in length, which had been supplied with the view of aiding in mounting the breach, to be employed against the scarp wall. The scarp being more than 20 feet in height the attempt proved abortive: other points of less height were sought, and the ladders were applied in vain

"The fire upon San Christoval, as well as upon the place, continued on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, on which day the breach in the wall of San Christoval appeared practicable; and I directed that a second attempt should be made on that night to obtain possession of that outwork. Major-General Houstoun ordered another detachment for this service, under the command of Major M'Geechy, of the 17th Portuguese regiment, who, with the officers destined to command the different parties composing the detachment, had been employed throughout the 8th and 9th in reconnoitring the breach and the different approaches to it.

"They advanced at about nine at night, in the best order, though opposed by the same means, and with the same determination as had been opposed to the detachment which had made the attempt on the 6th.

"Ensign Dyas again led the service, and the storming party arrived at the foot of the breach; but they found it impossible to mount it, the enemy having again cleared the rubbish from the bottom of the escarp. The detachment suffered considerably, and Major M'Geechy, the commanding officer, was unfortunately killed, and others of the officers fell; but the troops continued to maintain their station till Major-General Houstoun ordered them to retire.*

to almost every face and flank of the work. The garrison showered down upon the assaulting party shells, hand-grenades, stones, &c. in overwhelming quantities for an hour, in which these impracticable attempts were persevered in. At one o'clock A. M. the residue of the party retired, having lost 12 killed and 90 wounded. Lieutenant Forster, at the close of the combat, received a shot through the body, of which he died."—*Jones's Journal of Sieges.*

* "Every one who succeeded in reaching the parapet was instantly bayoneted down; and the garrison, after a little while mounting on the parapet, upset the ladders. At this time the two assaulting columns were completely mixed together, and united in many strenuous endeavours to replace the ladders at various points of the front; but the enormous quantity of large shells, hand-grenades, bags of powder and combustibles, which the garrison threw into the ditch, rendered their perseverance and gallantry unavailing; and after braving destruction till ten P. M., and having 40 men killed and 100 wounded, the remainder of the assaulting party was ordered to retire."—*Ibid.*

"When the reinforcements had arrived from the frontier of Castile, after the battle of Albuera, I undertook the siege of Badajoz, entertaining a belief that the means of which I had the command would reduce the place before the end of the second week in June, at which time I expected that the reinforcement for the enemy's southern army, detached from Castile, would join Marshal Soult. I was unfortunately mistaken in my estimate of the quality of those means.

"The ordnance belonging to the garrison of Elvas is very ancient and incomplete; unprovided with the improvements adopted by modern science to facilitate and render more certain the use of cannon; and although classed generally as 24-pounders, the guns were found to be of a calibre larger than the shot in the garrison of that weight. The fire from this ordnance was therefore very uncertain, and the carriages proved to be worse even than we supposed they were; and both guns and carriages were rendered useless so frequently by the effect of our own fire as to create delay, in consequence of the necessity which existed for exchanging both in the advanced batteries.*

"Those who are accustomed to observe the effect of the fire of artillery, will be astonished to learn that fire was kept up from the 2d to the 10th instant from fourteen 24-

* "The number of pieces of ordnance disabled during the siege was as follows:—

	24-pounder guns.		10-inch howitzers.	8-inch howitzers.	General Total.
	Iron.	Brass.			
Disabled by the fire of the enemy	1	2	—	3	6
Ditto by their own fire	—	15	2	1	18
Total	1	17	2	4	24

being eighteen guns and six howitzers rendered unserviceable—and the vent of the other thirteen brass 24-pounders being much enlarged and in a very bad state."—*Journal of Sieges.*

pounders, upon the wall of the castle of Badajoz, constructed of rammed earth and loose stones, of which the foot was seen at the distance of from 400 to 600 yards, and that it had not at last effected a practicable breach. It was impossible to estimate the length of time which would elapse before a practicable breach could have been effected in this wall; and, even if one had been effected, it was the opinion of the engineers and others, as well as my own, that although the breach could have been stormed, we could not have formed our troops to attack the enemy's intrenchment within, unless we had possession of Fort San Christoval.

"We had failed in two attempts to obtain possession of Fort San Christoval, and it was obvious to me that we could not obtain possession of that outwork, without performing a work which would have required the labour of several days to accomplish it.

"On the morning of the 10th instant I received an intercepted despatch, from the Duke of Dalmatia to the Duke of Ragusa, which pointed out clearly the enemy's design to collect in Estremadura their whole force; and I had reason to believe that Bonet's corps, which had marched from Toledo on the 28th and 29th of May, and was expected at Cordova on the 5th and 6th instant, would have joined the southern army by the 10th; and it was generally expected in the country that the southern army would have moved by that time.

"The movement of this army alone would have created a necessity for raising the siege; but on the same morning I received accounts from the frontiers of Castile, which left no doubt of the destination of the army of Portugal to the southward, and gave ground for belief that they would arrive at Merida on the 15th instant.

"I therefore ordered that the siege should be raised.

"I am concerned to add that this measure was rendered expedient, not only by the military considerations to which I have above referred, but by others relative to the security of Elvas.

"If the siege had been continued only for two days longer there would have remained at Elvas only 10,000 24-pound shot; a quantity by no means sufficient for its defence, if the course of events should enable the enemy to attack that place; and I learn that there are none at Lisbon, and if there were any, the government, under present circumstances, have not the power of procuring means of transport to send it up.

"Since the troops under Sir William Beresford have been in this part of the country, General Hamilton's division of Portuguese troops, consisting of three brigades, had been supplied with provisions generally from the stores of Elvas, as well as the troops of the garrison; and the stores of Elvas had been very inadequately, if at all, upheld to answer these demands.

"The consequence is, that there are not at this moment in the fort supplies for the garrison for one fortnight.

"All the means of transport which could be collected in this neighbourhood were employed in aid of the operations of the siege, from which they could not be relieved till the siege should be raised, and the ordnance and stores returned to Elvas.

"The application of these means of transport, to bring a supply to Elvas from the British magazines at Abrantes (which is the resource from which at last it must be drawn), and the eventual safety of that place required an early discontinuance of the operations against Badajoz; and this, independent of the circumstances above referred to, and the military considerations resulting from them, was a principal motive with me for raising the siege on the 10th instant.

"From this circumstance your lordship will see additional reason to lament the state of inefficiency of all the Portuguese departments attached to the army. It affords an additional proof of the embarrassments which meet me at every turn, from wants and deficiencies for which the Portuguese government ought to provide, but which invariably

at last fall, at the most critical moments, upon the resources which have been provided, with great difficulty and labour, and at great expense, by the departments of the British army.

"I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all the officers and troops employed at the siege of Badajoz, whose labours and exertions deserved a very different result.

* * * * *

"I enclose a return of the killed and wounded throughout the siege,* from which your lordship will observe that, excepting in the attempts to obtain possession of San Christoval, our loss has not been severe. We still maintain the blockade of Badajoz; and I know from an intercepted letter, that the enemy had in the place, on the 28th of May, only three weeks' provisions."

That the siege of Badajoz should fail, was an event for which Lord Wellington was prepared; and his official correspondence shows that the result of the attempt was always considered by himself as more than doubtful. He had few attached to the army who knew aught of engineering. Sappers and miners he had none, and a large proportion of

* "Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Lieut.-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K.B., in the several affairs with the French army, from the 30th of May to the 11th of June, 1811, inclusive.

	Officers.	Non-com^{d}. Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	9	3	106	—	118
Wounded	22	17	315	—	354
Missing	3	—	6	—	9
Total. . . .	34	20	427	—	481

his gunners were Portuguese, men full of zeal and gallantry, but sadly wanting in experience. "The ordnance employed at this siege, besides being of an excessively bad quality, was also totally inadequate in quantity to the reduction of such a fortress as Badajoz, although everything Elvas could supply was drawn from that garrison. The guns, it has been stated, were of brass, false in their bore, and already worn by previous service, and the shot were of all shapes and diameters, giving a windage from one-tenth to half an inch. The howitzers used as mortars were defective equally with the guns: their chambers were all of unequal size, the shells did not fit the bore, and their beds were unsteady; so that the practice was necessarily vague and uncertain, and they proved of little value."*

Few as the engineers were, they needed the commonest means to have rendered their services efficient.† Their implements were of the worst quality; and as Phillipon had scarped the rock bare before San Christoval, "the stony surface required a supply of earth and woolpacks, to form an artificial covering for the engineers and fatigue parties; while the workmen were exposed to the fire of several sixteen and eighteen-inch mortars, which threw their enormous shells with a precision that threatened ruin to everything within their range."‡

That Badajoz was besieged contrary to the rules of obsolete warfare must be conceded. It is a military maxim that a siege, provided there be time and means, is the only certain operation which a general can engage in. Wellington

* Jones's Journals of Sieges.

† "The skill displayed belonged to particular persons, rather than to the corps at large; and the very tools with which they worked, especially those sent from the storekeeper's department, were so shamefully bad that the work required could scarcely be performed; the captured French cutting-tools were eagerly sought for by the engineers as being infinitely better than the British; and when the soldiers' lives and the honour of England's arms were at stake, the English cutlery was found worse than the French."—*Napier.*

‡ Victories of the British Armies.

failed because he wanted both; but even that failure enhanced his reputation. An officer,* probably more competent than any to estimate Lord Wellington's plans and prospects of success, thus offers his opinion:—

"The most critical examination of the operations of this siege will not allow of blame for its failure being thrown on any one. From the general to the soldier each did his duty; nor should want of success discredit the original project. It must be admitted that there was a judicious application of all the means that could be collected for the reduction of Christoval. On trial those means proved insufficient; many of the causes of their insufficiency could not have been foreseen, and others, if foreseen, could not have been remedied; all that skill and bravery could effect was done.

* * * * *

"Such part of it as was carried through augured favourably for the remainder, and a candid consideration will, perhaps, grant that this attempt to recover Badajoz, although bold and hazardous in the extreme, and contrary to all rule, had much merit as a feasible expedient, and deserved a happier result."

In the mean time the movements of the French marshals were clearly developed. The flank position taken by the Duke of Dalmatia at Llerena, had always convinced Lord Wellington that Badajoz was his dearest object, and that he only waited for reinforcements to assume an offensive attitude on the Guadiana. On the 14th Drouet joined Soult, and both generals moved forward to Fuente del Maestro, while Hill with the covering army took post on the heights of Albuera. Marmont simultaneously commenced his operations, by despatching Regnier with two divisions through the pass of Banos, while with the remainder of his corps d'armée he advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo, protecting an immense convoy destined for the use of that fortress.

* Colonel Jones, R.E.

Lord Wellington, in consequence, issued orders for the divisions behind the Agueda* to move towards the Tagus by correspondent routes, should the Duke of Ragusa make that river the object of his march, or take up the line of the Coa, if assailed; and should the French marshal threaten Almeida, Spencer had instructions to ruin the works, and dismantle the fortress. This latter order was rather hastily executed by General Pack; and Spencer retired on the 6th, when Marmont issued from Rodrigo in two columns, one marching on Gallegos, and the other on Espeja. "The light division fell back before the latter, and Slade's cavalry before the former; but in this retrograde movement, the latter gave its flank obliquely to the line of the enemy's advance, which soon closed upon, and cannonaded it, with eight pieces of artillery. Unfortunately the British rear-guard got jammed in between the French and a piece of marshy ground, and in this situation the whole must have been destroyed, if Captain Purvis, with a squadron of the fourth dragoons, had not charged the enemy, while the other troopers, with strong horses and a knowledge of the firmest parts, got through the marsh. Purvis then passed also, and the French horses could not follow. Thus the retreat was effected with a loss of only twenty men."†

Marmont's true line of march was the Tagus; and while Regnier directed his route by the passes of Banos and Bejar, the French marshal moved through that of Perales, and the whole united at the bridge of Almaraz. But here an unexpected delay occurred. The pontoons had not reached the Tagus from Madrid, and the passage of the entire corps d'armée was accomplished by a solitary ferry-boat. Four days were thus consumed, a period sufficiently long to have enabled Lord Wellington to reduce Badajoz had his siege artillery remained serviceable; and the accidental circumstances of his gun-metal being composed of

* First, fifth, sixth, and light divisions, and a brigade of cavalry.
† Napier.

Portuguese brass* instead of British iron, robbed his daring efforts of success, and preserved a fortress for Napoleon.

* The first siege of Badajoz by the English being attempted with forty bronze cannon of Portuguese construction, the whole were rendered unserviceable in a very short space of time, though loaded with powder not more than one-third of the weight of the balls, and discharged at the moderate rate of once only in eight minutes; and the siege miscarried. The English attributed the quick deterioration of the cannon to the strength of their powder, and consequently they determined to have no parks but such as were composed of cast-iron cannon from England."—*Thiery.*

CHAPTER XXIV.

LORD WELLINGTON HALTS AT ALBUERA—TAKES AFTERWARDS A POSITION ON THE CAYA—STRENGTH OF THE RIVAL ARMIES—THE FRENCH MARSHALS SEPARATE—BLAKE'S OPERATIONS FAIL—LETTER TO THE HON. HENRY WELLESLEY—HEAD QUARTERS CHANGED TO PORTALEGRE—DEFEAT OF LORCA—WELLINGTON BLOCKADES RODRIGO; AND THE FRENCH ARMIES UNITE TO RELIEVE THE PLACE—DESPATCH TO LORD LIVERPOOL—POSITION OF FUENTE GUINALDO—AFFAIRS OF EL BODON AND ALDEA DA PONTE—CASUALTIES OF THE ALLIES ON THE 25TH AND 27TH OF SEPTEMBER.

THE advance of the Duke of Dalmatia confirmed Wellington's resolution of remaining at Albuera to the last moment that prudence would warrant, in the hope that he might succeed in bringing Soult to action, before he could receive assistance from Marmont, who had reached Truxillo on the 14th. The caution of the French marshal, however, was extreme; and on the 17th, the allies recrossed the Guadiana, taking a position on the Caya, while, on the 19th, the enemy introduced their convoys into Badajoz; and that fortress, when reduced to great extremity, was a second time abundantly replenished with provisions, and all the munitions of war.

The position of the allies was chosen with admirable judgment. It embraced a surface of scarcely four leagues, the right extending to the lower bridge of the Caya, and the left appuied upon the heights over the Gevora, and protected by the fortress of Campo Mayor. The nature of the ground effectually masked the dispositions of the allied brigades from observation by the enemy, while excellent communications enabled Lord Wellington to move the

mass of his army with celerity on any threatened point; and from the flatness of the country round Badajoz, any hostile movement was discernible from Fort La Lippe and the numerous watch towers which stud the Portuguese frontier.

It was necessary, indeed, that the strength of his position should compensate for Lord Wellington's numerical inferiority. The united army in his front outnumbered him in every arm, comprising 63,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 90 pieces of cannon; consequently the allied general was weaker in infantry by 10,000, while in cavalry and artillery the French marshals exceeded him nearly by one-half.

The opinion in the British camp was general, that a battle must be fought, and on the morning of the 24th the movements of the enemy tended to confirm this belief. Their cavalry and horse artillery crossed the Guadiana in two heavy columns, the right being directed towards Campo Mayor, and the left on Elvas. Although the allied divisions got immediately under arms, their masses were never exposed to view; and Soult and Marmont, after manœuvring in front of the position until evening, ended their unsatisfactory reconnaissance and withdrew. The right column had been steadily and successfully checked by the English and Portuguese heavy cavalry, but on the left the enemy had better fortune; a squadron of the 11th light dragoons was lost through the inexperience of their commanding officer, and the 2d German hussars driven in great confusion into Elvas, raising the casualties on this occasion to more than one hundred and fifty men.*

For a month the French marshals remained together; their numerous cavalry scouring the face of the country to an immense extent, and wasting it of everything that was

* The French cavalry were mistaken, from a general similarity in their appearance, for Portuguese dragoons. "The absurd fancy indulged in at home, of imitating foreign patterns in clothing the cavalry, led to numerous mistakes; while it greatly embarrassed officers, in ascertaining correctly whether troops, when at a trifling distance, were in reality friends or foes."—*Victories, &c.*

convertible into sustenance for either men or horses. At last, these precarious supplies failed altogether; and Soult and Marmont retired from Estremadura,—the latter marching northwards, and the former falling back upon Seville.

When the marshals separated, Soult left the 5th corps under the command of Girard, with Marmont; and the latter moved by the valley of the Tagus, and established his head quarters at Salamanca, occupying Truxillo and Plasencia, each with a division, and securing by military posts the passes of Bejar and Banos. Girard was cantoned at Zafra, and the northern army directed to cooperate with that of Portugal, when an opportunity of striking at Lord Wellington should present itself. Napoleon had planned the mode in which the future operations of these armies should be conducted; and when Dorsenne succeeded Bassieres, he received instructions from the Emperor to concert measures with Marmont, and act vigorously with their combined forces against the allies.

A strange fatality appeared still to influence the Spanish efforts in the field. Blake had urged Lord Wellington to remain beyond the Guadiana, but past experience had shown how little "twelve thousand Spaniards and an uneasy colleague" would assist, if a battle with the united corps d'armée of Soult and Marmont should result. Accordingly the Spanish general was allowed to act by himself, and an operation easy of execution, and important if effected, was suggested by Lord Wellington, and undertaken. Blake was to march rapidly down the right bank of the Guadiana, recross the river at Mertola, and obtain possession of Seville and its important magazines, then but weakly defended, and if lost, involving the entire support by which the blockade of Cadiz was maintained. But the expedition was a wretched failure. Blake amused himself by investing the castle of Niebla, without artillery; and consequently, poor as the place was, he was forced from it with some loss, while Soult immediately crossed the Sierra Morena, and secured Seville from any future effort.

Blake, by a miracle, escaped to Cadiz, while Ballasteros, with some trifling changes of fortune, maintained a mountain warfare for a few months, but finally embarked at Camelas, and terminated the struggle in the Condado de Niebla.

There, and in the Ronda mountains, a powerful diversion could have been originated. There Spanish armies might, it was believed, have been entrusted to their own management; and allies, worse than useless with his army, have proven to Lord Wellington of inestimable value by themselves. That he thought so, may be inferred from an extract of a letter addressed to the Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, and dated 20th July, 1811:—

"In my opinion, the most interesting points at present in Spain, are the Sierra de Ronda and the Condado de Niebla. The former, if the Spaniards should be obliged to act alone, is the fittest scene of their operations, and they would always have a retreat upon Gibraltar: the latter, if they are to combine their operations with ours, is the best, because the communication is shorter and more certain, and they would have a secure retreat into Portugal. In either case they could be supplied with facility from Cadiz, or they could be drawn thither if the enemy were to prepare for a serious attack upon that position.

"A corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, well equipped, in the Sierra de Ronda, or the Condado de Niebla, would be a thorn in the enemy's side, to which he must pay attention; would be an effectual diversion for our operations; and, if in the latter, would be ready either to join us through Portugal, or to march upon Seville, if we should be able, in a later period of the season, to make another attack upon Badajoz. It may be depended upon that, if the allies can only get hold of Seville for a few hours, the enemy must raise the siege of Cadiz; and therefore it would appear most desirable for the Spaniards to turn their attention seriously to that object. But it must be *seriously*.

It must be attempted with a corps of 10,000 or 12,000 men, well equipped with what is necessary to obtain success, and in some degree disciplined; and, if they once make such an establishment in one of those quarters, not only is their retreat secure, but the enemy must attend to them, or must give up Seville and the siege of Cadiz.

"This is the object I had in view when I proposed to General Blake to go to the Condado de Niebla, when he declined to join himself to us, after the last siege of Badajoz. But he has since embarked, and he looks to other objects, which are quite impracticable, as he may depend upon it are all offensive operations with the Spanish troops in their existing state; and he will find that not only they are impracticable, but that he removes himself and his troops from the real scene of action, in which he might be of some use, if he would remain quiet.

"I have not talked with Castaños or anybody upon this plan. The truth is, that it is impossible for any rational man to talk to any of them. They are visionaries and enthusiasts, who will not look at things as they really are; and, although they cannot be ignorant of the truth of all we say of the miserably inefficient state of their army, they talk and act as if it was an army, till some dreadful disaster happens, and they are highly offended if in any discussion the truth, which ought never to be concealed in such a discussion, is even hinted."

The recession of the French armies produced an immediate change in the positions of the allies; and Lord Wellington, leaving Hill in the Alentejo in observation of Girard, changed his head-quarters from the Quinta de St. Joaô to Portalegre, and subsequently to Fuente Guinaldo. The occupation of the line of the Coa was highly desirable; it placed the posts and villages in the more immediate vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo in the possession of the allied commander, and thus cut off all casual supplies from a fortress, already straitened by the guerillas of

Julian Sanchez, and separated from its covering army by a space of fifty miles. In fact, Rodrigo was the object at which Lord Wellington had secretly aimed; and measures had been taken to get up a powerful siege train from Lisbon, and forward all necessary arrangements for the immediate reduction of a fortress, which he justly considered, in a military point of view, to be invaluable.

But the period had not arrived when Rodrigo could be attacked. In Catalonia, Suchet's operations had been eminently successful, and Tarragona had fallen on the 28th of June by assault. Abadia, who had succeeded Santocildas in the command of the Spanish forces in Galicia, was unable to oppose Count Dorsenne; and to save his army, he sought refuge in the strong passes of Villa Franca. Blake was not equally fortunate. Having joined the Murcian army under Friere, the reinforcement he brought from Cadiz increased the united force to more than 20,000 men. But the career of this army was brief indeed. Soult, with his customary activity, hurried to meet it, encountered it at Baza, drove it in confusion towards Lorca, where he finally cut the line of retreat, and totally dispersed it. Murcia was thus left completely at the mercy of the French marshal. But the dread of disease effected for the Spaniards what their arms could not accomplish. Yellow fever was raging at Carthagena, and the horror of contagion induced Soult to suspend further operations, and return to Grenada. In the mean time, the strength of the French generals was hourly increasing; for between the middle of July and the end of September, 50,000 fresh troops had entered Spain, of whom above 8,000 were cavalry, and all veteran soldiers. All these circumstances rendered any offensive movement of Lord Wellington a most dangerous experiment; and accordingly he announced to Lord Liverpool, that he had abandoned the intention he had previously communicated of engaging in a siege.

"I am almost certain," he says, "I shall not be able to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, and I think it is doubtful whether

I shall be able to maintain the blockade of that place. However, I shall not give up my intention until I am certain that the enemy are too strong for me in an action in the field. The place, although weak in itself, and though the ground on which it stands is badly occupied, (the French have improved it in some degree,) is in the best chosen position of any frontier fortress that I have ever seen. It is impossible to do anything against it, either in the way of siege or blockade, excepting by crossing the Agueda; and of all the ravines that I have ever seen this is the most difficult to cross, excepting close to the fort; and in winter it cannot be crossed at all, excepting at the bridges, of which the only practicable one for carriages is under the guns of the fort. We must fight the battle, therefore, to maintain this blockade, with our backs to this river, over which we should have to retire in case of check; and this would be an awkward position, in which I ought not to involve the army, unless the numbers are so nearly equal as to render success probable. You will observe that these circumstances all favoured the French, when they attacked the place from Spain.

"However, there is one thing very clear, that if we cannot maintain this blockade, the enemy must bring 50,000 men to oblige us to raise it; and they can undertake nothing else this year, for they must still continue to watch this place, and we shall so far save the cause. In the mean time, if they offer me a favourable opportunity of bringing any of them to action, I shall do it."

The consequences Lord Wellington expected to result from his presence on the frontier were speedily realized. While he remained upon the Coa, the efforts of the French marshals were completely paralyzed; and, with immense means, they found themselves unable to effect commensurate objects, because these means were not disposable. Distant services they dared not undertake; for if they ventured to detach troops, they feared, with good reason, that Ciudad Rodrigo would be instantly besieged;

and unless the blockade could be broken, and supplies safely and speedily introduced, the place could not hold out for any length of time. To effect the latter, a grand junction of the armies under Marmont, Souhaur, and Dorsenne was determined: and having collected large convoys at Plasencia and Salamanca, the united force assembled at Tamamers on the 22d, having previously apprized the governor of Rodrigo that the fortress would be relieved.*

This junction of the French corps produced a magnificent army. Their total strength was over sixty thousand men, of which the cavalry might be reckoned at nearly seven thousand, and the artillery comprised one hundred and ten guns. A finer army for its numbers was never ranged beneath the eagles of Napoleon; for all the reinforcements were veteran soldiers, and of these a large proportion had been detached from the Imperial Guard.

Lord Wellington, perfectly aware of the object, but not exactly of the force by which it would be effected, concentrated his divisions, as far as the locality of the country would allow. Determined that the fortress should not be relieved, excepting by an army numerically superior, and anxious to see the amount of a force, of which so many conflicting accounts had reached him, he made his dispositions accordingly.† Of these, and the immediate occur-

* "Both armies are employed in collecting supplies of provisions; and I enclose the deciphered copy of a letter in cipher, from General Montbrun to the governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, from which it appears that it is the enemy's intention to endeavour to introduce large supplies of provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo from the side of Plasencia, as well as from that of Salamanca. The dates being all in cipher, and not having been able to discover that part of the key, we do not know exactly on what day the operation is to commence, but I should imagine about the 20th or 21st.

"From what I have stated to your Lordship in former despatches regarding the enemy's strength, and the difficulties and risks attending any operation on the right of the Agueda, you will not have expected that I should be able to prevent the introduction of this convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo."—*Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept.* 1811.

† "I propose, therefore, to keep the allied army in such a situation as long

rences, than which no peninsular events were more exciting, and none certainly so momentous, his own plain statement to Lord Liverpool will convey the clearest details:—

"*Quadraseis, 29th Sept.* 1811.

"The enemy commenced their movements towards Ciudad Rodrigo with the convoys of provisions from the Sierra de Bejar and from Salamanca on the 21st instant, and on the following day I collected the British army in positions from which I could either advance or retire without difficulty, and which would enable me to see all that was going on, and the strength of the enemy's army.

"The 3d division, and that part of Major-Gen. Alten's brigade of cavalry which was not detached, occupied the range of heights which are on the left of the Agueda: having their advanced guard under Lieut.-Colonel Williams, of the 60th, on the heights of Pastores, within three miles of Ciudad Rodrigo; the 4th division was at Fuente Guinaldo, where I had strengthened a position with some works; the Light division on the right of the Agueda, having their right resting upon the mountains which separate Castile and Estremadura. Lieut.-General Graham commanded the troops on the left of the army, which were posted on the Lower Azava; the 6th division, and Major-General Anson's brigade of cavalry, being at Espeja, and occupying Carpio, Marialva, &c.

"Don Carlos de España observed the Lower Agueda with Don Julian Sanchez's cavalry and infantry.

"Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, with Major-General Slade's and Major-General De Grey's brigades of cavalry, were on the Upper Azava, in the centre, between the right and left of the army, with General Pack's brigade

as I can, as that I may see the enemy, and form an opinion of their strength from a view of them when collected.

"If I should not be able to prevent the introduction of the convoy, I shall at least have had the satisfaction of obliging the enemy to collect all their troops for the purpose of escorting it, and thus of contributing to save the army and the kingdom of Galicia."—*Fuente Guinaldo, 18th Sept.* 1811.

at Campillo; and the 5th division was in observation of the Pass of Perales, in the rear of the right, the French general Foy having remained and collected a body of troops in Upper Estremadura, consisting of part of his own division of the army of Portugal, and a division of the army of the centre; and the 7th division was in reserve at Alamedilla.

"The enemy first appeared in the plain near Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 23d; and retired again in a short time; but on the 24th, in the morning, they advanced again in considerable force, and entered the plain by the roads of Santi-Espiritus and Tenebron; and before evening they had collected there all their cavalry, to the amount of about 6,000 men, and four divisions of infantry, of which one division was of the Imperial Guard; and the remainder of the armies were encamped on the Guadapero, immediately beyond the hills which surround the plain of Ciudad Rodrigo.

"On the morning of the 25th, the enemy set a reconnaissance of cavalry towards the Lower Azava, consisting of about fourteen squadrons of the cavalry of the Imperial Guard. They drove in our posts on the right of the Azava, but having passed the river, the Lanciers de Berg were charged by two squadrons of the 16th, and one of the 14th light dragoons, and driven back; they attempted to rally and to return, but were fired upon by the light infantry of the 61st regiment, which had been posted in the wood on their flank, by Lieut.-General Graham; and Major-General Anson pursued them across the Azava; and afterwards resumed his posts on the right of that river. Lieut.-General Graham was highly pleased with the conduct of Major-General Anson's brigade; and Major-General Anson particularly mentions Lieut.-Colonel Hervey, and Captain Brotherton, of the 14th, and Captain Hay and Major Cocks, of the 16th.

"But the enemy's attention was principally directed during this day to the position of the 3d division, in the hills between Fuente Guinaldo and Pastores. About eight

in the morning, they moved a column, consisting of between thirty and forty squadrons of cavalry, and fourteen battalions of infantry, and twelve pieces of cannon, from Ciudad Rodrigo, in such a direction, that it was doubtful whether they would attempt to ascend the hills by La Encina, or by the direct road of El Bodon, towards Fuente Guinaldo; and I was not certain by which road they would make their attack, till they actually commenced it upon the last.

"As soon as I saw the direction of their march, I had reinforced the 2d batt. 5th regiment, which occupied the post on the hill over which the road passes to Guinaldo, by the 77th regiment, and the 21st Portuguese regiment, under the command of Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, and Major-General Alten's brigade, of which only three squadrons remained which had not been detached, drawn from El Bodon; and I ordered there a brigade of the 4th division from Fuente Guinaldo, and afterwards from El Bodon, the remainder of the troops of the 3d division, with the exception of those at Pastores, which were too distant.

"In the mean time, however, the small body of troops in this post sustained the attack of the enemy's cavalry and artillery. One regiment of French dragoons succeeded in taking two pieces of cannon which had been posted on a rising ground on the right of our troops; but they were charged by the 2d batt. 5th regiment, under the command of Major Ridge, and the guns were immediately retaken.

"While this operation was going on on the flank, an attack was made on the front by another regiment, which was repulsed in a similar manner by the 77th regiment; and the three squadrons of Major-General Alten's brigade charged repeatedly different bodies of the enemy which ascended the hill on the left of the two regiments of British infantry, the Portuguese regiment being posted in the rear of their right.

"At length, the division of the enemy's infantry which

had marched with the cavalry from Ciudad Rodrigo, were brought up to the attack on the road of Fuente Guinaldo, and seeing that they would arrive and be engaged before the troops could arrive either from Guinaldo or El Bodon, I determined to withdraw our post and to retire with the whole on Fuente Guinaldo. The 2d batt. 5th regiment, and the 77th regiment, were formed into one square, and the 21st Portuguese regiment into another, supported by Major-General Alten's small body of cavalry and the Portuguese artillery.

"The enemy's cavalry immediately rushed forward and obliged our cavalry to retire to the support of the Portuguese regiment; and the 5th and 77th regiments were charged on three faces of the square by the French cavalry, but they halted and repulsed the attack with the utmost steadiness and gallantry. We then continued the retreat, and joined the remainder of the 3d division, also formed in squares, on their march to Fuente Guinaldo, and the whole retired together in the utmost order, and the enemy never made another attempt to charge any of them; but were satisfied with firing upon them with their artillery and with following them.

"Lieut.-Colonel Williams with his light infantry, and Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. R. Trench with the 74th regiment, retired from Pastores across the Agueda; and thence marched by Robleda, where they took some prisoners, and recrossed the Agueda, and joined at Guinaldo in the evening.

"I placed the 3d and 4th divisions, and General Pack's brigade of infantry, and Major-General Alten's, Major-General De Grey's, and Major-General Slade's brigades of cavalry, in the position at Fuente Guinaldo on the evening of the 25th, and ordered Major-General R. Craufurd to retire with the Light division across the Agueda, the 7th division to form at Albergueria, and Lieut.-General Graham to collect the troops under his command at Nave d'Aver, keeping only posts of observation on the Azava; and the

troops were thus formed in an échellon, of which the centre was in the position of Guinaldo; and the right upon the pass of Perales; and the left at Nave d'Aver; Don Carlos de España was placed on the left of the Coa; and Don Julian Sanchez was detached with the cavalry to the enemy's rear.

"The enemy brought up a second division of infantry from Ciudad Rodrigo, in the afternoon of the 25th; and in the course of that night, and of the 26th, they collected their whole army in front of our position at Guinaldo; and not deeming it expedient to stand their attack in that position, I retired about three leagues, and on the 27th formed the army as follows: viz. the 5th division on the right, at Aldea Velha; the 4th, and light dragoons, and Major-General Alten's cavalry, at the Convent of Sacaparte, in front of Alfayates; the 3d and 7th divisions in second line, behind Alfayates; and Lieut.-General Graham's corps on the left, at Bismula, having their advanced guard beyond the Villar Mayor River; and Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry near Alfayates, on the left of the 4th division, and having general Pack's and General M'Mahon's brigades at Rebolosa, on their left. The pickets of the cavalry were in front of Aldea da Ponte, beyond the Villar Mayor river; and those of General Alten's brigade beyond the same river, towards Forcalhos.

"It had been the enemy's intention to turn the left of the position of Guinaldo, by moving a column into the valley of the upper Azava, and thence ascending the heights in the rear of the position by Castillejos; and from this column they detached a division of infantry and fourteen squadrons of cavalry to follow our retreat by Albergueria, and another body of the same strength followed us by Forcalhos. The former attacked the pickets of the cavalry at Aldea da Ponte, and drove them in; and they pushed on nearly as far as Alfayates. I then made General Pakenham attack them with his brigade of the 4th division, supported by Lieut.-General the

Hon. L. Cole, and the 4th division, and by Sir Stapleton Cotton's cavalry; and the enemy were driven through Aldea da Ponte, back upon Albergueria, and the pickets of the cavalry resumed their station.

"But the enemy, having been reinforced by the troops which marched from Forcalhos, again advanced, about sunset, and drove in the pickets of the cavalry from Aldea da Ponte, and took possession of the village.

"Lieut.-General Cole again attacked them with a part of General Pakenham's brigade, and drove them through the village; but night having come on, and as General Pakenham was not certain what was passing on his flanks, or of the numbers of the enemy—and he knew that the army were to fall back still further—he evacuated the village, which the enemy occupied and held during the night.

"On the 28th, I formed the army on the heights behind Soito; having the Sierra de Meras on their right, and the left at Rendo, on the Coa; about a league in rear of the position which they had occupied on the 27th. The enemy also retired from Aldea da Ponte, and had their advanced posts at Albergueria; and as it appears that they are about to retire from this part of the country, and as we have already had some bad weather, and may expect more at the period of the equinoctial gales, I propose to canton the troops in the nearest villages to the position which they occupied yesterday.

"I cannot conclude this report of the occurrences of the last week, without expressing to your Lordship my admiration of the conduct of the troops engaged in the affairs of the 25th instant. The conduct of the 2d batt. 5th regiment, commanded by Major Ridge, in particular, affords a memorable example of what the steadiness and discipline of the troops, and their confidence in their officers, can effect in the most difficult and trying situations. The conduct of the 77th regiment, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Bromhead, was equally good, and I have never seen

a more determined attack than was made by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, with every advantage of the assistance of a superior artillery, and repulsed by these two weak battalions. I must not omit also to report the good conduct, on the same occasion, of the 21st Portuguese regiment, under the command of Colonel Bacellar, and of Major Arentschildt's artillery. The Portuguese infantry were not actually charged, but were repeatedly threatened, and they showed the utmost steadiness and discipline, both in the mode in which they prepared to receive the enemy, and in all the movements of a retreat made over six miles of plain in front of a superior cavalry and artillery.

"The Portuguese artillerymen attached to the guns, which were for a moment in the enemy's possession, were cut down at their guns.

"The infantry upon this occasion were under the command of Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, Lieut.-General Picton having remained with the troops at El Bodon; and the conduct of Major-General Colville was beyond all praise.

"Your Lordship will have observed, by the details of the action which I have given you, how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of the 1st hussars, and 11th light dragoons, of Major-General Alten's brigade. There were not more than three squadrons of the two regiments on the ground, this brigade having for some time furnished the cavalry for the outposts of the army, and they charged the enemy's cavalry repeatedly; and notwithstanding the superiority of the latter, the post would have been maintained, if I had not preferred to abandon it to risking the loss of these brave men, by continuing the unequal contest under additional disadvantages, in consequence of the immediate entry of fourteen battalions of infantry into the action, before the support which I had ordered up could arrive. Major-General Alten and Lieut.-Colonels Cumming and Arentschildt, and the officers of these regiments, particularly distinguished themselves upon this occasion.

"I have also to mention that the Adjut.-General, Major General the Hon. C. Stewart, being upon the field, gave his assistance as an officer of cavalry with his usual gallantry.

"In the affair of the 27th, at Aldea da Ponte, Brig.-General Pakenham and the troops of the 4th division, under the orders of Lieut.-General the Hon. G. L. Cole, likewise conducted themselves remarkably well.

"His Serene Highness, the Hereditary Prince of Orange, accompanied me during the operations which I have detailed to your lordship, and was for the first time in fire; and he conducted himself with a spirit and intelligence which afford a hope that he will become an ornament to his profession.

"The enemy having collected, for the object of relieving Ciudad Rodrigo, the army of the North, which were withdrawn from the attack they had commenced on General Abadia in Galicia, in which are included twenty-two battalions of the imperial guards, and General Souham's division of infantry, composed of troops recently arrived in Spain from the army of Naples, and now drawn from the frontier of Navarre, where they had been employed in operations against Mina, together with five divisions and all the cavalry of the army called off Portugal, composing altogether an army of not less than 60,000 men, of which 6,000 were cavalry, and 125 pieces of artillery, I could not pretend to maintain the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, nor could any effort which I could make prevent or materially impede the collection of the supplies, or the march of the convoy for the relief of that place. I did all that I could expect to effect without incurring the risk of great loss for no object; and as the reports as usual were so various in regard to the enemy's real strength, it was necessary that I should see their army, in order that the people of this country might be convinced that to raise the blockade was a measure of necessity, and that the momentary relief of Galicia, and of Mina, were the only objects which it was in my power immediately to effect.

"I have had no reports from the north since I addressed your lordship last, nor from the south of Spain.

"General Girard had collected at Merida a small body of troops, I believe with the intention of making an incursion into Portugal, under the notion that I had withdrawn Lieut.-General Hill's corps from the Alentejo for the purpose of maintaining the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo. But I imagine that he will break up his collection again, as soon as he shall hear that General Hill is at Portalegre.

"I have the honour to be, &c.

"WELLINGTON.

"P.S. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded on the 25th and 27th instant. "W."

"Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of General Viscount Wellington, K. B., in an affair with the enemy on the heights of El Bodon, on the 25th, and near Aldea da Ponte, on the 27th September, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	1	1	40	40	42
Wounded	16	13	156	63	185
Missing	—	1	33	9	34

CHAPTER XXV.

HEIGHTS OF GUINALDO—PICTURESQUE APPEARANCE OF THE FRENCH ARMIES—HEIGHTS OF EL BODON—FRENCH ATTACK REPULSED—BAYONET CHARGE OF FIFTH REGIMENT—POSITION TURNED—BEAUTIFUL RETREAT—DANGER OF THE LIGHT DIVISION—DARING RESOLUTION OF LORD WELLINGTON—MARMONT DISPLAYS HIS ARMY—ANECDOTE—WELLINGTON RETREATS, AFTER HAVING NARROWLY ESCAPED BEING TAKEN—MARMONT'S REMARK—ANECDOTE OF A FRENCH OFFICER—ARMY CANTONED UPON THE COA—JULIAN SANCHEZ CARRIES OFF GENERAL REGNAUD AND THE CATTLE OF RODRIGO—SOULT SENDS GIRARD INTO ESTREMADURA, AND WELLINGTON DESPATCHES HILL TO OBLIGE HIM TO WITHDRAW—MOVEMENTS OF BOTH GENERALS—ARROYO MOLINOS—GIRARD SURPRISED AND DEFEATED—LOSSES OF THE FRENCH—CASUALTIES OF THE ALLIES.

THERE are few lives so unmarked with incident, as not to offer some passage upon which the individual may look back with pleasure or with pain. The humblest journey from the cradle to the grave, is not without its reminiscences; and proportionately as the part enacted in the drama of existence has risen above the ordinary careers of men, memory will recall in greater number and variety, those past events "which cloud the brow, or fire the eye."

Save one, no modern life has been so brilliant or so eventful as that of him, happily surnamed "the Iron Duke." Like Napoleon's, "his crowded hours of glorious strife" followed fast upon each other, each sufficient in itself to support a claim for immortality. Yet, probably, throughout that sparkling career, from its opening at Assye until its close at Waterloo, there is no hour on which the memory of Wellington will dwell with greater pride, than that when he looked calmly from the heights of Guinaldo, on sixty thousand magnificent soldiers in battle order, within cannon range of his position.

In the progress of a campaign, situations of interest or beauty are not unfrequent—and nothing could be more striking, than the first appearance of the united armies, as they advanced to the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo. Far as the eye could range, the roads from Salamanca and Tamames were crowded with dense masses of sparkling soldiery, "accompanied by a countless number of waggons, cars, and loaded mules. Their progress was slow, and apparently cautious; but towards evening the convoy began to enter the place, under cover of about fifteen squadrons of cavalry, which passed the Agueda, and a large column of infantry, which halted upon the plain. Still no symptoms were manifested of a design to cross the river in force, or to attempt anything further than the object which was thus attained; for the advanced cavalry withdrew at dusk, and all bivouacked that night near the town. In the morning, however, as soon as objects became discernible, one corps of cavalry, amounting to at least five-and-twenty squadrons, supported by a whole division of infantry, appeared in motion along the great road, which, leading from Ciudad Rodrigo to Guinaldo, leaves El Bodon on the left; whilst another, less numerous, perhaps, but, like the former, strongly supported by infantry, marched direct upon Espeja. They both moved with admirable steadiness and great regularity; and as the sun happened to be out, and the morning clear and beautiful, their appearance was altogether warlike and imposing."*

It was a moment when the boldest spirit might have felt alarm. Advanced upon a naked height, the allies at El Bodon were isolated and unsupported; for, from necessity, the British brigades were widely separated from each other. To hold the height was their best hope; for to retire over an extensive plain in the presence of an overwhelming cavalry force, supported by light artillery, would have been an attempt too perilous for any but desperate men to risk. The danger of their position was apparent to all; none

* Lord Londonderry's Narrative.

blanched from the trial, and with fearless intrepidity they waited for the French assault.

"While squadron after squadron were defiling along the road, the English infantry remained in columns of battalions behind the ridge, and the cavalry stood dismounted, each dragoon with the bridle on his arm, and apparently as careless to coming events, as if he were on the parade-ground of his barrack, waiting for the trumpet call to "fall in." But when the advanced squadrons were about to mount the ridge, the infantry formed line; the dragoons sprang to their saddles; and the artillery, which had occasionally cannonaded the hostile squadrons as they came within their range, opened with additional spirit, and poured from the height a torrent of grape and case shot, that occasioned a serious loss to the enemy.

"The French appeared to feel sensibly the effect produced by the fire, and a brigade cheered and charged up the heights. The men stood by their guns to the last, but eventually they were obliged to retire. The French dragoons gained the battery, and the cannon were taken.

"Their possession by the enemy was but for a moment. The 5th regiment came steadily forward in line, and after delivering a shattering volley, lowered their bayonets, and boldly advanced to charge the cavalry. This—the first instance of horsemen being assailed by infantry in line—was brilliantly successful. The French were hurried down the height, and the guns recaptured, limbered up, and brought away."*

But valour could not maintain the height against numbers so fearfully disproportionate. A heavy column had moved unnoticed round the rear of the British right, and the position being turned was abandoned. Now was the moment to effect their destruction; for the British infantry were in rapid retreat, and the French squadrons, in all the assurance of success, coming down at speed to annihilate them.

* Victories of the British Armies.

"But they had yet to learn of what stern stuff the British soldier is composed. In a moment the 5th and 77th formed square, and in steady silence awaited the coming onset. The charge was made—the cheering of the dragoons pealed over the battle-field as they came on at speed, and with a fiery determination that nothing apparently could withstand. Against every face of the square a hostile squadron galloped; the earth shook—the cheers rose louder—another moment of that headlong speed must bring the dragoons upon the bayonets of the kneeling front rank. Then from the British square a shattering volley was poured in,—the smoke cleared away, and, but a few yards from the faces of the square, men and horses were rolling on the plain in death. The charge was repulsed, the ranks disordered; and the French dragoons, recoiling from that fearless array they had vainly striven to penetrate, rode hastily off to re-form their broken ranks, and remove themselves from an incessant stream of musketry which had already proved so fatal."*

The retreat of the right brigade was conducted by Picton in person; and the same daring, the same skill, and the same good fortune attended it. The whole of these gallant regiments united on the plain, and fell back on Guinaldo, which, with Cole's division, they occupied.

The position was not particularly good; and as one of much greater strength lay immediately in his rear, Lord Wellington issued orders for the troops to retire from Guinaldo, and take up ground he had previously selected on the Coa. From delay in the transmission of that order to the light brigade, and General Craufurd considering, when it did arrive, that it would be hazardous to ford the Agueda then, he determined to cross the mountains, and join the main body by a circuitous route, being ignorant that the passes of Gata and Perales were already in possession of the French. Lord Wellington despatched instant orders for the division to countermarch upon

* Victories of the British Armies.

Robleda; and strengthening both flanks of his position with 13,000 infantry and 2,500 horsemen, he remained boldly on Guinaldo.

The night of the 25th, to some who knew how critically Lord Wellington was situated, passed in anxiety and suspense—but the soldiery, wearied with the exertions they had made during the day, slept soundly in their dangerous bivouacs. Fires blazed along the allied line, and every appearance bore the semblance of confidence and defiance.

"Long before dawn, however, all were astir and in their places; and the different regiments looked anxiously for the moment which should behold the commencement of a game as desperate as any which they had been yet called upon to play. But, instead of indulging our troops as they expected, Marmont contented himself with making an exhibition of his force, and causing it to execute a variety of manœuvres in our presence; and it must be confessed that a spectacle more striking has rarely been seen. The large body of cavalry which followed us to our position, and had bivouacked during the night in the woods adjoining, were first drawn up in compact array, as if waiting for the signal to push on. By and by, nine battalions of infantry, attended by a proportionate quantity of artillery, made their appearance, and formed into columns, lines, échellons, and squares. Towards noon, twelve battalions of the imperial guard came upon the ground in one solid mass; and as each soldier was decked out with feathers and shoulder-knots of a bloody hue, their appearance was certainly imposing in no ordinary degree. The solid column, however, soon deployed into columns of battalions —a movement which was executed with a degree of quickness and accuracy quite admirable; and then, after having performed several other evolutions with equal precision, the guards piled their arms, and prepared to bivouac. Next came another division of infantry in rear of the guards, and then a fresh column of cavalry, till it was computed that the enemy had collected on this single point

a force of not less than 25,000 men. Nor did the muster cease to go on, as long as daylight lasted. To the very latest moment, we could observe men, horses, guns, carriages, tumbrils, and ammunition-waggons, flocking into the encampment; as if it were the design of the French general to bring his whole disposable force to bear against the position of Fuente Guinaldo."*

Indeed the salvation of the light division was achieved by Wellington, when old-school commanders would have abandoned it in despair. "The object was certainly one of an importance sufficient to justify the resolution, but the resolution itself was one of those daring strokes of genius which the ordinary rules of art were never made to control. The position was contracted, of no great natural strength in front, and easily to be turned; the entrenchments constructed were only a few breastworks and two weak field redoubts, open in rear, and without palisades."†

While Marmont was amusing himself with this singular review, Lord Wellington looked on with the calmness of an ordinary spectator. Scarcely a third of the allied army was within his reach;‡ and sixty thousand troops, some of them hitherto unconquered, with one hundred and ten pieces of artillery, manœuvring barely out of cannon range. "It was at this moment that a Spanish general, remarkable for his zeal and gallantry, and a great favourite of Wellington's, observed to him,—'Why, here you are with a couple of weak divisions in front of the whole French army, and you seem quite at your ease;—why, it is enough to put any man in a fever.'—'I have done, according to the very best of my judgment, all that can be done,' said Wellington; 'therefore I care not either for the enemy in front, or for anything which they may say at home.'"§

* Lord Londonderry's Narrative. † Napier.

‡ The left wing of the army were at Nava d'Aver, ten miles from Fuente Guinaldo; the fifth division at Payo, a distance of twelve, and the light troops at Cespedosa, fully fifteen miles from the position.

§ Sherer.

But Marmont allowed the golden opportunity to pass. During the night Wellington retreated, united his scattered brigades in their new position, and then courted rather than declined a battle. The affairs at Aldea da Ponte showed that no impression could be made;* and having exhausted their provisions, the French armies retired on the 28th, covered by a cavalry rear guard, far too powerful in numbers for Lord Wellington to molest.

The military talents of Lord Wellington had been already duly appreciated by the French; and his bold stand at Guinaldo, and masterly retreat upon the Coa, elicited their warmest admiration. In the conduct of these critical operations the allied general was personally present; and frequently—and as his staff thought—imprudently, exposed himself to fire. On one occasion, he narrowly escaped from being taken prisoner, having been deceived by the perplexing similarity of the dresses worn by the allied and French light cavalry.†

When Marmont was assured that his formidable opponent had lain for six-and-thirty hours in his front, like Samson, shorn of his strength, nothing could surpass his astonishment save the mortification which it caused. The mischief was however, attributed by the French marshal to planetary influence; and he somewhat prophetically exclaimed, that "Wellington's star was brilliant as Napoleon's!"

* This terminated the operations. The French placed a fresh garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo; Dorsenne marched to Salamanca; a strong division was posted at Alba de Tormes to communicate with Marmont, and the latter resumed his old position in the valley of the Tagus. At the same time Foy, who had advanced with his two divisions as far as Zarza Mayor, in the direction of Castello Branco, returned to Placentia; Girard also, being threatened by Hamilton's Portuguese division, which Hill had sent to check his advance, left two thousand men of the fifth corps at Merida, and retired to Zafra.

† "It is impossible to form an idea of the inconveniences and injury which result from having anything like them, either on horseback or on foot. —— and his pickets were taken in June, because the 3d hussars had the same caps as the French *chasseurs à cheval* and some of their hussars; and I was near being taken, on the 25th September, from the same cause.

"At a distance, or in an action, colours are nothing: the profile, and shape

On no occasion was the intrepidity of the officers on both sides more strikingly displayed. Many instances of personal daring were observed; and one very interesting occurrence is recorded. Felton Harvey, of the 14th light dragoons, had lost an arm in the course of previous service, but though unable to protect himself, he still was seen foremost in the fight. In a cavalry charge, he was encountered by a French officer. With an uplifted sword, the gallant horseman perceived when about to strike, that his opponent was defenceless. Instantly the *coup de sabre* was exchanged for a graceful salute, and, spurring his charger on, the chivalrous Frenchman rode into the thickest of the *mêlée*, to seek a trial with some abler antagonist.

Immediately on the retreat of the enemy, Lord Wellington broke up from his position in front of Alfayates, and leaving outpost duty and the observation of Ciudad Rodrigo to the light and fourth divisions, he crossed the Coa, and took cantonments in the villages on the left bank of the river. The weather became dreadfully wet; the accommodation for the soldiers was very wretched; disease increased frightfully, and, in a short time, sixteen thousand men were in hospital. Out-door pursuits were interrupted by the inclemency of the season; and a dull dispiriting season passed away, in which there was little to amuse, and nothing to excite.

A guerilla enterprise, at this dull period of the campaign, excited, from its boldness and success, a consi-

of the man's cap, and his general appearance, are what guide us; and why should we make our people look like the French? A *cock-tailed* horse is a good mark for a dragoon, if you can get a side view of him; but there is no such mark as the English helmet, and, as far as I can judge, it is the best cover a dragoon can have for his head.

"I mention this, because in all probability you may have something to say to these alterations; and I only beg that *we* may be as different as possible from the French in every thing.

"The narrow top caps of our infantry, as opposed to their broad top caps, are a great advantage to those who are to look at long lines of posts opposed to each other."—*Letter to Lieut.-Colonel Torrens, Fuenda, 6th Nov.* 1811.

derable interest in the allied bivouacs. Julian Sanchez had watched Rodrigo closely, and having observed that the cattle belonging to the garrison were driven out every morning to pasture beyond the works of the fortress, he determined to carry them off. The guard, though weak, were ever on the alert, and for several days Don Julian's band watched from their ambuscade in vain. Fortune at last crowned the patience of the guerilla chief. Regnaud, the governor of Rodrigo, attended by part of his staff and a few dragoons, rode out on the 15th of October, and most incautiously forded the Agueda at the very place where the guerilla cavalry were concealed. In a moment, the French general was surrounded—the escort was taken—and by singular good fortune, the grand object of the enterprise appeared at a sufficient distance from the fortress to admit of their being captured. From under the guns of Rodrigo the cattle were accordingly driven off; and the governor and what proved valuable booty were brought to the head quarters of Lord Wellington. "In a native of any country except France, such an unlucky coincidence would have produced a degree of gloom not to be shaken off; but by General Regnaud, his misfortunes were borne with the utmost philosophy and good humour. He became a frequent guest at Lord Wellington's table, and we found him an extremely entertaining as well as intelligent companion."*

This guerilla exploit was followed by one more important both in character and results. From his cantonments round Portalegre, Hill had kept the garrison of Badajoz on the alert, and prevented any movements in Estremadura. The local position of his corps was in another respect advantageous, as it enabled Castanos with the ruined army of Estremadura, to establish his head quarters at Carceres, a point particularly well adapted for recruiting his reduced battalions, and organizing his troops anew. Soult, to

* Lord Londonderry's Narrative.

prevent recruits and supplies from reaching the Spanish commander, detached Girard with a moveable column, composed of four thousand infantry and one thousand dragoons; and the French General having crossed the Guadiana at Merida, became so excessively troublesome in the northern district of the province, that Lord Wellington determined if possible to oblige him to withdraw. Orders to this effect were forwarded to General Hill, and that able officer lost no time in having them successfully executed. On the 22d of October he marched from Portalegre, with a corps he had assembled at Codiceira,—and directing his route towards Carceres, he learned at Albuquerque that Girard, after pushing on to Aliseda, had suddenly fallen back on Arroyo del Puerco. On the 25th, Hill reached Aliseda, where he found the light cavalry, under the Conde de Penne Villemur. Instantly resuming operations, the Spanish horse overtook the French, and drove them to Malpartida, which place they abandoned in the night, as Girard did Carceres, on finding that an allied corps was in motion to attack him.

On the evening of the 26th, General Hill having ascertained that the French column was leisurely on its march towards Merida, by the road of Torre Mocha, he pushed for that city by the shorter route of Aldea del Cano and Casa San Antonio—while Girard, ignorant that an enemy was so near him, halted on the 27th at Arroyo Molinos, with his rear guard at Albala.

Arroyo Molinos is a little town situated at the foot of one extremity of the Sierra de Montanches; this mountain, which is every where steep and appears almost inaccessible, forms a cove or crescent behind it, the two points of which are about two miles asunder. The Truxillo road winds under the eastern point; the road to Merida runs at right angles with that to Alcuescar; and that to Medellin between the Truxillo and Merida roads. The ground between Alcuescar and Arroyo Molinos is a plain, thinly scattered with cork trees and evergreen oaks; and General

Hill's object was to place a body of troops so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy by any of these roads."*

Late in the evening, the allied corps reached Alcuescar, a village within four miles of Arroyo de Molinos. Their approach was not detected. The French had neglected to patrol; and the antipathy of the Spanish peasants to Girard, whose severity had been extreme, prevented him from receiving any intimation that a dangerous enemy was beside him."†

At two o'clock in the morning, Hill marched for Arroyo; and abandoning a bivouac, which throughout a tempestuous night had been uncheered by a single fire, through storm and darkness he moved silently on his enterprise. The delay in marching was alarming, but he reached a hollow within half a mile of the place, at half-past six. Here, and undiscovered, his dispositions were rapidly completed. A column under Lieut.-Colonel Stewart marched upon the town—a second, under Major General Howard, made an extensive détour round the right of Arroyo, to gain the Medellin road—and the allied cavalry, moved between the brigades, ready to act wherever their services might be useful.

A brigade of Girard had marched two hours before; but Dombrouski's infantry, and Briche's dragoons, were only falling in on the Medellin road, when the alarm was communicated by a solitary videt. Girard was at first incredulous, but above the howling of the storm, the rush

* Southey.

† "I am happy to add that the greatest harmony subsisted amongst the allied troops during our late operations, and that nothing could exceed the good-will and friendly disposition of the inhabitants of the district through which we passed. I mention it as a singular instance of fidelity and patriotism, that although the inhabitants of Alcuescar in general, as also those of Arroyo Molinos, knew of the arrival of the allied troops in the vicinity of the former place, on the night of the 27th, not a man could be seduced from his duty, and the enemy remained in total ignorance of our near approach. On the other hand, I was correctly informed of every thing going on in Arroyo Molinos during the night."—*Hill's Despatch to Wellington.*

of infantry was heard, and in a few minutes, the 71st and 92d regiment burst into the street, while the wild music of their bagpipes was heard amid the cheering of the highlanders, playing the very opposite tune, "Hey, Johnny Cope, are ye waukin' yet?" Girard, and part of the dragoons had not quitted the village, but they now galloped off, making a bold and irregular resistance, while the infantry formed square and attempted to cover their retreat. But their pursuers came fast upon them; one Highland regiment lined the vineyard fences—another formed line upon their right—the 50th regiment secured the prisoners—and the rest of the column, with part of the cavalry, extended round the village, and cut off all escape. The English guns had now got up, and opened a crashing fire on the squares, while the French cavalry were dispersed by the charge of the allied dragoons, and the 13th rode bravely forward, and captured the artillery.

"But Girard kept his infantry together, and continued his retreat by the Truxillo road; the right column of the allies was, however, already in possession of that line, the cavalry and artillery were close upon the French flank, and the left column, having re-formed, was again coming up fast. Girard's men were falling by fifties, and his situation was desperate, yet he would not surrender, but giving the word to disperse, endeavoured to escape by scaling the almost inaccessible rocks of the Sierra. His pursuers, not less obstinate, immediately divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills at an easier part beyond his left, the 39th regiment and Ashworth's Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo road; the 28th and 34th, led by General Howard, followed him step by step up the rocks, and prisoners were taken every moment, until the pursuers, heavily loaded, were unable to continue the trial of speed with men who had thrown away their arms and packs."*

* Napier.

"The surprise at Arroyo de Molinos was a clever and spirited affair—and in a moral point of view, this expedition was less important in itself, than as it was the first indication of a spirit of hopeful enterprise in the British army; it seemed as if that army had now become conscious of its superiority, and would henceforth seek opportunities of putting it to the proof. For the Spaniards it was a well-timed success, when all their own efforts tended only to evince more mournfully the inefficacy of their troops and the incompetence of their generals."*

The affair at Arroyo was still more enhanced in military value, because a decisive success had been obtained at an expense of life comparatively trifling.† The French suffered heavily; and the summary of their loss was thus detailed by General Hill, in his despatch to Lord Wellington.

"The ultimate consequences of these operations I need not point out to your lordship; their immediate result is the capture of one general of cavalry (Brun), one colonel of cavalry, (the Prince d'Aremberg), one lieutenant-colonel *(chef d'état major)*, one aide-de-camp of General Girard, two lieutenant-colonels, one *commissaire de guerre*, thirty captains and inferior officers, and upwards of 1000

* Southey.

† Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the corps of the army under the command of General Viscount Wellington, K.B., under the immediate orders of Lieut.-General R. Hill, in the action with the French army near Arroyo Molinos, on the 28th of October, 1811.

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	—	—	7	6	7
Wounded	7	4	53	11	64
Missing	1	—	—	4	1

The Portuguese loss, but not the Spanish, is included in this return.

men, already sent off under an escort to Portalegre; the whole of the enemy's artillery, baggage, and commissariat, some magazines of corn, which he had collected at Carceres and Merida, and the contribution of money which he had exacted from the former town, besides the total dispersion of General Girard's corps.

* * * * *

"P.S. Since writing the above report a good many more prisoners have been made, and I doubt not but the whole will amount to 1,300 or 1,400.

"Brig.-General Morillo has just returned from the pursuit of the dispersed, whom he followed for eight leagues. He reports that, besides those killed in the plains, upwards of 600 dead were found in the woods and mountains.

"General Girard escaped in the direction of La Serena, with 200 or 300 men, mostly without arms, and is stated by his own aide-de-camp to be wounded."

CHAPTER XXVI.

ALARM OCCASIONED BY GIRARD'S DEFEAT—ORDER OF THE BATH BESTOWED ON GENERAL HILL—AFFAIR AT FUENTE DEL MAESTRE—GODINOT'S EXPEDITION FAILS—TROOPS DETACHED TO OCCUPY TARIFA—THAT PLACE INVESTED BY THE FRENCH—PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE—THE TOWN ASSAULTED—SIEGE RAISED—PREPARATIONS TO REDUCE RODRIGO—PLAN OF THE SIEGE—BRIDGE LAID DOWN AT MARIALVA—CITY INVESTED—UPPER TESON CARRIED BY ASSAULT—FRENCH SORTIE—BATTERIES COMMENCE BREACHING—CONVENT OF SAN FRANCISCO STORMED—ORDER FOR THE ASSAULT—COOLNESS OF NAPOLEON AND WELLINGTON.

THE surprise and dispersion of Girard's corps had occurred so unexpectedly, that when the extent of its loss was known, it spread a general alarm throughout Estremadura. Badajoz closed its gates—patrols were constantly kept moving along the fords of the Guadiana; and the more remote detachments of Soult's brigades were directed to concentrate around Seville.

From the allied army, General Hill received a well deserved meed of approbation; and the manly testimony which Lord Wellington bore to the merits of his lieutenant, was honourable to both. On the recommendation of the former, the Order of the Bath was bestowed by the Regent upon the conqueror of Arroyo—an honour to which past services had founded a claim, which after exploits more amply confirmed.

After a period of inactivity, Sir Rowland Hill was again moved from his cantonments into Estremadura; and he marched on the 1st of January, 1812, from Merida, to attack part of the fifth corps, under Drouet, then posted at Almendralejoz. The French General, however, declined a

contest, and abandoning his magazines, retreated by Zafra to Llerena. On this occasion a sharp affair took place between the allied cavalry and a part of Drouet's rear-guard at Fuente del Maestre; the latter were stoutly charged and broken, and lost in killed and prisoners nearly fifty men.

Hill's advance had been intended to embarrass Soult, and distract his attention for a time from Ballasteros, who, with Gibraltar in his rear and the Ronda mountains to favour his operations, had been gradually increasing and organizing an army which daily becoming more formidable, had already, in a great degree, interrupted the French communications between Malaga and Cadiz. Anxious to crush a force from which he had much serious annoyance to expect, Soult detached Godinot with a strong corps; but Ballasteros prudently retired, and placed his army under cover of the guns of Gibraltar. Godinot, unable to effect any thing against an enemy thus protected, retreated in his turn; and Ballasteros suddenly advancing, surprised and defeated a French corps which occupied Bornos, under the command of General Semele. This misfortune, added to the general failure of the expedition, mortified Godinot so deeply, that on reaching Seville, he committed suicide in a fit of despair.

The success of Ballasteros induced the British government to second his efforts, and troops both British and Spanish were detached from Cadiz and Gibraltar under General Copons and Colonel Skerret, to occupy the old Moorish fortress of Tarifa.

It was doubtful from the weakness of its curtains, and the entire want of ditches and outworks, whether this town was capable of defence: and the principal officers were so little sanguine of success, that both Colonel Skerret and Lord Proby recommended that Tarifa should be abandoned. But, fortunately, others entertained clearer views; and their influence induced their superiors, though reluctantly, to abide the issue of a siege—and the result proved, that the strength of a fortress consists far less in

the solidity of stone walls, than in the gallantry of its defenders.

Tarifa is commanded on its northern and eastern fronts by sand-hills, and the sea washes its southern wall; westward, a low neck of land extends, connected at its extremity by a bridge and causeway with a rocky island, which is but weakly fortified—while at mid-distance between the island and the town, a sand-hill was crowned with a battery, that effectually protected the sea front. Through Tarifa a mountain stream flows, its entrance being protected by a tower and portcullis, while the bed of the river in front of these defences was secured by strong palisades. The number of the garrison did not exceed 2,500 men, of whom about one half were British.

On the 19th of December, General Laval, to whom Victor had entrusted the conduct of the siege, appeared before the place. The investing army mustered 10,000 men, with a powerful siege train, comprising eighteen long sixteen-pounders, and two heavy howitzers. On the 22d,* the French broke ground; on the 29th their batteries were armed and opened with decisive effect, for a few discharges brought down the wall in masses, and left the place open either to assault or escalade.

The fire was renewed upon the 30th, and the breach was widened, until a space of sixty feet was exposed. But, undismayed, the garrison fortified the houses immediately behind it; and made cool preparations to repulse the assault which might now be momently expected. The defence of the breach was entrusted to the 47th regiment and a body of Spaniards; the town, portcullis, and ram-

* "The siege commenced with an evil omen; for on the first morning a French picket, having incautiously advanced, was suddenly cut off by a party of the 11th regiment and made prisoners—and a daring sally was made next day. Some of the English garrison penetrated the French-camp and seized a gun; of course they were unable to carry it away, but they managed to draw the enemy under the fire of the ships and tower, by which they suffered considerably.

part extending to the left, were confided to the 87th; and the space between was connected by a company of riflemen.

"On the same night, a tremendous rain increased the river to such a height, that the torrents, sweeping all before it, broke down the palisades and injured the portcullis. But this calamity did not daunt the British; they laboured gloriously all night, and by morning the defences were restored.

"The mountain flood subsided quickly, and at daylight a battalion of French grenadiers quietly approached by the river bed, and rushed forward to break down the stockade. Not a shot had been fired by the British, who waited their approach with perfect coolness; but when they touched the portcullis, a rolling volley was delivered, with such terrible effect, that the head of the column was annihilated, and all that composed it perished, from the officer that led, to the poor drum-boy who beat the *pas de charge*. The river bed was choked with corpses, and that approach was effectually barricaded by the dead—while rushing up the banks, the French grenadiers opened their musketry, assisted by a fire from the trenches and a number of pits in front of their lines, which had been dug by Laval to afford a cover for his sharpshooters. But the column had been too much shattered by the first discharge to recover its courage—a sustained fire of British musketry, closely and efficiently kept up, cut off the boldest of the French soldiers who still made anything like an effort at advancing—while a six-pounder on the town wall enfiladed the assailants at scarcely pistol distance, and kept up an unceasing torrent of grape, that tore up the masses of the enemy, and drove them once more for shelter to the hollow. It was hopeless to continue longer under this murderous fire.—The French retired at speed to their trenches, leaving the bed and banks of the stream heaped with corpses; while the cheering of the garrison, and the band of the 87th, as it struck up a national quick step, strangely contrasted with the groans

of dying men, and the still more harrowing outcries of the wounded.

"Every kindness was bestowed upon these sufferers by their generous enemy. Those who could be carried off the field were brought through the breach and dressed by English surgeons, or allowed to be removed to their own camp. The weather became horrible—rain fell in torrents—the besiegers and besieged were equally inconvenienced—and on the night of the 4th, Laval, having destroyed part of his artillery and buried the remainder, retreated and abandoned the siege. During the time the French remained before Tarifa, their loss exceeded a thousand men, while the British casualties did not reach much above one hundred."*

This fortunate defence proved but the forerunner to greater and more important successes. The secret object which had occupied Lord Wellington's mind so long, was now about to be disclosed, for all the preparations for the siege of Rodrigo were complete, and preliminary measures already taken for an immediate investment of the fortress. Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and the Espeja had been made entrepôts for the siege stores; while Almeida formed the grand magazine for the battering train and ammunition.

It seemed unaccountable that the extensive movements of artillery and stores from Lisbon to Almeida, should not have aroused the jealousy of the French marshals. It is true they were ostensibly intended to re-arm the latter place; and while Marmont was deceived by the careless attitude assumed by the allies in their cantonments, Soult's attention was distracted from the point where the storm was about to burst, by the operations then in progress against Tarifa, and the sudden irruption of Hill's corps into Estremadura, in the pursuit of Count d'Erlon. Unheeded, the allied general was thus enabled to close up his divisions to the more immediate vicinity of the fortress he

* Victories of the British Armies.

was about to attack; while, straitened for provisions, the marshals were necessitated to spread their troops over an expanse of country, which rendered it impossible on their parts, to effect a rapid concentration, should that be required by any hostile demonstration of the allies.

These were great advantages in favour of Lord Wellington, but he had many countervailing obstacles to surmount. His means of land transport were very scanty, and although by water carriage he had managed to forward seventy heavy guns to Villa de Ponte, he could bring only thirty-eight pieces to the trenches, with a very inadequate allowance of shot. Fortunately, however, enough were picked up among the ruined works of Almeida to supply the deficiency; but the task of their removal was most difficult, as the Portuguese muleteers consumed two days in traversing with empty carts a distance of barely ten English miles in length.

Considering the season of the year, and the nakedness of the country for many miles around the threatened fortress, the intended operation was bold to a degree. The horses had scarcely any forage, and the men were literally destitute of bread or shelter. The new year came in inclemently—rain fell in torrents—and though the investment was delayed two days, one brigade (M'Kinnon's) that marched from Aldea da Ponte, left nearly four hundred men behind, in a route of only four-and-twenty miles, numbers of whom perished on the line of march, or died subsequently of fatigue.*

The general appearance of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the country immediately around the works, has been already described.† Since the French, however, had obtained possession of the place, they had made very judicious additions to its defences. Three convents, situated in the centre and on either flank of the suburbs, had been fortified, while that of Santa Cruz, at the north-west angle of the

* Victories of the British Armies. † Vol. II. page 147.

glacis, had been converted into an infantry post. A small redoubt had been also erected on the upper Teson, supported by the fire of the convent of San Francisco, from which it was distant about 400 yards; and this redoubt completely secured the northern front of Rodrigo from being assailed.

"The general project for the attack, was to storm this redoubt on the first night, and establish a lodgement near it, with a good communication from the rear. On the succeeding night, the lodgement was to be extended to the right to form a parallel, and in front of the parallel to commence batteries for thirty-three pieces of ordnance, to ruin the defences. As soon as these batteries should be finished, to work forward under protection of their fire to the lower Teson, and there erect a battery to breach the main and fausse-braie walls, and during the time of that operation to sap up to the glacis, and blow in the counterscarp.

"To avoid the loss attendant upon forcing such retrenchments as the garrison might make behind the main breach, it was determined to attempt to form another opening in the scarp wall, just before the conclusion of the attack, by unexpectedly bringing a heavy fire on a small projecting tower seen to its base over the fausse-braie, and represented to be excessively weak and bad, and requiring but little battering to bring it down. A battery for seven guns to be prepared for that purpose, and the guns to be taken from the first batteries, when it should be deemed the proper moment.

"The garrison to be driven from the convent St. Francisco, by the fire of the left battery on the upper Teson, which it was concluded would cause the abandonment of the suburbs.

"The weather was excessively cold, and there being no camp equipage with the army, nor cover of any sort to be found in the vicinity of the place, it was regulated that the troops should remain cantoned in the nearest villages, and that the duties of the siege should be taken by the light,

1st, 3d, and 4th divisions alternately; each remaining four-and-twenty hours on the ground."*

Although the fords of the Agueda permitted the divisions to cross the river both above and below the town, yet the sudden rises to which the stream is liable in winter, alarmed Lord Wellington; and to guard against all chances of his communications being interrupted by sudden floods, he laid down a trestle bridge at the ford of Marialva, six miles below the town.

On the 8th of January, the light division forded the river at La Caridad, and formed the investment; and the engineers' stores were brought across the Agueda by the bridge, and parked 1,800 yards from the fortress. During the day every thing was kept as quiet as possible, and an equal examination made of every side of the town, so as to prevent any suspicion of an immediate effort being intended, or betray to the garrison the point about to be attacked.†

At eight o'clock that evening the redoubt upon the upper Teson was carried by assault. The affair was gallantly effected by three companies of the 52d, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Colborne, and conducted by Lieutenant Thomson. The loss was trifling, and the possession of the work was found of immediate value. "From the lodgement a distinct view was obtained of the defences of the place and of the intervening ground, and the commanding engineer was enabled to decide on the best trace for the parallel and the best sites for the batteries, and at dusk he picketed them out."‡

Until the 11th, the approaches were rapidly pushed forward, and the batteries and their magazines constructed.

* "The troops are to have with them a day's provisions cooked, and they are to be followed by two days' spirits, and no other baggage.

"A sufficient number of men to cook the provisions for the day the division is relieved, are to be left in the cantonments."—*Memorandum, Wellington Despatches.*

† Jones's Journal of Sieges.

‡ Ibid.

Some casualties occurred every day, but at this period the garrison distinguished the batteries from the other parts of the work, and attained their range so precisely, that two thirds of their shells fell into them; and their round shot caused many casualties, particularly amongst those at work in the ditch next the place, whenever they unthinkingly exposed themselves. In consequence of this, and some very destructive effects produced from shells exploding in the ditch amongst the workmen, who could not jump out in time to save themselves, the exterior excavation was discontinued altogether, and the interior of the batteries was directed to be sunken to the necessary depth to furnish earth for the parapets. About this time also the garrison adopted the expedient of firing shells filled with powder, and having long fuses in salvos. Some of these falling together into the parapets blew away in an instant the work of hours.*

On the 14th the irregular manner pursued by the allies, in introducing their reliefs to the trenches, had nearly produced a serious disaster. On the appearance of the division for duty, the guards and workmen generally drew off, leaving the trenches for the time without protection. This unmilitary proceeding had been observed from the steeple of the cathedral, and in consequence the garrison made a sally with five hundred men.

The sortie succeeded in upsetting most of the gabions placed during the preceding night in advance of the first parallel. Some of the troops even penetrated into the right of the parallel, and others would have pushed into the batteries, and probably spiked the guns, had it not been for the steady conduct of a few workmen, collected into a body by an officer of engineers, who manned the parapets, and kept up such a steady fire, as to induce the assailants to halt when within a few yards. On the approach of Lieut.-General Graham with the advance of the relieving division, the sortie retired into the town with little loss.†

* Jones's Journal of Sieges. † Ibid.

Intelligence in the mean time had been received, that induced Lord Wellington to alter his system of attack. Marmont was collecting his detached divisions, and his avowed object being the relief of the place, Wellington determined to prevent it by storming Rodrigo, without waiting to blow in the counterscarp—"in other words, to overstep the rules of science, and sacrifice life rather than time; for such was the capricious nature of the Agueda, that in one night a flood might enable a small French force to relieve the place."*

The sortie, added to the opening and lining of the embrasures, which the death of the acting engineer had embarrassed, delayed the breaching batteries from commencing their fire until half-past four in the afternoon. Then twenty-seven heavy guns opened; they were promptly answered by every piece of artillery which the garrison could bring to bear; and the united fire produced an effect more strikingly magnificent, than it has been the ordinary good fortune of a British soldier to witness.

"The evening," says Lord Londonderry, "chanced to be remarkably beautiful and still; there was not a cloud in the sky, nor a breath of wind astir, when suddenly the roar of artillery broke in upon its calmness, and volumes of smoke rose slowly from our batteries. These floating gently towards the town, soon enveloped the lower parts of the hill, and even the ramparts and bastions, in a dense veil; whilst the towers and summits, lifting their heads over the haze, showed like fairy buildings, or those unsubstantial castles which are sometimes seen in the clouds on a summer's day. The flashes from our guns, answered as they promptly were from the artillery in the place, the roar of their thunder reverberating among the remote mountains of the Sierra de Francisca; these, with the rattle of balls against the masonry, and the occasional crash as portions of the wall gave way, proved, altogether, a scene which, to be rightly understood, must be experienced."

* Napier.

To the 19th, with the usual incidents that attend a siege, the besiegers continued to breach, and the garrison to offer the boldest and most scientific opposition. The irresistible fire of the British guns had gradually ruined that portion of the works against which its violence was directed. The convent of San Francisco had been already taken with little resistance by the 40th regiment, the breaches rendered practicable, and a summons sent to the governor and declined.*

A personal examination of the breaches confirmed Lord Wellington's previous opinion, that the assault might be given with success; and directing the fire of the breaching batteries to be turned against the guns upon the ramparts, he seated himself upon the reverse of an advanced approach, and wrote out the following order of assault:—

"The attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo must be made this evening, at seven o'clock.

"The light infantry company of the 83d regiment will join Lieut.-Colonel O'Toole at sunset.

"Lieut.-Colonel O'Toole, with the 2d caçadores and the light company of the 83d regiment, will, ten minutes before seven, cross the Agueda by the bridge, and make an attack upon the outwork in front of the castle. The object of this attack is to drive the artillery-men from two guns in that outwork, which bear upon the entrance into the ditch, at the junction of the counterscarp with the main wall of the place: if Lieut.-Colonel O'Toole can get into the outwork, it would be desirable to destroy these guns. Major Sturgeon will show Lieut.-Colonel O'Toole his point of attack.

* "Lord Wellington, willing to spare the lives both of his own troops and of the garrison, sent in to demand a surrender. The reply, though not such as could have been desired, was nevertheless one which all brave men must admire: and I give it in the words of the governor, because these alone can do it full justice: 'Sa Majesté l'Empereur,' said he, 'm'a confié le commandement de Ciudad Rodrigo. Je ne puis pas le rendre. Au contraire, moi et la brave garnison que je commande s'enseveliront dans ses ruines.'"—*Lord Londonderry's Narrative.*

Six ladders, twelve feet long each, will be sent from the engineer park to the old French guard-room, at the mill on the Agueda, for the use of this detachment.

" The 5th regiment will attack the entrance of the ditch at the point above referred to, Major Sturgeon will likewise show them the point of attack; they must issue from the right of the convent of Santa Cruz; they must have twelve axes to cut down the gate by which the ditch is entered, at the junction of the counterscarp with the body of the place. The 5th regiment are likewise to have twelve scaling ladders, 25 feet long, and immediately on entering the ditch, are to scale the fausse-braie wall, and are to proceed along the fausse-braie, in order to clear it of the enemy's posts on their left, towards the principal breach.

" The 77th regiment are to be in reserve on the right of the convent of Santa Cruz, to support the first party, which will have entered the ditch.

" The ditch must besides be entered on the right of the breach by two columns, to be formed on the left of the convent of Santa Cruz, each to consist of five companies of the 94th regiment. Each column must have three ladders 12 feet long, by which they are to descend into the ditch, and they are to have ten axes to cut down any palisades which may be placed in the ditch to impede the communication along it.

" The detachment of the 94th regiment, when descended into the ditch, is to turn to its left to the main breach.

" The 5th regiment will issue from the convent of Santa Cruz ten minutes before seven.

" At the same time a party consisting of 180 sappers, carrying bags containing hay, will move out of the second parallel, covered by a fire of the 83d regiment, formed in the second parallel, upon the works of the place, which bags are to be thrown into the ditch, so as to enable the troops to descend the counterscarp to the attack of the breach: they are to be followed immediately by the storming party of the great breach, which is to consist of the

troops of Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade. Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade is to be formed in the first parallel, and in the communications between the first and second parallel, ready to move up to the breach immediately in rear of the sappers with bags. The storming party of the great breach must be provided with six scaling ladders, 12 feet long each, and with ten axes.

"The ditch must likewise be entered by a column on the left of the great breach, consisting of three companies of the 95th regiment, which are to issue from the right of the convent of St. Francisco. This column will be provided with three ladders, 12 feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be pointed out to them by Lieutenant Wright: on descending into the ditch, they are to turn to their right, and to proceed towards the main breach; they are to have ten axes, to enable them to cut down the obstacles which may have been erected to impede the communication along the ditch, on the left of the breach.

"Another column, consisting of Major-General Vandeleur's brigade, will issue out from the left of the convent of St. Francisco, and are to attack the breach to the left of the main breach; this column must have twelve ladders, each 12 feet long, with which they are to descend into the ditch, at a point which will be shown them by Captain Ellicombe. On arriving in the ditch, they are to turn to their left, to storm the breach in the fausse-braie, on their left of the small ravelin, and thence to the breach in the tower of the body of the place; as soon as this body will have reached the top of the breach in the fausse-braie wall, a detachment of five companies are to be sent to the right, to cover the attack of Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade by the principal breach; and as soon as they have reached the top of the tower, they are to turn to their right, and communicate with the rampart of the main breach; as soon as this communication can be established, endeavour should be made to open the gate of Salamanca.

"The Portuguese brigade in the 3d division will be formed in the communication to the first parallel, and behind the hill of St. Francisco (upper Teson,) and will move up to the entrance of the second parallel, ready to support Major-General M'Kinnon's brigade.

"Colonel Barnard's brigade will be formed behind the convent of St. Francisco, ready to support Major-General Vandeleur's brigade; all these columns will have detached parties especially appointed to keep up a fire on the defences during the above.

"The men with ladders, and axes, and bags, must not have their arms; those who are to storm must not fire.

"Brigadier-General Pack, with his brigade, will make a false attack upon the outwork of the gate of St. Jago, and upon the works towards La Caridad.

"The different regiments and brigades to receive ladders are to send parties to the engineers' depot to receive them, three men for each ladder."

Courage, like other qualities, has its varieties. Some men are born brave; others acquire intrepidity from example; and even a timid spirit may be stimulated by action, until personal apprehension is overcome. Amid the crash of battle, the dullest soul catches a glorious impulse, and, for the time, casts off its natural torpidity. To exert, however, that mental calmness which conveys, in brief and lucid language, the details of plans of action, requiring the agency of many, and whose success the misconception of an individual might destroy—this demands a philosophic concentration of thought, which many found foremost in the press of fight, never can obtain.

This, the most important quality of a great general, Napoleon and Wellington possessed extensively; and when the fate of battle hung upon a hair, both were calm and self-collected, and the order upon which victory or defeat depended, was issued with a coolness that approached insensibility. The terrible attack at Essling was simply indi-

cated by a gesture ;* and when tidings were brought upon that bloody evening, which might have palsied the firmest nerves, not a feature of Napoleon was seen to alter.† Sitting on the embankment of a field-work, undisturbed by the roar of his own artillery or a responding thunder from the batteries of the fortress, Lord Wellington penned the plan of the assault; and when that writing went forth, the doom of Ciudad Rodrigo was sealed!

* "From his station behind the centre of the French line, Napoleon pointed out with his finger, at seven in the morning, to Lannés, who was on horseback beside him, the direction which his corps should follow in their advance, which was where the Austrian line appeared weakest, between the left of Hohenzollern and the right of Rosenberg."—*Alison's History of Europe.*

† "Reports began to circulate, and soon spread like wild-fire through the ranks, that the bridges were broken down, and all communication with the reserve posts, and two-thirds of Davoust's corps, still on the southern bank, cut off. In effect, at half-past eight, the alarming intelligence reached the Emperor, that the fire-ships and heavy barks laden with stones, sent down by the Archduke, had, with the swelling of the river, produced the desired effect, and that a considerable part of the bridge over the main stream of the Danube had been swept away.

"In this terrible moment Napoleon's courage did not forsake him. Grave and thoughtful, but collected, he allayed by the calmness of his manner the alarm of those around him, and immediately gave the necessary orders to suspend the attacks at all points, and fall back towards the island of Lobau."—*Ibid.*

CHAPTER XXVII.

DAY OF THE ASSAULT—THIRD AND LIGHT DIVISIONS MOVE FORWARD TO THE TRENCHES—APPEARANCE OF THE FORTRESS—TROOPS ADVANCE TO THE ASSAULT—LARGER BREACH OBSTINATELY DEFENDED—THE LESSER CARRIED BY THE LIGHT BRIGADE—MAJOR MACKIE ENTERS THE CITADEL, WHICH SURRENDERS—FEROCIOUS CONDUCT OF THE TROOPS—DEATH OF GENERALS CRAUFURD AND M'KINNON—ALLIED CASUALTIES—RODRIGO A VALUABLE CONQUEST—ITS RAPID REDUCTION—HONOURS BESTOWED ON LORD WELLINGTON—MARMONT'S MOVEMENTS—SEVERITY OF CARLOS D'ESPANA—ESPIONAGE PURSUED ON BOTH SIDES—ANECDOTES—RODRIGO DELIVERED OVER TO THE SPANIARDS—PREPARATIONS TO BESIEGE BADAJOZ—SCARCITY OF MONEY NEARLY INTERRUPTS THE PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN—BADAJOZ INVESTED—ITS ADDITIONAL DEFENCES AND GENERAL STATE OF PREPARATION—LORD WELLINGTON'S MEANS OF ATTACK—RODRIGO NEGLECTED BY THE SPANIARDS—REMONSTRANCE ADDRESSED TO CARLOS D'ESPANA.

EARLY in the day the order of attack had been issued by Lord Wellington; and the officers to whom the conduct of the assault was to be entrusted, had thus ample time allowed them to become perfectly apprized of the duties which they had respectively to perform. To many the day appeared interminably long, and some passed the tedious hours in real or affected merriment—but others in the performance of a more sacred duty—that of conveying to wives or relatives, what might prove the last expressions of an undying regard.

To the third and light divisions, whose turns of duties fell upon the 19th, the assault was confided by Lord Wellington; and they marched from their cantonments to the more immediate vicinity of the trenches. A few minutes after six o'clock, the third moved to the rear of the first parallel, two gun-shots from the main breach,—while the light division formed behind a convent, three hundred yards in front of the smaller one. Darkness came on,—and with it came the order to "Stand to arms." With calm determination, the soldiers of the third division heard their

commanding-officer announce the main breach as the object of attack, and every man prepared himself promptly for the desperate struggle. Off went the packs,—the stocks were unbuckled,—the cartouch-box arranged to meet the hand more readily,—flints were screwed home,—every one, after his individual fancy, fitting himself for action. The companies were carefully told off,—the serjeants called the rolls,—and not a man was missing!*

Though the interval from the time when the storming parties entered the trenches, until they moved forward to the assault was brief, it was a period of most intense anxiety and excitement; and accidental circumstances tended to deepen those impressions, which coming events could not have failed to produce. "The evening was calm and tranquil, and the moon, in her first quarter, shed over the scene a feeble light, which, without disclosing the shape or form of particular objects, rendered their rude outline distinctly visible. There stood the fortress, a confused mass of masonry, with its breaches like shadows cast upon the wall; whilst not a gun was fired from it, and all within was as still and motionless as if it were already a ruin, or that its inhabitants were buried in sleep. On our side, again, the trenches crowded with armed men, among whom not so much as a whisper might be heard, presented no unapt resemblance to a dark thunder-cloud, or to a volcano in that state of tremendous quiet which usually precedes its most violent eruptions."†

The bell from the tower of the cathedral tolled seven; and, in obedience to previous orders, the troops marched rapidly, but silently to the assault. The third division, preceded by its storming party under Major Manners, a forlorn hope under Lieutenant Mackie, and accompanied by a body of sappers with hay-bags and ladders, made directly for the greater breach; while the light division, led by Major George Napier, with 300 volunteers, and a forlorn-hope under Lieutenant Gurwood, were directed

* Victories of the British Armies. † Lord Londonderry's Narrative.

against the lesser one.* A Portuguese brigade, commanded by General Pack, were to alarm the fortress on the opposite side, and threaten to escalade at the gate of St. Jago; and, should circumstances warrant the attempt, convert a false attack into a real one.

No piece of clock-work, however nicely arranged, could obey the will of its maker more accurately than the different columns obeyed that night the wishes of their chief; and his orders were, in consequence, executed at every point with the same precision and regularity as if he had been manœuvring so many battalions upon parade.† For a few moments, the heavy tramp of many men put simultaneously into motion alone broke upon the solemn stillness of the evening. But, suddenly, a shout upon the right of the line nearest the bridge was heard; it was taken up along the whole line of attack,—a spattering of musketry succeeded — the storming parties rushed forward to the breaches, — and every gun upon the ramparts that would bear opened with one tremendous crash, and told that the garrison were prepared for the assault and ready to repel it.

At the first alarm, the storming party of the third division advanced, and descended the ditch. At the bottom, a range of heavy shells had been placed with continued fuses; but hurried by the suddenness of the attack, the French prematurely fired them, and their fury had fortunately expended itself before the assailants were close enough to suffer from a murderous explosion.

"General M'Kinnon's brigade instantly pushed up the breach, in conjunction with the 5th and 94th regiments,

* The larger breach, exposing a shattered front of more than one hundred feet, had been carefully mined; the base of the wall strewn with shells and grenades, and the top, where troops might escalade, similarly defended. Behind, a deep retrenchment was cut to insulate the broken rampart, in the event of its being carried by storm. The lesser breach was narrow at the top, exceedingly steep, with a four-and-twenty pounder turned sideways, that blocked the passage up, except an opening between the muzzle and the wall, by which two files might enter.

† Lord Londonderry's Narrative.

which arrived at the same moment along the ditch from their right. The men mounted in a most gallant manner against an equally gallant resistance; and it was not till after a sharp struggle of some minutes that the bayonets of the assailants prevailed, and gained them a footing on the summit of the rampart. The defenders then concentrated behind the retrenchment, which they obstinately maintained, and a second severe struggle commenced."* The lesser breach was, at the same time, assaulted with equal intrepidity, but more decided success. The darkness of the ditch occasioned a momentary confusion, which the fall of the leading officers increased; while the ardour of the light troops brought so many to the breach, that they choked its narrow aperture with their numbers. For a moment the assailants recoiled, but it was only to return more resolutely to the onset. A cheer was heard above the thunder of artillery, — up rushed the stormers, — the breach was gained, — the supporting regiments mounted in sections, formed on the rampart, the 52d wheeling to the left, the 43d to the right, — and that success alone would have decided the fate of Rodrigo.

Although the greater breach had been carried by the first rush, isolated by a rampart 12 feet deep in front, retrenched on either flank, and swept by the fire of a field-piece and musketry from the houses which overlooked and enfiladed it, the progress of the storming party was arrested, and men and officers fell fast. At this trying moment, the gallantry of an adventurous individual, opened the gates of success. Mackie, who led the forlorn hope, dropping from the rampart into the town, discovered that the trench upon the right of the breach was cut quite across, and consequently, that an opening was left by which the assailants might get in. Reascending the top of the breach, he led the men through the trench into the street; and the enemy, on their appearance, abandoned any further effort at defence and fled towards the citadel. The false attack by the

* Jones's Journal of Sieges.

Portuguese, under General Pack, had been equally effective. They carried by escalade a small redan in front of the St. Jago gate, and of course, materially assisted in distracting the attention of the garrison by the alarm their movement had caused.

Thus terminated the struggle for Rodrigo. Some of the garrison still offered a useless opposition and were put to the sword, but any who demanded quarter, received it. From the great breach, Mackie, with a mixed party, reached the citadel; and his gallantry was rewarded by receiving there the submission of General Barrie and such of the garrison as it contained.*

* The honour of taking the citadel and governor of Rodrigo has been claimed by, and generally considered to belong to another and a distinguished officer. Major William Mackie is no more,—and the grave has closed upon one of the most gallant and neglected soldiers of his times. The fame of one whom the author of these pages from early manhood regarded with brotherly affection, is sacred; and he cannot permit the honour of an action, indubitably achieved by his lamented friend, to be assumed by another, no matter how deserving or distinguished. Colonel Gurwood, under a firm conviction, no doubt, that he was justly entitled to it, has informed the world, that "as the captor of the governor of Rodrigo, the Duke of Wellington presented him with his prisoner's sword." To receive *that sword* from *that hand* was, indeed, an honour of which Colonel Gurwood might be proud; but *the hand* to whom it should have been transferred, is blanching in the sands of Africa. To deserve and be neglected,—to see men whose services never extended beyond the trooping of a guard, pass over him by hundreds,—to witness military distinctions bestowed on individuals, whose claims were weak, as the persistency with which they were urged was boundless,—all these were borne by my friend without a murmur. He felt the injustice, but his was too proud a spirit to stoop either to remonstrance or complaint. But though the deed passed unrewarded, to have its performance claimed by another was not to be endured; and Major Mackie addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Napier a modest but accurate statement of the part he had acted in storming Rodrigo, leaving to the world—as I do—the task of deciding to whom, by right of conquest, the sword of General Barrie should have belonged. Premising, that after discovering an entrance from the breach to the street, and leading the storming party into the town, Mackie proceeded towards the citadel with such scattered men as could be induced to follow, of the after occurrences we shall give his own detail:—

"Having advanced considerably, and passed across a street running to the left, a body of the enemy came suddenly from that street, rushed through our ranks, and escaped. In pursuit of this body, which after passing us held their

After all resistance had ceased, the usual scene of riot, plunder, and confusion, which by prescriptive right the stormers of a town enjoy, occurred. Every house was entered and despoiled; the spirit stores were forced open; the soldiery got desperately excited; and in the madness of their intoxication, committed many acts of silly and wanton violence.* All plundered what they could, and in turn they were robbed by their own companions. Brawls and

course to the right, I urged the party forward in that direction, until we reached the citadel, where the governor and garrison had taken refuge. The outer gate of the inclosure being open, I entered at the head of the party, composed of men of different regiments, who by this time had joined the advance. Immediately on entering I was hailed by a French officer, asking for an English general to whom they might surrender. Pointing to my epaulets in token of their security, the door of the keep or stronghold of the place was opened, and a sword presented to me in token of surrender, which sword I accordingly received. This I had scarcely done, when two of their officers laid hold of me for protection, one on each arm, and *it was while I was thus situated that Lieutenant Gurwood came up and obtained the sword of the governor.*

"In this way, the governor with Lieutenant Gurwood, and the two officers I have mentioned still clinging to my arms, the whole party moved towards the rampart." . . . .

"I declare on the word of a man of honour, that *I was the first individual who effected the descent from the main breach into the streets of the town, that I preceded the advance into the body of the place, that I was the first who entered the citadel, and that the enemy there assembled had surrendered to myself and party before Lieutenant Gurwood came up.*" . . . .

"I appeal to any man in the least degree acquainted with the rules of modern warfare, if under these circumstances I am not justified in asserting that before, and at the time Lieutenant Gurwood arrived, the whole of the enemy's garrison within the walls of the citadel, governor included, were both *de jure* and *de facto* prisoners to myself. In so far, therefore, as the being the individual who made its owner captive could give either of us a claim to receive that sword to which Colonel Gurwood ascribes such magic influence in the furthering of his after fortunes, I do maintain that, at the time it became *de facto* his, it was *de jure* mine."

* "The town was fired in three or four places; the soldiers menaced their officers, and shot each other; many were killed in the market-place; intoxication soon increased the tumult; disorder every where prevailed, and at last, the fury rising to an absolute madness, a fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, when the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses."—*Napier.*

bloodshed resulted; and the same men who, shoulder to shoulder, had won their way over the "imminent deadly breach," fought with demoniac ferocity for some disputed article of plunder. At last, worn out by fatigue, and stupified with brandy, they sank into brutal insensibility. On the second day, with few exceptions, the whole rejoined their regiments; the assault and sacking of Rodrigo appearing in their confused imaginations rather like some troubled dream than a sad reality of blood and violence."*

A place of strength defended so desperately as Ciudad Rodrigo could not have been carried but with a heavy expenditure of life, and consequently, the losses of the third and light divisions were severe, and both had to lament the fall of a favourite general. Craufurd was mortally wounded in leading the attack upon the lesser breach, and M'Kinnon perished on the greater, as it was supposed, by the explosion of a mine,—the last desperate effort of the garrison when driven from their defences. Both were officers of the greatest promise—men already distinguished, and wanting only farther opportunities to display the military talents which they unquestionably possessed, to place their names among those of the best generals of the day. Craufurd was buried in the breach before which he had received his mortal wound; and M'Kinnon was carried to Espeja by the officers of the Coldstream guards, and there interred with due solemnity. In reporting Craufurd's death, Lord Wellington bore the amplest testimony to the "tried talents" of one whom he justly termed "an ornament to his profession," and from whose experience and ability he declared that he had derived much valuable assistance. M'Kinnon was universally regretted. To personal accomplishments, he united the blandest address and the gentlest disposition. Every quality which constitutes a perfect soldier he possessed—and "he was one of those men whom the dreadful discipline of war renders only more considerate

* Victories of the British Armies.

for others, more regardless of themselves, more alive to the sentiments and duty of humanity." *

The casualties attendant on the siege and storm amounted to above 1,000;† "and unhappily the loss of life did not end with the battle, for the next day as the prisoners and their escort were marching out by the breach, an accidental explosion took place, and numbers of both were blown into the air." ‡

* General M'Kinnon had been educated in France, his family residing for a time in Dauphiny. Among the visitors at his father's house, Napoleon, then a military student, was included; and it would appear that he then had contracted an early regard for the settlers, which in after elevation he evinced by inviting them to return to France. When the death of M'Kinnon was announced to him, the Emperor, it was said, betrayed more emotion than the loss of friends generally caused.

Doctor Southey relates the following interesting anecdote: — "The unwholesome heat in the vicinity of Badajoz induced some recurrence of a disease with which he had been attacked in Egypt, and General M'Kinnon returned for a few weeks to England there to recruit his health. In 1804 he had married a daughter of Sir John Call: she planted in his garden a laurel for every action in which her husband was engaged: and when in his last visit she took him into the walk where they were flourishing, he said to her, that she would one day have to plant a cypress at the end. Perhaps this country has never sustained so great a loss since the death of Sir Philip Sydney."

† "Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of General Viscount Wellington, K.B., during the siege and in the assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, from the 8th to the 19th of January, 1812.

	Officers.	Non-comd. Officers and Drummers.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	9	11	158	—	178
Wounded . .	70	35	713	—	818
Missing . . .	—	—	7	—	7

"Of the above numbers 6 officers and 140 men were killed, and 60 officers and 500 men wounded in storming the breaches."

‡ Napier.

The military importance of Ciudad Rodrigo rendered it a valuable conquest; and its capture placed in Lord Wellington's hands 80 French officers and 1,500 men. The arsenal was abundantly supplied; and besides the artillery of the place, consisting of one hundred and ten mounted guns, Marmont's battering train was taken with the fortress.

The rapid reduction of Ciudad Rodrigo was unparalleled in modern war, and its fall was so unexpected, that Marmont's efforts to relieve it were scarcely conceived and commenced, before the tidings reached him that the fortress he prized so highly was lost. By the lowest estimate of time it was calculated that four-and-twenty days would be required to bring the siege to a successful issue. On the 8th ground was broken, and on the 19th the British colours were flying from the flag-staff of the citadel. Massena, after a tedious bombardment, took a full month to reduce it; Wellington carried it by assault in eleven days. No wonder therefore, that Marmont, in his despatch to Berthier, was puzzled to account for the rapid reduction of a place, respecting whose present safety and ultimate relief he had previously forwarded the most encouraging assurances.*

"The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of Francisco, and broke ground on the first night of the investment; the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the fire of the defence had been in any manner lessened, and before the counterscarp had been blown in; were the true causes of the sudden fall of the place. Both the military and political state of affairs warranted this neglect of rules. The final success depended more upon the courage of the troops than the skill of the engineer; and when the general terminated his order for the assault with this sentence, 'Ciudad Rodrigo *must* be stormed this evening,' he knew well that it would be nobly understood. Yet the French

* Victories of the British Armies.

fought bravely on the breach, and by their side many British deserters,* desperate men, were bayoneted."†

The splendid achievement of the conqueror of Rodrigo obtained an honourable requital. He was advanced, in Spain, to the rank of a grandee of the first order, with the title of Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo; by the Portuguese, he was made Marquis of Torres Vedras; and at home, raised to the earldom of Wellington, with an increased annuity of 2,000*l.* a year. In the debate which took place in the lower house when the grant for supporting his additional honours was proposed, "Mr. Canning took occasion to state that a revenue of 5,000*l.* a year had been granted to Lord Wellington by the Portuguese government when they conferred upon him the title of Conde de Vimeiro; that as captain-general of Spain, 5,000*l.* a year had been offered him, and 7,000*l.* as marshal in the Portuguese service, all of which he had declined, saying, 'he would receive nothing from Spain and Portugal in their present state; he had only done his duty to his country, and to his country alone he would look for reward.'"‡

On learning that Rodrigo was besieged, Marmont had hastily concentrated the troops previously in cantonments; but as the intelligence had only reached him on the 15th at Valladolid, it was the 25th before he was in a condition that would warrant him in disturbing the investment. At Salamanca the French corps had united on the 25th, forming a grand army of 45,000 men, but they were still four marches from the fortress, which six days before had fallen. The junction of 5,000 men detached from Hill's corps, rendered

* Many of these misguided men had sought shelter in Rodrigo, and most of them perished during the assault. A few however, were executed afterwards, but mercy was extended to the remainder. A treasonable correspondence was at the same time discovered to have existed between some of the inhabitants and the French marshals—and these traitors to their country were exterminated by Carlos d'España, root and branch; the severity of the Spanish general forming a strong contrast to the lenity with which Lord Wellington visited the worst of military crimes—desertion.

† Napier. ‡ Parliamentary Register.

Lord Wellington strong enough to abide a trial, if Marmont should move forward to the Agueda, on learning that Rodrigo had been carried; but the French marshal retired again to Valladolid, his troops exhausted by forced marches, and himself unable to comprehend what ulterior objects his dangerous opponent might have in view.

The severe measures which Don Carlos d'España had pursued in his merciless execution of the Spanish traitors in Rodrigo, had removed those persons from whom Marmont had hitherto received his most accurate information, and at a time when Lord Wellington's designs were more impenetrable than ever. At no more embarrassing period indeed, could this secret intelligence have been interrupted; and nothing remained for the French marshal but to disperse his army again, and wait patiently until the plans of the allied general should be more fully developed.

It was a matter of surprise to all who were not aware of the extensive espionage employed on both sides, how accurately Lord Wellington and the French marshals to whom he was opposed, were acquainted with the objects and the capabilities of each other. At Lisbon, many persons in immediate connexion with the Regency were more than suspected of holding a correspondence with the French; and their treachery was encouraged by the culpable misconduct of the Portuguese government in not punishing criminals whose treasons had been established beyond a question. The English newspapers were regularly transmitted from Paris by Napoleon; and they teemed with intelligence mischievously correct, and that too, from the head quarters of the allied army; and—though a circumstance of rare occurrence—if an intimation of what he intended to attempt escaped from Lord Wellington's lips to the Spaniards with whom he was in communication, through the indiscretion of these individuals it was sure to reach the enemy. He says, writing to his brother,—"I apprized ——— of my intention and plan for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, and him alone, the success of which depends

principally upon the length of time during which I can keep it concealed from the enemy. Some Spanish women at Portalegre were apprized of the plan by him, and it must reach the enemy!!! Yet —— is one of the best of them."

Through the correspondence intercepted by the guerillas, Lord Wellington constantly obtained the most valuable information. This was generally contained in letters from the French generals themselves, intended to direct the movements of their colleagues. Although their despatches were written in cipher, the allied leader generally contrived to find out the key which unveiled their contents; and his own secret espionage was even more extensive than the enemy's. "He had a number of spies amongst the Spaniards who were living within the French lines; a British officer in disguise constantly visited the French armies in the field; a Spanish state-counsellor, living at the head quarters of the first corps, gave intelligence from that side; and a guitar-player of celebrity, named Fuentes, repeatedly making his way to Madrid, brought advice from thence. Mr. Stuart, under cover of vessels licensed to fetch corn from France, kept *chasse marées* constantly plying along the Biscay coast, by which he not only acquired direct information, but facilitated the transmission of intelligence from the land spies, amongst whom the most remarkable was a cobbler, living in a little hutch at the end of the bridge of Irun. This man, while plying his trade, continued for years, without being suspected, to count every French soldier that passed in and out of Spain by that passage, and transmitted their numbers by the *chasse marées* to Lisbon."*

To Castanos, as captain-general of the province, and who had been personally present at the siege, Ciudad Rodrigo was formally delivered over,—Lord Wellington having rendered the place defensible again by filling in the trenches, repairing the breaches, and adding considerably to the strength of the outworks. Provisions were also allocated for the use of the garrison from his own magazines, and money sup-

* Napier.

plied to defray the expenses of labour and materials; and on the 5th of March, Colonel Fletcher handed the fortress over to Calvert, the Spanish engineer.

Since the preceding December, Lord Wellington had been actively engaged in preparing the necessary means for the investment of Badajoz. Elvas was the grand entrepôt—and there siege stores were collected, and gabions and fascines prepared. The pontoon bridge was also brought forward from Abrantes; and a battering train which had been conveyed by sea and river carriage in the first place to Alcacer de Sal, was finally transported to the banks of the Guadiana. These preparations, from want of a proper supply of animals of draught, were exceedingly difficult and tedious; and while forage and provisions were scarcely procurable at any price, the military chest of the allied general was dangerously exhausted. "But the talents of Lord Wellington always rose with his difficulties, although the want of specie crippled every operation. A movement into Spain, such as that now intended against Andalusia, could not be effected without magazines when there was no harvest on the ground, except by paying ready money; because it was certain that the Spaniards, however favourably disposed, would never diminish their own secret resources for mere promises of payment. The English general and Mr. Stuart, therefore, endeavoured to get British bank notes accepted as cash, by the great merchants of Lisbon and Oporto; and Lord Wellington reflecting that, from the enormous sums spent in Portugal, many persons must needs have secret hoards which they would be glad to invest if they could do it safely, asked for English Exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner; intending to pay the interest punctually and faithfully, however inconvenient it might prove at the moment. This plan could not be adopted with Portuguese paper, because the finances were faithlessly managed by the regency; but some futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by Lord Liverpool, and money became so scarce, that even in the midst of victory, the war was

more than once like to stop altogether from absolute inability to proceed."*

Leaving a division on the Agueda to observe the frontier, Lord Wellington proceeded to Elvas by Villa Velha, where he fixed his head quarters on the 11th of March. The pontoon bridge was thrown across the Guadiana on the 15th, and on the same day two flying bridges were established. On the 16th Marshal Beresford passed the river, and invested Badajoz with the third, fourth, and light divisions, and a Portuguese brigade; General Graham, with the fifth, sixth, and seventh divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, marched upon Llerena; while General Hill moved by Merida upon Almendralejoz. These covering armies were intended to prevent a junction between the corps of Soult and Marmont, while the siege should be in progress—the former Marshal being in front of Cadiz—the latter moving by Toledo in the direction of Valladolid.

When Lord Wellington sat down before Badajoz, its garrison consisted of five thousand effective men, under the command of a most distinguished engineer, who had already defended the fortress with success. Since the former siege, Baron Phillipon had strengthened the place by mounting additional guns, retrenching the castle, and securing Fort San Christoval, which he connected by a covered way with the bridge by which the fort and city were united. "The Pardaleras too had been repaired and strengthened, and magazines established in the castle, into which, and into the citadel, it was the governor's intention to retire, if the place should be rendered no longer tenable. The enemy had also formed galleries and trenches at each salient of the counterscarp, in front of what they supposed would be the point of attack, that they might form mines under the breaching batteries, and afterwards sink shafts for other mines, whereby to destroy the works in proportion as the assailants should gain them, and thus, leave only a heap of ruins if the place should be taken. No foresight, indeed,

* Napier.

had been wanting on the governor's part. The peasantry having taken flight at the first siege and left their lands uncultivated, he had given directions for ploughing them with the oxen which were intended for slaughter, and they were sown by the soldiers within a circle of 3,000 yards: the kitchen gardens had also been distributed among the different corps and the officers of the staff, and in these they had a valuable resource." *

Convoys had reached Badajoz on the 10th and 16th of February, and the garrison was amply provisioned. Part of the inhabitants, to avoid the horrors of a siege which they had already twice experienced, voluntarily quitted the place; and such of the remainder as had not a sufficiency of food to maintain their families for three months were forcibly expelled. In powder and shells Phillipon was inadequately provided; for two convoys, which had attempted to bring him a supply, had been threatened by Hill's corps and obliged to return to Seville.

Such was the condition of Badajoz when, limited both in time and means, Lord Wellington determined to attack it. Although his battering train was respectable, and by exertions under which an iron constitution had nearly yielded, a tolerable supply of stores and ammunition had been obtained, still he was unprepared to undertake a formal siege. Mortars he had none — his miners were few and inexperienced — and if his operations were delayed, an advance of the French armies, or even the stormy weather he might prepare for at the equinox, must certainly interrupt the investment, and render his efforts to reduce Badajoz unavailing.

It would appear that the evil influences which occasionally dimmed the brightness of his star, proceeded invariably from those allies with whose fortunes his own were so intimately blended—and most of the embarrassments which checked success, were produced by the misconduct or apathy of those who were termed friends. To complete

* Southey.

the siege stores, those intended for the use of Elvas had been withdrawn, and consequently, that fortress was to a certain extent left defenceless. From his own magazines Rodrigo had been largely provisioned; and although his military chest was drained to the very bottom, still he left with Vivas, the Governor, 12,000 dollars to repair the works. What then must have been his surprise and disgust to receive a communication from Carlos d'España, stating that Rodrigo was but "provisioned for twenty-three days," and if Marmont could establish a single division between the Coa and Agueda, that place, whose reduction had cost so much British blood and treasure, must pass again into the hands of the enemy!

Justly incensed at the incapacity of an ally unequal to profit by success, or retain a conquest achieved so dearly as Ciudad Rodrigo had been, Lord Wellington gave an unreserved expression to his feelings,—and there are few letters in his voluminous correspondence which conveyed his opinions with more pointed and merited severity.

"The report which you make of Ciudad Rodrigo distresses me much. I had hoped that, when by the labour of the British and Portuguese troops, and at the expense of the British government, I had, in concert with General Castaños, improved and repaired the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, so that at all events the place was secure from a *coup de main*, and had left money in order to complete the execution of what our troops had not time to complete, I should not have been told by your Excellency, that for want of the assistance of fifteen or twenty British soldiers, who are artificers, and whose services are required for other objects essential to the cause of Spain, the whole business is at a stand. Is it possible that your Excellency can be in earnest? Is it possible that Castile cannot furnish fifteen or twenty stone-cutters, masons, and carpenters, for the repair of this important post? How have all the great works been performed which we see in the country?

"But your Excellency's letter suggests this melancholy

reflection, that everything, as well of a military as of a laborious nature, must be performed by British soldiers."

After enumerating the various supplies he had already placed in Rodrigo, Lord Wellington concludes:—

"In writing this letter to your Excellency, I do not mean to make any reproach. I wish only to place upon record the facts as they have occurred, and to show to your country and to my country, and the world, that if this important place should fall, or if I should be obliged to abandon plans important to Spain in order to go to its relief, the fault is not mine."*

* Dated, Camp before Badajoz, 20th March, 1812.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

STATE OF BADAJOZ — PLAN OF ATTACK—GROUND BROKEN—FRENCH SALLY AND ARE REPULSED—COLONEL FLETCHER WOUNDED—BAD WEATHER INTERRUPTS THE OPERATIONS—BRIDGE SWEPT AWAY—BATTERIES COMMENCE BREACHING —LA PICURINA CARRIED BY ASSAULT—PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE—SOULT ADVANCES TO LLERENA, AND WELLINGTON DETERMINES TO ASSAULT THE CITY—PLAN OF ATTACK—PHILLIPON'S PREPARATIONS TO REPULSE IT— EVENING OF THE STORM—BREACH ASSAILED WITHOUT SUCCESS—CASTLE ESCALADED—SAN VINCENTE CARRIED BY A BRIGADE OF THE 5TH DIVISION— WELLINGTON'S POSITION AND BEARING DURING THE ASSAULT—OUTRAGES COMMITTED BY THE TROOPS—FRENCH AND ALLIED CASUALTIES—REVIEW OF THE SIEGE — ORDER RESTORED — AND HEAD QUARTERS ESTABLISHED IN BADAJOZ.

THE works of Badajoz, in their relative strength, varied considerably. About the middle of the last century, a royal order was issued to rebuild the *enceinte** of the fortress; but it was so partially effected, that although new bastions were erected, the original curtains were suffered to remain. These being extremely low and of loose construction, were breached by the French with little difficulty;

* The reader who is not acquainted with terms used by engineers may find a brief explanation of those of frequent recurrence serviceable.

The glacis is the part beyond the covert-way to which it forms the parapet.

The flank is any part of a work which defends another.

The epaule is the shoulder of the bastion.

The gorge is next the body of the place where there is no rampart.

Fougasse is a small mine, six or seven feet under ground, generally formed in the glacis or dry ditch.

Curtain, the wall that connects bastions.

Counterguards are small ramparts with parapets and ditches, erected in front of a bastion or ravelin, to secure the opposite flanks from being open to the covert-way.

Lunettes are works on either side of a ravelin, with one perpendicular face. They are sometimes thrown up beyond the second ditch opposite the places of arms.

and apprized that their masonry was very bad, Lord Wellington, in his dispositions for the siege, took care to avail himself of this information.

As the counter-guard in front of the right face of La Trinidada had been left unfinished, the main scarp of the bastion might be seen sufficiently low down from the hill on which Fort Picurina stands, to be breached from thence. In consequence it was proposed to establish a parallel which should embrace Fort Picurina with its left, and extend so far to the right, as to form a first parallel against the place in which enfilading batteries might be established to keep under the fire of all the faces and flanks bearing on the Picurina hill; also to throw up batteries on the left of the parallel to injure the front defences of Fort Picurina, and to plunge into its interior with small charges, fired at high elevations, so as to break down the palisades along its gorge.

"These batteries were to open at day-light, and on the evening of the same day it was proposed to assault Fort Picurina, make a lodgment in it, and connect it with the first parallel. Then to throw up breaching batteries in the most eligible situations on the Picurina hill, to breach the right face of the bastion Trinidad; and as the attack

Revêtement of a battery is the exterior front formed of masonry or fascines, which keeps the bank of the work from falling.



Cunettes are small ditches.

Enceinte comprehends the whole defences of a place, except detached outworks.

Gabions (A) are large circular baskets, filled with earth or sand, and used for forming parapets, covering working parties, &c. &c.

Fascines (B) are small branches of trees bound together thus:—They are used for filling ditches, raising batteries, &c.

Retrench, in fortification, means the isolating of a breach by forming inner defences; as cutting a trench, palisading, erecting barricades, &c.

Chevaux de frise, are wooden spars, spiked at one end, and set into a piece of timber. They were originally used as a defence against cavalry, but are now commonly employed in strengthening outworks, stopping breaches, &c.

would not admit of the opposite flank of the bastion of Santa Maria being silenced by enfilade fire, it was proposed to breach it also at the same time with the face. Further, as from the distance of the breaching batteries, several days would be required to render the breaches practicable, during which time the garrison might retrench them, it was proposed, as soon as the great breaches should become practicable, to turn the fire of all the breaching guns upon the curtain between them, and make a third breach in it, which would from its situation turn the defences of the other two. The obstacles of the inundation to be avoided, by forming the columns for the assault behind the hills to the south and west of it. The covered-way and ditch to be entered as at Rodrigo." . . . . .

"The park was fixed on a gently rising ground, about 1,800 yards from the place, a little to the south of the Talavera road. The intervening heights of St. Michael concealed it from the view of the garrison. . . . . .

"In the course of the siege there were deposited in the park 3,000 intrenching tools, 80,000 sand-bags, 1,200 gabions, 700 common fascines, and an equal number of tracing fascines, with a sufficient supply of plank and splinter-proof timber and small stores. A quantity of brushwood was collected in the vicinity, and made serviceable during the operation."*

On the night of the 17th, Lord Wellington broke ground in front of Picurina, within 160 yards of the fort. The tempestuous state of the weather favoured the operation—the workmen were undiscovered by the enemy—and at daybreak, the approaches were 3 feet deep.

During the 18th, the work continued; the relief improving the parallel, and the garrison, which had been strongly reinforced, keeping up a heavy fire of musketry on the labourers, assisted by frequent discharges from some field-pieces and a howitzer. The fire however produced

* Jones's Journal of Sieges.

but few casualties; and during the night the parallels were prolonged, and two batteries traced out.*

On the 19th, while the working parties were busily engaged, 1,500 French infantry, and 40 horsemen, commanded by General Vielland, issued from the town by the Talavera gate unobserved, and with 100 from Picurina, fell suddenly on the working party in the parallel. Mostly unarmed, and completely taken by surprise, the men were driven from the trench in great confusion; but, being almost immediately rallied by their officers, in turn they charged the French vigorously and repulsed them. The sally caused much alarm; but it was too promptly repelled to occasion any loss more serious than the overturning of the gabions, and a trifling filling in of part of the approaches. "Some hundred entrenching tools were carried off, for Phillipon had promised a high price for each; yet this turned out ill, because the soldiers, instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather the tools. After the

* Some idea may be formed of the difficulty which Lord Wellington must have found in besieging Badajoz, when it is recollected, that with his defective means of transport, the annexed number of guns, and supply of ammunition, were brought forward and parked:—

24-pounders iron	16
18-pounders ditto, *(Russian guns)*	20
24-pounder howitzers iron	16
	52
24-pounder round shot from the north, from Alcacer do Sal, and collected at Elvas, (including 6,720, 22-pounder and 23-pounder)	22,367
18-pounder round shot from Alcacer do Sal, and collected at Elvas	17,837
5½-inch common shells	2,526
5½-inch spherical ditto	2,440
24-pounder grape	1,680
24-pounder case	424
18-pounder grape	1,000
18-pounder case	500

with an ample supply of powder.

Some additional supplies of 24-pounder and 18-pounder round shot were received from Alcacer during the operation.

action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces were placed as a reserve-guard behind St. Michael, and a signal-post was established on the Sierra de Venta, to give notice of the enemy's motions."*

The fighting while it lasted was severe, the French losing above 300 officers and men, and the allies about half that number. Several English officers were taken by the French cavalry, who secured them to their saddles, and attempted to carry them into the town; but the pursuit became so hot, that they were soon obliged to free themselves from such encumbrances, and consequently, the captives got away.

Colonel Fletcher, the commanding engineer, was unfortunately wounded.† Although unable to continue a personal superintendence, he possessed Lord Wellington's confidence so highly, that the attack was continued under his direction; and the commander-in-chief came every morning to his tent, accompanied by the staff-officers of the day, with the plan of the work executed and in progress, and consulted the colonel on the operations as they proceeded.

From this period of the siege the weather became most severe, and the rain came down in torrents. The labour in the trenches was consequently, both slowly and painfully executed; and nothing but the best spirit in the troops, united to an ardent zeal in the officers, enabled them to overcome difficulties, from which besiegers less determined would have recoiled. The customary task of excavation was easier far than the other duties entailed upon the working parties. Half the day was consumed in emptying the trenches of rain water; and the bottom became so

* Napier.

† "He was struck in the groin by a musket shot, fired within the distance of thirty or forty yards; but happily a silver dollar piece received the blow on its surface, and saved his life. Nevertheless the ball forced the dollar into the groin nearly an inch, and occasioned so severe a wound, as to deprive the army of his active personal services till almost the conclusion of the siege."—*Jones.*

muddy, that it was found necessary to have it artificially renewed by a layer of sandbags and fascines.

Throughout the 22d, the rain fell heavily; and at four in the afternoon, a torrent came down filling the trenches to an overflow. The floods rose fearfully; the pontoon bridge across the Guadiana was carried away; eleven of the pontoons sunk at their anchors, and the current became so rapid that the flying bridges could with difficulty work. It therefore became a question, if it would be possible to supply the army with provisions, and bring over the guns and ammunition for the attack; and serious apprehensions were entertained that it would be necessary to withdraw from before the place.*

But difficulties appeared only to rouse the determination, and demonstrate the resources, which Lord Wellington so eminently possessed. By immense exertions the bridge was restored—on the night of the 24th, the breaching batteries were armed—and, at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the roar of artillery announced that the British guns had opened.

"The day's firing, however, beyond breaking down some of the palisades in the covered-way, had produced very little visible effect on the defences of Fort Picurina; nevertheless the trenches being now well supported by a good parallel, and the batteries to enfilade all the faces and flanks of the place bearing on the Picurina fort being in full play, it was determined to assault and make a lodgment in that work this evening."†

The enemy, as soon as they perceived what point was immediately threatened, had taken every means for strengthening it; and abandoning their works on the right bank, they deepened the ditch of the Picurina, and strengthened the gorge with a second row of palisades. They also formed galleries communicating with each other, and brought a reverse fire to flank the ditches. Under the three angles of the glacis they placed fougasses, and arranged

* Jones's Journal of Sieges. † Ibid.

upon the parapets loaded shells and barrels of combustibles, which were to be rolled among the assailants at the moment of assault; and that each man might have several pieces to discharge, 200 loaded muskets were ranged along the interior of the banquette.

The execution of the assault was thus detailed by Lord Wellington, in his despatch to Lord Liverpool:—

Dated, Camp before Badajoz, 26th March, 1812.

"I directed Major-General Kempt, who commanded in the trenches on that afternoon, to attack La Picurina by storm, after it was dark that night, which service he effected in the most judicious and gallant manner.

"The attack was made by 500 men of the 3d division, formed into three detachments, the right under the command of Major Shaw, of the 74th, the centre under Captain the Hon. H. Powys, of the 83d, and the left under Major Rudd, of the 77th. The communication between the outwork and the body of the place was entered on its right and left by the right and left detachments, each consisting of 200 men; half of each which detachments protected the attack from sallies from the fort, while the others attacked the work in its gorge.

"It was first entered, however, by the centre detachment of 100 men, under the command of Captain the Hon. H. Powys, of the 83d regiment, who escaladed the work at the salient angle, at a point at which the palisades had been injured by our fire. The detachment which attacked the work by the gorge had the most serious difficulties to contend with, as it was closed by not less than three rows of palisades, defended by musketry, and a place of arms for the garrison, musket proof, and loopholed throughout. When the attack upon the salient angle, however, succeeded, the whole got into the work.

"The enemy's garrison in the outwork consisted of 250 men, with seven pieces of artillery, under the command of

Colonel Gaspartierre, of the Etat Major of the army of the South. But very few, if any, escaped: the colonel, three other officers, and 86 men have been taken prisoners, and the remainder were either killed by the fire of our troops, or drowned in the inundation of the river Rivillas.* The enemy made a sortie from the ravelin called San Roque, either with a view to recover La Picurina, or to protect the retreat of the garrison, but they were immediately driven in by the detachment stationed in the communication to protect the attack."

With the capture of the Picurina, the confusion of the night might have been expected to have terminated—but the garrison, apprehending a general assault, opened a tremendous fire of musketry and cannon, while the clang of the alarm-bell, and the hissing of rockets, increased an uproar which was continued till morning dawned.

The events of the succeeding ten days form but the history of a siege, in which the bold and continued operations of the assailants were opposed by all that science could devise, or gallantry effect. Before the crushing fire of the breaching batteries, the solid masonry of the bastions of La Trinidada and Santa Maria gradually gave way; and, on the morning of the 5th of April, the engineers reported to Lord Wellington that both breaches were practicable.

The near approach of Marshal Soult, whose advanced guards were already at Llerena, determined the allied general to assault Badajoz that evening. Accordingly, he made a close personal reconnaissance of the breaches; but the commanding engineer having reported that the enemy had retrenched the greater breach, and adopted the most effectual means for an obstinate resistance, Lord Wellington decided on deferring the attack for another day, and during

* On the eastern side, the arch of a bridge over the Rivillas in the rear of the lunette of San Roque, had been built up; and the current, being thus impeded, formed an inundation between Fort Picurina and the glacis of the place, 200 yards in breadth, and perfectly impassable.

that interval effect a third breach in the old curtain which connected the bastions against which his fire had hitherto been directed. Accordingly, on the morning of the 6th fourteen guns concentrated their fire on the escarpe, which they saw to its very base; and by four in the afternoon, the curtain was beaten down and the breach reported practicable.

Lord Wellington's plan of attack was originally confined to the storming of the bastions, and the carrying of the castle by escalade. The breach of La Trinidad was to be assaulted by the 4th division, under Major-General Colville, and that of Santa Maria, by the light, under Lieut.-Colonel Barnard; while the 3d division were ordered to assail the castle. The ravelin of San Roque was also to be attempted by detachments of covering parties from the trenches; and to distract the attention of the garrison, a false alarm was to be made against the Pardaleras. The breach in the curtain induced Lord Wellington to enlarge his plan of attack; and, on the 6th, a memorandum was addressed to "Major-General Colville, to allot a portion of the advance of the 4th division to storm the breach in the curtain between the bastions Santa Maria and La Trinidad. Further, the garrison being hourly improving their defensive expedients, Lieut.-General Leith was directed to employ a brigade of the 5th division to escalade the bastion of St. Vincente, or the curtain and flank between it and the bridge over the Guadiana, and to be prepared to support this brigade with the remainder of his division."*

Phillipon had made every preparation to receive the assault, which his own observations led him to expect upon the night it was given, and which belief the intelligence of deserters had confirmed. The French governor "availed himself of the inability of the besiegers to destroy the counterscarps, — an operation they had neither time nor means of accomplishing, — and formed behind the breaches the most formidable obstructions which destructive inge-

* Jones's Journal of Sieges.

nuity could devise. Night and day they were employed in clearing away the rubbish, destroying the ramps of the covered way, and making retrenchments behind the trenches. The fallen parapets were replaced with fascines, sand-bags, and wool-packs; casks filled with tarred straw, powder, and loaded grenades, were arranged along the trenches, and large shells with them. Immediately in front of the breaches at the foot of the counterscarp, 60 fourteen-inch shells were placed in a circular form, about four yards apart, and covered with some four inches of earth, and a communication formed to them with powder hoses placed between tiles in the manner of mine-tubes. *Chevaux de frise* were formed of sabre-blades; all the artillery stores were turned to account; and even a large boat was lowered into the ditch and filled with soldiers, to flank one of the breaches."*

The day passed, and every preparation for the assault was completed. The evening was dark and threatening,—twilight came, — the batteries ceased firing, — darkness fell,—and the trenches, though crowded with armed men, remained unusually quiet. Lights were seen occasionally flitting back and forward through the fortress, and the "All's well" of the French sentinels was distinctly heard. While waiting in readiness for the assault, the deep gloom which hitherto had shrouded the beleaguered city, was suddenly dissipated by a flight of fireworks, which rose over the town, and displayed every object around it.

The word was given to advance, and the 4th and light divisions issued from the trenches. "At that moment the deep bell of the cathedral of St. John struck ten; an unusual silence reigned around, and except the softened footsteps of the storming parties, as they fell upon the turf with military precision, not a movement was audible. A terrible suspense—a horrible stillness,—darkness,—a compression of the breathing,—the dull and ill-defined outline of the town,—the knowledge that similar and simultaneous

* Southey.

movements were making on other points,—the certainty that two or three minutes would probably involve the forlorn hope in ruin, or make it a beacon-light to conquest,—all these made the heart throb quicker, and long for the bursting of the storm, when victory should crown daring with success, or hope and life should end together.

"On went the storming parties; and one solitary musket was discharged beside the breach, but none answered it. The third division moved forward, closing rapidly up in columns at quarter distance. The ditch was gained,—the ladders were lowered,—on rushed the forlorn hope, with the storming party close behind them. The divisions were now on the brink of the sheer descent, when a gun boomed from the parapet. The earth trembled,—a mine was fired,—an explosion,—and an infernal hissing from lighted fusees succeeded,—and, like the rising of a curtain on the stage, in the hellish glare that suddenly burst out around the breaches, the French lining the ramparts in crowds, and the British descending the ditch, were placed as distinctly visible to each other as if the hour were noontide!"*

The explosion nearly annihilated the forlorn hope, and the heads of the storming party. For a moment, astounded by the deafening noise, the supporting troops held back; but as if by a general impulse, some rushed down the ladders which had been lowered to the bottom of the ditch,—others leaped boldly in, reckless of the depth of the descent,—and while some mistook the face of an unfinished ravelin for the breach, which on gaining was found to be entirely separated from the ramparts, the rest struggled desperately up the breach, only to encounter at the summit a range of sword-blades, framed in beams too massive to be cut through, and secured by iron chains beyond the power of removal.

In this fearful situation, the courage of the assailants assumed a desperation that appears almost incredible:

* Victories of the British Armies.

officers and men in fast succession gained the summit, only to be shot down; and many perished in vain attempts to force an impassable barrier of bristling sword-blades. "The garrison never appeared intimidated nor to lose their decision and coolness for a moment on any point, for whilst some were repelling the assailants with their bayonets from the summits of the breaches, others continued to roll down with the greatest precision and effect, shells and fire-barrels on the men in the ditch below, and their tirailleurs unceasingly fired with accuracy and steadiness from cuts in the parapets between the points of contention.*

"Similar gallant efforts to those above described were frequently repeated to carry the breaches, but the combustibles prepared by the garrison seemed inexhaustible. Each time the assailants were opposed by appalling and destructive explosions, and each time were driven down with a great loss of officers and of the bravest soldiers.

"After several efforts the remaining men, discouraged by such constant repulses, could not be prevailed upon to make a further effort. Their situation in the ditch of a front, with an incessant fire upon them from the parapets, was most trying; still not an individual attempted to withdraw—they remained patiently to be slaughtered, though far too discouraged to make a fresh attempt to extricate themselves by forcing the breaches."†

But at other points bravery obtained success, and Badajoz was already carried. The 3d division crossed the Rivillas, surmounted the castle hill, and under a tremendous fire, planted their ladders. The boldest led the way,—and unappalled by a shower of shells and missiles, they gained the parapet. But there the French received them with the

* "Gathering in dark groups, and leaning on their muskets, the assailants looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad, while the enemy stepping out on the ramparts, and aiming their shots by the light of the fire-balls which they threw over, asked, as their victims fell, *Why they did not come into Badajoz.*"—*Napier.*

† Jones's Journal of Sieges.

bayonet—while utterly incapable of resistance, they were hurled from the top, and crushed by huge stones and beams which, showered from the walls, destroyed any who survived the fall. Receding a few paces, the assailants formed again —two officers* caught up the ladders and the boldest men sprang after. Both reached the parapet unharmed,—the assailants swarmed up,—a firm footing was gained,—and the bayonet did the rest. Too late, a reinforcement detached by Phillipon reached the gate, and a sharp fusilade ensued in which Colonel Ridge was most unfortunately slain. But the French retired in despair, and the castle remained in the possession of the "fighting third."

Badajoz, on that fearful night, was encircled by men, desperately resolute to force their way through the iron defences that opposed them. A heavy fire had been opened on the Pardaleras,—the bridge was assailed by the Portuguese,—and the more distant bastion of San Vincente, was at the same time escaladed by Walker's brigade. After a desperate resistance, the French were driven along the ramparts, each bastion resolutely defended and each as bravely stormed.

In carrying the last, General Walker was severely wounded. A lighted port-fire having alarmed a soldier, he called out loudly that a mine was sprung, and a singular panic arose among troops, who but a few minutes before had braved death so recklessly. The whole gave ground, while General Veilland coming up with a French reinforcement, drove the affrighted soldiers along the rampart, and recovered possession of the works to the very bastion of San Vincente. But there, a weak battalion of the 38th had been held in reserve. Retaining their fire until the enemy closed, a shattering volley was delivered, and the regiment cheered and charged. Instantly the routed soldiers rallied—all advanced with renewed confidence—and the French, abandoning the defences, fled into the town, followed by a part of the assailants.

* Lieut.-Colonel Ridge and Mr. Cauch.

Lord Wellington, previous to the assault, had stationed himself on the left of the Calemon, as the best point from which he could issue future orders for the conduct of the attack. Although the carcasses thrown from the town, by betraying the 3d division to the garrison, had precipitated the attack, with the exception of the 5th division, whose ladders were delayed, all went forward correctly. The town clock announced the marching of the storming parties, and the roar of the artillery told that the conflict had begun. From a height beside the quarries, where Lord Wellington and his staff were standing, he saw the outline of the works, and "for a minute, the fireworks thrown from the place, showed the columns at the breaches. Darkness followed—stillness more horrible yet—and then the sudden burst of light, as shells and mines exploded. The main breach was literally in a blaze—sheets of fire mounted to the sky, accompanied by a continued roaring of hellish noises, as every villanous combustible was ignited to discover or destroy the assailants.

"The wounded came fast to the rear, but they could tell little how matters were progressing. At last, a mounted officer rode up. He was the bearer of evil tidings—the attack upon the breaches had failed—the majority of the officers had fallen—the men, left without leaders to direct them, were straggling about the ditch, and unless instant assistance was sent, the assault must fail entirely. Pale, but thoroughly undisturbed, the British general heard the disastrous communication, and issued orders to send forward a fresh brigade (Hay's) to the breaches. Half an hour passed, and another officer appeared. He came from Picton to say the castle had been carried by escalade, and that the 3d division were safe within the town."*

Lord Wellington instantly transmitted orders to hold the castle till the morning, and then blowing down the gates, to sally if necessary, and support a fresh assault.

* Victories of the British Armies.

No farther attempt to gain the breaches was required—and an officer was despatched to withdraw the columns, which was effected about midnight.

Resistance had ceased on the part of the garrison. Some irregular fighting occurred in the streets, but the intelligence of the capture of the castle at once occasioned an abandonment of the breaches—and Phillipon and Vieland, with part of the garrison, retired to San Christoval, where they surrendered on the first summons in the morning. At day-break the remnant of the 4th and light divisions entered the breaches unopposed; and Badajoz, after a well conducted defence, and a last and desperate effort to repulse an assault, fell to no ordinary conqueror.

Would that the story of that siege had ended with its capture; for "now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldier's heroism. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shricks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajoz." *

Who may not conceive the horrors attendant on the plunder of a captured town, when it is remembered that ten thousand furious and licentious madmen were loosed upon a helpless population, among which many of the loveliest women upon earth might be found? All within that devoted city was at the disposal of an infuriated army, over whom for the time control was lost, aided by an infamous collection of camp followers, who were, if possible, more sanguinary and pitiless even than those who had survived the storm!

"It is useless to dwell upon a scene from which the heart revolts. Few females in this beautiful town were saved that night from insult. The noblesse and the beggar—the nun, and wife and daughter of the artisan—youth and

* Napier.

age, all were involved in general ruin. None were respected, and few consequently escaped. The madness of those desperate brigands was variously exhibited; some fired through doors and windows; others at the church-bells; many at the wretched inhabitants as they fled into the streets to escape the bayonets of the savages who were demolishing their property within doors; while some wretches, as if blood had not flowed in sufficient torrents already, shot from the windows their own companions as they staggered on below. What chances had the miserable inhabitants of escaping death, when more than one officer perished by the bullets and bayonets of the very men whom but a few hours before he had led to the assault." *

Badajoz, in point of fact, was doubly won, for the successes of either the 3d or 5th divisions would have rendered its fall inevitable. It is a singular circumstance, perhaps without a parallel in the events of sieges, that an army with a powerful artillery, after twenty days' open trenches, and having formed three good practicable breaches in the body of a place, should at the moment of giving the assault employ two divisions on other points to escalade the defences where entire, and that each of the escalades should be crowned with complete success, whilst the efforts against the breaches were attended with utter discomfiture. Such an arrangement shows no very great confidence to have been placed in the main operation; and to the correct judgment formed on that head by Lord Wellington, with his firmness and resource, in seconding the assault by such unusual efforts, the army is indebted for its success against Badajoz.†

On the day of the investment the garrison consisted, by French returns, of 4,742 men. About 1,200 were rendered *hors de combat* during the siege, and 3,500 were made prisoners. The five French battalions in Badajoz had no eagles; but the colours of the garrison, with those

* Victories of the British Armies. † Jones's Journal of Sieges.

of the regiment of Hesse Darmstadt, were taken and transmitted by Lord Wellington to the Prince Regent.

The loss of the victors was most severe, for in the siege and storm nearly 5,000 men were killed and wounded.* Lieut.-Colonel M'Cleod of the 43d, and Major O'Hare of the 95th, died sword in hand in the breaches; and five generals, namely, Picton, Colville, Kempt, Walker, and Bowes, were wounded.

In reviewing this celebrated siege and assault, one feels at a loss whether to admire more that lofty flight of genius, which by greatly daring, and setting at nought all military maxims, effected what ordinary men would not attempt; or the matchless valour of British soldiers, which death, presented in every horrible variety, never could extinguish. That the attempt upon the breaches should not succeed one fact will easily explain.—When the columns arrived before them in the morning, no enemy to oppose, and with day-light to direct their entrance, time was required to remove the numerous obstacles which presented themselves, before a descent into the town was possible. Veiled in impenetrable darkness, and desperately defended, who could surmount those formidable barriers and live?

* "Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., at the siege and capture of Badajoz, from the 18th March to 7th April, 1812, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	72	51	912	—	1035
Wounded	306	216	3265	—	3787
Missing	—	1	62	—	63

The Portuguese loss is included in the above numbers.

And the wonder is, not that the troops should fail in forcing a passage, but that when hope was over, they should firmly remain to be slaughtered by an enemy on whom they could not retaliate, and persevere to the last, until a formal order was delivered to recall them from that fatal breach. To account for the capture of the castle and San Vincente is difficult indeed. "In ordinary military reasoning such places would be considered secure from assault; but the efforts of the British troops occasionally set all calculation at defiance; and when a few years shall have swept away eye-witnesses of their achievements on this night, they will not be credited."*

During this memorable siege, 2,523 barrels of powder, each containing 90 pounds; 31,861 round shots: 1,826 common and spherical 5½ inch shells; and 1,659 rounds of grape and case shot were expended. The reduction of Badajoz required 70,000 sand-bags; 1,200 gabions; 700 fascines, and 1,570 entrenching tools. Even a siege cannot be carried on without hard cash, and on this occasion Lord Wellington paid away 3,500 dollars!

It was a glorious triumph for the conqueror, and no doubt he felt it such. But glory may be bought too dear, and the most brilliant success is seldom unalloyed, for victory cannot be obtained without a sacrifice. "When the extent of the night's havoc was made known to Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers."†

The first care of the victorious general was to apportion buildings for the use of his wounded men, and remove them thither, as speedily as circumstances would permit; and on the second day, finding that riot and drunkenness among the soldiery was unabated, Power's Portuguese brigade was marched in, and the provosts posted in the squares, with discretionary power to punish those whom they found

* Jones. † Napier.

marauding. Order was promptly restored—head quarters removed to the city—the besieging park broken up—the guns and stores returned to Elvas, and the entrenching tools brought to the town. The immediate restoration of the damaged works were next proceeded with; and while his important conquest was placed in an attitude of defence, Lord Wellington allowed a short period of repose to his noble army, to enable it, with renewed vigour, to strain forward in the path of victory.



CHAPTER XXIX.

