WITH THE AUTHOR'S COMPLIMENTS

STRAY NOTES

ON

MILITARY TRAINING

AND

KHAKI WARFARE

BY

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PREFACE.

THESE notes and letters have been put together and printed, in the order of their more recent interest rather than their dates, as a small contribution to the vital question of "Compulsory Military Training."

They were written chiefly in view of possibilities in India. Many of these possibilities are manifest, but there are others which cannot be publicly discussed, and for which we are not prepared.

The British Garrison of India was fixed at 75,000 men, when we had ceased to think of pushing our outposts to the Hindu Kush, and before Calcutta and Bombay had become centres of disaffection, and the manufacture of bombs.

We may be assured that we can rely on the fidelity of most of our Great Feudatories, but who can answer for their followers, and there is the danger of their arms and arsenals falling into wrong hands.

If these apprehensions are groundless, it may still be contended that 75,000 British soldiers are not a sufficient garrison for India under the unsatisfactory conditions already existing or threatening. We are well prepared for immediate and sufficient reprisals against transgressors on our frontiers, but shall have to avoid any further territorial expansion.

Revolutionary agencies, and explosive science could soon make the Suez Canal an uncertain means of communication with the East. We have no troops to spare in South Africa, and our other Colonies are not yet in a condition to assist us.

If an insurrectionary movement in India found us involved in difficulties, say with Afghanistan, we cannot doubt that the consequences might be disastrous, without speedy reinforcements.

While the demon of unrest stalks the land, the risk of a "*non-possumus*" from our native troops is a serious consideration. Their numbers are as 2 to 1 of the British Garrison, and they are equally well armed and trained.

The Sepoy, if he is of a warlike race, fights for manhood's sake, and has shed his blood in our cause on many fields, though he is a mercenary, and we have no claim on his *patriotism*.

The sagacious handling of our Indian Army, among other problems of Imperial rule, is second only to the maintenance of our supremacy at sea.

As to national training, if it is not soon accepted as the bed-rock of all our naval and military measures, we may make up our minds to "lessen that big look" which we have so long shown in the face of an envious world.

Some of these notes are avowedly pessimistic —not without reason. Four years ago our

citizens of London were bidden by a First Sea Lord, to sleep in peace, and were assured that our Navy was complete and irresistible—that not a hostile dinghy could evade our fleet or invade our shores.

We have since built many warships, and are still anxiously clamouring for more Dreadnoughts.

Those who know India, are equally insistent upon more British Soldiers to keep the peace in that country.

If we are ready to send a fully trained Army Corps to Bombay at a week's notice, we shall hold our own, even against the .303 Rifle which will soon be in the hands of every man who has ten rupees to buy one, and the spirit to use it, either as a rebel or a patriot.

C. H. BROWNLOW, *F.M.*

THE LESSONS OF SOUTH AFRICA.

1900.

In these last days of the Nineteenth Century the Country may surely take for granted the existence of some well-considered scheme of joint naval and military mobilisation for the safety of our shores in all possible contingencies, of raid or invasion.

Purely defensive problems are comparatively simple, and the Downs of Kent and Sussex will readily lend themselves to a repetition of the earthworks of Plevna or the trenches of Pieter's Hill, if we have guns and riflemen to fill them.

It is our Army, for active offensive warfare beyond the seas, in all parts of the world, under ever-varying conditions of climate, food, clothing, transport and methods of fighting, that Lord Roberts,[1] and the experts, civil and military, who are to assist him in the arduous task, will have to re-organise in all its branches and departments.

If they can leave intact the time-honoured regimental system, and at once increase the number of our line battalions so as to give us, with their reserves, an additional 50,000 well-equipped and efficient soldiers, they will find absolution for the possible delay or failure of any

[1] The Field-Marshal was still in South Africa when this was written.

more radical measures of reform in other directions which they may undertake in deference to "nebulous and perhaps fictitious[1]" criticisms.

These criticisms are mostly based on Continental precedents and literature, which our amphibious character and our unfortunate objection to conscription will not always allow us to assimilate and profit by.

The Von Roons and the Von Moltkes of to-day would be the first to admit that the mobilising and transporting of 200,000 men, with artillery, cavalry and baggage animals, across 6,000 miles of sea is a very different achievement to putting the same number across a frontier river, and to think perhaps, that we cavil too much at our recent performances.

If our cunning in the field has sometimes failed us, we may console ourselves with the belief that the ubiquitous and valiant Boer would have equally outwitted the best of our European town-bred neighbours under the same circumstances.

Officers and men are full of the fighting instinct. It is the instinct of self-preservation that has been found wanting in the latest conditions of modern arms and warfare, and this can best be developed by the cultivation of individual intelligence and alertness in all ranks, even at the sacrifice of parade perfection, at which we labour too seriously. Our sailors are a good

[1] As described by Lord Salisbury.

example to our soldiers in these personal qualities, their more varied duties requiring the constant use of their brains as well as of their muscles.

In addition to Aldershot and Salisbury Plain we require some hundreds of square miles of Welsh mountains to camp on occasionally, as a school for mountain warfare, and for mounted infantry, as well as for scouting and outpost duties.

Magazine rifles are levelling up the millions of the inferior races to a disquieting military equality with their betters—big guns notwithstanding.

Mausers and intrenching tools have revolutionised the science of war in favour of the defensive and of ill-disciplined numbers that can shoot. Intrenchments and kopjes, or their equivalents, can be turned by the attacking party, but the latter require to be as two to one of the defenders, for manœuvres to the flank or rear of a good position.

To fight and run away has always had a legendary recommendation. Its value as a tactical method has been confirmed by the Boer, and it is morally effective in wearing out an enemy. It is certainly preferable to the laying down of arms.

Hereafter it behoves us to learn the lessons of war by fighting our own battles, as we are now doing in South Africa.

A reliance on auxiliaries of divers nations

and colours, except in their own or cognate countries, is at best a policy of drift or of dire necessity, which has no justification in face of the numbers and manhood of the immense population of our own islands, ready for the drill sergeant to make into good soldiers or to improve as citizens.

The nearest approach to conscription is what patriotism demands. A moral, if not a compulsory, obligation should rest on every man to qualify himself for military service of some kind, with or without a liability to serve abroad, his education commencing at his village school, where he should learn to straighten his back, to march past, and present arms to his master with a wooden rifle as a minimum test of efficiency, before he is twelve years old. Between twenty and thirty he should be required to show periodically, a certificate that he had practised the rudiments of infantry drill, and could shoot up to a certain standard.

He might acquire this elementary instruction how and where he pleased, but facilities could be afforded at military centres for such training, without uniform and without interference with his civil pursuits and pleasures.

To those who know India best, the too frequent cry for Indian troops to serve beyond the limits of Asia does not commend itself. The Government did wisely last year to treat that cry as unreasonable, and impossible, in the interests of India and South Africa alike. With

equal wisdom it has denied Maoris and Mohawks an entrance into our quarrel with the Boers.

The Colonial and Volunteer movements then so happily inaugurated have, we may hope, given us a lasting remedy for this tendency to look to India for help, if we are sensible enough to acknowledge the evil of it.

An Indian contingent landed at Durban would have found itself on the Tugela. It would doubtless have fought manfully; but would it have been politic to put it through such an ordeal, combined with the possibility of imprisonment in Pretoria on rations of mealies and "biltong"?

Our small army in China, where Indian troops are in their right place, is almost entirely Asiatic, and includes a Regiment of Chinamen. It is no less efficient for its immediate purposes on that account, and has already done good service, but instead of an exhibition of our strength it is a confession of our weakness, and might almost better have remained at Shanghai, to secure and sentinel our neglected sphere of influence in the Yangtse valley, until it was joined by a proper proportion of British Infantry, of which it has now only one battalion at Peking. This disproportion on such an occasion is without precedent, and though the reasons for it are obvious, will not escape the remarks of other Powers, nor of our own native soldiers.

It has long been a jealously guarded theory

that the native soldier cannot fight unless he is led by his British officer, and backed up by the British soldier. This sound tradition has, by force of circumstances, been disregarded, and it is fortunate that those circumstances were not more serious than the necessity of joining a raid against the Boxers. Nevertheless the fact remains that the South African war so used up our resources so as to render it impossible to send to China even one division of infantry of the established strength and composition.

All our Indian troops are not equally imposing or warlike, and "*Ignotum pro magnifico*" is a good asset, which it is well not to dissipate.

India deserves and commands our fullest sympathy and goodwill, but we must subdue any sentimental weakness with regard to that country, as indeed of any other country that we hold by the sword, when it comes to a question of letting the sword out of our own hands, or trusting to any sword but our own.

A short and sharp campaign, followed by an early return to the Punjab with his pockets full of rupees, is the ideal of the Sikh and the Afghan in our ranks.

The most, and certainly the best of our Indian soldiers are of the agricultural class, and much concerned with their farms and homes, a prolonged absence from which on foreign service is contrary to their real inclinations. Their fighting spirit is unquestionable, and it may be

over-stimulated as well as over-estimated, if carelessly appealed to.

We have not too many of these *best* soldiers for our purposes in India, and unless we elect to put a whole warlike province under arms and in training, we cannot find more. The balance of local military power has to be considered, and it is a serious question for the opinion of Soldiers and Statesmen, with historical memories and limited ambitions, as to how far we can safely carry enlistment in the Punjab for foreign service.

It will be said that these are matters that had better not be discussed; but mischievous delusions are worse than unwelcome truths, and should be corrected, if they are to be made an excuse for insufficient British garrisons where British interests are at stake.

It is no secret that Lord Roberts' Scheme of Mobilisation for the defence of India, contained the proviso that the Home Government was to embark thirty British battalions on demand for its completion, under certain circumstances therein defined.

Where should we look for those battalions now if wanted?

Our Imperialistic spirit is in full force, and needs no advertisement or oratory to excite or encourage it; but our Imperialistic genius has somehow faltered in South Africa, where we have been caught unprepared for a long-threatened political crisis, and for a campaign in which we

have lost an unmentionable number of guns and prisoners, to say nothing of lives and money. No other Great Power could have done so well, yet it cannot be denied that we might have done better, if we had been more alive to the fighting value of the Boers, and to their resources and readiness for war.

The optimistic repose in which we were disturbed by the events of 1857 in India, and again last year in Africa, must not be forgotten. It is remarkable how contentedly we have "muddled through" a war every ten years, in one or other of those countries, which a fixed and continuous policy might have averted.

A change of Government or a new Viceroy or Governor, has upset a decision on some most vital question, and all the usual consequences that end in an appeal to arms, have been the repeated result, without any improvement in our Imperial methods, after the necessary party recriminations have subsided.

In India especially, a continuity of purpose and proceeding is not only in accordance with the habits and feelings of the people, but necessary for the guidance of our short-lived officials.

Happily for the conscience of this country, neither of the wars in which we are now engaged was of our own seeking, whatever the first causes may have been.

The Boer and the Chinaman are responsible for the bloodshed they have provoked.

We have more than doubled the geographical extent and responsibilities of the British Empire in Asia and Africa during the last twenty years.

We hold India, South Africa and Egypt by the sword. Each in its turn has tried to shake off our yoke. It is vain to suppose that we can get rid of the cares of conquest by good government alone. The most abject races accept the blessings of civilisation at the point of the bayonet, and not from choice. Magistrates are of no avail without soldiers, and soldiers too of the ruling nationality and complexion.

The alien subject does not change his nature any more than his skin, even under British institutions, and Imperial fervour need not blind us to the fact that the British soldier has made the Empire, and must fight for it, with his Colonial federated brother in reserve if need be.

Assuming that we maintain a permanent British garrison of 50,000 men in South Africa, it will be well placed for the safety and support of nearly all our Colonies and possessions in the world. Within a five thousand miles radius of Cape Town or Durban are Bombay, Calcutta, Hong Kong, the Australian shore, the Persian Gulf, Gibraltar and Aden. Cape Town may become as important a military strategical centre as it is a naval one, and our existence need no longer depend on the Suez Canal.

In the future we have to look to our land forces as much as to our Navy. Our cruisers

cannot avail us in India or in the heart of China or of Africa. We shall probably reconstruct our Army accordingly into a more elastic institution. As its sphere of action expands, so must its numbers, efficiency and mobility.

What the immediate increase of those numbers ought to be, awaits the decision of the future Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts of Candahar, to whom, if his utterances have been correctly quoted, conscription is not anathema, should the existing means of filling up our ranks prove inadequate.

We have been told that our Infantry is the best in the world, and that it would be worse for our enemies if there was more of it. It is time that we acted on the great Napoleon's suggestive compliment, and had enough for the defence of the Empire, at least.

We hear (at lectures) that the day for Cavalry is past, and we know that big guns move slowly. But matured and well-trained Infantry, mounted or otherwise, can go anywhere and at once. It is precisely anywhere that its services are likely to be required, if only to keep the flag flying, until an Army Corps comes into line.

In such wars as ours the half-grown lads of our streets are a sacrifice of life, money, and prestige also, for physique has its moral as well as its military value in the eyes of friends and foes alike—especially in the East.

Professors of the Berlin school remind us

with truth that the principles of war are those of common sense, and yet they twit us with not conforming to the methods of "*la Grande Guerre*" in the "little wars with savages" which are said to demoralise our Generals.

It requires some imagination, as well as travel and experience of war, to realise the infinitely varied battlefields on which, during the Queen's reign, we have successfully encountered Sikhs and Afghans, Maoris and Abyssinians, Arabs and Soudanese, Zulus, and last, though not least, the doughty Boers.

On their own ground, these "savages" when fairly armed are as good fighters as any soldiers in Europe, and to them the solemnities of the drill book are no terror.

The plains of the Punjab, the defiles of Afghanistan, the Stockades of New Zealand, the highlands of Abyssinia, the deserts of the Soudan, and the South African veldt have each taught us a different lesson, the sum of which has not been thrown away upon our officers. If we have the men we shall always evolve our Generals, whom hasty and ungenerous criticisms have not quite extinguished.

The national readiness to join the colours, to march, and to fight, has never failed us in South Africa.

In a less popular war, the want of the trained soldiers in reserve, of which neighbouring countries command the instant muster by

half millions, and which we have to meet by begging or bargaining for raw recruits in the labour market, and drilling for a month before they take the field, might prove a disastrous hindrance to military operations at the outset.

The world is not too well disposed towards us—this we can bear with, and the feeling may change, but considering its power to injure us, are we prepared for all probable contingencies and combinations against us?

The once popular manœuvre of "putting our foot down," without soldiers and sailors in the visible background, has lost its efficacy—it has become as obsolete and as ridiculous as the goose-step.

Imperial federation has added greatly to our strength and security, but self-interest is a first principle in political bargains, and Colonial statesmen will have to respect it as Bismarck did—who affirmed that "*Do ut des*" was his supreme motive in such matters.

Even Canada and Australia are not altogether free from war-clouds (however small and distant), and should they at any time require a return of the splendid services they have given us, shall we be able to render it with the certainty and sufficiency due to our federal relations and obligations, under the voluntary system of recruiting our Army and Navy? If not, conscription or compulsory training might yet be a fitting sequel to the troubles and anxieties of

the last fifteen months in South Africa and China.

C. H. BROWNLOW.

WARFIELD HALL,

December, 1900.

P.S.—Before the close of the Crimean War we saw an Auxiliary German Legion encamped on the Kentish Downs, and we began to look for recruits in America, but were promptly warned off by the Government of that Country. After the Indian Mutiny it was seriously proposed to enlist 10,000 Chinamen as soldiers, a measure so manifestly impolitic, that it was at once vetoed, though supported by distinguished officers, not in touch with Indian feeling.

Such were our reserves and resources fifty years ago, and they are equally inadequate to-day, notwithstanding our overflowing population, our great possessions, and increasing responsibilities.—C. H. B.

1907.

QUALITY AND QUANTITY IN WAR.

"*On dit que Dieu est toujours pour les gros bataillons.*"

1903.

In his evidence before the South African War Commission a distinguished general officer gave a vivid description of an imaginary incident which is intended to show how half-a-dozen intelligent and enterprising soldiers may influence the results of an up-to-date battle.

The sketch is realistic and convincing, but before arriving at a conclusion as to the comparative importance of quality and quantity when widely extended opposing lines come under the fire of the latest guns and rifles, it is necessary to know what percentage of our short-service Infantry can be trained up to the standard of the half-dozen men therein described. Unless this percentage is a very satisfactory one, Army reformers should not run away with the idea that our generals, notwithstanding their protests to the contrary, have declared in favour of highly-trained skirmishers which stand for quality, rather than the big battalions representing quantity and reserves.

Clever generals may win battles with inferior numbers, though they certainly did not do so in our latest war.

Our administrative and other failures in South Africa have been expiated by a ruthless and world-wide exposure, but are we not suffering too much from Boer on the brain in setting him up as an ideal for our soldiers, whose aptitudes are of such a different kind, and whom slouch hats and polo breeches will no more transform into guerillas, than the Crimean képi and pegtop trousers of 1856 made them Zouaves?

The Boers, like Gurkhas and Afridis, are skirmishers by hereditary instinct as well as local conditions and modes of life. The two last-named races have for fifty years fought side by side with the British soldier and the Sikh without imparting to either the full secret of their craft, because the secret is in their blood more than in their education.

When we have a "thinking Army" the brains of our officers and men will develop, but there will always be a large residuum, that can march and fight but cannot think, to fill our ranks and to give us an overlapping line of battle whenever we may confront an enemy again.

It is a mistake to deride the big battalions—rather let us prepare to multiply them, by making compulsory training a national obligation on the rising generation. When we have done so we shall get the pick of the brains as well as the muscle of the country, and large reserves for the service of the King's vast Empire.

The difficulties of transport and supply must

always forbid the employment of a man more than is necessary on any distant campaign, but an army in the field, however highly trained and efficient, without ample reserves behind it is not operating on sound principles, whatever the changing tactics of the time may be. This needs no demonstration.

Any question as to quality and quantity can apply to Infantry only—the other branches must necessarily be maintained in the highest state of efficiency, irrespective of their strength or numbers.

Some very competent witnesses gave the relative value of fully trained and partially trained infantry in South Africa as 6 to 10.

No practical soldier will dispute the correctness of this estimate, nor can a thinking one forget the overwhelming numbers that enabled us to finish the Boer War.

A young captain taking his company into action would certainly prefer 60 efficient men at his back to 100 semi-efficients, but our spheres of war-like operations are so varied and so many, that the conditions are not impossible in which a general might hesitate in his choice between 6,000 and 10,000 of the two classes, if the latter had some leavening of the former, and had done one year's good training.

Few of our possible enemies, not even Cossacks, have the *sporting instincts* of Boers and Afridis, which so confounded us in South

Africa and Tirah, and still fewer are so full of that quality as to require being shot at like driven grouse.

Civilisation and over-population have extinguished many faculties that contributed to individual prowess, which moreover is of little avail against collective force and modern firearms.

Good average shots are more than ever necessary, and every young man fit to carry a rifle in the service of his country should be certified and enrolled as such. A renewal of this certificate every year, at the headquarters of the nearest Militia or Volunteer Regiment, after ten days' drill and rifle practice, free of expense, and with a small bounty at the end of it, would go far towards the creation of reserves of half-trained recruits, limited only by rejections, to fill up the ranks of our infantry, whenever the war-drum sounds again.

A slouch hat (to keep the Boer in mind), and a canvas overcoat, or Norfolk jacket, such as the French soldier wears, would be a sufficient outfit for this patriotic recruit, until he joined a regiment and finished his training in the field.

While we are thinking of skirmishing tactics other nations are preparing for great strategical campaigns. They have equally learnt the lesson of South Africa, but have not been overpowered by it.

It requires no large imagination to conceive circumstances and places wherein our magnifi-

cent fleet could afford no assistance to our armies, if insufficient in numbers to decide their own fate, and that of the Empire.

Our ships cannot convoy or convey reinforcements, efficient or semi-efficient, that do not exist.

We read in the Blue Book that "there is a timid school of theorists (Bloch or Von der Goltz?) who are eager to explain that the defence is more likely to be successful than the attack" in future wars, but that, in the opinion of the distinguished witness, "under skilful leading the attack has rather gained than lost by the new conditions."

The great Napoleon has told us that "Dans la guerre de montagne il faut *se faire* attaquer."

The inference from this maxim is that the advantage is with the defence when nature or the spade assist (instance the Boer intrenchments above the Tugela), unless the attacking general can march round the flanks of his opponent, to do which he must have the necessary numbers. Firearms and tactics must be ever varying factors, and even the fundamental rules of war are not immutable, so this may remain a debatable question between believers in the first Napoleon or in any later ones, until we have a scientific war to solve it; but the larger question of quality *versus* quantity, as regards a National Army, cannot well be deferred.

We are told that we have now two complete Army Corps, highly trained, and fully equipped for immediate service anywhere.

We have also two Army Corps in embryo, which are not likely to take the field as such, but may contribute battalions or brigades to reinforce the first two.

Our line reserves are most efficient in quality, but insufficient in quantity.

Assuming that the Militia and Volunteers are required at home, to protect our shores, will the Cabinet Committee, whose duty it is, or will be, to interpret the signs of the times, and to devise measures for the defence of the Empire, say that our available fighting strength in men is an adequate insurance against a repetition of the recruiting straits and make-shifts of 1900?

There are limits to Corps *d'elite*, but none to the military resources of an undefeated people, whose young men are taught the rudiments of drill, and the use of a rifle.

The Commissioners heard a great deal of evidence regarding our soldiers and their merits. It was stated that under modern conditions we could do with fewer, if they were more intelligent, and that whereas it took two years to train "a corner boy and a clod-hopper," one year would suffice for "University graduates or young barristers." This is probably very true, but it does not appear that any opinion was asked or expressed as to whether the latter class would

in case of war volunteer for two or three years' service in India, or in what numbers and at what price!

The "corner boy" is a new creation, but the "clod-hopper" in our ranks is as old as English History, and the maker of it.

At the King's next Levée, if the gallant officers present count the medals and the decorations he has gathered for them, they may feel quite sure that as he has fought in the past, so he will fight in the future.

Recent disorders in Continental armies, that depend upon conscription for recruits, have given a quietus to any further consideration of that unpopular measure in this country, but we *must* have soldiers, and *universal training to qualify for voluntary service when the call to arms arises,* is the only remaining means of holding our own in the world we have conquered.

The Empire demands Military as well as Fiscal reform. A great statesman has ridden for a fall and taken it smiling on behalf of the latter measure. Will no Prime Minister be equally daring and tell the nation that unless we have half-a-million of trained men ready to leave their ploughing or their peddling and to take up their rifles to cross the seas, we have no adequate means of fulfilling our Imperial obligations?

We have a treaty with Japan. Does it bind us to help her with our fleet only? We can have

no such reservation with respect to our Colonies —Canada, for instance.

When the genius of Edison or of Marconi has evolved the magnetic wave that is to electrocute or asphyxiate an army at untold distances, a skilful leader with a regiment of scouts and half-a-dozen scientists or chemists may suffice for a campaign, but until we have reached that stage we must look to "corner boys and clod-hoppers," especially the latter, and plenty of them, to fight our battles as heretofore.

If the gallant generals, whose reputations, and experience of the latest rifles give such weight to their words are supposed to imply a preference for small armies of experts (and immortals) in our wars of the future, the growing feeling in favour of some scheme of national training may cool, which they will surely regret.

It was not quality but quantity that failed us on the 27th February, 1881. Had numbers permitted, a counter attack, or an effective occupation would have averted the loss of Majuba Hill.

Later instances might be quoted, where our best troops did not achieve the best results for lack of numbers, which did not justify turning movements in the attack of strong positions, before defeat had demoralised the Boers in 1900.

In the days of miracles Gideon and his select 300 with trumpets and pitchers, and David with a sling and a stone, gained victories, which would

have been fruitless if the tribal levies of Israel and of Judah had not been present in tens of thousands to follow up and smite their enemies according to the tender mercy of the age.

The latest appointed Committee, guided by the latest published Blue Book (of 2,015 pages), may at last discover the missing secret of Army Administration, but we shall still be without a sound basis for the army we require, until the law makes the Drill Sergeant the inevitable successor of the School Master in the education and training of our young men and boys, according to given conditions of age and physical promise.

C. H. B.

1903.

"NATIONAL TRAINING."

1906.

A CORRESPONDENT ("P. T. G.") in *The Spectator* of the 17th November has dipped into Carlyle and extracted an *ipse dixit*, which sums up all that has been written or said in favour of "National Training" during the last six years.

He quotes a paragraph in which Carlyle calls it a lesson "beyond all other schooling," and advocates its importance "in all or in very many points of view—and ultimately in the point of actual military service, should such be required of it—that of commanding and obeying—were there nothing more, is it not the basis of all human culture; ought not all to have it, and how many ever do?"

The unexpected always happens. For the moment we have a truce in Europe; in South Africa we have captured Ferreira, which is a promise of vigilance! India is no longer threatened by the discomfited legions of Kuropatkin! Lord Kitchener has organised and arrayed his best troops against that dreaded contingency.

It is India that concerns us most. Early in 1857 we landed a small Army in Persia to

counteract the machinations of Russia. In May of the same year it was recalled in haste to relieve Delhi and Lucknow. We may not require very highly trained Infantry to protect or police India, but we may require numbers, and of the ruling complexion. When will the successors of Carlyle's "elaborate and many sounding pedagogues and professorial persons" recognise this fact?

Apart from European complications, we have always two, if not three, storm centres elsewhere in the King's dominions, that may singly or simultaneously burst in a cyclone of troubles, for which we are not prepared.

Are we to waste another six years in the consideration of Army reforms? the result of which as yet appears to be a "Striking force of one hundred and fifty thousand men" and the conception of "Reserve legions" of undefined strength, without any prospect of early maturity.

It is safe to assert that until we have national training, and half-a-million of Imperial Service Volunteers, to take up arms in the service of the country we shall have no Army worthy of the name. Carlyle, though steeped in military history and its lessons, wrote his characteristic remarks in favour of elementary drill in the spirit of the philanthropist and patriot rather than the Jingo. He dwells on his belief that "the vulgarest Cockney crowd, with nothing but beer and dull folly to depend on" would

welcome it as an amusement, and he clearly indicates a measure of national training, under the law of the land, as a means not only of promoting the discipline and happiness of the people, but the only means of safeguarding the honour and integrity of the Empire.

C. H. B.

December 1, 1906.

OUR NEW LITTLE ARMY.

1905.

"A RIGHT LITTLE, TIGHT LITTLE ISLAND,"
H.M.S. "Pinafore."

"A RED LITTLE, DEAD LITTLE ARMY."
Rudyard Kipling.

OUR Khaki clad, very mixed, new little Army,
In numbers, a most inoffensive toy Army,
On "business principles," strictly conducted,
Greatly admonished and highly instructed—
"Imperially thinking" but modestly speaking,
A very small army—of *ruling complexion*,
To guard the long line of far India's defence,
To manœuvre the Cossack into the Caspian,
And bury the bogey of Russian invasion.

When scanning the future for wars and commotions,
We may happen to light on some bellicose races,
Triumphantly yoked to our Chariot to-day,
That to-morrow may hark to "The Call of the Wild,"[1]
And try, not in vain, to kick over the traces—
(So teach us the Prophets, and Mr. Jack London).

[1] Unrest in India, of which we have not yet heard the end.—1907.

Heaven bless our "blue water" defensive conceptions,
The *entente* and alliance, with France and Japan,
But hasten the growth of our embryo Army,
To match the extent and the wealth of the Empire.

Events in Manchuria should cure some delusions,
So breezy and British, as to numbers in War.
Without half a million of trained volunteers,
Or "semi-efficients" to fill up its ranks,
Has the Empire land forces, equipped and sufficient,
A war to declare and successfully wage,
According to recent Far Eastern example,
On our own, or a friend's or an ally's behalf,
Where Kaisers, Shahs, Sultans, or Rajahs, may rage
And big battleships, cruisers and dinghies may fail?
If not, surely worse than disaster hangs over us,
While intelligent voters, our Lords and our Commons,
Still shrink from a measure for training our youth
To fight for their country like heathen Japan,
With heroic ideals and "Soul of a Nation."—

C. H. B.

KHAKI.

1903.

In 1857 the legions of John Lawrence marched to Delhi and Lucknow in Khaki of a classic hue, suggestive of Sinai and its sands, not of a kitchen garden in a drought.

The mixture which has been approved in Pall Mall as our War paint of the future, is borrowed, neither from the mountain, nor the moor, still less from the desert, or the country side.

Whatever its origin or its merits, India hopes that the Guides and the old Punjab Infantry may long continue to wear the Khaki introduced in 1850 by Sir Harry Lumsden, who was an Artist and a deer stalker, as well as a distinguished soldier, and who can scarcely be expected to rest in peace if departed heroes are permitted to look down from heaven on the parade grounds of to-day, and see their former comrades arrayed like ripe gooseberries instead of the Khaki warriors of their day.

C. H. B.

February 5, 1903.

P.S.—The writer attended his first Levée at



Levée in Khaki, 1856.

St. James's on 15th April, 1856, in "Khaki." He was asked by a Court official to account for his strange uniform, and had it not been for the explanations of the noble Lord who was to present him, might have left the Palace without having reached the Throne room.

"CHITRAL."

1895.

To the Editor of "The Times."

LORD ROBERTS concludes his letter which appeared in *The Times* of the 12th inst. as follows:—

"It is incomprehensible to me how anyone conversant with our position in India can arrive at any other conclusion than that Chitral is of great strategical importance."

Our big battalions, our magazine rifles, machine guns, and mountain artillery will make short work of the relief of Chitral, but the permanent occupation of it, the opening up and keeping open the direct road leading to it from Peshawar, is the important question on which Lord Roberts stops short of an explicit opinion, though his views clearly point to the necessity of so doing.