OPERATIONS OF SOULT AND MARMONT—AFFAIR AT USAGRE—GENERAL PROSPECTS OF LORD WELLINGTON—INTENDED PLAN OF OPERATIONS—PRESENT POSITION OF NAPOLEON—JOSEPH BUONAPARTE DISCONTENTED—ALTERATION IN SPANISH AFFAIRS—PARTY VIOLENCE IN ENGLAND—MURDER OF MR. PERCEVAL—LORD LIVERPOOL PRIME MINISTER—LORD WELLINGTON SELECTS THE NORTH FOR THE SCENE OF HIS OPERATIONS—BRIDGE AT ALMAREZ—ITS IMPORTANCE—DEFENCES AND SURROUNDING COUNTRY—EXPEDITION TO EFFECT ITS DESTRUCTION—ITS DIFFICULTY—HILL'S BOLDNESS AND ABILITY IS CROWNED WITH BRILLIANT SUCCESS—WORKS AND BRIDGE TOTALLY DESTROYED—LOSS SUSTAINED BY THE FRENCH—ALLIED CASUALTIES—SAFE RETREAT OF HILL'S CORPS—LORD WELLINGTON'S REPORT TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

On the receipt of certain intelligence that Badajoz had fallen, Soult fell back to Llerena, followed by the allied cavalry under the command of Sir Stapleton Cotton, his intended junction with the Duke of Ragusa having failed. That marshal had advanced from Salamanca while Wellington was besieging Badajoz; had left one division to blockade Ciudad Rodrigo, and had invested Almeida with the remainder of his force. After vainly endeavouring to alarm the governor of Almeida by the demonstration of a sudden assault, he crossed the Coa at Sabugal, drove away a body of militia which would have opposed his advance, and penetrated to Castello Branco. But for the sudden and unexpected fall of Badajoz, and the approach of his active and indefatigable opponent, he would have pushed on to Villa Velha, to destroy, if possible, the bridge. He now retired into Spain, taking with him the division he had left before Rodrigo.*

On the night of the 10th, Drouet's rear-guard halted between Usagre and Villa Garcia; and it appeared to General Cotton that they might be successfully attacked,

* Sherer.

by reaching their encampment at day-break. The dispositions were ably made—and had the flank movement from Bienvenida been simultaneous with the front attack at Usagre,* the French retreat on Llerena would have been cut off. But though the march of Le Marchant's brigade was unavoidably delayed, the result of the affair reflected infinite credit on all concerned; and with few casualties,† a heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy.

* "The advanced guard of Major-General Anson's brigade drove in the enemy's pickets from near Usagre two hours sooner than I had intended, and General Le Marchant's brigade had not time to get into the rear of the enemy, who fell back, upon the alarm being given, a sufficient distance to secure his retreat upon Llerena.

"Lieut.-Colonel Ponsonby followed the enemy soon after day-break through Villa Garcia, and was skirmishing with him when General Le Marchant's brigade arrived on the other side of the heights between the Llerena road and Bienvenida: I desired Colonel Ponsonby would show only three squadrons, and endeavour to amuse the enemy in front, until Major-General Le Marchant's brigade (which I had sent Colonel Elley to conduct under cover of the heights) was prepared to attack the enemy in flank: this succeeded admirably; and the enemy, being vigorously attacked, at the same moment, in front and flank, retired in the greatest confusion and disorder. I pursued him with Major-General Anson's brigade, and one regiment of Major General Le Marchant's (the 5th dragoon guards), supported by the 3d and 4th dragoons, to near Llerena, a distance of four miles, during which the enemy's loss in killed was very considerable, and about 150 prisoners, including a lieutenant-colonel, two captains, and one lieutenant, with about 130 horses, were brought off the field.

"The enemy's cavalry formed on the right, and in rear of seven guns, and between 8,000 and 10,000 infantry, which had taken up a position on the left of and close to the town. The whole soon afterwards retired upon Berlanga and Asuaga, to the former of which places my patrols followed them."—*Colton's Despatch to Graham, dated Santa Martha, 12th April, 1812.*

†

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	—	1	13	18	14
Wounded	2	4	35	9	41
Missing . . .	—	—	2	1	2

The reduction of Rodrigo and Badajoz had opened an extended field for the future operations of the allied leader. A prompt march into Andalusia might have been considered as the first consequence of his recent success, and the fall of Seville would have formed a glorious pendent to the capture of the frontier fortresses. The army was burning for fresh service, and its condition, like its spirit, was admirable—every arm was perfect—the cavalry well-mounted, and the artillery superb. Prudence, however, forbade Lord Wellington from undertaking what he might have so confidently expected to effect.* Rodrigo was unprovisioned, its garrison mutinous, and the defences of Badajoz unrepaired. If he followed Soult towards Seville, and withdrew his divisions from the Guadiana, Marmont might fall suddenly on Rodrigo—an effort to which he would be fully equal, as a fresh train of siege artillery was on its way from France, to replace the battering guns taken in Badajoz. Lord Wellington therefore determined to secure the conquests he had already made; but at the same time, and by a different line of operations, achieve every advantage which he might probably have obtained by advancing to Seville.

Had the Spanish armies displayed enterprize and vigour, Lord Wellington would have been justified in marching into Andalusia, immediately on the fall of Badajoz; for Ciudad Rodrigo would not have been molested, nor the frontier been left in danger. But the feeble operations of Carlos d'España and Mendizabal had no terror for an enemy; and present and prospective motives convinced the allied general that the south was not the proper theatre of war. "He

* "If Ciudad Rodrigo had been provisioned as I had a right to expect, there was nothing to prevent me from marching to Seville at the head of 40,000 men, the moment the siege of Badajoz was concluded.

"If I were to march there under existing circumstances, the formidable position which I have acquired with so many sacrifices would undoubtedly be lost, and with that position, all the objects of the expedition into Andalusia. It remains then to be seen what is to be done under existing circumstances."

considered that as the harvest in Leon and Castile, that is to say, in the districts north of the Gredos and Gata mountains, was much later than in Estremadura and Andalusia, he should be enabled to preserve his commissariat advantages over the French in the field for a longer period in the north than in the south. And if he could strike a decisive blow against Marmont, he would relieve Andalusia as securely as by a direct attack, because Madrid would then fall, and Soult, being thus cut off from his communications with France, would fear to be hemmed in on all sides." *

To employ without delay the finest army he had yet commanded, was Lord Wellington's determination; and the time seemed fitting. Alarmed by the threatening attitude which Russia had assumed, Napoleon's attention had been directed from the Peninsula to the North; and at the moment when the tide of victory in Spain had turned,—when his armies had been defeated, and his strongholds lost,—he felt himself necessitated to weaken his lieutenants, by drafting the *élite* of their corps, to complete that magnificent host with which he tempted fortune too far, and madly wrought his ruin. Joseph, weary of the painful part he had enacted, was anxious to lay down a sceptre which had nothing of royalty but its tinsel, and seek in retirement that happiness which, with an uneasy crown, he had found so unattainable. Recent events had shown, that the possession of the Spanish capital depended no longer on the imperious pleasure of the emperor. The past campaign had taught a serious lesson; and the question was not how soon a French army should find its way to Lisbon, but how long Madrid was to be secure from the aggressions of a British one.

This change of circumstances abroad was encouraging; but at home, there was much to embarrass, and more to apprehend. Mr. Perceval, then at the head of the administration, was a zealous and upright minister; but with

* Napier.

every wish to support a contest on the Peninsula, he trembled at the responsibility which its enormous expenditure must entail upon a cabinet that advocated its continuance. The Whig party were hankering after office; Cobbett and the demagogues of the day clamoured incessantly; and, with truth suppressed, and falsehood unblushingly resorted to, the country was fevered by mistatements; and when success could not be denied, it was dashed by the gloomiest assurances that ulterior discomfiture was inevitable. No wonder, then, that "the people, deceived by both parties as to the nature of the war, and wondering how the French could keep the field at all, were, in common with the ministers, still doubtful if their commander was a truly great man, or an impostor."*

Lord Wellesley had retired in disgust from an administration whose policy he entirely disapproved of; but Mr. Perceval still held office. That was limited to a brief period. On the 11th of May, this unfortunate gentleman was assassinated in the lobby of the house, by a ruffian named Bellingham; and, to the eternal disgrace of England, not a few were found who evinced a sympathy for the murderer, and even justified the felon act that removed a well-meaning, but short-sighted adviser from the councils of his prince, and robbed an innocent family of the kindest of protectors. It was, indeed, a melancholy example of the extent to which political asperity will reach, in warping the judgment, and extinguishing the better feelings of men's nature.

On the death of Mr. Perceval, Lord Liverpool succeeded as prime minister; and it was reserved for him to witness that cloud of promise which had arisen no larger than a man's hand, gradually overspread the political horizon, until the evils attendant on a military despotism had yielded to the stronger influence of moral government, based upon religion, and fraught with civil liberty.

At this political juncture, Lord Wellington took the

* Napier.

field again. Having selected the north for the scene of his operations, a first care was to sever the corps of Soult and Marmont, and interrupt their communications. Below Arzobispo, the bridges on the Tagus had been broken; and the passage of the river was maintained by means of pontoons and boats, thrown across the stream at Almarez, by the French marshals, after its noble bridge had been destroyed. A post of such importance had not been neglected; and on both banks of the river strong works had been erected for its defence. On the left bank, a well-constructed *tête-du-pont* was overlooked by Fort Napoleon, a redoubt, having an interior entrenchment and loop-holed tower, and with nine heavy guns and a garrison of 400 men.—These defences were formidable—and the right bank was secured by a redoubt called Fort Ragusa, flanking the bridge, with which it was connected by a flèche. The only opening in the mountain passable for artillery is by the Puerto de Miravete, which, at a league's distance from the bridge, is commanded by a castle, now in ruins. This solitary route had more than military considerations to render it interesting. "A marked alteration of climate is perceptible upon crossing the narrow mountain-ridge over which the road passes. Coming from Castile, the traveller descends from this ridge into a country, where, for the first time, the gum-cistus appears as lord of the waste,—the most beautiful of all shrubs in the Peninsula for the profusion of its delicate flowers, and one of the most delightful for the rich balsamic odour which its leaves exude under a southern sun; but which overspreads such extensive tracts, where it suffers nothing else to grow, that in many parts both of Portugal and Spain it becomes the very emblem of desolation. The old castle stood at a little distance from the road, on the summit of the Sierra: the French had surrounded it by a lower *enceinte*, twelve feet high; they had fortified a large *venta*, or traveller's inn, upon the road, and had constructed two small works between

the inn and the castle, forming altogether a strong line of defence."*

The strength of the works, and the difficulty a mountain route added to an enterprize whose success was so much dependent on the rapidity of its execution, were not the only obstacles to be encountered. Several French corps were in the vicinity of Almarez. Foy's had occupied again the valley of the Tagus, D'Armanac's was at Talavera, and Drouet's at Hinojosa de Cordova, with his cavalry nearer to Merida than Hill's division was to Almarez, and consequently, in a position which would enable him to interrupt Sir Rowland's retreat. Lord Wellington, however, masked his intended operation by demonstrations calculated to mislead the French marshals, and induce a belief that an incursion into Andalusia was the object of these movements; and although an unexpected delay had been occasioned by repairing the bridge at Merida, Hill crossed the Guadiana on the 12th of May, with 6,000 men and 12 pieces of artillery. Being joined by the heavy howitzers belonging to the siege train, and a convoy with pontoons and scaling ladders, the English general reached Truxillo on the 15th, and early next morning continued his march to Jaraicejo.

Here the necessary dispositions to carry out his intended enterprize were completed, Sir Rowland having determined to reach the pass at Mirabete by a night march, and at the same moment attack the castle, the venta, and the works which protected the bridge. Against the former, the left column, under General Chowne, was directed; the right, under the command of Hill, was to march by the mountain paths of Romangordo, and carry Fort Napoleon by escalade; while the centre, under General Long, to which the cavalry and artillery were attached, moved forward by the royal road.

The steep and rugged routes by which the pass could only be approached, delayed the march of the columns; and as morning had dawned, the movement, as far as surprise had been intended, failed. On a closer examination

* Southey.

of the French defences, their strength was found to be much greater than what had been reported; and it was now ascertained that much time would be required to reduce either the castle or the venta. In this difficulty, Hill adopted the bold resolution of leaving his artillery on the heights; and while the left column made a false attack upon the castle, he determined to march direct upon the bridge, and without a gun, trust for success to "bold hearts and British bayonets."

It was a daring and a hazardous attempt; and one, under existing circumstances, that none but a military genius of high order would have adopted. The result was doubtful, but circumstances had left no alternative but the essay. The march of the English general through Truxillo had been communicated to the French commanders; and, at a distance of four marches from Merida, Hill had good reason to apprehend that Drouet, with overwhelming numbers, would move rapidly to Medellin, and endeavour to intercept his retreat. The danger was great, but it did not deter him; and, on the evening of the 18th, he marched on his daring enterprize.

The right column had consisted of the 50th, 71st, and 92d regiments; but it was reinforced from that of the centre with the 6th Portuguese, a company of riflemen, and a detachment of gunners. At dusk, the division descended from the Sierra; but though the distance was not above two leagues, the whole night was consumed in traversing the valley; and when the head of the column halted under cover of some hillocks which hid it from the enemy, the rear was still winding slowly through a path, which no foot save the shepherd's had ever trod before.

While waiting for the straggling sections to come up, the opening roar of cannon announced that Chowne's false attack on Mirabete had commenced. "Pillars of white smoke rose on the lofty brow of the Sierra, the heavy sound of artillery came rolling over the valley, and the garrison of Fort Napoleon, crowding on the ramparts, were

anxiously gazing at these portentous signs of war, when, quick and loud, a British shout broke on their ears, and the gallant 50th regiment, aided by a wing of the 71st, came bounding over the nearest hills."*

Although astonished at the suddenness of the assault, the French were ready to repel it. A villager had already brought them intelligence of Hill's approach, and a cavalry picket, in British uniform, had been discovered on the mountain. In consequence, the garrison of Fort Napoleon had been reinforced; and they instantly opened a heavy discharge from small arms and artillery, which the guns on Fort Ragusa supported by a flanking fire, until the ground immediately in front of the rampart sheltered the assailants from its effects.

The assault was splendidly successful, for nothing could check the ardour with which it was given. In a few minutes the parapet was escaladed; and the inner defences, after a brief resistance, were abandoned, the garrison flying for shelter to the *tête-du-pont*. But, with dashing gallantry, the leading files of the assailants bore rapidly onwards, and entered the work intermingled with the fugitives from the fort; and in a rush across the bridge, which had been previously injured by the sinking of several of its pontoons, many of the French perished in the river. The panic of the garrison of Fort Ragusa was increased by the fire of Fort Napoleon; and although the redoubt was secure, the commandant abandoned it most disgracefully,† and added its defenders to the fugitive troops who were hurrying towards Naval Moral. "The river was soon passed; the towers and magazines in the forts, and in the *tête-du-pont*, were blown up; the guns thrown into the Tagus; the palisades, barriers, stores of timber and of tools, the pontoons and their carriages, were consumed by fire, and the works utterly effaced and destroyed."

* Napier.

† The unfortunate man was brought to trial for cowardice, and was condemned and shot at Talavera.

In addition to the destruction of the bridge and works, attended with a severe loss in killed and drowned, 260 prisoners were taken, including the governor and sixteen officers. A colour belonging to the 4th battalion of the *corps étranger* was captured by the 71st; and the whole was achieved with a loss comparatively trifling."*

Separated from the right bank of the Tagus, the castle and works at Mirabete must have fallen had Hill ventured to attack them; but within the reach of several French corps, and alarmed by a groundless report from Sir William Erskine, that Soult with his united divisions was actually in Estremadura, the English general very prudently retreated† on the 21st, and reached Merida safely on the 26th. Having effected the object of his expedition, there was nothing to be gained equivalent to the risk it must involve; "and the possession of the mountain forts would have not made amends for the valuable blood which must have been shed in taking them."‡

Of Lord Wellington's lieutenants none was more popular than Sir Rowland Hill; and the issue of his enter-

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army under the command of his Excellency General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., under the immediate orders of Lieut.-General Sir R. Hill, K.B., at the storm and capture of Fort Napoleon, and the enemy's other works in the neighbourhood of Almarez, on the morning of the 19th May, 1812.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	2	1	30	—	33
Wounded . .	13	10	11	—	144
Missing . .	—	—	—	—	—

† "Both Soult and Marmont had put their forces in motion as soon as they were informed of Sir Rowland's march: the latter arrived upon the Tagus too late to prevent the evil, and without the means of repairing it; the former, when he found that the allies had passed Truxillo on their return, gave up the hope of intercepting them. ‡ Hill's Despatch to Wellington.

prize gave unfeigned satisfaction to the army. From him who had planned it, he received the praise his admirable conduct had so richly deserved; and in transmitting the despatch to Lord Liverpool, the allied commander thus expressed his approbation:—

"I have the honour to enclose Sir R. Hill's report of this brilliant exploit; and I beg to draw your lordship's attention to the difficulties with which he had to contend, as well from the nature of the country, as from the works which the enemy had constructed, and to the ability and characteristic qualities displayed by Lieut.-General Sir R. Hill, in persevering in the line, and confining himself to the objects chalked out by his instructions, notwithstanding the various obstacles opposed to his progress.

"I have nothing to add to Lieut.-General Sir R. Hill's report of the conduct of the officers and troops under his command, excepting to express my concurrence in all he says in their praise. Too much cannot be said of the brave officers and troops who took by storm, without the assistance of cannon, such works as the enemy's forts on both banks of the Tagus, fully garrisoned, and in good order, and defended by 18 pieces of artillery."*

* Despatch, dated Fuente Guinaldo, 28th May, 1812.

CHAPTER XXX.

ADVANTAGES ATTENDANT UPON HILL'S SUCCESS—LORD WELLINGTON CROSSES THE AGUEDA—CIUDAD RODRIGO—AFFAIR AT VALMASA—SALAMANCA—ALLIES CROSS THE TORMES, AND LORD WELLINGTON ENTERS THE CITY—MARMONT RETIRES TO FUENTE EL SAUCO—FORTIFIED CONVENTS—LORD WELLINGTON INVESTS THEM—PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE—ASSAULT FAILS—MARMONT ADVANCES TO RELIEVE HIS GARRISONS—HIS OPERATIONS—THE FORTS SURRENDER—DESPATCH TO LORD LIVERPOOL—MARMONT RETREATS—CASUALTIES OF THE ALLIES—REJOICINGS IN SALAMANCA—LORD WELLINGTON REJOINS THE ARMY.

HILL'S success at Almarez was but the opening movement to a course of splendid victory; for while, by the destruction of that bridge, the communication between Soult and Marmont was completely interrupted, Lord Wellington facilitated his intended operations by repairing the ruined arch at Alcantara. By this, the best and shortest routes were secured for an advance; and while Hill's corps was immediately at hand, Drouet's would have required ten marches to unite it with that of Marmont.

Early in June, all was prepared for active operations; and Lord Wellington with the allied army crossed the Agueda on the 13th. To some of the troops the route leading through Rodrigo was interesting; and many indications of "siege and storm" were still apparent. "Its environs presented a gloomy picture of the effects of war on every thing near to an armed place subjected to such devastating visitations. The public walk, deprived of the foliage that had given it beauty and shade, looked bare, sterile, and deserted; the trees had fallen for the purpose of giving scope to the un-

interrupted sweep of artillery; roofless houses and battered walls presented themselves in all directions. The earth, thrown up to shelter the troops, still exhibited the rugged and bare aspect attendant on its being replaced without much attention to natural beauty or convenience. The great square contained dismounted cannon, shattered wheels, and ruined tumbrils; while the effects of bombardment had torn up and rendered unequal its former smooth and level area."*

The weather was fine, and as the route lay principally through forest lands, nothing could be more picturesque and beautiful than the country which the line of march presented. The wooded landscape displayed its verdure under the sunny influence of a cloudless sky, and singularly contrasted its summer green with the snow-topped pinnacles of the Sierra de Gata. No enemy appeared—for days the march was leisurely continued—until, on clearing the forest at Valmasa, the German hussars in advance had a slight skirmish with a French picket.

The enemy's cavalry, few at first, gradually showed themselves, extending in detached parties over the plain; while others, occupying the rising grounds that flanked it, indicated that they intended to allow no inferior force to oblige them to retire. The British horsemen rode forward, and a sharp combat succeeded, marked with all that animation which attends a cavalry affair. "Parties were observed firing or charging in all directions. Repeated attacks were made by either force, as circumstances warranted, or as they became most numerous at the particular points. In one direction was to be seen a troop or squadron charging half their number of opponents, who, by a precipitate retreat, fell back on others, until their strength became superior, when, in turn, they for a time carried with them the successful tide of battle. The plain was covered with officers and scattered cavalry soldiers; carbines and pistols were discharged without intermission; and frequent personal conflicts took place. On one occasion, Major Brotherton,

* Leith Hay.

of the 14th light dragoons, mounted upon a very small Spanish horse, crossed swords with a French officer of chasseurs, and continued cutting and parrying until the *mêlée* broke up the encounter."* With evening the skirmish closed; the enemy retiring across the Tormes, and the allies bivouacking on its banks, overlooked by a city already venerable from its antiquity, famed as a seat of learning,† and which was destined shortly to obtain a different and a more enduring celebrity.

Salamanca stands in a commanding situation on the right bank of the Tormes, a river of considerable magnitude there, which rises near the Sierra de Tablada in Old Castile, and falls into the Douro on the Portuguese frontier, opposite Bemposta. The country round is open, without trees, and with a few villages interspersed, in which the houses are constructed of clay. On the left of the river there are extensive pastures, on the right a wide and unenclosed corn country. The pastures are common, and the arable land occupied after a manner not usual in other parts

* Leith Hay.

† "In its best days, it is said to have contained no fewer than 8,000 native students, and 7,000 from foreign countries: when the present war began, the number little exceeded 3,000, among whom a few Irish were the only foreigners The population consisted of some 3,400 families: it had once been much greater. But Salamanca was still an important and a famous place: popular fiction had made its name familiar to those who are unacquainted with its history; while to the antiquary, the historian, and the philosopher, it is a city of no ordinary interest. The Roman road which extended from thence to Merida, and so to Seville, may still be traced in its vicinity: its bridge of twenty-seven arches, over the Tormes, is said to be in part a Roman work. The Mozarabic liturgy is retained in one of its churches. Its cathedral, though far inferior to some of the older edifices, whether of Moorish or Gothic architecture, in Spain, is a large and imposing structure. Twenty-five parish churches are enclosed within its walls, twenty convents of monks or friars, eleven of nuns: these, with its numerous colleges, give it an imposing appearance from without, and a melancholy solemnity within. Nowhere, indeed, were there more munificent endowments for education, and for literature, and for religion. It is a popular belief in Spain, that the Devil also has his college at Salamanca, where students in the black art take their degrees in certain caverns, every seventh being left with him, in earnest of the after-payment to which they all are bound."—*Southey.*

of Spain: it is cultivated in annual allotments, and reverts to the commonality after the harvest.

On the morning of the 17th, the allies crossed the Tormes by the fords of Santa Martha and Los Cantos; and Lord Wellington entered Salamanca at the head of his victorious troops. "Nothing could be more animating than the scene. The day was brilliant, presenting all the glowing luxuriance of a southern climate. Upwards of fifty staff officers accompanied the British general; they were immediately followed by the 14th dragoons and a brigade of artillery; the streets were crowded to excess; signals of enthusiasm and friendship waved from the balconies; the entrance to the Plaza was similar to a triumph; every window and balcony was filled with persons welcoming the distinguished officer to whom they looked up for liberation and permanent relief. Lord Wellington dismounted, and was immediately surrounded by the municipality, and the higher orders of the inhabitants, all eager to pay him respect and homage. At the same moment, the 6th division of British infantry entered the south-west angle of the square. It is impossible to describe the electric effect produced under these circumstances by the music; as the bands of the regiments burst in full tones on the ear of the people, a shout of enthusiastic feeling escaped from the crowd, all ranks seeming perfectly inebriated with exultation.

"From this scene, so calculated to distract the attention of ordinary men, Lord Wellington retired to make immediate arrangements for reducing the forts. A plan of them having been produced and placed in his hands by the Spaniards, he left the adulating crowd, escaping from the almost overwhelming demonstrations of friendship and respect with which he was greeted; and before the town had recovered from its confusion and its joy, or the 'vivas' had ceased to resound, his system of attack was decided upon, and the necessary orders for its execution issued to the troops."*

* Leith Hay.

Marmont, on the preceding night, had evacuated the city, and with a cavalry corps and two divisions of infantry retreated leisurely to Fuente el Sauco, followed by the allied advanced guard; while, with the exception of Clinton's division, which remained in Salamanca to invest the forts, the whole of the army of Lord Wellington took a position on the Sierra of San Christoval.

In a city of convents and colleges, there could be no difficulty in finding buildings equally adapted as well from their situation, as the solidity with which they had been constructed, for being converted into places of defence. Marmont had ruined thirty-five edifices, and fortified with the timber and materials they afforded three convents,* of which that of San Vicente was the principal. Placed on a sheer rock which overhung the Tormes, and severed by a deep ravine from other edifices, it had every capability of being rendered formidable, and the French engineers displayed considerable skill in its defence. It was secured in front by palisades, and on the re-entering angle by a fascine battery—while the windows were built up and crenellated—and no pains spared in the application of the necessary labour and materials which could secure it from aggression.

"On the opposite bank of a rivulet tributary to the Tormes, the convents of Los Cayetanos and La Merced had been converted with great skill into two redoubts, with well-covered perpendicular escarpes, deep ditches, and casemated counterscarps; they were also full of bomb proofs, made by supporting a roof horizontally and vertically with strong beams, and covering it with six feet of earth. These works were seen at once to be far more respectable than Lord Wellington had expected to find, his information amounting to little more than that some convents had been

* "It is impossible to describe the joy of the people of the town upon our entrance. They have now been suffering for more than three years; during which time the French, among other acts of violence and oppression, have destroyed 13 of 25 convents, and 22 of 25 colleges, which existed in this celebrated seat of learning."—*Wellington Despatches.*

fortified. It was necessary to reduce them before the army could advance, but the means of attack had been provided on this inadequate knowledge: they consisted of only four iron eighteen-pounders and four twenty-four pounder iron howitzers, with an hundred rounds for each. The engineers had only 400 intrenching-tools, without any stores; there were present three engineer officers, with nine men of the corps of royal military artificers; and the works were soon found to be even more formidable than they appeared."*

To the sixth division the details of the siege were committed. Ground was broken before San Vicente on the night of the 17th; on the 19th a battery commenced breaching, and with two field pieces placed on the roof of San Bernardo, which overlooked the fort, seven guns were turned on the devoted convent.

On the 20th, iron howitzers arrived from Elvas, and their fire was added to that previously maintained; but the building appeared unshaken, and its loopholed wall poured forth an incessant tiraillade from every crevice,— "when, in a moment, on one discharge of the battery, the wall and roof of the building, with its numerous inhabitants, were precipitated to the earth with a tremendous crash; a cloud of dust and lime cleared away to exhibit a shapeless heap of ruin; while its brave garrison, stationed in that part of the building, were buried and invisible in the mass which alone appeared."

To increase the confusion of the French, carcasses were thrown in with the design of firing the wood-work of the fort; but the defenders, with amazing determination, succeeded in extinguishing the flames, while they supported an unceasing fusilade, by which the assailants suffered heavily.

On the night of the 23d, the fire of the British guns established on the right bank of the Tormes had made no decisive impression; but as time was invaluable, and Lord Wellington seemed determined to let nothing induce him to move forward until the forts had fallen, an attempt was

* Southey.

made to carry Los Cayetanos and La Merced by escalade. The attack failed, and the loss sustained was considerable. A very valuable officer perished on the occasion: General Bowes, already wounded, was under the surgeon's hands when it was reported that the troops were giving way;—he instantly hastened to the post of danger, and died sword in hand in the *mêlée*.

In the meantime Marmont, having collected four divisions and a brigade of cavalry at El Sauco, advanced to relieve his isolated garrisons. On his approach, the allied army, strengthened by a brigade of the fifth division taken from the siege, formed in battle order on the heights of San Christoval; while, for security, the battering guns were moved across the Tormes. The summit of San Christoval was flat, and covered with a luxuriant crop of grain ready for the sickle, and the Tormes swept round the reverse of the position, touching both its flanks. The villages of Villares and Monte Rubio were behind the left of the hill—Cabrerizos on the right—and Christoval, Castillanos, and Moresco in front and at the foot of the ascent. The position was about four miles long, commanding an expanse of country on every side; but it had neither wood nor water, and as the weather was sultry, the troops suffered from the scarcity of both.

In the afternoon the French cavalry manœuvred as if they intended to turn the left of the position, while Marmont advanced with the mass of his army against the right. At night the allied pickets had been forced back; and the French remained in possession of Moresco, and rested on their arms within cannon range of the English divisions.

Lord Wellington, wrapped in his cloak, lay on the ground that night.* The period of repose was short, for

* "The country was unwooded, and the only shelter from an ardent sun was obtained by stretching blankets over sticks, and securing the edges to the ground. For this simple luxury Lord Wellington was indebted to a private of the 48d, as his own accommodation was on a par with the humblest soldier." —*Victories of the British Armies.*

with the first blush of morning both armies got under arms. All, however, continued quiet until evening, when an affair occurred between the 68th regiment and the French who were posted in the village of Moresco. Throughout the day Marmont had been endeavouring to signalize the forts, and was constantly occupied in reconnoitering Lord Wellington's position.

Having received reinforcements, increasing his army to fully 40,000 men, the French marshal moved by his left on the 22d, and seized a height which overlooked the right of the allies. To secure a view of the British position, however, was the only advantage he obtained; for on the approach of the seventh division, under Sir Thomas Graham, he retired from the heights, and took a new position two leagues in the rear,—his centre being at Aldea Rubia, and his flanks resting on Cabeza Vellosa and Huerta. By this new disposition, Marmont would have had the power of crossing the river, and opening a communication by the left bank with his imprisoned garrisons; but his able antagonist as promptly effected a movement of his troops, and thus obtaining a command of both banks of the Tormes, covered Salamanca completely.

The 23d passed without any hostile demonstration on either side: but at day-light on the 24th, a spattering fusilade, succeeded by the booming of artillery, told that the French had passed the river, and that Bock's cavalry were attacked. "After a time the fog cleared up, and the German horsemen were seen in close and beautiful order, retiring before twelve thousand French infantry, who in battle array were marching steadily onwards. At intervals, twenty guns, ranged in front, would start forwards and send their bullets whistling and tearing up the ground beneath the Germans, while scattered parties of light cavalry, scouting out, capped all the hills in succession, and peering abroad, gave signals to the main body."*

Graham with two divisions, and Le Marchant's cavalry,

* Napier.

were instantly detached across the Tormes, and formed in order of battle; while Wellington collected the remainder of his army between Moresco and Cabrerizos, in readiness to avail himself of any false movement of his rival. But when the allied dispositions were discovered, the French marshal hesitated to risk an action, and repassing the river, he occupied the position he had quitted.

It was Marmont's determination to offer battle on the 28th; but Lord Wellington, having obtained the siege stores he required from Almeida, pressed the forts so vigorously, that they yielded on the 27th; and the particulars of their fall were thus detailed to Lord Liverpool in a despatch, dated Fuente la Peña, 30th June, 1812.

"The ammunition to enable us to carry on the attack of the forts having arrived at Salamanca in the afternoon of the 26th, the fire was immediately recommenced upon the gorge of the redoubt of Los Cayetanos, in which a practicable breach was effected at about ten o'clock in the morning of the 27th; and we had succeeded nearly about the same time in setting fire to the buildings in the large fort of San Vicente, by the fire from which the approach to Los Cayetanos by its gorge was defended.

"Being in Salamanca at this moment, I gave directions that the forts of Los Cayetanos and La Merced should be stormed; but some little delay occurred in consequence of the commanding officer of these forts in the first instance, and afterwards the commanding officer of San Vicente, having expressed a desire to capitulate after the lapse of a certain number of hours.

"As it was obvious that these propositions were made in order to gain time till the fire in San Vicente should be extinguished, I refused to listen to any terms, unless the forts should be instantly surrendered; and having found that the commanding officer of Los Cayetanos, who was the first to offer to surrender, was entirely dependent upon the governor of San Vicente, and could not venture to carry

into execution the capitulation which he had offered to make, I gave directions that his fort and that of La Merced might be stormed forthwith.

" These operations were effected in the most gallant manner by a detachment of the sixth division, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Davis of the 36th regiment, under the direction of Major-General Clinton.

" The troops entered the fort of Los Cayetanos by the gorge, and escaladed that of La Merced; and I am happy to add that our loss was but trifling.

" The governor of San Vicente then sent out a flag of truce to ratify the surrender of that fort on the terms I had offered him; viz. the garrison to march out with the honours of war; to be prisoners of war; and the officers to retain their personal military baggage, and the soldiers their knapsacks: and notwithstanding that the 9th regiment of caçadores had actually stormed one of the outworks of San Vicente, and were in possession of it, I deemed it expedient to accept the fort by capitulation on those terms, and to stop the attack. * * * * *

" The enemy had been employed for nearly three years in constructing these works, but with increased activity for the last eight or nine months. A large expense had been incurred; and these works, sufficiently garrisoned by about 800 men, and armed with 30 pieces of artillery, were of a nature to render it quite impossible to take them, excepting by a regular attack; and it is obvious that the enemy relied upon their strength, and upon their being sufficiently garrisoned and armed; as they had left in San Vicente large depôts of clothing, and military stores of every description.

" I was mistaken in my estimate of the extent of the means which would be necessary to subdue these forts; and I was obliged to send to the rear for a fresh supply of ammunition. This necessity occasioned a delay of six days.

" The enemy withdrew their garrison from Alba de Tormes as soon as they heard of the fall of the forts of

Salamanca; and I have ordered that the works at both places may be destroyed.

"The operations against the forts of Salamanca were carried on in sight of Marshal Marmont's army, which remained in its position with the right at Cabeza Vellosa, and the left at Huerta, till the night of the 27th instant, when they broke up, and retired in three columns towards the river Duero; one of them directing its march upon Toro, and the others upon Tordesillas."

The fall of the forts was communicated to Marmont on the evening of the 27th; and he received intelligence at the same time that Caffarelli's expected reinforcement was delayed. The object for which he had advanced had failed—and it would have been impolitic to abide a battle now—accordingly he retreated during the night by the roads of Torro and Tordesillas, taking with him the garrison he had placed in the castle of Alba de Tormes.

The reduction of the forts of Salamanca occasioned a considerable loss, for 540 men had been rendered *hors de combat*, from the passage of the Tormes to the fall of San Vicente.* "When it was ascertained that Marshal Marmont had retired, a Te Deum was performed in the cathedral, at which Lord Wellington, accompanied by a numerous body of the officers of his army, attended. The scene was grand and impressive, the spacious noble building

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army under the command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B, in the siege of the Forts of San Vicente, Los Cayetanos, and La Merced, and in the position on the heights of Villares, from the 16th to the 27th June, 1812, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	6	5	104	28	115
Wounded	28	44	340	—	412
Missing	2	—	11	5	13

crowded to excess, and the ceremony performed with all the pomp and splendour of Catholic worship. The pealing organ never poured its tones over a more brilliant, varied, or chivalrous audience. To describe the variety of groups would be endless: the eye, wandering through the expanse of the building, could seldom rest twice on objects of similarity.

"All the pomp of a great episcopal seat was displayed on the occasion. Contrasted with the sombre dresses of the numerous unofficiating clergy, the scarlet uniforms of the British were held in relief by the dark Spanish or Portuguese costume. The Spanish peasant, in all the simplicity and cleanliness of his dress, appeared by the mustached and fierce-looking guerilla; while the numerous mantillas and waving fans of the Spanish ladies attracted attention to the dark voluptuous beauties of Castile. It was an enthusiastic and imposing scene; nor was its least impressive effect produced by the quiet, unassuming presence of the great man who, in the career of his glory, knew that by showing respect to the religious institutions of other countries, he best secured for himself those feelings which are only to be substantially acquired by deference to the customs of a people having an equal right with ourselves to adopt the persuasion or the forms most congenial to their minds, and most consistent with their conscientious views."*

The adulation of "a giddy crowd" had no charms for one whose mind was centered upon objects, from which the evanescent displays of popular approbation could never for a moment distract it. Ordering that the city forts should be razed, and the castle of Alba dismantled, Lord Wellington quitted Salamanca on the evening of the 28th, and on the 29th rejoined the army.

* Leith Hay.

CHAPTER XXXI.

LORD WELLINGTON ADVANCES TO THE GUAREÑA—BOTH ARMIES ANXIOUS FOR A BATTLE—WINE CAVES OF RUEDA—MARMONT ASSUMES THE OFFENSIVE—DETAIL OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE DUERO AND THE TORMES—AFFAIR OF CASTREJON—NARROW ESCAPE OF LORD WELLINGTON—OPERATIONS FROM THE 19TH TO THE 21ST OF JULY—THUNDER STORM—MORNING OF THE 22D—MARMONT'S FALSE MOVEMENT BRINGS ON THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA—DESPATCH TO LORD BATHURST—OBSERVATIONS.

WHILE all in Salamanca evinced that joyous excitement which victory elicits, Lord Wellington was preparing for a greater triumph; and the allied army was already on its march, and reached the Guareña on the 30th of June. On the 1st of July it encamped on the Trabancos, and on the 2d crossed the Zapardial, driving the French rear-guard in great confusion over the Tordesillas. The period that intervened from the 3d to the 15th, was marked by a few changes of position; but no serious affair took place until the junction of Bonnet's division from the Asturias, with a strong cavalry reinforcement, encouraged Marmont to extend by his right along the banks of the Duero,* and

* The river occasionally written Douro and Duero, rises in a mountain lake in Old Castile, and passes in its course the site of the ancient Numantia. At Simancas, it is joined by the Pisuerga, into which the Arlanza and Carrion had previously discharged themselves. Then, by a south-westerly course it runs to Tordesillas, and turning afterwards towards the west, passes through Toro and Zamora. Fed by the minor streams of Leon, the Duero enters Portugal, and, after the most lengthened course of the Peninsular rivers, falls into the Atlantic at Oporto.

occasioning the allies to make a corresponding movement, head-quarters were changed from Rueda to Nava del Rey. On the 16th, the French marshal passed two divisions across the bridge at Toro, and the allied general occupied Fuente la Peña and Canizal, the fourth and light divisions taking a position at Castrejon.

At no period of the campaign was the excitement in both armies raised to a greater pitch. The allies were flushed with victory, and confident of fresh success—the enemy, receiving daily an accession to their strength, and burning to wipe away the disgrace attendant upon their recent discomfitures. Marmont courted an action upon ground on which, from its being favourable for defence, he knew that his adversary must attack him at disadvantage—while Wellington, as ardent for a battle, but with a resolution not to be disturbed, refused to throw away a chance, and coolly waited until he could deal a blow that should be decisively effective. No time could be fraught with more military interest than that when the rival armies were in each other's presence on the Duero. "The weather was very fine, the country rich, and the troops received their rations regularly; wine was so plentiful, that it was hard to keep the soldiers sober; the caves of Rueda, either natural or cut in the rock below the surface of the earth, were so immense and so well stocked, that the drunkards of two armies failed to make any very sensible diminution in the quantity. Many men of both sides perished in that labyrinth, and on both sides also, the soldiers, passing the Duero in groups, held amicable intercourse, conversing of the battles that were yet to be fought: the camps on the banks of the Duero seemed at times to belong to one army, so difficult is it to make brave men hate each other."*

This state of inaction was hurrying to its close. Marmont had determined to resume the offensive; and having masked his design by deceptive movements for some days, he

* Napier.

commenced a series of operations, well conceived and ably executed, but which the superior genius of his opponent rendered nugatory in their results. After alluding to the movement of the French troops by their right, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst,* the allied general thus details the succeeding operations:—

"It was totally out of my power to prevent the enemy from passing the Duero at any point at which he might think it expedient, as he had in his possession all the bridges over that river, and many of the fords; but he recrossed that river at Toro in the night of the 16th, moved his whole army to Tordesillas, where he again crossed the Duero on the morning of the 17th, and assembled his army on that day at La Nava del Rey; having marched not less than ten leagues in the course of the 17th.

"The 4th and light divisions of infantry, and Major-General Anson's brigades of cavalry, had marched to Castrejon on the night of the 16th, with a view to the assembly of the army on the Guareña, and were at Castrejon under the orders of Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton on the 17th, not having been ordered to proceed further, in consequence of my knowledge that the enemy had not passed the Duero at Toro, and there was not time to call them in between the hour at which I received the intelligence of the whole of the enemy's army being at La Nava and daylight of the morning of the 18th. I therefore took measures to provide for their retreat and junction, by moving the 5th division to Torrecilla de la Orden; and Major-General Le Marchant's, Major-General Alten's, and Major-General Bock's brigades of cavalry to Alaejos.

"The enemy attacked the troops at Castrejon at the dawn of day of the 18th, and Sir Stapleton Cotton maintained the post without suffering any loss till the cavalry had joined him. Nearly about the same time the enemy turned, by Alaejos, the left flank of our position at Castrejon.

* Dated Cabrerizos, 21st July, 1812.

" The troops retired in admirable order to Torrecilla de la Orden, having the enemy's whole army on their flank, or in their rear, and thence to the Guareña, which river they passed under the same circumstances, and effected their junction with the army.*

" The Guareña, which runs into the Duero, is formed by four streams, which unite about a league below Cañizal, and the enemy took a strong position on the heights on the right of that river; and I placed the 5th, 4th, and light divisions on the opposite heights, and had directed the remainder of the army to cross the Upper Guareña at Vallesa, in consequence of the appearance of the enemy's intention to turn our right.

" Shortly after his arrival, however, the enemy crossed the Guareña at Castrillo, below the junction of the streams; and manifested an intention to press upon our left, and to enter the valley of Cañizal. Major-General Alten's brigade of cavalry, supported by the 3d dragoons, were already engaged with the enemy's cavalry, and had taken, among other prisoners, the French General de Carrié; and I desired Lieut.-General the Hon. L. Cole to attack with Major-General William Anson's and Brig.-General Harvey's brigades of infantry, the latter under the command of Colonel Stubbs, the enemy's infantry, which were supporting their cavalry. He immediately attacked and defeated

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army under the command of General the Earl of Wellington, K.B., near Castrejon, on the 18th July, 1812.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
British	61	297	27
Portuguese	34	96	27
Total	95	393	54

them with the 27th and 40th regiments, which advanced to the charge with bayonets, Colonel Stubbs's Portuguese brigade supporting; and the enemy gave way—many were killed and wounded—and Major-General Alten's brigade of cavalry having pursued the fugitives, 240 prisoners were taken.

* * * * *

"The enemy did not make any further attempt on our left, but having reinforced their troops on that side, and withdrawn those which had moved to their left, I brought back ours from Vallesa.

"On the 19th, in the afternoon, the enemy withdrew all the troops from their right, and marched to their left by Tarazona, apparently with an intention of turning our right. I crossed the Upper Guareña at Vallesa and El Olmo, with the whole of the allied army, in the course of that evening and night; and every preparation was made for the action which was expected on the plain of Vallesa on the morning of the 20th.

"But shortly after day-light the enemy made another movement, in several columns, to his left along the heights of the Guareña, which river he crossed below Cantalapiedra, and encamped last night at Babila-fuente and Villoruela; and the allied army made a corresponding movement to its right to Cantalpino, and encamped last night at Cabeza Vellosa, the 6th division and Major-General Alten's brigade of cavalry being upon the Tormes at Aldea Lengua.

"During these movements, there have been occasional cannonades, but without loss on our side.

"I have this morning moved the left of the army to the Tormes, where the whole are now concentrated; and I observe that the enemy have also moved towards the same river near Huerta.

"The enemy's object hitherto has been to cut off my communication with Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, the want of which, he knowns well, would distress us very materially. The wheat harvest has not yet been reaped in

Castile; and even if we had money, we could not now procure any thing from the country, unless we should follow the example of the enemy, and lay waste whole districts, in order to procure a scanty subsistence of unripe wheat for the troops.

"It would answer no purpose to attempt to retaliate upon the enemy, even if it were practicable. The French armies in Spain have never had any secure communication beyond the ground which they occupy; and provided the enemy opposed to them is not too strong for them, they are indifferent in respect to the quarter from which their operations are directed, or on which side they carry them on.

"The army of Portugal has been surrounded for the last six weeks, and scarcely even a letter reaches its commander; but the system of organized rapine and plunder, and the extraordinary discipline so long established in the French armies, enable it to subsist at the expense of the total ruin of the country in which it has been placed; and I am not certain that Marshal Marmont has not now at his command a greater quantity of provisions and supplies of every description than we have. Any movement upon his flank, therefore, would only tend to augment the embarrassments of our own situation, while it would have no effect whatever upon that of the enemy; even if such a movement could have been made with advantage as an operation purely military: this, however, was not the case, and when the French attempted to turn our right, I had the choice only of marching towards Salamanca, or of attacking the enemy in a position highly advantageous to him, which, for several reasons, I did not think expedient.

"I have invariably been of opinion, that unless forced to fight a battle, it is better that one should not be fought by the allied army, unless under such favourable circumstances as that there would be reason to hope that the allied army would be able to maintain the field, while those of the enemy should not.

"Your lordship will have seen by the returns of the two

armies that we have no superiority of numbers, even over that single army immediately opposed to us; indeed, I believe that the French army is of the two the stronger; and it is certainly equipped with a profusion of artillery, double ours in numbers, and of larger calibres. It cannot be attacked therefore in a chosen position, without considerable loss on our side.

"To this circumstance, add that I am quite certain that Marshal Marmont's army is to be joined by the King's, which will be 10,000 or 12,000 men, with a large proportion of cavalry, and that troops are still expected from the army of the north, and some are ordered from that of the south; and it will be seen that I ought to consider it almost impossible to remain in Castile after an action, the circumstances of which should not have been so advantageous as to have left the allied army in a situation of comparative strength, while that of the enemy should have been much weakened.

"I have therefore determined to cross the Tormes, if the enemy should; to cover Salamanca as long as I can; and above all, not to give up our communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; and not to fight an action, unless under very advantageous circumstances, or it should become absolutely necessary.

"Since I wrote to your lordship on the 14th, I have learnt that General Drouet had not crossed the Guadiana, nor had he moved in that direction. Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill therefore still remains at Llerena.

"The siege of Astorga continues. General Santocildes had detached a division of 4,000 infantry under General Cabrera, to Benavente. General D'Urban, with the Portuguese cavalry, joined on the left of the allied army, on the 17th instant.

"The enemy abandoned and destroyed the fort of Mirabete on the Tagus on the 11th instant, and the garrison marched to Madrid to form part of the army of the centre. They were reduced to five days' provisions."

The affair at Castrejon, while it bore evidence of the gallantry and steadiness of British troops, when attacked at disadvantage, and assailed by overwhelming numbers, was marked also by an incident, than which of the many that form Peninsular reminiscences, none can be more interesting.

On arriving at the scene of action, accompanied by Marshal Beresford, Lord Wellington rode hastily forward with his staff, to observe the enemy's dispositions, and, by them, direct his own. At the moment, a body of French horse crossed the low grounds at a gallop, and being mistaken for deserters, succeeded in mounting the height on which the left of the British cavalry was posted, when, falling boldly on the skirmishers, they drove them in, and occasioned a general disorder. But the panic was but temporary.

"The reserves came up from Alaejos, and these furious swordsmen being scattered in all directions were in turn driven away or cut down; but meanwhile thirty or forty, led by a noble officer, had brought up their right shoulders, and came over the edge of the table-land above the hollow which separated the British wings at the instant when Wellington and Beresford arrived on the same slope. There were some infantry pickets in the bottom, and higher up, near the French, were two guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry, which was disposed in perfect order. When the French officer saw this squadron, he reined in his horse with difficulty, and his troopers gathered in a confused body round him as if to retreat. They seemed lost men, for the British instantly charged, but with a shout the gallant fellows soused down upon the squadron, and the latter turning, galloped through the guns; then the whole mass, friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind to the bottom, carrying away Lord Wellington and the other generals, who with drawn swords and some difficulty got clear of the tumult. The French horsemen were now quite exhausted, and a reserve squadron of heavy dragoons coming in cut most of them to pieces; yet their invincible leader,

assaulted by three enemies at once, struck one dead from his horse, and with surprising exertions saved himself from the others, though they rode hewing at him on each side for a quarter of a mile."*

The 19th and 20th were passed in marching and manœuvring. Each hour wore away in the belief that the succeeding one would usher in a conflict; and when evening came, and the rival armies bivouacked in the other's presence, the weary soldier as he stretched himself upon his grassy bed, expected that the morrow's sun would rise upon a battle field. In the reminiscences of a life, while years shall slip away unregarded, those days of glorious excitement will come back with vivid freshness to the memory of him who fought at Salamanca.

What could be more beautiful than the military spectacle which the movement of ninety thousand men, in parallel lines, presented? The line of march was seldom without the range of cannon, and often within that of musketry. When the ground allowed it, the guns on each side occasionally opened. But the cannonade was but partially maintained. To reach a point was Marmont's object—to intercept him was that of Wellington. "The French general moving his army as one man along the crest of the heights, preserved the lead he had taken, and made no mistake;" and the extraordinary rapidity of his marching bore evidence to the truth of Napoleon's observation, that "for his greatest successes he was as much indebted to the legs as he was to the arms of his soldiers."

The morning of the 21st found the allied army on its old position of San Christoval. Marmont having garrisoned the castle of Alba, crossed the Tormes, marched up the valley of Machechuco, and bivouacked in the forest of Calvaraso de Ariba. In the afternoon, Wellington passed the bulk of his army also across the river, leaving the 3d division,

* Napier.

and a brigade of Portuguese cavalry entrenched upon the right bank of the Tormes.

The march of the 21st was tedious and fatiguing, and before the last of the columns had passed the fords, night had fallen, and a thunder storm of unusual violence came on. Nothing could harbinger a bloody day more awfully, than the elemental uproar of the night which preceded that of Salamanca. Crash succeeded crash—and in rapid flashes the lightning played over height and valley, while torrents burst from the riven clouds, and swelled all the streams to torrents. Terrified by the storm, the horses broke away from their picketings, and rushing madly to and fro, added to the confusion. One flash killed several belonging to the 5th dragoon guards, and occasioned serious injury to the men in the attempts they made to recover and secure them.

The morning broke sullenly before this uproar ended; and with the first dawn, the light troops of the enemy commenced skirmishing; while frequent movements of heavy columns, as they marched and countermarched, seemed rather calculated to confuse an opponent, than effect a particular object. On one of two heights, named Arapiles, the allied right was appuied, and the occupation of the other was attempted; but the French, with a similar design, had already detached troops, who succeeded in obtaining its possession. The day wore on,—the late tempest apparently had cleared the atmosphere,—all was bright and unclouded sunshine,—and over a wide expanse of undulating landscape nothing obscured the range of sight but dust from the arid roads, or wreathing smoke occasioned by the spattering fire of the light troops. "Marmont was busily manœuvring, and Lord Wellington coolly noticing from a height the dispositions of his opponent, which as he properly calculated would lead to a general engagement."*

At noon, from the rear of the Arapiles, Marmont made

* Victories of the British Armies.

a demonstration, as if his design was to attack the allied left. The movement brought Lord Wellington to the ground; but readily perceiving that it was but a feint of the French marshal, he returned to his former position on the right.

At two o'clock, finding that his abler antagonist was not to be deceived, Marmont determined to outflank the right of the allies, and interpose between them and the Rodrigo road; and in consequence, commenced marching his columns by their left. This was a fatal movement—and as the French infantry extended, a staff officer announced it to Lord Wellington. One eagle glance satisfied him that the moment for attack was come—a few brief orders passed his lips—and the doom of his rival's army was pronounced.*

Of that glorious day, the following official detail was given by the victor in his despatch to Lord Bathurst:—

"In my letter of the 21st, I informed your lordship that both armies were near the Tormes; and the enemy crossed that river with the greatest part of his troops, in the afternoon, by the fords between Alba de Tormes and Huerta, and moved by their left towards the roads leading to Ciudad Rodrigo.

"The allied army, with the exception of the 3d division and General D'Urban's cavalry, likewise crossed the Tormes in the evening by the bridge of Salamanca and the fords in the neighbourhood; and I placed the troops in a position, of which the right was upon one of the two heights called

* "Marmont had remarked, and rode forward to correct the irregularity of his flank movement, and personally direct the debouchement of his 3d and 4th divisions from the wood that had partially concealed them. At that moment, Lord Wellington was seated on the hill-side, eating his hurried meal, while an aide-de-camp in attendance watched the enemy's movements with a glass. The bustle then perceptible in the French line attracted his lordship's notice, and he quickly inquired the cause. 'They are evidently in motion,' was the reply.—'Indeed! what are they doing?'—'Extending rapidly to the left,' was answered. Lord Wellington sprang upon his feet, and seized the telescope; then muttering that Marmont's good genius had deserted him, he mounted his horse, and issued the orders to attack."—*Victories of the British Armies.*

Dos Arapiles, and the left on the Tormes, below the ford of Santa Marta.

"The 3d division, and Brigadier-General D'Urban's cavalry, were left at Cabrerizos, on the right of the Tormes, as the enemy had still a large corps on the heights above Babilafuente, on the same side of the river; and I considered it not improbable that, finding our army prepared for them in the morning on the left of the Tormes, they would alter their plan, and manœuvre by the other bank.

"In the course of the night of the 21st, I received intelligence, of the truth of which I could not doubt, that General Clausel had arrived at Pollos on the 20th with the cavalry and horse artillery of the army of the north, to join Marshal Marmont; and I was quite certain that these troops would join him on the 22d or 23d at latest.

"There was no time to be lost therefore; and I determined that, if circumstances should not permit me to attack him on the 22d, I would move towards Ciudad Rodrigo without further loss of time, as the difference of the numbers of cavalry might have made a march of manœuvre, such as we have had for the last four or five days, very difficult, and its result doubtful.

"During the night of the 21st, the enemy had taken possession of the village of Calvarassa de Arriba, and of the heights near it, called Nuestra Señora de la Peña, our cavalry being in possession of Calvarassa de Abaxo; and shortly after daylight, detachments from both armies attempted to obtain possession of the more distant from our right of the two hills called Dos Arapiles.

"The enemy, however, succeeded; their detachments being the strongest, and having been concealed in the woods nearer the hill than we were; by which success they strengthened materially their own position, and had in their power increased means of annoying ours.

"In the morning the light troops of the 7th division, and the 4th caçadores belonging to General Pack's brigade, were engaged with the enemy on the height called Nuestra

Señora de la Peña, on which height they maintained themselves with the enemy throughout the day. The possession by the enemy, however, of the more distant of the Arapiles, rendered it necessary for me to extend the right of the army *en potence* to the height behind the village of Arapiles, and to occupy that village with light infantry; and here I placed the 4th division, under the command of Lieut.-General the Hon. L. Cole: and although, from the variety of the enemy's movements, it was difficult to form a satisfactory judgment of his intentions, I considered that upon the whole his objects were upon the left of the Tormes. I therefore ordered Major-General the Hon. E. Pakenham, who commanded the 3d division in the absence of Lieut.-General Picton, on account of ill health, to move across the Tormes with the troops under his command, including Brig.-General D'Urban's cavalry, and to place himself behind Aldea Tejada; Brig.-General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry, and Don Carlos de España's infantry, having been moved up likewise to the neighbourhood of Las Torres, between the 3d and 4th divisions.

"After a variety of evolutions and movements, the enemy appears to have determined upon his plan about two in the afternoon; and, under cover of a very heavy cannonade, which, however, did us but very little damage, he extended his left, and moved forward his troops, apparently with an intention to embrace, by the position of his troops, and by his fire, our post on that of the two Arapiles which we possessed, and from thence to attack and break our line, or, at all events, to render difficult any movement of ours to our right.

"The extension of his line to his left, however, and its advance upon our right, notwithstanding that his troops still occupied very strong ground, and his position was well defended by cannon, gave me an opportunity of attacking him, for which I had long been anxious. I reinforced our right with the 5th division, under Lieut.-General Leith, which I placed behind the village of Arapiles, on the

right of the 4th division, and with the 6th and 7th divisions in reserve; and as soon as these troops had taken their station, I ordered Major-General the Hon. E. Pakenham to move forward with the 3d division and General D'Urban's cavalry, and two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, under Lieut.-Colonel Hervey, in four columns, to turn the enemy's left on the heights; while Brig.-General Bradford's brigade, the 5th division under Lieut.-General Leith, the 4th division under Lieut. General the Hon. L. Cole, and the cavalry under Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, should attack them in front, supported in reserve by the 6th division, under Major-General Clinton, the 7th, under Major-General Hope, and Don Carlos de España's Spanish division; and Brig.-General Pack should support the left of the 4th division, by attacking that of the Dos Arapiles which the enemy held. The 1st and light divisions occupied the ground on the left, and were in reserve.

"The attack upon the enemy's left was made in the manner above described, and completely succeeded. Major-General the Hon. E. Pakenham formed the 3d division across the enemy's flank, and overthrew every thing opposed to him. These troops were supported in the most gallant style by the Portuguese cavalry, under Brig.-General D'Urban, and Lieut.-Colonel Hervey's squadrons of the 14th, who successfully defeated every attempt made by the enemy on the flank of the 3d division.

"Brig.-General Bradford's brigade, the 5th and 4th divisions, and the cavalry under Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, attacked the enemy in front, and drove his troops before them from one height to another, bringing forward their right, so as to acquire strength upon the enemy's flank in proportion to the advance. Brig.-General Pack made a very gallant attack upon the Arapiles, in which, however, he did not succeed, excepting in diverting the attention of the enemy's corps placed upon it from the troops under the command of Lieut.-General Cole in his advance.

"The cavalry under Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton made a most gallant and successful charge against a body of the enemy's infantry, which they overthrew and cut to pieces. In this charge Major-General Le Marchant was killed at the head of his brigade; and I have to regret the loss of a most able officer.

"After the crest of the height was carried, one division of the enemy's infantry made a stand against the 4th division, which, after a severe contest, was obliged to give way, in consequence of the enemy having thrown some troops on the left of the 4th division, after the failure of Brig.-General Pack's attack upon the Arapiles, and Lieut.-General the Hon. L. Cole having been wounded.

"Marshal Sir William Beresford, who happened to be on the spot, directed Brig.-General Spry's brigade of the 5th division, which was in the second line, to change its front, and to bring its fire on the flank of the enemy's division; and I am sorry to add that, while engaged in this service, he received a wound, which I am apprehensive will deprive me of the benefit of his counsel and assistance for some time. Nearly about the same time Lieut.-General Leith received a wound which unfortunately obliged him to quit the field. I ordered up the 6th division, under Major-General Clinton, to relieve the 4th, and the battle was soon restored to its former success.

"The enemy's right, however, reinforced by the troops which had fled from his left, and by those which had now retired from the Arapiles, still continued to resist; and I ordered the 1st and light divisions, and Colonel Stubbs's Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, which was re-formed, and Major-General William Anson's brigade, likewise of the 4th division, to turn the right, while the 6th division, supported by 3d and 5th, attacked the front. It was dark before this point was carried by the 6th division; and the enemy fled through the woods towards the Tormes. I pursued them with the first and light divisions, and Major-General William Anson's brigade of

the 4th division, and some squadrons of cavalry under Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, as long as we could find any of them together, directing our march upon Huerta and the fords of the Tormes, by which the enemy had passed on their advance; but the darkness of the night was highly advantageous to the enemy, many of whom escaped under its cover who must otherwise have been in our hands.

" I am sorry to report that, owing to this same cause, Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton was unfortunately wounded by one of our own sentries after we had halted.

" We renewed the pursuit at break of day in the morning with the same troops, and Major-General Bock's, and Major-General Anson's brigades of cavalry, which joined during the night; and, having crossed the Tormes, we came up with the enemy's rear of cavalry and infantry near La Serna. They were immediately attacked by the two brigades of dragoons, and the cavalry fled, leaving the infantry to their fate. I have never witnessed a more gallant charge than was made on the enemy's infantry by the heavy brigade of the King's German Legion, under Major-General Bock, which was completely successful; and the whole body of infantry, consisting of three battalions of the enemy's 1st division, were made prisoners.

" The pursuit was afterwards continued as far as Peñaranda last night, and our troops were still following the flying enemy.

" Their head quarters were in this town, not less than ten leagues from the field of battle, for a few hours last night; and they are now considerably advanced on the road towards Valladolid, by Arevalo. They were joined yesterday on their retreat by the cavalry and artillery of the army of the north, which have arrived at too late a period, it is to be hoped, to be of much use to them.

" It is impossible to form a conjecture of the amount of the enemy's loss in this action; but, from all reports, it is very considerable. We have taken from them 11 pieces of

cannon,* several ammunition waggons, 2 eagles, and 6 colours; and 1 general, 3 colonels, 3 lieut.-colonels, 130 officers of inferior rank, and between 6,000 and 7,000 soldiers are prisoners;† and our detachments are sending in more at every moment. The number of dead on the field is very large."

Such was the unassuming narrative given by Lord Wellington of a victory, sufficiently brilliant in itself to confer immortality upon a soldier hitherto without a name. In other battles those daring flights of genius, untrammelled by formal rules of art which restricted ordinary men, had displayed the master mind of the victor; but Salamanca at once established his military superiority. It was a field of science, in which the intuitive rapidity of the conquerer detected a weakness in his opponent, and turned it to ruinous account. No trial had more to interest, and none had more to alarm; for Lord Wellington's position was so peculiar, that it was questionable whether the danger lay in courting or declining an action. His necessities were urgent, and nothing could relieve them, but an immediate retreat, or a decisive victory. If he fell back upon the frontier, the certain junction of Clausel's division, within a day or two, must give to Marmont a powerful superiority in cavalry and horse artillery, the arms by which, during a march of manœuvre, the French marshal would be enabled to bring on an action when he pleased. That the allied general was threatened by a dangerous opponent, previous occurrences had proved. Of the marshals, none handled troops more beautifully than the Duke of Ragusa; and during the late operations, he had both outmarched and outflanked the allied general, and yet in all the variety of

* "The official returns only account for 11 pieces of cannon, but it is believed that 20 have fallen into our hands."

† "The prisoners are supposed to amount to 7,000; but it has not been possible to ascertain their number exactly, from the advance of the army immediately after the action was over."

rapid evolutions his complicated movements had required, he had never left an opening for his watchful antagonist to attack. If Wellington received a battle, the repulse of his assailant and the winning a few trophies, would have brought no paramount advantages. Success demands a sacrifice—victory must be purchased with a loss—to cripple would be to defeat; for, when joined by the army of the centre, could Wellington, with weakened numbers, withstand an antagonist reinforced by 12,000 men? To fight without delay, and not fight at disadvantage, was scarcely possible. Days passed—no error allowed the opportunity—for every movement was made with admirable skill. For one moment however, Marmont's good genius was asleep—his order of march severed the left from the centre of his army—Wellington saw the mistake—"the fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunderbolt:" and but for the misconduct of Carlos d'España, in removing the Spanish garrison from the castle of Alba, without noticing it to Lord Wellington, Marmont's defeat would have proved the most ruinous upon record.

Had Wellington's career closed at Salamanca, he would have left behind him a reputation of being the second soldier of the age—but a more glorious end was destined to terminate it. The Pyrenees were to witness his triumphant march—the soil of France to afford him fresh fields of glory. Who could foretel the close? or who imagine, that in a "last battle" the hero of Marengo should be vanquished by the victor of Assye, leaving for posterity to determine, whether an imperial crown or ducal coronet had adorned the brows of the greater soldier?

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LIFE OF ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

ETC. ETC.

CHAPTER I.

SALAMANCA—OPENING OF THE BATTLE—PAKENHAM'S ATTACK—CHARGE OF THE THIRD DIVISION—FRENCH OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED—RALLY—CHARGE OF THE HEAVY CAVALRY—AND RUIN OF THE FRENCH LEFT WING—ATTACK ON THE ARAPILES FAILS, AND THE FOURTH DIVISION IS DRIVEN BACK—SIXTH DIVISION ADVANCES—THE FRENCH FINALLY DEFEATED—ESCAPE BY ALBA DE TORMES—AFFAIR AT LA SERNA—WELLINGTON ENTERS VALLADOLID—GUERILLA MOVEMENTS—MILITARY AND MORAL RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA.

WERE it desired to present in scenic variety the varied changes in the game of war, the period from the time that Wellington crossed the Agueda, until the ruined army of his rival passed the Tormes "in darkness and defeat," would be most happily selected. Brief as that interval was, more than ordinarily marks a soldier's life had happened. The siege and storm—the advance and the retreat—the march of manœuvre—until "after long coiling and winding, the armies came together, and drawing up their

huge trains like angry serpents, mingled in deadly strife,"*—a last grand effort, terminating a series of splendid operations, conducted with matchless skill, and closing with a decisive victory.

No conflict had been so long desired, and none more unexpectedly brought on. The baggage of the allied army was moving towards the Rodrigo road; the commissariate had already retired; evening was coming fast; and still no note of preparation indicated that the storm of battle was about to burst. Marmont, fearing that his cautious opponent would avoid a contest by retreating, hurried his own dispositions to force a battle, and Thomier's division, with his light cavalry and fifty guns, was put in rapid march. The centre columns were debouching from the forest, and Lord Wellington's corresponding movement was to be Marmont's signal to fall on.† Suddenly, the inactive masses which hitherto had been resting on the English heights, assumed a threatening attitude. Was it a feint? A few minutes removed that doubt—the allied brigades closed up rapidly on each other—and the third division, in four columns, rushed down the hill, and he who would have been the assailant was assailed!

Unchecked by a furious cannonade, Pakenham crossed the hollow between the high grounds occupied previously by the opposing forces; scattered the light troops who would have stayed his progress; and pressing up the hill, without pausing to deploy, the regiments brought their

* Napier.

† "In the progress of this scene the light infantry of either army were busily employed. The village of Arapiles, defended by the guards, and two companies of the fusiliers, was repeatedly assailed, and the enemy invariably driven back.

"At length the welcome intelligence was imparted, that we were no longer to be cannonaded with impunity. Lord Wellington arrived from the right, and communicated to General Leith his intention of immediately attacking the enemy.

"It is impossible to describe the energetic exultation with which the soldiers sprung to their feet: if ever primary impulse gained a battle, that of Salamanca was won before the troops moved forward."—*Leith Hay.*

right shoulders forward in a run, and, without halting, formed line from open column. No troops were ever more nobly led; and none advanced under showers of grape, and a heavy *tiraillade*, with more imposing steadiness. The crest was gained. The French line commenced firing, beat the *pas de charge*, and moved forward a few paces; but, undauntedly, Wallace's brigade closed up ranks necessarily disordered by a rapid advance over irregular ground, and all pushed boldly on.

The French, alarmed by this movement, became unsteady. The daring advance of an enemy, whom the concentrated fire of five thousand muskets could not arrest, was indeed astounding. All that brave men could do was done by their officers—as they strove to confirm the courage of their troops, and persuade them to withstand an assault that threatened their wavering ranks. "The colonel of the 22d *legère*, seizing a musket from a grenadier, rushed forward, and mortally wounded Major Murphy of the 88th. Speedily his death was avenged—a soldier shot the Frenchman through the head, who, tossing his arms wildly up, fell forward and expired. The brigade betrayed impatience; and the 88th, excited to madness by the fall of a favourite officer—who passed dead along their front, as his charger galloped off with his rider's foot sticking in the stirrup—could scarcely be kept back. Pakenham marked the feeling, and ordered Wallace 'to let them loose.' The word was given—down came the bayonets to the charge—the pace quickened—a wild cheer, mingled with the Irish hurra, rent the skies—and unwilling to stand the shock, the French gave ground. The Rangers, and the supporting regiments, broke the dense mass of infantry, bayoneting all whom they could overtake—until, 'run to a stand still,' they halted to recover breath, and stayed the slaughter."*

Marmont, perceiving the error he had committed, endeavoured to redeem it by issuing orders to halt the marching by his left, and hurry on the movement of his centre

* Victories of the British Armies.

columns, and thus reconnect his severed line. But at this moment, a howitzer shell shattered his arm, lacerated his side, and obliged him to be carried from the field. Bonet, who succeeded to the command, was also badly wounded; and the task of restoring the fortunes of the day devolved upon Clausel. Thomiere had fallen at the head of his division; Foy and Ferrey were among the wounded; and thus, the confusion incident to a sudden attack was increased, when the example and exertions of superior officers were most required to arrest the growing disorder, which otherwise threatened to end, as it did, in a general *déroute*.

Although driven from the first height, the French formed on their reserves upon a wooded hill, offering a double front, the one opposed to Pakenham's division, the other to that of Leith, which, with the Portuguese brigade under Bradford, and a strong cavalry and artillery support, were now coming rapidly into action. The advance of these noble troops, as they crossed the valley under a furious cannonade, was beautiful. A storm of grape fell heavily upon their ranks, but "the men marched with the same orderly steadiness as at first; no advance in line at a review was ever more correctly executed; the dressing was admirable, and spaces were no sooner formed by casualties, than closed up with the most perfect regularity, and without the slightest deviation from the order of march."*

On cresting the height, the enemy were seen in squares, with their front ranks kneeling. They appeared steady and determined; and until the drum rolled, not a shot was heard. Presently the signal was given—a sheet of fire burst from the faces of the squares—and a rolling volley as promptly answered it. This double fire hid the combatants from each other's view; but the English cheer rose wildly as the rattle of the fusilade died away; and next moment a steady array of glittering bayonets cleared the smoke, and the French square was shattered by the charge.

At this crisis, their flank fiercely assailed by Pakenham,

* Leith Hay.

and their front broken by Leith, the smoke was succeeded by clouds of dust, and the trample of approaching cavalry was heard. It was Le Marchant's. The rush of horses' feet rose above the din of battle; and that sound, so ominous to broken infantry, announced the final ruin of the French left wing.

Bursting through smoke and dust, the heavy brigade galloped across the interval of ground, between the heights where the third division had made its flank attack, and the fifth its more direct one. Sweeping through a mob of routed soldiers, the brigade rode boldly at the three battalions of the French 66th, which, formed in supporting lines, endeavoured to check the advance of the allies, and afford time for the broken divisions to have their organization restored. Heedless of its searching fire, the British dragoons penetrated and broke the columns; and numbers of the French were sabred, while the remainder were driven back upon the third division and made prisoners. Still pressing on, another regiment, in close order, presented itself; this too, was charged, broken, and cut down.

Although this brilliant attack had disordered the formation of the brigade, still the heavy cavalry rode gallantly at new opponents, and under a fire from which horsemen less resolute would have recoiled, they broke a third and stronger column, and seized and secured five pieces of artillery. Nothing could arrest their headlong career. Their noble commander, Le Marchant, had already fallen, fighting at their head; but leaders were not wanting; Cotton and Somerset were foremost in the front of battle; wounds were unheeded; and men attached to other arms of the service, carried away by a chivalrous enthusiasm, were seen charging with the heavy dragoons, and engaged in the thickest of the *mêlée*.*

* Of the unbounded bravery exhibited by British officers at Salamanca, many glorious instances are recorded. Captain Brotherton, of the 14th light dragoons, having been severely wounded in a recent skirmish, was not permitted to go with his own regiment into action; but, in an undress, he joined

With the ruin of the French left wing, the struggle might have been expected to have terminated and victory certain; but while the right of the allies, by its impetuous charges, had swept away all that opposed its advance, the battle was raging in the centre, and the fortune of the day for a brief time wavered. Against that Arapiles, which had been occupied by a French battalion and a battery of guns, Pack's Portuguese brigade was detached; while the fourth divison, under General Cole, simultaneously attacked Bonet's corps, with a vigour which promised a successful result. But Pack's assault failed totally. The Portuguese regiments recoiled; and after the gallant exertions of their officers had been used in vain, the attack was abandoned, and the height left in possession of the enemy.

Nothing could be more unfortunate than this repulse. Unassailed themselves, the French turned their musketry and guns upon the flank and rear of the fourth division, now completely exposed to their fire; while Bonet, remarking the failure of Pack's attack, rallied his retreating battalions, and in turn, becoming the assailant, drove back the British regiments. From the Arapiles a murderous fire was maintained; showers of grape fell thickly on the retiring division; men and officers dropped fast; and although Marshal Beresford, with a Portuguese brigade, came promptly to the assistance of the hard-pressed fourth,

a Portuguese corps, and was a second time wounded in assaulting the Arapiles. William Mackie, of the 88th, acting aide-de-camp to Colonel Wallace, after heading his own regiment throughout their slaughtering advance, joined the heavy cavalry as they galloped forward, and rode through every charge. Heroism, on that brilliant day, was neither confined to a particular service, nor even to the sex to which gallantry inherently belongs. "The wife of Colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition, and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers, and endured the privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude which belongs only to her sex; and in this battle, forgetful of every thing but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling, yet irresistibly impelled forwards by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death."—*Napier.*

the French gathered both strength and courage—for numbers of their companions derouted on the left, joined their companions in the centre, while Boyer's heavy cavalry moved forward to support an advance which promised to end in victory. At this dangerous crisis the confusion was increased by the loss of the commanding officers; for both Cole and Beresford were wounded, and carried from the field.

"Lord Wellington marked the emergency, and ordered Clinton's division to advance. This fine and unbroken corps, numbering 6,000 bayonets, pushed rapidly forward, confronted the victorious enemy, who, with loud cheers, were gaining ground on every point, as the hard-pressed fourth division was driven back by overwhelming numbers. Bonet, determined to follow up his temporary success, met Clinton's division manfully. For a time neither would give ground—a close and furious conflict resulted—while the ceaseless roll of musketry, and the thunder of fifty guns, told how furiously the battle-ground was disputed. Both fought desperately,—and though night was closing, the withered grass, blazing on the surface of the hill, threw an unearthly glare upon the combatants, and displayed the alternations that attended the 'heady fight.' But the British bayonet, at last, opened the path to victory. Such a desperate encounter could not endure. The French began to waver,—the sixth division cheered, pushed forward, gained ground,—while, no longer able to withstand an enemy who seemed determined to sweep everything from before it, the French retired in confusion, leaving the hard-contested field in undisputed possession of the island conquerors."*

The daring efforts of the French centre to restore the battle, but tended to increase the severity of the defeat. Like Thomier's, Bonet's division was entirely broken and dispersed; and had not darkness enabled the remnants of

* Victories of the British Armies.

these corps to shelter in the woods, or gain the fords at Alba, the whole must have been cut down or made prisoners.

When the battle was lost irretrievably, Clausel's dispositions to cover what threatened to prove a ruinous retreat, were in fine keeping with his previous efforts to restore a disastrous day. With the divisions of Foy and Maucune, after the latter had abandoned the Arapiles, he rallied on a rising ground, covering the roads leading to the fords at Encinas and Huerta, and thus secured the route to Alba de Tormes. To dislodge him, the light division, part of the fourth, and the guards were advanced, supported by the seventh, and a Spanish reserve. The enemy fell back under a heavy fire of light troops who disputed every height, while their retiring batteries occasionally maintained a heavy cannonade. Never pausing to reply to the fusilade of the French skirmishers, the British columns pushed steadily on, severed Foy's corps from Maucune's, and rendered the escape of the former all but desperate. But the devoted bravery of Maucune saved his colleague from destruction. His own situation was most perilous. His flank was turned; for the third division was moving round his left, while his assailants, with increasing numbers, were pressing him hard in front; and although the fire of the French artillery was rapid and well directed, it could not arrest the British advance, and the sixth division, with a brigade of the fourth, mounted the hill with fearless intrepidity. Darkness had fallen, but in a stream of fire the movements of the combatants could be traced. "On the side of the British a sheet of flame was seen, sometimes advancing with an even front, sometimes pricking forth in spear heads, now falling back in waving lines, and anon darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the apex of which often approached yet never gained the actual summit of the mountain; but the French musketry, rapid as lightning, sparkled along the brow of the height with unvarying fulness, and with what destructive effects the dark gaps

and changing shapes of the adverse fire showed too plainly. Yet when Pakenham had again turned the enemy's left, and Foy's division had glided into the forest, Maucune's task was completed, the effulgent crest of the ridge became black and silent, and the whole French army vanished as it were in the darkness."*

In the belief that Alba de Tormes was secured by a Spanish garrison, Lord Wellington directed his pursuit towards the fords of Huerta and Encinas. There, he naturally calculated that he should find the broken masses of the enemy; and with fresh troops, the capture or destruction of the whole must have followed.† In person he urged on the march of the troops; and so close was he on the heels of the enemy, that a spent bullet perforated his holster, and slightly contused his thigh.

Profiting as well by the darkness, as by the terrible mistake of Carlos d'Espana, in leaving the Castle of Alba undefended, Clausel, passing the Tormes by the bridge and fords, retreated hastily on Peneranda. At day-break the allied pursuit recommenced; and in a few hours the advanced cavalry of the left wing, the German dragoons, and Anson's light brigade, came up with the French rear-guard. Assailed vigorously by some squadrons of the 11th and 16th dragoons, the French horsemen broke and abandoned three infantry battalions, who hastily endeavoured to reach the crest of a height named La Serna. Two regiments succeeded in the attempt, and formed square; but the third, assaulted when in column, was completely overthrown. Following up their success, Bock's heavy dragoons, under a destructive musketry, formed, charged, and totally

* Napier.

† "I had desired the Spaniards to continue to occupy the castle of Alba de Tormes. ——— had evacuated it, I believe, before he knew my wishes; and he was afraid to let me know that he had done so; and I did not know it till I found no enemy at the fords of the Tormes. When I lost sight of them in the dark, I marched upon Huerta and Encinas, and they went by Alba. If I had known there had been no garrison in Alba, I should have marched there, and should probably have had the whole."—*Wellington's Letter to Graham.*

dispersed the remaining squares; and while many fugitives were cut down, more than five hundred of the broken battalions were overtaken and made prisoners.*

After the destruction of the rear-guard at La Serna, the French divisions continued their flight with a rapidity that speedily removed them beyond Lord Wellington's pursuit. At Nava de Sotroval, the cavalry and horse artillery under General Chauvel, joined the beaten army—and thus covered by fresh horsemen, Clausel reached Floris de Avila by a single march—crossed the Zapardiel next morning, and retreated by Arevala on Valladolid. The allies, worn down with fatigue, halted on the 25th; but the light cavalry and guerilla horse hung upon the French rear, securing many prisoners—while more, less fortunate, fell into the hands of the peasantry, from whom little mercy was either to be expected or obtained. On the 30th, Lord Wellington entered Valladolid, Clausel falling back on Burgos; but intending to strike a blow against King Joseph and the army of the centre, the allied general recrossed the Duero on the following day, and established his head-quarters at Cuellar. Having obtained supplies from the rear, Lord Wellington, leaving Clinton's division to observe the line of the Duero, with Anson's cavalry at Villavarrez, resumed his operations on the 6th of August, marching on the capital by the route of Segovia.†

* "The hill of La Serna offered a frightful spectacle of the power of the musket, that queen of weapons, and the track of the Germans was marked by their huge bodies. A few minutes only had the combat lasted, and above a hundred had fallen; fifty-one were killed outright; and in several places man and horse had died simultaneously, and so suddenly, that falling together on their sides they appeared still alive, the horse's legs stretched out as in movement, the rider's feet in the stirrup, his bridle in hand, the sword raised to strike, and the large hat fastened under the chin, giving to the grim, but undistorted countenance, a supernatural and terrible expression."—*Napier.*

† "Segovia, a celebrated town of Old Castile, where are many remains of Moorish and Roman antiquity. Among the former is the Alcazar, once the palace of the Moorish kings, and afterwards of Ferdinand and Isabella, but which since their days has been used as a state prison. This building stands on a rock, rising some hundred feet above the river, which winds round nearly

Besides the capture of seventeen pieces of cannon, and nearly one thousand sick and wounded men at Valladolid, the French had sustained other and severe losses during the recent operations. The guerillas, under Marquinez, made 300 prisoners—Tordesillas surrendered to Santo Cildes —while alarmed by the movements of the Gallician army, which in obedience to Lord Wellington's directions, had passed the Duero, and reached the Zapardiel, Clausel gave up the line of the former river, while Joseph, after dismantling the castle, forcing a contribution, and robbing the churches of their plate, abandoned Segovia, and retired through the passes of the Guaderama—thus separating his own army from that of Portugal, and leaving the approaches to the capital open to the advance of the allies.

Salamanca, whether considered in its military or moral results, was, probably, the most important of all the Peninsular triumphs. It was a decisive victory—and yet its direct advantages fell infinitely short of what Lord Wellington might have been warranted in expecting. How much more fatal must it not have proved, had night not shut in and robbed the victor of half the fruits of conquest? The total demolition of the French left was effected by six o'clock, and why should the right attack have not been equally successful? Had such been the case, in what a hopeless situation the broken army must have found itself! The Tormes behind, and a reserve of three entire divisions, who during the contest had scarcely drawn a trigger, ready to assail in front—nothing could have averted total ruin—and to the French, Salamanca would have proved the bloodiest field on record. Even had the Castle of Alba

three-fourths of its base, and is cut off from the town, on the remaining portion, by a deep ditch and defences. The aqueduct, said to have been built by Trajan, is to be seen at different points between the town and Ildefonso, where the water is obtained; but the most remarkable feature of this structure is the portion in the suburb of the town, consisting of two rows of arches one above the other, nearly two hundred in number, the whole being formed of large blocks of stone, fitted into and supporting each other without cement, having thus withstood the ravages of time for eighteen centuries."—*Mackie.*

been defended, that darkness which permitted Clausel to retire his routed divisions, and carry off guns and trophies, whose loss was otherwise inevitable, would have but added to the confusion, and increased the difficulty of retreating in the presence of an unbroken army; and consequently, the ruin of the French must have been consummated before assistance could have reached them, and those arms effected a junction, by which they were enabled to outmarch their pursuers, preserve their communications, and fall back upon their reserves.

Still the moral results of the battle of Salamanca were manifold. That field removed for ever the delusory belief of French superiority; and the enemy fatally discovered that they must measure strength with opponents in every point their equals. The confidence of wavering allies was confirmed; while the evacuation of Madrid, the abandonment of the siege of Cadiz, the deliverance of Andalusia and Castile from military occupation, and the impossibility of reinforcing Napoleon during his northern campaign, by sparing troops from the corps in the Peninsula—all these important consequences arose from Marmont's defeat upon the Tormes.

If then, when but considered as a successful battle, Salamanca had such results, how much more was a victory to be prized, which, in its more expansive consequences, influenced the fate of Europe! It occurred at the most momentous crisis of the war—Napoleon, with a countless army, was across the Niemen—Russia was to be humiliated or saved—and the Continent, subjugated or delivered. Had Marmont been victorious on the Tormes, his success would have been hailed as the forerunner of Napoleon's. In Spain, the apathy which succeeds despair, would have checked as hopeless, all farther attempts at resistance. In Britain, party clamour, like smothered fire, would have broken out with redoubled violence; and when her exertions were most called for to liberate the Continent from its thraldom, the energies of England must have been paralyzed—

for what minister would dare to peril the resources of the country in a distant struggle, when her blood and treasure had been profusely lavished in the Peninsula, and produced nothing but disappointment and defeat? Now the political horizon had brightened. The victory at Salamanca—the fearless attitude of Russia—the growing disaffection of the Germanic confederacy—all foretold that French despotism was at its zenith, and that Napoleon's strides upon the ladder of ambition would be downward.

With ominous rapidity the tidings of Marmont's disaster traversed the continent, and reached the Emperor's head-quarters,* at a moment when a nation was arrayed in arms to repel his unjust aggressions, or perish in defence of their altars and their homes. And when the veil had been removed —when he saw that thunder-storm himself had raised was on the point of bursting—when, with him the Rubicon was crossed, and it was difficult to decide whether the danger was more imminent in advancing or retiring—then, the fatal announcement came that his eagles were lowered to the dust, and his brother a fugitive from his capital. Could this ill-timed disaster be palliated or denied? Impossible. Joseph's precipitous flight confirmed the heavy tidings: and the oft-repeated boast that the tri-coloured flag would permanently float from the towers of Lisbon was falsified; for the banner of England was waving above the walls of the Retiro.

* "Napoleon had notice of Marmont's defeat as early as the 2d of September, a week before the great battle of Borodino. The news was carried by Colonel Fabvier, who made the journey from Valladolid in one course, and having fought on the 22d of July at the Arapiles, was wounded on the heights of Moskowa the 7th of September!"—*Napier.*

CHAPTER II.

SAN ILDEFONSO—PASSAGE OF THE GUADARAMA—AFFAIR AT MAJALAHONDA —DESPATCH TO LORD BATHURST—CASUALTIES—ALLIES ENTER MADRID—THE RETIRO—IT IS ATTACKED, AND SURRENDERS—ORDNANCE AND STORES TAKEN—POSITION OF LORD WELLINGTON—ITS INSECURITY—ENTHUSIASM AND INCAPACITY OF THE SPANIARDS—LETTER TO HON. HENRY WELLESLEY—HILL'S OPERATIONS—DEFEAT OF BALLASTEROS—SOULT RETIRES FROM CADIZ —DIVERSION FAILS IN CATALONIA—CLAUSEL ASSUMES THE OFFENSIVE—FOY'S OPERATIONS—GUERILLAS BECOME FORMIDABLE—LORD WELLINGTON DETERMINES TO ADVANCE—HIS REASONS FOR ATTACKING CLAUSEL—MISCONDUCT OF THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENTS—AMERICAN WAR—HONOURS CONFERRED ON LORD WELLINGTON.

In the beautiful village of San Ildefonso*—which place the allies reached on the 8th—Lord Wellington rested his troops for a day, and allowed the right to close up, preparatory to entering the passes of the Guadarama. On the 10th, the entire army crossed the mountains unopposed—Joseph Buonaparte, after a reconnaisance with Marshal Jourdan,

* "San Ildefonso is a village fifty miles north of Madrid. Here is situated the palace of La Granja, a favourite summer residence of the royal family. The buildings and gardens, with the numerous *jets d'eau*, were formed after the model of the palace and gardens of Versailles, by the Bourbon dynasty on their accession to the throne of Spain. The palace is situate at the bottom of the Sierra Nevada, an attached ridge of the Guadarama, in a recess on the north side of the mountain, which rises to a considerable height, covered with trees to its summit, and to the east and west; thus sheltering it at all times from the scorching heats of summer. The front of the building looks to the gardens, which rise before it, till they terminate in the craggy, pine-covered summit, adding much to the picturesque beauty of this delightful residence. The whole presents a scene, certainly, much more calculated to remind the beholder of the verdure and freshness of a more northern clime, than of the burning fields and sultry suns of Spain."—*Mackie.*

having detached a strong force to escort his crowded court, which on that morning had abandoned the capital, forming a convoy of 3,000 carriages and 20,000 people. The advanced guard of the allies, consisting of D'Urban's Portuguese dragoons, on the 11th drove in the French outposts, forced back Trielhard's light cavalry, and occupied the village of Majalahonda; having immediately in their rear, Bock's heavy brigade and Macdonald's troop of horse artillery.

A very unfortunate affair occurred that evening. Nothing indicated that the position of the advanced guard was insecure, and the immediate proximity of the German Legion (heavy cavalry and light infantry) at Rosas, rendered the chance of an attack most improbable. Acting, however, on false information, and under the belief that the Portuguese cavalry were far in front of the army, and unsupported, Trielhard, reinforced by a body of lancers and Italian dragoons, made a sudden and impetuous attack on D'Urban's brigade, the result of which Lord Wellington thus details to Earl Bathurst:—

"The enemy's cavalry, which had been driven off in the morning, and had moved towards Navalcarnero, returned about five in the afternoon; and Brig.-General D'Urban having formed the Portuguese cavalry in front of Majalahonda, supported by the horse artillery, ordered the cavalry to charge the enemy's leading squadrons, which appeared too far advanced to be supported by their main body. The Portuguese cavalry advanced to the attack, but unfortunately turned about before they reached the enemy; and they fled through the village of Majalahonda, and back upon the German dragoons, leaving behind them unprotected and unsupported the guns of Captain M'Donald's troop, which had been moved forward to cooperate with the cavalry. By the activity of the officers and soldiers of Captain M'Donald's troop, the guns were, however, moved off: but owing to the unfavourable nature of the ground over which

they were moved, the carriage of one was broken, and two others were oyerturned, and these three guns fell into the enemy's hands.

"The Portuguese dragoons having fled through Majalahonda, were rallied and re-formed, when the heavy dragoons of the king's German legion, which were formed between that village and Las Rozas, and the German cavalry, charged the enemy, although under many disadvantages, and stopped their further progress; but I am sorry to say that they suffered considerable loss, and that Colonel de Jonquières, who commanded that brigade, was taken prisoner.

"The left of the army was about two miles and a half distant, at the Puente del Retamar, on the Guadarama river; and Colonel Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry and a brigade of infantry of the 7th division, having moved forward to the support of the troops in advance, the enemy retired upon Majalahonda as soon as they observed these troops; and night having come on they retired upon Alarcon, leaving our guns at Majalahonda."

In this unexpected and unfortunate affair, nearly two hundred men, and one hundred and twenty horses were placed *hors de combat;* and troops, who had hitherto behaved bravely in the field, deserted officers who set them a noble example, and occasioned a serious loss*

* Return of killed, wounded, and missing in the affair at Majalahonda, on the 11th of August, 1812.

	King's German Legion and Royal Horse Artillery.				Portuguese.			
	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.
Killed . .	1	1	18	12	3	—	30	11
Wounded	5	5	36	12	3	—	49	5
Missing .	1	—	20	44	1	1	21	37

to their gallant supporters. That a career of victory should be clouded by the cowardice of a portion of their allies, was a cause of deep annoyance to the British army in general. "It was one of the most disgraceful and unlooked-for events that had taken place during the campaign. To be beaten at any time was bad enough; but to be beaten by a handful of lancers on the eve of entering Madrid, and almost in view of the city, was worse than all!"*

On the same evening, the adherents of the pseudo king in the greatest confusion hurried from the capital; and on the morning of the 12th, the French garrison closed the gates of the Retiro. At noon, the advanced guards of the allies entered the city amid the acclamations of the populace; and never did a delivering army receive a more enthusiastic reception. On the 13th Don Carlos d'Espana was nominated governor of the province and capital, and a new constitution was proclaimed; and on that evening Lord Wellington reconnoitred the Retiro, and instantly completed its investment.

This royal residence, at once the pride and curse of Spain, like the monarchy itself, had fallen from its pristine grandeur. Built by a servile minister to amuse the fancy of an extravagant king, such enormous sums were exhausted on the palace and its gardens, that fresh imposts were found indispensable to complete them. An additional burden thus laid upon a people already heavily oppressed, produced a revolt in Catalonia, and eventually occasioned a separation between Portugal and Spain. Its own magnitude hastened its downfal, and the Retiro rapidly decayed. Whether from caprice, or that an enormous establishment must have been maintained to uphold the state, which this gorgeous palace and its magnificent domains required, the Spanish kings gradually deserted it; and after the accession of Charles III. the Retiro ceased to be a royal residence, and part of its buildings were converted into a manufactory of porcelain. "Its park, however, continued

* Grattan's Reminiscences.

to be a fashionable promenade, the more agreeable, because carriages were not allowed to enter; but the French had now made it a depôt for their artillery stores, the victims whom they arrested for political offences were confined there, and they had fortified it as a military post, but with less judgment than their engineers had displayed on any other occasion. The outer line was formed by the palace, the museum, and the park wall, with flèches thrown out in part to flank it; the second was a bastioned line of nine large fronts, but with no outworks except a ravelin and a lunette; the interior was an octagonal star fort, closely surrounding what had been the porcelain manufactory. The garrison was far too small for the outer enceintes, and Marshal Jourdan had therefore left written orders, that if they were seriously attacked, they should confine their defence to the star fort, which, however, itself would be rendered nearly indefensible if the manufactory were destroyed."*

If his own personal inspection had not satisfied Lord Wellington that the Retiro was incapable to hold out, the marshal's instructions to the governor would have betrayed the secret of its weakness. That night the enemy's posts were driven from the Prado and Botanical Garden by detachments from the third and seventh divisions. "Having broken through the wall in different places, the troops were established in the palace of the Retiro, and close to the exterior line of the enemy's works enclosing the building called La China. The troops were preparing in the morning to attack these works preparatory to the arrangements to be adopted for the attack of the interior line and building, when the governor sent out an officer to desire to capitulate."† Honourable terms being granted, the garrison formally surrendered; and at four the same evening, marched out by the Rodrigo road.

Exclusive of invalids and camp followers, 2,000 veteran soldiers were thus unnecessarily lost. Within the walls

* Southey. † Wellington's Despatch.

an immense collection of military stores were found, comprising 189 pieces of brass ordnance, 900 barrels of powder, 20,000 stand of arms, magazines of clothing, provisions and ammunition; and, what afterwards proved a most valuable acquisition, a quantity of cables and cordage. The eagles of the 13th and 51st regiments fell into the captor's hands; and these trophies were immediately transmitted to England, and presented by Major Burgh* to the Prince Regent.

The position of Lord Wellington might now have been considered as one of pride and promise. A succession of brilliant operations had ended with the possession of Madrid — an event in itself forming a brilliant epoch in Peninsular history. It told that Wellington held a position and possessed a power, that in England many doubted, and more denied; and those, whose evil auguries had predicted a retreat upon the shipping, and finally an abandonment of the country, were astounded to find the allied leader victorious in the centre of Seville, and dating his general orders from the palace of the Spanish kings. The desertion of his capital by the usurper, proclaimed the extent of Wellington's success; and proved that his victories were not, as had been falsely asserted at home, "conquests but in name."

And yet never had Lord Wellington's situation been more insecure than at this bright but deceptive era. At the opening of the campaign, the fertility of the country enabled his antagonist to command every necessary for his subsistence; for all that his army required was exacted with unscrupulous severity. The allied general had no such resources to rely upon. The British government would not, even in an enemy's territories, carry on war upon so inhuman and iniquitous a system; but it exposed its army to privations, and its general to perplexities and

* Then aide-de-camp to Lord Wellington, and afterwards Major-General Lord Downes, K.C.B.

difficulties, which might have paralyzed any weaker mind than Lord Wellington's, by the parsimony with which it apportioned his means. When he advanced from Salamanca, there were but 20,000 dollars in the military chest: the harvest was abundant, but how was bread to be obtained without money?—and the same want would be felt in bringing his supplies from Ciudad Rodrigo, and other places in the rear of that fortress; the very difficulty of removing his wounded to the frontier of Portugal being sufficient to deter him from seeking an action on the Douro.*

Wellington, however, seized and obtained the opportunity. He had fought and won a glorious battle; but how far his situation was relieved by a great victory, a brief extract from his correspondence with the British minister will best determine.

"I likewise request your lordship not to forget horses for the cavalry and the artillery, and money. *We are absolutely bankrupt.* The troops are now five months in arrears, instead of being one month in advance. The staff have not been paid since February; the muleteers not since June, 1811; and we are in debt in all parts of the country. I am obliged to take the money sent to me by my brother for the Spaniards, in order to give my own troops a fortnight's pay, who are really suffering for want of money."†

In the capital he found nothing but misery and want. The iron grasp of the usurper had wrung from a once proud city, not only the means by which an ally could be succoured, but those that were necessary for their own existence and support. But yet the wild enthusiasm that hailed him when he appeared might have intoxicated a weaker minded conqueror. The blessings of the people accompanied him wherever he went. The municipal authorities gave a bull-fight in his honour, and when he appeared in the royal box, the air rung with the repeated shouts of not less than 12,000

* Southey.

† Letter to Earl Bathurst, dated Almedo, 28th July, 1812.

spectators. "He could not walk abroad by daylight because of the pressure of the multitudes who gathered round him; even in the dark, when he went into the Prado, though he and his suite were dressed in blue great coats in hopes of escaping notice, they were generally recognised and followed by crowds, the women pressing to shake hands, and some even to embrace them."* But this was that hollow and idle exultation, which expends itself in noisy ebullitions, and leads to no important results—and the intuitive quickness of Lord Wellington saw how valueless were the professions of the Spaniards.

He says, writing to Lord Bathurst, "I do not expect much from their exertions, notwithstanding all we have done for them. They cry *Viva*, and are very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are in general the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have known: the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country."

Such was his just estimate of the Spaniards as a people; and of the manner in which the civil and military departments were conducted, he drew a melancholy picture.†

"I do not at all like the way in which we are going on, particularly in relation to appointments to offices and great situations, in which branch of the government alone it is, I am afraid, in the power of the existing regency to do much good.

"They have sent an inefficient person, —— —— to command in Estremadura, displacing Monsalud, with whom we have all hitherto gone on well.

"Another equally inefficient, and without character, General ——, has been sent to supersede Don Carlos in Old Castile; and I learn that they have appointed a

* Southey.

† Letter to the Right Honourable Henry Wellesley, dated Madrid, 23d August, 1812.

General —— to command in New Castile, in which situation is included that of Governor of Madrid, which is at present by far the most important post in the country, with duties to be performed which require activity and intelligence; and yet the person selected to fill this office is, I understand, *an idiot, of between seventy and eighty years of age.*

" I assure you that I do not at all like the way in which we are going on; and persons here are much dissatisfied with the neglect of them by the Government.

" A month has now elapsed since the battle of Salamanca, and I have not even heard of General Castaños.

" Excepting in this town, where there was no regular authority when I entered it, and when I forced them to proclaim the constitution, and proceed to the elections immediately, these ceremonies have been, as usual, unaccountably delayed; and at Valladolid, Santocildes contrived to delay them till the French came in, and there the constitution has never been proclaimed at all, and the town is still governed by the French authorities.

" I am afraid also that, owing to the usual delays, the French found there their artillery and stores, and, what is particularly to be lamented, their muskets, of which they were much in want, as, even of those who were not wounded in the battle, the greater number threw away their arms afterwards, or during the retreat.

" What can be done for this lost nation? As for raising men or supplies, or taking any one measure to enable them to carry on the war, that is out of the question. Indeed, there is nobody to excite them to exertion, or to take advantage of the enthusiasm of the people, or of their enmity against the French. Even the guerillas are getting quietly into the large towns, and amusing themselves, or collecting plunder of a better and more valuable description; and nobody looks forward to the exertions to be made, whether to improve or to secure our advantage.

" This is a faithful picture of the state of affairs; and

though I still hope to be able to maintain our position in Castile, and even to improve our advantages, I shudder when I reflect upon the enormity of the task which I have undertaken, with inadequate powers myself to do any thing, and without assistance of any kind from the Spaniards, or I may say, from any individual of the Spanish nation.

" I enclose the copy of a letter from Sir Howard Douglas of the 18th, and the copy of intelligence from Salamanca of the 20th, which will show you how Spanish military affairs are going on.

" I hope the French will carry off the garrisons of Zamora and Astorga, as well as that of Toro. Any thing is better than that I should have to attack and carry those places; but I am repairing my heavy train for that object, and my troops are in march in that direction; and I must go if the French should maintain their garrisons. But whether I go, or the French should withdraw these garrisons, what will the world say? What will the Spanish nation in particular say of the Spanish officers and army upon such occurrences as the failure to take such a place as Astorga, after nearly three months' siege, and of allowing the garrison of Zamora to be relieved and carried off by a defeated army? At the same time I am so well aware of the inefficiency of the Spanish officers and troops when alone, that I recommended the measures which will enable the enemy to relieve Zamora; that is, foreseeing that the French would endeavour to relieve or carry off the garrison of Astorgo as soon as they should hear that I had marched towards Madrid, I recommended that Santocildes should take care to be first upon the Esla; but if I had conceived 8,000 Spanish to be equal to 4,000 men of any other nation, I should have recommended him to maintain the blockade of Zamora, and to cover the siege of Astorga.

" Pray request General O'Donnell to peruse the account of the transactions at the head-quarters of the army of Gallicia, given by Sir Howard Douglas. Can any army carry on operations against the French under such circumstances?

I have a great regard for General ——; but I should like to know what military part he plays in this drama. If he is a commander in chief, why does he not put himself at the head of his troops? The army of Gallicia is the only one in Spain, and the 8,000 men under Santocildes the active part of that army. Why is not the commander in chief with that part? These are questions which must occur to every reflecting mind; but there is no inquiry in Spain on subjects of this description.

"I am apprehensive that all this will turn out but ill for the Spanish cause. If, for any cause, I should be overpowered, or should be obliged to retire, what will the world say? What will the people of England say? What will those in Spain say? That we had made a great effort, attended by some glorious circumstances; and that from January, 1812, we had gained more advantages for the cause, and had acquired more extent of territory by our operations than had ever been gained by any army in the same period of time, against so powerful an enemy; but that, being unaided by the Spanish officers and troops, not from disinclination, but from inability on account of the gross ignorance of the former, and the want of discipline of the latter, and from the inefficiency of all the persons selected by the Government for great employment, we were at last overpowered, and compelled to withdraw within our own frontier.

"What will be Lord Castlereagh's reply to the next proposition for peace? Not that we will not treat if the Government of Joseph is to be the guaranteed Government; but he will be too happy to avail himself of any opportunity of withdrawing with honour from a contest in which it will be manifest that, owing to the inability of those employed to carry it on on the part of the Spaniards, there is no prospect of military success. Thus this great cause will be lost, and this nation will be enslaved for the want of men at their head capable of conducting them.

"Pray represent these matters to the Government and

the leading men in the Cortes, and draw their attention seriously to the situation of their affairs."

To describe more particularly the situation in which Lord Wellington was placed, a brief sketch of the operations of his own detached corps under Sir Rowland Hill, and those of his allies and enemies generally, will be requisite.

For a time, Soult had been too much occupied with the siege of Cadiz and in watching the movements of Ballasteros, to allow him to make any serious effort against Hill. Drouet, who commanded the division opposed to Sir Rowland, had fallen back to Azuaga, when Hill had advanced to Zafra; both parties maintaining a threatening attitude, but both acting with a caution which prevented an action, for which both were prepared. One rash affair occurred:—with the Royals and Third dragoon guards, General Slade had advanced to Llera, to cover a reconnaissance of the Conde de Penne Villemur towards Azuaga, and having encountered two regiments of French cavalry (17th and 27th dragoons) under General Lallemand, he attacked them with more impetuosity than discretion. Following a successful charge too rashly, the English cavalry were charged in turn by a French reserve, and repulsed with loss. In consequence, they were not only deprived of the prisoners they had taken, but suffered severely in their retreat.*

The check maintained on Soult by the presence of the army under Ballasteros, had been previously removed. That

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the affair near Maguilla, on the 11th June, 1812.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	—	2	20	6	22
Wounded	—	—	26	14	26
Missing	2	10	106	127	118

incapable commander rashly attacked the corps of General Conroux in its position at Bornos, and sustained a signal defeat. Consequently, Soult was enabled to reinforce Drouet, and the latter obliged Hill to retire on Albuera. The junction of the Spanish and Portuguese corps raised the force of Sir Rowland to 23,000 men; and as he had full permission to fight a battle if he pleased, and as Drouet's force did not much exceed 20,000 effectives, an action was hourly expected. The French general, however, halted at Almendralijos—and soon afterwards retired again; when Hill once more advanced to Zafra, placing a stroug division at Merida in readiness to pass the Tagus. No operation of any consequence succeeded. A cavalry affair took place on the 24th of July, which terminated favourably for the British; and, with a few movements which led to no particular results, matters remained quiet on the Tagus.

The battle of Salamanca, however, changed the aspect of affairs in the southern provinces; and after Marmont's defeat, Lord Wellington turned his attention to Soult. Orders were despatched directing Hill to attack Drouet, while General Cook should raise the siege of Cadiz, by storming the French works before the Isla. Soult anticipated these movements, by retiring from Cadiz after destroying the greater portion of his ordnance and stores—while Drouet was ordered to abandon Estremadura entirely, and march on Granada, to unite his corps to that under the Duke of Dalmatia.

Soult, having left a rear guard in Seville, quitted that city on the evening of the 26th; and, favoured by an insurrection of the inhabitants, a mixed force, Spanish and British, despatched from Cadiz to effect a diversion, suddenly entered the town next morning, making two hundred of the French garrison prisoners. A division of Soult's army, in its retreat to Granada, appeared before Seville the same evening; but, deceived by a report that Hill was already in the city, they retired hastily by their right upon Carmona, and reached Granada, with Ballasteros hanging on

their flank—that general's movements, as usual, producing no consequences beyond alarm.

The diversion expected from a descent on the coast of Catalonia, proved a failure. Sicily had absorbed a large force; and in watching the petty intrigues of a paltry kingdom, troops had been uselessly engaged, who elsewhere would have proved invaluable. An idle attempt on Italy had been designed, but fortunately it was abandoned. The east of Spain was, too late, selected for the scene of a diversion: and when the Catalans had been severely defeated, General Maitland appeared upon the coast. But the moment for action had passed. In an interview with Eroles, Maitland found that nothing in Catalonia could be effected; and that the best service he could achieve, would be to save Alicante, which the defeat of a Spanish army had endangered. O'Donnel had attacked Suchet's vanguard under Harispe; "but as usual, when Spaniards were brought forward in regular war, against well-disciplined and well-commanded troops, some of the officers either misunderstood their orders or executed them ill, and some of the men losing courage as soon as they lost hope, threw into confusion those who were braver than themselves; their loss amounted to 4,000 men, being little less than the whole number which they attacked, and they left more than 10,000 muskets in their flight."

In the mean time, Clausel, with a well-appointed force of 23,000 men, moved rapidly down the banks of the Pisuerga; Anson's brigade falling back by Tudela, and Santocildes retiring to Torrelobaton. On the 18th the French had reached Valladolid; and Foy, with a strong corps, was detached to bring off their blockaded garrisons. Those at Toro and Zamora were recovered; but Astorga, with 1,200 men to defend it, surrendered at the very moment when the besiegers were preparing to retire. Guadalaxara also fell to the Empecinado, increasing the number of French prisoners by 900. And in Guipuscoa and in Biscay, the presence of an English squadron had

encouraged the Partidas to become so formidable, that every place upon the coast was abandoned by Caffarelli, excepting the fortresses of Gueteria and Santona.

Aware that Joseph had effected a junction with Suchet, and that if Soult and Drouet, who were moving in the direction of Valencia, would unite their forces with the king's, more than 60,000 men would be collected in that quarter and be immediately disposable, Lord Wellington determined to anticipate their operations, by attacking Clausel upon the Duero. Hill was accordingly ordered to cross the Tagus, and march on Toledo by the bridge at Almaraz, the repairs of whose broken arch had been most ingeniously effected by Colonel Sturgeon, with the cordage and hawsers captured in the Retiro. The Murcian army were directed to move in the same direction, while Ballasteros should observe the mountain fortress of Chincilla, and the Partidas occupy La Mancha. Round Madrid, three British divisions, two cavalry brigades, and the corps of Carlos d'España were cantoned; and with the remainder of the allied army, forming an effective force of 60,000 men, Lord Wellington determined to attempt the reduction of the castle of Burgos.

Indeed, this was the only point on which the allied general could safely operate. To have moved into Valencia, would be to give up his communications with Portugal, and seek the united corps of Soult, Suchet, and the King, with a mixed army already weakened by sickness, which hot weather and long marches must every day increase. For such an undertaking he was deficient in men, and far more deficient in money. From home a reinforcement of the one, and a supply of the other were promised, and on these assurances he might depend—but from the allies there was little to be expected.* Instead of, by a vigorous application

* No pecuniary resources were to be found in Madrid. The inhabitants fed the garrison—and the produce of the sequestered and crown lands was readily given up to the allies, on promise of future payment; but when money was required for the military chest, a few thousand dollars were all that could be procured upon the most unquestionable security.

of the energies of the people and the resources of the state, to second the mighty efforts made, and making by Great Britain, the Cortes wasted day after day in the most ridiculous discussions — one hour inventing new constitutions, and the next determining the precedency of a saint;* and in the fifth year of the war, the Spaniards were precisely what Sir John Moore had described them in the first, "without an army, without a government, and without a general."

To other and serious annoyances, at this important crisis of the war, Lord Wellington was also exposed. The Portuguese government had an old claim upon that of Spain; and instead of providing funds for the maintenance of their own troops, they made an arrangement by which this unsettled account should be discharged. The Spaniards

* Would it be credited, that the Cortes, at such a momentous crisis, wasted its time in such nonsensical considerations as the following?

"A subject not less characteristic than curious had been brought before the Government. The barefooted Carmelites in Cadiz presented a memorial, stating that Philip III. and the Cortes of 1617, had chosen St. Teresa for patroness and advocate of Spain, *under the Apostle Santiago*, that the nation in all its emergencies might invoke her, and avail itself of her intercession. At that time the saint had only been beatified; but her canonization shortly afterwards took place, and then the Cortes of 1626 publsihed the decree, which was confirmed by Pope Urban VIII. *without prejudice to the rights of Santiago, St. Michael the Archangel, and the most Holy Virgin.* Jealous, nevertheless, of the imprescriptible rights of their own saint, the chapter of Compostella exerted their influence at Rome with such success, that the decree was suspended against the wishes both of the King and Cortes. That wish, however, continued in the royal family; and Charles II. in a codicil to his will, declaring that he had always desired to establish the co-patronship of St. Teresa for the benefit of his kingdom, charged his successors to effect it. The Carmelites now urged that at no time could it more properly be effected than at the present, when her potent patronage was needed against invaders, who sowed the seeds of impiety wherever they carried their arms. This memorial was referred to a special ecclesiastical commission; and in conformity to the opinion of that commission, the Cortes elected St. Teresa patroness and protectress, *under Santiago*, of those kingdoms; decreed that her patronship should forthwith take effect; enjoined all archbishops, bishops, and prelates, to see that the correspondent alterations should be made in the ritual for the saint's day; and required *the regency to give orders for printing, publishing, and circulating this decree!*"

were to support the Portuguese troops; and when their own armies were half-starved, they undertook to feed another! This flimsy effort of the regency to turn the burden of the war upon any shoulders but their own, was too gross to escape discovery — and Wellington, with his customary decision, ordered their subsidies to be withheld. The regency violently resented the act that their own trickery had provoked; and at the very moment when its services were most required, it was doubtful whether the Portuguese army would not have been actually disbanded for want of food or pay, and that entirely through the misconduct of those who should have sacrificed everything for its maintenance. With America, long and angry discussions on maritime rights ended as had been foreseen. War was declared; and, like family quarrels, the contest promised to be virulent. On the struggle in the Peninsula, this unhappy difference between the mother country and her former colonists, would have a serious effect—for the transport of supplies from England would be endangered, as in a short time, every sea would swarm with American cruisers.

Could honours have compensated for annoyances, the allied general would have had no reason to complain.* One wise proceeding emanated from the Cortes—for Lord Wellington was declared generalissimo of the Spanish armies, and the regency conferred upon him the order of the golden fleece—the collar of that order which had belonged to the Infante being presented to him by the daughter of Don Luiz, D. Maria Teresa de Bourbon. From his own prince, the conqueror of Madrid obtained a high mark of approbation—and his arms received a royal augmentation, namely, "in the dexter quarter, an escocheon, charged with

* During that year (1812) he had been created Duque de Ciudad Rodrigo, and advanced in the British Peerage, by the title of Earl of Wellington—the Parliament having added their thanks, and voted £2,000 per annum, for the support of the dignity conferred. To these honours, the Prince Regent of Portugal annexed that of Marquez of Torres Vedras—and subsequently, the higher, and it would appear, prophetic title, of Duque da Victoria.

the crosses of St. George, St. Andrew, and St. Patrick, *being the Union badge of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland*, as a lasting memorial of the glorious and transcendent achievements of the said Arthur Marquis of Wellington, on various important occasions, but more particularly in the recent brilliant and decisive victory obtained over the French army by the troops under his command, near Salamanca, on the 22d day of July last; such royal augmentation being first duly exemplified according to the laws of arms, and recorded in the Herald's College."

CHAPTER III.

LORD WELLINGTON ADVANCES FROM MADRID—PROCLAMATION TO THE SPANIARDS—LINE OF MARCH—CLAUSEL'S ABLE RETREAT—FRENCH FALL BACK TO BRIVIESCA—ALLIES ENTER BURGOS—CASTLE AND ITS DEFENCES—DIFFICULTY IN INVESTING IT—HORN-WORK ON ST. MICHAEL CARRIED BY STORM—FAILURE OF THE ASSAULT UPON THE CASTLE—FARTHER OPERATIONS—A BREACH MADE, AND STORMED WITHOUT SUCCESS—EFFECT UPON THE TROOPS—OPERATIONS CONTINUED—FOURTH ASSAULT SUCCEEDS—FRENCH SORTIES OCCASION A SERIOUS LOSS TO THE BESIEGERS—FINAL OPERATIONS—ASSAULT ON THE INNER LINES REPULSED—LORD WELLINGTON RAISES THE SIEGE—CAUSES OF ITS FAILURE—CANDOUR OF LORD WELLINGTON—LETTER TO LORD LIVERPOOL.

WHEN intelligence reached Lord Wellington that Clausel had come down the valley of the Pisuerga,—the first, fifth, and seventh British divisions, two Portuguese brigades (Pack's and Bradford's), the German heavy cavalry, and Anson's light brigade, were directed by rapid marches on Arevalo; and, on the 1st of September, he left the capital, and assumed the command. On the 6th, the allied army forded the Duero, and reached Valladolid on the 7th; Clausel having abandoned that city on the preceding evening. Hoping that Castaños would join him as he had promised, Lord Wellington halted during the 8th, while the French leisurely fell back through the valleys of Pisuerga and Arlanzon.

Immediately before he quitted Madrid, Lord Wellington, anxious to rouse the feelings of the Spanish people to a sense of their interests and duties, wrote the following address, which he caused to be extensively circulated.

PROCLAMATION.

"*Madrid, 29th August*, 1812.

"SPANIARDS!

"It is unnecessary to take up your time by recalling to your recollection the events of the last two months, or by drawing your attention to the situation in which your enemies now find themselves.

"Listen to the accounts of the numerous prisoners daily brought in, and deserters from their army; hear the details of the miseries endured by those who, trusting to the promises of the French, have followed the vagabond fortunes of the Usurper, driven from the capital of your monarchy; hear these details from their servants and followers who have had the sense to quit the scene of desolation, and if the sufferings of your oppressors can soften the feeling of those inflicted upon yourselves, you will find ample cause for consolation.

"But much remains still to be done to consolidate and secure the advantages acquired. It should be clearly understood that the pretended King is an usurper, whose authority it is the duty of every Spaniard to resist; that every Frenchman is an enemy, against whom it is the duty of every Spaniard to raise his arm.

"Spaniards! you are reminded that your enemies cannot much longer resist; that they must quit your country if you will only omit to supply their demands for provisions and money, when those demands are not enforced by superior force. Let every individual consider it his duty to do everything in his power to give no assistance to the enemy of his country, and that perfidious enemy must soon entirely abandon in disgrace a country which he entered only for the sake of plunder, and in which he has been enabled to remain only because the inhabitants have submitted to his mandates, and have supplied his wants.

"Spaniards! resist this odious tyranny, and be independent and happy.

"WELLINGTON."

The line of march by which Clausel retreated, and Lord Wellington advanced, was equally picturesque and fruitful. In patriarchal wealth, no valleys on the Peninsula were richer; for everywhere an abundance of corn, wine, and oil was found. To an advancing army these supplies were most valuable; and to a retreating one, this route gave great facilities of defence. The enclosures, so frequent in a highly cultivated district, presented continued obstacles to the march of the allies: while numerous ridges crossed the valleys, and with their flanks appuyed upon the mountains which rose boldly on either side, afforded at every mile a position that could be vigorously defended. Of these local advantages Clausel availed himself, "and baffled his great adversary in the most surprising manner. Each day he offered battle, but on ground which Wellington was unwilling to assail in front, partly because he momentarily expected the Gallicians up, but chiefly because of the declining state of his own army from sickness, which, combined with the hope of ulterior operations in the south, made him unwilling to lose men. By flank movements he dislodged the enemy; yet each day darkness fell ere they were completed, and the morning's sun always saw Clausel again in position. At Cigales and Dueñas, in the Pisuerga valley; at Magoz, Torquemada, Cordobilla, Revilla, Vallejera, and Pampliega in the valley of the Arlanzon; the French general thus offered battle, and finally covered Burgos on the 16th, by taking the strong position of Cellada del Camino."*

At last, however, his tardy ally came up, and on the 17th the Spanish corps of 12,000 men joined Lord Wellington. To force on a battle was now the great object of the English general; but Clausel, observing that his opponent had been largely reinforced, with excellent discretion declined an action, and retreated to Frandovinez. On the following night he retired through the town of Burgos, having been joined by Caffarelli, who had completed the necessary

* Napier.

SKETCH

of the

CASTLE of BURGOS,

between the 19th Sept. & 21st Oct.

1812.

preparations for defending the castle. Both generals fell back to Briviesca, where a reserve, organized specially by Napoleon, and intended to remedy any disaster which might befal the army of Portugal, united itself with the French corps.

When the advanced guards of the allies entered Burgos,* the city was in the greatest confusion. The French had fired some houses, which would have covered the approaches of a besieging army; and the Partidas, intent only on plunder, were marauding in all directions. Fortunately the flames were arrested, and the guerillas restrained by the exertions and influence of Carlos d'España; and, by the arrival of Lord Wellington, order was completely restored.

On the 19th of September the castle was regularly invested, and the duties of the siege entrusted to the first and sixth divisions, with the brigades of Pack and Bradford. On being closely reconnoitred, the defences were found to occupy an oblong, conical hill, and to be of a triple nature nearly all round. The lower or outer line consisted of the old escarp wall of the town or castle, modernized with a shot-proof parapet, and flanks ingeniously procured by means of palisades, or tambours, at the salient† and

* "The name of Burgos is derived from an old Burgundian word, meaning a fortress. The castle was built upon a hill which commands the rich plain watered by the rivers Arlanzon, Vena, and Cardenuela; in former times it was of great strength and beauty, cresting the summit of the hill, and towering above the houses, which in those times covered the slope; but when the succession to the throne of Castile was disputed by Affonso V. of Portugal, against Ferdinand and Isabella, in right of his wife Juana, the castle took part with that injured and most unfortunate princess, and firing upon the city, destroyed the best street, which was upon the descent: after this, the lower ground was built upon, and the castle was left standing alone upon the heights. During the sixteenth century, Burgos was the mart through which the whole interior trade with the ports in the Bay of Biscay was carried on, and from whence the Segovian cloth was sent to all parts of Europe. Its population was then from 35,000 to 40,000, exclusive of foreigners, who were many in number; it had been reduced to 8,000 or 9,000, the place having declined after the seat of government was fixed at Madrid."—*Southey.*

† In fortification, the *salient* angle is that which turns from the centre of a place; while the *re-entering*, points directly towards it.

re-entering points. The second line was of the nature and profile of a field retrenchment, and well palisaded. The third, or upper line, was nearly of a similar construction to the second; and on the most elevated point of the cone, the primitive keep had been formed into an interior retrenchment, with a modern heavy casemated battery, named after Napoleon.

The situation of this fortified post was very commanding, except on the side of the hill of St. Michael, the summit of which, at less than three hundred yards distance, is nearly on the same level with the upper works of the castle, but separated from them by a deep ravine. This height was occupied by a hornwork* of large dimensions; the front scarp of which, hard and slippery, twenty-five feet in height, stood at an angle of about sixty degrees, and was covered by a counterscarp ten feet in depth. The branches were not perfect, and the rear had been temporarily closed, on intelligence of the fall of Madrid, by an exceedingly strong palisading. No part of the front or branches was palisaded or fraised.

The whole of the interior of the hornwork was under fire of the battery Napoleon, and its branches were well flanked from the works of the castle.

Such was the general outline of the place; and to General Dubreton, with a picked garrison of 2,500 men, the defence of it was confided. The castle was amply provisioned; nine heavy guns, eleven field pieces, and six howitzers and mortars, were already mounted on the works; and as the depôt for the army of Portugal had been established within the walls, the French commander had an abundant supply of stores and artillery, and was thus enabled to increase his means of offence to any extent that he pleased, while in guns and amunition the besieging army were so miserably

* *A horn-work*, is a work having a front and two branches. The front comprises a curtain and two half bastions. It is smaller than a *crown-work*, and generally employed for effecting similar purposes.

deficient,* that from the very day of the investment, Lord Wellington expressed strong doubts that he should not succeed in his operations.

Considerable difficulty occurred in bringing the troops over the Arlanzon without loss, as every bridge and ford were exposed to the fire of the castle. The guards, however, passed the river above the town; and on the morning of the 19th the French were driven from three fleches which they were constructing, and the allied posts established on the different points of the hill, where any cover was found to protect them from the fire of the enemy.

The hill of St. Michael had been selected as the best point from which the French defences could be battered. And that night it was determined by Lord Wellington, that the horn-work should be stormed. "The arrangements for the attack were, that two parties to storm should march, one upon each salient angle of the demi-bastions, and enter the ditch at points where the counterscarp was still unfinished. At the same time that these parties should advance, a firing party of 150 men to march direct on the front of the work, halt at the edge of the ditch, and keep up a brisk fire on the garrison defending the parapets: under protection of this fire, the storming parties in the ditch to raise the ladders against the faces of the demi-bastions, and escalade them. A third storming party, under Major the Honourable Edward Cocks, 79th regiment, to be formed behind the fleche, to march round the rear of the work, and endeavour to force in at the gorge."†

* The park near Villa Toro contained, besides 1,200 engineering tools—

18-pounder guns	3
24-pounder iron howitzers	5
24-pounder round shot	900
24-pounder common shells	208
24-pounder spherical case	236
18-pounder round shot	1306
Ditto spherical case	100

† Journal of the Sieges.

Although the attack was irregularly executed, gallantry succeeded, and the horn-work was carried by its gorge; but the failure of the front attack occasioned a heavy loss—and the casualties on the part of the assailants were unusually numerous,* while those of the defenders were returned at but 143.

Until the night of the 22d, the operations of the siege were vigorously continued; the garrison maintaining a heavy fire of shot and shells upon the working parties. Anxious, therefore, to abridge the attack, Lord Wellington decided on carrying the exterior defences of the castle by escalade, and then form a lodgment on the wall; and that night the assault was given. Major Laurie of the 79th, with detachments from the different regiments before the place, formed the storming party. The Portuguese, who led the attack, were quickly repulsed; and though the British entered the ditch, they never could mount a ladder. Those who attempted it were bayoneted from above, while shells, combustibles, and cold shot were hurled on the assailants, who, after a most determined effort for a quarter of an hour, were driven from the ditch, leaving their leader, and half the number who composed the storming party, killed and wounded.†

After this discouraging failure an attempt was made to breach the walls; but the more commanding fire of the

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the assault and capture of the Fort of San Miguel, on the 19th September, 1812.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	6	5	60	—	71
Wounded	15	21	297	—	333
Missing	—	—	16	—	16

† Victories of the British Armies.

castle disabled the few guns placed by the engineers in battery; and nothing remained but to resort to the slower but more certain method by sap and mine.*

The former was, however, of necessity abandoned. The sap when pushed close to the walls was open to a plunging fire—while shells were rolled down the bank, and heavy discharges of musketry kept up from the parapet. In carrying the approaches down the hill, the workmen were exposed to the whole artillery of the place; and the only wonder was, that men could be induced to labour steadily under this terrible cannonade. "Showers of grape shot fell without intermission round the spot, causing an incessant whizzing and rattling amongst the stones, and appeared at the moment to be carrying destruction through the ranks; but, except the necessity of instantly carrying off the wounded, on account of their sufferings, it caused little interruption to the workmen. It was remarked here, as it had been on former occasions, that a wound from a grape shot is less quietly borne than a wound from a round shot or musketry. The latter is seldom known in the night, except from the falling of the individual; whereas the former, not unfrequently, draws forth loud lamentations."†

A gallery was now driven to the base of the escarp—the parapet of the communication between the upper and lower trenches being completed; and a chamber of five feet

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the siege of the castle of Burgos, from the 20th to the 26th September, 1812, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	7	2	50	—	59
Wounded . . .	12	13	264	—	289
Missing	—	—	—	—	—

† Journal of the Sieges.

charged with 1,100 pounds of gunpowder, and the gallery tamped with sand-bags. At midnight, 300 men were paraded in the lower trenches—the hose was fired—the wall came down, and a sergeant and four privates, who formed the forlorn hope, rushed through the smoke, mounted the ruins, and bravely gained the breach. But in the darkness, which was intense, the storming party and their supporting companies, missed their way—and the French, recovering from their surprise, rushed to the breach, and drove the few brave men who held it back to the trenches. The attack, consequently, failed; and from a scarcity of shot no fire could be turned on the ruins. Dubreton availed himself of this accidental advantage—and by daylight, the breach was rendered impracticable again.

This last failure produced a despondency generally among the troops, and more especially among the Portuguese. They had been working for twelve days, exposed to a close and well-directed fire from the artillery of the castle, without a useful shot having been fired from their own batteries in their support. As the spirits of the troops sank, discipline proportionately relaxed, and neither officers nor men performed their duty in the trenches with the zeal and alacrity which they had previously exhibited. In a letter to Marshal Beresford, Lord Wellington remarks, "Something or other has made a terrible alteration in the troops for the worse. They have lately, in several instances, behaved very ill; and whether it be owing to the nature of the service, or their want of pay, I cannot tell; but they are not at all in the style they were. I am rather inclined to attribute their misbehaviour to the misery and consequent indifference of both officers and soldiers, on account of their want of pay."*

Still, however, although as the siege progressed his chances of reducing the place became less promising, the allied general determined to continue his operations. Another mine was driven forward, and a new breaching battery

* Wellington Despatches.

erected—and although every day brought with it a serious loss, on the 4th of October, two eighteen-pounders and three howitzers were placed in battery on the hill of St. Michael; and their fire was so well directed and maintained, that at four o'clock in the afternoon, the old breach was completely exposed, and the mine loaded, tamped, and made ready for explosion.

The fourth assault met the success that it so well deserved. The mine was sprung at five o'clock, and its effect was ruinous; the wall came down in masses—the explosion shattering the masonry for nearly one hundred feet, and blowing up many of the garrison. "The assault was conducted with the greatest regularity and spirit. In an instant the advanced party were on the ruins; and, before the dust created by the explosion had subsided, were in contact with the defenders on the summit of the breach. The party to assault the breach were equally regular and equally successful; and, after a struggle of a few minutes, the garrison were driven into their new covered-way, and behind their palisades." *

The casualties were not great; but the preceding operations had added heavily to the returns.†

Lodgements were formed in front of the old and new breaches, but the darkness of the night, and the confusion into which the stormers and workmen had been thrown, rendered both imperfect, and consequently insecure. The

* Journal of the Sieges.

† Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K. B., in the siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 27th September to the 5th October, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	—	5	71	—	76
Wounded	11	10	302	—	323
Missing	—	—	4	—	4

following evening the French sallied—overturned the gabions, and inflicted a loss of nearly 150 men. This damage was repaired the next night; and, as a supply of ammunition had reached the park, and convoys were on their way from Ciudad Rodrigo and by Corunna, the drooping spirits of the besiegers were revived. According to rule, Lord Wellington's time and means were far too limited to allow him to calculate with any certainty upon the fall of Burgos; but from other circumstances it was still possible that its reduction might be effected.*

A second sally, on the night of the 7th, was even more disastrous than the former one. The works were greatly injured, the entrenching tools carried off, and 200 men killed and wounded. The sortie was bravely repelled—but the gallant officer by whom the horn-work of St. Michael had been carried,† fell in this unfortunate *mêlée.*‡

The remainder of the siege may be compressed into general occurrences. Lord Wellington, from the enormous expenditure of musket cartridges, which his weakness in artillery had rendered unavoidable, felt it necessary to

* "I am apprehensive that the means which I have are not sufficient to enable me to take the castle. I am informed, however, that the enemy are ill provided with water; and that their magazines of provisions are in a place exposed to be set on fire. I think it possible, therefore, that I may have it in my power to force them to surrender, although I may not be able to lay the place open to assault."—*Letter to Earl Bathurst: Villa Toro, 21st Sept.* 1812.

† Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Edward Cocks.

‡ Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the siege of the Castle of Burgos, from the 6th to the 10th October, 1812, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	7	4	116	—	127
Wounded	16	8	268	—	292
Missing	—	—	18	—	18

change his system of attack; and while the white church was assailed with hot shot, a gallery was commenced against that of San Roman. The former operation failed—the latter, however, was continued with better success.

The old breach in the second line was cleared again by the fire from the horn-work. A new one, on the 18th, was declared practicable; and Lord Wellington determined to storm them both, while a strong detachment was to escalade the front of the works, and thus connect the attacks upon the breaches.

At half-past four in the evening, a flag was displayed on a hill west of the castle, as a signal that the mine was sprung. The troops instantly rushed to the breaches—and both were carried most gallantly. The guards escaladed the second line; and some of the German legion actually gained the third. But the supports did not come up as promptly as they should; and the French governor, with a powerful reserve, rushed from the upper ground, drove the assailants beyond the outer line, and cleared the breaches. No troops could have fought more gallantly than the storming parties; but numbers prevailed over valour, and the attack consequently failed. The allied loss on this unfortunate occasion was severe.

The explosion of the mines had destroyed the greater part of the church of San Roman, and the assailants effected a lodgement among the ruins;—but the following night the enemy sallied, drove out the picket, and for a short time obtained possession of the building.

The ruins were once more cleared of the enemy, and a gallery commenced from the church against the second line—but the siege was virtually at an end. The troops had been gradually drawn to the front, in consequence of threatening movements of the French army,—and on the 20th, Lord Wellington gave the command of the investing force to Major-General Pack, and joined the divisions which hitherto had covered the operations against the castle. On the evening of the 21st an official order was

given to raise the siege. And thus a general of consummate abilities, and a victorious army, were obliged to retire unsuccessfully from before a third-rate fortress, "strong in nothing but the skill and bravery of the governor and his gallant soldiers," after—the casualties which occurred between the 18th and 21st being included *—sustaining a total loss of 509 officers and men killed, and 1,505 wounded or missing; a loss in numbers nearly equalling the garrison of the place.

The failure of Lord Wellington's attack on Burgos occasioned a powerful sensation in England when the news arrived that the siege had been abandoned, and the allied army was in full retreat. The operations to reduce the castle were then freely canvassed, and many were found who pronounced the method of attack defective. Professional men, however, will find but little difficulty in determining the true causes of the failure. It was solely attributable to the deficiency of Lord Wellington's means; for the best authorities have agreed that the siege arrangements were ably planned. There were some officers who thought those means not judiciously applied. "Other modes and other points of attack were suggested, and even submitted to Lord Wellington; but they were all found to be the visionary schemes of men unacquainted with the details—beautiful as a whole, but falling to pieces on the slightest touch. His lordship condescended to receive the projects offered, analysed them, saw their fallacy, and rejected them." †

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	4	3	89	—	96
Wounded	10	4	160	—	174
Missing	—	—	4	—	4

† Journal of the Sieges.

The reduction of a place like Burgos, when the strength of the French force immediately in its vicinity is considered, was never undertaken by a feebler army, with little but its own daring to depend on.* The allies had no experience in this department of the art of war, save what they had been taught upon the Peninsula; and none of the divisions before Burgos had been present when the border fortresses were reduced.

Military success is generally obtained by a skilful application of means adequate to the object; but how frequently has accident compensated for deficiency of power, and given to daring deeds a fortunate termination! The casual direction of a shell, or the explosion of a fire-work, has produced the fall of a city, on which science in vain would have exhausted her resources. At Burgos, fortune seemed to frown upon the allies; their most hopeful plans were marred by casualties that none could have foreseen; and storm and rain added to difficulties, which nothing but untiring labour and an enormous sacrifice of life would have succeeded in surmounting.

One striking trait in the character of the Duke of Wellington is the fearless candour with which, when necessary, he imputes error to others, or assumes it himself, and sometimes under circumstances which would warrant none other to be the accuser. At the end of the campaign, in a letter addressed to Lord Liverpool,† while he exonerates the government from all blame connected with his failure

* "In all the former sieges, almost every misfortune during their progress has been readily traced, next to the smallness of the means with which they were undertaken, to the defective state of the siege establishments of the army, which were seldom equal to draw the full benefit from even the small supplies that were brought up. But on this occasion even such as those did not exist: there was not the semblance of an establishment of that nature; not even a half-instructed miner, or half-instructed sapper—barely an artificer—hence the deviations from the original project, and the delay in the execution of such parts of it as were followed, which, combined with accident, served to render the project unavailing."—*Journal of the Sieges.*

† Dated Ciudad Rodrigo, 23d November, 1812.

at Burgos, he states the real causes which prevented his operations from succeeding, and enabled that fortress to hold out.

"From what I see in the newspapers I am much afraid that the public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, notwithstanding that it is in fact the most successful campaign in all its circumstances, and has produced for the cause more important results than any campaign in which a British army has been engaged for the last century. We have taken by siege Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, and Salamanca; and the Retiro surrendered. In the mean time the allies have taken Astorga, Guadalaxara, and Consuegra, besides other places taken by Duran and Sir H. Popham. In the months elapsed since January this army has sent to England little short of 20,000 prisoners, and they have taken and destroyed or have themselves the use of the enemy's arsenals in Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Valladolid, Madrid, Astorga, Seville, the lines before Cadiz, &c.; and upon the whole we have taken and destroyed, or we now possess, little short of 3,000 pieces of cannon. The siege of Cadiz has been raised, and all the countries south of the Tagus have been cleared of the enemy.

"We should have retained still greater advantages I think, and should have remained in possession of Castile and Madrid during the winter, if I could have taken Burgos, as I ought early in October, or if Ballesteros had moved upon Alcaraz as he was ordered, instead of intriguing for his own aggrandizement.

"The fault of which I was guilty in the expedition to Burgos was, not that I undertook the operation with inadequate means, but that I took there the most inexperienced instead of the best troops. I left at Madrid the 3d, 4th, and light divisions, who had been with myself always before; and I brought with me that were good the 1st division, and they were inexperienced. In fact the troops ought to have carried the exterior line by escalade on the

first trial on the 22d of September, and if they had we had means sufficient to take the place. They did not take the line, because the field officer who commanded did that which is too common in our army. He paid no attention to his orders, notwithstanding the pains I took in writing them, and in reading and explaining them to him twice over. He made none of the dispositions ordered; and instead of regulating the attack as he ought, he rushed on as if he had been the leader of a forlorn hope, and fell, together with many of those who went with him. He had my instructions in his pocket; and as the French got possession of his body, and were made acquainted with the plan, the attack could never be repeated. When he fell, nobody having received orders what to do, nobody could give any to the troops. I was in the trenches, however, and ordered them to withdraw. Our time and ammunition were then expended, and our guns destroyed in taking this line; than which at former sieges we had taken many stronger by assault.

"I see that a disposition already exists to blame the government for the failure of the siege of Burgos. The government had nothing to say to the siege. It was entirely my own act. In regard to means, there were ample means both at Madrid and at Santander for the siege of the strongest fortress. That which was wanting at both places was means of transporting ordnance and military stores to the place were it was desirable to use them.

"The people of England, so happy as they are in every respect, so rich in resources of every description, having the use of such excellent roads, &c., will not readily believe that important results here frequently depend upon fifty or sixty mules, more or less, or a few bundles of straw to feed them; but the fact is so, notwithstanding their incredulity. I could not find means of moving even one gun from Madrid. ——— is a gentleman who piques himself upon his overcoming all difficulties. He knows the length of time it took to find transport even for about one hundred barrels

of powder and a few hundred thousand rounds of musket ammunition which he sent us. As for the two guns which he endeavoured to send, I was obliged to send our own cattle to draw them; and we felt great inconvenience from the want of those cattle in the subsequent movements of the army."

CHAPTER IV.

MASSENA APPOINTED TO THE COMMAND IN THE NORTH—HE RESIGNS IN FAVOUR OF SOUHAM—THAT GENERAL DETERMINES TO RELIEVE BURGOS—LORD WELLINGTON'S DESPATCH—GREAT INFERIORITY OF THE ALLIES DETERMINES LORD WELLINGTON TO DECLINE A BATTLE AND RETIRE—ROUTES OPEN FOR A RETREAT—BOLD AND SUCCESSFUL OPERATION—ALLIES CROSS THE PISUERGA—DETAIL OF THE OPERATIONS—HALT UPON THE CARRION—LORD WELLINGTON DECIDES UPON ATTACKING THE ARMIES OF THE SOUTH AND CENTRE—DARING EXPLOIT—LORD WELLINGTON TAKES A POSITION AT RUEDA—ALLIED CASUALTIES—HILL QUITS THE CAPITAL AND RETREATS ON ALBA DE TORMES, AND WELLINGTON ON SAN CHRISTOVAL—ALLIED POSITION—ADVANCE OF THE FRENCH ARMIES—DESPATCH TO LORD BATHURST—CHARACTER OF THE RETREAT—ANECDOTES.

When Lord Wellington sate down before Burgos, the army of Portugal remained cantoned along the Ebro with an advanced guard only at Briviesca. There, under the immediate direction of Massena, who had been sent specially by Napoleon to the northern provinces, its several divisions were reorganized and brought into a fit condition to take the field. The Prince of Essling, however, under a plea of illness declined the command, naming General Souham his successor.

A formidable force was now collected between Burgos and Vittoria; as the army of Portugal, with the reinforcements received from France, and by its junction with Cafferelli's corps, amounted to 45,000 fighting men. On the 3d of October, Souham assumed the command; but, totally deceived as to the strength of the allied corps round Burgos, which at the French head-quarters were supposed to amount to 60,000 men, with numerous partida corps, besides three British divisions at Madrid, he waited for intelligence from Valencia, in order that his movements

should correspond with those of the other marshals and the king. Swarms of guerillas, however, interrupted all communication between the separated corps; and at last, he was indebted to the English newspapers for correct information regarding the strength and position of an army, from which he was distant but a few marches. Learning, therefore, that Soult had marched from Granada, and Joseph was intent upon the recovery of his capital—that no reinforcements of any consequence had reached Lord Wellington, and that the actual force of the allied army was not more than half what had been represented, Souham determined to save Burgos if possible; and his movements were thus communicated by Lord Wellington to the government at home:—

"The enemy on the 13th moved forward a considerable body of infantry and six squadrons of cavalry from Briviesca, to reconnoitre our outpost at Monasterio. They attacked the picket at the bridge in front of the town, but were repulsed by the fire of a detachment of the infantry of the Brunswick Legion. In this affair Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Frederick Ponsonby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely; and I hope I shall soon again have the benefit of his assistance.

"I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to advance for the relief of the Castle of Burgos with the army of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the north which was disposable; and they did advance in considerable force against the post of Monasterio, on the evening of the 18th. Lieut. Liznelsky, of the Brunswick Legion, who commanded a picket in Santa Olalla, disobeyed his orders in remaining in that village upon the approach of the enemy; and he was taken with his picket. The enemy consequently obtained possession of the heights which command the town of Monasterio, and our outpost was obliged to retire, on the morning of the 19th, to the Burgos side of the town.

" I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared, by the enemy's movement of the 18th, that they entertained serious intentions of endeavouring to raise it; and placed the allied army on the heights, having their right at Ibeas, on the Arlanzon, the centre at Riobena and Mijaradas, and the left at Soto Palacios. The enemy's army likewise assembled in the neighbourhood of Monasterio.

" They moved forward on the evening of the 20th with about 10,000 men, to drive in our outposts from Quintana-palla and Olmos. The former withdrew by order; but the latter was maintained with great spirit by the Chasseurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair opportunity of striking a blow upon the enemy, I requested Lieut.-General Sir Edward Paget to move with the 1st and 5th divisions upon the enemy's right flank; which movement, having been well executed, drove them back upon Monasterio; and our posts were replaced in Quintana-palla.

" On the morning of the 21st, I received a letter from Sir Rowland Hill of the 17th, in which he acquainted me with the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely to become so by an army.

" The castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the 9th instant, and General Ballasteros, although he had entered Granada on the 17th September, had not assumed the position in La Mancha which he had been ordered to assume by the Spanish government, at my suggestion.

" The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to amount to not less than 70,000 men, a very large proportion of which, it was expected, would be disposable for service out of that kingdom.

" I had desired Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage; and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated in consequence

of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making. I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 21st, and moved the whole army back towards the Duero."*

The position of Lord Wellington when the French army advanced from Briviesca, was certainly the most dangerous of any in which he had been previously, or indeed, was subsequently placed. His whole force consisted of 21,000 Anglo-Portuguese, 11,000 Spanish regulars, and the guerilla cavalry of Julian Sanchez and Marquiñez. The British and German horsemen were under two thousand five hundred sabres; and the artillery, including twelve ill-appointed Spanish guns, numbered but forty-two pieces, and these of an inferior calibre. The French army were all good soldiers, and exceeded the allies by twelve thousand men; while in those important arms, cavalry and artillery, they were immeasurably superior, as Souham had more than sixty guns, and five thousand admirable horsemen. In offering battle, Lord Wellington had not only stronger numbers to contend against, but his local position was most dangerous; while the spirit of his army, from recent reverses, had become depressed, and even its discipline had declined. Intelligence, however, reached the allied general on the 20th that decided him not only on refusing to abide an action, but also upon raising the siege. Joseph was advancing towards the Tagus; that river had become in many places fordable, and was consequently insecure; the fall of Chinchilla had opened the road from Valencia; while by the treachery of Ballasteros, La Mancha was undefended, and the surrounding country and its resources consequently, left for Soult to deal with as he pleased. To secure a junction with Hill was now become a measure of imperious necessity—a retreat was unavoidable—and to be successful, it must be promptly and rapidly effected.

* Dated Cabezon, 26th October, 1812.

Two routes were open by which the allies could fall back. That by the bridge of Villaton was safe from present interruption, but it was longer by a march; Lord Wellington therefore determined to cross the Alanzon at Burgos, although the operation was critical, as the army must defile over fords or bridges enfiladed by the artillery of the castle.

Having apprized the engineers that he intended to withdraw the covering force next morning, such stores and ordnance as could not be removed were wasted or disabled, the French guns buried, and their carriages destroyed; and at eleven that night the artillery commenced their retreat by the Villaton road, carrying off the heavy guns and howitzers.

"Finding, however, from the badness of the roads and weak state of the bullocks, that they could not get on with the three 18-pounders, they knocked all their trunnions off, demolished their carriages, and left them on the road; after which they continued their march to head-quarters at Frandovauez, with the five howitzers and a French 4-pounder, which they reached early the next morning."*

To defile an army across bridges within musket range of the castle batteries, was an operation that required both rapidity and silence. All was secretly prepared for the attempt—the wheels of the gun carriages were muffled with straw—and after dark the position was quietly abandoned. Although the night was moonlight, such was the good order observed by the troops, that the first division passed over without losing a man, or provoking the fire of the place.

There is no doubt that this dangerous passage would have been accomplished without discovery, had not some guerilla horsemen rashly galloped over, and betrayed to the garrison the movement of the allies then in progress. In anticipation of the attempt, the guns of the works had been already trained upon the bridge, and, consequently,

* Jones's Journal of Sieges.

the first discharge from the French artillery was destructive; but the range was lost after a round or two, and in the darkness it could not be recovered. By this bold and well-planned manœuvre, Lord Wellington extricated his entire baggage and field equipage; and the allies were placed on the other side of the Arlanzon, and in the direct line of their retreat, with a loss comparatively trifling.

In a retreat, an hour gained or lost may make or mar its fortune; and Lord Wellington reached Cellada del Camino and Hormillas before Souham was apprized that the allied position had been abandoned.

On the 23d, the main body of the allies crossed the Pisuerga, the right at Torquemada,* and the left at Cordovilla: but, by extraordinary marching the French were enabled to overtake the rear-guard; and at Venta de Pozo a sharp combat ensued, which, with the succeeding affairs that marked this celebrated retreat until the evening of the 26th, were thus detailed by Lord Wellington, in a portion of his despatch from Cabezon:—

"The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear guard consisted of the two light battalions of the King's German Legion, under Colonel Halkett, and of Major-General Anson's brigade of cavalry; and Major-General Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo, to give them support; the whole under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon; and the party of

* "Torquemada witnessed a most disgraceful scene of riot and confusion on the part of the British. There, immense wine-stores were found and plundered—and it was computed, that at one time, 12,000 men were lying in the streets and houses in a state of helpless intoxication. Nor was the boasted sobriety of the French proof against the temptation which these well-stored cellars presented. On their subsequent occupation of the town, Souham was obliged to stay his march for twelve hours,—for his own corps numbered more drunkards even than that of Lord Wellington."—*Victories of the British Armies.*

guerillas heretofore commanded by the late Marquiñez,* in the hills on the left of our rear guard.

"Major-General Anson's brigade charged twice, with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy were detained above three hours by the troops under Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village.

"The rear guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the guerillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear guard of Major-General Anson's brigade, and four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss; and Lieut.-Colonel Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.

"The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by Major-General Bock's and Major-General Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but unsuccessfully; and our rear guard was hard pressed. The enemy made three charges on the two light battalions of the King's German Legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss by the steadiness of these two battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct, and that of Colonel Halkett, who commanded them.

"The exertions and conduct of Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, and of the officers and staff attached to him, throughout this day, were highly meritorious; and although the charge made by the cavalry was not successful, I had the satisfaction of observing great steadiness in their movements. Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under Major Downman and Captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves.

"The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Dueñas, and

* He was murdered by one of his own troop.

left at Villa-muriel; and the 1st batt. 1st guards joined us from Coruña. I halted there on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa-muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of Major-General Oswald, in the absence of Lieut.-General Leith, on account of indisposition.

"I had directed the 3d battalion of the royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place; but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that Lieut.-Colonel Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa-muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palentia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed Major-General Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the 5th division. The bridge of Villa-muriel was destroyed, but the enemy discovered a ford,* and passed over a considerable body of cavalry and infantry. I made Major-General Pringle and Brig.-General Barnes attack these troops, under the orders of Major-General Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops cooperated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire upon the left had been very severe throughout the day, from which we suffered a good deal; and Major-General Don Miguel Alava was unfortunately wounded while carrying on the Spanish infantry in the pursuit of the enemy.

"I broke up this morning from the Carrion, and marched upon Cabezon del Campo, where I have crossed the Pisuerga.

* "Suddenly, a horseman darting out at full speed from the column, rode down under a flight of bullets, to the bridge, calling out that he was a deserter; he reached the edge of the chasm made by the explosion, and then violently checking his foaming horse, held up his hands, exclaiming that he was a lost man, and with hurried accents asked if there was no ford near. The good-natured soldiers pointed to one a little way off, and the gallant fellow having looked earnestly for a few moments as if to fix the exact point, wheeled his horse round, kissed his hand in derision, and bending over his saddle-bow dashed back to his own comrades, amidst showers of shot, and shouts of laughter from both sides."—*Napier.*

"The enemy appear to be moving in this direction from Dueñas. I propose to halt here to-morrow."

Having secured the bridges, Lord Wellington halted on the Duero for the two-fold purpose of affording rest to the divisions, and time for commissariat arrangements to be effected, which the want of means of transport and the desertion of the muleteers had rendered most difficult. On the 26th, Souham continued his pursuit, taking, however, the right bank of the river, and thus avoiding an action. On the 27th, the whole of the French army were displayed in front of Cabezon—but they gave the allies no annoyance, excepting by a distant cannonade. For the first time during the retreat, Lord Wellington was enabled to correctly ascertain the strength of the army that followed him—and that knowledge determined him to retreat immediately behind the Duero, and eventually, should circumstances require it, across the Tormes. Accordingly, Sir Rowland Hill was directed to abandon the Tagus altogether, and retreat by the passes of the Guadarama; and thus by uniting the allies on the Adaja, enable Lord Wellington to attack the armies of the south and centre, and prevent the intended junction between them and that of Portugal.

On the 28th the French, extending by the right, endeavoured to force the bridges at Simancas and Valladolid, which the brigades of the 7th division successfully defended. The enemy then detached troops to Tordesillas; but that bridge was effectually destroyed, and the regiment of Brunswick Oels posted in the ruins, to prevent its being repaired and rendered passable.

A chivalrous and successful exploit rendered, however, Lord Wellington's precaution unavailing. A detachment of the Brunswick light infantry occupied a tower behind the ruined arch, and the remainder of the regiment had sheltered themselves in a pine wood.

"The French arrived and seemed for some time at a loss, but very soon sixty French officers and non-commissioned

officers, headed by Captain Guingret, a daring man, formed a small raft to hold their arms and clothes, and then plunged into the water, holding their swords with their teeth, and swimming and pushing their raft before them. Under protection of a cannonade, they thus crossed this great river, though it was in full and strong water, and the weather very cold, and having reached the other side, naked as they were, stormed the tower. The Brunswick regiment then abandoned its position, and these gallant soldiers remained masters of the bridge."*

Guingret's success produced an immediate change in Lord Wellington's intended operations. Abandoning his regressive movements, he marched by his left, and boldly took a position on the heights between Rueda and Tordesillas, holding the enemy sternly in check, and thus preventing them from profiting by their daring enterprize. The bridges at Toro and Zamora had been rendered impassable—and aware that time would be necessary before the river could be passed, the allied leader halted until the 6th, awaiting the result of Hill's movements, by which it was expected that he would gain the Adaja on the 3d.

During these important operations, the casualties on both sides had been severe; and from the retreat commenced until the allies halted on the heights of Rueda, they sustained a loss of nearly nine hundred men.†

* Napier.

† Return of killed, wounded, and missing in the movements of the army, under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., from the 22d to the 29th October, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed . . .	4	14	109	74	127
Wounded . .	45	35	442	65	522
Missing . . .	8	12	223	59	243

In the meantime, Hill was executing the orders he had received with his accustomed zeal and success; and as he had a discretionary power from Lord Wellington, either to retire by the valley of the Tagus or the passes of the Guadarama, he chose the latter. After destroying the stores in La China, and burning his pontoons, he quitted the capital, and concentrated the whole of his divisions near Majadahonda on the 31st of October.

On the 2d, the armies of the south and centre united in the vicinity of Madrid; the King entering the capital on the 3d, and Soult moving slowly after the allies. On the 4th, after restoring the authorities who had been deposed, Joseph rejoined the Duke of Dalmatia.

Hill, in the meantime, had been marching upon Arevalo, when Wellington's orders altered the line of his retreat. The bridge of Toro had been rendered passable sooner by several days than had been expected, and hence, other combinations became necessary. To unite with Hill, and attack the army of the south, would now be dangerous, as before it had been desirable—for Souham, with both Toro and Tordesillas in his possession, could fall upon the allied rear; while, if Hill reached the Duero, the want of bridges or pontoons would secure Souham from attack, while Soult, by taking the route of Fontiveros, could reach the Tormes before the allies. Sir Rowland accordingly was directed to march rapidly on Alba de Tormes, while Wellington fell back on his old position—the heights of San Christoval. These movements were simultaneously effected —and the allied general, for the third time, placed his divisions upon ground that had already been immortalized by his victory.

The position of the allied army extended from San Christoval to the right bank of the Tormes at Aldea Lengua—and to the bridge of Alba, on the left. Three hundred Spaniards garrisoned the castle; the town being defended by a brigade of the second division, under Major-General Howard, on the right of the river, supported on

the left by Hamilton's Portuguese. Another brigade of the second division was posted in the neighbourhood of the fords of Encinas and Huerta; and the third and fourth divisions remained at Calvarrasa de Arriba. The light division and Spanish infantry were in Salamanca—Pack's brigade occupied Aldea Lengua—Bradford's were at Cabrerizos — and the British cavalry, beyond the river covered the front of the entire.

The allies were thus posted when the united armies of the north, south, and centre, whose junction had been already secured, advanced to the Tormes; and the subsequent operations, which ended both the retreat and the campaign, were thus detailed in the official despatch to Lord Bathurst, dated Ciudad Rodrigo, 19th Nov. 1812.

"On the 9th, the enemy drove in the pickets of Major-General Long's brigade of cavalry in front of Alba; and Major-General Long was obliged to withdraw his troops through Alba on the morning of the 10th. In the course of the day, the enemy's whole army approached our positions on the Tormes; and they attacked the troops in Alba with 20 pieces of cannon and a considerable body of infantry. They made no impression on them, however, and withdrew the cannon and the greatest part of the troops in the night, and this attack was never renewed.

"I enclose Lieut.-General Hamilton's report to Sir Rowland Hill of the transactions of Alba, which were highly creditable to the troops employed. From the 10th to the 14th, the time was passed in various reconnaissances, as well of the fords of the Tormes, as of the position which the troops under my command occupied, on the right of that river in front of Salamanca; and, on the 14th, the enemy crossed that river in force at the fords near Encinas, about two leagues above Alba.

"I immediately broke up from San Christoval, and ordered the troops towards the Arapiles; and as soon as I had ascertained the direction of the enemy's march from

the fords, I moved with the 2d division of infantry, and all the cavalry I could collect, to attack them, leaving Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill with the 4th and Lieut.-General Hamilton's divisions in front of Alba, to protect this movement, and the 3d division in reserve on the Arapiles, to secure the possession of that position.

"The enemy, however, was already too strong, and too strongly posted at Mozarbes to be attacked; and I confined myself to a cannonade of their cavalry, under cover of which I reconnoitred their position.

"In the evening I withdrew all the troops from the neighbourhood of Alba to the Arapiles, leaving a small Spanish garrison in the castle, with directions to evacuate it, if they should find that the enemy retired, and having destroyed the bridge.

"In the course of the night and following morning I moved the greatest part of the troops through Salamanca, and placed Lieut.-General Sir Edward Paget with the 1st division of infantry on the right at Aldea Tejada, in order to secure that passage for the troops over the Zurguen, in case the movements of the enemy on our right flank should render it necessary for me to make choice either of giving up my communication with Ciudad Rodrigo or Salamanca.

"On the morning of the 15th, I found the enemy fortifying their position at Mozarbes, which they had taken up the night before, at the same time that they were moving bodies of cavalry and infantry towards their own left, and to our communications with Ciudad Rodrigo. It was obvious that it was the enemy's intention to act upon our communications; and as they were too strong, and too strongly posted for me to think of attacking them, I determined to move upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I therefore put the army in march in three columns, and crossed the Zurguen, and then passed the enemy's left flank, and encamped that night on the Valmuza. We continued our march successively on the 16th, 17th, 18th, and this day, when part of the army crossed the Agueda, and the whole will cross

that river to morrow, and canton between the Agueda and Coa.

"The enemy followed our movement on the 16th with a large body, probably the whole of the cavalry, and a considerable body of infantry; but they did not attempt to press upon our rear. They took advantage of the ground to cannonade our rear guard, consisting of the light division, under Major-General Alten, on the 17th, on its passage of the Huebra at San Muñoz, and occasioned some loss.*

"The troops have suffered considerably from the severity of the weather: which, since the 13th, has been worse than I have ever known at this season of the year. The soldiers, as usual, straggled from their regiments in search of plunder, and I am apprehensive that some may have fallen into the enemy's hands.

"I am sorry to add, that we have had the misfortune to lose Lieut.-General Sir Edward Paget, who was taken prisoner on the 17th. He commanded the centre column, and the fall of rain having greatly injured the roads, and swelled the rivulets, there was an interval between the 5th and 7th divisions of infantry. Sir Edward rode alone to the rear to discover the cause of this interval, and as the road passed through a wood, either a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had got upon the road, or he missed the road, and fell into their hands in the wood. I understand that Sir Edward

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the operations of the army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K B., from the 15th to the 19th of November, inclusive.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	5	2	43	15	50
Wounded	6	7	126	9	139
Missing	1	3	174	58	178

was not wounded, but I cannot sufficiently regret the loss of his assistance at this moment.*

"In my despatch of the 7th instant, I communicated to your lordship my opinion of the strength of the enemy as far as I could judge of it from the reports I had received, and from what I had seen. I have since learnt that General Caffarelli, with the army of the north, certainly remained joined with the army of Portugal. King Joseph left Madrid on the 4th instant, and arrived at Peñaranda on the 8th, leaving at Madrid the civil authorities of his government, and a small garrison. These authorities and troops evacuated Madrid on the 7th, and marched for Castile; and Colonel Don Juan Palecca took possession of that city.

"Your lordship will have seen General Ballasteros's letter of the 24th October to the Regency, from which you will observe that he disobeyed the orders of the government given to him at my suggestion, to march his troops into La Mancha, and hang upon the enemy's left flank, because the Regency and Cortes had offered me the chief command of the Spanish armies.

"General Virues, who succeeded to the command upon General Ballasteros being removed, had not advanced farther than Jaen, when I last heard from that quarter on the 8th instant.

"The whole of the enemy's disposable force in Spain was therefore upon the Tormes in the middle of this month, and they were certainly not less than 80,000 men, but

* "From the account of a French officer to one of ours on that afternoon across the Huebra, I am inclined to believe that his want of sight was the immediate cause of his being taken. He said that a non-commissioned officer had knocked off his hat, but had not hurt him, and that he then surrendered himself. As he was remarkably well mounted, there is no doubt that he might have got away, either before receiving this blow, if he had been able to see the enemy, or afterwards if he had been able to see his way. But his want of sight is a terrible disadvantage. The interval between the 5th and 7th divisions could not have been more than half a mile, and the French could not have been on or near the road more than five minutes."—*Letter to Hon. Berkeley Paget.*

more probably 90,000. Of these, 10,000 were cavalry; and as the army of Portugal alone had 100 pieces of cannon, it is probable that they had not less in all than 200 pieces.

"I had 52,000 British and Portuguese troops, of which, 4,000 were British cavalry, on the Tormes, and from 12,000 to 16,000 Spaniards; and although I should have felt no hesitation in trying the issue of a general action on ground which I should have selected, I did not deem it expedient to risk the cause on the result of an attack of the enemy in a position which they had selected and strengthened.

"I entertained hopes that I should have been able to prevent the enemy from crossing the Tormes, in which case, they must have attacked me in the position of San Christoval, or must have retired, leaving us in possession of the line of the Tormes. I considered either to be likely to be attended by so many advantages to the cause, that I deemed it expedient to delay my march from the Tormes till the enemy should be actually established on the left of that river; and if the weather had been more favourable, we should have made the movement without inconvenience or loss.

"It is difficult to form a judgment of the enemy's intentions at present. They have not pushed any troops beyond the Yaltes, and very few beyond the Huebra. But it is obvious, and a general sense is said to prevail among the French officers, that until they can get the better of the allied army, it is useless to attempt the conquest and settlement of Spain; and as far as I can form a judgment from one of Marshal Soult's letters to the king in cipher, which was intercepted, and fell into my hands some time ago, it was his opinion, and he urged that Portugal should be made the seat of the war.

"The result of the campaign, however, though not so favourable as I at one moment expected, or as it would have been, if I could have succeeded in the attack of the Castle of Burgos, or if General Ballasteros had made the movement

into La Mancha which was suggested, is still so favourable, that this operation appears out of the question.

"The strong places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz being in our possession, and Almeida being re-established, it is not easy for the enemy to penetrate by either of the great entrances into Portugal; and although the two former of these places (particularly the first-mentioned) are neither in the state of defence, nor garrisoned as I could wish to see them, having deprived the enemy of their ordnance, arsenals, and magazines in Andalusia, at Madrid, at Salamanca, and Valladolid, it does not appear possible that these places should be attacked.

"I conclude, therefore, that for the present they will canton their army in Old Castile, and in the valley of the Tagus, and will wait for the arrival of fresh reinforcements and means from France."

The best military summary of this memorable retreat is probably contained in the despatches of him who directed it; and in the annals of modern war, no series of operations will be found, in which there was more to interest, or more to admire. Victory is not a certain proof of talent; and battles have been gained, in which every disposition was at variance with the rules of art—and the success of the field arose even from the errors or the ignorance of the commander. In war, skill does much; but sometimes fortune does more. His hour of conquest is not the time to test the abilities of a general,—try him amid difficulties and disasters—and passing by his victorious advance, mark well his conduct when retreating.*

* Defending his brother's conduct in the past campaign, the Marquis Wellesley, with considerable warmth, thus continued :—"For my part, if I were called on to give my impartial testimony, of the merits of your great general, I confess before Heaven, I would not select his victories, brilliant as they were—I would go to the moments when difficulties pressed and crowded on him—when he had but the choice of extremities—when he was overhung by superior strength. It is to his retreats that I would go for the proudest and most undoubted evidence of his ability."

Well might Lord Wellington describe that period of the campaign, from the night upon which he abandoned the height of St. Michael, until he halted before the Arapiles, as "the worst military situation" in which a British general had been placed. With a weak and dispirited army he commenced a retreat of two hundred miles, followed by a force physically and numerically superior.* The country he traversed afforded many fine positions for defence, but they were the most dangerous a general can occupy. The route was everywhere intersected by swollen rivers, whose safe passage depended on the accuracy with which the regressive movements were effected — while severe rains, deep roads, and the sudden rising of tributary streams, rendered it almost impossible to time the marching of a column with that precision on which the nice combinations of an army are dependent. To fall back over a flat surface is much more hazardous than to retire by a hill country. In the latter, cavalry can seldom act, and artillery is useless. Every mountain pass presents an obstacle to pursuit— they are positions the most embarrassing to a general— they cannot be forced in front; and the time they require in being turned, allows a retreating army to move leisurely away, and consequently, impose forced marches on an

* The Itinerary, from Burgos to Salamanca, as pursued during the retreat, would be :—

	Miles.
Burgos to Cellada del Camino	16
Venta del Moral (on the Arlanzon)	16
Torquemada (on the Pisuerga)	16
Duerras	8
Cabezon	16
Valladolid	8
Bridges of the Duero (Puenta and Tudela)	8
Reuda	12
Tordesillas	8
Rastrejon	28
Pituerga	25
Salamanca	16
	177

advancing one to overtake it. Hence, with the exception of the weather, which at times was desperate enough, of the two celebrated retreats, Wellington's was more difficult than Moore's. The former's was open at every moment to attack—lateral roads branched off in every direction: cavalry could act in all parts of the country; there were no mountain positions to defend; nor were the flanks of the retiring columns secure for an hour.

Other circumstances added seriously to Lord Wellington's embarrassments. The relaxed discipline of the soldiers had risen to an alarming height, and the more so, because the privations they endured were but temporary, and their marches not unusually severe. The excesses of the soldiery at Torquemada, were fully equalled by Hill's rear guard at Valdemoro—and hundreds of these besotted wretches were picked up by the enemy in the cellars they had plundered. Drunkenness produced cruelty—and many of the peasantry hitherto well affected to the allies, perished by the hands of infuriated savages, who seemed reckless whether friend or foe became the victim of their ferocity. On the first day's march from Madrid, seventeen murdered peasants were reckoned either lying on the road or thrown into the ditches.

Another mischievous breach of discipline had become very general. Numerous herds of swine were found among the woods, and the soldiers broke from their columns, and commenced shooting pigs wherever they could be found. The spattering fire kept up in the forest by these marauders, occasioned frequently an unnecessary alarm, and thus disturbed the brief space allowed for rest to the exhausted soldiers. Nothing but the greatest severity checked this most dangerous offence; and though two of the delinquents, when taken "red-handed" and in the very fact, were hanged in the sight of their guilty comrades, the evil was not abated by example; for hunger had made starving soldiers indifferent to the desperate consequences their offending was certain to draw down.

But the most serious cause for Lord Wellington's displeasure arose in the misconduct of some regimental officers, and the indifference of more; and those feelings in the commander were increased, by recollecting the zeal and devotion with which his orders had been hitherto obeyed. Apathy among inferior officers, however, was not the only annoyance the allied general had to contend against; for at this trying time, men were found who presumed to question the dispositions of their chief, and actually disobeyed the orders he had given.

On the last day of the retreat, when the allies fell back from the Huebra to Rodrigo, the broken surface of a country, "flat, marshy, and scored with water-gullies," rendered the recession of the columns without loss or confusion a very delicate operation. Lord Wellington had made the necessary arrangements to effect his object; and Napier records the following singular but characteristic occurrence, which the orders of the allied general produced:—

"Knowing that the most direct road was impassable, he had directed the divisions by another road, longer, and apparently more difficult; this seemed such an extraordinary proceeding to some general officers, that, after consulting together, they deemed their commander unfit to conduct the army, and led their troops by what appeared to them the fittest line of retreat! Meanwhile, Wellington, who had, before daylight, placed himself at an important point on his own road, waited impatiently for the arrival of the leading division until dawn, and then suspecting something of what had happened, galloped to the other road, and found the would-be commanders stopped by that flood which his arrangements had been made to avoid. The insubordination and the danger to the whole army were alike glaring, yet the practical rebuke was so severe and well-timed, the humiliation so complete, and so deeply felt, that, with one proud sarcastic observation, indicating contempt more than anger, he led back the troops and

drew off all his forces safely. However, some confusion and great danger still attended the operation: for even on this road one water-gully was so deep that the light division, which covered the rear, could only pass it man by man over a felled tree; and it was fortunate that Soult, unable to feed his troops a day longer, stopped on the Huebra with his main body, and only sent some cavalry to Tamames. Thus the allies retired-unmolested."

With this occurrence, the difficulties of the retreat terminated,—the French desisting from their pursuit, and the allies reaching the high grounds near Rodrigo, which afforded plenty of fuel for their bivouacs, while ample supplies were forwarded from the city for their use. Immediate assistance was despatched to succour sick or wounded men who had straggled from the line of march; and the British light cavalry and guerillas of Julian Sanchez succeeded in recovering fifteen hundred of these wanderers, who had escaped the enemy's patrols, and were perishing in the woods from cold and hunger.

Head-quarters were established at Ciudad Rodrigo on the 20th, and part of the allied army cantoned in the surrounding villages, and along the banks of the Agueda; while Hill was detached with a stong corps and the Spanish division of Penne Villemur into Estremadura, and having crossed the Sierra de Gata on the 18th, he occupied Coria on the 20th.

One of the unavoidable annoyances to which commanding officers are exposed, is to have operations still in progress, criticised by persons who cannot understand the numerous combinations by which a great result can only be obtained. This was strongly evidenced during the memorable retreat to the Agueda; and it would afford a useful lesson to the young soldier, to turn to the newspapers of that day, and remark the ignorance and presumption with which the operations of the allied general were censured by English journalists at home, on the authority of persons then with the army, to whom the complicated movements of Lord

Wellington were perfectly unintelligible. In their letters to England, rapid marches were described as preliminary measures for an abandonment of the Peninsula, and the sudden alterations in the line of the retreat, which secured the safety of the army, were described as the sure forerunners of disaster. But to those splendid displays of genius which marked the operations throughout, they were insensible. The initial movement when the Arlanzon was safely crossed under the batteries of Burgos—the prompt decision with which Wellington took a position at Rueda,* and paralyzed the efforts of his opponent, at the very moment when the daring exploit at Tordesillas had opened, as Souham supposed, a certain path to victory—the well-placed confidence with which he offered battle on that glorious field, where "Marmont's rashness had been fixed with a thunder-bolt," and, by beautiful movements, Soult's cautious skill rendered unavailing†—all these fine strokes of generalship were overlooked, and in the British

* "I found Lord Wellington inhabiting a very indifferent quarter in the village of Rueda, but, notwithstanding the reverse he had sustained, apparently in the same excellent spirits, the same collected, clear, distinct frame of mind, that never varied or forsook him, during the numberless embarrassing events and anxious occasions that naturally occurred to agitate a commander during the long and arduous struggle which he conducted with such firmness and judgment."—*Leith Hay.*

† "About two o'clock Lord Wellington, feeling himself too weak to attack, and seeing the French cavalry pointing to the Ciudad Rodrigo road, judged the king's design was to establish a fortified head of cantonments at Mozarbes, and then operate against the allies' communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; wherefore suddenly casting his army into three columns, he crossed the Junguen, and then covering his left flank with his cavalry and guns, defiled, in order of battle, before the enemy at little more than cannon-shot. With a wonderful boldness and facility, and good fortune also, for there was a thick fog and a heavy rain, which rendered the bye-ways and fields, by which the enemy moved, nearly impassable, while the allies had the use of the high roads, he carried his whole army in one mass quite round the French left: thus he gained the Valmusa river, where he halted for the night, in the rear of those who had been threatening him in front, only a few hours before."—*Napier.*

capital the destruction of the allied army on the Tormes was announced as inevitable, at the very moment when it was reposing on the banks of the Agueda, after the fatigues of one of the ablest retreats which history records.

CHAPTER V.

CANTONMENTS OF THE FRENCH AND ALLIES—LOSSES OF THE PAST CAMPAIGN—REPOSE REQUIRED BY BOTH ARMIES—CIRCULAR LETTER ADDRESSED TO COMMANDING OFFICERS AT FRENADA—IT CREATES AN EXTRAORDINARY SENSATION—STATE OF PARTIES IN ENGLAND—OPENING OF PARLIAMENT—SPEECHES OF THE OPPOSITION—CONFLICTING OPINIONS RESPECTING THE POLICY OF CONTINUING THE WAR, AND ON A VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD WELLINGTON, AND THE ARMY—SPEECHES OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY AND EARL GREY—ULTERIOR EFFECTS.

WINTER set in, and Lord Wellington took up cantonments best suited to restore the health and discipline of the soldiery, and fit them for that memorable campaign, which closed the military dynasty of France and the contest on the Peninsula. The head quarters of the French armies were settled early in December; that of the south occupied Toledo; the northern was at Valladolid; and Joseph, with the centre and his guards, took post at Segovia.

The allies were distributed as extensively as security with comfort would permit. Coria and Placencia were occupied by Hill, having a strong detachment in Bejar. Two divisions had their cantonments in Upper Beira, and round Castello Branco. Of the Spanish corps, one retired to Galicia, another into Estremadura, and a third garrisoned Ciudad Rodrigo. The allied infantry were quartered with the light division and Anson's cavalry on the Agueda, and the remainder on the banks of the Duero. The cavalry moved to the valley of the Mondego, excepting the Portuguese, who were collected at Moncorvo.

Four months of continued operations had occasioned enormous losses both to the allies and the enemy. But though in total amount the French might have been considerably greater, their numbers had never deteriorated, for their casualties were more than replaced by the reinforcements which continually joined them. With the allies the case was different; for the troops sent out from England bore no proportion to those expended in the recent contest. In the opening of the campaign the balance was heavily against the French; and from the advance across the Duero, on the 18th of July, until they repassed that river, on the 30th, their loss had exceeded fourteen thousand men, while that of the allies was under six thousand.* But from the time that Burgos was invested until the Huebra was crossed, the allied casualties, occasioned chiefly by the drunkenness and insubordination of the soldiery, rose fearfully above the enemy's; as during the operations of the double retreat, on a moderate computation, eight thousand men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners.

Both armies felt a necessity for repose; and although Lord Wellington was assured that Soult intended to break into Portugal by the valley of the Tagus, and the report was strengthened from the circumstance of the French marshal remaining with his corps well in hand upon the Upper Tormes; still, though he disbelieved that such was Soult's design, the allied commander took precautionary measures for securing the pass of Perales, and by the position of his cantonments rendering his troops disposable should an emergency require it. But the allied cantonments were undisturbed—as Wellington had exercised his usual judgment in the choice of a position. By the Tagus, the

* During the brief space of twelve days 20,000 men were rendered *hors de combat.* In the returns the French had one field-marshal and seven general officers; the allies one field marshal and four generals, killed and wounded. Three partial actions and a battle were fought,—the French marching two hundred miles, and the allies one hundred and sixty. Of trophies the French lost many; the allies none.

Duero, and the Mondego, he possessed the immense advantage of water-carriage, and "having also the interior and shorter lines, he was in a more menacing position for offence, and a more easy position for defence; wherefore, though he had ordered all boats to be destroyed at Almarez, Arzobispo, and other points where the great roads came down to the Tagus, the French, as anxious to prevent him from passing that river as he was to prevent them, sent parties to destroy what had been overlooked. Each feared that the other would move, and yet neither wished to continue the campaign—Wellington, because his troops wanted rest, more than one-third being in the hospitals; the French, because they could not feed their men, and had to refix their general base of operations, broken up and deranged as it was by the guerillas."*

To recover the health of the troops was Lord Wellington's first care; his next was to restore their discipline, and reorganize the army anew. Determined that the latter should be effected, he addressed the officers commanding divisions and brigades, by a circular letter, dated Frenada, 28th November, 1812:—

"GENTLEMEN,

"I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c., which are already in progress, by different lines of communication to the several divisions of brigades.

"But besides these objects, I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to the state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe,

* Napier.

that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree than any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships, excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

"It must be obvious, however, to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred. Yet the necessity for retreat existing, none was ever made on which the troops had such short marches; none on which they made such long and repeated halts; and none on which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy.

"We must look, therefore, for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army, to some cause besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

"I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

"I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army; and I am quite certain that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of their duty, and that the strict

performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

" Unfortunately, the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments; for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions; and the regulation of all that belongs to his food, and the forage for his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army—a British army in particular—shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

" These are the points, then, to which I most earnestly entreat you to turn your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments under your command, Portuguese as well as English, during the period in which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments. The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant inspection and superintendence of the officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their cantonments; and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned officers with a sense of their situation and authority; and the non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty by being constantly under the view and superintendence of the officers. By these means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the provost, and to punishments by the sentence of courts martial, will be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences and outrages of which there are too many complaints, when they well know that their officers and their non-commis-

sioned officers have their eyes and attention turned towards them.

"The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders of the army regarding the constant, real inspection of the soldiers' arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that article and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view both should be inspected daily.

"In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and lamented in the late campaign the facility and celerity with which the French soldiers cooked in comparison with those of our army.

"The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of the army, and the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others fetch water, and others to get the meat, &c. to be cooked; and it would soon be found that if this practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

"You will, of course, give your attention to the field exercise and discipline of the troops. It is very desirable that the soldiers should not lose the habits of marching, and the division should march ten or twelve miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit, and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division should be dry.

"But I repeat that the great object of the attention of the general and field officers must be to get the captains

and subalterns of the regiments to understand and perform the duties required from them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign."

The publication of this letter, which no common circumstances would have called for, occasioned an extraordinary sensation. With pain, Lord Wellington had witnessed the moral inefficiency of his army exceed by far its physical deterioration; and while experience detected the source from whence the mischief had arisen, and duty to the country and himself required that it should be thoroughly abated, still the reform could not be effected without a severe and uncompromising expression of disapprobation—and while the misconduct of the soldiery was exposed, blame was fearlessly directed against officers of all ranks, some of whom, in standing and influence, were not very inferior to himself. That there were honourable exceptions—that the guards and light division never compromised their characters by military offences—and that a more qualified censure would probably have been a juster one, the warmest admirers of Lord Wellington will admit; yet, in the abstract, the allied leader had ample reason for his displeasure, while the soldiers had some reason for complaint. The general was too careful of their efficiency to harass them by marches beyond their strength; and ample supplies had been carefully collected for their maintenance. But carelessness or incapacity had imposed privations unnecessarily upon the soldier, and thus rendered the foresight of their general unavailing. "Sometimes divisions were moved too soon, more frequently too late, and kept standing on wet ground, in the rain, for two hours, perishing with cold, waiting the order to move. Their clothes were seldom dry for six hours together, and during the latter part of the retreat continually wet; some times they were bivouacked in a swamp, when better ground was near; they lay down upon the wet ground, fell asleep from mere exhaustion, were roused to receive their meat,

and had then no means of dressing it,—the camp-kettles had been sent on, or by some error were some miles in the rear, or the mules which carried them had foundered on the way; and no fire could be kindled on wet ground, with wet materials, and under a heavy rain. The subalterns threw the blame upon their superiors, and these again upon theirs, all complaining of incompetence in some of the general officers, and carelessness or supercilious neglect in some of the staff."*

This strong expression of Lord Wellington's displeasure, while it occasioned murmurings in the army, added to the discontent at home which his failure at Burgos had caused. Two great parties divided the nation: those who supported the government, and advocated the policy of a Peninsular war—and those who, from bitter opposition, refused credence to the most unequivocal successes, and magnified every reverse that could hold out the remotest promise of ending in ulterior disappointment. To the latter party, the issue of the campaign afforded an opportunity of renewing those evil auguries, which Salamanca had falsified, and Napoleon's ruinous efforts against Russia had rendered nearly as much unheeded as "the cry of wisdom in the street." The failure of Burgos gave a new colour to those clamours; and in England the retreat to the Agueda almost restored the balance of opinion respecting the expediency of abandoning the contest in Spain. The ministerial party had expected far too much, and consequently their disappointment was proportionate; the opposition had raised "the wolf-cry" until the country had ceased to dread it; and they caught desperately at what proved a last pretext, to reiterate their denunciations, and abuse him who conducted, and those who planned the war. Ministers were denounced for continuing the contest, and for "starving" it; Lord Wellington both for inactivity and for rashness—for doing too little and too much—for wasting time at Madrid, and for attempting a siege with such inade-

* Southey.

quate means, that nothing but the most profuse expenditure of blood could afford even a forlorn hope of its succeeding.

The great efforts of the Whigs were reserved for the meeting of Parliament, which occurred in the end of November. The speech of the Prince Regent, which, after stating that the South of Spain had been delivered by the battle of Salamanca, proceeded to observe, that notwithstanding a siege had failed, and the capital had been from necessity abandoned, still the results of the campaign had been generally encouraging, and the Spanish cause had become more promising than before, occasioned a warm and protracted debate; and while ministers defended their conduct, the opposition as rudely attacked it. In the discussion that ensued, after Lord Wellesley,* Lord Grenville took the most prominent part. He said that "he maintained his former opinions—they were unalterable, and he felt convinced that the deliverance of Spain was beyond the utmost means of this country to effect—that it was cruel and base to embark the population of that country in so hopeless a cause, merely for the sake of a temporary advantage. Ministers had not advanced one step in the accomplishment of these objects, and this third advance into the interior of Spain had, by its failure, proved the correctness of the data on which his opinion had been founded. Their boast of having delivered Andalusia was idle; for no one doubted that the deliverance was but temporary, and that the French could re-occupy the provinces whenever they pleased. It was the want of means, the failure of supplies and resources, whic' had led to the unproductive results of all their exertions. The blame did not lie with the Spaniards, but with those who

* "This stern accuser was himself fresh from the ministry, versed in state matters, and of unquestionable talents; he was well acquainted with the actual resources and difficulties of the moment; he was sincere in his opinions, because he had abandoned office rather than be a party to such a miserable mismanagement of England's power; he was, in fine, no mean authority against his former colleagues, even though the fact did not so clearly bear him out in his views."—*Napier.*

encouraged hopes which never should have been entertained. The fault was with English ministers, who, in their ignorance, over-rated the condition of the country, and anticipated more from the Spaniards than they could by possibility perform. He asked, why ministers, with a revenue of one hundred and five millions, extorted by means the most grinding and oppressive from a suffering people, were yet unable to supply Lord Wellington's military chest? The difficulty arose from their incapacity, not from the deficient resources of the country, much as they had been drained. They might diminish by one half the income of every individual in this country, with as little effect or promise of ultimate success as had attended those plans which led them to circulate a vile and adulterated currency in paper coin throughout the nation. When such had been its effects, why not at this moment stop the contest in Spain?" *

This latter opinion was also supported in the House of Commons. Mr. Ponsonby said, "it was useless to carry farther an unprofitable contest; it was useless to waste the blood and the treasures of England for an unattainable object; it had been proved that the power of England was not competent to drive the French out of the Peninsula."

Mr. Freemantle "was convinced, that by the battle of Salamanca we had gained nothing but glory; that the deliverance of Spain was no nearer its accomplishment than when Lord Wellington was at Torres Vedras, and that our prospects at the present moment were not so bright as at the commencement of the last session, when his opinion had been exactly what it was at present—that no rational prospect existed of making an impression upon the enemy in Spain."

Mr. Whitbread "admitted that the situation in which we now stood in Spain was glorious, in so far as related to the achievements of our armies, though with respect to the expulsion of the French, we were not so near our object as

* Parliamentary Debates.

was supposed. There was this difference between an offensive and a defensive war; that an offensive war ought always to be a war of spirit. When vigorous efforts therefore were to be made in Spain, there ought to be no limit to that vigour. Let an application therefore be made to the Prince Regent, to know from him whether the greatest possible use had been made by ministers of the means with which they were entrusted for carrying on the war, before coming to a decision on the merits of ministers, or the probability of the war being in future carried on with success. He was far from wishing to refuse the means necessary for carrying it to a successful issue; but feeling that the people were groaning under accumulated burdens and threatened also with the Chancellor of the Exchequer's financial abilities, he thought the last resources of the country ought not to be granted without security that they would be properly applied."

When the vote of thanks to Lord Wellington and his army for the battle of Salamanca was brought forward, Sir Francis Burdett observed, that he was far from wishing invidiously to detract from the merits of men who had devoted their exertions to the service of their country, or to withhold from them any recompense that it was in the power of parliament to bestow: but when he heard the battle of Salamanca represented as being in importance equal to the battle of Blenheim, and to other great battles which had completely changed the aspect of the whole affairs of Europe, he could not suffer such delusions to go forth uncontradicted—delusions which were calculated to plunge the country, under the direction of the same persons, still more deeply in a destructive and ruinous war—for after boasted victories, were we not still as far from our object as ever? What! were we to permit the French troops to recover from their discomfiture and exhaustion, and wait until the tide of good fortune which had attended us flowed back on its source? Were we to rest satisfied with a retreat? Where was the Marquis of Wellington? In

what direction were we to look for the glorious results of the campaign? In what manner was the diminution of the French power in Spain evinced? Nothing seemed to have resulted from all our advantages but calamity and distress; and it followed, therefore, that either Lord Wellington was not entitled to the praise which the House was called upon to bestow, or that the fault of our failure was attributable to the gross negligence and imbecility of the ministers."

Farther than this, when a grant was moved to the Marquis of Wellington, Sir Francis said, "he did not wish to divide the House upon it, but he wished to move, that the consideration of the grant should be deferred till some inquiries had been made into the late extraordinary campaign. Lord Wellington's victories had none of the characteristics which distinguished those of Marlborough. It had been observed, and by military men too, that he had brought his army into difficulties, but that his men had fought him out of them again; and that in the capture of the fortresses a waste of life was to be complained of. The cause of Spain appeared to him infinitely more hopeless than it was at the commencement of the campaign—the case of the Peninsula more deplorable than ever."

The Marquis Wellesley moved for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the war in the Peninsula. "What secret cause," he asked, "amidst the splendid scene that had been exhibited in the Peninsula—what malign influence amidst the rejoicings and acclamations of triumph, had counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and converted the glad feelings of a just exultation into the bitterness of regret and disappointment? With an army in discipline and spirit superior to any that had ever been assembled, uniting in itself qualities so various, as never to have entered into the composition of any other such assemblage of force—with a general, pronounced by the whole world to be unsurpassed in ancient or modern times—the pride of his country, and the refuge and hope of Europe—

with a cause in which justice vied with policy—combining all that was ardent in the one motive, with all that was sober in the other—with the eyes of Europe fixed on our movements—with the admiration of the world excited by our achievements—how was it that our hopes had been raised only to be frustrated? How was it that we had been allowed to indulge in expectation of an approaching completion of success, only to behold the utter disappointment of our wishes? Why had a system of advance suddenly and inevitably been converted into a system of retreat? When victory actually sprung from the bosom of retreat, why was the glorious victor compelled to relapse into retrogression? Why had it happened that we had seen the great conqueror who chased the French armies from the plains of Salamanca, pursued in his turn, by those whom he had conquered, over those plains which had been the scene of his former triumphs? Why, in conclusion, had a system of offence shrunk into a system of defence, and what was the reason that our military operations in the Peninsula had ended where they began?

"I should be lost to every feeling of honour," he continued, "and to every sense of duty to the country, if I did not state that the effect of this campaign altogether has been not to approximate you towards your object, but to remove you from it; and that this calamity has arisen from the insufficiency of those means which, by a small addition, might have been rendered effective. I maintain, that the object we had in view—the only honest object—the only great object which we could pursue, or hope to obtain by our operations in Spain—was the expulsion of the French, or, at least, a considerable diminution of their power, with a view to the freedom of the people, and the independence of the Spanish monarchy. This doubtless was the main object which we ought to have contemplated; for the ultimate object of the British nation was, certainly, by the deliverance of the peninsula of Spain, to lay a solid foundation for the establishment of a permanent and honourable peace.

"What I have contended is, that the efforts we have made have not been equal to the resources of the country—that they have not been such as the magnitude, the infinite importance of the cause demanded, and as the favourableness of the opportunity particularly called for—that we have not made even a faint approximation to the object of the war, the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula—but that the French have been enabled, by our reverses, to consolidate their power in Spain, and to systematize the moral and military subjugation of the country. We ought to have called forth all our resources—and have we made any extraordinary sacrifice? we ought to have strained every nerve at this momentous crisis—and have we not remained little better than idle spectators of the fate of Spain? We have been deterred by petty objections, and by calculations of expense, which are but as dust in the balance."

Earl Grey supported the motion, "admitting that the great objects of the campaign had not been realized, but that, on the contrary, there had been a miserable failure; and that it was one of the most important duties of that House, in cases of ill success, to vindicate the interests of the country, by visiting with its severest censure the causes of the misfortune. Aware, as the ministers were, of the state of Europe, and knowing, as they must have known, the effect that at such a crisis would have been produced by a vigorous and decisive effort in the Peninsula, it was their duty to have provided Lord Wellington with ample means for carrying through his enterprising projects, and crowning them with brilliant and unqualified success. Nothing had happened which induced him to repent of his opinion, that the efforts of the Spanish people could alone enable them to withstand the overwhelming power of France. This sentiment he had uttered under the supposition that no other power would stand up against the French Emperor, and that that Emperor would not depart from the unity of council and of action, by which his

greatest successes had been achieved. And, indeed, if with such a commander and such an army as ours, and at a time when the army of France in the north had met with disasters, greater than which never fell upon a host assembled for the purposes of injustice and ambition—if under these circumstances we had achieved so little in Spain—what must have been the issue, if one tenth only of the forces employed against Russia had been turned against us? The time had called for exertion, and the exertions had failed—the French were in possession of the best parts of Spain; and we had made no advance towards the accomplishment of our object. Such was the case, and it called loudly for inquiry."

To Lord Wellington, and to ministers, these discussions were equally disagreeable. One felt the consciousness that a grand military conception should have commanded the brilliant success that it deserved, and that to evil influences, at home and abroad, its failure was only to be attributed. The other, no matter how honest the intentions, had found too late, that they had paralyzed the blow while they should have strengthened the arm of the victor. Men and means were all that Wellington required at Madrid, to have brought a brilliant opening to a triumphant end—and both were disposable in England—and, by a fatal indecision, both were withheld.

Lord Wellesley's *exposé* carried with it that conviction, which the reiteration of political abuse never can effect. Diseases yield to rough remedies when gentler treatment fails. The ground-work for constructing the most perfect army that modern Europe produced, may be traced to the unpopular address of Lord Wellington—and that splendid campaign, no longer bounded by some Spanish river, but closing on "the sacred soil of France," owed the spirit and munificence of its support to the coarse but salutary castigation, which the Whigs, from political rancour, bestowed upon a ministry, whose intentions were as honest, as their conduct had been censurable.

CHAPTER VI.

REORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY—LORD WELLINGTON'S LETTER TO THE SPANISH MINISTER OF WAR—BALLASTEROS—HIS CONDUCT AND CHARACTER—LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REGENCY—EXILE OF BALLASTEROS—LORD WELLINGTON SETS OUT FOR CADIZ—ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION THERE—VISIT TO LISBON—RETURN TO FRENADA—ECONOMY OF THE ARMY IMPROVED—MISCONDUCT OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT—THE ARMY NEGLECTED—RUINOUS CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY—SECRET ANIMOSITY TOWARDS THE BRITISH—PARTIDA WAR—CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN FAILURE—SOULT RECALLED—ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY—BATTLE OF CASTELLA.

WHILE the nation, as well as the parliament, were inquiring into the causes that had produced the recent failures on the Peninsula, Lord Wellington, having disposed of his army in the best quarters he could obtain, turned his chief attention to the organization of an effective force, with which he designed to take the field, and as early in the ensuing spring, as green forage could be procured for the cavalry. From England, he had the most encouraging assurances that all necessary supplies and reinforcements should be sent out without delay; and hence, he might calculate with certainty, on being able in the month of April to collect the most imposing British force, which had as yet appeared on the Peninsula. Could the native armies be brought into a sufficient state of organization to render them available for the purposes of a campaign, a very powerful auxiliary force would also be created. But constructed as they were, in Spanish troops no dependence could be placed—for, with the best spirit, their services were found at times more dangerous to their allies, than their

enemies.* The evil, however, was not without its remedy. By steady discipline, and a proper application of the resources of the country, Lord Wellington considered that the military establishment of Spain might yet be regenerated; and on receiving a copy of the decree of the Cortes, by which he was nominated to the chief command, after expressing his thanks for their confidence, he communicated through the minister of war† a candid statement of what the Spanish armies were; and also pointed out the only means by which they might be made efficient.

"Your Excellency and the government have a right to expect from me an accurate representation of facts as they shall appear to me; and you may depend upon it that I will perform this duty.

"I am concerned to have to inform you that the discipline of the Spanish armies is in the very lowest state; and their efficiency is, consequently, much deteriorated. Neither officers nor troops having been paid for months, nay, some for years, it cannot be expected that the troops should be in very good order, or that there should exist much subordination in the service.

"But circumstances have come to my knowledge, and under my view, lately, which show that the evil has taken deep root;‡ and that it requires a stronger remedy than

* "In the affair at Villa Muriel, they could neither advance or retreat in order. Their movements were made *à la débandade*, and if I had not ordered a movement on the enemy's flank by the British troops, not only the enemy would not have been driven across the Carrion, but they would have carried the heights above Villa Muriel, on which the Spanish troops were posted.

"It may be depended upon, that order and discipline alone can insure any solid success against the enemy with whom we are engaged."—*Letter to Sir Henry Wellesley.*

† Don Josef de Carvajal.

‡ "At Salamanca the overplus of ammunition was destroyed daily by small explosions, and large stores of clothing, of arms and accoutrements, were delivered to the Spanish troops, who were thus completely furnished; one hour after the English general had the mortification to see them selling their equipments even under his own windows."—*Napier.*

the mere removal of the causes, viz., want of pay, clothing, and necessaries, which have originally occasioned it. Not only are your armies undisciplined and inefficient, and both officers and soldiers insubordinate from want of pay, provisions, clothing, and necessaries, and the consequent endurance of misery for a long period of time, but the habits of indiscipline and insubordination are such, that even those corps which have been well clothed and regularly paid by my directions, and have, to my knowledge, seldom, if ever, felt any privations for more than a year, are in as bad a state, and as little to be depended upon as soldiers, as the others. The desertion is immense, even from the troops last adverted to. I can assure your Excellency, that the officers of the army in general (with some exceptions of officers, general and on the staff, as well as attached to regiments) take but little pains to apply a remedy to these evils; and, upon the whole, I am sorry to acknowledge to your Excellency, that I consider that I have undertaken a task of which the result is as little promising as that which was ever undertaken by any individual.

"I certainly was not aware, till very lately, of the real state of the Spanish army, or I should have hesitated before I should have charged myself with such an herculian labour as its command; but having accepted the command, I will not relinquish the task because it is laborious and the success unpromising; but will exercise it as long as I shall possess the confidence of the authorities who have conferred it upon me. It will be necessary, however, that the government should arm me with powers to enable me to perform this task. It is my opinion,

"First; that officers should be promoted, and should be appointed to commands, solely at my recommendation.

"Secondly; that I should have the power of dismissing from the service those whom I should think deserving such punishment.

"Thirdly; that those resources of the state which are applicable to the payment, or equipment, or supply of the

troops, should be applied in such manner as I might recommend.

"Fourthly; in order to enable me to perform my duties it will be necessary that the chief of the staff, and such limited number of the staff officers of the army as may be thought necessary, should be sent to my head quarters; and that the government should direct that all military reports of all descriptions should be sent to me; and I shall, of course, make my reports to your Excellency.

"The division of the Spanish territory into districts, and the appointment of an army to each district, was a wise arrangement; and I should propose that it should continue.* But it must be observed, that it is a most expensive and burthensome arrangement to the public.

"For instance, Castile and Estremadura are the territory of the 5th army; and, besides Captain-General Castaños, who is most usefully and deservedly employed, there is a captain-general with a large staff in Estremadura, and a captain-general with a large staff in Castile. There are not in the former province as many troops as will form the garrison of Badajoz; nor in the latter as many as will form the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo.

"The large staff in Castile is not only useless, but destructive of the resources by which troops could be maintained.

"Then in the same manner the second and third armies do not, altogether, compose two divisions, and yet they have attached to them all the staff, military as well as civil, of two complete armies.

"The seventh army in like manner is composed almost entirely of bands of guerillas; and the only corps that I

* The commands were subsequently thus arranged:—
Copons—Cataluña, Valencia, Murcia, Castilla Nueva.
Duque del Parque—Granada, Jaen.
Castaños—Estremadura, Castilla Vieja, Galicia.
O'Donnell—Sevilla, Cordova.

To Copons and Elio 50,000 douros each were assigned for military uses; and 100,000, to Castaños, O'Donnell, and Del Parque.

know of in Spain that all approaches in numbers to the size of armies are the fourth and sixth.

"I would propose to your Excellency that the Captain-General Castaños should continue, as he is at present, the captain-general of the fifth, sixth, and seventh armies, with the staff attached belonging to one only of those armies, viz., the sixth, and that all the rest, of every description, civil as well as military, should be recalled by the government, excepting only such officers as General Castaños should think proper to retain for the performance of the duties in the provinces of Castile and Estremadura.

"An arrangement of the same description ought to be applied to the second, third, and fourth armies; but I should wish to defer to make any proposition regarding these armies till I shall have seen more of the detail of their state.

"I should wish also to defer to a future opportunity, to draw your attention to the alterations which the existing state of the country requires should be made in the powers of the captain-general of the provinces, and the intendants respectively.

"We must not conceal from ourselves that there is but little authority of any description whatever in the provinces which have been occupied by the enemy; and even that little depends on the exercise of military power. It is vain to expect that a gentleman called an intendant will exercise the power to realize the resources of the country for the state, or even for the military, without the assistance of a military force; which military force, in the existing state of the army, will destroy more than its efforts would produce, even supposing that the military chief should be at all times disposed and ready to assist in supporting the civil authority of the intendant.

"I am aware that it is wrong in principle to invest military men with civil powers; but when the country is in danger, that must be adopted which will tend most directly to save it; when the enemy is in the country, that must be

done which tends most directly to drive him out, whatever may be the constitutional principles which may be invaded by those measures. I throw this out at present for your consideration, reserving myself to a future time to make a distinct proposition on the subject."*

The vanity and arrogance of the Spanish character required that it should be vigorously coerced; for, that an absolute control over the generals was indispensable, the vindictive disobedience of Ballasteros had too fatally established. Enraged at the appointment of Lord Wellington to the chief command, an army sufficiently powerful to have effected an important diversion was treacherously retained in Granada, and thus the whole power of the enemy concentrated against an ally, who, if properly supported, could have retained the advanced position in which a great victory had placed him. In Ballasteros, it is hard to decide whether his insubordination was to be characterised as baseness or absurdity; and it would appear scarcely credible, that one whose military exploits were confined to inglorious retreats under the batteries of Gibraltar for protection, should have supposed his influence so paramount with the soldiery, as to warrant him in not only questioning the appointment made by the Cortes, but in insulting its common sense by a bombastic appeal, which, coming from any other quarter, might have been considered as bitterly sarcastic. In this ridiculous document, after a parade of the services he had performed, the following passages occur:—

"I was surprised at learning that the English general, Lord Wellington, was appointed chief of the Spanish armies by a resolution of the general Cortes. They who, to preserve the reputation of their country, lie buried in their graves—thousands upon thousands of our companions in arms—are observing our proceedings, and I should not consider myself as having been born in the kingdom of Aragon, if I did not submit to your Excellency for the

* Frenada, 4th December, 1812.

information of government, that I cannot condescend to a determination that tarnishes the honour of the Spanish name, degrading the chiefs who are at their head."

* * * * *

"Have we not the honour to belong to the greatest nation in the world? Have not our arms resounded in the four quarters of the world? Can we give the command of our army to a foreigner, whatever may be our political situation, without disgracing the nation? No—Spain has still resources; her generals, chiefs, officers, and soldiers, still fortunately preserve the honour they inherited from their forefathers; and in the present war have convinced the English and French, that in battle they display equal valour and discipline to themselves, and that their chiefs know how to conduct them to victory!

"The fields of Baylen, Albuera, Saragossa, and Gerona, with many others, which I omit to state because I would not be thought to boast of myself, are indelible testimonies of this truth; and the 4th army, which I command, may tell the nation that in these quarters they are not inferior to any soldiers in the world; and that without degradation they cannot descend to submit to obscure the glories they have acquired, and the extraordinary services they have performed, out of compliment to Lord Wellington."*

This barefaced insult to its authority the Cortes could not overlook. Ballasteros was deposed and exiled—and Virues, his successor for a time, advanced with the Spanish army into La Mancha. But Soult was now upon the Tormes; the hour was passed—the mischief was irreparable—and thus, the inaction of a splenetic poltroon clouded the termination of a campaign whose opening had been so bright and promising.

All being quiet in front of his cantonments, Lord Wellington availed himself of the inactivity which winter caused, to visit Cadiz in person, communicate with the Spanish government, and, if possible, induce them to adopt his

* Letter to the President of the Regency.

views.* Leaving Frenada on the 12th, he reached Badajoz on the 20th, and Cadiz on the 24th—his journey having been considerably delayed by the swelling of the rivers. His reception by the Cortes was enthusiastic; and the pompous ceremonial which marked his entrance, formed a striking contrast to the unassuming manner in which he had travelled from his own head quarters to the seat of government. The highest authorities of the country meeting him on his route, conducted him in triumph along the ramparts that had been prepared for the uninterrupted passage of the cortège assembled to do honour to the British general. Accustomed in their own country, and from the habits of the French marshals, to find a commander-in-chief placing much importance in outward show or gaudy parade, the Spanish regency and members of Cortes met with surprise the great leader of the allied army, accompanied by Lord Fitzroy Somerset and one orderly dragoon!† During his brief visit, the city presented the appearance of a carnival; fête succeeded fête—and every class, the noble, the artist, the soldier, and civilian, vied with each other in exhibitions of attachment and repect.

From Cadiz Lord Wellington repaired to Lisbon. Along the line of his route triumphal arches were erected—and his entrance into the capital of Portugal was celebrated by an illumination of the city for three nights, and at the theatre of San Carlos his exploits were dramatized and enacted. But parade, and the acclamations of the "giddy multitude" had small attractions for the English general.

* "I propose to get into fortune's way, if I should be able to assemble an army sufficiently strong; and we may make a lucky hit in the commencement of next campaign. But it is obvious that we cannot expect to save the Peninsula by military efforts, unless we can bring forward the Spaniards in some shape or other; and I want to see how far I can venture to go, in putting the Spanish in a state to do something. In your life you never saw any thing so bad as the Galicians. Yet they are the finest body of men and best movers I have ever seen.

"God knows, the prospect of success from this journey of mine is not bright; but still it is best to try something."—*Letter to Marshal Beresford.*

† Leith Hay.

The objects which brought him to Lisbon were speedily accomplished—and leaving that city on the 20th of January, he reached his head quarters on the 25th, and resumed the command of the allies.

The experience of the past campaign suggested many valuable alterations in the internal economy of the army. It may appear to an unmilitary reader trifling to remark, that the French armies were in nothing so superior to the British, as in the rapidity with which their cookery was effected. It was a case of constant recurrence, that, before the antiquated iron kettle could be heated, a brigade was ordered off, and an English regiment marched away supperless, when, in half the time that it had halted, a French battalion could have dressed and discussed their rations. This abuse was now reformed; a tin camp-kettle was substituted, the lighter utensil being carried with ease upon the knapsack, while the mules, previously employed in transporting a cumbrous weight of metal, afforded means of shelter and comfort to the soldiery, by accommodating the infantry with three tents for every company.

It is impossible to look back at the difficulties with which, at this period of the war, Lord Wellington was environed, and not feel surprise that he should not have abandoned the cause of the Peninsula as desperate. His visit to Cadiz had encouraged a hope that, under his own immediate direction, the Spanish armies might in some degree become effective. But this was an event to be hoped for, and not relied upon, as melancholy experience proved before he returned to Frenada. By Britain, Portugal had been munificently supported; subsidized with an unsparing hand—plucked from the very grasp of the despoiler—saved in her last extremity—taught how to employ her strength—rendered respectable in her own eyes, and restored to a place among nations. For a brief period only, the military administration of the country had, from necessity, devolved on its government, during Lord Wellington's absence in the late campaign. What was

the condition of the troops?—what the condition of the country when he re-visited it? "The army in the field received no succours—the field artillery had totally disappeared—the cavalry was in the worst condition—the infantry was reduced in numbers—the equipments of those who remained were scarcely fit for service, and the spirit of the men had waned from enthusiasm to despondency. There was no money in the military chest—no recruits in the depôts—and the transport service was neglected altogether. Beresford's severity had failed to check desertion, because want, the parent of crimes, had proved too strong for fear; the country swarmed with robbers, and as no fault, civil or military, was punished by the regency, every where knaves triumphed over the welfare of the nation."*

The most impotent governments are generally the most factious, and the Portuguese proved no exception. While through wanton neglect in enforcing or employing national resources, the army had nearly been disbanded, a host of ill-disposed employées, aided by a licentious press,† abused

* Napier.

† A gross libel upon himself having appeared in one of these factious publications, Lord Wellington referred it for redress to what was termed "the Provincial Board of Censure." The satisfaction his lordship obtained, will be seen by perusing the official reply:—

"The Board of Censure of this province received in due time your Excellency's official communication of the 8th instant, with a copy of the 2d number of the newspaper called *El Español libre*, which by the Regency's order your Excellency sent them to have their opinion thereon; and having examined that paper with the serious attention required by the delicacy of the subject, and bearing in mind that by the 1st, 14th, and 18th articles of the law relative to the liberty of the press, all bodies and private individuals, of whatever condition or rank they be, are at full liberty to write, print, and publish their political ideas, only enacting, that the punishment awarded by the law shall be inflicted upon the authors of defamatory libels, or writings calumnious, subversive of the fundamental laws of the monarchy, licentious, and contrary to public decorum and manners, or such as contain personal abuse; none of which faults can be imputed to the paper referred to them; they deem it their duty, as protectors of the liberty of the press, to declare, as they do declare, the same free from legal censure, justice so requiring."

The document, however, concluded with very pious prayers for his lordship's health and prosperity.

the English authorities, and laboured to irritate the populace against those who had done so much for their deliverance. Indeed, both in Spain and Portugal, the secret animosity generally felt against the British soldiery, had during the last year frequently betrayed itself. At Salamanca, the malignant spirit of the Spaniards was daily exhibited in murderous assaults, and sometimes, in actual assassination. One case of peculiar atrocity occurred: an English bat-man, leading an officer's horse, having rubbed unintentionally against a Spanish subaltern posted at a gate, he was dragged within the guard-house, and bayoneted in cold blood. From the civil authorities no redress could be obtained, and they encouraged this violence in the soldiers. But these outrages were not transacted with impunity. One Spanish officer drew his sword upon a private of the 95th, and was shot dead by the rifleman; and another was slain by "a British volunteer at the head of his own regiment in a sword fight, the troops of both nations looking on."

Nor were the Portuguese less violent. On the same day* two charges were preferred by Lord Wellington—one against a native officer, for cutting down a private of the 14th light dragoons; the other against an artilleryman, for stabbing one of the 43d in Badajoz.

With such a spirit existing in the country—connected with governments generally feeble, always corrupt, and too frequently mischievous—a licentious press—a dangerous court intrigue in the Brazils, and a treacherous administration in Lisbon—with all these to mar his exertions, still Lord Wellington persevered; and the appearance of his army in the field at the end of the ensuing spring, best told with what success he had overcome difficulties, which to another, would have been insuperable.

While Lord Wellington was indefatigable in preparing for the opening of the last and most glorious of the Peninsular campaigns, the minor transactions of the war require

* Frenada, 2d December, 1812.

to be briefly detailed. The Partidas had been actively and successfully employed. Longa, in the valley of Sedano, surprised a French detachment returning, after a marauding expedition, to Burgos. Fromant, its commander, was killed, and nearly one thousand men slain or made prisoners. At Bilbao, Salinas de Anana, and Pancorbo, he captured the garrisons; and after eluding the pursuit of Caffarelli, cut off a small corps left to keep him in check, and retired safely when superior numbers advanced against him from Burgos. Mina was equally active, and in Aragon and Navarre gave ample employment to the enemy. Clausel, who on the recall of Caffarelli had succeeded to the command in the north, used every effort, but in vain, to put down this daring partisan. Indeed, so formidable had the guerilla chief become, that in an intercepted letter addressed by Clausel to King Joseph, the French general stated that "Mina would be lord of Navarre unless it were occupied by a corps of from 20 to 25,000 men; because when he was weak he always avoided an action, and fell upon detachments when he was sure of victory." In Valencia, Nebot, better known by the title of El Frayle (the Friar), had occasioned the French detachments much loss, besides keeping them in constant alarm. "His party was well organized, and provided with a regularity which was seldom to be found in the regular Spanish armies: and so rigorous were the measures employed against him, that women were put to death for supplying him with means and intelligence; and at length it was affirmed, that three criminals who had been condemned to capital punishment obtained their lives, and the promise of a good reward, on condition of presenting themselves to the Friar as volunteers, and taking an opportunity to assassinate him."*

In the mean time, Napoleon's failure in Russia began to display its evil influence on the French interests in the Peninsula. The war there, had now become a secondary

* Southey.

object. Europe was in arms,—and that throne, which a hundred victories had raised, was tottering. The spell of Napoleon's invincibility had been destroyed, and Talleyrand's prophecy was hurrying to its fulfilment. It would have been impossible to conceal the extent of the loss that Napoleon's mad ambition had occasioned; and when the order arrived for a heavy draft of veteran soldiers to repass the Pyrenees, the fact spoke trumpet-tongued, and told that the military power of France was shaken to its foundation. Soult, whom Napoleon justly estimated as his ablest lieutenant, was in this emergency suddenly recalled; and in such haste, that he remained only one night at Valladolid, and set off on the 10th, for France, taking in addition with him 700 chosen men from the army of Portugal, who were going to replace the imperial guard, and were then waiting at Valladolid for that opportunity of proceeding; a fact which in itself clearly proves the dread the French were in of the Partidas, when 700 chosen men dared not proceed without an escort."* The best soldier in his service was taken by Napoleon from the Peninsula. It is true, that still in numbers the French armies were ostensibly kept up. The reserve at Bayonne had been ordered into Spain, and twenty thousand conscripts allocated for the Peninsula; but these raw levies were a sorry exchange for the veterans they replaced. None knew better than Napoleon the value of a soldier inured to war;† and it was too evident that nothing but a stern necessity could have induced him to remove the

* Clarke.

† Lord Wellington estimated old soldiers probably even higher than Napoleon:—

"I am of opinion, from long experience, that it is better for the service here to have one soldier or officer, whether of cavalry or infantry, who has served one or two campaigns, than it is to have two or even three who have not. Not only the new soldiers can perform no service, but by filling the hospital they are a burthen to us. For this reason I am so unwilling to part with the men whom I have formed into the provisional battalions; and I never will part with them as long as it is left to my discretion.

* * * * * "The

flower of his army from the soil on which his footing every day became less firm.

While the Partida forces were every where in action, and increasing hourly in boldness and in strength, a powerful diversion was expected from the Anglo-Sicilian army, for the scene of whose operations the eastern coast of Spain had been selected. On no expedition of similar extent had more money been uselessly expended; and while Lord Wellington had scarcely a guinea to command, or his soldiers shoes to march with, enormous sums were wasted in dressing and equipping two auxiliary corps of Spaniards in a style of magnificence at once both culpable and contemptible. The expedition had met with small encouragement from Lord Wellington. He knew that the great effort must be made, not on the extremities, but in the heart of the kingdom; and he had ascertained too well by sad experience, the difficulty of maintaining one army in an effective state, to make him more than doubt the policy of attempting to support another in the field.

After several generals had for a brief space held the command, Sir John Murray came out in the end of February. By a most singular absurdity, a double responsibility was entailed upon this officer; for he was to be commanded by Lord Wellington in Spain, and also, by Lord William Bentinck in Sicily.

On the 6th of March the army was put in motion. The total strength amounted to 18,000 men, of whom 1,500 were cavalry. But its composition was particularly bad. The divisions of Whittingham and Roche made about 8,000 men, and the remainder were a mixed force of British, Germans, Maltese, and Italians; the former superior troops, the latter a mere collection of vagabonds and deserters. The Murcian army, under Elio, consisting

[1] The same is the case in regard to the cavalry, and indeed it is stronger; and if I were now to choose, I should prefer by far to give the horses of the fine regiments of English hussars to the old regiments here, and keep the officers and soldiers of the latter."—*Letter to Colonel Torrens.*

of 12,000 men, were to co-operate as a separate corps. The English general advanced through the mountain district of Castalla. It was an ill-combined operation; but the French were driven from Alcoy, and Murray's advanced posts established at Ibi and the pass of Biar, while Elio's corps extended to the left of the allies, and occupied Yecla and Villena.

Early in April Suchet assumed the offensive. Harispe surprised and defeated the Spanish division at Yecla, with a loss of 1,500 men; while the post at Villena, being insulated by the movements of the French, was forced to surrender, and a fine Spanish battalion, which garrisoned the castle, was consequently lost. Suchet had seconded the movements of Harispe by advancing on the pass of Biar; and obedient to Murray's orders, Colonel Adam, who commanded at that post, fell back upon Castella, after a sharp and soldierly resistance, in which, however, he was obliged to abandon two mountain guns, which had been previously disabled.

Suchet having collected three divisions of infantry and two cavalry brigades, next morning attacked the position of the allies. The ground was favourable for defence. The right was covered by a deep ravine, and nearly unassailable —the centre was strongly posted in front of the old castle —the left appuied upon the broken heights immediately before Castella—and the cavalry were formed both in front and rear of the town, on plains interspersed with olive trees. No stronger position could be found; but Sir John Murray, from some unaccountable reason, had given orders to abandon it—an absurdity which Suchet's attack alone prevented from being executed.

The left of the position was the most vulnerable; and while the right and centre were cannonaded, Suchet mounted on both sides of the Sierra occupied by the allied left wing, covered by a swarm of light troops. These were checked by the Spaniards under Whittingham; but on the Anglo-Italian troops, which formed the remainder of

the division, the attack was more determined. "When the main body came upon the second battalion of the 27th there was a terrible crash. For the ground having an abrupt declination near the top enabled the French to form a line under cover, close to the British, who were lying down waiting for orders to charge; and while the former were unfolding their masses a grenadier officer, advancing alone, challenged the captain of the 27th grenadiers to single combat. Waldron, an agile vigorous Irishman, and of boiling courage, instantly sprang forward: the hostile lines looked on without firing a shot, the swords of the champions glittered in the sun, the Frenchman's head was cleft in twain, and the next instant the 27th jumping up with a deafening shout, fired a deadly volley, at half pistol-shot distance, and then charged with such a shock that, maugre their bravery, and numbers, the enemy's soldiers were overthrown, and the side of the Sierra was covered with the killed and wounded."*

This repulse placed the French Marshal in a critical position. He had determined to retreat; and the defiles of Biar, by which he must retire, made a regressive movement most dangerous. His troops were separated—the cavalry not in hand to cover his columns—and as the pass became crowded, very great confusion had already ensued. Mackenzie's division had followed promptly and vigorously; and the three regiments which formed Suchet's rear guard, already fiercely attacked, "were forced to form lines and offer battle, answering gun for gun. The French soldiers were heavily crushed by the English shot, the clatter of musketry was beginning, and one well-directed vigorous charge would have overturned and driven the French in a confused mass upon the other troops then wedged in the narrow defile; but Mackenzie's movement had been made by the order of the quarter-master-general Donkin, without Murray's knowledge, and the latter, instead of supporting it strongly, sent repeated orders to withdraw the troops

* Napier.

already engaged, and in despite of all remonstrances caused them to fall back on the main body when victory was in their grasp. Suchet, thus relieved at a most critical moment, immediately occupied a position across the defile with his flanks on the heights, and though Murray finally sent some light companies to attack his left, the effort was feeble and produced no result; he retained his position, and in the night retired to Fuente de la Higuera."*

Nothing could be more discreditable than the impunity with which Suchet was permitted to withdraw troops already sufficiently beaten to have secured a decisive victory to a commander who could have seen and seized the opportunity. On the following day, Sir John marched directly on St. Felipe, hoping to reach the Xucar before his antagonist —but the result was what might have been expected from his indecision and delay. Suchet had regained a fortified camp—and Murray returned to Castalla, after fatiguing his own troops, and inflicting no loss upon his enemy.

In these inconclusive operations the allied loss amounted to 700 men, and that of the French was variously estimated. Suchet reduced it below belief, while Murray raised it beyond probability. The mean might be best taken—and 1200 men on the French side were probably placed *hors de combat.*

The remainder of this campaign belongs to a later period of the war. Its opening operations gave little promise on either side, that its close would be brilliant or important; and the end did not falsify the beginning.

* Napier.

CHAPTER VII.

MILITARY REFORM—REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE FROM ENGLAND—STATE OF THE ALLIED ARMIES, AND THOSE OF THE ENEMY—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NAPOLEON AND JOSEPH—PROSPECTS OF LORD WELLINGTON—DISPOSITION OF THE FRENCH CORPS—PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN—ITS OPENING—AFFAIR AT ALDEA LENGUA—PASSAGE OF THE ESLA—SKIRMISH AT MORALES—OPERATIONS OF THE ALLIED LEFT WING—MADRID ABANDONED—PASSAGE OF THE CARRION—AFFAIR AT BANIEL—BURGOS BLOWN UP—FRENCH TAKE A POSITION AT MIRANDA—MOUNTAIN MOVEMENT OF LORD WELLINGTON—ROMANTIC SCENERY—SURPRISE OF THE FRENCH—AFFAIR OF SAN MILLAN—REILLE RETREATS TO SUBIJANA DE MORILLAS—ARMIES OF THE SOUTH AND CENTRE PASS THE DEFILE OF LA PUEBLA.

WHILE these feeble operations were progressing in Valencia, and the Partida warfare was more extensively and usefully carried on, spring passed away, and Lord Wellington had the satisfaction to find that energy and perseverance would eventually be crowned with success, and those hopes he fully realized which had cheered him while all beside despaired. Every day added to the strength of the allied armies; and while with increased liberality England drew largely on her astonishing resources, the experience of past years enabled the commander-in-chief to employ his increased means with vigour and advantage. The same uncompromising spirit that, regardless of popularity, had dictated at Frenada his letter of reproof, urged on a vigorous inquiry into abuses, which when detected ensured the punishment of the offender. Every military department underwent a searching reform. The hospitals were cleared of malingerers; the depôts gave up their idlers; and hundreds who, under varied pretexts, would have otherwise evaded their duties, and remained in the country a dead

burthen on the government, were forced back to the colours they had deserted.

While every man capable of bearing arms was thus gathered to his regiment, the internal economy of the army, and the *matériel* for the ensuing campaign, had been proportionately improved and increased. A fine pontoon train was completed; and a number of carts, specially adapted for the rough roads they had to traverse, were built for the use of the divisions. Light camp-kettles and tents added to the comforts of the soldiers—while hospitals were conveniently established in the rear, and *ambulances* organized to accompany the army to the field

Owing to the measures adopted in the Peninsula, with the assistance he received from home, in April, Lord Wellington had under his command 200,000 fighting men, which, taken as a whole, was the finest force that ever Britain had embattled. Its *matériel* was truly magnificent, for abundant supplies and powerful reinforcements had arrived from England. The Life and Horse-Guards had joined the cavalry; and that arm, hitherto the weakest, was increased to nineteen efficient regiments. The infantry had been recruited from the militias—the artillery was complete in every requisite for the field—and a well-arranged commissariate, with ample means of transport, facilitated the operations of the most serviceable force that had ever been placed under the leading of an English general.

Of these masses of armed men, the flower was the Anglo-Portuguese army. It was composed of 45,000 British troops, and 28,000 Portuguese—all were effective soldiers —strong in health, buoyant in spirit, and perfect in discipline. Upon the Spaniards also, a surprising reformation had been wrought, since the Cortes had placed them under Lord Wellington's control. The regular troops had been fed, clothed, armed and organized—the Partidas, improved in general efficiency; and as they now received and obeyed the orders of the allied leader, the daring and activity was usefully directed, which formerly

had been unprofitably employed in loose and desultory operations. Besides the Anglo-Sicilian force at Alicant, amounting to 16,000 men, four Spanish armies, exclusive of the reserve in Andalusia, were ready to take the field. The first, or Catalonian, under Copons, mustered above 6,000. The Murcian, under Elio, amounted to 20,000. A third in the Morena, commanded by Del Parque, consisted of 12,000; while the fourth, under Castanos, was the strongest of the whole—for, with the army of Estremadura, that of Galicia, under Giron, the Asturians, under Porlier, and the guerillas of Julian Sanchez, Mina, and Longa, it amounted to 40,000 men, without including the small Partida bands who generally assisted in its operations.

While the strength and spirit of the allied armies had thus progressively increased, those of the enemy in both, had suffered a material abatement. The former, had been weakened by the drafting into Germany of 20,000 veteran soldiers; and the latter was seriously depressed, from the defection of Prussia, following as it did so rapidly on the frightful reverses his Russian invasion had occasioned. As usual, in the councils of the French generals there was little unity, and consequently, no sound results. Jealous of each other, they all, with few exceptions, disliked and despised the king, and openly contemned his authority. Indeed, Joseph's situation was any thing but enviable. The orders he issued to the marshals were sometimes treated with indifference, and at others totally disregarded. Abroad and at home the clouds were gathering; and while he saw the coming storm, he had neither mind nor means to delay or divert it from bursting. From many of his generals he would not receive advice, as they were objects of his distrust; and, as the plans of his abler brother were too far-sighted for him to comprehend, he refused to act up to the directions of Napoleon. Other causes added to his embarrassments. For weeks together his communications with France were interrupted—the transition of supplies rendered insecure—the revenue had

dwindled away, and the treasury was left without a guinea.

Nor was the correspondence between Napoleon and himself, when it escaped the Partidas, in any wise agreeable. On his side, it was a tissue of complaints—on his brother's, the bitterest reproaches taxed the pseudo king with want of capacity and obedience. On neither, however, had these angry letters much effect. To earnest entreaties for monetary assistance, Napoleon turned a deaf ear; and instead of relieving Joseph's wants, he reduced the subsidy of Spain to two millions monthly, with an order that the whole should be expended in payment of the soldiers. When the unhappy king asked where resources were to be obtained, "his brother, with a just sarcasm on his political and military blindness, desired him to seek what was necessary in those provinces of the north which were rich enough to nourish the Partidas and the insurrectional juntas. The king, thus pushed to the wall, prevailed upon Gazan secretly to lend him fifty thousand francs, for the support of his court, from the chest of the army of the south; but with the other generals he could by no means agree, and instead of the vigour and vigilance necessary to meet the coming campaign, there was weakness, disunion, and ill-blood."*

At the end of spring the French armies in Spain had amounted to about two hundred and forty thousand men, with thirty thousand horses. Of these, thirty thousand were sick and wounded; seventy thousand were operating in Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia; ten thousand garrisoned Madrid; and the remainder consisted of the different corps established in extensive cantonments, which occupied the country from the Tormes to the frontier.

Nothing could be more perfect than the skill with which Lord Wellington masked his intended operations. By the disposition of his corps, the formation of his magazines, and the false information he ingeniously conveyed to the enemy, he misled the French generals, who saw so many

* Napier.

plans open for his adoption, that it was impossible to guess that which he was most likely to select. He might turn their right by forcing the passage of the Tormes on the Duero—or by Avila and the valley of the Tagus march direct upon Madrid. He might then choose the north for the scene of his operations; or he might move southward, and unite with the Anglo-Sicilian army under Murray. All these plans were probable; all were discussed by Joseph and his generals, but they failed in penetrating Lord Wellington's true designs, and the blow was struck before the quarter where it was first felt had been suspected.

Immediately before the opening of the campaign some changes had taken place in the disposition of the French corps; D'Armanac, with part of the army of the centre, occupied Valladolid, which the king had made head-quarters; and Villatte, with a division of the army of the south, held the line of the Tormes from Alba to Ledesma. Three divisions were on both banks of the Duero, and Reille's cavalry on the Esla; Gazan was at Arevalo, D'Erlon at Segovia, Coroux at Avila, and Leval commanded at Madrid.

The plan of the allied general was a splendid military conception. Aware that the defences of Duero had been strengthened, he determined to avoid the danger and delay which would be required in forcing them; and by a fine combination of the Anglo-Portuguese army with that of Galicia, he gained the northern bank of the river, taking in reverse the line of defensive posts on the Duero, and opening to attack the whole right flank of the French army, whose scattered corps were too loosely cantoned to admit of rapid concentration. "Thus seventy thousand Portuguese and British, eight thousand Spaniards from Estremadura, and twelve thousand Galicians,—that is to say, ninety thousand fighting men, would be suddenly placed on a new front, and marching abreast against the surprised and separated masses of the enemy, would drive them refluent to the Pyrenees. A grand design, and

grandly it was executed! For high in heart and strong of hand Wellington's veterans marched to the encounter; the glories of twelve victories played about their bayonets, and he the leader so proud and confident, that in passing the stream which marks the frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups, and waving his hand, cried out, "Farewell, Portugal!"*

On the 21st of April, Sir John Murray had received orders to commence operations in conjunction with the Spaniards; but those of Lord Wellington were delayed from heavy rains having broken the roads and prevented the pontoon train from getting forward. On the 15th of May, that difficulty was surmounted, and five divisions of infantry, two brigades of cavalry, the pontoon equipage, and the artillery, were all thrown across the Duero—the infantry marching for the lower Esla, and the cavalry moving to Braganza. When Graham, who commanded the left of the allies, was considered to be sufficiently advanced, Lord Wellington, on the 22d, put the right of the army into motion, and directed his march towards the Tormes. The strength of this corps was nearly twenty-eight thousand men. It was composed of the second and light British divisions, Morillo's Spanish, and Amarante's Portuguese infantry, with five brigades of cavalry, in which the corps of Julian Sanchez was included. The right, commanded by Sir Rowland Hill, marched by the pass of Bejar, on Alba de Tormes, while the left, under Wellington himself, advanced on Salamanca by Matilla. On the 26th, the different columns simultaneously approached the Tormes, while Villatte, abandoning Alba, but anxious to ascertain in what strength Lord Wellington was advancing, took a position on the high grounds above the ford at Santa Martha, in front of the city of Salamanca.

The experiment was bolder than prudent; for in his retreat, Villatte was overtaken near Aldea Lengua, and charged by the British cavalry. The horsemen were very

* Napier.

gallantly repulsed, and the French general succeeded in extricating the column, but not without considerable loss. The heat was so intolerable that two hundred sunk dead in the ranks, and an equal number were made prisoners, while a leading gun having been overturned in the defile of Aldea Lengua, six others were thus retarded, and the whole, together with their tumbrils, fell into the allies' hands.

Even still the French were profoundly ignorant of Lord Wellington's true design; and Villatte's retreat on Medina del Campo, was evidently intended to expose the flank of the allies to an attack by the bridges at Zamora and Toro. The allies pushed forward on the 27th and 28th—the left towards the former, and the right towards the latter—while Lord Wellington, leaving the command with Hill, hurried off to observe the movements of his left wing; and after passing the Duero, at Miranda, by a rope and basket,* he reached Carvajales on the Esla, upon the 30th.

The difficulties encountered by Graham in his route through the Tras os Montes had been ably surmounted; but the passage of the Esla had occasioned a serious delay, and thus prevented the surprise and consequent separation of the French armies. On the 31st, although the water was swollen, a part of the hussars and light infantry forded the river at Almendra, and captured an enemy's picket at Villa Predrices. The pontoon bridge was immediately laid down, and the whole of the allied left wing was promptly sent across.

On the 1st of June the allies entered Zamora, the French falling back on Toro; and at Morales, their rear guard was overtaken and attacked by the 10th hussars, supported by the 15th. The enemy's cavalry, formed in

* "Opposite Miranda there is a ferry, where this deep and rapid stream is from eighty to a hundred yards wide, and the rocks on either side from four hundred to five hundred feet high. When it is so swollen that the ferry is impracticable, the only way by which travellers can cross is after the old Peruvian manner, in a sort of hammock or cradle, fastened to a rope, which is secured upon two projecting points of rock, about thirty feet above the ordinary level of the water."—*Southey.*

two lines, waited and received the British charge; and nothing could be more brilliant in both its execution and success. The French 16th was totally overthrown, losing two hundred prisoners, which, with its other casualties, rendered that fine regiment for a time unserviceable. A singular proof was given in this affair, of the indifference with which a people familiarized to danger, look upon events that others regard with terror. Though the fighting was almost in the streets of Morales, the Spaniards were now so accustomed to sights of war, that within ten minutes after the firing had ceased, the women were spinning at their doors, and the little children at play, as if nothing had happened.*

The allied army had now secured its junction on the Duero—that river being fordable—while Julian Sanchez had surprised the French picket at Castra Nuno, and driven their outposts from the fords at Pollas. Finding that the enemy were concentrating, Lord Wellington halted on the 3d, to allow the Galician army to close upon his left, and give time to the columns to get forward whom the passage of the Esla had delayed. On that evening the allies were finely combined. Wellington, in his open advance, had scarcely been checked for an hour—while Graham had conducted forty thousand troops, with every appurtenance that war requires, over a country hitherto considered impassable. The artillery and pontoons had traversed roads which even a muleteer accounted bad;† and, stranger still, the operation was completed, before the initial movement was known by the enemy! "The field

* Southey.

† "The difficulties of the march were indeed very great; most of the roads are so narrow, that carriages could barely pass between the thick walls which bounded them; and the mountain streams had their course in ravines, from whence the ascent is so laborious, that sixty men could not without great exertion enable the horses to drag the artillery up. Nevertheless, hope and ardour overcame all difficulties; and the advantage which the troops derived from being provided with shelter was sensibly felt: out of a division of six thousand men, there were but a hundred and twenty sick after a march of two hundred and fifty miles through such a country."—*Southey.*

was now clear for the shock of battle, but the forces on either side were unequally matched. Wellington had ninety thousand men, with more than one hundred pieces of artillery. Twelve thousand were cavalry; and the British and Portuguese present with the colours were, including sergeants and drummers, above seventy thousand sabres and bayonets: the rest of the army was Spanish. Besides this mass, there were the irregulars on the wings, Sanchez's horsemen, a thousand strong, on the right beyond the Duero; Porlier, Barcena, Salazar and Manzo on the left between the upper Esla and the Carion. Saornil had moved upon Avila; the Empecinado was hovering about Leval. Finally, the reserve of Andalusia had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz on the 30th, and numerous minor bands were swarming round as it advanced. On the other hand, though the French could collect nine or ten thousand horsemen, and one hundred guns, their infantry was less than half the number of the allies, being only thirty-five thousand strong, exclusive of Leval. Hence the way to victory was open, and on the 4th Wellington marched forward with a conquering violence."*

Unable to arrest the progress of an army too powerful and two well combined to be checked, Joseph had no alternative but to fall back and leave that capital for ever, to which he had so long held with culpable tenacity. Napoleon had urged him repeatedly to send away his heavy baggage, and remove every thing that would impede the abandonment of Madrid; but his advice had been disregarded. The emperor had also directed that Burgos should be strengthened and provisioned; but the place was unprovided with magazines, and the new works which had been commenced were not only incomplete, but, as they commanded the old defences, the castle could not hold out four hours. Hence, it was determined that the French corps should fall back behind the Ebro, and the artillery and stores, previously collected in the depôts of

* Napier.

Madrid, Burgos, and Valladolid, were ordered to be hastily removed to Vitoria, whither the court of the intruder, and the Spaniards who had attached themselves to his cause, were also directed to proceed.

The abandonment of Madrid presented one of those remarkable scenes incident to the war; the bustle attending a march of troops being accompanied by the confused departure of that portion of its population, whose political opinions had been favourable to a foreign usurpation. "Persons of rank, forced from their hitherto comfortable homes, were intermixed with all orders of the community, and alike contemptuously treated by the French troops. Quantities of carriages, cars, waggons, or laden mules, were urged onward to join the cavalcade, while numerous groups of the remaining population witnessed these departures with silent but expressive contempt. Many were wretched in appearance, and some of them incapable of undergoing any great degree of bodily fatigue. Their lamentations or declarations of inability were listened to with stoical indifference, and the bayonets of the amused French soldiery goaded them forward on their way." *

On the 7th, Lord Wellington crossed the Carrion; Joseph, with the armies of the south and centre, falling back on Burgos, and Count Reille, with that of Portugal, retiring by Castro Xerez. The allied leader, however, turned the line of the Pisuerga with his left wing, while the right, under Hill, marched direct on Burgos. Reille, who had been outflanked, having regained the Burgos road, appeared determined to retire no farther; and having taken a strong position, with the Hormosa in his front, his right resting on a height above Hormillas, and his left on the Arlanzon, he waited for the allies to come up.

Joseph had sent reiterated orders to Foy and Clausel to hasten to his assistance—and in the expectation that these corps would arrive, he calculated on making Burgos

* Leith Hay.

the termination of his retreat. Accordingly, with the armies of the south and centre he halted behind Estepar; and in this position, the tidings of Napoleon's victory at Bantzen was communicated to the army. But his hopes were speedily dispelled. On the 12th; Lord Wellington appeared, and promptly advanced against the range of heights which extend from Hormillas to Estepar. His right flank being turned by the British light troops, Reille was obliged to cross the Arlanzon by the bridge of Baniel, during which operation he was severely cannonaded by the horse artillery, and charged by the 14th light dragoons. The French behaved with great steadiness, and by a rapid movement crossed the river, losing, however, a few men, with a gun that had been previously disabled.

Not daring to secure Burgos by risking a battle for its defence, Joseph continued his retreat to Pancorbo, into which place he threw a garrison, having directed that Burgos should be blown up. It was asserted that the city as well as the castle had been doomed to destruction, and the means employed, seemed to warrant such a charge. If such were the demoniac intention of the French, it was providentially averted; for "the hurry, and fear, and confusion, with which their preparations were made, defeated this malignant purpose. Several mines failed; some which were primed did not explode; others were so ill managed that they blew the earth inwards; and as the explosion took place some hours sooner than was designed, the destruction which was intended for their enemies fell in part upon themselves. Many of their men, who were lingering to plunder, perished as they were loading their horses with booty in the streets and squares, and three or four hundred were blown up in the fort. Above one thousand shells had been placed in the mines: the explosion was distinctly heard at the distance of fifty miles; and the pavement of the cathedral was covered with the dust into which its windows had been shivered by the shock. The town escaped destruction, owing to the failure of so many of the

mines, but the castle was totally destroyed,—gates, beams, masses of masonry, guns, carriages, and arms, lying in one heap of ruins;—some of the mines had laid open the breaches, and exposed the remains of those who had fallen during the siege."*

Never had a campaign opened with brighter promise, nor proceeded with more continued success. It seemed indeed "the march of victory." Obstacles, from which another general might have turned, were no sooner presented than overcome; and with slight loss, the Tormes, the Esla, the Duero, the Carrion, the Pisuerga, and the Arlanzon, were crossed as if they had contained no water. Through a country abounding in positions, and with a surface of great natural strength, the French corps had been driven with all the precipitation that attends a beaten army; and a fortress, which unequal means for its reduction had a few months before rendered impregnable, presented nothing but a mass of rubbish, after entailing, like the feast-house of the Philistines, ruin on its possessors.† How proud must have been Wellington's feelings as he looked at that place of fallen strength! Once he had receded from its walls,—but it was to return with a power of his own creation, that rendered resistance unavailing, and obliged those who had maintained it so well, to level its ramparts in despair. "Dubreton's thundering castle" had disappeared—and that height which an army could not carry, was now defenceless as an open village!

The stand which Joseph had designed to have made at Burgos he hoped now to effect at Miranda, trusting for his security to the Ebro, until the long-expected succours should arrive under Clausel and Foy, and add a reinforcement that would enable him to risk a battle. The army

* Southey.

† A French regiment were defiling under the castle walls when the mines were sprung:—"the hills rocked above the devoted column, and a shower of iron, timber, and stony fragments falling on it, in an instant destroyed more than three hundred men! Fewer deaths might have sufficed to determine the crisis of a great battle!"—*Napier.*

of the centre, accordingly took post at Haxo, that of Portugal, at Espejo and Friars, while that of the south, occupied Miranda, covered by the castle of Pancorbo. The king's fancied security was speedily dispelled; for one of Wellington's bold and beautiful conceptions was already in full operation.

On the 13th, the allied army was put in march to gain the sources of the Ebro.* The Galicians, with the British left wing crossed the river next day, by the bridges of Rocamunde and San Martin. The centre followed on the 15th—while Sir Rowland Hill passed the right wing over by the Puente de Arenas. Thus the French were suddenly cut off from the sea-coast, and their immediate evacuation of all the ports, excepting Santona and Bilbao, was the result. Portugal no longer was to be the depôt for Wellington's supplies; a new base of operations was obtained, and the Tagus was abandoned for the sea-coast of Biscay.

To gain the road leading to Bilbao from Burgos, was now the great object of the allied general. Leaving the sixth division at Modena de Pomar, for the protection of his stores, Lord Wellington marched with the remainder through one of the most difficult countries that an army had ever traversed. Hill and valley—roaring torrents and dry ravines—every difficulty found in an alpine district—all were met, and all were surmounted. At times, the labour of an hundred soldiers was required to move forward a piece of artillery; at others, the gun was obliged to be dismounted, lowered down a precipice by ropes, or swayed up the rugged goatpaths by the united efforts of men and

* "The Ebro rises in the mountains of Santillana, its principal source being at the northern extremity of Old Castile, towards the Asturian frontier, near a town which from that cause is called Fontibre. The Sierra de Oca prevents it from trending westward, like the other great rivers of Spain; and at Miranda de Ebro, the point at which the Intruder had instructed the different divisions of his army to make for with all speed, it appears nearly as large a stream as at Tortosa, though in the course of the intervening sixty leagues it receives many and large rivers, one of them the Aragon, of such magnitude, that it is called the husband *(el varou)* of the Ebro."—*Southey.*

horses judiciously combined. "Strongly did the rough veteran infantry work their way through those wild but beautiful regions; six days they toiled unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by the junction of Longa's division, and all the smaller bands which came trickling from the mountains, they burst like raging streams from every defile, and went foaming into the basin of Vitoria."*

It can hardly be imagined what additional interest a brilliant operation will acquire by local circumstances, and the character of the country through which the line of march runs. The advance to the Zadorra exhibited, at every point of view, scenery beautiful as diversified. In it there was a singular combination of romantic wildness mingled with exquisite fertility. One while the columns moved through luxurious valleys, intersprinkled with hamlets, vineyards, and flower-gardens; at another, they struggled up mountain ridges, or pressed through alpine passes overhung with toppling cliffs, making it almost difficult to decide, whether the rugged chasm which they were traversing had been rifted from the hill side by an earthquake, or scarped by human hands. If the eye turned downwards,—there lay sparkling rivers and sunny dells; above rose naked rocks and splintered precipices; while moving masses of glittering soldiery, now lost, now seen, amid the windings of the route, gave a panoramic character to the whole.†

While this grand operation was in progress, the surprise of the enemy was excited, by finding that the immediate line of their retreat was not only unmolested by the allies, but that a convoy, which it would have required an army to protect, was permitted to retire without endangering a single carriage.‡ The routes left of the great Burgos road

* Napier. † The Bivouac.

‡ The French were sadly encumbered with useless equipages and accumulated plunder. Those of the Spanish noblesse who had acknowledged the usurper accompanied his retreat, — and state functionaries, in court dresses and rich embroidery, were mingled with the troops,—calashes, carrying wives or mistresses, moved between brigades of guns; while nuns from Castile, and

were believed by the French generals to be impracticable for the movements of an army; and in this supposition they were confirmed by the reports of the peasantry. Days passed away, the retreat continued unmolested; on the 10th no enemy had appeared, and the allies, it was concluded, were remaining quietly in their quarters. The apathy of the English general was extraordinary, and prisoners were asked by their French escort, "Was Lord Wellington asleep?"*

But the astonishment of the enemy was indescribable, when on the evening of the 18th, information reached their head quarters, announcing the astounding intelligence, that the whole of the allied divisions were established on the left bank of the Ebro! The bold and successful operations of the allied general had now seriously endangered the position of the French armies, and, as usual, the generals were at variance in their opinions regarding the course which Joseph should adopt. Reille, strongly advised the expediency of marching by the right bank of the Ebro into Navarre, and forming a junction with Suchet. The king, however, still reckoned on being strengthened by Clausel, or by the remainder of Foy's corps, of which Sarrut's division had already joined — and unwilling to abandon his immense convoys, he adopted the fatal resolution of retreating on Vitoria.

As it was deemed a matter of importance that Bilbao should be secured, Reille marched in the direction of Orduna early on the 18th, with two divisions, while Maucune, with a third, crossed the Aracena from Frias to join him. On arriving at Osma, Reille found himself in the presence of the first, third, and fifth British divisions, which were then debouching from the mountain passes,

ladies from Andalusia, attired *en militaire* and mounted on horseback, deserted convent and castle, to follow the fortunes of some soldier or employée. Excepting that of his great brother, when retreating from Moscow, no army since the days of Xerxes was so overloaded with spoil and baggage as that of Joseph Buonaparte.'—*Victories of the British Armies.*

* Ibid.

and had possession of the Orduna road. A movement of Sarrut's division, designed to feel the strength of the allies, brought on a sharp affair. But suddenly, a heavy firing beyond the hills announced that Maucune was attacked, and Reille fell back rapidly on Espejo.

Maucune's first brigade had cleared the defiles of Aracena, and halted near San Millan, to wait for the remainder of the division which was marching with the baggage, when most unexpectedly, the leading regiments of the British light division presented themselves on a ridge directly in front. The surprise was mutual; but without any hesitation the ninety-fifth opened its fire, and rushed down the hill, supported by the fifty-second, while the enemy fell back, closely followed by their assailants. At this moment, the second French brigade debouched from the defile, and a scrambling fight ensued. Both rushed eagerly on to gain a height—and the French and fifty-second reached its summit together. For a minute there was a sharp contest, hand to hand; but the enemy broke, threw off their packs, and fled at speed along the mountain side in the direction of Miranda, while the first brigade, pressed closely by the ninety-fifth, retreated on the road towards Espejo. In this affair, four hundred of the enemy were killed or made prisoners, and the whole baggage was taken.

Reille retreated behind Salinas; and as it was imperatively necessary that the great road to Bayonne should be regained, by a long night-march he reached Subijana de Morillas—for by holding this strong post on the Bayas with the army of Portugal, the armies of the south and centre would be enabled to move safely through the passes of Puebla. On the morning of the 19th they accordingly united at Arminon, and entering the defile effected its dangerous passage. This operation was critically timed; for while the French columns were still struggling through the gorge, the roar of Wellington's artillery told that their protecting army was attacked. Pressed by the fourth

division in front, and turned at the same time in flank by the light troops, Reille was driven roughly over the Zadorra; but the armies of the south and centre were already in position—and the allied divisions, wearied by their recent exertions, bivouacked that evening on the Bayas.

CHAPTER VIII.

POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMIES—VALLEY OF THE ZADORRA—VITORIA—ITS IMMEDIATE LOCALITY—CRITICAL POSITION OF THE INTRUDER—HE OCCUPIES VITORIA—PREPARATIONS FOR A BATTLE—FRENCH DISPOSITIONS—DIFFICULTY OF ATTACK—ARRANGEMENTS OF LORD WELLINGTON—RELATIVE STRENGTH—MORNING OF THE 21ST—COLUMNS MOVE TO THE ATTACK—POSITIONS TAKEN BY LORD WELLINGTON AND JOSEPH BUONAPARTE—OPENING OF THE BATTLE—OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE ACTION—ITS CASUALTIES—AND ORDNANCE AND STORES TAKEN FROM THE ENEMY.

On clearing the defiles of La Puebla, the armies of the centre and south halted in the valley of the Zadorra,—the former taking a position on the heights in front of Arinez, with their left upon the Zadorra, at Tres Puentes, and their right resting on the high and broken ridge which stretches between that river and the Ega—the latter forming a second line in front of the village of Gomecho—while, on falling back from Subijana de Morillas, the army of Portugal took possession of the heights of Zuazo,—thus presenting an interior or third line, and in the immediate front of the city of Vitoria.

The valley in which these armies with all their *matériel*, and a fugitive court and its incumbrances, were collected, from one extremity, at the pass of Puebla, to the other, at Vitoria, extends for ten miles over a broken surface. Its extreme breadth is probably about eight. The Zadorra, a narrow stream with steep and rugged banks, winds through this basin in its course towards the Ebro, and passes close to the city. The river enters the valley at

the defiles of Puebla, issuing between bold and rocky heights—on the right overhung by that of Puebla, and on the left by those of Morillas. The course of the stream severs the valley into unequal parts, the right being the more extensive; but the royal road traverses the left bank. On that side stands the village of Subijana de Morillas—commanding the pass which the army of Portugal disputed, while Gazan and D'Erlon were receding with the armies of the south and centre.

In the distance the spires of Vitoria are visible from the opening of La Puebla, and a city with a name already consecrated by former deeds of arms,* was now about to receive a new celebrity.

Vitoria was founded in 1181, by Sancho VII. of Navarre, but the victory from whence it derived its name has perished in the stream of time. Its situation is both picturesque and imposing, as it stands on a gentle eminence encircled by an amphitheatre of mountain. "With the exception of the height upon which the city is built, the country in its immediate neighbourhood is level, and of slight elevation. On the north-west front of the town, at the distance of a mile, runs the Zadorra, over which there are erected several bridges. To the south-west, the lofty and extensive heights of Puebla communicate with high grounds domineering the route leading to Pampeluna—while on the opposite side of the valley, which in that particular part becomes widely displayed, rise the eminences above the villages of Gamarra Mayor and Abechuco." Several principal and secondary roads branch from the city: that to Logrono, runs on the right hand, and that to Bilbao, on the left. Still farther, roads to

* It is remarkable, that within sight of this ground the battle of Najara was fought, in which Edward the Black Prince, acting as the ally of a bad man, defeated the best troops of France, under their most distinguished leader, Bertram du Guesclin, who was come in support of a worse. It is also remarkable, that the Prince of Brazil, before the battle of Vitoria was fought, should have conferred the title of Duque de Vitoria upon Lord Wellington.—*Southey.*

Estella and Pamplona diverge to the right, and on the left a road trends to Durango. All are passable for cavalry and guns; but the only route by which large convoys could be safely and expeditiously moved is by the royal causeway, which traverses the mountains of Guipuscoa, after winding through the defiles of Salinas.

The valley of the Zadorra was crowded with three powerful armies—and the immense incumbrances attached to the retiring court, although a convoy had been sent off that morning by the royal causeway, appeared to accumulate rather than diminish. Joseph's situation every hour became more critical—while the opinions delivered by his generals were not in unison with his wishes. On one question they all agreed—that a battle or a retreat was inevitable. The former met with few advocates; and to effect the latter, every incumbrance must be sacrificed—for the allies were on the right bank of the river; and by an extension of their left, they would cut through the royal causeway, and render that route impassable. If he should retire to Durango, in that mountain district the king must dispense with the services of those arms on which he chiefly depended — namely, cavalry and artillery, and expose himself to the incessant annoyances of the Partidas, to whose irregular warfare a mountain country was so favourable; and should he adopt a third course, by ordering Suchet to move to Zaragoza, while he retired to Pamplona, in that event he must give up his communications with France. A day of indecision passed; opinions were delivered, conjectures formed, and nothing done—while his indefatigable opponent was combining rapidly for a fatal blow. Joseph's resolution was reluctantly taken. A retreat could be effected only by abandoning the greatest accumulation of baggage, valuables, and plunder, which had ever accompanied a European army—and the king determined on the alternative, and announced that he would fight and not retire. This decision was followed by an order, that Clausel should hasten to Vitoria from

Logrono, while Foy's march on Bilbao was countermanded, and that general was directed to return from Durango with all the force he could collect, and join the king before the intended battle should be delivered.

On the evening of the 19th, the city of Vitoria presented a scene of indescribable confusion, in which alarm and display were singularly blended. Joseph, with his staff and guards, the entire of his court, and the head-quarters of the army of the centre, accompanied by an endless collection of equipages, intermingled with cavalry, artillery, and their numerous ambulances, occupied the buildings and crowded the streets. An unmanageable mass of soldiers and civilians were every moment increased by fresh arrivals, all vainly seeking for accommodation in a town unequal to afford a shelter for half their number.

But a yet stranger scene was enacting in Vitoria. While the city was brilliantly illuminated in honour of the pseudo-king, (and a gayer sight could not be fancied than its sparkling interior presented,) beyond the walls an army was taking a position, and a multitude of the peasants were forced by the French engineers to assist in throwing up field defences, and thus assist those who had ruled them with an iron hand, to place their guns in battery, and make other military dispositions to repel the army of those allies, who were advancing to effect their deliverance.

Although Joseph nominally commanded the united armies, to Marshal Jourdan, and the generals of division under him, the dispositions for the battle were entrusted. "During the morning of the 20th, great excitement, attended with feverish and unsteady feeling, seemed to have taken possession of the inhabitants and their numerous visitors. They had ascertained the near approach of the allied army, and in the act of occupying so extensive a position as that selected by Marshal Jourdan, great activity and constant movement were perceptible; troops passed through the town, and the sound of artillery and carriage wheels became incessant—while the immense convoy that had left Vitoria

appeared to have produced slight effect in relieving the crowded state of the town."*

At daybreak on the 21st, the second convoy, in which the king's baggage was included, left Vitoria, under the protection of the division of Maucune. Its extent was immense; and as it wound through the beautiful valley which the road to Irun traverses, the train of carriages and waggons appeared interminable. Every preparation was made for the approaching conflict, and the final dispositions of the French armies were leisurely completed.

The army of Portugal, reinforced from that of the south, formed the French right wing, commanding the roads from Bilbao and Durango, where they cross the Zadorra by the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga. Here, the river turning round the heights of Margarita at a sharp angle, presented for the French centre a new front. This was occupied by the army of the south,—their centre across the royal causeway in front of Ariñez, whilst the right appeared on a bold knoll above the hamlet of Margarita, and the left extended behind Subijana de Alava; its flank protected by Maransin's brigade, which occupied the heights of Puebla. The army of the centre was placed in reserve; the royal guard, a number of guns, and the most of the French cavalry being massed around the village of Gomecha. Batteries overlooked the bridges, and commanded all the passages of the Zadorra.

Although the position selected by Marshal Jourdan was generally strong, and well chosen to effect the objects for which he risked a battle, still it had one material defect:—its great extent would permit many simultaneous efforts to be made by an attacking army; and accordingly, on the following day, the allied leader, with admirable skill, availed himself of this advantage.

Such were the grand dispositions of the enemy—and in none of the Peninsular battles were nicer combinations required than for its attack. That was to be made on many

* Leith Hay.

points—and to be effective, the most exact calculations as to time and movements were indispensable. It was impossible for Lord Wellington to bring up to an immediate proximity for attack every portion of his numerous army; and hence, many of his brigades had bivouacked on the preceding night a considerable distance from the Zadorra. Part of the country before Vitoria was difficult and rocky; hamlets, enclosures, and ravines, separated the columns from each other; hence some of them were obliged to move by narrow and broken roads—and arrangements, perfect in themselves, were liable to embarrassment from numerous contingencies. But the genius that directed these extended operations, could remedy fortuitous events, should such occur.

The entire of the 20th, was occupied by the French marshal, in his dispositions for battle—and by the allied general, in a careful reconnaissance of the ground. Satisfied now that the king would fight on the Zadorra, which hitherto had been doubtful, Lord Wellington recalled Giron with the Galician army, which he had detached to take possession of Orduna, countermanded Graham's supporting movement, and hurried up the rear of the columns, with the exception of the 6th division, which was left at Medina del Pombar to protect the advance of the magazines. On the night of the 20th the allies were ably disposed upon the Bayas. The second and light divisions, the Spanish and Portuguese corps under Morillo and the Conde d'Amarante, formed the right of the allied army, and bivouacked in front of Puebla de Arlanzon, and in advance of the river. The right centre, comprising the fourth division, with the hussars and D'Urban's brigades, were also on the left of the river, but separated from the right wing, by a mountain range that extended from the Bayas to the Zadorra. The left centre, including the third and seventh divisions, was still on the right bank of the river at the distance of a league; and the left wing, composed of the first and fifth divisions, Pack's and Bradford's Portuguese,

and Longa's Spanish corps, with the remainder of the cavalry, were assembled at Murguia, on the left bank of the Zayas, and six miles still farther up the stream.

In numerical strength, the advantage was with Lord Wellington; in military composition, it remained with Joseph Buonaparte. Deducting the sixth division left at Medina del Pombar, the allies had 60,000 Anglo-Portuguese, with 20,000 Spanish troops upon the field. Of this force 10,000 were cavalry; and the artillery had 90 pieces of cannon. The French were inferior by 10,000; but in cavalry, they were stronger; and in artillery, superior by sixty pieces. As an army, nothing could be more perfect—the variety of colour and costume* forming a striking contrast to the simpler uniforms of the allies. But the appearance of the whole was soldierly—the cavalry was superb—the guns, caissons, and their appointments were perfect—and the horses, attached to every arm, in excellent condition.

Before day, on the morning of the 21st, the French army was in position, and the British and their auxiliaries were in march to attack it. In four columns, the allies approached the bridges of the Zadorra: Sir Rowland Hill, with the right wing, marched by Puebla; Wellington, with the right

* "Of the cavalry, the heavy dragoons, dressed in green, with brass helmets, were superior troops to the other classes of the same army serving in Spain. The chasseurs à cheval, except in uniform, varied little, either in quality or appearance, from the hussars; both were mounted on a slight, not very compact species of horse; each of these regiments possessed a '*compagnie d'élite*.' The chasseur regiments under the imperial government were variously dressed; and of the hussars, not two corps were in uniform alike. The horse artillery, habited in light blue, braided with black, appeared in a high state of equipment and discipline.

* * * * *

"The gens-d'armerie à cheval, at this time numerous in Spain, and selected from the élite of the cavalry regiments, were fine in appearance, frequently acting in a body; and with the distinction to be expected from veteran soldiers, their long blue clothing, cocked hats, and broad buff belts, gave them a very distinct appearance from any other class of French cavalry. The élite of the dragoon regiments, wearing furred grenadier caps, were men of great stature and martial appearance."—*Leith Hay.*

centre, to which the light division had been attached, advanced to Nanclares; the left centre made a circuitous movement, to seize the bridges of Tres Puentas and Mendoza; while Graham, with the left wing, marched by the Bilbao road, to gain the bridge which crosses the river between the villages of Abechuco and Ariaga.

The mists still hung upon the mountains, and as yet the movements of both armies were concealed. At nine o'clock the fog cleared, and in brilliant sun-shine "battle's magnificent array" was suddenly and splendidly exhibited.

At dawn of day Joseph placed himself upon a height that overlooked his right and centre. He was attended by a numerous staff, and protected by his own body-guard. Wellington chose an eminence in front of the village of Ariñez, commanding the right bank of the Zadorra, and continued there observing the progress of the fight, and directing the movements of his divisions, as calmly as if he were inspecting the movements of a review.

An hour passed—Sir Rowland Hill had not come up—and Wellington's frequent glances towards the Puebla showed how anxiously he was expected. A spattering fire was heard in that direction—musketry succeeded—smoke-wreaths went curling up the mountain—and announced that the second division had come up, and that the work of slaughter had begun.

Of the succeeding operations, and their brilliant termination, the victor transmitted to Lord Bathurst the following general details:—

"*Salvatierra*, 22*d June*, 1813.

"My Lord,

"The enemy, commanded by King Joseph, having Marshal Jourdan as the Major-general of the army, took up a position, on the night of the 19th instant, in front of Vitoria; the left of which rested upon the heights which end at La Puebla de Arganzon, and extended from thence across the valley of the Zadorra, in front of the village of Ariñez.

They occupied with the right of the centre a height which commanded the valley to the Zadorra. The right of their army was stationed near Vitoria, and was destined to defend the passages of the river Zadorra, in the neighbourhood of that city. They had a reserve in rear of their left, at the village of Gomecha. The nature of the country through which the army had passed since it had reached the Ebro had necessarily extended our columns; and we halted on the 20th in order to close them up, and moved the left to Murguia, where it was most likely it would be required. I reconnoitred the enemy's position on that day, with a view to the attack to be made on the following morning, if they should still remain in it.

"We accordingly attacked the enemy yesterday, and I am happy to inform your Lordship, that the allied army under my command gained a complete victory, having driven them from all their positions; having taken from them 151 pieces of cannon, waggons of ammunition, all their baggage, provisions, cattle, treasure, &c., and a considerable number of prisoners.

"The operations of the day commenced by Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill obtaining possession of the heights of La Puebla, on which the enemy's left rested, which heights they had not occupied in great strength. He detached for this service one brigade of the Spanish division under General Morillo; the other brigade being employed in keeping the communication between his main body on the high road from Miranda to Vitoria and the troops detached to the heights. The enemy, however, soon discovered the importance of these heights, and reinforced their troops there to such an extent, that Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill was obliged to detach, first, the 71st regiment and the light infantry battalion of General Walker's brigade, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan, and successively other troops to the same point; and the allies not only gained, but maintained possession of these important heights throughout

their operations, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy to retake them.

"The contest here was, however, very severe, and the loss sustained considerable. General Morillo* was wounded, but remained in the field; and I am concerned to have to report, that Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. H. Cadogan† has died of a wound which he received. In him His Majesty has lost an officer of great merit and tried gallantry, who had already acquired the respect and regard of the whole profession, and of whom it might have been expected that, if he had lived, he would have rendered the most important services to his country.

"Under cover of the possession of these heights, Sir Rowland Hill successively passed the Zadorra, at La Puebla, and the defile formed by the heights and the river Zadorra, and attacked and gained possession of the village of Subijana de Alava, in front of the enemy's line, which the enemy made repeated attempts to regain.

"The difficult nature of the country prevented the communication between our different columns moving to the attack from their stations on the river Bayas at as early an hour as I had expected; and it was late before I

* "General Morillo, with all his roughness and his ignorance, was an enthusiastic admirer of every thing English. Throughout the whole course of his various services during the war, he evinced a strong and marked feeling of attachment and respect for the troops of that country. He had raised himself from the lowest ranks by his enterprising courage and cordial exertion in forwarding every scheme or measure calculated, as he conceived, to resist French domination. He had obtained considerable authority over the division of Spaniards under his immediate orders; his courage was undoubted; his devotion to Sir Rowland Hill, with whom he had long served, unbounded. Under these circumstances, this officer, in most respects a very ordinary man, became known to the army, and his name identified with some degree of distinction."—*Leith Hay.*

† Lord Wellington, in a letter to his brother, Sir Henry Wellesley, thus alludes to the fall of this favourite officer:—"After he was wounded, and was probably aware that he was dying, he desired to be carried and left in a situation from which he might be able to see all that passed. The concern which I feel upon his loss, has diminished exceedingly the satisfaction I should derive from our success, as it will yours."

knew that the column, composed of the 3d and 7th divisions, under the command of the Earl of Dalhousie, had arrived at the station appointed for them. The 4th and light divisions, however, passed the Zadorra immediately after Sir Rowland Hill had possession of Subijana de Alava; the former at the bridge of Nanclares, and the latter at the bridge of Tres-Puentes; and almost as soon as these had crossed, the column under the Earl of Dalhousie arrived at Mendoza; and the 3d division, under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, crossed at the bridge higher up, followed by the 7th division, under the Earl of Dalhousie. These four divisions, forming the centre of the army, were destined to attack the height on which the right of the enemy's centre was placed, while Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill should move forward from Subijana de Alava to attack the left. The enemy, however, having weakened his line to strengthen his detachment on the hills, abandoned his position in the valley as soon as he saw our disposition to attack it, and commenced his retreat in good order towards Vitoria.

"Our troops continued to advance in admirable order, notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground. In the mean time, Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, who commanded the left of the army, consisting of the 1st and 5th divisions, and General Pack's and Bradford's brigades of infantry, and General Bock's and Anson's of cavalry, and who had been moved on the 20th to Murguia, moved forward from thence to Vitoria, by the high road from that town to Bilbao. He had, besides, with him the Spanish division under Colonel Longa; and General Giron, who had been detached to the left, under a different view of the state of affairs, and had afterwards been recalled, and had arrived on the 20th at Orduña, marched that morning from thence, so as to be in the field in readiness to support Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, if his support had been required.

"The enemy had a division of infantry with some

cavalry advanced on the great road from Vitoria to Bilbao, resting their right on some strong heights covering the village of Gamarra Mayor. Both Gamarra and Abechuco were strongly occupied as *têtes de pont* and the bridges over the Zadorra at these places. Brigadier-General Pack, with his Portuguese brigade, and Colonel Longa, with his Spanish division, were directed to turn and gain the heights, supported by Major-General Anson's brigade of light dragoons, and the 5th division of infantry under the command of Major-General Oswald, who was desired to take the command of all these troops.

"Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham reports, that in the execution of this service the Portuguese and Spanish troops behaved admirably. The 4th battalion of caçadores and the 8th caçadores particularly distinguished themselves. Colonel Longa, being on the left, took possession of Gamarra Menor.

"As soon as the heights were in our possession, the village of Gamarra Mayor was most gallantly stormed and carried by Major-General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which advanced in columns of battalions, under a very heavy fire of artillery and musketry, without firing a shot, assisted by two guns of Major Lawson's brigade of artillery. The enemy suffered severely, and lost three pieces of cannon.

"The Lieut.-General then proceeded to attack the village of Abechuco with the 1st division, by forming a strong battery against it, consisting of Captain Dubourdieu's brigade, and Captain Ramsay's troop of horse artillery; and under cover of this fire, Colonel Halkett's brigade advanced to the attack of the village, which was carried; the light battalions having charged and taken three guns and a howitzer on the bridge. This attack was supported by General Bradford's brigade of Portuguese infantry.

"During the operation at Abechuco the enemy made the greatest efforts to repossess themselves of the village of Gamarra Mayor, which were gallantly repulsed by the 5th

division, under the command of Major-General Oswald. The enemy had, however, on the heights on the left of the Zadorra, two divisions of infantry in reserve; and it was impossible to cross by the bridges till the troops which had moved upon the enemy's centre and left had driven them through Vitoria.

"The whole then cooperated in the pursuit, which was continued by all till after it was dark.

"The movement of the troops under Lieut-General Sir Thomas Graham, and their possession of Gamarra and Abechuco, intercepted the enemy's retreat by the high road to France. They were then obliged to turn to the road towards Pamplona; but they were unable to hold any position for a sufficient length of time to allow their baggage and artillery to be drawn off. The whole, therefore, of the latter which had not already been taken by the troops in their attack of the successive positions taken up by the enemy in their retreat from their first position at Ariñez and on the Zadorra, and all their ammunition and baggage, and every thing they had were taken close to Vitoria. I have reason to believe that the enemy carried off with them one gun and one howitzer only.

"The army under King Joseph consisted of the whole of the armies of the south and of the centre, and of four divisions and all the cavalry of the army of Portugal, and some troops of the army of the north. General Foy's division of the army of Portugal was in the neighbourhood of Bilbao; and General Clausel, who commanded the army of the north, was near Logroño with one division of the army of Portugal, commanded by General Taupin, and General Van-der-Maesen's division of the army of the north. The 6th division of the allied army, under Major-General the Hon. E. Pakenham, was likewise absent, having been detained at Medina de Pomar for three days, to cover the march of our magazines and stores."

* * * * *

"The nature of the ground did not allow of the cavalry being generally engaged; but the general officers com-

manding the several brigades kept the troops under their command respectively close to the infantry to support them, and they were most active in the pursuit of the enemy after they had been driven through Vitoria.

"I send this despatch by my aide-de-camp, Captain Freemantle, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's protection. He will have the honour of laying at the feet of His Royal Highness the colours of the 4th batt. 100th regiment, and Marshal Jourdan's bâton of a marshal of France, taken by the 87th regiment.

"I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the late operations,* and a return of the ordnance, carriages, and ammunition,† taken from the enemy in the action of the 21st instant."

* Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the allied army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., in the action with the French army, under the command of King Joseph Buonaparte, at Vitoria, on the 21st June, 1813 :—

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	British.	Spanish.	Portuguese.	Horses.
Killed. . .	33	19	688	740	501	89	150	92
Wounded .	230	158	3782	4174	2807	464	899	68
Missing . .	—	1	265	266	—	—	—	26

One Serjeant, two drummers, 263 rank and file, have been returned missing by the several corps of the army, British and Portuguese. It is supposed that the greater number of them lost their regiments in the course of the night, and that very few of them have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

AYLMER, Deputy Adjutant General.

† Return of ordnance, carriages, and ammunition, captured from the enemy in the action at Vitoria on the 21st June, 1813:—

151 Brass ordnance, on travelling carriages.
415 Caissons.
14,249 Rounds of Ammunition.
1,973,400 Musket ball cartridges.
40,668 Pounds of gunpowder.
56 Forage waggons.
44 Forge waggons.

A. DICKSON, Lieut.-Colonel,
commanding the artillery.

BATTLE
OF
VITTORIA.

June 21st 1813



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CHAPTER IX.

MORNING OF VITORIA—OPENING OF THE BATTLE—DEATH OF COLONEL CADOGAN—ALLIED ATTACK—BEAUTIFUL MOVEMENT OF THE DIVISIONS—ASSAULT ON THE RIGHT CENTRE OF THE FRENCH, AND ON THE VILLAGE OF ARINEZ—THE ROUTE OF THE FRENCH ARMY—ESCAPE OF JOSEPH BUONAPARTE—NIGHT OF THE 21ST—APPEARANCE OF THE BATTLE FIELD—LOSSES OF THE ENEMY—ANECDOTE—RAPID RETREAT—DESPATCH TO EARL BATHURST—FORTRESS OF PAMPLONA—RECONNOITRED AND BLOCKADED—SAN SEBASTIAN BESIEGED—HONOURS CONFERRED UPON LORD WELLINGTON—LETTER OF THE PRINCE REGENT.

VITORIA, in Ossian's language, might have been described as "a day of battles;" for the different attacks of the allied columns, though all tending to one grand result, respectively produced close and sanguinary combats. War has its picturesques—and the opening of Vitoria was singularly imposing. "Not a drum was heard"—a wide expanse of rich and varied landscape on which an artist would have gazed with rapture, was reposing in a flood of sunshine. From a gentle eminence in front of Arinez, the whole array of Joseph's army was visible; and on that height the allied staff were collected. There, Lord Wellington was standing, dressed plainly in a grey frock coat, with nothing to mark commanding rank, excepting a Spanish sash and the hat and feathers of a field officer. His telescope at one moment wandered over the extensive position occupied by the enemy, and the next, turned with fixed earnestness upon that point from whence he expected the crash of battle was to burst. The spattering fire of the French light troops opened from the side of the mountain, while

Morillo's corps debouching from the woods that clothed the bottom of the Sierra, brought on a heavy and sustained fire, which announced that the heights were boldly attacked and as obstinately defended. The Spanish efforts to carry them were brave, but unsuccessful. The fusilade continued, and the enemy remained unshaken. In a few minutes more, the smoke-wreaths which had risen steadily over the summit of the mountain, gradually commenced receding—and Cadogan's brigade* moving along the ridge, was seen advancing with that imposing steadiness which ever gives assurance of success. The hill was won—but, alas! on its summit lay their chivalrous leader; and till the haze of death had closed his sight, there, at his own request, he remained to "look his last" upon the battle. For a long time the fight was doubtful, as on each side reinforcements came into action. But when Hill, clearing the defile of La Puebla, seized the village of Subijana de Alava, the enemy's repeated efforts to win back their lost ground, though vigorously continued, proved unavailing.

Meanwhile, on the extreme left Graham's artillery was faintly heard, and told that there also the conflict had begun, while the light division, under the guidance of a peasant, crossed the Zadorra by Tres Puentes, and boldly established itself under a crested height on which the French line of battle had been formed. Before the bridge of Nanclaus, the fourth division was waiting until the third and seventh should arrive. Presently, Picton and Lord Dalhousie appeared, and the whole of the allied columns moved rapidly to their respective objects of attack. The third division crossed the river by the bridge of Mendoza and a ford—

* "His fall was deeply regretted, affording a striking example of the uncertainty attending all human events, and the fallacy of dependence on what is considered most desirable. The evening previous to the battle, when informed that it would certainly take place, his exultation was unbounded: going into action as the commander of that noble brigade, appeared the climax of his wishes, and the forerunner of distinction; before the conflict terminated, he was numbered with the dead!"—*Leith Hay.*

the seventh, with a light brigade, followed closely—the fourth division was already on the other side—Hill was pushing the enemy back—and on the left the thunder of his guns redoubled, and showed that Graham was advancing rapidly into action.

Nothing could be more beautiful than the military spectacle these simultaneous movements exhibited. The passage of the river—the movement of glittering masses from right to left, far as the eye could range—the deafening roar of cannon—the sustained fusilade of infantry—all was grand and imposing; while the English cavalry, displayed in glorious sunshine, and formed in line to support the columns, completed a *coup dœ'il* magnificent beyond description.

The subsequent advance of the allied columns against the enemy's right centre was beautifully executed, as, in echelons of regiments, it crossed that hallowed ground on which tradition placed the chivalry of England, when the Black Prince delivered battle to Henry the Bastard, and by a decisive victory replaced Don Pedro on the throne. As if animated by some glorious impulse, the battalions advanced, "not to combat but to conquer." Colville's brigade of "the fighting third" led the attack, and the first enemy's corps that confronted it was gallantly defeated. "Pressing on with characteristic impetuosity, and without halting to correct the irregularity a recent and successful struggle had occasioned, the brigade encountered on the brow of the hill two lines of French infantry, regularly drawn up and prepared to receive their assailants. For a moment the result was regarded with considerable apprehension, and means were adopted by Lord Wellington for sustaining the brigade, when—as that event seemed inevitable—it should be repulsed by the enemy. But valour overcame every disadvantage, and the perfect formation of the French could not withstand the dashing onset of the assailants. Their rush was irresistible — on went these daring soldiers, sweeping before them the formidable array

that, circumstanced as they were, appeared calculated to produce annihilation.

The day was evidently with the allies; but the French, covered by a swarm of skirmishers and the fire of fifty guns, retired on their reserves, which were posted in front of Gomecha. The village of Arinez became now the scene of a desperate conflict, and from its importance, this advanced post was desperately maintained. Checked in his assault after having seized three pieces of artillery and a howitzer, Picton returned lion-like to the charge, and with the 45th and 74th regiments, drove the French at the bayonet's point fairly through the village. Defeated thus in front, and their left flank turned at Subijana de Alava, the wreck of the armies of the south and centre made a last stand between the villages of Ali and Armentia, while that of Portugal still bravely maintained itself on the upper Zadorra. But this final struggle was succeeded by a total deroute. The left wing of the allies was furiously engaged; and the heights of Abechuco, the village of the same name, and the bridge at Gamarra Mayor, were all successively attacked, and all carried in splendid style after being desperately defended. The contest now was ended—the southern and central armies were seen in full retreat by the road on the right of Vitoria leading towards Salvatierra—the allies were advancing on every point—momently, the enemy's confusion increased—the guns were abandoned, and the drivers and horses went off at speed. The soldiers pressed wildly through a road already choked with the refugees from the capital, and the countless vehicles which accompanied their flight—and a scene of indescribable disorder ensued.

"The sun was setting, and his last rays fell upon a magnificent spectacle. Red masses of infantry were seen advancing steadily across the plain—the horse-artillery at a gallop to the front, to open its fire on the fugitives—the hussar brigade charging by the Camino Real—while the second division, having overcome every obstacle, and driven the enemy from its front, was extending over the heights

upon the right in line, its arms and appointments flashing gloriously in the fading sunshine of 'departing day.'" *

Never was a victory more complete, nor an army so thoroughly disorganized as the beaten one. Morning rose on three united corps, perfect in every arm, admirably combined, and disposed in a position leisurely and advisedly selected;—night closed upon a helpless rabble, hurrying from the field that had witnessed their defeat, and on which, all that renders the soldier formidable and effective was abandoned.

Like the Scottish monarch at Flodden, Joseph remained to witness

"The ruin that his rashness wrought;"

but not to expiate his folly with his life.† His inglorious retreat was effected with difficulty; for Captain Wyndham observed his flight, and riding with a squadron of the 10th hussars after the fugitive king, overtook and fired at his carriage. Obliged to save himself on horseback, the intruder effected his escape under the protection of an escort, too powerful for his daring pursuers to attack. Nothing, however, but his person was rescued; for his coach, and every valuable it contained, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

Night closed upon the victors and the vanquished—and darkness and broken ground favoured the escape of battalions flying from the field in mob-like disorder, and incapable of any resistance had they been overtaken and attacked. Two leagues from Vitoria the pursuit was abandoned—but the horse-artillery, while its fire could reach the fugitives, continued to harass the retreat by a discharge of shells and round shot. Reluctantly, Lord

* The Bivouac.

† "We chanced to meet a Curé on the French side of the Pyrenees, at whose house General Merle had been quartered shortly after the battle, who said that the general was furious, exclaiming against Joseph, and vowing that the *matériel* of three armies had been sacrificed to save *fifty ladies of light virtue and heavy baggage*."—*Peninsular Recollections.*

Wellington returned to the city, which he entered about nine in the evening. Two nights before, Vitoria displayed a blaze of light in honour of King Joseph's presence: now all betrayed panic and confusion—every door was closed—every lattice darkened—while a solitary lantern placed in front of each house, gave to the streets a sombre and mournful appearance.

During the progress of the battle, three leagues over a difficult surface had been traversed; and the long summer-day was consumed in an unremitting succession of laborious exertions. Night, however, was not to the wearied conquerors a season of repose; for property, in value and variety such as no modern army had abandoned, presented itself at every step, and the work of plunder commenced before the fire of musketry and cannon had ended. The camp of every division was like a fair; benches were laid from waggon to waggon, and there the soldiers held an auction through the night, and disposed of such booty as had fallen to their share to any who were inclined to purchase it. Even dollars became an article of sale—for as they were too heavy to be carried in great numbers, eight were offered for a guinea.*

It was, however, reserved for the dawn of morning to display the extent of the spoil which the beaten army had been obliged to leave at the disposal of their conquerors; and the country in front of Vitoria for several leagues, exhibited a scene which rarely has been equalled. There, lay the wreck of a mighty army; and plunder, accumulated during the French successes, and wrung from every part of Spain with unsparing rapacity, was recklessly abandoned to any who chose to seize it. Cannons and caissons—carriages and tumbrels—waggons of every description—all were overturned or deserted—and a stranger *mélange* could not be imagined, than that which these enormous ambulances presented to the eye. Here, was the personal baggage of a king—there, the scenery and deco-

* Southey.

rations of a theatre—munitions of war were mixed with articles of *virtu*—and scattered arms, drums, silks, embroidery, plate, and jewels, mingled in the strangest disorder. One waggon was loaded with money; another, with cartridges—while wounded soldiers, deserted women, and children of every age, everywhere implored assistance, or threw themselves for protection on the humanity of the victors. Here, a lady had been overtaken in her carriage—in the next calash, was an actress or fille-de-chambre,—while droves of oxen were roaming over the plain, intermingled with an endless number of sheep, goats, mules, horses, asses, and cows.* With the most lamentable confusion the grotesque was also ridiculously combined—camp followers were arrayed in the state uniforms of Joseph's court—and the coarsest females who accompany a camp, drunk with champagne and bedecked "in silk attire," flaunted in Parisian dresses which had been envied by the denizens of a palace.

The *matériel* of three armies was lost—their pride and confidence were lowered to the dust—but the actual casualties sustained by the French in this most signal defeat, fell infinitely short of what might have been reasonably expected. The killed and wounded exceeded that of the allies only by one thousand, and an equal number was probably the amount of the prisoners. No regular account of either could be obtained, as the French invariably falsified their losses—but the low amount of these casualties was occasioned by local circumstances preventing those ruinous results which otherwise must have attended a total overthrow. "The country was too much intersected with ditches for cavalry to act with effect in a pursuit; and infantry, who moved in military order, could not at their utmost speed keep up with a rout of fugitives. Yet, precipitate as their flight was, they took great pains to bear off their wounded, and dismounted a regiment of cavalry to carry them on—and they carefully endeavoured to conceal their

* Victories of the British Armies.

dead, stopping occasionally to collect them and throw them into ditches, where they covered them with bushes. Many such receptacles were found containing from ten to twenty bodies."*

Although the greater portion of the baggage and plunder left on the field of Vitoria, with the contents of the military chest,† fell into the hands of the Spanish peasantry and camp followers, still several interesting captures were secured. The sword of the fugitive king, and the bâton of his lieutenant, were brought to Lord Wellington, and both were transmitted to the Prince Regent.‡ In the carriage of the intruder much valuable booty was discovered: and a conclusive proof obtained that the spoliation of the country they invaded was systematic with the French armies, and that all plundered, from the private to the marshal. On searching Joseph's coach, the imperials were found stuffed with paintings of inestimable value in canvas rolls, abstracted from the royal palaces, and cut from their frames for an easier transmission into France. Of the fair sex, in variety and extent the capture was even greater than that of the *matériel* of the armies they accompanied; and hundreds of women, comprising wives and mistresses, actresses and nuns, were deserted in the town or overtaken

* Southey.

† "To such extent was plunder carried principally by the followers and non-combatants, (for with some exceptions, the fighting troops may be said to have marched upon gold and silver without stooping to pick it up,) that of five millions and a half of dollars indicated by the French accounts to be in the money-chests, not one dollar came to the public, and Wellington sent fifteen officers with power to stop and examine all loaded animals passing the Ebro and the Duero in hopes to recover the sums so shamefully carried off. Neither was this disgraceful conduct confined to ignorant and vulgar people. Some officers were seen mixed up with the mob and contending for the disgraceful gain."—*Napier.*

‡ The sword, which was of very curious workmanship, was taken by a Spanish officer; the bâton, by a soldier of the 87th. The latter was about fourteen inches long, covered with blue velvet, ornamented with the imperial eagles in rich embroidery, and tipped with gold. The case was of red morocco, clasped with silver, and adorned with eagles, having Marshal Jourdan's name inscribed at either end.

with the convoy. All were treated with kindness and respect; and those who desired it, were permitted to follow the retreating army whenever an opportunity was presented.

Of the many who fell into the hands of the victors, the lady of the commander of the army of the centre was included. Madam Gazan had quitted Vitoria on the morning of the battle, accompanied by her servants, and an only child, a boy of three years old. "When the day was utterly lost, in the confusion occasioned by the rush of carriages and the near approach of the firing, a gendarme à cheval rode up, proffering his assistance to the wife of his general. Her first impulse was securing the safety of her child, which the soldier undertook to be answerable for; and, having placed the boy before him, rode off, soon disappearing in the crowd. General Darriceau, wounded, and retiring from the field, rode up and spoke to her; but any attempt at extricating her carriage would have been fruitless, and in it she remained until surrounded by the British cavalry."

From Lord Wellington, the fair captive received every attention that could ameliorate the misfortune she had suffered; and a British officer,* who, when a prisoner with the French army of the centre, had experienced from Comte Gazan the kindness which one brave man ever shows to another in distress, was enabled to repay the debt of gratitude, by affording that protection to the wife of his benefactor, which but a few hours before, had been playfully solicited, with slight expectation indeed, that the request would be realized so soon.†

* Colonel Leith Hay.

† "In the morning, Colonel Alexander Gordon, aide-de-camp to Lord Wellington, had arrived at the advanced posts, with a letter from his lordship, agreeing to the exchange proposed by Comte Gazan; who, faithful to his promise, determined at once that I should be conveyed to the nearest of the allied troops. During the time occupied in preparing an escort, the French officers conversed with great cheerfulness, and apparent cordiality; and Madam Gazan, considering it an impossible contingency, ironically

The retreats of the French armies were so rapid, that the pursuit renewed upon the 22d by Lord Wellington after Joseph Buonaparte, as well as that continued on the 23d, by Sir Thomas Graham into Guipuscoa, by the pass of Adrian, failed either in overtaking the wreck of the army that accompanied the king, or in cutting off Clausel from the pass of Jaca, whence he was hastily retiring, on hearing of the total defeat of the armies he was advancing to support. These consequences the victory of Wellington might have produced, but fortune marred them—while that diversion from which the most important advantages might have resulted failed totally. In the east of Spain, the operations of the Anglo-Sicilian army which had been so feebly commenced, were more disgracefully terminated—and the general detail of Peninsular transactions were thus briefly but clearly communicated by Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst, in a despatch from Ostiz, dated 3d July, 1813.