The Swatis have had their fight and saved their tribal honour at the Malakand Pass, but the Bunerwal, the Mohmands, and the Bajauris remain to be reckoned with. They are standing aside, watching events and waiting to see if we abide by our proclaimed intention of merely marching into their country and out again.

Should we insist on a permanent right of way we shall have to subjugate those tribes, and it would be interesting to know how long Lord Roberts thinks it will take us to do so effectually, and what troops the operation will lock up on that frontier.

It would also be interesting to many who have served under Sir Neville Chamberlain, and who respect his political sagacity and experience no less than they admire him as a hard-fighting soldier, if Lord Roberts would say how the Afridis in our ranks, as well as in their own formidable hills, are likely to view our progressive policy in their near neighbourhood. We need not wait to shape our policy to suit the Afridis, but they are worthy of some consideration. Our really good fighting material in India is not so abundant that we can afford to reckon without them.

There is a limit to Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Dogras in numbers as well as in their appetite for the prolonged mountain warfare which we have in prospect. The Bajauris, the Swatis, and the Bunerwal do not enlist or care to leave their homes for military service as the Afridis do, and the wave of border tribes, of which we are so often reminded as ready to pour down with Russia for the loot of India, is a chimera, a long-nursed argument *ad captandum vulgus*. Satan himself would shake his head at the spectacle of our disbanded Sikhs paying their attentions to

these mountain warriors, marching through the Punjab with their promised loot.

A return to the *status quo* in Chitral is inconceivable. The only other disagreeable alternative is to tear up our proclamation, and to annex Swat and Bajaur; the absorption of the whole block of country between the Indus and Kunar rivers to follow in due time.

But there is still another possible solution of the question of a right of way to Chitral.

Umra Khan is at our disposal to found a "buffer state."

He is a young, capable, and determined partisan leader in those regions, and has already the nucleus of a half-disciplined force of some kind at his back.

Under our protection he might extend his chiefship over Swat as well as Bajaur, and any other valleys or passes necessary to our purpose.

A title, a subsidy, the present of 1,000 stand of obsolete rifles, a couple of honey-combed guns, and some bales of half-worn tunics as uniform, would complete the equipment of a new dynasty, the succession to which could be regulated on the principles, whatever they may be, which we intend to apply to other "buffer states" of equal instability.

It must be admitted that this is not a promising scheme, but it is better than annexation, and no other has been suggested to extricate us from the difficulties arising out of our too

diligent excursions in search of the weak places in the Pamirs.

The whole incident has quite a Russian complexion, but the Russians would have planned it, and not blundered into it as we have done. Notwithstanding the anxiety which it must occasion to many, we have good reason to be proud of the readiness of our troops in India to take the field in this emergency, and Lord Roberts is to be much congratulated on the mobilisation scheme which he completed, and which enabled Sir George White to carry out the prompt military measures which have evoked the compliments of even the French Press.

Sir Neville Chamberlain, in his letter to you of the 8th inst., with a modesty as "obsolete" as his so-called views, feels it necessary to remind you of his career and his qualifications to be heard on this subject.

I have no such claims, and only venture to address you on the strength of a long Regimental experience of the tribes of the North-West Frontier, both as friends and foes.

C. H. B.

14 *April*, 1895.

WARFIELD HALL.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

1897.

THERE are now 65,000 soldiers under arms on the North-West Frontier of India, described as "the flower of the British and native armies," armed, equipped and trained up to the latest standard. Of these, about 35,000 men are this week to attack the Afridis and some neighbouring tribes, numbering probably 25,000 fighting men, who carry swords and matchlocks, with a proportion—say 10 per cent.—of breech-loading rifles. The result will not long remain in doubt.

Against such numbers the Afridis can make no stand. They will fight and retreat to the higher ranges of the Sofeid Koh, where their women and children will already have taken refuge. When snow falls, they must make their submission on our own terms. Much will depend upon the conditions we impose. To disarm them effectually is impossible. To lay out cantonments and "light railways"[1] in their midst might be premature, and yet to punish them as they deserve is imperative. Inadequate fines and worthless security for future good conduct will be forthcoming. The surrender of

[1] As proposed by the Forward Party.

their hereditary rights and pretensions in the Khyber and Kohat Passes should be insisted on, and we may as an "Imperial" stroke include, among other penalties, a thousand young hostages to garrison Suakin and Berber.

The remedy demanded by the Press for past troubles is to be immediate and permanent. "Once and for all" is the popular phrase. Speaking of the border generally, nothing less than a solid occupation up to the Durand frontier will achieve this end, and our entanglements will begin again with the tribes beyond that still imaginary line, whether the Ameer of Afghanistan is friendly or otherwise, and it is hard to say where they will cease, short of Cabul and Candahar. The Afridis have never known a master, and they will not give up their independence in one short campaign. Even if they surrender their arms they will arm again. The gun trade in Cabul, already flourishing, will receive a fresh impetus. The Sikhs, after two desperate wars, accepted defeat, and became our obedient subjects, because they inhabit the plains, and have always been subject to some sort of rule, like all dwellers in the plains. They have not the mountaineer's passionate love of freedom, nor the bulwarks of nature to befriend them.

The Montenegrins, the Abyssinians, the Gurkhas of Nepal, the Circassians, and the Kaffirs of Afghanistan are examples of prolonged resistance to subjection, though the two last

were eventually conquered by methods which we are not likely to adopt—namely, extermination.

The [1]Bartle Frere - Lytton - Colley frontier policy, which was conceived in 1877, and afterwards came under more distinguished patronage, has failed to conciliate the Pathan tribesmen. They are not to be Sandemanised into "friendly intercourse" by means of posts and roads, and promises of non-interference. They decline to be cajoled into singing our National Anthem, and if we thrash them into it, the spirit of vengeance will be added to the spirit of devilry, which will surely drive them into the arms of the Invader[2] whenever he appears. If that venerable bogey has any sense of humour, he must laugh at the ridiculous situation in which a few Cossacks on the Pamirs have landed us. The game of brag has been well played by our opponents; the trap has drawn, our strength has been wasted, and our weak points have been laid bare. Travelling politicians, foreign professors, and exploring captains, who all write delightful books, and vouch for the strategical importance of Chitral, have had their say. "Retired Governors and Generals," who write to the *Times*, have proved blind prophets, for they predicted no "disasters" and no "incident of Empire" likely to call 65,000 men into the field at the worst

[1] Appendix A.

[2] The Invader is still a bogey, but the unrest within our borders is a reality.—1907.

season of the year. But there is still hope that her Majesty's Ministers in Downing Street will now take up the matter, and dictate their final measures with an honest conviction of the mistakes of 1895.

The Sikhs are often quoted as an example of how we ought to deal with our Afghan neighbours. The analogy is absurd. When the Khalsa army crossed the Sutlej to invade India in 1845-46, and again challenged us in 1848, we fought and beat that warlike people in six desperate battles. At Ferozeshah, the British force numbered fewer than 17,000 men, and their loss in killed and wounded amounted to 2,400.

The Sikhs were estimated to be 50,000 strong. They suffered immense losses, and we captured 73 guns at the point of the bayonet. At Sobraon, the Sikhs were defeated with a loss of 10,000 men and 67 guns, our own killed and wounded numbering 2,380 men. Moodkee and Aliwal were minor but sanguinary engagements. In 1848, Lord Gough, the hero of those victories, fought the battle of Chilianwala, with 14,000 men and 65 guns, the total British loss being 2,338. The battle of Goojerat followed, and finally broke up the Sikh power. In none of these great battles did the British forces exceed 20,000 men. Both sides fought at close quarters, with firearms of equal value—namely, the muzzle-loading smooth bore of the period. These facts and figures remind us of what the British soldier has

done on the plains of India. They also establish the valour of the Sikh under similar conditions.

The Gurkha and the Afridi have always proved our best soldiers in hill warfare. The numbers of the former are limited; the latter cannot for the present be counted on. There remain the British soldier and the Sikh. Of the last, good and trusty warriors as they are, it is possible to have too many under arms, especially in the Punjab, bearing in mind their history, and the fact that though they helped to save us in 1857, they nearly swamped us in 1845-46. These considerations are stamped as "obsolete." They point to the hope of a reaction in favour of the views of the greatest of Indian Viceroys—Lord Lawrence. They may appeal to a statesman, if not to a Jingo.

C. H. B.

14 *October*, 1897.

P.S.—Sandeman's policy in Biluchistan can be of no avail in Tirah.

The Afridis are not Biluchis—they differ totally—in race, history and habitat. Administrative genius and generalship may blockade, starve and exterminate them. But they will fight to the last, for the hungry freedom of many centuries.

C. H. B.

A Picket, 20th Punjab Infantry, on the N.W. Frontier of India.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

1898.

In a previous paper (14 October, 1897), I referred to the fact that we had 65,000 soldiers in the field on the North-West Frontier of India for the suppression of Afridis and other tribes, whom our forward policy had provoked into hostility. I also pointed out that in the great Sikh wars which led to the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the British Force engaged did not exceed a third of the above numbers.

Both sides fought heroically, under circumstances best suited to their aptitudes and training, viz., shoulder to shoulder on the open plain, except when the Sikhs had the opportunity of entrenching themselves.

The ordinary Briton is not an Alpine climber, nor a forest ranger, nor is the Sikh, and neither is at home on the hill-side like the Gurkha and the Afridi. The Dogra and the Punjabi Mahomedan are little better than the Sikh, and these races make up the composition of our reliable infantry for active aggressive warfare beyond our frontiers in India. We have only forty regiments of native infantry and twenty of native cavalry that can be trusted with any certainty to march and to fight, and to stand the climate in those regions.

The object of these remarks is to emphasise the difference between our offensive and defensive fighting power, and the necessity of wisely combining the two in the event of the realisation of the nightmare of invasion, which has so long and so grievously tormented us.

In comparison with our doubtful offensive strength, our defensive resources are immense. The whole of our Southern Native Armies and our Imperial Service troops within reach of railways, well provided with picks and spades, food and ammunition, could be put down anywhere, to create Plevnas and to defend them with a passive courage and tenacity which could be depended on—while our assailants starved.

Since the Lytton - Colley school[1] unfolded their maps to search for a scientific frontier, with a fine scorn for the existing one, and for the hard-earned experience and wisdom of Lord Lawrence and his school, we have heard of many projects for the safety of India, such as driving the Russians into the Caspian, meeting them on the Hindu Kush, occupying Herat, Cabul and Candahar—in fact, plunging into a sea of doubtful adventures, with Russians in front of us, the Afghans on all sides of us, and the independent tribes between us and our base in India.

The Forward party have studied their maps rather than the men they had to deal with, and their efforts have culminated in the occupation

[1] Appendices B. and C.

of Chitral and its consequences, of which history will in time take its account.

The Afridis will probably make some sort of submission before the spring, but we have no more conquered them than Napoleon conquered Russia in 1812.

We shall have to keep an additional force of at least ten thousand men in or within reach of the Peshawar Valley for another five years.

How to deal with the Khyber and Kohat Passes and the road to Chitral, which two years ago was pronounced "as safe as Piccadilly," must be a puzzle to the Forward party. They cannot well recant their policy, however obvious its failure, and they can no longer defend it. If they had started with the avowed intention of wiping out the tribes, they might consistently carry on the war to the bitter end; but the declared object was to conciliate them, to add to our recruiting ground (though our ranks have always been open to them), to forestall Russia in their goodwill, and to sit in their passes without interfering with their independence.

The tribes will settle down if we withdraw from their country, and the Cossack will patrol the Pamirs in vain; but Russia may, under certain circumstances, occupy Herat, in which case we have no alternative but to move at once on Candahar with the best troops at our disposal, and there await and assist the development of events.

There can be nothing in our treaty with the Ameer to compel us to go to Cabul (except to turn Russia out of it) if it does not suit our view of the situation, either military or political, to go there.

To invade India, Russia has to choose between two routes. She can move viâ Balkh and Bamian across the Hindu Kush, leaving behind her a mountain pass 12,000 feet high, with Cabul and the Khyber before her, and Candahar on her flank; or she may make a desert march from Herat of 420 miles to reach Candahar, and will there find a British army in position, and in railway communication with India. If she is successful, she has still our Plevnas to stop her. Should Cabul be the Russian objective, and they get so far, there is hope that they may be shut up in Sherpur.

The Lawrence school read their maps, as well as the Forward party. They fully recognise the scientific value of the Cabul-Candahar line as a strategic base against Russia, but they contest its practical value, until we have disarmed or exterminated the intervening Afghan and independent tribes, which we cannot do. Their history-books and their experience are opposed to the "friendly intercourse" theory as the foundation of a policy.

C. H. B.

5 *January*, 1898.

"OUR INDIAN FRONTIER POLICY."

1899.

To the Editor of the "Times."

MR. W. H. (BULLOCK) HALL, F.R.G.S., in his recently published book "The Romans on the Riviera," gives an interesting account of the Ligurians, who according to Strabo—

"Closed against the Romans all the roads into Iberia along the coast, and carried on a system of pillage both by sea and land. Their strength so increased that large armies were scarcely able to force a passage, and after a war of eighty years the Romans were hardly able to obtain a breadth of 12 stadia, for the purpose of making a road."

He also quotes Livy as follows :—

"In Liguria there was everything to put soldiers on their mettle; positions to scale, in themselves difficult enough without having to oust a foe already in position; hard marching through defiles lending themselves to constant surprises; an enemy dashing and light-footed, rendering every spot and hour insecure; wearisome and perilous blockadings of fortified strongholds in a country barren of resources and yield-

ing no plunder worth mentioning, with no camp followers and no long line of beasts of burden; no hope but in cold steel and individual pluck."

Another extract from Plutarch completes a parallel which all who have had to do with the wars or the politics of the North-West Frontier of India, and who can recall the rugged features of the Maritime Alps will recognise. He says, "The Romans did not choose utterly to cut off the people of Liguria, whom they considered a bulwark against the Gauls."

It is not on record that Lord Lawrence consulted Livy or Plutarch or even Cæsar as authorities on mountain warfare or the management of mountain tribes when deciding on his frontier policy, but had he done so he could not have profited more fully by the teachings of 2,000 years ago, or dealt more successfully with Afridis, Wuziris, and the like than the Romans did with the Ligurians. Mr. Hall reminds us that it took two centuries to break down the resistance of the latter, and to show them that a Roman road through their mountains was for their good, with extirpation as the only alternative.

Pursuing still further the parallel between our frontier tribes and the tribes of the Maritime Alps suggested by Livy's graphic account of the latter, it is worthy of note that the Romans even in Cæsar's time overran Gaul and settled in the valley of the Rhone without waiting to subjugate

the Ligurians (who blocked their land communications with Italy) very much as we have overrun Afghanistan without breaking our heads against the Afridi highlands.

Since the last invasion of Afghanistan we have initiated other methods of dealing with our immediate and troublesome neighbours, the results of which remain to be seen.

For a moment the subject is a stale one, and our latest treatment of it, culminating in the prodigious military efforts of 1898, has not improved its savour, but our frontier policy will again become a vital question in India the day the Ameer of Cabul dies.

The interesting fragments of ancient history quoted by Mr. Hall may instruct and console us without being taken too seriously as lessons, or putting us to sleep as to the future.

The Viceroy of India in his speech at Lahore, reported in *The Times* of the 31st ult., referring to the position of affairs on the frontier, said that it was his "desire to keep India safe, and to respect tribal independence."

Lord Curzon of Kedleston will do both if he will recognise the fact that posts and roads through their country do not convince the tribesmen of independence, but rather of a too "exact science" which he himself wisely deprecates as a solution of frontier politics. A solid occupation might suit some of the less warlike tribes, as a protection against each other, but a semi-

scientific one will please or pacify none, and be a source of weakness and anxiety to ourselves.

Prompt punitive expeditions, whenever necessary and however severe, vindicate our authority without making it detested; keep our troops in readiness and training for mountain warfare, and do not lock them up where they may not be wanted, and whence they cannot be extricated when wanted elsewhere.

Above all, they save us from surprises and sieges such as Chitral, Chakdara, and Saragarri, and do not open up too many highways and facilities for the coming Cossack.

C. H. B.

2 *April*, 1899.

THE COSSACK RECONNOITRING INDIA FROM THE PAMIR.

THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

CHITRAL.

1899.

THERE appears to be some unexplained hitch or delay in the relief of the garrison of Chitral this year. Conjecture as to the cause leads to the question, How much longer do we intend to remain there? Its continued occupation *under existing conditions* is in defiance of every military principle, and of all Indian political experience.

It has been sufficiently proved that, thanks to mountains and rivers, and a very impartially obstructive race of men on the Peshawar side of it, Chitral is not an open door as Herat is. It is not as much as a keyhole in a closed one.

If we are still troubled by fears of mysterious agencies, and recruiting parties in balloons from beyond the Pamirs, we should surely abandon half measures, and annex or effectively occupy the intervening country; otherwise we should withdraw from Chitral. The yearly relief of its garrison under the protection of so-called friendly tribes, is a humiliating performance far more damaging to our prestige than withdrawal, and offers a periodical invitation to the "Mad Mullah" and other local patriots to come out on the war-path.

The young Mehter of Chitral will shortly be of an age to marry, and according to family traditions to consolidate his inheritance by murdering his nearest of kin in due succession. He will doubtless wish to rule also.

The opportunity would be a fitting one to make over to him the reins of Mehtership, and to see if he cannot play his part as our friend and ally with the assistance of a Mahomedan political representative such as we have at Cabul, and a few detective scouts, instead of an isolated and imprisoned British garrison.

Should he prove disloyal or incapable, we still have annexation or Omrah Khan[1] to fall back upon.

The exiled Bajauri Chief who is waiting his time to recover his lost ascendancy, would doubtless answer Lord Curzon's call (the Ameer of Cabul consenting), and do his bidding on reasonable conditions, including the release of our troops from a false position.

This would be a bold measure, but we have precedents for it. We should be making use of a strong man, as we did of Dost Mahomed and Abdul Rahman in times past with much success.

Whenever troubles arise, it needs no prophet to warn us that they will extend to those regions, and we may safely assume that to bolster up our puppets of Dhir and Chitral will require as large

[1] Since dead.—1907.

a force as was employed there in 1895 and again in 1897.

Are we prepared once more to lock up 15,000 good soldiers and as many transport animals in a *cul-de-sac* of no strategical importance,—provided we hold the Malakand Pass?

We have an immense line of frontier to guard, and if we are to be ready for offensive measures on a decisive scale, whenever and wherever necessary, we cannot afford to have a man or a mule in the wrong place.[1]

C. H. B.

28 *April*, 1899.

[1] Such considerations might not deter a Tamerlane or a Napoleon, or even Carlyle's "Professorial Person," but rulers and soldiers of less ambition, like Lord Lawrence and Sir Neville Chamberlain, who spent their lives face to face with the question, have left us ample warning that we have reached the limit of our conquests with mercenary troops.—1909.

THE DURAND FRONTIER.

1902.

THE Wuziris have been giving trouble on the North-West Frontier of India, and a force has been marched into their country to punish them.

The matter is in the very capable hands of Lord Curzon, who cannot fairly be charged with inactivity, masterly or otherwise, in any of the functions of his high office. Nevertheless the cry has been raised that we are blundering as usual.

A militant morning paper compares our proceedings with those of the "indolent ostrich."

The arguments in favour of annexing and policing the country of our neighbours whom we call the independent tribes, and who, from Quetta to Chitral, number some 200,000 fighting men, are so strong that it is difficult to dispute such an apparently simple solution of the question, and yet there is much to be said against it.

The "Durand Frontier," which was a scientific device for the purpose of pushing our outposts and eventually our jurisdiction to the Afghan border, is still an imaginary one.

The tribes rose in arms against the first attempts to define it, and after two years' hard

fighting we reverted to the practical limitations and methods of Lord Lawrence and the Sikhs before him.

History, Ethnology, and Military topography forbid the hope that we shall ever make these fanatical mountaineers our well-behaved fellow subjects.

If we absorb them we shall only add to our troubles, for we shall become answerable for their raids into the Ameer's territories, as well as for their protection from the equally unruly Afghan tribes on the other side of our new limits.

Punitive expeditions are a regrettable necessity, and they are at present the only alternative, but they are not an unmixed evil, for they afford our troops periodical lessons in mountain warfare, and for fifty years have helped to keep our Punjab Regiments in a high state of fighting efficiency and readiness for service.[1]

Most of the Pathan border tribes are light-hearted brigands who prefer to remain naked and hungry as they are, rather than prosper under the eye of a policeman. They are fairly well disposed to us, notwithstanding their brigandage and its punishments, but annexation would make them our bitter enemies, and the possible instruments of our great Northern rival in her expansive designs, should she

[1] Our warlike neighbours act on us as a tonic—they keep us on the alert, and teach us to fight, as the Zulus taught the Boers. Moreover their tribal feuds keep down their numbers, much to our advantage, and their own.

succeed in embroiling us with Afghanistan, as a preparatory step to the sack of Delhi!

There is nothing new in these remarks, but they are offered as an antidote to any symptoms of war fever in India, which would be inconvenient, until we have recruited and reorganised our regular forces at home, especially our Infantry.

C. H. B.

23 *November*, 1902.

P.S.—We may wrangle over policies, and experiment with systems, but whether the guardians of the Frontier are to be tribesmen or Sepoys, the question will remain "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes," and to that the answer must always be,—the British Soldier.

THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

The Zukka Khel Expedition.

1908.

To the Editor of the "Times."

The Zukka Khel expedition is surely an imperative necessity, and Mr. Morley shows no desire to extend its operations, with the view to a further search for the Durand Frontier, that "haven of rest" from tribal troubles, which is the dream of students of strategy.

India is scarcely prepared just now for a repetition of the adventures of 1897, and for a second relief of Chitral, as your article on the subject in to-day's *Times* sufficiently indicates.

Your Military Correspondent's denunciation of the "raid and scuttle" policy is unanswerable. Its condemnation dates from 1849, when we inherited the system from the Sikhs, and John Lawrence, Neville Chamberlain, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson and other capable soldiers and politicals objected to it, and tried to get rid of it, but failed.

They found that they could not move mountains, or transplant their inhabitants, and that annexation would make matters worse.

They accepted the inevitable, with the

result that they created the Punjab Frontier Force, which "raided and scuttled" most successfully, until 1857, when it marched to Delhi and Lucknow and saved India.

Unless the Ameer of Afghanistan can be persuaded to defy his Mullahs, and risk his throne and his life by joining Lord Kitchener in a "drive" of the tribes from the Sofeid Koh to the sea, or until we can add 50,000 British soldiers to the garrison of India, we may make up our minds to deal as heretofore with the "rocks and the men" that from time to time afford us such useful lessons in Mountain Warfare.

C. H. B.

WARFIELD HALL,
15 *February*, 1908.

P.S.—If newspaper advocates of the Durand Frontier could realise the physical features of the Afridi and Wuziri highlands, they would better understand the objections to their visionary scheme.

C. H. B.

THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

Zukka Khels.

1908.

To the Editor of the "Times."

Your Simla telegram of yesterday's date announces the general opinion expressed there as being, "that the policy of withdrawal pursued in the case of the Zukka Khels is largely responsible for the present situation"—viz., the addition of Afghan and other tribes to the Mohmand invasion of our frontier.

Surely, Sir, this is not a well-informed military opinion or objection. Had these reinforcements appeared upon the scene before we had settled accounts with the Zukka Khels and retired, the Afridis under the influence of their Mullahs would have been compelled by religious feeling to join the combination against us.

The Mohmands, even in their own country, are not formidable, and will soon be dispersed; but the immediate necessity of attacking the Afridis in Tirah, considering the large numbers of that warlike tribe serving in our ranks, would have been most inopportune. This has been averted by the policy complained of in Simla—for a time at least.

C. H. B.

24 *April*, 1908.

THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

Annexation.

1908.

To the Editor of the "Times."

It is not within my competence, or that of any other "old Anglo-Indian officer brought up in the tradition of raid and scuttle" to reply in suitable language to the fine frenzy of protest which your Military Correspondent pours out in *The Times* of this morning on the threadbare subject of the Indian Frontier, and its guardians of the past. When he settles down to argue his points in favour of more drastic measures, he refers to "the 300,000 fighting men on the border" as "fierce, treacherous, fanatical, and untamed," adding that "it is as hopeless a task to conciliate a Pathan as to make a pet of a blizzard." He invokes a Pitt to close "the book of Frontier war."

Your Correspondent is a master of maps and figures and strong language, and he has seen the frontier. He is clearly an advocate for annexing the country of the tribes he so graphically describes. Has he made any calculation of the number of forts and miles of roads that would

be necessary to police this hornet's nest and how many troops we should lock up in the midst of our new subjects?

To annex and administer such a no-man's-land in the name of "science" would be a pedantic, lasting, and expensive blunder. The "mailed fist" seldom fails to restore order, and it can be withdrawn, ready to strike again when necessary. Unhappily we have no Pitt just now, but we have Lord Kitchener, who will assuredly adopt this view before he leaves India, and has learnt more about the difficulties of making "a pet of a blizzard," or, in plain language, adding 300,000 implacable Pathans[1] and their rugged mountains and barren valleys to our ever-growing responsibilities.

C. H. B.

WARFIELD HALL,

28 *April*, 1908.

[1] It is the strong rocks and the thirsty land that have made these tribes what they are, and helped them to keep out the Invader, from East or West. Raid for raid may be costly, but a permanent occupation would cost us ten times more.

THE AFRIDIS OF TIRAH.

1908.

THE Zukka Khel tribesmen have received a well-deserved punishment—somewhat limited by the wise endeavour not to provoke their neighbours into hostilities.

These minor operations occasion little disturbance, and even more important tribes, such as the Wuziris, the Mohmands, and the Bonerwal are not great fighters, if isolated and attacked separately.

But we cannot include the Afridis in this category, and if we are again compelled to invade Tirah the cry may be "*Delenda est*," for her sins are many, although her sons have served us well as soldiers for fifty years.

Lord Kitchener is doubtless prepared with a plan of campaign when required, and he knows that the Afridi in his historic stronghold laughs at scientific manœuvres, big guns and wooden soldiers. He will have to be cleared out of his natural fortifications, and followed up by swarms of the best infantry that we can put into the field, with limbs and eyes and warlike wits equal to his own. He will fight with his back to the Sofeid Koh (6,600ft.) and he will be supported by as many Oruckzais, Shinwarees, and other

tribes as he can feed. We shall contend with outflanking numbers from first to last, but we shall of course bring them to their knees if we are determined to do so, and we must then decide if the Campaign is to be a "raid and scuttle," or if we are to remain in Tirah, and build Cantonments and a Summer Palace on the Maidan plateau!

Should the latter alternative be forced upon us, it may mean a war of extermination, and the possibility of serious complications with the neighbouring Afghans, and the Ameer at Cabul.

Tirah[1] is but a speck on the map of India, yet it is the heart and kernel of the whole frontier question. Its geographical advantages for plunder and blackmail, as well as its rough highlands, have bred a race of fighting men that are not to be easily wiped out, and that keep up the courage of all the other tribes. Only the fittest survive the "*lex talionis*" of the Afridi.

The origin and the history of these people is obscure, but they have held Tirah against all comers since the Ghaznevede period, and have in turn arrested the Moghuls, the Sikhs and the British in their attempts to acquire a Camping Ground in the Maidan Valley.

We cannot name a finer example of a patriot in the world, than the Afridi on his own hillside.

[1] Colonel H. D. Hutchinson's Campaign in Tirah, 1897-1898, also Colonel Sir T. H. Holdich, R.E.

He needs no Act of Parliament to compel him to defend his Tirah.

A visitor to Peshawar can ride to Jamrood any afternoon, and looking across the border can see the Kooki Khail boy (of 12) sitting with his father's Jezail between his knees guarding the paternal life and blanket, while the owner ploughs his field.

It is a picture of duty before pleasure, for the teaching of *all* rising generations.

C. H. B.

May, 1908.

MOWLADAD KHAN, AFRIDI. 20TH PUNJAB INFANTRY.

MOWLADAD KHAN, AFRIDI.[1]

1885.

SIRDAR Bahadoor Mowladad Khan, an Afridi of the Khyber Pass, joined Coke's Rifles in 1853. Was transferred to the 20th Punjab Infantry in 1864. In addition to a long series of Campaigns and Expeditions on the North-West Frontier of India, including Dersumund and Miranzai 1854, Summana Hills 1855, Miranzai and Kurum 1856, Bozdar Hills 1857, Burrara Pass 1860, Ambeyla 1863, Huzara 1868, his field services include the siege and capture of Delhi, also actions of 4th and 14th July, 25th July (capture of guns at Ludlow Castle), 12th August, 25th August, and final assault 1857, the Rohilcund Campaign 1858, including Bhagoowala, Nuggeenah, Mirgunge, and capture of City of Barreilly, the Afghan Campaigns, Ali Musjid, 1878-80, Egypt, Tel el Kebir, 1882, and Herat, 1884 (Afghan boundary commission). Has received the Order of the Indian Empire, the Order of British India, and the Medjidieh, as well as the highest class of the Order of Merit (or valour), having on three different occasions been rewarded for distinguished personal gallantry in the field. Besides these decorations he wears five medals and six clasps. He has been

[1] Appendix D.

three times severely wounded, and has seen nearly 600 men of his two Regiments killed or wounded before the Queen's enemies. He has also the scar of a British bullet, as well as of an Afridi knife, both acquired before he enlisted.

C. H. B.

3 *January*, 1885.

THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

ANNEXATION OF TRIBAL TERRITORY.

1908.

THE annexation or permanent occupation of any tribal territory is likely to bring us into conflict with all the tribes, aided and abetted by the Afghans, with or without the consent of the Ameer.

A practical forward movement can have no finality, short of the line Cabul—Ghuznee—Candahar, and may eventually commit us to the Hindu Kush, and the Pamirs, as a "Scientific Frontier," at what cost and with what consequences would remain to be seen.