" General Clausel having retired towards Logroño, after finding our troops at Vitoria on the 22d June, and having ascertained the result of the action of the 21st, still remained in the neighbourhood of Logroño on the 24th, and till late on the 25th, and had not marched for Tudela, as I had been informed when I wrote my despatch of the 24th of June; I conceived therefore, that there was some prospect of intercepting his retreat; and after sending the light troops towards Roncesvalles in pursuit of the army under King Joseph, I moved the light, 3d, 4th, and 7th divisions, and Colonel Grant's and Colonel Ponsonby's brigades of cavalry, towards Tudela; and the 5th and 6th divisions, and the household and the Conde de la Bisbal's cavalry, from Vitoria and Salvatierra towards Logroño, in hopes that I should be able to intercept General Clausel.

requested, in the event of her being captured by the allies, that I would exert my good offices to obtain for her a favourable reception. This sally occasioned considerable mirth, which was not diminished upon my departure, an event witnessed by the whole staff."

" He made some extraordinary forced marches, followed by General Mina with his own cavalry, and the regiment of Spanish cavalry under the command of Don Julian Sanchez, and arrived at Tudela on the evening of the 27th. He there crossed the Ebro; but the Alcalde having informed him that we were upon the road, he immediately recrossed, and marched towards Zaragoza, where I understand from General Alava that he has since arrived.

" I then turned off to Caseda on the Arragon, where I arrived on the 28th; but, finding that the enemy had already advanced so far upon their march as to render it impossible for me to cut them off from Jaca, and thinking it probable that my farther advance in that direction would force General Clausel to avoid the road of Jaca, and to seek a junction with Marshal Suchet, which he would otherwise seek to avoid, and which I had no means of preventing, I discontinued the pursuit with the allied British and Portuguese troops; and they are on their return towards Pamplona. Those under General Mina are still following the enemy; and he has taken from them two pieces of cannon and some stores in Tudela, and 300 prisoners. Lieut.-General H. Clinton has also taken possession of five pieces which the enemy left at Logroño.

" In the mean time the troops under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill have kept the blockade of Pamplona, and have moved through the mountains to the head of the Bidasoa, the enemy having entirely retired into France on that side.

" I enclose the report which I have received from Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham of his actions with the enemy on the 24th and 25th of June, which appear to have been more serious than I had imagined when I addressed your Lordship on the 26th ultimo.

" General Foy had with him the garrison at Bilbao, and those of Mondragon and Tolosa, besides his division of the army of Portugal, and his force was considerable. It gives me great satisfaction to see that the Spanish and Portuguese

troops, mentioned by Sir Thomas Graham, have conducted themselves so well.

"The General has continued to push on the enemy by the high road, and has dislodged them from all strong positions which they have taken; and yesterday a brigade of the army of Galicia, under the command of General Castaños, attacked and drove the enemy across the Bidasoa, by the bridge of Irun. The enemy still maintained a post in a strong stone blockhouse, which served as a head to the bridge, and some troops in some loop-holed houses on the right of the Bidasoa; but General Don P. A. Giron having sent for some Spanish artillery, and Captain Dubourdieu's brigade of nine-pounders having been sent to their support, the fire of these guns obliged the enemy to evacuate; and they blew up the blockhouse and burnt the bridge.

"Sir Thomas Graham reports that in all these affairs the Spanish troops have conducted themselves remarkably well.

"The garrison at Passages, consisting of 150 men, surrendered on the 30th to the troops under Colonel Longa.

"The enemy, on seeing some of our ships off Deba, evacuated the fort and town of Guetaria on the 1st instant; and the garrison went by sea to San Sebastian.

"This place is blockaded by land by a detachment of Spanish troops.

"They have likewise evacuated Castro Urdiales, and the garrison have gone by sea to Santoña.

"In my former reports I have made your Lordship acquainted with the progress of the army of reserve of Andalusia, under General the Conde de la Bisbal, to join the army, and he arrived at Burgos on the 25th and 26th ultimo.

"When the enemy retired across the Ebro, previous to the battle of Vitoria, they left a garrison of about 700 men in the castle of Pancorbo, by which they commanded, and rendered it impossible for us to use the great communication from Vitoria to Burgos. I therefore requested the Conde de la Bisbal, on his march to Miranda, to make himself master of the town and lower works, and to

blockade the place as closely as he could. I have not received the report of his first operations, but I understand that he carried the town and lower fort by assault on the 28th; and I have now the pleasure to enclose his report of the final success of this operation, and the copy of the capitulation by which the garrison have surrendered. The decision and despatch with which this place has been subdued are highly creditable to the Conde de la Bisbal and the officers and troops under his command.

" I am concerned to inform your Lordship that Lieut.-General Sir John Murray raised the siege of Tarragona, I cannot say on what day, and embarked his troops; a great portion of the artillery and stores were left in the batteries. It appears that Marshal Suchet, with a considerable body of troops, had moved from Valencia by Tortosa, and General Maurice Mathieu with another corps from the neighbourhood of Barcelona, for the purpose of impeding Sir John Murray's operations, which he did not think himself sufficiently strong to continue. I have not yet received from Sir John Murray the detailed account of these transactions.

" Lieut.-General Lord William Bentinck, however, who had joined and taken the command of the army at the Col de Balaguer on the 17th, had brought it back to Alicante, where he arrived himself on the 23d, and was proceeding to carry into execution my instructions.

" When Marshal Suchet marched into Catalonia, the Duque del Parque had advanced, and had established his head quarters at San Felipe de Xativa, and his troops on the Jucar, where he still was on the 24th; but I believe that he will have retired upon Suchet's return to Valencia.

" I am not informed of the extent of the loss of the heavy artillery at Tarragona, nor whether it will cripple the operations of the troops on the eastern coast.

" Considering, however, the nature of the enemy's position in Valencia and Catalonia, and his possession of the numerous fortified posts in these provinces, which

render it scarcely possible for the allied troops to carry on any operation until they shall become masters of some of them, I am apprehensive that the enemy will be induced to withdraw his active army from thence, in order to throw them upon our right flank, in the confidence that, in the existing state of our equipment, we can effect nothing against any of the fortresses; and that, without some at least of the fortresses, the operations of our troops in the field must be very confined.

"Before I had received intelligence of the last state of affairs on the eastern coast, I had doubted of the expediency of laying siege to Pamplona, which I had at first intended, upon finding that the place was of such a description, and in such a state of defence, as to require a much larger equipment of heavy ordnance than I had immediately at command; and that it would require an operation of from five to six weeks' duration, which could not even be commenced for a fortnight or three weeks, and the employment of from 15,000 to 20,000 men of our best troops; whereas the blockade could be held by troops of inferior numbers, and of not so good a description; and it is probable that, in point of time, the place would be obliged to surrender within twelve weeks. The disasters at Tarragona, and my view of their probable consequences, have induced me to determine only to blockade Pamplona, for which the necessary works are now constructing; and I shall now have the whole army at liberty for any operation that I may think it proper to carry on."

On the 25th of June, Pamplona * had been closely shut

* "Pamplona, the ancient Pompeiopolis, founded by Pompey the Great, and consequently a place of much antiquity, is in modern days an extensive city, and one of the strongest fortified places of the Peninsula. Situated on a perfect level, it is not commanded by any domineering or neighbouring height. The citadel, built at the southern extremity of the works, is from the exterior little perceptible, the parapets of its walls being on a level with the surrounding plain, and consequently in great measure protected from the effects of breaching batteries."

up by the allied right wing, under Sir Rowland Hill, and on the 1st of July it was carefully reconnoitred by Lord Wellington, accompanied by Sir Richard Fletcher. From the formidable appearance the fortress presented, the allied commander prudently decided on blockading rather than besieging it. The works were found perfect; on one side it was shielded by the river, on the other covered by the citadel; while 200 pieces of artillery were mounted for its defence, with a picked garrison exceeding 4,000 men. To the 6th and seventh divisions, under Lord Dalhousie, the investment was in the first place entrusted; and to more effectually confine the garrison, field works were thrown up which commanded the several approaches to the city, and nine redoubts* were constructed within 1200 yards of the enceinte of the fortress, each calculated for a garrison of two to three hundred men. These preparations for a close and effectual blockade were rapidly completed. "The investing force furnished strong parties, which worked by regular reliefs throughout the day; but the greater portion of the labour was performed by the peasantry of the country, put into requisition for this service by the Spanish authorities. Neither the peasantry nor the soldiers received any working pay; nevertheless, through a vigilant superintendence and the exertions of the officers, the whole chain of redoubts was speedily in a state of defence. Garrisons were allotted to the several works, which were kept in them constantly prepared to receive and repel any attack; but the remainder of the blockading force was either placed under cover in the villages, or bivouacked on favourable spots just without the fire of the place; the whole, however, being in constant readiness to form under arms at their several alarm posts on the first intimation of the garrison making a sortie."†

* "The redoubts were ordered to be made of a strong field profile, and to be armed with the French field-guns captured at Vitoria, firing through embrasures."—*Journal of the Sieges.*

† Ibid.

The siege of San Sebastian was Lord Wellington's next operation, and it was effected as promptly as Pamplona had been blockaded. On the land side, part of the left wing under Sir Thomas Graham formed the investment; and on its sea front it was blockaded by a British squadron commanded by Sir George Collyer.

A year destined to witness the most glorious displays of England's bravery as the tide of conquest flowed on in a series of unchecked success, brought to Lord Wellington a well-deserved addition to his honours. On the 1st of January, 1813, he was gazetted to the colonelcy of the royal regiment of Horse Guards,* and on the 4th of March, elected a Knight of the Garter. On the 22d of July, the Cortes proposed and the Regency offered, the fine estate of Soto de Roma in Granada, to the commander of their armies, "in the name of the Spanish nation, and in testimony of its sincere gratitude." But from his own Sovereign a higher honour was conferred upon the conqueror of Vitoria—and that flattering distinction was intimated to the allied general, in the graceful manner that might have been expected from one, who had been pronounced "the most polished gentleman in Europe:—

"*Carlton House, 3d July*, 1813.

"MY DEAR LORD,

"Your glorious conduct is beyond all human praise, and far above my reward. I know no language the world affords worthy to express it. I feel I have nothing left to say, but devoutly to offer up my prayer of gratitude to Providence, that it has, in its omnipotent bounty, blessed my country and myself with such a General. You have

* This appointment appeared to have been particularly gratifying to Lord Wellington, and he expressed himself warmly to the Duke of York on the occasion, as "a fortunate and a favoured man:"—

"I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 13th January, in which your Royal Highness has informed me that the Prince Regent has been graciously pleased to appoint me to be Colonel of the Royal

sent me, among the trophies of your unrivalled fame, the staff of a French marshal, and I send you in return that of England.

"The British army will hail it with enthusiasm, while the whole universe will acknowledge those valorous efforts which have so imperiously called for it.

"That uninterrupted health and still increasing laurels may continue to crown you through a glorious and long career of life, are the never ceasing and most ardent wishes of, my dear Lord, your very sincere and faithful friend,

"G. P. R."

"Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G."

regiment of Horse Guards, upon the resignation of the Duke of Northumberland. I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to His Royal Highness for the repeated marks which I have received of his grace and favour, more particularly for this last instance of both; and I can only assure him of my devotion to his service. I am convinced that, on all the occasions on which I have been so highly favoured, I have been much indebted to the favourable representations which your Royal Highness has made of my services; and I beg that your Royal Highness will accept my most sincere thanks."—*Letter, dated Frenada, 31st January*, 1813.

CHAPTER X.

SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN—OPERATIONS OF THE ANGLO-SICILIAN ARMY—SIEGE OF TARRAGONA—FORT BALLAGUER SURRENDERS—SIR JOHN MURRAY RAISES THE SIEGE, AND ABANDONS HIS ARTILLERY—HE DEFENDS HIS CONDUCT—LETTER FROM LORD WELLINGTON—MURRAY SUPERSEDED BY LORD WILLIAM BENTICK—LORD WELLINGTON'S LETTER TO COLONEL TORRENS—COURT-MARTIAL SENTENCES MURRAY TO BE ADMONISHED—LETTER TO EARL BATHURST—DISPUTE BETWEEN THE CORTES AND THE CLERGY—LETTER TO THE SPANISH MINISTER OF WAR—CONGRESS OF PRAGUE—LORD WELLINGTON'S VIEWS—HE DETERMINES TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF IN THE PYRENEES—DISPOSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMY—DEFEAT OF VITORIA COMMUNICATED TO NAPOLEON—MARSHAL SOULT APPOINTED LIEUTENANT OF THE EMPEROR.

WHEN the army of the south were driven by the allies with trifling loss from the positions it had resumed in the fertile valley of the Bastan, excepting the army of Catalonia and the garrisons of Pamplona and Sebastian, there remained not an armed Frenchman in the Peninsula, and Spain was delivered from her oppressors. Never had a campaign been briefer or more brilliant. In six weeks, and with scarcely 100,000 men, Lord Wellington marched 600 miles, passed six great rivers, gained one decisive battle, invested two fortresses, and after driving 120,000 veteran troops from Spain, "stood on the summit of the Pyrenees a recognised conqueror."

Never had a general more reason to plume himself on the conquests he had thus obtained. The splendid plan of the campaign was his own conception—its execution was directed by himself—and by his unparalleled exertions and beneath his own eye, that noble force had been organized, which inflicted a series of defeats upon an army hitherto supposed invincible. The Portuguese had

recovered that efficiency which their wretched government had destroyed; and the Spaniards, hitherto proverbial for military misfortune, exhibited a wonderful improvement. For these advantages Wellington was indebted to himself. The Partida warfare was undoubtedly an admirable auxiliary; but that diversion which had cost England so much, and from which the most important results had been expected, proved in every respect a lamentable failure, after crippling Lord Wellington's means and entailing on the British nation a ruinous expenditure.

It had been arranged by Lord Wellington, that Elio and Del Parque were to occupy Suchet on the Xucar, while Sir John Murray, with the Anglo-Sicilian army, was to attack Tarragona. With the assistance of the Catalan commanders, Suchet must have been thus driven from the rich province of Valencia, and consequently, the lower Ebro would have been opened freely to the allies. But, should Suchet come down in force before Murray had sufficiently established himself in Catalonia, the latter was directed to return immediately to Valencia, and seize the lines which the French marshal had left undefended. Accordingly, on the 31st of May, Murray sailed from Alicante—landed off Tarragona on the 3d of June, and invested the fortress on the same evening. Tarragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, was a weak place. "A simple revêtement three feet and a half thick, without ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the two outworks of Fort Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, were not armed, nor even repaired until after the investment, and the garrison, too weak for the extent of rampart, was oppressed with labour. Here the time being precious to both sides, ordinary rules should have been set aside, and daring operations adopted. Lord Wellington adjudged 10,000 men sufficient to take Tarragona. Murray brought 17,000, of which 14,000 were effective."* The garrison consisted of a mixed force, not exceeding

* Napier.

1,200 men, commanded by an Italian officer called Bertoletti.

A strong hill fort at Balaguer, domineered the only road by which artillery could be moved, if the French should come to the relief of the city before its reduction could be effected; and a corps, under Lieut.-Colonel Prevost, was detached on the 3d for its investment. On the 7th, a magazine exploded, and the fort was surrendered by its commandant. This success secured Murray from any interruption on that side—for Tarragona could only be approached by a circuitous march of three days—the great road being under the guns of fort Balaguer, and the mountain pass impracticable for artillery.

On the 6th, Murray opened his fire on Fort Royal—and on the 8th, it was sufficiently breached to have warranted an assault, as the French had already stormed that front, at the time defended by a garrison of 8,000 Spaniards. Murray, however, declined an attack until he should have made an impression on the body of the place; and accordingly, on the 11th, two heavy batteries opened at the distance of 450 yards.

On the preceding evening it was communicated to Murray, that Suchet was in march from Barcelona, with 10,000 men and 14 pieces of cannon; and the English general expressed his resolution to offer battle, rather than allow the siege to be interrupted. Having despatched his cavalry to Altafalla for this purpose, he repaired in person to the eastward, to select a position for the intended combat, leaving orders that the outworks of Tarragona should be stormed at nightfall. A report that Morrice Mathieu had already reached Villa Franca, however, induced him to return early in the evening; but he repeated the order for the assault. At ten, when the storming party was formed and ready to advance, Murray countermanded his last order—and notwithstanding the earnest remonstrances of his officers, directed that the batteries should be dismantled and the siege raised.

Nothing could be more irregular or disgraceful than the scene that followed. "The parc and all the heavy guns of the batteries on the low grounds were removed to the beach for embarkation on the morning of the 12th, and at twelve o'clock Lord Frederick Bentinck arrived from Altafalla with the cavalry. It is said he was ordered to shoot his horses, but refused to obey, and moved towards the Col de Ballaguer. The detachment from Valls arrived next, and the infantry marched to Cape Salou to embark, but the horsemen followed Lord Frederick, and were themselves followed by fourteen pieces of artillery; each body moved independently, and all was confused, incoherent, afflicting, and dishonourable to the British arms." *

The embarkation of the siege artillery and stores was suddenly abandoned—a strange panic had seized the unfortunate commander, and he madly determined to sacrifice his battering train, when not an enemy was within leagues of Tarragona. Nothing could suppress the indignation which this disgraceful order caused. The army and navy openly expressed their feelings—the staff officers remonstrated—and the admiral not only refused obedience, but offered at his own responsibility, to remove the artillery during the night. After wavering for a time, Murray ordered a preconcerted signal to be given, and, as if an overwhelming enemy was at hand, the guns were spiked and abandoned! Unmolested, the British troops effected their embarkation; and "many of the stores and horses were shipped on the 13th without the slightest interruption from the enemy; but eighteen or nineteen battering pieces, whose carriages had been burnt, were, with all the platforms, fascines, gabions, and small ammunition, in view of the fleet and army, triumphantly carried into the fortress. Sir J. Murray meanwhile, seemed unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on the evening of the 12th, and took his usual repose in bed." †

* Napier. † Ibid.

In his despatch to Lord Wellington, Murray not only justified his conduct, but endeavoured to show that he had acted up to the spirit of the instructions received by him from the commander-in-chief. The defence was a miserable apology. He treated the loss of his artillery with indifference, and the glorious siege train, under whose thunder the ramparts of Badajoz had crumbled, he spoke of as being of no greater value than old iron! Lord Wellington, however, viewed the business in a different light; and in his reply* to Murray's despatch, he demolished the flimsy excuses under which Murray would have covered his misconduct:—

"I have received your letters of the 14th and 23d June," he said, "and I am much concerned that your matters have turned out so unfortunately. In my official letter I have stated the points on which we want information, and I recommend to you to write a detailed narrative of all your proceedings.

"I confess that that which weighs most upon my mind in all this is the loss of your artillery and stores, of which you think the least. First, they are very important trophies to the enemy, of which he will make good use, under existing circumstances, and entirely alter the nature of the operation of raising the siege.

"Secondly; the loss of them entirely cripples our operations on the eastern coast during the campaign, and prevents the army of the eastern coast from taking all the advantage which they may take of our success in this quarter, which it is probable will be followed by Suchet's throwing his army on our right flank. However, the consequences are not so important to you as the facts themselves; and I am anxious that you should place these in a light to justify you in the eyes of His Majesty's Government."

To the last hour of his command, Sir John Murray exhibited the same infirmity of purpose which all through

* Dated Huarte, 1st July, 1813.

had marred every operation in which he had engaged. On being informed that Mathieu's division had retreated on the Llobregat, he disembarked the army once more—at one moment, preparing to attack Suchet—and at another, threatening to cut off the column under Panettier. To complete this climax of absurdity, after having suffered his guns to pass into the hands of the besieged, he spoke of renewing the investment of Tarragona. The auxiliary force under Copons, which had moved to his assistance, escaped destruction by mere accident; for Murray left it to its fate, without intimating his intentions to the Spanish general. His last act was to hold a council of war, and come to the determination of re-embarking; when, at this juncture, the Mediterranean fleet hove in sight, and signalized that Lord William Bentinck was on board; and the admiral's answer, "We are all delighted," told how deeply the superseded general had fallen in the opinions of both services.

The disgraceful termination of these operations on the eastern coast was followed by a court martial on Sir John Murray. Charges were preferred against him by Lord Wellington; and in a subsequent letter,* the commander-in-chief gives a summary of the causes for this proceeding:—

"I entertained a very high opinion of —— ——'s talents; but he always appeared to me to want what is better than abilities, viz., sound sense. There is always some mistaken principle in what he does. I confess that I do not know what to make of ——'s charges. Raising the siege I do not care about; it might have been necessary when the enemy approached him; nor do I care much about his embarking; his instructions would warrant his doing so if he raised the siege, and did not think he could fight a decidedly successful action. But what I cannot bear is his leaving his guns and stores; and strange to say, not only does he not think he was wrong in so doing, but he writes

* Letter to Colonel Torrens, dated Lesaca, 8th August, 1813.

of it as being rather meritorious, and says he did it before at Biar.

"It appears that he knew on the 7th and 8th that Suchet was approaching him on one side, and Maurice Mathieu on the other.

"I shall charge him with having omitted then to make arrangements to raise the siege and to embark his guns and stores. I shall then charge him with disobedience of his instructions in not having gone to Valencia to join the Duque del Parque, when he raised the siege and embarked. If he had raised the siege on the 7th or 8th, or rather had then discontinued to disembark his guns and stores, and had afterwards embarked his corps on the 12th or 13th, upon finding Suchet approaching him, and thinking the enemy too strong for him, and had then sailed for the coast of Valencia, he would have obeyed his instructions, and the manœuvre would have answered; that is to say, he would have gained the lines of the Jucar, and probably more ground in Valencia without a battle. Instead of that, after losing his guns, he staid till the evening of the 17th; then Lord William embarked the army, which since the 12th had been disembarked at the Col de Balaguer; and in fact Suchet, after having obliged Sir John Murray to raise the siege of Tarragona, returned and forced the Duque del Parque to abandon the Jucar before he could be supported by Lord William Bentinck.

"The best of the story is, that all parties ran away. Maurice Mathieu ran away; Sir John Murray ran away; and so did Suchet. He was afraid to strike at Sir John Murray without his artillery, and knew nothing of Maurice Mathieu; and he returned into Valencia either to strike at the Duque del Parque, or to get the assistance of Harispe, whom he had left opposed to the Duque del Parque. I know that in his first proclamation to his army on their success, he knew so little what had passed at Tarragona, that he mentioned the English general having raised the siege, but not his having left his artillery. He could there-

fore have had no communication with the place when he marched; and he must have known of the raising of the siege afterwards only by the reports of the country."

The difficulty of holding a court-martial in Spain prevented Sir John Murray from being tried until the war had terminated. In England therefore, an inquiry into his misconduct took place. Defects in evidence and technical informalities obtained an acquittal on two charges—while on the third, he was found guilty and sentenced to be admonished.

It will appear a very singular fact, that Lord Wellington's most signal successes were generally shadowed by some reverse or misconduct that followed fast upon his triumph. In a week after the battle of Vitoria, Murray's failure at Tarragona was communicated, while many and serious annoyances, at the same moment, pressed him heavily; and the complaint he had often made, that his soldiers were never trustworthy but on a battle-field, was now too faithfully verified. In a letter* to Lord Bathurst, he thus describes the condition of the allied army only ten days after their matchless gallantry had won one of the most brilliant actions upon record.

"I enclose the copy of a letter from the Governor of Vitoria, which shows how our men are going on in that neighbourhood. These men are detachments from the different regiments of the army who were sent to Vitoria the day after the battle, each under officers, in order to collect the wounded and their arms and accoutrements. It is quite impossible for me or any other man to command a British army under the existing system. We have in the service the scum of the earth as common soldiers; and of late years we have been doing every thing in our power, both by law and by publications, to relax the discipline by which alone such men can be kept in order. The officers of the lower

* Dated Huarte, 2d July, 1813.

ranks will not perform the duty required from them for the purpose of keeping their soldiers in order; and it is next to impossible to punish any officer for neglects of this description. As to the non-commissioned officers, as I have repeatedly stated, they are as bad as the men, and too near them, in point of pay and situation, by the regulations of late years, for us to expect them to do any thing to keep the men in order. It is really a disgrace to have any thing to say to such men as some of our soldiers are.

"I now beg to draw your attention to the mode in which these irregularities affect our numbers. On the 17th June the total British and Portuguese force was 67,036 rank and file; on the 29th June it is 58,694 rank and file; diminution 8,342 rank and file. The British, on the 17th June, were 41,547 rank and file; on the 29th June, 35,650 rank and file: diminution 5,897. The loss of British rank and file in the battle was 3,164, including 200 missing; so that the diminution from irregularities, straggling, &c. since, for plunder, is 2,733. The loss of Portuguese rank and file in the battle was 1,022, including 73 missing; and their diminution, from the same causes, is 1,423.

"While we were pursuing the enemy by the valley of Araquil towards Pamplona, finding so many men straggling from their ranks, I ordered that an hospital might be established to receive them: and, although there are so many men absent from their regiments, there are only 160 in that hospital. The others are plundering the country in different directions."

Other considerations damped the ardour of success. The Cortes and the clergy were at issue, and particularly on the question of abolishing the Inquisition; and as Lord Wellington justly remarked, neither government nor Cortes appeared to care about a foreign war, the former being the instrument and creature of the latter; while their sole employment was "the praise of their stupid constitution, and how to carry on the war against the bishops and priests."

After counselling his own government against interfering in the internal concerns of Spain, until "the termination of all this folly," the deposition of Castaños and Giron drew from Lord Wellington the annexed just and spirited remonstrance, addressed to the Spanish war minister, and dated Huarte, 2d July, 1813:—

"I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letters of the 15th June, conveying to me the pleasure of the Regency, that the Captain-General Castaños should be recalled from the command of the 4th army, in order to attend the sittings of the Council of State, as he was not at the head of that army of which the command had been confided to him by the Regency; and that General Freyre should be Captain-General of Estremadura and Castille, and should command the 4th army; and that General Lacy should be Captain-General in Galicia, and should command the troops in that province independently of the general commanding the 4th army; and that General Don P. A. Giron should be removed to the 1st army.

"As the constitution of the Spanish monarchy has declared the ministers responsible for the acts of the government, I may consider these acts as those of your Excellency, and I hope that I may venture to convey a few observations upon them, which I beg may be laid before the Regency.

"Justice towards the character of Captain-General Castaños, an officer who has served his country in close concert with me for the last three years, and who in the whole course of that time has never differed in opinion from me on any subject of importance, induces me to remind your Excellency that the local situation of the 4th army before the commencement of the campaign prevented its formation into a corps of which the captain-general could with propriety place himself at the head; that, if this formation had been locally practicable, the deplorable state of the finances applicable to the support of the 4th army would have prevented its remaining united in such corps.

"Your Excellency must be aware that, when there is no money for the support of the troops, a particular district of country may not find it impossible to supply without payment the food for a small body, while it would be quite impossible to supply it for a large one; and for this reason, and others referable to the state of discipline and the peculiar organization of some of the troops, I did not think it proper that more of the troops of the 4th army should be assembled together than the two divisions composing the army from Galicia under the command of Don P. A. Giron.

"It would have been indecorous and improper, adverting to General Castaños's rank and situation, besides being inconvenient, if he had joined these divisions, or any other portion of the 4th army; and he therefore, in the commencement of the operations of the campaign, had his head-quarters at or near mine and the Portuguese head-quarters by my desire.

"Not only your Excellency has not adverted to these circumstances in the decision which you have recommended to the government regarding general Castaños, but you have omitted to advert to others. Besides being commander-in-chief of the 4th army, General Castaños was Captain-General of Estremadura and Castille and Galicia. In that capacity he had duties to perform most important for the political interests, and particularly for the welfare of the army.

"It was his duty to establish the authority of the Spanish government in the different towns and districts, as they should be successively evacuated by the enemy; and, from the nature of the operations of the army, and from the peculiar line of march it followed, he could not have performed this duty if he had been what is called at the head of the 4th army, or at my head quarters, which have moved nearly every day since the 22d May, have never been in any large or capital town, excepting Salamanca, where I left General Castaños, nor ever upon the high road.

"It was I, and not General Castaños, who suggested that

he should employ himself in this manner; and I must say that, considering the manner in which Don P. A. Giron has commanded the divisions of the army of Galicia in the field, we should have neglected our duty to the state if we had not chalked out for General Castaños the performance of those duties for which he is now punished and disgraced.

"In regard to the arrangements made by your Excellency for filling the appointments held by General Castaños, and the removal of General Don P. A. Giron, without trial or even cause assigned, from a situation in which he had been placed by General Castaños by my desire, and in which he had conducted himself entirely to my satisfaction, as I had already reported to the government, I believe that, in addition to the inconvenience and injury to the public of all changes of this description in the midst of a military operation, it will not be denied that they are directly in breach of the engagements made to me by the late Regency, and confirmed by the existing Regency, which engagements, your Excellency knows well, alone induced me to accept the command of the Spanish army.

"Your Excellency knows also that this is not the first time that the engagements solemnly entered into with me, after full and repeated discussions, have been broken; and nobody knows better than your Excellency the inconvenience to the service which resulted. You are likewise aware of my disposition and desire still to serve the Spanish nation as far as is in my power. There are limits, however, to forbearance and submission to injury; and I confess that I feel that I have been most unworthily treated in these transactions by the Spanish government, even as a gentleman.

"It is not my habit, nor do I feel inclined, to make a parade of my services to the Spanish nation; but I must say that I have never abused the powers with which the government and the Cortes have entrusted me, in any, the most trifling, instance, nor have ever used them for any purpose excepting to forward the public service. For the truth of this assertion I appeal likewise even to your Excellency;

and I believe it will be admitted that the circumstances which rendered necessary the formation of those engagements render it necessary to perform them, if it is desired that I should retain the command of the army."

Lord Wellington had however, more serious causes for inquietude than the stupid differences between the Cortes and the clergy. A congress was about to be assembled at Prague; and Napoleon had proposed that persons accredited by his brother and the Cortes, should submit the arrangements of a peace to that body for accommodation. The Emperor's design was self-apparent. A proposal to partition Spain would possibly meet with little opposition from the northern powers, while Britain, bent on the integrity of that monarchy, might be excluded from a general pacification, and left to deal single-handed with France.

Many conjectures were hazarded in the meantime, as to what should form the basis of the overture; and it was intimated that Lord Wellington's services might be transferred from the Peninsula to the Continent. These were indeed, important considerations; and to both, the allied general, with characteristic firmness, gave replies which had their due effect.

"In regard to my going to Germany, I am the Prince Regent's servant, and will do whatever he and his government please. But I would beg them to recollect that the great advantages which I enjoy here consist in the confidence that every body feels that I am doing what is right, which advantage I should not enjoy, for a time at least, in Germany. Many might be found to conduct matters as well as I can, both here and in Germany; but nobody would enjoy the same advantage here, and I should be no better than another in Germany. If a British army should be left in the Peninsula, therefore, it is best that I should remain with it.

"You see that we have already settled the question of the Ebro for you; and by a letter from my brother of the 3d,

I see that the Spanish government have settled for themselves the question of peace with Buonaparte. I recommend you not to give up an inch of Spanish territory. I think I can hold the Pyrenees as easily as I can Portugal. I am quite certain I can hold the position which I have got more easily than the Ebro, or any other position in Spain. I will go further; I would prefer to have Joseph as King of Spain, without any cession to France, (seeing how ready all the Buonaparte family are to separate from France, and notwithstanding that he is, I think, the least likely of any so to separate,) than to have Ferdinand with the Ebro as the frontier. In the latter case Spain must inevitably belong to the French."

Uncertain what turn the negotiations then in progress should eventually take, Lord Wellington, with sound judgment, prepared for an issue whether favourable or the reverse. To hold the Pyrenees was in his opinion the great object of the war; and that only could be effected by reducing Pamplona and San Sebastian. The former he had already blockaded; and the latter he was preparing to invest. The battering train was accordingly ordered round from Bilbao to Passages, and such dispositions made of the allied troops as should cover the blockade and siege from the chance of an interruption.

To achieve this object, difficulties presented themselves in the outset, which none but a superior genius could have conquered. Severed from each other by the great range of mountains trending into Spain in a southerly direction between the sources of the Bidasoa and the Arga, the fortresses were farther from each other than from the advanced posts of the French armies. The close blockade of Pamplona was indispensable to the reduction of San Sebastian; and as the passes through the Pyrenees were numerous, the country rugged and impracticable, the bridges narrow, and lateral communications between the leading roads circuitous everywhere, and in some places considered impassable for any animal but a mule; to guard

these openings in the mountains would require an immense dispersion of the covering army, while the difficulty which an alpine surface exhibited, prevented a rapid concentration, should the enemy advance in strength to relieve their beleaguered garrisons.

Thus circumstanced, and after a careful survey of the country, Lord Wellington made his final dispositions; and the result best told with what ability his different positions had been chosen.

To the fifth division, under Major-General Oswald, comprising Hay and Robinson's British, and Spry's Portuguese brigades, the duties of the siege were entrusted. The division of the guards, and that under Lord Aylmer, with the Germans, covered the great road leading from Irun to Oyarzun, and supported Freyer's Spanish division, which was in position in the heights of San Marcial, protecting the line of the Bidasoa from the Crown Mountain to the sea. The corps of Giron and Longa, communicated with the left centre at Vera, which consisted of the light division, posted at the pass of Echellas, and the seventh division on the heights of Santa Barbara, and Vera. The right centre, under Hill, remained in the valley of the Bastan, while the brigades of Pringle and Walker (second division) occupied the pass of Maya. On the right, the passes of Col. d'Ariette, and Col. d'Espegas were guarded by the Conde d'Amarante's brigades under Ashworth and Da Costa. Campbell's Portuguese brigade was strongly posted between the valleys of Aldudes and Hayra, connecting the troops in the valley of the Bastan with the right wing posted at Roncesvalles. The sixth division, under Pack, occupied San Estevan, forming a reserve for the allied centre, and supporting the brigades at the passes of Maya and Echellas. The right wing covered the direct approaches from St. Jean Pied de Port to Pamplona, while its front was secured by Byng's brigade of the second division, which held the passes of Roncesvalles and Orbaicete. Morillo's Spanish corps, also guarded the latter opening—while the fourth division formed a second

line in rear of Roncesvalles. The third division was in reserve at Olaque; and the mass of the allied cavalry, with the heavy artillery, were extensively cantoned in the country between Pamplona and Tafalla, in rear of the fortress, and a position from which they could operate if required. Some regiments of cavalry, British and Portuguese, with thirty-six light guns, were attached to the right and centre of the allies. The great hospital had been since the battle established at Vitoria; and commissariat depôts were formed along the coast, as the places best adapted for obtaining supplies, and forwarding them to the different divisions.

Like the tidings of Marmont's disaster at Salamanca, the news of Joseph's defeat reached Napoleon at a crisis, when a lost battle was a calamity indeed. With him, every previous armistice had obtained concessions; and, had Vitoria terminated differently, battles, in no way decisive, might from a fortunate success in Spain, have produced results similar to those of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. With ominous rapidity, the intelligence reached every European court that Joseph had been driven from his throne, and Wellington overlooked the fields of France—and none could gainsay it—a conqueror. With what astonishment these tidings were received, those immediately round the person of Napoleon have since narrated. Nothing could be more humiliating—nothing, the time considered, more ruinous. His brother no longer prosecuted the war in Spain, but defeated and shaken in confidence, had sought shelter in the plains of Gascony. "Accustomed as he had been to receive reports from the Peninsula little calculated to give satisfaction, or to confirm his impression of the invincible qualities of those troops which he had personally ever led to certain victory, so extensive and alarming a reverse as that now made known must have been as unexpected as it was disastrous; but with all the promptitude of a person born to command, instead of yielding to gloomy circumstances, he issued orders for a bold effort to counteract the tide of war, to recover the ground lost by Vitoria, and to

awaken to energy, as he conceived, the dormant spirit of his soldiers. Troops marched from the interior to reinforce, artillery from the depôts completed the equipment, and the marshal Duke of Dalmatia was entrusted with full powers to conduct the renewed hostilites, and retrieve the errors of his predecessors."*

On the 1st of July, Soult was appointed Lieutenant to the Emperor. His powers were plenary—amounting even to the removal of Joseph—and by force, if such an alternative should be required. That, however, was unnecessary. The fugitive monarch was weary of the mockery of a throne; and he willingly retired from the command of an army, which had always borne his control with dissatisfaction, and under it, had experienced nothing but dishonour and defeat.

* Leith Hay.

CHAPTER XI.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY—ITS STRENGTH—SAN SEBASTIAN—SIEGE COMMENCED—PREPARATIONS FOR ITS DEFENCE—REDOUBT AND CONVENT STORMED—ANECDOTES—SIEGE OPERATIONS—DETAILS—THE FIRST ASSAULT—ITS FAILURE AND CASUALTIES—LORD WELLINGTON BLOCKADES THE PLACE—SOULT JOINS THE FRENCH ARMY, AND ADDRESSES IT—REMARKS.

SOULT's first care was to reorganize the beaten armies with the large reinforcements which had joined them since their defeat, into one grand corps entitled *L'Armée d'Espagne.* According to its new formation, it comprised nine divisions of infantry, divided into a right, centre, and left. The former was commanded by Reille, the centre by Drouet (Comte d'Erlon), the left by Clausel—and the reserve was placed under the orders of Villatte. The cavalry was also organized in three divisions, of which two were of heavy dragoons, commanded by Generals Treillard and Tilly, with a light division under the marshal's brother, Pierre Soult. The lost artillery had been replaced—and on a scale, fully equal to those fine parks which had been abandoned by the French army at Vitoria.

Never had the casualties attendant on a total defeat been more speedily or effectually remedied. On the 21st of June the armies of the north, centre, and south, were utterly derouted—on the 21st of July, according to the imperial muster-rolls, Soult had under his immediate command,

without including foreign corps and garrisons, 80,000 men, with 90 pieces of artillery. Such was the force collected in front of Wellington, when he commenced the siege of a fortress already celebrated in military history.

"The town of St. Sebastian, containing nearly ten thousand inhabitants, is built on a low peninsula, running north and south; the defences of the western side being washed by the sea, and those on the eastern side by the river Urumea, which, at high water, covers four feet of the masonry of the scarp.

"The works of the land-front across the Isthmus consist of a single front of fortification, exceeding three hundred and fifty yards in length, with a flat bastion in the centre, covered by a hornwork, having the usual counterscarp, covered-way, and glacis; but the defences running lengthways of the peninsula, consist merely of a simple rampart wall, indifferently flanked, without either ditch, counterscarp, glacis, or other obstacle in its front; and further, this naked scarp wall, on the eastern side, is seen from its summit to its base, from the Chofre range of sand hills, on the right of the Urumea, at distances from five hundred to a thousand yards.

At the extremity of the peninsula, a rocky height, called Monte Orgullo, of the considerable base of 400 yards by 600 yards, rises steeply to a point, which is occupied by a small work or citadel called Fort La Mota. The whole of this promontory is cut off from the town by a defensive line near its foot; and its southern face is covered with batteries which plunge into the lower defences of the place, and add materially to their powers of resistance.

"It appears to have been an unaccountable oversight, (even looking to moderate security against surprise,) to have left the eastern defences of the town without cover or a second obstacle, as the Urumea, for two hours before and after high water, is so shallow as to be fordable; and, for the same period, a considerable space becomes dry on the left bank of the river, by which troops can march from the

Isthmus, along the foot of the sea scarp wall of the town, to its very extremity next the castle.

"Marshal Berwick, when he besieged St. Sebastian in 1719, aware of this circumstance, threw up batteries on the Chofre sand hills, to breach the eastern town wall, and, whilst that was effecting, pushed on approaches along the Isthmus, and established a lodgment and batteries on the covered-way of the hornwork of the land front, to prevent its left branch impeding the approach to the breach."*

On the 11th of July Lord Wellington transferred his head quarters from Zubieta to Hernani; and on the 12th reconnoitred the fortress from the hills of La Cabzada, and the castle from the height of Olia. The plan of attack proposed by the chief engineer (Major Smith) was immediately adopted; and it was determined that the town wall should be breached in two places from the Chofre sand hills and stormed by advancing during low water along the left of the Urumea. On the Isthmus, the enemy had fortified the convent of San Bartolemeo with a redoubt, and a circular work formed of casks upon the causeway; and to protect the flank of the column employed in the intended assault, it was necessary that these works in the first instance should be reduced.

Operations were commenced on the night of the 11th; and the siege opened with more efficient means than Lord Wellington had previously possessed. Upwards of three hundred engineers and five hundred artillery men were present. Forty pieces, including guns, mortars, howitzers, and carronades, were already collected, which, at a subsequent period of the siege, were increased to one hundred and seventeen.†

Although San Sebastian had been neglected by the French previous to the battle of Vitoria, that unexpected

* Journal of the Sieges.

† On the 23d of August the siege artillery and ammunition were thus officially returned; and certainly, though the place was strong, the means for its reduction were proportionate:—

24-pounder

defeat at once rendered the fortress an object of paramount importance. On the 22d of June, the convoy under General Rey reached the city, and the escort was directed to remain and form its garrison. The new commandant obliged the unfortunate refugees to continue their journey into France without protection; and drove every stranger from the city, although the risk of falling into the hands of the Partidas was imminent, and in that event destruction would have been inevitable, as from the hands of their indignant countrymen no mercy could be expected. Foy, during his retreat, left a reinforcement on the 27th; and on the 1st of July, the garrison was farther increased by that of Guateria, and a detachment of artillery and artificers from St. Jean de Luz. Thus upwards of three thousand men were now collected for its defence. Seventy-six heavy guns were mounted on the works, and subsequently, more reached the fortress by sea. Indeed, so imperfect was the coast blockade,* that the French not only received

24-pounder guns	56	round shot	40,138
		case and grape	2,398
		spherical case	9,199
18-pounder guns	14	round shot	22,081
		case and grape	1,100
		spherical case	4,500
10-inch mortars	16	common shells	5,317
		carcasses	20
8-inch howitzers	18	common shells	6,224
68-pr. carronades	12	common case	900
		spherical case	8,100

Total . . 116 pieces.

In addition, there was a Spanish 12-inch mortar, and 100 shells, brought from one of the ports on the coast.

Barrels of powder	7,555
Barrels of powder in filled cartridges	500

* The following passages occur in official letters from Lord Wellington, and prove that the naval resources of England were not employed as effectively as they might have been:—

"I am certain that it will not be denied, that since Great Britain has been a naval power, a British army has never been left in such a situation, and that at a moment when it is most important to us to preserve, and to the

supplies, but were enabled to send off their wounded men, and both were unmolested by the British cruisers.

The siege, by Lord Wellington's orders, was vigorously carried on; and the batteries being completed and armed on the 14th, opened on the Convent of San Bartolemeo and the redoubt. The fire was rapid and well-directed; and, next day, the south end of the church was beaten down, and though the roof was frequently in flames, they were extinguished by the exertions of the defenders. On the 16th a breach was practicable in the front of the building, and on the 17th, the end of the convent and part of the garden wall being laid open, at ten in the morning the convent and redoubt were assaulted and carried by the 9th regiment, three companies of the royals, and a detachment of the Caçadores. The French fought obstinately; but the gallantry of the assailants rendered a brave defence unavailing—and the enemy were driven in confusion down the hill, carrying a strong reinforcement just sent from San Sebastian, along with them in their flight through the burnt village of San Martin.

Unfortunately, the impetuosity of the troops when in pursuit could not be restrained by the exertions of the superior officers, who had received Major-General Oswald's directions not to pass San Martin; and a considerable loss was sustained by those who followed the enemy to the foot of the glacis, on their return to San Martin.* In this affair the French lost two hundred and fifty men; and the British casualties amounted nearly to one hundred.

enemy to interrupt, the communication by the coast. If they only take the ship with our shoes, we must halt for six weeks!"

* * * * *

"I beg your lordship to observe in what manner the blockade of the coast is kept up. I wish to make the siege of St. Sebastian, which is one of quite a different description from that of Pamplona; but I cannot undertake it till I shall know whether we are secure at sea. I really believe that this is the first time of late years that any British commander on shore has had reason to entertain a doubt on this point."—*Despatches to Earl Bathurst.*

* Graham's Despatch to Wellington.

Two batteries were thrown up during the night in a situation to enfilade and take in reverse the defences of the town. "This in the loose sand was a most difficult work, and the fire of the enemy was directed with great precision to interrupt it; four sentinels were killed in succession through one loop-hole. The only eminence from whence artillery could be brought to bear directly on the town, though still about a hundred feet below it, was above the convent, and almost adjoining its walls. Here a battery was erected; the covered way to it passed through the convent, and the battery itself was constructed in a thickly peopled burial-ground. A more ghastly circumstance can seldom have occurred in war;—for coffins and corpses in all stages of decay were exposed when the soil was thrown up to form a defence against the fire from the town, and were used, indeed, in the defences; and when a shell burst there, it brought down the living and the dead together. An officer was giving his orders, when a shot struck the edge of the trenches above him; two coffins slipped down upon him with the sand, the coffins broke in their fall, the bodies rolled with him for some distance, and when he recovered he saw that they had been women of some rank, for they were richly attired in black velvet, and their long hair hung about their shoulders and their livid faces. The soldiers, in the scarcity of firewood, being nothing nice, broke up coffins for fuel with which to dress their food, leaving the bodies exposed; and till the hot sun had dried up these poor insulted remains of humanity, the stench was as dreadful as the sight."*

The operations of the siege were rapidly continued; and on the 20th the whole of the batteries opened their fire. It was a singular coincidence that the breaching point selected by the British engineer, should have been the same spot chosen by Marshal Berwick nearly a century before. It was however, unfortunately stronger now than any other

* Southey.

portion of the masonry, as it had been additionally secured when the damages of the former siege had been subsequently repaired. But the fire from the fortress was much feebler than was expected; and as it was entirely directed against the battery employed in breaching, it was apparent from the commencement of the operation, that the garrison wished to spare their ammunition, as they scarcely ever fired at working parties bringing shot, &c.; and at this time many of their shells, which, having been thrown with great correctness, might have done much mischief, were not loaded with sufficient powder to burst them. Many shells, which exploded with their fuses downwards, were observed to spring up merely a few feet from the ground and fall again harmlessly, almost on the same spot."*

Both the artillery of the besiegers and the besieged began now to give evidence of failure; and many guns on the works of San Sebastian were observed at every discharge to give the double explosion, which generally attends an enlargement of the vent. Indeed, the wonder was that any metal could support the heavy fire maintained by the besiegers. "On the 22d, the expenditure from the breaching battery alone amounted to 3,500 rounds; which, for ten guns in action, averaged 350 rounds a gun, expended in about fifteen and a half hours of day-light. Such a rate of firing probably was never equalled at any siege, great accuracy of range being at the same time observed.

"The fire of the place was now very inconsiderable, but the garrison, whose proceedings were visible from No. 11 battery on Mount Olia, were observed to be unremitting in their exertions in placing sand-bags, and in preparing interior defences against the moment of the assault."†

On the evening of the 23d the breaches were reported practicable, and the assault was consequently ordered to be given. In the rear of the great breach however, the

* Journal of the Sieges. † Ibid.

houses had taken fire; and they burned so furiously, that it was deemed advisable to defer the storm for another day, and employ the interval in opening another breach between the main one and the half-bastion of St. John.

That delay was not neglected by General Rey; and, unfortunately, it afforded ample time for completing his means of resistance. On a cavalier in the centre of the land front, and commanding the high curtain, two additional guns were mounted, to assist the fire of one still serviceable on the horn-work, and two that were in casemates on the flank. "Two other field-pieces were mounted on an entrenchment which, crossing the ditch of the land front, bore on the approaches to the main breach; a 24-pounder looked from the tower of Las Mesquitas, between the main breach and where the third opening was being made, and consequently flanking both; two four-pounders were in the tower of Hornos; two heavy guns were on the flank of St. Elmo, and two others, placed on the right of the Mirador, could play upon the breaches from within the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus fourteen pieces were still available for defence; the retaining sea-wall, or *fausse braye*, which strengthened the flank of the horn-work, and between which and the river the storming parties must necessarily advance, was covered with live shells to roll over on the columns; and behind the flaming houses near the breach, other edifices were loop-holed and filled with musketeers."*

On the night of the 24th, the storming parties, amounting to about two thousand men of the fifth division, entered the trenches on the Isthmus; and on the explosion of a mine formed in the extremity of a conduit that connected an aqueduct with the town,† the assailants rushed forward.

* Napier.

† The peninsular sieges were always remarkable for displays of personal intrepidity and adventure. On the 21st, in carrying a parallel across the Isthmus, the pipe of a ruined aqueduct was accidentally laid bare. It opened on a long drain, four feet in length, and three feet wide "Through this dangerous

At first, the assault promised complete success. The counterscarp and glacis of the horn-work were blown in, and the French abandoned the flank parapet, while those at the main breach also fell back behind the burning houses. The storming parties were nobly led. Major Frazer and the engineer officer topped the breach; and with the greatest gallantry, but in broken order, many of the soldiery followed them. The attack, however, was irregular, and consequently inefficient. The boldest pressed to the summit of the breach; but there a sheer descent presented itself, while flames and smoke burst from the burning houses in their front, "and awed the stoutest;"—but the greater number of the assailants stopped at the demi-bastion, and unwisely opened their musketry, and returned the fusilade from the ramparts. That was a fatal error—the enemy rallied—manned the loop-holed houses commanding the great breach, and from front and flank opened a destructive fire on the stormers and their support, which darkness and local difficulties had paralysed in its advance. With restored confidence, the French from every quarter, poured death upon the column. Shells from the citadel—grape from the flank defences—grenades and musketry from the houses, increased the panic and added to the slaughter. The regiments intermixed—and the confusion became consequently, irremediable. In vain, the leading officers partially rallied the troops and set them a glorious example. For a while, in one dense mass, confined between the horn-work and the river, unable to advance and unwilling to retire, the assailants steadily remained—but it was only to be slaughtered—till the chances of succeeding became so desperate, that those who survived reluctantly gave way and returned to the trenches.

opening Lieutenant Reid of the engineers, a young and zealous officer, crept even to the counterscarp of the horn-work, and finding the passage there closed by a door, returned without an accident. Thirty barrels of powder were placed in this drain and eight feet was stopped with sand-bags, thus forming a globe of compression designed to blow, as through a tube, so much rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill the narrow ditch of the horn-work."—*Napier.*

The attack seems to have been, in many respects, imperfectly arranged, and more confusedly delivered. Its postponement was injudicious. There was no object to be obtained—and soldiers, right or wrong, always draw their inferences. The impression was accordingly conveyed, that either the means of attack were insufficient, or the defences stronger than had been supposed.* The tide calculations for the 24th were not suited for a day's delay. The water was consequently higher; and while the space beneath the walls was contracted, darkness increased the difficulty of making a well-combined assault. Worse still, the batteries on the sand-hills continued their discharges of grape, which fell heavily on the assailants as they were advancing; while the Portuguese, who reached the ditch in perfect order, were unable to escalade, as ladders had not been provided for the purpose.

The failure of the assault on San Sebastian was in every respect an unfortunate event; and the casualties were unusually severe. Five engineer officers, including their invaluable chief (Sir Richard Fletcher), with forty-four officers of the line, and five hundred and twenty men, were killed, wounded, or made prisoners.

As soon as it became fully day-light the garrison proposed a truce for an hour, which, being agreed to, they

* "The deferring of the assault from the 24th to the 25th, expressly because the breach was too difficult, rendered the troops uneasy, they suspected some hidden danger, and in this mood emerging from the trenches, they were struck by the fire of their own batteries; then wading through deep pools of water, or staggering in the dark over slippery rocks, and close under the enemy's flanking works, whence every shot told with fatal effect, how could they manifest their natural conquering energy? It is possible that a second and more vigorous assault on the great breach might have been effected by a recognised leader, but no general or staff officer went out of the trenches with the troops, and the isolated exertions of the regimental officers were unavailing. Nor were there wanting other sinister influences. General Oswald had in the councils earnestly and justly urged the dangers arising from the irregular mode of attack, but this anticipation of ill success, in which other officers of rank joined, was freely expressed out of council, and it is said even in the hearing of the troops, abating that daring confidence which victory loves."—*Napier.*

moved the wounded from the foot of the escarp wall into the place. On the expiration of the truce, the batteries commenced a regular fire on the breach to prevent its being cleared, or further retrenched, which fire was maintained uninterruptedly throughout the day.*

On the following day Lord Wellington came over from Lesaca. His intention was to push on the siege vigorously; but the great expenditure of ammunition, and the insufficiency of the heavy ordnance, induced him to postpone his operations until an ample supply of siege artillery and stores should arrive, as expected, from England. He made, however, all necessary arrangements for the future operations, and after some consideration, it was decided to persevere in the same plan of attack; but with the increased ordnance to enlarge the breach from its left extremity to the salient angle of the left demi-bastion of the land front, and by the fire of additional batteries, containing seven 24-pounders and four 8-inch howitzers to be established on the isthmus, to carry the breach from the salient angle of that bastion along its face to the end of the high curtain above it, so as to form one enormous opening or ascent of at least one hundred yards. Further, his lordship becoming acquainted with the general discouragement of the troops employed on the operation, and not being altogether satisfied with the recent assault, arranged that a body of volunteers should be obtained from the army generally, to bear the brunt of the next storming of the breaches—and in the meanwhile the trenches were to be held by a guard of 800 men.†

Other circumstances, besides a scarcity of ammunition, obliged Lord Wellington to substitute a blockade for a siege. Soult was concentrating in front of the passes, and the allied force would have been unequal to shut up Pamplona, invest San Sebastian, and afford an army of sufficient strength to cover the double operation. Accordingly,

* Journal of the Sieges. † Ibid.

orders were issued to disarm the batteries, and, with the exception of four pieces, remove the guns to Passages.

While this was being effected, the garrison made a successful sortie, in which they surprised and carried off two hundred and fifty Portuguese, and a few British soldiers.

From the moment that Soult announced his arrival, the greatest activity prevailed through the French cantonments, proving the high military estimation in which Napoleon's lieutenant was regarded by the army he commanded. On the 14th, the French marshal examined the whole line of the positions—directed that pontoons should be prepared—and, in a few days, he was ready to commence the offensive.

On the 23d, in an order of the day, the Duke of Dalmatia made a forcible appeal to his soldiers, couched in that florid language, to which Napoleon had familiarized his armies. After noticing his own appointment, and Napoleon's recent campaign, the marshal thus proceeded:—

"While Germany was thus the theatre of great events, that enemy, who, under pretence of succouring the inhabitants of the Peninsula, has in reality devoted them to ruin, was not inactive. He assembled the whole of his disposable force—English, Spaniards, and Portuguese—under his most experienced officers; and relying upon the superiority of his numbers, advanced in three divisions against the French force assembled upon the Douro. With well provided fortresses in his front and rear, a skilful general, enjoying the confidence of his troops, might, by selecting good positions, have braved and discomfited this motley levy. But, unhappily, at this critical period, timorous and pusillanimous councils were followed. The fortresses were abandoned and blown up: hasty and disorderly marches gave confidence to the enemy; and a veteran army, small indeed in number, but great in all that constitutes the military character, which had fought, bled, and triumphed in every province of Spain, beheld with indignation its laurels tarnished, and itself

compelled to abandon all its acquisitions—the trophies of many a well fought and bloody day. When at length the indignant voice of the troops arrested this disgraceful flight, and its commander, touched with shame, yielded to the general desire, and determined upon giving battle near Vitoria, who can doubt—from this generous enthusiasm—this fine sense of honour—what would have been the result had the general been worthy of his troops? had he, in short, made those dispositions and movements which would have secured to one part of his army the cooperation and support of the other?

"Let us not, however, defraud the enemy of the praise which is due to him. The dispositions and arrangements of their general have been prompt, skilful, and consecutive. The valour and steadiness of his troops have been praiseworthy. Yet do not forget that it is to the benefit of your example they owe their present military character; and that whenever the relative duties of a French general and his troops have been ably fulfilled, their enemies have commonly had no other resource than flight.

"Soldiers! I partake of your chagrin, your grief, your indignation. I know that the blame of the present situation of the army is imputable to others,—be the merit of repairing it yours. I have borne testimony to the emperor of your bravery and zeal. His instructions are to drive the enemy from those lofty heights which enable him proudly to survey our fertile valleys, and chase them across the Ebro. It is on the Spanish soil that your tents must next be pitched, and from thence your resources drawn. No difficulties can be insurmountable to your valour and devotion. Let us, then, exert ourselves with mutual ardour: and be assured, that nothing can give greater felicity to the paternal heart of the emperor, than the knowledge of the triumphs of his army—of its increasing glory—of its having rendered itself worthy of him, and of our dear country.

"Extensive but combined movements for the relief of the fortresses are upon the eve of taking place. They will

be completed in a few days. Let the account of our success be dated from Vitoria,—and the birth of his imperial majesty be celebrated in that city: so shall we render memorable an epoch deservedly dear to all Frenchmen.

"SOULT, DUC DE DALMATIE,
"*Lieutenant de l'Empereur.*"

How far the style of his Proclamation was suited to inflame the vanity of Frenchmen, by glozing over defeat and ascribing the reverses which had so unequivocally befallen their arms to every cause save the right one, none knew better than the marshal; but, in both truth and taste, many will question the address.* It could not be denied that Joseph and Jourdan had been outgeneraled. Well, from the same opponent, Soult had experienced a similar bad fortune on the Duero; and while he complained to his soldiers that they had been defeated, he might have as candidly informed them that they had been also, as regularly outfought.† The abuse heaped on the brother of his master no private animosity could justify—and what was the history of his own campaigns‡ and what was his present

* "Marshal Soult issued a proclamation in imitation of those spirit-stirring productions by which Napoleon was accustomed to call forth the enthusiastic admiration of his soldiers; but the essential quality calculated to give effect was wanting. When the emperor, by the roll of the drum, called attention to his emphatic words, the troops knew that he would fulfil the promise of leading them to victory, and that knowledge gave effect to the concise but brilliant announcement of his intentions, and what he expected from them. When the Duke of Dalmatia's proclamation appeared, it was that of an ordinary man, promising more than he could perform, and as such was received by those to whom it was immediately addressed."—*Leith Hay.*

† "In the expressive language of an officer who bore his part in the victory, 'they were beaten before the town, and in the town, and through the town, and out of the town, and behind the town, and all round about the town.' Every where they had been attacked, every where beaten, and now every where were put to utter rout. They themselves had in many actions made greater slaughter of a Spanish army, but never in any instance had they reduced an army, even of raw volunteers, to such a state of total wreck."—*Southey.*

‡ "He himself had been repulsed by a far inferior British force at Coruña; had been driven from Oporto, and defeated in the bloody field of Albuera.

condition? With him, no fortresses were abandoned—for all, when he joined his army, were in full and fortunate resistance. He possessed the confidence of his troops—the strongest positions in Europe were open for his selection—behind him was the sacred soil of France—and a veteran army, of equal strength to that of his rival, was placed under his absolute command. What, then, were the results? The same despised and "motley levy" which had driven the intruder from his throne, hurried "the lieutenant of the emperor" from every post where he ventured to risk a stand. When assailing, he was repulsed—when attacked, he was defeated,—and from his first attempt to force the passes of the Pyrenees, until his last desperate stand at Toulouse, in "all and every effort"—*he was beaten!*

He was addressing men who had been beaten at Vimiera, beaten at Talavera, beaten at Busaco, beaten at Fuentes d'Onoro, routed at Salamanca, and scattered like sheep at Vitoria. They had been driven from Lisbon into France; and yet the general who had so often been baffled addressed this language to the very troops who had been so often and so signally defeated!"—*Southey.*

CHAPTER XII.

LORD WELLINGTON'S PREPARATIONS—BLOCKADE OF PAMPLONA—POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES—TEMPORARY QUIET—BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES—DESPATCH TO EARL BATHURST—ALLIED CASUALTIES.

LORD WELLINGTON estimated the character of his opponent with justice, when he made preparations for immediate and vigorous hostilities. From past experience, he was well aware that the Duke of Dalmatia was as rapid in the conception of his plans, as daring in their execution—and notwithstanding the French general used every means to mask the true point on which he had determined to commence his operations, his able opponent, while expecting aggression on a different flank, made admirable arrangements to repel on every side the threatened attack.

The blockade of Pamplona was carried on by the Spanish corps of the Conde la Bispal,* after the British division, which had first shut in the fortress, had been moved by Lord Wellington to the front—and subsequently, O'Donel was joined by the division of Carlos d'España. Their united corps amounted to upwards of eleven thousand men—of whom seven thousand could be spared for field service, while the remainder would be fully sufficient to maintain the blockade effectually. La Bispal, however, dreaded an attack from the side of Aragon, but Lord Wellington felt

* O'Donel.

that from that quarter no danger need be apprehended, as Mina and the Partida chiefs were in such force and activity as required all Suchet's efforts to ensure the safety of the French corps in the eastern provinces, without attempting any disturbance of the blockade.

A careful reconnaissance convinced Soult that the right of Lord Wellington's position, at Roncesvalles, was the point of attack best adapted to effect the relief of the fortresses, and most likely, from other circumstances, to prove successful. His own positions were close to those of the allies. He had fully twenty thousand men in front of the Anglo-Spanish infantry of Byng and Morillo, which barely amounted to five thousand bayonets—and while his lateral communications were short and easy, those of the allies were circuitous and difficult. Hence, while Soult from local advantages could readily collect his troops into masses, and with superior numbers press on the allied corps, in every point isolated from each other by the rugged surface that intervened between the different passes in the mountains; from this cause the allied front line could not, for want of roads, make flank marches to support each other. Each division, therefore, when attacked, had nothing but its own gallantry to depend upon—the rear was the only point from which relief could be expected—and time would be required to obtain it.

"Meantime the hostile forces, though each within their own frontier, were encamped in some places upon opposite heights, within half cannon-shot; and their sentries within a hundred and fifty yards of each other. Hitherto with the Spaniards and Portuguese it had been, in the ever-memorable phrase of Palafox, war at the knife's edge; but that national contest, in which the aggressors had treated courtesy and humanity with as much contempt as justice, was at an end; it was a military contest now, and the two armies offered no molestation to each other in the intervals of the game of war. The French, gay and alert as usual, were drumming and trumpeting all day long; the more thoughtful English enjoying the season and the country,

looking down with delight upon the sea and the enemy's territory, and Bayonne in the distance, and sketching, in the leisure which their duties might allow, the beautiful scenery of the Pyrenees."*

This conventional tranquillity was short in its duration. Soult's dispositions were completed—his address issued to his army on the 23d—and on the 25th, he directed in person the opening movement of a series of attacks, as remarkable for the skill and bravery with which they were made, as for the dauntless gallantry that repulsed them.

The story of many a victory Lord Wellington's pen had communicated; but it never had narrated a more glorious succession of "proud events" than, when transmitting to the British secretary at war, a detail of the *Battles of the Pyrenees.*

"On the 24th Marshal Soult collected the right and left wings of his army, with one division of the centre and two divisions of cavalry at St. Jean Pied de Port; and on the 25th attacked with between 30,000 and 40,000 men, General Byng's post at Roncesvalles. Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole moved up to his support with the 4th division, and these officers were enabled to maintain their post throughout the day; but the enemy turned it in the afternoon, and Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole considered it to be necessary to withdraw in the night; and he marched to the neighbourhood of Zubiri.

"In the actions which took place on this day the 20th regiment distinguished themselves.

"Two divisions of the centre of the enemy's army attacked Sir R. Hill's position in the Puerto de Maya, at the head of the valley of Baztan, in the afternoon of the same day. The brunt of the action fell upon Major-General Pringle's and Major-General Walker's brigades, in the 2d division, under the command of Lieut.-General the Hon. W. Stewart. These troops were at first obliged to give way, but having

* Southey.

been supported by Major-General Barnes's brigade of the 7th division, they regained that part of their post which was the key of the whole, and which would have enabled them to reassume it if circumstances had permitted it. But Sir R. Hill having been apprized of the necessity that Sir Lowry Cole should retire, deemed it expedient to withdraw his troops likewise to Irurita, and the enemy did not advance on the following day beyond the Puerto de Maya.

"Notwithstanding the enemy's superiority of numbers, they acquired but little advantage over these brave troops, during the seven hours they were engaged. All the regiments charged with the bayonet. The conduct of the 82d regiment, which moved up with Major-General Barnes's brigade, is particularly reported.

"Lieut.-General the Hon. W. Stewart was slightly wounded.

"I was not apprized of these events till late in the night of the 25th and 26th; and I adopted immediate measures to concentrate the army to the right, still providing for the siege of San Sebastian, and for the blockade of Pamplona.

"This would have been effected early on the 27th, only that Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole and Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton concurred in thinking their post at Zubiri not tenable for the time during which it would have been necessary for them to wait in it. They therefore retired early on the 27th, and took up a position to cover the blockade of Pamplona, having the right, consisting of the 3d division, in front of Huerte, and extending to the hills beyond Olaz; the left, consisting of the 4th division, Major-General Byng's brigade of the 2d division, and Brigadier-General Campbell's (Portuguese) brigade of the Conde de Amarante's Portuguese division, on the heights in front of Villalba, having their left at a chapel behind Sorauren, on the high road from Ostiz to Pamplona, and their right resting upon a height which defended the high road from Zubiri and Roncesvalles. General Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, and that part of the Conde de la Bisbal's corps not

engaged in the blockade, were in reserve. From the latter the regiment of Pravia and that of El Principe were deteached to occupy part of the hill on the right of the 4th division, by which the road from Zubiri was defended.

"The British cavalry, under Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, were placed near Huerte on the right, being the only ground on which it was possible to use the cavalry.

"The river Lanz runs in the valley which was on the left of the allied, and on the right of the French army along the road to Ostiz; beyond this river there is another range of mountains connected with Lizasso and Marcalain, by which places it was now necessary to communicate with the rest of the army.

"I joined the 3d and 4th divisions just as they were taking up their ground on the 27th, and shortly afterwards the enemy formed their army on a mountain, the front of which extends from the high road to Ostiz to the high road to Zubiri; and they placed one division on the left of that road on a height, and in some villages in front of the 3d division; they had here also a large body of cavalry.

"In a short time after they had taken up their ground, the enemy attacked the hill on the right of the 4th division, which was then occupied by one battalion of the 4th Portuguese regiment, and by the Spanish regiment of Pravia. These troops defended their ground, and drove the enemy from it with the bayonet. Seeing the importance of this hill to our position, I reinforced it with the 40th regiment, and this regiment, with the Spanish regiments, El Principe and Pravia, held it from this time, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the enemy during the 27th and 28th to obtain possession of it.

"Nearly at the same time that the enemy attacked this height on the 27th, they took possession of the village of Sorauren on the road to Ostiz, by which they acquired the communication by that road, and they kept up a fire of musketry along the line till it was dark.

"We were joined on the morning of the 28th by the 6th

division of infantry, and I directed that the heights should be occupied on the left of the valley of the Lanz, and that the 6th division should form across the valley in rear of the left of the 4th division, resting their right on Orcain, and their left on the heights above mentioned.

"The 6th division had scarcely taken their position when they were attacked by a very large force of the enemy which had been assembled in the village of Sorauren.

"Their front was however so well defended by the fire of their own light troops from the heights on their left, and by the fire from the heights occupied by the 4th division and Brigadier-General Campbell's Portuguese brigade, that the enemy were soon driven back with immense loss from a fire on their front, both flanks, and rear.

"In order to extricate their troops from the difficulty in which they found themselves in their situation in the valley of the Lanz, the enemy now attacked the height on which the left of the 4th division stood, which was occupied by the 7th caçadores, of which they obtained a momentary possession. They were attacked, however, again by the 7th caçadores, supported by Major-General Ross with his brigade of the 4th division, and were driven down with great loss.

"The battle now became general along the whole front of the heights occupied by the 4th division, and in every part in our favour, excepting where one battalion of the 10th Portuguese regiment of Major-General Campbell's brigade was posted. This battalion having been overpowered, and having been obliged to give way immediately on the right of Major-General Ross's brigade, the enemy established themselves on our line, and Major-General Ross was obliged to withdraw from his post.

"I however ordered the 27th and 48th regiments to charge, first, that body of the enemy which had first established themselves on the height, and next, those on the left. Both attacks succeeded, and the enemy were driven down with immense loss; and the 6th division, having

moved forward at the same time to a situation in the valley nearer to the left of the 4th, the attack upon this front ceased entirely, and was continued but faintly on other points of our line.

"In the course of this contest, the gallant 4th division, which had so frequently been distinguished in this army, surpassed their former good conduct. Every regiment charged with the bayonet, and the 40th, 7th, 20th, and 23d, four different times. Their officers set them the example, and Major-General Ross had two horses shot under him.

"The Portuguese troops likewise behaved admirably; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Spanish regiments El Principe and Pravia.

"I had ordered Lieut.-General Sir R. Hill to march by Lanz upon Lizasso, as soon as I found that Lieut.-Generals Sir Thomas Picton and Sir Lowry Cole had moved from Zubiri, and Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie from San Estevan to the same place, where both arrived on the 28th, and the 7th division came to Marcalain.

"The enemy's force, which had been in front of Sir Rowland Hill, followed his march, and arrived at Ostiz on the 29th. The enemy thus reinforced, and occupying a position on the mountains which appeared little liable to attack, and finding that they could make no impression on our front, determined to endeavour to turn our left by an attack on Sir Rowland Hill's corps. They reinforced with one division the troops which had been already opposed to him, still occupying the same points in the mountain on which was formed their principal force; but they drew in to their left the troops which occupied the heights opposite the 3d division; and they had, during the night of the 29th and 30th, occupied in strength the crest of the mountain on our left of the Lanz opposite to the 6th and 7th divisions; thus connecting their right in their position with the divisions detached to attack Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill.

"I, however, determined to attack their position, and ordered Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie to possess himself of the top of the mountain in his front, by which the enemy's right would be turned; and Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton to cross the heights on which the enemy's left had stood, and to turn their left by the road to Roncesvalles. All the arrangements were made to attack the front of the enemy's position, as soon as the effect of these movements on their flanks should begin to appear. Major-General the Hon. Edward Pakenham, whom I had sent to take the command of the 6th division, Major-General Pack having been wounded, turned the village of Sorauren as soon as the Earl of Dalhousie had driven the enemy from the mountain by which that flank was defended; and the 6th division, and Major-General Byng's brigade, which had relieved the 4th division on the left of our position on the road to Ostiz, instantly attacked and carried that village. Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole likewise attacked the front of the enemy's main position with the 7th caçadores, supported by the 11th Portuguese regiment, the 40th, and the battalion under Colonel Bingham, consisting of the 53d and Queen's regiment. All these operations obliged the enemy to abandon a position which is one of the strongest and most difficult of access that I have yet seen occupied by troops.

"In their retreat from this position, the enemy lost a great number of prisoners. I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of all the general officers, officers, and troops throughout these operations. The attack made by Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie was admirably conducted by his lordship, and executed by Major-General Inglis and the troops composing his brigade; and that by Major-General the Hon. E. Pakenham, and Major-General Byng, and that by Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole; and the movement made by Sir Thomas Picton merited my highest commendation. The latter officer cooperated in the attack of the mountain, by detaching troops to his left, in which

Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. R. Trench was wounded, but I hope not seriously.

"While these operations were going on, and in proportion as I observed their success, I detached troops to the support of Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill.

"The enemy appeared in his front late in the morning, and immediately commenced an extended manœuvre upon his left flank, which obliged him to withdraw from the height which he occupied behind Lizasso to the next range. He there, however, maintained himself; and I enclose his report of the conduct of the troops.

"I continued the pursuit of the enemy after their retreat from the mountain to Olague, where I was at sunset immediately in the rear of their attack upon Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill. They withdrew from his front in the night; and yesterday took up a strong position with two divisions to cover their rear on the pass of Dona Maria.

"Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill and the Earl of Dalhousie attacked and carried the pass, notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of the enemy, and the strength of their position. I am concerned to add that Lieut.-General the Hon. W. Stewart was wounded upon this occasion.

"I enclose Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill's Report.

"In the mean time I moved with Major-General Byng's brigade, and the 4th division, under Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Lowry Cole, by the Pass of Velate, upon Irurita, in order to turn the enemy's position on Dona Maria. Major General Byng took in Elizondo a large convoy going to the enemy, and made many prisoners.

"We have this day continued the pursuit of the enemy in the valley of the Bidasoa, and many prisoners and much baggage have been taken. Major-General Byng has possessed himself of the valley of Baztan, and of the position on the Puerto de Maya, and the army will be this night nearly in the same positions which they occupied on the 25th July.

"I trust that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent

will be satisfied with the conduct of the troops of his Majesty, and of his allies on this occasion. The enemy having been considerably reinforced and re-equipped, after their late defeat, made a most formidable attempt to relieve the blockade of Pamplona, with the whole of their forces, excepting the reserve under General Villatte, which remained in front of our troops on the great road from Irun. This attempt has been entirely frustrated by the operations of a part only of the allied army; and the enemy has sustained a defeat, and suffered a severe loss in officers and men.

"The enemy's expectations of success beyond the point of raising the blockade of Pamplona, were certainly very sanguine. They brought into Spain a large body of cavalry, and a great number of guns; neither of which arms could be used to any great extent by either party in the battle which took place.

"They sent off the guns to St. Jean Pied de Port, on the evening of the 28th, which have thus returned to France in safety.

* * * * *

"Although our wounded are numerous, I am happy to say that the cases in general are slight; and I have great pleasure in reporting to your lordship, that the utmost attention has been paid to them by the inspector-general, Dr. M'Grigor, and by the officers of the department under his direction.

"Adverting to the extent and nature of our operations, and the difficulties of our communications at all times, I have reason to be extremely well satisfied with the zeal and exertions of Sir Robert Kennedy, the commissary-general, and the officers of his department, throughout the campaign; which, upon the whole, have been more successful in supplying the troops than could have been expected.

"I transmit this despatch to your lordship by his Serene Highness the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who is perfectly acquainted with all that has passed, and with the situation of the army; and will be able to inform your lordship

of many details relating to this series of operations, for which a despatch does not afford scope. His Highness had a horse shot under him in the battle near Sorauren on the 28th of July.

"P.S. I have omitted to inform your lordship in the body of the despatch, that the troops in the Puerto de Maya lost there four Portuguese guns on the 25th July. Major-General Pringle, who commanded, when the attack commenced, had ordered them to retire towards Maya; and when Lieut.-General Stewart came up, he ordered that they might return, and retire by the mountain road to Elizondo. In the mean time, the enemy were in possession of the Pass, and the communication with that road was lost, and they could not reach it.

"I enclose returns of the loss before San Sebastian, from the 7th to the 27th July."*

* "Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., at the Siege of San Sebastian, from the 7th to the 27th July, 1813.

"Portuguese loss included.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	11	9	184	—	204
Wounded	44	34	696	—	774
Missing	6	6	288	—	300



BATTLE

OF

TOULOUSE.

10th APRIL 1814

CHAPTER XIII.

OPENING MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH AT FIRST SUCCESSFUL—HEIGHT OF LINDOUZ—CHARGE OF THE 20TH REGIMENT—GENERAL COLE'S GALLANT RESISTANCE—HE OFFERS BATTLE ON THE HEIGHTS OF URROZ—COMBATS OF MAYA—ANECDOTE OF LORD WELLINGTON—CURIOUS COINCIDENCE—COMBAT OF SORAUREN—CHARGE OF THE 27TH AND 48TH REGIMENTS—AND HEROIC CONDUCT OF THE 40TH—GENERAL FAILURE OF THE FRONT ATTACKS—LORD WELLINGTON ASSUMES THE OFFENSIVE—BATTLES OF THE 30TH—FRENCH SEVERELY DEFEATED—SOULT RETREATS—ANECDOTE—MARCH OF THE LIGHT DIVISION—AFFAIR AT YANZI—EXPLOITS OF BARNES'S BRIGADE—CLAUSEL ABANDONS ECHALLAR—OBSERVATIONS.

MANY sanguinary actions had been fought upon the Peninsula, but in none had the fighting been so desperate and protracted as those designated "The Battles of the Pyrenees." It was an arduous struggle, in which as much depended on the enduring courage of the men, as on the firmness and capacity of their commanders. The combats were fierce and desultory; and the whole extent of the position was frequently and severely tried. The failure of one division could not have been compensated by the success of the rest,—nor was a disaster recoverable,—as the loss of one pass would have compromised the security of the whole.

The mists hung thickly on the rugged heights which rose in savage grandeur around the post at Altobiscar, when Soult, covered by a swarm of sharp-shooters, pressed forward with heavy columns, well supported by artillery, to the assault. Noon came—the sun was shining on the mountain battle-ground; and for many an hour had he witnessed a deadly and obstinate conflict. The French were fighting with all the confidence which immense

physical superiority will produce; while the allies, strong in courage and favourably posted for defence, evinced that subborn gallantry which numbers cannot shake. Elevated thousands of feet above the lower country, the roar of musketry seemed incessant, as every volley was repeated by the mountain echoes, until, like the grumblings of distant thunder, a louder crash rendered the fainter sounds inaudible. Still, in numbers, the assailants momentarily increased; the Spanish right was threatened at Orbaiceta; the left, turned at Aizola; and Morillo, after a bold stand, was eventually obliged to retire on the pass of Ibaneta.

The battle was all but lost. Reille was close to Atalosti; and, interposing between the brigades of Byng and the Portuguese of Campbell, he had just crowned the summit of the Lindouz, when the head of Ross's column, at the same moment, gained that ridge.

"The moment was critical, but Ross, an eager hardy soldier, called aloud to charge, and Captain Tovey of the 20th, running forward with his company, crossed a slight wooded hollow, and full against the front of the 6th French light infantry, dashed with the bayonet. Brave men fell by that weapon on both sides; but numbers prevailing, these daring soldiers were pushed back again by the French. Ross, however, gained his object: the remainder of his brigade had come up, and the pass of Atalosti was secured, yet with a loss of 140 men of the 20th regiment, and 41 of the Brunswickers."*

A sudden fog rose from the valley, and consequently, long before night the battle ceased. Cole had held his ground most gloriously, and with only 10,000 bayonets he sternly checked the French marshal, who had now 35,000 men collected in his front. Aware of the immense superiority of the enemy, the English general judiciously withdrew his brigades, and shrouded in darkness, receded silently from the presence of an overwhelming enemy, on whom through a long day's combat, he had inflicted a

* Napier.

heavy loss. Soult, the next morning, occupied the abandoned positions; but yet, and by desperate fighting, he had only gained three leagues, and seven still separated him from Pamplona. The intermediate surface was studded with strong positions; and that each would be desperately held, the experience of his opening efforts left him no reason to disbelieve.

Nor were the next day's operations more satisfactory. The mists were heavy; and while the march of the French columns was delayed, at evening the allies were so well united, that on the ridge which severs the valley of Urroz from Zubiri, Cole took a position and boldly offered battle. At dark, the junction of the allies was completed; and Soult's initial movements, in all essential consequences, had failed. The French marshal's confidence had undergone a striking change; and those immediately around him perceived in his altered bearing, that the hope of success had evidently abated.

D'Erlon's attack on the pass of Maya had been attended with even more slaughter than Soult's effort against the right, and the success was equally indecisive. Having assembled two strong divisions on the morning of the 25th, he made the necessary dispositions under cover of some heights, and at noon he commenced his operations.

Many circumstances promised success.* Some feints against the smaller passes of Espagne and Lareta had deceived the British general, and led him to suspect that the first onset would be made on the Portuguese troops that defended them. But D'Erlon's real object was the gorge of Maya; and, by a pathway that enters that pass from Espalette, he was enabled to fall on the advanced picket and

* From the situation of a round hill in front of Maya, the French columns were enabled to file round its reverse side undiscovered; and Dr. Southey says, that "the videts posted on a rock in advance of the picket, overcome by the oppressive heat of the weather, had unfortunately fallen asleep; and that consequently in attacking, D'Erlon, with an immense superiority in point of numbers, had also the advantage of a surprise."

some supporting light companies so suddenly, and in such strength, that nothing but the superior bravery of these noble soldiers could have maintained ground for a moment against an overwhelming force.

From the unavoidable dispersion of the British regiments, they came to the support of the light troops separately; and consequently, in some cases, they were opposed to tenfold numbers. As might have been expected, they were obliged at last to yield ground; but every position was obstinately held, until General Barnes's brigade of the 7th division came to their assistance, and checked the enemy's advance.* The fighting lasted for seven hours; and 1600 men were lost in this desperate and succesful resistance.

On the 26th, Picton joined Cole, and took command of the 3d and 4th divisions. He retired slowly as Soult advanced; and next day took a position to cover Pamplona, and offered battle. Lord Wellington, on the 27th, left Hill's head-quarters in the Baztan; and, anxious to ascertain how matters went, he crossed the mountain ridge into the valley of the Lanz, and, proceeding to Ostiz, learned that Picton had fallen back from Linzoain to Huarte. Riding at full speed, he reached the village of Sorauren, and his eagle-glance detected Clausel's column in march along the ridge of Zabaldica. Convinced that the troops in the valley of the Lanz must be intercepted by this movement, he sprang from his saddle, and pencilled a note on the parapet of the bridge, directing the troops to take the road to Oricain, and gain the rear of Cole's position. The scene that followed was highly interesting. "Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the only staff-officer who had kept up with him, galloped

* "The French gained ground until six o'clock, for the British, shrunk in numbers, also wanted ammunition, and a part of the 82d, under Major Fitzgerald, were forced to roll down stones to defend the rocks on which they were posted. In this desperate condition Stewart was upon the point of abandoning the mountain entirely, when a brigade of the 7th division, commanded by General Barnes, arrived from Echallar, and that officer, charging at the head of the 6th regiment, drove the French back to the Maya ridge."—*Napier.*

with these orders out of Sorauren by one road, the French light cavalry dashed in by another, and the English general rode alone up the mountain to reach his troops. One of Campbell's Portuguese battalions first descried him and raised a cry of joy, and the shrill clamour caught up by the next regiments swelled as it run along the line into that stern and appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give upon the edge of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. Lord Wellington suddenly stopped in a conspicuous place; he desired that both armies should know he was there; and a double spy who was present pointed out Soult, then so near that his features could be plainly distinguished. The English general, it is said, fixed his eyes attentively upon this formidable man, and speaking as if to himself, said, '*Yonder is a great commander, but he is a cautious one, and will delay his attack to ascertain the cause of these cheers; that will give time for the 6th division to arrive, and I shall beat him.*' And certain it is that the French general made no serious attack that day."*

Before Lord Wellington's arrival, Soult had been repulsed in an effort made against a hill occupied by a Spanish brigade, and the height had been reinforced by a British battalion. Some desultory skirmishing succeeded; but a violent tempest ended the contest for the day; and, no unusual occurrence in peninsular warfare—a stormy night proved the forerunner of "a bloody morrow."

Twelve British regiments were embattled on the Pyrenees who had fought at Talavera; and there were present not a few who might recall an incident to memory, that would present a striking but amusing contrast.† Cuesta, examining his battle ground four years before in lumbering state, seated in an unwieldy coach, and drawn by eight pampered mules; Wellington, on an English hunter, dash-

* Napier.

† On the 27th of July, 1809, Cuesta made dispositions for the battle of Talavera; and on the same day, in 1813, Lord Wellington was concentrating his divisions for the combat of Sorauren.

ing from post to post at headlong speed, and at a pace that distanced the best mounted of his staff.

At noon the French columns were formed for attack; and Clausel's first division, covered by a swarm of sharp-shooters, rushed boldly down the valley of the Lanz, and turned Cole's left. But they were instantly and severely repulsed by the Portuguese brigade attached to the 6th division, and driven down the height, while "almost at the same instant, the main body of the 6th division emerging from behind the same ridge, near the village of Oricain, formed in order of battle across the front. It was the counter-stroke of Salamanca! The French, striving to encompass the left of the allies, were themselves encompassed; for two brigades of the 4th division turned and smote them from the left, the Portuguese smote them from the right; and while thus scathed on both flanks with fire, they were violently shocked and pushed back with a mighty force by the 6th division, yet not in flight, but fighting fiercely, and strewing the ground with their enemies' bodies as well as their own."*

Two remaining divisions of Clausel's and Reille's now came into action—and while their attack was better combined, it was equally impetuous as that of the division that had been defeated. An ermita on the crest of a detached height on the left of the 4th division was of great importance to the security of the position; and with a most enduring gallantry, a column of the enemy mounted to the crest, and under a terrible fire, drove back the caçadore regiment posted round the chapel. Reinforced, however, by General Ross, the Anglo-Portuguese returned furiously to the charge, and the French were bayoneted down the hill. Again they rallied—advanced—and the allies were in turn driven back. Lord Wellington marked the deadly struggle, "brought Byng's brigade forward at a running pace, and sent the 27th and 48th British regiments belonging to Anson's brigade down from the higher ground in the

* Napier.

centre against the crowded masses, rolling them backward in disorder, and throwing them one after the other violently down the mountain side,—and with no child's play. The two British regiments fell upon the enemy three separate times with the bayonet, and lost more than half their own numbers." *

To carry the hill on the right of the position was the next object of the enemy; and there two Spanish regiments had been posted, supported by the British 40th. The attack was confident and daring, as with imposing numbers the enemy circled the base of the height, mounted most gallantly, and drove the regiment of El Pravia from the plateau. For a few minutes the 40th stood on that mountain height alone and unsupported; but a Portuguese regiment bravely rushed up to its support, and formed on that flank which the recession of the Spanish battalion had left uncovered. In fourfold numbers the assailants, in the mean time, were pressing up; and presently, their column topped the summit. The calm and steady attitude of the 40th, as contrasted with the clamorous advance of the French, might have been mistaken for the sullen devotion of a band that felt itself overmatched, but still scorned to seek its safety ingloriously. But never was silence more deceptive. The tiger's spring is preceded by an ominous tranquillity—the tempest's lull only tells that its fury is about to burst again. Not a murmur passed through the ranks of the British regiment, and yet the leading files of the attacking column rose rapidly over the crest of the sierra, and confronted the defenders. Another minute passed—the head of the column was developed—the enemy were lodged upon the plateau—and then the tempest burst.

The word to advance was given; and, with a thrilling hurra, on rushed the 40th with the bayonet. In a moment, the leading sections of the French column were annihilated, the supporting ones torn and disordered by a shattering volley, and the whole driven rudely from the height. In

* Napier.

vain they were reformed, and again and again led forward: the cheer, the charge, the volley, smote them on the summit, rent their array to pieces, and sent them down the hill. Four times they were urged on, and as often were they bloodily repulsed. At last heart and strength failed together; and they sullenly receded from a position, which the bravery of one glorious regiment had made impregnable.

Such was the termination of a combat, which, for its fierceness and obstinacy, was new to Wellington himself.* With Soult, all hope was over; and, worse still, both the troops, and the general opposed to him, had established an uncontroverted superiority. What was the result of four days' slaughter? What the condition of his rival? Wellington had vindicated his position with only 16,000 combatants; "and now, including the troops still maintaining the blockade, he had 50,000, 20,000 being British, in close military combination. Thirty thousand flushed with recent success were in hand, and Hill's troops were well placed for retaking the offensive."†

Despairing of success against the front of a position that had been already so admirably maintained, Soult sent to the rear the whole of his artillery, part of his cavalry, the sick and wounded, and every other incumbrance. This was a preparatory movement for his own retreat; for his army could not be supported in a mountain country so distant

* "The enemy had no success on any other ground, and were terribly beat after I joined the troops at Sorauren. Their loss cannot be less than 15,000 men, and I am not certain that it is not 20,000 men. We have about 4,000 prisoners. I never saw such fighting as on the 27th and 28th of July, the anniversary of the battle of Talavera, nor such determination as the troops showed. * * * * *

"I never saw such fighting as we have had here. It began on the 25th, and, excepting the 29th, when not a shot was fired, we had it every day till the 2d. The battle of the 28th was fair *bludgeon* work. The 4th division was principally engaged; and the loss of the enemy was immense. Our loss has likewise been very severe, but not of a nature to cripple us."—*Letter to Lord William Bentinck, Lisaca, 5th August*, 1813.

† Napier.

from its magazines, and where the means of transport were so difficult. That decision was however changed. On the 29th, which passed inactively, D'Erlon announced from Ostiz, that Villatte, with the French reserve, had passed the Bidasoa, from which Graham had retired. Thus reinforced by 18,000 men, Soult determined to attack the allied left, which was in a new position to cover San Sebastian; Hill's corps having reached Lizasso, and Lord Dalhousie's Marcalain, on the 28th.

For his new operation the French marshal reinforced Comet d'Erlon with a division; and early on the 30th occupied in force a mountain ridge opposite the 6th and 7th division of the allies; while from the heights, in front of the 3d division, he brought the troops closer to his left.

These movements were penetrated by his opponent; and Lord Wellington determined to dislodge the enemy from the main position, which they held in strength. Picton was accordingly directed to turn its left, by passing the heights recently abandoned by the French marshal, and marching by the road of Roncesvalles; while Lord Dalhousie should manœuvre against the right, by carrying the mountain in front of the 7th division. "The 4th division was to assail Foy's position; but respecting its great strength the attack was to be measured according to the effect produced on the flanks. Meanwhile Byng's brigade and the 6th division, the latter having a battery of guns and some squadrons of cavalry, were combined to assault Sorauren. La Bispal's Spaniards followed the 6th division. Fane's horsemen were stationed at Berioplano with a detachment pushed to Irurzun, and the heavy cavalry remained behind Huarte."*

If British fighting had been hitherto remarkable for the lion-like ferocity with which it repelled aggression, its vigour of attack and daring intrepidity, as strongly distinguished its irresistibility when assailing. Everywhere the advance against the French position was brilliant and successful.

* Napier.

General Inglis, by a daring effort, broke and dispersed with a much inferior force, two regiments on the right of Clausel's division. Dalhousie cleared the mountain in his front. The 6th division, under Pakenham, turned the French position at Sorauren; while Byng's brigade carried the village itself by storm. On perceiving the flank attacks succeed, Cole assaulted the front. There too, the enemy gave way; and all fell back, followed vigorously by Lord Wellington, until darkness closed the pursuit at Olaque.

"The allies lost 1900 men killed and wounded, or taken, in the two battles of this day; and of these nearly 1200 were Portuguese, the soldiers of that nation having borne the brunt of both fights. On the French side the loss was enormous. Conroux's and Maucune's divisions were completely disorganized; Foy, with 8,000 men, including the fugitives he had rallied, was entirely separated from the main body; 2,000 men, at the lowest computation, had been killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the woods and ravines, and 3,000 prisoners were taken. This blow, joined to former losses, reduced Soult's fighting men to 35,000, of which the 15,000 under Clauzel and Reille were dispirited by defeat, and the whole were placed in a most critical situation." *

That night Soult found himself most critically committed; and it was evident that no chance of extricating a beaten army was left but by falling back on San Estevan, by the pass of Doña Maria, a movement fraught with danger, and most disastrous should it not succeed. A night march was accordingly made—but early on the 31st, the French rear-guard was overtaken, and it formed on the summit of the pass. The ground was amazingly strong, and the enemy held it with determination; but the impetuous advance of the second and seventh divisions could not be checked, and again the beaten army was dislodged. Wellington had pressed on towards Irurita by the pass of Vellatte. Byng had already reached Elisondo, and taken a large convoy of

* Napier.

ammunition and provisions, with most of the regiment that formed the escort; and Soult's situation was now so critical, that a terrible disaster was likely to close an expedition that had been marked by a succession of defeats,—and accident alone averted it. "He was in a deep narrow valley, and three British divisions with one of Spaniards were behind the mountains overlooking the town; the seventh division was on the mountain of Doña Maria; the light division, and Sir Thomas Graham's Spaniards, were marching to block the Vera and Echallar exits from the valley; Byng was already at Maya, and Hill was moving by Almandoz, just behind Wellington's own position. A few hours gained, and the French must surrender or disperse. Wellington gave strict orders to prevent the lighting of fires, the straggling of soldiers, or any other indication of the presence of troops; and he placed himself amongst some rocks at a commanding point, from whence he could observe every movement of the enemy. Soult seemed tranquil, and four of his 'gensdarmes' were seen to ride up the valley in a careless manner. Some of the staff proposed to cut them off; the English general, whose object was to hide his own presence, would not suffer it; but the next moment three marauding English soldiers entered the valley, and were instantly carried off by the horsemen. Half an hour afterwards the French drums beat to arms, and their columns began to move out of San Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one consummate commander of the most splendid success, and saved the other from the most terrible disaster."*

From a great calamity fortune had delivered him, but Soult's position was still pregnant with danger. The French had chosen the route leading from the bridge of Yanzi in preference to the road from Sumbilla to Echallar; and on the latter the light division had been directed to head

* Napier.

their retreat, or elsewhere to cut in upon the column; and Alten, to effect the latter, crossed the Sierra of Santa Cruz, and hurried on to seize the bridge.

The division had already made a distressing march, and to scale a precipitous mountain on a day of intolerable heat, was an attempt almost beyond human perseverance. Famed for its former marches, the light division pressed forward with a courage not to be subdued, and the effort was splendid as distressing. "Many men fell, and died convulsed and frothing at the mouth, while others, whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled, leaned on their muskets, and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded for the first time."*

Late in the day, the leading companies reached the crest of a precipice overhanging the narrow road by which Reille's brigades were seen advancing through the defiles; and as they approached the pass, from the beetling cliff and the underwood below it, the fire of the British riflemen opened with fatal precision, and a scene of suffering and slaughter but rarely witnessed ensued.

"We overlooked," says Captain Cooke, in his narrative, "the enemy at a stone's throw, and from the summit of a tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were wedged in a narrow road, with inaccessible rocks on one side, and the river on the other. Confusion, impossible to describe, followed: the wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon; the cavalry drew their swords, and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echallar, but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were precipated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded called out for quarter, while others pointed to them, supported as they were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted with gore, and blood-stained sheets, taken from different habitations to aid the sufferers."

* Napier.

The loss of the retreating division was very heavy,* although the greater number effected their escape by the road of Echallar. The bridge, the road, and the ravine, were all heaped with the dead and dying; many of the latter having, as it was asserted, been thrown into the river, when every hope of carrying them off seemed desperate.†

That night the French marshal halted his wearied and dispirited soldiers round Echallar, and early next morning took a position on the Puerto, with the remnant of Clausel's fine divisions, now reduced to barely six thousand men, posted on a connecting hill between him and the town. Lord Wellington, with three divisions, at once determined to attack the latter, and accordingly, the light troops were put in march from Yanzi‡ to turn his right, the fourth moved on Echallar, while the seventh advanced against his left from Sumbilla.

Before either the front or flank attack was made, or even the fourth and light divisions were seen in march, a singular occurrence brought the battle to a close. General Barnes's brigade, alone and unsupported, boldly ascended the moun-

* "I imagine there are none of the enemy in Spain this night. General Hill's troops are in the Puerto de Maya; the light division at Yanzi; the 4th between that and Sumbilla; the 7th division between Sumbilla and Echallar. We have taken many prisoners. We should have taken many more, and struck some terrible blows this day, if it had not been for some mistakes, and the great fatigues of the troops."—*Wellington's Letter, dated San Estevan, 1st August*, 1813, 8 P.M.

† "When they saw us in front of them, where they had to pass, as it were, immediately under the muzzles of our pieces, they were compelled to adopt the cruel alternative of either throwing their wounded men down to perish, or run the risk of being shot or taken themselves. I believe the former, shocking as it seems, was generally adopted; and I have reason to believe that the greater part of them were thrown into the river; for, from the point where we first came in view of them to near where this affair took place, the Bidasoa was literally filled with the dead bodies of Frenchmen, and they could have come into it in no other way."—*Surtees.*

‡ "Soon after daylight, we were ordered to fall in, and move forward towards Vera. Just as we cleared the bridge, old Douro, with his staff, came riding up, who, when he saw how we had handled the enemy the night before, gave his head a significant nod, and smiled, which conveyed most intelligibly his approbation."—*Ibid.*

tain, and driving the skirmishers fiercely back, not only continued their advance, but actually forced the French from their position. In war, that exploit remains without a parallel; six thousand veteran soldiers defeated by fifteen hundred men, and in a position so steep and rugged, "that there would have been little to boast of if the numbers had been reversed, and the defence made good."

Clausel rallied on a mountain ridge in rear of Echallar. There was much that might have rendered his position tenable for a time, but in the dusk of evening, a part of the light division won the summit of the hill—the last Frenchman was driven, for the second time, across the frontier—and Spain was free.

Never did an army take the field with greater confidence than the French, although resuming its operations so immediately after its disaster at Vitoria. The severity of recent defeat seemed obliterated; while recollections of former victories, and assurances that they were about to march to new ones, inflated a people already intoxicated by years of military success. That the spirit of Soult's troops was extinguished by that brief but sanguinary campaign, their feeble defence of Echallar would establish; and probably, no general had ever greater cause to blush for an address to his soldiery, than the Duke of Dalmatia for that order of the day, in which, while announcing his own appointment, he heaped obloquy on those who had preceded him. "Had Marshal Soult commenced his operations without pretension, had he assumed the command under usual circumstances of service, his failure might have passed without severe animadversion; or had his military character been supported by a series of scientific or skilful movements, although unfortunate, posterity would not have withheld the meed of praise; but when placed in command with the presumptuous intention of rectifying the errors of others, proclaiming that he was to do so, and supported by great devotion and undoubted gallantry on the part of his troops, the result of the battles in the Pyrenees will

ablish the facts, that as a leader, he was not a Napoleon, that the loss of the battle of Vitoria might be attributed other causes than the incapacity of the imperial commanders on that occasion."*

For nine days the armies had been in each other's presence, and in severe operations and desperate fighting, these days were unexampled. The allied casualties† exceeded seven thousand men—and the French, doubling that number by some estimates, and trebling it according to others, might be taken at a mean, and safely set down at fifteen thousand. This was in a military view, a serious calamity, but in a moral one, it was still greater. The Spaniards had already gained a reputation for efficiency at Vitoria, and in the combats of the Pyrenees it was gallantly sustained. The Portuguese had long since been accounted "worthy to stand side by side with a British regiment," and they vindicated that character most gloriously. With the English, a superiority over every continental army was established—for assaulting or assailed, they had proved themselves unconquerable. Well might Wellington afterwards declare, that "with the army which had crossed the Pyrenees, he could do anything, or go anywhere." Born in

* Leith Hay.

† General return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the operations of the allied army, under the command of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., from the 25th July to the 2d of August, inclusive, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Total loss of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	British.	Portuguese.
Killed . .	43	59	779	881	559	322
Wounded .	331	261	4918	5510	3693	1817
Missing . .	17	16	672	705	504	201

This return includes the whole of the casualties during the operations between the 25th of July and the 2nd of August, enclosed in the despatch of the 1st, as well as the 4th of August.

different lands, upon the battle-field national distinctions were forgotten, and Britain was the only country. The old English battalions fought as if their own Black Edward was looking on—the Scottish fully supported their well-earned reputation—and that noble corps,* "whose stern valour would have graced Thermopylæ," was principally composed of Irishmen. From the same ranks, the cheer, the slogan, and the hurrah, thundered their bold defiance —and like their badges wreathed upon their colours, the spirit of three islands was blended into one. Yes, centuries will pass—but when will such an army, and under such a leader, be embattled?

* The 92d.



CHAPTER XIV.

CAREERS OF NAPOLEON AND WELLINGTON—SINGULAR ESCAPES OF BOTH—ANECDOTE—FRENCH ARMY TAKE UP CANTONMENTS—NEW LINE OF OPERATIONS OPENED TO LORD WELLINGTON—HE DECLINES INVADING FRANCE—LETTER TO EARL BATHURST—GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS—LORD WELLINGTON CANTONS HIS ARMY—PICTURESQUE POSITION—PARTIDA WARFARE—SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN RESUMED—NEGLIGENCE OF THE ADMIRALTY—ITS CONSEQUENCES—CONFIDENCE OF THE FRENCH GARRISON—SIEGE OPENS—ISLAND OF SANTA CLARA SURPRISED—SORTIE REPULSED—PRECAUTIONS—FALSE ATTACK—BREACHES PRACTICABLE—PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE AND ASSAULT—OFFICIAL REPORT—SAN SEBASTIAN TAKEN BY STORM.

It is narrated by a military writer,* that Lord Wellington, on receiving an official notification of his appointment to the colonelcy of the blues, observed playfully to those about him at the time, "that he was the luckiest fellow in the world, and had been born under some extraordinary planet;" and assuredly, the experience of after years verified the remark. Fame and fortune do not always reward desert—but on Wellington they flowed continuously; and while an admiring country munificently testified its gratitude to the greatest warrior it had produced, her favours were enhanced by the proud consciousness in him who received them, that all had been honourably earned.

In many striking points, the careers of Napoleon and Wellington exhibited a remarkable similitude. Born in the same year—following the same profession—passing that dangerous ordeal unharmed, in which so many of their contemporaries perished—and both surviving to gain the loftiest objects, at which "ambition's self" could strain. Beset with dangers, their preservation seemed miraculous—as both exposed themselves recklessly—and from their most

* Sherer.

"It is a very common error, among those unacquainted with military affairs, to believe that there are no limits to military success. After having driven the French from the frontiers of Portugal and Madrid to the frontiers of France, it is generally expected that we shall immediately invade France; and some even here expect that we shall be at Paris in a month. None appear to have taken a correct view of our situation on the frontier, of which the enemy still possess all the strongholds within Spain itself; of which strongholds, or at least some of them, we must get possession before the season closes, or we shall have no communication whatever with the interior of Spain. Then in France, on the same great communications, there are other strongholds, of which we must likewise get possession.

"An army which has made such marches, and has fought such battles, as that under my command has, is necessarily much deteriorated. Independently of the actual loss of numbers by death, wounds, and sickness, many men and officers are out of the ranks for various causes. The equipment of the army, their ammunition, the soldiers' shoes, &c., require renewal; the magazines for the new operations require to be collected and formed, and many arrangements to be made, without which the army could not exist a day, but which are not generally understood by those who have not had the direction of such concerns in their hands. Then observe, that this new operation is only the invasion of France, in which country every body is a soldier; where the whole population is armed and organized, under persons, not, as in other countries, inexperienced in arms, but men who, in the course of the last twenty-five years, in which France has been engaged in war with all Europe, must, the majority of them at least, have served somewhere.

"I entertain no doubt that I could to-morrow enter France, and establish the army on the Adour; but I could go no farther certainly. If peace should be made by the powers of the north, I must necessarily withdraw into Spain; and the retreat, however short, would be difficult, on

account of the hostility and the warlike disposition of the inhabitants, particularly of this part of the country, and the military direction they would receive from the gentry their leaders. To this add, that the difficulty of all that must be done to set the army to rights, after its late severe battles and victories, will be much increased by its removal into France at an early period; and that it must stop short in the autumn if it now moves at too early a period.

"So far from the immediate invasion of France, which, from what I have seen of the state of the negotiations in the north of Europe, I have determined to consider only in reference to the convenience of my own operations."

Such were Lord Wellington's views; and that they were soundly formed the experience of a few months established. Never, on the part of the allied general, was firmness of purpose more required than at this period of the contest. Enough had been done to excite the most extravagant expectations,* and not enough to warrant any deviation from the cautious policy that had hitherto guided Wellington through his varied difficulties, and produced slow, but successful results. The congress of Prague had not yet closed its sittings; and it was to be dreaded that Napoleon's admirable deplomacy might still effect a separate peace. In that event, 700,000 men would become instantly disposable; and nothing but an impregnable position could enable Lord Wellington to retain his footing in the Peninsula. With these views, the reduction of the frontier fortresses was of paramount importance—and he resumed the siege of San Sebastian, while the blockade of Pamplona was rigorously maintained.

In accordance with this determination, Lord Wellington,

* "In fine, all was exultation and extravagance. But Lord Wellington, well understanding the inflated nature of such hopes and promises, while affecting to rebuke the absurdity of the newspapers, took the opportunity to check similar folly in higher places, by observing, '*that if he had done all that was expected he should have been before that period in the moon.*'"—*Napier.*

with some immaterial changes, resumed his old positions, taking up a line of country extending from Roncesvalles to the debouchment of the Bidassoa.

"Nothing could be more magnificent than the positions of the British brigades. For many a mile along the extended line of occupation, huts crowning the heights or studding the deep valleys below them, showed the rude dwellings of the mighty mass of human beings collected in that Alpine country. At night the scene was still more picturesque. The irregular surface of sierras sparkled with a thousand watch-fires, and the bivouacs of the allies exhibited all the varieties of light and shadow which an artist loves to copy. To the occupants themselves, the views obtained from their elevated abodes were grand and imposing. One while obscured in fog, the hum of voices alone announced that their comrades were beside them,—while at another, the sun bursting forth in cloudless beauty, displayed a varied scene, glorious beyond imagination. At their feet the fertile plains of France presented themselves—above, ranges of magnificent heights towered in majestic grandeur to the skies, and stretched into distance beyond the range of sight."* Where it was deemed necessary, the posts were strengthened by field works, and connected by lateral roads improved by military labour. The left of the allied line was now the vulnerable point; and the reserve was moved accordingly, from San Estevan to Lesaca. To the Spanish troops under Carlos d'Espagna, the blockade of Pamplona was confided; and the 5th division again invested San Sebastian.

The partidas had been unusually active; and as their efforts were well directed and combined, their successes were proportionate. Zaragoza and some minor places were recovered—while Mina, Duran, and Martin Diez, (the Empecinado,) overspread the country, and interrupted the French communications—the former chiefs obliging General Paris to retire from Jaca into France. Lord William Bentinck

* The Bivouac.



SAN SEBASTIAN,

Carried by Assault,

had invested Tarragona—and across the Peninsula, from east to west, the allies maintained their communications—while the French marshals found the greatest difficulty in transmitting intelligence to each other, for out of a dozen despatches, one half were delayed, and the other never reached their destination.

As San Sebastian had been blockaded during the recent operations, the trenches were found in the same state as that in which they had been left—and therefore the siege was promptly resumed. On the 5th of August the battering-train was re-landed; and the same plan of attack was continued, but with an increased means of offence.

Lord Wellington had previously made repeated charges against the Admiralty, for the negligence and inefficiency in which the maritime department of the war had been conducted—but his causes for complaint had never been so many, nor so serious. Now, in a position to press the siege vigorously to a close, the means he had demanded months before from England had not yet reached the Peninsula,* because, forsooth, the mistress of the ocean could not find convoy for the transports. He had already been reduced to the necessity of using French ammunition, although, from the small bore of foreign muskets, the cartridges were too small. When his chest was nearly empty, money was lying for weeks on ship-board waiting for a cruiser to protect it; and when snow was falling on the Pyrenees, the soldiers

* "Your Lordship will see by my report, that we are still waiting for the battering train; and we have thus lost *sixteen days* in the month of August since I should have renewed the attack upon San Sebastian, if I had had the means. This is a most important period in the campaign, particularly for the attack of a place in the Bay of Biscay. How we are to attack Bayonne afterwards I am sure I do not know. A British minister cannot have too often under his view the element by which he is surrounded, and cannot make his preparations for the operations of the campaign at too early a period. * * *

"It is curious enough that all the intelligence I have of SanSebastian comes from the French head-quarters, they getting it by sea! I have just heard that a detachment of *sapeurs*, and some medical men, have arrived in the place; and I see General Rey's account of the assault in the *Journal de Paris*."—*Letter to Earl Bathurst.*

were without proper clothing, because the vessel containing their great coats, though ready to sail in August, was detained at Oporto until November.

On the fortunes of the siege, this sad neglect of the Admiralty in not making a proper application of the means they so extensively possessed, produced the most annoying consequences. For want of ammunition, the attack against the fortress was conducted with neither the confidence nor animation that it should have been—and each day brought fresh spirit and fresh resources to the defenders. During this forced inactivity, the garrison received supplies and reinforcements by sea, their damaged works were repaired, new defences constructed, the magazines filled, and sixty-seven pieces of artillery put in a condition to play. "Eight hundred and fifty men had been killed and wounded since the commencement of the attack in July, but as fresh men came by sea, more than 2,600 good soldiers were still present under arms."*

No wonder, then, that thus encouraged and reinforced, they calculated on a successful resistance—and the splendid commemoration of the birth-day of the Emperor,† showed that confidence reigned within the fortress, and that its garrison had full reliance in its own courage, and possessed ample means for its defence.

The arrival of the long-expected supplies, at last enabled Lord Wellington to proceed rapidly with siege operations—and the batteries formerly employed were enlarged, and others constructed and armed.‡ A sortie on the night of

* Napier.

† "The 17th was Buonaparte's birthday; three salutes were fired from the Castle of San Sebastian on the *eve* preceding, as many at four in the morning, and again at noon; and at night the words, *Vive Napoléon le Grand!* were displayed in letters of light upon the castle;—it was the last of his birthdays that was commemorated by any public celebration."—*Southey.*

‡ "Sailors were employed in this work, and never did men more thoroughly enjoy their occupation. They had a double allowance of grog, as their work required, and at their own cost they had a fiddler; they who had worked their spell in the battery went to relieve their comrades in the dance, and at every shot which fell upon the castle they gave three cheers."—*Ibid.*

the 24th produced some confusion, but it was repelled with the loss of a few prisoners. During the 25th the greatest activity prevailed—and on the 26th, everything being in readiness "the batteries opened with a general salvo at nine A.M. by signal from No. 11, with fifty-seven pieces of ordnance, viz. fourteen on the right, and fifteen on the isthmus. On that side the thirteen guns were directed to breach the left demi-bastion of the main front, and the left of the high curtain over it, as also the face of the left demi-bastion of the hornwork; which were all seen in a line one above the other."*

The effect of such powerful artillery was speedily apparent. Before nightfall, the revêtement of the demi-bastion to its salient angle was beaten down, and the towers and curtain severely battered. As supplies still reached the garrison from sea, it was determined that the rocky island called Santa Clara should be reduced—and accordingly, it was carried by a detachment of the 9th regiment on the night of the 26th. The possession of this island was important; it stood in the harbour's mouth, and while it facilitated the introduction of supplies, it also saw the reverse of the castle and enfiladed its defences. †

On the night of the 27th, the garrison made a sortie which proved unsuccessful. "Profiting by past experience, such precautions had been taken of forming good banquettes to the parallel, posting sentinels, &c., and the guard were kept so prepared to stand to their arms, that the assailants were immediately repulsed with the bayonet without effecting the slightest mischief; notwithstanding that, favoured by the obscurity of the night, and the vicinity of the place,

* Journal of the Sieges.

† "The only landing-place was under a flight of steps, commanded by a small entrenchment on the west point of the island, and exposed to the whole range of works on the west side of the rock, and of the walls; the garrison, consisting of an officer and twenty-four men, were thus enabled to make such a resistance, that nineteen of the assailants were killed and wounded."—*Southey.*

they had reached the crest of the parapet before a musket could be fired."*

The activity of the garrison continued unabated—and it was apprehended that they might attempt under cover of darkness, to cross the Urumea, and spike the guns in the Chofre batteries. In order, therefore, to guard against such a misfortune, the artillery officers took measures for their security by fastening an iron plate over the vents locked on by a chain, which would have occasioned some delay in spiking them, even if attempted by experienced artillerymen. They also resorted to similar measures for the safety of the breaching batteries on the right, which being almost unsupported by a parallel, and having only a small guard for their protection, were much exposed to danger should the garrison show any enterprise; for, the Urumea being perfectly fordable at low water, to cross and spike the guns, and return back into the place, would only have been the work of a few minutes."†

No attempt of the kind was made, and from the powerful fire of the British batteries, the defences were sufficiently ruined to warrant an assault. To ascertain the nature and extent of the fire which the enemy could turn on the columns when advancing, and if possible, induce them to spring their mines, the engineers recommended a false attack, which was accordingly made on the night of the 29th, by Lieutenant Macadam, of the 9th regiment. "The order was sudden, no volunteers were demanded, no rewards offered, no means of excitement resorted to; yet such is the inherent bravery of British soldiers, that seventeen men of the royals, the nearest at hand, immediately leaped forth ready and willing to encounter what seemed certain death. With a rapid pace, all the breaching batteries playing hotly at the time, they reached the foot of the breach unperceived, and then mounted in extended order, shouting and firing; but the French were too steady to be imposed upon, and

* Journal of the Sieges. † Ibid.

their musketry laid the whole party low, with the exception of their commander, who returned alone to the trenches."*

On the 30th, the sea flank for five hundred feet was laid open, and the fire of the Chofre batteries was turned against the defences of Monte Orgullo. The half bastion of Saint John, and the high curtain above it, were now in ruins, and the palisades on the face of the hornwork beaten down. Lord Wellington, satisfied with the appearance of the breaches, gave orders for their being assaulted next morning;† the debouches for the troops were prepared, and as the tide would have ebbed sufficiently by eleven o'clock, that hour was named for the storm.

The garrison expected the assault, and they had prepared to receive it. The appearance of the sea front was deceptive; behind it was a sheer descent of twenty feet, and among the burned houses in its rear, a wall fifteen feet high and loop-holed for musketry, with traverses at each extremity, completely isolated the whole extent of the breaches. The tower of Los Hornos, standing in the centre of the greater breach, was mined and charged with twelve hundred weight of powder—and at the salient angle of the covered way, close to which the column of attack must pass, two counter-mines were formed and charged for an explosion. Several guns flanked the breaches—and the Mirador battery commanded the whole space over which the assailants must move to the attack. The column of attack was formed of the 2nd brigade of the 5th division, commanded by Major-General Robinson, with an immediate

* Napier.

† "To break through the sea wall, between the left salient angle of the hornwork and the trenches, which was of masonry, four feet thick, and ten feet above the level of high water, three shafts were commenced in the advanced sap in front of No. 7, in a line perpendicular to the wall. The first was placed close at the back of the wall, the second, twenty-five feet from the wall, and the third, forty feet from the second; when sunk eight feet below the surface of the ground, a small return was made to contain the powder, and each was loaded with 540 pounds of powder."—*Journal of the Sieges.*

support of detachments of volunteers,* and having in reserve the remainder of the 5th division, consisting of Major-General Spry's Portuguese brigade, and the first brigade under Major-General Hay, as also the 5th battalion of caçadores of General Bradford's brigade, under Major Hill; the whole under the direction of Lieut.-General Sir James Leith, commanding the 5th division.

The morning was wet and gloomy, the devoted city was shrouded in mist, and, for want of light, the thunder of the British batteries was silent. About eight o'clock the fog cleared away—the roar of artillery was heard—and it was continued with unabated violence until the signal was given for the assault, and the storming parties rushed forward to the breaches.

"The column in filing out of the right of the trenches was, as before, exposed to a heavy fire of shells and grape shot, and a mine was exploded in the left angle of the counterscarp of the hornwork, which did great damage, but did not check the ardour of the troops in advancing to the attack. There never was anything so fallacious as the external appearance of the breach; without some description, its almost insuperable difficulties cannot be estimated. Notwithstanding its great extent, there was but one point where it was possible to enter, and there by single files. All the inside of the wall to the right of the curtain formed a perpendicular scarp of at least twenty feet to the level of the streets; so that the narrow ridge of the curtain itself, formed by the breaching of its end and front, was the only

* They consisted of 150 volunteers of the light division, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Hunt, of the 52nd regiment; 400 of the first division (consisting of 200 of the brigades of Guards, under Lieut.-Colonel Cook; of 100 of the light battalion, and 100 of the line battalions of the King's German Legion), under Major Robertson; and 200 volunteers of the 4th division, under Major Ross, of the 20th Foot.—*Graham's Despatch to Wellington.*

Fifty men only were required from each regiment—men, it was said, "who could show others how to mount a breach." When the order was read to the fourth division, and those who would volunteer were desired to step some paces to the front, *the whole division moved forward.*

accessible point. During the suspension of the operations of the siege, from want of ammunition, the enemy had prepared every means of defence which art could devise, so that great numbers of men were covered by intrenchments and traverses, in the hornwork, on the ramparts of the curtain, and inside of the town opposite to the breach, and ready to pour a most destructive fire of musketry on both flanks of the approach to the top of the narrow ridge of the curtain.

"Every thing that the most determined bravery could attempt was repeatedly tried in vain by the troops, who were brought forward from the trenches in succession. No man outlived the attempt to gain the ridge: and though the slope of the breach afforded shelter from the enemy's musketry, yet still the nature of the stone rubbish prevented the great exertions of the engineers and working parties from being able to form a lodgment for the troops, exposed to the shells and grape from the batteries of the castle, as was particularly directed, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions; and, at all events, a secure lodgment could never have been obtained without occupying a part of the curtain.

"In this almost desperate state of the attack, after consulting with Colonel Dickson, commanding the royal artillery, I ventured to order the guns to be turned against the curtain. A heavy fire of artillery was directed against it; passing a few feet only over the heads of our troops on the breach, and was kept up with a precision of practice beyond all example. Meanwhile I accepted the offer of a part of Major-General Bradford's Portuguese Brigade to ford the river near its mouth. The advance of the 1st battalion, 13th regiment, under Major Snodgrass, over the open beach, and across the river; and of a detachment of the 24th regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel M'Bean, in support, was made in the handsomest style, under a very severe fire of grape. Major Snodgrass attacked, and finally carried the small breach on the right of the great one, and Lieut.-

Colonel M'Bean's detachment occupied the right of the great breach. I ought not to omit to mention, that a similar offer was made by the 1st Portuguese regiment of Brig.-General Wilson's brigade, under Lieut.-Colonel Fearon; and that both Major-General Bradford and Brigadier-General Wilson had, from the beginning, urged most anxiously the employment of their respective brigades in the attack, as they had had so large a share in the labour and fatigues of the right attack.

"Observing now the effect of the admirable fire of the batteries against the curtain, though the enemy was so much covered, a great effort was ordered to be made to gain the high ridge at all hazards, at the same time that an attempt should be made to storm the hornwork.

"It fell to the lot of the 2d brigade of the 5th division, under the command of Colonel the Hon. Charles Greville, to move out of the trenches for this purpose, and the 3d battalion of the Royal Scots, under Lieut.-Colonel Barns, supported by the 38th, under Lieut.-Colonel Miles, fortunately arrived to assault the breach of the curtain about the time when an explosion on the rampart of the curtain (occasioned by the fire of the artillery) created some confusion among the enemy. The narrow pass was gained, and was maintained, after a severe conflict; and the troops on the right of the breach, having about this time succeeded in forcing the barricades on the top of the narrow line wall, found their way into the houses that joined it. Thus, after an assault which lasted above two hours, under the most trying circumstances, a firm footing was obtained.

"It was impossible to restrain the impetuosity of the troops, and in an hour more the enemy were driven from all the complication of defences prepared in the streets, suffering a severe loss in their retreat to the castle, and leaving the whole town in our possession."*

* Graham's Despatch to Wellington.

CHAPTER XV.

REVIEW OF THE SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN—ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THE TROOPS—ALLIED AND FRENCH CASUALTIES—HEROISM OF A SERJEANT—NOVEL APPLICATION OF SIEGE ARTILLERY—EFFECTS OF THE CANNONADE—APPEARANCE OF THE PLACE AFTER THE STORM—SOULT'S SECOND ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE SAN SEBASTIAN—DESPATCH TO EARL BATHURST—LORD WELLINGTON'S OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CASTLE—PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE—THE GARRISON SURRENDER—ANECDOTES—EXPOSURE OF THE ALLIED PRISONERS—OBSERVATIONS—REMARKS OF COLONEL JONES.

THE peninsular sieges had been remarkable for the obstinacy of their defences, and the last proved no exception, for San Sebastian was the most protracted—and, if the means of aggression are considered, the most sanguinary of the whole.* Circumstances beyond Lord Wellington's control, added to the difficulties of its reduction; and the desperate efforts made by Soult in the Pyrenees for its relief caused less annoyance, than that which afterwards arose from the neglect of the naval executive at home. Stores were rotting in the English arsenals—they were demanded in proper time—

* "In the annals of modern warfare, there is no conflict recorded so sanguinary and so desperate as the storming of that well-defended breach. During the blockade, every resource of military ingenuity was tried by the French governor—and the failure of the first assault, with the subsequent raising of the siege, emboldened the garrison, and rendered them the more confident of holding out until Soult could advance and succour them. The time from which the battering guns had been withdrawn until they had been again placed in battery, was assiduously employed in constructing new defences and strengthening the old ones. But though the place when reinvested was more formidable than before, the besiegers appeared only the more determined to reduce it."—*The Bivouac.*

and yet for sixteen days, when even an hour was inestimable, the siege "was languishing for supplies."

The assault differed from those of Badajoz and Rodrigo, as it was effected in open day—and to those who held the works, or those who carried them, it would be difficult to assign the palm. Never was a place of strength more admirably defended, nor, under more desperate circumstances, more daringly assailed and won.

The besieged had powerful advantages; their littoral communications were uninterrupted to the last; and while the besiegers supposed that the works had been ruined by their artillery, and that the sea front was naked and defenceless, it had been so strongly retrenched that an assault was nearly hopeless. Fortune, on the other hand, favoured the attack. The counter-mines were prematurely blown up—that under the great breach was never fired, an accidental shot having cut the saucisson, and prevented an explosion that must have annihilated half the column—while "the powder-barrels, live shells, and combustible materials which the French had accumulated behind the traverses for their defence, caught fire, a bright consuming flame wrapped the whole of the high curtain, a succession of loud explosions were heard, hundreds of the French grenadiers were destroyed, the rest were thrown into confusion, and while the ramparts were still involved with suffocating eddies of smoke, the British soldiers broke in at the first traverse. The defenders, bewildered by this terrible disaster, yielded for a moment, yet soon rallied, and a close desperate struggle took place along the summit of the high curtain; but the fury of the stormers, whose numbers increased every moment, could not be stemmed. The French colours on the cavalier were torn away by Lieutenant Gethin of the 11th regiment. The horn-work and the land front below the curtain, and the loop-holed wall behind the great breach, were all abandoned; the light division soldiers, who had already established themselves in the ruins on the French left, immediately penetrated to the streets, and at the same

moment the Portuguese, at the small breach, mixed with British who had wandered to that point seeking for an entrance, burst in on their side."*

San Sebastian was won. Would that its horrors had ended with its storm! but the scenes that followed were terrible. The sky became suddenly overcast—thunder was heard above the din of battle—and mortal fury mingled with an elemental uproar. Darkness came on; but houses wrapped in flames, directed the licentious soldiery to plunder, and acts of violence still more horrible. The storms of Badajoz and Rodrigo were followed by the most revolting excesses; yet they fell infinitely short of those committed after San Sebastian was carried by assault. "Some order was first maintained, but the resolution of the troops to throw off discipline was quickly made manifest. A British staff-officer was pursued with a volley of small arms, and escaped with difficulty from men who mistook him for the provost-martial of the 5th division; a Portuguese adjutant who endeavoured to prevent some atrocity, was put to death in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian, but deliberately by a number of English soldiers. Many officers exerted themselves to preserve order, many men were well-conducted, but the rapine and violence commenced by villains soon spread, the camp-followers crowded into the place, and the disorder continued, until the flames following the steps of the plunderer put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town."†

The loss sustained by the victors in the storm of San Sebastian exceeded two thousand men; and had the mines

* Napier.

† "This storm seemed to be the signal of hell for the perpetration of villany which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of antiquity. At Ciudad Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had been the principal object; at Badajoz lust and murder were joined to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian, the direst, the most revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes. One atrocity, of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity."—*Napier.*

been properly exploded,* it would no doubt have doubled that amount.† The garrison, at the moment of assault, mustered two thousand effective bayonets, of whom many were killed and wounded, and hundreds made prisoners, who could not gain the castle after the town had fallen.

It is hardly possible to describe the difficulties that presented themselves to the assailants; for even after the breaches, and the walls and traverses behind them, were carried, the most formidable obstacles were still to be overcome. "The principal square and every street presented a succession of retrenchments; but the garrison, dispirited at their previous loss, and being instantaneously attacked in every direction with vigour and determination, were scarcely able to make a momentary stand on any point; and 700 having been made prisoners, the remainder took refuge in the castle and the convent of St. Teresa."‡

The new and daring application of the besiegers' artillery, by which, when all other chances were desperate, the fortress

* Napier says that this was occasioned by the gallantry of some nameless soldier. "A serjeant, whose heroic death has not sufficed to preserve his name, running violently forward, leaped upon the covered-way with intent to cut the sausage of the enemy's mines. The French startled by this sudden assault, fired the train prematurely; and though the serjeant and his brave followers were all destroyed, and the high sea-wall was thrown with a dreadful crash upon the head of the advancing column, not more than forty men were crushed by the ruins, and the rush of the troops was scarcely checked. The forlorn hope had already passed beyond the play of the mine, and now speeded along the strand amidst a shower of grape and shells."

† Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K G., at the siege, assault, and capture of San Sebastian, from the 28th July to the 31st August, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	British.	Portuguese.	Horses.
Killed . .	45	40	676	761	572	189	—
Wounded .	105	93	1499	1697	1103	594	—
Missing . .	1	—	45	45	41	4	—

‡ Jones's Journal of Sieges.

was reduced, is the most striking event attendant on the storm of San Sebastian. The fire of forty-seven heavy guns and howitzers passed over the heads of the assailants, and yet the practice was so beautiful that scarcely a casualty occurred.* The effects of this cannonade were terrible. "On inspecting the defences, it was found that the tremendous enfilade fire on the high curtain, though only maintained for twenty minutes, had dismounted every gun but two. Many of these pieces had their muzzles shot away, and the artillery-men lay mutilated at their stations. Further, the stone parapets were much damaged, the cheeks of the embrasures knocked off, and the terre-plein cut up and thickly strewed with headless bodies. In short, the whole land front had, from the effects of the cannonade, been rendered a scene of destruction, desolation, and ruin."†

Three days after the assault, the interior of the city exhibited a fearful spectacle of the horrors which war and wickedness will produce. The streets were blazing, the troops plundering, and the people of the surrounding country flocking to profit by the spoils of their countrymen. "The few inhabitants who were to be seen seemed stupified with horror; they had suffered so much that they looked with apathy at all around them, and when the crash of a falling house made the captors run, they scarcely moved. Heaps of dead were lying everywhere,—English, Portuguese, and French, one upon another; with such determination had the one side attacked, and the other maintained its ground. Very many of the assailants lay dead on the roofs of the houses which adjoined the breach. The bodies were thrown

* "During this siege, several of the pieces were discharged upwards of 9,000 times in uninterrupted succession, without experiencing any material damage. Their fire was so accurate at the last attack, that they were employed in throwing shrapnel-shells, filled with powder and balls, over the heads of the besiegers, for the purpose of driving away the besieged who lined the top of the breach. It was one of these shells which set fire to a quantity of obusses and bombs that stood on the rampart, and occasioned an explosion, which created so much confusion in the place as to produce its fall."—*Thierry.*

† Journal of Sieges.

into the mines and other excavations, and there covered over so as to be out of sight, but so hastily and slightly that the air far and near was tainted; and fires were kindled in the breaches to consume those which could not be otherwise disposed of. The hospital presented a more dreadful scene —for it was a scene of human suffering; friend and enemy had been indiscriminately carried thither, and were there alike neglected;—on the third day after the assault many of them had received neither surgical assistance, nor food of any kind."*

While the storm of war was bursting upon the devoted city, blood flowed freely in the Pyrenees in the vain hope of enabling that fortress to hold out. Aware that the siege was hurried forward with ominous rapidity, Soult determined on a second effort to interrupt its progress, and in the hour of extremity occasion a diversion which the garrison might improve, and trust for final deliverance to some of the many accidents with which war abounds. The operations of the French marshal and their unsuccessful issue, were detailed to Earl Bathurst in the following abridged despatch.†

"Since the fire against San Sebastian had been recommenced, the enemy had drawn the greater part of their force to the camp of Urogne; and there was every reason to believe that they would make an attempt to relieve the place. Three divisions of the 4th Spanish army, commanded by General Don Manuel Freyre, occupied the heights of San Marcial and the town of Irun, by which the approach to San Sebastian by the high road was covered and protected; and they were supported by the 1st division of British infantry, under General Howard, and Lord Aylmer's brigade, on their left and in the rear of Irun; and by General Longa's division, encamped near the Sierra de Aya, in rear of their right. In order to secure them still further, I moved two brigades of the 4th division, on the 30th, to the convent of San Antonio, one of which,

* Southey. † Dated Lesaca, 2d September, 1813.

(General Ross's,) under Lieut.-General Sir L. Cole, the same day, afterwards moved up to the Sierra de Aya, and the other on the morning of the 31st, leaving the 9th Portuguese brigade on the heights between the convent of Vera and Lesaca. Major-General Inglis's brigade of the 7th division was moved on the 30th to the bridge of Lesaca; and I gave orders for the troops in the Puertos of Echalar, Zugarramurdi, and Maya, to attack the enemy's weakened posts in front of these positions.

"The enemy crossed the Bidasoa by the fords between Andara and the destroyed bridge on the high road, before daylight on the morning of the 30th, with a very large force, with which they made a most desperate attack along the whole front of the position of the Spanish troops on the heights of San Marcial.* They were beat back, some of them even across the river, in the most gallant style, by the Spanish troops, whose conduct was equal to that of any troops that I have ever seen engaged; and the attack, having been frequently repeated, was upon every occasion defeated with the same gallantry and determination. The course of the river being immediately under the heights on the French side, on which the enemy had placed a considerable quantity of cannon, they were enabled to throw a bridge across the river three quarters of a mile above the high road, over which, in the afternoon, they marched again a considerable body, who, with those who had crossed the fords, again made a desperate attack upon the Spanish positions. This was equally beat back; and, at length, finding all their efforts on that side fruitless, the enemy took advantage of the dark-

* "At that moment, Lord Wellington rode up with his staff. Then the Spaniards, who cared so little for their own officers, with that noble instinct which never abandons the poor people of any country, acknowledged real greatness without reference to nation, and, shouting aloud, dashed their adversaries down with so much violence, that many were driven into the river, and some of the French pontoon boats coming to their succour, were overloaded and sunk. It was several hours before the broken and confused masses could be rallied, and the bridges, which had been broken up to let the boats save the drowning men, repaired."—*Napier.*

ness of a violent storm to retire their troops from this front entirely.

"Notwithstanding that, as I have above informed your Lordship, I had a British division on each flank of the 4th Spanish army, I am happy to be able to report that the conduct of the latter was so conspicuously good, and they were so capable of defending their post without assistance, in spite of the desperate efforts of the enemy to carry it, that, finding that the ground did not allow of my making use of the 1st or 4th divisions on the flanks of the enemy's attacking corps, neither of them were in the least engaged during the action.

"Nearly at the same time that the enemy crossed the Bidasoa in front of the heights of San Marcial, they likewise crossed that river with about three divisions of infantry in two columns, by the fords below Salin, in front of the position occupied by the 9th Portuguese brigade. I ordered General Inglis to support this brigade, with that of the 7th division under his command; and as soon as I was informed of the course of the enemy's attack, I sent to Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie, to request that he would likewise move towards the Bidasoa, with the 7th division; and to the light division to support Major-General Inglis by every means in their power. Major-General Inglis found it impossible to maintain the heights between Lesaca and the Bidasoa; and he withdrew to those in front of the convent of San Antonio, which he maintained. In the meantime Major-General Kempt moved one brigade of the light division to Lesaca, by which he kept the enemy in check, and covered the march of the Earl of Dalhousie to join General Inglis.

"The enemy, however, having completely failed in their attempt upon the position of the Spanish army on the heights of San Marcial, and finding that Major-General Inglis had taken a position, from which they could not drive him, at the same time that it covered and protected the right of the Spanish army, and the approaches to San

Sebastian by Oyarzun, and that their situation on the left of the Bidasoa was becoming at every moment more critical, retired during the night.

"The fall of rain during the evening and night had so swollen the Bidasoa that the rear of their column was obliged to cross the bridge of Vera.* In order to effect this object, they attacked the posts of Major-General Skerrett's brigade of the light division, at about three in the morning, both from the Puerto de Vera, and from the left of the Bidasoa. Although the nature of the ground rendered it impossible to prevent entirely the passage of the bridge after daylight, it was made under the fire of a great part of Major-General Skerrett's brigade, and the enemy's loss in the operation must have been very considerable.

"While this was going on upon the left of the army, Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron attacked the enemy's posts in front of the pass of Echalar on the 30th and 31st. Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie made General Lecor attack those in front of Zugarramurdi with the 6th Portuguese brigade on the 31st, and the Hon. Major-General Colville made Colonel Douglas attack the enemy's posts in front of the pass of Maya on the same day, with the 7th Portuguese brigade. All these troops conducted themselves well.

"The attack made by the Earl of Dalhousie delayed his march till late in the afternoon of the 31st, but he was in the evening in a favourable situation for his further progress, and in the morning of the 1st in that allotted for him.

"In these operations, in which a second attempt by the enemy to prevent the establishment of the allies upon the

* "The storm commenced in the mountains about three o'clock, and raged for several hours with wonderful violence. Huge branches were torn from the trees and whirled through the air like feathers on the howling winds, while the thinnest streams, swelling into torrents, dashed down the mountains, rolling innumerable stones along with a frightful clatter. Amidst this turmoil, and under cover of night, the French recrossed the river, and the head-quarters were fixed at St. Jean de Luz."—*Napier.*

frontier has been defeated by the operations of a part only of the allied army, at the very moment at which the fort of San Sebastian was taken by storm, I have had great satisfaction in observing the zeal and ability of the officers, and the gallantry and discipline of the troops."

Immediately after Soult's second attempt for relieving the fortress to which he attached so much importance, had proved a sanguinary failure, Lord Wellington repaired in person to San Sebastian, to adopt the promptest measures for ensuring the reduction of the castle. In the first instance, a powerful bombardment was to be resorted to, in the hope that its garrison would be induced to capitulate, while at the same time breaching batteries were ordered to be erected on the works of the town, to ruin the defences of the place, and render hopeless all chances of success, should the governor push matters to extremity, and venture to abide an assault. The mortar fire was accordingly opened, and it continued with unabated fury until noon on the 3d, when General Rey sent out a flag of truce, and made propositions to surrender. The terms he demanded were considered by Lord Wellington inadmissible, and the bombardment was consequently renewed.*

On the 4th a quantity of combustibles and gunpowder accidentally exploded; and as the town had been fired during the assault, and the flames had never been got under afterwards, the houses blazed now with such increased violence, that it was difficult to carry forward the approaches. A moderate mortar fire however, was kept up on the castle, with occasionally a general salvo from all the mortars.

* "The French general continuing obstinate, a flight of shells, exactly at the hour indicated, following each other in rapid succession, was perceived sailing through the firmament. In the darkness that prevailed, nothing could be more fallacious than the impression created, as our eyes followed them, by the fusees in their rotatory motion. Instead of passing through the air with the velocity and impetus they in reality possessed, in appearance they were majestically and slowly pursuing their course."—*Leith Hay.*

On the 5th, the Convent of Santa Teresa was taken; and as the conflagration raged with unabated fury, the troops were obliged to fall back to the ramparts. On the night of the 7th, the breaching batteries being completed and armed, such of the steeples and houses that remained unburned were loopholed for musketry, and all was prepared for an assault—and at ten o'clock next morning, the fire of fifty-nine pieces of artillery opened with an appalling crash. By a preconcerted signal, the fire commenced from every point at the same moment, "and was so extremely rapid and well directed, and of so overpowering a nature, that the castle scarcely returned a single shot. After about two hours' firing, a great impression being made on the wall of the Mirador and of battery De-la-Reyna, the governor beat the *chamade*, and after some negotiation agreed to surrender his garrison prisoners of war."*

On the morning of the 10th the garrison accordingly filed out of the castle; and the scene was painfully interesting. The British regiments were drawn out upon the ramparts, the Portuguese formed in the streets, the bands occasionally played, the sun shone brilliantly, and yet, in effect, the spectacle was melancholy. All around told too faithfully the horrors that attend a siege. Crumbling walls and falling roofs nearly blocked up the streets; and fire and rapine seemed to have gone hand in hand in ruining this unfortunate city. Other appearances silently indicated the extent to which military licentiousness had arisen —for a gallows was standing in the Plaza, the halberts were erected, and the provost's guard was in attendance.

At noon, the French garrison marched out of the castle gate with the customary honours of war. "At its head, with sword drawn, and firm step, appeared General Rey, accompanied by Colonel Songeon,† and the officers of his

* Journal of Sieges.

† Of this gallant man the following anecdote is related by a British officer: "When the first assault on St. Sebastian failed, and our troops retreated to the

staff; as a token of respect, we saluted him as he passed. The old general dropped his sword in return to the civilities of the British officers, and leading the remains of his brave battalions to the glacis, there deposited their arms, with a well-founded confidence of having nobly done his duty, and persevered to the utmost in an energetic and brilliant defence."*

The fortress had been most ably defended—held out even when a hope was over that any accident could relieve it, and until the last pound of horse-flesh had been consumed. Yet the terrible repulse which the garrison had inflicted upon the assailants in the first storm, inspired a confidence that continued unshaken, until the *chamade* was beaten, and the terms of an almost unconditional surrender were carried into execution.

"Many of the French soldiers wept bitterly; there was a marked sadness in the countenance of all, and they laid down their arms in silence. The commandant of the place had been uniformly attentive to the officers who had been prisoners. When this kindness was now acknowledged, he said that he had been twice a prisoner in England; that he had been fifty years in the service, and on the 15th of the passing month he should have received his dismission; he was now sixty-six, he said, an old man, and should never serve again; and if he might be permitted to retire into France instead of being sent into England, he should be the happiest of men. Sir Thomas Graham wrote to Lord Wellington in favour of the kind-hearted old man; and it

trenches, the enemy advanced beyond his defences, or clustered on the ramparts, shouting defiance, and threatening a descent in pursuit. To check this movement, an animated fire of round and grape was opened from our battery, the thickest of which fell on a particular part of the breach where lay a solitary grenadier of the royals, shot through both legs, and unable to extricate himself from his awfully perilous situation. His fate appeared inevitable; when a French officer stepped forward, walked coolly through the hottest of our fire, lifted his wounded enemy in his arms, and bore him off, himself unhurt."—*Peninsular Recollections.*

* Leith Hay.

may be believed that the application was not made in vain."*

The reduction of San Sebastian had cost the victors a heavy loss; and its defence entailed upon the garrison one comparatively as severe — only thirteen hundred men grounded their arms upon the glacis—the remainder, during the operations, having been rendered *hors de combat.*

To a brave enemy the historian is bound to bear an honest testimony; and in Rey's defence of San Sebastian there was much to command an unqualified approbation. One circumstance, however, sullied the glory of the siege. The allied prisoners were obliged to labour under the fire of their own artillery; and afterwards, they were penned up in a contracted space within the castle, and exposed, without *blindages*, to the effect of a heavy and sustained bombardment. Even in the last terrible cannonade, these unfortunates were open to its fury—and hence the British batteries poured an indiscriminate destruction upon all†—friends and foes.