The student of maps is not always a student of mankind, and he may find that he has not taken sufficient account of the feelings and fighting values of those who are opposed to us, and of those who are on our side, in a war, and in the occupation of a region, so notoriously hateful to the latter.

If Moltke himself had been shown the maps of Afghanistan and Cashmere, with an invitation to suggest plans of campaigns for the invasion of the two countries, the geographical features of which are so very similar, he would probably

have drawn up two identical schemes, with the reservation that his views were subject to correction, as he had no personal experience of Afghans or Cashmiris, Sikhs or Gurkhas, and little knowledge of their qualities as soldiers.

The makers of Anglo-Afghan history, both political and military, have always failed to admit any such limitation or hindrance to their splendid audacity, and we have three times marched to Cabul with success, but returned from it in disorder (more than once) for lack of a proper appreciation of the difficulties of mountain warfare, of climate, and of race antagonism.

In these times of commotion and uncertainty, the Rulers of India have to think of the human factor, to the East of the Indus, as well as to the West, before risking a war in Afghanistan, for the rectification of our border, and the *civilisation* of our too patriotic neighbours.

It would be better to "raid and scuttle" a little longer, than be met with a "*non possumus*" from our best troops, if asked to do more. They[1] have as much at stake as we have, and would certainly prefer to fight our battles a little nearer home than Cabul.

These remarks may be objected to as hypothetical, and discouraging, but they are the fruit of thirty years' service in the Punjab, and a deep interest in its people to this day. In

[1] Notably the Sikhs.

the fifties and sixties of the last century, we fought with smooth bores, at close quarters, when, to "raid and scuttle" (especially to scuttle well) was an exhilarating annual training, greatly enjoyed by the good soldiers of the Frontier Force, and no doubt equally so by the young bloods among the tribesmen.

These tribesmen are really better fighters than the Afghans, and a strategic scuttle off their hill-sides is not so humiliating as a retreat from Cabul.

When our Territorial Army comes to a responsible age, and we can rely on our Home Guards for the defence of England, we may be able to send a couple of divisions of our Striking Force to India, if wanted, for a march to Cabul, Candahar or Chitral, without any anxiety as to the return journey, with flags flying and drums beating.

Till then our statesmen would do well to shut their ears to the war-cries of our Forward School, who are too ready to subordinate their wisdom to their valour.

C. H. B.

August, 1908.

AFGHANISTAN

The Development of "Gun-running."

1908.

The recent development of Gun-running *viâ* the Persian Gulf[1] is a serious matter for the Ameer, as well as for the Indian Government.

It must end in making Afghanistan a veritable cockpit. It may retard the over-population of the country, but it will render our periodical visits to Cabul more difficult. Should events compel her again to distract us with the bogey of invasion, Russia need not move a man to the South of the Oxus. She has only to send rifles and ammunition across the river, and over the Hindu Kush. We initiated the unsportsmanlike proceeding by arming Abdul Rahman against her in 1881, and cannot appeal to the Hague.

The Afghan in his wild state is an ideal brigand, but he is a man, and a good fighter in his own way—without strict allegiance to ruler or partisan leader.

[1] Upwards of a million rifles are known to have already reached Persian Biluchistan by that route.

It is strange how we cling to the ambition of *civilising* him, seeing that the Ameer cannot visit his own province of Huzara without a small Army. If our next envoy to Cabul could induce H.M. Habibulla Khan to fashion his tribal levies into Regiments and Brigades, equipped like our own Indian Infantry, with ready-made turbans, gaiters and spats, and drilled *ad nauseam*, he might render us a great service. The Afghan would cease to fight "in his own way," and perhaps take to football.

Before our "Agreement" with Russia wears out, we might well ask her to sign a more binding undertaking, to join us in putting down gun-running as a trade, and mutually to refrain from it as a measure of offence or defence.

If we are ever driven to occupy Afghanistan, or any part of it, our money will flow into the country, and every patriot or brigand will become possessed of a rifle. We can do nothing to prevent it. A Mahomedan population inhabiting a mountainous region, is not easily reduced to law and order, except by the "[1]Yermōloff System" in the Caucasus.

Morocco, Albania, Macedonia, and Kurdistan are instances of such regions, and such people, in the very heart and highways of the world. They are no more civilised, or as much so, as they were at the time of Zenophon and the retreat of "The Ten Thousand" from their Raid

[1] Baddeley's *Conquest of the Caucasus*, page 97.

to the East. It is the same with the Afghans, —whom we vainly hope to make our peaceful subjects, though we have not yet pacified Bengal.

C. H. B.

15 *August*, 1908.

THE LOCATION AND SEGREGATION OF OUR NATIVE TROOPS.

1907.

To the Editor of the "Times."

YOUR leading article of the 20th inst. on "The growth of certain disquieting features in the condition of India" is a well timed and much needed warning on the existing situation.

Without seeking to amplify your wisely guarded observations, may I remind you that one of the most valuable lessons taught us in 1857, and abundantly recorded and insisted on at the time, was the future necessity of a judicious location, and segregation of our native troops, especially those of the most warlike nationalities. Has the lesson been forgotten?

The massing of our best fighting regiments in brigades of the same class, and on their own soil, is politically a mistake, and conducive to troubles, such as fill every page of the past history of the Punjab.

The latest Russian scare, and the prevailing passion for administrative reform might account for this possible mistake, but the internal peace and safety of India are of more importance than

either the danger of invasion or the perfection of our parade accomplishments.[1] It is always easier to reinforce a tainted area with reliable troops than to withdraw its disaffected or suspected garrison, without provoking a crisis.

C. H. B.

25 *March*, 1907.

This letter was not printed by *The Times*.

[1] Our native troops are over drilled. The latter-day Sepoy refers to it with questionable merriment. He wonders if he is destined for a march on Berlin !—1908.

THE UNREST IN INDIA.

1908.

In 1857 the "Chupattie" was the forerunner of events.—In 1908 we have the "Bomb." It is futile to say that there is no analogy between the two periods, and to think that proclamations and promises will appease the so-called unrest, or that another rupee per month will ensure the loyalty of the Sepoy, unless these mild measures are supplemented by the moral effect, throughout India, of the arrival of four or five ship-loads of White Soldiers at our two most seditious seaports, before the hot weather sets in.

Should war break out in Europe, there can be no doubt that it will add to the unrest in India, and that these troops will be more wanted there, than in Europe, where our few soldiers can be of little account, among the legions of our neighbours, whether as allies or as adversaries.

A timely display of the "Imperial fist" need not lead to bloodshed. Blank cartridges will suffice to quiet Bengal and Bombay. A movement of troops downwards from the North West might stir up other latent troubles, which re-

inforcements by sea would probably repress or extinguish.

India cannot be unduly alarmed at the sight of a few more British bayonets, in answer to the revolutionary spirit indicated by the use of bombs.

C. H. B.

"THE OPERATIONS IN THE RIFF."

1909.

THE two leading articles in *The Times* of yesterday, one on "The Army Manœuvres" and the other on "The operations in the Riff," are very instructive reading—the first as a lesson in European warfare, and the second as a reminder of the very different training required for a Campaign on the North West Frontier of India, to what we practise on the Berkshire and Hampshire downs.

The Administrative, Transport, and Staff services need not enter into the comparison.

The Spaniards are fighting their battles from a base within a hundred miles of their own seaports. They have already embarked 45,000 Spanish soldiers in the conflict, and though they have gained some successes, they are still suffering from "regrettable incidents," the end of which they do not doubt, but cannot see.

In India two-thirds of our troops are indigenous, its mountains are infinitely more difficult and the tribes on its Frontier quite as good fighters as the Riffs.

Spain has many mountains and an army of brave soldiers, but her generals, like our own, have possibly preferred the enacting of classic

campaigns, and knee-to-knee Cavalry manœuvres on the plain, to the training necessary for hill warfare. Hence the reverses on and about the slopes of Mount Gurugu—which very much resemble some of our own, beyond the Indus.

Has the Army Council no power of appeal to the Government to provide suitable training ground on the Grampian and Cambrian hills (available between given dates, and with due respect to grouse moors and deer forests) for Artillery and Infantry manœuvres—including the very essential one of raid and scuttle?

The Chancellor of the Exchequer will doubtless supply the necessary funds.

He will understand that a lost battle is not unlike a bad budget, and that a retreat or "scuttle" is imperative in either case, to restore the *status quo.*

C. H. B.

5 *October*, 1909.

THE CURZON *VERSUS* KITCHENER CONTROVERSY.

1904.

To the Editor of the "Spectator."

THE *Spectator* of September 23rd contains a letter from "Anglo-Indian" on the Kitchener-Curzon controversy, giving incidentally the names of the Viceroys and Commanders-in-Chief who, notwithstanding inevitable differences of opinion, have worked together during the last fifty years in the service of India without any such public contention as has recently scandalised the country, and laid the foundation of troubles which require no large imagination to forecast. But, Sir, there are some of us still living who were in India, and in harness, when Sir Charles Napier measured his strength in opposition to Lord Dalhousie, and who recall with satisfaction the very different issue of that encounter, as decided by Lord Derby's Ministry, supported by the Duke of Wellington, and which led to the resignation, not of the Queen's representative, but of the war-mangled hero of the Peninsular, the conqueror of Scinde, who defied him. "Anglo-Indian" begins by saying that "Lords

Curzon and Kitchener were both new to the country, and ignorant of its administration and the people." As to this remark, it is scarcely necessary to assert that, with the exception of Lord Lawrence, and perhaps Lord Dalhousie, no Englishman has ruled India with the knowledge, the courage, and the sympathy shown by Lord Curzon during six eventful years. On the other hand, Lord Kitchener can know little of India, and during his two years' command has been saved from some serious blunders by Lord Curzon, and the checks of the Department he has succeeded in overthrowing. Lord Kitchener is a great organiser, and may yet prove himself a great general; but he has not the qualifications for a Military Dictator in India, even under the ægis of Mr. Brodrick.

C. H. B.

September, 1904.

DEATH OF FIELD-MARSHAL SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN, G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

1902.

THE late Sir Neville Chamberlain's reputation as a *beau sabreur* was made in the first ten years of his service, during which he was actively engaged in three successive campaigns of great import to India, viz., those of Afghanistan, Gwalior, and the Punjab, before he was 28 years of age. The final overthrow of the Sikhs and the annexation of their country in 1849 led to the recognition by the Lawrences of his great capabilities, and to his employment in high political and administrative duties, until he succeeded, still a very young man, to the command of the newly-raised Punjab Frontier force, which was the culminating point of his career. That force practically saved India in 1857, and became the example and the nucleus of nearly all that is soldierlike in our present Indian Army. He had no great passion for drill or for show manœuvres in the plains. His regiments were recruited from the pick of the northern races, and trained for and in mountain warfare under such commanders as Coke, Lumsden, Wilde, Daly, Sam Browne, Hodson, Keyes, Probyn, John Watson, Walter

Fane, and others who afterwards achieved distinction second only to his own. The natural warlike instincts and aptitudes of the rank and file, as well as of their splendid native officers (large numbers of whom were young men and old, of good family, Sikhs and others, who had seen much fighting in the troublous times before and after the death of Runjeet Singh), were kept alive by constant exercise on difficult ground, and their individuality developed thereby, instead of being stifled by too much attention to dress and the solemnities of the parade ground. Sir Neville Chamberlain, though a swordsman *par excellence* and a great leader, owing to his prowess as such, as well as to the circumstances of his early career, was tender-hearted as a woman, and ever loth to draw the sword except as a last resource. He was conspicuously generous in his sentiments and lenient in his treatment of an enemy—too much so, perhaps, for a prompt settlement of hostilities sometimes. It may fairly be said that Sir Neville's experience and knowledge of mountain warfare were absolutely unequalled, and yet he has been criticised for his defensive policy in the Ambeyla campaign of 1863, for which he had ample justification in the lines of Torres Vedras, and in the Napoleonic maxim, *Dans la guerre de montagne il faut se faire attaquer et ne jamais attaquer; c'est le contraire en plaine.* His losses in two months amounted to 908 killed and wounded, but the enemy suffered so severely

that no such combination of the tribes was arrayed against us between 1863 and 1895. We have never inflicted a like punishment in any frontier campaign, and it fell on the front rank of the combatants, representing the Ghazidom of all the tribes, from the Khyber to the Indus, who made their attacks in succession, and returned to their homes as soon as their meal bags were empty, taking with them their killed and wounded.

Had he not halted his fever-stricken column in a very favourable position, commanding the Ambeyla Pass, on its march to the Mahabun, until the tribes were exhausted by their fruitless and bloody attacks, he would have courted disaster, as well as the loss of his communications. A very severe wound prevented his carrying out the expedition to its end, and it was not in his nature to notice or reply to the comments of ill-informed critics on his plan of campaign.

* * * *

It was the fine moral fibre of the hero that few could do justice to who did not know him well. His reserve and almost morbid shyness forbad any approach to advertisement of his past, either by himself or his friends and admirers. It would be difficult to find even a good photograph to remind the present generation of his striking personality. He had the courage of his opinions, and thought Lord Lawrence a wiser man than

Lord Lytton on questions of Afghan policy and a scientific frontier for India. He knew India, and had no illusions as to its people. He was a torment to staff officers who sought to advise him, but a demigod to the regimental officer and the rank and file, especially in the fighting line, where he was usually to be found, as shown by his six bullet wounds and half-a-dozen sword "nicks" (so he called them). He no more followed the fashion, either in thinking or in dressing, than John Lawrence did—indeed, both of them rather preferred to breast the tide than to swim with it, and they were neither of them consequently popular heroes in their own generation or in society, whatever they may be in history. Neville Chamberlain commanded the Punjab Frontier Force when he was little more than 32 years of age, and in his many campaigns against the tribes, he had hundreds at his back where we now send thousands into the field, armed too with magazine rifles instead of the muzzle-loading gaspipes of his day. Though a man of war from his youth, he was at heart a lover of peace.

C. H. B.

19 *February*, 1902.

EXTRACT OF LETTER FROM SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN TO A DISTINGUISHED CONTEMPORARY (SIR GEORGE CLERK).

1880.

A CIVIL WAR must follow our withdrawal from the Capital (Cabul) whatever may be the nominal engagements we enter into with Abdul Rahman or any other Sirdar.

* * * *

We need to double the Army and more than double the expenditure to reduce the whole country to submission. No doubt that, given the men and the money, the thing can be done, though to the two conditions above alluded to you must add the disarmament of the whole male population. This too could be done, but only through measures of coercion, if not of cruelty, which our countrymen would never knowingly permit.

For instance, in the winter, when the mountains are covered with snow, we could assess each village at so many guns and swords, and turn out the inhabitants if they failed to produce the required number, and destroy the houses. We know what would become of the majority of the men, women, and children.

If such measures were possible we could have a war to the knife for two or three years, and make a wilderness of every fertile spot, but the thing is simply an impossibility, for various reasons, and therefore as these people must be allowed to live, and remain our neighbours, why make them our deadly enemies and thereby the friends of Russia ?

It is no exaggeration to say that India is now denuded of troops and it only needs some serious outbreak to prove this. The difficulty is great to get a sufficiency of recruits to keep the native Regiments up to 600 privates.

*

An elasticity in recruiting seems to have come to an end.

18 *May*, 1880.

COMPARATIVE LISTS OF KILLED AND WOUNDED DURING THE AMBEYLA CAMPAIGN, 1863, AND THE AFGHAN WAR, 1879-80.

It is interesting to compare the Despatches giving the particulars of the fighting at and about Cabul in 1879 with those of the Ambeyla Campaign of 1863.

The following statistics are gathered, in the former case from the reports of General Roberts, dealing with the events from the 2nd October, 1879, when his Force first met an enemy on its advance upon Cabul, to the 23rd December, 1879, when the final attack on Sherpur was repulsed, in the latter case from the despatches of Generals Chamberlain and Garvock, embracing a somewhat shorter period, viz., from the 18th October, 1863, when the Eusofzai Field Force first entered the Hills, to the 12th December, 1863, when the enemy made his last stand before our troops.

	AMBEYLA FORCE including reinforcements		CABUL FIELD FORCE including only those who were shut up in Sherpur	
	OFFICERS	MEN	OFFICERS	MEN
Average effective strength	150	6,746	225	6,882
CASUALTIES. Killed	16	236	10	105
Wounded	27	740	20	304
Total casualties, all ranks	1,019		439	

The percentage of casualties to strength of the two Forces was therefore

	OFFICERS	MEN
Ambeyla	28·6 per cent.	14·4 per cent.
Cabul	13·3 per cent.	5·9 per cent.

It has been remarked that the loss in officers during recent operations has exceeded that of former campaigns.

The above figures disprove this assertion—the Ambeyla Force having in this respect suffered twice as severely as the Cabul Force.

This may be accounted for by the fact that the former fought invariably on the hill-side, on

ground impracticable for Cavalry, with muzzle-loading Enfields and smooth bores, consequently at closer quarters with the enemy, whereas the latter was armed with breech-loaders throughout and had a comparatively open country to operate in, with the power generally to use all arms in combination.

Of the Ambeyla Force General Sir N. Chamberlain was himself severely wounded, one of his Orderly Officers was killed and another wounded. In the Cabul Force there were no casualties whatever among the General Staff, comparatively a much larger body.

The losses during 1880 of the Bengal portion of the troops in Afghanistan were as follows:

Actions and Engagements	Killed		Wounded		Total	
	Officers	Men	Officers	Men	Officers	Men
Ahmed Khail 19th April, 1880	—	17	9	115	9	132
Near Ghuznee 23rd and 24th April	—	2	—	12	—	14
Charasiab, near Cabul 26th April	—	4	—	34	—	38
Candahar 31st August and 1st September	3	37	11	217	14	254
Total	3	60	20	378	23	438
Grand Total Killed and Wounded					461	

These figures are extracted from the despatches of Sir Donald Stewart and Sir Fred. Roberts, referring to their respective marches from Candahar to Cabul and from Cabul to Candahar, and including the affair at Charasiab on the 26th April under General Macpherson. Thus the combined losses in action of the Bengal troops of the Cabul and Candahar Field Forces, in the second phase of the Afghan War, 1879-80, amounted to 900 officers and men killed and wounded; the casualty list of all ranks at Ambeyla having been 1,019.

Counting the killed alone the comparative losses in 1863 and 1879-80 were

	Officers	Men
Ambeyla Force - -	16	236
Cabul and Candahar Forces -	13	165

The aggregate numbers of Sir Donald Stewart's and Sir Frederick Roberts' commands must have been about double that of Sir Neville Chamberlain. The percentage of casualties to strength was therefore more than 50 per cent. greater in the short campaign of 1863.

C. H. B.

LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA ON THE BLACK MOUNTAIN.

1852-53.

EXTRACTS.

Letter dated 6th January, 1853, from Lieut-Col. ROBERT NAPIER, Bengal Engineers, to Col. MACKESON, C.B., reporting operations under his command against the Hussanzai and Akazai tribes on the Black Mountain in Huzara.

Paragraph 2. The Right Column advanced from Chuttah at 7 a.m. on the 29th ult., in the following order:—Three Companies of the Guides under Lieut. Hodson in advance, with the remainder of the Corps under Lieut. Turner in support, altogether consisting of 350 men including all ranks. In the centre, the two guns of the Huzara mountain train, and the 1st Sikh Infantry under Major Gordon, with the Rawal Pindi Police—176 men—as a rearguard under Lieut. Cookson, making a total of 826 men.

Paragraph 4. The first ground held by the enemy was a very steep and thickly-wooded shoulder of the mountain, rising abruptly for nearly a thousand feet above us, broken by precipitous rocks for some distance up the ascent, with more open ground near the summit. The enemy had an abattis at the bottom of the ascent,

from which they opened a close matchlock fire on us. About 8 o'clock the guns replied with good effect, and considerable impression having been made on the enemy, I gave the order to advance. The Guides in skirmishing order, supported by the 1st Sikh Infantry, rapidly ascended, and had cleared nearly the whole of the ascent, when the enemy charged boldly, sword in hand, and making a desperate onset on the advanced skirmishers, drove them back in some confusion. Order was quickly restored, and a firm advance up the hill drove the enemy from their ground, which they defended step by step; a very bold attempt to make a second charge was checked by the excellent practice of the guns, and by the leading companies of the Guides.

Paragraph 5. The column then advanced to the second hill, between which and some table-land was a hollow, studded with rocks and pine trees, and of a far more rugged character, broken by inaccessible cliffs on one side, and a dense wall of pine trees on the other, confining our operations to a very narrow front.

Lieut. Hodson posted his skirmishers accordingly, whilst the guns were getting into position, and when ready, the advance was again made; supported by their fire the skirmishers of the Guides, closely followed by Lieut. Brownlow and a company of Sikhs on the left, and Lieut. Turner with a party of Guides on the right,

steadily crowned the hill. The enemy made several very bold attempts to charge, coming within twenty paces of the skirmishers, but being unable to face the close fire of the rifles and the excellent practice of the artillery, at length abandoned their position, carrying with them their wounded.

Paragraph 7. I have found it difficult to give a more brief account of the operations, extending from the 29th December to the 2nd January, with justice to the troops under my command. Their conduct has been beyond all praise, in carrying a series of heights, the most difficult of access, defended by a brave and determined enemy, confident in the strength of his mountains, on which he had never previously been beaten . . . and at an elevation of 10,000 feet, with snow falling.

Notes on the Report.

Colonel Napier's column of 826 men and two guns overran the crest of the Black Mountain as described, and descended into the valley of the Indus on the third day, joining the troops manœuvring there, as a diversion, under the direction of Colonel Mackeson. The joint operation was a well-planned but a risky one, very congenial to the temperament of a Napier. His column had abandoned its communications with Huzara, retreat was impossible, but a bold dash from point to point

effected the objects in view, with comparatively small loss. The report shows no list of casualties, but I saw two native officers of the Guides killed, one by name Shakar Khan, a Laghmani, who was shot through the heart, standing by my side, taking his orders from Hodson for the advance, and another, a Gurkha Jemadar, immediately after our repulse, when he was wounded and captured. A few minutes later we recovered his body. with his arms hacked off, for the sake of the gold bracelets that he wore.

The previous evening Shakar Khan had sat at our bivouac fire relating the story of his life before Lumsden enlisted him. He had for years been a freebooter on the high-road between Cabul and the Khyber. He loudly blessed the British Raj, which had made him an honest man, and already a distinguished soldier.

The Guides and the 1st Sikhs were typical Regiments, the former largely recruited from the various frontier tribes, and the latter from the disbanded Khalsa Army, still proudly showing the scars of 1848-49.

It was a happy chance that found me on the Black Mountain on my twenty-first birthday, and in my first fight, under the ægis of the future Lord Napier of Magdala (*clarum et venerabile nomen*), the long-looked-for memoirs of whose brilliant services have not yet appeared, though official records attest his conspicuous share in the bloody and decisive battles of Mudki, Ferozshah

(severely wounded), Sabraon and Gujerat, the Sieges of Multan and Lucknow (severely wounded), the pursuit and defeat of Tantia Topee in Central India, the assault of the Taku Forts, and Pekin, the Abyssinian Campaign and Capture of Magdala, besides minor affairs on the N.W. Frontier of India.

Surely no good soldier was ever carried to his grave with tokens of greater honour and affection than was Field-Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala. He died in his eightieth year, on the 14th of January, and was buried in St. Paul's Cathedral on the 21st January, 1890.

1909. C. H. B.

P.S.—Colonel Mackeson was assassinated at Peshawar in the autumn of 1853. I commanded his escort, and was a guest in his camp during the preliminaries to hostilities against the Hussanzais—so were Robert Napier, James Abbott, and Hodson of the Guides. It was my first introduction to the Frontier and its thorny problems.

C. H. B.

MILITARY RANK AND COMMANDS FOR NATIVE PRINCES, AND OTHERS IN INDIA.

1885.

THE Government of India have under consideration the question of appointing Native Gentlemen to the Commissioned ranks of the Army, in the same substantive grades as European officers, and throwing open to them as well as to the most distinguished Native Officers in our service, a higher and more extended career.

It is proposed to raise two Regiments, one of Infantry and one of Cavalry, of which all the Officers shall be Natives, the Commandant having the rank of Major in the first instance, and rising to that of Lieutenant-Colonel after six years' approved service.

It may be assumed that any comparison between the efficiency of a Regiment so constituted and one with British Officers, is outside the question.

Except in a few instances, the appointments and commissions conferred on Natives of rank have hitherto been purely honorary, and the object now in view is to afford them a substantive

position in the Regular Army, and the exercise of their soldierly instincts and ambitions.

The details of such a scheme will not be difficult to work out when once its principle has been accepted. It means that we are to encourage and educate for the higher commands "the superior intellects and more stirring spirits" floating about India, or in our service, and referred to by the late Sir Henry Lawrence, in his Essays (quoted by the Government of India) as "Military Adventurers" of the type that fought their way from the lowest ranks to the thrones of Gwalior, Hyderabad, Oude and Lahore, for whose "restlessness and ability" we are to provide an outlet.

It is generally admitted that the absence of skilful professional leaders among the mutineers enabled us to tide over the troubles of 1857-58 as quickly and completely as we did.

To create such a class now would, I think, be a grave political and military innovation, full of doubtful consequences.

A small measure, such as the one put forward by the Government of India, would not satisfy the numbers who would hope to benefit by it—on the contrary, it would only excite feelings of jealousy and unrest, and an appetite which would have to be appeased by a much larger measure, involving the sacrifice of principles on which our supremacy is founded.

I yield to no one in my desire to improve

the status and prospects of the native Officers of our Army; the services and achievements of some of them have been splendid enough for the pages of Froissart, and they have not always been rewarded as they deserved; but except in very rare cases such men would prefer, and would be more safely and suitably recompensed by, unstinted and progressive additions of pay or pension, by civil titles and personal distinctions and authority in their villages and districts, than the commands of Regiments of the Line, in which they would find themselves beset by anomalies and vexations of many kinds, including the inevitable tutelage of a British captain or subaltern.

Should we adopt some system of Army reserves in India, as I think we ought, the commands of Reserve Depôts or Battalions, or of Militia and Yeomanry Corps of the Irregular kind, might with great advantage be exercised by native officers or native gentlemen with the honorary rank of major or lieutenant-colonel, but I would deprecate any scheme containing the mention of military colleges or of scientific education.

The best educated are not the most valiant of our Native Soldiers, and if Competitive Examinations were eventually to decide the claims of candidates for the higher commands, the Sikh, the Gurkha and the Afridi would have little chance against the Bengalee or the Anglicised

Indian, whose brain might weigh more than his heart.

It is true that in the armies of Russia and of France the higher grades are open to their Asiatic and African soldiers, but in both cases, as compared with India, the enormous preponderance of the conquering over the conquered races under arms, admits of no analogy.

We cannot afford a policy of sentimental adventure in India. The career of Colonel Arabi[1] in Egypt is to us a more appropriate and instructive study than that of Colonel Alikhanoff[2] in Turkestan.

The Duke of Argyll, in a recent speech, pointed out to the House of Lords how "the element of emotion is increasing in its influence upon our foreign affairs."

We are now passing through an emotional stage with regard to the spontaneous and universal outburst of loyalty on the part of the Princes and people of India, in face of the aggressive attitude of Russia. I believe that expression of feeling to have been thoroughly genuine, but we must not forget that a rush to arms at such a time implies not only the desire to help us, but also to strengthen the *raison d'être* of the oft-threatened forces of our feudatories, to obtain breech-loaders from our arsenals, and to

[1] Village Sheikh, promoted to General, rebelled, and defeated at Tel el Kebir.

[2] Central Asian adventurer, promoted to General in Russian service, eventually dismissed for intrigue and corruption.

prepare themselves for any eventualities, offensive or defensive, that war and disaffection may give rise to.

The feeling, therefore, is not one altogether devoid of self-interest, and in respect of the army as well as the aristocracy of India, we ought not to allow our emotions to blind us to the fact that a servant, however loyal, is never unwilling to become a master.

C. H. B.

24 *May*, 1885.

THE VICTORIA CROSS.

1902.

To the Editor of the "Times."

A PUBLIC agitation has recently arisen that the Victoria Cross warrant should be amended, "if it has been decided that senior officers are not eligible for the decoration." It is asked "by whom and by what authority this new rule has been made."

As a matter of fact, Sir, whatever the wording of the warrant may be, its interpretation, except in a very few cases, has always been the same.

Nearly forty years ago (when we practised more reserve in such matters) Lord Strathnairn, then Commander-in-Chief in India, decided that personal gallantry on several occasions during a hard-fought campaign, on the part of certain majors in command of regiments was no more than their duty, and should be recognised by other rewards than the V.C., for which they had been recommended in his published despatches by the general[1] under whom they had served; they received instead a step of rank and the C.B., as more conducive to their future promotion

[1] Sir Neville Chamberlain.

and usefulness. In the same *Gazette* several subalterns were given the V.C.

Lord Strathnairn argued that a captain or a subaltern might stake his life and lose it for the sake of the decoration, without playing with the lives of others, but that a field officer in command risked not only his own life, but possibly the success of the operation devolving upon him by an unnecessary display of personal valour. This decision was and has been generally accepted as a sound one by soldiers of experience.

Every officer and man has his appointed place in the fighting line, according to the nature of the ground and the tactics of the enemy. Good troops require direction more than leading, except in supreme moments, such as came to Wolfe and Abercromby, Crawford and Picton, Cathcart and Nicholson, who fought and died at close quarters with the enemy, without any reflection on the readiness of others to do their duty.

In a profession, the members of which are all supposed to be brave, a badge of superior courage, in addition to the usual rewards of a successful Commander, is more or less an invidious distinction, and should be beyond the reach of challenge, whether on the grounds of desert or expediency.

It is said "that the decoration has now become a close borough for the junior ranks."

A reference to the Army List of January 1,

1902, will show that on that date 131 officers and 75 of the lower ranks were entitled to wear the V.C., which does not indicate that the latter have yet invaded the "close borough" in undue proportion.

There is more reason in the remark that "the general public do not wish to see the V.C. made into a land Humane Society medal," and any change of existing rules would probably take that wish into account; but if the warrant, which has served its purpose very well for 50 years, is wisely administered it needs no change. Its main objects are sufficiently clear.

The unwritten laws of chivalry, as of justice, are easily interpreted by professional experts, who are guided by good precedents, and are not afraid of the general public.

The verdict of a Court of Honour, approved by the Commander-in-Chief should be final. There are well-understood limitations to the award of a V.C., but there need be no absolute bar to exceptions in cases the merits of which transcend all considerations.

Our general officers are to return to school, but is it necessary, Sir, to tear up a venerated warrant for the express purpose of reviving their courage after they have renewed their knowledge of war?

"AN AMAZED VETERAN."
C. H. B.

28 *August*, 1902.

THREE PHASES

OF

THE AFGHAN WAR, 1877 TO 1880[1].

"SHERE ALI."

EVENTS PRECEDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY AT CABUL.

Dated 1 *August*, 1877.

1. RECENT discussions in Parliament and elsewhere, on Indian Frontier affairs, have failed to elicit certain facts and results of the so-called spirited policy of Lord Lytton, which are more talked of in India than in England, and by which the prospects of that policy may be very fairly judged.

2. It is truly alleged that we are in peaceable occupation of Quetta, for the ostensible purpose of protecting trade routes, and watching all such matters as come under the comprehensive head of British interests; but it is, perhaps, not generally known that the Ameer of Cabul regards our presence there as a threat on Candahar, and

[1] It will be seen from the dates of these papers that they were written in *anticipation* of the questions arising out of the successive phases or periods of the Afghan War.

FANE'S HORSE CROSSING THE HELMUND.

that he naturally resents it; that he has largely added to the garrison of Candahar, and appealed to the national and religious feelings of his own subjects, as well as those of the Khan of Khelat, to resist our intrusion; in fact, that what we are supposed to have gained in influence at Quetta, we have certainly lost in goodwill at Cabul.

3. In November last, with a view to compelling the Ameer into closer and more friendly relations with us, Lord Lytton decided on a demonstration in the direction of the Kooram Valley, which leads to one of the most direct passes into Cabul. A bridge of boats was hastily thrown across the Indus at Kooshalgurh, and the collection of supplies and transport for a considerable force was set on foot with all despatch at Rawal Pindi and Kohat. The Wuziri tribes, whose mountains flank the proposed line of advance, were sounded as to their feelings in the matter, and the order for the march on Cabul was anxiously awaited by the uninformed in India.

4. Hearing of these preparations, Shere Ali promptly replied to the challenge by despatching fresh troops to Kooram and Jelalabad, and calling on the Afridis and the Akhoond of Swat to take up arms on behalf of a Mahomedan ruler against the unbelieving invader, thereby creating much excitement on our frontier.

5. The subsequent personal communications at Peshawar between the Cabul Envoy and Sir

Lewis Pelly led to nothing that could be put forward in justification of the "mischievous activity" which, but for our immediate disavowal of all hostile intentions, might have involved us in a most untimely rupture, and which, though it had for one of its primary objects the location of British officers as political agents at Cabul, Candahar, Balkh, and Herat, ended in the withdrawal or dismissal of the native officials who still represented us in Afghanistan.

6. The Ameer, heretofore at worst our lukewarm friend, is now all but our declared enemy, and turns his back on our alternate threats and cajolements in angry silence. Thus has been achieved all that General Kaufman could desire. Between the abandonment of the wise policy of non-interference and another Afghan War, brought about by the very same mistakes as those of 1838, it is but a step; and even Lord Lytton's "trained diplomacy" will not long avert it, unless we are to submit tamely to incendiary intrigues, if not to overt acts of hostility on our border.

The history of India is rich enough in examples of the inevitable course of events attending our dealings with such neighbours, beginning with self-interested friendship and ending in a war of annexation.

7. Whenever the actual necessity of guarding or occupying Afghanistan is admitted, let us put an army in the field and go there; we

are more likely to do so with the consent and invitation of its people, and to see them arrayed as our allies instead of as our enemies, if in the meantime we address ourselves to military preparations within our territory rather than the deceptive triumphs of diplomacy beyond it.

8. Students of strategy have much to say in support of the Forward school of policy against our present line of frontier. They quote the trite axiom, that a mountain barrier is of no value unless you occupy its passes, but they hesitate to suggest the only practical means of obtaining those passes, viz., the subjugation of the warlike and independent tribes which inhabit the Suleyman range, and the still more formidable regions to the north, tribes which have as yet shown no disposition to try the effect of "the presence and the daily acts in their midst of earnest upright English Gentlemen," an experiment as described by Lord Lytton himself.

9. Having occupied, at an untold sacrifice of men and money, the passes necessary to our purpose, and it is difficult to say in such a country, and in the light of General Gourko's recent exploits, how many these might be, considering that our north-west border alone embraces a front of some 800 miles, the next move assuredly forced upon us would be the annexation of Afghanistan itself, and once there we should, as good strategists, push our outposts to the Hindu Kush.

10. We have planted our flag at Quetta, and it must remain there; but, before we proceed further with Lord Lytton's ambitious and attractive diplomatic programme, it behoves us to count the costs and the consequences of a war against the people with whom it is our first interest to remain at peace, and whom, experience has shown, we can best conciliate by non-intervention in their affairs.

C. H. B.

"YAKOOB KHAN."

RESULTS OF THE FIRST CAMPAIGN, AND ASPECT OF AFFAIRS BEFORE THE TREATY OF GANDAMAK.

Dated 25 *April*, 1879.

1. THE immediate object of the Afghan War was to bring Shere Ali to account for his preference of the Russians to ourselves.

Our quarrel was a purely personal one. We had no complaint against the Afghans as a nation, though we have since announced the intention of securing "a scientific frontier" at the expense of Afghan territory.

2. Four months have elapsed since the war began. In the field we have been everywhere successful. We occupy Jelalabad, the Peiwar Kotal and Candahar. The Russo-Afghan alliance is heard of no more. It has served its purpose—that is to say, the purpose of Russia—in provoking a breach between ourselves and the Afghans.

3. Shere Ali is dead, the Mir Akhor is dead, the Prime Minister, Nur Mahomed Shah, died before the last evils of life and reign had overtaken his master. Thus, the three principal actors in the events which led to war have disappeared from the scene.

4. Yakoob Khan has succeeded to his father's throne, but not to his authority. To consolidate the latter he would doubtless be glad of our alliance and our support; but can he seek it?

5. Afghan blood has been shed and Afghan hate revived and intensified. Any honest overtures to us would probably bring a rival into the field, backed by the Moolahs and a war party.

6. Can he afford to give up the landmarks of his country, or can he pretend to guarantee the safety of British envoys and agents in any corner of his dominions? Rather than yield to our terms and alienate the best of his people, will he not prefer to temporise and obstruct and draw us on to Cabul, trusting to a repetition of the events that seated his grandfather, Dost Mahomed, so firmly on the throne?

7. Had Shere Ali died before we commenced hostilities, his Russian intrigues would have died with him, and his successor might peaceably have accepted our terms and our alliance; but concessions at the point of the bayonet are different.

8. A march on Cabul may therefore be forced upon us, but the advantage of going there is difficult to determine.

A permanent occupation of the capital is avowedly beyond our intentions. A temporary occupation would prolong anarchy, or if it imposed a ruler upon the people, be he Yakoob or any other, would be equally fruitless.

9. We have taken the territory that in the name of science we desired, but if we want a treaty as well, will no treaty satisfy us that does not give us a right to hazard the lives of a certain number of British officers as political agents in Afghanistan? The victims of this treaty-right would, in the present state of feeling, be utterly powerless for good. They would, in fact, be state prisoners, and the assassination of one of them might at any time, and probably the most inconvenient time, plunge us into yet another Afghan war.

10. If, then, we have no clear object in advancing, and if it is impolitic to stand still, can we not, under cover of our recent successes in the field, moderate our demands and withdraw from our anomalous position, or as much of it as may prove to be unscientific and unprofitable. It may surely be assumed that we have re-established our prestige in India and Central Asia, and that we can afford to do as is best in our own eyes without thought of what is bravest in the eyes of the world.

11. The world has seen the Russian Embassy retire from Cabul, and the Afghans have learnt the value of a Russian Alliance. We have shown that neither the Khyber nor the Kooram, nor the Candahar routes are sufficiently formidable to arrest our march into Afghanistan whenever it is incumbent on us to go there. May we not then inquire if the permanent occupation of one

or at most two of these three Passes will not give us the strategic advantages that we are bound to acquire ?

12. It can scarcely be argued that the retention of three such advanced positions, without lateral communications, and with their long lines of communications to the rear, at the mercy of independent and warlike mountain tribes, is to be sanctioned by any law of military science, unless we are prepared to subjugate and disarm those tribes, an operation that would employ all the men and means now in the field, and tax our best efforts for the next three years.

13. The most distinguished living authority on Indian military questions has pronounced in favour of our holding all the ground that we have gained, but Lord Napier of Magdala can be no advocate of the half measures in support of which his great name is sometimes quoted.

He has said in the House of Lords :—" India was surrounded and hemmed in by an almost impassable barrier of hostile tribes. . . . As we were now forced to extend our frontier we should do so to such an extent as to carry civilisation to the tribes themselves."

His views are clearly based on the understanding that we are to be masters of the tribes we leave behind us as we advance our frontier. To adopt his views without that understanding would be to place us in a position without parallel in the history of military blunders.

14. Were France to contemplate the forcible occupation and retention of the Simplon and Gothard Passes as security against invasion from the Italian side of the Alps, she would surely begin by breaking up the Swiss power and "civilising" the Swiss people.

15. If Yakoob Khan is disposed to listen to our terms, will it not be our wisest policy to make those terms as easy of acceptance by him as possible, and at the same time to minimise the disturbance of the independent tribes by withdrawing from Candahar and Jelalabad, and contenting ourselves with the retention of the Kooram and Peshin Valleys, and the command of the Kojuck and Peiwar passes as our strategic safeguards for the present?

16. Is it to be supposed that Yakoob Khan can sign away Candahar in any form, and still call himself the Ameer of Afghanistan?

Considering that his mother was a Mohmand, it will be nearly as impossible for him to surrender Jelalabad, but the Kooram and Peshin Valleys, being less Afghan in nationality and feeling, might remain in our hands as indemnity for the war, without much damage to the stability of his rule.

17. If we determine to hold our present ground at all three points, we shall do so under difficulties and disadvantages, and find ourselves embarked in troubles that time will aggravate rather than mend, until we have bridged the

Indus and completed the system of railways so necessary to our general policy.

18. In a military sense, Candahar is practically cut off from India for four months in the year, at a season, too, most favourable to operations on the Afghan side of the passes.

Peshin, in a less degree, is open to the same objection, but, being nearer to our base and its people comparatively indifferent to our presence, is less liable to attack, and can be held by fewer troops.

19. When the comparative strategic value of the Jelalabad and Kooram Valleys is considered, too much weight cannot well be given to the fact that whereas Jelalabad opens to us the road to Cabul only, a force in Kooram threatens both Cabul and Ghuznee, and is in a position, which the other is not, to join hands with the Peshin or Candahar column, and to co-operate with it in the direction of either Cabul or Herat.

20. The Kooram line of advance has also the recommendation of being as accessible and equidistant from Bunnoo as from Kohat; it has, in fact, many and manifest advantages over the Khyber line, but assuming that the one brings us as near to Cabul as the other, the former has this crowning argument in its favour, that it can be maintained with half the troops.

21. The Kooram route lies through a more or less open and cultivated valley, varying in

breadth from 3 to 10 miles, the upper portion of which affords a fair climate.

It is flanked on both sides by troublesome tribes, who from time to time will have to be dealt with; but their mountain fastnesses are too far removed from the highway to allow them to rob and murder with impunity, and they accordingly enjoy no traditional right to do so, as the Afridis do in the Khyber.

22. A comparison of the last returns of the Khyber and Kooram Field Forces will show the relative difficulties and requirements of the two lines of communication, to say nothing of the very important consideration that, notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the former, its safety is dependent on the goodwill and good faith of the Afridis, whom we cannot count on for a day, even while we submit to their insolence and greed.

23. The Afridis, including the Zukka Khel, the Shinwaris, and some other minor tribes, may be put down as numbering 20,000 of the finest fighting material on the frontier, of whom we have had no experience in the present campaign on their own hill sides.

24. The Khyber has from time immemorial been their toll-bar and looting ground, and no money payments will ever reconcile them to an indefinite surrender of the lawless though uncertain gains so much to their tastes and habits.

25. While our troops are sweltering and

sickening in the hot and unhealthy posts between Peshawar and Jelalabad, more especially those in the narrow gorges of the Khyber itself, our fickle subsidiaries are perched on the cool and bracing uplands of Tirah and Maidan, ready to swoop down upon a weak point whenever it may be their interest or their caprice to do so.

26. It is idle, then, to argue that our position in any part of the Khyber is a scientific one, until we have crushed the Afridis. If we are not prepared to do that just now, the occupation of Jelalabad, *except* as a halting ground on the march to Cabul, is a needless exhaustion of our strength.

27. The picked troops now employed in Afghanistan, some of which have been in the field two years already, i.e., since the commencement of the Jowaki campaign, will, in course of time, require to be relieved, and, if the Native Regiments are to be replaced by equally good ones, it will be difficult to find them, without a further addition to our forces.

28. To sum up, if we retain the Peshin and Kooram Valleys, with the command of the Kojuck and Peiwar passes, shall we not be in a position to regain in a week all that we now give up; and if by the moderation of our terms we can come to an alliance with Yakoob Khan, and seat him firmly on his father's throne, which we shall never do as long as Candahar and Jelalabad remain in our hands, shall we not have achieved all the objects of the third Afghan war?

29. We have thrown back Russia and her machinations for ten years at least. If at the end of that time we have bridged the Upper Indus,[1] completed our rail and road communications on the Thull-Chotiali and Kooram lines, and last, though not least, drawn the teeth of some of our great Indian Feudatories,[2] India will have no cause to fear the results of either intrigue or invasion from the north.

C. H. B.

[1] The Upper Indus has since been bridged, at Attock and Kooshalgurh. We can occupy Cabul in ten days. The City will welcome us, and we may sit down and eat grapes and melons until the snow falls, and history begins to repeat itself.

The highways of Afghanistan are the highways of Asia.

The Afghans have never stopped the march of an Army.

The tribes make a show of resistance and retire to their mountains, to play a waiting and elusive game, so favourable to the methods of predatory warfare, as practised by all mountaineers.

[2] The armed rabbles of our Feudatory Indian Chiefs have been greatly reduced, and now constitute "The Imperial Service Troops," under the Superintendence of British Officers.—1907.

"ABDUL RAHMAN."

NEGOTIATIONS WITH ABDUL RAHMAN AND THE QUESTION OF TERMS, BEFORE THE BATTLE OF MAIWAND.

Dated 5 *July*, 1880.

1. THE settlement of the Afghan difficulty appears to hang on an immediate decision on the following question:—

Are we irrevocably pledged to the retention of Candahar by our guarantees to Shere Ali, the present Governor?

As long as there is any doubt on this point, our negotiations with Abdul Rahman are a waste of time, and any treaty with him as worthless as that of Gandamack.

If we can say to him, "We recognise you as Ameer of Afghanistan. We make over to you Cabul, and as soon as you have established your authority you shall have Candahar also,"—there is a prospect of peace, and a possibility of good faith towards us. But to suppose that anything short of this will terminate our feud with the Afghans, is to shut our eyes to all the lessons we have learnt in our impolitic transactions with that people.

The province of Candahar represents at least a third, the easiest collected third, of the revenues of Afghanistan, and it completely commands the road from Cabul to Herat.

To dissever Candahar from Cabul is practically to cut off Herat also, and to consign it to a worse fate than even Afghan rule.

It is incredible that Abdul Rahman, or indeed any pretender to the throne, will consent to such a mutilation of the Barakzai Kingdom, and, if he does, it will be but to get us out of Cabul, and to gain breathing time. He will assuredly renew the war immediately he thinks himself strong enough to do so, and though we should have no difficulty in maintaining ourselves at Candahar, we cannot submit to be bearded and baited within its walls, but must defend the whole province and its outpost, must follow our assailants from Kelat-i-Ghilzai to Ghuznee, and in the end to Cabul.

2. Two years ago, the annexation of Afghanistan, the extension of our frontier to the Oxus, the enlistment of Afghan tribes who were to be our devoted soldiers, and their country a complacent bulwark against the encroachments of Russia, were fully believed in as projects within our power.

The most sanguine must acknowledge that belief to be shattered. It was asserted by military theorists that Afghanistan could be overrun by 5,000 British troops. We have now

a well-appointed army of 40,000 men beyond our border, and yet the ground we stand on from day to day is all we have conquered.

It is a needless humiliation to recount the difficulties of our position.

If we care to take a lesson from the Caucasus, and to resolve on a war of extermination, we may remain in the country. If not we must withdraw from it; and to withdraw from Cabul only is to drag but one foot out of the mire.

3. The advantages of Candahar are incontestable. It affords abundant supplies; its Doorani inhabitants are comparatively submissive to our rule, it is a commercial centre, it is historically a strategic point, and considerable prestige might attend our possession of it. But the question is, not whether it is worth having, but whether it is worth the price we must pay for it, in the certain and indefinite prolongation of the suicidal war which we are so anxious to terminate. If our guarantees to Shere Ali[1] are only of a personal nature, he can surely be recompensed for any change in our policy by a suitable pension, and employment elsewhere. We shall be straining at the gnat and swallowing the camel if our promises to him are more binding on us than our proclamations to the Afghans repudiating annexation.

4. If we retire from Cabul and remain at Candahar, will it not occur to those most con-

[1] The Governor of Candahar, appointed by us.

cerned that the different reception we have been accorded at the two places has influenced our decision, and will not the comparison suggest the remedy?

As long as we are at Cabul, the blister is applied to us there; but when it has fulfilled its object, and we are gone, can there be any doubt that we shall feel it at Candahar? Except in chronic disturbance of the province, it may fail to hurt us much; but, in that case we shall be made to suffer on the north-west frontier, and be goaded into hostilities, which must have but one end, a return to Cabul.

Quâ Russia too, it is above all things to be desired that should she ever make the mistake of entering Afghanistan, she may meet with no better welcome from its people than we have done. In this view, the bitter hatred we have roused should be allowed to cool, and it cannot cool while we retain Candahar, and keep a seton in the sore which time might heal.

5. Experience has shown that the Afghans do not care to shut themselves up in fenced cities.

Candahar, Ghuznee and Cabul have always succumbed to us without a siege.

Should circumstances leave it optional with us to revert to the Peshin Valley, as the limit of our advance in that direction, we could from thence re-occupy Candahar in a week. There is ample evidence that the intervening country is most favourable to a "*coup-de-main*" with that object.

6. The great superiority of Candahar as a position is admitted, but, in a choice between the two places, the following considerations weigh heavily in favour of Peshin:—

(*a*) It is distinctly outside the limits of Afghanistan proper, and though its occupation brings Candahar within our grasp, it does so at the least possible cost to the susceptibilities of the Afghans, and gives us a fair, if not the only, prospect of peace with that people.

(*b*) It shortens our precarious line of communications, and reduces the dangerous distance from our base by one hundred miles.

(*c*) It can be held by a much smaller garrison, as any trouble we may have with the semi-Belooch and Kakar tribes in its neighbourhood would be local. The initiative against the Afghans would remain with us, whereas at Candahar our hand would always be forced at the convenience of our enemies.

(*d*) It is not a garden or a granary, but it is nearly 1,000 feet higher than Candahar, and ought to be as healthy.

7. For five months in the year there is no fit resting place for the British soldier from Kurrachee to Candahar, a distance of 800 miles. Of this one-third at least is a howling desert, the horrors of which even the natives of the country are unwilling to face.

The Indus may again overflow the Kussmore dam, wash away the railroad, and submerge

Scinde. No engineer has as yet affirmed that it shall not.

Such are our communications with Southern Afghanistan. It may suffice for the occupation of Peshin, but if the more ambitious alternative of retaining Candahar is preferred, a second line is absolutely necessary to connect it directly with the Punjab.

8. The so-called Thal-Chotiali and Dera Ghazee Khan route has been most fully reported on by Sir M. Biddulph and Colonel Browne, R.E. It has or had strenuous advocates in Sir F. Haines and Sir Donald Stewart.

The location of a Bengal Brigade in the Boree Valley would appear to be the best means for the development of that route.

General Biddulph points to some spot midway between Barkhan and the Peshin frontier where "the villages and cultivation are almost continuous, the supplies seem practically inexhaustible, and the average elevation of 5,200 feet assures a healthy climate."

9. With regard to other points of our "scientific frontier," if the hidden wisdom of that phrase has not lost its spell, and if there are any who still believe that either rifles or rupees will "civilise" the Northern Afghan, that is, mitigate his hatred of us, our retirement from Cabul will revive the argument whether we are to retain the Lundi Kotal and Peiwar outposts, or fall back on Jumrood and Thal, our original frontier.

As long as we have an army in the field and fling money into their laps, the Afridis are our obedient servants, but do away with these conditions, and a small British force at Lundi Kotal will be in a false position.

We can force the Khyber when we like, and we can coerce the Afridis and the Mohmands without entering it. Why then should we permanently entangle ourselves in a formidable defile, and give those tribes the power of cutting our communications and driving us into hostilities whenever it may suit their caprice or their tribal feuds and complications to do so.

The history of the Kohat Pass[1] for the last thirty years is the best answer to this question, and neither sense nor science can excuse our putting ourselves in such a trap. Any arrangement with the Afridis for keeping open the Khyber would be better than a British occupation of it without the complete subjugation of Tirah. In the one case the interruption of traffic would involve a fine, or a blockade, or an expedition at our own convenience; in the other, it would be an insult and a danger to our flag, and would call for immediate action, whatever the season.

10. The possession of the Peiwar Kotal brings us, for six months of the year, within easy

[1] The Kohat Pass is now under our own control—a good road runs through it under the guardianship of the neighbouring tribes and our Frontier Police.—1907.

striking distance of Cabul, and to some extent it exercises an influence in the direction of Ghuznee. It might hereafter be necessary to threaten, if not again to invade Northern Afghanistan as a diversion in connection with possible operations in the South.

In this view Kooram has a decided value, and the Afghans should not be allowed to return to it, but a strong post at Thal and a good road to it from Kohat would secure every requisite advantage, and protect the Turis.

Until the Peiwar is reached, this line runs through a comparatively open valley, and offers no such difficulties as the Khyber. The bordering tribes may harass, but they cannot close the Kooram route so far.

11. To return to Candahar,—our decision with regard to it must shape our whole policy and the future of our relations with the Afghans.

As long as anarchy prevails throughout the rest of the country our present arrangement with Shere Ali is the best that can be devised, but we should at once declare that a strong and united Afghanistan, in fact the restoration of the kingdom we have overturned, is our supreme object, and that the Barakzai Sirdar, who firmly establishes his authority at Cabul and Ghuznee, shall reign at Candahar also.

To such a proposition many will say—"It is true we cannot remain in Cabul, but do not give

up Candahar. What will the people of India think? Where will our prestige be?"

This means: "Our quarrel is with Cabul; Cabul is too much for us, let us leave Cabul. Candahar is more submissive, let us keep Candahar."

All the world will know why we retreat and why we remain.

As to the people of India, if annexation means additional taxation, they will think more of that than of our prestige. The Russian scare, reflected from our newspapers, may have disturbed the more educated natives of Calcutta and Bombay, but the warlike people of the Punjab have never had any fear of the Russians or their possible allies, the Afghans, and they will not care to pay for the delusion by the permanent occupation of uncongenial regions which men of the plains detest—so much so, that recruiting for the Punjab Regiments had come to a standstill before the end of the war.

12. A few years ago, under the influence of the same scare, the Government of India was ridiculed for not entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with the Yakoob Beg of Kashgar, and assisting him with officers and men.

Had it done so, we should now be embroiled with the Chinese.

13. May it not be affirmed that the barren conquests of Russia in Central Asia, from the Caspian to the Amoor, are a source of anxiety

and of weakness to her rather than of strength, and that she has no power to hurt us except by practising on our fears?

Her intrigues with the late Ameer Shere Ali had only this object.

The Russian Mission to Cabul was an answer to our Malta Contingent, and succeeded in locking up 40,000 British troops in Afghanistan.

Had we been a little more patient, her Envoy would have been massacred instead of ours, and any retaliatory military enterprise would have ended in disaster.

14. In 1878-80 we have repeated, step by step, the mistakes of 1839-41. It needs but the restoration of Yakoob Khan, and the episode of the Somnath Gates, to complete the parallel.

Are we desirous to put upon the stage in like manner the events of 1857? If not, we must recognise that the necessities of our position in India require us so to shape our policy and to dispose our forces as to enable us to strike with all our might at one point, or at any given number of points in succession. If we accept the principles of the "scientific frontier," and entangle ourselves in three different passes, we throw the initiative into the hands of our enemies, instead of keeping it in our own, and shall find ourselves involved in three separate operations on the North-West Frontier alone, at a time when all our resources may be wanted elsewhere.

C. H. B.

"RETENTION OF CANDAHAR."

Dated 10 *February*, 1881.

1. SINCE my paper of the 5th July, 1880, was written, the battle of Maiwand has been added to our list of reverses. Candahar has been besieged and relieved; Abdul Rahman has been installed as Ameer of Cabul, and we have given up, with the full consent of former advocates of the scientific frontier, two out of three of its main features, viz., the Kooram and the Khyber passes.

The third point of strategic value secured by the Treaty of Gandamack, was the Peshin Valley, and it was argued by those who decided the question at the time, that Candahar was not to be desired, either in a scientific or a political sense.

2. Subsequent events have given this question a different complexion; but the arguments against the permanent retention of Candahar are as strong as ever, and we should make it over to Abdul Rahman whenever he will accept it, with a reasonable prospect of maintaining his rule.

3. A strong outpost in Peshin, with suitable reserves at Quetta and in the Boree Valley,

would, as I have already said, give us a commanding position with regard to Candahar, and being distinctly outside the limits of Afghanistan proper, would leave us the option of renewing hostilities with the Afghans at our own convenience instead of theirs.

4. Candahar in our possession will always be the focus of every intrigue, and the rallying point of every movement in support of which the national and religious feelings of the Afghans may be brought to bear against us. It will involve us in constant strife, and lead us into further annexations. The Afghan desires his independence above all things. If we leave him that, and keep clear of the faction fights and civil wars which are his chronic condition, he will not readily submit his neck to the Russian yoke, even for the delusive idea of the plunder of India.

5. If Russia is to invade India, she must first crush the Afghans, or get us to do so. She knows her business too well to leave Afghanistan behind her, armed and independent.

By keeping Candahar, we do her work and play her game. A conterminous frontier, with an Afghan population ready to join her against us, is Russia's best aim. Her quiet acquiescence in the events of the last two years proves this.

6. If we dismiss the idea of a Russian invasion in force, but seek to provide against her possible intrigues in India, and upon our North-

West Frontier, we must remember the extent of the latter, and that we are liable to the eruptions of border tribes along the whole line from Cashmere to Candahar.

7. The large force we should be bound to maintain at Candahar would be of no value to us, moral or material, at the other extremity of this great arc, nor could it safely be drawn upon in any emergency elsewhere, in or out of India.

C. H. B.

P.S.—Unless we are to adopt the view that in India one man is as good as another, if sufficiently drilled, as a soldier, we require a careful estimate of the fighting value, and reliability of our different Native Regiments, before we proceed further, in the direction of Imperial Expansion.

Disaffection in India and the objection to military training at home compel us to be cautious.

C. H. B.

1908.

THE Ambeyla Despatches (including Casualty rolls) cover 87 pages of the *Gazette of India*, dated 30 January, 1864.

War Gazettes are not popular reading, and War Correspondents did not travel so far north in those days.

The following extracts from the Despatches are intended to illustrate the nature of the opposition encountered by Sir Neville Chamberlain, and the necessity of the defensive policy adopted by him, for the reasons given with so much force and truth, in his letter to the Adjutant General of the Army dated 31 October, 1863. Any other course would have invited disaster, and happily his great reputation allowed him to disregard scientific criticism, and to act according to his practical convictions.

Some of the extracts may appear too personal, but they are given in support of the writer's pretensions to Frontier experience, and his strongly expressed opinions in favour of prompt punitive measures, rather than the annexation of any tribal territory.

C. H. B.

1909.

AMBEYLA DESPATCHES.

EXTRACTS.

FROM Brigr.-Genl. Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, K.C.B., Comdg. Eusofzai Field Force, to the Adjt. Genl., Head Quarters —(No. 5, dated Camp Crest of the Ambeyla Pass, the 31st October, 1863).

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will recollect that, in my letter No. 3 of the 25th instant, I mentioned that the people of Bonair had applied to the Akhoond of Swat to aid them in resisting the advance of the Force, and stated my opinion that, in the event of his doing so, the object with which the Force had adopted the route of the Chumla Valley would of course be rendered very difficult of attainment. I have now to report that the Akhoond has actually joined the Bonerwals, and that he has brought with him upwards of 100 standards from Swat,—each standard representing, probably, from 30 to 40 footmen—and, it is said, 120 horsemen. Besides the tribe with which he is more immediately connected, viz., the Swatees, he has summoned the people of the remote country of Bajour (on the border of the Cabul territory), the Mullazyes of Dheer, under their Chief Ghuzzun Khan; and other distant tribes whose names

even are hardly known except to the Officers who have served long on the frontier. There is, in fact, a general combination of almost all the tribes, from the Indus to the boundary of Cabul, against us. Old animosities are for the time in abeyance, and, under the influence of fanaticism, tribes usually hostile to each other are hastening to join the Akhoond's standard, and to fight for the sake of their common faith. The Akhoond has hitherto been opposed to the Sitana Moulvie, who represents an exceptional sect of Mahomedans; but at present the two are understood to be on friendly terms, and it is certain that the whole of the Hindustanee Colony are either at, or on the way to, Ambeyla.