The delay and loss of life in the reduction of San Sebastian, have been attributed to different causes. By some, the first assault was considered wanting in force and determination; and it has been contended that boldness and perseverance must have succeeded, as they had done before at Badajoz and Rodrigo. But this is a speculative question which never can be settled. The truth more probably is, that the tedious and disastrous progress of the

* Southey.

† "The officer of engineers (Lieut. Harvey Jones) made prisoner on the breach, who was at this time lodged in the castle, represents the effect of this concentrated fire to have been irresistible, tearing up or destroying every thing opposed to it. The space within Fort La Mota being extremely small, and much crowded with men, the loss of life was very great, and the garrison generally sought shelter in narrow trenches excavated along the face of the hill. The English prisoners in the castle suffered in still greater proportion than the garrison; for the officer charged with their custody feeling irritated at the loss his friends were sustaining from the bombardment, refused them the permission they solicited to throw up cover for their own protection, and they remained exposed to all its fury."—*Journal of the Sieges.*

attack arose from the abandonment of scientific principle in conducting it. Hence the event was not only dangerously procrastinated, but after an enormous expenditure of means and blood, success, even to the last moment, was insecure, and then it was achieved by an enduring gallantry that in no other troops would have been looked for.*

The true history of this protracted siege is clearly given by Colonel Jones. The defences of the fortress were thoroughly exposed to the Chofre sand-hills; and, as the after events proved, sufficiently near for the improved artillery of modern times to act upon them with ruinous effect. There, then, the siege artillery should have been placed, "to enfilade and plunge into the defences on the isthmus; and had those batteries been aided by other direct and enfilading batteries on the heights of St. Bartolomeo, and in advance of them, the garrison would not have been able, after a few hours' firing, to have preserved a single gun on the ramparts, or to have shown a musket over the parapets to retard the progress of the attack; in which case the approaches would have been carried forward uninterruptedly along the sandy isthmus, and a lodgment established in the hornwork, almost without loss.

"With respect to time, as there are no instances on record of a work of similar trace and profile to that under consideration, which has been attacked vigorously and with powerful means, having resisted above ten or twelve days, the longest of those terms may reasonably be assumed as the probable period within which a besieger might establish himself in the hornwork of St. Sebastian's.

"If, after the formation of a lodgment in the hornwork, such guns in the enfilading batteries on the Chofre sand-hills, as would become disposable, had been turned to breach the exposed scarp of the eastern defences of the town, and ruin its parapets; whilst direct batteries on the

* Colonel Jones gives a summary of the attack. "Thirty days open trenches, thirty days of blockade, 3,500 officers and men killed or wounded, 70,831 rounds of ammunition expended."

isthmus breached the land front, and the remaining ordnance continued a fire of annoyance on the defences, the place would in four days more (making a total of fourteen or sixteen days open trenches) have had three considerable breaches in its walls, with all its flanks destroyed, its parapets knocked down, and its artillery dismounted. Further, the troops, whilst giving the assault, would have had the support of a powerful artillery, or close musketry fire from the trenches, till on the very summit of the breaches; and, under such circumstances, who can doubt but that terms of capitulation would have been demanded, or a certain and almost bloodless triumph have been the immediate consequence?"*

* Journal of Sieges.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE VALENTIAN CAMPAIGN — OPERATIONS OF LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK — COMBAT OF ORDAL—PLANS OF THE FRENCH MARSHALS—MISCONDUCT OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT—STATE OF PARTIES—POLITICAL VIEWS OF LORD WELLINGTON—ANNOYANCES FROM THE PRESS—MISREPRESENTATIONS OF THE XEFE POLITICO—REMONSTRANCE OF LORD WELLINGTON—SINGULAR LIBEL —LORD WELLINGTON PREPARES TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE—AND DECIDES ON INVADING FRANCE—FRENCH POSITION—LORD WELLINGTON'S PLAN OF ATTACK—OFFICIAL DETAIL OF THE PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA.

It would appear almost a fatality, attendant on Lord Wellington's career, that the successes achieved by himself were generally followed by some misadventure on the part of his allies, arising too generally from the imprudence or the incapacity of individuals. The diversion intended to be effected in Valencia by the Anglo-Sicilian army had produced very opposite results; and all admitted that this failure was attributable to the misconduct of its commander. Sir John Murray's errors were unpardonable; and Lord William Bentinck, when he succeeded to the command, was not sufficiently fortunate in his operations to retrieve the mischief committed by his predecessor.

Immediately upon assuming the command at Alicante, Lord William joined the Spanish army under Del Parque, the French having retired, leaving garrisons in the fortresses. The British general, crossing the Ebro at Amposta, prepared to besiege Tarragona on the 30th of July, while the Spaniards shut in the garrisons in his rear. On the 11th of August, having been joined by the united corps of Sarsfield and Del Parque, Lord William landed his siege

artillery, and commenced the investment, while Suchet, as anxious to secure the place, advanced with all the disposable force he could collect, to interrupt the siege. Alarmed at the strength of the French marshal, and distrusting the efficiency of the army he commanded, Lord William retreated to Cambrils; and Suchet, having destroyed the works, and removed the garrison of Tarragona, retired again to the Llobraget, strengthening the river by a *tête-de-pont* at Molinos del Rey, and securing his communications with Barcelona and Lerida.

The town of Tarragona, from the convenience of its harbour, was again occupied by the allied forces; and early in September Lord William Bentinck moved forward to Villa Franca with his main body, after pushing an advanced guard to Ordal, a post ten miles from Villa Franca, and about the same distance from the French position on the Llobraget.

This advanced detachment of the allies was commanded by Colonel Adam, and consisted of the British 27th, a Calabrian battalion, and three Spanish regiments with four light guns. From the nature of the position, Lord William Bentinck considered that it was secure from an attack; but he forgot that it was open on both flanks, and that consequently no dependence should have been placed upon ground whose strength was in every respect deceptive.

Early on the morning of the 13th of September, Suchet by a night march reached the post of Ordal, and suddenly fell upon the pickets. "An old work which commanded the main road was well defended by the Calabrians, till they were driven from it by the repeated attacks of superior numbers; they rallied then about sixty paces in rear of it, behind some old ruins, and there, in conjunction with the Spaniards, who were close on their left, stood their ground some time longer. But in a night attack the assailants, acting upon ground with which they were well acquainted, and on a concerted plan, had greatly the advantage over a very inferior force who were taken by surprise. Colonel

Adam and the two officers next in succession to him were badly wounded, and obliged to quit the field; owing to the changes this occasioned, the regular directions were interrupted, and the ground in consequence was disputed much longer than it ought to have been against a force so greatly superior—and both British and Spaniards maintained it so resolutely, that the right and centre were nearly destroyed in their position."*

In this affair four guns were taken, and nearly five hundred men were killed and wounded. A great number of prisoners were at first in the enemy's hands, but profiting by the darkness, most of them escaped during the night, and joined the corps of Manso and D'Eroles.

Encouraged by his success, the French marshal pursued and overtook the allies after passing Villa Franca; and his cavalry and artillery pressed Lord William's rear guard, until it reached a deep ravine beyond the Venta de Monjos. Taking advantage of the ground, Lord Frederic Bentinck charged gallantly with the allied cavalry, broke through the enemy's dragoons, and in an encounter, hand to hand, wounded their commander. A second attack was repulsed by the fire of two guns, and the musketry of an English regiment; and having cleared the defile and reached Arbos, Suchet discontinued the pursuit, and the Anglo-Sicilian troops retreated unmolested to Tarragona. In a few days Lord William gave up the command to General Clinton and returned to Sicily.

Sir William, having made the best arrangements in his power for the supply of the Catalan army under Manso and Eroles, took a more advanced line of cantonments, establishing a strong corps at Villa Franca to observe the enemy on the Llobregat, and disposing the remainder of his reduced force in such positions, as would enable them to be concentrated if required with the least possible delay.

It seemed that the Catalonian expedition was fated to produce disappointment to all who obtained its command.

* Southey.

The time when the most important advantages might have arisen from a diversion, had been wasted by Murray in sitting down before a place he should have carried by assault, and in afterwards abandoning the siege, in a manner too disgraceful for any circumstances to palliate. Without his faults, Lord William Bentinck appeared to have inherited his bad fortune; and Sir William Clinton, with lessened means, found himself beset with greater difficulties than either of those who had preceded him. All he could expect to effect was to give full employment to Suchet's corps, and prevent if possible that marshal from detaching troops from Valencia, to assist Soult in his operations against Lord Wellington. Not daring to throw a bridge over the Ebro at Amposta, which would have been exposed to sallies from the garrison of Tortosa, he determined to repair the defences of Tarragona, and establish himself there with as much security as its ruined works would afford him. "Well was it for the Anglo-Sicilian army that, notwithstanding the credit it had lost by Sir John Murray's precipitate retreat, and the recent loss which it had sustained at Ordal, it had yet impressed Marshal Suchet with a most respectable opinion of its ability in the field; skilful as he was, nothing but that opinion withheld him from acting vigorously against it when he had it so greatly at advantage. His disposable force at this time was not short of 25,000 men, with a large body of cavalry; better troops he could not desire; and their supplies were protected by the possession of several important fortresses, all which were garrisoned well. The Anglo-Sicilian army amounted barely to 12,000 effective men, including a small body of cavalry; about half of these were British and Germans, the remainder Italians and Sicilians in British pay, on whom, though they were not ill disciplined, confidence could not be placed in the presence of an enemy."*

After Soult's efforts to relieve San Sebastian had been repeated without success, he submitted a proposal to

* Southey.

Marshal Suchet for a combined plan of operations, which however the loss of Zaragoza rendered impracticable. Another was then formed, in which the Duke of Albufera was required to cross the Eastern Pyrenees, unite himself with Soult at Tarbes, and then that both should enter Navarre by the routes of Oleron and Jaca. Suchet rejected this plan as dangerous, but offered to march with all the troops he could collect, and one hundred pieces of artillery, between the mountains and the Ebro upon Jaca; while Soult should force the northern passes of the Pyrenees, join his colleague, and with an united force assail the right flank of the allies. Circumstances prevented these plans from being effected. Most probably they would have proved unsuccessful, as all were in many points imperfect—and it would therefore be idle to speculate upon results of military combinations whose initial movements had never been commenced; for the fall of the castle of San Sebastian gave to Lord Wellington's operations the security that had been wanting, and enabled him to maintain the blockade of Pamplona so strictly, as to ensure a certain surrender.

While actively engaged in controverting the designs of the French marshals, and preparing to take the offensive himself, the allied commander was annoyed in every quarter by the villanous intrigues of the Spanish government, and exposed to the malignant slanders of a press whose licentiousness it secretly encouraged. In violation of its engagements to Lord Wellington, and false to the promises which had induced him to accept the command of the Spanish armies, the regency seized every opportunity to evince its personal hostility, and, as he complained, refused him the courtesy due even to a private gentleman. "His recommendations for promotion after Vitoria were disregarded, orders were sent direct to the subordinate generals, and changes were made in the commands and in the destinations of the troops without his concurrence, and without passing through him as generalissimo. Scarcely had he crossed the Ebro when Castaños, Captain-General of Gal-

licia, Estremadura, and Castile, was disgracefully removed from his government under pretence of calling him to assist in the council of state. His nephew, General Giron, was at the same time deprived of his command over the Gallician army, although both he and Castaños had been largely commended for their conduct by Lord Wellington. General Freyer, appointed Captain-General of Castile and Estremadura, succeeded Giron in command of the troops, and the infamous Lacy replaced Castaños in Gallicia, chosen, it was believed, as a fitter tool to work out the measures of the Jacobins. * * * * *

The clergy were at open warfare with the government; many generals were dissatisfied, and menacing in their communications with the superior civil authorities; the soldiers were starving; and the people, tired of their miseries, only desired to get rid of the invaders, and to avoid the burthen of supplying the troops of either side. The English cabinet, after having gorged Spain with gold and flattery, was totally without influence."*

This last was a mortifying conviction—but to its truth Lord Wellington could not shut his eyes; and in dissuading the English ministry from taking any part in forwarding the claim of the princes of the Brazils to the regency, he drew a sad picture of the Spanish government as it was then, while he gave a summary of its past misconduct and corruption.†

"Review," he says, "all the transactions with the Spanish government in relation to the operations of war; the negotiations respecting a British garrison at Cadiz, and the mode in which that measure was at last accomplished; look at your negotiations about America; at all that passed about my having the command, and the mode in which that object was accomplished; at the change of government accomplished last year by my brother, and its consequences; at the attempt made by me in the spring to obtain the consent

* Napier.

† Letter to Earl Bathurst, dated Lesaca, 5th September, 1813.

of the government to introduce Russian troops into the Peninsula, and the mode in which what I recommended was refused; and the fate of the recent recommendation of the British government to transfer the Spanish government to Madrid; and it will be admitted that, as a government, we have no influence over the Spanish councils.

* * * * *

"Our character is involved in a greater degree than we are aware of in the democratical transactions of the Cortes, in the opinion of all moderate well-thinking Spaniards, and, I am afraid, with the rest of Europe; and if the mob of Cadiz begin to remove heads from shoulders, as the newspapers have threatened Castaños, and the assembly seize upon landed property to supply their necessities, I am afraid we must do something more than discountenance them.

"The question is, how we shall discountenance them. It is not easy, possibly, for the persons composing the king's government to do so in public; and you may depend upon it that no public remonstrance, uncalled for, upon that or any other subject will ever have the smallest effect upon the Spanish government. But something may be done to save our character at least by the British Embassy at Cadiz, and by the British subjects in Spain in general, to bring democracy into discredit; and by taking every opportunity to point out to the Spanish nation the inconvenience and danger of the principle on which the government are acting; and by encouragement and countenance to the opposite party.

"You have seen lately how the *Liberales* defeated the measure of removing the government from Cadiz. They defeated the princess in the same way in the winter; and although she had a majority in the Assembly, not a soul dared to mention her name. They destroyed the Duque del Infantado's government (supposed, by the by, to have been established by our influence) in the same way, and the Duque has assured me that they had a majority in the Assembly at the time; and they recently defeated, in the same way,

Castaños' friends, likewise the majority, who, if they had had any spirit, would have saved him, and would have turned out the government. But Solano's ghost was staring them in the face, and they were afraid of the mob of Cadiz.

"It is quite impossible that such a system can last. What I regret is, that I am the person that maintains it. If I was out of the way, there are plenty of generals who would overturn it. Ballasteros positively intended it; and I am much mistaken if O'Donnell, and even Castaños, and probably others, are not equally ready. If the king should return, he also will overturn the whole fabric, if he has any spirit; but things have gone so far, and the gentlemen at Cadiz are so completely masters of their trade of managing that assembly, that I am afraid there must be another convulsion; and I earnestly recommend to the British government to keep themselves clear of the democracy, and to interfere in nothing while the government is in their hands, excepting in carrying on the war, and keeping out the foreign enemy."

At no period of the war had Lord Wellington escaped annoyance from the press. Success or disaster brought no respite from its attacks. If a failure occurred, at home it was represented by the opposition newspapers as a national calamity equally fatal and irremediable; and even victory was turned to mischievous account, for, by exciting expectations which no human means could realize, the periodical writers of the day laid the sure foundation for popular disappointment. In one of his letters Lord Wellington alluded to these newspaper absurdities with much humour.

"If I had been at any time capable of doing what these gentlemen expected, I should now, I believe, have been in the moon.

"They have long ago expected me at Bordeaux; nay, I understand that there are many of their wise readers (amateurs of the military art) who are waiting to join the army till head-quarters shall arrive in that city; and when

they shall hear of the late Spanish battle, I conclude that they will defer their voyage till I shall arrive at Paris. But you may depend upon this, first, that I shall neither myself form nor encourage in others, extravagant expectations."

The attacks of the villanous press at Cadiz were, however, of a more malignant character; and from the nature of its slander, Lord Wellington evinced an indignant displeasure on the occasion, whereas he generally treated their calumnies with silent contempt. The horrible disorder which unavoidably attends an assault upon a resisting fortress, was represented to his government by the *Xefe Politico*, as being not only unrestrained after the storm of San Sebastian, but actually encouraged by the British officers—and that functionary roundly asserted that the conflagration which had accidentally broken out in the unfortunate city previous to the storm, was not caused by a chance explosion, but deliberately perpetrated through feelings of revenge, because the trade of San Sebastian had been carried on with the French, to the exclusion of the English merchants. Lord Wellington indignantly repelled the foul accusation, and the following extracts from a letter addressed by the allied general to the Spanish minister of war, showed his anxiety to remove the stain which the mendacious press, encouraged as it was by that functionary, had endeavoured to fix upon the British army.

"This charge cannot be intended to apply to the common soldiers, who cannot be supposed to know or to reflect much upon what passed before they attacked the place. This infamous charge applies exclusively to the principal officers, who, from motives, not of commercial policy, but of commercial revenge, are supposed so far to have forgotten their duty, as to have ordered or suffered the sack of this unfortunate town, and thus to have risked the loss of all they had acquired by their labours and their gallantry; and you will more readily conceive, than I can venture to describe, the feelings of indignation with which I proceed to justify the general and other officers of this army from

a charge officially made, by a person in a high office, that they designed to plunder and burn the town of San Sebastian.

"I need not assure you that this charge is most positively untrue. Every thing was done that was in my power to suggest to save the town. Several persons urged me, in the strongest manner, to allow it to be bombarded, as the most certain mode of forcing the enemy to give it up. This I positively would not allow, for the same reasons as I did not allow Ciudad Rodrigo or Badajoz to be bombarded; and yet if I had harboured so infamous a wish as to destroy this town from motives of commercial revenge, or any other, I could not have adopted a more certain method than to allow it to be bombarded.

* * * * *

"In regard to the plunder of the town by the soldiers, I am the last man who will deny it, because I know that it is true. It has fallen to my lot to take many towns by storm; and I am concerned to add that I never saw or heard of one so taken, by any troops, that it was not plundered. It is one of the evil consequences attending the necessity of storming a town, which every officer laments, not only on account of the evil thereby inflicted on the unfortunate inhabitants, but on account of the injury it does to discipline, and the risk which is incurred of the loss of all the advantages of victory, at the very moment they are gained.

"It is hard that I and my general officers are to be so treated as we have been by the *Xefe Politico*, and unrestrained libellers, because an unavoidable evil has occurred in the accomplishment of a great service, and in the acquirement of a great advantage. The fault does not lie with us; it is with those who lost the fort, and obliged us, at great risk and loss, to regain it for the Spanish nation by storm."

A still more extraordinary accusation formed one of those daily attacks.* Lord Wellington, it was asserted, aspired to the throne of Spain, and was so little scrupulous

* It appeared in a Cadiz newspaper, called *Duende*.

as to the means of effecting the object of his ambition, that he was prepared to attain it by becoming an apostate.

"There is no end," he writes, "of the calumnies against me and the army, and I should have no time to do any thing else, if I were to begin either to refute or even to notice them. Very lately they took the occasion of a libel in an *Irish* newspaper, reporting a supposed conversation between Castaños and me, (in which I am supposed to have consented to change my religion to become king of Spain, and he to have promised the consent of the grandees,) to accuse me of this intention; and then those fools the Duques de —— and de ——, and the Viscomte de ——,* protest formally that they are not of the number of the grandees who had given their consent to such an arrangement!!! What can be done with such libels and such people, excepting despise them, and continuing one's road without noticing them?"

While the Spanish government and press, instead of supporting their victorious ally, returned his good services with obloquy and falsehood, Lord Wellington had made every preparation for assuming the offensive, and waited only for the fall of Pamplona to immediately resume hostilities. He knew that it was impossible that the fortress could hold out, and once in his possession, the base of his intended operations would be secure. The blockade was therefore rigorously maintained, and the desperate sallies of men suffering from famine and disease, but still determined to hold out, were rendered unavailing.

The sterility of the line of country beyond the Bidassoa, and the uncertainty of obtaining supplies by sea, whose debarkation must be effected on an iron-bound coast, unprovided with harbours, and open to the prevailing winds, made Lord Wellington hesitate in advancing into France. Had he acted entirely upon his military judgment, Catalonia would have been chosen for the theatre of his first operations, after Pamplona should have been reduced. But

* Dukes Ossuna and Frias and Viscomte de Gante.

other considerations decided him upon taking a position within the French territory. In England it was expected as a consequence of his success—on the continent it was ardently desired as the means of effecting a powerful diversion; and having mutually weighed the question, Lord Wellington acted on political rather than military considerations.

"The French position was the base of a triangle, of which Bayonne was the apex, and the great roads leading from thence to Irun and St. Jean Pied de Port, were the sides. A rugged mass of mountains intervened between the left and centre, but nearly all the valleys and communications, coming from Spain beyond the Nieve, centred at St. Jean Pied de Port, and were embraced by an entrenched camp which Foy occupied in front of that fortress."*

Soult had laboured vigorously to strengthen every portion of the position that nature had left unprotected, and Wellington was anxious to deforce his opponent, before these defences were completed. This, however, was not practicable until the fords of the Bidassoa had been sounded, and the state of the tides ascertained. On the 6th of October, all preparations were ready for the attempt, and while the requisite movements for the attack were effected with admirable skill, their true design had been so ably concealed, that though the French marshal was kept in constant alarm, the plans of his opponent remained impenetrable.

During the annals of the war many daring operations had been conceived and executed, but among the boldest the passage of the Bidassoa will be ranked. The plan was to carry the greater La Rhune† with its dependent ridges,

* Napier.

† "The key to the French position was the high steep mountain called La Rhune, which fronts the passes of Vera and Etchalar. Mount La Rhune is a remarkable spot; and its possession had been obstinately contested in the campaign of 1794, because its summit served as a watch-tower from whence the whole country between Bayonne and the Pyrenees might be observed. The mountain itself is within the French territory, but there is a chapel, or, in

cross the river by its lower fords, and place the left wing of the allies within France. Lord Wellington, by forcing this passage, would be enabled to establish himself in a position to menace the French centre, and obtain possession of the Irun road, as well as the harbour of Fuenterabia; and thus he would shorten his communications, and open another port by which he might receive supplies from England. Such were the objects of his attempt, and nothing could be more brilliant than its execution. The details of this bold and successful operation were thus officially given in a letter to Earl Bathurst, dated Lesaca, 9th October, 1813.

"Having deemed it expedient to cross the Bidassoa with the left of the army, I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that that object was effected on the 7th instant.

"Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham directed the 1st and 5th divisions, and the 1st Portuguese brigade under Brigadier-General Wilson, to cross the river in three columns below, and in one above, the site of the bridge, under the command of Major-General Hay, Colonel the Hon. C. Greville, Major-General the Hon. Edward Stopford, and Major-General Howard; and Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre directed that part of the 4th Spanish army, under his immediate command, to cross in three columns, at fords above those at which the allied British and Portuguese troops passed. The former were destined to carry the enemy's entrenchments about and above Andaye; while the latter should carry those on the Montagne Verte, and on the height of Mandale, by which they were to turn the enemy's left.

"The operations of both bodies of troops succeeded in

Romish language, a hermitage, on its summit, which used to be supported at the joint expense of the villages of Vera in Spain, and of Sarré, Ascain, and Urogne, in France; people of different nations, and hostile feelings, being there drawn together by the bond of their common faith.—The right of the army being at Roncesvalles and Maya, could at any time descend from its commanding situation into France."—*Southey.*


Foy
Roille
Clauzel
Vera
Sarre
Light Div.n
Le Echallar
Salinas
Inglas
Longa
Trui
San Marcial
1st Div.n
4th Div.n
SAN ANTONIO
LESACA
Light Troops and Spaniards
River
Viodle
Fme de Haitz
OYARZUN
PASSAGE
OF THE
BIDASSOA.
Passages
San Sebastian
River
Urumea
French
Allies

every point; the British and Portuguese troops took seven pieces of cannon in the redoubts and batteries which they carried, and the Spanish troops one piece of cannon in those carried by them.

"I had particular satisfaction in observing the steadiness and gallantry of all the troops. The 9th British regiment were very strongly opposed, charged with bayonets more than once, and have suffered; but I am happy to add, that in other parts of these corps, our loss has not been severe. The Spanish troops under Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre, behaved admirably, and turned and carried the enemy's entrenchments in the hills with great dexterity and gallantry; and I am much indebted to the Lieut.-General, and to Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, and to the general and staff officers of both corps, for the execution of the arrangements, for this operation.

"Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, having thus established within the French territory the troops of the allied British and Portuguese army, which had been so frequently distinguished under his command, resigned the command to Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, who had arrived from Ireland on the preceding day.

"While this was going on upon the left, Major-General Charles Baron Alten attacked, with the light division, the enemy's entrenchments in the Puerto de Vera, supported by the Spanish division under Brigadier-General Longa; and the Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron attacked the enemy's entrenchments and posts, on the mountain called La Rhune, immediately on the right of the light division, with the army of reserve of Andalusia.

"Colonel Colborne, of the 52d regiment, who commanded Major-General Skerrett's brigade in the absence of the Major-General on account of his health, attacked the enemy's right, in a camp which they had strongly entrenched. The 52d regiment, under the command of Major Mayne, charged, in a most gallant style, and carried the entrenchment with the bayonet. The 1st and 3d

caçadores, and the 2d battalion 95th regiment, as well as the 52d regiment, distinguished themselves in this attack. Major-General Kempt's brigade attacked by the Puerto, where the opposition was not so severe; and Major-General Charles Alten has reported his sense of the judgment displayed both by the Major-General and by Colonel Colborne in these attacks.

"The light division took 22 officers, and 400 prisoners, and three pieces of cannon: and I am particularly indebted to Major-General Charles Baron Alten, for the manner in which he executed this service.

"On the right, the troops of the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the command of Don P. A. Giron, attacked the enemy's posts and entrenchments on the mountain of La Rhune in two columns, under the command of Spaniards only.

"These troops carried every thing before them in the most gallant style, till they arrived at the foot of the rock on which the hermitage stands; and they made repeated attempts to take even that post by storm; but it was impossible to get up; and the enemy remained during the night in possession of the hermitage, and on a rock on the same range of the mountain with the right of the Spanish troops. Some time elapsed yesterday morning before the fog cleared away sufficiently to enable me to reconnoitre the mountain, which I found to be least inaccessible by its right, and that the attack of it might be connected with advantage with the attack of the enemy's works in front of the camp of Sarre. I accordingly ordered the army of reserve to concentrate to their right, and as soon as the concentration commenced, Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron ordered the battalion *de Las Ordenes* to attack the enemy's post on the rock, on the right of the position occupied by his troops, which was instantly carried in the most gallant style. These troops followed up their success, and carried an entrenchment on a hill, which protected the right of the camp of Sarre; and the enemy immediately evacuated all their works to defend

the approaches to the camp, which were taken possession of by detachments from the 7th division, sent by Lieut.-Gen. the Earl of Dalhousie through the Puerto de Echalar for this purpose.

"Don P. A. Giron then established the battalion of *Las Ordenes* on the enemy's left, on the rock of the hermitage. It was too late to proceed further last night; and the enemy withdrew from their post at the hermitage, and from the camp of Sarre, during the night.

"It gives me singular satisfaction to report the good conduct of the officers and troops of the army of reserve of Andalusia, as well in the operations of the 7th instant, as in those of yesterday. The attack made by the battalion of *Las Ordenes*, under the command of Colonel Hore, yesterday, was made in as good order and with as much spirit as any that I have seen made by any troops; and I was much satisfied with the spirit and discipline of the whole of this corps.

"I cannot applaud too highly the execution of the arrangements for these attacks, by the Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron, and the general and staff officers under his directions.

"I omitted to report to your Lordship, in my despatch of the 4th instant, that when on my way to Roncesvalles, on the 1st instant, I directed Brigadier-General Campbell to endeavour to carry off the enemy's pickets in his front, which he attacked on that night; and completely succeeded, with the Portuguese troops under his command, in carrying the whole of one picket, consisting of seventy men. A fortified post, on the mountain of Airola, was likewise stormed, and the whole garrison put to the sword.

"Since I addressed your Lordship last, I have received despatches from Lieut.-General Clinton in Catalonia, to the 3d instant. The general was still at Tarragona, and the enemy were in their old position on the Llobregat. Lieut.-General Lord William Bentinck had embarked for Sicily on the 23d of September.

"I send this despatch by my aide-de-camp, Captain the Earl of March, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's protection."*

* Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., in action with the enemy on the 7th and 8th October, 1813:—

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	British.	Portuguese.	Hor-es.
Killed . .	4	5	70	127	79	48	—
Wounded .	40	33	422	674	495	179	—
Missing . .	—	—	5	13	5	8	—

CHAPTER XVII.

PASSAGE OF THE BIDASSOA, A BOLD AND FORTUNATE OPERATION—FRENCH UNPREPARED FOR THE ATTEMPT—THUNDER STORM—OPENING MOVEMENTS, AND DARING ATTACKS BY THE ALLIES—INTREPIDITY OF ENGLISH OFFICERS —MISCONDUCT OF THE TROOPS—LORD WELLINGTON DETERMINES TO REPRESS IT—REPUBLISHES HIS GENERAL ORDER—OUTRAGES COMMITTED BY THE FRENCH—AFFAIRS AT SARRE—PAMPLONA SURRENDERS—WINTER SETS IN—COLD AND PRIVATIONS PRODUCE DESERTION—CRITICAL SITUATION OF LORD WELLINGTON—FRENCH AND ALLIED POSITIONS—LORD WELLINGTON DETERMINES TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE—PASSAGE OF THE NIVELLE—OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLES—ALLIED CASUALTIES.

No better proof could be adduced to establish the military talents of Lord Wellington than his success in executing the daring and difficult operation of crossing the Bidassoa, in the presence of an opponent like Marshal Soult, whose circumspection was equal to his ability. The passage of the Douero had always been considered as ranking among the foremost exploits of the allied general; but that of the Bidassoa equalled it in boldness of conception, and probably surpassed it, if the superior style is recollected in which its beautiful combinations were carried into execution.

By the assistance of Spanish fishermen, Lord Wellington ascertained that below the bridge the river could be forded at low water, and that too, at three different points. These sands were broad—the tide rose sixteen feet—the whole left bank of the Bidassoa was overlooked by the enemy's position—and therefore, the difficulty of collecting troops close to the river unobserved, was manifest. Success depended on the rapid execution of the attack; "and a check would have been tantamount to a terrible defeat, because in two hours the returning tide would come with a swallowing flood upon the rear."

The daring of the design—the hazard attendant on the slightest failure—" the unlikelihood that a commander, having a better line of operations, would pass such a river as the Bidassoa at its mouth, deceived the French general. Meanwhile his lieutenants were negligent. Of Reille's two divisions, La Martiniere's, now commanded by general Boyer, was at the camp of Urogne, and on the morning of the 4th was dispersed as usual to labour at the works; Villatte's reserve was at Ascain and Serres; the five thousand men composing Macune's division were indeed on the first line, but unexpectant of an attack; and though the works on the Mandale were finished, and those at Biriatu in a forward state, from the latter to the sea they were scarcely commenced."*

While Wellington's combinations were sufficiently marked to excite suspicion, they were so admirably confused with false movements, that Soult was completely misled. As if fortune had determined to smile upon the bold attempt, at nightfall a storm was seen collecting on the Haya, the Alpine height which overlooked the low grounds where the columns for the assault were to be collected. Thunder rolled, and drowned with its louder peals the noise of bringing artillery into position; and at daylight it burst with all its fury upon the right bank of the river, and the columns remained undiscovered. From the contiguity of the opposite bank, the French pickets were occasionally overheard; and although an enemy, in imposing force, was immediately in their front, their presence was unknown, and their object unsuspected.†

* Napier.

† It has been a subject of surprise to those unacquainted with active service, how little one division of an army in the field knows respecting the position and transactions of another. In the Pyrenees, occurrences which happened on one flank were not unfrequently communicated to regiments on the opposite one, through the medium of the English newspapers. A remarkable instance of this occurred during the combats on the Bidassoa. While the left wing, under Graham, were furiously engaged, the right, under Hill, had races on the plains of Burguette, and were perfectly unconscious that the slightest military movement was in progress.

Nothing could be more perfect than Lord Wellington's dispositions. The tents were standing, and every camp seemed quiet. At last the hour arrived when the tide had fallen sufficiently, and two heavy columns issued simultaneously from their concealment — one taking the ford pointing towards the heights of Andaya, and the other moving in rapid march directly against the French position at Sans Culottes. The astonishment of the enemy was great. The columns in safety had crossed the centre of the river; then rose a rocket from the steeple of Fuentearabia, and the thunder of the guns already in position on San Marcial answered the preconcerted signal. Another column advanced by the ford of Jonco; others crossed by the upper ones; and from the mountain ridges, the grand movement of attack by seven distinct points was visible; the troops above the bridge "plunging at once into the fiery contest, and those below it appearing in the distance like huge sullen snakes winding over the heavy sands."*

The combats which followed prove that to determined valour no difficulties are insurmountable. Nature had provided her strongest means of defence; everywhere rocks, and torrents, and ravines, barred the progress of the assailants; and if an easier surface occasionally presented itself, art had been skilfully employed to render that impracticable. Nothing, however, could stay the victorious rushes of the allies; and partial checks seemed only to act as stimulants to more desperate exertions. The success with which the allied divisions had held their own mountain posts against the troops who now confronted them, told them what desperate resistance might be expected in assaulting veteran soldiers, established on alpine heights, and fighting on their native soil. "Day after day, for more than a month, entrenchment had risen over entrenchment, covering the vast slopes of mountains which were scarcely accessible from their natural steepness and asperity. This they could see, yet cared neither for the growing strength of the works,

* Napier.

the height of the mountains, nor the breadth of the river with its heavy sands, and its mighty rushing tide; all were despised, and while they marched with this confident valour, it was observed that the French fought in defence of their dizzy steeps with far less fierceness than when, striving against insurmountable obstacles, they attempted to storm the lofty rocks of Sauroren. Continual defeat had lowered their spirit, but the feebleness of the defence on this occasion may be traced to another cause. It was a general's, not a soldier's battle. Wellington had with overmastering combinations overwhelmed each point of attack. Taupin's and Maucune's divisions were each less than five thousand strong; and they were separately assailed, the first by eighteen, the second by fifteen thousand men; and at neither point were Reille and Clauzel able to bring their reserves into action before the positions were won." *

Never had the allied troops fought better. They had immense difficulties to overcome; but the combinations of their general were masterly, and the subordinate officers led their battalions to each assault with that brave determination which inspires soldiers with a confidence that nothing can bar their success. Many displays of heroism were exhibited; and there was one of ready boldness, which gained the good fortune it deserved. The French garrison had abandoned a strong field-work which covered the right of the Bayonette ridge, and were observed by Colonel Colborne hurrying off in evident confusion. He galloped forward, attended by his own staff and a handful of the 95th, intercepted them in their retreat, and desired them to surrender. Believing that the colonel was in advance of a force too strong to be resisted, the order was instantly obeyed, and three hundred men threw down their arms, and were made prisoners by a body not exceeding twenty. Officers of every rank and age showed to their followers an example of dauntless intrepidity. During these arduous days the checks were few, and always overcome; and when a foreign brigade

* Napier.

wavered for an instant, the road to victory was shown it by a beardless boy.*

The misconduct of a few, on this occasion, sullied the brilliancy of conquest; and the same predatory spirit which had occasioned such fearful atrocities when San Sebastian was carried by assault, led to many excesses while these splendid operations were in progress. This breach of discipline brought, as it often did, a summary punishment on the offenders; for many were found by the French in a state of stupid drunkenness, and captivity paid the penalty of crime.

Determined to correct an abuse, under any circumstances injurious to discipline and efficiency, and, if committed in a country which he wished to conciliate, ruinous in the last degree, Lord Wellington not only declared that offenders should be punished with unmitigated severity, but that those whose duty required them to repress licentiousness, should feel the full extent of their responsibility. Several officers who had witnessed acts of plunder, and not made strenuous exertions to restrain them, were arrested and sent home;† and the General Order issued at

* When Downie's brigade betrayed a dangerous indecision, and declined to go forward, "there happened to be present an officer of the 43d regiment, named Haverlock, who being attached to General Alten's staff, was sent to ascertain Giron's progress. His fiery temper could not brook the check. He took off his hat, he called upon the Spaniards to follow him, and putting spurs to his horse, at one bound cleared the abatis and went headlong amongst the enemy. Then the soldiers, shouting for '*El chico blanco*,' '*the fair boy*,'—so they called him, for he was very young and had light hair —with one shock broke through the French, and this at the very moment when their centre was flying under the fire of Kemp's skirmishers from the Puerto de Vera."—*Napier.*

† "According to all the information which the Commander of the Forces has received, outrages of all descriptions were committed by the troops in presence even of their officers, who took no pains whatever to prevent them.

"The commander of the Forces has already determined that some officers so grossly negligent of their duty, shall be sent to England, that their names may be brought under the attention of the Prince Regent, and that His Royal Highness may give such directions respecting them as he may think proper; as the Commander of the Forces is determined not to command officers who will not obey his orders."—*Gen. Order, 8th October,* 1813.

Irurita, on the 9th of July, was repeated on the 8th of October, at Lesaca.

"The Commander of the Forces is anxious to draw the attention of the officers of the army to the difference of the situation in which they have been hitherto among the people of Portugal and Spain, and that in which they may hereafter find themselves among those of the frontiers of France.

"Every military precaution must henceforward be used to obtain intelligence, and to prevent surprise. General and superior officers, at the head of detached corps, will take care to keep up a constant and regular communication with the corps upon their right and left, and with their rear; and the soldiers and their followers must be prevented from wandering to a distance from their camps and cantonments on any accounts whatever.

Notwithstanding that these precautions are absolutely necessary, as the country in front of the army is the enemy's, the Commander of the forces is particularly desirous that the inhabitants should be well treated; and that private property must be respected as it has been hitherto.

"The officers and soldiers of the army must recollect that their nations are at war with France solely because the ruler of the French nation will not allow them to be at peace, and is desirous of forcing them to submit to his yoke: and they must not forget that the worst of the evils suffered by the enemy, in his profligate invasion of Spain and Portugal, have been occasioned by the irregularities of the soldiers, and their cruelties, authorized and encouraged by their chiefs, towards the unfortunate and peaceful inhabitants of the country.

"To revenge this conduct on the peaceable inhabitants of France would be unmanly, and unworthy of the nations to whom the Commander of the Forces now adresses himself; and, at all events, would be the occasion of similar and worse evils to the army at large than those which the

enemy's army have suffered in the Peninsula; and would eventually prove highly injurious to the public interests.

"The rules, therefore, which have been observed hitherto, in requiring, and taking, and giving receipts for supplies from the country, are to be continued in the villages on the French frontier; and the commissaries, attached to each of the armies of the several nations, will receive the orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the army of their nations, respecting the mode and period of paying for such supplies."

Nor were excesses confined to that army from which they might have been naturally expected;—naturally, because the spoliations of the French armies, during their invasion and occupancy of Spain and Portugal, would probably be retaliated by a people, whose national characteristic was revenge. The predatory habits to which Napoleon's atrocious system of "war supporting war" had familiarized his soldiery, produced now the fruits that might have been anticipated. By their own countrymen the French peasantry suffered more heavily than from the spoliation of the invaders; and an event, unknown in the British army, occurred—a captain of some reputation, and a member of the Legion of Honour, was shot by order of the Duke of Dalmatia for being present at the plunder of a house.

For several days both armies remained inactive. Soult was preparing for an attack; and Wellington completing his preparations for resuming the offensive, so soon as the fall of Pamplona would authorize it. Some slight affairs occurred. "On the night of the 12th, the enemy attacked and carried the redoubt in the camp of Sarre, which was held by a picket of 40 men of the army of reserve of Andalusia, who were taken, as well as 300 prisoners. There is reason to believe that they were surprised, as the reserve, for the support of the redoubt, had not time to give the picket assistance. This redoubt was certainly more distant from the line, and from the ground from which it could be supported, than I had imagined it to be

when I had directed that it should be occupied; and it is so near the houses of the village of Sarre, as always to be liable to an attack by surprise. I have therefore not allowed it to be reoccupied.

"After having possession of the redoubt, the enemy made an attack, on the morning of the 13th, upon the advanced posts of the army of Andalusia, under the command of Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron, with a view to regain possession of those works that they had lost on the 8th, which they had constructed in front of the camp of Sarre. It was at first imagined and reported that the real attack was on the side of the Hermitage of La Rhune; but it was confined entirely to the advanced posts of the reserve of Andalusia, and was repulsed by them without difficulty."*

The event so long expected had occurred, and a despatch from Carlos D'España announced the surrender of Pamplona. For four months that fortress had been resolutely defended; and although the sound of Soult's artillery had been heard by the garrison he had been so anxious to relieve, the diversion was utterly unavailing.† Maucune's sorties were boldly made and boldly repelled; and at the cost of above an hundred men, a trifling quantity of corn was with difficulty obtained. In October, the garrison were put upon an allowance of four ounces of horseflesh each man. In a week that too failed; every domestic animal had been consumed; rats were eagerly sought for,

* Despatch to Earl Bathurst.

† "The blockade of Pamplona having been well regulated, admitted of no brilliant actions; but the duties and labours of the troops, in consequence of the smallness of their numbers, were, from its commencement to its termination, constant and great. Their vigilance never relaxed for a moment, and in every sortie the garrison was firmly met and quickly repulsed.

"This blockade is probably a solitary instance of the investment of a large place, situated close to its own frontier, having been so successfully maintained for the long period of three months, so as to preclude the garrison from once communicating with, or receiving intelligence from their friends."—*Journal of the Sieges.*

and weeds supplied the place of vegetables. A feeble sally was made upon the 10th, but it was repulsed with a loss of eighty men. Disease generally accompanies famine—scurvy broke out—a thousand men were reported to be in the hospital, as many were wounded, and death and desertion had lessened the garrison by six hundred. In these desperate circumstances, Cassan, the governor, sent out to offer a surrender, provided he was allowed to retire into France with six pieces of artillery. A peremptory rejection of this condition was followed by a proposition that the soldiers should not serve for a year. This, too, being refused, it was intimated to the Spanish general, that after blowing up the works, Cassan would imitate Brennier, and trust to fortune and gallantry for the deliverance of his exhausted garrison. This proceeding on the part of the French governor was so repugnant to the rules of war, that a letter was conveyed to his advanced post, denouncing the attempt as inhuman, involving in a desperate experiment the destruction of unfortunate beings who had already borne the horrors of a siege, with an assurance that should it be attempted, the governor and officers would be shot, and the private soldiers decimated. Most probably the threat of mining the city had been merely used to obtain more favourable terms, and neither the abominable experiment was made, nor the terrible retaliation which would have followed was required. On the 31st the garrison surrendered, and the finest fortress on the Peninsula became thus a bloodless conquest.

Winter rapidly came on; and to remain upon those alpine heights, indifferently sheltered, and more insecurely supplied, was almost impossible. Already the hardships of the season were painfully experienced; and men and horses at times were threatened with actual starvation.*

* "The cattle brought for the consumption of the troops through a great part of Spain arrived in a jaded and lean condition—those who lived to reach the place of slaughter—for the roads along which they had been driven might

Communications between distant posts, difficult in good weather, were now almost impracticable; and bivouacks, in summer agreeable enough, became every day more dreary and uncomfortable.

"The wearisome duties of guard, fatigue, and the sufferings from frost and sleet, tried the patience, and shook the constancy, of the worst soldiers. Oftentimes as the chill mist upon the mountains was for a few hours dissipated by the sun or wind, the plains of France were seen spread below; and the eye of the longing sentinel, freezing at his post, could discern the smoke of towns and villages, and scattered homesteads, lying in pleasant and warm valleys, all green with verdure, or golden with corn. Thus many an idle rover, without principle to endure to the end, was tempted away, and deserted to the plains below."*

No trial is more severe upon the moral character of the soldier, than a state of inaction in the field, when accompanied by tiresome duties and severe privations. Many a brave man, who in the presence of an enemy would only abandon his colours with his life, under these circumstances loses spirit and principle, and, alike regardless of the impulses of honour and the obligations of an oath, adopts a desperate resolution, and in despair goes over to the enemy. Desertion at this period had risen to an alarming

easily be traced by their numerous carcasses, lying half-buried or unburied by the way-side—sad proofs of the wasteful inhumanity of war! The weather had been more stormy than was usual even on that coast and at that season. The transports at Passages were moored stem and stern in rows, and strongly confined by their moorings; yet they were considered in danger even in that land-locked harbour: some were driven forward by the rising of the swell, while others, close alongside, were forced backward by its fall, so that the bowsprits of some were entangled in the mizen-chains of others. The cold on the mountains was so intense, that several men perished. A picket in the neighbourhood of Roncesvalles was snowed up: the parties who were sent to rescue it drove bullocks before them as some precaution against the danger of falling into chasms, and the men were brought off; but the guns could not be removed, and were buried under the snow in the ditch of the redoubt."—*Southey.*

* Sherer.

height; and every exertion of Lord Wellington to arrest the crime, had been tried and found unavailing.*

To hold his present positions through the winter months was hardly practicable; and yet there were many circumstances which made a farther advance into the enemy's territory a very critical experiment; and Lord Wellington accordingly hesitated to take that step. Should Napoleon, either by success or negotiation, induce the allied sovereigns to agree to such terms as would end hostilities in Germany, it would be impossible for the allies to maintain themselves in France; and, to recross the Pyreness in the depth of winter would be a most difficult, and probably, disastrous operation. The news from Germany, however, confirmed the previous rumours which had already reached the south of France — the tide of Fortune had turned, and Talleyrand's fatal prophecy was being fulfilled.

Soult, in the mean time, had established his head-quarters at St. Jean de Luz, having placed his army in an intrenched position, extending from the sea to St. Jean Pied de Port. Wellington's *corps d'armée* were thus distributed. The 1st and 5th divisions, Aylmer's brigade, Bradford's and Wilson's Portuguese, and Giron's Spanish division, were encamped in France, around the greater La Rhune. The light and 4th divisions were posted on the heights of Vera. The army of Andalusia, with the 7th division on their right, occupied positions near Eschallar. The 3d division was between Eschallar and Maya. The 6th was posted at the latter place, with Hamilton's Portuguese in reserve, at Ariscoon. One brigade of the 2d division was at Alduides, and another, with Morillo's Spanish corps, occupied Roncesvalles. In the rear, the cavalry were quartered in the valley of the Bastan; and Lord Wellington's head-quarters had been removed from Lesaca to Vera.

* "Between the Spaniards, Germans, and, I am sorry to add, English, I believe we have not lost less than 1200 men in the last four months. The Portuguese (to their honour be it recollected) do not desert to the enemy. When they go, it is to return to their own country."—*Letter from Lord Wellington.*

The severity of the weather obliged the allied general to suspend an attack, originally designed to have been made on the 29th of October upon the enemy's fortified positions; and Soult, already apprised of the intention, employed the interval until the 10th of November, in strengthening his camp by additional field works and abatis. On the 6th and 7th the weather cleared; and the 8th was named for the attack; but, as usual, the Spanish divisions were unprepared—their commissariate had failed —and Lord Wellington was obliged to spare from his own stores 40,000 rations of flour. On the 9th, heavy rains rendered the roads impassable; but on the 10th a beautiful morning opened on a glorious day, and "ninety thousand combatants of all arms and ranks, above seventy-four thousand being Anglo-Portuguese, descended to the battle, and with them went ninety-five pieces of artillery, which under the command of Colonel Dickson were all with inconceivable vigour and activity thrown into action."*

Never were Lord Wellington's dispositions more fortunate in conception and effect. Before day-break, columns were within pistol-shot of the works they were to assault, and the enemy were ignorant that any force was in their front more formidable than the ordinary pickets. The darkness gradually gave place to morning. Three guns pealed from the mountain heights of Achubia; and before their smoke had cleared away, the columns of attack issued from their concealment, —and the battles of the Nivelle commenced.

With that clearness which always marked Lord Wellington's official communications, he thus detailed to Earl Bathurst,† the progress and termination of one of his most distinguished battles,—if the continued fighting of five days may thus be termed.

"The enemy had since the beginning of August occupied a position with their right upon the sea in front of St. Jean

* Napier. † Dated St. Pé, 13th November, 1813.

de Luz, and on the left of the Nivelle; their centre on La Petite Rhune, and on the heights behind that village; and their left, consisting of two divisions of infantry under the Compte d'Erlon on the right of that river, on a strong height in rear of Ainhoüé, and on the mountain of Mondarrain, which protected the approach to that village. They had had one division under General Foy at St. Jean Pied de Port, which was joined by one of the army of Aragon under General Paris, at the time the left of the allied army crossed the Bidassoa. General Foy's division joined those on the heights behind Ainhoüé, when Sir R. Hill moved into the Valley of Baztan. The enemy, not satisfied with the natural strength of this position, had the whole of it fortified; and their right in particular had been made so strong that I did not deem it expedient to attack it in front.

"Pamplona having surrendered on the 31st of October, and the right of the army having been disengaged from covering the blockade of that place, I moved Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill on the 6th and 7th into the valley of Baztan, as soon as the state of the roads, after the recent rains, would permit, intending to attack the enemy on the 8th; but the rain which fell on the 7th having again rendered the roads impracticable, I was obliged to defer the attack till the 10th, when we completely succeeded in carrying all the positions on the enemy's left and centre, in separating the former from the latter, and by these means turning the enemy's strong positions occupied by their right on the lower Nivelle, which they were obliged to evacuate during the night; having taken 51 pieces of cannon, and 1,400 prisoners.

"The object of the attack being to force the enemy's centre, and to establish our army in rear of their right, the attack was made in columns of divisions, each led by the general officer commanding it, and each forming its own reserve. Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill directed the movements of the right, consisting of the 2d division under Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir William Stewart; the 6th

division under Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton; a Portuguese division under Lieut.-General Sir John Hamilton, and a Spanish division under General Morillo, and Colonel Grant's brigade of cavalry and a brigade of Portuguese artillery, under Lieut.-Colonel Tulloh, and three mountain guns under Lieut. Robe, which attacked the positions of the enemy behind Ainhoüé.

"Marshal Sir William Beresford directed the movements of the right of the centre, consisting of the 3d division under Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, the 7th division under Mariscal de Campo Le Cor, and the 4th division under Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Lowry Cole.

"The latter attacked the redoubts in front of Sarre, that village, and the heights behind it, supported on their left by the army of reserve of Andalusia, under the command of Mariscal de Campo Don P. A. Giron, which attacked the enemy's positions on the right of Sarre, on the slopes of La Petite Rhune, and the heights behind the village on the left of the 4th division.

"Major-General Charles Baron Alten attacked, with the light division and General Longa's Spanish division, the enemy's positions on La Petite Rhune; and, having carried them, cooperated with the right of the centre in the attack of the heights behind Sarre.

"General V. Alten's brigade of cavalry, under the direction of Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, followed the movements of the centre; and there were three brigades of British artillery with this part of the army, and three mountain guns with General Giron, and three with Major-General C. Alten.

"Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre moved in two columns from the heights of Mandale towards Ascain, in order to take advantage of any movement the enemy might make from the right of their position towards their centre; and Lieut.-General Sir John Hope with the left of the army drove in the enemy's outposts in front of their entrenchments on the lower Nivelle, carried the redoubt

above Urogne, and established himself on the heights immediately opposite Siboure, in readiness to take advantage of any movement made by the enemy's right.

"The attack began at daylight; and Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole having obliged the enemy to evacuate the redoubt on their right in front of Sarre by a cannonade, and that in front of the left of the village having been likewise evacuated on the approach of the 7th division under General Le Cor to attack it, Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole attacked and possessed himself of the village, which was turned on its left by the 3d division, under Major-General the Hon. C. Colville; and, on its right, by the reserve of Andalusia under Don P. A. Giron; and Major-General C. Baron Alten carried the positions on La Petite Rhune. The whole then cooperated in the attack of the enemy's main position behind the village. The 3d and 7th divisions immediately carried the redoubts on the left of the enemy's centre, and the light division those on the right, while the 4th division with the reserve of Andalusia on their left, attacked their positions in their centre. By these attacks the enemy were obliged to abandon their strong positions which they had fortified with much care and labour; and they left in the principal redoubt on the height the 1st batt. 88th regiment, which immediately surrendered.

"While these operations were going on in the centre, I had the pleasure of seeing the 6th division, under Lieut.-General Sir H. Clinton, after having crossed the Nivelle, and having driven in the enemy's pickets on both banks, and having covered the passage of the Portuguese division under Lieut.-General Sir John Hamilton on its right; make a most handsome attack upon the right of the enemy's position behind Ainhoüé and on the right of the Nivelle, and carry all the entrenchments, and the redoubt on that flank. Lieut.-General Sir John Hamilton supported, with the Portuguese division, the 6th division on its right; and both cooperated in the attack of the second redoubt, which was immediately carried.

"Major-General Pringle's brigade of the 2d division, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir W. Stewart, drove in the enemy's pickets on the Nivelle and in front of Ainhoüé, and Major-General Byng's brigade of the 2d division carried the entrenchments and a redoubt further on the enemy's left: in which attack, the Major-General and these troops distinguished themselves. Major-General Morillo covered the advance of the whole to the heights behind Ainhoüé, by attacking the enemy's posts on the slopes of Mondarrain, and following them towards Itsassu. The troops on the heights behind Ainhoüé were, by these operations under the direction of Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill, forced to retire towards the bridge of Cambo, on the Nive, with the exception of the division on Mondarrain, which, by the march of a part of the 2d division, under Lieut.-General Sir William Stewart, was pushed into the mountains towards Baygorry.

"As soon as the heights were carried on both flanks of the Nivelle, I directed the 3d and 7th divisions, being the right of our centre, to move by the left of that river upon St. Pé, and the 6th division by the right of the river on the same place, while the 4th and light divisions, and General Giron's reserve, held the heights above Ascain, and covered this movement on that side, and Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill covered it on the other. A part of the enemy's troops had retired from their centre, and had crossed the Nivelle at St. Pé; and as soon as the 6th division approached, the 3d division, under Major-General the Hon. C. Colville, and the 7th division, under General Le Cor, crossed that river, and attacked, and immediately gained possession of the heights beyond it. We were thus established in the rear of the enemy's right; but so much of the day was now spent, that it was impossible to make any further movement; and I was obliged to defer our further operations till the following morning.

"The enemy evacuated Ascain in the afternoon, of which village Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre took possession,

and quitted all their works and positions in front of St. Jean de Luz during the night, and retired upon Bidart, destroying all the bridges on the lower Nivelle. Lieut.-General Sir John Hope followed them with the left of the army as soon as he could cross the river; and Marshal Sir W. Beresford moved the centre of the army as far as the state of the roads, after a violent fall of rain, would allow; and the enemy retired again on the night of the 11th into an entrenched camp in front of Bayonne.

"In the course of the operations, of which I have given your lordship an outline, in which we have driven the enemy from positions which they had been fortifying with great labour and care for three months, in which we have taken 51 pieces of cannon and 6 tumbrils of ammunition, and 1,400 prisoners, I have great satisfaction in reporting the good conduct of all the officers and troops. The report itself will show how much reason I had to be satisfied with the conduct of Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and of Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill, who directed the attack of the centre and right of the army; and with that of Lieut.-Generals Sir Lowry Cole, Sir Wm. Stewart, Sir John Hamilton, and Sir Henry Clinton; Major-Generals the Hon. C. Colville, and Charles Baron Alten; Mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, and Mariscal de Campo Don P. Morillo, commanding divisions of infantry; and with that of Don P. A. Giron, commanding the reserve of Andalusia.

"Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill, and Marshal Sir W. Beresford, and these general officers, have reported their sense of the conduct of the generals and troops under their command respectively; and I particularly request your lordship's attention to the conduct of Major-General Byng, and of Major-General Lambert, who conducted the attack of the 6th division. I likewise particularly observed the gallant conduct of the 51st and 68th regiments, under the command of Major Rice and Lieut.-Colonel Hawkins, in Major-General Inglis's brigade, in the attack of the

heights above St. Pé, in the afternoon of the 30th. The 8th Portuguese brigade, in the 3d division, under Major-General Power, likewise distinguished themselves in the attack of the left of the enemy's centre; and Major-General Anson's brigade of the 4th division, in the village of Sarre and the centre of the heights.

"Although the most brilliant part of this service did not fall to the lot of Lieut.-General Sir John Hope and Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre, I had every reason to be satisfied with the mode in which these general officers conducted the service of which they had the direction.

"Our loss, although severe, has not been so great as might have been expected, considering the strength of the positions attacked, and the length of time, from daylight in the morning till night, during which the troops were engaged; but I am concerned to add that Colonel Barnard, of the 95th, has been severely, though I hope not dangerously, wounded; and that we have lost in Lieut.-Colonel Lloyd, of the 94th, an officer who had frequently distinguished himself, and was of great promise.

"I received the greatest assistance in forming the plan for this attack, and throughout the operations, from the quartermaster-general, Sir George Murray, and the adjutant-general, the Hon. Sir E. Pakenham; and from Lieut.-Colonels Lord Fitzroy Somerset and Campbell, and all the officers of my personal staff, and His Serene Highness the Prince of Orange.

"The artillery, which was in the field, was of great use to us; and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the intelligence and activity with which it was brought to the point of attack under the direction of Colonel Dickson, over the bad roads through the mountains in this season of the year.

"I send this despatch by my aide-de-camp, Lieut. the Marquis of Worcester, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship.

"I enclose a return of killed and wounded."

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the operations of the army under the command of General the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., in the passage of the Nivelle on the 10th of Noverber, 1813.

	Officers.	Sergeants.	Rank & File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	26	28	289	16	343
Wounded	155	132	1991	25	2278
Missing	3	1	69	—	73

CHAPTER XVIII.

SOULT TAKES A POSITION AT BIDART—THE WEATHER INTERRUPTS LORD WELLINGTON'S OPERATIONS, AND SAVES THE BEATEN ARMY—INSUBORDINATION CONTINUES—OUTRAGES OF THE SPANISH TROOPS—THEY ARE SENT BACK TO THE FRONTIER—MILITARY INACTION—LETTER TO EARL BATHURST—INCONVENIENCE OF LORD WELLINGTON'S CANTONMENTS—HE DETERMINES TO CROSS THE NIVE—HIS PRESENT POSITION—CONFIDENCE AND GOOD FEELING EXISTING BETWEEN THE RIVAL ARMIES—BAYONNE—BATTLES OF THE NIVE—OFFICIAL ACCOUNT—ALLIED CASUALTIES.

COVERED by the night, the Duke of Dalmatia fell back to a position in front of Bidart; and the French division at Ascain retired also, abandoning that place to the Spaniards, who immediately occupied it with Longa's corps. The allied pursuit commenced early next day; but Sir John Hope was delayed by heavy rains and broken bridges, while the dreadful state of the roads completely impeded Marshal Beresford's advance, who had pushed forward after Soult from St. Pé, with a wing from the centre of the allies.

Soult's escape in the recent conflict from far greater losses than he had sustained, was entirely owing to the badness of the roads, which had rendered rapid movements on the allied part, impossible. Had Lord Wellington been enabled to push his successful operations with his customary rapidity, the French right wing must have been compromised, and it would have been either taken or cut to pieces. Nor, with this fortunate deliverance from a great calamity, was Soult's danger at an end. The entrenched camp at Bayonne was unfinished; and at Cambo, the bridge-

head on the left was ill constructed, and on the right it was scarcely traced out. Hence, though he reinforced Foy with D'Elon's division, the Nive would have proved a feeble barrier, and Wellington, with an army in high condition and flushed with recent victories, would have borne down any opposition which dispirited soldiers and an inferior force could have offered him. But the country and the weather favoured the regressive movements of the French marshal. The two great roads were still commanded by the French; and the bye-roads were so terribly cut up that cavalry were knee-deep, and no exertions could get artillery forward. On the 11th the rain came down in torrents; and the morning of the 12th was foggy—the advance of the allies was, consequently, interrupted; and the beaten army had thus ample time allowed them to take positions on the Nive, and occupy the camp at Bayonne.

While Lord Wellington's intended advance was thus most provokingly arrested, he had the mortification to find that the same licentious spirit which had so frequently led to robbery and outrage, showed itself again in the Anglo-Portuguese brigades, while Freyre's and Longa's troops had perpetrated the most outrageous crimes; for on entering Ascain they plundered the place and murdered several of the inhabitants. The insubordination of the Spaniards was most alarming. On the right, Mina's corps was reported to be in a state of mutiny, ravaging the country as they went along, and perpetrating every enormity. Nor was there any hope that these disorders would be repressed; for the civil and military authorities took no trouble to bring the worst offenders to justice, but permitting murder and robbery to pass unpunished, they sought every opportunity to display a deadly hatred towards the nation that had delivered them.*

* "The Spanish troops plunder everything they approach; neither their own or our magazines are sacred. But, till lately, there was some semblance of inquiry, and of a desire to punish the offenders: lately these acts of disorder have been left entirely unnoticed, till I have interfered, with my authority as

Nothing but determination like Lord Wellington's could have repressed these disorders, and averted the fatal consequences which would have otherwise resulted. The adjutant-general executed two British soldiers, affixing to their breasts a paper, on which their offendings were detailed; and the allied commander, with fearless severity, hanged every Spanish marauder who could be taken in the act. Nor did he stop there;—Mina's mutineers were disarmed—the Andalusian army sent back to the valley of the Bastan—the Gallicians cantoned between Irun and Hernani—and Longa's, by far the worst, were sent into the interior of Spain. Such decisive proceedings had their due effect. "However, the loss of such a mass of troops, and the effects of weather on the roads, reduced the army for the moment to a state of inactivity; the head-quarters were suddenly fixed at St. Jean de Luz, and the troops were established in permanent cantonments."

A short interval of quiet which succeeded, interrupted only by some slight affairs brought on between the light troops in the taking up of posts, appeared to have been as much employed by Lord Wellington in political consideration, as in military preparation. From the local advantages which a residence in the territory of France gave to

commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, to enforce it. The civil magistrates in the country have not only refused us assistance, but have positively ordered the inhabitants not to give it for payment; and where robberies have been discovered, and property proved to belong to the commissariat, the law has been violated, and possession withheld. This was the case lately at Tolosa.

"Then, what is more extraordinary, and more difficult to understand, is a transaction which lately occurred at Fuentearabia. In the arrangement of the cantonments, and station for general hospitals, it was settled that the British and Portuguese hospitals should go to that town. There is a building there which had been a Spanish hospital; and the Spanish authority who gave it over to our person, who was to have charge of the hospital, wanted to carry off, in order to burn as firewood, the boards, &c. which are the beds, in order that our soldiers might not have the use of them: and these are the people to whom we have given medicines, instruments, &c., whose wounded and sick we have taken into our hospitals, &c. and to whom we have rendered every service in our power, after having recovered their country from the enemy!" *Letter from Lord Wellington.*

the allied general, both in feeling the bent of popular opinion regarding the continuation of the Napoleon dynasty, and the restoration of the Bourbons, Earl Bathurst had been anxious to obtain from Lord Wellington information and advice for his guidance. To no one, as succeeding events demonstrated, could the secretary for foreign affairs have more fortunately applied; and the following document,* conveying his own present and prospective views, gave at the same time, a clear insight into the true state of the actual feeling of the French nation, and drew inferences from popular opinion, which the experience of a few months proved in every respect to have been singularly accurate.

"I enclose you the Proclamation† which I have issued since I have been in France, which will show you that I have acted exactly according to your wishes and the sentiments contained in his Royal Highness's speech from the throne, which I have since received. I am happy to add that the conduct of the Portuguese and British troops has been exactly what I wished; and that the natives of this part of the country are not only reconciled to the invasion, but wish us success, afford us all the supplies in their power, and exert themselves to get for us intelligence. In no part of Spain have we been better, I might say so well, received; because we really draw more supply from the

* Dated St. Jean de Luz, 21st Nov. 1813.

† "To the French People.

"On entering your country, I make known to you, that I have given the strictest orders, of which a translation is subjoined, to avert the misfortunes which are generally the consequence of the invasion of an enemy's army (an invasion which, you are aware, has resulted from that made by your government on Spain), and of the success of the allied armies acting under my orders.

"You may rest assured that I will carry those orders into effect; and I request of you to arrest and conduct to my head-quarters all those who, in disobedience of them, may do you an injury. But it is necessary that you should remain in your houses, and should not take any part in the operations of the war of which your country is about to become the theatre."

country than we ever did from any part of Spain. The inhabitants, who had at first left their habitations, have in general returned to them, many of them at the risk of their lives, having been fired at by the French sentries at the outposts; and they are living very comfortably and quietly with our soldiers cantoned in their houses.

"The Spaniards plundered a good deal, and did a good deal of mischief, in the first two days; but even this misfortune has been of service to us. Some were executed, and many punished; and I sent all the Spanish troops back into Spain to be cantoned, which has convinced the French of our desire not to injure individuals.

"I have had a good deal of conversation with people here, and at St. Pé, regarding the sentiments of the people of France in general respecting Bonaparte and his government; and I have found it to be exactly what might be supposed from all that we have heard and known of his system. They all agree in one opinion, viz., that the sentiment throughout France is the same as I have found it here, an earnest desire to get rid of him, from a conviction that so long as he governs they will have no peace. * * * *

"I have not myself heard any opinion in favour of the house of Bourbon. The opinion stated to me upon that point is, that twenty years have elapsed since the princes of that house have quitted France; that they are equally, if not more, unknown to France than the princes of any other royal house in Europe; but that the allies ought to agree to propose a sovereign to France, instead of Napoleon, who must be got rid of, if it is hoped or intended that Europe should ever enjoy peace; and that it was not material whether it was of the house of Bourbon or of any other royal family.

"I have taken measures to open a correspondence with the interior, by which I hope to know what passes, and the sentiments of the people, and I will take care to keep your lordship acquainted with all that I may learn. In the meantime, I am convinced more than ever that Napoleon's

power stands upon corruption, that he has no adherents in France but the principal officers of his army, and the *employés civils* of the government, and possibly some of the new proprietors; but even these last I consider doubtful.

"Notwithstanding this state of things, I recommend to your lordship to make peace with him, if you can acquire all the objects which you have a right to expect. All the powers of Europe require peace possibly more than France, and it would not do to found a new system of war upon the speculations of any individual on what he sees and learns in one corner of France. If Bonaparte becomes moderate, he is probably as good a sovereign as we can desire in France; if he does not we shall have another war in a few years; but if my speculations are well founded, we shall have all France against him; time will have been given for the supposed disaffection to his government to produce its effect; his diminished resources will have decreased his means of corruption, and it may be hoped that he will be engaged single-handed against insurgent France and all Europe.

"There is another view of this subject, however, and that is, the continuance of the existing war, and the line to be adopted in that case. At the present moment it is quite impossible for me to move at all: although the army was never in such health, heart, and condition as at present, and it is probably the most complete machine for its numbers now existing in Europe, the rain has so completely destroyed the roads that I cannot move; and, at all events, it is desirable, before I go farther forward, that I should know what the allies propose to do in the winter, which I conclude I shall learn from your lordship as soon as the king's government shall be made acquainted with their intentions by the king's diplomatic servants abroad. As I shall move forward, whether in the winter or the spring, I can inquire and ascertain more fully the sentiments of the people, and the government can either empower me to decide to raise the Bourbon standard, or can decide the

question hereafter themselves, after they shall have all the information before them which I can send them of the sentiments and wishes of the people.

"I can only tell you that, if I were a prince of the house of Bourbon, nothing should prevent me from now coming forward, not in a good house in London, but in the field in France; and if Great Britain would stand by him, I am certain he would succeed. This success would be much more certain in a month or more hence, when Napoleon commences to carry into execution the oppressive measures which he must adopt in order to try to retrieve his fortunes.

"I must tell your lordship, however, that our success, and every thing, depends upon our moderation and justice, and upon the good conduct and discipline of our troops. Hitherto these have behaved well, and there appears a new spirit among the officers, which I hope will continue, to keep the troops in order. But I despair of the Spaniards. They are in so miserable a state, that it is really hardly fair to expect that they will refrain from plundering a beautiful country, into which they enter as conquerors; particularly, adverting to the miseries which their own country has suffered from its invaders. I cannot, therefore, venture to bring them back into France, unless I can feed and pay them; and the official letter which will go to your lordship by this post will show you the state of our finances, and our prospects. If I could now bring forward 20,000 good Spaniards, paid and fed, I should have Bayonne. If I could bring forward 40,000, I do not know where I should stop. Now I have both the 20,000 and the 40,000 at my command, upon this frontier, but I cannot venture to bring forward any for want of means of paying and supporting them. Without pay and food, they must plunder; and if they plunder, they will ruin us all.

"I think I can make an arrangement of the subsidy to cover the expense of 20,000 Spaniards; but all these arrangements are easily settled, if we could get the money.

Where are we to get the money, excepting from England, it is impossible for me to devise; as the patriotic gentlemen at Lisbon, now that they can buy no commissariat debts, will give us no money, or very little, for the draughts on the Treasury, and the yellow fever has put a stop to the communication with Cadiz and Gibraltar; and if we had millions at all three, we could not get a shilling for want of ships to bring it."

Lord Wellington had felt considerable inconvenience from the narrow space afforded for the occupation of his army, as a surface far more extended than that which he possessed, was requisite for the subsistence of nearly nine thousand horsemen and one hundred pieces of artillery; and he had consequently determined to force the passage of the Nive, although to establish an army on both sides of a navigable river, whose communications were at all times bad, and occasionally totally interrupted by winter floods, with an enemy in front possessing excellent roads and well fortified positions, was certainly a daring resolution. From the 11th to the 20th, incessant rains prevented the intended movements; but Hill's threatened advance on the 16th, having alarmed the enemy, and caused them to destroy the bridge of Cambo, Lord Wellington brought forward his left wing to those heights between Bidart and Biaritz, which cross the Bayonne road in front of the Chateau de Barouillet. Half a league to the right, the plateau and village of Arcanges were occupied by the light division—and further on, the sixth division were posted at Avrauntz, with their right upon the river. The remaining divisions were placed *en potence* on the left of the Nive, and occupied Ustaritz and Cambo.

During the short term of inaction which the inclemency of the weather had occasioned, one of those periods of conventional civility, which not unfrequently occurred during the peninsular campaigns, took place between the French and allied outposts. "A disposition," says Quartermaster

Surtees,* "had for some time been gaining ground with both armies, to mitigate the miseries of warfare, as much as was consistent with each doing their duty to their country; and it had by this time proceeded to such an extent, as to allow us to place that confidence in them that they would not molest us even if we passed their outposts."

Lord Wellington, however, discountenanced those friendly relations, where the arrangements were so perfectly amicable, that the parties not only took charge of love letters, but even "plundered in perfect harmony."†

"Before this order was issued, the most unbounded confidence subsisted between us, and which it was a pity to put a stop to, except for such weighty reasons. They used to get us such things as we wanted from Bayonne, particularly brandy, which was cheap and plentiful; and we in return gave them occasionally a little tea, of which some of them had learnt to be fond. Some of them also, who had been prisoners of war in England, sent letters through our army-post to their sweethearts in England, our people receiving the letters and forwarding them."

On the 7th of December orders were issued to the gene-

* *Twenty-five years in the rifle brigade.*

† "The next day, there being no firing between us and those in our front, three French officers, seemingly anxious to prove how far politeness and good breeding could be carried between the two nations, when war did not compel them to be unfriendly, took a table and some chairs out of a house which was immediately in our front, and one which we had lately occupied as a barrack; and bringing them down into the middle of the field, which separated the advance of the two armies, sat down within 100 yards of our picket, and drank wine, holding up their glasses, as much as to say, 'Your health,' every time they drank. Of course we did not molest them, but allowed them to have their frolic out.

"During the day, also, we saw soldiers of the three nations, viz. English, Portuguese, and French, all plundering at the same time in one unfortunate house, where our pie, our pig, and wine had been left. It stood about 150 or 200 yards below the church, on a sort of neutral ground between the two armies; hence the assemblage at the same moment of such a group of these motley marauders. *They plundered in perfect harmony, no one disturbing the other on account of his nation or colour.*"—Ibid.

rals of division for forcing the passage of the Nive, and the 9th was named for its execution.

The city of Bayonne,* famed for its antiquity, and fated to witness a series of fierce and sanguinary conflicts, stands where the Nive unites itself with the Adour. As a fortress, its strength was by no means formidable; but, from its local position and entrenched camp, it offered a position for defence, which, when occupied by a veteran army under a commander such as Soult, few generals would have ventured to assail. Lord Wellington however, felt himself equal to the task; and the preliminary arrangements having been completed, a beacon was fired on the high ground over Cambo on the morning of the 9th, and the opening battle commenced, which, with the contests that succeeded it, were thus officially detailed by the victor to the British secretary at war.†

"Since the enemy's retreat from the Nivelle they had occupied a position in front of Bayonne, which had been entrenched with great labour since the battle fought at Vitoria in June last. It appears to be under the fire of the works of the place: the right rests upon the Adour; and the front in this part is covered by a morass occasioned by a rivulet which falls into the Adour. The right of the centre rests upon the same morass, and its left upon the river Nive; the left is between the Nive and the Adour, on which

* "Bayonne obtained its present name in the twelfth century, till when it was called Lapurdum, as when the cohort of Novempopulania had its head quarters there. This ancient city, which during three centuries belonged to our Plantagenet kings, is memorable in military history for the invention of the bayonet, a weapon that in its name indicates the place of its origin, and that, in British hands, has proved more destructive than any other to the nation by which it was invented. In the war of the French revolution this city would not have been tenable against a single division of an enemy's army: the war of intrusion made it immediately a place of great importance, as a depôt for the French; and therefore it was well fortified, to secure it against a sudden attack from the English, before the possibility of any more serious danger had been contemplated."—*Southey.*

† "Despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated St. Jean de Luz, 14th December, 1813.

river the left rests. They had their advanced posts from their right in front of Anglet and towards Biaritz. With their left they defended the river Nive, and communicated with General Paris's division of the army of Catalonia, which was at St. Jean Pied de Port; and they had considerable corps cantoned in Villa Franque and Mouguerre.

"It was impossible to attack the enemy in this position, as long as they remained in force in it, without the certainty of great loss, at the same time that success was not very probable, as the camp is so immediately protected by the works of the place.

"It appeared to me, therefore, that the best mode of obliging the enemy either to abandon the position altogether, or at least so to weaken his force in it as to offer a more favourable opportunity of attacking it, was to pass the Nive, and to place our right upon the Adour; by which operation, the enemy, already distressed for provisions, would lose the means of communication with the interior afforded by that river, and would become still more distressed. The passage of the Nive was likewse calculated to give us other advantages; to open to us a communication with the interior of France for intelligence, &c., and to enable us to draw some supplies from the country.

"I had determined to pass the Nive immediately after the passage of the Nivelle, but was prevented by the bad state of the roads, and the swelling of all the rivulets occasioned by the fall of rain in the beginning of that month; but the state of the weather and roads having at legth enabled me to collect the materials, and make the preparations for forming bridges for the passage of that river, I moved the troops out of their cantonments on the 8th, and ordered that the right of the army, under Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill, should pass on the 9th at and in the neighbourhood of Cambo, while Marshal Sir William Beresford should favour and support his operation by passing the 6th division, under Lieut.-General Sir H. Clinton, at Ustaritz. Both operations

succeeded completely. The enemy were immediately driven from the right bank of the river, and retired towards Bayonne by the great road of St. Jean Pied de Port. Those posted oposite Cambo were nearly intercepted by the 6th division; and one regiment was driven from the road, and obliged to march across the country.

"The enemy assembled in considerable force on a range of heights running parallel with the Adour, and still keeping Ville Franque by their right. The 8th Portuguese regiment, under Colonel Douglas, and the 9th caçadores, under Colonel Brown, and the British light infantry battalion of the 6th division, carried this village and the heights in the neighbourhood. The rain which had fallen the preceding night, and on the morning of the 8th, had so destroyed the road, that the day had nearly elapsed before the whole of Sir Rowland Hill's corps had come up; and I was therefore satisfied with the possession of the ground which we occupied.

"On the same day Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, with the left of the army under his command, moved forward by the great road from St. Jean de Luz towards Bayonne, and reconnoitred the right of the entrenched camp under Bayonne, and the course of the Adour below the town, after driving in the enemy's posts from the neighbourhood of Biaritz and Anglet. The light division under Major-General Alten, likewise moved forward from Bassussarry, and reconnoitred that part of the enemy's entrenchments.

"Sir John Hope and Major-General Alten retired in the evening to the ground they had before occupied.

"On the morning of the 10th Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill found that the enemy had retired from the position which they had occupied the day before on the heights, into the entrenched camp on that side of the Nive; and he therefore occupied the position intended for him, with his right towards the Adour, and his left at Ville Franque, and communicating with the centre of the army under Marshal Sir William Beresford by a bridge laid over the Nive; and

the troops under the Marshal were again drawn to the left of the Nive.

"General Morillo's division of Spanish infantry, which had remained with Sir Rowland Hill when the other Spanish troops went into cantonments within the Spanish frontier, was placed at Urcuray with Colonel Vivian's brigade of light dragoons at Hasparren in order to observe the movements of the enemy's division under General Paris, which upon our passage of the Nive had retired towards St. Palais.

"On the 10th in the morning the enemy moved out of the entrenched camp with their whole army, with the exception only of what occupied the works opposite to Sir Rowland Hill's position, and drove in the pickets of the light division and of Sir John Hope's corps, and made a most desperate attack upon the post of the former at the chateau and church of Arcangues, and upon the advanced posts of the latter on the road from Bayonne to St. Jean de Luz, near the mayor's house of Biaritz. Both attacks were repulsed in the most gallant style by the troops, and Sir John Hope's corps took about 500 prisoners. The brunt of the action with Sir John Hope's advanced post fell upon the 1st Portuguese brigade, under Major-General A. Campbell, which were on duty, and upon Major-General Robinson's brigade of the 5th division, which moved up to their support.

"Lieut.-General Sir John Hope reports most favourably of the conduct of these, and of all the other troops engaged; and I had great satisfaction in finding that this attempt made by the enemy upon our left, in order to oblige us to draw in our right, was completely defeated by a comparatively small part of our force.

"I cannot sufficiently applaud the ability, coolness, and judgment, of Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, who, with the general and staff-officers under his command, showed the troops an example of gallantry which must have tended to produce the favourable result of the day. Sir John Hope

received a severe contusion, which, however, I am happy to say, has not deprived me for a moment of the benefit of his assistance.

"After the action was over, the regiments of Nassau and Frankfort, under the command of Colonel Kruse, came over to the posts of Major-General Ross's brigade of the 4th division, which were formed for the support of the centre.

"When the night closed, the enemy were still in large force in front of our posts, on the ground from which they had driven the pickets. They retired, however, during the night, from Lieut.-General Sir John Hope's front, leaving small posts, which were immediately driven in. They still occupied in force the bridge on which the pickets of the light division had stood, and it was obvious that the whole army was still in front of our left; and, about three in the afternoon, they again drove in Lieut.-General Sir John Hope's pickets, and attacked his post. They were again repulsed with considerable loss. The attack was re-commenced on the morning of the 12th, with the same want of success. The 1st division, under Major-General Howard, having relieved the 5th division, the enemy discontinued it in the afternoon, and retired entirely within the entrenched camp on that night. They never renewed the attack on the post of the light-division after the 10th.

* * * * * *

"The 1st division, under Major-General Howard, were not engaged till the 12th, when the enemy's attack was more feeble; but the guards conducted themselves with their usual spirit.

"The enemy, having thus failed in all their attacks with their whole force upon our left, withdrew into their entrenchments on the night of the 12th, and passed a large force through Bayonne; with which on the morning of the 13th, they made a most desperate attack upon Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill.

"In expectation of this attack, I had requested Marshal

Sir William Beresford to reinforce the lieut.-general with the 6th division, which crossed the Nive at daylight in the morning; and I further reinforced him by the 4th division, and two brigades of the 3d.

"The expected arrival of the 6th division gave the lieut.-general great facility in making his movements; but the troops under his own immediate command had defeated and repulsed the enemy with immense loss before their arrival. The principal attack having been made along the high road from Bayonne to St. Jean Pied de Port, Major-General Barnes's brigade of British infantry, and the 5th brigade of Portuguese infantry, under Brigadier-General Ashworth, were particularly engaged in the contest with the enemy on that point; and these troops conducted themselves admirably. The Portuguese division of infantry, under the command of Mariscal de Campo F. Le Cor, moved to their support on their left in a very gallant style, and regained an important position between those troops and Major-General Pringle's brigade engaged with the enemy in front of Ville Franque. I had great satisfaction also in observing the conduct of Major-General Byng's brigade of British infantry, supported by the Portuguese brigade, under the command of Major-General Buchan, in carrying an important height from the enemy on the right of our position, and maintaining it against all their efforts to regain it.

"Two guns and some prisoners were taken from the enemy, who, being beat on all points, and having suffered considerable loss, were obliged to retire upon their entrenchments.

* * * * * *

"The enemy marched a large body of cavalry across the bridge of the Adour yesterday evening, and retired their force opposite to Sir Rowland Hill this morning towards Bayonne.

* * * * * *

"I send this despatch by Major Hill, the aide-de-camp

of Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill, whom I beg leave to recommend to your lordship's protection."*

* Return of killed, wounde d, and missing, of the army under the command of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., in the operations connected with the passage of the Nive, from the 9th to the 13th of December, 1813.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	32	15	603	13	650
Wounded	233	215	3459	21	3907
Missing	17	14	473	1	504

CHAPTER XIX.

BATTLES OF THE NIVE AND PYRENEES—SOULT'S ADVANTAGES IN BOTH—SIR JOHN HOPE—HILL'S ACTION AT ST. PIERRE—SOULT'S ATTACK—MISCONDUCT OF TWO COLONELS—HILL RALLIES THE REGIMENTS, AND RESTORES AND WINS THE DAY—GALLANT CONDUCT OF THE 92D—REINFORCEMENTS WITH LORD WELLINGTON ARRIVE—SOULT SAVES HIS ARMY, FAVOURED BY THE DARKNESS OF THE NIGHT AND DIFFICULTY OF THE GROUND OVER WHICH HE RETREATED —WELLINGTON AND HILL—GIRON'S AND MORILLO'S SPANISH CORPS AGAIN MOVED FORWARD TO COVER THE ALLIED OPERATIONS—THEIR OUTRAGES AT HELLETTE, AND IN PLUNDERING EXCURSIONS—LORD WELLINGTON DETERMINES TO PUNISH THESE DISORDERS— MORILLO REMONSTRATES — LORD WELLINGTON'S LETTERS TO THE SPANISH GENERALS AND MINISTER OF WAR.

THE battles of the Nive equalled those of the Pyrenees in obstinacy and duration. In the latter the French marshal was the assailant; in the former, he was the assailed: and though both in his attack and defence, he fought under the most favourable circumstances, in both he was signally defeated. In the Pyrenees, the passes were widely separated; the lateral communications indirect; the position extensive, and consequently, vulnerable in many points. The shorter lines of Soult's position enabled him to mass troops together with rapidity, and the undulating surface effectually concealed his movements. Hence his attacks were made with overwhelming numbers, and although expected, they could not be distinctly ascertained until the head of his columns were in immediate contact with the pickets. At Bayonne, the situations of Wellington and Soult were exactly reversed. The allied general was obliged to operate on both sides of a dangerous river, with bad roads and long and inconvenient lines; while, at the same time, he had to secure St. Jean de Luz from any attempts that Soult might make

to gain a point of such importance. The French marshal, on the contrary, had the advantage of a fortified camp, a fortress immediately beside him, excellent and short communications, with a permanent bridge across the Nive, by which he could concentrate on either bank of the river, and assail that wing of the allies which promised the best chances of success.*

To particularize the gallantry of the divisions severally engaged, would be to detail again the battles as they progressed. Never had Lord Wellington more cause to eulogize the matchless bravery of his troops, nor better reason to bear an honourable testimony to the merits of his lieutenants. Throughout these protracted combats, Sir John Hope not only exhibited the prompt resources which meet every contingency incident to a battle; but when an unexpected pressure required additional exertion to encourage troops, few in number and unsupported for a time, to maintain their ground against an overwhelming force that threatened them, the British general was foremost in the fight, and the marvel was how one, whose person was so distinguished and exposed, could have survived that sanguinary contest. Sir John Hope was slightly wounded in the leg and shoulder, had two horses disabled, his clothes were cut with bullets, and his hat four times struck. No wonder that Lord Wellington, when alluding in one of his letters, to the ability of his favourite general,

* "They fought well in this long series of actions, far better than they had done in defending their position upon the Nivelle; and this can only be explained by the different feeling with which men, and especially men of the French temperament, are animated when standing on their defence, from that which excites them when they are themselves the assailants. Marshal Soult, who was never wanting in ability, never displayed more than on this occasion. The often-repeated effort cost him his best troops, and forced upon him the mortifying conviction that, brave as they were, and admirably disciplined, they were, nevertheless, inferior to their opponents: for all circumstances here had been in his favour; the points of attack were at his own choice; and, wherever he attacked, he brought into the field a greatly superior force; yet every where he had been defeated."—*Leith Hay.*

added—"but we must lose him; he exposes himself so terribly."*

Had Sir Rowland Hill been still a nameless soldier, the battle of the 13th would have established him at once as an officer of high pretensions. On the heights of St. Pierre, he found himself, with 13,600 men, and fourteen pieces of artillery; in his front assailed by seven infantry divisions, mustering 35,000 bayonets; in his rear, threatened by the corps of General Paris and the cavalry under Pierre Soult. Never did a general abide a battle against greater odds, and achieve a bolder victory!

The thickness of the morning favoured Soult's order of attack, and his dispositions were, consequently, unobserved. Three infantry divisions, the cavalry of Sparre, and twenty pieces of artillery, marched against Hill's position; Foy's and Maransin's corps succeeded as a support; and a powerful reserve was in the rear. "The mist hung heavily; and the French masses, at one moment quite shrouded in vapour, at another dimly seen, or looming sudden and large and dark at different points, appeared like thunder-clouds gathering before the storm. At half-past eight Soult pushed back the British pickets in the centre, the sun burst out at that moment, the sparkling fire of the light troops spread wide in the valley, and crept up the hills on either flank, while the bellowing of forty pieces of artillery shook the banks of the Nive and the Adour. Darricau, marching on the French right, was directed against general Pringle. D'Armagnac, moving on their left and taking Old Mogguerre as the point of direction, was ordered to force Byng's right. Abbé assailed the centre at St. Pierre, where General Stewart commanded; for Sir Rowland Hill

* "I have long entertained the highest opinion of Sir John Hope, in common, I believe, with the whole world; but every day's experience convinces me of his worth. We shall lose him, however, if he continues to expose himself in fire as he did in the last three days; indeed, his escape was then wonderful. His hat and coat were shot through in many places, besides the wound in his leg."—*Letter to Colonel Torrens.*

had taken his station on a commanding mount in the rear, from whence he could see the whole battle and direct the movements."*

Ashworth's Portuguese brigade bore the brunt of the opening attack; and although the 71st, with two guns, and afterwards the 50th, were sent to their support, the whole were driven back, and the rest of the position won.

Under the brow of the height the 92d were formed. Instantly General Barnes led them forward, scattered the light troops who would have checked him, and charged and repulsed the column. But the French guns opened—their horse artillery commenced a close fire—a second column came forward with imposing steadiness—and the 92d fell back, and re-formed behind the high ground.

Happily, a thick hedge covered the front of the Portuguese, and the wood upon the right was occupied by some companies of their Caçadores with a wing of the 50th, who held it against every effort of the enemy. The French had already put their grand column in march; and, when the occurrence might have been fatal, two British colonels† compromised the safety of their posts, and withdrew their regiments out of fire!

Hill observed that Foy's and Maransin's divisions, after clearing the deep roads which had impeded them, were about to come to the assistance of Abbé, and therefore the battle must be won or lost upon a cast. He quitted the height where he had been posted; halted the Buffs—sent them again into action—and led back the 71st himself. Promptly employing his reserve,‡ he directed one brigade

* Napier.

† Bunbury, of the 3d (Buffs), and Peacock, of the 71st.

‡ "From the commanding mount on which he stood, he saw at once, that the misconduct of the two colonels would cause the loss of his position more surely than any direct attack upon it; and with a promptness and decision truly military, he descended at once to the spot, playing the soldier as well as the general, rallying the 71st, and leading the reserve himself; trusting meanwhile with a noble and well-placed confidence to the courage of the 92d and the 50th to sustain the fight at St. Pierre. He knew indeed that the sixth division

of Le Cor's against D'Armanac's, and led the other in person against Abbé. In the meantime, the wood was bravely held, and the 92d again formed behind the village of St. Pierre, and again came on to dare a combat with a column in numbers five times its superior. But, strange to say, the challenge was declined. A mounted officer who headed the enemy, waved his sword, and turned the French about; there was no pursuit; and the column retired across the valley, and resumed the position from which it had originally advanced.*

It was noon—the assault upon the allied position had failed on every point—Pringle had driven back Soult's right wing—Buchan had repulsed the left; but still there were sufficient troops disposable to have enabled Soult to have massed them in a column, sufficiently strong to force the allied centre. Hill, consequently, reinforced it with the 57th—the 6th division, which had been despatched by Lord Wellington to his assistance, now topped the height behind—the 4th division, with Lord Wellington in person, presently appeared—part of the 3d division succeeded, and the 7th were coming on in rapid march. But the crisis of the day had passed; and the fresh divisions arrived upon the ground only to witness the glory of their brave companions. Buchan was driving D'Armanac's division from the ridge which it had previously carried—Byng clearing another rising ground of the

was then close at hand, and that the battle might be fought over again; but, like a thorough soldier, he was resolved to win his own fight with his own troops, if he could. And he did so after a manner that in less eventful times would have rendered him the hero of a nation."—*Napier.*

* "How different was the conduct of the British generals, two of whom and nearly all their staff, fell at this point, resolute not to yield a step at such a critical period; how desperately did the 50th and the Portuguese fight, to give time for the 92d to rally and re-form behind St. Pierre; how gloriously did that regiment come forth again to charge, with their colours flying and their national music playing, as if going to a review. This was to understand war. The man who in that moment, and immediately after a repulse, thought of such military pomp, was by nature a soldier."—*Napier.*

enemy—the high road was vigorously attacked by the centre—and the French were everywhere deforced, and two pieces of artillery captured.

Immediately, Lord Wellington, after congratulating Sir Rowland upon his success, ordered a general advance; and until night closed, the retiring columns were vigorously pursued and sustained a heavy loss. Darkness, and very difficult ground, lessened casualties which must have been otherwise enormous; and Soult, after taking Foy's division across the Adour, sent two to Marsac, and left Count Drouet's in front of Mousseroles.

The action of St. Pierre lasted but a few hours; and on a space not exceeding a square mile, five thousand men were lying, killed and wounded. When Lord Wellington rode up, one rapid glance across the battle-ground told how furiously the attack had been made, and with what stern bravery it had been repelled on every point; and seizing his lieutenant's hand, he exclaimed, while his eyes sparkled with delight, "My dear Hill; the day's your own!" Never was a compliment more happily paid to skill and courage. It was delivered upon a field heaped with the corpses of the beaten enemy — the columns of attack were seen receding from a last effort, as vainly made, and as bloodily repulsed, as those desperate trials with which Soult throughout the day had hoped to shake the enduring valour of the allies—and, prouder honour! it issued from the lips of him on whose breath the fate of battles hung, and whose footsteps victory had attended.

It will be recollected that, owing to insubordination on the part of the Spanish troops, they had been sent back to the frontier by Lord Wellington, who thus preferred sacrificing the services of five and twenty thousand efficient soldiers at a moment when all the strength he could collect was requisite, rather than command a body of men whose conduct was insubordinate, and whose presence carried terror where they went. During the progress of the recent operations, the allied general found it necessary to add to

his numbers, and bring forward these refractory troops; and accordingly the Gallician army were advanced to St. Jean de Luz, and Giron's corps marched from the valley of the Bastan; the former to support Sir John Hope—and the latter to cover Hill's corps from the infantry of General Paris and the light cavalry under Pierre Soult.

It might have been expected that the displeasure evinced by the commander-in-chief, in sending the Spanish armies so disgracefully to the rear at the moment when active operations were recommencing, would have proved that he was inflexibly determined to crush that spirit of plunder and revenge, which had displayed itself in acts of robbery and bloodshed, and gone far to have roused into hostility a population otherwise indifferent to passing events. But this hope was miserably disappointed. On the 9th, when Paris retired to Hellette, and Morillo advanced by Itrassu, in the first village the Spaniards entered fifteen peasants were murdered, of whom several were women and children.

In the middle of December, fresh proofs were given how little these licentious soldiers could be trusted, and how insensible they had been to the strong measures with which Lord Wellington had visited their former misconduct. Freyer's corps had been placed in reserve at St Pé, while Morillo's, supported by Giron's, watched the valley of the Nive. Having obtained the assistance of two squadrons of the 18th hussars, Morillo made a marauding excursion towards Mendionde, attacked the enemy's pickets, and provoked a general skirmish; and when he had compromised the English cavalry, suddenly withdrew his infantry, and left the English cavalry to their fate. By desperate fighting, the deserted squadrons with great difficulty escaped from being taken—but several of their officers, and a large proportion of the men, were killed and wounded on the occasion.

Mina, at the same time entered the Vals de Baigorry and des Osses, his troops committing shocking outrages, burning

and plundering as they went along, and murdering men, women, and children, without distinction. The Basques immediately flew to arms, and, reinforced by some regulars from the garrison of St. Jean Pied de Port, they nearly cut off one of Mina's battalions, and drove the others away. These outrageous proceedings on the part of the Spaniards, called for determined measures from Lord Wellington to repress them; and in no point is the character of that great commander more admirable, than, when strong in the purity of his intentions, the firmness he displayed in carrying a principle into effect, involving as it did at that momentous period of the war, consequences no less important, than the probable alienation of an ally, from whom he had safely calculated on receiving a support of *forty thousand fighting men.*

To the Spaniards, the measures he adopted gave offence, and Morillo remonstrated with Lord Wellington. The commander-in-chief acceded to the request of the Spanish general; and the letter* that countermanded an order to keep Morillo's corps under arms, breathes an uncompromising spirit throughout, that bespoke a determination, at every hazard, to exact obedience.

" Before I gave the orders of which you and the officers under your command have made such repeated complaints, I warned you repeatedly of the misconduct of your troops, in direct disobedience of my orders, which I told you I could not permit; and I desired you to take measures to prevent it.

" I have sent orders to countermand those which I gave on the 18th; but I give you notice that, whatever may be the consequence, I will repeat those orders, if your troops are not made by their officers to conduct themselves as well disciplined soldiers ought.

" I did not lose thousands of men to bring the army under my command into the French territory, in order that the

* Dated St. Jean de Luz, 23d December, 1813.

soldiers might plunder and ill treat the French peasantry, in positive disobedience of my orders; and I beg that you and your officers will understand that I prefer to have a small army that will obey my orders, and preserve discipline, to a large one that is disobedient and undisciplined; and that, if the measures which I am obliged to adopt to enforce obedience and good order occasion the loss of men, and the reduction of my force, it is totally indifferent to me; and the fault rests with those who, by the neglect of their duty, suffer their soldiers to commit disorders which must be prejudicial to their country.

"I cannot be satisfied with professions of obedience. My orders must be really obeyed, and strictly carried into execution; and if I cannot obtain obedience in one way, I will in another, or I will not command the troops which disobey me."

Morillo, piqued at the style of a reply, in no wise calculated nor intended to apply an unction to his wounded pride, complained to General Freyre, expressing at the same time, a doubt touching the extent of Lord Wellington's authority. This letter Freyre transmitted to the commander-in-chief, and received a prompt answer* in return.

"In consequence of repeated complaints of the conduct of the troops under the command of General Morillo, it appears by the papers enclosed, that I took measures to call his attention to the subject, and I desired that he and his officers would prevent his men from plundering the country.

"Finding that all my remonstrances were vain, that the disorder complained of still continued, and that I received warning from various quarters of the danger to General Morillo and others from their continuance, I directed that General Morillo's troops should be kept under arms during the day till further orders, in order to insure good order in future.

* Dated St. Jean de Luz, 25th December, 1813.

"Notwithstanding the doubts of General Morillo that I have a right to give such orders, I believe he will find that every officer in command has not only a right, but that it is his duty, to order the troops under his command under arms whenever he thinks it proper or necessary; and it is the first time I have heard that it is disgraceful to officers and soldiers to be ordered under arms.

"General Morillo is mistaken in supposing that the same orders have never been given to the soldiers of the other allied nations. If he will inquire he will find that it has been done constantly; *and if he reflects a little he will discover that the disgrace does not consist in having received those orders, but in the conduct which has rendered them necessary.*"

Still Morillo appeared dissatisfied with both the power assumed by Lord Wellington, and particularly with the mode in which it was exercised. Again Freyer was appealed to; and on this occasion, charges of partiality appear to have been made against the commander of the allies. This elicited an immediate reply,* and its tone and truth appear to have brought the correspondence to a close.

"It would be very satisfactory to me to allow this subject to drop; but the letter from General Morillo contains some assertions which I cannot allow to pass unobserved, and several misconceptions, and I think proper to trouble you again upon this subject.

"I deny that the order of the 18th December ought to be viewed in any other light than as a measure to prevent a great evil and misfortune. Let General Mina state in what kind of situation he finds himself involved in his warfare with the French peasantry, and it will soon be seen how necessary some measures were to prevent a similar warfare with the division under General Morillo. I knew that this misfortune would have occurred; and it became

* Dated St. Jean de Luz, 8th January, 1814.

my duty to take effectual means to prevent it; and I am only sorry that those measures were disagreeable to the officers of General Morillo's division. * * * *

"I can assure you that, in my opinion, it was essentially necessary to put an effectual stop to the evils complained of; and I can equally assure you, that neither in the measure adopted, nor in the orders given to carry that measure into execution, had I the most distant intention to insult or injure the officers. I considered what General Morillo told General Hill as an acknowledgment that neither he nor his officers could stop the evil; and I acted accordingly.

"I might satisfy myself with this answer to General Morillo's complaints, and justify myself as the commander-in-chief of the British army to those who have a right to call upon me for such justification.

"General Morillo is, however, entirely mistaken in his assertions respecting the measures adopted to preserve discipline among the British troops; and, instead of asserting, as he has, that they may commit what crimes they please with impunity, he ought, if informed, to say that no crime ever goes unpunished when the criminal can be discovered. Hundreds of times in Spain and in Portugal whole corps and divisions have been placed and kept under arms, not only to prevent disorder, but to obtain the discovery of criminals; and in no instance has a criminal been discovered that he has not been tried, and the sentence of the court martial put into execution.* I defy General Morillo, I defy any

* A remarkable instance at this time occurred, and Lord Wellington's letter to the British commandant at Carthagena, shows his firmness in applying punishment to crime.

"I have received your letter of the 17th November, with eight proceedings of a general court martial on certain soldiers of Dillon's regiment at Carthagena, all of which I have confirmed.

"I desire that —— ——, and —— —— may be pardoned; that —— ——, —— ——, and lance corporal —— ——, may be executed by being shot; and that the remainder of the prisoners should first draw lots for one more to be executed, by being shot, according to the sentence of the general court martial.

"The other eleven prisoners are then to have the choice of suffering corporal

man to show an instance in which injury has been done to any individual, of which proof could be adduced, that the officer or soldier doing it has not been punished. Let him inquire how many soldiers have been hanged in Spain for plundering, and how many more have been otherwise punished and made to pay for the damage done, and he will find that there is no reason to complain on this ground.

"I have already sent to General Hill the complaints which he has made of the two soldiers of the 71st regiment, for the murder of a Spaniard, and have ordered that they might be tried; and if I am not misinformed by General Hill, there is no instance of a complaint made by General Morillo that redress has not been given where the criminal could be discovered. * * * *

"The British officers and soldiers, like others, require to be kept in order, and till I read General Morillo's letter I imagined that the last accusation that could be made against me was, that I neglected this duty. But, however I may endeavour to perform it, I must admit that, in a large and widely extended army, evils and injuries may be committed without my knowing it; but with this admission, I must say, that it is quite groundless to assert or suppose that British officers and soldiers are allowed to do what they please with impunity.

"I beg your excellency to ask the question whether the British officers and soldiers have no ground of complaint? During the summer and autumn there were frequent instances of officers and soldiers shot at and robbed by the Spanish troops on the roads, and one soldier was murdered

punishment, or to be executed according to sentence; and those who shall prefer to be executed are to be shot; those who prefer to receive corporal punishment are to receive a punishment not exceeding three hundred lashes.

"The punishments are to be carried into execution in the most solemn manner at Carthagena, in presence of the British troops to be paraded there for that purpose; and care is to be taken to impress upon the troops that their entrance into the British service is voluntary; that they are well treated, well fed, and taken care of; and that they must expect that any attempt to desert and break their engagement will be followed by certain punishment."

between Oyarzun and Lesaca. Our stores and convoys are frequently robbed, and only yesterday the accounts were received of an officer put to death at Vitoria; and a few days ago, I had accounts of others ill treated at Santander; and other events of the same kind occur frequently.

"I must produce some much stronger proof of a design to ill-treat the officers and soldiers of the British army than the death and ill-treatment of these individuals would give, supposing I were inclined to assert that such design existed; and yet this proof would be stronger than any General Morillo could adduce to support his assertion; as I again defy him to produce a single instance of a complaint made and proof adduced, and a denial or even a delay of redress.

"General Morillo has made two complaints, one of injustice, and breach of the Ordenanza of the Spanish army by me; the other of unjust and improper conduct in allowing officers and soldiers of the British army to misconduct themselves with impunity.

"I hope this letter will show the general that there is no foundation for either complaint, and that he will withdraw them, as made in a moment of irritation, to which every man is liable. If he does not do so, I hope that he is prepared to prove them.

"I feel the same respect and regard for General Morillo and his troops that I do for all the other troops under my command, and I do every thing in my power for them. This very regard must prevent me from allowing these charges of injustice to remain unrefuted; and they must be proved or formally withdrawn."

The determination of Lord Wellington had its effect. The counter-charges against the Spaniards were not to be denied; and Morilla, obstinate and revengeful as he was, quailed before a spirit he found too commanding to be resisted, and did not venture to persevere in a course of action, best suited, as his after life evinced, to a ruthless and sanguinary temper. The mischief which Lord

Wellington had dreaded was, however, already effected. The population of the Val de Baygory armed, and commenced a partisan warfare, which at last became so annoying, that the commander-in-chief published a manifesto, calling on the Basque peasantry either to join the French standard openly, or remain in peace at home; threatening, if the order were not obeyed, that their villages should be fired, and such as were taken in arms should be hanged as banditti. This threat had the desired effect—self-interest also, inducing them to keep on friendly terms with the allies; and during the remainder of the war, the Basque peasantry preserved a strict neutrality.

CHAPTER XX.

MEETING OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT—IMPROVED POSITION OF THE COUNTRY —DEBATES — SPEECHES OF LORD GRENVILLE, MARQUIS WELLESLEY, AND LORD LIVERPOOL, IN THE LORDS; AND THOSE OF MR. GRANT, MR. WHITBREAD, AND MR. CANNING, IN THE COMMONS — MEETING OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN PARIS — NAPOLEON'S ADDRESS TO THAT BODY — HIS OWN ADMISSIONS BETRAY THE DANGERS OF FRANCE, AND FALSIFY HIS FORMER PREDICTIONS.

THE British Parliament met in the first week of November; and in that assembly where his earlier struggles had met discouragement, his successes been contravened, and his prospects declared illusory, the full voice of general approbation was heard, and Wellington's high desert admitted and eulogized by those, who in the blindness of political asperity, had viewed his actions through a darkened glass, and would have sacrificed him a victim to the virulent spirit of party prejudice.

Britain had gained a position new in the annals of her history. She had seen Europe banded against her in arms,—every port barred against her commerce,—and, if threats could have achieved it, the days of her political existence had been numbered. She had dared and withstood the shock. The energies of a free people had supported her; the pilot had not blenched at the helm; and the storm, beneath whose fury she should have perished, fell with a fearful reaction, on the spirit who had evoked it. Two years before, Britain had been allied to Spain and Portugal alone; and now she was closely, and as after events proved,

sincerely united with Austria, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Bavaria, and Holland. In Germany, Napoleon had been forced across the Rhine; and the Peninsula, for the greater part liberated from invaders, had been traversed by a victorious commander, and its alpine boundary passed by a British army carrying with them conquest and success, and whose every movement had been followed by a victory. No wonder then, that parliamentary discussions assumed an altered tone, and that men hitherto wedded to prejudice and party, at last saw and confessed their errors; and, although in the eleventh hour, bore a manly testimony to the firmness of that ministry to whom they had been so bitterly opposed, and confessed the superior abilities of him on whom the government had staked their own reputation as well as the existence of the empire.

When the debates upon the war-supplies commenced in the upper house, Lord Grenville observed, that "upon this grand question, all party conflicts must be swallowed up and lost; it is the cause of no party, of no set of individuals, but of the whole nation joined in sentiment and in action to effect a great and glorious purpose. Internal tranquillity," he said, "might be considered as the first, and external peace as the second, blessing that any power under Heaven could confer upon a people; but what we desired and expected was the real blessing of peace, not the empty name; not the shadow, but the substance. Too long did deluded Europe, by temporary and partial truces, by concession following concession, purchase from the insatiable enemy a precarious quiet, a troubled sleep; furnishing to her foe the very means of his aggression, and of her own subjugation. The time, my lords, has now arrived (and I rejoice that I have lived to see the hour) when the walls of a British parliament may again re-echo to a sound formerly held sacred in this country, and upon the observance of which, I will venture to assert, depends the hope of the restoration of peace to Europe;—I allude to the old-fashioned tenet, now almost forgotten, of a balance

of power in Europe; and I offer up my thanks, with humble gratitude, to the Supreme Disposer of Events, that after so long a period he has permitted me to behold my native land in such a commanding situation, as to be able again to pursue that which ought to be the only legitimate object of foreign policy, I mean the establishment and preservation of a balance of power in Europe. * * * * * I was prepared to add an exhortation, that as the chances of war must necessarily be precarious, you would prepare yourselves to meet with firmness those disasters which human foresight could not predict, and which human wisdom could not prevent. Even now, under circumstances that might seem almost to justify the confidence of certainty, I offer that exhortation. If in the course of human events (although I see little cause to fear) any unforeseen calamity should unfortunately occur, remember the glorious cause in which you are engaged; it may for an instant damp your hopes, but let it not damp your ardour, or shake your resolution. Be assured, my lords, of this,—that there is for this country no separate safety, no separate peace! There is neither safety nor peace for England, but with the safety and peace of Europe;—as for continental Europe, it is equally true, that an indissoluble union, a firm confederation with this country can alone secure for all liberty, tranquillity, and happiness,—can alone obtain peace, now almost beyond the memory of living men. The plain duty of this country, placing its trust in Providence, is to improve by every possible exertion the bright prospect that lies before us. With the energies of Great Britain duly applied, ultimate success may be confidently anticipated; we may now look forward to the speedy accomplishment of that great purpose for which we have already sacrificed, performed, and endured so much,—and for which we are still ready to sacrifice, perform, and endure."

The Marquis Wellesley, after noticing the late glorious events which had raised the military reputation of the

country, said that it was far from his intention to dwell on former errors; but he would not hesitate to say that the glorious successes which had lately crowned our arms in Spain, and the arms of our allies in the north of Europe, were to be traced to the long train of persevering councils persisted in by the government of this country. Though those councils had not always immediately produced the results that were expected, they were not the less the cause of what had ultimately taken place. While we were exerting ourselves in a struggle apparently hopeless, at that moment the public councils of this country were of the utmost importance to European liberty; for opportunity was thus given to the rest of Europe to re-consider their former errors, and to learn that great lesson which the example of Britain afforded them. Nothing could be more true than the last words which that great statesman, Mr. Pitt, ever delivered in public, that England had saved herself by her firmness, and other nations by her example. What a satisfactory and consoling reflection was it for us, that from this fountain the sacred waters of gladness and glory had flowed;—that to the persevering spirit of this country it was owing that other nations were at last animated to deeds worthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and of the example which was set them!"

Lord Liverpool, adverting to the failures of the last twenty years, inquired "to what causes was the present irresistible impulse to be ascribed? Was it not that feeling of national independence, that feeling which first arose in the Peninsula, which gave the war a new character, and afforded grounds to hope not only for the deliverance of that country, but of the rest of Europe. There had before been wars of governments, but none like this between nations; and all our principles of policy and prudence must have been belied, if the issue of the present confederacy had not been very different from that of any of the former ones. They had before them examples of perseverance unexampled in any other cause than that of

liberty; they had seen the least military nations of Europe become formidable, and successfully resist the best disciplined troops of France. Small as Portugal was, the establishment of the Portuguese army had been of the greatest consequence, as the foundation of the success of the allied armies in the Peninsula; and as it gave, in addition to the general national feeling, a military tone, under the influence of which the Portuguese troops have been raised to an equality with the British. He was advancing no paradox, but a truth which was felt and admitted on the continent, when he said that the success of the peninsular cause gave new life to the suffering nations of Europe."

Mr. Grant observed, that "there would be no prouder page in history than that which told of this struggle and its victorious result,—which told that, at a time when the foundations of the world seemed to be shaken, when all former constitutions were swept away, rather as if by a sudden whirlwind than by any of the ordinary means of destruction,—there was yet one nation, which, reposing under the shade of a happy constitution, proud of its ancient liberties and worthy to defend them, dared to measure its strength at one time against the unnatural energies of a frantic democracy, at another time against the gigantic resources of the most tremendous despotism that had ever scourged the world. If, after this narration," he continued, "history were obliged to add that in this struggle at last we fell, but that we fell gloriously, with our arms in our hands and our faces to the foe, even this would have been no mean praise: but, thank God, history will be called, not to lament the fall of British greatness, but to celebrate its renewed exploits and living triumphs."

"The sleep," he continued, "which had spread over Europe, gave too much countenance to pernicious maxims; but the hour had at length come which exposed their fallacy, and rescued human nature from such calumnies. The experience of the last few years confuted that heartless and bloodless system, the miserable abortion of a cold head

and depraved imagination, which never wakened one noble thought, nor inspired one generous action. The experience of the last few years proved that those high sentiments which we were taught to respect are not false and visionary; but that they are founded upon whatever is deepest and purest in the human character. It proved that true reason is never at war with just feeling; that man is now what he was in those distant ages,—a creature born indeed to act upon principle, but born also to act upon strong passions; and that he never acts more nobly, more wisely, more worthily of himself, than when he acts upon the prompt persuasion of grand passions, sublimed and directed by lofty principles."

Mr. Whitbread declared, "that the proud exultation which then was manifested throughout the nation was hailed by no one, in the house or in the country, with more enthusiastic feelings than by himself; and that he gave credit to the ministry, and to him who was at the head of it, till cut off by the dreadful deed which every one deplored, 'for the great and steady confidence which they had placed in the talents and genius of our great commander.'"

After remarking in what distinct terms the prince regent in his speech had declared that there was no disposition to require anything from France inconsistent with her honour and pretensions as a nation, he thus continued:—

"I sincerely hope this feeling pervades the whole alliance; an alliance with which I am not inclined to quarrel, as I have been with former ones, for it is promoted and cemented by a feeling of common danger and necessity, and not purchased and raised up to oppress France. It has arisen from the keen and indignant sentiment which the grinding oppression of France herself has excited; and it holds out a memorable lesson to the governments of Europe. France in the course of her career since the Revolution, disturbed and overthrew the ancient monarchies, upon the pretext of their tyranny and despotism; but when those states passed

under the power of France, who was to liberate them, they found themselves subjected to a despotism still more odious, to a thraldrom still more insupportable. The emperor of that country is now in a condition to which, I firmly believe, nothing but his own restless and gigantic ambition could have reduced him—and I hope the alliance will profit from this."

Mr. Canning subsequently thus delivered his opinions.

"If," said he, "in the present state of this country and of the world, those who, during the course of the tremendous and protracted struggle, on various occasions, called upon parliament to pause, to retard its too rapid and too rash advance, and to draw back from the task it had unwisely undertaken to perform — if those persons have manfully and honourably stepped forward to join their congratulations to the joyful acclamations of the nation, and to admit the present to be the period favourable for a mighty and decided effort, how much more grateful must it be to those who, at no time during the struggle, have lifted up their voices in this place, excepting to recommend and to urge new exertions—to those who, when the prospects were most dreary and melancholy, insisted that there was but one course becoming the character and honour of Great Britain—a persevering and undaunted resistance to the overwhelming power of France! To an individual who, under the most discouraging circumstances, still maintained that the deliverance of Europe (often a derided term) was an object not only worthy of our arms, but possible to be achieved, it must be doubly welcome to come forward and vindicate his share in the national exultation. If, too, on the other hand, there have been those who, having recommended pacification when the opportunity was less favourable, are now warranted, as undoubtedly they are, in uttering the same sentiments, in the confidence that the country will sympathize with them, it is natural for those who, under other circumstances, have discouraged the expectation of peace, and have warned the nation

against precipitate overtures, now to be anxious to embrace this occasion of stating their sincere conviction and their joy (as strongly felt by them as by others) that, by the happy course of events during the last year, and by the wise policy we shall now pursue, peace may not, perhaps, be within our grasp, but is at least within our view. It is impossible to look back upon those times when the enemy vaunted, and we perhaps feared, that we should have been compelled to sue for peace, without, amid all the ebullitions of joy, returning thanks to that providence which gave us courage and heart still to bear up against accumulating calamity. Peace is safe now, because it is not dictated; peace is safe now, for it is the fruit of exertion, the child of victory; peace is safe now, because it will not be purchased at the expense of the interest and of the honour of the empire: it is not the ransom to buy off danger, but the fruit of the mighty means which we have employed to drive danger from our shores. I must, with heartfelt delight, congratulate my country, that, groaning as she has done at former periods under the heavy pressure of adverse war, still 'peace was despaired of, for who could think of submission?' Her strength, her endurance had been tried and proved by every mode of assault that the most refined system of hostility could invent, not only by open military attacks, but by low attempts to destroy her commercial prosperity; the experiment has been made, the experiment has failed; and we are now triumphantly, but not arrogantly, to consider what measures of security should be adopted, or on what terms a peace should be concluded.

"But has this country gained nothing by the glorious contest, even supposing peace should be far distant? Is it nothing to Great Britain, even purchased at so large a price, that her military character has been exalted? Is it no satisfaction—no compensation to her—to reflect that the splendid scenes displayed on the continent are owing to her efforts? that victories of Germany are to be attributed to our victories in the Peninsula? That spark, often

feeble, and sometimes so nearly extinguished as to excite despair in all hearts that were not above it,—that spark which was lighted in Portugal, which was fed and nourished there, has at length burst into a flame that has dazzled and illuminated Europe. At the commencement of this war, our empire rested upon one majestic column, our naval power. In the prosecution of the war, a hero has raised another stupendous pillar of strength to support our monarchy,—our military preeminence. It is now, that we may boast not only of superiority at sea, but on shore; the same energy and heroism exist in both the arms of Great Britain: they are rivals in strength, but inseparable in glory. Out of the calamities of war has arisen a principle of safety, that, superior to all attacks, shall survive through ages, and to which our posterity shall look forward. Compare the situation of England with her condition at the renewal of the war! Were we not then threatened by the aggressions of an enemy even upon our own shores,—were we not then trembling for the safety and sanctity even of our homes? Now contemplate Wellington encamped on the Bidassoa! I know that a sickly sensibility leads some to doubt whether the advance of Lord Wellington was not rash and precipitate. I cannot enter into that refinement which induces those who affect to know much to hesitate upon this subject: I cannot look with regret upon a British army encamped upon the fertile plains of France; I cannot believe that any new grounds for apprehension are raised by an additional excitement being afforded to the irritability of the French people: I foresee no disadvantage from entering the territories of our enemy not as the conquered but the conquerors! I cannot regret that the Portuguese are now looking upon the walls of Bayonne, 'that circle in those wolves' which would have devastated their capital,—that the Portuguese now behold planted on the towers of Bayonne the standard which their enemy would have made to float upon the walls of Lisbon! I cannot think it a matter of regret that the Spaniards are now recovering

from the grasp of an enemy on his own shores, that diadem which was stripped from the brow of the Bourbons to be pocketed by an usurper! I cannot think it a matter of regret that England, formerly threatened with invasion, is now the invader,—that France instead of England is the scene of conflict! I cannot think all this matter of regret; and of those who believe that the nation or myself are blinded by our successes, I entreat that they will leave me to my delusion, and keep their philosophy to themselves.

"That enemy," continued Mr. Canning, "who enslaved the press and made it contribute so importantly to his own purposes of ambition, endeavoured to impress upon other nations a belief that Great Britain fought only to secure her own interests, and that her views were completely selfish. That illusion is now destroyed, and the designs of this country are vindicated. We call on all the powers with whom we have been or are at war to do us justice in this respect: above all we claim it of America! I ask her to review her own and the policy of this country! Let her turn from scenes of bloodshed and horror, and compare with them the effect of British interference! She will see that wherever this country has exerted herself, it has been to raise the fallen and to support the falling; to raise, not to degrade the national character; to rouse the sentiments of patriotism which tyranny had silenced; to enlighten, to reanimate, to liberate. Great Britain has resuscitated Spain, and recreated Portugal; Germany is now a nation as well as a name; and all these glorious effects have been produced by the efforts and by the example of our country. If to be the deliverers of Europe; if to have raised our own national character, not upon the ruins of other kingdoms; if to meet dangers without shrinking, and to possess courage rising with difficulties, be admirable, surely we may not unreasonably hope for the applause of the world. If we have founded our strength upon a rock, and possess the implicit confidence of those allies whom we have succoured when they seemed beyond relief, then I say that

our exertions during the last year, and all our efforts during the war, are cheaply purchased; if we have burdened ourselves, we have relieved others; and we have the inward, the soul-felt, the proud satisfaction of knowing that a selfish charge is that which, with the faintest shadow of justice, cannot be brought against us."

In the French Legislative Assembly, a very different scene was being enacted. Napoleon had returned to Paris, but in what altered circumstances did he present himself now before the Chambers, whom formerly he had seldom convoked but to hear a recital of his conquests, and learn what new territories these had added to the empire?

With a parade, which the dangerous aspect of the times rendered worse than contemptible, twenty stand of colours taken during the last campaign in Germany, had been despatched to Paris as emblems of success; but, alas, the truth could not be held back that those silken trophies had been earned at the expense of 200,000 veteran soldiers. The day had passed when clap-trap folly was effective; and the summary of the emperor's harangue to the Council of State betrayed the secret of his soul. With him all was studied for effect, and he usually assumed the stateliness of Roman dignity in his addresses to the army and the senate—but on this occasion his language was commonplace and passionate, and his disjointed harangue hurried from his dangers to his designs. "Wellington," said he, "is in the south—the Russians threaten the northern frontier—Austria the south-eastern,—yet, shame to speak it, the nation has not risen in mass to repel them! Every ally has abandoned me: the Bavarians have betrayed me! —Peace? no peace, till Munich is in flames! I demand of you 300,000 men; I will form a camp at Bordeaux of 100,000, another at Lyons, a third at Metz: with the remnant of my former levies, I shall have 1,000,000 of men in arms. But it is men whom I demand, full-grown men; not these miserable striplings who choke my hospi-

tals with sick, and my highways with carcases. Give up Holland? rather let it sink into the sea! Peace, it seems, is talked of, when all around ought to re-echo with the cry of war!"

As far as a passive obedience to his demands would go, the French senate met the emperor's wishes, and 300,000 conscripts were placed at the disposal of the minister of war, to support, what St. Jean d'Angely termed, "the holy and honourable struggle," that was inevitable; and probably to this servility of his counsellors, the madness with which he declined the favourable terms which the allies had offered may be traced. The press had roused the French nation to a sense of its real danger; and Napoleon did not venture to announce that he would decline reasonable concessions, and provoke a contest on the soil of France, with Europe up in arms, and determined to place a solid barrier to his aggressions. No longer was "the second Carthage" hastening to its downfall—but France was declared "in danger"—and he who had raised monarchies, was trembling for his own. His speeches contained more matter to vindicate himself than satisfy the nation regarding the crisis that had been produced. "Brilliant victories," said he, "have illustrified the French arms in this campaign; unexampled defections have rendered those victories useless. Every thing has turned against us. France itself would be in danger were it not for the energy and unanimity of the French. I have never been seduced by prosperity; adversity will find me superior to its attacks. Often have I given peace to nations when they had lost all. From part of my conquests I have erected thrones for kings who have abandoned me. I had conceived and executed great designs for the prosperity and happiness of the world. A monarch and a father, I know what peace adds to the security of thrones and of families. Negotiations have been set on foot."

These admissions of Napoleon must have sounded

strangely to that legislative body, who, but two years before, had heard nothing from his lips but ominous annunciations of England's political and commercial downfal. In every quarter of the globe armies had been supported by Great Britain—while Napoleon boasted, that the country he inflicted with invasion, paid, in addition to its miseries, the whole expenses attendant on the aggression. "The allies whom England subsidises she destroys,"—"a clap of thunder shall end the affairs of the Peninsula,"—"the credit that sustained the colossal power of Great Britain is no more." Such had been his assertions—but the day had come when his auguries were falsified, and his short-lived dynasty was ended more rapidly than it had been raised!

CHAPTER XXI.

INJURIOUS EFFECT OF THE INVASION OF THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES FELT BY NAPOLEON—HIS INTRIGUES TO SEVER THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN SPAIN AND BRITAIN—SPANISH INSINCERITY—THE REGENCY REFUSE TO RATIFY THE CONVENTION AGREED TO BY FERDINAND—PALAFOX IS DESPATCHED INTO SPAIN, AND FINDS THEM EQUALLY DETERMINED—DUC D'ANGOULEME LANDS IN THE SOUTH OF FRANCE—PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF BY NAPOLEON—GROSS MISCONDUCT OF THE SPANISH AUTHORITIES—THE XEFE POLITICO OF GUICOSPOA—ATTEMPT TO PLACE SANTANDER UNDER QUARANTINE—MISTAKES OF THE ENGLISH MINISTRY—LORD WELLINGTON'S PECUNIARY EMBARRASSMENTS.

THE presence of an allied army in the south gave more real annoyance to Napoleon, than if aggressions had been committed on any other frontiers more directly exposed to hostilities, and where lineal distinctions alone marked territorial boundaries. To France, the Pyrenees had been hitherto considered sacred against invasion, as the blue waters that encompassed Britain; and therefore, both pride and policy demanded that the mountain barrier should be recrossed. Indeed, Napoleon might have been justly anxious to expel an intruder, who marked the stability of his occupation, by opening the ports of France, and regulating their commercial relations. In every scene of life there is romance, and politics are influenced more than every thing besides, by fortunate vicissitudes. Three years before, the framer of the Berlin and Milan decrees had excluded England from the continent; and he had lived to see that power whom he hated above all, not only welcomed in every European harbour, but even within the

ports of France itself, receiving and rejecting vessels and merchandise as she pleased.*

To remove Wellington from the southern provinces, under the existing pressure from without, was only to be accomplished by political intrigue; and that lay in detaching the Spaniards from the general alliance, a task, which, from Napoleon's estimate of their national character, he considered as being easily effected. Ferdinand appeared to be the proper tool; and him he selected as the means by which he should place the peninsular contest for the present in abeyance, and thus avail himself of the services of those armies, which still maintained themselves in the provinces of Catalonia and Valencia. The ex-monarch was at Valancay, leading the inglorious life best suited to a cold-blooded and stupid sensualist; and Laforest, the agent of Napoleon, repaired thither under the assumed name of M. Dubois.

A negotiation between persons equally insincere, and which, from the altered relations of Europe, produced no striking political effect, may be briefly narrated. That Napoleon would attempt, and Ferdinand agree to an accommodation of their differences, was an event that Lord Wellington was prepared for; and he rightly estimated how valueless it would prove, should the negotiation be completed. In a letter to Lord Bathurst,† he says:— "I have long suspected that Buonaparte would adopt this expedient; and if he had had less pride, and more common

* "As yet none of the other allied armies had passed the frontier; but Lord Wellington was established in France, where, taking into consideration the necessity of fixing the bases upon which the trade with the ports of French Navarre to the south of the Adour should be regulated, he published a proclamation, declaring that those ports were open to all nations who were not at war with any of the allied powers, and fixing a duty of five per cent *ad valorem* upon all articles, except grain and salt, and stores for the use of the army. An order of council was also published in England, permitting British vessels to trade with these and such other French ports as might be under the protection, or in the military occupation of his Majesty's arms."—*Southey.*

† Dated St. Jean de Luz, 10th January, 1814.

sense, and could have carried his measure into execution as he ought to have done, it would have succeeded. I am not certain that it will not succeed now: that is to say, so much of the misery felt in Spain is justly attributed to the vices and constitution of the government, that I think there must be many who would desire to put an end to them even by the sanction of this treaty of peace. If Buonaparte had at once withdrawn his garrisons from Catalonia and Valencia (which in all probability he must lose at all events,) and had sent Ferdinand to the frontier, or into Spain *(and he must be as useless a personage in France as he would probably be in Spain,)* I think it can scarcely be doubted that the peace would have been made, or, at all events, the prosecution of the war would have been so difficult as to render it almost impracticable, and great success hopeless."

It was intended by all concerned in this intrigue, that it should be kept concealed from Lord Wellington; and the Duque San Carlos, who had been sent into Spain with private instructions, travelled under the assumed name of Ducos, and with all the mystery of a secret embassy. The whole affair was on both sides based on treachery; and it proved to the allied commander and the world, that whether professedly, friends or foes, Spaniards were not to be relied upon. Of this disgraceful fact, an extract from a second letter from Lord Wellington shows that he was perfectly cognizant.

"The Duque de San Carlos, when passing through Catalonia, saw General Copons, and told him his story of course. The general sent him on with his own horses, and when he was gone the general dropped these expressions: 'As a conqueror Napoleon has made every concession to Spain that that country could require from him, and we ought to prepare to receive King Ferdinand.' He has not reported to me the arrival of the Duque, and what is still more extraordinary, for which I shall call him to account, he has not sent me a letter in cipher recently intercepted, he knowing that we possess the means of deciphering them all.

"I suspect that the same opinion about the peace prevails among the Spanish military here. They have all some notion of what has occurred, but not a word has any one of them said to any one of us; and I have repeated intelligence and warning from the French of some act of treachery meditated by the Spaniards. The police here have this day apprised me that several Spaniards have been sent in from Bayonne for the purpose of circulating reports regarding peace, and against us, all of which will be well received on this frontier."

The treaty between the French emperor and Ferdinand had been already signed, and San Carlos was commissioned by Napoleon to obtain its ratification from the regency; while, by Ferdinand, he was instructed to ascertain the true feelings of the Cortes and government, and, if well-affected, they were to be requested to confirm the treaty, with a secret intimation that Ferdinand, once released, was quite ready when required to violate its conditions and continue the war. The regency, therefore, were merely asked to temporize—and England, it was asserted, would freely accede to a suspension of hostilities on the part of Spain, aware of the secret reasons for which this pretended re-establishment of amicable relations was resorted to. The government, however, contented themselves with expressing great pleasure at learning that the health of their well-beloved monarch was so excellent, but firmly refused to ratify any treaty executed by Ferdinand while in captivity, and consequently, as they argued, under restraint.

This unexpected check, added to the delay occasioned by the removal of the Cortes from Cadiz to Madrid, was most annoying to Napoleon, who was urgent for the completion of a treaty which would enable him to remove his troops promptly from the Peninsula—and several influential Spanish prisoners were liberated by the emperor, in the hope that they might prove instrumental in hurrying the convention to a close. Of these, Palafox was selected as the fittest person

to proceed to the regency—and he accordingly passed into Catalonia armed with a duplicate of the commission already given to San Carlos, and with private instructions for the English ambassador at Madrid.

To this second envoy, the reply of the regency was a mere reference to their former answer—adding "that an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary had now been named, on his Majesty's part, for a congress in which the allies were about to give peace to Europe. In that congress they said, the treaty would be concluded; and it would be ratified not by the regency, but by his Majesty himself, in his own royal palace of Madrid, whither he would be restored to occupy, in the most absolute liberty, a throne rendered illustrious by the heroic sacrifices of the Spaniards, and by his own sublime virtues. As they expressed their satisfaction in the thought that they should soon deliver up to his Majesty the authority wherewith they were intrusted, —a charge of such weight that it could rest only upon the robust shoulders of a monarch who, by re-establishing the Cortes, had restored to freedom an enslaved people, and driven the ferocious monster, Despotism, from the throne of Spain."

This declaration was in no wise agreeable to the king. Five years' exile had wrought no change in either his principles or opinions; and he was as cold to every honourable impulse and as despotic in every feeling, as when he had abandoned his capital, and offered himself a willing victim to Napoleon. Nor was the manner in which, if liberated, the regency and Cortes had declared themselves ready to receive him, calculated to smooth away the liberal sentiments to which the government had given expression. Ferdinand was not to be considered *free*, until, and in the bosom of the Cortes, he had sworn to maintain the constitution; he was to be attended by no armed force; he should be accompanied by no foreigner—not even a menial servant—nor by any Spaniard who had held office under the intruder. The very route by which he was to travel

had been prescribed—and it was suggested, that two members of the Cortes should accompany him in his coach—a sad invasion upon Spanish etiquette.

But the time when Ferdinand's liberation might have caused a serious convulsion, was allowed to slip away. The secret conferences at Valancay were betrayed by persons in Napoleon's confidence; and the restoration of the Spanish monarch, which in December might have wrought much mischief, was delayed until the following March, when the struggle had virtually ended. While the treaty was still in progress, Lord Wellington throwing overboard the previous annoyances he had experienced from the regency, corroborated the grounds upon which they repudiated the convention to which their weak and worthless king had made himself a party. He rejected the proposed annuity to Charles IV.* as being far beyond the circumstances of the state—and denounced, as utterly inadmissible, a proposal to secure the properties and pensions of those Spaniards who had attached themselves to Joseph Buonaparte, as well as that condition which stipulated that the Peninsula should be evacuated by the armies of Great Britain.

While these negotiations were unsatisfactorily progressing, and it was still a doubtful matter whether the Congress of Chatillon might not effect a peace, to which the Emperor of Russia had given an unwilling consent, an event occurred as important in a political view, as it was at that moment, embarrassing to the allied general. In writing to Colonel Bunbury, Lord Wellington thus notices the occurrence:—

"The Duc d'Angoulême arrived here yesterday morning, and I have prevailed upon him to remain with his feigned title of Comte de Pradel. I shall be obliged to you if you will inform Lord Bathurst of the manner in which I became informed of his arrival, and the circumstances attending it; and that I did not receive his lordship's letters of the 18th ult. till after my return to Passages on the 2d. If I had,

* Thirty millions of reals.

I should probably have made some effort to induce the Comte de Pradel to remain at St. Sebastian for a few days at least. But as it was, I received at eleven at night a letter from the Comte from Oyarzun, expressing his regret at not being able to arrive at St. Jean de Luz on that night, and his intention to be here in the morning; and I had an interview with him at Urragne, in which I prevailed upon him to continue incognito till circumstances should change. These circumstances will account to the cabinet for his being here; and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will explain to them that, our troops being in fact cantoned in every village within the range that we occupy, it was not possible for the Comte de Pradel to come here at all without coming to the British army."

It was at this momentous period that Alexander had authorized his plenipotentiary to accede to the conditions offered by the allied sovereigns to the French emperor. Peace therefore might have been considered as almost a political certainty. But the hand of fate was on Napoleon —fortune smiled faintly on his arms at Champaubert—that feeble gleam of success obliterated the memory of terrible disasters; and with a rashness bordering on insanity, he rejected the liberal terms offered by his conquerors, and sealed his ruin!

To the soldier, winter is generally a season of repose—but it brought none to Lord Wellington. While Ferdinand and Napoleon were, as they believed, in secret correspondence, and a royalist movement in the south of France was in active organization, the allied sovereigns on the 1st of January had crossed the Rhine—with them the Rubicon—determined that France should be again restricted to her natural boundaries, the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine. To maintain his position in "the sacred soil" was therefore, with Lord Wellington a paramount consideration, but, from many untoward occurrences, a very doubtful one. He had reason to apprehend that Suchet would immediately unite his army with Soult's. He had been warned

that on the Spaniards no reliance should be placed. Their outrages were terrible, and nothing could repress them.* From their civil authorities the grossest insults were daily offered; and the most miserable subterfuges were resorted to by these degraded functionaries, to secretly annoy one whom they dared not openly oppose. In a letter to his brother,† Lord Wellington mentions one of the many annoyances he had to complain of:—

"That which I apprehended when I addressed you last has occurred: the *Xefe Politico* of the province of Guipuscoa has placed under quarantine in the ports of that province all vessels coming from Santander, without giving me the slightest intimation that he intended to do so, or had done so; and the first intimation I received of the act was the enclosed copy of a letter written by the Alcalde of Fuenterrabia to a Portuguese officer commanding a depôt at Andave, *desiring him to give no assistance to an English vessel which was at that time about to be cast away, and was afterwards wrecked in the Bidassoa*, as she had come from Santander, where there were appearances of the yellow fever!!"

At the time when this malignant attempt was made, which would not only disturb the communications by which the liberating army maintained its position on the frontier it had cleared of invaders, but must have fearfully added to the misery of the thousands suffering from wounds and sickness contracted in the peninsular defence, there existed no cases which could warrant the pretext of contagion being made an apology for driving the sick and wounded from hospitals, constructed in England, and maintained at her sole expense.

* "I have done every thing in my power, by severity and fair means, hitherto without success; and every question is taken up as one of national honour. The truth is, the officers will not discipline the troops, and the generals will not give themselves any trouble about the matter, and rather encourage indiscipline."—*Letter to Marshal Beresford, Feb.* 7, 1814.

† Right Hon. Henry Wellesley, dated St. Jean de Luz, 19th January, 1814.

Indeed, the whole conduct, past and present, of the *Xefe Politico* of Guipuscoa was in perfect keeping. The heroism of an Anglo-Portuguese division with a body of British volunteers, had recovered the strongest fortress in Spain; and in return, the victors were accused of firing the city designedly, and that too, from malicious feelings towards its unfortunate inhabitants. Lord Wellington had already demolished this audacious falsehood,—and what were the next acts of the provincial functionary? Failing to expel the maimed and dying from their wretched dwellings, he resorted to an expedient even more diabolical—to cut off all intercourse between them and their fellow-men; and by adding privations to bodily suffering, lessen their chances of recovery. Nor were the sick and wounded to be the only sufferers. By placing Santander under quarantine, Lord Wellington would have been deprived of the only harbour on which he could depend for his supplies from England; and the army who had fought for and established the deliverance of Spain, must have retired for sheer want of subsistence, from the advanced position which, by a dozen sanguinary combats, they had reached. With the uncompromising spirit which repressed Spanish insubordination in the field, Lord Wellington intimated that civic intrigue should not be permitted to add to the sufferings of his sick men, or paralyze the exertions of his effectives; and the following communication to the "Junta de Sanidad"* sufficiently expressed his opinions and his intentions:—

"In the recent instance of placing the British hospitals under quarantine, that is to say, not only those sick of the supposed epidemic disease, but those sick of other diseases; the wounded, those recovering from their wounds and sickness, those not sick at all; such as the officers of the medical department, and the military officers superintending the hospital, and all the British attendants upon it; I am afraid

* Spanish Board of Health.

that both the Junta de Sanidad, and the authorities of the town, have not been so considerate as they ought to have been, either towards the unfortunate objects of the measure they adopted, or of the interests of their country. In your letter of the 14th you state that the commandant of the British hospitals, and the gentlemen of the British medical department, concurred with you in the measures which you adopted. They have certainly deceived me most grossly, if there was such a concurrence of opinion; and I enclose you the copy of a paper transmitted to me by those gentlemen of the same date with your letter, from which it appears that the British and Portuguese medical gentlemen thought so lightly of the disorder which had induced you to put the British hospitals under quarantine in so extraordinary a manner, that they are about to send their convalescents to join their regiments in the army.

"But supposing that the danger of infectious disease, and not extreme sensibility to the inconvenience of having the hospital at Santander, and the desire to remove it, was the cause of your recent measure of putting the whole British hospital in quarantine, it cannot afford a ground for the desire which you have expressed, that I should no longer make use of the harbour of Santander, either by sending there sick soldiers, or soldiers in health, or effects.

"I beg to observe to you that the harbour of Santander belongs to the Spanish nation, and not to any particular set of individuals of that nation. The British army are serving the Spanish nation, and the soldiers and effects brought to Santander, whether for the service of the Spanish, the British, or the Portuguese army, are for the service of the nation; and till the government shall desire that I shall refrain from using the port of Santander, *I hope the town will forgive me for thus declaring that I shall use it as long as it shall be convenient to the service of the cause.*

"It is probable that the measure which the town of Santander have adopted of declaring the British hospitals in quarantine, unnecessarily, as appears from the enclosed

paper, and indeed from your own letter, followed as it has been by orders to the different ports on the coast from the *Xefe Politico* of Guipuscoa, to place all ships in quarantine coming from Santander, will have the effect of putting the whole of the northern coast of Spain and the army in quarantine, in respect to the rest of the world. If it has not that effect, it certainly will have the effect of obliging the army to fall back from the position which it now occupies towards countries in the interior of Spain capable of maintaining it.

"The measure adopted by the town of Santander, and its consequences, have cut off the communication between the army and its magazines, certainly without necessity; and it cannot be expected that the army will maintain its position if, notwithstanding the plenty that has been provided for it, it should starve."*

In the meantime the crisis of the war was hastening on. That deep and deadly hostility, which both his conquests and aggressions had excited in the breasts of the allied monarchs towards Napoleon, became every day more apparent—and there were not wanting indications at home, proving that in France, an extensive disaffection towards the existing government prevailed. In the greater towns, the ruin of commerce had produced a rooted discontent—and in the mountain districts, the conscription was detested. The long-concealed feelings in favour of the exiled line, again were resuscitated in the south; and those who were friendly to a Bourbon restoration secretly, and steadily increased. Lord Wellington's position within "the sacred soil," had also assumed a firmness that foreboded the most ruinous results; for his presence was now treated by the population with an indifference that evinced a declining regard for the emperor, and proved that the allies were neither feared nor disliked in that country which they had invaded.