It is necessary that I should place the state of affairs thus distinctly before His Excellency, in order that he may understand how entirely the situation has altered since the Force entered the Ambeyla Pass, and that instead of having to deal with the Mahabun Tribes, with a view to the expulsion of the Hindustanees from that mountain, we are engaged in a contest in which not only are the Hindustanees and the Mahabun Tribes (including even some Judoons and Khodakhails) accessories, but also the Swatees, the Bajourees and the Indus tribes north of the Burrendo, with a large sprinkling of the discontented and restless spirits from within our own border. I feel certain that His Excellency will approve of

my not making an advance into the Chumla Valley with my present Force, in the face of the above coalition. I could only do so by giving up the Ambeyla Pass. If the Force moved into the Valley, with a view to continue its advance towards the Mahabun, and to carry out the original views of the Government, it would be exposed to the enemy's incessant attacks, both by night and day, in flank and rear, and it would be impossible, in the face of such numbers, to protect adequately a long line of laden animals to which would be daily added an ever-increasing number of wounded and sick. On the other hand, if the Force merely moved into the Valley with a view to take up a position in open ground, it would still lose its communication with the rear, and whenever it required fresh supplies of provisions or ammunition, or to clear the Camp by sending sick and wounded to the rear, it would have to re-take the Pass, and to re-occupy, at great sacrifice of life, the very ground from which it had advanced. Further, I have felt it right not to forget, that if this Force should be seriously compromised by a hazardous movement in advance, there are not, within a very great distance, the troops necessary to meet any difficulty which would be certain, under such an eventuality, immediately to arise, either within or beyond the border. In fact my judgment tells me that, with our present numbers the only way to uphold the honour of our arms, and

the interests of the Government, is to act on the defensive, in the position the Force now holds, and trust to the effect of time, and of the discouragement which repeated unsuccessful attacks are likely to produce upon the enemy, to weaken their numbers, and to break up their combination.

I will now endeavour to make His Excellency acquainted with the nature of the position which the Force occupies. On the left it is enclosed by the Gurroo Mountain, which divides the Ambeyla Pass from Bonair. This mountain, which is estimated roughly to be 6,000 feet high, rises in a succession of ridges; steep, but not precipitous, the general direction of which is parallel to the Pass; occasional plateaux and knolls are found on its sides, which afford convenient and safe situations for our picquets, and about 1,000 feet above the Camp is a very remarkable heap of enormous *granite* rocks, which forms a conspicuous object from the entrance and throughout the Pass, and marks the point at which the crest or water-shed is reached, which separates Eusofzai from Chumla. The sides of the Gurroo Mountain are clothed with fir trees of large growth, interspersed on the lower slopes with the wild fig and the date tree, a remarkable mixture of the vegetation of a cold and of a tropical climate. To the front of Camp the Pass widens as it descends, and opens out into little plateaux, which at last meet the

plain of Chumla. The latter is distant about three miles from the Camp, and has the appearance of being well cultivated with a stream flowing through the middle of it, the head of which gives water to our Camp. A range of hills much lower than the Gurroo is on the right of Camp, and is crowned by our picquets. To the rear of Camp, but far below, is seen the plain of Eusofzai.

From Lieut.-Colonel A. TAYLOR, Royal Engrs., to Major T. WRIGHT, Asst. Adjt.-Genl.—(dated Camp top of Ambeyla Pass, the 23rd October, 1863).

For the Brigadier-General's information, I have the honour to report the details of the reconnaissance of the 22nd instant.

Agreeably to instructions received, I proceeded on the morning of the 22nd, with two Companies of Sappers and a detachment of the 32nd Pioneers, to improve the road from Camp to the Chumla Valley.

Sappers and Miners.
50 Rank and File under Lieut. Tucker.
Detachment of 32nd, 124 Rank and File under Lieut. Drake.

We found the Pass to be about 2 miles in length, and unoccupied by any enemy. The road was fair.

Shortly after 1 p.m., I was joined at the mouth of the Pass by a detachment of Cavalry under Lieut.-Colonel Probyn, C.B., V.C., and the 20th Punjab Infantry under Major Brownlow.

Guide Cavalry, 100 Sabres.
11th Bengal Cavalry, 100 Sabres.
20th Punjab Infantry, 250 Rank and File.

The Sappers and Miners returned towards Camp to repair the road, Major Brownlow occupied the foot of the Pass, and I proceeded with the Cavalry down the Chumla Valley in the direction of Kagah.

As we passed the Kotul leading into Bonair

on our left, and about 2½ miles distant, we observed that it was occupied in force by the Bonerwals, but from all we could learn, none had descended into the valley.

Arrived at Kagah (4 miles from camp). The reports that the Valley was quite unoccupied were confirmed, and I considered it desirable to take advantage of such a favourable state of affairs to push down the Valley as far as was compatible with the General's order to be in Camp by sunset.

Leaving the main body of the Cavalry at Kagah, I proceeded with a small escort to Kooan (7 miles beyond Kagah), and reached Kagah again about 4.30 p.m.

On arriving at the foot of our Pass we found that the Bonerwals were descending in considerable numbers with the view of preventing our return. They attempted to gain possession of a patch of very broken ground at the extreme end of the Valley through which our road lay. It was necessary to prevent them and to check them until Major Brownlow could come up in support: with this view the Cavalry charged in the most spirited way, and our object was attained. Major Brownlow occupied the broken ground with two Companies, and the Cavalry under a small escort of Infantry returned to Camp. The rear-guard duties now devolved on Major Brownlow.

Emboldened by our continued retreat, the

enemy had recovered from the effects of Colonel Probyn's charge, and by the time we had fairly entered the Pass, had assembled in great numbers and had surrounded a picquet under Lieutenant Richmond on the north side of the Pass. It was long before it could be got down. By this time day-light had quite gone, and the remainder of the retiring was effected in dim moon-light. The enemy pressed Major Brownlow very closely, and several times came in amongst his men sword in hand. Eventually, as we drew into Camp, the Camp picquets became engaged, and Major Brownlow's trying duties ceased. Nothing could be better than the way the whole affair was conducted, nor than the conduct of both Officers and men.

Casualties.

	Killed.	Wounded.				Horses.		
	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Havildars.	Sepoys.	Sowars.	Killed.	Wounded.	
20th Punjab Infy. .	2	...	2	9	...	...	...	
Guide Cavalry .	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	1 Officer's charger & 1 Sowar's horse missing.
11th Bengal Cavalry	...	1	...	...	...	...	2	
	2	1	2	9	2	...	2	

From Major C. H. BROWNLOW, Comdg. 20th Punjab Infy., and Comdt. "Eagle's Nest" Picquet on 26th October, 1863, to Lieut.-Col. J. L. VAUGHAN, Comdg. Left Picquet,—(dated Camp Chumla Pass, the 27th October, 1863).

I have the honour to report as follows on the attacks made by the enemy on the post under my command during the 26th instant.

My party, as detailed in the margin, occupied a breast-work of stones on high ground showing a semi-circular front of about 90 feet. Below this the ground for about 80 yards was level and commanded by the work. Beyond the plateau the hill, which is well wooded and studded with rocks, again rose, and its crest (distant 500 yards from our breast-work) was occupied by about 2,000 of the enemy, protected by a similar defence.

UP TO 3 P.M.
30 Marksmen of the 71st H.L.I. and 101st R.B. Fusiliers.
80 Marksmen of the 20th Punjab Infantry.

AFTER 3 P.M.
40 Marksmen of the 71st H.L. Infantry.
50 Marksmen of the 5th Punjab Infantry.
30 Marksmen of the 5th Punjab Infantry.

About 12 o'clock, noon, the Bonerwals, who had hitherto fired only an occasional shot,

commenced to move down from their position, matchlock-men posting themselves most advantageously in the wood, and opening a very galling fire on us, while their swordsmen and others advanced boldly to the attack, charging across the plateau in our front in the most determined manner, and planting their standard behind a rock within a few feet of our wall. The steady fire, however, with which they were received, rendered their very gallant efforts to enter our defences unavailing, and they were driven back and up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead; their matchlock-men only maintaining the fight and continuing to harass us much.

The movements to our left of the Column under your immediate command next attracted the attention of the main body of the Bonerwals. When repulsed by you, and retreating up the hill, they again came under our fire, and suffered severely from the excellent shooting of the 71st Highland Light Infantry and 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers. On the 6th Punjab Infantry being withdrawn from the ridge on my left, the enemy again came down the hill, and with loud yells, rushed sword in hand to the assault of our position, but were again and finally repulsed; the affair for the rest of the day subsiding into an exchange of shots when either party exposed itself.

I regret to say that our losses during the

day were severe, amounting to 50 killed and wounded of all ranks, being nearly half the number that the work held at any one time.

Corps.	Killed.			Wounded.		
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Men.
71st H.L.I. .	...	...	1	...	...	4
101st R.B.F. .	...	...	...	...	...	2
3rd P. Infy. .	...	...	2	...	...	...
5th ,, ,, .	...	...	1	...	...	1
20th ,, ,, .	1	1	8	...	1	27
	14			35		
Grand Total	49					

The conduct of all under my command during the day was admirable; but I would desire especially to bring to notice the undermentioned Officers and men, whose coolness and gallantry were conspicuous:—

Captain Butler, V.C., 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
Lieut. J. Bartleman, 20th Punjab Infantry.
Asst. Surg. R. T. Lyons, 20th do. do.
Private Stewart, 71st Highland Light Infantry.
,, Clapperton, do. do.
,, Barber, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.
Subadar Cowdoo, 20th Punjab Infantry.
Havildar Meer Mahomed, do.

Sepoy Lena Sing, 20th Punjab Infantry.
„ Jowala, do.

Among the killed of my own Regiment, I have to lament the loss of many good soldiers; Lieutenant G. M. Richmond, a young Officer of great promise (whose reckless gallantry cost him his life), and the Subadar Major Meer Ally Shah (who will not easily be replaced), being of the number who fell.

From Brigr.-Genl. Sir N. CHAMBERLAIN, K.C.B., Comdg. Eusofzai Field Force, to the Adjt.-Genl., Army Headquarters,—(No. 7, dated Camp Crest of the Ambeyla Pass, the 14th November, 1863).

I have the honour to continue my report of the proceedings of this Force from the date of my last letter No. 6 of the 7th instant.

Within the last few days the enemy have received the long expected reinforcements from Bajour. On the 11th they showed in large numbers about Ambeyla, whence considerable bodies ascended the hills in the direction of Lalloo, on our right front, and evidently with the intention of attacking the picquets on that flank of the Camp. These picquets were accordingly reinforced, and their breast-works and defences strengthened. The Crag Picquet in particular has been much enlarged and strengthened since the last occasion of its being attacked (30th ultimo), and has now been made capable of containing a garrison of 160 men. It has also been supported by the guns of the Peshawar Mountain Train, which have been placed in position in the main picquet. On the night of

the 12th instant the Crag Picquet, then under command of Major Brownlow, 20th Punjab Infantry, with garrison as per margin, was very hotly attacked by the enemy, who made repeated assaults upon it, all of which, however, were repelled by the steadiness of the defenders, most ably directed by Major C. H. Brownlow, whose name is already familiar to His Excellency for his admirable conduct when covering the retirement of the reconnoitring party on the 22nd ultimo, and for the gallant defence of the Eagle's Nest Picquet on the 26th ultimo. The enemy, after repeatedly failing in the attempt to dislodge the picquet, withdrew towards morning, and the place of Major Brownlow and the men of the 20th Punjab Infantry was taken by Lieutenant Davidson and a detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry. For further particulars of this night attack I refer His Excellency to Major Brownlow's report, appended.

15 Marksmen Her Majesty's 101st.
30 Men 14th Native Infantry.
115 Men 20th Punjab Infantry.

From Major C. H. BROWNLOW, Comdg. 20th Punjab Infantry, to Lieut.-Colonel A. WILDE, C.B., Comdg. Right Defence,—(dated the 14th November, 1868).

I have the honour to report as follows on the defence of the Crag Picquet during the night of the 12th instant.

On my assuming command of the post at 4 p.m., the garrison consisted as under:—

15 Marksmen 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, under the direction of Lieutenant Fosbery, Musketry Instructor.

115, 20th Punjab Infantry.

30, 14th Ferozepore Regiment.

The enemy occupied a level ridge about 250 yards to our front, his position extending more than half a mile in a direction facing our own. Between us lay a smooth hollow intersected by a ravine. The ground on our right and rear was precipitous, and almost unassailable in any force. The left face of the post was its weak point, rocks and trees affording shelter to an attacking party till within a few yards of it.

Anticipating an attack, I had urged Lieutenant Bartleman, 20th Punjab Infantry, who commanded the picquet during the day, to use his utmost exertions to improve the position as much as he could, by heightening the breastwork, constructing an abattis, &c., a duty which he performed admirably.

Before dark I had every man in his place for the night, with strict orders as to the nature of his duties, and the direction of his fire in case of attack.

About 10 p.m. their watchfires showed us that the enemy were in movement, and descending in great numbers to the hollow in our front, which in half an hour was full of them. Their suppressed voices soon broke into yells of defiance, and they advanced in masses to our attack, their numbers being, so far as I could judge from sight and sound, at least two thousand. I allowed them to approach within a hundred yards, and then opened a rapid and well sustained file fire from our front face, which, I believe, did great execution, and soon silenced their shouts and drove them under cover, some to the broken and wooded ground to our left, and the rest into the ravine below us.

In half an hour they rallied, and assembling in almost increased numbers, rushed to the attack, this time assaulting on our front as well as on the left. They were received with the greatest steadiness, and again recoiled before our fire. These attacks continued till 4 a.m., each becoming weaker than the last, and many of them being mere feints to enable them to carry off their dead and wounded.

The post was at one time in great danger of being forced at its left front angle, which from its position was badly protected by our fire.

The enemy clambered up, and assailing its occupants with stones from our breast-work, stunned and drove them back. At this critical moment the gallantry of the undermentioned men saved the post; answering my call, they followed me into the corner, and hurling stones on the enemy who were close under our wall and sheltered from musketry, drove them back and rebuilt the parapet, holding the point for the rest of the night:—

Havildar Allum Khan Naick Chutter Sing Sepoy Goolbadeen „ Mahomed Khan „ Alla Meer	20th Punjab Infantry.

I beg to append a Return of Casualties, which, I am glad to add, were not very serious, as, owing to the darkness of the night, the enemy did not fire much or effectively.

In the morning, not more than eight or ten of the enemy were in sight, and my men having been 48 hours on picquet, during which time they had worked all day and fought all night, were completely worn out: their muskets also were so foul that they could scarcely load. I therefore applied to Major Ross, commanding the lower picquet, for a relief, and at 8 a.m. made over command of the post to the late Captain J. P. Davidson, who came with a detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry.

EUSOFZAI FIELD FORCE.

Numerical Return of killed and wounded in the above Force to 20th November, 1863, inclusive.

Corps.	Killed.	Wounded.				Total.	Remarks.
		Mortally.	Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.		
½ C. Battery 19th Brigade Royal Artillery	...	...	...	3	2	5	This return does not include the casualties between 20th Nov. and 12th Dec., when hostilities ceased.
Hazara Mountain Train Battery	1	1	1	2	2	7	
Peshawar ,, ,, ,,	3	1	...	7	1	12	
Guide Cavalry	...	...	...	1	1	2	
11th Bengal Cavalry	1	...	...	1	...	2	
Her Majesty's 71st Highland Light Infantry	20	4	5	19	22	70	
,, ,, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	21	2	5	24	23	75	
Guide Infantry	2	...	...	1	5	8	
1st Punjab Infantry	34	12	4	39	27	116	
3rd ,, ,,	5	2	2	6	8	23	
5th ,, ,,	6	1	1	7	8	23	
6th ,, ,,	11	6	10	16	16	59	
14th Ferozepore Regiment Native Infantry	47	9	8	33	22	119	
20th Punjab Infantry	32	7	...	45	49	133	
32nd Native Infantry (Pioneers)	...	...	...	...	4	4	
4th Gurkha Regiment	5	...	...	2	2	9	
5th ,, ,,	25	4	2	15	18	64	
Total	213	49	38	221	210	731	

General figured Abstract of Casualties in the Eusofzai Field Force from the date of its entering the Ambeyla Pass up to the 16th December, 1863.

DATED ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
HEAD QUARTERS, CAMP RAWAL PINDI, 14*th January*, 1864.

CORPS.	KILLED.					WOUNDED.					TOTAL KILLED AND WOUNDED.					REMARKS.
	Eur.		Native.			Eur.		Native.			Eur.		Native.			
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Grand Total.	
General Staff	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1	
Royal Engineers	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1	
Survey Department	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1	
Orderly Officers	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1	
½ C. Batty. 19th Brig. R.A.	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	...	2	5	...	3	...	2	5	
3rd Punjab Battery	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
Hazara Mountain Batty.	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	7	7	1	...	...	7	8	
Peshawar ,, ,,	...	...	...	3	3	...	...	...	9	9	...	...	...	12	12	
11th Bengal Cavalry	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	1	...	1	...	...	1	1	2	
7th Fusiliers	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	...	...	3	...	3	...	...	3	
71st Foot	3	15	...	...	18	1	49	...	...	50	4	64	...	...	68	
79th ,,	2	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	2	
101st ,,	3	19	...	...	22	2	63	...	...	65	5	82	...	...	87	
1st Punjab Infantry	1	...	1	41	43	3	...	3	91	97	4	...	4	132	140	
2nd Sikh Infantry	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	
3rd ,, ,,	1	...	...	4	5	...	...	3	35	38	1	...	3	39	43	
3rd Punjab Infantry	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	3	3	...	...	...	4	4	
5th ,, ,,	...	...	...	6	6	1	...	2	14	17	1	...	2	20	23	
14th Native Infantry	1	...	1	45	47	1	...	1	69	71	2	...	2	114	118	
20th Punjab Infantry	1	...	1	30	32	...	...	2	99	102	2	...	3	129	134	
23rd Punjab Infantry (Pioneers)	1	...	...	6	7	2	...	4	40	46	3	...	4	46	53	
32nd Punjab Infantry (Pioneers)	...	...	...	3	3	3	...	1	21	25	3	...	1	24	28	
Sappers and Miners	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1	1	
4th Gurkhas	...	...	...	5	5	1	...	...	9	10	1	...	...	14	15	
5th ,,	...	...	1	27	28	2	...	2	44	48	2	...	3	71	76	
Guide Corps Cavalry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	2	...	...	...	2	2	
Guide Corps Infantry	...	...	...	2	2	1	...	2	14	17	1	...	2	16	19	
Grand Total	15	34	4	174	227	21	118	21	460	620	37	152	25	634	847	

SOME RECOLLECTIONS OF THE AMBEYLA CAMPAIGN, 1863.

April, 1910.

My Dear Dunsterville,

You ask me to give you the particulars of any "incidents," of Regimental interest, that came under my immediate personal notice during the Ambeyla Campaign.

I was on leave in Cashmere when the Eusofzai Field Force assembled for service, in October, 1863, but joined the Regiment at Nowshera, on its march for the scene of operations.

There was a good deal of fever in Peshawar that autumn, and the 20th had suffered like the rest of the force, but soon recovered health and spirits for the work in prospect. Our mountain bivouac proved a bracing one, and we had no more sickness, though we buried and cremated 33 good soldiers who fell during the Campaign. The killed and wounded totalled 134, out of some 350 of all ranks that represented the strength of the Regiment.

Sir Neville Chamberlain's despatches testify to the conspicuous good behaviour of the "Bis Lumbar" on every occasion that it was engaged. It had its full share, and a little more, of the

everyday fighting, and it had the good fortune to bear successfully the brunt of the enemy's attacks on three memorable dates, when any failure would have been disastrous, viz., on the 22nd October, in the front of the main pickets of the Camp, on the 26th October, on the Eagle's Nest picket, and on the night of the 12th November on the Crag picket.

These early encounters inspired confidence, and after the 12th November, it was a remark in Camp—"Brownlow's men hold the Crag to-night—we may sleep in peace." I cannot recall a compliment to the Regiment that pleased me more.

We were encamped, or rather bivouacked, together with the 1st Punjab Infantry, immediately under the Crag. The association of the two Regiments was a most happy one, and evoked a fine spirit of camaraderie and emulation.

Both were largely recruited from the Frontier tribes, and it is a remarkable fact that neither had a single desertion—notwithstanding the appeals of the enemy to their religious feelings. On the night of the 12th November, after the repulse of one of their most determined assaults on the Crag, the tribesmen, still swarming round the post, called for a truce, and proposed a song.

A shout of laughter from the Pathan Company that manned the front face of the breastwork led me to ask what the joke was.

I was informed, and at once assented,

whereupon a young Bajaori, who had already given his name and village, as well as offered to enlist in the Regiment, broke out into a well-known Pushtoo melody, which was loudly applauded on both sides when he concluded. After the exchange of a few words of complimentary defiance, two Afridi Sepoys (Mahomed Khan and Alameer) sprang on to the parapet of our breastwork and replied in an equally wild and warlike duet, sitting clearly outlined against the sky—though the night was dark. Not a shot was fired during this dramatic performance, and when it terminated they dropped instantly under cover. After a warning to look out, the enemy renewed the fight with a volley that rattled through the loose stones of the "Sungah," killing one, and wounding two or three of our men at the first discharge. The left hand corner of the enclosure was a weak point, owing to a ridge of rocks running up to it, and giving good cover to an attacking party. It nearly proved fatal to us. The enemy repeatedly assailed it with great spirit, and at last succeeded in getting over the wall, but were promptly driven out with the bayonet. It was at this angle that the post was captured by the enemy on the following day, and probably on the morning of the 30th October. For their audacious war song, Mahomed Khan and Alameer received the Order of Merit, and I think we eventually enlisted the Bajaori.

The defence of the Eagle's Nest was a very different affair to that of the Crag, but an equally critical one, and more fully described in Sir Neville Chamberlain's despatches. It cost the 20th 10 killed and 28 wounded out of the 80 that fought in the main picket with me on the 26th October—and the enemy suffered more severely at our hands than on any other occasion during the Campaign. The position was a very bad one, with a low wall of loose stones the only protection, and commanded in its front by the rising wooded ground occupied by the tribesmen in great force. An open space separated us, and when the latter charged across this, time after time, they were bowled over like rabbits, and few lived to return. The ground was soon covered with their dead and disabled, but the match-lockmen on the hill in front took their toll of our men, as they stood up to deliver their fire on the charging swordsmen. The enemy must have lost ten to our one at least, and gave up the contest after three hours of gallant endeavours to dislodge us.

It was a glorious three hours for the 20th. With two or three thousand men still sitting in front of us on strong ground, and a high mountain behind them, affording a safe retreat, an attack or pursuit would have been madness—though Mir Mahomed, ever at my side, urged me to try it. "When a Pathan runs, he never looks back"—such was his argument. During

the night the tribesmen melted away, and in the morning only a few remained to carry away the killed and wounded, which of course they were invited to do. There were some Bonerwal and Swati headmen among them, who conversed with much dignity and good temper, lamenting the necessity of opposing us at so great a cost.

Our losses in the Eagle's Nest included some fine soldiers. Young Richmond scorned cover of any sort, and was shot through the head, as were many, if not most, of the fallen. The Subadar Major, Meer Ali Shah, was hit by a bullet in the liver and died the same night. Among the casualties that distressed me much, was a young Naik named "Peerah," a Pathan of good family, belonging to a village on the Peshawar side of the Kohat Pass. He had returned from leave the day before we marched from Nowshera, and came to me with his Subadar to ask for ten days' leave. He said his marriage was arranged for the week following, and that it would be a "Shurm" and a loss to his family if it fell through. I reminded him that we were going on service, and that leave was impossible. He replied "I will rejoin the Regiment before a shot is fired. I will go in an Ekka to my home, and back within the time you appoint." I had every confidence in him, and said "You may go." He joined the Regiment in the Pass on the morning of the 26th, put on his uniform, and without asking for permission

proceeded to look for me in the Eagle's Nest. The fight had just begun. He saluted me, and commenced to load, when a bullet smote him between the eyes, and he fell dead without having spoken a word. He was a magnificent specimen of a man, and as good as he looked, though often in trouble owing to his high spirit. I asked Government to give his widow an increased pension, and she got it.

The 1st P.I. and the 20th had many experiences in our joint bivouac that are not chronicled. The Camp below us often asked for deliverance from "Snipers." On one such occasion Keyes sent for Mouladad (then a Jemadar, 1st P.I.), who at once located the offenders. Without many words, and regardless of Keyes' objections, he threw his puggree on the ground, stripped to the waist, tucked up his pyjamas, and started for his stalk. He insisted on going alone, and was soon lost to view. It was more than an hour before we heard a shot fired, and then another. Shortly afterwards he was seen climbing up the spur he had descended, with an ample head covering, a matchlock, and two tulwars. He had killed two men, and laying his spoils at Keyes' feet, went back to his company without any tale of his exploit. "There is nothing to tell—I found them and shot them"—that is all he would say. Next day I begged Keyes to let me have him as a Subadar—and thenceforth he was a much trusted and greatly honoured officer

of mine, and of all my successors in command of the "Bis Lumbar" for many years, as you know.

I might record many more "incidents" to glorify the Regiment, but I think you will scarcely find space for more, and I will conclude. On our return to Peshawar we were inspected by Lord Strathnairn in the ragged clothing we had worn for ten weeks. Our numbers were few and war stained, but a healthy sense of duty done brightened the faces of all ranks, and the Commander-in-Chief's speech was a most flattering acknowledgment of the good conduct that had distinguished the Regiment at Ambeyla.

His Excellency added, "I am going to send you to Rawul Pindi to rest and recruit," which was a gratifying announcement, that Cantonment being in those days a most popular one with Punjab Regiments, the best in fact in all respects.

At Rawul Pindi we prospered exceedingly. Within a year we enlisted over 250 splendid recruits, and in 1868 found ourselves once more on the warpath—this time on the Black Mountain in Huzara, and were mentioned in despatches as follows:

"During the Campaign the chief work fell upon the 20th Punjab Infantry, which they performed to the admiration of everyone."

The Huzara tribes are not such fighters as the Trans Indus men, and the Black Mountain is comparatively easy ground, notwithstanding

its "elevation" (10,000ft.), on which I need not trespass in search of "incidents," and only write this last paragraph to show that we had not forgotten the lessons of Ambeyla.

I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

C. H. BROWNLOW.

COLONEL L. DUNSTERVILLE,
Comdg. 20th Punjab Infantry.

"RUSSIAN INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN."

In the event of war between England and Russia, we are not likely to be without allies, nor is she, and it may at once be assumed that we shall mobilise all our available forces for contingencies in Europe as well as in Asia. The Afghans are just now our very good friends, and Herat is strongly held by the present Ameer in our interests, but Abdul Raham may die, and the usual war of succession will ensue. Afghan-Turkestan may assert its independence of Kabul, and so may Herat; those provinces may prefer to come to terms with the Russians, being nearer to them, rather than with us.

All these unknown factors enter into the question as to what part we are to play in the future with regard to Herat, but there can be no doubt or question as to the necessity of occupying Kandahar immediately after a *casus belli* with Russia is declared, or is imminent.

"Kandahar seals the routes to India by Beluchistan, and must be taken possession of before the invasion of India can be attempted

by any route." I quote the words of the Simla Report.

A few weeks should consolidate our position at Kandahar, with strong outposts on the Helmund River and at Kelet-i-Ghilzai, or even Ghuznee if necessary.

Any advance on Kabul by the Khyber line would be a secondary consideration, and ought to be avoided if possible, to enable us to concentrate our whole strength at the more important strategic point which covers India and flanks the Kabul route.

India is in a position to take this first step, and to fight a decisive battle on the Helmund, without reinforcements from England, against all that Russia can bring against her.

If Herat holds out on our behalf we must assist its garrison with Officers and subsidies, and arms and ammunition, but under no circumstances that can now be foreseen should we be justified in sacrificing the strategical advantages that the occupation of Kandahar in strength will give us by squandering that strength in marching to Herat.

To invade India, Russia has to choose between two routes. She can move *viâ* Balkh and Bamian, across the Hindoo Koosh, leaving behind her a mountain pass 12,000 feet high, with Kabul and the Khyber before her, and Kandahar on her flank; or she must occupy Herat and make a desert march of 420 miles to

reach Kandahar, there to find and fight a British Army in position, and in railway communication with India.

It is not unreasonable to hope that in their present state of feeling the Afghans generally will oppose the Russians at all points, though perhaps with little success at first.

Certain tribes or sections of tribes, may throw in their lot with some candidate for power under Russian auspices, but if Kabul is their objective, no partisan combination will be worth reckoning on for a day in that nest of hornets.

The Persians are of little account either as enemies, or as allies in the field. Teheran is so near to the Caspian, and so far from the Persian Gulf that the Shah has much to fear from Russia, and little to hope from us.

Yet, notwithstanding the questionable value of their troops, a strong Persian demonstration on their Khorassan frontier might prove a serious menace to our communications, if we occupied or besieged Herat. With a large force locked up in Herat our command of the Kabul route would be weakened. We might be beaten or foiled at both points.

There is another consideration.

The Eastern question in Europe has not been settled to the satisfaction of Russia. When it is revived she will, as usual, divert our attention to India. To draw us down to Herat, to waste our resources, and to break up our good

relations with the Afghans by her intrigues, would be very advantageous to Russia elsewhere.

We shall play her game, and put an intolerable financial burden on India if we fall into the trap, and march a British Army beyond the Helmund until we see very clearly into the future.

C. H. BROWNLOW.

HORSE GUARDS, WAR OFFICE,
1*st February*, 1889.

"RAJAMANIA."

IT was recently rumoured that the Government of India had under consideration the appointment of a certain number of Indian Princes, as officers, with substantive rank, in Regiments of Cavalry and Infantry of the line.

This rumour has, it is said, been contradicted in India. The experiment could not have succeeded. It would have been resented by both British and native officers; by the former for reasons too obvious to relate, and by the latter because of the supersession that would inevitably have resulted.

The young Rajah, riding a gay horse, wearing a pink pugree, and a pearl necklace, with "dyed garments from Bozrah" to match, is a brave figure in the eyes of our ladies, but standing by the side of a soberly-clad Sikh, Pathan or Dograh, he is not sufficiently imposing to leave any doubt as to which is the fighting man. (The incomparable Goorka of Nipal is in another category.)

In the legendary pages of Tod the Indian Prince has a great and well-deserved place, but the history of India of the last sixty years is more recent and reliable evidence in favour of our Northern soldiers—as soldiers.

The troops of the Native States are a great political asset, while our Army, if wisely recruited and located, is of course an imperial concern.

It would be a military as well as a political blunder to do anything to amalgamate, or to make the two homogeneous. The former are not only auxiliaries, but to the extent of their numbers, a counterpoise to the latter.

During an emotional stage of our history (1885), an outburst of loyalty on the part of the Princes and people of India (at the aggressive attitude of Russia) provoked a similar craze for far reaching changes, such as we now hear of, but fortunately the careers of Colonel Arabi in Egypt, and of Colonel Alikanoff in Turkestan, were so fresh in our memories, and so apposite, that we profited by the lesson, and decided to reject doubtful experiments.

The India Office must be in possession of the full particulars of the controversy, and the arguments against the proposed innovations are infinitely stronger now than they were in 1885, when sedition, and ·303 rifles did not fill the land, and the young men of our English lanes and streets did not turn a deaf ear to the sound of the drum.

It is claimed by enthusiastic Rajamaniacs that we should provide an outlet for the military aspirations of the Princes, and in addition to rank and honours should give them commands in peace and war, in fact should train them to succeed us in India, when we give the country home rule.

The Native States, as at present constituted,

and ruled, relieve us of the administration of one-third of British India, and strengthen the Empire.

To add to their troops, and to encourage their martial ardour, would make them an anxiety, and possibly a danger.

Notwithstanding the perplexing march of time, and events, we cannot disregard historical precedents, or the question of colour.

Another and perhaps the most important consideration of all is: How will Rajamania affect our Indian army?

During later years we have shown such undisguised admiration for the Indian Princes, for the romantic records of some of them, for their fidelity in the past, and their glorious apparel, that we may perhaps have excited some vain hopes. They have doubtless heard of various proposals for rewarding them still further, and may expect a good deal. Before their hopes grow into demands, let us remember that Sir John Malcolm, in his book on "India," has told us that:

"The difference between a wise foresight, which prevents demand, and that weakness which meets it with concession, is immense.

"The former is the characteristic of a rising and vigorous, the latter of a fallen and expiring Government."

Veiled conjectures as to the cause and extent of the troubles that threaten us would be

unprofitable and perhaps mischievous; nevertheless, lest any serious disaffection should declare itself north of Delhi, we cannot shut our eyes to the situation that we should have to deal with; involving, as it must, the two virile races, confronting each other on the Indus, and antagonistic for all time. How to play off one against the other will be an interesting military problem.

The Punjab is and always has been, between the hammer and the anvil—hence the hardihood and spirit of its people.

C. H. B.

10 *September*, 1911.

POSTSCRIPT.

The "purple and gold" of the Delhi Durbar recalls Babylon and its glories. The mountains beyond the Indus may some day breed a Cyrus to complete the parallel, by invading India. The British soldier and the Sikh will have to be our first line of defence when that happens.

The Sikh opposed us valiantly at Ferozeshah and Chillianwala. He fought for us at Delhi and Lucknow. With his face to the North he will fight for his home and his Badshah.

Army Headquarters being at Delhi, and the Rajahs on our left, the position should be a good one, and history be reversed.

C. H. B.

10 *February*, 1912.

NEPAL.

1909.

NEPAL, with her back to the Himalayas, and an army of 45,000 good soldiers, has little to fear from Invasion, but is capable of a very formidable military demonstration in any direction.

The Nepalese are our very good friends, and likely to remain so, as long as we show no slackening of our rule in India.

With a fast increasing population, and a small country, they will in time feel the want of more land, and if the "Unrest" in our own Provinces is allowed to smoulder, they may begin to think of the chances of acquiring some in Oude, the land of their origin, as an independent people.

We have now twenty Battalions of so-called Gurkhas in our service, whereas a few years ago we had only five, and the officers commanding them complained that they could not get recruits to fill up their ranks. It would be interesting to know if this "Gurkha increment" (to use a now familiar phrase) is due to hunger, or to a change in the policy of the Foreign Office at Katmandhu. It is needless to add that a Gurkha descent into the valley of the Ganges would set all India in a blaze.

C. H. B.

THE NEW FIELD-MARSHAL.

The "Times," June 22nd, 1908.

SIR CHARLES HENRY BROWNLOW, who was gazetted a Field-Marshal on Saturday, was born on December 12, 1831, his father being a brother of the first Lord Lurgan. He landed in India as a cadet in 1848, just before the outbreak of the last Sikh war, for which he got a medal. In May, 1851, he was appointed adjutant of the 1st Sikh Infantry, recently raised and recruited from the disbanded soldiers of Runjeet Singh's army. The 1st Sikhs were employed in the Hazara campaign, 1852-1853, under Major R. Napier, afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala, when Lieutenant Brownlow was first mentioned in despatches as "a gallant and efficient officer." During the operations against the Michni Mohmands in August, 1854, under General Sir Sydney Cotton, he was shot through the lungs, and received mention in despatches, as well as an autograph letter from Lord Dalhousie saying that "the conspicuous spirit and gallantry of your conduct on that occasion has earned for you the special notice of the Government."

His next service was in the Bozdar Expedition of April, 1857, under Sir Neville Chamberlain.

Immediately on the outbreak of the mutinies of the same year Lieutenant Brownlow was selected by Sir John Lawrence to raise the 8th, now the 20th, Punjab Infantry, which regiment has since achieved much fighting distinction and bears his name. With his newly raised corps he saw service on the Eusofzai border under Sir Sydney Cotton in 1858. In 1860 he took it to China and was present at the action of Shin-ho, the capture of the Ta-ku Forts, and the occupation of Peking, being promoted for his services to brevet major.

In 1863 Major Brownlow commanded the 20th Punjab Infantry throughout the Ambeyla campaign, during the sanguinary conflicts of which the corps lost one-third of its numbers in killed and wounded. In the summary of his services on that occasion Sir Neville Chamberlain concluded as follows:—

In addition to any other mark of approval his Excellency may consider this officer to deserve, I would most strongly recommend him as having well earned the distinction of the Victoria Cross by his personal gallantry on each occasion of his being engaged.

The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose, did him the honour to record that—

The repeated proofs you have given of superior military qualifications in the field, and on very trying occasions, convince me that you ought to receive the highest scale of rewards, in justice to yourself and to the Service.

He was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and received the C.B. for these services. He again commanded his regiment in the Hazara Expedition of 1868, and was thus mentioned by General Wilde:—

> During the campaign the chief work fell upon the 20th Punjab Infantry, which they performed to the admiration of everyone.

He now received the brevet of colonel and was made an A.D.C. to Queen Victoria.

In 1871 Colonel Brownlow was appointed to the command of the Chittagong column of the Lushai Expeditionary Force with the rank of brigadier-general. For this campaign, which lasted five months, he was mentioned in the *Gazette* of India as follows:—

> To Brigadier-Generals Bourchier and Brownlow the Governor-General in Council offers his sincere thanks for the great skill and energy they have displayed in the conduct of the troops under their command in the face of great difficulties, and for which they have so justly received and merited the marked commendation of the Commander-in-Chief. [Lord Napier of Magdala.]

He was promoted to K.C.B. and appointed to command the Rawal Pindi Brigade, which position he held until 1877. Sir Charles Brownlow was an A.D.C. to Queen Victoria from 1869 to 1884. He was Assistant Military Secretary for Indian Affairs at the Horse Guards to H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge from 1879 to 1889, and received the Grand Cross of the Bath

in 1887. He represents a name and family of which two were killed and four severely wounded in the wars of the late Queen's reign.

Sir Charles Brownlow married, in 1890, Georgiana, eldest daughter of Mr. W. C. King, of Warfield Hall, Berkshire.

THE NATIVE ARMY OF BENGAL;

ITS PRESENT MATERIAL AND ORGANISATION, AS COMPARED WITH THE PAST.

MOST of the existing regiments of the Native Army of Bengal, cavalry and infantry, differ from those that mutinied in 1857, in two important respects:—

1st. In the complement of British officers and the system of command and regimental administration.

2nd. In the composition or nationality of the rank and file.

The following remarks are made more especially with reference to the infantry, but they apply equally in principle to the cavalry.

The difference in the complement of British officers and regimental administration involves the change from the regular to the irregular system, with the result that, under the latter, seven officers, each with a distinct charge and responsibility, efficiently fulfil the duties which, under the former, engaged two or three times that number without interest and without success.

It is argued that the irregular system has failed on service for want of officers. Notwith-

standing all that has been said to that effect, I am not aware of a single authentic instance, during the Mutiny or since, where a good Punjab regiment was unable to do its duty on this account; and I maintain that it has not failed; and that it is capable of standing the strain of any test short of a European war, to which it is not likely to be subjected, and to which the addition of a few extra subalterns would make it as equal as any regiment under the regular system.

The advantages of the irregular system are, that it provides enough and not too many British officers for the work required of them; keeps them constantly before their men; and develops the intelligence, authority, and character of the Native officers, who should constitute the backbone of a Native corps, and without whom there can be no reliable connecting link between the British officers and the men.

The present organisation of a Native regiment appears to me admirable in all essential respects.

Should we further Prussianise our drill book, it may be found advisable to substitute for the two mounted wing subalterns four captains or subalterns on foot, without interfering with the Native officers; but beyond this I think any change would be for the worse.

I should equally deprecate any reduction of the existing number of companies, or interference

with the numbers of the Native and non-commissioned officers. A regiment as now constituted possesses great elasticity and power of expansion.

It could at once be recruited from 600 to 800, or even 1,000 privates, without greatly overtaxing the means of supervision; and a half battalion of a corps thus augmented would of itself be a very complete tactical unit.

One of the essentials of the regular system is, that there shall be a British officer or more to every company. Should that officer be wanting, the company is useless, for the Native officer, having no real functions as such, is unfit to command it.

Under the irregular system, as long as there remain three officers with a regiment, one to command it and the others to direct the two half battalions, there is no absolute break in the chain of responsibility, and the machine continues to work. The Native officer can, moreover, be replaced as fast as he is wanted. Not so the British officer; and the system that is most dependent on the latter is in my opinion the soonest likely to break down. The key-note of my observations and my belief is, that you cannot have a good Native regiment without good Native officers, and that you cannot have good Native officers if you deprive them of the command of their companies.

Another strong argument against the irregular system is, that it demands selected officers,

and that there is no longer a field for selection. I am not quite sure that the system, *as long as it was worked in its integrity*, did not make the officers just as much as the officers made the system. However, admitting this argument, and also that regiments composed of certain classes do not produce Native officers worthy of the name, I say let such regiments be officered on the regular system and leave the others as they are.

A return to the regular system, throughout, would mean simply the revival of the old Bengal army. I maintain that there is little in the history of that army to justify such a step. The records of the last 30 years of its existence are not devoid of glory, but disaffection and misbehaviour disfigure every page of it, more or less.

In an able article on the subject of "Our Sepoy army," a contributor to Colburn's *U.S. Magazine* (January and February, 1870), an advocate of the old system, and apparently an officer who served with Hindustanis at the defence of Lucknow, where he saw them to the best advantage, says of the Natives of India, as soldiers: "When on service unless well led and backed up in the ranks by Englishmen, they are in truth little better than cowards; we particularly allude to the battles of Ferozeshah, Aliwal, and Subraon, where it required the prominent example and active encouragement of some 15 or 16 English officers and two sergeants to get the

Native regiments to advance in face of the Sikh Artillery."

Speaking of Native officers, he again tells us: "*Leading*, in the mind of an Asiatic, means remaining in the rear (if possible under cover) and roaring out 'chullo baie' (go on brother)."

Such are the reminiscences of the regular system, and such the faith and feeling thereby engendered between officers and men.

On the other hand what has the irregular system done for us?

In the time of our direst need (besides many others of equal note, but which suffered less) it gave us regiments like the 2nd Gurkhas, the Guide Corps, the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Punjab Infantry, that fought at Delhi and Lucknow till more than half their numbers were killed or wounded; and in some cases, when all the British officers were put *hors-de-combat*, continued to fight under their Native officers, following the lead of any Englishman who might be temporarily attached to them.

This may prove too much; but the spectacle of 16 British officers and two sergeants in vain exhorting a regiment to advance is surely worse than that of a regiment going on fighting without any officers at all.

It may moreover be said that the different pictures represent different races. This is true; but I believe that the Hindustani sepoy of the last century, when he was to all intents and

purposes an irregular, and recruited from a fighting class, was little inferior to the Punjabee of 1857 in courage, endurance, or goodwill; and that his deterioration dates from the time when we put a shako on his head as a symbol of reform, and gave him the Articles of War instead of a good commanding officer as his friend and guide.

I have already remarked that the present *organisation* of a Native regiment appears to me admirable in all essential respects. I am very far from saying the same of the present *system*, which is not the irregular system in its integrity, as I will hereafter endeavour to show. By organisation I now mean the complement of the different ranks. I object to more British officers, because I think there is not room or work for more unless they supplant or displace the Native officers; and even then a large body of English gentlemen, of good education and high aspirations, cannot find sufficient outlet for their energies as captains and subalterns of small companies. The consequence is professional weariness and disgust on their part, and on the part of the men the discovery that their officers are nonentities.

The commanding officer of a Native regiment should be at once a fountain of hope and a rod of affliction to his men.

With an Asiatic soldier personal influence is the beginning and the end of all power.

Of what avail would be the personal influence

of a Chamberlain, Nicholson, Coke, or Lumsden, when filtered through some fifteen or sixteen officers, under the forms and ceremonies of the regular system ?

There were doubtless a certain number of very good regiments among the old Bengal Native Infantry, commanded and made so at different times by men of exceptional force of character, who kicked over the stumbling blocks in their way, and with the assistance of a good adjutant exercised a vigorous and wholesome rule, while the rest of the officers played billiards and signed the muster rolls.

If, as is often asserted, a Native regiment with six officers is not efficient, according to the ambitious parade standard of the present day, when as much is expected from it as from a British regiment, I say, reduce the standard and expect less. It is infinitely wiser and safer to sacrifice its accomplishments rather than its morale. And its morale, I repeat, is dependent upon good Native officers and a despotic commandant, conditions which a multitude of British officers will not admit.

In appearance and drill, indeed in all soldier-like qualities, a great many of our Native regiments are fit to take their place with credit to-morrow in any camp of exercise in Europe; but a campaign, even on their own soil, of any magnitude or duration, would soon see us through our small numbers of those highly-trained

men, when we should have to fall back, as we did in 1857, on mere recruits; and the system that will assimilate, and turn to the best account in the shortest period, the hasty levies of such warlike times, is the system we require and that is the irregular system.

I have to explain my remark that the system now in force is not the irregular system in its integrity, which it is my object to uphold.

That system received its death-blow in 1869, by the repeal of Article III. of Act V. of 1861 (which merely confirmed the powers exercised by commanding officers since 1857), and unless that article is restored, the decay of the present army, by the same process as the last one, is a mere question of time.

In 1871, when commanding my regiment, I had occasion to write on this subject, and I cannot do better than repeat my words, which after four years' experience as a general officer I can still endorse:—

"With regard to the power possessed by commanding officers during the twelve years succeeding the Mutiny, of reducing incompetent non-commissioned officers and discharging worthless men, I unhesitatingly assert that the measure abolishing that power was a most injurious one to the Native army, and calculated to encourage a relapse into the spirit of laxity and indifference to its officers, which gave the first warnings of the events of 1857.

"A man may be a notoriously bad character, a chronic and corrupting nuisance in a regiment, but until he is entitled to a handsome pension, or commits some offence for which he can be tried, and a conviction obtained which survives the obstacles and technicalities of the law and the usual appeal to higher authority, a commanding officer cannot get rid of him.

"Amongst this rapidly increasing class may be mentioned :—

"1. Ill-conditioned and disloyal men, who may be known as ringleaders and spokesmen on every occasion that some fancied right or grievance crops up for discussion, representatives of the 'Punch,' the canker that destroyed the Sikh army and rule; lawyers whom the law cannot touch.

"2. Gamblers, debauchees, and even worse, who may swindle and demoralise half a regiment before evidence can be found against them to satisfy a judge advocate.

"3. Malingerers, and men who destroy themselves with drugs ; who never did a fair day's work, and who look forward to an early pension.

"4. Men who, in a regiment that has seen service, may be a scoff and a byeword for their want of courage or endurance, and yet who are good soldiers according to the law.

"As I have before stated, such characters, until 1869, were summarily discharged, without any great hardship to themselves, and to the incalculable benefit of the tone and spirit of a regiment which they troubled. Under the new system, or rather the old one, which culminated in the Mutiny, and to which in our passion for centralisation, we have returned, they may soon become a mischievous party and power; for whereas large numbers of good men, particularly in Punjab regiments, take their discharge after four or five years' service, and return to agricultural pursuits, the bad ones hang on, preferring service in the vicinity of cities, with its opportunities for vice, to honest labour."

The Sepoy enlists for three years, but family affairs, such as the death of a father or brother, throwing land and property or a houseful of unprotected women and children on his care, often compel him to ask for his discharge within that term, when to insist on his fulfilling his obligation would be cruel, and he is accordingly released from service.

On the other hand, we bind ourselves to the Sepoy indefinitely, and as I have described, keep in our pay as long as it suits him a man who may be utterly worthless as a soldier, who, if he chose to work could get a better livelihood in civil life, and to whom a discharge would be no loss whatever beyond that of a prospective right to a pension which he does not deserve.

From my experience of officers, and especially commanding officers of Native regiments, I venture to affirm that they are as a rule more prone to the *laisser-aller* spirit, and to err on the side of mercy than of undue harshness towards their men. Should the protection of the Native soldier, by the repeal of Article III. of Act V. of 1861, have been rendered necessary by the exceptions to this rule, I am of opinion that it has been afforded at a most ruinous sacrifice of the efficiency and discipline of the Native army; and that if these exceptions had been deprived of their commands instead of the whole body of commanding officers of their powers, the result would have been happier both for the Native soldier and for the State.

The recent measures for the admission of young men of good family into the commissioned grades of the Native army ought to have the best results, but the experiment in old regiments should be carried out very gradually and with much caution.

The present status of our Native officers, of infantry, especially, is not such as to invite really good men of this description into their ranks; and it would be dangerous and impolitic for the sake of doubtful ones to dishearten the many that are to be found in well recruited corps, who are thoroughly fitted for the position, who value it, and who serve with the sole ambition of attaining it.

To raise the condition and character of the Native officer, and to make his position such as to identify his interests with our own, and to ensure his loyalty in the day of trial, the present scale of pay and rewards open to him should be increased and graduated upwards so as to suit the widely differing classes to whom we give commissions.

As it now is the well-bred, high-spirited, and influential scion of some more or less distinguished family, whose presence in a regiment is of inestimable value, may be found serving in the same rank and on the same pay as the meanest Hindoo, whose only recommendation may be a little reading and writing, and the sort of smartness which is attractive on the parade ground, but of no use in the field. The latter is well provided for, but to meet such cases as the former there is much need of some liberal scale or system of personal allowances and other considerations, ascending according to the family status, rank, merits or services of the individual. The prizes of the service are too few. There are many Native officers, with many wounds, who, by their gallantry during the Mutiny, at Ambeyla, and elsewhere, having achieved all the honours and rewards open to them, are now serving without the hope of anything further, a state of affairs which cannot be conducive to healthy feeling.

More frequent grants of land, civil titles, and

seats at durbars, etc., should be among the advantages held out to such men.

All this cannot be done without increased expenditure. If corresponding retrenchments are absolutely necessary, I would say disband a certain number of regiments, but do not mar the efficiency of those you retain, by further reductions in any grade whatsoever.

The sufficiency or otherwise of the pay of a Sepoy in our service at the present day is a question of immediate importance, and one that we should do well to anticipate and decide with a good grace, instead of waiting till it is forced upon us.

It is as dangerous to pamper as to starve a mercenary.

In this light there are some who think that we prepared the way to the events of 1857 by over-indulging the Sepoy, and that every concession to the Native soldier is fraught with peril as likely to establish a precedent or to grow into a right.

Lest this readily accepted argument be put forward as an objection to the much needed increase of his present pay, I would point out that a comparison between the circumstances of the old Bengal Sepoy and the Sepoy of to-day will show that we have fully profited by past lessons, and the balance of advantages will be found so largely in favour of the former (considering the rise during the last ten years in the

cost of the necessaries and luxuries of life and in the value of labour) that we need entertain no fear of any tendency as yet to do more for the latter than is absolutely indispensable to keep him in our ranks.

The Sepoy enlisted since 1857 has no knowledge of Scinde or marching batta.[1] His immediate rights for the first six years of his service consist of seven rupees per month as pay, free carriage of 20lbs. of baggage when he moves on the public service and $1\frac{1}{8}$ yards of red or drab shoddy, with some buttons and thread every year, to make him alternately a short coat or tight trouser; the sole item of clothing or equipment he receives from Government.

Besides keeping himself in athletic condition, on the income of a down country "kitmutgar" he is expected to pay for and maintain an elaborate kit, little inferior to that of the British soldier, and to take his place alongside of the latter with equal pride in his appearance and devotion to his duty. It can of course be argued that as long as we get recruits the inducement must be sufficient. In reply to this I would say, that though we may fill our regiments, it is, or soon will be with an inferior class of men, or that portion of the better or fighting class only which a love of adventure or boyish dislike of the plough will not allow to

[1] Field Service Allowance.

remain at home, a class which it is clearly our interest to draw into our service, but which we must pay, at least according to the ordinary labour market of the day. The Punjab corps are, I believe, entirely indebted for their recruits to the military spirit of the country, and to the liberality of our pension rules. Whether these motives to service are as wholesome, safe, and economical as immediate pecuniary inducements is the problem before us.

There is a difference between our old Sepoy army and the Punjabee portion of the present one which is likely to affect the pension list very materially.

The former was composed chiefly of Brahmins and Rajputs, whose caste prejudices did not encourage them to follow the plough if they could avoid it. The latter is or should be recruited from the purely agricultural classes, the yeomanry of the country, who represent its fighting population.

The result of this difference shows itself as follows, that whereas the Hindustani, having once enlisted, hung on to his regiment long after he was unfit for service—his pension of itself being unequal to his wants, and there being few other means open to him of adding to his income,—the Punjabee, unless he has been fortunate in promotion, is ready to go the day he is entitled to do so. His pension pays the rent of his farm, which is an ample provision for

him, and he falls back in the prime of life on the existence most congenial to him.

Considering the great reductions that have taken place in the Native army, and the obvious necessity of having every man with the colours in a state of the highest efficiency, it would be a grievous mistake to attempt to check in any way the tendency I have just noticed; but I think we are throwing away our money and our resources in not retaining some lien on the services of the hundreds of fine men who are every year drafted into the pension establishment.

[1]If every soldier who was invalided after fifteen years' service was liable, say for ten years longer, that is until he had completed five-and-twenty years from his first enlistment, to undergo a month's drill at the head-quarters of his district or division, receiving during that period his old rate of pay, and to be called upon, in case of emergency, for such duty and service as he was able to perform, we should have a reserve force at our disposal of a very useful quality, at a cost, during peace time, of about five rupees per annum for each sepoy, exclusive, of course, of the incidental expenses of the centres or depots where the materials for arming, clothing, and mobilising such a force would be deposited, and its annual training carried out.

[1] This system of creating a reserve force was inaugurated ten years later.

The details of a scheme of this sort need not be very difficult, and it could be made to embrace as large or as small a number of men as were wanted, by some suitable system of medical examination.

It is related of a retired or invalided Sikh Native officer of Coke's regiment, who had been got rid of as rather a turbulent character, that, being at his home in 1857, and hearing of the mutinies, he determined to rejoin his old corps, then on its way to Delhi. Colonel Coke found him waiting on the road, somewhere near Loodiana, with two tulwars at his side. On being asked to account for his appearance, he replied that he had come to command his former company, and had brought two swords, one to break in the service of the "Sirkar," and the other on his own account, in satisfaction of some hereditary grudge against the Hindustanis. He was allowed to assume his old position, and was badly wounded very early in the siege.

Having recovered, he was present at the final assault. His company fell in that morning at the head of the column, much to his delight; but owing to certain evolutions between the camp and the walls of the city, lost its place for a time. He rushed up to the younger Nicholson, who was in command, and loudly demanded that the previous order of the companies should be restored, and that he should lead the attack. This too was conceded, and the brave old man

was slain an hour afterwards, fighting amongst the foremost.

There are many such old men sitting at their homes in the obscurity of the pension list, who have done good service as soldiers, and are ready to do it again ; but having left all record of their worth behind them, they are unknown to the civil authorities, and are lost to us both as soldiers and citizens.

With regard to the composition or nationality of the rank and file of the present Bengal army as compared with the one that disbanded itself in 1857, it is certain that as we have extended our recruiting ground to the north, so have we improved the fighting quality of our soldiers. This, I presume, cannot be questioned by the most blind believer in the " Old Sepoy."

I am of opinion though, that we are far from making the best possible use of the materials at our disposal, and that the whole system of recruiting requires to be examined, with a view to some distinct rules being laid down on the subject.

Three thousand years have failed to obliterate the institutes of Menu, which separated the Aryan communities of the Gangetic Valley into priests, warriors, merchants, and handicraftsmen.

To this day caste and calling are alike hereditary ; and it is no more accounted a shame to the priestly Brahmin to turn his back upon a foe, than it is to the soldierly Rajput to stumble at the " Shastras."

In the days of Warren Hastings, Clive, and Wellesley, we recruited our regiments from the long-acknowledged fighting classes of the several countries that had yielded to our rule.

Later on, we flooded our ranks with Brahmins, who, though willing to accept the pay, were not likely to possess the qualities of good soldiers, and whose intrigues and cabals kept the army in a state of continuous though suppressed mutiny, till they reached a climax, and wrecked it altogether.

Since 1857 we have, as regards our Hindustani soldiers, adopted a less dangerous but equally short-sighted policy; we have enlisted large numbers of men of various servile and inferior breeds, which never from time immemorial sent a soldier into the field, and who though harmless to ourselves, are likely to be equally harmless to our enemies.

It is of course necessary to have some counterpoise to our more northern troops, and for that purpose, if for no other, we want, not make-believe soldiers, but *fighting men*, of whom there is no lack among the Rajputs or Chuttries, the Mahomedans and others, once dominant or independent races and classes of India, with military or predatory instincts and traditions.

Another defect of our system or want of system, as regards enlistment, is that at present there is scarcely a regiment in the presidencies of Bengal and Bombay that does not send its

recruiting parties into the Punjab. Without entering at length into the question of class regiments, I think I may safely assert that, whereas in a purely Punjab regiment, a Punjabee (Sikh, Dogra, or Mahomedan) retains whatever good qualities he may possess as a soldier, in a Hindustani one he very rapidly deteriorates, and assimilates in habits, feelings, and every other respect with the classes he is surrounded by.

The same may be said of the Pathan and the Gurkha, our finest non-subject materials for the ranks.

The more the different fighting races are kept separate the better; and if the objections to purely class regiments (which objections in my opinion are not as weighty as the arguments in favour of such) forbid them, we should at least recruit our several corps strictly within certain provincial or geographical limits, so as to know exactly what to expect from each in times of popular commotion and disaffection, or on the particular service for which you may require it. "*Divide et impera*" is the principle I would advocate.

C. H. BROWNLOW,

Brigadier-General.

September, 1875.

POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the above was written much has been done for the Indian Army, and with excellent results. Its pay has been increased, its service equipment immensely improved, a reserve force of efficient pensioners has been embodied, and a number of useless regiments have been disbanded, but too many still remain that cannot be depended upon for active warfare, and if they are retained for police purposes or political reasons they should be armed accordingly.

It is not the men, but their rifles and ammunition that constitute a danger, in case of seditious feeling in the country, when their arms might fall into wrong hands.

It is very certain that many Indian regiments now in possession of rifles of the latest pattern could not be asked to attack a position, held under modern conditions, or to look at an Afridi hill-side, except to smile at the idea of doing more—and yet these men might be formidable enough behind intrenchments, or the walls of an Indian village perched high above the plain on the ruins of a thousand years.

Our recruiting ground in India is vast, but the quality of our available recruits is so varied and so unequal in fighting power, that to keep

up the Army to its required strength, with due regard to the balance of the different races in our ranks, is one of the most delicate and difficult questions that the Government has to deal with.

The British officer all over the world is a generous enthusiast, and gives his whole confidence to whatever men he serves with. He does not feel called upon to make comparisons or to take a larger view of his surroundings, so that the common complaint of those who seek his guidance is that no two are of the same opinion.

C. H. B.

January, 1903.

NOTES ON
HORSE-BREEDING IN INDIA.

I HAVE read with great interest the Reports of the Director of the Army Remount Department, 1896-97, and of the Inspector General Civil Veterinary Department, 1897-98, on Horse-breeding in India,—interest not unmixed with disappointment at the results obtained after so many years of experimental endeavour.