* Dated St. Jean de Luz, 22d January, 1814.

While such was the political aspect of French affairs, in England, party clamour had subsided, and recent events silenced the virulent opposition to which the war-supporters had been hitherto exposed. Britain, in the meantime, was making tremendous efforts; her subsidies were distributed over the continent with unsparing liberality; and her exertions to bring the long-doubtful contest to a triumphant termination, were more energetically than judiciously directed. It seems strange that the most important quarter—that—where the tide of victory had first turned—had subsequently rolled on—and, as it might be now expected, at last would terminate in a glorious consummation—that its importance was overlooked, and men and money were, at this momentous crisis, wasted in idle and unprofitable operations. Soult was daily gaining strength—conscripts were forwarded in every direction to swell the ranks opposed to the allied general—and Suchet, with the flower of the Catalonian army, was under orders to cooperate.

It was therefore, a great misapplication of military means, to send an army under Sir Thomas Graham, to encourage a Dutch insurrection, instead of reinforcing Wellington with every soldier that England could have spared. The position of the allies in the south of France was politically imposing, but, in other points of view, it was one of danger and difficulty. On every side, Lord Wellington's operations were interrupted by rivers, and cramped by fortresses. A powerful army under a most able and enterprising captain, was strongly posted in front and flank. His depôts, his supplies, and his hospitals,—all were dependent upon chances—the former upon winds and waves—the latter on a reliance still less secure—Spanish integrity and gratitude. On every paltry potentate, having neither means nor wish to repay the boon by good service in the common cause, money and supplies were recklessly exhausted—while those glorious soldiers who had crossed the Pyrenees, were starving for want of clothing and great coats; and Lord Wellington's

chest was literally left without a guinea.* Writing, in December, to Earl Bathurst, he thus notices his poverty:—

"We are overwhelmed with debts, and I can scarcely stir out of my house on account of the public creditors waiting to demand payment of what is due to them. Some of the muleteers are *twenty-six months in arrears;* and only yesterday I was obliged to give them bills upon the Treasury for a part of their demands, or lose their services; which bills they will, I know, sell at a depreciated rate of exchange to the *sharks* who are waiting at Passages, and in this town, to take advantage of the public distresses. I have reason to suspect that they became thus clamorous at the instigation of British merchants."

Nor in the following month did his finances appear more flourishing. On the 27th of January he states, that the money for the Spanish army was still at Coruña, as well as 150,000 dollars from Lisbon. "We are short 18,000*l.* for the last month's pay to the troops, and there is not a shilling in any of the military chests. We are just as bad as the Spaniards. *I yesterday wanted to send off a courier to General W. Clinton in Catalonia, and the money for his expenses was borrowed from those who happened to have a little to lend.*"

* "The general clothing of the Spanish troops and the great coats of the British soldiers for 1813, were not ready in January 1814, because the inferior departments could not comprehend that the opening of new scenes of exertion required new means, and the soldiers had to brave the winter half naked, first on the snowy mountains, then in the more chilling damps of the low country about Bayonne. The clothing of the British soldiers for 1814 should have arrived in the end of 1813, when the army, lying inactive near the coast by reason of the bad weather, could have received and fitted it without difficulty. It did not however arrive until the troops were in progress towards the interior of France; wherefore, there being no means of transporting it by land, many of the best regiments were obliged to return to the coast to receive it, and the army, as we shall find, had to fight a critical battle without them."—*Napier.*

CHAPTER XXII.

CANTONMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY—SOULT FORTIFIES HIS POSITIONS—OPERATIONS RENEWED—LETTER TO EARL BATHURST—PLANS OF LORD WELLINGTON—DESPATCH FROM ST. JEAN DE LUZ—COMBAT OF GARRIS—THE TWENTY-NINTH REGIMENT—LORD WELLINGTON'S DESPATCH TO EARL BATHURST—ALLIED CASUALTIES—OPERATIONS OF SIR JOHN HOPE—A DETACHMENT OF THE GUARDS CROSSES THE ADOUR—IT IS ATTACKED BY THE ENEMY, AND GALLANTLY REPULSES THEM—PASSAGE OF THE RIVER—THE FLOTILLA COME IN SIGHT—BAR IMPASSABLE—ENTRANCE OF THE ADOUR—BAYONNE INVESTED, AND THE BOAT BRIDGE LAID DOWN—DESCRIPTION OF IT—INVESTMENT STRAITENED—SINGULAR OCCURRENCE.

In the meantime, Lord Wellington had determined to recommence his operations so soon as the weather would permit his troops to move. After his last defeat in December, Marshal Soult had established the centre of his army on the right of the Adour,* reaching to Port de Lanne. His left extended along the right bank of the Bidouse to St. Palais, on the left of which place two cavalry divisions were posted, while St. Jean Pied de Port was strongly garrisoned, partly by regular troops, and partly by national guards. The right wing, under Reille, occupied the

* The Adour, like the Gave, is a name common to many rivers in the Pyrenees, both simply meaning water in some of those primeval languages, the remains of which are still widely preserved in the appellations of rivers and mountains. The greater and noted stream, into which the others are received, has its sources in the county of Bigorre, under the Pics du Midi and d'Espade, two of the highest mountains in the chain; it passes by Campan, Bagnères, Montgaillard, and Tarbes, and begins to be navigable near Grenade, a small town in the little county of Marsan; having been joined by the Douze on the right below Tartas, it inclines to the south-west from its junction, passes Acqs, and then holds an almost southerly course to meet the Gave de Pau, which brings with its own waters those of the Gave d'Oleron, into which the Gave de Mauleon has been received. The Adour is then joined by the Bidouse, and lastly by the Nive.

entrenched camp at Bayonne; Drouet commanded on the Adour, Clausel on the Bidouse, and Harispe at St. Jean Pied de Port.

In that interval of inaction which the severity of the weather rendered unavoidable, Soult had received large reinforcements; and the strength and composition of the army of the south was considered so formidable by Napoleon, as to warrant his removing two divisions of infantry, Treillard's cavalry, and several batteries, to enable him the better to withstand the threatened march of the allied monarchs on the capital. Towards the end of December, some slight affairs occurred on the Joyeuse and L'Arran, "ending, as those attacks usually do, by both parties remaining in the possession of the ground they had before held, with little loss on either side."* The weather still continued wet and stormy; the rivers were full—the roads impracticable—and while it was impossible for Lord Wellington to move, his opponent employed himself in securing, by artificial defences, a country whose natural strength was remarkable. Protected on the right flank by the entrenched camp and fortress of Bayonne, and on his left by St. Jean Pied de Port, the French Marshal secured the bridges at Guiche, Bidache, and Came, by *têtes-de-pont.* In the rear, was the fortress of Navarreins on the Gave d'Oleron; and, still more retired, Hastingues and Oyergave, on the Gave de Pau, were placed in a condition of defence. Peyrehorade was also fortified—while in the rear of all, Dax was carefully entrenched, and made the grand depôt for the army.

The position occupied by Soult's army was in every respect well chosen, whether for aggression or defence. His wings were well advanced; but their respective flanks were safely rested, and each upon a fortress; while in the centre, the command of the Adour and Gave de Pau enabled the French marshal to concentrate there in force, thus giving him a mass of troops in hand, ready for an offensive movement when any opportunity might occur;

* Letter to Earl Bathurst, St. Jean de Luz, 30th January, 1813.

while from his lateral communications, he could repel a flank attack with celerity and effect.

That the French marshal should have remained on the defensive, or at least until Suchet joined him from Catalonia, was undoubtedly the best course he could have adopted. The blockade of Bayonne would necessarily require a large detachment from the allied army—and to the remainder, Soult was numerically equal.* Hence, had the allied general endeavoured to force the French centre, he would have had the bulk of Soult's army, everywhere entrenched, to overcome; while, if he ventured a flank movement, his own communications with St. Jean de Luz must have been seriously endangered.

These considerations induced Lord Wellington to threaten the right of the French army on the Adour, while, by one of his own bold and admirable efforts, he should force their left from the base of the Pyrenees, and thus compromise the security of the whole position, and cause Bayonne to be left to its fate. The weather had for a time cleared—both sides seemed weary of inaction—some partial affairs showed that the rival generals were anxious to renew hostilities—and the initial movements of this—the last campaign of the peninsular army—were thus detailed to Earl Bathurst: †—

"The enemy collected a considerable force on the Gave d'Oleron in the beginning of the week; and on the 3d instant, drove in the cavalry pickets between the Joyeuse and Bidouse

* "Besides the three divisions withdrawn by Napoleon, "two thousand of the best soldiers were also selected to join the imperial guards, and all the gens-d'armes were sent to the interior. The total number of old soldiers left did not, including the division of General Paris, exceed forty thousand, exclusive of the garrison of Bayonne and other ports, and the conscripts. * * * * It is remarkable also, as showing how easily military operations may be affected by distant operations, that Soult expected and dreaded at this time the descent of a great English army upon the coast of La Vendée, led thereto by intelligence of an expedition preparing in England, under Sir Thomas Graham, really to aid the Dutch revolt."—*Napier.*

† Dated St. Jean de Luz, 9th January, 1814.

rivers, and attacked the post of Major-General Buchan's Portuguese brigade on the Joyeuse near La Bastide, and those of the 3d division in Bonloc. They turned the right of Major-General Buchan's brigade on the heights of La Coste, and obliged him to retire towards Briscous, and they established two divisions of infantry on the height and in La Bastide, with the remainder of the army on the Bidouse and the Gave.

"Our centre and the right were immediately concentrated and prepared to move; and having reconnoitred the enemy on the 4th, I intended to have attacked them on the 5th, but was obliged to defer the attack till the 6th, owing to the badness of the weather and the swelling of the rivulets. The attack was made on that day by the 3d and 4th divisions, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton and Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole, supported by Major-General Buchan's Portuguese brigade of General Le Cor's division, and the cavalry under the command of Major-General Fane; and the enemy forthwith were dislodged without loss on our side; and our posts replaced where they had been.

"I then ordered the troops to return to their cantonments, as the weather has again rendered all operations impossible, for the moment; and the roads are in such a state, that it has become scarcely practicable to support the troops at the distance they are from the sea coast.

"The enemy have considerably reduced their force in Bayonne, with which place they keep their communication by a weak line along the right of the Adour. I entertain but little doubt that I could obtain possession of the entrenched camp at Bayonne; but it is so near the works of the town, that I doubt my being able to hold it, unless I should lay siege to the town; for which operation, in the existing state of the weather, I am not prepared.

"In the meantime, the enemy have, for the third time since the battle of Vitoria, received very large reinforcements."

The weather for a month kept the contending armies in their respective cantonments; but frost came on upon the 8th of February, and in a few days the roads were rendered hard enough to allow operations to recommence. Marshal Soult made an ineffective attempt to relieve Jaca, which was reduced to the last extremity; while Lord Wellington, bent upon passing the Adour below Bayonne,* designed to mask his principal operation, by threatening the French left with Hill's corps, and holding the centre in check with that under Marshal Beresford. Accordingly, on the 12th and 13th, the allied right wing was concentrated around Hasparen and Urcurray; and the opening of a grand series of operations was thus detailed to Earl Bathurst, in a despatch from St. Jean de Luz, dated 20th February, 1814:—

"In conformity with the intention which I communicated to your Lordship in my last despatch, I moved the right of the army, under Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill, on the 14th. He drove in the enemy's pickets on the Joyeuse river, and attacked their position at Hellette, from which he obliged General Harispe to retire with some loss towards St. Martin. I made the detachment of General Mina's troops in the valley of the Batzan advance on the same day upon Baygorry and Bidarry; and the direct communication of the enemy with St. Jean Pied de Port being cut off by Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill's success at Hellette, that fort has been blockaded by the Spanish troops above mentioned.

"On the following morning (the 15th), the troops under Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill continued the pursuit of the enemy, who had retired to a strong position in front of

* "It would seem that, uncertain if he should be able to force the passage of the tributary rivers with his right, he intended, if his bridge was happily thrown, to push his main operations on that side, and thus turn the Gaves by the right bank of the Adour: a fine conception, by which his superiority of numbers would have best availed him to seize Dax and the Port de Landes, and cut Soult off from Bordeaux."—*Napier.*

Garris; where General Harispe was joined by General Paris's division, which had been recalled from the march it had commenced for the interior of France; and by other troops from the enemy's centre.

"General Morillo's Spanish division, after driving in the enemy's advanced posts, was ordered to move towards St. Palais, by a ridge parallel to that on which was the enemy's position, in order to turn their left, and cut off their retreat by that road; while the 2d division, under Lieut.-General Sir William Stewart, should attack in front. Those troops made a most gallant attack upon the enemy's position, which was remarkably strong, but which was carried without very considerable loss. Much of the day had elapsed before the attack could be commenced; and the action lasted till after dark, the enemy having made repeated attempts to regain the position, particularly in two attacks, which were most gallantly received and repulsed by the 39th regiment, under the command of the Hon. Colonel O'Callaghan, in Major-General Pringle's brigade. The Major-General and Lieut.-Colonel Bruce of the 39th, were unfortunately wounded. We took 10 officers and about 200 prisoners.

"The right of the centre of the army made a corresponding movement with the right on these days; and our posts were on the Bidouse river on the evening of the 15th.

"The enemy retired across the river at St. Palais, in the night, destroying the bridges; which, however, were repaired, so that the troops under Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill crossed on the 16th; and on the 17th the enemy were driven across the Gave de Mauleon, &c. They attempted to destroy the bridge at Arriverete, but they had not time to complete its destruction; and a ford having been discovered above the bridge, the 92d regiment, under the command of Colonel Cameron, supported by the fire of Captain Bean's troop of horse artillery, crossed the ford, and made a most gallant attack upon two battalions of French infantry posted in the village, from which the latter were driven with considerable loss. The enemy retired in

the night across the Gave d'Oleron, and took up a strong position in the neighbourhood of Sauveterre, in which they were joined by other troops.

"On the 18th our posts were established on the Gave d'Oleron, and measures are in preparation to enable Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill to cross that river as soon as the pontoon train shall arrive.

"In all the actions which I have above detailed to your Lordship, the troops have conducted themselves remarkably well;* and I had great satisfaction in observing the good conduct of those under General Morillo, in the attack of Hellette, on the 14th, and in driving in the enemy's advanced posts in front of their position at Garris, on the 15th.

"Since the 14th the enemy have considerably weakened their force in Bayonne; and they have withdrawn from the right of the Adour above the town. Their whole force appears collected on the Gave; and they still hold their bridge at Peyrehorade.

"I returned from Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill's corps yesterday, in order to put in motion the left of the army, which I was in hopes I should have been able to have passed across the Adour below Bayonne; for which operation a bridge has been prepared by the assistance of the navy.

"The weather is so unfavourable, however, that it is impossible to attempt this operation at the present moment;

* Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., in the various operations from the 14th to the 17th February.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	1	2	28	—	31
Wounded	22	12	155	—	189
Missing	—	—	12	—	12

Portuguese included.

and I therefore return to Sir Rowland Hill's corps to-morrow morning, in order to superintend the further operations in that quarter; and I leave to Lieut.-General Sir John Hope to cross the Adour whenever the weather will permit.

"I have received no intelligence from Catalonia since I addressed your Lordship last; but I have this day received a report from the Governor of Pamplona, stating that the fort of Jaca had surrendered to General Mina by capitulation on the 17th instant. I am not acquainted with the particulars of this event; but I know that the place contained 84 pieces of brass cannon."

The combat at Garris was obstinately maintained; Harispe being anxious to hold his position in advance of the Bidouse, while Lord Wellington was equally determined to force that river before Soult could strengthen its defences. The brunt of the action fell upon Pringle's brigade. Evening had set in. The French were in force upon a bold hill in front—and Lord Wellington briefly intimated that "it must be carried before dark."

That order was gallantly obeyed. The 29th, headed by Colonel O'Callaghan, and led by General Pringle, plunged into a wooded ravine that wound to the crest of the mountain, and on which 4,000 Frenchmen were embattled. The 28th regiment followed closely in support—and the wild cheering of both, apprised Harispe that the storm of war was coming. The 29th gained the height, wheeled into line, and prepared to sweep the mountain of the enemy—while they, perceiving with surprise the inferior numbers of their assailants, charged resolutely back, and unchecked by the volley which received them, came boldly forward with the bayonet. Twice they tried that formidable weapon, and twice they experienced its deadly effect when wielded by a British arm. O'Callaghan fought at the head of his regiment, received two wounds, and on each occasion laid his opponent dead. Seeing that his centre was threatened by the Portuguese, and the Spaniards

were moving to cut off his retreat, Harispe declined a further contest, and crossing the Bidouse broke the bridges, and favoured by darkness and the heavy marching of Morillo's corps, he succeeded in gaining St. Palais.

Soult, on hearing that his left was thus seriously endangered, marched rapidly on Sauveterre, leaving a strong force to hold the bridge at Peyrehorade, while the allied posts were in the mean time established on the left of the Gave d'Oleron, from Sauveterre to its junction with the Gave de Pau. Lord Wellington's bold and brilliant operations now followed each other in quick succession, and he thus continued to give their general detail to Earl Bathurst:*—

"The movements of the right of the army, which I detailed to your Lordship in my last despatch, were intended to divert the enemy's attention from the preparations at St. Jean de Luz and Passages for the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, and to induce the enemy to move his force to his left, in which objects they succeeded completely; but upon my return to St. Jean de Luz, on the 19th, I found the weather so unfavourable at sea and so uncertain, that I determined to push forward my operations on the right, notwithstanding that I had still the Gave d'Oleron, the Gave de Pau, and the Adour to pass.

"Accordingly, I returned to Garris on the 21st, and ordered the 6th and light divisions to break up from the blockade of Bayonne; and General Don Manuel Freyre to close up the cantonments of his corps towards Irun, and to be prepared to move when the left of the army should cross the Adour.

"I found the pontoons collected at Garris, and they were moved forward on the following days to and across the Gave de Mauleon, and the troops of the centre of the army arrived.

"On the 24th, Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill passed

* Abridged Despatch, dated St. Sever, 1st March, 1814.

the Gave d'Oleron at Villenave, with the light, 2d, and Portuguese divisions, under the command of Major-General Baron Charles Alten, Lieut.-General Sir William Stewart, and Mariscal de Campo Le Cor; while Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton passed with the 6th division between Montfort and Laas; and Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton made demonstrations, with the 3d division, of an intention to attack the enemy's position at the bridge of Sauveterre, which induced the enemy to blow up the bridge.

"Mariscal de Campo Don Pablo Morillo drove in the enemy's posts near Navarreins, and blockaded that place.

"Field Marshal Sir William Beresford likewise, who, since the movement of Sir Rowland Hill on the 14th and 15th, had remained with the 4th and 7th divisions, and Colonel Vivian's brigade, in observation on the Lower Bidouse, attacked the enemy on the 23d in their fortified posts at Hastingues and Oeyregave, on the left of the Gave de Pau, and obliged them to retire within the *tête-de-pont* at Peyrehorade.

"Immediately after the passage of the Gave d'Oleron was effected, Sir Rowland Hill and Sir Henry Clinton moved towards Orthez and the great road leading from Sauveterre to that town; and the enemy retired in the night from Sauveterre across the Gave de Pau, and assembled their army near Orthez on the 25th, having destroyed all the bridges on the river.

"The right and right of the centre of the army assembled opposite Orthez: Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, with Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry, and the 3d division, under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, were near the destroyed bridge of Berenx; and Field-Marshal Sir William Beresford, with the 4th and 7th divisions, under Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole and Major-General Walker, and Colonel Vivian's brigade, towards the junction of the Gave de Pau with the Gave d'Oleron.

"The troops opposed to the marshal having moved on the 25th, he crossed the Gave de Pau below the junction of

the Gave d'Oleron on the morning of the 26th, and moved along the high road from Peyrehorade towards Orthez, on the enemy's right. As he approached, Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton crossed with the cavalry, and Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton with the 3d division, below the bridge of Berenx; and I moved the 6th and light divisions to the same point; and Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill occupied the heights opposite Orthez and the high road leading to Sauveterre.

"The 6th and light divisions crossed in the morning of the 27th at day-light, and we found the enemy in a strong position near Orthez, with his right on a height on the high road to Dax, and occupying the village of St. Boés, and his left on the heights above Orthez and that town, and opposing the passage of the river by Sir Rowland Hill.

"The course of the heights on which the enemy had placed his army necessarily retired his centre, while the strength of the position gave extraordinary advantages to the flanks.

"I ordered Marshal Sir William Beresford to turn and attack the enemy's right with the 4th division under Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole, and the 7th division under Major-General Walker and Colonel Vivian's brigade of cavalry; while Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton should move along the great road leading from Peyrehorade to Orthez, and attack the heights on which the enemy's centre and left stood, with the 3d and 6th divisions under Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton, supported by Sir Stapleton Cotton, with Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of cavalry. Major-General Baron Charles Alten, with the light division, kept the communication, and was in reserve between these two attacks. I likewise desired Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill to cross the Gave, and to turn and attack the enemy's left.

"Marshal Sir William Beresford carried the village of St. Boés with the 4th division, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole, after an obstinate resistance by the enemy; but the ground was so narrow that the troops could not deploy to attack the heights, notwithstanding the

repeated attempts of Major-General Ross and Brigadier-General Vasconcellos's Portuguese brigade; and it was impossible to turn them by the enemy's right without an excessive extension of our line.

"I therefore so far altered the plan of the action as to order the immediate advance of the 3d and 6th divisions, and I moved forward Colonel Barnard's brigade of the light division to attack the left of the height on which the enemy's right stood.

"This attack, led by the 52d regiment under Lieut.-Colonel Colborne, and supported on their right by Major-General Brisbane's and Colonel Keane's brigades of the 3d division, and by simultaneous attacks on the left by Major-General Anson's brigade of the 4th division, and on the right by Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, with the remainder of the 3d division and the 6th division, under Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton, dislodged the enemy from the heights and gave us the victory.

"In the meantime, Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill had forced the passage of the Gave above Orthez, and seeing the state of the action he moved immediately, with the 2d division of infantry under Lieut.-General Sir William Stewart and Major-General Fane's brigade of cavalry, direct for the great road from Orthez to St. Sever, thus keeping upon the enemy's left.

"The enemy retired at first in admirable order, taking every advantage of the numerous good positions which the country afforded him. The losses, however, which he sustained in the continued attacks of our troops, and the danger with which he was threatened by Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill's movement, soon accelerated his movements, and the retreat at last became a flight, and the troops were in the utmost confusion.

"Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton took advantage of the only opportunity which offered to charge with Major-General Lord Edward Somerset's brigade, in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles, where the enemy had been

driven from the high road by Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill. The 7th hussars distinguished themselves upon this occasion, and made many prisoners.

"We continued the pursuit till it was dusk; and I halted the army in the neighbourhood of Sault de Navailles. I cannot estimate the extent of the enemy's loss; we have taken six pieces of cannon and a great many prisoners: the numbers I cannot at present report. The whole country is covered by their dead. The army was in the utmost confusion when I last saw it passing the heights near Sault de Navailles, and many soldiers had thrown away their arms. The desertion has since been immense.

"We followed the enemy on the following day to this place; and we this day passed the Adour. Marshal Sir William Beresford marched with the light division and General Vivian's brigade upon Mont de Marsan, where he has taken a very large magazine of provisions. Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill has moved upon Aire, and the advanced posts of the centre are at Cazères.

"The enemy are apparently retiring upon Agen, and have left open the direct road towards Bordeaux.

"While the operations of which I have above given the report were carrying on on the right of the army, Lieut.-General Sir John Hope, in concert with Rear-Admiral Penrose, availed himself of an opportunity which offered on the 23d of February to cross the Adour below Bayonne, and to take possession of both banks of the river at its mouth. The vessels destined to form the bridge could not get in till the 24th, when the difficult, and at this season of the year dangerous, operation of bringing them in was effected with a degree of gallantry and skill seldom equalled.

* * * * *

"The enemy, conceiving that the means of crossing the river which Lieut.-General Sir John Hope had at his command, viz., rafts made of pontoons, had not enabled him to cross a large force in the course of the 23d, attacked the corps which he had sent over on that evening. This corps

consisted of 600 men of the 2d brigade of guards, under the command of Major-General the Hon. E. Stopford, who repulsed the enemy immediately. The rocket brigade was of great use upon this occasion.

" Three of the enemy's gun-boats were destroyed this day; and a frigate lying in the Adour received considerable damage from the fire of a battery of 18-pounders, and was obliged to go higher up the river to the neighbourhood of the bridge.

" Lieut.-General Sir John Hope invested the citadel of Bayonne on the 25th; and Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre moved forward with the 4th Spanish army in consequence of directions which I had left for him.

" On the 27th, the bridge having been completed, Lieut.-General Sir John Hope deemed it expedient to invest the citadel of Bayonne more closely than he had done before; and he attacked the village of St. Etienne, which he carried, having taken a gun and some prisoners from the enemy; and his posts are now within 900 yards of the outworks of the place.

" The result of the operations which I have detailed to your Lordship is, that Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port, and Navarreins, are invested; and the army, having passed the Adour, are in possession of all the great communications across that river, after having beaten the enemy, and taken their magazines.

" I have ordered forward the Spanish troops under General Freyre, and the heavy British cavalry and artillery, and the Portuguese artillery.

" Your Lordship will have observed with satisfaction the able assistance which I have received in these operations from Marshal Sir William Beresford, Lieut.-Generals Sir Rowland Hill, Sir John Hope, and Sir Stapleton Cotton; and from all the general officers, officers, and troops acting under their orders respectively. It is impossible for me sufficiently to express my sense of their merits, or of the degree in which the country is indebted to their zeal and

ability for the situation in which the army now finds itself.

"All the troops distinguished themselves; the 4th division, under Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole, in the attack of St. Boés, and the subsequent endeavours to carry the right of the heights; the 3d, 6th, and light divisions, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, Sir Henry Clinton, and Major-General Charles Baron Alten, in the attack of the enemy's position on the heights; and these, and the 7th division under Major-General Walker, in the various operations and attacks on the enemy's retreat.

" The charge made by the 7th hussars under Lord Edward Somerset was highly meritorious.

" The conduct of the artillery throughout the day deserved my highest approbation.

" I am likewise much indebted to the Quartermaster-General Sir George Murray, and the Adjutant-General Sir Edward Pakenham, for the assistance I have received from them; and to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, and the officers of my personal staff; and to the Mariscal de Campo Don Miguel Alava.

" The last accounts which I have received from Catalonia are of the 20th. The French commanders of the garrisons of Llerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, had been induced to evacuate those places by orders sent to them by the Baron de Eroles in Marshal Suchet's cipher, of which he had got possession.

" The troops composing these garrisons, having joined, were afterwards surrounded in the pass Martorell, on their march towards the French frontier, by a detachment from the 1st Spanish army, and by a detachment from the Anglo-Sicilian corps. Lieut.-General Copons allowed them to capitulate; but I have not yet received from him any report on this subject, nor do I yet know what is the result.

" It was expected in Catalonia that Marshal Suchet would immediately evacuate that province; and I hear here that he is to join Marshal Soult.

"I have not yet received the detailed report of the capitulation of Jaca.

"I enclose the returns of killed and wounded upon the late occasion.*

"I send this despatch by my aide-de-camp, Major Fremantle, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's protection."

When Lord Wellington found that a passage of the Adour was not practicable owing to the stormy weather which prevailed, he confided that important operation to Sir John Hope, and rapidly returned to the right to force the Gaves, an attempt that proved eminently successful, and led to one of his noblest victories—that of Orthez.

As Bayonne was left to its own strength, preparations had been completed for establishing a bridge below the town, and investing the citadel immediately when the passage of the river should be effected. A bend in the course of the Adour concealed one part of the stream about three hundred yards in width from the view of the city; and though the river had a strong current, subject to sudden floods, with a strong tide-way, exposed to the heavy swell that crossed its shifting sand-bar, by the skill of the engineers, and the daring gallantry of British sailors, the bridge was rapidly thrown across a stream, dangerous in itself, and overlooked by a camp and fortress.

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the allied army under the command of Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., in the action with the French army under the command of Marshal Soult, on the 27th February, at Orthez.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	18	25	234	7	277
Wounded	134	89	1700	33	1923
Missing	1	5	64	51	70

The movement of the right centre to support the right wing of the allies, had induced Marshal Soult to believe that for the present the Adour was secure; but on the night of the 22d, the first division marched with a rocket and 18-pounder brigade, skirted the enemy's outposts unchallenged, and at day-break reached the sand-hills, extending between Biarits and the mouth of the Adour.

A flotilla of *chasse-marées* had been collected at Socoa and Passages; and their arrival in the Adour was intended for the morning of the 23d, but the winds were boisterous and adverse, and consequently, Admiral Penrose was unable to reach his destination. A few small boats and pontoons were obtained; and at noon a hawser was stretched across the river; and by a sort of flying bridge the guards immediately commenced crossing. A French corvette, moored higher up the stream, had been in the meantime cannonaded,* and the front of the entrenched camp sufficiently alarmed, to keep the attention of the enemy occupied; and early in the evening six companies of the guards, two companies of riflemen, and part of the rocket troop, were safely debarked on the right bank of the river.

The alarm had now reached the city, and two battalions, amounting to 1,300 men, were hastily despatched from the citadel to attack the small and isolated body, who, as it appeared to the French governor, had crossed the river with more daring than discretion. Colonel Stopford, however, availed himself of an excellent position, and formed

* "There were twelve boats to assist the *Sappho*; but when a few rockets had been discharged, the terrified sailors took to their oars, and made all speed up the river; the effect, indeed, of these weapons was most terrific; they dashed through the water like fiery serpents, and pierced the sides of the boat, burning apparently even under water with undiminished force. The guns meantime opened upon the corvette, and fired about 400 rounds at her, some toward the conclusion with hot shot. This failed to set her on fire; and when the three-coloured flag was shot from the flag-staff, the enemy presently nailed it to the mast-head; but after some hours the French retired from the contest with the loss of the captain, and four-fifths of the crew of the corvette."—*Southey*.

to receive the threatened attack. His left flank rested on a morass, his right was secured by the river, while the fire of the British artillery swept his whole front from the opposite side, and on either flank rocketeers were placed—then a new arm, and, as it proved, a most imposing one.

The French came on in two columns, beating the *pas-de-charge*, and with the confidence which nearly threefold numbers gave, and the guards coolly and steadily received them. A well-directed musketry was opened and sustained—a lively cannonade supported it from the other bank of the Adour, and the rockets cut through the column as it advanced, killing and wounding numbers in their flight, which on this occasion was most happily directed.* The French instantly gave way, and fell back to the citadel, and the gallant band lighted fires and formed their bivouacs. "It was a most brilliant moonlight night, and the stillness was uninterrupted except by the murmur of the waves of the sea breaking on the sandy beach. The contrast between the remarkable stillness of the night, and the active scene of the preceding day, was exceedingly striking."†

On the 24th the ferrying of the troops was carried on with unabated activity; and three brigades were already landed on the right bank, when Admiral Penrose and his flotilla appeared in sight, steering for the mouth of the Adour under a press of canvass, and with a favourable wind.

* "There was a prejudice in the army against this weapon, which had hitherto not been used in the field; the opinion seems to have been, that if it had been an efficient means of destruction, it would sooner have been borrowed from the East Indian nations. Lord Wellington, however, was willing that they should be tried; and some experiments which were made at Fontarabia gave reason for supposing that they might be found useful on the Adour. The direction of this new arm was assigned to Sir Augustus Fraser, but the trial was to be made under all the disadvantages of inexperience; for the corps was composed of men hastily brought together, and entirely ignorant of the arm they were to use; and the rockets themselves were equipped in five different ways, and consequently liable to as many failures."—*Southey.*

† Batty's campaign in the Western Pyrenees.

Unfortunately, however, the surf upon the bar was unusually heavy, and Captain O'Reilly, with the French pilot, in attempting to lead the flotilla in, was swamped, and narrowly escaped from drowning. As evening approached, the weather became more wild and stormy; and the whole coast presented one long unbroken line of surf and spray, as the waves broke upon the bar in quick succession. In the mean time, the tide had fallen, and the attempt to cross these dangerous sands was of necessity postponed until flood water; and as the enemy had removed the Balise Occidentale which marked the channel, the pilot replaced the signal staff with a halbert and handkerchief attached, to direct the course that the boats and *chasse-marées* should steer.

"When the water rose again the crews were promised rewards in proportion to their successful daring, and the whole flotilla approached in close order, but with it came black clouds and a driving gale, which covered the whole line of coast with a rough tumbling sea, dashing and foaming without an interval of dark water to mark the entrance of the river. The men-of-war's boats first drew near this terrible line of surge; and Mr. Bloye, of the Lyra, having the chief pilot with him, heroically led into it, but in an instant his barge was engulphed, and he and all with him were drowned. The Lyra's boat thus swallowed up, the following vessels swerved in their course, and shooting up to the right and left kept hovering undecided on the edge of the tormented waters. Suddenly Lieutenant Cheyne of the Woodlark pulled ahead, and striking the right line, with courage and fortune combined, safely passed the bar." *

The scene that followed was truly awful; and men who had witnessed death in every form upon a battle field, shuddered as they looked at the efforts of human courage, bravely, but in many instances fatally, employed in combating the fury of the elements. "The boats were so agitated as they attempted the passage, sails flapping, oars apparently

* Napier.

useless, and all steerage lost, that it seemed as if each must inevitably be wrecked. Two vessels were stranded, but almost all their crews were by great exertion saved. A gun-brig also was driven ashore; Captain Elliot of the Martial gun-brig was swamped in his boat: his surgeon was picked up by this gun-boat, but upon her striking the ground the shock threw down a 24-pounder, which fell upon him and killed him. Three transport boats with their crews were lost; every exertion was made to save those who were struggling for life in the surf, literally within ten yards of their countrymen on shore; but though there were men with ropes tied to them on the beach, who spared no endeavour for assisting them, and who, when the waves retired appeared as if they were close to them, not a soul could be saved: some who actually obtained footing on the ground were carried back by the receding surf, and swept away for ever. But the zeal and intrepidity of British seamen will overcome all obstacles that are not absolutely insuperable: officers and men on this occasion displayed gallantry which could not be surpassed, and skill which has seldom been equalled; vying with each other, they essayed the passage; and happily the wind towards evening gradually died away, and about thirty vessels got in."*

On the following morning the citadel of Bayonne was regularly invested by the 1st division and Bradford's Portuguese brigade, the allies encompassing the whole *enceinte* of the works, their right flank resting on the river below the city, and the left on the banks of the Adour above it. The bend of the stream favoured the investment, by shortening the half circle occupied by the troops, their front extending little more than two miles, while a marsh afforded it considerable protection. The day was beautiful. The movement was made in columns of companies, by battalions, the brigades at deployment distances; while the whole division, pivoting on its right, extended its left beyond the citadel, and then closing gradually to the river, shut in the

* Southey.

camp and citadel, and severed all communications between the country and the town. A feint attack was in the meantime made upon the entrenched camp, to keep its garrison on the alert; and the bridge was prepared for laying down, and on the following evening it was completed.

It consisted of six-and-twenty *chasse-marées*, lashed to each other, and moored by the bow and stern to resist the current that changed at ebb and flow. Heavy guns were occasionally substituted for anchors; and cables were strained by capstans across the centre of the decks, with strong oak planks laid transversely, and sufficiently secured to form a platform, at the same time pliant and substantial—calculated to rise or fall with the tide—and strong enough to support the weight of artillery. Immense stone piers had been erected by the French to contract the channel of the stream, and, by an artificial current, prevent the sand from accumulating on the bar. These, from their breadth, formed an admirable causeway, while they lessened the space of water to be bridged to an extent of two hundred and seventy yards. It was supposed by French engineers impracticable to secure pontoons so as to resist the ocean swells and mountain floods to which the Adour was so constantly exposed; but a fortunate shifting of a sand-bank formed an excellent break-water;* while a boom was laid above the bridge to arrest fire-ships or floating timber, which it might have been expected the enemy would employ for its destruction.

Immediately on the completion of this extraordinary undertaking, Sir John Hope determined to straiten the investment of Bayonne. It was accordingly executed by an advance in converging columns, covered by a multitude of skirmishers. Those upon either wing established them-

* "Nevertheless this fortune, the errors of the enemy, the matchless skill and daring of the British seamen, and the discipline and intrepidity of the British soldiers, all combined by the genius of Wellington, were necessary to the success of this stupendous undertaking, which must always rank amongst the prodigies of war."—*Napier.*

selves within nine hundred yards of the enemy's works, without any serious loss; but the centre attack was not made with equal good fortune. The village of St. Etienne was obstinately defended; while favoured by difficult ground, and covered by the fire of the guns mounted on the northern cavaliers of the citadel, the enemy sharply disputed the villas and gardens which sheltered them from the fire of the assailants. But finally, St. Etienne was carried, and a gun taken from the enemy, who retreated in disorder to the citadel. Thouvenot, the governor, had sallied to support his pickets; but, after two attacks, he was roughly driven back, the village was abandoned, the allied outposts taken up without further opposition, and every preparation made for a regular siege.

A very singular occurrence at this time was remarked. The left wing had just secured themselves in their new positions, when an immense flight of eagles was seen hovering in the air. They remained about Bayonne for several days, occasionally alighting on the sand-hills, and finally turned their aerial course in the direction of Orthez. "It is not improbable that they were the same flight of birds which, for months, after the battle of Vitoria, were seen constantly frequenting that scene of action, sometimes in such numbers as to make it alarming, if not dangerous, to roam singly over the field."*

* Batty's Campaign.

CHAPTER XXIII.

SOULT OFFERS BATTLE AT ORTHEZ—STRENGTH OF HIS POSITION—COMBAT AT THE VILLAGE OF ST. BOES—LEFT ATTACK OF THE ALLIES REPULSED—WELLINGTON CHANGES HIS DISPOSITIONS, AND THE RIGHT CENTRE OF THE FRENCH IS CARRIED—HILL FORCES THE BRIDGE, AND THE FRENCH ARE DEROUTED—LORD WELLINGTON WOUNDED—CASUALTIES—COMBAT OF AIRE, AND ITS RESULTS—ROYALIST PARTY AT BORDEAUX—LORD WELLINGTON'S POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES—NEW TREATY BETWEEN THE ALLIED POWERS—NAPOLEON'S EXTRAVAGANT DEMANDS—BERESFORD DETACHED TO BORDEAUX—WELLINGTON'S INSTRUCTIONS—SOULT AND WELLINGTON REINFORCED—WAR IN CATALONIA—JUAN VAN HALEN—HIS TREACHERY AND SUCCESS—LERIDA, MEQUINENZA, AND MONSON SURRENDER—AND THEIR GARRISONS ARE MADE PRISONERS—FERDINAND'S RETURN—LORD WELLINGTON REMONSTRATES AGAINST THE LIBERATION OF THE FRENCH GARRISONS.

WHILE the operations of the allied left wing were thus fortunately executed, those of the right and centre proved equally successful.

The preparatory movements of the corps under Beresford, Hill, and Picton, had rendered the strong positions taken by the French marshal on the Gave d'Oleron and Gave de Pau untenable; and as it was indispensable for the preservation of his magazines that Soult should abide a battle, he determined to hold the Bordeaux road, and accordingly concentrated his army at Orthez.*

The position had every advantage for defence. The left and centre were particularly strong—the former, indeed, almost unassailable; while the right, although it could be turned, would require extended movements, which must

* Orthez stands upon the Gave de Pau, there a considerable river, and remarkable, because its accessible source is a waterfall, higher, except one in America, than any that has ever yet been measured; it springs from a height of 1266 feet, and being twice broken on the way by projections of the precipice, falls upon a bed of perpetual snow, under which it works its passage. Orthez was formerly the residence of the princes of Bearn during some two hundred years from the middle of the thirteenth century.


BATTLE
ORTHEZ
Church of Broglus
Cavalry
Light Div.n
Swamp
Roman Camp
5th Div.n
From Peyrehorade
Tarbes Bridge
Gave de Pau
Cacadore
St Boes
Tarbes Div.n
Foyes
Swamp
From Dax
Fort
D Armagnac
Cavalry
Light
Cavalry
Line of French retreat
To Aire
Mont de Marsan
RONTUN
L Troops to Chs Hill
Tower
Gl Harispe
ORTHEZ
To Pau
Heights of Manrin
Serres
French
Allies

of necessity be dangerous in their execution, both from the difficulty of the ground the troops must traverse, and from the facility with which an army well in hand, could be brought to bear on any point that accident might weaken.

The left wing of the allies commenced the battle seriously about nine o'clock, although from daylight a partial fusilade had been kept up between the light troops, occasionally varied by the deeper booming of artillery. While the 3d and 6th divisions carried the lower grounds against which they had been directed, the 4th had won the village of St. Boes, and endeavoured by desperate fighting, to gain a footing on the open ground behind it.

"Five times breaking through the scattered houses did Ross carry his battle into the wider space beyond; yet, ever as the troops issued forth, the French guns from the open hill smote them in front, and the reserved battery on the Dax road swept through them with grape from flank to flank. And then Taupin's supporting masses rushed forwards with a wasting fire, and lapping the flanks with skirmishers, which poured along the ravines on either hand, forced the shattered columns back into the village. It was in vain that with desperate valour the allies, time after time, broke through the narrow way, and struggled to spread a front beyond. Ross fell dangerously wounded; and Taupin, whose troops were clustered thickly, and well supported, defied their utmost efforts. Nor was Soult less happy on the other side. The nature of the ground would not permit the 3d and 6th divisions to engage many men at once, so that no progress was made; and one small detachment which Picton extended to his left, having made an attempt to gain the smaller tongue jutting out from the central hill, was suddenly charged, as it neared the summit, by Foy, and driven down again in confusion, losing several prisoners."*

Finding that the left attack had not succeeded, Lord Wellington detached a caçadore battalion to clear Ross's

* Napier.

right flank from the skirmishers that had annoyed it. But the Portuguese brigade was already broken and driven back, and the village cleared of the British troops, and again occupied by the enemy. On every side the attack had failed; for beyond a given point the assailants had never been able to advance—and now, disordered and repulsed, nothing appeared wanting but for the French marshal to push forward his reserves, and seize a decisive victory.*

But the lion was in the path. Wellington had galloped forward to direct the movements of his left wing personally; and now, in the thickest of the fire, he suddenly changed the plan of attack, and with that rapidity of conception, which with him had turned the fortunes of so many fields, he instantly changed his dispositions.

Directing Walker's division (the 7th) and Barnard's light brigade against the left of the height, where the French right united with the centre, he supported their attack by an advance of the 3d and 6th divisions, which previously had remained unengaged, until Beresford's operations should be demonstrated. In a moment, "the face of the battle was changed." The furious assault of the light brigade bore down resistance, and gained the crest of the hill. The 52d bore right against a French battalion which connected the divisions of Foy and D'Armanac, and at the same time Picton and Clinton were moving on their flank. On both sides the musketry was close and destructive. Two generals, Bechand and Foy, were carried from the field; and troops, so lately confident of victory, as suddenly became shaken and discouraged. Indeed, the storm had

* "As this happened at the moment when the detachment on Picton's left was repulsed, victory seemed to declare for the French; and Soult, conspicuous on a commanding open hill, the knot of all his combinations, seeing his enemies thus broken and thrown backwards on each side, put all his reserves in movement to complete the success. It is said that in the exultation of the moment he smote his thigh exclaiming, '*At last I have him!*' Whether this be so or not, it was no vain-glorious speech, for the moment was most dangerous."—*Napier.*

so strangely burst from an unexpected quarter—for the march of the 52d had been hardly perceived save by the skirmishers—that the enemy "got into confusion, and the disorder spreading to Reille's wing, he also was forced to fall back and take a new position to restore his line of battle. The narrow pass behind St. Boes was thus opened, and Wellington, seizing the critical moment, thrust the 4th and 7th divisions, Vivian's cavalry, and two batteries of artillery through, and spread a front beyond."*

Instantly D'Armanac's position was crowned by a British battery, whose fire swept through the columns exposed to their cannonade, and rent these heavy masses into pieces. In vain the French cavalry charged the English guns. The fire of the 42d repulsed them—the 3d division fought with its customary determination—Inglis's brigade charged with the bayonet; and Soult, seeing the ground was not to be recovered, commenced an orderly retreat, although but a brief space before, his movements had indicated the advance that leads to victory.

How rapidly the fortunes of a battle alter! Immediately after he had changed his dispositions for attack, Lord Wellington ordered Hill's corps to force the bridge of Orthez, an order that was promptly executed. Comprehending in a moment how matters went, Hill, when he crossed the Gave, pushed rapidly forward by a parallel ridge, to that by which Soult must retire his beaten army to Sault de Navailles. The French retreat had already commenced, and nothing could be more soldierly than the steadiness with which it was conducted, as the whole *corps-d'armée* fell back by echelons of divisions, each covering the movements of the other, and holding by turns the different positions which the ground they crossed presented.

"In this manner the French yielded, step by step, and without confusion, the allies advancing with an incessant deafening musketry and cannonade, yet losing many men, especially on the right, where the 3d division were very

* Napier.

strongly opposed. However, as the danger of being cut off at Salespice by Hill became more imminent, the retrograde movements were more hurried and confused; Hill seeing this, quickened his pace, until at last both sides began to run violently, and so many men broke from the French ranks, making across the fields towards the fords, and such a rush was necessarily made by the rest to gain the bridge of Sault de Navailles, that the whole country was covered with scattered bands. Sir Stapleton Cotton then breaking through, with Lord Edward Somerset's hussars, a small covering body opposed to him by Harispe, sabred two or three hundred men; and the 7th hussars cut off about two thousand who threw down their arms in an enclosed field; yet, some confusion or mismanagement occurring, the greatest part recovering their weapons escaped, and the pursuit ceased at the Luy of Bearn."*

Never did a beaten army escape the worst consequences of a *déroute* more narrowly. Had the British cavalry been enabled to get forward with more celerity, a large portion of the French infantry must have been unavoidably cut off. To another circumstance, also, the comparatively low amount of the French casualties may be attributed. A defeat, complete as that of Orthez, would have most probably entailed upon the vanquished army a terrible disaster, had not Lord Wellington been prevented from following up his success, and pressing his advantages by personal direction. At the very moment when the confusion in the enemy's ranks was increasing, a spent shot struck the pommel of his sword, and caused a painful contusion. Lord Wellington with difficulty kept his saddle, and an intersected country, which otherwise he would have crossed at speed, was, therefore, slowly traversed. Had he been allowed to urge it on, the pursuit would have been ardently and successfully continued; but it ceased at Sault de Navailles—and night closed upon the victors and the vanquished.

* Napier.

The losses sustained on both sides were considerable. On the allied part they fell upon the Anglo-Portuguese alone, for no Spanish troops took share in these sanguinary and brilliant operations. The casualties of the enemy were, however, immensely greater. Besides six guns, Soult lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at least five thousand men, exclusive of thousands of conscripts, who flung away their arms, and disbanded themselves the moment that the rout began. This will account for the high estimate to which the French casualties were raised even by themselves; the total loss having been variously stated — by some writers at ten thousand—by others at fourteen thousand—an immense number in a single action to be thus placed *hors-de-combat*.

During the night the beaten army fell back to Hagetman, was joined there by the garrison of Dax with two conscript battalions, and, halting behind the Adour, it took a position at St. Sever. This, however, was abandoned on the approach of the allied centre; and the French divisions continued their retreat to Agen,* breaking down the bridges in their rear. The pursuit was as rapidly continued by the allies, as bad roads and bad weather would permit.

The easterly line chosen by the French marshal for his retreat, had left the Bordeaux road uncovered, and thus enabled Beresford, with the light division and Vivian's cavalry to reach Mont de Marsaux, where he captured an immense magazine, while the centre moved on Cazeres, and the right marched on Aire. Early on the 2d of March, Hill found himself in presence of the enemy, who were strongly posted on a ridge of hills half a league in front of the town, with their right resting on the Adour.

Sir Rowland, with his usual decision, instantly ordered an attack. Sir William Stewart, with the second division, advanced against the right of the French line, and Da Costa, with his brigade, attacked the centre.

* Agen is on the right bank of the Garonne, midway between the cities of Bordeaux and Toulouse.

"The Portuguese succeeded in gaining possession of the ridge, but were thrown into such confusion by the resistance made by the enemy, as would have been of the most serious consequence, had it not been for the timely support given by the second division, under Lieut.-General Sir W. Stewart, who, having previously beaten back the enemy directly opposed to him, and seeing them returning to charge the Portuguese brigade, ordered forward the first brigade of the second division, which, led by Major-General Barnes, charged the enemy in the most gallant style, and beat them back, throwing their column into the greatest confusion.

"The enemy made various attempts to regain the ground, but Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir W. Stewart, having now been joined by Major-General Byng's brigade, was enabled to drive them from all their positions, and finally from this town.

"By all accounts of prisoners, and from my own observations,* at least two divisions of the enemy were engaged. Their loss in killed and wounded has been very great, and we have above one hundred prisoners. The enemy's line of retreat seems to have been by the right bank of the Adour, with exception of some part of their force, which, being cut off from the river by our rapid advance to this town, retired in the greatest confusion in the direction of Pau. These troops have left their arms in every direction."

The action of Aire was equally creditable to the commander as to the British regiments engaged. From the promptness with which Sir Rowland made his attack, both skill and courage were required to render it effective. Da Costa's brigade were however brought clumsily into action, and the Portuguese battalions did not display their usual spirit—their fighting was feeble and irregular, and Harpise's division easily repulsed them;† but Stewart detached Barnes,

* Hill's report to Wellington, dated Aire, 3d March, 1814.

† "Hill expresses himself much dissatisfied with Da Costa's brigade, in an affair of the 2d instant, near Aire; and I think you had better send somebody

with the 50th and 92d, to remedy the mischief; and the impetuous charge of these splendid regiments at once decided the fortune of the day. When night came, Harispe was forced back upon the Lees, Villatte driven from the town, while Roguette's division, which had come from Barcelona to his support, covered the retreat, but failed to restore the battle. The general results of the combat of Aire are thus given by Colonel Napier:—

"Two generals, Dauture and Gasquet, were wounded, a colonel of engineers was killed, a hundred prisoners were taken, many of Harispe's conscripts threw away their arms and fled to their homes, and the magazines fell into the conqueror's hands. The loss of the British troops was one hundred and fifty; General Barnes was wounded and Colonel Hood killed. The loss of the Portuguese was never officially stated, yet it could not have been less than that of the British; and the vigour of the action proved that the French courage was very little abated by the battle of Orthez. Soult immediately retreated up the Adour by both banks towards Maubourget and Marciac, and he was not followed; for new combinations were now opened to the generals on both sides."

By the opening of the Bordeaux road, an opportunity was afforded to Lord Wellington of carrying the war into the very heart of France, and encouraging a popular demonstration in favour of the exiled family. For this he was assured that every thing was rife—that the attachment of the citizens of Bordeaux towards the Bourbons was sincere—and that, although the presence of a garrison faithfully devoted to Napoleon restrained an open declaration of their feelings, all that was required to produce a popular outbreak would be the advance of the allies; and hence, a very powerful movement might be made to overturn a tottering government, and favour the restoration of

over to inquire into the business. They seem to have run away, and to have got into confusion without much cause."—*Wellington's Letter to Beresford, 4th March*, 1814.

Louis XVIII. Under these circumstances, Lord Wellington despatched Marshal Beresford, with the fourth and seventh divisions, and Vivian's light cavalry, to take possession of Bordeaux.

But although no military difficulty was to be apprehended, there were many political considerations which might have induced Lord Wellington to waver in his resolution. The congress at Chatillon had not been broken up, and the question of peace or war was still alive, and remained to be decided. Napoleon's brilliant success in checking the invading armies, with a force decidedly inferior, had excited the strongest hopes that he might ultimately expel them from the French territories, and dissolve, what he believed to be, an ill-compacted alliance. On this belief he acted, even to the moment when the bond of union had been more firmly cemented between the contracting powers; and when Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain, had formed a league offensive and defensive, for twenty years, each binding itself not to treat separately with the enemy, and each to keep on foot an army of 150,000 men, exclusive of garrisons, England reserving an option to subsidize other troops in place of her own, and agreeing to supply five millions sterling, to be divided among the other powers for maintaining the war.

What, then, were Napoleon's demands, as contained in his *ultimatum* to the congress? He required for himself the whole line of the Rhine, a great part of that of the Waal, and the fortress of Nimeguen—Italy, including Venice, for his son-in-law Eugene Beauharnois—indemnities for that prince, as having been Grand Duke of Frankfort—for Jerome, on the score of his kingdom of Westphalia—for Louis, as Grand Duke of Berg—and for Joseph, not indeed in compensation for Spain, but for Naples—from whence Bonaparte himself had removed him to Madrid! Such demands were at once rejected, and the congress was dissolved.

That Napoleon's delusion should have led him to propose

such terms, Lord Wellington never could have been warranted in imagining. On the contrary, he expected that the emperor's demands would have been sufficiently modified to justify the allied sovereigns in acceding to them; and consequently he inferred that a peace was not only a probable contingency, but an event that might be confidently expected. Acting on this conviction, after giving Marshal Beresford general directions for the conduct of his march, and a discretionary power when in possession of the city, either to continue the municipal authorities then in office, or to appoint others in their place, he thus instructed him on the nicer points connected with his delicate command:*

"There is a large party at Bordeaux in favour of the House of Bourbon; and I beg you to adhere to the following instructions in regard to this party and their views.

"If they should ask for your consent to proclaim Louis XVIII., to hoist the white standard, &c., you will state that the British nation and their allies wish well to Louis XVIII.; and as long as the public peace is preserved where our troops are stationed, we shall not interfere to prevent that party from doing what may be deemed most for its interest: nay, farther, that I am prepared to assist any party that may show itself inclined to aid us in getting the better of Bonaparte.

"That the object of the allies, however, in the war, and, above all, in entering France, is, as is stated in my proclamation, *Peace;* and that it is well known the allies are now engaged in negotiating a treaty of peace with Bonaparte. That, however I might be inclined to aid and support any set of people against Bonaparte while at war, I could give them no farther aid when peace should be concluded; and I beg the inhabitants will weigh this matter well before they raise a standard against the government of Bonaparte, and involve themselves in hostilities.

* Official letter, dated St. Sever, 7th March, 1814.

"If, however, notwithstanding this warning, the town should think proper to hoist the white standard, and should proclaim Louis XVIII., or adopt any other measure of that description, you will not oppose them; and you will arrange with the authorities the means of drawing, without loss of time, for all the arms, ammunition, &c., which are at Dax, which you will deliver to them.

"If the municipality should state that they will not proclaim Louis XVIII. without your orders, you will decline to give such orders, for the reasons above stated."

On the 8th of March, Beresford marched on Langou; and on his route he was joined by Vandeleur's cavalry brigade, thus increasing his corps to 12,000 men. On the 12th he entered the city unopposed, Cornudet, the imperial commissioner, having first burned some ships upon the stocks, and L'Huillier, the commandant, crossing the river with his garrison, and occupying some strong posts upon the right bank of the Garronne, together with the fortress of Blaye.

On entering Bordeaux, Marshal Beresford was joyfully received by the Bourbonists. The mayor and municipality were in attendance to bid him welcome, and the tricoloured flag gave place to the white banner of the royalists. On the same afternoon the Duc d'Angoulême made his entry,* and Louis XVIII. was immediately proclaimed with the customary formalities.

While these occurrences took place, Lord Wellington and Soult remained in mutual observation, each, as after events proved, in ignorance of the other's force. The marshal was not aware that Wellington had detached a

* "He was accompanied by the Count Dumas and a British officer, their grooms, and one orderly dragoon. The duke himself preserved a quiet and retired demeanour, well becoming his position; however, the old Count Dumas could not avoid telling the people, as he passed, who the duke was. For this purpose, he often fell behind the party, and conversed with such groups of Frenchmen as they passed upon the road. The intelligence was almost every where received with a decided expression of satisfaction and respect. There were no loud acclamations, but the good disposition was evident and general."—*Sherer.*

corps to Bordeaux, while the allied commander received assurances that Soult had been largely reinforced. The loss of his magazines, when Beresford's absence was discovered, prevented the French marshal from taking the offensive at once; and on the 13th, Freyre's Spanish corps, amounting to 8,000 men, with Ponsonby's heavy dragoons, strengthened Lord Wellington's army and fully restored the numerical balance; at the same time Beresford, with Vivian's light cavalry and the 4th division, was recalled from Bordeaux, leaving the occupation of the city to the 7th division and Vandeleur's brigade, under the command of Lord Dalhousie.

As Suchet was daily expected from Catalonia to reinforce Soult, and Clinton had already received orders to march the better portion of his British and German troops from Tarragona, to strengthen Lord Wellington, a slight digression will be necessary to connect the military and political history of the Peninsula with the operations in the south of France.

In Catalonia, the war had languished, for both sides had been weakened, and both were acting on the defensive. Early in December, Suchet, by a forced night march, had endeavoured to surprise the allied head quarters at Villafranca. But the design transpired, and Sarsfield's division, falling back from the town towards Arbos, united with the cavalry and artillery, and, joined by Mackenzie's division, took a position and offered battle, which the French Marshal declined, and in turn retreated rapidly on the Llobregat.

The intelligence of the defection of the Nassau regiments from Soult, was secretly transmitted to the officer in command of the Germans under Suchet. He communicated the occurrence to the French Marshal, who, fearful that they might imitate the example of their countrymen, caused them to be disarmed and confined. By this unavoidable proceeding he lost the services of more than two thousand good soldiers; and he was further weakened by the withdrawal of a similar number of Italians. Neither

army was in a condition to undertake active operations; the French holding by Barcelona as the last means of maintaining their footing in Catalonia; and the allies occupying Tarragona, which, with great labour, they had rendered defensible again.

In January, a united movement had been planned by Clinton and Copons, with a design of surprising the French cantonments at Molins del Ray, and the adjacent villages on the Llobregat. The enterprise failed, because Copons, without making any communication to the English General, instead of sending Manso, chose to go himself with a larger force, and set off two hours later than the time which had been agreed upon—and finally appeared on the right flank of the enemy instead of in the rear. Meantime the force from Villafranca having arrived at the hour appointed, the French, who, if there had been the same punctuality on the other side, must have been taken by surprise, were able to effect their retreat over the Llobregat by the stone bridge.

Although he had received positive instructions from Napoleon, to despatch to Lyons forthwith a division of infantry with the greater portion of his cavalry and guns, still Suchet felt unwilling to lose his hold of Catalonia, and ventured to remonstrate with his master. Not receiving a reply, the Marshal concentrated the remnant of his army around Gerona—a preparatory movement towards carrying it into France—and one of the most singular military occurrences was among the latest events which marked the Catalonian war.

A Spanish adventurer, named Juan Van Halen, was attached to Suchet's staff. Possessing a handsome person, imposing address, a ready wit, and an extraordinary turn for intrigue, his life had been a continued scene of changes and deceit. He passed from the Spanish navy to the engineers; joined Blake's corps, after the battle of Rio Seco; and afterwards swore allegiance to King Joseph, and held a commission in his guards. He had served in every part of Europe, and was now employed by Suchet as an aide-de-

camp. Finding that the Imperial cause was falling, he determined, by becoming a double traitor, to conciliate the Spanish authorities, and thus purchase an immunity for past crimes. Overtures were accordingly made to Eroles—and by the agency of a mistress who followed the fortunes of this adventurer, he transmitted to the Spanish General accurate returns of the strength of the French armies, and all other information he was enabled officially to obtain. At last, he secretly unlocked Suchet's portfolio, copied the key of his cypher, and prepared to desert to the Spaniards.

The difficulty found by the French Generals in sending and receiving information, as well from the activity of the Partidas as from the duplicity of the emissaries they employed, had originated many curious devices to render their communications unintelligible should they fall into an enemy's hand, and also, prove their authenticity, when they fortunately reached their destination. Among many others "Suchet had recourse to the ingenious artifice of placing a very small piece of light-coloured hair in the cyphered paper; the latter was then enclosed in a quill sealed, and wrapped in lead. When received, the small parcel was carefully opened on a sheet of white paper, and if the hair was discovered the communication was good, if not, the treachery was apparent, because the hair would escape the vigilance of uninitiated persons, and be lost by any intermediate examination. Van Halen knew this secret also, and when his emissaries had returned after delivering the preparatory communication, he proceeded in person with a forged convention." *

Van Halen's first attempt was made on the governor of Tortosa. It was boldly commenced, and might have probably obtained success, had not General Robert, the commandant of the garrison, received intelligence during the night which excited his suspicions, and Van Halen was very nearly taken by a counter snare. At Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, his artifice and effrontery succeeded;

* Napier.

and three fortresses, in a state of perfect defence, were obtained by the audacity of a cheat.

Monzon was at this time stored for seven months, Mequinenza for eighteen, and Lerida for two years. By the recovery of these places, 40,000 inhabitants were saved from the miseries of a siege, and 6,000 Spanish troops were rendered disposable for other service. The navigation of the Ebro, the Cinca, and the Segre was restored; the most fertile part of Catalonia delivered; Aragon secured; and a direct communication opened with Lord Wellington's army.

The garrisons had been put in march, as they supposed, to join Suchet at Barcelona; but on reaching the defiles at Martriell, they were suddenly surrounded. On a preconcerted signal the heights around were instantly covered with armed men. "It was in vain to offer resistance; and two generals, having two thousand six hundred men, four guns, and a rich military chest, capitulated, but upon conditions, which were granted and immediately violated with circumstances of great harshness and insult to the prisoners. The odium of this baseness, which was quite gratuitous, since the French, helpless in the defile, must have submitted to any terms, attaches entirely to the Spaniards. Clinton refused to meddle in any manner with the convention. He had not been a party to Van Halen's deceit; he appeared only to ensure the surrender of an armed force in the field, which the Spaniards could not have subdued without his aid; he refused even to be present at any consultation previous to the capitulation."*

Lamarque, when he found himself a prisoner, and comprehended how completely he had been imposed upon by Van Halen,† shrugged his shoulders, and observed, "That

* Napier

† "Van Halen afterwards got into the Inquisition as a freemason and a liberal, got out of it, published his adventures in English, went to Brussels, headed the inhabitants in that insurrection the success of which they have had so much reason to repent, was suspected of treachery by the party whom he had served, thrown into prison, and after a while released. And there the drama of his unquiet life breaks off."—*Southey.*

for five days he had been in a dream, and he was not quite sure whether he was yet awake."

Ferdinand, in the meantime, had been restored, and exchanged a prison for a throne; and he came back with every vicious failing not remedied, but confirmed by misfortune. On the 7th of March his passports were received at Valancay; and on the 13th, attended by the infantes, he took his departure, and was received by Suchet at Perpignan. The object of the French marshal was to restore the fortresses still garrisoned by the imperial troops, on an understanding, that the garrisons should be sent at once to France, and thus rendered immediately disposable. To this proposition Lord Wellington strenuously objected. Writing to the Spanish minister of war, "There can be no doubt," he says, "that the French government are much distressed for men. The conscripts desert in all directions; and the armies are much reduced by the daily combats in which they are engaged. The propositions, therefore, to withdraw the garrisons from Barcelona, Tortosa, Peñiscola, and Murviedro, is a scheme to bring into the field against this army from 15,000 to 20,000 men more than it has opposed to it, or than can be brought against it.

"This scheme is likewise attended by another; viz. to hold Figueras and Rosas, and probably a corps of troops in the field within the Spanish frontier. The Spanish troops now in Catalonia, therefore, would be unable to cooperate with this army in any offensive operation against the enemy.

"There is undoubtedly a limit to the numbers against which I can venture to contend with this army; and the Spanish nation would sustain a great misfortune if it were to be overpowered. I earnestly recommend to the government, therefore, not to allow any capitulation whatever to be made with the garrisons of Barcelona, Tortosa, Peñiscola, and Murviedro, excepting on the basis of their being prisoners of war.

"I repeat my orders to General Copons on this subject,

and I tell him that I desire that he will not agree to any capitulation whatever with those garrisons, or with any French troops within the Spanish frontier, excepting on the basis of their being prisoners of war, without positive orders from the government." *

"If, and on many occasions, the allied commander had reason to complain that his suggestions had not been attended to, on this, they were not made in vain. The Spanish government acted with candour and good sense ;—and the chief object which Napoleon intended to have achieved, by liberating a worthless monarch, consequently proved a failure.

* Letter dated Aire, 17th March, 1814.

CHAPTER XXIV.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF ORTHEZ—SOULT URGED BY NAPOLEON TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE—HIS PROCLAMATION TO THE FRENCH ARMY—GENERAL OCCURRENCES—LORD WELLINGTON'S DESPATCH TO EARL BATHURST—CHIVALROUS ADVENTURE OF AN ENGLISH OFFICER—COMBAT OF TARBES—SOULT RETREATS, AND THE ALLIES ADVANCE—CHARGE OF THE 13TH LIGHT DRAGOONS—OPERATIONS OF SOULT AND WELLINGTON—ANECDOTE—PASSAGE OF THE GARONNE—OFFICIAL DETAIL OF THE BATTLE OF TOULOUSE—ALLIED CASUALTIES.

ALTHOUGH the defeat of Orthez had not been so calamitous in the first instance, as might have been reasonably expected, its consequences produced the most serious embarrassments. The loss of magazines, the desertion of conscripts, the abatement of public confidence,—all crippled the resources of Marshal Soult, and consequently, disheartened his soldiery and relaxed their discipline. The uncertain resources of the French army, and the general laxity of their military system, now rendered them impatient and insubordinate. With the inhabitants, all apprehension from the invaders had long since passed away; and the inoffensive demeanour of the Anglo-Portuguese, added to the probity and liberality with which every engagement was discharged, obtained the friendship of the peasantry, and secured their perfect neutrality. Indeed, the conduct of the French army had been latterly so outrageous as to alienate popular affection; and the peasantry viewed them, not as countrymen, but marauders. These feelings had become so marked, that Soult, in his correspondence with the Duke de Feltre, complained that, in the departments of the Lower Pyrenees

and Land de Ger, the inhabitants were better affected to the allies than the French; and that it was by no means improbable, that they would not join them in the field.

Soult had been urged by Napoleon to take the offensive —Wellington was equally desirous to resume active operations—and both generals had used every effort to increase the strength and efficiency of the respective armies. It would appear, however, that the means employed were widely different; the one, endeavouring to allay the angry feelings which war unfortunately produces; the other, to rouse every bad passion, which national antipathy and wounded pride could have engendered. An angry proclamation was issued by the marshal, which, in the usual tone of French addresses, falsified the past, and was equally infelicitous in predictions of the future. The opening was almost a burlesque, and in keeping with the General Order issued on his appointment to the lieutenancy of the Spanish armies. "Soldiers," says the marshal, "at the battle of Orthez, you did your duty; the enemy's losses surpassed yours; his blood moistened all the ground he gained. You may consider that feat of arms as an advantage. Other combats are at hand; no repose for us until his army, formed of such extraordinary elements, shall evacuate the French territory, or be annihilated! Its numbers and progress may be great, but at hand are unexpected perils. Time will teach the enemy's general that French honour is not to be outraged with impunity.

"Soldiers, he has had the indecency to provoke you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition; he speaks of peace, but firebrands of discord follow him! He speaks of peace, and excites the French to a civil war! Thanks be to him for making known his projects, our forces are thereby centupled; and he himself rallies round the imperial eagles all those who, deceived by appearances, believed our enemies would make a loyal war. No peace with the disloyal and perfidious nation! No peace with the English and their auxiliaries until they quit the French territory! They

have dared to insult the national honour, the infamy to incite Frenchmen to become perjured towards the emperor. Revenge the offence in blood. To arms! Let this cry resound through the south of France; the Frenchman that hesitates abjures his country and belongs to her enemies."

What the advantages were, obtained by this "feat of arms" at Orthez, it would be very difficult to discover; and the marshal's splenetic comments upon Lord Wellington's addresses to the French people, proved that these appeals had not been made in vain. The tone and spirit of the Proclamation evinced throughout, the feelings under which it had been written;—all bespeak the mortification which attends promises of brilliant success which terminate in continued disasters.

The French marshal, in the mean time, had ascertained the real strength of his opponent; and considering it to be a favourable opportunity to strike a blow on the rear and right flank of the allies, he crossed the Adour on the 12th of March. Lord Wellington, while part of his detachments were coming forward, took a strong position at Garlin; and on the 20th of March, he communicated the subsequent operations to Earl Bathurst in a despatch from Tarbes, dated the 20th March, 1814:—

"The enemy collected their force at Conchez on the 13th, as I reported to your Lordship in my despatch of that date, which induced me to concentrate the army in the neighbourhood of Aire. The various detachments which I had sent out, and the reserves of cavalry and artillery moving out of Spain, did not join till the 17th.

"In the mean time, the enemy, not finding his situation at Conchez very secure, retired on the 15th to Lembège, keeping his advanced posts towards Conchez.

"The army marched on the 18th, and Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill drove in the enemy's outposts upon Lembège. The enemy retired in the night upon Vic Bigorre; and on the following day, the 19th, held a strong rear guard in the

vineyards in front of the town. Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, with the 3d division and Major-General Bock's brigade, made a very handsome movement upon this rear guard, and drove them through the vineyards and town; and the army assembled at Vic Bigorre and Rabastens.

"The enemy retired in the night upon Tarbes. We found them this morning with the advanced posts of their left in the town, and their right upon the heights near the windmill of Oleac. Their centre and left were retired, the latter being upon the heights near Audos. We marched in two columns from Vic Bigorre and Rabastens; and I made Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton turn and attack the right with the 6th division, through the village of Dours; while Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill attacked the town by the high road from Vic Bigorre.

"Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton's movement was very ably made, and was completely successful. The light division under Major-General C. Baron Alten likewise drove the enemy from the heights above Orleix; and Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill having moved through the town and disposed his columns for the attack, the enemy retired in all directions. The enemy's loss was considerable in the attack made by the light division; ours has not been considerable in any of these operations.*

"Our troops are encamped this night upon the Larret and the Arroz; Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton with the 6th division, and Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, with

* Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the army, under the command of Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., in the operations from the 7th to the 20th March, 1814.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	4	3	41	21	51
Wounded	36	29	360	40	425
Missing	4	1	33	34	38

Major-General Ponsonby's and Lord Edward Somerset's brigades, being well advanced upon their right.

"Although the enemy's opposition has not been of a nature to try the troops, I have had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct in all these affairs, particularly with that of the 3d division in the attack of the vineyards and town of Vic Bigorre yesterday, and with that of the 6th and light divisions this day.

"In all the partial affairs of the cavalry, ours have shown their superiority; and two squadrons of the 14th dragoons under Captain Milles on the 14th, and one squadron of the 15th on the 16th, conducted themselves most gallantly, and took a great number of prisoners.

"The 4th Portuguese dragoons under Colonel Campbell likewise conducted themselves remarkably well in a charge on the 13th."

Soult's retreat across the plains of Ger might have been seriously endangered, could the British cavalry have been promptly employed; but a thick country and strong rear guards prevented it. A wooded height, commanding the great road, was evidently occupied by the enemy—and Lord Wellington could not determine the force in which the enemy held it, for the fire of a cloud of skirmishers prevented a reconnaissance. By the daring address of an English officer,* however, this difficulty was overcome. "He rode forward as if he would force his way through the French skirmishers, but when in the wood dropped his reins and leaned back as if badly wounded; his horse appeared to canter wildly along the front of the enemy's light troops, and they, thinking him mortally hurt, ceased their fire and took no further notice. He thus passed unobserved through the wood to the other side of the hill, where there were no skirmishers, and ascending to the open summit above, put spurs to his horse and galloped along the French main line, counting their rigiments as he

* Captain William Light.

passed. His sudden appearance, his blue undress, his daring confidence, and his speed, made the French doubt if he was an enemy, and a few shots only were discharged; while he dashing down the opposite declivity, broke from the rear through the very skirmishers whose fire he had first essayed in front. Reaching the spot where Lord Wellington stood, he told him there were but five battalions on the hill."*

At Tarbes the combat was exceedingly sharp, though short. The centre being attacked by the rifle brigade, induced the French to believe that, from their green uniforms, their assailants were Portuguese troops; and it was only after a close conflict, "muzzle to muzzle," that the error was discovered; and to darkness, and a thickly cultivated country, Harispe's division were indebted for its ultimate escape.

That night Soult retreated in two columns. D'Erlon's and Reille's reached St. Gaudens the following day, while Clausel's rejoined Pierre Soult's, at Monrejean. It was a long and harassing march; but the French marshal was apprehensive that his retreat on Toulouse might have been cut off by Trie and Castlenau, towards which places the march of the fourth division and Vivian's light cavalry had been directed. Accordingly, he fell back upon a city which, at the same time, was his principal depôt—"the knot of all his future combinations"—and the only position where he could hope to make a successful stand.

The allies marched by St. Gaudens, Galan, and Trie,—each place forming the route of a separate column. On the 22d, a sharp affair between some squadrons of French and English cavalry took place in front of St. Gaudens, in which the 13th light dragoons were particularly distinguished.† On the 25th, Hill, with the right wing, had

* Napier.

† "Here four squadrons of French cavalry were drawn up in front of the town. Overthrown by two squadrons of the 13th Dragoons at the first shock, they galloped in disorder through St. Gaudens, yet rallied on the other side,

entered Cacerez,—Wellington, with the centre, was at Samatan,—and Beresford, with the left column, at St. Foy. On the 26th, the armies again confronted each other,—Beresford taking post behind a small stream called the Aussonelle, while the French were in position on the Touch.

The rate of marching had been very different, the French army accomplishing in four days, what the allied took seven to perform. For such very opposite methods of executing their respective movements, each commander had sufficient reasons. Soult, aware of the importance of Toulouse, was anxious to reach that city without delay, and secure a strong position, before his opponent could disturb him. Wellington was more solicitous to bring his army efficiently, than rapidly forward; and by husbanding their strength, and keeping his corps well together, be ready for the crisis when it came. In their relative movements, both generals evinced a sound discretion. Every moment gained by Soult enabled him to become more formidable—and important advantages compensated the fatigue he inflicted upon his soldiers; while with Lord Wellington, all considerations gave way before one great object—that of placing the allies on their battle ground in fresh and vigorous condition, and trusting the result to that discipline and valour, which had been so often depended on, and never been found wanting.

On the 28th, Lord Wellington proceeded to lay down his bridge; but the water surface, on the sheer line being stretched over, was found too extensive to be covered by the pontoons. This failure elicited a remark from a staff officer, that, "until the river fell, a passage would not be effected." Lord Wellington observed instantly, with cheerful animation, but with strong decision, "If it will not do one

and were again broken and pursued for two miles, many being sabred, and above a hundred taken prisoners. In this action the veteran Major Dogherty, of the 13th, was seen charging, between his two sons, at the head of the leading squadron."—*Napier.*

way, we must try another; for I never in my life gave up any thing I once undertook."*

On the 31st, the pontoons were laid down, and Hill crossed the Garonne; but, from the state of the roads, it was found impossible to reach Toulouse in that direction—and consequently the right wing countermarched and re-crossed to the left bank of the river. A better situation was found for laying the bridge—and on the 4th of April it was removed, and thrown across a bend of the Garonne, half a league above Grenade. Beresford crossed immediately, with the 4th and 6th divisions and a cavalry brigade; but a sudden rising of the river prevented the light divisions and Freyre's Spaniards from following, for the pontoons were obliged to be taken up, to prevent their being swept away by the flood; and consequently, Beresford's position was isolated, and open to an overwhelming attack. Soult, however, did not avail himself of the advantage that accident had placed in his way; and on the 8th, the flood had sufficiently abated to allow the bridge to be replaced, and Freyre crossed and joined Beresford. On the 9th the pontoons were carried up the stream to Ausonne,—and on the 10th, the 3d and light divisions passed the river at daylight, and Lord Wellington formed his divisions for the attack.

His own official account of the splendid but sanguinary operations that succeeded, were thus detailed in his despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated Toulouse, 12th April, 1814:—

"I have the pleasure to inform your Lordship that I entered this town this morning, which the enemy evacuated during the night, retiring by the road of Carcassone.

"The continued fall of rain and the state of the river prevented me from laying the bridge till the morning of the 8th, when the Spanish corps and the Portuguese artillery, under the immediate orders of Lieut.-General Don

* Sherer.

Manuel Freyre, and the head quarters, crossed the Garonne.

" We immediately moved forward to the neighbourhood of the town; and the 18th hussars, under the immediate command of Colonel Vivian, had an opportunity of making a most gallant attack upon a superior body of the enemy's cavalry, which they drove through the village of St. Croix d'Orade, and took about one hundred prisoners, and gave us possession of an important bridge over the river Ers, by which it was necessary to pass, in order to attack the enemy's position. Colonel Vivian was unfortunately wounded upon this occasion; and I am afraid that I shall lose the benefit of his assistance for some time.

" The town of Toulouse is surrounded on three sides by the canal of Languedoc and the Garonne. On the left of that river, the suburb, which the enemy had fortified with strong field-works in front of the ancient wall, formed a good *tête-de-pont*. They had likewise formed a *tête-de-pont* at each bridge of the canal, which was besides defended by the fire in some places of musketry, and in all of artillery from the ancient wall of the town. Beyond the canal to the eastward, and between that and the river Ers, is a height which extends as far as Montaudran, and over which pass all the approaches to the canal and town from the eastward, which it defends; and the enemy, in addition to the *têtes-de-pont* on the bridges of the canal, had fortified this height with five redoubts, connected by lines of entrenchments, and had, with extraordinary diligence, made every preparation for defence. They had likewise broken all the bridges over the Ers within our reach, by which the right of their position could be approached. The roads, however, from the Arriège to Toulouse being impracticable for cavalry or artillery, and nearly so for infantry, as reported in my despatch to your Lordship of the 1st instant, I had no alternative, excepting to attack the enemy in this formidable position.

" It was necessary to move the pontoon bridge higher up

the Garonne, in order to shorten the communication with Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill's corps, as soon as the Spanish corps had passed; and this operation was not effected until so late an hour on the 9th as to induce me to defer the attack till the following morning.

"The plan, according to which I determined to attack the enemy, was for Marshal Sir William Beresford, who was on the right of the Ers with the 4th and 6th divisions, to cross that river at the bridge of Croix d'Orade, to gain possession of Montblanc, and to march up the left of the Ers to turn the enemy's right, while Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre, with the Spanish corps under his command, supported by the British cavalry, should attack the front. Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton was to follow the marshal's movement with Major-General Lord Edward Somerset's brigade of hussars; and Colonel Vivian's brigade under the command of Colonel Arentschildt, was to observe the movements of the enemy's cavalry on both flanks of the Ers, beyond our left.

"The 3d and light divisions, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton and Major-General Charles Baron Alten, and the brigade of German cavalry, were to observe the enemy on the lower part of the canal, and to draw their attention to that quarter by threatening the *têtes-de-pont*, while Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill was to do the same on the suburb on the left of the Garonne.

"Marshal Sir William Beresford crossed the Ers, and formed his corps in three columns of lines in the village of Croix d'Orade, the 4th division leading, with which he immediately carried Montblanc. He then moved up the Ers in the same order, over most difficult ground, in a direction parallel to the enemy's fortified position; and as soon as he reached the point at which he turned it, he formed his lines and moved to the attack. During these operations, Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre moved along the left of the Ers to the front of Croix d'Orade, where he formed his corps in two lines with a reserve on a height in front of the left of the enemy's position, on which height the Portuguese

artillery was placed; and Major-General Ponsonby's brigade of cavalry in reserve in the rear.

"As soon as formed, and that it was seen that Marshal Sir William Beresford was ready, Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre moved forward to the attack. The troops marched in good order, under a very heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and showed great spirit, the general and all his staff being at their head; and the two lines were soon lodged under some banks immediately under the enemy's entrenchments; the reserve and Portuguese artillery, and British cavalry, continuing on the height on which the troops had first formed. The enemy, however, repulsed the movement of the right of General Freyre's line round their left flank; and having followed up their success, and turned our right by both sides of the high road leading from Toulouse to Croix d'Orade, they soon compelled the whole corps to retire. It gave me great satisfaction to see that, although they suffered considerably in retiring, the troops rallied again as soon as the light division, which was immediately on their right, moved up; and I cannot sufficiently applaud the exertions of Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre, the officers of the staff of the 4th Spanish army, and of the officers of the general staff, to rally and form them again.

"Lieut.-General Mendizabal, who was in the field as a volunteer, General Ezpeleta, and several officers of the staff and chiefs of corps, were wounded upon this occasion; but General Mendizabal continued in the field. The regiment de *Tiradores de Cantabria*, under the command of Colonel Leon de Sicilia, kept its position, under the enemy's entrenchments, until I ordered it to retire.

"In the meantime, Marshal Sir William Beresford, with the 4th division, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Lowry Cole, and the 6th division, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Henry Clinton, attacked and carried the heights on the enemy's right, and the redoubt which covered and protected that flank; and he lodged those troops on the

same height with the enemy; who were, however, still in possession of four redoubts, and of the entrenchments and fortified houses.

"The badness of the roads had induced the marshal to leave his artillery in the village of Montblanc; and some time elapsed before it could be brought to him, and before Lieut.-General Don Manuel Freyre's corps could be reformed and brought back to the attack. As soon as this was effected the marshal continued his movement along the ridge, and carried, with General Pack's brigade of the 6th division, the two principal redoubts and fortified houses in the enemy's centre. The enemy made a desperate effort from the canal to regain these redoubts, but they were repulsed with considerable loss; and the 6th division continuing its movement along the ridge of the height, and the Spanish troops continuing a corresponding movement upon the front, the enemy were driven from the two redoubts and entrenchments on the left; and the whole range of heights were in our possession. We did not gain this advantage, however, without severe loss; particularly in the brave 6th division. Lieut.-Colonel Coghlan of the 61st, an officer of great merit and promise, was unfortunately killed in the attack of the heights. Major-General Pack was wounded, but was enabled to remain in the field; and Colonel Douglas, of the 8th Portuguese regiment, lost his leg; and I am afraid that I shall be deprived for a considerable time of his assistance.

"The 36th, 42d, 79th, and 61st, lost considerable numbers, and were highly distinguished throughout the day.

* * * * *

"The 4th division, although exposed on their march along the enemy's front to a galling fire, were not so much engaged as the 6th, and did not suffer so much; but they conducted themselves with their usual gallantry.

* * * * *

"The ground, not having admitted of the operations of the cavalry, they had no opportunity of charging.

"While the operations above detailed were going on, on the left of the army, Lieut.-General Sir Rowland Hill drove the enemy from their exterior works in the suburb, on the left of the Garonne, within the ancient wall. Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton likewise, with the 3d division, drove the enemy within the *tête-de-pont* on the bridge of the canal nearest to the Garonne; but the troops having made an effort to carry it they were repulsed, and some loss was sustained. Major-General Brisbane was wounded; but I hope not so as to deprive me for any length of time of his assistance; and Lieut.-Colonel Forbes, of the 45th, an officer of great merit, was killed.

"The army being thus established on three sides of Toulouse, I immediately detached our light cavalry to cut off the communication by the only road practicable for carriages which remained to the enemy, till I should be enabled to make arrangements to establish the troops between the canal and the Garonne.

"The enemy, however, retired last night, leaving in our hands General Harispe, General Baurot, General St. Hilaire, and 1600 prisoners. One piece of cannon was taken on the field of battle; and others, and large quantities of stores of all descriptions, in the town.

"Since I sent my last report, I have received an account from Rear-Admiral Penrose of the successes in the Gironde of the boats of the squadron under his command.

"Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie crossed the Garonne nearly about the time that Admiral Penrose entered the river, and pushed the enemy's parties under General Lhuillier beyond the Dordogne. He then crossed the Dordogne on the 4th, near St. André de Cubzac, with a detachment of the troops under his command, with a view to the attack of the fort of Blaye. His Lordship found General Lhuillier and General Desbareaux posted near Etauliers, and made his dispositions to attack them, when they retired, leaving about 300 prisoners in his hands. I enclose the Earl of Dalhousie's report of this affair.

* * * * *

"I send this despatch by my aide-de-camp, Major Lord William Russell, whom I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's protection.

"P.S. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the late operations."*

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under the command of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.B., at the battle of Toulouse, 10th April, 1814 :—

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank & File.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	British.	Spanish.	Portuguese.	Horses.
Killed . .	31	21	543	595	312	205	78	62
Wounded	248	123	3675	4046	1795	1722	529	59
Missing .	3	—	15	18	17	1	—	2

PLAN of CIUDAD RODRIGO.

Carried by Assault on the Night of

THE 19TH JANUARY 1812.



CHAPTER XXV.

MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF TOULOUSE—DELICATE POSITION OF LORD WELLINGTON—OPERATIONS ON THE MORNING OF THE 10TH—ATTACKS BY FREYRE AND PICTON REPULSED—BERESFORD'S ADVANCE—ITS DANGERS AND DIFFICULTY—COMBAT AT MONT RAVE—THE HEIGHT CARRIED, AND SOULT DRIVEN BEHIND THE CANAL—SERIOUS LOSSES—BOTH ARMIES PREPARE FOR BATTLE—SOULT ABANDONS TOULOUSE—FRENCH LAY CLAIM TO VICTORY—REMARKS—BOTH GENERALS CALUMNIATED—ALLIES ENTER TOULOUSE—COLONELS COOKE AND ST. SIMON ARRIVE WITH INTELLIGENCE FROM PARIS NAPOLEON'S LAST EFFORTS AND DISPOSITION—SOULT REFUSES TO SEND HIS ADHESION TO THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WELLINGTON ENFORCES—SORTIE AT BAYONNE—HOWARD'S REPORT—CASUALTIES—OBSERVATIONS.

To a general circumstanced like Soult, the occupation of Toulouse was an object of paramount importance. It commanded the best bridges over the Garonne, and the chief roads throughout the country—while its arsenal, immense population, and lastly, its defensibility, gave it local advantages, which from its vicinity to his birth-place, the French marshal could properly appreciate. In a political, as well as a military view, Toulouse was of equal consideration. It was Soult's point of union with Suchet and Decaen, for either could join him there; and Suchet had been urged—and it was reasonably expected that he would have consented—to assist in what seemed the only course of operations which could check the prosperous career of Lord Wellington, to whom, since he passed the Pyrenees, every difficulty had been presented, and all had been overcome.

Toulouse offered also, a excellent position on which a battle might be received. The breadth of the Garonne—the protection which the canal of Languedoc afforded—the strength of the fortified suburbs of St. Cyprien, St. Stephen, and Guillemerie—the heights of Sacarin and Cambon—

and the stronger ridge of Mont Rave—all were most favourable for maintenance; and Soult with local knowledge, excellent judgment, and ample time, turned all to the best advantage. It was, in fine, a position in every respect important—easily held—and easily retired from.

Lord Wellington was delicately situated—and delay would not be serviceable. Bayonne, indeed, might fall, and the Spaniards be brought forward from the Bastan; but, during that time, Soult also would receive reinforcements, and employ every hour usefully in strengthening the defences of both the river and the city. Lord Wellington "had taken the offensive, and could not resume the defensive with safety; the invasion of France once begun, it was imperative to push it to a conclusion. Leading an army victorious and superior in numbers, his business was to bring his adversary to battle as soon as possible; and as he could not force his way through St. Cyprien in face of the whole French army, nothing remained but to pass the Garonne above or below Toulouse."*

Before day-break on the 10th, the light and 3d divisions crossed the river, driving in the French outposts; the Spanish corps gained the Pugade; Beresford, in three columns, but without artillery, passed the marshes between the Ers and Mont Rave; while the light cavalry forced the French from the bridge of Bordes, and seized that of Montaudran.

The Spanish corps loosely assailed the height of Calvinet, and were repulsed with heavy loss. They were rallied, and again led on; but the second effort was still more unfortunate, for now a regular *déroute* ensued;† and the disaster

* Napier.

† "They were not aware that a rather deep ravine separated them from the enemy's works; however, on they pushed, in a very disorderly manner, till they reached the point the French intended they should reach, when a fire was opened out upon them, such as they had never witnessed before. Few troops would have remained unshaken by such a reception, but to the Spaniards it was intolerable; consequently they broke into a thousand parties, and, turning tail, it was who should be first away from such unpleasant doings.

was only checked by Lord Wellington covering their flight, by interposing Ponsonby's dragoons, and, under a heavy fire of reserve artillery, and a threatened advance of a wing of the light division, obliging their pursuers to retire to their own entrenchments.

But a more serious repulse was inflicted on the 3d division. Picton had been directed to make a false attack upon the bridge of Jumeaux—but heedless of an order distinctly given, and with the very worst military judgment, he rashly attempted to carry works approached over a dead flat, exposed necessarily to a withering fire, and which when reached, could only be surmounted by escalade. His noble division sustained a heavy loss. Four hundred officers and men were uselessly sacrificed; and thus, through the unsteadiness of the Spaniards, and the rashness of Picton, the allied attacks from the height of Pugade to the river, had proved sanguinary failures.

The battle was apparently lost; and there is little doubt but the means of victory were in Soult's hands, had they been promptly exercised. "The repulse of Picton, the utter dispersion of the Spaniards, and the strength of the second line of entrenchments at St. Cyprien, enabled him to draw, first Taupin's whole division, and then one of Maransin's brigades from that quarter, to reinforce his battle on the Mont Rave. Thus three divisions and his cavalry, that is to say, nearly fifteen thousand combatants, were disposable for an offensive movement without in any manner weakening the defence of his works on Mont Rave or on the canal."*

Beresford, in the meantime, was executing a flank move-

I am told that Lord Wellington at this moment 'wondered whether the Pyrenees would bring them up again, they seemed to have got such a fright.' He did not indeed depend on their valour, or he would have made a bad winding up of his Peninsular campaign. The moment they left the height, every man took the way that seemed to him best, and they soon after literally covered the whole plain, and set to work with all expedition to plunder."—*Surtees.*

* Napier.

ment, and struggling over a marshy surface two miles in extent, always within range of the French guns, and occasionally exposed to their musketry. After driving the enemy from the village of Mont Blanc, the marshal left his guns there for a double purpose—assisting the operations of Freyre's corps, by cannonading the French works at La Pugade, and expediting his flank march, which the encumbrance of artillery must have seriously delayed. Indeed, the movement was imminently dangerous; and fortune offered chances to the French commander which, if vigorously employed, must have produced results very different from those, on which Soult afterwards rested a claim to victory.

On the left of Beresford's march, the Ers flowed parallel to the fortified heights upon his right—and the swamp narrowed as he advanced, and its surface became every step more difficult. Headed by a division of dragoons—one flank, shut in by a river—the other, overlooked by heights bristling with artillery and crowned by 14,000 infantry, Beresford pushed forward without a gun, gained the point he aimed at, and formed at the foot of the position.

The line was scarcely completed when the French vigorously attacked it—but a flight of rockets went roaring through their ranks; and that arm of war, so lately introduced, terrified and disordered troops who never before had witnessed their effect, nor heard the appalling noise that accompanies their discharge. Lambert's and Anson's brigades rushed forward with a deafening cheer. The charge of Vial's cavalry on the right flank was repulsed; and on the left, it was anticipated by the rapid advance of the 4th division. Nothing could check that conquering movement. The plateau was gained—two redoubts carried at the bayonet's point—and Taupin killed in a vain attempt to rally his flying troops, who hurried off in the greatest disorder to Sacarin and Cambon.

For a brief space the battle ceased. Soult employed the interval in reinforcing his right from his reserves, while

Beresford got his artillery from Mont-Blanc. About two o'clock the action was renewed—and Pack and Douglas, the former with the Highland, the latter with the Portuguese brigade, rushed from the hollow ground which had previously sheltered them, and mounting the heights, carried the whole French defences, including the redoubts of Colombette and Calvinet.

Sustained by the reserves pushed freely into action, and covered by a tremendous fire of artillery, the French with superior numbers returned to the attack, and a terrible contest ensued. One redoubt was recovered; but still, though sadly reduced, the remnant of the highlanders held the hill; and the 6th division having steadily advanced, the enemy were again driven from the hardly-contested eminence—Colombette a second time taken—and the French finally retired, carrying with them Generals Harispe and Baurot, both severely wounded in encouraging a desperate but vain resistance.

The tide of battle turned; and it was hopeless to expect that the allies could be dislodged by any fresh effort that Soult could make. Beresford had got his artillery into line; and already master of the greater portion of Mont Rave, he was marching along its crest to renew the action. Picton was threatening the bridge from which he had been previously repulsed—the Spaniards had rallied and reformed—and the light division was ready to support their new attack.

Soult, under all these circumstances, declined the contest; abandoned the northern portion of the plateau and redoubt at Calvinet; and, contenting himself with retaining the fortified posts at Sacarin and Cambon, fell back behind the Canal, leaving the whole line of works and the heights of Mont Rave in the undisputed possession of the allies.

In this sanguinary battle the allied loss exceeded four thousand six hundred men, including four generals, Brisbane, Pack, Mendizabel, and Espelette, wounded. The French casualties might probably have been less by a thousand; but they lost a gun, and had five generals placed *hors-de-combat.*

It was a lamentable contest, because it was a useless one. Much blood had been unnecessarily—and some assert—wantonly spilled; for Napoleon was already hurled from his throne, and a provisional government had been appointed.

The night of a bloody day was passed on both sides in preparation for another trial. Soult, with the arsenal of Toulouse to supply every deficiency, was reorganized next morning — Wellington was obliged to seek his supplies from magazines beyond the river—and although he crossed over to St. Cyprien, to expedite the replacement of ammunition and make new dispositions with Hill's corps for the intended attack, the day wore away before the necessary arrangements were completed. Anxious to renew the battle, he had already pushed his light cavalry along the canal to cut Soult off from Carcassone, and interrupt Suchet's communications; but evening came before he was in a condition to force a passage of the bridges—and therefore, the attack was of necessity postponed until the 12th.

These preparatory movements of the allied cavalry had not been lost upon the French marshal, and he saw unequivocal indications of a determination to shut him in—for works had been commenced across the roads leading to his lines, and the allies, closing up rapidly, everywhere drew nearer to the place. Toulouse was already under the guns of the invaders—St. Cyprien might be ruined in an hour—and, therefore, while reiterating his entreaties that Suchet should advance, Soult added a belief that he could not hold his position, and observed, "that it was not improbable but he should be forced to fight a passage from the city." On the night of the 11th he abandoned Toulouse, and made a forced march of two-and-twenty miles to Villefranche—leaving two generals, sixteen hundred disabled men, immense magazines, and eight pieces of artillery to the conquerors.

Such was the final result of Soult's desperate efforts to keep Toulouse—such the operations from which the French marshal's admirers claimed a victory. "Victories," says Napier, "are determined by deeds and their consequences;"

and, if the gallant colonel's be a test, those advanced by the Duke of Dalmatia would prove but sorry claims. That the occupation of this most important city was a paramount consideration to all others, extracts from Soult's correspondence with Suchet will establish. "I have entrenched," he says, "the suburbs of St. Cyprien, which forms a good bridge-head. The enemy will not, I think, attack me there unless he desires to lose a part of his army. Two nights ago he made a demonstration of passing the Garonne two leagues above the city; but he will probably try to pass it below, in which case I will attack him whatever his force may be, because it is of the utmost importance to me not to be cut off from Montauban, where I have made a bridge-head."—"I think the enemy will not move on your side unless I move that way first, and I am determined to avoid that as long as I can."—"If I could remain a month on the Garonne, I should be able to put six or eight thousand conscripts into the ranks who now embarrass me, and who want arms, which I expect with great impatience from Perpignan."—"I am resolved to deliver battle near Toulouse, whatever may be the superiority of the enemy. In this view I have fortified a position, which, supported by the town and the canal, furnishes me with a retrenched camp susceptible of defence."—"I have received the unhappy news of the enemy's entrance into Paris. This misfortune strengthens my determination to defend Toulouse whatever may happen."*

On the 10th, he notices the battle, by mentioning that the allies had sustained a heavy loss, but that they had established themselves in an important position himself had occupied on the right; adding that his stay in Toulouse was doubtful. And his Letter of the 11th was more confirmatory of this suspicion: "As I told you in my letter of yesterday, I am in the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear being obliged to fight my way at Basiege, where the enemy is directing a column to cut my communications.

* Suchet's Correspondence.

To-morrow I will take a position at Villefranche, because I have good hope that this obstacle will not prevent my passing."

What, let it be simply asked, were the relative objects of Soult and Wellington? Was it not with one to hold a city that the other was as anxious to obtain? And what were the results? Soult, after his defeat at Tarbes, had made forced marches to complete the defences of Toulouse, and garrison a place to which he attached such value. His opponent advanced more leisurely; for, as the end was great, so also, were the means limited and the difficulties many. Were they not surmounted? "He desired to pass the Garonne, and he did pass it; he desired to win the position and works of Mont Rave, and he did win them; he desired to enter Toulouse, and he did enter it as a conqueror at the head of his troops." *

It has been asserted that before the battle of Toulouse was fought, Soult was in full possession of the events which had already taken place in Paris; that he was apprised of Napoleon's abdication, and also that a convention had been settled; and that with this knowledge, and consequently, the most atrocious cruelty, he caused a wanton slaughter both to his enemy and himself; and nearly a similar charge has been made against Lord Wellington. Both these accusations were unfounded. That Wellington should have sought an action, under the discouraging prospects which an attack upon Toulouse held out, would be—and without any object to influence it—to risk a reputation gained by a glorious succession of victories which had already reached their consummation. That Soult could have received orders from the Provisional Government, was an impossibility. The direct route by which a courier could find him in Toulouse, from the 4th, had been in possession of the allies. His despatches were sent from the capital on the 7th—consequently they must have first arrived at the British outposts—and hence, by an official communication from

* Napier.

Lord Wellington, Soult, two days after the battle, received that intelligence which it was falsely insinuated had reached him before that day of carnage—the 10th of April. In a letter addressed to Talleyrand, and dated the 22d, the marshal observes, that the circumstances preceding this act of adhesion were so "extraordinary as to create astonishment." "On the 12th," he continues, "I received through the English the first hints of the events at Paris. I proposed an armistice; it was refused: I renewed the demand; it was again refused. At last I sent Count Gazan to Toulouse, and my reiterated proposal for a suspension of arms was accepted and signed the 18th, the armies being then in presence of each other. The 19th I ratified this convention, and gave my adhesion to the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. And upon this subject I ought to declare, that I sought to obtain a suspension of arms before I manifested my sentiments, in order that my will and that of the army should be free."

Although this cruel charge against the Duke of Dalmatia was extensively circulated and believed, by those best qualified to estimate its truth or falsehood it was always scornfully repudiated. By friends and enemies the calumny against the French marshal was denounced; and by none, and with more warmth and indignation, than by the victor of Toulouse. When "Lord Aberdeen, after the passing of the English Reform Bill, repeated the accusation in the House of Lords, and reviled the minister for being on amicable political terms with a man capable of such a crime, Lord Wellington rose on the instant and emphatically declared that Marshal Soult did not know, and that it was impossible he could know, of the Emperor's abdication when he fought the battle."

Soult's night retreat was ably executed, his corps defiling within range of the English artillery; and although Hill's division and the light cavalry pursued, his losses were confined to some fifty dragoons which were overtaken and cut off. On the same day, Lord Wellington entered

Toulouse amid the acclamations of the Bourbon party, who immediately upon Soult's departure, raised the white flag, and declared for Louis XVIII. That evening, two officers, Cols. Cooke and St. Simon, reached the city after a vexatious delay near Blois, bearing authenticated intelligence that the reign of Napoleon had ended—and St. Simon was despatched to Soult, at whose head quarters he arrived early next day.

While these events had been progressing in the south, the crisis of Napoleon's fortunes was hurrying with fearful rapidity to its consummation. It will be a subject of suprise to after ages, how blind Napoleon appeared to coming events, when all beside could see that the hand of fate pointed so clearly at his downfal; and it will also be cause for admiration, to observe with what indomitable resolution he bore up against accumulating evils, and still "plucked laurels as he fell." Reduced by the defeat at Arcis, on the 20th of March, to the command of an army not exceeding seventy-five thousand men, on the 22d, he had thrown himself behind the allies on the Marne, and marching on Vitry and St. Dizier, declared that "he would reach Vienna before they should arrive in Paris." But the allies, justly considering this act as only a rash effort of despair, pushed steadily forward towards the capital—drove the French marshals* from the Marne—concentrated their corps d'armée at Chalon—and, on the 29th of March, invested the northern portion of the capital.

When Napoleon found that the enemy were neither to be diverted nor deterred, he determined to countermarch on Paris. The direct route was however, blocked by a Prussian corps at Vitry; and he could only reach the capital by a *détour* of fifty leagues. Accordingly, his troops were put in motion, while he went forward post, and on the 31st, was within three leagues of Paris.

There, he learned that every hope was over. After a sharp action on the heights of Bellevue, the allies took a

* Marmont and Mortier.

position that domineered the city; when finding that Paris could not be defended, Joseph Buonaparte retired from the Regency, and Marmont capitulated. On that evening, the Duke of Ragusa marched out with his artillery—the barriers were immediately given up—and on the 31st, the allied sovereigns entered Paris, no demonstration of attachment towards the Emperor being evinced, nor the slightest disorder ensuing.

Finding that his capital was in the possession of his enemies, Napoleon repaired to Fontainbleau, collected any troops which could be obtained, and announced his intention of "marching direct to Paris" on the 3d. But on the 2d, a decree passed the conservative Senate,* based upon an abdication of the throne.

While these final measures were in progress, the mission of Col. St. Simon to Marshal Soult did not induce the Duke of Dalmatia, as might have been expected, to give an adhesion to the Provisional Government. On the contrary, he treated St. Simon's authority as questionable; and, placing his army in observation at Castelnaudery, expressed a determination to hold a defensive attitude until the abdication of Napoleon was properly authenticated; proposing, in the mean time, that a suspension of hostilities should be agreed to. To this Lord Wellington peremptorily objected—and instantly moved his army, either to compel Soult's adhesion, or recommence operations. On the 17th, the French and English outposts had assumed a threatening attitude, when happily, an official communication from

* "That body, finding that the allied powers would no longer treat with Buonaparte, or recognise him politically as the ruler of France, formally pronounced his deposition. By this act the nation and the army were absolved from the oath of allegiance to their late Emperor; and the confidence of those superior officers and civil functionaries, who had to this moment faithfully adhered to him, was at once destroyed.

"Thus, upon all sides pressed to submit, and plainly deserted by all those whose interests must have been the inevitable sacrifice of any continued attachment to his fortunes, he sullenly acquiesced in the decree of the senate." —*Sherer.*

the chief of the Emperor's staff satisfied the marshal that Napoleon's fate was sealed—and consequently, he forwarded his adhesion.*

Suchet having adopted the cause of the Bourbons, his army was included in the convention agreed upon by Wellington and Soult, and intelligence was immediately despatched to Clinton and Hope announcing the events which had occurred.

After detailing to Earl Bathurst the arrangement and conclusion of the convention, Lord Wellington transmitted the particulars of a sortie made by the Governor of Bayonne on the 14th of April.†

"Yesterday morning, a considerable time before day-break, the enemy made a sortie and attack in great force, principally on the left and centre of our position of St. Etienne, in front of the citadel. The left of the position was occupied by pickets of Major-Gen. Hay's brigade; the brigade itself had been directed to form in case of alarm

* "Marshal Soult did not at first consider the information to be so authentic as to induce him to send his submission to the Provisional Government, but he proposed that I should consent to a suspension of hostilities to give him time to ascertain what had occurred; but I did not think it proper to acquiesce in this desire. I enclose the correspondence which passed on this occasion.

"In the mean time I concluded on the 15th a convention for the suspension of hostilities with the general officer commanding at Montauban, of which I enclose a copy; and the troops being prepared for moving forward, they marched on the 16th and 17th towards Castelnaudery.

"I sent forward on the 16th another officer who had been sent from Paris to Marshal Soult, and I received from him the following day the letter of which I enclose the copy, brought by the General of Division, Compte Gazan, who informed me, as indeed appears by the marshal's letter, that he had acknowledged the Provisional Government of France.

"I therefore authorised Major-Gen. Sir George Murray and Mariscal de Campo Don Luis Wimpffen to arrange with General Gazan a convention for the suspension of hostilities between the allied armies under my command and the French armies under the command of Marshals Soult and Suchet, of which I enclose a copy."—*Letter to Sir William Clinton.*

† Report from Major-Gen. Howard to Major-Gen. Colville, dated Camp, near Bayonne, 15th April, 1814.

near the village of Boucaut, as it was merely serving provisionally on this side of the Adour; the centre by pickets of the 2d brigade of the guards, and right by pickets of the 1st brigade of guards. Major-Gen. Hay was the general officer of the day, in command of the line of outposts, and I regret much to say, was killed shortly after the attack commenced, having just given directions that the church of St. Etienne should be defended to the last. The enemy, however, by great superiority of numbers, succeeded in getting in towards the left of the village, and got momentary possession of it, with the exception of a house occupied by a picket of the 38th regiment, under Captain Foster of that corps, who maintained himself till the support coming up, Major-Gen. Hinuber, with the 2d line battalion King's German Legion, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Bock, immediately attacked and retook the village.

" The enemy attacked the centre of our position likewise in great numbers; and by bearing in great force on one point after a sharp resistance, they succeeded in compelling one of our pickets to retire, and which enabled him to move up a road in the rear of the line of pickets of the centre of the position, and which compelled the other pickets of the 2d brigade of guards to fall back till the support arrived up to their assistance, when the enemy was immediately charged, and the line of posts reoccupied as before. Major-General Stopford, I regret to say, was wounded, when the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel Guise. In consequence of the enemy having gained temporary possession of some houses which had been occupied by the pickets of the centre of the position, Colonel Maitland found the enemy was in possession of ground on the rear of his left, and immediately advanced against him rapidly with the 3d battalion 1st guards, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. W. Stewart, on a ridge of ground which runs parallel with the roads; and Lieut.-Colonel Woodford, of the Coldstream, ascending the hill at the same time by a simultaneous charge these two corps immediately dislodged

the enemy, and reoccupied all the posts which we had before possessed; and from the time the enemy was dislodged he did not show the least disposition to renew the attack. Colonel Maitland expressed his satisfaction at the conduct of both his officers and men, and also his obligation to Lieut.-Colonel Woodford for his prompt concurrence in the movements above mentioned.

"It was towards the right that Lieut.-General Sir John Hope was taken. In endeavouring to bring up some troops to the support of the pickets, he came unexpectedly in the dark on a party of the enemy; his horse was shot dead and fell upon him; and, not being able to disengage himself from under it, he was unfortunately made prisoner. I regret to say that, from a letter I have received from him, I find he was wounded in two places, but in neither of them dangerously. You will easily conceive, Sir, that only one feeling, that of the greatest regret, pervades all the troops at the lieut.-general's misfortune.

"The enemy having commenced their attack between two and three o'clock in the morning, a considerable part of the operations took place before daylight, which gave them a great advantage from their numbers; but, whatever end they might propose to themselves by their attack, I am happy to say it has been completely frustrated, as they effected no one object by it, except setting fire to one house in the centre of our position, which, from being within three hundred yards of their guns, they had rendered perfectly untenable before, whenever they chose to cannonade it. From the quantity of fire of every description which the enemy brought on us, you will easily conceive our loss could not be inconsiderable. In Major-General Hay, who was well known to you, his Majesty's service has lost a most zealous and able officer, who has served a considerable time in this army with great distinction. The loss of the enemy must, however, have been severe, as he left many dead behind him, and he was afterwards observed burying a good number of men. In regard to prisoners, we had no

opportunity of making many, from the facility the enemy possessed of immediately retiring under the guns of their works."

It would appear, that to some unaccountable fatality that sanguinary affair must be attributed. Rumours had already reached the outposts, that Napoleon had abdicated—and although from these reports the vigilance of the blockading army might have been naturally expected to abate, the besieged should have remained merely on the defensive, and Thouvenot's sortie was unwarrantable. The result was not to his advantage. His casualties were admitted to reach nine hundred men, and the allied were nearly equal*—both losing a general. The siege had not commenced — for neither stores nor artillery had been brought forward—hence, there was no immediate cause for apprehension; and, though nothing was known certainly, it was generally believed that Napoleon was either dead or dethroned. The operation therefore, appears rather designed to gratify bad passions than attain any military object. It seemed to have been purely a work of slaughter — and to gain no end, men were unnecessarily lost. "On both sides the troops, broken into small bodies by the enclosures,

* Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, in the operations of the army under the command of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., in a sortie made by the garrison of Bayonne, on the morning of the 14th of April, 1814.

	Officers.	Serjeants.	Rank and File.	Horses.	Total loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.
Killed	8	3	139	—	150
Wounded	36	28	393	1	457
Missing	6	7	223	—	236

Portuguese loss included.

and unable to recover their order, came dashing together in the darkness, fighting often with the bayonet, and sometimes friends encountered, sometimes foes: all was tumult and horror. The guns of the citadel, vaguely guided by the flashes of the musketry, sent their shot and shells booming at random through the lines of fight; and the gun boats, dropping down the river, opened their fire upon the flank of the supporting columns, which being put in motion by Sir John Hope on the first alarm, were now coming up from the side of Boucaut Thus nearly one hundred pieces of artillery were in full play at once; and the shells having set fire to the fascine depôts and to several houses, the flames cast a horrid glare over the striving masses."*

At best it was a sanguinary experiment. No object was gained or could be gained—much blood was idly wasted—Thouvenot, in a few hours was as closely enclosed, as he had been before his sally—his loss exceeded that inflicted on his enemy—and many of his casualties were caused by the indiscriminating fire of his own guns.

* Napier.

CHAPTER XXVI.

SOULT'S ADHESION TERMINATES THE WAR—FERDINAND'S PROGRESS AND RECEPTION IN THE CAPITAL—THE FRENCH GARRISONS EVACUATE THE SPANISH FORTRESSES—EFFECTS OF NAPOLEON'S DOWNFAL—DEPOSITION OF EUGENE BEAUHARNOIS—BONAPARTE QUITS FONTAINEBLEAU, AND SAILS FOR ELBA IN THE UNDAUNTED FRIGATE—CONGRESS OF PARIS—LORD WELLINGTON APPOINTED AMBASSADOR TO THE COURT OF FRANCE—HE IS RAISED TO AN ENGLISH DUKEDOM, AND HIS LIEUTENANTS ADVANCED TO THE PEERAGE—LETTER TO LORD LIVERPOOL—THE DUKE VISITS MADRID, AND ADDRESSES A POLITICAL MEMORANDUM TO FERDINAND—RETURNS TO BORDEAUX, AND TAKES LEAVE OF THE PENINSULAR ARMY—RECEPTION IN ENGLAND—TAKES HIS SEAT IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS—THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S ADDRESS—THE DUKE'S ANSWER—PROCEEDINGS ON THAT OCCASION.

FROM whatever cause it might have arisen, the delay in transmitting intelligence from Paris to the south, can never be sufficiently deplored. While Soult's reluctance to obey the instructions of the provisional government created suspicions in Lord Wellington's mind, that the suspension of hostilities he proposed, was merely a project for temporising until some reaction should take place in favour of Napoleon, it gave also a colouring to reports already circulated to the marshal's disadvantage,* which the submission of the officer commanding at Montauban, and the prompt adhesion of the armies of Aragon and Catalonia, were in no way calculated to remove. While Soult wavered as to the course he should adopt, Suchet, on a later receipt of Saint Simon's intelligence at Narbonne, on the 19th, acted with decision. Having assembled the generals and superior officers of the army, he laid before them the documents he had received—"and there was but one opi-

* "Indeed suspicions were expressed in the Moniteur that orders and despatches had been intercepted, with the view of giving Marshal Soult an opportunity of retrieving the reputation of the French armies, by fighting in a position which he thought inexpugnable."—*Southey.*

nion as to the course to be adopted."* Suchet's adhesion was instantly communicated to Soult, and hence no alternative was left him but to follow the example of his comrade. The allies were in his front—the army of Catalonia had formally withdrawn its allegiance from the emperor—when, yielding an unwilling consent, the Duke of Dalmatia acknowledged the provisional government—sent Comte Gazan to Lord Wellington's head-quarters—and signed the Convention.†

Thus was the war concluded, happily for all parties, even for the French, whom nothing but such a series of defeats could have delivered from the tyranny which their former victories had brought upon themselves. It was by the national spirit which had first shown itself in the Peninsula, by the persevering efforts of Great Britain in the peninsular war, the courage of her troops, and the skill of her great commander, that Bonaparte's fortune had been checked at its height, and successfully resisted, till other governments were encouraged, and other nations roused by the example; and that power, the most formi-

* Suchet's Memoirs

† On this occasion the following "General Order" was addressed to the army:—

"1. The commander of the forces has the pleasure to inform the army that he has agreed upon the following Convention for the suspension of hostilities between the allied armies under his command and the French armies opposed to them, and hostilities are forthwith to be suspended accordingly.

"2. Upon congratulating the army upon this prospect of an honourable termination of their labours, the Commander of the Forces avails himself of the opportunity of returning the general officers, officers, and troops, his best thanks for their uniform discipline and gallantry in the field, and for their conciliating conduct towards the inhabitants of the country, which, almost in an equal degree with their discipline and gallantry in the field, have produced the fortunate circumstances that now hold forth to the world the prospect of genuine and permanent peace.

"The Commander of the Forces trusts that they will continue the same good conduct while it may be necessary to detain them in this country; and that they will leave it with a lasting reputation, not less creditable to their gallantry in the field than to their regularity and good conduct in quarters and in camp."

dable which had ever been known in the civilized world, was then beaten down. The independence of Spain and Portugal had been triumphantly vindicated and secured; and if the civil liberties of both countries were not restored, and firmly established upon a sure foundation, the cause is to be found, not in any foreign influence exercised ill, but in old evils which time had rendered inveterate.*

The news of Napoleon's abdication reached Ferdinand at Valencia; and from that city he proceeded to Madrid, after the illness of a week—his route rather exhibiting the pilgrimage of a devotee, than the return of a monarch to a capital, from which, for five years he had been estranged. The briefest notice of what subsequently occurred, is only required to mark what may be considered the singular termination of a long and sanguinary war—the restoration of a worthless king, to a people equally worthless.

"The first thing he did, when he was sufficiently recovered to leave the house, was to visit all the nunneries, that the nuns might not be disappointed in their ardent desire of seeing him; and in these visits part of two days was employed much to the increase of his popularity, this being at the same time an evidence, it was thought, of good nature, and of devout respect for the superstition of the country. When these visits were concluded, he attended an evening *Te Deum* in the cathedral, performed by the light of twenty thousand tapers; after which he and the Infantes adored a chalice of legendary reputation which is venerated there."†

Liberty had been for years familiar in Spanish mouths—liberty they professed—swore that they would attain it—and yet they neither appreciated the blessing, nor understood the word. It was the war-cry of their deliverance, headed their decrees, and was inscribed upon their *Plazas*.‡

* Southey. † Ibid.

‡ "In most of the large towns, the *Plaza Mayor*, or *Great Square*, had been new named *Plaza de la Constitucion*, and a stone with these words engraven on it erected there; at Valencia this was removed one night, and in the morning what is absurdly called a provisional stone of wood, was set up in its place, with the words *Real Plaza de Fernando VII.*: this was publicly done; and the

But what could a people know of liberty, who stooped again to the thraldom of a stupid priesthood, and permitted a bigot king—a wretch without one redeeming virtue—to restore the most accursed institution that ever had degraded religion and humanity—the Inquisition?

Ferdinand's return to the capital was marked by anomalous demonstrations—triumphal arches and arrests. Flowers were strewn, and suspected persons were incarcerated. All parties united in restoring the despotism, whose overthrow had cost France half a million of men, and Great Britain an expenditure of money that put calculation at defiance. All—Liberales, Moderatos, and Serviles—all bowed to the will of the Beloved One—and the very name of Freedom was obliterated. The word Liberty "appeared in large bronze letters over the entrance of the hall of the Cortes in Madrid. The people of their own impulse hurried thither to remove it; they set up ladders, forced out letter by letter from the stone, and as each was thrown into the street, the spectators renewed their shouts of exultation. They collected as many of the journals of the Cortes, and of the papers and pamphlets of the *Liberales*, as could be got together; formed a procession in which the religious fraternities, and the clergy regular and secular, took the lead; piled up these papers in one of the public squares, and sacrificed them there as a political *auto-da-fé*, after which high mass was performed, and *Te Deum* sung, as a thanksgiving for their triumph."

In the mean time measures were taken for the removal of Sir William Clinton's army from the blockade of Barcelona, as well as for the liberation of the French garrisons and prisoners, and the restoration of such fortresses as still

provisional stone was first borne under Ferdinand's window with military honours, in a long procession formed by the populace, with officers intermixed, carrying drawn swords, and bearing the royal flag. 'A stanza, composed and printed for the occasion, was soon affixed to it, denouncing, in a ferocious spirit, vengeance upon any one who should profane it, and upon the liberal party."—*Southey.*

remained in the possession of the enemy. To carry into effect that part of the convention, Suchet despatched some officers of his own staff, accompanied by commissioners on the part of the allies.* Ferdinand had faithfully promised the French marshal, when he received him at Perpignan, that every facility should be given to such French troops as remained to cross the frontier; but Suchet properly estimating the little reliance that should be reposed in the assurances of a perfidious monarch, carried out Napoleon's instructions, and retained the Infante Don Carlos as a hostage. This precaution, added to the stronger influence of Lord Wellington, eventually secured the fulfilment of the eighth article of the convention,† and the fortresses were accordingly evacuated and given up.

The fall of Napoleon was accompanied by the most important changes. Monarchs vanished and reappeared—states and kingdoms were partitioned—and with a magical rapidity, the aspect of Europe underwent a wondrous change. None was more sudden or remarkable than that to which Italy, "the cradle of Napoleon's glory," was sub-

* Suchet's Memoirs.

† "Art. 8. The garrisons of all the places which are occupied by the troops of the army of the Duke of Albufera, shall be allowed to return without delay into France. These garrisons shall remove with all that properly belongs to them, as also all the arms and artillery originally French.

"The garrisons of Murviedro and of Peñiscola shall join the garrison of Tortosa, and their troops will then proceed together by the great road, and enter France by Perpignan. The day of the arrival of those garrisons at Gerona, the fortresses of Figueras and of Rosas shall be made over to the Spanish troops, and the French garrisons of these places shall proceed to Perpignan.

"As soon as information is received of the French garrisons of Murviedro, Peñiscola, and Tortosa, having passed the French frontier, the place and forts of Barcelona shall be made over to the Spanish troops, and the French garrisons shall march immediately for Perpignan. The Spanish authorities will provide for the necessary means of transport being supplied to the French garrisons in their march to the frontier.

"The sick or wounded of any of the French garrisons who are not in a state to move with the troops, shall remain and be treated in the hospitals where they are; and will be sent to France as soon as they have recovered"

jected. The terrible disasters of his step-father obliged Eugene to yield to the propositions of Marshal Bellegarde—and a convention was concluded the same day on which the sanguinary battle of Toulouse had been decided.

On the 19th the French army returned within the limits of old France, and the senate of Milan* declined the request of the viceroy, that they would recommend to the allied sovereigns that Eugene should remain at the head of the government.

A feeling of irritation pervaded the public mind in Italy; and the army had not proceeded three marches beyond Mantua, when an insurrection broke out in Milan. The finance minister, Prina, was assassinated, and his residence demolished; and nothing would have saved the viceroy from a similar fate had he been in his capital. Amidst this popular excitement, and the eagerness of the Italians to be released from the dominion of the French, the friends of Eugene thought him fortunate in being able to join his father-in-law at Munich, almost incognito. Thus at the expiration of nine years, fell the iron crown which Napoleon had placed on his head, saying, "Dieu me l'a donné; gare à qui la touche." †

Bonaparte remained still at Fontainebleau: Elba had been named for his future residence, with a liberal allowance for the maintenance of an establishment, that still should bear the semblance of a royal one; and commissioners were nominated on the part of the allied powers, to conduct the fallen emperor to the place of his destination. On arriving at Fontainebleau they were very coolly received, and Colonel Campbell was the only one to whom Napoleon was civil. Noticing the traces of old wounds, he asked him in what

* The following is a curious circumstance relative to the senate of Milan: in the height of our disasters, that body sent a deputation to congratulate *Napoleon the Great* on the prospect of his triumphing over all his enemies. The deputation on its way received intelligence of the siege of Paris, and had just time to get back to Milan to be appointed to congratulate the allies on the *downfal of the tyrant.*

† Bourrienne's Memoirs.

battles he had received them, and on what occasions he had been invested with the orders he wore. He next questioned him as to the place of his birth, and Colonel Campbell having answered that he was a Scotchman, Napoleon congratulated him on being the countryman of Ossian, his favourite author, with whose poetry, however, he was only acquainted through the medium of wretched translations. On this first audience Napoleon said to the colonel, "I have cordially hated the English. I have made war against you by every possible means, but I esteem your nation. I am convinced that there is more generosity in your government than in any other. I should like to be conveyed from Toulon to Elba by an English frigate"—a request that was subsequently acceded to.*

After a humiliating journey, during which the insecurity of popular affection was amply proved, Napoleon embarked at Frejus in the Undaunted frigate, and proceeded to "the lonely isle," which was to form the dominions of one for whose ambition half the continent had not been found sufficient.

While these momentous changes were in progress, the allies were assembled in the capital of France to organize anew the political relations of Europe, on which Napoleon's arbitrary enactments had produced such serious changes. As the representative of Great Britain, Lord Castlereagh hastened to the convention, having recommended to the Prince Regent, that the office of ambassador to the court of France should be given to Lord Wellington; and on the 21st, Sir Charles Stewart was despatched to Toulouse to apprise the allied commander of the appointment, and request his presence in the French capital to assist in the important deliberations that should occur. To this honourable mark of a sovereign's esteem, Lord Wellington returned a modest, but manly reply:†—

"Your brother Charles has just given me your letter of

* Bourrienne's Memoirs.

† Letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated Toulouse, 21st April, 1814.

the 13th, and I am very much obliged and flattered by your thinking of me for a situation for which I should never have thought myself qualified. I hope, however, that the Prince Regent, his Government, and your Lordship, are convinced that I am ready to serve him in any situation in which it may be thought that I can be of any service. Although I have been so long absent from England, I should have remained as much longer if it had been necessary; and I feel no objection to another absence in the public service, if it be necessary or desirable.

"In regard to going now to Paris, your brother will inform you of the circumstances here, which would render my absence just now inconvenient, and possibly dangerous to the public service. I shall know more, however, of the state of affairs in a day or two. I will undertake the journey with pleasure, if I should find I can do so without public inconvenience."

Finding that he might safely quit the army, to whose discipline he had previously borne an honourable testimony,* he set out for the French capital on the night of the 10th,

* "GENERAL ORDER. "*Toulouse*, 16th *April*, 1814.

"3. The Commander of the Forces takes this opportunity of expressing his approbation of the conduct of the army in general since the troops have passed the French frontier, and of returning his thanks to the General Officers of the army in particular, and to the Officers for the attention they have paid to the discipline of the troops.

"4. There have been some exceptions certainly, which the Commander of the Forces has been obliged to notice, but they are principally among those whose experience of the evils to be apprehended from allowing the troops to ill-treat and plunder the inhabitants, and from want of attention to the orders of the army, is more limited than that of others.

"5. The Commander of the Forces trusts, that the officers of the army are aware of the advantages which have been derived from the good conduct of the troops; and that they will never forget that it is as much their duty towards their own country and the troops under their command, to prevent them from ill treating and injuring the people inhabiting the country become the theatre of the operations of the war; as it is to set them the example of courage and conduct, and to lead, animate, and direct them when opposed to the enemy in the field."

and arrived in Paris on the 4th of May. From all, his reception was enthusiastic; and each of the allied sovereigns expressed in unqualified praise, how much the glorious issue of the long and doubtful struggle for the restoration of European liberty, had been indebted to his talents and enduring constancy. From the restored king (Ferdinand) he had recently received a letter expressing the deepest gratitude and esteem; and the Order of the Sword had been sent him by the Crown Prince of Sweden. But a higher distinction awaited him—a dukedom was conferred upon himself, and peerages on his most distinguished lieutenants.*

To Lord Liverpool he thus expressed his thanks for the honour he had been officially employed to notify:—

"I have received your Lordship's letter of the 3d, and I beg that you will lay before his royal highness the Prince Regent my grateful acknowledgments for the fresh marks which your Lordship has announced to me of his Royal Highness's grace and favour. Nothing can be more satisfactory to me than that his Royal Highness should have rewarded the services and merits of my gallant coadjutors, who, I am sure, feel equally grateful with me for his Royal Highness's favours, and are equally desirous of aiding, by every means in their power, to forward his Royal Highness's views for the prosperity of his kingdom.

"I beg your Lordship also to accept my thanks for your favourable recommendation of my services to his Royal Highness.

"I return to the army to-morrow, in order to carry into execution the convention with the French government, and the orders of the government for the expedition.

"I propose to go to Madrid in order to try whether I cannot prevail upon all parties to be more moderate, and to adopt a constitution more likely to be practicable, and to

* Sir John Hope, Sir T. Graham, Sir S. Cotton, Sir Rowland Hill, and Sir W. C. Beresford.

contribute to the peace and happiness of the nation. I am afraid that I shall not be in England till the end of June; but I hope I shall be able to do much good by this journey. A very short time in England will enable me to settle all that I have to do there."*

The DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S stay in Paris was necessarily brief; and from the French capital he proceeded to Madrid, where his presence was ardently expected. The country was threatened with a political convulsion, which Ferdinand's early display of unamended despotism and cruelty seemed calculated to hurry to a crisis. From the commanding influence which the Duke possessed over every party, it was considered possible that the spirit of the contending factions might be sufficiently moderated to lead to such practicable alterations, as might restore national tranquillity; and, anxious for its accomplishment, he left Toulouse, and reached Madrid on the 24th of May.

On the 5th of June, the Duke took his departure; but, previously, he addressed an able memorandum to Ferdinand, in which the relative advantages to be gained by Spain attaching herself exclusively to France, or maintaining a friendly understanding, "and cementing her alliance with Great Britain," were clearly and honestly examined. Having pointed out the ruinous state of a kingdom after one of the most terrible and disastrous contests by which any nation had ever been afflicted, its territory entirely occupied by the enemy, the country torn to pieces by internal divisions, its ancient constitution having been destroyed, and vain attempts made to establish a new one; its marine, its commerce, and revenue entirely annihilated; its colonies in a state of rebellion, and nearly lost to the mother country—the Memorandum set forth the most likely means by which these evils might be removed—and proved, that by a firm alliance with England, the Spanish

* Letter to Lord Liverpool, dated Paris, 9th May, 1814.

nation could only hope to become regenerated. Nothing could be more lucid than the picture drawn of the actual condition of the country—nothing more easily comprehended than the mode by which the mischief might be remedied:—

"The finances of Spain are in the utmost disorder, the revenue is unproductive, if not nearly destroyed, and is, at all events, quite unequal to the expenses. But before those expenses can even be reduced by the reduction of the military establishments, money must be found to pay the arrears of the army. The various political events which have occurred must have shaken the credit of the Spanish government; and, even if the government had credit, there is but little money in the country which could be borrowed as a resource. England alone can be looked to for assistance in this respect.

"It cannot be expected, however, that the British government will come forward with the resources of the British nation to aid his Majesty, if they are not certain of the line of policy which his Majesty will adopt both in America and in Europe; neither will it be in their power to give that aid which every well-wisher of his Majesty would wish to see afforded, if his Majesty should not at an early period carry into execution his gracious promises made to his subjects in his decree of the 4th May; and if some steps should not be taken to prove to the world the necessity and justice of the numerous arrests which attended his Majesty's restoration to his throne, or for the release of the innocent and the judicial trial of the guilty.

"All nations are interested in these measures, but Great Britain in particular; and the nature of the British constitution, and the necessity which the government are under of guiding their measures in a great degree by the wishes and sentiments of the people, must prevent them from giving aid to his Majesty in money, or from giving countenance to the endeavours which may be made to raise

money by loan in England, at least till the world shall be convinced by experience of the sincerity of his Majesty's professions in regard to his own subjects, and of his desire to unite his interests with those of the British government.

"Great Britain is materially interested in the prosperity and greatness of Spain, and a good understanding and close alliance with Spain is highly important to her; and she will make sacrifices to obtain it; and there is no act of kindness which may not be expected from such an ally. But it cannot be expected from Great Britain, that she will take any steps for the firm establishment of a government which she shall see in the fair way of connecting itself with her rival, and of eventually becoming her enemy; like other nations, she must by prudence and foresight provide for her own interests by other modes, if circumstances should prevent his Majesty from connecting himself with Great Britain, as it appears by the reasoning in this memorandum is desirable to him." *

On the 10th, the Duke rejoined the army at Bordeaux, and the peace having been signed by the allied powers in Paris, nothing remained but to break up the armies in the south, and despatch the troops under orders for America, with the least possible delay. In a letter to Earl Bathurst,† the Duke of Wellington announced that the necessary arrangements for these purposes had been com-

* Wellington Despatches, Vol. XII. p. 43.

† "The Portuguese and Spanish troops having marched to return to their respective countries, the British cavalry and the horses of the artillery having marched to embark in the Channel, and a part of the British infantry besides those destined for foreign expeditions having embarked in the Gironde, and the remainder being collected here and in the neighbourhood of Bayonne for embarkation as soon as vessels shall arrive to take them away, and having been informed that it is the intention of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to employ me in his service in another manner, I propose to quit the army to-morrow on my return to England, and to leave to Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie to direct and superintend the embarkation of the infantry, which is all that remains to be done."—*Wellington Despatches.*

pleted;—and on the same day he took leave of the finest army, for its number, that had ever been embattled.

"GENERAL ORDER. *Bordeaux, 14th June,* 1814.

"1. The Commander of the Forces, being upon the point of returning to England, again takes this opportunity of congratulating the army upon the recent events which have restored peace to their country and to the world.

"2. The share which the British army has had in producing these events, and the high character with which the army will quit this country, must be equally satisfactory to every individual belonging to it, as they are to the Commander of the Forces; and he trusts that the troops will continue the same good conduct to the last.

"3. The Commander of the Forces once more requests the army to accept his thanks.

"4. Although circumstances may alter the relations in which he has stood towards them, so much to his satisfaction, he assures them that he shall never cease to feel the warmest interest in their welfare and honour; and that he will be at all times happy to be of any service to those to whose conduct, discipline, and gallantry, their country is so much indebted."

Immediately afterwards, the Duke of Wellington proceeded to England; and on the 23d, he reached Dover. His reception, after a long absence of five years, was thus described in a periodical of that day:—"About five o'clock this morning, his Majesty's sloop-of-war, the Rosario, arrived in the roads, and fired a salute. Shortly afterwards, the yards of the different vessels of war were manned; a salute took place throughout the squadron, and the launch of the Nymphen frigate was seen advancing towards the harbour, with the Duke of Wellington: at this time the guns upon the heights and from the batteries commenced their thunder upon the boat leaving the ship; and on passing the pier-heads his Lordship was greeted with three distinct

rounds of cheers from those assembled; but upon his landing at the Crosswall, nothing could exceed the rapture with which his Lordship was received by at least ten thousand persons; and notwithstanding it was so early, parties continued to arrive from town and country every minute. The instant his lordship set his foot on shore, a proposition was made, and instantly adopted, to carry him to the Ship inn: he was borne on the shoulders of our townsmen, amidst the reiterated cheers of the populace."*

The allied sovereigns had preceded him to England on their memorable visit to the Regent; and being at Portsmouth to witness the grand spectacle of a naval review, the Duke set out the following morning to pay his duty to his prince. Wherever he appeared the most enthusiastic greetings marked the attachment of the people towards the great captain of the age; and on the 28th he appeared for the first time in the House of Lords since his well-merited elevation to the peerage of Great Britain.†

"Shortly after three o'clock, the lord chancellor having taken his seat, the Duke of Wellington was introduced, supported by the Dukes of Richmond and Beaufort, in military uniform, and in their ducal robes. Being arrived in the body of the house, the Duke made the usual obeisance to the lord chancellor, and showed his patent and right of summons: these noblemen then approached the table, where his grace's various patents, as baron and viscount, earl, marquis, and lastly as duke, were each read by the clerks. The oaths were then administered, and the Test Rolls were signed by him. He then, accompanied by his noble supporters, took his seat on the dukes' bench, and saluted the house in the usual manner, by rising, taking off his hat, and bowing respectfully.

* Annual Register, 1814.

† On this interesting occasion the Duchess of Wellington and Countess of Mornington were present—and the honours conferred upon a conqueror were witnessed by those to whom he was most endeared—a mother and a wife.

"The lord chancellor then rose, and, pursuant to their lordships' order, addressed his grace.

"'My Lord Duke of Wellington,

"'I have received the commands of this house, which, I am persuaded, has witnessed with infinite satisfaction your grace's personal introduction into this august assembly, to return your grace the thanks and acknowledgments of this house, for your great and eminent services to your king and country.

"'In the execution of these commands, I cannot forbear to call the especial attention of all who hear me to a fact in your grace's life, singular, I believe, in the history of the country, and infinitely honourable to your grace, that you have manifested, upon your first entrance into this house, your right, under various grants, to all the dignities in the peerage of this realm which the crown can confer. These dignities have been conferred at various periods, but in the short compass of little more than four years, for great public services, occurring in rapid succession, claiming the favour of the crown, influenced by its sense of justice to your grace and the country; and on no one occasion in which the crown has thus rewarded your merits have the houses of parliament been inattentive to your demands upon the gratitude of the country. Upon all such occasions they have offered to your grace their acknowledgments and thanks, the highest honours they could bestow.

"'I decline all attempts to state your grace's eminent merits in your military character; to represent those brilliant actions, those illustrious achievements, which have attached immortality to the name of Wellington, and which have given to this country a degree of glory unexampled in the annals of this kingdom. In thus acting, I believe I best consult the feelings which evince your grace's title to the character of a truly great and illustrious man.

"'My duty to this house cannot but make me most anxious not to fall short of the expectation which the

house may have formed as to the execution of what may have been committed to me on this great occasion; but the most anxious consideration which I have given to the nature of that duty, has convinced me that I cannot more effectually do justice to the judgment of the house, than by referring your grace to the terms and language in which the house has so repeatedly expressed its own sense of the distinguished and consummate wisdom and judgment, the skill and ability, the prompt energy, the indefatigable exertion, the perseverance, the fortitude, and the valour, by which the victories of Vimeiro, Talavera, Salamanca, and Vitoria were achieved; by which the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were gloriously terminated; by which the deliverance of Portugal was effectuated; by which the ever memorable establishment of the allied armies on the frontiers of France was accomplished; armies pushing forward, in the glory of victory at Orthez, to the occupation of Bordeaux.

"'These achievements, in their immediate consequence infinitely beneficial to the common cause, have, in their final results, secured the peace, prosperity and glory of this country, whilst your grace's example has animated to great exertions the other nations of Europe, exertions rescuing them from tyranny, and restoring them to independence, by which there has been ultimately established among all the nations of Europe that balance of power, which, giving sufficient strength to every nation, provides that no nation shall be too strong.

"'I presume not to trespass upon the house by representing the personal satisfaction which I have derived from being the honoured instrument of conveying to your grace the acknowledgments and thanks of this house upon every occasion upon which they have been offered to your grace, or by endeavouring to represent the infinite gratification which I enjoy in thus offering, on the behalf of the house, on this day, to your grace in person, those acknowledgments and those thanks. Your grace is now called to aid

hereafter, by your wisdom and judgment, the great council of that nation, to the peace, prosperity, and glory of which your Grace has already so essentially contributed; and I tender your Grace, now taking your seat in this house, in obedience to its commands, the thanks of the house in the words of its resolution:—That the thanks of this house be given to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, on his return from his command abroad, for his eminent and unremitting service to His Majesty and to the public.'

"The Duke answered the address to the following effect:

"'My Lords,—I have to perform a duty, to which I feel myself very inadequate, to return your lordships my thanks for this fresh mark of your approbation of my conduct and of your favour.

"'I assure your lordships that I am entirely overcome by the honours which have been conferred upon me; and by the favour with which I have been received in this country by the Prince Regent, by your lordships, and by the public.

"'In truth, my lords, when I reflect upon the advantages which I enjoyed in the confidence reposed in me, and the support afforded by the government, and by his Royal Highness the commander-in-chief, in the cordial assistance which I invariably received upon all occasions from my gallant friends, the general officers of the army, who are an honour to their country, the gallantry and discipline of the troops, and in the manner in which I was encouraged and excited to exertion by the protection and gracious favour of the prince, I cannot but consider that, however great the difficulties with which I had to contend, the means to contend with them were equal to overcome them; and I am apprehensive that I shall not be found so deserving of your favour as I wish.

"'If, however, my merit is not great, my gratitude is unbounded; and I can only assure your lordships that you will always find me ready to serve his Majesty to the utmost of my ability in any capacity in which my services can be at all useful to this great country.'

"His Grace then retired to unrobe. He wore a field marshal's uniform, with the insignia of the Garter. On his return into the house, he sat for a few minutes on the extremity of one of the benches, and then retired for the evening.

"In addition to the pecuniary remuneration voted by parliament to the Duke of Wellington for his distinguished services,* the House of Commons resolved to pay him the highest tribute of respect and applause that it was possible to bestow on a subject, that of its thanks, accompanied with a deputation of its members, to congratulate him on his return to this country. Lord Castlereagh rose in the house on June 27th, to make a motion for this purpose, which was unanimously agreed to; and a committee was appointed to wait on his Grace, to know what time he would name for receiving the congratulations of the house. Lord Castlereagh having reported from the committee that it

* "On May 10th, a message from the Prince Regent was communicated to the House of Commons, the purpose of which was to inform the house that his Royal Highness had conferred upon that victorious commander the rank and title of a duke and marquis of the United Kingdom, and recommending the grant to him and his successors of such an annuity as might support the high dignity of the title conferred, and prove a lasting memorial of the gratitude and munificence of the nation.

"The message being taken into consideration on the 12th, the Chancellor of the Exchequer rose to call the attention of the house to the distinguished services of the Duke of Wellington, and the Speaker moved the resolution, 'That the sum of 10,000*l.* be paid annually out of the consolidated fund for the use of the Duke of Wellington, to be at any time commuted for the sum of 300,000*l.* to be laid out in the purchase of an estate.'

"Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Ponsonby, and Mr. Canning, who followed, all agreed in the high merits of the noble Duke, and objected to the grant as too small, especially since a large sum would be necessary for a mansion suitable to the dignity conferred upon him. A motion was in consequence made for an additional 100,000*l.* making in all the sum of half a million granted to the Duke, which passed *nem. con.*

"A similar message from the Prince Regent being communicated to the House of Lords an equal unanimity took place in the proceedings upon it. On this occasion Lord Liverpool moved the same grants to the Duke which were first proposed in the other house.

"At the same time, in consequence of messages from the Prince Regent, pecuniary grants were made by parliament to Lord Wellington's associates in victory, Generals Hope, Graham, Cotton, Hill, and Beresford, now raised to the peerage."

was the Duke's desire to express to the house his answer in person, the following day, July 1st, was appointed for the solemnity.

"At about a quarter before five, the Speaker being dressed in his official robes, and the house being crowded with members, some of them in military and naval uniforms, and many in the court dresses in which they had been attending the Speaker with an address to the Prince Regent on the peace, the house was acquainted that the Duke of Wellington was in waiting. His admission being resolved, and a chair being set for him on the left hand of the bar towards the middle of the house, his Grace entered, making his obeisances, while all the members rose from their seats. The Speaker then informing him that a chair was placed for his repose, he sat down in it for some time covered, the serjeant standing on his right hand with the mace grounded,* and the members resumed their seats. He then rose, and spoke, uncovered, to the following effect:

"'MR. SPEAKER,—I was anxious to be permitted to attend this house, in order to return my thanks in person for the honour they have done me in deputing a committee of their members to congratulate me on my return to this country; and this, after the house had animated my exertions by their applause upon every occasion which appeared to merit their approbation, and after they had filled up the measure of their favours by conferring upon me, at the recommendation of the Prince Regent, the noblest gift that any subject had ever received.

"'I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration of the great efforts made by this house and the country at a moment of unexampled pressure and difficulty, in order to support the great scale of operations by which the contest was brought to so fortunate a termination. By the wise policy of parliament, the government was enabled to give

* Southey.

the necessary support to the operations which were carried on under my direction; and I was encouraged, by the confidence reposed in me by his Majesty's ministers, and by the commander-in-chief, by the gracious favour of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and by the reliance which I had on the support of my gallant friends, the general officers of the army, and on the bravery of the officers and troops, to carry on the operations in such a manner as to acquire for me those marks of the approbation of this house, for which I have now the honour to make my humble acknowledgments.

" 'Sir, it is impossible for me to express the gratitude which I feel; I can only assure the house that I shall always be ready to serve his Majesty in any capacity in which my services can be deemed useful, with the same zeal for my country which has already acquired for me the approbation of this house.'

" This speech was received with loud cheers, at the end of which the Speaker, who had sat covered during its delivery, rose, and thus addressed his Grace:

" 'My Lord,—Since last I had the honour of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed; but none without some mark and note of your rising glory.

" 'The military triumphs which your valour has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Those triumphs it is needless on this day to recount. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children's children.

" 'It is not, however, the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our applause; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of

victory; that moral courage and enduring fortitude, which, in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood nevertheless unshaken; and that ascendancy of character, which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires.

" ' For the repeated thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this house, in gratitude for your many and eminent services, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknowledgments; but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor. It owes to you the proud satisfaction, that, amidst the constellation of great and illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all, by common acclamation, conceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven, and the common destinies of our nature, shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name and example as an imperishable monument, exciting others to like deeds of glory, and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country amongst the ruling nations of the earth.

" ' It now remains only that we congratulate your Grace upon the high and important mission on which you are about to proceed, and we doubt not that the same splendid talents, so conspicuous in war, will maintain, with equal authority, firmness, and temper, our national honour and interests in peace.'

" His Grace then withdrew, making the same obeisances as when he entered; and all the members rising again, he was reconducted by the serjeant to the door of the house. After he was gone, Lord Castlereagh moved, that what the Duke had said on returning thanks to the house, together with the Speaker's answer, be printed in the votes, which was agreed to *nem. con.*"

CHAPTER XXVII.

GENERAL FEELING IN ENGLAND IN FAVOUR OF ABOLITION OF SLAVERY—ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE FRENCH COURT TO COOPERATE IN EFFECTING IT—THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S VISIT TO THE NETHERLANDS—MEMORANDUM RESPECTING ITS DEFENCE—TERMINATION OF THE AMERICAN WAR—POLITICAL STATE OF FRANCE—NAPOLEON'S ESCAPE FROM ELBA—DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S DESPATCH TO LORD CASTLEREAGH—UNANIMITY OF THE CONGRESS—DECLARATION OF THE 13TH OF MARCH—PROCEEDINGS OF NAPOLEON—DUKE OF WELLINGTON ASSUMES THE COMMAND OF THE ARMIES IN THE NETHERLANDS.

FROM the extraordinary excitement attendant upon a war, which, with one brief intermission, had exceeded a period beyond the ordinary average of mortal life, the tide of popular feeling flowed in an opposite direction; and, as if surfeited with scenes of bloodshed, it sought for opportunities to ameliorate the condition of the unfortunate; and that neglected caste, who during the progress of past events had been forgotten save by a few philanthropists, now seemed almost exclusively to possess the sympathies, and engross the undivided attention of the nation. The intense interest generally displayed by the abolitionists of that day is thus described by the Duke of Wellington in a letter to his brother:—

"I was not aware till I had been some time here, and am unable to describe to you, the degree of frenzy existing here about the slave trade. People in general appear to think that it would suit the policy of the nation to go to war to put an end to that *abominable* traffic, and many wish that we should take the field on this new crusade. All

agree that no favour can be shown to a slave-trading country; and as Spain, next to Portugal, is supposed to be the country which gives most protection to this trade, the interests and wishes of Spain are but little attended to here. Besides, it is not easy to describe the unpopularity attached to the king's name, from the occurrences at his return to Madrid. The newspapers afford some specimen of it; but at a late dinner at Guildhall I recommended to the lord mayor to drink the King of Spain's health, and he told me that he was become so unpopular in the city, he was afraid that, if the toast were not positively refused, it would at least be received with so much disgust as to render it very disagreeable to me and to every well-wisher to the Spanish government." *

Upon the Duke of Wellington, the abolition of negro slavery had been enforced by the popular writings of the day as the chief end and object of his embassy; and it was desired, that as nothing could be expected from Ferdinand, on whose white slaves at home the dungeons of the Inquisition had been re-opened, the sympathies of the French monarch might be enlisted in a cause, in principle based on humanity, but probably in the abstract as injurious to those whose condition it proposed to ameliorate, as embarrassing to the best interests of property and commerce. That this diplomacy would succeed, the Duke of Wellington never entertained the slightest expectation; and from just reasoning he came to a correct conclusion. "I do not think," he wrote, "that there is the smallest prospect at present of prevailing upon the French government to abolish the trade entirely within the period of five years. The king told me that he could no more attempt to force the inclinations of his people upon this subject than the King of England could the inclinations of his.

"There are but few persons now in France who have turned their attention to the slave trade, and those few are

* London, 20th July, 1814.

proprietors in the colonies or speculators in the trade, and interested in carrying it on. I am sorry to say that there is a very large interest of the former in the House of Peers; and it is not easy to believe what an influence the proprietors of St. Domingo have on all the measures of the government. The proposition to abolish the slave trade is foolishly enough connected with other recollections of the revolutionary days of 1789 and 1790, and is generally unpopular. It is not believed that we are in earnest about it, or have abolished the trade on the score of its inhumanity. It is thought to have been a commercial speculation, and by some to have been occasioned by the continental system; and that, having abolished the trade ourselves with a view to prevent the undue increase of colonial produce in our stores, of which we could not dispose, we now want to prevent other nations from cultivating their colonies to the utmost of their power.

"These impressions can be overcome only by time and perseverance; but till they are overcome, I acknowledge that I do not think the king has the power to do more than prevent the trade of his subjects on that part of the coast from which we have expelled it."*

The Duke had proceeded to Paris by the Netherlands, where the army under Lord Lynedoch was still cantoned. The British government were anxious that the Belgian frontier should be subjected to a military survey, and a report made how far the country was defensible. This was effected by the Duke, assisted by Colonels Smith and Pasley —and by a curious fatality, that country which was to witness his greatest effort, and crown a series of successes, had its capabilities of defence thus detailed in a memorandum addressed to Earl Bathurst.†

"The frontier on which it is the object of this memorandum to suggest the principles on which it should be defended extends from Liege along the Meuse and the

* Paris, 15th Sept. 1814. † Paris, 22d Sept. 1814.

Sambre to Namur and Charleroi, and thence by Mons to Tournay and the sea.

" It is intersected by roads, canals, and rivers, running in all directions from the French territory, and some one or other of the numerous French fortresses opposite to it.

" The face of the country is generally open, and affords no feature upon which reliance can be placed to establish any defensive system.

" With all these disadvantages, this country must be defended in the best manner that is possible. In the partition which has been made of the different portions of the French territory which have fallen vacant in consequence of the operations of the last campaign, it has been joined to Holland, not solely with a view to augment the pecuniary resources of that country, and its means of raising an army, but to give additional security to its frontier, by placing in the hands of the government of the Dutch provinces those countries which were always deemed essential to their defence, and from the whole to form a state on the northern frontier of France, which, by its resources, its military strength and situation, should be a bulwark to Europe on that side.

" To provide the best defence that can be devised for these provinces will be not only to perform the condition implied in the acceptance of their government from the allied courts, but it is likewise a duty to their inhabitants. It cannot be expected that the government of the new sovereign should settle, or that the inhabitants should be so industrious as they ought to be, if they should see themselves exposed to be abandoned upon the first appearance of hostilities with their powerful neighbour.

" Whatever may be the difficulty then of finding a system for the defence of those provinces, it is obvious that they must be defended. The object is to discover the mode of defending them which shall best secure the end in view, shall be best adapted to the political connexion of these provinces with Holland and other countries, and shall be most

consistent with the military establishment, and least burthensome to the finances of the Dutch government.

" The Netherlands having been joined with Holland, the connexion between those countries must be kept in view in discussing the system of defence for the frontier of the former; and likewise that it is probable that the disposable armies of Great Britain and Hanover would cooperate in the defence of these provinces.

" The secure communication then with England and the north of Germany is an essential object in any system of defence to be adopted, and, above all, that with Breda and Bergen op Zoom, and with the Dutch places in the Lower Meuse and Lower Rhine.

" The operations of the revolutionary war have tended in some degree to put strong places out of fashion; and an opinion prevails, which has been a good deal confirmed by the operations of the last campaign, that strong places are but little useful, and at all events are not worth the expense which they cost. Much may be urged against these new doctrines as applicable to any theatre of war; but, in respect to that under discussion, it is only necessary to remind those who are to consider and decide upon this subject, that in the war of the revolution the whole of the Austrian Netherlands and the Pays de Liege, from the French frontiers to the Meuse, those very provinces fell into the hands of the enemy in consequence of one unsuccessful battle of no very great importance in itself, fought near Mons; that the allies regained them with equal rapidity in the following campaign, when they had a superiority of force; and that, very imperfect field works only having been thrown up at some points during the period of their possession by the allies, the enemy did not find it so easy as they had before, and it required much more time to get possession of the country when the enemy regained the superiority of force in the year 1794, notwithstanding that that superiority was much more commanding than it had been in November 1792.

"It cannot be expected that, in the event of the commencement of hostilities, the French should not be superior to the allies in the Netherlands in the first instance; and, unless the country should be in some manner strengthened, the same misfortune as occurred in 1792 must be the consequence.

"The general unpopularity attached to fortifications, their expense, and the difficulty in remedying the defects of the situation of some of the ancient fortresses in the Netherlands, induced me to endeavour to find a situation which, being strongly fortified, might cover the country, and which the enemy would not venture to pass; but I could find no situation which would answer the purpose. First, there is no situation in the country which affords any advantages to be taken up as a fortress, or which covers or protects any extent of country; secondly, there is no situation to which the enemy could not have an easy access both by land and by water for the artillery and stores necessary to attack it; and, thirdly, there is no single situation in the country which, if fortified, the enemy might not pass without risk, as, in case of being defeated and obliged to retire, he could not fail to find innumerable roads which would lead him to some one or other of the strong places on the French frontier.

"The construction of such a place, therefore, might be attended by the most serious consequences to the allies, while it could under any circumstances be of but little detriment to the French.

"It is obvious then that the country must be fortified upon the old principle; and, considering by whom it was fortified formerly, the local advantages of the sites of some of the old fortifications, and that in many instances they present the means of inundating the country, upon which it must in a great degree depend for its defence, and the expense to be saved by adhering to the old plans in almost all, I am inclined to recommend that the old situations should in every instance be adhered to, and the old sites,

with the modern improvements in the flanks, should in almost every instance be followed.

"By the adoption of the system above recommended it will be observed that all the principal objects to be attended to are secured. The right of the line from the Scheldt to the sea, will be made so strong as, with the aid of inundation, to be quite secure even though left entirely to its garrisons; and it must be observed that, owing to the great command of water in this part, the expense of the works to be constructed, and the time they will take, will be much diminished. The disposable army, then, having its communications with Holland secured by the strength of the right of the line and by Antwerp, will be applicable entirely to the defence of the left.

"I do not consider that in a memorandum of this description it is desirable, nor in the cursory view which I have taken of the Netherlands can it be expected, that I should point out the positions to be taken by the disposable armies which can be allotted for their defence. Those which I should point out would be good or bad according to the strength with which they should be occupied, according to that of the enemy, and, supposing the enemy to be on the offensive, according to his plan of attack. The same reasoning applies to the fortification of positions beforehand for armies to occupy eventually. The fortification of these positions cannot be a secret, and, in a country such as these provinces, no position can be taken with an army which is not liable to be turned, and which would not be turned if the works on it were to be previously constructed.

"There are, however, good positions for an army at La Trinité and at Renaix behind Tournay; another between Tournay and Mons, on the high grounds about Blaton; there are many good positions about Mons; the course of the Haine from Binch towards Mons would afford some good ones; about Nivelle, and between that and Binch, there are many advantageous positions; and *the entrance of the forêt de Soignies by the high road which leads to*

Brussels from Binch, Charleroi, and Namur, would, if worked upon, afford others.

" Having given my opinion upon the general principle on which these provinces should be defended, I proceed to point out the mode in which preparations should be made to carry into execution what I have proposed, if it is approved of, and the mode in which the work should be executed. First, I recommend that a committee of British, and another of Dutch engineers, should be appointed to go to each of the places above pointed out to be fortified, and that they should form detailed plans, with sections, &c. of the works to be executed, with estimates of the expense to be incurred, and a *mémoire raisonné* upon each fortification, pointing out the garrison required for its defence, and their reasons for thinking such garrison ' necessary.'

" Secondly; with this information the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands will have it in his power to select such of the plans as he may think proper, and to employ those officers for the execution of whose plans and estimates he may approve.

" Thirdly; in the execution all the earth work should be completed without loss of time. The foundations of the revêtements in masonry are perfect in almost every one of the fortresses which I viewed; and the rubbish should be cleared from the revêtements and ditches, and the works should be raised to the requisite height in earth, leaving room for the revêtement in masonry to be completed as the materials may be collected and circumstances may afford opportunities."

While the general pacification of Europe was being effected, the contest between England and the United States had been carried on with varied success, and with a spirit which indicated on both sides a firm resolution of enforcing by the sword, the rights to which each country considered herself entitled. While the peace of Paris enabled Britain to direct her mighty resources against the only power with

which she was at variance, the States passed an enactment to increase their military establishment by forty thousand men. For carrying this plan into execution, a bill was introduced, which provided that the white male inhabitants of the United States, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, should be distributed into classes of twenty-five in each, every class to furnish one able-bodied man to serve during the war—that assessors should determine the territorial precincts of each class, so that the property in each division should be as nearly equal as possible—that in case of failure, a penalty should be levied on each class, to be divided among them in proportion to the property of individuals — and that every five male inhabitants liable to military duty, who should join to furnish one soldier during the war, should be exempt from service.

Whilst measures were thus agitating, which seemed to portend a renewal of hostilities in the coming year on a scale proportioned to the force of the two contending powers, the commissioners at Ghen, anxious to restore the blessings of peace to both countries, compromised their differences, and on December 24 signed a treaty of peace and amity between Great Britain and the United States.*

A national excitement terminates generally in the disappointment following upon success, or in the bitterer feelings produced by unexpected reverses. In Britain the harmless absurdity which supposed that a slave emancipation should form a rider to a treaty, which secured the pacification of Europe, was very different to the deadly hatred that lowered pride and altered fortunes † had produced in France.

* Annual Register, 1814.

† "With scarcely any exceptions, both officers and soldiers retained a high sentimental attachment to the man who so long had led them to glory and victory, and under whose banners, notwithstanding recent disasters, they fondly regarded themselves as destined to retrieve their own importance, and the honour of their country. The imperial rank, which he had been still suffered to preserve, maintained his titular dignity; and his position at Elba, separated only by a narrow space of sea, kept him in constant view, and allowed a ready intercourse with his partizans."—*Annual Register.*

During a quarter of a century, the French people had at one time been stimulated by the frenzied movements of a revolution, and at another, intoxicated by continued success, and deluded into a belief that in arms their legions were invincible. A country essentially military like France, differed from the commercial population of her great opponent. With one, the sword was readily turned to the ploughshare, for most of her soldiery had in earlier life been either engaged in manufacturing or agricultural pursuits. With the other, there were thousands whose trade was war—and war conducted upon principles, which unfitted the soldier in peaceful times from adopting any honest or profitable alternative. Hence, in France, and probably to half a million persons, peace was not only humiliating but ruinous. The enormous war establishment was suddenly and extensively reduced; and a dangerous portion of the community flung loose upon the country, with neither an inclination to adopt more peaceful callings, nor the power, had they possessed the wish, of becoming useful members of the commonwealth.* Partial disturbances occasionally betrayed the state of popular temper—and circumstances in themselves of trifling importance evinced the unsettled feelings of the French. While in Paris an excommunicated actress was interred with shouts of *Vive le Roi!* at Rennes, the head of a royalist commissioner was demanded by the mob, whose excesses if not caused were certainly encouraged by the authorities who should have suppressed them. "Neither the magistrates nor the military in the town interfered, notwithstanding that the riot lasted from ten in the morning till dark the first day, and had been renewed

* The same uneasiness still exists in regard to the discontented in Paris; but there has been no act of riot, and all accounts agree in stating that Monsieur has been received throughout his tour in the southern provinces with an extraordinary degree of enthusiasm. This tends to prove that the sentiments of the people are really favourable to the House of Bourbon; but the danger is not in that quarter, but among the discontented officers of the army, and others, heretofore in the civil departments of the service, now without employment.—*Paris, 20th October*, 1814.

on the two following days. The inactivity of the former was attributed not less to the disinclination of the latter to act than to design; and it was generally understood, and indeed was probable, that the préfet and the military officers were the original promoters of and encouraged the riot; in which the principal actors were the bourgeoisie and the Etudians en Droit, who it will be recollected were the principal promoters of all the revolutionary measures in the same town."*

Such was the feverish state of France at the commencement of a year that opened "big with events." Early in February the Duke of Wellington repaired from Paris to Vienna to replace Lord Castlereagh, whose presence was deemed so indispensable at home before the meeting of the British parliament, that, though the Congress was still engaged, as it had been since the preceding October, he was obliged to absent himself from its deliberations, and nominate a successor. Months had passed—the manifold and conflicting interests of the several European powers required so much consideration, that the progress of the general settlement was necessarily slow. The attitude of the continent presented the appearance of an armed peace, for each state maintained a war establishment, and seemed to be preparing rather for the field, than seeking the repose to which, for a quarter of a century, Europe had been a stranger. This delay, however, in resuming peaceful relations proved most fortunate—for one of the most singular events which history records suddenly and unexpectedly occurred—Napoleon's escape from Elba.

The effect produced by this extraordinary attempt, when the intelligence reached Vienna, is thus detailed by the Duke of Wellington in a despatch to Lord Castlereagh:†—

"I received here on the 7th instant a despatch from Lord Burghersh, of the 1st, giving an account that Bonaparte

* Letter to Lord Castlereagh, dated Paris, 19th January, 1815.

† Dated Vienna, 12th March, 1815.

had quitted the island of Elba, with all his civil and military officers, and about 1200 troops, on the 26th of February. I immediately communicated this account to the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and to the King of Prussia, and to the ministers of the different powers, and I found among all one prevailing sentiment, of a determination to unite their efforts to support the system established by the peace of Paris.

"As it was uncertain to what quarter Bonaparte had gone, whether he would not return to Elba, or would even land on any part of the continent, it was agreed that it was best to postpone the adoption of any measure till his farther progress should be ascertained; and we have since received accounts from Genoa, stating that he had landed in France, near Cannes, on the 1st of March; had attempted to get possession of Antibes, and had been repulsed, and that he was on his march towards Grasse.

"No accounts had been received at Paris as late as the middle of the day of the 5th of his having quitted Elba, nor any accounts from any quarter of his farther progress.

"In the mean time the sovereigns, and all persons assembled here, are impressed with the importance of the crisis which this circumstance occasions in the affairs of the world. All are desirous of bringing to an early conclusion the business of the Congress, in order that the whole and undivided attention and exertion of all may be directed against the common enemy; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, even if Bonaparte should be able to form a party for himself in France, capable of making head against the legitimate government of that country, such a force will be assembled by the powers of Europe, directed by such a spirit in their councils, as must get the better of him.

"The Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia have despatched letters to the King of France, to place at his Majesty's disposal all their respective forces; and Austrian and Prussian officers are despatched with the

letters, with powers to order the movement of the troops of their respective countries placed on the French frontiers, at the suggestion of the King of France.

"The plenipotentiaries of the eight powers who signed the Treaty of Paris assembled this evening, and have resolved to publish a declaration, in which they will, in the name of their sovereigns, declare their firm resolution to maintain the peace and all its articles with all their force, if necessary. I enclose the draught of what is proposed to be published, which, with the alteration of some expressions and the omission of one or two paragraphs, will, I believe, be adopted.

"Upon the whole, I assure your Lordship that I am perfectly satisfied with the spirit which prevails here upon this occasion; and I do not entertain the smallest doubt that, if unfortunately it should be possible for Bonaparte to hold at all against the King of France, he must fall under the cordially united efforts of the sovereigns of Europe."

Whatever trifling differences might have hitherto prevailed among the members of the Congress, regarding territorial or financial questions, every consideration yielded now to the emergency of the day; and all cordially united in one design, and expressed a firm determination of maintaining the Treaty of Paris inviolate, and placing the disturber of Europe without the pale of civil and social relations. Accordingly, on the 13th of March, the following "Declaration" was signed and promulgated by plenipotentiaries* on the part of their respective courts:—

"The powers who have signed the Treaty of Paris, assembled in Congress at Vienna, being informed of the escape of Napoleon Bonaparte, and of his entrance into France with an armed force, owe it to their own dignity

* Austrian, Spanish, French, British, Portuguese, Prussian, Russian, and Swedish—a wonderful confederation.

and the interest of social order, to make a solemn declaration of the sentiments which this event has excited in them.

" By thus breaking the convention which established him in the Island of Elba, Bonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended: by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe, that there can be neither peace nor truce with him. The powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Bonaparte has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance.

" They declare, at the same time, that firmly resolved to maintain entire the Treaty of Paris, of 30th of May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall hereafter resolve on, to complete and consolidate it, they will employ all their means and will unite all their efforts, that the general peace, the objects of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled, and to guarantee against every attempt which shall threaten to replunge the world into the disorders and miseries of revolutions.*

" And although entirely persuaded that all France, rallying round its legitimate sovereign, will immediately annihilate this attempt of a criminal and impotent delirium; all the sovereigns of Europe, animated by the same sentiments, and guided by the same principles, declare, that if, contrary to all calculations, there should result from these events any real danger, they will be ready to give to the King of France and to the French nation, or to any other government that shall be attacked, as soon as they shall be called upon, all the assistance requisite to restore public tranquillity, and to make a common cause against all those who should undertake to compromise it.

* Appendix, No. I.

"The present declaration inserted in the Register of the Congress assembled at Vienna on the 13th of March, 1815, shall be made public.

"Done and attested by the plenipotentiaries of the high powers who signed the Treaty of Paris."

"*Vienna, March* 13, 1815."

The singular detail of Napoleon's successful escape from Elba will be found elsewhere;* and it will be only necessary to give a summary of his adventurous attempt, from his landing in Provence to his arrival in Paris.

When the descent at Cannes was reported in the capital, both chambers were hastily convoked on the 6th, and subsequently the ex-emperor was declared "a rebel and a traitor." In the mean time his progress was unopposed; and not only loose adventurers, but whole regiments joined him as he hurried towards the capital. At first he announced himself lieutenant to his son; but at Lyons, reassuming the purple, he addressed the French people in his own name, heading his manifesto "By the grace of God, and the constitutions of the empire, Emperor of the French." Declaring every thing "null and void" which had taken place since his abdication, he abolished all orders and appointments, and convoked a general meeting of the authorities to re-establish a constitution, giving to this extraordinary assembly the title of "Champ de Mai."

On the 28th of March the Duke of Wellington was placed over the armies in the Netherlands; the Prince of Orange resigning the chief command,† and accepting a

* Appendix, No. I.

† On the 10th of April, his royal highness the Prince of Orange took leave of the army in a General Order, in which he stated that in delivering over the troops, he congratulated them on that command being placed in the abler hands of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington. After thanking Sir Henry Clinton, the general officers, and the heads of the departments, for their cordial support, he bore an honourable testimony to the conduct of the troops while they had remained in quarters; and justly added, that he considered their excellent discipline during peace, as the best assurance of what might be expected when their services should be required in the field.

subordinate appointment. Early on the morning of the 5th of April the Duke reached Brussels; and startling events, "each in itself a history," followed in quick succession.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS OF THE ALLIES — MURAT'S EXCITE SUSPICION — DECLARATION OF VIENNA IMPUGNED IN PARLIAMENT—DUKE OF WELLINGTON JUSTIFIES IT — NAPOLEON'S MANIFESTO — HE ADDRESSES THE SEVERAL MONARCHS PERSONALLY—REPLICATION OF THE SOVEREIGNS—NAPOLEON'S PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE—GARRISONS THE FORTRESSES, AND PUTS PARIS IN A STATE OF DEFENCE—MURAT'S DISASTROUS CAMPAIGN—THE CHAMP DE MAI — ASSEMBLY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY — ALLIED CONFEDERACY— NAPOLEON JOINS THE ARMY ON THE FRONTIER, AND OPENS HIS LAST CAMPAIGN.

THE military dispositions of the allies to render unavailing Napoleon's efforts to regain that throne, from which, most fortunately for the peace of Europe, they had succeeded in removing him, were framed on a magnitude to achieve the end, should the French nation prove faithless to the Bourbons. In other quarters symptoms of disquiet had appeared. Murat had been arming with suspicious haste; and as his dissatisfaction at the present state of things was not concealed, his warlike preparations could be intended for no purpose but to disturb the existing tranquillity of the continent; and hence, it was necessary that Italy should be secured from his aggressions. To hold the Neapolitan army in check, a corps of 150,000 Austrian troops was made available. Two hundred thousand Austrian, Bavarian, and Confederated Germans, were ordered to collect upon the Upper Rhine—an equal number of Prussian, British, and Hanoverian were to occupy Flanders—the whole to be supported by a grand reserve of 200,000 Russians—and thus more than 700,000 men would promptly be in active operation.

It will appear, however, singularly unaccountable, that while the most serious consequences were to be dreaded from Napoleon's evasion, in England the danger seemed unfelt, and the government treated it as an ordinary event requiring no additional exertion. By the treaty of Chaumont, it was arranged that Great Britain should increase her forces on the continent; and the Duke of Wellington urged the necessity of that part of the treaty being immediately carried into effect;* but so supine were the ministry that even the militias were not called out, while every moment was of deep importance, and Napoleon's military strength progressing with giant strides. The Declaration of the allies was impugned in parliament as a document which went far to encourage assassination—and forgetting that the insatiate ambition of a restless man would probably cause the slaughter of a million, there were found in the British senate many, who with mawkish sensibility, reprobated the Duke for being party to a treaty that eventually secured the world's peace, and deprived the disturber of the continent of the future power of being mischievous. The Duke of Wellington felt and expressed the injustice of thus attacking "a servant of the public when absent on public service, day after day;" and in a letter to his brother, justified the allied Declaration by reasoning that was not to be contravened.

* "If you could let me have 40,000 good British infantry, besides those you insist upon having in garrisons, the proportion settled by treaty that you are to furnish of cavalry, that is to say, the eighth of 150,000 men, including in both the old German legion, and 150 pieces of British field artillery fully horsed, I should be satisfied, and take my chance for the rest, and engage that we would play our part in the game. But, as it is, we are in a bad way.

"I beg that your Lordship will take this proposition into consideration.

* * * * * *

"I have got an infamous army, very weak and ill equipped, and a very inexperienced staff, in my opinion they are doing nothing in England. They have not raised a man; they have not called out the militia either in England or Ireland; are unable to send me any thing; and they have not sent a message to Parliament about the money. The war spirit is therefore evaporating, as I am informed."—*Extracts from the Duke's Letters.*

"If," he said, "I have done any thing wrong or unbecoming my own character, or that of the station I filled, I ought to be prosecuted, or at least censured for it, in consequence of a specified motion on the subject; but it is not fair to give to the act of any individual a construction it will not fairly bear — a construction which no man breathing believes it was intended to bear—and to charge him home with being an assassin day after day in speeches, and never in form.

"I say, first, that the Declaration has never been accurately translated; and the meaning of the words *vindicte publique* is not 'public vengeance,' but 'public justice.' But, if even the meaning was 'public vengeance,' the Declaration does not deliver Bonaparte over to the dagger of the assassin. When did the dagger of the assassin execute the vengeance of the public?

"In regard to his being declared '*hors de la loi*;' first it must be recollected at what period and under what circumstances he was so declared. The period was the 13th of March; and, although we knew Bonaparte had landed and had made progress in France sufficient to create a contest there, we were not aware that he could be established without firing a shot. The object then of this part of the publication was to strengthen the hands of the King of France by the opinion of the Congress.

"Secondly; was he not '*hors de la loi?*' and had he or not broken all the ties which connected him with the world? The only treaty by which he was connected with the world was that of Fontainebleau—that he broke. Having quitted his asylum, he landed in France with such a force as showed that he relied solely upon treachery and rebellion, not only for success, but for safety. He incurred all risks in order to gain the greatest prize in Europe, one which he had abandoned only ten months before under a treaty with the allied powers; and is it possible that it can be gravely asserted that Bonaparte, an individual like any other, should have been guilty by this act of only a breach of treaty? If he

was guilty of more, of which there can be no doubt, it was of the crime of rebellion and treason, with a view to usurp the sovereign authority of France; a crime which has always been deemed '*hors de la loi*' so far as this, that all sovereigns have in all times called upon their subjects to raise their arms to protect them from him who was guilty of it. The declaration does no more. This is my reasoning upon the subject. I am perfectly satisfied with what you said on the night of the 28th of April; but I only hope that ——— may not go off with the notion that I acted without reflection upon this occasion.

"I never knew any paper so discussed as the Declaration was; and I believe there never was a public paper so successful, particularly in Italy and France."

The Declaration of Vienna was calculated to produce a sensation in France, which Napoleon would have willingly avoided. To prevent its dissemination was impossible; and he thought it expedient to counteract its effects, by accompanying the document with a manifesto of his own. This contained an elaborate justification of his enterprise, a specific detail of the grievances, real or imaginary, which were cited as the pretexts for invading France, and an appeal to the law of nations, against the doctrine supposed to be inculcated by the language of that celebrated anathema. But the assertions and arguments of Napoleon were feeble apologies for a wanton interruption of those peaceful relations which his reappearance was certain to disturb; and if a portion of the French nation, misled by personal attachment, were blind to the flimsy veil with which he would have shrouded the workings of inexcusable ambition, others viewed the act in its true colours, and trembled for the consequences that should follow.

None saw more clearly the results which his madness must produce than the aggressor; and he made a last, but ineffectual, attempt to avert the hostility of Europe, and obtain a recognition of his power from the allied sovereigns.

Abandoning the usual mode of official communication between governments, and imitating his conduct when elected to the consular throne, Napoleon addressed a letter personally to the different monarchs. But the allies were not to be imposed upon by assurances of peaceful intentions, from one who for years had deluged the continent in blood. Napoleon's letter was returned from the British Cabinet unopened;* and at Vienna, it elicited from the Congress a fresh Declaration of personal hostility, which neither concessions nor promises could avert. The reasoning in the replication of the sovereigns was unanswerable; and assurances, expressed by Napoleon in his overtures, that in Europe henceforth "no other rivalry should be known than that of promoting the blessings of peace—no other contention, than the sacred one of advancing the felicity of mankind," were treated with incredulity and contempt. "The man," said the Congress in reply, "who now offers to sanction the Treaty of Paris, and pretends to substitute his guarantee for that of a sovereign whose loyalty was unstained, and benevolence unbounded, is the same who, for fifteen years, has ravaged and convulsed the earth to find food for his ambition; who has sacrificed millions of victims, and the happiness of a whole generation, to a system of conquest, which truces, little entitled to the name of peace, have only served to render more oppressive and more odious; who, after having by his wild enterprises wearied even Fortune, armed all Europe against him, and exhausted all the resources of France, has been compelled to renounce his projects, and abdicate his power, in order to secure the wreck of his existence; who, at a time when the nations of Europe indulged in the hope of enjoying permanent repose, has meditated fresh catastrophes, and by an act of double treason, to the powers who too generously spared him, and to a government which he could attack only through the blackest treachery, has

* Castlereagh's Note to Caulincourt, April, 8, 1815; Clancarty's Despatch, Vienna, May 6, 1815.

usurped a throne which he had renounced, and which he had occupied only to inflict misery on France and on the world. This man has no other guarantee to propose to Europe but his word; but after the fatal experience of fifteen years who would be rash enough to accept that guarantee? Peace with a government placed in such hands, and composed of such elements, would prove only a perpetual state of uncertainty, anxiety, and danger. No power could really disarm; nations would not enjoy any of the advantages of a true peace: they would be crushed by inevitable expenses. As confidence would nowhere revive, industry and commerce would everywhere languish; as there would be no stability in political relations, gloomy discontent would sit brooding over every country, and agitated Europe would be in daily fear of fresh explosions."

Had Napoleon really expected that professions, falsified by every action of his life, would avert the storm that was collecting, the firm and uncompromising rejection of his overtures would have dissipated the hope. The sword was drawn, and the scabbard was thrown away. Through blood he had waded to a throne—by bloodshed only could that elevation be maintained—and with a desperate resolution he proceeded to attain the means by which he could secure the object of a guilty ambition. With few exceptions, every man in France between the ages of twenty and sixty was called out, and commissioners were spread over the country to urge forward a general enlistment. The columns of the Moniteur were daily filled with the most exaggerated accounts of warlike preparation. "The aggregate was vauntingly computed at above 2,000,000 of effective men; but not more than one-tenth was actually equipped and took the field. The imperial guard was re-established, and consisted of eighty infantry regiments, five regiments of cavalry, several corps of gendarmerie, engineers, &c., composing a total of more than 40,000 men. Unceasing exertions were made to provide a powerful artillery, which was always an important point in Napoleon's preparations,"

and that they were successful, was sufficiently proved by the number of cannon abandoned at the rout of Waterloo.

Napoleon's exertions were equally directed to obtain means for aggression and defence; and while an enormous army was rapidly embodied, the positions and places of strength extending from the capital to the frontiers were completed. "Napoleon also wished to fortify Paris, and inquired of Carnot how much time and money would be necessary. 'Two hundred millions, and three years,' replied the minister, 'and when it is finished, I would ask only 60,000 men and twenty-four hours to demolish the whole.' Bonaparte concealed his resentment at this answer, and persisted in a partial execution of his purpose. The heights of Montmartre, of Chaumont, and of Mesnil-Montant were fortified, but the Parisians viewed the labour with natural alarm. It betrayed two probable events; that Napoleon calculated upon the advance of the enemy as far as the capital, and that he was determined to endure a siege—either of them sufficient to inspire terror."*

While thus occupied, Napoleon had the mortification to learn that Murat, deaf to his remonstrances, had consummated his previous folly, by an advance upon the papal territories. On the 4th of April, with one wing of his army, he defeated Bianchi on the Tanaro, and entered Modena—but his left wing was totally defeated by Count Nugent. Finding that Naples was threatened by the British fleet, Joachim commenced a retreat, and proposed an armistice that was refused. On the 26th the Austrian vanguard reached Rimini; and on the next day, Count Nugent entered Rome. On the 28th Murat was wounded in an affair near Gambia—but the fatal blow was struck upon the 3d of May. On the 2d, the Austrians crossed his line of march near Tolentino; and on the next morning, their reserve having come up, the Neapolitan army was defeated and dispersed—and so totally disorganized, that when Murat reached his capital, his escort was reduced

* Historical Account, &c.

to four lancers. On the 21st he sailed for France; and on the 23d the Austrian advanced guard entered Naples, and the restoration of the deposed king (Ferdinand) was effected without bloodshed. Such was the brief history of an attempt which, if better timed and more ably concerted,* might have seriously embarrassed the allies, and caused a powerful diversion in favour of Napoleon.

While these events were occurring in Italy, Napoleon was incessantly engaged with military preparations, and the framing of a new constitution which was to be promulgated at an approaching pageant, designated the *Champ de Mai*, —a festival, by curious contradiction, taking place on *the 1st of June*, and holden in the *Champ de Mars*. Than this singular ceremonial nothing could be more anomalous or absurd. Mass was performed by an archbishop,† accompanied, not by "the swelling organ," but the thunder of artillery; and the remainder of the scene was divided between acclamations and prayers. The Deputy Dubois addressed Napoleon, and he in turn harangued the crowd. Oaths were administered—eagles introduced and distri-

* "As he wished to make common cause with Napoleon, he ought to have organised a force of a hundred thousand men in five corps, each of twenty thousand, without any other equipment than their arms. He should have precipitated himself, like a torrent, upon Turin, by Rome, Sienne, Florence, Sarzanne, Chiavari, Acqui, and Asti. This bold movement would have intimidated the King of Sardinia, who would probably have proposed some arrangement. The Austrians, not being attacked, would have remained merely spectators, and Murat would have established his communications with Napoleon. So far from this manœuvre tending to expose the kingdom of Naples, it would have drawn the enemy's forces in an opposite direction, and Murat had all the officers of his army as hostages for his family. He might have been master of Turin by the 25th of April, as well as of Mont St. Bernard, Mont Cenis, and the Col-de-Tende. As he drew his sword from its scabbard for Napoleon, he ought to have adopted the concentric system, and advanced to form the right wing of his brother-in-law's army, by leading his last man, and bringing, or sending by sea, the two hundred millions in gold which he had amassed in his coffers."—*Sarrazin. Hist. de la Guerre de la Restauration.*

† "In the centre was placed an altar, surmounted with a canopy, and encircled with seats for the priests, musicians, and others. Napoleon is described, however, as paying but little attention to the celebration of mass, being more occupied with viewing the assembly through an opera-glass, than with his devotions."—*Mudford.*

buted—and the whole concluded by a military spectacle, in which 50,000 men defiled before the emperor.

On the 8th of June, Napoleon opened an imperial session, distinguished for its tumultuous debates and ephemeral existence. To an address of the representatives, he returned a reply "full of oracular nothings," excepting that he informed these authorities, that "on that night he would depart to place himself at the head of his army." He was evidently annoyed at the disorder and indecency which marked the first proceedings of the legislative body he had established — and he deprecated its continuance. "All public discussion which may tend to diminish, directly or indirectly, the confidence which ought to be placed in its dispositions, would be a misfortune to the state: we should find ourselves amid rocks, without a compass and without a rudder. The crisis in which we are placed is imminent."*

Imminent indeed it was — and well might Napoleon tremble when he contemplated the mighty power leagued together, avowedly to effect his overthrow. "History does not record an instance of a confederacy so numerous and so gigantic, linked together by such perfect unanimity and concord. One common spirit impelled and regulated the whole. No petty jealousies, no disheartening doubts, no separate interests were permitted to prevail. The vast machine moved onwards with portentous energy. Army after army traversed the plains of Germany, and hovered upon the confines of France, waiting the appointed moment when they should rush to battle, and spread over that devoted land fire, and carnage, and desolation. Renowned generals appeared on either side, and nothing could be hoped from negligence or mischance. A fierce and sanguinary struggle, between the bravest troops, guided by the most experienced commanders, could alone decide the issue. It might also be called a war of heroes; for never, perhaps, were such disciplined veterans opposed to each other. Bravery was the distinction of none, where all had been nurtured in warlike habits, and had stood the

* Moniteur, 12th June, 1815

shock of many a stubborn field. Slight exceptions cannot destroy this characteristic of the whole. The warriors who emancipated Europe in 1814, were again embattled in the same cause. Those banners were once more unfurled, which had waved in triumph before the walls of Dresden, Leipsic, Salamanca, Vitoria, Toulouse, and Paris. Could it be feared that victory would now desert them? The motive, the will, the instruments were the same: and, without presumption, reason might presage the result would correspond."*

Napoleon's journey was secret and expeditious. Before day-light on the 12th he quitted the capital, and on the 14th joined the army collected on the frontier. Ere sun-rise next morning he was dressed, and at dawn he was on horseback. His *corps-d'armée* were already in march—the Prussian outposts driven in—and a last campaign opened, which three days virtually concluded.

* Mudford.

CHAPTER XXIX.

STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF THE ALLIED ARMY—ITS DISTRIBUTION—PRUSSIAN ARMY—ITS STRENGTH, ORGANIZATION, AND POSITIONS—FRENCH ARMY—ITS FORMATION, STRENGTH, AND SUPERIORITY OVER THE ANGLO-BELGIAN—MOVEMENTS OF THE FRENCH ARMY—GENERAL ORDER—NAPOLEON COMMENCES HOSTILITIES—ZIETHEN DRIVEN BACK, AND BLUCHER TAKES A POSITION—WELLINGTON DIRECTS HIS SCATTERED CORPS TO MARCH ON QUATRE BRAS—OFFICIAL DESPATCH ADDRESSED TO EARL BATHURST.

In strength and composition the hostile armies differed essentially from each other; and the numerical estimates given by military writers are so irregular and conflicting, that a careful examination of their various statements is required, before an accurate conclusion can be arrived at.

Of the three armies now collected on the French frontier, that commanded by the Duke of Wellington was the weakest and the worst. It was, with few exceptions, a "green army," formed of a mixed force, comprising British, Hanoverian, and Belgian troops, with the contingents of Nassau and Brunswick Oels. Its effective strength on the 15th of June was 78,500 men, of whom 53,000 only were British, Germans, and Hanoverians. On the 18th its numbers were considerably reduced—for by that morning's returns, the grand total of the force under the immediate orders of the Duke of Wellington, was 74,040 men.

The general distribution of the army, previously to the commencement of hostilities, was as follows: the right wing, under Lord Hill, was near Ath; the left, under the Prince of Orange, at Brain-le-Comte and Nivelles; a strong

corps of cavalry, under the Marquis of Anglesea, was quartered near Grammont; while a reserve, of all arms, occupied the city and vicinity of Brussels, where the Duke had fixed his head-quarters.

The Prussian army was considerably stronger than that termed British; and on the 27th of May it was fully concentrated on the Meuse—the 1st corps, commanded by Von Ziethen, being at Charleroi; the 2d, under Von Pirch, at Namur; the 3d, under Thielman, near Ciney; and the 4th, (Bulow's,) at Liege. Its total strength was returned at 115,000 men.

The French army, previous to the opening of hostilities, comprised the five grand corps which formed the armies of the North and the Moselle, and amounted, on a low calculation, to 150,000 men. The 1st corps was commanded by Drouet (Count d'Erlon); the 2d, by Reille; the 3d, by Vandamme; the 4th, by Gerard; and the 6th, by Lobau.* To these were attached four divisions of cavalry, under Pajol, Excelmans, Valmy, and Milhaud—the whole forming a distinct corps, commanded by Marshal Grouchy. There were, besides, two divisions of the guard, under Friard and Morand, making, according to a French return, a grand total of 154,370 men; of whom 24,750 were cavalry, 7,520 artillery, and 122,100 infantry, with 296 pieces of cannon.

While the French army exceeded the Duke of Wellington's in number, in its composition it was still more superior. The elements for its construction were ready for Napoleon's use—for the country was overrun with soldiers—men, according to Davoust's term, "whose trade was war, and whose battles were as many as their years." From the moment the return of the emperor was announced, these veterans hurried to his standards. To organize a

* "The respective strength of these five corps, including infantry, cavalry, artillery, &c., was as follows:—the 1st corps, 25,640; 2d corps, 30,840; 3d corps, 24,250; 4th corps, 17,700; 6th corps, 17,840.

practised soldiery was comparatively an easy task; and hence the army with which Napoleon crossed the frontier, as far as numbers went, was equal to any that he had ever directed on a battle field. That commanded by Lord Wellington was formed of very different materials. A mixed force, hastily collected, and imperfectly put together, what unity of operation could be expected in the hour of trial, from men whose languages were unknown to each other—whose dresses were unfamiliar to the eye—whose efficiency was untried—and whose courage and fidelity were doubtful? The greater portion of the peninsular soldiers had been unfortunately removed beyond recall. Half the regiments in Belgium were therefore, second battalions composed of militia men and recruits; and of the contingent troops, many were but recently embodied, and few had ever been under fire; "and yet, with this indifferent army, inferior in numbers, in discipline, in equipments, and in artillery, did the Duke of Wellington accomplish a triumph, unparalleled even in the series of his own great achievements."*

Napoleon had already directed the initial movements of the detached corps which were to comprise his grand army. Early in June, the 1st corps was at Valenciennes, the 2d at Mauberge, and head quarters at Laon. On the 5th and 6th, the army of the Moselle broke up from its cantonments round Metz, and advanced by Philipville, while the army of the north united itself to that of the Ardennes, at Beaumont, on the 13th. On his arrival at Avesnes, Napoleon found his whole force in line, and perfectly disposable to launch against that point of the frontier which might appear to him the most assailable. As yet his plans were as little known to his own officers as to those of the allies; but on the 14th, the publication of a General Order, partially disclosed his intentions; and his last address was made to the last army he was destined to command:—

* Mudford.

" Soldiers!

" This day is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland, which twice decided the destiny of Europe. Then, as after the battle of Austerlitz, as after the battle of Wagram, we were too generous. We believed in the protestations and in the oaths of princes, whom we left on their thrones. Now, however, leagued together, they aim at the independence, and the most sacred rights of France. They have committed the most unjust aggressions. Let us then march and meet them. Are not we and they still the same men? Soldiers! at Jena, against these same Prussians, now so arrogant, you were one to three, and at Montmirail one to six. Let those among you, who have been captives to the English, describe the nature of their prison-ships, and the horrible sufferings they endured. The Saxons, the Belgians, the Hanoverians, the soldiers of the Confederation of the Rhine, lament that they are obliged to use their arms in the cause of princes, who are the enemies of justice and the rights of all nations. They know that this coalition is insatiable. After having devoured twelve millions of Poles, twelve millions of Italians, one million of Saxons, and six millions of Belgians, it now wishes to devour the state of the second rank in Germany.

" Madmen! One moment of prosperity has bewildered them. The oppression and humiliation of the French people are beyond their reach: if they enter France, they will find their tomb there. Soldiers! we have forced marches to make, battles to fight, and dangers to encounter; but, if we are firm, victory will be ours. The rights, the honour, and the happiness of the country will be recovered. To every Frenchman who has a heart, the moment is now arrived, when he should either conquer or die!"*

At day-light, on the 15th, Napoleon commenced hosti-

* Dated Avesnes, June 14, 1815.

lities. His 2d corps crossed the Sambre, near Thuin, and drove in Ziethen's outposts, who fell back on Fleurus to concentrate with the Prussian corps. On both sides the fighting was determined. Charleroi was obstinately maintained; and although vigorously pressed by the French cavalry, Ziethen retreated with perfect steadiness. That evening Napoleon's head-quarters were at Charleroi.

The night of the 15th was employed by the emperor in passing his remaining divisions to the left bank of the Sambre, and by Blucher, in taking a position on which he might accept a battle. The 1st Prussian corps was posted at St. Amand; the 3d, at Brie; the 4th, at Ligny; and the 2d, in reserve. The attack on Ziethen was communicated to the Duke of Wellington at Brussels, at half-past four in the afternoon; but it was merely intimated that a sharp affair of outposts had occurred—for as yet the more serious operations of Napoleon were wrapped in mystery—and whether he would actually become assailant was uncertain.

Convinced that the emperor was determined to enter Belgium, the Duke of Wellington made the necessary dispositions to concentrate his army on the extremity of a position, immediately connecting his own left flank with the right wing of the Prussian army.

The point on which Wellington's detached corps were directed to unite, was a hamlet called Quatre Bras, standing on the intersection of the great road from Charleroi to Brussels, by that running from Namur to Nivelles. The village is small; and the adjacent country presents a surface in which wood-lands and corn-fields are intermixed. The Bois de Bossu is close to the hamlet; and its distance from Brussels is about twenty English miles.

The prudence of Napoleon's attack has been, and will ever be, a doubtful question. If judged by military rules, it was a dangerous experiment; and the whole operations appear to have been rather conceived in the spirit of desperate adventure, than under the sounder calculations

which should influence the decision of a commander.* His plans were beyond his power. One battle he might have delivered with effect—for two, his means were totally insufficient; his success at Ligny had therefore no results; and his repulse at Quatre Bras left him in a worse position than when he commenced hostilities. Finally, the issue proved that he dared much—did much—risked a desperate game—failed—and was ruined irretrievably.

More important events than those transacted between the 15th and 18th of June were never crowded in the page of history. All require separate details. But as the victor's despatch conveyed a general and faithful summary, it is given, as addressed to Earl Bathurst:†—

"Bonaparte, having collected the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps of the French army, and the Imperial Guards, and nearly all the cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that river and the Meuse, between the 10th and 14th of the month, advanced on the 15th and attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobbes, on the Sambre, at day-light in the morning.

"I did not hear of these events till in the evening of the

* "It has been said, that Wellington and Blucher were taken by surprise. They were, perhaps, so far taken by surprise, that they doubted whether Napoleon would act upon the offensive; an opinion which was generally entertained by the most experienced officers in both armies. A defensive war, in the French territory, was one which appeared better suited to the military resources of France, and more likely to rouse a national spirit. It was accordingly concerted between the two illustrious commanders, that they should be ready to enter France, in the vicinity of Maubeuge, by the 1st of July. But though this plan was in contemplation, no precaution was neglected by the Duke of Wellington, which would enable him to act upon the opposite system, should Bonaparte, as in the event he did, precipitate himself into Belgium, and there open the campaign. With such an extent of frontier to defend, and with so small a force, how was it possible to dispose of that force in any way which could more effectually have embraced the double object of protection and attack? Such appears to be the concurrent judgment of the best military writers upon this subject, and in that judgment it at least becomes me to acquiesce."—*Mudford.*

† Dated Waterloo, 19th June, 1815.

15th; and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march, and afterwards to march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters to prove that the enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack.

"The enemy drove the Prussian posts from the Sambre on that day; and General Ziethen, who commanded the corps which had been at Charleroi, retired upon Fleurus; and Marshal Prince Blucher concentrated the Prussian army upon Sombref, holding the villages in front of his position of St. Amand and Ligny.

"The enemy continued his march along the road from Charleroi towards Bruxelles; and, on the same evening, the 15th, attacked a brigade of the army of the Netherlands, under the Prince de Weimar, posted at Frasne, and forced it back to the farm house, on the same road, called Les Quatre Bras.

"The Prince of Orange immediately reinforced this brigade with another of the same division, under General Perponcher, and, in the morning early, regained part of the ground which had been lost, so as to have the command of the communication leading from Nivelles and Bruxelles with Marshal Blucher's position.

"In the mean time I had directed the whole army to march upon Les Quatre Bras; and the 5th division, under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, arrived at about half past two in the day, followed by the corps of troops under the Duke of Brunswick, and afterwards by the contingent of Nassau.

"At this time the enemy commenced an attack upon Prince Blucher with his whole force, excepting the 1st and 2d corps, and a corps of cavalry under General Kellermann, with which he attacked our post at Les Quatres Bras.

"The Prussian army maintained their position with their usual gallantry and perseverance against a great disparity of numbers, as the 4th corps of their army, under General Bulow, had not joined; and I was not able to assist them as I wished, as I was attacked myself, and the troops, the

cavalry in particular, which had a long distance to march, had not arrived.

"We maintained our position also, and completely defeated and repulsed all the enemy's attempts to get possession of it. The enemy repeatedly attacked us with a large body of infantry and cavalry, supported by a numerous and powerful artillery. He made several charges with the cavalry upon our infantry, but all were repulsed in the steadiest manner.

"In this affair, his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange, the Duke of Brunswick, and Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, and Major-Generals Sir James Kempt and Sir Denis Pack, who were engaged from the commencement of the enemy's attack, highly distinguished themselves, as well as Lieut.-General Charles Baron Alten, Major-General Sir C. Halkett, Lieut.-General Cooke, and Major-Generals Maitland and Byng, as they successively arrived. The troops of the 5th division, and those of the Brunswick corps, were long and severely engaged, and conducted themselves with the utmost gallantry. I must particularly mention the 28th, 42d, 79th, and 92d regiments, and the battalion of Hanoverians.

"Our loss was great, as your Lordship will perceive by the enclosed return; and I have particularly to regret his Serene Highness the Duke of Brunswick, who fell fighting gallantly at the head of his troops.

"Although Marshal Blucher had maintained his position at Sombref, he still found himself much weakened by the severity of the contest in which he had been engaged, and, as the 4th corps had not arrived, he determined to fall back and to concentrate his army upon Wavre; and he marched in the night, after the action was over.

"This movement of the marshal rendered necessary a corresponding one upon my part; and I retired from the farm of Quatre Bras upon Genappe, and thence upon Waterloo, the next morning, the 17th, at ten o'clock.

"The enemy made no effort to pursue Marshal Blucher.

On the contrary, a patrol which I sent to Sombref in the morning found all quiet; and the enemy's videttes fell back as the patrol advanced. Neither did he attempt to molest our march to the rear, although made in the middle of the day, excepting by following, with a large body of cavalry brought from his right, the cavalry under the Earl of Uxbridge.

"This gave Lord Uxbridge an opportunity of charging them with the 1st life guards, upon their *débouche* from the village of Genappe, upon which occasion his Lordship has declared himself to be well satisfied with that regiment.

"The position which I took up in front of Waterloo crossed the high roads from Charleroi and Nivelles, and had its right thrown back to a ravine near Merke Braine, which was occupied, and its left extended to a height above the hamlet Ter la Haye, which was likewise occupied. In front of the right centre, and near the Nivelles road, we occupied the house and gardens of Hougoumont, which covered the return of that flank; and in front of the left centre we occupied the farm of La Haye Sainte. By our left we communicated with Marshal Prince Blucher at Wavre, through Ohain; and the marshal had promised me that, in case we should be attacked, he would support me with one or more corps, as might be necessary.

"The enemy collected his army, with the exception of the 3d corps, which had been sent to observe Marshal Blucher, on a range of heights in our front, in the course of the night of the 17th and yesterday morning, and at about ten o'clock he commenced a furious attack upon our post at Hougoumont. I had occupied that post with a detachment from General Byng's brigade of guards, which was in position in its rear; and it was for some time under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Macdonell, and afterwards of Colonel Home; and I am happy to add that it was maintained throughout the day with the utmost gallantry by these brave troops, notwithstanding the repeated efforts of large bodies of the enemy to obtain possession of it.

"This attack upon the right of our centre was accompanied by a very heavy cannonade upon our whole line, which was destined to support the repeated attacks of cavalry and infantry, occasionally mixed, but sometimes separate, which were made upon it. In one of these the enemy carried the farm house of La Haye Sainte, as the detachment of the light battalion of the German Legion, which occupied it, had expended all its ammunition; and the enemy occupied the only communication there was with them.

"The enemy repeatedly charged our infantry with his cavalry, but these attacks were uniformly unsuccessful; and they afforded opportunities to our cavalry to charge, in one of which Lord E. Somerset's brigade, consisting of the life guards, the royal horse guards, and 1st dragoon guards, highly distinguished themselves, as did that of Major-General Sir William Ponsonby, having taken many prisoners and an eagle.

"These attacks were repeated till about seven in the evening, when the enemy made a desperate effort with cavalry and infantry, supported by the fire of artillery, to force our left centre, near the farm of La Haye Sainte, which, after a severe contest, was defeated; and, having observed that the troops retired from this attack in great confusion, and that the march of General Bulow's corps, by Frischermont, upon Planchenois and La Belle Alliance, had begun to take effect, and as I could perceive the fire of his cannon, and as Marshal Prince Blucher had joined in person with a corps of his army to the left of our line by Ohain, I determined to attack the enemy, and immediately advanced the whole line of infantry, supported by the cavalry and artillery. The attack succeeded in every point: the enemy was forced from his positions on the heights, and fled in the utmost confusion, leaving behind him, as far as I could judge, 150 pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, which fell into our hands.

"I continued the pursuit till long after dark, and then

discontinued it only on account of the fatigue of our troops, who had been engaged during twelve hours, and because I found myself on the same road with Marshal Blucher, who assured me of his intention to follow the enemy throughout the night. He has sent me word this morning that he had taken 60 pieces of cannon belonging to the Imperial Guard, and several carriages, baggage, &c. belonging to Bonaparte, in Genappe.

"I propose to move this morning upon Nivelles, and not to discontinue my operations.

"Your Lordship will observe that such a desperate action could not be fought, and such advantages could not be gained, without great loss; and I am sorry to add, that ours has been immense. In Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton his Majesty has sustained the loss of an officer who has frequently distinguished himself in his service; and he fell gloriously leading his division to a charge with bayonets, by which one of the most serious attacks made by the enemy on our position was repulsed. The Earl of Uxbridge, after having successfully got through this arduous day, received a wound by almost the last shot fired, which will, I am afraid, deprive his Majesty for some time of his services.

"His Royal Highness the Prince of Orange distinguished himself by his gallantry and conduct, till he received a wound from a musket ball through the shoulder, which obliged him to quit the field.

"It gives me the greatest satisfaction to assure your Lordship that the army never, upon any occasion, conducted itself better. The division of guards, under Lieut.-General Cooke, who is severely wounded, Major-General Maitland, and Major-General Byng, set an example which was followed by all; and there is no officer nor description of troops that did not behave well.

"I must, however, particularly mention, for his Royal Highness's approbation, Lieut.-General Sir H. Clinton, Major-General Adam, Lieut.-General Charles Baron Alten (severely wounded), Major-General Sir Colin Halkett

(severely wounded), Colonel Ompteda, Colonel Mitchell, (commanding a brigade of the 4th division), Major-Generals Sir James Kempt and Sir D. Pack, Major-General Lambert, Major-General Lord E. Somerset, Major-General Sir W. Ponsonby, Major-General Sir C. Grant, and Major-General Sir H. Vivian, Major-General Sir O. Vandeleur, and Major-General Count Dornberg.

"I am also particularly indebted to General Lord Hill for his assistance and conduct upon this, as upon all former occasions.

"The artillery and engineer departments were conducted much to my satisfaction by Colonel Sir George Wood and Colonel Smyth; and I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the Adjutant-General, Major-General Barnes, who was wounded, and of the Quartermaster-General, Colonel De Lancey, who was killed by a cannon shot in the middle of the action. This officer is a serious loss to his Majesty's service, and to me at this moment.

"I was likewise much indebted to the assistance of Lieut.-Colonel Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who was severely wounded, and of the officers composing my personal staff, who have suffered severely in this action. Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. Sir Alexander Gordon, who has died of his wounds, was a most promising officer, and is a serious loss to his Majesty's service.

"General Kruse, of the Nassau service, likewise conducted himself much to my satisfaction; as did General Tripp, commanding the heavy brigade of cavalry, and General Vanhope, commanding a brigade of infantry in the service of the King of the Netherlands.

"General Pozzo di Borgo, General Baron Vincent, General Muffling, and General Alava, were in the field during the action, and rendered me every assistance in their power. Baron Vincent is wounded, but I hope not severely; and General Pozzo di Borgo received a contusion.

"I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blucher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the

successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of General Bulow upon the enemy's flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded.

"Since writing the above, I have received a report that Major-General Sir William Ponsonby is killed; and, in announcing this intelligence to your Lordship, I have to add the expression of my grief for the fate of an officer who had already rendered very brilliant and important services, and was an ornament to his profession.

"I send with this despatch three eagles, taken by the troops in this action, which Major Percy will have the honour of laying at the feet of his Royal Highness. I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's protection."

"I have to inform your Lordship, in addition to my despatch of this morning, that we have already got here 5,000 prisoners, taken in the action of yesterday, and that there are above 2,000 more coming in to-morrow. There will probably be many more.

"Amongst the prisoners are the Comte de Lobau, who commanded the 6th corps, and General Cambrone, who commanded a division of the guards.

"I propose to send the whole to England, by Ostend."

GENERAL MAP OF OPERATIONS from 14 to 20 JUNE, 1815.





London. A.H. Baily & Co. 83 Cornhill.

CHAPTER XXX.

WELLINGTON DESPATCHES — OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN INTERESTING — BRUSSELS—INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED THERE OF NAPOLEON'S ADVANCE—MARCH OF THE 5TH DIVISION—PRINCE OF ORANGE ATTACKED—QUATRE BRAS—DUKE OF WELLINGTON REACHES THE FIELD OF BATTLE, AND ORDERS THE BOIS DE BOSSU TO BE RECOVERED—NEY'S DESPERATE ATTACKS BEAUTIFULLY RECEIVED AND REPULSED—PROGRESS AND CLOSE OF THE BATTLE—REMARKS — CASUALTIES — LIGNY—PRUSSIANS DEFEATED, AND RETREAT—MORNING OF THE 17TH OF JUNE—WELLINGTON FALLS BACK ON WATERLOO—AFFAIR AT GENAPPE—THE ALLIES TAKE A POSITION—GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE ALLIED TROOPS — MORNING OF THE 18TH — NAPOLEON'S DISPOSITIONS FOR ATTACK—ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BOTH ARMIES—OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

THE limited extent of official despatches, obliges a commander to restrict himself to a general summary of operations and their results. The Duke of Wellington's are distinguished for clearness and simplicity—the story of his battles are plain unvarnished tales, in which success is neither over-coloured, nor failure extenuated or concealed. His victories are briefly detailed—his reverses as candidly admitted. Anxious only to put the country which confided in him in possession of events as they really occurred, Wellington's correspondence is remarkable for nothing but brevity and truth. In a few sentences, the important consequences of skill and daring were communicated—and it was left for the pen of history to elucidate those "crowded hours of glorious strife," which conferred undying fame upon him who had achieved them.

Many circumstances united to give additional interest to the commencement and the close of the Belgic campaign. Never did the events of a few days produce more important consequences; and, till the storm burst, nothing but conjecture could point out the quarter, on which, with

characteristic impetuosity, Napoleon would precipitate his masses.

Brussels, from its immediate contiguity to the frontier, and being the head-quarters of the commander-in-chief, was at the period filled by an influx of strangers. On the 15th, no unusual excitement was discernible—the streets were crowded—and although it was believed that Napoleon had joined the army, and consequently was within a few marches of the city, the capital of Belgium appeared gay and undisturbed, as if that dreaded man had still remained an inmate of the Tuilleries. The day passed, and rumour was busy; but until the arrival of the Prince of Orange in the evening, nothing was known beyond there having been an affair between the outposts. The Duke, after receiving his illustrious visitor, resumed his place at the dinner table; when shortly afterwards, General Muffling, the Prussian general attached to the British army, " came into the room, with evident marks of having proceeded hastily, when a chair was reached, and he was placed next to his Grace, with whom he entered into close conversation, and delivered some official despatches. The Duke occasionally addressed himself to Sir T. Picton. The movements of the enemy created no surprise—all was quiet and regular, the decisive moment for action was not yet come.

" The second courier arrived from Blucher before twelve o'clock on the night of the 15th, and the despatches were delivered to the Duke of Wellington in the ball-room of the Duchess of Richmond. While he was reading them, he seemed to be completely absorbed by their contents; and after he had finished, for some minutes he remained in the same attitude of deep reflection, totally abstracted from every surrounding object, while his countenance was expressive of fixed and intense thought. He was heard to mutter to himself—' Marshal Blucher thinks,'—' It is Marshal Blucher's opinion;'—and after remaining thus abstracted a few minutes, and having apparently formed his decision, he gave his usual clear and concise orders to one of his

staff-officers, who instantly left the room, and was again as gay and animated as ever; he staid supper, and then went home."*

But before the ball had ended, the strains of courtly music were drowned in the louder "note of preparation." The drum had beat to arms, the bugle sounded "the assembly," and the Highland bagpipe added its wild and martial summons to the field. All were already prepared, all were promptly under arms—and the 5th division filed from the Parc with the corps of Brunswick Oels, and directed their march through the forest of Soignies.

Eight o'clock peeled from the steeple clocks; all was quiet — the brigades, with their artillery and equipages, were gone—the crash of music was heard no longer—the bustle of preparation had ceased—and an ominous and heart-sinking silence succeeded that noise and hurry which ever attends a departure for the field of battle.

While Napoleon with his right and centre was attacking the front of the Prussian position, Grouchy manœuvred by the Namur road upon its flank, and simultaneously, the 1st and 2d corps, with four cavalry divisions, were turned against the British positions.† When Blucher on the evening of the 15th had been deforced at Charleroi, the advanced corps of the Prince of Orange had also been driven back from Frasnes—but a fresh brigade was promptly moved up—and before the morning of the 16th, the greater portion of the ground had been recovered.

Early in the afternoon, Ney's attack was made with the vigour and determination which superior numbers encourage—and it was gallantly and successfully repulsed. But

* Booth's Narrative.

† "To the left wing, under Marshal Ney, was assigned the dangerous honour of encountering the British. The words '*Nous marchons contre les Anglais*' passed uncheered along the column, when its destination became known. The ill-omened sounds checked not indeed the spirits of the brave, but it was associated with too many fatal recollections, to elicit even a single shout of anticipated triumph from the most sanguine of that enthusiastic host."—*Campaign of Waterloo.*

physical force gradually prevailed—the Hanoverians fell back—the Bois de Bossu was occupied by the enemy—and when the leading regiments of the 5th division reached Quatre Bras, with reduced strength the Prince of Orange was bravely but feebly opposing assailants, encouraged by success, and whose superiority could no longer be resisted.

A march of more than twenty miles, executed in sultry weather, and over a country where little water was procurable, had abated the vigour of the British brigades, but their spirit was indomitable. The Duke of Wellington had overtaken the column in its march; and when he reached Quatre Bras, at a glance he saw the critical position of the day, and instantly directed that the Bois de Bossu should be regained.

Ney, whose infantry doubled that of his opponent, sustained by a proportionate artillery, and the fine cavalry division under Excelmans, was pushing his advantages to their crisis. Checked, however, by the arrival of the British battalions, he strove to crush them before they could deploy—and, under a withering fire of artillery, to which the weak Hanoverian batteries ineffectively replied, he launched his cavalry against the regiments as they reached their battle-ground—all was in his favour—his horsemen were in hand—the rye-crop, reaching breast high, covered their advance—and the charges were made before the regiments were established. But English discipline and courage rose superior to the immense advantages which circumstances conferred upon their assailants—and in every effort the enemy was roughly repelled. Lancers and cuirassiers were driven back with desperate slaughter—while whole squadrons, shattered in their retreat, and leaving the ground covered with their dead and dying, proved with what fatal precision the British squares sustained their fusilade.

"The efforts of the French to break the squares were fierce and frequent. Their batteries poured upon these unflinching soldiers a storm of grape, and when an opening

was made by the cannon, the lancers were ready to rush upon the devoted infantry. But nothing could daunt the lion-hearted English—nothing could shake their steadiness. The dead were coolly removed, and the living occupied their places. Though numbers fell, and the square momentarily diminished, it still presented a serried line of glittering bayonets, through which lancer and cuirassier vainly endeavoured to penetrate.

"One regiment,* after sustaining a furious cannonade, was suddenly, and on three different sides, assailed by cavalry. Two faces of the square were charged by the lancers, while the cuirassiers galloped down upon another. It was a trying moment. There was a death-like silence; and one voice alone, clear and calm, was heard. It was their colonel's,† who called upon them to be 'steady.' On came the enemy!—the earth shook beneath the horsemen's feet; while on every side of the devoted band, the corn bending beneath the rush of cavalry disclosed their numerous assailants. The lance blades approached the bayonets of the kneeling front rank—the cuirassiers were within forty paces—yet not a trigger was drawn. But, when the word 'Fire!' thundered from the colonel's lips, each face poured out its deadly volley—and in a moment the leading files of the French lay before the square, as if hurled by a thunderbolt to the earth. The assailants, broken and dispersed, galloped off for shelter to the tall rye, while a stream of musketry from the British square, carried death into the retreating squadrons."‡

But numbers were certain to prevail. The regiments fought with devoted heroism; and though miserably reduced, they still held their ground with a desperate tenacity. Far overmatched, the result was tottering in the balance; and nothing but the bull-dog courage of English soldiers could have resisted the desperate pressure. "The contest was at its height—the incessant assaults of the enemy

* Twenty-eighth. † Sir Philip Belson.

‡ Victories of the British Armies.

were wasting the British regiments, but, with the exception of the Bois de Bossu, not an inch of ground was lost. The men were falling by hundreds—death was busy everywhere —but not a cheek blanched, and not a foot receded! The courage of these undaunted soldiers needed no incitement —but on the contrary, the efforts of their officers were constantly required to restrain the burning ardour that would, if unrepressed, have led to ruinous results. Maddened to see their ranks thinned by renewed assaults, which they were merely suffered to repel, they panted for the hour of action. The hot blood of Erin was boiling for revenge —and even the cool endurance of the Scotch began to yield, and a murmur was sometimes heard of, 'Why are we not led forward?'"

"At this juncture, the division of guards, under General Maitland, arrived from Enghien, and after a march of fifteen hours, without any thing to eat or drink, they gallantly advanced to the charge, and in half an hour completely cleared the wood. Though they became masters of the Bois de Bossu, they found difficulty in emerging from its shelter. As often as they attempted to come out, a tremendous fire of round and grape shot was opened by the French batteries, followed by a charge of cavalry. When they retired, and the enemy endeavoured to penetrate the wood, they were received in turn with a steady and well-directed volley of musketry, which compelled them also to return. These alternate attacks continued for nearly three hours. At one time, the enemy was furiously encountered by a square of Black Brunswickers, while the British, rapidly lining the ditches, kept up a most destructive fire— but the loss was very severe, and the men found great difficulty in forming line again. The undismayed gallantry of the guards was the more remarkable, as they were composed chiefly of young soldiers, and volunteers from the militia, who had never been in action. Some of these noble fellows were so overcome with fatigue, that when they entered the wood, they sunk down, and had only sufficient strength to

cheer their comrades to the onset. The carnage was dreadful—the conflict obstinately maintained on either side—the French, from their superiority in cavalry and artillery, committing a slaughter which was well repaid by the terrible fire of the British musketry.

"Evening was now closing in; the attacks of the enemy became fewer and feebler; a brigade of heavy cavalry and horse artillery came up, and, worn out by the sanguinary struggle of six long hours, the assailants ceased their attack, and the 5th division with the 3d and the guards took up a position for the night on the ground their unbounded heroism had held through this bloody day.

"Ney fell back upon the road to Frasnes. The moon rose angrily—still a few cannon shot were heard after daylight had departed; but gradually they ceased. The fires were lighted, and such miserable provisions as could be procured, were furnished to the harassed soldiery; and while strong pickets were posted in the front and flanks, the remnant of the British, and their brave allies, piled arms, and stretched themselves on the battle field." *

The failure of the French attack on Quatre Bras, made by veteran troops in very superior numbers, and directed by one of the best and boldest generals of the age, seems unaccountable; and Ney's apology, for what all must admit to have been a defeat, is not maintainable. The *corps-d'armée* he commanded, was, according to the organization practised by Napoleon, perfect in every arm; and in artillery and cavalry it was immensely superior. The force assailed was generally composed of raw soldiers—and being twenty miles in advance of its reserve, the supporting troops reached the ground after the key of the position had been carried. That support merely consisted of infantry; for, from the distance of their cantonments from the field, it was six in the evening before the British batteries and cavalry were able to get up.† To

* Stories of Waterloo.

† "Exhausted by heat and fatigue, they halted at Nivelles, lighted fires,

complain that the 1st corps "was idly paraded" between Ligny and Quatre Bras "without firing a shot," when its presence could have decided the fate of either battle, throws a slur upon Napoleon's generalship, but presents a sorry excuse for Ney's discomfiture.

"There is no doubt, that if he could have brought his 1st corps into action, with the addition of five-and-twenty thousand men, he might have gained 'a very glorious triumph;' but it is affirmed, that he complained unjustly of the absence of that corps. On the 16th, at noon, he had personally surveyed the position at Quatre Bras, and perceiving but few troops collected, concluded that the English were at too great a distance to arrive in any strength during the day. This opinion he communicated to Napoleon, who, confiding in it, very naturally employed the 1st corps of his army, when he thought it might decide the success of his own attack against the Prussians. Besides, in what

and prepared to cook their dinners. But the increasing roar of cannon announced that the Duke was seriously engaged, and a staff officer brought orders to hurry on. The bivouac was instantly broken up—the kettles packed—the rations abandoned—and the wearied troops cheerfully resumed their march again.

"The path to the field of battle could not be mistaken; the roar of cannon was succeeded by the roll of musketry, which was every step more clearly audible; and waggons, heaped with wounded British and Brunswickers interspersed told that the work of death was going on.

"The guards, indeed, came up at a fortunate crisis. The Bois de Bossu was won; and the *tirailleurs* of the enemy, debouching from its cover, were about to deploy upon the roads that it commanded, and thus intercept the Duke's communication with the Prussians. The 5th division, sadly reduced, could hardly hold their ground—any offensive movement was impracticable, and the French *tirailleurs* were issuing from the wood. But on perceiving the advancing columns they halted. The 1st brigade of guards having loaded and fixed bayonets, were ordered to advance—and, wearied as they were with a fifteen hours' march, they cheered, and pushed forward. In vain the thick trees impeded them, and although every bush and coppice was held and disputed by the enemy—the *tirailleurs* were driven in on every side. Taking advantage of a rivulet which crossed the wood, they attempted to form and arrest the progress of the guards. That stand was momentary—they were forced from their position, and the wood once more was carried by the British."—*Victories of the British Armies.*

respect could Ney consider that corps as a reserve, ready to act upon any sudden exigency? It was in the rear of Frasnes, above three miles from the field of battle, a distance which must have precluded it from cooperating in any movements necessary to repel urgent and immediate danger. In fact, the marshal was beaten by a superior bravery which did not enter into his calculations; and that part of his querulous epistle to the Duke of Otranto* may be considered as the fallacy of a man more anxious to disguise than reveal the truth.

"The loss sustained by the British and their allies in this glorious and hard-contested battle amounted to 3,750 *hors de combat*. Of course the British suffered most severely, having 316 men killed, and 2,156 wounded. The Duke of Brunswick fell in the act of rallying his troops, and an immense number of British officers were found among the slain and wounded. During an advanced movement the 92d, after repulsing an attack of both cavalry and infantry, was retreating to the wood, when a French column halted and turned its fire on the Highlanders, already assailed by a superior force. Notwithstanding, the regiment bravely held its ground until relieved by a regiment of the guards, when it retired to its original position. In this brief and sanguinary conflict, its loss amounted to 28 officers and nearly 300 men.

"The casualties, when compared with the number of the combatants, will appear enormous. Most of the battalions lost their commanding officers—and the rapid succession of subordinate officers on whom the command devolved, told how fast the work of death went on. Trifling wounds were disregarded—and men severely hurt refused to retire to the rear, and rejoined their colours after a temporary dressing."

Like that at Quatre Bras, the conflict at Ligny only closed with day-light. For five hours the struggle had been obstinately continued. Men fell by hundreds, and

* Appendix, No. III.

200 pieces of artillery were turned against the devoted villages, for whose possession Napoleon and Blucher were contending. Both generals pushed their reserves freely into action; and as soon as one battalion was destroyed, another came forward, and mounting over the dead and dying, charged through the blazing houses of Ligny and St. Amand.* At four o'clock the fortune of the day was so doubtful, that Napoleon hastily called up the 1st corps, which Ney had also despatched an aide-de-camp to hurry to his assistance at Quatre Bras. Night came on—no decisive advantage had been gained—and Blucher, like a wounded lion,† although with feebler strength, seemed to fight with additional ferocity.

Darkness, however, enabled Napoleon to carry a village which he had assailed throughout the evening so frequently and furiously, but in vain. In the gloom, a division of French infantry, by a circuitous march, gained the rear of the Prussian corps, while a mass of cuirassiers forced a road at the other side of Ligny. These movements obliged

* "It would be difficult to describe the dreadful carnage that ensued. The combatants were soon fighting hand to hand, upon the dead bodies of their comrades. It was literally a murderous struggle between battalion and bat talion, in orchards, gardens, and streets. The village was six times taken and retaken within five hours. The castle of Ligny was disputed by the Prussians, to the last gasp."—*Mudford.*

"A French regiment of infantry, 800 strong, retired from the conflict with only 80 men—every wall, every fence, every hedge, was so obstinately and fiercely defended."—*Giraud.*

† "In one of these charges Blucher nearly closed his illustrious career. Heading a regiment of cavalry, which failed in its attack, his horse was wounded, and galloped furiously forward, till it dropped down dead. The marshal fell under it, and could not be immediately extricated, for the enemy were pursuing. The last Prussian horseman had passed him, as he lay senseless on the ground; but his aide-de-camp, Lieut.-Colonel Count Nostiz, gallantly determining to share the fate of his general, cast himself by his side, and covered him with his military cloak, that he might not be recognised. The French cuirassiers rode rapidly by; the flying Prussians suddenly rallied, attacked their pursuers, and they again passed him in their retreat. The opportunity was instantly seized, and the veteran hero mounting a dragoon horse, escaped from his imminent peril."—*Mudford.*

the Prussians to fall back; and they retired leisurely towards Tilly, repelling every attack, and leaving nothing to the enemy but a ruined village, some wounded men, and a few disabled guns, which the state of the roads prevented them from removing.

At day-break, of the 17th, the whole of the allies were up and ready to accept battle; but as the Duke of Wellington had been apprised during the night, that Blucher had retreated to unite himself with his 4th corps, and concentrate his army on the Wavre, it was necessary for the allied commander to maintain his communication with the Prussians, and make a correspondent movement; and accordingly he determined to fall back on a position already chosen, in front of the village of WATERLOO.*

Napoleon was mistaken in supposing that Blucher intended to rally his *corps-d'armée* round Namur, for the marshal, with a sounder judgment, took a line of retreat parallel to what he considered must be that of the Duke of Wellington, who he knew would fall back from Quatre Bras on ascertaining the regressive movements of his Prussian ally. Uncertain as to the route which Blucher had selected, Grouchy's corps, with the cavalry of Pajol

* "Napoleon and his marshals were greatly elated by the retrograde movements of Wellington and Blucher on the 17th, and the defeat of the latter on the 16th. They even contrived to make a victory of the battle at Quatre Bras. Soult, in a despatch to Davoust, the minister at war, announced that they had not only separated the line of the allies, but that 'Wellington and Blucher saved themselves with difficulty. The effect was theatrical. In an instant the firing ceased, and the enemy was routed in all directions.' Another account appeared in the Moniteur, declaring 'that a British division of five or six thousand Scottish had been cut to pieces; *we have not seen any of them prisoners.*' The latter assertion was undoubtedly true; but it admits of a very different explanation. A third account detailed fresh miracles for the Parisians and contradicted the former. 'The noble Lord must have been confounded. *Whole bands of prisoners are taken.* They do not know what is become of their commanders. I hope we shall not hear again of the Prussians for some time, even if they should ever be able to rally. As for the English, we shall see now what will become of them. The Emperor is there!' This curiosity about the English was soon gratified; and three days after they might have written from Paris, '*The Emperor is here!*'"

and Excelmans, were detached in pursuit, while Napoleon in person hastened his march to bring Wellington to action, and reached Frasnes at nine o'clock on the morning of the 17th.

The non-arrival of the 6th corps and reserve, however, obliged Napoleon to delay his intended attack until the whole of his corps were on the ground—and his able opponent was in the interval eluding a combat which he had determined to refuse, and retreating leisurely to the position on which he had resolved to accept a battle. This operation in open day was difficult, as the Dyle was in the rear of the allies, and the long and narrow bridge at the village of Genappe, the only mean by which the *corps-d'armée* could effect its passage. Wellington disposed some horse-artillery and dismounted dragoons upon the heights, and leaving a strong rear-guard in front of Quatre Bras, he succeeded in masking his retreat until, when discovered, it was too late to offer any serious interruption to the regressive movement of the allies.

Napoleon had already made the necessary dispositions, and his columns were formed for attack, when from the heights above Frasnes, he discovered that nothing was in front but a rear-guard. His cavalry were instantly ordered to pursue —and at Genappe the rival horsemen came in contact. The 7th hussars and some squadrons of the 11th and 23d light dragoons charged without success. Lord Uxbridge, however, repeated the attack with the life-guards, and the French cavalry were so roughly repelled, that, with the exception of a partial cannonade, too distant to produce effect, the allied columns fell back to their position without farther interruption.

Throughout the day, rain had fallen heavily at times; and as evening closed, the weather became wild and stormy. The wind was violent, the rain increased, thunder rolled and lightning flashed vividly; and a more cheerless bivouac than the allied, was never occupied by an army before a fearful conflict.

While the troops reposed on the battle-field, the Duke of Wellington, with his general officers and their respective staffs, occupied the village of Waterloo.* On the doors of the several cottages the names of the principal officers were chalked—"and frail and perishing as was the record, it was found there long after many of those whom it designated had ceased to exist!"

The position which Wellington took up was most judiciously selected. It extended along the front of the forest of Soignies, near the point where the Brussels road is intersected by that from Nivelles. At this point stands the hamlet of Mont St. Jean; and at the debouch of the forest, the village of Waterloo is built. The French adopted the former as their designation of the battle of the 18th of June; the latter, however, was chosen by the conqueror, to give a name to his last, and his most glorious victory.

Early in the morning the dispositions of the allies were completed. The British right reclined on a ravine near Merke Braine, and the left appuied upon a height above Ter la Haye. The whole line was formed on a gentle acclivity, the flanks partially secured by small hollows and broken grounds. The farm-house of La Haye Sainte, in front of the left centre, was defended by a Hanoverian battalion—and the chateau of Hougomont, in advance of the right centre, was held by a part of the guards and some companies of Nassau riflemen. Wellington considered this to be the key of his position, and great attention was bestowed

* "Napoleon passed the night of the 17th in a farm-house which was abandoned by the owner, named Bouquean, an old man of eighty, who had retired to Planchenoit. It is situated on the high road from Charleroi to Brussels. It is half a league from the chateau of Hougomont and La Haye Sainte, and a quarter of a league from La Belle Alliance and Planchenoit. Supper was hastily served up in part of the utensils of the farmer that remained. Bonaparte slept in the first chamber of this house: a bed with blue silk hangings and gold fringe was put up for him in the middle of this room. His brother Jerome, the Duke of Bassano, and several generals, lodged in the other chambers. All the adjacent buildings, gardens, meadows, and enclosures, were crowded with military and horses."—*French Detail.*

upon its defence. In addition to its natural advantages, the walls were crenellated to afford perfect facility for the musketry and rifles of its defenders.

Behind this chain of posts the first line, composed of Wellington's finest battalions, was formed. The second was rather in a hollow, and partially sheltered from the enemy's artillery. The third, composed of cavalry, was in the rear, extending nearly to Ter la Haye.

At the extreme right, the British army obliqued to Merke Braine, and defended the road to Nivelles. The extreme left was in communication with the Prussians by the road to Ohain, leading through the passes of St. Lambert. A corps of observation, under Sir Charles Colville, comprising a large portion of the 4th division, was stationed at Halle, to defend the British right, if attacked, and cover Brussels if it should be turned.

Cooke's division (the guards) occupying a rising ground beside Hougomont, with its right rested on the Nivelles road. Alten's division was formed behind La Haye Sainte, with its left on the road of Charleroi. The Brunswickers were partly in line with the guards and partly in reserve; and one of their battalions was extended in the wood of Hougomont, *en tirailleur*.

On the left, Picton's division, Lambert's brigade, a Hanoverian corps, and some Dutch troops, extended along the lane and hedge which traverse the undulating ground between Ter la Haye, and the road to Charleroi; and the village itself, that of Smohain, and the farm of Papilotte, adjoining the wood of Frichermont, was garrisoned by Nassau troops, under the command of the Prince of Weimar.

No part of the allied position was remarkable for natural strength; but where the ground displayed any advantages, they had been made available for defence. The surface of the field of Waterloo was perfectly open—the acclivities of easy descent—and the whole had an English appearance of unenclosed corn-fields, in some places divided by a hedge. Infantry movements could be easily effected, artillery might

advance and retire, and cavalry could charge. On every point the British position was assailable; and the island soldier had no reliance but in "God and his Grace"—for all else depended on his own stout heart and vigorous arm.

The morning of the 18th was wet and gloomy, but as the day advanced, the weather gradually improved. From the allied position the French were distinctly seen as they came up, forming columns, and making the other preparatory dispositions for a battle. The British divisions were equally exposed to the enemy's view; and when the different brigades were discovered getting into battle order, Napoleon exhibited mingled feelings of satisfaction and surprise, exclaiming to one of his staff—"*Ah! je les tiens donc ces Anglais!*"

About nine o'clock the French dispositions were commenced, and at half-past eleven they were completed. The 1st corps (D'Erlon's) were formed in front of La Haye Sainte, its right extended towards Frichermont, and its left resting on the Brussels road. The 2d corps, leaving its right on D'Erlon's left, extended itself in the direction of Hougomont with a wood in front. Behind these corps was the cavalry reserve of cuirassiers, the grand reserve, consisting of the imperial guard, occupying the heights of La Belle Alliance. The 6th corps, under Count Lobau, with the cavalry of D'Aumont, were left in the rear of the French right, to observe the Prussians in the event of their debouching by the Ohain road, through the defiles of Saint Lambert.

Napoleon's own position was with his reserve.* There, with his hands behind him, he paced back and forward,

* "The eminence on which Bonaparte was while he gave his orders during the battle, is part of the territory of Planchenoit. It is called the Field of Trimotio, and is the property of several individuals: it is not far from the farm of Caillou. Bonaparte retired to this house for a moment during the battle. After he had lost it, endeavouring to avoid the crowd in the great road, he threw himself into the orchard opposite this farm-house to get the start of the mass of fugitives. A part of these being closely pursued sought refuge in the buildings of the farm; they were set on fire, and several of them reduced to ashes."—*Letters of a French Officer.*

issuing orders, and observing the progress of his attack. "As the battle became more doubtful, he approached nearer the scene of action, and betrayed increased impatience to his staff by violent gesticulation, and using immense quantities of snuff. At three o'clock he was on horseback in front of La Belle Alliance; and in the evening, just before he made his last attempt with the guard, he had reached a hollow close to La Haye Sainte. Wellington, at the opening of the engagement, stood upon a ridge immediately behind La Haye, but as the conflict thickened, where difficulties arose and danger threatened, there the Duke was found. He traversed the field exposed to a storm of balls, and passed from point to point uninjured, and more than on one occasion, when the French cavalry charged the British squares, the Duke was there for shelter."*

The strength of the British and French armies has been variously and very differently stated. The former, including its corps of observation, which were non-combatant on the 18th, with the Brunswickers, Belgians, and Nassau contingent, amounted to 74,400. The force of the latter (French), from the contradictory statements, is difficult to be determined with accuracy—probably 90,000† would be nearly its amount. Taking its original strength at 145,000, deducting 10,000 *hors-de-combat* in the battles of the 15th and 16th, and reckoning Grouchy's corps at 45,000, we shall find that 90,000 Frenchmen were on the field of Waterloo. Certainly Bonaparte was equal in men, and very superior in artillery;—the French parks, amounting to 296 pieces, while the British and Belgian guns did not exceed 150.

From day-break occasional shots had been interchanged between the light troops; but when two mighty armies, and each commanded by the "meteors of an age," were

* Victories of the British Armies.

† Other statements reduce it to not quite 70,000. *Vide* Appendix, "Waterloo Returns."

preparing for a terrible and decisive contest, a desultory fusilade scarcely attracted attention. At noon, Joseph Bonaparte directed the 2d corps to advance against Hougomont. The British batteries opened on the French masses as they debouched—their own guns covered their advance—and under the crashing fire of 200 pieces of artillery—a fitting overture for such a field—Waterloo opened, as it closed, magnificently!

CHAPTER XXXI.

POST OF HOUGOMONT—ITS GARRISON ATTACKED BY THE SECOND FRENCH CORPS—ENEMY REPULSED, BUT RENEW THEIR EFFORTS—LEFT CENTRE OF THE ALLIED POSITION ASSAILED—DEATH OF PICTON—CHARGE OF THE FIFTH DIVISION AND SECOND BRIGADE OF HEAVY CAVALRY—DEATH OF SIR WILLIAM PONSONBY—CAVALRY MOVEMENTS—THIRD ATTACK ON HOUGOMONT—LA HAYE SAINTE CARRIED—STEADINESS OF THE BRITISH INFANTRY—THEIR DEVOTED HEROISM—EVENING—PRUSSIAN ADVANCE—WELLINGTON'S CHANGE OF DISPOSITIONS—NAPOLEON MISTAKES BLUCHER'S CORPS FOR GROUCHY'S—ON ASCERTAINING HIS ERROR, MAKES A GRAND EFFORT—CHARGE OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD—ITS FAILURE—CRISIS OF WATERLOO—PRUSSIAN CORPS COME GRADUALLY INTO ACTION—WELLINGTON'S GRAND CHARGE—ROUT OF THE FRENCH ARMY—NIGHT OF WATERLOO—PRUSSIAN PURSUIT—WELLINGTON RETURNS TO BRUSSELS.

AFTER a careful reconnaissance, Napoleon determined that the centre of the allies was the most vulnerable point of the allied position; and he directed his 2d corps to advance and carry the important post of Hougomont.

This place, destined to obtain a glorious celebrity, was an old-fashioned country house, and had once been the residence of a Flemish nobleman. It stood on low ground about three hundred yards in front of the right centre of the allied line, and close to where it leaned upon the road leading from Nevilles to Waterloo. On one side there was a large farm-yard and out-buildings; on the other, a garden, surrounded by a high brick wall. An open wood, covering an area of some three or four acres, encircled the chateau; but as it was free from copse, and the trees stood apart from each other, it only masked the post without adding much to its strength. In this wood some Nassau riflemen were stationed. The house and garden was occupied by the light companies of the Coldstream and 3d guards. A detachment of the 1st battalion was posted in the wood upon the left; and the remainder on a small eminence immediately

in the rear of the chateau, as a support to the troops who garrisoned the house and defended the enclosures. The whole force to which the key of the Duke's position was entrusted, did not exceed 1,800 men, of whom 300 were Nassau sharp-shooters. The troops in the house were commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Macdonnell; and those in the wood by Lord Saltoun.

Shortly before eleven o'clock, the enemy's columns were put in motion against Hougomont—and the battle of Waterloo began.* Comprising three divisions, nearly thirty thousand strong, the French attack was made in close columns, supported by the fire of numerous batteries, and the effect was grand and imposing beyond description. As the heads of the enemy's masses rose above the hollow ground which had hitherto concealed their movement, the British artillery opened with round and case shot; and the French and Nassau light troops commenced a sharp and rapid fusilade. But the latter was forced to yield to numbers—the wood was carried—and

* "The time when the battle began has been stated with a marked contrariety. The Duke of Wellington says it commenced 'about ten o'clock,' and further observes, that when his troops discontinued the pursuit at night, 'they had been engaged during twelve hours.' In this, General Gneisenau concurs, but of course, only from information he had received. General Alava, who was by the side of the Duke the whole day, fixes it at 'half-past eleven.' Napoleon, and General Drouet, state 'twelve' as the hour, while Marshal Ney names 'one o'clock.' Without tracing minuter contradictions, this may suffice to show the difficulty of attaining exact knowledge where it might have been presumed no difficulty could exist. With one exception, which I think ought to be decisive, I was equally bewildered by the intelligence I received from officers whom I had an opportunity of consulting. By one, I was told, the battle began 'soon after mid-day;' by another 'exactly twenty minutes past eleven,' and by a third, 'at ten o'clock.' But Sir George Wood, and his information is what I conceive cannot be disputed, gave me the following statement. 'The action commenced about half-past ten, or a quarter to eleven. There had been skirmishing before, all the morning. A column of the enemy was advancing against Hougomont, and the first gun that was fired was from our lines against that column. I gave the order, by the command of the Duke. The gun did immediate execution, and killed six or eight. This column then retired, and went round the wood."—*Mudford.*

the chateau and its dependencies were vigorously and resolutely assaulted.

But the defence was able, as it was obstinate. On the French masses the fire of the English musketry fell with rapid precision; and the perseverance of the enemy only produced a bloodier discomfiture. The French gave ground —the guards charged from the enclosures—part of the wood was recovered—and the fire of the British howitzers* cleared the remainder of it from the enemy.

The repulse of Joseph's corps was followed by a tremendous cannonade,—for on both sides every gun, which would bear, had opened. The fire was furiously continued. Heavy bodies of cavalry were seen in motion; and it was easy to foresee that this terrible cannonade would be followed by more desperate and more extended efforts.

On perceiving the French cavalry displayed, the Duke ordered his centre divisions to form squares by battalions; but as this formation exposed them to the fire of the French artillery, they were retired to the reverse of the slope, and there found shelter from a cannonade still fiercely kept up, and as fatally returned from the allied batteries, whose service all through that trying day was remarkable for its precision and rapidity.

The French attacks were again renewed against Hougomont—but they were as unavailing as they had proved before. Their artillery fire, however, had become too oppressive to be sustained; the Duke ordered fresh batteries forward to keep it under;† and every new effort of

* "The imposing approach of the howitzer troop encouraged the remainder of the division of the guards, who were lying down to be sheltered from the fire. The Duke, observing what was intended, made some remarks upon the delicacy of the service, as it regarded the correctness of the howitzers, part of the wood being held by our troops, and part by the enemy; his Grace explaining at the same time, in the clearest and most calm manner, the situation of affairs. The Duke being satisfied that every dependence might be placed upon the men and guns, orders were given, the troop commenced its fire, and in ten minutes the enemy were driven from the wood."—*Artillery Operations.*

† "Two batteries of 8-pounders, and heavy howitzers, were brought to bear on two guns which were detached from the brigade, under Captain Napier, for

the enemy increased the slaughter, but failed in either abating the spirit or the obstinacy of the defence.

At last despairing of success, the French artillery opened with shells upon the house—the old tower of Hougomont was quickly in a blaze—the fire reached the chapel, and many of the wounded, both assailants and defenders, there perished miserably. But still, though the flames raged above, shells burst around, and shot ploughed through the shattered walls and windows, the guards nobly held the place, and Hougomont remained untaken.

While these terrible attacks were continued against the right centre, the left of the allied position was also furiously assailed. The recession of the English regiments behind the crest in front of which they had been previously formed, appears to have misled Napoleon—and a movement intended only to shelter the infantry from the French guns, was supposed to have been made with an intention of retreating. Under this belief Napoleon ordered his 1st corps forward, to fall on that part of the position extending between La Haye Sainte and Ter la Haye.

Shortly before two, Drouet advanced, drove a Belgian brigade roughly back, and the head of his columns reached the broken edge that partially marked the 5th division. After repulsing the cavalry, Picton formed line, and moved Kempt's and Pack's brigades forward to meet the anticipated attack. The heads of the enemy's columns were already within forty yards, when the musketry of the 5th division delivered a rolling volley that annihilated the leading sections and produced a visible confusion. Picton saw and seized the crisis, and thundered the word "Charge!" It was the last he uttered—for the next moment a musket

the purpose of flanking the wood of Hougomont, to prevent the enemy from attacking the right side of the same; the heavy loss sustained by these guns, induced the general to order the other guns of the brigade to assist them, together with Lieut.-Colonel Webber Smith's troop of horse artillery and Major Sympher's, which opened such a fire of shrapnell shells and round shot on them, that in less than a quarter of an hour they had not a gun to bear on us, and a great number of the enemy with the cannon were destroyed."—*Ibid.*

bullet perforated his forehead, and he dropped from his saddle a dead man.*

The division however, obeyed the order of their fallen chief, charged through the hedge, and routed their assailants. It was one of those moments which a battle presents, and which, when seized on, restores the fortunes of a doubtful field, and not unfrequently, snatches an unexpected victory. The 2d cavalry brigade was immediately behind the 5th division, forming a line of 1300 broadswords. Lord Anglesea observing that the French cuirassiers and lancers were preparing for a flank attack upon the British infantry, led on the heavy cavalry—and the Royals, Greys, and Enniskilleners, charged with a vigour and effect that bore down every opposition. In vain mailed cuirassier and formidable lancer met these splendid horsemen. They were overwhelmed; and the French infantry, already broken and disorganized by the 5th division, fell in hundreds beneath the swords of the English dragoons. The eagles of the 45th and 105th regiments, and upwards of two thousand prisoners, were the trophies of this brilliant exploit.

In cavalry encounters, whether success or defeat attend the charge, to a greater or a less degree the assailants must be disorganized; and acting as the 2d brigade did at Waterloo, against an arm immeasurably superior, the splendid onset of the British dragoons was eventually repulsed; and in turn, they were obliged to yield to the attack of horsemen whose order was unbroken. Many gallant officers and soldiers fell—and none more regretted than their

* "But alas! like most military triumphs, this had its misfortune to alloy it. Picton fell! but where could the commander of the gallant 5th meet with death so gloriously? He was at the head of his division as it pressed forward —he saw the best troops of Napoleon repulsed—the ball struck him; and as he fell from his horse he heard the Highland lament answered by the deep execration of Erin; and while the Scotch slogan was returned by the Irish hurrah, his fading sight saw his favourite division rush on with irresistible fury. The French column was annihilated, and 2,000 dead enemies told how desperately he had been avenged. This was, probably, the bloodiest struggle of the day. When the attack commenced—and it lasted not an hour—the 5th division exceeded 5,000 men; when it ended, they reckoned scarcely 1800!"

chivalrous leader, Sir William Ponsonby. "Having cut through the first column, he passed on to where Colonel Dorville was so hotly engaged, and found himself outflanked by a regiment of Polish lancers, in a newly-ploughed field, the ground of which was so soft, that the horse could not extricate itself. He was attended by only one aide-de-camp. At that instant, a body of lancers approached him at full speed. His own death he knew was inevitable, but supposing that his aide-de-camp might escape, he drew forth the picture of his lady, and his watch, and was in the act of delivering them to his care, to be conveyed to his wife and family, when the enemy came up, and they were both speared upon the spot. His body was afterwards found lying beside his horse, and pierced with seven wounds. It is said, however, that he did not fall unrevenged, for the brigade he commanded, had an opportunity before the battle ceased, of again encountering the Polish lancers, almost every one of whom was cut to pieces."*

An attack had been simultaneously made by part of D'Erlon's division on the farm house of La Haye Sainte, which had been repelled by the Germans under Baron Alten; and they, in turn, were charged by Milhaud's cuirassiers. But forming square, steadily and rapidly, their assailants galloped on without breaking a battalion, and suffered a heavy loss from the musketry of some regiments diagonally placed, whose fire was closely and coolly delivered.

Passing the intervals between the squares, the French cuirassiers topped the crest behind the British infantry. This chivalrous act was recompensed by nothing but its daring; for, before a splendid charge of the life-guards, blues, and 1st dragoon guards, that celebrated cavalry whose prowess had turned the tide of many a doubtful field, gave way; and in the *mêlée*, hand to hand, steel helmet and cuirass proved no protection against the stalwarth arm of the English trooper. The conflict was short and

* Mudford.

severe; and Milhaud's cavalry were deforced and driven into the valley.

Further to the left, an opportunity of charging an unsteady regiment of French infantry was seized by Colonel Ponsonby. With the 12th light dragoons and a Belgian corps, the attack was gallantly made—but in turn, these regiments were assailed by the French lancers, and driven back with serious loss.

Another and more determined attack was made about this period of the battle upon Hougomont—but the Duke had reinforced the weakened garrison—and favoured by the cover which the houses and enclosures afforded, the fresh assault failed totally. The obstinacy with which Napoleon endeavoured to win this important post, may be best estimated by the terrible expenditure of life his repeated attacks occasioned. Eight thousand men were rendered *hors-de-combat* in these attempts; and when evening and defeat came, the burning ruins were still in the possession of those gallant soldiers who had held them nobly against so many, and so desperate attacks.

It was strange, that throughout the sanguinary struggle, but one success crowned the incessant efforts of Napoleon—the temporary possession of the farm-house of La Haye Sainte. "Its defence had been intrusted to Colonel Baring, with a detachment of the German legion, amounting to about three hundred men, subsequently reinforced by two hundred more. The attack begun at one o'clock, and continued above two hours. Several guns were brought to bear upon the house—but the conflict was chiefly maintained by massy columns of infantry, who advanced with such fury, that they actually grasped at the rifles of the besieged as they projected through the loopholes. Four successive attempts were thus made, and three times the assailants were gallantly beaten off. Twice the enemy succeeded in setting fire to a barn or out-house, contiguous to the main building—but both times it was fortunately extinguished. The numbers of the garrison, at length,

began to diminish—many were either killed or wounded —and at the same time their ammunition was failing. It became impossible to supply the one, or reinforce the other, for there was no practicable communication with the rest of the army. The men, reduced to five cartridges each, were enjoined to be not only sparing of their fire, but to aim well. A fourth attack was now made, by two columns, stronger than either of the preceding, and the enemy soon perceived that the garrison could not return a shot. Emboldened by this discovery, they instantly rushed forward, and burst open one of the doors; but a desperate resistance was still made with the sword-bayonet, through the windows and embrasures. They then ascended the walls and roof, whence they securely fired down upon their adversaries. This unequal conflict could not long continue, and after an heroic defence the post was surrendered. It is affirmed that the French sacrificed to their revenge every man whom they found in the place. It is at least certain, that some individuals were most barbarously treated. The shattered and dilapidated state of the house, after the battle, conspicuously evinced the furious efforts which the enemy made for its possession, and the desperate courage displayed in its defence. The door was perforated by innumerable shot-holes; the roof destroyed by shells and cannon balls; there was scarcely the vestige of a window discernible, and the whole edifice exhibited a melancholy scene of ravage and desolation. Yet when obtained, it offered no advantage commensurate to the loss with which it had been purchased; for the artillery, on an adjacent ridge, continued to pour down such a destructive and incessant fire, that Napoleon could make but little use of the conquest to promote his subsequent operations."*

Still the situation of the allied army became every moment more critical—its own glorious efforts exhausting its strength, and every noble repulse rendering it less capable of continuing what seemed to prove an endless resistance.

* Mudford.

Though masses of the enemy had fallen, thousands came on anew. With desperate attachment, the French army pressed forward at Napoleon's command; and while each advance terminated in defeat and slaughter, fresh battalions crossed the valley, and, mounting the ridge with cries of '*Vive l'Empereur!*' exhibited a devotion which never has been equalled. Wellington's reserves had gradually been brought into action; and the left, though but partially engaged, dared not, weakened, to send assistance to the right and centre. Many battalions were miserably reduced, and presented but skeletons of what these beautiful brigades had been when they left Brussels two days before The loss of individual regiments was prodigious. One* had 400 men mowed down in square without drawing a trigger: it lost almost all its officers; and a subaltern commanded it for half the day. Another,† when not 200 men were left, rushed into a French column and routed it with the bayonet; a third,‡ when nearly annihilated, sent to require support: none could be given, and the commanding officer was told that he must 'stand or fall where he was!'

"No wonder that Wellington almost despaired. He calculated, and justly, that he had an army who would perish where they stood—but when he saw the devastation caused by the incessant attacks of an enemy, who appeared determined to succeed, is it surprising that his watch was frequently consulted, and that he prayed for night or Blucher?"§

Never did a battle demand more stoic courage than Waterloo from its commencement to its close. Nothing is more spirit-sinking to a soldier than the passive endurance of offence—nothing so intolerable, as to be incessantly assailed, and not permitted, in turn, to become assailant. The ardent struggle for a hard fought field, differs immeasurably from the cheerless duty of holding a position, and

* Twenty-seventh. † Ninety-second.
‡ Thirty-third. § Stories of Waterloo.

repelling, but not returning, the constant aggressions of an enemy.

"In an attacking body there is an excited feeling that stimulates the coldest and blunts the thoughts of danger. The tumultuous enthusiasm of the assault spreads from man to man, and duller spirits catch a gallant frenzy from the brave around them. But the enduring and devoted courage which pervaded the British squares when, hour after hour, mowed down by a murderous artillery, and wearied by furious and frequent onsets of lancers and curiassiers; when the constant order, 'Close up!—close up!' marked the quick succession of slaughter that thinned their diminished ranks; and when the day wore later, when the remnants of two, and even three regiments were necessary to complete the square, which one of them had formed in the morning—to support this with firmness, and 'feed death,' inactive and unmoved, exhibited a calm and desperate bravery which elicited the admiration of one, to whom war's awful sacrifices were familiar.

"Knowing, that to repel these desperate and sustained attacks, a tremendous expenditure of human life was unavoidable, Napoleon, in defiance of their acknowledged bravery, calculated on wearying the British into defeat. But when he saw his columns driven back in confusion—when his cavalry receded from the squares they could not penetrate—when battalions were reduced to companies by the fire of his cannon, and still that 'feeble few' showed a perfect front, and held the ground they had originally taken—no wonder that his admiration was expressed to Soult—'How beautifully these English fight! But they must give way.'" *

Evening came, and yet no crisis. Napoleon, astounded by the terrible repulses which had attended his most desperate attacks, began to dread that the day would have an unfavourable issue, and that Soult's estimate of the stubborn endurance of the English infantry might prove fatally

* Stories of Waterloo.

correct. Wellington, as he viewed the diminished numbers of his brave battalions, still presenting the same fearless attitude that they had done when the battle opened, still felt that to human endurance there is a limit; and turned his glass repeatedly to that direction, from which his expected support must come. At times, also, the temper of the troops had nearly failed; and, particularly among the Irish regiments, the reiterated question of "When shall we get at them?" showed how ardent the wish was to avoid inactive slaughter, and, plunging into the columns of the assailants, to avenge the death of their companions. But the "Be cool, my boys!" from their officers was sufficient to restrain this impatience — and, cumbering the ground with their dead, they waited with desperate intrepidity for the hour to arrive when victory and vengeance should be their own!

At last, the welcome sound of distant artillery was heard in the direction of St. Lambert, and a staff officer reported that the head of the Prussian column was already in the Bois de Paris. Advised therefore, that his gallant ally would presently come into action, the Duke made fresh preparations to repel what he properly anticipated would be the last and the most desperate effort of his opponent.

Satisfied that his right flank was secure, Lord Hill was directed to send Clinton's division, with Mitchell's brigade, and a Hanoverian corps from the extreme right, towards the centre, which the reinforcement of Hougomont, by the removal of Byng's brigade, had weakened. Chassé's Dutch division was also moved to the lower ground from Braine la Leud as a support to the right of the position; and, subsequently, the light cavalry of Vandeleur and Vivian were both brought forward; and where danger was apprehended, care was taken to have a sufficient force in hand to meet the storm which was presently about to burst.

It is said that Napoleon felt assured that the cannonade which announced Blucher's advance, was only the fire of Grouchy's guns, who, in obedience to his repeated orders,

had reached the battle-ground alone, or was advancing, *pari passu*, and holding Bulow's corps in check. This intelligence was rapidly conveyed along the line; and, to a soldiery easily exhilarated, victory appeared certain, and preparations were made, for what was believed to be, a final and triumphal attack.

But the illusion was brief. The Prussians debouched from the wood at Frichermont—and half Napoleon's right wing was thrown back, *en potence*, to check their attack, while his last grand movement should be executed against the allied army in his front.

While Napoleon directed that great effort which he anxiously hoped might prove decisive, the British infantry, who held the threatened point, were laid down on the reverse of the crest they occupied, to obtain shelter from the enemy's artillery. With its proverbial intrepidity, the imperial guard, in close column, came on to the assault—and nothing could be more imposing than the steadiness with which they ascended the slope of the position, although the fire of the English guns fell upon their dense masses with ruinous precision. Presently, the guards moved forward to the crest of the height; and the finest infantry in the world confronted each other at the distance of fifty paces. The cheers of the French formed a striking contrast to the soldier-like silence with which the English received the attack; and shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* was only answered by a rolling volley. The first steady fire of the British guards disorganized the crowded column—and the fusilade was rapidly and steadily sustained. Vain efforts were made by the French officers to deploy, and the feeble fire of their leading files was returned by a stream of musketry that carried death into ranks in close formation, and every moment increased their disorder. The word to charge was given—the guards cheered, and came forward—but the enemy declined the contest, and the shattered column hurried down the hill, with the precipitate confusion attendant on a heavy repulse. After routing their opponents,

the victorious infantry halted, re-formed, fell back, and resumed their former position.

Nor was the attack of Napoleon's second column more fortunate. After repelling the attack of the first column of the imperial guard, Maitland's brigade brought its left shoulders forward to meet the second column, which was now advancing, while Adams's brigade,* pivoted on its left, moved its right wing rapidly on, having Bolton's troop of artillery in the angle, where the right of the guards touched the left flank of the light brigade. Undismayed by the repulse of the first column, the second topped the height in perfect order, and with a confidence which bespoke the certainty of success. But the musketry of Maitland's left wing smote the column heavily in front; and the fire of the light regiments fell, with terrible effect, on the flank of a mass already torn and disordered by the close discharge of grape and case shot from the English battery. The ground in a few minutes was covered with dead and wounded men — the confusion increased — the disorder became irremediable. To stand that intolerable fire was madness —they broke—and, like the first column, endeavoured to reach the low ground, where, sheltered from this slaughtering fusilade, they could have probably reorganized their broken array. But this was not permitted.† Pressed by

* 52d, 71st, and two companies, 3d battalion, 95th.

"The irremediable disorder consequent on this decisive repulse, and the confusion in the French rear, where Bulow had fiercely attacked them, did not escape the eagle glance of Wellington. 'The hour is come!' he is said to have exclaimed, as, closing his telescope, he commanded the whole line to advance. The order was exultingly obeyed: and forming four deep, on came the British. Wounds, and fatigue, and hunger, were all forgotten, as with their customary steadiness they crossed the ridge; but when they saw the French, and began to move down the hill, a cheer that seemed to rend the heavens, pealed from their proud array, as they pressed on to meet the enemy."—*Stories of Waterloo.*

† "Then came the hour of British triumph. The magic word was spoken —'Up, guards, and at them!' In a moment the household brigade were on their feet: then waiting till the French closed, they delivered a tremendous volley, cheered and rushed forward with the bayonet, Wellington in person directing the attack."—*Ibid.*

the guards—charged by the 52d—retreat became a flight, and Wellington completed the *deroute* by launching the cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur against the mass, as it rushed down the hill in hopeless disorder.

This, indeed, was the crisis of the battle. The Prussian demonstration, slight at first, had latterly become more dangerous and decided. The whole of the 4th corps had now got up, with Pirch's division of the 2d, and Ziethen's column appeared on the right flank of the French, and rendered Count Lobau's position still more critical. The discomfiture of Ney's attack had produced over the French corps a general unsteadiness; and before it was possible to rally and renew the fight, one grand and general attack decided the doubtful field, and consummated the ruin of Napoleon.*

As the French right gradually receded, the allied line, converging from its extreme points at Marke Braine and Braine la Leud, became compressed in extent, and assumed rather the appearance of a crescent. The marked impression of Blucher's attack—the debouch of Ziethen by the Ohain road—and the bloody repulse inflicted on the imperial guard—all told Wellington that the hour was come, and that to strike boldly was to secure a victory. The word was given to advance. The infantry, in one long and splendid line, moved forward with a thrilling cheer—the horse artillery galloped up, and opened with case shot on the disordered masses,† which, but a brief space before,

* "With the 42d and 95th, the British leader threw himself on Ney's flank. and rout and destruction succeeded. In vain their gallant chief attempted to rally the recoiling guard; and driven down the hill, they were intermingled with the old guard, who formed at the bottom in reserve."—*Stories of Waterloo.*

† "When the imperial guards, led on by Marshal Ney, about half-past seven o'clock made their appearance from a corn-field, in close columns of grand divisions, nearly opposite, and within a distance of fifty yards from the muzzles of the guns, orders were given to load with canister-shot, and literally five rounds from each gun were fired with this species of shot, before they showed the least symptom of retiring. At the twenty-ninth round, their left gave way."—*Letters of an Artillery Officer.*

had advanced with such imposing resolution. Instantly, the allied cavalry were let loose; and, charging headlong into the enemy's columns, they turned retreat into rout, and closed the history of one of the bloodiest struggles upon record.

For a short time, four battalions of the old guard, comprising the only reserve which Napoleon had left unemployed, formed square, and checked the movements of the cavalry. But, "panic-stricken and disorganised, the French resistance was short and feeble. The Prussian cannon thundered in their rear; the British bayonet was flashing in their front; and, unable to stand the terror of the charge, they broke and fled. A dreadful and indiscriminate carnage ensued. The great road was choked with the equipage, and cumbered with the dead and dying; while the fields, as far as the eye could reach, were covered with a host of helpless fugitives. Courage and discipline were forgotten. Napoleon's army of yesterday was now a splendid wreck. His own words best describe it—'It was a total rout!'

"The last gleam of fading sunshine fell upon the rout of Waterloo. The finest army, for its numbers, that France had ever embattled in a field was utterly defeated; and the dynasty of that proud spirit, for whom Europe was too little, was ended.

"Night came: but it brought no respite to the shattered army of Napoleon; and the moon rose upon the 'broken host' to light the victors to their prey. The British, forgetting their fatigue, pressed on the rear of the flying enemy; and the roads, covered with the dead and dying, and obstructed by broken equipages and deserted guns, became almost impassable to the fugitives—and hence the slaughter from Waterloo to Genappe was frightful. But, wearied with blood, (for the French, throwing away their arms to expedite their flight, offered no resistance,) and exhausted with hunger and fatigue, the British pursuit relaxed, and between Rossome and Genappe it ceased

altogether. The infantry bivouacked for the night around the farm-houses of Caillou and Belle Alliance, and the light cavalry halted one mile further on, abandoning the work of death to their fresher and more sanguinary allies. Nothing indeed, could surpass the desperate and unrelenting animosity of the Prussians towards the French. Repose and plunder were sacrificed to revenge: the memory of former defeat, insult and oppression, now produced a dreadful retaliation, and overpowered every feeling of humanity. The *væ victis* was pronounced, and thousands beside those who perished in the field, fell that night beneath the Prussian lance and sabre. In vain a feeble effort was made by the French to barricade the streets of Genappe, and interrupt the progress of the conquerors. Blucher forced the passage with his cannon; and so entirely had the defeat of Waterloo extinguished the spirit, and destroyed the discipline of the remnant of Napoleon's army, that the wild hurrah of the pursuers, or the very blast of a Prussian trumpet, became the signal for flight and terror."*

It was a singular accident, that near La Belle Alliance† the victorious generals met; for thither, Blucher, on forcing the French right, had urged forward his columns in pursuit. Comparatively fresh, the Prussians engaged to follow up the victory—and the allies left the great road open, and bivouacked on the field.

By moonlight, Wellington recrossed the battle-ground, and arrived for supper at Brussels—an honour which Napoleon had promised to confer upon that ancient city. The excited feelings which such a victory must have produced, are said to have suffered a reaction, and given way to deep despondency, as he rode past "the dying and the dead." God knows, it was "a sorry sight"—for on a surface, not exceeding two square miles, fifty thousand dead or disabled men and horses were extended.

* Stories of Waterloo. † Mudford asserts that it was closer to Genappe.

CHAPTER XXXII.

DEFEAT AT WATERLOO—FRENCH LOSSES—WATERLOO CONSIDERED AS A BATTLE, A VICTORY, AND AN EVENT—CONDUCT OF NEY AND GROUCHY—WELLINGTON NOT SURPRISED—HIS POSITION WELL CHOSEN—AND THE BATTLE JUDICIOUSLY RECEIVED—NAPOLEON'S MISTAKES AT LIGNY, QUATRE BRAS, AND WATERLOO—ERRORS IN HIS WHOLE SYSTEM OF ATTACK—GALLANTRY OF THE FRENCH ARMY—SKILL AND DEVOTION OF ITS GENERALS—PERSONAL CONDUCT OF NAPOLEON AND WELLINGTON.

MANY of Wellington's victories were as decisive, but he had never inflicted a defeat so terrible as that of Waterloo. At Salamanca, after the dispersion of Marmont's rear-guard on the heights of La Serna, scarcely a prisoner was made; and in a few days, every French soldier, save those left upon the battle-field, had returned to their colours, and the army, reorganized anew, was ready for immediate service. At Vitoria, the enemy were utterly *derouted*, and not a gun or equipage was saved; but the men and horses, which constitute the most valuable portion of a parc, escaped—the scattered soldiers rallied in the rear—and Soult's subsequent operations gave a convincing proof, how rapidly his losses had been replaced, and his army had been made effective. But at Waterloo, the disaster went beyond a remedy. That matchless corps,* whose prowess

* "What Napoleon's feelings were when he witnessed the overthrow of his guard—the failure of his last hope—the death-blow to his political existence, cannot be described, but may be easily imagined. Turning to an aide-de-camp, with a face livid with rage and despair, he muttered in a tremulous voice—'*A present c'est fini!—sauvons-nous;*' and turning his horse, rode hastily off towards Charleroi."

had decided many a doubtful day, were almost annihilated—the cavalry completely ruined—the artillery abandoned*—and if the number be computed, including those left upon the battle-ground, sabred in the pursuit, captured on the field, or made prisoners by the Prussians, with the still greater portion of fugitives who disbanded on entering France, and returned to their respective homes—the total losses sustained by Napoleon and consequent on his defeat at Waterloo, cannot in round numbers amount to less than forty thousand men.

Twenty-six years have elapsed; and all that can evidence the transactions of that memorable day, has been written or narrated by those who witnessed, or were actors in the drama. Men whose views, and objects, and prejudices were totally opposed, have detailed the eventful occurrences; and, under the conviction that the tale was true, the most conflicting statements have been made. This is easily accounted for. "The history of a battle is not unlike the

* *Artillery taken at Waterloo, 18th June, 1815.*

12-pounder guns	35
6-pounder guns	57
6-inch howitzers	13
24-pounder howitzers	17
Total cannon	122

SPARE GUN CARRIAGES.

12-pounder	6
Howitzer	6
6-pounder	8
Total	20
12-pounder waggons	74
6-pounder waggons	71
Howitzer waggons	50
Total	195
Forage waggons	20
Waggons of imperial guard	52
Total	72

Grand Total, 409.

history of a ball. Some individuals may recollect all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost; but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment when they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value." *

By dispassionate comparison, and a collation of conflicting statements, the truth will be generally obtained—and Waterloo with its results shall be submitted to a candid examination.

In whatever point of view Waterloo is considered, whether as a battle, a victory, or an event—in all these, every occurrence of the last century yields, and more particularly, in the magnitude of its consequences. No doubt, the successes of Wellington in Spain, were, in a great degree, primary causes of Napoleon's downfal; but still the victory of Waterloo consummated efforts which had been made for years before to achieve the freedom of the continent—and wrought the final ruin of him, through whose unhallowed ambition the world had been so long convulsed.

As a battle, the merits of the field of Waterloo have been freely examined and very differently adjudicated. Those who were best competent to decide, have pronounced this battle as that upon which Wellington might securely rest his fame—while others, admitting the extent of the victory, ascribe the result rather to fortunate accident than military skill.

Never was a falser statement hazarded. The success attendant on the day of Waterloo, can be referred only to the admirable system of resistance in the general, and an enduring valour, rarely equalled, and never surpassed, in the soldiers whom he commanded. Chance, at Waterloo had no effect upon results. Wellington's surest game was to act entirely on the defensive—his arrangements with Blucher, for mutual support, were thoroughly matured †—and before night the Prussians must be upon the field. Bad weather and bad roads, with the conflagration of a

* Wellington Despatch, 8th August, 1815. † Appendix, No. IV. p. 540.

town in the line of march, which, to save the Prussian tumbrils from explosion, required a circuitous movement—all these, while they protracted the struggle for several hours beyond what might have been reasonably computed, only go to prove, that Wellington in accepting battle, under a well-founded belief that he should be supported in *four hours*—and when single-handed he maintained the combat and resolutely held his ground during a space of *eight*, had left nothing dependent upon accident, but providing for the worst contingencies, had formed his calculations with admirable skill.

The apologists for Napoleon lay much stress on Ney's dilatory march on Quatre Bras, and Grouchy's unprofitable movements on the Dyle.* The failure of Ney upon the 16th will be best accounted for by that Marshal's simple statement. His reserve was withdrawn by Napoleon; and when the Prince of Moskwa required, and ordered it forward, to make a grand effort on the wearied English, the corps was "idly parading" between Quartre Bras and Ligny; and during the arduous struggles at both places, that splendid division had never faced an enemy nor discharged a musket. Ney's failure in his attack was therefore attributable to Napoleon altogether; for had his reserve been at hand, who can suppose that the exhausted battalions of the allies, after a march of two-and-twenty miles and a long and bloody combat, must not have yielded to fresh troops in overpowering masses, and fallen back from a position no longer tenable? To Grouchy's imputed errors, also, the loss of Waterloo has been mainly ascribed both by Napoleon and his admirers. But neither was that marshal's conduct obnoxious to the censure so unsparingly bestowed upon it; nor, had he disobeyed orders and acceded to the proposition of his second in command, would a movement by his left have effected any thing beyond the delay of Napoleon's overthrow for a night. By following Gerard's

* Appendix, No. V.

advice, and marching direct on Waterloo, the day would have ended, probably, in a drawn battle—or even Wellington might have been obliged to retire into the Wood of Soignies. But in a few hours Blucher would have been up—in the morning the Anglo-Prussian army would have become assailant—and with numbers far superior, who will pretend to say that Napoleon's defeat upon the 19th, would not have been as certain and as signal as his *déroute* at Waterloo, upon the fatal evening that closed upon a fallen empire and a last field?

That the disastrous result to a battle so confidently delivered, should bring with it a national irritation never to be assuaged, may be readily conceived; and in seeking out a balm to be ministered to wounded pride many apologies have been made to palliate this dreadful failure. The commonest were the excuses generally adopted—and to undervalue the talents of the victor, and to ascribe the fruits of military skill and moral courage to accident and treachery, have been customary alternatives with the vanquished. If the statements imputed to Napoleon in his exile—and there is no reason to question the truth—comprise the grounds upon which Wellington's generalship is to be impugned, it is an easy task to examine them *seriatim*, and determine how far they are capable of being disproved or sustained. The gravest charges made by Napoleon against his successful opponent are, that in the first place he was surprised, fought afterwards in a bad position, and eventually delivered a battle which he should have declined. The causes to which he attributes his own defeat are generally, errors in some officers, treachery in others, and apathy and indifference in the whole. Let us now see how far these allegations can be supported.

That Wellington was surprised is nothing but an idle fabrication. A reference to his correspondence* will show that for weeks he had penetrated Napoleon's intentions, and had made deliberate arrangements for rendering

* Appendix, No. IV.

them unavailing.* That the French were concentrating—that they would cross the Belgic frontier, and most probably make a rush upon the capital,† every drum-boy in Brussels was assured — and that a system of combined operations between Wellington and Blucher had been matured, subsequent occurrences established. The allied army was consequently, so cantoned, that when Napoleon's demonstrations should be sufficiently developed, its divisions might be promptly united. To conceal his point of attack to the last moment, and be able to take the initiative by some hours, was on Napoleon's side an important advantage, and on Wellington's, no fault. Was the latter on the first rumour of the emperor's advance, to mass his army together, and leave the country beyond the space it covered, open to the undisputed march of the French army? That, indeed, would have been a convenience to Napoleon, and a course he would have undoubtedly approved—but his able antagonist was neither to be alarmed nor diverted—and he waited with the coolness of a great general, until the movements of his rival enabled him to act with safety and success.‡

* "I heard yesterday that Vandamme's corps had moved to its left, and had brought its right upon Givet. There are a great number of troops about Maubeuge, Avesnes," &c.

"I heard also that measures had been taken to move the guards from Paris to Maubeuge in forty-eight hours; and that an aide-de-camp of the emperor was there on the 12th."

Again—"We hear of Bonaparte's quitting Paris, and of the march of troops to this frontier, in order to attack us. I met Blucher at Tirlemont this day, and received from him the most satisfactory assurances of support.

"For an action in Belgium I can now put 70,000 men into the field, and Blucher 80,000; so that, I hope, we should give a good account even of Bonaparte."—*Wellington's Correspondence.*

† "A general, in the Duke of Wellington's suite, familiar with Bonaparte's usual system of tactics, having looked at Ferrari's map, offered a bet that he would attack the centre, 'for,' said he, 'as by this map he must perceive, that the two high roads of Nivelles and Genappe, after meeting at Mont St. Jean, lead direct and united to Brussels, he will be irresistibly hurried to adopt his favourite manœuvre of forcing the centre.'"—*Booth's Narrative.*

‡ A second despatch from Blucher reached Brussels towards midnight on the 15th, communicating that decisive intelligence which the Duke of Wellington required, namely, that the French had actually crossed the Sambre in force, and were marching in the direction of Charlèroi and Fleurus.

With regard to Napoleon's assertions, that Waterloo was a bad position on which to accept a battle, it unfortunately happened that he was never enabled to prove its defects, by forcing the allies into the forest in its rear. Without wasting time on the discussion of a charge captiously put forward by a man irritated by an unexpected defeat, we will rest the question on the authority of one of his own generals,* to whose opinions, military experience and admitted abilities give a weight before which loose assertion crumbles into pieces.

"We have said that one of the essentials in a position is that it should offer the means of retreat; which brings us to the consideration of a question created by the battle of Waterloo. Supposing an army to be posted in front of a forest, having a good road behind its centre and each of its wings; would it be compromised, as Napoleon asserts, in the event of its losing the battle? For my own part, I think, on the contrary, that such a position would be more favourable for retreating than if the country were perfectly open; since a beaten army cannot traverse a plain without being exposed to the utmost danger. Doubtless, if the retreat should degenerate into a disorderly flight, a portion of the guns remaining in battery in front of the forest would probably be lost; but the infantry, the cavalry, and the rest of the artillery, would be able to retire with as much facility as across a plain. But if, on the contrary, the retreat takes place with order, nothing could possibly protect it better than a forest: provided always, that there exist at least two good roads behind the line; that the enemy be not allowed to press too close before the requisite measures preparatory to retiring are thought of; and that no lateral movement shall enable the enemy to anticipate the army at the outlets from the forest, as happened at Hohenlinden. It would also greatly tend to secure the retreat if, as was the case at Waterloo, the forest should form a concave line behind the centre; for such a bend

* Jornini, Précis de l'Art de la Guerre.

would then become a regular *place d'armes* in which to collect the troops, and afford time to file them successively into the high road."

No wonder, then, that the Duke held so tenaciously to his ground, when aware of the perfect ease with which, if eventually deforced, he could rally in the wood, and holding Napoleon in check until Blucher should come up, by a renewed attack, and with superior numbers, command next morning a certain victory!

From the inconclusive results of the Prussian defeat at Ligny—the bloody repulse inflicted upon Ney at Quatre Bras—and the relative positions of his own army and that of Blucher, Wellington was not only justified in receiving battle, but he had every reason to expect that he should have been reinforced several hours before the Prussians actually came up—and that Waterloo would have terminated at three o'clock, as decisively as it closed at seven. That Bonaparte never calculated on the enduring courage of British infantry* is certain—but Wellington did—and the result proved how correctly the latter estimated the qualities of the troops whom he commanded. When, therefore, in his conversations at St. Helena, Napoleon gravely declared that Murat alone was wanting to have enabled him to have broken those squares, which for a long day had remained unshaken by reiterated attacks, one is tempted to smile at the effect which he imagined the white plumes of him of Naples would have produced upon the island infantry. The chances are, that at Waterloo he whose melancholy fate, with all the weakness of his character, must as a soldier be regretted, might there have found a nobler grave; and instead of perishing like a bandit, Murat would have died a warrior's death, charging sword

* "The coolness with which every man stood his ground, receiving or escaping death, as chance might order, transcends all eulogy. Hundreds were annihilated by the enemy's artillery without having fired a shot. The 27th regiment had 400 men, and every officer, except one subaltern, knocked down in square, neither moving an inch nor discharging a single musket."—*Mudford.*

in hand at the head of that splendid cavalry, to whom before he had so often showed the path to victory.

We have examined the different charges preferred by Napoleon and his admirers against the Duke of Wellington when questioning his claims to the character of a great commander. More serious ones however have been made against his accuser; and, unlike the faults imputed to his rival, these can be neither justified nor denied.

To others, Napoleon ascribes his reverses—but we shall inquire what portion of his misfortune was solely attributable to himself. That the "treason" he pretends to have existed in his camps was altogether confined to the desertion of a general officer,* may be inferred from the fact, that no information could be obtained by the allies of his movements until their outposts were driven in; and yet, with an army fully concentrated, his attack upon the Prussians was delayed until late in the afternoon, which had it been made, as it ought to have been, in the morning, must have necessarily succeeded, as until noon Blucher had only two corps in position. Nor is it certain that even then his dispositions were correct. According to the statements of a Prussian authority of high character, "Bonaparte's attack upon Ligny was the worst plan he could have adopted. That upon St. Amand was better; but the correctest movement was, to march with the whole army (including the guards, consisting of six corps,) in two columns, so as to separate the English army from the Prussian, and then to attack that, promising the easiest victory. In this case, he ought to have marched by Mallet and Wagnele. At all events, he ought to have attacked the right wing of the Prussian army; it was only by that means that he could hope for victory. The French were too weak to engage with both armies at once."

At Quatre Bras, also, the impunity with which Wellington was permitted to retire leisurely and without loss, by a solitary bridge, has been already noticed. But at

* Bourmont.

Waterloo more serious mistakes were committed by Napoleon, and his obstinate perseverance in attempts upon Hougomont* have been freely and fairly condemned. Sarrazin asserts that "Napoleon ought to have masked the post, and proceeded to the principal attack, which should have been against the left wing, to separate it from the Prussians, and at the same time approximate the French army to the corps of Grouchy. By this operation, Napoleon might have been master of the position of Mont St. Jean, and avoided the battles at Hougomont and La Haye Sainte."†

Waterloo, as a battle, has no striking event to distinguish it from other actions, and no grand military conception marked a field devoid of scientific display.‡ Napoleon's plan was to weary out the endurance of the English infantry, and at what expense, appears to have been with him a very secondary consideration. "When evening came, no doubt he began to question the accuracy of his 'military arithmetic,'—a phrase happily applied to his meting out death by the hour. Half the day had been consumed in a

* "Within half an hour 1500 men were killed in the small orchard at Hougomont, not exceeding four acres.

"The loss of the enemy was enormous. The division of General Foy alone lost about 3000, and the total loss of the enemy in the attack of this position, is estimated at 10,000 in killed and wounded.

"Above 6000 men of both armies perished in the farm of Hougomont; 600 French fell in the attack on the chateau and the farm; 200 English were killed in the wood, 25 in the garden, 1100 in the orchard and meadow, 400 near the farmer's garden; 2000 of both parties behind the great orchard. The bodies of 300 English are buried opposite the gate of the chateau; those of 600 French have been burnt at the same place."—*Booth's Narrative.*

† Hist. de la Guerre de la Restauration.

‡ "You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call gluttons. Napoleon did not manœuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was, that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery.

"I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking about us as if they had been our own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well."—*Wellington to Beresford.*

sanguinary and indecisive conflict; all his disposable troops but the Guard had been employed, and still his efforts were foiled; and the British, with diminished numbers, showed the same bold front they had presented at the commencement of the battle."* Nor when attacked by that Guard, whose advance into a doubtful fight had hitherto wrested victory from the most obstinate, did the fortunes of the day waver. Surrounded and on every side assailed, not a square gave way. "In this terrible situation, neither the bullets (*boulets*, cannon-balls) of the Imperial Guard, discharged almost point blank, nor the victorious cavalry of France, could make the least impression on the immovable British infantry. One might have been almost tempted to fancy that it had rooted itself in the ground, but for the *majestic movement* which its battalions *commenced* some minutes after sunset, at the moment when the approach of the Prussian army apprised Wellington he had just achieved the most decisive victory of the age."†

The endeavour made to shift the causes of his failure upon those who had always served him so devotedly, will be adduced as a trait of meanness in Napoleon's character, and totally unworthy of its greatness. Never did the French army in their palmy days fight with more determination. Never were they more heroically led on, nor were their officers more distinguished for their gallantry.‡ If the

* Victories of the British armies. † Foy.

‡ "So rapid and impetuous were the assaults of the cavalry, that our guns were frequently in their possession, the artillerymen being forced to seek shelter in the squares behind. But the well-directed fire of the infantry, and the charges of the cavalry, who rushed forward at every opportunity, prevented them from ever removing any of the cannon. On one occasion, the activity of two artillery officers enabled a single gun to do much execution. As often as the enemy's squadrons retired, these officers, issuing from the square, loaded and fired the gun, which was sure to destroy six or eight. This manœuvre was repeated several times, when the French officer who commanded the corps, by a noble act of self-devotion, saved his men from at least one discharge. As the squadron recoiled, he placed himself singly by the piece, and waved his sword as if to defy any one to approach it. He was killed by a Brunswick rifleman."—*Mudford.*

chroniclers* of Napoleon when in exile can be credited, all were nevertheless included in one sweeping condemnation. But facts are stubborn things; and to these must be opposed the querulous complaints of a fallen man, whose last days were embittered by the memory of what he had been, and outraged by a coarse-minded individual, and by the imposition of unnecessary restrictions. If, at Quatre Bras his first corps were non-combatant, and Ney failed in an attack, which, with D'Erlon's assistance, must have proved, *quantum valeat*, successful, was it not by Napoleon's special instructions that the first corps was withdrawn from the point where it was required, and "idly paraded" towards Ligny, where it remained unemployed? Was Grouchy censurable for obeying orders, which were not countermanded until Waterloo was lost? Was Soult wanting in duty, when he communicated the results of his own experience, and assured the Emperor that he was wasting his superb cavalry in idle efforts to deforce infantry which never would give way? What, after Waterloo was won, and hope had ended—what even then, was the conduct of Napoleon's generals? Grouchy's retreat was an admirable operation, and many instances could be adduced to prove that a chivalrous spirit actuated the French officers, and every personal feeling gave way before the calls of duty.†

* Gourgaud, Montholon, and O'Meara.

† General Vandamme having been obliged to have Wavre evacuated, after being informed of the loss of the battle of Waterloo, remained constantly with the rear guard: it was under these circumstances that he was severely wounded in the belly, by a ball; but notwithstanding his pain and loss of blood, he still remained on horseback. When he reached the village where the army had just halted, he dismounted from his horse—his breeches were full of blood. A surgeon offered to dress his wound:—'Let me alone,' said he, 'I have something else to do.' He immediately began to examine the map, and to write his orders. The surgeon remarked to him, that he was losing much blood, and that in a quarter of an hour he might not even be able to continue his march, if he would not suffer himself to be dressed, and that he would do his duty without disturbing him. 'Well then,' replied he, 'on that condition only.'"—*Moniteur.*

To impute to Napoleon any want of courage and intrepidity, would be to make a charge falsified by the actions of a daring and adventurous career, but certainly, at Waterloo he appeared to attach an importance to his personal security, that, though correct in an abstract view, was not in keeping with the bearing of a soldier, staking "his life upon a cast." A charge of an opposite description might be made against "the iron Duke," for he as recklessly exposed himself. Had the issue been otherwise—had a bloody and decisive defeat closed the history of a bloody day, we have little doubt but Wellington would have done what Napoleon ought to have done—died at the head of the last battalion which, with desperate fidelity, still presented its front to the enemy!

BADAJOZ

AND ITS

ENVIRONS.



CHAPTER XXXIII.

PURSUIT OF THE FRENCH ARMY—GROUCHY'S OPERATIONS—RETREATS ON PARIS—GENERAL ORDER—ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES—OFFICIAL DETAILS—FLIGHT OF NAPOLEON—HE ARRIVES IN PARIS, AND ABDICATES IN FAVOUR OF HIS SON—CHAMBER OF PEERS—NAPOLEON QUITS THE CAPITAL, AND SURRENDERS HIMSELF TO CAPTAIN MAITLAND—CONVENTION OF ST. CLOUD—TERMINATION OF WELLINGTON'S MILITARY CAREER—PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHARACTER OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

THE victory of Waterloo was decisive, and every exertion was subsequently made to follow up its success, and secure the advantage, which skill and courage had obtained. The Prussian corps pressed the retreat with a spirit and alacrity that prevented any immediate rally from being attempted; and on the 19th Wellington was moving in excellent order upon the French capital—a wonderful military exploit, after such a conflict as that of Waterloo.

To connect the narrative of events, Grouchy's operations require a brief detail. Detached by Napoleon in pursuit of Blucher, on the 17th, he halted at Gembloux, and next morning continued his advance on Wavre. On the 18th he drove the Prussians from the right bank of the Dyle, but wasted the day in vain attempts to cross that river, which was resolutely held by Thielman. The distant cannonade at Waterloo announced that the Emperor was seriously engaged, and Grouchy made additional efforts, and without success, to force a passage, under a belief that the whole Prussian army was in his front. At Limale, however, he passed the Dyle, and bivouacked on the left bank of the

river. On the 19th he was attacked, when Thielman was sharply repulsed, and consequently retreated; but the tidings of the disaster at Waterloo reached both generals early in the day, when Grouchy immediately retired, crossed the Sambre, and marched upon Dinant, closely followed by the Prussians. The retreat was very ably conducted, and the marshal reached Paris on the eighth day, after sustaining little loss, excepting in artillery.