It is twenty years since I left India, so I cannot judge of the latest results except from these exhaustive reports.

But I wonder that we have been so slow, both at home and in India, to recognise the certain mischiefs of cross breeding, and so long ignored the value of the fixity of type.

The General Stud Book has kept the thoroughbred pure in blood, but he is now produced for speed only, and two-thirds of those that go into training are without bone or symmetry, and unsound, good for a five furlong race and a grass country, but of doubtful value as stallions to sire remounts fit to carry heavy or even medium cavalry.

Promiscuous or repeated crossing, with the



MASTER MCGRATH.
A TYPICAL ARAB CHARGER. HEIGHT 14½ HANDS.
1871—1877.

view to improving a breed, has mongrelised or extinguished many useful ones in all countries.

This is well known, but it cannot be too often repeated, that an occasional cross only is allowable for the attainment of any desired change of blood. A greyhound is sometimes crossed with a bulldog to keep up the quality of courage in the breed, but I believe it takes nine pure crosses to wipe out the stain, and even then there is no absolute safety from reversions. I have had full sized, good looking Hackney mares with unsuspected pony or cart blood in thei pedigrees that were never safe from reversiona freaks, both as to type, size, colour, and the smallest peculiarities, due to back breeding, proving that it requires many generations to arrive at an ideal brood mare or stallion that will produce its like with certainty.

Established type is common of course in man as in all other creatures. The best example of it is perhaps the Rajputs of Oude and the adjacent valley of the Ganges, who combine a fine physique, due to soil and climate, with great uniformity of size, shape, and character, due to their marriage laws and customs, which are immutable.—

A Rajput marries a Rajput only, but his wife must not be of the same "Goth" or Clan or within a given number of generations of the same stock as himself. She must, when possible, belong to a family of good bodily health and

history, to ensure the propagation of a martial race. It is the same with the Brahmins, but being of priestly descent and occupation, they attach less importance to physique. The Sikhs, though of clearly established type, are not of such ancient and unmixed race as the above. An example of the mongrel is the Mahomedan of the plains of India, who marries any woman; and so among four footed animals is the horse of India, after our attempts at miscegenation.

The mingling of Eastern and Western blood in man or beast does not appear to be blessed by nature.

If sterility is the result, to the extent given in paragraph 187 of Colonel Queripel's report, viz.: 75 per cent., horse breeding must be a ruinous industry in the Northern Punjab. My own experience in England has been under 15 per cent. of barren mares.

Whether the breeds of unmixed Eastern blood are more prolific is surely a matter for investigation. I do not see it referred to in the reports.

During the time that I was at Rawal Pindi, 1864 to 1877, the Norfolk trotter of that day was much in favour and in use throughout that district, and I have no doubt has been so up to a recent date.

The well-bred Dhunni mares appeared, at the first cross, to nick well with the Hackney, but thirty years of crossing and recrossing may

have destroyed all semblance of the original breed and replaced it by a nondescript with many defects, including, seemingly, that of sterility.

The excessive and injudicious infusion of English T.B. or any other foreign blood must be equally injurious, with that of the Hackney to the Native breeds. Not so that of the Arab, which is a cognate breed, almost indigenous to the soil and climate, and the blood of which is and has been, and ever will be, the foundation and mainstay of all good horse flesh in India, from the Ekka Tattoo to the winner of a Calcutta Derby.

In England the Arab has as many detractors as the Hackney, but that is to be accounted for. He wants size, both for racing and getting across a clay country.

The English and the Australian thoroughbreds are of course unimpeachable as stallions when they can be got of the right size and substance, sound in themselves, and with sound pedigrees.

As Colonel Queripel is very strongly in their favour, especially the newly discovered Australian variety, he must be satisfied that their produce will not run to leg, and demand twice the grass and grain and grooming and shoeing that suffices for a smaller horse, got by an Arab of the same money value. Of horses it is true that "a good big one is better than a good little one," but this applies to Leicestershire,

alongside a railway, with plenty of corn and hay at hand, and not to a hill campaign in a region of stones and sand and maybe little water, ravaged by the omnivorous Afghan or Cossack, where he is most likely to be wanted.

The thoroughbred is unequalled on the turf, but we should not be blinded by his triumphs at Newmarket to his defects as a stallion for India, if his stock are not at home in that country. However, my belief in the Arab for India is such that I would allot the same money for stallions of that breed as for all the others put together. I would maintain the following proportions in every ten, viz.:

5 Arabs.
3 T.B.E. and T.B.A.
2 Hackneys.

10 Total

The Arab may diminish the size of our remounts, but they will be sound and hardy, whether exposed to heat or cold, hunger or drought.

If they prove unequal to the weight they have to carry, we can lessen it by putting some of the equipments of the soldier, and of the horse also, on selected mules and ponies, as has already been done on service, and as advocated by General Sir John Watson in his remarks on this subject. If horses cannot be found to suit the riders, the riders should be made to suit the

horses, by reducing the impedimenta of both. Even on Arabs our cavalry would have the speed and momentum of any other cavalry it is likely to meet, and our Mounted Infantry be equally serviceable.

There can surely be no debate as to the sound policy of continuing to breed and to buy our own horses in India, and not to look to the Colonies for more than is absolutely necessary.

The Australian of my time was a coarse and uncertain brute, but I hear he is greatly improved.

It is, I think, to be regretted that the Government of India was unable to sanction the continuance of Colonel Deane's system of breeding from the mares in the Remount Department. A revival of the old stud policy which turned horses into the Ranks at Rs. 1500 a head may well be avoided, but experimental stud measures must always be useful, if not necessary.

The brood mare is the Alpha and Omega of the whole question. A scientific centre such as a small Stud farm in some well selected locality might in time discover on what lines she can best be bred, and how mated, in different parts of India. It might also work out the problem of reviving some of the purely indigenous breeds once famous in that country, in favour of which Sir John Watson has put forward such clear and cogent reasons.

It appears to be a proved and admitted fact that after three or four generations of cross

breeding with stallions of Western blood, the Eurasian mare becomes barren, to the extent that only one in four produces a foal.

But the Arab is not of Western blood, and it is surely most important to lose no time in clearing up by enquiry and practical experiment the question whether the Indo-Arabian mare is not quite as prolific as her pure bred Indian sister, such as the Marwari, Kattiawari or Beluchi mare.

C. H. BROWNLOW.

WARFIELD HALL,

April, 1899.

THE TRANS INDUS PATHANS.

1850-64.

MEMORANDUM BY

BRIGADIER GENERAL SIR C. H. BROWNLOW, K.C.B.

THE following account of the Trans Indus Pathans is compiled from the reports and official papers quoted at the foot of this page, and embraces the whole of the tribes of that descent, dependent and independent, on the North West Frontier of the Punjab.

EXTRACT FROM JAMES' REPORT ON THE PESHAWUR DISTRICT.

1864.

Of the Afghans nothing is known before we meet them in the hills of Ghor and Suliman, at the time of the Arab invasion of Khorasan. They trace their descent themselves to the

1. Report on the Settlement of the Peshawur District, by Major Hugh R. James, C.B., Commissioner and Superintendent Peshawur Division (1864).
2. Rough notes on the Khuttucks, by Lieutenant F. H. Pollock, Assistant Commissioner Kohat (1850).
3. Report showing the relations of the British Government with the tribes on the North West Frontier of the Punjab, from 1849 to the close of 1855, by R. Temple, Esq., Secretary to the Chief Commissioner.
4. General Report on the Eusofzaies, by H. W. Bellew, Assistant Surgeon, Corps of Guides (1864).

Israelites through Afghana, son of Yaremiah, son of Saul, king of Israel; and state that they wandered to those mountains after the Captivity, and at the summons of some of their brethren who had settled in Arabia, embraced the Mahomedan faith, large numbers of them joining in the wars of the Prophet, under the first proselyte of their branch, named Kees, who received the titles of Abdool Rasheed and Pathan from Mahomed, and returning to his native mountains converted the remainder of his nation.

The Khuttuks occupy the eastern extremity of the mountain range, extending from the Soofaid Koh to the Indus. These hills come down close to the river at Attock and fill up the angle formed by it with its tributary, the Kabul river, for some miles, when they gradually recede in a south-westerly direction.

The Khuttuks hold all these hills for a distance of some 25 miles west, together with the strip of plain between them and the Kabul river, to Naoshera; and a small tract of country to the north of that stream. To the south they possess the hilly country bordering on the Indus to near Mukhud, extending westward to Teeree. Thus to the north-east they adjoin, and indeed form part of Peshawur, but as they stretch to the south-west, the Bungushes of Kohat, and the Adam Khail Afridis interpose between them and that district.

The Khuttuks as a people are a most favourable specimen of Pathans, and deserved better leaders than have lately been in power over them; they retain all the good qualities for which they were renowned under Khooshal the Great, are brave and independent, and the only Afghan tribe which can lay claim to faithfulness.

Their hills afford good pasturage for cattle and goats, of which they have large herds. All their bullocks are trained to carry loads, and the Khuttuks form the principal carriers of salt to the countries north of Peshawur and all Afghanistan.

To this circumstance of foreign travel, which cannot but tend to civilize, combined with a desire to retain the respect entertained for large divisions of their tribe, they are perhaps indebted for the good qualities which so remarkably distinguish them from all other Afghans.

From the termination of the Khuttuk country to the west, we come to the Afridis, a name which is commonly assigned to all the tribes between the Khuttuk hills and the Kabul river.

They may certainly be classed as the wildest and most uncontrollable tribes of Eastern Afghanistan, a character which applies to all the descendants of "Kurlanee" or "Kurrara," with the solitary exception of the Khuttuks.

Located in a wild and rugged mass of

mountains, not capable of cultivation, and commanding all the passes leading from the east, they have been driven from their earliest settlement to seek a subsistence by plunder and the exaction of fees upon the transit of merchandize through their territory, extorted by violence, and rudely distributed amongst the tribe. Capable of enduring fatigue, and of subsisting upon the wild roots and berries of their mountains; active, wary, and athletic, and true to each other in all that concerns a common enemy, they have successfully resisted all attempts to coerce them, made at various times by men whose genius and enterprise seemed incapable of check.

Acknowledging a head in the person of their hereditary chiefs, they cling more closely than other portions of the Pathan nation, to the democratic institutions they have received from their forefathers, and which in other tribes have been more or less subdued by their intercourse with, and forced dependence upon, some governing power. Their rude state of society is still kept together by as rude and simple a code, understood and acknowledged by each individual and enforced by the community at large, every member of which considers its infringement as an act committed against his own privileges. The chiefs, or mulliks, are indeed the representatives of the tribe, division, or family to which they respectively belong, but they possess no independent power of action, and before they can

be privileged to speak in "jirga," or council, they must have collected the wishes, on the subject under consideration, of the bodies they represent.

Dear to the Afridis is their code of honour, or Pukhtoonwalee; the rules prescribed by which are their sole guide in all matters connected with the rude government which keeps their wild society together; a code, which teaches that an unavenged injury is their deepest shame, a blade well steeped in blood their proudest badge. It nevertheless serves to check immorality, and to prevent the unbridled exercise of their passions. Any infringement of this code is visited with heavy penalties. Most of the tribes set apart one of their families as the hereditary preserver of the local customs, styled the "Serishtah," which is distinct from the family in which the "Mullikee" or chiefship is vested. The "Serishtah" details the customary penalties for crimes, the numbers to be furnished by each clan of the tribe when they go out to war, the division of spoil and other such general matters. The amount of fines varies in different tribes, but the following are amongst the penalties imposed by all alike.

1. A man who murders another without cause:—to be stoned to death, unless he be a "Turboor" or "kinsman" of the murdered man, in which case he must be slain with the sword.

2. A man who refuses to go to battle:—to

pay a "nagah" or fine, of 40 rupees, with confiscation of property, and burning of his house.

3. A man who acts contrary to the decision of a jirga:—to suffer banishment and his house to be burnt.

4. Adultery, if suspected on strong grounds is punished by the death of the woman first, and then of the adulterer: if the act is proved, two men's lives must be forfeited.

5. When the relatives of a murdered man consent before a jirga to compromise the matter, a "nagah" may be taken of 360 rupees as the price of blood.

The punishment of death by stoning is another custom which points to an Israelitish origin. In the hands of an Afridi the stone is a formidable weapon, and is that most frequently used in their petty village frays, which are generally attended with loss of life, or severe maiming. The stone is also employed as a pledge of faith at the ratification of treaties. If two tribes determine to close a feud, or to form an alliance; or if families or individuals similarly become reconciled, and blot out the remembrance of former wrongs, vows are exchanged over a stone placed between the parties, which is thus made a witness to the contract. These truces may be permanent or for a certain number of years. Private oaths of all kinds are verified in a like manner.

In common with all Pathans, the Afridis

exercise a rough hospitality, and offer an asylum to any fugitive endeavouring to escape from an avenger or from the pursuit of justice; and they would undergo any punishment, or suffer any injuries, rather than deliver up their guest.

More blood is shed by the Afridis in the pursuit of hereditary revenge, than in the open affrays of villages and tribes; for the latter though frequent are not very sanguinary, the parties being ensconced behind rocks, or in towers, exchanging long shots, and making a vast display, but continuing sometimes for two or three days before a man is killed, when the contest frequently ends. Of course there are exceptions to this, when strong provocation leads to more bitter animosity, and the parties close in earnest; but it requires a great deal to draw the Afridi from his more cautious style of warfare.

The villages of those tribes, which are permanently located in the hills bordering on Peshawur, are substantially built, and contain two or more towers. These are square, and consist, for a height of eight or ten feet, of solid masses of earth and stone, upon the top of which is a room calculated to hold a dozen men, with one low doorway, and loop-holed on all sides. A rope is slung from the door frame, by help of which the Afridi scrambles up the wall, placing his feet in the crevices between the stones. Most of them have a parapet above the roof,

also loop-holed, reached by a ladder from inside, where the watch is placed in times of danger. These towers are secure against assault and musketry, and the mulliks of villages usually occupy them when driven to extremities, or surrounded by many of their inimical relations. I have known men maintain this kind of defence for months together.

Besides these towers the villages are further protected by "Sungurs," or stone entrenchments on the hill sides around them, every path of which is known to the men: they are placed partly to command the approaches, but chiefly to cover a line of retreat into the hills when driven before an enemy, whom they are thus enabled to hold in check, until the cattle and women have gained a place of safety in some fastness beyond.

The tribes, which occupy these hills only during the winter months, have no villages, but dwell in caves, dug out of the mountain sides, in spots near to water and pasturage, which are by nature defensible positions; the neighbouring peaks being occupied by watchers in time of war, whilst the crags and hollows, familiar to these active mountaineers, form at every hundred yards natural barriers to a pursuing enemy.

Having thus described the Afridis with reference to such features of their characters as admit of general application, I will add a few brief remarks regarding each division.

The first of these are the "Adam Khail" who occupy the range which separates Kohat from Peshawur, from the Khuttuk boundary to the Kohat Pass. They number about 3,600 matchlock-men, but have lost those ties of affinity which at one time bound their clans together. The Kohat Pass leads through the western extremity of their border, and is situated in the lands of the Gulla Khail, with the exception of the village of Akhor, which belongs to the Hussan Khail branch. There is a second pass to the east called the Jowakih, which, after passing through the lands of the Hussan Khail by Koree and Boree, enters those of the Jowakih clan. The Adam Khail are permanent residents in the above localities and their villages are substantial, strengthened by towers and situated for the most part in defensible positions. These villages were assigned by the Sikhs to Jageerdars and Arbabs in order to avoid coming into immediate contact with the hill men, whose payment of revenue was uncertain and precarious, and with whom the Jageerdars were forced to maintain a good understanding. The times of sowing and of harvest are periods of strife and commotion. Every member of the tribe is on the alert; the ploughman is seen with a matchlock slung across his back, and a sword by his side; whilst day and night the watchman overlooks the crop, that no enemy may lurk amongst the corn. The tribe acknowledges no dependence upon

either Kabul or Peshawur, and in former days Boree and Janakhor maintained those bands of robbers which infested the Attok road.

Next to the Adam Khail are the Aka Khail, who number about 1,500 matchlock-men. The chief division is that of the Busee Khail, by which name the whole tribe is usually denominated by Europeans, since the Buddabair outrage of 1855. The Settlements of the Aka Khail are in the low range of hills, extending from the Kohat Pass to the Bara river. They are a nomad tribe, and come down to these hills in the cold weather, when the approach of snow obliges them to bring their cattle for pasturage here; removing with their flocks and herds, in the summer, to the mountains north of Teerah, where they have both villages and cultivation. In their lower settlements they live in caves, and gain a subsistence by the sale of firewood at Peshawur, the sole produce of their stony mountains. Their cattle at this season graze in the plain which skirts the Momund tuppah, but they have no cultivation. Their feuds with neighbouring tribes are constant and fierce, and when their cattle is out on the plain, they are obliged to employ scouts placed on distant peaks, or hid in the branches of a few trees, which are to be met with here and there, and mark the position of the tanks used for watering.

To the west of the Aka Khail lies the extensive and fertile country of Teerah, bounded

to the north by the mountains of Soofaid Koh, and to the south by a lofty range running parallel to the former. Both mountains and plain are occupied by the Orukzai, a large tribe numbering 30,000 men. They have little to do with Peshawur, and have in later years lost much of the influence they once possessed over all the neighbouring tribes, by whom they are now held in but little account. To the north of Teerah, amidst the spurs and slopes of the Soofaid Koh, are the districts of Bara and Maidan, situated at the sources of the Bara river, where the Aka Khail and other migratory Afridi tribes have their summer residences.

Returning to our immediate neighbours, the hills north of the Bara river form a district called Kajooree, the occupation of which is shared by the Mullik Deen Khail, the Kumbar Khail, the Sipahs, and the Kummurai. These also are all migratory, descending to Kajooree only in the winter, and living like the Aka Khail in caves. They own a kind of allegiance to the Amir of Kabul, from whom they receive an annual allowance.

The Mullik Deen Khail is, perhaps, at present the most important of the Afridi tribes; its lower settlements are not confined to the Kajooree lands, which are but a small portion of them, but they extend to the Khyber, in the politics of which they hold the chief place. The tribe numbers 3,500, and is divided

into three principal clans, the "Daolut Khail," to which the khanship belongs; the "Oomur Khan Khail," to which the "Serishtah" appertains, and the "Kurnah Khail." Their chief settlements below are Oochaghwurai and Choora, near the mouth of the Khyber Pass. Their present allowance from Kabul is Rupees 9,000: it is received by the Khan, who gives presents to the "Mishurs" or elders according to a fixed scale. The tribe is well disposed, and not much addicted to thieving. There is no instance of a raid having been committed by them in our territories; they have furnished us too with many faithful and good soldiers both in times of difficulty and since annexation.

The Kumbur Khail have a share in Kajooree, but were dispossessed by the Mullik Deen Khail, who occupied their lands, for siding with the Kookee Khail, in a feud arising out of the occupation of Gagree and Jamrood by the latter. These had agreed to give a share of the crops to the Mullik Deen Khail, but their numbers increasing, and aid being obtained from the Khuleels, they refused to adhere to their promise. The feud has lasted for nine years, and is now wearing out; but that with the Kumbur Khail continues, and in the last two years they are said to have lost a hundred men on either side. Since their ejectment from Kajooree, they have been obliged to take up their winter quarters with the Kookee Khail. They number

about 3,000, and live in the summer at Kaoo and Shoolubur, north of Teerah, and have three gurhies in the Bara district. Their allowance from Kabul is Rupees 1,300.

The "Kummarai" tribe holds the remainder of Kajooree for its winter quarters. It numbers only 800 matchlock-men, and receives an allowance of 500 rupees from the Kabul Government, which is divided amongst the tribe. Their summer quarters are on the spurs of Soofaid Koh, and they possess, in a greater degree than the other tribes, the hardy qualities of mountaineers: they are good cultivators and sportsmen; have extensive herds of cattle, and are less addicted to plunder than any of their neighbours.

In no instance are the wild and lawless habits of the Afridi race so fully illustrated as in the "Zakha Khail." Their upper settlements are in the Maidan and Bara district, and their winter quarters adjoin those of the "Mullik Deen Khail." They occupy the hills at the south entrance of the Khyber, and their principal village is that of Bazar, where the greater portion of their cattle is kept; cultivating but little, despising the trade in firewood, which is the chief means of subsistence in the winter to most of the other tribes, they depend wholly upon plunder.

The Kookee Khail is a large tribe, numbering 5,900 men, and occupy an important position

and influence in the politics of the Khyber, which they occupy as far as Ally Musjid, their settlements extending north of the Pass, and bordering on our Khuleel Tuppah. Jubba, Gagrai, and Kuddum are their villages at the mouth of the Khyber, and celebrated places of refuge for criminals. The tribe is more noted as affording an asylum to such criminals, than for any direct acts of aggression: they are the principal traders in firewood, and we have consequently a ready means of bringing them to submission, when necessary, by debarring them from intercourse with Peshawur.

The Kookee Khail have possessions at Rajghur, a Pass near the source of the Bara, where they appear to be prosperous, and to cultivate extensively. Their allowance from Kabul is 4,000 Rupees.

It may be well to recapitulate here the Kabul allowances, or "Mowajib," received by the tribes in the vicinity of the Khyber, with whom we are occasionally brought into contact. The present grants are as follows:

Mullik Deen Khail	....	Rs.	9,000
Kookee Khail	....	,,	4,000
Zakha Khail	....	,,	4,000
Sipah	....	,,	4,000
Kumbur Khail	....	,,	1,300
Kummurai	....	,,	500
Shahbaz Orukzai	....	,,	100
Total		Rs.	22,900

Our hill neighbours from the Kookee Khail to the Kabul river are the "Moolagorees," a small and comparatively quiet tribe, who seldom commit aggressions in our territory.

West of the Moolagorees is the large tribe of Shinoarees. They number 12,000 men. The mass of the tribe is inoffensive, and they are great carriers, own numerous camels and trade largely with Peshawur: their possessions extend to the Sofaid Koh.

We now arrive at the upper Momunds, whose hills border upon our territory from the Kabul to the Swat river. Their possessions lie between the former and the countries of Koonur and Bajour to the north, and extend to the Jelalabad district to the west.

The Momunds number about 17,000 men, and are divided into six clans; of these the "Turukzai" is the chief, as containing the hereditary khanship; the Michnie and Pindialee divisions are also of this clan, which is therefore the most frequently brought into contact with us. The "Morcha Khail," Saadut Khan's branch, reside at Lalpoora, but a few of them have long been settled in the Michnie villages. The "Alumzai" are also an important clan, as they occupy the hills adjoining our district opposite to Shubkuddur, between the Michnie and Pindialee divisions. They are the most powerful branch of the tribe, and their head-quarters are at Gundao: their centrical situation

enables them to exercise great influence, and they are the principal agents for arranging for the transit of merchandise through the Momund hills.

The Baezai is the most numerous of the clans: and its country is the most fertile portion of the district; the people also are more civilised and prosperous than their neighbours.

The three remaining clans are small, and need not be separately noticed.

The Momunds like all other Pathans, whilst clinging to democratic institutions, acknowledge the authority of their hereditary Mulliks of divisions, and the Chief or Khan of the whole tribe; and perhaps this authority is more real amongst the Momunds than is usually found elsewhere: still, however, in matters affecting the tribe they cannot assume independence of action.

Adjoining the country of the Momunds, to the north-west, is situated the district of Koonur. The district is fertile and beautifully wooded, and the inhabitants of the plains are a quiet race of Tajuks, who remain in willing subjection to the ruler of the day: the surrounding hills are occupied by Shinwaries, Safis and Momunds, who acknowledge his supremacy but pay no tribute.

North-east of the Momunds, lying between their territories and Swat, is the district of Bajour, the southern portion of which ap-

proaches, but does not border on, the Peshawur district. The people have a local reputation for manliness, and are more peaceful in their occupations. They can muster from 25 to 30,000 men. The country is fertile, and celebrated for its wheat, which is largely exported. It produces quantities of iron of excellent quality, from which the Peshawur and neighbouring markets are supplied.

I have now briefly alluded to all the tribes in the vicinity of the Peshawur district to the west of the Swat river. The low range of hills bordering the district eastward of that stream, as far as the Ranozai valley, is occupied by a portion of the "Ootman Khail." This tribe is divided into two chief clans, the "Oomur Khail," and the "Assoo Khail." The former possess the range on our frontier, and number about 3,000 men; the "Assoo Khail" dwell further back, on both sides of the Swat river, and number 5,000. They are a wild people, but do not go out of their own borders to plunder, though they are at all times ready to harbour our criminals, and to allow marauders from Swat to pass their lands.

From the Ootman Khail to the Indus our border is a series of irregular valleys, formed by spurs from the higher mountains: these are all within our territories, except the most northerly one of Ranezai, to the north-east of the district, which is independent.

The Ranezai are a branch of the Eusufzai tribe, which settled in Swat and Bonair, and in common with their brethren, own a self-imposed allegiance to the Saiud king they have set up. Their position in the plain affords a convenient rendezvous for the turbulent spirits, who have caused us so much annoyance from the direction of Swat, and a safe route from marauders in their expeditions to and fro.

Separated from our territories by the Ranezai valley, and the rugged range of the Aylum mountains, the valley of Swat stretches far up to the north-east, parallel with that of Bajour to the west. It is watered throughout by the river of that name, and it possesses a rich and fertile soil. Rice is the chief production of its plains, and, being of esteemed quality, is largely exported. The settlement of the Pathans here in the 15th century has been already narrated: they have maintained their independence, but owing probably to their having at once settled down to agricultural pursuits, and the position of their country, which has both secured them from attack, and prevented their taking a part in the wars and expeditions of their brethen in the hills immediately around the Peshawur valley, they have lost the martial character for which they were once celebrated, and are held to be greatly inferior to the Mundun clan.

To the south the next district, which adjoins our territory, is that of Bonair, a valley stretching

from the Aghun mountains to the Indus. The Burundoo stream, rising in the eastern slopes of those mountains, flows through the valley, and falls into the Indus above Sitanah. The tuppahs within the influence of this stream are fertile and well cultivated, but the other portions are dry. The Eusufzai clans settled in Bonair differ in no respects from the other divisions of the tribe: each has its hereditary Khan, who possesses, however, but little influence. The Bonair men in former days were constantly called in by the Mundun clans to take part in their feuds, especially in the Loondkhwur and Sudhoom valleys, but they never crossed over as invaders, merely as mercenaries, who, by throwing themselves into the contest, secured the victory for the faction which paid them for their services. They are said to number 12,000 men, which is probably not too high an estimate. A great many Parachass are settled in Bonair, who trade with our villages by the Mallundray Pass, which is practicable for camels. The original inhabitants were of Goorkha descent; some remained and were converted to Islam; they are known as Boonairwals.

South-east of Bonair is the small valley of Chumla, occupied by a mixture of all the Mundun clans, of whom three-fourths are of the Amazai. It was here that the Munduns left their families during their contest with the Eusufzai, which terminated in the occupation of Swat and

Bonair by the latter, and of the plains in the Peshawur valley by the former. Individual families of different clans continued to reside there, whose descendants have since retained the district, and now number about 4,000 men.

In the hills south of Chumla are the Khoodo Khail of Punjtar, a branch of the Dorozai clan of Mundun, settled in our districts upon the Indus.

The corner, between Punjtar and the Indus, is occupied by the Jadoons, who live on the slopes and spurs of the Mahabun range; they are a quiet, orderly race, independent, but living on friendly terms with their neighbours. The chief portion, perhaps, of this tribe is settled in the Hazara district, where they have long been amenable to government.

Having thus briefly noticed all our neighbours, a few words must be added regarding the tribes whom we found in occupation of the valley at annexation.

These may be conveniently classed into two divisions; 1st, the residents of Eusufzai and Hushtnuggur; and, 2nd, those of the Doaba and districts south of the Kabul river.

The former more nearly resembled the independent tribes in the hills, especially those on the Eusufzai border, with whom they were, indeed, closely connected.

In them we have a fair specimen of civilised Pathans. I cannot think of a people to whom

they may better be compared than to the Canaanitish states in the patriarchal times. Like them they were divided into a number of small independent communities, consisting of a chief town (the original settlement), with a surrounding district and dependent villages; the latter put out either as population increased, or as distant fields were brought under cultivation. These are called "Bandahs," and in Eusufzai have retained their position as subordinate hamlets. In other places they have gradually acquired a separate importance as independent villages. The chief men of these communities were their Mulliks or Khans, who are simply patriarchal Chiefs with limited powers; who appear to have been nothing more than leaders in war, and agents for the clan in their transactions with their neighbours. The real power rested in the body of the adult male population, especially in the elder portion of it. The share of the Khan in the hereditary possessions of the community was not larger than that of his brethren, nor his privileges greater than to secure for him the semblance of a rude chiefship.

Such appears to have been the exact condition of the Canaanitish states in Abraham's time, though we are apt to attach more importance to them from the circumstance of their Mulliks being known to us as "Kings," the literal translation of the term. Instances are numerous of their affairs being thus settled, and determined

by the community at large, and not by the will of individuals. Thus the sons of Jacob proposing the conditions of an alliance with Hamor, Mullik of Shechem, they were well received by the latter, but he would give no final answer until he had communed with the men of the city in the gate (Genesis xxxiv). So likewise Abraham, in transacting about a transfer of land, deals not with the King of the Hittites, but "bowed himself to the children of Heth." (Genesis xxiii.) Throughout the sacred narrative the dealings of the patriarchs with the Canaanitish princes and people, are but as the simple occurrences of every-day life amongst the Pathan communities of Eusufzai.

And in this place I would notice a custom which prevails here, and which may be connected with the national tradition of their Israelitish descent; it is similar to the law of the scapegoat (Num. xvi). In times of severe pestilence, when the visitation is looked upon as a Divine judgment for the sins of the people, a goat or calf is taken and brought before a solemn assembly, where the chief Moolahs lay their hands upon its head, and turn it loose in the desert, thus typifying the sending away of those sins for which they believed themselves to be suffering.

In the second division of the district (south of the Kabul river) much of this independence had been lost by the assistance afforded to the chief men by Government, in reducing their

clans-men to a subordinate position: they had not, indeed, lost the peculiar characteristics of Afghan communities, but these had become fainter; and the will of the chief in many cases superseded that of the brotherhood. The chief men of these districts were styled "Arbabs," and they were in the enjoyment of large estates and allowances, usually farming the revenues of their districts, and marshalling their clansmen at the bidding of the local ruler. Subordinate to them were the Mulliks of villages, or rather of families; for each family sent its representative Mullik to the village council. The general mass of the population was agricultural; but there has always been a tendency amongst the younger portion to seek military service for a time, returning to their homes when they have amassed sufficient means to reclaim their ancestral fields.

The hospitality for which Afghans are notorious is carried to such extremes as to cripple their means of paying the revenue. An unlimited supply of beds, blankets and food is the mark of a true Afghan Mullik; one who resorts to economical arrangements in his household is lightly esteemed, however excellent his character may be in other respects: so also is the Mullik who keeps food of two qualities, the superior for his own use, the inferior for that of his guests.

In every parish, or "Kundee," of a village

is a place of public resort called the "hoojra," which is sometimes the property of individual Mulliks, but more frequently of the parish. There the male population meets in the evening to discuss affairs; here, too, guests are received and entertained; loose characters of the village more frequently passing the whole night at the hoojra than in their own houses.

The villages have for the most part an air of great comfort; the court yards being large, with, in most instances, a patch of vegetables or a clump of mulberries in the enclosure: the mosques and hoojras are chiefly in the outskirts, with wells and groves in the vicinity. In most villages there is a good supply of running water, which not only encourages plantations of this kind, but saves the female portion of the community the labour of "grinding," as water mills are universal, and hand mills unknown.

In most villages there exist indications of a former state of society in small mud forts or towers, similar to those of the hill villages, before described; places of refuge in days gone by, when one parish was pitted against another in deadly feud, or when the whole village had to watch against the advent of a neighbouring clan, or of Sikh officials. Many of these have disappeared, or been converted into cattle sheds and ordinary domiciles.

The knowledge of the tribes in the plain is little more than that possessed by their brethren

in the hills; their bigotry and superstition as great. Everywhere Moolahs, Sheikhs and Saiuds are objects of reverence, whose temporary wants are freely attended to. Moolahs of note attract to their mosques a number of wandering adventurers from other countries, known as "talib-ilm," or seekers after learning; but who are most frequently idle vagabonds, ready to join in any piece of mischief which comes in their way; and sometimes the regularly employed spies of robbers and dacoits.

The Afghans are a joyous people, and the wealthier classes much addicted to field sports, chiefly hawking. Festive gatherings are frequent, either at the shrines of popular saints or at centrical places where such meetings are held periodically, and where people seem to come together, not to buy and sell, or even to quarrel, but simply to make a noise and be happy. Tilting, shooting at a mark, racing and wild music relieve the monotony; whilst the boisterous groups of children and young lads to be seen at these fairs, as well as in the villages, are a sure indication that this happiness is not merely a holiday garb, but attends the Afghan in his home, be he peasant or noble.

Below the Wazeeree limits, a little south of the Gumul river, are the Sheorani hills, stretching from the latitude of Dera Ismail Khan downwards to nearly the latitude of Dehra Futteh Khan, a distance of fifty miles. In these

hills is the lofty square-shaped mountain called "Solomon's Throne" (Tukht-i-Suliman), which gives its name to the Sulimani range, running parallel for 300 miles to the Indus and forming our western frontier. At the base of this mountain runs the important Zerkunni Pass, the high road for caravans to and from Kandahar. The Sheoranis are of Pathan lineage; of inferior stature to the Wazeerees; they are warlike and predatory, and quite independent. The number of their fighting men has been set down at 10,000, but this is found to be high. They can muster 1,000 men within a day's notice; in the course of three or four days they will muster 3,000 more. They adjoin the British tracts of Tak (partially) in the north, then Kolachi, then Durrabund, and lastly, Chondwan, all in the Dera Ismail Khan district, and forming the border plains of the Upper Derajat.

The independent and dependent tribes having been thus described in detail, it may be well to give a summary of their respective forces:—

The numbers of fighting men of the independent tribes may be thus estimated:—

	Fighting men
Tribes on Hazara frontier and near the Indus, north of Peshawur	8,000
Swat and its dependencies	20,000
Momunds	12,000
Afridis	20,000

	Fighting men
Orakzais and other tribes on the Kohat frontier	30,000
Waziris	20,000
Sheoranis and others in Dera Ismail Khan district	5,000
Beloch tribes on Dera Ghazi Khan border	20,000
Total	135,000

Besides the above, there are other warlike tribes within British territory, with the following numbers of fighting men :—

	Fighting men
Turnoulis (including Jehandads)	8,000
Other tribes of Hazara	10,000
Eusufzai	25,000
Khuttuks	12,000
Bungushes	15,000
Derajat tribes in British territory	10,000
Total	80,000

THE PATHANS AS SOLDIERS.

In physique, in animal courage and in natural intelligence, the Pathan is second to no class or race that serves in the ranks of the Native Armies of India.

A good specimen of an Afridi, fresh from his mountain wilds, may be called a savage, but he is a splendid one.

Deep-chested, strong limbed and wiry; inured to extremes of both heat and cold; accustomed to the poorest fare; a stranger to drink and drugs, and the vices of cities and civilization; his only inheritance a matchlock and a blood feud; at peace with his own clan only to join in its raids on another; he is a man of war from his youth upwards, and enters our service naked and hungry, but with little to learn as a Light Infantry soldier.

It is said that he is faithless. The charge may be admitted against the Afghans as a nation; every tribe or section of which has conflicting interests, and is ready for its own advantage to betray a neighbour or to repudiate a treaty, but the Pathan as a soldier in our own ranks cannot justly be called faithless.

In regiments where they muster strong, are represented by their own Native officers and non-commissioned officers, and are properly commanded and treated, they have been seldom known to fail in their duty, even under the most trying circumstances. During the Umbeyla campaign when (to quote the words of Sir Neville Chamberlain,) we were opposed to a general combination of almost all the tribes, from the Indus to the boundaries of Kabul, who fought under the most powerful of influences,

the spirit of religious fanaticism, fanned and excited by the Akhoond of Swat, the regiments that were most frequently engaged and suffered most severely were those in which the Pathan element preponderated, and at the termination of hostilities it was recorded in the despatches of the same distinguished officer, that though the ranks of the Native corps contained members of almost every tribe on the Frontier, there had been no desertions and no backwardness in any one instance to engage the enemy. With the exception of his objection to the unclean animal, the Pathan has scarcely a prejudice of any kind, social or religious, that can interfere with his value as a soldier. He is constitutionally light-hearted and hopeful, and readily adapts himself to whatever circumstances he may be placed in. He is perfectly happy on board ship, and his love of adventure, when once he has got over his love of home, impels him to respond gladly to a call to foreign service.

Of all the tribes that have been enumerated, those that seek service in our ranks in the largest numbers, are the Afridis, the Khuttuks and the Eusufzais.

C. H. Brownlow.

REMARKS

On Von Scherff's System of Infantry attack as applicable to British Troops.

VON SCHERFF has so completely exhausted the subject of the New Tactics of Infantry and the formations of attack best suited to the armaments and requirements of the day, and his arguments as to general principles are so convincing that we may take them for granted and confine ourselves to the enquiry whether the details of his system are adapted to the British Army, and how far.

His method of direct frontal attack on a position defended by breech loaders, as exemplified by the movements of one Battalion acting with others on either side of it, and as practised at the Roorkee and Rawal Pindi Camps of Exercise, consists:

1. In the extension, to begin with, of one fourth as skirmishers, covering the exact front of the Battalion when deployed and no more. The employment of another fourth as supports, and the remaining half as reserve.

2. The advance of the fighting line (on coming under Infantry fire, or within 1000 yards of the enemy) by alternate rushes of companies

or half companies direct to the front, and as a rule or a consequence regardless of cover.

3. The skirmishing line having been reinforced, first by the supports and again if necessary by the reserve, a final charge of the whole Battalion.

The distinguishing features of this mode of attack are, a narrow front, allowing only 24 inches interval between skirmishers in the initial stage, and directness of advance, any delay or deviation from the perpendicular line for the sake of cover being impossible and indeed contrary to its spirit and intentions.

It is sufficiently simple, and any well drilled Battalion should be able to carry it out after a few days' practice, but it is designed for such exceptional circumstances, that considering the British Soldier has to fight in every quarter of the globe, it would be vain to adopt it as anything like a normal formation of attack. It wants flexibility, and, by crowding the skirmishers too much, not only checks their free and rapid movement in conformity with the ground, but hinders the full effect of their preparatory fire, and exposes them to unnecessary loss.

Von Scherff, as interpreted at the Roorkee and Rawal Pindi Camps of Exercise, gives 24 inches interval between individual skirmishers in the opening stage of the attack, this corresponds in the language of our drill book to an

extension of $2\frac{2}{3}$ paces, and the fourth of a Battalion thus extended, exactly covers its original front when deployed.

To cover the front of a Battalion and a half as I advocate would require an extension of exactly 4 paces (provided always that two companies out of eight, or one-fourth of the whole, were so extended), this would give 48 inches between individuals when the skirmishers first moved out; when joined by the supports the intervals would be reduced to 12 inches, and when finally re-inforced by the reserve, there would be, for the final effort, after deducting five and twenty per cent. for casualties, a rank entire shoulder to shoulder, either to advance, maintaining its fire to the last, or to concentrate for a charge on any weak point of the enemy's position.

Such an attack need not fail for want of fire power. If the moral force of numbers or its striking power was not sufficient to bring it to a successful conclusion, a fresh Battalion would have to decide the issue.

This would entail an intermixture of Battalions, an evil certainly, but an evil we must make up our minds to, and a lesser evil surely than the entanglement of more Battalions in the fighting line in the first instance than absolutely necessary.

A Brigade of three Battalions in order of attack, with two Battalions side by side extended

as I propose, *i.e.*, on a front and a half each, and the third in reserve, would in nine cases out of ten, be better placed than a Brigade with its three Battalions extended according to Scherff and all involved in the fight to the front. If the latter Brigade, still adhering to the narrow formation, kept a Battalion in reserve it would be overlapped by the former. This would apply equally to a Division or Corps d'armée with its Brigades drawn up in the same way.

In the field, a Battalion should I think invariably be divided into four or eight Companies, according to strength, and to insure a certain degree of uniformity in proportions it should be laid down as a general rule, that the skirmishers first extended represent a fourth of the Battalion, the supports another fourth, and the reserve the remaining half.

A Brigade Commander would thus have certain fixed data to work upon. In taking up a position offensive or defensive, having decided whether he would occupy the ground assigned to him with his Battalions at deploying intervals, or intervals and a half, his orders to that effect could at once be conveyed in the authorised words of command, for whatever the strength of the Battalions, provided they were similarly distributed, the front indicated would signify an extension of the same number of paces in each case, a fact which would not hold good if the proportions varied.

The Commander of a Brigade of three Battalions, with two Battalions extended as above, and the third in support, would control a front of 1,000 paces and a depth of about the same.

With regard to the other exceptional feature of Von Scherff's system, *viz.*, the advance of the fighting line (on coming under Infantry fire, or within 1000 yards of the enemy), by alternate rushes of Companies or half Companies direct to the front, and, as a rule or a consequence, without heed to cover, I am of opinion, notwithstanding the high authority against me, that in the confusion and excitement of battle, the alternate advance, *except from cover to cover*, of anything less than Battalions, if extended on their front, or half Battalions, if extended on a front and a half, would be found impracticable. Cover enables the advanced fractions to contract their front and get into groups, thereby more effectually unmasking the fire of those behind them, hence the exception.

Von Scherff himself says, "whoever has been in a position to hear bullets whistling past him from behind, even considerably on one side of him, will confess that such music is even less conducive to forward movement than is the rain of hostile shot coming from the front."

Any doubt in my mind on this point was set at rest by what I saw during the recent musketry experiments with ball cartridge at Rawal Pindi,

when the fractional mode of advancing and firing was attempted on a dead plain, and, in spite of accurate dressing and plenty of room (an extension of 6 paces, instead of $2\frac{2}{5}$, as required by Von Scherff), was not carried out to the end, for the reason that it was dangerous.

In all other respects, our own skirmishing drill differs very little in principle or practice from Von Scherff's, and the Field Exercise book of 1874 gives a wise latitude on all questions which can only be decided by the nature of the ground operated on, such as the formations in which the supports and reserves should follow the advanced body, and the distances to be maintained between them.

Von Scherff lays no stress on the necessity of any particular mode of sending out and supporting the skirmishing line, with a view to obviating the intermixture of Companies at the second and third stages of the attack, and I think our various methods of getting into extended order from line and column are so simple and so well suited to our regimental organisation, that it would be useless to disturb them. In theory it is preferable to send out one half Battalion under its Major as skirmishers and supports, keeping the other half Battalion intact as a reserve till the last moment; but in practice this is often inconvenient, and it would be mischievous to make it a *sine qua non.*

The foregoing remarks do not aim at any-

thing new; their intention is rather to show that little change is needed in our light drill, beyond the determination of certain fixed rules to insure the same degree of extension, and uniform proportions between front and depth, throughout the several Battalions of a Brigade or Division when working together.

In conclusion, I would remark that our first object should be to develope the intelligence and self-reliance, consequently the individual fighting power, of the British soldier. Good as he is, he is still the product of the Sergeant-Major rather than the Officer.

CHAS. H. BROWNLOW,
Brigadier General.

RAWAL PINDI,
April, 1875.

APPENDIX A.

"THE SCINDE AND PUNJAB FRONTIERS."

In a memorandum dated 22nd March, 1876, Sir Bartle Frere compares the Scinde and Punjab Frontier Systems. His conclusions are based on the assumption that there is no considerable difference in the physical features of the two lines of Frontier, or in the fighting qualities of the tribes which the Scinde and Punjab officials have to deal with on their respective borders. As the whole question depends upon the correctness of these assumptions, and of certain facts put forward by Sir Bartle Frere in support of his views, which are clearly unfavourable to the Punjab system, I will extract and endeavour to reply to the statements and inferences in his paper which I conceive to be incorrect, or of doubtful value as the foundation of any opinion on the subject.

Extract from SIR B. FRERE'S *Memorandum.*	*Replies.*
1. "Away from the Passes there is not so much difference as is generally supposed in the obstacles which the hills (opposite the Scinde and Punjab Frontiers) present to invasion or military occupation."	1 & 2. These are two important questions which military critics would decide very differently to Sir Bartle Frere. A reference to maps and to the records of our hostile operations on the two Frontiers will, I

2. "There is considerable difference in appearance and character, the Northern, or Afghan, and Pathan tribes being the handsomer and more intelligent race, but as fighting men the Beloochees have never shown any inferiority to their neighbours."

3. "In Scinde it was a cardinal rule to regard the Khán of Khelat as our independent ally."

4. "The Punjab policy was to deal separately with each tribe and to avoid recognising the authority of the Ameer of Cabul."

5. "The principle laid down for our dealings with the Frontier tribes in Scinde was, to be actively good neighbours to them, 'to do as we would be done by.' Active interference by using our troops was only permitted in case of overt acts of outrage by armed men. In all such cases our troops acted at once as against a civilised enemy in the field, *pursued and attacked without reference to border*."

6. "The principles laid down for the dealings of our officers in the Punjab with the tribes over the border were—

"'Absolute non-interference,' 'masterly inactivity,' and 'budi for budi,' or evil for evil if our neighbours injured us, otherwise abstention from all interference. On no account were our troops to cross the border without express instructions from Government."

7. "In Scinde, the ordinary rules of war in civilised countries were ordered to be strictly observed. Armed men resisting

think, convince anyone (except at Jacobábád) that the Afridis, the Wuziris, the Mohmands, and the Boonerwal are each as much more formidable an enemy than the Beloochees, as the high and rugged mountain ranges of the Punjab Frontier are more difficult of invasion than the little hills on the Scinde border.

3 & 4. The Khán of Khelat exercises some show of authority over a comparatively quiet people. The Ameer of Cabul has no more influence than we have over the warlike and turbulent tribes of the Punjab border whom we deal with through their respective "Jirgahs" whenever necessary to call them to account.

5. The disposition of their Beloochi neighbours and not the superior wisdom of the Scinde officials rendered practicable and successful the excellent principles here laid down. In like manner the open country and the absence of sufficient obstacles, not the greater enterprise of the troops, permitted of the rule that hostile parties were to be "pursued and attacked without reference to border."

6. With the exception of the Afridis, the tribes on the Punjab border are the jealous guardians of mountains and passes which lead to nowhere. We can neither derive nor confer any benefit by meddling with them. We may some day find them of use if we leave them alone now. Under such circumstances "absolute non-interference," so long as they do not injure us, is surely our best policy. In case of a border raid, pursuit is limited to the foot of the hills. An officer who committed himself by entering a defile in possession of the enemy would have much to answer for, but the rules and precautions of war would be his only "express instructions" to the contrary.

7 & 8. In Scinde, when hostilities were forced upon us, "the object aimed at was the individual punishment of the evil-doer, not the

were to be attacked and defeated, made prisoners, or slain. Unresisting or unarmed men were everywhere to be spared and protected. No plunder was permitted, no wanton destruction of houses, trees, crops, or other property was allowed. The object aimed at was the individual punishment of the evil-doers, not the punishment of his tribe or family. Punishment of the culprit's clansmen with a view by coercing the innocent to reach the guilty was not allowed."

8. "In the Punjab the great object of an expedition seemed to be to strike terror into the enemy. Prisoners were rarely made, and quarter rarely given to armed men. Houses, trees, crops, etc., were destroyed. Tribal punishment was the object by whatever loss or suffering that could be inflicted. With a view to bring tribal pressure on the culprit his whole tribe might be blockaded."

9. "We deal with Khelat as far as possible as we would with Belgium or Switzerland."

10. "In the Punjab we deal with the tribes beyond our Frontier as the French would with the tribes beyond their border in Algeria, as powers outside the pale of civilised diplomacy."

11. "Would our position at Peshawar or anywhere else on the Punjab Frontier be less strong if, instead of the present multitude of independent departments and commands, there were only one chief as Military Commandant punishment of his tribe or family." The horrors of war were unnecessary! Mr. Bright himself might command the troops in Scinde. In the Punjab the political officer in charge of our relations with any tribe has to show a long list of individual evil-doers, and his bill of indictment against it as a body is a heavy one before an expedition is sanctioned, but when it sets out, the object is unquestionably "to strike terror into the enemy." The universal habit of the Pathan tribes when they have made up their minds to fight is to remove their women and children and cattle to a distance far beyond our reach. They are well-armed, fine marksmen, and fond of fighting. Their tactics are to contest our advance as long as they can, in safety. Under cover of breastworks and aided by the naturally strong features of their country they inflict much more loss than they suffer. As we retire they advance, and are most formidable in their pursuit. Their houses and crops are really their only vulnerable point. If they submit these are spared. If they continue to resist they are destroyed. I have served in the Punjab for five-and-twenty years, and taken part in ten expeditions on its frontier, of more or less importance. I declare that I never saw quarter refused or an unresisting or wounded enemy treated otherwise than with the greatest consideration by our troops.

9, 10 & 11. Our relations with Jummoo and elsewhere prove that the Punjab officials are just as capable as those of Scinde to deal with a neighbouring power as we would with "Belgium or Switzerland." The independent and disunited Pathan tribes are certainly not within "the pale of civilised diplomacy" and are dealt with according to a system which has been built up during the last quarter of a century by a succession of distinguished men whowere not wanting in humanity, originality, or the capacity and

and Viceroy's Agent, or if he had authority to deal with the Amir and the Frontier tribes so as to establish the best possible neighbourly relations with them, helping them if they wanted help, punishing them severely if they insulted, annoyed, or thwarted us, and using for the purpose whatever force might be necessary to convince rude and arrogant men that we were far stronger than they were. I cannot but think that any of our great Frontier Commanders would feel his hands much strengthened if he were told that he had the confidence of Government, and that between the Indus and the mountains he was supreme."

courage to do and devise what was best under the circumstances. An able and ambitious soldier with the powers of a "Military Commandant and Viceroy's Agent" supreme between the Indus and the mountains, might achieve great things, but he might also do more harm than good in his pursuit of "neighbourly relations" with "rude and arrogant men."

C. H. BROWNLOW,

Br. General.

RAWAL PINDI,

1876.

APPENDIX B.

THE KOHAT PASS.

A MILITARY road through the Pass, available at all times as a means of lateral communication, between Peshawar and Kohat, is such an obvious desideratum that it may well appear preposterous to Lord Lytton that we should have gone on for so many years without securing it. Sir Charles Napier and Sir Colin Campbell (Lord Clyde) found themselves confronted with the problem in 1851, and marched into the Pass to solve it. How they came out again is a matter of history, and I am not aware that the experience they gained (at some cost) led to any proposition or scheme for a cheap and permanent remedy for the anomalous position in which the geographical configuration of the country and the affection of the Afridis for their barren rocks have placed us.

Since Sir Charles Napier's time we have certainly made great progress in military science and in our armaments; but I am afraid that our Pundits of the Staff College, and even our breech loaders have not brought us much nearer to the settlement of this question.

Mountain warfare is still a scrambling,

uncertain business, in which science does not avail much against an enemy like the Afridis, fighting in a confused jumble of hills and glens, offering a succession of defensive positions in every direction, and an amount of cover which, with all our discipline, and all our arms, places us on little better than equal terms with an adversary whose individual fighting power on such ground is so much better than ours.

Our choice lies between the *status quo* with its much derided system of fines, hostages, blockades, and purely punitive expeditions, or an Afridi War. I see no middle course open to us. The attempt to build a series of forts in the Pass must inevitably involve us in a war, and if we have counted the cost and made up our minds that the object in view is worth it, I should advocate our striking at the heart of the enemy, by operating up the comparatively open valley of the Bara river, and dictating terms to the whole Afridi tribe in Tirah, rather than fighting them in a cramped and tortuous defile, which from my recollection of it, affords no sites for intrenched positions or forts that would not either be commanded by neighbouring hills, or if perched on those hills be without water and every other convenience for such posts.

Even assuming that the forts have been constructed and garrisoned as proposed, would they really give us the command of the Pass, so long as the Afridis were unsubdued as a tribe?

I think not, and I fear that our forts would be in a state of chronic siege, much more damaging to our prestige than the unsatisfactory state of affairs to which we are now liable, when the tribes are obstructive.

C. H. BROWNLOW,

B. General.

12 *February*, 1877.

APPENDIX C.

EXTRACTS.

FROM Chapter V. of "Lord Lytton's Indian Administration."

"'WHEN I came to India I found that our officials on the Punjab frontier were profoundly ignorant of the geography of the country five miles beyond their border. No map of it existed. Within our border, raids were constantly perpetrated with perfect impunity by the same tribes. The raiders, though a mere handful of men, invariably found our frontier authorities totally unprepared for their visitations and invariably escaped unharmed, after cutting the throats, and plundering the property, of the Queen's subjects. . .'"

"In the autumn of this year (1877) the Viceroy authorised a small expedition against the Jowaki tribes, who had perpetrated incessant raids upon the Peshawar border. In carrying out a punitive expedition against them, he insisted as far as possible, on the principles which he had laid down."

"His difficulties were great owing to the multiplicity of authorities with whom he had to deal, and the first expedition was a failure. The

Viceroy had explicitly urged a 'night surprise.' Nevertheless it was carried out in broad daylight.

"'The tribes were thus made aware in good time of all that our authorities flattered themselves they were keeping secret; the expedition was ludicrously ineffectual, and has of course done more harm than good.'

"In despair of otherwise coming to a satisfactory understanding with the frontier authorities, the Viceroy sent his military secretary, Colonel Colley, unofficially to Peshawar to ascertain the real facts of the situation there and to assist the Viceroy in arriving at some practical decision on the various proposals which had been submitted to him. The principles which were laid down at this conference of officers were as follows:

"'1st. To avoid as far as possible operations necessitating the ultimate retirement of the British troops under pursuit and fire of the enemy.

"'2nd. To hold all positions once taken until the absolute submission of the tribe has been secured.

"'3rd. To make the loss and suffering fall as heavily as possible on the enemy's fighting men, and as lightly as possible on the non-combatants.'"

"Under the new system advocated by the Viceroy, operations were begun against the

Jowaki tribes under General Keyes, who advanced into their country on November 9, with a force about 2,000 strong. Pains were taken to isolate this tribe, which had caused the disturbances, from the surrounding and neighbour tribes, thus reducing the strength of the enemy to be quelled to some 1,200 or 1,500 men. This was successfully accomplished."

"On November 23 the Viceroy wrote to Lord Salisbury: 'I have made every effort to keep the present operations (which in some form or other were absolutely unavoidable) within the narrowest possible bounds; first, by confining them to the Jowakis and taking every security for the isolation of that tribe before we attacked it; secondly, by rejecting every plan of operations which was not so devised as to enable us to employ the minimum of force with the maximum of effect; and thirdly, by steadily resisting the pressure put upon me by the Punjab authorities, both civil and military, as well as by the Commander-in-Chief, for permission to employ a force greatly in excess of what is admitted to be necessary for the purposes to which the present expedition is confined.'"

"On December 7 he was able to write as follows: 'Our operations against the Jowakis have thus far been an unprecedented success. Our troops are now masters of nearly the whole Jowaki country. The tribe seems to be quite bewildered and cowed by the new tactics which

I have at last succeeded in getting our frontier authorities to adopt. The Jowakis have shown hardly any fight, but, considering the small amount of fighting there has been, the losses of the enemy have been unusually large and our own unusually small. None of the other tribes have shown the slightest disposition to join the Jowakis.'"

"I anticipate from the success of this Expedition the permanent establishment in India of a whole set of new and better principles of warfare. I do not think it likely that our frontier officers, having once recognised the ease, safety and superior result of the new system will ever again revert to the old one, and I think we have heard the last of the old 'British Raid.' Our frontier authorities write me word that not only has the new system of operations been signally successful against the Jowakis, but that it has also made a profound impression on all the surrounding tribes who now for the first time perceive that War with the British Government may be to them a much more serious matter than it hitherto has been."[1]

Notes on the preceding Extracts.

These inflated sentences need no serious comment. They were the joint production of a Poet and a Professor, equally gifted and equally

[1] Which might have been omitted if the Viceroy had read the "Record of Expeditions against Frontier tribes."

vain, without any practical experience of rule, administration, or mountain warfare.

Within a year of their arrival in India they proceeded to judge, disparage, and condemn with ready pens, the life-work of such men as John Lawrence, Neville Chamberlain, John Nicholson, and many other soldiers and civilians of good repute on the Punjab Frontier.

Lord Lytton wound up his verdict with the announcement:

"I anticipate from the success of this expedition (against the Jowakis) the permanent establishment in India of a whole set of new and better principles of warfare."

The Jowaki Afridis inhabit a small wedge of mountainous country, between the Kohat Pass and the general direction of Nowshera and Attock. Two-thirds of their border is conterminous with British territory, but the Pass Afridis link them up with the rest of the Afridi tribe, and Tirah, which has always increased the difficulty of isolating and punishing them.

Lord Lytton and his talented Military Secretary discovered no "new system" and the "whole set of new and better principles of warfare," which they claimed to have carried out, in opposition to the Punjab authorities, "as well as the Commander-in-Chief in India," probably obstructed and delayed the Campaign of 1877.

When once the means of "taking every security for the isolation" of the tribe, had been

placed at the disposal of Sir Charles Keyes and Sir Richard Pollock, academic instruction in a business of which they were both masters in their respective lines, could only have amused them.

C. H. B.

1909.

APPENDIX D.

MOWLADAD KHAN.—AFRIDI.

MOWLADAD enlisted in the 1st Punjab Infantry on 16th January, 1853; was promoted to "Naick" on 1st April, 1856, and to Havildar on 1st December, 1857; and the following character of him was given by General Coke, C.B.: "This man was promoted to Naick for recapturing in the Khyber Pass two rifles which had been stolen in the Regiment. In all the different engagements, he has shown himself a bold resolute soldier; distinguished himself at the attack on the Metcalfe Garden 23rd July, 1857; at Ludlow Castle 12th August; at the capture of the guns, and on the 25th August in General Nicholson's engagement, after carrying off Lieut. Lumsden's body from the village he returned to the attack and was wounded; joined in the assault on the City on the 14th September, though his wounds were not healed."—Admitted to the 3rd Class Order of Merit by G.O.G.G., No. 19 D/, 25th February, 1858. Promoted to Jemadar 10th October, 1862, present with the Regiment during the Ambeyla Campaign; distinguished himself on every occasion for his gallantry. Admitted to the 2nd Class Order of Merit; he was marked

for promotion in the Regiment, but at the urgent request of Colonel Brownlow he was transferred to the 20th Punjab Infantry in the rank of Subadar. While in the 1st Punjab Infantry, whenever there was anything to be done Mowladad was always to the fore. A bold and gallant soldier he has ever shown himself to be, but he possesses still more valuable qualities. He is a man of fine judgment with perfect knowledge of hill warfare, whose instincts always lead him right, honest and straightforward in his duty, true and loyal in his attachment. In these times when our connection with the Frontier Tribes is daily becoming more and more delicate, I look upon Mowladad as an invaluable servant to Government.

(*Signed*) C. P. KEYES, *Lt.-Colonel*,
Comdg. 1*st Punjab Infantry.*

DERA ISHMAIL KHAN.

22 *October*, 1868.

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