On recommencing operations, the Duke of Wellington's first act was to impress upon his victorious soldiers the necessity that existed for maintaining the strictest discipline, and the following general order was issued to the allied troops:*—

"1. As the army is about to enter the French territory, the troops of the nations which are at present under the command of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, are desired to recollect that their respective sovereigns are the allies of His Majesty the King of France, and that France ought, therefore, to be treated as a friendly country. It is therefore required that nothing should be taken, either by officers or soldiers, for which payment be not made. The commissaries of the army will provide for the wants of the troops in the usual manner, and it is not permitted either to soldiers or officers to extort contributions. The commissaries will be authorised, either by the field marshal, or by the generals who command the troops of the respective nations, in cases where their provisions are not supplied by an English commissary, to make the proper requisitions, for which regular receipts will be given; and it must be strictly understood that they will themselves be held responsible for whatever they obtain in way of requisition from the inhabitants of France, in the same manner in which they would be esteemed accountable for purchases made for their own government in the several dominions to which they belong.

* Dated Nivelles, 20th June, 1815.

"2. The field marshal takes this opportunity of returning to the army his thanks for their conduct in the glorious action fought on the 18th inst., and he will not fail to report his sense of their conduct, in the terms which it deserves, to their several sovereigns."

That order was rigorously enforced—and the forbearance and inoffensive demeanour of the British soldiery must have exhibited to the French people a very striking contrast to that which had been the general conduct of their own troops, when crossing a hostile soil in the full career of victory.

The decisive results of Wellington's success may be estimated from the inability of every attempt made by the wreck of the French army to arrest the allied march upon the capital; and the details, as given officially by the Duke, will best establish how totally Napoleon's power was destroyed by that brief campaign,—how fatal had been the defeat inflicted on the field of Waterloo.

"We have continued," he says, "in march on the left of the Sambre since I wrote to you. Marshal Blucher crossed that river on the 19th, in pursuit of the enemy, and both armies entered the French territory yesterday; the Prussian by Beaumont, and the allied army under my command, by Bavay.

"We have blockaded Le Quesnoi and Valenciennes; the Prussian army Landreçy and Maubeuge. Avesnes surrendered to the latter last night.

"I expect the King of France at Mons to-morrow. I have written to urge him to come forward, as I find the people in this country well disposed to his cause; and I think it probable that he might be able to get possession of some of the fortresses.

"The remains of the French army have retired upon Laon. All accounts agree in stating that it is in a very wretched state; and that, in addition to its losses in battle, and in prisoners, it is losing vast numbers of men by deser-

tion. The soldiers quit their regiments in parties, and return to their homes; those of the cavalry and artillery selling their horses to the people of the country.

"The 3d corps, which, in my despatch of the 19th, I informed your lordship had been detached to observe the Prussian army, remained in the neighbourhood of Wavre till the 20th. It then made good its retreat by Namur and Dinant. This corps is the only one remaining entire."*

* * * * *

"I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have given Napoleon his death blow; from all I hear, his army is totally destroyed, the men are deserting in parties, even the generals are withdrawing from him. The infantry throw away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their horses to the people of the country, and desert to their homes. Allowing for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing that Bonaparte can still collect, in addition to what he has brought back with him, the 5th corps d'armée, under Rapp, which is near Strasbourg, and the 3d corps, which was at Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as the others, and probably some troops from La Vendée, I am still of opinion that he can make no head against us."†

* * * * *

"The citadel of Cambray surrendered on the evening of the 25th instant, and the king of France proceeded there, with his court and his troops, on the 26th. I have given that fort over entirely to His Majesty.

"I attacked Peronne with the 1st brigade of British guards, under Major-General Maitland, on the 26th, in the afternoon. The troops took the hornwork which covers the suburb on the left of the Somme by storm, with but small loss; and the town immediately afterwards surrendered, on

* Despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated Le Cateau, 22d June, 1815.

† Letter to the Earl of Uxbridge, dated Le Cateau, 23d June.

condition that the garrison should lay down their arms, and be allowed to return to their homes.

"The troops, upon this occasion, behaved remarkably well; and I have great pleasure in reporting the good conduct of a battery of artillery of the troops of the Netherlands.

"I have placed in garrison there two battalions of the troops of the king of the Netherlands.

"The armies under Marshal Blucher and myself have continued their operations since I last wrote to your lordship. The necessity which I was under of halting at Le Cateau, to allow the pontoons and certain stores to reach me, and to take Cambray and Peronne, had placed the marshal one march before me; but I conceive there is no danger in this separation between the two armies.

"He has one corps this day at Crespy, with detachments at Villers Cotterets and La Ferté Milon; another at Senlis; and the 4th corps, under General Bulow, towards Paris. He will have his advanced guard to-morrow at St. Denis and Gonesse.

"The army under my command has this day its right behind St. Just, and its left behind La Taulle, where the high road from Compiègne joins the high road from Roye to Paris. The reserve is at Roye. We shall be upon the Oise to-morrow." *

* * * * *

"The enemy attacked the advanced guard of Marshal Prince Blucher's corps at Villers Cotterets on the 28th, but, the main body coming up, they were driven off with the loss of six pieces of cannon and about one thousand prisoners.

"It appears that these troops were on the march from Soissons to Paris, and, having been driven off that road by the Prussian troops at Villers Cotterets, they got upon that of Meaux. They were attacked again upon this road by General Bulow, who took from them 500 prisoners, and

* Despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated Orville, 28th June.

drove them across the Marne. They have, however, got into Paris.

"The advanced guard of the allied army under my command crossed the Oise on the 29th, and the whole on the 30th, and we yesterday took up a position, with the right upon the height of Richebourg, the left upon the Bois de Bondy.

"Field-Marshal Prince Blucher, having taken the village of Aubevilliers, or Vertus, on the morning of the 30th of June, moved to his right, and crossed the Seine at St. Germain's as I advanced; and he will this day have his right at Plessis Piquet, his left at St. Cloud, and the reserve at Versailles.

"The enemy have fortified the heights of Montmartre and the town of St. Denis strongly; and, by means of the little rivers, Rouillon and La Vieille Mer, they have inundated the ground on the north side of that town; and water having been introduced into the canal De l'Ourcq, and the bank formed into a parapet and batteries, they have a strong position on this side of Paris.

"The heights of Belleville are likewise strongly fortified, but I am not aware that any defensive works have been thrown up on the left of the Seine.

"Having collected in Paris all the troops remaining after the battle of the 18th, and all the depôts of the whole army, it is supposed the enemy have there about 40,000 or 50,000 troops of the line and guards, besides the national guards, a new levy called *les tirailleurs de la garde*, and the *Fédérés*." *

* * * * *

"Field-Marshal Prince Blucher was strongly opposed by the enemy in taking the position on the left of the Seine, which I reported in my despatch of the 2d instant that he intended to take up on that day, particularly on the heights of St. Cloud and Meudon; but the gallantry of the Prussian troops, under General Ziethen, surmounted every obstacle,

* Despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated Gonesse, 2d July, 1815.

and they succeeded finally in establishing themselves upon the heights of Meudon, and in the village of Issy. The French attacked them again in Issy, at three o'clock in the morning of the 3d, but were repulsed with considerable loss; and, finding that Paris was then open on its vulnerable side, that a communication was opened between the two allied armies by a bridge which I had had established at Argenteuil, and that a British corps was likewise moving upon the left of the Seine, towards the Pont de Neuilly; the enemy sent to desire that the firing might cease on both sides of the Seine, with a view to the negotiation at the palace of St. Cloud of a military convention between the armies, under which the French army should evacuate Paris.

"Officers accordingly met on both sides at St. Cloud, and I enclose the copy of the military convention* which was agreed to last night, which has been ratified by Marshal Prince Blucher and me, and by the Prince d'Eckmuhl on the part of the French army.

"This convention decides all the military questions of this moment existing here, and touches nothing political.

"General Lord Hill has marched to take possession of the posts evacuated by agreement this day; and I propose to-morrow to take possession of Montmartre."†

* Appendix, No. VI.

† "GENERAL ORDER:—

"1. The Field-Marshal has great satisfaction in announcing to the troops under his command, that he has, in concert with Field-Marshal Prince Blucher, concluded a military convention with the commander-in-chief of the French army in Paris, by which the enemy are to evacuate St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly, this day at noon; the heights of Montmartre to-morrow, at noon; and Paris the next day.

"2. The Field-Marshal congratulates the army upon this result of their glorious victory. He desires that the troops may employ the leisure of this day to clean their arms, clothes, and appointments, as it is his intention that they should pass him in review."—*Gonesse, July* 4, 1815.

While these operations were in progress, which achieved, for the second time, the deliverance of the continent, we will briefly narrate the occurrences of the last days of Napoleon's reign, which ended his strange and eventful public history.

When hurried from "the lost battle" by his personal staff, he passed hastily through the wreck of a ruined army, and "reached Genappe at half-past nine; and here his flight was so materially retarded, as to render his chance of escape at one time doubtful. The single street which formed the village was already crowded with fugitives, and impassable from the equipages, cannon, and caissons, which, from the terror of the drivers, had been overturned on the causeway, or confused and become inextricable. Through the wreck of his *matériel*, Napoleon at last effected a passage, and, hurrying on to Quatre Bras, proceeded with great rapidity. There was another bridge across the river with which his guide was unacquainted, and thus the emperor was directed to the defile of Genappe, and narrowly escaped being made prisoner. He seemed fully aware of his critical situation, and dreaded to find the Prussians before him at Quatre Bras, or hear the trumpets of their light cavalry in his rear. At Gossilies, however, he recovered his tranquillity, and dismounting from his horse, proceeded on foot to Charleroi. He passed through that town without delay, continuing his flight to the meadow of Marcinelle, where he halted with his staff.

"His attendants pitched a tent upon the green, and lighted a fire. A sack of corn was loosely thrown on the ground, and the jaded horses of the fugitive group were permitted to refresh themselves. Wine and food having been procured, Napoleon partook of both; and this was the first nourishment he had received since he had breakfasted at eight o'clock at the farm-house of Bossu.

"From the moment he left his last position in front of La Belle Alliance, till he rested at the bridge of Marcinelle, he

preserved a gloomy silence. The observations of his staff, when obstacles occurred upon the road, were only noticed by a sullen reply; but now standing with his back to the fire, and his hands in their customary position behind his back, he conversed freely with his aides-de-camp. About two in the morning he called for his horse—his staff immediately mounted—and Bertrand having procured a guide, the whole party followed the route to Paris."

After dark, on the 20th, Napoleon reached the capital, accompanied by his brother Jerome, Count d'Erlon, and a small staff—and occupied the Palais de l'Elysée. The night was consumed in numerous consultations with his friends, and in framing the bulletin of a battle,* which had laid France "bare and defenceless, and placed her at the feet of her enemies." But what counsels could devise measures to counteract a misfortune which all admitted to be irremediable? What address could stimulate a nation to fresh exertions, on whom such terrible calamities had fallen? "The ruin was so sudden, and so complete, that the most vigorous mind could not grapple with it. There was no proceeding, which ingenuity could devise, or zeal could execute, that presented the slightest chance of success. Submission—unreserved and absolute submission—was all the conquerors had left them. In vain did Napoleon demand men and money. Where were they to be had? The people would not rally round the fugitive, and the greater part of his old army was annihilated. With 60,000 disciplined troops, he was now to meet the shock of confederated Europe—for at Waterloo he had encountered little more than its advanced guard."† The only alternative left was an abdication; and on the 22d of June, Napoleon formally renounced the throne in favour of the King of Rome, and a provisional government, consisting of

* "Nuits de l'Abdication de l'Empereur Napoleon." *Vide* Appendix, No. VII.

† Historical Account, &c.

Fouché, Caulincourt, Carnot, Grenier, and Quinette, was nominated.*

But this conditional resignation met a furious opposition from the Chamber of Peers. Fierce and inconclusive debates resulted—days passed—the allies were approaching the capital—and it was communicated to Napoleon that while he remained in Paris, there was no chance whatever of pacific arrangements being effected with the allied monarchs. On these representations the ex-emperor consented to withdraw. On the 29th, he quitted his capital for ever, and repaired to Rochefort, after having in vain applied to the Victor of Waterloo for a passport to enable him to proceed to America. In idle projects to effect an escape from France, and elude the vigilance of the British cruisers, a short time was consumed; but, despairing of success, he surrendered himself to the protection of an English commander,† and was eventually conveyed to that lone and cheerless island, where a career closed in solitude and captivity, whose noontide lustre had, meteor-like, been dazzling as evanescent.

The convention having been ratified, on the 4th the posts of Neuilly and St. Denis were given up to allied detachments. The French army marched in the direction of the Loire; and on the 6th, the barriers of the capital were occupied by the confederates. On the 7th, the white standard of the Bourbons replaced the tri-coloured banner of Napoleon—and on the next day, Louis XVIII. re-entered Paris, and the strange history of "the hundred days" ended with a general peace.

With the second restoration of the Bourbons, the Duke of Wellington's military career may be considered as having

* See Appendix, No. VIII.

† Captain Maitland, of the Bellerophon.

terminated; for although the French army on the Loire assumed a threatening attitude, and declined to acknowledge the monarch whom the allies had replaced, it eventually submitted to the existing government, and the country was tranquillized. The occurrences connected with the general pacification which resulted, the subsequent occupation of France, and diplomatic transactions of the following years, belong to the political history of the Great Captain—a task which the author of these pages has been induced to undertake—and at no distant period, the memoirs of the statesman shall be annexed to the biography of the soldier.

One duty remains to be discharged; and the professional character of him whose military command commencing at Assaye, and concluding at Waterloo, embraced such opposite services and scenes, shall be briefly and impartially considered.

The time, however, has yet to come, when that character shall be correctly estimated. When party prejudices have died away—petty jealousies subsided—the grave received its honoured tenant—and, in Ossian's words, "the grey stone rests above the chief,"—then, and not till then, will public opinion be dispassionately exercised, and justice awarded to the greatest man whom England has produced.

In a double view Wellington's character is to be examined; for two epochs of a long life were devoted, and almost exclusively, to very opposite pursuits—war and politics. The history of one epoch we have completed; and as the memoirs of the second are reserved for a future duty, we will simply content ourselves with observing, that as a politician, many have been abler—but none honester than the Duke of Wellington.

The intrinsic value of a soldier's character must not be tested by merely what he has done, but by the circumstances under which his exploits have been achieved. What was the opening of Wellington's peninsular career? He debarked with an army not ten thousand strong, to

operate against an able general* commanding five and twenty thousand disposable soldiers, and at a period immediately subsequent to disastrous campaigns in which the qualities of British soldiers had been unjustly depreciated, while those of their opponents acquired by admirable discipline and consequent success, a reputation amounting to invincibility.†

That delusion Wellington's first victories dispelled. Was he then cordially supported by his allies, and liberally sustained by his friends? No—abroad and at home, he was harassed by the suspicions of one party, and paralyzed by the misconduct of the other; and, while an object of deadly jealousy to the imbeciles with whom he was obliged to act, whose errors he was forced to remedy, whose madness he was expected to control, the keenest shaft reached him from that country to which he should have looked confidently for support; and in England, while goaded out of doors by the rabid outpourings of unwashed demagogues, within the walls of St. Stephen's he was exposed to the baser attacks of dishonest statesmen, who, to attain an unworthy end, would have blasted the hopes of Britain,‡ and left Europe at the mercy of a man whose ambition the extent of a world could not satisfy.

As a great commander, the amount of Wellington's reputation depends upon a simple question:—Was he the first or second of his age?

* Junot, Duke of Abrantes.

† "He, Napoleon, thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier, but so terrible and sure in war, that the number and greatness of their exploits surpassed those of all other nations; the Romans not excepted, if regard be had to the shortness of the period; nor the Macedonians, if the quality of their opponents be considered."—*Napier.*

‡ "An English commander must not trust his fortune. He dare not risk much, however conscious he may be of personal resources, when one disaster will be his ruin at home. His measures must, therefore, be subordinate to this primary consideration."—*Ibid.*

"That he was less vast in his designs, less daring in execution, neither so rapid nor so original a commander as Napoleon, must be admitted, and, being later in the field of glory, it is to be presumed that he learned something of the art from that greatest of all masters; yet something besides the difference of genius must be allowed for the difference of situation; Napoleon was never, even in his first campaign of Italy, so harassed by the French, as Wellington was by the English, Spanish, and Portuguese governments. Their systems of war were, however, alike in principle; their operations being necessarily modified by their different political positions. Great bodily exertion, unceasing watchfulness, exact combinations to protect their flanks and communications, without scattering their forces, these were common to both. In defence firm, cool, enduring; in attack fierce and obstinate; daring, when daring was politic; but always operating by the flanks in preference to the front: in these things they were alike; but, in following up a victory, the English general fell short of the French emperor. The battle of Wellington was the stroke of a battering-ram—down went the wall in ruins. The battle of Napoleon was the swell and dash of a mighty wave, before which the barrier yielded, and the roaring flood poured onwards, covering all." *

It has been objected to the Duke of Wellington's character as a great man, that he was constitutionally cold and impassible—stern in the exaction of duty—careless in rewarding merit—the end his mighty object—the means a matter of indifference. That charge is false; and had the publication of his extensive correspondence possessed no other value, it would have proved in an hundred instances, that misfortune obtained his sympathy, and the widow and orphan met frequently in him a warm and an eloquent supporter.

* Napier.

That his firmness approached severity may be imputed rather to the circumstances under which he acted at the moment, than to any natural harshness of disposition. Had he not possessed the sternest determination, the conflicting elements of which his army was composed could neither have been reduced to order, nor could their discipline have been maintained. To restrain military license, to assure the delinquent that his offences would be punished, examples were necessarily made; and their salutary effects were best evidenced by the fact, that the conduct of the allied army was as remarkable for peaceable demeanour in cantonments, as it was for its heroism and efficiency in the field.

To form a great general, mental and physical qualities are essential; and with both Wellington was largely gifted. In the vigour of manhood, few were better fitted to endure privations and fatigue. An economist in time, the space allotted for personal indulgence was brief—his hours for repose were limited—his meals were simple and rapidly despatched—and hence, the greater portion of his time was passed in the saddle or bureau: and no hospital or cantonment escaped his visits, nor did a letter or report remain unanswered.

In his manner and address the Duke was always frank, and, when he pleased, dignified and graceful. Easy of access, the soldier's complaint was as attentively listened to as the remonstrance of the general. If a favour were required, it was promptly granted, or as decisively refused; and on the merits of a statement, when once a decision was made, influence would be used in vain, and entreaty pass unheeded.

In personal simplicity, the Duke's costume was in keeping with his character. He despised every thing like parade, and excepting when their services were necessary, dispensed with the attendance of his staff. Nothing could be more striking than the plainness of his appearance in public, when contrasted with the general frippery and parade of his

opponents; and the peasantry could scarcely be persuaded that the unpretending personage who courteously listened to their story, or returned a passing salute, was that great captain, whom conquest had attended from the Tagus to the Seine.

In estimating the military talents of Napoleon and Wellington—for to compare either with any other commander of the age would be absurd—to the former, a superiority has been generally conceded for the decision with which he followed up a defeat, and the important consequences which always were attendant on his victories. Both were admitted to have possessed an inimitable skill in handling masses of men, with the same facility that ordinary commanders directed the movements of a brigade. Their combinations were beautiful—their conceptions grand—they were not the laboured efforts of military art, but the outbreakings of military genius—formed in a moment—executed as rapidly—changed, should circumstances require, and adapted to meet the emergency that might arise. If Wellington did not push his victories to grand results, let us inquire the causes; and when Napoleon's military *improvisation* is declared unequalled, let us see how far Wellington's was behind.

The circumstances under which these two great commanders conducted their campaigns, were different; for Napoleon had never Wellington's difficulties to contend with. The former was a free agent. His battles were delivered to clear away obstacles that impeded an advance, while Wellington's were generally received to enable him to maintain a position in the country. Napoleon, when victorious, had always the means in hand to push his success, and secure the fruits of conquest. Wellington's battles were frequently defensive; and the heavy repulses which masterly combinations enabled him to inflict, were unadorned with the trophies which accompany a bold advance; and often, his most brilliant fields were followed

by regressive movements, which always follow a defeat and rarely attend on victory.

That Wellington possessed within himself the rapid resources and daring confidence which mark a great commander, his conduct when placed in dangerous positions, or at the crisis of a doubtful day, will best establish.* What operations could be more masterly than his retreat across the Tagus,† or his advance across the Douro? What act more daring than to hold the height of Guinaldo with two weak divisions, within cannot shot of an army strong enough not to defeat, but annihilate him? Look at the sudden ruin inflicted on Marmont at Salamanca—the seizure of Arinez‡—the counter-stroke at Sauroren. Follow the footsteps of the peninsular army from Rolica to Toulouse. Commence his history at Assaye, and close it on the night of Waterloo. Test his military character by his acts—let him then dispute the palm with Napoleon—and who will pronounce him second to any general of the age?

In the prime of manhood, Wellington's appearance indicated both activity and strength. In height he was nearly five feet ten inches; his shoulders were broad, his chest expansive, his arms long; the hand large, but well formed; the wrist unusually bony; the whole frame-work evincing a capability of enduring the extremity of fatigue. The keen, grey eyes were brilliant; and his sight remarkably acute. His face was long, the features striking; the nose aquiline;

* "And for the Englishman's hardiness and enterprise bear witness the passage of the Douro at Oporto, the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, the storming of Badajoz, the surprise of the forts at Mirabete, the march to Vitoria, the passage of the Bidassoa, the victory of the Nivelle, the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, the fight of Orthez, the crowning battle of Toulouse! To say that he committed faults is only to say that he made war; but to deny him the qualities of a great commander is to rail against the clear mid-day sun for want of light. How few of his combinations failed! How many battles he fought, victorious in all!"—*Napier.*

† By the bridge of Orzobispo.

‡ At Vitoria.

the brow open and developed; and "the lower portion of the face contradicting, in a singular manner, the stern and almost iron expression of all above the mouth."

The general expression of the Duke's face was cheerful. In probably the most trying moment of his career, when the failure of the attack on the great breach at Badajoz was communicated, he was observed to be "pale, but perfectly collected." In the hour of his triumph, when he had ascertained the extent of his conquest, and found that the laurels of Salamanca were added to his wreath, the admirable historian of his wars* thus describes him as he stood:—"I saw him late in the evening of that great day, when the advancing flashes of cannon and musketry, stretching as far as the eye could command, shewed in the darkness how well the field was won; he was alone, the flush of victory was on his brow, and his eyes were eager and watchful, but his voice was calm, and even gentle. More than the rival of Marlborough, since he had defeated greater warriors than Marlborough ever encountered, with a prescient pride he seemed only to accept this glory, as an earnest of greater things."

What he is now, the portrait taken especially for this work will faithfully depict.

Seventy-one winters have shed their snows upon his honoured head, and those iron nerves which war and climate could not shake, have felt the hand of Time, and owned its power—but, though the frame has yielded, the mind retains its vigour, and the heart beats firmly as it once did upon the battle-field. Like the oak of that proud ship which bore the flag of Nelson, decay is traced upon the surface, but the core remains intact. True to his country, that voice which turned "the heady fight" to victory, still gives its fearless counsels in the senate—uninfluenced by party predilection, and reckless whether its

* Colonel Napier.

honest sentiments accord with popular opinion, or provoke the clamour of the crowd.

When a century shall have passed away; when beauty fades into kindred dust, statesmen are forgotten, the rottenness of demagogues is exposed, and a new generation wonders only how a past one could be fooled—in the page of England's history *one name* will stand out in bold relief—and one consenting voice pronounce—that the greatest soldier Britain had produced, was ARTHUR, DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Substance of the Treaty of Vienna.

THE treaty concluded at Vienna, between his Britannic majesty, the emperors of Austria and Russia, and the king of Prussia, after the preamble, states, that they have consequently resolved to renew, by a solemn treaty, signed separately by each of the four powers with each of the three others, the engagement to preserve, against every attack, the order of things so happily established in Europe, and to determine upon the most effectual means of fulfilling that engagement, as well as of giving it all the extension which the present circumstances so imperiously call for.

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties above-mentioned solemnly engage to unite the resources of their respective states for the purpose of maintaining entire the conditions of the treaty of peace concluded at Paris the 30th of May, 1814; as also the stipulations determined upon and signed at the Congress of Vienna, with the view to complete the disposition of that treaty, to preserve them against all infringement, and particularly against the designs of Napoleon Bonaparte. For this purpose they engage, in the spirit of the declaration of the 13th of March last, to direct in common, and with one accord, should the case require it, all their efforts against him, and against all those who should already have joined his faction, or shall hereafter join it, in order to force him to desist from his projects, and to render him unable to disturb in future the tranquillity of Europe, and the general peace under the protection of which the rights, the liberty, and independence of nations had been recently placed and secured.

Art. 2. Although the means destined for the attainment of so great and salutary an object ought not to be subjected to limitation, and although the High Contracting Parties are resolved to devote therein all those means which, in their respective situations, they are enabled to dispose of, they have nevertheless agreed to keep constantly in the field, each, a force of 150,000 men complete, including cavalry, in the pro-

portion of at least one-tenth, and a just proportion of artillery, not reckoning garrisons; and to employ the same actively and conjointly against the common enemy.

Art. 3. The High Contracting Parties reciprocally engage not to lay down their arms but by common consent, nor before the object of the war, designated in the first article of the present treaty, shall have been attained; nor until Bonaparte shall have been rendered absolutely unable to create disturbance, and to renew his attempts for possessing himself of the supreme power in France.

Art. 4. The present treaty being principally applicable to the present circumstances, the stipulations of the treaty of Chaumont, and particularly those contained in the sixteenth article of the same, shall be again in force, as soon as the object actually in view shall have been attained.

Art. 5. Whatever relates to the command of the combined armies, to supplies, &c. shall be regulated by a particular Convention.

Art. 6. The High Contracting Parties shall be allowed respectively to accredit to the Generals commanding their armies, Officers, who shall have the liberty of corresponding with their Governments, for the purpose of giving information of military events, and of every thing relating to the operations of the army.

Art. 7. The engagements entered into by the present treaty, having for their object the maintenance of the general peace, the High Contracting Parties agree to invite all the Powers of Europe to accede to the same.

Art. 8. The present treaty having no other end in view but to support France or any other country which may be invaded, against the enterprizes of Bonaparte and his adherents, his most Christian Majesty shall be specially invited to accede hereunto; and, in the event of his Majesty's requiring the forces stipulated in the second article, to make known what assistance circumstances will allow him to bring forward in furtherance of the object of the present treaty.

SEPARATE ARTICLE.

As circumstances might prevent his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland from keeping constantly in the field the number of troops specified in the 2d Article, it is agreed that his Britannic Majesty shall have the option, either of furnishing his contingent in men, or of paying at the rate of thirty pounds sterling per annum for each cavalry soldier, and twenty pounds per annum for each infantry soldier, that may be wanting to complete the number stipulated in the 2d Article.

No. II.

Narrative of Napoleon's Adventures, from his Escape from Elba until his Arrival at the Tuilleries.

(Abridged from the *Moniteur* of the 26th of March, 1815.)

On the 26th of February, at five in the evening, he embarked on board a brig, carrying 26 guns, with 400 men of his guard. Three other vessels which happened to be in the port, and which were seized, received 200 infantry, 100 Polish light-horse, and the battalion of flankers of 200 men. The wind was south, and appeared favourable; Captain Chaubard was in hopes that before break of day the Isle of Capraia would be doubled, and that he should be out of the track of the French and English cruisers who watched the coast. This hope was disappointed. He had scarcely doubled Cape St. Andre, in the Isle of Elba, when the wind fell, and the sea became calm; at break of day he had only made six leagues, and was still between the Isle of Capraia and the Isle of Elba, in sight of the cruisers.—The peril appeared imminent; several of the mariners were for returning to Porto Ferrajo. The Emperor ordered the voyage to be continued, having for a resource, in the last resort, to seize the French cruisers. They consisted of two frigates and a brig, but all that was known of the attachment of the crews to the national glory would not admit of a doubt that they would have hoisted the tri-coloured flag and ranged themselves on our side. Towards noon the wind freshened a little. At four in the afternoon we were off the heights of Leghorn; a frigate appeared five leagues to windward, another was on the coast of Corsica, and farther off a vessel of war was coming right before the wind, in the track of the brig. At six o'clock in the evening, the brig, which had on board the Emperor, met with a brig which was recognised to be Le Zephir, commanded by Captain Andrieux, an officer distinguished as much by his talents as by his true patriotism. It was proposed to speak the brig, and cause it to hoist the tri-coloured flag. The Emperor, however, gave orders to the soldiers of the guard to take off their caps, and conceal themselves on the deck, preferring to pass the brig without being recognised, and reserving to himself the measure of causing the flag to be changed, if obliged to have recourse to it. The two brigs passed side by side. The Lieutenant de Vaisseau Taillade, an officer of the French marine, was well acquainted with Captain Andrieux, and from this circumstance was disposed to speak him. He asked Captain Andrieux if he had any commissions for Genoa; some pleasantries were exchanged, and the two brigs going contrary ways, were soon out of sight of each other, without Captain Andrieux having the least knowledge of who was on board this frail vessel.

During the night between the 27th and 28th, the wind continued fresh. At break of day we observed a 74-gun ship, which seemed to be making for Saint Florent or Sardinia. We did not fail to perceive that this vessel took no notice of the brig.

The 28th, at seven in the morning, we discovered the coast of Noli; at noon, Antibes; at three on the 1st of March we entered the Gulf of Juan. The Emperor ordered that a captain of the guard, with twenty-five men, should disembark before the troops in the brig, to secure the battery on the coast, if any one was there. This captain took into his head the idea of causing to be changed the cockade of the battalion which was at Antibes. He imprudently threw himself into the place; the officer who commanded for the King caused the drawbridges to be drawn up, and shut the gates; his troops took arms, but they respected these old soldiers, and the cockade which they cherished. The operation, however, of the captain failed, and his men remained prisoners at Antibes. At five in the afternoon the disembarkation in the Gulf of Juan was effected. We established a bivouac on the sea-shore until the moon rose.

At eleven at night the Emperor placed himself at the head of his handful of brave men, to whose fate was attached such high destinies. He proceeded to Cannes, from thence to Grasse, and by Saint Vallier; he arrived on the evening of the 2d at the village of Cerenon, having advanced twenty leagues in the course of the first day. The people of Cannes received the Emperor with sentiments which were the first presage of the success of the enterprise.

The 3d the Emperor slept at Bareme; the 4th he dined at Digne. From Castellane to Digne, and throughout the department of the Lower Alps, the peasants, informed of the march of the Emperor, assembled from all sides on the route, and manifested their sentiments with an energy that left no longer any doubt. The 5th, General Cambronne, with an advanced guard of forty grenadiers, seized the bridge and the fortress of Sisteron. The same day, the Emperor slept at Gap, with ten men on horseback and forty grenadiers. The enthusiasm which the presence of the Emperor inspired amongst the inhabitants of the Lower Alps, the hatred which they evinced to the noblesse, sufficiently proved what was the general wish of the province of Dauphine.—At two in the afternoon of the 6th the Emperor set out from Gap, accompanied by the whole population of the town. At Saint Bonnet the inhabitants, seeing the small number of his troop, had fears, and proposed to the Emperor to sound the tocsin to assemble the villages, and accompany him *en masse*:—"No," said the Emperor, "your sentiments convince me that I am not deceived. They are to me a sure guarantee of the sentiments of my soldiers. Those whom I shall meet will range themselves on my side; the more there is of

them the more my success will be secured. Remain, therefore, tranquil at home."—At Gap were printed several thousand proclamations, addressed by the Emperor to the army and to the people, and from the soldiers of the guards to their comrades. These proclamations were spread with the rapidity of lightning throughout Dauphine.

The same day the Emperor came to sleep at Gorp. The forty men of the advanced guard of General Cambronne went to sleep at Mure. They fell in with the advanced guard of a division of 6,000 men, troops of the line, who had come from Grenoble to arrest their march. General Cambronne wished to speak with the advanced posts. He was answered that they were prohibited from communicating with him. This advanced guard, however, of the division of Grenoble, fell back three leagues, and took a position between the lakes at the village of———.

The Emperor, being informed of this circumstance, went to the place, and found there a battalion of the 5th of the line; a company of sappers, a company of miners; in all from seven to eight hundred men. He sent an officer of ordnance, the chef d'escadron Roul, to make known to these troops the intelligence of his arrival, but that officer could not obtain a hearing, the prohibition being still urged against having any communication. The Emperor alighted and went to the right of the battalion, followed by the guard with their arms reversed. He made himself known, and said that the first soldier who wished to kill his Emperor might do it; an unanimous cry of *Vive l'Empereur* was their answer. This brave regiment had been under the orders of the Emperor from his first campaign in Italy. The guard and the soldiers embraced. The soldiers of the 5th immediately tore off their cockade, and requested with enthusiasm and tears in their eyes, the tri-coloured cockade. When they were arranged in order of battle, the Emperor said to them—"I come with a handful of brave men, because I reckon on the people and on you—the throne of the Bourbons is illegitimate, because it has not been raised by the nation; it is contrary to the national will, because it is contrary to the interests of our country, and exists only for the interest of a few families. Ask your fathers, ask all the inhabitants who arrive here from the environs, and you will learn from their own mouths the true situation of affairs; they are menaced with the return of tythes, of privileges, of feudal rights, and of all the abuses from which your successes had delivered them. Is it not true, peasants?"—"Yes, Sire," answered all of them with an unanimous cry, "they wish to chain us to the soil—you come as the angel of the Lord to save us!"

The brave soldiers of the battalion of the 5th demanded to march the foremost in the division that covered Grenoble. They commenced their march in the midst of a crowd of inhabitants, which augmented every moment. Vizille distinguished itself by its enthusiasm. "It was here that the Revolution was born," said these brave people.

" It was we who were the first that ventured to claim the privileges of men; it is again here that French liberty is resuscitated, and that France recovers her honour and her independence."

Fatigued as the Emperor was, he wished to enter Grenoble the same evening. Between Vizille and Grenoble, the young adjutant-major of the 7th of the line, came to announce that Colonel Labedoyere, deeply disgusted with the dishonour which covered France, and actuated by the noblest sentiments, had detached himself from the division of Grenoble, and had come with the regiment, by a forced march, to meet the Emperor. Half an hour afterwards this brave regiment doubled the force of the imperial troops. At nine o'clock in the evening the Emperor made his entry into the Faubourg de ——.

The troops had re-entered Grenoble, and the gates of the city were shut. The ramparts which defended the city were covered by the 3d regiment of engineers, consisting of 2,000 sappers, all old soldiers covered with honourable wounds; by the 4th of Artillery of the line, the same regiment in which, twenty-five years before, the Emperor had been a captain; by the two other battalions of the 5th of the line, by the 11th of the line, and the faithful hussars of the 4th.—The national guard and the whole population of Grenoble were placed in the rear of the garrison, and made all the air ring with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur.* They opened the gates, and at ten at night the Emperor entered Grenoble, in the midst of an army and a people animated by the most lively enthusiasm.

The next day the Emperor was addressed by the municipality and all the departmental authorities. The military chiefs and the magistrates were unanimous in their sentiments. All said that princes imposed by a foreign force were not legitimate princes, and that they were not bound by any engagement to princes for whom the nation had no wish. At two the Emperor reviewed the troops, in the midst of the population of the whole department, shouting, *A bas les Bourbons! A bas les ennemis du peuple! Vive l'Empereur, et un gouvernement de notre choix.* The garrison of Grenoble immediately afterwards put itself in a forced march to advance upon Lyons. It is a remark that has not escaped observers, that every one of these 6,000 men were provided with a national cockade, and each with an old and used cockade, for, in discontinuing their tri-coloured cockade, they had hidden it at the bottom of their knapsacks: not one was purchased, at least in Grenoble. It is the same, said they in passing before the Emperor, it is the same that we wore at Austerlitz. This, said the others, we had at Marengo.

The 9th the Emperor slept at Bourgoin. The crowd, and the enthusiasm with it, if possible, increased. " We have expected you a long time," said these brave people to the Emperor; " you have at length arrived to deliver France from the insolence of the noblesse, the pretensions of the priests, and the shame of a foreign yoke." From Grenoble

to Lyons the march of the Emperor was nothing but a triumph. The Emperor, fatigued, was in his carriage, going at a slow pace, surrounded by a crowd of peasants, singing songs which expressed to all the noblesse the sentiments of the brave Dauphinois. "Ah," said the Emperor, "I find here the sentiments which for twenty years induced me to greet France with the name of the Grand Nation; yes, you are still the Grand Nation, and you shall always be so."

The Count d'Artois, the Duc d'Orleans, and several marshals, had arrived at Lyons. Money had been distributed to the troops, and promises to the officers. They wished to break down the bridge de la Guillotiere and the bridge Moraud. The Emperor smiled at these ridiculous preparations. He could have no doubt of the disposition of the Lyonnois, still less of the disposition of the soldiers. He gave orders, however, to General Bertrand to assemble the boats at Misbel, with the intention of passing in the night, and intercepting the roads of Moulins and of Macon to the prince who wished to prevent him from passing the Rhone. At four a reconnoisance of the 4th hussars arrived at la Guillotiere, and were received with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* by the immense population of a faubourg which is still distinguished by its attachment to the country. The passage of Misbel was countermanded, and the Emperor advanced at a gallop upon Lyons, at the head of the troops which were to have defended it against him. The Count d'Artois had done every thing to secure the troops. He was ignorant that nothing is possible in France to an agent of a foreign power, and one who is not on the side of national honour and the cause of the people. Passing in front of the 13th regiment of dragoons, he said to a brave soldier covered with scars, and decorated with three chevrons, "Let us march, comrade; shout, therefore, *Vive le Roi!*" "No, monsieur," replied this brave dragoon, "no soldier will fight against his father. I can only answer you by crying *Vive l'Empereur!*" The Count d'Artois mounted his carriage and quitted Lyons, escorted by a single gend'arme. At nine o'clock at night the Emperor traversed the Guillotiere almost alone, but surrounded by an immense population.

The following day, the 11th, he reviewed the whole division of Lyons, and the brave General Brayer, at their head, put them in march to advance upon the capital. The sentiments which the inhabitants of this great city and the peasants of the vicinity, during the space of two hours, evinced towards the Emperor, so touched him, that it was impossible for him to express his feelings otherwise than by saying, "People of Lyons, I love you." This was the second time that the acclamations of this city had been the presage of new destinies reserved for France.

On the 13th, at three in the afternoon, the Emperor arrived at Villefranche, a little town of 4,000 souls, which included at that moment more than 60,000. He stopped at the Hotel de Ville. A great number

of wounded soldiers were presented to him. He entered Macon at seven o'clock in the evening, always surrounded by the people of the neighbouring districts. He expressed his astonishment to the natives of Macon at the slight efforts they made in the last war to defend themselves against the enemy, and support the honour of Burgundy.—"Sire, why did you appoint a bad mayor?"

At Tournies the Emperor had only praises to bestow upon the inhabitants, for their excellent behaviour and patriotism, which under the same circumstances have distinguished Tournies, Chalons, and St. Jean-de-Lone. At Chalons, which during forty days resisted the force of the enemy, and defended the passage of the Saone, the Emperor took notice of all the instances of valour; and not being able to visit St. Jean-de-Lone, he sent the decoration of the Legion of Honour to the worthy mayor of that city. On that occasion the Emperor exclaimed, "It is for you, brave people, that I have instituted the Legion of Honour, and not for emigrants pensioned by our enemies."

The Emperor received at Chalons the deputation of the town of Dijon, who came to drive from among them the prefect and the wicked mayor, who, during the last campaign, had dishonoured Dijon and its inhabitants. The Emperor removed this mayor and appointed another, confiding the command of the division to the brave General Devaux.

On the 15th the Emperor slept at Autun, and from Autun he went to Avallon, and slept there on the night of the 16th. He found upon this road the same sentiments as among the mountains of Dauphiny. He re-established in their office all the functionaries who had been deprived for having united to defend their country against foreigners. The inhabitants of Chiffey had been peculiarly the object of persecution by an upstart sub-prefect at Semur, for having taken up arms against the enemies of our country. The Emperor gave orders to a brigadier of gendarmerie to arrest this sub-prefect, and to conduct him to the prison of Avallon.

On the 17th, the Emperor breakfasted at Vermanton, and went to Auxerre, where the prefect remained faithful to his post. The noble 14th had trampled under foot the white cockade. The Emperor likewise heard that the 6th regiment of lancers had likewise mounted the tri-coloured cockade, and was gone to Montereau to protect that point against a detachment of the body guard who wished to pass it. The young men of this body guard, unaccustomed to the effects of lancers, took flight on the first appearance of this corps, which made two prisoners. At Auxerre, Count Bertrand, Major-general, gave orders to collect all the boats to embark the army, which was already four divisions strong, and to convey them the same night to Fossard, so that they would be able to arrive at one o'clock in the morning at Fontainbleau. Before he left Auxerre the Emperor was rejoined by the Prince of Moskwa.

This marshal had mounted the tri-coloured cockade among all the troops under his command.

The Emperor reached Fontainbleau on the 20th, at four o'clock in the morning. At seven o'clock he learned that the Bourbons had left Paris, and that the capital was free. He immediately set off thither, and at nine o'clock at night he entered the Tuilleries, at the moment when he was least expected.

No. III.

Ney's official Account of the Battles of Quatre Bras and Waterloo, addressed to the Duke of Otranto.

THE most false and defamatory reports have been spreading for some days over the public mind, upon the conduct which I have pursued during this short and unfortunate campaign. The journals have reported those odious calumnies, and appear to lend them credit. After having fought for twenty-five years for my country, after having shed my blood for its glory and independence, an attempt is made to accuse me of treason; an attempt is made to mark me out to the people, and the army itself, as the author of the disaster it has just experienced.

Forced to break silence, while it is always painful to speak of oneself, and above all, to answer calumnies, I address myself to you, Sir, as the president of the provisional government, for the purpose of laying before you a faithful statement of the events I have witnessed. On the 11th of June, I received an order from the minister of war to repair to the imperial presence. I had no command, and no information upon the composition and strength of the army. Neither the Emperor nor his minister had given me any previous hint, from which I could anticipate that I should be employed in the present campaign; I was consequently taken by surprise, without horses, without accoutrements, and without money, and I was obliged to borrow the necessary expenses of my journey. Having arrived on the 12th at Laon, on the 13th at Avesnes, and on the 14th at Beaumont, I purchased in this last city, two horses from the Duke of Treviso, with which I repaired, on the 15th, to Charleroi, accompanied by my first aide-de-camp, the only officer who attended me. I arrived at the moment when the enemy, attacked by our troops, was retreating upon Fleurus and Gosselies.

The Emperor ordered me immediately to put myself at the head of the 1st and 2d corps of infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-generals d'Erlon and Reille, of the divisions of light cavalry of Lieutenant-general Pine, of the division of light cavalry of the guard under the command

of Lieutenant-Generals Lefebvre Desnouettes and Colbert, and of two divisions of cavalry of the Count Valmy, forming, in all, eight divisions of infantry, and four of cavalry. With these troops, a part of which only I had as yet under my immediate command, I pursued the enemy, and forced him to evacuate Gosselies, Frasnes, Millet, Heppegnies. There they took up a position for the night, with the exception of the 1st corps, which was still at Marchiennes, and which did not join me till the following day.

On the 16th, I received orders to attack the English in their position at Quatre Bras. We advanced towards the enemy with an enthusiasm difficult to be described. Nothing resisted our impetuosity. The battle became general, and victory was no longer doubtful, when, at the moment that I intended to order up the first corps of infantry, which had been left by me in reserve at Frasnes, I learned that the Emperor had disposed of it without advertising me of the circumstance, as well as of the division of Girard of the second corps, on purpose to direct them upon St. Amand, and to strengthen his left wing, which was vigorously engaged with the Prussians. The shock which this intelligence gave me, confounded me. Having no longer under me more than three divisions, instead of the eight upon which I calculated, I was obliged to renounce the hopes of victory; and, in spite of all my efforts, in spite of the intrepidity and devotion of my troops, my utmost efforts after that could only maintain me in my position till the close of the day. About nine o'clock, the first corps was sent me by the Emperor, to whom it had been of no service. Thus twenty-five or thirty thousand men were, I may say, paralysed, and were idly paraded during the whole of the battle from the right to the left, and the left to the right, without firing a shot.

It is impossible for me, Sir, not to arrest your attention for a moment upon these details, in order to bring before your view all the consequences of this false movement, and, in general, of the bad arrangements during the whole of the day. By what fatality, for example, did the Emperor, instead of leading all his forces against Lord Wellington, who would have been attacked unawares, and could not have resisted, consider this attack as secondary? How did the Emperor, after the passage of the Sambre, conceive it possible to fight two battles on the same day? It was to oppose forces double ours, and to do what military men who were witnesses of it can scarcely yet comprehend. Instead of this, had he left a corps of observation to watch the Prussians, and marched with his most powerful masses to support me, the English army had undoubtedly been destroyed between Quatre Bras and Gemappes; and this position, which separated the two allied armies, being once in our power, would have opened for the Emperor an opportunity of advancing to the right of the Prussians, and of crushing them in their turn. The general opinion in France, and especially in the army, was, that the Emperor would have

bent his whole efforts to annihilate first the English army; and circumstances were favourable for the accomplishment of such a project: but fate ordered otherwise.

On the 17th, the army marched in the direction of Mount St. Jean.

On the 18th, the battle began at one o'clock, and though the bulletin which details it makes no mention of me, it is not necessary for me to mention that I was engaged in it. Lieutenant-general Count Drouet has already spoken of that battle in the House of Peers. His narration is accurate, with the exception of some important facts which he has passed over in silence, or of which he was ignorant, and which it is now my duty to declare. About seven o'clock in the evening, after the most frightful carnage which I have ever witnessed, General Labedoyere came to me with a message from the Emperor, that Marshal Grouchy had arrived on our right, and attacked the left of the English and Prussians united. This general officer, in riding along the lines, spread this intelligence among the soldiers, whose courage and devotion remained unshaken, and who gave new proofs of them at that moment, in spite of the fatigue which they experienced. Immediately after, what was my astonishment, I should rather say indignation, when I learned, that so far from Marshal Grouchy having arrived to support us, as the whole army had been assured, between forty and fifty thousand Prussians attacked our extreme right, and forced it to retire!

Whether the Emperor was deceived with regard to the time when the marshal could support him, or whether the march of the marshal was retarded by the efforts of the enemy, longer than was calculated upon, the fact is, that at the moment when his arrival was announced to us, he was only at Wavre upon the Dyle, which to us was the same as if he had been a hundred leagues from the field of battle.

A short time afterwards, I saw four regiments of the middle guard, conducted by the Emperor, arriving. With these troops, he wished to renew the attack, and to penetrate the centre of the enemy. He ordered me to lead them on; generals, officers, and soldiers all displayed the greatest intrepidity; but this body of troops was too weak to resist, for a long time, the forces opposed to it by the enemy, and it was soon necessary to renounce the hope which this attack had, for a few moments, inspired. General Friant had been struck with a ball by my side, and I myself had my horse killed, and fell under it. The brave men who will return from this terrible battle will, I hope, do me the justice to say, that they saw me on foot with sword in hand during the whole of the evening, and that I only quitted the scene of carnage among the last, and at the moment when retreat could no longer be prevented. At the same time, the Prussians continued their offensive movements, and our right sensibly retired, the English advanced in their turn. There remained to us still four squares of the old guard to protect the retreat.

These brave grenadiers, the choice of the army, forced successively to retire, yielded ground foot by foot, till, overwhelmed by numbers, they were almost entirely annihilated. From that moment, a retrograde movement was declared, and the army formed nothing but a confused mass. There was not, however, a total rout, nor the cry of *Sauve qui peut*, as has been calumniously stated in the bulletin. As for myself, constantly in the rear-guard, which I followed on foot, having all my horses killed, worn out with fatigue, covered with contusions, and having no longer strength to march, I owe my life to a corporal who supported me on the road, and did not abandon me during the retreat. At eleven at night I found Lieutenant-general Lefebvre Desnouettes; and one of his officers, Major Schmidt, had the generosity to give me the only horse that remained to him. In this manner I arrived at Marchienne-au-Pont at four o'clock in the morning, alone, without any officers of my staff, ignorant of what had become of the Emperor, who, before the end of the battle, had entirely disappeared, and who, I was allowed to believe, might be either killed or taken prisoner. General Pamphele Lacroix, chief of the staff of the second corps, whom I found in this city, having told me that the Emperor was at Charleroi, I was led to suppose that his majesty was going to put himself at the head of Marshal Grouchy's corps, to cover the Sambre, and to facilitate to the troops the means of rallying towards Avesnes, and, with this persuasion, I went to Beaumont; but parties of cavalry following on too near, and having already intercepted the roads of Maubeuge and Philippeville, I became sensible of the total impossibility of arresting a single soldier on that point to oppose the progress of the victorious enemy. I continued my march upon Avesnes, where I could obtain no intelligence of what had become of the Emperor.

In this state of matters, having no knowledge of his majesty nor of the major-general, confusion increasing every moment, and, with the exception of some fragments of regiments of the guards and of the line, every one following his own inclination. I determined immediately to go to Paris by St. Quentin, to disclose, as quickly as possible, the true state of affairs to the minister of war, that he might send to the army some fresh troops, and take the measures which circumstances rendered necessary. At my arrival at Bourget, three leagues from Paris, I learned that the Emperor had passed there at nine o'clock in the morning.

Such, M. le Duc, is a history of this calamitous campaign.

Now, I ask those who have survived this fine and numerous army, how I can be accused of the disasters of which it has been the victim, and of which your military annals furnish no example. I have, it is said, betrayed my country—I who, to serve it, have shown a zeal which I perhaps have carried to an extravagant height; but this calumny is supported by no fact, by no circumstance. But how can these odious

reports, which spread with frightful rapidity, be arrested? If, in the researches which I could make on this subject, I did not fear almost as much to discover as to be ignorant of the truth, I would say, that all has a tendency to convince that I have been unworthily deceived, and that it is attempted to cover, with the pretence of treason, the faults and extravagances of this campaign; faults which have not been avowed in the bulletins that have appeared, and against which I in vain raised that voice of truth which I will yet cause to resound in the House of Peers. I expect, from the candour of your Excellency, and from your indulgence to me, that you will cause this letter to be inserted in the Journal, and give it the greatest possible publicity.

I renew to your Excellency, &c.

MARSHAL PRINCE OF MOSKWA.

Paris, June 26, 1815.

No. IV.

Official Documents written by the Duke of Wellington previous to the opening of the Campaign.

TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL LORD STEWART, G.C.B.

I SAW Clarke* yesterday, and he told me that a person of the War Office, upon whom he could depend, had informed him that on the 30th of April the enemy's regular army amounted to 130,000 men; and the guards to 25,000; the gendarmerie and national guards raised, and expected to be raised, would make it 280,000. This was the utmost expected.

Beurnonville, who ought to know, told me this day that we ought to reckon that the enemy had an effective force of 200,000 men. He says the king had 155,000 when he quitted Paris, and that he had granted above 100,000 *congés*, which had been called in; but that not above half could be reckoned upon as likely to join. I understand, likewise, that there were above 100,000 deserters wandering about France.

In reference to these different statements, I beg you to observe that Clarke speaks from positive information; Buernonville from conjecture. According to Clarke's account, the army gained in strength only 3000 men in the last fifteen days; but then it must be observed, that the guards have gained about 19,000, being the difference between 6000, which they were, and 25,000, which they are now.

* Duc de Feltre.

In respect to periods of commencing operations, you will have seen that I had adopted the opinion that it was necessary to wait for more troops, as far back as the 13th of April. After, however, that we shall have waited a sufficient time to collect a force, and to satisfy military men that their force is what it ought to be to enable them to accomplish the object in view, the period of attack becomes a political question, upon which there can be no difference of opinion. Every day's experience convinces me that we ought not to lose a moment which could be spared.

I say nothing about our defensive operations, because I am inclined to believe that Blucher and I are so well united, and so strong, that the enemy cannot do us much mischief. I am at the advanced post of the whole; the greatest part of the enemy's force is in my front; and, if I am satisfied, others need be under no apprehension. In regard to offensive operations, my opinion is, that, however strong we shall be in reference to the enemy, we should not extend ourselves further than is absolutely necessary, in order to facilitate the subsistence of the troops. I do not approve of an extension from the Channel to the Alps; and I am convinced that it will be found not only fatal, but that the troops at such a distance on the left of our line, will be entirely out of the line of the operations.

We are now, or shall be shortly, placed on the French frontier in the form of an *échelon*, of which the right, placed here, is the most advanced of the *échelon*, and the left, upon the Upper Rhine, is the most retired.

Paris is our object, and the greatest force and greatest military difficulties are opposed to the movements of the right, which is the most advanced part of our general line. Indeed, such force and difficulties are opposed to us in this part, that I should think that Blucher and I cannot move till the movements of others of the allied corps shall have relieved us from part of the enemy's force opposed to us. Then, it must be observed that we cannot be relieved by movements through Luxembourg.

In my opinion, then, the movement of the Allies should begin with the left, which should cross the Rhine between Basle and Strasbourg.

The centre collected upon the Sarre should cross the Meuse on the day the left should be expected to be at Langres.

If these movements should not relieve the right, they should be continued; that is to say, the left should continue its movement on both banks of the Marne, while the centre should cross the Aisne; and the distance between the two bodies, and between each and Paris, should be shortened daily.

But this last hypothesis is not probable; the enemy would certainly move from this front upon the earliest alarm of the movements on the Upper Rhine; and the moment he did move, or that the operation

should be practicable, Blucher's corps and mine should move forward, and the former make the siege of Givet, the latter of Maubeuge; and the former likewise to aid the movement of the centre across the Meuse.

If the enemy should fall upon the centre, it should either retire upon Luxembourg or fight, according to the relative strength; and in either case Blucher should act upon the enemy's communication upon the Aisne.

But the most probable result of these first movements would be the concentration of the enemy's forces upon the Aisne; and accordingly we hear of the fortifications of Soissons and Laon, of an intrenched camp at Beauvais, &c. &c. We must, in this case, after the first operation, throw our whole left across the Marne, and strengthen it if necessary from the centre, and let it march upon Paris, between the Seine and the Marne, while the right and the centre should either attack the enemy's position upon the Aisne, or endeavour to turn its left; or the whole should cooperate in one general attack upon the enemy's position.

I come now to consider the strength required for these operations. The greatest strength the enemy is supposed to have is 200,000 effective men, besides national guards for his garrisons. Of this number it can hardly be believed that he can bring 150,000 to bear upon any one point.

Upon this statement let our proceedings be founded. Let us have 150,000 men upon the left, and 150,000 men upon the right; and all the rest, whatever they may be in the centre, or after a sufficient centre is formed, let the remainder be in reserve for the right, left, or centre, as may be most convenient for their march and subsistence, and I will engage for the result, as they may be thrown where we please. Let us begin when we shall have 450,000 men. Before the Austrians upon the left shall be at Langres, the Russians will have passed the Rhine, and the whole Prussian army will be in line.

These are my general ideas, which I do not think differ much from Knesebeck's. Mind, when I think of the siege of Givet and Maubeuge, I do not mean by the whole of the two armies of the right, but to be carried on by detachments from them. The centre should seize Sedan, which is not strong or garrisoned, and observe Longvy, Thionville, and Metz. The left will have to observe Huningue and the fortresses in Alsace.

In regard to the force in Piedmont, I confess that I wish that the whole Austrian army in Italy was actively employed against Murat, with the exception of the garrisons. Murat must be destroyed early, or he will hang heavily upon us. If any force should be employed from Piedmont, its operations should be separate from those of the great confederacy. They cannot be connected without disconnecting those

of what I have hitherto considered the left from the remainder of our great line, however they may be calculated to aid that left, particularly by being directed upon Chambery, or by keeping that post in check. Their basis is, however, different, and cannot easily be made otherwise.

These opinions are for yourself; God knows whether they can be acted upon, or whether the Allies will allow their forces to be divided as I suppose; and particularly whether the Prussians will act in two corps, one under Blucher here, and another from Luxembourg with the centre; or whether the other Allies will like to commence till the whole Russian army is *en mesure*. But I am convinced that what I have proposed is so clearly the plan of operations, that I do not doubt it will be adopted, with but little variation.

Secret Memorandum for H.R.H. the Prince of Orange, the Earl of Uxbridge, Lord Hill, and the Quartermaster-General.

1. Having received reports that the Imperial guard had moved from Paris upon Beauvais, and a report having been for some days prevalent in the country that Buonaparte was about to visit the northern frontier, I deem it expedient to concentrate the cantonments of the troops with a view to their early junction in case this country should be attacked, for which concentration the Quartermaster-General now sends orders.

2. In this case, the enemy's line of attack will be either between the Lys and the Scheldt, or between the Sambre and the Scheldt, or by both lines.

3. In the first case, I should wish the troops of the 4th division to take up the bridge on the Scheldt, near Avelghem, and with the regiment of cavalry at Courtrai, and fall back upon Audenarde, which post they are to occupy, and to inundate the country in the neighbourhood.

4. The garrison of Ghent are to inundate the country in the neighbourhood likewise, and that point is to be held at all events.

5. The cavalry in observation between Menin and Furnes are to fall back upon Ostend, those between Menin and Tournay upon Tournay, and thence to join their regiments.

6. The 1st, 2d, and 3d divisions of infantry are to be collected at the head-quarters of the divisions, and the cavalry at the head-quarters of their several brigades, and the whole to be in readiness to march at a moment's notice.

7. The troops of the Netherlands to be collected at Soignies and Nivelle.

8. In case the attack should be made between the Sambre and the Scheldt, I propose to collect the British and Hanoverians at and in the

neighbourhood of Enghien, and the army of the Low Countries at and in the neighbourhood of Soignies and Braine le Comte.

9. In this case, the 2d and 3d divisions will collect at their respective head-quarters, and gradually fall back towards Enghien with the cavalry of Colonel Arentschildt's and the Hanoverian brigade.

10. The garrisons of Mons and Tournay will stand fast; but that of Ath will be withdrawn, with the 2d division, if the works should not have been sufficiently advanced to render the place tenable against a *coup de main.*

11. General Sir W. Ponsonby's, Sir J. Vandeleur's, and Sir H. Vivian's brigades of cavalry will march upon Hal.

12. The troops of the Low Countries will collect upon Soignies and Braine le Comte.

13. The troops of the 4th division and the 2d hussars, after taking up the bridge at Avelghem, will fall back upon Audenarde, and there wait for further orders.

14. In case of the attack being directed by both lines supposed, the troops of the 4th division and 2d hussars, and the garrison of Ghent, will act as directed in Nos. 3 and 4 of this Memorandum; and the 2d and 3d divisions, and the cavalry, and the troops of the Low Countries, as directed in Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

Dated Brussels, 30th April, 1815.

Memorandum, dated Brussels, 16th May, 1815, *and addressed to the King of the Netherlands, and Marshals Blucher, Wrede, and Schwarzenbergh.*

The following is stated to be the strength and composition of the French army.

1st corps; Four divisions of infantry, each composed of four regiments, and each regiment having 1200 men, 19,200; two divisions of cavalry, each of three regiments, and each regiment having 600 men, 3600. This corps is commanded by the Comte d'Erlon, and is between Valenciennes and Condé.

2d corps; Five divisions of infantry, each of four regiments of 1200, 24,000; three divisions of cavalry, each of three regiments of 600 each, 5400. This corps is commanded by Comte Reillé, and is at Avesnes, &c.

The 3d corps is commanded by General Vandamme, and is supposed to be 14,000 or 15,000 men, and is between Mezieres and Rocroi.

The 4th corps consists of three divisions of infantry, of four regiments of 1200 each, 14,400; one division of cavalry, three regiments of 600 each, 1800. This corps is at Metz, and is commanded by General Rapp.

The 5th corps is at Strasbourg and on the Upper Rhine, but is not strong.

6th corps; Four divisions of infantry, each of four regiments, 1200 men, 19,200. One of these divisions is the 19th, consisting of the 5th, 11th, 27th, and 72d of the line. The 6th division of reserve of cavalry, of the 2d, 7th, 12th, of dragoons, and 1st hussars, belongs to this corps. The cavalry is supposed to be 3600 men. This corps is commanded by Comte de Lobau, and is at Laon.

The 7th corps consists of the 22d and 23d divisions of infantry, each of four regiments of the same strength, 1200 men, 9600; and of the 10th division of cavalry, three regiments. The corps is at Chambery.

The 8th corps consists of the 26th and 27th divisions, the first of three, the last of four regiments, of 1200 each, and of the 11th division of cavalry, of four regiments of 600 each. This corps is on the frontier of the Pyrenees, and is commanded by General Clausel.

The 9th corps consists of the 24th and 25th divisions of infantry, consisting of three regiments, each of the same strength, and one regiment of cavalry, and of the 2d division of National Guards. This corps is commanded by Marshal Brune, and is at Aix, Toulon, Tarascon, &c.

Besides these corps there are the guards, supposed to consist of 20,000 men, and they are at Paris.

Of these corps Buonaparte, on the 2d instant, ordered the formation of four principal armies, and of three corps of observation.

1st; Army of the North, in the territory of the 2d and 16th military divisions, consisting of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 6th corps, and of three divisions of reserve of cavalry.

2d; Army of the Moselle, in the territory of the 4th and 3d military divisions, consisting of the 4th corps.

3d; Army of the Rhine, consisting of the 5th corps.

4th; Army of the Alps, in the terrritory of the 7th and 19th military divisions, consisting of the 7th corps.

1st; Corps of observation de Jura, commanded by General Le Courbe, consisting of General Abbé's division, composed of the 6th, 18th, 58th, and 83d, of the line; 2d and 3d hussars, and 19th Chasseurs. This corps is to observe the *débouchés* from Befort to Geneva. The 6th military division will be its territory.

2d; Corps of observation of the Var, its territory the 8th military division. This corps will have the defence of the Var.

3d; Corps of observation of the Pyrenees. This corps will have the defence of the Pyrenees.

These two last corps of observation are stated to be formed of the 9th corps d'armée, as before recited, but I should imagine must be formed of the 8th and 9th.

In addition to the troops of the line, composing these four armies and

corps d'observation, the battalions of national guards *de réserve* are destined to join them in the field, and the sedentary national guards to form the garrisons of the strong places.

Great exertions have been made to complete the cavalry. First, the gendarmerie have supplied 4250 horses; and it is stated that these have completed two regiments of carabineers, twelve regiments of cuirassiers to 500 horses each, and fifteen of dragoons to 600 each; making a total of 16,000 heavy cavalry.

A depôt has been formed under General Bourcier for 6000 horses; for the purchase of which contracts have been made, which are now in the course of execution.

Orders have been given to the regiments of light cavalry to purchase 3000 horses; and the prefects have received orders to take by requisition as many as 8000 horses for the cavalry. All these measures will have produced 21,250 horses, which it is expected will have reached their regiments in the first week in May; and will increase the cavalry to 41,300 men.

For this reason the cavalry in all these estimates have been reckoned at 600 men each regiment; whereas, I know at present they are not more than between 300 and 400.

From all that I have heard lately, also, I should doubt the regiments of infantry being all of 1200 men. I am certain, however, that the person who gives me the intelligence believes they are so.

WELLINGTON.

No. V.

Grouchy's Report to Napoleon.

Dinant, June 20, 1815.

IT was not till after seven in the evening of the 18th of June, that I received the letter of the Duke of Dalmatia, which directed me to march on St. Lambert, and to attack General Bulow. I fell in with the enemy as I was marching on Wavre. He was immediately driven into Wavre, and General Vandamme's corps attacked that town, and was warmly engaged. The portion of Wavre, on the right of the Dyle, was carried; but much difficulty was experienced in debouching on the other side, General Girard was wounded by a ball in the breast, while endeavouring to carry the mill of Bielge, in order to pass the river, but in which he did not succeed, and Lieutenant-General Aix had been killed in the attack on the town. In this state of things, being impatient to co-operate with your majesty's army on that important day, I detached several corps to force the passage of the Dyle and march against Bulow.

The corps of Vandamme, in the mean time, maintained the attack on the Wavre, and on the mill, whence the enemy showed an intention to debouch, but which I did not conceive he was capable of effecting. I arrived at Limale, passed the river, and the heights were carried by the division of Vichery and the cavalry. Night did not permit us to advance farther, and I no longer heard the cannon on the side where your majesty was engaged.

I halted in this situation until day-light. Wavre and Bielge were occupied by the Prussians, who, at three in the morning of the 18th, attacked in their turn, wishing to take advantage of the difficult position in which I was, and expecting to drive me into the defile, and take the artillery which had debouched, and make me repass the Dyle. Their efforts were fruitless. The Prussians were repulsed, and the village of Bielge taken. The brave General Penny was killed.

General Vandamme then passed one of his divisions by Bielge, and carried with ease the heights of Wavre, and along the whole of my line the success was complete. I was in front of Rozierne, preparing to march on Brussels, when I received the sad intelligence of the loss of the battle of Waterloo. The officer who brought it informed me, that your majesty was retreating on the Sambre, without being able to indicate any particular point on which I should direct my march. I ceased to pursue, and began my retrograde movement. The retreating enemy did not think of following me. Learning that the enemy had already passed the Sambre, and was on my flank, and not being sufficiently strong to make a diversion in favour of your majesty, without compromising that which I commanded, I marched on Namur. At this moment, the rear of the columns were attacked. That of the left made a retrograde movement sooner than was expected, which endangered, for a moment, the retreat of the left; but good dispositions soon repaired every thing, and two pieces which had been taken, were recovered by the brave 20th dragoons, who besides took an howitzer from the enemy. We entered Namur without loss. The long defile which extends from this place to Dinant, in which only a single column can march, and the embarrassment arising from the numerous transports of wounded, rendered it necessary to hold for a considerable time the town, in which I had not the means of blowing up the bridge. I entrusted the defence of Namur to General Vandamme, who, with his usual intrepidity, maintained himself there till eight in the evening; so that nothing was left behind, and I occupied Dinant.

The enemy has lost some thousands of men in the attack on Namur, where the contest was very obstinate; the troops have performed their duty in a manner worthy of praise.

(Signed) DE GROUCHY.

No. VI.

Convention of Paris.

Art. I. There shall be a suspension of arms between the allied armies commanded by his Highness the Prince Blucher, and his Excellency the Duke of Wellington, and the French army under the walls of Paris.

Art. II. The French army shall put itself in march to-morrow, to take up its position behind the Loire. Paris shall be completely evacuated in three days; and the movement behind the Loire shall be effected within eight days.

Art. III. The French army shall take with it all its materiel, field-artillery, military-chest, horses, and property of regiments, without exception. All persons belonging to the depôts shall be removed, as well as those belonging to the different branches of administration, which belong to the army.

Art. IV. The sick and wounded, and the medical officers whom it may be necessary to leave with them, are placed under the special protection of the Commanders-in-chief of the English and Prussian armies.

Art. V. The military and those holding employments, to whom the foregoing article relates, shall be at liberty, immediately after their recovery, to rejoin the corps to which they belong.

Art. VI. The wives and children of all individuals belonging to the French army, shall be at liberty to remain in Paris. The wives shall be allowed to quit Paris for the purpose of rejoining the army, and to carry with them their property, and that of their husbands.

Art. VII. The officers of the line employed with the Federés, or with the Tirallieurs of the National Guard, may either join the army or return to their homes, or the places of their birth.

Art. VIII. To-morrow, the 4th of July, at mid-day, St. Denis, St. Ouen, Clichy, and Neuilly, shall be given up. The day after to-morrow, the 5th, at the same hour, Montmartre shall be given up. The third day, the 6th, all the barriers shall be given up.

Art. IX. The duty of the city of Paris shall continue to be done by the National Guard, and by the corps of the municipal gendarmerie.

Art. X. The Commanders-in-chief of the English and Prussian armies engage to respect, and to make those under their command respect, the actual authorities, so long as they shall exist.

Art. XI. Public property, with the exception of that which relates to war, whether it belongs to the government, or depends upon the municipal authority, shall be respected, and the allied powers will not interfere in any manner with its administration and management.

Art. XII. Private persons and property shall be equally respected. The inhabitants, and, in general, all individuals who shall be in the

capital, shall continue to enjoy their rights and liberties without being disturbed or called to account, either as to the situations which they hold, or may have held, or as to their conduct or political opinions.

Art. XIII. The foreign troops shall not interpose any obstacles to the provisioning of the capital, and will protect, on the contrary, the arrival and the free circulation of the articles which are destined for it.

Art. XIV. The present Convention shall be observed, and shall serve to regulate the mutual relations until the conclusion of peace. In case of rupture, it must be denounced in the usual forms, at least ten days before-hand.

Art. XV. If difficulties arise in the execution of any one of the articles of the present Convention, the interpretation of it shall be made in favour of the French army, and of the city of Paris.

Art. XVI. The present Convention is declared common to all the allied armies, provided it be ratified by the powers on which these armies are dependent.

Art. XVII. The ratifications shall be exchanged to-morrow, the 4th of July, at six o'clock in the morning, at the bridge of Neuilly.

Art. XVIII. Commissioners shall be named by the respective parties, in order to watch over the execution of the present Convention.

Done and signed at St. Cloud, in triplicate, by the Commissioners above named, the day and year before mentioned.

(Signed) THE BARON BIGNON.
COUNT GUILLEMONT.
COUNT DE BONDY.
THE BARON DE MUFFLING.
F. B. HERVEY, *Colonel.*

Approved and ratified, the present suspension of arms, at Paris, the 3d of July, 1815.

Approved, (Signed) MARSHAL THE PRINCE D'ECHMUHL.

No. VII.

French official Account of the Battle of Ligny.

Paris, June 21.

ON the morning of the 16th the army occupied the following position:—

The left wing commanded by the Marshal Duke of Elchingen, and consisting of the 1st and 2d corps of infantry, and the 2d of cavalry, occupied the positions of Frasne.

The right wing, commanded by Marshal Grouchy, and composed of the 3d and 4th corps of infantry, and the 3d corps of cavalry, occupied the heights in rear of Fleurus.

The Emperor's head quarters were at Charleroi, where were the Imperial Guard and the 6th corps.

The left wing had orders to march upon Quatre Bras, and the right upon Sombref. The Emperor advanced to Fleurus with his reserve.

The columns of Marshal Grouchy being in march, perceived, after having passed Fleurus, the enemy's army, commanded by Field-marshal Blucher, occupying with its left the heights of the mill of Bussy, the village of Sombref, and extending its cavalry a great way forward on the road to Namur; its right was at St. Amand, and occupied that large village in great force, having before it a ravine which formed its position.

The Emperor reconnoitred the strength and the positions of the enemy, and resolved to attack immediately. It became necessary to change front, the right in advance, and pivoting upon Fleurus.

General Vandamme marched upon St. Amand, General Girard upon Ligny, and Marshal Grouchy upon Sombref. The 4th division of the 2d corps, commanded by General Girard, marched in reserve behind the corps of General Vandamme. The guard was drawn up on the heights of Fleurus, as well as the cuirassiers of General Milhaud.

At three in the afternoon, these dispositions were finished. The division of General Lefol, forming part of the corps of General Vandamme, was first engaged, and made itself master of St. Amand, whence it drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet. It kept its ground during the whole of the engagement, at the burial-ground and steeple of St. Amand; but that village, which is very extensive, was the theatre of various combats during the evening; the whole corps of General Vandamme was there engaged, and the enemy there fought in considerable force.

General Girard, placed as a reserve to the corps of General Vandamme, turned the village by its right, and fought there with its accustomed valour. The respective forces were supported on both sides by about 50 pieces of cannon each.

On the right, General Girard came into action with the 4th corps, at the village of Ligny, which was taken and retaken several times.

Marshal Grouchy, on the extreme right, and General Pajol fought at the village of Sombref. The enemy showed from 80 to 90,000 men, and a great number of cannon.

At seven o'clock we were masters of all the villages situate on the back of the ravine which covered the enemy's position; but he still occupied, with all his masses, the heights of the mill of Bussy.

The Emperor returned with his guard to the village of Ligny; General

Girard directed General Pecheux to debouch with what remained of the reserve, almost all the troops having been engaged in that village.

Eight battalions of the guard debouched with fixed bayonets, and behind them, four squadrons of the guards, the cuirassiers of General Delort, those of General Milhaud, and the grenadiers of the horse guards. The old guard attacked with the bayonet the enemy's columns, which were on the heights of Bussy, and in an instant covered the field of battle with dead. The squadron of the guard attacked and broke a square, and the cuirassiers repulsed the enemy in all directions. At half-past nine o'clock we had forty pieces of cannon, several carriages, colours, and prisoners, and the enemy sought safety in a precipitate retreat. At ten o'clock the battle was finished, and we found ourselves masters of the field of battle.

General Lutzow, a partizan, was taken prisoner. The prisoners assure us, that Field-Marshal Blucher was wounded. The flower of the Prussian army was destroyed in this battle. Its loss could not be less than 15,000 men. Ours was 3,000 killed and wounded.

On the left, Marshal Ney had marched on Quatre Bras with a division, which cut in pieces an English division which was stationed there; but being attacked by the Prince of Orange with 25,000 men, partly English, partly Hanoverians in the pay of England, he retired upon his position at Frasne. There a multiplicity of combats took place; the enemy obstinately endeavoured to force it, but in vain. The Duke of Elchingen waited for the 1st corps, which did not arrive till night; he confined himself to maintaining his position. In a square attacked by the 8th regiment of cuirassiers, the colours of the 69th regiment of English infantry fell into our hands. The Duke of Brunswick was killed. The Prince of Orange has been wounded. We are assured that the enemy had many personages and generals of note killed or wounded; we estimate the loss of the English at from 4 to 5,000 men; ours on this side was very considerable, it amounts to 4,200 killed or wounded. The combat ended with the approach of night. Lord Wellington then evacuated Quatre Bras, and proceeded to Genappe.

In the morning of the 17th, the Emperor repaired to Quatre Bras, whence he marched to attack the English army: he drove it to the entrance of the forest of Soignes with the left wing and the reserve. The right wing advanced by Sombref, in pursuit of Field-marshal Blucher, who was going towards Wavre, where he appeared to wish to take a position.

At ten o'clock in the evening, the English army occupied Mount St. Jean with its centre, and was in position before the forest of Soignes: it would have required three hours to attack it; we were therefore obliged to postpone it till the next day.

The head-quarters of the Emperor were established at the farm of

Oaillon, near Planchenoit. The rain fell in torrents. Thus, on the 16th, the left wing, the right, and the reserve, were equally engaged, at a distance of about two leagues.

French official Account of the Battle of Mont St. Jean (Waterloo).

At nine in the morning, the rain having somewhat abated, the 1st corps put itself in motion, and placed itself with the left, on the road to Brussels, and opposite the village of Mont St. Jean, which appeared the centre of the enemy's position. The 2d corps leaned its right upon the road to Brussels, and its left upon a small wood, within cannon shot of the English army. The cuirassiers were in reserve behind, and the guards in reserve upon the heights. The 6th corps, with the cavalry of General d'Aumont, under the order of Count Lobau, was destined to proceed in rear of our right to oppose a Prussian corps, which appeared to have escaped Marshal Grouchy, and to intend to fall upon our right flank, an intention which had been made known to us by our reports, and by the letter of a Prussian general, enclosing an order of battle, and which was taken by our light troops.

The troops were full of ardour. We estimated the force of the English army at 80,000 men. We supposed that the Prussian corps, which might be in line towards the right, might be 15,000 men. The enemy's force, then, was upwards of 90,000 men; ours less numerous.

At noon, all the preparations being terminated, Prince Jerome, commanding a division of the 2d corps, and destined to form the extreme left of it, advanced upon the wood of which the enemy occupied a part. The cannonade began. The enemy supported, with 30 pieces of cannon, the troops he had sent to keep the wood. We made also on our side dispositions of artillery. At one o'clock, Prince Jerome was master of all the wood, and the whole English army fell back behind a curtain. Count d'Erlon then attacked the village of Mont St. Jean, and supported his attack with 80 pieces of cannon, which must have occasioned great loss to the English army. All the efforts were made towards the ridge. A brigade of the 1st division of Count d'Erlon took the village of Mont St. Jean; a second brigade was charged by a corps of English cavalry, which occasioned it much loss. At the same moment, a division of English cavalry charged the battery of Count d'Erlon by its right, and disorganized several pieces; but the cuirassiers of General Milhaud charged that division, three regiments of which were broken and cut up.

It was three in the afternoon. The Emperor made the guard advance to place it in the plain upon the ground which the first corps had occupied at the outset of the battle; his corps being already in advance.

The Prussian division, whose movement had been foreseen, then engaged with the light troops of Count Lobau, spreading its fire upon our whole right flank. It was expedient, before undertaking any thing elsewhere, to wait for the event of this attack. Hence, all the means in reserve were ready to succour Count Lobau, and overwhelm the Prussian corps when it should be advanced.

This done, the Emperor had the design of leading an attack upon the village of Mont St. Jean, from which we expected decisive success; but, by a movement of impatience so frequent in our military annals, and which has often been so fatal to us, the cavalry of reserve having perceived a retrogade movement made by the English to shelter themselves from our batteries, from which they suffered so much, crowned the heights of Mont St. Jean, and charged the infantry. This movement, which, made in time, and supported by the reserves, must have decided the day, made in an isolated manner, and before affairs on the right were terminated, became fatal.

Having no means of countermanding it, the enemy showing many masses of cavalry and infantry, and our two divisions of cuirassiers being engaged, all our cavalry ran at the same moment to support their comrades. There, for three hours, numerous charges were made, which enabled us to penetrate several squares, and to take six standards of the light infantry, an advantage out of proportion with the loss which our cavalry experienced by the grape shot and musket firing. It was impossible to dispose of our reserves of infantry until we had repulsed the flank attack of the Prussian corps. This attack always prolonged itself perpendicularly upon our right flank. The Emperor sent thither General Duhesme with the young guard, and several batteries of reserve. The enemy was kept in check, repulsed, and fell back—he had exhausted his forces, and we had nothing more to fear. It was this moment that was indicated for an attack upon the centre of the enemy. As the cuirassiers suffered by the grape-shot, we sent four battalions of the middle guard to protect the cuirassiers, keep the position, and, if possible, disengage and draw back into the plain a part of our cavalry.

Two other battalions were sent to keep themselves *en potence* upon the extreme left of the division, which had manœuvred upon our flanks, in order not to have any uneasiness on that side—the rest was disposed in reserve, part to occupy the *potence* in rear of Mont St. Jean, part upon the ridge in rear of the field of battle, which formed our position of retreat.

In this state of affairs the battle was gained; we occupied all the positions which the enemy occupied at the outset of the battle: our cavalry having been too soon and ill employed, we could no longer hope for decisive success; but Marshal Grouchy having learned the movement of the Prussian corps, marched upon the rear of that corps, which insured

us a signal success for next day. After eight hours' fire and charges of infantry and cavalry, all the army saw with joy the battle gained, and the field of battle in our power.

At half-after eight o'clock, the four battalions of the middle guard, who had been sent to the ridge on the other side of Mont St. Jean, in order to support the cuirassiers, being greatly annoyed by the grape-shot, endeavoured to carry the batteries with the bayonet. At the end of the day, a charge directed against their flank, by several English squadrons, put them in disorder. The fugitives recrossed the ravine. Several regiments, near at hand, seeing some troops belonging to the guard in confusion, believed it was the old guard, and in consequence were thrown in disorder. Cries of *All is lost! the guard is driven back!* were heard on every side. The soldiers pretend even that on many points ill-disposed persons cried out, *Sauve qui peut.* However this may be, a complete panic at once spread itself throughout the whole field of battle, and they threw themselves in the greatest disorder on the line of communication; soldiers, cannoneers, caissons, all pressed to this point; the old guard, which was in reserve, was infected, and was itself hurried along.

In an instant, the whole army was nothing but a mass of confusion; all the soldiers, of all arms, were mixed *pêle-mêle*, and it was utterly impossible to rally a single corps. The enemy, who perceived this astonishing confusion, immediately attacked with their cavalry, and increased the disorder, and such was the confusion, owing to night coming on, that it was impossible to rally the troops, and point out to them their error. Thus a battle terminated, a day of false manœuvres rectified, the greatest success ensured for the next day,—all was lost by a moment of panic terror. Even the squadrons of *service*, drawn up by the side of the Emperor, were overthrown and disorganized by these tumultuous waves, and there was then nothing else to be done but to follow the torrent. The parks of reserve, the baggage which had not repassed the Sambre—in short, every thing that was on the field of battle, remained in the power of the enemy. It was impossible to wait for the troops on our right; every one knows what the bravest army in the world is when thus mixed and thrown into confusion, and when its organization no longer exists.

The Emperor crossed the Sambre at Charleroi, at five o'clock in the morning of the 19th. Philippeville and Avesnes have been given as the points of re-union. Prince Jerome, General Morand, and other generals, have there already rallied a part of the army. Marshal Grouchy, with the corps on the right, is moving on the Lower Sambre.

The loss of the enemy must have been very great, if we may judge from the number of standards we have taken from them, and from the retrogade movements which he made; ours cannot be calculated till after the troops shall have been collected. Before the disorder broke out,

we had already experienced a very considerable loss, particularly in our cavalry, so fatally, though so bravely engaged. Notwithstanding these losses, this brave cavalry constantly kept the position it had taken from the English, and only abandoned it when the tumult and disorder of the field of battle forced it. In the midst of the night, and the obstacles which encumbered their route, it could not preserve its own organization.

The artillery has, as usual, covered itself with glory. The carriages belonging to the head-quarters remained in their ordinary position: no retrogade movement being judged necessary. In the course of the night they fell into the enemy's hands.

Such has been the issue of the battle of Mont St. Jean, glorious for the French armies, and yet so fatal.

No. VIII.

Napoleon's Abdication.

FRENCHMEN!—The defection of the Duke of Castiglione delivered up Lyons, without defence, to our enemies; the army of which I confided to him the command, was, by the number of its battalions, the bravery and patriotism of the troops which composed it, fully able to beat the Austrian corps opposed to it, and to get into the rear of the left wing of the enemy's army, which threatened Paris.

The victories of Champ Aubert, of Montmirail, of Chateau Thierry, of Vauchamp, of Mormans, of Montereau, of Craone, of Rheims, of Arcsur-Aube, and of St. Dizier; the rising of the brave peasants of Lorraine, of Champagne, of Alsace, of Franche Comté, and of Bourgoin; and the position which I had taken on the rear of the enemy's army, by separating it from its magazines, from its parks of reserve, from its convoys and all its equipages, had placed it in a desperate situation. The French were never on the point of being more powerful, and the flower of the enemy's army was lost without resource: it would have found its grave in those vast countries which it had mercilessly ravaged, when the treason of the Duke of Ragusa gave up the capital and disorganized the army. The unexpected conduct of those two generals who betrayed at once their country, their prince, and their benefactor, changed the destiny of the war. The disastrous situation of the enemy was such, that at the conclusion of the affair which took place before Paris, it was without ammunition, on account of its separation from its parks of reserve.

Under these new and important circumstances, my heart was rent, but my soul remained unshaken. I consulted only the interest of the

country. I exiled myself on a rock in the middle of the sea. My life was, and ought to be, still useful to you. I did not permit the great number of citizens, who wished to accompany me, to partake my lot. I thought their presence useful to France; and I took with me only a handful of brave men, necessary for my guard.

Raised to the throne by your choice, all that has been done without you is illegitimate. For twenty-five years France has had new interests, new institutions, and new glory, which could only be secured by a national government, and by a dynasty created under these new circumstances. A prince who should reign over you, who should be seated on my throne by the power of those very armies which ravaged our territory, would in vain attempt to support himself with the principles of feudal law: he would not be able to recover the honour and the rights of more than a small number of individuals, enemies of the people, who, for twenty-five years, have condemned them in all our national assemblies. Your tranquillity at home, and your consequence abroad, would be lost for ever.

Frenchmen! In my exile I heard your complaints and your wishes; you demanded that government of your choice which alone was legitimate. You accused my long slumber; you reproached me for sacrificing to my repose the great interests of the country.

I have crossed the seas in the midst of dangers of every kind: I arrive amongst you to resume my rights, which are yours. All that individuals have done, written, or said, since the capture of Paris, I will be for ever ignorant of: it shall not at all influence the recollections which I preserve of the important services which they have performed. There are circumstances of such a nature as to be above human organization.

Frenchmen! There is no nation, however small it may be, which has not had the right, and which may not withdraw itself from the disgrace of obeying a prince imposed on it by an enemy momentarily victorious. When Charles VII. re-entered Paris, and overthrew the ephemeral throne of Henry V., he acknowledged that he held his throne from the valour of his heroes, and not from a prince regent of England.

It is thus that to you alone, and to the brave men of the army, I account it, and shall always account it, my glory to owe everything.

By the Emperor. NAPOLEON.

(Countersigned) COUNT BERTRAND.

OFFICIAL DETAILS RELATING TO THE BATTLES OF QUATRE BRAS, LIGNY, AND WATERLOO.

Addressed to Colonel Sir William De Lancy. Movements of the Army.

Bruxelles, 15th June, 1815.

GENERAL DORNBERG's brigade of cavalry, and the Cumberland hussars, to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high road near to that town.

The Earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the cavalry this night at Ninhove, leaving the 2d hussars looking out between the Scheldt and the Lys.

The 1st division of infantry to collect this night at Ath and adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

The 3d division to collect this night at Braine le Comte, and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice.

The 4th division to be collected this night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which are to be moved to Audenarde.

The 5th division, the 81st regiment, and the Hanoverian brigade of the 6th division, to be in readiness to march from Bruxelles at a moment's notice.

The Duke of Brunswick's corps to collect this night on the high road between Bruxelles and Vilvorde.

The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morning on the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

The Hanoverian brigade of the 5th division to collect this night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight to-morrow morning to move towards Bruxelles, and to halt on the high road between Alost and Assche for further orders.

The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 2d and 3d divisions of the army of the Low Countries; and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move the 3d division of British infantry upon Nivelles as soon as collected.

This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that the enemy's attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, and the left of the British army.

Lord Hill will be so good as to order Prince Frederick of Orange to occupy Audenarde with 500 men, and to collect the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries, and the Indian brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning at daylight.

The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at daylight.

Movement of the Army. After Orders, 10 *o'clock,* P.M. 15*th June,* 1815.

THE 3d division of infantry to continue its movement from Braine le Comte upon Nivelles.

The 1st division to move from Enghien upon Braine le Comte.

The 2d and 4th divisions of infantry to move from Ath and Grammont, also from Audenarde, and to continue their movements upon Enghien.

The cavalry to continue its movement from Ninhove upon Enghien.

The above movements to take place with as little delay as possible.

WELLINGTON.

Instructions for the Movement of the Army on the 16*th. To General Lord Hill, G.C.B.*

16*th June,* 1815.

The Duke of Wellington requests that you will move the 2d division of infantry upon Braine le Comte immediately. The cavalry has been ordered likewise on Braine le Comte. His Grace is going to Waterloo.

To the same.

16*th June,* 1815.

Your Lordship is requested to order Prince Frederick of Orange to move, immediately upon the receipt of this order, the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries, and the Indian brigade, from Sotteghem to Enghien, leaving 500 men, as before directed, in Audenarde.

To the same.

Genappe, 16*th June,* 1815.

The 2d division of infantry to move to-morrow morning at daybreak from Nivelles to Quartre Bras.

The 4th division of infantry to move at daybreak to-morrow morning to Nivelles.

16*th June,* 1815.

The reserve artillery to move at daybreak to-morrow morning, the 17th, to Quartre Bras, where it will receive further orders.

To Major-General Sir J. Lambert.

16*th June,* 1815.

The brigade of infantry, under the command of Major-General Sir J. Lambert, to march from Assche at daybreak to-morrow morning, the 17th inst., to Genappe, on the Namur road, and to remain there until further orders.

Instructions for the Movement of the Army on the 17th.
To General Lord Hill.

17th June, 1815.

The 2d division of British infantry to march from Nivelles on Waterloo at 10 o'clock.

The brigades of the 4th division, now at Nivelles, to march from that place on Waterloo at 10 o'clock. Those brigades of the 4th division at Braine le Comte, and on the road from Braine le Comte to Nivelles, to collect and halt at Braine le Comte this day.

All the baggage on the road from Braine le Comte to Nivelles, to return immediately to Braine le Comte, and to proceed immediately from thence to Hal and Bruxelles.

The spare musket ammunition to be immediately parked behind Genappe.

The corps under the command of Prince Frederick of Orange will move from Enghien this evening, and take up a position in front of Hal, occupying Braine le Château with two battalions.

Colonel Erstorff will fall back with his brigade on Hal, and place himself under the orders of Prince Frederick.

To Major-General the Hon. Sir C. Colville, G.C.B.

17th June, 1815.

The army retired this day from its position at Quatre Bras to its present position in front of Waterloo.

The brigades of the 4th division at Braine le Comte are to retire at daylight to-morrow morning upon Hal.

Major-General Colville must be guided by the intelligence he receives of the enemy's movements in his march to Hal, whether he moves by the direct route or by Enghien.

Prince Frederick of Orange is to occupy with his corps the position between Hal and Enghien, and is to defend it as long as possible.

The army will probably continue in its position in front of Waterloo to-morrow.

Lieut.-Colonel Torrens will inform Lieut.-General Sir C. Colville of the position and situation of the armies.

To Sir Charles Stuart.

Waterloo, 18th June, 1815.

I enclose two letters, which I beg you to peruse and forward without loss of time. You will see in the letter to the Duc de Berri, the real

state of our case and the only risk we run. The Prussians will be ready again in the morning for any thing.

Pray keep the English quiet if you can. Let them all prepare to move, but neither be in a hurry or a fright, as all will yet turn out well.

I have given the directions to the Governor of Antwerp to meet the *crotchets* which I find in the heads of the king's governors upon every turn. Believe me, &c.

WELLINGTON.

The post-horses are embargoed in my name; I conclude, to prevent people from running away with them; but give the man orders to allow anybody to have them who goes with an order from you.

NAPOLEON'S INTENDED PROCLAMATION.

So confident was Bonaparte of getting to Brussels, after inflicting upon the allies a decisive defeat, that addresses were already prepared to be issued on his arrival in the capital of Belgium. The following is a copy of one of these singular documents:—

Proclamation to the Belgians and Inhabitants of the left Bank of the Rhine.

The ephemeral success of my enemies detached you for a moment from my empire; in my exile, upon a rock in the sea, I heard your complaint, the God of battles has decided the fate of your beautiful provinces; Napoleon is among you; you are worthy to be Frenchmen; rise in mass, join my invincible phalanxes to exterminate the remainder of these barbarians, who are your enemies and mine: they fly with rage and despair in their hearts.

At the Imperial Palace of Lacken, June 17, 1815.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

By the Emperor,
The Major-General of the Army,

COUNT BERTRAND.

STAFF RETURNS,

JUNE 18TH, 1815.

General Officers.	*Aides-de-Camp.*	*Majors of Brigade.*
Field Marshal the DUKE of WELLINGTON, K.G. and G.C.B. &c. Commanding the English and Allied Troops, in conjunction with the Prussian Troops under the Command of Marshal PRINCE BLUCHER	Lt.-Col. Ld. F. Somerset, 1st F.G. *w.* Lt.-Col. Sir U. Burgh, 1st Foot Gds. Lt.-Col. Fremantle, Coldst. Guards. Lt.-Col. Sir A. Gordon, 3d Ft. Gds. *k.* Lieut. Lord G. Lennox, 9th Light D. Lt.-Col. Hon. H. Percy, 14th Lt. D. Capt. Lord Arthur Hill, h. p. Lt. Hon. G. Cathcart, 6th Dr. G. *extra* Lt.-Col. Sir F. Canning, 3d Ft. G. *w.*	
General His Royal Highness the Hereditary PRINCE of ORANGE, G.C.B. *w.*	Lt.-Col. Baron Tripp, 60th Foot ... Capt. Lord John Somerset, 60th Ft. Capt. Hon. F. Russell, h. p. Capt. Hon. A. F. H. De Roos, 1st F.G. Capt. Earl of March, 52d Foot, *extra* Capt. Visct. Bury, 1st Foot Gds. *do.* Lieut. Webster, 9th Light Drag. *do.*	Lt. Jas. Rooke, *w.* h.p.
Lieutenant-General the EARL of UXBRIDGE, now MARQUESS of ANGLESEY, G.C.B. *w.*	Capt. Seymour, 60th Foot, *w.* Capt. Streeruwitz, 2d Germ. Huss. Capt. Wildman, 7 Hussars, *w.* Capt. J. J. Fraser, 7th Huss. *extra*, *w.* Brig.-Maj. Thornhill, 7th Huss. *sev.*	
Lieutenant-General Lord HILL, G.C.B.	Brev.-Major Egerton, 34th Foot. Brev.-Major Churchill, 1st F. Gds. Capt. Mackworth, 7th Foot. Capt. Hon. O. Bridgeman, 1st Foot Guards, *extra*, *w.* Lt.-Col. Hill, Royal Horse Gds. *sev.*	
Lieutenant-General Sir THOMAS PICTON, K.G. and C.B. *k.*	Capt. Algernon Langton, 61st F. *w.* 16 Capt. C. Chambers, 1st Foot Gds. *k.* Capt. Tyler, 93d Foot, *w.* Capt. Barrington Price.	
Lieutenant-General Sir H. CLINTON, G.C.B.	Capt. F. Dawkins, 1st Foot Gds. Capt. Gurwood, 10th Hussars, *sev.*	Cap. G. Ecles, 95th F. *k.*
Lieutenant-General C. Baron ALTEN, K.C.B. *w.*	Lieut. Havelock, 43d Foot, *w.* 16th. Brev.-Maj. Heise, 2d Germ. Lt. Bat.	Capt. Tormin, K.G.L. Capt. Claudt, K.G.L.
Lieutenant-General Sir C. COLVILLE, G.C.B.	Capt. Jackson, 37th Foot. Lieut. Frankland, 2d Foot.	
Maj.-Gen. G. Cooke, *s.w.*	Capt. Desbrowe, 1st Foot Gds.	
Maj.-Gen. V. Baron Alten	Lieut. Baron Estorff, 2d Germ. Hus.	Capt. Einem, K.G.L.
Maj.-Gen. Sir K. A. Howard, K.C.B.		
Maj.-Gen. H. Hinuber, K.C.B.	Lieut. Heimburg, 3d Ger. Line Bn.	Capt. Weigman, *k.*
Maj.-Gen. Sir J. O. Vandeleur, K.C.B.	Capt. W. Armstrong, 19th Lt. Drag.	Brev.-Major Childers, 11th Light Drag.
Maj.-Gen. K. Mackenzie	Brev.-Maj. Chalmers, 52d Foot. ...	Capt. Holmes, 78th F.
Maj.-Gen. Sir J. Kempt, K.C.B. *w.*	Capt. Hon. Charles Gore, 85th Foot.	
Maj.-Gen. W. Dornberg, K.C.B. *s.w.*	Capt. Krauchenberg, K.G.L. 2d Hus.	Cap. De Robers, K.G.L
Maj.-Gen. Sir W. Ponsonby, *k.*	Lieut. B. Christie, 5th Drag. Gds..	Maj. Reignold, 2d D. *k.*
Maj.-Gen. Sir J. Byng, K.C.B.	Capt. Dumaresque, 9th Foot, *w.* ...	Cap. Stothert, 3d F.G. *k*
Maj.-Gen. Sir D. Pack, K.C.B. *w*...	Major L'Estrange, 71st Foot, *w.*	
Maj.-Gen. Ld. E. Somerset, K.C.B.		Capt. Villiers, Royal Horse Guards.

STAFF RETURNS—(*continued.*)

General Officers.	*Aides-de-Camp.*	*Majors of Brigade.*
Maj.-Gen. Sir T. Bradford, K.C.B, Maj.-Gen. Sir J. Lambert, K.C.B.... Maj.-Gen. Sir M. Power, K.C.B.	Lieut. Baynes, 89th Foot	Bt.-Maj. H. G. Smith, 95th Foot, *k.* 16th.
Maj.-Gen. Sir C. Grant, K.C.B. *w*...	Lieut. Mansfield, 15th Hussars, *w.* Capt. Moray, 13th Dragoons, *w.*	
Maj.-Gen. Sir James Lyon, K.C.B.	Lieut. M'Glashan, K.G.L.....	Capt.Richter,1Cey.R.
Maj.-Gen. P. Maitland	Lord Hay, 1st Foot Gds *k.* 16th...	Cap.Gunthorpe,1F.G.
Maj.-Gen. G. Johnstone	Capt. Gray, 95th Foot.....	Capt.Holmes, 78th Ft.
Maj.-Gen. Sir R. W. O'Callaghan, K.C.B.		
Maj.-Gen. Sir J. Keane, K.C.B.		
Maj.-Gen. Lord George Beresford.	Brev.-Maj R.B.Gabriel, 2d D. Gds.	Maj.J.H.Blair,91F.*w.*
Maj.-Gen. Sir C.Halkett, K.C.B.*s.w.*	Capt. Marschalk, K.G.L. *k.*	Capt Drewe, 73d Foot.
Maj.-Gen. Adam, *s.w*.....	Lieut. R. P. Campbell, 7th Foot...	Cap.Crofton, 54th F.*k.*
Maj.-Gen. Sir R. H. Vivian, K.C.B. Brig.-Gen. A. Bryce, Royal Eng.	Capt. Keane, 7th Hussars.....	Capt. T. N. Harris, *w.* h. p.

Adjutant-General—

Major General Sir E. Barnes, K.C.B. *w.*
Maj. Hamilton, *w.* 4th West India Regt., A.D.C. to Major-Gen. Barnes.

Deputy Adjutant-General—

Lieut.-Col. Sir G. H. F. Berkeley, K.C.B., 35th Foot, *w.*

Assistant Adjutants-General—

Col. Sir J. Elley, K.C.B., Royal H. Gds. *w.*
Col. Hon. A. Abercromby, 2d Foot Gds. *w.*
Lieut.-Col. Rooke, 3d Foot Guards.
Lieut.-Col. Sir N. Hill, 1st Foot Guards.
Lieut.-Col. Barclay, 1st Foot Guards.
Lieut.-Col. Sir G. Campbell, bart., 6th Ft.
Lieut.-Col. Sir G. Scovell, h. p.
Lieut.-Col. Sir C. Grant, 11th Foot.
Lieut.-Col. Currie, *k.*
Lieut.-Col. Waters, *w.*
Major Darling, h. p.
Brev.-Major Evatt, 55th Foot.
Brev.-Major Breymann, K.G.L.

Deputy Assistant Adjutants-General—

Capt. Hon. E. S. Erskine, 60th Foot, *w.*
Capt. Lord C. Fitzroy, 1st Foot Guards.
Capt. G. Black, 54th Foot.
Capt. C. Bentinck, Colds. Foot Guards.
Capt. H. W. Curzon, 69th Foot, *k.*
Capt. L. Grant, 78th Foot.
Capt. Blanckley, 23d Foot.
Lieut. H. Somerset, 18th Dragoons.
Brev.-Maj. Helse, K.G.L.
Lieut. Hamilton, 46th Foot, *w.*
Lieut. Rooke, h. p. *w.*
Lieut. Gertslacher, K.G.L. *k.*

Quarter-Master-General—

Col. Sir W. H. Delancy, K.C.B. *w.*

Deputy Quarter-Master-General—

Lieut.-Col. Torrens, 1st West India Regt.

Deputy Quarter-Masters-General—

Capt. Brunton, 60th Foot.
Capt. Moore, 1st Foot Guards.
Capt. Hillier, 74th Foot.
Capt. P. Gurwood, 10th Hussars, *w.*
Lieut. Barailler, 33d Foot.
Lieut. Jackson, Royal Staff Corps.
Lieut. Scharnhorst, K.G.L.
Lieut. Brauns, Royal Staff Corps.
Lieut. W. de Goebau, *w.* 16th.

Assistant Quarter-Masters-General—

Col. Sir R. D. Jackson, 2d Foot Guards.
Lieut.-Col. Sir J. Dickson, K.C.B.
Lieut.-Col. Lord Greenock.
Lt.-Col. Sir H. Bradford, 1st Foot Gds. *s.w.*
Lieut.-Col. Sir C. Broke, K.C.B.
Lieut.-Col. Bell, h. p.
Brev.-Maj. Hon. G. L. Dawson, 1st Drag. Guards, *w.*
Major Beckwith, *w.*
Brev.-Major Jessop. 44th Foot, *w.* 16th.

Deputy-Assistant-Quarter-Masters-General—

Capt. Fitzgerald, 25th Foot, *w.*
Capt. Wright, Royal Staff Corps, *w.*
Capt. J. Fraser, 90th Foot.
Capt. Mitchell, 25th Foot.
Capt. Macleod, 35th Foot, *w.* 16th.
Capt. Cameron, 1st Foot Guards.
Capt. Thornton, 78th Foot.

Comm. Officer of Artillery—

Sir G. A. Wood.

Comm. Officer of Engineers—

Lieut.-Col. Smyth.

Military Secretary—

Lt.-Col. Lord F. Somerset, 1st Foot Gds. *w.*

Assistant Military Secretary—

Capt. Hon. A. F. H. De Roos, 1st F. Gds.

Deputy Judge Advocate—

Lieut.-Col. Goodman, 48th Foot.

STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY ON THE MORNING OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO,

18*th June*, 1815.

DIVISIONS.	BRIGADES.	REGIMENTS.	STATIONS.	OFFICERS.				TROOP QUARTER MASTERS & SERGEANTS.					TRUMPETERS OR DRUMMERS.					RANK AND FILE.					
									SICK.					SICK.					SICK.				
				Field Officers.	Captains.	Subalterns.	Staff.	Present.	Present.	Absent.	Command.	Total.	Present.	Present.	Absent.	Command	Total.	Present.	Present.	Absent.	Command.	Prisoners of War and Missing.	Total.
		Royal Artillery		8	50	91	26	152	9	...	...	161	44	...	...	...	44	4,537	306	17	9	9	4,9
		Artillery, K.G.L.		2	17	29	...	20	...	...	1	21	6	...	...	...	6	520	73	...	29	...	6
		Royal Engineers		2	5	12	6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
		Royal Sappers & Miners.		1	17	29	...	33	...	...	2	35	19	...	...	...	19	683	10	8	17	...	7
		Royal Waggon Train		...	...	2	...	17	...	...	3	20	2	...	...	...	2	266	...	3	10	...	2
		Royal Staff Corps		1	2	9	4	9	...	...	...	9	4	...	...	...	4	238	5	...	...	...	2
		1st Life Guards		1	4	11	2	19	...	...	3	22	4	...	...	...	4	210	10	1	7	...	2
		2d Life Guards	Position in	1	3	4	4	16	...	...	2	18	3	...	1	...	4	197	...	4	30	...	2
	First	R. Horse Guards (Blue)	front of	1	4	8	3	19	...	...	1	17	4	...	...	...	4	213	...	9	15	...	2
		1st Dragoon Guards	Waterloo.	2	4	7	1	46	...	1	4	20	4	...	...	...	4	515	12	...	3	...	5
		1st Dragoons		1	9	14	4	20	...	...	2	47	8	...	...	...	8	364	7	1	22	...	5
	Second	2d Dragoons		2	5	13	6	30	...	...	...	28	6	...	...	...	6	375	1	5	10	...	3
		6th Dragoons		3	6	13	6	33	1	...	...	34	6	...	...	...	6	384	7	...	8	...	3
		1st Lt. Dragoons, K.G.L.		2	6	12	6	29	1	...	2	30	6	...	...	...	6	443	6	20	27	15	5
		2d Lt. Dragoons, K.G.L.		2	9	15	7	48	...	2	5	54	10	...	...	...	10	433	14	37	31	13	5
	Third	23d Light Dragoons		4	8	14	6	30	1	9	2	41	10	...	...	...	10	287	...	39	16	45	3
		11th Light Dragoons		3	7	12	6	22	...	1	3	26	4	...	2	...	6	287	7	1	14	...	3
Cavalry		12th Light Dragoons		2	6	14	5	34	...	...	...	34	6	...	...	1	7	368	3	1	22	...	3
	Fourth	16th Light Dragoons		2	6	17	5	34	...	...	...	34	4	...	...	...	4	363	5	1	25	...	3
		*2d Hussars, K.G.L.	*Courtrai*	3	8	17	6	36	1	...	1	38	5	...	1	...	6	362	5	1	33	...	3
		7th Hussars		1	4	9	4	49	1	5	6	53	6	...	...	...	6	493	15	17	34	14	4
	Fifth	15th Hussars		2	7	13	6	23	...	...	...	34	6	...	...	1	7	383	3	16	6	...	3
		1st Hussars, K.G.L.		2	9	17	7	30	...	5	6	30	6	...	...	...	6	498	16	6	93	...	3
	Sixth	10th Hussars	Position in	3	7	11	5	44	2	...	8	53	9	1	...	...	10	389	...	5	1	...	3
		18th Hussars	front of	1	4	14	5	31	...	...	1	32	6	...	...	...	6	378	5	5	8	...	3
	Seventh	3d Hussars, K.G.L.	Waterloo.	2	10	20	5	33	...	...	...	33	6	...	...	...	6	590	26	22	149	...	4
		13th Light Dragoons		1	7	15	5	34	...	...	14	63	11	...	...	...	11	380	7	1	1	1	4
		†1st Guards, 2d battalion.		...	4	21	4	46	2	1	...	34	6	...	...	...	6	688	...	276	12	...	1,0
	1st British..	†1st Guards, 3d battalion.		...	7	17	5	43	...	...	8	56	21	...	...	...	22	758	...	255	8	...	1,0
		Coldstr. Guards, 2d batt.		...	7	25	5	40	...	...	8	53	20	...	2	...	22	939	49	4	11	...	1,0
First	2d British..	3d Guards, 2d battalion		...	5	26	5	55	3	1	6	65	15	1	...	6	22	957	41	6	57	...	1,0
		52d Regiment, 1st batt..		2	10	41	6	65	1	1	2	69	22	...	...	...	22	1,002	18	12	6	...	1,0
	3d British..	71st Regiment, 1st batt..		3	9	32	6	61	...	...	1	62	21	...	...	...	21	798	6	4	2	...	8
		95th Regt., Prov. batt....		1	2	5	2	11	...	...	1	12	6	...	...	...	6	176	2	2	8	...	1
Second		95th Regiment, 2d batt..		2	6	20	6	37	1	...	3	41	17	...	...	...	17	567	10	3	5	...	5
	1st K.G.L...	1st Line Batt., K.G.L....		2	6	16	5	25	3	2	18	48	12	...	...	...	12	389	20	27	17	5	4
		2d Line Batt., K.G.L....		1	6	17	5	30	1	3	16	50	12	1	1	...	14	423	25	32	13	18	5
		3d Line Batt., K.G.L....		3	4	17	6	32	...	2	13	47	13	...	...	...	13	508	6	30	11	...	5
		4th Line, Batt., K.G.L....	Position in	2	5	17	6	26	...	4	3	33	9	...	...	1	10	413	...	38	11	...	4
		30th Regiment, 2d batt....	front of	3	5	26	6	33	...	5	5	43	14	...	...	...	14	548	...	45	9	13	6
	5th British..	33d Regiment, 2d batt....		2	6	21	5	22	...	4	10	36	12	...	2	4	18	501	10	14	6	30	5
		69th Regiment, 2d batt....	Waterloo.	2	6	17	5	23	1	1	4	34	19	...	...	...	19	464	23	16	8	5	5
Third		73d Regiment, 2d batt....		2	5	12	4	32	...	5	5	42	17	...	...	...	17	426	...	102	34	...	5
		5th Line Batt., K.G.L....		2	4	20	5	30	...	1	16	47	16	...	...	...	16	394	32	21	10	...	4
	2d K.G.L...	8th Line Batt., K.G.L....		2	6	18	6	31	...	...	15	46	15	...	...	1	16	436	11	3	95	...	5
		1st Light Batt., K.G.L....		3	5	18	6	23	3	7	20	53	12	...	1	1	14	382	26	57	29	...	4
		2d Light Batt., K.G.L....		1	5	19	6	24	3	4	19	50	14	...	1	...	15	352	28	59	12	...	4
	4th British.	14th Regiment, 3d batt..		2	8	23	5	33	1	...	2	36	11	...	...	...	11	548	9	7	7	...	5
		23d Regiment, 1st batt..		3	10	25	6	35	...	...	3	38	23	...	...	...	23	639	...	5	3	...	6
		51st Regiment		2	9	28	6	39	...	...	3	42	14	2	2	...	18	521	5	17	6	...	5
Fourth		*35th Regiment, 2d batt..	*Near*	2	5	23	6	31	...	1	2	34	16	...	2	...	18	481	6	69	14	...	5
	6th British.	*54th Regiment, 1st batt..	*Broine le*	2	5	29	5	38	...	3	3	44	19	...	...	...	19	497	...	37	7	...	5
		*59th Regiment, 2d batt..	*Comte.*	3	6	21	6	38	1	...	1	40	15	...	...	...	15	432	18	10	1	...	4
		*91st Regiment, 1st batt..		1	8	27	6	48	1	3	1	53	21	...	...	...	21	774	18	31	1	...	8
		†28th Regiment, 1st batt..		2	8	20	5	36	1	2	1	40	27	...	1	...	28	458	...	88	9	2	5
	8th British.	†32d Regiment, 1st batt..		2	4	14	6	26	...	6	2	44	14	...	1	...	15	427	...	216	17	...	6
		†79th Regiment, 1st batt..		...	4	17	5	30	...	12	3	45	10	...	2	1	13	374	5	290	34	...	7
Fifth		†95th Regiment, 1st batt..	Position in	1	3	7	6	27	1	11	...	39	10	...	2	...	12	364	...	185	...	...	5
		†1st Regiment, 3d batt....		1	5	23	7	34	...	14	1	49	17	...	3	...	20	366	...	236	2	...	6
	9th British.	†42d Regiment, 1st batt..	front of	...	1	13	3	25	...	12	1	38	15	...	1	...	16	272	9	220	25	...	5
		†44th Regiment, 2d batt..		2	4	18	6	39	2	2	3	46	15	...	1	...	16	396	12	32	15	...	4
		†92d Regiment, 1st batt..	Waterloo.	1	2	15	4	27	...	16	1	44	12	...	3	1	16	361	...	217	10	...	5
		4th Regiment, 1st batt..		1	2	20	4	36	...	2	2	40	11	1	...	...	12	596	6	55	12	...	6
		27th Regiment, 1st batt..		...	3	15	3	34	...	1	1	36	8	...	...	...	8	687	...	10	1	...	6
Sixth	10th British.	40th Regiment, 1st batt..		2	9	27	5	55	...	2	1	58	17	...	...	...	17	747	...	11	3	...	7
		*81st Regiment, 2d batt..	*Bruxelles.*	2	9	22	5	26	...	1	1	28	9	2	1	...	12	406	17	16	...	...	4
		*25th Regiment, 2d batt..		3	5	16	5	29	...	...	3	32	12	1	...	1	14	354	21	5	8	...	3
Seventh	7th British.	*37th Regiment, 2d batt..	*Antwerp.*	1	9	19	6	34	2	...	1	37	13	2	...	...	15	387	34	62	8	...	4
		*78th Regiment, 2d batt..		2	7	19	5	22	1	...	2	25	10	...	...	...	10	313	16	5	3	...	3
		*1st Royal Veteran Batt.	*Nieuport.*	1	7	19	6	27	4	...	4	35	5	...	...	...	5	649	24	...	10	...	6
		*1st Foreign Veteran Batt.	*Ostend.*	2	6	9	5	32	2	1	...	35	12	...	...	...	12	536	40	1	18	...	5
		*2d Garrison Battalion ...	*Antwerp.*	2	7	21	4	38	3	...	...	41	14	...	...	...	14	696	43	...	...	...	7
			Ostend.																				
			TOTAL.....	129	469	1,330	380	2,473	53	164	277	2,947	852	13	30	26	921	37,603	1,128	3,046	1,186	170	43,1

* These Regiments were not at the battle of Waterloo.

† The increase of the number included in the column "Sick Absent" arises from these Regiments having been engaged at Quatre Bras on the 16th.

J. WATERS, Lieut.-Col.
Assistant Adjutant General.

002

COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH AND ALLIED ARMIES, ON THE DAY OF THE 18TH JUNE.

Effective Strength of the French Army at the Commencement of the Battle.

Infantry	48,840	
Cavalry	15,400	
Artillery	6,188	
Total	70,428	Men, and 240 Guns

Effective Strength of the Allied Army at the Commencement of the Battle.

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Artillery.	Total Men.	Guns.
British	15,418	5,877	4,094	25,389	78
King's German Legion	3,900	2,268	625	6,793	18
Hanoverians	10,258	497	240	10,995	12
Brunswick	4,908	885	510	6,303	16
Nassau	2,926	.....	.....	2,926	...
Dutch Belgic	13,393	3,105	990	17,488	40
	50,803	12,632	6,459	69,894	164

Effective Strength of the Prussian Army at half-past Four p. m.

Infantry	12,180	
Cavalry	2,720	
Artillery	1,646	
Total	16,546	Men, and 83 Guns.

Pirch's Corps having arrived about Half-past Six o'Clock, the above Force augmented to—

Infantry	36,200	
Cavalry	6,000	
Artillery	2,032	
Total	44,232	Men, and 107 Guns.

At Seven o'Clock part of Ziethen's Corps reached the Field, and joined the extreme left of the Allied Army, increasing the Prussian Forces to—

Infantry	39,910	
Cavalry	7,670	
Artillery	2,306	
Total	49,886	Men, and 123 Guns.

RETURN OF THE KILLED, WOUNDED, & MISSING,

Of the British and Hanoverian Army, under the command of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G., in the following Battles:—

	OFFICERS.	SERJEANTS.	RANK AND FILE.	Total Loss of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Rank and File.	BRITISH.	HANOVERIANS.	HORSES.
QUARTRE BRAS, JUNE 16, 1815.							
Killed	29	19	302	350	316	34	19
Wounded . . .	126	111	2143	2380	2156	224	14
Missing	4	6	171	181	32	149	1
RETREAT FROM QUATRE BRAS TO WATERLOO, JUNE 17, 1815.							
Killed	1	1	33	35	26	9	45
Wounded . . .	7	13	112	132	52	80	20
Missing	4	3	64	71	30	32	33
WATERLOO, JUNE 18, 1815.							
Killed	116	109	1822	2047	1759	288	1495
Wounded . . .	504	364	6148	7016	5892	1124	891
Missing	20	29	1574	1623	807	816	773

TOTAL . . . { Killed 2432
Wounded 9528
Missing 1875

The greater number of the men returned missing had gone to the rear with wounded officers and soldiers, and joined afterwards. The officers are supposed killed.

Blucher's official Account of the Battles of Ligny and Waterloo.

THE Prussian army was posted on the heights between Brie and Sombref, and beyond the last place, and occupied with a large force the villages of St. Amand and Ligny, situate in its front. Mean time, only three corps of the army had joined; the fourth, which was stationed between Liege and Hannut, had been delayed in its march by several circumstances, and was not yet come up. Nevertheless, Field-Marshal Blucher resolved to give battle; Lord Wellington having already put in motion, to support him, a strong division of his army, as well as his whole reserve, stationed in the environs of Brussels, and the fourth corps of the Prussian army being also on the point of arriving.

The battle began at three o'clock in the afternoon. The enemy brought up above 130,000 men. The Prussian army was 80,000 strong. The village of St. Amand was the first point attacked by the enemy, who carried it, after a vigorous resistance.

He then directed his efforts against Ligny. It is a large village, solidly built, situate on a rivulet of the same name. It was there that a contest began which may be considered as one of the most obstinate recorded in history. Villages have often been taken, and retaken: but here the combat continued for five hours in the villages themselves, and the movements, forwards or backwards, were confined to a very narrow space. On both sides fresh troops continually came up. Each army had, behind the part of the village which it occupied, great masses of infantry which maintained the combat, and were continually renewed by the reinforcements which they received from their rear, as well as from the heights on the right and left. About two hundred cannon were directed from both sides against the village, which was on fire in several places at once. From time to time the combat extended through the whole line, the enemy having also directed numerous troops against the third corps; however, the main contest was near Ligny. Things seemed to take a favourable turn for the Prussian troops, a part of the village of St. Amand having been retaken by a battalion commanded by the Field-Marshal in person; in consequence of which advantage we had regained a height, which had been abandoned after the loss of St. Amand. Nevertheless, the battle continued about Ligny with the same fury. The issue seemed to depend on the arrival of the English troops, or on that of the fourth corps of the Prussian army; in fact, the arrival of this last division would have afforded the Field-Marshal the means of making, immediately, with the right wing, an attack, from which great success might be expected: but news arrived that the English division, destined to support us, was violently attacked by a corps of the French army,

and that it was with great difficulty it had maintained itself in its position at Quatre Bras. The fourth corps of the army did not appear, so that we were forced to maintain, alone, the contest with an army greatly superior in numbers. The evening was already much advanced, and the combat about Ligny continued with the same fury, and the same equality of success; we invoked, but in vain, the arrival of those succours which were so necessary; the danger became every hour more and more urgent; all the divisions were engaged, or had already been so, and there was not any corps at hand able to support them. Suddenly, a division of the enemy's infantry, which, by favour of the night, had made a circuit round the village without being observed, at the same time that some regiments of cuirassiers had forced the passage on the other side, took, in the rear, the main body of our army, which was posted behind the houses. This surprise, on the part of the enemy, was decisive, especially at the moment when our cavalry, also posted on a height behind the village, was repulsed by the enemy's cavalry in repeated attacks.

Our infantry, posted behind Ligny, though forced to retreat, did not suffer itself to be discouraged, either by being surprised by the enemy in the darkness, a circumstance which exaggerates in the mind of man the dangers to which he finds himself exposed, or by the idea of seeing itself surrounded on all sides. Formed in masses, it coolly repulsed all the attacks of the cavalry, and retreated in good order upon the heights, whence it continued its retrograde movement upon Tilly. In consequence of the sudden irruption of the enemy's cavalry, several of our cannons, in their precipitate retreat, had taken directions which led them to defiles, in which they necessarily fell into disorder; in this manner, 15 pieces fell into the hands of the enemy. At the distance of a quarter of a league from the field of battle, the army formed again. The enemy did not venture to pursue it. The village of Brie remained in our possession during the night, as well as Sombref, where General Thielman had fought with the third corps, and whence he, at day-break, slowly began to retreat towards Gembloux, where the fourth corps, under General Bulow, had at length arrived during the night. The first and second corps proceeded in the morning behind the defile of Mount St. Guibert. Our loss in killed and wounded was great; the enemy, however, took from us no prisoners, except a part of our wounded. The battle was lost, but not our honour. Our soldiers had fought with a bravery which equalled every expectation; their fortitude remained unshaken, because every one retained his confidence in his own strength. On this day, Field-Marshal Blucher had encountered the greatest dangers. A charge of cavalry led on by himself, had failed. While that of the enemy was vigorously pursuing, a musket shot struck the Field-Marshal's horse: the animal, far from being stopped in his career by

this wound, began to gallop more furiously till it dropped down dead. The Field-Marshal, stunned by the violent fall, lay entangled under the horse. The enemy's cuirassiers, following up their advantage, advanced; our last horseman had already passed by the Field-Marshal; an adjutant alone remained with him, and had just alighted, resolved to share his fate. The danger was great, but Heaven watched over us. The enemy, pursuing their charge, passed rapidly by the Field-Marshal without seeing him: the next moment, a second charge of our cavalry having repulsed them, they again passed by him with the same precipitation, not perceiving him any more than they had done the first time. Then, but not without difficulty, the Field-Marshal was disengaged from under the dead horse, and he immediately mounted a dragoon horse.

On the 17th, in the evening, the Prussian army concentrated itself in the environs of Wavre. Napoleon put himself in motion against Lord Wellington upon the great road leading from Charleroi to Brussels. An English division maintained, on the same day, near Quartre Bras, a very severe contest with the enemy. Lord Wellington had taken a position on the road to Brussels, having his right wing leaning upon Brain-la-Leud, the centre near Mont St. Jean, and the left wing against La Haye Sainte. Lord Wellington wrote to the Field-Marshal, that he was resolved to accept the battle in this position, if the Field-Marshal would support him with two corps of his army. The Field-Marshal promised to come with his whole army; he even proposed, in case Napoleon should not attack, that the Allies themselves, with their whole united force, should attack him the next day. This may serve to show how little the battle of the 16th had disorganized the Prussian army, or weakened its moral strength. Thus ended the day of the 17th.

Battle of the 18th.

At break of day the Prussian army again began to move. The 4th and 2d corps marched by St. Lambert, where they were to take a position, covered by the forest, near Frichemont, to take the enemy in the rear, when the moment should appear favourable. The first corps was to operate by Ohain, on the right flank of the enemy. The third corps was to follow slowly, in order to afford succour in case of need. The battle began about ten o'clock in the morning. The English army occupied the heights of Mont St. Jean; that of the French was on the heights before Planchenoit: the former was about 80,000 strong; the enemy had above 130,000. In a short time, the battle became general along the whole line. It seems that Napoleon had the design to throw the left wing upon the centre, and thus to effect the separation of the English army from the Prussian, which he believed to be retreating upon Maestricht. For this purpose, he had placed the greatest part of his reserve in the centre, against his right wing, and upon this point he

attacked with fury. The English army fought with a valour which it is impossible to surpass. The repeated charges of the Old Guard were baffled by the intrepidity of the Scottish regiments; and at every charge the French cavalry was overthrown by the English cavalry. But the superiority of the enemy in numbers was too great; Napoleon continually brought forward considerable masses, and, with whatever firmness the English troops maintained themselves in their position, it was not possible but that such heroic exertions must have a limit.

It was half-past four o'clock. The excessive difficulties of the passage by the defile of St. Lambert, had considerably retarded the march of the Prussian columns, so that only two brigades of the fourth corps had arrived at the covered position which was assigned to them. The decisive moment was come; there was not an instant to be lost. The generals did not suffer it to escape. They resolved immediately to begin the attack with the troops which they had at hand. General Bulow, therefore, with two brigades and a corps of cavalry, advanced rapidly upon the rear of the enemy's right wing. The enemy did not lose his presence of mind; he instantly turned his reserve against us, and a murderous conflict began on that side. The combat remained long uncertain, while the battle with the English army still continued with the same violence.

Towards six o'clock in the evening, we received the news that General Thielman, with the third corps, was attacked near Wavre by a very considerable corps of the enemy, and that they were already disputing the possession of the town. The Field-Marshal, however, did not suffer himself to be disturbed by this news; it was on the spot where he was, and no where else, that the affair was to be decided. A conflict continually supported by the same obstinacy, and kept up by fresh troops, could alone ensure the victory; and if it were obtained here, any reverse sustained near Wavre was of little consequence. The columns, therefore, continued their movements. It was half an hour past seven, and the issue of the battle was still uncertain. The whole of the 4th corps, and a part of the 2d, under General Pirch, had successively come up. The French troops fought with desperate fury: however, some uncertainty was perceived in their movements, and it was observed that some pieces of cannon were retreating. At this moment, the first columns of the corps of General Ziethen arrived on the points of attack, near the village of Smonhen, on the enemy's right flank, and instantly charged. This moment decided the defeat of the enemy. His right wing was broken in three places; he abandoned his positions. Our troops rushed forward at the *pas de charge*, and attacked him on all sides, while at the same time, the whole English line advanced.

Circumstances were extremely favourable to the attack formed by the Prussian army; the ground rose in an amphitheatre, so that our artillery

could freely open its fire from the summit of a great many heights, which rose gradually above each other, and in the intervals of which the troops descended into the plain, formed into brigades, and in the greatest order; while fresh corps continually unfolded themselves, issuing from the forest on the height behind us. The enemy, however, still preserved means to retreat, till the village of Planchenoit, which he had on his rear, and which was defended by the guard, was, after several bloody attacks, carried by storm. From that time the retreat became a rout, which soon spread through the whole French army, and, in its dreadful confusion, hurrying away every thing that attempted to stop it, soon assumed the appearance of the flight of an army of barbarians. It was half-past nine. The Field-Marshal assembled all the superior officers, and gave orders to send the last horse and the last man in pursuit of the enemy. The van of the army accelerated its march. The French being pursued without intermission, was absolutely disorganized. The causeway presented the appearance of an immense shipwreck; it was covered with an innumerable quantity of cannon, caissons, carriages, baggage, arms, and wrecks of every kind. Those of the enemy who had attempted to repose for a time, and had not expected to be so quickly pursued, were driven from more than nine bivouacs. In some villages they attempted to maintain themselves; but as soon as they heard the beating of our drums, or the sound of the trumpet, they either fled or threw themselves into the houses, where they were cut down or made prisoners. It was moonlight, which greatly favoured the pursuit, for the whole march was but a continued chace, either in the corn-fields or the houses.

At Genappe, the enemy had entrenched himself with cannon, and overturned carriages: at our approach, we suddenly heard in the town a great noise and a motion of carriages; at the entrance we were exposed to a brisk fire of musketry; we replied by some cannon-shot, followed by a *hurrah*, and, an instant after, the town was ours. It was here that, among many other equipages, the carriage of Napoleon was taken; he had just left it to mount on horseback, and, in his hurry, had forgotten in it his sword and hat. Thus the affairs continued till break of day. About 40,000 men, in the most complete disorder, the remains of the whole army, have saved themselves, retreating through Charleroi, partly without arms, and carrying with them only 27 pieces of their numerous artillery.

The enemy, in his flight, had passed all his fortresses, the only defence of his frontiers, which are now passed by our armies.

At three o'clock, Napoleon had despatched, from the field of battle, a courier to Paris, with the news that victory was no longer doubtful: a few hours after, he had no longer any army left. We have not yet any exact account of the enemy's loss; it is enough to know, that two-thirds of the whole were killed, wounded, or prisoners: among the latter are

Generals Monton, Duhesme, and Compans. Up to this time about 300 cannon, and above 500 caissons, are in our hands.

Few victories have been so complete; and there is certainly no example that an army, two days after losing a battle, engaged in such an action, and so gloriously maintained it. Honour be to troops capable of so much firmness and valour! In the middle of the position occupied by the French army, and exactly upon the height, is a farm, called *La Belle Alliance.* The march of all the Prussian columns was directed towards this farm, which was visible from every side. It was there that Napoleon was during the battle; it was thence that he gave his orders, that he flattered himself with the hopes of victory; and it was there that his ruin was decided. There, too, it was, that, by a happy chance, Field-Marshal Blucher and Lord Wellington met in the dark, and mutually saluted each other as victors.

In commemoration of the alliance which now subsists between the English and Prussian nations, of the union of the two armies, and their reciprocal confidence, the Field-Marshal desired that this battle should bear the name of *La Belle Alliance.*

Last Operations at Waterloo. Abridged account of the Campaign in the Netherlands, by Count Drouet, Aide Major-General of the Imperial Guard, on June 18, 1815, *addressed to the Chamber of Peers,* 24*th of June,* 1815.

THE 1st corps, whose left leaned on the high road, attacked at the same time the houses of Mont St. Jean, established itself there, and advanced as far as the enemy's position. Marshal Ney, who commanded the two corps, was himself on the high road, to direct the movements according to circumstances.

The Marshal told me, during the battle, that he was going to make a great effort against the centre of the enemy, while the cavalry should pick up the cannon which did not seem to be much supported. He told me several times when I brought him orders, that we were going to gain a great victory.

Meantime the Prussian corps which had joined the left of the English, placed itself *en potence* upon our right flank, and began to attack about half-past five in the afternoon. The 6th corps, which had taken no part in the battle of the 16th, was placed to oppose them, and was supported by a division of the Young Guard and some battalions of the Guard. Towards seven o'clock we perceived in the distance towards our right, a fire of artillery and musketry. It was not doubted but that Marshal Grouchy had followed the movement of the Prussians, and was

come to take part in the victory. Cries of joy were heard along our whole line. The troops, fatigued by eight combats (*huit combats*, perhaps it should be *huit heures à combats*, eight hours of fighting,) recover their vigour and make new efforts. The Emperor regards this moment as decisive. He brings forward all his guard; orders four battalions to pass near the village of Mont St. Jean, to advance upon the enemy's position, and to carry with the bayonet whatever should resist them. The cavalry of the guard and all the other cavalry that remained at hand, seconded this movement. The four battalions when they arrived upon the plateau, were received by the most terrible fire of musketry and grape. The great number of wounded who separate from the columns, makes it believed that the guard is routed. A panic terror communicates itself to the neighbouring corps, which precipitately take flight. The enemy's cavalry, which perceives this disorder, is let loose into the plain; it is checked for some time by the twelve battalions of the Old Guard who had not yet charged, but even these troops were carried away by this inexplicable movement, and follow the steps of the fugitives, but with more order.

All the carriages of the artillery hurry towards the great road; soon they are so thronged together that it is impossible to make them proceed; they are mostly abandoned in the road, and unyoked by the soldiers, who carry away the horses. All hasten towards the bridge of Charleroi, and meet at Marchiennes, whence the wrecks were directed upon Avesnes and Philippeville.

Such is the account of this fatal day. It was to crown the glory of the French army, to destroy all the vain hopes of the enemy, and perhaps soon to give to France the peace so much desired: but Heaven has decided otherwise; it is thought fit that after so many catastrophes our unhappy country should be once more exposed to the ravages of foreigners.

Narrative of the Hon. Colonel Ponsonby's Adventures on the Field of Battle.

AT one o'clock, observing, as I thought, unsteadiness in a column of French infantry, (50 by 20, 1000, or thereabouts,) which were advancing with an irregular fire, I resolved to charge them. As we were descending in a gallop, we received from our own troops on the right, a fire much more destructive than theirs, they having began long before it could take effect, and slackening as we drew nearer. When we were within fifty paces of them, they turned, and much execution was done among them, as we were followed by some Belgians, who had remarked our success.

But we had no sooner passed through them, than we were attacked in our turn, before we could form, by about 300 Polish lancers, who had come down to their relief; the French artillery pouring in among us a heavy fire of grape-shot, which, however, for one of our men, killed three of their own. In the *mêlée*, I was disabled almost instantly in both of my arms, and followed by a few of my men, who were presently cut down, (no quarter being asked or given,) I was carried on by my horse, till receiving a blow on my head from a sabre, I was thrown senseless on my face to the ground. Recovering, I raised myself a little to look round, (being, I believe, at that time in a condition to get up, and run away,) when a lancer passing by, exclaimed, "*Tu n'est pas mort, coquin,*" and struck his lance through my back; my head dropped, the blood gushed into my mouth, a difficulty of breathing came on, and I thought all was over.

Not long afterwards (it was then impossible to measure time, but I must have fallen in less than ten minutes after the charge,) a tirailleur came up to plunder me, threatening to take my life. I told him that he might search me, directing him to a small side-pocket, in which he found three dollars, being all I had. He unloosened my stock and tore open my waiscoat, then leaving me in a very uneasy posture; and was no sooner gone, than another came up for the same purpose, but assuring him I had been plundered already, he left me; when an officer, bringing on some troops, (to which probably the tirailleurs belonged,) and halting where I lay, stooped down and addressed me, saying, he feared I was badly wounded. I replied that I was, and expressed a wish to be removed into the rear. He said it was against the order to remove even their own men, but that if they gained the day, as they probably would, (for he understood the Duke of Wellington was killed, and that six of our battalions had surrendered,) every attention in his power should be shown me. I complained of thirst, and he held his brandy-bottle to my lips, directing one of his men to lay me straight on my side, and place a knapsack under my head. He then passed on into the action, and I shall never know to whose generosity I was indebted, as I conceive, for my life. Of what rank he was I cannot say; he wore a blue great coat. By and by another tirailleur came and knelt and fired over me, loading and firing many times, and conversing with great gaiety all the while. At last, he ran off, saying, "*Vous serez bien aise d'entendre que nous allons nous retirons; bon jour, mon ami.*"

While the battle continued in that part, several of the wounded men and dead bodies near me were hit with the balls, which came very thick in that place. Towards evening, when the Prussians came, the continued roar of the cannon along theirs and the British line, growing louder and louder as they drew near, was the finest thing I ever heard. It was dusk when two squadrons of Prussian cavalry, both of them two

deep, passed over me in full trot, lifting me from the ground, and tumbling me about cruelly. The clatter of their approach, and the apprehensions it excited, may be easily conceived: had a gun come that way, it would have done for me. The battle was then nearly over, or removed to a distance. The cries and groans of the wounded all around me became every instant more and more audible; succeeding to the shouts, imprecations, outcries of "*Vive l'Empereur*," the discharges of musketry and cannon: now and then intervals of perfect silence, which were worse than the noise—I thought the night would never end. Much about this time, I found a soldier of the Royals lying across my legs, who had probably crawled thither in his agony: his weight, convulsive motions, his noises, and the air issuing through a wound in his side, distressed me greatly; the latter circumstance most of all, as the case was my own. It was not a dark night, and the Prussians were wandering about to plunder; (and the scene in Ferdinand Count Fathom came into my mind, though no women, I believe, were there;) several of them came and looked at me, and passed on: at length, one stopped to examine me. I told him as well as I could (for I could say but little in German,) that I was a British officer, and had been plundered already; he did not desist, however, and pulled me about roughly, before he left me. About an hour before midnight, I saw a soldier in an English uniform coming towards me; he was, I suspect, on the same errand. He came and looked in my face; I spoke instantly, telling him who I was, and assuring him of a reward if he would remain by me. He said that he belonged to the 40th regiment, but had missed it. He released me from the dying man; being unarmed, he took up a sword from the ground, and stood over me, pacing backwards and forwards.—At eight o'clock in the morning, some English were seen at a distance; he ran to them, and a messenger was sent off to Hervey. A cart came for me. I was placed in it, and carried to a farm-house, about a mile and half distant, and laid in the bed from which poor Gordon, (as I understood afterwards,) had been just carried out. The jolting of the cart, and the difficulty of breathing, were very painful. I had received seven wounds. A surgeon slept in my room, and I was saved by continual bleeding; 120 ounces in two days, besides the great loss of blood on the field.

Such, probably, is the history of many a brave man; yet to me it was new. The historian, describing military achievements, passes silently over those who go into the heat of the battle, though there, as we have seen, every character displays itself. The gay are still gay, the noble-minded are still generous; nor has the Commander in his proudest triumph a better claim to our admiration, than the meanest of his soldiers, when relieving a fallen enemy in the midst of danger and death.

The Field of Waterloo, on the Morning of the 19th of June.

(From Stories of Waterloo.)

WHEN the next sun rose, the field of battle presented a tremendous spectacle of carnage. Humanity shuddered at the view; for mortal suffering, in all its terrible variety, was frightfully exhibited. The dead lay there in thousands—with them human pain and agony were over; but with them a multitude of maimed wretches were intermingled, mutilated by wounds, and tortured by thirst and hunger. A few short hours had elapsed, and those who but yesterday had careered upon the plain of Waterloo, in the full pride of life and manhood, were stretched upon the earth; and many who had led the way to victory, who with exulting hearts had cheered their colder comrades when they quailed, were now lying on the field in helpless wretchedness.

Nor was war's misery confined to man, for thousands of wounded horses were strewn over this scene of slaughter. Some lay quietly on the ground, cropping the grass within their reach; some with deep moaning expressed their sufferings; while others, maddened with pain,—

> "Yerk'd out their armed heels at their dead masters,
> Killing them twice."

When day came, and it was possible to send relief to the wounded, many circumstances tended to retard the welcome succour. The great road to Brussels, from heavy rains, and the incessant passage of artillery and war equipages, was so cut up, as to materially retard the carriages employed to bring in the wounded. Dead horses and abandoned baggage choked the causeway, and the efforts of Belgic humanity were rendered slow and difficult. Up to the very gates of Brussels, "war's worst results" were visible: the struggles of expiring nature had enabled some to reach the city, while many perished in the attempt; and, dying on the roadside, covered the causeway with their bodies. Pits, rudely dug, and scarcely moulded over, received the corpses, which daily became more offensive from the heat; and the same sod, at the verge of the forest, covered "the horse and his rider."

When such evidence of destruction was apparent at a distance from the field, what a display of devastation the narrow theatre of yesterday's conflict must have presented! Fancy may conceive it, but description will necessarily be scanty and imperfect. On the small surface of two square miles, it was ascertained that 50,000 men and horses were lying! The luxurious crop of ripe grain which had covered the field of battle was reduced to litter, and beaten into the earth; and the surface, trodden down by the cavalry, and furrowed deeply by cannon-wheels, strewn with many a relic of the fight. Helmets and cuirasses, shattered fire-

arms and broken swords; all the variety of military ornaments; lancer caps and Highland bonnets, uniforms of every colour, plume and pennon, musical instruments, the apparatus of artillery, drums, bugles; but, good God! why dwell on the harrowing picture of "a foughten field?"—each and every ruinous display bore mute testimony to the misery of such a battle.

Could the melancholy appearance of this scene of death be heightened, it would be by witnessing the researches of the living, amidst its desolation, for the objects of their love. Mothers, and wives, and children, for days were occupied in that mournful duty; and the confusion of the corpses, friend and foe intermingled as they were, often rendered the attempt at recognising individuals difficult, and, in some cases, impossible.

In many places the dead lay four deep upon each other, marking the spot some British square had occupied, when exposed for hours to the murderous fire of a French battery. Outside, lancer and cuirassier were scattered thickly on the earth. Madly attempting to force the serried bayonets of the British, they had fallen in the bootless essay by the musketry of the inner files. Farther on, you traced the spot where the cavalry of France and England had encountered. Chasseur and hussar were intermingled; and the heavy Norman horse of the Imperial Guard were interspersed with the grey chargers which had carried Albyn's chivalry. Here the Highlander and tirailleur lay, side by side, together; and the heavy dragoon, with "green Erin's" badge upon his helmet, was grappled in death with the Polish lancer.

On the summit of the ridge, where the ground was cumbered with dead, and trodden fetlock deep in mud and gore, by the frequent rush of rival cavalry, the thick-strewn corpses of the Imperial Guard pointed out the spot where the last effort of Napoleon had been defeated. Here, in column, that favoured corps, on whom his last chance rested, had been annihilated; and the advance and repulse of the Guard was traceable by a mass of fallen Frenchmen. In the hollow below, the last struggle of France had been vainly made; for there the Old Guard, when the middle battalions had been forced back, attempted to meet the British, and afford time for their disorganized companions to rally. Here the British left, which had converged upon the French centre, had come up; and here the bayonet closed the contest.

THE END.

R. CLAY, PRINTER, BREAD STREET HILL.

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